Durham E-Theses

Ideological conflicts and integration in building a Chinese New Village: Confucianism, communism and neoliberalisation

WEI, LAN

Ideological conflicts and integration in building a Chinese New Village:

Confucianism, communism and neoliberalisation

Lan WEI

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Anthropology

University of Durham

2018

Abstract

The Building a Chinese Socialist New Village Programme that intends to narrow the rural-urban gap, improve the rural living conditions and develop the economy of rural China, has been conducted throughout the country since 2006. This thesis is a study of the new rural landscape in a model of 'New Village' in south of China. In this thesis, I set out to answer two key questions: first, how was the 'New Village' built up, from blueprint to funding, project execution and so forth? Second, how does the New Village 'afford' (in Gibson's sense) local life and how do the local people adapt into the New Village? I conducted twelve-months ethnographical fieldwork in Baikou New Village, one of the earliest models of the New Village programme, and found that the conflicts and integration between the three dominant concepts – Confucianism, communism and neoliberalism – provide the key framework in understanding the two questions. Under the framework, the landscape of Baikou New Village will be explained from both the micro view and macro view and embedded in the cultural, historical, economic and political contexts, which may contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the Chinese New Village programme.

Contents

Declaration

The work and contents of this thesis have not been submitted elsewhere for any other degree or qualifications.

Statement of Copyright

Acknowledgements

Glossary

Chinese pinyin	English	Chinese
'*xuanwu chuitou, zhuque xiangwu, qinglong wanyan, baihu xunfu*'	Tortoise lower its head, vermilion phoenix dancing, green dragon wriggling, white tiger bending down	玄武垂头，朱雀翔舞，青龙蜿蜒，白虎驯俯.
aiguo weisheng yundong weiyuan hui	Patriotic Hygiene Campaigns Committee	爱国卫生委员会
banyang	model	榜样
beng xiaokang	strive for the well-to-do life	奔小康
bieshu	villa	别墅
buda buchengcai	No beating, no success	不打不成才
cabianqiu	play the edge ball	擦边球
cai	prosperity	财
Caozhu niangniang	Caozhu goddess	曹主娘娘
chaxu geju	Chinese anthropologist Xiaotong Fei used the term to explain the fundamental structure of Chinese society.	差序格局
chaxu renge	differential personality	差序人格
chuji nongye shengchan hezuoshe	Primary Cooperative of Agricultural Production	初级农业生产合作社
cunmin xiaozu	Village team	村民小组
cunrong cunmao	appearance of the village	村容村貌
dadao	Down with Confucianism	打倒孔家店

kongjiadian		
dadui	brigade	大队
dajia	All the family members	大家
dangjia	family manager	当家
daoli	reason, principle and rule	道理
Datou Shan	Big Head Mountain	大头山
Dibao	Rural Minimum Living Standard Guarantee program	低保
ditan	little square in the village	地坛
dongya bingfu	sick man of east Asia	东亚病夫
duilian	*a couplet written in red paper*	对联
fagao	sticky rice cake	发糕
fajiu	punish somebody to drink, or punish somebody by making them get drunk	罚酒
fangbian	convenient and easy	方便
fen zao	stove division	分灶
fenliao	latrine	粪潦
fenshui zhi	tax-sharing system	分税制
fu	happiness	福
gaige kaifang	Reform and Opening Up	改革开放
gaoji nongye shengchan hezuoshe	Advanced Cooperative of Agricultural Production	高级农业生产合作社
gongde ci	the temple to eulogize the merit and virtues of the ancestor	功德祠
gongfen	work point or work credit	工分
guan yu tudi wenti de zhishi	Directive Concerning the Land Issue	关于土地问题的指示

Guangfu wenhua	Cantonese culture	广府文化
guanxi	social capital	关系
Guowuyuan yishi xietiao jigou	Advisory and Coordinating Organs of the State Council	国务院议事协调机构
hao difang	good place	好地方
hexie shehui	harmonious society	和谐社会
hongbao	money that packed by red envelope as gift	红包
huayuan shi cunzhuang	Garden-style village	花园式村庄
hukou	(urban-rural dual) household registration	户口
huzhu zu	mutual-aid group	互助组
jiahe wanshi xing	harmony brings wealth	家和万事兴
jianzu jianxi	*jianzu jianxi*	减租减息
jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi (dangan/baochan daohu)	Household Contract Responsibility System	家庭联产承包责任制
jiazhang	family head	家长
jiazu zhidu wei zhuanzhizhuyi zhi genju lun	Family system is the foundation of the despotism	家族制度为专制主义之根据
jiedao	street	街道
jikong	worship Confucius	祭孔
jin	1 jin = 0.5 kilograme	斤
jing	smart, sly, stingy	精
jingjiu	propose a toast to somebody	敬酒
jiupin	style of drinking	酒品

juren	gentry	举人
juren	bachelor	举人
juweihui	Community Committee	居委会
juweihui	Residents' Community	居委会
ken bangmang	willing to help	肯帮忙
keting	living room	客厅
kongmiao	Confucian Temple	孔庙
kuangren riji	A madman's diary'	狂人日记
li	reason, principle and rule	理
li	ritual	礼
Liji	Book of Rites	礼记
lishihui	village committee	理事会
longmai	Dragon vein	龙脉
mainzi gongcheng	show-off project	面子工程
mazhusun zhixiang	hometown of Taiwanese bamboo	麻竹笋之乡
meiyou bu touxing de mao	there is no cat that does not want fish	没有不偷腥的猫
menkou tudi caishen	the earth god is placed in front of this door	门口土地财神
mianzi	face	面子
minfeng	folk custom or the local ethos	民风
mu	1 mu= 666.7 square meters	亩
nei	inside	内
qingmiao fei	compensation fee for crop on the land	青苗费
renmin gongshe	People's Commune	人民公社

renpin	personality	人品
renqing	norms of interpersonal behaviour	人情
shan	a platform for worship	墒
shanbian	the side of the mountain	山边
shanshui	mountain-water	山水
shengchan dui	Production team	生产队
shengchan fazhan, shenghuo kuanyu, xiangfeng wenming, cunrong zhengjie, guanli minzhu	*advanced production, rich life, civilized (local) atmosphere, organised and tidy villages, and democratic management*	生产发展,生活宽裕,乡风文明,村容整洁,管理民主.
shenti shi geming de benqian	body is the capital of revolution	身体是革命的本钱
shidian	a place to experiment particular policy	试点
shou	long life	寿
shuaiga	bad, stupid, selfish	衰格
shushu	skill of fortune-telling	术数
shuyuan	academies	书院
Siqing movement	Socialist Education Movement (1962-1965)	四清运动
suku yundong	grumbling movement	诉苦运动
suzhi	human-quality	素质
suzhi jiaoyu	human-quality education	素质教育
tan	altar	坛
Tian xia nongmin yijia qin	the unification of all the world's peasants	天下农民一家亲
tian xia wei gong	sharing the world in common	天下为公

tianjing	skywell at the front	天井
tianren heyi	the ideal of the unity and harmony of humanity and heaven	天人合一
tianxia	everything under heaven	天下
tianzi	son of the heaven, the emperor	天子
tonggou tongxiao	State monopoly for purchase and marketing	统购统销
tuqi	rustic	土气
wai	outside	外
weisheng	hygienic	卫生
weisheng jian	toilet	卫生间
women xianzai zenyang zuo fuqin	'How should we be father now'	我们现在怎样做父亲
Wuxu Bianfa	Hundred Days Reform	戊戌变法
xianfa yu kongjiao	Constitution and Confucianism	宪法与孔教
xiao	filial piety	孝
xiao chanquan fang	uncompleted-right house	小产权房
xiaoqu	resident-community	小区
xingzheng cun	administrative village	行政村
xinyong `	trustworth	信用
yangjiu	wine from the western culture	洋酒
yangqi	the energy of *yang*, which indicates life, positivity and warmth	阳气
yangqi	western style or 'posh'	洋气
Yangwu yundong	Self-Strengthening Movement	洋务运动
yaozhifu xianxiulu	build the road before you get rich'	要致富先修路

yaozhifu xianxiulu	build the road before you get rich	
Yingcheng jiedao	Yingcheng Street	英城街道
zhong	centre	中
zhonghou laoshi	loyal and honest	忠厚老实
zhongnanhai	an imperial garden where serves as the central headquarters for the Communist Party of China and the Central government of China	中南海
zhuzuo	Primary seat	主座
zi	procreation	子
ziran cun	natural village	自然村
zongci	ancestral hall	宗祠
zongzu shehui	lineage society	宗族社会
zou guanxi	using guanxi to achieve the goal	走关系

Chinese History/Chronology

Dynasty	Period
Prehistoric Times	1.7 million years ago - the 21st century BC
Xia	21st - 17th century BC
Shang	17th century BC - 1046 BC
Zhou	1046 - 256 BC
↳ Western Zhou	1046 BC - 771 BC
↳ Eastern Zhou	770 - 256 BC
Qin	221 - 207 BC
Han	206 BC - 220 AD
Three Kingdoms	220 - 280 AD
↳ Kingdom of Wei	220 - 265 AD
↳ Kingdom of Shu	221 - 263 AD
↳ Kingdom of Wu	222 - 280 AD
Jin	265 - 420 AD
↳ Western Jin	265 - 316 AD
↳ Eastern Jin	317 - 420 AD
↳ Five Hus and Sixteen States	304 - 439 AD
Northern and Southern Dynasties	420 - 589 AD
↳ Northern Dynasties	386 - 581 AD

Sui	581 - 618 AD
Tang	618 - 907 AD
Five Dynasties and Ten States	907 - 960 AD
Ten States	902 - 979 AD
Song	960 - 1279 AD
Northern Song	960 - 1127 AD
Southern Song	1127 - 1279 AD
Liao	907 - 1125 AD
Western Xia Dynasty	1038 - 1227 AD
Jin	1115 - 1234 AD
Yuan	1271 - 1368 AD
Ming	1368 - 1644 AD
Qing	1644 - 1911 AD
Republic of China	1912 - 1949 AD
People's Republic of China	1949 -

Chapter 1 Introduction

Figure 1.1 Baikou New Village

Note: A: New apartment that will be distributed to every family

B: Village park, including fitness centre, garden, basketball ground and public toilet

C: Park of Karaoke centre

D: Cultural Centre but leased out in 2015 and used as a private kindergarten at present

E: Yelin restaurant opened in 2015

(The green field and mountain are all collective property of the village)

In this thesis, I explore the process and the effect of building an ideal New Village in rural China through a case study of Baikou New Village in Southern China, a model Chinese New Village. Here, the 'New Village' particularly refers to its material entity, the new landscape, including architecture, roads, gardens and other public

infrastructures. This study strives to illuminate the ideological conflict and integration in modern China through investigating the process and the effect of building an ideal New Village in rural China. It explains the new space construction and consumption in the New Village, and thereby, traces the change and continuity of social relationships in the rural community in history. This introduction will briefly demonstrate the emergence and outcomes of the Chinese New Village.

1.1 Industrialisation and Rural development

Chinese modern history starts with the outbreak of the First Opium War (1840-42). Henceforth, China began her way of modernisation and industrialisation through learning from the West and Japan. After the First Opium War and the later Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), [1] the Qing government realised that industrialisation and modernisation through learning from the West was the only way to strengthen the state against foreign intrusion. As a result, the Qing government launched the Self-Strengthening Movement (*Yangwu yundong*) (1861- 1895) that institutionally promoted industrial development by the Qing government, especially in military industry. As Table 1.1 shows, five main types of industries were preferentially developed during the Self-Strengthening Movement, including 71.4% military industry investment and 12.8% transportation investment. Unfortunately, the newly established modern military of the Qing Empire was defeated by the Japanese navy in the First Sino-Japan War (1894-95), which indicated the failure of the movement. To some extent, the start of Chinese industrialisation and modernisation was a kind of defensive modernisation that was intended to strengthen the state against foreign intrusion (Black et al., 1994, Rozman, 2003: 98), rather than a spontaneous development from within Chinese society. Thus, it accompanied a series of conflicts with the traditional social system. [2] Nevertheless, the tendency towards industrialisation never retreated from

---

[1] The Taiping Rebellion was a rebellion or civil war between the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and Qing Empire between 1850 and 1864. This rebellion was unlike the past rebellions in Chinese history, as it was based on the ideology of Christianity that comes from the West rather than an endogenetic ideology (Jin and Liu, 1993).

[2] For example, according to Yejian Wang, even in the most flourishing period of the Qing dynasty, the total fiscal avenue [state revenue stream] was no more than 5.6% of the total grain output value of the country (Rozman, 2003: 98); and at the end of the Qing dynasty, the total taxation was only 2.4% of the

Chinese society and its history was turbulent until the Reform and Opening Up (which I will discuss further below). As Chinese communists claimed in the seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1945, 'after we have achieved new democracy, the Chinese people and government must adopt practical processes to establish systems of heavy and light industry after several years, transforming China from an agricultural country to an industrial country'. From 1949 industrialisation was also the direction taken by New China. Under the influence of the Soviet Union's mode of industrialization that gives priority to the development of heavy industry, the Chinese Communist Party has given tremendous priority to develop heavy industry since New China was established in 1949. [3] As a consequence, 'agriculture feeds industry' was the general policy until the late 1990s when the tension between the peasantry and government was intense and nearly at breaking point.

Type	Number of Enterprises	Amount of Capital	Percentage
Military	19	69,943,461	71.4%
Transportation	7	12,508,702	12.8%
Coal Mining	7	2,716,228	2.8%
Metal Mining and Smelting	9	6,637,250	6.7%
Textile	5	6,103,803	6.2%
Total	47	97,909,444	100%

gross national product (because peasant agriculture is primarily oriented toward providing the household's subsistence rather than selling crops on the market) (ibid., 96). This demonstrates that the central government did not have enough financial resources to support industrial development.

[3]In the first five-year plan (1953-1957), the heavy industry projects occupied 85% of the total industry investment. However, in the second five-year plan (1958-1962), the heavy industry development was even more dominated as the Great Leap Forward unfolded throughout the country. The non-equilibrium between agricultural production and industrialisation caused a catastrophe.

Table 1.1 The Types and Capital of the Enterprises in the Self-Strengthening Movement during 1863-1894 (Huang, 1982)

As Yang pointed out, the root of the rural-urban disparity lies in the strategy of the centrally planned system that 'favored heavy-industry development and extracted agricultural surpluses largely for urban capital accumulation and urban-based subsidies' (Yang, 1999: 306-310). The rural-urban gap grew rapidly in various aspects of the Chinese society after the Reform and Opening Up in 1978, especially since the 1990s (see *Figure 1.2*) (Rozelle, 1994: 99-124, Khan and Riskin, 1998: 221-253, Kanbur and Zhang, 1998: 686-701, Gustafsson and Shi, 2002: 179-204, Wan and Zhou, 2005: 107–120, Shen and Yao, 2008: 2182, Shi, 2010, Xing et al., 2009: 338-349). To some extent, the disparity between the rural and urban in Chinese history is not a new phenomenon. In traditional Chinese society,[4] the city is the site of the bureaucratic class and the rich, for example, gentry and landlord (Jin and Liu, 1993).[5] The reasons why the rural-urban gap became a serious social problem since the 1980s can be understood from various perspectives. One of the core reasons should be attributed to the collapse of the self-sufficient system (socially and economically) and the overexploitation of resources (especially land, because of its ambiguous ownership which I will discuss in Chapter Four), and agricultural surplus after the Reform and Opening Up. In addition, the migration between rural and urban zones had never been prohibited in Chinese history. However, at the end of 1953, the central government implemented a policy – *tonggou tongxiao* (state monopoly for purchase and marketing of agricultural products), which means that the agricultural products will be confiscated from the peasants with very

---

[4] For this thesis, the term 'traditional Chinese society' only refers to the history before the Republic of China (1912-1949), though the process of modernisation in China began long before 1912. Guantao Jin and Qingshan Liu suggested that Chinese social structure is an Ultra-stable system as Chinese civilisation has very high integration that maintains its internal social structure throughout social transformation. The Ultra-stable system is constructed by three levels, the high level - bureaucracy (the lowest bureaucracy in Qing dynasty was county; the middle level – gentry (*xiangshen*) [i.e. between bureaucracy and the village]; and the low level – lineage. The three levels of the system were unified by the ideology of Confucianism ((Jin and Liu, 1993). The middle level – the gentry, were wealthy and relatively educated landlords who acted as a bridge between the government and the local people.

[5] The number of people from the landlord and gentry levels who moved to urban areas was often much more at the end of the dynasty than at the beginning (ibid., 125-7). For example, according to Yuefu He's research, at the beginning of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), in Tongxiang county, 83% *juren* (bachelors) who were often from the gentry lived in villages and 10% live in towns; then at the end of the Ming dynasty, there were 70% *juren* living in villages and 28% living in towns ((He, 1994).

low cost (peasants often received fertilizer and seed as compensation) and delivered to the urban population governed by official quotas. *Tonggou tongxiao* was practised for 39 years until 1992. To some extent, this policy stabilised the price of agricultural products and relieved the food crisis when agricultural products were in scarcity. Nevertheless, it also implies that the government must limit the population of the urban and the rural areas to guarantee the balance of grain allocation. In other words, migration between rural agricultural producers and urban consumers must be limited. On these grounds, the control of the agricultural migration started to be practiced around 1955 according to the *hukou* system (urban-rural dual household registration system). The prohibition on rural migration was cancelled in 1984. However, the distinction between the agricultural population and the non-agricultural population still determines people's ease of access to state-provided welfare and opportunities.

In the 1990s, as the degree of marketisation permeated the entire society, the industry/agriculture price scissors[6] further extracted the agricultural surplus. As Cao Jinqing rightly pointed out, the core problem of the current rural development is that, 'state-driven internal accumulation of capital meant that agriculture bore the burden of the industrialization process, and this created the tense relationship between the peasantry and the local government, responsible as it was for the extraction of agricultural surplus' (see Day, 2008: 49-73). The excessive peasant burdens and the unequal distribution of resources have led to widespread collective protests in many agricultural provinces since the 1990s (Unger, 2002, Bernstein and Lü, 2003, Yep, 2004, Li and O'Brien, 2008: 1-23, Gobel, 2010). While rural China confronted problems of economic and social stability, urban economy and society were experiencing a period of thriving development.

---

[6] This resulted in a discrepancy when the agricultural product exchange with the industrial product. The price of the former is lower than its value, and the price of later is higher that its value.

Figure 1.2 Real urban and rural per capital income (1978-2005)

Source: Data from National Bureau of Statistics in China (2006a)

In response to the rising rural-urban gap, the central government enacted a series of policies to reduce the fiscal burden of the rural and promote development. For example, the new rural cooperative medical system was introduced in 2003 by the government whose aim is to ensure basic healthcare for the rural population. The policy of educational surcharges waiver eliminated the collection of most educational charges for compulsory education (primary and middle school) in 2006. The tax-for-fee reform in 2002-04 and the abolition of agricultural taxes in 2005-06 largely eliminated the tax burden. The Building a New Socialist Countryside programme in 2006 apparently improved rural living conditions, especially the condition of the infrastructure. Then, the Rural Minimum Living Standard Guarantee program (or *Dibao* program) that aims to alleviate rural poverty was initiated in 2007. Most recently, 'The Beautiful Countryside' policy was implemented for the purpose of beautifying and ameliorating the rural living environment in 2013. 'The Beautiful Countryside' programme is the latest step of the Building a New Socialist Countryside programme. As rural development and construction have become the main work of policy concentration again since the middle 2000s, various effects have become apparent.

Although the slogan of the Building a New Socialist Countryside programme stated the main purpose of the programme to be '*advanced production, rich life, civilized (local) atmosphere, organised and tidy villages, and democratic management*' (*shengchan*

fazhan, shenghuo kuanyu, xiangfeng wenming, cunrong zhengjie, guanli minzhu), it is interpreted at the local level mainly through constructing the new landscape of the village. Among all the changes in rural China, the change of landscape may be the most visible and tangible.

Landscape study has received increasing attention from anthropologists. It is a useful concept in anthropology for it is 'a concept in between' as Morphy claimed, 'At a time when simple determinisms are breaking down, and the boundaries between disciplines are continually being breached, it is useful to have a concept that is free from fixed positions, whose meaning is elusive, yet whose potential range is all-encompassing' (Hirsch and O'Hanlon, 1995: 205). This is the very reason why I choose to focus on the new landscape of the New Village as my subject of the research.

1.2 Inscribing and practising the ideologies in the new landscape: Confucianism, communism, and neoliberalism

1.2.1 Collectivisation from 1956 to 1976

Period	Agricultural regime
pre-1947	traditional agriculture (family farming and tenancy)
1947–52	*first land reform*
1952–5	family farming
1955–6	*collectivization*
1956–76	collective farming
1977–83	*second land reform (decollectivization)*
1984–2007	family farming

Note
The phases in italics were periods of transition from one regime to another. The periodization used here sidesteps the question of whether periods of transition (such as 1977–83) should be classified as family or collective farming, and this can make a considerable difference to the analysis of performance.

Figure 1.3 Chinese Agricultural Institutions, 1949-2007 (Bramall, 2008)

	Communes	Production brigades	Production teams	Household size
1959	21,785	1,070	168	4.35
1963	7,020	872	101	4.23
1970	13,594	1,088	153	4.61
1981	15,060	1,152	136	4.54

Source: ZGTJNJ (1983: 147).

Figure 1.4 The size of collective farms, 1959-1981 (persons per unit) (see ibid., 217)

After New China (the People's Republic of China) was established in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party immediately started the nationwide Land Reform between 1947-52[7] that confiscated land from landlords and rich peasants and redistributed it to the middle and poor peasants. As soon as the Land Reform was completed, the process of collectivisation was initiated in 1953 which included three stages. At the lower-stage cooperatives (1954-55), the mutual-aid group (*huzhu zu*) was composed by several households to share some resources and instruments of agricultural production. At this stage, the land was pooled but the private ownership of land was still retained. However, collectivisation created higher-stage cooperation from 1955. At the beginning, the mutual-aid group expanded to be Primary Cooperative of Agricultural Production (*chuji nongye shengchan hezuoshe*). Peasants still had private ownership of land during this period but land was under unified management of the farming cooperative and they can receive a return on the basis of their labour. In 1956, the primary cooperative was upgraded to the Advanced Cooperative of Agricultural Production (*gaoji nongye shengchan hezuoshe*) - land and farm implements were collectivised during this period. In 1958, the Advanced Cooperative of Agricultural Production was promoted to the People's Commune which became not only the basic administrative unit of the agricultural population, but also of the non-agricultural population. There were three key features of the collective farm: firstly, it was a three-tier structure that was made up of the commune, production brigade and production teams (for the size of each tier please see Figure 1.4); secondly, land, draught animals and big pieces of farm equipment were owned by the collective rather than the individual family; and thirdly, the allocation of income was on the basis of work points (*gongfen*) (Bramall, 2008).

---

[7] Some areas started earlier than others. The earliest area started the Land Reform in 1947.

The collective era lasted three decades and significantly influenced every aspect of social and economic life. The evaluation of the collectivization of Chinese society between 1956 and 1976 is still controversial. For example, in terms of equality, the Gini coefficient was only 0.16 in 1978 in urban China and 0.21 in rural China at the same time (Shi, 2010), which means, just after the collective era, China was one of the most egalitarian countries in the world. In terms of GDP per capita, it was 89.52 dollars in 1960; 165.41 dollars in 1976; and 8,069.21 dollars in 2015. The per capita GDP of the world was 450.52 dollars in 1960; 1,547.62 dollars in 1976; and 10,112.33 dollars in 2015 (World Bank, 2015) (see Table 1.2). In 1960, the per capita GDP of the world was nearly five times that of China. Then in 1976, it was about 10 times that of China. However, in 2015, the per capita GDP of China was already very close to the world average. In this sense, the economic development of the collective era in China was far less than the world average.[8] Comparing the two aspects, it seems that collectivisation is good for equality but negative for economic development. Then, in the sense of democracy and freedom, obviously, Chinese collectivisation was hardly considered as a positive model from the perspective of Western liberalism. The *hukou* system limited the migration of people. The commune system attempted to eliminate subsidiary production by banning the sale of craft products and subsidiary crops at markets, particularly in local markets which had played an important role since the Ming dynasty (Huang, 1986: 81, 83, 210-211, Jin and Liu, 1993: 364-365, Zhao, 1986).[9] In terms of ideology, Chinese Marxism-Leninism or Maoism was the dominant ideology. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), this ideology of Marxism-Leninism was even further purified and absolutised through publicly denouncing, criticising and

---

8 Bramall suggested that without the irrigation projects that were constructed in the collective era and brought to successful completion during the 1970s, 'the continuing growth of production that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s would simply not have been possible' (Bramall, 2008). In addition, some researchers have proved that from 1956, Mao started de-centralising the Soviet–style state-centred-planning system (Schurmann, 1966, Shirk, 1993). Schurmann suggested that, though the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) was a disaster at the time, it laid a good foundation for the later local self-governance in the post-Mao era because it collapsed the state-centred-planning system and empowered the local government in terms of economic development (ibid.).

9 According to Dwight H. Perkins, from the beginning of the Ming dynasty to the 1940s, the population increased 7 to 9 times, while the increase of cultivated land was less than 4 times, (see in Huang, 1986: 8). This indicated that the cultivated land per capita decreased and subsidiary production, for example, artecraft producing, was a significant resource of income (Jin and Liu, 1993: 364-5).

penalising the people who 'following the capitalist road' (Potter and Potter, 1990).[10] At the level of the individual, the three-decade collective era perhaps largely reconstructed people's cosmology, value and morality, especially through collectivism which highly strengthened the idea of equality in every aspect of people's social lives. The means of production and the products were relatively equally shared in a brigade, though the credit system in fact also calculated the income of every individual according to their contribution. In 1976, the Cultural Revolution ended as Mao passed away, followed by the collapse of collectivisation. From here, China started the era of marketization.

	1960	1976	2015
World	$450.52	$1,5462	$10,112.33
China	$89.52	$165.41	$8,069.21

Table 1.2 Per capita of the World and China in 1960, 1976 and 2015.

(Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.)

1.2.2 Neoliberal era

Neoliberalism is an ideological and philosophical movement that emerged in post-World War I Europe and the United States to oppose 'the rising tide of collectivism, state-centred planning, and socialism' (Ganti, 2014: 89-104). Since the 1970s, neoliberalism has become a catch-all term that is considered as the dominant ideology shaping our world today (Thorsen, 2010: 1-25). However, the term 'neoliberalism' is often undefined, unevenly employed across ideological divides and used to characterize an excessively broad variety of phenomenon (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009: 137-161). As Harvey pointed out, neoliberalism is 'a theory of political economic practices' rather than a 'complete' political ideology (Thorsen, 2010: 1-25). Nevertheless, the basic definition of neoliberalism often contains two aspects. First, 'giving the priority to

---

[10] Potter and Potter defined that the Cultural Revolution is 'a kind of millenarian movement designed to purify, intensify, and apotheosize' in order to 'strive directly for the most purely communist social forms' (Potter and Potter, 1990: 83).

individual freedom and the right to private property' (Blomgren, 1997); second, 'state interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum' (Harvey, 2007). As Thorsen said, neoliberalism is a loosely demarcated set of political beliefs which most prominently and prototypically include the conviction that the only legitimate purpose of the state is to safeguard individual liberty, understood as a sort of mercantile liberty for individuals and corporations (Thorsen, 2010: 1-25).

The Reform and Opening Up of China shows that the Chinese Communist Party in fact abandoned three decades of collectivisation and launched its process of marketisation. However, the political system remained one-party. Whether the society and economy of contemporary China are 'neoliberal' is a difficult question. As Kipnis and Nonini suggested, referring to its oligarchic corporatist state and party, the strengthening of personalist ties, and the persistence of highly un-egalitarian hierarchies, it is not precise to use 'neoliberalism' to describe contemporary China (Kipnis, 2008: 275–289, Nonini, 2008: 145-176). Meanwhile, in the sense of economic structure, as David Harvey argued, 'as neoliberalism requires a large, easily exploited, and relatively powerless labour force, then China certainly qualifies as a neoliberal economy, albeit 'with Chinese characteristics' (Harvey, 2007: 144).

In the collective era, the free market was strictly prohibited. While the Reform and Opening Up policy introduced market principles to China and private enterprise started to return. In December 1978, the Chinese central government held the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China which marked the beginning of the 'Reform and Opening Up' (*gaige kaifang*). Although the relevant policies that issued from the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China still did not allow *baochan daohu* (Household Contract Responsibility System) until 1984, there were only some changes of personnel in the central government (Han, 2011).[11] Although the earliest practice of

---

[11] But officially, this conference is regarded as the beginning of the Reform and Opening Up. In fact, according to People's Daily, Kun Zhang found that, the term *gaige kaifang* had not appeared as the headline until 1984 and until Deng Xiaoping visited Shenzhen in Southern China in 1984, the reform was not officially launched (Zhang, 2017).

the Household Contract Responsibility System was probably in Xiaogang village, FengYang county, Anhui province in 1978, but national-wide implementation was not initiated till 1984. The Household Contract Responsibility System specifically meant that collective land could be distributed to every family according to the number of family members, though peasants have only the right of usage of the land rather than its ownership. In urban areas on the other hand, the state-owned enterprises were gradually privatised.[12] I use the term 'neoliberalism' rather than 'marketisation' or 'privatisation' to interpret the post-Maoist era because the former contains the dimension of ideology, while the latter only refers to the process of participating in a free market.

After three decades of Reform and Opening Up, the increased social inequality (the Gini coefficient more than doubled from 1978 to 2015) has recently led to a nostalgia for the collective era. People started to sing red songs (the songs of the Red or Maoist era), and to recall the memory of the age of innocence when people were not corrupted by money. In the neoliberal era, there was no warm collective as a backup, and the individual was pushed into the sea of the competitive market. As David Harvey rightly points out,

Increased social inequality within a territory was construed as necessary to encourage the entrepreneurial risk and innovation that conferred competitive power and stimulated growth. If conditions among the lower classes deteriorated, this was deemed to be because they failed, usually for personal and cultural reasons, to enhance their own human capital (through dedication to education, the acquisition of a Protestant work ethic, submission to work discipline and flexibility, and the like). Particular problems arouse, in short, because of lack of competitive strength or because of personal, cultural, and political failings. In a Darwinian neoliberal world, the argument went, only the fittest should and do survive (Harvey, 2007: 156-157).

---

[12] In the 1990s, the reform of the state-owned enterprises (from state-owned to private) led to millions of laid-off workers who could not easily adapt into the new environment or new market (Many enterprises remained partly owned by the State as "public-private" organisations). As a result, social protests frequently exploded throughout the whole country.

In the second half of the 1980s, as the forces of marketization and privatisation proceeded without a mature legal system to provide the foundation, social conflict between different interest groups constantly worsened. As a consequence, in 1989 a nationwide '89 Democracy Movement' burst out. This movement demanded that democracy and justice should be the foundation of economic reform. In view of this matter, Hui Wang (2008) rightly pointed out, there are some ironic aspects of neoliberalisation in China. First, the formation of the modern market society is not spontaneous, but the result of state intervention and violence. Second, as a political arrangement, the formation of the market society in fact legislated the historical conditions of the '89 Democracy Movement in the tide of neoliberalisation.[13] Third, urban-centred marketization and economic development resulted in a rural crisis on the basis of the institutional unfairness between rural and urban. Fourth, Chinese reform responded to the international environment and foreign policy was adjusted, transferring attention from the third world to the developed capitalist countries. This made China ignore the regrettable effect of the successful experience of western development – the crisis of the third world. On the basis of these facts, the request of the 89 Democracy Movement was thus highly connected to the request for social equality. The ideology of socialism during the collective era therefore served as a significant resource for critiques of neoliberalism (Wang, 2008). This process continues – searching for discursive resources from traditional ways of life seems to be the new target in the neoliberal era.

1.2.3 Confucianism

Confucianism is regarded as a worldview that crosses between religion, way of life, system of belief about society, and state ideology (Rozman, 2002:13). During the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty (141 B.C. – 87 B.C), the Chinese scholar Dong

---

[13] To be specific, the corruption after the movement, smuggling, unfair distribution, the intervention of interest groups in policy-making, over-exploitation of land and so forth, meant that social issues worsened rather than improved in the 1990s. The unfair market expansion resulted in further social stratification and the stability of society thus broke down, which therefore provided sufficient conditions for the further centralisation of state power and state monopolisation.

Zhongshu promoted Confucianism as the official ideology of the Chinese imperial state. Although Confucianism has experienced transformations during its history, becoming integrated with other philosophies, for example, Taoism, Buddhism and Legalism, and its dominant position has also experienced some fluctuation during the past 2,000 years, nevertheless, it is still the conceptual foundation of Chinese culture.

The 20th century might have been the most tragic century for Confucianism. After a series of failures in battles with the West and Japan, to some extent, the reflection on the reasons of Chinese defeats focused on the reconstruction of ideology. As Jin and Liu suggest (2011), the evolution of Chinese modern thought can be divided into three stages. The first stage came before the First Sino-Japan War (1894-95). It was based on Confucianism and tried selectively to absorb some modern western thoughts. The second stage took place between 1895 and 1915 when a dualist model deriving from both western and Chinese ideas prevailed. In the public area, this was a stage of learning from the west. Then, the third stage was the New Culture Movement (1910s-1920s) when western thoughts started to become the dominant ideology in the reconstruction of Chinese society (Jin and Liu, 2011: 14-15). Henceforth, Confucianism was increasingly represented as traditional nonsense that led to the ignorance of Chinese people and the backwardness of China: 'Down with Confucianism' (*dadao kongjiadian*) was the slogan of the movement. During the Cultural Revolution, the tide of anti-Confucianism reached its peak. Nearly all the Confucian temples were demolished; rituals, including ancestor worship, weddings and funerals were prohibited; family ethics underwent a revolutionary transformation, children no longer necessarily complied with or respected parents;[14] and teachers were criticised and humiliated by students.[15] In short, from the early twentieth century to the end of the twentieth century, Confucianism was rejected and under constant criticism from the state level to the local, from national ideological construction to the ethics of everyday practice.

---

[14] Filial piety is the first principle of Confucianism.

[15] Respecting teachers is also one of the most important principles of Confucianism.

Nevertheless, after the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, the prohibitions on ritual practices (for example, ancestor worship), religious beliefs and traditional culture were gradually reversed. As aforementioned, the lineage is the basic unit of self-governance in Confucian (or traditional) society. Through two nation-wide sample surveys, Tangbiao Xiao found that almost 20% of lineages were reconstructed up to the beginning of the 21st century. The revival of the lineage in the regions of the south, southwest and southeast is much more salient than in central China, the northwest and northeast. He also suggested that in some other places the lineage is not in resurgence but is collapsing (Xiao, 2011: 14-29).

In 2007, Confucius' descendants began once again to worship Confucius (*jikong*) in the original Confucian Temple (*kongmiao*) in Qufu city in Shandong province. Worshiping Confucius on Tomb-sweeping Day was a national ritual in the Ming Dynasty and Qing Dynasty. Since the establishment of the New China in 1949, this activity has been prohibited. In 2008, the Central Council of State set Tomb-sweeping Day as a national holiday. In Yingde city, for some families, Tomb-sweeping Day is even more important than the Spring Festival that follows the Lunar New Year. People who work far from Yingde city and who moved away from Yingde city return to Yingde and worship their ancestors around the Tomb-sweeping Day. After the ban was lifted in the early 1980s, the revival of the tradition of Confucianism started from this local event. Then, around 2005, the government started to support and encourage this revival and attempted to absorb resources from the tradition of Confucianism, for example, as an encompassing and embedding solidary group, lineage can provide incentives to local officials to offer public goods and services (Tsai, 2007: 355-372). Perhaps the revival of the lineage will contribute to the rebuilding of civil society. Other phenomena show the revival of Confucianism. For example, as Daniel Bell observed, courses on Confucianism are among the most popular at university. Conversely, courses on Marxism struggle to get students, unless they are made compulsory. But in fact, universities have substantially cut compulsory courses on Marxism (Bell, 2010: 26).

Yang Gan employed a Chinese classical concept '*tong santong*' to explore the subjectivity of Chinese civilisation in the age of globalisation (Gan, 2014). The so-called '*tong santong*' specifically means that the community of Chinese civilisation is the one unified by shared cultural tradition and custom, the unified political system and the important historical consistency between different ages. He then pointed out that the tradition of Confucianism, the tradition of Maoism and the tradition of Dengism, are consistent traditions rather than clearly demarcated (Gan, 2007). I will limit (and maybe simplify) the definition in representing the mainstream ideology of Maoism as communism, and the mainstream ideology of Dengism as neoliberalism. The three ideologies sometimes show high tension and are sometimes harmoniously integrated with each other in everyday practice. This thesis attempts to analyse the complex conflicts and integration of the three ideologies through a detailed analysis of the new dwelling space in an urbanised Chinese Socialist New Village.

1.3 Methodology

In this research project I relied on traditional anthropological long-term fieldwork in a small-scale community in south of China. In this chapter, I will first demonstrate how I selected the field site. In the second section, I will introduce the rapport building and the reflection on my role as an anthropologist in the field. In the third section, I will introduce the specific methods that I applied in the ethnographical fieldwork, including participation observation, interview, photo elicitation, Rokeach Value Survey and archive and statistics application. Relevant anthropological literature on field methods is reviewed. Finally the limitations and ethical considerations relevant to this project will be demonstrated.

1.3.1 Selection of field site

There are three reasons why I chose to do fieldwork in Yingde city in Guangdong province. First, Guangdong is one of the most economically developed regions in China. Therefore, in terms of the New Village programme, Guangdong is also in the leading position in China. Second, in terms of personal ties, I have a friend who was doing real

estate business and who has frequent contacts with the local government in Yingde city. I also considered that the real estate business is closely associated with my research project and it might therefore contribute some information that would be hard to collect without personal ties in China. In addition, as regards language, Guangdong is in the Cantonese circle where the dialect Cantonese is the dominant language spoken in this region. I considered that it would be a good opportunity to train myself to do fieldwork in another language during the doctoral programme.

Twelve-months fieldwork was conducted in Baikou village in 2015. Meanwhile, two short term, one-month fieldworks were conducted in Zhejiang province (southeast of China) and Shandong province (northeast of China) as complementary observations at the national level. Moreover, I also interviewed nine village heads of the nearby villages to collect relevant information for making a picture of the region in which Baikou is located. This project does not have ambitions to do formal macro-comparative studies at the national level, however, the data that are presented from different regions may contribute more substantial analysis for some specific issues in this thesis and could form the basis of future research.

1.3.2 Rapport building and my role as an anthropologist

After arriving in Yingde, my local friend introduced me to the mayor of Langping street (or Langping township – the administrative unit that will be further introduced in Chapter Two). Obtaining the permission of the local government to conduct the fieldwork is often the primary step in China because of the censorship system. Without the agreement and recommendation of the local government, the subordinate government and the village may refuse my investigation, especially as I am studying abroad. Thanks to my friend's recommendation, the mayor recommended several models of New Village to me after I stated my research project. Baikou New Village was one of those recommended. We made an appointment to visit Baikou two days later. Nonetheless, after the meeting with the mayor, I decided to visit Baikou by myself primarily because the local people might present different attitudes if the government

officially introduced me to the village (I assumed the existence of tension between the local government and the village).

I first arrived in the village in winter. Many villagers were enjoying the sunshine and chatting by the road side. After I introduced myself, they started to complain about the unfair distribution of land reparation (this issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four), the unemployment situation, the corrupt essence of the New Village project and so forth. Two women guided me to their house to show me the terrible quality of houses built in the New Village project. At this moment, although I repeatedly claimed that I was just a student who came to do fieldwork, I was regarded as a journalist who could help them to report their discontentment and indignation.

Two days later, when I was introduced to the village by an official and village leaders of the township, all the villagers were invited to a feast in the Cultural Centre for celebrating the completion of Chuanzhu Chen's house. The team head invited me to the feast too. On that occasion, I quickly become the 'famous person' of the village. I was invited to sit with the elites of the village and some famous figures in Chengxi Residents' Community, including civil servants and successful local businessmen. Until this moment, people were all quite friendly to me. However, two days after I moved into Baikou, Jiale Tong held a feast to celebrate his son's one-hundred-days birthday. He invited the whole village too. Half way through the dinner, I left, and moved to a villager's home because they invited me to discuss village affairs. I thought that I was not a significant figure in this feast, so it should be no problem to leave early. Unfortunately, reports of my early leaving for the group meeting immediately spread through the village and I realized that people assumed that I was taking the side of villagers who were planning a petition relating to the land issue. Just as many anthropologists have experienced at the beginning of entering the community where they were to study, I was then refused by the majority of the village, including the people who did not want to be involved in trouble and the people who stood on the other side of the petition group (Rabinow, 1977, Geertz, 1973, Firth, 1983). In the following days, many people refused my request for interviews and avoided me. Some

relevant officials of the Chengxi Residents' Community also refused to be interviewed by me even though the township government gave me permission. Fortunately, my landlady Rendi Xu and her best friend Dingliang Liu are both very warm-hearted people and gave me tremendous help to reclaim my identity as a student and neutral observer. Moreover, I tried to make friends with young people who could understand my research project and my identity more easily. I reminded all interviewees that I would not reveal the interview to anyone else. The tension between different interest groups of the village required me to be more sensitive to make people trust my neutral standpoint and the confidentiality of the interview. It took me several months to persuade people to accept my 'neutral role' between different interest groups in the community.

Having learned a lesson at the beginning of the fieldwork, I later avoided showing my own opinion on the land issue since that could easily have involved me in local conflicts. This distancing was also helpful in establishing a greater degree of objectivity in my fieldwork: 'Once researchers fail to distance themselves from the people they are studying, however, or fail to allow them the same distancing, the rules of qualitative reliability and validity are sidestepped, reducing the likelihood that sociologists and their work will be trusted by their readers' (Gans, 1999: 542-543). However, as time went by, my personality and preference was inevitably reflected in the better relationship with some people and greater distance with others. Voloder argued, "the proximity or distance between the researcher's and participants' experiences impact on the type of anthropological knowledge produced, as certain kinds of intersections and divergences allow for particular kinds of insights and oversights in the analysis of the ethnographic material" (Voloder, 2008: 30). The data I collected may have been limited by my personal relationship and distance with some participants. However, my reflections on my own standpoint largely reduced the possible biases. Also, to take a countermeasure for this limitation, I adopted a strategy of triangulation, crosschecking data from different interest groups repeatedly, to ensure its precision (Bernard, 2017).

1.3.3 Research methods

a. Participant observation

This research project focuses on the landscape of the New Village. Therefore, the observations on the image and interaction of people with village spaces is one of the most significant methods for understanding the core part of this research, including the perception of the space, the consistency and inconsistency in how domestic space is used by family members, social relations and the organization of public space. During fieldwork, I visited the majority of families of Baikou village to observe the arrangement of domestic space and their everyday practices in it. Fabian claimed that vision, visual experience and visual expressions of experience are rightfully part of anthropological/ethnographic thought and discourse (Fabian, 1983). The analysis of the space construction and consumption is mainly based on the data that I collected by participant observation, especially the visual experiences in the village. I also recorded nearly all of the visual data with photographs which are frequently used in the thesis as a research method for interpretation (Byers, 1964, Caldarola, 1985, Collier, 1967, Wagner, 1979).

Moreover, I joined many family and community activities during the course of my fieldwork, including three weddings, a funeral, three acts of ancestor worship (tomb-sweeping days) during the spring, a community trip, a communist party referendum held in the village, a community meeting, a house-warming feast, a feast for the one-hundred-day birthday of a baby, several birthday feasts and so forth. Through participation in and observation of the interactions in these rituals and feasts, I established a rapport with many villagers and was gradually accepted as a member of the community – albeit a temporary one. Participant observation also nourished my understanding of the values, ethics, social principles and social and family relations within the community.

b. *Interviews and Interviewing*

Participant observation has tended to be equated with ethnography in recent years (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). However Herbert Gans advocates the decoupling of ethnography and participant observation (Gans, 1999). Other forms of data or material are also significant in anthropological research. As Martine Forsey suggests, 'listening is at least as significant as observation to ethnographers. Ethnography is arguably more aural than ocular, the ethnographer more participant listener than observer' (Forsey, 2010: 561). Therefore, the casual conversation and formal interview are other important methods applied in the fieldwork. As Hammersley and Atkinson suggest, 'the expressive power of language provides the most important resource for accounts. A crucial feature of language is its capacity to present descriptions, explanations, and evaluations of almost infinite variety about any aspect of the world, including itself' (ibid., 126).

Research interviews can provide access to the meanings people attribute to their experiences and social worlds. While the interview is itself a symbolic interaction, this does not discount the possibility that knowledge of the social world beyond the interaction can be obtained (Silverman, 1997: 100). The researcher is an active player in development of data and of meaning (Ritchie and Lewis, 2014: 139). Also, Holstein and Gubrium stress that the researcher is not simply a 'pipeline' through which knowledge is transmitted, but also sees knowledge as constructed in the interview, through collaboration between interviewee and researcher (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995)

During my fieldwork, the casual conversation and formal interview provided another dominant method for collecting information. The casual conversation often took place in the public space of the village during everyday life. I conducted formal interviews with two groups of people: 1) the community members of Baikou Village; 2) the relevant municipal and township government officials. In total, I conducted more than fifty interviews during one year of fieldwork and all the interviews were recorded digitally using a voice recorder. The informal conversations were, however, not

recorded by voice recorder but transcribed by memory as soon as possible after the conversation.

c. Photo Elicitation

Photograph elicitation is a method that introduces images into the interview context. Douglas Harper states that,

Photo elicitation is based on the simple idea of inserting a photograph into a research interview. The difference between interviews using images and text, and interviews using words alone lies in the ways we respond to these two forms of symbolic representation. This has a physical basis: the parts of the brain that process visual information are evolutionarily older than the parts that process verbal information. Thus images evoke deeper elements of human consciousness that do words; exchanges based on words alone utilize less of the brain's capacity than do exchanges in which the brain is processing images as well as words. These may be some of the reasons the photo elicitation interview seems like not simply an interview process that elicits more information, but rather one that evokes a different kind of information (Harper, 2002: 13).

In this research project, I used photo elicitation to explore individuals' ideas about 'the ideal landscape'. Their intuitively most favourite and least favourite landscape can be easily captured when they made comments on the photos of the landscape that I showed them. I selected 21 landscape photos which represented very typical landscapes in China and asked some relevant questions based on their comments on these photos and their selection of their most and least favourite landscapes. The participants might otherwise not have been prepared or able to voice their opinion of the description and only able to provide a stereotypical verbal description of their ideal landscape. In this light, the greatest advantage of photo elicitation might be that the more intuitive visual

perception that directly mirrored their preference, and can be further explored during conversation.

d. Rokeach Value Survey

This thesis also applied the Rokeach Value Survey as a method to understand the values of the villagers cross different ages. Rokeach Value Survey is a values classification instrument, developed by social psychologist Milton Rokeach (Rokeach, 1988). The instrument is designed for rank-order scaling of 36 values, including 18 terminal values and 18 instrumental values (see appendix 1). The interviewees are asked to number these values from the most significant value to the least significant value for them.

e. Archive & Statistics

Historical material and statistical data also made an important contribution to this anthropological research project. First, the Archives Centre of Yingde city provided many archives between 1949 (when New China was established) and 1985, including the material relevant to the agricultural and industrial development of Yingde, demographic information, contracts and planning and land-use maps. I am not permitted to review material contained in the most recent thirty-years' archive according to the rule of the Archives Centre. Fortunately, the Department of Statistics of Yingde city provided sufficient relevant statistic data for recent decades. Third, the Annals Office of Yingde government (the obligation of this office is to compile the yearbook of the city) and also the local museum provided some useful historical information on the region, which contributed to the picture I constructed.

1.3.4 Ethical Considerations

a. Consent and agreement of my research

This research project upholds the relevant principles of the Ethical Guide for Good Research Practice of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth (ASA, 2011). At the beginning of the fieldwork, I tried to use written

consent to make my interviewee feel relaxed to accept my interview. However, I found that requesting written permission made potential research particpants nervous and sensitive. Therefore, for most of the villagers, I preferred to request verbal informed consent that followed the same protocol as described in a written consent process but I recorded it later rather than put it in writing. Participants, in every case, agreed beforehand that the interview could be recorded. All interviewees were made aware of the purpose of my research and agreed with the data obtained being used for the purposes of my thesis (and potential subsequent publications).

b. *Anonymity*

All socially prominent interviewees and interest stakeholders are anonymised in this thesis in order to maintain their confidentiality. The names of the individual research participants are also anonymised. As this project pays a lot of attention to domestic space, I photographed many private domestic spaces; the names of their owners have also been anonymised.

c. *The responsibility of the anthropologist*

Scheper-Hughes said, "the work of anthropology demands an explicit ethical orientation to 'the other'" (Scheper-Hughes, 1995: 418). During the fieldwork, I received tremendous help from the local people and the local government. Maybe I do not have the capability to give back as much as I gained. In my last meeting with the village head, I asked him what I could do for the village. He said, 'hope you can say some good words of our village. Do some positive propaganda of our village please.' In the context of rural China, a good reputation of a place is often considered important (I discuss this further in Chapter Five), therefore, making a good reputation for the place is often expected when researchers do investigations in the community. At the level of the nation, this expectation is associated with the nationalism in China. The critiques of the social phenomena in China written in English (or other languages) and published for a foreign audience are often considered as negative and disloyal by many Chinese people. Unfortunately, my observations and findings hardly contribute to the purpose of advertising. Instead, after I finish this thesis, I hope to share my findings and

suggestions if the local people are interested and if it is not deemed too arrogant. As I responded to the village head, 'I hope Baikou will have a good future. Maybe I cannot advertise for her, but I hope I can provide some good suggestions to you in the future.'

1.3.5 Limitation

a. The disappearance of the old village

The old village had been razed to the ground when I arrived in Baikou. Thus there is no substantial material heritage for investigating and comparing with the present New Village. The neighbouring villages offered opportunities for comparative studies as they shared quite similar settlement patterns that corresponded to the villagers' memories. This absence of the 'old village' may however have limited the accuracy and adequacy of the comparisons I make in this thesis.

b. Language

Baikou people mainly speak Fucheng dialect in their everyday life which is a sort of combination of Cantonese and Hakka. The majority of the generation born before the 1950s can only speak Fucheng dialect, however, nearly all the generations born after this can speak Mandarin, which largely constrained my motivation to speak Fucheng dialect. After nearly half a year, I could generally understand Fucheng dialect but cannot speak it well. It may have resulted in my ignorance of some slang expressions and terms that cannot be precisely translated into Mandarin, and therefore have limited my understanding of some specific contexts.

Translating some Chinese terms into English is another tricky issue for this thesis. For example, in Chapter Four, I discuss the concept of '*cabianqiu*' which can be directly translated as "play the edge ball", however, this term can be used in various contexts which is hard to describe adequately. In Chapter Five, I discuss the term '*jing*' that is frequently used in personality evaluation. It is hard to find an English term that is exactly identical to '*jing*'. In Chapter Six, I discuss the concept of *jiang daoli* which is

also hard to translate simply into English. Longxi Zhang said, the difference between Chinese culture and language and Western ones is obvious. Translation should contribute to removing the obstacles for better communication and understanding by finding the equivalent meaning under the surface of the changeable cultural differences (Zhang, 1999:43). In this thesis, as I have stated, some translations may not be exactly identical with the word in its original cultural context.

c. *Gender bias: as a female anthropologist*

As a female anthropologist, the advantages and disadvantages in building rapport and collecting relevant data in this male chauvinist-society are to some extent inevitable. As Scheper-Hughes claimed, 'the anthropologist is always a necessarily flawed and biased instrument of cultural translation, like every other crafts-person we can do the best we can with the limited resources we have at hand: our ability is to listen and to observe carefully and with empathy and compassion' (ibid., 417-418). My personal identity provides my 'limited resources'. The village leaders of Baikou are nearly all male and of a similar age to me, and they play much more significant roles in public life. Unfortunately, as an unmarried female anthropologist, it is considered inappropriate to form close relationships with these young men. This may have limited my participation in the public life of the community.

1.4 Thesis structure

This project is composed of nine chapters. In the first chapter, I have briefly stated the research question, the research objectives and the research framework and the historical background, and the methodology of this research. In the second chapter, the relevant information of the Baikou New Village will be introduced, including the historical, cultural, economic and political background of this city, the history of the village, the history and effect of becoming a model of New Village. The chapter three will be a review chapter which is composed of the six most relevant dimensions of the thesis. In Chapter Four, I will discuss three conflicting social forces – the collective ownership of land (a legacy of communism), the market-oriented policy-making and the social

strategies of the stakeholders - by investigating the issue of land accumulation and expropriation in Baikou New Village. In chapter five, I will discuss the local interpretation of the discourse of modernity and scientificity in reorganising the place and building the New Village. In chapter six, I will explore the conditions of community life through an investigation of the construction and usage of public spaces in the New Village. In chapter seven, I attempt to analyse the ethics, production and cooperation of the family by comparing old and new houses in relation to their function and structure. In chapter eight, I will focus on the conflict and cooperation of families in terms of production and consumption through an analysis of the distribution of bedrooms. Then the final chapter will be the conclusion of this research. In each aspect of village life, we will see how villages tried to reconcile the three social forces identified at the start of this section.

Chapter 2 Becoming Baikou New Village

Figure2.1 Panorama of Yingde city

In this chapter I will present an introduction to Baikou village where I conducted one year of ethnographic fieldwork. Firstly, I will provide some basic information about Yingde city which Baikou village is subordinate to, including a brief history of Yingde, an introduction to the language, religion, geographical condition, resources, administrative unit and so forth. Secondly, I will discuss the genesis of Baikou village through demonstrating the origin and the composition of the lineages of the village. Thirdly, the genesis of the 'Baikou New Village' will be demonstrated from the perspective of its project application, financial resources and its influence as a model village.

2.1 Introduction to the City

2.1.1 History of becoming a part of China

Figure 2.2 Maps of Yingde county in the county annals of Xuantong Emperor (1909-1912) shows the main architecture of the county

(A: City centre of Yingde; B: Xi temple; C: Caozhu temple; D: Wenlü Academie)

Yingde city is located in the boundary area between Hunan province and Guangdong province and a part of Nanling Cultural Corridor. [16] According to the current archaeological evidence, the Niulan cave archaeological site, the earliest residents of the location which Yingde city occupies at present can be traced back to the interim between the Paleolithic era and the Neolithic era. During the Spring and Autumn periods (771 B.C.-476 B.C.), the territory of the current Yingde city belonged to Baiyue or Hundred Yue who inhabited south Asia. During the Warring States period (475 B.C.

---

16 Xiaotong Fei suggests that microscopically China can be generally divided into eight cultural areas, including: the Northern grassland area, northeastern alpine forest area, southwestern Qinghai-Tibet plateau area, Yunnan-Guizhou plateau area, Nanling Cultural Corridor, coastal area and central plain region (Fei, 1983).

