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Taming the Evil: US Non-proliferation Coercive Diplomacy and the Counterstrategies of Iran and North Korea after the Cold War

Seunghoon Paik

Thesis Submitted to the School of Government and International Affairs for the Degree of PhD

Supervisor: Anoush Ehteshami

January, 2017
Submission declaration

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Abstract

In the 40 years since the end of World War II, the most critical strategic problem for the US was containment of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, scholars and experts focused on building deterrence theories on how to confront communist aggression. In comparison, the theory of diplomatic coercion, which tries to use threats or a limited amount of force to influence the behaviour of another by making it choose to comply, was popular neither among decision-makers nor scholars. Since a favourable international environment for applying coercive diplomacy began after the Cold War finished in the 1990s, coercive diplomacy and the coercion literature have proved to be less rich and less cumulative than that of other political theories.

However, regardless of this weak enthusiasm for it, the concept of coercion was adopted as state foreign policy and diplomatic coercion was executed as a strategy. The US administrations after the fall of the Soviet Union have implemented coercive diplomacy to influence their adversaries. The non-proliferation policy of the US was no exception. Regardless of the differences in the doctrines and policies of each administration, Clinton, Bush and Obama had a consistent policy on nuclear non-proliferation. Having become the hegemonic state of unipolar system with the ability to conduct a war in any place in the world, the execution of coercion was the most convenient policy strategy for the US among the other alternatives. From a basis of dominant military strength and economic power, the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations attempted to dismantle the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea by every conceivable means, utilizing hard power, soft power and smart power. The coercive, non-coercive and persuasive inducements of coercive diplomacy were applied to stop these nuclear programmes.

None of the administrations allowed the full fledge nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. Instead, they labelled Iran and North Korea rogue states or ‘axis of evil’ during the span of the three presidents. Admittedly, the Obama administration showed differences in terms of rhetoric, but the ‘strategic patience’ which it applied to Iran and North Korea during its first term was not much different from the policy of its predecessors. Moreover, Obama applied the most severe economic sanctions, which even prohibited the Iranian oil trade. However, the coercive diplomacy of the US administrations did not have tangible success in
disarming these states of their nuclear programmes; instead, they increased their nuclear capabilities. Although a nuclear deal has recently been reached in the Iranian case, it will take a process lasting 15 years to complete the settlement. It seems that US coercive diplomacy is most likely to be maintained during this period. This study focuses on the non-proliferation coercive diplomacy of the US against the ‘axis of evil’ of Iran and North Korea and their counterstrategies in order to examine the dispute process as a whole and to provide more efficient policy proposals regarding the subject.
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1. Introduction

On 15 July 2015, a nuclear negotiation which had lasted 13 years finally reached a historic agreement. However, as Hillary Clinton stated in Iowa “… this president and the next president have the tools, resources and support to send a clear message to Iran: Cheat and you will pay. And when you threaten the region and Israel, you threaten America. We will keep confronting you on human rights and terrorism. And make no mistakes, we will never allow you to acquire a nuclear weapon. Not just during the term of this agreement – never.”1 The nuclear deal is an ongoing project rather than a completed settlement. As is stipulated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, there are 15 years of bumpy road ahead. Certainly, reaching a nuclear deal is a great start but no one knows whether it will turn out to be one small step or one giant leap.

The success of nuclear non-proliferation all depends on will and the knowledge accumulated from past failures. One should remember the agreed Geneva framework for a 10-year process and how it ended. This chapter therefore focuses on the context of research for a general understanding of US non-proliferation policy toward Iran and North Korea. Moreover, the chapter explains the purpose and the extent of the research to give an understanding of the conceptual framework of the thesis and the model employed in the following chapters.

1.1 Background to the Research

Two regions of the world especially giving non-proliferation analysts concern are the Middle East and East Asia. In the Middle East, Israel possesses nuclear weapons, Iran is seeking to achieve a fuel cycle with the capability of producing a weapon, and Syria built a covert nuclear reactor which was later destroyed by Israeli aircraft. In East Asia, North Korea already possess dozens of bombs and maintains its nuclear armament.

programme despite increasing pressure from the international community. Setting aside the issue of the Israeli nuclear policy of ‘Non-Denial, Non-Confirmation’ and Syrian nuclear ambitions, the problem comes down to the nuclear programme of the ‘axis of evil’ being the imminent threat to global nuclear non-proliferation.

The nuclear developments in Iran and North Korea have long histories of sanctions and military threats from the international community. However, pressure from the international community, which is mostly led by the US, has not shown tangible success in dismantling their nuclear programmes nor in halting their development. Although the nuclear deal with Iran has been reached, Iran is still proclaiming its rights to operate a nuclear reactor and enrich uranium, which carries the potential of transforming into a weapons programme. North Korea is a ‘de facto’ nuclear state maintaining a nuclear weapons programme.

Although the two countries, Iran and North Korea, that are causing most concern\(^2\) to non-proliferation experts are in different regions and it may seem irrational to seek a common solution to address the problem, the two countries share many common features, such as the environment, the dynamics of international politics and the necessity of a nuclear programme for their national interest. Moreover, after the Cold War, the nuclear programmes of both countries progressed despite the same US coercive non-proliferation strategy and both have obtained a certain degree of success in keeping their nuclear programmes by countering US coercion.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 signalled the unexpected end of the Cold War. New agendas emerged along with the transformation of the international environment: the rise and transmogrification of terrorism, international disintegration manifested in the Balkans, nuclear proliferation and the encroachment of human rights. With the main threat – the Soviet Union – gone, there needed to be a change in US identity and foreign policy. Although George Bush Sr. announced that a ‘New World Order’ would harmonize with international organizations and its force would only be exercised for humanitarian intervention, alternative narratives continued to construct US foreign policy as imperialist. The US intended to expand its political and economic influence after the Cold War. As the areas the US

needed to keep an eye on expanded threats against US security also became broader and more diverse. These included residual threats from Russia, and ones from regional aggressors such as Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Syria and Libya, all using the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other WMD, and support for terrorism. After the end of the Cold War, as a unipolar hegemonic state, the US was much more likely to seek solutions to the above-mentioned security issues by means of coercive diplomacy. The basic of coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic effort to solve disputes without actually engaging in war under circumstances of clear asymmetry of power. Therefore, for the US it is much more convenient to influence its adversaries by implementing the use of threats, limited force or economic sanctions.

Admittedly, there were some cases in which the US had implemented coercive diplomacy during the Cold War: the Laos Crisis of 1961-1962, dealing with North Vietnam in 1965, the 1968 Pueblo incident and the 1963 the Cuban missile crisis. However, due to a possible elevation to a global war, coercive diplomacy based on the concept of compellence was never the US’s favourite option before the demise of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War the core of US foreign policy was more a deterrence strategy. However, as the ‘end of history’ had prevailed, the advent of a hyperpower changed the global strategic environment. Thus, history witnessed that coercive diplomacy was consistently used in US foreign policy after the Cold War. This study therefore aims to examine the US non-proliferation policy under Clinton, Bush and in Obama’s first term against Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programmes to find the implications for resolution not only of these disputes but also ones with potential states that might face US coercive diplomacy for acquiring a nuclear capability in the future.

3 After becoming the hegemonic state in Unipolar system, the Series of US government policy reviews such as the Qurrendinial Defense Reviews, Nuclear Posture reviews and National Security strategy clearly indicated its use of power to deal with the security threats
1.2 The Purpose of the Research

It was in the post-Cold War era that coercive diplomacy based on compellence theory became frequently used as a tool of the US foreign policy. It therefore started to dominate academic debates and expanded to studies of various aspects of strong states’ foreign policy. The US non-proliferation policy was no exception.

However, the compellence literature has proved to be less rich and less cumulative than that of its strategic counterpart, deterrence, which was well-developed during the Cold War. Although scholars generally agree on what is at the core of coercion, the compellence literature suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity as each scholar seeks to build their own concepts rather than refine the work of others. This is evident from the various terms used more or less interchangeably as synonyms for coercion: compellence, coercive diplomacy, military coercion, coercive military strategy, and strategic coercion.

Regardless of its weak theoretical basis, the concept of coercion was adopted as foreign policy and diplomatic coercion was executed as a strategy. This study will clarify the concept of coercion by examining the work of previous scholars to build a comprehensive theoretical framework and a model with which to analyse US non-proliferation strategy towards Iran and North Korea.

The majority of the existing research on diplomatic coercion regarding North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programmes has focused on US foreign policy and its strategies. Admittedly, previous research has also utilized coercion theory to establish theoretical frameworks. However, it has focused on examining the US strategy of asymmetric deterrence and compellence, not the whole process of contention which characterises coercive diplomacy. The nuclear policies of Iran and North Korea are easily neglected and have generally been simplified as tactics of ‘brinkmanship’ or ‘muddling through.’

Since US diplomatic coercion does not operate unilaterally, the nuclear strategies of Iran and North Korea have to be given the same weight to achieve a clear analysis of US nuclear non-proliferation compellence strategy. Although existing research has utilized

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the concept of coercion to emphasize the use of US asymmetric power in its non-proliferation policy towards Iran and North Korea, it has not been able to suggest policy proposals capable of achieving the dismantlement of their nuclear programmes. This is well depicted in <Illustration-1> below.

<Illustration-1> What is Coercive Diplomacy?

In the same way that every action has a reaction, when coercive diplomacy is applied by the coercer, there is also the coercee’s counter-coercive diplomacy. Therefore, if the coercee is not treated as an independent variable in a study, an accurate analysis of coercive diplomacy cannot be reached. If the counter-coercion strategies of Iran and North Korea are not treated as independent variables, a study cannot accurately evaluate the efficiency and validity of US non-proliferation policy towards their nuclear programmes.

Iran and North Korea are not dependent variables in US coercive diplomacy. Both countries are agents which have their own objectives against US coercion and take action to maximize their interests. Thus, if this mutuality of contention is not included in the analysis, an efficient means or objective of US coercive diplomacy that can achieve a resolution is highly unlikely to be identified.
Moreover, existing studies of the US non-proliferation strategy towards the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea fail to include the influence of other state actors as independent variables in their analyses of US coercive diplomacy. The strategic environment around the non-proliferation policy towards Iran and North Korea is intertwined with the different interests of each state that has a relation with the issue. That is, if a study on coercive diplomacy does not include the influence of other agents such as Israel, China, Russia etc. on non-proliferation by Iran and North Korea, it cannot efficiently evaluate coercion or coercive diplomacy towards the two countries. For example, if the US tries to execute efficient coercive diplomacy against Iran’s nuclear programme, the US must consider the influence of China and Russia, which softly balance and support Iran. However, previous research on compellence theory or coercive diplomacy has not taken this into account.

As Geoffrey Blainey argues, excessive military optimism is a vital prelude to war.\(^8\) If a state which has clear superiority of power calculates that the military option would bring an easier victory than the diplomatic alternatives, and stalemate in negotiations is only buying time to the benefit of the adversary, a war is highly likely to happen. Although a US military strike against the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea seems unlikely, their nuclear proliferation under the US coercive diplomacy is always a plausible and risky environment for a possible war. Moreover, the US has never removed the military option from the table in its dealings with Iran and North Korea. On the contrary, it has been utilized as an inducement to achieve the compliance of these states.

Therefore, this research will explain the US non-proliferation policy towards Iran and North Korea using a comprehensive theoretical framework and a model based on diplomatic compellence theory. It will examine US coercive diplomacy regarding the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea and their counterstrategies against the US to explain the causality of how US coercion failed to dismantle the nuclear programmes of the two countries during the post-Cold War period, which according to compellence theory was an optimal period for US coercive diplomacy to extend its muscles.

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Moreover, the theoretical framework and the model will offer understanding of policy implications for future US non-proliferation strategy.

1.3 The Validity and the Extent of the Research

As James N. Rosenau argues, the five potential influences on a state’s foreign policy are: 1) the external environment of the international system; 2) the societal environment of the state; 3) the governmental structure of its policy-making process; 4) the bureaucratic roles occupied by individual policymakers; and 5) the personalities of foreign-policy officials and members of the governmental elite. Therefore, research on US non-proliferation policy after the Cold War could be performed in various ways. This approach can also be applied to analysing the nuclear strategies of North Korea and Iran, which opposed the US non-proliferation coercive diplomacy aiming at the dismantlement of their nuclear programmes.

Since the environment of US domestic politics, the perceptions of each president of these nuclear programmes and the international strategic environment regarding nuclear issues were all different for the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations, these various influences can be examined to analyse the non-proliferation policy of the US towards the two countries.

Factually, Clinton’s basic policy stance of ‘engagement and enlargement’ was influenced by the external environment of the international system – the so-called ‘end of the Cold War’ – which made the US a unipolar state in the international community. In addition, the rapid growth of the US economy was one of the key elements that bolstered the ‘engagement and enlargement’ doctrine of the Clinton administration. For the Bush administration, the 9/11 crisis and the domination of hard-line policymakers were the driving factors which formed Bush’s foreign policy of war on

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terrorism and pre-emptive strikes.

Obama’s sustained, direct and aggressive diplomacy which emphasized a dialogue with rogues was influenced by the personalities of foreign policy officials and members of the governmental elite who understood ‘power’ as a more stereoscopic concept: ‘smart power.’ Moreover, as John Mearsheimer argues, the concept of ‘offshore balancing’ meant that the Obama administration could not execute a unilateral foreign policy as its predecessors had done due to the economic crisis which occurred in 2008.

However, with all these differences and different variables that influenced each US administration after the Cold War, as will be examined later in Chapters 4 and 5, the US non-proliferation policy towards its ‘Axis of Evil’ amounted to the implementation of coercive diplomacy. Since the US had become a unipolar state with the ability to execute a conventional war in any place in the world, the implementation of coercion was a more plausible policy strategy than other alternatives. On the basis of US dominant military strength and economic power, the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations attempted to dismantle the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea through every conceivable means utilizing hard power, soft power and smart power. Thus, although there were differences among the rhetoric and the doctrines of each administration, the policy reviews of the Ministry of Defence, the Department of State and the government all reveal the use of coercive inducements such as a military presence, economic sanctions and threats of possible military strikes in the attempt to achieve complete verifiable irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes.

This was ostensibly a rational choice for the US, a country that had become a hyperpower. As will be examined in the following chapters, the majority of scholars and politicians in the US argue that although the execution of coercive diplomacy against the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea might not be the optimal solution, it was ‘less evil’ than all the other options. Moreover, Iran and North Korea

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had both been classified as ‘rogue states,’ members of the ‘axis of evil’ and ‘state sponsors of terrorist groups’ since the Reagan administration. Although each administration evaluated the threats from North Korea and Iran at varying levels, the nuclear programmes of the two countries were dealt with from this perspective.

The four major US government policy reviews, the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defence Review,\textsuperscript{15} the Nuclear Posture Review\textsuperscript{16} and the Ballistic Missile Defence Review, display the hard-line stance of the US towards the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea and this does not seem likely to change dramatically in the near future. Fortunately, there was a historical agreement regarding the Iranian nuclear programme during the second term of the Obama administration, which is a period that this thesis does not cover. However, President Obama stated “like all families, sometimes there are going to be disagreements… everybody [should] keep in mind that we’re all pro-Israel,”\textsuperscript{17} which clearly indicates that the US coercive diplomacy would continue regardless of whether the Iranian nuclear deal was confirmed or not. On the other side, although the Ayatollah Khamenei toned down his ‘Great Satan’ rhetoric regarding the US, Iran’s top clerical committee, the Assembly of Experts, clarified that the US was the main enemy of Iran’s national security. The chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Mohammad Yazdi, stated that “the nuclear agreement should not change our foreign policy of opposition to America, our number one enemy, whose crimes are uncountable.”\textsuperscript{18} These statements indicate that the environment of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy in both countries would continue. Moreover, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action which constituted the Iran nuclear deal of 2015 is a 15-year-long phased process which could collapse in any moment.

\textsuperscript{22} Tribune wire reports, “Obama expects better U.S.-Israel ties after Iran deal in place”, \textit{The Chicago Tribune}, Aug 28, 2015 [accessed 11 Sep 2015].
Since the anti-western regimes and sentiments are strongly established in Iran and North Korea, there are some experts who view both countries as irrational or non-rational actors, and refer to their leaders as ‘Mad Mullah’ and ‘Mad dog.’\textsuperscript{19} However, like any other state, Iran and North Korea also have multi-faceted foreign policies. Thus, many studies focus on various different variables such as leadership, international relations and domestic politics to understand their foreign policies.

Admittedly, there are different agents within Iran and North Korea who affect the foreign-policy decision-making process. However, as the protection of their nuclear programmes and the development of nuclear capabilities are perceived as a critical interest and vital to the national security of both countries, their nuclear strategies were formed as optimal choices to confront the US coercive diplomacy that aimed at the CVID of their nuclear programmes. Thus, even though both Iran and North Korea sometimes chose to suspend their nuclear development, it basically happened within the framework of their counter-coercive diplomacy and the circumstances of the strategic environment that they faced under US coercion. Iran and North Korea never negotiated the dismantlement of their nuclear programmes with the US. Moreover, if Iran and North Korea sensed that their core interests were violated, both countries stopped their nuclear talks or nuclear suspension and executed counter-coercive diplomacy, which raised the tension and the deterrence level by developing their missile and nuclear capabilities.

Since there are many variables and agents that influence the decision-making process of a state, there are many loopholes in postulating the state as a single agent when analysing its foreign policy. Despite the efforts of political scientists and the development of methods such as the “system approach,” the “group think model,” the “government politics model,” the “organizational process model” etc., one still cannot claim to know exactly what happens in the black box of Iran and North Korea’s foreign-

policy decision making. Conventionally, foreign policy is perceived as a ‘state action’ which a ‘state’ decides and executes in its relations with other states or the international community for the maximization of its interests. Thus, in the majority of papers, foreign policy is still easily perceived as a state’s reaction to external affairs or external influence based on rational choice theory.

Due to their unique political systems, there are increasing numbers of researchers that emphasize ‘actor-specific theories’ in analysing the foreign policies of Iran and North Korea. Some studies even refuse to assume state homogeneity to understand Iran and North Korea since Velayat-e faqih and Juche are indigenous systems and ideologies that have their own values and are different from the western concepts of states and political systems. However, since the national security agenda involving nuclear programmes and strategy are issues that have to be dealt with as conventional hard politics of the state, there is validity in considering Iran and North Korea as unitary actors in their nuclear policies. As will be examined in the case study chapters, Iran and North Korea display rationality during the contention of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy over their nuclear programmes.

Moreover, there is another critical problem involved in research on the nuclear strategies of Iran and North Korea using actor-specific theories and models. As Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow argue, a massive amount of information is needed in order to employ an actor-specific approach to analysing the foreign policy of a state.\(^{20}\) Thus, research which employs the actor-specific method such as Model II of the “Organizational behaviour model” and Model III of the “government politics model” has its limits in analysing a state’s foreign policy specifically related to national security issues. For instance, due to the confidentiality of the subject, reliable information on the decision-making process in the nuclear programmes and the nuclear policies of Iran and North Korea is almost impossible for a researcher to access. However, Allison’s three models give a clear picture of a state’s foreign policy being decided through a process of contention among agents, a negotiation game between states, rather than the pursuit of static organizational and bureaucratic interests. This intensifies the validity of this research.

Arguably, the contention between the nuclear strategies of Iran and North Korea and the non-proliferation policy of the US proceeded within a theoretical framework of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy, resulting in state foreign policy action. There was not much room for other agents but the state in the contention process. Although there were some differences in each US administration, all three US presidents shared the same goal of not accepting a nuclear weapon capability of Iran and North Korea, including a fully fledged nuclear programme which is permissible within the NPT. Similarly, Iran and North Korea also displayed continuity in their nuclear policies of securing their nuclear programmes against US coercion despite changes of leadership in their domestic politics.

There is a high level of explanatory adequacy in analysing the US non-proliferation policy towards Iran and North Korea from the perspective of compellence and coercive diplomacy. This is because coercive diplomacy theory sees resolution being achieved through forceful persuasion, but not war, in a situation where there is clear asymmetry of power between the agents.

However, apart from the question of “for or against” coercive diplomacy, previous research which has examined the US non-proliferation strategy towards Iran and North Korea from the perspective of compellence theory falls short in a vital point. An accurate evaluation of coercive diplomacy is arrived at when the contention between the coercer and coercee is comprehensively fed into the analysis. This is because, regardless of the power discrepancy between the two, coercive diplomacy is not just a coercer’s game. The coercee also employs its counter-coercive diplomacy to achieve its diplomatic objectives against the coercion. Thus, if the contention between the coercer and the coercee and how it affects the coercion process and its result are neglected, one

cannot fully understand or explains the causality of the outcome of US non-proliferation policy towards Iran and North Korea.

Moreover, if the US does not understand the dynamics of how the counter-coercive diplomacy of Iran and North Korea is formed within the theoretical framework of compellence and its strategic environment, it cannot execute efficient coercive diplomacy to achieve the compliance of Iran and North Korea.

Indeed, the international community has a common interest and grounds to deal with the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, with the aim of prohibiting their acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability. However, despite the consensus on the generalities of non-proliferation, the countries neighbouring Iran and North Korea which have to balance US hegemony in the region also easily become a means of their counter-coercive diplomacy against US compellence. The non-proliferation agenda which is supported by China and Russia cannot be identical to that of the US.

All these subjects had to be considered within US coercive diplomacy in order to make the right inducements to maximize possible behavioural changes by Iran and North Korea. However, previous research based on coercive diplomacy has only focused on examining the coercers and their policy while overlooking the above-mentioned variables. Since successful coercive diplomacy achieves behaviour change through a ‘stick and carrot’ approach, these other variables need to be considered within the model. Previous research has insufficiently unravelled the complex dynamic nature of compellence. Research on US non-proliferation strategy towards Iran and North Korea has been no exception.

Therefore, this study aims to build a comprehensive contention model – a contention model of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy. It will use the model to examine the coercive diplomacy of the US and the counter-coercive diplomacy of Iran and North Korea in a global strategic environment where the influence of other agents contributes to the group dynamics of the contention progress. Moreover, by using the results from the model the study aims to measure the validity of the US non-proliferation strategy in international conflict where there is a clear asymmetry of power between states.
2. Assessing the Post-Cold War US Security Strategy and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

2.1 Introduction

When the Bipolar system of the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, many scholars expected the rise of a multilateral system. Structural realists considered that US unilateralism would be a transitory system which would soon be replaced through a process of ‘balance of power.’ Since the Soviet Union had collapsed due to its imperial overreach, there was an overflowing of scepticism about the US unilateral system. The depression of the US economy at the time was also a critical point which bolstered the argument. Moreover, there seemed to be a possible advent of a Japanese era, which could be compared with the rise of China in recent years. As Charles A. Kupchan shows, some scholars predicted that the US unipolar system, which had come about through the unexpected demise of the Soviet Union, would be tempered by a decrease in US will to intervene in international affairs. Therefore, they predicted that a multilateral system would be formed through Europe balancing the power of the US and Asia filling any power vacuum.

However, while Francis Fukuyama declared that it was ‘the end of history’ after the fall of its mighty foe, the US demonstrated its presence as a unipolar hegemonic state. The decades of the post-Cold War period were managed behind a US lead. With the booming of its economy, the US had become not only the unilateral military hegemon but a unipolar state with the capability of extending both its soft and hard power across

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the international community.\textsuperscript{28}

The US aimed to build a ‘new world order’ that could guarantee its unipolar hegemony in the transition of the global security environment at the advent of a new century. The policy reviews and papers of three US administrations after the Cold War, those of Clinton, Bush and Obama, clearly displayed its intention to keep its unilateral hegemonic status. This intention was shown in Clinton’s engagement and enlargement, Bush’s policy of ending tyranny and spreading democracy and Obama’s renewal of global leadership in a ‘new era of engagement.’\textsuperscript{29}

Admittedly, with the 2008 global economic crisis, the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and hesitation over Libyan intervention, it seemed the US unilateral hegemonic status was on the wane during the first term of Obama. Although the Obama administration had its own foreign policy initiatives, which could be described as a progressive pragmatism, they were evaluated as mere damage control but lacking grand strategy.\textsuperscript{30} However, with the Obama administration’s aim of “building at home, shaping abroad,”\textsuperscript{31} set out in its 2010 National Security Strategy, the US clearly showed its strategy of “offshore balancing” by maximizing its geopolitical strength to keep its unilateral hegemonic status.\textsuperscript{32}

As the US economy recovered from its financial deficit, unemployment and energy dependency through the shale revolution,\textsuperscript{33} the Obama administration released its 2015 National Security Strategy, which stated its intention of more US engagement with the international community to secure US unilateral hegemonic power: “Today, the United States is stronger and better positioned to seize the opportunities of a still new century and safeguard our interests against the risks of an insecure world.”\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{29} Barack Obama, Renewing American Leadership, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol.86, No.4, 2007, pp. 2-16.
\textsuperscript{33} Edward Crooks, “The US Shale Revolution”, \textit{Financial Times}, Apr 24, 2015. \url{https://www.ft.com/content/2ded7416-e930-11e4-a71a-00144feab7de} [assessed on 25 May 2015]
Since the US lost a certain amount of its credibility among the international community with its 2003 Iraq invasion\textsuperscript{35} and the rise of China, there were analyses that the US unilateral hegemonic status would be degraded.\textsuperscript{36} However, there is still no ‘constraint structure’ which could damage US unilateralism. Moreover, in the global security environment of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century where there is no player capable of substituting US hegemony, the strong will of the US to sustain its superiority and unilateralism cannot be ignored even if US power has actually decreased. In particular, in a situation in which there are many analyses viewing China’s potential to become a partner in a new G2 being hindered by it facing the middle income trap,\textsuperscript{37} the hyper-power or hyper-puissance of the US will continue for a considerable period of time.\textsuperscript{38}

Therefore, this chapter will study US security strategy and its non-proliferation policy in more detail. It will bring better understanding of why it is important to contemplate US non-proliferation policy through the conceptual lens of coercive diplomacy within a US unipolar system. Moreover, the chapter will examine the validity of applying the framework of coercive diplomacy to Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programmes and why these two cases should be dealt with together.

2.2 The Post-Cold War US Security Strategy

2.2.1 The Pursuit of US Hegemony as a Unipolar Power

After the demise of the Soviet Union, the US has become the unrivalled state in international politics. Despite the expectation of scholars that the post-Cold War system would be multilateral rather than unilateral, the splendid economic growth during the


Clinton administration\(^{39}\) made the US a hyper-power state.\(^{40}\) The accumulated wealth made the Bush administration able to implement a two-war strategy as a unipolar hegemonic state. Although the 2008 financial crisis hit the US hard and made its unipolar hegemony falter, the resilience of the US economy and the growth slump in China, the only potential rising state that could challenge US unipolar hegemony, made its eclipse seem highly unlikely in the next few decades.

Various indices show that US unipolar hegemony should be sustained for a considerable period of time. From 2001 to 2015, the US created approximately a quarter of world total GDP and it produced a national GDP of 17.9 trillion dollars in 2015.\(^{41}\) Its national defence budget in 2015 was $598.5 billion dollars, which is equivalent to the total for the next top 11 military powers.\(^{42}\) Among them, seven countries – Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany, South Korea and Australia – have signed collective defence arrangements with the US and created military alliances. These indices clearly testify to the firm unipolar hegemonic status of the US.

However, although the bipolar system of the Cold War collapsed decades ago, world politics has not yet settled into being a unipolar system. The current world political system seems “transitional and amorphous.”\(^{43}\) Nevertheless, despite uncertainty about complete settlement of the US unipolar system, US power among the international community is extensive and comprehensive. Moreover, there is no alliance in the making or state that could challenge US unipolar hegemony. Even China, which is perceived to be the front runner to compete with US hegemony, would seem to need decades to become the real G2 in the international system due to its economic slump.\(^{44}\) While it may not be plausible to consider the post-Cold War international system as a US unipolar structure, no one can deny US unilateral hegemony and its influence on the international community.

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With its nemesis gone, from George H. W. Bush to Obama the US sought to build a ‘new world order’ that could establish US hegemony in a unipolar system. The H. W. Bush administration stated that it was “ensuring that no hostile power is able to dominate or control a region critical to our interests; and, working to avoid conflict by reducing sources of regional instability and violence, limiting the proliferation of advanced military technology and weapons of mass destruction, and strengthening civil-military institutions,” and the US started to utilize its military, diplomatic and economic assets not only to deter possible elements of security threats but also to coerce them to comply with US interests. The US is no longer shackled by its containment and deterrence strategy against the Soviet Union and now can stretch its influence without worrying about World War III.

2.2.2 The Compellence Strategy Era

The end of the Cold War bipolar system brought an abrupt change in US foreign policy’s grand strategy: deterrence of the Soviet Union. However, the US had to face a rapid transformation of the international security environment and with it new threats which it had not needed to consider under the bipolar system.

The top priority in US security strategy was no longer containment or deterrence of the Soviet Union. It had to determine an appropriate strategy and force structure for the new era and to continue to properly manage the post-Cold War reduction of its armed forces without sacrificing its readiness for those forces to respond to threats in an increasingly complex world.45

As the Warsaw Treaty Organization dissolved, the US had to amend its deterrence strategy accordingly. A withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons and a redeployment of US forces all around the world were inevitable. Therefore, tension rose among the regional hegemons such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom etc. over how to

achieve a balance of power in the vacuum created. Moreover, the absence of the Soviet Union led to ethnic strife and refugee problems in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union’s nuclear warheads that were left in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan and consequent possible nuclear proliferation became new challenges for US national security too. The terrorism which grew in this newly created environment also became an important US security issue. However, none of these problems were considered serious security threats to the US and were not dealt with in the same way as the security agenda during the Cold War period.

With the arrival of the new international security environment and the ensuing problems, the US decided to actively intervene to eradicate potential security treats by coercing behavioural change in the agents involved. The Clinton administration took the initiative to reformulate policies for the use or threat of use of military power in the US military and security strategy. 46 In order to achieve its aim, the US redeployed its military forces and elaborated an implementation plan.

The US was aware that strengthening its compellence strategy in this unipolar environment would lead to criticism that it was acting imperially. Therefore, it tried to achieve agreements with international organizations such as the NPT to make intervention a more legitimate and delicate tool. However, as witnessed in Panama and with the 2003 Iraq invasion, the US clearly sought to secure its unipolar hegemony and implemented the foreign policy which utilized its military strength to compel the adversaries.

Apart from its military interventions, the US employed various means to execute its compellence strategy. Although there were differences of degree in how hard the US would implement its measures, all the US administrations after the Cold War commonly emphasized the spread of democracy, the promotion of economic ties and the enlargement of international institutions. As the unipolar hegemonic state, the US started to employ more than a deterrence strategy. In order to achieve the necessary coercion, it set out four major action plans.

2.2.2.1 The Spread of Democracy

The spread of democracy is the most notable example of the US compellence strategy and is based on democratic peace theory. As Jack S. Levi argues, “The absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.” Thus, the US policymakers believed the spread of democracy would reduce international conflict and provocation.

Democratic peace theory has been criticized by scholars critical of liberal internationalism who doubt the existence of a possible quantitative methodology to prove the theory. However, despite this criticism the US set the spread of democracy as a core value in its foreign security policy and executed coercive diplomacy by implementing economic sanctions and military intervention.

With an increase in the number of studies not treating democratic peace theory as an ‘iron law’ and quantitative studies on how democracy affects state conflict, US coercive policy to ‘spread democracy’ started to secure its theoretical ground.

Democratic peace theory, which interprets democratic peace phenomena, can be divided into two categories: “structural/institutional” and “cultural/normative.” The “structural/institutional” interpretation sees the democratic system and its institutions as key. This logic is well-explained by Robert Putnam, who states “Any key player at the international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game board, and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat.” Thus, the leaders of democratic states have to play a two-level game that simultaneously maximizes the national interest by negotiating with other state leaders at the international level and persuades domestic interest groups to accept

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the result. Since democracy has checks and balances on authority and power through elections and public opinion, structural/institutional democratic peace theory holds that peace is naturally achieved through the democratic decision-making process. That is, since the citizen is a rational actor who does not wish to pay the price of war, rational decision makers who have to win their representativeness via the citizen’s vote have a tendency to avoid war.

The cultural/normative interpretation considers that peaceful conflict resolution between states is more likely to happen among democratic countries that share the same values and norms of democratic culture. Decision makers in democratic states have a tendency to utilize diplomatic means and dialogue rather than violence and force to resolve conflicts.

However, there are scholars who criticize these distinctions. James L. Ray argues that this analytical categorization of democratic peace theory is neither clear nor important. However, Maoz and Russett point out that the analytical separation between the “structural/institutional” and “cultural/normative” schools is based on different approaches and methodology, providing more variety to the understanding of democratic peace theory. They argue that the “structural/institutional” interpretation is based on economic ‘rational choice theory’ whereas the “cultural/normative” interpretation utilizes sociological methodology to focus on sociocultural variables.

