ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES’ NATIONAL SECURITY

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ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES’ NATIONAL SECURITY

BY

SHEIKH MAJID ABDULLA RASHID ALMOALLA

THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICS

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DURHAM UNIVERSITY

2017
To

The Late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan

The Late Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum

The Late Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed Al Qasimi

The Late Sheikh Rashid bin Humaid Al Nuaimi

The Late Sheikh Ahmad bin Rashid Al Mualla

The Late Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamad Al Sharqi

The Late Sheikh Saqr bin Mohammad Al Qasimi

Founders of the United Arab Emirates
ABSTRACT

This study addresses a gap in the literature on the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) national security. It establishes a reference for further research into the analysis of national security of similar countries to the UAE based on established international relations theory.

The UAE, since its establishment in 1971, has gone through exponential development and changes in terms of its politics, economics and social structures. However, attempts to develop a comprehensive approach to analysing the various aspects of maintaining the country’s existence are scarce. Any research focuses on narrow specific areas.

This research analyses the UAE’s national security by using the most relevant analytical framework based on Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis from the Copenhagen School of International Relations. The threats to the UAE’s impeding national security threats are addressed using the various elements in the hypothesis. These elements are the ‘idea of state’ which concentrates on the country’s state formation, the institutional framework of the UAE, and the structure of its physical base. Importantly, due to the dynamic interdependency of these elements, a threat to one can create a threat to the other elements.

The researcher establishes a framework for the analysis of national security, which; because of the similarity of the political, economic and social base of the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia), can be used to analyse their national security systems. Furthermore, the researcher addresses the requirement for further exploration of the interdependencies between the three elements composing the state and the need for a coherent approach in addressing those threats.

The study is structured in five parts. Chapter one highlights the research’s introductory material. Chapter two explores the theories of national security of the major schools of international relations theories, while chapter three theorizes the UAE’s national security according to the most relevant international relations theory (Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’). Chapter four explores the specific threats to the UAE national security and finally chapter five demonstrates the researcher’s findings and recommendations.
DECLARATION

I hereby confirm that this study is my own work and all the material has been developed solely on my own efforts. This study has not been submitted for other degrees.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, praise to God for helping me and giving me the health and the ability to accomplish this thesis.

I am especially grateful to my thesis supervisors, for their guidance, advice and comments, which helped me to achieve the PhD in this format. In addition, I extend my thanks and gratitude to all Lecturers and Staff in the school of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, for their help during my study.

Finally, I extend my thanks, appreciation and gratitude to my family and all who encouraged me to pursue my study and to overcome the obstacles that confronted me during my study in the United Kingdom.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADEC: Abu Dhabi Education Council

AED: UAE Dirham

AQAP: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

CIA: The Central Intelligence Agency

GCC: The Gulf Cooperation Council

GCHQ: The Government Communications Headquarters.

GDP: Gross domestic product

INTERPOL: The International Criminal Police Organization

IRENA: International Renewable Energy Agency

IRGC: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

ISIL: Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

KHDA: The Knowledge and Human Development Authority

MOE: The Ministry of Education

MOU: The Memorandum of Understanding

NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NSA: The National Security Act

PFLP: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

TNCs: Transnational corporations

TOS: The Trucial Oman Scouts
**UAE**: The United Arab Emirates

**UAR**: The United Arab Republic

**UK**: The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

**UN**: The United Nations

**US**: The United States of America

**USD**: United States dollar

**WAM**: The Emirates News Agency
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Academic studies addressing national security issues, whether in assessing threats to countries or attempting to understand a particular country’s national security situation, in relation to the established theories in the field are challenging. Such studies address the perceived reality of national security within a state of temporality; the global situation affecting national security can change rapidly. Hence policies, strategies and international relations in relation to national security have to be flexible in order to address such dynamism.

The literature on the Middle East security studies undertaken by researchers has either been specialized within certain fields, or lacking when it comes to providing a holistic assessment view of a particular country’s national security. Individual state studies are essential in order to develop the internal analytic capability of national security issues and the consequent challenges.

In the second decade of the 21st century, the Middle East has gone through considerable turmoil and systemic changes. The Arabian Gulf countries, albeit still generally perceived as stable heavens in the region, have not been immune from the recent unrest. Consequently, the capacities of the national security of these countries, including the UAE, have been put to the test. In this context, the UAE has secured a crucial role in promoting security across the region and ensuring its internal stability.

As is apparent in the context of the Middle East in this decade, the types of threats to national security vary with time and geography. Understanding such threats can provide a realistic reference for future generations of academics, politicians and those interested in historical, structured studies. In this context, it is necessary to fill the gap in the literature in relation to the lack of hypothetical and theoretical review of the threats to the UAE’s national security. The researcher addresses this need and contributes to the development of knowledge of UAE national security threats within the context of a specific international relations school.
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The research objectives are, first, to start to fill the gap regarding the lack of literature related to the national security of UAE based on theories of international relations. This study does not cover all the issues related to national security in the UAE, but aims to be an important starting point for future research. The second objective is to establish a model to analyse the national security of other countries with similar social, cultural, political and economic values, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The location of these countries in the same interconnected geographical area has resulted in considerable homogeneity between these countries and peoples in terms of the historical, social, economic, cultural and political arenas.

1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND

The concept of national security has been of considerable interest to western international relations scholars since the emergence of the post-Cold War era. The national security concept has evolved, since it was first used officially, in the early years of Cold War, when its term appeared in 1947 in the National Security Act (NSA) of the United States of America (US).¹ Thus, as Rudolf argues: “National security was primarily defined in terms of military defense in scholarship produced during the cold war”.² A typical definition of national security in this context is given by Brown who argues that national security is “the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders”.³

Bock and Berkowitz extend the concept from the physical, economic and institutional aspects to include the more ephemeral aspect of values. Thus, they argue: “National security can be most fruitfully defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats”.⁴

Other academics also highlight values as a core element of national security. Thus, Wolfers explains: “[A] nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war”.  

Adar and Check add to the definition by stating what they consider the core values of a nation to be in relation to nation security. They posit that “the national interest encompasses the core values, such as the sustenance of state sovereignty and the guarantee of its territorial integrity at one level and the insurance of its economic interests at another”. However, Gordon and Taylor divide core values into two elements—fundamental values and core interests—stating that “national security encompasses the protection of the fundamental values and core interests necessary to the continued existence and vitality of the state”.

It is clear that the concept of national security has been expanded by international relations scholars. It was initially confined to the role of the military security in protecting the state from external threats. Thereafter, it was broadened to include the need for political security in order to protect the state from internal threats. The next step was to take into account economic factors, since the components of military security and political security are dependent to a degree on the economic strength of the state. This meant that national security now included ensuring the provision of the materials required for economic security. Moreover, development was introduced as a security component, based on the belief that development is the primary weapon in the struggle for survival, because it ensures the continuity of economic growth and mitigates risks from exogenous economic shocks. Relatedly, following the spill over effects of the energy crisis that resulted from the actions of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, which

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banned petroleum exports to the countries supporting Israel in the 1973 war, energy security became an integral part of the national security of states.\textsuperscript{11}

At the end of the Cold War, there has been a revolution in the field of security studies with academics moving away from the traditional state-centred approaches and theories towards a broader understanding of the concept of security.\textsuperscript{12} Although inter-state war still occurs, internal violence within states is now a more important issue, which bypasses the traditional focus, instead focusing on the identity and culture of the groups involved.\textsuperscript{13} These internal conflicts include racial and ethnic conflicts, as happened in the Balkans and Chechnya in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, the concept of societal security was added to the elements of national security. Finally, the concept of national security has been expanded to include environmental security on the grounds that environmental degradation can lead to a serious deterioration in the quality of standards of living, impacting negatively on the economy and triggering conflicts over resources.\textsuperscript{15}

However, the same degree of interest and consideration has not been shown by their Arab counterparts. The majority of international relations Arab scholars reject the notion of separating the concept of national security for an independent Arab state from the concept of pan-Arab national security related to the Arab states as a unit. This is primarily due to the influence of the Nasserite ideology that gained wide acceptance in Arab territories from Oman to Morocco from the 1950s. The Nasserite ideology was propagated by ‘the Sout Al Arab’ radio station, the mouthpiece of Nasser’s regime and which broadcast from Egypt and covered the vast Arab territories. The station called on Arab nations to topple the colonizing powers and to revolt against the regimes in their states in pursuit of an Arab national union, under Nasser’s leadership, with a secular tenor and based on a socialist ideology. One of the drawbacks of the Arab national security model is that nationalism cannot be established among nations with the only language as a common characteristic, but should be based on a number of elements, the most important of which is similar

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Rudolph, Christopher. (2006), op, cit., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{15} Robenson, Paul. (2008), op, cit., p. 132.
racial origins. For example, there are nations such as the US, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), Australia, parts of Canada and South Africa that speak English, but we cannot claim that the speakers of English all have common national origins. Furthermore, the national interests of individual Arab states may come into conflict or pose threats to the existence of other Arab states, which undermines the national interest of the Arab nation.

An example of this occurred in 1990 when Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait and threatened the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Arab states were split into two camps precipitated by the desire to protect their national interests during the Arab League Emergency Summit held in Cairo one week after the invasion, and in the voting session on Resolution No.195 to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and to call for Arab forces to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman, Bahrain,

17 Ibid, p. 100.
18 The Arab League Emergency Summit resolution adopted on August 10, 1990 stated that “in light of the historic and monumental responsibility dictated by the difficult situation arising from the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait and the grave repercussions thereof on the Arab World and national Arab security and the Arab nation’s higher interests, it is decided to:

3. The Arab League condemns the Iraqi invasion of the State of Kuwait and does not recognize Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait or any other consequences entailed by the Iraqi forces’ invasion of Kuwaiti territories and calls on Iraq to immediately withdraw from Kuwait and to return to the status as it was before 1/8/1990.
4. The Arab League reaffirms the sovereignty, independence and regional integrity of the State of Kuwait as a member in the Arab League and the UN and insists on the return of the legitimate ruling regime that existed in Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion and the Arab League supports this legitimate regime in all measures it takes to liberate its land and restore its sovereignty.
5. The Arab League condemns the Iraqi threats against Arab Gulf states and deplores the Iraqi build up of troops at the borders with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and affirms the Arab League’s complete solidarity with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states and support any measures caused by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states to in line with the legitimate right of self defense and in accordance with Article Two of the Joint Arab Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty signed by members of the Arab League and Article 51 of the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolution No.662 of August, 9 1990, provided that these measures shall come to an end immediately upon the withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimacy there.
6. Responding to the request of Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries, to transfer Arab troops to support its armed forces, in order to defend its territory and territorial integrity against any external aggression.
7. The Arab League hereby tasks the Arab League Secretary General with monitoring the enforcement of this resolution and report thereon within fifteen days to the Arab League Council which will take the necessary measures.

Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia and Djibouti backed the resolution while the remaining Arab states expressed their reservations. The resolution was approved by a majority vote, but this crisis demonstrated that Arab states do not adhere to the ideal of Arab national security but are bound to defend their national interests even if they came into conflict with the interests of other Arab states.

This was also demonstrated when the administration of US President George Bush threatened an allied invasion of Iraq to topple the regime of Saddam Hussain under the pretext of the existence of weapons of mass destruction. International and regional interests to topple the Saddam regime coincided with Arab national interests to whose existence this regime posed a threat. Thus, Arab states did not openly oppose the US threat of invasion. During the Arab League Summit held in Cairo weeks before the invasion, Arab countries failed to extend any military support to Iraq, which went against the Joint Arab Defence Treaty, nor did Arab states attempt to present a unified political backing to the Iraqi regime for the purpose of pre-empting the military offensive. The only exception was the UAE, which opposed the invasion and proposed an initiative to spare Iraq the worst of the imminent war and protect the unity of its territory and its people. The UAE proposal called on Saddam Hussain to step down and welcomed him to stay in the UAE. The UAE proposal guaranteed that members of the Iraqi regime would not be prosecuted and that the UAE would negotiate with international organizations to reach an agreement allowing them and their families to live safely in the UAE. The final element in the proposal was that Iraq would be left under the auspices of the UN and the Arab League until a new Iraqi government was formed. The Arab League refused to place the initiative on the summit’s agenda citing the rule prohibiting interference in the internal affairs of member states. Accordingly, the Iraqi regime rejected the UAE initiative, Iraq was occupied, thousands of Iraqis were killed, and Iraq’s institutional structure and infrastructure were destroyed in a war that was fought illegitimately outside the framework of the UN Security Council.

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22 Ibid., p. 677.
In late 2010, the contrasts between the national interests of the individual Arab states grew sharper when a wave of protests and security turmoil erupted in a number of Arab states. Dubbed the “Arab Spring”, this wave of protest was fuelled by a multitude of internal factors including autocracy, corruption and economic recession that undermined living conditions in many Arab states, compounded by external factors that contributed in instigating the populaces to revolt against the ruling regimes in their countries. The protests began in Tunisia, progressed to Egypt, then to Libya, Yemen and Syria with the local populations demanding the downfall of autocratic regimes and the establishment of democratic regimes. The Arab League interfered directly in the internal affairs of Libya and Syria where the regimes had cracked down on the revolutionaries. This was contravened of one of the essential principles on which the Arab League was established; non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. The memberships of the Libyan and Syrian regimes were revoked which led to the elimination of communication channels and the lack of means by which to exert direct pressure on both regimes. It also resulted in the absence of the element of balance and accuracy in the information on the situation on the ground and the political situation in these two states. These factors led Syria and Libya into civil wars that still rage to this day. Furthermore, the changes in the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, resulted in the ascent of radical Islamist organizations to power, which resulted in the Arab states reconsidering the repercussions of the developments taking place in terms of their national interests.

Therefore, international relations scholars in the Arab World need to separate the concept of Arab national interests and the status of national security in relation to the individual Arab states as the evidence suggests that there is no real regional security system that unites the national interests of Arab states. This reduces the concept of Arab national security to no more than a banner.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: PARAMETERS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The UAE is one of the most important countries in the Middle East in terms of energy, economy and foreign trade. It is the fifth largest oil exporter in the Gulf area, producing 2.9 million barrels

of oil per day, and its oil reserves total 97.8 billion barrels. This means that it possesses 5.7% of the world oil reserves. Moreover, the UAE produces about 61.9 billion cubic metres per year of natural gas liquids. In addition, the natural gas reserves amount to 6.1 trillion cubic metres, which represents 3.3% of the total world reserves. This is the fourth largest natural gas reserve in the Gulf area and the sixth largest in the world.

In terms of the economy and foreign trade, the UAE is one of the most dynamic countries in the Middle East. The estimated GDP per capita of the UAE in 2015 was AED1.6 trillion, which is the third highest in the Middle East. Furthermore, it ranks third after Hong Kong and Singapore among the most active countries in terms of re-exports. Foreign direct investment in the UAE amounted to USD126 billion (AED462.4 billion) in 2015. Thus, if the national security of the UAE were threatened, it would impact on the investing countries whose interests are tied to that of the UAE.

Since its independence in 1971, the UAE has faced various internal and external security challenges that have threatened its survival. One of these challenges was the instability in the international arena following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. According to Nye, the struggle for power in the current international system exists on three levels with military force located at the top; while economic power is located in the middle and international relations at the bottom.

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25 Energy Information Administration, Available at: <URL: http://www.eia.doc.gov/emeu/cabs/UAEOil.html> Access Date: 19 October, 2008.
28 Energy Information Administration, op. cit.
29 The UAE Government official website, op. cit.
At the top level, the current international system is a unipolar one, led by the United States, which still maintains its military superiority over the rest of the world. However, at the middle level the international system is a multipolar one with economically powerful centres such as the United States, Europe, China and Japan all competing for economic powers. At the bottom level, transnational relations that cross borders are located outside the control of governments. These include non-state actors, such as bankers who transfer funds electronically, terrorist groups across states, and the hackers who threaten the electronic security of states. In addition, governments face environmental challenges such as climate change or the spread of epidemics.34

In this context, the key focus of this study is to shed light on the threats affecting the national security of the UAE through an analysis of the behaviour of the UAE regime based on international relations theories.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the most appropriate theory by which to analyse the national security of the UAE?
2. What are the major threats that affect the UAE national security as highlighted by the selected theory of analysis?

1.5 LITERATURE ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UAE

Much research analyses the national security of different countries across the world; however, academic studies on the national security of the UAE are rare. Indeed, the only study that addressed the subject directly is National Security of the United Arab Emirates: A Perspective in Light of Global Changes to the New World Order by Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan in 2003. The study discusses the national security of the UAE through the lens of the collective security framework, which is based on the traditional military perspective of security. The author traces the performance from 1990 to 1998 of the defence system of the GCC states, which was established in 1981, in order to strengthen the collective security of its founding countries—the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. As the author explains the littoral states on the southern Arabian Gulf founded the GCC in 1981 in order to contain the risks from the Iran-Iraq War on the security and economy of their respective entities. In addition, the new entity aimed

to help their economies recover from the chaos caused by the down turn in oil prices on their economies.

However, the GCC’s joint military cooperation actually began following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, despite the fact that the agreement on defence and security cooperation among the member states had been concluded years previously. Several reasons obstructed military co-operation between the six countries prior to Iraq’s invasion. First, the different nature of the military forces of the six member states, created by great disparities in military spending. The entire defence spending in the GCC countries since its inception and until 1990 amounted to around USD222.5 billion, with Saudi Arabia as the highest spender. 35 As a result, there was a great disparity between the countries in terms of the number of members of the armed forces relative to their population. In 1986, the UAE had the highest level of military personnel relative to its population, at 9.9%. 36 In addition, the armed forces were often dependent on foreigners for operating their sophisticated weapons and the training of local military and civilian personnel.

The second obstacle was the lack of co-ordination in the purchase of weapons between the different GCC armed forces. As a result, the diversity of weapons systems led to a slow rate of integration at the technical level. In addition, the training methodologies formed another difficulty for integration; for example, Saudi Arabian troops were trained under the methodology of the American army, while Omani and the UAE troops adopted the British training methodology. The difficulty of integration created enormous challenges for the process of coordination among the different sets of armed forces.

Third, the individual external relations of the GCC countries formed a barrier to military cooperation. For example, Iranian pressure on Kuwait and the UAE to reduce their political and financial support for the Iraqi army during its war with Iran hampered military cooperation between the GCC countries, such as their efforts to connect their air defences during the Iran-Iraq war. In addition, there were differences between the relationship of each country with the West in the field of defence co-operation. At that time, Kuwait rejected the presence of foreign military bases in the region. In contrast, Oman had defence agreements with the US and the UK, which

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36 Ibid, p.95.
allowed both countries the opportunity to establish military bases on its territory to defend it in the event of external aggression.

The fourth factor was the failure of the GCC countries to achieve adequate military strength to allow them to rely on their own abilities to defend themselves against any external aggression. Thus, the Iran-Iraq war represented a financial drain on two levels. First, the GCC countries were forced to double their military spending in order to strengthen their defence capabilities. Second, they had to provide considerable financial support to Iraq as it was seen as defending their national interests against the Shi’a Iranian regime, which came to power after the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. Ironically, the threat to the GCC following the end of the Iran-Iraq war came from Iraq. In 1990, the Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait after the Iraqi regime had conducted diplomatic escalations against Kuwait and the UAE in the Arab League, accusing them, a few weeks before the invasion, of increasing their oil production beyond the quota prescribed by OPEC in order to reduce the price of oil to weaken Iraq economically. The UAE and Kuwait denied the Iraqi accusation, and subsequently the UAE formally requested the US to conduct the first joint exercise between the two armed forces in the UAE, while Kuwait entered into bilateral negotiations with Iraq in Saudi Arabia to contain the crisis created by the Iraqi regime. However, less than 24 hours after the two sides announced that they would resume negotiations later in Baghdad, Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait, with the other GCC countries unable to repel the Iraqi aggression. Dick Cheney, the US Secretary of Defence stated, at the time, that the Iraqi forces were capable of reaching Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, from the south of Iraq as no major military obstacle stood in their way. At the time, the Saudi National Guard battalion were concentrated on the eastern border of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to stop Iraqi forces from gaining control of the oil fields located there.

This crisis revealed the failure of the GCC to guarantee its collective security because there was no planning for the possibility of the emergence of expansionist ambitions for Iraq after the end of its war with Iran. This was, in part, because Iraq was considered a strategic ally, but also because there were no joint initiatives or co-ordinated military policy between the six members of the GCC. Therefore, it was agreed that the GCC would seek the assistance of foreign forces in order to protect them from the threat of Iraq and to liberate Kuwait if Iraq refused to implement the UN Security Council resolutions to withdraw its troops. The international coalition forces, including GCC forces, managed to liberate Kuwait and eject Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory in 1991.
Notably, the study by Al Nahyan focused upon the collective security of the six GCC countries, including the UAE without addressing the UAE’s own national security. Furthermore, the national security of countries cannot be understood only through the military dimension as the concept includes other dimensions (such as the social and economic aspects). Therefore, this study reviews most of the dimensions affecting national security in the UAE. However, the researcher acknowledges that not all matters relating to national security of the UAE are discussed, as the aim is to provide a starting point for research on this subject in the future.

1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The nature of the subject required the researcher to adopt more than one approach in order to help to organize the relevant ideas and information to answer the research questions. Thus, the Systems Analysis Approach is important in explaining the behaviour of the UAE political system on its national security. The Systems Analysis Approach considers the political system as the unit of analysis, in which the system is a set of components that are functionally and orderly associated with each other, including interaction and interdependence. This means that the actions of a certain part affect the rest of the parts, as any change in the environment affects the system and the actions of the system affect the environment. In this sense, the UAE political system can be analysed on the grounds that political interactions in its society constitute a system of behaviour. The Systems Analysis Approach was used to understand the nature and constituent parts of the federal political system in the UAE, and how these parts interact with each other. In addition, the approach was used to understand how the UAE political system interacts with its social environment, and how this system maintained its survival since independence.

Second, the researcher used the historical approach in order to understand the historical developments witnessed within the Arabian Peninsula in general and the UAE in particular as these have influenced the functioning of the UAE national security. Third, the survey method was used to survey the number of public and private schools and the number of students who are studying within such schools in all educational zones of the UAE. This was necessary because official statistics were not available at the UAE’s Ministry of Education for a number of school districts. The data allowed the researcher to perform quantitative analysis to assess the level and content of education, in view of its positive and negative impacts on national security.
In addition, the researcher adopted several methods for collecting information, such as desktop research in relation to books, official documents, theses, magazines, newspapers and e-materials that deal directly with the subject of the thesis. Furthermore, the researcher conducted 11 personal interviews with decision-makers in the UAE in the education sector in order to explore the vulnerability of the curriculum to undermining the sector’s role in mitigating threats to the UAE’s national security and also the impact of the education outcomes on the human resource base. In addition, data was collected from the interviews concerning the distribution of students between the public and private sectors, at the time of the thesis research. Overall data was not available from either the official Ministry of Education websites, or the public sources providing statistics on students’ distribution and curriculum.

In addition, an interview was conducted with an author of a book related to the thesis. The author is a former leader in the Muslim Brotherhood Organization in Egypt, which was strongly involved in the Arab Spring, and has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood organization in UAE which attempted to destabilize the political system in the Emirates. The author was useful in providing insights on the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership structure and internal workings.

The researcher did not interview decision-makers in the national security field in the UAE to evaluate their views on the Emirate’s national security vulnerabilities, as such a discussion is not permitted under their job confidentiality agreements.

Official statistics from various sources were used to build new statistical tables and analysis. The researcher also attended a wide range of relevant lectures, seminars, conferences and exhibitions. Moreover, the researcher added his personal experience as a police officer in the Police General Headquarters of Dubai in the UAE while discussing the structure of the Interior Ministry, the processes of its subsidiary departments and the subject of intruders in the UAE, which are discussed in the following chapters.

1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This study consists of four chapters. The first chapter presents the problem, objectives, hypotheses and research questions, in addition to problems that were faced during the study. This chapter also

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37 See Appendix 13.
contains the literature review, which addresses the subject of national security in the UAE, as well as detailing the methodology. The second chapter explores the theories of international relations and security studies which can explain the behaviour of states towards their national security in order to choose the most appropriate theory to be applied to this study. The third chapter explores theorizes the UAE national security analysis. The fourth chapter explores the external and internal security challenges faced by the UAE. The final chapter concludes with the findings and recommendations for further research.
CHAPTER TWO
THEORIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Analysing national security threats is challenging if the research is not related to existing theoretical studies in the field. The structure is essential to synthesise the perceptions of existing national security threats. Therefore, reference is made in this study to the established international relations theories elaborating on their definitions of the scope of national security and the respective threats. This is done in order to use the most appropriate theories for analysing the UAE’s national security threats. In this context, Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis is examined in this chapter as a tool by which to analysis the threats facing the national security of the UAE.

Many international relations’ thinkers have addressed the interpretation of states’ behaviours towards the subject of its national security through the prism of an anarchic international system. These academics agree that the national interest, in which one of its top priorities is the desire for survival, remains the main driving force influencing the behaviour of states. However, they differ in their methods and approaches of interpretation. The leading classical realists who touched upon the subject of national security did not consider the internal level including societal and cultural factors, but instead focused on the behaviour of the state within the realm of international politics. Thus, they interpret the behaviour of the state within the medium of international politics, and not analysing it as a unit of competing interests and values.³⁸ Behavioural generalizations are frequently applied to the states of the Third World when attempting to explain the national security approaches. However, the approaches do not distinguish sufficiently between state survival and regime survival.

According to Mohamed Ayoob, it is “difficult to disentangle issues of state security from those of regime security in the Third World”.³⁹ It is also true that most regimes in the Third World attempt to portray threats to their regimes as threats to the state. Analysts must, therefore, distinguish between issues of regime security and those of state security. However, in many cases, given the lack of unconditional legitimacy both of the regime and of the state structure in the Third World

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and the close perceptual connection between regime and state as far as the majority of the state’s population is concerned, the line between regime security and state security becomes very thin, and the interplay between the two so dense, that it is virtually impossible to disentangle one from the other. As Crocker, Hampson and Aall point out in connection with the Middle East:

[T]hose who rule must attempt to encourage loyalty to the state, of which they hope themselves to be the chief beneficiaries, while at the same time seeking to disguise the fact that their system of power, and thus the identity of the political structure itself, frequently owes more to the old ties of sectarian and tribal loyalty. In many such countries, the fall of the regime is likely to signal the failure of the state as well; any student of Tudor England or Bourbon France will find this phenomenon very familiar. Iraq provides the latest testimony to the veracity of this proposition.\(^{40}\)

Although, this analysis may resonate with many Third World countries, the model does not appear to relate to the UAE. The regime in the UAE is an outcome of the state’s composition, as the legitimacy of the regime is dependent on the state structure.

This chapter reviews a number of international relations schools of thought, in addition to the security studies, in order to explain the behaviour of states towards their national security. The aim is to choose the most appropriate theories for the analysis of the national security of the UAE, in order to answer the research questions.

2.1 THE REALIST SCHOOL

Realism was, for many years, the dominant theory in the field of security studies and international relations.\(^ {41}\) As McCormack argues: “[t]raditional thinking about security has been deeply colored by the Realist paradigm, which has dominated the discipline of international relations since roughly 1950”.\(^ {42}\) The Realism School considers the state as a unitary actor to be the tool for analysing the various international phenomena. Realism assumes that international politics is a struggle for power between different countries seeking to promote their interests unilaterally.\(^ {43}\)


However, the Realism School is divided into several theories, including classical Realism and Neo-Realism.\textsuperscript{44} Hans Morgenthau laid the foundations of classical Realism in his book \textit{Politics among Nations}, which provided the theoretical framework for the writings of Realist School thinkers.\textsuperscript{45} His book remains one of the most systematic attempts to use the principles of Realism in the construction of an experimental theory in international politics.\textsuperscript{46} Morgenthau identifies six principles for political Realism. The first principle states that political Realism believes that objective laws, which are inherent in human nature, govern politics.\textsuperscript{47} The second principle states that “the main signpost that helps political Realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power”.\textsuperscript{48} The third principle explains that the meaning of national interest, which is defined by force, is not constant because it varies over time and with circumstances. Although survival is considered to be the minimum level of national interest, states seek through their foreign policies to search for other ways to maintain their survival.\textsuperscript{49} The fourth principle emphasizes the awareness of political Realism towards the moral significance of political action; however, at the same time, it realizes the undesirable tension between ethical leadership and the requirements of successful political action. Therefore, it believes that building successful political action requires refining the behaviour of states from their ethical principles, because the standard of judging a specific policy is located in its political outcomes not its moral ones.\textsuperscript{50} The fifth principle affirms the refusal of political Realism to identify the moral aspirations of a particular state “with the moral laws that govern the universe”.\textsuperscript{51} The sixth principle asserts that the difference between political Realism and other schools of thought

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, pp. 99-100.
is real and substantial because the “political Realist sees power as the economist deals with wealth, and the moralist sees action in light of moral principles”.\textsuperscript{53}

In contrast, Lebow argues that the classical realistic thinkers stress the similarities, rather than the differences, between domestic and international policies, as well as the role of ethics and community in promoting stability in both fields.\textsuperscript{54} Most classical realists believe that in an anarchic world, states are preoccupied with providing their citizens’ material needs and with building alliances with other states for the sake of survival. Thus, the state, through its central institutions, in enacting laws and legislation, and providing protection for its citizens and borders, would have a domestic policy that would be little different from the way it tackles international policy. Moreover, all the policies are the result of human drives and subject to the same pathologies. Moreover, all policies are based on the principle of struggle, which can never be separated from the social life itself. In this case, the struggle is based on laws, organizations, rules, and social acceptance. Such scholars believe that the solidarity of the community and the mutual rules that maintain law, order, and self-control in the domestic policy are the same as for international policy.\textsuperscript{55}

The Neo-Realism movement emerged in order to organize the ideas of classical Realism within a coherent and strong theoretical framework.\textsuperscript{56} Morgenthau postulates that the theory is a “loose term”.\textsuperscript{57} However, Hoffman argues that Morgenthau did not succeed in unifying the realm of theory with that of politics,\textsuperscript{58} and that “Morgenthau was not sufficiently ‘theoretical’ or ‘scientific’ in his theories”.\textsuperscript{59} Lott describes classical realism “as a rhetorical device that presents the dangerous environment in which states operate rather than a general theory of international

\textsuperscript{52} Pullen, L. (2000). op. cit.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, pp. 55-56.
\textsuperscript{58} Griffiths, Martin. (1999), op. cit., p. 39.
Thus, Waltz proposed a version of the classical Realism theory titled Neo-Realism. Waltz contradicts the classical realists’ analyses of the behaviour of states on grounds of human nature; he argues that the behaviour of states is not limited by the intelligence or wickedness of their leaders or their physical or spiritual deficiencies but rather is decided by formulas arising from the anarchic nature of the process of international politics. Accordingly, Waltz denies the influence of the state’s internal politics in providing explanatory frameworks for its external behaviour. Neo-Realism focuses on the structure of the international system to explain the behaviour of states within that system, by studying the circumstances and the systemic data that give rise to the security dilemma. Waltz argues that the system consists of a structure and interacting units, and floats the notion that domestic political system is hierarchical in which internal units assume positions according to the degree of their power and authority or functions. By contrast, the international system is anarchical as international units position themselves in accordance with perpendicular relations between them. Due to this structure, international units have to be self-reliant and to adopt arrangements that guarantee their survival and improve their security status regardless of the nature of these arrangements. This leads to the ‘security dilemma’. Thus, Waltz wrote: “In an anarchic domain, a state of war exists if all parties lust for power. But so too will a state of war exist if all states seek only to ensure their own safety”.

Furthermore, Waltz and other Neo-realists believe that balance of power theory arising from the security dilemma makes it possible to predict the behaviour of states. This is because states are related by a behaviour of balancing, whether or not the power the state seeks to balance is the end goal, so long as security is the main objective. Each coalition seeks to enrol the largest number of

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members. However, states always prefer to join with weaker members because states always view bigger powers as a threat. Therefore, the behaviour based on the balance of power is the best way to maintain the status quo.\textsuperscript{69}

The idea of security in Neo-Realism led to a division among its adherents into offensive realists and defensive realists.\textsuperscript{70} Offensive realists believe that this direction offers a more accurate interpretation of the behaviour of states on the grounds that the anarchic nature inherent in the international system leads states to attempt to maximize their security. One of the best ways to achieve this aim is to increase its power relative to other states. Therefore, a state will seize any opportunity to increase its power, regardless of the status quo and the threats they face.\textsuperscript{71} In contrast, defensive realists argue that maximizing or achieving security is achieved by maintaining the status quo in the international system; therefore, aggressive behaviour will not lead to security but to insecurity. This is because security can be achieved with relative ease through defensive rather than offensive behaviour; any state trying to increase its powers will find itself in confrontation with a balance of power or a coalition of powers that may be stronger than that state.\textsuperscript{72} Defensive realists believe that the structure of international relations provides states with incentives to maintain the balance of power rather than attempt to change it.\textsuperscript{73}

\subsection*{2.2 THE LIBERALIST SCHOOL}

The Liberal School of international relations definition of national security was strongly used throughout the first half of the 1990s as a result of the growing role of non-state actors and the increasing importance of both economic and social components. Indeed certain thinkers, such as Joseph Nye, saw these elements as the most important components at the individual level, the state level or the international system level.\textsuperscript{74} While the Liberal School is divided into several theories,\textsuperscript{75} they all share a view about international politics based on three basic assumptions which set it

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{69} Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979). op. cit., p. 126.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, p. 10.
\end{flushleft}
apart from the Realist and Constructivist Schools. The first assumption is the belief that rational individuals and private groups are the fundamental actors in international politics, and the needs of individuals and social groups drive the interests underlying the behaviour of the state. Therefore, individuals in the different social levels determine the material and moral roles to be enacted, pushing them into political and collective action. Thus, the central axiom of the Liberal School states that understanding the practices of force or promoting collective action among nations cannot be achieved without understanding the basic social goals that states seek to achieve. The second assumption asserts that the state or any other political institutions are non-unitary actors in relation to domestic and foreign policy. The choices of the different interests constitute the goals of the state, which the official representatives of the state are committed to follow. Thus, the parliamentary institutions constitute a transmission belt through which the choices of individuals and different groups in civil society enter the political field; these choices are reflected in the foreign policy of the state. The internal policy of the state is constructed by the interaction of different social actors since the state itself is not considered as an actor. In the third assumption, liberals assert that the behaviour of the state in the international system is a result of the fine tuning of its options, since the state needs to target a goal in order to provoke conflict, achieve cooperation or take any action in order to achieve such a goal. Moreover, El-Marhoun states that the concept of national security in liberal thought focuses on maintaining the state’s survival against external threats, whether this concept is related to the individual, the state or the international system. This policy is usually adopted as an objective of the foreign policy, which can be achieved by following protective and preventive procedures added to other remedial measures that may aim to change the surrounding environment of the state.

In any case, Walt believes that the end of the Cold War gave a strong impetus to the emergence of the three liberal theories in the field of international relations. Thus, the 'Democratic Peace' theory provides different analytical tools from those used by traditional Realism and Neo-Realism.

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77 Ibid, pp. 161-162.
78 Ibid, pp. 163-164.
80 El-Marhoun, (3March, 2006),op. cit.
Schools. Doyle and Russet, the theorists of this thought, argue that security analysis must be based on the democratic variable within the regimes of the states. The theory focuses on the internal variable of the political system and how it is represented as an alternative to the power variable. This means that democratic representation, commitment to human rights and the transnational interdependence between states make countries more prone to peace rather than war and the logic of power.\textsuperscript{82} This is because democratic countries embrace the norms of compromise,\textsuperscript{83} which prevents the use of force between parties embracing the same principles; thus, it is rare that democratic countries engage in wars with each other.\textsuperscript{84} This is in contrast to the case of permanent conflict envisaged by realists in the security dilemma.\textsuperscript{85}

Second, the theory of liberal institutionalism emerged in the post-Cold War era as an explanatory theory for the behaviour of states toward their national security. Liberal institutionalism argues that institutions play a crucial role in international security and even in strengthening the internal security of nations. Nations acquire powers and tools through these institutions, which allow them to adjust aspects of internal issues, and subsequently result in the adjustment of a nation’s policies in the international environment. Such influence and dependencies does not allow countries to act unilaterally in their internal policies. Fukuyama stresses that, at the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy became one of the basic components of the value system in the new world order. Thus, states that suppress the practices of individual freedom under liberal democratic doctrine come into conflict with political legitimacy in the international community. Therefore, the spread of liberal democratic ideals has led to the erosion of the modern state’s sovereignty through external institutions that can interfere in its internal affairs to ensure “refocusing sovereignty away from states, in practice their leaders, and locating it with the people the nation”\textsuperscript{86}

Third, the economic strand of Liberalism theory has increased in importance, particularly through the globalization of world markets, the rise of non-governmental organizations and transnational networks, and the rapid spread of global communication technologies. These factors have all


\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, p. 263.

\textsuperscript{84} Walt, Stephen M. (Spring 1998), op. cit., p. 39.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.

contributed to undermining the power of the states and shifted the focus of states from issues concerned with military security to issues related to the economy and social welfare, in which communities have become tied together by a network of economic and social contacts. These links, due to their strength, have made it difficult for states to break them. In fact, states could face the wrath of their own populace if they are denied the luxuries gained from the network of links. Thus, populations are reluctant to fight wars which threaten their level of economic well-being.\textsuperscript{87}

\section*{2.3 THE CONSTRUCTIVIST SCHOOL}

The Constructivist School emerged in the field of security and international relations studies following the end of the Cold War because of the failure of Realism and liberalism to explain the reasons that led to the fall of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{88} Both schools neglected the internal changes within Soviet society, because the intellectuals of these schools only considered physical factors to be important in understanding the behaviour of states in the international system. Therefore, the Constructivism School emerged as a new explanatory theory arguing that international relations cannot be understood within the purely material constraints highlighted by Realism or within the institutional constraints on the local and international levels highlighted by the liberalism. Constructivists argue the focus should be on the impact of ideas and the social dimension in international politics.\textsuperscript{89} Thus, constructivists believe that international politics is driven by ideas, values, and common standards, which are adopted by the actors. In this context, constructivists focus on the intersubjective dimension of knowledge and the role of shared ideas as an ideational structure that hinders or constitutes the behaviour of states.\textsuperscript{90} This is because the ideational structure not only affects the incentives of different behaviours of the state, but also affects the basic character, which is defined as the state’s identity.\textsuperscript{91} Wendt, as a leading constructivist, stresses that the identity is “a property of international actors that generates motivational and


\textsuperscript{88} Walt, Stephen M. (Spring 1998), op. cit., p. 41.


behavioral dispositions”.92 Constructivists believe that the states have a corporate identity which
generates the main objectives of the states such as material security, stability, economic
development and recognition by others states. However, the states rely on their social identities in
order to achieve their objectives, as their identity is the framework that constitutes the way in
which states see themselves in terms of their relations with other countries. Therefore, states define
their national interests on the basis of these identities.93 For that reason Wendt states that “identities
are the basis of interests”,94 because actors could never establish their interests without identifying
themselves first.95

Thus, the identity of the state is determined by the ideas and values and standards held by its
individuals. This identity is the factor that specifies the national interests and how to achieve them.
Therefore, constructivists do not separate the internal and international environments when
analysing the behaviour of states. They argue that interests are determined outside the social
context of the states as a precondition dictated by the nature of the international system, but they
stress that the interest is determined by the identity which changes as a result of the interactions of
institutions, norms and cultures. Therefore, the process, rather than the structure, of international
system determines how countries interact with each other in international politics.96 The
intellectuals of the Constructivist School believe that:

the international system is not something ‘out there’ like the solar system. It does not
exist on its own. It exists only as inter-subjective awareness among people. It is a human
invention or creation not of a physical or material kind but of a purely intellectual and
ideational kind. It is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been
arranged by certain people at a particular time and place. If the thoughts and ideas that
enter into the existence of international relations change, then the system itself will
change as well. That is because the system consists in thought and ideas.97

95 Ibid.
Sides of the Mediterranean Based on Constructivist Perspective”. Master's Thesis, Faculty of Law and Political
Science, University of Batna, p. 29. (In Arabic)
97 Jackson, Robert and Sørensen, Georg. (2003). Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches
Constructivists and structural realists share the same perspective regarding the chaotic nature of international relations, and that states seek to be secure and maintain their survival in the chaotic system. However, they differ in the interpretation of the policies of the countries use in overcoming the chaos of the international system.\textsuperscript{98} Constructivists believe that self-reliance is not the only way to overcome the issue of chaotic international system. It is true that seeking this option is imposed on the states, but not due to the chaos of the system rather due to the states’ behaviours. In this context, certain changes in the behaviour of the state could lead to the emergence of bilateral and multilateral understandings between the actors in the system.

