China’s public diplomacy towards Africa

A Thesis
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of
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by
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This thesis analyzes China’s public diplomacy in the field of Sino-Africa relations, arguing that China has adopted public diplomacy with soft power as a vital component of its foreign policy on the continent from the early 2000s onward. The necessity of public diplomacy in China’s foreign policy was driven by the objective of developing close economic ties with African countries even as Beijing faced manifold issues in its relations. To comprehend the link between China’s public diplomacy and Sino-Africa economic ties, the research adopts an International Relations approach of neoliberal institutionalism, examining the use of public diplomacy to manage the asymmetric relations between China and Africa, in which China wields economic dominance over Africa. With the rising importance of public diplomacy globally in the twenty-first century, China has employed its public diplomacy to explain and justify its rising global influence, and to dispel negative publicity in the international society. While China has a government-centered public diplomacy system, unlike that of the West, various actors (governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental actors) systematically engage in China’s public diplomacy through diverse instruments such as foreign aid, media, institutions for exchanging culture, and language training to the populations of foreign countries.

The Chinese government deploys its public diplomacy in African countries based on smart power, which combines soft power (culture) and hard power (China model and economic power), as most of China’s public diplomacy is linked to aid projects, grants, and low-interest loans for building closer economic relations with African countries. China’s public diplomacy seeks to build a positive image of China that focuses on a mutual sense of solidarity to elicit connectedness and shared identity between China and partner countries, mutual development, and harmonious coexistence through diverse public diplomacy activities. Public diplomacy fills the gap between China and Africa in asymmetrical economic relations that give rise to issues of distrust and discontent towards China – such as the exploitation of African wealth, and accusations of neocolonialism. By conducting fieldwork in Nigeria and South Africa, the research confirms that China’s public diplomacy is integral to its foreign policy that focuses on China’s economic development and securing its position on the global stage through African partnerships, bilateral and multilateral (FOCAC). It also discovered that Chinese public diplomacy not only promotes an amicable and friendly environment that promotes deepen relations for economic objectives, but also boosts China’s claim to be a global great power in the new era, as President Xi Jinping has ordered.
Declaration and Copyright

I, Yunhee Kim, hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with ethical conduct and academic rules. This thesis is a result of my own work under Dr. David Kerr’s supervision. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I has fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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Most of all, I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. David Kerr, for his faith in my research and his patient encouragement over many years. I would never have been completed my thesis without Dr. Kerr’s supervision.

And I also dedicate this thesis to my parents, my aunt, my sister, and my Rottweilers. Without my family’s support, it would have been impossible to endure the hard times throughout my thesis work.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Asian-African Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asia Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD-Fund</td>
<td>China-Africa Development Fund Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABC</td>
<td>China-Africa Business Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALI</td>
<td>China-Africa Lekki Investment Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASS</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Social Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>China Cultural Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCECC</td>
<td>China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIA</td>
<td>China Cultural Industry Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>China Central Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFAO</td>
<td>Central Foreign Affairs Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGGC</td>
<td>China Gezhouba Group Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICIR</td>
<td>China Institute of Contemporary International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIF</td>
<td>China International Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIIS</td>
<td>China Institute of International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPG</td>
<td>China International Publishing Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISU</td>
<td>Confucius Institution at Stellenbosch University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNOOC</td>
<td>China National Offshore Oil Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPC</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAEFC</td>
<td>Chinese people’s association for friendship with foreign countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Communist Party’s Central Publicity Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPDA</td>
<td>China Public Diplomacy Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPPCC</td>
<td>Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRCC</td>
<td>Chinese Railway Construction Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>China Radio International</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Chinese Scholarship Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLSG</td>
<td>External Propaganda Leading Small Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERGP</td>
<td>Economic Recovery and Growth Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAL</td>
<td>Final Act of Lagos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISS</td>
<td>Foundation for International Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTZs</td>
<td>Free-Trade Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAPP</td>
<td>General Administration of Press and Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCIS</td>
<td>Government Communication and Information System</td>
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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Research topic background: China and the necessity of public diplomacy

Former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping formulated a famous strategy of China’s foreign policy known as “tao guang yang hui, you sou zuo wei” during the upheavals in Eastern Europe from 1989 to 1991. The strategy suggested that “China should keep a low profile and should not seek to play a leadership role on the international stage (tao guang yang hui), while doing something and promoting the establishment of a new international political and economic order (you sou zuo wei)” (Lu, 2017, p.59). However, the character of China’s foreign policy has changed from defensive and passive to active after Deng’s era, as a result of the country’s rapid economic development, Chinese leaders’ views of the world, and changes in recognition of China’s role in the international society. Thus, China’s foreign policy goals are to promote a pleasant and peaceful international environment favorable to China’s economic growth, and at the same time, expand its clout on the global stage, and China’s great rejuvenation through socialism with Chinese characteristics. This was clear in current President Xi Jinping’s speech, which stressed the aim of achieving the “China Dream” at the first session of the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2013 (China Daily, 2013a).

China is conscious of its international reputation since the Tiananmen Incident, and wants to avoid international isolation. The Chinese government, especially, pushed forward peaceful development during the Hu Jintao regime to refute the China Threat theory that sprung from China’s growing economic and military power and influence, during the 1990s. Around the same time, the study of public diplomacy and soft power came to the fore in China, thanks in part to the importance of effective communication in the conduct of foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics around the globe with the advent of globalization and the advancement of information technology. China adopted public diplomacy as the core of its foreign policy to manage its public image in earnest from the early 2000s, as “public opinion is crucial in contemporary international relations, communication becomes a vital means of generating influence and an ever-more powerful aspect in the conduct of foreign affairs” (Hartig, 2016, p.656). Thus, China carries out public diplomacy through its main instruments (culture, foreign aid, and education and cultural exchange institutes) and actors.

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1 It means that ‘tao guang yang hui’ is weakened and ‘you sou zuo wei’ is more highlighted.
(governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental actors) to export its nation’s positive image and communicate with the foreign public to improve its reputation as a friendly country and promote its national interest. Current President Xi Jinping introduced his doctrine, China Dream, to the foreign public and sought the cooperation of the African people to realize the doctrine, which focuses on national rejuvenation and prosperity. The doctrine was articulated in a speech in Tanzania, during his first visit to Africa in March 2013:

The Chinese people are currently committed to realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation while African people are striving for the African dream of self-development through unity and growth. People in China and Africa should strengthen unity and cooperation and support and help each other to make their respective dreams come true. At the same time, they should also work with the international community to push for the realization of the world dream of lasting peace and common prosperity, so that we can make greater contributions to the peace and development of mankind. (MFA, 2013a)

Concurrently, he stressed the need to strengthen Sino-African relations through mutual respect, win-win cooperation, and cultivating “kinship-like qualities in the relations” through people-to-people exchanges – especially through younger generations to create mutual understanding (ibid). Xi stressed the significance of public diplomacy at an October 2013 Conference on the Diplomatic Work with Neighboring Countries by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He argued that, “We should strive to strengthen publicity work, public diplomacy, cultural and people-to-people exchanges with the neighbouring countries, and consolidate and expand social and public opinion foundations of the long-term development of relations between China and its neighboring countries” (MFA, 2013b). He indicated China’s diplomatic goal with neighboring countries is not only to realize two “centenary goals” and the nation’s great rejuvenation (ibid), but also to protect its interests on the global stage.

In other words, Xi’s speech shows that China utilizes public diplomacy efficiently to cement friendly relationships with foreign countries, as well as to achieve its foreign policy goals. Furthermore, he showed a strong interest in keeping China’s rights and interests tied to peaceful development, established by Hu Jintao during the 2000s, as follows: “We will stick to the road of peaceful development, but will never give up our legitimate rights and will

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3 The first centenary goal is to build a moderately prosperous society in all respect by 2020. The second centenary goals is to build a modern socialist country which is strong, prosperous, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by the middle of the twenty-first century (more information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/09/c_136666993.htm)
never sacrifice our national core interests. No country should presume that we will trade our core interests or that we will allow harm to be done to our sovereignty, security or development interests” (China.org.cn, 2013a). All things taken together, this thesis understands China’s public diplomacy to be an effective means for bridging the gap that arises from a disjunction between foreign negative perceptions of China and the promotion of its national interests politically and economically through its foreign policy, so as to create a favorable environment for smooth diplomatic activities. At the same time, Beijing facilitates public diplomacy to establish its norms, customs, and rules through its soft power in an era of internationalization (d’Hooghe, 2010).

Furthermore, public diplomacy allows China to be a responsible country, as Beijing boosts its presence through cooperation within the international system and on the global stage. By using public diplomacy, China reduces neighboring countries’ wariness, caused by its sudden rise, and increase its favorable image in global society via the image of peaceful development and spread of Chinese culture. China concurrently engages in international governance issues – such as Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, and supporting South-South cooperation – by offering various public diplomacy activities for the resolution of issues at the UN. This is not only to enhance its international reputation as a responsible country developing peacefully, but also to establish a foothold for multilateral diplomacy. By extension, in 2015, Xi promised to provide positive support to UN peacekeeping activities by contributing 8,000 troops and providing US$100 million in military assistance for the African Union peacekeeping mission over five years, and US$1 billion for a 10-year joint China-UN peace and development fund. Therefore, Sinologist d’Hooghe (2015) said, “Public diplomacy has to make China’s rise palatable to the world and has to create understanding, respect, and ultimately support for China’s political model and policies” (p.3).

1.1.1 China and Africa

Scholars have great interest in China’s attempts to secure energy resources through Sino-

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4 According to a September 2011 white paper of China’s Peaceful Development by the State Council, China’s core national interests are state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, and national reunification, overall social stability, the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development, and China’s political system established by the Constitution (China.org.cn, 2013a).


Africa relations resulting from the growth of China’s economy during the 1990s. Chinese leaders, including high-ranking governmental officials, have chosen African countries as a first stop on their overseas trips every New Year since the early 1990s. The economic ties between China and Africa are thriving (see Appendix III). As mentioned above, China’s sustainable economic development is one of its core national interests, and it is the main priority for Chinese leaders since China’s reform and opening up. On that note, Africa is crucial to the achievement of China’s economic development not only for maintaining stability, but also for providing long-term legitimacy to the Communist Party and China’s political system. Thus, China focuses on securing raw materials (including oil) from African countries. At the same time, China sees Africa as a potential market for its exported products. Chinese companies have also extended their business in African countries based on China’s ‘Going Out’ policy. Recently, their African expansion has been encouraged to solve the burden of personnel expenses in China’s domestic market due to a rise in labor costs, avoiding regulations in the United States and European countries, and expanding their markets in Africa. By extension, Beijing politically recognizes Africa as supporters on the international stage, including realizing the One China policy.

The economic ties between China and Africa began to thrive during the 1990s, when the volume of trade between China and Africa increased rapidly, encouraged by China’s rapid economic growth. However, this did not continue smoothly in the mid-2010s. Trade dropped off sharply, with a lower import volume from African countries to China, from 2015 (UN Comtrade, 2017). At the same time, the global economic recession and China’s own economic slowdown led to a decline in the price of raw materials, due to weak demand. For this reason, from January to October 2015, the trade volume decreased 18 percent over the same period in the previous year, but the total volume of Chinese export to Africa showed a surprising 5 percent increase. The chief Chinese export items to Africa were mechanical and electrical products, whereas China’s imports from Africa were mineral energy resource products. China’s import volume did not decline quantitatively, and some products even increased (MOFCOM, 2016). Hence, there was a negative impact on the economies of the majority of African countries that rely highly on exports to China or Chinese imports, because of the imbalanced economic relations coupled with a drop in the price of raw materials.

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However, the rumblings of discontent over the economic ties between China and Africa have been felt since the 1990s, when China increased its attention on its economic relations with African countries. The problems have festered, with the considerable, asymmetric economic gap between China and Africa resulting in widespread strife over, for example, favorable investment terms for China, China’s turnkey projects and package deal-based foreign aid to Africa (such as the Angola model), poor-quality and low-priced Chinese imports, and the export of raw materials to China in return for manufactured goods. Hence, there has been an increase in hatred for and crime against China and its people in Africa (Gebrewold, 2009) as relations between China and the continent have become ever more intertwined. Therefore, the matter of the lopsided economic situation in Sino-Africa ties is magnified, and there has been a greater need to resolve contemporary economic and political issues since the early 2000s. China’s business activities, including capital investment in Africa, experienced difficulties due to different business environments and political, social, and legal systems in China and Africa. Chinese enterprises are up against a brick wall on account of the lack of understanding between the companies and the African people, regarding environmental problems, job creation, and sustainable regional socio-economic development. Hence, the Chinese government is keenly aware of the necessity of mending fences with Africa for its national interests, because Africa plays a significant role at various stages.

1.1.2 Sino-African relations and public diplomacy

Based on the discussion in 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 above, China utilizes its public diplomacy to boost economic ties with African countries by filling the gap that has arisen from the lopsided economic relations, and to achieve its diplomatic goals in Sino-Africa relations. Unlike China’s previous African policy, which gave undue stress on pursuing economic interests in Africa, Africa policy between 2006 and 2015 enhanced its policy towards Africa, based on China’s public diplomacy, to consider the African people’s welfare, education, health system, human resource development, poverty alleviation, and Africa’s economic development based on strengthened political and economic cooperation between China and Africa. By extension, China pursues multilateral cooperation with African countries through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and draws upon the detailed content of China’s public diplomacy in the fields of education, media, cultural exchanges, people-to-people exchanges, and others for mutual understanding and benefit under win-win cooperation.

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8 The form and character of China’s foreign aid will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
Based on the above, this thesis found the vital role of China’s public diplomacy in its foreign policy towards African countries through trends in China’s political economy. First, the study observes that the early 2000s marked a turning point in China’s African policy. Through an extensive process of change, a soft power concept was introduced by President Hu Jintao, China’s leader from 2003 to 2013, emerging as a consequence of China’s expanding multilateral diplomacy with multidimensional and multilayered policies related to Africa. As China officially adopted soft power as part of its African policy, it also promoted the notion of public diplomacy, meaning the engagement of China’s objectives and ambitions with government agencies and opinion in Africa. The chief reason for the introduction of public diplomacy with soft power was that China also realized that the asymmetrical interdependence relationships between China and Africa, mainly concentrated on raw materials and industrial products, were an obstacle to cementing its strategic cooperation under the principle of mutual benefit. This change shows that China is striving to keep pace with the rapid changes in the global political economy. The Chinese government, consequently, pushed forward with public diplomacy as its major foreign policy in the early 2000s. Second, the study also pays attention to the Chinese government, which has been prioritizing economic growth since Deng Xiaoping was China’s leader and champion of its economic reform. Since then, current Chinese president Xi Jinping has also prioritized “keep the economy growth” through his new slogan “China dream”, which he first articulated in his 2013 inaugural speech. China dreams of becoming a 21st century world power, based on domestic economic power and far greater status internationally, accomplished after three decades of high growth, and President Xi pledged to fulfill the goal of creating a moderately prosperous (Xiaokang) society by 2020, before the Party celebrates its centenary in 2021. China concentrates on its foreign policy and public diplomacy with soft power, based on the country’s history and culture as well as economic power, to mitigate the “China Threat” seen from the West, and to achieve the country’s rejuvenation. Lastly, China has exhibited a tendency for converting its interests from securing energy resources to focusing on service/manufacturing industries in African nations, resulting from a continuing decline in China’s economic growth since 2012. Besides, as part of Chinese government-driven projects, a significant number of Chinese private and state-owned enterprises have been making inroads into Africa’s service/manufacturing/media/education sectors since the mid-2000s. As a result, Chinese companies are involved in its public diplomacy activities in Africa to both improve China’s image and boost its business in Africa.

However, while the purpose of China’s public diplomacy is most linked to boosting economic ties and contemporary issues, the linkage is often noted but rarely studied in the vast literature on China’s public diplomacy and soft power. Hence, this research stresses the
importance of exploring the function and effect of China’s public diplomacy in conjunction with its foreign policy, which especially focuses on economic goals in international relations. This is because China puts economic development first in its political system, in tandem with conveying to the international community a national image of peaceful development and mutual development based on public diplomacy. Thus, this thesis attempts to examine the effect and role of public diplomacy with major instruments (soft power and economic power) in Sino-African relations. This is because public diplomacy has implications for China’s diplomatic activity towards African countries, which has become increasingly important for China politically and economically, since the early 2000s.

1.2 Research Questions and Aims

Based on the research topic background, above, in order to explore the research, the aims of the thesis are as follows:

(1) to explore the diversification of China’s African policy by making use of public diplomacy, in accordance with the changes of the diplomatic paradigm that arises from globalization;

(2) to examine the significance and role of China's public diplomacy in its African policy through the power politics of economic interdependence with sub-Saharan African nations, and asymmetrical interdependent relations;

(3) to investigate how China’s diversified new Africa policy is able to compensate for the limitations of its previous policies, and produce actual results in amicable Sino-African relations.

1.2.1 Research questions and relevance

Drawing on a discussion of neoliberal institutionalism in connection with China and Africa’s relations, the theoretical framework and aim of the research leads to three research questions. As this research considers China’s public diplomacy in Africa, the research questions are divided into three parts to analyze the influence of China’s public diplomacy on Africa under asymmetrical interdependence relations. The first question refers to the role of

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9 The majority of research on China’s public diplomacy with soft power is focused on fields such as culture, media, communication, and public relations, rather than looking into the general mechanisms between China’s public diplomacy and its foreign policy based on its public diplomacy activities.
public diplomacy within the general sense of diplomatic relations. The second question aims to find the major cause(s) of asymmetrical interdependence in Sino-African relations by examining past diplomatic relations in order to infer the necessity of China's public diplomacy. The third question seeks to demonstrate how China's public diplomacy is implemented in Africa.

Question 1: What is the meaning of public diplomacy in international relations, and in the Chinese form of international relations? Why and how did China map out and implement its new strategy of public diplomacy in the context of the asymmetrical interdependent relations between China and Africa, and how did this connect to its political purpose based on former and current Chinese leaders' political perspectives?

With regards to examining the role of public diplomacy, the first question will account for the significance of public diplomacy from both a Chinese perspective and in foreign relations following globalization. Since the early 2000s, Beijing has perceived a change in the diplomatic paradigm following its experience of globalization, and reconsidered negative Western publicity of China in its relations with Africa connected to the considerable growth of China’s economy. The Chinese government put new weight on public diplomacy under the soft power concept as an component of its implementation process in order to not only boost its global image and the realization of its government’s major foreign policy aims, but also to ensure friendly relations with Africa. Given this context, the first question is relevant to grasp the requisite concepts to understand public diplomacy; the importance of public diplomacy through soft power in the Chinese political perspective; the distinctiveness of China’s public diplomacy influences on its foreign policy; and the way China’s public diplomacy is implemented, i.e. public relations diplomacy, media diplomacy, cultural diplomacy. This question will be answered in Chapter 3.

Question 2: What problems have emerged from asymmetrical economic interdependence in Sino-African relations? To what extent does China’s public diplomacy activity in Africa coincide with the development of an economic relationship of asymmetric interdependence between China and key African partners, and how does that public diplomacy address China’s vulnerabilities?

An analysis of asymmetric interdependence relations between China and Africa is crucial to comprehend the big picture of Sino-African relations, in connection with the gap between China’s African policy and its implementation, before considering the application of public diplomacy in Africa. On the basis of the history of China’s foreign policy towards African countries, from the 1950s to 1990s, the second question examines key drivers that effect
asymmetrical interdependence in Sino-African relations. This examines aid, trade, and investment relations from the past to the present to show how China holds its dominant position in the issue-specific forms of power politics. It establishes how and when China and Africa produced asymmetrical interdependence; and why, unlike China, Africa has failed to reduce its vulnerability.

The analysis of influential factors that has produced China and Africa’s asymmetrical interdependence relationship is significant to comprehending China’s power position in Africa. In order to provide a full understanding of the correlation between power and asymmetrical interdependence, a brief explanation of the theoretical paradigm is necessary. Keohane and Nye (2011),\textsuperscript{10} whose theory will discussed later in the theoretical framework section, argue that “vulnerability” and “sensitivity” should be considered to comprehend the nature of power in complex interdependence. Their observation of power and asymmetrical interdependence suggests “asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power, links the liberal stress on interdependence with the realist focus on power” (p.xxi) and “it is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependence relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues” (p. 9).

Despite China and Africa maintaining close relations through economic cooperation under mutual cooperation and mutual interests since the 1980s, the asymmetrical interdependence relationship has given rise to discord and animosity in Sino-African ties. By analyzing changes in economic interdependence through China’s African policy, the second question is relevant to explaining the necessity of public diplomacy in China’s foreign policy in order to minimize friction and promote friendship with Africa. This question will be answered in Chapters 4 and 5.

Question 3: What role has China’s public diplomacy played in its foreign policy towards sub-Saharan African countries? How has public diplomacy worked within the greater changes in China’s African policy between 2003 and 2016, and influenced not only Africa’s political economy and thinking but also the context of Sino-African ties? To what extent can China’s public diplomacy activities be seen as separate from, or subordinate to its pursuit of key economic relations with African countries?

The analysis of China’s public diplomacy implementation within its African policy is a crucial

subject. The third question will discuss the performance of public diplomacy as key to shaping Sino-African ties, and to bridging the gap between policy and implementation. Thus, the third question will seek to explain the role and aim of public diplomacy in multilateral and bilateral ties with African countries through China’s African policy during the 2000s. Also, this question will examine the role of various actors in various public diplomacy activities. The role of transnational actors in public diplomacy, especially, will be discussed through the prism of the theory of complex interdependence. This question will be answered in Chapter 5 and through case studies (Chapters 6 and 7).

1.2.2 Research framework and case studies

To conduct the research and answer the research questions, this thesis is broken down into two parts: a framework part and a case study part. Building upon the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, the framework part focuses on the background of public diplomacy, and analyzes not only China’s public diplomacy constituents within the scope of its political economy and culture, but also China’s African policy. The case study part was conducted to assess China’s strategy through public diplomacy in Africa, based on the analysis of content in the framework part.

Framework

This first section of the thesis provides the framework of the research structure and is divided into three primary parts: the nature and roles of public diplomacy in international relations, China’s international strategy (the policy framework), and China’s strategy in Africa (the implementation framework).

The first part of the framework on public diplomacy lays the foundation to understand the meaning and role of public diplomacy for this thesis. To address the first research question, this chapter lays out a comprehensive exploration of the concept of public diplomacy – such as its main agents, target audiences, medium of public diplomacy, and assets for public diplomacy. It also looks into public diplomacy-affiliated concepts such as soft power, because Nye’s concept of “soft power” has influenced traditional diplomacy in the 21st century. In addition, it attempts to explain how public diplomacy relates to the traditional idea of diplomacy, discusses whether emerging powers have new or distinctive ideas and practices in conducting diplomacy, and how culture can be a form of soft power that adds new dimensions to the public diplomacy of emerging powers. This part also covers the Chinese perspective of public diplomacy with soft power.
The second part shifts to an analysis of China’s international strategy and policy on the grounds of public diplomacy. This part elucidates what mechanisms of public diplomacy China has deployed connected to its soft power and various assets inherent in the realm of China’s political economy and social culture, as outlined in the first part. In order to understand the role of China’s public diplomacy in Africa, it is necessary to first examine the performance of three actors – government, semi-governmental, and non-governmental actors – and their roles and activities, which comprise public diplomacy. However, in view of the wide range of China’s public diplomacy instruments, this research establishes separate categories in order to conduct a detailed analysis as follows: (1) foreign aid, (2) the media, (3) cultural and educational institutes. This part will probe how the three actors’ roles and activities using the three instruments differ between countries; furthermore, it accounts for how China’s traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy, and economic and cultural soft power connect to their international diplomatic strategy, because China is the most important of the new powers in the 21st century.

The third part examines China’s strategy in Africa. It explains the gap between China’s African policy and the reality of Sino-African relations, and looks at the ways China seeks to strengthen the sense of solidarity between it and the African continent through public diplomacy, including China’s extensive aid and investment in African countries. This part also considers the necessity of China’s new African strategy to keep pace with its international strategy, in order to answer the second research question. Thus, this part will examine how China obtained its ascendancy within asymmetric economic interdependence in Sino-African relations, retracing the development of China’s policy towards Africa, which began with aid in the 1950s, to the funding system and diverse investments established during the 1990s. Not only that, it will analyse China’s policy from the 1950s to 1990s, in order to draw a comparison between China’s political economy strategy and the status quo of Sino-African relations, and therefore investigate the intention of aid and investment as part of its African policy. As to African nations’ stances on China, Africa has embraced China’s African policy revolving around aid and investment to stabilize the continent politically and economically, since the beginning of the postcolonial era in the 1950s. However, relations and cooperation began to bloom in earnest following bilateral economic agreements with China in the late 1980s. However, the issue of the purpose of China’s African policy has come to the fore, especially related to lopsided economic dependency.

Given this context, the third part identifies problems, and examines the differences between

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11. China’s public diplomacy is led and implemented by the government, but this does not mean that the role of non-government actors is excluded from China’s public diplomacy (d’Hooghe, 2007, p.6).
China’s and African nations’ policies and objectives by reviewing political discourse and past political economy events, between the 1950s and 1990s, focusing on asymmetrical economic interdependence in Sino-African relations. It investigates the differences between China’s previous African policy based on traditional diplomacy and its new policy of public diplomacy through case studies. In this way, this chapter takes note of interactions between the Chinese government and African public, with the assistance of public diplomacy. It also explores how this connection exerts influence on Sino-African relations. In addition, the analysis of strategy examines how China effectively applies its international diplomatic strategy to the formulation of its new African policy to salvage the situation that has arisen from the gap between its previous foreign policy and its application in Africa.

**Case Studies**

The case studies will examine how China has implemented its public diplomacy in African countries to strengthen and deepen Sino-African relations, in conjunction with the conclusions from the first, second, and third chapters, in order to answer the third research question. Before discussing the selection of the case studies, it is necessary to classify the case studies in two groups as China differentiates in its policy in Africa. Thus, the case studies are categorized as “bilateral” and “multilateral” according to the characteristics of China’s foreign diplomacy implementation, including the application of its public diplomacy in Africa. The case studies will be carried out with three selections on the basis of these two categories. The first category of case study, bilateral, will look at China’s relations with Nigeria and South Africa; and the second case study, multilateral, will focus on the FOCAC.

The following reasons explain why these three case studies were chosen (two bilateral case studies and one multilateral case study).

First, China has been striving to improve relations with African countries since 1949, when Mao established the People’s Republic of China. Since then, China has emphasized mutual interchange, through which the relations between China and African countries were strengthened through a variety of aid and investment policies. As China pursued a distinct policy for each African country, per its national interests, it is important to examine the political economy exchanges in bilateral ties between China and African countries. Paying

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12 For example, African countries are categorized according to China’s different regional policies in Africa. First, “regional leaders” – China treats South Africa as their flagship nation for “their regional or international political and economic influence”. Second, “problematic countries” – China pays attention to the political instability in African nations such as Sudan, Zimbabwe and DRC, so as to apply a discreet foreign policy to avoid criticism from international society. (Y. Sun, 2014a, p.20). In addition to this, the author argues that China also treats Nigeria as an “important market for securing oil and gas and expanding Chinese companies” for its economic development.
due attention to the importance of different African countries to China for its various interests, this research chose two African countries to analyze China’s public diplomacy policy. These two countries have different internal political, economic, and social features, but exhibit a sense of solidarity with China. Therefore, a brief explanation of the countries’ characteristics to help understand the case selection is as follows:

Nigeria is a major exporter of oil to China, and it’s the third largest trading partner in Africa. In addition, Nigeria is experiencing slow but steady economic growth – although its national economy has slowed down recently. It has a relatively democratic governmental system among the West African countries. Meanwhile, South Africa has the highest growth potential; and leads Africa in economic growth. It stands out as a major economic power among sub-Saharan African countries after gaining entry to the BRICs club in 2010. Since then, China has concentrated on securing a beachhead in South Africa from which it can engage in global diplomatic activities. Also, China is interested in South Africa as a hub country for an increase in trade; enhancing the mining industry and the steel industry based on its rich supply of natural resources.

Second, FOCAC was launched by China in 2000, and is significant to China not only to fulfill its multilateral diplomacy goals with Africa, but also to conduct multidimensional and multilayered policies through various institutions in Africa. Also, FOCAC is the fruit of former Chinese leaders’ foreign diplomatic endeavours over the last two decades. Its development is highly significant to the complex interdependence characteristics of China-Africa relations and to cement relations with African countries. Thus, FOCAC is a good case study with which one can examine the application of China’s public diplomacy across the multiple countries affiliated with FOCAC.

As for the public diplomacy effect on Sino-African relations, the case studies will investigate how public diplomacy has influenced three sectors: (1) the African public, (2) China and Africa’s political economy, and (3) the relations between China and Africa. This part will then evaluate whether the results of public diplomacy activities contribute to address the gap between China and Africa that has arisen from asymmetrical economic dependence. Owing to the fact that economic relations are the most important dimension of China’s involvement in Africa, this part also examines which actors (governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental) are engaged in China’s public diplomacy and create links between China’s public diplomacy activities and African public to advance its strategy in Africa. This part also sheds light on the subject of public diplomacy as an effective way for China to advance its international economic policy in African countries and cement its political and economic
relations with Africa. It examines the idea of China’s culture as a form of power, as well as its economy as instruments of public diplomacy. The case study chapters lay the groundwork for answering the third research question.

1.3 Methodology

Drawing on the research aims and research questions, this part will discuss the ideal methods for analysis and data collection with which to conduct the research. It will begin with an account of the thesis’s research methods, and then describe its practical research design for answering the research questions.

This research is based on qualitative research. Before discussing research methods, it is necessary to define this, as it serves as a guide for a general outline of the research:

Qualitative research is multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials – case study, personal experience, introspective, life story, interview, observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts – that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ lives. (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p.2)

Based upon a neoliberal institutionalist analysis of the content of Sino-African relations, and through the use of complex interdependence theory developed by Keohane and Nye, the research begins by introducing the role of public diplomacy in the context of general diplomatic relations. Next, it will establish the frame of China’s public diplomacy in order to comprehend its significance in Sino-African relations of asymmetrical interdependence. This process is necessary because China stresses the importance of the particular characteristics of its diplomatic policy in international relations. Chapter 3 attempts to organize the concept of public diplomacy from the Chinese perspective through a comparison between Chinese and Western public diplomacy. The related concept of soft power is also discussed, as it is seen as a requisite for assisting in the effective implementation of public diplomacy. The chapter will also focus on establishing the cause of the necessity of public diplomacy from political history and from China’s current international position, which strives to keep pace with the rapid changes resulting from globalization. In this process, the research discovers key factors that facilitate China’s differentiated approach.
To provide a more concrete empirical analysis of Chinese public diplomacy, Chapters 4 and 5 will discuss the necessity of employing public diplomacy, explained within the context of China’s political system and also Sino-African relations, respectively. Chapter 4 will look into how China utilizes public diplomacy by using its soft power and actors (governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental actors) to strengthen foreign relations and achieve China’s foreign policy goals in international relations. The following chapter will get to the root of the asymmetrical economic relationship between China and Africa, and explains the necessity of public diplomacy in dealing with China’s African policy and its recognition and acceptance from Africa, and also the lopsided economic relations between China and Africa. These processes will be examined through a comparative analysis of China’s 2006 and 2015 white papers on African policy, former and current leaders’ political slogans, and China’s political economy doctrines from the 1950s to 1990s, which are related to China’s public diplomacy and relations between China and Africa.

After this, in order to examine China’s differentiated public diplomacy activities in African countries; it will use three case studies – Nigeria, South Africa, and FOCAC – from two channels (bilateral and multilateral). The case studies are crucial, and form a large part of this thesis. The definition of the case study research method, according to Yin (2014), is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p.16). A case study in research assumes comprehending actualities in the current world by grasping the case’s significant contextual conditions (ibid). Thus, Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the role of China’s differentiated African policy through public diplomacy, and evaluate the role of its public diplomacy with respective to its host country, according to interview materials and documentary analysis. These case studies, especially, will discuss the role of public diplomacy in addressing the gap that has arisen from China’s African policy and its implementation. To draw a conclusion from the case studies, a comparative method is adopted because it facilitates scrutiny of the context of knowledge, forward categorization and prediction (Burnham, Lutz, Grant and Layton-Henry, 2008, p.80). Therefore, the research will examine China’s differentiated policy of public diplomacy in African countries that have different political economy and social cultures, and assess how the policy is significant in bilateral and multilateral ties diplomatically, economically, and politically.
In this research, the qualitative analysis of case studies is applied as a basic analyzing method for comparison of the three countries through an interpretative approach, with core components of a case study: “a selection of case elements and research materials, participants’ viewpoint in the event such as interview and documents analysis” (Yin, 2011, p.12). Hokpin (2010) pointed out the objective of comparative method in political science as establishing, testing, and clarifying causality (p.285). Thus, an interpretive process is crucial for understanding “the observers’ value system, political assumption, age and gender” (ibid, p.13). In this regards, Bhattacherjee (2012) suggested “observations must be interpreted through the eyes of the participants embedded in the social context. Interpretation must occur at two levels” (p.115). The first level entails observing or experiencing a certain circumstance of the social participants’ subjective view. The next level is to grasp participants’ experiences in the context of its meaning for a certain circumstance’s “thick description” or “rich narrative story”, which can understand participants’ behaviour in the situation (ibid).

It is also necessary to consider the question of comparative sample size before carrying out interpretive process. Concerning the selection of two types of comparative methods between “small-N (few cases)” and “large-N (many cases)”, this research adopts small-N, as generally small-N is employed in the qualitative comparative method and large-N is employed in the quantitative comparative method (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012, p.88). Besides, compared to large-N, small-N cases have a few factors to be considered when one analyzes the causality of events, and it is easier to grasp the status quo in the political sector when analysing a small number of cases (Collier, 1993, p.105). In this context, the research examines in depth the function and role of China’s public diplomacy in the political, economic, and social cultural sectors in each case study. By extension, it will identify the primary factors in which China’s former diplomatic policy in each African country contrasts with the current, and analyze the meaning of the differentiated policies. The research is able to produce detailed and specific analysis of China’s public diplomatic policy through the case studies.

The main difference between the case study and other qualitative designs such as ethnography and grounded theory is that the case study is “open to the use of theory or conceptual categories that guide the research and analysis of data” (Meyer, 2001, p.331). Comparison analysis is necessary because it identifies similarities and differences between performers and programs (Gilboa, 2008). However, Yin (2003) pointed out the lack of objectivity of case studies while analyzing data and materials related to an empirical research.

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13 The three case studies are the Nigeria and South Africa case in bilateral ties and FOCAC in multilateral ties.
project, for example on contemporary issues, as it can be influenced by various external factors (p.12-13). To avoid these weaknesses, it is necessary to establish detailed limitations and collect not only wide-ranging but also in-depth data to analyze from various angles (Yin, 2011, p.11-13). Thus, the case studies are classified into two groups: bilateral and multilateral. In the bilateral cases, the regime is the criteria for comparison in each country; it will focus on the correlation between the role of China’s public diplomacy and political economy and diplomatic relations regarding different government systems. In the multilateral case, over fifty African countries have joined FOCAC. Therefore, it will analyze interrelation between the role of China’s public diplomacy and political economy and diplomatic relations between China and Africa.

As the research field is so broad, one needs to set up parameters for the analysis of the relationship between China and African nations. First, the thesis considers China’s cultural diplomacy to be subordinate to the general concept of public diplomacy. The thesis adopts the perspective of Cull (2008a, 2009b), d’Hooghe (2015), and Nye (2008), that culture is one element of public diplomacy. Thus, it will not place more emphasis on the explanation of cultural diplomacy, but rather it will focus the discussion primarily on China’s public diplomacy with core instruments (media, education and cultural exchange institutes, and foreign aid). Second, this thesis will focus on researching China’s public diplomacy between from 2003 to 2016, as it relates to contemporary issues. Therefore, it will only cover China’s foreign policy from 2003 to 2016, rather that also including China’s leaders prior to Hu Jintao. However, the thesis analyzes Sino-African ties from the 1950s because the majority of China’s core Africa policies have been established since then. Third, when it comes to selecting African countries, the research set limits on countries’ located in Sub-Saharan Africa, where China is within public diplomacy range. The two case study countries and the FOCAC member nations are not only located in Sub-Saharan Africa, but were also selected because they share relations within the sphere of Chinese public diplomacy activity: media, educational institutes, cultural exchange institutes, and foreign aid including investment. The two case study countries that enjoy bilateral ties with China share some common denominators: they employ English as the official language, have ongoing economic development in each region, they are attempting to become full democracies, and they play an important role in the Chinese political economy system. On the other hand, the two countries also exhibit differences, for example their respective supplies of natural resources, their political stability, and their leaders’ political impressions of China.

14 It was in 2003, during the regime of Hu Jintao, that soft power was first officially mentioned in public as part of China’s foreign policy. Since then, up to 2016 and the regime of Xi Jinping, it has continued to be a strategic goal of the nation’s foreign policy.
analyzing the three case studies, one can analyze China’s public diplomacy from 2003 to 2016.

The next part will discuss data collection, which the research conducted using the following sources: 1) documentation, 2) archival records, and 3) interviews. Due to the fact that each data source has strengths and weaknesses, the three sources complement each other in the research.

**Documentary and Archival Records**

There are three categories of documentary and archival analysis: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary sources are 1) gained from first-hand/direct evidence or information about the event, objective, or people, and 2) made or recorded during the time period by a qualified person. Thus, primary sources are raw and need to be interpreted by the researcher, such as interviews, surveys, fieldwork, books and newspaper/magazine articles that contain factual information besides historical accounts, government records from governmental agencies and organizations, speeches, audio/video recordings, photographs, legal and financial documents, and others. Secondary sources are any items that were created by someone who was not directly involved in, or was an eyewitness to the events. Also, they can include interpreted, summarized, or processed primary sources by someone else, based on personal views and descriptions, such as articles from journals, newspapers, and magazines after the events, literature reviews of journal articles and books, government official publications and debates, historical studies, and others. Tertiary sources include dictionaries, bibliographies, directories, chronologies, textbooks, databases, encyclopedias, guidebooks, almanacs, and others that provide synthesized information and sources. They are comprised of abstracts, interpretations, or compilations of primary and secondary sources. (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004; Burnham, Lutz, Grant, and Layton-Henry, 2008; Given, 2008; Merriam and Tisdell, 2016).

The sources for this research are based primarily on literature in English. Due to the uniqueness of Chinese and African nations’ governments, the sources are often not offered in a transparent manner, if there are any available at all. In addition, access is not easy. Therefore, major materials for the study are drawn from all the sources published by Chinese and African nations’ governments; all sources published and issued in China and Africa, including speeches about policy makers and related interviews, TV coverage and documentaries, books written by policy makers, coverage of incidents, and official web-sites. Also, the research collected sources from the publications and archives of international organizations and institutions. As for official governmental publications and debates, and
publications and archives of international organizations and institutions, they offer more
reliable information than other secondary sources (Lutz, Grant, and Layton-Henry, 2008).
Other secondary sources were acquired from scholars’ research papers in major journals and
books, credible political web-sites, personal blogs of scholars, conferences, seminars, news or
newspapers reporting and materials, professional surveys, and think-tanks’ and school
research institutes’ output.

**Interviews**

The purpose of in-depth interviewing is to comprehend not only other individuals’
knowledge of life but also the meaning of experience in their lives. Therefore, interviewing
gives voice to another individual’s story (Seidman, 2006, p.9). In this context, Maccoby and
Maccoby define interviewing as “a face-to-face verbal exchange, in which one person, the
interviewer, attempts to elicit information or expressions of opinion or belief from another
person or persons” (1954, p.449). Kvale and Brinkmann (2008) interpret an interview as
gathering an interviewee’s information for analysis and clarification of certain phenomena in
political science (p.3). Based on the objectives and background of interview research,
therefore, a combination of “semi-structured interviews” and “standardized open-ended
interviews” were conducted for the following reasons.

There are three types of in-depth interview research that can be conducted (Patton, 2014,
pp.437-438). First, an “informal conversational interview”, which does not follow a
premeditated path – no prepared question topics nor wording – between interviewer and
interviewee. Second, a “semi-structured interview”, for which topic and issues are
predetermined by the interviewer beforehand, and the interviewer makes decisions about
the sequence of the interview questions and their wording. Third, a “standardized open-
ended interview”, which is conducted by putting a set of the same predetermined questions
to all interviewees. Interview questions are prepared based on precise word selections and
sequences conforming with a completely open-ended format. The second interview method
is similar to the third in terms of utilizing a premeditated interview form for minimizing the
effect of bias and subjectivity on the interview; whereas the third method has an advantage
over the second regarding the efficient management of interview time. Not only that, but the
comparison analysis of interview content is facilitated by this method (ibid, p.441).
According to Patton’s suggestion, by combining interview types, the interviewer is able to
conduct in-depth research on certain subjects through flexible examination (ibid). Therefore,
the interviews conducted for this paper were carried out using the second and third methods
– the “semi-structured interview” and “standardized open-ended interview” – to answer the
All interviews for the research will be conducted through an elite interview method, as this facilitates the interviewer in collecting valuable information through the eyes of elites who have broad experience and important positions in the realms of political economy and social culture (Marshall and Rossman, 2010, p.155). There are various definitions of the word “elite”, since the meaning within a specific area or society diverges from the subjective point of view towards it. However, in order to conduct an interview, the research follows Lamont’s extensive definition (2015): “elites are anyone who occupies a position of influence or importance within a particular organization that is under study” (p.84).

The purpose for utilizing elite interview methods is similar to the objectives of research case studies. One purpose is to confirm the role and necessity of China’s public diplomacy in Africa, based on the contents of Chapter 4. This process facilitates the cross-checking of collected data that comes from different sources in order to present reliable and definite findings. Not only that, another purpose is to gather rich, new and detailed information with regards to elites’ thoughts and their way of thinking about issues related to China’s public diplomacy in Africa. The other purpose is not only to draw inference from the elite interviews about the African public’s responses, opinions and awareness of China’s public diplomacy, but also to identify the elements of political economy that are not disclosed in the primary documentary and archival sources (Transey, 2007, pp.5-10).

Before discussing the detailed interview design, one needs to clarify interviewees in this research. To hear African public’s opinion, the set of interviews will be conducted with Chinese, Nigerian, and South African interviewees in three categories: (1) the media (2) cultural institutes, and (3) educational institutes. These were chosen based on the contents of China’s second white paper on its African policy (Xinhua News, 2015f). There are three reasons why the interview research adopts the three categories from China’s African policy white paper. First, in order to help fully understand the reason for selecting the categories, a brief account is necessary (a detailed explanation is in Chapter 5). China’s second white paper on its African policy, issued by the Chinese government in 2015, it focuses on not only supporting aid, trade, and investment but also supporting welfare, education, cultural exchanges, and media as part of the public diplomatic policy intended for African publics. Put another way, China carries out a multidirectional policy towards African countries’ governments and their people. As for China’s public diplomatic policy, it can be interpreted as China’s government’s attempts to comprehend African society and culture in tandem with disseminating China’s ideology, including its culture and the “peaceful coexistence” line. In
addition, the Chinese government takes the lead and establishes all of its public diplomatic policy. Thus, it is more reliable to conduct interviews with people in fields in which Chinese foreign policies are officially implemented, in order to comprehend its public diplomacy in Africa. Second, China executes its African policy with different plans in each African country. For that reason, there was some difficulty in gaining uniformity in the interviewees in Nigeria and South Africa. Thus, deciding on interviewees who are related to China’s public diplomacy activities in each country within each category, facilitated the conduct of interviews with appropriate questions. Third, the three categories are directly connected to the African public, and therefore it enables us to analyze the purpose of China’s public diplomacy that endeavours to communicate with the public. However, as mentioned earlier, China’s public diplomacy is implemented mostly through (1) foreign aid, (2) the media, (3) cultural institutes, and (4) educational institutes in Africa. For foreign aid, mainly documentation and archival records will be used to analyze detailed information. However, the research also conducted interviews of Chinese staff who work at Standard Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which are in South Africa, to learn of the general process of China’s aid as part of public diplomacy in African countries.

Building upon the discussion above, a key sample for interview in each category in each country is as follows: (1) the media: broadcast director at newspaper publishing company (including Internet newspaper), or broadcasting station, or radio station, or communications company; (2) the cultural institute: director or teachers at Confucius Institute/Cultural Center, or language centre at University; and (3) the educational institute: professor, or director, or trainer at human resource development centre (including technical training (agriculture, telecommunication technology, medical treatment), a university that has a Chinese government scholarship program, student exchange program to China, or research center or think tank to exchange information between China and Nigeria/South Africa. In addition to interviewees in the three categories, interviews were conducted with Chinese, Nigerian, and South African people who not only support China’s public diplomacy activities within the three categories, but who also understand the trends of China’s public diplomacy in the three categories.

The interviewee selection for the research follows the purpose of qualitative research, which is to interpret the meaning of the nature or phenomena, and to propose ideas and concepts or theories. For that reason, the interview samples are required to be related to relevant events, circumstances, and processes (Ritchie, Lewis, and Elam, 2003, p.82) in order to illuminate the role of China’s public diplomacy in Africa. Furthermore, the research focuses on not only the role of China’s public diplomacy in Africa, but also its necessity for each
African country. To identify China’s need of public diplomatic policy in Africa, the research will hold interviews with officials at the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Nigeria and South Africa. The reason for this decision is the difficulty in contacting Chinese governmental officials in China. Moreover, the Embassy officials in each country fully grasp the role of China’s public diplomacy, and have broad experience in their relevant localities. The fieldwork for the interviews was carried out in Nigeria (from November 18th, 2016, to December 19th, 2016, in Abuja and Lagos) and in South Africa (from February 16th, 2017, to March 14th, 2017, in Cape Town and Johannesburg). The sample size is approximately 12 people in total in each country, depending on the interviewees’ availability. Regarding the small sample size, Crouch and McKenzie (2006) suggests less than twenty samples when the research relies on phenomenographic research concepts or approaches, and it facilitates the researcher’s close associate with the interviewees, and enhance the validity of in-depth interview. Since the sample size is small, the research adopts snowball sampling – that is, receiving recommendations for other relevant, potential interviewees from confirmed interviewees. This sampling method is appropriate for the research that has a dispersed and small interviewee population (Ritchie, et al., 2003, p.94).

As mentioned above, the research focuses on the correlation between China’s public diplomacy activities and its effects, especially maintaining close economic relations with African countries, boosting Chinese economic development, and encouraging a positive reputation from the African public. These have not, so far, been studied in detail. Thus, the necessity of conducting interviews for the research lies in that fact that it has been difficult to ascertain the association between China’s public diplomacy activities and its effects from existing research, and to answer the research questions based only on available documents that discuss Chinese public diplomacy in Africa and Chinese enterprises’ activities in Africa separately. As for documentary and archival analysis, Bowen (2009) refers to documentary analysis as “a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents – both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material” (p.27). Current document/archival analysis enables the research to look into a variety of China’s public diplomacy policies and its actives in chronological order, rather than detailed descriptions of local people’s opinions. Nonetheless, information is sparse as a majority of data are published by the Chinese and African governments, and cannot give us a full picture of China’s public diplomacy. However, the most important element of the research is the general intent of public diplomacy, that China’s public diplomacy activities are also designed to engage with the African public, thereby analyzing its effects in Africa and answering the research questions. Therefore, the aim of the fieldwork interviews is not only to grasp and verify the effectiveness of China’s public diplomacy by gathering the opinions of Nigerian
and South African people, but also to obtain opinions of China’s public diplomacy strategy from Chinese officials at Chinese embassies. The interviews facilitate the gathering of very detailed information from the insights of interviewees acquired from their personal experience and knowledge.

The interview questions in Appendix II were used during fieldwork in Abuja and Lagos, Nigeria, in 2016. The interviews were conducted with Chinese interviewees at a Chinese newspaper (West Africa Business Weekly), Confucius Institutes, the Chinese Cultural Centre, the Chinese embassy, Chinese telecommunications companies (ZTE, Huawei, and a private company for the Chinese government), as well as Nigerian interviewees at government agencies. The second round of fieldwork was conducted in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2017. Interviews were conducted with Chinese interviewees working for Xinhua (a Chinese newspaper), Confucius Institutes, a private Chinese language education foundation, a Chinese telecommunications company (ZTE), the China Segment of South Africa at Standard Bank in South Africa, the African representative office at ICBC in South Africa, the Chinese property development company Shanghai Zendai, as well as South African interviewees at the China-Africa Project in the Journalism Department at University of Wits, the department of International Relations at University of Wit, and the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch. The second round of interviews was conducted in the same manner as the first. All interviews were conducted in person, on the ground, with in-depth interviews, which enabled me to uncover valuable perceptions, and enabled the research to find rich and descriptive data on Chinese public diplomacy activities – that is, the “real story” of public diplomacy based on the interviewees’ experiences, and opinions in Nigeria and South Africa from participants in the know. Also, it utilized the snowball sampling method. However, during the interviews, the majority of interviewees (N-B1, N-B2, N-B3, N-C1, N-D2, N-E2, S-A1, S-B1, S-C2, and S-E1) related to government agencies did not want to reveal their identities due to security concerns at their work, so they did not allow the interviews to be recorded, and instead notes were taken for their responses. Some Chinese interviewees requested that their English names be used and recorded, which they use in Nigeria and South Africa before starting interview. Thus, the research concealed names to protect interviewees’ privacy and followed interviewees’ request to use their English name which is what they are known as in Nigeria and South Africa on this thesis, according to ethical considerations. The list of interviewees is in Appendix I.

In sum, the research adopted a methodology of both documentary and archival analysis and interview methods to support each other and address the weaknesses inherent in each method. The interview findings were helpful to comprehend not only the connection
between China’s public diplomacy and its effects especially on economic relations between China and Nigeria/South Africa, but also the link between China’s public diplomacy and its foreign policy. This is because the interviewees’ personal experiences, current activities, and opinions were not published in available books or newspapers, because the Chinese government does not open its activities to the world except in official speeches and documents. However, it was hard to obtain all detailed information on China’s public diplomacy in Nigeria and South Africa from interviewees, due to their respective time restrictions. Hence, the research has collected various bits of information from secondary sources to address missing pieces that could not be obtained from interviewees to answer each chapter’s research question(s). However, the case study chapter about Nigeria and South Africa prioritized findings from interviews over secondary sources. Meanwhile, the FOCAC case study chapter is primarily based on primary sources published by the Chinese government and African countries, due to the inherent difficulty (impossibility) in conducting interviews with parties from over 50 African countries. In addition to the case study chapters, the other chapters used both primary and secondary sources.

1.4 Organization of the thesis

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background of the research topic and establishes the research questions, the structure of the thesis, and the methodology used to collect data and its analysis. Chapter 2 discusses neoliberal institutionalism in order to understand Sino-African economic relations and public diplomacy and provide a theoretical framework. Chapter 3 examines public diplomacy and discusses Joseph S. Nye’s concept of soft power, as well as the connection between propaganda and strategic communication to comprehend public diplomacy mechanisms. Chapter 3 also covers public diplomacy and soft power from the Chinese perspective, including a closer examination of the instruments of public diplomacy and the necessity of public diplomacy in international relations. Chapter 4 looks at detailed information of public diplomacy, how systematically governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental actors carry out China’s public diplomacy, and the significance of sustainable development on China’s foreign policy. This chapter also explains how China utilizes its public diplomacy to promote a pleasant environment for developing close economic ties with foreign countries. Chapter 5 explores Sino-Africa relations with a discussion of the necessity of China’s public diplomacy to economic ties between China and African countries, based on the contents of Chapters 3 and 4. It reviews China’s policies towards Africa from the 1950s to 1990s to trace developments and to understand how China obtained its ascendancy within the asymmetric economic
interdependence in Sino-African relations, and how it utilizes its policies towards African countries to become more deeply involved politically and economically. The chapter also analyses the white papers of China’s African policy, and investigates the necessity of public diplomacy in China’s African policy through an examination of disputes between China and Africa resulting from lopsided economic relations. Furthermore, it briefly discusses how China utilizes public diplomacy instruments (foreign aid, media, and cultural and education institutes) to boost economic ties with Africa. Chapters 6 and 7 are case studies that examine the role of public diplomacy to strengthen and deepen Sino-African relations in bilateral and multilateral ties. As for the bilateral relations chapters, it focuses on the relationships between China and Nigeria and South Africa, respectively. Thus, each chapter describes the background to the relationships and how they have evolved, and reviews their disputes with China in economic relations. Then, it discusses the role of public diplomacy and the use of foreign aid, media, and cultural and educational institutes, and evaluates the effect of China’s public diplomacy on the public and political economy sectors, and the relationships between each country and China. The multilateral relations chapter focuses on how China boosts cooperation with African countries through public diplomacy and institutions. Thus, it reviews the main agendas of each FOCAC meeting to examine the role of public diplomacy in institutions, and examines the mechanisms and institutions of FOCAC. Then, it examines how FOCAC, institutions, and public diplomacy closely connect with each other to boost economic relations between China and Africa, and evaluates the role of public diplomacy in multilateral ties. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. It draws together answers to the research questions, and examines the limitations of the research based on the discussion in all previous chapters. The chapter suggests research contributions and implications, and proposes potential avenues for future research.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

Understanding China’s foreign policy, strategy, and behaviour has become a major issue in International Relations (IR) study in recent years, but there is no consensus on how we should understand China as an international actor. Instead, there are several conflicting perspectives that have arisen when analyzing China’s contemporary foreign policy and behaviour in international relations. Many questions have been raised as to how to account for China’s foreign policy, and how it should be studied. This chapter cannot review all these questions, but will focus on those theoretical aspects that allow us to understand the relationship between China and Africa in terms of public diplomacy. Even this relationship is very broad. It is therefore necessary to identify a core relationship to study. This thesis focuses on public diplomacy in political economy relations – specifically, the role of China’s public diplomacy instruments: foreign assistance, media, and institutions. Therefore, this theory chapter explores and explains the role of public diplomacy in shaping the relationship between China and African nations in political economy, with a specific focus on economic interdependence. The chapter will argue that the focal point for China’s public diplomacy activities in African countries can best be explained within the school of neoliberal institutionalism, and through the use of complex interdependence theory as developed by Keohane and Nye. Drawing on neoliberalism, complex interdependence theory and research questions, this chapter will define the theoretical framework to analyze and explain the main political economy objectives of Sino-Africa relations and scrutinize why China’s foreign aid and investment requires and uses public diplomacy towards the sub-Saharan African nations.

2.1 Neoliberalism theory as an interpretation of complex interdependence

To understand complex interdependence in global relations, this section will first locate this concept within the school of neoliberalism. Before discussing neoliberalism, there are a few aspects of liberalism briefly review in the context of its fundamental assumptions in order to create a basis for comprehending neoliberalism. Liberalism as a political theory encompasses such as religious freedom rule under agreement, individual freedom, economic freedom, and democracy. Unlike realists, liberalists think that human nature is not necessarily evil; in other words, that relations between human beings can be reasonable and cooperative. The superiority of freedom lies in the good development of personality and cultivation of capability. By extension, liberalists emphasise the importance of freedom of
political economy, asserting the role of free trade in preventing war and establishing a peaceful and social harmony at the global level, through the division of labor in the global market, minimum economic interference by the state, and global economic freedom. To address anarchy in international relations, liberals look to international law, new international organizations, international regimes, world citizenship, and international ethics (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010, pp.96-98). Based on this, they support the view that liberal values – such as individual freedom, human welfare, world peace, the prevention of a war, the development of personality, and worldwide mutual cooperation – could be achieved in international society.

Drawing on the assumptions of liberalism, there are various types of liberal International Relations (IR) theory, which can be collected into four groups; first, commercial liberalism, republican liberalism, sociological liberalism, and neoliberal institutionalism (Grieco 1988; Keohane 1989; Baldwin 1993). However, this paper only focuses on the fourth category, neoliberal institutionalism, which stresses the importance of cooperation and the role of institutions in international relations. Neoliberal institutionalism has a notably different view to that of republican and commercial liberals. Where commercial and republican liberals claim that there is an automatic “balance of profit”, neoliberalism believe in “the role international institutions play in obtaining international collective outcomes” (Sterling-Folker, 2013, p.115). Moreover, neoliberal institutionalism shows the difference between the four types of liberalism. Contrary to other three types of liberalism, neoliberalism embraces international institutions in liberalism’s core assumptions, and shares several major assumptions with neorealism (Nye, 1988). In this way, Keohane interpreted neoliberal institutionalism as “not a single logically connected deductive theory, any more than is liberalism or neorealism: each is a school of thought that provides a perspective on world politics” (2011, p.158). First, neoliberalism shares with neorealism several assumptions that relate to man, the state (the state-centered assumption), and international system. Second, neoliberalism and neorealism are both considered to be a “paradigm or conceptual framework”, because they play a greater role than just “theory”, despite the fact that each is rooted in liberalism or Realism (Lamy, 2008, p.116). However, the shared assumptions between neoliberalism and neorealism have caused controversy over each other’s perspective. This matter is resolved when one examines the perception of the assumption gap between neoliberalism and Realism (ibid).

Despite liberalism regarding institutions as important, not all liberals place a high value upon international institutions as does neoliberal institutionalism. In addition to neoliberalism, the following theories have also embraced the assumption of the importance
of international institutions: functionalism, which stresses international integration; neofunctionalism, which focused on regional integration; and complex interdependence theory. Based on complex interdependence theory, neoliberal institutionalism took shape, and was further developed by Keohane’s 1984 publication, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. The following is a summation of the argument in his book:

 [...] I assume, with the Realists, that actors are rational egoists. I propose to show, on the basis of their own assumptions, that the characteristic pessimism of Realism does not necessarily follow. I seek to demonstrate that Realist assumptions about world politics are consistent with the formation of institutionalized arrangements, containing rules and principles, which promote cooperation (Keohane, 1988, p.67).

According to the arguments in his book, Keohane accepted the realist’s viewpoint of anarchy in the international system, and that anarchy hinders international cooperation. However, he pointed out that Realism underestimated international institutions’ ability when it comes to improving cooperation in international politics, on account of their overemphasis on conflict between nations. Put another way, realists such as Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer (2001) are of the opposite viewpoint, in which the anarchic nature of the international system would not change despite the influence on globalization. The nation would still be the most important actor in international relations; conflicts between nations would increase in the Post-Cold War era compared to during the Cold War. Unlike the neoliberalist view, realists believe interdependence and cooperation are difficult to realise between great powers, and are expected to be realised only between great powers and weaker nations. Unless the nature of anarchy in international relations changes, the importance of military power, particularly that of nuclear weapons, still takes precedence in the Post-Cold War period.

The major assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism regarding cooperation and institutions can be organized as follows. In contrast to liberalism’s view, neoliberalism accepts the salient state-centric perspective of neo-realism, whereby neoliberalists consider nations as unitary and rational actors in pursuit of maximizing absolute gains – which means that, insofar as nations acquire ‘profits’, neoliberalists are indifferent to the extent of other nations’ profit-making – through cooperation in all issue-areas in competitive international relations. In terms of cooperation from the institutional neoliberalist perspective, Keohane addresses cooperation as follows: “intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of
their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination” (1984, p.51-2). By extension, he differentiates cooperation from harmony and discord. He considers harmony to be “a situation in which actors’ policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard for others) automatically facilitate the attainment of others’ goal[s]”, which means that harmony occurs when actors align their policy and actions. This is shown in the example of trade relations in a competitive market world, Adam Smith’s invisible hand (demand and supply) (ibid, p.51). Counter to harmony, discord arises when cooperation is needed. Cooperation does not have “pre-existent harmony”, and so separate individuals or organizations need to reach a consensus on their actions through “policy coordination” in order to avoid creating discord (ibid, pp.52-4). However, a hindrance to achieving cooperation arises from nations cheat other nations, and do not conform with the expectations of cooperation. To overcome problems with cooperation, as Keohane pointed out above, nations are required to adopt the character of institutions, as international institutions exert their influence on cooperation between nations; and if the circumstance requires, nations can reform institution for the sake of mutual benefit and increasing the chance of securing their international interests (Lamy, 2008, pp.509-10). Neoliberal institutionalism’s assumptions, according to Keohane’s argument, can be fulfilled when it meets two requirements. First, mutual interests should exist between two nations, which means that the actors can obtain mutual interests through cooperation. Second, “the variations in the degree of institutionalization” have a considerable effect on state behaviour. This is due to the fact that institutional neoliberalism construes institutionalization as a constant instead of a variable in the international politics. It thus stresses that institutional variations are meaningless when it comes to explaining variations in actors’ behaviour, if the institutions are fully established in world politics (Keohane, 1989, pp. 2-3).

Neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the development of international cooperation between states and other actors, stressing not only the relations between cooperation and international institutions, but also the role of international organizations and international regimes. Institutional neoliberalism, although it overlaps with other liberalistic views, has become the mainstream in the era of globalization. Institutional neoliberalists seek to explain how and why nations will pursue cooperation based on the expansion of institutions in international relations. Thus, it is necessary to examine the meaning of “international institution” and “international regime” from the perspective of institutional neoliberalism.

What is the meaning of “international institution”? Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1993) pointed out that international institutions and international regimes are like the prime vehicle in neoliberalism, though the terms “institution” and “regime” are often interpreted differently
among International Relations (IR) scholars. Despite the fact that the two words exist, a large number of IR scholars put “sets of rules” meaning on international institutions towards government’s behaviour in international relations. The contextual meaning of rule is interpreted as the expression of “forbid, require, or permit particular kinds of actions” (Martin and Simmons, 2013, p. 328). In this regard, Keohane (1988) proposes the definition of institution as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”, and he considers institution to be “a general pattern of categorization of activity” or “a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized”, which can manifest in three forms: “formal intergovernmental or cross-national nongovernmental organization, international regimes, and conventions”, which would include international institutions (p.383). When differentiating between the three forms of international institutions, a “formal intergovernmental or cross-international nongovernmental organization” means a formal bureaucratic structure based on definite rule and purpose. Second, Keohane and Nye deem international regimes as “devices for enhancing the utility of actors whose interests were taken as given” (1997, p.660). Keohane also defines the meaning of “international regimes” as “specific institutions involving state and/or transnational actors, which apply to particular issues in international relations” (ibid, p. 384). In contrast, Young (1982) defines it as an “agreement among some specific groups of actors” (p.16). As such, the definition of international regime is open to interpretation, depending on the scholar’s perspective. From the various interpretations of regime, Krasner (1982) attempts to explain the occurrence of international regimes as the connection of “sets of [implicit or explicit] principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures” (p.186). Third, according to Keohane (1989), “conventions” – such as reciprocity, traditional diplomatic immunity – are “temporally and logically prior to regimes or formal international organizations” (p.4). This means that Keohane supposes that international institutions go through a process of development from convention to regime, to organization. Also, he argues that convention is the most informal of the three forms of international institution, and is comprised of actors understanding one another’s expectations and regulating actors’ behaviour based on explicit rules. As such, Keohane considers international institution to be an expansive concept that counters Ruggie’s view that international organizations and international institutions are subsumed under international regime as a comprehensive notion (Ruggie, 1975, p.568).

In summary, neoliberal institutionalism highlights nations’ cooperation through international institutions. Neoliberalists believe that international cooperation is both

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15 The thesis adopted Krasner’s perspective to understand the meaning of international regime.
necessary in, and an outcome of interaction and negotiation in international relations. Neoliberalists are scholars who analyze the development of international relations from the viewpoint of institutional liberalism rather than the influence of human nature and power politics. Realists, however, think that international institutions are the result of power relationships and can never suppress national interests or actions. Also, nations – especially great powers – can ignore institutions, norms and treaties, depending on their necessity. Unlike realists, neoliberalists explain the behaviors of international actors, particularly national actors, as controlled within institutions producing international relations with diverse structures (Grieco, 1998, p.494). This can be verified, in their view, through the concept of interdependence. Particularly in the UN, GATT, WTO and numerous environmental treaties, nations make an effort to establish the institution. Although nations do not always keep to the rules of the institution, regime, or treaty under the uncertain conditions of international relations, most of time they try to avoid disruptive behaviour. The reason for this can be found in the concept of sensitivity to the cost applied by change to the external environment, and vulnerability from the cost applied by foreign change after a policy change. In other words, nations seem to avoid subverting existing rules and regimes because of these sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Thus, it means that nations can achieve cooperation and standardised behaviour even in a state of anarchy. Therefore, neoliberalists focus on an optimistic view, in which international institutions can contribute to reducing international conflict and war considered inevitable by realists.

2.2 Complex Interdependence Theory

To get a clear understanding of the role of public diplomacy in China's foreign political economy, it is necessary to examine the goals China will pursue, and how China perceives external conditions in the process of carrying out its foreign aid and investment policy in order to achieve its objectives in international relations. There were three theories that prepared the ground for neoliberal institutionalism before the 1990s and oppose Realism’s arguments and its critical viewpoint of international politics. First was functional integration theory in the 1940s and early 1950s, second was regional integration theory in the late 1950s and 1960s, and third was complex interdependency theory in the 1970s. This chapter focuses on the importance of interdependence in international relations.

During the 1970s, Keohane and Nye observed the importance of international organizations for political negotiation in international relations in both transnational and
transgovernmental ties. In light of this, despite the fact that complex interdependence theory started as criticism of Realism, they introduced complex interdependence theory not as an alternative but as a supplement to Realism, with an explanation of international regime and redefinition of international organization in their 1977 publication, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. However, there are various interpretations of interdependence in international relations. As explained by Keohane and Nye (2011), “Dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces. Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence” (p.7). And they also argued that “Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (ibid). Also, interdependence exists “where there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions” (ibid, p.8). Keohane and Nye’s assumptions of Realism can be characterized as follows: “Military security will be the dominant goal; military force will be most effective, although economic and other instruments will also be used; potential shifts in the balance of power and security threats will set the agenda in high politics and will strongly influence other agendas” (1997, p.139).

### 2.2.1 Characteristics of complex interdependence

Keohane and Nye suggest three primary characteristics of complex interdependence theory. First, there are multiple channels that link societies, which include transgovernmental, interstate, and transnational relations. Interstate relations are the typical channels acknowledged by realists. Complex interdependence theory suggests patterns of interdependence will be formed through not only the informal and formal connections between governmental elites and foreign office arrangements, but also informal ties among nongovernmental elites like face-to-face and through telecommunication and transnational organization like multinational banks or corporations. Multinational firms and banks exert influence on domestic and interstate relations. Also, these actors are crucial as not only are “their activities in pursuit of their own interests”, but also because “they act as transmission belts, making government policies in various countries more sensitive to one another” (Keohane & Nye, 2011, p. 21). Second, there is “the absence of hierarchy among issues” and “military security does not consistently dominate the agenda” in complex interdependence (ibid, p.20). There are multiple issues and no definite agenda in interstate relationships. The boundary line between domestic and foreign issues has become ambiguous, and foreign

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affairs agendas have broadened. Governments stress not only “Agriculture; Commerce; Defense; Health, Education and Welfare; Interior; Justice; Labor; State; and Treasury” but also security in complex interdependence, whereas the realist gives weight only to national interests, the military, and security (ibid, p. 22). Third, there is a minor role for military force as a country’s instrument of policy (ibid, p. 21). It means that the use of military force can be unrelated to managing conflict of economic issues among members of an alliance, even if it is crucial for that alliance’s political and military relations with a rival bloc when complex interdependence prevails. Yet, force is less significant as an instrument of policy and is an inappropriate way of attaining objectives – i.e. economic and ecological welfare, which are gaining greater importance – despite the fact that intense relationships of mutual influence exist. This is because “the effects of military force are both costly and uncertain” (ibid, p. 23).

2.2.2 Power in asymmetrical interdependency

Keohane and Nye argue that asymmetrical interdependency can be the source of power in “relations between transnational actors (such as multinational corporations) and governments as well as interstate relation” (2011, p. 15). The basis for their argument is as follows:

(1) Asymmetric interdependence can be the root of power. Keohane and Nye considered power as “control over resources”, or “the potential to effect outcomes” (2011, p. 10).

(2) There are two different angles of power – “sensitive interdependence” and “vulnerability interdependence” – that stem from asymmetric interdependence. The meaning of interdependence is “sensitivity obscures some of the most important political aspects of mutual dependence” (Keohane & Nye, 2011, p. 11). The significance of sensitivity is the “liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation”, in a sense of “the cost of dependence” (ibid, p. 10). Also, sensitivity contains “degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework”. One could therefore ask: “how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?” Sensitivity can be determined by two cases: “the volume of flows across borders” and “the costly effects of changes in transactions on the societies or governments” (ibid, p. 10). If the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increases oil prices, as an example of sensitivity, there is a direct influence on oil prices (an increase) in oil importing countries.
In addition, vulnerability means “an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events after policies have been altered”. This is based on “the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face”, and is judged “only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time” (Keohane & Nye, 2011, p.11). To understand the context of vulnerability, one can extend the example above: the oil importing country could formulate various alternative power means, such as establishing a nuclear power plant or mediating ways to diversify the oil import market to stabilize oil supply, even if the country shows sensitivity due to the rise in the price of oil.

(3) The strong and the weak nature of power are the result of asymmetric interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2011, pp. 13-16). Keohane and Nye suggest the significance of vulnerability with regard to “understanding the political structure of interdependence relationships” (2011, p.13). In general, a powerful nation in the perspective of Keohane and Nye, is one that it is not susceptible to vulnerability (as in 2, above). They also claim that “sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability interdependence in providing power resources to actors”, and that “if one actor can reduce its costs by altering its policy, either domestically or internationally, the sensitivity patterns will not be a good guide to power resources” (ibid, p.13). Keohane and Nye propose how policy makers and analysts can avert asymmetric sensitivity interdependence: policy must be reviewed as a “pattern of vulnerability interdependence”, because “an analysis of actual and potential vulnerabilities” should provide background for consistent policy (ibid, p. 14). Yet, they pointed out that “influence deriving from favourable asymmetries in sensitivity is very limited when the underlying asymmetries in vulnerability are unfavourable”. This is the reason that “if one set of rules puts an actor in a disadvantageous position, that actor will probably try to change those rules if it can do so at a reasonable cost” (ibid, p.15).

2.3 Theory application and relevance to research topic

Based on the above explanation of neoliberalism and complex interdependence theory, this section will explain how the theories can be applied to the research questions of this thesis. Therefore, the following explanations provide an approach to understanding the underlying causes and factors in Sino-Africa relations, and therefore the connection with China’s public diplomacy.

2.3.1 Sino-Africa relations under complex interdependence
As has been noted in the section covering the background of China-Africa relations, the long-standing ties between China and Africa laid the foundations for present bilateral ties. These relations display economic interdependence through the fact that China’s objective in Africa is securing not only natural resources and a strong market into which they can export their products, but also the extension of power alliances to secure China’s position as a strong nation in the international community. From the perspective of African nations, Chinese foreign aid and overseas investment, notwithstanding some negative opinions, serves as encouraging growth in many different spheres including political economy, welfare, social/cultural, and others. In this overall perspective, the bilateral ties between China and African nations present complex interdependence in terms of the pursuit of economic interests, i.e. win-win cooperation, using diverse strategies without resorting to military force. In addition, and contrary to realist assumptions, relations between China and Africa under complex interdependence exhibit bargaining processes, such as the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), in place of a power struggle.

Thus, Sino-Africa relations, especially in the context of China’s power politics, can be explained in the category of complex interdependence. To use Keohane and Nye’s formulation, “patterns of interdependence and patterns of potential power resources in a given issue-area are closely related [- indeed.] two sides of a single coin” (1987, p.730). The issue of China’s resource investment and Africa’s natural resource supply is construed as an issue-specific power structure model, instead of an overall power structure, as the circulation of power capabilities within a specific issue might shift freely, irrespective of the circulation of general abilities.

When considering power politics deriving from asymmetrical sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence under complex interdependence, there is a power hierarchy in asymmetrical interdependence that is the source of power. China’s power politics to secure natural resources in Africa is asymmetric interdependence in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability. Given this situation, it is crucial to consider the pattern of asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence that provides power resources to actors in Sino-Africa relations. There is a marked contrast between China’s previous and current foreign policies. In contrast to China’s previous foreign investment objective, which was confined to obtaining natural resources and mining cooperation, the current Xi Jinping era expanded the scope of its foreign aid to emphasize mutual cooperation for development in the realms of infrastructure, transportation networks, manufacturing industries, medical services and health care (Y. Sun, 2014), through multilateral channels in Sino-Africa relations under the management of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Even though, ostensibly, China has
started to reform its foreign investment, the fact remains that China’s main purpose in Sino-Africa relations is acquiring a market for its manufactured exports and securing natural resources. For example, since the Hu Jintao era, China rendered a large amount of aid to Africa and received payment in natural resources, including crude oil and minerals-rights and interests. Considering this, two examples lend themselves to ascertain the main purpose of China’s foreign aid to Africa. The first is that the Chinese government did not make clear their position on a concessional loan to Africa in the foreign aid white paper of 2014. Also, according to the Chinese and Africa economic and trade cooperation white paper of 2013, investment is highly concentrated in the mining and finance sectors (Xinhua News, 2013). The other fact is that China’s natural resources, i.e. those related to oil and not, still comprise a large proportion of imports from Africa (The World Bank, 2015c). This will be explained in more detail through a case study, in Chapter 6 and 7. Under the conditions of China’s foreign policy consisting of trade, investment and aid, China and Africa are shown to have an asymmetrical structure, since China possesses investment capital and technology, but lacks natural resources. Africa is the opposite, as they lack capital and technology but have access to natural resources.

For these reasons, the majority of Africa’s nations failed to hold a dominant position in two ways: China’s investment into Africa (such as that is, the inflow of capital and technology transfer) and their balance of trade with China (such as markets for manufactured goods). Notwithstanding the fact that relations between China and Africa are for pursuing economic interests under ‘win-win cooperation’ and ‘the five core foreign policy principles’, the majority of the African nations’ economies are greatly influenced by Chinese capital injections. Africa depends heavily on China not only buying its raw materials and crude oil, but also importing industrial products. The following example is a true reflection of the state of affairs in Africa that results in a domino effect on most sectors of its economy, resulting from of Chinese capital injections: China has been experiencing a prolonged downturn in economic growth since 2012, which hit bottom in 2015. Its declining economic growth led to a decrease in demand for raw materials and in investment. Consequently, it had trouble exporting manufactured goods to Africa. This situation coincided with a price reduction for raw materials and oil. This meant less business and income for Africa’s natural resource producers, because China’s economic slow-down did not generate the same appetite or need for large amounts of imported crude oil and other raw material from Africa. This resulted not only in business shrinkage in the private sector, mass unemployment, and a socio-economic crisis in African nations, but also led to economic recession – especially in those countries whose economies are more focused on natural resources. This phenomenon was unavoidable, as most of Africa’s natural resource producers are bound up with their dependence on
foreign trade and, for a long time now, their ties to China. Despite the fact that African nations are suffering from economy difficulties, however, it is hard for them to set up countermeasures, such as import and economic diversification, long-term business support policies, to avoid the current situation as it would burden them with costs imposed by China’s unexpected events to changed policies. China, on the other hand, can seek alternative sources from which to secure natural resources, and other markets for its exports, when it comes to advancing their common objective, ‘win-win cooperation’.

2.3.2 The correlation of complex interdependence relations with China’s public diplomacy

To facilitate understanding of China’s public diplomacy it is necessary to examine why the Chinese government adopted public diplomacy, by way of soft power, when they pursued a differentiation of policy strategy and encountered some difficult situations and responses when applying their foreign policy in Sino-Africa relations.