- 221 B.C.) it belonged to Chu state. David Faure suggested that since the Qin dynasty (221 B.C. - 207 B.C.) the power of the emperor eventually extended to include *lingnan* (the South of the Five Ridges).[17] For Yingde, in the Han dynasty (202 B.C. - 220 A. D.), Zhenyang county and Hanguang county were established, subordinated to Nanhai country – the first time that Yingde was a part of the empire and officially governed by the emperor. During the Tang dynasty (618-907), *lingnan* was regarded as an exotic area and up to the North Song dynasty (971-1050), Guangdong was still very much a frontier territory. However, this situation changed in North Song dynasty (Faure, 2007:17-26), for dramatic increase in the number of people awarding a degree in the imperial examination. This reflected Guangdong's integration into the imperial system (Faure, 2007: 17-26). Since the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), Yingde city has been subordinated to Shaozhou (the present Shaoguan) (see Figure 2.2), the regional centre since the twelfth century when neo-Confucian scholarship was in ascendance. It was in the region that an intellectual revolution was propagated (ibid., 33).

2.1.2 Language

Figure 2.3 Map of Yingde city

---

[17] *Lingnan* (岭南) refers to Guangdong province, Guangxi province, Hainan province, Hongkong and Macao. It is a geographical area in the south of *nanling* or South of the Five Ridges.

Geographically, Yingde city is located at the border of the Shaoguan city (the former Shaozhou Fu) and Qingyuan city (see Figure 2.3). In 1988, Yingde city was administratively transferred from the Shaoguan city to Qingyuan city. Administratively, there are generally three levels of city: province-level city, prefecture-level city and county-level city. [18] Yingde city is the county-level city below the prefecture-level Qingyuan city.

Yingde is dominated by Hakka people, with nearly 64% people speaking Hakka (The People's Government of Yingde City, 2013). Nevertheless, in the area of the city centre and nearby villages speak the *Fucheng* dialect which is between Hakka and Cantonese. According to my fieldwork in Baikou village, as aforementioned in section two, the majority of the pre-1950s generation can only speak *Fucheng* dialect. Some of the generation of the post-1950s can also speak Mandarin and Cantonese, while nearly all the post-1960s generation can speak both Mandarin and Cantonese. The villagers prefer to be classified as belonging to Cantonese culture which, it is assumed, is more developed and advanced. People generally think Cantonese is more *Yangqi* (western style or 'posh') than *Fucheng* dialect. *Fucheng* dialect is considered too *tuqi* (rustic). *Tu* means the earth, and *qi* means energy or air (the concept of *qi* is the fundamental concept of Chinese cosmology which will be further discussed in Chapter Five). *Tuqi* is often used to describe the style of the rural people, for example, 'the dressing style is very *tuqi'* means that the dressing style is very outdated. Hans Steinmüller translated '*tuqi*' as 'countrified and coarse', which indicated that some aspects of local culture and customs are a source of embarrassment for the local people (Steinmüller, 2010: 81-96). People consciously associate themselves with Cantonese culture, which has been especially influenced by Hong Kong since the Reform and Opening Up and keep themselves apart from local customs.

---

[18] But there are also some special cases, for example, municipality directly under the central government.

2.1.3 Religion

In terms of religion (in the general sense), according to the Yearbook of Yingde Country 2015, there are four main religions in Yingde: Buddhism, Daosim, Protestant Christianity and Catholicism. In fact, in comparison with the four main religions, ancestor worship based on Confucianism is the dominant religious practice in everyday life. The majority of villages have an ancestral hall. With the resurgence of lineage activities in recent years, some big ancestral halls have been rebuilt with donations by lineage members (Figure 2.4 shows the typical ancestral hall in this region, with three main buildings and two dooryards, which will be further discussed in following chapters).

Figure 2.4 Ancestral Hall of Lu lineage in 2015

Figure 2.5 Caozhu niangniang

Figure 2.6 Xi temple (enshrining caozhu niangniang)

Meanwhile, the local deity *caozhu niangniang*, the guardian goddess of the region along the Bei River, is still widely worshiped in Yingde. Yingde is the source or fount of *caozhu niangniang* worship. Xi temple (see Figure 2.5-6), built in the Tang dynasty (618-907) near the city centre of Yingde, is the original temple enshrined *Caozhu niangniang* (Lin, 2009). Since then, the Xi temple has been rebuilt and extended many times. During the Cultural Revolution, the status of the goddess was demolished and the

temple was used as the school and office building of the Makou brigade. The present Xi temple was refurnished after 1993 by local believers (ibid., 32-39).

Ancestor halls, *Caozhu niangniang* temples and Taoist temples (Taoist deities are often enshrined together with the folk deities, for example, *Caozhu niangniang*) are often supported by members of the public, in contrast, some big Buddhist temples in this region are officially protected and were rebuilt by the government after the Cultural Revolution.

2.1.4   Resources of Yingde

Yingde is a tourist resort in Guangdong province by virtue of its beautiful karst landscape with plenty of hot spring resorts and its proximity to Guangzhou city. The geographical morphology of Yingde city is a basin, surrounded by mountains. Mountainous land accounts for 52.5% of the total land (Historical data committee, People's Public Consultative Committee of Yingde city, 2013: 5). Ying stone is the major export product of the region. Yingde also abounds in limestone, which contributes to the major production of cement in the province.

Agricultural production is mainly small-scale due to the morphological conditions. Paddy rice is the main subsistence crop. The main economic crops include yam, tea and giant Taiwanese bamboo (*Dendrocala*mu*s latiflorus*). Yingde is famous for its black tea and is one of the top producing areas in the world. Tea cultivation was the backbone of local industry even in the collective era. Since the Reform and Opening Up in 1978, the government provided lots of support to encourage the peasantry to cultivate black tea. By virtue of the advocacy and support provided by the local government, the output of black tea increased in the region and tea-shops spread rapidly throughout the city. People got used to setting a tea table in the living room or the office. Tea culture has been revived in recent years.

During the 1990s, giant Taiwanese bamboo was imported in several townships and became another significant cash crop in Yingde city. Yingde is also called the hometown of Taiwanese bamboo (*mazhusun zhi xiang*). This bamboo is easier to cultivate in semitropical regions that have a humid climate, but it demands much less water than paddy rice. Therefore, although the topography of Baikou village is relatively higher than the nearby villages which makes it difficult to store water, Taiwanese bamboo can still be well cultivated in the village. It requires a smaller labour force than paddy rice and other dry-land crops, for example, cassava, peanut, and soy-bean. The farmers only need work on these crops between May and October every year. Baikou was the poorest village in the region for its shortage of water. The poor-quality land in the village was of no interest to neighbouring villages, as a result, Baikou residents were able to reclaim a vast area of land around the village in the 1980s and early 1990s.[19] This laid a good foundation for the cultivation of bamboo during the mid-1990s (an issue that will be further discussed in Chapter Four). The apparent disadvantage of the poor-quality land helped the Baikou villagers enclose all the nearby land, which surprisingly made them one of the richest villages in the region.

2.1.5   Administrative unit

At present, the local government of China consists of five levels of administration, including the provincial (province, autonomous region, municipality, and special administrative region), prefecture, county, township or street, and administrative village (*xingzheng cun*) or Residents' Community (*juweihui*). Street and township are both the primary level of the government. Street is usually the term used in the more urbanised areas with most of the non-agricultural population, while the township comprises a mainly agricultural population. In terms of governance, there is no obvious distinction between the street and township. The township is composed of administrative villages and the street is composed of residents' communities. The administrative village and the residents' community are the lowest autonomous units which are often composed by several natural villages (*ziran cun*) or villager teams (*cunmin xiaozu*). The former

---

[19] Since the mid-1980s, the village has reclaimed lots of land and started to cultivate peanuts, which has improved their income (this will be further discussed in the next chapter).

mainly comprises an agricultural population and the latter is mainly composed of a non-agricultural population.

The administrative hierarchy in China comprises five tiers: national or central government, provincial government, prefectural government, county government, and township government (or street government). Baikou village is a village team (based on Baikou production team in the collective era). At that time, the Baikou village team was subordinate to the Chengxi Residents' Community of Langping Street. Chengxi Residents' Community was preceded by the Maokou brigade in the collective era. It changed to the 'Makou administrative' around 1980 and later changed to be Chengxi Residents' Community in 2010 when it was absorbed into the city centre of Yingde city. In the collective era, Makou brigade (the present Chengxi Residents' Community) was subordinated to Fucheng commune, which is nearly identical to the present Yingde city. Since 2005, Yingde city has consisted of Langping Street (*Langping jiedao)* and 24 townships. The majority of the population in the townships is agricultural while the majority of the population of Langping Street is non-agricultural. During the collective era, Yingde city was known as the Fucheng commune, which consisted of approximately 28 brigades and hundreds of production teams. Economically, Langping Street is the wealthiest administrative area in Yingde city.

The senior community members still tend to call Baikou village a 'production team' (*shengchan dui*). During the collective era, collective activities among these teams who were in the same brigade were very frequent and included dam, irrigation system and road construction, and the meetings of both ideological and school education. Also, intermarriage among the teams promoted social communications within the brigade. However, since the Reform and Opening Up, such communications have tended to be eliminated. The generation born before the 1990s still has quite close social networks with the nearby villages, while the generation born after the 1990s often do not even know people who are from the same community.

2.1.6 Traffic, economics and demography

Figure 2.7: Per capita GDP, Comparison between Yingde city, Guangdong province and China between 2005 and 2014

Yingde is approximately 90 kilometres from Shaoguan city and approximately 80 kilometres away from Qingyuan city (see Figure 2.3). The road network was relatively slow due to the mountainous topography, but improved when the much faster Guangdong section of the G4 Beijing-Hongkong-Macau expressway opened in 2003, and the Guangle expressway in 2014. Before the two expressways became available, the poor transport network of Yingde acted as a brake on its economic development. Yingde was one of the most economically backward areas in Guangdong province (see Figure 2.7). The per capita GDP of Yingde was much lower than Guangdong province as a whole and even the national average for China. In addition, when Wuguang high-speed railway started operating in 2012, the time taken to travel to the provincial city Guangzhou was largely shortened: it now took about 40 minutes from Yingde to Guangzhou and about 80 minutes to Shenzhen city, the first special economic development zone in China. Before the high-speed railway was built up, it took nearly three hours to Guangzhou and nearly five hours to Shenzhen.

Three rivers run through Yingde: the Bei, Lian and Wen rivers, connecting Yingde with Shaoguan and Guangzhou. Waterway transportation has been important since ancient times. However, flooding continues, even now, to pose a serious threat to some villages,

even though many dams were constructed to reduce the frequency of flooding in the collective era.

Figure 2.8 Permanent residents and registered residents of Yingde city between 1988 and 2014

Figure 2.9: Population of Guangdong province between 2005 and 2014

The population of Yingde city increased 3.98% from 1,053,600 in 2005 to 1,095,500 in 2014 (Statistics Bureau of Yingde city) (see Figure 2.8). The total population of Guangdong province increased by about 15.77% from 91,940,000 in 2005 to 106,440,000 in 2014 (Guangdong Statistics Yearbook) (see Figure 2.9), which is far faster than that of Yingde city.

2.2 Genesis of Baikou village

According to the record of Chengxi Residents' Committee, the registered population of Baikou village was 339 in 2015. In 1979, early stage of the Reform and Opening Up, the population of Baikou was only 188 (see Table 2.1). Since the Reform and Opening Up, the population of Baikou village has experienced the biggest increase among villages in the region. On the one hand, the rapid rise of the population should be attributed to improved healthcare provision. In spite of the lack of official record, the interviews in the villages in the region highlighted that infant mortality was higher before the 1960s. Many families suffered from infant mortality. On the other hand, the motivation to raise a son and the improved economic climate were also significant factors. During the practising of one-Child-policy, civil servants violating the policy have to resign and even receive a heavy fine. Peasants would face fine or sometimes confiscation of their possessions for violation. Despite the harsh policy, families continue to take the risk of having more children until they have a son.

Village	Population (1979)	Household (1979)	Size (1979)	Population (2015)	Household (2015)	Size (2015)
Baikou	188	32	5.9	339	76	4.46
Liang Wu	133	25	5.3	260	60	4.3
Liuqiao	45	9	5	43	24	1.8
Kuai Wu	103	19	5.4	124	31	4
Jin Zhuyuan	73	12	6.1	107	26	4.1
Shui louxia	89	16	5.7	158	39	4.1

Pingshan	184	28	6.6	260	45	5.8

Table 2.1: Population and Household size of Baikou village in 1979 and 2015

2.2.1 The lineage village

Figure 2.10: Genealogy of the Tongs, 2015

A single-surnamed or one-surname-dominated village is also known as a lineage village, where all or nearly all the community members are kin. Multi-surnamed villages are composed of different lineages that have no blood relationship between them. According to Hui Qing, inhabiting a community is the necessary condition to develop the lineage, although the village named by surname does not have a long history in China. Only since the Sui dynasty (581-618) and Tang dynasty (618-907) did this phenomenon start to emerge, and only in the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and Qing dynasty (1644-1912), was it prevalent (Qin, 2003: 43). Therefore, as Hui Qing points out, for most of the history of the Imperial era, it is not correct to say that Chinese rural society was a self-governing lineage society (ibid., 44). Baikou is a multi-surnamed village, including 11 surnames, which is different from the other nearby villages that are all lineage villages with single surname or one dominant surname. According to the

genealogy of the Tongs (see Figure 2.10), the Tong family has been settled in Baikou village for 15 generations. Baikou people usually marry between 20 and 30, thus the history of Tong family should encompass 300-450 years. As the land quality is too poor to cultivate much paddy rice, nevertheless, Baikou has never developed into a stable and flourishing village. According to a man called Jiakun Ye who is 96-years-old, people frequently shuttled in and out of Baikou before the liberation (before 1949 when New China was established). The land was not rich enough to feed a large population. Therefore, once people found a better place, they moved away. However, since the 1940s, the population of the village has continued to increase.

Surname	Year of Move In	Hometown	Household
Tong	Qing Dynasty (Emperor Guangxu)	Nanxiong county, Shaoguan city	15
Ye -1	Republic of China (1912-1949)	Yingde city centre	13
Liu	Before 1916	Xiatai (下太)	8
Zhu-1	Before 1949	QingTang (青潭)	5
Zhu-2 (周)	Around 1925	Dadong (大洞)	5
Zhu-3 (周)	Before 1949	Yingde city	1
Chen (曹)	1940s	Qingyuan city (清远)	5
Deng	Around 1947	Xiatai	2
Bo	1948	Dadong	5

Surname	Year of Move In	Hometown	Household
Liang (梁)	1947-52 (Land revolution)	Shunde city	2
Wei (吴)	1966	Xia Baikou	4
Luo (罗)	Around 1977	Shihui Pu town, Yingde city	1

Table 2.2: The history and composition of Baikou

At present, the population of the first four lineages is similar. The Tong lineage came from Nanxiong county of Shaoguan city. It is said that the Tongs were the first family who settled down in Baikou village. The second oldest lineage of Baikou village is Ye. The most popular explanation of how the Ye moved into Baikou is that the Yes helped the Tongs win a lawsuit concerning land and in return for this the Tongs awarded lots of land to the Yes. The Tongs are regarded as the original inhabitants of Baikou, although their authenticity did not offer them superior social status in the village. Rather, the Ye families obviously hold more power in the community decision-making, which can mainly be attributed to the elites of the Ye. The former village head, Xuede Ye and the former party secretary of Chengxi Residents' Community Committee, Huantong Ye are both from the Ye lineage. Jiale Tong, a young man, from the Tongs said,

We are the biggest surname (lineage) in the village, but we do not have (excellent and powerful) people, no foresight, not civilized, like fighting inside of the lineage. If we (the Tongs) can be more solidary, Baikou should have belonged to us at that time (in the past). They dare not fight with others but only our own people. …. This is because our Tongs includes three branches and come from different places, so it is very hard to have solidarity.

The Zhus, another large lineage, also have three branches and they are from different places. The earliest branch of the Zhus came from the Dadong township of the Yingde city. Their ancestors were hired by Baikou villagers before the Liberation in 1949. They lived in others' houses at the beginning, and then settled down in the village. The second branch came from Qingtan township of Yingde city also before the Liberation. The third branch, only one family, came from Yinde city centre, moved away in the 1960s but returned to the village in 2012 as the village has increasingly demonstrated its value in various ways in recent years. The distinction between the three branches has been intentionally blurred with a view to increasing the solidarity of the lineage, though their domestic relations are not really close.

Liu, a major lineage, moved from Xiatai township in Yingde city more than 100 years ago. It is also one of the earliest and largest lineages in Baikou. The Liu lineage is, in fact, descended from two adopted brothers rather than the genetic descendants of the Liu lineage. In size, the Lius cannot compare with the other three biggest lineages, however, the village head of the 1980s, Dingliang Liu, and the present village head Anle Liu, have helped establish the prestige of the lineage.

Village Cadre	Surname
Team leader	Liu
Accountant	Tong
Cashier	Ye

Table 2.3: The members of official village committee since 2014

The four biggest lineages have greater influence in village decision-making. The village head and the main committee members are always drawn from one of the four lineages. As the Table 2.3 shows the current village cadres who took posts in 2014 are from the Lius, the Tongs and the Yes. Table 2.4 lists the village heads since the 1950s, and Table

2.5 shows the surname of the present members of the *lishihui* (village committee), which to some extent provides evidence that lineage power is closely aligned with village governance. The nearby lineage villages show the same phenomenon – for example, Table 2.6 shows that nearly all the village heads are from the dominant lineage.

Names of successive village heads	Period
Huantong YE	1950s
Zihe TONG	1960s
Simin YE (2-3 years) Guojin ZHU (2-3 years) Guancheng WEI (3 years) Zixiu TONG (2-3 years)	1970s
Dingliang LIU	1982-1993
Huantong YE	1994-1995
Xuede Ye	1996-2014

Table 2.4: Names of successive village heads

Surname	Number	Surname	Number
Ye	3	Deng	1
Tong	2	Chen	1
Zhu	1	Wei	1
Liu	1	Liang	1

Table 2.5: Composition of Lishihui (village committee)

Village	Birth year of Village head	Education	Surname of village head	Surname of majority	Household number of the village	Household number of the bigger lineage
Liang Wu	1958	Primary school	Liu	Liu	45	45
Liuqiao	1978	Middle school	Lin	Lin	24	24
Kuai Wu	1978	Middle school	Kuai	Kuai	31	31
Qingyun Tang	1965	Middle school	Ye	Ye	68	47
Jin Zhuyuan	1976	Middle school	Zheng	Zheng	26	20
Shui Louxia	1975	Middle school	Li	Zen	39	29
Hongtian	1970	Middle school	Deng	Zhu	63	10
Wei Wu	1964	Primary school	Wei	Wei	64	57
Lao Wu	1951	Middle school	Mo	Mo	38	38
An Shan	1964	Primary school	Xie	Xie	45	34
Zhiji Tongg	1967	Middle school	Li	Li	73	60

Table 2.6 Heads of the nearby villages

2.2.2 Minor families in Baikou

The Chens came from Qingyuan city in the 1930s. Weifu Chen moved to Baikou from Qingyuan city, as a cowherd, and worked for his uncle whose surname is Ye, and then moved away from Baikou only two years later after his nephew moved in. He soon married a daughter from the Lius, and then introduced his younger brother, Jinbing Chen, to move into the village too. Jinbing Chen was a widower with only a daughter. His daughter married a son of the Yes. A widow married Jinbing Chen and brought with her two sons with the surname Deng. This at least is the first version of the Deng's origin. The second version is: the Dengs moved from Xiatai township (which is about one hour drive from Baikou) about two years before the Liberation. But before moving to Baikou, they stayed in Wangbu township for a short time. They then came to Baikou as casual labourers for a rich family who had moved away after they were robbed by the local bandit.[20] The Bos moved from Dadong township of Yingde city around 1948 and were adopted by the Weis. However, after the parents passed away, the adopted son changed his surname back to Bo. The Liangs moved from Guangzhou city to Yingde city during the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945), and then moved into Baikou during the Land Reform period (1947-1952). At that time, all the villages were very open to accepting new community members because the government was advocating the unification of all the peasants of the world (*Tian xia nongmin yijia qin*). In 1966, responding to the policy that 'small villages merge into a big village', Xia Baikou and Shang Baikou merged as Baikou village, and the two families of Wei moved from the Xia Baikou to Shang Baikou at that time. Before 1966, Baikou was separated into Shang Baikou and Xia Baikou (or upper Baikou and lower Baikou). Shang Baikou is in the south of the village, and the Xia Baikou in the north. Their 100 *mu* land and some mountain land was merged into Shang Baikou too. From 1966 onwards, the village changed its name to 'Baikou'. The last family, Liu, moved from Shihui Pu township of Yingde city around 1977. The brother of the Luo taught Zixiu Tong, the team leader of

---

[20] The old man Jiakun Ye said, 'Baikou is a multi-surnamed village, so lots of bandits bullied us and robbed us before the liberation. My second uncle was killed by the bandits'. By 1930 the country's total bandit population was conservatively estimated at twenty millions (Billingsley, 1988: 1). As Billingsley suggested, banditry was one of the commonest peasant reactions to oppression and hardship (ibid., 2). The huge bandit population to some extent indicated the chaos and the poverty of the society in the era of the Republic.

the 1970s, to drive a tractor; as an exchange, Zixiu Tong invited his brother to move into Baikou. Since then, the lineage composition of the village has remained the same.

2.3 Genesis of Baikou New Village

Baikou village was selected by the county government as an early 'model village' in 1996 whilst the New Village was established in 1997. This project can be considered as an initial trial of the New Village building project at the local level. Guangdong province is the leading province in terms of economic development and policy experimentation since the Reform and Opening Up. In most democratic western countries, a new policy is often made up based on anticipation and assumption. According to the policy cycle, the conventional way to describe the chronology of a policy process often includes agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision making, implementation, and evaluation (eventually leading to termination) (Jann and Wegrich, 2007: 43). However, in China, before a national policy is implemented there is a period called policy experimentation (*zhengce shidian*) when the central government select some places to practise the new policy. This institution, to some extent, shows its advantage in the context of China. As Sebastian Heilmann suggested, 'Policy experimentation is frequently highlighted as a potent means to facilitate institutional innovation, and avoid reformist leaps in the dark by injecting bottom-up initiative and local knowledge into the national policy process' (Heilmann, 2008: 1-26). Baikou as a model of New Village, can be considered as an experimental point (*shidian*) of the New Village programme in Yingde city. Baikou New Village is the first Chinese New Village in Yingde city and possibly one of the earliest in China. As a model village, Baikou was developed as an example that other villages in the region could learn from when planning their own redevelopment. The village received many visits from officials who intended either to establish a New Village or to research relevant projects. As a model village, Baikou provided an exemplar of the ideal new village. Since the Reform and Opening Up, the Chinese government sent government officials on overseas visits to learn from the developed countries as an initial step towards opening the market and reforming the structure of national economic development (Coase and Wang, 1988). In

1996, the secretary of Yingde city visited some villages in Taiwan. When he came back to Yingde, he decided to build a Chinese New Village based on the Taiwanese model.

2.3.1 Why Baikou?

The reason why Baikou village was selected for redevelopment can be ascribed to four main advantages. First of all, Baikou village is one of the nearest villages to the city that owned the largest territory in the region – approximately 3,000 *mu*.[21] It was considered to have great potential for the future expansion of the city centre (The issue of land transfer from cultivated land to commercial or industrial land will be further discussed in the Chapter Four).

Second, Baikou was better placed, economically than neighbouring villages at that time. Since the mid-1980s, Baikou had reclaimed lots of wasteland and started to cultivate peanuts, which improved their economic position (this will also be further discussed in the Chapter Four). Then in the mid-1990s, Baikou imported giant Taiwanese bamboo, which greatly improved their income. By 1996, the per capita annual net income of Baikou village was approximately 5,000 yuan (according to the villagers' estimate), that is, even more than the per capita net income of Langping street ten years later in 2006 which was only 3,668 yuan according to the record of the Yearbook of Yingde City (2006b). According to Park's investigation, the share of non-agricultural income in total rural household net income increased from 22.3% in 1990 to 52.4% in 2004 in China (Park, 2008: 51). Nevertheless, agricultural income was always the main income in Baikou before 2012, when the government expropriated most of their land – an issue I return to in the Chapter Four.

Thirdly, like many other villages in China, the existing personal relationship between the village leader and the township leader plays an influential and positive role in the project's application. The former secretary of the Chengxi Community Committee

---

[21] 1 *mu* = 666.67 square meters. In ancient China, the unit of land is not calculated by the size of the land but by the output of the land. From the Zhou dynasty (1050-771 B.C.), land was gradually calculated more precisely using the unit *mu* (Chen, 2015: 16).

Huantong Ye (born in 1955) is from Baikou village. This New Village project was originally to be carried out in a nearby village called Kuai Wu that is closer to the city centre and also owned plenty of land. However, Huangtong Ye strongly recommended Baikou to the party secretary of Langping street. Therefore, Baikou became the model village instead of Kuai Wu.[22] The former village head Xuede Ye (born in 1957) is another figure that made a great contribution to the New Village project. Xuede Ye said that the New Village was his ideal so he felt very happy when it was completed. But he was also very disappointed because people do not appreciate his contribution at all. Indeed, people show him no gratitude and many complain of his 'suspicious corruption'. Both Huantong Ye and Xuede Ye are considered to be the most significant figures in building the Baikou New Village but neither of them has been involved in the project since 2014. Huantong Ye fled from Yingde because of corruption charges. Xuede Ye was dismissed in 2014, having also been suspected of corruption.

Fourthly, in the early 1990s, because of the rapid rise in population, new houses were in demand. However, there was no land available for building in the old village. Several families had therefore built new houses outside the old settlement. The expansion of the original settlement was therefore particularly desirable.

2.3.2 Funding

In 1997, the total cost of a 2.5-storey house was approximately 60,000 yuan.[23] The county government promised to meet half of the cost (30,000 yuan), and the villagers who hoped to build a new house would be expected to pay the rest (30,000 yuan).

---

[22] According to my fieldwork in Lianhe village and Langxi village in Zhejiang province, the two model villages received more than ten million yuan during the construction of the New Village. But the nearby villages which are in a very similar condition in the sense of economics, demography and geography received very limited financial support from the government. For these two villages, the personal relationship between the village leaders and the township government officials played a crucial role too. In other words, *guanxi* is at least one of the determinants in becoming a model of New village in a democratic rural society (this will be further discussed in Chapter Five).

[23] As aforementioned, the per capita annual net income was approximately 5,000 yuan, and a core family at least would have 10,000 yuan annual net income, which means a core family is able to build a new house in around six years (without calculating the price inflation and the unstable market price of the agricultural products.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the only collective income had been from the plough and pool leasing in Baikou village, which was very low to rent. The plough is only 30 yuan per mu per year even in 2016. Thus the village cannot be self-supporting for this housing project. Nevertheless, most villagers wanted to join the project, though some young couples could not afford even the 30,000 yuan. Some families borrowed money from their kin or friends, mainly from close kin. In a short time, 42 households decided to join the project and paid the 10,000 yuan deposit, and soon after, they paid the remaining 20,000 yuan. The government initiated the project before the funding was made ready, but they were in fact not able to pay the 30,000 yuan per house they promised. The final total cost per house was approximately 80,000 yuan. Both government and the household paid more than the original plan. Xuede Ye said,

There was no preparation for this project at all. There was no budget. You solved the problems whenever you met them. As Chairman Mao said, 'No matter if you have unsuitable conditions, you must go ahead' (you tiaojian yao shang, mei tiaojian yeyao shang). …… The party secretary of the Yingde city initiated this project but in fact, he did not give me appropriate help. If you (meaning the party secretary) cannot give me money, at least you should give some policies. But he just said, 'you should solve the problem by yourself.' … At that time, we bought lots of construction materials on credit. However, the bosses (of the companies of the construction materials) had petitions when we could not pay back the debt. The journalist of China Central Television (CCTV) even interviewed me. But this is my problem and I cannot pass the buck to the higher (civil servant of the higher level's government). The debt has yet to be repaid even today, but time solved all the problems. The bosses forgot the debt as time went by. We recruited lots of construction teams. The debt of each team is not so high, so some of them just ignored it if they earned lots of money from other projects. In general, this project gives the villagers good living conditions, but it caused some bad influence on the society.

In 1997, Yingde city was a very backward county in economic terms, due to its inconvenient traffic conditions and undeveloped industrial sector. The project's financial crisis, mentioned by Xuede Ye, was a controversial issue in 2000. At that time, there was a group protest by construction workers and building material dealers. The *Beijing Morning* reported that, "The peasants build villas with heavy debt – such a 'well-to-do life' (*beng xiaokang*) in Yingde city, Guangdong province". The report shows that the village was in debt to the construction companies and building material dealers for about 1.6 million yuan. The heavy debt should be attributed to the poor management of the Yingde government – 'the condition of the house in which you live determines whether you reach the well-to-do life' (*xiaokang bu xiaokang, guanjian kan zhufang*) (*Beijing Morning*, 2003, see in *People*, 2003).

Around 2000, and because of the financial crisis, the New Village project drew a lot of media attention. It was beleaguered as a showcase project in which the local government intended to achieve the blueprint of a better life that was proving to be beyond their real (economic) capability. According to an investigation undertaken by the newspaper *Beijing Morning*, the government eventually expropriated and sold a piece of land worth 1.8 million yuan from Baikou village to pay back the debt (*ibid.*) (we will discuss the land expropriation issue in Chapter Four). The result of this investigation contradicts the explanation of Xuede Ye that I quoted above. It is still a sensitive issue, making all the stockholders vigilant. As a result, I was unable to collect detailed data relating to the highly sensitive debt issue during my fieldwork.

To a large extent, the funding for building a new village relied on selling land in Yingde city. At present, the principal of the funding for New Village construction called the 'Tripartite payment' involves the local government, the village (as a unit) and the farmer each contributing one-third of the cost of new builds. However, the government only supports some of the public infrastructures New Village projects. In the Chengxi Residents' Community Committee, for example, this extends to the piped water system, sewage system, road and waste collection systems. The funding of these public infrastructures comes from the appropriate government departments. In most cases, the

foundations of new houses in Chengxi Residents' Community were paid by the village's collective income, mainly, from the compensation of the land expropriation in the 2000s. There are benefits in developing an overall plan for the New Village. If there is no land expropriation, the village committee would receive little collective income. In other words, the compensation of land expropriation is largely the only collective income for the majority of villages in Chengxi Residents' Community.

2.3.3   As a model village

Although the planning and construction of Baikou New Village met with lots of criticism due to difficult financial issues (we will discuss the land expropriation issue in Chapter Four), it has received many honours since 1997 (see Table 2.7) and has provided a model for other villages near Qingyuan city, especially in the sense of 'hygiene' or 'health' and ecology which will be further discussed in Chapter Six. Since the construction of the new village, many leading villagers in the local townships visited and learned from Baikou new village. Sometimes, even representatives from villages from other provinces come to Baikou to learn from the model. For example, in 2015, a group from Hunan province visited Baikou new village. This kind of visiting is usually organised by the local municipal government and city government.

No.	Year	Awarding	Grantor
1	1997	Civilised Village	1. Langping street communist committee 2. Langping street government
2	2000	Model village sub-committee	Langping street government
3	2007	Model Village of Ecology	Qingyuan municipal government
4	2009	Advanced village sub-committee	Langping street government
5	2009	Healthy village of Guangdong province	Patriotic Health Campaign Committee of Guangdong province

6	2010	Advanced village sub-committee	Chengxi Resident's Committee
7	2010	Livable village	Yingde city government
8	2011	Activity Centre of Popularizing Scientific Knowledge	Chengxi Resident's Committee
9	2011	Advanced village sub-committee	Langping street government
10	2012	Advanced village sub-committee	Langping street government
11	2012	Model Village of Ecology	Qingyuan municipal government
12	2013	Activity Centre of Popularizing Scientific Knowledge, Guangdong Province	Association of Science and Technology, Guangdong Province; Cultural and Ethical Progress Committee Office, Guangdong Province; General Office of Finance, Guangdong Province; General Office of Science and Technology, Guangdong Province
13	2015	Healthy village of Guangdong province	Patriotic Health Campaign Committee of Guangdong province
14	2015	Healthy village of Qingyuan city	Patriotic Health Campaign Committee of Qingyuan city

Table 2.7: List of the awards Baikou New Village received from 1997 to 2015

In implementing the policy 'Building a new socialist countryside' since 2006, Baikou is pre-eminent in building the very first 'model village' in China. Establishing a model for imitation and reproduction is a customary path in implementing a social project in China (Liu, 2011: 135). This model was much used during Mao's collective era. These models often receive large subsidies from government for infrastructure construction or sometimes even private house construction. Although Baikou new village met with financial crisis during the period of construction and was forced to sell some land, they in fact still received much more financial aid from the government than other nearby

villages. In this sense, being chosen as a model village is often considered to be very lucky. In the meantime, people are also proud of being residents of the model village project which suggests their superiority. As a result, there was much competition to be selected as the first model for New Villages.

The personal tie between the village leaders and the government officials played a significant role in this competition. In the case of Baikou village, Lianhe village and Langxi village, the village leaders made crucial contributions in winning the project for their village. The Personalist principle is the core of Confucian ethics (Weber and Gerth, 1953, Liang, 1963: 94, Fei, 1947 [2013]: 22-37, King, 1991: 63-84, Hwang, 1987: 945). While this particularistic social tie of *guanxi* (personal relationship) has been challenged and it was intended to be demolished in the early twentieth century, especially through the collectivization in the collective era (as we have mentioned in the first chapter), personal ties are still further rehearsed in social life and have become important social capital to gain access to desirable resources in the post-Mao era (Yan, 1996: 1-25, Ye, 1994).

Figure 2.11: Typical Housing of Baikou New Village

Figure 2.12: Yard of the new house

In Langxi village, Lianhe village in Zhejiang, and Wangjia village in Shandong (in the later 'beautiful village' movement), people are often proud to live in a model New Village because it indicates that their villages are good places (*hao difang*). A good place refers to both good people and a good environment. Place is a space which can be defined as relational, historical and concerned with identity (Augé, 1992: 78). Baikou villagers often try to deny that Baikou is a good place when I show my appreciation of the place, though the village is very well-known for it is a model of New Village where people live in beautiful villas (*bieshu*) (see Figure 2.11 and 2.12) and own plenty of land. The dissatisfaction mainly refers to the unequal share in the interest generated by land expropriation (this issue will be further discussed in Chapter Four). In this sense, a 'good place' is clearly more than the concept of physical space, but also refers to the spacialisation of socio-cultural value. As Giddens said, 'place' is best conceptualized by means of the idea of locale, which refers to the physical settings of social activity as situated geographically (Giddens, 1990: 18).

As a model village, Baikou new village offers an ideal or a blueprint that can be copied by other villages. According to the data I collected through photo elicitation aforementioned in Chapter Two, *yishan banshui* meaning 'nestling under mountains

56

and besides rivers' is the most frequently word used among young and old to describe the ideal landscape. To some extent, this kind of 'ideal landscape' is consistent with its historical trajectory. The subject matter of Chinese landscape painting might be the valid expression of the ideal landscape for the Chinese. Since the Sui dynasty (581-618), *shanshui* (mountain-water) has been the main subject matter of Chinese painting. For example, the painter of Northern Song (960-1126) Guo Xi's Early Spring (see Figure 2.13-2.14) is a typical Chinese *shanshui* painting. In this painting, architecture and people are minor subject matters, while mountains and water together are the dominant subject matter. Comparing the narrative of *shanshui* painting and the imagination of the ideal landscape of the Baikou villagers, the ideal landscape in fact has not changed a lot. However, the reality shows tremendous transformation. The prizes that the government has awarded to Baikou indicate the success of its vision of an ideal New Village. It should be hygienic (*weisheng*), ecologically friendly and livable, and it should be scientific, advanced and civilised. To some extent, the different 'ideals' of the New Village are the representations of the different philosophies and cosmologies. The old village accords even more with the 'ideal landscape', which represented the core idea of Chinese philosophy – *tianren heyi*. *Tianren heyi* is considered as the core idea of Chinese philosophy (Zhang, 1985: 3-10, Qian, 1991: 93-96, Li, 1998: 21-26, Ji, 1996: 11-18, Tang, 2005: 5-10). *Tianren heyi* (literally translated: *tian*-heaven; *ren*-human; *he*-integrate; *yi*-one) can be simply translated into 'the ideal of the unity and harmony of humanity and heaven' (Cua, 2013: 376). The Chinese philosopher, Yijie Tang said, '*tian*' contains three levels of meanings, god, nature and morality (Tang, 2005: 6). In this sense, the concept of '*tian*' is not the external being of mankind, rather, it is an organic, consistent, endless and active entity which includes mankind (ibid., 7). By contrast, in this light, the New Village reveals the idea of separation of nature and mankind (or culture). To be more specific, it presented the conquest and alteration of nature by mankind.

Figure 2.13-2.14 Guo Xi, Early Spring, signed and dated 1072. Hanging scroll, ink and color on silk 158.3x108.1. National Palace Museum, Taipei

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter first briefly introduced the history of Yingde city. Yingde has more than 1,700-years of history since it merged into Han culture and became a part of the Chinese Empire. Yingde can be classified as the Hakka cultural area, but in general, it shared the same mainstream of Chinese culture, for example, in terms of religion, Buddhism, Taoism and ancestor worship are the dominant religious worship and practices in Yingde. Then, to a large extent, ancestor worship was the main resource used to rebuild civil society from the 1980s after the Cultural Revolution (this will be further discussed in the following chapters), with many ancestral halls rebuilt or refurnished and lineage genealogy re-edited. The ancestor worship rituals are commonly practised in Spring. However, only the old generation (the generation before the 1950s) participate in the ritual of *caozhu niangniang* worship as it often considered as superstition rather than religion. Therefore, the revival of the folk religion in Yingde may meet more difficulties after the communist era.

Yingde is famous for its beautiful landscape, Ying stone and long history of black tea production. But before the Reform and Opening Up, Yingde city was an underdeveloped economic unit. Even nowadays, it is one of the most backward cities in Guangdong province due to the disadvantage of poor traffic. In recent years, however, as the communication network has been largely improved, the advantages of Yingde may eventually transcend the limitations of its geographical location. Both the population and GDP per capita have shown remarkable rises in recent decades. Since the 1980s, 'build the road before you get rich' (*yaozhifu xianxiulu*) has become a common saying in China. Road construction was one of the most crucial prerequisites for economic development. The local gradually linked with the nation, then with the global, through the development of the market economic. By exchanging with a bigger network, the local society has been gradually reconstructed by the external power and its internal variation, and has to search for a new order.

The second section elaborated the genesis of the Baikou village, presenting the origin of the village and the composition of its lineages. Baikou is composed of eleven lineages whose members have gradually moved to Baikou from the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) until the 1970s. It explained the general structure between the lineages, the four dominant ones and the ties between them, for example, the Ye moved to Baikou because their ancestors helped Tong, and Chen moved to Baikou because their ancestors worked for Ye. On the basis of the principal of democracy (the minority is subordinate to the majority), the four lineages enjoy more priority in decision-making in village issues due to their advantage in terms of the population (as the lineage is often very solidary). Meanwhile, the elite of the lineage often play vital roles in village affairs. The lineage elite will become the interest spokesmen of the lineage. For example, at present, the Yes are in the prior position in the issue of land expropriation and compensation mainly due to the fact that the two main leaders of the village in the past decade were from the Yes (to be discussed in Chapter Four).

In the third section, I elaborated the genesis of Baikou New Village from the perspective of model selection, funding, and its effect as a model village. The obvious

reason why Baikou was selected as the model village can be attributed to its abundance of land and the personal ties forged between the leader of the village and the leader of the residents' community. The former guaranteed the cost of building a New Village which generally can only be met by land transfer from agricultural land to commercial land (I will elaborate on this point in Chapter Four).

Baikou New Village is a typical model village and characteristic of top-down social programmes initiated by the central government. The ideal New Village should be hygienic, scientific, advanced and civilized, and present the typical imagination of the government. On the contrary, villagers imagine the ideal village quite differently, in a way that is consistent with historical representations of the ideal landscape found in fine art – in *shanshui* painting.

During the past 18 years since the new village was constructed in 1997, Baikou has been ineluctably integrated into the capitalist market by land expropriation. However, it cannot successfully change its industrial structure from an agricultural production dominated community to an industrial production dominated community. The residents agree that the living conditions are better than before, nevertheless, everyone doubts whether they can have a good life in the future after having lost all their land.

In Chapter Four I will discuss the current primary issue of Baikou village – land expropriation – which is closely associated with rural governance and the Building the Socialist New Countryside program. I will analyse land development from the perspectives of social structuration and the social strategies of social agents.

Chapter 3 Literature Review

In Chapter One I reviewed literature on the anthropological research methods that I used during my fieldwork. In this chapter I will review the theories on which my analysis is based.

3.1 Anthropology of landscape

Landscape has been an important subject in disciplines such as geography and art history, but for anthropology, this subject only drew great attention in the 1990s when many anthropologists pushed it from the background to the foreground (See, for example, Bender, 1993a, Ingold, 1993: 152-174, Ucko and Layton, 1999, Hirsch and O'Hanlon, 1995). The concept of landscape has in recent years been examined using various approaches, perspectives and theories.

Japanese anthropologist Hironao Ka-wa suggests that recent important paths in landscape studies include studying the 'production of landscape' through official and academic representations based on the concept of 'space'; and studying the 'construction of landscape' through native people's practices based on the concept of 'place' (Ka-wa, 2015: 44-59). The former focuses on the practices of ideologies and power in producing space, in other words, how the landscape is produced politically, especially in terms of the contradiction between local and colonial ideas of landscape (Harvey, 1990, Küchler, 1993, Bender, 1993, Green, 1995, Selwyn, 1995, Rutheiser, 1999, Ucko and Layton, 1999, O'Sullivan, 2001: 87-101,). On the other hand, the approach emphasizing 'landscape construction' places greater emphasis on an emic perspective and local interpretations of the landscape (Bender, 1992, Vitebsky, 1992: 223, Bender and Winer, 2001, Stewart and Strathern, 2005: 35-47). Ucko and Layton also identify two contemporary orientations in studying landscape: first, an ecological approach in which landscape is viewed as a physical and ecological entity and second, a cultural approach wherein landscape is understood as a conceptual and cultural image or representation of local surroundings (Ucko and Layton, 1999: 2). The ecological

approach treats landscape as an object external to perception but capable of description. It explains behaviour as a response to external constraints and opportunities, while the cultural approach aims to understand behaviour as meaningful. It regards landscape as the expression of an idea which the analyst must try to understand and translate into the terms of his or her own discourse as far as possible (ibid., 2). To some extent, Ucko and Layton's dichotomy shares a very similar pattern with that described by Hironau Ka-Wa. Both views emphasise that landscape is a material entity, shaped by the social and cultural while also contributing to the reproduction of the society and culture.

In this thesis, the landscape of the New Village will be examined from both perspectives. On the one hand, the new landscape of the New Village is mostly the product of a top-down policy which connotes the ideological and political indication. For example, the layout of the New Village manifests the orderliness and equality between all the households (see Chapter Five). Then the Fitness Centre, the public toilet, the garden and the Cultural Centre become the necessary elements of a New Village, associated with the ideas of nationalism and modernity (see Chapter Six). Social stratification was inscribed in the new landscape; as I explained, the first row of the New Village is considered as the rich and the politically powerful row (see Chapter Five). Also, the newer, western-style houses present the permeation of western culture and values (see Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight). In this sense, the landscape of the New Village will be read as a cultural image, following Cosgrove and Daniel's influential definition, 'landscape is a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing, structuring or symbolising surroundings' (Daniels and Cosgrove, 1988:1). On the other hand, as Hirsch argued, Daniels and Cosgrove's definition neglects what exists as a part of everyday social life, and their definition only captures one half of the experience intrinsic to landscape, ignoring the other half and the cultural processes of which both poles of experience are a part and through which both are brought into relation (Hirsch and O'Hanlon, 1995: 5). From the perspective of 'landscape construction', this thesis will also pay attention to the everyday experiences of local people in the new landscape, representing sometimes conflicting etic views.

Tim Ingold suggests two perspectives of landscape studies, namely, studying landscape under the building perspective (which he opposes) and the dwelling perspective (which he advocates) (Ingold, 2000). As a devotee of Heidegger's claims, Tim Ingold understands landscape as a 'lived-in' dwelling (Ingold, 1993: 152-174). Heidegger claimed,

We do not dwell because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is because we are dweller… To build is in itself already to dwell … Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build (Heidegger, 1971: 148, 146, 160).

Following the concept of 'dwelling', Ingold sees the landscape as a cultural process. He argues that 'the forms people build, whether in the imagination or on the ground, arise within the current of their involved activity, in the specific relational contexts of their practical engagement with their surroundings' (Ingold 1995:78). The research subject of this thesis – the landscape of the New Village - was clearly planned and established under the 'building perspective' which is not seeing 'place-as-process' (the term used by Pred (1984)) but as the execution of planning and design, reflecting the imagination of an ideal place by the 'designer and planner' (which here mainly refers to the government).

The phenomenological approach which seeks to understand landscape from the point of view of sense and experience is distinct from the earlier two dichotomies, namely, Hironao Ka-wa's production/construction of landscape, and Ucko and Layton's ecological/cultural approach of landscape studies. In comparison with the former two views, a phenomenological approach has the advantage of understanding landscape as a series of named locales, a set of relational places linked by paths, movements and narratives (Tilley, 1994: 34) which is directly felt and perceived by people, rather than as an object. Tim Ingold's 'dwelling perspective' reversed previous ways of understanding the landscape. The term landscape ceases to define a way of seeing, an

epistemological standpoint, and instead, becomes potentially expressive of being-in-the-world itself (Wylie, 2007: 149). Thus landscape is not a scene to view, but as 'life world', a world to live (ibid., 149).

Ingold's 'dwelling perspective' offers an inspiring insight into the ambivalence between the top-down planned new landscape and the *habitus* of the local. The Chinese New Villages are mostly built by planners and architects who are outsiders of the village. In the case of Baikou New Village, in 1996 the blueprint was based on the Taiwan model (when the government officials visited Taiwan). This kind of top-down planning programme ignored the process of making the landscape and lacked any understanding of the materiality of place. Rather, from the building perspective, the landscape is regarded as a scene, a visual effect or an object.

Allen Pred argues that place is a process whereby the reproduction of social and cultural forms, the formation of biographies, and the transformation of nature ceaselessly become one another at the same time that time-space specific activities and power relations continuously become one another. Meanwhile, the processes through which these phenomena are interwoven in the becoming of place or region are not subject to universal laws but vary with historical circumstances (Pred, 1984: 279). To a large extent, the way that these New Villages are produced fails to consider relevant historical circumstances. Nevertheless, the appropriation and adaptation of the local may show the process of re-making top-down planning. For example, I will explain how the traditional cosmology is fitted into the discourse of 'science' in Chapter Five. The appropriation and adaptation can be traced in the way that the villagers use the flower bed, which supposed to improve the pure aesthetical effect of the village and makes it more civilized (see Chapter Six), also in how uncertain of the centre of the new house for the local, which was based on the shared common sense in the old house (see Chapter Seven), and why the villagers build the kitchen behind the main building but transfer the one in the building to become a bedroom or storage area (see Chapter Eight).

Duncan and Duncan further suggest that landscapes can be seen as texts which are transformations of ideologies into a concrete form and that this is an important way in which ideologies become naturalised (Duncan and Duncan, 1988: 117). This thesis pays particular attention to the ideological conflicts and integration (between Confucianism, communism and neoliberalism) that are inscribed in and maybe highlighted by the new landscape. In this light, the ideological underpinnings of the landscape will draw particular attention in my analysis.

3.2 Anthropological approaches to the house

It was probably Morgan that first drew attention to the house as a material entity of social culture, in anthropological studies. Morgan's main idea was to study kinship through the house setting (Morgan, 1881). He argued that, at different stages of the society in which native Americans lived, the nuclear family was too fragile to stand on its own, and so the families lived as a form of Primitive Communalism (ibid.). Later, a famous study of the house was carried out by Mauss (Mauss, [1950] 1979). He studied the houses of the Eskimo and found that in the summer and the winter, they live in different type of house, which presented the Eskimo's cosmology and view of time and space (ibid.). Nevertheless, in recent decades, the house, or the home, came to be seen less as a backdrop or reservoir of an almost unconscious *habitus* constructed out of order and relations, instead, it became 'a mode of expression, a means by which people constructed themselves and their ideologies' (Miller, 2001: 10-11). Miller's statement may be an implicit reference to Bourdieu's study of Kabyle house, in which the house is read as the carrier of unconscious *habitus*, reflected the cognitive structure of the inhabitant (Bourdieu, 1990, Bourdieu, 1970: 151-170). The house, as the subject of anthropological study, is like landscape, an all-encompassing subject. As Carsten and Hugh-Jones stated, '... the significance of a focus on the house is that it brings together aspects of social life which have previously been ignored or treated separately. Crucially, we would consider architectural features of houses as an aspect of their importance as social units in both life and thought' (Carsten and Hugh-Jones, 1995): 20-21). My research suggests that social and family life can be understood comprehensively through an examination of the house.

The anthropology of the house experienced two waves. The first wave took place in the 1960s and 1970s, and was based on structural and symbolic analysis. Then the second one occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, which emphasised the house as a point of consumption, with more emphasis on domesticity and the home (Miller, 2001: 9). In the first wave, Levi Strauss' concept 'house society' which originated from the study of the Kwakiutl social organization, and Bourdieu's work on the Kabyle house in Algeria, were the key representative works. Levi-Strauss' concept of 'house society' engaged with the study of kinship in which the house is an institutional unit of Kwakiutl society. According to him, the house is a 'moral person holding an estate made up of material and immaterial wealth which perpetuates itself through the transmission of its name down a real or imaginary line, considered legitimate as long as this continuity can express itself in the language kinship or of affinity, and most often of both' (Levi-Strauss, 1982, see in Carsten and Hugh-Jones, 1995: 6-7). The physical house acts to solidify and objectify the relationships of alliance (Lévi-Strauss, 1987: 155-19). In China, the lineage village is often centred on the ancestral hall, which can be regarded as a typical 'house society' where the 'house' is the metonym for lineage, clan and family (see Chapter Seven). The approach taken in the first wave, in general, sees the house as a symbol, a metaphor, and an abstract structure.

Since the 1980s when symbolic anthropology and structural anthropology gradually faded from the mainstream of anthropological discussion, the study of the house also tended to be examined through the emerging theory of practice. To be specific, in the new wave, consumption within the house, the domesticity, the bodily experiences of space and the agency of the inhabitants of the house drew much more attention. As Amos Rapoport suggested, the built forms are a communicative device that are encoded with meaning as a result of human interactions with them and that they act as a mnemonic for cuing appropriate behavior (Rapaport, 1982). The interaction between the things and the people thus draw greater attention in these studies. For example, in *The Japanese house: material culture in the modern home*, Inge Daniels conducted holistic fieldwork inside the domestic arena where 'everyday life, state control and religious

intervention intertwined as abstractions and ideologies from the world of politics and religion may be transformed into personal, lived experiences, while individual and familial concerns can be elevated to a communal, national, but also otherworldly level' (Daniels, 2010: 192). In this book, she showed how the two conflicting ideologies practised in the domestic space and resulted in domestic frictions or tensions between inhabitants of the Japanese homes. The two ideologies are the family ideology that prioritise patrilineal blood ties with an emphasis on filial piety and the obligation to care for parents and ancestors, and the Western ideal that stresses the importance of the bond between the marital couple and values informal personal relationships driven by affection and spontaneous sentiment (ibid., 183). While Daniel's findings also apply to the houses of the Chinese 'New Village', the Chinese house shows another influential tradition, namely, the tradition of communism.

Victor Buchli's research on Soviet architecture, meanwhile, shows greater potential in making comparisons with the spatial organization in Chinse Socialist New Village. He found that to eradicate the petit-bourgeois consciousness, the material culture of the house was largely eliminated and simplified (Buchli, 1997: 170). This process also took place in China. In the collective era, the ancestral tablet, deity statues, traditional artefacts and so on all became regarded as superstitions to be eradicated from the domestic space or replaced by the revolutionary elements. The domestic space played an important role in carrying out the ideologies of collectivism and communism during this era. However, once the collective era ended, these eliminated elements were very soon revived in the domestic life. As Chapter Seven will show, the decoration of the living room not only includes Mao's portrait that is the remnant of the collective era, but also the portrait of the ancestor, small statues of various deities, which are traditional artefacts.

In *House form and culture*, Rapoport argues that 'What finally decides the form of a dwelling, and moulds the spaces and their relationships, is the vision that people have of the ideal life' (Rapoport, 1969: 47). The idea of the 'ideal life' originates, to some extent, from the ideology of the people, but an ideology always exists in an apparatus

(the house can be considered as an apparatus in this sense) and its practice, or practices (Althusser, 2006: 86-98). For example, Dolores Hayden argued that the patriarchal ideal that 'A woman's place is in the home' has been the one of the most important principles in architecture design and urban planning in Unitied State in the twentieth century which thoroughly divided the public and private space and constrained the potential for communal activity in a community (Hayden, 1980). In fact, this patriarchal principal is also influential to the Chinese houses in recent years. The new houses in Baikou apparently indicate the same rule, according to which every house can be a completely independent unit, avoiding cooperation with the neighbourhood. It also implied the tendency of neoliberalisation to be expressed in the terms of housing. As Tim Ingold argues, the properties of materials are not fixed attributes of matter but are processual and relational, thus, to describe these properties means telling their stories (Ingold, 2007: 1). In this thesis, the 'processual and relational' material objects of the house, including the structure of house and the things in the house, will be analysed from the perspective of the changing, conflicting, and integrating ideologies (see Chapter Seven and Eight).

3.3 State and society

After 1949, almost all civil organisations which had previously existed, disappeared, including the rural civil organisations such as temple fairs, clansmen's associations, ancestral halls, civil corps and so forth (Yu and Nora, 2003). As Zhenglai Deng pointed out, after the Chinese Communist Party gained control of state power in 1949, the planned economic and highly centralised political system led to the high *gleichschaltung* (standardisation and integration) of the state and the society (Deng, 2008: 10). He further explained, the high *gleichschaltung* of the state and the society has three main aspects. First, the state collectivised the rural (including the means, tools and achievements of production), and socialised the state capital. It integrated all the economic sectors into the frame of the planned economy and made economics to be the appendage of politics, which suppressed the precondition of the civil society – the market. For example, Gellner believe that only a market economy ensures that contractual associations are sufficiently flexible and adaptive to create civil society (Gellner, 1994: 100, see in Layton, 2006: 9). But this supposed precondition for civil society has been proved untenable (see Philip Huang's and Robert Layton's argument

below). Second, the state highly politicised social life and controlled public opinion. Third, in terms of administration, every individual has to be integrated into the administrative system through the unit system (*danwei zhidu*) (Deng, 2008: 10-11). These three policies shaped the *gleichschaltung* of the state and the society. For example, as in the first Land Reform, the state coercively confiscated the land from the landlord and rich peasant and redistributed the land to every peasant equally which even resulted more than one million landlords and rich peasants being killed or committing suicide (Johnson, 1983: 196-202, Rummel, 2011, Short, 2001: 436-437, Fairbank and Goldman, 2006). Then, in the later collective era from 1957 to 1978, individual rights almost completely give way to the collective or group rights.