Thus, the Constructivist perception of security relations can be understood in the form of an equation in which there are two states, A and B. When State A takes certain political, military and economic actions in the form of self-help in order to achieve the goal of survival then State B will pursue the same behaviours in order to achieve the same goals. This is because this state will change its policy based on the principle of uncertainty in its foreign relations. However, Constructivist Theory envisions that if State A has taken the confidence-building measures and reduced any excessive defensive actions, then State B will take the same path. Thus, States A and B use other methods than self-help to achieve survival, which in turn leads to an increase in the chances of achieving international security.

Therefore, it is possible conclude that constructivism, although it has adopted the same central axiom as neo-realism concerning the issue of a chaotic international system, disagrees with neo-realism on the interpretation of the behaviour of states. This is because constructivists consider the social interpretations in the form of beliefs, reactions and norms. Furthermore, the chaos is not the factor that leads to the formation of spontaneous behavioural patterns of states, such as the emergence of the security dilemma in international politics.\textsuperscript{99}

\textbf{2.4 THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL}

The Copenhagen School stands in contrast to the focus of Realism on military factors and Liberalism on economic factors. However, it shares the view with constructivism that threats to national security are perceived through a collective understanding of what a threat is, be it political,

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid, p. 209.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid, p. 64.
environmental or economic. Thus, threats are treated more broadly than the traditionally recognized threats relating to military interventions. This school argues that other considerations such as political and environmental factors have to be taken into consideration in order to reach an accurate interpretation of the behaviour of states toward their national security.\textsuperscript{100} In fact, “the Copenhagen School became a term for a school of academic thought with its origins in international relations theorist Barry Buzan’s book \textit{People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations}”\textsuperscript{101} In this book, Buzan discusses his hypothesis about the nature of the state and stresses the necessity of analysing the nature of the state in order to understand the threats it that may face in terms of its national security. Buzan believes that any state consists of three interrelated elements: the idea of the national state; the institutional expression of the state’s political and administrative system; and the physical base of the state (the people, resources, technology).\textsuperscript{102} He argues by understanding these elements, it is possible to achieve a deep and profound perception about the threats to its national security that any state could encounter (see Figure 2.1).

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101} Kostić, Roland. (2007). “Ambivalent Peace: External Peacebuilding Threatened Identity and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. \textit{PhD Dissertation, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University}, p. 28.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
According to his assumption about the nature of the state, Buzan points out that any state is the outcome of a contract between a group of people who share the same culture and perhaps the same ethnicity, race or heritage and who are named the 'Nation' rather than being only a physical organism. Therefore, he considers that the idea of the state is the most centralized element in the Nature of the State hypotheses. It is through this idea of the state that the nation organizes the ideological underpinning on which the state is formed, and through which its institutional structures are established according to the physical base of the state. As a result, Buzan believes that any state can be defined through the nation and organizing ideologies.

Furthermore, he argues that four different patterns explain the links between the nation and the state. In the first pattern, the nation, which precedes the state, plays an essential role in the creation of the state and the relationship between the nation and the state is deep. In this pattern, the purpose of the state is to protect, represent and express the nation, as:

the nation provides the state with both a strong identity in the international arena, and a solid base of domestic legitimacy – solid enough to withstand revolutionary upheavals,

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as in the case of France at the end of the eighteenth century, or defeat and occupation by foreign powers, as in the case of France and Japan during the 1940s.\footnote{Ibid, p. 76.}

In the second pattern, the state plays a key role in the creation of a nation, through the absorption of immigrants to fill any uninhabited territory. The residents submit to state control, such as in the case of the US, many countries in Latin America and Australia. In these cases, the institutions of these states integrate the migrants and indigenous people in their communities through the consolidation of cultural elements such as language, arts, custom and law. Thus, a new national identity for the nation becomes established over time, which retains the parts of the original identity that do not conflict with the new national identity of the state. Moreover, some institutions in Asian and African countries, which gained independence after decolonization in the twentieth century, such as Sudan and Nigeria, added a new layer of collective identity among its population in order to cope with the complex ethnic, tribal and religious divisions within the framework of the nation-state.

In the third pattern; the state is formed as a part of nation-state, in which the nation was divided into two or more divisions, such as Vietnam and Korea. The Vietnamese nation embraced the idea of forming the states of North Vietnam and South Vietnam, with each part seeking to join the other part to unite the nation. This resulted in a lack of security for each state and for others as a result of the 30-year struggle between the two competing regimes. In the case of North and South Korea, the strategy to differentiate the Korean nation into two states was adopted in order to build the legitimacy of each part.

In the fourth pattern, the state has more than one nation within its borders and forms what is called a multination-state. Federal states that contain two or more states and imperial states rely on this pattern. In this pattern, the federal state encourages the states contained within its regime to retain their own identities and does not attempt to impose any artificial national identity upon them. Furthermore, the federal state attempts to restructure the multination-state within this context so that no one nationality dominates the structure of the entire state; examples include Canada, the UK and India. In contrast, the nation dominating the structures of an imperial state seeks to suppress other nationalities in order to transform itself into a semblance of the nation-state and thus maintain its dominance of the state structure. The dominating nation resorts to suppressing
the other nationalities through absorbing their cultural and racial elements in order to transform itself into a semblance of a nation-state, or by adopting a non-nationalist ideology such as Communism in the case of China. Thus, China was able to contain different nations under the framework of the communist state. Similarly, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was established after the revolution against the Shah’s regime in 1979, saw the Persian nation adopt the Islamic caliphate regime (or what is termed the wali al-faqih regime) in order to impose their control over the state while marginalizing other nationalities in Iran.

In terms of the organizing ideologies, Buzan argues that the ideologies are the most evident factor in the upper idea of the state. These ideologies determine the form of the state, such as monarchical, republican or communist. In addition, many varieties of political, economic, religious and social thoughts may serve as an idea of the state, when the nation and the values associated to its national identity form a major element of the idea of the state. Thus, the ideologies handle the relations between the government and the community by identifying the conditions for harmony and conflict in the internal politics.\(^{105}\) However, the ideas by their very nature are prone to interact with other ideas, which may lead to the fact that “[o]rganizing ideologies can be penetrated, distorted, corrupted and eventually undermined by contact with other ideas. They can be attacked through their supporting institutions, and they can be suppressed by force”.\(^ {106}\) Thus, “[i]n some cases, an organizing ideology will be so deeply ingrained into the state that change would have transformational, or perhaps fatal, implications”.\(^ {107}\) For example, in Saudi Arabia, the largest segment of the idea of its state is based on Islam; if this changed it would be impossible for the state of Saudi Arabia to survive.

In terms of state institutions, Buzan explains that the state institutions, including the government, are the mechanism through which the state exerts its authority. These institutions are broadly defined and include the executive, legislative, administrative and judicial authorities, in addition to the laws, rules and procedures. Accordingly, the institutions of the state are more tangible than the idea of the state, because they have a physical presence. This means that they are more vulnerable to physical threats than ideas which makes “ideas so difficult as an object of

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\(^ {105}\) Ibid, p. 80.
\(^ {106}\) Ibid, p. 82.
\(^ {107}\) Ibid, p. 80.
However, Buzan also explains that the ideas and institutions are intertwined and cannot be separated from each other; the ideas of democracy or communism would be pointless without the institutions that exist to implement them and the institutions would be meaningless without an idea to grant them definition and purpose. Therefore, any radical change to the idea of the state may lead to its death. In this case, the main threat to the state is internal. The internal threats can come from small groups of militants relatively isolated from the community that threaten the institutions by force, which leads the institutions to defend itself. However, the main danger arises when the opponents threaten the idea of the state and the state responds violently, which eventually erodes its legitimacy and causes collapses, as happened in Poland in 1980. A further example is of powerful guerrilla movements fighting against the institutions of the state, as happened in the case of Afghanistan. In addition, widely popular discontent may occur against the institutions of the state, as happened in South Africa in the 1990s, or a comprehensive revolution against the institutions of the state, as happened in Iran in 1979. In this context, regimes may interfere in the internal policies of other regimes in order to protect their national interest. For example, a regime can launch a propaganda campaign against the ideology of a certain regime, or provide funds and facilities for opposition groups, or encourage armed revolts against another regime, or escalate external economic pressures in an attempt to undermine the credibility of the local government or sponsor direct intervention by armed force under the guise of an international umbrella.

Finally, Buzan explains his perception of the physical base of the state. He argues that it consists of the state’s residents and its territories, including all natural resources and human-made wealth within its borders. He adds that the physical base of the state is the most significant element in his Nature of the State hypothesis in terms of security. Threats to the physical objects are necessarily more direct and, therefore, clear in terms of the confiscation or destruction than threats to amorphous objects such as ideas and institutions. Another factor that threatens the physical base of the state occurs when a state claims that a certain region that lies under the sovereignty of another state is part of its territory, whether or not this claim is internationally recognized. Also, a province belonging to a state may be exposed to the threat of joining with another country, such as the Republican counties in Northern Ireland. The loss of a region does not necessarily, or even

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108 Ibid.
usually, threaten the state’s survival. Each of Germany, Pakistan, Mexico and Poland has lost large areas of their territories without disrupting the historical continuity of the state. However, some areas are clearly more important to a state than others for a variety of reasons. The value can arise from its resources, such as oil in the disputed areas between Iran and Iraq; for strategic reasons, such as Gibraltar; or due to a combination of these reasons, such as the Falkland Islands, Kashmir, and the four islands of northern Japan. Such territory has a much higher priority as an object of security than other areas. Also, the physical base may be exposed to threats of damage or harms such as land-seizure motivated by policy of deterrence by another state; as happened in the Six-Day War launched by Israel against Egypt, Syria and Jordan in 1967.

Human migrations also represent a serious threat to the physical base of the state, especially if the state was a nation-state and the immigrants are from different cultural or ethnic backgrounds. This migration may threaten the fabric and cohesion of the community. Similarly, Giesen highlights certain countries with traditional societies adopt specific regulations in relation to foreigners wishing to obtain citizenship that are additional to normal international requirements such as the need to respect the law and the constitution of the state. Such countries require those who want to obtain its citizenship to be conversant in the language, customs, traditions and the history of their communities before being admitted as members in order to maintain the continuity of the collective identity of their citizens. This is because these countries do not want to be changed because of their interaction with migrants who do not belong to their communities.109

In addition, the state’s inability to control its borders is another threat to its physical base. Relatedly, environmental threats also threaten the physical base of the state, as there is a strong correlation between environmental degradation and security. The grave consequences of environmental degradation are becoming a more acute issue, because it can lead to internal violence as populations are forced to migrate to less affected areas leading to an outbreak of social tensions between the displaced and resident population. Similarly, crises are associated with the scarcity in natural resources, such as water and energy.110 Finally, Buzan adds that the

technological threats can affect the physical base of the state. An example is the threat to the country’s electronic networks associated with its institutions from internal or external hacking. Hathaway et al. define an attack via the Internet as “any action taken to undermine the functions of a computer network for a political or national security purpose”. Indeed, many countries are now dependent on the technologies related to the Internet, as their micro-infrastructure is highly digitalised and therefore vulnerable to cyber-attacks that could destabilize their national security. For example, in 2013, vital institutions, including several major banks and three of the largest TV networks in South Korea suffered coordinated cyber-attacks, which could have led to chaos across the country, if the attack had not been contained by the authorities.

2.5 THEORISING THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UAE

It is important to note that none of the theories promulgated by the four schools of international relations theory in relation the interpretation of a country’s national security issues fit exactly with the social, economic and political composition of the UAE. This is because most are founded on a historic western perspective that differs radically with the concepts and perceptions of developing countries, to which the UAE belongs.

The Balance of Power theory, which was formulated by Realist School thinkers, explains the behaviour of the Great Powers in time of peace and war, in a comprehensive manner. However, when it is applied to Third World countries, it loses much of its cohesion and analytical capabilities in relation to providing an adequate explanation for the behaviour of those countries to maintain their national security in an international system characterized by anarchy. Arguably, the reason for this is that it derives from a European view of history, which views the major powers in a permanent state of conflict and war that is radically different from the position of most Third World countries, including the UAE. Therefore, Realist School scholars, such as Van Evera, argue that Third World countries generally do not matter, whether in the theoretical domain or in the

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114 Ibid, p. 45.
international reality of the post-Cold War world, despite the fact that most of the world’s population live in those countries.  

Furthermore, Liberal School thinkers ignore the political and social specificities and the economic conditions of the Third World. This School claims that peace and international cooperation are achieved through three elements. First, the unification of political systems across the world through pursuing the principles and values of liberal democracy based on democratic representation as the main priority of the state. The second is applying the free-market economic system, which restricts state interference in domestic markets, opens markets to transnational corporations (TNCs) and provides economic freedom for all members of society. The third is succumbing to the dictates of international organizations and non-governmental organizations in order to change the internal or external behaviour of states in the case of incompatibility with the values of liberal democracy. Thus, the achievement of peace between states depends on the presence of these three features; the absence of any of these features renders states unable to achieve cooperation and peace among themselves, which will reflect negatively on the security of the international system stability. In fact, the theories of Liberal School thinkers are ideologically biased as they are derived from Western ideas and philosophies. For example, according Mansour in his article, ‘Adam Smith and Economic Liberalism’, Smith’s Economic Liberalism has to be applied in order to establish global peace. This thesis emerged in the eighteenth century during a period of armed conflict between the European powers over the colonies scattered across the world because of the imposition of trading monopolies for their companies. Therefore, Smith called for the absolute freedom of trade for all the European powers in order to invoke fair competition instead of colonial conflict. Accordingly, thinkers associated with the Liberal School continue to pursue the idea that economic freedom is a way of eliminating conflict. However, they ignore the fact that their version of economic freedom creates monopolies for TNCs. Thus, by extension, world peace is a means by which to provide global security for capital, and the unification of the world under the banner

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115 Ibid, p. 53.
117 Ibid, p. 56.
of global capital. Therefore, Mansour stresses that Liberalism School intellectuals paint a false ideological image of the reality.\textsuperscript{118} Moreover, the Liberal School, with its emphasis on the importance of economics and economic interests taking precedence over other considerations, such as political and military interests, makes it incapable of interpreting the behaviours of Third World countries generally.\textsuperscript{119} This includes the UAE, which is situated in a neighbourhood dominated by the aggressive policies of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The latter rejects the UAE’s repeated calls to solve the territorial dispute over the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa by peaceful means through direct negotiations or by resorting to the International Court of Justice. Moreover, the UAE, despite being one of the richest countries in the world in per capita terms, has regional neighbours that have suffered economically because of the policies of their regimes, which have harnessed economic resources for regime survival at the expense of the development of their societies, such as the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. This has creating an incubator for al-Qaeda extremists in Yemen, which pose a direct threat to the security and stability of the UAE as well as the entire world.

Meanwhile, the Constructivist School addresses the nature of the construction of international relations prevailing between the countries of the Third World. However, because of its ideologican cognitive roots, it produced a theory that is unable to explain the behaviour of Third World countries towards their national security. The Constructivist School is unable to interpret the existence of conflicts between states and groups that share common identities, values, ideas, norms and standards because the theory is based on an approach that these commonalities ensure peace. Furthermore, it ignores considerations of power and the chaotic nature of the international system.\textsuperscript{120} Nevertheless, the constructivist approach is useful in theorizing the UAE’s national security and the state’s behaviour towards perceived threats, especially in terms of shared values, identity structures, and interests. This is evident in the UAE’s engagement in the Yemen War as part of the international alliance to re-establish stability and combat Iranian interventionism in Yemen which is perceived to pose a major threat to Saudi Arabia, and consequently to the UAE.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, pp. 58-59.
However, Constructivism fails to explain certain international relations events such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which occurred despite the fact that the two countries are broadly compatible in terms of historical, social and cultural values, standards and ideas. Thus, constructivist theories find it difficult to explain and interpret certain events, especially with regard to processes of change in regional politics. However, constructivism can explain the changing nature of the structures of international relations but not the events that lead to the change.

Furthermore, in relation to constructivists’ assumptions about the power structure of international relations, Walker explains that they believe that “it is important to recognize that ideas, consciousness, culture, and ideology are bound up with more immediately visible kinds of political, military and economic power”. Although, this approach can be projected on the UAE’s perceived power system, this is not appropriate because it is not directly related to the UAE’s reality; for example, the UAE’s economic power is not essentially bound by the established ideology or culture. Therefore, constructivism is not the ideal model to base an analysis framework for threats to the UAE’s national security.

Meanwhile, the Copenhagen School’s approach identifies the state as the object of the threat, i.e. the ‘referent’, and as the securitizing actor. “Following Buzan, Waever and de Wilde the referent object for security has ‘traditionally been the state and, in a more hidden way, the nation’”. Therefore, in order to apply the justification for securitizing a threat, the Copenhagen school applies a constructivist approach by which the “securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object”. In this context, researchers argue about how securitization abuse is open to states, especially if national perceptions are manipulated to construct a reality that political conflict is a national security threat and then enforce securitizing measures on the political system. Furthermore, while states can securitize an issue, they can also de-securitize it depending on their political purpose, or when common interests and alliances with other international entities calls for de-securitizing an issue. The “process and possibilities for de-securitization are

121 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
undertheorized”.¹²⁶

The critique can be verified against the reality of the national security of the UAE. In reality, the outlined threats have not lead to securitization except where the sovereignty of the state and social cohesion were threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood’s secret UAE branch in 2012 and the subsequent decision to classify it as a terrorist organization.

Furthermore, the Copenhagen School’s highlights how the use of language can raise an issue to a security threat. As Wæver states, “the utterance itself is the act...by uttering ‘security’, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it”.¹²⁷ However, certain authors suggest that the reliance on language as a securitizing tool, neglects other forms of communication, such as images, or practices as in bureaucratic practices or physical measures through which an enforcement of the securitization concepts are communicated. Williams “has suggested that television images of September 11—and in particular those of the World Trade Centre towers—were central to the development of dominant perceptions of security and threat in the American context”.¹²⁸ Similarly, Möller “discusses visual representations of the September 11 attacks—along with conflict in Iraq—in pointing to the ways in which photographic exhibitions are similarly able to communicate particular meanings of security and threat”.¹²⁹ Hansen, “meanwhile, uses the example of the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in a Danish newspaper in 2005 in pointing to the potentially central role of visual representations as forms of securitisation”.

In conclusion, the Copenhagen School, Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis is the most appropriate basis for analysing the national security of the UAE. However, not only it is based on European historical and cultural roots but it also has been deepened and expanded to take account of the cultures of other nations. Thus, the Copenhagen School is able to overcome the bias of the Realist, Constructivist or Liberal Schools. The School’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis is able to analyse the national security of the UAE using three basic elements. These elements are the idea

¹²⁹ Ibid.
¹³⁰ Ibid.
of the state, the institutions of the state, and the physical basis of the state. This hypothesis is flexible and can be applied to all forms of states whether a nation-state or a state that was part of a nation-state, a multi-nation state or an artificial-nation state. The hypothesis has distanced itself from alignment with particular polarity of values when discussing the inevitability of a state’s failure to survive in the event of any radical change to its ideology, upon which the idea of its establishment was founded, whether that ideology was based on Western democratic thought, communist thought or the values associated with the identity of its community. The ideologies, upon which the different states are based, are the foundations that determine the terms of harmony and conflict between governments and members of communities who are subject to its powers, as the state institutions are formed in accordance with the ideological framework upon which the idea of the state is based. These institutions then enforce and apply their mechanisms on both the government and the society in order to maintain the security and stability of the society and protect its survival in its territory. Therefore, in the event of any sudden and radical change to the ideology, the institutions will change, which could lead to the death of the state. Thus, the concept of security in the Copenhagen School is not static, but is a social structure formed through dynamic practice.\footnote{Williams, Michael C. (September, 1997). “The Institutions of Security: Elements of a Theory of Security Organizations”. \textit{Cooperation and Conflict}, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 288.}

Furthermore, the Nature of the State hypothesis includes the presence of extremist groups in a state’s territory which isolate themselves from their communities and, when they have an opportunity, pose threats to the security and stability of the state. These groups can be extreme Christian or Islamic groups, or extremist groups based on other ideologies. In addition, the hypothesis includes the physical capabilities of the states in terms of resources or economic and military power. Thus, all nations are subject to the same standards of analysis. The Copenhagen hypothesis also has expanded the concept of national security through the introduction of new dimensions not addressed in the theories of the other schools. These dimensions include the environment and the technological dimension of cyber security, which is now one of the most prominent security challenges facing countries. Accordingly, the Copenhagen School’s Nature of the State hypothesis is used to analyse the UAE’s national security in order to answer the research questions.
2.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter reviews the hypotheses of the most important theoretical trends in relation to national security in international relations theory, including Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and the Copenhagen Schools is reviewed. The discussion highlights the differences between the schools, despite the fact that each emerged in more politically advanced societies, which are radically different from the society of the UAE. The majority of the concepts and analytical frameworks for Security Studies adopted by those schools are not suitable for application to the UAE or to the rest of the Third World countries. This is because the majority of the explanatory theories of international relations are based on an idea that security issues are determined by the relationship between the major powers in the international system.

Finally, a hypothesis belonging to one of the schools of international relations theory is chosen as the most appropriate for analysing the issue of national security of the UAE. The hypothesis on the Nature of the State by Buzan, as one of the pioneers of the Copenhagen School, is best able to conform to the reality of the international system, without any ideological or cultural bias. This is because it deepens and expands the importance of the ideologies of political systems and the cultures of nations and proposes a formula for security analysis for the states that reflects the changes which took place in the international system after the end of Cold War.

The next chapter theorizes the UAE national security analysis in the light of Buzan’s hypothesis.
CHAPTER THREE
THEORIZING THE UAE’S NATIONAL SECURITY

This chapter identifies the nature of internal and external challenges facing the national security of the UAE by analysing the three constituent parts of the state identified by Buzan’s Nature of the State hypothesis. Buzan argues that if one of the three parts is exposed to a threat, it will damage other constituents of the state. Understanding the constituents helps to reach a broad understanding of the dangers related to the survival of the state. This chapter discusses the idea of the UAE, in terms of its institutional expression, its political and administrative system and its physical base. It also discusses the threats that affect the constituent parts of the UAE.

3.1 THE IDEA OF THE UAE

To understand the idea of the UAE’s state formation, it is necessary to understand the relationship between the nation and the state. According to Buzan’s theory regarding the nature of the state, the idea of any state can be defined through the nation and its organizing ideologies. Therefore, the first step in the case of the UAE is to trace the roots of the residents of this geographical area who decided to form their own state in 1968. The second step is to identify the ideology that they have chosen to form such a state, so that through these steps the threats to the idea of the UAE can be identified.

In fact, the inhabitants who settled in the territory on which the UAE was founded were of an Arab ethnic origin. Arabs migrated from what is present day Yemen after the collapse of the Marib Dam in AD130 and settled in the south-eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula.\(^{132}\) This nation was divided into independent groups, with its members linked by the ties of kinship, language, religion, customs, traditions, ethics and values.\(^ {133}\) The common values underpinning the societies saw power delegated to the chief of the tribe to which they belonged or with which they were allied. The chief protected the members’ interests in exchange for the members’ loyalty and obedience.\(^ {134}\) Thus, the tribe formed the basic framework for social, economic and political life in the territory

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\(^{133}\) Interview with Mohammed Khalifah. (26 April 2005). *Al Jazeera TV Channel*. Available at: <URL: http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/opposite-direction/2005/4/26%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%84%d8%a9%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a9/> Access Date: 4 March, 2012. (In Arabic).

of the UAE before its independence. However, the tribal affiliation led to disagreement on the idea of the formation of a state that would gather their sheikhdoms under its framework. However, in 1952, the idea of the state began to grow among these groups following the establishment of the Trucial States Council by the British authorities, who were extending their tutelage and control over the area. The Trucial States Council included the rulers of the seven sheikhdoms that eventually formed the UAE: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Um Al Qaiwain, Al Fujairah and Ras Al Khaimah. The Council, headed by the British Commissioner, coordinated meetings between the member rulers in order to encourage them to work on adopting modern management methods for their sheikhdoms and develop security, economic and social services for their subjects.

In 1965, a new phase began for the Council, when it became under the administration of the rulers of the Trucial States, as the British Commissioner resigned from the presidency of the Council and asked the members of the Council to elect one of them for the post of President. The post alternated between the members, and changed the view of the rulers from a narrow focus on protecting the interests of members of their tribe and its allies to a wider focus of protecting the interests of their fellow citizens of the same race. The process of development and advancement started in the Trucial States under the supervision of the President of the Council. This development included the construction of the electricity and water networks, roads and communications, as well as schools and hospitals.

The next stage started in 1968 when the UK announced that it was planning to withdraw from east of the Suez Canal, which included the Arabian Gulf by 1971. Following the announcement, negotiations continued for three years between the rulers of the Trucial States in addition to Qatar and Bahrain to establish a federal state. The aim of the negotiations was to achieve survival for the Trucial States following the British withdrawal, which led to fears of a threat from an emergence of a power vacuum in the region. A bilateral federal union started between Abu Dhabi and Dubai in 1968, which encouraged the remaining sheikhdoms to join. The rulers of the nine sheikhdoms

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met days after the bilateral federal union was created in Dubai and signed a cooperation pact to establish a federation; a committee was tasked with drafting the constitution for this union.\footnote{Bin Hewedin, Mohammed. (2010). \textit{Federation in UAE: Theory, Facts, and Future}. Abu Dhabi: ECSSR, pp. 44-45. (In Arabic).}

However, the proposed federation faced obstacles from the outset because of inconsistencies in the idea of the state in the communities of the nine sheikhdoms and the proposed federal state system. For example, the proposed federal government would undermine the authority and sovereignty of the local governments in the emirates. This was particularly the case in terms of security with the local rulers having to pass this mandate to the proposed federal state whose leader would be elected from among the rulers every five years. Furthermore, the issue of sovereignty over the individual sheikhdoms was a major hurdle in the negotiations. The rulers feared that handing over authority to the federal state would undermine the social, political and economic systems that formed the fabric of their societies. The populace still pledged allegiance to the individual ruler to protect their security, defend their interests and ensure their future rather than the leader of the proposed federation. As a result of the mounting differences over the role of the federal institutions, first Bahrain and then Qatar withdrew; each declaring independence. Qatar and Bahrain did not agree with the Trucial Council members about their idea of a state that would protect their nation under its framework. They did not develop the vision of the state reached by the rulers of the Trucial States.\footnote{Kassem, Jamal Zakaria. (1999). \textit{Contemporary Arab Unity Experiences: The Experience of the United Arab Emirates}, Fourth Edition, op. cit., p. 112.}

On 2 December 1971, the rulers of the Trucial States, with the exception of Ras Al Khaimah, agreed to an interim constitution for a federal state, which defined the political system and the state institutions in accordance with the idea of the state based on shared ideas, beliefs and values developed over hundreds of years. On 10 February 1972, Ras Al Khaimah joined the federal state after ratifying the interim constitution, giving birth to the UAE federation between the seven political units. Importantly, the creation of the national entity of the UAE has protected and maintained the values associated with the individual tribal identities, enabling a national identity to evolve.

In summary, as Buzan proposes, the formation of the UAE saw the formation of the ideological underpinning on which the state is formed. The UAE as a nation was established on a shared ideology between the demographic constituents comprising the tribes, and their closely-knit social
fabric sharing a common value system derived from ethical and Arabic values. This coherence underpins the national identity of the UAE and had facilitated the cooperation between the different tribes to promote the country’s establishment and strengthen its base.

3.2 THE UAE INSTITUTIONS

The legislative, executive and judiciary institutions in the UAE relate to the idea of the state as agreed upon by the rulers of the UAE during the negotiations to establish the federal state. The institutions were defined in the draft constitutions before the declaration of the federal state. Therefore, it is important to discuss the political and administrative systems in the UAE in order to understand the relationship between the concept of the state and the institutions of the state.

The nature of the composition of the Federal regime in the UAE differs from other federal regimes as the UAE adopts a hereditary regime based on the federation of seven tribal hereditary monarchies, from which two rulers are chosen for the positions of the president and vice-president of the federal state. Each Emirate is ruled by a single family. The ruling family in Abu Dhabi is the Al Nahyan family, while in Dubai it is the Al Maktoum family, in Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah it is the Al Qasimi royal family, in Ajman it is the Al Nuaimi family, in Umm Al Quwain it is the Al Mualla family, and in Fujairah it is the Al Sharqi family. The delegation of power in the individual Emirates is achieved through the heirs of the ruling family. Each emirate ruler appoints a crown prince after consulting other members of royal family. The crown prince succeeds the ruler after the ruler’s death, which leads to a smooth transition of power; thus preserving the security and stability of the Emirate and the federal state. Since its establishment, the UAE has only experienced one case in which a ruler of an emirate died without a crown prince in place. The exception was in 1972 when Sheikh Khalid Bin Mohamed Al Qasimi, the ruler of Sharjah was assassinated during a coup attempt by Sharjah’s former ruler Sheikh Saqr Bin Sultan Al Qasimi. The coup was foiled by the intervention of the Union Defence Force of the UAE government. As Sheikh Khalid had not appointed a crown prince before his death, members of the Al Qasimi royal family in Sharjah met to choose a ruler; after the consultations, they elected

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Sheikh Sultan Bin Mohamed Al Qasimi. The criteria considered by the ruling families in the UAE for choosing rulers are based on the qualities of intelligence, martial skills, political acumen, piety, good character, and generosity.\textsuperscript{141}

Therefore, the traditional tribal system, as an essential pillar in the idea of the state, remained a key factor in the political structure of the UAE, as identified by the Federal Constitution of the State.

\subsection*{3.2.1 The Federal Authorities in the UAE}

The UAE Constitution enshrines the authority of the Ruler of each Emirates as the highest authority in the federal state, through their membership in the Federal Supreme Council, which elect from its members the President and Vice-President of the federal state. The UAE Constitution gives the Federal Supreme Council the competencies and powers, which position it at the forefront of the five federal institutions that form the federal authorities. In order, these are the UAE President and Vice President, the Federal Council of Ministers, the Federal National Council and the Federal Judiciary (see Figure 3.1).

According to Article 46 of the UAE Constitution, the Federal Supreme Council is the highest authority in the state and consists of the rulers of the seven member Emirates or those acting in their capacity in case of a ruler’s absence. At the internal level, the Federal Supreme Council draws up the principles governing the activity of the executive authority of the Federal State, which are based on the achievement of the goals for which the Union has been established. Such goals consist of maintaining the State’s security, sovereignty and independence, protecting the rights and freedoms of the people of the UAE, and establishing close co-operation among the Emirates for their common interest to achieve prosperity and development in all areas in order to provide a better life for all citizens.\textsuperscript{142} The supreme principles, set by the Council to govern the activity of the executive authority of the Federal State on the external level, are based on supporting Arabic

\textsuperscript{141} Van der Meulen, Hendrik. (1997). \textit{The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates}. Ph.D., The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, p. 47.
and Islamic issues and cooperating with all countries and peoples based on the principles and charters approved by the Arab, Islamic and international institutions.\textsuperscript{143}

\textbf{Figure 3.1: The Federal Authorities in the UAE}

The Federal Supreme Council elects from among its members a President and a Vice-President for the State for a period of five years,\textsuperscript{144} with no limit on the number of terms the President and Vice President can hold the same position.\textsuperscript{145} If the office of the President or the Vice President falls vacant because of death or resignation, or because one ceases to be the Ruler in his Emirate for any reason, the Supreme Council is called into session within one month from that date to elect a successor to the vacant office.\textsuperscript{146} The President of the UAE manages the affairs of the Federation alongside with his duties as Ruler of an Emirate. The two roles are different; one is at the Federal level and the other at the Emirate level. This duality is similar for the Vice-President of the State,\textsuperscript{147} who cannot exercise power in the Federal State when the President is present, but acts on behalf

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Article 51 of the Constitution of the UAE.
\textsuperscript{145} Article 52 of the Constitution of the UAE.
\textsuperscript{146} Article 53 of the Constitution of the UAE.
of the President in his absence for any reason.\textsuperscript{148} While the President of the Federal State enjoys executive powers in addition to other limited legislative powers, the Constitution obliges the President to exercise the powers in coordination with the Supreme Council of the Union because of the possible impact on national security of the Federal State such as the declaration of a defensive war.\textsuperscript{149}

The role of the Federal Council of Ministers in the UAE is to act as an executive body, empowered to follow up the implementation of the general policy of the UAE, which is drawn by the Federal Supreme Council. The aim is to achieve the goals for which the Union was established. Therefore, it is exercising its powers under the oversight of the Federal Supreme Council and the President of the UAE.\textsuperscript{150}

The Federal National Council role in the Federal State is authorized to discuss and express an opinion on the draft federal laws referred to it by the Federal Council of Ministers. The opinion can include approval, amendment or rejection. The draft laws, which include the draft General Budget of Federal State, in addition to the Final Account of Federal State, are then submitted to the President of the UAE who forwards them to the Federal Supreme Council for approval.\textsuperscript{151} The Federal National Council is also empowered to discuss constitutional amendments received from the Federal Supreme Council, which should achieve the majority of at least two-thirds of the votes of the members present for approval. In addition, the Federal National Council formulates an opinion on international treaties, conventions and agreements concluded by the State with other States and international organizations.\textsuperscript{152} Moreover, the Federal National Council oversees the actions and activities carried out by the Federal government, such as directing the questions to the ministers of the Federal government about internal matters within their jurisdictions. In addition, it considers complaints submitted to it against Federal government agencies, and make

\textsuperscript{149} See Articles 1, 47, 115, 118, 123, 140, and 146 of the Constitution of the UAE.
\textsuperscript{150} See Article 60 of the Constitution of the UAE.
\textsuperscript{151} See Article 89 and Article 90 of the Constitution of the UAE.
\textsuperscript{152} Article 91 of the Constitution of the UAE.
recommendations to the Federal Council of Ministers on issues concerning the UAE public political, economic or social activity.\textsuperscript{153}

The UAE constitution makes the Federal Supreme Court the highest authority in the judicial system within the federal state. The Federal Supreme Court is independent from the federal and Emirati governments. The judicial system has a bilateral framework that includes the local judiciary and the federal judiciary. While the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah retain their judicial bodies, the judicial authorities in the Emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain and Fujairah have merged with the federal judiciary while federal first instance courts and federal appellate courts have been established in each emirate affiliated to authority of Federal Supreme Court. The independence of the Federal Supreme Court enables it to provide a balance between the federal government and local authorities in order to ensure the achievement of the objectives for which the federal state was established. In this context, the UAE Constitution grants the Federal Supreme Court the authority and power to adjudicate in the following matters:\textsuperscript{154}

1. Decide on different disputes among the member Emirates of the UAE, or between any one or more Emirates and the federal government in the case that the dispute is remitted to the Court upon the request of any of the concerned parties.

2. Consider the constitutionality of a federal law if it is challenged by one or more of the Emirates on the grounds that it is in conflict with the Constitution of the UAE. The Court also has the power to consider the constitutionality of legislation enacted by an Emirate if it is challenged by a federal authority on the grounds that it is in conflict with the Constitution of the UAE or the federal laws.

3. Consider the constitutionality of laws, legislation and regulations in general, if it is requested by any court in the country while hearing a relevant case.

4. Interpret the provisions of the Constitution, if it is requested by any federal authority or by the government of any Emirate.

5. Call into account the ministers and senior officials of the UAE appointed by decree for their actions while performing their official duties upon the request of the Supreme Council.


\textsuperscript{154} Article 99 of the Constitution of the UAE.
6. Decide on the crimes, which directly affect the interests of the UAE, such as the crimes relating to the UAE’s internal or external security, forgery of the official records or seals.

7. Hear the cases of conflict of jurisdiction between a federal court and a local court in an Emirate.

8. Hear the cases of conflict of jurisdiction between a court in an Emirate and a court in another Emirate.

9. Any other powers provided in the Constitution or which may be conferred upon the Federal Supreme Court by a federal law.

3.2.2 The Organization of the Federal and Local Institutions in the UAE

The UAE Constitution organizes the institutions between the federal government and local governments of the seven Emirates of the UAE (see Figure 3.2). The member Emirates have retained their tribal system exercised on their territories, as they did not lose their identities upon their accession to the Union. However, they have become internal constitutional units, which exercise a semblance of independence and self-governance on their territories. In this context, Article 5 of the Constitution stipulates that:

A member Emirate shall exercise sovereignty over its own territories and territorial waters in all matters which are not within the jurisdiction of the UAE federation under the Constitution. So, the semblance of the independence and autonomy principle for the member Emirates of the Federal State is expressed in retaining their own flags for use within their territories.

In addition, Article 3 states that “the natural resources in each emirate are publicly owned by the emirate.” Thus, each Emirate possesses its own legislative, executive and judicial authorities. The Federal Constitution gives each emirate the powers that do not fall under the authority of the Federal government as set out in Articles 120 and 121.

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155 Ibid, p. 46.
156 The member Emirates, by joining the federal state, gave up their international characters and some of their executive, legislative and judicial powers and certain aspects of their sovereignty in return for the establishment of an independent and sovereign federal state with a new international character which is the UAE and in return for a better standard of living, greater stability and a heightened international status. See Karam, Ghazi (2010), op. cit., p. 311.
157 Article 5 of the Constitution of the UAE.
158 Article 3 of the Constitution of the UAE.
159 Article 120 stipulates that the UAE has exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction in the following matters: (1) Foreign affairs. (2) Defense and the federal armed forces. (3) Protection of the UAE’s security against internal or external threats. (4) The matters pertaining to security, order, and government in the permanent capital city of the UAE. (5) The matters relating to federal officers and the federal judiciary. (6) The federal finance, taxes, duties and dues. (7) The federal public loans. (8) Post, telegram, telephone, and wireless services. (9) Paving, maintaining, and improving such roads as the Supreme Council may deem main roads, and regulating the traffic movement on those roads. (10) Air control
Figure 3.2: The Central Federal Government and Local Governments in the UAE

The distribution of powers between the federal and local institutions for managing the internal affairs plays a basic role in supporting the idea of the UAE, which is, as already highlighted, based on the tribal system. This tribal system has guaranteed the security and stability of the member Emirates’ citizens since ancient times. Although all UAE citizens hold one nationality, the subordination of their nationality and issuance of their passports lies under the authority of the member Emirates to which they belong. The local government assume responsibility in terms of providing public services and developing the infrastructure of the areas that lies under its authority, with the assistance of the federal government. For example, local governments provide lands free of charge to their citizens in order to build houses. However, citizens, in conjunction with their local governments, can seek assistance from Sheikh Zayed Housing Program, a federal government institution, to assist them in building those houses, whether by giving them interest-


According to Article 121, it has been stipulated that the federal authorities have the exclusive authority towards:

- Labor relations and social security;
- Ownership of real properties and expropriation for the public interest;
- Extradition of criminals;
- Banks;
- All types of insurance;
- Protection of agricultural and animal wealth;
- Major legislation relating to the penal, civil, and commercial codes; company law, civil and criminal procedure codes;
- Protection of intellectual, technical and industrial property rights; copyright; and printing and publishing rights;
- Importation of arms and ammunitions except for use by the security forces of any Emirate;
- Other aviation matters that do not lie within the federal executive jurisdiction;
- Delimitation of the territorial waters and regulation of navigation in the high seas; and
- Regulation of the free financial zones, the manner in which they are established, and how far they are excluded from scope of application of the federal legislative provisions.
free loans or build such houses free of charge. This is done to raise the standard of living and social level of the citizens in all Emirates.

However, foreign affairs are monopolized by the federal government in order to ensure the protection of the national interests of the State, which may conflict with the interests of a member Emirate, and may affect the survival of the State in the future.

3.2.3 State Protection Institutions in the UAE

The security system of UAE has experienced many changes since the announcement of the independence of the State. The Ministry of the Interior has been responsible for all aspects of internal security operations in the State; however, in recent years federal agencies have been established to work with the Ministry of the Interior in strengthening internal security in the federal state. Consequently, the Ministry of the Interior and security agencies that help and support the internal security of the UA are discussed in this section.

3.2.3.1 The armed forces and its role in maintaining security in the UAE

Ahead of the UAE’s independence, the Trucial States had six military units. “the Trucial Oman Scouts, the Defense Army of Abu Dhabi, the Defense Army of Dubai, the National Guard of Sharjah, and the Motorized Force of Ras Al Khaimah” along with the National Guard of Umm Al Quwain. The Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS) were formed by the UK in 1951, to act as police and peacekeeping forces across the Trucial States. British officers and Jordanian warrant officers trained and led the forces. They gained the confidence of the population over two decades, as they played an impartial role in protecting the coast’s public order. During the talks over the federal union, the emirates’ rulers agreed unanimously to make the TOS the core of the Union Defence Forces for defending the country after the British troops’ withdrawal. However, the forces of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah were not integrated into the federal agencies that help and support the internal security of the UA are discussed in this section.