Africa is indispensable to China’s ability to secure energy resources. Africa’s natural resource sector is, as observed earlier, considered a significant factor to stable and abundant energy supplies needed to maintain China’s continued economic growth, which is closely linked not only to the legitimacy of its one-party system, but also to the unification of the Chinese people. To achieve its goal, the Chinese government meditates ways to diversify the overall diplomatic strategy; for example, from carrying out summit diplomacy that is based on bilateral relations, to multinational diplomacy and exploring and opening overseas markets and supply chains. Despite the fact that Sino-African relations are in a condition of complex interdependence, the Chinese government has placed increased emphasis on one particular tool – public diplomacy – in its foreign assistance strategy, by introducing Chinese culture in order to promote amicable relations and resolve conflicts between China and the continent, and to maximize its national interest. The following cases show how the Chinese government utilizes public diplomacy in its foreign investment policy.

First, China employs public diplomacy through soft power to manage its public image. There have been various instances of negative publicity of China’s foreign aid to African nations, and its reputation does not exert favorable influence over African nations in the long term. The Chinese government, therefore, adopted different public diplomacy approaches to address critical African and international public opinion of China’s investment in Africa. In accordance with globalization, the change of the diplomatic paradigm not only defused the
prejudice of a “China Threat”, but also boosted its amicable and peaceful national image, a kind of “China Opportunity Theory”, to the world. In turn, despite China still adhering to the “principle of non-intervention”, it sought to widen its field of cooperation in substantive and humanitarian aid – for example, educational assistance, construction of public interest facilities, medical services, and others – in order to detract from an impression of a purely mercantilist pursuit of profit in troubled nations, as had emerged in Sudan and Angola.

Second, public diplomacy via soft power facilitates the reduction of impression distance between China and Africa. The significance of communication is abundantly clear in modern society. Insofar as Sino-Africa relations are characterized by complex interdependence, it is hard to neglect the development of a mutual sense of solidarity to elicit connectedness and identity from two nations' people. This is because, in turn, it will lead to cooperation for mutual benefit. So, the Chinese government pushes forward with cultural and social sharing and interaction, by establishing Confucius Institutes and holding a variety of international forums, and others.

Third, public diplomacy assists China’s strategic policy diversification under its policy of “peaceful coexistence”. China takes a different approach to Africa than that of Western countries, using a variety of means in eclectic fields that the West does not attempt to pursue. African nations had accepted the Western model of political reform and economic restructuring, based on political democratization and economic liberalization as a means for stabilizing public livelihood and lead the development of nations. By following this model, they experienced unexpected results, such as intensifying confusion in their politics and economies. As a result, African nations became interested in the “China model”, which stands on a basis of national political control and state-led development as an alternative to the West’s recommendations. China has since formulated its own foreign policy, sometimes called the “Beijing Consensus”, based on a performance system and policy regulation through public diplomacy that differentiates from the West: for example, introducing the elements of capitalistic market economy, no compulsory demands of human rights resolutions, nor political liberalization.

Despite the fact that China’s foreign aid, essentially, performs as the core of its foreign relations to support the maintenance of amicable cooperative relations with developing nations, public diplomacy through soft power plays a role in bridging the delicate gap between policy and African nations by presenting China as “a responsible great power” in global society. The Chinese government, for example, offered diverse aid, including
preferential loans, development aid, manpower development, medical services, and others, as “cooperation” for mutual benefit and development. Not only that, Beijing offers infrastructure construction, a so-called “concrete diplomacy”, as a part of foreign aid to consolidate its position in Africa, but also stresses a closer identity with developing countries through “South-South cooperation”, a condition of equivalent mutual cooperation for development in a bid to increase its influence in international society. In recent years, Chinese president Xi Jinping pushed ahead with a “One Belt, One Road” strategy to prompt economic community that highlighted the expression of “joint”, “mutual”, and “cooperation”.

2.4 Public diplomacy in international relations theory

As public diplomacy has become an important tool for connecting China’s African strategy to its economic objectives, this section discusses International Relations theory related to public diplomacy and soft power, as these two main concepts are central to this dissertation and to understanding the role of China’s public diplomacy in its foreign policy. Firstly, public diplomacy from the Chinese perspective will be examined, as China adheres to its own viewpoints to understand public diplomacy in international society, which differ from the West’s interpretation. Secondly, as globalization stresses the importance of soft power, due to limitations of hard power following the end of the Cold War, this section will examine soft power within the framework of neoliberalism. Thirdly, a discussion concerning public diplomacy after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 from a Constructivist viewpoint will be covered. Lastly, the fourth part discusses Realism from a public diplomacy angle during the Cold War.

2.4.1 Public diplomacy from the Chinese perspective

Before the examination of international relations theory, it is necessary to talk about the Chinese viewpoint of public diplomacy through soft power, as it is differs from the Western perspective. As soft power has become a key component of China’s foreign policy, it must be examined in general context of China’s conduct of public diplomacy. Chinese international relations scholars identify problems of systematic analyses, and critique Nye’s concept of soft power because it focuses on the American viewpoint and reflects their experiences with political economy. Given these reasons, Chinese scholars have redefined the concept of soft power from the Chinese perspective, in order to explain and connect it with Chinese culture, thereby studying a soft power with Chinese characteristics. These efforts are aimed at improving China’s public image, following the example of the West to develop the potential
for Chinese soft power as a tool of foreign relations. According to a study by Wang (2014), a Chinese international strategy expert, analysis of the Chinese academic world has a broader concept of Chinese soft power than the formulation presented by Nye. In contrast to Nye’s focus on American culture and politics, which are still connected with the concept of American exceptionalism and manifest destiny, Wang pointed out, Chinese scholars concentrate on identifying key factors for its soft power based on China’s nature, culture, and history to achieve a harmonious world by respecting diversity and stressing ethics from a Confucian perspective. China holds Confucian ideals in high self-esteem, which has had a positive effect on Chinese modernization, harmonious coexistence thought, patriotism and others. The character of China’s soft power, reflected in its public diplomacy which functions to boost China’s national image, raises Confucianism’s status further, and is aims to disseminate its ideals.

In the matter of China’s different viewpoint of international relations, Buzan and Acharya (2010) argue that it is hard to explain the current IR situation in Asia completely using only Western international relations theories. They offer the example of how China responds to the Chinese “power rise”. According to their argument, China has concentrated on solving issues presented by their continuous rise in power by developing a Chinese school of international relations, opposed to the “China threat theory”. It is difficult to connect to international relations theories developed by Western scholars for interpretation (ibid, pp.2-3). Despite these difficulties in examination, this research attempts to analyze the role of public diplomacy through soft power, identity, and norms by using Constructivism and institutionalism, via neoliberalism in international relations theory. This is because those theories play a pivotal role in Chinese public diplomacy in sub-Saharan African nations.

2.4.2 Public diplomacy from the perspective of neoliberal and complex interdependency theory

The characteristics of complex interdependence theory are linked to public diplomacy’s character:

Public diplomacy describes the means by which states, associations of states, and non-state actors understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance their interests and values. (Gregory, 2008).

Nye’s concept of soft power connotes a typical concept of neoliberalism, and his idea is to
place public diplomacy at the centre of 21st Century international relations. A shift from hard power to soft power articulated by Nye (2004) illustrates a process where agreement is reached depending on the spectrum of actions taken. The process has four steps: “coercion, conciliation, agenda-setting and charm” (p.8). These four steps utilize resources amenable to each action: “force and restraint, compensation and buy-off, system, value, culture and policy” (ibid. p.10). In other words, the concepts of soft power and hard power identified by Nye may be deemed as a combination of Robert Dahl’s political power view under behaviourism, and a resource-oriented instrumental political power view adopted by the mainstream of international political science. Based on this view, power is an ability to procure intended outcomes by affecting others’ actions based on the possession of specific resources (ibid, p.3). Rather than merely adopting these two political views, however, a notable characteristic of Nye’s power concept lies in the fact that pays more attention to the ‘non-material’ and ‘relational’ aspects that generate and operate power.

Nye’s Soft power can be subdivided into culture, political value and foreign policies, with the specific components of economic power, education, academic arts and foreign affairs, and subjective elements of a nation’s global presence, role and tradition. According to Nye’s claim (2004), the soft power of the United States is comprised of three things: American culture, political view and foreign policy. That is, America’s high-end (pop) culture, democracy and civil rights for American political view, and the details and style of American foreign policy. Each of these may have generated hostility in some countries; however, America has generally managed to charm or attract the world as a whole. Soft power does not engage in direct functions, such as military threats or economic sanctions. Instead, it induces others to respond in an intended manner through indirect influence designed to promote others’ compliance. Nonetheless, Nye asserts that soft power is a tool difficult to directly impose, because it is a concept that exists under universal values – however, soft power may be more effective than coercion. This is because the key elements of soft power are comprised of intangible resources, and it is therefore difficult for a nation to control. Also, because the influence of soft power differs depending on the given situation, it is hard to attain intended outcomes within desired timeframes.

The significance of public diplomacy and soft power is highlighted in an interdependent and globalized world. Keohane and Nye (2002) defined globalization in connection with interdependence as “a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at a multicontinental distance. These networks can be linked through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances (such as acid rain and pathogens)” (p.193). Thus, “global”
refers to “a network of relationship”, including multicontinental distance and global links to “networks of connections (multiple relations), not simply to single linages”; a good example of economic or military interdependence is between the United States and Japan. Moreover, multilateral interdependence, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, qualifies as multicontinental interdependence. An integrated world market is another example, as it would allow for the free flow of people, goods, and capital, and convergence in interest rates (ibid). Hence, Keohane and Nye (2002) understand that globalization refers to a series of processes of increases and decreases in globalism (pp.193-195), but they emphasized that globalization is “the process by which globalism becomes increasingly thick” (p.198).

Keohane and Nye (2002) comprehended that interdependence and globalism are both multidimensional phenomena and suggest four types of globalism based on economic, military, environmental, and social and cultural network. Economic globalism “involves long-distance flows of goods, service, and capital, and the information and perceptions and that accompany market exchange”; military globalism “refers to long distance network of interdependence in which force, and the threat or promises of force, are employed”; environmental globalism “refers to the long distance transport of materials in the atmosphere or oceans or of biological substances”; and social and cultural globalism “involves movement of idea, information, and image, and of people – who of course carry idea and information with them” (pp.195-196). This includes the diffusion of knowledge or the movement of religions. Moreover, these interdependences interact with other types of globalism as economic, military, and environmental activities convey “information and general ideas, which may then flow across geographical and political boundaries” (p.197). By extension, Keohane and Nye (2002) refer to political globalism refers to that “subset of social globalism that refers to ideas and information about power and governance”. Political globalism is measured by imitation effects, the diffusion of government politics, or of international regimes (ibid). However, Keohane and Nye (2002) point out that the division of globalism into separate dimensions is inevitable, yet somehow arbitrary, and suggest three ways to create thick globalism: increased “density of networks”, “institutional velocity”, and “transnational participation” (p.199).

Thus, due to globalization and the emerging information-age, power was shifted from states

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17 Keohane and Nye (2002) argue that the World Trade Organization (WTO), Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Montreal Convention, and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are responses to economic, military, environmental, and social globalization (p.197).

18 The meaning of thickness is that “different relationships of interdependence intersect more deeply at more different point” (Keohane & Nye, 2002, p.201).
to non-state actors, and most information is now interdependent between actors. Public diplomacy encourages cooperation among nations, international actors and foreign public through mutual understanding through two-way communications. On that note, public diplomacy in conjunction with soft power shares the neoliberal perspective that public diplomacy pursues cooperation by sharing soft power with others to achieve common goals, rather than to dominate others.

### 2.4.3 Public diplomacy from the perspective of Constructivism

Constructivism is a theoretical approach focusing on the possibility that national identity or national goals can be created and structured depending on the context in which nations study each other through interactions in the international community. Also, it holds a different perspective of the nature of international relations. Constructivists have focused on the following: first, “the idea of social construction suggests difference across context rather than a single objective reality”; second, “Constructivists have emphasized the social dimensions of international relations, and have demonstrated the importance of norms, rules, and language at this level”; and third, “Constructivists introduced the possibility of agency and have emphasized processes of interaction” (Fierke, 2013, p.189). According to Wendt (1999), a Constructivist, national goals are not fixated with history, and Constructivism asserts that a nation's behaviour keeps changing. In other words, national preference is not fixed, but rather evolves through new learning processes. Hence, national identity as well as international relations is evolving. The concept of nation-states and colonial control can be taken as an example. Since Constructivism is an understanding of the international society as a reality that continues to change, rather than one with a deductive theoretical frame, it may be considered to be more of an approach rather than a theory.

Wendt (1999) describes international politics as “socially constructed”, and that “these structures shape actors’ identities and interests rather than just their behaviour.” He suggests two core beliefs that are the main principles of Constructivism, which he calls the “two basic tenets”. First, that “the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces”. Second, that “the identities and interests of purposive actors are conducted by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt, 1999, p.1). He explains, using these tenets, that Constructivism criticizes a “materialist” perspective, and adopts an “idealist’s” perspective that stresses “social”, opposes “individualist” and accepts the “holist” or “structuralist’s” viewpoint. He organizes these accounts as “structural idealism”, referred to as “socially constructed” in international politics. In other words, it is “mutually constitutive” and “co-determined” under the
structure and agency as “social” (ibid, p.1, 184). The idealism in Constructivism is meant to accept “the role of ideas” in international politics, and “observes that the meaning and construction of that material reality is dependent on ideas and interpretation” (Barnett, 2008, p.430). Also, the holism in Constructivism is “recognizing that agents have some autonomy and their interactions help to construct, reproduce and transform those structure” (ibid, p.430). Wendt suggests three virtues for an idealistic approach to international relations. First, a “program of empirical research for studying the content of real world state interests.” Second, “an idealist approach to interests also suggests ways to operationalize the relationship between cognition (agency) and culture (structure).” Third, “new possibilities for foreign policy and systemic change” (1999, pp.133-4).

In Wendt’s Constructivist view of structure, agency and culture (1999), Constructivism is focused on shared “knowledge”, or “culture,” instead of private beliefs. However, this sharing can result in either cooperation or conflict. He also points out that culture can be a form of ideology, norm, rule, and/or organization. In this way, Constructivism can be associated with public diplomacy. Public diplomacy calls this cultural diplomacy, which is “the linchpin of public diplomacy; for it is in cultural activities that a nation’s idea of itself is best represented” (U.S. Department of State, 2005, p.1), and their activities can be summarised as follows:

Cultural Diplomacy may best be described as a course of actions, which are based on and utilize the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation or promote national interests (Institute for cultural diplomacy, n.d).

Also, Constructivists consider identity as a crucial element that emerges from international interactions. In this regard, Onuf (1998) argues that “Constructivism is a way of studying social relations – any kind of social relations” (p.1), and Ruggie (1998) also insists that “core Constructivist research concern is what happens before the neo-utilitarian model kicks in” (p.867). Wendt (1999) describes identity as the “property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions. This means that identity is at base a subjective or unite-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-understanding.” And he suggests there are “four kinds of identity”¹⁹; first, “personal or corporate”; second, “type”; third, “role”; fourth,

¹⁹Wendt (1999) explains them thus: “personal or corporate identity is a site or platform for other identities”. And the term type identity refers to “a social category or label applied to persons who share (or are thought to share) some characteristic or characteristics, in appearance, behavioral traits, attitudes, values, skills (e.g. language), knowledge, opinions, experience, historical commonalities (like region or place of birth), and so on” (p.22). Also, the role identity takes the dependency on culture and are not based on intrinsic properties (p.227). Collective identity takes “the relationship between Self and Other to its logical conclusion, identification. Identification is a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether” (p.229).
“collective” (p.224).

This Constructivist perspective is focused on non-material elements such as culture, knowledge, information and norms as components of international relations and society. Public diplomacy also emphasizes the importance of interaction through non-material elements that Constructivism prioritises for having common understanding. By extension, the ultimate goal of public diplomacy is “ensuring a positive perception of their activities among domestic and international audience to achieve their goal” (Pagovski, 2015, p.8). In addition, this interaction has led to a shift in the definition of public diplomacy, as follows; “from achieving behavioural goals to attitudinal/cognitive goals; ranging from information provision (monologue) to communication (dialogue); persuasion to relationship building; and managing publics to engaging with publics” (Szondi, 2008, p.10). Therefore, the Constructivist perspective is helpful for understanding the identity factor in public diplomacy.

However, Constructivism’s perspective is hard to provide a clear framework with which to understand China’s public diplomacy due to the limitations of China’s soft power in areas such as human rights issues, minority race issues, Tibetan independence, China’s rapid economic development (the ‘China Threat’), freedom of religion, and others that arise from its socialist system. In other words, there is a difference in opinion over China’s identity based on its culture, history, norms, and institutions, which are the basic source of its soft power. In connection with China’s identity in the international society, David Kerr (2015) argued as follows:

China’s international identity is undoubtedly a problem in its relations with international society. The official explanation is that this is because other countries do not understand China, its history, traditions and institutions. An alternative explanation is that the various forms of international identity that China has proposed since 1949 have been state-defined and state-interested. Allowing China’s civil society to have more influence and authority over China’s international identity would not only produce more creativity in this area but would encourage other civil societies to revalue their views of China. (p.57)

Thus, as mentioned above, China’s identity hinders to be identified which “becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether” (Wendt, 1999, p.229) with other countries. By extension, it limits the influence of China’s public diplomacy towards foreign nations.
2.4.4 Public diplomacy from the perspective of Realism

Realist thought emphasizes the state-oriented, international system of anarchy, and considers the pursuit of power to be a normal means of achieving survival and security. This dominant view was challenged by new international relations theories in the early 1970s. This challenge played a great role in encouraging other new responses to emerge. Challenging Realism, there are many international relations theories such as neoliberalism and concepts of interdependence, international regime and institutionalism. Before discussing Realism, it is important to state that, as for Realism’s connection with this research topic and content, there is practically no immediate connection between public diplomacy and Realism. However, due to the fact that Realism has relevance to institutional neoliberalism and complex interdependence theory, this section will cover a comprehensive view of Realism that is linked directly with the two core theories, so as to answer the research questions.

Realism is divided into three categories: classical Realism, beginning with Thucydides’ text on the Peloponnesian War, and extending to the start of the twentieth century; modern realism, 1939–79; and structural or neorealism, 1979 onwards (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011, p.89). In Realism, international politics after the World War II is analyzed based on power relations between nations. As representative scholars, Morgenthau (2005) asserted that the conflicts between nations in international politics are unavoidable in the process of obtaining power related to a nation’s advantages over other nations. Therefore, Morgenthau mentioned that Realism is the objective law based on human beings’ selfishness. His perspective of human nature is based on Hobbes’s view of classical Realism, that “the natural condition of man is a state of war” (Donnelly, 2000, p.14). Not only that, his thoughts – such as power-oriented and selfish human nature, state-centric view, states as unitary actors, power politics in international politics, and others – exerted their influence on the formation of Realism’s core assumptions.

In explaining international relations through the lens of power, Morgenthau (2005) argued that in Realism, the most important performer of international politics is the nation. He hypothesized that cooperation between nations is not possible because the purpose of nations is to increase their national power; and that the best policy is a diplomatic policy serving the national interest. In addition, he argued that the superpower system can prevent

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20 The weakness of the historical sequence’s organization overlooks “the important question about divergence within each historical phase.” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011, p.89); Dunne, T., & Schmidt, B. C. (2011). Realism. In J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P. Owens (Eds.), The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations (5th ed.). (pp. 86–99). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
conflicts between nations in the international system, and that the balance of power between superpowers is a strong force that can bring the international order and peace. His core argument was, “politics is government by laws that are created by human nature. The mechanism we use to understand international politics is the concept of interests, defined in terms of power” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011, p.90). However, his assertion has been criticized for the following reasons: the balance of power between superpowers in the international system induced conflicts between other nations; it could not explain the increases in instances of international cooperation, nor the increased role of non-governmental institutions and international organizations (Kaufman, 2006).

Structural Realism, developed after 1979, shared Morgenthau’s view that international politics is organised around the pursuit of power, but takes a different position on human nature from the classic realist’s. Structural realists argue, instead, that “the international system creates the same basic incentives for all great powers”, and “ignore cultural difference among states as well as differences in regime type” (Mearsheimer, 2013, p.78). Mearsheimer’s position, an offensive realist theory, accounts for relations between the great powers, and the modern state and claims “offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want” (2001, p.63). He explains the reason why states fight over power is because of the “structure of the system”, and characterizes states' interest in strength as “states maximize relative power, with hegemony as their ultimate goal” (p.65). He also insists that “great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power” (p.87). He puts emphasis on accumulating power, and suggests that the ideal position is to achieve global hegemony, although he acknowledges that it is hard to realize (p.32). In contrast to Mearsheimer's offensive Realism, other realists such as Aron (1996), Wight (1978), and Kissinger (1994) think diplomacy plays a crucial role in maintaining the equilibrium of international politics. In this regard, culture and ideological systems are also significant elements for settling disputes between states who “belong to the same type” and “share common policy goals”, via the framework of trusted diplomacy (Chiaruzzi, 2012, p.41).

By reviewing Realism’s core assumptions, in sum, modern Realism focuses on structural power under anarchy, since relations between states are determined by their structural

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21 Morgenthau suggested ‘six principles’ in political realism; first, “politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature”; second, “interest is defined in terms of power”; third, “interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but whose meaning can change”; fourth, “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in the abstract; the circumstances of time and place must be considered”; fifth, “the moral laws that govern the universe are distinct for the morals of any one nations”; sixth, “the differences between political realism and other schools is real and profound” (Morgenthau, 2005).
relations, and there is a limited role for inter-state diplomacy. Diplomacy points to the common interests of states in achieving order under anarchy and avoiding destructive wars, but diplomacy cannot guarantee order or peace, which are structural effects. In order to settle a dispute, as reviewed above, the majority of realists presuppose that the surest and more secure way is through dependence on military force, rather than communication, with regards to security issues. But realists face demands to change their approach to military power and intervention, to which they adhered since World War II, due to changes in international relations since the end of the Cold War. Thus, present-day diplomacy often operates as ‘Coercive Diplomacy’, which means the “use of limited force to persuade an opponent to stop pursuing an activity it is already undertaking”, with the purpose of showing an enemy the cost of defying conformity (Kegley and Blanton, 2015, pp.254-262). In conclusion, few structural realists consider diplomacy as an important element in world politics, which is still largely organised around force or the threat of force. In consequence, what needs to be understood is that the realist’s understanding of diplomacy proposes a different approach when compared to neoliberalist and Constructivist public diplomacy, which has communication and comprehension at its core. Thus, Realism is excluded as one of the primary theories for this research since its core assumptions do not give significance to public diplomacy.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed neoliberalism and complex interdependence theory. It has established that Sino-African relations show asymmetrical interdependence notwithstanding that China and African nations pursue mutual interests under cooperative relations. China achieves its political economy purposes from Africa in return for foreign assistance, such as rendering aid and investment, and by introducing its culture and development model under the pretext of contributing to African economic growth. However, there is still a considerable disparity between China and Africa with regards to economic dependence. Thus, China is required to seek ways to reduce the gap between its African policy objectives and the results of its policy implementation, as reflected in the responses of African governments, organizations and publics. This chapter proposed the necessity for public diplomacy by discussing Sino-Africa’s asymmetrical interdependence. It also gave an account of the role of China’s public diplomacy in the context of China and Africa’s interdependent relationships, using the neoliberal institutionalist perspective.
After reviewing neoliberalism, Constructivism, and Realism, this chapter identified the character of public diplomacy from a Chinese perspective and three international relations theories. It also found that China perceived public diplomacy in its own way, presenting in contrast to the West. However, due to globalization and the emerging information-age, China’s public diplomacy focuses on encouraging cooperation among nations and foreign public through mutual understanding through two-way communications. On that note, China’s public diplomacy in connection with soft power could understand the framework of neoliberal perspective that public diplomacy pursues cooperation by sharing soft power with African countries to achieve common goals, rather than to dominate African public or countries. On the basis of these two different viewpoints, it is a cornerstone for comprehending China’s public diplomacy in Africa, which will be used to answer the research questions. The next chapter will discuss public diplomacy and soft power from both the Western and Chinese perspectives, to answer the first research question.
Chapter 3. Conceptual part for public diplomacy

In the twenty-first century, the awareness of public diplomacy has risen significantly. The term public diplomacy refers to governmental and non-governmental diplomatic activities targeted at a foreign public. The role of public diplomacy has magnified in recent years, especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when most countries realized the limitations of traditional diplomacy. Hence, not only superpowers but also emerging countries now competitively focus on and utilize public diplomacy as a tool of their foreign policy, including soft power and new technologies, in order to keep pace with globalization.

The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of public diplomacy and soft power in 21st century international relations. This chapter is designed to comprehend China’s public diplomacy to answer the question of why and how China maps out its public diplomacy as a strategy for its foreign policy. Therefore, the chapter discusses public diplomacy with soft power in a broader context. The chapter begins with a discussion of the Western approach to public diplomacy in comparison to traditional diplomacy, as well as looking into its subsidiary concepts of propaganda, strategic communication, and Joseph Nye’s conception of soft power. After this follows sections analyzing public diplomacy and soft power from the Chinese perspective, and, at the same time, how China’s public diplomacy is relevant to its political purpose as articulated by current and former leaders in Beijing. Lastly, the chapter also identifies the elements that constitute China’s soft power, what it means for its public diplomacy, and addresses the importance of the cultural element in China’s soft power.

3.1 A model of Public diplomacy

3.1.1 Defining and function of Public Diplomacy

What is the meaning of diplomacy? Prior to looking into public diplomacy, it is worth briefly discussing a general definition to help understand the features of public diplomacy. The dictionary definition of diplomacy is “the management of the relationship between countries” and “skill in dealing with people without offending or upsetting them” (Diplomacy, n.a). The derivation of the word diplomacy is from the ancient Greek verb diploun, which means “to double”; and from the Greek noun Diploma, which is “an official document written on double leaves (diploo) joined together and folded (diplono)” (Constantinou, 1996, p.77). Since then, the term Diploma was used for “folded documents of states”, and the first use in English is from around 1645. Modern-era diplomacy is generally presumed to have been
formed at the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, which serves as a foundation of the independence of states and the notion of religious freedom and tolerance. Moreover, France’s Cardinal Richelieu, the first foreign ministry, and the classic approach of international relations was introduced, based on the nation-state and national interest as its final goal, in 1626 (Kissinger, 1995; Siracusa, 2010). The term diplomacy, subsequently, emerged in 1796, coined by E. Burke. After one hundred years, the word was properly defined as the international relations between nations (Jones, 1999; Nicolson 1963). Since then, diplomacy, however, has various interpretations (Melissen, 1999) among scholars, and there is no consensus regarding diplomacy (Jönsson, 2012).

The character of diplomacy has also changed depending on the times, and impressions of contemporary issues. In the aftermath of the First World War, the term diplomacy was divided into two – ‘old diplomacy’ and ‘new diplomacy’ – due to the failure of old diplomacy during the war (Wiseman and Sharp, 2012). The salient characteristics of traditional diplomacy, in brief, were “highly formal, institutional, interpersonal, slow, and usually protected by secrecy” (Gilboa, 2001, p.1). After this, the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in the wake of the Second World War set the stage for attempts to institutionalize the multilateral diplomatic method and generate interest in the role of public opinion in foreign policy. Institutionalized multilateralism was embraced after the Cold War. Globalization also increased the importance of international actors and non-state actors with the aid of technological development in the area of communications, travel, and information transfers (Wiseman and Sharp, 2012). In a contemporary perspective of diplomacy, Melissen (1999) concisely defined diplomacy as, “the mechanism of representation, communication, and negotiation through which states and other international actors conduct their business” (p. xvii). Gilboa (2001) argued that diplomacy is mostly related to “international negotiation, to a communication system through which representatives of states and international or global actors, including elect and appointed officials, express and defend their interests, state their grievances, and issue threats and ultimatums” (p.1). In short, diplomacy is “an instrument of foreign policy” from the macro view. At the same time, from the micro view, diplomacy is associated with “a process of communication”, which plays a role in settling discord and leading to negotiation in the international system (Surmacz, 2016, p.74), which shows similar characteristics to public diplomacy of the day.

Public diplomacy has moved to the fore as “a new dimension of diplomacy”, and the key method of political communication in the twenty-first century, especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the rise of the information age (Snow, 2009). While traditional diplomacy was focused on security and conversations between governments, conducted by
governmental officials (Powell, 2004; Ham, 2010), public diplomacy has expanded its target audience to the public sector. With respect to the relationship between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy, as characterized by Manheim (1994), public diplomacy is associated with the diplomacy activity of “government-to-people contacts” and “people-to-people contacts”, while traditional diplomacy is concerned with “government-to-government contacts” and “diplomat-to-diplomat contacts”. But both types of diplomacy consider communication to be important (pp.3-4). Public diplomacy differs in its target audience – that is, the public – to whom it communicates as part of diplomacy, but Mellisen (2005) sees “public diplomacy as old wine in new bottles” (p.3). To be more exact, the features that underpin public diplomacy – such as image cultivation, multilateral relationships, propaganda, and activities – already exist in old diplomacy. The invention of the printing press in the 15th century changed the manner of official communication with foreign publics (ibid). The periodical presses of the 17th century were used as a diplomatic instrument for the local powers, including newspapers that were under intense pressure to do “(self)censorship” for local or national authorities. Richelieu, for example, utilized Renaudot’s Gazette as a mouthpiece to inform broad international audiences (Helmers, 2016). Although the era of modern diplomacy (especially modern sovereign-state diplomacy) was introduced by the Treaty of Westphalia, it is “equally significant as a major step in the development of multilateral diplomacy” (Wiseman and Sharp, 2012, p.259). About the Richelieu’s view of diplomacy, scholars believe he laid the foundation for public diplomacy of the day, based on the fact that his conception of foreign policy and diplomacy continued to dominated until the end of the 20th century (Riordan, 2016). The present-day public diplomacy is aimed at “the general public in foreign societies and more specific non-official groups, organizations and individuals”, which explains postmodern transnational relations (Mellisen, 2005, p.5). By utilizing governmental and non-governmental activities, public diplomacy is aimed at the publics of foreign countries directly, using the instrument of soft power to promote a positive national image. In this way, states expand sympathy and gain trust from foreign publics directly through culture, art, history, education, and others. In addition, it helps states to not only improve their relations with other countries, but also gain influence in the international society.

The term public diplomacy, which is popular in the present day, was first coined by Edmund Gullion, a former US diplomat and Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, when he established the Edward R. Murrow Center, in 1965. The concept of public diplomacy was described on the early Murrow Center brochures, thus:
Public diplomacy ... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications. (Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, n.a)

However, prior to Gullion’s use of the term, there were public diplomacy activities – such as the United States Information Agency (USIA), established by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953, to supervise and oversee information operation work. The activities of USIA were repackaged with the appearance of the term, as it brought forward a new and positive meaning, unlike propaganda; however, it was “a perfect piece of propaganda about propaganda” (Cull, 2008b, p.259). In other words, the role of public diplomacy was to change opinions in other countries, to exert influence in conjunction with hard power during the Cold War. Around this time, the three major powers – the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe – expended a lot of effort on communications with the world, in support of conventional diplomatic activities (Melissen, 2005a, p.4). Public diplomacy was performed based on government-led projects aimed at foreign publics, conducted mainly through academic exchanges, cultural events, and international broadcasts (Servaes, 2012). The USIA was in charge of all public diplomacy, including cultural relations until its closure, in 1999 (Cull, 2008b). Hence, by using the term public diplomacy during the mid-1960s, Gullion had the intention of not only segregating the image of propaganda during the 1950s from America’s practice of international information exchange, as part of public diplomacy but also to raise the status of staffers at USIA from agents of advertising or public relations to the role of diplomats (Cowan and Cull, 2008). The background for Gullion’s efforts to change the image of public diplomacy was that the term was widely used as “a cluster of new diplomatic practices” during the First World War. In the 1950s, it markedly shifted towards the sphere of propaganda and international information (Cull, 2009a, pp.19-21). When the term public diplomacy was first applied in 1956, it was for “the process by which international actors seek to accomplish the goals of their foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics”; however the term only gained traction internationally after the Cold war ended (Cull, 2008, p.31).

With the cessation of the Cold War, the discussion of and necessity for public diplomacy temporarily seemed to be on the wane. Public diplomacy, however, was identified as a new
diplomatic style in the twenty-first century, especially following the September 11th terrorist attacks, as mentioned earlier (Melissen, 2013). To date, the conceptualization of public diplomacy has been widely researched in mass communications, marketing, diplomacy, international relations, strategic studies, and diplomatic studies (Gilboa 2008; Gregory 2008; Sharp 2013; Golan and Yang 2015). Nevertheless, Gilboa (2008) has argued that “scholars have not yet pursued or even sufficiently promoted systematic theoretical research in this field”, until now (p.73). Most public diplomacy studies, furthermore, are based on a historical perspective research and American experiences during the Cold War, although some European countries have, since 1949, adopted German-style public diplomacy as a core component of their foreign policy, and France also utilized public diplomacy to cultivate its national grandeur and politique d’influence (Melissen, 2005a). On the other hand, d’Hooghe (2015) has pointed out the limitation of public diplomacy, that “[c]urrent understanding of public diplomacy is mainly based on Western concepts such as soft power, and on the public diplomacy practice of the United States and other Western countries with democratic political system” (p.7). Regarding this, Wang (2013) claimed that public diplomacy is not only connected to American culture, politics and national characteristics, but also reflects well “Americanization” and “universalism” as the United States was the leading country in research of public diplomacy (p.89). Taken together, the lack of an accurate definition of public diplomacy in International Relations could lead to a situation in which most public diplomacy research is based on American standards. Most scholars and experts in the International Relations field, moreover, do not have precise information about public diplomacy with regards to propaganda, public relations, international public relations, and public affairs. The lack of research into the non-governmental sector’s activities, including NGOs, civil society, and individuals, is another impediment to developing a theory (Gilboa, 2008; Gregory, 2008). Nowadays, the most interesting multidisciplinary field is the communicative facet of public diplomacy (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008; Kelley, 2009; L’Etang, 2009; Zahara 2009), on which diplomacy focuses.

One way to understand the trend in public diplomacy is to examine the connection between public diplomacy and propaganda (Snow, 2004; Snow and Taylor, 2006; Zahara, 2004) – this will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.2. At the same time, researchers look at the correlation between public relations, public diplomacy and diplomacy. Public relations, which has greater relevance to public diplomacy, is regarded as communication management between an organization and its public. On this, Golan and Yang (2015) have argued that “international public relations can be understood as the relationship management function in its global sense” (p.1). The connection between public relations and public diplomacy has been further researched by Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, and Kendrick (2013), Gilboa (2008),
L’Etang (1996, 2009), Signitzer and Coombs (1992), Signitzer and Wasmer (2006), and Yun (2009). L’Etang (2009), for example, noted that “PR [public relations] and public diplomacy may both be seen as euphemistic terms for propaganda, from which practitioners in both areas have endeavored to distinguish themselves” (p.608). However, public diplomacy correlates with public relations in the function of “representational (rhetoric, oratory, advocacy), dialogic (negotiation, peacemaking), advisory (counseling), intelligence gathering (research and environmental scanning, issues management) intercultural communication, and public opinion management” (p.616). Signitzer and Coombs (1992) argued that the two spheres are “in a natural process of convergence” and “a process which should be cultivated and not ignored” (p.146). The convergence is a result of modern technology and the needs of modern nation-states (p.145). They also observed that people in the two spheres often pursue the same objective, “to affect public opinion for the benefit of their client/organization” (p.139). By extension, Signitzer and Wasmer (2006) expressed their view of public diplomacy as a specific governmental function of public relations, and argued that “[f]ormal political relations are becoming more and more closely connected with actors other than national governments. There is a shift away from the traditional, state-level diplomacy and towards public, citizen-level diplomacy” (p.382), resulting from developments in international relations. However, Golan and Yang (2015) contend that, although there is a convergence of public diplomacy and public relations as identified in their ultimate goals, public diplomacy’s final goal is to collect information for a nation’s foreign policy. Public relations, on the other hand, concentrates on a relationship of mutual benefit between any organizations and foreign publics.

There are researchers in another academic field who are interested in the interaction between public diplomacy and communication. Public diplomacy is communication with other nations to create a dialogue that is designed to inform and influence. According to Tuch (1990), a former American Diplomat, argued that “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies” (p.3). Also, Sharp (2007) viewed the definition of public diplomacy as “the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented” (p.106). Hence, scholars focus on the research of the parallelism and marked difference between public diplomacy and strategic communication, and the denoting of strategic communication in public diplomacy (Gregory 2005; Haydon 2010; Jönsson and Martin, 2003; Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, 2002; Pamment 2011; van Dyke and Verčič, 2009) – this will be discussed later, in chapter 3.3. Furthermore, research
is being carried out to discover how to boost national branding via public diplomacy (Copeland, 2006; Potter 2009; Szondi, 2008).

While public diplomacy plays an important role in the twenty-first century, it still lacks a clear and widely agreed-upon definition, despite the variety of public diplomacy-related activities in which actors are involved (Lee and Melissen, 2011; Pamment, 2013; d’Hooghe, 2015; Dolea, 2016). The definition, as well as purpose and objectives of public diplomacy, are also diverse; the strategies which provide the means for public diplomacy feature a variety of opinions among scholars (Hoking, 2005). The commonly-accepted meaning of public diplomacy is:

  a. referring as the direct or mass-mediated communication activities through individuals, governmental/non-governmental organizations towards a foreign government and/or foreign public and/or the domestic publics;
  b. aiming at directly or indirectly reducing negative images, phrases, generating sympathy and understanding for a nation’s ideas, goals, foreign policies and its institutions, culture and model of society;
  c. targeting at building relationships and positive images, facilitating closer political ties or alliances, and boosting tourism and foreign direct investment (Löffelholz, Auer, and Srugies, 2015, p.440). Also, involving activities in the field of information, education and culture (Ham, 2005, p.57).

However, there is a difference in viewpoint between traditional public diplomacy and new public diplomacy (see Table 1). The definition of public diplomacy before the 9/11 attacks was, per the U.S. Department of State (1987)’s definition, that public diplomacy encompasses “government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and televisions” (p.85). Malone’s view of public diplomacy is “one of direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments” (1985, p. 199). Traditional public diplomacy is different in several ways to the new public diplomacy (Snow, 2014), as follows: official in nature; government-to-publics (one-way communication); connected to foreign policy and national security outcomes; passive public roles; a necessary evil of technology and new media democratized international relations; bilateral informational and asymmetrical bilateral communication style between partners; crisis-driven and reactive. However, a recent trend among scholars is the acceptance that nongovernmental actors also play a role in public diplomacy, partly as a result of accepting new international circumstances – this has given rise to a new definition
(Rugh, 2011). For example, Cowan and Cull (2008) defined public diplomacy to mean “an international actor's attempt to advance the ends of policy by engaging with foreign publics” (p.6). It is not only in defining public diplomacy, but there are also diverse views of who is the main agent and target in public diplomacy (Kelley, 2009) depending on the country, but the origins of contemporary public diplomacy are based on the US experience (Melissen, 2005a; Cowan and Cull, 2008). This notwithstanding, public diplomacy has become a measure that applies social power in international politics in many countries around the world (Ham, 2010). But each country sees it differently. For example, the main agent of public diplomacy in the United States is government-level actors, and their activities are targeted towards the people of other countries (Hayden, 2015, pp. 212-129). On the other hand, public diplomacy in the United Kingdom allows various non-state actors, with the help of state-actors, to lead its public diplomacy efforts towards foreigners in its own country and also publics of other nations (Pamment, 2016a). Hence, the University of Southern California (USC) - Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD), which has led public diplomacy research since 2003, defines public diplomacy more broadly as

the public, interactive dimension of diplomacy, which is not only global in nature, but also involves a multitude of actors and networks. It is a key mechanism through which nations foster mutual trust and productive relationships and has become crucial to building a secure global environment (USC-CPD, n.a).

Table 1: The comparison between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional diplomacy</th>
<th>Public diplomacy</th>
<th>Public diplomacy (in the twenty-first century)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main agent</strong></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government and various private actors including NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government and Foreign publics (excluding domestic public)</td>
<td>Government and Foreign publics (including domestic public)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communication style</strong></td>
<td>Horizon between government and government</td>
<td>Unilateral and Top-down with a closed communication style</td>
<td>Horizon and Bilateral communication and exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>and Type of relations</strong></td>
<td>(between main agent and target)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The comparison between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy
Means (when carrying out public diplomacy)  | Conversation and negotiation between government and government | Public Relations (PR)  | Various means including digital media (internet, satellite, real-time news, and Mobile telephones) which is based on information and communication technologies |
---|---|---|---|
Resources and Assets | Hard Power | Hard Power < Soft Power | Hard Power < Soft Power |


According to Fitzpatrick (2010), public diplomacy generally has the following functions, categorized based on the distinct features and practices: advocacy/influence, communication/informational, relational, promotional, warfare/propaganda, and political (p.89). Based on these functions, states utilize public diplomacy to achieve the following goals:

a. “Increasing people’s familiarity with one’s country”, which “mak[es] them think about it, updating their images, turning around unfavourable opinions”;
b. “Increasing people’s appreciation of one’s country”, which “creat[es] positive perceptions, getting others to see issues of global importance from the same perspective”;
c. “Engaging people with one’s country”, which “strengthen[s] ties – from education reform to scientific co-operation; encouraging people to see us as an attractive destination for tourism, study, distance learning; getting them to buy our products; getting to understand and subscribe to our values”;
d. “Influencing people”, which “get[s] companies to invest, publics to back our positions or politicians to turn to us as a favoured partner” (Leonard, Stead, & Smewing, 2002, pp.9-10)

In the same context, Mark (2009) identified the objectives of public diplomacy: one is idealistic, the other is functional. The idealistic objectives contain the notion of a two-way relationship based on mutual exchange; and the functional objectives include advancing the interests of trade, politics, diplomacy, and economy, developing bilateral relationships in order to maintain bilateral relationship in times of tension. By extension, a research of
functional objectives has lately developed, which concerns the relationship between public diplomacy and aid. This research aims to help understand contemporary issues in international relations that have arisen with newly-emerged aid actors, such as BRICS, who employ public diplomacy with non-traditional soft power, such as international development funds to support states’ political and economic objectives (Fisher and Bröckerhoff, 2008; Gilboa, 2008; Pamment, 2015, 2016b; Pamment and Wilkins, 2016; Shah and Wilkins, 2004).

So, what is the new public diplomacy? The 'new public diplomacy' became a common term in 2005 (Pamment, 2014), after the 9/11 attacks, which highlighted the need to build up a national image for foreign publics, as part of a country's foreign policy. Now, foreign ministries from all countries prioritize public diplomacy. Not only to boost a country's image, but states also utilize public diplomacy as an instrument for supporting the most vital of national interests. A good example of this is Poland, which deployed public diplomacy for its campaign to join NATO and the EU. Countries in the Global South participate in public diplomacy due to strong economic motives (inviting travel business after terrorism), as do rogue and socialist states who need a bridge to communicate with the foreign public (Melissen, 2005a). Moreover, with the advent of globalization and the information age, public diplomacy practitioners and scholars take note of the rising clout of non-state actors in foreign affairs, which also highlights in growth in importance of new public diplomacy in the international relations (Fitzpatrick, 2010).

The paradigm shifted from state-centred and hierarchical ‘traditional public diplomacy’ to a ‘network-centered’ or ‘new public diplomacy model’ that involves a diverse set of actors by boosting collaboration and dialog (d’Hooghe, 2014, p.5-6, 18). The new public diplomacy is especially focused on mutual understanding, engagement and relationship building (Melissen, 2005a). Pammet (2013) described new public diplomacy as “a major paradigm shifts in international political communication, about which there has been strong consensus” (p.3). Fitzpatrick (2010) wrote that new public diplomacy reflects “a perceived need for greater collaboration and cooperation among nations and peoples by emphasizing principles of mutuality and dialogue” (pp.85-86). Gilboa (2008) interpreted new public diplomacy as “an attempt to adjust public diplomacy to the conditions of the information age” (p.58). Melissen (2005a) argued that the new public diplomacy is more and more ‘interconnected’ with foreign publics, and is moving away from a one-way information flow to engagement and communicating with foreign audiences (p.13). The background to the shift is based on the revolution in three spheres – mass communication, politics, and international relations – each of which have influenced public diplomacy in the post-Cold War and post-p/11 eras.
Mass communication enjoyed two major technological innovations: the global news network, which provides real-time broadcasting services; and the Internet, which facilitates the exchange of ideas about world affairs between states, NGOs, communities, firms, and individuals. Certain revolutions in politics have also produced mass participation in the political process, as societies transformed from autocracies into democracies. Lastly, the revolution in international relations influence the goals and means of foreign policy. In other words, "favourable image and reputation around the world, achieved through attraction and persuasion, have become more important than territory, access, and raw materials, traditionally acquired through military and economic measures" (Gilboa, 2008, p.56). The development of three factors provided an opportunity for the redefine of public diplomacy from an angle of "an active role for publics" over a passive object of government foreign policy strategies. The growth of global social movements and civil society has changed the character of multilateral diplomacy, due to the increase in NGOs' participation in international affairs (Hoking, 2005). In addition to these factors, the media and the new trend that identifies image as a concern in international politics, and the possibility for states to 'rebrand' themselves in the global marketplace are components of the new public diplomacy. Image and branding, especially, reflect the mass market over policy elites (ibid, p.31), as part of a new wave of 'people power' resulting from globalization and the spread of democracy. Bruce Gregory (2011) summarized that public diplomacy today "comes to mean an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values" (p. 276).

New public diplomacy creates various forms of public diplomacy based on the new multidimensional environment of public diplomacy. First, Fitzpatrick (2011) proposed “a dialogic model of public diplomacy” to clarify the conceptual and practical requirements of the model based on eight criteria: (a) mutuality: a reciprocity of parties and interests, as well as the opportunity for expression; (b) presence: being open to each other and involved in matters; (c) commitment: engaging with others and participating in effort to reach mutually satisfying outcomes; (d) authenticity: honesty, transparency, and genuineness; (e) trust: empathetic to the other rather than using authority and power; (f) respect: recognizing and accepting differences; (g) collaboration: removing the idea of winning-losing and defeating, and engaging between parties; and (h) risk: parties accept the uncertain dialogic outcomes (pp.19-21). Due to rise in prominence of NGOs and other non-state actors’ involvement in diplomacy, the situation has led to a ‘new’ or ‘network’ and ‘relational’ public diplomacy, and thus competitive strategies have been supplanted by collaborative strategies with multiple stakeholders (d’Hooghe, 2015). Hence, d’Hooghe puts citizen diplomacy, cultural
diplomacy, and strategic communications (including national-branding) as subsets of public diplomacy. Cowan and Arsenault (2008) observed that new communication technologies, including the Internet, provide a cornerstone to encourage monologic and dialogue communication, and cross-national collaborations. Park and Lim (2014) have observed that digital media leads “networked public diplomacy” through analyses of the web and social media practices. By mapping the organizational information network online, for example, the activities of the core public diplomacy organizations in both South Korea and Japan were identified due to highly interconnected information networks by sharing information and sources. Network-based public diplomacy performs the role of a bridge between communities and practices (Fisher, 2013a). Thus, public diplomacy in a globalized world embraces networking and collaboration with diverse actors, because no single actor has the answer (Fisher, 2013b), and a variety of actors with diverse views are more credible and legitimate, and more easily appeal to foreign publics and earn trust.

Under the various forms of 21st century public diplomacy, public diplomacy requires utilizing efficiently its components and instruments. Nye (2008) argued that the means of public diplomacy is soft power, whereas Hoking (2008) advanced three powers – hard power, soft power, and sticky power – which are crucial to carrying out public diplomacy successfully, and stresses that public diplomacy is not itself uniquely the expression of soft power. Hoking said that the three powers are connected to each other. For example, soft power supports the

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22 As to cultural diplomacy, Barr (2015) understands that “one of the best examples of the broader field of public diplomacy, which refers to the methods governments and organizations use to communicate their values, policies and beliefs – with the goal of improving their relationship, image and reputation with the publics (i.e. not just governments) of other countries” (p.181).

use and influence of the military and hard economic strength. Recently, economic power can partly establish an environment through the appeal economic principles and influences – for example, the Beijing Consensus attracts adherents that are repelled by the American model. Gilboa (2008) also observed that soft power relies on hard power from the perspective of the state, because a powerful military, economy, and established technological infrastructure all make strong nations attractive. Nicholas Cull (2008a, 2009b) examined soft power, and concluded that public diplomacy needs the following elements as instruments of public diplomacy: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting. Based on these elements, and the new multidimensional environment of public diplomacy, Leonard, Stead, & Smewing (2002) suggested three dimensions of public diplomacy: news management (short-term strategy), strategic communication (mid-term strategy), and relationship building (long-term strategy). They also drew a distinction of public diplomacy based on three spheres (political/military, economic, and social/cultural); two types (cooperation and competition); and five instruments (political party diplomacy, brand diplomacy, NGO diplomacy, Diaspora diplomacy, and business diplomacy). By extension, Gilboa (2008) proposed to distinguish based on time dimensions. The first, immediate level expects to react within hours, or a few days, to developing events by using advocacy, international broadcasting, and cyber-public diplomacy. The second, intermediate level allows weeks or months for proactive planning and implementation of policies with the instruments of international public relations, corporate diplomacy, and diaspora public diplomacy. The final, long-term level is similar to traditional public diplomacy, and aims to construct relationships with global publics over years by building favorable conditions through cultural diplomacy, exchanges, and branding.

3.1.1.1 Propaganda and Public diplomacy

Propaganda has been around since the time of the ancient Greeks. Then, as now, there were differing opinions about politics and religion. Even though they lacked modern tools – such as newspapers, the radio, movies and, most recently, the Internet – ancient practitioners had their own methods. The games, theatre, assembly, law courts and religious festivals all provided ample opportunity to spread ideas and beliefs (Taylor, 2003). Unlike the traditional method of communication in diplomacy, which was between the nations, public diplomacy had as its objective the improvement of the nation’s image and diplomatic relations, together with the communication of history, culture, language, and others to the public of another country. It can be said that public diplomacy is related to propaganda; by the 1950s, the meaning public diplomacy shifted remarkably towards the sphere of
international information and propaganda (Cull, 2009).

In its origins, “propaganda” is an ancient and honorable word, meaning the respectful attention of mankind. Propaganda, the word, is derived from the seventeenth century Roman Catholic Church (Black, 2001, p.121; Somerville, 2012, p.3), specifically from the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (Committee for the Propagation of the Faith) in 1622. The Propaganda Fide was used as a means to an end to subdue the Protestant Reformation. (Bernays, 2004, pp.26-27; Brown and Davis, 2012, p.76; Auerbach and Castronovo, 2013, pp.2-3). The lexical-semantic of public diplomacy in Oxford dictionary is “information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view” (Propaganda, n.a). In other words, the general meaning of propaganda is the activity of explanting one’s argument to obtain somebody else’s agreement or understanding (Black, 2001; Alleyne, 2003, p.93). In a similar vein, Harold Lasswell (1927), an American political scientist and a linchpin of propaganda research, said “propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols” (p.627). Somerville (2012) also defined a general standard for propaganda as follows: “A simplistic and very narrow image, with propaganda presented as something that only repressive, autocratic or essentially ‘bad’ regimes practice in order to lie to and control their subjects or to lie to the world to present a falsely positive view of an essentially negative regime” (p.3). Taking these definitions together, the general impression of propaganda in our society is negative. However, Bernays (2004) saw the other aspect of propaganda in the early twentieth century, and argued that whether “propaganda is good or bad depends upon the merits of the cause urged, and the correctness of the information published” (p.20). He researched a way to make use of the meaning and role of propaganda born in capitalism in many different fields in society, in which it does not have a negative connotation. Also, he emphasized the good points of promotion by reinterpreting public relations, focusing on the communication of the public rather than promoting the governing method. The use of information sharing is essential to winning battles and war (Garcia, 2010). The role of propaganda is comparable to public persuasion as it stresses the importance of public decision-making. Taylor (2003) explained the meaning of propaganda as “a process by which an idea or an opinion is communicated to someone else for a specific persuasive purpose” (p.7). The technological advancement of communications has had an equal effect on international propaganda (Rubin, 1971, p.83). Also, Murrow (1963), a former US diplomat who coined the term of public diplomacy, mentioned with regards to propaganda: “the most important reason is the truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive, we must be believe; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that”.

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Nevertheless, there remain diverse opinions about propaganda. Jewett and O’Donnell (2006), who have defined a negative opinion of propaganda, describe it as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that fur- there is the desired intent of the propagandist” (p. 7). Nowadays, propaganda is used more as a soft power tool to encourage and invoke people’s ideas, and beliefs, and is identified as part of public diplomacy. The terms propaganda and public diplomacy are similar, and conceptual confusion arises as a result (Brown, 2008; Seib, 2009a). Propaganda and public diplomacy are like two sides of the same coin, and have unclear boundaries (Brown, 2008). However, the main difference between public diplomacy and propaganda is their communication system: one is a one-way communication, while the other is two-way communication (Mellisen 2004, d’Hooghe 2014). That being said, Snow (2010) observed that, for relations between propaganda and public diplomacy based on power, propaganda and public diplomacy interact like the linkage between soft power and hard power introduced by Nye. Therefore, even though propaganda has a negative connotation, when taken together, the two are like two sides of the same coin.

3.1.1.2 Strategic communication and Public diplomacy

The general understanding of strategic communication is being magnified as a key issue by government agencies and scholars following the advent of globalization and developments in information and communications technologies. Former U.S. National Security Advisor James Jones (2009) stressed the importance of strategic communication at the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2009 as follows: “The world is a smaller place. Communications is more rapid. And therefore our reactions must be swifter. And we must be able to communicate rapidly throughout the government and around the world in order to effectively respond.” Gregory (2005) also stressed the significance of strategic communication gaining prominence following the September 11 terrorist attacks, when countries around the world realized the importance of communication and information exchange through public diplomacy.

Even though the significance of strategic communication has increased in the twenty-first century, there remains no unified definition and comprehension regarding strategic communication (Cornish, Lindley-French and Yorke, 2011; Paul, 2011). Instead, many scholars interpret strategic communication from different angles. Moss and Warnaby (1998) approach strategic communication from two perspectives: first, strategy communication, which stands for “the role of communication in facilitating the strategy-making process”
(p.133); and second, communication strategy, which refers to “the nature and focus of communications strategy itself” (ibid), thus interpreting strategic communication as communication and ensuring that it is designed and implemented as planned (p.139). On the other hand, Manheim (1994) and Halloran (2007) refer to strategic communication as persuading, and Halloran (2007) views it as follows:

Strategic communication means persuading allies and friends to stand with you. It means persuading neutrals to come over to your side or at least stay neutral. In the best of all worlds, it means persuading adversaries that you have the power and the will to prevail over them. Vitally important, strategic communication means persuading the nation’s citizens to support the policies of their leaders so that a national will is forged to accomplish national objectives. (p.6)

Due to the difficulties in single-word or simple interpretations of strategic communication, Cornish, Lindley-French, and York (2011) identified four approaches: “information operations, psychological operations, public diplomacy, and public affairs” (pp.3-4). There are many divergent opinions among scholars regarding the relationship between strategic communication and public diplomacy. Paul (2011) understands public diplomacy is a component of strategic communication. He compares public diplomacy and strategic communication as follows:

Public diplomacy is a narrowly conceived set of activities focused on government engagement, outreach, and broadcast, while strategic communication includes all of those things, but further capabilities, such as those included in information operations, as well as the communicative value of policies and more importantly actions . . . [and] Strategic communication, includes only elements that could be harnessed in support of national policy objectives. Some of public diplomacy is (and should remain) as unfocused and unpurposive efforts to build relationships, foster understanding, and promote engagement with foreign audiences that have absolutely nothing to do with current national policy goals. (pp.40-41)

However, this study contends that strategic communication is a subset, or function of public diplomacy. Nye (2004) considered strategic communication to be a part of the three dimensions of public diplomacy, and the role of strategic communication here focuses heavily and effectively on designing and disseminating a message to accomplish a nation’s

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24 The first dimension of public diplomacy is daily communication; the second is strategic communication; and the final dimension is developing lasting, long-term relationships with key individuals.
persuasive objective (Zahara, 2010). D’Hooghe (2015) understands strategic communication’s activities and strategies to be within the realm of public diplomacy, with the intention of achieving long-term and well-defined goals on selected issues, as well as mutual understanding based on long-term relationships. The correlation between the two is easily seen in the function of public diplomacy, which is the communication of a nation’s foreign policies to foreign citizens through strategic communication methods – such as conferences and events, media outreach, and exchanges of culture, students or personnel. Also, due to the development of information technology, modern strategic communication needs to be understood using careful mapping of networked relationships over simple broadcasting (Pamment, 2011; Zahara, 2009).

3.2 Relationship between Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

3.2.1. A Review of Nye’s Theory of Soft Power

As stated earlier, following the First World War, the world became ever more interested in soft power, which is a kind new power that dominates the opinions of other countries. Later, as the information era began, with the development of the internet and new communication media, many countries placed greater importance on soft power as a new power, believing it to be as important as hard power. Thus, many political researchers became interested in the conceptual research of soft power and how to apply it effectively in developing diplomatic strategies (Mellisen, 2005a). The concept of soft power was first proposed by Joseph S. Nye, a political scientist at the Kennedy School of Government, at Harvard University in the U.S., in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, and further developed in his 2004 book, Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics. This latter book criticised the Bush administration’s post-9/11 strategies for dealing with terrorism. In addition, Nye pointed out that it would significantly taint the United States’ positive image in the world. He further stressed that the United States was exposing the limits of an imperialism based on conventional military strength and economic power while they also dealt with the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, as well as Chinese power after the financial crisis in 2008 (Nye, 2010b, 2011).

Nye (1990b, 2004) differentiated between hard power and soft power to enhance on the meaning of soft power. Prior to distinguishing between the two types of power, he interpreted power as “the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants”, and introducing several ways to affect the behavior of others: (1) coerce with threats; (2) induce with payments; and (3) attract and co-opt” (Nye, 2008a, p.27). He argued that
hard power is based on inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”) (Nye, 2004), and defined hard power as “the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences and strategies” (Nye, 2011, p.11). On the other hand, soft power is “getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them” (Nye, 2004, p.5). Nye’s concept of soft power was fully adapted from work by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1963), which referred to a “second face of power” (as cited in Nye, 2008). To understand soft power, more specifically, it is necessary to understand the three aspects of relational power: “commanding change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences” (Nye, 2011, p.11) – inspired by Robert Dahl, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, and Steven Lukes respectively (pp.11-18). The first face of relational power was from Dahl’s 1957 definition of power, that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (pp.202-203), which focuses on the coercive exercise of power. The second face of power, as articulated by Bachrach and Baratz (1962), is that power is “[also] exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A” (p.948). Thus, “A controls the agenda of actions in a way that limits B’s choices of strategy” (Nye, 2011, p.14), which highlights the agenda-setting exercise of power. Unlike the previous two faces of power, which explain how power is used to get A’s wants from B, regardless of B’s will, the last face of the power, articulated by Luke (1974, 2005), describes the aspect of power to manipulate B to do something. Thus, “A helps to create and shape B’s basic beliefs, perceptions, and preferences” (Nye, 2011, p.14), and normally shows a government’s ideological and decision-making power to control people. Nye applied these three different aspects of relational power to expand his interpretation of soft power; that is, “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcome” (Nye, 2011, p.13).

Based on these conclusions, Nye (2004, 2011) proposed an analogy for the global political climate of the 21st century, which he saw as being unfolded vertically and horizontally, and a three-dimensional chess game. At the top of the chessboard, the unipolar military power game is being played; multipolar economic power is on the middle level; and at the bottom is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control, such as international terrorism, pandemics, and climate change. He argued that the United States is at the top of the chessboard, joined by Europe, Japan, and China as the major players in economic power. The power at the bottom of the board includes non-state actors, but power at this level is widely diffused. Thus, at the bottom of the board, it is unnecessary to draw the boundaries of unipolarity, multipolarity, hegemony, and other clichés about which political
leaders and pundits argue. Most of all, he asserted that the chessboard of international politics in the 21st century is now in its third stage due to two recent great power shifts: one is a power transition among states, and the other one is a power diffusion away from states to non-state actors. Through the expansion of networks and dissemination of knowledge powered by information technology, global power has shifted from hard power (military and economic power) to soft power (ibid). Furthermore, also due to the advent of the information age, Nye (2002, 2004, 2014) has argued that the importance of soft power will continue to increase relative to that of hard power, as countries are able to draw cultural and ideological inspiration from dominant cultures and ideas that are closer to global norms (such as liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy), and exert influence over how issues are framed using multiple communication channels. Countries’ credibility is also enhanced through their domestic and international performance.

Table. 2: Three types of power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Behaviors</th>
<th>Primary currencies</th>
<th>Government Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hard Power</strong></td>
<td>Coercion, Deterrence</td>
<td>Threats, Force</td>
<td>Coercive Diplomacy, War, Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Power</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Power</td>
<td>Inducement, Coercion</td>
<td>Payment, Sanction</td>
<td>Aid, Bribes, Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soft Power</strong></td>
<td>Attraction, Agenda setting</td>
<td>Values, Cultures, Policies, Institutions</td>
<td>Public Diplomacy, Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft Power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Adopted from Nye, 2004, pp. 8, 30-32

Nye (2004) divided sources of power25 into three categories – military, economic, and soft power – each with its own behaviors, primary currencies, and government policies (see Table 2 above). He said that power today is less tangible and less coercive than in the past, but the three sources of power remain relevant. Hard and soft power are also related, because both operate around the ability to achieve one’s aims by affecting the behavior of others. The two types of power are also based on the usual resources and attributes an actor possesses. The

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25 Keohane and Nye (1998) divided power into “resource power”, which is “the possession of resources that are usually associated with the ability to reach outcomes you want”; and “behavior power”, which is “the ability to obtain outcomes you want”. “Behavior power” was further divided into hard power and soft power. According to Keohane and Nye, hard power is “the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do through threat of punishment of promise of reward”, whereas soft power is “the ability to get desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion. If a state can make it power legitimate in the eyes of others and establish international institutions that encourage others to define their interests in compatible ways, it may not need to expend as many costly traditional economic or military resources. Hard and soft power are related, but they are not the same” (p.86).
power shift from hard to soft power is the result of a “spectrum of behaviors”, which ranges from command power (the ability to change what others do) to co-optive power (the ability to shape what others want), and from coercion to economic inducements, to agenda-setting to pure attraction. Economic power exhibits similar behaviors to hard power, utilizing force and sanction (pp.6-11). Meanwhile, soft power tends to be closer to co-optive power, based on three power resources: a country’s “culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (p.13). Nevertheless, Nye (2004, 2010a) asserted, while soft power is difficult to directly impose on others, because it is a concept of universal values, soft power may be more effective than coercion. This is because soft power is not only comprised of intangible resources, but also difficult for a nation to control. The influence of soft power also differs depending on the given situation, which may make it difficult to realise intended outcomes within a desired timespan.

The general sources of power are “simply the tangible and intangible raw materials or vehicles that underlie power relationships, and whether a given set of resources produces preferred outcomes or not depends upon behavior in context” (Nye, 2011, p. 9). However, in the twenty-first century, with evolved technologies, behavioral or relational power is also significant (Nye, 2004, 2011). Power in the context of relations carries weight only when resources and its attributes are recognized by the opponent as valuable. In the same vein, in addition to soft power, the development of information and communication technology gave rise to relational power, which focuses on credibility and reciprocity between agents and non-agents of international society. Network/cyber power is created through relational power and networks and, by extension, social and communication power comes from the establishment of network/cyber power and relational power (ibid). Based on the importance of soft power in the twenty-first century, Nye further introduced smart power, which combines the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction (Nye, 2011), and utilizes hard and soft power flexibly to produce successful results (see, Nye, 2009, 2010a, pp.224-225). Wilson (2008) elaborated, explaining smart power as “the capacity... to combine elements of hard and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing” (p. 115). For example, China’s military support to African countries to combat terrorism, the Beijing Consensus and economic power are accepted as positive and favorable by developing countries, and can subsequently be seen as preparing the groundwork for the future implementation of China’s soft power policies.
3.2.2 Soft Power: Academic discussions regarding soft power and public diplomacy

As soft power took centre-stage in the twenty-first century, Gallarottie (2011) proposed three grounds for understanding the importance of soft power in international relations. First, the impact of interdependence and the pervasive process that compounds its effects on the power of globalization, because globalization enhances the process of social and economic interdependence in the international system. Furthermore, globalization gives rise to information interdependence (Rogerson, 2000). Second, social and political changes resulting from globalization bring about a modern population more concerned with the economy than hard power and, consequently, led to economic interdependence. Lastly, the growth of international organizations and regimes has created a network of cooperation that provides a fundamental component of soft power (Gallarottie, 2011, pp.33-36).

Soft power is a type of power to gain desired result by influencing others without using. However, soft power has limits: (1) it is “a descriptive rather than a normative concept” (Barr, 2011, p.15); (2) soft power is not fully managed by governments, as abstract factors such as culture and values come from civil societies (Nye, 2004, p.17), and the factors are hard to evaluate (Mead, 2004, p.51); and (3) the strength of culture, a resource of soft power, does not equal political power (Cooper, 2004, pp.170-171). However, Seib (2009b) argued that soft power is hard to separate from the government. As soft power is not clearly separated from hard power, there are limits to the exercise soft power if a country does not have sufficient hard power.26 The reason for the limitations of soft power is that it is concentrated on “the ability to get what you want through attraction” (Nye, 2004, p.11), and that exerting soft power is conjoined with a country’s economic, social and cultural factors. So, soft power does not carry much weight on its own. On the interaction between soft power and public diplomacy, Nye (2011) observed that “soft power is generated only in part by what the government does through its policies and public diplomacy” (p.101). Nye (2004), has also highlighted multiple channels of communication, which help to frame issues, cultural customs and ideas that are connected to prevailing global norms, and credibility in an information age. He defined credibility as “the crucial resource and an important source of soft power”, and referred to public diplomacy as a means to communicate with foreign publics, to lead public reputation and opinion through “shared goals to create credibility” by using broadcasting, arranging exchanges, subsidizing cultural exports, and others (p.106).

Also, a country’s foreign policy and political value, three of the power resources Nye identified, above, are relevant to government policy. Thus, government policy enhances credibility through foreign policies such as peacekeeping, development assistance, and embracing diverse opinions, which are reflected in an increase in a country’s soft power. A foreign policy characterized by hypocrisy, arrogance, and brutality (for example, the invasions of and war in Iraq) would diminish a country’s soft power.

Soft power shows effective results when public diplomacy is performed through the different tools that soft power possesses. Public diplomacy is therefore one of soft power’s primary instruments; the role of public diplomacy was recognized in practice before it came to the fore in contemporary debates (d’Hooghe, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2010; Hoking 2005; Melissen, 2005b; Snow, 2004, 2009). McDowell (2008) elucidates the connection between public diplomacy and soft power by building on Nye’s conception that soft power requires three elements (a country’s culture, its ideals and values, and its foreign policies), explaining that is a serious concentric circle between the two, “with PD [public diplomacy] forming a subset of diplomacy, which is itself a subset of government activities, which is just one element of a country’s soft power” (p.12). On the other hand, due to the advent of globalization and improved information technology, some in academia have argued that the interrelation between public diplomacy and soft power does not accord with current social phenomena, as there are different types of power that exert influence on the notion of new public diplomacy (Ham, 2008, 2010; Hayden, 2011, 2015; Pammet, 2014, 2015).

3.3. Chinese view of Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

3.3.1 The China’s Public Diplomacy from Chinese perspective

There are four milestone events in the past sixty years of China’s diplomatic history: the conflict between China and Russia in the early 1960s; the ‘opening up’ of the country in 1970s; the acceleration towards becoming a market economy, starting in 1992; and China’s arrival on the global stage, symbolized by its joining the WTO in 2001. While China went through a period of change in its diplomatic history, one thing remained consistent in

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27 Such as social power which defines as “the ability to set standards, create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment” (Ham, 2010, p.8). Integrated power means “leading and using alliances; developing new strategies and combining them with traditional strategies; and ending divisions between defense, homeland security, diplomacy, energy, and foreign aid” (Gilboa, 2008, p.62). And smart power which combines soft power and hard power (Nye, 2010a).
China’s foreign policy: its attempts to communicate with the world. In its first attempt to establish a dialogue with the world, the Chinese government invited foreign journalists to visit Yan’an in the 1930s, to report on the domestic situation of the Sino-Japanese War. In 1937, American journalist Edgar Snow interviewed Mao Zedong and other key personnel – including Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Xiao Jinguang – over four months in China, and Snow started to introduce China to the world through Western news articles and his book, *Red Star Over China* (1937), based on real stories about the Communist Party of China, the Red Army, the Sino-Japanese War – later, the book would be translated into over twenty languages (China Daily, 2010c). In 1971, China’s “Ping-Pong diplomacy” also functioned as a boost to Sino-America relations, and helped to finally establish diplomatic relations between the two countries, in 1979. The Tiananmen Incident in 1989, in particular, led China to focus on the country’s reputation around the world. In the aftermath of the incident, the Chinese government focused on improving its propaganda models, to burnish its image abroad (Kurlantzick, 2007a). On this topic, K. Zhao (2015a) pays attention to China’s “peaceful goals”, as expressed by its scholars and its government’s officials. He argued that China’s public diplomacy is not a new concept or idea, but one derived from its existing experiences, including Ping-Pong diplomacy, Panda diplomacy, Chess diplomacy, and people-to-people diplomacy (p.57). However, scholars and policymakers began to systematically research how to employ soft power, and China’s fostering of public diplomacy following the Tiananmen Incident (Hall & Smith, 2013). To start mending fences with its Asian neighbors, China tried to spread its culture and keep pace with the changing global order, by dispelling its communist image and avoiding critical international public opinion of it violation of human rights. Along with this process, China’s public diplomacy did innovate internally, and in this way, international cultural relations have gradually improved (Zhu, 2013).

A feature of China’s public diplomacy that can be seen in contemporary issues can be deduced from its character. One is that traditional Chinese think highly of its image in all relationships, and the other is that its external propaganda was under the Communist regime’s control and management. In recent years, the central role of its public diplomacy and communication has been shown to the new world (Cull, 2009b). In the Chinese language, there is no big difference between ‘public relations’ and ‘propaganda’. However, since the term propaganda has a negative connotation, the country has gradually started to favour ‘public relations’, the interpretation of which has greatly changed as well (Q. Zhao, 2011). Unlike the Western image of propaganda, propaganda in China is more like public diplomacy, given that it is considered a conversation between the government and the public. The meaning of propaganda in China is different from that in the Western, and it connotes positive images. Furthermore, the term propaganda is classified in two groups – internal
propaganda (duinei xuanhuan) and external propaganda (duwai xuanhuan) – which improve China’s image abroad. The practice of mixing internal and external propaganda makes China’s public diplomacy weak (Wang, 2008). The concept of China’s public diplomacy (gongong waijiao), was first proposed in the 1990 book Diplomacy Abroad, edited by Qipeng Zhou. Since then, the term was used as mass and civil diplomacy mixing with the term public, due to a translation issue from English to Chinese. However, the Chinese mostly perceive public diplomacy as people-to-people diplomacy (minjian waijiao) with the approach of cultural exchange or diplomacy (ibid).

Wang (2008) and Aoyama (2007) argued that China’s public diplomacy was shaped when Beijing introduced a mouthpiece system in 1983, during its reformation and open period (Aoyama, 2007). In the era of Chinese Economic Reform, propaganda was developed and expanded considerably to enhance communication with foreign countries (Q. Zhao, 2011). Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has spread carefully-worded statements of customary Chinese thought, normally a part of its internal propaganda (duinei xuanhuan), to overseas Chinese, the Taiwanese, and non-Chinese foreigners (Brady, 2012, p.63). The best examples of this are as follows: Civilization (wenming), Filial Piety (xiao), virtue (de), Prosperous Society (xiao kang shehui), Harmony (hexie), Confucius (kongzi), Yellow Emperor (huangdi), Respecting the Rites (mingli), and Honesty and Trust (chengxin) (ibid, pp.63-67). Especially since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Beijing policymakers have put international publicity ahead of everything else in order to build a favorable national brand abroad, and has adopted a strategy of “foreign publicity with Chinese characteristics” (Ding, 2011, p.312), and utilized public diplomacy to publicize itself to the world. By extension, in 2004, it introduced a new Division for Public Diplomacy, as part of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Public diplomacy was now applied in earnest to China’s foreign policy, based on the governmental guideline that “foreign policy must be an extension of domestic policy and that diplomacy should serve domestic politics” (Wang, 2008, p.260).

The general goal of China’s public diplomacy is “to serve China’s foreign policy objectives

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The external propaganda is associated with “rising global awareness of Chinese achievements and to the construction of a new image of China for oversea audience” and controlled by the jurisdiction of a broad system of state publicity over diplomatic institutions (K. Zhao, 2015b, pp.168-169).

Li Zhiyong (2009) differentiated clearly the meanings of public diplomacy between the new and original terms. The terms are public diplomacy (gonggong waijiao), people-to-people diplomacy (minjian waijiao), civil diplomacy (gongmin waijiao), mass diplomacy (gongzhong waijiao), and people diplomacy (renmin waijiao). When the word public is translated into Chinese, it is rendered as ‘non-private’, ‘non-competitive’, or ‘non-discriminatory’. Thus, there are different public diplomacy activities based on these differing translations (K. Zhao, 2015b, pp.169-170).
and its domestic development by improving China’s image in the world” (d’Hooghe, 2015, p.99). Giving a detailed account of the goal, Yang Jiechi (2011), a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and now a State Councilor, observed that the characteristics of China’s public diplomacy are based on people-to-people diplomacy and civil diplomacy, which Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai established to encourage the development of foreign relations between China and other countries. Consequently, China established diplomatic ties with the United States and improved its relations with Japan. Furthermore, China’s public diplomacy is aimed at promoting common development and prosperity in the world. Constantly, China draws close to other countries, showing a true version of China’s image that seeks world peace and prosperity, and seeks to resolve any misunderstandings and negative impressions of China in international society. Therefore, China’s public diplomacy functions to boost cooperation, trust, and mutual understanding between foreign publics and China based on both domestic and international perspectives about contributing to world development and peace. To realize its goals, the Chinese government has established five main strategies for its public diplomacy (Hall and Smith, 2013). First, the Chinese government pays attention to Chinese citizens abroad, as they can be a potential source of influence in its overseas expansion. Second, Beijing corrects its weakness in international media, by establishing its own TV channels with, for example, English-language, French, and Spanish content. Third, the Chinese government supports a public diplomacy division, which operates under the umbrella of its Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to cope with the task of “peaceful development” and “peaceful rise” in order to improve its public image. Further, the government founded a Public Diplomacy Research Center and journal, Public Diplomacy Quarterly. Fourth, Beijing financially supports over 320 Confucius Institutions, which have spread to 100 countries. Fifth, China hosts cultural, sports, and business events, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Exhibition (pp.3-4).

So, how does China’s public diplomacy develop and carry out its strategies? China’s public diplomacy is classified exchanges in four ways, as follows:
Figure 1: The mechanism of public diplomacy

Note. Adopted from Q. Zhao, 2011

1. A nation’s government to B nation’s public: The primary significance is public diplomacy, and government conducts public diplomacy through mass media. It contains cultural exchanges and education offered to the other nation’s public under governmental support.

2. A nation’s public to B nation's government: This type of activity includes non-government organizations, university researchers visiting foreign governments for research, or introducing the country to another government. These personal initiative activities increase and have a wide range of activities aimed at the other nation’s government. As time goes by, it establishes a public diplomacy.

3. A nation’s public to B nation’s public: The exchange between public and public is called “nongovernmental diplomacy”, or the people-to-people diplomacy in China. It has been pursued since the new government of the People’s Republic of China was formed, and carries out both government and non-governmental diplomacy. Prior to China establishing diplomatic ties with Japan in 1972, it conducted information exchanges and trade interchange, under non-government leads.