However, since the Reform and Opening Up that began around the end of the 1970s, as the state gradually withdrew its power from the social and economic field, the relationship between state and society moved toward one of division and separation. There are four models of the relationships between the state and society. These include the strong state and weak civil society, the weak state and strong civil society, the weak state and weak civil society, and the strong state and strong civil society (He and Yu, 1998: 185). To some extent, the Reform and Opening Up tended to weaken the power of the state but strengthen the power of the society, though it is definitely still not appropriate to say China has a weak state and strong civil society. Since the 1990s, the 'state-and-society' paradigm became an accessible and useful model for understanding the social transformation and social governance in China, since the most significant transformation of China during that time was the changing relationship between state and society. For example, in terms of property rights, although the state (urban) and the collective (rural) retain the ownership of all land, the use right of land belongs to the individual or household in the rural area.

Nevertheless, the application of the 'state-and-society' paradigm in studying Chinese society has been criticized by many writers over the past three decades. For example, Philip Huang has argued that the binary opposition of the state and the society is an inappropriate model with which to study China because is an ideal abstracted from modern Western experience (Huang, 1993: 216). Rather, distinguishing between the concepts of 'civil society' and 'public sphere' of Habermas (Habermas, 1989), Huang

suggests that there is a 'third realm' between the state and the society in Chinese history. For example, in the late Qing dynasty, Huang found that the justice system is a trinary system, including the formal legal system with its codified laws and official courts; the informal justice system with its well-established customary practices for dispute resolution by kin/community mediation; and the semi-institutionalised dialogue between magisterial opinion and community/kin mediation (ibid., 226). To take another example, in administration, the unsalaried semi-official played a significant role in providing local public service and local governance (ibid., 227-228). Layton also claimed that civil society can develop without the aid of a sovereign or centralised state, and social order can be sustained in self-governing local communities (Layton, 2006). In other words, the society can be organised by its own will rather than dominated or steered by the state. Joel Migdal proposed the concept of state-in-society, which suggests a mutual constitutive relationship between the state and society (Migdal, 2001). This model therefore denied the state-centered theory and the society-centered theory, but emphasizes the agency of members of the society and the consequent dynamic relationship between state and society. Peter Evens noted that the relation between state and society is often characterised by zero-sum conflicts. In response, he suggests the state-society synergy theory. He argued that the complementarity of state and society creates objective grounds on which cooperation between government and citizens can be built. The embeddedness of state and society in the public affairs, provision of public goods, community everyday life and so forth, generates the normative and interactional basis for realizing the potential joint gains, in a non-zero sum relationship between State and society (Evans, 1996: 8). Ying Xiao has even challenged the relevance of the 'state-and-society' paradigm and asserted it has difficulty in explaining the complex mechanisms of social change in China. He suggested the 'institutions and life (or everyday life)' as the substitutive paradigm (Xiao, 2014: 88-104). The advantage of the 'institutions and life' paradigm is that it is able to present the complex mechanisms of the interplay between formal agents of the state in their institutional practice and people as independent actors in their lives (ibid., 88). To sum up, all these critiques and the substitutive paradigms attempted to overcome the dichotomous view of the relationship between the state and society that originates from the west. Some of them show ambitions to search for paradigms rooted in the context of China. Through the case study of Baikou village implementing the

New Village programme, this thesis aims to use historical comparative studies to show the dynamic relationship between the state and society and also explore the logic of practice in executing a top-down policy or launching a top-down national movement.

Although the critiques advanced by these scholars revealed the state-and-society paradigm's limitations, a dynamic version of the state-and-society frame is still a useful angle from which to analyse the process of the New Village movement in this thesis. In other words, the top-down national Building the Socialist New Village Movement clearly presents the complex mechanisms of the social change in China from the perspective of the state-and-society. In this thesis, this analytical framework includes three main perspectives.

First, the relationship between the state and society has been explored from the perspective of social strategies. The relationship between the top-down policy of the state and the local social strategies has been examined in many aspects in the Building the Chinese New Village programme. Chi-Pui Cheung used an ethnography of urban change in Jiangxi province to show the gap between ideal state policy and actual policy implementation created by individuals enacting state policies (Cheung, 2012). Cheung, and also Feizhou Zhou, suggested that fiscal reform directly resulted the revenue of the local government and the explosive land transfer in the most recent two decades (this will be further discussed in Chapter Four) (ibid., 293-328; Zhou, 2007). Harry Harding noted that the implementation of policy will be poor when policy directives are vague (Harding, 1981: 350-351). O'Brien and Li noted that there is a pattern of selective policy implementation in the Chinese countryside as some cadres conscientiously enforce unpopular policies for the village but refuse to carry out the locally popular ones (O'Brien and Li, 1999: 167). Therefore, they suggested that liberalised rules of political standing are needed to prevent ground-level bureaucrats from thwarting measures designed to limit their power and enhance their accountability (ibid., 170). The interaction between the institutional arrangement (or the state) and the social strategies of the social actors shows, in other words, the relationship between structure and action. In this sense, Bourdieu's practices theory (1990) and Gidden's structuration (1984) provided theoretical resources in analysing the relationship of state and society. For example, the modernisation of rural areas seen from the perspective of the state (the

slogan of the movement) and its local interpretations show the power of tradition (which opposes the ideal of modernisation) and the inevitable social stratification (which is counter to the ideal of socialism) that is embedded in the new landscape of the New Village (in Chapter Five).

Second, following the perspective of the classic economists, North and Thomas found that property ownership is the key factor in economic growth, but the efficient property ownership (which means more beneficial to increase the economy) is one of many results of the interaction between the state and society (or individual) (North and Thomas, 1973). North found that the state simultaneously wants to maximize the rent and maximize tax through increasing the land exchange fee, therefore, there is always conflict between the two different intentions. It explained why some inefficient ownership system have existed in the human history (North, 1981, see Zhou, 1995: 179). In this light, it also explained why, after the tax reform in 1994 which decreased the tax income of the local government (see Chapter Four), the land revenue, that is, rents from leasing local government land, became the main source of income for local government. However, there are escalating conflicts between the local government, the village (or the collective) and the individual peasant on the issue of property ownership, specifically, the land transfer, after the economic reform in China in the 1980s (Zhou, 1995: 178-189, Gui and Tao, 2011: 104-110, Zhou, 2007). The left wing and the right wing hold obviously very different view on the issue of land privatisation or property ownership in contemporary China, which is also reflected their different ideas of the relationship between state and society. For example, the right-wing economist Qiren Zhou insists that the efficiency of land development can only be achieved under the private ownership system (Zhou, 2004). Qiren Zhou pointed out that the collective ownership is neither 'collective or collaborative private ownership', nor simply the state ownership. It is a kind of social system that is controlled by the state while the adverse effect of the social system is suffered by the collective (ibid., 181). Therefore, he suggests this is a very ineffective ownership system which constrained economic development (ibid.). On the other hand, left-wing scholars claimed that the collective ownership of the rural land is the foundation of socialist China. As Xuefeng He asserted, privatisation will result in the polarisation of the rich and the poor (He, 2010). Also, Sargeson claimed collective ownership could contribute to the building of civil

society in rural China (Sargeson 2016). However, the escalating social conflicts and the increasing rich-poor gap of the countryside may be negative evidence against this proposition. Chapter Four will give an analysis on this debate through the specific case study in Baikou New Village, and section 3.4 of my review will focus on the transformation of China's class structure.

Third, following the perspective of deliberative democracy derived from Habermas (1985), the thesis will also pay attention to explaining how the community members participate in public affairs, becoming a self-governing community. In other words, it will explore the resources for re-establishing civil society in rural China. Habermas asserted 'all arguments, be they related to questions of law and morality or to scientific hypothesis or to works of art, require the same basic form of organisation, which subordinates the eristic means to the end of developing intersubjective conviction by the force of the better argument' (ibid., 36). Unfortunately, the descending reciprocal relationship in the community life and the zero-sum game in the issue of land transfer, to some extent, urged the emergence of the free riders who impeded the way to shape the 'intersubjective conviction' (see Chapter Four and Chapter Six). As Layton said, mutual aid in community life is based on non-contractual relationships which provides free space for the villages to create and contest them 'without interference from beyond the village'. Mutual aid is 'a field where it is within the power of villagers to negotiate their own standards by which to judge the validity of each others' actions' (Layton, 2000: 193). The development of deliberative democracy, therefore, also depends on the system of reciprocal relations in the village.

To sum up, in this thesis, the paradigm of state and society is the dominant analytical framework with which to understand the social transformation of rural China, and to explore the ideological conflicts and integration in the New Village programme. In other words, the blueprint and the implementation of the Chinese Socialist New Village programme is, to some extent, a mirror that shows the relation of the state and society in contemporary China.

3.4 Transformation of China's class structure

In the Introduction, we have mentioned that the increasing rural-urban gap and social inequality were the main incentives to launch the Chinese Socialist New Village Programme. The growing social stratification has become a new social problem after the Reform and Opening Up. Xueyi Lu categorised ten types of social class that emerged in contemporary China based on the possession of three kinds of resources – economic resources, cultural resource and organisational resources, including the managers of the state and society, managers of enterprises, private entrepreneurs, professional and skilled employees, office staff, self-employed businessmen and so forth (Lu, 2002: 55-63). It shows that the formation of social strata in Chinese society has emerged. Unfortunately, this formation of social strata is not a reasonable structure for a modern society for these four reasons: 1) the proportion of the farming labourer is too high among the population with 44% in 1999; 2) the proportion of the middle class is too low with only approximately 15% in 2002; 3) the social status of the higher class is not accepted by the lower ones because of the inequitable resource distribution; 4) the structure of the social strata is in regional disequilibrium (ibid.). Many studies show that the social order confronts challenges associated with the increasing social differentiation and inequality (Sun et al., 1998: 1-17, Sun, 2002: 9-15, Lu, 2002).

There are two dominant traditional sociological theories of social class. The first approach originates from Marx, and concerns class differentiation originating from the unequal possession of the means of production. Later, the neo-Marxian class theory follows Marxian class theory by emphasizing the determinant role of the objective economic structure in class division. As Frank Parkin said, an individual's position within a class hierarchy is determined by his or her role in the production process, and political and ideological consciousness is determined by class position (Parkin, 1979: 355-374). Another tradition, stemming from Weber, provides a multidimensional approach, suggesting that social stratification emerges from the interplay of the three components of power within a community – class (economic), status (prestige) and power (political) (Weber et al., 1964). Market capabilities or, in other words, the ability to exploit the market, are the determinant power in class division according to Weberian class theory (Weber, 1978). Based on the critiques of the two traditional class theories,

Bourdieu developed a relational approach or relational thinking model which attempted to integrate the object-subject dichotomy. According to the so-called relational thinking model, Bourdieu suggests to analyse class from the interplay between the field and the capital (including economic capital, social capital, cultural capital and symbolic capital) (Bourdieu, 1977). Bourdieu's class theory will be examined on the issue of *guanxi* (or social capital) in Chapter Five.

On the basis of these class theories, some Chinese social scientists also developed models specifically for Chinese social stratification. For example, Lizhong Xie suggests that social stratification should be considered as a pluralistic discourse, which takes 'social stratification' as a 'discourse reality' constructed by specific social members with certain specific strategies when constrained and guided by a specific discourse system (Xie, 2008: 68-101). Chunguang Wang discussed the non-equilibrium between current Chinese social strata in change and their impact on the social development and order, in the light of the social equilibrium theory. He found that the legislation lag of the social strata (in other words, lack of social recognition and social trust), has led to the non-equilibrium between these social strata (Wang, 2005: 58-77). Xin Liu developed a 'power generation theory' to explain the mechanism of social stratification in contemporary China. He found that the socialist market economy not only encouraged the state public power to look for opportunities for profiting from rents in the state-owned enterprises, but also non-state enterprises. He argued that in the process of marketisation and reform of decentralisation and profit-sharing, public power generates 'rent-seeking ability' which it exerts as redistributive power. The basic institutional arrangement of a socialist market economy determines that redistributive power, rent-seeking ability, and marketability together constitute the dynamic basis of social stratification (Liu, 2005: 1-25). To some extent this argument agrees with my findings on the issue of land transfer in Baikou New Village, in which I discussed how the ambiguous property ownership and the structure of tax policy encouraged rent-seeking of the local government from the land transfers (see Chapters Four and Six).

Chinese class stratification has been transformed from a rigid status hierarchy under Mao to an open, evolving class system in the post-Mao period (Bian, 2002: 91). However, this open and evolving class system also shows the differentiated and unequal

distribution of the population. At the village level, the New Village project provided a big contribution to Baikou's urbanisation and made Baikou the most prosperous village in this region. In addition, the former village head and party secretary of Chengxi Residents' Community's personal *guanxi* with the former mayor of Yingde county played a significant role in winning this project for Baikou. At the level of family and individual, when the village was substantially de-agriculturalised and most land was transferred to real estate companies in the 2010s, social stratification was also aggravated. The first row of new houses was considered as the 'high class' of the village, consisting of the previous and present village leaders. It indicates that this increasing differentiation is not only the result of how much land the family possessed, but also arose because some people have more political power than the others. This political power partly was determined by the size of the lineage someone belongs to (see Chapter Five). The case of Baikou indicates that social stratification may cause the collapse of social trust in the community, because it is hard for community members to believe that they continue to share common interests. In addition, the desire to distinguish their identity and become the 'middle class' can be traced in the house décor (for example, putting a tea table in the living room, setting a wine shelf in the dining room or between the dining room and living room, building more bathrooms and so forth, see Chapter Seven). As Ann Anagnost found, the separation of the various new social strata follows the logics of consumerism, and the success of the middle-class is measured in commodified expressions of social distinction (Anagnost, 2008: 504).

Li Peilin wrote: '… very profound economic and social changes have taken place in China in the 20 years since the reform.... It is imperative to solve the social issues of the gap between the rich and the poor, environmental pollution, corruption and poverty during economic growth and it is of utmost importance to establish a common concept of social justice under a market economy' (Li, 2002: 45). The Chinese Socialist New Village programme aims to carry forward the socialist tradition of the country, unfortunately, due to the lack of a common concept of social justice, or more precisely, lack of a healthy civil society and a self-governing system, social stratification and class conflicts have even intensified in Baikou in recent years.

3.5 Structure and agency

Marx said, 'Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past' (Marx, [1852]1963). This statement underlines the dynamic relationship between structure and agency. In contemporary social science, 'structure and agency' are regarded as an opposing dichotomy. The conceptions of structure focus on its constraining nature and fail to recognise its empowering aspects, while the conceptions of agency are related to the creative, contingent and unstructured component of social life (Hays, 1994: 59). As Sharon Hays concluded, the actual use of the term 'structure' varies widely. For instance, Gusfield refers social structure to institutions (Gusfield, 1984); Skocpol and Theda views it consists of the relations between states, between classes, and between state and class (Skocpol and Theda, 1979); Berger see it as material circumstances (Berger, 1981); to Bellah, it is said to include such features as the economy and the state (Bellah, 1985, Geertz, 1977: 6); Geertz equates it with 'political instruments,' 'institutions,' and the 'power element' (Geertz, 1977: 331, 337, see in Hays, 1994: 58). By contrast, the actual use of the term 'agency' often refers to individual choice (for example, Alexander, 1987, Becker, 1981, Elster, 1989), or human action in general (for example, Blumer, 1986, Douglas, 1970, Garfinkel, 1967, Giddens and Dallmayr, 1982, Giddens, 1984, Mehan and Wood, 1975: 509-530) (see in Hays, 1994: 59). Although there are many social scientists who have researched the relationship between structure and agency, Giddens and Bourdieu have been particularly influential.

Giddens' structuration theory explained how the individual influences the reproduction of the social system. Giddens defined structuration as 'The structuring of social relations across time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure' (Giddens, 1984: 376). Bourdieu's influential concept of *habitus* is also a theory of structure-agency. He defined *habitus* as:

> *...systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or*

an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them (Bourdieu, 1990: 53).

The two theories can be categorised as "co-deterministic" suggesting social phenomena arise from inter-actions between agency and social structure (Dépelteau, 2008: 51). Both of them reject the mode of ontological dualism to explain the relationship between structure and agency, but emphasises the indiscernible relation between the two. Individual goals and social norms are not necessarily present at the beginning of the analysis but are themselves the outcome of a prior collective construction process (Rasche and Chia, 2009: 716). As Giddens suggests, the actors are potentially reflexive enough, and their social systems open and plural enough, to free their activity from mindless reproduction of initial conditions (Giddens, 1984, Giddens, 1991, see Whittington, 2006: 615). In everyday life, people negotiate the constraints handed down to them through a constant stream of tricks, stratagems and manoeuvres" (ibid., 615).

If we see the structure as 'state' or 'institution' (as we have discussed in section three of this chapter) and the agency as 'human action', 'social action' or 'social strategy', contrasting the terms shows its validity in analysing the game-like relationship between the municipal government, the local government, the rural elites and the villagers in land development and New Village programme. In Chapter Four, I will focus on the creativity and agency of the social actors in maximising their self-interest in land requisition. The social strategies that were taken in the distribution of benefits are complex practises emerging from institutional agendas, historical and cultural contexts and individual agency. Both Bourdieu (1990) and Giddens (1984) argued that culture is realized in the very playing of strategies (see Layton, 2000: 121). In Chapter Five, *guanxi* (social capital), as a form of agency which offers the potential for corruption, will be discussed. Then, the way to organise the new space of the village and the way in which the local people use the space (including both the public space and domestic space) demonstrate the agency of the local people in constructing and consuming space (see Chapter Five, Six and Seven,). In Chapter Eight, I will discuss the tendency for the individualisation and the transformation of family relationships that shows the conflicts and integration of Confucianism and Neoliberalism. 'Individualism' may be the antonym of 'collectivism' or 'communism' which Chinese Communist

Party aims to advocate through collectivisation. As Tocqueville said, the word 'individualism', which we have coined for our own requirements, was unknown to our ancestors, for the good reason that in their days every individual necessarily belonged to a group and no one could regard himself as an isolated unit (De Tocqueville, 1998 [1955]: 96). Before the Reform and Opening Up, the word individualism used to be criticized in China. However, after the reform, marketisation accelerated the process of individualisation. As Lash and Urry argued, the accelerating individualisation process generated by capitalism is ''a process in which agency is set free from structure, a process in which, further, it is a structural change itself in modernisation that so to speak forces agency to take on powers that heretofore lay in the social structures themselves' (Lash and Urry, 1994: 5).

3.6 Temporality

The concept of time has been studied by philosophers and scientists both in the West and also in China since ancient times. It was, however, only during the 1970s and 1980s that anthropologists start to pay more attention to time as a focus (Munn, 1992: 93-123). In this thesis, the concept of temporality offered a significant dimension to explore the social change and the rural planning in the light of the three dominant ideological conflicts and integration in the New Village programme that provide the theoretical focus of this thesis.

Johannes Fabian in *Time and the other* argued that, in the West, the concept of time was transformed from the initial secularisation of the Judeo-Christian notion of history during the Renaissance to its revolutionary naturalisation in the course of the nineteenth century (Fabian, 1983: ix). In the Judeo-Christian tradition time was thought of as a sequence of specific events that befall a chosen people, while the abstract 'universal Time' was established concretely and politically in the Renaissance in response to both classical philosophy and to the cognitive challenges of the earth's circumnavigation (ibid., 2-3). Unlike old sacred Time, the new naturalised Time was no longer the vehicle of a continuous, meaningful story; it was a way to order an essentially discontinuous and fragmentary geological and paleontological record (ibid., 14). He further pointed out that civilization, evolution, development, acculturation,

modernisation (and their cousins, industrialisation, urbanisation) are all terms whose conceptual content derives from evolutionary Time (ibid., 17). This linear evolutionary Time, which supposes a history progressing toward a better state in the future, influenced Morgan's typology of the progressive stages of human history which he identified as savagery, barbarism and civilization (Morgan, 1964 [1873]). Then Marx developed the chronology of modes of production which, as interpreted by Soviet Russia and Socialist China from the early to the late twentieth century, advocates linear evolutionary Time. Marx's theory of three social formations was based on the three types of production modes – Asiatic, ancient (or feudal) and modern bourgeois (Marx, 1972: 83). According to the Soviet interpretation, Marx was supposed to have delineated five progressive stages of human socio-economic formations: the 'classless' primitive community, the slave-based society of classical times, the feudal society based on serfdom, the modern bourgeois society based on capitalism, and lastly the advanced 'classless' society of the future, for example, communist society (Stalin, 1940, see Hoogvelt, 1982). Correspondingly, the path of modernisation of China since the early twenty century is exactly characterised by this evolutionary unilinear progressive Time. From the New Culture Movement in the early twentieth century through to the 'New Village', China is always striving to achieve a more modern, advanced, civilised and progressive condition, which can be generally called 'new'.

In German, modernity is literally 'new time'. As Koselleck said, "The emphatic use of the expression 'new time' was not only sustained by previous inventions, innovations, and discoveries that, on looking back, would have conferred an entirely new shape to the world, but this concept was likewise directed at the future in which new things would continue to come about" (Koselleck and Presner, 2002: 165). In this light, the New Village is also characterised by the 'new time' with intention to get rid of the 'old time' or the past. For example, the whole old village was entirely razed to the ground and the New Village build up on a new site with a completely new layout and new architectures. As the slogan of the programme stated, '*advanced production, rich life, civilized (local) atmosphere, organised and tidy villages, and democratic management*', the 'New Village', to some extent, is a synonym of 'advanced', 'rich', 'civilized', 'organised', 'tidy', and 'democratic'. All these characters express the interpretation of modernity and progressiveness in the context of China. To take some more specific

examples, the symbols of the 'old time' such as firewood should be hidden from the public view (see Chapter Seven). But some objects that accords to the imagination of the modernity (or the new time) are often the essential elements of the New Village, including the Western-style house, garden, public toilet, flower bed and so forth (see Chapter Six).

Human life is a process that involves the passage of time; this life-process is also the process of formation of the landscapes in which people have lived (Ingold, 2000: 189). However, the new landscape of the New Village is a kind of 'modern' landscape which eradicates the history of the village but make the new one as a representative of modernity. In the sense of planning, as Abram and Weszkalnys defined, planning is a way of conceptualising space and time and the possibilities that time offers space in its most elemental form (Abram and Weszkalnys, 2011: 3). Abram further suggests that planning time is inherently modern due to the notions of progress that are inherent in plans (Abram, 2014: 129-147). For the planner, the unruly past is always considered as an impediment to planning and development. This is also why, since the New Cultural Movement, Chinese Communist Party always tried to eradicate the unruly past by condemning the past as 'misery', as 'backward and benighted superstition', and as the 'oppression of the poor'. In this sense, Confucianism is part of the 'unruly past' that disrupts attempts to implement the logic of Neoliberalism. Paradoxically, as Zonabend argued, the past lives in ways of thought that have never changed. The common behaviour, springing from the 'memory of man', gives coherence to the group and in addition links the present to the past (Zonabend, 1984: 138). Munn also made a clear statement of the relationship between temporality and social practices. She said,

【Human temporality is】 *a symbolic process continually being produced in everyday practices. People are 'in' a sociocultural time of multiple dimensions (sequencing, timing, past-present-future relations, etc.) that they are forming in their 'projects'. In any given instance, particular temporal dimensions may be foci of attention or only tacitly known. Either way, these dimensions are lived or apprehended concretely via the various meaningful connectivities among persons, objects, and space continually being made in and through the everyday world* (Munn, 1992: 116).

The past that remained in the memory of the villagers still shows its influence on the way people to settle down in the New Village. For example, in Chapter Seven and Eight, the arrangement and the décor of domestic space clearly shows the power of the 'past'.

Moreover, planning is a particular form of governmental technology through which social discipline, ritual and rhythm are made present in social life, and in which time is materialised, mediated or brought into conflict (Abram, 2014: 129). However, the tendency of neoliberalisation of Chinese government in recent years has been largely to monetise time, which has to some extent constrained the development of civil society in China. As Gosden said, 'The dissonance between an overarching global time and local rhythms, plus the equation between time and money which makes both a scarce resource, is the cause of profound thought and anxiety' (Gosden, 1994: 2). Unlike the democratic countries which Abram investigated (Abram, 2014), although the government emphasizes that the New Village programme is not a top-down programme and they always try to listen the villagers' demand and expectation, in fact, the democratic process is perfunctory. The official of the planning department said that they sometimes ask for the village leaders' ideas and demands during the design phase, but actually they (village leaders) often have no idea of the planning at all, so they cannot really participate in the process of planning. A landscape planner from a famous university who carried out many New Village programmes told me they often can accomplish a project in one or two days. If the local government could offer more money, they may spend more time in designing. Baikou New Village was built in only half a year. The process of planning was also carried out in a very short time (less than half a year), which to some extent shows the neoliberalisation of time.

Chapter 4 Land Reclamation, Requisition and Compensation

The relationship between land and peasant has been the fundamental relationship throughout Chinese history, as in many other agricultural societies. The land system of China has experienced various transformations and revolutions in the history of the People's Republic of China. The first national Land Reform of the People's Republic of China was between 1947 and 1952, which largely reshuffled both social structures and social relations and laid the foundations for the Communist Party taking control of the state. In the collective era (1955-76), nearly all the means of production were collectively owned, including land that had been privately owned before 1955. Since the Reform and Opening Up, as the *baochan daohu* (Household Contract Responsibility System) was initiated, the rural land system changed again. The household holds the use rights to land although the ownership is still collective, which has led to escalating conflicts in rural society on the issue of land transfer from farmland to commercial or industrial land (I will further discuss this point below). Like many villages in China (especially the villages close to or at the city centre), land requisition has been the most contentious issue in Baikou in recent years. This chapter will begin with documenting the process of land reform and land accumulation in Baikou village. The second section will discuss the issue of land requisition and its compensation in Baikou village by analysing the specific social strategies used in the particular social context.

4.1 Land reform and land reclamation

	Before the Land Reform		After the Land Reform	
Class of the peasant	Percentage of the population	Land Occupancy	Percentage of the population	Land Occupancy
Poor	52.37	14.28	52.2	47.1
Middle	33.13	30.94	39.9	44.3
Rich	4.66	13.66	5.3	6.4
Landlord	4.75	38.26	2.6	2.2
Others	5.09	2.86	--	--

Figure 4.1: Comparison of Land Occupancy of different classes before and after the Land Reform (National Statistics Bureau, 1980)

There have been three main land reforms since New China was established in 1949. The Chinese Communist Party launched the 'Rent and Interest Reduction' campaign (*jianzu jianxi*) in the liberated area (the area ruled by the Chinese Communist Party) in 1943. During the campaign, the peasants were encouraged to require the landlord to reduce the rent and interest of the land. The landlord-tenant relationship was common in rural society but was never reducible to the Marxist mode of class conflict. For example, many researchers have evidenced that the landlord-tenant relationship was very harmonious and mutually beneficial to both parties in rural China (Li, 1986: 635; Liang, 2006: 331; Li, 2011: 133; Fei, 1999: 375-376). Also, some other researchers have proved that the tenant-landlord relationship has never been the main conflicting relationship threatening social stability in Chinese history (Qin, 2003; Fairbank, 1998: 329). Therefore, at the beginning of the campaign, the peasants were afraid or ashamed to make the claim advocated in the directive because this complaint was seen to represent a lack of moral and ethical identification (Li, 2006: 76-94). However, after a series of campaigns (*suku yundong*), grumbling about the history of land tenancy, the feeling of exploitation and the consciousness of class were strengthened, which led to 1-

2 million landlords killed or committing suicide (ibid., 84-88; Fairbank and Macfarquhar, 1990: 91). The Directive Concerning the Land Issue (*guan yu tudi wenti de zhishi*) *was* successfully implemented in 1946 (Hinton, 1980, Crook and Crook, 2006, Hinton, 1966, Wang, 1945: 658-659, Li, 2006: 76-94). The previous campaigns laid a strong foundation for the later national Land Reform between 1949 and 1952. All peasants were classified into four broad groups: poor peasant, middle peasant, rich peasant and landlord. According to Mao's 'How to differentiate the classes in rural areas', written in October 1933,

> *A landlord is a person who owns land, does not engage in labour himself, or does so only to a very small extent, and lives by exploiting the peasants. ……*

> *The rich peasant as a rule owns land. But some rich peasants own only part of their land and rent the remainder. Others have no land of their own at all and rent all their land. The rich peasant generally has rather more and better instruments of production and more liquid capital than the average and engages in labour himself, but always relies on exploitation for part or even the major part of his income.*

> *Many middle peasants own land. Some own only part of their land and rent the rest. Others own no land of their own at all and rent all their land. All of them have a fair number of farm implements. A middle peasant derives his income wholly or mainly from his own labour. As a rule he does not exploit others and in many cases he himself is exploited by others, having to pay a small amount in land rent and in interest on loans. But generally he does not sell his labour power. Some middle peasants (the well-to-do middle peasants) do practice exploitation to a small extent, but this is not their regular or their main source of income.*

Among the poor peasants some own part of their land and have a few odd farm implements, others own no land at all but only a few odd farm implements. As a rule poor peasants have to rent the land they work on and are subjected to exploitation, having to pay land rent and interest on loans and to hire themselves out to some extent.

In general, a middle peasant does not need to sell his labour power, while the poor peasant has to sell part of his labour power. This is the principal criterion for distinguishing between a middle and a poor peasant (Mao, 1969).

According to Figure 4.1, before the Land Reform, there is a marked gap in land occupancy among different classes, with 52.37% of peasants only owning 14.28% land before the reform. This big gap in land ownership and the intensive conflict between the landlord and tenant were used as a persuasive statement for the first Land Reform (Li, 2011: 124). However, some research indicates that there was greater equality in north China. For example, Martin C. Yang's research in Taitou village in Shandong province found that, 'in Taitou there are no professional money lenders, probably because no family is a really big landlord. There has been very little borrowing and lending between the richer families and the needy ones, for the money changes hand between individuals who know each other' (Yang, 1945: 152). Norma Diamond revisited Taitou village about 40 years later, she confirmed that in 1945, 'with so little land and equipment to distribute from the landlord household, rich peasants and even a few middle peasants had to give up land, tools, and draft animals to equalize holdings. The level of education was relatively high' (in Parish, 1984: 246-269). According to Sidney Gamble's research in Ting Hsien in north China, 'over 92 per cent of the families owned some land, over 96 per cent farmed some land (Gamble, 1954: 11). Then, Andrew B. Kipnis's study in Fengjia suggested that, 'most older residents denied the existence of any big landlords' (Kipnis, 1997: 123). Nonetheless, in the first Land Reform, egalitarianism was the dominant principle and as a result, the equality of land distribution increased to some extent, with more than one million landlords and rich

peasants killed or committing suicide (Johnson, 1983: 196-202, Rummel, 2011, Short, 2001: 436-437, Fairbank and Goldman, 2006).

The second reform occurred in 1958 when the People's Commune system was applied throughout China, wherein all the means of production were collectivized, including land. The third reform occurred by the end of 1978 when the Reform and Opening Up started. Land then was re-distributed to households based on the Household Contract Responsibility System. Nevertheless, land tenure is still collectively organised. Under this system, the individual peasant or the household only has the 'right of use' and the 'right of transfer' for 30 years, and the transferred land could not be used for non-agricultural projects (Law of Land Administration, Article 63).[24]

> *No right to the use of land owned by peasant collectives may be assigned, transferred or leased for non-agricultural construction, with the exception of enterprises that have lawfully obtained land for construction in conformity with the overall plan for land utilization but have to transfer, according to law, their land-use right because of bankruptcy or merging or for other reasons.*

In the first land reform in the early 1950s, all private lands owned by landlords and rich peasants were confiscated and then redistributed to the poor and middle peasantry. No family was classified as 'landlord' or 'rich peasant' in Baikou due to the poor-quality of both land and water supply. There were only two families classified as 'middle peasant', the rest were all 'poor peasant'. Baikou villagers were poor and equal in terms of wealth so there were no stinging conflicts in the village during the first Land Reform. As the old man Jiakun Ye, the team head of that time, remembers:

---

[24] The Law of Land Administration of People's Republic of China' adopted at the 16th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress on June 25, 1986; amended for the first time at the 5th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on December 29, 1988 in accordance with the Decision on Amending the Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China; revised at the 4th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on August 29, 1998 and promulgated by Order No.8 of the President of the People's Republic of China on August 29, 1998; and amended for the second time in accordance with the Decision on Amending the Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 11th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress on August 28, 2004.

...there is nobody's house confiscated in the Land Reform in our village. We even can share the landlord' houses in other villages at that time... We do not have landlords, so we do not have land to distribute. The Land Reform work team lived in Baikou for a short time. They asked Zhuyi's grandfather to another village (Changling village) and thus they can obtain house from the landlord of the village. But Zhuyi's grandfather was reluctant to move away from Baikou as they were used to living in Baikou.[25]

The second land reform (1955-6) included the process of collectivization, during which land was confiscated from private ownership to become public property. Baikou's collectivization was very smooth, without any of the bloody struggling that frequently happened in rural China at that time. This can be attributed primarily to its equal poverty between households. To some extent, the memory of the collective era for Baikou villagers is more positive than for other nearby villages that might be due to the negligible difference between the collective era and the pre-collective era in terms of the poverty levels. Moreover, Baikou in fact did not suffer a lot from the Three Year Great Chinese Famine between 1959 and 1961, the most criticised tragedy of the collectivisation and the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960). Baikou was used to cultivate dryland farming crops, including soybean, cassava and sweet potato, that not only rescued them from famine but also helped lots of production teams in the same brigade. Jiakung Ye said,

... lots of people died around 1959, but nobody died in Baikou. At least, we had lots of sweet potato. At that time, every People's Commune sent people to search for edible wild herbs, our village sent some villagers too. But when they brought the wild herbs back, I asked them to throw them away, because we

---

[25] The local people said, during the first land reform, many landlords were exiled to the other nearby villages because it was easier to confiscate their property and redistribute it to other villagers. While, some poor families of the poor villages also moved to other richer nearby villages to obtain some property from the landlord.

have lots of sweet potato. Other production teams came to our village to take sweet potato too. At that time, everything was free. Every team shares everything with other teams.

There is no marked increase in the amount of ploughed land in the collective era. This can probably be attributed to the negligible improvement in terms of agricultural production capability during those years. Then, the motivation to promote production and raise income was more or less constrained by the dreadful memory of the landlords' experience during the Land Reform. The restrictive incentive mechanism and relative equality in wealth were probably conducive to the stagnant rate of land reclamation. In any case, the fruits of labour would be shared by the collective. Although the individual could receive more work points, the difference between the diligent and the lazy regarding the accumulation of work points was not great. Xuede Ye remembered, the highest work point is ten, some teenagers can earn three or four points every day. At the end of the year, subtracting the cost of the grain ration which was anyway fixed according to the number of the member of the household, the production team would distribute money to every family according to the work points they collected. However, some families would owe the production team if their work points failed to cover the cost of the grain ratio. This kind of family is called *chaozhihu* (overspending household). Siren Ye said, 'my family only has two (good) labour forces, a grandmother, and eight children. So we are always the overspending household.' But they received the same grain ratio with other households. Siren Ye also said that at the beginning of the collectivization people were all very diligent, however, people started to go slow: 'It is very common to see people participate in the work but actually not really working.' Even at the beginning of the Reform and Opening Up, the wasteland was still completely open to reclamation without disputes between the households. It probably indicated that productivity and the means of production were quite balanced before the mid-1980s. Then afterwards, with the import of new technology and the exploitation of the market, the previous equilibrium was broken and this promoted the reclamation of the wasteland.

The third Land Reform was implemented in 1979, when the Household Contract Responsibility System substituted the collectivisation. Firstly, land and some other collective properties, for example, production tools and livestock were equally distributed to team members. Approximately four *mu* per capita of farmland was allocated to each villager in 1981 in Baikou, including 1.5 *mu* paddy rice field and 2.5 *mu* dry land. Until this point, the per capita of land in Baikou was absolutely fair. However, the disparity of the per capita of land started to increase in the following years as the village began reclaiming land which led to increasing inequality in wealth. In 1979, the population of Baikou was 188, while the total farmland was only about 752 *mu* (assuming the per capita of farmland was four *mu*). However, before the first land requisition for the Mashan road construction project in 2001, the total land was more than 3,000 *mu*.[26] The villagers said that there was not much land that could be reclaimed in the 1990s as most of land had been reclaimed. Within seven years (from around 1984 to 1990), the amount of farmland dramatically rose more than 2,000 *mu*.[27] The majority of families still reclaimed new land by manual power alone at that time. However, four families (three are from the Yes, Xuede Ye, Siren Ye and Simin Ye, and Dingliang Liu) each acquired a tractor during the land reclamation and as a result reclaimed more than 100 *mu* land and became the first 'rich group' in the village after the Reform and Opening Up. In fact, until now, three of the four families (except Simin Ye) are still considered the richest in the village.

From the second year after the land was reclaimed, Baikou villagers have cultivated peanut which can be well cultivated even on dry land. To some extent, it improved their economic position. According to Dingliang Liu, since around 1985, many families in Baikou started to hire casual labourers in the busy season from the nearby villages because they have much more land than other villages in this region. These causal labourers were all from nearby villages, sometimes the nearby townships, rather than

---

[26] There are no precise statistics of the land in Baikou that I can collect from the government but villagers agreed that it is about 3,000 *mu*.

27 According to Article 9 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1982), the wasteland should belong to the state. However, the reclaimed wasteland can be possessed by the household in Baikou.

Baikou. Dingliang Liu said, 'I think since the 1980s, we became richer than the nearby villages. Although we do not have irrigated land as much as they had, the amount of our dry land is much more than them. We might have to work harder than them, but I guess we should have been richer than them since that time.' In short, the growing economic stratification started to be promoted by land reclamation in this region. In the village, inequality was particularly enhanced by the use of a tractor.

In addition, the last land redistribution of Baikou was carried out in 1995 with minor adjustments for newborn children. Since then, the amount of land owned by each family did not change much before the later land expropriation. According to the Rural Land Contract Law which was promulgated in 1997, the contract conferring use rights to rural land could be extended to a maximum of 30 years which largely fixed the amount of land that a household might hold. According to my investigation of the villages in Yingde county, and also the other three villages (Lianhe village, Langxi village and Wangjia village), the amount of land that a household holds would not be changed even if the number of household members increased or decreased during the villages is more or less fixed. However, in the 2000s, the extensive conversion of collective-owned rural land to state-owned urban land, again transformed the structure of the land distribution in rural areas. The next section will analyse the issue of land expropriation and compensation in Baikou village and thereby explain the relationship between social interaction and social institutions, between the agency of the social actor and social structure.

4.2 Land expropriation and compensation

4.2.1 Urbanisation and land transfer

Figure 4.3 Arable land (% of land area) in China between 1978-2013 (World Bank, 2013)

As Figure 4.3 shows, since 1978, the arable land of China kept rising, peaking in 1991, which is matched by the situation in Baikou. Since 1991, it started to decline, which can be largely attributed to the process of urbanisation. Besides the special administrative regions, including Hong Kong and Macau, there are three levels of cities in China, including provincial-level, prefectural-level and county level. In 1949, there were 79 cities in total in China. By 1981, the number had jumped to 233 (Li et al., 1988). In 1995, the number of cities had risen to 640 (China Statistical Yearbook, 1996) and further increased to 667 in 1999 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2000). Moreover, the rural population decreased substantially from 790,140,000 in 1978 to 629,610,000 in 2013. The urban population increased from 172,450,000 in 1978 to 731,110,000 in 2013 (see Figure 4.4). The high rate of urbanisation has led to a massive increase in demand for land for infrastructure and property developments.

Year	1978	2013
Total population	962,590,000	1,360,720,000
Urban population	172,450,000	731,110,000
Rural population	790,140,000	629,610,000

Figure 4.4: Chinese population in 1978 and 2013 (National Bureau of Statistics of China)

4.2.2 Institutional arrangement of land development – legal system and tax system

The institutional arrangement of land development in China mainly includes two aspects: the legal system and the tax system. In terms of the legal system, according to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1982), the ownership of all land is public, which means that the individual only has the use right of land. There are two types of public ownership: the mines, rivers, forests and urban land are state owned, and the rural lands are collectively owned. The collective ownership of rural land includes the right of ownership, the right of contracting and the right of use.[28]

There are two main defects of the Land Administration Law (2004) that might lead to escalating conflicts in rural society over the issue of land transfer (Lin and Ho, 2005: 411-436, Zhou, 2004: 193-210). First, the ambiguous subject of ownership. The transfer of rural land (or the right of contracting) can only be achieved through 'requisition' by the state. As Article 43 of the Land Administration Law (2004) states, 'all units and individuals that need land for construction purposes shall, in accordance with law, apply for the use of state-owned land'. In other words, for rural land transfer to be done in any other way, it must be expropriated by the local government. Rural land cannot be converted by the collective (that is the village team), if the collective subordinates to a Resident's Community or the administrative village. Rather, according to the acreage, rural land transfer must be approved by a different level of government. Then, the

---

[28] 'Contracting' means that the land can be leased out for a maximum of 30 years.

administrative village (or the village team if it subordinates to the Resident's Community) is the legal owner of rural land, which enables the village committee to become the embodiment of the collective ownership of rural land. On the basis of the structure of land ownership established by the Land Administration Law (2004), the local government (as the agent of the land transfer) is legitimised as the profit-driven entity. When it cooperates with the national context of marketisation, the profit-driven motive is inevitably out of control of the government (this issue will be further discussed below). The preservation of agricultural land is the guiding principle of the land administration, and in accordance with 'public interest' is the constitutional prerequisite of land requisition. However, the massive urbanisation and de-agriculturalisation of Chinese society has obviously challenged these legal rules throughout the whole country because profits can be made.

Second, the boundary between the just and the unjust in land expropriation is ambiguous. In terms of the legitimacy and reasonableness of land requisition, according to Article 2 of the Land Administration Law (2004), 'The state may make expropriation or requisition on land according to law for public interests, but shall give compensations accordingly.' However, the concept of 'public interest' can be defined either broadly or narrowly. As Hui Qing said, 'public interest' is not an absolutely objective concept but is, to a large extent, a concept that is defined by the public subjectively'. He therefore claimed that, democracy is the only way to decide if the project accords with the 'public interest' (Qing, 2009: 24-29). Many researchers argue that ambiguous property rights resulted in inefficient land development as well as social conflict and social resistance to land expropriation (Zhang, 2003, Zhao, 2009: 93-129, Yang and Liu, 2004: 24-28, Liu and Yang, 2003: 16-24, Li, 2007, Zhu, 2002: 41-57, Huang and Wang, 2002: 66-71). However, Peter Ho argued that the state preserved the rights to develop land and to expand markets by retaining the ambiguities of property rights. He further challenged the neoliberal theory that private property ownership is the fundamental condition of economic development (Ho, 2001: 394-421). If the law generates an unclear structure, then the agency of social actors can definitely play with the ambiguous rule and find any opportunity to win the game. I will discuss this issue further below.

The reform of the tax system since the mid-1980s, which is called '*fenzhao chifan*', and translates to 'divided the hearths to cook food' (a 'family' is defined as those who eat food cooked at the same hearth, so hearth division is a metaphor of divide the family and live apart. It will be further discussed in Chapter Eight) was gradually implemented as a part of the economic reform in the Reform and Opening Up. The new tax system differed from the former system by allowing the central government to devolve responsibilities for local expenditure to local government. As economic development increased in China, the capacity of the central government (state) to collect tax gradually declined (Zhou, 2007: 49-82).[29] At the first stage of the fiscal reform, it assigned local government's property rights over increased income and created strong incentives for local officials to pursue local economic development (Oi, 1992: 99-126). Nevertheless, in 1994, the Chinese government issued the new fiscal system, called the 'tax-sharing system' (*fenshui zhi*). The tax is categorised into three types – central tax, local tax and shared tax. Value-added tax yielded the highest income, but it was categorised as shared tax, with 75% going to the central government and 25% to the local government. This change, to some extent, constrained the motivation of the local government to develop enterprises (ibid., 52). This 'tax-sharing system', issued in 1994, directly resulted in a shortfall in the local budget and the demand for making extra-budgetary profit, for example, informal fees and levies (Cheung, 2012: 293-328). As a consequence, land revenue, became the new economic pillar for local government. It became the main source of municipal and county finance (Chen, 2015).

4.2.3 History of land expropriation in Baikou

As aforementioned, in the collective era, the ownership of land was transferred from private ownership to collective ownership. Then, after the Reform and Opening Up in the post-Mao era, land ownership was retained as collective, although the individual peasant had the right of contract and the right of use. This institution of land ownership largely retained the power of the state at the grassroots and the foundation of the

---

[29] The government revenue comprised 28.4% of the GDP in 1979, but declined to 12.6% in 1993. In 1979, 46.8% of tax revenue went to the central government but fell to 31.6% in 1993 (ibid., 52).

'socialist state'. On this basis, the government always has the agency to withdraw the right of use from the peasant and to marketise land for the 'public interest'.

Baikou experienced the earliest land requisition in the early 1980s; land which was taken to build a state-owned fruit and tea factory. Unfortunately, I could not find the precise record of how much land was expropriated, but according to some villagers, it was quite a large area but not cultivated land. Before the 1990s, land was not valuable in Baikou because of its poor quality. The team head of the 1980s Dingliang Liu said, in 1981, they thought that mountainous land was useless, so they gave more than 10 *mu* to the neighboring village, Qingyun Tang, for free. Land requisition was not a big issue at that time.

In the 1990s, the Mashan road construction project was recognised as the first land requisition with approximately 270 *mu* expropriated from several families in 1996. The families whose land was expropriated received 1,000 yuan per person (about two-months income per capita at that time) as compensation. Nobody disagreed with this compensation. At this point, both cultivated land and waste land were still not very valuable in Baikou.

The second land expropriation took place in 2005, with approximately 40 *mu* of land expropriated, mainly from Siren Ye's family. Siren Ye suggests this was the first land expropriation in Baikou. It is perhaps the first time villagers had conflict with the local government on the issue of land expropriation in Baikou after the Reform and Opening Up. But at this point, the issue of land expropriation was still not a big issue. As Siren Ye said,

> *Government has not paid me. The Chengxi resident's community committee*
> *signed an IOU to me for 40 mu land expropriation. I wrote a protest, but I did*
> *not take further action. They (the Chengxi resident's community committee)*
> *said, if I paste the protest in public, they will arrest me. But they later*

apologized and paid the debt to me. They sold the land to the municipal government and made some profit from it.

Then, around 2010, conflicts over the issue of land expropriation suddenly broke out in Baikou. Between 2008 and 2010, a real estate company called *Bifeng Huafu* expropriated more than 100 mu of land through the mediation of the local government. Unfortunately, as the land owners were not satisfied with the compensation fee, the expropriation was not smooth. Dingliang Liu remembered it with anger,

Around 2009 and 2010, when the land cannot be expropriated for Bifeng Huafu real estate (because people would not relinquish it), about 200 or 300 policemen came to Baikou village. The land was my brother's. Finally, they cannot win the fight. I think the government officials who subordinated to the communist party are not human beings. They only think of their own interest. It is impossible to beat them.

Then in 2010 and 2011, just opposite to the Baikou New Village, 200 *mu* of land was expropriated by Guangying Huayuan real estate. Later, some other real estate companies purchased the land through Chengxi resident's community, Yingcheng street, and the Yingde city government, according to the level of expropriation. In 2015, approximately 2,000 *mu* of land in Baikou was expropriated - about two thirds of the total land of the village. In 2015, there are still some families resisting this expropriation. A woman called Xilian Chen initiated a petition which 21 households signed. Even though she persisted for more than a year the petition was consistently ignored by the local government. The petition listed seven accusations against the village cadres:

1) *The previous village cadres sold 50 mu land in Niulan Di to their friends and relatives without the permission of the villagers.*
2) *Since 2011, the previous village cadres sold more than 1,000 mu land to the developers, some of the land used for real estate, some for building*

karaoke centre, some for private house and some are lying waste. All the land sold by the village cadres themselves without the villagers' permission.

3)   *The previous cadres sold the most of the land of the villagers, but their own land still remained even more than 100 mu for leasing.*

4)   *The previous cadres sold more than 70 households' houses inherited from the ancestors, and most of the houses are demolished by force. We received nothing so far, except 20,000 to 30,000 yuan (monthly income per capita is approximately 2,000-3,000 yuan in Yingde between 2010-2015) resettlement fee. Some of villagers even have not received the resettlement fee. Now, the old houses have been demolished and the land have been sold to the developers. The previous cadres even sold approximately 100 mu field.*

5)   *After so much arable land was lost, the villagers could no longer guarantee their own subsistence. We do not have a little land to plant some vegetable.*

6)   *In 1994, approximately 60 mu land in Xitang Wei were lease to Wenjin Zhao with the collective consent. When the contract ended, the previous cadre bought the 60 mu land for himself and paid Wenjin Zhao.*

7)   *I am the villager of Baikou. I have two old houses inherited from my ancestor. It is about 430 square meters (equivalent to 0.65 mu) according to the village cadres' measurement. Now, the houses have been demolished and some new houses are under construction, but I received nothing.*

In the petition, the previous village cadres are the defendants. To some extent, she listed the main accusations against the village cadres that the villagers resisted. In fact, number 4 is not true according to some other villagers' words. Every villager should have received approximately 110,000 yuan land compensation fee in total since 2010. Only some new born children and new wives who just married into Baikou have not yet received the land compensation fee. In the next two sub-sections I will compare the scheme of land compensation fee distribution of Baikou with the nearby village in Chengxi resident's community. Based on the analysis of the general schemes, I will

further explain the dynamics between the three stakeholders: the owner, the user and the deputy of the owner of the land expropriation.

4.2.4 Three schemes of compensation distribution

Three different schemes of compensation distribution are practised in the villages in Chengxi Residents' Community. Article 47 of the Land Administration Law (2004) stated that compensation for requisitioned agricultural land includes a land compensation fee, resettlement fee, and compensation for attachments to and crops on land. Compensation for attachments to and crops grown on land, as private property, always belong to the household which has the use right of the land. Nevertheless, the land compensation fee and the resettlement fee are managed in different ways. In many cases, however, there is no resettlement fee if the expropriated land is farmland.

In the first scheme, the collective or the village committee keep the land compensation fee and the resettlement fee as collective income. For example, Jin Zhuyuan village is a one-lineage-dominated village, with 20 households of Zheng lineage, and six households of three other lineages. In 2011, 117 *mu* of land was expropriated by the government for road construction. The village kept the land compensation fee which was approximately 2.7 million yuan in total. The compensation fee for the attachments and crops were directly distributed to the households. The village head, Chunneng Zheng, said that the village committee planned to construct a New Village, and use the land compensation fee for re-arranging the building site and the infrastructure of the new village. However, before 2011, there were four unmarried daughters in the village, they required the land compensation fee as they will not stay in the village after marriage in the future. As a consequence, the village decided to distribute 10,000 yuan to each community member. The total of the distributed land compensation fee was 1.26 million, but the population of the village is 107, which means that some villagers whose *hukou* has been transferred away from the village can still share the compensation. This situation is often seen in lineage villages in the region.

Kuai Wu village deal with the land compensation fee and compensation to the attachment of land happened in the same way. Kuai Wu village is a lineage village with 31 households. In 2012, 150 *mu* of land was expropriated. The team head Shirui Kuai said,

> *Our distribution scheme is very simple. In the rural areas, people pay more attention on the inheritor, and the son is very important. The money must be used in building a house. It must not be distributed to individual households. Once it distributed, it will be very hard to reassemble. Now, each of the households received a 90 square meters (equivalent to 0.135 mu) construction site as compensation. Some people will not spend money in building a new house. So it will make lots of mess in setting boundaries between the houses. The houses must use the same colour and same structure. If someone's house is red and someone's is yellow, it will not be like a village. Also, if someone build a new house and some do not, it will be hard to lease out together. It is not good for the village development.*

The population of the two villages are only 107 and 124 respectively. Jinzhuyuan village is still in the process of planning a New Village project; Kuai Wu village started their New Village project in December 2012.

The second scheme for compensation, namely fee management involves directly distributing funds to the household according to the expropriated area. For example, Zhiji Tang village is also a one-lineage-dominated village, with 60 households of Li lineage, and 13 households of Zeng lineage. In 2004, 10 *mu* of land was expropriated for railway construction and 60 *mu* of land was expropriated for Guangluo road construction. The land compensation fee was only distributed to the households whose land were expropriated. According to my fieldwork in Lianhe village and its nearby villages, all the villages applied the second scheme that distributes all the compensation to the individual household directly.

The third scheme is only practised in Baikou and Liuqiao which own the most land per capita in this region. In this system, the land compensation fee is equally distributed to every villager. The compensation fee of a fixed amount of land – five *mu* per person in the case of Baikou. Then, the rest of the compensation fee will be paid into the collective treasury. Baikou only shares the compensation with the villager whose hukou is registered as Baikounese. However, Liuqiao village shares the compensation with the people whose *hukou* had been transferred away from the village. Perhaps, it is because Liuqiao is a single-lineage village while Baikou is a multi-lineage village. The single-lineage village is from the same ancestor and all the community members are the kin. It might be the reason why Baikou village follows the principle of legality but Liuqiao village follows the principle of kinship or custom.

To some extent, the choice of one of these three predominant schemes was made according to each village's idea of fairness. The first and third schemes share a similar rationale in so far as the village committee have greater rights in the redistribution of compensation. The second scheme means to grant greater rights to the individual household. It is hard to suggest any universal variables that necessarily led to the selection of a particular scheme among the three. Nevertheless, several factors might be influential in determining the strategy for sharing the interest, 1) the amount of land per capita; 2) the size of the village; 3) the lineage or multi-surnamed village; 4) the scale of the expropriated land; 5) the future plan of village (if they have plans to build a new village that will need large funding for infrastructure construction); 6) the village leaders; 7) the economic situation of the village.

The scheme of Baikou was determined by the village committee and several village representatives in 2011. Dingliang Liu said, at that time, the main concern was that, 'it is not good if the difference between different families are too big. So we thought it is reasonable if every person got five *mu* and the rest as collective property.' The eldest brother of the Ye, Siren Ye, who is the biggest land owner in Baikou, said,

In the villages in the nearby townships, people collect all the expropriation fee of their own land. In that case, we (the Ye brothers) have the most land in the village. We would definitely be the richest if we directly collected all the land compensation fee for ourselves. But we do not have selfish motives. We want the village to be good. So we applied the principle of five-mu per person. At the beginning, some people who have more land disagree. I do not agree too. However, the minority is subordinate to the majority. We are not that selfish. I have more than 200 mu land. We devoted our land (to the village).