In-depth studies of democratic peace theory inspired the US with confidence to implement the ‘spread of democracy’ as it action plan for securing US unilateral hegemony. The US believes its core values are economic liberalism and democracy, and the ‘spread of democracy’ assumes that political leaders and people are rational. The assumption that their pursuit of self-interest combined with the normative value of democracy will reduce security threats is therefore indispensable for the US.

After the Cold War, the US consistently emphasized the strategic importance of the “spread of democracy”. The Bush administration in particular argued that the promotion of democracy is the most efficient long-term plan to bring peace among strong states and eradicate fundamental terrorism.\(^{55}\) Although the US’s spread of democracy was faced with unexpected difficulties and side effects in Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine etc., it has remained in place as US foreign policy.

The US consistently expanded the alliance of democracy,\(^{56}\) which is based on the normative assumption that states which share the value of democracy will enjoy close cooperation.\(^{57}\) Since it seems that a network of alliances can be built more strongly among democratic states, the US attempted to intensify its alliances by spreading the democratic system to deal with security problems. As a result of efforts by US administrations, the eastern European countries that were once members of the Warsaw Pact became member states of NATO: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia.

2.2.2.2 The Enlargement of Economic Relations

Along with the ‘spread of democracy,’ the US utilized trade and investment as tools in its coercive foreign policy.\(^{58}\) It tried to sign free trade agreements with its allies and security alliance partners to expand the common ground of economic interest. This was based on the expectation that with greater economic interdependency the incentives for diplomatic and security cooperation would also increase.\(^{59}\) The US believed it would thus strengthen its unipolar hegemony in the international system.

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Although there are controversies over the Washington consensus, it could be an example of a US structural attempt to enlarge its economic relations. However, Moises Naim states, “It is also worth remembering that the belief that a less developed country could not really benefit from freer international trade and investment was, and to a certain extent continues to be, widely held in these countries. Therefore, the prescription of the Washington Consensus that government-imposed barriers to imports and exports, to foreign investment, and to foreign currency transactions had to be lifted was sharply at odds with the long-held conviction that developing countries had to protect their economies from an unfair and exploitative international system rigged against them.”

The Washington consensus thus has some elements of the US utilizing FTAs and trade as foreign policy. Moreover, with enlarged economic blocs, economic sanctions and conditional economic incentives were used as inducements to coerce behavioural change in US adversary states. Iran and North Korea were typical examples.

The US also made the best use of enlargement of economic relations as a solution to global terrorism. In order to minimize the social economic unrest caused by poverty, which is believed to reinforce terrorism, the US argued that economic development assistance to the third world would reduce global economic inequality, and therefore terrorism.

2.2.2.3 The Enlargement of International Institutions and Regimes

The importance of international institutions and regimes has progressively intensified in international relations and politics. The US has taken advantage of this and utilized it as a means of its foreign policy. In order to expand free trade and enhance the efficient management of the global economy, the US has supported and strengthened the establishment of international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the

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World Bank, the International Monetary Fund etc.

The nuclear non-proliferation issue is a case in point. The international non-proliferation treaty and regime were established to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, since the NPT regime allows the peaceful use of nuclear energy, there are grey areas and weak points in the complete prevention of state nuclear armament. Thus, the US actively reinforces the NPT regime and complements the NPT measures to counter nuclear proliferation. The implementation of 93 + 2 additional protocols is a typical example. After witnessing Iraq’s shocking development of a nuclear capability during the first Gulf War, the NPT allowed member state intelligence information to be used as a source for the accurate inspection and surveillance of nuclear facilities and programmes.63 This gave the US more room to implement its foreign policy because of the information asymmetry created by the superiority of the US intelligence agencies.

Moreover, the US initiated a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to control the spread of nuclear-related materials. The PSI is not a free-standing initiative but builds on wider efforts by the international community through existing treaties and regimes. It was launched in 2003 and is now endorsed by 103 countries including Russia.64 It is not a legally binding agreement or treaty, but the US purpose of making it a global standard measure for non-proliferation is clear.65 In addition, the US has also utilized the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to strengthen its compellence strategy.

The US made use of international institutions to secure its objective, the unipolar hegemony. To maximize its national interests, it wanted to strengthen the international regime through building close cooperation systems among the democratic states. The establishment of the Community of Democracies in 2000 and the 2004 establishment of the Democracy Caucus in the UN are examples of how the US planned to combine the

‘spread of democracy’ through enlarged international institutions.

2.2.2.4 Securing US Military Superiority and Escalation Dominance

The US compellence strategy is clearly revealed in its military doctrine and policy. The US believes it must sustain the absolute superiority of its military strength to confront the rise of potential adversaries and security threats. In order to stabilize the world order under US unipolar hegemony, it retains the possibility of pre-emptive strikes, the unilateral use of military means and even pre-emptive war. Moreover, countries that are labelled part of the ‘axis of evil’ and ‘rogue states’ are not given any negative assurance by the US. That is, the US would use its nuclear arms to attack countries such as Iran and North Korea.

After the Cold War, the US transformed its military forces to effectively respond to the new international security environment. It redeployed the US forces stationed abroad and reorganized its forces into lighter, faster and effective military operation systems. The vision was to maximize US capability of prompt intervention against any potential security threat. In order to achieve this goal, it enhanced its capabilities of airlift transportation, long-range precision strikes and naval-based power projection. Moreover, it tried to establish an “Afghanistan model” that could facilitate prompt and easy intervention in regional conflicts and against threats.

In addition to its development of conventional military power and operation systems, the US enhanced its asymmetric warfare capabilities. Strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles – the “nuclear triad” – were retained even under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia. In the post-Cold War era, the US realized its traditional nuclear strategy posture based on the ‘usability paradox’ and a ‘balance of terror’ would not work to deal with its future security

threats. Thus, the new nuclear triad system was developed to sustain US escalation dominance and secure its unipolar hegemony to implement its compellence strategy. The new nuclear triad system was a combined strategy of nuclear and conventional weapons, a comprehensive defence system with MD and infrastructure to effectively intervene against new security threats. This system also included drone technology and the “military technical revolution” of advanced precision weapons to strengthen US military capabilities.

The four major US action plans were still valid under the Obama administration and are highly likely to be continued in the new administration. They can be summarised in Hillary Clinton’s remark as Secretary of State when she emphasized the “three Ds” – defence, diplomacy and development – as the keys to US foreign policy.

On the basis of its assessment of each different security threat the US combines above mentioned four action plans to form an efficient compellence strategy. Balancing among these four action plans to create a more efficient coercive policy has become an important element in US foreign policy.

There are, however, opinions that the US should implement its compellence strategy with more prudence after the ‘spread of democracy’ and the incorporation of Georgia into NATO led to an unexpected disaster and escalated a regional conflict. The failure of ‘Iraqi Freedom’ also made the US administration hesitate to employ direct coercion in the form of limited warfare. However, the fundamental structures of the US compellence strategy are still up and running. Although the Obama administration emphasized dialogue, it did not abandon its compellence strategy despite the following statement

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by the President: “tougher sanctions and aggressive, principled and direct high-level diplomacy, without preconditions… By going the extra diplomatic mile, while keeping all options on the table, we make it more likely the rest of the world will stand with us to increase pressure on Iran, if diplomacy is failing.”

Obama instead elaborated Bush’s compellence strategy by implementing other forms of inducement. Persuasive inducements such as offering a dialogue and punitive inducements such as consolidating international agreement over more efficient sanctions were implemented. Moreover, the US military superiority, which secures escalation dominance, was always sustained in all the US administrations after the Cold War, i.e. the framework of the US compellence strategy was retained regardless of the rhetorical differences between the administrations in the post-Cold War period.

2.3 The US Non-Proliferation Policy

2.3.1 Background

The ‘Manhattan Project,’ which was initiated in 1942, succeeded in building a nuclear bomb, with the first detonation of a US nuclear weapon in New Mexico on 16 July 1945. The two nuclear bombs which were dropped on Japan in August 1945 then kicked off the nuclear arms race among the international community. As a result, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China became nuclear weapon states and through the bipolar system of the Cold War strategic nuclear weapons were spread under the nuclear umbrellas of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It was clear that the massive destructive power and the asymmetric nature of nuclear weapons had soon occupied the primary place on the agenda of international politics.

The US nuclear strategy was first established in the 1950s under the Eisenhower


administration. The first US nuclear strategy, the “New Look,” was based on US nuclear weapon superiority to offset any threats that the Soviet Union possessed by means of a ‘massive retaliation’ capability.77

However, the ‘massive retaliation’ strategy was only sustainable when the quantitative expansion of nuclear weapons could maintain US military superiority. Thus, when the Soviet Union initiated its nuclear arms race against the US in the 1960s, the strategy lost its validity. The Kennedy administration therefore shifted to a new nuclear strategy based on ‘flexible response.’ This was that the US would implement its policy measures according to the level of the various security challenges from the Soviet Union.78

However, the ‘flexible response’ strategy to limit and control possible security threats from outside was not the only nuclear strategy that the Kennedy administration adopted. It also implemented the ‘mutual assured destruction’ strategy to deter possible nuclear provocation by the Soviet Union: although the Soviet Union had the ability to make a first nuclear strike on the US, the strengthened US second-strike capability would deter the Soviet Union from doing so.79

‘Mutual assured destruction’ was counterevidence that the ‘balance of terror’ was not created by the existence of nuclear weapons themselves. As the Soviet Union had advanced its nuclear capability to compete with the US in the 1960s, neither the US nor the Soviet Union had the absolute ability to demolish the counter strike capability of their opponent with a first nuclear strike. Thus, despite the differences in the political systems of the two superpowers, the nuclear strategy of both bipolar states became deterrence based on ‘mutual assured destruction.’80 As the nuclear capabilities of the US and the Soviet Union remained parallel after the Kennedy administration, the US nuclear strategy for the rest of the Cold War became a ‘deterrence strategy.’

The long sustained deterrence strategy started to show signs of change in the 1980s as

third-world countries enhanced their conventional arms and displayed ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons. The US had to establish a new nuclear strategy to confront the rising threat. As a result, it mapped out a ‘discriminate deterrence’ strategy, which proposed preparation for ‘mid-intensity conflicts’ against regional hegemons that had acquired the rudiments of a nuclear, chemical and missile capability.\textsuperscript{81}

The ‘discriminate deterrence’ strategy aimed to reduce the possibility of a nuclear weapon being used in the escalation of a conflict. It meant that US non-proliferation policy would go beyond the long-lasting deterrence to become a compellence strategy. The US planned to utilize its overwhelming military strength to coerce a behaviour change in third world countries that intended to acquire nuclear armaments.

However, although the leading concept in the US nuclear strategy started to shift to a compellence strategy, the US did not only implement coercive measures. From 1970, the US and the Soviet Union initiated a dialogue about their bilateral nuclear arms race in the arena of international politics. As both countries realized that the proliferation of nuclear weapons to third-world countries would harm their national interests, common ground between them was created. In order to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons to third-world countries, they attempted to prevent nuclear proliferation through international politics and bilateral strategic arms reduction talks. As a result, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, SALT I & II, took place from 1969 to 1972 and 1969 to 1979 respectively, and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, INF, was negotiated from 1981 to 1987 and finalized a reduction of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START I, II, III and New START were agreed between the two powers to reduce the number of nuclear weapons to 1,550 on each side.\textsuperscript{82} The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime was also established to prevent nuclear proliferation in 1968. The three depositary states were the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

Nevertheless, the US peaceful approach to solving nuclear proliferation did not mean abandonment of its compellence nuclear strategy. The US effort to reduce nuclear arms

\textsuperscript{81} Michael T. Klare, US Military Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, \textit{The Socialist Register}, No. 28, pp. 131-142.

was due to an assessment that a massive quantity of nuclear arms was no longer efficient in the changed environment of international politics. Moreover, control and surveillance of peaceful uses of nuclear power through the international NPT regime was already included as a tool in the US compellence strategy.

The use of nuclear weapons was never removed from US military security measures and remained a tool in the US compellence strategy after the demise of the Soviet Union. The Clinton administration introduced a ‘nuclear triad’ system to maintain US military dominance and coerce behavioural change in its adversaries. Moreover, it did not confirm any negative assurance to states that were categorized as ‘rogue.’ The Bush administration was much tougher in every respect. It declared the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against an enemy and the ‘nuclear triad’ system of the Clinton administration was intensified in a ‘new nuclear triad’ system. Moreover, the non-proliferation policy was changed to a more aggressive counter-proliferation policy.

As was well-known before his inauguration, Obama wanted to tone down the rhetoric and change the policies of his predecessor. Thus, the counter-proliferation strategy was changed back to a non-proliferation strategy and other diplomatic measures such as direct dialogue, providing economic incentives, and multilateral engagement based on common security and humanity were emphasized. However, the Obama administration did not abandon the compellence strategy. The ‘new nuclear triad’ system was sustained and no negative assurance was guaranteed to adversary states such as Iran and North Korea. Moreover, the PSI and the GICNT, which were initiated by the Bush administration, were enhanced during the term of the Obama administration.

2.3.2 The US Non-Proliferation Strategy after the Cold War

The US non-proliferation policy in the post-Cold War period was based on compellence, which aimed to secure US unipolar hegemony. Thus, as mentioned above, the US combined four major action plans to coerce behavioural change in any state that attempted to develop a nuclear weapon capability.
2.3.2.1 Compellence through the NPT and the UN Security Council

As a nuclear arms race became inevitable in the 1950s, the US started to plan measures to efficiently curb global nuclear proliferation. Since it could not blindly coerce sovereign states into non-proliferation, it undertook a policy of transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear material for the peaceful use of atomic energy if sovereign states signed a safeguard agreement not to use transferred nuclear technology or material for military purposes. This was a similar approach to that employed by Rome in the Third Punic War, in which it demanded that Carthage should surrender over 200,000 suits of armour and 2,000 siege weapons in exchange for a peace treaty.

The US control of nuclear proliferation through the ‘peaceful use of atomic energy’ seemed very effective to prevent the appropriation of nuclear material and technology for military purposes. However, as the safeguard agreement in the bilateral negotiations approved US nuclear inspection of sovereign states and limited their decisions on their nuclear development, it seemed that the US had violated the Treaty of Westphalia, which guarantees the rights of nation states. Therefore, in 1953 the US president Eisenhower proposed to the UN general assembly the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct nuclear inspections\(^{83}\) and thus avoid the issues of breach of state sovereignty.

Following Eisenhower’s proposal, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957. However, since the US and the Soviet Union had to deploy their strategic nuclear arsenals to provide nuclear umbrellas for the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the process of building a non-proliferation regime through the IAEA became lengthy. In 1964, the slow progress in forming the international non-proliferation regime reached a turning point when China succeeded in developing a nuclear weapon. On witnessing the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon technology to a communist country, the US took the initiative with the establishment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. Thus, on 17 August 1965, it submitted the first draft of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the eighteen-nation Committee on

Disarmament. As a result, the IAEA opened the NPT treaty for signature in 1968 and it finally entered into force in 1970. However, within the Cold War bipolar system of economic and military competition it was difficult for the international community to consolidate strong binding forces for the NPT regime, and in 1974 India carried out a nuclear test, demonstrating that nuclear proliferation was continuing.

However, the situation changed when the US become a unipolar state after the end of the Soviet Union in 1989. Ostensibly, the US argues that its nuclear policy which utilizes the NPT regime is in the common interest of the international community in preventing nuclear proliferation. It therefore claims that its nuclear policy contributes to global prosperity and peace. However, whether intentionally or not, it utilizes the NPT regime as a tool to coerce sovereign states to abandon their nuclear development. In this way US nuclear superiority cannot be challenged by any other state within the NPT system.

The hidden side of the NPT regime is the US ambition to secure its unipolar hegemony. This became clearer as the US completed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and established a Missile Defense system, MD. The ABM treaty was signed between the US and the Soviet Union in 1972 to limit quantities of anti-ballistic missiles to one hundred each. However, once the US became the unipolar state, it found the ABM treaty to be an obstacle to its aim of building a MD system to sustain its unipolar hegemony. It therefore unilaterally withdrew from the ABM treaty in 2001 and abolished it in 2002.

In the early 1980s as a prelude to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US undertook a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. The SDI was a system with which it sought to sustain its military superiority beyond any potential security challenges. It eventually developed into the Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system and then into the National Missile Defense system, now well-known as the MD system. Moreover, the US attempted to develop a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrating Weapon system that could destroy covert nuclear and military facilities hidden underground or

inside mountains. Although the project was cancelled because of the budget deficit in 2006, it clearly showed the US intention of intensifying its compellence strategy measures. 86

The US abrogation of the ABM treaty and its establishment of the MD system were seen as degrading the non-proliferation regime. 87 Since these steps contradicted signed agreements and ongoing negotiations on arms reduction treaties such as SALT, INF and START, the irony of US nuclear policy is one of the proofs that it is implementing a compellence strategy: on the one hand it promotes nuclear non-proliferation through an international non-proliferation regime and on the other hand it established the MD system to strengthen its first nuclear strike capability.

It is true, however, that the MD system was based on the concept of ‘deterrence by denial.’ This means that the MD system is a countervailing strategy to limit possible damage from adversaries with non-nuclear weapon systems. This seems ethically superior to the US nuclear strategy in the Cold War based on ‘mutual assured destruction.’ However, despite the ethical aspect of the MD system, it cannot be denied that it made the US nuclear weapon system untouchable. 88

The US also takes advantage of other international institutions such as the UN Security Council (UNSC) as tools in its nuclear compellence strategy. The UNSC operates as a means of multilateral collective security to resolve international conflicts and crises. It releases presidential statements, press releases and resolutions as declarations of intent. While the press releases and presidential statements are exhortative measures that have no binding power, UNSC resolutions are voted agreements that have more legal force, equivalent to soft law. In this way, UNSC resolutions become the basis for all the UN agencies to exert their authority in their fields of interest. 89

The authority of the UNSC is projected on the basis of the UN charter. According to Chapter VI of this charter, the UNSC implements non-military diplomatic measures such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement to resolve crises and conflicts. Chapter VII approves more aggressive measures being implemented by the UNSC, with articles 39, 41 and 42 indicating possible implementation of economic sanctions, limited warfare or total war.90

The US takes advantage of the UNSC being able to execute multilateral military, diplomatic or economic interventions to coerce states that try to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. Thus, along with its unilateral measures the US attempts to achieve UNSC resolutions which intensify its compellence strategy. The cases of Iran, Libya and North Korea are typical examples. Under the authority of UNSC resolutions, they have all faced international economic sanctions and the pressure of possible ‘peace enforcing’ military interventions.

2.3.2.2 Compellence through Economic Incentives and Sanctions

Along with diplomatic and economic sanctions through UNSC resolutions and the NPT regime, the US executes unilateral economic sanctions and incentives in its compellence strategy. A typical example is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, (CTR). When the Soviet Union collapsed, one of the top US concerns was diffusion of the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear weapons that had been deployed to the member states of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, US senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar submitted a joint bill which was later enacted as the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, creating the CTR. Three US ministries, the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, spend approximately a billion dollars a year to operate the CTR programme.91

Initially, the CTR programme dismantled nuclear and chemical weapons, nuclear and chemical materials and WMD-related facilities in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and

Kazakhstan. In the 15 years of the CTR programme, it succeeded in eliminating 6,600 Soviet nuclear warheads, 470 ICBM launch pads, numerous nuclear submarines, strategic bombers and stockpiles of weapons-grade enriched uranium, and 50,000 nuclear scientists were redeployed.92

The CTR has much similarity to the US compellence strategy. First, its priority objectives are comprehensive. Its goal is to dismantle not only nuclear and chemical weapons but all the elements of WMD programmes. Thus, nuclear and chemical materials for weapons programmes, nuclear weapon technology, human resources for WMD programmes and WMD facilities are all included for irreversible dismantlement. Second, the CTR is not based on a principle of reciprocity. It coerces other states to abandon their WMD programmes without the US losing its WMD capability, i.e. the US does not reduce its nuclear weapon numbers or programmes while it conducts CTR to reduce those of other states. The programme can therefore be considered a US compellence measure to maintain US unipolar hegemony.93

Besides coercion through economic incentives, the US has also utilized punitive inducement. The economic sanctions which were imposed on India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea are typical examples. After nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, the US imposed economic sanctions on both states, using its ‘Arms Export Control Act’ and the ‘Export-Import Bank Act’ to try to force them to renounce nuclear weapons.94 In the case of Iran, it imposed the first economic sanctions after the seizure of the US embassy in Teheran during the 1979 Islamic revolution. Since then, US presidents have issued executive orders and imposed economic sanctions under the ‘Iran-Iraq Arms Non-proliferation Act,’ the ‘Iran and Libya Sanctions Act,’ the ‘Iran, North Korea and Syria Non-proliferation Act’ and the ‘Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act’ trying to coerce Iran into behavioural change.95

Policy towards North Korea is no different. After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the US imposed its first sanctions using the ‘Export-Import Bank Act’ of 1945. Since then, US economic sanctions have been imposed under the ‘Trading with the Enemy Act,’ the ‘National Emergencies Act,’ the ‘Export Administration Act,’ the ‘Arms Export Control Act,’ the ‘Iran, North Korea and Syria Non-proliferation Act’ and the ‘Patriot Act.’ Moreover, many executive orders have been issued by US presidents with the aim of forcing the irreversible nuclear disarmament of North Korea.\(^{96}\)

2.3.2.3 Compellence through Dominant Military Superiority

Beyond the previously-mentioned MD system, the US effort to sustain its military superiority is massive. The US defence budget alone surpasses the total of the next top 11 countries’ defence budgets.\(^{97}\) With its peerless scale of military expenditure, the US maintains absolute escalation dominance regarding any sort of threat and security challenge. In addition, it does not conceal its intention to do this. The Quadrennial Defence Review, which encompasses all US military policy reviews such as the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy, clearly indicates that its military means will be employed to resolve security threats and stabilize US unipolar hegemony.

After the Cold War, there was a growth of criticism that a lack of consensus in US administrations and an absence of consistency in its military strategy could not counter the new security threats of the post-Cold War period.\(^{98}\) Occasionally, the US Department of Defense released policy reviews. However, there were rising concerns among defence experts that the US as the unipolar state needed periodic policy assessments to deal with the new security environment. Therefore, the H.W Bush

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administration first released a ‘Base Force Assessment’ report compiled by Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell to revisit US military strategy as a whole. In the
Clinton administration, Defense Secretary Les Aspin released a ‘Bottom-up Review,’
which later became the background for the ‘Military Structure Review Act’ of 1996, the
so-called ‘Lieberman Amendment.’ On the basis of this act, guidelines for
Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) were established and the first one was released in
1997 under the leadership of Defense Secretary William James Perry. Subsequently, a
QDR report has been issued every four years. Therefore, the Bush and Obama
administrations released two QDR reports each during their tenures.

Although there are differences of degree in the administrations’ QDR reports, the QDRs
clarified three objectives of US military strategy: 1) to establish a favourable
international security environment for the US; 2) to enhance US military capability
against new security threats; and 3) to maintain US military superiority through
technological, tactical and military innovation.

First, the US maintains an approximate average of 150,000 active duty military personnel
around the world and manages naval operations to enhance its readiness to intervene against
potential security threats. The US naval force headquarters of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh
Fleets are stationed in Bahrain, Napoli and Japan respectively for efficient projection of US
force. Moreover, the US maintains its nuclear superiority to intensify its escalation
dominance. Although the US showed a will to reduce its strategic nuclear weapons by
signing nuclear arms reduction treaties such as START I and II and New START, it
announced development of its MD programme and other military projects which would
strengthen its nuclear superiority. Thus, the US military strategy was to sustain or intensify
its military superiority to maintain a favourable security environment.

Second, in order to establish a quick reaction capability to confront the rise of new
security threats, the US tried to achieve a balance between end strength, readiness and

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99 Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletskey and Kristin Leuschner, Defense planning in a decade of change:
Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-up Review and Quadrennial Defence Review, Santa Monica: RAND
101 Defence Manpower Data Centr

modernization. Furthermore, it declared a ‘win-win strategy’ in the ‘major theatres of war.’ That is, if security threats simultaneously occur in different regions of US interest, it would carry out two different interventions or even two total wars to achieve victory. The 2001 QDR, which was released after 9/11, clearly states that the US would ‘swiftly defeat’ two adversaries and ‘win decisively,’ which might involve a regime change rather than simply defeating the enemy’s military.

To support the new US force-planning structure, a 1-4-2-1 model was created: defend (1) the United States; deter forward in 4 critical regions (Europe, northeast Asia, the Middle East and southeast Asia); swiftly defeat 2 adversaries nearly simultaneously; and win 1 war decisively, including potential regime change.102

The US military strategy that was generally stated in the QDRs was to build US forces that are multi-mission capable. It aimed to create a military that could easily transform and deploy to various levels of conflict from full-scale war to ‘low-intensity conflict.’103 Thus, in order to separately confront adversary states and non-state adversaries, the US allocated the military operation of regular and unconventional warfare to the general military unit and the operation of counter terrorism and counter proliferation to Special Forces. Accordingly, the US increased the numbers of its special operation troops by 30% and established the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) to engage 2,600 more marines. Moreover, it reorganized its military system to project its special warfare unit more efficiently.104

The US also reinforced its triad weapon system of ICBMs, SLBMs and ALCMs to make it more prompt and efficient – the ‘new nuclear triad.’ Thus, the Mobile Consolidated Command Centre of the US STRATCOM was abolished and the reporting system was simplified for an efficient use of the triad weapons.105

Lastly, the US military strategy aimed at military technological innovation to prevent future security threats. Since it evaluated that its clear-cut victory in the first Gulf War was due to technical development of weapons in the 1970s and 1980s, it believed that technological innovation should be continued and even applied to ‘military transformation’ in order to sustain US unipolar hegemony in the 21st century. For example, it employed new information technology that utilizes computers, satellites, drones etc. to establish a new military command and control system. The asymmetry of information created by this innovation leads to US information dominance, which is believed to be a key element in modern warfare. Through ongoing military transformation using new technology, the US plans to sustain its unipolar hegemony.

A common argument of all the QDRs is that US military force will contribute to bringing a ‘spread of democracy,’ promoting cooperation between states, providing regional security and removing security threats to the US and its allies. This clearly displays support for the four major action plans in US military strategy. Moreover, by applying the concept of preventive defence, the QDRs seek to establish more than the conventional ‘deter-defend strategy.’ Thus, the QDRs demonstrate the US compellence strategy involves intervening militarily if it is necessary to prevent the advent of a security threat.

However, due to the global economic crisis the US had to enact a Budget Control Act in 2011. Under this act, a sequester programme started to cut its military expenditure in the 2012 fiscal year and for the next 10 years. Since a total of 487 billion dollars has to be saved in this period, many QDR plans had to be delayed or scaled down. The ‘win-win’ strategy in two major war theatres was toned down to a ‘1+ win strategy.’ That is, while waging a total war in one region the US would implement ‘deter and denial’ in another war theatre until the end of the first war. However, despite the budget cut, the US distinctly stated that it will sustain military power projection to secure ‘full-spectrum operation’ capability and US unilateral hegemony. Moreover, it clearly revealed that it will use military power not only to deter security threats but also to compel adversaries to bring peace.

2.3.3 US Non-Proliferation Policy Against the ‘axis of evil’

Fundamentally, the US is against nuclear proliferation in all countries, whether they be allies or adversaries. Since nuclear weapons can shift the power balance in a region and degrade US unipolar hegemony, it employs economic and diplomatic sanctions backed by military pressure to coerce behavioural change in states that seek nuclear weapon capability. However, as witnessed in several nuclear tests – Israel in 1966, India in 1974 and the simultaneous nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 – it selectively allows nuclear proliferation on the basis of its grand foreign policy strategy.

Certainly, the US became stricter and more determined about nuclear proliferation after becoming the unipolar hegemonic state after the Cold War. Thus, India and Pakistan had to face US economic sanctions based on the Arms Export Control Act and the Export-Import Bank Act after their nuclear tests in 1998. However, when the US needed the support of both counties after 9/11, it eased the sanctions and approved their nuclear weapons. For the US, India was a crucial regional player to check and balance Chinese expansion. Moreover, in order to enlarge its influence in southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, the US needs India to stand by its side. Pakistan was also critical for the US to win the ‘war on terrorism’ after 9/11. To stabilize US power projection to Afghanistan and the Middle East, Pakistan’s support was inevitable.

Despite these exceptional cases, the US implemented its coercion and compellence strategy to limit nuclear proliferation. In particular, the nuclear programmes of countries labelled as ‘rogue’ and part of the ‘axis of evil’ face more severe coercion. Therefore, the WMD of Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Syria and Libya were dealt with using more intense compellence than the cases of South Africa, Ukraine, India and Pakistan.

In the post-Cold War period, the US perceived the nuclear threat from ‘rogues’ and the ‘axis of evil’ to be more imminent than that from Russia or China. Since the non-proliferation strategy in the previous bipolar system – deterrence – can no longer contain the nuclear ambition of individual states, the US decided to employ a compellence strategy based on its military strength and its escalation dominance. Thus, it started to handle the threat of nuclear proliferation through a ‘capability-based approach’ rather
than a ‘threat-based approach.’ Since unspecified asymmetric threats from unspecified agents had increased after the Cold War, the passive deterrence strategy from the bipolar system was not sufficient to confront new security threats with WMD.\(^{108}\) Therefore, the US decided to focus on its ability to confront potential threats and execute preventive measures based on its capability, not on assessment of the size of the threat.\(^{109}\)

The US clearly indicated that it would reinforce its conventional weapons to prevent adversaries from acquiring WMD. Moreover, it threatened a possible use of nuclear weapons if adversaries do not comply with its demands for their nuclear disarmament.\(^{110}\) Therefore, along with Russia and China, the ‘axis of evil’ – Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and North Korea – was excluded from any US negative nuclear assurance.

Since the Middle East and northeast Asia were designated as critical regions in US security strategy after 9/11, the two regions have become major US war theatres. The regional states of the two regions that were labelled ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ in the 1980s were categorized as ‘rogue states’ and later turned into the ‘axis of evil,’ a target of the US compellence strategy.

As Libya abandoned its WMD in 2003, Iraq’s Saddam regime was replaced with pro-US Shiites, and Syria’s nuclear facility was destroyed by an Israel airstrike in 2008, Iran and North Korea are the only members of the axis of evil left trying to acquire their own nuclear programmes and confronting US coercion.

### 2.3.4 Geopolitics and the US Non-Proliferation Coercive Policy

After the Cold War, the US saw the Middle East and northeast Asia as critical regions for its global security strategy.\(^{111}\) As the US indicated the regions as ‘two major theatres of war’ and


the ‘win-win’ or ‘1+ win’ strategies as its security policy objectives, it planned to enhance its military capability by rebalancing and transforming its military force to secure its unipolar hegemony. While the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact used their ‘Iron Curtain’ to secure their expansion toward the sea, the US clearly identified the Middle East and northeast Asia as important geopolitical regions to contain Russia and China to sustain its unipolar hegemony.

2.3.4.1 The Geopolitical Importance of the Middle East

1) Israel

The conventional US policy objectives in the Middle East were containment of the Soviet Union, the oil security of the Gulf States and the security of Israel. Since the US abruptly filled the power vacuum in the Middle East after World War II, its policy in the region had been highly influenced by the bipolar Cold War system. Therefore, it established the Baghdad Pact and utilized the strong states in the region, Iran and Turkey, to confront the Soviet Union. In the early period of US Middle East strategy, Israel was not a strategic partner of the US. However, as the spread of ‘pan Arabism’ and the non-aligned movement weakened the Bagdad pact and the Soviet Union succeeded in establishing diplomatic ties with the socialist countries of Syria, Egypt and Iraq, the US perceived Israel as its last bastion in the Levant area. As a result, US national interest in the Middle East became equated with the security of Israel and it started to rely on Israel to project its Middle East policy.

From 1949 to 1973, when the US focused on containment of the Soviet Union through the Bagdad Pact, its economic aid to Israel was an average of $120 million a year, which was a relatively small amount compared to its assistance to other states. However, after witnessing the Israeli military capability in its victories in three Middle East wars,


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the US started to appreciate Israel as a strategic partner in the region. As Henry Kissinger states, “When confronted with the realities of power in the Middle East – after much anguish and circuitous manoeuvres – Nixon recognized that he must pursue, in the national interest, the same strategy which others supported for reasons of ethnic politics: to reduce Soviet influence, weaken the position of the Arab radicals, encourage Arab moderates, and assure Israel’s Security.” Therefore, US economic aid to Israel quintupled after 1971 and increased again to 2.6 billion dollars in 1974. Since then, it provided Israel with an average of 3 billion dollars a year in economic aid until 2015. Currently, Israel is an indispensable strategic partner of the US in the Middle East and possesses 200 nuclear weapons.

2) Oil security

47.3% of world oil reserves are buried in the Middle East and 32.4% of total world oil production takes place in the Middle East Gulf states. Since petroleum became an important source of energy for various industry sectors after World War I, the Middle East has been a core strategic region for energy security. In particular, the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf is a vital transport channel for international energy markets. In 2014, 63% of the world’s oil production, 56.5 million barrels per day, was transported on maritime routes, and 57% of all the seaborne oil trade passed through the Strait of Hormuz. If this critical transit point were blocked, it would cause a global energy crisis.