4. Communication and interaction between government and public within A and B’s nation individually: This is the mutual exchanges between a government and its citizen.

It is not common to identify it as a category of public diplomacy, but it is more often related to public diplomacy today. It is analogous with public relations.

Above all, three different actors conform and its detail strategies are designed under China’s foreign policy. Interviewee N-C1 gave his opinion that China’s public diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy, used to achieve long-term strategies put in place by previous leaders. Based on the interviewee’s view, dividing public relations started with Deng Xiaoping, and has been continued by Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, their rhetoric connecting with the objectives of China’s public diplomacy. Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese foreign policy started to evolve based on the external situation of the world. Also, reform has been a major theme of China’s economic and political development since 1978, but China’s reforms were confronted by serious obstacles (Liu and Dittmer, 2006). Deng Xiaoping encouraged deeper reform in China and its people in 1988:

China is conducting a deep reform in order to create better conditions for future development. We do not just set our sight on the twentieth century but also think about the new century. The problem is that if we do not move ahead we have to retreat. Only deep and comprehensive reform can guarantee that we can build a well-to-do (xiaokang) society by the end the twentieth century and make more progress in the next century. (Xiaoping, 1993, p.268 as cited in Liu & Dittmer, 2006, p.2)

China was also criticised by the international community as a result of the crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping proposed that China’s core foreign policy strategy was “tao guang yang hui” (hide capability and keep a low profile). It became the model for China’s foreign relations for the next two decades (Brandy, 2017; Sørensen, 2015). Based on Deng’s model, the Hu Jintao regime put forward “heping jueqi”, which refers to “peaceful rise”31 as opposed to a Chinese threat to international society potentially posed by its rapid economic development (Lam, 2015). The “heping jueqi” slogan was first mentioned by then-Vice President Zheng Bijian’s speech to a plenary session of the Bo’ao Forum for Asia in 2003, and explained the meaning of China rise as peaceful in the world:

In the twenty-five years since its reform and opening up, China has blazed a new strategic path that not only suits its national conditions but also conforms to the tide of the times. This new path enables China’s peaceful rise by independently building socialism with Chinese characteristics while participating in, rather than isolating

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31 The term “peaceful rise”, from 2003-2004, was later replaced by “peaceful development” due to the nuance of “rise”, which many thought sounded too provocative (Buzan, 2014).
In addition, Hu’s scientific perspective on development (kexue fazhanguan)\(^{32}\) led to economic development and the advancement of science and technology, which are now utilized as a source and means of China’s public diplomacy. By extension, Hu appreciated the importance of soft power and public diplomacy, and applied it to China’s foreign policy. Unlike the report of 17th National Party Congress, the report of the 18th declared that China would carry on public and cultural diplomacy, to safeguard legitimate rights and interests overseas. The report also stressed that the country realized the importance of public and cultural diplomacy, and thus the CPC would focus on soft power and protection of its overseas rights and national interests (Yang, 2014). As a result of previous leaders’ achievements, current President of China Xi Jinping has promoted the idea of a China Dream (Zhongguo Meng)\(^{33}\) as a major ideological campaign within China. This is not a wholly new idea, but it is one that is defined and advanced differently by Xi, suggesting “a new phase in China’s modernization and internationalization” (Kerr, 2015, p.1). He suggested the direction for the China Dream at the first session of the 12th National People’s Congress in 2013:

The Chinese dream, after all, is the dream of the people. We must realize it by closely depending on the people. We must incessantly bring benefits to the people [...] We must make persistent efforts, press ahead with indomitable will, continue to push forward the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation [...] We must follow the strategic thinking that development is of overriding importance [...] We must constantly tamp the material and cultural foundations for the realization of the Chinese dream. (China Daily, 2013a)

A lot of time passed from the reign of Deng Xiaoping to that of Xi Jinping, but examining the national slogans of former Chinese leaders, Deng Xiaoping’s stable development slogan, which prevented clashes with external powers, was developed by Hu Jintao to mean a harmonized society and responsibility to the international society. Also, it shows that before Xi Jinping, Deng Xiaoping’s slogan provided China’s main diplomatic value, and this official foreign relations policy is a response to criticisms from and checking by Western countries, including those from the United States. Currently, China proposes the ‘China Dream’ to

\(^{32}\) The mean of the scientific outlook on development is that China has changed from the situation of over-reliance on a cheap labor force, funds and natural resources to well-educated workers and improvement of science and technology, a development mode for the country (China Daily, 2010b).

\(^{33}\) The meaning of China Dream can be interpreted in various ways. However, this research adopted Kerr (2015)’s perspective to understand China’s public diplomacy.
generate a national revival on the international stage (Tsang, 2015), by putting forward a far-reaching goal of recreating the Silk Road, through the “One Belt and One Road” policy. Taken together, the main objective of China’s public diplomacy is to promote the nation’s economic development through peaceful coexistence on the international stage. Public diplomacy helps China to achieve amicable relations with foreign countries. For example, foreign direct investment (FDI) and World Trade Organization (WTO) played important roles in Chinese economic development, through vigorous interactions with related nations, and contributed to major changes in Chinese strategy from “bringing in” (yin jin lai) to “going out” (zou chu qu) (Zhu, 2013, p.7). In this regard, China seeks to achieve its goals through its public diplomacy in following ways: First, China pursues a “harmonious society” to bridge the gap between rich and poor and, by extension, to seek “scientific development” to maintain sustainable economic development. Second, China pursues their “harmonious world” and “peaceful rise” strategies to erase China’s negative public image and improve cooperation with other nations, and to stimulate China’s economic activity. Third, China wants to be recognized by the world as a friendly and contributing nation. Finally, China wants to introduce its ancestors’ culture and lessons to the world (d’Hooghe, 2008, p.43). In sum, public diplomacy is a suitable tool for China to achieve its contemporary goals, as Beijing has traditionally sought many of the rights and privileges of a great power, without accepting the responsibilities that came with them (Medeiros and Fravel, 2003). The following section will discuss China’s soft power, which is the means of its public diplomacy.

3.3.2 China’s soft power and its culture and history

Soft power has been adopted as a core concept in Chinese foreign policy since the Hu Jintao era. Hu officially highlighted China’s cultural soft power in his keynote report made on behalf of the 16th CPC Central Committee to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in 2007:

Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength [...] enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and interests [...] The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will definitely be accompanied by the thriving of Chinese culture. (China.org.cn, 2007)
Notwithstanding Hu’s public announcement in 2007, Hu did not give shape to what and how soft power was going to enhance China’s ability to get others to “want what it wants” (Suzuki, 2009). After the concept of soft power arrived in China from the West, around 1993, China’s soft power was buttressed by the Chinese government through research by Chinese scholars and policy-makers (Wang, 1993; Wang and Lu, 2008, p.442).34 The majority of Chinese scholars, including Cho & Jeong (2008), Li (2008), W. Zhang (2010), and Wang & Lu (2008), pointed out the limitations of Nye’s conception of soft power to understand Chinese soft power. While Nye’s concept is typical of American knowledge-based experiences and pragmatic characteristics, Chinese soft power has a broader scope, covering a larger spectrum, and emphasizes China’s own characteristics, and also considers its present condition based on Chinese thought. Hence, Chinese scholars and analysts refer to soft power as an “intangible, non-quantifiable, non-material or spiritual power” (Wang & Lu, 2008, p.427). Chinese scholars concentrate on analyzing Chinese traditional culture and economic development models, which are interpreted as hard power to exert soft power. Therefore, the concept of soft power in China is more like the concept of smart power (Wang, 2008). In a similar vein, Chinese writers use soft power term in three different ways: first ruan shili (soft strength), which has the closest to the Western definition of soft power and often used among Chinese writers; second ruan quanli (soft authority or right); third ruan liliang (soft physical strength or force) (Barr, 2015, p. 183). In other words, the Chinese perspective of power is that hard and soft power are “more intertwined and in agreement with the policy line that they are both essential parts of a state’s Comprehensive National Power” (d’Hooghe, 2015, p.110). In addition, Ding (2008) referred to soft power as a medium to lead to Chinese development through the glorification or idealization of historical background. Moreover, Wang (2011) considered China’s soft power facilitates to communicate with the world.

China began to focus on soft power due to the international situation. Like public diplomacy’s goal, the reason that China has paid attention to soft power is related to its high level of economic growth. Since the 1990s, China has discussed its role in international society with more confidence thanks to its rapid economic growth. In particular, China’s economic growth model gained the spotlight following the global financial crisis in 2008. However, China’s economic development has been shown as menacing or a threat to the

34 With regards to China’s soft power in China, the view diverges over the matter of the core elements of China’s soft power. One is that Chinese soft power is strong, due to its unique values. The other view suggests that China’s political power is the most important component of its ability to exercise its soft power overseas (d’Hooghe, 2015, pp.111-113; Shambaugh, 2013, p.170; Wang, 2011; Wang 2015 also see Yan. X. (2007). Ruanshili yu Zhongguo Jueqi (Soft power and the Rise of China). Beijingdaxiue Zhongguo yu Shijie Yanzhu zhongxin Yanjiu Baogao (research paper of the Beijing University’s China and the World Research Center), 5, 1–18;
world, and as an authoritarian and nationalistic model for international society (Roy, 1996). China, concurrently, recognized the expansion of America’s values in the era of globalization and information age. Hence, the Chinese leadership began to develop more sophisticated diplomatic policies based on soft power, by mobilizing officials and scholars and emphasizing its favorite national image – that of a peaceful and responsible great power, as well as one fostering an amicable international environment for its ascendancy (Ding, 2008). Hence, high-ranking government advisors in China deem soft power to be “indispensable in the country’s attempt to increase its ‘comprehensive national strength’ (zonghe guoli) and regain its status as a leading world power” (Huang and Ding, 2006). This approach is similar to Kurlantzick’s understanding of Chinese soft power, that

[for] the Chinese, soft power means anything outside of the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations. (2007b, p.6)

When one considers that the current debate on soft power in China is connected to its foreign policy orientation, there is little doubt that soft power has become an important topic in Chinese strategic circles (Li, 2008). China’s soft power is relevant to fostering a positive and intimate image of China overseas. China’s soft power had become embedded in its traditional ideology, culture, and foreign strategies (Ding, 2008a, 2008b; Lai, 2012a). Thus, Chinese discourse proposes that the most vital source of soft power is from culture, domestic institutions and values (Zhang & Liu, 2009). Based on this vital source of China’s soft power, Beijing employs the following elements as a tool kit to exercise soft power leverage: China’s reassuring political discourse and diplomatic conduct, including self-control against contentious subjects and issues, public diplomacy, and trade and assistance (Lai, 2012a). Taken together, interviewee N-C1 argued that the China model, foreign aid, and its culture play a leading role in its soft power based on his experience in African countries. Other scholars also understand the source of China’s soft power as follows: the Confucius Institutions (which provide Chinese cultural and language instruction), the policy of a harmonious world and being good neighbor, foreign aid, and China model35 provided by its domestic policies and values (Bin, 2008; Grill and Huang, 2006; Huang and Ding, 2006; Kurlantzick, 2007b; Li, 2008; Liu and Tsai, 2014; Suzuki, 2009). Based on the last thirty years, China’s soft power activities in developing countries, in particular, has been deployed in the form of grants, aid projects, low-interest loans, direct investment, economic

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35 Due to the controversies over the concept of the Beijing Consensus, this research has adopted the “China model”, which refers to China’s model of economic development, or the Beijing Consensus, to avoid controversy in this thesis. More discussion on this topic will appear in Chapter 4.
collaboration agreement, and cultural exchanges to promote its soft power among developing countries (Tang and Li, 2011).

As to providing a definition of the concept of China’s cultural soft power, Guozuo Zhang (2017) has divided Chinese culture into three levels: at the macro-level, culture leaves its marks on the human mind, in the form of material culture and spiritual culture. At the medium-level, culture is comprised of China’s general development of economics, politics, culture, society, diplomacy, and others and refers to ideologies that can be spread through language and images, and influence others’ emotions and psychology. The micro-level covers all specific knowledge of different fields, disciplines, and policies. However, among the three levels, the medium- and micro-levels of culture are involved in major cultural soft power (p.40). The importance of China’s culture for its soft power has been expressed by Li Yunshan. As a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, and President of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, he highlighted the significance of culture and the core values of socialism during his speech at a Party School opening ceremony: “We have every reason to consolidate our confidence in culture, and the key is to be aware of the deep root of our culture that has unique advantages, [...] this would help enhance China’s soft power, elevating it into a major socialist cultural power” (Xinhua News, 2016d). The component of culture that the Chinese government and scholars consider to be an important part of its soft power is comprised of those China’s values that highlight its cohesion, solidarity and long-term stability (G. Zhang, 2017, p. 40), which are different from those in the West, and especially from those in America.

Hence, China tries to connect its contemporary cultural soft power to its traditional culture, as its traditions are the root, the path of historical development, as well as the soul of China that distinguishes it from other countries. Positive core values from China’s traditional culture popular today include an optimistic and sanguine ethos, unity, harmony, high-spiritedness, courage, creativity, and others (G. Zhang, 2017, pp.45-47). Two historical Chinese characteristics influence its soft power. The first is the doctrine of the system. In the past, traditional society recognized that it was necessary to establish a doctrine of the system as an ideology of provide norms and standards of traditional order to maintain the order of a unified empire. Confucianism and School of Law were used as the basis of a doctrine of the system by the ruling classes. These ideas not only helped to provide unification and homogeneity to the empire as a whole, but also served to justify the profits of the ruling classes and races. Accordingly, several religious systems had been developed, including

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36 Wang Huning (1993) also stressed culture as a core component of China’s soft power.
Taoism and Buddhism, which helped form the ideas and cultural system coping with Confucianism. China has a long, thousand-year history of cultural glory in East Asia, based on the values of traditional Chinese culture found in Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism and other classic schools of thought, such as winning respect through virtue (ri de furen), benevolent governance (wang dao), peace and harmony (he), and harmony without suppressing differences (he er bu tong) (Li, 2008, p.292). Also, the term harmony is emphasised, ‘giving priority to human beings’ (yi ren wei ben) and ‘harmony between nature and human kind’ (tian ren he yi) in traditional Chinese culture (ibid). The other historical characteristic is Sinocentrism, or a China-centered view of world order. The view of the world in traditional Chinese society was not that of the modern nation-state system comprised of equal, sovereign nations. Rather, it was Sinocentrism, in which hierarchical order is created centred around China. With the emergence of Chinese nationalism, Sinocentrism was again revived in the Chinese people’s view of the world (Scott, 2008; S. Zhao, 2011). Their historical practice of tributary trade, which allows differentiated and preferential treatment in economic and diplomatic relations, is found again in today’s strategies for pursuing the national interest with proper harmony of hard power, such as military force and foreign relations.

3.3.3 The varied opinions of China’s Soft Power

As discussed earlier, China’s soft power differs from Nye’s concept of Soft power. There is a wide range of opinion about China’s soft power among scholars, with regards to which component of soft power makes China’s so different. Moreover, there have been many controversies about whether China’s soft power is able to be an instrument to achieve peaceful development on the global stage. Studies on China in International Relations so far have focused on the emergence of China as an economic and military power. However, many Western scholars, including Nye, have shown interest in China’s soft power, but have pointed out China’s soft power has limitations, despite the fact that Chinese culture, including language, is spreading through developing countries.

Most scholars offer China’s political system as the greatest hindrance to smoothly implementing its soft power strategies. Joseph Nye (2015b) recently interpreted the situation as “China has emphasized its cultural and economic strengths, but it has paid less attention to the political aspects that can undermine its effort”, and pointed out two factors (China’s nationalism and censored civil society) as limitations on China’s soft power. Despite the frequent assertions of it being a socialist China that has adopted soft power to seek a peaceful
rise, and a positive image of the country on the world stage, its authoritarian regime is a problem when China exercises its soft power, due to the lack of transparency, censorship, unequal opportunities, and domestic corruption (Li and Worm, 2011). In other words, the high rate of China’s economic growth and nationalism are the result of the Chinese Communist Party’s battle for legitimacy, but nationalism has a negative impact on China’s soft power (for example, when China was establishing a Confucius Institution in Manila, during an ongoing ownership contest between China and the Philippines over islands in the South China Sea). The authoritarian governmental system also limits the strength that can be drawn from civil society, and believes that the government is the primary source of its soft power, and publicizes the belief that its ancient culture appeals to the world at large (Nye, 2015b). Not only this, internationally, the West raises the issue of the suppression of human rights and freedoms, which are related to China’s non-compliance with international norms (Huang and Ding, 2006), whereby the unfavorable international reputation is linked to China’s soft power. Based on contemporary issues and China’s soft power system, China’s unique political system affects not only the value of its soft power, but also its public diplomacy, and gives rise to unintended consequences that are far from the positive responses of foreign publics.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed public diplomacy and its related subordinate concepts (propaganda and strategic communication), and has drawn common points between public diplomacy and these concepts. Based on the discussion, the chapter has discovered the importance of public diplomacy for states, especially in the globalization and information-oriented age, and has found that the development of communication technology gave rise to a new public diplomacy.

Unlike earlier, or old public diplomacy, the new public diplomacy displays five characteristics: 1) seeking mutual understanding to sustain relationships among nations, international actors, and foreign publics with bilateral and symmetric dialogue; (2) considering public opinion; (3) attaching great importance to mutuality and trust, and long-term focus on relationship-building; (4) establishing networks of relationships between non-state actors and organizations and multiple stakeholders; and (5) facilitating a collaborative approach to foreign relations. In addition, it has reviewed Nye’s concept of soft power with three different aspects of relational power to understand the flow of power from hard
(command power) to soft (co-optive power). The chapter has also acknowledged the necessity and importance of public diplomacy to generate soft power, which is intangible; and recognizes that there is a dispute about the connection between public diplomacy and soft power due to the advent of other forms of power, such as smart power, social power, and integrated power.

By reviewing the Western perspective on public diplomacy and soft power, and also China’s public diplomacy and soft power, the chapter has recognized that the concept of public diplomacy and soft power is broader in China than it is in Western conceptions. In particular, the notion of propaganda in China connotes a positive image, unlike in the West, and China had attempted to communicate with the world before the introduction of the concept of public diplomacy to China, in the early 1990s. The goal of China’s public diplomacy is to create an amicable image of the country to achieve its goal of being a responsible power and maneuvering through a peaceful rise/development. In addition, China wants to be shown to contribute to world peace, as well as construct for itself an image of a respectable country through soft power based on the China model, and a harmonized and civilized historical background. Based on this positive image, China attempts to move past, or dissuade the China threat theory, and refute distorted impressions of the country arising from the West. By extension, China is pursuing an expansion of its role, and is waiting for an opportunity to fulfill the Sino-Globalization.

Building on the general background of China’s public diplomacy and soft power outlined in this chapter, the next chapter will look at mechanisms for its implementation, based on the three dimensions (government actor, semi-governmental actor, and non-governmental actor), and also how the Chinese government applies public diplomacy to shape the conditions of diplomacy for its economic relations with other countries.
Chapter 4. China’s Public Diplomacy in its International Strategy with a focus on economic relations

This chapter aims to expand our overview of China’s public diplomacy and soft power, as introduced in Chapter 3, and link it with the necessity of China’s public diplomacy to achieve its foreign policy goals, before starting the discussion on Sino-African relations. First, therefore, this chapter will analyze the China model from a Chinese perspective, and discuss Joshua Ramo’s Beijing Consensus. Then, it will examine the role of each of China’s main actors (governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental actor) who have ties to its public diplomacy activities, and analyze how – and with which instruments – they carry out public diplomacy. Third, it will consider how culture and foreign aid exert influence on China’s public diplomacy, and how to create a favorable environment for China to have close economic relations with foreign countries.

4.1 China’s International Strategy and the Importance of Public Diplomacy

As discussed in Chapter 3, through public diplomacy, the Chinese government seeks to foster common development, cooperation, and mutual understanding with other countries and foreign publics. To this end, Hu Jintao expounded a four-point proposal for building a harmonious world, at the UN’s 60th Anniversary Summit in 2005. The first point is to embrace multilateralism. He argued that “[w]e must abandon the Cold War mentality, cultivate a new security concept featuring trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, and build a fair and effective collective security mechanism aimed at preventing war and conflict and safeguarding world peace and security”. The second is to foster economic cooperation, which is of mutual benefit to all countries that are intertwined, by establishing and enhancing “a multilateral trading system that is open, fair and non-discriminatory”, and by engaging in a “worldwide energy dialogue and cooperation” and “balanced development in the world”. The third is “to preserve the diversity of civilizations in the spirit of equality and openness, make international relations more democratic” as all countries are entitled to choose their own

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37 As for Beijing consensus publications, Stefan Halper (2010) is also famous for his work on Beijing Consensus. However, this thesis adopted Joshua Ramo (2004)’s perspective to understand China model.
social system and paths of development, independent of outside meddling. The final point is to reform the UN to maintain its authority and improve its validity to produce better results (China.org.cn, 2005b). Two years later, Hu explained how to realize a harmonious world, in a report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Part of China. He pointed out that “the people of all countries should join hands and strive to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity” (China Daily, 2007c). To achieve this, he suggests that all countries should (1) observe the United Nations Charters’ principles and aim, (2) follow international law and universal norms, and (3) boost democracy, collaboration, harmony, and mutual advantage in international relations. Hu identified five aspects of a harmonious world:

Politically, all countries should respect each other and conduct consultations on an equal footing in a common endeavor to promote democracy in international relations. Economically, they should cooperate with each other, draw on each other's strengths and work together to advance economic globalization in the direction of balanced development, shared benefits and win-win progress. Culturally, they should learn from each other in the spirit of seeking common ground while shelving differences, respect the diversity of the world, and make joint efforts to advance human civilization. In the area of security, they should trust each other, strengthen cooperation, settle international disputes by peaceful means rather than by war, and work together to safeguard peace and stability in the world. On environmental issues, they should assist and cooperate with each other in conservation efforts to take good care of the Earth, the only home of human beings. (ibid)

Hu’s suggestion for how to create a harmonious world is directly connected to China’s foreign policy, which aims to foster an image of China as a stable, reliable, and responsible economic partner, a rising economic power that does not have to be feared (d’Hooghe, 2011). China’s international strategy aligns with the objective of public diplomacy as proposed by Mark (2009), and mentioned in Chapter 3.1, that the idealistic objective is to create a bilateral relationship based on mutual exchange, with the functional objective of boosting the interests of trade, politics, diplomacy, and economy, and manage tensions in international bilateral relations. In other words, explains that China’s public diplomacy is designed by and focused on its foreign policy, based on domestic policy. The following sections will discuss the importance of sustainable economic development in China’s foreign policy and how it links to its public diplomacy activities.
4.1.1 The significance of sustainable development as China’s international strategy

As discussed in Chapter 3, China’s development model is widely recognized as a source of its soft power. China’s economic development is important not only to China’s socialist political party as a way of creating domestic legitimacy for national unification (Buzan, 2014), but also offers a favorable impression for developing countries (d’Hooghe, 2007; Kurlantzick, 2007b) such as Vietnam, Kazakhstan, India, Brazil, Iran, and Zimbabwe (Huang & Ding, 2006). According to a white paper on China’s peaceful development, published by the State Council Information Office in 2011, the core components of China’s national interests are state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification. The paper also states clearly that China’s political system is based on an all-round social stability, including ensuring sustainable economic and social development (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011b). Since economic reform began in 1978, China has enjoyed remarkable economic growth. China accumulated the largest amount of currency reserves; addressed the poverty of 200 million people in the late of 1970s; and, especially in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Chinese public and its leadership gained confidence that it had a right to become a global power through economic success, enjoying trade surpluses of around $100 billion trade annually (Kurlantzick, 2007a). Especially, even though China’s recent economic growth has slowed since the global financial crisis during the mid-to-late-2000s, China’s GDP grew between 2009 to 2010, from 9.4 to 10.6 percent (World Bank, n.a). Also, in 2008, China’s exports changed from labor-intensive products to medium-technical products. The volume of exports was $1.423 trillion, an increase of 17.2 percent from the previous year; and its trade surplus was $295.4 billion, an increase of 12.5 percent over the previous year, when the world experienced an economic recession (Takahara, 2012). Since then, China has become a second largest economy in the world, through large-scale expansion of financial investment-related business, and by increasing intermediary-goods imports between 2009 and 2010. Around the same time, the import of end goods has also improved, due to increased consumption.

China’s rapidly growing economic prowess led to a reputation for prosperity and affluence, and improved China’s attractiveness, making it an exemplar of success (Huang & Ding, 2006). China’s economic development method became known as the “Beijing Consensus”, as opposed to the Washington Consensus. The phrase was first coined in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former Time magazine foreign affairs editor, Goldman Sachs China advisor, and a professor at Tsinghua University:
China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity. I call this new centre and physics of power and development the Beijing Consensus. (Ramo, 2004 p.3-4)

He argued that the Beijing Consensus is going to replace the Washington Consensus, especially in developing countries. The three core theorems of the Beijing Consensus are: first, the innovation theorem – China has pushed ahead balanced development between urban and rural areas, regions, economy and society, humans and nature and its domestic economy and the international economy, by establishing improvements in quality of life, rather than growth of GDP. Second, demanding a development model where sustainability and equality as its first considerations theorem – focusing on quality-of-life rather than measuring like per-capita GDP to manage the massive contradictions of Chinese development. And third, a self-determination theorem – China has endeavored to promote self-determination in relation to the United States, for example, focusing peaceful development not reliant on weaponry, and by developing asymmetric capabilities to balance the United States (Ramo, 2004, pp.11-12). Based on this, Ramo noted that the “Chinese development policy is more effective and practical for system-transition states and developing countries” rather than the Washington Consensus, which consistently applies a series of so-called neoliberal policies to reach economic development goals (Cho and Jeong, 2008, p.462). To sum up, the term “Beijing Consensus” represents a model for economic development based on China’s successful growth into an economic superpower under one-party communist rule, while the Washington Consensus demands a free market system in conjunction with liberal democratic reform through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Hayden, 2011; S. Zhao, 2010).

However, the Beijing consensus is controversial among scholars who question whether or not the pattern of China’s economic development can be an alternative development model for other countries (Chen and Goodman, 2012; Barr, 2011; Ferchen, 2013; Kennedy, 2010; Lai, 2016; So, 2013; Naughton, 2010; S. Zhao, 2010, 2011). When one looks into the three theorems of the Beijing Consensus, technological innovation is not a core element of China’s growth. China has not been an innovation leader, nor innovative in its technological and policy initiatives, but its enterprises have invented and designed products and provided services outside China. As to China’s high-tech sectors, the successful and massive Chinese companies build networks as assemblers and manufacturers of other designs. And China’s
economic policy is not an innovation, but resembles a modified version of the East Asian model of several newly-industrialized East Asian economies – referring to the development of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong in the 1970s and 1980s. Second, China's sustainable and equitable development is highly limited. China concentrates on rapid GDP growth over environmental concerns, although China has taken steps to draw up measures of infrastructure for environmental protection. Also, China puts economic growth and legal reform before political liberalization and robust civil society. China still exhibits inequality in its growth experience – for example, personal, sectoral, or regional inequality – however, 700 million people have been lifted out of poverty. Third, China's economic development strategy is not unique, as China shares similarities and differences in policies with other countries, including liberal capitalist governance regimes, and those of developing states. Also, due to diverse reasons including non-policy-related elements of China’s remarkable economic growth, it is hard to link its success with the Beijing Consensus (Barr, 2011; Kennedy, 2010; Lai, 2016; S. Zhao, 2010, 2011). Additionally, the concept of the Beijing Consensus excludes several overarching features to understand China’s development, such as, economically, the increase and progression of reform from a basic sector (agriculture) to a complex sector (manufacture and finance); utilization of China’s comparative advantage by using labor-intensive manufactured exports; a connection with the global economy; promotion of non-state enterprises; and increased reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). And in the political arena, the improvement of governance and cadre promotion, highlighting political stability, and slow political reform (Lai, 2016, p.25). Hence, in lieu of embracing Ramo’s Beijing Consensus, Chinese scholars have put forward “the China model” to “describe the possible component and features in China’s path of development” (ibid). In addition to the China model and the Beijing Consensus, other names have been suggested, such as “state capitalism”, “market authoritarianism”, “authoritarian capitalism” (Barr, 2011). Michael Barr also argued that the Beijing Consensus is not a consensus, nor unique to China. Hence, the Beijing Consensus is recognized as a concept and term that that distinguishes between China and the West.

As Minglu Chen and David S. G. Goodman (2012) have argued, despite many efforts to identify a China model by journalists, scholars, and public intellectuals, there is little agreement about the dimensions of the China model. Moreover, Barr (2011) also observed the difficulties of China’s model, in that it is hard to standardize the style or pattern of China’s 30-plus years economic strategy of reform and opening up. He also cautions that “framing China’s success by referring to the uniqueness of its model can be more misleading than helpful and has set up a barrier rather than a bridge to comprehend China’s soft power” (Barr, 2011, p.15). However, as pointed out in Chapter 3, the China model is a component of
its soft power and makes a favorable impression on developing countries, and boosts close
ties and economic cooperation between China and developing countries. Therefore, this
research will briefly summarize the features and patterns contained in the China model only
to understand the further discussion on Sino-Africa relations, which will be discuss in
Chapters 5-7. When taking all scholarly arguments together, the term “China model” is a
constant in China’s strategic planning, which forms the basis of all its economic development
policies. The China model was well summarized by S. Zhao (2010), who argued that the
model is associated with diverse aspects of China’s unique economic and political reform
such as gradualism, pragmatism, the important role of the Chinese government in markets
and economic development, the advance in commercial law, and the limitation of civil and
political rights for stability and economic growth.

4.1.2 China’s public diplomacy system: strategic connection between political
leadership, various government departments, and instruments

To grasp China’s government organizations, we need to address the fundamental meaning of
the public from the Chinese perspective. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the Chinese
government considers public to mean Chinese public. In parallel, the West – especially
American scholars – believe it means public affairs, which has a broader scope than
diplomacy. Thus, a mixture of public diplomacy and public affairs holds a place in the
Chinese political system, which organizes and coordinates its policy. The Chinese
government does not, however, have single organ of public diplomacy, which is solely
responsible of its operation as in the America’s system. Most of Chinese public diplomacy’s
work, therefore, is shared by the various government departments, such as the Ministry of
Commerce, the Ministry of Culture (MOC), the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Information Office of the State Council, and other stakeholders in the
Central Government, the business sector, media organizations, and think tanks (Wang,
2008; K. Zhao 2015b). Regarding China’s public diplomacy operation, Yang (2011) explained
a systematic and close cooperation among all relevant government departments, institutions,
and Chinese citizens for its public diplomacy. First, China carries out public diplomacy,
which pertains to major diplomatic activities and high-level visits. In this case, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs has managed national leaders’ overseas visits or international conference
attendance, where China shares its fundamental perspectives and its polities with foreign
audiences. The Chinese government has hosted various events, such as the Shanghai World
Expo, the Beijing Olympics, China’s National Pavilion Day, and the Summit Forum. Chinese
leaders, including high-level government personnel are involved in its events for opening and closing ceremonies. Not only that, but China arranges media interviews and Internet forums for foreign leaders and ambassadors to fosters positive impressions towards China. Second, China utilizes public diplomacy to encourage external publicity and communicate with the public through information utilization under Chinese government supervision. To do this, Beijing holds nearly one hundred press conferences every year, sharing authoritative information on sensitive subjects with supportive foreign correspondents working in China. Moreover, China makes good use of the Internet to impart Chinese information through various websites, which are under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various agencies stationed overseas. Third, China focuses on boosting its institutions and mechanisms both internally and externally to improve the structure and function of its public diplomacy system. This is carried out at a high level, a joint operation between Beijing leader’s initiatives and Chinese embassies abroad, and various institutions on the ground. By extension, the Chinese government focuses on training diplomatic staff not only to have smooth communication skills and encourage understanding between China and foreign publics, but also to publicize China’s policies. Beijing has enhanced personnel exchanges with media and research institutions, and has dispatched key personnel to research at Chinese and foreign universities and research institutions. Thus, the hallmark of China’s public diplomacy is a government-centered (the government exerts influence directly or indirectly), top-down system.

To examine the feature of China’s diplomacy above, the next section will look at three different actors of China’s public diplomacy. This research into the three actors is divided into three, based on their role in China’s public diplomacy system: (1) governmental actors at the central level, including state leaders and major ministries related to diplomatic missions overseas; (2) semi-governmental actors at the local level, including local governments, provinces and cities; and (3) non-governmental actors, including academic circles (universities think tanks), cultural organizations, businesses (large corporations and chambers of commerce), NGOs and lobby groups (national and international advocacy.

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38 The ideas to divide three categories in the study are adopted from the definition of Gregory (2011) approach of public diplomacy which mentioned in Chapter 3.1.1 that public diplomacy refers as “an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values” with Shambaugh (2013) suggestion that China deploys three divided institutions – governmental, semi-governmental, and nongovernmental – and various instruments to conduct its public diplomacy with soft power abroad (p.176). Based on this, the study adopted d’Hooghe (2015)’s understanding of the framework of China’s public diplomacy on the basis of decision-making and role of its public diplomacy policy (pp.35-36).
group), and citizens (exchange and friendship organizations and associations and individual citizens). The three actors deploy diverse instruments (media, foreign aid, education institutions/activities including Confucius Institutes) when they carry out public diplomacy. The discussion of each actor begins with governmental actors in conjunction with public diplomacy programs, because China’s public diplomacy is a government-centered system, and most programs are designed by government ministries. After discussing the main actors, the chapter will briefly review the central role of sub-state actors and non-state actors, with the purpose of promoting understanding of China’s public diplomacy activities in Sino-African relations, in Chapters 6–7.

**Governmental main actors for China’s Public diplomacy**

China’s public diplomacy expert Ingrid d’Hooghe (2015), who is a research associate at the Clingendael Institution, has proposed six departments’ groups that perform similar work through government-level actors: the State Council Information Office (SCIO) and State Information Internet Office (SII); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassies and missions abroad; the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education and the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television (SARFT); the Ministry of Defense and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); China’s leaders; the Communist Party of China (CCP); and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (p.134). This section will look into the main actors who play a significant role in constructing and practicing China’s public diplomacy policy. These actors will be separated into two categories (information, and cultural and education), because the main actors and related institutions formulate and take charge of the programs of the two categories (Han, 2010, p.296). Although China’s foreign aid is important to its public diplomacy, it will be covered in Chapter 4.2.2, because China’s foreign aid is mostly concentrated in African countries unlike Asian countries.

**Governmental major actors handling of information programs**

In general, the foreign ministry is the primary state actor to perform public diplomacy, although China’s public diplomacy activities are under the purview of the State Council Information Office (SCIO) and the Communist Party’s Office of External Publicity (Wang, 2011). According to China.org.cn (the so-called China Internet Information Center), referred to as China’s authorized government portal site under the control of the SCIO and China International Publishing Group (CIPG), the aim of SCIO is officially “to promote communication, cooperation and mutual trust between China and the world” (China.org.cn, 2014a). Established in 1990, the SCIO set the Chinese government’s sights on changing its international image. It was subsequently responsibility for online news contents (Shirk, 2011,
p. 238). Its major role is not only vital to most of China’s public diplomacy development and determination, but it is also responsible for monitoring foreign media and cooperating with foreign news agencies and rendering assistance to foreign journalists, in order to ensure delivery of “accurate” Chinese news and information (Chen, 2011, p.75). Not only that, but the SCIO is also responsible for censoring domestic media and the Internet information about its domestic and foreign policies, education and culture, history, economic and social development, foreign media monitoring, domestic media and Internet censoring, providing information on Chinese human rights promotion, organizing news conferences, compiling and publishing both the Chinese government’s white papers and visual images, and arranging cultural interagency and cross-regional exchanges (China.org.cn, 2014a).

In fact, the original home of the Communist Party’s Office of External Publicity was the Party Central Committee-affiliated Overseas Propaganda Department, which the CCP founded in the wake of the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989 (Chen, 2011, pp.76-7). In 1998, the Chinese government renamed its department to the External Publicity Department based around ‘xuan’ in the word Zhong Xuan Bu, as it is called in Chinese. In Chinese, xuan means “propaganda” or “propagate”, and “publicity” or “publicize”. Therefore, Western scholars have two impressions of the External Publicity Department: one of “publicity” to “propaganda”, and the other of both “publicity” and “propaganda” (Hartig, 2015, p.85). Moreover, it supervised the creation of the SCIO, which took it upon itself to “publicizing China in an authentic, colorful, lively, and timely way” in international society during the 1990s (Hayden, 2011, p.192). The SCIO is typically referred to in Chinese as both the Guo Xin Ban and Wai Xuan Ban, which means External Propaganda Office, as the role it performs covers both the party and the state’s bureaucratic system. It is also both a subordinate in the State Council, and superintended by the CCP’s Small Groups. In other words, the SCIO performs administrative work for the External Propaganda Leading Small Group (EPLSG), similar to the work of the Leading Group of Foreign Affairs Work (who assigns duties to the Central Foreign Affairs Office (CFAO)). However, the SCIO has more authority than the CFAO in terms of manpower, finances, and exerting said authority. In regards to the SCIO’s management system, the Chinese refer to it as “one organ, two signboards”, which connotes the CCP in tandem with the state organs for the determination

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and management of its major cases (Shambaugh, 2013, p.221; d’Hooghe, 2015, pp.134-5; Hartig, 2015, p. 85; Zheng and Chen, 2015, p.67). Despite the fact that the SCIO has had a vital role in China’s public diplomacy ever since it was established, it plays a similar role to that of the Communist Party’s Office of External Publicity, which falls under the Communist Party’s Central Publicity Department (CPD) umbrella. The CPD draws up guidelines and disciplines through the Communist Party’s office of external publicity consultation; its realm of responsibility is not only China’s media – including film, drama, art, news, education, and literature (Brady, 2002, p. 565), but also international publicity environment and publicity work that requires permission for certain issues (d’Hooghe, 2015, pp.134-5). The SCIO embarked in earnest on China’s public diplomacy work under Zhao Qizheng’s leadership, who was minister from 1998 to 2005. Put another way, China established a foothold for its public diplomacy policy implementation during this period. During his career, he served as vice mayor of Shanghai, and played an active part in the “Shanghai-clique” with Jiang Zemin, and communication with the outside world (Cull, 2008c, p.128). Zhao’s greatest accomplishment was the improvement of the Chinese government’s under-utilized press conference and unilateral information-delivery spokesperson system. In an interview with China.org.cn, in 2008, Zhao clarified the role of the government spokesperson at the SCIO thus: “the spokesperson prepares with a process that we call a ‘production line’. They must have a good command of the public information in their field and a good understanding of what the press and the public are interested in.” (China.org.cn, 2005a) In addition, he focused on official information by holding frequent press conferences, restoring the use of English language at news conferences, exhorting its officials to cooperate with journalists, and instituting “the risky Western-style approach of speaking off-the-record in Beijing” (d’Hooghe, 2015, pp.135-6). He also avoids to used specific terms, xuanchuan, which implies “propaganda” when translated into English, in favour of the more benign ‘explaining’ or ‘shuo ming’ (Cull, 2008c, p.129).

With the SCIO, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA or MFA, hereafter MFA) is a government department inseparable from the conduct of China’s public diplomacy. The China’s MFA has been a major department in the domain of public diplomacy since 2009, when China’s then-leader Hu Jintao included it in his diplomatic policy (Lai, 2012b, p. 501). Chinese government acknowledged the importance of public diplomacy, and as a result the MFA set up a Public Diplomacy Division (Gonggong Waijiao Chu) within its Information Department in 2004, to take responsibility for “Internet-related issues and public diplomacy coordination with targeted domestic audiences” (K. Zhao, 2015b, p.3). Five years later, the division was promoted to the Public Diplomacy Office (Gonggong Waijiao Bangongshi) (Hartig, 2015, p.86), with responsibility for “the overall planning and coordination of public
diplomacy for the MFA and oversea Chinese embassies and consulates” (K. Zhao, 2015b, p.56). The primary responsibility of the office is advising public diplomacy regarding Chinese diplomatic envoys, including coordinating its public diplomacy and managing MFA’s 204 websites. In 2010, the MFA established a Consultative Committee on Public Diplomacy with the objective of advising, operation and assessment, and taking the lead in its public diplomacy. In the spring of the same year, the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) launched Public Diplomacy Quarterly, managed by Zhao Qizheng, the former director of the SCIO and spokesman of the CPPCC. He said the following regarding the founding of the journal: “The aim and mission of this journal is to facilitate the development of China’s public diplomacy” (People’s Daily, 2010).

In December 2012, the Chinese government also established the China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA) with the purpose of creating “a nationwide non-profit organization compromising experts and scholars, celebrities, and relevant institutions and enterprises in the field of public diplomacy” (China Public Diplomacy Association, 2014). The president, Li Zhaoxing who held several other posts, including the Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the chairman at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress before joining the China Public Diplomacy Association, delivered the hopeful message in his first inaugural speech that the association would “contribute to strengthening the soft power of China by mobilizing, coordinating and organizing social resources and the public for the promotion of China’s public diplomacy in an inclusive and pioneering manner” (MFA, 2012). The Association’s work was mainly composed of inspiring and organizing social and people-to-people resources not only for the implementation of its public diplomacy activities, but also contribution to the nationwide diplomacy and general public diplomacy (China Public Diplomacy Association, 2014). In addition to CPDA, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is another crucial department of public diplomacy with MFA. The CPPCC typically does not exert influence on the country’s foreign affairs; yet exceptions are made in connection with public diplomacy, as “it stresses the communication with foreign civil society, and CPPCC is the organ that represents Chinese civil society” (Wang, 2014, p. 94). The features of the CPPCC-led public diplomacy show “flexibility, diversity and extensiveness” (Yu, 2014, p.404). The CPPCC mostly conducts public diplomacy through its Committee of Foreign Affairs; it takes charge of organising exchanges with international officials and representatives from non-governmental organisations as well as communication with foreign countries through such as think tank and the Public Diplomacy Quarterly like mentioned above (Hertig, 2015).
Media and its subordinate instruments and programs for public diplomacy

China's information is shared through the media. The Chinese government employs media as one of its main tools of public diplomacy implementation. In this regard, in 2009, China's former leader Jiang Zemin encouraged “China to establish a publicity capacity to exert an influence on world opinion that is as strong as China's international standing”. Since then, the Beijing government initiated a renovation of its international broadcasting, coinciding with the Tiananmen Square Massacre (Rawnsley, 2015, p. 465); they invested approximately US$6.6 billion in that year, concentrating especially on China Radio International (CRI), China Central Television (CCTV), China's official news wire, the Xinhua News Agency, and the newspaper China Daily (d’Hooghe, 2015, p. 164).

Xinhua News Agency

The Xinhua News Agency is the largest state news agency and the center for collecting and releasing information in China (Xinhua News, n.d.). Xinhua has been the CCP’s mouthpiece since it was established, in 1931. More specifically, then Xinhua’s main role was the dissemination of news reports and Party and state propaganda (Shambaugh, 2013). In 1998, the Beijing government initiated significant reforms, and, ten years later, Xinhua became the largest news agencies in the world (Hong, 2012). Over the past three decades, the Chinese government has extended the Xinhua News Agency with the aim of creating “a central platform for the promotion of its global narrative” (Chen, Gloan, and Kiousis, 2016, p. 2). China still censors the media, which is still controlled by and under the supervision of the Communist Party, but they have relaxed control in recent years. The ongoing improvement of the media have promoted the activities of commercialization and professional journalism. Xinhua, consequently, has showed progressive improvement in the means of its propaganda proliferation, growing into a multi-purposed and multi-dimensional media platform (Jiang, 2011; Shirk, 2011).

Now, Xinhua has full news coverage and release facilities with multiple channels, functions, and means such as a satellite communications and transmission network, and computerized information processing systems. Xinhua releases diverse types of news items, in the fields of its politics, economics, society, technology, science, education, and culture, with overall 400,000 words daily to Chinese and foreign public through its special circuits to its domestic TV stations, newspapers, and radio stations. Likewise, it publishes same amount of news and new photo plates 24 hours a day, with Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabian, and Portuguese versions for overseas audiences (Xinhua News, n.d). Xinhua News Agency established Xinhuanet in 1997, as an online news service. The responsibility of Xinhuanet is to publicize China and report the world through three online domains: xinhuanet.com,
xinhua.org, and news.cn. The domain chinaview.cn is offered only in English. It also covers over 200 countries and regions in six different languages: Chinese, English, Spanish, French, Russian, and Arabic. *Xinhuanet* is the third top news website after BBC and CNN providing news services to overseas Internet users. Not only that, but it also manages several main governmental websites, but also numerous official conference and crucial international events websites, such as the APEC Forum, China-Africa Cooperation Forum Beijing Summit, and China-Korea Exchange Year (Jirik, 2016; Reilly, 2012; Wasserman, 2015).

*Xinhua* not only employs approximately 10,000 employees and 1,000 correspondents in 162 bureaus around the world, but also has overseas branches in over 100 nations and regions, including Hong Kong, New York, London, Paris, and others, so as to collecting on-the-spot information and broadcast China’s information. *Xinhua* is also planning to expand to 180 more bureaus by 2020 (Hartig, 2015, p.87). In 2010, The Chinese government launched *Xinhua’s* 24-hour global news channel in English, known as the China Network Corporation (or CNC World) in order to present an international vision from a Chinese perspective (Zheng and Robertson, 2011). At a lunch ceremony in Beijing, *Xinhua’s* President Li Congjun stated, “I will broadcast news report in a timely way and objectively, and be a new source of information for global audiences” (BBC, 2010). At the same time, *Xinhua* opened new bureaus to strengthen its staffs especially in the North American, European, and Asian market (Shambaugh, 2013, p.229) and diversified its product line through enhanced web presence, video, multimedia, and audio streaming.

**CCTV**

China Central Television (CCTV)\(^{40}\) is China’s single national television network. Its original name was Beijing Television, established in 1958, and was renamed as CCTV in 1978. The main function of CCTV between 1958 and 1978 was to function as a mouthpiece of the CCP, and therefore the Chinese government utilized it as an “ideological vehicle” to promote the continuous political movement to their people. CCTV mirrors China’s politics, economy, society, and its transition. In this context, Zhu and Berry (2009) interpret CCTV as “demonstrate[ing] that the country has been moving toward a society of mass consumption with a public-oriented civic culture, even while it is sternly maintaining communist ideology” (pp. 40-1).

By the late 1970s, the China’s television started foreign exchange programs and broadcasting to the outside world. Its activity began when CCTV signed an agreement with similar news

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\(^{40}\) For more information on CCTV’s channels organization information, see Latham, K. (2007). *Pop Culture China!: Media, Arts, and Lift style*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO (pp. 54-5).
agencies in the United Kingdom and the United States, for the purpose of exchanging programs in 1979. After the 1980s, CCTV’s overseas expansion accelerated when a large number of foreign media in Africa, Europe, North America, and Latin America started to purchase CCTV’s programs. In 1984, the Chinese government established a special department in CCTV that took charge of external communication. Since then, new programs aimed at foreign audiences have been launched, such as English News, Focus (an English-language program), Cultural Lounge and Hello Beijing (entertainment programming). Based on the work of these programs, CCTV dispatched to the United States a one-hour external program recording in Chinese and English language in order to provide updated Chinese news to North American through China’s daily news in 1992 (Liu, 2012, p.119). Beijing launched its external television broadcasting with its first international channel, CCTV-4 the same year, which is available for broadcast in more than 80 countries in North Africa, East Asia, Australia, and East Europe. By the late 1990s, CCTV-4’s network covered 98% countries and regions of the world, and enlarged its facilities to broadcast 24 hours a day in four units rotating every six hours (Liu, 2012, p.120).

In 2000, another satellite channel, CCTV-9, was set up with the goal of promoting “Your Window on China” (CCTV, 2007). CCTV-4 was aimed at foreign and overseas Chinese viewers based on Chinese-language programs. In contrast, programs on CCTV-9 are in English, and targeted at foreigners who live in China and in the English-speaking world. For this reason, CCTV-9 allowed its programs to take a more liberal line, while CCTV-4 adheres to the political line. The main task of CCTV-9 is to introduce China to the non-Chinese world, especially “emphasizing programs on life in China and contemporary culture alongside China’s perspective on international news” (Brandy, 2010, p.167). Since 2001, under the Chinese government’s “going out” policy, CCTV-9 made a new leap forward, setting up a 24-hour channel and broadcasting in French and Spanish, and keeping abreast of global media such as CNN. When most international broadcasters such as the BBC World Service reduced services it provided due to a retrenchment in expenditure, the Chinese government encouraged CCTV’s international services. Between 2004 and 2009, individual channels – CCTV-French, Russian, Spanish, and Arabic – were set up to take aim at viewers in specific cultures and regions. In 2007, the overseas Chinese service department of CCTV-4 was divided into three channels according to region – CCTV International Asia, International America, and International Europe. In 2010, CCTV-9 changed its name to CCTV-News (or CCTV-N) targeting English-speaking viewers (Rawnsley, 2014). Now CCTV owns six international channels, in six languages (Chinese, English, Spanish, French, Russian, and Arabic) (Zhu, 2011, p.301). CCTV also launched new businesses in the new media field, for example Mobile TV, Bus Mobile TV, Internet TV and Internet Protocol TV, which is provided
by CCTV.com. CCTV offers its programs in 140 countries and regions, and maintains cooperative relationships with 241 media outlets in 140 countries and regions.

Despite the Chinese government’s communication endeavors with the outside world, there are inherent difficulties in CCTV’s management. Brandy (2008) pointed out that there is a limitation in terms of the absence of editorial independence, even though China has access to the latest equipment for its world broadcasting. She found that CCTV-9 is still the mouthpiece for the Chinese government with regards to foreign relations, and mirrors the Party-line perspectives on Chinese domestic affairs (Brandy, p.168). She attributes the cause to the political controls put on the broadcasting station, and the prominence given to advanced broadcasting equipment over staff training, which has a disruptive influence on the creation of quality programs for overseas channels and audiences. The actual CCTV-9 audience rating is low; moreover those viewers are concentrated (around 50 percent) on Chinese who reside in China whose objective is to study English (Puppin, 2017). According to Branigan (2011), who spent seven years as the Guardian’s correspondent in China, however, CCTV viewers still question the veracity of its news reports, in contrast to foreign-language state media, and believe they are meant to spread China’s soft power. Beijing, however, concentrates on producing non-news programming that enhances its appeal, such as cultural shows.

China’s CCTV shows offer the Chinese people the chance to come close to unconstrained and liberated new ideas, in tandem with enhancing its authoritarian propaganda to the world through globalization. Moreover, CCTV-9 receives governmental financial support, whereas other CCTV channels on the CCTV network are funded by private and public enterprises through advertising expenses (Geevarghese, 2015). In this regard, Cull (2009b) argues that “the channels operate as badges of prestige as much as an actual ideological delivery apparatus, and are not subject to the same market pressures as commercial channels”. Zhang (2011) construes this situation that people who live outside China are possibility to access official Chinese website and watch its programs easily, thereby they are “subject to the state’s version of the world view” (pp.73-4). Thus, the Chinese government hires foreigners for CCTV-9, because as “the door of the Chinese media is opening wider, more voices are allowed and the media has become more objective when reporting sensitive issues” (CCTV, 2008). In a bid to avoid impartial broadcasting, the main role for foreigners was that of news anchor, and copyeditor; the number of foreigner employees gradually increased in comparison to when CCTV Africa and CCTV America have lunched. Besides, their workspaces have been expanded from Beijing headquarters to Nairobi and DC (Jirik, 2016). In this context, Hartig (2015) explains that foreigners’ activities in CCTV “should not only be
understood as a means of adapting to Western journalistic standards, but also as a means of winning (more) international credibility” (p.89).

**China Radio International**

China Radio International (CRI) is a state-run radio station, establishing in 1941 aimed at a global audience. Seeking to play the role of a bridge between China and the world, CRI airs both domestic and world news through 61 language services, which is the largest number of all global media organizations. CRI produces for radio, Internet, mobile web, print, and television, with 18 Internet radio services, 70 public radio service branches abroad, and three domestic FM radio services. To deliver accurate and comprehensive broadcasting about global affairs, CRI also cooperates with international news agencies and media groups, and has established 32 correspondent bureaus in foreign countries (CRI, 2012).

Based on the media-related content above, the characteristics and mechanisms of media in China’s public diplomacy are understood as follows. When China describes its global media around the world, there are several words which they never forget to mention: “abroad” (*jingwai*), “overseas” (*haiwai* or *guowai*), “foreign” (*waigui*), and “international” (*guoji*). To reach out to the foreign public and promote China, the Chinese government operates its media system in three symbolic spaces – inside China (*guonei*), outside China (*guowai*), and overseas China (*haiwai huaren*). The first is Chinese media that are produced inside China and controlled by the government. It is also aimed at its own people, and circulated only in China. The second is so-called “ethnic community media”, produced for Chinese residents abroad in the Chinese-language. The third is aimed at foreigners who reside in other foreign countries, and speak different languages. Foreign correspondents based in China are involved in the production of programs for foreign viewers. Lately, Chinese media displays a tendency towards equivocal differentiation of these three symbolic spaces. The Chinese government manipulates to redraw the boundary between inside China and outside China, so as to awaken its One China policy. Increasingly, most of China’s media for foreign viewers contains its ideological and political contents because of the inseparable relationship (W. Sun, 2014, pp.1894-1895) between the Party-state and its media.

To understand the role of China’s media in its public diplomacy, we need to comprehend what kind of images Chinese leaders hope to show the world. When examining China’s media policy from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping (so-called, Media 1.0, Media 2.0, and Media 3.0 respectively), Jiang suggested “guidance of public opinion”, which inherited the Mao era’s notion of “politicians running the newspapers” for the purpose of maintaining social and political stability. On the other hand, Hu stood on “public opinion channeling”,

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which took aim at its soft power development and dissemination of “China’s [official] voice” overseas. Based on Hu’s media policy, Xi, by extension, seeks multilateral and expansive control of media platforms, which act as a bridge between the domestic and international situation (Bandurski, 2016). Given Xi’s general government policy focused on the international system accommodating a transformed China based on its political economy and military strength, he adopted a more intense media policy to handle the immense disruptions which arose from his reform programs (Hadland, 2015). State media, especially, adheres to the current political stance (Wang and Zeng, 2016). Despite Chinese leaders’ endeavors to develop the media, certain challenges must be overcome to outperform its “going out” policy through media. Rawnsley (2015) pointed out that China’s media have issues, such as their lack of comprehension of targeted audiences, and the strong connection between its government and media, and thus other countries are antagonizing China.

Culture-related main actors and programs for public diplomacy

In order to fulfill the State Council’s purview of supervising culture and art, the Chinese Ministry of Culture consists of ten departments responsible for drafting culture and art policies, strategies, and regulations, and supervising the system – such as a nation-wide network of public culture services, general national cultural activities, the construction of key national cultural facilities, administering the cultural market, developing cultural market plans and libraries, overseeing the State Cultural Relics Bureau and Chinese Cultural Centers in foreign countries, and guiding artistic creation and its production (China.org.cn, n.d.). Moreover, the Ministry has an administrative organ, the State Bureau of External Cultural Relations (SBCR), established to handle foreign affairs associated with “culture work and cultural exchange” with the Hong Kong Administrative Region (HKSAR), Macao, and Taiwan. The SBCR is in charge of establishing regulations and policies of their work field, carrying out liaison work in tandem with the Cultural Department, which is administered by Chinese embassies in foreign countries, performing publicity activities in foreign countries, entering into cultural arrangements between China and foreign countries, and conducting plans for cultural exchange programs and executive annual schedule. In 2003, furthermore, Chinaculture.org commenced operations to provide not only China’s up-to-date news about

41 The General Affairs Office, Policy and Regulation Department; Planning and Finance Department; Personnel Department; Art Department; Education, Science and Technology Department; Cultural Market Department; Cultural Industry Department; Social Cultural Department; and Bureau for External Cultural Exchanges.

42 They have three functioning departments: 1) General Office, 2) Relics Protection Department, and 3) Department of Museums. They also cover the affairs of North America and Oceania, Asia and Africa, African, Asian, Eurasian, Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan, translation and international affairs.
its culture, history, politics, and economy, but also its comprehensive services through Chinese and English languages. The Website is another name of Chinadaily.com.cn, supervised by the Ministry (Chinaculture.org, 2014).

The Chinese Ministry of Culture, with the aim of “promoting all-round cultural exchanges and facilitating the prosperity of the African culture”, set up the Chinese Cultural Center in the Republic of Benin in 1988, the first such endeavor, through cooperative efforts between the Chinese Ministry of Culture and the Benin Government. China provided Chinese language, art, and shadowboxing courses, and supported diverse cultural activities, e.g., art exhibitions, books, drama performances, and others (China Cultural Center, n.d.). China operates over 95 cultural departments in the Chinese embassies and consulates in 82 countries (China.org.cn, 2009b). Along the ancient Silk Road, China also has grand plans for building at least more 50 cultural centers by 2020. By the end of 2014, China had set up twenty centers in the main cities of leading countries, spending around $214 million (1.33 billion yuan) to establish the overseas culture centers. In 2015, the total expenditure increased by 181 percent when compares to the previous year. As a role of “window” into Chinese culture, the Chinese Cultural Centers focus on publicizing its culture, which includes the lives of ordinary Chinese, unlike the Confucius Institutes (China Daily, 2015). Not only this, but China has contracted both cultural cooperation agreements and executives’ programs with nearly 800 with 145 national governments; enjoying good cultural relations with around 159 countries. The Chinese Ministry of Culture is in charge of major cultural events such as the “China-Japan Culture and Sports Years”, “China-France Cultural Years”, “China-Russia Cultural Years” in a bid of “multi-dimensional and multi-layered” international cultural exchange extensively through multiple channels (China.org.cn, 2009b).

Take, for example, the cosmopolitan “Happy Chinese New Year” celebration, which has been celebrated since 2009: in 2015, the Ministry of Culture and other several Chinese authorities hosted events in over 320 cities in 118 countries, through more than 800 programs. The following year, it celebrated with 2,100 festive activities in 400 cities in 140 countries. As a result, Vice-Minister of the Chinese Ministry of Culture Ding Wei gave a press briefing for “2016 Happy Chinese New Year”, in which he said that China will “seek a new way to engage China’s large enterprises in the promotion. Happy Chinese New Year activities will give a boost to the development of the enterprises” (China Daily, 2016a).

As can be seen from Wei’s address, China has been striving to reform its cultural system and the growth of its cultural industry to expand their culture widely to abroad since the 16th CPC

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43 Centers have been set up in Cairo, Paris, Malta, and Tokyo since 2002.
44 Most “Chinese New Year” celebration activities or programs are temple fairs, China lantern festivals, parades, exhibitions, special performances, and intangible cultural heritage displays.
National Congress, when Beijing required that the opening of its cultural markets picked up steam, complying with China’s WTO commitment. As a way of executing the “going out” strategy, cultural enterprises took part in displaying China’s capability to cooperate and compete on the international stage. In 2006, the Ministry of Culture engaged in “Policies on Encouraging and Supporting the Production and Export of Cultural Products and Services”, which is under the control of the Office of the State Council and six other institutions: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, the People’s Bank of China, the General Administration of Customs and Taxation, the State Administration of Radio, Film and TV (SARFT), and the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP). The policies are based on “The Advice on Further Strengthening and Improving the Work of Exporting Cultural Products and Services”, which was issued by the central government in 2005. The two documents, published in 2005 and 2006, laid the groundwork for support mechanisms for Chinese enterprises that entered foreign markets (Li, 2016, pp.129-130). Since then, China’s first culture industry plan, “The Cultural Industry Revitalization Plan”, launched by the State Council in 2009, aimed to promote “culture industry into new economic growth point for further improving cultural market main body and enhancing its development vigor” (Xu, 2011, p.913). Under the Ministry of Culture’s supervision, the China Cultural Industry Association (CCIA) was established in June 2013 with the aim of “building platform, providing service, enhancing coordination and attaining innovative development” in the various spheres of culture. The association is responsible for fostering China’s cultural industry and Chinese cultural soft power as a global-centric social organization in the area of culture, through the operations of its six essential businesses as an independent legal entity and a top-level national association (CCIA, n.d.). The Ministry has also established the name of the project, “Team China”, to systematize Chinese companies which take part in China’s major celebrating events – such as the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the 60th anniversary of the founding of New China in 2009 – for the sake of exporting China’s cultural work. As “key export-oriented” cultural enterprises, the 211 companies are on the list of the Ministry of Culture. In 2009, the total value of China’s cultural products exports and services was $86.13 million; the film sector accounts for over $400 millions of its total overseas revenue. China makes profits from a cultural export sector on the rise (China Daily, 2010b).

45 The State Council approved and the Ministry of Civil Affairs registered CCIA.
46 The various cultural fields are art performance & entertainment, E-commerce, web culture, cartoon & gaming, film & TV media, fine arts & crafts and cultural finance, Cultural Tourism.
47 The six businesses are international communication and cultural exchange, exchange and cooperation, industry research, cultural finance, industrial investment, and real entity operation.
Not only the Ministry of Culture, but also the Ministry of Education is crucial to China’s public diplomacy, as it conducts and establishes Chinese education-related policies, plans, and strategies, which are in the realm of public diplomacy (the Ministry of Education, n.d.). The Ministry is in charge of organizing and supervising international education exchange cooperation; drawing up programs’ policies for Chinese students to study overseas and vice versa; and creating joint education programs between Chinese and foreign educational institutions (Hartig, 2015). As a non-governmental and non-profit public institution affiliated with the Ministry, Hanban not only aims to provide the source and teaching service of Chinese language and culture throughout the world, but also focuses on the development of multiculturalism and world harmony. The function of Hanban covers the entire process of establishing Confucius Institutions, formulating development plans and policies for boosting Chinese language internationally, supporting various types and levels of Chinese-language programs at educational institutions all over the world, and establishing the standards of Chinese teaching, and promoting Chinese language teaching materials (Hanban, n.a). To achieve these goals, Hanban sets up the Confucius Institution to introduce Chinese language and culture to the foreign public. Furthermore, since 1997, the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC) has been entrusted by the Ministry of Education with managing the daily operations of international students’ enrollment and administration, due to the increased number of foreign students in China (Han, 2010).

In addition to the main actors in China’s public diplomacy, municipal and provincial governments also engage in promoting China’s international image, cultural exchange, and overseas expansion. Since the end of 2003, the Chinese government started to expand its system of spokespersons, from the level of central government offices to the provincial government level (Aoyama, 2007). In 2011, the CCPCC at provincial and municipal levels was instructed to set up public diplomacy offices and activities (Shambaugh, 2013). Recently, the Chinese government, through the MFA, has held diverse events in Ningxia, Guangxi, Shaanxi, and Sichuan so as to set the stage for expanding cooperation and communication between provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities in central and western China and overseas nations, as well as with famous international enterprises. Events from 2016 included the China-Arab States Economic and Trade Forum and the China-Arab States Expo, hosted by Ningxia province as a core region in China’s Belt and Road Initiatives; the China-ASEAN Expo in Guangxi province, which is a crucial region for the Silk Road Economic Belt.

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48 China’s provinces are Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Zhejiang. The autonomous regions are Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. The municipalities are Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. The special administrative regions are Hong Kong and Macao (Zhang, et al., 2015, pp.56-58).
and the Modern Maritime Silk Road; “An Open China: Shaanxi Engaging the World” in Shaanxi province; and the 3rd China International Logistics Development Conference held in Sichuan, to discuss mutual development and collaborative work between China and foreign countries. Through these events, China optimizes a given opportunity based on frontline channels, connections, and information. By extension, the MFA and Chinese embassies overseas provide full-dimensional support and services for foreign local’s opening up and development (MFA, 2016).

Not only that, China’s provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities and two special administrative regions each have their own ties with foreign countries, especially African countries. With regards to supporting financial relations, for example, the Shanghai municipal government operated its own investment strategy in Africa in 1998, with the purpose of encouraging local Chinese companies to invest in Africa. Provincial support for Chinese companies’ investment produces results that strengthen not only ties between China and African countries, but also expected sustainable development in Africa countries. For example, the Shanghai Construction Corporation and Ningbo C.S.I. Power and Machinery Group in Zhejiang province have built 20 power plants in Nigeria. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce, in collaboration with the Guangxi province program has worked with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to invest in Africa. The general aim of the Guangxi program is to deepen economic ties in Sino-African relations, coupled with Chinese companies’ social responsibility (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012, pp.84-89).

In addition to China’s governmental and semi-governmental actors, China’s non-governmental actors play an important role in China’s public diplomacy. The majority of non-governmental actors operating as part of China’s public diplomacy are from Chinese academic-related institutions and schools, culture organizations, Chinese companies, and Chinese people (those living in China and abroad). All non-governmental actors work in various fields of public diplomacy, within the established policies of the Chinese government with its governmental ministries. The engagement of non-governmental actors is important because cultural factors plays a leading part in China’s public diplomacy, largely because they can have a greater ripple effect with the public than governmental activities. Based on fieldwork in Nigeria and South Africa, for example, Chinese interviewees N-A2 and N-B2 stressed the Chinese people’s participation in maximizing the effectiveness of China’s cultural activities when the Chinese embassy or cultural center organized public diplomacy events, such as Chinese traditional dance performances and diverse exhibitions to boost mutual understanding of Chinese culture in Nigeria. Nigeria-D3 also stresses the importance of the engagement overseas of Chinese residents and companies with China’s public
diplomacy, when a company holds an event for the local people, such as a charity bazaar or voluntary service. Interviewee S-B2, a Chinese businesswoman, also autonomously sponsors a scholarship and supports Chinese language teaching to the local students. Interviewee S-G1 argued that his company makes a lot of effort to boost mutual understanding between the local people and the company, not only to encourage the company's reputation for business purposes, but also to dispel an ingrained negative perception of China in South Africa. While these examples are limited to only Nigeria and South Africa, they show that Chinese public diplomacy is based on people-to-people diplomacy, which China has turned to in its foreign policy for a quite some time (e.g., ping-pong diplomacy was also a typical form of people-to-people diplomacy during the 1970s).

With the purpose of boosting people-to-people exchanges, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries was established in 1954, purely for the promotion of friendship and mutual understanding between the Chinese people and the foreign public around the world. The association has several branches in each of China’s provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. Also, the oldest China’s organization is Chinese People’s Institution of Foreign Affairs, which was founded in 1949, with the intent of conducting international exchanges and expanding people-to-people diplomatic activities as part of the political activities with diplomats and other successful and famous people in organizations and academic circles in foreign countries. The institution’s work is mainly to boost friendship between the Chinese people and international public, including promoting the development of China’s diplomatic relations and contributing to world peace. The institution also organizes and participates in diverse academic-related activities for research in international affairs, by exchanging thoughts with various foreign experts (China.org.cn, 2011). China’s universities and institutions contribute to the expansion of China’s public diplomacy activities as well. According to interviewee N-B3, in 2015 the Chinese embassy in Nigeria received a lot of consuls from China’s major universities when a Centre for China Studies was opened in Abuja, Nigeria, and promoted various conferences and seminars between Chinese and Nigerian universities, on a wide variety of subjects. The representative think tank for China’s public diplomacy is the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), which was founded in 1956 as an affiliated organization of the MFA. The institute primarily focuses on medium- and long-term policy issues of strategic importance in international politics and world economics, as well as organizing various seminars and conferences to exchange different views and constructing a worldwide network for collaborative research with domestic and foreign scholars (CIIS, n.a). In addition to CIIS, there are the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), the Foundation for International Strategic Studies (FISS), and the State
Council International Studies Research Center. Contrary to expectations that all think tanks are closely linked to the Chinese government, in the case of CASS, the academy is more concerned with pure scholarship, sharing and establishing knowledge and information about foreign countries with other, similar organizations. The academy’s research agenda also does not cover all contemporary policy concerns. However, the majority of think tank personnel provide information, intelligence collection and policy analysis for the Chinese government (Shambaugh, 2002, p.576).

In sum, by reviewing these three different China’s public diplomacy actors, this research has ascertained that the Chinese government pushes forward public diplomacy as a means of improving China’s reputation in the eyes of the foreign public, based on collaborative public diplomacy activities as organized by a government-centered system. It has also found out that China’s public diplomacy is an instrument with which to gain a foothold to achieve the goals of its foreign policy using certain tools (e.g., the media, foreign aid, education institutions/ activities). The following section will discuss the ways in which China’s soft power, especially cultural and foreign aid, promote a favorable environment and how it applies to the relations between China and other foreign countries to boost economic ties.

4.2 China’s Soft Power in Public Diplomacy for supporting close economic relations

The fundamental purpose of China’s public diplomacy is to concentrate on the CPC and the government’s central objectives, and to achieve greater interest in reform, development, and stability. Thus, the ultimate goal of public diplomacy is to ensure that China’s overall interests are safeguarded and promoted (H. Zhang, 2013, p.238). Put another way, as explained earlier in Chapter 3 and 4.1.1, former and current Chinese leaders focus on economic development as a core political policy, and China’s public diplomacy is the means by which they can fill in the gaps in other countries’ understanding of and address misconceptions about China. China, at the same time, stimulates friendship, trust, cooperation and mutual understanding in international society, and is committed to lasting peace and common development on the global stage. Drawing upon this goal of China’s public diplomacy, the following section will discuss how China’s cultural soft power and foreign aid, among the instruments of its public diplomacy, are concerned with setting up a favorable environment in support of close economic relations with other countries.
4.2.1 The role of cultural soft power in shaping the conditions of diplomacy for economic relations

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the element of culture cannot be ignored in China’s contemporary foreign policy, and may even be its main component. Xi Jinping addressed the cultural component at a conference on diplomatic work with neighboring countries, held by the CPC Central Committee in 2013:

> We should strive to strengthen publicity work, public diplomacy, cultural and people-to-people exchanges with the neighbouring countries, and consolidate and expand social and public opinion foundations of the long-term development of relations between China and its neighboring countries. The development of relations depends on people-to-people friendship. We should comprehensively promote cultural and people-to-people exchanges, deepen friendly exchanges on tourism, science and education, regional cooperation and others, and make a lot of good friends. (MFA, 2013)

Hu Jintao also highlighted the need to boost Chinese culture as soft power when he delivered the keynote address on behalf of the 16th CPC Central Committee to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party, in 2007. In the speech, he said "[c]ulture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength", and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will definitely be accompanied by the thriving of Chinese culture" (China Daily, 2007b). Furthermore, he proposed guidelines to straighten out Chinese culture nationally and internationally, discussing the topic of “cultural security” at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee in 2011 (Xinhua News, 2011).

Considering the positions of China’s former and the current leaders, the significance of cultural diplomacy with people-to-people exchanges in its foreign policy is clear, and has only grown as China’s economic and political influence on the global stage has increased. Chinese culture is a frequently mentioned in China’s government-related major strategies, and Chinese leaders (Hu and Xi) have frequently referred to “cultural power”, “cultural security”, “soft power”, “cultural soft power”, “cultural diplomacy” in public, and have declared that soft power is a core policy in China (deLisle, 2014, pp.274-275). By employing cultural diplomacy in China’s public diplomacy strategy, the Chinese government encourages people-to-people ties through language training, cultural festival, exhibitions, and others. However, the connections and boundaries between China’s cultural diplomacy and its public diplomacy are not entirely clear (Hartig, 2015). Deng (2006) also notes that it is hard to
distinguish between public diplomacy and soft power, because the two are closely intertwined with each other, due to the diplomatic context of cultural diplomacy as a substantive instrument of public diplomacy and the nature of public opinion. In a similar vein, Li (2004) understood that both public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy have a certain objective in realizing foreign policy strategy. However, public diplomacy focuses on a short-term policy with a view to promoting the country’s foreign policy to implement efficiently, whereas cultural diplomacy aims at understanding a country’s culture and system, thus promoting a favorable environment for that country’s long-term goals.

Wang (2015) regarded China’s culture as a core source of soft power, because the background of its culture represents China’s footprints, containing religion, social culture, and history. As a result, China’s culture is an important tool with which to communicate with the world in the age of globalization. Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao recognized its culture as a significant tool to support peace, development, and cooperation in international society. His understanding of Chinese culture and cultural exchange has been explained as follows:

Cultural exchanges are a bridge connecting the hearts and minds of people of all countries and an important way to project a country’s image. The rich and profound Chinese culture, which has a time-honored history, has made significant contribution to the progress of human civilization. The traditional Chinese culture is noted for its many luminous ideas: the philosophical precept of harmony without uniformity, the political belief that people is the foundation of the nation, the educational guideline of respecting teachers and valuing education, and the moral ethic of do not do to others what you would not have them do to you. We should use various forms and means, including tour performance and exhibition, Chinese language teaching, academic exchange and sponsoring culture year activities, to promote Chinese culture and increase its appeal overseas. We should implement a ‘going global’ cultural strategy, develop culture industry, improve the international competitiveness of Chinese cultural enterprises and products, increase the export of books, films, TV programs and other cultural products, so that these Chinese cultural products and particularly the best of them, will reach the rest of the world. (China Daily, 2007b)

Thus, Chinese scholar Li Xinhua (2004) referred to cultural diplomacy as one of the diplomatic forms, with which a country can, using cultural exchange and cultural diffusion, achieve its foreign policy or political goals. In the same vein, Peng Xingling (2006) viewed cultural diplomacy as a diplomatic activity that uses inclusive, peaceful instruments, with a
view to achieving foreign policy objective by introducing a country's culture to the world. Taken together, the meaning of cultural diplomacy from the Chinese perspective is as an instrument for China’s diplomatic activities not only to maintain China’s cultural peculiarities, but also to pursue its interests. On that note, cultural diplomacy is different to other general cultural exchanges, because it stresses the important role of the Chinese government and political purpose (China.com.cn, 2009a). China’s cultural diplomacy is mainly targeted at foreign governments, and promotes mutual understanding and friendship though foreign student exchanges, using its traditional and modern culture. Cultural diplomacy acted as a bridge to connect China with the world through people-to-people exchanges, when China’s cultural diplomatic capacity was limited due to the containment and isolation policies of the West, until normalization was achieved and diplomatic relations with foreign countries improved (Deng, 2006; D. Zhang, 2010).

China’s cultural diplomacy is based on its traditional and contemporary cultures. China aims to grow into a cultural nation, based on the cultural inheritance accumulated over its long history. The Chinese Government offered extensive support to promote its cultural industry, so that the cultural industry can grow at a higher rate than the Chinese economy, after discovering that cultural industry lagged behind politics and economy growth. Today, China’s cultural diplomacy continues to evolve, increasing its capabilities, commensurate with the modern interpretation of cultural diplomacy, building on diverse examples of successful foreign cultural diplomacy (Hu, 2008; D. Zhang, 2010). Jia (2012) and Lin and Qu (2013) suggested that the strategic goal of cultural diplomacy is, 1) realizing “heping jueqi” (peaceful rise/development) in international society, while dispelling the “China threat” image; 2) establishing trust, friendship, and mutual understanding, not only in the world but also among countries that enjoy economic relations and are interdependent with China, and at the same time pursuing “qiutongcunyi” (let us agree to differ) to open and embrace differences between other countries; 3) maintaining the core values of socialism and learning about advanced and exceptional foreign cultures to improve China’s development and influence in the world; and, 4) promoting the world’s cultural development based on Chinese competitive culture. By using cultural diplomacy in public diplomacy, therefore, China seeks to boost China’s image through sincere and concrete actions, which lay the groundwork for mutual understanding and friendship between China and other countries. The Chinese government pursues a harmonious society with peaceful development because it is based on “stability” (wending) rather than “chaos” and “disorder” (luan). The Chinese government has prioritized stability as a political agenda since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. In addition, the true meaning of harmonious society has changed from control and prevention, grappling with economic uncertainty, to the realization of a “xiaokang” society.
To achieve these goals, the Chinese government utilizes three instruments to apply leverage in its cultural diplomacy (D. Zhang, 2010). First, it focuses on teaching the Chinese language to introduce culture through its Confucius Institutes. China has much pride in its culture and civilization. In particular, China traditionally emphasizes Confucian ideas, which have had a positive effect on Chinese modernization, harmony (*he*) and gentle (*wen*), patriotism and its peaceful image. It began establishing Chinese institutes in other countries to spread its culture in remote lands. As of 2017, a total of 516 Confucius Institutes and 1,076 Confucius Classrooms have been established in 142 countries. Among them, 135 Confucius Institutes were established in 51 countries along the Belt and Road. Establishing the Confucius Institutes was called for by the Chinese Ministry of Education, and is promoted as a national policy that plays the role of advance guard in a culture war, one of the strategies through which China develops its soft power (China Daily, 2017b). Second, it concentrates on cultural exchanges with foreign cultures by establishing firm cooperative relationships between China’s central, provincial, and municipal offices, embassies and legations abroad to smooth cultural exchanges between China and the world. Third, establishing a strategic alliance with mass media such as news, newspapers, and opening TV channels to introduce China through CCTV and CNN. Fourth, developing cultural goods and services (D. Zhang, 2010). China hosts diverse cultural events and major world tournaments in China. Cultural diplomacy shows the uniqueness of Chinese civilization, and made good use of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and 2010 Shanghai World Expo.