Nevertheless, in Baikou village, the main problem with this strategy is that there are still several families (mainly the Ye brothers) who own plenty of land because their land was not appropriated or only appropriated a little, while some others have lost nearly all their land. Nevertheless, every villager shared the same amount of land no matter if their own land was expropriated. A young man called Jiale Tong is an army veteran who returned to the village in 2013. He sharply pointed out that,

The Ye brother's land in fact haven't been touched at all. So for them, of course, five mu per person is the best deal. Because any way their land is not expropriated. I am sure that they have calculated the area of the expropriated land would be. Or, maybe they have exact information (from government). It is not hard to get the information. There must be some planning map. In addition, in the contract (of the principle of the land distribution), it promised to fix the principle for ten years. So, how about ten years later? Xuede Ye said, this principle will not be changed when he is in tenure. But what if he is not in tenure? Who knows when their land will be expropriated?

It is hard to find out the intention or the plan of the Ye brothers, but the result shows that, at present, they are indeed the biggest beneficiary as they still hold most of land that has not been expropriated yet, with nearly 300 *mu* of the 800 *mu*. Meanwhile, they are trying to avoid having their land expropriated. I will discuss this issue further in the next subsection.

4.2.5 Pursuing maximum interest from the land expropriation

Clearly, nearly all the land expropriated from Baikou is used for real estate, that is, for commercial projects. In the sense of 'public interest', both the local government and the real estate companies have probably made a profit, and land expropriation may indirectly promote local economic development and create a bigger employment market. Changqing Li works for a real estate company. He told me that according to his estimate, before 2013 or 2014, most of the real estate companies in Yingde had made a big profit. But since 2014, the market for real estate is no longer as robust. However, the key issue concerns the 'fairness' of distribution of compensation. The nationwide land disputes in China in recent years can be specifically identified as the consequence of two forms of 'unfairness': first, the unfairness of exchanges between the government and the individual villager (or household); second, the unfairness of interest distribution among individual villagers (or households). In other words, the issue of land disputes resulted from the conflict between government and peasant, and the conflict between peasants of the same community.

After rural collective land has been converted into state owned land, the land will be sold according to the market price that is usually many times the compensation fee. For example, according to the Protection Standard of the Land Requisition Compensation in Guangdong Province (amended in 2010) (see Figure 4.5), the land is classified into five types: arable land, vegetable garden, forest, water surface for aquaculture and wasteland. Meanwhile, according to the specific location of the land, it is classified into ten levels of value. For example, the land of Yingcheng Street where is the lowest level in State administration to which Baikou belongs, classified as Type 7, has the following values: 47.45 yuan per square metre of the arable land, 36.50 yuan per square metre of vegetable garden, 16.2 yuan per square meter of forest, 49.30 yuan per square meter of water surface for aquaculture and 14.6 yuan per square meter of wasteland. However, according to the Baseline of land prices in Yingde city (2010), rural land is classified as Level 4. The average baseline price of Level 4 land is 337.67 yuan per square metre, which is at least 10.30 times of the average compensation fee of the type 7 with 32.80

yuan per square meter, and should be much higher than the baseline. It shows the big gap between the compensation fee and the market price of the land. In other words, the government made a much greater profit from the land development than the peasant.

Unit: 10 thousand Yuan per hectare

Type	Arable Land	Vegetable Garden	Forest	Water surface for aquaculture	Wasteland
One	128.7	99	45	133.65	39.6
Two	97.5	75	34.2	101.25	30
Three	78	60	27.7	81	24
Four	70.2	54	25	72.9	21.6
Five	58.5	45	20.6	60.75	18
Six	52.65	40.5	18.6	54.7	16.2
Seven	47.45	36.5	16.2	49.3	14.6
Eight	40.3	31	14.85	41.85	12.4
Nine	33.15	25.5	12.15	34.4	10.2
Ten	30.2	23.25	10.8	31.4	9.3

Figure 4.5: Protection Standard of the Land Requisition Compensation in Guangdong Province (amended in 2010) (Guangdong sheng zhengdi buchang baohu biaozhun)

	Level One	Level Two	Level Three	Level Four
Commercial Land	2,212	1,278	651	469
Housing Land	1,376	922	586	374
Industrial Land	467	334	221	170

Figure 4.6: Baseline of land price in Yingde city (Yingde shiqu jizhun dijia yilanbiao 2010)

Taking another more specific example, the land reparation provided by Guangying Huayuan real estate was 26,000 yuan per *mu*. The reparation for lost seed plants depends on the type of the crop; for example, an individual bamboo was 40 yuan, multiply this by 40 plants and the total reparation should be 1,600 yuan per *mu*. In 2015, Guangying Huayuan real estate started to sell the properties it had built. There are 24 buildings, with 12 *mu* building area - 3,200 flats, and the price is 3,600 – 4,300 yuan per square metre. Every flat has an area of about 80 square metres, so each costs at least 28,800 yuan. As the villagers complained, the reparation cannot even buy a room from those companies. Feizhou Zhou found that the compensation fee of 'S county' in 2003 only accounted for 6.9% of the selling price (from government to the market) (Zhou, 2007). The big gap between land compensation fees and the market price is a very common phenomenon in China.

In this matter, the peasant and the village are the land provider, the government is the agent of land exchange between market and state, and the land developer is the land receiver. In most accounts, the peasants are the exploited, while the government and land developer often gain more profit from land development. There are various types of power games played between the three subjects under the present institutional arrangement. People call it *da cabianqiu* (playing edge ball). 'Playing edge ball' means finding the equivocality of the policy or rule and then taking action which lies

somewhere at the edge of legality. Jing Zhang suggests that the three parties – the owner, the user and the deputy of the owner, are all able to participate in the land-rule selection in particular contexts and that regularly causes land disputes (Zhang, 2003). The land-use rule can be interpreted in various ways according to the context but basically it is both a political competition and a measure of legitimacy (ibid.). The land issue of Shui Louxia village which is very close to Baikou New Village might be an interesting example to present this game of edge ball.

Strategy one: sail under false colours

In 2011, in Shuilouxia village approximately 100 *mu* of land was expropriated by the Yingde Supply and Marketing Cooperative, a member of the All China Federation Supply and Marketing Cooperative. The land was supposed to be used to build an agricultural product exchange market, which definitely accords with the 'public interest'. The land that was expropriated was categorized as type 7, with a compensation fee of about 30,000 yuan per mu land and the compensation fee for the crops on the land (*qingmiao fei*), determined by the type of crop, was much less than the land compensation fee (this will be further discussed below). The process of this land requisition was quite smooth in 2011. However, the villagers then found that this project did not involve agricultural production but the development of real estate. The team head of Shui Louxia village said,

> *Now, the land is not in construction because lots of villagers protested. They*
> *thought it will be helpful if a market was built here, however, they cannot*
> *obtain any benefit if it is for real estate. Many elder villagers said, 'if you used*
> *it for construction (public infrastructure), we will all support it. But now, it is*
> *a lie. So the land is still there (not in construction).*

Changing the original plan after expropriating land from the peasantry is a frequent strategy. This strategy was also applied in Baikou when the village committee wanted to lease out the Cultural Centre (a big building used as the public space of the village) to be a kindergarten – a narrative I shall consider in greater detail in Chapter Six. In the

case of Shuilouxia village, the peasants seemed to be very unified and resisted the fake project insistently, meaning that it is currently on hold. However, it is hard to know if they will finally compromise as the Baikou villagers did in the case of the Cultural Centre leasing or in the case of *Bifeng Huafu* land transfer.

Strategy two: co-operating with gangdom

During field work, Baikou villagers often complained to me that there is no way that they can refuse the requisition because threats of violence were used as a strategy to collect the land successfully. There is a drug dealer who, at the peak of land requisition (around 2010), was said to be 'secretly employed' by the village committee to threaten villagers in order to compel the families who refused the land requisition to change their position. Guanyuan Bo's wife said to me,

> *I really do not want my land expropriated. I do not know what I can do without land. We are already too old to find a job. Nobody wants to employ us. When the village hold a referendum, in fact, lots of people (who agreed the land requisition) are the relatives of the village leaders (dang guan), so more than half people agreed. We did not agree at all. But we had no other choice. They forcibly dismantled my hen coop and cut down my bamboo. Lots of people disagreed with it (the land requisition), but we had no choice, the upper people (government) forced us.*

Jiale Tong's family built a new house in the location of the present New Village in 1994, three years earlier than the New Village project. The village needed to demolish his house to build the new village. He said,

> *At the beginning, they (the village leaders) said they will compensate us several ten of thousands, but we did not agree. Then they kept coming to our home to persuade us, and promised to compensate several hundreds of thousands. You see how big the difference can be! The village leaders would*

not come to my home, so they asked someone who had a bad relationship with us to threaten us (the drug dealer Weihong Ye). But at that time, I was in the army and they did not know what my position was. So they dared not force us. They were afraid that I would use my 'relationship' to do something bad to them. I asked them to give me a new house in exchange, otherwise they could not touch my house. If they paid by cash, then the amount must be enough to buy a new house.

The use of violence is a strategy often seen in rural China. In recent years, the villain or the local tyrant often became the village head or the member of the village committee. Even employing violent, criminal gangs as the resource of governance in the rural area is not a rare phenomenon, especially in the villages which own adequate natural resources (He, 2011: 113). This ploy is consistent with that used by the Chinese Communist Party who incorporated banditry into the revolutionary army before the New China (Ye, 1959, Zhang, 2010: 66-83), and also other similar incorporations in Chinese history. People often use a word to describe a powerful person in the village, '*heibai tongchi*' (literally, eats both the black and the white) which means that the person has a good relationship with both the government and the gang world, so he (or she) can actualise his (or her) intentions easily.

Strategy three: unaffordable compensation fee for luxury crops

As aforementioned, compensation for land expropriated includes land compensation fees, resettlement fees and compensation for attachments (buildings, sheds and so forth) or green crops grown on the land. The land compensation and resettlement fees are largely fixed by the regulation, while, the compensation for attachments or green crops can be manipulated flexibly according to the rule. For example, Dingliang Liu who is also one of the biggest land owners in Baikou, still held 70 *mu* of land. He leased out 50 *mu* to a factory with a 50-year contract; the factory built a huge workshop occupying an area of 30 *mu* which means that if the government wants to expropriate the land, the 'compensation fee of the attachment to the land' will cost a lot. Paradoxically, it is illicit

to build factories on the cultivated land, but customarily, the government will also pay the compensation fee if they need to expropriate the land.

Compared with attachments, green crops are even more flexible. The level of compensation for green crops in land expropriation is determined by the local municipal government. For economic crops, for example trees, the government should pay the market price as compensation. As a consequence, lots of villagers planted high-priced trees in order to avoid requisition as the government would not be willing to compensate for the excessively expensive crops. For example, Siren Ye, Xuede Ye and Simin Ye, the three brothers who are the biggest land owners in Baikou, cleverly planted some very high-priced trees on approximately 300 *mu* of land (the total amount of the remaining land that has not been expropriated is only about 800 *mu*). In addition, the nearby villages also applied this strategy to protect their interests too. For example, in Jinzhuyuan village, the villagers planted lots of expensive trees in their fields in 2014. The village head Chunneng Zheng said, 'in fact, it is all because the government has not given enough compensation.'

Strategy four: fake divorce

Around 2010, the divorce rates of Lianhe and Langxi villages suddenly increased, with around 10 couples divorcing in Lianhe village and 30 couples in Langxi village. However, these are mostly not 'true divorces', but just divorces in the legal sense, which means the couples still live together and share property. The reason for these 'fake divorces' is that every individual can be an independent household according to the *hukou* system. Then, according to the local land management regulation, every household can receive a plot or house site from the village. As a consequence, many couples divorced in order to gain more house sites.

Similarly, in Baikou, some daughters of villagers married out and converted their *hukou* back to the village after divorcing in 2012 when the village received a large land expropriation fee. According to the rule of land expropriation fee distribution in Baikou, the fee will be equally distributed to each villager whose *hukou* is in the village, rather

than to the one who has the use right of the expropriated land. As a consequence, these married out women then divorced and moved back to the village. On the contrary, the divorce of men in Baikou was often hidden. According to the registration of the Chengxi Residents' Community Committee, eight couples divorced between 2013 and 2015. However, only two couples' divorces have been publicly noted. Other separated couples still live together after their divorce and only very close relatives and friends know of their divorce. It should be pointed out that these divorced women still retained their *hukou* in Baikou, which guaranteed their rights to share the land compensation fee.

To sum up, these strategies contribute to the process of creating a new form of culture which is possibly not the 'harmonious society' (*hexie shehui*)[30] that the Chinese government strives for. In contrast, playing at the edge between the legal and illegal (in fact, nothing is really illegal or at least, nothing is far away from legal) as a sort of social strategy, may not lead to positive and innocuous social interaction that every social member would participate in voluntarily. Rather, it is defined as a zero-sum game, and there seems no sufficient condition to shape a co-operative system between the three main stakeholders. Layton claimed that, 'Social interaction, not action, is the key to understanding how people's life-chances vary through time as local culture is enacted in a social and natural environment' (Layton, 2000: 178). He argues that social behaviour is shaped by adaptation to particular circumstances (ibid., 178). Obviously, if playing with the rule (or law) is inevitable for protecting interests in 'particular circumstances,' why does the rule exist? According to Li Su, 'modern jurisprudence, to a large extent, suits the urban society, the industrial and commercial society and the stranger society (i.e. *gesellschaft*); but because of the different economic and cultural condition, modern jurisprudence and the relevant systems are difficult to employ successfully in rural and acquaintance-based society (i.e. *gemeinschaft*) in many countries' (Su, 2002: 9).

---

[30] Since the Hu-Wen Administration (2003-2015) which responded to escalating social conflicts by evoking the Confucian theme of social harmony and mutual respect. In March 2007, the prime minister Wen Jiabao made explicit references between the concept of 'harmonious society' and tradition: 'From Confucius to Sun Yat-sen, the traditional culture of the Chinese nation has numerous precious elements, many positive aspects regarding the nature of the people and democracy. For example, it stresses love and humanity, community, harmony among different viewpoints, and sharing the world in common (*tian xia wei gong*)' (Bell, 2010: 9)

4.3 Conclusion

China has experienced three land reforms since New China was established, which reshaped the fundamental social relationships in society. The first land reform was to confiscate land from landlords and rich peasants and equally redistribute it to poor peasants between 1947 and 1952. The second land reform transformed the privately owned land into collectively owned land in the collective era. Then the third land reform was the Household Contract Responsibility introduced between 1978 and 1984. Baikou did not experience dramatic change during the first and second land reforms due to its general poverty. However, in the third land reform, it suddenly became one of the richest local villages in terms of land. The land reclamation in the 1980s and early 1990s was the significant primary accumulation that laid good foundations for the future development of agriculture. In the late 1980s, Baikou started to cultivate peanuts over a large area, which to some extent improved Baikou's economic position. Then, in the early 1990s when Baikou introduced the Taiwanese bamboo as its main economic crop, a crop which is well suited to its particular land quality (a relative lack of water), Baikou's economy has outstripped most of the nearby villages. These structural transformations of the relationship between land and peasantry (from private ownership to collective ownership, then to Household Contract Responsibility and from rural society to urban territory) was key in generating the social and economic transformation of the community. In general, the focus of the Chinese government was on 'the development of rural society with industrialisation occurring primarily in the countryside' during Mao's era, (circa 1949-1976). During the post-Mao reform period the focus was on modernising and rebuilding the nation through urbanisation (Padua, 2014: 205, Kram et al., 2012, Xu and Yeh, 2009: 559-581, Ma and Wu, 2004: 1, Yeh, 1999). In China, urbanization is seen by policy-makers and planners as a formal strategy to narrowing the rural–urban gap (Siciliano, 2012: 165-178). [31] This process of urbanization of populations (i.e., rural communities becoming part of the urban

---

[31] An urbanization strategy can be defined as a set of policies designed to influence the spatial distribution of the population and its economic activities (McGranahan and Tacoli, 2006). It refers to urban and rural policies, such as the reclassification of settlements from rural to urban, redrawing of the boundaries of urban centers, rural–urban migration, land use change, etc.

environment) is closely linked to commodification of land as a market resource (Perkins, 2006: 243-257, see in Siciliano, 2012: 167). In other words, urbanisation includes two strategies, urbanising the rural space and moving the rural population into the urban area. In general, and without wanting to oversimplify a very complex situation, the former strategy is mainly intended to transform the character of the space while the latter is mainly intended to transform the character of the population. The former strategy is possibly easier to be adopted in the places near urban centres, while the latter strategy possibly better suits more backward and remote places. In this light, the former strategy is more appropriate for Baikou. As a consequence, it is almost inevitable that the space of the place is re-arranged, transferring farmland to non-agricultural land, marketising the rural space and producing the new social space of the rural territory.

Section two first explained the institutional arrangement that encouraged land development to be exploited as the main financial resource of the local government. Then, I demonstrated the history of land expropriation in Baikou village which presented the process of urbanisation and de-agriculturalisation of the village. The three schemes for land compensation fee distribution in Chengxi Residents' Community each presented a different definition of 'fairness'. However, the tension between the three main stakeholders of the nation-wide issue of land expropriation was clearly represented in their interactions. In the final part of the second section, thus, through analysing the concept of 'playing edge ball' in the everyday practice in the Chinese society, I explained how social actors adopt various social strategies in response to the particular social circumstance.

In conclusion, in this chapter I have presented a detailed analysis of the processes of land reclamation, requisition and compensation of Baikou, which delineated a picture of the relationship between land and society at different stages in the history of New China, especially the relationship between the conversion and marketisation of rural land since the Reform and Opening Up. China, at present, is facing the choice either to privatize collective land or to maintain collective ownership. As mentioned above, in Chapter Three, sociologist Xuefeng who is an influential representative of the 'collective

ownership school', suggested that the privatization of land could result in more peasants losing their land, partly because they can see no further than the present (He, 2010). Sally Sargeson also claimed that the collective ownership of land stimulates participation in self-governance, and the transformation of the land to state ownership and private ownership weakens participation (Sargeson, 2016). The effect of privatisaion of land in Latin America supported this assumption. As Layton found, 'since private property can be mortgaged and sold, increasingly powerful entrepreneurs can use privatisation to gain control of vast areas of land and organize the cultivation of export crops for personal profit. Success in breaking down local civil society can undermine the goal of securing undivided allegiance to the state. Privatisation of land in Latin America had allowed the appearance of a new class of landlords hostile to state centralization, while formerly independent peasants were reduced to poverty as tenants' (Layton, 2006: 107). Those that hold the opposite view, that advocate the private ownership of rural land, including Qiren Zhou, assert that the present ownership system of rural land and the associated institutions do not accord with the principle of economic efficiency (Zhou, 2004: 193-210). The reason for this phenomenon is the overwhelming power of the government which exerts almost total control over land development, while the peasantry has not received fair interest in the sphere of land development. He then suggested the amendment of land law and the development of the market of rural land transfer (ibid., 193-210). As Hui Wang claimed, the legitimization of private ownership is considered as a way to deal with present social conflicts; however, if the process of privatization is not under the principle of democracy and justice, the legitimization of privatization can only become the illegimate process of distribution (Wang, 1998: 11). Clearly, in the case of Baikou, the direct distribution of interest from land development is not fair enough. As a result, the competition between the three stakeholders may not be healthy competition, rather, it breaks the tie of trust between the government and the peasant, also between the peasants. Unfortunately, in the case of Baikou, neither collective ownership nor the collective distribution of land compensation fees are necessarily conducive to the self-governing participation that Sargeson suggested (2016). Rather, the nature of self-interest is encouraged during social interaction. Nevertheless, this is not entirely attributable to the weaknesses in the legal system of land ownership but also to a tax system that limits local government in their exploration of other patterns of economic development.

This chapter has introduced the background of the emergence of the New Village in detail. I have shown that the land expropriation system is central to the building of the New Village. The relationships between the state and the society, and between structure and agency have been clearly shown in the land reform, land reclamation, and land expropriation and compensation. In the following chapters, I will present an interpretation of the production and space consumption (use of space) in the New Baikou Village to demonstrate how the three ideologies – Confucianism, communism and neoliberalism combine and conflict and are inscribed in the material entity of the village.

Chapter 5 Reorganising a place: siting, layout, arch and wall

The logic of making a place indicates the cosmology and philosophy of the subject who dwells in the place. This chapter will focus on the ways in which the space of the New Village, while organised by the logic of modernity, is simultaneously integrated with traditional values, and by the logic of market and production while symbolically solidifying social differentiation. Through a comparison with the old village, this chapter will present the transformation of the idea of producing a place in Chinese rural society. Firstly, it will demonstrate how the New Village was positioned in a new space following the principle of *fengshui*. Second, it will analyse the layout of the New Village from the perspective of the transformation of the social order and continuing social differentiation that has taken place during the last three decades. Third, the traditional-style arch of the New Village, as a phenomenon of revival or invention of tradition (following Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) will be analysed from the perspective of the reproduction of social capital. Fourth, the village wall will be understood from the perspective of community construction and establishing ownership of property.

5.1 Siting the New Village

Figure. 5.1 Options for the site of the Baikou New Village

As Bennett pointed out, 'locating a good site is more than an exercise in cosmological abstraction and the manipulation of theoretical constructs; it is the successful

application of cosmology to everyday life' (Bennett, 1978: 1-26). Siting is the paramount step in the course of establishing a new village. In tradition, *fengshui* (literally, wind and water) or Chinese geomancy, has been applied to the positioning of houses and graves for avoiding the malicious *qi* (bad fortune) and take the advantage of the positive *qi* (fortune) since ancient times. David Hall and Ames Roger defined qi as the 'vital stuff constitutive of all things' (Hall and Ames, 1998). They said,

> *A difficult term to contextualize within Western conceptual frameworks, qi is variously rendered as 'hylozoistic vapours', 'psychophysical stuff', 'the activating fluids in the atmosphere and body', and, perhaps most appropriately, 'vital energizing field'. In the earlier texts, before the notion came to be adapted to the speculative constructions of the Han cosmologists, it had a significance not unlike the Greek pneuma ('breath' or 'animating fluid'). In the 'cosmological' speculations of the Han dynasty (206 B.C. – A.D. 220), qi came to be understood as the vital stuff constitutive of all things and was characterized in terms of the active and passive dynamics of yang and yin (Hall and Ames, 1998).*

Ancient classics reaching back to the Zhou period (1100-770 B.C.), including the Shijing [Book of Songs] and the Shujing [Book of Documents], reveal the cosmo-symbolic conventions relevant to the siting of imperial capitals and palaces (Knapp, 1999: 29). *Fengshui* was a kind of *shushu* (skill of fortune-telling). The Chinese philosopher Youlan Feng said, the basic thought of *fengshui* is that human beings are the creatures of the universe. Therefore, the dwelling house and grave must be arranged in harmony with natural forces, the *fengshui* (Yu-Lan and Bodde, 1949). Feuchtwang said,

> *Feng-shui as a single term stands for the power of the natural environment, the wind and the airs of the mountains and hills; the streams and the rain; and*

much more than that: the composite influence of the natural processes. Behind it is a whole cosmology of metaphysical concepts and symbols. By placing oneself well in the environment feng-shui will bring good fortune. Conversely, an analysis of the site of any building or grave with knowledge of the metaphysics of feng-shui will tell the fortune of the site-owner. This analysis and the art of good siting we call Chinese geomancy (Feuchtwang, 1974: 2).

The Chinese continue to employ *fengshui* in order to accommodate their lives within the totality of time and space, and to pursue worldly benefit and avoid misfortune (Knapp, 1999: 29). However, since the New Culture Movement between the 1910s and 1920s *fengshui*, like Confucianism, was also characterised as a fallacy by the new ideology of science.[32] Then, in August 1966, at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the campaign to destroy the 'Four Olds' – old thinking, old culture, old customs and old habits was launched. Therefore, during this time *fengshui* was regarded as a part of a backward culture of feudalistic superstitions (which also included ancestor worship, Daoism, Buddhism, Shamanism, local religions, to name just a few of the 'superstitions') that was strictly prohibited. Nevertheless, after the Reform and Opening Up, the practices of *fengshui*, like other 'old thinking, old traditions,' started to revive. In both urban and rural areas, private and public construction projects, *fengshui* has been widely re-applied to many issues, including positioning a new house or grave and selecting the appropriate day for weddings, funerals and house moving. *Fengshui* has become a booming industry in China in recent years. The economic success of China at the same time certainly boosted national self-assuredness and inspired new faith in the traditions that were previously associated with backwardness (Bruun, 2003: xx).

In Yingde city, some big real estate projects often invited a *fengshui* master to inspect the *fengshui* of the site and the design of the buildings. Even for some government

---

[32] In 1915, Duxiu Chen proposed to advocate democracy and science, and 'against tradition, against Confucianism, and against ancient Chinese language'. The movement is called New Culture Movement that laid a foundation for the development of Marxism and of science.

construction projects, *fengshui* is a significant concern. For example, a big man-made lake was excavated in 2013 for improving the *fengshui* of the city hall. In the New Village or the later 'Beautiful Countryside' projects[33], *fengshui* principles are also often applied. The director of 'Beautiful Countryside' Office of Yingde City, Xiaoliao Lin said,

> *In fact, fengshui is not superstition. It is culture. For example, the layout of the house, if you know it, it is science; if you don't know it, it is superstition. In the world, there are only things you know or things you don't know. You must see it from a scientific perspective. For example, it is scientific to set particular propositions of space to see the sunshine (jian yang) or hide in the dark (jian yin). In fact, it is the intensity of illumination or transmittance of light. It is relevant to the function of the ancestral hall. The ancestral hall is a building for enjoying coolness. The ancestral tablet cannot be exposed to the sunlight, otherwise, it will be over solarized and not good to maintain the ancestor tablet that should be handed down from generation to generation. Meanwhile, the ancestral hall is always permeated with incense, thus if the building is exposed too much to the sun, it will soon be ruined. Also, like the beifu shan (the mountain behind the village)[34], it is, in fact, a fengshui forest that can be used for adjusting the environment of the village (in building the Beautiful Countryside), so we will always keep it.*

To some extent, the idea of *fengshui* has been tactfully integrated with the discourse of science - a new way to perceive the environment and to practice in the environment. The attitude toward *fengshui* was nevertheless to some extent embarrassing, according to Hans Steinmüller's research. He suggested that in the everyday practices of tradition, *fengshui* contradicted the pre-1980s ideology, thus people still avoided claiming it was

[33] 'Beautiful Countryside' launched in 2012 that is the further version of the 'Building a Socialist New Countryside'.

[34] According to *fengshui*, a village is usually shielded by a mountain that provides a protective screen.

reasonable. On the other hand, *fengshui* practices in everyday life reproduced 'a space of cultural intimacy' (Steinmüller, 2010: 81-96). Whilst *fengshui* is part of traditional Chinese culture, it may have also become a credible resource to reconstitute the identity of Chinese people, to re-interpret the relationship between nature and culture, and to rebuild the cosmology that is considered to be authentic Chinese cosmology, *tianren heyi*, as I discussed in Chapter Two. Stephan Feuchtwang defined *fengshui* as 'divination, a form of knowledge. It is a way of conceiving and perceiving reality and a way of dealing with reality' (ibid., 14). The local interpretation of *fengshui* varies considerably. *Fengshui* was often described as a many-head monster, which 'embraces an infinite repertoire of interpretation that may be brought into the service of all classes of people' (ibid., 3).

Figure 5.3 Panorama of Baikou

(1). Kunlun mountain
(2). Grand-parent-mountain
(3). Parent-mountain
(4). Master mountain
(5). Baihu mountain
(6). Qinglong mountain
(7). The village
(8). Water
(9). Shuikou-sha
(10). Anshan
(11). Chaoshan
(12). Luocheng

Figure 5.4 One pattern of the ideal fengshui

The four cardinal directions of the world and the four seasons are represented by special terms taken from Chinese astronomy in *fengshui*: the dragon represents spring and east; the bird represents summer and south; the tiger represents autumn and west; the tortoise represents winter and north. These terms compress the concepts of time and space into one, building a place in which human beings dwell. The East Jin Dynasty (317-420) scholar Pu Guo's '*Zang shu*' described an ideal landscape according to *fengshui*: tortoise lowers its head, vermilion phoenix dancing, green dragon wriggling, white tiger bending down ('*xuanwu chuitou, zhuque xiangwu, qinglong wanyan, baihu xunfu*'). This means that the peak of the northern mountain should be low, like the turtle lowers its head; the southern mountain range should be up and down with vivid rhythm like the vermilion phoenix dancing; the western mountain should be up and down with gentle rhythm like the green dragon wriggling; the eastern mountain should be a mild hill like the white tiger bending down (Liu, 1995: 137). The landscape depicted in Figure 5.4 presents the ideal *fengshui*. The northeastern mountain of Baikou New Village is called dragon (*long mai*). To some extent, the site of the New Village is thus quite close to the ideal site according to the principles of *fengshui*.

When the New Village project was initiated at Baikou in 1997, there were two choices for the site. The first choice (which we will call Choice A, see Figure 5.1) was to the southeast of the original village, closer to the city centre but further from the mountains and water resources. The second choice (we call Choice B) is just opposite the old village which is close to mountain and water resources. The advantage of Choice A is its proximity to the city centre, while its disadvantage is its scarcity of water resources. Choice B was in the reverse situation. All the families participated in the selection for the positioning of new village[35] and Choice A won more votes. Some villagers said it is only because it is closer to the city, but others explained that it was because Choice A has better *fengshui* than Choice B. The former village head Xuede Ye said,

> *The siting of the new village was based on other villagers' suggestion. I prefer to build the new village opposite to the old village, because it can be built along the Mashan road (where is good to open some shops along the road), and also the old village can remain. However, the villagers all thought the fengshui of the new site is better.*

The old village was besieged by mountains. A geomancer suggested that the location of the old village was too close to the mountains and full of *yinqi*[36] (the energy of yin, which indicates death, maliciousness and negativity in this context). Nevertheless, the

---

[35] The planning and design of the New Village are provided by local government, specifically, by the Planning and Design Institute which is subordinate to the Bureau of Housing and Urban-rural Development. The head of the Planning and Design Institute Liangben Deng said the planning and design of a New Village are often learned through visiting other model villages. Their work is to draw a simple blueprint. They always listen to the opinions of the villagers though they often only communicate with village leaders. It is not completely top-down planning but rather a co-production of the government and the villagers.

[36] *Yinqi* refers to the concept of *yin-yang*. Chinese historian, Sima Tan (165 B.C.- 110 B.C.), first classified the philosophical schools in China which have been cited in his son, Sima Qian's, monumental history of ancient China 'Record of Chinese History' *(Shiji)*: 1) Yin-yang school; 2) Confucianism; 3) Mohism; 4) School of Names (or Logicians); 5) Legalism; 6) Daoism (Fen, 2013: 31-32). The concept of yin-yang was a kind of *shushu* too. It is a pair of opposite and complementary forces in the universe. The original meaning of *yang* is the sun, and yin is the moon, which was basically the Chinese cosmogenesis. But the original meaning later developed as two forces of the universe. Yang symbolizes male, positive, convexity, fire and so forth; and *yin* symbolizes female, negative, passive, concave, water and so forth.

mountains are quite far away (approximately one kilometre) from the present New Village. Some villagers explained that the visual field is now broad and open, thus the atmosphere of the location is brighter than the old one, which indicated more *yangqi* (the energy of yang, which indicates life, positivity and warmth). In the 1990s, as the technique to dig wells had been widely employed in the rural area, which eliminated the need to consider the water resources in deciding the site. Nearly every family dug a well in the courtyard in Baikou, which solved the problem of daily water usage. Then in 2003, the village installed a tap water system. The limitations caused by water scarcity at the new site was thus no longer the primary concern. In the old village, a spring pool with a well beside it was the busiest shared space. When people recalled memories of life in the old village, the spring pool featured in their happy childhood and community life.

5.2 Layout of the village

5.2.1 Centring and de-centring

The general layout of the New Village is a rectangular grid occupying 46,000 square meters (approximately 69 *mu*) in total, of which 25,000 square meters (approximately 38 *mu*) are covered by buildings. All the new buildings face to the south, share the same layout and are perfectly arranged in a line. The plan shows clear orderliness, equality and simplification (see Figure 1.1), which is often considered as a representation of modernity by the local people and the government. These characteristics are, in fact, not absolutely demarcated with the principle of *fengshui*. According to fieldwork he undertook in Sichuan and Jiangsu provinces, Ole Bruun found that, when people built bigger houses than their neighbours, it caused animosity or grudges because the bigger houses catch more of the fortune-bringing *qi* which, in turn, improves the four fundamental aspects of good life for the Chinese – prosperity (*cai*), happiness (*fu*), long life (*shou*) and procreation (*zi*) (ibid., 199-201). In Wangjia village, the size of houses is approximately the same although they were not all built at the same time as Baikou New Village. In Langxi village and Lianhe village, this rule is applied less strictly, but in general, before the 2010s when the relevant policies of house building were not strict,

families were always trying to build a bigger house than their neighbours if they had enough money. The local government made rules to limit the size of the new houses and planning regulations are strict. For example, the new houses cannot be more than three storeys; the total area of the house is limited by the number of occupants; and the space between houses cannot be less than eight meters thus guaranteeing sufficient sunshine for each. To some extent, these limitations echo the idea of egalitarianism and decreased the degree of social stratification in relation to property ownership in rural areas (the situation in urban areas is very different). In Baikou New Village, the houses built in 1997 and 1998 were completely the same, while the houses in the last row of the village, built after 2012, are bigger than those built earlier. Villagers have not complained openly about this anomaly, possibly because the newer houses in the last row are less noticeable to the rest of the village.

From a historical perspective, Yi-fu Tuan suggests that as early as around 1,000 BC, the Duke of Chou 'aspired to divide the country into mathematical squares with the royal capital at the centre', which implies 'a need for clarity and standardization in the interest of efficient government' (Tuan, 1997: 47-58). Through comparing the rectangular grid of the settlements that have right-angled streets and avenues in China and the United States, he further suggests that for the United States, this sort of settlement is primarily for economic purposes, while for the official city in imperial China, 'the rectangular pattern of streets inspired by the orderly processes of heaven, can be set down anywhere, with little regard for the area's geographical uniqueness' (ibid., 54). In terms of economic efficiency, the rectangular-gridded Baikou New Village echoes to the demand of straight and wide roads for the passage of tools or vehicles such as buffalo and tractor before 2010 and later, private cars.

The original Baikou village nestled between two mountain ranges, standing by a big spring-fed pool and two streams that were the main water resources of the village. Some houses were built at the foot of the west mountain, and the others along the streams. The families of the same lineage often resided together, sharing the same building or

neighbouring with each other, although some families had to build new houses away from their original home after they married. The space between the houses was very narrow. The villagers said that, in the old village, it was not necessary to visit another family because people lived together along a little lane and frequently met every day.

The old village was divided into two parts. One part of the village was called *shanbian* (the side of the mountain) and another part called *dacun* (big village or main village). Dacun was the primary settlement. The village extended by the Tong's house along a tiny stream. After the good sites along the stream were fully occupied, newcomers started to build houses by the mountain which became another part of the village, *shanbian*. There were clear sub-settlements composed of different lineages with a shared ancestral hall in the old village. In other words, a lineage was a co-residential unit with an ancestral hall at its centre. In general, the layout of the old village very much followed these three rules: 1) proximity of new houses to the prior settlement, 2) obedience to the natural landform and resources, 3) the same lineage always settles in the same place. Moreover, the layout of the old village was not a strictly structured layout but, rather, loosely aggregated.

Yiji Tong, born in 1966, told me: 'in the old village, we all lived in a lane, so we were all together. No need to visit people's home. Now, it is not a lane anymore.' The New Village is strictly gridded and good for motor vehicle movement while the old village was not accessible to motor vehicles. On the other hand, the layout of the old village provided a social space for developing social ties between the residents. In the new village, in general, six families share a lane. The axis road of the new village is about ten meters wide and shared by all the villagers, but the usage rate can be very different. For example, people living in the first row only need pass a maximum of five families on leaving the village, while the last families at the back of the village have far greater opportunity to meet other community members during everyday life.

Figure 5.5 Typical traditional layout of the lineage village in this region, conceived on an extension of the ancestral hall

In fact, Baikou old village is not a typical village in this region. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the majority of the villages in this region are lineage villages. Wu (room or house) is often used to name a lineage village. For example, Yang Wu means Yang village, because a village is a big house centred on the ancestral hall, expanding the living space along the north, west and east sides of the ancestral hall (see Figure 5.5). The core family or the joint family often live together in a subunit. Their rooms could be a bedroom, kitchen or storage, randomly dispersed within a subunit, but the function of each room is not clearly demarcated. Rather, the kitchen can be also used as a dining room and/or storage space. The ancestral hall is not only a ritual space but also a space for community activities, including holding feasts, chatting, receiving guests, storing agricultural equipment and so forth. In the south of China, the ancestral hall is generally the place to worship the ancestors, but in the north of China the tomb, rather than the ancestral hall, is the place to worship the ancestors (Cohen, 1990). According to the structure of the architecture, the whole lineage village, in fact, shares a single building with the same centre – the ancestral hall. Although there was no such ancestral hall that could be shared by the whole village, Baikou old village in fact followed the same logic of producing the place. Every lineage has a little shared ancestral hall at the centre of their houses as earlier mentioned. Xin Liu applied Roman Jakobson's concept of

'metaphoric and metonymic processes' to analyse the concept of *wu* (house, room) and *jia* (family, home, house). The two concepts are at once metaphoric and metonymic. He suggested that a sense of brotherhood derives from sharing a house, and the meaning of self bears a material form (Liu, 2000: 37). In this light, both the lineage village and the multi-surnamed village share the same logic before the New Village programme. I will further discuss this in Chapter Seven.

To sum up, the layout of Baikou New village, Baikou old village, and the lineage village present different logics of organising dwelling space. To some extent, the typical layout of a lineage village sustained and strengthened the cohesion of the kin group through sharing the same living space, especially when there is an absolutely shared 'centre' – the ancestral hall. The old Baikou village was very much organised by the logic of lineages. The same lineage often lived together in a sub-settlement with a shared ancestral hall. Mary Douglas claimed that shared symbols promote social solidarity and provide a mechanism for social control (Douglas, 1993). However, the layout of the Baikou New Village is scattered, every building is an independent unit. Every household owns an independent building, a courtyard and a backyard in the New Village. Stephan Feuchtwang argued that 'place–making is a process of centring' and 'centring is the making of territory into a place' (Feuchtwang, 2004: 4). However, the process of building a New Village is a process of de-centralising and scattering; every household became a self-governing unit through constructing an independent family space. Lévi-Strauss claimed that house is 'the objectification of a relation: the unstable relation of alliance which, as an institution, the house functions to solidify, if only in an illusory form' (Lévi-Strauss, 1983: 155). In the sense of a 'house society', the unification of the lineage, to some extent, broke down as a result of the new logic of place organisation – the richer have priority in choosing their favourite location for the new house. Moreover, obviously, from 'living in a shared house' to 'living in different houses', social relations are objectifying in another way.

5.2.2 First row and the concept of 'front'

This sub-section will focus on analysing how social relations are objectified and symbolised in the new landscape. The layout of the New Village is equally divided into two parts by a north-south axis – the east and west. Meanwhile, at the middle of the village, some public spaces run in a line from the east to the west. Equality is one of the prominent rules of building a New Village, where all the buildings are the same. However, the pattern of social stratification is clearly inscribed in the pattern of Baikou New Village, because the rich who paid their deposit first had priority to select the position of their house in 1997. The first row thus became the most popular choice because it is regarded as the best position. The 58-year-old man, Guanyuan Bo, who lives in the first row explained, 'the first row is closer to the front, so it is better. The sunshine is better because there is no house in front. I think now it is still the best position.' Shumei Deng, a middle-aged woman, said, 'I was the fifth or sixth one to pay the deposit, so I could select earlier and I selected the front position. The front position has more sunshine. If I selected once again, I would still select here.' It seems that the abundant sunshine is the main reason why the first row is the best position, though Guangdong province is located on the margin of the tropical zone and it is scorching in summer. Also, there is no evidence to show that the first row receives more sunshine than those behind since the village is located on a slope, the north is slightly higher than the south, and the distance between two rows is wide enough to avoid the shadow of the front row.

The first row means 'in front of the village', which implies 'getting ahead of others'. For a single traditional courtyard, the front part of a courtyard cannot be the centre or the best position of the entire space. The main building of a courtyard used to be on the north side of the site, if there is no backyard behind. But the most southerly building is the most obvious 'front' building in a courtyard and is usually used as a guest room or store and considered lower than the other three directions in the sense of space hierarchy. In Wangjia village, most of the families now use the most southerly building as the store. So, as for an ancestral hall centred settlement, the south part of the building is in the lowest position in the sense of space hierarchy. To some extent, in my

assessment, the revolutionary history of the last century of China probably re-constructed the new perception of 'front' that is identical with 'prior', superiorising and magnifying it. This interaction is supported by what I was told in Baikou: the 'first row' is considered to be the best position in the village, mostly, for the generations who were born before the 1970s. The younger generations do not have any preference for the first row. Many of the young villagers prefer the middle area of the village because it is more at the centre. Some believe the last row is the best because it is quieter. For those born before the 1970s and who experienced the revolutionary years from 1940s to 1970s, 'to be the first' and 'to be the fore-goer' was always encouraged in the era of revolution. This historical experience may contribute to their preference to be 'first' or in the 'front'.

Eighteen years after the New Village was established, these households of the first row are still the wealthiest. The majority of the village heads and primary leaders of the post-collective period reside in the first row. The villagers who are considered the smartest and politically the most influential in the village all live in the first row, including Huantong Ye (the former communist party secretary of Chengxi Residents' Community), Xuede Ye (the former village head), Siren Ye (his wife Guantao Mo has been the accountant of the village for many years), Anle Liu (the present village head), Dingliang Liu (the village head between 1982 and 1992), Yijian Tong (who has been the village cashier for many years), Xuejun Ye (Xuede Yan and Siren Ye's brother), Wenbo Zhu (village cashier in 1960s and 1970s) and Guanyuan Bo (village cashier in 1990s). These families are all from the four biggest lineages and have good relationships with each other, except Guanyuan Bo and Jingfang Chen who belong to the small lineages and in strict terms, cannot really be classified figuratively as the 'first row'.

The villagers often use the term 'first row' to indicate a group who are the wealthiest, the most influential in village affairs and decision-making, but also a vested interest group who unfairly receive more benefits from the land development than others. For example, the outsiders who build illegal houses (*xiao chanquan fang*) in Baikou New

Village are nearly all the friends or relatives of the 'first row'. There are nine *xiao chanquan fang* in the village. Five of them are owned by the 'bosses' of the real estate company whose identity is not open but who are considered as the friends of the former village head, Xuede Ye, and the former communist party secretary of the Chengxi Residents' Community, Huantong Ye. One is owned by Shifeng Ye who was the former party vice-secretary of the Chengxi Residents Committee, and also a friend of Xuede Ye and Huantong Ye. Another is owned by Wenbo Zhi who is the head of Yinghong township and a relative of Shifeng Ye. The last two are owned by the sister of Xuede Ye and sister of Huantong Ye.

According to Chinese land law, only the villager who has hukou registration in the village can build a house, as all the land is collectively owned and its sale is forbidden. However, in recent years, the phenomenon of *xiao chanquan fang* has been widely practised in rural China. *Xiao chanquan fang* literarily means 'uncompleted-right house' which refers to the houses built on collectively owned land in rural areas without paying a land transfer fee. These houses have no legal property ownership confirmed by the state, but do have property ownership confirmation from the township government or village committee. In other words, the Property Ownership Certification of *xiao chanquan fang* is issued by the township government or village committee, rather than the state. In essence, they are illegal but the local government often ignores their existence. As the price of the *xiao chanquan fang* is usually much lower than the local real estate market price, the market of the *xiao chanquan fang* is still a popular way to invest or to promote a tendency toward suburbanization. Article 43 of the Land Administration Law (2004) may account for one of the main opportunities for the emergence of the *xiao chanquan fang* by providing a legal loophole. It states:

> *All units and individuals that need land for construction purposes shall, in accordance with the law, apply for the use of State-owned land, with the exception of the collective economic organizations and peasants of such organizations that have lawfully obtained approval of using the land owned by*

peasant collectives of these organizations to build township or town enterprises or to build houses for villagers and the units and individuals that have lawfully obtained approval of using the land owned by peasant collectives to build public utilities or public welfare undertakings of a township (town) or village.

The concept of 'public utilities or public welfare' was the reason that *xiao chanquan fang* provided when applying for space to play *canbian qiu* (edge ball) (see Chapter Four). In general, as the issue of *xiao chanquan fang* becomes intertwined with the financial resources of rural development and the issue of land ownership reform, both local government and central government turned a blind eye to it in recent years. Heidenheimer and Johnston point out, 'the more complex the network of social interaction and the more complicated and diverse the ways that tangible benefits can be exchanged, the less likely it is that particular actions can clearly be labelled corrupt' (Heidenheimer and Johnston, 1989: 149-163). It is hard to say for certain whether these *xiao chanquan fang* are corrupt. Nonetheless, they strengthened the association between the 'first row' and the issues of 'corruption', 'injustice', 'wealth' and 'power'. In other words, the vested interest group of the land development (first row) is considered to have received more interest than others in the village, which is in contradiction with the principle of 'equality'.

The concept of 'front' as a positive concept makes the 'first row' the best position in the New Village because the families who have the priority (who are rich enough to pay the deposit immediately) to select the new house all chose to live in the first row. The first row became an interest group because these families cooperated and formed alliances to gain more interest in the land development. In Mao's era, the classification of social class in the rural society clearly followed the principle of one's economic condition, the amount of land possessed (see Chapter Four). To be specific, the richer the class one belonged to, the lower the social status in Mao's era. This logic is, in fact, still practised in some rural areas. For example, in Baikou, the rich group is considered to be

associated with negative connotations, such as 'injustice', 'free-rider', 'sly' and so forth, because the land resources are limited but the rule of land compensation distribution is manipulated by the rich class. Therefore, in the sense of 'morals', the rich class cannot win higher social status but are considered as an inferior group.

Bourdieu suggested that the structure of the social space is the product of the two fundamental principles of differentiation – economic capital and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1998: 5). Nevertheless, lineage is another significant factor that possibly resists the logic of capital in Chinese rural society. In 1997, 'live neighbouring brothers' was the rule to select the location of a house, though the majority of families were not able to achieve this because of the rule of selection priority. Therefore, the significance of the economic capital has to some extent escalated. As Daniel Bell suggested, East Asian societies are characterized by both social hierarchy and economic equality. In these societies that are governed by informal rituals (*li*), social status can be expressed differently, and the powerful need not rely on material wealth to show their 'superiority' to the same extent as in the West (Bell, 2010: 45). He further pointed out that rituals involve the powerful and powerless in shared rites. The rich are made to feel a sense of community with the powerless, and they are less likely to seek other means of domination such as material wealth (ibid., 45). The logic of Confucianism in the terms of class classification is clearly different from the logic of capitalism which indicated that the richer a class, the higher social status it will be.

To sum up, the layout of the New Village was planned using very different principles to the old village. The new village mainly followed the principles of efficiency (easy to reach by vehicle), equality and organisation which is achieved by top-down planning. The old village was mainly organised by the principle of kinship. The lineage often lived in a complex with a shared ancestral hall. Although all the buildings in the new village are the same, which indicated the idea of equality, the emergence of the 'first row' shows the tendency for social stratification in the community which reveals the conflicts between the different principles of social stratification, including the principles

of Confucanism, Communism and Capitalism. The next section will focus on the practice of 'social capital' through analysing the construction and the meaning of the arch.

5.3 The arch, the face

Figure 5.6 Arch: the gate of the village

5.3.1 Tradition and nostalgia

The navy veteran Jiale Tong said,

> *How to say, our village is called New Village. The appearance of the village is very bright, but it is very bad in fact. You interviewed many villagers of the first row, so they always say the very positive things. So why can they live on the first row? This is a question. Usually, it is because they have more money. The village leaders usually live there. Because it (the New Village) needs a menmian (gate and face, or gate). Only when the menmian was built, could the project be developed.*

Jiale Tong's words indicate that the New Village has a good landscape (or a good appearance), but that the other elements of the community are not as positive as the landscape. He further suggests that the first row is the *menmian* (face) of the village. Without the *menmian*, the New Village cannot be built up. In other words, the first row was the cornerstone on which a New Village was established. The so-called *menmian* of the New Village is analogous to the *mianzi* of an individual, which refers to the 'social position and prestige' within one's social network (Hwang, 1987: 961). The significance of the *menmian* of a village indicates the significance of the 'social position and prestige' of the community in the region. Kwang-kuo Hwang suggested that 'doing face work' is a power game. It is a way of showing off one's power, and a method of manipulating the allocator's choices of allocating resources to one's benefit (Hwang, 1987: 944-974). In other words, without establishing the *menmian* (the reputation) the New Village cannot receive support from the government, local entrepreneurs, individual or other social organisations. Therefore, the first row played an important role in the process of building the New Village in 1997. Nevertheless, in 2015, the first row is no longer the *menmian* of the New Village. Instead, a traditional granite arch - a literal gate - was established as the main access to the south of the village in 2010 (see Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.7 Arch of Lianhe village

The arch is considered one of the most beautiful points in the New Village with its symmetrical framework, orange glazed-tile roof and four white granite pillars with delicate carving. This kind of arch is prevalent in China, especially the places that are developing tourism and the model of the New Village. For example, Lianhe built an arch as the gate of their New Village too (see Figure 5.7). The arch is not only the entrance of the village which demarcates the outside and the inside of the village, it is also the *menmian* of the village, in other words, the face of the community. Although all the buildings are very modern in style, the arch remains in the traditional aesthetic. Perhaps, the prevalence of the traditional-style arch in recent years stands in opposition to the accelerating, uncontrolled and alien modernity: the demand for gratification from a past which has been lost or threatened by the irreversible tendency of utilitarianism and materialism (Zwingmann, 1959: 227). The disruption of tradition in China in the last century correspondingly inspired a strong longing for the sense of belonging and the certainty of self-identity in the decollectivized era. As Svetlana Boym said, 'the twentieth century began with a futuristic utopia and ended with nostalgia' (Boym, 2008: XIV). The traditional-style arch may express people's nostalgia for the fading past and the desire to establish the subjectivity of so-called 'Chinese tradition', despite the fact that this kind of tradition cannot usually offer authenticity of the local. As Hobsbawm and Ranger pointed out, tradition plays a significant role in establishing 'continuity with a suitable historic past', though the 'past' is often a constructed product generated in response to current demand (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983: 1).

5.3.2 From symbolic capital to social capital

The grandness of the arch seems out of place in a village with a population of fewer than four hundred. Shifeng Ye, the former party vice-secretary of the Chengxi Residents' Community explained that the arch was copied from Dongguan city, after the village leaders had visited a model New Village there. It cost about 300,000 yuan, but the exact cost of the arch is not transparent. Hence, in 2010, lots of villagers protested against the unclear and non-transparent accounting. As one villager said,

The accounting had never been transparent during Xuede Ye's tenure. The accounting that Chengxi Residents' Community released is all fake. Until the year when the arch was established, we go to protest, and the accounts were released. But the account book was carefully re-made. Lots of accounting is not clear at all, for example, the cost of travelling and treating guests.

An unreasonable-costing, show-off project is often called *mianzi gongcheng*. Baikou villagers often call the arch a *mianzi* gongcheng, as they do of the Cultural Centre (which I will discuss in Chapter Six). The concept of *mianzi* in social interaction and social exchange often plays a significant role in Chinese society, which is one of the dimensions of *guanxi*. The term *guanxi* is considered as a variant form of social capital in the context of China (Smart, 1993: 388-408, Szeto et al., 2006: 425-438, Qi, 2013: 308-324). *Guanxi* is often translated as 'particularistic ties' or 'personal networks', however, as King suggested, it is better to leave this word untranslated because of 'the complicated and rich meaning of the word' (King, 1991: 63-84). Xiaoying Qi suggests this is because *guanxi* involves personal connections between individuals in their formation and maintenance of long-term relationships which follow implicit social norms, including *xinyong* (trustworthiness), *mianzi* (face), *renqing* (norms of interpersonal behaviour), reciprocity and obligation (Qi, 2013: 300-310). *Guanxi* is a multi-dimensional form of social capital and *mianzi* (face), is one of its dimensions.

According to Bourdieu, there are four forms of capital which can be interconverted to each other, economic capital, cultural capital, social capital and symbolic capital (Richardson, 1986: 241-258). Symbolic capital consists of the 'prestige and renown attached to a family and a name'. It is 'perhaps the most valuable form of accumulation in a society in which the severity of the climate ... and the limited technical resources … demand collective labour (Bourdieu, 1977: 179). The magnificent and impressive arch shows the wealth of Baikou, thus is supposed to improve the *mianzi* of the village in the

region. Hopefully, it will contribute to the social prestige of every community member. According to Bourdieu's classification of capital, *mianzi,* in fact, may be analogous to symbolic capital rather social capital. It can be transferred into social capital. The so-called social capital, according to Bourdieu,

> *is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a 'credential' which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the world* (ibid., 247).

As the gate is often considered as the *mianzi* of the family or the community, the Chinese often build a big door as the main entrance to an individual house or village. The aesthetic effect of the gate always draws people's attention (this will be further discussed in Chapter Seven). It expresses the social status of the family or community which are expected to gain more symbolic capital and social capital.

5.3.3 The reproduction of social capital in the post-Mao era

Paradoxically, in recent years, the critiques of the 'show-off projects' often cite objections due to the unreasonable spending of tax revenue, and even protests due to their close connection with corruption (as happened in Baikou). More importantly, *guanxi* is played by the vested interest group - when it is practised in marketised contemporary China, it is often the target of social criticism. *Zou guanxi* (using *guanxi* to achieve the goal) is associated with injustice, unfairness and corruption. In Chapter Three, I discussed how the personal tie between Huantong Ye and the local government official enabled Baikou to replace Kuai Wei and become the model New Village. In this case, the Baikou community was the beneficiary of the *guanxi* playing but Kuai Wei

was the victim. In the case of land compensation distribution, some big lineages may receive more interest than small lineages. This is also because the big lineages have a wider social network, more social capital and stronger *guanxi*. It suggests that *guanxi* is a double-edged sword.