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country's armed forces. The four emirates announced that they would keep their forces independent from the Union Defence Forces; Article 142 of the provisional constitution stipulated that member emirates had the right to build local armed forces that could be integrated into the Union Defence Forces when necessary to repel foreign aggression.165

The integration of military forces in the UAE passed through a number of stages. The first stage started when the British government handed over the TOS to the UAE on 21 December 1971 after the declaration of independence.166 The Scouts formed the nucleus of the federal state security forces. They were renamed the Union Defence Force, which was officially established on 27 December 1971, following the decision of the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the UAE President. Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the UAE Minister of Defence, was charged with leading and supervising the force.167 In 1975, members of the Federal Supreme Council invited an Arab Committee comprised of Arab military leaders from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait to provide advice about the best method for the integration of the Armed Forces in a formula acceptable to the rulers and that would conform to the Constitution.168 The Committee opted to unite the forces of the individual Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Umm Al Quwain, and Ras Al Khaimah) under one central command. The Committee also proposed making three separate commands in military zones for the forces of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Ras Al Khaimah, and merging the forces of Sharjah and Umm Al Quwain under one command. On 6 May 1976, a meeting of the Defence Supreme Council was held, led by the UAE President,169 in which they discussed the decision to integrate the Armed Forces under one central command, i.e. the General Headquarter of the UAE Armed Forces. Subsequently a meeting of the Federal Supreme Council was held on 6 November 1976 to discuss the integration decision. The Council agreed to issue a

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168 Bin Hewedin, Mohammed. (2010), op. cit., p. 72.
169 The Defence Supreme Council is led by the President of the Federation and its members include the Federation Vice-President, the Federation Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Interior, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This council was established according to Article 141 of the UAE Constitution and its role is to issue recommendations in all that is related to the defence affairs, the security and safety of the federation and the preparation, organization and development of the Armed Forces, specifying their residences and camps. The Council may invite whosoever to its sessions, such as military consultants and experts and others who may have an opinion in such matters, and the law shall organize all that is related to such Council.
constitutional amendment, abolishing the provisions of Article 142 of the temporary constitution, in order that the state could be granted the sole right to establish ground, marine, and air forces.\textsuperscript{170} Moreover, it was agreed to form commands of military zones led in each case by the son of the ruler of the Emirate in which the force was located. Hence, the Command of Western Region Military Zone was formed in Abu Dhabi led by Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Command of the Central Military Zone was led by Sheikh Ahmed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, and the Command of the Northern Military Zone was led by Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr Al Qasimi.\textsuperscript{171} The forces of Sharjah and Umm Al Quwain were merged in Yarmouk Bridge led by the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{172} The merger of the forces was purely formal. In 1978, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the UAE President, issued a resolution to reorganize the Armed Forces through the full integration of the air and marine forces, and abolition of the military zone commands, turning them into brigades and organized military groups directly linked to the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{173} Abu Dhabi turned the Command of the Western Military Zone to a brigade formation directly affiliated to the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{174} Sharjah, which had earlier been committed to the full integration of the Sharjah National Guard in the units of the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces following the integration resolution in 1976,\textsuperscript{175} formed other forces in 1984 under the name of the Sharjah Amiri Guard.\textsuperscript{176} In 1990, Sharjah merged that force into the units of the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{177} Moreover, the Command of the Northern Military Zone of Ras Al Khaimah was turned into a brigade formation under the name, Second Badr Brigade.\textsuperscript{178} The brigade remained under the command of Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr al-Qasimi until he retired in the mid-1990s, upon which the brigade was fully integrated in the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces. Dubai maintained its forces under the name of Command of the Central Military Zone, until the force was fully integrated in the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces in 1997.\textsuperscript{179} 2006 marked the last stage


\textsuperscript{171} Bin Hewedin, Mohammed. (2010), op. cit., ibid.


\textsuperscript{174} Ibid, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid, p.19.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid, p. 21.

in the integration of the UAE Armed Forces, when Umm Al Quwain issued a resolution to merge its forces, known as the Umm Al Quwain National Guard, into the General Headquarter of the UAE Armed Forces.\footnote{Al Ali, Abdulla A. Al Shibah, Abdulla M. Al Zaabi, Shiekha I. and William-Wright, John. (2007), op, cit., p. 23.}

Furthermore, the UAE government has focused on modernizing its Armed Forces, and enhancing its defence capabilities according to the latest developments in the weapons industry, for the sake of maintaining security and stability. In 2001, the UAE Armed Forces were assigned a mission to contribute alongside the Ministry of Interior to the internal security of the State based on a decree of Federal Law No. 1 of 2001. This Law stated that the mission of guarding the sea and marine borders is assigned to the Armed Forces, and consequently the personnel of the Coast Guards currently with the Ministry of Interior along with all facilities were to be moved to the Coast Guards of the Armed Forces. It also stated that all powers assigned to the Ministry of Interior for guarding the coasts and borders were cancelled. The decree assigned the Armed Forces to carry out all the necessary missions for the sake of securing the land and marine borders, as well as to implement all laws and exercise the powers stipulated in all the applicable laws and regulations. The Armed Forces were given the right to shoot trespassers crossing the land and marine borders, according to the regulations issued by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The decree stated that the land border guards were responsible for the security of all passages and paths, fighting smuggling and infiltration, providing help in search and rescue operations, and securing all monuments, archaeological sites and all objects relating to the heritage and the water resources in the areas of marine borders. The decree also stated that the missions of the Coast Guards was to guard the marine borders with the neighbouring countries, promptly report any suspect activity, and to prevent the violation of state laws and the customs and security systems or those relating to immigration, health, or preserving environment and natural wealth. They were also tasked to carry out search and rescue missions and offer help in emergencies, perform surveillance of navigation in cooperation with the Ministry of Transportation and the port authorities, report any navigational threats, and protect the oil facilities and cables as well as the marine pipes. They were further assigned to protect marine means of transportation, navigational and other facilities. Moreover, the UAE government tasked the Armed Forces to provide medical services for citizens in the furthest
order points, whether such spots lie in the desert or in the distant valleys and islands; such treatment and medical services are provided free of charge.\(^{181}\)

Furthermore, the State President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and after obtaining the approval of the members of the Supreme Council of the Union, ordered that the UAE government task the armed forces with participation in international peacekeeping forces under the banner of the United Nations in several operations. The UAE government has also dispatched forces on a number of external missions to participate with the international community in preserving the security and stability of many of the tense spots in the world.

The first participation of the UAE Armed Forces outside its territory was in Lebanon in 1976, where a UAE Armed Forces battalion has participated within the Arab Deterrent Force. This force was formed by Arab countries, based on a decision by the League of Arab States, in order to contribute to the maintenance of internal security of Lebanon at the beginning of the outbreak of the civil war.\(^{182}\) The mission of the UAE Armed Forces in Lebanon continued until 1979.\(^{183}\) In addition, squads of the UAE Armed Forces took part in the international alliance and with the GCC Forces in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm for the liberation of Kuwait in 1990-1991.\(^{184}\) Moreover, a battalion of the UAE Armed Forces also took part in the operation of stabilizing Somalia with the UN forces in 1993 in Operation Hope Restoration; the mission of the UAE Armed Forces continued until 1994.\(^{185}\) In 1999, the UAE Armed Forces participated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the White Hands Operation for the rescue of Kosovo refugees who fled to Kukes in Albania,\(^{186}\) because of the ethnic cleansing perpetrated against them by the Serbian forces. The UAE Armed Forces established a camp for 10,000 refugees from Kosovo,\(^{187}\) with the participation of national and charity organizations in UAE, they provided the necessities for refugees.\(^{188}\)

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\(^{183}\) Ibid, p. 355.


\(^{185}\) Ibid, p. 61-63.

\(^{186}\) Ibid, p. 65.

\(^{187}\) Ibid, p. 67.

Sheikh Zayed Airport, in the region to facilitate the delivery of rescue materials for refugees.\textsuperscript{189} Furthermore, the UAE Armed Forces took part, with Kosovo Forces (KFOR) led by the NATO, in the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo from 1999-2001.\textsuperscript{190}

In 2001, a UAE Armed Forces mission participated in clearing mines in the south of Lebanon, within the framework of a special agreement signed between the UAE government and the Lebanese government. Under “Operation Emirates Solidarity”, the UAE pledged to help clear mines from the southern areas of Lebanon from which the Israeli forces withdrew in 2000, at a cost of USD50m. The project continued until it ended successfully in 2009.\textsuperscript{191} In addition, in 2003, a mechanised unit of the UAE Armed Forces was established in Kuwait among the GCC Peninsula Shield Forces. Kuwait had sought the help of the GCC Peninsula Shield Forces to abort any potential attacks from Iraq, and the participation of the UAE Armed Forces continued from 9 February 2003 until 15 May 2003.\textsuperscript{192} After the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the UAE Armed Forces offered humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people. Sheikh Zayed hospital was opened in Baghdad,\textsuperscript{193} which is one of the most modern and biggest hospitals to be opened in Iraq since the ousting of Hussein. The hospital is one of the best diagnosis centres in Iraq, in which Iraqi patients are treated and are provided with medication for free. It is run and managed by the UAE Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{194} Moreover, the UAE Armed Forces with the help of the UAE Red Crescent Authority have taken part in refurbishing and maintaining orphanages in Iraq.\textsuperscript{195}

The UAE Armed Forces also provided humanitarian aid for the Afghan people after the Taliban were toppled in 2004. They are based in the tense south part of Afghanistan, where they have been welcomed by the residents.\textsuperscript{196} The UAE Armed Forces have sought the help of national and charity

\textsuperscript{194} Al-Dhaferi, Nasser. (2011), op. cit., p. 203.
organizations in UAE to implement a number of development projects. The Forces have also supervised the construction of a number of mosques, schools and vocational institutes, and universities in a number of areas in Afghanistan. In cooperation with relevant authorities in the UAE and Afghanistan, the Forces have implemented a number of health projects, such as the Sheikh Zayed hospital and a number of clinics in the different states, providing them with the necessary medical equipment, medications, labs, and scan labs. With the help of the UAE Red Crescent Authority, the UAE Armed Forces has provided various forms of aid in different Afghan states, such as the construction of Sheikh Zayed City in Kabul in Afghanistan, as a residential city for orphans and those afflicted by the war in Afghanistan.

In March 2011, a UAE force joined the GCC Peninsula Shield Forces based in Bahrain, in response to an official request by the Kingdom of Bahrain. The demands were raised by groups, which were loyal to the ‘Welayat al Faqih, which is the guardianship of the Jurist system established in Iran. Therefore, the roots of the demands are of a religious nature with a political front to legitimize the demands. The protests created dangerous chaos in some areas in Bahrain. For example, a group of demonstrators closed main roads and streets in the heart of the capital, Manama, with the aim of holding a coercive general strike, isolating it from the remaining governorates in the Kingdom. When the unarmed Bahraini police forces attempted to negotiate with some of the demonstrators to open one of the roads, the demonstrators attacked them, and a number were injured. Furthermore, a demonstrator crashed into a police officer in his car. Therefore, Bahrain summoned the GCC Peninsula Shield Forces to protect the public organizations, public sites, and strategic facilities in the Kingdom, in order that the Bahraini security systems could organize the

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internal security. The Bahraini security then dispersed the demonstrations, and arrested the outlaws. After restoring security in the country, the Bahraini authorities held national reconciliation talks with more than 300 Bahraini personalities representing the different political and social societies, as well as women, young people, public figures, and members of both the People's Assembly the Shura Council and the Unions’ representatives. The aim of the dialogue was to reach common principles to re-launch the path of political reforms in Bahrain.  

In addition, in March 2011, the UAE Air Force joined NATO Air Forces in military operations in Libya, aiming to implement the UN Resolution No. 1973, which declared Libya a no-fly zone. The Resolution was aimed at protecting civilians against the attacks by the regime of Colonel Muammar Al Gaddafi, which committed crimes against humanity using military planes and jets against the Libyan people, who initially peacefully revolted against the regime on 17 February 2011.

The UAE Air Force has also participated, in September 2014, in the international coalition led by the USA to launch air strikes against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The group had gained control of large parts of Iraq and Syria.

Lately, the UAE Armed Forces have been participating with the international coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia to return legitimacy to Yemen. Since March 2015, the Yemeni regime has faced armed rebellion consisting of military forces belonging to the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, fighting alongside a militia belonging to the Houthi group. The Houthis are

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208 Al-Houthi movement is an intellectual ideological armed movement founded by Hussein Badereddin al-Houthi in the 1990s in the north of Yemen. This movement's ideas are based on the teachings of the Zaidi doctrine, which is one of the schools of Muslim Shiite sect (Zaydi Shi'a Islam). The followers of this movement aim to return the Imamate regime in North Yemen, which ended with the fall of Mutawakkilite Kingdom in the 1960s following a military coup. The Imamate regime was an absolute monarchy, in which the imam governs his people in accordance with the Divine Right of Kings’ hypothesis. This limited the legitimacy of the rule of Yemen to descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, and embrace the Zaidi sect. Thus, the Houthis aspire to restore the idea of the Imamate
financed by the Iranian regime in order to destabilize the security and stability of the Arabian Peninsula region. Rebel troops have seized control of large parts of northern Yemen and the government institutions in the capital, Sanaa. The legitimate president of the Republic of Yemen, Hadi Abed Rabbo Mansour, has called for help, through an official letter, from his neighbours in the GCC. He has requested their assistance by all possible means, to protect Yemen and its people from the continued aggression of rebel military forces and deter the attacks. His call is based on the Principle of Self-Defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Arab League Charter and the Joint Arab Defence Treaty. Furthermore, he argues that the constant status of instability in Yemen creates a vacuum for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to fill, further destabilising Yemen and the GCC countries. Accordingly, military operations were launched in Yemen by international coalition forces in an attempt to restore security and political stability. The coalition has managed to regain control of areas, which had been under the control of rebel military forces, in addition to regions in the south previously controlled by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In addition, while the military operation is running political negotiations between the conflicting parties are on-going.

### 3.2.3.2 Ministry of Interior of the UAE

The Ministry of Interior was established according to Article 58 of the UAE Constitution and Article 3 of the Federal Law No. 1 of 1972. It was given responsibility for all issues relating to nationality, passports, immigration and residence, state security against all internal threats, organizing and supervising the federal security forces, and coordinating and enhancing cooperation between the police forces in all the emirates members of the federation. The Ministry of Interior was further assigned the supervision of the spending of the financial allocations of the Federation Budget on internal security according to the needs of each Emirate. It was tasked that in coordination with the concerned authorities, it should supervise security affairs, order, and local

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State in the territory of Yemen in the hope to gain power; as they claim to be descendants of Muhammad, peace be upon him, and that they have a divine right to take over power in Yemen in order to restore the theocratic rule of the state. See Orkaby, Asher. (10 November 2014). “The 1968 Siege of Sana: A Houthi Historical Parallel”. The Washington Institute. Available at: <URL: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-1968-siege-of-sana-a-houthi-historical-parallel> Access Date: 14 November 2015.

209 Article 58 of the UAE Constitution states that:

The Law will specify the ministers’ competences and each minister’s powers. The first federal ministers council shall contain the following ministries: (1) Foreign Affairs (2) Interior (3) Defence (4) Finance, Economy and Industry (5) Justice (6) Education (7) Public Health (8) Public Works and Agriculture (9) Communications, Post, Telegraph and Telephones (10) Labour and Social Affairs (11) Information and (12) Planning.
management in the permanent federal capital, traffic in the permanent federal capital and the main federal roads which the Federal Supreme Council declared shall be main roads, as well as the other tasks assigned to the Ministry according to any other laws.\textsuperscript{210}

The Ministry of Interior has both central and de-centralized authority. All police powers are under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. Therefore, the Ministry representatives in the UAE (police commanders, Directors of the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs, Directors of the General Civil Defence Administrations) have no authority to tackle issues relating to the national security without referring first to the Ministry. The federal government may narrow or widen the scope of the issues, which are mostly of an executive or organizational nature, that these representatives can independently handle. This is undertaken according to the Ministry's public policy.\textsuperscript{211}

Overall, the objective of the general police command at the level of the state (Abu Dhabi General Police Command, Dubai General Police Command, Sharjah General Police Command and Fujairah General Police Command) is to keep peace and security in their individual Emirates. The Ministry of Interior seeks to provide the necessary resources in order to achieve this target in the best way. Police colleges in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah have been established for graduating national cadres to work in the different security sectors in the state. The Ministry provides its staff with frequent security courses to enhance their performance and equip them with the necessary knowledge and experience for their work. The Ministry of Interior also sends staff to other states to undertake special security studies, to learn other languages, and to learn more about the cultures of such countries. The overall aim of this policy is to ensure a security strategy that protects the UAE’s national identity from being obliterated as a result of the demographic weakness created by the large migrant population.\textsuperscript{212} Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior has a communications network linking it to all operation rooms of the police general commands. In addition, the banks, private companies and public organizations are linked by a warning system to the police general

commands in order to respond to any emergences as rapidly as possible. The police command centres, stations, patrols, and ambulances are linked through the developed communications network, which enables them to send patrols and ambulances to the site of an incident as soon as possible. The Ministry of Interior has also provided the most developed and fastest means of transportation to the general police commands in Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah and Fujairah. This includes helicopters, which are mostly used in search operations for those missing on land or at sea, and in the surveillance of traffic, in rescue operations and in the transportation of the injured. Finally, the Ministry of Interior and some of the general police commands in the state provide online services in order to guarantee a speedy provision of services for nationals and residents in the state. For example, the website of Dubai Police Command enables community members to communicate with Dubai Police Commander, his Deputy, Directors of the general departments and police stations in Dubai. Among other services, the website also provides legal consultations, as a free service to all nationals and residents, which contributes to raising the level of legal awareness.213

Meanwhile, the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs, which supports the Ministry of Interior, supervises the implementation of the nationalization law, processes passports of nationals, and ensures the implementation of the laws governing the visa and residency of foreigners in the state. The Central Command in Abu Dhabi is in charge of issuing a UAE family registration record and passports for nationals, as well as visas and residency for foreigners in the state. It further supervises the entry and exit of individuals from airports, as well as the land and sea border points. A number of regional departments in each Emirate support the Central Command in Abu Dhabi in order to provide services to nationals and foreigners. Moreover, the General Directorates of Residency and Foreigners Affairs across the state enter information relating to nationals and residents in a unified database system attached to the Ministry of Interior. Similarly, data of those travelling to and from the state is entered into the system at all airports, ports and border points.

In addition, the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs uses an eye print system for foreigners. The eye print system is one of the most accurate systems for identifying people; it

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is “based upon mathematical analysis of the random patterns visible in the iris of a person’s eye”.214 The iris print system takes a picture of the iris, which is stored, and then coded symbols are made, which saved alongside the data of the person in one unified central database.215 The iris print is taken of all foreigners who have an entry visa to the state the first time they arrive in all airports, ports, or border points. Then, the print is compared to those saved in the database, and if the system identifies the print among those saved in relation to those previously deported or have transgressed any laws, the necessary legal measures are taken. In this case, the person would be regarded as attempting to illegally enter the state with fake official documents. Through the iris print system, between 12 October 2002 and 31 March 2011, 295,088 people who have been deported or legally sentenced were caught while attempting to re-enter the country.216 Thus, this system has proved to be highly efficient, because the violators could have posed a threat to the safety and security of the state. By 2011, the total number of iris prints entered into the database of the UAE Ministry of Interior has reached 2,132,568 persons, which means that the UAE has the biggest approved database of iris prints in the world.217

The Civil Defence Administration of the Ministry of Interior is one of the basic pillars for maintaining security and stability in UAE. The Civil Defence Administration provides protection for all citizens and residents in the state, as well as for public and private property. It also secures the safety of the transportation and guarantees the progress of work in the public sector. The Administration aims to protect the sources of national wealth in war, peace, emergencies, and catastrophes.218 Civil Defence Units in the UAE in 1976 were integrated in one system that supports the Ministry of Interior, following a resolution issued by the Federal Supreme Council. Previously, the Fire Brigades were affiliated to the respective municipalities of the Emirates, and had limited capabilities. The Civil Defence System has witnessed tangible development following its integration under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, which has expanded the construction of Civil Defence Administration centres to cover all parts of the state. The Abu Dhabi Civil

217 Ibid.
Defence Central Command has established regional departments in each Emirate. Furthermore, the Civil Defence Central Command provides the latest equipment to its centres. It also trains its job cadre by providing basic and specialized courses in the fields of firefighting, rescue, aid, and evacuation. The Civil Defence Administration also holds simulated experiments with the authorities directly involved with civil defence, such as airports, oil refineries, ports, government organizations, and private companies, to train their workforce to face all eventualities. Moreover, it carries out the mission of enforcing compliance with regulations in terms of fire prevention in buildings, factories, warehouses, companies working with hazardous materials, and buildings for the distribution, storage, and trade of gas cylinder. This role is based on Cabinet Decree No. 154 of 1991, which issues such regulations according to international standards. The Civil Defence Administration has been assigned the mission of ensuring such conditions are implemented in order to protect life and property, and limit the losses resulting from fire accidents. Such regulations have led to a decrease in the number of fires.

3.2.3.3 The Federal Demographic Structure Council

In 2010, the Federal Demographic Structure Council was established by the resolution of Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, UAE Vice President, Prime Minister and Ruler of Dubai. The Federal Demographic Structure Council, which reports directly to the Cabinet, is a legal entity that is financially and administratively independent. The Council is led by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior, with five members, the Minister of Labour as Deputy Director, the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Social Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the General Secretary of the Council who is appointed by resolution of the Director.\footnote{WAM. (20 April 2010). “Mohammed issues resolution on FDSC functions”.\textit{Khaleej Times Newspaper}. Available at: \url{http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=/data/theuae/2010/april/theuae_April506.xml&section=theuae} Access Date: 30 August 2011.}

The Federal Demographic Structure Council is tasked with the mission of studying and evaluating the status of the demographic structure in the state. It proposes demographic strategies, policies, and systems aimed at enhancing the role of citizens, maintaining the national identity, and achieving the desired demographic balance. Moreover, the objectives of the Council include following up the implementation of the rules, laws, and regulations relating to the demographic
structure on the part of local and federal authorities. Such laws and regulations include nationalizing the important productive sectors, taking the necessary corrective measures within the framework of ensuring jobs for Emiratis, proposing the necessary legislation to handle any deficit in the demographic structure in cooperation with the concerned authorities, and laying down the required programmes relating to the demographic structure.\textsuperscript{220}

### 3.2.3.4 The State Security Department of the UAE

The State Security Department was established according to Federal Law No. 6 of 1976, according to which the intelligence departments in all Emirates were merged into the State Security System. The Department reports directly to the President of the State. Moreover, this Department was given responsibility under Law No. 4 of 1974, which were previously assigned to the State Security Force that was supervised by the Ministry of Interior.\textsuperscript{221}

### 3.2.3.5 The Higher National Security Council

The Higher National Security Council was established according to Federal Law No. 17 of 2006. The Council is chaired by the UAE President, while the UAE Vice-President is the Vice-Chairman of the Council. Other members include the Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, the Defence Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Interior Minister, the Minister for Presidential Affairs, the Chief of National Security, the Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces and the National Security Advisor. In addition, the Higher National Security Council has a General Secretary and a General Assembly who are appointed by the Chairman.\textsuperscript{222}

The objective of the Higher National Security Council is to pursue the successful achievement of the UAE’s national security in all areas, including the economy, as well as the nation's social, cultural and environmental security.\textsuperscript{223} The Higher National Security Council discusses the federation security policies, directs the various state security organs towards improving their strategies in the interest of national security, ensures coordination among them, and boosts their

\textsuperscript{220} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{221} Bin Hewedin, Mohammed. (2010), op. cit., pp. 126-127.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
capabilities to face and handle efficiently any crisis or disaster. It is also tasked to supervise the preparation and approval of the National Council Strategic Plan to ensure that all threats that could jeopardize the national security are efficiently handled. Other tasks include stating an opinion on the drafts of agreements and pacts relating to national security before they are issued, declaring Martial Law.\textsuperscript{224} The National Emergency and Crisis Management Authority, the National Electronic Security Authority and the National Search and Rescue Centre has been established under the supervision of the Higher National Security Council (see Figure 3.3).

![The Higher National Security Council](image)

**Figure 3.3: The Structure of the Higher National Security Council**

The National Emergency and Crisis Management Authority is tasked by the Chairman of the Higher National Security Council to be the major national standard-setting body responsible for regulating and coordinating efforts relating to emergency and crisis management across the UAE, as well as the development of a national plan for responding to emergencies. The Authority aims to boost the UAE’s capabilities in facing cases of emergency and crisis. Therefore, its work focuses mainly on the development, consolidation and maintenance of laws, policies and procedures related to emergency and crisis management at the federal, local, and private level. The aim is to maintain the safety of nationals and residents, as well as public and private property in the state.\textsuperscript{225}

The General Authority of Ports, Border and Free Zones Security was established by the chairman of the Supreme Council for National Security in order to propose draft federal laws related to the security of ports, borders and free zones in the State. It is also charged with developing a national strategy for the security of ports, borders and free zones, in coordination with the concerned

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid.

authorities in the federal and local institutions. The Authority is also tasked with following up the implementation of security standards, procedures and requirements, which are designed to control the entry and exit of people and goods through the UAE’s ports and free zones. Furthermore, the Authority follows up the implementation of international commitments and requirements in relation to border, ports and free zones security across the State. In addition, the Authority has been commissioned to forward recommendations relating to the issuing of licenses for the establishment of ports and free zones, as well as the renewal and cancellation of licenses. These tasks are set within the goal of the Authority, which is to promote the State security capabilities in ports, borders and free zones in order to ensure and achieve effective response to threats affecting its national security.

The National Electronic Security Authority is affiliated to the Supreme Council for National Security in order to organize the protection of the communications network and information systems in the State. In addition, the Authority is tasked to develop, modify and use the necessary means in the area of cyber security. Furthermore, it works to raise the efficiency of methods that are used to preserve and exchange information among all federal and local institutions within the State, either through information systems or any other electronic means. The Federal Decree grants the Authority the competencies and powers, which include proposing legislation on electronic security, and setting the standards that ensure the provision of electronic security within the State, as well as supervising its implementation. Other competencies and powers include: the preparation of a national plan to face any risks, threats or attacks on cyber security, in coordination with the concerned authorities; and, ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the systems protecting the communication networks and information systems across government institutions and the private sector in the State. The main goal of the National Electronic Security Authority is to create a safe and secure national digital environment.226

Finally, the National Search and Rescue Centre, which is affiliated to the Supreme Council for National Security, assumes tasks relating to the provision of land, sea and air search and rescue services throughout the State, in coordination with the relevant local authorities. The Centre also performs the tasks of preparing the general framework of the National Plan for Search and Rescue at the national level. It also proposes legislation and regulations relating to search and rescue to

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226 The UAE Official Gazette “Federal Decree Law No. 3 of 2012”. Issue 540.
the Supreme Council for National Security. In the case of approval by the Council, the Centre takes the necessary measures to implement them at the level of the Ministry of Interior’s search and rescue teams, which operate in each Emirate. The Centre’s objective is to achieve the goal of ensuring the safety of the UAE citizens and residents living on its territory.

3.2.3.6 Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation

The UAE established Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation in 2006, following a study evaluating energy in the UAE. In 2008, the UAE government stated that “the UAE’s annual peak demand for electricity would be likely to rise by 9 percent per year, from around 13,000 megawatts (MW) in 2007 to over 40,000 MW by 2020”. In this context, the UAE decision-makers focused on a number of areas in order to preserve the future energy security in the State. The first area is the ability to produce electrical energy on time. The second area of focus is to build autonomy from a reliance on other countries in terms of electricity production. The third area is to develop a long-term infrastructure for future generation, in order to meet their needs. The fourth focus is ensuring energy is economically feasible and uses reliable and secure resources for its generation. Finally, the report highlights the need to diversify energy sources.

As a result of the report, the government adopted a decision to diversify its energy sources from non-renewable energy sources such as oil, natural gas and coal, through the development of sustainable and varied energy sources. The government is balancing the increasing need for electricity production with its responsibility to find eco-friendly technologies and low carbon emissions. The UAE is one of the signatories to The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol, which aims to stabilize greenhouse gases emissions at a level

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227 Fahad Al Qahtani, the Director of External Affairs and Communications at the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), *Emirates Nuclear Energy Forum 2013*, 20 March 2013, Dubai, UAE.
that prevents damage to the climate.\footnote{See “The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol”. Available at: <URL: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf> Access Date: 4 March 2013.} In this context, Masdar City in Abu Dhabi, which is one of the world’s most sustainable cities, hosts the headquarters of International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). This is an intergovernmental organization that aims to promote the adoption of renewable energy worldwide. Furthermore, the UAE has built solar power plants for renewable energy rather than wind or water based plants, because of the nature of the climate and geography of the UAE. These plants include Shams 1 in Abu Dhabi, which is the largest concentrated solar power plant in the Middle East and Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Solar Park in Dubai. In addition, the government is developing peaceful nuclear energy to produce electricity, as it is an eco-friendly technology because of its low-carbon emissions.\footnote{El-Katiri, Laura. (December 2012). “The GCC and the Nuclear Question”. \textit{Oxford Energy Comment}, pp. 2-3.} Thus, the UAE will reduce its dependence on non-renewable through its increasing reliance on nuclear power and renewable energy to produce electricity. This will help to maintain environment and energy sustainability, and the fight against global warming in addition to ensure energy security in the UAE.\footnote{The Staff. (15 October 2012). “‘Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation’ Major sponsor of Energy Forum”. \textit{Al Bayan Newspaper}. Available at: <URL: http://www.albayan.ae/across-the-uae/news-and-reports/2012-10-15-1.1747310> Access Date: 4 March 2013. (In Arabic).}

The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation was established by Article 4 of Federal Law No. 6 of 2009. The Authority is responsible for regulating and licensing all activities related to nuclear energy in the UAE, while ensuring public safety as a primary objective. While the Authority also determines and specifies all matters relating to the control and supervision of the nuclear sector in the State, particularly those related to safety, nuclear safety, nuclear security, radiation protection, safeguards and implementing any obligation under the relevant international treaties, conventions or agreements entered into by the State. The UAE signed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, and the IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Agreement in 2003, and the IAEA Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention. In addition, the UAE has bilateral cooperation agreements in the areas of the peaceful use of nuclear energy with the world's leading nuclear powers such as the US, the UK, France, Canada, Russia, Australia, Argentina, South Korea and Japan.

On 23 December 2009, the President of UAE established by decree the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, which is assigned to establish and manage four nuclear power plants in Abu Dhabi.
Each plant, which will have a capacity of 1,400 MW, is run in cooperation with the Korean Electric Power Corporation, which is the third-largest nuclear power company in the world. The first plant is expected to start operating in 2017 and the last plant to be completed by 2020. The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation will monitor and control the construction of the four nuclear reactors, and verify and ensure the implementation of activities conducted by the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, in accordance with the regulations of the Emirates Nuclear Energy and the terms of its license. The decision granting the license by the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation has been taken after examining all the security and safety factors, including the suitability of the reactor site, the design of the facility and the analysis of safety and management systems and upon ensuring the quality of construction and measures for radiation safety, physical protection, safeguards and assurances; in order to ensure the security and safety of nuclear energy in the UAE.

3.2.4Summary of the Institutional Base of the UAE

In summary, the UAE has successfully established its institutional base, which is the second pillar of Buzan’s idea of the state. The institutional structure has evolved since 1971, responding to continuous environmental, political, technological and growth instigated changes. The investment in the development of the institutions, despite the challenges, has been enormous unlike other Middle Eastern countries in which prioritizing internal infrastructural development, the legal framework, and economic growth have not been major goals. As the institutions form the organizational pillar of the idea of the state, the threats to their security is more real especially against the changing political environment across the region.

3.3 THE PHYSICAL BASE OF THE UAE

The physical base of the UAE is distinct from many of the surrounding countries in terms of its geographical location, the composition of its population, the economic structure, the level of digital development and the development of environment-related legislation. The physical base,

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according to Buzan, is the real expression of the state existence and is prone to direct attacks and threats to its national security.

### 3.3.1 The Geography of the UAE

The UAE is in the heart of the Arabian Gulf. It lies between the longitudes 51° and 56° 31’ east and latitudes 23° and 26° 50’ north. It is bordered to the east by the Gulf of Oman and the Sultanate of Oman, to the west by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to the north by the Arabian Gulf, and to the south by the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia.\(^{237}\) The Al Hajar al Gharbi mountain chain extends along the eastern borders in an arc stretching from the north-eastern border with the Sultanate of Oman in Musandam Peninsula to the south-eastern border in Al-Ain.\(^{238}\) In addition, plains cover the UAE to the Arabian Gulf in the north and Saudi Arabia in the west and south. The country has a total of 700 km coastline of which 100 km are on the Gulf of Oman and 600 km on the Arabian Gulf.\(^{239}\) The UAE has a total area of 83.600 sq. km,\(^{240}\) including about 200 natural islands.\(^{241}\)

### 3.3.2 Demographics of the UAE

The UAE is distinct from its neighbours in terms of the diversity of its demographic composition. The total population is 8,264,070, according to the latest census conducted by the UAE National Bureau of Statistics in 2010. The number of UAE citizens total 947,997, i.e. 11.5% of the population of the state; the remainder are migrant workers and their families (see Figure 3.4).

According to the latest census, the native population in Abu Dhabi is 404,546, while the population in Dubai is 168,029, in Sharjah 153,365, in Ras Al Khaimah 97.529, in Fujairah 64,860, in Ajman 42,186, and in Umm Al Quwain17,482 (see Table3.1). Detailing the population composition of the UAE is important for understanding the physical base of the UAE because UAE nationals compose only 11.5% of the total population. This poses a risk to the continuity of the established

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\(^{240}\) Ibid.

political system in the long run as the majority migrant population could eventually raise political
demands or work through pressure groups to influence the country’s policies.

![Population Composition of the UAE](image)

**Figure 3.4: Population Composition of the UAE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emirate</th>
<th>Total Number of Emirati Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>404,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>168,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharjah</td>
<td>153,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Al Khaimah</td>
<td>97,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujairah</td>
<td>64,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajman</td>
<td>42,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm Al Quwain</td>
<td>17,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number</strong></td>
<td><strong>947,997</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.1: Total Number of Emirati Population**

Table 3.2 shows the changes in the population by gender and national and non-national according
to the censuses of 1980, 1995 and 2010. The data highlights that the changing demographics
potentially forms a challenge to the stability of the State, because the majority of the population
are expatriate residents.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (no.)</td>
<td>150,502</td>
<td>297,060</td>
<td>479,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (%)</td>
<td>51.63</td>
<td>50.58</td>
<td>50.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (no.)</td>
<td>141,021</td>
<td>290,270</td>
<td>468,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (%)</td>
<td>48.37</td>
<td>49.42</td>
<td>49.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>291,523</td>
<td>587,330</td>
<td>947,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Nationals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (no.)</td>
<td>569,139</td>
<td>1,295,735</td>
<td>5,682,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (%)</td>
<td>75.73</td>
<td>71.05</td>
<td>77.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (no.)</td>
<td>182,416</td>
<td>527,976</td>
<td>1,633,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (%)</td>
<td>24.27</td>
<td>28.95</td>
<td>22.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>751,555</td>
<td>1,823,711</td>
<td>7,316,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Total</td>
<td>1,043,078</td>
<td>2,411,041</td>
<td>8,246,070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Population by Gender and National/Non-national, 1980, 1995 and 2010

This situation is reflected in the composition of the UAE demographics, where male foreigners comprise 69% of the UAE’s population. The variety of nationalities, predominance of males and the economic motivation for their presence in the country does not encourage social inclusion in most cases. The majority of the migrant workers are in low-skill jobs with temporary short-term work contracts, which further acts a barrier to social inclusion. Finally, the growth rate of non-nationals has been faster than that of Emiratis in the past three censuses, again threatening the stability of the demographic base of the country. The unique nature of the demographics in the UAE requires a broad range of national security policies in order to maintain the social coherence and stability.

### 3.3.3 The Economic Base of the UAE

Prior to its independence, the UAE was not ready on the economic level to become a state. At the economic level, the vast majority of the Trucial States population lived at subsistence level, which

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was little different from the conditions their ancestors lived previously. The economic base of the new state was fishing, growing date, fruits and vegetables, breeding cattle and camels, and hunting. Although the pearl trade was important, its importance fell in the 1930s, due to the international economic depression, and the introduction of the industrial pearl from Japan. The economic difficulties contributed to the educational weakness of the community. Thus, prior to independence, the UAE lacked the factors necessary for establishing an economically viable state; it had a poor infrastructure, under-developed human resources, and weak natural wealth.

Following the discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi in the 1950s, and the start of its export in 1962, the Abu Dhabi government initiated a program of infrastructure in the Emirate. Because of its small native population, thousands of foreign workers were imported in order to build the infrastructure and to start economic development in the Emirate. In contrast, the emirates in which oil was not discovered—Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, and Fujairah—were left behind the development procession. Therefore, Abu Dhabi promised during the negotiations for the creation of the federal state to bear the major burden of the federation's budget. In addition, it pledged to establish a substantial fund for the sake of promoting development in the other Emirates.

Oil is an important nature resource in the UAE. The huge revenues earned from its export from the 1970s fuelled the rapid development of the county’s institutional and physical base. The build-up of oil revenue, especially between 1974 and 1980 when there was an exponential rise in oil prices due to high global demand, contributed to growth in GDP. In contrast, economic growth slowed as a result of falling oil prices between 1982 and 1986 as global demand fell sharply, particularly from Western countries.

However, in the past three decades, the UAE economy has undergone profound changes from an economy that derived its wealth from oil to a more diverse and open economy. The economic transition process began with the fall of oil prices in the 1980s and the accompanying economic

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and financial negative repercussions. These necessitated a reconsideration of its production, investment and foreign trade structures in order to diversify the sources of national income.\textsuperscript{249} The planning has led to a growing role played by non-oil sectors in the UAE’s national economy (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Building and Construction</th>
<th>Wholesale and Retail Trade</th>
<th>Real Estate and Business Services</th>
<th>Transport and Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Percentage Real GDP Growth of Selected Non-Oil Sectors, 2010-2014\textsuperscript{250}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Real GDP growth of the oil sector</th>
<th>Real GDP growth of the non-oil sector</th>
<th>GDP (in constant prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: Real GDP Growth in the Oil and Non-Oil Sectors, 2010-2014\textsuperscript{251}

In terms of the non-oil sectors, according to the latest statistics issued by the Central Bank of the UAE in 2015, the banking sector, which consists of 23 national banks and 26 foreign banks,\textsuperscript{252} enjoys a strong capital base. In part, this is a result of the ability of the country to preserve its position as a safe haven in the Middle East. Customer deposits increased in local banks from AED50.3 billion in 2014 to AED142.4 billion in 2015.\textsuperscript{253}


\textsuperscript{251} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.
In addition, the free zones in the UAE have played a significant role in the economy. The Federation has more free zones (36) than any other country in the Middle East. The free zones are present in each Emirates; Abu Dhabi has five, including the Media Free Zone (Two Four 24), Khalifa Port, Khalifa Industrial City (Kizad), Abu Dhabi airport, (Sky City) and Masdar City Free Zone. There are also 23 in Dubai, covering the sectors of information and communication technology, media, industry, commerce, finance, gold, diamonds, flowers, education, health care and human services sectors. These include Dubai Media City, Dubai Airport Free Zone, Jebel Ali Free Zone, Dubai Science Park, Dubai Flower Center, Dubai Knowledge Park, Dubai Healthcare City and International Humanitarian City. There are also two free zones in each of Sharjah, Ajman and Ras Al Khaimah, while Umm Al Quwain and Fujairah have one each.

The free zones conform to international standards and have become a desirable investment destination for foreign industrial, commercial and media companies. They are served by a modern infrastructure, in addition to other privileges, which include the quick processing of visas/residence transactions for the employees. The free zones also allow 100% foreign ownership of companies, as the free zones are not subject to the UAE Companies Law, which stipulates that the foreign equity in the company within the State may not exceed 49%. In addition, the free zones permit free transfer of capital and profits in full to investors, and exemption from taxes and customs duties. Thus, the total trade volume of free zones in the country in 2015 have amounted to about AED 497 billion.