In sum, through China’s cultural diplomacy, China has used many instruments and tools in its pursuit of introducing a positive Chinese image (friendly and trustworthy), its spirit, and joining the cultural community. Also, China realizes its peaceful rise/development through mutual understanding, resulting from its multidimensional approach to spreading China’s culture to foreign countries and its people.

### 4.2.2 China’s public diplomacy with soft power in shaping the conditions of diplomacy for economic relations

As mentioned in Chapter 3, China’s soft power is closer to smart power, which combines soft power (such as culture) and hard power (such as its development model and economic power). Also, China utilizes foreign aid in its public diplomacy towards African countries – for example, case grants, aid projects, low-interest loans, direct investment, economic collaboration agreement, and cultural exchanges – to promote its soft power among developing countries (Tang and Li, 2011). China renders its aid not only to prevent and cure
malaria, for example, but also to support the region’s important economic organizations when countries need help, especially in Asia and Africa, but also without interfering in a country’s domestic affairs, unlike the West (Cooper, 2016). Consequently, China presents a positive image to foreign countries through its foreign aid, which at the same time supporting its economic development. By extension, by utilizing foreign aid in its public diplomacy, China aims to promote common development and common prosperity for China and the world at large, as expressed in Chinese leaders’ speeches (mentioned earlier). Thus, the following section will discuss the difference in understanding of foreign aid between China and the West, and in which sectors China renders its support to foreign countries.

4.2.2.1 The Characteristic of China’s foreign aid system

Prior to discussing China’s aid in Africa, it is necessary to have a clear understanding and interpretation of China’s foreign aid, because China’s aid system is distinctive and also opaque regarding how it is constituted (Brautigam, 2011; Davies, 2008; Lancaster, 2007). Chinese foreign assistance somewhat shares the intentions of the definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA), as defined by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (DAC).49 Be that as it may, it is not clear how to distinguish between China’s foreign aid and ODA. Nonetheless, analysis of China’s foreign aid system has identified certain characteristics. First, in lieu of embracing the ODA aid framework that DAC stipulates, China bolsters the integration of aid and investment through its own political economy purposes and style, based on its bilateral ties. Second, unlike DAC member donors, China’s foreign aid plays a significant role in its foreign policy, which could shape its political doctrine – such as “peaceful rise or peaceful development”, or “responsible great power” – and its long-cherished dream of a Sinocentric international environment. Not only that, China is not a member of the OECD, so there is no justification for going after and carrying out its aid activities within the boundaries of ODA. Thus, most Chinese foreign aid lies within the category of development finance, as opposed to other kinds of aid (Y. Sun, 2014a). Lengauer (2011) also argued that Chinese financial programs do not fit into aid terms in principle, due to the fact that the Eight Principles to which the Chinese government adheres holds as a fundamental principle that its foreign aid

49 The understanding of ODA by the DAC as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which as provided by official agencies, including state and local government, or by their executive agencies; and each transaction of which is administrated with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and is concessional in character and conveys a grant of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent)” (OECD, n.a).
offers different instruments for political economy engagement. For now, there is no definitive definition of China’s aid in academia, but one can infer a meaning through the context of a whitepaper on China’s foreign aid, published in 2011:

China maintains that foreign aid is mutual help between developing countries, focuses on practical effects, accommodates recipient countries’ interests, and strives to promote friendly bilateral relations and mutual benefit through economic and technical cooperation with other developing countries. (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011a)

China’s aid, which has clear differences to ODA, is based on bilateral aid agreements with no strings attached, nor political preconditions for receiving the aid or loans; unlike the conditions Western donors and multilateral organizations can insist on, in order to receive – for example, aid in return for specific economic reforms that adhere to the Washington Consensus (Mattlin and Nojonen, 2015). Also, the definition of ODA does not include funding for cultural exchanges, export credits or trade financing, private charity, remittances, or financial aid for covert actions by intelligence agencies (Lancaster, 2007). On the other hand, when one examines China’s 2011 and 2014 foreign aid white papers, Chinese aid contains all of these things. To put it another way, there is a gap between the Chinese view concerning the purpose of aid, and that of the OECD-DAC (see Table 3).

Table 3: The comparison of foreign aid between China and DAC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>China’s aid</th>
<th>DAC aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>No concept of ODA</td>
<td>ODA concept clearly defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixing with aid-investment-trade</td>
<td>(DAC principles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Win-win and self-reliance</td>
<td>Social and institutional underpinning of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus and</td>
<td>Physical capital</td>
<td>development</td>
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<tr>
<td>purpose</td>
<td>Growth in income</td>
<td>Social capital</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Framework</td>
<td>South-South cooperation</td>
<td>North-South cooperation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mostly state-centered</td>
<td>Participatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Regions</td>
<td>Strategic, diplomatic, and commercial importance</td>
<td>Strategic and historical importance</td>
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<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Priority Sector</td>
<td>Economic &amp; productive sectors (i.e. infrastructure, industry, agriculture)</td>
<td>Social sector (education and health) and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political condition</td>
<td>No political conditionality</td>
<td>Good governance and policy conditionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Project aid and other financing modalities (i.e. export credit subsidies, resource-for-infrastructure deals)</td>
<td>Programme aid becoming increasingly dominant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Adopted from Ohno, 2013, p.195; Trinidad, 2013, pp. 36-37

Since 1950, the contents of China’s aid programs have steadily adapted to the changing international landscape, its interests marching in step with the domestic situation (Trinidad, 2013, p. 19). Specifically, since China began its foreign aid program in 1950, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the Chinese government has successfully optimized its foreign aid as a means of seeking profits in the field of political economy and security, and building up its strategic national power. Additionally, today, China utilizes foreign aid in order to increase publicity of its values through public diplomacy activities, which include soft power (Lengauer, 2011, p.9). The transition of China’s foreign aid can be divided into four periods. The first period is from the 1950s to the early of 1970s. During the 1950s and 1960s, the beneficiary countries were selected based on ideological and historical homogeneity, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Vietnam. The spread of aid widened to countries in Africa and Central and South America due to the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011a). In 1964, the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance were articulated, establishing the basic principles for China’s foreign aid. Since then, China has become a member of the UN, in 1971, and the purpose of China’s aid shifted from an ideology-centric unification to one that will support China’s standing and goals internationally, for example, by isolating Taiwan from the global stage.

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[50] Chapter 5, due to the historical backdrop covering most staple events related to China’s foreign aid policy in Sino-Africa relations, briefly discusses China’s aid purpose transition and its aid system development according to chronological changes. This is to confirm that China’s foreign aid is also in company with its government’s political economy purpose on the international stage. It will be connected to an understanding of how China’s foreign aid works in Africa countries.
The second period was after China adopted Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and opening up policy, in 1978. China increased the variety in its foreign aid from purely economic aid to mutually-beneficial cooperation for national development, focusing more on practical interests. Also, a hallmark of China’s foreign aid during the late 1970 and the 1980s was that the Chinese government gave increasing weight to the economic value of its foreign aid, as opposed to political value. Another characteristic during this period was that China increased aid for public health and technical assistance, infrastructure projects, public works, and awarding scholarships to give a chance to study in China (Lum, Fisher, Gomez-Granger, & Leland, 2009). During the 1980s, there were two major changes adopted by China’s foreign aid, which concentrated on win-win and common development, based around augmented technical assistance and profit-seeking behavior (Kjøllesdal & Welle-Strand, 2010, p.5).

The final period is from the mid-1990s to 2003. In the 1990s, China embraced the socialist market economy and achieved a high level of economic growth (Cheng, Fang, and Lien, 2012, p.4). Hence, the Chinese government diversified the sources and means of funding by restructuring its foreign aid mechanisms, for example, by establishing in 1993 the Foreign Aid Fund for Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects to support its small- and medium-sized enterprises. Not only that, since the 1990s, Beijing started to pay attention to aid’s capacity for improving human resource development, including technical training in recipient countries. From 1995, the Export-Import Bank of China has also taken a role in foreign aid, providing medium-and long-term low-interest loans (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011a).

The final period is from 2004 until the present. China’s rapid economic growth and improved economic strength leads to active foreign financial assistance (Cheng, Fang, and Lien, 2012, p.5). Furthermore, China began to take part in multilateral aid programs administered by various international organizations, in light of its desire to fulfil its responsibilities as a responsible power, and to boost its image as a humanitarian country in the international community. As part of its infrastructure assistance, Beijing utilizes ‘One Belt One Road’ and AIIB for expanding economic exchanges and cooperation via joint construction in member and neighbouring countries (see OBOR, below).

China’s foreign aid is based on soft power and the China model, which are intertwined in China’s foreign aid policy. Beijing’s foreign aid policy is also different to that of the West, the so-called Washington Consensus, focusing on South-South cooperation and a harmonious world; both of these are reflected in its foreign aid strategy. As has already been discussed, the Beijing Consensus (or China model), which is the opposite to the Washington Consensus,
is more concerned with preserving the value of the political economy systems in developing countries. In this way, China strategically presents a united front with developing countries through South-South cooperation, focusing on achieving the goal of economic growth through gradual market-based economic reforms. China also maintains its position in the international society as “a developing country”, rather than “a developed country” so as to cement cooperative relationships with other developing countries through South-South cooperation. In connection with this, Xi Jinping stressed the importance of South-South cooperation during his first appearance at the UN headquarters: “the South-South cooperation is set to play a bigger role in promoting the collective rise of developing countries and generating a robust, sustained, balanced and inclusive growth of the world economy”. During the meeting, Xi also highlighted South-South cooperation should comply with “the principles of mutual respect and trust, equality, solidarity and win-win cooperation, and help developing countries realize fair, open, all-round and innovation-driven development” (Xinhua News, 2015d). China claims peaceful development, to which harmony is central, and endeavors to become a responsible country in the company of the other superpowers. Looking ahead, Hu Jintao first announced the need to forge a “Harmonious World” in 2005, which reflected the direction of China’s foreign aid.

Looking at the big picture, China’s foreign aid functions as not only the medium of presenting its institutions and thoughts, its soft power. It also assists with finance, technology, infrastructure facilities, and human resource development. Thus, China’s aid policy is divided into two approaches: investment, which refers to “co-operation”; and assistance, which contains concessionary grants, interest-free loans and debt relief (Davies, 2008, p.2). However, China tends to integrate trade and investment in order to foster diverse partnerships, because China’s aid is often rendered as part of larger investments and trade deal packages, in tandem with large amounts of non-concessional loans and export credits. Therefore, the line between aid, investment, and trade are closer than for DAC members (OECD, 2012, p.11). When one standardizes China’s foreign aid into bilateral aid and multilateral aid, according to equity shares or contributions to multilateral institutions, the bilateral aid system is divided into three types based on the category of payment: grants, loans, and debt relief.51 (See Figure 2, below.)

51 Taking a closer look at China’s foreign aid system, one can see that there are three major financial resources that make up China’s foreign aid: grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. Grants are widely used for recipient countries’ social welfare, human resources development, emergency humanitarian aid, and technical cooperation. Interest-free loans are for backing of constructing public facilities to improve people’s livelihood in recipient countries. China tends to provide concessional loans only for larger projects (minimum size of US$2.4 million), which are tied to considerable use of
China’s bilateral aid decides on whether or not a country needs to repay loans according to an assessment of the recipient’s cooperative relations and financial conditions. Grand-type aid finances small- or medium-scale welfare projects, technical cooperation, material assistance, human resource development cooperation, education and training aid, and others. Credit assistance is divided into interest-free loans and concessional loans. The former is intended to assist recipient countries’ construction of, for example, public facilities and launching projects for improving the public’s livelihood. Concessional loans are aimed at helping establish manufacturing projects, including large- and medium-sized infrastructure projects that will benefit society and the economic sphere, and to support the completion of plants, electronic and machinery products. As circumstances require, China will expand debt relief aid, which alters what type of aid they are providing – from credit assistance to grand-type aid. As for loans, the Chinese government’s post-2012 focus has experienced a marked shift, from non-interest loans to concessional loans (Kitano, 2016, p.30), collecting both into its foreign aid program, as can be seen in the FOCAC case (Kobayashi, 2008). The share of aid dispensed in the form of grants has decreased slightly, from 41.4 to 36.2 percent (Y. Sun, 2014b). The tenure of interest-free loans is normally 20 years, including five years of use.

Chinese goods (at least 50 percent) and services, which are a condition for using Chinese construction firms as contractors (Brautigam, 2011, p.205).
five years of grace, and ten years of repayment. Meanwhile, the period for concessional loans' repayment is usually 15-20 years, with 5-7 years of grace and the annual interest rate is between two and three percent (Stallings, 2016). China’s concessional loans are broadly attached to its goods, services, and materials, unlike those provided by DAC donors, which provide foreign aid without conditions – a so-called “untied aid”. Furthermore, China’s non-interest loans are different to those from DAC members (Watanabe, 2013, pp.74-75). Also, the proportion of grants is much lower than 25 percent, which is the ODA standard (Strange, Bradley, Michael, Andreas, and Axel, 2015).

It is necessary to pay attention to China’s concessional loans’ features and management process. Concessional loans are one type of official development assistance that form the basis of South-South cooperation: equal and mutually beneficial. The Export-Import Bank of China is the sole lender designated by Chinese government to issue these loans. The loan is supposed to first boost social and economic development and improve living standards in developing countries, and to promote economic cooperation between China and the recipient countries (Dornan and Brant, 2014). However, unlike interest-free loans, it can’t be cancelled, nor easily rescheduled. Put it another way, once the interest rate and terms have been negotiated and signed, nothing will change (Brautigam, 2011, p.114). Although the Exim bank is in charge of project estimations, credit management, loan disbursements, and collection of principle and interest payments, MOFCOM is practically the authorized ministry of concessional loans. MOFCOM is responsible for signing intergovernmental framework agreements with recipient country governments plus establishing policies. To provide concessional loans, the following basic criteria need to be fulfilled: 1) the project should be approved by both the Chinese and the borrowing country’s government; 2) the borrowing country should have cordial and amicable diplomatic ties with China, with a stable political economy situation, and the ability to reimburse debt; 3) the project should have social benefits; 4) the project should be practical technically and realizable, and can produce smooth economic returns; 5) Chinese enterprises should be selected as the exporter and contractor; 6) more than 50% of the requisite items for the project (such as equipment, materials, technology, and services) should be provided by China; 7) local equipment, funds and labour needs for the project should be secured before starting the project (Kobayashi, 2008, p.16). Under these criteria, concessional loans are issued through MOFCOM procedures (see Figure 3), which is a clear difference to loans from the West.
Figure 3: Structure of Concessional Loans by China Exim bank

Note. Adopted from Davies, Edinger, Tay, and Naidu, 2008, p.18 and the Exim Bank (n.a)

1. Government of the borrowing country applies to the Chinese government for loan (no less than $2.4 million) and submits necessary documents to China Exim bank.
2. China Exim bank goes through the documentation of the application and submit to MOFCOM.
3. The Chinese government enters into an agreement with the borrowing country, given the recommendation is accepted.
4. The Exim bank signs a project loan agreement with the borrowing country. Then, it negotiates the loan’s interest rate and grace period, with repayment due semi-annually. For preferential export buyer’s credit, the Bank signs a project loan agreement upon approval from relevant government authorities.
5. The Chinese contractors and exporters send invoices to the borrowing country’s government, per the contracted terms.
6. The borrowing country’s executing agency sends a progress report and invoice to its government.
7. The borrowing country’s government submits the same document (number 6), plus a drawing application to the Exim bank.
8. China’s Exim bank disburses the loan according to project timetable.
9. The borrowing country’s government makes a payment of the interest, fees, principal, and loan repayment to the Exim bank.
Based on the three major financial sources above, China provides its foreign aid in eight ways, as follows: complete projects, technical cooperation, goods and materials, medical teams sent abroad, human resource development cooperation, volunteer programs in foreign countries, emergency humanitarian aid, and debt relief (the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011a). The choice of aid type is chosen based on Beijing’s interpretation of the project-specific needs, which are part of a larger package with commercial contracts; structuralizing purely state-to-state relation and managing different cases of its aid project’s tendering process under the Chinese government (Kjøllesdal & Welle-Strand, 2010, p.6). The salient feature of Chinese foreign aid assistance, in particular, is the focus on infrastructure sectors. Since 1950, 61 percent of China’s foreign assistance loans have comprised of transportation construction projects, and only 8.9% of the total for energy and resource development such as oil and mineral (the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011a). The second white paper on China's foreign aid, published in 2014, states that between 2010-12, 44.8% of the distributed loans were for economic infrastructure (transport and communications, broadcasting and telecommunications, and power supply), and 27.6% were for social and public infrastructure (hospitals, schools, civil construction, well drilling and water supply, and other public infrastructure). Although China’s aid for infrastructure sector has deceased since 2010, the Chinese government has increased more practical assistance, such as for office supplies, mechanical equipment, transport vehicles, medicine and medical devices to recipient countries (the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2014 - see Figure 4).

52 The forms of ODA are general budget support, project-type interventions, donor country personnel, other technical assistance, scholarships/training in donor country, imputed student costs, debt relief, administrative costs not included elsewhere, development awareness, refuges in donor countries, and core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institute.
53 China offers aid in the fields of education, health, communication, agriculture, transportation, and energy.
Recently, Beijing has concentrated on concessional loans along with investment for the sake of China’s continued economic growth, at the same time taking into account of strategic interest for exercising political leverage to developing countries. In terms of this, New York University Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of public service has convincingly argued that China’s foreign aid “is driven primarily by the need for natural resources and secondarily by diplomatic objectives. […] opening up foreign market for Chinese goods and help PRC companies invest, set up manufacturing plants, and develop markets overseas” (Lum, et al., 2009, p.5). Hence, Chinese foreign assistance is comprised of 53 percent government-sponsored investment, 42 percent concessional loans, and 5 percent in grants and debt.
cancellations in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia (ibid, p.7).\footnote{This data is researched during the period from 2002 to 2007.}

The scale of China’s foreign aid has also increased. In the early 2000s, China’s foreign assistance was relatively limited and small when compared to the DAC’s top donor countries. Since then, however, as part of its “go global” strategy, China has contributed roughly 3.9 percent of total global development aid, a threefold rise in total contributions compared with 2001 (Johnston and Rudyak, 2017). However, when one compares the larger scale of China’s foreign assistance with its growing economic power, it is still inadequate when compared with other advanced nations, and exhibits clear weighting towards certain countries that are of value to China’s economy. Moreover, Beijing is still a low contributor to multilateral assistance through international organizations, such as the UN and UNDP. In general, according to China’s foreign aid white papers in 2011 and 2014 (the State of Council of People’s Republic of China, 2011a, 2014), from 1950 to 2009, China rendered total aid of 256.29 billion yuan (US$37 billion) to foreign countries. Of that, 106.2 billion yuan (US$15 billion) was in grants, and 76.54 billion yuan (US$11 billion) was in interest-free loans, and 73.55 billion yuan (US$10 billion) was in concession loans. But China’s foreign aid decreased from 2010 to 2012: total aid dropped to 89.34 billion yuan (US$14.41 billion). Contrary to this, aid to Africa\footnote{China tends to prioritize its foreign aid as follows: the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as defined by the United Nations as an income level, Africa by geographic dimension, economic society infrastructure by sectoral dimension. As for the standard of poorest nation, DAC classifies them into four categories based on gross national income (GNI) per capita as reported by the World Bank: as of 2013, Least Developed Countries (per capita GNI < $992), Other Low Income countries (per capita GNI≤$1045), Lower Middle Income countries ($1046≤ per capita GNI ≤$4125), Upper Middle Income Countries ($4126≤ per capita GNI ≤$12745) (OECD, 2017).} has increased from 45.7 percent to 51.8 percent, since 2010.

There is a noteworthy feature in Chinese foreign assistance system. As has been noted earlier, the Chinese government applies public diplomacy to its aid program. This is because it is of great importance not only to make up for critical factors that come from general foreign aid system, but also to mitigate the go-ahead and hidden selfish intentions of its foreign financial assistance. To China, public diplomacy is also a tool of own country’s economic growth, according to Interviewee S-A3. Therefore, it is no wonder that China employs public diplomacy to strengthen its foreign assistance. Yet, when we examine the argument of economics Nobel Prize-winning Professor Angus Deaton (2015), that there is an ODA blind spot when it comes to the vitalization of recipient countries’ economic growth,\footnote{Read more information of Professor Angus Deaton argument with ODA, Deaton, A. (2015). The great escape: health, wealth, and the originals of inequality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.} one cannot find any unadulterated or perfect foreign aid aimed at purely reducing poverty and economic development in the international arena. Not only that, but given that aid is a means of “hard-
headed diplomacy” (Lancaster, 2007, p.3), Beijing also considers it to make up for the weaknesses in its foreign aid, such as the lack of transparency, the negative effects of its non-intervention policy, the political economy purposes of its aid projects as well as the same blind spot as the West above.

At the forefront of China’s efforts, ODA plays the role of an initiator to poverty reduction, in social sectors such as health and education, and governance. The social sectors have been gaining importance (i.e. around the 51 percent of total ODA in 2004) in the 2000s, when compared to 1990, when 82 percent of ODA was distributed to economic infrastructure, financial sector, agriculture, and industry. ODA allocation is also shifting from infrastructure and production to social sectors in African countries, taking up 60 percent of all sector allocated ODA (Saidi & Wolf, 2011, p.10). China’s efforts are an indication that it wants to march in step with the West in rendering humanitarian and practical assistance; and reflects the policy outlined in China’s first and second foreign aid white papers. China reports that 62.1 percent of its completed projects were carried out on public facilities, and 26.9 percent on economic infrastructure, from 2010 to 2012. The number of complete public facilities projects has doubled than since 2010. As the main form of China’s foreign aid is complete projects, the growth in public facilities assistance is intended to boost China’s public diplomacy in its aid system. Not only that, it is not only foreign humanitarian assistance aimed at improving people’s livelihood and promoting economic and social development in recipient countries, but also a commercial-focused aid to create a regional cooperation mechanism. The aid can be broken down into specific assistance categories, focusing on the public in recipient countries. Unlike ODA’s recent trend, however, the Chinese government has reported increasing importance in assistance for social and public infrastructure in tandem with basic facilities, which are directly related to the public. While the previous style, which focused only on constructing transportation, Beijing has also highlighted that “medical and health care is a major field where China directs it foreign assistance”. In light of this, the Chinese government provides both full infrastructure assistance (such as hospital construction and medical equipment) and technical development cooperation, including dispatching medical teams to recipient countries. However, Shung Lin and colleagues (2016) point out that China’s medical aid is not yet ready for recipient countries. Unlike the West’s aid system, the unique style of China’s foreign aid raises additional doubts regarding whether the medical aid is given out of a sense of altruism, to give the people a helping hand, or whether China uses medical aid as another part for China’s strategic approach to recipient countries (Johnston and Rudyak, 2017; Lin et al., 2016, pp.1-5). For example, a Chinese medical aid team dispatched to Africa focused too much on a single region (66 percent of total) (Wang, Zhu, and Zhang. 2013, p. 92) that was beneficial to China: therefore, it is hard
for Beijing to evade the negative international publicity. Nevertheless, China offers foreign aid in diverse fields to benefit the public in aid-receiving counties (see Table 4).

Table 4: The comparison of scale of China’s foreign aid between prior to 2009 and after

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of foreign aid</th>
<th>2010-2012 (a)</th>
<th>1950-2009 (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete project</td>
<td>580 construction projects in 80 countries</td>
<td>2,205 projects¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods and materials</td>
<td>424 batches¹ of aid in 96 countries and regions</td>
<td>-²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical cooperation</td>
<td>171 projects² in 61 countries</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resources development cooperation</td>
<td>1,951 training sessions³ in China/ 29,148 people training from developing countries</td>
<td>4,000 training sessions and 120,000 people training in China³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical teams</td>
<td>Dispatching 55 teams, including 3,600 medical personnel, to 54 countries²</td>
<td>Dispatching 21,000 medical workers in total, and treated 260 million patients/ 60 medical team with 1,324 medical personnel, and 130 medical institution in 57 developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer programs</td>
<td>Dispatching 7,000 young volunteers, including Chinese-language teachers, to 60 countries</td>
<td>Dispatching 405 young volunteers to 19 countries/ 7,590 Chinese language teaching to 70 countries⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Rendering RMB 1.15 billion to 30 countries</td>
<td>200 occasions from 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt relief</td>
<td>Assisting 9 LDCs⁵ with 16 mature zero-interest loans, RMB 1.42 billion in total</td>
<td>Assisting 50 countries regarding cancellation of 380 mature debts, RMB 25.58 billion in total⁵</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Adopted from the white paper of China’s foreign aid in 2011 and 2014 (the State of Council of People’s Republic of China, 2011a, 2014)
(a) ¹ This includes mechanical equipment, office supplies, inspection equipment, articles for daily use, transport vehicles, medical devices.
² This mainly covers industrial and agriculture-related management projects, clean energy development, cultural and education, sports and physical training, and medical and health care.
³ The training sessions are the program of technical and official personnel education and on-the-job academic education.
⁴ This is for supporting medical service and providing medical treatment around 7 million patients.
⁵ The nine less-developed countries are Tanzania, Zambia, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Togo, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan, which are heavily indebted.

(b) ¹ This includes agriculture, industry, power supply, energy, transportation, cultural and education, communication, and health care.
² The Chinese government does not release an accurate number of its work, but then the form is for the purpose of technical, industrial, and living related products assistance.
³ The trained people are mostly managers, interns, technical personnel and officials. Also, the trainees are drawn from over 20 fields, including agriculture, medical and health care, economy, diplomacy, and environment protection.
⁴ Beginning with five volunteers to Laos to provide education and medical and health care services for the first time, in 2002, the 405 young volunteers are for traditional Chinese medicine treatment, Chinese language teaching, agricultural technology, computer skills, and sports and physical training in 2009. As to Chinese language teachers, China began to dispatch volunteer Chinese language teachers in 2003; after six years, an increased number of teachers were dispatched to 70 countries.
⁵ China started to assist in debt relief in 2000, at the FOCAC First Ministerial Conference. Since then, Beijing had held several meetings of the FOCAC and UN High-Level Meeting by 2009; after which it signed debt relief protocols with 50 countries, of which 35 are African countries; 312 of 380 debts cancelled, between RMB 189.6 and RMB 255.8 billion cancelled in total.

The last noteworthy feature of the Chinese foreign assistance system is the foreign aid it gives through multilateral agencies. For effective and comprehensive foreign aid for development, China promotes international and regional cooperation through dialogue and assistance via multilateral organizations. Taking advantage of the establishment of the FOCAC, the Chinese government began in earnest to take part in multilateral joint projects across diverse platforms. Also, China refined its policies and principles of foreign aid through multilateral international conferences. The majority of scholars agree that the reasons for China’s multilateral cooperation, is that it is the role of multinational agencies in the global arena. Given numerous and momentous transnational problems, multilateral aid agencies have come to play a gradually-more-significant role in solving problems through regional or global networks with diverse perspectives. In this sense, as long as China maintains bilateral aid agreements in its foreign policy system on the condition of trade for aid, Beijing feels keenly the necessity of multilateral agencies, for the sake of transnational
cooperation (Zhang and Smith, 2017; Zhou, 2017). On the other hand, Xiong (2017) found that the reason for China’s multilateral cooperation is global transformation in the era of internationalization. China just goes with the flow when the whole world grapples with resolving urgent problems: “strengthening international cooperation for development, narrowing the North-South gap, and ensuring the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals” (p.61). This is because China is ready to alter its role from “active participation” to “active developer” or “active advocate” with a better understanding of multilateral diplomacy in the international society (ibid, p.63). Nonetheless, it is clear that China is able to mitigate poverty by means of multilateral agencies, on which China did not previously place much emphasis. In 2006, the International Poverty Reduction Center in China, which was jointly sponsored and funded by the Chinese government, the UNDP, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank Group. Since then, the significance of poverty reduction aid has increased, as can be seen in China’s first and second foreign aid white papers. In the first white paper, “poverty reduction” and “poverty alleviation” were mentioned only twice, whereas they appeared eleven times in the second white paper, when China officially explained the forms and purpose of its aid. There is little official information from the Chinese government regarding poverty reduction as related to official aid data. As a result, it is difficult to accurately analyze and track how much money the Chinese government has dispersed for poverty alleviation. Yet, it is possible to estimate China’s poverty reduction aid, because Beijing recognizes the responsibility of the present global development challenges. At the same time, Beijing has a chance to reframe China’s foreign aid, to address a gap in the Five Principles and the Eight Principles, while at the same time distinguishing it from the West’s foreign assistance (UNDP, 2014). By extension, China has proposed pushing ahead with trilateral cooperation for effective international experience-learning and training programs – e.g. UNDP-China-Cambodia for cassava planning, UNESCO-China-Africa (one of African countries) for education – to promote an upgraded version of bilateral or South-South Cooperation that China adheres to in its foreign aid policy.

**OBOR**

The importance of trade with infrastructure aid in the Sino-African relations feeds into the Beijing leadership’s grand long-term strategy – China’s Belt and Road Initiative (B&R) – which

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57 Trilateral aid cooperation works in a triangular relationship between a recipient country, a traditional donor, and an emerging country such as China or India (Fordelone, 2013, p.31).

58 This is also called as “One Belt, One Road (OBOR)”, or ‘The Belt and Road (B&R)’. Xi Jinping proposed ‘Silk Road Belt’, which stands for boosting cooperation between China and Central Asia through establishing a ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ on September, 2013. And a month later, at the Indonesian parliament, Xi put forward establishing a ‘21st Century Maritimes Silk Road’ to boost maritime cooperation with setting up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) not only to
was proposed by Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan, in 2013. The aim of his ambitious and grandiose plan was to remake Eurasia as an economic block centred on China. Thus, the Chinese government concentrates on increasing the interconnectivity and cooperation between China, especially its inland regions, and Eurasia using a “Silk Road Economic Belt” between Central Asia and Europe, and a “Maritimes Silk Road” between Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Beijing also attaches great importance to its “One Belt and One Road (OBOR)” strategy for its own sustainable economic development, which is evolving out of the low-price and export-oriented economy in China (Woo, 2017). Thus, it is designed as a tool for considering China’s economy and the significance of diplomatic relations with its surrounding nations. The chief hidden economic agenda of OBOR is to resolve issues of overcapacity, job creation, overproduction problems, and regional imbalance issue in China’s economic growth, following the 2008 recession, through infrastructure construction and its facilities business. Pu (2016) suggests that OBOR is part of China’s expanded economic development strategy, providing an opportunity for an “upgraded version” of China’s “Going Out” strategy, which encourages Chinese outward foreign direct investment, such as overseas investment, building infrastructure, conducting mergers and acquisitions, and exporting workers. He said OBOR is pursued to carry out the “five connections”, which fundamentally concentrate on economy (connecting infrastructure, finance, and trade), “policy communication”, and “connecting the peoples’ minds” (Pu, 2016, pp.113-5). The last two elements are for the sake of consolidating cooperation and trust-building by meditating policy, and the invigoration of non-governmental exchanges with the help of education and cultural exchanges, which are based on public diplomacy activities. Due to the fact that economic and political strategies are intertwined, OBOR includes China’s political views – “geopolitical and diplomatic offensive” – which endeavors to expand China’s influence and political power using investment, which is designed by its government (Summers, 2016, p.1628). OBOR reflects the views of the leadership in Beijing, which is not only to fulfil “China’s Dream” and revive the historic Silk Road through economic diplomacy, but also to raise its voice to hold the United States in check.

In 2014, China launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to achieve its goal of becoming the regional center of political economy. The OBOR strategy and the AIIB signify that China is acquiring greater capabilities in oversight of its economy and finance. The main purpose of the AIIB is to “foster sustainable economic growth and development, by investing infrastructure and other productive industries, to improve connectivity and to promote regional cooperation” (China Daily, 2016e) in the Asian region. This highlights fund infrastructure but also to stimulate economic integration and interconnection between infrastructure construction regions.
differences with the Asia Development Bank (ADB), which focuses on reducing poverty through social development, such as education extension and exterminating disease, for developing countries (see table 5).

Table 5. The comparison between AIIB and ADB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIIB</th>
<th>ADB</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The year of establishment</td>
<td>June 2015</td>
<td>December 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President*</td>
<td>Jin Liqun (Chinese)</td>
<td>Takehiko Nakao (Japanese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>Beijing, China</td>
<td>Mandaluyong, Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading country</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Japan and United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type and Aim</td>
<td>Multilateral financial institution/</td>
<td>Social development organization/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aiding infrastructure construction for</td>
<td>Reducing poverty, financial support</td>
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<td>developing countries in the Asian</td>
<td>(loans and grants), technical assistance</td>
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<td>region</td>
<td>for developing countries in the Asian</td>
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<td>region</td>
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<td>Member nation</td>
<td>57 members**</td>
<td>67 members (48 are from within Asia and</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the Pacific and 19 outside)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital base</td>
<td>US$ 100 billion</td>
<td>US$ 165 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholders***</td>
<td>China less then 30%</td>
<td>Japan 15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India 10-15%</td>
<td>United States 15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>People’s Republic of China 6.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*the present president in 2017 **2017 criterion ***based on December 2015 data

Source: Author

Furthermore, OBOR is distinguished from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has the purpose of boosting global financial stability; and from the World Bank, which concentrates on poverty reduction, and development support through financial and technical assistance.

The author organized information on the basis of AIIB Articles of Agreement (AOA) based on A History of Financial Management at the Asian Development Bank published by ADB.
With the introduction of the AIIB, China is empowered to secure finance and employ funds for OBOR from AIIB, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), and a Silk Road Fund. The AIIB alongside the OBOR, especially, supports Beijing to facilitate the following: first, China currently assures US dollar as the main currency of the AIIB, but the Beijing government pushes ahead with the Renminbi’s (RMB) internationalization through the OBOR initiative. Second, China will create a new China-centric financial order by managing China-led financial institutions (AIIB, SCO, NDB), in tandem with gaining recognition in the international financial system and market. China took the lead in establishing the AIIB, and has a nearly-30 percent stake, with nearly 26 percent of the voting rights in the AIIB, thereby wielding substantial influence over its management. However, Jin Liqun, a president of AIIB, described the direction of the bank operation, which focuses on complementary cooperation, during the AIIB opening ceremony: “AIIB worked closely with other Multilateral Development Banks (MDB), like co-financing projects with World Bank, Asian Development Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development” (China Daily, 2016e). Third, China already utilizes its foreign exchange holdings for infrastructure investment through the Silk Road Fund, and will expand the efficiency of its foreign exchange reserves through OBOR. China’s AIIB engages African countries in pursuing practical interests in the economic sector through infrastructure development, although it was established for developing Asian countries. In 2015, the president of the African Development Bank (AfDB), Donald Kaberuka, hinted at jointing hands with AIIB with regards to infrastructure issues in Africa. He likened AIIB to “a game changer in international financial architecture”, commenting that AIIB could satisfy African countries’ needs for infrastructure funding, because the necessary expense for infrastructure construction would require US$1.5 trillion per year. However, the development funds are still insufficient, although the IMF and World Bank have increased their financing to US$400 billion (Xinhua News, 2015c). Not only that, but African countries are delighted about the AIIB’s infrastructure investment in Africa, due to the diversification of financial resources’ providers.

### 4.3 Conclusion

This Chapter began with a review of the China model, based on Ramo’s formulation of the “Beijing Consensus”. The China model shows the character of China’s economic

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development based on an authoritarian system with a core policy of a gradual and step-by-step economic reform, and the importance of sustainable and equal domestic development, focused also on China’s peaceful development/rise in the international society. The model has been positively received by developing countries, which has hitherto only experienced the Western-style development model, and therefore functions as an element of China’s soft power for public diplomacy. Next, the chapter examined China’s three different actors (government, sub-government, and non-governmental actors) to understand how China’s governmental-centered public diplomacy system realizes China’s foreign policy. In addition, it examined how China tries to foster a favorable image of itself, to dispel its negative global image (especially that of the “China threat theory”, and false and skewed images of China from the Western media), with a purpose to establish a groundwork for communicating with the world. Then, the chapter looked into China’s cultural diplomacy, which exhibits China’s strong intent to rise or develop peacefully, through mutual understanding with foreign public and accepting differences in the world, based on China’s culture and people-to-people exchange activities. Finally, the chapter examined the role of China’s foreign aid, and the different ways it is understood by those in China and in the West. From the Chinese point of view, foreign aid boosts friendly relations without interference in domestic affairs, as part of its public diplomacy. One can see this in China’s aid to developing countries, especially Africa, which offers various types of assistance for medical, education, developing welfare system, and others to achieve a harmonious world and mutual development. By extension, China, utilizing the OBOR long-term strategy, offers infrastructure development to African countries to derive terms favorable to vitalize China’s exports and establishing facilities that support its business in African countries.
Chapter 5. China international strategy for Africa and the role of public diplomacy

Drawing on Chapter 3 and 4, which focused on the background and mechanisms of China’s soft power public diplomacy and the connection between its foreign policy and public diplomacy, this chapter will discuss China’s Africa policy – especially the economic relations between China and African countries, and China’s public diplomacy towards African countries. It also aims to illuminate the problem of asymmetric economic relations between China and Africa to elicit the necessity of public diplomacy in the Sino-Africa relations. This chapter will help us to understand China’s public diplomacy policy in detail, as well as the case studies on China’s relationships with Nigeria, South Africa, and FOCAC, which will follow in Chapter 6.

Therefore, this chapter will begin with a description of Sino-African ties from the 1950s to the post-Tiananmen Square years (after 1989, and review not only stable policies that have established the foundations for current China’s Africa policy, but also the impact of major events that have solidified today’s relations. Second, based on the historical background of Sino-Africa relations, it will examine China’s two Africa policy white papers, published in 2006 and 2015, in order to examine which factors are stressed by the Chinese government in its relations with African countries. Third, it will scrutinize the disharmony caused by lopsided economic ties between China and Africa. Lastly, it will discuss the general character of China’s public diplomacy in Africa aimed at fostering close economic relations with African countries, before moving on to the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7.

5.1 Africa in China’s strategy

This part examines China’s foreign policy towards African nations, from the 1950s to the early 2000s, to grasp the big picture of Sino-African relations. The reason for this review is that the core policies between China and Africa were established during the 1950s, and they remain cornerstone of China’s contemporary Africa policy. By reviewing previous Sino-Africa ties, and the range of policies between them since the 1950s, this part will ascertain the significance and necessity of China’s public diplomacy in its foreign diplomatic strategy.
Hence, the part is divided into three parts based on major landmarks for periodization to give an overview of the flow of political economy, China’s aid, and investment in the context of China’s political purpose in Sino-Africa relations: first, the Mao era, between 1949 and 1976; second, the first decade under Deng Xiaoping, between 1978 and 1989; and third, the post-Tiananmen Square years, from 1989. Then, drawing upon the historical backdrop of China and Africa relations, China’s pursuits in its relations with Africa will be scrutinized, through the lens of the two white papers on China’s Africa policy.

5.1.1 China’s African policy from the 1950s to the 1990s

5.1.1.1 The Mao era, between 1949 and 1976

The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” are hailed as the first guiding principles of China’s diplomacy that were established to engage in international relations in the Mao era (Raine, 2009, p.15). China has adhered to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” as their foreign policy tenets since 1954, after they were expressed by former Premier Zhou Enlai during negotiations between the Chinese and Indian governments on the subject of the Tibet issue. Using the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, China engages in realistic diplomacy towards Asia and Africa’s emerging countries. The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” are extended to the various Afro-Asian conferences. A representative example is, in 1955, the Bandung Conference (also called the Asian-African Conference (AAC)), convened in Bandung, Indonesia, and attended by representatives from 29 Asian and African nations. The conference was sponsored by Burma (now Myanmar), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan; it presented a new indicator for relations between China and Africa (Xinhua News, 2015a). This conference played a catalytic role in sustaining the Sino-Africa relation, addressing some of the limitations in China’s relations with African nations prior to 1956. Former Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai moved toward establishing diplomatic relations with Egypt as a first step among African nations, in 1956, after meeting with a few African leaders at the Bandung Conference.

Starting there, Beijing mapped out a strategy to integrate itself with Africa by providing three factors: standing up to the superpowers, spreading the China model, and China’s third world policy (Yu, 1977, p.98; Alan and Alves, 2008, p.47). Also, China had the opportunity to

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62 The division is based on Mawdsley’s understanding of the relations between China and Africa in chronological order (2007).

63 The contents of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are: 1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit and 5) peaceful coexistence.
promulgate the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, starting with the declaration of the Ten Principles of Bandung, which are based on promoting peace and cooperation in the world. Since then, these Five Principles have formed the core of China’s foreign policy – for example, the First Conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization was held in 1957; China set up the China-African People’s Friendship Association in 1960; Organization of African Unity Charter in 1963; and other non-aligned movements (Rain, 2009, pp.15-16). China established a socialist constitution, and specified the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” as key to its foreign policy in China’s constitution in 1954. The United Nations General Assembly, moreover, took up these Five Principles and included them in the declarations in 1970 and 1974 (MFA, 2014b). In 1982, China’s new foreign policy was amended at the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, highlighting these Five Principles in 1982:

China adheres to an independent foreign policy as well as to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries. (People’s Daily, 1982)

Adherence to the Five Principles in Chinese political system as guiding principles was evident during the 1960s and 1970s in many ways. China pursued an equal partnership, undeterred by system or ideology, for its best interests during the deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union. China, moreover, was protected by the Principles from other nations’ intervention in China’s domestic affairs, and legitimized its cooperative exchanges with Africa’s dictatorships. These Principles were employed to establish amicable relations with the new nations of Asia and Africa; China gave prominence to the voices of Third World countries that sought independence and autonomous political systems by opposing the Soviet Union and United States imperialism. In addition, the Principles were utilized to create

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64 The contents of The Ten Principle of Bandung are: (1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; (3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small; (4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; (5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; (6) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers, abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries; (7) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; (8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties’ own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; (9) Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation; (10) Respect for justice and international obligation. (Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/23/content_436882.htm)
stable international relations and economic cooperation, to sustain China’s economic development and political stability during the 1970s, after China’s reform and opening up. However, the international community condemned the Chinese government’s lack of clarity on the meaning of the Principles and its diplomatic strategy – i.e., without establishing clear interpretations of the Principles, and standards for the Principles’ application, China stands on the principle of non-intervention for its national interests with regards to its aid to rogue nations in Africa such as Sudan; the issue of Tibetan independence; and the problem of human rights in China, and others. By extension, according to Li (2007), during the Mao era, a “dogmatic approach” and diplomacy of an “ultra-leftist mentality” inclination dominated in Sino-Africa relations; China treated Africa as an ally in fighting hegemony and imperialism in the aftermath of the 1960s Sino-Soviet split (Li, 2007, p.70). Yet, by the end of the 1960s, China reoriented its diplomatic policy, and adopted a pragmatic line, an aid basis of “free and unconditional”, a diplomacy based on existing Chinese communist thought, which had its roots in the slogan of “exporting revolution” with an attendant absurdity in the principle of “non-interference in international affairs” (ibid, p.71).

Between December 1963 and February 1964, Zhou Enlai made a tour of ten African countries, and proposed the Eight Principles for Chinese Economic Assistance and Five Principles governing China’s relations with the Arab and African countries as reflected in the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and Bandung spirit. China’s economic assistance is offered as long-term, interest-free or low-interest loans, technical assistance, and landmark construction for establishing their own independent domains, emphasizing mutual economic assistance, equality, and mutual benefit. China left a good impression

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65 The ten African countries are: the United Arab Republic (currently Egypt), Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.

66 (1) The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries; (2) In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges; (3) China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for repayment; (4) The purpose of the Chinese Government is to help them to be self-reliant and gain independent economic development; (5) The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results; (6) The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices; (7) In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique; (8) The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country.

67 (1) China supports the Arab and African peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism and old and new colonialism, and to win and safeguard national independence; (2) It supports the pursuit of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the Governments of Arab and African countries; (3) It supports the desire of the Arab and African people to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice; (4) It supports the Arab and African countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultations; (5) It holds that the sovereignty of the Arab and African countries should be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed.
behind after preferring this unconventional offer to African nations in the 1960s (MFA, n.a-b). China began to render its aid to friendly nations of North Africa during 1950s: e.g., Egypt (1956) and Algeria (1958); and in the 1960s, extended aid to sub-Saharan African nations, e.g., Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Tanzania, and Zambia (Brautigam, 2014, p.132). As a majority of African nations declared their independence from colonial rulers, the more actively aid was utilized as a major instrument in Beijing’s diplomacy.

From 1949 to 1978, the primary aim of China’s diplomatic policy towards Africa, however, was virtually confined to aid that was not given on the basis of practical and sustainable development, but rather connected to politics. This is because political conditions in Africa from 1960s through 1980s were still influenced by the Soviet Union, through the supply a large amounts of arms, compared to other countries. Also, the contest for ideology between the Soviet Union, the United States, and European nations was exercised in Africa (Li, 2007, pp.70-71). Beijing focused on deploying its aid as part of a policy of containment aimed at the Soviet Union, and the use of patronage for political advantage from African nations to solve the Taiwan issue. Drawing on the purpose of China’s diplomacy towards Africa, China began to support Africa’s revolutionary movements and its liberation, which were ideologically based on Maoist China (Alden and Alves, 2008, p.48); and began to provide military assistance to Africa governments. In 1958, Beijing began to support Algeria’s goal of liberation and revolution from France by furnishing it with US$10 million for military procurement (Hickey and Guo, 2010, p.135); in 1960, it helped train Guinea Bissau’s rebels to secede from Portuguese rule. During the 1960s, Beijing broadened the boundary of military support in the name of liberation movements. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency allegedly, from 1961 through 1971, assessed that 75 percent of military supplies procurement was from foreign countries, and that China supplied Africa with US$42 million worth of arms (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, pp.164-165).

In terms of China’s aid for ingratiating with Africa during 1960s, as observed earlier, China’s aid supply was interlocked with African nations’ independence, and besides military support, provided aid to in sub-Saharan Africa as follows: First, China began to offer its economic and technical cooperation, including 5,000 tons of rice to Guinea after they voted down de Gaulle’s constitution by plebiscite in 1960 (Hickey & Guo, 2010, p.135). Second, Beijing offered a US$20 million interest-free loan to Ghana in 1961 and provided technical assistance, high-profile visits, and diverse loan agreements between 1966 and 1972. China’s established its first diplomatic ties with a sub-Saharan African nation with Ghana (Hess and Aidoo, 2015, p.47). Third, in the same year as Ghana, China signed an economic and cooperation agreement with Mali and dispatched technical experts in the field of
construction, oil refinery, textile mill, and leather processing. China aided the agriculture sector in tea plantation in 1962, and sugar plantation in 1966. In 1968, China sent medical teams to Mali, and promised US$100 million for agricultural and light industrial projects in the late-1970s (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, p.241). Fourth, Tanzania received a US$42 million loan, and a US$3 million subsidy from China in 1964, following Tanzania’s former vice president’s visit to China. It was the beginning of an impressive Chinese financial and technical assistance program for Tanzania (ibid. pp.260-261). Fifth, Beijing promised US$50 million in assistance to Zambia in 1964, the same year in which Zambia became independent from Great Britain. China worked on diplomatic relations with Zambia because it was pivotal to China’s strategic goals in southern Africa, based on its abundant resources. In 1967, China granted Zambia a US$17 million interest-free loan while its president, Kenneth David Kaunda visited Beijing; in the ensuing months, China provided a US$7 million line of credit to Zambia; and later that year, the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway was confirmed by China, Tanzania, and Zambia (ibid. p.324-325).

The Tanzania and Zambia railroad is a transport artery that links east Africa with southern Africa; it has been a primary means of transportation until recently. The purpose of the TAZARA Railway (also called the Tanzam Railway or the Uhuru68 Railway in Swahili) was to sever dependent relations with Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Angola that had white-ruled political systems, when Zambia exported its copper abroad. Thus, the TAZARA line began at the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam, and extended southwest by traversing Tanzania. In this context, TAZARA Railway, which was one of China’s largest foreign aid projects has a symbolic meaning to Africans, one of “anti-apartheid and anti-imperialist”. The World Bank, in fact, even declined this railway project for the reason of financially impracticality. In 1970, despite it being an onerous construction project, China dispatched not only over fifty thousand experts, including workers in order to construct the “Freedom Railway”, but also US$400 million in long-term, interest-free loans for TAZARA building funds, under the China’s turnkey project management. The actual cost was nevertheless assumed to be much higher than the official fund. In 1976, TAZARA was opened (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, p. 261; Brautigam and Tang, 2012, p.6; Akyeampong and Xu, 2015, pp. 764-765). Consideration China’s economic situation at the time, prior to its reforms and opening up, the cost of TAZARA’s construction were tremendous. During the early 1970s, when the TAZARA Railway was under construction, Zambia’s average per capita income was higher than China’s. Beijing persisted in excessive investment, despite the fact that China was suffering from famine due to food shortages, from 1956 to 1961. Guinea received 10,000 tons of rice

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68 Uhuru means “freedom” in Swahili.
from China in 1960, and China’s aid fund towards Africa was expanded from US$25 million in 1960 to US$39.2 million in 1961 (J. Zhang, 2017). Nevertheless, China took into consideration the impact of aid to Africa had on its unstable economy, and China offered a projected estimated total of US$4.7 billion in aid to Africa, from 1960 to 1989 (Brautigam, 2008). The sum total of aid was almost half of its total when compared to its overall overseas support during the same time period. Through China’s outgoing foreign policy, China set up diplomatic relations with 20 African nations from 1970 and 1976 (Alden and Alves, 2008. p.51).

China’s intent for its aid in foreign policy contributed a valuable reward to China after it officially appeared on the international stage, with its entry into the United Nations, in 1971. Taiwan’s expulsion from the United Nations, concurrently, led China to hold a seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. From 1971 to 1979, China was recognized by 46 states instead of Taiwan. Despite gaining the recognition of the United Nations General Assembly, Taiwan was still seen as a barrier to establishing bilateral relations between China and the U.S., until they officially established diplomatic relations in 1979. During the 1970s, China was required to keep Taiwan in check as they pursued an intensive diplomatic drive to increase Taiwan’s international recognition. In this, they presented China’s coercive diplomatic tactics to get Taiwan under its influence and force Taiwan to break off diplomatic relations with all countries in the international community. In the case of Africa, China forged new links with African countries that broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Taylor, 2002, p.126). The Beijing leadership expressed China’s position, to make the Taiwan issue clear in a meeting with then-President of the U.S. Richard Nixon in Beijing, through the Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the United State of America, in 1972:

the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China, which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities, which aim at the creation of ‘one China, one Taiwan’, ‘one China two governments’, ‘two Chinas’, an ‘independent Taiwan’ or advocate that ‘the status of Taiwan remains to be determined’. (MFA, n.a-d)

With regards to China’s goal of reunification with Taiwan, the majority of African countries contributed much in supporting the One China policy in opposition to Taiwan’s so-called
“flexible diplomacy”. Most African countries abide by China’s One China policy in support of China’s policy becoming a reality. Insofar as China needed to enhance the nation’s position in the international community through the Third World, especially Africa, Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation is a substantive issue for China not only to secure and enlarge a bridgehead in Africa but also to fulfill the One China policy.

5.1.1.2 The First decade under Deng Xiaoping, between 1978 and 1989

In counterpoint to Sino-Africa relations stance based on “third world” and ideological unity in 1960s, under the influence of Deng’s economic liberalization policy, the aim of China’s relations shifted from ideology to trade during the 1980s. The possible reason for the shift was that a mutual sense of solidarity in Sino-Africa relations changed the perception of China in Africa (Obiorah, 2008, p.3). China achieved results through its economic openness and policy of pragmatism, and so radical Maoism was supplanted by Deng’s new policy.

China began to place its top priority on economic development and introducing technology and foreign capital, carrying out its reforms and opening up policy in 1978, at the third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. However, Deng’s new policy produced transient changes in its relations with Africa, owing to insufficient funds for China’s domestic economic development. China’s aid expenditure in 1978, for instance, was 1,721 billion RMB, which represented about 1.53 percent of its gross expenditure. This was a 0.97 percent drop when compared to China’s gross expenditure on aid in 1977. All expenditure on China’s aid in 1980 fell by 1.86 percent from two years earlier, the largest year-on-year decline since 1978 (Watanabe, 2013). From the year of policy enforcement to 1982, the new policy led to unexpected results, such as dwindled economic aid and bilateral trade. To straighten out Sino-African relations, the 12th CPC National Assembly adjusted its foreign policy to satisfy both China and African countries’ economic development based on the “Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence” (Li, 2007, p.90). In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution during Mao’s era, Beijing’s new foreign strategy was invigorated by market-oriented economic development projects under the opening up policy and non-antagonism, including the relaxation of relations with the Soviet Union on a global basis around the mid-1980s. Also, China toughened its foreign policy towards Africa to cement diplomatic relations between China and the continent.
In a bid to promote relations with Africa following the unavoidable reduction in assistance, from 1982 to 1983, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang made a tour of 11 African countries, promoting South-South cooperation and smooth aid supply. Zhao's statement, unlike Zhou Enlai's principles during his visit to Africa from 1963 to 1964, reassured “mutual assistance” and “mutual benefit” based relations between China and Africa, pledging to stand against “racism, aggression, and expansionism” (Q. Zhang, 2015, pp.57-58). In addition, he made an additional remark, stressing the importance of economic and technological cooperation in Tanzania at the end of the tour: (1) equality and mutual benefit; (2) common progress; (3) stress on practical results; and (4) diversity in form. In 1984, China henceforth provided US$258.9 million in aid to Africa’s sixth-largest donor (Brautigam, 2008, pp.203-204). Furthermore, there is a new wave of African economic development following independence. In 1980, the first economic summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was held in Lagos, and adopted the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) that called for “self-reliance” and “self-sustainment” (Asuk, 2011, p.134). In connection with self-directed movement, in Shaw’s understanding, a large number of civil societies across multiple regions were influenced by the movement. Also, he argued, “The dynamic of regional exchange given economic crisis and conditionalities is already a reality which sustains many local political economies, whether through the transnational movement of capital, commodities, currencies, drugs or labour” (Shaw, 1994, p.21). Unfortunately, the LPA fell short of solving issues with Africa’s economic growth, and the majority of African nations carried out large-scale restructuring through the IMF and World Bank. Subsequently, there were calls for the foundation of a New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001.

China’s diplomatic policy strategy after the reforms and openness policy was modified, to reduce the scale of aid and bring to an end extensive technical support, as a result of the government’s financial deficit for its modernization plan. China adopted a position of “low profile co-operation projects” that demanded “small investments” and “quicker returns” (Alden & Alves, 2008, p.53). For the sake of maintaining relations with Africa, and promoting mutual dependence in economic interests, China also shifted its aid method: first, Beijing adopted the practice of providing its aid fund through tripartite cooperation, under a mutual assistance system that was established by African governments, international aid agencies such as the United Nations and its related agencies. Second, China looked to its companies to help establish the growth of its foreign aid and thus contributed vastly to the economic boom in the late 1970s. And third, leaders in Beijing applied new elements to its

69 The 11 African countries are: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Zaire, the Congo, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Tanzania, and Kenya.

All considered, China’s diplomatic policy after the reform and opening up of China’s economy was the search for internal solutions to make effective use of its market economy system to support aid for Africa, under the overall aim of cooperative development fulfillment. Ultimately, China’s new foreign policy was influenced by the opening up of the Chinese economy – i.e., the introduction of new technologies led to China obtaining foreign exchanges through technology sales; promoting development in its lagging industrial field; and seizing opportunities of keep up with developed countries. Beijing’s new diplomatic policy of international aid, investment, and trade built a stable basis not only for pursuing its economic interests, but also for establishing a firm cooperation in Sino-African relations (Ross, 1994, p.446). Though China set up independent foreign policy during the 1980s, this did not mean that China mapped out a specific diplomatic strategy towards Africa, but was more focused on pursing its modernization – although, China did have a close connection with the developed world. All these early stages of China’s foreign policy towards Africa were embarked on during a process of looking for solutions to the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989.

5.1.2 The post-Tiananmen Square years, from 1989

During the political turmoil in China during the 1990s, the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989 was a momentous event. The incident was a watershed in China’s modern history, which led to a structural shift in the domestic and international systems. Externally, a mass-democratization movement arose in Africa, influenced by the 1980s, and there were plentiful signs of change in Africa, such as “the national conference, co-opted transitions, government change via democratic election, guided democratization, conditional transitions, recalcitrance and piecemeal reforms, and armed insurrections culminating in elections” (Joseph, 1999, p.3).70 Moreover, Sino-African relations showed signs of faltering, owing to Taiwan’s revival in outside activity, and growing economic power and strengthened democratic identity. China set about its work to salvage the internal and external situations.

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protest, China was not only subjected to diplomatic isolation, but also denounced by the community of nations with regards to its

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human rights record. The West called China to account for its human rights abuses after the Tiananmen Square incident. This produced an unexpected result of worsening relations between China and the West. By highlighting its “peaceful coexistence” line, to relieve this situation, China started to get down to reviving a broad connection with the developing world, especially Africa, as a way of alleviating tension in its relations with other nations, especially the Western world. Soon after the Tiananmen incident, from 1989 to 1992, China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Vice Premier Wu Xueqian visited seventeen and three sub-Saharan African countries, respectively. Foreign Minister Qian visited Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. China’s endeavor to smooth the events of Tiananmen Square was presented in a different way. Not only did Qian Qichen mention the Tiananmen Square incident in African countries while touring in southern Africa, but also the Chinese government invited the representatives of sixteen sub-Saharan African countries to visit China (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, p.46).

Qian Qichen, however, did not make a sudden visit to Africa in order to suppress the Tiananmen incident; in the 1970s and ’80s, there were brisk exchanges between China and Africa – African leaders, including presidents and heads, visited China 84 times in a brief span of ten years. Between 1978 and 1980, five of China’s leaders71 paid 33 visits to African nations, and former Premier Zhao Ziyang visited 11 African nations in the same year that China’s new foreign policy was amended at the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Even after Zhao’s visits, three more high-ranking governmental officials – Li Xianlin, Li Peng, and Wu Xueqian – promoted amity in Sino-African relations on their way to Africa (Li, 2008, p.28). The West’s upbraiding of China over human rights issues roused support rather than antipathy from the Third World countries, who saw this as the West meddling with China’s modernization in order to derail its development. It led to deepening political alliances with China (Taylor, 1998, pp.446-448). By virtue of the influence of developing countries, particularly African nations, China’s human rights issues, that had a drag on China for twelve years following the Tiananmen Massacre, were not placed on the conference table of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. Given China’s then-position in international relations and the political situation following the Tiananmen Square protest, as Konings (2007) observes, the following three factors that made African countries ally with China. First, the majority of corrupt African government officials and their political elites were under pressure to democratize and liberalize their politics. Second, the enmity towards “neo-imperialists” due to intervention in the internal affairs of developing countries, a sense of fellowship among countries of the Third World. Third, an

71 The Five leaders who visited Africa from 1978 and 1980 are Li Xianlian, Geng Biao, Ulanfu, Ji Pengfei, and Chen Muhua.
implicit agreement to disregard condemnation of China in order to receive continued support (Konings, 2007, p.350). The Tiananmen Square incident, after all, became an impetus to cement Sino-African relations; which developed into expanded diplomatic cooperation.

In the early 1990s, China’s external affairs were concern with Taiwan’s sudden rise in economic power, and support for its independence movement, because China saw this as a threat to its international prestige. Taiwan devoted all its strength to regaining diplomatic recognition. Taiwan made the most of its chances at the time by going slow on China’s aid in Africa; launching an all-out diplomatic assault through Dollar Diplomacy, vis-à-vis small African countries that faced indigent circumstances. It created a stir in ten African countries, starting with Liberia, that were delighted to receive substantive economic assistance rather than a political alliance; this led to establishing ties with Taiwan over China for nine years, starting in 1998 (Liu, 2011, p.88). In terms of China’s economic growth, relations with Africa were a considerable issue for China after it carried out its economic reforms and opening up policy, because China required a considerable quantity of raw materials to supply its production, and also new export markets into which it could sell its products. Thus, Taiwan's obstruction of diplomatic ties with Africa was a real thorn in China’s side, despite the fact that China had been imposing sanctions to isolate Taiwan from the international community since 1970s. This caused China to impose a stranglehold on Taiwan’s growing economic and political influence through the One China policy, in order to take back the initiative in Africa. As to Africa’s demeanor, in Taylor’s (2002) view, especially in light of diplomatic ties between China and Taiwan, African countries’ elites became aware of the two Chinas’ scramble for Africa, and chose to use this competition to pursue the economic interests of Africa: “most Africans do not care much who is the ‘real’ China or with whom official diplomatic ties should be established” (Taylor, 2002, p.129).

China’s efforts to cement Sino-African ties by strengthening solidarity continued during the 1990s. In 1992, China’s former president Yang Shangkun, during his visit to Africa, expressed five principles that refreshed antipathy for the West’s intervention under the existing principles in China’s African policy (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, pp.46-47). In 1996,

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72 Liberia, Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, Niger, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Senegal, Chad and Sao Tome.

73 The five principles are: 1) support for African sovereignty, national independence, and economic development; 2) opposition to foreign intervention; 3) respect for different political systems and development paths; 4) support for African unity, cooperation and the Organization of African Unity; and 5) Belief that African states should participate actively in the international system as equal members.
China's previous president Jiang Zemin visited six African countries\textsuperscript{74} at the invitation of their leaders. He announced China’s African policy\textsuperscript{75} for a new era while in Africa, meeting with representatives of these countries to converse and exchange opinion. Jiang renewed China’s guiding principles relative to bilateral ties, “to treat each other as equals, develop sincere friendship, strengthen solidarity and cooperation, and seek common development”, and called for “strengthen[ing] solidarity and cooperation with African countries and work[ing] together with them to contribute to the lofty cause of world peace and development” (MFA, n.a-a). Jiang also suggested a five-point proposal,\textsuperscript{76} which underlined “the development of a 21st century-oriented long-term stable China-Africa relationship of all-round cooperation” during his keynote address in Ethiopia. His Africa visit paved the way to making relations more active, and resulted in agreements with six African countries related to technical and cultural cooperation, trade and economy (ibid).

China’s African policy during the 1990s stands in opposition to previous leaders’ diplomatic policy towards Africa. In counterpoint to the previous ideology-centric policy, from the 1980s onwards, strategic economic interests of “mutual confidence”, “sovereign equality”, “sovereign equality”, and “non-intervention” adhered to existing principles of African policy, “mutual benefit and development”. This foreign policy prepared the ground for subsequent presidents to solidify Sino-African ties, and kept Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping onside for establishing public diplomacy during the 2000s. Furthermore, the internal economic and political moves of China’s previous president Jian Zemin continued, which cast a long shadow over its aid to and diplomatic performance in Africa. His attempts at economic reform can be summarized as follows: He proposed the idea of socialist market economy as mandatory to the conduct of foreign aid programs in accordance with the market principle in the report to the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992; the following year, his proposal was

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\textsuperscript{74} The six African countries former leader, Jiang Zemin visited are Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.

\textsuperscript{75} China’s African policy contains the following contents: 1) respecting the choices of road to development made by African people themselves; 2) abiding by the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries; 3) respecting all countries and treat them as equals, irrespective of their size, strength and wealth; 4) supporting African countries in their just struggle to maintain national independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity and oppose foreign interference; 5) promoting unity among African countries and advocate settlement of disputes among them, if any, through peaceful negotiation; 6) upholding justice and help safeguard the rights and interests of African countries in international affairs; 8) continuing to provide economic aid to African countries without attaching any political strings; and 9) sticking to the principle of equality and mutual benefit in its economic cooperation and trade with African countries.

\textsuperscript{76} The five-point proposal included the following elements: 1) fostering a sincere friendship between the two sides and become each other’s reliable “all-weather friends”; 2) treating each other as equals and respect each other’s sovereignty and refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs; 3) seeking common development on the basis of mutual benefit; 4) enhancing consultation and cooperation in international affairs; and 5) looking into the future and create a more splendid world.
accepted by the Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP. Beijing’s leadership carried out an extensive reform in the following areas: “systemic reforms in the market systems, the nature of enterprises, the public finance and taxation systems, the banking system, the social security system, and macroeconomic management” (Wu and Fan, 2015, p.64). In 1994, China set up the China Export Import Bank, which is a financial institution working as a government agency with the immediate effect on the introduction of socialist market economy. This new system facilitated concessional loans as a new tool of its foreign aid from the following year.

Thus, China executed its foreign aid reforms based on the fruits of Jiang’s labor, in 1995. It brought about several changes in China’s foreign aid. The first change was that the new Chinese foreign aid program facilitated not only to increase its aid funds through concessional loans, but also to strengthen its overseas aid. Breaking with pre-1995 practice, when the Chinese government covered all the expenses of foreign aid, the concessional loans were supported to lighten the burden on the government. The China Export Import Bank offered long-term and low-interest loans, and a large number of developing countries took out loans, which led to an increase in the Chinese aid fund. By extension, by the late of 1990s, China provided training and seminar sessions for development in the fields of human resources, economy, welfare, and technical training in developing countries. The second change was that the new foreign aid program improved China’s aid projects between China and recipients, making their operation smoother. Third, China instituted a grant assistance system, overseas volunteers and debt relief; a starting point for launching its overseas volunteer program and Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). For nine consecutive years beginning in 2002, Beijing has run its overseas volunteer program: volunteers were sent to 17 countries in Africa, including Ethiopia and Liberia, in order to train each country’s people in the fields of education, international relief, welfare, technical training, Chinese language education, and others (Watanabe, 2013, pp.70-72). Also, in 2000, FOCAC was established to combine China’s foreign aid with its diplomacy.

The launch of FOCAC heralded a new era of Sino-African relations that is full of possibility. FOCAC, according to Taylor’s view, is a crucial outgrowth of China’s foreign policy after the Tiananmen Square incident. In terms of FOCAC’s political basis, Taylor pointed out that “anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonist rhetoric was revived and Chinese diplomacy embarked on a prolonged campaign to nurture ties with developing nations” (Taylor, 2011, p.36). China achieved a strong partnership with Africa through FOCAC, which has served as a foundation for promoting “strengthening friendship, promoting cooperation, equal consultation, enhancing understanding, and expanding consensus” (FOCAC, 2013). FOCAC
pushes forward mutual development and common interests through a multi-layered and multi-dimensional approach to China’s African policy-making and practice. (There is a more detailed discussion of FOCAC in Chapter 8.)

5.2 Character and progress of China’s economic relations in Africa

5.2.1 The characteristic of key drivers for African policy in Chinese politic system

Drawing upon the five-decade history of Sino-African relations, above, China has released two white papers on its African policy, in 2006 and 2015. China’s attention to African countries is growing day by day, and its African policy is more extensive and clear. Given the consideration that there was no official document outlining China’s African policy before 2006, the two white policy papers are a clear expression that China underwent a substantial change in order to interact with the world. Also, with regards to the actual publication years of the two policy papers, they were released in the same year as the third and sixth FOCAC. It is therefore accepted that China’s African policy is an outgrowth of its multilateral communications with African countries. Though China’s Africa policy should be discussed in relation to FOCAC’s agenda, this section will cover the chief purpose of Africa policy, which China considers to be first in their policy. FOCAC will be analyzed in a case study, Chapter 8, of multilateral communication in Sino-African relations.

When we examine China’s Africa policy, there are four principles and goals that the Chinese government stipulated on the first white paper: first, from a political angle, “Sincerely, friendship and equality” through high-level visits, exchanges between each country’s legislative bodies, political parties, local governments, consultation mechanisms, and cooperation in international affairs. Second, from an economic standpoint, “mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity” by means of trade, investment, financial cooperation, agriculture, tourism, and multilateral cooperation, infrastructure, resource cooperation, debt reduction and relief including economic assistance. Third, from a global outlook perspective, “mutual support and close coordination” for Africa’s peace and security. Fourth, from an international social exchange perspective, “mutual learning and seeking common development” in the fields of education, science, culture and health through the help of cooperation in environment, consul, administration, media, medical and health, science and technology, human resource development and education, people-to-people exchange, disaster reduction, and humanitarian assistance (FOCAC, 2006a). Before releasing the
policy paper officially in 2006, however, China had already stated the aims to which it adheres for its Africa policy (China Daily, 2003):

- First, China sticks to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
- Second, China countenances unity, cooperation, and union among African countries along with their self-improvement.
- Third, China aims at developed and cement a long-term and stable political relationship with Africa under by friendship, mutual trust, and cooperation in many ways.
- Fourth, China carries on providing economic assistance to African countries under the condition of no political involvement and implementing measures for the China aid projects in Africa of profit improvement.
- Fifth, China demands the international community to have a concern for the issue of African peace and development and provide assistance to African countries in terms of investment, remission of debt and launching a new business.
- Sixth, China supports Africa to participate in and play a bigger role in international affairs.

Overall, China’s first Africa policy built on existing policies, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Five Points Proposal of the 1990s, and added public diplomacy which stresses the importance of multilateral communication and soft power policy, for consideration of China’s image on the global stage. Through the white paper, China firmed up its African policy as part of its political and economic policies for pursuing its economic interests and African recognition and acceptance of the One China policy. At the same time, the style of the policy displayed a tendency that underlines “ideological neutrality and diplomacy” which contributes to China’s economic needs from African countries, by adhering to the principle of nonintervention and anti-colonial affinities as part of strategic partnership in Sino-African relations (Median, 2006, pp.76-77). Beijing also strategically attracted the African Union (AU) to become a member of the FOCAC, and communicates with AU and NEPAD, thereby allowing for the “comprehensive development of pragmatic cooperation” and “mutual political trust” (FOCAC, 2006a) in Sino-African relations, and Africa’s integration and political stability. Furthermore, Wen Jiabao underlined the strategic partnership when he gave a speech to African countries at the Opening Ceremony of the 4th Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC, in 2009:

I am convinced that as long as China and Africa go hand in hand with an enterprising spirit and cooperate on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, we will seize
opportunities and overcome challenges to take the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership to a new level, and make China-Africa friendship and cooperation even more fruitful. (FOCAC, 2009c)

Drawing on the first white policy paper, China published another, reinforced African policy in 2015. There are a couple of previously unmentioned terms that we should pay careful attention to in the second policy paper. First, China’s newly expressed interest in “establishing and developing comprehensive strategic and cooperative China-Africa partnership”. There is no formal definition of “comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership” that the Chinese government has yet formulated. But, when one takes into consideration the overall contextual signification of the second policy paper, its meaning is clear: extensive and multidimensional cooperation in social, scientific, political and economic spheres through various channels to communicate with government and nongovernment for abiding and strong relationship and mutual benefit. Furthermore, the expansive relationship is based on the South-South development cooperation that China is the leading country in the world market and plays various important roles for development in the international community. On the basis of the two Africa policy papers, China set the stage for communication with African countries in two ways. One is bilateral cooperation in which economic activities, through trade, China’s investment and aid, take place between China and each African country. The Chinese government encourages the cooperation of its government-owned companies when Beijing provides aid and the bulk of investment for infrastructure development through the bilateral ties. Recently, China continued its efforts to communicate with African publics by means of various exchange programs, as part of its “mutual learning and seeking common development” African policy. The second important element is multilateral cooperation via the FOCAC. China brings a new agenda for its African policy activities based on collective dialogue with participating African countries of the forum (as previously mentioned, there is more discussion of FOCAC in Chapter 8).

All this considered, China’s two Africa policy papers are thoroughly designed based on its aims in the fields of economics, politics, and security in Africa. As mentioned earlier, China has immense cultural and economic appeal in and influence on African countries; in particular, from its aid, investment, trade, and infrastructure development. Africa buttressed China’s broad sphere of political activities on the international stage, as an example of its support for China to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in the 1970s. In the same vein, China recently presented an image of itself taking responsibility in the field of security, such as engaging in UN peacekeeping in Africa, putting a temporary hold on its non-interference principle to improve its image on the global stage by attaining
and expanding its economic interests in Africa.

Since the early 1990s, China has maintained extensive relations with African nations in areas such as finance, trade, investment, development assistance, technology transfer and training, tourism, and cultural exchanges. China has displayed special interests in African countries from four strategic perspectives: obtaining natural resources (especially oil and gas), a market for China’s exports, sufficient security and stability, and political legitimacy (Alden, 2005; Haroz, 2011). The aim of these interests is ultimately to benefit China’s economy. First, for China’s economic concerns in Africa, China started to turn its attention to African countries during the early 1990s, due to its need to secure stable and dependable energy resources (e.g., crude oil) for its continuing economic growth. According to U.S. Energy Information Administration data, China imported 22 percent of all Sub-Saharan Africa’s crude oil exports (EIA, 2013). China depended heavily on imports from oil-producing countries, including African countries, after the 1990s due to its rapid economic growth. The total amount of China’s energy imports increased steadily post-1996. In the case of coal, China has shown increased energy import dependency on coal, from 3.8% in 2000 to 8.2% in 2006, whereas China relied on petroleum imports of around 33.8% in 2000. This situation resulted from an increased consumption by transportation or automobiles that need petroleum in China, resulting from steep economic development (Ma & Oxley, 2014, pp. 73-5). African crude oil exports accounted for 62% of total exports, from a total bilateral trade value between China and Africa of $160 billion, in 2013. Meanwhile, in the same year, the United States imports of crude oil from Africa were more than 80% of the whole merchandise imports (IEA, 2014). China relies on a large amount of crude oil from African countries, just as the United States does, but African oil resources come into strategic relations between China and Africa because of their interdependent bilateral trade, which opens a gate for Africa stating its demands of China in return for resources. For this reason, China utilizes its economic means to acquire natural resources from African countries.

Unlike during the 1990s, Africa has grown in value as a new market for the 21st century. The majority of African countries underwent the change of swift political transition towards the establishment of democracies, with the cessation of civil wars after the mid-1990s. From the 2000s, especially, most countries in Africa showed high rates of growth, growing at an average annual rate of 5.3% from 2000 to 2010 (IMF, 2016, p.11), resulting from political stability and a rise in the prices of raw materials. From the 2000s, furthermore, the driving force of Africa’s ever-growing middle class and urbanization has led to a rapidly-growing population.  