The Chinese philosopher Shuming Liang said, western societies think highly of public virtue, but Chinese think of private virtue (Liang, 1963). He further explained, Western people think of how to contribute to the family, the society, the state and the world, while Chinese people think of how to contribute to the emperor, father, wife, brother and friend (ibid.). In fact, the logic of *guanxi*, echoes the logic of *Chaxu Geju* which Chinese anthropologist, Xiaotong Fei, used to describe the fundamental structure of Chinese society. According to Xiaotong Fei, *Chaxu Geju*, the boundary between the 'public' (*gong*) and 'private' (*si*) is ambiguous, for example, for a core family, other members of the joint family are the outsiders; and for the joint family, other members of the lineage are the outsiders. The boundary of the 'insider' and 'outsider' is defined by the closeness of the kinship (Fei, 1947 [2013]). He further explained, 'In Chinese society, the most important relationship – kinship – is similar to the concentric circles formed when a stone is thrown into a lake' (ibid., 63). In the network of concentric circles, 'everyone stands at the center of the circles produced by his or her own social influence. Everyone's circles are interrelated. One touches different circles at different times and places' (ibid., 62-63). Yunxiang Yan explained that *Chaxue Geju* is maintained by four mechanisms. First, through the imbalance of rights and obligations to maintain the hierarchy, and legitimize it by ethical norms; second, through control the resources that maintain the hierarchy; third, through unofficial custom and official law to punish the social members who challenge the hierarchy; fourth, through some institutionalized paths of social mobility to provide people with the opportunity to change their social position, and to obtain more rights and power (Yan, 2006: 201-213). He also pointed out that *Chaxu Geju* correspondingly resulted in the *Chaxu Renge* (the differentiated personality) and reversely strengthened the *Chaxu Geju* (ibid., 210).

Putnam applied the concept of 'social capital' to explain why in northern Italy the regional governments are 'efficient in their internal operation, creative in their policy initiatives and effective in implementing those initiatives' (Putnam, 1993: 81), while in the south of Italy, regional governments are far more inefficient. Putnam defined social capital as the 'features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit' (Putnam, 1995: 65-78). He argues that social capital positively impacts on governance 'because it allows community members to overcome the dilemmas of collective action which would otherwise hamper their attempts to cooperate for the purpose of improving social life' (Putnam, 1993, see Xie, 2012: 50). However, nowadays in Baikou, people often say, 'we are not as solidary as in the past'; 'everyone only thinks of their own family now'. The present village head Anle Liu vented his grievance:

The most difficult thing is that people's minds are not solidary since I took over the tenure. The issue of land expropriation in the village must mess up people's minds because of their competing interests. The village is not solidary, even the brothers are not in a line. Many people think [being] village head is only for my own benefit. They think I make lots of money. In fact, you have your pain, and I got my pain. We are all in pain. Before I become the village head, I thought there must be lots of money can be made. But now I realize, it's not true at all. You (I) have food to eat and wine to drink. You got drunk every day...... I don't want to brag. I only hope I can do my job well and win some respect from others. We are still young. If we do bad, people will not respect you (me) in the future.

Social capital is still considered important for social life. However, the social network of the village to some extent meets a dilemma that obviously hampered the exploration of future development. The community exists, at present, more in a state of mistrust and competition rather than cooperation. The former village head Xuede Ye was accused of illegally selling collective land to outsiders, or to favour his own relatives. He is the

main figure who is criticized for benefitting himself and the 'bosses' and thereby betraying the collective benefit. But he also expressed his frustration and discontent regarding the development of Baikou:

There is no person can develop enterprise in Baikou. The development of Baikou mainly relies on land. Now, all the land of Yingde city is owned by 'bosses'. It is not possible to get the legal certification of our land. Nowadays, if you don't have money, you can't make guanxi (with government). If you don't have guanxi, you can't import enterprise (to the village). Bosses will look at your brain and your personality. We have no brain, so they will not cooperate with us. They only want our land.

In the market society, as the 'field' where the practices of the capital reproduction take place has been dramatically changed, the conversion and the reproduction of the types of capital may meet various problems and challenges. Basically, it is the effect of the collision between the logic of *guanxi* in a traditional society and the logic of social capital in a market society. The mutual trust is, in any case, the foundation to guarantee more social cooperation and development. The next section will focus on community construction by analysing the wall of the New Village.

5.4 The wall: the boundary and the community

Mountain Name	Area	Four cardinal directions			
		East	**South**	**West**	**North**
Shang Baikou	2,000 *mu*	Qihe river is the boundary; Yellow muddy road and fox cliff are the boundaries.	Jixin hill (chicken heart hill) and Shuizhipo mountain (Shuizhi woman mountain) are the boundaries. are the boundaries.	From Goupo hill to the field is the boundary; Shuiyan cliff is the boundary.	Hongshiwei (red stone tail) long lake and Dali mountain are the boundaries.
Xia Baikou	20 *mu*	Field.	Zhu family (Zhujia Wu)	Stone mountain.	Big cliff.

Table 5.1 Certificate of Mountain and Forest (holder: Baikou production team, Makou brigade, Fucheng People's Commune)

The wall of the New Village built in 2009 is another symbolic and physical boundary between the outside and inside. Jikun Ye told me that during the Land Reform in 1951, the work team of the Land Reform came to Baikou to decide the boundary of the village. Nobody objected to their opinions because of it being collective land. Then in 1981 the boundary was marked by the People's Commune. According to the Certification of Mountain and Forest issued by Fucheng People's Commune on 27th December 1981, the territory of the village was officially marked on paper but not on the landscape (Table 5.1). In other words, the old village was an open space without any physical boundary between the inside and outside. The boundary of the New Village is however clearly demarcated by a wall and gate (or the arch). There were four entrances left after the village walls were constructed in 2009 and only two have been retained since the middle of 2015 – one in the north and another in the south. Xuede Ye said the original consideration of building a wall was to avoid possible land requisition since the wall could serve as a powerful statement of ownership. In fact, even the space enclosed by

the wall land has been sold to real estate companies. Just as in the case of the arch, many villagers also objected to the wall project in 2009, because they suspected the former village head intended to gain corruptly from this project. However, in 2015, nobody disagrees that the wall is necessary as a demarcation between those within and those without when rapid urbanisation results in increasing mobility of the village's inhabitants, and many outsiders rent houses in Baikou, although it is hard to evaluate its effect on the security of the community. Anthony Cohen claimed that the symbolic boundary of a community can be used to contrive and maintain the awareness of the community's distinctiveness (1985: 40). In other words, the boundary is a way to strengthen the community. In this light, the wall may increasingly play a significant role in identifying the community when it tends to merge with a wider world in the process of urbanisation and marketisation.

On the 21st of February 2016, the state council of China issued 'Several Opinions of the State Council of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Enhancing Administration of Urban Planning and Construction', which requires new resident communities to stop building town walls and enclosing the community, and requires the established resident-community *(xiaoqu)* to gradually open the community, make the inner road open to the wider public and promote land usage. In legal terms, the space inside of the resident community is privately owned by the residents and the new regulation generated a heated argument as to whether the government has the right to prevent the building of town walls. A slogan widely spread as an online objection to the policy was: 'turnover the wall of the resident community, start with turning over the wall of *zhongnanhai*' (an imperial garden where serves as the central headquarters for the Communist Party of China and the Central government of China). The physical boundary of a community is not only relevant to the ownership of the property but also the feeling of being a community. Through constructing a symbolic boundary and distinguishing the "insider" and "outsider", both the concept of community and the self-awareness of community members are being emphasized (Cohen, 1985).

Blakely and Snyder's research suggests, in the 1990s, there was a phenomenal growth of gated communities throughout the U.S. They argued that the tendency to live in club-like communities with common spaces and facilities arises from a fear of strangers, and not just a concern for personal and property safety (Banerjee, 2001: 9-24). In this light, China has largely followed the same path in recent decades. Unlike those commercial *xiaoqu* in the urban area whose residents are often in the same economic class, a community like Baikou is a 'collective' that shares more properties and resources but whose members are not necessarily in the same economic class. Hence, their connection is much closer than the commercial xiaoqu in the city. The next chapter will further discuss the concept of community through the production and use of public space.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I firstly illustrated how the principle of *fengshui* has been incorporated into rural and urban planning in recent years and how it influenced the location and layout of the New Village. 'Siting' is still a paramount step in building a place. The whole village participates in making this decision. As the application of technology overcame the disadvantage of location in terms of water resources, the position of the New Village is no longer limited by the availability of natural resources. Finally, the concern of *fengshui* and the traffic conditions of the position outstripped the concern for natural resources. Interestingly, the principle of *fengshui* integrated with the discourse of scientificity is renascent in the everyday practices in latest decades.

In the second section, I discussed the ways in which the layout of the village presented the idea of order in the micro-society through comparing the layout of the old village and the New Village. Although Baikou is not a lineage village, it virtually follows the same principle in producing the place – the same lineage settled in the same house with a shared ancestral hall as the centre. In the New Village, every individual house is an independent unit, without sharing a lineage centre (although they do have a centre in the sense of the New Village). In other words, the scale of a 'house' has decreased from the

house of a lineage to the house of the individual household. Then, the New Village is largely ordered by the logic of the market – the rich have priority in choosing the location of their house. In this section, I paid considerable attention in the concept of the 'first row' which has expressed the social differentiation in the village since the 1990s. As a result of the process of social differentiation intertwined with the unfairness and inequality of collective property distribution, the vested interest group is considered to be a 'bad' group. It may be a universal phenomenon in Chinese society as demonstrated in Chapter Three. The tension between the wealthy and the poor (or maybe the vested interest group and the exploited group) is increasing. As I discussed in Chapter One, the Gini index has dramatically risen in recent decades (since the Reform and Opening Up). Although collective property or land cannot be sold by the village, there is always some space to favour private benefit particularly when big lineages cooperate with each other in the power game. In this power game, although the lineage is still a unit, the alliance of 'class' also plays significant role.

In the third section, I firstly discussed how the revival of tradition in the landscape construction in the New Village revealed the sentiment of nostalgia that urges people to try to find self-identity from tradition in constructing the arch at the entrance to the village. The prevalence of this kind of arch throughout the country shows that rapid economic development has greatly boosted the confidence of the country and that China intends to establish her subjectivity through recalling her tradition, instead of only following the path of Western civilisation. On the other hand, building a splendid arch is often a way to flaunt the wealth of the community. The arch is the representation of the face (*mianzi*) of the community which can be considered as the community's symbolic capital. Thus, from the perspective of capital reproduction, I compared the logic of *guanxi* that originates from the Chinese tradition with the term 'social capital' that origins from western society (or capitalist society). In the post-Mao era, the principle of the market gradually permeated every aspect of Chinese culture. The integration of the principle of *guanxi* and the principle of the market often resulted in corruption and unfair distribution of collective resources. This thesis does not aim to give a comprehensive and detailed explanation of the collision of the two principles, but

generally to describe how the arch represented the face of the community that was supposed to gain more social capital for it, and how the project of the arch was at the same time often considered as the *mainzi gongcheng* which provided a chance of corruption and unreasonable spending of the collective income of the community.

In the final section I discussed the relationship between the boundary and the community by analysing the establishment of the wall around Baikou New Village. In 2009, the wall project suffered scorching objections as it was considered a useless project for anything but corruption. However, in 2015, many villagers see it as providing a necessary contribution to the security of the village due to its fast urbanisation. In recent years, Baikou New Village has gradually become surrounded by the expanding city and since 2008, the territory of the community has declined radically. This may make the villagers aware of the threat of losing the 'place' and therefore feel it necessary to make a statement of village ownership through the construction of a physical boundary. In this way, the wall contributes to the definition of village identity. In fact, this is what Xuede Ye claimed when he decided to build the wall: when the rural community is involved in the tide of marketization and urbanisation, the boundary might be the best way to solidify the community – excluding the outsiders and generating a greater sense of belonging among villagers.

This chapter described the general picture of the New Village, including siting, layout, gate (arch) and wall. It demonstrated the logic of making a place in the New Village project, which inevitably brought about the collision of the traditional and the modern or, to be more specific, the collision of the three ideologies, Confucianism, Communism and Neoliberalism. Meanwhile, it shown the agency of the local in interpreting the ideal of the state. The next chapter will focus on the collapsing and construction of community in contemporary rural China by analysing the construction and usage of the public space of the New Village.

Chapter 6 Public Space in the Village

In terms of public space, a typical Chinese New Village often includes an administration building, a cultural centre,[37] a public toilet, an open fitness centre, a garden or park, a village clinic and a garbage collection point. Baikou New Village includes all these elements other than the village clinic, because there is a hospital near the village. This chapter will focus on the planning and the usage of public space in the New Village through a comparison with the old village. In this chapter, 'public space' is taken to mean the space for the community or for social life; such space is intended to be used for community activities, everyday interaction and public activity. Community activity includes feasts, celebrations, entertainments and so forth that are organised by the village, and the community is the unit for these activities. Everyday interaction refers to the social interaction between individuals that occurs in this public space, including everyday greetings, communal exercise, playing cards and so forth. Public activity here specifically refers to the concept of the public sphere that Habermas identified. According to Habermas (1964), the concept of the public sphere refers to a realm of social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. It is a domain between society and state, in which the public organises itself as the bearer of public opinion (Habermas, 1964). In fact, during my fieldwork, there were only three activities that occurred in Baikou that can be categorised as public. These will be discussed below. Public space in the New Village will be investigated with reference to these three types of social interaction. Through making some comparisons with the usage of the public spaces in the old village, I will try to delineate the transformation of community life in Baikou village in order to discuss the conditions or constraints of activating civil society in rural China. I further argue that in the old village, public space was shared not only in terms of ritual and entertainment, but also in terms of production and life. As a consequence, the cohesion of the community is based on a comprehensive range of cooperation and interaction in everyday life.

---

[37] Sometimes the Cultural Centre and the administration building is the same thing.

6.1 Fitness centre: physical fitness, patriotism and nationalism

Figure 6.1 Fitness centre

The fitness centre is symmetrically opposed to the square of the Cultural Centre. To the east of the fitness centre is a garden, then an open basketball court with two table tennis tables aligned in a line from the east to west. Thus, the west part of the middle area of the village is basically the space for exercises. The basketball court and the table tennis tables are hardly used because of their obscure location which is obstructed by some trees, and perhaps also because the local people are either unfamiliar with basketball or do not like intense exercise that requires team cooperation. The small fitness centre, with about ten items of fitness and leisure equipment, was established in the northeast corner of the garden in 2015 (see Figure 6.1). Since then, it has become the most joyful and lively point in the village because the elders often bring their grandchildren to the fitness centre. Although most of this fitness equipment is not appropriate for children, nonetheless most of the time, only they use it. Adults often simply sit on the boundary of the fitness centre or on an iron stool, chatting with each other or looking around at the passers-by.

In 2011 when I did fieldwork in Langxi village in the southeast of China, I found the majority of the villagers rarely used the fitness equipment there either. They said that farm work is intensive physical work so there is no need to do extra exercise. However, in 2016, in response to the transformation from agricultural production to the industrial production or service industry, 'square dancing' and walking have become popular exercises for females in Langxi village. Similarly, in Baikou village instead of doing exercise in the fitness centre, some women, especially the middle-aged and older ones, do 'square dancing' together after dinner.

The fitness centre is one part of the standard 'New Village' according to the model villages throughout China. As I mentioned in Chapter Three, Baikou is honoured as the 'Healthy Village of Guangdong Province', awarded by the Patriotic Health Campaign Committee of the province, and the 'Healthy Village' of the city, awarded by the Patriotic Health Campaign Committee of the city. The 'Healthy Village' refers to the generally clean environment and availability and accessibility of fitness equipment. The so-called 'Patriotic Health Campaign Committee' is a department of the Advisory and Coordinating Organs of the State Council (*Guowuyuan yishi xietiao jigou*). Its concrete work is executed by the National Health and Family Planning Commission. The Patriotic Health Campaign Committee was established in 1952 as the Epidemic Prevention Committee. Since 1953, it has been renamed as the Patriotic Health Campaign Committee. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the Patriotic Health Campaign Committee was halted. It was re-established again in 1978.

The connection between 'patriotism' and 'health' can be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century. In the late nineteenth century, when European ideas about nationalism were introduced to China, theories of Social Darwinism, including Huxley's Evolution and Ethics and Spencer's Principles of Sociology (translated by Fu Yan), influenced the definition of the new conception of the state – 'the image of the nation is a biological organism struggling for survival among other like organisms' (Brownell, 2000: 209). 'A country is like a body', so it must have citizens with strong

bodies in order to be a strong country (ibid., 209). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the term the 'sick man of east Asia' (*dongya bingfu*)[38] was employed by Chinese scholars, for example, Qichao Liang, Fu Yan and Youwei Kang, who created an image of 'sick Chinese' to motivate people 'to be unified to scour the history of shame'[39] and to urge the Qing Government to reform (Ye, 2010). This term originally referred to criticism of the powerlessness of the Qing Government. However, the 'sick man' discourse integrated with the prevalent Evolutionism of that period in China, and resulted in a social movement to make a new 'body' of the population, to lead the national imagination and to inculcate the spirit of patriotism. Legislation included the opium abolition movement, the release of female footbinding, cutting men's hair, and so forth (Townsend, 1992: 97-130, Ye, 2010). Up to 2008 when Beijing hosted the Olympics, the term *dongya bingfu* was often used to create an encouraging contrast between the past and the present achievement, the patriotism and probably, nationalism.

James Harrison suggests that the traditional Chinese self-image has generally been defined as 'culturalism', based on a common historical heritage and acceptance of shared beliefs, not a nationalism, based on the modern concept of the nation-state (Harrison, 1969: 2, Harrison, 1980: 134-134, see Townsend, 1992). Since the end of the nineteenth century, however, nationalism started to permeate Chinese affairs, manifesting itself even among ideas and movements differing widely in other respects (Townsend, 1992: 101). Joseph Whitney pointed out that China was transformed from a cultural entity to a political entity when the Confucian idea of the state was replaced by an imported nationalism (Whitney, 1970). However, in recent years, the Confucian idea of the state, the so-called *tianxia* (天下), which extends beyond the nation and territory has become prevalent: it is the world that extends as a concentric circle from the core cultural circle, 'everything under heaven'. To some extent, the concept of *tianxia* has been revived through integration with intense nationalism and by the re-interpretation

---

[38] The term 'sick man of east Asia' (*dongya bingfu*) originates from another term 'sick man of Europe' that refers to the Ottoman Empire of the same period (Scott, 2008: 9).

[39] The Qing Government was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War between 1894-1895, the First Opium War between 1839-1842 and the Second Opium War between 1856-1860.

and exploration of the value of Confucianism in contemporary China. As James Townsend suggests, 'China's entry to a world of sovereign nation-states was unusually prolonged and traumatic because it forced the Chinese to reject their age-old cultural identity and adopt a new politicized one', while, 'this long, wrenching 'identity crisis' makes contemporary Chinese nationalism unusually intense, becoming in the resolution of the crisis something like the religion of modern China' (ibid., 102).

Mao's famous remark '*shenti shi geming de benqian*' (the body is the capital of revolution) was the motto in the past. Now, the healthy and visually beautiful body is the capital of the labour market. According to the Google Ngram Viewer,[40] use of the word 'fitness' dramatically increased since the 1960s at a global level. This tendency shows that people are paying more and more attention on their body at a global level. In recent years, fitness has become a buzzword in Chinese society too. Possibly, it should partly be attributed to the very high cost of medical expenses. Medical expenses are often the least affordable cost for many rural families. Partly, it should also be attributed to the process of marketisation that urges the individual to participate in the market as a commercial product in neoliberal society. The fitness of the body then is the capital of the market.

---

[40]
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?year_start=1800&year_end=2008&corpus=15&smoothing=7&case_insensitive=on&content=fitness&direct_url=t4%3B%2Cfitness%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3Bfitness%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BFitness%3B%2Cc0

6.2 Garden and flower bed: aesthetics and modernity

Figure 6.2 Garden

In the blueprint of the ideal New Village, besides concerning the physical health of the people, the aesthetic effect of the place is also an important concern. Therefore, gardens and flower beds by the road are also standard planning in a typical New Village. As Wolfgang Welsch pointed out, aestheticisation is at its most obvious in the urban space, where just about everything has been subjected to a face-lift over the last few years. With this, the world is becoming a domain of experience (Welsch, 1997). The New Village programme and the 'Beautiful Countryside' programme are largely considered as a programme of aestheticisation of the countryside. Therefore, many model New Villages built gardens and many flowerbeds in the village, though building a garden in a village has never been a Chinese village tradition. As Francesca Bray said, the garden was not for permanent occupation, but rather a place of retreat from 'the duties of ordinary life, the setting for music making, drinking, composing poetry' (Bray, 1997: 85). In traditional Chinese architecture, the garden is sited behind the main building; it is the world beyond everyday life, as Foucault rightly described it as a 'heterotopia' (Foucault and Miskowiec, 1986: 22-27). In the Baikou New Village, the public garden is sited at the centre of the village, opposite the Cultural Centre, nearly on the central axis of the village (see Figure 6.2). The striking location places the garden under the

gaze of all the passers-by. At the centre of the garden is a traditional pavilion, which is surrounded by green plants. A winding cobblestone-paved alley leads toward the pavilion. The pavilion was not often visited before the fitness centre was built as the winding alley limited easy access to the pavilion. According to my investigation of the preference of the 'ideal village', a straight and wide road is always one of the core concerns of the peasants, whereas the winding alley expressed the idea of the classic Chinese garden design. Although the design of the garden is not very exquisite, its 'design idea' basically expressed the classic Chinese garden style, with winding alley, pavilion, tree and flowers. In other words, this kind of garden was the ideal for the literati, not for peasants.

Although some villagers believe the garden is one of the most beautiful places in the village, the aesthetic effect of the garden cannot compare with the 'grandiosity' and the modern style of the Cultural Centre, which represents the wealth of the community and the ideal of modernity. According to my field research, the majority of the villagers agree that the Cultural Centre is not only the centre of the village, but also the most beautiful place in the village (some also believe the arch is the most beautiful place), rather than the 'garden' that was intended to improve the village's aesthetic visual effect. 'Beauty of a place', in this sense, seems more relevant to grandiosity and their imagination of 'modernity' which is even further from the ideal landscape they described – *yishan banshui* (nestling under mountains and besides rivers) – in the photo elicitation that I mentioned in Chapter Three. In other words, the natural beauty of the environment is not as important as the constructed modern environment. In this sense, the 'beauty' or 'aesthetical effect' is very much culturally constructed.

In 2013, the central government launched another movement called 'Beautiful Countryside'. As part of this, the municipal government of Yingde city set up an office called the 'Beautiful Countryside Office'. Only two civil servants are full-time staff of the office, and the other ten or eleven all come from other departments and work part-time. The projects of the 'Beautiful Countryside' planned to distribute funding as

rewards to the villages that develop the relevant projects by themselves. The government emphasizes it intends to motivate local people to apply for projects because they know what they need. Nonetheless, the village head Anle Liu said the municipal government organised a conference to train the village leaders to build a 'beautiful village'. The government classified model villages into five levels; the first level could receive about one million yuan funding; the second could receive about 500,000-60,000 yuan funding; and the lowest might be a *weisheng* (hygienic) village, for which the funding is 200,000 yuan. So now they have the motivation to make their village beautiful, for example, if they clean up the firewood that is piled in front of the house, then the villager can receive several hundreds of yuan reward.

To 'make beautiful', here, particularly means cleaning up the things that are considered as ugly, for example, firewood. Firewood is regarded as ugly because it is a symbol of 'backwardness', 'undevelopment', 'the bitter life of the past' and 'dirtiness'. Therefore, in many model New Villages, firewood is one of the features that is most attacked. People often use the term '*huayuan shi cunzhuang*' (garden-style village) to identify the ideal village, which is also based on the impression of the countryside landscape of the West.

Figure 6.3 Growing vegetables in front of the gate

Flower bed

Some villagers told me that the public garden and the footpath (on each side of the main road of the village) are to a large extent wasted. It would be much better if the village leaders could give the land to them to grow vegetables. They think the basketball court is not a problem, but there are many mosquitos and some snakes in the garden. Children are afraid of snakes. Unfortunately, there are some years when even growing vegetables in front of private houses is not allowed because it is considered to ruin the beauty of the village. There are often conflicts between the government (or village committee) and the farmer (or citizen) on the issue of growing vegetables in public flower-beds by the footpath. This kind of behaviour is considered as lacking *suzhi* (human quality) which in this context means not educated or civilised (the discourse of *suzhi* will be further discussed in Chapter Eight), because the public flower-bed is a public space and its function is supposed to be 'making the environment beautiful'. 'Lack of *suzhi*', here, implies the people who do not have public consciousness but only think of their own benefit. Moreover, from the view of the designer (or the official), the aesthetic effect and the function of an object are detached from each other. In fact, the non-functionality of an object is the prerequisite of its 'aesthetic effect' in the context of *cunrong cunmao* (appearance of the village). However, from the view of the villagers, the land in front of the house should belong to the house owner rather than the village; then the *cunrong cunmao* cannot be an important part of their concern, and growing vegetables is even more convenient than buying vegetables from the city. It is not only an economic concern but also a life habit. In short, the issue of growing vegetables in the flower bed is, to some extent, relevant to the ambiguous boundary between the 'private space, collective space and public space'. This should largely be attributed to the ambiguous rights of property ownership that I have discussed in Chapter Four. Meanwhile, it is relevant to the contradiction between the economic demand and the aesthetic demand, the former is the main concern of the rural people, but the latter is the main target of the 'Beautiful Countryside' programme.

6.3 Grocer shop, poker spot and mah-jong table: commercialisation and unemployment

Figure 6.4 People playing cards in front of a grocer's shop in Baikou

Figure 6.5 People playing cards in front of someone's house in Baikou

Figure 6.6 People playing cards in Lianhe village

All the public spaces we have discussed above are elements of the planning of a New Village, but the grocery shops and the poker spots are unplanned consequences that emerged with the process of urbanisation and de-agriculturalisation. In this section, I will argue that, the rapid urbanisation of Baikou has resulted in a high rate of unemployment as the local people are far less prepared to adapt to the new environment.

There are several poker spots spread through different parts of the New Village, and several families own mah-jong tables. Poker and mah-jong are relatively new games in Baikou. Residents started to play cards and mah-jong only in the last decade. The first day I went to Baikou to do pilot research (before the local government introduced me to the village leaders), I saw a group of villagers playing poker under a tree. Some villagers thought I was a journalist, so they started to complain about the village issues to me, as I discussed in Chapter Two. One of their complaints was that they do not have an area to farm after losing their land so they have to kill time by playing poker: 'We have no hope.' While in rural China, many play poker and mah-jong during their leisure time in the slack season, in Baikou it has become the routine of the everyday life. The increased spare time also highlights the reality of unemployment. The village head,

Anle Liu, claimed nearly 70% of villagers have no job. But his definition of 'unemployed' does not include those in farm work and casual work. He said, 'in fact, there are still lots of job there, but many young people in our village rather sleep at home than work outside because they despise the jobs that actually suit them.' The elder and middle-aged residents still do some farm work and casual work, but most of them are not able to earn a stable income and therefore have become domestic labourers, helping their children to do housework and look after grandchildren (I will discuss this further in Chapter Eight).

Poker or mah-jong as a kind of everyday social activity can be classified into two types: one is purely entertainment, and another is gambling. In Baikou, poker is often purely entertainment, but mah-jong is often gambling. People play poker at a small table for fun (see Figure 6.4-6.5), and there are always some bystanders around. The atmosphere of the poker table is always very exciting. Both the players and the onlookers boldly express excitement, pleasure and sorrow at the table. The intensive interactions ensure the group is always in movement. Everyone focuses on the game. When I tried at times to ask questions around the table, I always failed to draw their attention. These poker partners are all middle-aged or older, and most of them are female. However, mah-jong is a more private activity as it is always played with bets, though there are some mah-jong clubs in the city and some more professional players go to the club (usually men; woman play at home). The atmosphere of mah-jong is much more serious and always at someone's home when played in the village. The host either charges ten yuan as a fee or is given four chances of exemption at the beginning of the game. I played mah-jong several times with the villagers. During the game, the players rarely talk. People start to make comments or express regret during the game, often lamenting the mistakes they made until the round finishes. The winner rarely shows their excitement – probably, because it is only 'small' gambling. They may be considered too stingy and be disdained if the excitement shown is too obvious because of winning a little money, as generosity is always concerned important in moral evaluations. People often apply the word '*jing*' to evaluate a person. Jing contains multi-layered meanings, including smart, sly and stingy. When this word is used to describe a child, it has a positive meaning –

smart, learning things fast, flexible; when it used to describe an adult it indicates, most of the time, this person is stingy, mean, sly, self-interested and not generous, yet smart. Another word '*lia*', is often used to positively indicate qualities of being smart, excellent and fast learning. By contrast, '*shuaiga*' is another word very often used to evaluate a person. It also contains multi-layered meanings, including bad, stupid, selfish and *bu jiang daoli* (do not follow the *daoli*). These words often used to evaluate people are, to some extent, based on evidence for the capability of doing things and the intention of sharing and cooperation with others, which are the two key aspects in the evaluation system.

According to my fieldwork in Langxi village and Lianhe village in Zhejiang province, nearly all the card games or mah-jong are gambling (see Figure 6.6). Men often play in the public space or in front of the gate of someone's home; but women hardly appear in the public space as gambling is considered inappropriate behavior for them. However, during the Spring Festival, the whole village joins in the gambling activity, and even women play in the public spaces. I have never seen people play cards purely as a game in Langxi or Lianhe village, the bets are usually boldly put on the table. However, in Baikou, poker is always purely a game without bets, yet the players keep playing day by day with enthusiasm.

Moreover, in comparison with the mah-jong in Langxi village or Lianhe village, the rules of mah-jong in Baikou are much simpler, and the playing path is much slower. Possibly, the perception of the connection of time and economy in Baikou may be looser than in Lianhe village and Langxi village. Although, in terms of spatial production, Baikou is much more urbanised than Lianhe village and Langxi village, to some extent, the habitus of the local people is less urbanised and commercialised. To some extent, this disequilibrium has constrained their agency to adapt to the new environment.

Of course, playing poker and mah-jong is not the whole story of their new lives. In May of 2015, a huge restaurant opened in front of the village and approximately 200 staff moved to Baikou, which led to further openness and marketization of the village. Some villagers built a second house behind their first house and leased it out to the migrant workers. Before May of 2015, this was not a very pervasive phenomenon. Before that month, the village was a relatively closed community. In September of 2015, the kindergarten opened in the Cultural Centre (which I will discuss in the next section). The kindergarten recruited many students from Chengxi Residents' Community. Some of them are local, and some are the children of the migrants. In short, there was a dramatic increase in people moving into Baikou, and the mobility of the village people grew. Between May and September, four grocery shops opened. The staff of the restaurant are all very young (most of them are around 20-25 years old). They enjoy chatting and drinking in the grocer's after work at night, which broke the night-time silence of the village. During the day, people come and sit in front of the stores, play poker and chat. The process of urbanisation and commercialisation will continue in years to come in Baikou. The village head of Qingyun Tang (which has experienced nearly two decades of urbanisation) said, 'Baikou will have to wait another ten years to become similar to us, as we have waited ten years.' Qingyun Tang is one of the richest villages in Chengxi residents' community, mainly because of the appreciation of land value. The main income of the villagers in Qingyun Tang comes from the rent fee of houses and stores. People do not have to work at all but only collect their rent. There are three striking keywords used of Qingyun Tang when people mention this village: wealth, gambling and prostitution. Will this become the unfortunate future of Baikou too?

6.4 The Cultural Centre

6.4.1 The establishment of the Cultural Centre

Figure 6.7 Cultural Centre and Square in early 2015

(Image provided by Chengxi Residents' Community)

Figure 6.8 Cultural Centre Opening Ceremony in January 2013

(Image provided by Chengxi Residents' Community)

The Cultural Centre is located at the most easterly end of an east-west line that runs through the middle of the New Village. In front of the Cultural Centre, there is a big square with a national flag erected at the exact centre which is in line with the central gate of the Cultural Centre (see Figure 6.7-6.8). This magnificent architecture is considered to be the centre of the village. In July 2011, the foundation stone of the Cultural Centre was laid. The project was completed in 2012 and open to the community in January of 2013. Knapp said, the process of building is highly ritualised with cosmological and magical intentions that attempt to deal with the possibility of unsettling actions on the part of both carpenters and masons (Knapp, 1999: 40). Indeed, the ritual of the cornerstone laying and the opening ceremony of Baikou Cultural Centre were the most magnificent ceremonies at the level of a village in this region. At the opening ceremony, even the municipal government official leaders attended and made speeches, which is very unusual for a village (see Figure 6.8).

Figure 6.9 Conference room

Figure 6.10 Meeting hall

Figure 6.11 Village office

The Cultural Centre is a three-storey building, occupying an area of approximately 2,500 square meters, including a square in front of the main building (see Figure 6.8), a banqueting hall (see Figure 6.13), a gym, a conference room (see Figure 6.9), a meeting hall (see Figure 6.10), a village committee office (Figure 6.11), a study, several other

offices, a reception area, a big kitchen, several toilets and so forth. In addition, the Cultural Centre is equipped with some air conditioners and multimedia facilities. The building and the square in front of the Culture Centre cost in total more than 7,000,000 yuan.[41] For a small village, it is obviously another *mianzi gongcheng* which is unreasonably extravagant. The funding was obtained by transferring 40 *mu* of land to a real estate company, which therefore, yielded 175,000 yuan per *mu*. According to a real estate company's record, the average price of land in Baikou was 492,200 yuan per *mu* in 2014. We can therefore confidently say that this exchange was not based solely on market principles. The village leaders always emphasize that the 'boss' (the boss of the real estate company) helped them to build this Cultural Centre, and they did not need to pay anything at all. However, the villagers disagreed. In general, the villagers believe the Cultural Centre is a useless showcase project; a project intended as a source of corruption for the rich and powerful. The usage rate of this huge building is extremely low. A big meeting/feast took place only twice during my fieldwork. Apart from these few events, the Cultural Centre was closed for most of the time. The facilities and the equipment have become covered with thick dust.

6.4.2 A feast in the Cultural Centre

Figure 6.12 Women help for the housewarming celebration in the backyard of the Cultural Centre in early 2015

---

[41] A house in Baikou cost approximately 300,000 yuan in 2015 compared to approximately 60,000 yuan in 1997.

Figure 6.13 Housewarming Celebration of Chuanzhu Chen's family in banqueting hall in early 2015

Janet Carsten suggested that, the commonality of a community can be created by the cooking, consumption and incorporation of feast food (Carsten and Hugh-Jones, 1995: 121). Before 2015, Baikou retained the tradition to share feast food with the whole community, but since the second half of 2015, this tradition met some challenges. One day, very soon after I arrived in Baikou village, all the villagers were in the Cultural Centre to celebrate Chuanzhu Chen's family moving into a new house. The team head invited me to the feast too, even though he is not a family member of the feast holder. Other people from the same lineage are supposed to help in the feast. Around eight o'clock, the relatives and close friends went to the Cultural Centre to have breakfast – often minced beef congee. After the breakfast, they started to prepare food and set the tables. Men were busy in the kitchen, and women were washing raw materials in the backyard (see Figure 6.12). People sat at the tables as a group in general by gender, and children and elders sat with women. Everyone looked happy.

The celebration lasted three days, but the lunch of the first day was the main feast that all guests attended (see Figure 6.13). The close relatives and friends who joined to organise the feast often returned to eat the remainder of the food from the first lunch on the second and third days. As in Janet Carsten's Langkawi village in Malaysia, the chefs of the feast are always men. Cooking is a symbolical process of transformation between internal and external relations of the house (ibid., 121-122) – women act as assistants. This housewarming celebration was in winter, so a hotpot was the main course, with some other cooked dishes. The dishes were not very formal compared with other places I visited. For example, in Lianhe village, Langxi village and Wangjia village, the feasts were much more like banquets.

In Wangjia village, I was invited to a wedding feast. I asked how much *hongbao* (money packed in a red envelope) would be expected to be given to a common friend. I was told that, in recent years, it is often more than five hundred yuan, because the food for an individual costs approximately two hundred yuan. In Lianhe village and Wangjia village, the *hongbao* is even bigger than in Wangjia village. Zhejiang province, where Lianhe village and Langxi village are located, is famous for its wealth-flaunting feasts for weddings, housewarmings, funerals, and birthday celebrations. This is simply because Zhejiang is one of the most economically developed regions in China. Moreover, private enterprises are their dominant economic resource with the consequence that raising funds from a circle of acquaintances is the dominant means for raising capital, rather than through government and bank loans such as in Shandong and many other places in China. Therefore, the investment in the symbolic capital (wealth-flaunting feasts) is a necessary strategy to establish a good reputation and to raise more funds for private enterprises. This kind of feast in Yingde is very low-key in comparison with Zhejiang province. In Baikou, the amount of *hongbao* is often less than one hundred yuan for each family which is much less than the other three villages I mentioned, and all the family members can join the feast. Thus, the feast is often a losing proposition, and of course, the food is much simpler than in the other three villages. In this light, as the whole village (except the families who have extremely bad relations) will be invited, the *hongbao* is often kept in quite equal amounts for different

guests and the difference between the core circle (close kin and friends) and other friends is not very big. The food and wine provided at the feasts by different holders are said to be quite similar too.

Figure 6.14 The food and tableware of the feast

On the one hand, the structure of the feast retained some traditions of the past. The feasts are supposed to include some symbolic food appropriate to a particular feast, often homophones with positive meanings. For example, the sticky rice cake (*fagao*) is a homophone of fortune because the pronunciation of 'sticky rice cake' is similar to that of 'fortune' in Chinese, namely '*fa*', meaning 'make fortune'. Thus, the sticky rice cake is always served in housewarming celebrations in this region. Similarly, every round table is shared by ten people as 'ten' is an auspicious number. On the other hand, the feast in Baikou also shows more obvious borrowings from Western culture. For example, drinks often include whisky, brandy, beer and some beverages such as coke and orange juice. Unlike the majority of places in China where white spirit (Chinese traditional distilled spirit) and beer are the main drinks, in Yingde city since the 1990s people prefer to drink *yangjiu* (western wine, mainly brandy and whisky) during feasts

instead of traditional Chinese wine. People said that this tendency might be influenced by fashions established in Hong Kong. All tableware including chopsticks, cups and rice bowls are of single-use plastic (see Figure 6.14), as it takes time and effort to wash dishes and plastic tableware is considered more hygienic.

The feast lasted for approximately 40 minutes, and the majority of people left the Cultural Centre soon after finishing the meal. Some men stayed at their tables and drank for fun. The basic rule of the drinking game between men is finding a reason to ask people to drink more. During the lunch, as I sat with the prestigious men of the locale, lots of young men come to *jingjiu* (propose a toast to somebody) to show their respect and expect to build *guanxi* with those considered prestigious. Chinese believe that *guanxi* is often made through drinking together, through the process of *jingjiu* and *fajiu* (punish somebody to drink). People often say, *jiupin* (the style of drinking) shows *renpin* (personality). Drinking is, then, often a necessary social skill for every man when he starts his career life, but women are not often required to do so. In recent years, the Chinese culture of drinking has been criticised because it often encourages people to drink to excess which has resulted in health and other social problems. Although Western drinking culture is becoming increasingly prevalent, in rural areas, the Chinese culture still has deep roots.

6.4.3 Less cooperation, smaller feast

Since May 2015, almost the whole building of the Cultural Centre in Baikou has been leased out to a kindergarten (I will discuss this issue below); only the village office on the ground floor of the Cultural Centre remains. The village retained the rights to hold feasts in the Cultural Centre according to the contract. However, after it was leased out, family feasts immediately moved to nearby restaurants. People said that it was much more convenient to hold feasts in the restaurants. Instead of inviting the whole village, the guests are then limited to their circle of close friends and relatives. The scale of feast sharing may tend to be narrower within the community in the future, which may impede

the shaping of the commonality of the community that Carsten suggested (1995). During Robert Layton's fieldwork research in 1969 in Pellaport in Franche-Comte, community cooperation and interaction was intensive compared to 1995 when he returned and community interaction had dramatically declined (Layton, 2000: 206-209). As he pointed out, in 1995, 'the context in which it is felt community interaction can gain expression are now those that allow gossip and the expression of friendship, but not substantive exchanges of labour' (ibid., 209). Since the Household Responsibility Contract System was initiated in the 1980s, the substantive exchanges of labour and cooperation between the families in China decreased compared to the collective era. On the contrary, competitive relationships have become increasingly intense in recent years as land development has become the main source of economic growth in the village. Corresponding to this transformation, unlike Pellaport where the strong sense of community smoothly slipped into the track of individualisation, the transformation of Baikou-as-community is struggling: the moral system is facing severe challenges.

In order to comprehend individuals' understanding of the term 'good' in Baikou village, I undertook 41 interviews with adults across the age range. According to the interviewees, the definition of a 'good person' for those born before 1970, primarily involves acts of reciprocity and generosity. For example, Xuezhi Tong is a 41-year-old man who is always very positive and joyful. He said,

A good person (haoren) must like help others. Of course, there are lots of good persons. Our village is very unified (qixin – qi means unified, xin means heart). You see, everyone comes to help for the feast. Good people should help each other. There are some bad people, but the good people are always dominant. In our village, I don't know who is a bad person. If a person is not generous, this person might not be very good. But what is a bad person? Maybe the thieves are bad? I don't know. Maybe my son (his son is a policeman) knows it better.

Sheneng Tong is a 58-year-old man, who undertakes some casual labour for truck loading. He expressed a different idea from Xuezhi Tong, saying,

> *In the past, people were more unified, but nowadays, people only take care of themselves. Yes, the present (material) life is better than the past, but in terms of people's hearts, I think people were better in the past. …… A good person should be loyal and honest (zhonghou laoshi), but now, you will be bullied by others if you are loyal and honest. Yet I think people should not only take care of their own family, but also treat other people well.*

When this senior generation make positive comments about somebody, '*ken bangmang*' (willing to help) are the most frequently words applied. Also, 'good' is taken to mean 'honest', 'loyal' and 'just'. However, the younger generation seem to be very suspicious of the definition of a 'good person'. The village head Anle Liu said,

> *I think this question is a bit naïve. Old children will talk if a person is good or not good. In the society, I think, it is hard to make comments. ….. For example, in the TV shows, some people like helping others, and they can sacrifice their own interest for others. They are good people. I think everyone has a little the kind of 'good'. But it is impossible to be completely 'good'.*

A'hong is Chunlei Ye's wife, and is 43 years old. She said, 'this is a very complicated question. The definition of a good person always depends on 'for whom'. For example, someone who is a good person for me may not be for you.' Guxin Liu, a 45-year-old man said,

There is no good person. Everyone born with good heart, but the society will make you lose the good heart. In the society, everyone tries to cheat the other for money. In my life, I cannot find anyone who is completely good, but always some parts of the person are good and some other parts are bad. Now, people only think about 'interest'. Also, I don't think there is anyone who is completely bad. Everyone is just trying to survive. There is only the man of interest, but no bad or good person.'

Xiaomei is a young wife (28 years old) who married into Baikou three years ago. She said,

Anyway, for me, I don't care who is bad or good. You can do anything you want, if it has no relevance to me. In my life, I never met a really bad person, the worst might be the thief who stole my mobile phone. But it's their job, and we just take different positions for this issue. Some corrupted officials are even worse. They steal openly but you cannot fight against it. They are even more like a robber. But some corrupted officials donated their bribes (to the poor). Good person and bad person is always relative. From different angles and different positions, it has different definitions. There is no absolutely good or bad. It is all depending on your position. …… The society is too messy now, it is not necessary to care for all the messy. We should focus on our own life. If the people around us have difficulties, we can only give some suggestions.

The relativism and scepticism of 'good' has become the dominant value of the generation born after 1970 who mainly grew up in the era of de-collectivism or the era of marketisation. Robert Layton asserts, 'a continuing relationship is intrinsic to the success of reciprocal exchange, whereas commercial transactions can be concluded

between parties who do not know each other and will never meet again. The insistence that the value of reciprocal exchanges must not be calculated in money asserts they are governed by different principles' (Layton, 2000: 218). As I have discussed in Chapter Three, since the 1990s, Baikou has cultivated Taiwanese bamboo as the main economic crop. In terms of production, since that time, nearly every family owns one or two cows as the main production tool, and some families own tractors. During the busy season, many families hire casual labourers from nearby villages. In everyday life, the internal mutual aid has gradually been substituted by commercial transactions, for example, holding feasts in restaurants, building houses by employing a company and so forth. So as James Scott's research in southeastern Asia found, the reciprocal system in the peasant society is inevitably collapsed when the market economy permeates into it (Scott, 1976). The principle of the 'moral economy' that Scott found in the peasant society, is increasingly substituted by the market economy (ibid.). As a consequence, the ethics of those who have grown up in this environment are in correspondence to the new principles, namely, the relativism, scepticism and nihilism of morality. Therefore, the multi-dimensional value of 'reciprocal exchange' is reduced to the mono-dimensional market exchange. The feast involving the whole community will probably become another sweet memory for some people in the future.

6.4.4 Deliberative democracy: meeting in the Cultural Centre

Figure 6.15 Village meeting in Cultural Centre in early 2015

Figure 6.16 Village meeting in Cultural Centre in early 2015

To some extent, in Baikou and many other villages in China, the decline of reciprocal relations and the increasing individualisation has limited the development of the public sphere in the Habermasian sense (Habermas, 1991). In the old village, the village meetings were often held in the ancestral hall of the Tong family as it was the biggest one in the village. In the 1960s, the village built a little square (called *ditan*), and the general meetings were then held there. People said that in the collective era there were many meetings of the village and the brigade. For example, every year the whole production team (the village) met and voted to decide if a person deserved the *gongfen* (work credit) he or she gained according to their performance. The villagers often also met to learn Mao's words during the Cultural Revolution. If the village needed to build any infrastructure in the collective era, the whole village met and made decisions together by discussion and vote. To some extent, the democratic orientation of public life was even more prevalent at the level of the production team and brigade (in other words, above the level of a single village) in the collective era than in the post-collective era. As a result of a reduced public life, people often resorted to the might of the law rather than collective deliberation.

At the end of January 2015, after I had been in the village for two weeks, the *lishihui* organised a general meeting in the hall of the Cultural Centre (see Figure 6.15-6.16). This was the only general meeting of the village to be held in 2015 during my fieldwork. As far as I know, it is also the only one to have been held in recent years, as the majority of the village decisions were made by the village representatives and the *lishihui* members (the village committee). I will begin by presenting a description of this event directly from my fieldnotes:

The majority of the villagers came to the Cultural Centre although some refused or were unable to come. The main issue of the meeting was how to deal with the land and explain the situation of the 6.5-storey house that had been in construction for several years. Round tables were set in the hall with some red stools; peanuts were served and there was water on the tables. People sat around the tables and ate peanuts before the meeting started. When the tables were generally filled, the village head Anle Liu started to give a speech in the local dialect at the rostrum. After about three minutes, some people complained that they could not hear him at all because he was not using the microphone. Then people started to hiss and look for the microphone. However, during his speech, people still kept talking around the table, and after several minutes, some people complained again that the volume was too low. This time, Anle Liu did not stop talking, but limited himself, only speaking to one table. The rest of the people talked by themselves around the other tables. A middle-aged man said to me, 'you cannot get the truth here. If you want the truth, you must visit every family and have a talk with every family. It is not easy for you to understand.' However, when I asked to visit their homes, all the people around the table tactfully refused me. They did not even want to share their names with me as they were afraid that I may make trouble, though they did want to complain about the unfairness of the land issue. After approximately one and a half hours, the village head, all the lishihui members and some prestigious old or middle-aged men converged around one table and the discussion then changed into a fight between the village head and his uncle, Dingliang Liu (see Figure 6.16) (previously discussed in Chapter Four). The meeting lasted over three hours, but in the middle of it,

people started to leave. The main discussion around the table, involving only men, continued.

Jiang Daoli – an alternative to general meetings

On the second day of the meeting, a middle-aged woman said to me, 'Now, everyone has their own thought. You have your thought and I have my thought. In the past, everything is simpler because anyway you are poor and you have nothing.' It is a common idea that people believe that 'wealth' broke the peace of life. 'Thought', in this context, refers to the evaluations of the way to distribute property or compensation of the land. It also indicates the pluralisation of society. Another man said to me, 'the society does not care about fairness these days, but in my opinion, *jiangdaoli* is always the most important.' Chinese people often apply the word '*daoli*' as the principle in social life. *Daoli* literally means reason, principle and rule. The appropriate way to deal with social or family conflicts is considered to be through *'jiang daoli'* – that is, talking *daoli* – which is logically reasonable and emotionally acceptable. The Chinese philosopher, Shumin Liang, suggested that the harmonies between human and nature, between human beings, between self and others is called rationality (Liang, 1979: 134). He further pointed out that Confucianism emphasizes that the meaning of life is to practise the '*li*' (理) (Liang, 1963). Here, *li* means *daoli*, that aims to achieve peaceful consent by *jiang daoli*. In this sense, *jiang daoli* is more or less identical to the process of building up the communicative rationality in everyday speech – as Habermas claimed (Habermas, 1985). Habermas applied the concept of 'validity claim' as a substitute for objective truth. He said, 'we understand a speech act when we know the kinds of reasons that a speaker could provide in order to convince a hearer that he is entitled in the given circumstances to claim validity for his utterance—in short, when we know what makes it acceptable' (Habermas, 1998: 232). There are some contexts in which people apply the word '*daoli*' in order to assert the acceptability of their claims.

Context one:

I asked Jiale Tong if he has any photos of the old village. He said to me, 'According to *daoli*, the Residents' Community should keep the photos in the archive. Before the village was razed to the ground, they should have taken a panorama of the old village. Nowadays, the picture of the old village is often kept to compare with the new village.' In this context, *daoli* is nothing to do with morality, ethics, legitimacy or logically reasonability, but only refers to a rule of work.

Context two:

A woman talked about the hukou issue with me. She said,

> *A woman's hukou can be retained in Baikou village. But once she is married out and has children, the stuff that village distributed to us (she indicates the compensation fee of the land expropriation in this context), she should not take her share, even her hukou is still in the village. ... Because other people (in the village) will need it too. ... But if she has not got married, no matter how old she is, she can share because she can't receive the benefit from her husband's village (in the case). It is the daoli?*

In this context, the logic of fairness may be the main logic of *daoli*. If a woman maintains an interest in both her birth place and her husband's village, it is unfair. Furthermore, according to Article 30 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women, 'Women shall enjoy equal rights with men in the allotment of responsibility farmland, or grain ration farmland and in the approval of housing sites in rural areas, and women's lawful rights thereto shall not be infringed upon.' However, according to Chinese custom (as Han people mainly practice virilocal residence), the married daughter often does not enjoy the rights of her parent's community but her husband's community will give her the rights of his community. In

this sense, the law and custom are not compatible. As a result, in recent years, many 'married daughters' have come back to their parent's community to share the compensation of the rural land development which thereby has caused many conflicts (He, 2012: 23-36).

Context three:

One day, the village head told me that a young woman had died because of uraemia. I showed my sympathy – she was only about 40 years old. At this moment, a young woman sitting by us said that this (the death) also freed her. She had even more suffering from the disease. The village head was not very happy with what she said, but he replied, 'this is a kind of daoli'. Here, daoli means, logically reasonable. However, the village head was unhappy that the young woman had not shown sympathy but only said something that was logically reasonable.

Context four:

One day, when I interviewed Siren Ye, we discussed the land issues of the village. He told me the following story:

> *There is a man called Shihui Chen. He is about 60 years old. He went out to do business many years ago and now lives in another place, in Yingde. He hasn't built a new house in the New Village. Maybe it is because he thought the New Village cannot be established. Or maybe it is because he didn't have enough money. But he should not lack money. Maybe he thinks if he had enough money, he can build a house anywhere. Many people think like that. But now, he wants to build a house in the New Village too. According to the daoli, the village should give him a piece of land, but the Wei family want the piece of land too. They occupied that land (by their old house) but they dare not to use it (to build a new house) at the moment.*

Here, *daoli* means, people who belong to the village have a right to have a piece of land to build a new house. However, because he did not want to join the New Village project and did not want to live in this village before, and also, because some others want that land, it is possible that he may not receive a piece. In other words, his 'disloyalty' to the village can be a reason to rebut his legitimate rights to have a piece of land there. Shuihui Chen's *hukou* has been transferred away from the village. However, Duanlou Zhu and Yueming Wei's hukou also moved from their village many years ago, yet they still received a piece of land to build new house. However, they were soldiers and worked for state-owned enterprises after retiring from the army. Therefore, according to *daoli*, although their *hukou* no longer belongs to the village, their right to build a house in the village can be agreed because the reason they left the village is considered honourable. In other words, rights can be determined or underpinned by morality.

Context five:

Dingliang Liu made a comment on Shequan Tong: 'he is a bit petty. But if you discuss some issues with him, he has *daoli*.' Here, *daoli* means that, he can understand things well and offer clear analysis.

The term '*jiang daoli*' can thus be applied in various contexts in everyday life. Through *jiang* (communication), *daoli* can be clarified, approved and thereby build a rational consensus. The definition of '*daoli*' is not an abstract norm, but contextualised pragmatism which can even challenge the legal rule. For example, according to the law, only the villager whose hukou is registered in the village can build a house in the village. However, the people who made a contribution to the village, who have a good reputation, who served in the army and so forth, can legitimately override the law. On the other hand, the exceptions of the routine made space for rent-seeking behaviour if there is no public sphere in which to debate its validity. The general meeting of the village provides a space to *jiang daoli* but unfortunately, the Baikou villagers are

pessimistic about shaping a shared *daoli* through the general meeting. They disagree about some decisions that the village committee made. However, until they eventually resorted to protests, they could not find a positive way to guide the decisions to a direction closer to the right *daoli*.

Baogang said that according to Confucian thinking, there are three essential forces: morality, reason, and might. To persuade people one must try morality first, reason second, and might last. Morality is normatively higher than reasoning, and reasoning higher than might (以道服人高于以理服人，以理服人高于以力服人). In view of this allegiance to morality, there must be minimal reasoning, in Chinese words, "*daoli shang shuo de guo qu* " (道理上说得过去). Might is acceptable only after deliberation has failed, and not before. Or as Fang Dongmei, a twentieth-century philosopher, configures it: the cultivation of virtue is the most important (He, 2014: 63-64).

Jiang daoli (*as opposed to general meetings*) can, to some extent, be understood as a kind of deliberative democracy that through deliberation achieves consensual decision-making. It emphasizes the process of democracy. *Jiang daoli*, in this sense, is at least the local resource to develop deliberative democracy which may contribute to the re-establishment of civil society. When everyone has his/her own thought (as Rendi Xu said), the society is increasingly multicultural; *jiang daoli* may be more efficient than social conflicts and judicial proceedings, as some researchers have found (He, 2012: 23-36, He and Wang, 2007: 56-73). As Jorge Valadez suggested, deliberative democracy as a form of democratic governance has great potential to respond to multicultural societies because it emphasizes the responsibility of public interest, promotes mutual understanding of political discourses, discerns different political inclinations, and supports policies that consider the demands and interests of all participants (Valadez, 2001).

6.4.5 The centre of the village

Through studying the sacred space in different cultures, Mircea Eliade found that the religious man [*sic*] sought to live as near as possible to the Centre of the World. He believes that his country lay at the midpoint of the earth, his city constituted the navel of the universe, and the temple or the palace were veritably Centres of the World (Eliade, 1959: 43). Mircea Eliade further suggests that, every construction or fabrication has the cosmogony as a paradigmatic model, and a universe comes to birth from its centre (ibid., 44-45). The centre of the village, in this sense, is the foundation of the place from which the universe comes to birth. In Eliade's word, it is the navel.