The real estate sector is another influential sector in terms of the economic growth of the UAE. The real estate sector is among the biggest sectors in terms of using inputs from other sectors, such as construction materials, public services, natural resources, energy and land, as well as its extensive use of labour. These linkages increase its interdependence with other sectors and its importance to the overall economy. Based on data published by the Economic Supplement of UAE

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newspaper, *Al Bayan*, the total value of real estate projects launched in the UAE in 2015 amounted to about AED 111 billion, which exceeded the value in 2014.\textsuperscript{257}

### 3.3.4 The e-Infrastructure

In an attempt to mirror the rapid technological developments in the world, the UAE federal and local governments has been transforming the provision government services into e-services since 2003.\textsuperscript{258} The first project was the Emirates Identity Authority, through which the Authority issues identity cards with a unique identification number to all citizens and legal residents. The card bears an electronic chip carrying personal data of its holder, including copies of his/her official documents, such as passport and birth certificate, and biometric data (i.e. facial, iris, and fingerprint). These are provided when applying for the card at registration centres; biometric technologies provide a high degree of accuracy to verify and confirm the identity of a person.\textsuperscript{259} Furthermore, the digital security on the identity card chip in terms of the user signature and encryption features meets the highest international security levels.\textsuperscript{260} The identity cards have become the backbone of the e-government initiatives, and the main hub for the services and e-commerce in the public and private sectors.\textsuperscript{261} The identity card is the primary source of identification in the federal and local institutions as well as private companies and through related Internet and smart applications. The government also established the Federal Electronic Network in the virtual world with the aim to consolidate the ideas of electronic and smart government at the federal and local level. The Network is now one of the fundamental cornerstones of smart government in the UAE, as it connects the database of all federal and local authorities in the country in order to provide electronic and smart services to citizens and residents within the state or abroad. Moreover, the design of UAE Smart Cloud, emanating from the Federal Electronic Network, was launched in order to provide the cloud infrastructure service to the federal and local

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institutions. Officials of General Authority for Regulating the Telecommunications Sector; supervisors of the project, state that this infrastructure enables the federal and local institutions to raise the efficiency of computing resources as well as its capabilities of storage effectively, with low costs. In addition, the cloud infrastructure service can be used as a joint platform for the government institutions to recover from disasters that may affect the communication system.\textsuperscript{262}

In addition, the UAE is developing smart cities, using on information and communication technology. This enables officials to manage, control and monitor the critical infrastructure, including roads, bridges, tunnels, railways, trains tunnels, airports, seaports, telecommunications, water and energy, in order to achieve the optimum level of resources and security. In turn, this helps contributes towards a sustainable environment, which promotes a feeling of happiness and wellness for the residents.\textsuperscript{263} In 2014, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, announced the start of a project to transform the Emirate of Dubai into a smart city within three years.\textsuperscript{264}

The Dubai Smart City project is based on three main concepts (see Figure 3.5). The first concept is promoting communication between residents and the different institutions and facilities by facilitating access and the sharing of information and data. This enables Dubai’s population to stay informed and linked with all the data related to government entities, the stock exchange, schools, universities, hospitals, weather, road conditions and traffic jams, emergency services, shops, etc. All of Dubai City will be covered by broadband and high-speed wired and wireless optical networks to ensure communication between the population and its institutions and various facilities, which will form the backbone of the future Dubai Smart City.\textsuperscript{265} Second, the various databases will be integrated to make them available to all via the ‘My window to Dubai’ program, which offers a live feed through an online virtual embodiment of Dubai City. Third, cooperation and coordination between all concerned parties will contribute on an ongoing basis to the design and development of smart solutions in the city through applications, initiatives and electronic


\textsuperscript{263} The Staff. (February 2013). “Smart Cities - Seoul: a case study”. ITU-T Technology Watch Report, p. 1


\textsuperscript{265} The Staff of e4all Magazine. (April 2014), op. cit., p. 5.
programs. The process of transforming Dubai into a smart city will be supervised through a five-dimensional room. This will control and monitor the management of all facilities and services of the city through interconnected and sophisticated electronic systems, in order to ensure they achieve the city’s goal of ensuring the happiness of its residents.

![Diagram: Dubai’s Smart City Circle]

**Figure 3.5: Dubai’s Smart City Circle**

### 3.3.5 Summary of the Physical base of the UAE

In summary, as outlined by Buzan’s Nature of the State hypothesis, the physical base of a state is the concrete expression of the state’s existence. The state’s physical base includes its population (rapidly growing in the case of the UAE), its natural resources (such as oil in the UAE) or lack of them, its territory (including the disputed islands of the UAE) and investment in all types of

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267 The Staff of e4all Magazine. (April 2014), op. cit.

infrastructural assets. These elements can be exposed to internal or external threats of varying degrees.

3.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter analyses the UAE through the three components to the Nature of State hypothesis—the idea of the state, its institutions and its physical base. The chapter discusses the formation of the UAE in 1971, which is still based on a tribal ruling system that has governed the territory for more than 1,500 years and has contributed to the security and stability of those who were subject to its authority. In addition, it discusses the nature and functions of the UAE’s legislative, executive and judiciary institutions, which were negotiated ahead of the declaration of independence. These institutions help to maintain the stability and security of the citizens. Thereafter, the chapter reviews the physical base of the UAE. In addition, it also highlights the threats faced by the UAE, including external threats from foreign governments, international criminal organizations and individuals, as well environmental threats, all of which can adversely affect the security and stability of the society of the UAE.

The next chapter addresses the threats to the three components of the state in more detail.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE THREATS TO UAE’S NATIONAL SECURITY

In the preceding chapter, a framework based on Buzan’s hypothesis is proposed in order to analyse the threats to the UAE’s national security. Threats to the idea of state, the physical base and the institutions supporting the existence of this state are addressed in this chapter. Importantly, exposure to threats in any one of the three components may expose other components to further threats. Although critics argue that this relationship is exaggerated, in reality it may find resonance, especially in critical times. This chapter addresses the definition of national security threats in the UAE as a construct based on Buzan’s hypothesis. The chapter discusses the risks that threaten the UAE’s national security; based on Buzan's hypothesis on ‘The Nature of the State', by discussing with the threats to the idea of the state, then the threats to the state’s institutions and finally the anticipated threats to the physical base of the state. Securitising an issue, in Copenhagen school’s approach, provides a useful tool by which to analyse the changing perceived potential threats highlighted by the author to the UAE national security.

As is apparent in the discussion, matters of national interest from a security perspective, which some may consider as challenges rather than threats to the country’s security, call for securitization measures as long as they persist. These threats (or challenges depending on one’s perception) identified by the researcher include population imbalance, illegal immigration which assists the infiltration of terrorist organizations, the threat to the national economy by over-dominance of foreign business, and the weakening of the collective national identity, and negative population growth (leading to national population shrinkage).

4.1 THE THREATS TO THE IDEA OF THE STATE IN THE UAE

This section highlights the most significant threats to the idea of the state in the UAE following Buzan’s analysis. The identity and the ideology of the nation that were adopted influenced the creation and mandates of the institutions of the state which ensure the protection of its interests on its territories (see Figure 4.1). Thus, the following threats to the idea of state in the UAE are discussed because in the view of the researcher these are of major importance and form on-going challenge which if unresolved are elevated to the status of a threat.
This section discusses the imbalances in demographic structure in the UAE, which resulted in tension between the national identity of the UAE and the influence of the cultures and identities huge diverse migrant community, which is frequently at odds with the essence of the UAE national identity. The increase in the number of expatriates residing within their state led to attempts to impose their foreign identities on UAE nationals in their own country, which imposes a perceived threat to the idea of the state. Also, the section discusses the private education in the UAE, which attracts the majority of citizens because of the failure of the state schools’ curricula to keep pace with the requirements of universities and the labour market in the UAE. These private schools pose a threat to the national identity of the UAE, because of weak supervision by the Ministry of Education.

### 4.1.1 Conflict of Identities

A serious threat to the idea of the state has emerged due to the UAE's demographic imbalance. This resulted from the UAE's aspiration to develop the country rapidly supported by the huge
inflows of oil revenues and the small size of its indigenous population. In order to meet the development objectives, the country saw a massive influx of foreign workers and investors. Economic, social and cultural development projects are still on going across the Federation, along with attempts to expand economic diversification from oil to other sectors such as tourism, real estate, and medium and heavy industries, in turn necessitating the employment of more foreign employees.  

The influx of foreign labour to the UAE and other GCC countries evolved through five stages. The first stage, from the beginning of the 1940s to the early 1950s, coincided with the start of oil exploration in the region, which necessitated importing labour for use in such operations, with India and Iran as the main sources of the expatriate labour. The second stage lasted from the early 1950s until 1973, during which the Arabian Gulf entities started to invest the oil revenues for the development of their societies. The majority of workers coming to the UAE and the other countries of the Arabian Peninsula were Arabs. As highlighted previously, this period was characterized by the rise of Nasserist thought. During this period Egyptian President Nasser stirred up unrest against British forces in the Gulf region in order to force their withdrawal and seize the oil fields to finance his political project of the United Arab Republic (UAR), extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf. In this context, he encouraged Egyptians belonging to the Nasserist thought and their allies from the Arab Nationalist Movement from other Arab countries to travel to countries in the Arabian Peninsula that were under British tutelage. These migrants contributed to the establishment of schools in the different emirates and taught Nasserist ideas to the students. These ideas included the fight against colonialism as well as working to overthrow the traditional ruling regimes to enable the creation of the UAR.

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271 Ibid.
274 The researcher experienced Nasserist thought in public schools in the UAE during his schooling from 1984-1996. Students, after the flag-raising and performing the national anthem of the UAE, had to chant part of the Nasserist Thought slogan, which says: “our homeland from the Atlantic to the Arabian Gulf, Our hope is one Arab nation state, We would die for the life of the United Arab Republic”. This oath was cancelled by the end of the 1990s by the Ministry of Education after being invoked by several generations.
The third stage for the arrival of foreign workers began in the autumn of 1973 after the surge in oil prices and ended when oil prices fell sharply in 1983. During this period, the UAE received substantial oil revenues because of escalating oil prices, which led to a significant increase in government spending on infrastructure projects, health care services and education. The high level of projects and small population prompted the UAE government to import many foreign workers with the requisite skills. These migrants were mainly Asian workers from India and Pakistan.\(^{275}\)

The fourth stage of the influx of foreign workers to the UAE spanned the period from 1983 to August 1990. The period was marked by a decrease in the pace of the arrival of foreign workers to the UAE because of falling oil revenues. Indeed, arrivals stopped entirely at the start of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 because of the instability in the region. The fifth stage began with the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 and continues to date,\(^{276}\) during which the characteristics of the third stage re-emerged, with foreign labour from more than 203 countries coming to work in the Federation,\(^{277}\) as job opportunities were created in relation to development, economic and social projects.\(^{278}\) The local governments in the UAE spent billions of US dollars implementing infrastructure projects, especially in the energy and transportation sectors, and building international airports, seaports, railways, metro lines, roads, bridges and tunnels, in addition to developing national airlines.\(^{279}\)

### 4.1.2 The Increasing Demographic Imbalance

The phenomenon of rapidly growing foreign population residing in the UAE has resulted in a decreasing proportion of UAE citizens in terms the total population (see Table 4.1). This changing demographic is creating a threat to the idea of the state in the UAE. According to official census data, the population of the UAE has increased eightfold over 25 years, from 1,043,078 in 1980 to


\(^{277}\) Ibid, p. 44.


8,264,070 in 2010. State with the highest rate of natural growth of population can only double their population every 25 years. Thus, the increase in the population of the UAE over the 25 years, would in normal circumstances have taken around two centuries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationals</td>
<td>291,523</td>
<td>587,330</td>
<td>947,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Population</td>
<td>27.92</td>
<td>24.36</td>
<td>11.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expatriates</td>
<td>751,555</td>
<td>1,823,711</td>
<td>7,316,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Population</td>
<td>72.08</td>
<td>75.64</td>
<td>88.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1,043,078</td>
<td>2,411,041</td>
<td>8,264,070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: The Growth of the Demographic Imbalance

Importantly, the increase in expatriate residents (873%) had been significantly larger than the increase in UAE citizens (225%). This is an important factor for the idea of the state as the majority of the population have identities that differ from the identity of the state. Accordingly, the nation-state society has turned to be a de facto multi-identity community. Therefore, it is an important indicator of a potential threat to the idea of the state.

The presence of a huge number of foreign nationals from 203 nationalities inside the UAE, with different languages, religions, and cultures from those of the indigenous minority, threatens to obliterate the identity of the current and future UAE generations. This is because the UAE identity formed since independence in 1971 is based on an allegiance to the nation and its leadership, the rulers of the seven Emirates. The internal and external policies of the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the UAE’s founder, who developed the federal state from an idea to a reality, changed the identity from mere allegiance to the ruler of the local Emirate to a much wider allegiance to the Federal state and its president. UAE nationals who witnessed the establishment of the Federation and their offspring have a deeply-rooted allegiance to the Emirates and their rulers. However, over the

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years later generations have changed as a result of several factors, the most important being the obliteration of the national language, increased social interaction between nationals and non-national residents and the education policy in the UAE.

First, the UAE’s language, which is Arabic but with a specific UAE dialect, is threatened with marginalization. This dialect differs from those of the neighbouring GCC countries, and is culturally distinctive, reflecting the unique UAE national identity. However, because of the continuous interaction inside the multi-cultural UAE community with foreign employees, whether in the market, the work place, at home, school, university, hospital and all aspects of life, a number of UAE nationals have learned to speak and understand other languages such as Urdu, Persian and English, in order to ease transactions within the community. In contrast, most foreign workers are not interested in learning Arabic, the official language of the state; being fluent in Arabic is not a condition for acceptance into the local community. However, the UAE government has recently approved Arabic as the official language of communication in the federal government sector. Meanwhile, English is still the dominant language in all transactions in the private sector, which is a major player in the UAE national economy.

At the level of social interaction, the Federal government has pursued a policy of multiculturalism because of its dependence on foreigners to drive national development. Culture is a basic resource, like power, food and air, required by groups and individuals for life. Hence, the UAE government allows the building of houses of worship for free for all divine religions. It also grants residents freedom of worship, provided that public order and rules of conduct are maintained. Moreover, the UAE government permits foreign communities to establish societies, schools, hospitals, clubs, and commercial councils, which enhance their cultures. In addition, in 2015, the President of the UAE issued Federal Decree Law No. 2 on Combating Discrimination and Hatred. This law guarantees equality among members of society of citizens and foreigners residing on the territory of the State and criminalises discrimination among them based on religion, creed, doctrine, denomination, caste, race, colour or ethnic origin in addition to rejecting hate speech

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284 Ibid.
285 Ibid, p. 211.
286 Article 32 of the UAE constitution.
through different ways, means or forms of expression.\footnote{The UAE Official Gazette, “Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015”. Issue 582.} This law was promulgated despite the fact that the UAE Constitution had already addressed these rights in chapter No. 2 titled “The Fundamental Social and Economic Bases of the Union” and chapter No. 3 titled “Public Freedoms, Rights and Duties” of the Constitution. In addition, discrimination and hatred issues are dealt with in the provisions of the Federal Penal Law in Part 5 titled “Crimes Affecting Religious Doctrines and Rites”, as well as chapter 6 of Part 7 concerning Crimes Perpetrated against Reputation. The issues of hate and discrimination were also addressed in miscellaneous articles within the Penal Law in relation to incitement to commit such crimes, which may destabilize society by spreading hate. In addition, the cyber-crimes law increased the penalty of a number of crimes contained in the Federal Penal Law if any of the electronic or smart devices have been used in such crimes; such as social media and similar cyber platforms; in spreading sedition, hatred or contempt in society.\footnote{Al-Sharif, Yusuf. (28 July 2015), op. cit.} However, the escalating threat of extremist ideologies fed by radical groups promoting a clash of civilizations and a rejection of the other in terms of ethnic, cultural and religious identity,\footnote{Editors. (1 September 2015). “Anti-discrimination & Hatred Law and strengthening the foundations of the UAE model”. National Shield Journal. Available at: <URL:http://www.nationshield.ae/home/details/files/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%8A%D8%B2-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%80%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%85%D9%88%D8%BO%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A#.V5dzS9okqUL> Access Date: 22 March 2016. (In Arabic).} has led to the UAE regime codifying and criminalizing such acts in order to maintain the integrity and existence of the society, through the specific Law No. 2 of 2015.\footnote{Al-Sharif, Yusuf. (28 July 2015). “Shedding light on the Anti-discrimination Law”. Al Bayan Newspaper. Available at: <URL:http://www.albayan.ae/opinions/articles/2015-07-28-1.2424843> Access Date: 17 September 2015. (In Arabic).} Furthermore, in 2016, the Council of Ministers of Federal Government created two new posts the Minister of State for Tolerance and the Minister of State for Happiness. The former is charged with creating a compatible system consisting of plans, programs and community initiatives. The system aims to consolidate the values of tolerance, pluralism and acceptance of others in terms of thoughts, culture, sects, confessions and religions among the citizens and foreigners residing on the territory of the State. This aim should ensure peaceful coexistence among the different groups within the community. The Minister of State for Happiness is charged with ensuring the happiness of citizens
and foreigners residing in the UAE. This is achieved through the harmonization and conformation to all plans, programs and policies adopted by the State’s Federal Institutions in order to advance economic development and promoting the security, cohesion and stability of society in the state.291

However, the multiplicity of cultures in the UAE community could pose a threat to the cohesive social unity and social fabric of the tribal society that shares many common values, customs and traditions. Unlike federal states, such as the UK and Canada, the UAE is a nation-state formed by one nation, not a multinational state. The influx of expatriates has resulted a failure to respect the UAE’s national values and norms. According to Rasmussen, the cultural inheritance constitutes the backbone of the nation-state in keeping with the emotional values of the nation, to the extent that any attack against them would result in a sense of violence towards the aggressor.292 For example, some foreigners wear clothing that is deemed indecent according to custom in the UAE. This clothing does not cover the shoulders and knees in public places as therefore offends the public decency of the conservative residents in the State. This constitutes a crime punishable by UAE law. Therefore, the authorities have compelled all shopping centres to put up signs at entrances to alert people about the necessity to wear modest clothes. However, abuses still take place. For example, in Dubai Mall one foreign tourist, after an Arab woman criticized her for wearing a blouse that exposed part of her breast, took off her clothes and wandered about in her underwear in protest against the criticism.293 Furthermore, some foreigners in UAE commit acts, which offend the customs and traditions of the UAE, such as sexual harassment, flirting with women or kissing women in public places. Such acts violate the public order and deserve a penalty according to the UAE laws.294 There are also foreigners who drink alcohol in public, although UAE law bans drinking alcohol except in licensed places such as certain hotels, bars, and licensed

Another complaint is of foreigners drinking, eating and smoking in public during the day in the month of Ramadan, during which Muslims fast from sunrise until sunset, despite UAE laws imposing a penalty for this, whether or not the person is Muslim.296

However, abuses by foreign residents and visitors still occur in public places in the UAE because of the lack of familiarity with the laws, rules and regulations to maintain the values and customs in the conservative society. In part, this is because of the failure of The National Council for Tourism and Antiquities, which is responsible for educating tourists about the customs and traditions of the community in UAE, before their entry into its territory.297 The National Council for Tourism and Antiquities could have cooperated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior in the publication of brief guidance on the behaviours, which are prohibited within the UAE. This could be distributed through the official websites of the Embassies of the State and through the official website of the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs, through which, the application of electronic visas to enter the State are processed. In addition, brochures could be printed containing concise guidance and distributed by the staff of the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs to all foreigners arriving by air, land or sea. This would reduce unfamiliarity with the rules and help deter behaviour that offends the values and customs of the UAE citizens; which is one of the most important elements of their national identity.

4.1.3 The Private Education System

In relation to the education system in the UAE, the Ministry of Education (MOE) adopts conflicting strategies that may contribute to undermining the national identity of the UAE’s current and future generations. Education is a cornerstone of a state’s national security and hence is central to achieving the state’s comprehensive development. Education also plays a major role in enhancing the national identity and in forming the character of national students. This is because school is the most influential social institution that shapes the behaviour and psychology of the

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295 Ibid.
296 Ibid.
emerging generations.\textsuperscript{298} However, it appears that the powers of the MOE have declined. Previously, the MOE enjoyed wide powers over all government and private schools through its sub-divisions in each of the Emirates. However, since 2009, Abu Dhabi and Dubai sought independence from the MOE, especially in the supervision of the private schools. Abu Dhabi Education Council (ADEC) and the Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA) in Dubai now exercise independent powers over schools in those Emirates. Both governments of Abu Dhabi and Dubai adopt special strategies in relation to education. Nevertheless, despite this independence the ADEC and KHDA are still required by the MOE to file lists of students registered in private schools at the beginning of each school year, as is the case in all other educational areas. Such lists enable the classification of national and non-national students registered in private schools (see Table 4.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emirate</th>
<th>Total Number of Emirati Students</th>
<th>Total Number of Foreign Students</th>
<th>Total Number of All Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>54,250</td>
<td>120,750</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>27,011</td>
<td>164,325</td>
<td>191,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharjah</td>
<td>15,519</td>
<td>104,911</td>
<td>120,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajman</td>
<td>2,879</td>
<td>26,241</td>
<td>29,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm Al Quwain</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>2,893</td>
<td>3,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Al Khaimah</td>
<td>3,347</td>
<td>13,932</td>
<td>17,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujairah</td>
<td>2,865</td>
<td>8,685</td>
<td>11,521</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Number**  
106,462  
441,708  
548,170

**Table 4.2: National and Non-National Students in Private Schools in the UAE: 2010/11**\textsuperscript{299}

The large number of students enrolled in private schools can be attributed to the policies adopted by the MOE in the 1970s and the 1980s in developing the curricula, and the lack of attention to teaching students English in primary schools. Therefore, it became common for UAE nationals to send their children to private schools in order to learn English and benefit from the foreign educational curricula. Some private schools, due to their material capabilities and efficient human resources, managed to attract UAE nationals. These schools provided curricula that met the market


\textsuperscript{299} Sources: The UAE Ministry of Education, ADEC & KHDA.
requirements and managed to keep pace with educational changes including new methods such as preparing students for university and meeting market requirements. They taught students skills of scientific thinking, debate and problem-solving. Those schools succeeded in running their education and financial matters without the bureaucracy of the centralized management of public schools. As private schools are investment projects, any weakness in its performance would lead to its losing money and eventually being closed. This trend towards private education endangers the UAE identity for the current and future generations for a number of reasons. First, the educational climate in some foreign private schools is very different from that of the UAE community. The UAE nationals found they were in a minority in terms of students and teachers. As a result, they had to interact with other nationals, and hence came to develop a mix of conflicting identities. Second, some foreign private schools are not committed to teaching the three compulsory subjects imposed by the MOE for Arab and Muslim students in the public and private schools, namely, Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies. In this context, certain foreign schools did not raise the UAE flag or play the UAE national anthem at the beginning of a school day, which is required in all public schools, because the flag is “a symbol for defining both political and national identity”. This created a generation of students who did not feel a sense of belonging to their country. In 2009, the UAE government became aware of this issue. As a result, the MOE issued a binding resolution requiring all schools to raise the UAE flag and play the UAE national anthem at the beginning of a school day. Third, the private education sector in the state has been transformed from a sector limited to foreign residents into a system for all individuals, through its different educational systems. By 2009, the number of foreign educational curricula taught in the foreign school was 18: three were British, three Canadian, two Indian, one Australian, one American, one French, one German, one Russian, one Japanese, one Pakistani, one Bangladeshi, one Philippine, and one Iranian. Although Article 32 of Federal Law No. 28 of

300 Al-Bahli Mohammed, (2009), op. cit., p. 150.
301 Interview with Salem Saif Al Jaber, Chief of Private Education Section in Ras Al Khaimah Educational Zone, UAE Ministry of Education, Ras Al Khaimah, 11 April 2011. To see the interview, please refer to Appendix 1.
1999 stated that private schools may not teach any curriculum without the prior approval of the MOE, officials confessed that they did not scrutinize foreign curricula due to the insufficient numbers of staff with knowledge of the languages involved.\textsuperscript{305} Instead, they depended on the students and parents to inform them of any violations in books used in the private schools.\textsuperscript{306} Therefore, the lack of supervision over the school curricula could lead to the spread of ideas that contradict the values and traditions of the Muslim UAE community. In educational terms, this is referred to as “the inherent curricula”. The danger of this approach lies in the fact that the student is educated through different ways and in different cultures from UAE nationals in other schools. In part, this is because some of those teachers or supervisors are foreigners who have different intellectual and religious ideologies.\textsuperscript{307} This could lead to the creation of an entire generation of religious extremists, which is what happened in the case of the Afghan Taliban movement,\textsuperscript{308} whose leaders graduated from Islamic schools in Pakistan. Finally, the private schools pose a threat to the UAE identity, since they affect language, religion, culture, history, national allegiance and national identity in general. Private schools may create non-allegiance in the case of current and upcoming UAE generations. In turn, this could lead to the emergence of a spirit of intellectual and psychological defeat.\textsuperscript{309} The new generations in UAE no longer speak, write, think, or read in Arabic. For example, one UAE mother told a MOE official that when she went with her son, who is studying in a foreign school, on a tourist visit to Canada, her son expressed his relief at finally being able to understand the Friday sermon for the first time, because it was in English.\textsuperscript{310}

To summarize, the continuing influx of foreign nationals, many of whom are settling for long periods and who do not hold the traditional values upon which the UAE was founded, pose a threat to the generic national identity. Former migrants had a degree of association and appreciation for the UAE culture and therefore did not form a noticeable threat to the identity of the UAE society. The threat to the idea of the state in the UAE will be manifested when the national identity is subsumed by other cultures and identities. In the foreseeable future, this would require a reshaping

\textsuperscript{305} Interview with Sheikha Khulood Al Qasimi, the Director of the Curriculum Department in the UAE Ministry of Education, Dubai, 24 April 2011. To see the interview, please refer to Appendix 10.
\textsuperscript{306} Interview with H.E. Ali Mehad Al Suwaidi, the Acting Director General of the UAE Ministry of Education, Dubai, 24 April 2011. To see the interview, please refer to Appendix 11.
\textsuperscript{307} Al-Bahli Mohammed, (2009), op. cit., pp. 163-164.
\textsuperscript{308} Taliban in Pashto language means students.
\textsuperscript{310} Ibid, p. 33.
of the idea of state in order to encompass the foreign identities. In turn, this would impact the other constituent parts of the state, namely the physical base and the institutions of the state.

In addition, the education system of the UAE, which helps to reinforce the traditional idea of the state, is under pressure from the plethora of curricula based on imported education systems in the private sector. The curricula are not subject to an effective monitor and approval system, which results in an unstructured value system being communicated to the Emirati and non-Emirati students. This heterogeneous value system undermines the base for future generation attitudes towards the traditional idea of the state in the UAE.

4.2 THE THREATS TO THE UAE INSTITUTIONS

This section focuses on the threats to the UAE’s national security through the institutions of the state. The idea of the state in the UAE evolved from the existing political structure of the seven local emirates which were independently ruled by the royal families. The need to develop a communal approach to the newly created Federation was expressed in a new institutional framework. It is important to recognise that in the UAE and the individual emirates the line between the state and the regime is a thin one, as both are interdependent and the continuation of the established model calls for regime stability. That said, this analysis outlines existing threats and potential challenges to security on a state level.

Figure 4.2: Threats to the UAE Institutions
In the context of institutions, Buzan’s hypothesis limits the internal threats to small groups of militants, relatively isolated from the society, who reject the idea of state and the existing institutions implementing it. Therefore, the militants use force to weaken these institutions in order to overthrow the regime and obtain gain access to power. The groups that pose a threat to UAE institutions are the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda and ISIS (see Figure 4.2). The following sections address the threats from these three groups to the institutions in the UAE.

4.2.1 The Muslim Brotherhood

The UAE institutions under threat from a small radical group, isolated from the Emirati community. The Muslim Brotherhood Group branch in the UAE is part of an international organization, which has been recently classified as a terrorist group by a number of countries.311 The majority of Sunni Islamic radical movements have emerged out of its school,312 including al-Qaeda and ISIS. Since Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 in order to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate regime,313 which was abolished in Turkey in 1924 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk at the end of the Ottoman Empire.314 Al-Banna laid down the organizational framework, objectives, implementation stages, and methods for the achievement of its objectives. Importantly, the Brotherhood’s objective of reinstating the Caliphate are not confined to Egypt, but extend to the entire Islamic world.315 In order to implement its objective, members across the world are required to be loyal to the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and to follow their instructions.316 Despite the group’s global intentions, it was until the

311 The Muslim Brotherhood organization is listed as a terrorist organization in Russia, Canada, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In addition, Hamas, the military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, is banned in the United States, Canada and the European Union.
mid-1950s that members of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt explicitly started to spread their call to other countries.\textsuperscript{317}

There is a similarity between the attempted global reach of Communism and the Muslim Brotherhood; the loyalty of the communist parties in other countries was given to the leaders of the former Soviet Union, while the same approach exists with the affiliates of the International Organization of Muslim Brotherhood, even if it is against the national interest of their own states.\textsuperscript{318} The theorist of Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, who is considered as “the father of militant jihad”,\textsuperscript{319} called his followers, in his book ‘Milestones’, to abandon their loyalty to their homeland if it does not apply shari’a. For Qutb the homeland is no more than a piece of land that does not have any weight or consideration if it does not apply the provisions of Islamic law.\textsuperscript{320} Muslim Brotherhood members are obliged to protect the land, establish the caliphate on its territories, and overthrow regimes that do not apply Islamic law.\textsuperscript{321} Qutb obliged members to establish an independent community isolated from their societies as he predicted that they would be attacked when they came to the notice of the infidel societies. At this point, he argued members would be entitled to defend themselves by force to protect their independent community.\textsuperscript{322} He added that God granted them the right to destroy and undermine the institutions of the state by ignoring regulations and laws that curtail access to power, in order to establish an Islamic caliphate.\textsuperscript{323}

Meanwhile, the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood spread its ideas in the UAE after independence. The aim was to attract UAE nationals and create a secluded community in order to undermine the state institutions and establish a theocratic state. This base could be used to establish a launching pad to undermine the regimes of neighbouring countries bringing them into the Islamic Caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood started to create the institutional framework

\textsuperscript{321} Ibid, pp. 131-132.
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{323} Ibid, p. 68.
in the region in 1972, when Hassan Hudaibi, the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, held the first meeting of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in the world during the *hajj* (pilgrimage) in Saudi Arabia. This meeting led to the formation of committees in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. In 1974, the first official branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE was established in Dubai under the name of the Reform and Social Guidance Association. Thereafter, two further branches were established in Fujairah and Ras Al Khaimah (1976), while the headquarters of the Social Guidance Committee of the Reform and Social Guidance Association opened in Ajman (1981).

The nominal objective of the Association was to gain more members for the Muslim Brotherhood. They attempted to achieve this by various means. From the early 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood gained controlled of the Ministry of Education in the UAE in order to influence national students, and embed the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas in their minds. Through their control of the education sector, they were able to write the curricula. In addition, its members, who worked as teachers, were able attract students to the Reform and Social Guidance Association, through football matches. Teachers, who were members of the Reform and Social Guidance Association, would go to students’ homes after school to take them to the Association headquarters. After the games, they would invite students to attend religious lectures, during which they encouraged students to join the Association. Furthermore, followers of the Reform and Social Guidance Association controlled the scouting activities and summer camps in some emirates, during which they propagated the dogma of the Muslim Brotherhood.

These attempts were supported by the presence of a media arm highlighting the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in UAE. The outlet was the *Reform Magazine*, which portrayed a good image of the members of the Reform and Social Guidance Association and promoted the thoughts and the ideas of their extremist organization within the UAE. For example, in 1982, the *Islah* magazine

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324 Ali, Abdel Rahim. (December 28, 2010). Brotherhood came out of prison is Mistoobein of the changes that have occurred in the community. *Al-Ahram Newspaper*. Available at: <URL: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=394952&eid=3320> Access Date: 12 July 2013. (In Arabic).


326 The researcher experienced this during his studies at school in Dubai between 1989 and 1993.


328 Ibid, pp.110-111.
published a statement that was attributed to a fake organization named the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe,\textsuperscript{329} which demanded the abolition of the death sentences in Egypt that had been issued against Khaled Al-Islambouli and his colleagues who were convicted of the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. The call was not based on any legal or humanitarian rights as is usual with the international human rights organizations. However, they argued that the assassination of Sadat was not a crime according to Islamic law, as he was an infidel governor since he made a peace treaty with ‘the Jews’, who are perceived as enemies of God. In addition, Sadat did not apply \textit{shari’a} in Egypt. Therefore, God has permitted to kill him, according to statement in \textit{Islah}.\textsuperscript{330}

Members of the Muslim Brotherhood made use of mosques to spread their message through Friday prayers, which are supposed to address religious matters. However, preachers started to tackle political issues. For example, in the late 1980s, in a Friday sermon, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Ras Al Khaimah accused the UAE Minister of Education of being a disbeliever.\textsuperscript{331} In addition, the Reform and Social Guidance Association used other methods to attract young people. It took part in charitable activities, through the establishment of a branch that offered aid. Donations were collected from mosques and schools, through activities, speeches, coupons and other methods.

Despite the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE to attract young people, many nationals withdrew from the Reform and Social Guidance Association after the disclosure of its links to a foreign organization aimed at toppling the ruler. For instance, Rashid Al-Jumairi, a former member of the Association in the UAE, stated that in 2000 he travelled to Kuwait with some of Association leaders and members. At the meeting, a leader of the UAE Reform and Social Guidance Association gave a speech in the presence of Jassim Yassin, a prominent figure of the Muslim

\textsuperscript{329} In 1989, an organization with the same name The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe was founded in London. See the official website of the organization at: <URL: http://www.fioe.org/ShowPage_en.php?id=1&img=1> Access Date: 20 March 2014.

\textsuperscript{330} Al Islah Magazine. (1982). A statement to Muslims about death sentences against fighters Khaled Al-Islambouli and his brothers. \textit{Al Islah Magazine}, issue 50, pp. 28-29. (In Arabic). To see the statement, please refer to Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{331} Al–Nogaidan, Mansour (2011), op. cit., p. 116.
Brotherhood in Kuwait, in which he emphasised the need to follow the lead of Hassan Al Banna to be loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood, and to seek to establish an Islamic Caliphate.\footnote{Ibid, p.125}

A further escalation in activities took place in 2011. According to Abdul Rahim Ali, Director of the Arab Centre for Research and Studies, the members of the International Organization of Muslim Brotherhood held a meeting in Istanbul on 12 November 2011 headed by General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. At the meeting, they took the decision to run for the presidential elections in Egypt. They also sought to increase their penetration of the Arabian Gulf region, in order to exploit the progress achieved by the organization's branches in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, and benefit from the general revolutionary mood with the youth of the region. This included encouraging the existing cells in Kuwait and the UAE to conduct a systematic escalation in order to undermine and overthrow the institutions of their ruling regimes. The ultimate aim was to harness the wealth of these states to finance their project of the Islamic Caliphate, which was to be established from the ruins of states entangled in the wave of revolutions of the Arab Spring that broke out in late 2010.\footnote{Interview with Abdel Rahim Ali in Al Tahrir TV Channel in (13 January 2013). Available on YouTube at: <URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wAZmZcH0if0> Access Date: 15 January 2013. (In Arabic).}

The Muslim Brotherhood’s escalation against the UAE regime depended on three basic elements. First, the members of the Brotherhood in the UAE focused on portraying themselves to the West and the international human rights organizations as human rights activists and leaders of the opposition. They claimed that their group was a national opposition movement, which aims to reform the political system in the UAE. Furthermore, they claimed they were not affiliated to the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, but carry the message of Islam and help to reform the UAE through the provision of advice and guidance according to Islamic law.\footnote{Interview with Saleh Zafiri, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE, in Al-Hiwar TV Channel in (11 December 2011). Available on YouTube at: <URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dp1miTCUpFM> Access Date: 25 April 2012. (In Arabic).} Second, the members of the organization questioned the role of the institutions of the state, such as the state’s security apparatus, the judiciary, police, media and the General Authority of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, which oversees the mosques in the country. Using social communication, the members of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to portray the state security apparatus as an authoritarian institution unrelated to the rulers of the state, but which has the ultimate power to
control the police, the judiciary, the state’s official mass media and the Authority of Islamic Affairs and Endowments. Moreover, they accused the members of the state security apparatus of being infidels because they fight against Islam by not permitting members of the Muslim Brotherhood to deliver speeches in mosques on Fridays on the grounds that they use their sermons to promote the organization's thoughts, as well as infidelizing and criticizing their opponents. Third, Muslim Brotherhood members used slander and libel against the systems of governance and its legitimacy through social communication and religious preachers from abroad belonging to the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. This followed the Brotherhood’s failure to gain popularity among the tribal community of the UAE, which was adhering to its identity and its customs, traditions and teachings of Islam. The ideas of reform and overthrowing the ruling regimes contradict with the provisions of the Shafi’i and Maliki doctrines followed by the majority of the population in the UAE. Therefore, the policy of labelling the regime in the UAE as infidels reflects on the people of the UAE who are loyal to their ruling regime, in accordance with the principles of their ideology.

Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood group in the UAE moved outside their independent society into the wider society for the first time in order to publicly escalate their activities against the regime. This action immediately met with the decision to withdraw Emirati citizenship from certain members of the Muslim Brotherhood because of their involvement in acts that were proven to pose a threat to the state’s security, according to the Emirates News Agency (WAM). All those involved were previously granted Emirati citizenship through naturalization. Therefore, their Emirati citizenships were withdrawn in accordance with Article 16 of the Naturalisation Law No. 17 of 1972 and its amended law, which provides for the withdrawal of nationality from any naturalized person “if he commits or attempts to commit an act that poses threat to the security and safety of the State”. The Article does not require the person to be prosecuted and the UAE regime gave them a deadline to adjust their residency status in the state.

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In response, the Muslim Brotherhood strengthened its policy, first adopted in 2004, of addressing foreign human rights groups and foreign media on issues relating to the rule of law, human rights, and civil society institutions. This policy was assisted by the growing role of non-state actors in the international arena and pressure by the US on the Middle Eastern countries to adopt ideas associated with the liberal democratic doctrine of individual freedom and political pluralism and the western model of democratic rule. In this context, the Muslim Brotherhood group in the UAE cooperated with foreign human rights organizations, some of which are credible. However, others are connected with terrorists groups; for example, the Al-Karama Foundation, the former Chairman of which and one of its members in Yemen were convicted of funding al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and other terrorist organizations in the region. The Brotherhood’s cooperation included providing the groups and media with false information about the practices of the UAE security and justice institutions in order to put pressure on the UAE regime and to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to undermine the state’s institutions. Although human rights organizations claimed that they obtained these reports from independent sources, it was subsequently confirmed that source was a person required to appear before UAE courts for trial on terrorism charges. The source was a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE who then became a member of al-Qaeda. After leaving the UAE in 2013, he oversaw the graduation of a battalion consisting of citizens belonging to the GCC in Syria to fight alongside with fighters of al-Nusra Front and the ISIL, which were proscribed by the UN Security Council as terrorist organizations in 2013.

341 Ibid.
The Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE also raised the subject of the lack of freedom of speech, despite the fact that this right is granted in the UAE constitution since 1971. Article 30 of the Constitution provides for the freedom of opinion and expression in speech, writing, and other means of expression within the limits of the law. An example of this type of attack was by Saleh Al-Dhufairi, one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE, who wrote on his Twitter page that the UAE will not enjoy security until the organization members are liberated from the constraints of laws and regulations.\footnote{Twitter. (9 April 2012). Available at: <URL: https://twitter.com/SalehAlDhufairi/status/18930057845 3700608> Access Date: 9 April 2012. (In Arabic).} In addition, one female member claimed that through freedom of expression young people in our communities who do not belong to the organization could be convinced of the idea of changing the regime. However, because of the lack of freedom of expression, young people are satisfied with their ruling regimes and they are indifferent about participating in governance because all their material needs are met.\footnote{Adel, Wael. (April 2011). “The Concept of Power Lecture”. The Second Youth Rising Forum in Qatar. Available at: <URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0721QqbXE&feature=plcp> Access Date: 23 April 2012. (In Arabic).} Thus, in addition to appearing in the foreign media, members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE openly used the Internet and social networks to gain the local and global support to mobilise against the regime of the UAE.

The leader who wrote on Twitter about the need to allow members to be liberated from the repressive laws, also stated at one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s secret meetings that in order to succeed in seizing power in the UAE, bloodshed and loss of lives would have to be made. In January 2013, the UAE security services arrested the leader and other members of the group for planning to overthrow the government. The members were referred to the public prosecutor for investigation by the public prosecutor.\footnote{The details of the trial highlight that the UAE security agencies monitored the defendants since 2010, after acquiring written permission from the public prosecutor.} The public prosecutor then referred them to the Federal Supreme Court, which considers crimes that affect the federal structure of the state, for trial.