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77 The number will be increased when adding other African resources such as copper, iron ore, timber, and cotton.
78 China’s reliance on imports of petroleum was 7.6 percent in 1995 (Ma & Oxley, 2014, pp.73).
consumer market. Africa’s emerging markets are driven by large, young generations and abundant resources, which furnish China with motive for concentrating on Africa. Unlike Africa, due to the rising cost of the labor force, water and electricity domestically, and global economic recession internationally, from the 2000s, the salient characteristic of China’s economic transition has been a slowdown in its labor-intensive industries.\textsuperscript{79} Thus, Africa’s potential as an emerging market matches China’s craving for a new place to which it can relocate its industry, which could provide the low-cost human resources and abundant resources unavailable in China. Moreover, the Chinese government formulated its “go global”\textsuperscript{80} strategy in 2001, further urging its enterprises to enter the African market. China’s investment field in Africa has also shifted from the development and securing of natural resource to the manufacturing and service industries, so as to find new markets in which to sell Chinese products with “Made in Africa” labels, in order to evade the European and United States’ control over Chinese products’ quality and price.

Therefore, China has arranged to relocate 85 million of its light manufacturing jobs from China to Africa, said Justin Yifu Lin, the former World Bank Chief Economist and Senior Vice President, Development Economics (The World Bank, 2011). Chinese enterprises show signs of focusing on potential investment in African countries that have continuous economic growth and large populations, such as Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Kenya, which are among Africa’s top ten fastest-growing economic countries (Kamel, 2017, p.34); and also countries that possess considerable amounts of raw materials and crude oil such as Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, Zambia, and others.

\textsuperscript{79} The driving force of China’s rapid economic development comes from the cheap and abundant Chinese labor force, which produced the result of a successful exporting country. However, as a result of the economic depression of developed countries, which were China’s main importers, China encountered not only the limitations of an export-driven economic structure for its development, but concurrently suffered from oversupply in its manufacturing market. Moreover, owing to the cityward migration tendency of the Chinese population, China faces difficulties in supporting cheap labor for its exports; it has led to a reduction in China’s low-price benefits.

\textsuperscript{80} China’s “go global” strategy has gone through four stages in entering foreign market, since 2001, when China established the policy. In the “go global” era, 1.0, the preliminary stage, most Chinese enterprises began establishing sales networks abroad and targeting low-end international trade. The “go global” era 2.0 focused on state-owned enterprises overseas expansion, focusing on infrastructure projects and securing oil and natural gas. Then during the era 3.0, China’s manufacturing sets about gradually shifting its base from China to overseas. Private enterprises concentrated on investing in foreign markets directly, in tandem with setting up factories abroad, increasing local labor employment and international infrastructure and companies acquisition. Now China’s “go global” policy enters its 4.0 era: private enterprises are the main engine, as the impetus for developing into world-class innovators through diversified investments and elevating their positions within global value chains. Based on China’s continuing economic transformation in the 4.0 era, Chinese enterprises endeavor to translate their ideas into reality as follows: from “world factory” to “world market”, from “a capital importing country” to “a capital exporting country”; from “made in China” to “made for China” under China’s new opening-up strategy in the 21st century (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2016a).
Second, in terms of China’s political concerns in Africa, China seeks political recognition and legitimacy from Africa. As for China’s political recognition, its strict adherence to the One China policy is by far the most important. China holds support for Taiwan in check in African countries, because China sees value in Africa. Beijing has been observing Taiwan’s political activities to drive out in Africa through fair or foul means since the 1990s, but there are still three African countries (Swaziland, Burkina Faso, and São Tomé and Príncipe) that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan (Brautigam, 2008, pp.211-212; Eisenman, 2007, pp.36-37). The background to China’s efforts is that African countries hold an especially important position at the UN in terms of their number: African countries make up over one-quarter of UN members, and three non-permanent UN Security Council seats are from the Africa Group regional block. On the strength of the African countries’ position at the UN, China peddles influence in the global market based on Chinese-led initiatives without Western criticism of its record on human rights and environmental pollution (Hanauer and Morris, 2014a, p.7). African countries also have the potential power to lend assistance politically to China in the international community, due to their great importance at the UN. African countries are always at the center of matters of substance to China regarding devising solutions to contentious China issues in the international relations. Typical examples are when African countries have recognized China over Taiwan, and supported China’s induction as a member of the UN, in 1972; six African countries supported the end to China’s international isolation, including ending Western sanctions, in 1989. Since 1991, China has been designating Africa as the first Chinese foreign minister’s destination in every new year out of gratitude for the continent’s general political support (Taylor, 2006, pp.64-67). To give an example of a recent, contemporary issue, on January 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi secured definitive support for the “One-China” policy from five African countries during his trip to Africa. Nigeria, as a representative of the five African countries, issued a joint statement that adhered to the “One-China” policy with China, and subsequently reaffirmed the strong relationships between China and Nigeria. During the meeting, Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister Geoffrey Onyeama said, “Taiwan will stop enjoying any privileges because it is not a country […], we recognize the People’s Republic of China, the One-China Policy” (Xinhua News, 2017a). Nigeria also showed its support by imposing limitations on Taiwan’s presence in Nigeria, ordering Taiwan to shut down its offices in Nigeria’s capital and moving its trade mission to Lagos. In return, China promised Nigeria a US$40 billion investment in addition to a US$60 billion economic package pledged by Xi Jinping in 2015 (Africa Times, 2017).

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81 The six African countries are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
82 The five countries are Madagascar, Zambia, Tanzania, Congo, and Nigeria.
With regards to the matter of China’s legitimacy, China recognizes the power that comes from political connections with African countries to establish a solid foothold for itself on the international stage. The Chinese government began to provide financial support to African nations during the 1950s, for the purpose of developing political solidarity based on ideological support, and claims of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism for the sake of gaining global recognition with African help. But now Beijing appreciates the difficulties for its policy that arise from its authoritarian political system in an era of internationalization. So, China utilizes Africa for legitimization of its non-intervention policy, including the human right issue, by pursuing tangible benefits through its aid to and investment in rogue African countries, and by infusing African countries with new hope for a rapid economic growth like China. By forming a strong sense of solidarity, China acquired the possibility of sharing common ground and mutual benefits with African countries without political interruption regarding matters of Western ethics. For this, having left behind international criticism about rendering assistance to corrupt leaders, Chinese leader Xi Jinping arranged a meeting with Zimbabwe President Robert Gabriel Mugabe in January 2017, to confirm the two countries’ solidarity and a pledge to deepen collaboration with Zimbabwe via continuous support across various fields.

Third, as more and more of China’s enterprises push into overseas markets, the significance of security issues for the Chinese government are highlighted. Though the purpose of Beijing’s security is focused on its people’s protection, there are three fundamental reasons that can be placed in three categories. First, from the angle of China’s domestic situation, China’s security interests rightly focus on the profits of its country and people, rather than substantive national security problems in African countries, so as to justify the Chinese people a government based around the CCP. Also, taking into account that Beijing prefers to maintain the dignity of the CCP externally, it is a matter of utmost importance that it protects Chinese who are in African countries. Second, from the perspective of seeking economic profits in Africa, maintaining the conditions of prosperity, stability, and security of African countries has an important bearing on the stability of Sino-African relations. By extension, it informs vigorous Chinese commerce activities in conjunction with sustaining continued trade and investment (Hanauer and Morris, 2014b). On that note, the Chinese government reiterated security and common prosperity-related words and expressions in both of its Africa policy papers. Third, from the international point of view, China desires to pave the way for elevating China’s voice and bolstering the country’s image on the world stage, by way of a deeper Chinese engagement in international peace. Unlike previous images of China, that of a country that uses any means to make profit in its relations with another country, by using peaceful means, China pursues its own strategy to extend its reach in the
world, reorganizing international order based on China, not the West. China’s intention reflects Xi Jinping’s address to the United Nations General Assembly’s annual gathering of world leaders in 2015. Xi said, “Let prosperity, fairness and justice spread across the world”. He demanded “a new form of international relations”, under which all countries are equal, and pledged to support developing countries, especially those in Africa including the establishment of a $1 billion, 10-year China Peace Development Fund for the UN and joint new UN peacekeeping system. Moreover, China founded an 8,000-troop stand-by peacekeeping force, giving $100 million for the purpose of establishing its own stand-by force (The UN, 2015a). According to the UN troop police contributors archive (1990-2016) data (The UN, n.a), China’s contribution to UN peacekeeping is growing. The number of Chinese peacekeepers in 2003 was 358, and in 2004 the number was 1,036. By 2016, there had been a sevenfold increase in thirteen years. Now, China is ranked 12th in peacekeeper contributions.83

5.2.2 The disharmony of China’s African policy in Africa

As discussed earlier, China is not only interested in Africa for economic reasons; China expects security and political interests as collateral benefits through its economic relations with the continent. Though Beijing argues that Sino-African relations are win-win and strategic relations, there have been disputes between China and Africa; most of these arise from asymmetrical economic ties. To understand the existing, lopsided economic ties between China and Africa, it is necessary to briefly examine how the features of the economic relations have changed overtime. The initial stage of economic cooperation between China and Africa, as mentioned in the previous chapter, began in the 1950s when China established diplomatic relations with African countries. Also, China established its mercantile-centric relations with foreign countries to benefit the nation’s economic development; they cemented this approach at “the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference”, in September 1949, in Beijing. The Common Program’s Article 57 specifies the following: “the People’s Republic of China may restore and develop commercial relations with foreign governments and peoples on the basis of equality and mutual benefit” (Levi, 1953, p.281). Moreover, it underlines the need for the “protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international peace and friendly cooperation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war” (MFA, n.a-c). From the 1950s to

83 More detailed information on the UN peace operation by numbers is from Global Peace Operation Review, http://peaceoperationsreview.org
1970s, and drawing on the contents of the Common Program, China focused on expanding its relations with Africa as a way of promoting friendship with the Third World. The official bilateral trade agreements, which established current economic ties, started in the late 1950s, with Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Morocco, and Sudan were based on the political and geopolitical considerations of China’s foreign policy (AfDB, 2010). As for the feature of China’s aid, China rendered aid unilaterally, despite China’s difficult economic situation – e.g., the aforementioned TAZARA railway.

However, China’s reforms and opening-up policy marked a watershed moment in Sino-African relations, which developed into “equality and mutual benefit” under the ‘Four Principles’ of then-Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, and concentrated more on its economic development and practical results and diversification than before (C. Zhang, 2013, p.11). Beijing began small-scale investment in African countries in the 1980s, and started to expand and widen the scale of its investment and diversification in the 1990s (Xinhua News, 2010). Since the mid-1990s, China has shifted its recognition of African countries from strategic relations for political purposes to equal and mutual benefits on the principle of reciprocation and win-win. The relations between China and Africa also entered a stabilized stage in the fields of trade and mutual investments. China made use of a diversified strategy of aid and investment, moving beyond simple trade deals in Africa. Thus, Sino-African relations, from the 1980s to the 1990s, concentrated on conventional inter-government communication, based on reciprocal contracts. By establishing FOCAC in 2000, China increased its assistance to Africa through extensive discussions about strengthening the solidarity and boosting multilateral economic ties with African countries. To maintain close economic ties with Africa, China formulated its African investment policy; its aid and investment were also divided based on business purpose, as related to the Chinese government’s “go global” policy and public diplomacy strategy.

Given the transition of Sino-African economic relations, one must consider Beijing’s tendency for displaying signs of moving forward with its general foreign diplomatic policy towards Africa. In addition, the policy also focuses on financial means, with special preferential treatment only for Africa. The link between China’s foreign policy and economic diplomacy can be found in China’s grand strategy, which makes economic development the highest priority for its political system, and a strategic approach that strengthens the link between its orientation to the international stage and its interests. China’s new approach, which adjusts its system for the era of globalization, is reflected in speeches from the leadership at the time. During the 10th Conference of Chinese Diplomatic Envoys Stationed Abroad, in Beijing in 2002, Hu Jintao stressed the significance of strengthening “diplomatic
work in the economic and cultural fields” in order to “protect China’s rights and interests overseas”, and to “build a contingent of diplomatic professionals”. At the meeting, Premier Wen Jiabao also underlined that all foreign affairs should contribute to China’s major economic development-related strategies (People’s Daily, 2004). Furthermore, Hu announced “peaceful rising” in 2004 during Boao Forum for Asia (BFA). Eight years later, he announced that “China will continue to hold high the banner of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit and strive to uphold world peace and promote common development”, at the opening of the 18th National Congress of the Community Party of China (Xinhua News, 2012b).

All things considered, since the inauguration of Hu Jintao’s government in 2002, Beijing placed greater emphasis on its strategy for expanding diplomatic activities for the benefit of its economic development on the global stage, after joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. China’s rapid economic growth gave rise to considerable foreign exchange holdings. This empowered China to extend its clout into African countries. China concurrently recognized the importance of sweeping away the China threat image through cultural diplomacy, to turn opinion in its favour by taking advantage of the international situation and relations. Thus, the Beijing government aimed to establish a friendly and cordial international environment, which was beneficial to its economy, through its aid and investment. China provided for rapid changes in the international situation more actively after the global financial crisis in 2008, carrying out its comprehensive, assertive foreign policy based on cultural and economic factor to expand its influence throughout the world.

Notwithstanding China’s pushing ahead with mutually beneficial peaceful development with Africa, complaints are coming from many African countries regarding the lopsided economic relationships. There are differing opinions about economic cooperation in Sino-African relations, over the question of whether or not the relationships are actually win-win. In terms of economic cooperation, Africa is an indispensable continent, from which China can secure energy resources and develop its business abilities and activities by expanding trade and fostering a foreign market. Africa also needs China, as it provides many opportunities, such as assistance and investment in infrastructure development and industrial cooperation, including supporting technology and science, helping African nations to establish a foothold for economic growth. Also, from Africa’s perspective, economic ties with China are important because they offer a more attractive model for rapid economic growth, especially after the past failures of economic structure reforms based on the Western system – the World Bank and IMF. Moreover, China’s economic cooperation methods are unique: rendering assistance with no string attached across all sectors including commerce, agriculture, and
trade, and without any interference in the internal affairs of African countries, to boost the business sector for its economic growth. Nonetheless, the reality behind China’s cordial diplomacy is that Beijing’s economic interest in securing natural resources from Africa is also no different from the interests of Western countries (Tull, 2006, p.471). In this regard, Alden and Large (2011) argue that China’s style of involvement in Africa is confronted by common questions of power, states and restrictions on Africa’s development after all, although expanding and deepening China’s engagement with African countries could bring benefits and even great possibilities of gains in the world economy (p.33).

On closer scrutiny of the economic links between China and Africa, the debates associated with the matter of equality occurs due to China’s dominant position in socioeconomic aspects, i.e. gaining the upper hand in Sino-African relations, in the market economy and achieving economic and social development. To be more precise, Africa is strongly influenced by China’s economy due to its reliance on substantive goods, such as industrial and agriculture products, machinery and transport equipment from China (see China’s trade with Africa, below). When one examines contentious aspects affecting the ties between China and Africa, one can separate them into three categories, as will be described next.84

First, from a policy angle, China’s general African strategy is purposeful and calculated based on its demands (Rich and Recker, 2013, p.62). For example, for China’s Africa policy in 2006, the goal of Chinese companies was to seek to maximize economic profits within a short time, whereas the Chinese government mapped out long-term, public good-oriented objectives (Dent, 2011, p.14). Considering that China’s interests in Africa focus on economic profits, the majority of China’s projects are based on a short-term strategy of exploitation, and a long-term strategy of favoring China’s enterprises to provide a better environment when they conduct their business in Africa. On that note, China’s tempting policies do not directly help African countries, as China takes de facto control of the Sino-African economic relations. As in the case of Angola, Uganda, and Zambia, for example, China’s promising resource-for-infrastructure deals stir up serious liquidity crises for natural resource-producing countries, due to an ongoing slump in global commodity prices (Olander, Bosielo, Huang, and Wu, 2015). However, the reality is that Africa’s resource-dependent countries’ main source of revenue is from selling natural resources, including crude oil. If China considered Africa to be a true partner enjoying mutual benefits and sustained economic development, China would not support African countries based on putting China’s economic profit first. Although China provides loans to secure access to Africa’s oil and minerals, the situation is the same

84 The discussing part is expanded based on the content of Africa’s vulnerability in the Sino-African economic ties which the author briefly mentioned on Chapter 2.
for the resource-for-infrastructure deals. According to an interviewee S-F1, South Africa, on the subject of global oil prices declines, China places a high price on oil when they provide African countries with huge amounts of money in oil-backed Chinese loans (Interviewee S-F1, 2017). In 2006, the International Monetary Fund warned that the problem of China’s loans hinders African countries’ development, and “creat[es] a new wave of hidden debt” in Africa. The IMF voiced concern over the situation that it is difficulty to examine the details of how this money is used for the recipient African country’s political and economic development (Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power, 2010; Wang and Elliot, 2014). China’s aid projects provide the possibility of corruption by focusing too much on producing “quick and tangible results” (May, Mohan, and Marcus, 2010). Luckily, this has not been reported yet, as of 2014, while debt levels were still moderate for most countries in receipt of Chinese loans. Some countries, such as Angola and Ghana, have taken out considerable loans from China, have since turned to the IMF after all (Brautigam and Hwang, 2016). In the case of Angola, it is a classic example of how China’s mercantile-centric aid works in a country’s economic system. In 2003, the Angolan government published that they no longer agreed with the IMF regarding the adoption of a staff-monitored programme (SMP) for demonstrating good performance, which would have provided credibility to its economic policies and fundraising for national reconstruction. Instead, Angola elected to accept China’s US$2 billion financing package for public investment, which contained oil-backed lines of credit with far looser, less onerous conditions (Mullins, Mohan, and Power, 2010, p.868). Since the end of the war in 2002, Angola has shown considerable progress in its political economy sector, but the country still faces the difficult task of reducing its dependency on oil and diversifying its economy, and public financial management system, according to the World Bank (2016a).

Based on the China’s strategy for Africa, the question emerges whether or not China’s loans or aid in return for commodities as collateral are actually providing proper aid to African countries. China has made numerous pledges of aid for infrastructure development in African; Beijing’s leaders renew its commitment to aid whenever they give a speech on the development of Sino-African relations. In December 2015, at a China-Africa summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, Xi Jinping pledged US$60 billion in aid for Africa’s development, including US$35 billion in loans and export credits, and US$5 billion in grants and interest-free loans, especially for African countries’ industrialization, and supported Africa’s development and prosperity achievements. The money that Xi proposed was triple the amount pledged at the FOCAC meeting, three years before (China Daily, 2015b). In
reality, the impressive Chinese aid package, however, did not directly cover all African countries, but rather focused on countries that have an impact on China’s economy. According to the Johns Hopkins China Africa Research Initiative (CARI)’s report on the flow of China’s loans to African governments and state-owned enterprises, from 2000 to 2014, 54 percent of total Chinese loans went to the following five countries: Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When we consider that there are 54 African countries on the continent, the question is how many countries could receive appropriate aid from the remaining 46 percent of Chinese loans. Moreover, over the same period, the four largest sectors that took Chinese loans were transportation ($24.2 billion), energy ($17.6 billion), mining ($9.0 billion), and communications ($7 billion) (Hwang, Brautigam, and Eom, 2016, pp. 1-2), all of which are most advantageous to Chinese enterprises operating in African countries. Not only that, while China’s investment is not limited to natural resource-rich countries, and has expanded to include commodity-poor countries since 2009 (Alves, 2013), it is undeniable that China’s investment is still focused on African countries who have proven beneficial to China. This is because, when China made a pitch for securing energy before the 2000s, it now focuses on Africa as a new substitute market for its manufacturing business after losing manufacturing competitiveness in its domestic market (as mentioned earlier). Of course, there are benefits that China provides, such as providing a foothold for infrastructure, development of Africa’s unexploited resources, and potential economic markets to become a global value chain. The result has been that several African countries, such as Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, have shown steady economic growth with the assistance of China’s investment and aid. However, it remains a small number of African countries that have experienced positive economic growth, so it is hard to deem that the Chinese loan and investment system are an immediate factor for sustained Africa’s development.

Second, from the perspective of intertwined economic engagement, the fast-growing economic ties between China and Africa do not resolve Africa’s endemic problems, such as its asymmetrical integration into the world market; nor does it curtail the continent’s dependency on price-volatile primary goods, which comprise around 73 percent of the total export revenues from African countries (Tadros, 2013, p. 103). Overall Sino-African

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85 The meaning of aid from China side is different than what OECD defined. Aid, investment, and loan programs are all in China’s aid. More information, read China’s aid and investment section in Chapter 4.

86 For example, China is deep engaged in the cocoa sector in the Ivory Coast, which is the world’s largest cocoa producer. Meanwhile, China has provided $10 billion in financing to expand the port of Abidjan, which is used by landlocked countries Burkina Faso and Mali. The money is also meant to be used to build a railroad to transport iron from the country’s west; and to construct a hydroelectric power plant (Essoh, 2014).
economic ties were proceeding comparatively briskly, when one calculates gains and losses in the context of the global economic recession, and the decline in global demand for raw materials. However, China and Africa’s domestic economic situations are changing because the price of raw materials is falling, and the demand for commodities in China is slowing due to a domestic economic decline. For this reason, there is a conspicuous, growing gap in demands between China and Africa. Even though Beijing provides a considerable amount of foreign aid to Africa every year, China’s aid always provokes international controversy regarding whether or not China’s aid is effectively linked to African countries’ development. This is because, unlike the West, Beijing deploys its aid as a means of China’s geopolitical incentives and economic diplomacy, which are a driving force in an era of internationalization and a globalized market economy. At the same time, China continues its efforts to boost the African public’s welfare and economic growth through its substantive African aid programs.

While China penetrates deep into African countries to expand its business, secure its export market, and procure natural resources, Africa’s situation is the opposite to China’s. African countries still rely on the majority of high-value products from China, while China’s economy has moved from heavy industry to light and service since the 1990s. China’s trade with African countries is mainly concentrated in countries with competitive and abundant resources, and five countries (Angola, South Africa, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Equatorial Guinea) account for around 75 percent of Africa’s total exports to China. However, fewer than half of African countries benefit from trade with China: generally, the majority of African countries maintain a slight trade deficit with China (AfDB, OECD Development Centre, and UNDP, 2017; Wang & Elliot, 2014). By extension, based on Africa’s general need to develop a manufacturing sector and maintain existing trade trends, it would be hard for Africa to close the distance between it and China. Africa has begun to focus on economic development based on its young human resources, and the growth of the middle class. Hence, Africa is dependent upon Chinese aid and investment in telecommunication and infrastructure, including power, potable water, and transport systems, which are linked to African countries’ development. However, the situation of China’s investment is very much the same with trade, and exerts influence on African countries. Beijing also tends to invest in capital-intensive sectors in the more capital-scarce African countries (Chen, Dollar, and Tang, 2016). Moreover, China’s financial flows interlocks with African countries’ domestic economies. China’s investment growth impinges on African countries’ export growth – for example, a 1 percent decline in China’s investment growth is linked to an average 0.6 percentage decline in Africa’s export growth. In particular, resource-rich countries (especially oil exporters) are strongly influenced by China’s
investment (The World Bank, 2015b, pp.159-160), although they are also subject to the influence of global growth and commodity prices. In general, African countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Angola, Sudan, and Ethiopia) that receive large sums of direct investment from China (China Daily, 2010d). However, not all African countries are bogged down by unfair trade with China; typical examples of this are Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and others, who do not depend on natural resources, achieving sustained growth based on China’s investment in infrastructure development and their manufacturing sectors.

The Chinese government invests in Africa mostly in the manufacturing, mining, and construction sectors to assist with Africa’s economic development. Moreover, a large number of Chinese manufacturing companies are operating in Africa as well. However, the truth is Chinese enterprises are often involved in Africa’s aid and investment projects, enjoying symbiotic relationships in Africa. At the Chinese governmental level, aid for infrastructure (mostly social overhead capital) is provided not only on the condition of securing oil and mining area development rights, but also on the condition that the work is carried out by Chinese employees dispatched from China. Also, the Chinese government offers basic infrastructure, such as railroads, harbor facilities, power supply networks, pipeline construction, and others, under the name of development assistance, but also to facilitate the supply of minerals, timber, cotton, oil and gas to China. Also, China’s development assistance is based on a combination with commerce, a so-called “tied aid”. A typical example is Sudan. In 2004, China exercised its veto when the U.N. Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Sudan; and instead made a massive investment in Sudan. As a result, China possessed exclusive access to the South Sudan oil industry, including refining, exploration, and the pipeline. As of 2015, Sudan’s biggest oil customer was China, with exports worth $3,153 million. China is also Sudan’s biggest source of imports, totaling around $1,915 million (The World Bank, 2015a). From the Chinese enterprises’ perspective, the reason for running their business in Africa is the low production cost, especially cheap labor and local market access, and potential for export markets – these are the critical factors in Africa, according to Dr. Xiaofang Shen (2015) at Johns Hopkins University. Chinese enterprises in Africa contribute to job creation for the African people, and train and educate them to look forward to a brighter future. However, problems arise here, regarding the difference in opinion of “substantive assistances” between China and Africa. African people complain that China does not provide practical support, such as technology transfer, which is crucial for the African people’s ability to become independent. On the other hand, the Chinese government and Chinese companies concentrate on the improvement of all-around living conditions and assisting with development in regions in which they conduct their business. When one examines Chinese investments in the manufacturing sector, which
accounts for almost half of total investment, local African populations perceive the Chinese economic impact as generally positive, in terms of job creation (Shen, 2015, pp.16-17). In contrast, small and medium African enterprises often collapsed or lost competitiveness due to the inflow of low-cost Chinese textile goods. Also, China does not provide technology transfer, significant skills development, or productivity improvements in Africa relative to the level of trade between China and the continent (Gadzala, 2009; Zafar, 2007).

Third, from the procedural perspective, there is the issue of nonfulfillment of China’s investment and trade deals, which are anchored to agreements with high-ranking Chinese government officials; proposing similar deals without completion (Interviewee S-A1, 2017). This is also evident when China and African countries meet multilaterally at FOCAC. Although the FOCAC action plans outline cooperative projects, they do not clearly determine which African country will deliver on the project. The majority of China’s deals, which are supposed to provide assistance to the African people, are decided under a process that needs greater transparency and equitable bidding procedures. Hence, weaknesses are ascribed to the inadequacy of the Chinese government or companies’ research before approaching African countries. This became a cause for concern among African populations, when China’s foreign direct investment in Africa was declining as a proportion of its other, increasing investment. When one lists the top ten failed, canceled, or stalled deals and projects, they are as follows: Nigeria’s railway construction project, in 2006, which is valued at US$7.5 billion; Angola’s railway construction project, in 2011, valued at US$4.2 billion; and US$3 billion investments, respectively, in Democratic Republic of Congo’s metals sector (2009), in Gabon’s metals sector (2012), and in Ghana’s energy sector (2011). Also, US$1.4 billion of China’s projects were in Nigeria’s energy sector in 2007, and real estate in 2008 (Wall Street Journal, 2014).

However, this is just the tip of the iceberg of China’s failure to follow through with its investment pledges to Africa. Interviewee S-F1 (2017) pointed out that the lack of Chinese information gathering for investments in Africa gives rise to negative impacts on the recipient African countries, which count on the deal with China for their development. Nonetheless, the Chinese government continues to propose considerable amounts of funds for investment in infrastructure construction and other projects, with direct links to African people’s living standards. Furthermore, the intended beneficiaries of Chinese-funded projects are open to censure regarding total quality management issues in Africa. The

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87 A typical example of the problem of the lack of accurate information before investment, is the case of Democratic Republic of Congo: due to an insufficient information gathering on local area investment, and failure to adapt to African-style management, a $1 billion investment in a 3m hectare palm-oil plantation went down the drain, because of are selected for the plantation was unsuitable.
Chinese government rushes its assistance to African countries, establishing the hardware of economic development (such as railroads, dams, bridges, highways, and ports) to attract attention from African countries instead of concerns about the quality of facilities. However, it is necessary to take note of the procedures for China’s completed projects when they render aid to Africa. China’s completed projects are not completed by local African workers, but rather by Chinese laborers and engineers and shipped to Africa. The African countries complain about the lack of technology and skills transfer from Chinese projects in Africa. David N. Abdula (2017) found the cause of the issue to be the myopic strategy between China and African government officials and policymakers, who just focuses on a visible change in Africa through China’s aid.

Also, there is a communication problem. The Chinese government still heavily adheres to a foreign policy based on state-to-state communications that focuses on large contracts, such as resource development and infrastructure aid, supporting the African public from a distance, due to the lack of a sympathetic bond between its rulers and the public. The majority of China’s African policy is concentrated on the economic sector, rather than on assisting in ending the civil wars in Africa, as part of its non-interference policy. “China strongly believes that Africa belongs to the African people and that African affairs should be decided by the African people […] Africa belongs to Africans and we must be allowed to chart our development path”, Xi Jinping has said (China Daily, 2015b). However, China has been criticized by the West over its continued support for rogue African nations, who need to reform their political systems. China props up immoral and unscrupulous African leaders, and provides aid and investment based on conditions that are palatable to the leaders, not the public.

Another issue is that Chinese firms also do not act responsibility towards their African employees. China focuses its investment primarily on the manufacturing, mining, infrastructure, and energy industries in Africa. Chinese firms in African countries are often accused of flouting African countries’ labor legislation and the poor working environment – for example, an absence of safety supervision, low wages, unreasonable working hours, and unsafe working conditions. An example of this is the ‘copper belt’ in Zambia, which has been operated by Chinese firm for some time: African employees need to work for two years before they receive safety helmets without ventilation system in a mine, and there are deaths almost every day due to the absence of safety provisions. The firm’s managers offer hush money to union bosses, in order to conceal their criminal management. During the presidential election Zambia, in 2014, one of the candidates, Michael Sata, referred to the salaries at Chinese-owned copper mines as slave wages (Noyoo, 2013). In the case of the
manufacturing industry, Chinese firms are causing ever-more environment damage and making unfair deals, such as evading skills transfer and job creation, and treating African employee’s poorly, which is against human rights. This has led to rising African antipathy towards China, especially from groups that are pushing for greater transparency in civil society. In this regard, interviewee S-C1 has pointed out that there is still much room for improvement from China concerning their social responsibility, including environment considerations and community development. Moreover, China needs to comply with labor laws in African countries, instead of acting in such a mercenary manner. Unfortunately, few of China’s companies are making the appropriate efforts to fulfil their business and social responsibilities in Africa.

In light of the above examples of discord between China and its African hosts, China is finding it difficult to evade criticisms of being a “colonialist power”, “imperialism”, “Cinafrica”, “Red-colonialism”, and “neo-colonialism”, not only from the West but also from African countries. The typical example of this was when former Nigerian central bank governor, Lamido Sanusi, condemned China’s approach to Nigeria as a new form of imperialism. He excoriated the unfair relations, and accused China of establishing its facilities in and boosting only those industries in Africa that presented China an advantage – for proof, he pointed to the import-export imbalances between China and Nigeria. Investigative journalist Richard Behar described Sino-African relations as one of “parasite and host”. In a special report for *Fast Company*, China Storms Africa, Behar (2008) argued that,

> Anyone who thinks that kind of ravenous acquisition of resources is a thing of the past should take a close look at the suction China is applying in the sub-Sahara. The region is now the scene of one of the most sweeping, bare-knuckled, and ingenious resource grabs the world has ever seen.

In 2010, at a meeting with oil companies in Lagos, Nigeria, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson also expressed his views on China’s involvement in Africa that “[China] is a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals. China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons. China is in Africa for China primarily. [...] China's presence is to secure votes in the United Nations from African countries” (The Guardian, 2010).

As has been noted by critics, China is exploiting African countries for their own benefit. However, Moyo (2010) asserted in her book that China’s involvement in Africa is different to that of the Western countries, which are confined to foreign aid, granting loans in return for
politic political reformation, thereby imposing Western values on the African political economy. She refers to the Chinese as “our friend”, because China offers multidirectional diplomatic support through personal visits from, for example, the Chinese President and government dignitaries, which generate a sympathetic bond from the African public. When one examines the African people’s survey of preferences towards China, conducted by the Pew Research Center between 2015-2017, one sees a different impression: overall, African people have a favorable opinion of China (favorable feelings contain, to a greater or lesser degree, “very” and “somewhat” favorable) – although, it is worth point out that the survey only measured responses from eleven African countries (Pew Research Center, 2016). Not only that, but according to a survey of fifteen Sub-Saharan African countries’ perceptions conducted by the Ethics Institute of South Africa in 2014, generally 49 percent of respondents thought that Chinese companies’ investment contributed to African countries; while 42.4 percent of respondents had negative views, and 35.3 percent of respondents had favorable perceptions towards Chinese companies in their own countries (Geerts, Xinwa, & Rossouw, 2014). Also, in terms of Chinese companies’ responsibility for the environment in Africa, only 11.4 percent of respondents agreed that Chinese companies observe environmental standards and address their environmental impact in Africa. Many respondents did not think that Chinese companies fulfill their employment (43.7) or social (43.4) responsibilities (ibid). Taking these surveys’ findings together, the African people recognize that China’s involvement leads to development, but also want China to be held accountable for African countries’ economy and society in tandem with its investment.

However, Beijing well understands these unfavorable issues: Chinese Premiere Li Keqiang referred to the problems in Africa as “growing pains”. Furthermore, the Chinese government not only hears the criticisms, but also is “sincere in deepening collaboration via equal and earnest consultation” to settle complicated problems in conjunction with its public diplomacy activities with African countries, by improving living standards, helping the environment, job creation, and education support – including scholarships, skill training, exchange student program (Xinhua News, 2014). Also, with regards to China’s neo-colonialism in Africa, in an interview with the African press in 2014, Li insisted on

assur[ing] our African friends in all seriousness that China will never pursue a coloni
colonialist path like some countries did or allow colonialism, which belonged to the past, to reappear in Africa. China will forever be a reliable friend and true partner of

88 The surveyed countries are Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.
89 The institution is managed by non-profit and private.
the African people and contribute to Africa’s endeavor in developing its beautiful home continent. (FOCAC, 2014)

This is reflected in China’s Africa policy, which is linked to its public diplomacy activities. In recent years, China has become increasingly interested in countering and addressing dissent regarding its record on job creation and education support, including skill training in African countries. Chinese investment, concurrently, has had the effects of raising tax revenues, increasing job creation, and creating value in African products, in those countries in which it has invested.

**Trade relations between China and Africa**

Since 2009, China has been the biggest single trade partner with Africa. China passed the United States and took first place after record amounts of trade with Africa in 2009. However, China does not trade with all Sub-Saharan African countries, and instead concentrates heavily its exports on a few countries (Lugh, 2014). The total trade volume between China and Africa doubled from 2010 to 2014. Also, bilateral trade has grown rapidly since 2006, from US$55 billion to US$199 billion in 2013. This shows that China is the largest trade partner, surpassing the United States (Wang & Elliot, 2014). This is the result of China’s successful strategy, combining significant economic support with strengthening diplomatic power; although, global foreign trade increased according to its economic growth. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang mentioned the goal of increasing bilateral trade to US$400 billion, and raising China’s direct investment to US$100 billion by 2020, during his speech regarding a framework for China and Africa cooperation at the headquarters of the African Union in Ethiopia, in 2014. Furthermore, he reiterated that China’s Africa policy is meant to reflect China’s agreements to “deepen and grow Sino-African relations”, urging progress in six areas: “industrial cooperation, financial cooperation, poverty reduction, ecological protection, people-to-people exchange, and peace and security issue” (China Daily, 2014c).

China began to trade with Africa in the 1950s, at which time trade volume was only US$12.14 million. China has gradually increased its trade with the continent, and by 2008 it had reached US$105.21 billion. Since 2009, as China’s economy has slowed, the total export and import volumes between China and African countries has also begun to experience a decline. However, China has maintained stability from 2010 to 2014 (see figure, below). The graph data shows total exports and imports. One can see a general rise in exports to Africa, while China’s import from Africa plummeted in 2015, a result of the global financial crisis and
China’s slowing economy. From 2015 onwards, the majority of African countries – including Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola – which rely on crude oil and raw materials for exports, accounting for around 70 percent of the continents’ total exports, suffered from a steep fall in commodity prices and the devaluing their currencies in the global market. Therefore, these countries experienced “a sharp decline in export values rather than export volumes”, and also took a hit from reduced Chinese imports, because China accounts for 13 percent of world commodity imports, and its portion of certain metals is as high as 40 percent (The World Bank, 2016b).

Figure 5: China-Africa Bilateral Trade (1992-2015)

Note: the y-axis is based on US$bn, adopted from UN COMTRADE and CARI at Johns Hopkins University

China engages in trade with African countries based on the following factors: labor-intensive and capital-intensive production, from which China derives comparative benefits; China’s fast economic growth; securing of extensive and large amounts of natural resources in Africa; focusing on construction of infrastructure facilities in African countries; and concentrating on China’s shipping and light manufacturing sectors (Eisenman, 2012, p.1). Also, the hidden side of the China-Africa trade is that China’s low-price products appeal to Africa’s high demands for clothes, electronic devices, machinery, and textiles; it facilitates China’s ability to increase the amount it exports to African countries (Tull, 2006, p.464). In addition to this, China’s aid and investment in Africa shows a similar general disposition. Taken together, China shows a tendency for trade with African countries that is to their advantage, which reflects Chinese leader’s long-range goal in political economy. The principle exports and imports between China and Africa in 2014 accounted for 71 percent of China’s main import goods, made up of African mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, and commodities
and transactions. Africa’s main imports, however, were machinery and transport equipment, and manufactured goods (see figure, below).

Figure 6: The trade between China and Africa in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China Import From Africa 2014 (US$m)</th>
<th>Africa Import From China 2014 (US$m)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials: 16%</td>
<td>- Machinery and transport equipment: 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commodities and transactions, n.e.s: 47%</td>
<td>- Manufactured goods: 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Crude materials, inedible, except fuels: 24%</td>
<td>- Miscellaneous manufactured articles: 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Manufactured goods: 13%</td>
<td>- Chemicals and related products, n.e.s: 28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Food and live animals: 4%</td>
<td>- Food and live animals: 47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The information of figure is adopted from UNCTADStat database of UNCTAD (n.a)

While Chinese imports of energy products and resources from Africa have remained steady, the trend in African import from China has clearly shifted towards high-end and high-tech products, such as mechanical and electrical products, mobile phones and related equipment, televisions, and motorcycles (China Daily, 2014a). This situation is because the reasonable price and decent quality of China’s products appeals to and suits the recent, sharp increase in African people’s consumption. The African consumer market is growing fast, due to an ever-growing and young middle class, urbanization, rapid economic growth (average annual growth has been around 5 percent since 2000), and a large population. Chinese enterprises that conduct business in Africa also contribute to increasing China’s export of electrical and mechanical products to Africa. The Chinese government endeavors to strengthen economic exchanges between China and Africa. To that end, during the fifth BRICS summit in Durban, South Africa, in 2013, Xi Jinping promised to exempt 97 percent of custom duties for products made in the least-developed countries that have diplomatic relations with China (Xinhua News, 2013a). Beijing’s preferential treatment of trade with African countries is another method to help African countries to create an “African free trade zone”, which will be practical by 2017, and will bolster trade between African countries. This is anticipated to
be a result of the trade and economic cooperation in the Sino-African relations. The African free trade zone will include 26 African countries, and function as a form of regional organization. In this regard, Beninese economist Pascal Komlan stressed that, “First, without that free trade zone at a continental scale, China has been for more than a decade the biggest trading partner of Africa. With this new framework, China-Africa trade relations will experience an exponential growth.” Moreover, he emphasized the significance of Chinese companies’ presence in Africa for the free trade zone, for the sake of infrastructure development which would allow for smoother African commerce (China Daily, 2014d). To put it another way, the majority of African countries require China’s aid for infrastructure facilities, such as expressways and railroads for basic transportation and also for generating electricity and drawing water, in order to improve its ability to process exports.

5.3 The role of public diplomacy in China’s African strategy, with a focus on economic relations

There are various perspectives on China’s foreign aid in Africa. However, most of them focus on diplomatic security, history, and politics, rather than public diplomacy. Thus, this section attempts to analyze China’s aid in Africa not only as a part of public diplomacy, but also its role in boosting economic ties through the various methods (discussed in Chapter 3). By looking at the pattern of China’s aid in Africa, this section also investigates how China utilizes its foreign aid to fill the gap between China and Africa that arises from economic ties and how it leads to closer economic relations. Also, it will assess the significance of Chinese companies’ involvement in China’s foreign aid in Africa.

5.3.1 China’s aid in Africa

This part will analyze the distinctive elements of China’s Africa aid, in line with China’s public diplomacy strategy of creating close Sino-African economic ties. China’s economic aid in Africa is generally carried out based on the methods and characteristics of its foreign aid system, as discussed in Chapter 4. As with China’s foreign aid to other countries, China also adheres to bilateral aid as a core policy in Sino-African ties. However, the Chinese government often employs co-financing to cope with a common development barrier, i.e., the regional and sub-regional transport corridor projects (Hayashikawa, 2015). It is easy to

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90 The regional organizations include SADC and COMESA.
find evidence of this from the speeches of Chinese high-ranking governmental officials. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s pledge of $30 billion credit included a $10 billion credit line to African countries for reciprocal projects agreed at the Africa Union, on his first trip to Africa (China Daily, 2014b). A few days later, he emphasized Sino-Africa economic ties at the Plenary Session of the 24th World Economic Forum (WEF) on Africa:

   China-Africa friendship as the ‘axle bearing’ driven by the two ‘wheels’ of economic and trade as well as people-to-people and cultural exchanges [...] China is willing to move forward shoulder to shoulder with the African countries in equal treatment and sincere cooperation, elevate Africa’s development to a new high, and make greater contributions to world prosperity, progress and lasting peace. (MFA, 2014a)

China embarked on aid and investment in Africa in the form of basic infrastructure development (such as railroads, agriculture, drinking water and hospital facilities), and dispatched experts in the fields of medical care, resource development, and infrastructure construction. The Chinese government employed trade and investment with foreign aid in the name of economic cooperation. This is because China believes that it would develop a mutual benefit with a win-win situation, for both China and recipient countries. Moreover, China also believes that this strategy will benefit China’s own interest in economic growth (Ping, 2013, p.126).

China’s official finance in Africa is comprised of grants, debt relief, and interest-free loans, as with other aid-recipient countries, in conjunction with market-rate export buyers’ credits, preferential export credits, and commercial loans from Chinese banks, none of which would qualify as ODA (Brautigam, 2011c). There are two distinguishing ways in which China renders aid to Africa. First is a purely commercial-centric aid (such as debt relief and interest-free loans in return for a natural resources), and the second is a combined commercial aid with public diplomacy (such as directly connecting to the African public’s livelihood). However, it is hard to clearly draw a line between these two approaches, as they are based on similar calculations under the government’s political and economic goals. Nevertheless, China’s mechanism for African aid is categorized according to its unique style, which is representative of Sino-African economic ties: charm offensive aid, aid in combination with commerce, and China’s enterprises’ overseas expansion. Charm offensive aid is part of China’s public diplomacy-related aid. However, due to the fact that the public diplomacy-related aid is also connected with aid for trade and investment, such as infrastructure development and assisting with public amenities, this author has sorted medical and health care, humanitarian aid, cultural exchanges and scientific and technical
assistance as charm offensive aid. Put another way, the aid aims to bridge the gap between China and Africa when problems arise from the aid in combination with commerce and investment. Hence, China’s aid in Africa based on communicating with the African public is for eliciting positive opinions of China from African people, to secure future African political and economic support, and not for China’s economic benefit and development. For example, China’s considerable medical aid in Africa. China has built 27 hospitals in Ghana, Zimbabwe, and other African countries; it has dispatched 43 medical teams to 42 African countries, which have treated over 5.57 million patients. Beijing recently launched a “Brightness Action” initiative to treat cataract patients and provide customized support – for example, providing mobile hospitals, setting up demonstration and training centers for diagnosis and treatment technologies, to advance Sino-African cooperation in medicine and healthcare.

China also zealously promotes cultural and educational exchanges as a crucial part of a new type of strategic partnership in Sino-African relations. As of 2012, over two years, China has granted 18,743 government scholarships to African students. Twenty pairs of leading African and Chinese universities have started cooperating under the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Universities. After the launch of the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange plan in March 2010, 64 educational projects have been supported through visits and exchanges of over 600 Chinese and African scholars (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2014b). In addition, China provides diverse aid programs connected to African people’s welfare and livelihood. Given that most public diplomacy-related aid was drawn up through the FOCAC ministerial conference, the details of China’s aid from public diplomacy activities will be discussed in a later case study chapter.

Second, regarding the aid in combination with commerce, this exhibits the typical characteristics of Chinese aid, and the majority of China’s aid in Africa is related to aid-for-trade and investment. In aid-for-trade, infrastructure construction has two characteristics: commercial products in tandem with public goods. Moreover, Beijing provides preferential credit through either the Export-Import Bank of China (hereafter Exim Bank) or the China Development Bank when it carries out infrastructure projects in Africa (Aurégan, 2017; Tang, 2015). In terms of power, telecommunication, and transport, which make up the main areas of aid China provides in Africa, these are classified as aid-for-trade, not investment. (Hayashikawa, 2015). In particular, large scale of infrastructure projects proceed as part of a financial package that also includes concessional loans, sellers and buys’ credits, and bank guarantees, adopted by China’s Ministry of Commerce and Exim Bank (Brautigam, 2011b).

91 The characteristic of charm offensive aid style is not related to construction work but directly link to the African public.
Chinese aid is provided in the form of complete or in-kind projects through financial transfers, and complete projects are not only financed with either zero-free loans or grants (which account for 40 percent of China’s aid expenditures), but also Chinese enterprises receive and carry out projects (OECD, 2012, pp.12,17). Since 2000, to greater and lesser degrees, China’s loans to Africa have increased for over a decade (see figure, below).

Figure 7: Chinese Loans to Africa, 2000-2014

![Chinese Loans to Africa, 2000-2014](image)

Note. Adopted from CARI at Johns Hopkins University, 2016

From 2010 to May 2012, China approved concessional loans of around $11.3 billion for 92 African projects (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2014b). Chinese aid typically concentrates on specific projects, rather than the large programmatic models that Western donors prefer – such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or a program for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment (Cheng and Taylor, 2017). Hence, in general, China’s complete projects improve the lives of Africa’s people, in the fields of production, agriculture, culture, and education, covering industry, health care, power supply, communication, energy, transportation, and others. Technical cooperation is also provided through subsequent actions (operation or maintenance) after the projects are completed (SCIO, 2011). In 2012, Chinese enterprises completed construction contracts worth $40.83 billion in Africa, which accounted for 35.02 percent of China’s overseas completed contract work. This was an increase of 45 percent since 2009. Also, since 2013, Africa has been China’s second largest overseas construction project contract market. China’s capital, technologies, and equipment have effectively helped reduce construction costs for African countries, as result, their infrastructure situation have gradually improved (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2014b). The Tanzania-Zambia Railway project is a good example of China’s long tradition of providing trade-related assistance (OECD, 2012,
p.11) in the 1970s. As of 2015, China has completed 1,046 projects, including 3,530km of highways, and 2,233km of railway in Africa (Xinhua News, 2015b). The table below shows the largest projects that China financed, valued at over $1 billion.

Table 6: The biggest development projects between China and Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Chad-Sudan</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Coastal Railway</td>
<td>Lagos-Kano railway</td>
<td>Mini-city the outer of Johannesburg</td>
<td>Construction of oil refinery</td>
<td>Railway</td>
<td>Standard-gauge railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount (US$ billion)</td>
<td>$12b</td>
<td>$8.3b</td>
<td>$7b</td>
<td>$5.8b</td>
<td>$5.6b</td>
<td>$3.4b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another example of a successful Chinese aid project is the Martyrs of Pentecost Stadium (or Stade des Martyrs) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was constructed between 1988 and 1993. From 2008 to 2015, China completed the following significant infrastructure aid projects: the African Union Conference Center in Ethiopia, which cost $200 million and was completely funded by China; the Addis Ababa-Adama expressway in Ethiopia; the largest Maputo Airport in Mozambique; and the Merowe Dam in northern Sudan. Other aid projects for cultural and welfare facilities include: the Zimpeto Stadium in Zimpeto, Mozambique; the Dakar Grand Theatre in Senegal; the Mali Hospital in Mali; and the Yaounde Conference Center in Cameroon (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2015).

According to the OECD’s data about trade flow and aid, China financed around $743 million of aid-for-trade between 2006 and 2011 (OECD, 2013). While there are no official figures and data to prove Chinese aid-for-trade exists, China’s trade for aid-related assistance has a tendency to be made up of the following three elements: first, quota-free and duty free market access to products from less-developed countries (LDCs); second, large-scale infrastructure projects (such as factories, roads, and ports) to address supply-side constraints; third, sharing of Chinese experience and knowledge in economic and trade development, and capacity development training programs (Hayashikawa, 2015). Another type of widely-known Chinese aid is the so-called “Angola Model”: the obvious suggestion that in return for infrastructure development support, China will receive contracts related to
natural resources (Klaver and Trebilcock 2016). In 2004, through China’s Exim Bank, China approved a $2 billion financing package for public investment projects in the fields of infrastructure, telecommunications, and agri-business to Angola. The loan was payable over 12 years, at a deeply concessional interest rate, delivered in two $1 billion-tranches, with a grace period of up to three years (Brautigam, 2011c). At the same time, China imposed the condition that over 50 percent of the construction’s materials, equipment, and workforce were to be provided by China. In 2007, the Chinese government financed an additional $2.5 billion infrastructure loan, for hydroelectric power generation and oil refinery expansion in Angola (Alves, 2013). The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) also operated under the “Angola Model”, when it has received aid from China. In 2008, China entered into a $9 billion contract with the DRC for large infrastructure projects, to be provided by a Sino-Congolese Joint venture, Sicomines, in exchange for access to copper and cobalt concessions. The large infrastructure projects included the construction of 3,200km of railway tracks, 4,000km of roads, airports, schools, hospitals, and two hydroelectric dams (Kabemba, 2016).

China has deployed the “Angola Model” as a major strategy for its foreign aid in other resource-producing countries in Africa. These African countries have in common a dire need for infrastructure reconstruction, due to the backward basic facilities caused by poverty and/or war, while simultaneously flourishing in the natural resource sector. Debora Brautigam argues that “commodity-backed loans are a pre-commitment technique”. It is best suited to countries with weak governance, suffering from the “resource curse”, and incapable of accessing global finance. It also allows “a government to have public works expenditures today, paying for them with future exports” (Brautigam, 2011a, pp.6–7). China’s aid in combination with commerce is for strengthening China’s position in Africa and gaining Africa’s trust. In a win-win situation, China turns Africa’s poor conditions to its advantage, not only for the supply of mineral, oil and gas, but also for the extension of Chinese enterprises’ influence into African countries, in return for infrastructure assistance. At the same time, African countries are able to establish infrastructure, thereby improving the quality of life for their populations, and improving their countries’ economic development, through China’s aid in return for natural resources with no attendant political intervention or interference. The reason for China’s extensive provision of infrastructure aid is that infrastructure development is an important motivational factor for Africa, explains interviewee S-F2, is that African nations are keen to invite foreign capital because most of the continent lacks basic, or sufficient infrastructure, as well as the skills crucial to its countries’ development. He adds that China seizes the opportunity to gain allies and enlarge its influence in Africa through targeted infrastructure assistance (Interviewee S-F2, 2017).
Lastly, Chinese enterprises’ overseas expansion is a crucial means of China’s Africa aid and investment. Chinese enterprises are comprised of Chinese state-owned enterprises (central, state-owned enterprises and provincial state-owned enterprises)\textsuperscript{92} and small- and medium-sized private firms. Through the first and second China’s Africa aid mechanisms, above, a large number of Chinese enterprises have made advances into various regions of Africa and complemented each other with their own advantages. The Chinese government supports and encourages Chinese enterprises with strengths and good reputations to expand their investment in Africa, and has set up necessary measures to guide enterprises to manage this expansion (\textit{China Daily}, 2010d). Chinese enterprises play as important a role as the Chinese government, because they play substantive and effective roles for governmental aid projects as a part of China’s public diplomacy and as private businesses on the ground.

As briefly noted above, from the middle of the 1990s onwards, large and mostly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) went to Africa as investors and as contractors for Chinese-aid-funded projects in the fields of infrastructure and public building, due to a dramatic increase in China’s trade with Africa and the need for resources. Then, China’s small- and medium-sized private firms entered Africa to establish a Chinese-based incorporated entity, or to start a business from scratch in Africa (Kaplinsky and Morries, 2009). The Chinese government also employs investment through Chinese enterprises as a means for achieving its goals. For example, Guinea made a $7 billion of mining-and-infrastructure deal with the China International Fund (CIF) Ltd., in 2009. CIF founded an additional partnership to exploit Guinea’s diamond, iron ore, oil reserves, and also the world’s largest reserves of bauxite. Recently, to increase China’s investment and investment diversification in Africa, China signed bilateral investment treaties with 32 African countries, and established joint economic commission mechanisms with 45 African countries (Oster, 2009). China has been pushing the establishment of overseas economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa through Chinese enterprises. China built economic and trade cooperation zones in Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Zambia, and has invested nearly $250 million in infrastructure construction. Based on the support of China’s and African countries’ governments, Chinese enterprises oversee infrastructure construction in these cooperation

\textsuperscript{92} Since there is no clear definition to distinguish between central state-owned and provincial state-owned enterprises in China, the author refers to them en masse as “SOEs”, instead of differentiating between the two sub-categories. According to Xu Yi-Chong (2014), the majority of SOEs operate under the auspices of the Chinese government, expanding China’s influence into Africa to secure supplies of natural resources and to counter Western political and economic influence. He also argued that the following China’s major government departments support China’s SOEs: the MFA, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and other line ministries such as health, education, water resources, railway, and agriculture.
zones. As for the cooperation in resource development, an important component of China and Africa investment cooperation, China always focuses on Africa’s social and economic development for mutual benefit and development. Chinese enterprises also stick to open and transparent ways of cooperation to jointly utilize resources with African countries to support local people and governments (China Daily, 2010d). China’s enterprises mostly concentrate on the service sector (60 percent), extracting natural resources (20 percent), and manufacturing sector (20 percent) in Africa (S. Zhao, 2015). However, from 2003 to 2015, the top ten recipients of Chinese FDI were African countries, to be used in the energy and manufacturing sectors (CARI, 2016).

Chinese state-owned enterprises, such as PetroChina, CNOOC, and Sinopec, and corporations such as Nonferrous Metals Group, directly take part in the extraction of natural resources in Africa. Moreover, small, private Chinese enterprises expand manufacturing investment, especially in small-scale commodities. The 2013 white paper on “China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation” stated that “manufacturing is China’s key investment field in Africa”: the volume of Chinese enterprises’ direct investment in African manufacturing sectors totaled US$1.33 billion, 2009 to 2012. China’s investment in manufacturing industries in Africa, also, amounts to US$3.43 billion. The majority of African countries, including Ethiopia, Mali, and Uganda, which do not possess natural resources, are delighted by large Chinese investment in industries such as sugar refineries, glass, fur, medical capsule and automobile factories, textile, and steel pipe manufacturing projects (MOFCOM, 2013).

Figure 8: Sectoral Changes in Africa’s fast-growing countries, 2009-14

93 The top ten African countries are South Africa ($5186.9 m), Nigeria ($2090.62 m), Zambia ($2025.04 m), Democratic Republic of the Congo ($1510.27 m), Zimbabwe ($1455.48 m), Sudan ($1598 m), Kenya ($1104.76 m), Tanzania ($793.21 m), Ethiopia ($777.3 m), and Republic of the Congo ($700.83 m) (m=million).
Since 2015, and in part owing to a recent drop in the price of crude oil and raw materials, most natural resource-producing African countries – such as Nigeria, Angola, South Africa – have striven to shift their economies from resource-dependency connected to foreign investment of infrastructure (harbors, electricity-generation, and railroads) to manufacturing (vehicles and textiles) in response to slowing economic growth (see figure, above). Contrary to the countries’ situation, non-natural resource-producing countries – such as Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Cote d’Ivoire – have experienced better growth rates based on China’s investment in their infrastructure and manufacturing sectors.

5.3.2 China’s public diplomacy through media

China’s media engagement in Africa is expansive. The question arises regarding the purpose of the Chinese media in African countries, especially how to boost mutual understanding through its media. From a soft power point of view, Kurlantzick (2007) says that the Chinese media’s expansion and cooperation in African countries is a way to deliver the Chinese charm offensive directly. Whereas China’s public diplomacy through foreign aid is directly linked to economic relations with African countries, the media functions to form amicable
public opinion in Africa by introducing various elements of China’s culture, such as news, movies, soap operas, TV shows, documentaries, and others, to positively influence overall Sino-Africa relations, including economic ties. As China provides more and more aid, trades at greater volumes, and invests more broadly in Africa than do other world powers, it becomes more necessary to encourage a favorable image of China and its culture among the African public (Bailard, 2016).

The Chinese media, recently, is more invigorated in Africa. It is present in both the state-owned media, such as CCTV Africa, China Daily Africa Weekly, CRI, and the Beijing Review, as well as the Xinhua News Agency and private media companies such as a private Chinese digital pay-TV operator and Star Times. However, Chinese media strategies were built on a solid foundation. CRI commenced its radio transmissions to Africa in 1956, when it was still called Radio Peking (established in 1941) (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, p.207). After 50 years, in 2006, CRI officially set up its first overseas FM radio station branch in Nairobi, Kenya. CRI 91.9 FM in Nairobi broadcasts programs 19 hours per day provided in English, KiSwahili, and Chinese for around two million listeners in the East African nations. Most programs cover subjects from current events around the world, including China-related news such as the economy, social and cultural development, introducing cultural and educational exchange information between China and Africa. During its official launch ceremony, Wang Gengnian, director-general of China CRI, said,

I appreciate the vital role that China has played and continues to play in the economic development of Kenya. I am convinced that the launch of CRI in Nairobi will open up new possibilities of exchanges as well as creating synergy in our different fields of our social endeavors like culture, tourism and the media. (English.gov.cn, 2006)

By bringing China’s media to African nations via CCTV-Africa certainly granted international prestige to the organization. China’s CCTV launched in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, as its first broadcast hub outside of its Beijing head office, in January 2012 (Zhang, 2014, p.2). The primary reason to set up CCTV-Africa in Nairobi was the consideration of securing key points in East Africa, the English-speaking countries (Li and April, 2013, p.89). It was the first Chinese overseas news center, which was part of the Beijing government’s media expansion project, and included investment of US$6 billion. China’s intent for CCTV Africa was not only to strengthen its voice in a region of greater interest, but also to consider Chinese viewers who work and reside in many African countries. CCTV broadcasts African programs – e.g., Africa Live, Faces of Africa, and Talk Africa – at least 10 hours per week to
the world. Also, in January of the same year, the China Daily started to publish its African Weekly edition in Nairobi, in cooperation with Nation Media Group, which is the largest media company in East and Central Africa (Zhang, 2014, p.3).

In this way, Bilard (2016) noted that “the relevance of China’s international broadcasting presence in Africa to its soft power and public diplomacy objectives is clear” (p.448). Gagliardone (2015) comments that China wants the following three benefits from CCTV Africa: First, China redresses its negative image among the African public, on account of the limitations on domestic media freedom, by focusing on broadcasting on comprehensive, everyday African topics, rather than reporting Chinese thoughts in detail. Second, the Chinese media offers Africa “positive reporting” regarding Chinese-related news, rather than negative and contentious topics such as political disputes, religion, and famine. Third, having already experienced colonial rule from Western powers, much of the African public harbor animosity towards China because they do not wish to be colonized again. CCTV Africa, therefore, affords a great opportunity for African journalists to experience China’s new style of media and its freedoms, which provide differentiated services from Western media (pp.26-27). In the same vein, Li and Rønning (2013) have argued that Chinese government agencies, such as the Department of Publicity (also known as Central Propaganda Department), disseminate the contents of China’s Africa policy through media such as CCTV Africa, as an instrument of outbound propaganda. According to statistical analysis data produced by Marsh (2017) of the BBC and CCTV’s African news programmes, CCTV displays a tendency to mirror the highest priorities of Chinese policy: that is, “stability” and “harmony”. CCTV Africa focuses on “stability”, as it relates to the country, government or society, hopes, the future, and “human interest” stories. Marsh interprets the results as “CCTV’s tendency to prioritise officials and government pronouncements militate against the picture-led imperative for which Western television news has been criticised, while still favouring a dialogue of the elite rather than providing a truly alternative perspective” (Marsh, 2017, p.185-6). In this way, Interviewee S-A3 (2017) said that the general character of China’s media in Africa focuses on the contents of cultural exchanges between China and Africa, China and Africa’s public, a peace-loving China, mutual benefits and win-win cooperation, and the China model.

China has expanded its media influence through cooperation with African journalists and media practitioners every year. In the 2013-2015 FOCAC action plan, China pledged to train 30,000 African journalists in China, and offered 18,000 scholarships for study during their stays in China. Nevertheless, the majority of African journalists are from state broadcasters and government-affiliated media, and these journalists tend to have a more positive image of
China than they initially had after they finish their training and return to Africa. The majority of the discussion of media cooperation is set up through FOCAC, and the FOCAC Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018) is an especially good resource regarding China’s rational public diplomacy activities in Africa. Through FOCAC, China has a program to train a thousand African media practitioners per year (a detailed discussion of FOCAC will be in Chapter 8). Furthermore, the role of Chinese telecommunications companies stands out in connection with training and technology support of media digitalization, and the dissemination of various Chinese TV channels in Africa. In this regard, Jiang, Li, Rønning, and Tjønneland (2016) explained the extension of the influence of China’s telecommunications companies in Africa thus: “soft power is an often-mentioned concept. Power in this context must be understood as combining ideology aspects with economic power: media communication investments are very much about economic influence” (p.3). Moreover, Li and colleagues argued that of China’s major telecommunications companies entered the African media market, it is not only China’s behemoth – such as ZTE and Huawei – but also small- and medium-sized businesses, such as Techno and Star Times, as well as digital broadcasting ventures (ibid, p.4). The expansion of China’s telecommunications companies was possible in Africa because the majority of African governments hardened their desire to develop and modernise their telecommunications industries: as a result, they liberalized their telecommunications policies to promote a pleasant investment environment for foreign investors (Berg and Hamilton, 2002). Through China’s go out policy, the majority of China’s companies are now in African countries to expand their business and facilitate the embedding of a positive, modernized and developed image of the China model, through companies’ social responsibility, helping to develop social communities, job creation, voluntary work for the local populations, and technical education. Hence, Chinese companies work in partnership with local African telecommunications operators, and set up collaborative systems for the mutual benefit of China and Africa. (More detailed discussion of China’s public diplomacy with media will appear in Chapters 6 and 7.)

In sum, China deploys media and Chinese telecommunications companies as instruments of its public diplomacy to create a positive image of itself, countering Western’s bias and negative media reports, and to address the China’s unfavorable public reputation that has arisen due to the asymmetrical economic ties between China and Africa. By broadcasting a favorable image of China and focusing on the friendly interaction between Chinese and African populations, China seeks to embed a mutual development relationship and peaceful coexistence, rather than lopsided relations based on obtaining an advantage in Africa. Also, Chinese telecommunications companies in Africa assist in dispelling the criticism that China
is not providing sufficient technology transfer to Africa and only focuses on expanding its business and exploiting Africa’s natural resources.

5.4 The perception of China with regards to China’s public diplomacy through cultural soft power

This part will discuss China’s varied cultural and educational exchange activities based on the framework of China’s public diplomacy in Africa. Sino-African social, cultural, and educational exchanges have shown marked improvement in quantity, scale, and form lately. From 1995 to 2005, China signed 65 cultural agreements with African countries, including 151 implementation plans, sent 50 Chinese governmental cultural delegations to Africa, and brought over 160 African cultural groups to visit China. Also, China has already established relations for educational exchanges with nearly 50 African countries, offering nearly 20,000 government scholarships (Xu, 2008). As previously mentioned, in Chapter 4, China’s cultural diplomacy is based on its culture and traditions, and the Chinese government utilizes Chinese language and culture through Confucius Institutions as an instrument of public diplomacy. However, in addition to the general activities of the Confucius Institute and Confucius classrooms, which Hanban publishes openly, King (2014) has pointed out that China does not publicize a full report of China’s cooperation in education and training in Africa. It is therefore a challenge to ascertain the extent of China’s cultural education and training aid in Africa, nor to pinpoint the major differences with traditional donors’ activities in African countries. Also, as mentioned in Chapter 1, China does not conduct formulaic public diplomacy activities across all African countries, but rather adjusts its public diplomacy to each countries’ political economic conditions, in addition to offering the core activities such as Confucius Institutes and Cultural Centers in Africa. Hence, China’s public diplomacy through cultural soft power is often perceived as being conducted through Confucius Institutes and the Cultural Centers in Africa because they are not only managed by the Chinese government, but also operated based on China’s culture and language.

There are 46 Confucius Institutes and 23 Confucius Classrooms in Africa (Hanban-b, n.d.). As briefly mentioned in Chapter 4, Confucius Institutions are non-profit educational institutions and aim to spread understanding of Chinese culture and language to foreign people, and cooperate in educational and cultural exchanges between China and the world. However, Yang and Hsiao (2012) have argued that Confucius Institutes are not relevant for teaching or introduction of Confucianism, but rather to provide Chinese language teaching projects combined with comprehensive social, cultural and diplomatic outreach. Thus, King
(2010, 2013) associates Confucius Institutes with China’s foreign policy, to understand the role of Confucius Institutes in Africa. Yang (2010) believes the Chinese government takes advantage of Confucius Institutes to promote its governance model and expand its influence on the global stage by teaching students. In a similar vein, China utilizes Confucius Institutes to convey the political ideas of its elites through various channels based on “Going Global Cultural Diplomacy” (wenhua zou chuqu waijiao) and “Popularize Chinese Culture around the world” (tuidong zhonghua wenhua zouxiang shijie) (Yang & Hsiao, 2012). However, Stambach and Kwayu (2017) have a different view of Confucius Institutes, that they provide more practical training to the local populations, based on their fieldwork of taking classes at a Confucius Institute at the University of Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania. Due to the colonial experience, African people are more sensitive towards propaganda. However, they concluded that China offers the Confucius Institution program as aid, and also the programs in Confucius Institute are pragmatic, not ideological. From the University of Dar es Salaam perspective, the Confucius Institute is an example of self-reliance and independence from the United States and European countries, to forge a better direction for the country’s development. The activities of China’s Confucius Institutions showed through during one of the interviews in Nigeria. Interviewee N-B1 (2016) said that the image of Chinese culture among the African public is a profound and mysterious one, due to the images of kung fu, which is a very popular component of Chinese culture in Africa. On the other hand, some African people have an image of China as very modernized, due to modern Chinese culture seen in movies and TV shows, and on TV channels. Nowadays, therefore, the interviewee considers teaching programs at Confucius Institute to feature China’s traditional and modern cultures to draw the attention of African youth to learn Chinese culture and language, to learn more about China in order to cement future relations. At the same time, the interviewee supports language training to support local Nigerian people to get jobs at Chinese companies, and also supports the awarding of scholarships to give local students the opportunity to complete their studies (this will be discussed at greater length in a case study chapter). In sum, from the functional perspective of public diplomacy, China efficiently utilizes Confucius Institutions to communicate with African people, and to develop a bond of sympathy through China’s culture. However, they also provoke criticism that Confucius Institutes contribute to achieving China’s foreign policy goal, because they are inseparable from relations with the Chinese government.

Not only Confucius Institutes but also China’s Cultural Centers play a vital role in introducing China to Africa through Chinese culture. The Chinese government has established twenty Chinese cultural centers overseas, five of which are in Africa (Mauritius, Benin, Cairo, Nigeria, and Tanzania). The difference between a Cultural Institute and a
Confucius Institute is that Cultural Institutes are focused only on promoting mutual understanding between Chinese and local populations, instead of engaging in education support, such as at universities and offering language training, which are the role of Confucius Institutes (Interviewee N-B2, 2016). Recently, a variety of events for cultural and art exchange have been held in both China and Africa to cement Sino-Africa ties. China has also hosted diverse events with African people in China; for example, the Second China-Africa Cultural Heritage Preservation Forum in Chengdu, in 2015; the African Cultures in Focus program in China to introduce Africa’s culture and art performances; the Spring Festival in Africa; and the 2016 Meet in Beijing Arts Festival, attended by South Africa’s MusicFest Art Troupe. Moreover, Cultural Centers arrange various events with the Ministry of Culture and provincial and municipal cultural bureaus, and 14 of China’s provinces and municipalities have engaged in cultural exchange programs with over 20 African countries. The cultural exchanges in Africa that introduce China have also been diverse, and events are held around a wide range of subjects; including movies, traditional dance, Chinaware art, calligraphy, singing contests with Chinese popular music, traditional clothes, and others (ibid). (More detailed information on this will be included in the case study chapter.)

5.5 Conclusion

The present foundation of solid Sino-African relations was laid in the 1950s to 1990s, the fruit of China’s efforts despite its inability to offer financial and infrastructure assistance to Africa from 1950 to the 1970s. The majority of African countries entered into diplomatic relations with China in the late 1950s, after which China began offering assistance to the continent. The key aspect of the relations between China and Africa, until the 1970s, was Chinese aid to Africa intended to address political isolation on the international stage, and in joining the United Nations with the help of African countries. In return for becoming a member of the international community, Beijing supported the construction of a railway that connected Tanzanian and Zambia. Furthermore, China provided economic assistance free of interest, and dispatched technicians in the fields of construction, agriculture, and medical treatment to African countries. Since then, China has adopted reforms and its opening up policy, and suffered the Tiananmen Square massacre, which marked a watershed moment that led to the adoption of utilitarianism over ideology-centric policies, aimed at boosting its economic development and reforming the global image of China, from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s.

In the course of a decade of Sino-Africa relations, China established the FOCAC and an
Africa policy to strengthen relations between China and the continent. Beijing focused on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, mutual benefit, mutual development, and providing economic aid without political involvement. However, it is designed for economic gain, maintaining the One China policy, and expanding its influence through political bonds with African countries, and the expansion of its companies in Africa. As a result of increasingly lopsided trade between China and Africa, there has been a rise in discord. The majority of African countries rely on China’s imports, thus China’s economic recession/slowdown have an impact on Africa’s economy, as does any depreciation in raw materials prices. Chinese exports with low prices also seriously affect African countries’ domestic enterprises. However, China attempts to address the gap between China and Africa that springs from unbalanced economic ties. Thus, the Chinese government exercises public diplomacy through various instruments – such as foreign aid, the media, and cultural institutions – to improve the country’s image, and to gain the trust of the African public through practical and humanitarian aid intended to improve the African population’s welfare and economy. Also, China endeavors to develop a bond of sympathy by introducing Chinese culture and language through diverse events and activities with the African public.

The next chapter will look in more detail at China’s public diplomacy activities in bilateral and multilateral ties, based on data collected through interviews, conducted during fieldwork in Nigeria and South Africa.

Chapter 6. Case Study: Bilateral Channel
Chapter 6.1 Nigeria

The Sino-Nigerian relationship is one based on cooperative and mutually beneficial economic relations. China wants to secure energy resources, and diversify its export market through the expansion of Chinese enterprises in Nigeria. This is because Nigeria is not only Africa’s leading oil producer, but also offers plenty of potential customers for Chinese commodities, and freight and transportation opportunities as a result of its harbor. That being said, while Nigeria’s political situation is not perfectly stable, Nigeria has a relatively democratic system when compared to other oil-producing countries in Africa. Hence, those factors fully qualify Nigeria for stronger economic and diplomatic relations with China. In contrast to China, Nigeria’s needs of economic development are in its manufacturing sector, and the desire to enrich its agriculture industry. However, while the two countries’ requirements are hard to align perfectly, relations have been linked together by interests.  

Thus, based on the discussion in the conceptual chapters on public diplomacy with soft power (Chapters 3 and 4) and the general background of China’s relationship with and policy towards Africa (Chapter 5), this chapter will examine the role of China’s public diplomacy in Nigeria, to explore the links between China’s public diplomacy and its policy towards Sino-Nigerian political economy relations. Thus, it is comprised of three parts: the first introduces the general background of how China and Nigeria developed a strategic partnership with the Nigerian government. This part also covers the cause of disharmony between China and Nigeria in their bilateral economic relations. The second part discusses the role of China’s public diplomacy, using three instruments – foreign aid, cultural and education institutes, and media – to analyze how China’s public diplomacy works in Nigeria and how it carries out China’s foreign policy in Nigeria. The third part considers the effect of China’s public diplomacy on the Nigerian public sector, Nigeria’s political economy, and relations between Nigeria and China, and also assess how China’s public diplomacy works to strengthen ties and boost ongoing interaction between the two countries.

94 While China and Nigeria enjoy active economic relations with high volumes of trade and investment, there is cacophony between them. Contentious matters in Sino-African relations have already been broadly explored in Chapter 5. However, this section will discuss this discord related to economic relations, focusing on bilateral relations between China and Nigeria. It will not cover all contentious issues between China and Nigeria, due to a limited time to research within the doctoral program, but will examine typical and well-known issues to connect with the discussion of China’s public diplomacy in Chapter 7. This approach will also be applied to the next case study, on South Africa, in Chapter 6.2.
6.1.1 The background of Sino-Nigeria strategic partnership

China and Nigeria established diplomatic ties in 1971, and bilateral relations between the two countries have strengthened at a quicker rate than China’s relations with other African countries. Despite the fact that China took Taiwan’s seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council with the help of African nations in 1971, mutual exchanges between China and Nigeria were minimal before the 1990s. From the early 1990s, however, the two countries began to develop strategic ties over the course of three stages. The first stage of Sino-Nigeria relations was overcoming hardship to develop close economic ties. When Sani Abacha’s regime came to power after a military coup in 1993, the West imposed economic sanctions against Nigeria, and so Nigeria chose China as an alternative source of aid and investment. Based on Abacha’s efforts at the beginning of his regime (1993-1998) to make contact with the Chinese government, the Nigerian-Chinese Chambers of Commerce was established in 1994. The China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) took advantage of this, and in 1995 gained a $529 million contract for the restoration of Nigeria’s railway system. This, in turn, led to a 1997 visit from Li Peng, then-premier of China’s State Council, to sign protocols regarding power generation, oil, and steel production. However, CCECC’s restoration work and Li’s protocols were unsuccessful due to the Western sanctions (Izuchukwu and Ofori, 2014) and the military coup in Nigeria’s political system. The next stage of relations between China and Nigeria forged ahead with economic cooperation. Olusegun Obasanjo’s 1999 victory in the presidential elections paved the way for active Chinese economic cooperation with Nigeria. Furthermore, during his second term, from 2003 to 2007, the two countries solidified their interdependence based on each country’s demands. During former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Nigeria in 2006, Hu and Olusegun agreed to work on a strategic plan for the future growth of bilateral, strategic ties between two countries. In a bid to achieve this bilateral strategic partnership, the two leaders agreed on a four-point proposal\(^{95}\) that contained the key components of political mutual trust, economic reciprocity, and mutual assistance in international affairs (China.org.cn, 2006). In the same year, the intergovernmental Nigeria-China Investment Forum was established; Obasanjo significantly boosted Chinese companies’ infrastructure-building engagement across a range of sectors, adding a growing number of Nigerian projects, in return for which China secured access to several of Nigeria’s major oil fields (Salter, 2009).