In the nearby lineage villages, the ancestral hall is always the centre of the village as I have discussed in Chapter Five. Jiale Tong's words may point out the irreplaceable meaning of the ancestral hall compared with the Cultural Centre:

> *The biggest failure of the New Village was demolishing the ancestral hall. All the nearby villages retained the ancestral hall but only we demolished it. Although we are a multi-surnamed village, you must retain at least one. The Cultural Centre cannot replace the ancestral hall. The ancestral hall is different from feudal superstition.[42] What is the traditional virtue of Chinese? If you forget your ancestor, forget the root, how can you inherit the virtue? Worship in the ancestor hall is for remembering our root, it is not feudal superstition. In my generation, for example, my younger brother, think that the Cultural Centre can be seen as ancestral hall. But their essence is different. There is no space for worship in the Cultural Centre. A village needs cohesion. Where is it from? If a village can forget its root, it cannot be a good village.*

---

[42] The term 'feudal superstition' was first introduced during the New Cultural Movement and taken up by the communist government in the 1950s. The term 'feudal' was identical with the 'landlord-tenant-system' in the Zhou dynasty. However, since the New Cultural Movement, the term 'feudal' is often used in the negative sense, which refers to the tradition which is associated with 'conservative', 'backward', 'ignorant' and so forth.

The community cannot be a good community. Because you forget where your forefathers, and you forget where you are from……

As mentioned in Chapter Five, the lineage village was always centred by the ancestral hall, but as Baikou is a multi-surnamed village, it is hard to say any family's ancestral hall is the centre of the village. Instead, in the old village, people often defined a fountain pool as the centre of the village, because it was the main water resource of the village and the local people had frequent social interactions around it. They used to wash vegetables and clothes there, to bath and swim, chat and exchange information. Before the 1980s, when people started to dig wells at home, they also used to collect water from a well by the fountain pool. Villagers said, at that time, when there was a drought, they had to pump from the fountain pool. The water in the fountain pool never dried up.

People also suggest that *ditan* is the centre of the village because it is shared in common. In the collective era, the village meetings were often held there. In the post-collective era, every family had a little piece of small *ditan* as the grain-drying ground in front of their house too. The big *ditan* for grain-sunning was equally distributed to every family during the harvest time. Moreover, the *ditan* was also the place where a movie was shown once a month in the 1970s and 1980s. Children learned to ride a bicycle, played games and hung out with friends in the *ditan*. Compared with the big square in front of the Cultural Centre, the function of the *ditan* was much more multi-dimensional, which included many aspects of everyday life.

However, in the old village, the family ceremonies, rituals and feasts were always held in the tang (hall) of the family house (or small ancestral hall of a family). Inviting the whole village (except those with whom the host had bad relations) to the feast was the

tradition of the village,[43] except during the years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) when all the feasts were strictly under control. A villager described a wedding that took place at this time: 'the only dowry we had was a hoe, that encouraged us to work hard'. Although some people may secretly invite their close relatives to have a small feast, the majority of the couples were only accompanied by some young friends and celebrated with some candy.[44] Although the fountain pool and the *ditan* were not the ritual centre, their significance in terms of production and daily life identified them as the centre of the village.

6.4.6 The Cultural Centre – the new centre of the village?

In the New Village, with only a population of several hundred people, the necessity of building such an enormous Cultural Centre is disputable, but it is still regarded as the centre of the village. Its controversial legitimacy cannot deprive it of its central position. The Cultural Centre played the role of the centre both in the sense of ritual and ceremony, and in the sense of administration. The village committee set an office in the Cultural Centre (see Figure 6.11), but that is hardly used either. It is nonetheless the *menmian* (face) of the village too when outsiders visit. Therefore, all the honors the village received are exhibited in the office.

---

[43] The village owned some tables, pews, tableware, and cookers that could be used for the host family. Before the 1990s when the economic situation was still bad, only one member of every family could go to the feast. Children below nine or ten years could sometimes go to the feast with their parents or grandparents. Meanwhile, the daughter's wedding feast was usually very simple, with only the close relatives invited. Sometimes there was no feast at all. But nowadays, although the daughter's wedding feast is simpler than the son's, the difference is not too obvious.

[44] Candy is a symbol of a happy marriage, implying that the new couple will have a sweet married life in the future.

Figure 6.17 Cultural Centre as kindergarten since September 2015

In 2015, the village *lishihui* decided to lease out the Cultural Centre as it had been left unused for a long time. The *lishihui* members tried to ask one family to sign the lease contract at a time. The rent fee is 16,800 per month, and every three years it increases by 2,000 yuan. The tenancy is 15 years - from 1st of May 2015 to the 30th of April 2030 - and the first four months is free to allow for the cost of furnishing. Only a few families disagreed with the transfer and refused to sign the contract. The reason that these families disagreed was, in fact, more due to previous conflicts with the village leader that caused them to distrust him, than with the leasing of the Cultural Centre. The contract did not, in fact, explain how the building would be used, but the *lishihui* members explained to the villagers that the Cultural Centre would be leased out to be a trading company. In fact, it is a kindergarten. Several weeks later when the rentier started to refurnish the Cultural Centre, some villagers said they were angry because they felt cheated. Some complained that the *lishihui* member leased the Cultural Centre to their relatives to serve their self-interest. However, nobody really took action to stop it, and the villagers can never prove if the exchange (or the rent fee) is reasonable or not. The former village head Xuede Ye said,

Our village actually has lots of resources. I have not been in the leased-out Cultural Centre. I feel very disappointed. It is very short-sighted that they only focus on the little money. But we still signed the contract. I do not know the detail. I did not know that it might become a kindergarten. I was very happy after the Cultural Centre established. I realized my dream. The Cultural Centre is similar to the Ancestral Hall. We are a multi-surnamed village, so we do not build an Ancestral hall. …… I quite despise these young people. They only care about the little interest (to the village). No brain!

However, after the kindergarten opened, some families sent their children there because it gives a 30% discount for Baikou children. People forgot the lie in a very short time. As Xuede Ye said, 'time is always the way to solve all the problems in the village'. Probably, this is why Chinese people usually do not respond to people's requests, requirements, protests, and so forth in a direct way, but always try to find an excuse to put it off. Forgetfulness is considered as a good characteristic for Chinese people as it indicates broad mindedness and generosity. A person who insists on safeguarding their own rights and interests can never be considered a model figure but rather as an unpopular figure, both for the government, the community, in social relations and even in the family. On all accounts, the Cultural Centre is neither the ritual centre nor the administrative centre of the village, but only a geographical centre of the village since it became the kindergarten. The community had, then, taken a further step to disperse from the cohesive centre.

6.5 Conclusion

As Duncan and Duncan said, landscape can be seen as texts which are transformations of ideologies into a concrete form and that this is an important way in which ideologies become naturalized (Duncan and Duncan, 1988: 117). This chapter has tried to explain the composition of the public spaces that make a typical or ideal village. The fitness centre, the garden and the grocery shops are the public spaces where everyday

interactions are carried out. The fitness centre represents the connection between the nation and the individual body in China's modern history. The fitness centre, as a part of a typical New Village, can be traced to the emergence of nationalism, starting in the late nineteenth century, which connected bodily health with the power of the state. In recent years, the fitness of the body has become more relevant to the logic of the market and the value of the individual in the labour market. The garden and the flower bed in front of the private houses are also standard parts of the typical New Village, evidence for the connection between aesthetic taste and the imagination of modernity. Besides the public spaces that were planned by the government, some poker spots have emerged in the New Village in recent years because of the rise in the unemployment rate which accompanied the process of urbanisation. As Allen Pred suggests, place is a process, but not a static material entity (Pred, 1984).

This chapter has focused attention on the Cultural Centre which is the most conspicuous piece of architecture in the New Village. It is supposed to be the centre in terms of administration, ritual practice and community activity; in other words, in the sense of community activity and public activity that I defined at the beginning of this chapter. In recent years, land development has resulted in many conflicts in the village which in fact require more communication and deliberation in open public space. However, the villagers are pessimistic about general meetings and deliberation. Jiagang Chen said there are three characteristics of deliberative democracy: legitimacy, publicity and responsibility (Chen, 2004: 28). An asymmetry in the flow of information resulted in a crisis of confidence. Baogang He and Chunguang Wang found deliberative democracy may improve the practice of rural democracy and self-governance, but the social inequality influences the validity of the deliberative democracy as, for example, when different social classes have different levels of ability in social action and different opportunities to obtain information (He and Wang, 2007: 58). In the case of Baikou, lineage may be another factor that impacts the legitimacy and justice of the practice of deliberative democracy. The bigger lineage it is, the more power it often has in the decision-making of the community. Nonetheless, *daoli* can only come with communication, consensus and practice. As Habermas claims, 'developing

intersubjective conviction by the force of the better argument' is necessary to reach a consensus (Habermas, 1985: 36). Obviously, for a small village, the Cultural Centre can be defined as a showcase project that was an unreasonable waste. However, a public space such as the Cultural Centre may be necessary to cultivate a civil society in which every community member participates in the process of shaping the common '*daoli.*'

In terms of geographical location, the public spaces in Baikou New Village spread along the central axis, the main road (from the north to south) and the road at the north of the Cultural Centre and the garden area (from east to west). The geographical centre is consistent with the cultural and social centre of the village. In the old village, the centre of the village was the sun-drying grain ground or the fountain pool that was the main water source of the village, not only in the sense of social activity and everyday life, but also in the sense of production. The public spaces of the new village are very much limited with regard to sharing leisure time, especially after the Cultural Centre was leased out. People hang out together in the garden, the fitness centre, the grocers and the poker spot. The cohesion of the community probably cannot be generated by recreation alone because the reciprocal system no longer contains multiple dimensions of social life, and the young people's activity space is no longer in the village. As Layton suggests, the reciprocity is the pre-condition for the development of the civil society (Layton, 2000). Forging a path for community life and re-establishing civil society may be the pressing matter of the moment, not only for Baikou, but for many Chinese villages which are in the process of community collapse.

Chapter 7 Reordering the domestic space: layout, *keting* and *weisheng jian*

> *The house is not an object, a 'machine to live in'; it is the universe that man [sic] constructs for himself by imitating the paradigmatic creation of the gods, the cosmogony. Every construction and every inauguration of a new dwelling are in some measure equivalent to a new beginning, a new life* (Eliade, 1959: 56-57).

Tim Putnam identified two successive transformations in contemporary modes of living since the nineteenth century models (in the West). The first transformation is associated with the emergence of the modern home in the domestic architecture of the 1920s until the 1950s when domestic space was designed around a technical core of sewers, water and gas mains, power cables, and telephone lines. The technical infiltration of the household was paralleled by infiltrating economic and political structures that affected individual household members in numerous other ways. In the 1960s, a second transformation arose as the technical, economic, and political structures of modernity became literally 'postmodern' (Putnam, 1993: 81). The transformation of domestic space does not only reflect and define cultural changes, but also reshapes social relationships and social life.

As I discussed in Chapter One, China started her history of modernisation (or Westernisation – the two concepts are often considered synonymous with each other) at the end of Qing dynasty. As a consequence, China experienced very similar transformations to the West. In general, the first transformation in architecture was the technical infiltration that took nearly the entire twentieth-century to complete because of the big gap in regional development. In fact, some places even today do not have sewers, a tap water system or gas mains. The second transformation started at different times according to the rate of regional development but, in general, the more economically

developed, the more westernized. For example, in the Pearl River Delta area and Yangtze River Delta, the two most economically developed regions in China, Western-style architecture (*yangfang* or *yanglou*, literally, 'western house') has been increasingly prevalent since the 1990s, after the Reform and Opening Up.

In previous chapters I have discussed the new way to organise the space of the village, while in this chapter I will focus on the way domestic space is organized and examine how the local people adapted to the new house through their own styles of furnishing and interior decoration. The design and usage of the entrance, *keting* (living room), and *weisheng jian* (toilet) will here be interpreted in detail under the framework of 'social order and space order'. The kitchen and bedroom will then be interpreted under the framework of 'family cooperation and individualisation' in Chapter Eight.

7.1 Entrance of the house

Figure 7.1 Gate of the new house built in 1997

Figure 7.2 Gate of self-funded new house

7.1.1 Avoiding the straight

In Baikou New Village, every domestic building owns a yard with the house at the east or west side of the middle central axis. Below, I will call the entire domestic building that includes both the house and the courtyard, the 'yard'. The walls of the yards were completely self-funded. The villagers built them spontaneously several years after their new houses were built, when their economic condition improved. The first entrance to the yard in the middle of the southern wall is often made of stainless steel and glass, approximately three meters wide and four meters in height (see Figure 7.1). The house is often either on the west or the east of the yard as two neighbouring houses shared a wall. The entrance of the house is east-facing or west-facing, rather than south-facing as in the case of most traditional houses I have described in Chapter Five.

Francesa Bray said, 'The walls and gates that surrounded the family compound provided protection as well as privacy for its inmates, keeping out the ghosts and evil influences that could strike a family down with misfortune or disease. Both ghosts and evil influences were thought to travel in straight lines or 'arrows' (Bray, 1997: 92). In many places, there is therefore a screen in front of the main entrance. For example, in Wangjia village in Shandong province, nearly all the houses have courtyards. A screen built just behind the gate serves to block the straight line between the gate of the

courtyard and the door of the main building at the north side of the courtyard. This echoes the principle of *fengshui*.

It is hard to say whether the design of Baikou new houses built in 1997 by the government followed the principle of *fengshui* to prevent straight access. However, some new houses built by the households themselves (rather than the New Village project) should have considered *fengshui*, and intentionally built the gate of the yard at the southeastern corner of the yard (see Figure 7.2). James Gibson suggested that 'an important kind of place, made intelligible by the ecological approach to visual perception, is a place that affords concealment, a hiding place' (Gibson, 1950). He further pointed out that, in the design of housing, privacy is the reason for providing opaque enclosures (ibdi., 136). Gibson's principle of 'concealment' echoes the principle of *fengshui* in this light. According to *fengshui*, every house has its devices for preventing straight access and the intrusion of both men and demons. The idea of a winding entrance to the house arises from the desire to make a limit between what is public and what is private (Edkins, 1872: 294). It seems that the scientific nature of *fengshui*, emphasized by contemporary practitioners (as I have discussed in Chapter Five), is in this light not a groundless statement.

7.1.2 Threshold

Figure 7.3 Earth god

The gate is the threshold that separates the outside and inside. Mircea Eliade claimed that, 'The threshold is the limit, the boundary, the frontier that distinguishes and opposes two worlds – and at the same time the paradoxical place where those worlds communicate, where passage from the profane to the sacred world becomes possible' (ibid., 25). The boundary of the two worlds is not only demarcated by the physical substance, but also by the sacred symbols. The gate is supposed to be the place that the evil spirit and ghost, and the sacred and protective god, meet. In the Spring Festival, or on the most significant festival day of the family, especially weddings and the establishment of a new house, a couplet written in red paper (*duilian*) will be presented at the gate (see Figure 7.1). The couplets are always auspicious words. Then, the door gods and earth god are often worshipped at the gate. The door gods always come in pairs who are often metamorphoses of historical heroes (Dun, 1906). These gods are painted as two images and pasted on each wing of the gate of the yard. They guard the house and keep out the invasion of ghosts, evil spirits and bad luck (Van Gennep, 1909). In addition, according to Van Gennep, the threshold is the liminal zone that divided and connects two distinct territories (Van Gennep, 1909). He also suggests that society is like a house with rooms and corridors. Crossing the thresholds symbolize stepping into

the beginnings of new statuses which is a dangerous act and should be controlled by ritual (Cieraad, 2006: 53). At weddings in Yingde, when the bride leaves her parent's home, her brother will carry her across the threshold. After arriving at the groom's home, she will be carried by her husband to cross the threshold. The earth god is 'a tutelary deity, the governor of a place, concerned with agriculture' (Wolf, 1974: 134). Instead of presented by images like the door god, the earth god in this region is often presented by a piece of red paper marked with the Chinese characters '*menkou tudi caishen*' (the earth god is placed in front of this door), pasted at the corner of the west wing of the gate (see Figure 7.3).

Beyond the protection of the gods, the physical solidness of the house is, to some extent, exaggerated. The gate of the yard is usually four metres high and made of stainless steel. It is the face of the family, just as the arch at the entrance to the main street is considered the face of the community. The gate is generally very big and aesthetically pleasing, based on the tastes of the local people, often with some floral patterns or auspicious Chinese characters. Although the households of Baikou share very similar gates, there are several gates in the first row that are obviously more sumptuous than others. Etymologically, *hu* (household), literally, means door. According to Liushu Jingyun, the Chinese classical dictionary edited in the Ming dynasty, the door of the room is called *hu*, and the door of the hall (*tang*) is called *men*. People often apply the word '*mengdang hudui*' to describe the matched marriage where the consorts come from families with similar social status. This word originates from the Ming dynasty novel, Xixiang Ji (The story of the western wing) and is still used nowadays. *Mengdang* is a kind of stone-made decoration put in front of the gate. *Hudui* is the wooden decoration at the top of the gate. These always appear in pairs and their shapes are strictly limited by the social status of the family. Therefore, in a traditional house in the Imperial era, the gate and the social status of the family were institutionally associated. As Francesca Bray said, in late imperial China, 'the gate signalled status conferred on the family by the institutions of the state' (ibid., 93).

7.2 Layout of the new house

*Figure 7.4 Layout of the Zhu's old building built before the 1950s*

*(Drawn from memory by Ruifeng Zhu in 2016)*


Figure 7.5 House of Ye built in 1968

*Figure 7.6 House of Yangtu Wei built in 1994-5*

Figure 7.7 Plan of the house built in 1997 and 1998 (Ground floor)

Figure 7.8 Plan of the house built in 1997 and 1998 (First floor)

*Figure 7.9 Plan of the house built in 1997 and 1998 (Second floor)*

Figure 7.10 Structure of Chinese house (left) and American house (right) (see Knapp and Lo, 2011: 58).[45]

The transformation of the house structure mirrors the transformation of social relations. As Janet Carsten said, 'house structure reflects in a complex way the social relations that are enacted within it' (ibid., 124). The threshold of the transformation of the house structure in Baikou might have been 1997 when the traditional symmetrical structure as previously mentioned in Chapter Five (see Figure 5.5, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6) was replaced by the Western-style asymmetrical one (see Figure 7.7, 7.8, 7.9). There are various kinds of Chinese architecture in different regions of China, including the courtyard in north China, cave-style in the northwest, and *tianjing*-style houses (a yard between the door and the building) in the southeast, to name just a few. In Guangdong province, the architecture is in the *tianjing*-style: the ancestral hall is the centre of the building, and is strictly symmetrical. Up to 1995, the layout of the house in Baikou still followed the symmetrical structure. There is a tang (the scaled-down version of an ancestral hall) in the middle of the building and rooms that lie symmetrically at the east and west wings of the tang. There is a yard in front of the main building, and a kitchen and storage spaces at the east and west of the yard (see Figure 7.6). This structure echoes the architecture of the lineage village in that the placement of an ancestral hall at the centre dominated the orientation and symmetry of the whole.

However, in 1997, the house structure underwent a revolutionary transformation. First of all, in terms of the yard, as Kuo Shang and Lingyu Yang observed, Chinese

---

[45] The shadow means the architecture and the white space means the open space.

architecture places the open space in the middle of the building, while American architecture places the building at the middle of the yard and the open space surrounded the main building (Knapp, 1999) (see Figure 7.10). The transformation can be evidenced by comparing Yangtu Wei's house built in 1994 with the typical American-style (or Western-style) house found in Taiwan. The houses built after 2012 in the last row of the village, largely extended the interior space and reduced the external space (or the space of the yard). For example, the construction area of Zhu's house, built in 2015, is nearly 200 square meters and the floor area was nearly 800 square meters, while the construction area of the houses built in 1997 was only 90 square meters and the floor area 215 square meters (lots of families built a second house behind the first building, converting the balcony into rooms).

The interior layout of the new houses built in 1997 show obvious differences too. The 44 new houses that were constructed with support from the government in 1997 and 1998 are 2.5-storey buildings each with a courtyard of 300 square meters. As Figure 7.7 shows, on the ground floor, a living room is the biggest room at the southwest (or southeast), with a little bedroom at the same line at the south side of the building. The senior parents often use the little bedroom on the ground floor (this will be further discussed in Chapter Eight). At the north side, there is a kitchen, a toilet and a dining room. However, most families use the kitchen as a bedroom or storage area and, instead, build a kitchen behind the house – I will further explain this below. On the first floor, at the south side, there is another living room and a balcony. This living room is often left unused, and many families converted the balcony to be a bedroom for the young couple. Then, on the north side, there are two tiny bedrooms and a bathroom. The unmarried younger generation often live in these tiny bedrooms, and sometimes there can also be a guest room if there are not so many family members. On the south side of the second floor is a big balcony, and there are two rooms and a toilet at the north side. These two rooms are often used as storerooms or bedrooms, depending on the family size. In addition, the stair is at the middle of the building, between the north and south sides. The houses built after 1997 all share similar layout with these new houses, but are often taller than the houses built in 1997, having three or four storeys. The newer houses,

built from around 2010, are also all three-storey or four-storey, and every storey of the house includes a kitchen, bathroom, living room, dining room and balcony, functioning as an independent flat. The effective use of land is the fundamental concern. This kind of apartment-style design is good for future family division as every core family can live independently in their own one storey flat, and before the family division it can be leased out to increase family income. On the other hand, in terms of lifestyle, people consider the apartment-style design to be more convenient. It is easier to clean, to move, and to meet each other on one floor. There are many dimensions that show clear distinctions between older houses and houses built after 1997. The following sections will interpret the *keting* and *weisheng jian* in detail.

7.3 *Keting* (living room)

Figure 7.11-12 Keting of Sheneng Tong's home (built in 1997)

Figure 7.11-12 Keting of Yiji Tong's home (built in 1997)

Figure 7.13-14 Keting of Shezhen Wei's home (built in 2001)

Figure 7.15 Keting of Yueming Wei's home (built in 2003) (The certification of the awards children received at the right side of the wall)

Figure 7.16 Guanyin statue in Yueming Wei's keting

Figure 7.17-18 Keting of Chuanzhu Chen's home (built in 2015)

Figure 7.19 Keting of Siming Ye's home (built in 1997)

Figure 7.20 Ancestor veneration at Maosong Zhu's home

Figure 7.21 Group photo of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China

7.3.1 Positioning of the *keting*

The living room (see Figure 7.9-7.20) can be called *keting* in Chinese, which literally means guest hall: *ke* means guest, and *ting* means hall. The *keting* is mainly used for receiving guests and for family gatherings. A television, sofa and tea table (sometimes used as a dining table) are the indispensable items of furniture in the *keting*. Nonetheless, even the houses built during the same period are varied in the arrangement of sofa and television which may show that the family are unfamiliar with the new house plan and driven to find their own solutions with the arrangement of furniture. However, in those built before 2010, the majority of families placed the television on the northern wall of the living room and the sofas are placed on the other three or two (one side must be opposite to the television from where it is convenient to watch TV) sides of this space. In houses built after 2010, however, the television is usually placed on the western or eastern wall. According to tradition, the orientation of the body or the position of the person is very much ordered by the hierarchy of social status. The south-facing position is the superior position usually reserved for the one who is of a superior social position or the senior generation; the north-facing position is the inferior position normally reserved for the one who is in the inferior social position or the younger generation. Then, the left (west) is superior to the right (east); for example, in Figure 7.21, Chairman Jinping Xi stands at the middle of the group, then, prime minister Li Keqiang stands at the right hand of Xi. The identical ordering of the social hierarchy and the position is still strictly practised in formal occasions, including official meetings, ritual

ceremonies, feasts and so forth. In Wangjia village in Shandong, I was invited to a wedding feast and treated as an important guest,[46] thus the host arranged for me to sit at the most superior position. I felt that it was inappropriate to accept the position as I was the youngest at the table, so I took another less important seat. The host and the other guests tried to show their hospitality and insisted that I should sit at the most superior position. But they finally agreed the seat I selected because of my insistence and also because there were several important seniors at the table. After my seat was finally decided, it took more than ten minutes to distribute the seats to the remaining guests according to their age and their relationship with the host, because everyone tried to place themselves in an inferior position to show their humility. Chinese people are often trained to be sensitive to the connection between spatial position and social position. In the *keting*, the hierarchy of the spatial position therefore becomes ambiguous.

7.3.2 Décor of the *keting*

The *Keting* is the most decorated space in the new house as it is not only the space for family gatherings, but also the space for receiving guests. In other words, it is the face of the family. The wall of the *keting* is often decorated by calligraphy work, landscape paintings, Mao's portrait, the Chinese character '*fu*' (literally, happiness), portraits of ancestors, a clock and wall calendar, to name just a few.

Calligraphy

The calligraphy work often presents auspicious words and mottos. '*Jiahe wanshi xing*' (harmony brings wealth) and *fu* might be the most frequently presented calligraphy in the rural homes in China, which to some extent expresses the core value of Chinese people – the happiness of the family, and harmony, are considered to be the foundation of the prosperity of a family. According to the Rokeach Value Survey (see appendix 1), the majority of the middle-aged and the elderly place 'world peace', 'national security'

---

[46] The local people evaluated me as an elite because I am doing a Ph.D.

and 'family security' as the most significant values with very clear homogeneity and a clear hierarchical ordering of the values. They believe that these three things are the foundation of all other values, and the hierarchical significance of these values very much depends on the scale of the unit. The bigger scale it is, the more important it is. These senior generations all experienced the collective era and the Cultural Revolution, which may contribute to their perception of the close connection between the world, the country, the family and the individual. For the young generation who grew up after the Reform and Opening Up, on the other hand, 'family security' is the most relevant value and there is no particular similarity of the ranking of the other values. However, 'salvation' is always the most irrelevant value for all the villagers. People think they are just ordinary, they cannot accomplish such a great job – to save the world. In general, the happiness of the 'family' is always the goal of every individual for both the senior and the young generation. [47] As Fairbank and Reischauer said, 'The family is the fundamental unit of the society for Chinese, rather than individual, nation or church' ((Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989: 15) (The next chapter will focus on discussing family cooperation and the transformation of family structure). Besides the best wishes of the family, some inspirational mottos are presented in the *keting*. Ancient poems that express the wisdom of life, the beauty of nature or the ideal life, are also the subjects often seen in these calligraphic works.

Portrait of Ancestor

Portraits of deceased ancestors are often hung on the lower part of the northern wall, to the left or right of the television (see Figure 7.20). In the ancestral-hall centred house, the *shenzu pai* (the tablet of the ancestor) was part of a shrine placed at the centre of the northern wall in the ancestor hall itself. During the Cultural Revolution, ancestor worship was strictly forbidden. *Keting* substituted the ancestral hall in traditional houses. Since the 1980s, villagers have started to worship the portraits of deceased ancestors. Ruifeng Zhu said,

---

[47] Unfortunately, I lack information from the generation born after the 1990s.

Some of the portraits include text. In the festival worship, we usually put some food in front of the portrait. The keting has replaced the ancestral hall. The portrait will be the conspicuous position in the keting. The house always hang portraits, but the shenzu pai (the tablet of ancestor) must be put in the ancestral hall. In the past, the economic was weak, but shenzu pai cost more money. So we used photographs.

Shezhen Wei, a man born in 1958 said, 'My father died in 1999. I do not know why I hang his portrait. I just did it. In the past, the elders said, the portrait of the oldest son should be hung up. But this kind of portrait should not be hung too high.' My landlady, Rendi Xu, told me that when she hung her deceased husband's portrait in the *keting*, her son objected to it because he thought that it is inauspicious to hang a portrait of the dead in the *keting*. But she said that she does not think it is inauspicious at all. Nevertheless, lots of young people think it is not good to hang a portrait of the deceased ancestor at home, even a close ancestor.

Landscape painting

A landscape painting is another frequently used decorative element in the *keting*. Francesca Bray made an analysis of the Chinese aesthetical taste for natural landscapes in the house. She suggested that a house always embodies the social world, and the garden which contained the natural and wild elements 'offered escape from the red dust of human commerce into a tranquil contemplative world of mountains and waterfalls where social relations were irrelevant' (ibid., 84). Then, she said, 'For those with lesser means, a landscape scroll, some pot plants or bonsai, carved latticework in the windows or a view of a more fortunate neighbour's trees could serve a similar purpose' (ibid, 84). The landscape painting is, to some extent, the representation of the ideal landscape of the people who display them at home (as I have discussed in Chapter Two).

Portrait of Mao

Mao's portrait is still one of the most popular adornments in rural China, so it is in Baikou. When I ask them why they hang Mao's portrait in the *keting*, the immediate answer is always: 'Chairman Mao is very great'. As the couplet on the portrait in Figure 7.11 shows, the great Chairman Mao unified all the people, his contribution can be compared with the sun and the moon. I had several very intense discussions with Baikou villagers and local government officials concerning Mao. One of the issues we discussed was how to evaluate his governance, especially collectivization, the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward, as well as the Great Famine from 1959 to 1962. In general, people all agreed that Mao made some 'mistakes', but everyone makes mistakes. His contribution is much more significant than the 'mistakes' he made. Meanwhile, Mao's moral quality is highly valued. As Dingliang Liu who adores Mao very much said, 'Mao Zedong was never a selfish person. Many of his close relatives were sacrificed for China. He was not corrupt, possibly a law unto himself, but not a dictator. Because he wants to realize his ideal, he needs power to make people to listen to him.' Dingliang Liu visited Shaoshan, Mao's hometown, three times. He sincerely believes that China has become worse and worse since Mao's death. On the contrary, he criticizes Deng's governance a lot, mainly because of the corruption, though he agreed that material life is much better than in Mao's era.

In addition, the awards the children received in school are always displayed in the *keting* (see Figure 7.15). Their performance in school often bears the hope of the family. Also, some families enshrine the Buddhist god, local deities and Daoist deities in the *keting*. Figure 7.16 shows the Buddhist goddess, Guanyin (avalokitesvara), enshrined in the *keting* of the veteran Yueming Wei's home.

7.3.3 From *tang* to *keting*

As mentioned above, the *keting* is considered to be the substitution of *tang* (the scaled-down version of an ancestral hall) of a house, but its ritual function is largely replaced

by the function of entertainment. This section will explain the history of the ancestral hall and thereby present an account of the transformation from the *tang* of the traditional house to the *keting* of the new house.

The *keting* may be the space where people spend most time in everyday life, compared with other rooms in the house. Watching TV with the family in the *keting* during the evening is a daily ritual. Children often do homework here under their mother's monitoring (as teenagers attending middle school they often need more private space and move to the bedroom to do homework). Many families also use the *keting* as an informal dining room or simply combine dining room and *keting* (see Figure 7.19). Guests are often invited to a formal dining room located in an extra building behind the main building of the yard, while close friends and relatives regularly have dinner in the *keting* too.[48] Some well-off families have a tea set on the tea table that echoes the revival of a tea culture in the region in recent years (I noted in Chapter Three that Yingde is famous for black tea). To some extent, the *keting* echoes the new demands of modern life, and also contributes to the construction of a new social life and social relationships in contemporary China. Nevertheless, the history of the *tang* may be a representation of the different ways to organize society.

`

History of tang, Confucianism and ancestor worship

The classical Confucian text, '*liji*' ('Book of Rites'), was drafted by Confucian scholars in the Warring States era (BC 475 – BC 221) and the early Han dynasty (BC 202-220). *Liji* is the foundation of Confucianism, formulating, as it does, the ceremonial rites, administrative rules, behaviour norms and so forth. It can be thought of as the initial official book that standardized the social order in terms of ancestral worship. According to *Liji*, 'the emperor has seven temples, one altar and one *shan* (a platform for worship); the dukes have five temples, one *tan* (altar) and one *shan*; the senior official has three

---

[48] As aforementioned, a kitchen is often built behind the main building. Besides the kitchen, there is a dining room, a toilet and a storage unit built behind the main building too.

temples, two *tan*; the official has two temples and one *shan*; the official teacher's house has one temple'. Close ancestors are worshipped in the temple while more distant ancestors are worshipped in the *tan*, and then people move to *shan* for ancestor worship. They worship in a temple of the highest standard, then *tan* and *shan* (Ji, 1986). The populace has no right to establish a temple, *tan* or *shan*. In this context, the concept of temple should be understood as family temple.

The *li* of ancestor worship also regulated how many generations of the ancestors should be recognized and when the ancestors can be worshiped. According to Zhou *Li* (*Li* of Zhou, or Officers of Zhou), 'the *tianzi* (literally, son of the heaven, the emperor) has seven temples, the duke has five temples, the senior officer has three temples, the officer has one temple, and the populace cannot have a temple.' To be specific, the Zhou emperor worships seven ancestors: 1) Houji who was claimed as the primogenitor of the ruling family of the Zhou dynasty; 2) King Wen of Zhou, who was the king of Zhou in the late Shang dynasty (1600 B.C. – 1546 B.C.); 3) King Wu of Zhou, who was the first king of Zhou in the Zhou dynasty; 4) great-great-grandfather; 5) great-grandfather; 6) grandfather; 7) father. The duke can worship five ancestors: 1) the first monarch; 2) great-great-grandfather; 3) great-grandfather; 4) grandfather; 5) father. The senior officer can worship three ancestors: 1) first monarch; 2) grandfather; 3) father. The populace can only worship an ancestor in the bedroom of the first son of the legal wife, but are not allowed to worship in the public space (Yan, 2002: 43).

Since the Ming dynasty, the imperial court gradually loosened the restrictions on ancestor worship for ordinary folk. According to Ming Jili (Book of *Li* from the Ming dynasty), the ministers and officials have permission to worship the previous four generations of ancestors, while the populace has permission to worship only two generations of ancestors. Jianhua Chang clarifies the situation by explaining that the permission given to the populace to worship their primogenitor encourages the solidarity of the different branches of the lineage (Chang, 2001: 65). Establishing the ancestral hall as the common property of the lineage needed all the members to be

unified, and then it strengthened the solidarity of the lineage. Through study of the Bamboo slips of the Wei Jin period (220-420) in Zoumalou, Changsha province, Hui Qin has claimed that state power deeply permeated the society below the level of county (ibid., 23). He further suggests that, the self-governance lineage society (*zongzu shehui*) did not appear until the Song or Yuan dynasty (Qin, 2003). Jianhua Chang suggests that in the following Ming dynasty, although the relationship between lineage and government was more intensive, the lineage had no jurisdiction without the permission of the government (Chang, 2001: 421-422). Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the lineage society was a highly self-governing one in the imperial period.

In the Song dynasty (960-1279), the populace enshrined and worshipped the portrait, statue or tablet of the ancestor in the Buddhist temple, called *gongde ci* (the temple to eulogize the merit and virtues of the ancestor) (Masaaki, 1982: 1-2). Historian Jianhua Chang also suggests that ancestor worship was attached to the temple in folk religion, the memorial temple and official religion (for example, Buddhism) in folk society before the Song dynasty. However, since the Song dynasty, the independent ancestral hall gradually appeared with the rise of neo-Confucianism (Chang, 2005). The neo-Confucian scholar Zhu Xi (1130-1200), drafted Zhuzi Jiali (Zhuzi family ritual) to reform the *li* system. Zhu Xi considered the populace too insignificant to have a family temple, so he named these ancestral worship sites *zongci* (ancestral hall) rather than family temple (Faure, 2003: 1-20). *Ci* is a hall whose sacredness is lower than a temple.

At the beginning of the Ming dynasty, the *li* system basically followed the *Zhuzi Jiali*. According to *Zhuzi Jiali*, all the families of the officials should firstly establish the family temple to the east of the main bedroom.[49] Establishing a family temple had been the privileged right of the aristocracy since the pre-Zhou dynasty. This rule was intended to restrict the possibility of local people making an enormous network that

---

[49] According to the plans of the imperial palaces of the Tang, Ming and Qing dynasties, the ancestral temples all locate in the central part of the architecture complex (usually on the east-side) (Steinhardt, 1990: 3, 4, 11).

would possibly threaten the centralization of authority. However, in the fifteenth year of Jiajing, Emperor (1536) of the Ming dynasty, Yan Xia, a Grand Tutor (the crown prince's tutor) and scholar, submitted three memorials to the emperor. Two of the memorials are 'I beg for the permission for the subjects to worship the primogenitor in the winter solstice' and 'I beg for the permission for the ministers and officials to build family temples' (Wang, 1995: 70a – 78a). Yan Xia's memorials may, to some extent, have positively influenced the later prevalence of ancestral hall construction among the populace. The requirement of the qualification to build a family temple was loosened and in the Qing dynasty, the ancestral-hall style architecture complex became a very prevalent structure of settlements (Faure, 2003: 5).

The emergence of the ancestral hall in Chinese history, to some extent, evidenced the practice of Confucianism. Even though the power of lineage has been forbidden to the greatest degree since the end of the nineteenth century, placing a *tang* at the middle of the building has never disappeared in rural villages in south and southeast of China. Until, that is, the 1990s, when the *keting* gradually replaced the *tang*, with the ritual function replaced by the recreational function. In Baikou, 1997 may be the threshold when the *keting* first replaced the *tang*, as the Wei family's house built in 1994 still retained the *tang* as the centre of the building as noted above. Some villagers mentioned that the houses built in the early 1990s are similar to Wei's house. Now, for most families in China, the *keting* is mainly used to watch TV, which clearly cannot be equated with the tang where the primary function is ritual.

7.3.4 Private and public domain

Some research shows that since the 1960s, in many countries home life has turned progressively inward, away from the public realm, toward the backstage of the private garden (Gullestad, 1992, Halle, 1996, see in Cieraad, 1999: 147). The process of 'inward toward the private domain' in the post-collective era was also the tendency along with the increasing privacy of the dwelling space. Yunxiang Yan's research from

Xiajia village in the north of China suggests that the newly emerging living room marked a clear boundary between private and the public in the domestic space, a response to the increasing demand of privacy (Yan, 2003).

In the houses built before 1997, the bedrooms are directly connected with the *keting*, which is easy to enter. The *keting* is more private than the *tang* which is a half-open space (with a *tianjing* or skywell at the front) that directly faces the gate in south China. According to the memory of the villagers, in the old village, close guests were often invited into the bedroom or kitchen, while the common visitors were invited into the *tang*. In the houses built in 1997, there is a little hall between the other rooms and the *keting* which sets a boundary between the domain that is open to visitors and the private domain. The houses built in recent years often have a hall in front of the living room.

Céline Rosselin points out that in Western domestic architecture the hall was originally designed to be the main room of the house and the showcase of the residents' wealth. Nevertheless, in nineteenth-century apartment buildings in Europe, the size of the hall was reduced and its function changed into a distributing one: giving entrance to the various rooms of the apartment. The changed morphology of the hall is not a result simply of the formal separation of rooms, but rather to the urban split between the private and public domains. The hall became the intermediate zone to protect the privacy of residents (Eleb-Vidal and Debarre Blanchard, 1989, 1995, see Rosselin, 1999: 54). There seem to be some similarities between nineteenth-century Europe and contemporary China in terms of the separation of private and public domains in the domestic space. In new buildings constructed in 1997, the bedrooms are supposed to be on the first and second floor. People must cross a little hall behind the *keting* to reach the bedrooms (I will further discuss the issue of 'privacy' in Chapter Eight).

7.3.5 The centre of the house

Angela Zito clearly defined the concept of centre (*zhong*):

within the discourse of li, the word zhong, "center," does not mean "inside" (that is nei, whose antonym is wai, "outside"; zhong has no proper opposite term). As a noun it means "middle," but an empty one, found between the inner and outer, where the upper and lower meet and where there is no movement in the four directions. As a verb, zhong means to hit the center. "Centering" thus constantly creates itself through the correct separation of upper and lower, the correct bounding of inner and outer. Conceived of in this manner, it is the mediating third that makes meaningful difference possible. When people "make the triad with Heaven and Earth," they zhong, providing meaningful connection between these two constantly related forces (Zito, 1993: 332).

In traditional architecture, the ancestral hall was the centre in both physical and symbolic senses. This is always the biggest room in the house and all the other rooms seem to be an extension of the ancestral hall. However, in houses built around 1997 and later, the centre of the house is not as self-evident as in the old houses. People sometimes believe that the second floor is the centre, as the house comprises three floors; sometimes the *keting* on the ground floor is the centre; and sometimes the bedroom is the centre. Yi Zhu, a girl born in 1993, said:

I think the centre of the house should be at the entrance of the stair, in front of the kitchen door. Because that point is in front of the doors of toilet, kitchen, grandmother's bedroom, mother's bedroom and dating (hall). So it is the middle of the whole building.

Opinions differ however: Jiale Tong said, 'the centre of the house should be where the television is placed' whilst a woman called Shu Ye aged 41 said, 'the centre of the house depends on what you care for most. For example, in the rainy cold day, I think the *keting* is the centre. Also, we discuss every family issue in the *keting*.' Rendi Xu aged 67 said, 'the centre of the house might be the stair? Or maybe the living room on the first floor? I guess that position is the best.' Yicong Liu, a man aged 33 and married in 2012, said, 'I think the centre of house is my bedroom. Because centre means harmony. I feel peace in my bedroom.' Finally, Ruifeng Zhu, aged 37 said:

The keting is the centre of both the houses built 2015 and built in 1997, because only the keting can be the counterpart of the ancestral hall. In the old village, we called the ancestral hall 'ting' as well. Now, we call the keting 'ting', which is the same as the ancestral hall's colloquial word. The bedroom is only for sleeping. So we do everything in the keting, for example, if you visit my home, we will be in the keting.

Clearly, the concept of 'centre' in the new building is not so absolute as in the old buildings where the *tang* (or ancestral hall) is the absolute centre. In the new houses, the centre can be defined in the sense of measurement, the extension of the personal attachment (as Yicong Liu said that his bedroom is the centre), the frequency of usage or the significance in family life. The uncertainty of the centre of the new houses points to the decentralization of the dwelling space. In simple terms, *tang* was the definite centre of the old house while the *keting* is not necessarily the centre of the new house.

7.4 Weisheng Jian (Toilet)

Figure 7.22 Weishengjian with a squat toliet

Tim Putnam suggests that since the 1960s in Britain, the living room has become more casual, while the kitchen and bathroom have been drawn toward the front stage and made suitable for presentation (see Cieraad, 1999: 146-7). *Weisheng jian*, literally, hygiene room, which is identical with bathroom or toilet, is a new space that has appeared in modern China. In the ancestral-hall-centred architecture, there is only a *fenliao* (latrine) outside the main building of the house, usually in the pig sty. During the 1960s, the village built three public toilets. Human excrement was the main fertilizer used in agricultural production, thus it is also collective property. Improving hygiene is also one part of the movement of modernity that is intended to improve China's public health and national image. The word *weisheng* (hygiene, sanitary, health or public health) derived from Daoist *weisheng zhidao* (the way of guarding life), which is basically 'a variety of regimens of diet, meditation, and self-medication that were practised by the individual in order to guard fragile internal vitalities' (Rogaski, 2004: 1, 4-5).

However, in the nineteenth and twentieth century, under the influence of the western ideology of modernity, the word *weisheng* 'shifted away from Chinese cosmology and moved to encompass state power, scientific standards of progress, the cleanliness of bodies, and the fitness of races' (ibid., 1). As a result, even now, there is still a coordinating organisation that is subordinate to the State Council of the People's Republic of China: the Patriotic Hygiene Campaigns Committee (*aiguo weisheng yundong weiyuan hui*). The main duty of this organisation is to improve China's 'health, appearance, and national status' (ibid., 2). In this light, *weisheng* goes far beyond bodily and mental health, or the cleanliness of the environment, to become 'a central element in the definition of modernity' as Rogaski suggested (ibid., 2).

Before the collective era in Baikou, every family had a *fenliao* in the sty used for defecation, while people urinated in their bedroom, in a commode, emptied every morning by women. As Shezhen Wei said,

The family did not have an indoor toilet in the past. We used a wooden commode for peeing and went to the public toilet to defecate. The public toilet should have been built before 1973 before I went out to work. In 1981, we (the collective) separated and moved to the dangan system (in which the household is a unit in production), since then every family has had its own toilet.

Rendi Xu born in 1949, said,

We used a wooden commode for urinating, and later it turned to a plastic commode. It (the urine) can be used for planting vegetables. When the commode is getting full, we take it to vegetable garden. There are two commodes in a house, and they usually put at a corner behind door. Some of

them have covers, but usually do not have. So the room is very smelly. But in the past, maybe we were used to living there, so we do not feel it is smelly. Nowadays, the young will not allow us to put it at home. But defecation will be in the fenliao. …… The public toilets are squat toilet and divided by wood. If you hear someone coming, you cough……

Sheneng Tong born in 1957,

In the old village, we did not have our own toilet, but every family had one after the land distributed for every household. After dangan, you must have your own toilet because you will not have fertilizer if you do not have a toilet. Before dangan, there are three toilets in the village, everyone went there. The public toilet was divided into female and male toilet. Unlike the ethnic minority group, they do not divide it. Once separated to dangan, some family immediately built a toilet, some had difficulty and built it after one or two years. At that time, it cost about two hundred yuan to make a toilet. Digging a hole is not enough, you must use lots of lime. At that time, making money is very hard. You can only earn one yuan per day. But at that time, food is much cheaper than now.

In the New Village, a public toilet has been built behind the garden, though it is very rarely used. Nevertheless, the public toilet is always an indispensible part of an ideal New Village which is a symbol of the 'modern' and 'civilized'. The newer the house, the more toilets it includes. For example, in the new house of the three Zhu brothers, every floor of the house includes three toilets, so the building has twelve toilets altogether.

7.5 Conclusion

As Paul Oliver said, 'Each culture has different expectations of its dwellings, and makes demands on them which are related to its social structure and to the ways in which its members organize their daily lives' (Oliver, 1987: 17-21). The traditional ancestral-hall-centred houses in old Baikou village presented a very different logic of social order compared with the new houses built since 1997. In fact, the new houses directly copied the Western model, which is quite different to the traditional house. To some extent, the two types of architecture evidence the typical dwelling space of Chinese and Western culture – the highly symmetrical principle of the Chinese architecture was subverted and replaced by asymmetrical western-style architecture (if the dichotomy between 'China' and 'West' is not too general and imprecise).

In this chapter I have tried to explain the transformation of the ways in which society and the family are organized in China through comparing the layout, the interior décor and the function of domestic architecture. Although the spatial organization of new houses has dramatically changed (and is imported from western architecture), the perception of space that is internalized by tradition has sometimes survived. For example, the boundary of the inside and outside of the house is marked not only by the gate, but also by the symbolic system of Daoism. The portrait of the deceased will be hung on the north wall of the *keting* where it is considered identical with the ancestral hall. Through integrating the element of the 'old time' into the new house, people consolidate their self-identity and ally themselves with their ancestors, which will reversely influence the solidification of the lineage and its political power in the present community life. As discussed in Chapter Two, the past and their common memory give coherence to the community (see Zonabend, 1984).

The local people show their agency in their use of appropriation and their adaptation of the new house. Nevertheless, the resulting sense of chaos is, to some extent, inevitable. The hierarchy of social status was clearly inscribed in the traditional residence in the

very manner of its spatial ordering. In the new house, there is however no absolute centre and clear order, or we can say, the definition of the 'centre' and 'order' shows a sort of chaotic sense in the perception of the subject. I will proceed, in the next chapter, to discuss the new order or new hierarchy which is largely determined by economic power in family life and which is manifested symbolically in the spatial organization of the new house.

Chapter 8 Cooperation and conflicts in the domestic space: kitchen and bedroom

For the Chinese, the house is a symbol of the family. The word *jia* can be translated into home, house, family and clan, as I have mentioned in Chapter Five. Therefore, the meaning of house must be embedded into the context of 'family' to be understood. This chapter will discuss family structure and family relationships through analysing and comparing the transformations of kitchens and bedrooms from the old house style to the new houses built after 1997. In south China, the kitchen and bedroom, compared with other spaces in the house, may be the ones that most clearly inscribed a family's structure and relationships and also contributed to the reproduction of these. The transformation of the two spaces in history also reveals the continuity, conflicts and integration of the three ideologies – Confucianism, communism and neoliberalism in domestic life.

In the first section, I will begin by analysing the position of the kitchen. I will present the changing division of labour in a family and the transformation of the status of female in a family during the process of marketisation. I argue that the phenomenon of whoring in contemporary China can be considered as an expression of weakened control over morality and women which is even further exploited when patriarchal culture integrates with the principle of the market. Moreover, I also explain how new technology impacts the organisation of the domestic space. Thirdly, I discuss the symbolic meaning of the kitchen as an expression of family division. In the second part of this chapter, I will use the bedroom distribution to explain the transformation of the intergenerational relationship and the family structure. Then, the detailed case study of Dingliang Liu's family in terms of the layout and distribution of the bedroom will be analysed as a medium to understand the contemporary Chinese family and the process of individualisation.

8.1 Kitchen

8.1.1 Labour division and gender inequality

Figure 8.1 Dining room in backyard

Figure 8.2 Kitchen in backyard

Francesca Bray suggests the kitchen was as much the centre of the house as was the shrine for many Chinese. The encyclopaedia *Jiabao quanji* (Complete collection of household treasures), first published in 1707, includes a manual on building in which it is stated that the ancestors and the Stove God must both be worshiped before a family moves into its new house (Bray, 1997: 107). Although the significance of the kitchen

can be compared with the shrine of the ancestors, the location of the kitchen is often inconspicuous in a traditional house: in the front-yard or the back-yard. In Chinese, 'go to the kitchen' can be expressed as '*xia chufang*' – literally, down to the kitchen, which implies the lower status of kitchen in a house. It further indicated the low value of kitchen labour, because it should be female's job. In a patriarchal society, the female space should be inconspicuous.

Feminists regard domestic labour as a common burden imposed on women by patriarchy and lazy husbands (Anderson, 2000: 1). However, the gendered division of labour is not that clear according to the history that can be traced in Baikou village. Despite this, the 'female working space' has remained inconspicuous from the past to now. Baikou men learned to cook when they were little boys, around seven or eight years old. Some of them still cook after marriage. The old man Jiakun Ye said, 'Man and woman usually do not have labour division. It depends on if the couple haggle over every ounce. But laundry must be woman. Cooking, farming, carrying water and excrement are not necessary man or woman.' Shezhen Wei born in 1958 also said, 'the one who is free will cook. But laundry must be woman's job'. Xuezhi Tong born in 1973 and his wife born in 1974. He said, 'She (wife) did most of the housework. If she is at home, I will not cook. But if she is not at home, I have to cook. But laundry is always her job. I nearly never did it.' The consensus on laundry is retained (although washing machines have now become an essential for every family) but cooking is not necessarily a woman's job.

Thoughts of gender equality were first introduced into China during the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864)[50] which was influenced by Christian ideals about gender. In the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, women first shared the equal right of property and the right of education with men; the custom of foot-binding was abolished; women were allowed to participate in political affairs; and polygamy was replaced by monogamy (Wang, 2001: 123-130, Zheng, 1955: 42-51, Liao and Wang, 2007). Then, since the

---

[50] The Taiping Rebellion was the rebellion of the Christian millenarian movement called the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom against the Qing Empire, which took place between 1851 to 1864.

New Cultural Movement in the early twentieth century, under the influence of western values such as 'democracy' and 'equality', the relevant policies were further developed in the direction of gender-equality, which also generally focused on the empowerment of women in political participation, property rights, education and marriage. For example, in 1916, the leader of the New Cultural Movement, Duxiu Chen, expressed the criticism that Confucianism denied the freedom of women (see Lin et al, 1984: 154); Daiying Yun criticised arranged marriage and advocated the freedom of marriage in 1917 (All-China Women's Federation, 1981: 197); in 1918 and 1919, the journal 'New Youth' which initiated and played a significant role in the New Cultural Movement published many articles on the liberation of women.

Then in Mao's era, the feminist movement tended to erase gender differences. As Zhang pointed out, state socialism attempted to erase gender and sexual desires in the public sphere as part of the liberation project (Zhang, 2010: 165). This effort led to the state promotion of the so-called iron girls – strong proletarian model workers who could perform men's work and "hold up half the sky" in building socialism (Honig, 2000: 97-110). Thus, gender differences were largely muted in public discourse and were replaced by a set of highly politicized, non-gender-specific characteristics, such as revolutionary fervor and selfless work (Chen, 2002: 317). Li Zhang argues that such erasure of gender difference not only failed to address the problem of gender inequality but also deprived Chinese men and women of their unique gender identity and ability to publically express their sexual desires (ibid., 166). In the post-Maoist era, gender differences visibly re-appeared and were interpreted in different ways from the past. As Li Zhang suggests, now, the self-worth of women is deeply intertwined with the refeminization of their body, physical appearance and conduct. The self-worth of men is, on the other hand, tied to their ability to make money, possess desirable material goods or gain political power (ibid., 166).

Meanwhile, the revival of patriarchal tradition coupled with the logic of the market has, to some extent, made woman even more deprived in some areas. The gender labour division seems to be more emphasized in recent years after the Maoist era. Females take

responsibility for doing housework in the majority of families, even if they work outside, especially the senior female (domestic work mainly becomes the responsibility of the elders and the young work outside, while the elder man often contributes much less than the elder woman) (this will be further discussed below). As many women complained, men do not work at all, thus women have to work both at home and outside. In Baikou, young women have lost even more freedom at present since they have to adapt to the labour market and also take more responsibility for housework than their husbands (though their parents-in-law may do most of the housework).

Tim Putnam suggests that, as negotiations have become the supreme characteristics of postmodern democratic family life, the centre of the house has shifted from the master bedroom to the postmodern living kitchen. Functional kitchen design is now considered impersonal and outdated, needing a more personal, romantic, or even glamorous touch. The postmodern kitchen has become the battleground of domestic responsibilities for it not only brings family members together for the sharing of a meal, but also plainly reveals domestic labour (see Cieraad, 2006: 11). Seemingly, the newer the house is, the higher the status of the kitchen (this is true of Baikou too). As mentioned earlier, in the house built in 1997, the north room on the ground floor was supposed to be used as a kitchen. However, nearly all families who did not build the second house at the north of the yard built a kitchen behind the main building (see Figure 8.1-2). In the houses built after 2010, the kitchen, the living room and the dining room are often next to each other. The dining room and living room share the same open space without partition, and the kitchen is often separated from the living room and dining room by a glass-made double sliding door. Domestic labour in the kitchen is open to view. Nonetheless, in Baikou, very few young men cook as their fathers did when they were young.