Recently, with its ‘shale revolution’ and a diversification of oil import channels, the US has created its own leverage and succeeded in building threat control on Middle East oil. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the US would face a similar situation to that of the 1973 oil shock even in a worst-case scenario such as the Strait of Hormuz being closed. However, the East Asian countries, which import an average of 75% of their oil supply

from Gulf oil states, are different. 85% of the crude oil supplies that leave through the Persian Gulf are headed towards Asian countries. Therefore, if the energy security of the Middle East were damaged it would lead to US unipolar hegemony. In particular, the US, which has declared a ‘pivot to Asia’ would face Chinese expansion if Middle Eastern energy security became destabilized. It would provide China with a reason for maritime expansion. In fact, it has recently changed its foreign policy doctrine from 躲光養晦 (keep a low profile) to 主動作為 (take initiative) under the leadership of Xi Jinping.

Even though energy dependency on oil has started to decrease with technological innovation and renewable energy, the importance of oil in the energy sector is highly likely to continue for the next few decades. The US military aid and massive arms sales to the Gulf oil monarchs shows that the Middle East is an essential region for global energy security.

The geopolitics of the Middle East, the security of Israel and global energy security are core US foreign policy interests. Therefore, any abrupt change in the balance of power or escalation of conflict in the region is considered a serious threat to the US unipolar world order. Moreover, since the Middle East lacks a collective security system such as NATO, the US cannot overlook any changes in the Middle East.

2.3.4.2 The Geopolitical Importance of East Asia

East Asia is another critical region for US foreign and security policy. Without referring to the controversial argument of Samuel Huntington after the Cold War, the US...
doctrine of a ‘pivot to Asia,’ or a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, indicate checking and balancing China as the most critical need to sustain US unipolar hegemony.\textsuperscript{126}

1) The Rise of China

The economic and military rise of China, the decline of US hegemony and power transition are not new arguments in international politics. In the late 1980s there was a similar argument that Japan and Germany would rise and compete with the US for global hegemony.\textsuperscript{127} However, the past discourse on the rise of Japan and Germany was disproved by Joseph Nye’s prediction that the US would sustain its hegemonic status through soft power.\textsuperscript{128} However, due to its size and influence, the rise of China is perceived as a more serious and substantial threat to US unipolar hegemony.

US concern was clearly revealed in its policy reviews in the post-Cold War era. In 1995, the Clinton administration released its US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, the EASR report. This stated that US East Asian policy would focus on the stabilization of peace between Japan and China, and prevent any threat which could bring a shift in the power balance in the region such as the North Korean nuclear programme.\textsuperscript{129} Therefore, the US announced it would maintain 100,000 troops in East Asia and consolidate multilateral systems such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

The US East Asia policy aim in the 1998 EASR report was more lucid than the previous one. It stated that the US would help build an equilibrium of the power balance in East Asia, and clearly stated that it would prevent any attempt at WMD proliferation. By strengthening collective security with allies in the region, the US planned to prevent any type of arms race and threats to its hegemony.

\textsuperscript{126} Paul MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, \textit{International Security}, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 7-44.
\textsuperscript{127} Fred Bergsten, The World Economy after the Cold War, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 69, No. 3, 1990, pp. 96-112.
The Bush administration took a firmer stance in its East Asia policy. During the whole presidential election campaign, Bush referred to China as a ‘strategic competitor,’ not a ‘strategic partner,’ and declared the US would build a ‘theatre ballistic missile defence’ in East Asia to contain Chinese expansion. \(^{130}\) Particularly after 9/11, the Bush administration realized the importance of collective security for the US, Japan and South Korea for counter terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and sustaining its unipolar hegemony against Chinese expansion. In 2005 the Bush administration released a report entitled ‘The Military Power of the People's Republic of China,’ which portrayed Chinese military force as a threat to the whole of eastern and southern Asia and the Pacific Ocean.


The geopolitical importance of Asia in US foreign and security policy continued in the Obama administration. Although it took some time to release its Asian strategy due to the policy priority of the US military withdrawal from Iraq, the Obama administration announced that the axis of US policy strategy had moved to Asia. According to ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,’ the Obama administration’s security strategy for the next 10 years would focus on the enhancement of US military strength to prepare for total war with the rising adversary – China. \(^{132}\) This was a shift from the 9/11 paradigm of US security strategy focusing on enhancing US counter terrorism and unconventional warfare capability. Following this, a ‘Joint Operation Access Concept’ (JOAC) report was released by the US Defense Department to implement a detailed action plan. Here, the concept of ‘AirSea Battle’ was created to offset China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) military strategy to deter US intervention. \(^{133}\)


The JOAC was a clear statement that the US would achieve military superiority over the Chinese deterrence capability in order to sustain its unipolar hegemony. It emphasized an enhancement of the US ability to offset Chinese military power through flexible integration of space and cyberspace operations into the traditional air-sea-land battle space. Thus, US military strategy was set to intensify capabilities such as long-range missiles, the direct intervention of special operations forces and cyber warfare to destroy the deterrence system of an adversary. Therefore, despite the budget sequestration reducing the military budget by 259 billion dollars from 2012 to 2017, the Obama administration announced it would maintain stealth strike bombers, its long-range missile capability, hunter-killer nuclear submarines, and its Integrated Reception System in Asia.

To sum up, the Middle East and East Asia are geopolitically critical regions for US foreign and security policy. Especially after the Cold War, the two regions became objects of more detailed US military strategy to maintain the new world order and US unipolar hegemony. The Middle East is important for the US in terms of global energy security and the pro-US countries that contain the expansion of Russia and fundamentalist terrorism. East Asia is a region that is becoming more important than the Middle East because it is now becoming a theatre in which the US aims to contain China, which has risen as its new nemesis. Therefore, after the Cold War US administrations clearly revealed their intention in various policy reviews such as NSS, NPR, QDR, NDS, NMA etc. to employ a compellence strategy in the region to maintain US unilateral hegemony.

2.4 Conclusion

The US security strategy in the post-Cold War era is to maintain the unipolar hegemony which it achieved after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although pessimism about US unipolar hegemony has continued since 1990, the US still has unchallenged military and economic superiority. There is no country that could globally project its power and

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execute total war like the US.

The US is well aware of its unipolar hegemony and has set its grand security strategy to sustain its global leadership. It is actively engaged in solving new security threats that have arisen in the new global environment after the Cold War. Therefore, its conventional containment and deterrence strategy started to shift to a strategy of compellence, using ‘engagement and enlargement’ and the ‘spread of democracy.’ In order to keep its unipolar hegemony, the US has pursued the aim of behavioural change by its adversaries to comply with its demands.

For an efficient compellence strategy, the US has set the spread of democracy, the enlargement of economic relations, the enlargement of international institutions and regimes, and the securing of US military superiority and escalation dominance as its four major action plans. The US non-proliferation policy is part of this, and so the US compellence strategy and its four major action plans have been applied to achieving a nuclear-free world.

Since its conventional nuclear strategy based on ‘mutual assured destruction’ could not contain the new nuclear threats of the 21st century, the US decided to enhance its military superiority and escalation dominance to solve the problem of nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, the US even admitted the possibility of nuclear strikes in its non-proliferation policy. As the chances of asymmetric threats from unspecified agents increased, the US realized the need for a more aggressive strategy than conventional nuclear deterrence. Therefore, its non-proliferation policy became more rooted to its compellence strategy. For instance, the ‘nuclear triad’ system – ICBM, SLBM and strategic bombers – was elaborated into a ‘new nuclear’ triad system, which involves a combination of an offensive strike system with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, and revitalizes the defence system by including MD to provide a new capability to overcome any emerging threat. Moreover, the US has clearly stated that it will not provide negative nuclear assurances to the countries that it labels as ‘rogue states’ or members of the ‘axis of evil’ to secure its escalation dominance. Thus, North Korea, Iran, and Syria are among the five states that could be struck by US nuclear weapons.

Enlargement of international institutions and the international regime have also been utilized as tools for US coercion on nuclear non-proliferation. PSI and GINCT were set up by the
US to operate voluntarily, but have become a regime that implements binding measures against any state that breaches non-proliferation. The IAEA and NPT have also strengthened their surveillance and inspection capabilities to detect and punish any state misbehaviour in nuclear development. Since the enlarged international institutional regime is interconnected, it can trigger international institutions such as the UNSC to promptly engage and impose measures to bring about behavioural change by states that attempt to achieve nuclear weapon capability. The enlarged international regime also provides justification for US coercion on nuclear non-proliferation.

Needless to say, economic inducements are the classic coercive measure in US non-proliferation policy. In addition to economic inducements through Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, unilateral US economic sanctions have always been imposed on counties that attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. After the Cold War, South Africa, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea were all coerced by means of US economic inducements to abandon their nuclear programmes. Moreover, the US consolidates its economic sanctions by utilizing UNSC resolutions to maximize the effect of economic embargos.

Although the US employed its compellence strategy in all the nuclear proliferation disputes after the Cold War, the degree of US coercion varies according to the strategic environment and background of each conflict. Due to abrupt changes in the security environment and the strengthening of their democratic regimes, the nuclear programmes of South Africa and Ukraine were easily dismantled with a low degree of US coercion, whereas Iran, Iraq and North Korea, which are labelled ‘axis of evil’ members, have to face severe US compellence. India and Pakistan, which share common interests with the US as essential strategic regional partners, successfully acquired nuclear weapons with US acquiescence.

Currently, the two countries that are left to cause concern about nuclear proliferation are Iran and North Korea. These two countries are located in the Middle East and East Asia, regions where the core policy interest of the US is to sustain its unipolar hegemony. Their nuclear weapon programmes could change the balance of power and damage US

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unipolar hegemony. Therefore, they have become policy priorities for the US. Non-proliferation by Iran and North Korea is not just an agenda for a ‘nuclear-free world,’ but a core objective of US security and foreign policy.

However, the two-decade-long US compellence strategy against the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran has not achieved its objective, the dismantlement of their fully fledged nuclear programmes. Although there was a historical agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and the US in 2015, it will take a 15-year process to finalize the agreement. It is therefore too early to evaluate the JCOPA of 2015 as a case of successful non-proliferation. Until the phased steps in the Iran-US agreement are completed, the US has clearly stated that it will maintain its compellence strategy towards Iran.

This chapter, has dealt with non-proliferation policy within the broader picture of US security and foreign policy and has shown that the concept of compellence has become the core of US diplomatic strategy since the Cold War. Moreover, the implications of nuclear threats in two strategic regions critical for the US – the Middle East and East Asia – have been examined. In these regions, US non-proliferation policy has gone beyond a deterrence strategy to compellence to secure US unipolar hegemony.

The following chapter will examine coercive diplomacy, which is the actual implementation of the US's compellence and forceful persuasian. Moreover, the chapter will present the structural framework and theory which will be applied in this research.
3. US Compellence Strategy and Coercive Diplomacy

3.1 Introduction

Since the US became the unilateral hegemonic power after the demise of the Soviet Union, there is high validity in analysing its post-Cold War foreign and security policy through the concept of the compellance. Compellence and coercive diplomacy is a strategy of a strong state to derive the compliance of the weak where there is a clear asymmetry of power. If the power difference between states is marginal, a compellence strategy is a risky political choice which might end up in total war, as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis.

With its absolute superiority and the escalation dominance, the US utilizes various inducements such as economic aid, sanctions, the restoration of diplomatic relations, surgical strikes and limited warfare to achieve behavioural change by any agents that pose security threats or display potential elements of being security threats. The new global security problems of nuclear proliferation, intensified ethnic conflicts, human rights violations and global terrorism have all been dealt with through compellence rather than through the conventional strategy of containment and deterrence. As the hegemonic state in a unipolar system in the post-Cold War era, the US has extended its soft, hard and smart power to engage with global security issues to stabilize peace and to sustain its unipolar hegemony.

After the Cold War, most US decision makers and foreign policy experts perceived that a strategy of compellence was the optimal choice to deal with security issues. At least, they believed it was lesser evil than other alternatives. This was revealed in a series of policy reviews and reports by the US government that were released after the Cold War: QDR, NSS, NDS, NMS etc. According to its policy reviews, the US has implemented its compellence action plan to achieve compliance by agents to abandon their misbehaviour. However, despite the absolute power superiority of the US, due to its

democratic system it has difficulty in implementing a total war to coerce behavioural change in an adversary.  

Therefore, the US started to implement coercive diplomacy as the core of its compliance strategy. This involves forceful persuasion utilizing every kind of inducement except total war. As a result, scholars of international relations and politics started to examine the policies of strong states that attempt to solve international conflict and security threats by means of compellence. This has led academic research to take on the study of coercive diplomacy.

It is an admitted fact that coercive diplomacy is practised in relation to many global security issues. The statement by Jeff Rathke, Acting Deputy Spokesperson, that “Sanctions will be suspended in a phased manner upon verification that Iran has met specific commitments under a finalized joint comprehensive plan of action” shows that the recently agreed Iran nuclear deal is also within the framework of coercive diplomacy. The JCPOA is a phased process of providing inducements to achieve compliance by Iran. If Iran’s behavioural change – dismantlement of its nuclear weapon capability – stops, economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure and possible military intervention will be triggered to compel it to proceed with this dismantlement.

As has been witnessed in the cases of various security issues such as ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian war, the nuclear programmes of North Korea, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Libya, the US uses coercive diplomacy to achieve compliance with its demands. However, previous studies on US coercive diplomacy have only focused on US coercive inducements and their effectiveness without evaluating the coercees’ counter-strategies against US coercion. Implementation of counter-measures by adversaries to offset the coercer’s coercion makes it difficult to achieve the objective of coercive diplomacy.

If the counter-strategy of the coercee is not treated as an independent variable in research on US security policy and strategy, the validity and utility of US coercive

diplomacy on particular issues cannot be understood or evaluated. Since the utility of coercive diplomacy is relative, the coercer’s coercive diplomacy cannot achieve its objective – behavioural change by the coercee – if it fails to evaluate the aims of the coercee’s counter-coercive strategy and the strength of its resistance to the inducements of coercive diplomacy. Moreover, in the case of US coercive diplomacy, countries that attempt to check and balance US unipolar hegemony such as China, Russia and regional hegemons degrade and limit the US coercion. Thus, the US has to consider how this strategic environment influences the process before implementing its coercive diplomacy.

As previous studies on US coercive diplomacy have failed to examine the mutual contention between the coercer and coerce in the complex dynamics of the strategic environment, this chapter will revisit the concept and theory of coercive diplomacy to build a theoretical framework and model for further research on strategy towards nuclear non-proliferation.

3.2 Literature Review: Coercive Diplomacy Theory

Despite decades of research on coercive diplomacy, there are many areas which are unexplored and in need of consensus, in particular the mutuality of coercive diplomacy and the linkage between deterrence and compellence. These are the two major issues that need to be examined for a clear understanding of coercive diplomacy.

In most security conflicts, reciprocal bargaining takes pace to achieve the desired outcome for each participant. Thus, during the bargaining or negotiation process, the participants skilfully utilize exploitation of potential force to achieve their objectives. Scholars understand that this process of strength and power is used as a diplomatic tool to compel adversaries.141 However, the heavy focus and reliance on deterrence during the Cold War prevented any comparative analysis linking deterrence to compellence.

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Naturally, reciprocal bargaining and the mutuality of coercive diplomacy was also overlooked in research.

The end of the Cold War led to a second wave of studies on compellence strategies and coercive diplomacy. Alexander George, Peter Vigo Jakobson, Lawrence Freedman, Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman and Robert J. Art investigated the concept and the detailed logic of coercive diplomacy, including the mutual aspect of coercion. This chapter will focus on research by previous scholars to clarify the theory and model of mutual coercive diplomacy which will be employed as the theoretical framework in the present study.

3.2.1 The Concept of Coercive Diplomacy

In order to understand coercive diplomacy, it is crucial to differentiate between the concepts of compellence and deterrence, which are both sub-concepts of coercion. They may seem very similar at first glance, since both of these concepts contain the use of force or the threat of using force against an opponent to achieve the results desired by the coercer. According to John Rothgeb, the crucial difference between the two lies in the time order of who initiates the action – the coercer or the coercee. If one tries to coerce or compel an opponent, it means an attempt at aggression or a threat has been made by the opponent or is in the process of being made. Therefore, in general, the coercer takes the initiative in executing the next move. In deterrence, on the contrary, the coercer is satisfied with the behaviour of the opponent and wants to maintain the status quo by preventing any aggression or change in its behaviour. Thus, it is the opponent or future coercee that has the ball in its court, so to speak, and thus is the one that has the initiative to reply.142

An attempt to find the difference between compellence and deterrence is also seen in Thomas Schelling’s *Strategy of Conflict*. He sees it as the “difference between inducing inaction and making someone perform,” classifying the former as deterrence and latter

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as compellence. Unlike deterrence, compellence is a concept that contains the active use of violence. In other words, compellence is the use of threats or force to make an opponent stop an action that has already been started, or to perform an action that the coercer wants.

Schelling’s classification of deterrence and compellence can also be found in his other book, *Arms and Influence*. Here, he defines deterrence as a “threat intended to keep an adversary from doing something.” This is a passive concept: a certain party or state makes a threat of action in order to deter an opponent from performing a certain act. In contrast, compellence is a more active concept: the coercer takes the initiative, forcing the opponent to change or stop its behaviour against its will.

The success of deterrence can be measured by a certain behaviour not being performed by the opponent, and the success of compellence can be measured by how quickly and accurately the opponent changes its behaviour to conform with the coercer’s wishes.

![Figure 3-1] Comparison between deterrence and compellence

Robert J. Art “The four foundations of force”, p. 135

Figure 3-1 shows Robert J. Art’s diagrammatic illustration of Schelling’s concept. In deterrence, A is not showing any aggression that is unacceptable to B. Being satisfied with the situation and wanting to maintain the status quo, B threatens or warns A that it will retaliate if there is a shift or attempt by A bringing any aggression to this status quo.

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As a result, A does not change its behaviour and stays the same.

In contrast, in compellence, A is performing or has already performed a certain behaviour that is not tolerable for B. Thus, B takes action to threaten A to stop or change its behaviour. As a result, A stops the threat or aggression that had been intolerable to B and B also stops coercing A.

Schelling defines coercion as including concepts of both deterrence and compellence. Coercive diplomacy, while sharing some similarities with the concept of compellence, is not without its differences. Compellence does not distinguish between the offensive and defensive uses of coercion. Moreover, it relies on the offensive use of coercion. In contrast, coercive diplomacy is the defensive use of strategy to persuade the opponent to comply. It emphasizes flexible diplomacy by executing reasonable persuasion, inducements and coercive threats.

The concept and theory of coercive diplomacy are based on the works of Alexander L. George. The logic is that “The diplomacy will be successful if demands on an adversary are backed with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be considered credible and potent enough to encourage compliance.” In other words, coercive diplomacy can be defined as “the use of forceful persuasion, military threats or limited reinforcement of military power to cause the adversary to expect sufficient costs and risks to cause him to stop what he is doing.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coercion</th>
<th>Deterrence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compendence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackmail</td>
<td>Coercive Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alexander L. George elaborated on compellence and built the concept of coercive diplomacy.

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148 Ibid, p.5.
diplomacy as is categorized in Table 3-1. He defined coercive diplomacy as a strategy of
defensive use of force in persuading the adversary. George criticizes Schelling’s concept
of compellence in that it includes coercive diplomacy, blackmail and sometimes the
concept of deterrence. For this reason, George uses the term ‘coercive diplomacy’
instead of compellence. According to George, the concept of coercive diplomacy
distinguishes between the uses of defensive and offensive coercion. With this distinction,
George asserts that in contrast to compellence, which mainly depends on offensive
coercion, coercive diplomacy includes not only coercive threats but also the possibility
of flexible diplomacy with reasonable persuasion and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{149}

Coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy, a non-military measure for the defender
when facing aggression from an adversary that encroaches upon its interests.\textsuperscript{150} As
Table 3-2 shows, George classified coercive diplomacy in 3 types: type A – persuading
the opponent to stop short of the goal; type B – persuading the opponent to undo the
action; and type C – persuading the opponent to make changes in its government or
regime.\textsuperscript{151}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Deterrence & Coercive Diplomacy & \\
\hline
 & Type A & Type B & Type C \\
Persuade opponent not to initiate an action & Persuade opponent to stop short of goal & Persuade opponent to undo action & Persuade opponent to make changes in government \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Three Types of Coercive Diplomacy}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{149} Ibid, p. 7
\textsuperscript{150} Alexander L. George states that “drawing a line,” “buying time to explore a negotiated system,”
“retaliation and reprisal” and “engaging in a test of capabilities” are the four other non-military strategies
apart from coercive diplomacy which are available for a “defender” when confronted by an adversary’s
attempt to change the status quo. Any of these four strategies may be preferable to an immediate resort to
coercive diplomacy.
\textsuperscript{151} Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” \textit{The Limits of Coercive
Peter Viggo Jakobson gives credit to George for bringing the concept of the ‘carrot’ to the conceptual framework of coercive diplomacy. Jakobson explains that there is a higher possibility of achieving coercive diplomacy when the carrot and stick go side by side, thus the concept of coercive diplomacy becomes more elaborate. In 1996, when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed inducement, which came from the concept of the carrot, to solve humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War era, it led to further discussion on the use of force and developed into the concept of coercive inducement. Coercive inducement is utilized to harmonize various diplomatic, economic and political means to achieve persuasion, unlike physical or military strikes.

As Table 3-3 shows, further studies classified inducement into three categories: coercive, persuasive and compensative inducement. Coercive inducement consists of violent coercion, which applies the use of limited force or the threat of using limited force and non-violent coercion, such as economic sanctions. Compensative inducement literally promises a reward as an inducement. Some examples of this could be providing a light water reactor to North Korea or offering enriched uranium to Iran. Lastly, persuasive inducement involves giving information or exchanging information to induce the adversary.

<Table 3-3> The Inducements in Coercive Diplomacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coercive Diplomacy</th>
<th>Coercive Inducement</th>
<th>Compensative Inducement</th>
<th>Persuasive Inducement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent coercion, Use of limited force, Air strikes</td>
<td>Non-violent coercion, Economic sanctions, Non-violent threats</td>
<td>Economic, political compensation</td>
<td>Providing new information, discussion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

152 Peter Viggo Jakobson, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, New York: S. Martin’s Press, p. 37.
The concepts of compellence, coercive diplomacy and coercive inducement involve the use of threats or force and include non-military means to make an opponent stop an action it has already started, or to take an action it is not willing to take. If deterrence is to prevent things which an actor does not want from the opponent, compellence, coercive diplomacy and coercive inducement are to focus on the object that the coercer wants from the coercee.\textsuperscript{156}

### 3.2.2 Variants of Coercive Diplomacy

Alexander George created a framework of four variant models that policymakers could employ in using coercive diplomacy:

1) Try-and-See approach. This represents the first component of the ultimatum variant, “a demand on the opponent.” There is no set time limit, no sense of urgency conveyed. Instead, the coercer makes a single threat or takes a single action “to persuade the opponent before threatening or taking another step.”

2) Gradual turning of the screw. This is similar to the try-and-See method in that it makes a threat but “relies on the threat of a gradual, incremental increase of coercive pressure rather than threatening large-scale escalation to strong, decisive military action if the opponent does not comply.”\textsuperscript{157}

3) The Tacit Ultimatum. This is similar to an ultimatum except that it does not set out an explicit time limit or punishment. However, the actor or actors and the opponent both believe that the situation is escalating into a crisis. Thus, tension increases.

4) The Ultimatum. “A demand on the opponent, a time limit or sense of urgency for compliance with the demand and a threat of punishment for noncompliance” are applied to the matter and substantial coercion is under operation.\textsuperscript{158}


The coercer can change its approach during the process depending on whether the crisis escalates or settles down. It can begin with the try-and-see approach and move immediately to the ultimatum, or move from the try-and-see approach to a gradual turning of the screw to the ultimatum. Coercive diplomacy is a form of persuasion and bargaining in a crisis. Therefore, one cannot say that a strong hardcore variant contributes more to solving problems.\textsuperscript{159}

The use of military force is only limited for the purpose of threats or setting an example. Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic and political effort to solve a crisis; the role of military action is to build credibility and to show the coercer’s intention to mobilize a bigger force if necessary. The use of total force or of force that will escalate into war means that coercive diplomacy has failed. Moreover, the use of military force is not always required in coercive diplomacy. Peter Viggo Jakobson considers that Western powers will only resort to using military force and military threats when their interests are challenged by a serious menace or if there is a greater possibility of success and few casualties are expected.\textsuperscript{160}

The nuclear strategies and programmes of Iran and North Korea also developed through stages such as these with changes in the US coercive diplomacy. This thesis will examine how the two countries responded and proceeded under US coercive diplomacy. It will follow the strategies of three US administrations and reveal how each is different from the other.

3.2.3 Contextual Variables of Coercive Diplomacy

Alexander L. George states that as “coercive diplomacy is highly context-dependent, many different variables can affect the variant of the strategy the policymaker selects, its


\textsuperscript{160} Peter Viggo Jakobson, “Chapter 7: Conclusion”, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, New York: S. Martin’s Press, p. 130-134.
implementation, and its outcome.” To apply coercive diplomacy to a particular crisis, five contextual variables need to be considered:

1) The global strategic environment. A particular regional crisis might be affected significantly or occasionally; another crisis or conflict may be accorded a higher priority.

2) Type of Provocation. A clear attempt at violation and flagrant disregard of international law by the opponent gives the coercer legitimacy. This is extremely helpful in obtaining international and domestic support. Moreover, it helps to cut off the opponent’s international backing or protection from its allies.

3) Images of war. The more horrible the images of war the crisis triggers, the more likely it will be that one or both sides avoid war and cooperate.

4) Unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is likely to be more difficult to carry out when it is employed by a coalition of states than by a single government.

5) Isolation of the Adversary. The success of coercive diplomacy is more complex and more difficult when the adversary is not an isolated state but is diplomatically and militarily supported by allies.

As the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea were managed under US coercive diplomacy, the above-mentioned contextual variables affected both cases and the processes of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy. Since three US administrations attempted to apply coercive diplomacy to the nuclear proliferation of Iran and North Korea, understanding how these three administrations dealt with the above-mentioned contextual variables will shed light on why they achieved the outcomes that they did.

### 3.2.4 Conditions which Favour the Success of Coercive Diplomacy

In his book *Arms and Influence*, Tomas Schelling sets out five necessary conditions for

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the success of coercion: 1) the threat of coercion has to be forbidding enough to make
the opponent believe the cost of non-compliance will be great; 2) the threat to the
opponent has to be reliable; 3) the opponent needs time to comply and execute the
coercer’s request; 4) the coercer has to guarantee that surrender will not lead to more
requests to the opponent; and 5) the crisis or the circumstance of conflict will not be
recognized as zero-sum. Both coercer and adversary must be persuaded that negotiating
will bring more benefits than each pursuing their own interest through force. 162

Alexander L. George elaborates on Schelling’s work. Schelling’s five conditions were formed
through deductive reasoning, but George applies inductive methods to case studies and
identifies eight conditions for coercive diplomacy:

1) Clarity of objective – clarity about what is to be accomplished through coercive diplomacy.
This helps the policymaker decide among various options. Moreover, clarity of what is
demanded helps persuade the adversary.

2) Strength of motivation. The coercing power must be sufficiently motivated, and the
motivation must be strong enough to lead the crisis.

3) Asymmetry of motivation. It is essential to recognize that motivation is a two-sided matter.
It is more likely to be successful if the side employing coercion is more highly motivated than
its opponent by what is at stake in the crisis.

4) Sense of urgency. It is the opponent’s perception of the situation that is critical. If the
coercer has a great sense of urgency to achieve its object, it is more likely to generate a sense
of urgency that the opponent complies.

5) Strong leadership. – Decisions on coercive diplomacy and its implementation and results
depend to some extent on strong and effective top-level political leadership. The Cuban
missile is a good example.

6) Adequate domestic and international support. Since most strong states are democratic states,

a certain level of political support at home is needed to execute coercive diplomacy. International support is also an important factor. As NGOs and global organizations such as the UN have established, international support is a crucial factor for the success of coercive diplomacy.

7) Unacceptability of threatened escalation. The impact of coercive diplomacy is greater if the initial action and threat against the adversary arouse fear of an escalation to circumstances less acceptable than those promised if the adversary complies with the demands of the coercer.

8) Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis. Clarity of objectives and demands may not suffice. In some cases, it may also be necessary for the coercer to formulate specific terms regarding the termination of the crisis that both sides can agree on.163

Alexander L. George emphasizes asymmetry of motivation, sense of urgency and unacceptability of threatened escalation as particularly significant conditions among the eight: “coercive diplomacy is facilitated if the coercee believes that an asymmetry of motivation operates in favour of the coercing power, that it is really time-urgent to respond to the coercing power’s demands and that the coercing power will engage in escalation that would impose unacceptable costs.”164 Therefore, the goal of coercive diplomacy is to make the adversary come to the conclusion that the loss caused by non-compliance exceeds the interest incurred through confrontation.

On the basis of Schelling and George’s work, Victor Viggo Jakobson comes to four ideal conditions for performing successful coercive diplomacy: 1) the coercer has sufficient military force to take on the adversary in a short period of time with low costs; 2) the coercer should set a time limit for the adversary to comply or else the adversary will not trust its military threats; 3) a conviction that there will be no further demands after compliance – if the adversary thinks that there will be another request or demand after complying, the motivation to comply will be reduced; and 4) the adversary should be rewarded for compliance, thereby providing it with a carrot.

164 Ibid. p. 287.
However, it is not sufficient to claim that these conditions will lead to a success of coercive diplomacy. Since coencer and the adversary, or coercer, are not static actors, both change their strategies to maximize their interests through a contest of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy. Given this dynamic nature of coercion, coercive threats should not be taken as single discreet events with a linear logic. Moreover, a coercive contest should be considered a series of actions and counter-actions, which are not only based on and anticipate each other but also other changes in the security environment.165

3.2.5 Coercive and Counter-Coercive Diplomacy

As mentioned in the introduction, for successful coercive diplomacy one should consider the mutuality of coercion. No unilateral coercive diplomacy operates in the real world. Regardless of the asymmetry of power, most coercees have resource to executing counter-coercion. Therefore, the coercee also executes its counter-coercive diplomacy to implement measures to change the coencer’s behaviour and coercion during contention over a crisis. Thus, the contention of the coencer and coercee are reciprocally formed. This mutual dynamic of coercion has been studied and identified in Lawrence Freedman’s *Strategic Coercion* and the co-work by Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman: *The dynamics of Coercion*.

3.2.5.1 Strategic Coercion

Strategic coercion is a term that Lawrence Freedman employed to distinguish his theory from those of other scholars. According to Freedman, strategic coercion is a fundamental concept underlying any strategy that uses threats or coercion as a means to influence another’s decision. He defines strategic coercion as the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices.166 The key to strategic coercion is an awareness of the fact that the coercee that has to face the strategic coercion also has strategic alternatives: the coercee in strategic coercion is not a guinea pig in a science lab whose behaviour depends on the coercion of the coencer.

According to Freedman, the coercee can either agree with the demands of the coercer or deny them. Moreover, the coercee may also ask or counter-coerce the coercer to amend its demand. ‘Strategic coercion’ thus clarifies the bidirectional nature of coercion when it comes to the actual implementation of state policy. This reinforces the value of examining the contention process of coercion for an accurate analysis since coercer and coercee that initiate and receive the coercion are simultaneously playing both roles.\textsuperscript{167} The coercer imposes a cost for resistance and non-compliance on the coercee but the coercer also has to pay the enforcement costs of the coercion. Moreover, the coercee can execute counter-coercion to increase the enforcement costs to the coercer and also reduce its own non-compliance costs, thus attempting to achieve the compliance of the coercer with its objectives or manipulate the coercion of the coercer.

In a conflict or crisis, even if the coercer’s coercion has been well-planned to harmonize with all the conditions favourable for successful coercive diplomacy and the coercee is fully aware of this situation, coercion is not the only variable in strategic coercion. It is just one of the factors or variables that will be considered by the coercee to decide on compliance or refusal to comply with the demands of the coercer. Other than the coercer’s coercion, the coercee also considers other important variables, such as its national interest in the particular issue, domestic support, international relations and the dynamics of the issue etc. Thus, the best standpoint for analysing the consequences of strategic coercion is to examine the contention or the crisis with a balanced perspective on the two sides. One factor is the ‘asymmetry of motivation’ between the coercee and coercer who are dealing with the specific issues that have triggered the crisis and the contention. Another factor is the agents’ capability and their positions within the international balance of power.\textsuperscript{168} Thus, the most efficient way to strengthen their positions is for the coercer and coercee to either initiate coercion or counter-coercion. Both need to obtain the support of other international agents support for their side. This is similar to Alexander George’s ‘adequate international support’ condition.