\(^{95}\) The four proposals are: 1) to enhance political mutual trust to promote strategic cooperation; 2) to expand cultural exchanges and cooperation and jointly combat various diseases, including malaria and bird flu; 3) to expand cooperation in areas including agriculture, energy, electricity, infrastructure construction, telecommunications and satellite, to achieve reciprocity and win-win results; and 4) to promote South-South and South-North spirit, and strengthen cooperation in international affairs to boost world peace, improve coordination and cooperation on the major international issues of human rights, peacekeeping, anti-terrorism, and UN reform.
In laying the foundation of an oil-for-infrastructure policy, China and Nigeria’s economic interests were suitably matched. China began to spread out, not only securing oil and gas but also expanding its companies’ clout in the Nigerian market. The final stage of the two countries’ relations moves beyond just economic ties and grew into mutual exchanges in many different fields. For example, Nigeria offered four oil blocks to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), in return for its commitment to invest US$2 billion in the Kaduna refinery project in Lagos. In 2007, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was also offered four blocks in exchange for a US$2.5 billion China Exim Bank loan to upgrade the Lagos-Kano railway and construct a hydropower project at Mambilla. However, the two agreements foundered due to deep-seated corruption, irregularities, and instability in Nigeria’s political system (Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther, 2011). After laying the economic groundwork of Sino-Nigeria relations in the early of 2000s (the second stage, above), from around the end of 2010, the two countries have expanded their strategic relations, covering not only the political economic sector but also welfare and general livelihood. To use the words of Zhao Linxiang, Economic and Commercial Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Nigeria, “both countries had experienced steady increase in bilateral relations right from the administration of former President, Goodluck Jonathan” (Amaugo, 2016). Chinese merchandise and companies are found all over Nigeria: from industrial products to service commodities, Chinese goods are part of the Nigerian people’s lives. In addition to economic cooperation, China and Nigeria’s political bond has also deepened on the international stage. In 2015, for example, China supported Nigeria for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, in recognition of China’s One-China policy. Also, through people-to-people communications and cultural exchanges, China and Nigeria have endeavored to broaden and deepen their understanding of each other, which goes beyond economic ties.

China and Nigeria have improved their relationship utilizing high-ranking governmental officials visiting and high-level talks ever since they established diplomatic ties. Since 2000, a Chinese delegation including the Chinese Foreign Minister has paid a state visit to Nigeria almost every year (Chinese Embassy in Nigeria, 2004), and previous Chinese President Hu Jintao also visited Nigeria during his term. Nigeria’s current president, Muhammadu Buhari, made an official visit to Beijing in 2015 to conduct formal talks. The strategic partnership between China and Nigeria has led to complementary cooperation as part of their win-win relations. Also, China’s various actors – such as government-affiliated groups, private and government-owned companies – have helped to maximize the impact of the strategic partnership on Nigeria’s politics, economic, social and cultural spheres. Based on the enormous efforts between the two countries, as of 2016, Nigeria is the second largest market
for Chinese exports in Africa. On the back of these close economic ties, China and Nigeria have something in common: they both have very large populations, and put economic growth first in their government policies. In addition to economic ties, the two countries have made it clear that they support South-South cooperation on the world stage. Recently, despite trade between China and Nigeria experienced a slump due to a drop in global oil prices and the 2015-16 global economic recession, the two countries’ trade nevertheless grew from US$384 million in 1998, to around US$18.1 billion in 2014. (Oguh, 2016). When we consider China’s import and export products in trade with Nigeria, in 2010 China’s exports are driven by manufactured goods (38 percent). The other items include vehicles (11 percent), electrical equipment (10 percent), textile products, industrial machinery, and telecom equipment (9 percent), and agri-food products (3 percent). On the other hand, China imports nearly 90 percent of its petroleum and gas from Nigeria (Egbula and Zheng, 2011, p.8). Nigeria is the largest recipient of FDI among African countries. The total flow of FDI into Nigeria has increased ten times: from US$1.14 billion in 2001, to US$11.5 billion in 2009. China has also expanded its FDI into Nigeria, from US$3 billion in 2003, to US$10 billion. The Chinese government directly invested US$1.1 billion in Nigeria’s infrastructure, in the form of low-interest loans. However, 75 percent of China’s FDI goes to Nigeria’s oil and gas sector (Izuchukwu and Ofori, 2014, p.366).

That being said, Sino-Nigerian ties do not always go smoothly, despite the leaders of the two countries displaying a strong desire to cooperate with each other to establish a win-win strategy. Although they share mutual interests in deriving benefits through a strategic partnership, “the engagement between Nigeria and China may be sour as well as sweet” (Adekola, 2013, p.4). This is because China holds an edge over Nigeria in the various fields (trade and investment), because Nigeria relies heavily on China that now plays an important role in Nigeria’s economy and its people’s daily lives. Hence, as mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4, Nigeria is deeply affected by a slowdown in China’s economic growth. Another problematic cause of tension in Sino-Nigerian economic relations is the huge amount of textiles imports from China: this weakens the textile sector in Nigeria, and has caused many Nigerian textile firms to go out of business due to the difficulties of competition with China. Thus, around 160,000 textile workers have been laid off, and the workforce declined to approximately 90,000 from 1995 to 2002. In 2005, the available workforce for textiles was only 35,000; and in 2010, there were fewer than 40 textiles factories in Nigeria, down from around 200 operating previously. This phenomenon is caused by massive Chinese illegal and legal imports, available at preposterously low prices (Muhammad, Mukhtar, and Lola, 2017).

As discussed in Chapter 5, the form of China’s complete aid is a problem in Nigeria as well.
China does not procure construction materials in Nigeria, but rather imports the majority of necessary equipment, including building materials, from China (Interviewee N-D2, 2016). As a result, Chinese aid does not always lead to the development of local Nigerian companies. Furthermore, China’s construction aid is not connected to all of Nigeria’s economic development and the improvement of Nigerian people’s life. Some of China’s construction aid is for the privileged class: for example, airport expansions in Abuja, Enugu, Kano, and Port Harcourt. In addition, according to Interviewee N-F1 (2016), the majority of Chinese small- and medium-sized businesses operating in Nigeria, which are outside of the scope of the Chinese embassy or Chinese government management, tend not to follow the agreements based on environmental protections and technology transfer between the Chinese and the Nigerian government. Thus, while Chinese SOEs and behemoths do obey the agreements, it is hard to ignore the fact that most Nigerian workers who work for small- and medium-sized Chinese enterprises complain about the lack of technology transfer and environmental protections in Nigeria. Based on these tensions between China and Nigeria, the following section will discuss how China endeavors to create a harmonious environment to foster close economic relations with Nigeria.

6.1.2 The role of China’s public diplomacy in Nigeria

As stated in the preceding chapter, although China and Nigeria have a mutual goal in gaining an economic advantage and mutual global political protection, there remains a gap that prevents China and Nigeria from strengthening their relations. Thus, the following chapters will discuss how China’s public diplomacy works with the Nigerian people, using different measures to cement strategic ties between China and Nigeria.

6.1.2.1 Foreign aid

In addition to trade and FDI, China provides various types of assistance to Nigeria that is directly related to improving the Nigerian people’s living environments and contributing to economic growth. Regarding the significant factors for Nigeria’s economic development, to refer to Udoma Udo Udoma, Minister of Budget and National Planning: “Infrastructure is very necessary to grow the economy of a nation. There is need to fix infrastructure in order to create an environment for private sector to grow”. To accomplish infrastructure development in Nigeria, the CEO of the Infrastructure Bank of Nigeria, Adekunle Oyinloye stresses the importance of “funding commercially viable infrastructure projects”, which are
assisted by both public institutions and private sector companies with the provision of specially-designed construction loans (Ministry of Budget and National Planning, n.a). Nigeria’s President Buhari, by extension, highlighted China’s pledge to provide support in the areas of power, infrastructure, agriculture, transport, and roads, when he visited China in 2016 (China Daily, 2016b). On that note, China carries out public diplomacy by rendering assistance in the form of funding and collaborative work between China’s private companies and Nigerian businesses to boost Nigeria’s infrastructure development. Prior to 2000s, while China only focuses on establishing infrastructure through its companies in Nigeria, Beijing now considers both the development of infrastructure and the region as a whole, when deciding on where construction work will be located.

As for China’s typical infrastructure development assistance, the Chinese construction and engineering firm China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC) pledged to improve Nigeria’s human resources development. The company’s headquarters were established in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, out of which they operate their business linked to all north and west African countries. The company also promised to do a good job of integration and social responsibility practices, sharing the fruits of development, and building a good environment for the local people (China Daily, 2016d). At the same time, the CGGC conducted project for the construction of dams, power plants, bridges and roads in Nigeria. A typical example of the company’s project is $3.2 billion hydroelectric plant construction on the Mambila plateau, with Sinohydro. Seventy-five percent of the project’s financing came from China’s ExImBank, and the Nigerian government paid the rest. The project agreed to repay the loan out of the revenue generated by the hydroelectric plant; and the project is expected to be completed in early 2018 (AidData, n.a). In 2014, the China Railway Construction Corp won a contract for a nearly $12 billion project for coastal railway construction, which is one of China’s largest overseas construction projects. The total length of the track is to be 1,402 kilometers, connecting Nigeria’s economic capital Lagos in the west, to Calabar in the east. The project will create nearly 200,000 local jobs and is expected to vitalize Nigeria’s manufacturing sector along the railway (CCTV, 2014). In 2017, the Chinese firm CCECC Nigeria Ltd. began construction of the Lagos-Ibadan double-track railway, which adopts Chinese standard in 2017. The construction is a $1.58 billion project, and will take three years to complete. Spinning out of the railway construction, the Nigerian government and the CCECC expect around 4,000 jobs to be created for young Nigerians, and regional development through boosting related industries and the creation of new tax opportunities (People’s Daily, 2017).
Also, China funds support infrastructure and agriculture development. From 2000 to 2007, China provided infrastructure financial assistance mainly for transport (over 60 percent), electricity, telecom and others (Oyeranti, Babatunde, and Ogunkola, 2011, p.188). China then decided to support Nigeria’s key facilities to boost its economic development. In 2017, Beijing decided to invest an additional $40 billion in Nigeria, following the previous $45 billion investment. The additional funds were provided aside from the total $60 billion which China pledged at FOCAC; and is planned to be used for Nigeria’s economic development (Guardian, 2017). Recently, the Chinese government has focused on utilitarian and practical assistance, rather than the apparent aid that China had provided during the mid-2000s. For example, in 2006, Beijing agreed to provide a CNY40 million grant for infrastructure projects, which includes establishing a power generation station and the maintenance and management of the Kaduna refinery, in return for four oil-backed contracts. Two years later, China provided a $2.5 billion loan to Nigeria for an infrastructure project in exchange for oil exploitation rights, but the project was rejected by the Yar’Adua Administration (Ploch, 2010, pp.27-28). Although the Chinese government still has good cause for financially supporting Nigeria, China nevertheless endeavors to reach a reasonable compromise with Nigeria, and at the same time aims to meet the economic development needs of the Nigerian government. On that score, in 2011, the Chinese government sent over 400 Chinese agriculture experts in a bid to boost crop cultivation at the small earth dams in Nigeria (AidData, n.a).

China has gradually increased its aid to Nigeria every year. China’s latest plan for Nigerian support is a long-term blueprint that facilitates the fulfillment of deeper relations with Nigeria, for the mutual benefit of political economy on the international stage. To gain Nigeria’s trust, China needs to get rid of the negative impression that China obtains a unilateral advantage through Sino-Nigerian economic ties. Hence, Beijing supports the vitalization of Nigeria’s production sector, which links economic development with maximizing the efficiency of China’s aid. Through the process of assistance in diversified and modernized production industries, such as manufacturing, agriculture, and mining, China not only counts on the knock-on effect of job creation and regional development to present a positive image of China, but also places itself in a position of advantage by expanding Chinese companies’ influence in the manufacturing and infrastructure business sectors. By using aid as part of its public diplomacy approach, Sino-Nigerian ties expect more extensive practical cooperation and deepened strategic relations.

In addition to China’s aid above, Beijing also focuses on improving the Nigerian people’s welfare, and providing scientific technology. In 2014, the Nigerian and Chinese governments
agreed on a CNY10 million grant for assistance with medical treatment and protection against Ebola. In the same year, the Chinese embassy in Nigeria also donated vehicles to the Nigerian FCT Police Command to combat crime. In 2013, China donated 250 books to Nigeria’s National Library, and provided scholarships for 70 Nigerian youths to study at the Guangdong University of Petrochemical Technology and the Guangzhou City Construction College in China. China also set up a library in Abuja for the local youth. China also worked on a hospital construction project in Abuja, which cost US$12.5 million, from 2009 to 2013. The project was conducted under China-Africa cooperation adopted in 2006 (AidData, n.a).

6.1.2.2 China’s Media

The role of the media in Nigeria is to create a positive and favorable global image of China – one that not only presents its long strides for economic development under the control of a highly-centralized system of government, but also of being at the center of the world with an attractive historical backdrop. Thus, while Chinese cultural institutions and people-to-people exchanges inform the few Nigerian people who engage with them, the Chinese media focuses on disseminating China’s social culture more widely. The expansion of China’s media and telecommunication companies has been conducted as a part of a policy of extending the boundaries of its public diplomacy activities. Lately, the Confucius Institute at the University of Lagos and the CCC in Nigeria have launched a renewed Chinese Culture Month “Movie Week” series of events for local Nigerian people. In the case of the Confucius Institute, they do not limit the audience, and allow students enrolled in classes at the Confucius Institute and also other university students and staff, other community members, and elementary and middle school students from the Confucius Institute teaching sites. Chinese Director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Lagos Wang Yongjing explains her views on using media for cultural exchanges and its ripple effect, thus:

We used modern multimedia sound equipment, for a vivid and captivating promotion of Chinese culture, leaving the classroom so that they could reach a broader audience of Nigerian locals. After watching these films, the students could obtain a direct understanding of contemporary Chinese culture and the rapid development of technology in China, while at the same time also deepening their impression of China. (Hanban, 2016)

As for China’s media, Beijing utilizes three vehicles to interact with the Nigerian public. The first are China’s media programs, which are produced in China. To improve intercultural
exchanges, since 2016, more than 17 Chinese movies and TV dramas across diverse genres – including urban comedy, family, and adventure – were broadcast over more than 400 hours in Nigeria. The Chinese movies and dramas aired through the cooperation between StarTimes, a Chinese international pay-TV service provider, and the state-run Nigeria Television Authority. StarTimes boasts the largest number of subscribers in Nigeria, so that China expects a collateral benefit of rapidly disseminating Chinese culture and providing a window of second-hand experience through Chinese movies and TV dramas. With regards to the introduction of Chinese movies and TV dramas, Yan Xiangdong, cultural counselor of the Embassy of China in Nigeria, said that, “dramas and movies are important parts of culture and cultural exchanges between the two countries” (Xinhua News, 2016e).

All Chinese TV shows and movies are dubbed into Igbo, Yoruba, and other local Nigerian languages, so that local populations can watch Chinese shows more easily. Nigerian viewers appreciate China’s thoughtful consideration and the TV shows and movies that feature family affection, a developed China, and fascinating action scenes like Kung Fu. Based on the positive response from the Nigerian public, François Dubé (2016) argues that screen-to-screen cultural interaction goes a long way to grow links between the two countries’ film industries. Hence, recently, Nigerian movies have used China as a background, or used Chinese and Nigerian’s relations (for example, in a love story) as material for movies. When one considers that Nigeria’s film industry (Nollywood) is the world’s third-largest producer of feature films (with around 300 producers making 1,000 films a year) (Towse, 2010, p.436), such collaboration will not only boost cultural understanding, but also generate closer economic ties between China and Nigeria.

The second measure is using Nigeria’s journalists. China’s media expansion in Nigeria is the result of various cooperative processes in Sino-Nigeria ties. The “Experience China: China-Nigeria Media Symposium”, was a significant meeting for interaction between major Chinese and Nigerian media outlets, was held in Abuja in 2013. China’s vice-minister of the State Council Information Office, Li Wufeng, visited Nigeria to attend the meeting with the Chinese ambassador. The priority agenda of the meeting was establishing programs to improve a mutual sense of solidarity in Sino-Nigeria relations, and to rectify the wrong impression of China that resulted from the biased reporting in Western media. Thus, China began to run the “Experience China” program, which is jointly controlled by China (through the State Council Information Office and the Chinese Embassy in Nigeria) and Nigeria (through its Federal Ministry of Education). The program reflects Nigerian requests for more Chinese media involvement in Nigeria, improvement of China’s media’s leverage in the nation, and a boost to trade relations between the two countries (China.org.cn, 2013b).
Chinese government also deploys reporters and journalists to understand each country and keep up with the pace of their strengthening economic ties. With the aim of strengthening China-Africa friendship, Beijing also provides for Nigerian journalists, as well as other African journalists, to learn and acquire wider and deeper knowledge of Chinese political economy, media, and cultural development through a 10-month media and cultural exchange fellowship in collaboration with the China Public Diplomacy Association at the China Africa Press Center in Beijing. During the fellowship, the journalists have the opportunity to interview officials from relevant government ministries, agencies and enterprises, and experience working with major Chinese media organizations. By extension, the journalists are allowed to attend major events, such as plenary sessions of the Chinese People’s Congress, Chinese People’s Political Consultation Conference, G20 Summit, and FOCAC Coordinators’ Meeting, to grow their understanding of China’s major political systems as it relates to Africa. To understand the real image of China, the journalists visit around 35 cities and towns across 12 provinces and municipalities (People’s Daily, December 2nd, 2016). China recognizes the role of journalists, and put effort into training them, as the journalists are the medium that connects China with the Nigerian public. Also, Beijing has attempted to bridge the gap between Nigerian journalists and Chinese correspondents in Nigeria. Although there are Chinese correspondents in Nigeria, the reality is that interaction with local journalists is lower in Nigeria. Considering that Nigeria’s media system is more liberal and enjoys greater freedom of speech than China’s (Oyeyinka, Olalere, Lateef, and Omolayo, 2013), the role of journalists is of enormous importance to introduce a favorable image of China to Nigeria – certainly as important as teaching Chinese language, and watching Chinese movies and TV shows. For that reason, Executive Secretary of the All-China Journalists Association Wang Dongmei has requested Chinese and Nigerian media practitioners’ unity to boost win-win cooperation between the two countries. As of 2017, there are around 230,000 certified members who have participated in an exchange program in China. The Chinese government is planning to expand and diversify programs available to Nigerian journalists. “As journalists [...] we should work harmoniously together in promoting more cordial diplomatic relations between our two countries”, and “We strongly believe that as journalists in Nigeria and China, we must join hands, promote more training programmes and exchanges between us, in the interest of our two nations” said Wang (Business Day, 2017).

The last method is the Chinese news media. In Nigeria, there are officially only China Radio International (CRI) and Xinhua correspondents as part of a government media company. Several Chinese private companies, such as StarTimes, Huafei Nigeria Times, the West Africa Business Weekly newspaper, and others, support China’s major media organizations
(Interviewee N-A1, 2016) in China when they publish articles about the various concerns in Nigeria. Government-owned media company CRI established an office in Lagos, in 2009, and broadcasts in the Hausa language to target the northern region of Nigeria. Around five million radio listeners are Nigerians in the Northern region and neighboring countries, and listen to CRI’s Chinese news and programs in Hausa. CRI Director of the Hausa Service Chen Liming said, “the radio programme had so far continued to draw the attraction of Nigerians to the business and other opportunities currently existing for Nigerians in Nigeria and China’s relations” (PM News, 2017). The CRI continues its efforts to get close to the Nigerian public. To do this, for example, a Chinese radio presenter adopts a Nigerian name to add a local touch, when running a radio program; and also collects feedback from Nigerian radio listeners through bulletin boards, postcards, and by phone. The Chinese government also employs Nigerian graduates of the Hausa language and dispatches them to the CRI headquarters in Beijing, to ensure accurate and efficient radio broadcasting.

Unlike the CRI, there is neither a joint venture newspaper between China and Nigeria, nor a Chinese newspaper for Nigerian subscribers in Nigeria. However, a private Chinese newspaper does play a role in communicating between China and Nigeria. According to Interviewee N-A1 (2016), the Chinese newspaper in Nigeria is aimed at promoting China-Africa cooperation and reflecting Chinese voices. In the Nigerian media market, the West Africa Business Weekly is the most powerful private Chinese media. This newspaper has cooperative relationships with both Nigerian and Chinese media. The editorial team of the newspaper is based in China. In Nigeria, the journalists are responsible for interviewing both Nigerian and Chinese celebrities and notables, and translating and sorting Nigerian news. The newspaper was established in 2003, by the Nigeria-China Council for the promotion of peaceful national reunification. In a bid to build a media platform, the newspaper gained the support of the Chinese embassy in Abuja, the Consulate in Lagos, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of China, and China’s mainstream media in its early years (Interviewee N-A1, 2016). However, since 2014, the newspaper has more freedom of expression than in previous years, after a new Chief took control of the newspaper (Interviewee N-A2, 2016).

The West Africa Business Weekly is a solely Chinese newspaper that publishes 32 pages every week in Nigeria, and includes Nigerian news and Nigeria-Chinese groups news. The newspaper covers Nigerian visits by Chinese leaders, politicians or businessman, Chamber of Commerce activities, the activities of the embassy and consulates as part of its coverage for Chinese in Nigeria, and it is free to both Chinese and Nigerians. The articles regarding Nigerian news in the newspaper are drawn from the main local newspapers, such as Punch,
Thisday, Business Today, Daily Trust, The Guardian, Vanguard, Premium Times Nigeria, the Sun News, and others, to better comprehend the local situation. Not only that, other news in the fields of the exhibitions, business opportunities, exchange rates, and the security situation are featured in the newspaper (Interviewee N-A1, 2016). The news articles are provided both in Chinese and English. Although the West Africa Business Weekly newspaper was initially aimed at Chinese people in Nigeria, Nigerians who are interested in Chinese news and business trends in Nigeria also now subscribe to the newspaper. With regards to cementing better relations between China and Nigeria, the newspaper broadens the boundaries, and performs a role of “bilateral communication” between China and Nigeria, according to Interviewee N-A2 (2016). Hence, from 2017, the newspaper’s journalists and correspondents will increase the prominence of article that focus on how to promote better Sino-Nigerian relations, rather than focusing on what the relationship is (Interviewee N-A2, 2016). In the same vein, the newspaper reports on the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAEFC) delegation, which includes the Export-Import Bank of China and Chinese state-owned and private companies, who are looking for cooperative projects as a part of China’s going out policy in Nigeria in 2016. The founder of the newspaper also provided a three board seats for Nigerian governors and CPAEFC members to discuss the creation of projects (Interviewee N-A1, 2016). All these efforts of China’s media involvement have brought about positive effects: not only do more and more Chinese companies and businessmen come to Nigeria to do business to boost active economic ties, but Chinese and Nigerian younger generations also have the chance to develop broader knowledge and engagement, said the interviewee. The interviewee also explained the difficulties experienced by China’s media in Nigeria, and that China media has difficulty exporting its values due to its strong censorship system, hierarchy, and conservative policies, and at the same time Nigerians do not really identify with China’s values (Interviewee N-A1, 2016).

6.1.2.3 Cultural and Education Institutes

Chinese culture is a crucial factor for China’s wider publicity push for its political economy and social culture, as has already been stated in Chapter 3. Culture and education factors are the core means by which the Chinese government first promoted its public diplomacy activities in Nigeria, as most of China’s public diplomacy activities have expand based on the influence of cultural and education interchanges. In 2016, during a symposium marking the 45th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Nigeria, China did not forgot to add mention of people-to-people exchanges, science and technology education as critical
factor which have led to fruitful cooperation between China and Nigeria. Hence, Chinese cultural and education institutions in Nigeria are mostly run by the Chinese government, but Chinese private companies have also worked to foster support from Nigeria’s younger generations and to promote community economic development through its own skill training programs.

In the mid-2000s, Beijing put a lot of effort into cultural exchanges. Typical examples are the establishment of Confucius Institutes and visits from Chinese delegations to Nigeria, for example for the “Chinese Movie Week 2008”, which the Chinese government financed, provided the film projectors, and trained local Nigerians to use them. The “Chinese Movie Week 2008” was a collaboration between the Chinese embassy in Nigeria and the Nigerian Film Corporation (NFC). As part of the collaboration, the embassy created a scholarship to support NFC staffers’ graduate degrees in film studies at Chinese universities (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, p.221). However, Sino-Nigerian cultural exchanges began to diversify in earnest after former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan made an official visit to China with Edem Duke, then-chief of the Minister of Tourism, Culture and National Orientation, in 2013. In the same year, the Chinese government took the opportunity to establish a Chinese cultural center in Abuja, the 14th overseas cultural center (Chinese Embassy in Nigeria, 2015). Since then, exchanges between China and Nigeria have become more active, including not only language instruction, but also comprehensive instruction and introductions to Chinese culture, music, calligraphy, traditional dance, and Chinese beauty.

There are three main ways in which China has introduced its culture into Nigeria. The first is through the Confucius Institutions. There are two Confucius Institutes in Nigeria: the first institute is at the Nnamdi Azikiwe University in Oka, the second is at the University of Lagos. Both institutes were established in 2007. Although two the Confucius Institutes are located in different areas in Nigeria, the education programs are 98 percent similar, because each institute follows the goals established by the headquarters, Hanban. Also, all Chinese directors are trained through the same courses, and work under similar guidelines and rules. So, all directors have similar directives from the headquarters (Interviewee N-B1, 2016). The general principles of the Confucius Institutes, as defined by their constitution and by-laws, are as follows:

Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and
other countries, to deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world. (Hanban, n.a)

Not only this, the constitution and by-laws of the Confucius Institutes offer the same services: Chinese language teaching; holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test), and tests for the Certification of Chinese Language Teachers; training Chinese language instructors and providing Chinese language teaching resources; providing information and consultative services concerning China’s education, culture, and so forth; conducting language and cultural exchange activities between China and other countries. Especially in Nigeria, the Confucius Institutes offer various programs based on the Hanban’s general goals. According to the instructors at the Confucius Institutions in Nigeria, the institutions are angled towards Nigerian people in various ways: for example, sharing all Chinese festivals with the Nigerian people, performances with Chinese people only open to the Nigerian public, cultural activities with Nigerian students at primary or secondary school, and the indirect introduction of Confucius ideas (Interviewee N-B1, 2016). The need for an indirect approach is meant to help disarm any initial resistance to Chinese culture, because there are some cultural differences between China and Nigeria. On that note, the Confucius Institutes in Nigeria also hold various events for Nigerian students who are learning Chinese language, providing an opportunity to boost interest for learning about Chinese culture and language, and to stimulate contacts with Nigerian public. In support of the Institutions’ goals, Chinese corporations, such as Huawei, offer prizes and the Chinese government offers a one-year exchange student program for Nigerian students who win events or contests in Chinese singing or dancing, or other areas of Chinese popular culture.

As of 2016, there are 15 schools at which one can learn Chinese language, operated through the Confucius Institutes in Nigeria. The Institutes plan to open more Chinese language classes at local Nigerian schools, and to provide free Chinese language classes to Nigerian employees at newly-arrived Chinese companies that have recently arrived in Nigeria (Interviewee N-B1, 2016). Through Chinese language teaching at local primary and secondary schools, and universities, Confucius Institutes play the role of a bridge linking China and Nigeria. The Chinese language classes at schools cover not only watching Chinese movies, but also learning origami to make Chinese traditional marks and symbols to comprehend and acquire general experience of contemporary Chinese culture. However, the majority of scholars ask whether or not the Confucius Institutes fulfil functions that follow the general principles of the Confucius Institutes. Hartig (2015) argued that Confucius Institutions do not show the “real” China to the world, but rather the “correct version” of it,
which is influenced by political and/or ideological concerns and practical issues. The “correct version” pushed by Confucius Institutes limits their ability to boost China’s soft power and communicate strategically with the public. Hughes (2014) also pointed out that the difficulties of excluding Chinese political influence in Confucius Institutes because the Chinese Party-State manages and is closely linked to the Confucius Institutes. Although there are diverse perspectives on the Confucius Institutes, the Confucius Institutes in Nigeria surely attempt to connect China with Nigeria through language and social culture exchanges. Nigerian students who learn the Chinese language and about its culture open doors to new opportunities, for example, the chance to get a job at a Chinese company in Nigeria. By extension, the Confucius Institutes in Nigeria create scholarships for study in China, which are fully funded by the Chinese government, and are awarded based on the Nigerian students’ HSK score. Nearly 50 Nigerian students seized the chance to study in China. The headquarters organize technical training, for example in Chinese cooking, agricultural methods, and phone repairs, according to students’ demand. The different types of education available to Nigerian students are linked to promoting employment by Chinese companies and regional economic development in Nigeria (Interviewee N-B1, 2016). The Confucius Institutes in Nigeria, in other words, play an influential role for both the Nigerian people and also Chinese companies. The Institutes provide opportunities not only for Nigerians to get jobs at Chinese companies, but also to help Chinese businesses to thrive in Nigeria.

The second means for spreading Chinese culture is through the China Cultural Centers (CCC). The first CCC opened in Nigeria in 2013, after the two countries signed a joint agreement in 2012. Around the same time, a Nigerian Cultural Center also opened in China, the first African Cultural Center in China, with the purpose of deepening relations and friendship between China and Nigeria through active cultural exchanges, to learn about their different histories and cultures. The CCC in Nigeria was the third center in Sub-Saharan Africa, after Mauritius and Benin, and it is run by the Ministry of Culture with financial support from the Chinese government. The CCC provides the following services and activities (Interviewee N-B2, 2016):

a. Chinese language training;

b. Arts and craft exhibitions (hosting and participation);

c. Martial arts training, such as Kung Fu;

d. Painting and sculpture training;

e. Chinese tea production training;
f. Excursion exercise;

g. Professional seminar hosting and facilities rental;

h. Corporate translation service (English-Chinese vice versa);

i. Chinese cuisine training

In addition, the CCC provides facilities and venues for educational activities from local government, schools, and public agencies (CCC, 2015). The CCC works in collaboration with the Secondary Education Board and Education Resource Center in Abuja to educate school students. It hosts various competitions (such as Wushu and spring festival), and Nigerian-China women fashion shows, and exhibitions to increase understanding of each culture’s differences. Moreover, the CCC has held performances of Cultural Entertainment in conjunction with Nigeria’s National Council for Arts and Culture (NCAC), and an evening of Cultural Entertainment with performances from Qinghai Culture Troupe, and Federal Capital Territory Center for Social Development to mark the 45th anniversary of diplomatic relations (Interviewee N-B3, 2016). Although the Confucius Institutes and the CCC provide similar programs, there is a key difference between the two organizations. The Confucius Institutes are managed by Hanban, and offer free language classes mostly to students. The CCC, on the other hand, targets the Nigerian public more generally, with more specialized cultural introductions. Also, the CCC does not provide free Chinese language courses, and also charges for the HSK Chinese Proficiency Examination – setting the price depending on the level of Chinese language class being taken. The role of the CCC is to interact with the Nigerian public through participation in a variety of cultural events and festivals. The center is also designed to stimulate interest in Chinese culture and cement cultural exchanges in Sino-Nigeria relations (Interviewee N-B2, 2016).

Notwithstanding the major role of the CCC in cultural exchange activities in Nigeria, the CCC also plays a crucial role in intergovernmental conferences and meeting meant to smooth communications with the Nigerian government, and to strengthen bilateral relations. The CCC, for example, arranged a meeting with the Director of Foreign Cultural Center in Nigeria, and hosted a seminar to celebrate the 95th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2016. A Chinese staff member at the CCC in Nigeria described the success of the countries’ efforts is the cooperative and amicable diplomatic relations between China and Nigeria under mutual understanding and development (Interviewee N-B3, 2016).

Lastly, both the Chinese government and Chinese private company Huawei have worked hard to develop human resources at Huawei’s private training center in Nigeria. Since 1999,
when Huawei first arrived in Nigeria, the company has hired locals – today, around 70 percent of its employees in Nigeria are Nigerian (Interviewee N-D3, 2016). The role of Huawei’s training program has been to contribute to the Nigerian community, to promote employment opportunities, and to facilitate technology transfers. Beginning with the establishment of the first information and communications technology (ICT) solutions provider, and founding an ICT training center in Abuja96, in 2004, Huawei launched many programs for Nigerians – for example, free short-term training and internships for Nigerian women in 2013, in partnership with Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Communication Technology (FMCT) (Interviewee N-D3, 2016). Not only that, but Huawei also operates a Nigerian youth training program, ICT to Youth, but also, in 2015, the company entered into an MOU with the Federal Government of Nigeria with a promise to provide over 2,000 training opportunities for Nigerian youths. As of 2016, Huawei’s Abuja ICT Training Center has trained over 12,000 of its employee, customers, suppliers and partners (ibid). Youth training is held at Huawei’s Abuja and Lagos ICT centers, and each sends selected youths who are in the top 5 percent of each training class to China in order to receive intensive training at Huawei’s headquarters’ training center. Huawei employs the trained Nigerian youths and continues to train them for promotion and ongoing development, for both Nigerian people and Nigeria’s ICT sector (ibid). In 2016, Huawei launched an Innovation and Experience (I&E) center in Lagos, with an investment of $6 million. The center is the first in West Africa, and was established to “exchange ideas, explore business solutions through innovation and also a platform to develop win-win information and communications technology (ICT) eco-system” for the sake of the development of the company and Nigeria. Huawei Technology Nigeria Limited also signed a Joint Innovation MOU with the University of Lagos, to foster more ICT talent in Nigeria (Xinhua News, 2016f).

The Chinese government does not have an ownership stake in or have any right to control of Huawei, because the company is an independent, private company. However, Beijing works in conjunction with Huawei to create close economic ties and implement its public diplomacy strategy for Sino-Nigeria relations. Huawei, in particular, has had a major, positive effect on the development of Nigeria’s telecommunications sector and skills training. Charles Ding, Senior Vice President of Huawei, clearly indicates the company’s intention, as the only representative from the telecom industry present at the 5th Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs, a side event of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC):

We […] cooperate with governments, customers, and industrial partners to increase the telecom network coverage significantly to achieve a win-win cooperation. […]

96 The Huawei training centre is located in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Egypt, and Tunisia.
Huawei looks forward to working together with governments, industrial partners, and enterprises in Africa and China, to build a better connected Africa, ensuring that the digital economy becomes the bridge of friendship that connects China and Africa. (Huawei, 2015)

Huawei maintains economic cooperation with Nigeria; at the same time, its social responsibility plays a role as part of China’s public diplomacy to encourage communication between China and the Nigerian public. To support Huawei’s work in Nigeria, the Chinese government not only supports Huawei’s overseas expansion financially, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, but also promotes positive relations with the Nigerian government.

In addition to ICT training, a Chinese multinational Group of Companies (CGC) was started to focus on promoting integrated agricultural technology in Nigeria. Agriculture is a key sector of the Nigerian economy: around 30 percent of the Nigerian people are engaged in the sector. This is the first time that an organization has collaborated on work between the Chinese Embassy in Nigeria and the Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, in a bid to grow Nigeria’s economy. According to a training program that includes the China-Africa agriculture modernization plan – one of China’s ten major cooperation plans with Africa – the program is designed to introduce content mainly related to agriculture technology (Xinhua News, 2016c).

6.1.3 The effect of China’s public diplomacy in Nigeria

Based on the previous content, this section will discuss how various Chinese governmental, semi-governmental and non-governmental actors – such as government agents, enterprises including SOEs, and private companies, and institutions – exert influence in Nigeria through public diplomacy instruments (e.g., foreign aid, culture and education institute, and media). Furthermore, it will consider how it encourages better results when China communicates with the Nigerian public and boosts China’s reputation on the ground. Thus, the section will start with the Nigerian public, to examine how Chinese public diplomacy is affected and how it has broadened its scope to address Nigeria’s political economy and the bilateral ties between the two countries.

6.1.3.1 The Nigerian public

China’s public diplomacy exerts a positive influence on China’s reputation in the eyes of the Nigerian public. Nigerians learn about Chinese culture and watch Chinese broadcasts
through the institutions and media; they get first-hand experience of China’s assistance boosting Nigeria’s infrastructure. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2013, Nigeria was one of the countries viewed favorably by Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, and South Africa. Nigeria enjoyed a good impression from 76 percent of Kenya (78 percent) and Senegal (77 percent) respondents. In Pew’s 2007 research there was no data regarding Nigeria’s attitudes towards China (Kohut, et al., 2013), but now results show that most Nigerian people have a favorable image of China. Considering that China really started to focus on it public diplomacy during the Hu Jintao era, China’s public diplomacy strategy has paid off and delivered positive results from the Nigerian people. By extension, the favorable image of China can be connected to a positive local reaction to China’s foreign policy towards and enterprise activity in Nigeria. The Pew has also been shown that 70 percent of Nigerians believe that China considers Nigeria’s interests when they compose their foreign policy towards Nigeria. China’s scientific and technological success is recognized by 85 percent of Nigerians, across all age groups. Nigerians also think positively about the way the Chinese are conducting their business in Nigeria (Ibid, p.31). In the same vein, Ayoola (2013) found that nearly 90 percent of Nigerians strongly believed that increased trade relations with China will boost the Nigerian economy, as part of the Vision 20:2020 program/policy in his 2011 field survey. Due to China’s various public diplomacy efforts at communicating with the Nigerian public, the image of China and its enterprises has gradually improved in Nigeria. Despite some differing opinions about China’s involvement in Nigeria, nearly half of Nigerians deem that China is not in Nigeria solely for natural resources, and nor does it practice neo-colonialism in Nigeria. Nigerians also display a tendency to prefer China’s policy and its implementation over that of the West. Furthermore, they have positive views on Chinese migration, Chinese company’s business for large projects, Chinese small-business activities, China’s rising international power, and China’s non-interference policy (Sautman and Yan, 2009).

As can be seen from the survey results above, Nigerians and Chinese have a common interest that puts economic development first, and consequently there is a generally favorable view of China’s economic involvement in Nigeria. This clearly reflects that China is a major trade and investment partner in Nigeria, and China’s rapid economic growth has become an object of envy in Nigeria. Through China’s various media and cultural institutions’ activities, Nigerians have deepened their understanding of China as an advanced and modernized country, its ideas and customs, and has replaced its negative impression of China (that it always pursues its own interests unilaterally) with a more friendly impression. At the same time, Chinese enterprises’ efforts have also taken part in the process of promoting a positive Chinese image in Nigeria, through skills training and area development. By showing their
social responsibility, Chinese companies contribute to the impression that relations between China and Nigeria are equal. Hence, Nigerians bridge the gap between China and Nigeria caused by unequal economic relations with complementary partnership and mutual understanding, via various exchange programs for learning their different cultures. Interviewee N-A2 (2016) also notes that the Chinese government and its enterprises’ efforts establish harmonious relations between China and Nigeria. Interviewee N-B1 (2016) also looks ahead to a better future in Sino-Nigerian ties, as the majority of Nigerian youths get the chance to experience Chinese TV shows and dramas, learn the Chinese language, and participate in cultural exchange activities – more so than do adults. When the younger generations have grown up, the two countries will further close the gap caused by economic relations, and enjoy closer relationships than today’s.

To conclude, China’s improved image in Nigeria boosts Sino-Nigerian economic relations. The efforts to understand each other have led to concrete relations for a more developed strategic partnership, in order to achieve their mutual interests. China’s public diplomacy towards the Nigerian public is not only to improve understanding of China’s culture and language, but also to generate a sympathetic bond and enhance China’s credibility. This is directly linked to improving and growing foreign relations between China and Nigeria. As a result of China’s positive and friendly image in the eyes of the Nigerian people, Beijing expands its leverage in Nigeria’s political economy sector. China’s expanded leverage, and its effect on Nigeria’s political economy sector are explored in the following section.

6.1.3.2 The political economy sector in Nigeria

There are still problems waiting to be resolved regarding China’s economic involvement in Nigeria. Nevertheless, China’s public diplomacy approach to its relationship with Nigeria has been positively receives by the Nigerian government. China’s public diplomacy contributes to boosting China and Nigeria’s economic activities by presenting a positive image to the Nigerian politicians and public. Notwithstanding the cooperation between China and Nigeria already existing in various fields (agriculture, fisheries, mineral exploitation, light industry, textile, mechatronics, and oil refining), China also provides full support to professionals, infrastructure, funds for modern agriculture, industry development, and expanding mutual cooperation in the fields of culture, education, media, women, and youth (Xinhua News, 2016a). China’s multidirectional support for Nigeria is interpreted as not only solving Nigeria’s domestic issues, but also eliciting a positive reaction from Nigerians towards Chinese involvement in the country’s economy.
The biggest obstacles in Nigeria’s economy are as follows: high unemployment rates, with low output; a weakness in competitive exports, resulting from poor domestic production capability; a fragile internal power and energy supply system, due to insufficient and poor oil refining technology and supply facilities; the unstable Naira currency, which is linked to the import market; and the worsening deficit in government finance. Due to the decline in international oil prices, Nigeria is also faced with unexpected difficulties arising from an economic recession, wasting foreign reserves, and a weak Nigerian currency. Hence, the Nigerian government is keen to receive assistance from China to address the shaky Nigerian economic conditions. To maximize economic ties with China, in 2016, Nigeria adopted the renminbi as a reserve currency (instead of the US dollar) to shore up the Naira, after Buhari paid a visit to Beijing. Regarding this, Interviewee S-F2 (2017) said,

On the point of RMB internationalization, I think it’s still a strategic move of Chinese government in order to gain more say in trade. Also, African countries’ economies are tied with USD as well, it is also many of the countries’ target to lower the influence from USA. I believe RMB will bring more diversity to the trading world, and help balancing the USD dominant situation.

This momentous decision signified that China wields considerable economic influence in Nigeria, through its enormous investment and generous aid. The Nigerian government also recognizes the positive Chinese influence in its country. Since 2016, Nigeria’s central bank planned to diversify its foreign exchange reserves away from the US dollar, by converting its stock to the Renminbi. Also, Buhari requested that China’s technical committees promptly complete discussions of a new joint project for rail, power, manufacturing, agriculture, and solid mineral projects, which are crucial for its economic diversification and development. While previous regimes were passive about the unfair economic relations, Buhari attempted to rectify the gap between China and Nigeria, seeking mutually benefits and reciprocated respect and trust to further strengthen relations. In 2016, he called upon Chinese investors to improve economic ties through a Nigeria-China Business and Investment Forum, and said:

Although the Nigerian and Chinese business communities have recorded tremendous successes in bilateral trade, there is a large trade imbalance in favour of China, as Chinese exports represent some 80 per cent of the total bilateral trade volume. This gap needs to be reduced. Therefore, I would like to challenge the business communities in both countries to work together to reduce the trade imbalance. You must also imbibe the spirit of having a mutually beneficial relationship in your business transactions. You must not see Nigeria as a consumer market alone, but as...
an investment destination where goods can be manufactured and consumed locally. The future is bright and I am very confident that our policies will make Nigeria the investment destination of your choice. (FOCAC, 2016)

Through China’s support and Buhari’s efforts on diversifying its production market, Nigeria got the chance to establish a foothold to strength the weak point for economic development. Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Geoffrey Onyeama noted that, “partnership with China in the identified area would enable Nigeria to achieve its economic diversification plans” (Allafrica, 2016). The Nigerian government embraces Chinese companies’ investment and technology transfer to achieve its goal. Interviewee N-D2 (2016) argued that Nigeria needs China to achieve economic development under a win-win strategy, although Sino-Nigerian ties are perceived in a negative light by the West. This is because Chinese companies provide not only better-priced products for the Nigerian people, and reasonably priced construction, but also transfer high technology. Also, the interviewee has a positive view of Chinese involvement in Nigeria’s economy due to their experience that major sectors – such as telecommunication, manufacturing, and agriculture – are improving as a result of cooperation with Chinese enterprises. By extension, they also pointed out that China’s various recent activities and efforts related to improving the living and welfare conditions of the Nigerian people also lead to better results in Nigeria’s economic development. Since the early 2000s, when China began to operate in earnest in the Nigerian business environment, gross capital formation has risen as a percentage of GDP. At the same time, China’s increased FDI has led to a decrease in Nigeria’s unemployment rate (Nnanna, 2015, pp.41-43). Interviewee N-A2 (2016) also expressed his views on China’s efforts at communication diversification in Nigeria. He said that it enables the formation of a good Chinese reputation in Nigeria, which in turn leads to positive results, as there are diverse fields in which China and Nigeria cooperate. Hence, over 40 medium- and large-sized Chinese private firms have arrived in Nigeria: they have invested US$ 800 million (China Daily, 2014c), and cooperate with local Nigerian companies. The Chinese government also focuses on supporting Nigeria’s economy by encouraging its companies to go out into Nigeria, and by sending its scholars to Nigeria to boost certain areas’ technology, and also by rendering financial aid.

The Nigerian economy does not rely heavily on the oil sector, nowadays. Given a nearly 7 percent increased the Nigeria’s annual real GDP over last ten years, non-oil sectors and services (such as telecommunication and retail) account for 57 percent of GDP growth. Also, manufacturing and agriculture constitute 9 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of the growth (Chen, Sun, Ukaejiofo, Tang, and Brautigam, 2016). Thus, cooperation with China is of even more importance than it was in the early 2000s, as China has developed the most
competitive and largest construction industries with specialized expertise, linked to its ability to render necessary financial assistance to Nigeria (Oyeranti, Babatunde, and Ogunkola, 2011). China, in practice, helped Nigeria to get results in various fields; it steered a win-win situation in both Nigeria and China’s economy.

A typical example is that China’s foreign aid casts a glow in the Free-Trade Zones (FTZs) in Nigeria. Oyeranti and his colleagues note that Kajola Specialized Railway Industrial FTZ, Ogun Guangdong FTZ, China Town, and Lekki FTZ have converged on Chinese investment, and operate a joint undertaking that is mostly for manufacturing, trade, and transportation between China and Nigeria (Oyeranti, et al., 2011). The FTZs in Nigeria were established by a joint venture between Chinese companies and the Nigerian government; and various spin-offs from the FTZs were expected. Lekki FTZ, for example, was established through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Chinese Government (on behalf of China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), Nanjing Jiangning Development Zone in the Jiangsu Province, and the Chinese Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC)) and the Lagos State Government (on behalf of Lekki Worldwide Investment Limited), with China-Africa Lekki Investment Ltd (CALI) and China-Africa Development Fund Ltd (CAD Fund), in 2007. As the largest Nigerian trade, economic, and financial hub, the FTZ is located on the Lekki Peninsula in Lagos, and was approved by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce in 2007 (Xinhua Silk Road Information Service, 2016). To promote the FTZ, Nigeria’s government provides preferential policies to investors as follows: complete tax exemption for all Federal, State and Local Government taxes, rates, customs duties, and levies; 99 year-land leasehold, and 50 years of concessionary rights of the zone’s operation and management; 100 percent repatriation of capital, profits and dividends; and one-stop approvals for all permits, operating licenses and incorporation papers. Since 2016, the Central Bank of Nigeria also began to issue the Guidelines for Banking Operations in the FTZ. CALI also assists the enterprises in the FTZ to prepare to start their business in Nigeria, by introducing their products and services to CRCC and CCECC, who reserve a seat beforehand in Nigeria. Although the CAD Fund is currently China’s only operating fund specialized in Africa, and CALI’s second largest shareholder, it can provide the necessary financing if a project fits their investing criteria (Xinhua Silk Road Information Service, 2016). The aim of the Lekki FTZ is to develop an offshore economic growth zone, promoting exports, creating more job opportunities, attracting foreign investment, minimizing capital flight, and setting up a one-stop global business haven. Recently, the FTZ began the construction work of not only a power plant that could supply a stable amount of energy across the country, but also water and sewage treatment plants. The promising investors at the FTZ are agri-processing, clothing and textiles, food and beverages, forestry,
pharmaceuticals, and mining. The current total investment of $140 million is from steel structuring, truck assembly, steel pipes, furniture manufacturing, and generator manufacturing in the Lekki FTZ (Oyeranti, et al., 2011).

In addition, Nigeria achieved good results in agriculture development through the two phases of the China-Nigeria South-South Agriculture cooperation program, between 2002 and 2004. China provided Nigeria with all-around technical training in fisheries, agronomy, water conservancy, and animal husbandry. Beijing offered not only numerous training opportunities to Nigerian agriculture officials and technical staff to improve their capability, but also provided high-quality seeds to Nigerian farmers. The agriculture sector accounts for 23 percent of Nigeria’s GDP, and engages 38 percent of its working population. The Nigerian government expects its agriculture industry to be a stable driver of its GDP under Buhari’s Economic Recovery Growth Plan (Xinhua News, 2017e). Not only that, but China’s telecommunication companies are also expanding their business in Nigeria; while at the same time assisting in improving Nigeria’s communication facilities by training the local people. Chinese enterprises operate satellite networks with Nigerian companies; consequently, the systems cover 84 percent of Nigeria, and boost the broadcasting and electronic equipment business. In the same vein, interviewee N-D2 (2016) discussed the development of the Nigeria’s telecommunication sector. As he works at one of the companies engaged in the extension of broadband fiber optic cable from Abuja to Lagos, he argued that Chinese telecom companies helped to improve Nigeria’s communications network with its technology. During the fiber installation operation, the company provided good quality materials at a reasonable price, hired locals who were willing to learn the technology for the construction, and trained them.

In sum, it is true that there are outstanding issues that the Nigerian government still needs to solve regarding Chinese economic involvement in Nigeria. These problems include adjusting prices between China and Nigerian in manufacturing, definite core technology transfer, environmental problems, quality enhancement, the Nigerian people’s working conditions at Chinese company, and others. However, overall, China’s Nigeria involvement makes up for Nigeria’s deficiencies, and its merits outweigh the problems. Per Söderbom and Teal (2002)’s research, based on the 2001 Nigerian Manufacturing Enterprise Survey, the factors that Nigeria needs to address in its manufacturing sector, in order to catch up, are the poor investment in equipment and machinery, insufficient skilled labor, and a lack of technology. Together, these result in poor product quality and high prices, which cannot be competitive domestically or internationally. These issues are not only relevant to the manufacturing sector, but are pervasive in Nigeria’s various industries, all of which hinders
its economic development. From the early 2000s, the Chinese government’s multi-directional strategy towards economic ties with Nigeria has brought about encouraging results in key areas that are connected to its economic development in Nigeria. Today, Chinese enterprises also have an equitable agreement and protection of local businesses in mind when they operate in Nigeria (Nnanna, 2015). Unlike the previous public image, that China only exploits Nigeria to gain access to oil and gas, Nigeria now recognizes China’s positive, necessary impact on Nigeria’s economy, after receiving the various training sessions, large amounts of investment, and improved infrastructure facilities resulting from the Chinese government and companies’ efforts. It is safe to say that the reflection of public diplomacy in China’s foreign economic policy has had the effect of boosting Sino-Nigerian economic ties.

6.1.3.3 The relations between Nigeria and China

Given China’s positive effect on Nigeria, above, the strategic relations between China and Nigeria are strengthening economically and politically as a result of China’s public diplomacy. As discussed above, China has gone a long way to provide substantive assistance directly linked to the Nigerian public and its economic development, in order to cement good relations between China and Nigeria. Hence, China’s public diplomacy policy plays an important role in creating a forum for conversation of political economy cooperation. With regards to Sino-Nigerian economic cooperation, at a meeting with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that, “China is willing to strengthen cooperation and exchanges in a wide range of areas with Nigeria, including politics, trade, investment, finance, agriculture, education, security, international issues and others”. In response, Buhari reconfirmed Nigeria’s support for the all-round development of bilateral ties, and further stressed that the relationship has made progress in various fields, including developments in the emergent areas of infrastructure, agriculture, and power production (Xinhua News, 2015e). One year later, China pledged to stimulate production capacity cooperation with Nigeria, during a meeting with Buhari in Beijing. This type of cooperation is part of China’s public diplomacy connected to economic ties, which also includes providing assistance through infrastructure construction (railways, highways, and hydroelectric stations), the creation of free trade areas, expansion of agriculture technology transfer and investment, and boosting the development in mining, aviation, and finance. At the same time, Beijing encourages its enterprises to invest in Nigeria, with the expectation of receiving more support from Nigeria. In this way, Buhari has an optimistic view of
cooperation with China, and referred to it as “lifting the Nigeria-China cooperation to a new level” (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2016b).

The reciprocal cooperation and extension of ties serves as the foundation for bolstering relations, especially in the fields of economics and trade. Through overseas trip by the two countries’ leaders, major issues and deals are negotiated and launched. In terms of China’s support to Nigeria, China has strengthened its position and gained the upper hand in the cooperative area in Nigeria. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s government policy towards Nigeria, China’s aims with regards to Nigeria are to expand Chinese manufactured goods’ access into the Nigerian market; to increase the share of Chinese multinational companies in the Nigerian market; and to increase China’s influence in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector and its investment in Nigeria so as to join the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) market (Izuchukwu and Ofori, 2014, p.362). Based on the Chinese government’s goals, Beijing has extended trade and secured resource in support of China’s economic growth and globalization, and to accomplish Sino-centrism with a peaceful rise through cooperation with Nigeria.

As for Nigeria’s demands, Nigeria wants China’s assistance with economic development. According to the core purpose and primary principles of Nigeria’s state constitution, the aim of the country’s foreign policy (Adekola, 2013, p.2), which is reflects the importance of economic expansion by wielding its influence over African countries and globally, can be summarized thus:

a. promotion and protection of the national interests;

b. promotion of African integration and support for African unity;

c. promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace;

d. promotion of mutual respect among all nations;

e. promotion of a just world economic order;

f. respect for international law and treaty obligations.

Nigeria, as mentioned above, received an economic assistance package from China, which covered the areas of education, infrastructure development, fund support, petroleum refining technology and facilities, agriculture, mining, telecommunication, media development, and others. The acute need for China’s support, which is greater than before, is because of an overall economic crisis in Nigeria. Nigeria’s high growth did not last long: it
was enjoying a 7 percent of annual average increase until 2014, after which it started a precipitous decline. The reason for this decreased growth rate included continuing internal matters (mentioned earlier) and government incapacity due to inefficient budget policies and corruption. Under current-President Buhari’s policy objectives, focused on economic reconstruction, strengthening public security, and rooting out corruption, Nigeria established “Economic Recovery and Growth Plan for 2017-2020” (ERGP). The Medium Term Plan for 2017-2020 builds on the Strategic Implementation Plan, which was as short-term strategy for Buhari’s three objectives, and was developed with the goal of restoring economic growth in mind, through leveraging of the ingenuity and resilience of the Nigerian people. The key priorities of the ERGP are as follows: stabilizing the macroeconomic environment, achieving agriculture and food security, ensuring energy sufficiency (power and petroleum products), improving transportation infrastructure, and driving industrialization focused on small- and medium-scale enterprises. The Nigerian government also focuses on the Nigerian people’s healthcare, education, social inclusion, job creation, youth empowerment, population growth management, and environment sustainability (ERGP, n.a.). Hence, through China’s assistance, Nigeria can resolve its dependency on imported Chinese goods, by boosting domestic productivity so that Nigeria’s economy can be less vulnerable to Chinese and global economic fluctuations. Drawing on diversified production investment in Nigeria, Nigeria can shift away from a reliance on oil and gas, and move into competitive fields such as mining, agriculture, and manufacturing. The transfer of advanced technology from China also fortifies the foundation for qualitatively improving Nigeria’s education system. These serve as catalysts for bridging the divide between government, corporations, and the public, and in the long run should create jobs and help the poor in Nigeria.

In return for China’s extensive support, Nigeria upholds China’s One-China policy, which is of utmost importance to China. When it comes to China’s political demands, the One China policy is a necessity for not only establishing bilateral ties but also maintaining relations with Nigeria. On that note, in the mid-2000s, when China and Nigeria established their strategic ties, then-Nigerian President Obasanjo supported China’s Anti-Secession Law, which is meant to prevent Taiwan independence. In 2017, the Nigerian government reaffirmed its commitment to the One-China policy, with the view to maintaining the long-standing friendship and cooperation with China, during a tour of Nigeria by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. In a joint statement by Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister Geoffrey Onyeama, affirming that the core of the two countries’ strategic partnership is the One-China policy, Nigeria recognized that “the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of
China’s territory” (CCTV, 2017). According to the policy, Nigeria reconsidered a trade agreement with Taiwan and imposed sanctions against Taiwan, such as a prohibition on the use of the country’s name and insisting that permission be obtained prior to Taiwanese government officials’ entry into and departure from Nigeria. By insisting on total support, China have brought Nigeria over to China’s side in its diplomatic dispute with Taiwan.

Recently, China has lead the fight to eradicate terrorism in Nigeria. In 2017, China formally pledged to support not only Nigeria but also other West African countries to fight against terrorism. Although the number of Chinese residents in Nigeria are increasing, the Chinese government was helpless against misdemeanors and terrorism in Nigeria. A decisive incident in China’s military cooperation was during the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria, which led to irreversible damage to both China and Nigeria. In 2012, some Chinese were killed by Boko Haram when they opened fire at crowds in the city of Maiduguri, in northern Nigeria (Xinhua News, 2012a). After this, China and Nigeria entered into an agreement of military cooperation, including training and retaining a security presence in regions plagued by terrorism, and also providing disaster response capabilities. President of the Senate of Nigeria David Mark, additionally, requested China’s assistance in the mass production of military hardware for the Nigerian Navy, Airforce, Army, the Police, and an aircraft spare parts production center in Nigeria, when he met with the President of the Chinese Parliament, Zhang Dejiang in Abuja in 2013 (Channels TV, 2013). The next year, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls from dormitories in Chibok, Borno State. China emphasized its responsibility as a powerful nation, and performed the role of a member of the UN Security Council in combating terrorism in Nigeria. However, China’s plan was to gain ground gradually, to earn a strong partnership with Nigeria through humanitarian intervention based on respect for Nigeria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition to the Chinese government’s efforts, Chinese enterprises enthusiastically promoted friendship in Sino-Nigerian relations, by sending relief to the victims of Boko Haram. A typical example of this is Huawei’s donation of relief materials to the Nigerian people displaced by Boko Haram. Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria Zhou Pingjian shared his impression of the Chinese company’s social responsibility:

As a good friend of Nigeria, we are ready to play our due part. At the government level, we are working with the government to do something on the issue and at the business level we encourage more and more Chinese companies here to follow Huawei’s example to better integrate with the Nigerians here. (Xinhua News, 2017b)
6.1.4 Conclusion

Contemporary Sino-Nigerian relations display an expansion of strategic relations based on the four-point proposal agreed by Hu Jintao and Olusegun Obasanjo. To be more exact, the two countries cooperate with each other in various ways and fields to gain advantages through close relations in international society. However, multiple issues remain: such as the trade imbalance, Nigerian textile industry recession, the lack of technology transfer, problems related to China’s completed aid projects, and others. In China’s Nigerian foreign policy of the 2010s, China addresses these issues and focuses on political equality, economic win-win cooperation, and cultural exchanges aimed at generating mutual trust. China’s public diplomacy plays the role of a bridge between China and Nigeria, to build trust and expand cooperation.

First, the Chinese government utilizes its foreign aid, focused on utilitarian and practical assistance in production sectors, and connected directly to Nigeria’s economic development – such as power plants, oil refineries, manufacturing, agriculture, mining, and others, to create maximum value from China’s foreign assistance in Nigeria. Beijing also concentrates on improving Nigeria public’s welfare, and expects science and technology development to improve cooperation and deepen strategic relations, as well as earn the local populations’ trust.

Second, China’s media in Nigeria focuses on producing an friendly atmosphere that connects China and Nigeria in the sectors of political economy and social culture, through newspapers, magazine, and a radio station.

Third, by using China’s cultural and educational institutes, Beijing seeks to introduce Chinese language and culture to the Nigerian public, and promotes not only local Chinese companies’ development but also job creation for local people. Chinese telecommunications behemoth, Huawei, engages in technical education for local youths and people, to help local development and improve China’s image. Chinese public diplomacy activities in Nigeria display a tendency for both introducing China through culture and language, and also for considering China’s economic development through its companies in Nigeria. At the same time, through China’s public diplomacy activities, China endeavors to support local people’s welfare, human resource development, job creation, and Nigeria’s economic development, in a number of ways, which improves China’s public image and weakens discontent that arises from the lopsided economic relationship it has with Nigeria.
As a result of China’s public diplomacy activities in Nigeria, the Nigerian public seem to have developed a favorable image of China, which is also reflect in Nigerian foreign policy. As expressed in Pew’s aforementioned research, the majority of Nigerians recognize that China endeavors for mutual development and understanding as part of its win-win strategy. Also, the common interests between China and Nigeria, which puts economic development first, generate momentum for various forms of political economy cooperation between the two countries: for example, in the fields of development in emergent industries, infrastructure, agriculture and power production, and in providing assistance for infrastructure construction, expanding agriculture technology transfers and investment, and boosting developments in mining, aviation, and finance, as part of China’s public diplomacy. China now also supports Nigeria on security issues that arise from Boko Haram’s operations, and supports social stability and security. With China’s multidirectional assistance, Nigeria established the FTZs, and expects to develop its vulnerable sectors – such as manufacturing, agriculture, mining, infrastructure, and others – which are directly linked to economic development.

Chapter 6.2 South Africa
South Africa’s economy has taken the industrial lead in Africa. Unlike other African countries, South Africa has a firm footing in the steel and auto industries, including manufacturing, based on its abundant natural resources. It also became an official member of the BRICs countries in 2010. Thus, South Africa’s politically and economically influential conditions attract China’s attention, as they enjoy the common grounds of being emerging markets, powerful developing countries, and members of the BRICs countries. Hence, China cements its relations with South Africa in order to wield greater influence over political economy issues on the international stage. Through complementary multilateral cooperation, China and South Africa seek to enhance their mutual interests and develop their relationship into a strategic partnership. However, the economic ties between the two countries are not mutually favorable, as China has the upper hand over South Africa due to a disparity in the economic power between the two countries.

The chapter keeps the same framework and aims as the previous chapter, and will explore the role of China’s public diplomacy in South Africa to create a close economic relationship, and examines the connection between China’s public diplomacy and its foreign policy towards Sino-South African political economy relations. The chapter is divided into three parts: first, it introduces the overall background of how China and South Africa have become strategic partners, and discusses the causes for disharmony between China and South Africa in bilateral economic relations. Second, it looks at the role of China’s public diplomacy using three instruments – foreign aid, cultural and education institutes, and the media – to analyze how China’s public diplomacy works in South Africa, and how it carries out in China’s foreign policy towards South Africa. Third, it examines the effect of China’s public diplomacy on the South African public, South Africa’s political economy, and the relations between China and South Africa, and assesses how China’s public diplomacy works to strengthen ties and boost ongoing interaction between the two countries.

6.2.1 The background of China-South Africa relations

South Africa officially established diplomatic ties with China in 1998. Due to the fact that South Africa established diplomatic ties with Taiwan before 1998, official relations between China and South Africa were a step behind those Beijing enjoyed with other African countries. Sino-South African relations have gone through three different stages: first, the two countries entered a limited partnership based on common interests; next, this developed into a more mature strategic economic and political relationship; and, lastly, they established the current “comprehensive strategic partnership”, which is based on a
strengthened trade relationship and increased the nations’ common interests (Bradley, 2016, pp.882). The gradual changes were led by former President Thabo Mbeki, and the strengthened cooperation in Sino-South African ties were made by President Jacob Zuma. Most of the diplomatic relations in Sino-South African ties were established in the early 2000s. The Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership between China and South Africa was signed, in 2000, by Chinese President Jiang Zemin and South African President Thabo Mbeki. The declaration underlined the importance of cooperation and mutual support regarding key global multilateral issues, based on mutual benefit. Based on the declaration, the China and South Africa Bi-National Commission was also established to “guide and coordinate all government-to-government relations between China and South Africa, and to consult on matters of mutual interest in the bilateral and multilateral spheres”. Through the Bi-National Commission, the two countries agreed to cooperate politically and economically on the international stage (MFA, 2004). The first meeting of the China and South Africa Bi-National Commission was held in 2001, and the second was held in 2004, when China’s Vice President Zeng Qinghong paid an official visit to South Africa. During the second meeting, the two countries agreed to cooperate to elevate their strategic partnership and developed the shape of trade between China and South Africa. China embraced the Southern African Customs Union decision negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China, which was the result of South Africa recognizing China’s positive market economy status. The two countries agreed not only to launch the negotiation, but also to support mutual trade and investment in the name of mutual economic interests. Through the second commission meeting, China and Africa set up the deeper, strengthened, and diversified strategic partnership between China and South African through exchanges in the areas of trade, investment, culture, education, science, technology, and international affairs, including defense issues for world peace and stability.

Through Sectoral Committee Meetings and counterpart consultation, the two sides’ respective Foreign Ministries have intensified cooperation and consultation on mutual concerns regarding international issues of education, trade, economic cooperation, and improving market access for agriculture products into the two countries’ markets (DIRCO, 2004). In 2006, China and South Africa signed the Program of Cooperation on Deepening the Strategic Partnership, during a visit to South Africa by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao with South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki. The two countries agreed to not only foster and support each countries’ enterprises, but also to deepen cooperation in health, forestry, agriculture, technology, transportation science, IT, renewable energy, mining, cultural exchange, human resource development, medical science, and others (MFA, 2007). The following year, Chinese President Hu Jintao paid a visit to South Africa to further enhance
the strategic partnership between China and South Africa, during his first tour of eight African countries. During his visit to South Africa, he highlighted the Beijing FOCAC (so called Beijing Summit) in 2006, and reaffirmed the strong partnership between the two countries. Hu said,

It has been proved that strong China-South Africa relations of all-round cooperation serve the fundamental interests of both countries and peoples, promote unity and cooperation among developing countries and contribute to global peace and development. The Chinese Government and people will work closely with the South African Government and people to enhance mutual political trust and practical cooperation and steadily strengthen China-South Africa strategic partnership to the benefit of our two peoples. (MFA, 2007)

Sino-South Africa ties became solidified after the signing of the Beijing Declaration on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, during South African President Jacob Zuma’s first official visit to China, in 2010. The key component of the declaration is that “the two sides expressed the desire to further strengthen and deepen friendly exchange and cooperation between the two nations in both political and regional affairs by establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership based on equality, mutual benefit and common development”. Based on the aim of the promoting strengthened political economy ties, the declaration covers 38 bilateral cooperation agreements, such as political dialogue, mineral exploration, investment, trade, and agriculture for a collaborative effort in the UN and FOCAC. As a result of Zuma and Hu’s agreement, the two countries not only discussed the establishment of a consolidated partnership on climate change, but also agreed to encourage each country’s companies to increase infrastructure construction (power generation, railway, airport, housing, road, and ports). Furthermore, China and South Africa have an understanding to facilitate practical cooperation between the two countries’ energy companies, as well as expand cooperation in the sectors of cultural exchange, education, health, aquaculture, information communication, personnel exchange, science and technology – including civil aviation, defense, transportation, civil aviation, and mineral resource. The declaration also highlights that South Africa adheres to the One-China policy and supports the peaceful development of Cross-Taiwan Straits relations and the cause of China’s national reunification (China Daily, 2010b).

As a result of the cooperation agreement between China and South Africa, China has been South Africa’s largest single trading partner since 2009, and bilateral trade increased significantly – nearly 30 percent – from 2012 to 2013. Since then, China has become not
only South Africa’s biggest import county, but also the largest importer of South African goods. As of 2016, the volume of South Africa’s exports to China was R101.18bn, and the volume of imports from China was R199.03bn. The main export items to China are mineral products (59.93%), iron and steel (25.36%), wood pulp paper (3.83%) and textiles (2.65%). South Africa’s imported items from China are machinery (45.53%), textiles (10.04%), iron and steel products (8.48%), chemicals (6.25%), toys and sports apparel (5%), plastic and rubbers (4.98%) and footwear (4.21%) (SARS, n.a). Due to South Africa’s developed domestic environment, Chinese investors converged on South Africa’s mining, manufacturing, finance, wholesale and retail business, transport, and tourism sectors.

However, there is discord between China and South Africa due to the unbalanced nature of their economic ties. First, as mentioned above, South Africa is heavily reliant on completed products and high-technology electronics and machinery. On the other hand, China imports a large amount of minerals, iron and steel from South Africa. In other words, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, South Africa is in the precarious position of being subject to the fluctuations in international raw materials prices, and also China’s changing domestic economic situation. Hence, South Africa recorded an approximately R73 billion trade deficit with China in 2014, and considered countermeasures when South African International Relations Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (Fin24.com, 2014). Also, South Africa’s steel industry has damaged due to Chinese steel dumping and a sharp decline in raw material prices. This led South African steel company ArcelorMittal to close its century-old Vereeniging steelworks, and reduce its workforce by around 1,200 personnel, following a 25 percent decrease in production. In 2015, approximately 11,000 people in the South African steel industry lost their jobs due to Chinese dumping, and the International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa worried that the South African steel industry was in danger of collapsing (ITAC, 2016). South Africa also depends on imports of low-price manufactured goods, such as knitted and crocheted fabrics, clothing, footwear, household appliances, general purpose machinery, electronic products, and others, which has a direct impact on the South African manufacturing sector, which in turn results in lost profits, slow growth in output, and a decline in the number of jobs available (Edwards and Jenkins, 2015). From 2001-2010, 76,000 people lost their jobs in the manufacturing sector in South Africa, which was a 70 percent total loss resulting from increased imports (ibid). Based on this discord between

China and South Africa, the following part will discuss how Chinese public diplomacy has worked to build harmonious and close economic ties with South Africa.

6.2.2 The role of China’s public diplomacy in South Africa

6.2.2.1 Foreign Aid

The strategy of China’s South Africa foreign aid is distinctive from that with other African countries, such as Nigeria, which focuses on infrastructure development as a means for encouraging economic development. Interviewee S-G1 (2017) pointed out that South Africa is a unique country, in many ways, and that it should be classified as a developed country. It is at the forefront of African development in its civil infrastructure development, medical field, mining, agriculture, and others. Interviewee S-C2 (2017) also said that the “South Africa industrial sector even compete[s] with Chinese companies. South Africa doesn’t seriously need to get help from China in that part.” Because South Africa is equipped with better infrastructure than other African countries, China gives greater weight to finance, equipment manufacturing, and aviation cooperation, rather than all-around infrastructure development. However, this does not mean that South Africa has advanced, developed and well-appointed infrastructure facilities like other developed countries. Hence, in 2013, the China Development Bank offered US$5 billion to South African logistics group Transnet, to repair and restore South Africa’s old railway, which is used for commodities transportation. In 2015, Transnet and China Export Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) signed a US$2.5 billion deal for a port, railway, and pipeline project in South Africa. The agreement was made during a meeting between Zuma and Xi; and covered Chinese mechanical products, and South African service and operation, based Chinese companies’ construction work and management (Interviewee S-F1, 2017).

From 2000, China embarked on providing aid in a variety of areas in South Africa. However, unlike in other African countries, China did not offer South Africa unconditional infrastructure construction and development, and instead gradually expanded its aid to South Africa. In 2000, China assisted South Africa with a US$44 million grant to improve water supply materials, which was helped it to implement the South Africa Free Basic Water Policy (Interviewee S-F1, 2017). The following year, the Chinese municipality of Tianjin and South Africa’s Tshwane municipal council entered into an agreement to cooperate on mutual interests, through the exchange of sports, trade, and tourism. Also, in the same year, Shanghai signed a US$3 billion cooperative development deal with KwaZulu-Natal, in the
areas of economic development and investment, culture, environmental management, culture, and education. Shanghai also invested in 19 factories manufacturing garments, steel, electronics, and appliances. In 2002, China and South Africa signed an agreement to jointly develop herbal AIDS medicine. China also supports financially South Africa’s Human Resource Project. Since 2004, China and South Africa have agreed to provide to each other mutual legal assistance on criminal matters (AidData, n.a). From the mid-2000s to the early 2010s, China provided financial assistance not only for cultural exchanges and the establishment of education centers, but also for malaria prevention to the South African public. In 2006, China rendered US$2.5 million in support to South Africa for various skills training as part of 13 agreements on a wide range of cooperation in the fields of agriculture, national defense, sciences and technology, politics, economy, and trade signed by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and South African President Thabo Mbeki. The agreement was signed when Wen arrived in South Africa on the fifth leg of his seven-nation African tour, and he underlined the aim of the meeting “to strengthen China-South Africa friendship, enhance political mutual trust, expand cooperation of mutual benefit and promote common development” (China Daily, 2006). Since then, China began in earnest to expand its aid to more sectors, such as South Africa’s banking sector, infrastructure development, providing scholarships, crude oil refineries, and renewable energy projects. Among China’s aid to South Africa, the support for renewable energy projects is particularly worthy of notice. China ICBC and Standard Bank Group agreed to provide US$2.4 billion (R20bn) of financial assistance to renewable energy projects in South Africa, in 2013. In this regard, ICBC Chairman Jiang Jianping explained the aim of the assistance, which it was intended to “promote the use of renewable energy in South Africa in support of the South African government’s renewable energy programme, and through this partnership, to help save the environment.” He added that, “the objective of this partnership is to facilitate the entry of investors into South Africa, and ICBC is excited about the opportunity to co-lend into renewable energy with Standard Bank” (Standard Bank, 2013). The Chinese bank’s activities in South Africa are part of an agreement between China and South Africa made when the South African Vice-President visited China in 2011. The two countries agreed to cooperate on geology and sustainable mineral resource management, development, and utilization in China and South Africa based on mutual benefit. Furthermore, the agreement included the development of financial cooperation, signed by China Development Bank and Development Bank of South Africa. Through the two banks’ support, the financial assistance provides for bilateral cooperation in the areas of infrastructure construction, water resource utilization, transportation, housing, education, and health. Additionally, Xi Jinping urged greater bilateral cooperation in the areas of media, technology, education, human resource training
by using various mechanisms such as the United Nations, G20, World Trade Organization, and BRICS. Xi also stressed that “the two countries should keep closer negotiation and cooperation on major international and regional issues and maintain their common interests” (China Daily, 2011).

Based on the agreement above, China’s other major banks arrived in South Africa, and act as intermediaries between Chinese companies and South African market. The Bank of China, for example, opened its Johannesburg branch in 2000, as the first Chinese bank operating in South Africa. Since then, the bank has focused on the wholesale business, and endeavors to cement China and South Africa’s economic and trade cooperation by actively taking part in South Africa’s local markets and complying with related regulations. The Bank of China Johannesburg branch’s loan and syndication services and partnership with the China and Africa Development Fund is an example of how it supports Chinese companies addition to obtaining spin-off effects in South Africa. The Bank of China launched the R1 billion syndicated loan project when Chinese company Jidong Development Group and the China-Africa Development Fund signed a memorandum of understanding with South Africa’s Women Investment Portfolio Holdings group and limestone-miner Continental Cement, with regards to building a R165 billion cement manufacturing plant in the north of Brits, in South Africa, in 2010. Thanks to the bank’s syndicated loan, insured against political and default risk by Sinosure, Jidong’s investment was successfully accomplished. The project was set up successfully in 2014, and created 600 job opportunities during the construction of the manufacturing plant. Also, more jobs were created for South African workers through the plant’s operation. The Bank of China’s Johannesburg branch also grants credit facility to South Africa’s local consumers of machinery and equipment produced in China. Furthermore, the bank offered R6 million when China Southern Railway received an order for 459 locomotives to be exported to South Africa (Gao, 2016). Thus, the first cooperation between China and South Africa’s companies over local electric locomotive production contributed to the establishment of a developed transportation system in South Africa.

In sum, unlike in other African countries, where most of China’s aid is concentrated on infrastructure development, China’s support for South Africa is relatively diverse. China focuses on improving facilities that are connected to South African people’s health and living conditions, key infrastructure facilities development, and financial support through Chinese banks in South Africa (the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in Cape Town, Bank of China in Johannesburg, China Construction Bank in Johannesburg, and the Export-Import Bank of China in Johannesburg). The major Chinese banks' expansion into South Africa suggests that the inroads into South Africa made by Chinese companies are gaining
momentum, contributing to South Africa’s infrastructure development and providing funds to boost South African businesses in resource exploitation. China carries out public diplomacy in South Africa, such as ICBC’s renewable energy support. At the same time, China and South Africa attempt to work for mutual benefit through strategic partnerships. ICBC is very relevant to Standard Bank Group, because ICBC purchased a 20 percent stake in the bank, in 2007, because Standard Bank Group has a very wide sphere of activities, and fulfills the necessary conditions as a major African bank, as it operates in 18 African countries, has advanced operating system, management information and credit risk policies, and a market capitalization of ZAR146 billion. (Meyer, Alao, Alden, and Alves, 2011). The two banks cooperate on over 26 projects, with a total value of US$14 billion across multiple fields, such as risk management, business for enterprises, IT, money market, cash management, and others (interviewee S-F2, 2017).