The economic independence of woman often cannot help them challenge the patriarchal logic or improve their social status. Women's participation in the labour market deprived them of their rights even further, both in the sense of economic and mental happiness, since suffering their husband's betrayal is a common phenomenon in Baikou (and also Lianhe village and Langxi village). People said capable men in Baikou often

visit the KTV (karaoke entertainment centre) and spa centre in the city which provide sexual services. A woman who does cleaning in the karaoke entertainment centre in front of Baikou village said to me, I often see the village leaders (both the former and the young) in the KTV centre in front of Baikou New Village. The village head Anle Liu said to me, 'Look, people at my age in our village, what are they doing every evening? Whoring! …… It is not Mao's era any more. Nobody will work that hard these days ……'

Men's whoring: weakened control over morality

The phenomenon of whoring appeared in the region during the 1980s which is an expression of the weakened control over morality after the Reform and Opening Up. Rendi Xu said that after her husband retired from the army and came back to Yingde, she often heard that a man only needs to pay two yuan to '*zhao ji*' (literally, to look for a chicken, which means to look for a prostitute). As many other women have done in other parts of China, Rendi Xu complained, 'now, there is no good man any more. They are all arsy-varsy (licentious). Look at the brothers of the village head of Qingyun Tang (a nearby village), all of them are arsy-varsy (licentious). They are notorious.' However, when I interviewed the village head of Qingyun Tang village (who had been in the position for eight years at that time) he spoke candidly, even though he is a married man, 'I met many girls here. They come from the mountain area and struggled in the city by selling their own body. Some of them were crying in my arms. If I can, I will write a book about it.' He has no shame in having extramarital sexual relationships. This phenomenon is especially common in areas that have experienced rapid economic development. Having an extramarital affair or sexual relationship was very strictly forbidden in the collective era. According to the middle-aged and the elders, sexual relationships were extremely strictly controlled in the collective era. Even two unmarried lovers could not have sex at that time, and behaviour was monitored by everyone. On Army Day, the village committee treated all the communist members of the village to a meal in a restaurant. During the lunch, we were talking about life in the collective era. Some men teased Zixiu Tong for he had an affair with a woman. Some days later, when I reviewed the archives of the collective era, I found his affair was

clearly recorded in the annual report of Makou Brigade (see Figure 6.13). The report shows,

The team member of Baikou production team of Makou brigade, the communist Zixiu Tong was the principal of the tractor station. He was also the secretary of Makou brigade. During his tenure, he twice had sexual relations. In this year, he twice had male-female relation with Qiaoti Huang, on the staff of the commune. The first time was at night of 19th March. But he is impenitent and made the mistake again. The second time was at night on 16th May.

Figure 8.3 An annual report of Makou brigade in 1976

Zixiu Tong is close to 70 years old now. As he was a leading figure in the village during the collective era, I had planned to interview him for a long time. However, he always escaped when he saw me coming. Some villagers said he must feel embarrassed to talk about the past because he had affairs at that time and was fined by the brigade. People of his age still have a strong sense of shame in relation to extramarital affairs. However, the young people do not care so much if other people know about their extramarital affairs or sexual relations, so long as their wife does not learn about it.

It is a tacit rule, to 'never involve yourself in other people's family life'. Therefore, the wife whose husband had an extramarital affair often cannot know the truth. Even when they do know the truth, many women can neither stop their husband nor decide to divorce. Partly, this is because the extramarital affair is so often seen in social life that many females believed that there is no 'better man'. There is a saying, 'there is no cat that does not want fish' (*meiyou bu touxing de mao*), which implies that all the men will deviate from the track if they have a chance. Therefore, if the man does not want to divorce but only to have some fun 'outside', this is acceptable to many women. As a matter of law, monogamy has only been practised since the People's Republic (1912-1949). After New China was established in the 1950s, the new Marriage Law (1950) also forbad polygamy. During the collective era, sexual relationships were under strict surveillance. However, after the Reform and Opening Up, as political coercion gradually eased and the economy improved, extramarital affairs and *de facto* (illegal) 'polygamy' started to become a common social issue.

In the early stage of my research in Baikou, I joined a *lishihui* meeting. During the meeting, I asked them if they visited other model villages. A young man answered, yes, we visited Dongguan city. Then, some other men started to laugh and say, yes we all went to Gondguan. The village head then said,

> *……we had very good minfeng (folk custom or the local ethos) in the past. But once you get money you become bad. It is universal everywhere. Anyway, people get to be bad once they are involved in the competition for more benefit, for example, go to Dongguan (go whoring).*

Then he started to laugh too. Dongguan is famous for its sex industry. In 2014, the local government called out more than 6,000 policemen to eradicate the porn industry which was breaking news in 2014. Since then, 'Go to Dongguan' has become a euphemism for 'go whoring'.

Michael Herzfeld defined cultural intimacy as 'the recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality…' (Herzfeld, 1997: 3). Prostitution, although regarded as immoral and unethical in the official discourse is, at the level of social practice, interrelated with the discourse of capability and sociality. In contemporary China, extramarital sex is often not a secret among male groups. It is a symbol of masculinity, of earning capability and intimacy between men. In this light, the struggle for gender equality in the past century may meet new challenges in the post-Mao era.

8.1.2 Technology and space organisation

Besides the transformation in domestic labour distribution, new technologies and resources also contribute to the increased significance of the interior space of a house. There is no chimney in the houses built in 1997. Before the land expropriation that took place around 2010, firewood was still the main fuel for cooking, thus the majority of families still used a brick-made firewood stove which required a chimney. As a result, many families built a brick-made firewood stove in the back-yard or the front-yard. Since the 2010s many families have stopped using firewood, partly because of the inconvenience of collecting it but also because when they refurbished their houses after receiving land compensation they removed the brick cooking stoves as they released dirty black smoke. Instead, the majority of families have installed gas or electric stoves in the new kitchen. A young man, Guiquan Bo born in 1983, said, 'In the old village, my family had a gas stove. At that time, we used a brick cooking stove when we had time, and we used the gas stove only when we did not have time because the gas stove is much faster.' The fuel of the brick cooking stove was partly obtained from the waste of agricultural production, while some was gathered from the nearby mountain. Collecting firewood from the mountain is a happy memory for some of the post-1960s generations while, for the elders, firewood is symbol of a 'good place'. A 63-year-old woman, Feng'er Hu, told me that she married into Baikou through an introducer. At that time, Baikou had the best firewood but in Lianfeng (her hometown), they did not have firewood. In the past, Baikou people lived in mud-brick houses so using firewood was very convenient. Feng'er Hu is obviously very proud of Baikou's firewood. However,

nowadays, firewood is considered a symbol of backwardness and dirt, which counters the image of modernisation, so it is always being concealed from view, as I discussed in Chapter Six. Due to the change of the technique and the fuel resources of the stove, the kitchen can now be placed inside the house rather than outside.

8.1.3 Stove division and family division

Symbolically, family division is also called stove division (*fen zao*). Before new China was established, the joint family was the dominant family structure (Cohen, 1992: 357-377) – since then family size has tended to decrease. According to the national population censuses in 1982, 1990, 2000 and 2010 (see Table 8.2), the nuclear family has been the dominant family type in China for three decades. However, the official registered household is not necessary equivalent to the customarily defined household. As I have discussed in Chapter Four, 'household' is the unit on which an application for a homestead is based (the non-agricultural population do not have this right). As a result, the family is often divided into different households as far as they could.[51] Customarily, the people who share a stove are considered as a household. For example, Feilong Ye's parents live in the same building with their son, but the stoves are separated. They are considered to be one family, but two households. The concept of 'family' is not necessarily identical with the concept of 'household'. As Lancaster claimed, it might not be appropriate to assume family and household were synonymous (Lancaster, 1961: 329-31, see also Layton, 2000: 124).

---

[51] Once children are 18 years old, they can be separated from the core family and become an independent household which, in many rural areas, gives them the right to apply for a homestead. Article 11 of the Rural House Land Approval and Management Provisional Regulation of Yingde City (issued in November 2013) states that: 'Every household can only have use right of one homestead. The new homestead must follow this standard: inside the planning area of suburb and township, the maximum of every homestead for each household is 80 square meters; outside the planning area of township, the maximum of every homestead for each household is 150 square meters.' The last opportunity for Baikou people to apply for a new homestead was 2010. After this, no homestead could be distributed to the new established household.

Household Number	Population	Household Size	House Number
76	339	4.46	64 (78)

Table 8.1 Household number and house number

Also, people who live in the same house do not necessarily constitute a household. The family division is both ritualised and actualised by 'stove division', but not by 'house division'. There are 76 households and 78 houses in the Baikou New Village, but 12 of them belong to outsiders as I have discussed in Chapter Five. Meanwhile, there are two houses belonging to the people who are no longer Baikou villagers as defined by their *hukou*. Thus, there are, in fact, 64 houses shared by the 76 households, which means that there are some houses shared by more than one household (see Table 8.1). The three Zhu brothers continued sharing the hearth before moving into their new house, and they agreed that the big family was not divided at that time, although all of them had already married and had children. Also, in the sense of *hukou*, every son has already registered as an independent household. However, after moving into the new house, each of them occupied a storey of the building. Every storey has an independent kitchen, which means the joint family divided into four core families. However, the three brothers managed a goods van together before and after the family division, which is their main source of income. In other words, they are still a production unit both before and after the family division, but not a consumption unit.

To sum up, the symbolic meaning of the kitchen is retained in Baikou New Village, though the space itself has experienced dramatic change from the traditional to the western-style house. The direction of the stove is still often arranged on the basis of the *fengshui* rule. The stove should sit on the north and face to the south, that is the same as the direction of the house. The stove god who reported to Heaven at the New Year on his family's behaviour is still widely worshipped in the community as many other regions in China (Bray, 1997: 107). In Baikou, the stove god is usually represented as a piece of red paper marked with '*ding fu ru zhao jun*' (the stove god will guarantee happiness). The stove god 'is the lowest-ranking member of a supernatural bureaucracy'

and 'the family is the smallest corporate unit in the society', and the stove god is invited to join the family. The character of the association between the god and family is essentially bureaucratic (Wolf, 1974: 133).

Although the kitchen is placed in an inconspicuous corner of the house, it is still the 'hottest' centre of a house both in the sense of physics and of symbolism. Although the new technology and the new structure of labour division to some extent changed the allocation of labour in the kitchen, the cultural meaning of the kitchen is unchanged in Baikou New Village.

The next section will focus on the transformation of family structure and family life through a focus on the bedroom.

8.2 Bedroom and family life

Roger Ames said,

> *This fundamental importance of the family is sedimented into the modern Chinese language. …… In the Chinese case, one might reason that I am certainly incarnate and live my life as an embodied individual, but at the same time I am Bonnie's husband, and Austin's father, and Henry's collaborator, and Sor-hoon's professor, and Gail's next-door neighbour - and that these roles and relationships as I have grown them and they have grown me over a lifetime are arguably more real and enduring than my sometimes tenuous and increasingly disappointing body. In fact, for the distinguished person, roles and relations persist long after the inevitable demise of their physicality. Growth for Confucianism takes place not primarily in our physical persons, but in the opportunity for enchanted living that our roles and relationships provide each one of us (Ames, 2011:65).*

According to Confucianism a person is, therefore, constituted by their family relations. Nevertheless, as Confucianism became the target of criticism at the beginning of the last century, the Chinese family was also considered to be an obstacle for China's development. Confucian family patterns and values were attacked because the critics of the old order saw them as a source of personal misery and unhappiness as well as the major source of China's weakness and inability to stand up to Western powers (Whyte, 1996: 1-30). In the New Cultural Movement, the intellectuals of the day launched a series of critiques of the Confucian family, including Duxiu Chen's 'Constitution and Confucianism' (*xianfa yu kongjiao*); Yu Wu's 'Family system is the foundation of the despotism' (*jiazu zhidu wei zhuanzhizhuyi zhi genju lun*); Xun Lu's novel, 'A madman's diary' (*kuangren riji*) and 'How should we be father now' (*women xianzai zenyang zuo fuqin*), to name just a few. In response to these critics, many features of the traditional family faced reform, including arranged marriage, the subjugation of women, filial piety training, and the extraordinary emphasis on obligations of individuals to their families (ibid., 7). However, even during the collective time of Mao's era, the family as a production and consumption unit was never completely eradicated, especially as a unit of consumption. As Myron Cohen said, 'the period of collectivization was characterized by state control of land and all other non-residential property, so that the scope of family property holdings was reduced to individually-assigned but family-run private plots, and to housing, furniture, some tools, and so on' (Cohen, 1992: 367). The work points awarded in lieu of cash wages were regarded as family property and always distributed at the time of family division in the collective era (ibid., 372).

Family type	2010	2000	1999	1982
Nuclear family	60.89	68.18	70.61	68.30
Linear family (or stem family)	22.99	21.72	21.33	21.74
Compound family	0.58	0.56	1.08	0.92

One-person household	13.67	8.57	6.34	7.98
Incomplete family	0.93	0.71	0.57	0.84
Other	0.93	0.26	0.08	0.22

Table 8.2 Changes in Chinese family structure 1982-2010 (%)[52] (see Wang, 2014: 103).

Note: A nuclear family refers to families composed of a married couple or one member of the couple and their unmarried child(ren), including families composed of a couple only; a linear family (or stem family) refers to families composed of a married couple or one member of the couple, a married child and their grandchild(ren); a compound family refers to families composed of a married couple or one member of the couple along with two or more married children; and an incomplete family refers to families composed of unmarried brothers and/or sisters (Wang, 2014: 103).

As previously mentioned, according to the national census from 1982 to 2010, the nuclear family was the dominant family structure in China, comprising 68.30% of the total in 1982 and 60.89% in 2010 (see Table 8.2). Yuesheng Wang suggests that the One-child policy largely contributed to this feature (Wang, 2006: 96-108) whilst Weber pointed out that, given the function of the household, it is becoming increasingly inopportune for an individual to join a large communistic household in a capitalist society. An individual no longer gets protection from the household and kinship groups but rather from political authority, which exercises compulsory jurisdiction. Furthermore, household and occupation become ecologically separated, and the household is no longer a unit of common production but of common consumption (Weber, 1978: 375). The Chinese family may contradict Weber's prediction that 'the household will no longer function as a unit of common production' in the process of capitalisation, but as Chayanov asserted, the peasant economy is still retained in the

---

[52] The data for 2010 is calculated from the Excel data on the one percent sample from the sixth national long-form census. Data for 1982, 1990 and 2000 has been obtained from the one percent sample database of the third national census in 1982, the fourth national census in 1990 and the fifth national long-form census in 2000.

sense of household cooperation (Chayanov, 1926). From 2000 to 2010, the percentage of the nuclear family decreased from 68.18% to 60.89%, while the linear family increased from 21.72% to 22.99%. The increase in linear families (especially the three-generation linear family) should be attributed to the way in which the two conjugal pairs of the linear family (parents and married child) have shaped a new pattern of co-residence which has some advantages in modern life, for example, holding independent accounts but sharing some living expenses. The new model of linear family co-residence gives more space to autonomy.

Also, Yunxiang Yan suggests, the traditional Chinese family that is characterized by the centrality of the parent-son relationship in family life tends to be substituted by the conjugal relationship in contemporary China, while the economically more functional stem family guaranteed its persistence (Yan, 1997: 191-212). The senior conjugal pair often help the married child to take care of grandchild(ren) and so the junior conjugal pair, as the more valuable labour force, are able to participate in the labour market (often as migrant workers).

Philip Huang also claimed the three-generational stem family still retains its significance in the social, economic and legal institutions of contemporary China, which is different from the assumption that the family as a unit of production will be gradually replaced by the individual in the process of industrialisation (Huang, 2011: 82-105). He further explained, first, it is because agricultural production and subsidiary occupation (in the past, mainly craft production and now mainly in industry or the service industry) are both the significant income of a family. Second, it is because some relevant laws also strengthened the consistency of the three-generation families, including the Law of Succession of People's Republic of China (1985) which stipulated that the descendants who support parents can inherit more property, and the laws of land and property which are closely associated with the Law of Succession and strengthened the intergenerational duties and rights (ibid., 82-105). Also, Davis and Harrell pointed out, it was not the case that Communism simply destroyed the traditional Chinese family, but many of its key policies actually stabilized and strengthened families. For example,

the large investments in public health and famine relief reduced mortality and the restrictions on internal migration intensified the flow of intergenerational aid because they tied most adult men (and their sons) to the villages and towns of their birth (Davis and Harrell, 1993: 1). In Baikou, after moving into the New Village, the co-resident stem family became even more popular than in the old village. There are only very few core families (or nuclear families) co-residing in Baikou. Nevertheless, family relations show clear changes. In the following subsections, through analysing and comparing the distribution, design and usage of the bedroom in the western-style new house and in the traditional houses built before 1997 in Baikou, I will discuss the transfer of domestic power, intergenerational intimacy and conflict, and the awareness of privacy and rising individualism in rural China.

8.2.2 Bedroom distribution and domestic power transfer

Family head	Family structure	Family size	Ground floor	First Floor	Second floor
Shezhen Wei	Stem family co-residence	6	Senior couple	Junior couple; grandson	--
Rendi Xu	Stem family co-residence	4	Grand daughter	Son; Rendi Xu	Daughter-in-law
Yali Hua	Stem family co-residence	6	Yalihua; senior couple	Unmarried son and daughter	Unmarried son
Yiji Tong	Stem family co-residence	6	Yijian Tong; divorced daughter	Junior couple; grandson	Former wife of Yijian Tong
Guxin Liu	Core family co-residence	4	Guxin Liu and his wife	Unmarried son; unmarried daughter	--

| Dingliang Liu | Stem family co-residence | 6 | Senior couple | Junior couple; grandson and granddaughter | -- |

Table 8.3 Bedroom distribution of six families in Baikou New Village

Floor	Room on each floor	Bedroom Distribution
Ground Floor	Two bedrooms, a living room, a kitchen, a dining room, and a mini toilet	Senior conjugal
First Floor	Two or three bedrooms, a living room, a bathroom and a balcony (sometimes it transformed into a room)	Junior conjugal, unmarried sibling, the third generation and guest
Second Floor	Two bedrooms, a mini toilet and a big balcony	Mostly vacancy

Table 8.4 The layout of the new house built in 1997 and the typical structure of the bedroom distribution in Baikou

As I have presented in Chapter Seven, the layout of the new house is very different to the old house built before 1997. As Table 8.3 shows, stem family co-residence is the dominant organisation of residence, which includes senior and junior conjugal pairs (and their children) and unmarried siblings. Table 8.4 shows the specific rooms on each floor and the general bedroom distribution in the new houses. The senior conjugal pair often live on the ground floor. They often use the word '*fangbian*' (convenient and easy) to explain why they prefer to live on the ground floor. The senior conjugal pair often take the responsibility for childcare and housework, thus they need to move around frequently. Also, they often mentioned that the ground floor is cooler and therefore preferable to the first and second floor. The junior conjugal pair and unmarried children, however, often prefer the first floor because of its greater privacy (this will be further discussed below). The bedrooms on the second floor are often vacant or used as storerooms due to the problem of summer heat.

Figure 8.4 Bedroom of Shezhen Wei (senior of the family) (Southern room on ground Floor)

Figure 8.5 Bedroom of the Junior couple in Shezhen Wei's family (Northern room on first floor)

Figure 8.6 Bedroom of the junior couple in Dingliang Liu's family (southern room on the First Floor)

Figure 8.7 Bedroom of the grandchildren in Dingliang Liu's family (northern room on the First Floor)

The bedrooms on the first floor are always south-facing (which is considered the best in China as it receives more sunshine), bigger and better furnished than those on the ground and second floor (see Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5), which indicated the superiority of the junior generation in the family. Dingliang Liu's family is a typical stem family co-residence in Baikou, with six family members, including Dingliang Liu (family head), his wife Chunmei Lin, his son, daughter-in-law, granddaughter and grandson. Dingliang Liu was 60 years old in 2015. Dingliang Liu and his wife live in the southern bedroom on the ground floor which is small but south-facing. His son Yicong Liu and daughter-in-law Wei Huang live in the southern bedroom on the first floor which was previously used as a living room (see Figure 8.6). When Yicong Liu and Wei Huang got married in 2011, they merged the living room, the small bedroom and the toilet on the first floor as a big en-suite, with a small baby room included in the en-suite (see Figure 8.7). Therefore, the size of this en-suite is approximately four times bigger than their parent's little bedroom on the ground floor, which is however much cosier. In the Spring, the ground floor is always very humid in this region, causing bedding to get damp and mouldy. In addition, the increasing popularity of the en-suite (including toilet in the bedroom) further highlights the increasing consciousness of privacy. In Baikou,

when I asked for permission to photograph the rooms in the house, the senior hosts often agreed with no hesitation, while, the younger generation often felt awkward and sometimes refused it – further evidence that the younger generation have a stronger consciousness of privacy than their parents.

Bedrooms are generally not so well decorated as living rooms and often only include a bed, wardrobe, bedside table, and sometimes a desk. In many places in China, the television is often in the bedroom; people watch TV in bed. In Baikou, however, very few families put televisions in the bedroom. Instead, watching TV is a family activity in the *keting* (see Chapter Seven).[53] This arrangement largely guarantees the division of 'family time' and 'conjugal private time' in the family as it does in many western societies. The bedroom is the most private territory (at the level of the individual) in the new houses (built after 1997). It is the space shared with the most intimate person. In the old houses, the bedroom is more multi-functional than in the new house. It is much more frequently visited during the day time and often used to receive close friends and kin. The bed is sometimes even used as sofa. According to my observations, the door of the senior couple's bedroom is often left open and kept accessible for all family members, while the junior couple's bedroom is often closed. In the houses built between 1960 and 1990, the door of the bedroom directly faces the hall or the main entrance of the yard which definitely counters the *fengshui* principal. In other words, the bedroom in the old house can be more easily accessed than in the new one. Access to the bedroom in the new house, on the other hand, means crossing through the living room first, and there is also a hall between rooms that serves as a transitional space to the private zone.

The young couple often apply the expression 'more quiet' to express their preference for the bedroom on the first floor. 'More quiet' in this context, is identical with 'more private'. It means the separation from others in the house. According to Yunxiang Yan's research in Xijia village, when the private space is more emphasized in the new houses,

---

[53] Though at the same time, children do their homework on the tea table and the young family members may focus on their own mobile chatting with friends or watching news.

a couple have more convenience to 'develop conjugal intimacy, to be left alone, and to make decisions without parental intervention' (ibid., 197). Whereas, the senior couple often use the word *fangbian* (convenience, easy) to express their preference to the bedroom on the ground floor. However, *fangbian* should refer to 'easily accessible', as previously mentioned, the senior parents have to move around frequently because their working space and living space are both in the domestic, and also because they have lived on the ground floor for the most of their lives.

The old houses built before 1997 are often single storey. The environment in which they were used to living and the current reality of their living space may contribute to the way they perceive the space where '*fangbian*' is the key point rather than 'quiet'. The consciousness of privacy may be a pertinent subject to testify the consciousness of 'self' (in other words, the consciousness of the relation and the division between self and others) as Adam and Eve have the consciousness to hide their body after eating the forbidden apple. As Attfield said, privacy was about being about to control access to their own space. The occupier of the new house spoke of the pride they experienced from 'having my own front' (Attfield, 1999: 76).

Many researches have evidenced the exploitation of parents in the Chinese family in recent decades (Guo, 2001: 422-439, Yan, 2009, Kang, 2009, Shen, 2010). Some others argued that Chinese parents are not just the victims of modernity, but have also increased their agency in making a better relationship with children and creating a more independent and freer life (Boermel, 2006: 401-418, Thøgersen and Anru, 2008: 11-37, Logan and Bian, 1999: 1253-1282, Zhang, 2005: 53-76, Zhang, 2004). The inferior status of the senior parents in a family can be traced through the living conditions of their bedroom in Baikou. Yunxiang Yan has pointed out that the ultimate aspiration of a family transferred from the happiness of the ancestor and parent, according to the Confucian principle, to the happiness of children in Chinese families in recent years (Yan, 2016: 244-257). There are two main reasons that may contribute to the new familism in Baikou. First of all, in terms of economics, after dominant production transferred from agriculture to industry and commerce in recent years, the authority of

the senior tends to be transferred to the younger generation who are more capable of adapting into the new market. In other words, the younger generation's economic capability has led to their rising status. Secondly, this age group has developed a more individualistic consciousness. The next section will further explain the two aspects through a case study of Dingliang Liu's family.

8.2.3 Neo-familism: a case study of Dingliang Liu's family

This section will focus on Dingliang Liu's family as a case study for understanding new family life in terms of family cooperation and intergenerational relationships.

Name	Age	Gender	Education	Bedroom
Dingliang Liu	60	M	Primary School	Southern bedroom on the ground floor
Chunmei Lin	59	F	Two-years Primary School	
Yicong Liu	33	M	High School	southern bedroom on the first floor
Wei Huang	30	F	Bachelor	
Jingye Liu	3	F	Kindergarten	Sleep with parent
Baiyu Liu	1	M	Kindergarten	Sleep with grandparent

Table 8.5 Some relevant information about Dingliang Liu's family

As a cooperating unit

Dingliang Liu was a soldier between 1974 and 1978 and after retiring from the army in 1978, returned to the village, engaging in agricultural production again up until 1996. He was the village head between 1982 and 1993. Around 1983, a group of about ten men of Baikou village went to Guangzhou to work in a dockyard for one year. At that

time, the salary was a little better than doing agricultural production. However, when the village leader decided to come back to Baikou, the rest followed him. Dingliang Liu said he is not good at doing business, so he never tried. In 1996, he was selected to work in the Chengxi Residents' Community. His main job was recruiting soldiers, overseeing birth control and coordinating the resolution of disputes and conflicts. He retired in 2014. However, as he is not a formal government official in Chengxi Residents' Community his pension is only about 700 yuan per month (2015). In the same year, the average lowest monthly salary in Yingde was 1,210 yuan. Dingliang Liu's wife Chunmei Lin has never worked outside the village. She was engaged in agriculture until 2009 when the land was gradually expropriated by the government in Tong Baikou. Although Dingliang Liu's family still have 70 *mu* of land that has not yet been expropriated, they have stopped farming as they think the income from agriculture is low while the work is very demanding. Now, their new job is childcare and housework – every morning Dingliang Liu also helps his son to look after the small supermarket in the city centre. In the afternoon, after collecting his granddaughter from kindergarten at around four o'clock, he often plays *Majhong* with his friends until night falls. His wife, Chunmei Lin, takes responsibility for the housework, including cooking, laundry and cleaning, as well as looking after her grandson.

Yicong Liu's work experience is obviously more varied. In 2000, when he graduated from high school, he went to the Pearl River Delta to work in transportation (delivering goods by tricycle) for two to three years. Then at the end of 2003, he came back to Yingde and learned to drive. He worked as a bus and truck driver for about five years; then around 2008, he went to Qingyuan city to drive for a businessman for approximately six years. During the time, he met his wife who is the daughter of his boss. Then in 2014, with his wife Wei Huang's help, he opened a small supermarket in Yingde city centre. He works in the supermarket from noon to midnight every day. His father often works for him and this provides him with some leisure time when he wants it.

Yicong Liu married Wei Huang around the time she graduated from university in 2011. She went to Chengxi Residents' Community to work after she married.[54] In this family, only hers is regarded as a proper job. In the villagers' view, 'someone has a job' means the job should have a long-term contract. Temporary jobs and self-run businesses are only considered as 'have things to do' rather than 'have a job'. 'Have a job' is a sort of honour, which gives the person and his or her family more authority in the community, especially if they are a civil servant. Therefore, to be a civil servant is one of the most popular and most competitive jobs throughout China. Since 2008, the pass rate for entry into the civil service has never been over 2%. A post in the civil service is called iron-rice-bowl, unbreakable, stable, good welfare, good salary, and maybe high social status. It might be one of the reasons why Wei Huang has more authority in the family than her husband. Besides her formal job, Wei Huang sometimes also does a little housework and teaches her children. After dinner, she goes to the supermarket to help her husband for several hours in the evening, and also the weekends. She often complained to me that she feels too tired in this family life.

As a consumption unit

Name	Expense details	Monthly cost (unit: yuan)	Percentage of the monthly total cost (%)
Dingliang Liu	Car	1,000	10.87
Dingliang Liu	Smoking	500	5.44
Dingliang Liu	Majhong (gambling)	1,500	16.30
Yicong Liu and Wei	Car	1,000	10.87

---

[54] Her father-in-law, Dingliang Liu, said his son is not capable, so he let his daughter-in-law work in the Chengxi Residents' Community rather than his son. In addition, the other three villagers who went to Chengxi Residents' Community to work are the daughter of former village head Xuede Ye, son of Xuede Ye's elder brother, son of the former secretary of the Chengxi Residents' Community. *Guanxi* as social capital probably plays a role in civil servant recruitment at the level of the Residents' Community.

Huang			
Jingye Liu (daughter)	Kindergarten fee	1,200	13.04
Family	food	2,000	21.74
Family	Utility bills	500	5.44
Family	Traveling, gift, living goods, etc..	1,500	16.30
Total		9,200	

Table 8.6 Monthly expenditure of Dingliang Liu's family in 2015

Wei Huang and her mother-in-law are the family bookkeepers. Traditionally, there is only one family manager, though sometimes the family head and the family manager are not the same person. The position of the family head (*jiazhang*) who represents the family to the outside world, is often taken by the senior male of the family (in this case, Dingliang Liu is the family head of the family), while, the family manager (*dangjia*) is generally in charge of the overall management of the family, especially their economic affairs (ibid., 362-3). Dingliang Liu's monthly personal costs account for nearly one-third of the total cost of the family, which is paid from their own account. He and his wife take charge of their own savings that derive mainly from Dingliang Liu's pension of nearly 700 yuan per month and reparation for land expropriation (since around 2008, every villager received approximately 130,000 yuan in reparation, as I have mentioned in Chapter Five). Also, the fee for renting their 70 *mu* of land is 25,000 yuan per year, which also belongs to the senior conjugal pair. Their son and daughter-in-law take responsibility of the remaining monthly costs (approximately 6,200 yuan). The income from the supermarket, that is in fact managed by the whole family, is nearly 10,000 yuan per month, and belongs entirely to the junior conjugal pair. Wei Huang's monthly salary of nearly 4,000 yuan belongs to herself.

In general, this family is one of the wealthiest in Baikou. According to Engel's Coefficient,[55] the food cost only accounts for 21.74% of their expenditure (see Table 8.6), which means the family belongs to the richest group at the international level.[56] Unfortunately, economic conflict is one of the main issues between the two conjugal pairs in the stem family, which is relevant to the idea of 'wealth distribution' in the stem family. Firstly, the junior conjugal pair believe that the land expropriation compensation fee (that is distributed to their core family members) should be managed by them, but the senior conjugal pair said that most of the compensation fee was spent on their son's wedding, house furnishing and opening the supermarket. Also, the senior conjugal pair have spent nearly all their time helping the younger couple look after their children and on housework. In addition, the junior conjugal pair think their parents gave lots of their savings to their two daughters. In this region, customarily, daughters rarely inherit family property (including cash) except the dowry. Wei Huang has a bad relationship with her two sisters-in-law, thus she is very unhappy that the land compensation fee that was distributed to her core family may go into her sisters-in-laws' pockets.

In many other families in Baikou, the stem family is the fundamental cooperating unit in everyday life, while the conjugal family is often the fundamental financial unit. The stem family shares some properties such as the house, land and some other production tools, but the 'cash' often goes to the individual's account. Wei Huang complained that the land compensation fee is distributed to every family member in all the other families while her parents-in-law have kept the fee for themselves. But her parents-in-law complained that even though they spend all the money on their son and daughter-in-law and work for them every day, they are still not satisfied. The young generation's consciousness of autonomy in the light of finance and their dependence on their parents seem to be selfish and self-interested individualism as Yunxiang Yan suggested (Yan, 2010). On the other hand, we should notice the anxiety and pressure that the young

---

[55] Engel coefficient is an indicator applied to evaluate people's living standards internationally. The statistician, Ernst Engel, found that when expenditure increases, the proportion devoted to food declines. Therefore, as the Engel coefficient increases, the subject of the consumption is by nature poorer.

[56] The majority of the families I investigated spend approximately 1,500 - 2,000 yuan on food every month, which should account for less than 50% of the total income of the family. In other words, according to the Engel's Coefficient, they should be in the rich section (40%-50%).

generation suffer when they are completely pushed into the sea of the market. As Wei Huang complained, she works from morning to night every day to improve their economic situation, but her parents-in-law (especially Dingliang Liu) spend money without thinking about the situation of the family. The village head, Anle Liu said, 'the senior generation do not need to think about the future, but we have to'. In fact, in the village, the young generation often enjoys better material conditions (better bedroom, more freedom to travel, more money for consumption) than their parents. The filial piety (*xiao*) that is considered as the core value of Confucianism then gives way to the benefit of the descendent, which echoes Yunxiang Yan's findings, as I have mentioned above (Yan, 2016).

Education fees are one of the biggest expenditures for Dingliang Liu's family and also the majority of families in Baikou. In 2015, the family only needed to pay for the granddaughter's kindergarten fee of 1,200 yuan per month, while in 2016, when the grandson also went to kindergarten, the tuition fee was double that. Free education only includes primary and secondary education (nine years in total). In Baikou, the majority of those born before 1990 completed only the compulsory nine-year education, but the majority of the generation born after 1990 go on to high school and college. A grandson, Sheneng Tong, expressed his expectation that for his grandchildren, 'the best is that they can study more, no matter what they are going to do; even farming will need a good education'. This may be the typical understanding of education in this region.

Bourdieu's theory of capital is helpful in this context. According to Bourdieu there are three forms of capital – economic capital, cultural capital and social capital. He defined them as follows:

> *Depending on the field in which it functions, and at the cost of the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital,*

which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations ("connections"), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility (Bourdieu, 1986: 16).

Family investment in education has become increasingly important in China as the individual is increasingly involved in the competitive environment of the market. Since the 1980s, when the One-child-policy was enacted in China, improving the quality of the population has been advocated at the same time. As Kipnis claimed, the concept of *suzhi* (human-quality) has become increasingly central to the dynamics of culture and governance in China over the past two decades (Kipnis, 2007: 388). It is generally believed that improving *suzhi* is accomplished primarily by improving the education of individuals. The term '*suzhi jiaoyu*' (human-quality education) has been one of the main national tasks in achieving the modernisation of China since the Reform and Opening Up. As cultural capital can be reproduced and transferred to become economic capital, the human-quality and the logic of the market under the ideology of neoliberalism echo each other. Associating with the One-child-policy that makes the only child becomes the sole focus point of the family, the education of the descendent becomes the most important investment of the family. Also, it contributes to the descending familism that Yunxiang Yan noticed.

Travel costs are also one of the biggest expenditures for families who own a motor vehicle. Up to 2015, nearly half of the families in Baikou had a car. A car often costs about 15,000 yuan per year to run, including insurance and petrol. In fact, public transport is very convenient in Baikou, but owning a car is still an expectation, especially among men because in Bourdieu's terms it is a principal item of symbolic capital. Also, the car is the tool that connects a person to life outside the village, which expands their social network and saves time. The processes of urbanisation has obviously changed people's perception of time too: efficiency is increasingly emphasized in everyday life.

Intergenerational conflicts

Conflicts are unavoidable when people live under one roof. In Dingliang Liu's case, the main conflict explodes between the daughter-in-law and the parents-in-law, and conflict between the sisters-in-law. We have discussed the economic conflicts before. In this section, the other conflicts in everyday life will be further discussed.

Wei Huang's first child was born in 2011 and second child in 2013. Her parents-in-law gave her tremendous help in raising the two children, especially her mother-in-law, Chunmei Lin. Chunmei Lin not only cooks for the family every day, she spends all her time with her grandson and wherever she goes, her grandson is always with her. Her granddaughter was also raised up by her until she started kindergarten when she was three years old. However, Wei Huang often said that her little son's character is odd because her mother-in-law brought him up badly. When he wants something or is unsatisfied, he will keep crying and shouting. Wei Huang believes that it is because her mother-in-law often shouts at him. By contrast, she is always trying to treat her children with a very gentle attitude. According to traditional education, there is nothing wrong with smacking a child. Chinese people believe 'No beating, no success' (*buda buchengcai*) – a successful child must suffer extremely strict training. Nevertheless, modern puericulture advocates the encouraging-style of education, communicating with the child as an individual, a subject. Wei Huang is an educated mother. Her idea of education is very different from that of her mother-in-law who follows the tradition in which she was brought up.

Moreover, Wei Huang is very unhappy with her mother-in-law's domestic habits, especially the different standard of *weisheng* (hygiene or cleanliness in this context). She explained that her mother-in-law often washes her underwear together with the children's clothes which could easily result in infection. She also complained that the house is always messy because her mother-in-law is not good at cleaning. Wei Huang is from a well-off businessman's family. To some extent, her family and educational background make her superior to her husband's family. Their conflicts are not only

because of the intergenerational gap, but also because of the class differentiation. Yicong Liu complains about her mother too:

As for living together with parents, I think if the relationship is not very good, it is better not to talk too much. My parents are not very clean at home in the term of hygiene, and we don't have lots of common language. I am not very often at home neither during the daytime nor the night. …… Because I am too busy, I have no time to be with my family. But if I stay at home every day, then I think we may quarrel every day. After we had children, I think it is not very appropriate to ask parents to take care of them. For example, my parents have different habit of geren weisheng (personal hygiene), and they always shout at a child. They don't know how to educate children.

As observers, the best friends of this family often show their sympathy to Dingliang Liu and his wife. Once I was invited to have dinner in Dingliang Liu's family. We discussed at what age people should retire. I said, people who are older than 60 should enjoy a retired life. Wei Huang was very unhappy with my opinion. She said, 'in Hong Kong and Japan, people older than 70 years old still work. It is not realistic to stop working at 60 I think.' I then kept quiet. In 2016, Wei Huang finally decided to live separately from her parents-in-law and bought an apartment at the city centre, costing approximately 1.5 million yuan. Unfortunately, their conflicts escalated at that time. She expected her parents-in-law to give her the land reparation that belongs to their core family, however, her parents-in-law refused and only gave them 20,000 yuan. As a result, they had a big fight and her parents-in-law stopped helping them in shop and looking after the children. Although her parents-in-law felt angry with her decision, they finally made the choice to live by themselves. They said, they have changed their mind that a family should live together because they feel tired seeing their daughter-in-law's grey face every day.

After they lose their land, the middle-aged and elderly are largely marginalised from economic production, while the younger generation find it easier to adapt to the labour market. Some grandparents said that raising children is more relaxing than doing

agricultural work; some said it makes them feel more pressure and under greater responsibility. The most common complaint concerning childrearing is about the lack of freedom and the lack of economic independence. As Yixiong Tong, a 50-year-old man explained:

I sometimes work outside, but I can't often do it. I need to take care of my grandsons. I like working outside. It is more free. But now, I can't find a way to do it. I like clipping trees. My son and daughter-in-law work outside of Yingde. They travel to many different places. They enjoy freedom but we (he and his wife) are not free.

The new labour market has pushed young people to prepare themselves to adapt to a new life, and also emancipated them from 'trivial and boring' domestic work. However, grandparents are now commonly imprisoned in the domestic space. In this sense, these senior parents may start to look for another way to arrange their later life, which is what Rendi Xu did when she refurnished a big bedroom on the first floor, and arranged many trips for herself.

8.3 Conclusion

Historian Michael Katz remarked about Louise Tilley and Joan Scott's study of the English and French family of the early years of the industrial revolution,

A close relationship exists between the organization of the family and the mode of production at any given time. Yet [Scott and Tilley] also show that the relationship is very complex. Domestic organization does not change quickly or easily. Families adopt complex strategies which enable them to preserve elements of customary practices in altered circumstances, and the family patterns that emerge represent adaptations, complex compromises between tradition and new organizational and social structures (Katz, 1978: xi, see in Tilley and Scott, 1978: xi).

There are three determinant factors in family formation, namely, state power and policy, the specific local contexts of cultural difference, and economic and political change (Davis and Harrell, 1993: 9). The Maoist period witnessed a rapid shift away from corporate kin groups, elaborate weddings, concubinage, and early marriage, not because the economic and social transformations of the 1950s and 1960s made such changes irresistible to individual men and women, but because the state drafted a law of regulations that required immediate compliance (Davis and Harrell, 1993: 20). In the post-Mao era, economic and political reform also created different family formulations with some consistencies and some inconsistencies. For example, the stem family still retains its economic advantage, but it is unlike the traditional stem family which has a family head to manage all the family properties and family affairs. Rather, the conjugal pairs have more autonomy.

In this chapter I have examined the transformation of family patterns and the cooperation and conflicts commonly experienced by Baikou families through analysing the kitchen and bedroom in the new houses built after 1997. In the case of Baikou, the most conspicuous transformation is the increasing co-residence of the stem family in the New Village, and also the power transfer from the senior to the young in a family. Friedrich Engels claimed, 'only by absorbing families which had undergone a radical change could a social form higher than the family have developed; at the same time, these families were thereby enabled later to constitute themselves afresh under infinitely more favourable circumstances' (Engels, 1878 [2010]). Since the New Cultural Movement, the family has been one of the most important targets for criticism. The Chinese family experienced a dreadful revolution in the last century. However, when the Household Contract Responsibility System was enacted in the 1980s, the family became the fundamental production unit again. In general, the stem family is the dominant form of co-residence in Baikou New Village. The core family became the dominant family structure in China, while, in Baikou, stem family co-residence is still the norm. Yan found that the stem family and aggregated family have an advantage in economic development over the core family before and after the Reform and Opening Up in 1978 (Yan, 1998: 82). In Baikou, the cooperation of the stem family is also the

most efficient strategy in terms of economic production. The senior generation hardly adapts to the new environment of production when they cannot continue agricultural production. But the young generation is more competitive in the new market economy. Therefore, parents become the domestic workers and young couples work outside the family. This labour distribution within a stem family causes the transfer of power from the old to the young, which challenges filial piety and encourages the so-called descending familism in which all the attention focuses on the descendant, as Yunxiang Yan suggested (2016).

Nonetheless, conflicts between the senior and junior conjugal pairs are often seen. In this chapter, the case study of Dingliang Liu's family presents the typical conflicts that develop between the two generations because of their different ideas, values and living habits, along with ambiguous property rights and labour distribution. Although in the economic sense, the stem family is more advantageous, the junior couple tends to be independent from their parents. Unfortunately, the junior couple also relies economically on their parents, especially at the early stage of their marriage. Nevertheless, the parents are not just the victims of the individualisation of the younger generation. When the expectation of filial piety is frustrated, the ways of life of the older generation may be developed in other ways, freeing them from childcare and housework.

Chapter 9 Conclusion

In the thesis, based on twelve-month ethnographical fieldwork in Baikou village in the south of China, various research methods, including participant observation, interview, photo elicitation, archive studies, statistics, and Rokeach Value Survey, were applied to elucidate the process and the effect of the 'Building a New Socialist Countryside' programme, a significant rural development programme with the purpose of creating, '*advanced production, rich life, civilized (local) atmosphere,* organised *and tidy villages, and democratic management'* (as I mentioned in Chapter One). The practice and the effect of this programme has been widely studied from different perspectives, for example, the perspective of geography (Long et al., 2010: 457-470), of cultural heritage protection (Kong-jian, 2006), of agricultural development (Ming, 2006, Zhicheng, 2007), of rural governance (Schubert and Ahlers, 2012: 67-86), of public goods investment (Chen et al., 2006: 002), to name just a few. Nevertheless, the research associated with the programme in the anthropology of China remains less well-defined. Through the material entity – the landscape of the New Village, this research evaluates this programme from the view of anthropology.

In this thesis, I have analysed and compared the transformation of the dwelling space (the village and the house) in Baikou village in south China before and after 1997. I set out to answer two key questions: first, how was the New Village built up, from blueprint to funding, project execution and so forth? Second, how does the New Village 'afford' (in Gibson's sense) local life and how do the local people adapt into the New Village? During the fieldwork I conducted in Baikou New Village, I found that the conflicts and integration between the three dominant concepts – Confucianism, communism and neoliberalisaion – provide the key framework in understanding the two questions. At the same time, this thesis focused on the six main dimensions identified in Chapter Two to explain the social change of rural China, including the anthropology of landscape, the anthropology of the house, the relationship of state and society, the transformation of the social class, the relationship of structure and agency, and the anthropology of temporality.

9.1 Landscape of the New Village

In Chinese anthropological circles, landscape studies have not drawn much attention. This research focuses on a top-down planned model of New Village to examine the ideological conflicts in the construction and consumption of landscape. The new landscape of the New Village is not investigated as a cultural image that represents, structures and symbolises surrounding as Daniels and Cosgrove defined (Daniels and Cosgrove, 1988). On the contrary, in this thesis, the landscape of Baikou New Village has been explained by combining the micro view and macro view of the cultural, historical, economic and political contexts, which contributed to a comprehensive understanding of the research subject.

In general, the landscape of the New Village has been explained by mixed approaches. Hironau Ka-wa (2015) suggested the perspective of 'production' and 'construction' as a useful approach to understanding the new landscape as the product of the etic planning that is the achievement of the top-down policy, and as the emic construction of the living space that shows the local interpretation of the new landscape. The former indicates the practices of ideologies and power in producing space, which are mainly expressed through the imagination of modernity, civilisation and advance in the case of New Village. In the planning and designing of the New Village, this imagination is often expressed by high orderliness, as in straight and wide roads (see Chapter Five), the fitness centre, garden, public toilet (see Chapter Six), Western-style houses (see Chapter Seven and Eight) and so forth. Meanwhile, the perspective of 'construction' emphasises the emic perspective and the local interpretations of the landscape (Bender, 1992, Vitebsky, 1992: 223, Bender and Winer, 2001, Stewart and Strathern, 2005: 35-47), which in the New Village programme is reflected in the village's participation in building the new landscape.

Drawing on Tim Ingold's dwelling perspective on landscape, the new landscape as the product of top-down planning clearly follows the building perspective that he disagreed with. The building perspective neglected the participation of the dweller in shaping their dwelling space, which led to the conflicts between the new dwelling space and the villagers' *habitus* or their particular perception of the dwelling space shaped in the

social activity in recent history. To be specific, in Chapter Five and Six, we discussed the transformation of the perception of direction – how the idea of centre is blurred in the New Village, and how the concept of 'front' connects with the idea of 'best' and 'first'. In terms of site selection, *fengshui,* along with traffic conditions, comprise the key concerns for the villagers in building a New Village. The role of these factors led me to conclude that both the principles of traditional cosmology and the demands of urbanisation and marketization are centrally important to the New Village project. Although the principle of *fengshui* has been practised in site selection, the layout of the village, to some extent, transgressed the principles of *fengshui* that placed emphasis on *cangfeng deshui* (hide from the wind and provide easy access to water). The New Village shows clear orderliness, equality and simplification, has good access and can be captured in a single glance. As Pred claims, place is a process. It is not subject to an universal laws but vary with historical circumstances (Pred, 1984). In general, the inconsistency between the model of the New Village (including Baikou) and the ideal dwelling space the local people described is clear. The former stresses the importance of the awards that Baikou received, 'scientific', 'hygienic', 'cultivated' and so forth, while the latter emphasize the characteristics of traditional *shanshui* painting of a village nestling under mountains and besides rivers. *I Ching* (the Book of Changes) is one of five classic Confucian texts (and also the origin of *fengshui*) which evokes the fundamental Chinese cosmology – that nature and human beings are always in relation and in the process of shaping each other. This cosmology is central to the ideal dwelling space (not the ideal New Village) that people imagined.

9.2 Anthropology of the House

The house has been explored by anthropological approaches from various perspectives. In this thesis, through analysing and comparing the old and new villages, and the old house with the new house, the integration of and conflicts between Confucianism, communism and neoliberalism have been thoroughly interrogated.

To understand the consistency and transformation of the new house, I have drawn on Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* and Levi-Strauss' concept of 'house society' to interpret the new village and the new houses in Baikou New Village. Since the Han

dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.), the Confucian scholar Zhongshu Dong (179 – 104 B.C.) suggested the employment of Confucianism as the official ideology. Since then, the official legitimate status of Confucianism was retained for the most part of Chinese history until the collapse of the Qing empire (1912). With the rise of New Culture Movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, Confucianism started to become the target of heavy criticism. But if so, the key values of Confucianism, including the family-centred social network, ancestor worship, *xiao* (filial piety), patriarchy and so forth, are still widely practised in everyday life. As Bourdieu suggests, the house is the carrier of unconscious *habitus* which reflected the cognitive structure of the inhabitant (Bourdieu, 1970: 151-170, 1990). These Confucian values are also embodied in architecture. For example, the location of kitchen is often behind the main building where is dark and humid, and considered as female space. Then, the ancestral hall is the pre-eminent ritual space and is located centrally (the northernmost of the main building) in the traditional house in this region. For the lineage village, the ancestral hall forms the centre. Kin often live close with each other in a cluster of buildings that share an ancestral hall. The hierarchy of family relations is also inscribed in the layout and in room occupancy. In the new house, however, ritual space is not clearly defined. The new house, characterized mainly by western-style architecture, is quite distinct from the symmetrical and ancestral-hall-centred traditional houses in this region. There is no equivalent space to the ancestral hall in the new house. The perception of direction among local people is confused in the new space; they do not have a clear idea of the centre of the house, nor of the superior or inferior direction of the house (which is always clear in the old houses). Although the New Village has clearly contributed to the formation of different lifestyles, social and family relations, and individual characteristics in contemporary Baikou, some continuities remain in the use of the new space. For example, the ancestor portrait is enshrined in the *keting,* considered as the substitution of the *tang* (hall) in the old house (see Chapter Seven).

According to Inge Daniels, the grand issues such as ideology, religion and politics, can be transformed into the personal, lived experiences in the domestic arena, and the individual and familial concerns can be 'elevated to a communal, national, but also otherworldly level' (Daniels, 2010: 192). The new house (cooperating with the ideology of neoliberalism), to some degree, promotes labour distribution and the consciousness

of privacy in domestic life – as I discussed in Chapter Eight. To be more specific, in terms of room distribution, the intergenerational power transfer was clearly inscribed in the distribution of bedroom when the principle of market permeated everyday life and replaced the principle of Confucianism. The parents gradually lost their authority and power in family life when they lost their economic advantage in the labour market. The descendants, rather than the ancestors, become the focal point of the family, as I discussed in Chapter Eight. According to Confucianism, parenthood is the core relation and all other relations are developed from this (Li, 2008: 73). In contrast, the conjugal relationship has grown into the core relation in contemporary China. The concept of 'family' tends to be limited in 'stem family' or 'core family', especially for the young generation born after 1970s. The transformation of the family structure and family relations are also reflected in the bedroom distribution. The bedroom of the senior conjugal is always inferior to their children. The core family is favoured by many young people because of the different lifestyles and everyday habits between the different generations. However, the stem family is still the dominant family structure in Baikou due to its economic advantage and the strength of local custom. At the same time, pursuing individual competitiveness in the labour market, the young prefer to pay more attention to education and self-development. Nevertheless, the influence of Confucianism prevails in the view that the family represents the ultimate value of the individual who is still understood as being relationally constituted (Ames, 2016). The Confucian person is understood fundamentally as a process – 'person' is what we 'do' with our relations rather than what we 'are.' In this sense, the Confucian person is conceived of as a 'human becoming' rather than a 'human being' (Ames, 2008: 50). In other words, the family relation is the core relation that gives meaning to life. Daniel's research on the Japanese house found two conflicting domestic ideologies coexist in the Japanese family which resulted in domestic tensions – the priority of the patrilineal blood tie which can be considered as the Confucian ideology, and the Western ideals of domesticity that stresses the importance of the bond between the marital couple and values informal personal relationships driven by affection and spontaneous sentiment (Daniel, 2010: 183). While, in the case of Chinese family, this tension may even presented in a sharper way in the everyday life, as I witnessed in Dingliang Liu's family.

Unfortunately, in terms of gender issues, although women's economic significance in a family in Baikou is quite equal with men, their social status still have not been improved simultaneously with their economic contribution. To some extent, women are even exploited further when the patriarchal culture integrates with the principle of the market. As many women complained, they do everything in the family while their husbands have nothing to do (see Chapter Eight). As Dolores Hyden criticised the housing arrangement in America that supposed that 'a woman's place is in the home' and ignored the reality that many woman are employed, so do the new houses in the Chinese New Village, copied from the West, follow the conventions of American housing in the last century. In this sense, we may need to reconsider how to reorganise housing in contemporary China. As Hyden advocated, 'Women must transform the sexual division of domestic labour, the privatized economic basis of domestic work, and the spatial separation of homes and workplaces in the built environment if they are to be equal members of society' (Hyden, 1989: 187).

9.3 State and society

As stated in Chapter Two, the relationship between state and society is a key dimension in any attempt to analyse the social transformation of rural China under the influence of the Building a Socialist New Countryside programme.

First, the state-society relation can be investigated from the perspective of the classic economists who see property ownership as the key factor in determining the relationship of the state and society and the economic growth. Since the 1980s, although China had dramatic economic reform, the rural land ownership right remains collective, the peasant only has the use right. The legal setting of the property ownership is ambiguous. Also, the tax system is another essential factor encouraged the local government largely depends on developing land to promote both economic growth and tax collection. As a result, the social conflicts were increasing along with land development. Correspondingly, the social actors take various social strategies in the game, thus the tension between the state and society was largely intensified in the process of land development in China. Promoting land development and urbanisation are probably the primary impulses in building the New Village in the

case of Baikou (see Chapter Four). To some extent, the three land reforms implemented since New China was established, laid the foundation of the social and economic structure. The collective ownership of land is the legitimate foundation of communist China. Paradoxically, this 'collective ownership' largely urged the emergence of the so-called state-capitalism when land development became the main financial resource of the local government. According to the data provided by Chengxi Residents' Community, more than half of all petitions from villagers to the Residents' Community in recent years are related to the issue of land. The conflicts of land expropriation between the local government and the people predominate throughout the whole country, especially in the coastal region which is economically more developed. To some extent, Xiao's 'institutions and life (or everyday life)' paradigm is useful to explore the complex mechanisms of 'the interplay between formal agents of the state in their institutional practice and people as independent actors in their lives' (Xiao, 2014: 88).

The state-society relation can be also investigated from the perspective of deliberative democracy a concept that derives from Habermas (1985). In Chapter Six, I focused on the organisation of the public space in the New Village. The public space is the hub of community activity, everyday interaction and public gathering. The public space of Baikou New Village is composed by the fitness centre, the garden, the grocer shop, poker spot and Mah-jong table, and the Cultural Centre. These spaces give the possibilities of the community life, and provide the condition for the establishment of civil society. In the old village, people share far more activities in the everyday life in the public space than in the New Village. In the New Village, the most everyday activities be take place in the domestic space. In addition, the shrinkage of public spaces in the New Village in recent years has, to some extent, marked the gradual decline of community life in Baikou. This can be partially attributed to the marketisation of public space – for example, leasing out the Cultural Centre in the centre of the village. It can also be attributed to the fact that the individual has become the main unit participating in the labour market. As Layton claims, mutual aid or cooperation in a community will contribute to the development of civil society (Layton, 2006). Cooperation between members of the community tends to be less important when the means of production is transferred from agriculture to industry and commerce. By contrast, the competition

between households is being strengthened with rapid land expropriation, as land resources are limited and ownership of land is collective. In summary, increasing competition and decreasing cooperation have together resulted in the disharmony of the community, and hindered the development of the civil society. The high gleichschaltung of the state and the society between 1949 and the end of 1970s is obviously reshaped by marketisation since the Reform and Opening Up (Deng, 2008). However, the re-establishment of the civil society is still hanging in doubt.