As in the previous work by Schelling and George, Freedman also sees deterrence and

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid, pp. 13-14.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid, p. 14.
compellence as sub-concepts of coercion. Unlike the coercive diplomacy of Alexander George, Freedman includes the concept of deterrence in strategic coercion. However, although George clearly distinguishes between compellence and deterrence, he does not rule out the use of deterrence within coercive diplomacy. Deterrence in strategic coercion has some resemblance to the ‘try-and-see’ approach of George’s coercive diplomacy, where the coercer waits to see how the coercee responds or behaves when a crisis is initiated as a result of the coercee’s breach of the status quo. Compellence in the concept of strategic coercion is a continuous threat or coercion by the coercer to achieve the compliance of the coercee.169

The design of the threat and the demands made is assumed to support the will of agents to reflect a broader political relationship between the coercer and the coercee, and cannot be expected to serve as the only influence on this relationship. While Schelling and George clearly point out an important feature by linking coercion with diplomacy and away from the supposed concerns of traditional military strategy, the distinction between an apolitical use of ‘brute’ force and a highly political use of threatened ‘exemplary’ force is troublesome.

Freedman’s concept of strategic coercion is made much clearer as it distinguishes between ‘control’ and ‘coercion.’ The concept of control does not acknowledge choice by the coercee. That is, it puts the coercer in an overriding position that cannot be challenged through any choice of the coercee. However, in strategic coercion the coercee also has options. Coercion works and influences interactively through the agents’ choices. As Table 3-4 shows, Freedman uses the concept of strategic coercion to stress this mutuality and distinguish his theory from the concepts of coercion, compellence and coercive diplomacy.

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### Table 3-4: Concepts which use threats as tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Coercion</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compellence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Coercive Diplomacy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coercive Inducement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Compensative Inducement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent coercion, use of limited</td>
<td>Non-violent coercion, economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>force, air strikes</td>
<td>sanctions, non-violent threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic, political compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide new options, exchange opinions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.5.2 Pressure Points and Escalation Dominance

Matthew Waxman and Daniel Byman introduce the concept of pressure points and escalation dominance, which are crucial in the analysis of the contention between coercion and counter-coercion.\(^{170}\) Coercion may be successful when the coercer finds a pressure point of the coercee and efficiently threatens that point. For instance, if the target regime or government is founded around a certain tribe, political party or specific elite group, it will be pressure points. When a threat to a pressure point continues, such as one against the interests and lives of the elite group – e.g. continual air strikes – the opponent might comply with the coercer’s demand so as to not lose control of its power. However, the opponent can also use the same concept. Occasionally, the characteristics of US coercive diplomacy are used by opponents as pressure points. Byman and Waxman point out five characteristics of US coercive diplomacy that erode the credibility of coercion and limit US capability: 1) a preference for multilateralism; 2)

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sensitivity to casualties; 3) an aversion of domestic public opinion to suffering by target-state citizens; 4) dependence on advanced technology to reduce American casualties; and 5) observance of international regulations. Many case studies on the crisis management of US coercive diplomacy show that its opponents are already aware of these characteristics and use them in their counter-coercion as pressure points.  

The ‘escalation of dominance’ can be easily explained as an absolute superiority of the coercer. It means the coercer has to be more capable than the coercee under any circumstance during escalation of the contention. This means that any form of escalation which the coercee could achieve through counter-coercion will not affect the coercer. The success of coercion or coercive diplomacy can be achieved when the coercer maintains superiority in escalation dominance. The most successful results will be reached if the coercer simultaneously increases its threat against the opponent and offsets the opponent’s ability to counter-coerce and threaten. International isolation, economic sanctions, support for rebel groups, air strikes and invasion can be used as means of coercion.

The theoretical framework for the present research includes the coercion theories of Schelling, George, Jakobson, Freedman, Byman and Waxman in their entirety. Thus, the use of diplomatic coercion theory in this research does not refer to the work of any particular scholar. Using this comprehensive theoretical framework based on the work of previous scholars, a contention model of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy will be applied to the case studies in the thesis to examine US coercive diplomacy.

3.3 Methodology and Modelling of Coercive Diplomacy

3.3.1 Methodology

Related concepts and propositions are systematically assembled to form a theory to explain certain behaviour in a given environment. A proposition is a construct of several

concepts and theory is an assembly of several such propositions. Therefore, since a theory represents a composition of many propositions and concepts in a system, theory is more comprehensive and complex than hypotheses and propositions. 172 Those who are not familiar with scientific research perceive theory as mere ‘speculation.’ However, theory is essential to substantiate happenings in reality. Well-defined theories are established through positivist examination and experiment to prove their value in reality. 173 Kurt Lewin emphasizes the importance of bridging theory and reality by stating “no theory could exist without reality and no reality could be constructed without theory.” Theory therefore has a critical role in social and political science research. 174 However, no theory is absolute all proven theories need to be developed to achieve higher validity in explaining their subject matters.

Coercive diplomacy theory is based on the realism of international politics. Realism assumes the state is the single most important actor that has clear sovereignty. Thus, the agent in a coercive diplomacy model is the state and the analysis has to take a state-centric view. Since realism presumes the state is a rational actor that seeks maximization of profit, the coercive diplomacy model also assumes that state behaviour is utility maximization. Moreover, since realism presumes a state of anarchy in international relations, coercive diplomacy theory embraces anarchy as the basic ‘strategic environment’ in which the coercer and coercee are considered when implementing their coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy.

Coercive diplomacy is a theory that the coercer, which has asymmetrically more power, uses diplomatic coercion in order to induce the adversary to change behaviour to comply with its demands without engaging in a war. The coercer forcefully persuades the coercee that complying with the coercer’s demands is more profitable than taking a risk and paying the cost of non-compliance with the coercer’s coercion. Since coercive diplomacy theory assumes the coercee is also a rational actor that seeks utility maximization, the coercee would not make any choice that is unprofitable.

This research proceeds by means of a comprehensive coercive diplomacy model which is based on the theories of coercion, coercive diplomacy and mutual coercion. There have been a number of studies and articles which try to explain international conflict using the concepts of coercion and coercive diplomacy. However, few previous scholars have developed coercive diplomacy theory. Thomas C. Schelling, Alexander L. George, Lawrence Freedman, Peter V. Jakobsen, Daniel L. Byman, and Matthew C. Waxman are among the few who have developed the concept of coercion into more of a theory. Schelling separates coercion and deterrence to emphasize the differences between containment and compellence. Alexander L. George and Peter V. Jakobsen contribute by adding the concept of inducement. Finally, Lawrence Freedman, Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman bring understanding of mutuality in coercion. In a crisis environment, the coercion never works in one way. Although the mutuality of coercion is not completely neglected in academia, most studies of coercive diplomacy tend to focus on strong states and the coercer’s policy to investigate what can be done to achieve the compliance of the coercee. This thesis has the aim of analysing diplomatic disputes over proliferation by the ‘axis of evil’ by inputting both the coercer and the coercee into a ‘contention model of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy’ in order to gain clearer understanding of state coercion.

The scope of this study is limited to the 20 years of contention using coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy between the US and North Korea and between the US and Iran after the end of the Cold War. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the US rise as a unipolar state produced a clear asymmetry of power, it was a rational choice for the US to project its power on issues that could affect its national interests. As coercive diplomacy theory focuses on diplomatic efforts by strong states to solve disputes without actually engaging in war under circumstances of a clear asymmetry of power, the cases of Iranian and North Korean nuclear development naturally fit into the model.

Since there is a clear asymmetry of power in the contention over the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran, the US generally takes the initiative on the issue. Moreover, it is the US that wanted to stop the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea and initiated the coercion on both countries to suspend or dismantle their nuclear programmes. Thus, in the coercive diplomacy model of the contention between the US
and Iran and North Korea, it is US demands that determine the contention.

A change in the coercer’s demand means a change of phase in the contention. For instance, at the beginning of the second nuclear crisis with North Korea, the US focused on the North Korean highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme and demanded North Korean CVID. The result of the contention was the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and an end to its nuclear suspension. Therefore, the US changed stance and demanded that North Korea take part in six-party multilateral talks. North Korea resisted by demanding the bilateral talks. This phase of contention ended with North Korea accepting the six-party talks. Of course, persuasive and compensative inducement also helped achieve the compliance of North Korea.

When the coercer makes a demand and coerces the coercee to change, the contention begins. Phase one of the contention ends when the demand of the coercer results in either 1) compliance by the coercee; 2) compromise with an alternative; or 3) non-compliance by the coercee. If the coercer begins offering different inducements – more severe sanctions, a compensative economic package, or both, or even a small change in the demand – it is the beginning of a new phase of contention. By dividing the contention into phases in this way, one can evaluate and analyse whether the coercive diplomacy is a failure or success and what can be changed to achieve better implementation of state policy.

The analysis in this research looks at the administrations of Clinton, Bush and Obama. Even though the study examines the detailed phases of the contention process using its coercive diplomacy model and not the strategy of each administration as a whole, changes of personality of foreign policy officials and governmental elites is surely an important factor that influences a state’s foreign policy. Thus, this division based on leadership change in the coercer can clearly reveal consistency in US non-proliferation policy and coercive diplomacy and the validity of using the coercive diplomacy model in the methodology of the thesis. It has been particularly widely used in international politics. For instance, state behaviour is commonly analysed in terms of ‘doctrine’ on the basis of official statements, government policy reviews, media interviews etc. Therefore, while using the coercive diplomacy model as its main methodology, the thesis uses
content analysis to build a model of the coercive diplomacy in each phase of contention.

To carry out this analysis using the coercive diplomacy model, this study mainly collects and references US official government statements, reports and official policy reviews, North Korean and Iranian official government statements and statements by state-owned news agencies in these countries, and official statements and reports by the IAEA and the UN. As ancillary reference data, various US think tank and newspaper/broadcast media reports will be utilized.

### 3.3.1.1 Data collection

Content analysis is defined as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context”. Content analysis particularly has been widely used in international politics. For instance, the state behaviour is commonly analysed with the ‘Doctrine’ based on the official statement, policy reviews of government, interview with media and etc. Thus, while using the coercive diplomacy model as a main methodology of the dissertation, it uses content analysis to build the coercive diplomacy model in each phased of contention.

To carry out such analysis with the coercive diplomacy model, this research mainly collects and references the US government’s official statements, reports, official policy reviews, the North Korean and Iranian government’s official statements, statements of state owned news agencies of those countries and the official statements and reports of IAEA and UN. Also, as an ancillary data, various data from US think tanks and newspaper/ broadcast media of states that could help analyse conditions of Iran and North Korea will be utilized as reference data.

### 3.3.1.2 Research Question and Hypothesis

A lack of understanding of the decision-making process in compellence and coercive diplomacy is caused by discrepancies between the theory and actual implementation of

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state coercive policy. Thus, under the hypothesis that misunderstanding of compellence and coercive diplomacy theory causes failure of US strategy against nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, the thesis will examine the following questions. How did the US coercive diplomacy after the Cold War influence the nuclear strategies of Iran and North Korea? How did the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea progress despite US coercive diplomacy? And what caused the failure of the US coercive diplomacy against nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea?

3.3.2 The Contention Model of Coercive and Counter-Coercive Diplomacy

A theoretical model is a structure or a system based on a specific theory to examine behaviour or happenings in reality. If the purpose of theory is to explain phenomena in the real world, a social scientific model makes a representation of these phenomena based on the related theory. The theoretical model examines the variables that are related to certain actions and analyses how they influence agents to produce a certain result or phenomenon. For instance, a marketing manager uses a theoretical model to evaluate how spending from an annual budget influenced sales profit and growth in the market in a designated period. Another example is weather forecasting, where the direction and intensity of wind, temperatures, levels of humidity and barometric air pressure are put into a theoretical model to predict future weather patterns.

A theoretical model is highly efficient to understand the subjects of social and political science. Therefore, various theoretical models such as path models, network models, mathematical models etc. have been created to analyse the actions of agents in reality. All theoretical models have descriptive, predictive and normative forms to clarify the related theory. That is, a theoretical model captures the variables in a theory and relates them to show how they lead to a certain action or phenomenon.
As described in Figure 3-2, the development of a theoretical model includes inductive and deductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning begins an observation, which leads to a question of “why this has happened?” In order to derive an answer to the question, a hypothesis is needed to draw a provisional conclusion. The theory and the theoretical model test the hypothesis reach a scientifically verified conclusion through deductive reasoning based on logic and the evidence. Therefore, this chapter will construct a theoretical model of coercive diplomacy to examine US non-proliferation policy towards Iran and North Korea in the following chapters.

3.3.2.1 Coercive Strategy of the Coercer

In order to perform a precise analysis of a state’s foreign policy by applying coercive diplomacy theory, it is necessary to consider the coercive diplomacy of the coercer, the counter-coercive diplomacy of the coercee, the neighbouring states, and any important agent that has influence on the subject matter as independent variables. The dependent variables are the consequences of the contention resulting from the independent valuables. Resolution, the status quo and escalation of a crisis are the possible results which can be expected. Thus, the coercive diplomacy model which will be applied to analyse the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea will be built on comprehensive knowledge and concepts from previous studies of coercive diplomacy.

Following Alexander George’s coercive diplomacy concept, a coercer first has to decide which type of coercive diplomacy it will implement towards the coercee: type A –
persuading the opponent to stop short of its goal; type B – persuading the opponent to undo an action; or type C – persuading the opponent to make changes in its government or regime. The type of coercive diplomacy can change as the coercive diplomacy proceeds. This is because coercive diplomacy is kinetic and changes according to the consequences of the contention between coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy.

Alexander George’s eight conditions favourable for the success of coercive diplomacy will also be included in the coercive diplomacy model in order to explain how they influence the contention process and its results. It is certain that the eight conditions are influential on the implementation of the coercive diplomacy towards Iran and North Korea and a lack of certain favourable conditions would be fatal for the success of US coercive diplomacy. However, since not all the conditions need to be considered in each phase of the contention process, they will only be included when necessary.

Five contextual variables that have an impact on the contention between coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy are also included in the model: the global strategic environment; the type of provocation; images of war; unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy; and isolation of the adversary. As Alexander L. George states, coercive diplomacy is highly context-dependent. These five variables can affect the policymakers of the coercer and coerceree in selecting and implementing policy. To take the example of global strategic environment, when the Bush administration gave the Saddam regime in Iraq an ultimatum and there was military intervention in 2003, the global strategic environment was not supportive of Iran and North Korea. The cost of resistance or counter-coercive diplomacy could lead to military intervention. Therefore, North Korea and Iran had to maintain low profiles and remain compliant with the US. However, when in 2008 there was a financial crisis that shook the US, the Bush administration could not afford new expenditure on engaging in another international affair, or even maintaining its policy. Therefore, the global strategic environment was more favourable for Iran and North Korea to implement their counter-coercive diplomacy. The Bush administration had no option but to tone down its so-called ‘pure coercion’ coercive diplomacy and initiated the six-party talks with North Korea which had been put on hold since the administration had set the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programme as a precondition for any dialogue. The coercer’s coercive diplomacy can be described
as in Figure 3-3 below.

(Figure 3-3) The Coercive Diplomacy of a Coercer

When coercive diplomacy is implemented, the coercer considers the contextual variables and conditions that favour the success of its coercive diplomacy and then selects the type of coercive diplomacy and inducements to coerce the coercee. During the process of coercion, the coercer examines and deploys four variants of coercive diplomacy to implement more effective coercion: try and see; gradual turning of the screw; tacit ultimatum; and ultimatum.

3.3.2.2 Counter-Coercive Strategy of the Coercee

The objective of the coercer in implementing coercive diplomacy is to maximize the cost of non-compliance to the coercee. Therefore, the coercer uses both a carrot and a stick, compensative and punitive inducements, to convince the coercee that compliance with the coercer is much more beneficial and rational. By showing the clear asymmetry between the cost of non-compliance and the consequence of compliance, coercive diplomacy induces the coercee to comply.

In contrast, the goal of the coercee and of counter-coercive diplomacy is to maximize the enforcement cost to the coercer, which will hinder the execution of coercive
diplomacy. Moreover, the coercer tries to minimize the cost of non-compliance which will be imposed on it during the coercion.

The strategy of counter-coercive diplomacy is to defend or expand the coercer’s main objective during the contention of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy. Just as the coercer sets the objectives of its coercive diplomacy, the coercer also sets the aims of its counter-coercive diplomacy and accordingly plans how it will be implemented. If the coercer evaluates the demands of the coercer as unacceptable, it also implements carrots and sticks, compensative and punitive inducements, to counter-coerce the coercer. The inducements of counter-coercive diplomacy aim to maximize enforcement costs and minimize non-compliance costs.

For example, when the US demanded the complete verifiable irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the North Korean nuclear programme, North Korea counter-coerced the US coercion by utilizing its carrot and stick. By freezing its nuclear programme and allowing an IAEA inspection, it reduced the possible cost of non-compliance with the US coercion. Since North Korea made a favourable gesture, it became difficult for the US to raise the level of the coercion, which meant lowering the non-compliance cost to North Korea. On the other hand, North Korea also revealed its missile and nuclear capabilities and added in conventional weapon provocation to raise the enforcement cost of the US coercive diplomacy. If the deterrence level of North Korea escalated, it meant the enforcement cost which the US had to pay for its coercion rose. Although it was North Korea that was forced to comply, it also had its own coercive and compensative inducements in its counter-coercive diplomacy.

The coercer uses two implementation strategies to maximize the enforcement cost to the coercer and minimize the non-compliance cost to itself. There are two typical methods for maximizing the enforcement cost of the coercer. First, it has to show a strong ‘sense of urgency’ in its counter coercion. Coercive diplomacy includes military threats and a limited use of military force. Therefore, if the coercer is not willing to resist military action or the coercer’s threats, a counter-coercive diplomacy cannot exist. The latter is effective when the coercer shows its willingness to make total war or to cause a high level of military conflict that the coercer is not willing to afford. If the coercer sustains
the credibility of its implementation of a high enforcement cost on the coercer by showing willingness to take military action which the coercer cannot manage, it displays ‘strength of motivation’ not to comply with the coercive diplomacy. If this happens, the coercee has leverage on the escalation dominance of the coercer, which is a crucial element for the success of coercive diplomacy.

The second method is to raise the enforcement cost. When contention between coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy occurs, the coercee can reveal or develop its ability to raise the cost of implementing coercive diplomacy. Missile development and the revelation of the nuclear enrichment programmes of Iran and North Korea are good examples. As the ability of the coercee increases, the enforcement cost to the coercer of implementing and sustaining the coercive diplomacy increases as well.

A second implementation strategy of counter-coercive diplomacy is to minimize the non-compliance cost to the coercee. By minimizing the pressure of coercive diplomacy, the coercee can manipulate the coercer’s coercion. There are also two methods of doing this. First, the coercee can decrease the legitimacy of the coercer’s coercive diplomacy. The coercer’s demand is the key element justifying its coercive diplomacy. If the coercive diplomacy has the right cause and objectives, it is highly likely to lead to the compliancy of the coercee. Therefore, the coercee provokes an argument over the legitimacy of the coercive diplomacy and reduce the justification for it in order to dampen the momentum and the power of the coercer’s inducement. When the coercee succeeds in showing that the coercive diplomacy lacks legitimacy, the coercee can portray the demand of the coercer as unilateral unbalanced oppression and request a compromise to sabotage the coercive diplomacy. The second method is to weaken the solidarity of the multilateral group involved in the coercive diplomacy. The coercee’s counter-coercive diplomacy can be described as in Figure 3-4 below.
‘Adequate international support’ is one of Alexander George’s eight crucial conditions that favour the success of coercive diplomacy. In a globalized world, no coercive diplomacy operates without multilateral participants. Therefore, the coercee utilizes its own diplomatic asset – international relations and mutual interests – to lead the contention between coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy as it wishes. In the cases of North Korea and Iran, a multilateral structure – P5+1 and the six-party talks – was also established and it became the theatre of contention for the coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy. Even before this structure or system was established, there were three-party talks on the first North Korea nuclear crisis and an EU3 dealing with the Iranian nuclear programme.

As mentioned above, coercive diplomacy cannot simply be described as a stick and a carrot. For an accurate assessment of coercive diplomacy, the participants, the strategic environment and various variants have to be considered. The contention between the coercive diplomacy of the coercer and the counter-coercive diplomacy of the coercee can then be analysed on the basis of these considerations. If the objective of the coercive diplomacy is not achieved as a result of the contention, or the contention escalates to all-out war, it is a failure on the part of the coercive diplomacy. The contention between the coercer and coercee can be modelled as in Figure 3-5 below.
3.3.2.3 Non-Proliferation and Coercive Diplomacy

Ever since a nuclear weapon was first used in World War II, its massive power of destruction and the swift way it brought the war to an end, in addition to fears of being attacked with nuclear weapons, enticed many countries to acquire nuclear armaments. These weapons were considered an optimal option by countries whose national security was exposed to great threats, regimes that feared subversion and countries that wanted to increase their status and political influence.

The motivation for a state’s nuclear armament has been analysed using three models: 1) the security model – a state builds nuclear arms to raise its capability of preventing any external threats, including a nuclear attack; 2) the domestic politics model – a state utilizes nuclear weapons as a political tool for domestic and bureaucratic reasons; 3) the norm model – a state wants to achieve modernity and identity through nuclear armament. 176 Many countries

such as South Africa, Libya, Ukraine, Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea attempted to obtain nuclear armaments or ability following these three models of motivation.

The US Government executed coercion and inducement in all these cases to prevent nuclear proliferation. However, it is difficult to analyse every case mentioned above in terms of coercive diplomacy due to differences in the backgrounds for each country. Moreover, the fact that the US used coercion and inducement as a diplomatic tool, and the amount of pressure and willpower being different for each country make it even harder to apply coercive diplomacy to each case. US coercive diplomacy was relatively weak in the cases of South Africa, Ukraine, Pakistan and India compared to Iran, North Korea, Libya and Iraq. Iran and North Korea are the only two countries left that are being subjected to ‘relatively intensive’ US coercive diplomacy.

In July 1985, President Reagan asserted that “The American people are not going to tolerate intimidation, terror, and outright acts of war against this nation and its people. And we’re especially not going to tolerate these attacks from outlaw states run by the strangest collection of misfits, loony tunes, and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich.”

However, it was the Clinton administration that elaborated on this concept. In 1994, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake labelled five regimes as ‘rogue states’: North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Iran and Libya. In theory, at least, to be classified as a rogue a state had to commit four transgressions: pursue weapons of mass destruction, support terrorism, severely abuse its own citizens, and stridently criticize the United States. Even though the concept of rogue states was abolished in the last six months of the Clinton administration, economic sanctions and coercive diplomacy towards the nuclear development of Iran and North Korea were maintained through the two terms of his regime.

Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, and his administration were much more hard-liners. The concept of ‘rogue states’ was replaced with the “axis of evil,” a label that befell three states: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. After the 9/11 Crisis, the US non-proliferation strategy, which was based on the concept of ‘contradiction of usage’, was that nuclear weapons could be developed and possessed but not used and the ‘balance of terror’ was changed to a counter-proliferation strategy. The Bush administration exercised more aggressive coercive diplomacy against Iran.

and North Korea.

When he was a democratic candidate in the presidential election, Obama proposed to negotiate with Iran using “big sticks and big carrots” to persuade the country’s leaders not to develop nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{178} However, after the inauguration, the Obama administration took the stance of using dialogue without military threats to solve issues. The administration attempted to change and tone down the policies of the Bush administration. Even though it was relatively weak compared to the previous one, the coercive diplomacy of Obama was operational. Iran and North Korea are still subject to economic sanctions and they are getting tougher. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, announced that it would exclude Iran and North Korea from any ‘negative security assurance’ and it would not remove the threat of using US nuclear weaponry on these two countries.\textsuperscript{179} The Obama administration maintained a framework of coercive diplomacy which is still coercing both countries.

The goal of coercive diplomacy is to achieve a state’s objective by diplomatic means without necessitating war. This means the objective of US coercive diplomacy on non-proliferation is to prevent Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons without going to war. However, the above-mentioned theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy introduced violent coercive inducements and the limited use of force or threats to use force as important means of coercion. Although Alexander L. George and Lawrence Freeman state that it is possible to use coercion without the use of military force, if the US could make a credible threat to use military force, which would impose an escalation of costs and a threat to Iran and North Korea, US coercive diplomacy against the nuclear development of these two countries would be much more effective.

North Korea’s long-lasting efforts to possess nuclear weapons and frequent requests for a non-aggression pact with the US reveal its fear of US military action against its regime. In addition, the routine denouncement, threats and provocation by North Korea against joint South Korean-US military exercises such as the Ulchi-Freedom Guardian and Key Resolve Force also show North Korea’s fears of the US military capability.\textsuperscript{180}

Distinguishing itself from North Korea, Iran is claiming to observe the NPT and to be exercising its right to a peaceful use of nuclear technology. In spite of the differences, Iran is not free from US military threats similar to those against North Korea. Iran has witnessed US invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, a strong alliance between the US and Pakistan and is also well aware of the close proximity of the US forces stationed in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain, as well as the naval fleets in the Straits of Hormuz. Whether Iran wants nuclear weapons or nuclear power is not clear. The Iranian authorities deny that they are seeking nuclear weapons for deterrence or retaliation since Iran’s level of technological progress cannot match that of existing nuclear weapon states. However, the fact that Iran wants to implement the Japanese nuclear programme model reveals its fear of a threat from the US military. Even without weaponization, pursing the Japanese model shows its ambition to use its nuclear capability as a strategic deterrent. Iran is unlikely to agree to a zero-enrichment policy because in doing so it would give up the most valuable bargaining chip it can bring to the table.

The non-proliferation of WMD and the management of international conflict are the two main concerns in America’s security strategy in the post-Cold War era. In terms of effectiveness, coercive diplomacy is the essence of crisis management after the rise of the US as the head state in the unipolar system. Coercive diplomacy supports a strategy of engagement, strategic coercion and any types of inducement that counter the proliferation of WMD.

The theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy is of much value to analyse the nuclear development of Iran and North Korea. An analysing the application of US coercive diplomacy to these two countries helps highlight the problems and provides some parameters for potentially more effective policies.

3.4 US Diplomatic Strategy and Coercive Diplomacy

In order to achieve an accurate analysis of US diplomacy toward the nuclear development of Iran and North Korea under the theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy, it is crucial to clarify the validity of coercive diplomacy in US diplomatic
strategy. For instance, if the US used an appeasement strategy to deal with the issue, it would make contradiction for applying coercive diplomacy as the theoretical framework as it would have no validity.

The US diplomatic strategy after the Cold War can be divided into four main types: appeasement, engagement, containment and isolation. Appeasement is a strategy used as a method of positive sanction. It is a strategy that applies the state’s territorial or geopolitical influence to the opponent in order to change its behaviour. Appeasement needs no consistent relationship or cooperation, and if it is executed one single time it can be called an appeasement strategy. The Munich Agreement in 1938 is a typical example.

Compared to appeasement, engagement is a gradual strategy and it brings change in the balance of politics, diplomacy, economics and the military. The state that exerts engagement is aware of this change and with this prospect implements its policy. Engagement emphasizes cultural, social and economic factors more than military ones. Through consistent relations and cooperation, engagement seeks change or maintains the opponent’s behaviour.

Containment is an aggressive strategy that prevents the geopolitical expansion and hinders the influence of the target state. Since a state can exchange and continue relationships in various fields with the target state while pursuing a containment strategy, containment is compatible with engagement. However, containment and an appeasement strategy cannot be concurrent with each other since they are contrasting concepts.

Isolation is the opposite to engagement. It involves cutting all relations with the target states to marginalize it. An appeasement strategy can be used with isolation due to its one-off use characteristic. This means that even if a state wants to isolate a target state, it can use an appeasement strategy to achieve its objective since appeasement is not a gradual or continuous strategy.

Thus, if the US sets its diplomatic strategy as containment or isolation, it is appropriate to analyse the US diplomacy within the theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy.
The problem is when the US uses appeasement or engagement. Since engagement and containment or isolation and appeasement can be used at the same time, it seems there is still room for coercive diplomacy. However, without strictly clarifying the relationship between these diplomatic strategies and coercive diplomacy, there will be many weaknesses in using coercive diplomacy as a theoretical framework for the study.

In the context of non-proliferation and the US diplomacy toward the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, appeasement cannot be used as a strategy. Thus, it is important to clarify the relationship between engagement and the use of coercive diplomacy. ‘Engagement’ is one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon. It may vary in meaning depending on the issues, circumstances, and the context of relations between the states.181

Many scholars have different views on how to define engagement. Randal Schweller states that engagement encompasses “any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of established order…it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target’s behaviour.”182 This is similar to Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George’s view in which engagement is seen as a policy of appeasement.183 Victor D. Cha sees engagement as a strong state using non-coercive and non-punitive inducements on the weak state to obtain its objectives.184 If a weak state uses non-coercive and non-punitive inducements on a strong states to change its behaviour as the weak state wishes, he sees it as appeasement. Richard Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan view engagement as the use of a positive incentive to achieve a goal, which does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: “Engagement implies a willingness to use positive incentives as a means of rewarding good behaviour and, to a certain degree, linking these incentives to other areas of behaviour.”185 Robert Litwak differentiates negative sanctions such as containment, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, limited and total war

from positive sanctions, defining the use of the latter as engagement. While the concept of engagement differs for each scholar, there is a common element. The strategy is to make the target state change its behaviour to that preferred by the state that performs the engagement. Chester A. Crocker defines engagement as “a process which involves exerting pressure, by raising questions and hypothetical possibilities, and by probing the other country’s assumptions and thinking.”\textsuperscript{186} In this comprehensive perspective, engagement needs coercive diplomacy as a sub-policy.

There are views that do not accept the coercive inducements of coercive diplomacy as means of engagement. However, as mentioned above, coercive diplomacy also includes non-violent and positive incentives such as persuasive and compensative inducement. Moreover, in the field of non-proliferation, the US administration will not tolerate any attempts by rogue states to pursue nuclear armament or capabilities. This is clearly stated in the series of US Nuclear Posture Reviews and Quadrennial Defence Reviews that were released after the Cold War. Therefore, whether it is the engagement and enlargement of the Clinton administration, the hawk engagement of the Bush administration or the cooperative engagement of the Obama administration, whether the dove or the have the initiative in the US administration, coercive diplomacy has a valid place in analysing US diplomacy when dealing with the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea.

\textbf{3.5 Conclusion}

After the demise of the bipolar system, a favourable international environment for applying coercive diplomacy began in the 1990s. Although the compellece literature has proven to be less rich and less cumulative than the ‘other side of the coin,’ deterrence, US administrations have implemented coercive diplomacy to induce their adversaries and to solve security threats to the US.

According to Robert Putnam, the leaders of states have to play a two-level game that simultaneously maximizes the national interest by negotiating with other state leaders at

the international level while persuading domestic interest groups to accept the result.

“All key player at the international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game board, and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat.”

The two-level game was also played in the US coercive diplomacy on the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. For instance, the Clinton administration had the opportunity to implement a great process to solve the North Korean nuclear program. However, due to opposition from domestic groups, it could not execute its policy. The Clinton administration failed to persuade the Republican statesmen who controlled the US congress, the media and even some groups within its administration. The enfeeblement of the support base for North Korean diplomacy led to questioning of the reliability of Clinton’s North Korean policy. It therefore resulted in a brinkmanship strategy by North Korea rather than compliance with the coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration.

The Bush administration also faced the same problem. Bush’s coercive diplomacy toward the North Korean nuclear programme was much more hardline than the strategy of the Clinton administration. However, after massive losses in the election for Bush’s second term, the administration had to tone down its coercive diplomacy as it was judged to only increase the nuclear ability of North Korea.

The Obama administration also implemented coercive diplomacy to deal with nuclear proliferation. Since it learned from the failures of previous administrations, Obama waited to pressure North Korea using strategic patience. However, when provocation by North Korea and disclosure of its nuclear ability brought about domestic pressure for more US engagement on the issue, the Obama administration had to change its policy.

Since the US domestic politics is important in forming foreign diplomacy, there are scholars who emphasize the domestic factor when analysing the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. However, as shown in this chapter, the US administrations consistently sustained coercive diplomacy toward the nuclear proliferation of North

Korea and Iran. Moreover, the theoretical model of coercive diplomacy brings room to examine the mutuality of coercion. The US domestic politic environments can be considered and analysed as strategic environments for the counter-coercive diplomacy of Iran and North Korea.

Although the level of coercive diplomacy changed according to domestic politics and the environment, the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations executed coercive diplomacy and North Korea and Iran counter-coerced the U.S. to achieve their goals. Through the contention of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea progressed. Therefore, this thesis focuses on analysing the nuclear strategies of Iran and North Korea under the US coercive diplomacy.