6.2.2.2 The media

The majority of China’s major media organizations entered the South African market, unlike in other African countries, where only a few organizations opened operations. Since 2000, China Daily, Xinhua, CCTV, and China Radio International (CRI) established offices staffed by numerous journalists; the People’s Daily also has a large number of correspondents in South Africa. According to Interviewee S-A1 (2017), the role of Chinese journalists and correspondents in South Africa is to introduce and connect China to Africa, and vice versa. He added that the reason for the large Chinese media presence in South Africa is because it is an important country for China, both politically and economically. Interviewee S-A2 (2017) also expressed his opinion on the importance of media in Sino-South African relations, stating that China and South Africa are crucial to each other through exchanges of economy, culture, tourism, language and others. Thus, the two sides need to better understand each other, but the reality is that there are still many misunderstandings. That is why the media is so curial for the two countries, because journalists report accurate information so that the Chinese and South Africans can better understand each other (Interviewee S-A1, 2017). Therefore, China’s biggest newspaper, the China Daily, established an English-language African edition in South Africa, in 2013. The second African bureau for China Daily’s English daily was opened in Johannesburg, following the launch of a Nairobi branch in 2012. The newspaper’s aim is “to introduce China to the world and present news with a Chinese angle,” said China Daily’s deputy chief editor Gao Anming. The China Daily’s English newspaper is published every Friday, and covers mostly business news targeted at South Africans. The newspaper focuses on following an independent editorial policy, although the newspaper is
fully under Chinese government control. Hence, they hire local and Chinese journalists who understand more about China and South African business trends (Smith, 2012). Also, there is a private Chinese website, NF online (Nanfei zaixian), which has a goal of collecting major news related to Chinese in South Africa, and South African news to inform its readers on various issues such as crime, major events, cultural exchanges, scholarships, and others, in order to facilitate understanding between the two countries.

China focuses on introducing China not only through newspapers, but also through broadcasting via local mass media organizations. Chinese media in South Africa also cooperates with the local media, such as the Independent Media Group, to exchange news articles so as to promote mutual understanding between China and South Africa (Interviewee S-A1, 2017). In other words, the range of China’s media activities has increased, and is not limited to information delivered by newspapers. Wu (2016) pointed out that China began to focus on to disseminating China’s viewpoint in Africa in 2012; the following year, it concentrated on media investments in South Africa to introduce China to the public. Hence, China has conducted the following three significant investments when Chinese media entered South Africa: joint ventures (e.g., WeChat’s launch in South Africa with Naspers and China’s Tencent); engaging South Africans as partners or consumers (e.g., setting up telecommunications infrastructure and selling Chinese-brand mobile handsets); and accepting South African company shares – such as China’s Star Time, which has a stake in South Africa’s TopTV and StarSat, and the purchase of South Africa’s Independent News and Media by the Sekunjalo consortium partially by providing funding and also by acquiring 20 percent of the country’s second-largest newspaper publisher. The consortium is composed of South Africa’s state-owned broadcaster, CCTV, and the China-Africa Development Fund (Harber, 2014, p.149; Wu, 2016).

Here is an example of China’s media engagement in South African media: the China Hour was launched at CTV, a Cape Town-based TV channel that features cooking shows, documentaries, and kids’ entertainment. The China Hour is broadcast four times per week on CTV, produced by LB International Productions. The show mostly covers lifestyle content about China and South Africa, such as fashion, food, travel, and culture. The show’s original purpose was to provide information to viewers to help them understand the differences between China’s and South Africa’s cultural background, as a result of the increased Chinese population in South Africa. The China Hour at CTV has won popular acclaim and high ratings since May 2016 and the program’s airtime has increased 30 minutes more than usual from December 2016 (Interviewee S-A1, 2017). Also, StarSat introduced Chinese broadcasting as a subscriber channel in South Africa. China’s StarTimes owns 20 percent of
StarSat, which began broadcasting in South Africa in 2010. StarSat launched pay TV packages including 47 channels for R99 (around $8) per month, which offers more channels per package with competitive price than other companies in South Africa. A notable product of company was when it offered a Chinese TV channel package with 17 Chinese channels, for R149 (around $11), which let South Africans watch Chinese television broadcasts easily at with only one subscription (StarSat, 2017). Moreover, StarSat broadcast widely the “2015 Beijing TV Dramas & Movies Broadcasting Exhibition”, which contained 30 Chinese TV movies and dramas, dubbed into the local language, through their Chinese channels. As one of the events among the Beijing Week activities for the Year of China in South Africa, the exhibition was sponsored by the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (Interviewee S-A1, 2017).

To encourage harmonious communication between Chinese journalists and South Africa, China cooperates with South African academia. Since 2009, the Journalism Department at Wits University in South Africa has arranged various programs to help form connections between China and South Africa, through the Wits Africa-China Reporting Project. The project’s coordinator (Interviewee S-A2, 2017) said that the aim was to support Chinese and South African journalists to write about Sino-South African relations and issues. Through the project, the department not only offers different types of seminar and meeting to create understanding between China and South Africa, but also publishes China-Africa related articles collected from Chinese and South African journalists through its website. In 2016, the Wits China-Africa project arranged a joint event to open communication between South African journalists and Chinese Universities in Beijing, and with the Chinese embassy in South Africa. The first joint event was for Chinese journalists, for two weeks in 2016. The content of the workshop was mostly based on practical skills training experience for Chinese journalists, regarding how to report in and on Africa, through lectures and training at Wits Journalism Department, including a number of excursions to selected places in Johannesburg. The Chinese participants were affiliated with government-owned media agencies, private businesses, financial news companies, and also freelancers for People’s Daily, CCTV, Global Times, and China Daily (Interviewee S-A2, 2017). Furthermore, in the same year, the Wits China-Africa projects organized a Sino-South Africa Business and Journalism Seminar, which was jointly hosted by the Wits China-Africa Project and the China and South Africa Economy and Trade Association at the China Construction Bank Building in Johannesburg. The seminar, which arranged meetings for South African journalists working in Sino-South Africa financial circles, was the first in South Africa. With influential Chinese companies in South Africa (FAW, CRI Eagle, China Construction Bank, ICBC, China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation, ZTE, Huawei and Hisense) and major South
Africa media outlets (the Mail and Guardian, The Independent, and Kaya FM) attending, the two groups presented a plan for how to fill the gap between the practical problems for reporting about Chinese firms, and Chinese companies’ expectations from the local media. Through the seminar, moreover, the two groups learned the differences between each group’s view of social responsibility, the methods of cooperative communication, companies’ management methods based on different cultural backgrounds – all to help rectify false reporting of Chinese companies, and to smooth communication between the two groups in the future (The Wits Africa-China Reporting Project, 2016). Through the joint events and workshops, Chinese people from universities would like to cement relations with South African schools to encourage them to learn the Chinese language and learn about Chinese culture. Also, Chinese people who run their businesses in South Africa are keen to get the message out to the South African public about what they are doing for the local people and the country. Through better publicity, Chinese companies can make up for their shortcomings, which arise from their cultural background – such as speaking loudly, shy, aggressive image, and others – and therefore improve their business reputations in the eyes of the South African people (Interviewee S-A2, 2017). Interviewee S-G1 (2017), for example, also could not easily understand the situation of Chinese people and companies’ distrust in South Africa, although Shanghai Zendai contributes to the local community and environmental protection in South Africa as a part of social responsibility.

With regards to China’s media involvement in South Africa, Interviewee S-A1 (2017) summed up the three advantages of media involvement: first, it will help Chinese tourists and entrepreneurs in China to understand South Africa, and therefore attract Chinese tourists and investment in South Africa. Second, it is a good means through which the Chinese government can establish its diplomatic strategy towards, and improve relations with South Africa, based on contemporary issues. Third, it attracts voluntary participation from the Chinese public, by delivering news about what the Chinese government is up to in South Africa, thereby generating better support for China’s Africa policy. The interviewee, however, referred to China’s media involvement in South Africa as a double-edged sword. The interviewee pointed out that the disadvantage of media involvement is that the crime and disorder in South Africa news in China presents a negative image of South Africa to the Chinese public, and consequently demotivates Chinese people from traveling to or expanding their business in South Africa (Interviewee S-A1, 2017).

The cooperative media work between China and South Africa is based on a Letter of Intent of Friendly Co-Operation and Exchange between South Africa’s Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) and China’s State Council Information office (SCIO), issued
in 2004. The letter is meant to improve mutual exchanges of information, and the cooperation of the media between the two parties. The two parties agreed on the following stipulations:

- To boost mutual visits by high-level delegations of up to six persons every two years for a period of seven days, from 2005.

- To set up a mechanism for consultation and a continued cooperative relationship.

- To exchange media and information through periodicals, electronic video and audio products, and books.

- To stimulate cooperation and exchange between the media organizations of the two countries, dispatching journalists from the two countries to collect news.

- To encourage conducting workshops and seminars with media organization-related people from the two countries (GCIS, 2004).

Furthermore, in 2015, the Chinese government officially called for enhanced media cooperation with South Africa, to give it a louder voice on the global stage and create mutual development between the two countries. The appeal for media cooperation was made at the China-Africa Media Summit in Cape Town, South Africa. Xi Jinping highlighted the media as an important channel for both countries to learn and communicate with each other, in his congratulatory message at the Summit. He added that, “I hope the media of both sides can use the opportunity of this summit to have more broadened and in-depth cooperation to promote the friendship of China and Africa” (China Daily, 2015c). The role of the media is to rectify misunderstandings, prejudices, and stereotypes created by the world’s unbalanced media power system. And as a result, create an objective, balanced and impartial international public opinion environment. Through media cooperation in Sino-South Africa ties, the two countries are able to pursue enlarged cooperation in various directions, not only at the people-to-people level, but also business-to-business, and government-to-government levels, Zuma stressed (ibid).

6.2.2.3 Cultural and Educational Institutes

As mentioned earlier, China began to expand the establishment of its cultural and education institutes during the mid-2000. China focused on introducing Chinese culture and language to South Africa through the exchange activities. Interviewee S-B2 (2017) highlights the
importance of Chinese language in South Africa in introducing China, because the language contains Chinese elements such as culture, history, customs, and propriety. Thus, South Africans could understand and learn China more easily without reserve when they learn Chinese language. Confucius Institutes took charge of teaching Chinese language in South Africa. Interviewee S-B1 (2017) said the aim of the institute in South Africa is to teach Chinese language, introduce Chinese culture to the local people, enhance mutual understanding, and cooperate in the development of projects with locals. Interviewee S-C2 (2017) stressed the significance of the Confucius Institutes in South Africa, because there are no professional institutions through which South Africans can learn Mandarin except for the Confucius Institutes. Hence, recently, the Chinese government has exerted influence by setting up a Mandarin Language Training Program in South Africa, since 2013, and entered into an agreement with the South African government to cooperate with China to popularize the Chinese language in South African schools and among the South African public. Thus, Chinese language teachers who come from China, and local Chinese people in South Africa engage in teaching the Chinese language to South African government officials and staff at South African companies, in order to create more opportunities to learn the Chinese language outside of the Confucius Institutes. The Chinese embassy in South Africa welcomes not only students but also adults, from various fields, to learn Mandarin because it is a good opportunity to introduce China’s culture and history through language (Interviewee S-A1, 2017).

In addition to the Confucius Institute, the Chinese government deploys various other means to introduce China to South African society, including its social culture and political economy, in the following ways. The first is by using booklets. Every month, the Chinese embassy distributes a monthly magazine, ChinAfrica, published by the Beijing Review (China’s national English news weekly) to universities, with the purpose of giving wider publicity to students and professors so as to share information about China’s relations with Africa (Interviewee S-C1, 2017). The Beijing Review’s Africa branch was established in Johannesburg in 2012, publishing the first Chinese print media aimed at elite African readers in public office, the media, political parties, international organizations, and business. Through the ChinAfrica monthly magazine, China introduced general information about business trends, culture, and the media. Also, Chinese diplomats visited the universities in person, and instructed South African students about general Chinese trends on the global stage. They also held a Q-and-A sessions afterward. The intent of this was to break down the walls of China’s negative reputation, and increase comfort and familiarity through direct conversation with government officials (Interviewee S-C1, 2017). The last way is scholarship. The Chinese government granted scholarships that offered the largest amount
of funding in South Africa (Interviewee S-C2, 2017). The various scholarships are based on numerous sector-level agreements made during the 3th China and South Africa Binational Commission in 2007, when Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka made an official visit to China to strengthen the strategic partnership through mutual political trust, and deepened sector-level cooperation with key economic objectives. As part of the sector-level agreement, the Chinese government pledged to invest RMB20 million in education and skills initiatives in various fields, growing the number of opportunities that South African students' had to obtain a scholarship from China; and also supplied Chinese language teachers to promote the establishment of Mandarin courses in 50 South African high schools. Starting in the mid-2000s, five Confucius Institutes and four classrooms have been established in South Africa. The Confucius Institutes offer classes mainly in Mandarin, culture, cultural exchanges, academic activities, the HSK test, summer and winter camps in China, and a Chinese bridge competition.

Keeping up with the fact that South Africans show an enthusiasm for learning the Chinese language and becoming more deeply involved in relations between China and South Africa, the Confucius classrooms were also set up at high schools. The Chinese language classes are similar at each school, where the Chinese language class is mandatory for students between Grade 8 and 12. Each school’s Chinese classroom is run in collaboration with the South Africa-based Confucius Institute. The classroom mostly provides Chinese language instruction, and people-to-people and cultural exchange activities. To introduce China to the South African youth, China has devised a far-reaching plan through various activities. The Confucius Institutes hold a “Chinese bridge” language competition to encourage students’ interest in the Chinese language. Hanban links Confucius classrooms at the high schools to foreign language schools in China to motivate South African students to study the Chinese language, and provides Chinese language teachers through an exchange system (Interviewee S-B1, 2017). And the Confucius Institutes in South Africa make efforts to train local people to produce Chinese teachers and organize diverse Chinese language teaching and learning conferences affiliated with South African high school principals. By extension, the Chinese government supports South African high school students to take history tours in China, to

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98 The two countries signed an agreement to cooperate on Education, Human Resources, public Administration, Mineral and Energy, Water, Forestry, Traditional Medicine, Science and Technology, and Trading.

99 The five Confucius Institutions are at the following universities in South Africa: first, in 2007, at Rhodes University and Tshwane University of Technology, Stellenbosch University (in 2009), the University of Cape Town (in 2010), Durban University of Technology (in 2014), and the University of Johannesburg (in 2016). Moreover, Hanban established four Confucius Classrooms at the Westerford High School, the Cape Academy of Mathematics, Science, and Technology (in 2009), Chinese Cultural and International Education Exchange Center (in 2016), and Groote Schuur High School in Cape Town (in 2017).
learn about China through a field trip (Interviewee S-B1, 2017). The Confucius classroom is regarded as a foothold to Confucius Institutes, which links them with the high school, where the younger generations are stimulated to learn about China through Chinese language in the classroom. Furthermore, in the case of the Confucius classroom at the Cape Academy of Mathematics, Science, and Technology, a Chinese language class is offered for business people and social community, to teach Business Chinese and is not confined to the students at the school. The classroom also opens a Chinese learning materials book shop and compiles Chinese teaching materials in the 11 languages of South Africa, to allow Chinese language to be taught to a greater number of South Africans (Hanban, 2011).

In addition, in 2016, the Confucius Classroom was set up in cooperation with the Department of Tourism of South Africa at the Chinese Culture and International Education Exchange Center to develop tourism in the country. Through the joint establishment of the Confucius Classroom, China launched the first Chinese language training program for a professional workforce for the department and managerial personnel in the fields of hospitality, tourism, and museum profession. The Chinese language training program is composed of a three-months, customized Chinese cultural course aimed at helping students to understand the differences between Chinese and South African culture, China’s traditional and modern life, tourism, and business etiquette through study of tourism. Also, the Chinese government offers an additional exchange training course in China to those who complete the language training program at the center in South Africa. All classes at the center are designed for government ministries of South Africa, with useful and rich content in an intense, 40-hours per week course. The intensified courses are given as lectures by the faculty members of the Confucius Classroom, unlike at other Confucius Institutions and its Classrooms (Hanban, 2016). Not only that, the Confucius Institutes in South Africa have operated a daily half-hour on-air Chinese classroom in West Pretoria since 2012. The purpose of the class is to promote Chinese language and culture more extensively to the South African public. Teachers mainly manage the class at Confucius Institute at the Tshwane University of Technology, but other South Africa-based Confucius Institutes also try their best to encourage students and local populations to participate in the class. The on-air class covers general Chinese information, such as Chinese language, history, customs, calligraphy, cultural trends, dialects, Chinese tea drinking habits, and ancient stories. Besides the class, there is also the annual Hanyuqiao competition, and the organization also provides information regarding scholarships that the Chinese government awards to South African students every year. The Director of the Confucius Institute at the Tshwane University of Technology pointed out that over 530 students, including residents, take the on-air class and it creates ripple effects: for example, more Chinese companies – such as
Lenovo, Huawei, and StarTimes – expand the range of their business activities in South Africa. He also highlighted that more Chinese tourists are expected to visit South Africa after 2012, when 100,000 Chinese chose to travel to South Africa (China Daily, 2013b). Thus, there are more job opportunities for South Africans with advanced Chinese language abilities in the service and tourism sectors in South Africa. Also, the South Africa-based Confucius Institutes carry out distinct activities, which differentiate them from other Confucius Institutes in other African countries. Interviewee S-B1 (2017) said that one of the successful activities are the China Health Maintenance Seminars. The interviewee said that the Confucius Institution at Stellenbosch University (CISU) has successfully hosted the South Africa–China Health Maintenance Seminar for three years, and have a very good reputation. The seminar is aimed at providing intensive training to local practitioners, promoting medical science between experts from both countries, improving academic abilities through workshops, and skills through clinical instruction. This event has already gained support from the Department of Health in South Africa, and all attendants receive credits towards their continuing professional development requirements. CISU invites experts in traditional Chinese medicine from Xiamen University, Guangzhou University of Chinese Medicine, and other hospitals in China, to provide regular training to local practitioners and medical students, introducing this health approach to local communities. They host this event with the help of the University of the Western Cape and South African Association of Chinese Medicine and Acupuncture (Interviewee S-B1, 2017).

Based on the Chinese government’s efforts, South African public schools officially began to teach Mandarin as an optional second language from 2016. As of 2016, over 40 schools, as well as the Confucius Institutes and their classrooms, have introduced Mandarin, and around 500 schools in South Africa are planned to offer Chinese language classes as a second additional language in the next five years. The Chinese language training is aimed at students from Grade 4 to 12 at local schools (Interviewee S-B1, 2017). This means that most South African youth who are between Grade 4 to 9 learn Mandarin as part of their compulsory education courses, as stipulated in the South African Schools Act of 1996. To boost Chinese language classes in South Africa, the Chinese government not only provides textbooks and teachers for the classes, but also connects the South Africa-based Confucius Institutes with Chinese language education in South Africa (Xinhua News, 2017c). Chinese vice Premier Liu Yandong referred to the role of the Confucius Institute as “a ‘rainbow bridge’ which connects the hearts of the two peoples of China and South Africa”, during her visit to the Confucius Institute at the Durban University of Technology, in 2017. There are a total of 46 Confucius Institutes in 32 African countries, and 23 Confucius Classrooms in 14 countries (Hanban, 2016).
In addition to Confucius Institutes, Chinese private company Huawei puts a lot of effort into conducting public diplomacy in South Africa. Huawei entered the South Africa market in 1998 and established its East and South African regional headquarters in Johannesburg. In 2008, Huawei launched its first training centre in South Africa to “transfer skills and share expertise in next generation telecom technologies with employees, local partners and the industry” (Huawei, 2008). In 2016, Huawei launched its first African Innovation and Experience Centre in Johannesburg. Huawei invested around US$ 4.8 million for the centre to showcase the company’s state-of-the-art Information and Communication Technology (ICT) products and solution in the field such as 5G wireless communication technology, safe city solution, smart home solutions, and others. Moreover, the centre serves as not only an open lab for university students but also an incubation centre for upcoming ICT enterprises in South Africa (Xinhua News, 2017f). In the same year, Huawei and the Tshwane University of Technology have jointly launched Huawei Network Academy, which is composed of “a global ICT technology education program” and Huawei’s first installation in the Eastern and Southern Africa region. Thus, the program aims to “help accelerate the development of educational tools and promote the development of the local ICT technical workforce” (Huawei, 2016). Moreover, Huawei sent 10 South African university students, who are selected from five top universities in South Africa, to China for a two-week ICT training in Beijing and Shenzhen the same year. The students participated in the “Seeds for the Future” training program100 which is “a social investment program that takes students from the world to receive ICT training and culture exchange” at Huawei Shenzhen and Beijing branches (ChinAfrica, 2016a). The Chinese Economic and Commercial Counselor Rong Yansong said that “the cooperation between China and South Africa will benefit the African continent and people”. And he wished “the students can be experienced ambassadors on their return to South Africa” (ibid).

6.2.3 The effect of China’s public diplomacy in South Africa

This section will discuss to what extent the effect of China’s public diplomacy is linked to the South Africa public and its domestic political economy, as well as Sino-South African relations. It will also look at the how China’s public diplomacy impacts China’s foreign policy towards South Africa, in terms of both South African political economy and also Sino-South Africa ties in general.

100 The program has been carried out in 67 countries and regions across five continents, benefiting more than 15,000 students from 150 universities. Over 1,700 university student from all around the world have studied and trained at the Huawei headquarters (ChinAfrica, 2016a).
6.2.3.1 The South Africa public

China has slowly won South Africa’s favor since 2000, from the perspective of Interviewee S-G1 and S-D1 (2017). Drawing on the research of Wike, Stokes, Poushter, and Oates at Pew Research Center, the degree of South Africa’s favorable impression of China is not surprising, when one compares it with South Africans’ opinions of Tanzania, Kenya, Senegal, and Nigeria – where, in 2004, there were both favorable (40 percent) and unfavorable (45 percent) views (Wike, Stokes, Poushter, and Oates, July 2014). However, the South Africans’ view showed a 7 percent increase in their favorable opinion of China in 2015 (Wike, Stokes, and Poushter, June 2015). Such a phenomenon is largely due to South Africa’s status as a developing country among other African countries, and as a result they have different requirements and priorities to those of other nations. For example, according to Wike and Simmons’s research (2015), the South African public's most important priorities was education and not health care, food supply, infrastructure, energy supply, and governance. The importance of the health care sector appeared remarkably lower than for other countries. As can be seen from their research, 74 percent of the South African public also does not see the necessity of foreign aid, while 68 percent of other African countries believe that more foreign assistance is needed (Wike and Simmons, 2015).

Seen from this perspective, the South African public hopes to show to China that they are different to other African countries. South Africa still grapples with poverty reduction, and the need to address the gap between rich and poor, but due to its relatively stable domestic environment (not enjoyed by other African countries), China’s public diplomacy requires diverse programs to present a favorable impression of China to the South African people. In this connection, Interviewee S-C1 (2017) singled out one mode of China’s public diplomacy communication: He said that China’s public diplomacy still had a limited attitude, close to the typical image of China, when they introduced Chinese broadcasts to foreigners. He also found a problem with how China’s public diplomacy is operated: the majority of its public diplomacy is managed by the government. Interviewee S-C2 (2017) also expressed his view on China’s cultural public diplomacy, that China needs to utilize popular culture that can improve understanding of China and can better keep pace with the times, as opposed to relying on traditional Chinese subjects. However, the two interviewees agreed that China’s public diplomacy media activities and language teaching has contributed to greater positive publicity in South Africa, when compared to the situation when the Chinese government did not incorporate soft power into its foreign policy. Despite China’s improved, positive image in South Africa, Interviewee S-C2 (2017) says, there remains a gap in favorable opinions
between South Africa’s public and government. The South African public still has a negative opinion of China due to China’s different political and ideological stances on contemporary issues – for example, the South African government’s frequent refusal to issue the Dalai Lama with a visa, the trade imbalance between China and South Africa, and the encroachment of Chinese businesses into South Africa’s manufacturing, textiles, and other sectors. Whereas the South African government wholeheartedly welcomes China, and has even adopted China’s development model based on authoritarian capitalism for its economic development. This manifested as shared political views, and support for maintaining a pro-Chinese stance on the global stage. This will be discussed more in following sections.

There is, however, a problem that China needs to solve with regards to the South African public. In terms of South Africa’s development, Interviewee S-C1 and S-C2 (2017) stresses the importance of China to South Africa’s economic development. As the volume of trade between the two countries increased, South Africa recognized China’s economic power and its significance for generating investment in South Africa. Conversely, Hess and Aidoo (2015) argued that the South African public “diverges from this pattern of recognition in its engagement with China, as it sees its relationship as a positive one but not essentially as a blueprint to economic self-determinations” (pp.70-71). Hence, by using Chinese companies’ social responsibility to develop local businesses and transfer skills and technology, combined with aid from financial and education institutions, China gains favor in South Africa that allows it to expand cooperation and investment in the economic sectors. Due to the fact that South Africa’s infrastructure is already quite developed, China conducts a different approach to foreign policy, unlike that with other African countries. Hence, China cannot draw public attention by offering various infrastructure development products as part of an unconditional aid strategy. Instead, China must indirectly impress upon the South African public the importance of China to its economy by presenting itself as a mature country interested in social responsibility, developing renewable energy and environmental protection in South Africa. For example, in 2011, China joined the plan of South Africa’s New Economic Growth Path, which focuses on renewable energy and energy-saving as a driver for economic development. At the same time, Chinese businesses operate in businesses such as solar and wind energy, and coal chemistry through mutually beneficial joint investment with South African companies. Based on China’s different approach to South Africa, by adapting its South Africa policy for the local situation, China’s public diplomacy functions as a bridge to bring together China and the South Africa’s public and business to improve foreign policy, which is beneficial for its country’s economic growth resulting from smooth and cordial relations with South Africa.
6.2.3.2 The political economy sector in South Africa

In 2011, the National Planning Commission’s Diagnostic Report, appointed by President Zuma in 2010, identified nine primaries, deep-seated challenges that have faced South Africa’s development since 1994. The challenges are as follows: an unemployment problem; a want of advanced infrastructure in proportion to its rapid economic growth; a lack of quality school education for black people; social divisions; a resource-intensive economic system; uneven and poor public services; high corruption; and the gap between the rich and the poor (National Planning Commission, 2011). It is true that the challenges remain a work in progress for the South African government, with its long-term economic development plan. However, the role of China is in no small measure part of South Africa’s development plan. Hence, it is necessary to keep an eye on Chinese public diplomacy activities, including its various actors, and how they boost South Africa’s economy, as well as improve China’s standing on the international stage. As mentioned above, the South African people considers relations with China to be important, both domestically and internationally. At the same time, there are still many obstacles preventing further strengthening of the strategic partnership. China’s positive reputation with the South African public and its government, based on China’s public diplomacy efforts in many different spheres, creates a bridge between China and South Africa and its people. South Africa attracts not only more Chinese corporate investment, but also takes the lead in smooth technological cooperation, establishing factories, infrastructure, and others that are essential for South Africa’s economic growth. In this way, China contributes to relieve some chronic problems that impede national development in South Africa; at the same time, they boost the South African economy. Interviewee S-A3 (2017) argues that a characteristic of China’s public diplomacy shows that its aim is economic, and the means of carrying out its public diplomacy is based on its strategy of mutual benefit. In other words, China’s public diplomacy is one part of its government’s economic growth plan based on the win-win strategy aspect of its African policy.

South Africa’s government believes that its high unemployment rate is the biggest obstacle that hinders its economic development. As discussed earlier, Chinese companies and Confucius Institutes play an important role in education activities, including language and skill training, and contribute to reducing the unemployment rate in South Africa. By extension, the overall favorable impression of China in South Africa led to many Chinese companies expanding their operations and investment in South Africa. By the end of 2015,
according to a Report on the Development of Chinese Enterprises in South Africa by the South Africa-China Economy and Trade Association, Chinese companies invested around US$13 billion, and over 300 Chinese companies operated in industries related to mining, financing, and household electronic appliances, construction machinery, and telecommunications in South Africa. Through its activities in South Africa, Chinese companies helped address South Africa’s employment problem, because South Africans comprise 91 percent of the total number of employees at Chinese companies (ChinAfrica, 2016b). However, this does not mean that South Africa’s employment condition is as bad as in other African countries. For example, the average wage in South Africa is higher, and labor laws are also strict than in other African countries (Interviewee S-C2, 2017). Nevertheless, as the number of Chinese companies increased in South Africa, most Chinese companies focused on hiring local South African workers as part of a win-win strategy for both China and South Africa and as a way of raising Chinese companies’ profiles in South Africa. Also, from the South African perspective, as China’s image changed in South Africa, a fair amount of South African people are now willing to work at a Chinese company, whereas before they avoided working for the Chinese due to their negative reputation (Interviewee S-B2, 2017). Thus, all the efforts – both at the policy and people-to-people levels – have paid dividends by reducing the unemployment rate. More specifically, Statistic South Africa reported that the rate of unemployment went down slightly by 0.6 percent according to the results of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey for the fourth quarter of 2016. The growth in employment was mostly driven by the service industry and Transport and Manufacturing sectors. Particularly impressive was that the unemployment rate among youth aged between 15 and 34 declined by 1.1 percentage points; which improved the overall national youth unemployment average (The Statistics South Africa, 2017). Pali Lehohla, Statistician-General for Statistics South Africa, underscored the importance of education to reducing the unemployment rate based on the fact that those in the group with sub-high school level educations showed higher unemployment rate when compared with the group whose members are fully educated. Lehohla added that “the labour participation rate of graduates is higher because the likelihood of them getting jobs is higher and they continue searching for work” (SA News, 2017a). It is true that the statistical results show that the unemployment rate was little improved in 2016. But when one considers Chinese companies’ wide range of activities and considerable investment in South Africa, the results show that the general effort of Chinese enterprises and its education institutions can be seen as playing an important role in reducing the unemployment rate.

When one examines the role of public diplomacy in South Africa’s main economic sector development, its tourism and mining sectors are intimately linked to China. The Chinese
government especially focuses on the tourism and mining industries in South Africa as part of its approach to intergovernmental cooperation. In other words, China plays a larger role in the two areas (Interviewee S-C2, 2017). With regards to South Africa’s tourism, China is the leading growth market: South Africa received around 11,800 visitors from China in 2016, a 38 percent increase on the previous year. It is expected that even more Chinese tourists will travel to South Africa in 2017 (Interviewee S-C2, 2017). Hence, South African travel agencies have begun to hire sightseeing guides who could speak Mandarin. Moreover, the South African government created new promotional materials that are translated into Mandarin for the main tourist areas that appeal to the Chinese. The Confucius Institutes in South Africa provide assistance to local travel companies and the South African government for their Mandarin-related tourist work, as the role of tourism is increasingly crucial for South Africa as a major source of national income. In 2015, South Africa earned $2.7 billion from tourism that directly supported 711,746 jobs, according to Tourism Satellite Account (China Daily, 2017a). The two countries’ smooth cooperation on tourism is based on the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Tourism, which was signed in October 2013. The agreement mainly covers the promotion of tourism development, skills development, includes an exchange of capacity-building initiatives, and also investment opportunities related to both countries’ tourism marketing. In 2017, the two countries reconfirmed their commitment to deepening their partnership to grow the tourism industry in both countries at the first meeting of the South Africa-China High-Level People-to-People Exchange Mechanism (PPEM). To accomplish this aim, the PPEM allows for the creation of opportunities for people in both countries, and exchanges information and identifies common causes and strategies between the two countries to benefit from the sharing of academic, social, cultural and economic capital across the government, businesses, and civil society. By extension, tourism for South Africa is “emerging as an important foreign policy tool and an instrument of economic diplomacy in strengthening the broader bilateral relations” on the global stage, according South African Tourism Minister Tokozile Xasa (SA News, 2017a). With regards to South Africa’s mining sector, it is also part of the South African government’s plan to attract Chinese investors to South Africa’s downstream mineral development industries. In addition, in 2016, China and South Africa entered into a mining research partnership between the University of the Witwatersrand and China University of Mining and Technology. In the same year, the two universities also established the joint International Research Laboratory of China-Africa Mining Geospatial Informatics. The situation that currently requires cooperation with China is associated with the rapid decline of raw materials, including minerals in the international market and the changing structure of South Africa’s mining sector. Drawing on a comparison between South Africa’s mining sector in 1980 and in 2012,
Gold mining exports have decreased steeply due to the lack of gold deposits, whereas the importance of platinum group metals – such as iron ore, manganese, chromite, copper, nickel, and zinc – as well as related quarrying products have increased. The mining sector plays a crucial role in the South African economy, especially its considerable contribution towards earning foreign currency. Therefore, the struggling mining industry is directly linked to the rest of its economy. The areas experiencing the greatest impact are job creation in value-added sectors, such as financial and business services; trade, catering and accommodation; and transport, storage and communication (ICD, 2013). Thus, South Africa expects to produce positive economic development by receiving support from China, such as skills transfer and investment for mining infrastructure. One example of this is the development project for the July 2011 Bakubung Platinum Mine in Ledig. The project is composed of an underground mine with a twin vertical shaft system and a processing plant, a US$1 billion project that joins a Chinese investment consortium, Jinchuan and the China Africa Development Fund in holding a 45 percent interest in Wesizwe Company. As a result, the cooperative work not only created 3,135 jobs when at full production, but also serves as a positive showcase of a successful BRICS strategic partnership in action to the international stage (SA News, 2014).

Furthermore, Chinese companies serve as a driving force behind South Africa’s maritime development, as Chinese investment has sharply increased in this field in recent years. As the trade volume between China and South Africa has increased, China’s marine transport and the logistics market have risen alongside (Interviewee S-C2, 2017). South Africa owns a large number of port facilities in Durban, Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth; 95 percent of South Africa’s export cargo is moved via marine transportation. South Africa is also the primary logistics competition for all sub-Saharan African countries. However, the current situation in South Africa’s logistics market faces several issues such as inefficient port facilities, high logistic costs, the lack of connected facilities to inland areas, and others. This is directly linked to South Africa’s economic development. At the China-South Africa Business Forum in China in 2014, South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma therefore encouraged Chinese investment in its blue economy programme, Operation Phakisa, which focuses on as mineral resource beneficiation, improving industrial capacity, enhancing agro-processing (including energy). Zuma also highlighted the importance of maritime development in South Africa due for the following reason: “The ocean has a potential to contribute to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) up to R177 billion. The ocean also has a potential to contribute between eight hundred and one million direct jobs.” In 2010, the marine sector contributed around R54 billion to South Africa’s GDP and created around 316,000 jobs. To encourage Operation Phakisa’s success, the South African government
focuses on marine transportation and manufacturing activities, such as coastal shipping, trans-shipment, boat building, refurbishment and repair; offshore oil and gas exploration; aquaculture and marine protection service and ocean government (SA News, 2015b).

In sum, given the situation explained above, China’s public diplomacy has an important bearing not only on many parts of South Africa’s economy and its development, but also on China’s foreign policy in pursuing economic interests. The common features of China’s public diplomacy activities appear in South Africa’s tourism and mining sectors, which show the links between China’s non-state actors, such as language institutions and think tanks, and South Africa’s non-state actors. The public diplomacy activities also connect Chinese non-state actors and the South African state actors to encourage partnerships on certain topics or issues to produce better results.

By cooperating broadly with South Africa in many different fields, China’s economic involvement in South Africa will increase in the future. China’s public diplomacy will become more active, keeping pace with China’s non-state actors’ expansion into South Africa in order to produce good results in the economic sector. The expectation comes from Zuma’s economic policy for South Africa. In response to the sluggish economic growth resulting from the global recession in 2009, Zuma adopted a “New Growth Path” in 2011 to boost its domestic development by creating five million jobs over ten years, and reducing the unemployment rate to benefit South Africa’s economic growth. The South African government considered the unemployment matter to be the chief issue holding back the country’s economy. Hence, the plan focused on “the partnering between key social players, business and government to address key structural challenges in the economy”, and boosting the six sectors to create more jobs. The key areas that required attention for the plan were infrastructure, mining, green economy, manufacturing, tourism, and agriculture (SA News, 2011). Also, the plan was based on China’s development model, which presented the Zuma administration with a foothold for the country's economic development. All this considered, South Africa needs more cooperation with China in order to expand investment and trade, and to realize China’s development model successfully in its own economy, as well as solidifying its status as Africa’s greatest economic power. When one examines the trends in South Africa, that Chinese investors are already keenly converging on six sectors by focusing on skill training and promoting small- and medium-sized local businesses through collaborative works, a greater variety of public diplomacy activities will need to be carried out to catch up with South Africa’s development plan in order to benefit mutual interests between the two countries. Details of the two countries’ mutual interests, and the results of China’s public diplomacy in South Africa will be discussed in the next section.
6.2.3.3 The relations between South Africa and China

Drawing on China’s varied public diplomacy activities, above, the overall view of Sino-South Africa relations is of deepened and strategic ties. During a 2017 official visit to China, President Zuma hailed China’s support for Africa’s independent growth, and expressed his hope for maintaining close cooperation with China in regional and international affairs – not only at the United Nations but also among the BRICs. He also encouraged the expansion of bilateral ties between China and South Africa through closer high-level engagement. Hence, in the same year, China and South Africa officially agreed to launch the South Africa-China High-Level People-to-People Exchange Mechanism (PPEM) to foster a strengthened partnership. Zuma said that “the official launch of the PPEM will facilitate public participation in developing South Africa-China relations and bring more benefits to the people” (Xinhua News, 2017d). Based on the existing programs between the two countries related to government communications, journalists, and broadcasters, the communication agreement was intended to boost collaborative work on news coverage between television and radio broadcasters from the two nations. With regards to the communication agreement, China’s State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television Vice Minister Tong Gang said that, “the agreement has a lot of scope of strengthening cooperation in news coverage for the dissemination of just and objective information to the world for ‘our mutual benefit’” (Chinese Embassy in South Africa, 2017). Thus, China and South Africa were further empowered to do the following: exchange information, create opportunities, and identify common causes and strategies. This is intended to provide benefits for the publics in both countries by sharing economic, social, and cultural capital throughout the academic world, government, civil society, and business. Not only that, but in terms of general and technical professional activity in the two countries, China and South Africa highlighted technical exchanges and cooperation in public radio and television broadcasting, including the creation of communication and training opportunities (ibid).

As pointed out above, the South Africa’s government’s priority is its economic development, based on a reduction in its unemployment rate and levels poverty. It also shares China’s opinion and view that economic development should be primary in foreign policy. As for economic interests, South Africa upgraded its ties with China as part of a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2010 (as mentioned above), based on the efforts of China’s public diplomacy activities in South Africa during the 2000s. Since then, China and South Africa’s relations have strengthened in the social and cultural, political, and economic spheres.
Bilateral ties between China and South Africa were enhanced when the two countries entered into several agreements in the mid-2010s. In 2014, Premier Li Keqiang pledged to President Zuma that “China will make South Africa a priority destination for oversea investment, and encourage and support the country’s industry”. China also promised South Africa that it would improve its contributions to the medical treatment for Ebola, marine economy, finance cooperation, nuclear power, and joint venture airlines (China.org.cn., 2014b). In the same year, South Africa also signed several strategic agreements with China intended to “strengthen bilateral relations, trade cooperation and create sustainable investment opportunities between the two countries”. The agreements included “the Five to-Ten Year Programme on Cooperation Between China and South Africa” which concentrated on bilateral cooperation, mutual political trust and strategic coordination, mutual cooperation on economic benefit and trade, people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, African affairs and China-Africa relations, and international affairs and BRICS-related issues. Not only that, but the two countries also agreed to enlarge their previous agreement over agriculture cooperation and phytosanitary measures (The Presidency, 2014). In 2014, the two countries’ leaders, Jacob Zuma and Xi Jinping, signed twenty-six agreements valued at R94 billion, and based on “the Five-to-Ten Year Programme on Cooperation Between China and South Africa”. The agreements were focused on the following six areas (The Presidency, 2015):

a. Alignment of industries to accelerate South Africa’s industrialization process

b. Enhancement of cooperation in Special Economic Zones (SEZs)

c. Enhancement of marine cooperation

d. Infrastructure development

e. Human Resources cooperation

f. Financial cooperation

The agreements that South Africa made with China are associated with improving the existing Industrial Development Zones by establishing SEZs. The SEZs not only facilitate industrial and economic decentralization by creating new hubs in South Africa, but also boost job creation, investment, and economic development through trade with China (Cissé, 2012b). South Africa did not have any SEZs in its country, so South African officials regularly visit China to receive training as a part of the aforementioned 2014 agreement. The training is made of learning about marketing tools and channels, planning, infrastructure development, financing and managing of SEZs, and how to deal with potential investors
(Xinhua News, 2016b). The new move of establishing SEZs is considered to be evidence of South Africa is adopting the Chinese development model; while, at the same time, attracting China’s investment and expanding trade with China. By extension, South Africa expects Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional integration through industrialization, mineral and infrastructure development with China. Based on Zuma’s pragmatic, regional approach, it paired China’s support for SADC’s infrastructure construction to establish a foothold for accelerated regional integration. By using its close-knit economic relations with SADC members, South Africa could achieve its goal of economic growth through job creation (Interviewee S-C1, 2017). In the same vein, there was an attempt to encourage China’s investment and boost trade between the SADC and China. For example, the first SADC-China Trade Fair and Investment Forum in Johannesburg, in 2011. The Forum was called “IMEXPO”, and was supported by the Department of Trade and Industry of South Africa and the SADC Secretariat. The aim of the forum was “to show new markets and projects and to promote inter-Africa trade within SADC region. Traders from SADC and China will be able to form and build relationships”. A delegation of over 60 companies from China and 13 from the 15 SADC countries attended the forum (Government Communication, 2011). As for China’s extensive economic cooperation in South Africa, China has reaffirmed its intention “to play a pivotal role in South Africa’s re-industrialization and development agenda, as well as to continue to be a strategic partner for South Africa in the bilateral and multilateral arena” as part of the win-win cooperation between both countries (SA News, 2015a). In light of this, Bradley (2016) pointed out that Zuma’s African National Congress (ANC) government is “increasingly hitching its fortunes to the economic potential of China’s rise” (p.884).

From a political perspective, South Africa’s ANC and China’s CCP have closer relations than other African countries, because South Africa is only country to establish ties with China’s National People’s Congress after China set up the Parliamentary Regular Exchange Mechanism in 2011 (Bradley, 2016). South Africa has, therefore, adhered to China’s One China Policy since establishing diplomatic ties with China in 1998. Current President Zuma said that the One China Policy “address[es] the question of the territorial sovereignty of China as the sole and legitimate representative of all the people of that country, with which we have strong historical, political, economic and social relations”. At a meeting for aspect of South African Foreign Policy at the University of Pretoria in 2011, he also explained South Africa’s adoption of the One China Policy as “consistent with international law, which recognises the PRC as the sole and legitimate representative of all the people of China” (The Presidency, 2011). As a provision of China’s One China policy, the South African government canceled the Dalai Lama’s visa to attend the 14th World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates in
Cape Town in 2014. It was a third time in five years that the Dalai Lama’s visa was denied by the South African government (News 24, 2014b). In this regard, Anthony (2014) interpreted the situation as “economic and political ties with China now far outweigh the domestic South African opinion of a vocal, but ultimately minority, constituency”. And the incident damaged China’s reputation with the majority of South Africans, who have an ambivalent feeling about China. Olander, Standen, and Bradley argued that China and South Africa’s ties not only go beyond economic, ideological and political cooperation, but also more and more extend beyond the state-level connections between the ANC and CCP. Hence, the two ruling parties are on a “parallel engagement track” that seems entirely separated from that of “the day-to-day state-led diplomacy” between the two countries (Olander, Standen, and Bradley, 2016). South Africa has been voting with China on a number of issues, including sensitive subjects such as human rights. Recently, South Africa has had common cause on the international stage with China over various issues, including voting against a 2016 United Nations resolution on the “promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet” alongside China and Russia. Moreover, South Africa, domestically, accepted considerable funding from China intended for the building of the ANC’s political school, in 2014. Not only that, but the ANC sends many of its Members of Parliament and leaders to China for political education hosted by the Chinese government (News24, 2014a).

Internationally, China and South Africa adhere to South-South cooperation; at the same time they share responsibilities to maintain international security and peace, climate change, and promote African’s development and reform of major international institutions (Niu, 2011). South Africa also takes part in multilateral forums (such as the G20, the BRICS, FOCAC, and BASIC) with China, and the pattern of its multilateral behavior clearly displays its alignment with China and other developing nations. In the same vein, the ANC has mapped out a noticeably anti-Western and pro-China path for its international relations (Bradley, 2016). South Africa also anticipates China to provide assistance for economic development and poverty reduction in South Africa and other African countries through BRICS. Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa said that the two countries’ cooperation is “leading to new development opportunities for the African continent” (SA News, 2016).

6.2.4 Conclusion

Although China established diplomatic ties with South Africa relatively late compared to other African countries, China and South Africa have now formed firm cooperative relations based on the efforts of former President Thabo Mbeki and current President Jacob Zuma.
However, there have been tensions due to the lopsided economic and trade relations between the two countries, which has mostly affected South Africa’s steel market, a key industry in South Africa for a long time. In addition, South Africa’s textile industry also faces possible collapse due to China’s dumping of exports in South Africa. Through public diplomacy, the Chinese government endeavors to plug the gap between China and South Africa to engender closer economic relations. However, China adopted a different public diplomacy approach in South Africa due to South Africa’s more advanced economy and developed financial and legal systems compared to other African countries. Also, the majority of the South African public is more concerned with education and not food supply, infrastructure and energy supply, governance, and foreign aid. Under these circumstances, China carries out its public diplomacy in the following ways: First, China utilizes its foreign aid to extensively expand its support in various fields, such as assisting in development of culture, environmental management, education, tourism, health and welfare, infrastructure construction, manufacturing, human resource, banking system, water resource utilization, transportation, housing, and others – rather than giving undue attention to and support for developing South Africa’s infrastructure. Through China’s public diplomacy based on foreign aid, the Bank of China, one of the biggest Chinese commercial banks, seized the opportunity to enter South Africa’s banking sector. The bank functions as a support for both Chinese and South African companies for mutual benefit. Second, the role of the media in China’s public diplomacy in South Africa is not only for introducing Chinese culture but also encouraging breakthroughs in resolving misunderstandings between South Africa’s public and Chinese companies. The media provides a deeper and better understanding of each other through journalist exchanges and a variety of seminars between the Chinese and South African media. Third, the role of Chinese culture and education institutions is not only to introduce Chinese culture and language to the South African public, including younger generations, but also to support South African government officials and staff at South African companies to boost tourism and increase opportunities for South Africans to get service and tourism jobs. Taken together, the role of China’s media, education and cultural institution influences not only the South African public, but also its business sector. China also promotes mutual benefits for China and South Africa through its public diplomacy activities in South Africa.

Based on China’s public diplomacy activities, the South African public has divided opinions on China. It is true that the general image of China has improved and become more favorably in South Africa, compared to when China did not carry out its public diplomacy in earnest. However, the South African people are still wary due to their differing opinions on Chinese politics and ideology – for example, refusing the Dalai Lama’s visa and frequent
damage to its business sector caused by trade with China, especially with regards to South Africa's steel and textile industries. However, the South African government welcomes relations with and support from China more than its public, because the government wants to attract Chinese companies’ investment as well as cooperation in technology, establishing factories, infrastructure, and others that are essential to South Africa's economic growth. The leaders of the two countries signed 26 agreements based on the Five-to-Ten Year Programme on Cooperation in 2014, to create closer economic connections. Through deepened economic relations, political cooperation has also been strengthened. As a result of all of this, China expects to expand its influence on the African continent through the SADC to assist in its regional integration through the development of industrialization, mineral, and infrastructure.

Chapter 7. Case Study: Multilateral Channel - FOCAC
The previous chapter examined the bilateral ties between China and Nigeria, and China and South Africa. This chapter aims to discuss the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC), including its background, purpose, procedures, participating institutions, and its direct/indirect effect on Sino-African relations. This is because bilateral ties between China and African countries are based on the agreed policy frameworks that were made through the FOCAC. Hence, this chapter focuses in particular on how China and African countries with conflicting interests can cooperate with each other through FOCAC mechanisms. It will also consider how much of a priority China’s public diplomacy has in the FOCAC to enhance cooperation, including economic relations in Sino-African relations. Furthermore, the chapter will examine how China’s public diplomacy activities reflect China’s wider understanding of the role of its relationship with Africa in the international system.

This chapter’s discussion is connected to Chapter 5, which covered China’s African policy and its public diplomacy activities linked to economic growth. Hence, the chapter will mostly concentrate on the overall flow of FOCAC’s agenda, which is based on China’s public diplomacy strategy towards African countries and the involvement of institutions for mutual benefit and solving problems between China and Africa multilaterally, rather than analyzing detailed information on public diplomacy activities. Hence, it will begin with an introduction of the FOCAC before examining the contents of FOCAC, in conjunction with the institutional public diplomacy agenda to analyze not only the connection between the FOCAC and public diplomacy, but also the linkage between cooperation and institutions through the FOCAC. The second section will examine the correlation between public diplomacy and economic relations between China and African countries who participate in the FOCAC, institutions, and public diplomacy. The last section will evaluate the role of public diplomacy in China’s economic relations with Africa.

7.1 Introduction of FOCAC

In 2000, China established the FOCAC as a multilateral platform for cooperation and exchange in the areas of politics, economics, social development, and international development between China and the African countries with which it has formal diplomatic ties (Li and April, 2013). FOCAC, initially, was created as a new regional multilateral forum by China at the suggestion of African countries. Contrary to the belief that the Chinese government was solely responsible for FOCAC, the core of FOCAC’s establishment was African nations. In 1997, when envoys from Ethiopia and Mauritius visited China, they proposed the establishment of “one to multi partnerships” for cooperation in Sino-African
relations. Since then, many other African countries proposed that “a new kind of partnership with China” with fresh measures and innovative institutions based on large-scale, high-level contacts – similar in style to the US-Africa Business Forum, the British Commonwealth Conference, the Franco-African Summit, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, and the Africa-EU Summit – with increased communications about mutual concerns, such as development and peace. In 1999, the Foreign Minister of Madagascar referred to a “multilateral forum”, while talking with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, to strengthen relations between China and Africa. When African countries suggested the new framework of a multilateral forum in the late 1990s, the aim of cooperation between China and Africa shifted from projects to long-term strategic planning. Based on the African countries’ suggestion, China also keenly felt the necessity for building a permanent cooperative mechanism with African countries to cope with, or address Western competition in Africa. International economic globalization was also a contributing factor to the need for the FOCAC. In 1997, Zhao Changhui of the Exim Bank suggested pushing for cooperation with Africa as an overall strategy, including a plan that forms an inter-ministerial committee to shape and carry out the strategy. After two years, Chinese President Jiang Zemin officially proposed the first FOCAC Ministerial Conference to the Secretary-General of the then Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) and all Heads of State of African Countries. Consequently, the FOCAC was formally established in 2000 (Li, et al., 2012, pp.7-11; Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng, and He, 2012, pp.16-17). The Chinese government defines FOCAC as “a platform established by China and friendly African countries for collective consultation and dialogue and a cooperation mechanism between the developing countries, which falls into the category of South-South cooperation”. The primary concerns of the FOCAC are: first, “pragmatic cooperation”, which focuses on expanding cooperation and strengthening consultation; second, “equality and mutual benefit”, which aims to boost economic cooperation, including trade and political dialogue for mutual development and reinforcement (FOCAC-b, n.a).

FOCAC is especially focused on cooperation between China and Africa. Former President of China Jiang Zemin underlined the importance of cooperation at the Opening Ceremony of the FOCAC Ministerial Conference: “Despite twists and turns on the road ahead, there are bright prospects for this cause. So long as we work together tirelessly, we will surely achieve the great goals that we have been pursuing together and accomplish the lofty cause that we have been promoting” (FOCAC, 2009a). On the basis of cooperation, FOCAC influences “the central pillar in advancing China-Africa relations and is the arena for constructive diplomatic interaction” (Shelton and Paruk, 2008, p.2). Based on the official FOCAC definition, many scholars consider FOCAC as follows. Interviewee S-A3 (2017) views FOCAC as a great forum
for collecting various dialogs from different African countries at one time. Power and Alves (2012) described FOCAC as a “regularised structure”, and read it as “provide[ing] a public setting for celebrating the achievements of the relationship, an opportunity to formulate a raft of economic targets aimed at fostering mutual development interests and recalibrating policies to match these, as well as a stage to endorse common perspectives on global issues” (p.20). Plessis (2014) also argued that “the main goal of FOCAC is without a doubt based on greater co-operation and equality between partners” (p.122). To sum up, the forum provides the following conditions for Sino-African relations: first, promoting a long-term win-win relationship by developing cooperation and problem-solving in Sino-African ties; second, building a positive and advanced South-South cooperation through dialogue between China and Africa; third, opening the door for Chinese and African leaders to grow closer and share their views on policy coordination, inclusive commercial interaction, and common prosperity; finally, establishing policy frameworks and assembling an agenda of a common political and economy for mutual benefit for future constructive communication (Shelton and Paruk, 2008, p.3-4). Not only that, FOCAC discusses diverse activities under a public diplomacy framework to enhance communication between China and African countries by using various instruments, such as Confucius Institutions, think tanks, media, human resource development, and others, to cement political trust and mutual economic interests. After launching the first FOCAC in October 2000 in Beijing, the forum convenes every three years to boost cooperation between China and African countries. Since 2000, a total of six FOCAC meetings have taken place; China’s first Africa policy was published to coincide with the third FOCAC, in 2006; and its second Africa policy was released in 2015, when the sixth FOCAC meeting was held. When we examine the six forums from 2000 to 2016, the common agenda between China and African countries was expanded upon and detailed at every triennial meeting. Furthermore, FOCAC set the stage for expanding Sino-African economic ties multilaterally on the global stage. To facilitate understanding of the mechanism of FOCAC, it is necessary to examine the contents of the six forums and institutions that are involved in FOCAC at the macro level. Then, we will discuss the detailed public diplomacy activities agenda, which are divided into media, education and culture.

7.2 The contents of FOCAC in connection with public diplomacy agenda through the connections of institution

The FOCAC is based on existing China and African relations (covered in Chapter 5), with additional consideration of practical economic issues (Brown and Chun, 2009) and public
diplomacy-related agendas to mitigate various issues that arise from Sino-African economic ties. The FOCAC process sprung from the convergence of various economic and political factors in China and Africa. Unlike Since the 2000s, the interaction between China and Africa has not only become more multidimensional and multi-layered, but there are also more diverse actors in policy-making and implementation (Brown and Chun, 2009). Hence, China and Africa’s common objectives have converged on mutual and equal benefit to pursue peace and development. This is articulated in two documents, the Declaration and the Plan of Action. The Declaration was issued at the first Minister Conference. It simply summed up the areas of mutual interest that needed progress from the Chinese and African delegations. And the Plan of Action contained more extensive information that provides a concrete path for the stakeholders’ relations with objectives to be carried out before the next Ministerial Conference, three years later (MacDonald, 2012). The following section will discuss the contents of the FOCAC (from the first to the sixth Ministerial Conference) to establish what kind of plans for mutual benefit were set up during the meetings. However, it is hard to cover all detailed contents of each ministerial conference, so the chapter will focus the core agendas, which marked a watershed in Sino-African multilateral relations.

The 1st Ministerial Conference (October 2000 in Beijing, China): The aim of this conference was to discuss the establishment of a new, stable, and strong long-term partnership for economic cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit, and keeping pace with the new international political and economic order in the 21 century. The first meeting was attended by 44 African countries, over 80 Chinese ministers, 17 representatives of regional and international organizations (including OAU), and members of the Chinese and African business communities (FOCAC-a, n.a). During the conference, the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC and “the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social development” were adopted for cementing and improving Sino-African ties.

Through the first FOCAC meeting, the agenda related to finance, development assistance, and trade were notably crystallized. China established the China-Africa Products Exhibition Centre in China to not only boost bilateral trade but to also facilitate the introduction of African products into the Chinese market (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012). The Chinese government pledged to expunge or reduce 156 African loan debts, worth RMB10.9 billion, held by the most heavily indebted and least developed African countries. Beijing also announced the establishment of the Human Resource Development Fund to Africa in order to train professionals for economic development (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012; FOCAC, 2013). King (2007) argued that the African Human Resource Development Fund was connected to “a new modality, the short-term training of African professionals in
different disciplines” (p.341). Notwithstanding the fact that the two sides did not establish a series of hard-and-fast targets during the first meeting, it laid the groundwork for a new level of interaction in education in various dimensions. At the first meeting, the two sides agreed to grapple with “specific cooperation projects” and “country-specific training plans” for their implementation (King, 2007). With this example providing momentum, therefore, successive scholarship mechanisms for long-term training such as a degree courses and dispatching Chinese teachers to Africa, were established to boost communication between Chinese and African universities.

The 2nd Ministerial Conference (December 2003 in Addis Ababa, capital of Ethiopia): the second forum had the theme of “practical and action-oriented cooperation”, and was intended to produce positive results in three years – especially in the areas of the politics, trade, economics, and social development. At the forum’s opening ceremony, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed a four-point proposal, which was based on mutual support, consolidated consultation on the coordination of positions, and improved cooperation, to strengthen relations between China and Africa. The forum adopted the Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006), discussed the establishment of “a new type of partnership” in Sino-African relations for more practical and inclusive cooperation (FOCAC-c, n.a). The action plan contained different aspects when compared to plans that begin in 2006. It does not a) include “consular and judicial co-operation”, b) consider “increased exchanges between political parties, legislatures and local governments”, nor c) make preparations for “climate and environmental protection” in China and Africa (Plessie, 2014, p.121).

Although the scale of aid that came out of the second conference remained small (King, 2007), the outcomes of the second forum were also concentrated on the economic sector. China agreed to provide financial assistance for infrastructure development – such as roads, railway, and buildings – as a part of the second FOCAC agenda. In terms of trade, Chinese and African ministries (Commerce, Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and Economy) agreed on preferential market access for products from Africa to China so as to boost bilateral economic cooperation. Furthermore, trade agreements were signed by the two sides that fall within the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework for making a better trade environment – such as harmonizing trade policies and trade negotiations for mutual benefits. As for investment, the agriculture sector received the most attention during

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101 The four proposal are first, continuing to keep the traditional friendship between China and Africa through mutual support; second, stimulating democratization of international relations via intensified consultation; third, coping with the globalization jointly with coordination of position; fourth, having advanced relations in Sino-African ties through enhanced cooperation.
the second FOCAC meeting. Through the outline of the Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006), the development policies for the sector were established. China also established policies for financial support for companies using MOFCOM and China’s Exim Bank for agriculture development in African countries. Not only the agriculture sector, but also the establishment of joint ventures was a key issue in China-Economic partnership, for business management exchanges and joint investment by enterprises on both sides. To boost investment, the second FOCAC meeting encouraged private, small-, and medium-sized enterprises in China and Africa. In this way, African countries produced good results such as job creation, technology transfer, and human resource development with Chinese support. Through the meeting, China set up Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Nigeria, Egypt, Mauritius, Zambia, and Ethiopia, to encourage Chinese private, small-, and medium-sized companies to open their businesses in Africa (Cissé, 2012b). Moreover, to build on economic ties between China and Africa, the first China-Africa Business Conference was also held in tandem with the second FOCAC meeting. The amount of US$1 billion was signed by twenty-one cooperation agreement when over 500 Chinese and African entrepreneurs attended the meeting. Also, China agreed to exempt from custom duties 190 tariff items exported from the 28 least-developed African countries (ChinAfrica, 2012).

The culture and education sectors were also addressed during the second FOCAC forum. The education-related detailed agenda was officially established through the Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006). According to the plan, China pledged to provide aid for human resource development and training of African personnel in various fields over three years, and supported higher education and technical and vocational education and training institutions to enhance and strengthen its disciplines and fields of specialization with new a scholarship system and communication exchanges (King, 2007). Beijing also extended tourism cooperation to African countries: sponsoring both “Meet in Beijing” (an international arts festival for African arts), “Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa”, increasing people-to-people exchanges with Africa, and proposing the “China-Africa Youth Festival” that was held in China in 2004 (FOCAC-c, n.a). Based on the plan’s agenda of the second FOCAC meeting, the Chinese government made 382 different assistance agreements with African countries, and agreed to train 12,600 African professionals. Beijing also granted 17 African countries the Approved Destination Status for Chinese (FOCAC, 2012a).
The 3rd Ministerial Conference and the Beijing Summit (November 2006 in Beijing, China): the two meetings were held under the banner of “friendship, peace, cooperation, and development”. Due to the participation of top political leaders, the third FOCAC was designated a “summit” rather than a conference. The plan for China and Africa’s relationship took more concrete shape through the adoption of the “Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC” and the “Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)”, in which 48 African countries joined. The 2006 Beijing Action plan is of utmost importance as it not only covered extensively the “new type of strategic partnership” in Sino-African relations, but also became a template for all future FOCAC action plans after 2006 (Plessis, 2014). At the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summit of FOCAC, then-President Hu also interpreted “the new type of strategic partnership” as follows: “Building strong ties between China and Africa will not only promote development of each side, but also help cement unity and cooperation among developing countries and contribute to establishing a just and equitable new international political and economic order”. Hu stressed “friendship”, “mutual trust”, “mutual support”, “common development” for “the forging of a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership” in politics, economics, a balanced and harmonious global development, and international affairs (especially security cooperation) (FOCAC, 2006b).

To fulfil the new type of China and Africa strategic partnership and cement the two parties’ cooperation, Hu suggested the following eight steps at the Summit (FOCAC, 2009a):

a. By 2009, China doubles its assistance to Africa (based on 2006 level);

b. China provides US$3 billion for preferential loans and US$2 billion for preferential buyer’s credit to Africa;

c. By establishing the China-Africa Development Fund, it will raise US$5 billion to encourage and support Chinese companies to invest in Africa;

d. China constructs the African Union Conference Centre to support Africa’s unity and the African integration process;

e. Beijing cancels those debts that matured in 2005, owed by the most heavily indebted and least-developed African countries;

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102 The Beijing Summit initiated to celebrate the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and African countries. The summit jointly introduced to the two sides at the third FOCAC meeting in 2006.
f. China increases the number of export items from 190 to over 440, and offers zero-tariff treatment to the least-developed African countries;

g. China establishes three to five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa;

h. Beijing trains 15,000 African professionals; dispatches 100 senior agriculture experts and 300 youth volunteers to Africa; establishes ten special agriculture technology demonstration centres, building 30 hospitals, 30 malaria prevention and treatment centres, and 100 rural schools in Africa, rendering RMB300 million grant for providing artemisinin; and increase Chinese government scholarships for African students from 2,000 per year to 4,000 per year, by 2009.

The 4th Ministerial Conference (November 2009 in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt): the theme for this conference was deepening the new type of strategic partnership in China and Africa relations. During the conference, Chinese and African delegations present adopted the “Declaration of Sharm El Sheikh” and the “Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)”. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also announced five new measures in addition to those Chinese President Hu proposed at the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC in 2006, to further enhance cooperation between China and Africa. Wen highlighted China’s constant support for Africa thus: “Whatever change may take place in the world... our policy of supporting Africa’s economic and social development will not change” (FOCAC, 2009c).

After the conference, China and Africa made new progress on cultural exchanges and cooperation on trade, development, political economy, FOCAC institution building, and on other areas. From an economic perspective of the fourth FOCAC, China put less emphasis on loans and grants, instead underlining the importance of capacity building and technology transfer to Africa when compared to previous Ministerial Conferences. By extension, Beijing announced its support for the African Union by extending its range of activities in Africa and international affairs (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012). China offered support in the form of US$10 billion in concessional loans and US$1 billion in special loans for African small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and promised US$966 million for 38 specific African SME projects. Beijing also cancelled the debts of the poorest and least-developed African countries that were due by the end of 2009. In addition, the least-developed Africa counties received the benefit of zero-tariff treatment for 60 percent of their exports to China.

103 The five new measures are: first, China proposes to establish a China-Africa partnership to deliberate climate change; second, China will enhance cooperation with Africa in the fields of technology and science; third, China will support Africa to establish financing capacity; fourth, China will further open up its market to African products; lastly, China will improve cooperation with Africa in agriculture (FOCAC, 2009d).
Apart from economic assistance, the fields of climate change, scientific and technology transfer received attention, and projects in the area of agriculture, education, human resource, health, and cultural exchange were expanded. As a result, China announced nearly 150 clean energy projects, including five new agro-technology demonstration centers, coupled with dispatch of 300 Chinese specialists to Africa. Not only that, China supported 30 hospitals and 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers in African countries. Through the China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Program, China held nearly 90 projects for joint research and demonstration, and invited 42 African researchers to conduct their post-doctoral studies in China by the end of 2011. China also supported the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Program, thereby carrying out Chinese and African academic institution projects, holding international seminars in both China and in Africa, and sponsored Chinese and African scholars for academic visits and exchanges (FOCAC, 2012a).

The 5th Ministerial Conference (November 2012 in Beijing, China): the number of conference attendees was increased to include important personnel from each African country and institution. Chinese President Hu Jintao, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and African leaders attended the opening ceremony. Fifty Chinese and African foreign ministers for international economic cooperation joined the conference. The theme of the Conference was “build[ing] on past achievements and open up new prospects for the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership”. With that goal in mind, the Beijing Declaration and the Beijing Action Plan (2012-2015) were adopted to bring about new cooperative programs to be carried out over the next three years. At the opening ceremony of the Conference, Hu delivered a speech focusing on deepening cooperation between China and Africa (FOCAC, 2012b):

China and Africa should, with both current and long-term needs in mind, redouble efforts to draw up a blueprint for promoting our cooperation in the next stage and lay a solid foundation for making new and greater progress in growing China-Africa relations in the years ahead.

Hu also suggested taking new steps to open new prospects for forming a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership by “strengthening political mutual trust, expanding practical cooperation, increasing cultural and people-to-people exchange, developing coordination and cooperation in international affairs, and making FOCAC stronger”. Thus, the Chinese government pledged to adopt measures in the five areas as follows. As part of the measures, China committed to provide a US$20 billions line of credit for the development of infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, and small- and medium-sized enterprises in
African countries, to support their sustainable development. In a bid to implement China’s public diplomacy, Beijing carried out its “Brightness Action” activities as a part of health cooperation for African people, and the “African Talent Program” to strengthen the African people’s abilities – for example, training 30,000 personnel in diverse sectors, offering 18,000 government scholarships, and building cultural and vocational skills training facilities in Africa. China initiated water supply projects in Africa to provide safe drinking water (FOCAC, 2013). To improve understanding between China and Africa, China proposed the “China-Africa People-to-People Friendship Action” in order to promote and support cooperation and exchanges between people’s organizations, especially between women and youth. China also suggested a “China-Africa Press Exchange Center” in China to boost China and Africa’s media, including correspondent exchanges between media organizations in China and African nations. In addition, China proposed the “China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan” to support 100 academic and scholarship programs research, exchanges, and cooperation from the both sides. The purpose of China’s public diplomacy-related plans and activities was to establish solid public support for improving China-Africa common development (FOCAC, 2012b). At the conference, China highlighted its support for the African integration process through enhancing capacity. President Hu said,

China’s relations with all African countries, the African Union (AU) and other regional organizations have grown in strength. China has formed strategic partnerships and launched strategic dialogue mechanisms with many African countries. And China has supported African countries in independently resolving hotspot issues in the region and advancing the process of African integration. [...] China will establish a partnership with Africa on transnational and trans-regional infrastructural development, support related project planning and feasibility studies and encourage established Chinese companies and financial institutions to take part in transnational and trans-regional infrastructural development in Africa. China will help African countries upgrade customs and commodity inspection facilities to promote intra-regional trade facilitation. (FOCAC, 2012b)

Not only that, but China paid more attention to Africa’s peace, and security by supporting the African Union. To that end, the Chinese government started the “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security” to support and cement ties between the African Union and African countries; financed the “AU peace-keeping missions” and the “development of the African Standby Force”; and trained the African Union’s security and peace-related officials and peacekeepers (FOCAC, 2013).
The 6th Ministerial Conference (3rd December 2015) and the second FOCAC Summit (4th-5th December 2015 in Johannesburg, South Africa): The sixth Conference was held alongside the second Summit. Attending the Summit were Chinese President Xi Jinping, fifty African heads of State and Government, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and heads of international and regional organizations (The UN, 2015b). They met with all leaders in Africa for the first time, an example of the deepening cooperation. The theme of the Summit was “Africa-China Progressing Together: Win-Win Cooperation for Common Development”, and it led to the adoption of the “Johannesburg Declaration” and “Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018)”, which outlined concrete measures for cementing the growing mutual partnership in Sino-African relations for the next three years after reviewing the status of previous agreements made at the first Summit.

At the Summit, Xi proposed ten major plans for China-Africa cooperation in different areas over the next three years: industrialization, agriculture modernization, infrastructure, green development, financial services, trade and investment facilities, poverty reduction and public welfare, public health, people-to-people exchanges, and peace and security. The purpose of the plans was to upgrade Sino-African relations to a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. As for the initiatives, Xi said that “China-Africa relations have today reaches a stage of growth unmatched in history. [...] Let’s join hands and open a new era of China-Africa win-win cooperation and common development” (FOCAC, 2015a). Xi pledged US$60 billion to help African countries’ address the impediments hindering their independent and sustainable development. Hence, Xi offered to assist in the areas of infrastructure, financial problem, industrialization, and agriculture modernization through public diplomacy activities aimed at the African public. A new suggestion at the Summit was that, for agriculture cooperation, China offered to set up a “10+10 cooperation mechanism” for agriculture research between the two sides, and implement “agriculture development projects” in 100 African villages to improve Africans’ standard of living in rural area. As a part of its public diplomacy, China also proposed to launch “Happy Life projects” and programs for women and children. Beijing established regional vocational education centers and capacity-building colleges for African countries, providing training for 200,000 technicians in Africa and 40,000 training opportunities in China. With regards to security cooperation, Xi announced US$60 billion in free aid for the African Union, and said, “China will continue to participate in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and support African

104 The financial support included US$5 billion in free aid and interest-free loans, additional capital for the China and Africa Development Fund, and the Special Loan for the Development of African SMEs. Also, it included US$35 billion for preferential loans and export credits on more favorable terms, and US$5 billion for a China-Africa production capacity cooperation fund, with a starting capital of US$10 billion.
countries’ capacity building in areas such as defense, counter-terrorism, riot prevention, customs and immigration control” (FOCAC, 2015a).

For the broader perspective, China and Africa signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Promotion of China-Africa for practical cooperation between China and the African Union, across many different fields: such as industrialization, highways, railways, regional aviation networks, and utilizing existing cooperation mechanism including the Joint Working Group of Transnational and Transregional Infrastructure Cooperation in Africa (FOCAC, 2015b). China also offered to promote major shared priorities, specifically comprehensive economic growth for sustainable development through poverty reduction and the allocation of adequate resources, as stipulated by Africa’s Agenda 2063, which included the First Ten Year Implementation Plan, China’s New Five-Year Plan and Two Centenary Goals, and the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In this way, the African Union (AU, 2015) interpreted China’s new focus on Africa’s sustainable development as “the 2nd FOCAC Summit afford[ing] the right opportunity to share the African Union’s new strategic direction in addressing its development and integration agenda.”

Looking at the events and agreements from the first six FOCAC summits, the main aim of Sino-Africa relations has been to grow closer through the Forum. This was reflected in each Forum’s theme, which changed from “long-term partnership for economic cooperation” at the first Forum, to “companionship” at the sixth Forum, at which China expressed its desire for “Africa-China Progressing Together: Win-Win Cooperation for Common Development”. The action plans, declarations, and outcomes from all six Forums displayed Africa’s perspectives influencing the economic (trade and investment) relations, and their attempt to relieve the asymmetry in the relationships between China and African countries. Not only that, China also embraced African countries’ needs from China, which were, first, support for African economic development through investment, aid, infrastructure, and trade; second, to support African nations’ political legitimacy and recognition in bilateral interactions and in multilateral fora, such as at the World Bank and the United Nations (Hanauer and Morris, 2014); and, third, render necessary assistance for the development of younger African generations, welfare, media, medical fields, and others to aid Africa’s future development and poverty alleviation (as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). At the first Summit in 2006, Ghanaian President John Kufuor stated his view on the Sino-Africa relations through FOCAC, that China is a partner who could help the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) become a world economic power (MFA, 2006). Consequently, as explained above, the notable outcome was China’s agreement to pledge financial aid to Africa. At the third
Forum, Hu suggested US$5 billion for preferential loans and preferential buyer’s credit to Africa; and a further US$100 billion by the next Ministerial Meeting, through the Declaration. At the next FOCAC meeting, China pledged US$11 billion in concessional loans, including a special credit for SMEs, and US$966 million for its projects. China doubled its financial aid at the fifth Forum, committing to provide US$20 billion for Africa’s sustainable development. At the sixth Forum, China pledged US$60 billion in free aid to the African Union. In addition to financing for loans and business, China supported training programs, agriculture sector development, medical development (including hospital development), alternative energy, and Africa’s integration, security, peace, and others. The program for sectors receiving aid and attention becomes more detailed and expansive with every new Ministerial Meeting. In relation to this, Alden (2014) argued that the situation is a convergence that reflects the obvious economic asymmetries between China’s activist form of state-led capitalism and Africa’s exploitation of its under-developed resource based to attract Chinese investment and, concurrently, the paradoxical political symmetry implied in the mutual commitment to sovereign equality. (p.364)

However, when one draws a line between FOCAC and China’s first and second Africa policy, which clearly represented China’s views, the two documents contain a wide-ranging discussion and view of the ministerial meetings and summits. The recent FOCAC also focused on Africa’s industrialization, infrastructure, health, agriculture, culture, people-to-people relations, and human resources development so as to deepen cooperation (Mthembu, 2016). Nevertheless, interviewee S-A3 (2017) pointed out that China’s second Africa policy focused on Africa’s industrial development over infrastructure to achieve the dream Agenda 2063, although Agenda 2063 needs infrastructure development for regional integration. Albeit there is a divergence of opinion over which sector needs to prioritize between China and Africa, China makes a lot of effort to cement relations through bridge the gap that arises from lopsided Sino-African ties. At FOCAC, China is conscious of the asymmetric relations between itself and Africa, especially with regards to economic ties. To improve the situation, China introduced the “Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development”, which was adopted at the first Ministerial Conference. The Programme clearly specifies what needs improving in the economic relationship between China and Africa:

The Ministers note the necessity to move towards balanced and enhanced trade and acknowledge the need to assist in improving the production capacity in Africa and in diversifying the composition of African exports. They pledge to collaborate and share
experience in overcoming Africa’s export dependence on primary commodities, single products and raw materials... promote two-way trade and facilitate access for products to the Chinese market... providing better and preferential access to the Chinese market for Africa export of commercial importance. (FOCAC, 2009b)

In addition to trade, investment also reflected Africa’s views of the development of African enterprises and locals “through bilateral and/or trilateral cooperation channels”. In the natural resource sector, which provokes criticism from African countries and the West, China agreed to “promote investment in, and exploration and beneficiation of metallurgical resources and that such beneficiation should be done in Africa” (ibid) for mutual benefit. Besides, China promotes activities connected with international institutions, when delivering on commitments to African countries. For example, China pledged to establish agriculture demonstration centers across the African continent, and set up 10 in 2006 and 30 in 2009, in cooperation with the United Nations’ (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (The UN, 2015c), as suggested by the Programme, rather than working unilaterally. Rather than disregarding Africa’s domestic situations, China worked with African countries for mutual benefit. After the second Summit, the strategic partnership aspect of Sino-Africa relations took more concrete shape (see table, below), which underlined mutual concerns in individual sectors. This led to various cooperative activities, such as in political affairs and regional peace and security, cooperation in the field of development, economic cooperation, cooperation in international affairs, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges and cooperation. The sphere of cooperative activities so far covers all levels and fields of African society (MacDonald, 2012).