9.4 Transformation of China's class structure

The increasing social stratification has become a new social problem after the Reform and Opening Up, which is obviously against the ideal of communism that is the foundation of the ruling Chinese Communist Party. Social differentiation in contemporary China is closely associated with corruption and unfair distribution as shown in the case of Baikou (also see Wang, 2008), the tension and conflict between different social classes has thus unavoidably increased in recent years.

In this thesis, I draw on Bourdieu's class theory which takes field and capital as the main concepts in analysing social stratification. In Chapter Five, I discussed how the lineage power (as the main social capital or *guanxi* in the community) is manipulated in the benefit distribution, or more precisely, in the rent-seeking. Thus, the feeling of deprivation of the left-behind is openly expressed in the everyday life. The discussion of the 'first row' clearly shows the conflict between the two interest groups. As Chunguang Wang suggested, the legislation lag of the social strata has led to the non-equilibrium between the social strata (Wang, 2005: 58-77). According to Anagnost, the new stratified society is articulating inequality as a cultural difference in a hierarchy of national belongings (Anagnost, 2008: 497). I have further shown how the idea of class is expressed in everyday life, for example, through the house décor or owning a private car which shows their superior economic status that can be transferred into a sort of social capital (see Chapters Seven and Eight). In the case of Baikou, the increasing social stratification indicates that the marketisation of the society has not established a transparent, just and legitimate foundation which will contribute to a healthy civil society. Rather, the mechanism of the Chinese social stratification presented in the

shadow of rent-seeking and corruption. As Xin Liu asserts, the socialist market economy encouraged the rent-seeking behaviour of the state public power (Liu, 2005). As a result, social conflict is inevitable. In this process, the mechanism of market, the tradition of Confucianism (which refers to the agnation and *guanxi*), and the expectation of communism (which espouses absolute equality), arbitrarily interplay with the social actors to boost their capital in the social competition.

9.5 Structure and agency

The relation between structure and agency expounded and proved by Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1990) provided a significant view to investigate the social development and social change in contemporary China too. In the thesis, I have paid much attention on explaining how the structure-agency relation works in the context of rural development.

First, besides the large amount of land, the reason why Baikou was selected as the model of the New Village, was also because of the personal tie (or *guanxi*) between the village leader and the key government official (see Chapter Two). The ambiguous land ownership to some extent encouraged countless free-riders throughout China. In the case of Baikou, in the land compensation distribution, the people who have more social capital, or are from bigger lineage, often receive more benefit from the land expropriation. Then, in the corresponding conflicts caused by land expropriation, various social strategies (or *da cabianqiu* – playing edge ball) were taken to pursue further benefits, as I have described in Chapter Four. All these conflicts and corresponding strategies evidenced the contradiction between the concept of 'law' and an emergent, processual and changing Chinese philosophy. To be more specific, as Zehou Li claims, Chinese philosophy traditionally emphasizes pragmatic reason which contrasts with Western philosophy, based on the logic of reason (Li, 2008). Similarly, Roger Ames argues that according to the emergent and processual Chinese cosmology, "the Chinese tradition does not privilege some fixed formal aspect – that is, logic as the 'form' of thinking – as being more 'real' than what is otherwise in flux (that is, semantics)" (Ames, 2008: 46). As a result, the 'law' is always played flexibly in different contexts. Land development eventually gave rise to the interplay of the

principles of communism, capitalism and traditional values, resulting in significant tensions between the state, local government, village agents or grassroots elites and the villagers. Moreover, as the individual was freed from the social solidarities with the centralisation of the state, as De Tocqueville found in France, the individual achieved more space to express demand of equality (De Tocqueville, 1955: 96, see King, 2004：20-22). In the context of China, this 'liberation of the individual' unfortunately have not contributed to establish a just and equal society, but resulted more free-riders when the ideology of individualism companied with the ideology of neoliberalism and Confucianism.

In terms of the new dwelling space, the villagers show their agency in appropriating and adapting the new material entity. They build their kitchen behind the main building but use the kitchen in their house for storage or as a bedroom (see Chapter Eight). They plant vegetables in the flower bed in front of the house rather than using it purely for aesthetic purposes (see Chapter Six). Some families arrange the domestic space according to the *fengshui* principle though the structure of the house cannot be dramatically changed to conform to the *fengshui* principle (see Chapter Seven). All these behaviours express in various ways the interplay of structure and agency. In this sense, the importation of Western-style material culture into the context of China, obviously created, in dynamic fashion, a similar but different quality and character, rather than a completely passive imitation.

9.6 Temporality

Finally, temporality is another helpful dimension to evaluate the social change in China. As stated in Chapter Two, the path of modernization of China since the early twentieth century is characterized by the unilinear evolutionary time progressive Time that developed in Western culture as Fabian suggested (Fabian, 1983). Thus, since the New Culture Revolution, China strives to be more modern, advanced, civilised and progressive. The imagination of the 'New Village' is also a response to this concept of time. To be 'New', means to be modern, to be advanced, to be civilized and progressive. Therefore, the old village is completely razed to be ground, and the firewood that is considered as the symbol of past or backward, should be hidden from

the public view (Chapter Six). In this sense, Marx's concept of progression through stages of society largely shaped the routine of development in China.

Moreover, temporality is an important dimension to evaluate the power of 'past', or the power of 'memory' in the planning project. Although the planning time is inherently modern due to the notions of progress that are inherent in plans (Abram, 2014: 129-147), the past plays significant role in establishing the self-identity and searching for the subjectivity (see Zonabend, 1984). Munn regarded human temporality as a symbolic process that is continually being produced in everyday practices (Munn, 1992). In their everyday life, through substantialising the 'past' or the 'history' in the residential space, people anchor themselves in the space and the time. In this sense, the revival of the traditions that was suppressed in the Cultural Revolution, for example, ancestor worship and local deity worship, shows the meaning of the 'past' in creating the 'future'.

In addition, the unbelievable fast speed in building a New Village (in fact, in most of the planning projects in China), shows the insufficient or the absence of the democractic process in the planning activity. In this light, it also indicates the monetisation of time and the neoliberalisation of the state.

9.7 Coda

Cultures and ideologies have continued to collide, compete and sometimes combine throughout human history. In the current era of globalisation, this tendency of worldviews to compete and sometimes combine is omnidirectional in everyday life, and is played out in the construction of dwelling space, the pattern of production and consumption, in social and family relations and in the perception of space. Samuel Huntington claimed, 'the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural' (Huntington, 1993: 22). In essence, the conflicts occurring in the New Village programme are reflection of the conflicts between traditional culture and western culture, or traditional culture and modern culture, if the division is not over-simplified. Giddens said that in traditional cultures,

the past is honoured and symbols are valued because they contain and perpetuate the experience of generations. Tradition is a mode of integrating the reflexive monitoring of action with the time-space organisation of the community (Giddens, 1990: 37). By integrating and synthesizing with the 'modern' elements, 'the traditional' exhibits its vitality in some areas but inevitably fades away in some others in the making and transformation of the New Village.

Hui Wang pointed out that, unlike Marxism which specifically identifies modernisation with the capitalist mode of production, Chinese modernisation refers primarily to the transition from the backward to the advanced in terms of politics, economics, technology and the military. This concept of modernisation is not only applied in scope of improvements in technology, the establishment of the nation-state and modern bureaucracy, but also creates a teleological historical view and world view (Wang, 1997: 133-150). By explaining how the New Village is constructed, both in the material and social sense, used and adjusted according to the specific situation, in essence, this thesis reveals the process of modernisation in rural China. In this process, the principles of Confucianism, communism and neoliberalism mutually contribute to the new life of the New Village.

This research systematically interpreted the logic and the effect of producing a Chinese New Village, which is intended to contribute to shape a holistic understanding of the New Village programme and the rural development in China. The thesis has revealed how forbiddened 'traditions' were revived in the new era after the Cultural Revolution, and it also shows that 'traditions' are desired in society as an irresistible part of modernization. In this sense, the core progression we are facing in Chinese social science development is the integration of the culture that is rooted in people's consciousness and unconsciousness with the exotic cultures that we have no choice but to adopt in this globalising world, for example, the compatibility of the concept of 'intersubjectivity' and the concept of 'a relationally constituted person'. All in all, in dealing with subjectivity and agency, in Chinese anthropologist Hairong Yan's words, we must pay attention to the way the power of discourse incites and disciplines at the

same time, works its way through subjectivity and agency, and contains its own constitutive limits and contradictions. Subjectivity and agency are conditioned by their material and discursive predictions. Analyzing predications of the subaltern subject and her overdetermined inability to cohere is where we can begin our critical representation (Yan, 2006: 254).

People said that after just two years of receiving large land reparations, gambling, prostitution and squandering were 'everywhere' in Baikou. However, after these two years, such things declined and life gradually recovered from the chaos. The unexpected shocking meeting of old culture with new one will inevitably cause confusion for some time, but people seem to finally find a way to make life easier and more comprehensible, if not necessarily better. In the process, the shape and degree of tension between structure and agency are continually changing. It is to the causes and effects of these dynamic processes which I have directed my attention in this thesis.

Appendices

Rokeach Value Survey

On the following pages are two lists of values; 18 terminal values and 18 instrumental values. Terminal values are "end result" values describing what you want to get out of life. Instrumental values are the ways you seek to accomplish your terminal values. Terminal values are marked with (T); Instrumental values are marked (I).

Your task is to put each value in a priority order - #1 matters most, #18 matters least – for **how each value matters to you:** how much of a "guiding principle" is each value in your life? Don't worry about how you believe you **should** prioritize the list, or how others might prioritize it for themselves, or how they might prioritize it for you. Prioritize the lists according to the way things are for you.

Print the Terminal and Instrumental Values on separate pieces of paper that you can cut into individual blocks. Start with the Terminal Value blocks. "What is it you want most out of life?" Arrange the blocks according to what matters most to you. When you're finished arranging your Terminal Values, copy the results onto the Terminal Values blank sheet (page 4). Ignore the "why this matters to me" column for the moment.

Do the same thing with the Instrumental Values blocks. "What is most important to you about the way you go about achieving your Terminal values?" Again, arrange the blocks according to what matters most to you. After you've finished prioritizing your Instrumental Values, transcribe them onto the Instrumental Values blank form (page 5).

The final step of identifying your Terminal and Instrumental Values is to write a short sentence about the meaning of each value. For example, if "National Security" is one of your higher values, you might understand it (and yourself!) better by identifying **why** it is a priority for you.

There are a couple of ways you can do this exercise: You can arrange the values in a "first thought that comes to mind" manner. Some people believe that this way most closely reflects how you see yourself. The other way is to spend some time on the project, thinking carefully about your choices. Other people believe that a carefully thought-out response more accurately reflects your view of yourself. Either way, your goal is to identify how you see yourself.

Nothing is set in stone: at any time, you should go back and change the ranked order of either list if you have any new thoughts about your answers.

When you've finished ranking both sets of values, you should have a fairly accurate picture of how you really feel about what's important in your life.

Why is this important? There are several reasons. First, people tend to try to accomplish similar results using similar means in a variety of situations in their lives and relationships. Sometimes its helpful to step back and see oneself through new eyes. Second, not everyone sees things the same way as another person does. Conflicts can arise when people hold different values and means of accomplishing their values. Understanding (and more importantly, **accepting!**) this may help you work more effectively with others who have very different Terminal and Instrumental values.

Have fun!

A Comfortable Life a prosperous life (T)	Social Recognition respect and admiration (T)
Equality brotherhood and equal opportunity for all (T)	True Friendship close companionship (T)
An Exciting Life a stimulating, active life (T)	Wisdom a mature understanding of life (T)
Family Security taking care of loved ones (T)	A World at Peace a world free of war and conflict (T)
Freedom independence and free choice (T)	A World of Beauty beauty of nature and the arts (T)
Health physical and mental well- being (T)	Pleasure an enjoyable, leisurely life (T)
Inner Harmony freedom from inner conflict (T)	Salvation saved; eternal life (T)
Mature Love sexual and spiritual intimacy (T)	Self-Respect self-esteem (T)
National Security protection from attack (T)	A Sense of Accomplishment a lasting contribution (T)

Page 2

Ambitious	Independent
hardworking and aspiring (I)	self-reliant; self-sufficient (I)
Broad-minded	**Intellectual**
open-minded (I)	intelligent and reflective (I)
Capable	**Logical**
competent, effective (I)	consistent; rational (I)
Clean	**Loving**
neat and tidy (I)	affectionate and tender (I)
Courageous	**Loyal**
standing up for your beliefs (I)	faithful to friends or the group (I)
Forgiving	**Obedient**
willing to pardon others (I)	dutiful; respectful (I)
Helpful	**Polite**
working for the welfare of others (I)	courteous and well-mannered (I)
Honest	**Responsible**
sincere and truthful (I)	dependable and reliable (I)
Imaginative	**Self-controlled**
daring and creative (I)	restrained; self-disciplined (I)

Terminal Values	Why this matters to me
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	

Instrumental Values	Why this matters to me
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	

So what?

What difference does this exercise make?

Now that you know these things about yourself, what changes should you consider making in key areas of your life?

What does this say about your employment?

What does this say about your hobbies or recreational activities?

What does this say about your relationships within your family? Your marriage, children (etc)?

If you are currently experiencing conflict with someone, what role might differing values play in the conflict? How might you respond to this? Are there ways you can respect the other person's values while maintaining your own?

What additional insights has this exercise brought to your mind?

Bibiliography

ABRAM, S. 2014. The time it takes: temporalities of planning. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute,* 20, 129-147.

ABRAM, S. & WESZKALNYS, G. 2011. Introduction: Anthropologies of planning— Temporality, imagination, and ethnography. *Focaal,* 2011, 3-18.

ALEXANDER, J. 1987. *Twenty Lectures,* New York, Columbia University Press.

ALTHUSSER, L. 2006. Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation). *The anthropology of the state: A reader,* 9, 86-98.

AMES, R. T. 2008. What Ever Happened to" Wisdom"? Confucian Philosophy of Process and" Human Becomings". *Asia Major*, 45-68.

AMES, R. T. 2011. *Confucian role ethics: A vocabulary*, Hongkong, Chinese University Press.

AMES, R. T. 2016. *Getting Past Transcendence: Determinacy, Indeterminacy, and Emergence in Chinese Natural Cosmology*, New York, Springer International Publishing.

ANAGNOST, A. 2008. From 'Class' to 'Social Strata': grasping the social totality in reform-era China. *Third World Quarterly,* 29, 497-519.

ANDERSON, B. 2000. *Doing the dirty work?: The global politics of domestic labour*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

ATTFIELD, J. (ed.) 1999. *Bringing modernity home,* New York: Syracuse University Press.

AUG , M. 1992. *Non-Places: An Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*, London: Verso Books.

ASA (Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and the Commonwealth). 2011. Ethical Guidelines for Good Research Practice, http://www.theasa.org/downloads/ASA%20ethics%20guidelines%202011.pdf <retrieved: 2 March 2017>

BANERJEE, T. 2001. The future of public space: beyond invented streets and reinvented places. *Journal of the American Planning Association,* 67, 9-24.

BECKER, G. S. 1981. *A Treatise on the Family,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

BELL, D. A. 2010. *China's new Confucianism: Politics and everyday life in a changing society*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

BELLAH, R. (ed.) 1985. *Individualism and commitment in American life,* Berkeley: University of California Press.

BENDER, B. 1992. Theorising Landscapes, and the Prehistoric Landscapes of Stonehenge. *Man,* 17.

BENDER, B. 1993. *Landscapes: politics and perspectives*. Oxford: Berg.

BENDER, B. & WINER, M. 2001. *Contested landscapes,* Oxford and New York, Berg.

BENNETT, S. J. 1978. Patterns of the sky and earth: a Chinese science of applied cosmology. *Chinese science,* 3, 1-26.

BERGER, B. 1981. The survival of a counterculture. *Ideological work and everyday life among rural communard.*

BERNARD, H. R. 2017. *Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative approaches*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield.

BERNSTEIN, T. P. & L , X. 2003. *Taxation without representation in contemporary rural China*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

BIAN, Y. 2002. Chinese social stratification and social mobility. *Annual review of sociology,* 28, 91-116.

BILLINGSLEY, P. 1988. *Bandits in Republican China*, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press.

BLACK, C. E., DUPREE, L., ENDICOTT-WEST, E. & NABY, E. 1994. *The modernization of inner Asia*, New York, ME Sharpe.

BLOMGREN, A.-M. 1997. Nyliberal Politisk Filosofi En Kritisk Analys Av Milton Friedman, Robert Nozick Och FA Hayek.

BLUMER, H. 1986. *Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method,* California, University of California Press.

BOAS, T. C. & GANS-MORSE, J. 2009. Neoliberalism: From new liberal philosophy to anti-liberal slogan. *Studies in Comparative International Development,* 44, 137-161.

BOERMEL, A. 2006. "No Wasting" and "Empty Nesters": "Old Age" in Beijing. *Oxford Development Studies,* 34, 401-418.

BOURDIEU, P. 1970. The Berber house or the world reversed. *Information (International Social Science Council),* 9, 151-170.

BOURDIEU, P. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

BOURDIEU, P. 1990. *The logic of practice,* Palo Alto, Stanford University Press.

BOURDIEU, P. 1998. *The state nobility: Elite schools in the field of power*, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press.

BOYM, S. 2008. *The future of nostalgia*, New York, Basic books.

BRAMALL, C. 2008. *Chinese economic development*, London, Routledge.

BRAY, F. 1997. *Technology and gender: Fabrics of power in late imperial China,* California, University of California Press.

BROWNELL, S. 2000. Gender and nationalism in China at the turn of the millennium. *China briefing*, 195-232.

BRUUN, O. 2003. *Fengshui in China,* Copenhagen, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies.

BUCHLI, V. 1997. Khrushchev, modernism, and the fight against petit-bourgeois consciousness in the Soviet home. *Journal of Design History,* 10, 161-176.

BYERS, P. 1964. Still photography in the systematic recording and analysis of behavioral data. *Human Organization,* 23, 78-84.

CALDAROLA, V. J. 1985. Visual contexts: A photographic research method in anthropology. *Studies in Visual Communication,* 11, 33-53.

CARSTEN, J. & HUGH-JONES, S. 1995. *About the house: Lévi-Strauss and beyond*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

CHANG, J. 2001. Of the Establishment of the System of Offering Sacrifices to Ancestors and the Building of Ancestral Hall in the Ming Dynasty and Their Evolution. *Nankai Journal (Philosophy, Literature and Social Science edition)* 421-422.

CHEN, A. 2015. *The transformation of governance in rural China: market, finance, and political authrity,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

CHEN, J. 2004. Xieshang minzhu yinlun. *Marxism & Reality*, 26-34.

CHEN, J., WU, J. & ZHOU, L. 2006. Investing in Public Goods in the Building New Countryside in Beijing: An Analysis of Demand [J]. *Issues in Agricultural Economy,* 7, 002.

CHENG, Q. & ZHUANG, X. 1995. *Shijie chaye 100 nian,* Shanghai, Shanghai Scientific and Technical Publisher.

CHEUNG, C.-P. 2012. The Paradox of China's Urban-Rural Integration: The Hukou System, Rural Policy, And Rural Land Development. *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development,* 41, 293-328.

CIERAAD, I. 2006. *At home: an anthropology of domestic space*, New York, Syracuse University Press.

COASE, R. & WANG, N. 1988. *How China became capitalist,* New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

COHEN, A. 1985. *The symbolic construction of community*. London, Tavistock Publication.

COHEN, M. L. 1992. Family Management and Family Division in Contemporary Rural China. *China Quarterly,* 130, 357-377.

COLLIER, J. & COLLIER, M. 1986. *Visual anthropology: Photography as a research method*, Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.

COMMITTEE, C. 1979. *In:* COMMITTEE, C. (ed.) *Cihai Dictionary.* Shanghai, Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House.

CROOK, D. & CROOK, I. 2006. *Revolution in a Chinese Village: Ten Mile Inn*, London, Routledge.

CUA, A. S. 2013. *Encyclopedia of Chinese philosophy*, London, Routledge.

DANIELS, I. 2010. *The Japanese House*, Berg Publishers.

DANIELS, S. & COSGROVE, D. 1988. *The iconography of landscape*, Cambridge University Press Cambridge.

DAY, A. 2008. The end of the peasant? New rural reconstruction in China. *Boundary 2,* 35, 49-73.

DENG, Z. 2008. *Guojia yu shehui: zhongguo shimin shehui yanjiu,* Beijing, Peking University Press.

DENIS, C. & STEPHEN, D. 1988. *The Iconography of landscape : essays on the symbolic representation, design, and use of past environments*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

DEPELTEAU, F. 2008. Relational thinking: A critique of co-deterministic theories of structure and agency. *Sociological theory,* 26, 51-73.

DE TOCQUEVILLE, A. 1998 [1955]. *The Old Regime and the Revolution, Volume II: Notes on the French Revolution and Napoleon,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

DOUGLAS, J. D. 1970. *Understanding Everyday Life,* Chicago, Aldine.

DOUGLAS, M. 1993. Purity and Danger. *Purity and Danger*.

DUN, L. 1906. *Yanjing suishi ji,* Beiping, Henri Vetch.

DUNCAN, J. & DUNCAN, N. 1988. (Re) reading the landscape. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 6, 117-126.

EDKINS, J. 1872. Feng-shui, Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal. *Foochow, March*, 294.

ELIADE, M. 1959. *The sacred and the profane: The nature of religion*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

ELSTER, J. 1989. *Nuts and bolts for the social sciences*, Cambridge University Press.

ENGELS, F. 2010. *The origin of the family, private property and the state*, London, Penguin Books.

EVANS, P. 1996. Introduction: Development strategies across the public-private divide. *World development,* 24, 1-10.

FABIAN, J. 1983. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object,* New York, Columbia University Press.

FAIRBANK, J. K. & REISCHAUER, E. O. 1989. *China: tradition & transformation*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin College Division.

FAIRBANK, J. K. 1998. *The Cambirdge History of Republic China: Republican China, 1912-1949,* Beijing, China Social Sciences Press.

FAIRBANK, J. K. & GOLDMAN, M. 2006. *China: A new history*, Harverd, Harvard University Press.

FAURE, D. 2003. Citang yu jiamiao: cong songmo dao ming zhongye zongzu liyi de yanbian. *Journal of History and Anthropology,* 1, 1-20.

FAURE, D. 2007. *Emperor and ancestor: State and lineage in South China*, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press.

FEI, H.-T. 1947 [2013]. *Peasant life in China*, Read Books Ltd.

FEI, X. 1983. *congshi shehuixue wushinian,* Tianjin, Tianjing People's Publishing House.

FEI, X. 1999. *Fei Xiaotong wenji,* Shanghai, Qunyan Press.

FEUCHTWANG, S. D. R. 1974. *An anthropological analysis of Chinese geomancy,* Vientiane, Acheve d'imprimer sur les presses de l'Imprimerie Nationale Lao.

FEUCHTWANG, S. 2004. *Making place: State projects, globalisation and local responses in China*, Hove, Psychology Press.

FIRTH, R. 2013. *We the Tikopia: A sociological study of kinship in primitive Polynesia*, London, Routledge.

FORSEY, M. 2010. Ethnography as participant listening. *Ethnography,* 11, 558-572.

FOUCAULT, M. & MISKOWIEC, J. 1986. Of other spaces. *diacritics,* 16, 22-27.

GAMBLE, S. D. 1954. *Ting Hsien: A North China Rural Community*, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press.

GAN, Y. 2007. *Tong santong (wenhua: zhongguo yu shijie xinlun 01),* Beijing, Joint Publishing.

GAN, Y. 2014. *Tong santong,* Beijing, Joint Publishing.

GANS, H. J. 1999. Participant observation in the era of "ethnography". *Journal of contemporary ethnography,* 28, 540-548.

GANTI, T. 2014. Neoliberalism. *Annual Review of Anthropology,* 43, 89-104.

GARFINKEL, H. 1967. *Studies in ethnomethodology,* Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.

GEERTZ, C. 1977. *The Interpretation of Cultures Slected Essays,* New York, Basic Books

GELLNER, E. 1994. *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals,* Harmondsworth, Penguin.

GIBSON, J. J. 1950. *The perception of the visual world,* Cambridge, The Riverside Press.
GLDDENS, A. 1984. *The constitution of society*. Cambridge, Polity.

GIDDENS, A. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity,* Cambridge, Polity.

GIDDENS, A. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity: self and society in the late modern age*. Cambridge, Polity.

GIDDENS, A. & DALLMAYR, F. R. 1982. *Profiles and critiques in social theory*, University of California Press.

GOBEL, C. 2010. *The politics of rural reform in China: state policy and village predicament in the early 2000s,* London, Routledge.

GOSDEN, C. 1994. *Social being and time,* Oxford, Blackwell.

GOW, P. 1995. Land, people, and paper in western Amazonia. *The anthropology of Landscape Perspectives on Place & Space*.

GREEN, N. 1995. Looking at the landscape: class formation and the visual. *Hirsch and Hanlon*.

GUI, H. & TAO, Z. 2011. 'Land rights' dispute: six types of farmers' land appealing to higher authorities. *Journal of Najing Agricultural University (Social Science Edition),* 11, 104-110.

GULLESTAD, M. 1992. *The art of social relations: essays on culture, social action and everyday life in modern Norway*, A Scandinavian University Press Publication.

GUO, X. 2001. Land expropriation and rural conflicts in China. *The China Quarterly,* 166, 422-439.

GUSFIELD, J. R. 1984. *The culture of public problems: Drinking-driving and the symbolic order*, University of Chicago Press.

GUSTAFSSON, B. & SHI, L. 2002. Income inequality within and across counties in rural China 1988 and 1995. *Journal of Development Economics,* 69, 179-204.

HABERMAS, J. 1964. The public sphere: An encyclopedia article.(Lennox, F. & Lennox, S., trans.). *New German Critique*.

HABERMAS, J. 1985. *The theory of communicative action*, Boston, Beacon press.

HABERMAS, J. 1989. *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society,* Cambridge, MIT press.

HALL, D. L. & AMES, R. T. 1998. Qi. Available: https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/qi/v-1.

HALLE, D. 1996. *Inside culture: Art and class in the American home*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

HAMMERSLEY, M. & ATKINSON, P. 1995. *Ethnography: Practices and principles*. New York, Routledge.

HAN, G. 2011. Huanyuan Hua Guofeng: guanyu Hua Guofeng de ruogan shishi zhenxiang. *Yanhuang Chunqiu,* 2.

HARDING, H. 1981. *Organizing China: the problem of bureaucracy, 1949-1976*, Stanford University Press.

HARPER, D. 2002. Talking about pictures: A case for photo elicitation. *Visual studies,* 17, 13-26.

HARRISON, J. P. 1969. *Modern Chinese Nationalism*, New York, University of New York.

HARRISON, S. S. 1980. Correction: The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy. *Third World Quarterly,* 2, 134-134.

HARVEY, D. 1990. *The condition of postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of social change,* Oxford, Blackwell.

HARVEY, D. 2007. *A brief history of neoliberalism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

HAYDEN, D. 1980. What would a non-sexist city be like? speculations on housing, urban design, and human work. *Signs Journal of Women in Culture & Society, 5*(S3), S170-S187.
HAYS, S. 1994. Structure and agency and the sticky problem of culture. *Sociological theory*, 57-72.

HE, B. 2012. Xieshang minzhu he xieshang zhili: jiangou yige lixing qie chengshu de gongmin shehui. *Open Times*, 23-36.

HE, B. 2014. Deliberative Culture and Politics: The Persistence of Authoritarian Deliberation in China. *Political Theory,* 42, 58-81.

HE, B. & WANG, C. 2007. Deliberative Democracy in Rural China :A case study. *Sociological Studies,* 3, 56-73.

HE, X. 2010. *Diquan de luoji: zhongguo nongcun tudi zhidu xiang hechu qu,* Beijing, China University of Political Science and Law Press.

HE, X. 2011. Lun furen zhicun -- yi zhejiang fenghua diaocha wei taolun jichu. *Social Science Research,* 2011, 111-119.

HE, Y. 1994. *Wanqing shishen yu jindai shehui bianqian: jianyu riben shizu bijiao,* Guangzhou, Guangdong People's Publishing House.

HE, Z. & YU, K. 1998. *Shehui zhuyi yu gongmin shehui* Beijing, Central Compilation&Translation Press.

HEIDEGGER, M. 1971. Building dwelling thinking: poetry, language, thought. Translated from the German by Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper Colophon Books.

HEIDENHEIMER, A. J. & JOHNSTON, M. 1989. *Political corruption : a handbook*, Transaction Publishers.

HEILMANN, S. 2008. Policy Experimentation in China's Economic Rise. *Studies in Comparative International Development,* 43, 1-26.

HERZFELD, M. 1997. Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-state. *Journal of Anthropological Research*.

HINTON, W. 1966. *Fanshen: A documentary of revolution in a Chinese village*, University of California Press.

HINTON, W. 1980. *Fanshen: zhongguo yige cunzhuang de geming jishi,* Beijing, Beijing Publishing House.

HIRSCH, E. & O'HANLON, M. 1995. *The anthropology of landscape: perspectives on place and space,* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

HO, P. 2001. Who owns China's land? Policies, property rights and deliberate institutional ambiguity. *The China Quarterly,* 166, 394-421.

HOBSBAWM & E., J. 1983. *The Invention of tradition*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

HOLSTEIN, J. A. & GUBRIUM, J. F. 1995. *The active interview,* London, Sage.

HOOGVELT, A. M. M. 1982. *Theories of Social Evolution and Development: The Marxist Tradition*, Macmillan Education UK.

HUANG, P. C. 1986. *The peasant economy and social change in North China* Beijing, Beijing, China Publishing House.

HUANG, P. C. 1993. " Public Sphere"/" Civil Society" in China? The Third Realm between State and Society. *Modern China,* 19, 216-240.

HUANG, P. C. C. 2011. The Modern Chinese Family: Perspectives from Economic and Legal History. *Open Times*, 82-105.

HUANG, R. 1982. shilun yangwupai qiye de xingzhi he zuoyong. *In:* LIANG, F. (ed.) *zhongguo shehui jingji shilun,* Taiyuan: Shanxi People's Publishing House.

HUANG, S. 1999. *Guangdong zuqun yu quyu wenhua yanjiu,* Guangzhou, Guangdong Higher Education Press.

HUANG, Z. & WANG, H. 2002. Land expropriation for a non-public purpose and compensation for its development right. *Economic Research Journal*, 66-71.

HUNTINGTON, S. P. 1993. The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, 22-49.

HWANG, K.-K. 1987. Face and favor: The Chinese power game. *American journal of Sociology*, 944-974.

INGOLD, T. 1993. The temporality of the landscape. *World archaeology,* 25, 152-174.

INGOLD, T. 2000. *The perception of the environment: essays on livelihood, dwelling and skill*, Psychology Press.

INGOLD, T. 2007. Materials against Materiality. *Archaeological Dialogues,* 14, 1-16.

JANN, W. & WEGRICH, K. 2007. Theories of the policy cycle. *Handbook of public policy analysis: Theory, politics and methods*, 43-62.

JI, X. 1996. "Tianren heyi" xinjie. *China Qigong Science*, 11-18.

JI, Y. (ed.) 1986. *Wuli tongkao,* Taipei: The Commercial Press.

JIN, G. & LIU, Q. 1993. *The transformation of Chinese society (1840-1956): the fate of its ultrastable structure in modern times,* Hongkong, The Chinese University Press

JIN, G. & LIU, Q. 2011. zai kexue, minzhu, baihuawen yundong beihou. *Digest,* 9, 14-15.

JOHNSON, P. 1983. *Modern times: the world from the twenties to the eighties*, New York, Harper & Row.

KA-WA, H. 2015. Trends and scope of landscape anthropology. *Journal of Guangxi University for Nationalities (Philosophy and Social Science Edition),* 4, 44-59.

KANBUR, R. & ZHANG, X. 1998. Which Regional Inequality? The Evolution of Rural–Urban and Inland–Coastal Inequality in China from 1983 to 1995. *Journal of Comparative Economics,* 27, 686-701.

KANG, L. 2009. *The change of feedback model: study on intergenerational relationship in urban area from the perspective of generational gap.* Shanghai, Shanghai University.

KHAN, A. R. & RISKIN, C. 1998. Income and Inequality in China: Composition, Distribution and Growth of Household Income, 1988 to 1995. *China Quarterly,* 154, 221-253.

KING, A. Y.-C. 1991. Kuan-hsi and network building: A sociological interpretation. *Daedalus*, 63-84.

KIPNIS, A. B. 1997. *Producing guanxi: Sentiment, self, and subculture in a north China village*, Durham, Duke University Press.

KIPNIS, A. B. 2008. Audit Cultures: Neoliberal Governmentality, Socialist Legacy, or Technologies of Governing? *American Ethnologist,* 35, 275–289.

KNAPP, R. G. 1999. *China's living houses: folk beliefs, symbols, and household ornamentation*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press.

KONG-JIAN, Y. 2006. Three Proposals for Preventing the Potential Damage by Building the New Countryside and Protecting the Local Cultural Landscape and the Industrial Heritage [J]. *Chinese Landscape Architecture,* 8.

KOSELLECK, R. & PRESNER, T. S. 2002. *The practice of conceptual history: Timing history, spacing concepts*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

KRAM, M., BEDFORD, C., DURNIN, M., LUO, Y., ROKPELNIS, K., ROTH, B., SMITH, N., WANG, Y., YU, G. & YU, Q. 2012. Protecting China's biodiversity: A guide to land use, land tenure, and land protection tools. *Beijing: The Nature Conservancy*.

LASH, S. & URRY, J. 1994. *Economies of signs and space,* London, Sage.

LAYTON, R. 2000. *Anthropology and history in Franche-Comté: a critique of social theory*, Oxford, University Press Oxford.

LAYTON, R. 2006. Order and Anarchy. *Civil society, social disorder and war*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

LEVI-STRAUSS, C. 1987. *Anthropology and myth: Lectures 1951-1982,* Oxford, Blackwell.

LI, H. 2007. *Study on Land Conflict in the Process of Expropriation.* Wuhan, Huazhong University of Science and Technology.

LI, H. C., ZHOU, Z. P. & XU, S. J. (eds.) 1988. *Urban Land Economics*, Science Promotion Press.

LI, J. 1986. *Dingxian shehui gaikuang diaocha,* Beijing, China Renmin University Press.

LI, J. 2006. The peasant mentality during Land Reform: centered on rural north China, 1937-1945. *Modern Chinese History Studies,* 4, 76-94.

LI, J. 2011. Jiaowan buke guozheng: cong jizhong Dingxian kan jindai huabei pingyuan zudian guanxi de fuza benxiang. *Modern Chinese History Studies*, 124-135.

LI, L. & O'BRIEN, K. J. 2008. Protest leadership in rural China. *China Quarterly,* 193, 1-23.

LI, P. 2002. Introduction to special issue Social Stratification in China since Reform. *Social Sciences in China Today,* Spring.

LI, Q. 1998. "Tianren heyi" yu zhongguo zhexue de jiben wenti. *Social Scientis* 21-26.

LI, Z. 2008. *Essays on Chinese traditional thoughts*, Beijing, Joint publishing

LIANG, S. 1963. *Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi,* Hongkong, Jicheng Book Company.

LIANG, S. 2006. *Zhege shijie hui hao ma: Liang Shuming wannian koushu,* Shanghai, Oriental Publishing Centre.

LIN, C. 2009. *Beijing nvshen caozhu niangniang,* Guangzhou, Guangdong People's Publishing House.

LIN, G. & HO, S. P. 2005. The state, land system, and land development processes in contemporary China. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 95, 411-436.

LIU, P. 1995. *Fengshui -- zhongguoren de huanjing guan,* Shanghai, SDX Joint Publishing.

LIU, X. 2000. *In one's own shadow: An ethnographic account of the condition of post-reform rural China*, Berkeley, University of California Press.

LIU, X. 2005. Understanding the mechanism of social stratification in contemporary China. *Sociological Studies*, 1-25.

LIU, Y. & YANG, M. 2003. Zhongguo nongmin jiti suoyou tudi fazhanquan de yayi yu kangzheng. *Chinese Rural Economy*, 16-24.

LOGAN, J. R. & BIAN, F. 1999. Family values and coresidence with married children in urban China. *Social Forces,* 77, 1253-1282.

LONG, H., LIU, Y., LI, X. & CHEN, Y. 2010. Building new countryside in China: A geographical perspective. *Land Use Policy,* 27, 457-470.

LU, X. 2002. *dangdai zhongguo shehui jieceng yanjiu baogao*, Social Sciences Academic Press (CHINA).

LU, X. 2002. Dangdai zhongguo shehui shida jieceng fenxi. *Study and Practice,* 3, 55-63.

MA, L. J. & WU, F. 2004. *Restructuring the Chinese city: Changing society, economy and space*, Routledge.

MAO, Z. 1969. *How to Differentiate the Classes in the Rural Areas:(October 1933)*, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press.

MARX, K. 1972. *Marx and Engles selected works (Volume 2),* Beijing, People's Publishing House.

MARX, K. [1852]1963. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,* New York, International Publishers.

MASAAKI, C. 1982. Chugoku bukkyo shakaishi kenkyu. *Studies in the social history of Chinese Buddhism). Kyoto: Tohosha*, 1-2.

MAUSS, M. 2013. *Seasonal variations of the Eskimo: a study in social morphology*, Routledge.

MCGRANAHAN, G. & TACOLI, C. 2006. Rural–urban migration, urban poverty and urban environmental pressures in China. *Contribution to the China Council Task Force on Sustainable Urbanisation Strategies, International Institute for Environment and Development, London*.

MEHAN, H. & WOOD, H. 1975. The morality of ethnomethodology. *Theory and Society,* 2, 509-530.

MIGDAL, J. 2001. State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Constitute and Transform One Another. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MILLER, D. 2001. *Home possessions*, Berg Publishers.

MING, Z. 2006. Promoting the innovation of agricultural engineering science and technology, building new socialist countryside of China [J]. *Transactions of the Chinese Society of Agricultural Engineering,* 6.

MORGAN, L. H. 1881. *Houses and house-life of the American aborigines*, US Government Printing Office.

MORGAN, L. H. 1964 [1873]. *Ancient society*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

MUNN, N. D. 1992. The Cultural Anthropology of Time: A Critical Essay. *Annual Review of Anthropology,* 21, 93-123.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF CHINA, 2006a. *National Bureau Statistics of China*

[Online]. Available: http://data.stats.gov.cn/index.htm [Accessed 2017].

NONINI, D. 2008. Is China Becoming Neoliberal? *Critique of Anthropology,* 28, 145-176.

NORTH, D. C. 1981. *Structure and change in economic history*, Norton.

NORTH, D. C. & THOMAS, R. P. 1973. *The rise of the western world: A new economic history*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

O'BRIEN, K. J. & LI, L. 1999. Selective policy implementation in rural China. *Comparative Politics*, 167-186.

O'SULLIVAN, A. 2001. Crannogs: places of resistance in the contested landscapes of early modern Ireland. *Contested Landscapes: movement, exile and place*, 87-101.

OI, J. C. 1992. Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China. *World Politics,* 45, 99-126.

OLIVER, P. 1987. *Dwellings: the house across the world*, Austin, University of Texas Press.

PADUA, M. G. 2014. New cultures and changing urban cultures. *New Cultural Landscapes*, 205.

PARISH, W. L. (ed.) 1984. *Chinese rural development: the great transformation,* New York, Sharpe.

PARKIN, F. 1979. *Marx's Theory of History: A Bourgeois Critique*. New York: Columbia University Press.

PERKINS, H. C. 2006. Commodification: re-resourcing rural areas. *Handbook of rural studies*, 243-257.

POTTER, S. H. & POTTER, J. M. 1990. *China's peasants: the anthrpopology of revolution,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

PRED, A. 1984. Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the Time-Geography of Becoming Places. *Annals of the association of american geographers,* 74, 279-297.

PUTNAM, R. D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work,* Princeton, Princeton University Press.

PUTNAM, R. D. 1995. Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. *Journal of Democracy,* 6, 65-78.

QI, X. 2013. Guanxi, social capital theory and beyond: toward a globalized social science. *The British journal of sociology,* 64, 308-324.

QIAN, M. 1991. Zhongguo wenhua dui renlei weilai keyou de gongxian. *Chinese Culture*, 93-96.

QIN, H. 2003. *Chuantong shilun: bentu shehui de zhidu, wenhua jiqi bianqian,* Shanghai, Fudan University Press.

QIN, H. 2003. *Chuantong shilun: bentu shehui de zhidu, wenhua jiqi bianqian,* Shanghai, Fudan University Press.

QIN, H. 2009. Zhongguo tudi zhidu de weilai xuanze. *China real estate magazine.*

RABINOW, P. 1977. *Reflections on fieldwork in Morocco*, Berkeley, University of California Press.

RAPOPORT, A. 1982. The meaning of the built environment. *Beverly Hills: Sage. CEO Discourse in Mergers and Acquisitions,* 151.

RAPOPORT, A. 1969. *House Form and Cultua*, New Delhi: Prentice-hall of India Private Ltd.

RASCHE, A. & CHIA, R. 2009. Researching strategy practices: a genealogical social theory perspective. *Organization studies,* 30, 713-734.

RICHARDSON, J. (ed.) 1986. *The forms of capital,* Westport, Greenwood.

RITCHIE, J. & LEWIS, J. 2014. *Qualitative research practice: a guide for social science students and researchers,* London, SAGE.

ROGASKI, R. 2004. *Hygienic modernity: Meanings of health and disease in treaty-port China*, Berkeley, University of California Press.

ROKEACH, M. 1988. *Rokeach value survey*, Palo Alto, Consulting Psychologists Press.

ROSSELIN, C. 1999. The ins and outs of the hall: A Parisian example. *At home: An anthropology of domestic space*, 53-59.

ROZELLE, S. 1994. Decision-Making in China's Rural Economy: The Linkages between Village Leaders and Farm Households. *China Quarterly,* 137, 99-124.

ROZMAN, G. 2003. *The modernisation of China,* Nanjing, Jiangsu People's Publishing House.

RUMMEL, R. J. 2011. *China's bloody century: genocide and mass murder since 1900*, Piscataway, Transaction Publishers.

SARGESON, S. 2016. Grounds for self-government? Changes in land ownership and democratic participation in Chinese communities. *Journal of Peasant Studies*.

SCHEPER-HUGHES, N. 1995. The primacy of the ethical: propositions for a militant anthropology. *Current anthropology,* 36, 409-440.

SCHUBERT, G. & AHLERS, A. L. 2012. County and township cadres as a strategic group:"Building a New Socialist Countryside" in three provinces. *The China Journal*, 67-86.

SCHURMANN, F. 1966. *Ideology and organization in communist China*, Berkeley, University of California Press.

SCOTT, D. 2008. *China and the international system, 1840-1949: power, presence, and perceptions in a century of humiliation*, SUNY Press.

SCOTT, J. C. 1976. *The moral economy of the peasant: Subsistence and rebellion in Southeast Asia,* New Haven, Yale Uiversity Press.

SHEN, Y. 2010. *Individualisation and the restructuring of kinship relations and organizations in contemporary urban China: the case of Shanghai's families.* Shanghai, Fudan University Press.

SHEN, Y. & YAO, Y. 2008. Does grassroots democracy reduce income inequality in China? *Journal of Public Economics,* 92, 2182.

SHI, L. 2010. Changes in income inequality in China in the last three decades. *Professor's unpublished paper, Beijing Normal University, nd.*

SHIRK, S. L. 1993. *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China,* Berkeley, University of California Press.

SHORT, P. 2001. *Mao: A life*, Basingstoke, Macmillan.

SICILIANO, G. 2012. Urbanization strategies, rural development and land use changes in China: A multiple-level integrated assessment. *Land Use Policy,* 29, 165-178.

SILVERMAN, D. (ed.) 1997. *Qualitative research :theory, method and practice,* London: Sage.

SKOCPOL, T. & THEDA, S. 1979. *States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

SMART, A. 1993. Gifts, bribes, and guanxi: A reconsideration of Bourdieu's social capital. *Cultural anthropology,* 8, 388-408.

STEINM LLER, H. 2010. How popular Confucianism became embarrassing: On the spatial and moral center of the house in rural China. *Focaal,* 2010, 81-96.

STEWART, P. J. & STRATHERN, A. 2005. Cosmology, resources, and landscape: Agencies of the dead and the living in Duna, Papua New Guinea. *Ethnology*, 35-47.

SU, L. 2002. *Songfa xiaxiang,* Beijing, China University of Political Science and Law Press.

SUN, L. 2002. women zai kaishi miandui yige duanlie de shehui ? . *Strategy and Management,* 2, 9-15.

SUN, L., LI, Q. & SHEN, Y. 1998. Zhongguo shehui jiegou zhuanxing de jinqi qushi yu yinhuan. *Strategy and Management*, 1-17.

SZETO, R., WRIGHT, P. C. & CHENG, E. 2006. Business networking in the Chinese context: Its role in the formation of guanxi, social capital and ethical foundations. *Management Research News,* 29, 425-438.

TANG, Y. 2005. Lun "tianren heyi" *History of Chinese Philosophy*, 5-10.

TH GERSEN, S. & ANRU, N. 2008. 'He Is He, and I Am I': Individual and Collective among China's Rural Elderly. *European Journal of East Asian Studies,* 7, 11-37.

THORSEN, D. E. 2010. The Neoliberal Challenge - What is Neoliberalism? *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justic,* 2, 1-25.

TILLEY, C. 1994. *A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments (Explorations in Anthropology),* London, Berg.

TOWNSEND, J. 1992. Chinese Nationalism. *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs,* 27, 97-130.

TSAI, L. L. 2007. Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China. *American Political Science Review,* 101, 355-372.

TUAN, Y.-F. 1997. Sense of place: what does it mean to be human? *American Journal of Theology & Philosophy,* 18, 47-58.

UCKO, P. J. & LAYTON, R. (eds.) 1999. *The archaeology and anthropology of landscape: shaping your landscape,* London and New York: Routledge.

UNGER, J. 2002. *The transformation of rural China,* New York, M.E.Sharpe.

VALADEZ, J. 2001. *Deliberative democracy, political legitimacy and self-determination in multicultural societies*, Boulder, Westview Press.

VAN GENNEP, A. 1909. The rites of passage (1960 translation by M. Vizedom and G. Coffee). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

VITEBSKY, P. 1992. 14 Landscape and self-determination among the Eveny. *Bush Base: Forest Farm: Culture, Environment, and Development*, 223.

VOLODER, L. 2008. Autoethnographic challenges: Confronting self, field and home. *The Australian Journal of Anthropology,* 19, 27-40.

WAGNER, J. 1979. *Images of information: Still photography in the social sciences,* California, Sage Publications.

WAN, G. & ZHOU, Z. 2005. Income Inequality in Rural China: Regression-based Decomposition Using Household Data. *Review of Development Economics,* 9, 107–120.

WANG, C. 2005. dangqian zhongguo shehui jieceng guanxi bianqianzhong de feijunheng wenti. *Society,* 25, 58-77.

WANG, H. 1997. Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity. *Frontiers,* 5, 133-150.

WANG, H. 1998. dangdai zhongguo de sixiang zhuangkuang yu xiandaixing wenti *Literature and art forum,* 6, 6-21.

WANG, H. 2008. *Qu zhengzhihua de zhengzhi: duan 20 shiji de zhongjie yu 90 niandai,* Beijing, Joint Publishing.

WANG, Q. 1995. *Xu wenxian tongkao*, Shanghai, Shanghai Classics Publishing House.

WANG, Y. 2006. The changing family structure in contemporary China: an analysis. *Social Science in China*, 96-108.

WANG, Y. 2014. An Analysis of Changes in the Chinese Family Structure between Urban and Rural Areas: On the Basis of the 2010 National Census Data. *Social Science in China,* 35, 100-116.

WANG, Z. 1945. Shunping xian 1944 dongji jianzu yundong zongjie. *Jin cha lu yu*, p.658-659.

WEBER, M. & GERTH, H. H. 1953. The Religion of China, Confucianism and Taoism. *Philosophy,* 28, 187-189.

WEBER, M. 1978. *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*, University of California Press.

WEBER, M., HENDERSON, A. M. & PARSONS, T. 1964. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by AM Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons*, New York; Collier-Macmillan: London.

WELSCH, W. 1997. *Undoing aesthetics,* London, SAGE Publications.

WHITNEY, J. B. 1970. *China: area, administration, and nation building*, Berkeley, University of Chicago.

WHITTINGTON, R. 2006. Completing the practice turn in strategy research. *Organization studies,* 27, 613-634.

WHYTE, M. K. 1996. The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine? *Economic Development & Cultural Change,* 45, 1-30.

WOLF, A. P. 1974. *Religion and ritual in Chinese society*, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press.

WORLD BANK. 2015. Available: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD [Accessed 2015].

XIAO, T. 2011. *zongzu zhengzhi: cunzhi quanli wangluo de fenxi,* Beijing, The Commercial Press.

XIAO, Y. 2014. From 'state and society' to 'institutions and life': the changing perspective of research on social changes in China. *Social Sciences in China,* 9, 88-104.

XIE, L. 2008. Pluralistic Discourse Analysis :Analyzing the social stratification phenomenon as an illustration. *sociological Studies*, 68-101.

XIE, L. 2012. *Environmental activism in China,* London, Routledge.

XING, L., FAN, S., LUO, X. & ZHANG, X. 2009. Community poverty and inequality in western China: A tale of three villages in Guizhou Province. *China Economic Review,* 20, 338-349.

XU, J. & YEH, A. 2009. Decoding urban land governance: state reconstruction in contemporary Chinese cities. *Urban Studies,* 46, 559-581.

Yan, H. (2006). Self-development of migrant women and the production of Suzhi (quality) as surplus value. *Everyday Modernity in China*. M. Y. Dong and J. Goldstein, Washington, University of Washington Press.

YAN, Y. 1996. The culture of guanxi in a North China village. *The China Journal*, 1-25.

YAN, Y. 1997. The Triumph of Conjugality: Structural Transformation of Family Relations in a Chinese Village. *Ethnology,* 36, 191-212.

YAN, Y. 2003. Individualism and the Transformation of Bridewealth in Rural China. *A Draft for the Malinowski Memorial Lecture*.

YAN, Y. 2006. "Chaxu geju" and the notion of hierarchy in Chiense culture. *Sociological Studies*, 201-213.

YAN, Y. 2009. *The individualization of Chinese society*, Oxford, Berg.

YAN, Y. 2016. Intergenerational Intimacy and Descending Familism in Rural North China. *American Anthropologist,* 118, 244-257.

YANG, C. K. 1959. A Chinese village in early Communist transition. *A Chinese village in early communist transition.*

YANG, D. T. 1999. Urban-Biased Policies and Rising Income Inequality in China. *The American Economic Review,* 89, 306-310.

YANG, M. & LIU, Y. 2004. Yayi yu kangzheng: yige guanyu nongcun tudi fazhanquan de lilun fenxi kuangjia. *Finace and Economics*, 24-28.

YANG, M. C. 1945. *A Chinese Village: Taitou, Shantung Province*. New York, Columbia University Press.

YANG, M. M.-H. 1994. *Gifts, favors, and banquets: The art of social relationships in China*, New York, Cornell University Press.

YANG, R. 2010. *Bingfu, huanghuo yu shuishi: xifang shiye de zhongguo xingxiang yu jindai zhongguo guozu lunshu xiangxiang,* Taipei, Chengzhi University Press.

YEH, A. G. 1999. *Bibliography on Socio-Economic Development and Urban Development in China*, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press.

YEP, R. 2004. Can tax-for-fee reform reduce rural tension in China? The process, progress and limitations. *China Quarterly,* 177.

YEARBOOK OFFICE OF YINGDE CITY, 2006b. *Yearbook of Yingde City* [Online]. Guangzhou: Guangdong People's Publishing House. Available: http://www.gd-info.gov.cn/shtml/yds/lanmu13/lanmu01/2013/05/23/78355.shtml [Accessed].

YEARBOOK OFFICE OF YINGDE CITY, 2013. *Yearbook of Yingde City* [Online]. Guangzhou: Guangdong People's Publishing House. Available: http://www.gd-info.gov.cn/shtml/yds/lanmu13/lanmu01/2013/05/23/78355.shtml [Accessed].

YEARBOOK OFFICE OF YINGDE CITY, 2015. *Yingde Yearbook* [Online]. Available: http://www.gd-info.gov.cn/books/dtree/showbook.jsp?stype=v&paths=21136&siteid=yds&sitename=英德市地情网 [Accessed].

YU, K. & NORA, S. 2003. *The emerging of China's civil society and its significance for governance*, Asienstiftung.

YU-LAN, F. & BODDE, D. 1949. A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. *Philosophical Review,* 58, 380-382.

ZHANG, D. 1985. Zhongguo zhexue zhong "tianren heyi" sixiang de pouxi. *Universitatis Pekinensis (Philosophy and Social Science),* 22, 3-10.

ZHANG, H. 2004. *"Living alone" and the rural elderly: strategy and agency in post-Mao rural China*, na.

ZHANG, H. 2005. Bracing for an uncertain future: a case study of new coping strategies of rural parents under China's birth control policy. *The China Journal*, 53-76.

ZHANG, J. 2003. Uncertainty of land-use rules: an explanatory framework. *Social Sciences in China*.

ZHANG, K. 2017. "gaige kaifang" shi weizao jiyi? *Ruqi Suoshi.*

ZHANG, L. 1999. "Translating Cultures: China and the West". *Chinese Thought in a Global Context: A Dialogue Between Chinese and Western Philosophical Approaches*.

ZHANG, Y. 2010. Studies on the bandit problem in the early stages of building the red army and the central soviet areas. *Modern Chinese History Studies,* 178, 66-83.

ZHAO, G. 1986. *Man and land in Chinese history: an economic analysis*, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press.

ZHAO, Y. 2009. The Interactive Relationship between Farmers , Local Governments and the State during the Course of Land Acquisition. *Sociological Studies*, 93-129.

ZHICHENG, L. 2007. The Chief Task for New Countryside Building Is To Quicken the Construction of Modern Agriculture. *Issues in Agricultural Economy,* 2.

ZHOU, F. 2007. The Role of Government and Farmers in Land Development and Transfer. *Sociological Studies*, 49-82.

ZHOU, Q. 1995. Zhongguo nongcun gaige: guojia he suoyouquan guanxi de bianhua (shang) - yige jingji zhidu bianqianshi de huigu. *Management World*, 178-189.

ZHOU, Q. 2004. Property rights and land requisition system: a critical choice for China's urbanization. *China Economic Quarterly,* 4, 193-210.

ZHU, K. 2002. Urban development under ambiguous property rights: a case of China's transition economy. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,* 26, 41-57.

ZITO, A. 1993. Ritualizing Li: Implications for Studying Power and Gender. *Positions,* 1, 321-348.

ZONABEND, F. 1984. *The enduring memory: Time and history in a French village*, Manchester, Manchester University Press.

ZWINGMANN, C. 1959. *" Heimweh" or" Nostalgic Reaction": A Conceptual Analysis and Interpretation of a Medico-Psychological Phenomenon,* Palo Alto, Stanford University.