The trial was conducted in the presence of the relatives of the defendants, and representatives of the Emirates Association for Human Rights, of civil society organizations and of the local press. At the trial, evidence, including audio and video tapes of secret meetings held by the defendants, such as the meeting mentioned previously, was presented. The evidence revealed that the
defendants were managing a secret organization. The organizational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood group branch in the UAE was similar to that of a state. A Consultative Council (shura) consisting of 30 members elect the organization’s Board of Directors from among its members. The Board of Directors consists of the chairman, vice-chairman, secretary-general, and a further five members. Moreover, the Board of Directors has three bodies under its supervision. The first body is the Areas Office, which is a centralized leadership body that manages the organization’s administrative offices across different areas of the UAE (Abu Dhabi, Bani Yas city, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah and the rest of the regions of eastern coast overlooking the Gulf of Oman). Each office is composed of around seven persons and has a chairman, vice-chairman and a secretary, in addition to representatives from the Office of Local Committees, such as the Educational Committee, which educates the families of members. This was based on the system developed by al-Banna and is considered to be one of the most important practical areas of spiritual education in the Muslim Brotherhood. In this system every responsible member of the committee presides over no more than five new members through weekly meetings at one of their houses on the pretext of increasing harmony among them and teaching them the Islamic religion subjects, using the books of Muslim Brotherhood thinkers, but primarily Qutb. The members of the Student Action Committee, which is another local committee supervised by the administrative offices, work on attracting young people in schools, colleges and universities to enter the ranks of the secret organization. In addition, the administrative offices supervises the Social Action Committee, the members of which aim to control associations of public benefit with the aim of creating a popular base. Overall, the task of the administrative offices is managing the organizational work in areas that fall within their jurisdiction, in addition to collecting information that serves the organization's interests.

347 Al-Qaradawi (2003), op. cit., pp. 177-178.
are submitted by the administrative offices periodically to the management office, which, in turn, are presented to the Board of Directors.

The responsibility of the second body, called the Office of Central Committees, is to support the work of the organization across the country. The Office of Central Committees includes the Planning Committee, which has the task of developing the organizational plans followed and applied by the organization in order to seize power. It also includes the Committee of Expat Communities, which aims to attract members from the Asian Muslim communities, particularly, those from India and Bengal, to support the organization in the future as they form the majority of the population in the UAE. These expats are thought to be more likely to support the Muslim Brotherhood in overthrowing the UAE regime than the indigenous population. There is also the Rights Committee, which includes a number of lawyers and university graduates, is tasked with communicating with human rights organizations abroad and to provide them with reports to incite world opinion against the UAE regime and to put pressure on it to permit the activities of the organization's members in the UAE. The Charity Committee, which also falls under the umbrella of the Office of Central Committees, is charged with collecting donations, alms and zakat (taxation) from benefactors in order to support both the activities and programs of the organization within the state,\(^{351}\) and charity associations outside the UAE belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Finance Committee is responsible for collecting the subscriptions of members, with each member paying an amount of 5% to 7% of his/her monthly income to support the goal of establishing an Islamic State on the territory of the UAE.\(^{352}\) This Committee also determines the organization’s annual budget and diverts surplus funds to the Investment Committee, which is responsible for the management of organization’s longer-term investments, including trading, lands, real estate and stocks. These assets are registered in the names of members in order to safeguard the confidentiality of the organization. The Media Committee has the mission to promote its message by means of audio-visual media and social communication. As highlighted previously, the Committee attempted to incite the people of the UAE against the regime of their own country through the means of social communication. The International Relations Committee,


\(^{352}\) Interview with Jamal Al-Hosani, a former Brotherhood member in the UAE, in Abu Dhabi Al Emarat TV Channel, (18 April 2014). Part two, op. cit.
which also falls under the aegis of the Office of Central Committees, is charged with communicating with the Muslim Brotherhood’s regional or international organizations. One example is when the Organization brought to the UAE scholars and preachers from the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood after it failed to gain popularity among the tribal UAE community. Furthermore, the Education Committee oversees the private schools owned by the organization and administers the affairs of education in general within the UAE by penetrating the national educational institutions, such as the Ministries of Education and Higher Education and Scientific Research, in addition to educational councils and educational zones. Lastly, the Dialogue Committee aims to open dialogue with community groups and the political leadership in the UAE in order to gain recognition for the legitimacy of the organisation within the UAE.353

The third body, which is under the direct supervision and leadership of the organization’s Board of Directors, is known as the External Action Group. The members of this group focus on three committees, which were created after the outbreak of the Arab Spring, in order to expedite their grab for power in the UAE. The first is the Supporting Committee, through which the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the UAE communicate with the other organizations affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, whether at a regional or international level, in order to gain political support for mobilising against the regime in the UAE.354 The leaders of the organization travelled to Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco after the political parties affiliated to the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood gained access to power in those countries.355 In addition, some Muslim Brotherhood leaders communicated directly with the embassies of foreign countries in the UAE in order to promote the organization and provide foreign diplomats with information to discredit the role of government institutions in the UAE. Furthermore, the Committee members demand assistance from other countries to put pressure on the authorities to recognize their secret organization, while the board members have revealed to the membership that there are foreign

countries, which support their aspirations to gain power. The second committee under the aegis of the External Action Group is the Media Committee, which communicates with the outside world. The Media Committee commissioned members of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood to establish the Emirates Centre for Human Rights in London and trigger media campaigns in Europe to distort the role played by the institutions of the UAE in maintaining its security. This was achieved by creating allegations about human rights violations by these institution, in particular the security agencies, against what were described as political opponents of the ruling regime. In this context, the Emirates Centre for Human Rights, since its inception, has adopted the cause of the members of the secret organization in the UAE and promoted their alleged suffering to the international media and international human rights associations in order to incite international public opinion against the UAE regime. Moreover, The Telegraph newspaper confirms that the Emirates Centre for Human Rights is a front created by the wife of the CEO and founding member of the Cordoba Foundation in the United Kingdom. The newspaper reported that “the Cordoba Foundation works closely with other British extremist groups which seek the creation of an Islamic dictatorship, or caliphate, in Europe”.

In addition, the British ex-Prime Minister David Cameron listed this organization as a “front for the Muslim Brotherhood” in 2008. In addition, in 2004, UK bank accounts of the Cordoba Foundation and its chief executive and his wife were closed, not because of their religious affiliation, but because the bank felt that they represent a “potential risk for the future”, according to Hara Rafiq, Head of Outreach for Counter-Extremism at the Quilliam Foundation. The listing of the Cordoba Foundation was taken following a review conducted by Sir John Jenkins, the UK ambassador in Saudi Arabia. The review investigate the philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood, its values, policies, and the

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extent of its connections with extremist organizations, as well activities carried out by its members in the UK, and its impact on the national security of the UK.\textsuperscript{361}

The third committee under the aegis of the External Action Group is the Legal Committee, which is responsible for building legal relations international organisations. These include the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe, which is affiliated to the International Organization of Muslim Brotherhood,\textsuperscript{362} whose leaders in the 1980s issued a statement of support in the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE’s \textit{Islah} magazine for the terrorists who killed Sadat at the military parade in 1981. The Legal Committee requested the support of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe, as one of the organizations under the umbrella of the European Network on Religion and Belief that participate in formal and informal consultations with the European Union, to gain access to the European Parliament. Furthermore, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe has worked with other organizations belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood attempting to influence the decisions of the European Parliament in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE. This influence resulted in the European Parliament passing a resolution condemning the human rights record in the UAE, without giving the opportunity to present its point of view or the right of reply to the UAE authorities to the charges contained in the report. The influence was also demonstrated in the formulation of the European Parliament’s decision to issue two resolutions: the first specifically addressed the issue of the detainees belonging to the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, while the second referred to other aspects of human rights. According to \textit{Al Bayan} newspaper, the second resolution was drafted after the interventions of organizations belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood to suggest that concerns are not limited the detainees.\textsuperscript{363} Furthermore, in 2014, Ewald Stadler, a member of the European Parliament from Austria presented a parliamentary submission questioning the impact of organizations affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood on the decisions of the European Union. He raised the subject of consultations with the Cordoba Foundation and the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe by the Directorate-General for


\textsuperscript{363} The Staff. (11 November 2012). “Elusion and confusion in the European Parliament after issuing a decision about the UAE”. \textit{Middle East Online}. Available at: <URL: http://middle-east-online.com/?id=142375> Access Date: 14 August 2014. (In Arabic).
Justice (DG JUSTICE) in the European Commission. Stadler also demanded clarification from the Commission on whether it allowed for one or more of those organizations to use facilities in the EU, and how the Commission classifies such organizations enabling them to gain an advisory position in the European Union.

However, the internal campaigns launched by the Muslim Brotherhood through social networks along with their external campaigns with some human rights organizations failed to force the UAE authorities to cancel the trial the Muslim Brotherhood members at the Federal Supreme Court. The case continued in accordance with the principles of a fair trial enshrined in the UAE constitution, with the presence of the defendants’ relatives, representatives of civil society associations and the local media. Since the beginning of the trial, the Federal Supreme Court ensured the defendants’ freedom to choose their defence team, and has provided the indictment and its annexes to their lawyers immediately. In addition, upon referring the case to the judiciary the defendants were able to contact and meet their lawyers. Furthermore, the usual guarantees provided for defendant were available, including which include enabling the accused to present their defence personally, giving them complete freedom to provide proof of their innocence in word and in writing, providing defence witnesses, enabling them to question the prosecution witnesses, technical experts and financial experts on their own and through their lawyers. Finally, the accused were able to review the audio and video evidences presented in the case file and to respond to the requests of some of the defendants to listen to them in closed secret sessions. At the end of the trial the defendants who were convicted of membership in a secret organization were sentenced to prison for varying durations, while those whose involvement was not proven were declared innocent.

However, since the end of this trial, further cases against other members of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood within the UAE have been opened. A cell composed of foreign residents and UAE citizens working within the state was arrested in 2012. This cell sought

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to establish a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood organization within the UAE, and create offices across the various emirates. The cell was to summon members belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and to consolidate the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood Organization in their families. In addition, it was to recruit other Egyptian residents along with UAE citizens in order to spread the ideology and thoughts of Muslim Brotherhood Organization. Furthermore, it was to assist members to undermine and demolish the state institutions with an aim to gain power in the state. At the end of the trial, the Federal Court sentenced the convicts to terms ranging from three months to five years in prison.\textsuperscript{367} Then, in 2016, the Federal Supreme Court issued its judgment on Yemeni members of a Muslim Brotherhood cell, which was active in the UAE passing sentences ranging upwards from three years but freeing two of the 19 accused. Those found guilty were accused of establishing a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the state, collecting donations and funds without prior authorization from the competent authority, and cooperating with the secret UAE-branch of Muslim Brotherhood organization in order to implement its plan to gain power through the overthrow of state institutions.\textsuperscript{368} The members of the cell formed an executive office for their organization in the UAE, to which other administrative offices distributed across the state, were affiliated. This was done in coordination with the UAE branch of Muslim Brotherhood in order to achieve their goal to seize power in the State. The Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood organization in the UAE was supporting the UAE-branch of secret Muslim Brotherhood organization with funding of AED 200,000 a year from donations and funds collected illegally by its members in the UAE. The remaining funds were sent to Yemen to support the Muslim Brotherhood there. The funds transferred by UAE-based organization to the Yemeni organisation reached about AED2 million.\textsuperscript{369}


\textsuperscript{368} WAM. (13 June 2016). ““The Supreme Federal Court” issues judgments in the case of the Yemeni "Muslim Brotherhood" organization”. \textit{Albayan Newspaper}. Available at: \texttt{<URL:http://www.albayan.ae/across-the-uae/accidents/2016-06-13-1.2660100> } Access Date: 17 June 2016. (In Arabic).

4.2.2 Al-Qaeda

The ideas of Sayyid Qutb, the theorist of Muslim Brotherhood, have provided the inspiration to radical Islamic groups against the perceived infidel regimes. In this context, AQAP sought to establish an Islamic emirate across the Arabian Peninsula by dismantling the ruling regimes in the region. This was to be carried out mainly through destabilizing such states, by launching attacks against oil facilities, foreigners, and security forces, which would weaken regimes allowing them to be toppled. AQAP was established in the Arabian Peninsula through a merger of its two branches in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, but its development has passed through five stages.

The first stage was laying down the foundations. The origins of Al-Qaeda as an organization inspiring terrorism around the world and training operatives can be traced to the Soviet War in Afghanistan from the early to the late 1980s. At first militants were recruited from the Arabian Peninsula and other Arab countries in training camps in Afghanistan in order to fight for the Afghans against the communist Afghans supported by Soviet forces. The Cold War prompted the US to seek the help of militants from Arab and Islamic countries to fight the Soviet forces. According to the Green Belt Strategy, the US’ plan was to stop the Soviet expansion into the non-communist mid-south Asia, and to dismantle the mid-Asian Soviet Republics by stoking militant and vehemently anti-communist Islam in the countries and neighbouring regions. The approach was adopted because the vast majority of the population in those areas embraced Islam. The US urged Arab and Islamic regimes to open jihad for Muslims by supporting the Afghans in their fight against the communists. Some Arab and Islamic regimes allowed their citizens to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight for the Afghans or to take part in aid operations. Volunteers

376 Until 2000, a number of Salafist Jihadist groups and camps in Afghanistan enjoyed a degree of autonomy during the rule of Taliban. These included (1) Al-Qaeda, (2) Jordan Mujahideen, (3) Egyptian Islamic Jihad, (4) Egyptian
included the youth of the Arabian Peninsula who received training in Afghanistan under the supervision of Osama Bin Laden. In these camps, militants were trained in the use of guns, explosives, and detonators. Furthermore, they received lectures about Qutb’s thoughts, which were adopted by Al-Qaeda as the pillar of its ideology. Abdullah Azzam taught his vision about global jihad. Azzam is of the view that regimes are based on man-made laws and regulations and such regimes, whether Arab, American, Afghan or Russian, do not believe in God. He argues that this is because those who apply judgments that are not based on Qur’an and Sunnah are disbelievers, even if they are Muslims. Thus, according to Azzam, the laws that govern the community set the identity of the individual whether or he/she is a believer. This stage came to an end in the late 1980s with the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, and the militants, including Osama Bin Laden, returned to their homelands.

The second stage was that of exploration. This stage was primarily an attempt to find the best regions from which to run the Islamist struggle. In the late 1990s, Bin Laden based himself in Saudi Arabia with a cell of Saudi and Yemeni mujahideen who returned with him from Afghanistan. They chose to launch their attacks against the Marxist pro-Russian Republic in South Yemen. However, the Yemeni government arrested a number soon after they crossed the border.

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377 Osama Bin Laden: A Saudi millionaire, who volunteered to work in Afghanistan during the Soviet Invasion. Later, his role developed with the establishment of camps to receive and provide volunteers, and train them. The young people, often from the Arabian Peninsula, became the nucleus of Al-Qaeda, which he led. In 2011, Bin Laden was killed by a special unit of the United States army in Pakistan. See, Walsh, Declan; Adams, Richard and MacAskill, Ewen. (2 May 2011). “Osama bin Laden is dead, Obama announces”. The Guardian. Available at: <URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/02/osama-bin-laden-dead-obama> Access Date: 29 November 2011.
379 Dr. Abdullah Azzam, a Jordanian Professor on the shari'a. In the early 1980s, he worked as a lecturer in the University of King Abdul Aziz in Jeddah, where he met Osama Bin Laden, who was his student. At the outset of the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, he left Saudi Arabia for Pakistan to receive Arab volunteers in Afghanistan. There he worked as a consultant for teaching mujahideen in Afghanistan and Pakistan training camps. In 1989, he was killed in a car bomb in Pakistan. See, Atwan, Abdel Bari. (2006). The Secret History of al Qaeda. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 73-74.
381 Abu Haneya, Hassan (2011), op. cit., p. 79
Correspondence took place with the Saudi Arabian government and Bin Laden was officially charged with responsibility for the attacks. However, the Saudi regime failed to take any measures against him. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Bin Laden suggested to the Saudi government that he should take over defence in Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait through the Arab mujahideen who had fought by his side in Afghanistan, but the Saudi regime rejected this suggestion. Later, the US-led coalition of foreign forces was called to defend Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait. This deployment angered Bin Laden, as he believed the presence of foreign troops or “infidel militaries” on the Holy land of Mecca and Medina, profaned sacred soil.

In 1991, Bin Laden left Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan. However, conditions in Afghanistan were unstable due to armed conflict between the various Afghan militias, and Bin Laden moved again, this time to Sudan, which was ruled by the Islamic-oriented National Islamic Front. There Bin Laden launched a number of construction and agricultural projects. Moreover, Bin Laden summoned the Arab mujahideen from Afghanistan to Sudan, along with their families, to reside there. In 1992, Bin Laden launched his first terrorist attack in which two bombs were detonated in Aden, Yemen, targeting US forces at the Golden Moor Hotel, killing three people and injuring five others. In 1994, Al-Qaeda downed two Blackhawk helicopters in Mogadishu, leading to the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia. The same year, the Saudi government revoked Bin Laden’s citizenship and froze his wealth on grounds of funding terrorist groups. In 1996, Bin Laden and his group left Sudan for Afghanistan after the Sudanese authorities made it clear that they were no longer welcome there. In 1998, Bin Laden declared the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders. Bin Laden escalated his speeches at the time in the Arabian Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia and Yemen. He stated that the US’ presence in Saudi Arabia was an occupation of a country of sacred places, classifying it as second only to the Palestinian occupation.
The third stage was the stage of the structural organization of AQAP. 1998 marked the inception of a local organization of al-Qaeda in Yemen, which launched a number of terrorist attacks in Yemen, the most prominent of which was the bombing of the missile destroyer U.S.S. Cole in 2000, killing 17 US soldiers. In 2002, the UAE security authorities arrested one of the perpetrators of the attack Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, a Saudi national. He was arrested while in the final stages of launching “attacks on vital economic targets” to cause “the highest possible casualties among nationals and foreigners in the UAE”. In 2003, another local Al-Qaeda organization was established in Saudi Arabia, which launched a number of terrorist attacks, the most important of which was the attack on the US Consulate General in Jeddah in 2004, killing five of the consulate employees.

The fourth stage is the stage of disobedience, in which both local branches of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Yemen united under the regional leadership in Yemen. This came as the Saudi authorities heightened their activities against the organisation on its territories, which forced a number of the members to flee to Yemen, making use of the poor security situation in the country. The central government was at war with the Al Houthi rebels in the north and faced separatist action in the south. Moreover, the geography of Yemen, characterised by mountains, valleys, deserts, and coasts, and its demographic structure with its tribal nature suited the demands of an armed organization such as Al-Qaeda. It offered a refuge for strangers and good support. In this phase, AQAP launched a number of attacks inside and outside the Arabian Peninsula. In 2009, it attempted to assassinate Prince Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud, the Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior, during a suicide attack, which led to the death of the mastermind of the assassination attempt, while Prince Nayef was saved. In the same year, one of AQAP’s members attempted to bomb Northwest Airlines flight no. 253 on its way from Amsterdam to Detroit, but the attempt

389 Ibid.
390 Ibid.
393 Shaye, Abdul-Illah Haider . (21 January 2010), op. cit.
failed. In 2010, the Brigades of Abdulla Azzam of Al-Qaeda bombed the Japanese oil tanker M Star near the Hormuz Straight. The terrorist group hit the tanker with a small boat laden with explosives, leading to the destruction of one side of the tanker hull, and one crew member was slightly injured. No oil leakage resulted, although the tanker was on its way to Japan with two million barrels of oil shipped from Port of Umm Said in Qatar and the Port of Das Island in the UAE. Immediately after the attack, the vessel headed to the Port of Fujairah in the UAE, to inspect the damage and check the reason for the explosions, as the crew did not know the actual cause of explosion. Finally, in 2010, based on information obtained from Saudi Intelligence, security officials in the UK and the UAE found two booby-trapped pieces of cargo sent from Yemen to Chicago, US transiting via Dubai (UAE) and East Midland (UK) international airports. Security officials at the East Midlands airport and officials in Dubai International Airport found plastic explosives inside laser printer cartridges, just before they were shipped on board the planes. The bombs were intended to explode over the Atlantic or just prior to landing in the US. AQAP was charged with this plot, as the evidence pointed to them.

The fifth phase started with the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen, which resulted in radical groups taking advantage of the poor security situation. Thus, AQAP was able to exploit the chaos in Yemen in 2011 during the period of

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401 Ibid.
opposition protests against the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Indeed, it was able to gain control of the province of Abyan in the south,\textsuperscript{407} albeit only for one year, as they retreated after an attack by the Yemeni army forces allied with local resistance fighters, to liberate the region from their grip.\textsuperscript{408} Thereafter, AQAP elements took refuge in the desert and rugged mountainous areas in southern Yemen.\textsuperscript{409} It was only after the outbreak of the civil war in 2015 between the Houthis forces and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh on the one hand, and the forces loyal to Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi on the other hand, that AQAP was again able to take advantage of the chaos and increase its active presence in the country.\textsuperscript{410} Inside Yemen, AQAP managed to regain control of the province of Abyan,\textsuperscript{411} and expanded into the city Al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramaut province, as the state institutions collapsed. It was able to exploit the discontent resulting from the killings and repression of civilians by the Houthis in the south by using the tribal structure as a social incubator for its presence in the region.\textsuperscript{412}

The Arab coalition, which entered the civil war in Yemen in support of the legitimate president, has reduced the risk of AQAP expanding further. In 2016, Yemeni armed forces loyal to President Hadi; with the support of the UAE armed forces and other coalition forces liberated Hadramout province from AQAP.\textsuperscript{413} The AQAP forces made a tactical withdrawal from the province and returned to the desert and rugged mountainous areas in southern Yemen, vowing revenge against the UAE, which led the liberation process of the city. The liberation saw the killing of nearly one

\begin{thebibliography}{1}
\bibitem{409} The Staff. (16 January 2015). “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a factory for the production of global terrorism”. \textit{Al-Arab newspaper}. Available at: <URL: http://alarab.co.uk/m/?id=42856>Access Date: 25 January 2016. (In Arabic).
\bibitem{411} Al Qalisi, Mohammed. (3 December 2015), op. cit.
\bibitem{412} Maqtari, Bushra. (28 August 2015). Al-Qaeda in Yemen: the rightful heir of chaos. \textit{Al-Araby Al-Jadeed}. Available at: <URL:https://www.alaraby.co.uk/Print/cba4e9c4-93b6-41ce-acd9-46dfec8074c5/905a28fe-9db8-47ce-bbeb-3fc7b1cf258> Access Date: 14 November 2015. (In Arabic).
\end{thebibliography}
thousand AQAP fighters, as well as the seizure of huge amounts of heavy, medium and light weapons of all kinds, in addition to tons of ammunition, bombs, rockets, and explosives.\footnote{112}

In 2013, in the UAE, the security agencies uncovered an al-Qaeda cell, which was planning to implement operations affecting homeland security, as well as seeking to expand its activities to the regional countries, according to an official statement published by the WAM.\footnote{113} The circumstances of the case were made clear during the trial of cell members at the Supreme Federal Court. The Public Prosecution charged the nine foreign defendants with the formation of a cell belonging to al-Qaeda organization, with the aim to promote the objectives of the organization and attract new members to join them. In addition, they sent others to fight with Jabhat Al-Nusra (Victory Front), the (then) branch of al-Qaeda in Syria. Jabhat Al-Nusra are involved in the Syrian civil war in order to establish the Islamic caliphate. The defendants also collected money and sent it to Victory Front. At the end of the trial, the Federal Court sentenced the accused to sentences ranging from life imprisonment to seven years, but freed two innocent defendants.\footnote{114} In addition, in 2015, the UAE security agencies caught a terrorist group called Al Manara Youth Group, formed by a UAE citizen, who was an ideological supporter of al-Qaeda. The group, consisting of 41 persons, were planning to carry out operations with the aim of destabilizing the stability of the state in order to seize power and establish an Islamic caliphate state on its territory. In addition, firearms, ammunition and materials used for making explosives were found in their possession. Furthermore, the security agencies uncovered the organizational structure of the group, which includes a chairman, vice-chairman and committees, in addition to cells with assigned tasks.\footnote{115} The defendants were referred to the Supreme Federal Court for trial following the public prosecutor’s investigations. The defendants were charged with joining a terrorist group. The court listened to statements from the accused and the arguments of their lawyers. The court ruled at the

end of the trial, which lasted for several months, with sentences against the convicts of the case, ranging from life imprisonment to six months and acquitted seven.\textsuperscript{418}

In 2016, the Supreme Federal Court had also considered the case of 23, 21 of whom were Yemeni and two Emiratis, accused of joining al-Qaeda in Yemen.\textsuperscript{419} At the end of the trial, the court sentenced two of the accused, in absentia, to life imprisonment and 12 others to three years imprisonment, while the court acquitted another nine defendants.\textsuperscript{420} Also in 2016, the Supreme Federal Court sentenced an Emirati citizen to life imprisonment, after he was caught by the UAE security forces and charged with planning to carry out terrorist acts. The security services found plans to blow up vital civilian and military facilities in the UAE. The defendant’s house contained prohibited chemicals, tools, equipment and devices, which are used in the explosives and arms industry. In addition, the public prosecutor found that the accused was running social networks that promoted extremist ideas, and that he was collecting funds for AQAP before declaring his allegiance to ISIS and setting himself as the Emir of the organization in the UAE.\textsuperscript{421} After the trial, which included a review of a medical report on the accused’s mental health, the court found him guilty.\textsuperscript{422}

4.2.3 ISIS

In a different arena, at the end June 2014, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and in the Arabian states as Daesh, announced the establishment of an Islamic caliphate under the name of the Islamic State. The Caliphate, which extended across Iraq and Syria, was led by the self-appointed Caliph of Muslims, Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS. The group evolved from the nucleus of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (also known al-Qaeda in Iraq), which was founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004. Salem Al-Jamili, a former officer in the Iraqi intelligence, revealed that the then Iraqi President Saddam Hussein tried in the 1990s to attract al-Qaeda to overthrow the Saudi regime. When al-Qaeda started to launch terrorist attacks on Saudi government institutions in order to force the regime to expel foreign forces from its territory, Hussein sent a message in 1995 to bin Laden in Sudan offering cooperation against the foreign troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. The message was sent via a mediator belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, which had a close relationship with bin Laden. However, the mediator informed Iraqi intelligence that bin Laden refused to cooperate with Saddam Hussein because he viewed his Ba’ath regime to be an infidel regime and that he was responsible for bringing foreign troops to the Arabian Peninsula. Other attempts by the former Iraqi regime were mediated by Hassan al-Turabi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, but bin Laden continued to refuse.423

Upon the fall of Hussein’s regime in Iraq, militants from a number of countries joined the forces associated with the former Iraqi regime against occupying forces in Iraq.424 Thereafter, the militants and the former Iraqi army officers came under the framework of al-Qaeda in Iraq under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.425 The organization evolved after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006 at the hands of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, whom Osama bin Laden called on to pledge allegiance as an Emir of the Islamic State of Iraq in 2007, at which stage most of militant groups in Iraq pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi.426 As the organization took control of a vast swathe of territory in the Sunni areas of Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq transformed its organization-style management structure to that of a state-style management structure. Many former Iraqi army officers assumed leadership positions in the military organization and the shura (Consultative) Council of Islamic State of Iraq. These military leaders developed the military forces along the lines of a nascent state, in terms of regulation, plans and military equipment.427

425 Ibid.
427 Ibid.
For example, Haji Bakar, a member of the Islamic State of Iraq organization who reached the rank of colonel in the Iraqi army before the invasion, was assigned the role of following up the production of chemical weapons, in addition to weapons development. He also played a big role in the enrolment of a large number of Iraqi officers, who had been discharged from the service after the Iraqi occupation. He was eventually killed in January 2014 in fighting between the militant groups in Syria.\textsuperscript{428} Moreover, the military leaders developed multiple sources of funding for the organization. They adopted a more pragmatic approach than bin Laden, the leader of the organization, who stuck to his convictions, despite offers from countries that were in conflict with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood to provide logistical assistance to his organization. In contrast, the organization in Iraq started to receive financial funding from countries across the Middle East through unofficial funding from individuals running humanitarian and charitable associations linked to ruling regimes.\textsuperscript{429} Moreover, the former Iraqi officers used the tactic of waging military operations that had an economic return for the organization, such as taking control of energy sites and marketing products through indirect network affiliated to the organization. In addition, the organisation imposed taxes in the areas under its control. The organization also resorted to the kidnappings of foreigners for ransom.\textsuperscript{430}

Following the killing of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State in Iraq, and Abu Ayyub al-Masri his number two in April 2010 in a joint attack by US and Iraqi forces in Tikrit city,\textsuperscript{431} a new stage started. The group was experiencing a series of failures as a result of the rebellion of local Sunni tribes following aggressive acts by the members of the organization against the local population. At the time, al-Qaeda was in retreat not only in Iraq, but also across the whole region. At this stage, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi assumed leadership of the organization.\textsuperscript{432}

\textsuperscript{428} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{430} Manna, Haytham. (29 August 2014). “Funds of 'Islamic state' are stained with the blood of innocent people”. \textit{Al-Arab Newspaper}. Issue 9645, p. 6. (In Arabic).
The background of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is subject to speculation, although it is generally agreed that he is Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri, born in 1971 in the city of Samarra in Iraq, and that he moved to Baghdad where he gained a BA, MA and PhD in Islamic studies at the Islamic University of Baghdad.\textsuperscript{433} He worked as a professor and imam of a mosque during Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, reports differ concerning his affiliation and progression in al-Qaeda in Iraq. Some reports indicate that after the occupation of Iraq, al-Baghdadi founded an armed group bearing the name of Army of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah (Adherents to the Sunnah and Community Army) to resist the foreign presence. The group is reported to have joined al-Qaeda in Iraq through the Mujahideen Shura Council, which was founded by jihadist groups at the beginning of 2006. However, the umbrella organisation only lasted for six months, when it was agreed to dissolve their individual jihadist organizations and incorporate them under the authority of the Islamic State of Iraq. The new group was led by elements from al-Qaeda in Iraq who were the most qualified leaders in terms of both shari`a and jihad, and had the aim of restoring the Islamic caliphate in the region.\textsuperscript{434} However, this hypothesis is not consistent with reports, which confirm that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was arrested by the US military and held in Camp Bucca from 2005 to 2009. In addition, according to the official announcement, the group of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was not among the jihadist organizations that joined under the framework of the Mujahideen Shura Council; only six were named: al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the Army of the Victorious Sect, Ansar al-Tawhid Brigades, the Islamic Jihad Brigades, the Strangers Brigades, and the Horrors Brigades.

During the first few months of taking control al-Baghdadi started to tactically withdrawal from the areas under the control of Islamic State of Iraq where the inhabitants rejected its presence. However, a new trend started in 2011 with the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. The group implemented large-scale attacks on Iraqi prisons to free hundreds of their members, while its forces attempted to occupy government sites, such as the building of the Council of Salahuddin Governorate for several hours. In addition, the organization built many camps in the desert areas in Iraq. Moreover, the organization forces extended its operations into Syria under the pretext of participating in the jihad against President Bashar Assad’s regime. The organization’s fighters were easily able to cross the 600km border between the two countries. In addition, in Syria in 2011 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi created the al-Nusra Front (known in Arabic as Jabhat al-Nusra), under the

\textsuperscript{433} Ibid.
leadership of a Syrian called Abu Mohammed al-Golani. This policy attempted to gain the confidence of the various Syrian armed groups, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which was backed by regional and international countries that had begun fighting the regular forces of Syrian government. Al-Baghdadi’s plan was to mislead the Syrian opposition in believing that Islamic State in Iraq forces were supporting the Syrian people against the Assad regime, rather than spreading the ideology of Sayyid Qutb and annexing Syria into the Islamic caliphate. Al-Baghdadi revealed the nature of the relationship between the al-Nusra Front and Islamic State in Iraq, when he announced the establishment of an ISIL in an audio tape on 9 April 2013 on jihadist websites and broadcast by Al Jazeera. In the tape, he stated that:

We assigned Al-Golani, who is one of our soldiers, with a group of our sons and pushed them from Iraq to Al-Sham to meet with our cells in Al-Sham and set for them the plans and drew for them the policy of work and supplied them with half of what is in the treasury every month and supplied them with men who became experienced from the battlefields from Muhajirin and Ansar so they did well next to their brothers from the ardent sons of Al-Sham, and the influence of the Islamic State expanded to Al-Sham and we didn’t declare that for security reasons for the people to see the reality of the State away from the distortion, forgery and fabrication of the media and time has come to declare before the people of Al-Sham and the whole world that Jabhat Al-Nusra is only an expansion for the Islamic State of Iraq and part of it and we are determined after making Istikhabara of Allah Almighty and consulting whom we trust in his religion and wisdom to continue in the journey of ascending of the group by passing all that will be said since the pleasure of Allah is above everything, and no matter what happens to us because of that so we declare keeping our trust in Allah abolishing the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and abolishing the name of Jabhat Al-Nusra, and joining them under one name ‘The Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham’ and also uniting the banner which is the banner of the Islamic State the banner of the Khilafah Insha’Allah.\(^\text{435}\)

However, only two days only after the declaration, the al-Nusra Front implicitly rejected his leadership by pledging their allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the al-Qaeda leader, who intervened through a message published on the Al-Jazeera Net website discouraging al-Baghdadi from announcing the new organization.

Nevertheless, al-Baghdadi continued to operate in Syria, where his group fought against al-Nusra Front, the FSA (which is affiliated to the coalition of Syrian opposition), and the Syrian Kurds

who had established a kind of autonomy in the north of the country. He managed to subdue much of Syria, in addition to forming military bodies, public headquarters and shari’a courts for his state on Syrian territory. The organization also managed, through the use of social networks and smart phone applications, to attract new fighters to the organization from around the world. ISIL has used Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and other social media to showcase its brutality, role in the insurgency, influence, power and ascendancy. These messages attract young people who suffer from a feeling of marginalization and who find in the organization a way to take revenge, reprisal and retaliation. Despite its brutality, the organization attracted foreign girls, especially minors, by deceiving the min to relationships with its members through social networking, thereby tempting them with marriage. Upon arrival, the girls are subjected to a professionally planned brainwashing process, which books their travel tickets, send its cadres to receive them at the airport and facilitate their entry into the territories under its control. The girls are then directed to use social media to promote the story of their affiliation to the organization in order to attract more girls.

The next turning point came in June 2014, when the fighters of ISIL which had been based in the city of Fallujah in Iraq since the beginning of 2014, took Iraq's second biggest city Mosul, Tikrit, and parts of Samarra. Around 30,000 government forces fled, leaving their weapons, equipment, vehicles and military bases to the several thousand fighters from ISIL. It also gained control over four oil fields to the north of Mosul city and south of Tikrit city, making the organization one of the richest extremist groups in the world. As a consequence of their gains, they announced, at the end of June 2014, the establishment of the ‘State of the Islamic Caliphate’ and changed the title of their organization to the ‘Islamic State’ (IS). They also asked those who believe in the ideas of Sayyid Qutb to pledge allegiance to the organization’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as ‘Caliph’ to the Muslims of the world.

This declaration faced opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood organization. Its spiritual leader, Yusuf al-Qaradawi stated that the declaration of the Islamic Caliphate was a false step that did not serve the Islamic project. He explained that the appointment of al-Baghdadi as a Caliph to Muslims does not meet several shari’a conditions, including linking the Caliphate to an organization with

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a reputation for strictness that would damage the Caliphate project. As is evident from al-Qaradawi’s statement he does not oppose the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, but he opposes its control by al-Baghdadi. Al-Qaradawi argues in an interview published on the web that al-Baghdadi was a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, who left in order to become the leader of the IS after his release from Camp Bucca prison.

However, the international community only took action against IS after it began its incursion into the Kurdistan region of Iraq and committed genocide crimes against more than 500 people from the Yazidi minority, in addition to capturing more than 300 women. Dabiq magazine, issued by IS in English, claimed that the women and their children were spoils of war, and therefore can be sold in a slave market. The incursion created a humanitarian disaster as thousands of Yazidis were displaced into Kurdistan and the surrounding areas. Accordingly, the international community started to provide humanitarian aid to those displaced and provided military assistance to stop further gains by IS. Moreover, the US formed an international coalition to bomb positions held by IS in both Iraq and Syria in order to weaken their power and support government forces in Iraq and the forces of the moderate Syrian opposition in Syria. Military personnel from Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE participated in coalition.

Support from the Muslim Brotherhood Organization for IS was given by al-Qaradawi who condemned the air attacks on his official page on Twitter. He declared that he would not support the US attacks on IS as they were not driven by the values of Islam, but by national interests.

439 Asharq Al-Awsat Editors. (14 October 2014). “al-Qaradawi: al-Baghdadi was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, and after his release from prison; «Daesh» lured him with the leadership”. Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper. Available at: <URL: http://www.aawsat.com/home/article/200881> Access Date: 24 October 2014. (In Arabic).
440 Yazidis are a group following the Yezidi religion, which is one of the oldest Eastern religions to have emerged from the civilization of Mesopotamia. It embraces its own beliefs and rituals that are unrelated to the Islamic religion. This group belongs ethnically to the Kurds, and most of them live in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.
This support came despite his previous statements that he was opposed to the previous incarnation, the ISIL, and he opposed the establishment of IS.

In response to the attacks by the international coalition, IS called for members of Islamic extremist groups across the world who support the Islamic Caliphate State to kill the citizens of countries that were participating in the coalition. Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, the spokesperson for IS, stated in an audio recording broadcast in more than one language on jihadist websites, that:

If you can kill an American or European, especially the French, or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other one, whether he is civilian or military, from the citizens of those countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, put your trust in God and kill him in any way or manner whatsoever.\textsuperscript{444}

Accordingly, the countries participating in the international coalition have tightened their security procedures.

Meanwhile, the security services in the UAE arrested elements of a cell belonging to Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar Al Sham, offshoots of al-Qaeda,\textsuperscript{445} several months before the UAE joined the international coalition against IS in Iraq and Syria. The investigations by the UAE Public Prosecution showed that the suspects were part of al-Qaeda support groups; some of whom had fought for militant groups affiliated to al-Qaeda in Syria. Those arrested had various roles, including: attracting UAE citizens to fight in the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham; collecting and transferring money to Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar Al Sham in Syria; providing these groups with the necessary equipment and devices needed to support terrorist acts; manufacturing bombs inside the UAE and conducting tests by detonating them in the mountainous areas in the emirate of Ajman; possessing firearms without a license; and managing a website that disseminated information about al-Qaeda with a view to promoting its ideology and attracting new members. The accused were tried before the Federal Supreme Court, in the presence of their lawyers, relatives, representatives of the media and members of civil society organizations.

\textsuperscript{444} Asharq Al-Awsat Editors. (22 September 2014). “«Daash» threatening to kill the citizens of the international coalition against it and calls for Turkey's Kurds to fight ISIS Organization”. \textit{Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper}. Available at: <URL: http://www.aawsat.com/home/article/186611> Access Date: 25 September 2014. (In Arabic).

operating in the state. During the trial, two of the defendants admitted participating in fighting with terrorist groups in Syria. The prosecuting witnesses also confirmed that two of the defendants had received military training from ISIS, adding that the defendants were members’ cells which were connected with IS.

To summarize, the UAE institutions still face threats from extremist groups, such as IS- or al-Qaeda-linked organisation, which follow the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, and which are seeking to establish the so-called Islamic Caliphate State.

**4.3 THE THREATS TO THE PHYSICAL BASE OF THE UAE**

This section assesses the most significant threats identified to the physical base of the UAE using Buzan’s hypothesis (see Figure 4.3). It discusses the Iranian regime’s threat to the UAE, which began in 1971 when the forces of the Shah occupied islands that were under the UAE’s sovereignty. Furthermore, the regime, which gained power in Iran after the fall of the Shah, continued its occupation of the islands and continues to pursue an aggressive policy towards the UAE. The threat to the control over the air, land and sea ports in the UAE are included because the flexible visa system provides an opportunity for subversive elements to enter the country, as does illegal border-crossing. In addition, technological threats that may affect the security and stability of the UAE are discussed, especially as the country's technical development programs are accelerating in a way that could lead to a loss of control by the state over the volume of government-specific data that is hosted in off-state data centres. The nature of the UAE economy and the rapid development phase through which the state is going in parallel with the lack of the necessary legislation to curb the effects of economic downturns and their impact on the stability of the state also constitutes a source of security risks, such as the volume of money transfers abroad and the increase in investment in the real estate sector, which consumes a large proportion of financial liquidity. In addition, environmental threats that could affect the physical base of the UAE are a concern, particularly because of the UAE’s arid environment, the shortage of water resources and dependence on

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seawater desalination for fresh water supply. Other environmental threats to the Gulf region discussed include a leakage of Iran's nuclear reactors which are located on the opposite coast of the Gulf.