Table 7: The chronology of cooperation, based on main commitments of FOCAC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation Field</th>
<th>FOCAC I</th>
<th>FOCAC II</th>
<th>FOCAC III</th>
<th>FOCAC IV</th>
<th>FOCAC V</th>
<th>FOCAC VI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
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<tr>
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<th>Zero-Tariff treatment</th>
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<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Resource Development and Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>People-to-people exchange</td>
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*Note. Organized by author based on the information on FOCAC.org*

### 7.2.1 The mechanism and Institutions of FOCAC

To streamline consultation between China and Africa, joint follow-up mechanisms at various levels were established through “the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development” at the first FOCAC, agreed upon by all parties. Based on the agreement, the Senior Official Preparatory Meeting for the Ministerial Conference is held a few days before, and the Senior Official Follow-up Meeting is held a year before the conference. Also, a meeting of the Chinese Follow-up Committee and African diplomats in China is arranged twice per year to facilitate good results from the follow-up actions. The Ministerial Conference is held every three years to assess the progress adopted and implemented by the Programme during the conference (FOCAC, 2013).

FOCAC is a multilateral cooperation platform with multi-level interactions between China and African countries (Li, et al., 2012). Hence, it is composed of 28 member departments.
including agencies of the Chinese Follow-up Committee, which was set up in November 2000. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Commerce are in charge of FOCAC, and the Committee members have irregular plenary meetings to report on the implementation of FOCAC measures. In addition, the following Chinese departments take part in FOCAC for public diplomacy-related activities: Agriculture, Science and Technology, Education, Health, Culture, Environmental Protection, Land and Resources, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Information Office of the State Council, State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, the Beijing Municipal Government, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, the Bank of China, the People’s Bank of China, the Export-Import Bank, the China Africa Development Fund, the National Development and Reform Commission, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, the General Administration of Customs, and the National Tourism Administration. In addition, the Committee has a secretariat that consists of two separate parts: one is made up of director general-level officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Culture; the second is the director general of the Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, functioning as the Secretary General under the management of the Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FOCAC, 2013). The majority of Chinese departments involve in FOCAC also manage and supervise public diplomacy activities related to society, culture, media, tourism, education, and finance in China. In addition to China’s Follow-Up Committee of the FOCAC, there are also four African institutional groups – African Diplomatic Corps, Senior Officials of African Countries, African Foreign Ministers, African Union – involve in a similar process of consultation, feedback, and implementation. Besides these four institutions, there are three others that facilitate the implementation of FOCAC projects at the national and regional levels: African Ambassadors in China, follow-up committees in the relevant departments in African countries, and sub-regional organizations. While the Chinese Follow-up Committee has a centralized and unified structure, the African institutions in FOCAC feature multilateral/bilateral and centralized/decentralized organizations that speak for Sino-African relations (Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng, and He, 2012). The role of the African institutions in FOCAC, is to serve not only as exchanges and modifiers of FOCAC measures for the further improvement of Sino-Africa relations Follow-up Committee, but also to forge connections between collaborative programs of FOCAC and African countries to smooth progress. However, the African side is less centralized when compared to the Chinese. For example, South Africa and Ethiopia only have specific offices for FOCAC follow-up, unlike other African countries that have a specific desk to manage Sino-related affairs (The UN, 2015a). Moreover, unlike China’s institutionalized Follow-Up Committee, Africa does not
have a core institution that coordinates and manages follow-up in African countries. Thus, each African country manages its own follow-up actions (Li, et al., 2012).

As referred to earlier, FOCAC is a platform for multilateral cooperation with multiple levels of interaction between China and African countries. For multilateral cooperation, FOCAC follows a process of preparation and formation for a series of Declarations, Action Plans, and Programmes that are based on multi-level interaction. The center of the mechanism is the interaction between heads of state from all sides; the second level is comprised of senior officials’ meetings; the final level of interaction is between diplomats and the host countries (Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng, and He, 2012). As for the decision-making procedure of FOCAC, China assumes the lead in fulfilling commitments, such as hosting the meetings and combining suggestions and opinions (see figure, below).

Figure 9: The procedure of multi-level interaction of FOCAC for decision making

Note. Adopted from Li, et al., 2012

7.2.2 FOCAC and Institutions

Besides the strengthened economic ties between China and Africa, China and Africa affirmed their solidarity and expanded their dialogue through the South-South agenda before the
establishment of the FOCAC. Based on the same objective as South-South agenda, China and Africa have pursued stronger voices in the international arena and at international institutions such as the UN, WTO, IMF, and World Bank (Shelton and Paruk, 2008). The South-South cooperation is an effective tool in the FOCAC framework for strengthening Sino-Africa relations; it helps to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and alleviates poverty to dramatically cut down on social and economic ills in Africa countries. Through the framework, China has been giving its assistance to Africa in the fields of health, infrastructure development, agriculture, and education (UN, 2005).

One thing to note in connection with FOCAC is that the institutionalization is visible beyond bilateral relations with African countries, and can be seen in multilateral relations with the African continent (Gazibo and Mbamia, 2012). China has gradually engaged regional, sub-regional, and international organizations in providing active support to strengthen the African voice regionally and internationally, and to clarify information although dialogue and consultation underlie the process of FOCAC and its related cooperation (The UN, 2015a). By extension, China seeks to expand and create multilayered transnational government networks through FOCAC (Sohn, 2011). In this regard, Plessis (2014) said that “FOCAC institutionalised China and Africa’s relations and functioned as the ideal mechanism to manage contemporary China-Africa relations” (p.117). Through the FOCAC framework, China supports African integration via the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programme, including regional efforts. Furthermore, at the second Summit in 2015, Beijing pledged to cooperate with the African Union’s Agenda for Regional and Continental Integration and Development through programs such as Agenda 2063, including the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan of Agenda 2063 (FOCAC, 2015a).

As previously mentioned, FOCAC and the African Union cooperate closely, and the cooperation has become stronger over time. The Africa Union Commission joined as a full member of the FOCAC in 2011, at the Senior Officials’ meeting in China. A year later, China gifted the construction of the African Union headquarters in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, at a cost of around US$200 million. After three years, the African Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China on industrial development and to improve transportation networks on the Africa continent. About this Zuma said, “It was in that meeting that we discussed what we think is important for Africa to attain its vision and objective of a prosperous, united and peaceful Africa guided by its people.” (AllAfrica, 2015). In 2015, China has officially opened its permanent mission to the African Union headquarters for cementing diplomatic relations with African countries on the African continent105. In

105 For more information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-05/08/c_134219455.htm
addition, China set up a forum for economics and trade, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in 2008. China also cemented its relations with the South African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Gazibo and Mbamia, 2012) to contribute to regional integration – for example, with the establishment of the Great COMESA-SADC-EAC (East African Community) Free Trade Zone.

China expands its cooperation multilaterally by approaching growth from the bottom-up, and from inside-out through regional organizations and international institutions not only to strengthen economic ties, but also to deepen relations between China and Africa. This connects with the background of FOCAC’s aim to enhance cooperation and equality between China and Africa. FOCAC also functions as the ideal institution to coordinate Sino-African relations. There are two main ways in which FOCAC restructures Sino-African relations: first, FOCAC creates coordination for Chinese interventions in Africa; second, FOCAC encourages the level of cooperation between China and Africa. The deeper Sino-African relations become, the more the interaction between the two sides is complicated by diverse actors on both sides. Hence, individuals, workers, entrepreneurs, and multinational companies, local, provincial, and national governments play an active role on the international stage under the FOCAC framework (Gazibo and Mbamia, 2012; Plessie, 2014). Under the FOCAC framework, there are various subsidiary forums aimed not only at widening and cementing cooperation between China and Africa, but also improving the quality of the content of FOCAC. The sub-forums cover science and technology, agriculture, culture, think tanks, NGOs, media, finance, youth, women, law, and local governments (FOCAC, 2013).

7.3 Overview of economic relations between China and African countries among FOCAC, institutions, and public diplomacy

7.3.1 The economic sector related institutions

As discussed in Chapter 5, China and Africa have had robust economic relations (mostly through trade and investment) since 2000. Since the FOCAC’s establishment in 2000, the trade volume between China and African countries has expanded significantly. This has made China the largest trading partner with African countries today (more information on this can be found in Chapter 5). As part of the FOCAC initiatives that strengthen trade, investment, and aid in Sino-Africa relations, the China-Africa Business Council (CABC), the China and Africa Development Fund (CADFund), and SEZs were created. After adopting the
first FOCAC action plan, all economic tools have been utilized by China with a view to cooperating with African countries (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012).

The CABC is the first Public Private Partnership (PPP) initiative model between China and Africa, under the auspices of the South-South cooperation (CABC, 2015) and the “Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development” that was created during the first Ministerial Conference. The United Nation Development Program (UNDP) provided US$1 million in initial seed capital (ERA, October 2009). As a non-profit organization and an adjunct to FOCAC, the CABC was jointly established by the UNDP, the China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchange, and the China Society for Promotion of the Guangcai Program, in 2005. The Chinese central government officially approved as part of the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 2006. The core aim of the CABC is to “establish a strong international network of international organizations, national investment agencies, chambers of commerce, industry associations and civil society organizations to address socioeconomic development issues”. In addition to its economics-related aims, the CABC aims to also improve infrastructure, promote vocational education, address poverty, health, gender equality issues (UNCTAD, 2017, pp.1-2). The CABC is designed to boost China-Africa trade and investment through a close relationship between the Chinese government and private sector, the latter of which includes over 16,500 Chinese private companies. The CABC has offices in China and six African countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Tanzania). In 2008, the CABC held a seminar that concentrated on the impact of the global financial crisis on China-Africa commercial relations, and concluded that the FOCAC provided a solid framework through which China and Africa can address global crises (ERA, 2009).

The council provides the following services: organizing business visits between China and Africa, analyzing investment opportunities; providing advanced information service through the CABC’s own database and publications (such as Chinese Enterprises in Africa 2015, Guide for Chinese Companies to Invest in Africa 2016, and The Third United Republic of Tanzania-China Business Forum Handbook); offering financial services using domestic and international financial institutions, such as the China Development Bank, the CAD Fund, and the IFC, human resource service such as organizing workshops and training members; holding exhibitions in China and Africa for trade, investment, and technology transfer (CABC, 2015; UNCTAD, 2017). In 2015, the CABC’s expenditures were around US$744,000; most spent on employees, services, goods, and operating costs. The council organized the following events in 2016 related to finance, investment, agriculture, think tank, and welfare (ibid):
a. Action makes vision reality;

b. Signing of the cooperation agreement between the China-Africa Business Council and the China-Africa Development Fund;

c. Forum on Angola’s Investment Environment and Legal Risks;

d. China-Nigeria Forum on Productive Capacity and Investment cooperation;

e. China-Côte d’Ivoire Conference on Agriculture cooperation;

f. China-Mozambique Forum on Productive Capacity and Investment Cooperation;

g. Fifth China-Africa Think Tank Forum;

h. Commencing the potential of pharmaceuticals in the socioeconomic transformation of Africa;

i. Twenty-sixth ordinary session of the African Union Assembly and signing of the cooperation agreement with the Organization of African First Ladies against HIV/AIDS.

The CADFund is one of the “Eight Measures” for China-Africa practical cooperation announced by President Hu Jintao at the 2006 Beijing Summit of FOCAC. A year later, the fund, “an Africa-focused equity investment fund”, was officially launched by the Chinese government with the aim of supporting and boosting investment by Chinese enterprises in Africa. The Fund mainly serves Chinese firms that invest in Africa and seeks Chinese partners for African projects. It is a vehicle for equity investment, quasi-equity investment, and fund investment (CADFund-a, n.a). Grimm and Schickerling (2013) argue “[it] forms part of the Chinese government’s practical implementation, for some of its plans and objectives, for the African continent”, and that “the Fund is an economic and diplomatic tool of the Chinese government” to achieve its goals in Africa (p.1). So, the CADFund focuses on improving capacity building of the African economy and enabling cooperation between China and Africa using direct investment and advisory services (ibid). The Fund supports to boost Africa’s industrialization and agricultural modernization, energy sector, transportation, telecommunication facilities, trade zones, and sustainable development. Thus, the CADFund’s priority investment areas are as follows: first, providing capital financing for companies that invest in Africa and sharing in their risk; second, connecting African projects with Chinese companies and vice versa; third, providing value-added services, supporting
companies that are in difficult circumstances in Africa’s investment environment (CADFund-a, n.a).

A representative office of the CADFund was established in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2016, which is not only the second representative office of CADFund in eastern African countries but also the first regional office in East African Community countries. The Fund’s five overseas representative offices are located in Ethiopia, Zambia, Ghana, and South Africa (CADFund, 2016). The CADFund is fully financed by the China Development Bank, which also supports China’s infrastructure development projects and encourages basic and strategic industries (ERA, October 2009). The total amount of the Fund has gradually increased to US$10 billion (as of 2016). In 2007, the Fund was worth US$5 billion (including the initial US$1 billion), and added an additional US$2 billion after the Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs, which was held in conjunction with the 2012 FOCAC. Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged US$5 billion to the Fund at the Johannesburg Summit of FOCAC in 2015. The CADFund works in tandem with over 1,000 companies, including over 500 investment projects in Africa; and has invested more than US$3.5 billion in 87 projects in 36 African countries. The projects are steer the investment of Chinese companies in Africa, and support sustainable development in Africa through investment (CADFund, 2016). Examples of the Fund’s activities include (Grimm and Schickerling, 2013):

a. US$22.6 million invested in a cotton cultivation project in Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia;

b. US$16.4 million invested in a power plant in Ghana;

c. US$50.9 million invested in Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector;

d. Reserving shares in SEZs, Lekki in Nigeria and Suez in Egypt.

While China established the China-led institutions and plans for cooperation through multilayered and multilateral networks through FOCAC, a difference of opinion between China and Africa on FOCAC nevertheless exists. The first problem is the China-centric operating system. In other words, China is “in control of the whole process and [...] sets the agenda and the declarations and outcomes” (Taylor, 2012, p.31). Structurally, Africa does not have centralized institutions and mechanisms to collect African countries’ opinions as discussed earlier. Therefore, it is difficult for the FOCAC to express the views of African heads of state (MacDonald, 2012). Ian Taylor (2011) argued that “A key issue facing Africa’s engagement with FOCAC is that the continent lacks a consistent and unified collective policy to connect with Beijing” (p.94). In the same vein, interviewee S-A3 (2017) argued that “it is
so urgent for Africa to set up China policy like the Africa policy, which China established towards African countries, to have equal relations with China”. Li, et al (2012) indicated the structural problem with FOCAC regarding the decision-making process and collecting dialogue from African countries; suggesting the need to give the AU greater input between China and Africa in the operation FOCAC. Thus, they proposed the establishment of an office at the AU, like the Chinese Follow-up Committee, to cooperate with China through efficient and effective communication and coordination. In 2011, the Chinese government has invited the African Union Commission to become a full member of the FOCAC, and also provided financial support to the AU. So far, nothing has happened with regards to an organized African institution related to FOCAC and a bottom-up approach to solving Africa’s chronic problems. In this context, interviewee S-C2 (2017) pointed out that the general South African public does not know much about the FOCAC nor its functions, unlike the government and other high ranking positions. The second problem is the level transparency of China’s aid commitments related to FOCAC action plans. Interviewee S-C1 (2017) said that FOCAC sets action plans and agendas at every tri-annual meeting, but does not release detailed information – such as how many plans were carried out, and which countries received China’s support. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Chinese government (unlike the West) does not announce the minutiae of its aid deals, including where it goes and how it is used. For example, the Exim Bank opened its figures on export credits and guarantees to the public, but kept information regarding sovereign aid lending secret (Guéin, 2008). A typical operational problem of China’s commitment is in the NGOs sector, as it relates to FOCAC action plans (Sohn, 2011). Take, for example, this instance from the Johannesburg action plan: for the sake of education and human resources development in Africa, the two sides agreed to mobilize resources, including NGOs, to carry out “Africa 200 ‘Happy Life’ Projects” and “poverty reduction programs for children and women”. In terms of the agenda of “people-to-people exchanges” and “environmental protection and tackling climate changes”, China and Africa also intended the action plan to enhance mutual visits by NGOs, and to examine a model for environmental cooperation between Chinese and African governments and non-governmental capital (FOCAC, 2015b). But the present situation of China’s NGOs is that “many Chinese NGOs are unable to attain official non-profit registration status, thereby negatively impacting their social and political legitimacy” due to the fact that they are under government control (Tai, 2015, p.19). These circumstances leave room for doubt about whether Chinese NGOs in Africa work properly and appropriately in the role of NGOs.

7.3.2 FOCAC and Public diplomacy
Shelton and Paruk (2008) called FOCAC as “part of China’s foreign policy of ‘soft power’” (p.19). As discussed in Chapter 5, one of the reasons for establishment of China’s public diplomacy was to bridge the gap that has been created in Sino-African economic relations (mainly trade and investment), as well as a growing number of Chinese living and working in African countries. The role of public diplomacy in FOCAC is also to mitigate the divergence of opinion within FOCAC between China and Africa. Hence, there are 13 sub-Forums within the framework of the FOCAC focused on the areas of law, youth, women, think tanks, media, and others, aimed at further strengthening the role of the FOCAC (Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the FOCAC, 2015). Each session not only reflects a variety of opinions from African countries including the AU and other African regional organizations but also displays a clear goal of bridging the divide through different discussions about future activities. The Chinese government also connects its existing public diplomacy means, such as medical teams and human resources development, used for bilateral ties between China and Africa, to the work of these sub-Forums. As discussed earlier, the FOCAC carries out its diverse programs and shares its opinions with the AU and international institutions’ programs, such as the UNDP. However, the UN agencies have not fully participated in FOCAC’s works and activities, such as tracking commitments or directly supporting coordination. Nonetheless, the UN has gradually been taking a bigger part in the FOCAC as an observer – for example, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon attended the fourth FOCAC (The UN, 2015c).

FOCAC sees the necessity of public diplomacy, thus the China-Africa Public Diplomacy Forum was held in 2016 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. It was attended by officials, experts, businessmen, and media professionals from China and Africa. The aim of the forum was to “explor[e] opportunities for future development and shared diplomatic perceptions so as to understand the divergence of opinions which could lead to misunderstandings”, with an emphasis on connecting China and African countries “heart and soul” (SCIO, 2016). The forum’s theme was prepared by the China public diplomacy association and included three sub-forums concentrated on public welfare, culture, and traditional medicine, with representatives from China and Africa countries seeking cooperation with local communities, companies, and NGOs to improve mutual understanding and win-win cooperation (CRI, 2016). At the opening ceremony, the Minister for Information, Culture, Arts and Sports Nape Nnauye, emphasised the importance of the media as it acts, first, in bridging the gap between the publics of both sides; second, promotes national culture; and finally safeguards stability. From the African angle, the necessity for mutual understanding between China and Africa is “the development of the continent”, added Communication Advisor for the African Union Commission Doreen Apollos (SCIO, 2016).
Prior to having the public diplomacy forum, China carried out its public diplomacy through the media; China’s media-led public diplomacy was briskly carried out following the third FOCAC with the Beijing Summit, in 2006 (Madrid-Morales, 2016). The Forum on China-Africa Media Cooperation has been held every two years to boost mutual trust and promote inclusive development for deepening cooperation between China and African media (Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the FOCAC, 2015). For example, the FOCAC media seminar was held in Beijing three months before the fourth FOCAC, in November 2009, jointly hosted by the State Council Information Office (SCIO) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The participants of the seminar included around 70 delegates composed of press officials and major press media from 27 African countries, and representatives of African media agencies in China. Also, journalists from China and Africa attended the seminar to discuss these two topics: “the role of media in promoting China-Africa relations” and “how to raise the voice of the developing countries in the international public opinion”. During the seminar, Beijing stressed the media’s role in Sino-African ties and its function in “enhancing the mutual understanding between the Chinese and the African people and maintaining the China-Africa friendly cooperation” under the framework of FOCAC. The two sides agreed on the following: the Chinese and African media should reinforce cooperation, promote China and Africa to the world in one voice, introduce China-Africa pragmatic cooperation, serve as the promoters, protectors and builders of China-Africa friendship, increase the voice of China and Africa in international public opinion, clarify false remarks on China-Africa cooperation, and strive for greater say for the developing countries (MFA, 2009). To boost friendship between China and Africa, the two sides implemented the “China-Africa People-to-People Friendship Action” and the “China-Africa People-to-People Friendship Partnership Plan” through small and micro-scale social livelihood projects, mutual visits by NGOs, and extensive people-to-people exchanges and cooperation through diverse programs (FOCAC, 2015b). In addition, the China-Africa Think Tank Forum has been held every year to offer a platform and regular institution for dialogue and exchanges between Chinese and African think tanks (Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the FOCAC, 2015). The education cooperation agenda was specifically established at the Sino-African Education Minister Forum in November 2005. Through the “China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Program” and the “China-Africa Think Tank 10+10 Partnership Plan”, China and Africa expanded cooperation, for example by implementing various Chinese and African academic institutional projects, and inviting 200 African scholars to visit China every year. China also pledged to provide US$2 million a year through the framework of the UNESCO trust fund for education development programmes in Africa (Li and Liu, 2013). As for Chinese public diplomacy for education and human
resource development, China recently implemented the “20+20 Cooperation Plan” to enhance the cooperation mechanisms between Chinese and African institutions of higher education, boosting regional and national studies between Chinese and African universities. The plan supports schools to establish partnerships between research centers pursuant to the Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018) (FOCAC, 2015b). In addition to China’s public diplomacy through the sub-forums, the Chinese government has carried out various public diplomacy activities based on each of the FOCACs’ declarations and action plans.

To cite one example, medical cooperation gave shape to the establishment of detailed programs and activities through FOCAC, although China has been cooperating in the medical field for the past 46 years. Through the medical aid agreements at the first FOCAC, China has been providing aid to treat malaria and pulmonary tuberculosis. Since 2003, China has dispatched Chinese medical soldiers alongside the UN Peace-Keeping Force to, for example, the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Chinese government established anti-Malaria centres in African countries to boost efficient medical support, as part of President Hu’s commitment at the third FOCAC in 2006. China also encourages Chinese pharmaceutical companies to produce anti-malaria drugs and establish branches in Africa to streamline distribution – for example, Beijing Holley Cotec developed DihydroArtemisinin or “Cotecxin” in 1993, which was approved by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a malaria treatment. As part of the medical cooperation, Beijing cooperated with African countries to promote hospitals and medical facilities and provide Chinese medical training to improve the local health care systems in Africa (Li, 2013, pp.64-71). The Chinese government also deploys multiple actors – such as Chinese and African women, legal, young youth, Chinese and African Non-Government Organizations – to implement the UN’s Millennium Development Goals and boost China’s public diplomacy in African countries. To sum up, as Li Baoping and Liu Jianbo have noted, “The FOCAC measures to promote people-to-people exchanges, higher education and training speak of international cooperation between the two regions” (2013, p.29). FOCAC enables China to establish various practical policies and major institutions for public diplomacy through multilateral communications. In Batchelor’s (2017) understanding, the plans for cultural cooperation in FOCAC action plans have been extended and prominent since 2009 (the fourth FOCAC), whereas before they fell under a broader heading. FOCAC, in turn, sets the stage for China to carry out its public diplomacy more efficiently based on dialogue during the tri-annual ministerial meetings and annual or tri-annual sub-forums, through the framework of FOCAC. As discussed above, therefore, China bases its attempts to bolster its positive image in diplomatic relations with African countries and strengthen economic ties with leading African countries by calming
controversy over the gap created between China and Africa by asymmetric economic relations.

7.4 Evaluate the role of China’s public diplomacy in the dynamics of economic relations with Africa

One needs to be clear about how the FOCAC mechanisms work in conjunction with China’s public diplomacy. A noteworthy feature of the FOCAC institutions established by China to enhance cooperation with Africa are the China-centric institutions, as discussed above. To understand the establishment of China-centric institutions, G. John Ikenberry and Darren J. Lim (2017) noted today’s international order, which is “complex and multilayered, both at regional and global levels, and states can be ‘in’ some of it, while staying outside of or opposing other parts of it” (p.5). It consists of norms, rules, and institutions; global multilateral economic rules and institutions such as the Bretton Woods regime and the WTO, and multilateral security institutions (such as the UN), as well as diverse alliance partnerships (ibid). Under circumstance like these, the two scholars argue that China “will not pursue a blanket approach to the existing international order, but will find themselves supporting and participating in some area, while opposing and working around other areas” (p.6). On that note, Beijing is particularly interested in regional rules and institutions, which can provide membership to venues for great power activities (p.7). China’s approach is based on its own, different view of “the United States’ hegemonic position within the international order”, “its liberal internationalism”, and the necessity for “deeper foundations of sovereignty and the primacy of state actors” on the global stage. China therefore attempts to diverge from the America-centric international system, and away from liberal internationalist rules and principles, such as human rights, free trade, and democracy; and liberal characteristics, such as self-determination and institutions of decolonization in the international system (pp.6-7). Forsby (2011) also analyzed China-centric institutions based on liberal institutionalism, stating that “by engaging China and entangling it in a mesh of liberal institutions, China will gradually be turned into fully fledged-member of the Liberal Order, in the process liberalizing its own polity” (p.13). However, despite China adjusting itself to become a regular member of international society – for example, by joining institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and G20, and also liberalized its economy – there has also been a lack of political reform and liberalization in China (ibid, p.13-4).

However, the Chinese government facilitates its institutions based on its economic power over member states. China’s non-liberal political system – its limitation of freedom of the
press, speech, and religion and media control – impedes the public diplomacy activities of the FOCAC framework. It is hard to deny that the FOCAC’s system of public diplomacy is not considerably different from the typical style of China’s own public diplomacy, which was covered in Chapter 3. The public diplomacy in FOCAC is mostly based on existing Chinese public diplomacy activities. Of course, China’s government-led and controlled public diplomacy system has the benefit of being able to consistently and coherently map out a long-term plan, as discussed in Chapter 3. China’s public diplomacy in FOCAC gives prominence to the importance of public opinion, which is a measure as well as a source of power through communication, as has been argued by Henrikson (2006). Though FOCAC provides various venues for exchanging information, establishing plans and forging relationships between China and Africa, such the sub-forums, there are weaknesses which FOCAC compensates for in order to generate better results. First, China has a monopoly in Africa on public diplomacy activities. Public diplomacy has emerged as an important matter of FOCAC, but it highlights the imbalanced interactions between China and Africa. For instance, cultural cooperation based on the “Cultures in Focus”, part of the action plan in 2013 and 2014, was conducted disproportionately with regards to location, sponsorship, and organization of events for cultural cooperation. In terms of Cultures in Focus event locations in 2013 and 2014, twice as many events were held in Africa than in China. The Chinese government alone not only supported over 70 percent of the events, but also organized 37 percent of events in 2013 and 72 percent of events in 2014, while Africa organized only 9 percent and 12 percent of events in 2013 and 2014, respectively (Batchelor, 2017, pp.81-85). Counter to the initial intent of cultural cooperation, that it would help create a positive image of China among the African public through cultural exchanges, the lopsided China-led cooperation had difficulty in generating positive results (such as mutual trust, understanding, and amicable relations with Africa). Second is the lack of opportunities for communication between China and the general public in African countries. The FOCAC compiles dialogue and establishes action plans and declarations with high-ranking officers from China and Africa. Thus, the sub-forum topics of FOCAC are not directly associated with the African public, but communication through the sub-forums is at the root of developing a positive image and recognition of China in Africa, and cementing relations between China and the continent. Therefore, this raises doubts about whether government officials fully reflect the will of public diplomacy in action plans during meetings, or whether the plans are of help to direct communications with the African people to form a sympathetic bond with China, and vice versa. For example, Yun Sun (2015) pointed to the think tank forum of FOCAC, and that the focus of the forum “eventually lies upon the African elite, rather than the general public at the grassroots level”, although it seems to focus on think tanks over governments. She
also argued that China needs to concentrate on the view of local communities and general public towards China, rather than on the influence of elite opinions in Africa.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter discussed FOCAC and how it contributes to improving Sino-African ties, South-South cooperation, closer relationships between Chinese and African leaders, and establishing an agenda and policy framework for mutual development and benefit for the next FOCAC meeting. FOCAC also supports the establishment of diverse Chinese public diplomacy activities based on various opinions surveyed during FOCAC meetings. There have been six FOCAC meetings between 2000 and 2016, and the areas of cooperation covered by the Declarations and a Plans of Action have diversified over time. Thus, FOCAC VI covered not only general topics of economic relations (such as investment, trade, zero-tariff treatment, and debt relief), but also cooperation on the media, human resource development, education, technical training, environmental protection, security, and people-to-people exchanges as part of China’s public diplomacy.

China leads FOCAC meetings and its mechanisms, but the majority of African countries also engage in decision-making, delivering their opinions on various agenda before they are implemented. The mechanism of FOCAC includes multi-level cooperation between different Chinese government departments, agencies, and embassies and their counterparts in Africa. By using the tools and aims of South-South cooperation, FOCAC advances cooperation between China and African countries through the AU, ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and alleviate poverty, thereby attempting to dramatically address the social and economic ills in Africa countries. Through the framework, China has given its assistance to Africa in the fields of health, infrastructure development, agriculture, and education. Also, FOCAC established the CABC, CADFund, and SEZs to strengthen and buttress economic ties in Sino-Africa relations. Furthermore, China works with UN-affiliated organizations, such as UNDP and UNESCO, to support African countries’ development under the FOCAC framework. However, while the Chinese government utilizes its economic power and China-centric institutions to cooperate with African countries, there remain problems that need to be resolved – such as limitation of freedom of speech, religion, and strong state control of the media in China’s domestic political system, which in turn hinders its public diplomacy activities through FOCAC. Also, China needs to improve the systematic issue of the lopsided, China-led cooperation and the lack of opportunities in
communication with the general public in Africa, which could lead to stronger cooperation, mutual trust and understanding, and friendly relations with Africa.

Chapter 8: Conclusion
This thesis has focused on understanding the necessity and role of China's public diplomacy in Sino-Africa's relations, as a means for cementing economic ties between China and the continent. In addition, it has shed light on the significance of China's public diplomacy for its foreign policy, which is focused on domestic economic development. As noted in the introduction to the research, most nations pay attention to public opinion in the establishment of foreign policy due to an increased participation in foreign affairs resulting from more-developed information and communication technology. Public diplomacy research, furthermore, is an important research topic that has recently attracted the attention of scholars in an increasingly global society. Thus, in the early 2000s, China joined the ranks of countries utilizing public diplomacy to generate positive foreign policy results. However, the question was raised among scholars as to whether the role and substance of China's public diplomacy share its intentions, from the perspective of public diplomacy from other countries (especially the West), due to China's authoritarian governmental system.

As this research has discussed, China's public diplomacy achieves its foreign policy objectives based on its culture, domestic institutions and values, and foreign policies in connection with its economic power and other soft power instruments, rather than through coercion and force as a means of persuasion. Despite the fact that China's public diplomacy functions well in foreign nations (especially developing countries), the character and mechanisms of its public diplomacy provoke controversy in academic circles, because it is based on propaganda and a government-led system that sets limits to maximize China's public diplomacy effect. Based on the differing perspectives, the thesis looked into the function and role of China's public diplomacy in Sino-African relations, which have the problem of lopsided economic ties, and examined how China has led cooperation through its public diplomacy. The aims of the research were: first, to explore the diversification of China's African policy through the use of public diplomacy, in accordance with changes of the diplomatic paradigm that have arisen from globalization; second, to examine the significance and role of China's public diplomacy in its African policy through the lens of power politics of economic (asymmetric) interdependence over sub-Saharan African nations; third, to investigate how China's diversified new African policy has compensated for the limitations of its previous policies, and produce actual results in the form of amicable Sino-African relations. In order to achieve these aims, the research posed three research questions, which were addressed throughout the thesis. To arrive at proper conclusions, the three research questions will be addressed here based on the discussions in main chapters. Then,
this chapter will examine the limitations and contributions of the research, and implications for further research into China’s public diplomacy in the field of International Relations.

**China’s public diplomacy and economic ties with Africa**

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the research focused on the correlation between China’s public diplomacy activities and its effects, especially the maintenance of close economic relations with African countries, boosting Chinese economic development, and improving China’s reputation among the African public. Thus, it adopted a framework of neoliberal institutionalism and complex interdependence to understand 1) the lopsided economic ties between China and Africa, and 2) the character of China’s soft power-based public diplomacy and instruments to examine public diplomacy’s effect on Sino-Africa asymmetrical relations.

Prior to the discussion of Sino-African economic ties and China’s public diplomacy, it is necessary to first sum up the perspective of neoliberal institutionalism, and how it provided a framework for understanding the research topic and answering the research questions. Neoliberals recognize the concept of power as “power-as-resource” and a “relational power” approach that conceives of power as “a relationship (actual or potential) in which the behavior of actor A at least partially causes a change in the behavior of actor B” (Baldwin, 2013, p.274). Keohane and Nye (1987, 2011) assessed the source of power as asymmetrical interdependence which linked realist and neorealist analysis to concerns of liberal with interdependence. They regarded the two as “necessary complements to one another”. And they also argued that “this approach was analytically justified, in our view, because realism and liberalism both have their roots in a utilitarian view of the world, in which individual actors pursue their own interests by responding to incentive” (Keohane & Nye, 1987, p.728).

Keohane and Nye (1987, 2011) observed the burgeoning of informal and formal relations between states, companies, and economics and the proliferation of actors involved in international relations. Whereas international relations concern states, transnational relations include sub-state and extra-state actors, creating complex interdependence at the global system level. Within interdependence, international institutions have an influence on “state prerogative growth” (Telò, 2009, p.85). Thus, Keohane and Nye (1987, 2011) argued that asymmetric interdependence can be the source of power in interdependent relations between transnational actors, governments, and in interstate relations. In this situation, complex interdependence refers to “the complex ways in which as a result of growing ties,
the transnational actors become mutually dependent, vulnerable to each other’s actions and sensitive to each other’s needs” (Rana, 2015, p.291). Thus, Keohane and Nye (1987, 2011) suggested that the key characteristics of complex interdependence are the multiple channels connecting societies,¹⁰⁶ the absence of hierarchy among domestic and foreign issues,¹⁰⁷ and a minor role for military force. Keohane and Nye (2011) also understood that, “It is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependence relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues” (pp.10-11). By extension, they focused on “the pattern of economic interdependence has implications for power and vice versa” (Keohane & Nye, 1987, p.737). Moreover, asymmetrical economic interdependence provides “a political resource to the less dependent state”, and the state can “effectively threaten to make a change in its economic relationship with more dependent states to bring about political change” (Crescenzi, 2003, p.74). In other words, asymmetrical interdependence give rise to bargaining power.

Through the lens of this theoretical framework, the thesis assessed that, in Sino-Africa relations, asymmetrical economic interdependence is a source of power for China. To use Keohane and Nye (2011)’s formulation, interdependence does not only concern mutual benefit, but there are two different types of interdependence that lead power relations: sensitive interdependence and vulnerability interdependence. In terms of Sino-African asymmetrical economic ties, this research found that China gained the upper hand in interdependent economic relations with Africa, and exhibited fewer sensitivities and vulnerabilities in trade and investment. Thus, African countries that have active economic ties with China likely complain about the lopsided relations. However, from a macro point of view, the thesis found that China and Africa are interdependent, although China holds power in asymmetrical economic relations with Africa. This is because Africa plays an important role in China’s economy, especially for its enterprises executing the going out policy, as well as the ongoing need to secure energy resources from African countries for China’s continued economic development.

Keohane and Nye (2011) argued that the power of information arose due to the contemporary information revolution resulting from globalization, and thus they focused on

¹⁰⁶ The multiple channels are interstate relations, comprised of normal channels of communications by realists; transgovernmental relations, which are informal ties among nongovernmental elites; and transnational relations, which are between multinational banks or corporations.

¹⁰⁷ This means that the military issue is not the sole agenda. Governments stress welfare, health, education, and other issues as well. Thus, there is no longer a clear distinction between high politics and low politics in the late twentieth century. Economic, cultural, commercial, and technological relations play an important part in major issues of international politics.
the connection between the information revolution and globalization and interdependence. The international exchange and flow of information fosters a multitude of opinions and interests. Also, the actions of transnational actors, multinational companies, tourism, and others influence governments’ policies and society. However, interdependent relations do not always promote cooperation, and cooperation operates within the same (or similar) types of regime. Cooperation “arises out of discourse, along with the shared belief that mutual adjustment is necessary – albeit often painful” (Keohane & Nye, 2011, p.256). Thus, Keohane and Nye (2011) stressed the difference between the power that comes from asymmetrical interdependence and soft power:

asymmetrical interdependence is an important source of hard power. The ability of the less vulnerable to manipulate or escape the constraints of an interdependent relationship at low cost is an important source of power. In the context of hard power, asymmetries of information can greatly strengthen the hand of the less vulnerable party. Soft power, on the other hand, is the ability to get desired outcomes because others want what you want; it is the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas or culture or the ability to set the agenda through standards and institutions that shape the preferences of others. It depends largely on the persuasiveness of the free information that an actor seeks to transmit. (Keohane & Nye, 2011, p.216)

As in Table 2 in Chapter 3, Nye (2011) divided power into hard power and soft power, based on resource power and behavioral power suggested in Keohane and Nye (1998)’s work. Nye argued that the power shift from hard to soft ranges from command power to co-optive power, from coercion to economic inducements, to agenda-setting, to pure attraction. The significance of public diplomacy and soft power is stressed in an interdependent and globalized world. By extension, Keohane and Nye (2002) argued that “global” refers to multilateral interdependence and “a network of relationship”, including multicontinental distance and global links to “networks of connections (multiple relations), not simply to single linages”108 (p.193)

Complex interdependence provides a framework with which one can examine how

108 The connection between global and interdependence and a network of relationship are from Keohane and Nye’s view of globalism. Keohane and Nye (2002) defined globalization in connection with interdependence as “a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at a multicontinental distance. These networks can be linked through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances” (p.193).
interdependence relations affect norms, institutions, and regimes, and are intricately entwined with each other in the era of globalization. Based on this framework, this thesis analyzed China’s public diplomacy and soft power in conjunction with a global understanding of public diplomacy. In the early 2000s, China began in earnest to utilize public diplomacy in its foreign policy, after recognizing the significance of China’s reputation and image for enhancing diplomatic relations with foreign countries – especially in the wake of China’s development and a lingering concern about a ‘China Threat’ in international society. Beijing also recognized power had shifted from states to non-state actors, and that information was no longer constrained by national boundaries due to globalization and the emerging information age. Thus, the Chinese government utilizes various soft power instruments to produce a positive reputation for itself from foreign publics, and form amicable relationships with foreign countries. This accords with the global understanding of public diplomacy, as defined by the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy, that “the public, interactive dimension of diplomacy which is not only global in nature, but also involves a multitude of actors and networks. It is a key mechanism through which nations foster mutual trust and productive relationships and has become crucial to building a secure global environment” (n.d). The idea of public diplomacy evolved from the old to a new public diplomacy with diverse cutting-edge communication instruments, as shown in Table 1 in Chapter 3. However, judging by the general trends and character of public diplomacy, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the research found that the China’s public diplomacy is somewhere between the old and new formulations. Beijing still maintains an old-style public diplomacy that is governmental centered, top-down, and very much limited to international non-governmental actors, rooted in political advocacy and propaganda, and targeted messaging. On the other hand, China also utilizes various instruments – such as the internet, the media and soft power – to maximize the effects of its public diplomacy, and considers corporate branding and relationship-building with foreign publics which are typical of the new public diplomacy.

While China does not follow the general tendencies of new public diplomacy, this thesis verified that China’s soft power public diplomacy encourages cooperation in Sino-African relations through two-way communications with African publics. On that note, as mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7, China’s public diplomacy shares the neoliberal perspective that pursues cooperation by deploying soft power to achieve common goals, rather than to dominate others. In the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, the salient state-centric perspective of neo-realism is accepted. Therefore, neoliberalists consider nations as unitary and rational actors in pursuit of maximized absolute gains through cooperation in all issue-areas in competitive international relations – which means that, insofar as nations get profits,
neoliberalists are indifferent to the extent of other nations’ profit-making. Regarding institutional neoliberalist cooperation, Keohane accounts for it as follows: “intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination” (Keohane, 1984, pp.51-2). Neoliberal institutionalists stress the importance of institutions, which enhance cooperation through increased mutual responsiveness and transparency based on a “set of rules”, and provide information that facilitates long-term cooperation through shared mutual interests with other nations.

China states that it is pursuing peaceful development and mutual development in international society. This is reflected in its African policy in 2006 and 2015, in which China’s public diplomacy functions as a bridge between China and the continent to relieve disharmony that has arisen from asymmetrical economic ties, and to boost cooperation for mutual benefit. Notwithstanding China’s foreign policy focus on economic development, China’s public diplomacy performs a communications role with the African people, and supports improvements in welfare and infrastructure. Furthermore, the Chinese government simultaneously utilizes its public diplomacy to boost cooperation and promote its economic development through various activities, including foreign aid, media, education and cultural exchange institutes in Africa. This research found that China's public diplomacy is linked to its foreign policy in support of China’s domestic economic development, and it is crucial to strengthening economic and political relations with African countries. China began to utilize FOCAC, in connection with its South-South Cooperation strategy, to expand its multilateral diplomatic, economic and political cooperation with African countries. By extension, China strengthened its relations with the UN and actively engaged in various public diplomacy activities to establish a foothold to take part in multilateral diplomacy. The role of China’s public diplomacy at the UN stands China in good stead for presenting itself as a responsible country, thereby securing for China the right to speak and pursue its national interest on the global stage.

The theoretical framework of neoliberal institutionalism and complex interdependence provided a big picture with which to understand the importance of cooperation between nations for mutual benefit, and to explain China’s public diplomacy and its lopsided economic ties with Africa. Furthermore, the theoretical framework helps to understand how the emergence of non-state actors and the development of communication technology are of growing importance in public diplomacy in an ever-more globalized world. Thus, countries carry out public diplomacy in diverse ways, and share and exchange information easily. The
neoliberal institutionalism and complex interdependence theoretical framework provided a big picture with which to understand the importance of cooperation between nations for mutual benefit, and to explain China’s public diplomacy and lopsided economic ties with Africa. Furthermore, the theoretical framework helps to understand that, in a more globalized world, the emergence of non-state actors and the development of communications technology are of growing importance in public diplomacy. Thus, countries carry out public diplomacy in diverse ways and share and exchange information easily. Drawing on the theoretical framework, this chapter will answer and draw conclusions from the research questions.

8.1 Answering the Research Questions

Based on the theoretical framework in Chapter 1, this thesis was designed with three primary parts: the nature and role of public diplomacy in international relations, China’s international strategy (policy framework), and China’s strategy in Africa (implementation framework), and three case studies that examine bilateral ties (two countries) and multilateral ties (one organization). Based on the findings in previous chapters, this chapter will answer the research questions in turn.

Question 1: What is the meaning of public diplomacy in international relations, and in the Chinese form of international relations? Why and how did China map out and implement its new strategy of public diplomacy in the context of the asymmetrical interdependent relations between China and Africa, and how did this connect to its political purpose based on the former and current Chinese leaders’ political perspective?

The answer to question one is based on the discussion in Chapter 3. Prior to discussing China’s public diplomacy, the general character of public diplomacy and the linkage between public diplomacy and soft power was discussed, in order to comprehend the public diplomacy mechanisms for addressing foreign publics. Although different scholars have differing definitions and understandings of public diplomacy, this thesis understands public diplomacy as communication with foreign publics and/or foreign governments and/or the domestic publics through diverse actors and instruments, directly or indirectly addressing negative impressions and phrases, generating sympathy and understanding for a nation’s ideas, goals, foreign policies and its institutions, culture, and societal model. It also aims to build relationships and positive images, facilitating closer political ties or alliances. With the advent of globalization and the information age, public diplomacy enhances the processes of
social and economic interdependence in the international system. The importance of public diplomacy is highlighted due to the increased influence of non-state actors in foreign affairs, thus establishing networks of relationships between non-state actors and facilitating a collaborative approach to foreign relations. Unlike during the Cold War era, public diplomacy in the twenty-first century is less likely to be connected to propaganda, because it uses soft power as its instrument and focuses on two-way communication and engaging with diverse actors to shape perceptions and change people’s minds (Nye, 2015a). Thus, as neoliberal institutionalism suggests, public diplomacy pursues two-way communication and cooperation through soft power aimed at foreign publics, to achieve mutual goals. Also, strategic communication is a subset and function of public diplomacy as it focuses on designing and disseminating a message to achieve a nation’s foreign policy objectives and long-term goals for select issues, as well as mutual understanding through networked relationships.

The Chinese understanding of public diplomacy is broader than that of the West. Unlike the West, the Chinese perspective of public diplomacy refers to propaganda, which means a conversation between the government and the public – propaganda does not have negative connotation in China. China mostly perceives its public diplomacy as people-to-people diplomacy through cultural exchanges. The aim of China’s public diplomacy is similar to Western public diplomacy, but the Chinese government utilizes its public diplomacy to support its foreign policy that is focused on domestic economic development. Also, China’s public diplomacy is a top-down and government-led system. Thus, governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental actors carry out public diplomacy through foreign aid, media, education and cultural exchange institutes based on China’s foreign policy goals (see Figure 10 below).
The significance of public diplomacy to the Chinese government is highlighted by its connection with globalization, the transition into an information-oriented society, and the importance of domestic economic development in its political system. China’s former and current leaders have focused on economic development since adopting the reforms and openness policy, thus endeavoring to promote a peaceful international environment. China encountered reputational difficulties due to its rapid economic growth during the 1990s. Thus, since the 2000s, China has carried out its public diplomacy using various instruments (foreign aid, media, education and cultural exchange institutes) to boost its image on the international stage, as well as calm controversies such as the West’s ‘China Threat’ theory. The Chinese government moved to improve the country’s international image when its soft power and the international image were damaged by various major crises, such as SARS in 2003, avian influenza (H5N1) in 2004, and the contaminated milk and infant formula scandal in 2008. Since then, China has hosted the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the Shanghai

Note: Author assembled this diagram based on content in previous chapters\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{109} As for various foreign aid activities based on China’s economic power in the category of a sphere of public diplomacy, it contains rendering complete projects including infrastructure development, goods and material supports, and debt relief.
Expo in 2010, and various events to present a positive image to the world. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao also pushed forward the concept of China’s peaceful rise/development with mutual development as the core of its foreign policy to promote cooperative and friendly relations with foreign countries. In 2005 and 2015, Hu also established new African policies based around various public diplomacy activities not only to bridge the gap that arose from asymmetrical economic ties, but also to publicize China’s new, responsible image to the African people. Based on China’s foreign public diplomacy-based strategy, Beijing utilizes public diplomacy in multidirectional ways towards African countries, directly connected to China’s economic development. As discussing in Chapter 4, continuous economic development is important for the Chinese government, as it enhances the domestic legitimacy of the CCP, and enhances the international legitimacy of its socialist market economy. Due to China’s going out policy, in conjunction with its rapid economic growth, Africa is important to China for securing energy resources, expanding China’s businesses in the African market, and establishing a solid foothold on the global stage through African countries. Hence, the Chinese government makes the best use of public diplomacy to resolve disputes over asymmetrical economic ties between China and Africa.

Question 2: What problems have emerged from the asymmetrical economic interdependence in Sino-African relations? To what extent does China’s public diplomacy activity in Africa coincide with the development of an economic relationship of asymmetric interdependence between China and key African partners, and how does that public diplomacy address China’s vulnerabilities?

The answer to this question is based on Chapters 4 and 5, and the discord arising from the lopsided economic ties between China and Africa discussed in Chapter 5. African countries that have close economic relations with China have complained that imports from China ruin African countries’ domestic small- and medium-sized businesses, because they are unable to compete with China’s low-priced products. Also, China’s foreign aid and investments have managed to generate economic profits for China, without providing much actual assistance to economic development. In other words, the majority of African countries failed to gain the upper hand over Chinese investment, such as the inflow of capital, technology transfers and balance of trade (especially manufactured goods) with China. The disparity between China and African countries intensified due to the effect of China’s declining economic growth on African economies, as well as the global economic recession – these led to a decrease in demand for raw materials and investment in Africa. Due to the price reduction of raw
materials and oil, resource-rich African nations’ domestic economies suffered, thus giving rise in unemployment and socio-economic inequality. Given that most African countries show the high degree of dependence upon foreign trade with China, this situation was inescapable.

As discussed in Chapter 5, China is most concerned with maximizing its economic advantages through foreign policy. This includes its African policy, which is more concerned with China and its companies benefiting in Sino-African economic relations. China’s foreign aid is also provided mostly in the form of completed projects. However, various public diplomacy aspects of China’s Africa policy mitigate antipathy between China and African countries through practical support, such as Africa’s industrialization, agriculture modernization, and infrastructure development, all of which are linked to African countries’ economic development based on political and economic cooperation. China also focuses on culture, academia, people-to-people exchanges, the cooperation of the media, tourism, establishing welfare facilities, public health systems, enhancing human resources development through technology education, as well as supporting peace and security, and environmental protection in Africa. Thus, China’s public diplomacy functions as a bridge between its peaceful rise/development, the Five Core foreign policy principles, and the pursuit of Chinese economic interests in Africa. In other words, China earns trust from African countries through its public diplomacy, which leads to mutual trust, understanding, benefits, and win-win cooperation based on amicable relations. By using different forms of public diplomacy, China is able to mitigate an existing negative reputation – that of China focusing only on securing energy resources and returning a good profit in its economic relations with African countries. It also allows China to seize the opportunity to cement its political and economic relations with African countries, bilaterally and multilaterally. While China has gained the upper hand in economic relations with Africa, public diplomacy also reduces its vulnerability to worldwide economic downturns. The various public diplomacy activities cultivate an opportunity for China’s enterprises to enter and expand their operations in Africa based on their improved reputation among the African people. The Chinese government also extends its cooperation to African countries in various fields to strengthen political and economic solidarity.

Question 3: What role has China’s public diplomacy played in its foreign policy towards sub-Saharan African countries? How has public diplomacy worked within the greater changes in China’s African policy between the year between 2003 and 2016, and influenced not only
Africa’s political economy but also the context of Sino-African ties? To what extent can China’s public diplomacy activities be seen as separate from, or subordinate to its pursuit of key economic relations with African countries?

The answer of the final question is based on the discussion in Chapter 5 and the case studies (Chapters 6 and 7). China definitely concentrates on public diplomacy as an overarching strategy in its foreign policy. This is reflected in the fact that China has spent approximately US$10 billion per year on external propaganda, while the United States spent only US$666 million on public diplomacy in 2014 (Shambaugh, 2015). China’s public diplomacy is a foreign policy instrument deployed to achieve the long-term strategy expressed by previous and current leaders: that of continuing economic growth. Hence, China’s public diplomacy is designed to contribute to the economic growth of China by creating amicable and friendly relations with foreign countries, as discussed via research questions 1 and 2. The Chinese government began to utilize public diplomacy to foster harmonious relations and to calm dissent in economic relations with Africa in the early 2000s.

The research required case studies (Chapters 6 and 7) to examine the role of China’s public diplomacy, its effects on Africa’s political economy and Sino-Africa’s relations, between 2003 and 2016. First, the thesis compared China’s public diplomacy approaches in Nigeria and South Africa, and found that China carries out different public diplomacy programs in each country according to its political and economic situation and China’s diplomatic goals. The common denominator in China’s public diplomacy in Nigeria and South Africa is the focus on mending fences with each country, because the two countries have suffered domestic economic problems due to their trade relations with China. With regards to Sino-Nigerian relations, China imports around 90 percent of its oil and gas from Nigeria, whereas Nigeria imports nearly 40 percent of its manufactured goods from China. Sino-South African trade ties also showed that China relies heavily on mineral products from South Africa (nearly 60 percent). On the other hand, South Africa is heavily dependent on trade with China for manufactured products, such as machinery and textiles. Thus, Nigeria and South Africa are significant to China for securing natural resources. Therefore, China’s public diplomacy is designed to maintain an amicable and harmonious environment in bilateral relations through the use of foreign aid, media, and education and cultural exchange institutes.

China utilizes its public diplomacy instruments (foreign aid, media, education and cultural exchange institutes) in Nigeria and South Africa in various ways. The common aim of the three instruments is to create a friendly and positive Chinese reputation among the African public and support for China’s foreign policy to foster domestic economic growth. The role of
the media and education and cultural exchange institutes in both countries is to create understanding between China and Nigeria and South Africa, by introducing and sharing their different cultures and languages. This is based on people-to-people exchanges, cultural events and bilateral cooperation, which allows people in China, Nigeria and South Africa to experience each other’s culture and media. China’s semi-governmental and non-governmental actors engage in cultural exchange activities through, for example, the Confucius Institutes and Cultural Centers in Nigeria and South Africa. China’s foreign aid focuses on the establishment of supporting infrastructure and welfare facilities based on China’s economic power to assist Nigeria and South Africa’s economic and social development. China’s foreign aid is also carried out through Chinese educational institutes, which are operated by its enterprises – providing, for example, technical education assistance to develop human resources and companies in the fields of agriculture, medicine, and others, which are directly linked to job creation and Nigerian and South African economic development. In addition, the Chinese government provides necessary assistance to Nigeria and South Africa for economic development through technical cooperation and associated technology development in connection with Chinese academia and enterprises in the mining and manufacture sectors. For example, Chinese telecommunications company, Huawei, provides technical training at its training centers to Nigerian and South African to cultivate a promising young workforce, and hires them to smooth over any conflicts between Chinese and Nigerians, and to create jobs to support the Nigerian and South African economy. China’s public diplomacy activities are also intended to address the language barrier that exists between Chinese enterprises and local people and staff, by providing language courses and instruction. Chinese enterprises also utilize public diplomacy to boost their business in Africa. In sum, China’s public diplomacy conducted via foreign aid and education and cultural exchange institutes is meant to assist Nigeria and South Africa’s economic development through language and technical training and cooperation to push unemployment down, develop vulnerable sectors, improve China’s reputation among local people, and generate profits from cooperative works and projects.

Although the two countries have close economic ties with China, there is a different public diplomacy goal for each:

a. **Foreign aid:** China’s foreign aid in Nigeria is mostly focused on supporting Nigeria’s economic development and improving the lives of its people, through technology transfer and infrastructure projects. On the other hand, China’s foreign aid in South Africa assists in various fields, such as the development of environmental management, education, tourism, health and welfare, infrastructure construction, a
banking system, and others, but does not place undue value on developing infrastructure. The Chinese foreign aid programs reflect Nigeria’s and South Africa’s (government and public) general preferences in that Nigeria focuses on economic development as a priority, while South Africa is interested in creating the necessary environment for its people’s health and living conditions as well as helping domestic businesses to prosper.

b. **Media:** The Chinese government utilizes Nigerian and South African journalists for cultural exchanges and media through various events and exchange programs, to release proper news verified by journalists in order to rectify bias reporting from the West. The media’s role in Nigeria is to create positive and favorable impressions of China, using its traditional culture and the China model, and also China’s modern culture. In particular, the China model presents a favorable impression to Nigerian people, as the country puts economic development first. Chinese media in South Africa more actively use domestic media than in Nigeria. The aim of this is to attract Chinese enterprises to come to South Africa (as part of China’s going out policy), promote Chinese tourism business in South Africa, cement relations with the South African government by addressing contemporary issues of mutual benefit, introduce China’s culture and media to the South African people, and appeal to Chinese people in China about its international economic power in order to legitimize the government’s status. The South African media also functions as an intermediary to find ways for enhancing South African public opinion of Chinese companies through the exchange of opinions based on contemporary issues. To achieve its aims China pursues various methods and collaborations with local media and by acquiring shares in local media companies, because it is hard to break into South Africa’s media field due to its more advanced media system (compared to Nigeria’s).

c. **Educational and cultural exchange institutes:** Confucius Institutes do much work to teach the Chinese language, introduce Chinese culture, and provide various scholarships to local students in Nigeria and South Africa. In addition, the Confucius Institutes in Nigeria support employment by Chinese companies and regional economic development in Nigeria by teaching the Chinese language. China’s Cultural Center in Nigeria arranges diverse cultural events in cooperation with local communities to foster mutual understanding. While Confucius Institutes in South Africa also focus on boosting tourism through the Chinese-language training program, it also offers classes on cultural differences between China and South Africa, China’s traditional and modern life, tourism, and business etiquette through case analysis of tourism. In addition to the Confucius Institutes’ activities, the
Chinese Embassy in South Africa utilizes booklets, such as a monthly magazine, *ChinAfrica*, published by Beijing Review to local universities to introduce students to Chinese culture. Chinese enterprises, especially Huawei, also run private training centers in Nigeria and South Africa and actively train the younger generation locals in order to aid in the transfer of skills.

Taken together, the public diplomacy programs are different in Nigeria and South Africa, although they have a similar purpose. This is because not only do the two countries have different levels of political economy, but also the Chinese government has different diplomatic goals in the bilateral relationships. As for Sino-Nigerian ties, China aims to strength its political alliance internationally, for example to expand support for the One China policy, and to wield stronger influence at the UN, secure energy resources, pursue its economic interests through trade and investment, increase the clout of Chinese enterprises in the Nigerian market, and gain a foothold to manufacture and sell Chinese products to the world, “Made in Africa”. Regarding Sino-South Africa relations, Beijing focuses on political alliance internationally and economic interests through trade and investment, as in Nigeria, supporting Chinese companies’ overseas expansion via the Standard Bank and in connection with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in South Africa. The Chinese also seek to utilize South Africa’s power in regional integration such as SADC, and regional development programs such as NEPAD, to extend China’s political and economic leverage over the African continent. Furthermore, there is a connection to BRICs, providing China with a platform to gain and hold a more prominent position on the global stage.

As discussed in Chapter 7, the FOCAC is based on existing Sino-African relations with an additional practical economic consideration and public diplomacy-related agendas. From the perspective of multilateral ties through FOCAC, China’s public diplomacy – provided through foreign aid, media, and education and cultural exchange institutes – boosts mutual understanding and mutual benefit, as part of China’s win-win cooperation strategy, an extension of South-South cooperation. The entire public diplomacy agenda at FOCAC is to mitigate various issues that have arisen from Sino-African economic ties. The minutiae of China’s public diplomacy are discussed during FOCAC meetings and articulated in two documents, the Declaration and the Plan of Action. The public diplomacy content is updated every three years, and the recent FOCAC VI meeting discussed China’s multidirectional public diplomacy to strengthen relations with African countries. It covers education, media, human resource development, infrastructure development, people-to-people exchanges, welfare assistance, environmental protection, and security, as well as economic assistance such as investment, trade, zero-tariff treatment, and debt relief. China boosts cooperation
with African countries through the UN, the framework of the WTO, the AU, COWAS, SADC, COMESA to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and alleviates poverty to dramatically cut social and economic ills in African countries.

To sum up, as shown in Figure 10 above, a variety of actors in three different groups engage in China’s public diplomacy activities, deploying its soft power and economic power in Nigeria and South Africa. By using smart power in the two countries, China’s public diplomacy produces the following results.

First, the bilateral ties between China and Nigeria and South Africa:

a. China’s image has improved based on its public diplomacy programs in the eyes of the Nigerian and South African public. However, South Africans exhibit a less-favorable impression towards China’s economic power than do Nigerians, due to having more-developed economic and infrastructure systems than other African countries. Thus, China’s public diplomacy has limitations. For example, there are soft power issues related to Tibet and China’s authoritarian system. However, South African sentiment is far more favorable about learning the Chinese language as a result of China’s cultural public diplomacy activities and non-governmental actors’ willingness to employ local people.

b. China’s public diplomacy creates an opportunity for its businesses to establish branches and operations in Nigeria and South Africa, based on its government aid projects and collaborative works.

c. China’s public diplomacy supports African countries’ political economy by agreeing to share and develop technology, help alleviate poverty and create jobs with the Nigerian and South African governments.

d. China’s public diplomacy has led to more concrete bilateral ties with the Nigerian and South African governments, as part of China’s South-South cooperation strategy, and has also expanded China’s diplomatic, political and economic relations.

Second, the role of public diplomacy in the multilateral ties through the FOCAC is similar to the discussion about bilateral relations, above. China’s public diplomacy is meant to promote mutual understanding and amicable ties. For example, when China focuses on resolving distributional issues in existing trade and investment relations, and problems of collaboration and cooperation in Sino-African relations. A difficulty is the perception that China-centered collaboration projects only provide profits to the Chinese involved, and also that offering complete projects does not support economic development in Africa. Thus, the role of public diplomacy in the FOCAC is also meant to mitigate the divergence of opinions.
through various sub-Forum meetings, which mostly discuss detailed agenda of public diplomacy to settle deep-seated conflicts between China and Africa, and lead to mutual trust and enhance cooperation for mutual prosperity. The FOCAC also carries out various programs and shares its opinions with the AU and international institutions’ programs, such as the UNDP, to cement multilateral cooperation in Sino-African relations.

Overall, China’s public diplomacy between 2003 and 2016 positively influenced not only Africa’s political economy, but also strengthened cordial relations to boost Sino-African mutually beneficial political and economic relations. Hence, China’s public diplomacy activities were subordinate to its pursuit of key economic relations with African countries. However, the limitations of China’s public diplomacy are the focus of this thesis. Although China’s public diplomacy brought about better results, as can be seen in the case studies, Beijing still faces certain challenges to address in its public diplomacy activities. The problem arises from a divergence of opinion about the value of soft power in public diplomacy between China and the West. Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu (2008) compared the difference between the Chinese perspective and Nye’s ideas as follows:

Chinese understanding of the sources of soft power encompasses the three components of soft power identified by Nye—culture, domestic institutions and values, and substance and style of foreign policy. But their emphasis is different from Nye’s regarding the first two components. Nye’s discussion of American soft power highlights contemporary American pop culture while Chinese discussion of Chinese soft power underscores traditional Chinese culture. Nye stresses the attraction of American political institutions and values, such as democracy and human rights, while Chinese analysts emphasize the attraction of the Chinese economic development model. Furthermore, in terms of policy recommendations, Chinese analysts attach great importance to the domestic foundation of soft power broadly defined, such as national coherence and government legitimacy, whereas Nye has focused his attention on improving the substance and style of America’s foreign policy to make the US more attractive abroad. (Wang and Lu, 2008, p.431)

Although China pursues its soft power in foreign countries, there are disagreements about China’s soft power regarding the notion of state sovereignty and other normative values, such as humanitarian intervention and human rights, between the West and China (Huang, 2013). Put differently, there are soft power ‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’ that also influence China’s public diplomacy (d’Hooghe, 2007). The assets that China possesses are its traditional and contemporary cultures, the China model, foreign aid, scientific progress, environmental
policies, and others. The liabilities include human rights issues, minority race issues, Tibetan independence, China’s rapid economic development (the ‘China Threat’), freedom of religion, and others that arise from its socialist system. Other issues in China, such as the gap between the rich and poor and environmental pollution resulting from its rapid economic development, have emerged as considerable concerns. Furthermore, they have negative effects on China’s soft power. This has not considerably interrupted the effects of China’s public diplomacy in African countries, which still suffer from corruption in their political systems and also have large wealth gaps, but it has had an impact in other countries that have stable political and economic systems. With regards to the Nigerian and South Africa case studies in this thesis, the South African public was more sensitive to China’s human right issues and freedom of religion arising from its socialist system than were Nigerians. However, the Nigerian public accepted the China Model more readily than did South Africans. This shows that China’s public diplomacy is affected by the foreign country’s political economy system as suggested above.

In sum, as mentioned earlier and in Chapters 6 and 7, the Chinese government acquired positive results through its public diplomacy as part of its foreign policy in Africa. However, scholars researching China’s public diplomacy question the effect of its public diplomacy under an authoritarian system, which in China is top-down and government-centered. Thus, the thesis proposes to carefully improve the following shortcomings to draw better conclusions about China’s public diplomacy: China’s media regulation, political ideology-infused Confucius Institutes, ambiguity about the core values of China’s soft power, the standardized public diplomacy programs for political and diplomatic purposes, and the lack of transparency of China’s foreign aid and public diplomacy activities in Africa.

This thesis concludes by mentioning challenges and limitations of the research, suggesting the main contributions of the research, and proposing further avenues for study of China’s public diplomacy in Sino-African relations.

8.2 Research Challenges and Limitations

The research suffered from a couple of limitations. First, a limitation in the data collection. Due to limited time in which to contact more interviewees through the snowball sampling...
method during the fieldwork, the research could not create a balance between the number of Chinese and African interviewees in Nigeria. While the study attempted to contact two Nigerian professors who were engaged in cooperative think-tank activities after leaving Nigeria, the scholars requested anonymity as well as only conducting interviews via video calls to confirm the author's identify. However, due to the poor electronic system in Nigeria, the interview did not go well as the internet connection was frequently dropped during an interview. Also, the majority of Chinese interviewees connected with its government, such as with the Confucius Institutes, Cultural Centers, Embassies, and Chinese companies who engage in government-led projects, were conscious of the Chinese government, and therefore it was difficult to collect balanced information regarding the strengths and weaknesses of China's public diplomacy. All things considered, the research was hard to conduct via interviews due to the uniqueness of China's public diplomacy, which is under the government's management unlike other countries'. Hence, the research relied on practical activities to find the intent and aim behind China's public diplomacy activities, through Chinese interviews. As mentioned earlier, the research provided detailed information and opinions about China's other activities and public diplomacy, which could not be obtained during interviews, through documentary and archival analysis.

Another limitation is the broad scope of the research topic, which is partially linked to the research's contribution, which will discuss below. As mentioned at the beginning of the thesis, the research finds a necessity of public diplomacy in Sino-Africa's economic relations, as well as for China's political goals that focus on domestic economic development. Thus, it was hard to distill the extent of China's public diplomacy activities through instruments and actors in order to examine the links between China's public diplomacy and its foreign policy, which is largely concentrated on seeking economic profit from African countries. Due to the fact that China utilizes diverse instruments (especially foreign aid, media, and education and cultural exchange institutes) to carry out its public diplomacy in Africa, it was difficult to exclude certain elements to draw out the correlation between China's foreign policy and its public diplomacy activities in Sino-African economic relations. Hence, the research covered China's public diplomacy through all three instruments (foreign aid, media, and education and cultural exchange institutes) to examine the connection. However, it is hard to deny that the research could not include deeper discussion of each instrument when compared to other research, which might only study one of these public diplomacy instruments – in part due to the time limitations of a doctoral program. Nevertheless, the thesis found a linkage based on the contents of interviews and documentary and archival analysis. Most of all, the interviews provided great assistance in analyzing the correlation between the two. In addition, the research only examined China's public diplomacy policies and activities in its African policies.
from 2003 to 2016, and therefore its conclusions are not closed debates. Rather, the conclusions provide a new perspective for researching China’s public diplomacy, and also introduce an in-depth discussion of the various roles of China’s public diplomacy for further study.

8.3 Research Contribution and Implications

First, this thesis has modestly contributed to an examination of the topic of China’s public diplomacy in connection with Sino-Africa’s economic relations, and analyzed it under the framework of neoliberal institutionalism. Most research of public diplomacy, including China’s, is carried out in the fields of journalism, communications, public affairs/relations, and others, rather than International Relations, political diplomacy, and/or international politics. Notwithstanding the fact that China carries out its public diplomacy based on soft power and economic power in African countries, the research found that China’s public diplomacy focuses on encouraging cooperation among nations, international actors, and foreign publics through mutual understanding and bilateral communications, to achieve common goals rather than to dominate others which is characteristic of the public diplomacy of the West.

Second, this thesis has modestly contributed to an examination of the connection between China’s public diplomacy and its foreign policy that focuses on China’s economic development in Sino-Africa’s relations, especially economic ties. The trend in China’s public diplomacy research generally concentrates only on certain aspects of China’s public diplomacy activities (mostly the media and Confucius Institutes), the mechanisms of its public diplomacy in the Chinese domestic political structure, and the meaning of public diplomacy on the global stage. However, this thesis strove to establish the necessity of China’s public diplomacy in addressing disharmony in China-African economic relations, and discussed the changes in China’s foreign diplomacy keeping pace with globalization and China’s rapid economic development. As mentioned above, the research also covered various public diplomacy activities based on three instruments, which also acted as a limitation on the study. At the same time, the approach presents a broad picture of the role of China’s public diplomacy to analyze the connection between China’s foreign policy and its public diplomacy, whereupon it proved that China’s public diplomacy is linked to its foreign policy. In addition, China’s public diplomacy is connected to its economic relations with African countries as a means for cementing its relations by addressing the gap created by
asymmetric economic ties in which China gains the upper hand over trade and investment in Africa.

Third, this thesis has modestly contributed to analyzing the significance of smart power (economic power and military assistance with soft power) in China’s public diplomacy activities. The foreign aid provided as part of China’s public diplomacy towards African countries is diverse, ranging from technology education and medical services, to infrastructure development such as hospitals, schools, and railroads, which are in turn connected to African people’s welfare and the continent’s economic development. The aid cannot be provided to Africa if China does not enjoy strong economic power. China also provides military assistance to prevent further terrorism from Boko Haram in Nigeria. The smart power in China’s public diplomacy casts light upon the importance of coupling hard power with soft power in African countries, unlike existing research which only focuses on China’s soft power (culture and language) to achieve its foreign policy goals.

Lastly, this thesis has modestly contributed to illuminating China’s attempt to cooperate with diverse institutions, using the FOCAC as a case study. Although China has a top-down system for its public diplomacy, and an authoritarian government for its political system, China has pursued cooperation with foreign countries through various institutions as well as its public diplomacy activities.

Based on the limitations and contributions of the thesis, further research into the following could prove useful in expanding our understanding of China’s public diplomacy. A potential avenue for future research would be into how President Xi utilizes public diplomacy to achieve the China Dream (Zhongguo Meng). At the 19th CPC National Congress, Xi stressed the need to “hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation”, and emphasis the One China principle, and need to realize the dream of building a powerful military (Xinhua News, 2017g). Xi also stressed that “socialism with Chinese characteristics is the right theory to guide to the Party and people to realize national rejuvenation” and exhorted a strengthening of the Party’s path, theory, and system as well as culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics (ibid). Thus, the thesis suggests an avenue for the further study in how China draws a favorable reputation from foreign publics while still supporting Chinese political agenda with core values. The suggestion is to research the role of China’s public diplomacy in its foreign policy
when the Chinese government strongly pushes its goal of realizing a national rejuvenation on the global stage.
APPENDIX I: List of Interviewees

<Due to protecting interviewees’ confidentiality, the list of interviewees is deleted after passing the viva>
APPENDIX II: Interview Questions

The interview questions for the research are as follows:

*Interview questions for the Chinese Embassy*

a. What is the status and character of Chinese public diplomacy activities in Nigeria/South Africa?
b. How long has Chinese public diplomacy been carried out in Nigeria/South Africa and what are its core objectives?
c. How does China conceive of public diplomacy as a part of its foreign policy?
d. Can you give me examples of key support projects in Nigeria/South Africa? (If there is collaboration work going on with Nigeria/South Africa, can you be more specific?)
e. Can you describe the most successful results you have achieved through the support projects?
f. To what extent are Chinese companies involved in Chinese public diplomacy activities in Nigeria/South Africa? Can you describe Chinese company’s participation if they are involved in the project?
g. What is your opinion over the general progress or problems for Chinese public diplomacy activities in Nigeria/South Africa?

*Interview questions for media-related public diplomacy activity of China*

a. Can you tell me about Chinese media activities and presence in Nigeria/South Africa’s media market?
b. What is the extent of China’s media involvement in Nigeria/South Africa nowadays?
c. Can you tell me about your division’s work in Nigeria/South Africa? (in the event of company’s interview)
d. Can you describe the latest project either you have worked on or are working on which is in collaboration between China and Nigeria/South Africa?
e. Can you give me an example of successful/failure case in the China’s cooperation program with Nigeria/South Africa? More broadly, what is the most successful/failure case for media cooperation in Africa?
f. Can you explain the aim or purpose of media cooperation between China and
Nigeria/South Africa?
g. How did your institution/project/company’s start to enter into a partnership with Chinese partners?
h. Can you describe the advantage and disadvantage of receiving China’s technical support in Chinese TV shows and movies?
i. What is your opinion on the prospects of China’s media involvement through technical cooperation or investment in television broadcasting in Nigeria/South Africa’s media business sector?

*Interview questions for education-related public diplomacy activity of China*

a. Can you describe what type and intent of training courses/programs are held at the company/agency?
b. How does your company/agency/institution start to train the Nigerian/South African public based on Chinese skills?
c. What kinds of Chinese company are involved providing its skills?
d. What do you think about Chinese aid for the training courses/programs?
e. It is easy to receive news that Chinese enterprises extend its business in Nigeria/South Africa, what is your opinion of the link between Chinese training assistance and its company activities in the Nigeria/South Africa’s telecommunication/medical/agriculture sector?

*Interview questions for the cultural exchange-related public diplomacy activities of China*

a. Can you describe the intention of establishing the Confucius Institute/Chinese cultural center in Nigeria/South Africa?
b. Please explain what kinds of program are conducted at the Confucius Institute/Chinese cultural center? And can you explain the purpose of the program as well?
c. How many Chinese and Nigerian/South African lecturers work at Confucius Institute/Chinese cultural center? Can you explain the aim or purpose of the lecturing in Nigeria/South Africa?
d. Can you describe the Nigerian/South African’s participation level of learning cultural exchange?
e. Can you give me an example of successful/failure case in the cultural exchange program?

f. Can you describe how the cultural exchange program relates to and influences Sino-African relations?

**Interview questions for infrastructure-related public diplomacy activities of China**

a. Can you tell me about the significance of infrastructure development in African countries?
b. Can you explain when China’s infrastructure investment/assistance starts in Nigeria/South Africa? and explain what is the purpose of it?
c. In what field of China’s infrastructure development investment/assistance normally implemented in Africa? Can you please give me specific examples of China’s infrastructure development investment/assistance in Nigeria/South Africa?
d. To what extent and by which means does the Chinese government-owned companies or its private companies participate in its infrastructure development investment/assistance when they construct in Nigeria/South Africa?
e. Can you describe the latest project either you have worked on or are working on which is in collaboration between China and Nigeria/South Africa for infrastructure development or urban development? And what is the purpose of the collaboration work for?
f. What is the extent of China’s involvement or part in South Africa’s infrastructure and urban development nowadays?
g. Can you describe the advantage and disadvantage of China’s infrastructure development involvement in Nigeria/South Africa not only from China’s side but also from Nigeria/South Africa’s side?

**Interview questions for finance-related** public diplomacy activities of China

a. Can you tell me the significance of China’s foreign aid especially financial assistance in Africa?
b. Can you explain when China’s financial assistance starts in Africa?
c. Can you give me an example of successful/failure case in the China’s foreign assistance program?

111 As for Chinese banks within the category, the banks include foreign banks which China acquires shares in African countries and Chinese bank which entered financial market in Africa.
d. Can you describe the latest project either you or the bank/company have worked on or are working on which is in collaboration between China and Nigeria/South Africa?

e. Can you explain the character of China’s foreign assistance through its finance in Africa? And can you give me a typical example of it?

f. What do you think about the linkage between China’s foreign assistance and Africa’s economic development?
APPENDIX III. China’s investment and contracts in Africa from 2005 to 2015

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