This chapter has reviewed the literature on diplomatic compellence to establish a theoretical framework and a model of coercive diplomacy which will be used in this study. It has also explained the validity of using coercive diplomacy in analysing the US policy toward the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. Moreover, by discussing the possible strategic stances of US foreign policy, it has demonstrated the existence of coercive diplomacy as the core US non-proliferation strategy after the Cold War. Chapters Four and Five will examine how US coercive diplomacy affected the nuclear programmes and nuclear strategies of Iran and North Korea and how the US policy failed in the mutual contention process of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy.
4. An Analysis of Diplomatic Contention between the US and Iran on Nuclear Nonproliferation after the Cold War

4.1 Introduction

Even without referring to the ‘Three Models’ of Scott D. Sago, it is not difficult to infer how nuclear weapons and its capabilities of the state are perceived as a symbol of prestige and power in international politics of anarchy. The nuclear yield of ‘Little Boy’ and ‘Fat Man,’ which ended World War II, later created a balance of power so-called ‘balance of terror’ and it becomes the concept of nuclear deterrence. Ironically, the redoubtable destructive power of nuclear weapon had restrained the war and waged the peace in severe political contention of the Cold War.

Admittedly, there are some scholars who question ‘nuclear deterrence’. John Mueller argued that the long sustained peace after the 1945 was due to the elevated ‘rational mind’ of the states that had experienced the catastrophic destruction through the previous two world wars. He asserted it was not the terror and destructive power of nuclear weapons that brought peace but the strong aversion from the international community that the war was used as a political tool.\(^{188}\) However, a majority of scholars reason that the existence of nuclear weapons was the major factor which prevented another world level military dispute during the fierce contention of the Cold War. Thus, this perception and the understanding of history still affect the analysis of the nuclear strategy of the states that are facing a security threat from the outside. Iran’s nuclear programme was not an exception.

Despite Iran’s proclamation of achieving the peaceful nuclear energy, the scholars and experts analysed and understood the purpose of Iran’s nuclear programme as the acquirement of nuclear deterrence against outside threats which does not necessarily means the nuclear armament like as Japan model.\(^{189}\) Nevertheless Iran officially announced its

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denial of nuclear armament and observed the NPT and IAEA safeguard agreement, which was clearly different from that of North Korea’s, this perception became the reason or at least a justification of why Iran had been imposed to economic sanctions of the international community.

Even when diplomatic relations was intimate with the West during Shah’s era, the concept of nuclear deterrence and Iran’s cognition on nuclear armament was publicly announced and disclosed by Shah himself as having, “No intention of acquiring nuclear weapons but if small states began building them, Iran might have to reconsider its policy.” In a declassified 1974 CIA report, the US, who was the biggest patron of Iran at the time, was also convinced if India was successful in nuclear armament, Shah would definitely be as well.190

In the early stages of the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini was against nuclear armament and any type of WMD since he interpreted it as un-Islamic. Thus, although Iran had suffered because of Saddam’s chemical attack and encountered the threat of national security in the Iran-Iraq War, Iran never utilized WMD against the Iraqi army. However, the Supreme Leader himself acknowledged the power of nuclear weapons as a nuclear deterrence.191 This perception was in line with the announcement of then Prime Minister, Mir-Hussein Mousavi, that Iran would restrain the use of its chemical weapons and other WMD, but there was also the possibility of using it in compelling situations.192

The intention of current Supreme Leader Khamenei on the nuclear programme is still controversial among experts. It is uncertain whether Khamenei is willing to build nuclear weapons or just to generate nuclear energy. That is, when viewed in an historic light, even if Iran’s nuclear programme might aim to achieve nuclear weapon capability, Iran perceives the development of a nuclear programme as a symbolic and practical deterrence power against

outside threats, not the actual use against the adversary.\textsuperscript{193}

Nevertheless substantial threats from the outside generated Iran’s ‘siege mentality’ and necessity of nuclear deterrence, any nuclear programme beyond the nonproliferation regime, NPT and IAEA safeguard agreement, could not be approved by the international community. However, the problem lies in the nuclear technology itself since there is no difference between the peaceful use of atomic energy and the nuclear weapon process. That is, there are no boundaries between a full-fledged nuclear programme for the peaceful use of atomic energy and the nuclear weapon programme. Although the IAEA put a cap of uranium enrichment to 20 present, the technology of producing a 20 percent enrichment of uranium and the over 90 percent of enriched fissile material are exactly the same. Therefore, restriction and the coercion of the US on Iran’s nuclear programme rely on its credibility and degree of its confidence on the Iranian government, not the level of Iran’s observance to the IAEA safeguard agreement.

Since Iran is currently a member state of NPT and observes its duty, such as allowing IAEA inspections and a six month pre-notice before the activation of nuclear facilities, the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme by accusing Iran as the proliferator of nuclear weapons has less legitimacy. As Mark Fitzpatrick stated, “Possessing an enrichment capability is not the same as having the Bomb. If enrichment alone conferred weapons status, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands and Brazil would be considered nuclear-weapons capable.”\textsuperscript{194} As such, the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme has had its limit from the beginning.

Prior to the 1979 revolution, the primary motive of Iran’s nuclear programme was to achieve its modernity and identity through nuclear development, the ‘norm model’. That is, through the progress of the nuclear programme, Iran wanted to strengthen its status as a technologically advanced regional hegemon. It was inline and fit harmoniously with


the ‘twin pillar’ policy of the US, who wanted to develop its Middle Eastern policy through Iran and Saudi Arabia as the central axis. However, it faced a dramatic change after the Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the theocratic state, Vila at-e Faqih. The elevated tension between the anti-western Khomeini regime and the US, followed by the Iran-Iraq War brought change in the perception of Iran’s nuclear programme. The changed environment pushed Iran’s nuclear programme to slant more towards a ‘security model’, which was to consider the nuclear programme of Iran as a nuclear deterrence. Moreover, the cutting of diplomatic ties and commercial trade with western countries, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War threatened Iran’s energy security by damaging self-sufficiency in its energy sector. Thus, the nuclear programme agenda became not only a security matter but an issue of domestic politics. With its various dynamics intertwined, Iran’s nuclear programme became a more difficult issue to be resolved.

There are three approaches to dealing with Iran's nuclear programme as such: 1) military action, including pre-emptive strikes, 2) the behavioural change of Iran through sanctions paired with containment and deterrence, which was the coercive diplomacy, and lastly, 3) learn to live with a nuclear capable Iran, with a full cycle nuclear programme or even nuclear weapons.195

The most hard-line policy proposal among the three groups is to solve Iran’s nuclear programme through military action, including pre-emptive strikes. According to Matthew Koenig, the level of Iranian nuclear capability is very high and if Iran succeeds in nuclear armament, it would degrade the US’ influence in the region and its Middle East policy, which would create turmoil on regional security. Moreover, he argues that nuclear Iran would ignite the nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Thus, since the cost of dealing with nuclear Iran is much more expensive, he claims it would be better to execute military operations to stop them, although it might cause collateral damage.196

Max Boot asserts ‘toothless diplomacy’ turned Iran closer to a nuclear state. He claims

195 Hossein Mousavian divided to 5 groups by including “Espionage and covert action to sabotage Iran nuclear programme” and “Diplomatic Solution”. However, the boundary of “covert action” and “diplomatic solution” is somewhat unclear or overlap with the coercive diplomacy; Hossein Mousavian, "The Iranian Nuclear Crisis; A Memoir", Carnegie Endowment, 2012, p. 5

air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities are the only option left for the US. Although he admits military intervention is hardly an ideal solution, a physical strike on Iran’s nuclear facility would guarantee years of setback on Iran’s nuclear programme, which diplomacy would not accomplish.

Norman Podhoretz assumed zero enrichment is the only condition for the P5+1 that would make Iran’s nuclear programme acceptable. However, since the possibility of Iran accepting zero enrichment is low, he claims the only viable means of stopping Iran’s nuclear programme is military action on Iranian nuclear facilities.197

Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisnstadt argued for the necessity of a military strike in ceasing Iran’s nuclear programme. Although it was hard to gauge the aftermath of military action on Iran, both asserted the US had to consider it seriously since a nuclear Iran would be a much more difficult opponent to manage. Moreover, they urged for a more severe economic sanction and pressure from the international community, since they insisted it would escalate the possibility of Iran’s nuclear dismantlement.198

However, for the decision maker, the execution of military operations to resolve Iran’s nuclear programme is not an easy task, since it is impossible to predict the results and the aftermath. Moreover, even if the military operation was successful as planned, it would not guarantee the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme. Contrary to expectations, there is the possibility of strengthening Iran’s consolidation of its nuclear programme, which would make it more difficult to resolve the case. In addition, since Iran has been protectively developing its nuclear programme after the 1986 air strike on the Bushehr nuclear power reactor during the Iran-Iraq War, many experts are sceptical that a military strike would result in success, like as the Operation Opera and Operation Orchard of 1981 and 2007. Even worse, military action could bring a breakdown of global solidarity against Iran’s nuclear programme. This might lead to an unfavourable environment and conditions for the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme.199

The other far sided group of experts suggest that the approval of Iran’s nuclear programme would be much more efficient in managing and resolving Iran’s nuclear programme. According to Kenneth N. Waltz, Israel’s nuclear monopoly in the region is no longer sustainable in the long term. He argues Israel’s nuclear arsenal is the main contributor of nuclear proliferation, not Iran’s desire to possess a nuclear programme or its weapon capability. He asserted that accepting nuclear weapons or a weapons capable Iran would bring much more stability in the region rather than prohibiting Iran’s nuclear programme.  

Barry R. Posen bolsters the argument of Kenneth N. Waltz by questioning the fears of the Middle East arms race, which might be initiated by Iran’s nuclear weaponization. He argues US military presence and capability in the Middle East is already sufficient to forestall a nuclear Iran. Paul Pillar also strengthened Waltz’s view on Iran’s nuclear programme by giving an example of a well-contained nuclear China under Mao’s rule.  

Robert D. Kaplan argued in his interview with Henry Kissinger that nuclear negotiation was a tactic of buying time rather than a symptom of reduced tension. For ‘revolutionary powers’ like Iran and North Korea, he understands the negotiation and treaty talks are a ‘concessionary phase in continuing struggle.’ In his interview, Kissinger stated, “Iran, merely by pursuing nuclear weapons, has given itself a role in the region out of proportion to its actual power, and it gains further by the psychological impact of its being able to successfully defy the United Nations Security Council.” Although Kissinger mentioned that he would try his best to stop nuclear Iran if he were in the position to be against the “ideologically and militarily challenges the Middle East order,” he did not believe nuclear Iran to be of the same threat as that of a nuclear Soviet Union during the Cold War.  

Moreover, Kissinger furthered his argument that Iran’s strategic interest should run parallel with the US, such as by limiting Russian influence in the Caucasus and Central

Asia, limiting the Taliban’s influence in Afghanistan, and establishing the stability of Iraq and Iran as a peaceful balancing power in the Sunni Arab world. With Kissinger’s interview, Kaplan asserted that strengthening the Shiite role in the Middle East would balance Sunni hostility, which degraded the US’ interest in the region. Moreover, since all options to stop nuclear Iran was at a high cost and the chance for success was poor, Kaplan argued the containment of nuclear Iran was the most sensible policy for the US.\(^{203}\)

However, nuclear Iran directly contradicts the nuclear policy of past US’ administrations and it is also remote from the Prague Doctrine of the US, which desired to accomplish a nuclear free world through the NPT and IAEA safeguard agreement. The idea by Kenneth Waltz of admitting a nuclear Iran seemed plausible under the concept of the balance of power, which prevailed widely in international politics. However, as Senator John McCain had said, “There is only one thing worse than military action against Iran, and that is a nuclear-armed Iran,” and the acceptance of a full-fledged Iranian nuclear programme meant the nuclear weapons capability was highly unlikely to happen in US foreign policy.

The last group is the happy medium of the two extremes mentioned above. They argue that a behaviour change by Iran through sanctions paired with containment, deterrence, and a coercive diplomacy will solve Iran’s nuclear programme. The majority of scholars and experts are in this group. Although while they admit coercive diplomacy is not the best choice, they argue it is the lesser evil among the other options the US could implement. Those are as followed:

Kenneth Pollack offers the triple track strategy as the most efficient way of dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme. He asserts the necessity of 1) keeping the door open for grand bargaining, 2) sustaining the Stick-and Carrot approach to induce Iran, and 3) preparing a well-schemed containment policy as a fall-back option.\(^{204}\) Although he addresses his policy proposal in a sophisticated way, the triple track strategy could simply be defined as a coercive diplomacy. As he stated, while none of the possible US options for Iran’s


\(^{204}\) Kenneth Pollack, “The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America”, Random House Publishing Group, New York, pp. 400-416
nuclear programme are good in the absolute sense of the word, he concluded that utilizing a ‘Stick and Carrot’ coercive diplomacy is ‘unquestionably’ the best choice among all the other bad options.  

Richard N. Haass argues for the necessity of immediate US engagement on Iran’s nuclear programme. Although he emphasizes talk and diplomacy to be the heart of the US’ policy on Iran, he asserts limited military action and deterrence would be the buttress for the diplomatic success of ceasing Iran’s nuclear programme. 

Alon Ben-Mei asserted the necessity of a new US negotiation strategy in solving Iran’s nuclear programme. He argues that the US should end threats to Iran for a regime change, and initiate secret talks along with implementing punitive measures in case the negotiation fails. 

David Albright and Jacqueline Shire suggest a solution for Iran’s nuclear programme by increasing sanctions with an incentive package deal. Although their solutions oppose military action, they stated that, “To ensure aggressive Iranian action in the region is discouraged, the US must maintain a robust array of military forces in the Gulf region for years to come.” The coercive diplomacy utilizes compensative inducements and escalation dominance. 

The co-authors of the book of the Brookings Institution, ‘Which Path to Persia?’, also emphasized the importance of coercive diplomacy in solving Iran’s nuclear programme. Since the concept of persuasion can be integrated with many other options such as military threats, economic sanctions and compensative inducement, etc., they argue in order to induce Iranian compliance, the persuasion strategy will bring much more flexibility in facilitating reaching a ‘deal’ with Iran.

207 Alon Ben-Meir, “Nuclear Iran is Not an Option: A new negotiating strategy to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons”, Digest of Middle East Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 2009, pp 74-89.  
As many of the experts have analysed and suggested, the US administrations after the Cold War executed its will of Iran’s behavioural change on the nuclear programme. Although there were differences in rhetoric and inducement, the ‘dual containment’ of the Clinton administration, the ‘counter-proliferation’ of the Bush administration, and the ‘Prague Doctrine’ of the Obama administration, they all share the flat-footed denial of the full-fledged Iranian nuclear programme. The series of Nuclear Posture Reviews released by each administration in 1994, 2002 and 2010 detailed with accuracy the firm rejection on the full-fledged Iranian nuclear programme. The PSI, which was implemented by the Bush administration, was succeeded by the Obama administration, and Obama further clarified his policy on Iran’s nuclear programme would be more systematized with Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, or GICNT. Moreover, the three administrations consistently sustained its ‘escalation dominance’ against Iran through the US military based in Kuwait, Turkey, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan with the fifth Fleet of the US Navy in the straits of Hormuz.

The three US administrations have set out economic sanctions, possible air strikes, limited military operations and kept full military operations as a last resort to maintain its escalation dominance for any contingency to derive Iran’s compliance. However, Iran did not give up its nuclear programme and even succeeded in the advancement of its nuclear capability by counter-coercing the US pressure. Thus, this chapter will examine the contention of the US and Iran through the contention model of coercive diplomacy after the Cold War and how it lead to the failure during the Clinton administration to the first term of the Obama administration.

**4.2 Analysis of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear Programme**

**4.2.1 The US Coercive Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear Programme**

The objective of the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme is the Complete Verifiable Irreversible Dismantlement, or CVID, of Iran’s nuclear weapon capability. However, it directly contradicts Iran’s objective of the nuclear programme,
which aims to achieve a full-fledged nuclear programme, including uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing technology.

Since there are no distinct boundaries regarding these technologies as to what constitutes the peaceful use of atomic energy and what constitutes nuclear armament, the concerns of the US and their coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme is lack in reason. Moreover, since the NPT and IAEA safeguard agreement also approves a certain level of nuclear enrichment and spent fuel reprocess technology as the sovereign rights of a state, unless Iran breaches the regulation, such as by conducting a fissile material test, withdraws from NPT or implements any unreported nuclear activities, US intervention on Iran’s nuclear programme has no justifications. Thus, unlike the case with North Korea, the US coercive diplomacy has had its limits and difficulties from the beginning.

The types of coercive diplomacy during the process of contention are type A: persuading the opponent to stop short of the goal, type B: persuading the opponent to undo the action, and type C: persuading the opponent to make changes in the government or regime. Thus, if the US decided to coerce the compliance of Iran and change its behaviour, the aims of the US coercive diplomacy could be categorized with these three types. Forcefully persuade Iran to temporarily stop or cease its nuclear programme, force a complete dismantlement, or force a regime change for the dismantlement of the nuclear programme.

Each goal differs from the other. In the case of Iran’s nuclear programme, type A is to seize or freeze Iran’s nuclear programme. That is, the objective of type A’s coercive diplomacy is to seize Iran’s nuclear programme and its development of nuclear weapon capability. Type B is the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapon capability, which means more than a seizing or freezing of the current nuclear programme. It includes the dismantlement of their ‘past nuclear capability,’ which aims for the complete dismantlement of Iran’s entire accumulated nuclear capability, such as accumulated enriched uranium. The goal of type C, the complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear weapon capability through a regime change, goes even further to achieve the assurance of the ‘future Iranian nuclear programme’ by eliminating the Iranian regime, which is hostile to the US.
There is much evidence that the US coercive diplomacy aims for the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapon capabilities. In 2003, when Iran offered full transparency over its nuclear programme, including additional protocols, Bush dismissed Iran’s offer in order to coerce Iran to abandon its nuclear programme. Up until now, the US has not changed its ultimate objective of its coercive diplomacy. Even if it limits the sovereign right of Iran’s peaceful use of atomic energy, the US is against a full-fledged Iranian nuclear programme.

4.2.1.1 Favourable Conditions for the US Coercive Diplomacy on the Nuclear Programme of Iran

As witnessed by the long, fruitless years of contention between the US and Iran on the nuclear programme, it is a difficult task for an agent to derive successful results from the coercive diplomacy. The coercive diplomacy is highly context-dependent and easily influenced by many different variables. Thus, it is important to identify conditions which favour the success of the coercive diplomacy. Through a number of case studies by the preceding researchers, eight conditions are identified that favours success: Clarity of Objective, Strength of Motivation, Asymmetry of Motivation, Sense of Urgency, Strong Leadership, Adequate Domestic and International Support, Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation, and Clarity Concerning the Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis.

The objective of the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme is clear. It is the complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear weapon capability that might degrade Iran’s sovereign right to a full-fledged nuclear programme, including uranium enrichment. However, methods of achieving dismantlement varies: 1) Freeze Iran’s nuclear programme → Dismantlement, 2) Freeze Iran’s nuclear programme → Decrease Iran’s nuclear capability → Dismantlement; it is similar to the step-by-step proposal offered by Russia in 2011, 3) the Dismantlement, which could be referred to as a one-shot resolution with grand bargaining, 4) Dismantlement through a regime change or military intervention. Since the choice of which method to implement is determined by the contention between the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy, there is room for ‘Clarity of Objective’ to be damaged. For example, suppose the US changes the type of coercive diplomacy from type A to type C during the contention of the coercive and
counter coercive diplomacy. The discrepancies of the objective, the freezing of Iran’s nuclear programme and the regime change of Iran degrades the ‘Clarity of Objective.’ Moreover, if the US coercive diplomacy fails to send a clear signal of what they are demanding from Iran, it could be referred to as an absence of ‘Clarity of Objective.’ Thus, ‘Strong Leadership,’ which secures the consistency of the US coercive diplomacy, is important for success.

‘Strength of Motivation’ indicates the willingness of how much and how far the US would go to accept the enforcement cost of the coercive diplomacy of Iran’s nuclear programme. Series of the US’ policy reviews and official statements indicate its strong motivation for not accepting any nuclear weapon capability of Iran. Moreover, a major factor for the impasse of Iranian nuclear negotiation is due to the 20 percent LEU programme, which is admissible to the NPT, and the IAEA could be referred to as one of the indicators of the strength of US motivation.

‘Asymmetry of Motivation’ is the discrepancy and the gap between ‘Strength of Motivation’ of the US, whose goal is the dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear programme, and Iran, who wants to secure a full-fledged nuclear programme. It is likely that the more Asymmetry of Motivation is created, the more there is of a negotiation to be settled. Thus, the US utilizes many types of inducements to dampen Iran’s motivation for achieving its nuclear programme. On the contrary, Iran implements counter measures to neutralize US inducements and strengthen Iran’s motivation to achieve a full-fledged nuclear programme.

The ‘Sense of Urgency’ is about how the US or Iran perceives Iran’s nuclear programme as their policy priority. Whoever has a greater Sense of Urgency will generate a more favourable environment for its policy aim. Thus, it is somewhat related to ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’ since how the US or Iran perceives the nuclear issue as their policy priority is the main factor that causes the ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’. When the Bush administration initiated operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003, the US policy priority of removing WMD was high and Iran frequently appeared in the media and Washington as the next target. Since the US’ ‘Sense of Urgency’ on WMD rose, it influenced the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of the US, which created the ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’. Thus, it drove Iran to propose negotiations with the US in
April 2003\textsuperscript{210} which contains ‘full transparency over Iran’s nuclear programme, including the Additional Protocol’, ‘Cooperation against terrorist organizations, particularly the Mujahedin-e Khalq and al-Qaeda’ and ‘Iran’s acceptance of the Arab League’s 2002 “land for peace” declaration on Israel-Palestine.’

Due to the geopolitical environment of Iran, the international support is crucial for the success of US coercive diplomacy: the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapon capability. The US has to combine the solidarity and assets of Iran’s neighbouring states and international nuclear power. Thus, the establishment of multilateral negotiation, P5+1, was set to maximize the incompliant cost of Iran. However, although it all shares the necessity of stopping Iranian nuclear weapon capability, each state has a different agenda and interest in dealing with Iranian nuclear negotiation. For example, in February 2005, the United Kingdom, France and Germany’s so-called E3 compelled the Bush administration to declare that it would not use force against Iran. Moreover, Russia and China, who tried to soft balance the US in the region, provided civilian nuclear technology to Iran. Thus, in order to overcome this entangled diplomatic dynamics, the ‘Strong Leadership’ of the US was critical for the success of its coercive diplomacy.

The ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ could be easily explained with the concept of the red line. If the US coercive diplomacy succeeds in drawing a clear red line on Iran’s nuclear programme, the possibility of Iran changing its behaviour to the US coercive diplomacy would be maximized. However, drawing a red line on the Iranian nuclear programme that has not clearly breached the NPT and IAEA regime is not an easy task. Moreover, Iran is fully aware of this and cleverly deals with their nuclear programme to degrade the solidarity of US alliance in nuclear negotiation, which is to maximize the enforcement costs of the US coercive diplomacy.

The last condition that favours coercive diplomacy is the ‘Clarity Concerning the Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis.’ When an agreement or compromise of Iran’s nuclear programme is made as a result of contention between the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy, terms and agreements have to be clarified for the best results. If not,

the North Korean nuclear negotiation and the collapse of the Geneva Agreed Framework would be the perfect example of what may happen.

The implementation of the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme begins by stating clear objectives and demands for Iran. After they have been set, the measures and inducements of the US coercive diplomacy are chosen. When the objectives and means of the coercive diplomacy are settled upon, the US manages its coercive diplomacy within the strategic environment by considering favourable conditions. <Figure 4-1> shows how the US coercive diplomacy is set and implemented to Iran.

<Figure 4-1> The Model of the US Coercive Diplomacy on Iran

4.2.2 Iranian Counter Coercive Diplomacy

Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy has been applied to preserve its full-fledged nuclear programme and guaranteed access to advanced nuclear technology against US non-proliferation policy. Moreover, through its counter coercive diplomacy, Iran has had the objective of removing economic sanctions and re-joining the international community. In implementing its counter coercive measures, Iran was at an advantage to degrade US coercive diplomacy since its nuclear activities and development has not yet violated the NPT and IAEA safeguard agreement. Thus, Iran limits itself within the IAEA and NPT regime such as by limiting their uranium enrichment to 20 percent and providing six
months’ notice before nuclear material is introduced at its nuclear facilities. Within the non-proliferation regime boundaries, Iran maximizes its counter coercive diplomacy by travelling between the red lines.

Although Jacqueline Shire and David Albright argue Iran had breached six NPT safeguard agreements: 1) Uranium Imports, 2) Uranium conversion, 3) Uranium enrichment, 4) Hidden Sites, 5) Laser Isotope Enrichment Experiments, 6) Plutonium Experiments,211 it was never confirmed by the IAEA. Even in the IAEA censure report, Iran was never accused of violating the NPT safeguard agreement. “Inconsistent with its obligations” and “lack of full cooperation reduces the level of confidence” are the descriptions in the IAEA document on Iran’s nuclear programme. However, these statements did not constitute a formal finding of Iranian noncompliance.212

The will of preserving its nuclear capability and programme, the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of the Iranian counter coercive diplomacy could be witnessed in a long enduring economic sanction, which is due to its persistence in acquiring a nuclear programme. Iran has always refused to abandon its sovereign rights for the peaceful use of atomic energy and development of nuclear technology. Not just claiming its right, Iran goes even further to demand international support for its nuclear development. Thus, if Iran believes the negotiation process is leading to a complete dismantlement of its nuclear programme, it counter coerced the US by delaying negotiations or increasing their nuclear capability, combining it with missile development.

The best case scenario for Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy is to remove economic sanctions, join the international community, and preserve its full-fledged nuclear programme. Thus, in order to confront the US nonproliferation policy, Iran implements its measures to maximize the enforcement costs of the US coercive diplomacy and minimize the incompliant cost, which will be imposed for sustaining its nuclear programme.

The agreement of the Paris Accord in 2004 is an example of Iranian counter measures against the US coercive diplomacy. Through the Paris Accord, Iran claimed its sovereign right on the peaceful use of the nuclear programme by agreeing to a temporary freeze of uranium enrichment and an IAEA inspector to monitor the cessation. Similar to North Korea, Iran utilizes the suspension of its nuclear capability to degrade the “Adequate Domestic and International Support” of the US coercive diplomacy. Although it was used as a bargaining chip in later negotiations, whether they would sustain additional protocols or not, Iran also signed the Additional Protocol for good measure and for the Safeguards Agreement of NPT, which guaranteed greater authorities of the IAEA to verify Iran’s nuclear programme. The Iranian counter coercive diplomacy paid off in 2005 when E3, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, compelled the US not to use military action on Iran. By expressing its will to negotiate and compromise, Iran degraded the alliance of the US coercive diplomacy, its inducements and justifications of the coercion.

Iran also intensified its diplomatic ties with countries hostile to the US, such as Russia and China, to degrade and counter coerce the US coercive diplomacy. As the founding supreme leader of Velayat-e Faqih, Ayatollah Khomeini, stated, “Our youth must know that China and Russia, like the US and Britain, feed on the blood of our people.”213 China and Russia were not considered friendly allies of Iran. However, the strategic necessity of each state rapidly brought them together. Through strengthened relations, Iran did not just restrain them from participating in US coercion, but also obtained their support on nuclear development and its counter coercive diplomacy.

During the Cold War, a theocratic Iranian regime viewed communist Soviet Union as no different to other imperialistic western countries. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Iran become more firm in its perceptions. Thus, despite serious conflicts with the US, Iran set its foreign policy as being “neither East nor West.” However, when facing the massive deployment of US forces in the Persian Gulf after the demise of the Soviet Union, ties between Iran and Russia began to strengthen with growing mutual interest in foreign diplomacy, military and the economy.

Nevertheless Russia voted in favour of the series of UNSC resolutions on Iran; 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010, it rejected further punitive action even when the IAEA officially condemned Iran’s lack of cooperation in September 2008. Russia also refused to participate in a P5+1 meeting in 2008 to discuss levelling additional sanctions against Iran. Moreover, ever since Iran and Russia reached an agreement in 1995 to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Russia has been supplying the materials and expertise for Iranian nuclear development. According to its 1995 contract term, the VVER-1000 water cooled reactor was planned to be built in Bushehr, which could annually produce 180kg of plutonium from its spent fuel. Moreover, it also agreed to provide a 50MW light water research reactor, a provision of 2,000 tonnes of natural uranium and annually train 15 Iranian nuclear scientists. However, as it was agreed that the spent fuel had to be managed and sent back to Russia, Iran carefully executed its nuclear development under the IAEA safeguards.

China, like Russia, had agreed to a series of UNSC resolutions on Iran. However, as foreign Ministry Spokesman of China, Liu Jianchao, stated in July 2008, he, “believes that sanctions, especially unilateral sanctions, are of no help,” and that China had no intention to fully support the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. This was once again witnessed in 2009, when Obama presided over a UN Security Council meeting, the first US president to do so. Although China voted in favour of the Resolution of 1887, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman, Jiang Lee, reiterated China’s position that sanctions were not an appropriate method in dealing with Iran’s nuclear enrichment. Moreover, China and Iran enjoyed the extensive economic and diplomatic relationship despite UN Security Council sanctions. When the US and other western countries imposed sanctions against Iran due to concerns over its nuclear programme, Chinese oil companies were able to win bids for developing large oil fields in Iran. That is, the efficiency of coercive diplomacy is not determined by the coercive diplomacy of coercer but the result of the contention between the policy of coercer and coercee.

Since 2007, China has replaced the European Union as Iran’s largest trading partner. As

reported by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trade between Tehran and Beijing totalled more than $36 billion in 2012. In April 2010, as unilateral US sanctions against Iranian gasoline imports appeared imminent, a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation, CNPC exported 600,000 barrels of gasoline worth $110 million dollars to Iran. Similarly, that month, Iran’s Press TV reported that Sinopec’s trading company, Unipec, agreed to ship some 250,000 barrels to the country via a third party in Singapore. Iran’s Economy Minister, Shamseddin Hosseini, stated in 2010, “Iran is perfectly capable of meeting its needs and, as in the past, the sanctions policy will not be effective.” Iran actively built diplomatic assets to devaluate US coercion. The counter coercive diplomacy of Iran could be described as <Figure 4-2> below.

<Figure 4-2> The Counter Coercive Diplomacy Model of Iran

The success of the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme did not merely result from how well its plans and inducements were schemed, or by maximizing the incompliant costs of Iran and favourable conditions for the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme. It is rather a contention process of deriving results by competing the Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy with efficient coercion. The following <Figure 4-3> shows a clear picture of how the contention is made between the US coercive diplomacy and counter coercive diplomacy of Iran.
4.3 An Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Clinton Administration and the Counter Coercive Diplomacy of Iran

4.3.1 Background

The conflict and negotiation of Iran’s nuclear programme ignited in earnest in 2002 when the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which included the People’s Mujahedin of Iran and the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, or MEK, impugned the nuclear armament programme that led to an IAEA inspection on Iran’s nuclear site. However, the history of Iran’s nuclear programme goes back to 1950 when Pahlavi dynasty ruled Iran.

The origin of Iran’s nuclear programme was the civil nuclear co-operation agreement with the US, as a part of the Atoms for Peace programme in 1957. On the basis of this agreement, the Central Treaty Organization’s (CENTO: consisting of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, the United Kingdom and the US) nuclear science institute was moved from

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Baghdad and established in Tehran. In 1959, the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, or TNRC, was planned for the nuclear science institute of CENTO, and negotiations for providing the 5MW research reactor was discussed between the US and Iran. At that time, the US was more than favourable towards the development of Iran’s nuclear programme. In 1961, although it was turned down by the Kennedy administration, the US Joint Staff Office suggested stockpiling its tactical nuclear weapons in Iran.

The TNRC started its construction in 1961 and was finally established in 1967. Soon after its establishment, the US provided the 5MW research reactor and the development of Iran’s nuclear programme has taken off ever since. It is known that the US administration had provided 112kg of plutonium, 104kg of which was fissile isotope. They also provided 5.54kg of 93 percent enriched uranium, which was also a fissile uranium isotope, and both could be used as nuclear weapons. In 1969, the US and Iran agreed to a ten years extension of the cooperation for ‘Atoms for Peace programme. With the environment of the Middle East at that period, the withdrawal of UK and the following new ‘twin pillars’ policy of the US, the Nixon and Ford administration, who needed friendly relations with and the support of Iran, continued to cooperate in developing Iran’s nuclear programme.

On March 1974, Iran officially announced its ‘full-fledged nuclear power industry’ plan that would produce 23,000MW of electricity by building 23 nuclear power plants before 1994. For the success of the ‘twenty-year vision plan’ which included uranium enrichment, fabrication of fuel and the reprocess of spent nuclear fuel, Iran established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and appointed Dr. Akbar Etemad as the director of the organization. By 1976, the budget of the AEOI reached 1.3 billion US dollars and became the biggest public economic institution other than the Iran nation oil company.

Although Iran swiftly signed the safeguard agreement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 1 July 1969, the annual production plan of 23,000MW electricity by the indigenous

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nuclear programme was not something to be overlooked by the US. If Iran succeeded in building its nuclear programme as planned, it meant that Iran could annually produce fissile plutonium for 600 to 700 nuclear warheads.\textsuperscript{221} Thus, when India succeeded in its nuclear armament in 1974, the US requested extra means to control the fabrication and reprocess of spent nuclear fuel of Iran’s nuclear programme apart from the NPT safeguard agreement. However, under Cold War, the US Pentagon was also worried about damaging the relationship with Iran. Moreover, since US allies, Germany and France, were already cooperating with the Iranian nuclear development, curbing Iran’s nuclear programme became a more complicated matter. Thus, the US decided to keep Iran close and support its nuclear programme.