Figure 4.3: The Threats to the Physical Base of the UAE

4.3.1 Iran

The UAE and Iran have strong bilateral diplomatic and trade relationships, but the ties are complicated, as since 1971 Iran has continued to occupy the islands of Lesser Tunb, Greater Tunb and Abu Musa, territories which the UAE claims as its own. The roots of the dispute began in 1968, when the UK declared its intention to withdraw from the Gulf region by the end of 1971.448 Iran’s Reza Shah Pahlavi stated to the UK that he would not support UAE’s independence unless he occupied the three islands (Greater and Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa).449 British diplomats held talks with the various parties, with the result was that Ras Al Khaimah’s ruler refused to assign

sovereignty of Greater and Lesser Tunb islands in return for financial compensation from the Shah’s government.\textsuperscript{450}

However, the ruler of Sharjah allowed the peaceful deployment of Iranian forces on Abu Musa Island in areas specified on a map attached to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concluded between his government and the government of the Shah of Iran dated 25 November 1971.\textsuperscript{451} The preamble of the MOU stipulates that the government of Sharjah shall not waive its claim to sovereignty over Abu Musa Island and also will not recognize Iran’s claim to the ownership of the island, while the Iranian government held the same beliefs. The MOU stated that Iran shall have full jurisdiction within the boundaries referred to in the map that were seized by its military forces, and over which the Iranian flag flies. In addition, the government of Sharjah shall maintain full jurisdiction over the rest of the island and the Sharjah flag will continue to fly on its police station in the island. In addition, the agreement stated that Iran and Sharjah recognize the extension of the territorial waters of Abu Musa island to a distance of 12 nautical miles, in which all citizens of Iran and Sharjah shall enjoy equal rights for fishing.\textsuperscript{452} It can be understood from the MOU that the government of Sharjah was compelled to accept these arrangements so as not to lose the entire island; the Iranian acts of aggression on 30 November 1971 that came before the independence of the UAE confirm the reality of this hypothesis. The Iranian forces landed on Abu Musa Island and occupied the areas identified by the MOU, while its forces also occupied Greater and Lesser Tunbs by force. The Iranian troops faced by weak resistance from Ras Al Khaimah forces on Greater Tunb: four Ras Al Khaimah police and three Iranian soldiers were killed and all the Arab families were displaced to Ras Al Khaimah on the same day.\textsuperscript{453}

The UAE continued to claim the three islands after the overthrow of Mohammad Pahlavi and the rise of the Iranian Islamic Republic in 1979. It insisted on its ownership of these islands, but Iran citing historical reasons rejected any dialogue. In 1992, Iran breached the MOU, by seizing full


\textsuperscript{452} Ibid, pp. 490-491.

control over Abu Musa. The Iranian forces on Abu Musa prevented UAE nationals and some foreign teachers affiliated to the UAE Ministry of Education, and members of their families, who were returning to resume their work on the island at the start of the school year, from disembarking. Iranian breaches to the terms of the MOU have been on-going from the 1980s with the aim to put the island under Iranian full sovereignty. These measures include:

1. Aggression against the territories belonging to the jurisdiction of the UAE by building roads and an airport in addition to civilian and military facilities within such territories.

2. Putting restrictions on the daily life of the citizens of the UAE and the residents of the island in order to force them to leave the island, by preventing them from building new houses or service facilities or renovating their old homes only within narrow limits. The Iranian military authorities on the island have also closed the shops located within the part that belongs to the jurisdiction of the UAE and did not allow such shops to be re-opened unless they obtain a license from the Iranian authorities.

3. Compelling the island’s population to enter and leave the island through the seaport located in the area belonging to the Iranian jurisdiction.

4. Interceptions by Iranian military ships against the fishing boats belonging to the UAE in the territorial waters belonging to its jurisdiction.

5. Flying the Iranian flag on a part of the island, which is located under the jurisdiction of the UAE in 2014.

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458 Ibid.


Iranian systematic breaches of the terms of the 1971 MOU have progressively emptied the document of its value, until it has become worthless, as, implicitly, the intention of Iran is to annex the island permanently to its sovereignty.\textsuperscript{461} Although the UAE still seeks an end to the crisis, either through direct negotiations or by referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice, Tehran continues to reject this proposal.

Since the 1979 Iranian revolution erupted, Tehran has appeared to pose a threat to the national security of the GCC countries.\textsuperscript{462} The Iranian regime has adopted hostile policies towards the neighbouring countries. Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian Revolution, declared that Iran aimed to export its revolution outside the borders of the country in order to protect its security. The statement is attributed to Khomeini’s belief that all the neighbouring countries were agents of the West and could annihilate the new order in Iran. Hence, Khomeini stated clearly “If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat”.\textsuperscript{463} Consequently, the Iranian regime aimed to destabilize the security and stability of the neighbouring countries, namely Iraq and the GCC countries, in order to topple their regimes. This resulted in the eruption of the Iranian-Iraqi war from 1980 to 1988. After the war was over, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, leading to an increased foreign military presence in the GCC countries, which resulted in the liberation of Kuwait and the termination of the Iraqi military power in 1991. In 2003, the Iraqi role against Iran came to an end following the US-led occupation of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Nevertheless, Iran is still surrounded by powerful powers, whose intentions cannot be fully predicted by Iran. Such powers include Pakistan, with its nuclear arsenal and shared borders, across which elements of the Jundallah group are fighting against the Iranian regime. Furthermore, Iraq is not stable from a political or a security point of view, while the Iraqi-Iranian borders are home to the attacks of militants of the anti-Iranian regime Party of Free Life of Kurdistan. Another regional power is Turkey, which has the biggest and strongest army in the region, the government of which is opposed the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, a strategic ally of Iran. In addition,

Israel opposes the Iranian nuclear programme. Finally, there are US military bases in the Arabian Gulf region. Therefore, arguably, the Iranian regime has many reasons to adopt both defensive and offensive attitudes towards the neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{464}

Five major current and potential threats to the national security of the UAE and other GCC countries from Iran can be identified.\textsuperscript{465} The first threat is from Iran’s conventional military power.\textsuperscript{466} Although its armed forces have limited capacities and could have been much stronger, if the basic elements in Iran's armed forces were updated,\textsuperscript{467} the Iranian land forces include about 1600 to 1750 tanks including Chieftain Mark 3/5s, M-47/M-48, M-60A1, T-72/T-72S, T-69II, and T-62s.\textsuperscript{468} However, according to some experts, “Iran's sustainable operational tank strength may be fewer than 1,000 tanks. Further, its Chieftains and M-60s are at least 16-20 years old, and the T-72 is Iran’s only tank with advanced fire control systems, sights, and anti-armour ammunition”.\textsuperscript{469} Iran’s ground troops have access to around 720 armoured vehicles, 650 troop carriers, more than 2000 artillery trailers, and 9000 missile launchers. The ground troops also have a huge number of mortar guns, and anti-tank guided weapons. However, most of these weapons are outdated, while the artillery trailers, on which the Iranian ground troops mainly rely, are weak and their control over targeting is unreliable. Meanwhile, Iran has only 55 obsolete helicopters with limited operational capabilities, while the air short-range defence is said to be ineffective in the face of the modern long-range fighters and accurate fire systems. Most of Iran’s missile launchers and ground weapons have cluster warheads, which are inaccurate unless used against static objects and huge targets. They are more likely to cause injuries rather than kill. In addition, the Iranian marine and air forces suffer from the embargo imposed on the import of spare parts and military equipment following the Iranian revolution by the US, the UK, and France. During the Shah's regime, 70% of the air fighters and military vessels in the Iranian armed forces were

\textsuperscript{465} Ibid, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{466} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{467} Ibid.
produced in these countries. The Iranian marine forces have three Russian Kilo class submarines. Offshore, they have old-fashioned three missile frigates and two armoured cruisers, which are out-dated, with limited amphibious potential, and are not fit for purpose. The marine forces have a huge number of minelaying vessels, patrol canoes, sea patrol lanes, and minelayer helicopters. Nevertheless, the capability of the Iranian marine forces to fight in a traditional sea battle is well below the level during the 1987-88 Tankers War, in which they were defeated by the US marine forces.

The second threat is asymmetric. The Iranian regime seeks to terrify the GCC countries in which foreign military bases are located, or attack them using untraditional capabilities such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is different from the Iranian army, particularly from an ideological perspective, the method of running its operations, and its functional role in Iranian society and policy. The IRGC was formed in 1979, following the Iranian revolution. Al Khomeini established the corps under his direct leadership in order to protect the new regime against internal and external threats. This nucleus of the Revolutionary Guards contributed to toppling the Shah’s regime and helped in aborting the rebellion of a number of ethnic groups in the country, as well as an insurrection that was carried out by a the Organization of the Iranian People's Fedayeen Guerrillas. Following the Tehran bombings in 1981, in which a large number of Iranian leaders were killed, the IRGC coordinated efforts with the Internal Security Forces in order to reassert internal stability. Moreover, the IRGC fought with the Iranian Army in the 1980-1988 war against Iraq.

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472 Ibid, p. 57.
473 Ibid.
474 Ibid.
478 Ibid.
479 Ibid.
The role played by the IRGC has developed until it has become a major economic, military, and political power in Iran. From the end of the war with Iraq in 1988, the IRGC has taken part in the reconstruction of Iran. Over time, the IRGC has taken an ever more assertive role in virtually every aspect of the Iranian economy. Recently, the IRGC has been involved in construction, oil, gas, and telecommunications sectors. In 2009, a financial group affiliated with the IRGC bought 51% of the shares of the Telecommunication Company of Iran for the sum of almost USD8 billion. Due to its strong relations with the Iranian political leadership, the IRGC often wins commercial contracts for government projects, undermining private sector companies. Furthermore, the IRGC engages in illegal activities such as “smuggling government-subsidized gasoline, contraband, and narcotics”.

From a military perspective, the IRGC operates independently of the regular armed forces. In 1985, the IRGC established naval and aviation troops, and specialized units for the use of more developed weapons, such as armour, air defence systems, missiles, and other systems. It has established a purchasing authority that is independent of those of the regular army and has built facilities for the military industries. Moreover, the IRGC established an official structure by the name of the Al Quds Force, which works towards recruiting and training the Iranian Republic Front to handle activities abroad in favour of the regime. It also trains agents of the Iranian Islamic Revolution who seek to import the revolution to their countries by any means, including violence. For example, in 2011, elements of the Al Quds Force planned the assassination of Adel Al Jubeir, the

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484 Ibid.

485 Ibid.


Saudi ambassador to the United States. However, the US security forces arrested one of the suspects before the assassination could be carried out.

In general, the IRGC and the Iranian regular army forces have adopted the strategy of asymmetric warfare, following its success in the 2006 Lebanon-Israel war. Furthermore, in the event of attacks against its nuclear facilities, Iran has threatened more than once that it would launch its missiles against US bases located in the GCC countries, which would lead to high levels of civilian casualties in the GCC countries due to the inaccuracy of the Iranian missiles. Iran might also resort to closing down the Strait of Hormuz by planting mines at its entrance, or by using small explosive-laden boats that depend on speed, benefiting from the fact that they could not be seen when they are close to any ship. Iran could also target ships with anti-ship missiles; reportedly, Iran has hundreds of anti-ship cruise missiles.

The third threat from Iran is the use of agents and partners to carry out acts of sabotage in the GCC countries. It may seek the help of agents such as Hezbollah to carry out terrorist attacks in the Arabian Gulf states. Following the Iranian revolution, the new regime established Hezbollah organizations in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Lebanon. The Iranian regime provided money, weapons, training, strategic and ideological support in order for such organizations to serve as an appendage of Iranian foreign policy (see Figure 4.4).

Hezbollah Al-Hejaz was established in Saudi Arabia in 1987. This party has cooperated with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards by launching terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, including destabilizing the security situation in Saudi Arabia during the Hajj in 1987. A huge demonstration by Shiite Hajjis in Mecca, the Muslim sacred city, destroyed public property, spread chaos, terrified other Hajjis from across the world, and killed and injured a large number of Hajjis. In addition, in 1988,

489 Ibid.
Hezbollah Al-Hejaz claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Sadaf Petrochemical Plant in Jubail, in the east of Saudi Arabia; a Hezbollah cell with four members from Tarut had carried out the attack. One of them had earlier fought with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Furthermore, in 1996 elements of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz bombed the Khobar Towers housing complex at the US Air Force base in Dhahran, killing 19 US soldiers and injuring 347 people.\textsuperscript{494} In 2014, the UAE government proscribed Hezbollah Al-Hejaz as a terrorist organization.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4_4.png}
\caption{Hezbollah Organizations in the Middle East}
\end{figure}

During the 1980-1988 Iranian-Iraqi war, Kata'ib Hezbollah fi al-Iraq (Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq) was created. It acted as a proxy for Iran in launching attacks against the Iraqi forces in Ahwar, in the south of Iraq. After the regime of Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003, Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq resumed activity and played a major part in stirring sectarian tensions between 2006 and 2007. During this action, a number of pilots and officers of the Iraqi army who had taken part in the Iranian-Iraqi war were assassinated, as well other distinguished Iraqis, including scientists, doctors and university professors.\textsuperscript{495} In 2011, Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq issued a statement threatening to target Kuwait with missiles if it resumed the construction of a port in the disputed


region with Iraq. Accordingly, in 2014, the UAE government proscribed the group as a tourist organization.

The Lebanese Hezbollah was established in 1982 during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. The Iranian regime dispatched some of its Revolutionary Guards to establish military camps for Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, and pumped in money and weapons to support the resistance to the occupation. Hezbollah eventually forced the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000. The Israeli withdrawal popularised Hezbollah in Lebanon and the wider Arab and Islamic world. However, following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2004, the role of Hezbollah in the political arena in Lebanon took a different course. The assassination divided Lebanon into a pro-Syrian camp including Hezbollah, as the Syrian regime was a strategic ally of Iran, and an anti-Syrian camp. In 2008, Hezbollah forces and its allies occupied areas in West Beirut, in response to Lebanese Cabinet resolutions to shut down Hezbollah’s military telecommunications network and to remove Beirut Airport’s security chief over alleged ties to Hezbollah. After the Lebanese government reversed its decision, Hezbollah forces and their allies withdrew from their locations. Furthermore, the actions of Hezbollah are not confined to Lebanon, but it operates outside the country in order to implement the agenda of Iran to destabilise the security and stability of the surrounding states.

In 2009, in response to Hezbollah’s attempts to destabilise the UAE, the authorities deported 150 alleged members to Lebanon. As a result, the Hezbollah organization was included in the list of terrorist organization in the UAE in 2014. However, the Lebanese Hezbollah has not stopped operations in the UAE. Three foreigners were arrested by the UAE security services and were referred to the Public Prosecution for trial, accused of creating and managing a group affiliated to

499 Ibid, p. 274.
Lebanese Hezbollah inside the country at the beginning of 2016.\textsuperscript{501} After the accused were presented to the court, evidence reviewed, witnesses heard, and the defence submitted by their lawyers, they were sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and deportation from the state after the court found them guilty. In addition, the UAE security forces have arrested another seven, two of whom are UAE citizens. The arrestees are accused of forming a cell related to the Lebanese Hezbollah organization, and passing on confidential information related to the UAE armed forces to the organization and security data for the purpose of planning to target oil and gas wells in the country. During the trial, the Public Prosecution has stated that one of the accused was tasked by the Lebanese Hezbollah organization to compile information about types of armament for the military aircraft of the UAE armed forces, as well as details of the military deal between UAE and French company agreed at IDEX exhibition 2015. The assignments also included obtaining information about the UAE security agencies knowledge of Lebanese Hezbollah, Iranian revolutionary guards and Iranian intelligence.\textsuperscript{502} The Public Prosecution also gave evidence that one of the accused has passed to her husband, a co-accused, maps and photos of oil and gas installations run by an oil company in Abu Dhabi, in which she worked. She also provided him with data including names and numbers of wells, production quantities and marketing prices. Her husband confessed to delivering the information to the organization. According to the local newspaper Al Bayan he was a member of the Iranian intelligence service since 2006, and participated in developing a plan by the Lebanese Hezbollah organization and Iranian intelligence to target interests of the UAE.\textsuperscript{503}

The fourth threat is the potential emergence of Iran as a nuclear power.\textsuperscript{504} Any Iranian success in obtaining nuclear weapons would be far more important than its regional conventional weapons superiority. In fact, the Iranian ambitions to develop nuclear weapon can be traced back to the


Shah’s reign. Iran’s civil nuclear power programme had started as early as 1975 when it signed an agreement with Kraftwerk Union for the construction of two pressurized water reactors (PWRs) with a power of 1200 MW in Bushehr. At the same time, the US signed a number of cooperation agreements and pacts that enabled it to sell nuclear technology to Iran. Furthermore, the US offered an irradiated fuel chemical reprocessing plant for the procurement of plutonium from the nuclear fuel cycle. At the time, the Shah launched a secret programme with the aim of developing nuclear weapons. However, following the Iranian Revolution, the nuclear projects came to a halt as all foreign agreements and other technical cooperation programmes collapsed. Kraftwerk Union withdrew and failed to complete the construction of the two reactors in Bushehr. In addition, France terminated an agreement for the provision of depleted uranium to Iran, while the US reneged on its obligations to provide Iran with new fuel cores for the research reactor in the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre.

The Iranian regime resumed its nuclear fuel activities in the mid-1980s. However, the full framework of the program was not publicly revealed until August 2002, when an opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, revealed detailed information about two secret nuclear facilities, and about companies involved in the purchase of materials and equipment required for the Iranian nuclear programme. One of the facilities, near Arak, is a plant for the production of heavy water, the basic material used in certain types of reactors for the production of nuclear weapons-grade plutonium. The other facility was still under construction near the city of Natanz. In December 2002, the Institute for Science and International Security published further details including satellite pictures of the facilities. The Natanz facility was identified as a plant for the depletion of uranium by centrifuging. Depletion plants can be used for the production of low-depleted uranium, for use in the manufacture of civil nuclear power reactors, or high-depleted uranium for use as a fuel for nuclear weapons.

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507 Ibid, pp. 16-17.
The Iranian regime has sought to develop nuclear weapons in order to deter any Arab or US attempts to undermine its dominance in the Gulf region or overthrow its regime.\textsuperscript{511} If Iran had nuclear weapons it would affect the stability of the Gulf region, especially in relation to the effect on the balance of power. Iran already far outweighs the combined GCC countries in terms of traditional military power. In order to counter-balance this power, instead of engaging in an arms race, the GCC countries have sought protection through common-defence agreements with the US and other international powers.

However, the main UAE and GCC national security concerns about the Iranian nuclear programme have to do with the resulting environmental damage. For instance, the Bushehr reactor, which is one of the most important facilities of the Iranian nuclear project, lies 280km from Kuwait. The reactor depends on technologies imported from Russia, which lacks nuclear security. In the light of the West’s ban on the machines and equipment used in the nuclear industries, Iran might seek to complete its nuclear programme using less secure nuclear equipment.\textsuperscript{512} Hence, the GCC countries sit within a circle of environmental danger in the event of a technical error, an earthquake, or if the reactor was bombed. Such a disaster could lead to the immediate death of about 200,000 people, and would cause pollution in the Gulf waters, leading to a cessation of operations of the desalination plants lying on the Arabian Gulf shores.\textsuperscript{513}

As a result of Iran’s nuclear program, it was subjected to economic sanctions by the international community for 12 years in an attempt to curb its development of uranium enrichment programmes. After rounds of negotiations with the P5+1 group of world powers (the US, the UK, France, China, Russia + Germany), an agreement was concluded to lift the sanctions after the International Atomic Energy Agency certified that Iran has restricted its sensitive nuclear activities. The suspension of the sanctions regime is dependent on Iran’s fulfilling the conditions stipulated. If it is found to have contravened the agreement sanctions will be reinforced. Therefore, the threat to the UAE is ongoing, as the agreement is subject to political changes, especially following election is Iran in

\textsuperscript{512} Abd Elqader, Ashraf Abd El-Aziz. (2010), op cit., p. 183.
\textsuperscript{513} ECSSR Authors. (2006). op. cit., p. 5.
2017 and the US presidential election in late 2016. A new administration in either country could revoke the agreement.\textsuperscript{514}

The fifth threat is the religious and ideological threat posed by Iran in the Gulf region, in an area where support is given on sectarian grounds.\textsuperscript{515} In Iran, ideology and Shiite Islam cannot be separated. Iran operates in accordance with a unique political ideology created by Khomeini, who formulated the idea of the state as a Shiite Islamic Republic, which replaced the Imperial State of Iran. In Khomeini’s formulation of the idea of the state, the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran embodies the authority of Shiite Islam on earth, and to give up that responsibility is to abandon the will of Allah. Thus, the survival of the regime and its formula is an existential need and expression of the self-interest and the Iranian nationalism.\textsuperscript{516} Indeed, the integration of the Shiism into the Persian national project did not materialise in 1979, but can be traced back to 1501 with the announcement of Twelver Shiism,\textsuperscript{517} as the official religion of the Safavid Empire, which ruled Persia (the old name of Iran) at that time.\textsuperscript{518} The Safavids sought to convert tribal groups and social classes across Persia from the Sunni faith to Shiism; “clerical discipline and orthodox Shiism with its detailed legal ordinances coincided with the Safavids political vision and gave the empire its formative image”.\textsuperscript{519}

\textsuperscript{515} ECSSR Authors. (2008). op. cit., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{517} Twelver Shiism is a doctrine of Shiite Islam, which is referred to as the duodenal doctrine because its followers believe that after death of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in 632 AD his cousin Ali bin Abi Talib inherited his spiritual and political power over the Islamic nation formed before the Prophet’s death. Consequently, the adherents of the doctrine refused the succession of the three, who led after death of Prophet Muhammad. They believe that the legitimate succession started when the fourth Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib assumed power and his descendants inherited the Caliphate, where Caliph is called Imam according to their beliefs. Shiites agree that 12 imams have inherited the spiritual and political power from Prophet Muhammad, (peace be upon him). These are: (1) Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib; (2) Imam al-Hasan ibn Ali; (3) Imam al-Husayn ibn Ali; (4) Imam Ali ibn al-Husayn; (5) Imam Muhammad ibn Ali; (6) Imam Jafar ibn Muhammad; (7) Imam Musa ibn Jafar; (8) Imam Ali ibn Musa; (9) Imam Muhammad ibn Ali; (10) Imam Ali ibn Muhammad; (11) Imam al-Hasan ibn Ali; and (12) Imam Muhammad ibn al-Hasan. Adherents believe that the twelfth Imam disappeared in the tenth century and will appear at the end of time to establish the Islamic State and to rule the world by the Islamic Law. See, No author. (2010). Islamic Beliefs, Practices, and Cultures. New York: Marshall Cavendish, pp. 138-139. Also, Davidson, Mark. (2012). Hidden in Plain Sight: The Signposts of the Coming of the Antichrist Revealed. Maitland, FL: Xulon Press, p. 168.
The use of Shiism by the Safavid State was not based on religion per se, but was used to integrate the passion of sectarian into the Persian national identity. This was because the regime aimed to differentiate Persian nationalism, from the Ottoman Empire in the west and Sunni kingdoms in Afghanistan and India in the east. Nevertheless, the Safavids used Shiite Arab scholars from the Jabal Amil region of southern Lebanon to teach the Persians the fundamental concepts of the religion. Eventually, they succeeded in making Shiite Islam the main religion in Persia after decades. Although the Safavid dynasty has ended, the merger of Shiism into Persian national project, or more precisely the turning of Shiism from a doctrine to a tool serving the Persian national tendency has again been invoked by Khomeini since 1979. In this context, Khomeini stopped Arab Shiite scholars from reaching the upper ranks in Shiite religion, in order to equate Shiism with the Persians. The Iranian regime has confined Shiite references to the city of Qom, Iran, and not to other areas such as the city of Najaf in Iraq. Najf is an important city in Shiite Islam because the tomb of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Imam of the Twelver Shiism is located here. In addition, Arab and Iranian senior religious scholars have graduated from its religious schools. In addition, the Jabal Amil region in Lebanon, whose religious scholars played a major role in the establishment of Shiism in Iran during reign of the Safavids, is also marginalised.

The Iranian regime has opposed the Arab school of Shiism in order to introduce wilāyat al-faqīh (the theory of the guardianship of the jurist) as the core doctrine of the duodenum. This concept was included by Khomeini in the idea of the Islamic Republic of Iran and has been formulated in its constitution. Thus, the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, who is the head of political regime in Iran, has the power of divine governance on the earth as a deputy of the absent twelfth Imam. He also has absolute authority over the affairs of human beings as the guardian of the country's

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affairs in the absence of the missing Imam. The executive, legislative and judiciary authorities in Iran exercise their powers with his absolute supervision according to Article 57 of the Iranian Constitution.\textsuperscript{526} His spiritual powers cross over the borders of Iran to encompass the world, because Shiites in any place are nationals of the deputy of the absent twelfth Imam, known as \textit{valy-e-faqih}.\textsuperscript{527}

Significantly, intellectuals of the Arab Shiite school and some intellectuals of the Iranian Shiite school have opposed the ‘wilāyat al-faqīh’ theory as it contradicts the teachings of Twelver Shiism.\textsuperscript{528} This is because engaging in politics is forbidden according to Shiite scholars, as it infringes on powers of the missing Imam. It also undermines the theory of absence, which is based on the notion that the nation exists in a time of absence, in which the establishment of Islamic government is not possible. Thus, no religious scholar can succeed the missing Imam, because such a succession is not mentioned in relation to the twelfth imams.\textsuperscript{529} In addition, the absolute powers of the Supreme Leader as indicated in Khomeini’s theory is not based on evidence from Shiite books or a principle recognized by scholars of other Islamic sects. However, it returns to Persian principles that revolve around the so-called reverence or absolute obedience and full acceptance of religious political power represented by the political and religious legacy of the pre-Islamic Persian Empire. The political system of the Empire was based on the idea of the divine right embodying rulers with political and religious powers. As the gods have granted this right to the king only and not to other human beings.\textsuperscript{530} Moreover, \textit{wilāyat al-faqīh} is not historically proven, except in the Safavid dynasty, which created Imami Shiism in state institutions. The Safavids selected one Shiite scholar as the deputy of the absent imam in order to derive legitimacy for their rule. The approach was based on the belief that legitimate government could not be practiced except by the Twelfth Imam, according to Twelver Shiism. Thus, \textit{wilāyat al-faqīh} lasted

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{526} Amon, Hala Rashid. (9 January 2016). “Reading in the Iranian Constitution, episode (1-3). Al-Khomeini sought to perpetuate power by preparing for establishment of Faqih state”. \textit{Middle East Newspaper}, Issue 13556. (In Arabic).
\item \textsuperscript{528} Abou El-Khayl, Youssef. (16 April 2015). “Wilāyat al-faqīh: Shiite opponents are more than supporters”. \textit{Alriyadh Newspaper}, Issue 17099. (In Arabic).
\item \textsuperscript{529} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
for two centuries until the collapse of the Safavid Empire until Khomeini revived it. However, Khomeini has developed this concept, as he took over the political leadership of Iran. In addition, he gave to himself and his successors the sanctity to ensure continuity of rule inside Iran, while his influence expanded outside Iran.

4.3.2 Environmental Challenges Facing the UAE

It is the impact not the causes of environmental degradation that make it a security issue. For instance, environmental factors per se are not blame for organized violence, but they may aggravate tensions by interplaying with other factors such as mass migration resulting from worsening environmental conditions. In turn, this may undermine domestic and international security. In this context, the UAE faces a number of environmental challenges that pose a threat to its national security.

The major threat is the scarcity of water resources in the UAE, as with other states in the Arabian Peninsula. This is due to factors such as location and geography as the area has a desert climate zone characterized by extreme drought and desertification, which gives rise to very limited and irregular rainfall and the virtual non-existence of fresh surface water. There are no rivers in the Arab Peninsula, and the under-water reserves drawn by states in this region are diminishing rapidly due to overconsumption during the last three decades, because of population growth and urban and industrial expansion. Therefore, the UAE is challenged by the scarcity of water resources and fast depletion of underground water reserves which is compounded by a continuous deterioration in the quality of this water. The quality of underground water is now unfit for use as fresh water because of the increase in the salinity in most areas. In addition, underground water

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is contaminated with seawater in many coastal areas. As a result, the UAE has concentrated on desalination on its coastlines on the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman as a strategic option to meet its residential, commercial and industrial needs. The UAE is second in the world in the production of desalinated water, behind Saudi Arabia. Its production capacity increased three-fold since 2000 to the current 1,700mcubic meters year, which accounts for 90% of total usage. It has also focused on recycling of wastewater for use in gardening, landscaping, green areas and forests.

While water desalination has helped the UAE meet its fresh water needs, the process has a negative toll on the environment as desalination plants discharge highly saline water that produce negative physical, chemical and biological impacts in the bio-marine environment. Water desalination plants and electric power plants also contribute to global warming because of the heavy use of fossil fuels, which leads to significant emissions of pollutants into the atmosphere. According to Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority’s estimates, nearly 13.5 million tons of gases are released from desalination and electric power plants in Abu Dhabi each year and carbon dioxide makes up 99.5% of such emissions.

In order to reduce this environment threat, the UAE government sought to minimize its reliance on fossil fuels through the use of non-renewable energy to produce fresh water and electricity. In 2006, a study conducted by the UAE government to evaluate the energy situation until 2020 revealed that the current energy production capacity would be sufficient to meet only half the demand in 2020 which indicated the need to build a long-term energy infrastructure. The report found that: the natural gas reserves were insufficient to meet the projected demand; the use of oil and diesel was costly and harmful to the environment; the use of coal, while lower in costs was even more harmful to the environment; and alternative energy sources would only meet 6-7% of

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540 Ibid.
541 Ibid.
the peak demand on energy in 2020. Therefore, the UAE government opted to diversify energy sources instead of relying on one source for the production of electricity and using a mix of non-renewal fossil fuels, such as oil, natural gas, and coal, and low-carbon emissions sources.

In addition, the UAE took strategic steps towards developing sustainable and diversified energy sources, in order to balance between its increasing electrical energy needs and its responsibility to find environment tally friendly and low-carbon emission technologies. The UAE is one of the signatory nations on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to stabilize the emission of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and reduce the possibility of climate change. Abu Dhabi is one of the world’s most sustainable cities in the world as it relies completely on solar and other renewable energy to create an environment free from carbon emissions and waste. Abu Dhabi also hosts the headquarters of the International Renewable Energy Agency, which is a non-government organization that aims to promote the worldwide reliance of renewable energy. The UAE started a project to build solar energy stations such as the Smash 1 station and the Sheikh Mohamed Bin Rashid Solar Energy Complex in Abu Dhabi, which are the largest in the Middle East. In contrast to solar energy, given the climate and geography of the UAE, the prospects for the generation of energy from wind power or water are insignificant. However, the UAE government took the decision to develop nuclear power for generating electricity given that it is a clean source of energy because of its low carbon emissions. The reliance on nuclear and renewable energy for the generation of electricity will contribute to minimizing reliance on non-renewable sources of energy and help the sustainability of the environment, while containing the global warming problem and guaranteeing energy security of energy in the UAE.

542 Al Qahtani, Fahad. The Director of External Affairs and Communications at the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC). (23 March 2013). Emirates Nuclear Energy Forum 2013, Dubai, UAE.
544 Al-Hammadi, Mohammed, Chief Executive Officer of the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC). (23 March 2013). Emirates Nuclear Energy Forum 2013, Dubai, UAE.
545 El-Katiri, Laura. (December 2012), op. cit.
The move towards nuclear energy started with the promulgation of a decree by the president of the UAE, on 23 December 2009, to establish the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation. The Corporation is tasked with the construction and management of four, 1,400 MW capacity nuclear power stations in Abu Dhabi in cooperation with Korean Electric Power Corporation, the world’s third largest nuclear power company. The first nuclear station is planned to go online in 2017 and the fourth in 2020.\textsuperscript{547} Nuclear energy is expected to contribute as much as 25\% of the electricity needs of the UAE by 2020.\textsuperscript{548}

However, the use of nuclear energy has raised significant concerns among experts and the public over its safety following the Fukushima Diiachi Nuclear Power Station disaster in Japan in March 2011. The Fukushima nuclear power station contained six nuclear reactors with a production capacity of 4.7 MW. The massive earthquake, combined with the giant tsunami waves, cut electricity supplies in the area and shut down the safety and cooling systems for the first, second and third nuclear reactors. The fifth and sixth reactors were in complete shutdown status pending regular maintenance and recharging with nuclear fuel when the catastrophe hit, while the fourth reactor had just been emptied of fuel before and was about to be recharged. Operators relied on secondary systems in case of any failure in the electric power grid and these systems ran on diesel. However, the seawater flooded the pumps and washed away the diesel tanks. The failure of the cooling systems in the three reactors resulted in overheating and the exposure of fuel vessels, which increased the pressure inside these vessels and led to a hydrogen explosion (a nuclear reaction resulting in the third hydrogen isotope known as Tritium and which is a by-product of nuclear fusion). Dangerously high concentrations of radioactive materials leaked into the environment around the site.\textsuperscript{549}

In light of the environmental disaster in Japan, the UAE government, through the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation,\textsuperscript{550} instructed the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation to


\textsuperscript{550} The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation was established on 2009, according to Article 4 of Federal Law No. 6 of 2009. The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation is responsible for regulating and licensing all activities related to nuclear energy in the UAE, while ensuring public safety as a primary objective. The Authority also determines and
address all issues related to the safety of the nuclear power stations being built in the UAE. The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation had applied for a license to build the nuclear power station in the Brakah area in Abu Dhabi. Accordingly, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation prepared a report on the lessons learned from the Fukushima Catastrophe for the purpose of ensuring that the multi-unit nuclear power station would be built, designed and operated so as to mitigate risks in a situation similar to the Fukushima accident despite this being highly unlikely to occur in the UAE. The report also validated that the structures, systems and components, as well as the proposed safety enhancements, guaranteed a significant safety margin in the event of an unexpected shutdown and to withstand stressful events of a remote probability. After a meticulous evaluation of the report, The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation concluded that the safety grounds were sufficient for the issuance of the construction license.\footnote{Federal Authority for Nuclear RegulationOfficial Website. “UAE National Report for the 6th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety March/April 2014”. Available at: <URL: http://www.fanr.gov.ae/En/Opendata/Documents/UAE_CNS_6RM_report_final_2014_English.pdf> Access Date: 16 June 2014.}

Another serious environmental challenge faced by the UAE is air pollution. In 2012 the External Affairs, Planning, Petroleum, Mineral Resources, Agriculture and Fisheries Committee, formed by the Federal National Council, confirmed in a report the results of empirical research that links air pollution in the UAE to certain respiratory diseases. The study indicates that between 15\% and 40\% of UAE children suffer from asthma because of direct environmental factors such dust, carbon monoxide emissions from cars and plants, in addition to genetic factors.\footnote{Farghali, Alaa. (11 April 2012). “40 per cent of children in the UAE suffered from asthma due to the air pollution”. Emarat Alyoum Newspaper. Available at: <URL: http://www.emaratalyoum.com/local-section/other/2012-04-11-1.475629> Access Date: 16 June 2014. (In Arabic).}

The study also reveals that stone crushers in the mountainous areas in Ajman, Ras Al Khaima and Fujairah, where raw materials used in the manufacture of marble, granite and cement are mined, cause respiratory diseases in the nearby population as a result of the build-up of dust particles resulting from these mining activities.\footnote{Ibid.} However, some of the companies continue to pollute the environment, despite the stringent supervision of their activities by the Ministry of Environment in the application of the Council of Ministers’ Decree No. 20 of 2008 on the regulations applicable

specifies all matters relating to the control and supervision of the nuclear sector in the State, particularly those related to safety, nuclear safety, nuclear security, radiation protection, and safeguarding and implementing any obligation under the relevant international treaties, conventions or agreements entered into by the State.
on stone crushers and quarries and the transport of mining materials within the UAE. These regulations address various aspects of the quarrying and mining activities, including licensing of works, limiting works, controlling dust, environmental monitoring and liability for environmental damages. The Decree ensures that the mining companies have an obligation to conform to its provisions and the provisions of executive decisions rendered for its enforcement. Furthermore, the Decree obligates licensing authorities to issue operating licenses only if the applications are supported by an environmental permit issued by the relevant environmental authority in the area and is subject to the approval of the Federal Environmental Agency. The Decree also prohibits the use of explosives and detonations without a prior permit from the relevant authority, which is subject to the approval of the Ministry of Interior. The decree also stipulates that in all cases, each detonation shall be carried under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior in coordination with the specialized authorities. These laws also ban any works that may entail any damage of whatever kind to the environment, including earth scrapping in plateaus and valleys in preparation for mining and quarrying works. The resolution also ensures that companies transporting the products of these quarries are under an obligation to take all necessary measures to prevent any spillage or dumping of quarry and mining materials during transport. It also places quarrying facilities under an obligation to use modern dust-control technologies. In the event of any environmental damages or damages to any third parties because of any contravention of the provisions of these regulations, offenders shall be liable for all the costs deemed necessary for remedying the damages.

The Assistant Director of the Masfout Municipality in Ajman blamed the repeated violations by the mining companies on the low fines stipulated for violations, which range from AED5,000 to AED30,000. These are insignificant compared to the profits made by the companies. Thus, the fines do not act as a deterrent against environmental violations. Officials also point out that all the quarrying and mining companies commit environmental violations when not being supervised by the authorities. These violations result in the imposition of fines or the closure of the quarry for a certain period. The owners then agree to pay the fines and pledge compliance with any measures.

required by the Ministry of Environment, thereby, resuming mining activities within a few days from the closure, and the repeat the violations during any gap in the supervision.\textsuperscript{556}

Moreover, the marine environment in the UAE faces many challenges, with oil pollution being the most important. As previously highlighted, the UAE has nearly 700 kms of coastlines on the Arabian Gulf and 100 kms on the Gulf of Oman, in addition to nearly 600 kms of coastlines around natural islands that are under its territorial control. The Arabian Gulf is a shallow semi-closed sea,\textsuperscript{557} the length of which is around 805 kms stretching from the mouth of Shat Al Arab to the Strait of Hormuz.\textsuperscript{558} The average depth of the water is 35 meters and the maximum depth is 100 meters near the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz, the width of which is only 60 kms.\textsuperscript{559} More than 250,000 oil tankers enter and exit the Arabian Gulf every year, carrying nearly 60 percent of the world’s total seaborne oil exports.\textsuperscript{560} Although oil is an essential commodity, the tankers pollute the marine environment in the UAE and other littoral states of the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman due to the amount of oil that leaks from these tankers. These leaks occur because of accidents, rusting hulls, the dumping of sea water used in washing the oil tanks back into the sea or the dumping of waters used in balancing the tankers, which are filled to at least 60% of their capacity with seawater after offloading their oil in order to maintain their balance at sea. All these accidents and practices pose a threat to the marine life, including fish, sea turtles, sea birds and coral reefs in the affected areas.

Floating oil slicks produce vapours that saturate the air and reach coastal areas. The concentrations of hydrocarbon vapours can reach unacceptable limits, which, in turn, affects the marine and land environment. Petroleum oils also contain numerous organic compounds of varying degrees of toxicity. Among the most troublesome of these compounds is Benzopyrene, which is carcinogenic producing a highly toxic effect on marine life. Oil is less dense than water; therefore, it floats on the surface forming a thin layer that separates water from the atmosphere. This layer spreads over

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{556} The Staff. (27 March 2013). “Stone crushers: an unavoidable evil”, op. cit.
\end{thebibliography}
large areas of the water surface, preventing the exchange of gases between air and water, in turn reducing the amount of oxygen dissolved in water, which disturbs the gaseous balance. The insoluble oil layer also prevents light from reaching aquatic life and hinders the process of photosynthesis, which is a main source of oxygen, a purifier of water. This leads to massive marine life death and the disruption of the food chain and the ecosystem. Furthermore, oil leaked into the marine environment travels for long distances carried by the current and with the movement of the tide forms small black balls that obstruct shipping activities, fishing, spoil the beauty of the pristine sandy beaches and harms crustaceans and the coral reef, and in turn, tourism. More stable hydrocarbon compounds from leaked oil move along the food chain and become stored in the livers and fats of marine animals. The harm from these compounds takes years to manifest in humans.\textsuperscript{561}

Since independence, the UAE has witnessed many accidents involving oil spills from tankers. In 2013, two square kilometres of the Merbah and Gadfaa area in Fujairah were hit by a major oil spill from a tanker sailing along the coastline. Mohamed Al Yatim, Secretary General of the Fujairah Fishermen Association, said the oil spill was serious because of the density of the tar layer that reached more than one kilometre into the sea. The tar from the oil spill accumulated on the beaches of the Merbah and Gadfaa area, which resulted in the stinging smell of tar. Yatim added that the pollution was also harmful because the greater part of the fish population lives near the water surface where the oil slick was nearly 20 cm thick. The pollution problem in Fujairah had largely receded in the previous five years after the enforcement of the MARPOL International Agreement on prohibiting oil tankers from washing their tankers in territorial waters. Prior to the convention, the coast of Fujairah experienced an average of 10 pollution accidents every year, but this fell to only one or two every year, with the severity of the pollution also considerably lower.\textsuperscript{562}

The construction by the UAE of artificial islands in its territorial waters generated strong controversy from among environmentalists over the possible harmful impact on the marine life in the Arabian Gulf. In 2011, Dubai built the artificial islands in order to diversify its economy, which


does not rely on oil exports, but on sectors such as real estate, financial services, aviation and tourism. These artificial islands greatly improved the investment outlook for Dubai in particular and the UAE in general. The artificial islands host giant residential, commercial, retail and entertainment projects. Moreover, the construction of artificial islands is a legitimate practice recognized by international organizations. For example, Articles 11, 58, 60 and 82 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 provides for practical guidelines for coastal states seeking to build artificial islands. The convention gives coastal states the right to construct artificial islands on which structures and installations are built, operated and used. According to the Convention, the artificial islands are subject to the state’s absolute sovereignty. Coastal states may also establish safety zones around the artificial islands in order to guarantee the safety of the artificial islands in light of the internationally recognized standards, including international shipping routes. The safety zones may not be larger than 500 meters. The artificial islands cannot have their own territorial waters and their existence does not affect the demarcation of borders of regional waters.