According to Mustafa Kibaroglu, Iran could achieve its nuclear development since solidarity in the nonproliferation policy of the West was rather weak in the 70s. Thus, he argued the sensitive nuclear technology would easily spread to countries like Iran, Libya and South Africa.\textsuperscript{222} However, nuclear development of Iran was possible since the US had acquiesced Iran from acquiring it. In a declassified US National Security Council document in late the 90s, it was clearly stated that the objectives of the US foreign policy in the 70s was not the nonproliferation of Iran but to provide for the nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities and settle Iran’s nuclear programme to prevent regional nuclear proliferation, especially in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{223} In October 1978, the US Department of Energy shipped four laser devices to Iran for uranium to enrichment.

As was revealed in the past, before the demise of the pro-US Shah Regime in 1979, the US was the biggest patron of Iran’s nuclear programme. Under its support, Iran achieved its nuclear capability. Although Akbar Etemad, the first director of the AEOI denied his interview soon after the release of the article, it is believed that the Shah had plans to make nuclear bombs.\textsuperscript{224} However, in a recent interview with BBC, Etemad admitted Shah would have gone for nuclear armament by stating, “The Shah had the idea at the

\textsuperscript{221} Ibid
\textsuperscript{222} Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West”, \textit{Middle Eastern Studies}, Vol. 43, No. 2, Mar 2007, p. 231
\textsuperscript{223} National Security Memorandum 292, US National Security Council, Apr 22, 1975
time that he’s strong enough in the region and he can defend our interest … but he told me that if this changes ‘we have to go for nuclear’…my mission was to go for all the technologies imaginable in the field of nuclear technology”. Some of the scholars had even further argued that the Shah could appoint the scientists for its nuclear armament under the US support. 

Iran’s nuclear programme which had progressed under the Shah had stopped after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini who succeeded in the establishment of the theocratic state believed the nuclear programme as the ‘Shah’s expensive toy’ and the West ‘imperialistic project.’ Moreover, on religious grounds, he objected to nuclear weapons as un-Islamic. As the leadership of Iran had changed, the western countries that had been helping Iran’s nuclear programme decided to suspend its project. Thus, Iran’s nuclear programme came to a half-willing, half-coerced halt.

The nullified nuclear programme resumed a new phase when the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War happened in 1980. The war, which devastated Iran, started to reinforce the discourse and agenda of acquiring its nuclear technology, not only for the deterrence power and national security but for its energy supply and efficiency to reconstruct Iran and its economy.

In early stages of the Iran-Iraq War, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti claimed Iran should acquire nuclear armament to secure an endangered Iran. In April 1984, then president Ayatollah Khamenei argued that nuclear weapons would serve as a ‘deterrence of God’s soldiers’. In February 1993, Akbar Torkan, former Iranian defence minister, also made a similar statement, saying, “Can our Air Force take on the Americans, or our Navy take on the American Navy? If we put all our country’s budget into such a war, we would have just burned our money. The way to go about dealing with such a threat requires a different solution entirely.”

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As it was shown in various statements of the Iranian officials, Iran had built a new discourse on its nuclear programme. Although it is controversial whether the statements were actually intended to nuclear armament, the fact remained that its nuclear programme, once labelled as ‘Westoxification,’ had been reinitiated during the Iran-Iraq War period. In 1983, Iran sent an official memorandum to Hans Blix, the director general of the IAEA, to request its cooperation for Iranian nuclear development. Iran also strongly claimed the rights to the peaceful use of atomic energy at the Non-Aligned Movement Conference in 1984. Some of the western countries took it as a declaration of Iranian nuclear armament.\textsuperscript{231}

In 1987, Iran acquired critical components, including the blueprint of Zippe-type P-1 centrifuges and an enrichment plant with gas centrifuges, from AQ Khan Network. As a result, Iran could skip many steps of difficult research.\textsuperscript{232} In May 5, 1987, Iran signed three agreements with Investigaciones Aplicadas, INVAP of Argentina, for the advancement of its nuclear programme: 1) a $5.5 million agreement was signed for the replacement of the reactor core at the TRNC. The new core operated on 20 percent of enriched uranium rather than the 93 percent enriched fuel required by the US supplied core,\textsuperscript{233} 2) the provision of a component for building pilot plants for uranium conversion in to uranium dioxide, and 3) the provision of a component for nuclear fuel fabrication. However, since the Iran–Iraq war, the progress of the Iran nuclear programme had its limits.

The Iranian nuclear programme was initiated when Rafsanjani was inaugurated in 1989. The Rafsanjani administration set out to reconstruct war-devastated Iran, making it their top priority. In order to counter-balance the electric shortage caused by the rapid population growth and the war, Rafsanjani decided to succeed Shah’s nuclear programme and spur its development.

4.3.2 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy between Clinton and Rafsanjani

The year Rafsanjani was elected president was a pivotal year in Iran’s history. The war


\textsuperscript{233} “Argentina Strikes a Deal with Iran,” \textit{Nuclear Engineering International}, July 1987, pp. 4-5.
that consolidated the systemically weak theocratic Iran due to its abrupt revolution had just ended a year before and the charismatic figure who led this unity, Ayatollah Khomeini, passed away on 3 June, 1989. The factionalism and power struggle in Iran’s domestic politics started to bloom accordingly.  

In this political environment, Rafsanjani, who was considered the leader of the pragmatic faction, became the president of Iran with a landslide victory of 94 percent of the votes. The Rafsanjani administration set its objectives as the reconstruction of the economy of war-devastated Iran by building an efficient bureaucracy system, and centralizing the government power, rather than staying in religious teaching. Rafsanjani put his aim into practice by forming his cabinet members with technocrats who had received ‘modern training’. Through his two terms of presidency, Rafsanjani only appointed four cabinet members from clerics and few with military backgrounds, which was an innovative and pragmatic decision for an administration that had just finished eight years of religion-related war.

However, Rafsanjani’s policy moderation was not the fundamental change of Iran from Khomeini’s era. The objective of Rafsanjani’s foreign policy was not to reconcile with the US but to enhance Iran’s status in the region. As witnessed prior to becoming the president, Rafsanjani, who was known as a pragmatist, revealed his stance of protecting the theocratic states of Khomeini. Rafsanjani worked together with Ayatollah Khomeini and Khamenei to expel Montazeri from becoming the next supreme leader, legalized the Expedience Council and removed the position of prime minister to centralize authority. Rafsanjani’s pragmatism was within theocratic rules but meant to centralize the governing power for the efficient reconstruction of a devastated Iranian economy and its infrastructure. The nuclear programme of Iran also proceeded with this prospect.

After witnessing the victory of the first Gulf War and the demise of their long-time foe, the Soviet Union, the Clinton administration evaluated the US as the only dominant power in the Middle East that could unilaterally flex its muscle to influence the regional

235 Ibid, p.113.
236 Ibid, p.113.
rogue states. The US no longer viewed the Middle East through a competitive prism. However, the absence of bipolar competition and its vacuum could also bring a decrement of control over the regional powers by giving them more freedom in making their policies. Moreover, as revealed through the first Gulf War, the increased military capabilities of Iraq, including the nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles, was considered that any provocation or conflict in the region could bring enormous impact and turmoil, which could no longer be contained in the region as was the case during the Iran-Iraq War.

The Clinton administration wanted to create a virtuous circle by containing the threats of Iran and Iraq, which would promote the peace process between Israel and the Arab countries. The US believed the more the peace process between Israel and Arabs was settled, the higher the possibility of dismantling the threat created by Iran and Iraq. Therefore, the well-known policy of ‘dual containment’ was implemented to cease the proliferation of WMD, and to spread democracy and the settlement of peace in the region. The dual containment of Iran and Iraq meant the change of US policy, which was to build up one to balance the other as the post Iranian revolution balance of power structure in the Middle East. After the US became a hyper power, the Clinton administration decided not to rely on Iran or Iraq to bring balance to the region.237

4.3.2.1 Clinton’s Limited ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw’ and the Resistance of Rafsanjani

1) The Timely and Well-Structured but Limited ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw’

The Clinton administration decided to use economic sanctions as the key tool for its ‘dual containment’ and coercive diplomacy to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme. With its ‘engagement and enlargement’ doctrine and the ‘dual containment’ policy, the Clinton administration began its implementation of a more severe economic sanction. The main point of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, which was enacted by the Bush Sr. administration, was to ban the provision of any dual use of technology and

devices to Iran and Iraq. However, there was a loophole. With the approved license from the US government, any firm could export prohibited items and technology to Iran and Iraq. Thus, the Clinton administration extended the Export administration Act, which expired in 1994 through Executive order 12924 on 19 August 1994 and edited in a clause of ‘presumption of denial’ to easily cancel the licenses issued to the companies. Moreover, the Clinton administration strengthened the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act by adding ‘secondary sanction’ to any foreign countries who exported the prohibited item to Iran and Iraq.

The tightened and amended economic sanction of the Clinton administration made its coercive diplomacy more efficient. Since the Arms Export Control Act and the Export administration Act was automatically lifted when the US took Iran off the State Sponsors of Terrorism, the strengthened Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of the Clinton administration made it possible to sustain its coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme in any changing political circumstances. Vice versa, the strengthened Arms Export Control Act and the Export administration Act made the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act more efficient and convenient in being implied against Iran’s nuclear programme.

Despite the well-schemed economic sanction structures of the Clinton administration, there was a problem in clarity with the terms used in the sanction act, one of the most important conditions for the success of the coercive diplomacy. This was the ‘Clarity Concerning the Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis.’ Since the terms used in the sanction act, such as ‘advanced conventional weapons,’ ‘destabilizing number and type of weapons’ and ‘dual use devices’ were somewhat vague, it was difficult to implement actual enforcement. The advancement in missile capabilities of Iran by importing the C 801 and C 802 missiles from China is one good example. Moreover, when Russia provided the equipment and devices to build the Bushehr nuclear reactor, since Iran and Russia argued it to be for the peaceful use of Atomic energy, it was not an easy task for the US to put a curb on its

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238 c 802 missile has a small radar reflectivity and is only about five to seven meters above the sea surface when it attacks the target, and since its guidance equipment has strong anti-jamming capability, target have a very low success rate in intercepting the missile. The hit probability of the c 802 is estimated to be as high as 98 percent. The c 802 can be launched from airplanes, ships, submarines and land-based vehicles, and is considered along with the US “Harpoon” as among the best anti-ship missiles of the present-day world.
The Clinton administration also intensified the US trade and investment ban on Iran. The primary authority regulation of the Iranian sanction on the commercial sector is the International Emergency Economic Power Act, which was enacted in 1977. It authorized the US president to block transactions and freeze assets to deal with the declared existence of the ‘unusual and extraordinary threat to national security, foreign policy, or the economy of the United States’. Moreover, in the event of an actual attack on the US, the president could also confiscate property connected with a country, group, or person that aided in the attack.

On the basis of the International Emergency Economic Power Act, the Clinton administration issued the executive orders to gradually turn the screw to elevate its coercive diplomacy on Iran. Through executive order 12957 on 15 March 1995, the US prohibited the investment of American firms or individual on Iran’s energy sector. Two months later, on 6 May 1995, the Clinton administration issued executive order 12959 to ban all commercial trade and investment with Iran, a ban that a majority of experts say was the most effective economic sanction made by the US.

However, the executive orders also had a problem with clarity in terms of coercing Iran. The country of origin for all oil products was labelled as the location where it had been refined and not the actual location where the oil had been extracted. Thus, if Iran’s crude oil was mixed with other crude oil in the refining process or refined outside of Iran, it was impossible to completely ban the Iranian oil trade. Moreover, as the US prohibited aid, trade and investment, Iran initiated eleven ‘buy back’ projects in its energy sector to naturalize the US economic sanction.

The Clinton administration acknowledged this situation that with its trade invest ban, the US could not prevent Iran from developing the energy industry that would degrade the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. Thus, with the support of the congress, the Iran-Libya Sanction Acts bill was sponsored by Senator Alfonso D’Amato and passed at the 104th congress session on 5 August 1995. According to the Iran-Libya Sanction Acts, which was later changed to the Iran sanction Acts in 2006, the US could prohibit any firm that invested 20 million dollars or more on Iranian energy resources.
Although the US coercive measures were swift and implemented in a timely manner, there was scepticism on the effectiveness of the coercion. According to Daniel Altman, since the private sector of Iran’s industries were weak and the government controlled almost 80 percent of the economy, no strong business class was formed to wield its leverage on the Iranian regime. Thus, he argued that even if the US economic sanctions had been successfully implemented, it would not create enough pressure to coerce a behavioural change in the Iranian government.\(^\text{239}\) Inversely, this meant the Iranian economic structure was more favourable to the Iranian government in counterploting against the US coercive diplomacy and mobilizes the Iranian public into opposing the US.

Anthony H. Cordesman argued that since Iran’s net trade of other industries excluding the oil export were insignificant in the total GDP, the US economic sanction had little chance to derive Iran’s compliance. Moreover, by emphasizing the fact that Iran’s trading partners were already well-diversified, he asserted the implementation of the US economic sanction and the result of it would not be as effective as planned.\(^\text{240}\)

Whether efficient or not, the Clinton administration attempted to derive Iran’s compliance on dismantlement of its nuclear programme through omnidirectional economic sanctions in the military, commercial and energy sector. However, Rafsanjani decided to counter coerce the US by utilizing Iran’s asset to precede its nuclear programme rather than to comply with the coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration.

2) The Sustained Nuclear Programme with Secured Justification

Despite the changed environment and actual US coercion on Iran’s nuclear programme, the director of the AEOI, Reza Amollahi, strongly announced its plan by stating, “Through any means possible,” to complete the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor at the 35\(^\text{th}\) IAEA general session in 1991. However, due to pressure from the


Clinton administration in 1993, the three cooperation contracts made with Argentina in 1987 was canceled after only fulfilling one among the three contracts: namely, the provision of 19.73 percent enriched uranium fuel for the research reactor.

Rafsanjani sustained his will to achieve the nuclear programme and tried to procure the devices and components for its reactor. In 1993, Iran tried to acquire eight steam condensers built by the Italian firm Ansaldo under the German Kraftwerk Union contract of the past Shah regime. However, the Clinton administration seized its attempt by pressuring the Italian government. Moreover, the negotiations with Czech firm Skoda supplying the reactor components were cancelled again due to US pressure in 1994. For the same reason, Iran also failed to buy nuclear power reactor components from an unfinished reactor in Poland. When the nuclear cooperation with foreign countries become more difficult to achieve due to US coercion, Rafsanjani concentrated building nuclear cooperation with China and Russia, who could countervail the sabotage. 241

On 16 February 1993, Rafsanjani met Jiang Xinxiong, the president of the China National Nuclear Industrial General Corporation, and agreed to the provision of technology and equipment for the construction of a 300MW nuclear power station in Ahvaz. 242 After the agreement, Rafsanjani made a statement that the nuclear cooperation would only be for the peaceful use of atomic energy to contain the justification of US coercive diplomacy.

On 13 April 1993, the Iranian parliament ratified their nuclear cooperation agreement, which approved the purchase of two VVER-440s and 440MW reactors from Russia and two 300MW pressurized water reactors from China. 243 On 18 June 1993, with the partnership of Amir Kabir Technological University and the AEOI, Iran produced its first X-ray tube using cobalt-57, designed to detect uranium.

As the denouncement of Israel and the US mounted with the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme, Reza Amrollahi, then director of the AEOI, announced Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful use only and emphasized that Iran was the first state to

242 “Rafsanjani Says Nuclear Energy Used for Peaceful Purposes; Cooperation with PRC,” New China, 17 February 1993
proclaim a nuclear free zone in the Middle East at the IAEA General conference on 27 September 1993. Moreover, Iran suggested an inspection visit by the IAEA. On 15-21 November 1993, a group of International Atomic Energy Agency officials, led by IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Bruno Pellaud, visited Iranian nuclear facilities in Tehran, Isfahan, and Karaj. Since the IAEA announced that they had, “Found no evidence which was inconsistent with Iran’s declaration,” Iran degraded the justification of the US economic sanction and its coercive diplomacy on the Iran nuclear programme.

When Russia initiated the construction of a 1000 MW nuclear reactor plant in Bushehr on 21 March 1994, Iran again invited Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA, on 18 April 1994, to discuss the nuclear development and a nuclear free Middle East to dampen the build-up efforts of the US concerning its coercive diplomacy. Despite the information provided by IAEA inspectors and Iranian commitment to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the US accused Iran of attempting nuclear weapon development. On 13 August 1994, John D. Holum, the director of the US Arms Control Agency, claimed Iran was continuously attempting to acquire a nuclear weapons programme and criticized the IAEA of not knowing of Iran’s wrongdoing. 244

As US denouncement and pressure on Iran’s nuclear programme continued, Iran revealed the possibility of withdrawing from the NPT. On 12-16 September 1994, at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in Geneva, the Iranian delegation claimed that Iran was not being granted access to technology designed for the peaceful use of nuclear energy as stipulated by Article IV of the NPT and disclosed its consideration for a withdrawal. 245 On 20 September 1994, Iranian delegates to the IAEA General Conference in Vienna stated that Iran would postpone its decision of the withdrawal from the NPT until closure of the final Preparatory Committee meeting for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. 246 It was more of an aggressive Iranian counter coercive diplomacy to derive support on its development of the nuclear programme and neutralize US coercion.

244 “Tehran Pursuing Nuclear Programs,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 13, 1994, p. A4
245 Mark Hibbs, “Iran May Withdraw From NPT Over Western Trade Barriers,” Nucleonics Week, September 22, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9;
246 Mark Hibbs, “Western Group Battles Iran At Third NPT Prepcom Session” Nucleonics Week, September 22, 1994, pp. 9-10
On 7 January 1995, Iran and Russia signed an 800 million dollar contract in Tehran to finish the first reactor unit based on the Russian VVER-1000 reactor design. After the agreement was signed, the Clinton administration opposed its contract by raising the possibility of the plutonium from the VVER-1000 reactor to be used as a nuclear weapon. However, as Thomas Stauffer stated, “The reactor at Bushehr is the wrong kind of nuclear reactor for producing weapon grade fissile materials. It will produce the wrong kind of plutonium,” and many nuclear experts doubted the possibility of creating a plutonium bomb with the Bushehr reactor. Moreover, since the agreement specified that all the nuclear spent fuel would be returned to Russia and the development would be preceded under the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the US’ argument was too weak to prohibit the deal.

On 9 January 1995, officials from the US Department of Energy, or DOE, claimed they had “almost no doubt” that Iran had succeeded in obtaining nuclear materials and “if Iranians maintain this intensive effort to get everything they need, they could have all their components in two years.” The very next day, on 10 January 1995, CIA Director James Woolsey, stated at the Senate intelligence committee that Iran is most likely to continue developing nuclear weapons through indigenous resources, in which case it might have a nuclear weapon within five years.

However, the U.S, allegation was immediately damaged by Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov, when he stated, “the Russia-Iranian cooperation in nuclear power engineering has peaceful goals….nuclear reactor to be finalized by Russian specialists in Iran cannot be used for war purposes since war plutonium is made by reactors of another type.” The IAEA bolstered the Russian assertion that there was no

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249 “Iran Ever Closer To the Bomb,” Iran Brief, Jan 9, 1995, p. 8.
250 Ibid
251 “Iranian-Russian Agreement for Bushehr Power Plant Mikhailov Statement,” ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 10 January 1995
evidence of Iran constructing nuclear weapons. However, the most harm came from the inside. On 26 January 1995, Thomas Graham, a senior official at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency declared the nonexistence of the Iranian nuclear weapon programme and denounced US allegations as being a stretch and a conjecture of Iran’s future intention. Moreover, he admitted that Iran was in full compliance with all of its NPT obligations.

On 15 March 1995, the Clinton administration enacted executive order 12957, banning commercial investment with Iranian oil resources. On 16 March 1995, a day after executive order 12957 had been enacted, Kenneth R. Timmerman, the Director of the Middle East Data Project, testified before the US Senate that US firms had exported dual-use technologies to Iran without proper Department of Commerce, or DOC, licensing or inspection. However, his allegation was again criticized by the official from the DOC as “inaccurate and without foundation.”

The Clinton administration continuously denounced Iran’s nuclear programme and alleged its possession of a secret nuclear weapon programme in the media to damage Iran’s justification of nuclear development. On 6 May 1995, the Clinton administration enacted executive order 12959 prohibiting all the US investment in Iran to intensify coercion.

On 11 May 1995, at a joint press conference with US President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced that Russia would not sell gas centrifuge to Iran and would eliminate all “military” aspects of Russia’s nuclear deal with Iran. Iran immediately denounced the joint statement. Reza Amrollahi, head of the AEOI, argued that the provision of centrifuge never was in the agreement. He criticized America’s accusation as “childish hostility.” However, although the provision of centrifuge was not in the final agreement, Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council’s Inter departmental Commission for Ecological Safety, reported the fact that the additional protocol to the Iran-Russia nuclear contract on January 1995 indicated

252 “Iran Gets Nuclear All-Clear,” The Independent, January 11, 1995, p. 15
both sides had discussed the provision of a centrifuge for uranium enrichment. This did partially contradict Amrollahi’s statement that Iran “had never sought” centrifuges technology through the agreement. However, with the IAEA’s consent on Amrollahi’s statement about the no centrifuge deal in the agreement, the Clinton administration’s diplomatic efforts were again unsuccessful in gaining justification of its coercive diplomacy.  

Despite US coercion and sabotage, Iran slowly made progress in its nuclear programme. On 22 June 1995, Rafsanjani announced the completion of the first phase of a nuclear research centre in Bonab. The facility was planned to perform a research radiating agricultural products. Moreover, after the press conference of the IAEA Director General Hans Blix, where it was announced that the IAEA inspections had not detected any evidence of Iranian nuclear military programs on 3 July 1995, Iran signed a series of nuclear cooperation contracts: an additional two VVER 440 light water reactors at Bushehr and 10 years provision of nuclear fuel from Russia

As Iran’s nuclear programme progressed, the Clinton administration implemented further measures to coerce Iran. Not only with the economic sanctions and diplomatic intervention, the Clinton administration also intensified military appearance as well. On 1 July 1995, the fifth fleet of the US Navy, which had been dismissed in 1947, was reactivated to secure its ‘escalation dominance’ in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, the Clinton administration continued to raise questions on Iran’s nuclear programme and wanted to consolidate the solidarity of the international community to participate its coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. However, it once again failed to do so as IAEA experts Vlado Valkovich and Frank Watt declared their inspection on Iran’s nuclear programme, “entirely for peaceful purposes” on 6 November 1995.

256 “Reportage on Iranian President Rafsanjani Visit; Nuclear Research Center Opened,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Programme Network, Tehran, Jun 22, 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950622000242
258 “IAEA Reportedly Confirms ‘Peaceful Efforts’,” IRNA, Tehran, Nov 6, 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951106000410
Although Clinton’s coercive diplomacy failed to bring upon a behavioural change of Iran, the US coercive diplomacy was not just a series of failures. On 9 January 1996, Chen Chi Chan, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, said that the agreement between China and Iran for a nuclear power plant had been frozen. On 15 January 1996, Slovak economic minister, Jan Ducky, stated that the Slovak Republic would not participate in the construction of a new power station in Iran. The Clinton administration had succeeded in slowing the pace of Iranian nuclear programme development.

However, Rafsanjani’s Iran did not back down and contended with US pressure to continue the progress. On 6 February 1996, Reza Amrollahi, head of the AEOI, declared Iran had successfully developed laser technology and produced zero-power and miniature reactors. On March 1996, Spain and Iran negotiated a comprehensive economic deal worth $1.5 billion which included nuclear cooperation at the Bushehr nuclear facility. 259 Iran also consistently disclosed its will on nonproliferation to strengthen its justification of the nuclear development. On 25 September 1996, Iran signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to disclose its integrity on total disarmament of nuclear weapons.

On 2 June 1997, Iran announced the first phase of its $33 million electron accelerator had initiated operation. It was a device able to produce 239 Pu or 233 U of nuclear material. The figure <Figure 4-4> explains how the contention leads to the initiation of electron accelerator. It was an achievement of the Rafsanjani administration that had preceded its nuclear programme development under the US coercive diplomacy.

259 “Spain Providing Credits for Deal Involving Energy and Nuclear Projects,” BBC news, March 5, 1996
Even before the inauguration, the Clinton administration set the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme as the objective of its foreign policy. During the first term of his presidency, the Clinton administration decided to utilize economic sanctions as the tool to coerce Iran to abandon its nuclear programme. Moreover, the Clinton administration aggressively intervened in the nuclear cooperation of Iran and foreign countries to sabotage the deal and extend its economic sanction to any international firms or individuals who invested and had transactions with Iran. However, since Rafsanjani’s Iran observed the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement to claim its sovereign right to peaceful atomic energy and peaceful nuclear cooperation, which was guaranteed by NPT Article 4, the US could not elevate its inducements of coercive diplomacy more than the economic sanction. This was also disclosed during an interview with Rafsanjani by Asahi Sinbun, that his priority for Iran’s nuclear programme was to win the credibility of its justification from the international community against false accusations by the US.  

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Since repeated IAEA inspections evaluated Iran’s nuclear programme as ‘peaceful use of nuclear energy’ during the Rafsanjani presidency, the Clinton administration could not implement more aggressive coercive inducement such as air strikes and the limited use of military force on Iran’s nuclear programme.

Nevertheless the Clinton administration could not implement military options as a measure, the war readiness and ‘escalation of dominance’ was strengthened by redeployment of the US naval force. Prior to the first Gulf War in 1990, the Commander Middle Eastern Force, COMIDEASTFOR of the US Force was responsible for the military operations in the region. However, as its combat ability was revealed as improper during the Gulf War, the Seventh Fleet which was in charge of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean was given the temporary task of overseeing the region. In 1995, the Clinton administration decided to reactivate the Fifth Fleet to replace COMIDEASTFOR to implement efficient military operations in the Middle East.

The coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration on Iran’s nuclear programme was type B, which is to persuade the opponent to undo the action. That is, the US’ objective was to coerce Iran into abandoning its nuclear programme. However, without the justification for the coercion, it was difficult to acquire ‘Adequate International Support,’ which was an important condition for the success of the coercive diplomacy. Moreover, since Iran observed the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the US could not set its ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation.’ If the US could not set a clear limit leading to the unacceptable costs of Iran, the US could not enforce Iran to think that the Iranian loss of compliance exceeded its interest of confrontation. In that case, there was no need for Iran to accept US coercion. Thus, rather to accept US demands, Rafsanjani observed the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement to intensify its justification of nuclear programme development. Moreover, by counterploting the weakly justified US coercive diplomacy, Iran intensified the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of Iran’s nuclear programme. Overall, the coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration had little success in delaying Iran’s nuclear programme by sabotaging the deal. However, it failed to achieve the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme or a behaviour change in Iran.
4.3.2.2 Iranian Missile Development: Advent of the New Tool for Counter Coercive Diplomacy

“You don’t have a weapon until you put it in something that can deliver a weapon.”\(^\text{261}\)

Colin Powell, press interview on 17 November 2004

The collective capability on nuclear fissile materials, explosive devices and delivery system is called the ‘nuclear force’ of a state. Some regard the production of nuclear materials, explosive devices and the development of the delivery system as the three components of a state’s nuclear deterrence.\(^\text{262}\) That is, prohibiting the delivery system itself is considered as crucial as controlling the nuclear materials and the explosive device in nuclear nonproliferation. Thus, the dangerous task of transporting nuclear explosives, along with the missile technology including ICBM, is perceived to be of similar importance and threat as that of a nuclear bomb. Iran, who acknowledged the importance of missile technology in the Iran-Iraq War, decided to continue its development progress during the Rafsanjani period. Whether it was intended or not, the improvement of the missile technology meant an increased deterrence of power since its advancement of missile capability raised the enforcement cost of the US coercive diplomacy on Iran. The Iranian objective of the missile development was clearly revealed when the Commander of the Aerospace Division of the IRGC, BG Amir Ali Hajizadeh, stated, “Iran possesses the ICBM technology but has no intention of producing missiles with ranges greater than 2,000 kilometres… Iran’s interest is only in the ability to target US and Israeli bases in the region.”\(^\text{263}\)

To restrain the missile development of Iran, the US utilized the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, which was established in 1987. The MTCR was initially created to prevent unmanned delivery systems for nuclear weapons, specifically delivery

systems that could carry a minimum payload of 500kg at a minimum of 300km. However, at the 1992 annual meeting in Oslo, the MTCR expanded its scope to unmanned aerial vehicles for all weapons of mass destruction. It was the groundwork of the US to build international solidarity to curb Iran’s missile development.

However, against the coercive diplomacy of the US, the Iran succeeded to acquire efficient tool for its counter strategy. Against the US coercion, Iran continued its missile development through non-members of the MTCR, especially North Korea and China. In March 1993, a group of 21 Iranian officials travelled to Pyongyang, North Korea, to discuss the cooperation on ballistic missile programs. The Iranian group was led by Brigadier General Hossein Mantequei, director of the Defence Industries Organization, DIO. The DIO was responsible for Iran’s ballistic missile development and production. On 12 April 1993, US intelligence sources confirmed that China had sold key missile components to Iran.

On 14 July 1993, more specific information was captured by the Yonhap News Agency. It was disclosed that the Iranian delegation who had visited North Korea on April 1993 was to sign a contract for the purchase of 150 Rodong 1 missiles. According to its report, Iranian delegation requested the increase of the missile’s maximum range from 1,000 km to 1,300km, which could reach Israel.

The Iranian attempt of acquiring missile capability for a possible strike on Israel revealed a glimpse of the Iranian counter coercive diplomacy against US coercion. Since the security of Israel was perceived as crucial to the national interest of the US, the increase in Iran’s ability to strike Israel meant an increased deterrence power of Iran and the enforcement cost of the US coercive diplomacy.

Not only purchasing the missiles, Iran increased its missile operation capability to upgrade the deterrence power by executing missile exercises. Since 60 percent of the

world’s marine transport of oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz in 1993, it was a great threat to the US, whose stable flow of oil was one of its crucial national interests in the region. From 23rd-30th October 1993, Iran conducted a week-long “Missile War Game” dubbed Sa’eqeh 3, Lightening 3 in a 1000km area around the Straits of Hormuz. The exercise aimed to “establish command, control, communication, and intelligence distribution between Tehran and its main strategic headquarters, including the activation of missiles on orders from Tehran.” The Khatam ol-Anbia 1 strategic headquarters was activated to coordinate Iran’s surface-to-surface ballistic missile units. The communication system successfully reacted to a simulated missile launch. Shore-to-sea missile units from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC, and the Navy participated in the exercises on Abu Musa, Kishm and other islands off Hormuzgan Province. This was the first of a regular set of IRGC exercises involving the regular military. Offensive and defensive chemical weapons units were also employed in the exercise.

On 14 June 1994, Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Pelletreau, stated at the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, “North Korea has in the past delivered Scud B and Scud C, primarily to Iran and Syria. We’re concerned about press reports and other intelligence that they might, at some point, sell the Rodong missile with a much longer range than the Scud B and Scud C.” If the revealed information was true, it was a serious threat to the US administration, since acquiring the Rodong missile, which surpassed the maximum range of Scud C, 805-1126km, meant Iran’s advanced capability of a strike on Israel.

On 23 November to 1 December 1995, Iran executed Saeqa 4 missile exercises for the missile manoeuvres in the Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman. The firing was reportedly the first operational test of “advanced missile systems” built by the Iranian Navy. As senior US Navy officials reported, Iran had increased its integrated naval capabilities, anti-ship missiles, and anti-aircraft capabilities and by doing so, upgraded

its means to oppose possible coercion from the US.  

On 13 May 1996, Iran tested a new land-based anti-ship missile called the Tondar, which Brig. General Ahmad Dadbin, commander of Iran’s land forces, claimed to have produced indigenously. Tondor was known to western experts as a ballistic missile with a reported range of approximately 700km, which was modified from the Chinese C-801 Sardine anti-ship missile. Once again, Iran displayed its improved missile technology to cease the strait of Hormuz and its deterrence power for its counter coercive diplomacy against US pressure.  

On 9 December 1996, for the first time ever, Iran successfully fired a Chinese-made HY-2 Silkworm missile from a Houdong patrol boat during a 10-day military exercise. On 6 June 1997, Iran conducted a live-fire test in the Persian Gulf. The C-802 was fired from an F-4 aircraft. US Secretary of Defence William Cohen reported that Iran’s C-802 missile tests were the first known launching by Iran of the air-launched variant of the Chinese-made C-802. It was the last increment of Iran’s missile capability in the Rafsanjani period.