The UAE incorporated the articles regulating artificial islands stipulated by the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 in its federal legislation. Thus, the UAE promulgated Federal Law No. 19 of 1993 on marine areas, which provides for the creation of artificial islands as regulated by international conventions. In light of these legislative developments, the Government of Dubai commenced building artificial islands in a three-stage operation, and the governments of the other Emirates soon followed suit. The first stage involved the creation of two artificial islands shaped like two giant palm trees, which is the UAE’s national symbol. The first of the two islands is Jumeirah Palm and is one of the largest artificial islands in the world with an area of 560 hectares. The Jumeirah Palm comes with complete infrastructure servicing residential, entertainment and tourism facilities.

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being constructed and will be twice the size of Jumeirah Palm, with an expected population of 250,000 in 2020. More than 262 million cubic meters of rock and sand were used in the building of the islands. The total area of the two islands is nearly 110 million square meters and they will add some 120 kms of sandy beach to the Dubai coastline.

In the second phase, Dubai built 300 small artificial islands in the shape of a map of the world surrounded by a 26 km-long white rocky fence to protect it from erosion. This project is called World Islands. The projects range from private islands for homes to resorts and private residential islands. It will cover an area of 9 kms in length by 6 kms in width. Three million cubic meters of sand and 33 million tons of rocks were used to build the World Islands, which will add nearly 232 kms of sandy beaches to the coastline of Dubai. Marine and air transport will be the only means to move between the islands. Most recently, Dubai began the third stage of the project to build another four islands, named the Deira Islands, which will have a total area of 15.3 square kms and will add nearly 40 kms of beaches to the coastline. The infrastructure for these artificial islands can accommodate the development of hotels, resorts, retail centres, apartments and housing for real estate investors and therefore contribute to bolstering Dubai’s status as an international tourism, retail and business centre.

However, some environmentalists believe that the building of artificial islands on along the shore of Dubai has disturbed the environmental balance in the water of the Arabian Gulf and claim that coral reefs have suffered massive destruction as a result of the reclamation and backfilling works to create the islands. Environmentalists are also concerned that the habitat for sea turtles has been

571 Ibid.
destroyed or altered because of the changes in the natural water currents in the area. In an attempt to address these concerns, Nakheel, the Dubai government-owned company in charge of the artificial island projects, responded that research carried out prior to the start of the projects confirmed that sea turtles only settle on remote islands and that the majority of the coral reefs near the coast of Dubai were already dead. Nearly 65% of these reefs were killed by causes such as disease, fluctuations in the seawater temperature, oil pollution, unplanned coastal development works and the lack of fishing regulations. For these reasons, Nakheel transferred the remaining coral reefs in the areas to the wave barrier around the World Islands project using the most advanced technology. This was undertaken under the supervision of a team of environmental scientists led by renowned marine biologist and assistant professor and head of the marine biology lab at New York University in Abu Dhabi, John Bert. After five years spent transferring the coral reefs to their new habitat, Bert said:

The transfer operation is among the biggest coral reef transfer projects ever carried out in the world. More than 20,000 coral colonies were saved. Pioneering technology was used in the submarine transfer of the coral reefs, which demonstrated the skill of the engineers and environmental scientists working together to protect marine environment. This step has an additional advantage to other marine creatures as the new coral reef habitat has become a diverse ecosystem that hosts a verity of coral reefs fishes including rare species never before seen in that area.

4.3.3 Infiltrators into the UAE

Since independence, the UAE has suffered from illegal immigration by different nationalities. Citizens from neighbouring Asian countries, in particular Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and India, make up the vast majority of illegal immigrants. A number of factors contribute directly to this issue. One is the long UAE marine borders, extending over 700 kms on the coastline. This length allows individuals to more easily elude the coastguards. Moreover, the

574 Ibid.
smuggling of immigrants into the UAE is now a profitable trade for international gangs.\textsuperscript{578} Smugglers use a variety of methods, with as many as 156 identified in 1993.\textsuperscript{579} The main method is the use of small boats or commercial vessels laden with goods that give infiltrators illegal access into UAE by dropping immigrants near the coast.\textsuperscript{580} Furthermore, land borders shared with the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia are also used. As the UAE border guards and coastguards have imposed more stringent control measures over the UAE’s eastern beaches, infiltration has intensified in the coastal areas overlooking the Sultanate of Oman.

The harsh economic condition in the neighbouring Asian countries is one of the main reasons encouraging their citizens to illegally enter the UAE in search of better job opportunities and a better standard of life. Their chance of obtaining a work visa in the UAE are increased by the high standards that hinder official access, except for those who have academic or technical skills that are needed in the UAE. The majority of the illegal immigrants work in the construction sector for very low wages.

However, the economic situation has never been the sole motivation for illegal entry into the UAE. Other reasons including illegal activity, such as drug smuggling to the wider Gulf region.\textsuperscript{581} For instance, in 2009, the Saudi authorities declared that in cooperation with the UAE authorities they had aborted a drug-smuggling operation from UAE to Saudi Arabia by an international smuggling gang. The cargo comprised 686,000 narcotic pills.\textsuperscript{582} In addition, in 2012, the UAE authorities arrested a gang in Sharjah that were selling drugs inside the UAE. The gang comprised 11 people and was led by two women, who infiltrated the UAE. They distributed drugs through group members, which included five people from one GCC country and one Arab woman. All 11 members were caught red-handed, when the police raided the apartment. They found 5,177

\textsuperscript{580} Ibid.
Tramadol capsules in addition to 250 capsules of narcotics.\textsuperscript{583} Other illegal immigrants have been involved in smuggling goods, such as gold to avoid paying customs duties, or counterfeit goods such as cigarettes. In addition, some illegal entrants smuggle cash linked to money laundering activities. Finally, some enter illegally after being denied legal entry, such as those who have been deported on criminal grounds that affect the stability and security of the UAE community. Such people may not be allowed back except with special permission from the UAE Minister of Interior.

The UAE security authorities started to document the number of infiltrators arrested in 1977, since then until 1990, the number of infiltrators fluctuated. The numbers rose from 1991 until a peak of 11,487 in 1995. Then the numbers fell to a low of 1,664 in 1998. This sharp decrease from 1996 can be attributed to the issuance of Decree No. 13 of 1996, which amended the regulations on foreigners’ visas and residence.\textsuperscript{584} However, the numbers rose sharply from 1998 to a new peak of 14,617 in 2001. In subsequent years, the number of infiltrators arrested fell because of the state strengthening its borders and the development of the hardware to monitor the land and sea borders. In 2011, only 446 people were arrested (see Figure 4.5).

Illegal infiltration into UAE poses security, economic, social and political threats to the state. From a security perspective, due to the stringent measures of banning their access to jobs and housing,\textsuperscript{585} illegal immigrants may commit crimes, such as murder, smuggling and marketing of narcotics, robbery, forgery, prostitution or begging, especially as the UAE security authorities have no fingerprints for such infiltrators. Statistics issued by the UAE Ministry of Interior indicate that most crimes in the country are committed by unemployed people who live illegally in the state.\textsuperscript{586}


\textsuperscript{584} Decree No. 13 of 1996 for the amendment of the UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 1973 regarding the visas and residence of foreigners in its amended Article 31 which stipulates that illegal immigrants shall be sentenced to at least a one-month imprisonment and/or a fine of no less than AED1,000. The court shall order his/her deportation. Amended Article No. 32 stipulates that the driver of any means of transportation who attempts to illegally bring foreigners into the state shall be imprisoned for a minimum of three years and maximum of 15 years along with a fine of no less than AED5,000. The same sentence shall apply to whoever guides infiltrators across the land borders. In all cases, the means for committing such a crime shall be confiscated, even if it belongs to other people. The fine shall be for each and every infiltrator, and the court may deport any foreigner who violates this article.

\textsuperscript{585} Federal Law No. 6 of 1973 for the visas and residence of foreigners amended by Decree No. 7 of 2007 stipulated in Article 34: (1) that whoever employs or provides housing for infiltrators shall be sentenced to at least two month-imprisonment and a fine of AED 100,000.

\textsuperscript{586} Amer, Qassem Ahmed. (2001), op. cit., p. 51.
From an economic perspective, large sums of money from the proceeds of illegal activities such as drug selling, prostitution, and robbery are being smuggled out of the state by illegal immigrants. Such illegal money transfers undermine the national economy. Moreover, the presence of a number of illegal residents in the state exerts more pressure on the services provided by the state for legal residents. This, in turn, increases expenditure on the basic services by the state that could have been spent in other fields. From a social perspective, illegal infiltration poses direct threats to the UAE national security. In general, UAE imposes stringent measures on public health for the prevention of diseases, especially those that are contagious. All foreigners are subject to full medical tests, but illegal immigrants cannot be examined, and hence all individuals in the community are at risk from any infectious diseases they may carry such as AIDS, swine flu, and bird flu. From a political perspective, some foreigners seek access to UAE with the aim of carrying out espionage activities and hence harm the country’s national security. According to Al-

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588 Ibid, pp. 53-54.
589 Ibid, p. 54.
Sheryany, the Iranian regime has been responsible for the illegal infiltration of a number of its subjects into the UAE for this type of activity.\textsuperscript{590}

In contrast, a large segment of illegal immigrants claim that they are UAE nationals and that they lived in UAE before its independence, but due to circumstances failed to obtain nationality. For example, a large number claim that they had settled in UAE before independence but that they had migrated to neighbouring countries to work. Following the UAE’s independence and as the living standard improved following the discovery of oil, they decided to return, but could not provide sufficient evidence to support their claims. In 2008, the UAE government established a Supreme Committee including representatives of the Ministries of Interior, the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and the State Security Department of UAE in order to find a solution for those who have no specific nationality in the state. The UAE government opened special centres in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ajman for two months in order to receive applications of those who want to rectify their residency status by applying for the UAE citizenship. The applications require the applicants to submit their passports of countries of origin until their residency is legalised in the UAE and a decision is made based on a review of their case by the Committee.\textsuperscript{591} This committee finally settled the issue by guaranteeing the rights of those entitled to nationality according to the rules of the laws on naturalization and passports, subject to showing the earlier nationality for those who had ID cards. It also emphasised the importance of settling the issue of their residency with their families in the state.\textsuperscript{592}

Following the final demarcation of borders with the Sultanate of Oman in 1999, the UAE built a border wall to stop the infiltration of foreigners into the state. On behalf of the state, the UAE Armed Forces signed an agreement with Advanced Integrated Systems and AGT companies to supply the latest state of the art technologies and systems to secure its borders from infiltrators.\textsuperscript{593}


\textsuperscript{591} Dossari, Salman. (3 September 2008). UAE: To open the door for the Non-Citizen Nationals / the “Bidoun” to modify their status for «the last time». Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper. Available at: <URL: http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&amp;article=485360&amp;issueno=10872#.VPKcV5GoVjo> Access Date: 7 February 2012. (In Arabic).


Both companies devised an integrated system of detectors and sensors that meet the UAE’s needs and its geographical nature.\textsuperscript{594} Despite this, a number of infiltrators still make their way into UAE. In order to address and counter these security challenges, the UAE established the General Authority of Ports Border and Free Zones Security in 2011, which is affiliated to the Supreme Council for National Security. The Authority enjoys a legal personality, and financial and administrative independence and has executive and regulatory powers. The Authority is authorized to propose draft laws, and to develop a national strategy for the security of the UAE’s ports, borders and free zones, in order to ensure the achievement of the national security strategy.\textsuperscript{595}

4.3.4 Cyber War

The progress of the UAE in embracing the digital technology era has weakened the state’s grip on its national security and control of national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{596} Even the most powerful countries in the world such as the US lack the ability to protect cyber-controlled systems located within their borders. Thus, the national infrastructure, such as power plants, railroads, airlines and banking services are exposed to cyber-attack.\textsuperscript{597} A cyber-attack on a state’s infrastructure could conceivably have devastating consequences for the very existence of the country, as it would undermine the government’s ability to maintain internal security and defend its national borders. For instance, perpetrators of cyber-attacks can remotely take control of gas pipelines, fuel production facilities, chemical plants, electrical power plants, air navigation systems, traffic lights and other vital systems in the target country, and wreak havoc by manipulating the programming of these systems. Cyber-attacks can also result in devastating economic losses if banks and stock exchanges are targeted, even if the interruption of services is brief. Finally, cyber-attacks may undermine the combat readiness and effectiveness of the armed forces.

Therefore, and despite the difficulty of combating cyber-crimes, from the mid-1990s the UAE government has taken initiatives to address these crimes. The General Dubai Police Headquarters created the first cyber-crime department in the Federation; a practice followed by other police

\textsuperscript{594} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{595} The UAE Official Gazette “Federal Decree Law No. 6 of 2011”. Issue 528.
headquarters around the UAE. The UAE also passed Federal Law No. 2 of 2006 on combating cyber-crime. However, due to the rapid technological advances and the emergence of new forms of crimes, the law was amended by Federal Law No. 5 of 2012, which covers a broad range of crimes committed by any means of information technology.\textsuperscript{598} For example, the new law criminalizes the use of information technology with intent of hacking, carrying denial of service attacks, forging electronic documents and fraud, and the law also criminalizes the unauthorized disclosure of information electronically stored including the data and numbers related to credit cards or bank accounts or details or any other method of electronic payment. Furthermore, the law criminalizes any person using information technology to forge, counterfeit or copy credit or civil identity cards, as well as abuse, defamation or extortion using information technology. The amended law also defines crimes carried out against national security and stability using information technology.

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\caption{Types of Cyber Attack}
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Cyber-attacks that pose threats to national security are classified into three distinctive types. First, attacks carried out by cyber criminals who break into computer systems for personal interest. Second, attacks carried out by Hacktivists\textsuperscript{599} who break into the computer systems of governments.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{598} The UAE legislator defines internet technology as any electromagnetic, electrochemical or otherwise any other device used for the processing of data the performance of logical and arithmetic and storage functions and which includes any capacity for the storage of information or for communications related or working in conjunction with this device.

\textsuperscript{599} “Hacktivism” is a word combined from the two English words ‘hacking’, or computer piracy and ‘activism’ or political activism and refers to electronic acts of piracy that aim at achieving a political objective or direct attention to a social or economic issue. See Abu Taleb, Ahmed. (January 2012). “Anonymous: political piracy in cyberspace”. \textit{International Politics Journal}, Issue 187, p. 111. (In Arabic).
\end{footnotesize}
international organizations or companies to spread their message and attract international attention to causes they advocate. Third, cyber-attacks lunched by one government against another for the purpose of achieving their national interests (see Figure 4.6).

Cyber-crimes are committed by persons who illegally hack into computers and the personal telephones of individuals, companies and government institutions around the world for the purpose of theft, extortion or the sale of the information obtained from these devices. These represent the biggest security nightmare for countries as cyber-crimes result in USD110bn in losses annually. Nearly 550 million people globally were victims of some form of cyber-crimes in 2013. In relation to the UAE, a study by Trend Micro security specialists indicated that during 2009 internet piracy disabled 250,000 computer systems in the UAE, the majority of which came from locations outside the country. Justin Doo, Director of Information Security at Symantec MENA said that during 2012, UAE residents were victims of nearly 1.5 million electronic crimes, highlighting a sizeable increase in the number of incidents.

The first electronic crime in the UAE was registered in 1995 when a number of girls filed a case with the police against a person who hacked their email accounts and stole personal photos before blackmailing them, asking for cash in return for not publishing the photos online. With the aid of computer experts, the police arrested the suspect who was living in the UAE. After this case, the first police department specializing in cyber-crime was formed in an acknowledgement of the emergence of new forms of crimes, which threatened security in the UAE. This also required a drive to secure qualified police cadres specializing in cyber-crimes. As a result, the electronic crimes department were able to arrest a person from a European country who hacked into the email of a Chinese company in Dubai, then wrote to the company’s clients notifying them that the company’s bank accounts were changed and that they should send their transfers to a new banking

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600 Interview with Abdulla Al-Ali, Digital Forensics Specialist, Al Youm TV Channel, 19 September 2013. (In Arabic).
603 Abu Shamala, Abeer (30 May 2013). “USD 420 million in losses for the UAE from cyber crimes in 2012”. Al Khaleej Newspaper. Available at: <URL:http://www.alkhaleej.ae/economics/page/2547673a-c18b-4ec7-81e0-9c782c919f64> Access Date: 17 April 2014. (In Arabic).
605 Ibid.
account. However, the thief was able to steal USD 3 million as the company did not realise it had been hacked until it received emails from clients complaining that their goods had not arrived despite making payment.\(^606\) The authorities also detained a gang that gained unauthorized access to bank accounts by using cameras planted in ATMs which filmed PINS entered by clients. Gang members used these PINS to withdraw cash from ATMs using a device to program the ATMs by transferring data through the card slot. The gang was arrested along with the equipment used in the crime and AED20,000 of stolen funds.\(^607\) The UAE security authorities also arrested a gang that were counterfeiting credit cards using a high-tech machine imported into the country in an apartment. Gang members used the credit cards to buy products worth millions of dollars before selling the goods and dividing the proceeds among them. When caught, they confessed to siphoning nearly AED16 million from banks accounts using the stolen credit card information.\(^608\)

Despite the success of the UAE in arresting many cyber-criminals, the authorities continue to face an uphill battle to protect the security of information in the country. The rapid advance in the use of smartphone and digital smart tablets in daily life makes it lucrative for cyber-criminals to hack into these devices and steal credit card information and personal files. The use of malicious links, spread through email, increases the number of victims. The viral progress of malicious software used by internet criminals enables them to hack applications used by government systems on smart and digital smart tablets in the future.\(^609\)

Second, recent years have seen the rise of Hacktivists who are mainly anonymous and do not adopt any particular ideology but fall under the umbrella of the online protest movement against governments and international companies and advocate popular freedoms. Hacktivists use their piracy skills to hack websites of government and international organisations to shut them down or to steal confidential information in order to leak the data or to expose activities such as violations


\(^607\) Fouda, Mohammed (23 February 2013), op. cit.


of human rights. However, their activities can cause serious damage to national security for the states targeted.

A number of groups and activists have gained online fame such as Anonymous, Julian Assange and Edward Snowden. The Anonymous hacking group is one of the most famous Hacktivist groups on the internet as it has launched multiple campaigns of cyber-attacks on corporate and government websites in order to direct international media attention to certain issues. For example, in 2012, Anonymous launched what was dubbed ‘Operation Paycheck’, which targeted Amazon, Visa, MasterCard, PayPal and a Swiss bank,\(^{610}\) in response to these companies’ stance with respect to shutting the Wikileaks’ website down, freezing its assets and stopping donations. As a result of this cyber-attack, PayPal lost more than £3.5million.\(^{611}\) In 2013, Anonymous threatened the Israeli government that it will launch an attack on 7 April dubbed ‘#OpIsrael’ in retaliation for its oppression of the Palestinians and the Israeli government’s lack of respect for human rights and international law. When the deadline passed, hackers groups attacked a number of Israeli government websites. These included the website of the cabinet, which was disabled for a lengthy period, the Tel Aviv stock exchange, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Knesset, the Israeli police, the Ministries of Infrastructure, Education, Transport, and Justice, the army logistics centre, and many private companies and e-commerce websites. The hackers also compromised more than 19,000 Israeli Facebook accounts by publishing the passwords for these accounts, along with data of 30,000 Israeli credit cards stolen after tens of e-commerce sites were hacked. In addition, names, ID numbers, email addresses and geographic data of thousands of Israeli politicians, Israeli army officers and Mossad agents were released.\(^{612}\) In 2014, the Anonymous hacking group launched the ‘OpHackingCup’ attack against Brazilian government websites in support of local protests against the money spent by the government to host the World Cup at a time when the country was suffering from weakening public services and infrastructure due to limited resources. Brazilian government websites, along with those of a number of private

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companies, were shut for a number of hours. The organizations affected included the Department of Justice, Sao Paulo Military Police, the Brazilian Intelligence System, the Brazilian Football Confederation, Bank of Brazil, Hyundai Brazil and the Brazilian Foreign Ministry from where confidential emails were stolen.\footnote{Cooper, Paul. (13 June 2014). “Anonymous hacks FIFA World Cup as promised”. Tech Guru Daily. Available at: <URL: http://www.tgdaily.com/social/108246-anonymous-hacks-fifa-world-cup-as-promised/> Access Date: 22 April 2014.}

Rarely do Hacktivists reveal their real identities for fear of prosecution under the anti-piracy and anti-cyber-crimes laws. However, this is not the case with Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, a website responsible for leaking thousands of classified military and diplomatic documents by the US and other countries. Nevertheless, in 2007, Assange declared that his responsibility as a member in the advisory body of Wikileaks\footnote{Silverstein, Charles, (ed.). (2011). The Initial Psychotherapy Interview: A Gay Man Seeks Treatment. Burlington, MA: Elsevier, p. 191.} was to guarantee complete anonymity to the sender of classified documents or material or material subject to regulations that were considered to be of political, diplomatic or moral importance. These materials are then evaluated by a team of experts, volunteers from major international media organizations, journalists and Wikileaks staff.\footnote{Fielder, Jonathan. (26 July 2010). “Wikileaks: A history of sensitive secret leaks”. BBC Arabic. Available at:<URL:http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/worldnews/2010/07/100726_wikileaks_profile_tc2.shtml>Access Date: 22 April 2014. (In Arabic).}

The leaking of classified documents published by the website led to a barrage of accusations by many countries, including the US, that these documents pose a threat to their national security. In 2010, Wikileaks published nearly 92,000 classified US military documents on the war in Afghanistan.\footnote{Madar, Chase. (2013). The Passion of Bradley Manning: The Story Behind the Wikileaks Whistleblower. London; New York: Verso, p. 155.} The documents included names of Afghani citizens who worked with the US and allied forces in Afghanistan, threatening their security.\footnote{Ibid.} A spokesperson for the Afghan militia movement, the Taliban, said the group would use the materials to track down Afghans who colluded with what Taliban considers as foreign invading forces.\footnote{Foust, Joshua. (30 July 2010). “Taliban Use Wikileaks to Hunt, Murder Named Afghans”. Registan. Available at: <URL: http://registan.net/2010/07/30/taliban-use-wikileaks-to-hunt-murder-named-afghans/> Access Date: 23 April 2014.} The leak prompted a strong condemnation by a White House spokesperson who said the leaks pose a threat
to national security and put the lives of American and their allies in danger. Wikileaks also leaked 40,000 classified US Defence Iraq War logs, and up to 250,000 documents classified by the US Department of State. These leaks provided terrorists with sensitive information that put US national security at risk.

Wikileaks also published Cable No. 09STATE15113 sent by the US Secretary Department to US embassies and consulates directing diplomats to update a list that was prepared as preliminary survey on 2008 of infrastructure and key resources sites in relevant countries, the loss of which might pose a threat to US national security, economy or public health. The sites included oil and gas pipelines, underwater telecommunications cables, and installations near US borders, such as dams and chemical plants that could cause damage to US national security if targeted. The US State Department also instructed staff to focus on services and export facilities; for example, those related to critical minerals or chemicals needed by US industry, or strategic companies, such as telecom hubs that would pose major threat to global communications if attacked. Finally, US diplomats were instructed to focus on vital logistical sites such as the Strait of Hormuz and Panama Canal, all ports and waterways. According to the cable, to ensure US national security, diplomats had to determine the locations of these sites in order to prevent, deter or at least minimize the impact of a potential terrorist attempt to destroy or capture them and to plan a rapid response in the event of an attack, natural disaster or other emergency. The publication of this cable on Wikileaks drew widespread condemnation from the US and the UK. British Foreign Secretary William Hague said the publication by Wikileaks of a list of sensitive locations around the world in relation to US interests without consideration to the security of millions of people was deplorable, as the sites could become targets for terrorists holding anti-American sentiments.

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The final type of cyber-attack that poses threats to national security is cyber-warfare, which refers to acts by one nation attacking computers or networks of another nation with the aim of destruction, disruption or espionage, and in defence of the national interests of the attacking government. Cyber-warfare first emerged on the international scene in 1998 when Pakistan and India were the first two countries to wage such a war, following India’s test of nuclear weapons and the re-emergence of the bitter and historic conflict over the disputed Kashmir region. India and Pakistan, like other countries who have taken part in cyber warfare, never openly admitted their actions due to the illegitimate nature of the cyber-attacks and the violation of the sovereignty of the victim countries.

Cyber-warfare is radically different from conventional warfare in that it is covert, may be launched simultaneously from across multiple countries, and engagement is undeclared, with no party assuming responsibility. Instead, the perpetrators hide their identity and maintain a pretence of innocence. For example, in 2012 Saudi Aramco was a victim of a cyber-attack when a highly destructive virus dubbed Shamoon infected the company’s computers. It wiped clean (burned) the hard drives of more than 30,000 computers. Everything was deleted—e-mails, working files, documents, commercial data, address, and whatever else was stored in the hard drives—and presumably much of it was also pilfered by the attackers. It was all replaced with a single image, a burning US flag. Saudi Aramco took more than ten days to restart all its electronic services hit by the virus. Meanwhile, the same virus was infecting the computers of Qatar RasGas Group, which is the largest liquefied natural gas producer in the world. US security officials said the Iran was “almost certainly” behind the attack on Aramco and Qatar RasGas. However, the Saudi

625 Caplan, Nathalie. (Winter 2013), op. cit., p. 96.
authorities did not accuse Iran; instead, a spokesman for the Saudi Interior Ministry described the attack as an act of terrorism by organized groups from a number of countries across four continents.632

In 2013, Edward Snowden who was working in the US National Security Agency leaked highly confidential documents from the Agency to the British newspaper, The Guardian, and American newspaper, The Washington Post. The Guardian revealed that the list of targets included traditional opponents of US and sensitive states in Middle East, but also allies such as European Union missions, the French, Italian and Greek embassies, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, India, and Turkey. It added that one of the documents, dating from 2010, targeted 38 embassies and missions and included details of an unusual combination of methods, which ranged from planting listening and bugging devices in the electronic communications equipment, to capturing the transmission of the cables through specialized antennas.633 The newspaper pointed out that the leaked documents suggested that the goal of wiretapping the EU Embassy in Washington was to collect information about political differences on global issues as well as differences between the member states. Thereafter, the German magazine Der Spiegel revealed that the National Security Agency tapped the phones of 122 world leaders, including the leaders of Colombia, Peru, Somalia, Belarus, Guatemala and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Der Spiegel also reported that the National Security Agency had been monitoring the mobile phone of Merkel for up to 10 years.634 The magazine also published the contents of a National Security Agency document from 2010 which indicated that an American intelligence unit, ‘Special Collection Service’ (SCS), comprising agents from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and high-level officials of the National Security Agency was active in around 80 locations, including 19 European cities, such as Berlin, Madrid,


Rome, Paris, Geneva and Prague. According to the magazine, the SCS teams were usually working under the cover of diplomatic representation and thus enjoyed diplomatic protection.\(^{635}\)

The Snowden documents also revealed espionage programs used by the CIA and its allies to monitor activity of any user of the Internet around the world.\(^{636}\) *The Guardian* newspaper revealed classified documents about the espionage activities at the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters, which, with the help of the National Security Agency, captured images of millions of Internet users across the world during their conversations over computer cameras. This was part of a monitoring program called ‘Optic Nerve’. The documents from 2008 to 2010, showed that during six months in 2008 the operation targeted about 1.8 million users of the ‘Yahoo’ accounts, and their images were stored in the agency database, regardless of whether or not the individuals were the target of British intelligence. After the revelations, Yahoo denied any complicity in the operation as the company does not violate its users’ privacy. *The Guardian* also revealed that in the previous five years German, Spanish and Swedish Intelligence Services had developed programs to monitor internet and mobile traffic similar to those carried out by American intelligence agencies. The methods included tapping the fibre-optic cables and working secretly with telecommunications companies. The newspaper further reported that the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters played a leading role in providing advice to its European counterparts on how to overcome national laws that restrict the authority of intelligence agencies regarding surveillance activities.\(^{637}\) Moreover, *The Guardian* revealed that the National Security Agency could monitor the activity of any user of the Internet around the world, through a secret program called ‘X-Keyscore’. This program allows direct access without permission to the content of e-mail messages and the contents of messages, which are exchanged on social networking sites such as Facebook or any other activities on the Internet, if the Internet Protocol address (IP address) of such persons are available to the Agency. In this context, the Agency set up at least 700 servers


with the program including in Russia, China, Venezuela and the UAE. Since the amount of information held electronically has reached limits that threaten the national security of countries, to mitigate this threat the UAE now uses Cloud Computing systems, not only to save the huge volumes of data efficiently, but also because Cloud Computing can enhance the security of the data. For example, the Cloud Computing can make cyber-attacks more difficult by removing the idea of having a fixed point of access. In Cloud Computing data is transferred continuously so that the attacker will not know where the goal is that s/he targets. Nevertheless, Cloud Computing is not a safe environment to save information. It is possible that an employee in a company that is responsible for the maintenance of the Cloud Computing system could leak information kept in the system to any persons or countries in return for money or leaking information to websites as a Hacktivist.

4.3.5 Proxy Battlefield

Analysts anticipated that the UAE would face prominent security threats following the withdrawal of the British forces in 1971, the gravest of which would be sabotage acts carried out by internal or external parties. The threat occurred because of the lack of limits imposed by the UAE authorities on foreigners seeking to obtain entrance and residence visas. The analysts argue that this would give subversives easy access to UAE. Although this analysis is old, the predictions of the British analysts have come true. UAE has been targeted since independence by a number of terrorist attacks and crimes that have dealt a blow to its national security. These have resulted primarily because of the lack of firm security regulations in relation to investigations prior to the issuance of residence and visit visas for foreigners. For example, national from the US and certain European countries are exempt from visa requirements. In addition, other foreigners from east and west Europe can obtain tourist visas upon their arrival to UAE, for 30 days, without renewal. Furthermore, Thai, South African and Chinese tourist visas require a guarantee from the hotels.


and the tourist companies hosting them. This lack of control has seen the UAE become a proxy battlefield for international criminal and foreign intelligence organizations.

There have been a number of terrorist-related incidents. In the 1970s, armed Palestinian groups abused the UAE government’s support for the Palestinian case and their right to their territory, by making the UAE a theatre for their terrorist operations. In 1973, a Japan Airlines jet was hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Japanese Red Army on its way from Amsterdam to Tokyo. The jet was directed to Dubai International Airport. After negotiations between the UAE security authorities and the hijacker, the jet was fuelled and flew to Libya, where all the hostages were released. In 1974, a British Airlines jet was hijacked from Dubai International Airport by the PFLP while en-route from London to Brunei via Beirut, Dubai, Calcutta and Singapore. As passengers were disembarking, four Palestinian terrorists scaled the wall of Dubai International Airport, and opened gunfire on the British jet, which was fuelling. They injured an airhostess and an airport worker who were nearby. They boarded the jet, and flew the remaining passengers and crew to Libya. Then in 1977, Saif Said bin Ghubash, the UAE’s first Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, was assassinated by a gunman of Palestinian origins. Minister Ghubash had been escorting his Syrian counterpart, Abdul Halim Khaddam, in Abu Dhabi International Airport. As both ministers entered the Main Hall on their way to the departure lounge, the man attempted to assassinate the Syrian Minister and shot the UAE Minister by mistake. Ghubash was immediately taken to hospital but died of his injuries.

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641 Interview with Dr. Christopher M. Davidson, 4 November 2011.
645 Ibid.
649 Ibid.
On 28 March 2009, Sulaiman Madov, a Chechen military leader and government opponent, was assassinated as he was leaving his home in Dubai.\(^{651}\) He was shot inside the parking area in the building where he lived.\(^{652}\) Lt. Gen. Dahi Khalfan, the Dubai Police Commander, reported that the Chechen Vice-Prime Minister Adam Delimkhanov was the mastermind behind the assassination,\(^{653}\) while five others were the perpetrators.\(^{654}\) Two were arrested, one Iranian and another Tajik, while the other three, two Russians and a Kazakhstani, including the actual murderer, fled to Russia immediately after committing the crime.\(^{655}\) International arrest warrants were issued for the perpetrators by the UAE authorities through Interpol.\(^{656}\)

In 2009, the UAE security authorities foiled a terrorist plot that targeted the Dragon Mart, one of the biggest markets for the sale of Chinese products in Dubai. The UAE security forces arrested two Chinese men, members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is on the UN list of terrorist organizations. Members of this movement belong to the Uighurs Muslim minority in China, and most of them live in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, East Turkestan, which is calling for autonomy from China. The terrorists entered in UAE on 16 July 2009 to target Chinese interests in the country following unrest in Xinjiang.\(^ {657}\) The Chinese market in UAE is one of the biggest in the world outside China.\(^ {658}\)

On 19 January 2010, Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh, a senior Hamas military commander, was killed at Al-Bustan Rotana Hotel in Dubai. The crime was discovered the following day by room service at the hotel. At first, the security forces had no suspicions about his death, knowing nothing about

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\(^ {653}\) Ibid.


\(^ {655}\) Ibid.


his identity. Al-Mabhouh earlier had entered the state with a passport that did not mention his position. He was found lying in bed with his medications by his side, and no traces of violence were noted. His hotel room was also locked from inside, so all the evidence pointed to natural death.\textsuperscript{659} Once the UAE security forces found his real identity, a serious investigation was carried out in the case.\textsuperscript{660} The body of Al-Mabhouh was subject to a post mortem, and it was found that he had been injected with succinylcholine, which is a strong sedative used in hospitals. Then he was suffocated using a pillow.\textsuperscript{661} The UAE security forces sought the help of the CCTV in Dubai International Airport and some hotels and shopping malls in Dubai, and gathered thousands of pictures before and after the crime was committed to solve the case. These images played a major part in solving the case.\textsuperscript{662}

A group of 28 suspects of different nationalities were found to have taken part in his assassination.\textsuperscript{663} In a press conference, Lieutenant General and Chief of the Dubai Police Force, Dahi Khalfan Tamim, reported that the assassins had come to Dubai on different flights from a number of European countries. Pictures were taken of them as they arrived in Dubai International Airport.\textsuperscript{664} Investigations revealed that 12 suspects held British passports, six held Irish passports, four held French passports, and three held Austrian passports, in addition to two Palestinians, and a German suspect.\textsuperscript{665} The analysis of the CCTV footage revealed the assassination plot. The assassination group resided in different hotels in Dubai. They went to the hotel, to wait for Al-Mabhouh who was supposed to arrive at 14:12 but turned up at 15:25. Two of the group also went up in the same elevator with Al-Mabhouh to locate his room, after which the leader of the group booked the room opposite. The group closely monitored all parts of the hotel until Al-Mabhouh

\textsuperscript{659} Al Arabiya News. (4 March 2010). Dubai says Mabhouh betrayed by Hamas member. Available at: <URL: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/03/04/102144.html> Access Date: 3 November 2011.

\textsuperscript{660} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{664} Al Najami, Siham. (16 February 2010), op. cit.

left at which stage the assassination group was divided into four groups inside the hotel. When Al-Mabhoh returned to his room at 20:24, part of the assassination group, who were waiting in his room, attacked him. The whole group left the hotel at 20:52. The Israeli Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, known as the Mossad, was accused of the murder, and international arrest warrants were issued against the suspects by the UAE security forces through Interpol.

Furthermore, the UAE has witnessed acts by international criminal gangs. On 15 April 2007, the House of Graff jewellers in Wafi Mall at Dubai, Dubai was robbed by the international ‘Pink Panther’ gang. The thieves entered the mall in cars during shopping hours, and threatened salesmen in the jewellery shop with weapons before stealing diamonds worth an estimated AED14.7 million. According to Dubai Police, the robbery only lasted for one minute and 45 seconds. Dubai Police also reported that the gangsters were from East Europe and entered the country with forged passports. However, Dubai Police recovered all the diamonds, and arrested the logistics person of the gang in UAE. Moreover, Dubai Police sent twelve DNA samples from the suspects to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), following which four were matched to samples from a robbery of a jewellery shop in Vaduz, the capital of Liechtenstein. It was later found that the perpetrators were an international gang, which was given the name Pink Panther by the British Police following the first robbery in the Mayfair area.

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669 Ibid.
670 Ibid.
in London, 2003. The gang carried out about 120 raids on luxury shops in more than 20 countries. Interpol believe that there might be up to 200 criminals in the gang; most of them Serbs with military experience.

On 16 November 2008, a Chinese businessman was kidnapped in Dubai by a Chinese mafia gang. The gang demanded a ransom of USD27 million for his release, or otherwise he would be killed. The UAE police investigations traced the hostage to an apartment in Ajman; the gangsters also had another place in one of the old Arabian homes in Fujairah. Dubai Police attacked both places at the same time after obtaining prosecution permission in UAE, and in coordination with Ajman and Fujairah Police forces. The kidnapped businessman was released and the eight gangsters, including a woman, were arrested inside the Ajman apartment. At the same time, the gang leader was arrested in Fujairah.

### 4.3.6 Economic Threats

Macroeconomic stability is a key factor for creating the conditions for state institutions to operate successfully in terms of the Idea of the State. In the case of the UAE, the macroeconomic stability of the state is threatened in a number of ways. First, when there are long-term falls in oil prices. Second, if there is an internal security crisis. Third, in the case of insecurity in neighbouring states. These factors can result in the slowing of state spending on development projects and the related state sectors, as well as a slowdown in the financial and commercial markets because of weaker investor confidence. In turn, this will exacerbate the financial problems because of declining liquidity in the banking system. A contraction or slowdown in real GDP growth will reflect negatively on income levels as employment levels fall, reducing savings rates and falling private sector investment. Weakening macroeconomic conditions exacerbate the security, economic and social conditions in the country raising the threat of insecurity as workers take action through

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679 Ibid.
strikes. Furthermore, in the UAE where the government has significantly raised living standards through high expenditure on education, housing and health care, austerity packages undermine the Idea of the State. The Constitution stipulates that the state shall provide the right to housing, health care and education free of charge for its citizens. Thus, fiscal cutbacks can undermine the state institutions that protect the interests of the citizens, which will result in threatening the stability of the state.

A further economic threat is the high levels of money transfers by foreign residents in the UAE. The transfer of these remittances reduces liquidity in the banking system and foreign currency reserves, as well as curtailing economic growth through lower domestic spending. Fiscal policy in the UAE encourages foreign workers and foreign investors to transfer most of their savings from salaries, wages, investment returns and capital abroad, since such transfers are not subject to income tax, and there are no fees imposed on transfers outside the country.\(^\text{680}\) This occurs despite the fact that the UAE government has provided an investment environment for foreign residents on its territory, to invest their money and their savings in the state's economy.