Throughout Rafsanjani’s rule, Iran denied its missile development by cooperating with North Korea, China and Russia. It is still unclear how much help and technological support was exchanged. However, Iran surely succeeded in building its missile capability and deterrence power against US coercion. As the International Institute of Strategic Studies reported, Iran achieved indirect deterrence with its development that could hit cities in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Gulf States. Moreover, since the advancement of missile capability during the Rafsanjani period led to a Shahab-3 missile of Khatami, which made it possible to strike Israel, the advent of efficient tool foe counter coercive diplomacy was a quiet of success for in Iran.  

271 James Bruce, “Iran Warns USA to ‘Think Twice’ About an Attack,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jun 12, 1996, p. 27.  
The US coercive diplomacy without compensative and persuasive inducement was at a crossroad after the 1997 Iranian presidential election. The factionalism that had blossomed after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini was actively developed through the Rafsanjani period and it caused a change in domestic politics in Iran.

During the Rafsanjani presidency, the reformist faction became disgruntled since Rafsanjani put more emphasis on protecting the theocratic state of Iran and could not meet expectations in terms of reformation due to pacifying the conservatives. Moreover, after being marginalized by the centralized government and the theocratic regime, the radical parliamentarians who were once loyal to the Iranian revolution, became much more moderated by abandoning its statist economic system and toned down anti-Americanism to draw more support from the public. Interlinked with these factions, a group of students, scholars, clerics and politicians were formed to demand a reformation on authoritative theocratic Iran. It soon had become a reformist movement and coalition for change. That is, the rigidity of theocratic Iran awakened the majority of Iranian nationals who felt themselves too marginalized to create a stream of reformist movement.

In an overwhelming trend, the leader of the reformist faction, Khatami, was elected as the president of Iran in 1997. Khatami received 69.5 percent of the votes and achieved a landslide victory. As an unexpected reformist who seemed more open and less hostile to the US had been elected president, the Clinton administration revealed in the possibility of a policy change. The real mood change came when Khatami sent a letter to Yasser Arafat, in which was disclosed the shift of its stance on the Arab-Israel peace process, saying that, “He acknowledged Israel’s legitimacy, and would discuss the possibility of a region-wide peace if the Palestinians were allowed to establish a state on the West Bank and Gaza.” the US began to reappraise its policy change from ‘dual containment’ by providing persuasive and compensative inducement to Iran.  

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However, as Madeleine Albright stated “These hopes must be balanced against reality… its efforts to develop long range missile and to acquire nuclear weapons continue. The United states opposes and will continue to oppose”, 275 the moderation of the US policy did not mean the approval of Iran’s nuclear programme or a fundamental change of its coercive diplomacy. Moreover, As Suzanne Maloney had evaluated “The reformist trend has not prevailed over some of the most powerful instruments of the state power in Iran, including the military, the state television and radio, vast semi-governmental economic conglomerates, and the religious councils that must approve any parliamentary legislation.” 276, the reformist character and the approach of Khatami was encouraging but his ‘2nd of Khordad Movement’ shown its limit for the US to change its coercive diplomacy on Iran.

It was clearly revealed on 27 August 1997, about two months after his inauguration, Khatami replaced the vice minister of Iran and director of AEOI, Reza Amrollahu, to Gholam reza Aghazadeh, who was then Minister of Iran’s oil ministry. The swift replacement of a western trained nuclear scientist with decades of experience to someone who had no background on nuclear technology was a shock not only to the insiders of AEOI but also to all the other western experts dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. None of the experts knew what caused the sudden leadership change in the AEOI. 277 It was later revealed by David Patrikarakos that, according to his interview with Khazaneh, the replacement was the ‘ultimate political appointment’ by the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. 278

Khamenei wanted to propel the nuclear programme. As he believed Reza Amrollahi was too weak to overcome western pressure, especially from the US, to fulfil the speedy development of Iran’s nuclear programme. Thus, Khamenei ordered Khatami to dismiss Reza Amrollahi. Since Gholam reza Aghazadeh developed and managed the Iranian oil industry under difficult situations such as wars and sanctions, Khamenei evaluated him

as the right person to accomplish the Iranian nuclear programme as scheduled.

Admittedly, the Clinton administration had implemented other inducements such as possible diplomatic normalization and ease of sanction to derive a behavioural change in Iran on its nuclear programme. However, as Madeleine Albright stated “We could have achieved a breakthrough only by abandoning our principals and interest in nonproliferation, terrorism and the Middle East, far too high a price”, 279 the Clinton administration could not implement any fundamental changes of its policy. With its environment of domestic and international politics, Khatami had limits in wielding leverage on Iran’s nuclear programme. Thus, the contention of coercive and counter coercive diplomacy between Iran and the US continued.

4.3.3.1 The Continued Clinton’s Limited ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw’ and the Upgraded Resistance of Khatami

On 22 July 1997, on the eve of Khatami’s inauguration, IAEA director Hans Blix announced an official statement after an inspection of Iran’s nuclear site, declaring that Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes and Iran had always allowed the inspection of its nuclear facilities with little advance notice. 280 It meant the Khatami administration had initiated its term with an advantageous position against the US coercive diplomacy by achieving its legitimacy on the development of the nuclear programme. This became more obvious when the US Department of Energy conducted its first subcritical nuclear test on 3 July 1997. Although the subcritical nuclear test was not subject to the provisions of the CTBT, as it is not accompanied by a nuclear explosion, many experts and even some countries argue that subcritical tests could be used beyond their stated purpose and could be used in developing new nuclear weapons. 281

This contradiction was later criticized and utilized by Iran to bolster its counter coercive

279 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir, Easton Press, 2003, p. 323
diplomacy. On 20 September 1997, Mahmud Mohammadi, spokesman for the Iranian
Foreign Ministry stated, “At a time when the United States finds fault without
supervised peaceful nuclear activities, it engages in destructive atomic tests,” and
criticized the US coercive diplomacy on Iran as ‘discriminatory’. With this ironic
environment, the reformist Khatami who was considered more favourable leader to
bringing change in Iran nuclear negotiation could not do much differently from that of
Rafsanjani’s period.

In the beginning of Khatami’s presidency, Israel and the US questioned Iran’s nuclear
 programme and claimed that Iran had a covert nuclear weapon programme. On 26 August
1997, Benjamin Netanyahu, then Israel’s prime minister, asked the world’s major powers
to come together to prevent Iran and Iraq from developing nuclear weapons by stating,
“they’re arming themselves feverishly and this is a problem for the international
community.” On September 1997, former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher
argued Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing nuclear
weapons. Accordingly, similar to Rafsanjani, Khatami opposed the accusation and
continued with the nuclear programme. On 3 September 1997, Iran announced the
appointment of Gholam Reza Aqazadeh to replace Reza Amrollahi as the head of the
AEOI. As mentioned, this was a display of Iran’s will to continue its nuclear
programme.

In response, the Clinton administration announced a possible economic sanction on
Russia, who was supporting the nuclear programme in the Bushehr nuclear reactor. On 23
September 1997, during a high-level talk visit in Moscow, US vice President Al Gore
stated the US would execute economic sanctions on Russia if assistance in Iran’s nuclear
programme continued. However, US pressure could not create any resonance on
Russia since Valeriy Nesterushkin, Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, denied the
accusation and announced its commitment to complete the construction of the Bushehr

284 Al J. Venter, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambition: Innocuous Illusion Or Ominous Truth?,” Jane’s International
286 Joseph Cirincione, ed., Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
nuclear power plant.

To strengthen its counter coercive diplomacy, Iran disclosed its will of observing the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and inversely intensified the legitimacy of its nuclear programme. On 2 October 1997, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of the AEOI, assured Mohamed ElBaradei, the new coming Secretary General of the IAEA, that Iran would follow all the regulations dictated under the purview of the IAEA in an effort to obtain information necessary to use nuclear technologies. In reciprocation, Hans Blix, then Secretary General of the IAEA, assured Gholam Reza Aqazadeh that cooperation between the Agency and Iran would continue.287 The close ties with IAEA indicated the observance of NPT by Iran which directly contradicted and degraded the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme.

Since it appeared that putting pressure on Russia was not productive, the Clinton administration turned to China. On 14 October 1997, the US State Department spokesman James Rubin stated China should give “clear and unequivocal assurances” that it would not convey nuclear weapons technology to Iran.288 On 16 October 1997, the US intensified its request that China halt all nuclear cooperation with Iran, even what was allowed under NPT, for further nuclear technology assistance from the US.289

Despite Iran requested definitive proof of US’ allegations on Iran’s nuclear programme.290 On 29 October 1997, Chinese officials provided “authoritative, written communications” that China would not engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran after completing two projects which they had already undergone: a zero-power research reactor and the production of zirconium tubes.291 It could be considered a small success of the US coercive diplomacy. However, in the long run, as Madeleine Albright later confessed, “It left us isolated,” and banning all the legitimate cooperation that been approved in international treaties degraded the US coercive diplomacy by damaging the

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48680
“consolidation of International support”.

On 7 January 1998, even during a historical interview with CNN, Khatami denied allegations that Iran was seeking to develop nuclear weapons and claimed the programme to be ‘seeking peaceful nuclear energy.’ This displayed Iran’s clear limitations on how far it could stretch its appeasement policy with the US. Thus, despite a favourable approach from Khatami, the Clinton administration continued to coerce Iran’s nuclear programme. On 9 February 1998, James Foley, a spokesman for the US State Department, stated the US would cut economic aids to Ukraine unless it stopped cooperation with Iran’s nuclear programme. The Clinton administration had already ceased the US firm Westinghouse Electric Corporation’s two nuclear power plants deal with Ukraine.292 The coercion on Ukraine was efficient to curb the nuclear programme of Iran since the Ukraine firm, Turboatom, had made a contract with Russian firm, Zarubezhatomenergostroy, to provide the turbine for a 1000MW reactor at Bushehr.

As the progress of the nuclear programme fell behind schedule due to the US coercive diplomacy, Iran converted many of the Iranian subcontractors to Russian on a “turnkey” basis293 and decided to conclude a “contract for completing the first unit” of its nuclear power plant at Bushehr.294 Instead of surrendering to the US coercive diplomacy, Iran attempted to accomplish its nuclear development by all means nessasry.

On 7 March 1998, the US coercive diplomacy had a small success as it established a new 30-year nuclear cooperation accord with Ukraine. This accord confirmed the two states’ commitment to controlling the export of nuclear technology by allowing Ukraine to purchase US fuel for its nuclear reactors. With its closed deal, Ukraine cancelled the provision of turbine for the Bushehr nuclear reactor.295 Although Russia and Iran gathered for a meeting to build turbines that needed for the nuclear power plant’s generators, Iran’s nuclear programme had to fell behind schedule.

However, the legitimacy of the US coercive diplomacy soon took a hit. On 16 March 1998, IAEA spokesman David Kyd announced Iran had not violated the NPT or any other laws governing non-proliferation. The IAEA had inspected the research centre at Isfahan and the experimental reactor at the University of Tehran four times in the past year. The two reactors under construction at Bushehr were not inspected because no form of nuclear fuel had been transferred there yet.\(^\text{296}\) Without the IAEA’s clear accusations on Iran’s nuclear programme, the Clinton administration could not increase coercion by utilizing its capable inducements. Thus, as it had done in Rafsanjani’s period, the Clinton administration could only implement an independent economic sanction and diplomatic sabotage on international aid and the cooperation of Iran’s nuclear programme.\(^\text{297}\)

In contrast to the slowed pace of the nuclear programme, the development of Iran’s missile capability was remarkable. On 23 July 1998, Iran tested a medium-range missile, Shahab-3, which had a range of approximately 800 miles and was capable of hitting Israel and Saudi Arabia. Although some sources claimed it was a failure since it exploded 100 seconds after the take-off,\(^\text{298}\) the fact that Iran had built Shahab-3 which had the potential to alter the political and military balance of power in the Middle East was a big progress for Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy. On 25 July 1998, Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani announced that Iran had successfully tested a 1,300km-range surface-to-surface missile.\(^\text{299}\)

On 30 July 1998, soon after the missile test, the Clinton administration immediately imposed sanctions on seven Russian companies accused of selling weapons technology to Iran.\(^\text{300}\) Moreover, after witnessing Iran’s missile capability, the US extended its coercion to the IAEA by threatening the possible cut of US allocation to the agency. On 3 August 1998, in protest of Iran’s nuclear programme and its capability, the US House of Representatives voted to cut funding for the IAEA by the exact amount that the IAEA was assisting Iran with the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.\(^\text{301}\)

However, as David Kydd, an IAEA spokesman stated, “This action cannot influence this agency’s general policies”, US coercion on the IAEA could not lead to the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme. On 11 October 1998, despite elevated US sanctions, the Economic Council of Iran allocated 418,000 million rials, equivalent to 140 million US dollars, for the completion of the Bushehr power plant. Moreover, as it was denounced as a ‘double standard’ by Russia, the US unilateral accusation on Iran nuclear armament and economic sanction harmed international solidarity on Iran’s nuclear programme, which adversely affected the US coercive diplomacy. As the US failed to consolidate the “adequate International support”, Iran’s nuclear programme continued its progress. On 9 January 1999, Yevgeniy Adamov, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, stated the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant would be finished by 2000 or 2001.

The Clinton administration again intensified its sanctions to curb the nuclear cooperation between Iran and Russia. On 12 January 1999, US National Security Advisor Samuel Berger announced US sanctions against three Russian entities, D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology, the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology, and the Moscow Aviation Institute, for aiding Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

As the US coercive diplomacy continued, on 16 March 1999, Kamal Kharazi, the Minister of foreign affairs, met with Mohammed Al-Baradi, the director of the IAEA, and Wolfgang Hoffman, the executive secretary of the CTBT, to reiterate the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and show appreciation to the IAEA for its support for Iran’s nuclear programme against US coercion. Iran strengthened its justification of the nuclear programme by emphasizing its observance of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, Iran succeeded in the

enhancement of missile deterrence for its counter coercive diplomacy against US coercion. On 29 April 1999, Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani stated that Iran, “has a considerable number” of deployed Shahab-3 missiles that could be launched at any time to strike Israel.\(^{306}\)

On 20 July 1999, with no inducements left to coerce Iran, the US passed a bill that degrades its coercive diplomacy; freeze the allocated funds for the IAEA. The US House of Representatives passed a measure that the Secretary of the State could control the release of the IAEA funds to facilitate coercion on Iran’s nuclear programme. On 14 March 2000, President Clinton signed the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 to take punitive measures against any individual or organization that provided any material aid to Iran’s nuclear or any other WMD programme.\(^ {307}\) The legislation also cut considerable funding from the US-Russia space station project unless Russia demonstrated a commitment against the Iranian nuclear weapons programme. However, pressuring the IAEA based on weak accusation on its support to possible Iran nuclear weapon programme was placing US into a corner.

During the second term of the presidency, the Clinton administration not only put pressure on Iran, China, Russia, but also Ukraine, Czech and IAEA, to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme. The coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration show a partial success since it restrained the development of Iran’s nuclear programme, such as the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor and turned down the international nuclear cooperation of China, Ukraine, Czech, South Africa, Spain, Argentine, etc. to Iran. However, the US neither succeeded to dismantle the Iran nuclear programme nor built its justification for coercive diplomacy. As US sustained the adamant stance of prohibiting the peaceful use of atomic energy of Iran, it create the room for Iran to implement its counter coercive diplomacy to take the advantage in developing its nuclear programme. Moreover, since the Iran nuclear capability had increased with is advancement of missile technology by counter coercing US coercion, it could be considered that the coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration was more of a failure.

On the contrary, the contention process of coercive and counter coercive diplomacy was partial success for Iran. Although there were many failures of nuclear cooperation by the coercive diplomacy of Clinton administration, Iran successfully sustained a close relation with Russia and secured its legitimacy of the nuclear programme by observing the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Moreover, as Iranian ambassador to Russia, Mehdi Safar, stated, the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant was nearly 40 percent finished on 22 May 2000. 308 Iran did make some progress on its nuclear programme. However, the most crucial factor in evaluating Iran’s success was its advancement of nuclear deterrence by acquiring the ability to strike Israel and other close US allies, as well as the US military bases in the region. The advancement of Iran’s missile deterrence means the increment of enforcement cost for the US coercive diplomacy.

The damaged justification of the US coercion could also be counted as the success of the Iran counter coercive diplomacy. Since Iran kept its nuclear programme under the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement, all the US coercive inducements that had been implemented to Iran’s nuclear programme defamed the US coercive diplomacy by influencing favourable conditions of its success, the ‘Adequate Domestic and International Support’. The < Figure 4-5> shows how the contention was set and resulted.

<Figure 4-5> The Contention Model of the US and Iran during the Khatami Period

4.4 An Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Bush Administration and the Counter Coercive Diplomacy of Iran

4.4.1 Background

During the US presidential campaign in 2000, presidential candidate George W. Bush declared his foreign policy would be based on ‘realistic internationalism’ that focused on the establishment of peace through its strength, the US military force.

Robert B. Zoellick, the US Trade Representative during the first term of the Bush administration, disclosed the principles of Bush’s foreign policy: 1) pursue US national interest based on US power, 2) build and sustain coalitions and alliances, 3) recognize international agreements and institutions as a means of an objective, not a form of ‘political therapy’, 4) accept the revolutionary change of the environment in global politics and security, and 5) realize the evils that hate and confront the US. He argued the Bush administration would lead the US to a diplomatic success reminiscent of the Reagan administration if the five principles were well-projected in the US foreign
Accordingly, Condoleezza Rice, then foreign policy adviser to Bush’s presidential campaign, also argued for ‘selective intervention’ based on geopolitical priority rather than Clinton’s humanitarian intervention with multilateral, liberal internationalism. In comparison to the Clinton administration, Bush’s foreign policy was the US Internationalism, which put a higher value on military strength and alliance to intensify the US centric world order.  

Bush’s policy stance of emphasizing US power and the US centric alliance was also reflected in its perception on International Organization. As George W. Bush stated “I will never place US troops under U.N. command…America will pay its dues but only if the U.N.’s bureaucracy is reformed… Our goal is a fellowship of strong, not weak, nations. And this requires both more American consultation and more American leadership”,  Bush’s priority was cooperation with its democratic alliances rather than International Organizations which included the UN.

Bush openly criticized the multilateralism of the Clinton administration by accusing it of having weakened the ties of their allies and losing the credibility of US leadership. The criticism also influenced the US Middle East policy of ‘dual containment’. The Bush administration did not believe in the virtuous circle of ‘dual containment’ or that the containment of Iran and Iraq would bring a better environment for the Israel-Palestine peace process or that the reciprocal interaction between the two would eventually solve the regional problem. By judging Clinton’s proactive mediator role in the Israel-Palestine peace process as non-beneficial to its national interest, Bush denied engaging in the Israel-Palestine peace process as an active mediator despite the requests of Yasser Arafat and Hosni Mubarak.


By comparison, Bush’s policy on the regional ‘rogues’, Iran and Iraq, was more determined and specified. The Bush administration sustained a hard-line policy on Saddam’s Iraq and even declared a possible military intervention. Admittedly, there was a moderate decision making group in the Bush administration that counterbalanced the aggressive US’s Iran and Iraq policy, such as Colin Powell, the Secretary of the state, and Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State. However, after 9/11, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, who were backed by hardliners in the Pentagon, took the initiative in the decision-making process of the US foreign policy.

4.4.1.1 The Bush Administration after the 9/11 Crisis

The 9/11 crisis, which was a direct strike on the mainland of the hyper power, was a staggering blow. As explained as the ‘Paradox of American power’ by Joseph Nye, the 9/11 crisis led a fundamental change in the US’ foreign policy.³¹² The hard-line foreign policy of the Bush administration shifted to a more extreme stance, the so-called ‘offensive realism’ or ‘Neo-conservative.’

As George W. Bush stated on the very day of 9/11, “This will be a monumental struggle between good and evil. But goodwill prevails”.³¹³ Bush dealt the 9/11 crisis in a dichotomy manner. This soon became the stance of the US foreign policy: ‘War on Terrorism’; “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”.³¹⁴ If a nation defined war as one of the tools in diplomatic process, it could be stopped when the adversary complied with the request of enforcer and abandoned its will to resist. However, if the war became a battle of good versus evil, there is no room for negotiation and compromise. The Bush administration even implemented a law that could violate human rights and freedom to detain POWs from Afghanistan and Iraq by using extraterritorial jurisdictions at Guantanamo Bay.³¹⁵


The US even declared the ‘pre-emptive strike’ against the security threat. John Lewis Gaddis bolstered the idea by arguing that the previous presidents such as Quincy Adams, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson had never abandoned US rights on pre-emptive measures.\(^{316}\) However, as Jacques Derrida criticized the US justification of a pre-emptive strike and its war against ‘rogues’ as a homologous discourse and structure, which lacks in logic with many contradictions,\(^{317}\) in a long term, it degraded the US foreign policy. The weakly justified and controversial doctrine of the Bush administration had soon revealed its limits. The US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme was not an exception. The Bush doctrine and the discourse of “axis of evil” created a more favourable environment for Iran to resist the US coercion.

After 9/11, the Bush administration evaluated that the International Arms Control regime based on ‘Idealism’ such as NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapon Convention, was not enough to solve the nonproliferation problem. Thus, the US decided to bring peace and security through its military dominance and economic power. On January 2002, the Bush administration released its Nuclear Posture Review. Through the NPR, the Bush administration announced a ‘New Triad System’ in which nuclear weapons could be utilized as a means of pre-emptive strikes on non-nuclear weapon states such as Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Syria, and Libya.

According to a series of the Bush administration’s policy reviews, the US’ nuclear strategy clarified three key axes: 1) counter proliferation against the actual use of WMD, 2) the nonproliferation of the WMD, and 3) consequence management as damage control of the US being attacked by the WMD. The counter proliferation covered the interdiction of nuclear weapon technology and fissile material transfer. It also included active and passive intensification of the nuclear deterrence, such as a pre-emptive strike and missile defence. The nonproliferation of WMD was to implement the active nonproliferation diplomacy, strengthen the multilateral regime, increase threat reduction cooperation, such as the Nunn-Lugar programme, and the utilization of various sanctions. The WMD consequence management was basically the crisis management of


the US government after being attacked by WMD. As displayed in the policy reviews, after 9/11, the Bush administration displayed its will of active prevention on nuclear proliferation.

The nuclear programme of Iran was a good target to test the strengthened US nonproliferation policy. Thus, on 14 August 2002, when the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, or the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, or MEK, claimed Iran had a covert nuclear weapon programme, although one of the Bush administration’s reasons for the attack on Iraq in 2003 was Iraq’s sheltering of the MEK, the US took the MEK allegation to justify the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. On 13 December 2002, after CNN aired a coverage based on the ISIS report about the suspicious covert Iranian nuclear facility, the Bush administration used it as leverage to implement a more hard-line coercive diplomacy on Iran. Rather than using a stick and carrot to derive Iran’s compliance, the Bush administration set the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme as a pre-condition for any further negotiation. It was the Bush administration’s ‘pure coercion’ coercive diplomacy. As it was revealed in CONPLAN 8022, the Bush administration decided to execute bilateral and multilateral sanctions backed by its military dominance to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme.

4.4.2 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy between Bush and Khatami

The hard-line policy of the Bush administration gathered momentum after MEK’s allegation on Iran’s covert nuclear programme and the related CNN report later that year on the nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Natanz and Arak. However, MEK’s allegation on Iran’s covert nuclear programme was patchy. The Uranium Conversion Facility in Isfahan was operating under the supervision of the IAEA from the beginning and the construction of heavy water reactor in Arak was under no duty to report to the IAEA according to the Safeguards Agreement.

The problem was the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, which was also found to be under construction and unreported to the IAEA but claimed to be tested the centrifuge by simulation. Iran had not informed the IAEA about the simulation test of the Natanz enrichment facility. Moreover, the Chinese imported components that had been used in the facility were also not reported to the IAEA. Thus, it increased the suspicion and concern of the western countries on Iran’s nuclear programme and of its purpose. However, the construction of the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility and simulation test without injecting the nuclear fuel could not be considered as problems by international law since the IAEA Safeguards agreement that Iran had signed only required them to report to the IAEA six months prior to the actual introduction of nuclear fuel into the facility. At the time, Iran did not sign the 93+2 additional protocol.

In the IAEA additional protocol standards, Iran’s unreported construction of the enrichment facility at Natanz was a breach of IAEA regulations. However, this was not the case since Iran had not signed one. Iran had not agreed to the ‘subsidiary arrangement’ at the time. The ‘subsidiary arrangement,’ the so-called Code 3.1 was the regulation that the members of the NPT must report the construction of a nuclear facility when a decision is made to build one. However, without confirmation of these specific details, the Bush administration amplified their suspicions and concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and attempted to build a ‘Sense of Urgency’, ‘Strong Leadership’ and ‘Adequate Domestic and International Support’ for its coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. It was clearly revealed on 16 March 2005, when President Bush said Iran’s hidden nuclear programme had been discovered “because a dissident group pointed it out to the world.” Later that day, White House acknowledged that the dissident group which was cited by the president was the National Council of Resistance of Iran, or NCRI, the organization which largely consisted of MEK members. 319

4.4.2.1 The Absence of Negotiation and the ‘Pure Coercion’ of the Bush Administration: Nuclear Talks between IAEA, EU3 and Iran

After 9/11, the decision making process of the Bush’s first term was dominated by the

technocrats, the so-called neocons: Vice President Dick Cheney, Chief of Staff to the Vice President Lewis Libby, National Security Council Senior Director for Near East and North African Affairs Eliott Abrams, Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counter proliferation and Homeland Defence Robert Joseph, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John R. Bolton.

Since the neocons evaluated the international treaty and multilateral agreement as non-beneficial and sometimes severely degrading US sovereignty and its foreign policy, the Bush administration preferred the implementation of unilateral measures excluding cooperation with multilateral organizations such as UN and NATO. This was also directly reflected during the first term of Bush’s nonproliferation policy on Iran’s nuclear programme. When the Iraq war ended with Bush’s declaration of victory at the USS Abraham Lincoln on 1 May 2003, there was the increasing sense in Washington that Iran would be the next target.

The Bush administration aimed the CVID of the Iran nuclear programme and went even further by not accepting Iran’s peaceful use of atomic energy, which was totally legitimate under the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Similar to the North Korean nuclear case, the Bush administration set the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme as a precondition for any negotiation. That is, instead of inducing Iran to abandon its nuclear programme through the stick and carrot method, the US attempted to implement ‘pure coercion’; possible pre-emptive strikes, economic sanctions, UNSC resolutions and omnidirectional pressure to coerce the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme. The persuasive and compensative inducements such as diplomatic and economic normalization, easing the sanction, the de-listing of Iran from ‘state sponsors of terrorism’, and the investment on Iran’s energy sector, the support were not given as a means of coercive diplomacy. It was not the archetypal coercive diplomacy that derived the compliance of coercee by simultaneously providing the ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’. Rather, it was the maximization of the stick, the coercive inducement and pressure to make Iran abandon its nuclear programme.

The ‘pure coercion’ coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration was become clearer when the Washington Post disclosed on May 2005 that the Concept of Operation Plan 8022, the so-called ‘Global Strike,’ had been completed in November 2003. The ‘Global Strike’ was the substantial military implementation of Bush’s upgraded nonproliferation policy, and the ‘New Triad system,’ which was announced in the US Nuclear Posture Review in 2002.

Admittedly, compared to Operational Plan, CONPLAN is not yet a detailed military plan which only includes a small scale military operation. However, while OPLAN was rather a defensive form of military operation to response to actual or potential threat for which military operations may be required, the CONPLAN 8022 was more of an offensive concept of military operation by allowing a pre-emptive strike, which included nuclear strikes when the nuclear activities of North Korea and Iran were detected.

1) The Iranian Nuclear Crisis and the First IAEA Resolution of September 2003

Irrespective of MEK’s allegation on Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme, Iran continued its development of the nuclear programme. On 21 August 2002, Alexander Rumyuantsev, the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, stated that Russia had signed all the necessary agreements to import the radioactive fuel waste from the Iranian Bushehr plant. It means Iran had succeeded to sustain its cooperation with Russia.

In order to impose high enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy, Iran continued to secure its justification of nuclear programme through IAEA. On 16 September 2002, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, Director of the AEOI, addressed to the 46th general conference of the IAEA that Iran had been the vanguard of the advocates of the nuclear-free zones and had played an active role in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East since 1974.

323 Hans M. Kristensen, Global Strike :A Chronology of the Pentagon’s New Offensive Strike Plan, Federation of American Scientists, 2006, pp. 4-9
324 “Russia to import Iranian nuclear fuel waste,“ Agence France-Presse, Aug 21, 2002.
Despite Iran’s denial of the nuclear armament, its will to observe the NPT regime and the assurance of the Russia, the US did not hold back its suspicion on Iran’s nuclear programme. On 12 December 2002, after CNN aired satellite pictures of two additional nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, which was alleged by ISIS as the secret nuclear fuel cycle facilities, the US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated that, “Iran is actively working to develop nuclear weapons capability,” and declared, in a CNN interview on December 13, that Iran’s energy needs do not justify these nuclear facilities.

Admittedly, Iran flares more natural gas annually than the equivalent energy its future reactor could produce. Thus, the alleged power-generation applications of the $800 million dollar Bushehr nuclear plant and the two follow-up nuclear reactors seem neither economically justified nor truthful to the US. However, whether nuclear programme of Iran seems non-profitable, the development of “peaceful use of Atomic energy” is Iran’s sovereign rights under the NPT regime.

Although the MEK’s allegation and CNN report was a good opportunity for the US to build its momentum to push Iran, due to the preparation of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration could not afford to utilize its resources to execute a measure to coerce Iran. Thus, the US attempted to indirectly influence Iran’s nuclear programme by offering a lucrative economic package to Russia in exchange for halting construction of the nuclear reactor in Bushehr and other nuclear cooperation with Tehran. However, as Yuri Bespalko, a spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry stated “Americans are being rather sly when they offer this kind of swap... It’s better to have a bird in the hand than two in the bush”, Russia rejected the proposal. 326

Despite US allegations and sabotage on Iran’s nuclear programme, Iran continued to show its ‘Sense of Urgency’ on the nuclear programme and development under the NPT regime. On 9 February 2003, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami declared that Iran had discovered and extracted indigenous uranium in the Yazd area. He also stated, “It is our legitimate right to obtain nuclear energy for peaceful aims....We are ready to accept IAEA

inspectors to check our nuclear activities in order to reveal the lies told by others.” 327 On 10 February 2003, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, director of the AEOI, stated that Iran was not interested in nuclear arms production but sought to acquire nuclear know-how to generate electricity to meet its energy demands. As he put it, “the AEOI started its activities by drilling special wells in Arkedan of Yazd…. With the completion of the Isfahan factory in the near future, we hope to complete the fuel cycle and indigenously produce fuel for our plants.” Iran disclosed its will to secure a full-fledged nuclear programme. 328

On 10 March 2003, the standoff of the US and Iran entered a new phase when the director of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, announced an IAEA inspection on the Natanz nuclear facility of 22 February 2003. As ElBaradei stated, Iran’s enrichment facility was “very sophisticated” which is in need of “full transparent” and “sign the additional protocol”, 329 the US who had expressed their discontentment of the IAEA inspection immediately coerced Iran to accept the IAEA additional protocol. During the Preparatory Commission for the NPT Review Conference on April 28 to 9 May 2003, US Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf accused Iran of cheating on its obligation under the NPT, stating that Iran has an “alarming, clandestine programme” and “is going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international inspections in North Korea and Iraq.” 330 The IAEA March report played an important role in consolidating France, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to support the US argument on Iran to accept the IAEA additional protocol.

It was based on the view that if Iran’s objective was the peaceful use of nuclear programme, it would be much safer and more productive to precede its nuclear programme with IAEA cooperation under the additional protocol. However, Iran had a plausible reason to be reluctant in accepting the additional protocol. Since Iran had suffered from US sabotage on its legitimate nuclear programme under the IAEA

327 “Khatami says Iran mines uranium for nuclear plant,” Reuters, Feb 9, 2003.
328 “Aqazadeh says Iran seeks nuclear know how to generate electricity, not weapons,” IRNA, Feb 10, 2003.
Safeguards Agreement, signing the additional protocol would make it almost impossible for Iran to precede its nuclear development.

However, Iran had to comply with US coercion to a certain degree since the US succeeded the international support on its coercive diplomacy. Moreover, as the Bush administration had displayed its ‘Sense of Urgency’ and ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’ on the Iran nuclear programme through the Iraq war, Iran did not have many options to choose from after witnessing the fall of Baghdad and was in danger of becoming the next possible target.

According to Tim Guldimann, then Swiss ambassador to Tehran, Iran sent a forward looking negotiation agenda to the US on 1 May 2003. In the disclosed document by Guldimann, the Khatami administration suggested full transparency on its nuclear programme including the 93+2 additional protocol and full cooperation and the exchange of all the information on the war on terrorism as the agenda of the negotiation. However, as Mousavian’s interview with Tim Guldimann revealed, the Bush administration was in firm stance that Iranian nuclear dismantlement is the precondition for the further negotiation. Thus, US denounced Tim Guldimann and Switzerland for passing the memorandum of Iran nuclear negotiation. If Iran’s offer was a fact, as Tim Guldimann claimed, it was the golden opportunity to implement a more intensified supervision on Iran’s nuclear programme. However, the Bush administration, after experiencing a victory in the wars with Iraq and Afghanistan, seemed disinterested in negotiating for the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme, but aimed to negotiate the nuclear dismantlement of Iran as a precondition.