Meanwhile, the free zones in the UAE, despite of being one of the most successful free zones in the Middle East, can pose a threat to the security and stability of the state. This is because the local governments permit the companies operating in the free zones to employ non-Emirates, which could further exacerbate the demographic structure imbalance. According to the \textit{Alroeya Newspaper}, the main reason that foreign investors establish companies in the free zones is to obtain residency visas, which are valid for three years, as opposed to two years for companies established outside the free zones. This is a more important consideration than the success of the company, since the procedures for establishing a company in the free zones is relatively easy, and the costs of establishment start from AED 25,000 plus an annual fee.\(^\text{681}\)

Finally, the real-estate sector, which is promoted as a key sector in each Emirate’s sustainable economic development plans, in relation to its role in supporting other productive and service


\(^{681}\) Ghawi, Michelle. (23 July 2015). “Investors looking for residencies”. \textit{Alroeya Newspaper}. Available at: <URL:http://alroeya.ae/2015/07/23/262710/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9/> Access Date: 28 August 2015. (In Arabic).
sectors. However, this focus on real estate as a driver of the economic growth does not actually achieve the sustainable development of the economies, as real estate is an infrastructural support for other economic sectors. Furthermore, it is exposed to high risks of supply exceeding demand.\textsuperscript{682} Thus, the development of the real estate sector as a key rather than a supportive sector is liable to encourage high returns to investors only for short periods. Therefore, it will not have a positive role in sustainable economic development in the long run, but may actually be a hindrance to the growth of other sectors, which may be more important pillars in the process of sustainable development.\textsuperscript{683}

In summary, the discussion of the major threats to the physical base in the UAE demonstrates the interdependence of the elements of the physical base and their impact on the country’s national security. The threat posed to the territory of the UAE by Iran’s occupation of the three islands of Abu Musa, and Greater and Lesser Tunb is a destabilising tool used by Tehran. This is particularly the case because of Iran’s aggressive policy towards the region and its failure to respond to international efforts to resolve the issue. Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear development programme, with plants such as Bushehr close to the Islands, poses an environmental threat to the UAE and neighbouring countries. If a nuclear accident or an earthquake hit these structures, it would have a devastating effect on the UAE’s environment, public health and the availability of clean water sources for desalination. Furthermore, the threats to the physical base in the UAE in the form of coordinated cyber-attacks on its e-infrastructure are not an immediate danger. However, the speed and size of a successful attack could affect the UAE’s stability and hence its existence.

\textbf{4.4 CONCLUSION}

The internal and external threats to the security of the UAE are presented in line with Buzan’s hypothesis ‘the nature of the state’ in order to develop an understanding of the national security of the UAE within an established frame of reference. The threats to the various components of the hypothesis, and the idea of interdependencies between the various threats, relate strongly with Buzan’s proposition. The threats discussed are dynamic, interacting with each other as suggested by Buzan. For example, the effect of the current demographic imbalance and its negative


\textsuperscript{683} Ibid.
implications for the UAE’s national identity (an essential component of the idea of state) is also a threat for the country’s long-term political stability. This is because the undermining of the traditional national identity is imminent due to its heavy exposure to the cultures and identities of the majority migrant population in the UAE. Relatedly, the failure of the state to ensure that the education system underpins the traditional national identity is a further threat to the idea of the state in the UAE. The future may require a reshaping of the idea of state in order to encompass the foreign identities, which impact the other constituent parts of the state, namely the physical base and the institutions of the state.

These threats are being exploited by forces, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda or IS, that are attempting to destabilize the institutional structure of the UAE. These groups have and are attempting to exploit the gaps created by the demographic imbalance. They have occasionally succeeded in building their networks and infiltrating the institutions (an essential component in expressing the existence of the state), aiming to destabilize the system and overthrow the existing power structures.

Furthermore, Iran has threatened the physical base of the UAE in 1971 through its occupation of the three UAE islands in the Arabian Gulf. In addition, its nuclear program threatens the environment of the UAE. Furthermore, Tehran’s use of proxy battlefields in the region, such as in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, highlights the interdependency of the threats to the components of the idea of state as suggested by Buzan. This is also reflected in the imbalance in the demographic structure, which is an economic drain on the country when untaxed income is remitted in large volumes by the majority foreign population. This threatens the physical base of the UAE.

In the final chapter, the preceding chapters are re-capped and the conclusion of the study is detailed, as well as recommendations provided for further research.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The main objective of this study is to analyse the national security of the UAE since independence in 1971. In this context, the study discusses and the policies adopted by the decision makers in the UAE to ensure the security of its citizens, the stability of the state and its impact on the ground. The study points to the presence of threats that affect the UAE’s national security, despite the promulgation of legislation and creation of institutions specifically designed to contend with such threats. In order to achieve the objective, two questions are answered. 1) What is the most appropriate theory by which to analyse the national security of the UAE? And 2) What are the major threats, which affect the elements of the UAE national security according to the selected theory of analysis?

In order to answer these questions, the research is structured as follows. The study commences with a discussion on the relevancy of delinking the UAE’s national security from the Arab states’ national security, despite the similarities of effects. Thus, the first chapter stresses the importance of separating the formulation of the concept of Arab national security from that of the national security of UAE. However, this differentiation is controversial for a wide segment of Arab academic researchers, who consider the subject of national security of Arab Middle Eastern states as inseparable and interdependent and, therefore, each country’s national security should not be defined in isolation.

This thesis also criticises the concept of interdependent Arab national security on the grounds that nations cannot be built solely on a populace linked by speaking one language, but it is based on several elements, including racial origins. Although the vast majority of the nationals of the Arabian Peninsula are of Arabic ethnicity, other Arab countries include different ethnicities, such as Armenians in Lebanon, Kurds and Turkmen in Iraq and Syria, and Amazigh and Berbers in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Thus, even if the populace of the various countries speak Arabic they are not all Arabs. Furthermore, the League of Arab States, which includes all the Arab countries in the Middle East, has never concluded an agreement between its members to unify their foreign policy in order to serve the interests of all Member States in the League. Members have concluded agreements for joint defence, in addition to economic and cultural cooperation, which are included under the framework of collective security but not Arab national security. In fact, the
agreements are tools used by the individual states to maintain their own national security. This is because any obligations under these agreements can be evaded if they conflict with the national interests of the state. Thus, the researcher addresses the subject of the national security of the UAE without succumbing to the prevailing thought in the Arab region in relation to the framework of the concept of the so-called Arab National Security.

The second question is answered by exploring the literature on national security approaches and theories in chapter two. This is done in order to establish an analytical framework for the study. In undertaking the literature review, the lack dearth of academic research on the topic in relation to the UAE was highlighted. Nevertheless, the chapter reviews the interpretations of the four schools of international-relations theory—Realism, Constructivism, Liberalism and Copenhagen—about the behaviour of states towards the preservation of their national security. The discussion highlights that most of the hypotheses are not commensurate with the nature of the social, economic and political composition of UAE. This is because the four schools tend to analyse national security based on the norms of first-world countries. Furthermore, the analysis of the four schools is founded on a Western historical perspective with its social, political, strategic and geographical environment, which is significantly different from that existing in the Third World and developing countries, including the UAE. However, the researcher concludes that Buzan’s hypothesis from the Copenhagen School on the ‘Nature of the State’ takes into account the differing conditions in the Third World and developing countries. Thus, the study adopts this approach for the analysis of the national security of the UAE.

The third question, which identifies the main components of the UAE’s national security based on Buzan’s hypothesis, is answered in chapter three. The chapter commences with an analysis of the UAE’s formation and the consequent creation of the political, social and economic structure of the country. These elements help to form the three pillars of Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis, namely: the idea of state; the physical base; and the institutions established to ensure the continuity and stability of the state.

The three pillars of Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis are used in chapter four to analyse the types of internal and external threats to the UAE’s national security. Buzan’s proposition is closely related to the reality of the situation in the UAE, as the analysis links the various threats, which are dynamic and interrelated, to the components of the hypothesis. Nevertheless, the threats
highlighted in chapter four are not a definitive list as impact of one threat may create further unforeseen threats in the future. For example, the effect of the current demographic imbalance impacts the UAE’s national identity, an essential component in the idea of the state, and although a threat to the long-term political stability of the country is not a threat at present. A second effect of the imbalance is the economic drain because the majority foreign population remits untaxed income in huge volumes from the UAE. This threatens the physical base of the country.

The threats to the idea of the state include the growing demographic imbalance, with UAE nationals accounting for less than 11% of the entire population. This imbalance has occurred because of the reliance on foreign workers to work on the huge economic development projects implemented by the government. The reliance on expatriate workers has turned the UAE turned into a de facto multicultural society. Thus, the transformation of a homogenous society to a multicultural society will result in a reconfiguration of the nation and what it stands for by redefining the idea of the state. Thus, the rest of the associated elements can be destabilized, which could lead to the collapse of the established society. In addition, Ministry of Education has failed to protect Emirati students from the influence of ideas atypical for their values, which may be gained through the curriculum of private schools within the state. The Private Education Law issued by the Council of Ministers obliges the Ministry of Education to approve the curricula of private schools in the UAE. However, the ministry is not carrying out its duties, under the pretext that there is not sufficient staff at the Ministry who have the necessary language skills to review the curriculums of the foreign schools. If the foreign curricula contain beliefs that depart from the national identity of the UAE, then it could result in the creation of generations who embrace ideologies that call for the demolition of the idea of the state.

One of the threats to the institutions is the risk created by human rights organizations cooperating with extremist organizations who wish to overthrow the UAE regime. This is created by the proven lack of credibility of the reports issued by certain human rights associations. These reports have undermined external support for the government of the UAE and boosting the credibility of extremist organisations.

Meanwhile, the hostile policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the UAE and its neighbours poses a threat to the physical base of the state. In particular, the Iranian regime rejects the UAE’s call for a peaceful solution to the issue of the island of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa,
which were occupied by the Shah of Iran's regime in 1971. The UAE proposes a solution through bilateral negotiations between the two countries, referring the case to the International Court of Justice or resorting to international arbitration. In addition, the Iranian regime continues to interfere in the internal affairs of the regional countries through its clients and agents in order to protect its presence on the international scene. A further threat arises from the failure of neighbouring countries to control their land, sea and air borders with the UAE or the inadequate systems of certain countries regarding the issuance of travel documents. Most illegal infiltrators into the UAE come from the maritime border between the UAE and Iran, or the land and sea borders between the UAE and the Sultanate of Oman. In relation to passports, weak controls over the issuing of passports in a number of countries has been exploited by some intelligence agencies and international criminal organizations in order to use fake travel documents to enter the UAE in order to carry out criminal operations on its territory. In addition, in a number of countries, people deported from the UAE because of criminal activity can change their passports in their home country and therefore return to the UAE.

Other factors that threaten the physical base of the state include the high levels of remittances by the expatriate workforce and investors without having paid taxes on their earnings. This curtails financial liquidity and foreign currency in the financial sector. In addition, the depletion of the already overstretched infrastructure, such as electricity production and water use, on expanding development projects, will add further pressure on these resources. A further factor is the inability to guarantee the security of the cyberspace of the state against the virtual attacks, including ensuring information. This is because of result of the constant evolution in information technologies and new methods developed to penetrate electronic systems.

Furthermore, a number of environmental challenges pose a threat to the UAE physical basis. First, water shortage is a pressing and growing national security threat as pressure rises on the existing capacity to desalinate the seawater to meet the demands of the ever-expanding population. Furthermore, the desalination process poses a threat to salinity levels impacting negatively on marine life, which is a key element of the food chain in the UAE. The lack of natural alternatives of water sources is a time bomb for the national security of UAE. Second, the environmental threat from a nuclear accident is present, given Iran’s nuclear energy program. Third, air pollution levels have increased exponentially in the UAE as the number of cars and vehicles has increased with
the size and wealth of the population and the failure to provide a suitable public sector transport system. Although, different local authorities monitor the level of pollution in the Emirates measures to combat or reduce the effects of the emissions fall short. The number of respiratory diseases has increased in the recent years, which has elevated the pressure on medical resources.

The UAE government is developing evolving policies to address these threats. Recent developments include the introduction of new legislation such as Federal Law No. 6 of 2009 concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which aims to develop and regulate the nuclear sector within the UAE for peaceful purposes to meet future challenges of energy supply. In addition, Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 attempts to combat crimes in relation to the use of information technology. The Law includes articles that provide legal protection for the privacy of information, data and figures published and circulated on the information network. In addition, Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 addresses terrorist crimes, the threat of which have been exacerbated by the breakdown in security following the outbreak of Arab Spring in late 2010. For example, Islamic State controls significant territories in the Middle East, which have seen the destruction of the institutions of the countries, and the announcement of an Islamic Caliphate. This law adopts a comprehensive vision of terrorist crimes, their types, classifications, purposes, objectives, the relevant organizations and the penal limits in order to achieve security and stability in the state community. Finally, Federal Law No. 2 of 2015 attempts to combat discrimination and hatred. The Law prohibits abuse of the divine entity, religions, prophets, apostles, holy books, houses of worship, and discrimination based on religion, creed, doctrine, sect, race, colour, or ethnic origin. The law also criminalizes statements or actions by posting on information or communications networks, websites, or any readable, audio or video means that could provoke tensions between individuals or groups, in order to maintain the cohesion of community texture in the state.

Furthermore, new institutions have been established to address relevant threats. These include the Higher National Security Council in 2006 to regulate and coordinate the work of the security services, and federal and local institutions concerned with maintaining the security and stability of the State, through four subsidiary bodies. In addition, the Federal Demographic Structure Council was created in 2009 to coordinate with the federal and local institutions and research centres in relation to the demographic structure of the UAE. The body is charged with establishing an integrated information base, which is to be the main source for decision-makers in addressing the
demographic imbalance while maintaining the focus on economic and social development. Furthermore, the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation was set up in 2009 to regulate the nuclear sector in order to ensure security and nuclear safety. Finally, in 2016, the Federal government introduced two new posts. The first is the Minister of Tolerance, who is tasked with consolidating tolerance as a fundamental value in the multi-cultural UAE community. It also introduced the post of State Minister of Happiness who has the task of harmonizing all plans, programs and policies of the State in order to achieve happiness for the community, thereby ensuring security and stability in the UAE.

In conclusion, the challenges are still strong as there are gaps in implementing executive procedures because of a lack of effective coordination between different segments of the executive apparatus. This is particularly apparent between the local and federal authorities. For example, in the case of the education sector, the split between the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai has created two parallel legislative and organizational bodies within the Ministry of Education (MOE). The MOE supervises and legalizes the education system, with an emphasis on the national curricula. The diversification of the curriculum is not an issue in itself as long as there is agreement on the core value system, which represents the identity of the UAE. In this context, common identity and national history subjects have not yet been introduced despite the identity challenges facing the new generations. The problem is that a common approach to the core value system preserving the national identity and hence ensuring the nature of the state has not gained a consensus.

**5.1 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE**

Analysing the existing and potential threats to the UAE’s national security based on the established school of thoughts is challenging. The UAE has a unique existential structure and the pace of change and challenges that it has and is going through, makes it difficult for any referential theory to provide a complete answer. While Realism, Constructivism, and Liberalism theories may provide a degree of reference by which to analyse the threats, they fail to address the situation in the UAE. However, Buzan’s ‘Nature of the State’ hypothesis (from the Copenhagen School), despite its controversial approach, can provide comprehensive reference of analysis for the UAE state nature.
The threats posing to the UAE national security when analysed from Buzan’s perspective are multidimensional. Buzan’s model of the stable state is comprised on three interrelated components: 1) the idea of the state which comes as a result of a joint contract between a group of people who share the same culture, and perhaps the same race, gender or heritage to create a state that protects them and express their interests in the international arena; 2) the physical base of the state which includes its territory, its inhabitants, natural resources and human-made wealth; and 3) the institutions serving the interests of the state. Any threats to one of these three components are considered threats to the national security (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: National Security Threats Dynamics

This research has established a referential framework for analysing the UAE’s national security according to Buzan’s hypothesis. This approach is the first of its kind undertaken of the UAE. The analytical framework could be used for similar studies on the national security of the other members of the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) because of the similarity of their socio-political and economic environment.

The research highlights the inapplicability of the major national security theories established in the West in relation to the Middle East. This is because of the complexity and differing natures of the geopolitical and socioeconomic environments of the region compared to the West. The more a theory is neutral and takes a global perspective relative to the generic compositions of states the easier it is to relate to the Middle East. This is the strength of Buzan’s theory. Further studies
tailored towards understanding the specifics of national security studies of the Middle East and the Gulf countries are needed.

5.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The researcher encountered difficulty in finding literature relating directly to the national security of the UAE. This problem created an academic barrier that forced the researcher to use material of a more generic nature. As such, in order to establish a coherent understanding of the idea of the state, reviews of the education system, the institutional structure, and knowledge of the physical base of the UAE were undertaken. However, the lack of official statistics for the number of public and private schools in each of the seven Emirates meant that the researcher had to conduct field visits to all education zones in each Emirate in order to collect the relevant data. The Ministry of Education does not receive the data from private schools because of their autonomy from the Ministry, despite claims to the contrary by the Ministry of Education's Assistant Undersecretary for Private Education Affairs. The official stated that the Ministry received the statistics from all school districts and educational zones in the state periodically and added that it is available in the Department of Statistics in the Ministry.

5.3 IDEAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This research does not provide the definitive list of threats to the UAE’s national security. However, it does shed light on areas for further research in terms of the potential threats and further assessments of the existing measures taken by the UAE’s state authorities to preserve its national stability. In particular, the researcher recommends further studies into future threats of an electronic nature. This is important because new technology has reshaped social interaction across the globe and provided unprecedented access to information. This access poses multidimensional threats to the national security, through economic threats in the form of fraud, theft of business secrets theft, and allowing terror groups to inculcate youngsters with radical ideologies, which threatens social stability.

Furthermore, the researcher recommends conducting an in-depth study on the role of educational curricula on the national security of the state. The education system is not limited to promote loyalty to the state, but plays a prominent role in the development of countries’ economies. For example, Japan was able to advance economically after the destruction of its capabilities at the end
of World War II, but only after improving its education system. It is now a member of the Group of Seven major industrialized nations, thanks to its educational outcomes, which have successfully balanced economic development and maintaining its national identity. Japanese society, despite its huge economic and social change, still clings to its own language and traditions stretching back thousands of years. Therefore, it would be interesting to study this model within the frame of UAE’s national security. Finally, a similar approach in analysing the UAE’s national security in the light of Buzan’s theory is recommended for other Gulf countries.
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Statement in Islah magazine

“A statement to Muslims about death sentences against fighters Khaled Al-Islambouli and his brothers.”
Translated into English: “A statement to Muslims about death sentences on fighters Khaled Al-Islambouli and his brothers.”

Behold, God has given the believers their lives and their possessions, promising them paradise in return, [and so] they fight in God’s cause, and slay, and are slain: a promise which in truth He has willed upon Himself in [the words of] the Torah, and the Gospel, and the Qur’an. And who could be more faithful to his covenant than God? Rejoice, then, in the bargain which you have made with Him: for this, this is the triumph supreme!” God Almighty has spoken the truth.

If there is anything at all for Egypt to be proud of, it would be sufficient honour and pride for her that she had among her sons, those who are facing strong injustice and stand up to restrain tyrants valiantly, turning away from this world pleasures, seeking to die for the sake of God, nothing ever scares them from obeying and applying the orders of God and fearing no one but Him.

Whenever another Pharaoh appears to tyrannize over Egypt, to become unfair and despotic and behave arrogantly or tyrannically, God sends from its people those who correct the wrong and end the corruption in its lands. And whenever diseases become entrenched, affliction spreads and enemies combine to attack it, advocates for God emerge in the arena, in which they are ready with the righteous word, seeking God’s word, combating the falsehood, fighting it for the sake of God. Thus, while “some of them have died and some are still waiting to follow the same path, and they never changed their oath that they made to God.”

When the country was opened to the Jews and corruption spread throughout Egypt as miscreants controlled every part of its land, it was incumbent upon the people of righteousness to remove the evil by their own hands after all other ways have been closed to them. Muslim preachers and religious men have been sent to the darkness of prisons without committing any fault except for not submitting to Jews and refusing to surrender to the enemies of God and the enemies of Egypt. It happened that the great Mujahid Khaled Islambouli and his righteous brother mujahideen sacrificed themselves for the sake of God Almighty in response to His orders to uphold His Word. It happened that God’s will was fulfilled when Anwar Sadat was executed at the hands of these young believers after he challenged the Supreme Being, disputed and shared God Almighty in his pride and superciliousness with all effrontery and tyranny, sending thousands of innocent people to prison, preventing and restricting the freedom of Muslims and their mosques, and after he
rubbed Egypt's face in the dirt by accepting to submit and lie down in the face of the enemies of God.

Whatever is said about the legality of the assassination, it remains clear that those who took retribution against the tyrant are well aware of the large responsibility and its great sensitivity, so they strived and died, and therefore gained the divine reward. They were keen—even according to the testimony of their opponents—not to target others, only the evil head, even though they were able to target more people. However, they had a genuine commitment to the order of God, who ordered believers to not to kill a soul without a just cause such as a legal punishment for murder or for causing corruption on earth. However, Sadat was a person who killed innocent souls using mock trials, and spread corruption on earth and betrayed the Muslim nation; accordingly, he deserved death since Egypt is worthy of life.

Islambouli and his brothers only applied the rules of fairness and smashed the falsehood. Therefore, they fought for the holiest thing of Egypt, for its religion, because the rulers of Egypt should have not descended on this dangerous slope, which caused their deceased ruler to succumb to that fate, who only scourged Egypt since the era of the former tyrant Nasser.

The death penalties issued against these honourable brave men are a stigma on the history of the ruling regime in Egypt, with its injustice and flagrant arbitrariness, which led to the withdrawal of all litigants from the courtroom. Throughout the trial, the rights of those righteous men were aggressively denied. The statements of the Minister of Defence and the press of the regime about sentencing them to death issued before the end of the trial made the trial a farce, like the previous trials of martyrs Abdulkadir Ouda, Sayyid Qutb, Shukri Mustafa and their brethren.

The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe sent many messages to the Egyptian President denouncing the trial of these young believers before a military court and these unfair sentences against them. It invites all who care about Egypt as a Muslim nation to join their call for the abolition of these unfair rules and sentences and claim for not litigating against these mujahideen unless before a court that they accept.

We ask Almighty God for Egypt to be united by the pillars of justice under the Qur’anic guidelines and laws; by which people never fear the absolutism of a ruler over them while the ruler never
fears the fury of his people by the ruling nor the ruling fury of the parish, while all people are equal before the Law, no matter what their position in society.

Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe


The Islah magazine, Issue 50, 1982.

\(^{684}\) Hijri Calendar [A.H. or Anno Hegirae] is the Islamic calendar adopted by Muslims, which is based on the lunar calendar, by which the Muslims determine the times of festivals and the month of fasting each year. It began with the year in which the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) migrated from Mecca to Medina, which was a turning point in the message for the Islamic religion and of which it was possible to end with the killing of the Prophet in Mecca at the hands of opponents to his message.
Appendix 2: Interview 1

Transcript translated from Arabic

**Interviewee:** Huda Ali Bin Salem Al Zaabi

Head of Applied Sciences in Curriculum Department

UAE Ministry of Education

**Location:** Dubai

**Date:** 30 March 2011

INTERVIEWER: Who are the people that write the national education curricula?

INTERVIEWEE:

- Curricula specialists of the Curricula Department in the Ministry of Education.
- University Professors.
- Subject teachers and instructors.
- Members of different social organizations in the state.
- 90% of those who write and create the curricula are Emiratis and only 10% are foreigners.

INTERVIEWER: What are the main objectives of the National Education Curriculum [ie achieve a national identity related to the UAE] that are to be deeply rooted in the students?

INTERVIEWEE:

1. Students should express their identity and belonging to the UAE, and shall care for the positive aspects in the national culture, and shall learn how to preserve the UAE community as an Arabic Islamic community (national identity).

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685 Interviews with Educationalists are brief due to the survey’s limited questions.
2. Students shall recognize the importance of the government and should be able to distinguish between the different roles played by the different political institutions in the state. Students should also develop their knowledge about the characteristics of the UAE federal regime (the state and the government).

3. Students should gain greater knowledge about the regulations, rules, and systems at home, at school, and in the community, and should be able to understand how laws are enacted and how they operate in UAE. They should also get to know more about the role of laws in protecting and regulating the community (the law).

4. Students should acknowledge their rights and obligations and should be able to observe human rights in general, as well as the rights and obligations of children. They should be taught how to accept the views of others and to respect the views of the majority and act upon the same (rights and obligations).

5. Students should take part in work at home and school and should protect the environment from the different sources of pollution, in addition to being committed to active participation in the students’ groups (active participation).

6. Students should be able to recognize the basic concepts of a developing economy, and should identify the main economic values required to achieve social development, in addition to identifying the basic concepts of the economic system in the UAE (National Economy).

INTERVIEWER: Is the curricula of National Identity being taught at all stages in the government schools?

INTERVIEWEE:

- No. It is taught in the first, second, third, seventh, eighth, and ninth grades.
- The National Education Document was developed in 2009, in the light of which national identity books are written from the kindergarten stage through to high school.
Appendix 3: Interview 2

**Interviewee:** Mr Brian Fox

Division Manager for Licensing & Accreditation

Abu Dhabi Education Council

**Location:** Abu Dhabi

**Date:** 3 April 2011

INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in Emirate of Abu Dhabi?

INTERVIEWEE: There are 184 private schools in Emirate of Abu Dhabi.

INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in private schools in Abu Dhabi in the school year 2010/11?

INTERVIEWEE: The total number of private school students in Abu Dhabi is 175,000 students, and national students comprise 31% of the total number of students in private schools.

INTERVIEWER: Are the statistics about the number of students in the private and government schools being sent to the Ministry of Education?

INTERVIEWEE: Statistics are not sent to the Ministry of Education, as Abu Dhabi Education Council is independent from the Ministry of Education.

INTERVIEWER: Are licenses being granted to private schools in Abu Dhabi according to the Private Schools Regulations issued according to the Cabinet Decree No. 29 of 2008?

INTERVIEWEE: Educational licenses are being granted to the private schools in Abu Dhabi according to the rules and regulations of Abu Dhabi Education Council, which conforms with the Private Schools Regulations issued upon the Cabinet Decree No. 29 of 2008.

INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in Abu Dhabi commit to Article 12 stipulated in the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and taught in a manner
consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The curriculum shall include Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”?

INTERVIEWEE: Yes, private schools are committed to teaching the three compulsory subjects from Grade one until Grade 12.
Appendix 4: Interview 3

Transcript translated from Arabic

**Interviewee:** Farida Mohammed Mahmud

Private Education Section

Sharjah Educational Zone

UAE Ministry of Education

**Location:** Sharjah

**Date:** 7 April 2011

INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in the Emirate of Sharjah?

INTERVIEWEE: The Emirate of Sharjah has 77 private schools.
Appendix 5: Interview 4

Transcript translated from Arabic

Interviewee: Musa Gharib

Chief of Private Education Section

Ajman Educational Zone

UAE Ministry of Education

Location: Ajman

Date: 10 April 2011

INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in the Emirate of Ajman?

INTERVIEWEE: The Emirate of Ajman has 22 private schools.

INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in all private schools for the school year 2010/11?

INTERVIEWEE: The confirmed number of students is 29,120.

INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of Emirati students in the private schools in the Emirate?

INTERVIEWEE: The total number is 2,879 students.

INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in the private schools being sent periodically to the Ministry of Education?

INTERVIEWEE: Each school year, we are committed to sending statistics about the number of Emirati and foreign students to the Ministry of Education following the Ministry regulations.

INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in the Emirate of Ajman commit to Article 12 stipulated in the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and taught in a manner
consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The curriculum shall include Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”?

INTERVIEWEE: Yes, private schools comply totally with this matter.
Appendix 6: Interview 5

Transcript translated from Arabic

Interviewee: Thuraya Al Kharji

Chief of Private Education Section

Umm Al Quwain Educational Zone

UAE Ministry of Education

Location: Umm Al Quwain

Date: 10 April 2011

INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in the Emirate of Umm Al Quwain?

INTERVIEWEE: The Emirate of Umm Al Quwain has five private schools.

INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in all private schools for the school year 2010/11?

INTERVIEWEE: The confirmed number of students is 3,484.

INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of Emirati students in the private schools in the Emirate?

INTERVIEWEE: The total number is 591 students.

INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in the private schools being sent periodically to the Ministry of Education?

INTERVIEWEE: Each school year, we are committed to sending statistics about the number of Emirati and foreign students to the Ministry of Education following the Ministry regulations.

INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in the Emirate of Umm Al Quwain commit to Article 12 stipulated in the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and
taught in a manner consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The curriculum shall include Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”?

INTERVIEWEE: Yes, private schools totally comply with this matter.
INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah?

INTERVIEWEE: The Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah has 24 private schools.

INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in all private schools for the school year 2010/11?

INTERVIEWEE: The confirmed number of students is 17,279.

INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of Emirati students in private schools in the Emirate?

INTERVIEWEE: The total number is 3,347 students.

INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in private schools being sent periodically to the Ministry of Education?

INTERVIEWEE: Each school year, we are committed to sending statistics about the number of Emirati and foreign students to the Ministry of Education following the Ministry regulations.

INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah commit to Article 12 stipulated in the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and taught in a manner consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The
curriculum shall include Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”?

INTERVIEWEE: As a matter of fact, during the inspection campaigns carried out on private schools in the Emirate, some violations on the part of private schools in the Emirate were revealed. The Ministry earlier approved the admission of Arab students in three Indian schools in the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah upon certain terms and conditions. The most important of which was that Arab students are to be taught the Ministry curricula in three subjects, namely: Arabic, Islamic Education, and Sociology, according to the number of sessions given in the government schools, i.e. 9 to 13 sessions. The three schools approved such conditions and implemented the same. However, they violated the conditions due to the difficulty presented in coordinating two different curricula. Normally, the Indian curriculum is heavy and long and hence requires more sessions. Furthermore, teaching the compulsory subjects according to the Ministry curricula exerted significant pressure on the schools. Thus, one of them chose not to accept Arab students, while the other two reduced the sessions of the three compulsory subjects (Arabic, Islamic studies, and social studies). Both schools assigned the computer teacher to teach sociology. Thus, Ras Al Khaimah Educational Zone stopped admission of Arab students in the Indian schools in the Emirate for failing to abide by the terms and conditions laid by the Ministry of Education, and due to their delay in correcting the violations recorded by the zone.
Appendix 8: Interview 7

Transcript translated from Arabic

Interviewee: Sulaiman Salem Sulaiman

Chief of Private Education Section

Fujairah Educational Zone

UAE Ministry of Education

Location: Fujairah

Date: 12 April 2011

INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in the Emirate of Fujairah?

INTERVIEWEE: The Emirate of Fujairah has 12 private schools.

INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in all private schools for the school year 2010/11?

INTERVIEWEE: The confirmed number of students is 11,521.

INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of Emirati students in the private schools in the Emirate?

INTERVIEWEE: The total number is 2,865 students.

INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in the private schools being sent periodically to the Ministry of Education?

INTERVIEWEE: Each school calendar year, we are committed to sending statistics about the number of Emirati and foreign students to the Ministry of Education following the Ministry regulations.

INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in the Emirate of Fujairah commit to Article 12 stipulated in the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools
shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and taught in a manner consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The curriculum shall include Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”?

INTERVIEWEE: Yes, private schools totally comply with this matter.
Appendix 9: Interview 8

Transcript translated from Arabic

Interviewee: Fatima Alnasser

Strategy Development Associate

The Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA)

Location: Dubai

Date: 17 April 2011

INTERVIEWER: How many private schools are there in Emirate of Dubai?

INTERVIEWEE: There are 146 private schools in Emirate of Dubai.

INTERVIEWER: How many students are there in all the private schools in Dubai for the school year 2010/11?

INTERVIEWEE: Statistics are not ready to be publicized. (Note: It was only two months until the end of term).

INTERVIEWER: What is the number of Emirati students in the Private schools in Dubai?

INTERVIEWEE: The total number is 27,011 students for the school year 2010/11, but those are initial numbers.

INTERVIEWER: Are statistics for the number of students in the private and government schools being sent to the Ministry of Education?

INTERVIEWEE: Data about the private schools in Dubai are being collected through Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA), and then statistics are sent to the Ministry of Education. As for the government schools, data are collected through the Ministry of Education in coordination with the KHDA and then a copy of the statement is sent to the KHDA.

INTERVIEWER: Are licenses being granted to private schools in the Emirate of Dubai according to Cabinet Decree No. 29 of 2008 regulating Private Schools system?
INTERVIEWEE: Educational licenses are being granted to private schools in Dubai according to the rules and regulations of the KHDA, which conforms to the Private Schools Regulations issued upon Cabinet Decree No. 29 of 2008.

INTERVIEWER: Do private schools in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi commit to Article 12 stipulated in the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and taught in a manner consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The curriculum shall include Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”?

INTERVIEWEE: Yes, private schools totally comply with this matter.
Appendix 10: Interview 9

Transcript translated from Arabic

**Interviewee:** Sheikha Khulood Al Qasimi

The Director of the Curriculum Department

UAE Ministry of Education

**Location:** Dubai

**Date:** 24 April 2011

INTERVIEWER: What are the standards and conditions imposed on selecting school textbooks in private schools in the UAE?

INTERVIEWEE: School textbooks and curricula must:

- Eliminate all texts, names, animation, picture, or data that do not conform to the laws imposed by UAE and the traditions, national, religious and social values of the UAE community.

- Eliminate of all flags, symbols and slogans of countries and organizations that do not share normal relations with UAE.

- Eliminate anything that might offend Allah, Prophets and Messengers, the Divine Religions, and all that has to do with UAE.

- Eliminate all subjects that deal with life practices that do not conform to the UAE Arab Muslim community (alcoholic drinks, drugs, etc.)

- Comply with the publication laws applicable in UAE.

- Conform to the curricula stipulated in the school license (British, American, Indian, Pakistani, Philippine, German, etc.), and the other curricula applicable in private schools.

INTERVIEWER: Does the Curriculum Department in the Ministry review all the books of foreign curricula before approving them to be used in private schools?
INTERVIEWEE: The Curriculum Department reviews the books being taught in private schools, which adopt the Ministry of Education curriculum. However, it does not review foreign books being taught in private schools, which adopt a foreign curriculum. The Ministry sets out to its rules and regulations on the school textbooks and curricula to be used as a pre-condition for private schools applying for license. Thus, upon receiving complaints from students or parents about any mistakes or notes included in the curricula of private schools, these are investigated by the Private Schools Inspection and Supervision Office in the Ministry of Education. If any violations are proven, the schools are sanctioned according to the Private Schools Regulations.

INTERVIEWER: Are those working in the Curriculum Department qualified to review the foreign curricula?

INTERVIEWEE: We do not have sufficient qualified resources in the Ministry capable of reviewing the dozens of books and curricula in foreign languages, to ensure that they conform to the standards and regulations laid down by the Ministry and to approve the teaching in the private foreign schools. This requires the presence of a huge number of Emiratis with B.Sc.s in Education, and who are fluent in the relevant foreign languages (English, French, German, Russian, Japanese, Urdu, etc.).
Appendix 11: Interview 10

Transcript translated from Arabic

Interviewee: H.E. Ali Mehad Al Suwaidi
   The Acting Director General
   UAE Ministry of Education

Location: Dubai

Date: 24 April 2011

INTERVIEWER: Are you confident that there are no ‘hidden curriculum’ in the curricula taught in foreign private schools, especially as there is no review whatsoever on your part of the foreign books being taught at private schools in the UAE?

INTERVIEWEE: Firstly, I do agree with you on this point; however, what we have to understand is that foreign books are not the only tool for penetrating and affecting Emirati students negatively. We actually do not know what happens inside the classroom after the foreign teacher closes the door on the students. Hence, we mainly depend on the students and their parents to report any violations in the books being taught in private schools. We also mainly rely on them to report any violations on the part of foreign teachers inside classrooms.

INTERVIEWER: What methods are adopted by the Ministry of Education to protect Emirati students in private schools from being exposed to missionary or semi-missionary thoughts or from receiving indirect messages that criticize and question the customs, traditions, and moral values of their community? During my field visits to the educational zones in the UAE, I found that there are about 100 Emirati students registered at St. Mary’s Catholic High School in Fujairah. Upon asking the Chief of Private Education in Fujairah educational zone about them, he told me that the number of Emirati students at this school could easily multiply if it were not for the limited spaces in school due to the high turnover in registration; the school teaches the British curriculum.

INTERVIEWEE: The responsibility of the Ministry within the private school is to commit to teaching Emirati and other Arab students the Ministry curricula in three core subjects, including
their mother language and Islamic religion, as these play a role in maintaining their language, religion, and identity. Moreover, all private schools in UAE are committed to raising the state flag and playing the national anthem in morning assemblies. In addition, on finding any violations in private schools, for example failing to teach the compulsory curricula of the three subjects according to the Ministry’s terms and conditions, or if the private schools teach curricula that do not agree with the rule and regulations set by the Ministry of Education, penal measures are taken until the violations are corrected.

Meanwhile, the responsibility outside the private schools lies principally with the parents of the citizen students who voluntarily send their children to private schools. We depend on parents to guide and advise their children to hold on to their identities, values, and religion. Most foreign private schools celebrate occasions that contradict our culture and religion, such as Christmas, Easter, and Thanksgiving. For example, I always advise my grandchildren who study in private schools to hold on to their customs and traditions and to the teachings of Islam.

INTERVIEWER: The Minister of Education reported to Gulf News [a popular newspaper] that the Ministry has no authority over private schools located in Abu Dhabi and Dubai due to the independence of both Abu Dhabi Educational Council and Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA) of Dubai. What is their authority?

INTERVIEWEE: The Minister meant that the Ministry has no organizational and administrational authority to regulate the work of private schools in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Both Abu Dhabi Educational Council and the Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA) of Dubai have independent powers over private schools in their zones. Both have educational strategies in their local governments. However, the Ministry of Education respects their vision, and we may also make use of similar strategies, if they are successful, in other zones.

INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in private and government schools being sent by Abu Dhabi Educational Council and KHDA to the Ministry of Education on a regular basis?

INTERVIEWEE: Yes, annual statistical lists containing the number of students are usually sent by all educational zones in the United Arab Emirates to the Ministry of Education.
Appendix 12: Interview 11

Transcript translated from Arabic

**Interviewee:** Anonymous

UAE Ministry of Education

**Location:** Dubai

**Date:** 24 April 2011

INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of students in all private schools in the Emirate of Sharjah for the school year 2010/11?

ANONYMOUS: The confirmed number of students is 120,430.

INTERVIEWER: What is the total number of Emirati students in the private schools in the emirate?

ANONYMOUS: The total number is 15,519 students.

INTERVIEWER: Are statistics about the number of students in the private schools being sent periodically to the Ministry of Education?

ANONYMOUS: Each school year, the Ministry receives the statistics from Sharjah Educational Zone.

INTERVIEWER: Do the private schools in the Emirate of Sharjah commit to Article 12 stipulated in the Private Education Regulations, which states that: “The curriculum provided in these schools shall be approved by the Ministry or the authorized accrediting organization and taught in a manner consistent with the culture and values of the United Arab Emirates. The curriculum shall include Arabic language, Islamic studies and civic studies taught in accordance with Ministry guidelines”?

ANONYMOUS: Yes, I know the private schools totally comply with Article 12.
Appendix 13: Interview 12

Transcript translated from Arabic

**Interviewee:** Tharwat El-Kherbawy

A former Muslim Brotherhood member in Egypt

Author of The Secret of the Temple

**Location:** Abu Dhabi

**Date:** 24 February 2013

INTERVIEWER: What is the approach of ‘Cessation and Ascertaining’ that has been pursued by Shukri Mustafa (the Spiritual Father of the current Muslim Brotherhood Leader, Mohammed Badie) and his group?

INTERVIEWEE: Shukri Mustafa and his group believe that all human beings in the world are infidels, because they are not ruled by *sharia* (Islamic Law), while they believe that Islam has been absent from the world since the end of ‘The Rightly-Guided Islamic Caliphate’ in the year of 661. They believe that Muslim rulers who do not rule by *sharia* are definitely infidels, as well as their populaces, because they are content and allow that to take place. Moreover, they consider Muslim scholars as infidels because they have not declared their rulers and their people disbelievers. Shukri Mustafa and his group anathematize all persons whom they introduced to their thoughts who then refused or disapproved of the thought, or those who accepted their thoughts but refused to join their group and pay allegiance to their leader. In addition, they consider a person who joined their group and left it as an infidel.

INTERVIEWER: Did Mohammed Badie, the current leader [at that time], visit Yemen?

INTERVIEWEE: Yes, he settled in Yemen from 1979 to 1985; and during this period, he travelled to Afghanistan several times during the fight against the Soviet Union there.

INTERVIEWER: Has Ayman al-Zawahiri been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood?

INTERVIEWEE: Yes, he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1975 to 1979.
INTERVIEWER: Did Osama bin Laden join the Muslim Brotherhood as a member?

INTERVIEWEE: Yes, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood [he was introduced] by Manea Qattan, the first Egyptian Chief for the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Saudi Arabia and then he became a disciple of Dr. Abdullah Azzam, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Jordan, who was residing in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s.

INTERVIEWER: Is al-Qaeda subordinated to the Muslim Brotherhood or the Muslim Brotherhood organization is affiliated to al-Qaeda?

INTERVIEWEE: Al-Qaeda is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, the same as Hamas, but the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood is a secret unlike the relationship between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.