Although the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice denied having received Tim Guldimann’s memorandum, Congressman Robert Ney, Trita Parsi, and former senior National Security Council official Flynt Leverett and Gary Sick confirmed the Iranian high official had said subsequently that the deal was from the supreme leader. On 9 December 2013, John Kerry also admitted to Tim Guldimann’s memorandum and criticized the Bush administration. He was the first senior US official who stated the

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proposal was real.  

On 6 June 2003, the IAEA released the first IAEA Board Statement on the Iran nuclear programme based on its inspection in February 2003. In the statement, the IAEA criticized five points that Iran had failed to clarify regarding its nuclear programme and requested Iran’s approval of the IAEA’s additional protocol to restore its credibility on the nuclear programme. The five points were that they had: 1) failed to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991, 2) failed to declare the use of the imported uranium and related nuclear activities, 3) failed to declare the facility which had received, stored and reprocessed such materials, 4) failed to provide timely updated design information on the nuclear facility including the Tehran research reactor, and 5) failed to provide the information about the nuclear facility in Isfahan and Arak. However, since Iran had not signed the IAEA additional protocol, the five points which had been criticized by the IAEA were not in violation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Thus, the IAEA Board Statement could not declare that Iran had violated the NPT.

Although the IAEA did not stipulate that Iran had breached the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the IAEA Board Statement which cast doubt on Iran’s nuclear programme worked against the ‘strategic environment’ of Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy. According to ElBaradei, all the member states except Cuba requested Iran to be more transparent and to build confidence with the international community at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in June 2003. Immediately, the US grouped a hard-line bloc with the United Kingdom, Austria and Canada to denounce Iran’s unreported nuclear activities as ‘proof of Tehran’s intention to produce nuclear weapons’ and demanded Iran to unconditionally accept the additional protocol and suspend the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility.

Nevertheless the unyielding stance of the US, all the attempt to suppress Iran nuclear programme without IAEA confirmation of Iran’s breach on NPT lacks in justification. It gave space for Iran to play their diplomatic game. On 18 June 2003, Iran’s ambassador

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to the IAEA, Ali Salehi, stated that Iran would not allow the IAEA more intrusive inspections but would consider the matter if the IAEA stops using the “language of force.”\textsuperscript{335} Iran disclosed it would not sign the unconditional IAEA additional protocol and continued its development on the nuclear programme. On 2 July 2003, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, the Chief of AEOI stated, “Beside Bushehr, we intend to build several more nuclear power stations with the overall power capacity of 6,000 megawatts, and we are offering Russia a chance to take up this opportunity.”\textsuperscript{336}

On 7 July 2003, the Bush administration imposed economic sanctions on six private companies for selling WMD technology to Iran. The sanction included a ban on trading with and receiving assistance from the US, which would remain for two years. The six companies were: Taian Foreign Trade General Corporation of China, Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant of China, Liyang Yunlong Chemical Equipment Group Company of China, China North Industries Corporation, China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation.\textsuperscript{337}

Before the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on September 2003, the Bush administration decided to coerce Iran by pressuring the IAEA and the international community. During an interview with the Associated Press, then Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, John Bolton stated, “One has to wonder whether international regime that finds opposition in the form of states party to the agreement are ever going to work,”\textsuperscript{338} and requested the firm action of the international community against Iran by emphasizing the ‘Path of Action’ that the Bush administration had taken in the Iraq war to eliminate the threat of WMD.

As the US successfully displayed ‘Strength of Motivation’ and ‘Sense of Urgency’ on Iran nuclear programme by possible unilateral intervention on Iran after the end of Iraq War, Iran had to send a positive sign of accepting the IAEA additional protocol. Although it was not required by the IAEA Safeguards Agreement that Iran had signed,

\textsuperscript{338}Charles J. Hanley, “What ultimately is found in Iraq may determine future inspections, enforcement”, \textit{Associate Press}, Aug 21, 2003.
Iran even approved of the environment sampling on its nuclear facility. 339

Despite Iran’s participation and support on the IAEA inspection, the resolution which was adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on September 2003 was too harsh and demanding of Iran. As director of AEOI Gholamreza Aqazedah stated “It seems that the resolution has been engineered in such a manner to guarantee its non-implementation…it should, to promote the effectiveness of the safeguards and non-proliferation regime”, the requirement level of the IAEA resolution was impossible for Iran to implement.

The IAEA September resolution adjured Iran to immediately accept the additional protocol, suspend all enrichment related nuclear activities and the full declaration of imported nuclear material in the past. According to the resolution, Iran had to complete the report within 50 days, in which the deadline was 31 October 2003, and guarantee unlimited access, inspection to and sampling for the IAEA.

As explains in the figure < Figure 4-6>, the adoption of the IAEA resolution on 13 September 2003 could be considered a partial success of the US coercive diplomacy. The Bush administration successfully carried the momentum of victory in the Iraq war to intensify the ‘Sense of Urgency’, ‘Strength of Motivation’ and ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’ to coerce Iran. Moreover, it also gained ‘Adequate Domestic and International Support’ through the IAEA Board statement, which had led to the resolution. However, the excessive US demand which was based on lack of clear evidence soon paid its price.

<Figure 4-6> The Success of the US Coercion and IAEA resolution September 2003

2) The Instant Bounce Back of Iran: the Tehran Agreement and IAEA Resolution of November 2003

The IAEA resolution of September 2003 was highly intrusive and offensive to Iran who had been observed the previous IAEA Safeguards Agreement. On 19 September 2003, Khatami once again denied nuclear armament but also announced its continuous development of the nuclear programme.340

On the same day of Khatami’s statement, the voice of the hardliners in Tehran was also disclosed. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the Guardian Council of Iran, stated that Iran should consider leaving the NPT after international pressures on its nuclear programme. On 21 September 2003, Jannati again urged Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT by stating, “What is wrong with considering this treaty on nuclear energy and pulling out of it? North Korea withdrew.” 341

The unreasonable and unrealistic demands of the IAEA’s September resolution caused the formation of diverse opinion groups within Iran. According to Hossein Mousavian, they could be categorized into six groups, each seeking a different approach: 1) The

confrontational approach, 2) The nuclear rights approach, 3) The grand bargaining approach, 4) The eastern bloc approach, 5) The conciliatory approach, and 6) The pragmatic approach. However, regardless of the inclination whether it be reformist, pragmatist, hardliner, etc., the IAEA September resolution itself was a big challenge to Iran’s dignity. Ironically, the US coercion created the strong domestic support to bolster the Iran counter coercive diplomacy.

At a glance, it seemed the IAEA September resolution was a success of the US coercive diplomacy. However, as Thomas Schelling defined one of the conditions for successful coercion as being, “The coercer has to guarantee that the current surrender will not lead to more requests to the opponent”, the character of the resolution degraded and limited the US coercive diplomacy in a long term.

In Iran’s domestic politics, the policy option of the reformist who could strengthen diplomatic relations with the US shrank as public opposition grew against the US and the international community. A large scale demonstration took place, chanting for the withdrawal of the NPT against the accusation on Iran which was based on the IAEA additional protocol that Iran had yet to sign. The ‘strength of motivation’ of Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy was enhanced accordingly.

The weakly justified US coercion also degraded the international support and consolidation of not only Russia and China, but also with the regional allies of the US. On 30 September 2003, Egypt and Saudi Arabia criticized the IAEA of being pro-Israel in their dealings with Iran by singling them out and therefore causing a serious threat to the stability of the entire region. Then Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, claimed at a UN General Assembly, “What surprises us is that at a time when the IAEA is intensifying its efforts and monitoring NPT member countries, we see that it continues to ignore the rejection of Israel in not joining the treaty.”

The Khatami administration’s counter strategy against the US and the IAEA resolution was to secure Iran’s nuclear rights, stop Iran’s nuclear programme from being referred to

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the UNSC, defame anti-Iran US accusation to degrade the international consolidation on Iran nuclear programme and lastly, to engage with the international community for the support on Iran. On 6 October 2003, Kamal Kharrazi stated, “We will not allow anyone to deprive us of our right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and in particular our right to enrich fuel for our power stations.” However, he confirmed Iran’s commitment to the NPT and reassured that they would cooperate with IAEA inspection. 344

On 16 October 2003, the director of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, visited Iran to avert an escalation of the crisis over the IAEA resolution’s October deadline. The meeting between Rouhani and ElBaradei took place at the Sa’dabad palace on October 17, 2003. During the meeting, Iran and IAEA clarified the ‘suspension of Iranian nuclear activities’ as ceasing the introduction of gas into the nuclear centrifuge. 345 As Mossavian argued, the suspension could be seen as a much more moderated interpretation of the September resolution. Since the gas introduction to the centrifuge was not a serious impairment to Iran’s nuclear programme, it opened up the possibility for an Iran nuclear agreement.

On 18 October 2003, Iran began negotiations with Mohamed ElBaradei over the signing of an additional protocol, which would allow inspectors open access to all of Iran’s suspected nuclear facilities. 346 On 19 October 2003, soon after negotiations with the IAEA, the foreign ministers of EU3 – the United Kingdom, France and Germany - flew to Iran to discuss the implementation of the IAEA September resolution. On 21 October 2003, Iran conceded to the demands of the IAEA after talks with EU3 and confirmed the signing of the Additional Protocol, which would approve of open and unannounced IAEA inspections, as per the ‘Tehran agreement.’ Iran also agreed to suspend all “uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities,” which was the suspension of gas introduction to the nuclear centrifuge. 347

The Teheran agreement was the success of Iran counter coercive diplomacy. By appropriately observing the NPT and IAEA inspection, Iran secured its enrichment

programme and justification of its counter coercive diplomacy against the US. Moreover, it prevented the Iran nuclear dossier to be referred to UNSC and even consolidated the international support for Iran nuclear programme.

On 12 November 2003, the IAEA released the report that no evidence of a covert nuclear weapon programme had been found in Iran. However, it expressed concerns regarding its production of plutonium, which was often associated with bomb-making. Although the IAEA did not define its discoveries as Iran’s violation of the NPT, there was a discrepancy between the result of the IAEA inspection and the previous denial of Iran.348 A trace of enriched uranium was found at the pilot enrichment facility, Kalaye Electric Company, and at the Natanz nuclear facility. These facts could be used as unfavourable evidence against Iran. Indeed, on the day of the IAEA report release, US Undersecretary of State John Bolton evaluated the IAEA’s report on Iran as “impossible to believe” and argued the detection of enrichment trace underscored the US stance that “the massive and covert Iranian efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons programme.” 349 However, on 13 November 2003, former director of the IAEA Hans Blix questioned the U.S’ claim that Iran was engaged in developing nuclear weapons by saying there was no “direct evidence.” He also added that Iran’s civilian reactors were not a worry. 350

As it was shown that the US secretary of the state Colin Powell had failed to persuade the 25 EU states, including its future members, to declare Iran’s nuclear programme as having violated the NPT,351 the results of the IAEA inspection were insufficient to be referred as an agenda at the UNSC. The undeclared enriched uranium, which was detected at the Kalaye electric company, was confirmed to be a small amount of 1.2 percent enriched uranium-235. Moreover, the 35 percent uranium enrichment trace that was found at the Natanz nuclear facility was due to the contaminated nuclear components from Ukraine. The IAEA’s November 2003 report stated it found “no evidence” from the previous undeclared nuclear activities of Iran that could relate it to a

nuclear weapons programme.

The IAEA November resolution, which was adopted on 26 November 2003, was far different from the IAEA September resolution. The US who had intended to refer Iran’s nuclear programme at the UNSC by accusing Iran’s noncompliance with the NPT regime, was weakened. At the 2004 November IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the member states acknowledged Iran’s voluntary suspension on its nuclear enrichment programme and the phrase that stipulated Iran’s non-compliance of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement was lifted in its statement. The contention is briefly explained in <Figure 4-7>.

Although the November resolution adopted Paragraph 8’s so-called ‘triggering mechanism,’ which could directly refer Iran’s nuclear programme at the UNSC in case of Iran’s violation, it could be considered as a failure or a setback of the US coercive diplomacy, which aimed to utilize the IAEA resolution to build up measures to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme. Again, the objective of US coercive diplomacy which surpasses the NPT –no enrichment- could not derive the dismantlement of Iran nuclear programme or the decrement of its capability.

<Figure 4-7> The Success of Iran’s Counter Coercion and the IAEA November Resolution 2003
3) The Continued Contention and the Paris Agreement of November 2004

On 18 December 2003, Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s representative to the IAEA, signed the 93+2 Additional Protocol over Iran’s nuclear programme. As the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, disclosed the possibility of direct talks with Iran on 30 December 2003, it seemed issues of Iran nuclear programme would reach an agreement. However, when new technical problems and disclosures occurred during Iran’s implementation of the IAEA resolution, contention continued between the US and Iran.

In a comprehensive document submitted to the IAEA on 23 October 2003, Iran only admitted its possession of a P-1 nuclear centrifuge. However, after Muammar Gaddafi announced his commitment to disclose and dismantle all WMD programs in Libya on 19 December 2003, the US acquired information that Iran had the blueprint for a P-2 type nuclear centrifuge. The P-2 centrifuge relied on stronger maraging-steel rotors, which would improve speed, hence yielding a higher Separating Work Unit. The speed of the P-2 centrifuge could reach 90,000 RPM, which was about 50 percent higher than that of P-1 design centrifuge.

On 28 January 2004, Iran admitted to the purchase of the P-2 centrifuge design in 1995 from
the A.Q khan network. Since Iran’s omission of purchasing the P-2 centrifuge blueprint and its research in the October’s declaration was perceived as a deliberate concealment by the EU3, it created an unfavourable environment for Iran. For EU3, the revelation of the P-2 centrifuge, which was not mentioned in the October declaration, could be considered as ample evidence of Iran’s ill intentions. However, in legal terms, Iran’s purchase of the P-2 centrifuge design was also difficult to be dealt with as a violation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

As it was stated in the IAEA Board of Governors resolution on February 2004, when Iran’s October report was submitted to the IAEA, Iran had not yet signed the IAEA Additional Protocol and the objectives of the October report was to clarify Iran’s past observance on its previous IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Thus, although Iran’s concealment on the purchase of the P-2 centrifuge was a clear breach under the IAEA Additional Protocol, technically it was not a violation of the NPT regime for Iran who did not yet signed or ratified the additional protocol.

If the US continuously accuse Iran’s past nuclear activities, which it was not bound to observe under previous IAEA Safeguards Agreements, as a reason for referring to the UNSC or more severe coercion, it directly contradicted Thomas Schelling’s condition on the success of coercive diplomacy where he stated, “The coercer has to guarantee that the current surrender will not lead to more requests to the opponent.” However, despite the continuous execution of coercive diplomacy, US ignored this basic logic of compellence.

On January 2004, when Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, led by Hassan Rouhani, visited Vienna to discuss the further implementation of Iran’s Additional Protocol, another problem that had not been reported in the Iran’s October declaration was raised: the detection of polonium. Since polonium is a highly radioactive neutron that could be applied to implosion-type designed nuclear weapons as the initiator for the explosion, it strengthened US claims on Iran’s nuclear armament. However, again, the agreed Safeguards Agreement that Iran signed in 1974 did not indicate the need for polonium and bismuth radiation to be reported to the IAEA. Moreover, the Tehran Research Reactor, where the radiation was detected, had been under the supervision of the IAEA for the past thirty years.

Despite the plausible reason for Iran to challenge the accusation, new detections of Iranian nuclear activities which were inconsistent with its October 2003 declaration was not beneficial to Iran. The ‘concept of suspension’ of Iran’s nuclear programme had intensified to cease production and assembly of centrifuges, which included the construction of nuclear facilities. The US obstinately cornered Iran to dismantle its nuclear programme. However, even George Tenet, the director of CIA admitted, the US had no “concrete proof,” or any “actionable information” on Iran’s nuclear weapon programme.

US coercion without hard evidence could only cause severe damage on its legitimacy of coercion. The degraded justification of the coercive diplomacy had a negative impact on ‘Adequate Domestic and International Support,’ which inversely reduced the incompliant cost of Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy. Indeed, the lack of evidence later weighed in Iran’s favour to reach the Paris Agreement.

However, whether the request was reasonable or not, in the face of strong US allegation on Iran’s nuclear weapon programme, Iran needed to find a technical solution to assure IAEA and the members of the IAEA Board of Governors that there was no nuclear weapon programme to neutralize the US coercive diplomacy. Therefore, Iran decided to accept an extended suspension on its nuclear programme and IAEA inspection, which would grant technical and legal justification to the Iran nuclear programme.

On 23 February 2004, in order to avoid the collapse of the negotiation, EU3 and Iranian officials met in Brussels and signed an agreement. Through the Brussels Agreement, Iran approved the intensified definition of suspension on its nuclear programme and agreed to cease the manufacturing of parts and assembly of centrifuges. In return, EU3 promised to support normalizing the Iran-IAEA nuclear cooperation for peaceful atomic use and close the Iran nuclear dossier at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in June 2004.

354 Ibid. p. 133
The US immediately opposed the Brussels Agreement. The US argued if the Iranian nuclear case was closed at the scheduled IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 2004, Iran would give up the ‘voluntary suspension’ and obtain nuclear armament. As Ken Brill, US ambassador to the IAEA stated on 26 February 2004, “Iran’s nuclear programme clearly geared to the development of nuclear weapons”, The US pressured the IAEA to refer Iran to the UN Security Council through the Paragraph 8 at the coming March 2004 IAEA Board of Governors meeting.\(^{356}\) However, again it was hasty coercion of the US which lacks in justification and consolidation of support from the international community.

The suspension of Iran nuclear enrichment facility and ratification of 93+ 2 additional protocol could effectively curb the Iran nuclear programme. Since Iran has to report any nuclear development to IAEA as soon as it plans to do so, the Brussels Agreement could bring effective control on Iran nuclear development. However, due to the excessive objective of the US coercive diplomacy on prompt CVID of Iran nuclear programme, the US had lost the opportunity.

On 13 March 2004, after five days of discussion, the IAEA Board of Governors issued a resolution that denied the Brussels Agreement of closing Iran’s nuclear dossier at the June 2004 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. All the Brussels Agreement was deferred to the result of the IAEA inspection and the issue of polonium, P-2 centrifuge, and trace of HEU, which had already been dealt with in Brussels Agreement. Moreover, all the issues were to be reopened in the following IAEA meetings.\(^{357}\)

Since the US was against the Brussels Agreement, the deferment could be considered as a success of the US coercion. However, it clearly contradicts conditions which favour the success the coercive diplomacy. If the coercree recognizes the crisis or the circumstance of conflict as zero-sum, coercree is highly likely to counter react.

Although the head of AEOI Gholamreza Aghazadeh announced its suspension of all nuclear enrichment activities and construction, he also stated Iran’s plan to set up a

\(^{356}\) “US Again Accuses Iran of Hiding Nuclear Programme,” Middle East Online, February 26, 2004

uranium conversion plant near Isfahan to send a clear message that the peaceful use of nuclear programme would not be abandoned. It was to build the ‘strength of motivation’ of Iran counter coercive diplomacy that securing the full-fledge nuclear programme is its objective.

On 18 June 2004, after four days of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, a resolution to settle Iran’s nuclear dossier at the following IAEA meeting in Brussels was released. However, the resolution was far from the Brussels Agreement of February 2004. Although it appreciated Iran’s efforts to observe the declaration under Articles 2 and 3 of its Additional Protocol, it also requested Iran to extend nuclear suspension and continue implementing the Additional Protocol for the reassurance of the international community to close Iran’s nuclear dossier.

In the framework of coercive diplomacy, the coercer has to guarantee that the current surrender will not lead to more requests to the opponent. However, the IAEA resolution was inconsistent with the Brussels Agreement which guaranteed the lifted of Iran nuclear programme from the IAEA agenda for the compliance of Iran on suspending its nuclear enrichment programme.

The IAEA Resolution of June 2004, which denied the closure of Iran’s nuclear dossier, initiated a crisis. Iran’s domestic situation was heightened by condemning Khatami’s conciliatory policy. His opposition group started to call for the withdrawal of the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement. In order to secure the ‘strength of motivation’ and its inducement of counter coercive diplomacy, Khatami sent a letter to the IAEA and EU3 about its plan to resume reassembling the centrifuge within a week after the IAEA June 2004 resolution. Iran also decided to convert 37 tonnes of yellowcake to uranium hexafluoride gas to counter coerce the US and the IAEA member states.

The US immediately denounced Iran’s re-initiation of the centrifuge plan. Many high officials in the Bush administration such as Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld

disclosed the possibility of a military strike on Iran by stating that they were, “testing all possible ways.” However, the US could not risk Iranian retaliation on a fragile Iraq.\textsuperscript{360} The coercive diplomacy is effective when they could establish the absolute escalation dominance and demand a justifiable request to the coercee with both coercive and compensative inducements. However, the US failed to meet the criteria.

Without any means to induce Iran to the compliance, the US could not stop the re-initiation of Iran nuclear programme. Iran gradually turns the screw to increase the tension by announcing its plan to produce 40 tons uranium hexafluoride. On 15 October 2004, Senior G8 representatives met in Washington to discuss Iran’s nuclear programme. Through the G8 meeting, the EU3 agreed on a comprehensive plan, the so-called “way out,” to offer to Iran: The total suspension of Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing activities for a clear verification of the IAEA inspection → Replace heavy water reactors to light water reactors → The provision of ‘objective guarantees’ that Iran would not divert materials that could be used as a nuclear weapon. In return, EU3 would recognize Iran’s right of peaceful use of atomic energy → do not support the referral of Iran’s nuclear case to UNSC and initiate negotiations to normalize relations with Iran.

However, Iran rejected EU3’s ‘way out’ offer as it did not specify Iran’s suspension period and the provision of ‘objective guarantees’ could be misused to stop Iran’s nuclear programme. Rather to comply with the coercion and demands of the US and the international community, Iran decided to counter coerce them through implementing its Uranium enrichment which is permissible under IAEA and NPT regime.\textsuperscript{361} The US allegation of Iran’s nuclear violation and its change definition of ‘nuclear suspension’ gave more room for Iran to implement its counter coercive diplomacy. Thus, Iran successfully widened the gap between the US and the EU3 who had different views on Iran enrichment programme.

On 5 November 2004, after a yearlong shaky relation and the blink of negotiation collapse, the EU3 and Iran gathered in Paris to ease tensions before the November 2004

IAEA Board of Governors meeting. As the result, as Figure 4-8 shows, the contention that had sparked after the revelation of P-2 centrifuge was lead to Paris agreement which was more favourable to Iran.

4) The Stalemate of the Paris Agreement and the End of the First Term of the Bush Administration

The Paris Agreement was quite a success for Iran. Firstly, it was an agreement that displayed the possible support of the international community on Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme. Second, the agreement acknowledged the suspension of Iran’s nuclear programme as a ‘voluntary and temporary confidence-building measure’. Lastly, as stated in the Paris Agreement, ‘The E3/EU recognizes Iran’s rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination,’ and judging Iran’s nuclear programme on the basis of past activities was opposed in the agreement.  

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After the Paris Agreement, Iran actively disclosed its aim of counter coercive diplomacy that Iran’s nuclear programme was not to be dealt with as an issue of the international community and the IAEA. Iran set its ‘objective guarantee’ as nuclear cooperation with the IAEA to settle its full-fledged nuclear programme, whereas the US continually claimed Iran to be a treacherous opponent with an ample amount of energy resources who did not need a nuclear enrichment and programme. On January 2005, Iran agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to visit the secret military site of Parchin, which had been denied until then. However, although Iran displayed its compliance to the IAEA request, Iran clarified its will to secure its full-fledge nuclear programme.

Moreover, Iran aimed to establish direct linkage with its nuclear programme and other agendas to strengthen the diplomatic ties with EU and international community to increase the enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy. On 17 January 2005, Iran presented a package deal of 33 articles to build a political and security relationship with EU3 at the meeting in Geneva. Through its package deal, Iran offered their full cooperation with the EU on combating terrorism, the elimination of WMD and the adoption of measures to prevent an unauthorized access to its nuclear capabilities and enrichment technology by any individual, group or state. In return, Iran requested the acceptance of a full-fledged nuclear programme, including uranium enrichment.

However, the EU3 rejected Iran’s offer since they wanted no enrichment related activities of Iran as the ‘objective guarantee’ of non-diversion. By witnessing the gap between the EU and Iran, US Vice-President Dick Cheney noted that Iran was, “right at the top” of the Bush administration’s ‘trouble spot’ list and raised the possible pre-emptive strike of Israel on Iran. However, as the situation in Iraq exacerbated, another US military intervention or military conflict seems distant from reality. Thus, the US coercion was not forbidding enough to make the Iran to believe the cost of incompliance will be large or reliable. Moreover, the aberrant US coercive diplomacy of pure coercion

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which lacked justification, compensative inducement and dialogue was losing its momentum on Iran nuclear programme.

Iran shrewdly seized the opportunity to execute its counter coercive diplomacy to increase its diplomatic measure against US coercion. While implementing the agreed accord of the Paris Agreement, Iran reached out to consolidate support from the international community. On 1 February 2005, director of AEOI Aghazadeh met the foreign ministers of Portugal and Belgium and flew to Japan on 9 February 2005 to discuss Iran’s nuclear programme with the Prime Minister of Japan, Junichirō Koizumi. On 13 February 2005, Hassan Rouhani, then chief nuclear negotiator, embarked on a diplomatic tour to Algeria, Tunis, Russia, Germany and France to request their cooperation on Iran’s nuclear issue.

Since Iran successfully strengthen its counter coercive diplomacy under the NPT regime and initiate its nuclear enrichment programme, the US can no longer ignore Iran. As the complaints increased from EU3 that non-participation of the US was preventing the resolution of Iran’s nuclear programme, the Bush administration had to abandon its Iran nuclear policy and form the P5+1 to sit with Iran to negotiate the Iran nuclear programme.

During the first term of presidency, the Bush administration set the CVID of Iran’s nuclear programme as a precondition to coerce Iran without a dialogue. However, as Iran counter coerced the US by observing the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, expand its diplomatic relation and increase its missile capability, the Bush administration did not have many options except the sustaining its economic sanctions and escalation dominance to pressure Iran.

The ‘pure coercion’ of the Bush administration was based on an overly optimistic view of US power that directly challenged the theory of coercive diplomacy, which was to maximize the complaints of the adversary with the ‘stick and carrot.’ Indeed, due to the US coercive diplomacy, Iran fell behind with its schedule for the nuclear development. However, Iran’s nuclear capability was secured and progressed through its counter

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coercive diplomacy by building the justification of its nuclear development and signing the international agreements on its nuclear programme.

The perception of ‘Iran’s nuclear suspension’ also shifted favourably to Iran from legally binding obligation to a ‘voluntary and confident building measure of Iran’ for further nuclear development. Moreover, as it succeeded the advancement of missile technology, Iran achieved a substantial level of nuclear deterrence. The Shahab 3 missile, which was successfully developed during the Clinton administration, became much more accurate and stabilized after several test fires during the first term of the Bush administration. The maximum effective range of Shahab 3 increased from 1,300km to 2,000km. 369 Moreover, on May 2005, Iran achieved a technological breakthrough of developing ICBM by launching two staged rockets with solid fuel missile motors. 370

Although the US slowed down Iran’s nuclear programme and succeeded in the suspension of Iran’s enrichment programme, the increased level of Iran’s nuclear deterrence and nuclear capability was a clear failure of the US coercive diplomacy. Moreover, the weakly justified unilateral coercive diplomacy led the advent of a more hard-line right wing regime in Iran, the Ahmadinejad administration. In 2005, in the Iranian presidential election, the conservative Ahmadinejad was elected by obtaining 62 percent of the total votes. As Condoleezza Rice later disclosed in an interview with the al-Arabiya a few months before the Iranian presidential election in 2005, she argued that a total shift of Iran’s policy is necessary for Bush administration, the Bush’s coercive diplomacy was more of a failure since it neither decreased Iran’s nuclear deterrence nor created an Iranian regime and international consolidation favourable to the US.

4.4.3 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy between Bush and Ahmadinejad

4.4.3.1 ‘Transformational Diplomacy’ of the Second Bush Administration

On 2 September 2004, in a speech accepting the Republican Party’s presidential

nomination, George W. Bush told the US national television audience that his end term would focus on spread of democracy. On 5 November 2004, in his first press conference after the victory of the presidential election, Bush stressed his re-election as a political ‘mandate’ of US citizens by stating, “I earned capital in this campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it”. Bush made it clear that his second term would continue its neoconservative’s approach to pursue US hegemony and military dominance. As explained in <Table 4-1> below, the dramatic shift of Bush’s policy stance after 9/11 continued through his second term.

<Table 4-1 >The Shift of the Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy after 9/11>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character</th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Neoconservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Order</strong></td>
<td>The US centric balance of Power</td>
<td>Unipolar System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Policy</strong></td>
<td>Maximization of National Interest excluding the Value</td>
<td>Offensive Proliferation of the Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
<td>Balance of Power, Military Superiority, Selective American Unilateralism</td>
<td>Promotion of Democracy, Military Dominance, American Unilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Intervention</strong></td>
<td>Selective Intervention with Deterrence</td>
<td>Offensive, Value driven Intervention (Humanitarian, Democratization, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the international and domestic political environment of Bush’s second term changed greatly from his first one. In a public opinion poll after 9/11, 73 percent of US citizens agreed that the US should execute affirmative intervention in international affairs, and there was public consensus on ‘US internationalism’ in dealing with its national security and counter terrorism. However, as the situation in Iraq was exacerbated, the support on Bush’s neoconservative approach shrank not only with the Democratic Party supporters but also within the Republican Party. As Henry R. Nau argued, the conservative scholar group disclosed its concern that if the factional rift continued among the neocons, realists and nationalists of the conservatives, it would cause a surrender of power to the Democratic Party.371

From an international relation perspective, the Bush administration had difficulty sustaining

its unilateral policy as it did during Bush’s first term. The ally nations’ domestic general opinions had increased to demand the withdrawal of their military forces from Iraq and anti-Americanism rapidly grew within the Middle East after the two wars in the region. Moreover, since the regional unrest of the Middle East contradicted EU’s national interest, as witnessed by the fact that EU3 had preceded its own negotiation with Iran during the first term, the Bush administration had to simultaneously execute its policy by coercing Iran and persuading not only China and Russia, but also the EU. However, despite difficulties, the Bush administration released policy reviews; 2006 QDR, 2006 NSS that the second term of his presidency would continue its coercive diplomacy on ‘rogue states’ through the ‘Transformational Diplomacy’.372

Although the second term of the Bush administration displayed its ‘Strength of Motivation’ on Iran’s nuclear programme with its policy reviews, as long as Iran observed the regulations of the NPT regime and claimed its rights to the peaceful use of atomic energy, the measures that the US could utilize was insufficient to coerce nuclear dismantlement of Iran. Thus, the Bush administration claimed that article IV of the NPT would only be guaranteed to the states that fully complied with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including the Additional Protocol and NPT regulation to pressure Iran. Since Iran has not been fully inspected by the IAEA for the 93+2 Additional Protocol, the US claimed to refer the Iran nuclear dossier to the UNSC to obtain a platform to strengthen its coercive diplomacy. Moreover, as the Bush administration evaluated the failure of Iran’s nuclear dismantlement was due to failed ‘consolidation of International support’, the Bush administration implemented the multilateral framework of P5+1 to execute its coercive measure.

4.4.3.2 The Advent of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Administration: Repercussions of a Weakly Justified Bush’s Coercive Diplomacy

On 24 June 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the presidential candidate of the conservative Abdagran party was elected as the president of Iran by winning 61.69 percent of the total votes. Combining that to the victory of the conservative party in Iranian general

election securing 156 seats out of a total of 290 on 7 May 2004, it become clear that Iran’s policies, including nuclear negotiations, would shift to more hardliner than the Khatami administration. On the same day of Ahmadinejad’s election, the senior nuclear negotiator for the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Hossein Mousavian, announced that 95 percent of Iranians supported the government’s nuclear programme and Iran is determined to continue its nuclear development.  

Confident that the Iranian politics was dominated by conservatives, the Ahmadinejad administration reinitiated its nuclear enrichment by discarding the nuclear deal with EU3. During his presidential campaign, Ahmadinejad had had criticized Khatami’s nuclear diplomacy. He denounced the two years of Khatami’s nuclear negotiation (2003-2005) as having exchanged ‘a pearl for a lollipop’. He believed Iran had achieved nothing by suspending the nuclear enrichment programme and by agreeing to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol. Moreover, he defined nuclear enrichment as Iran’s sovereign right, which should not be up for negotiation. Ahmadinejad disclosed his willingness to take on US sanctions and persecution. As the result, Iran’s nuclear negotiator Rouhani and his team were replaced by conservative right wing Ali Larijani and Iran nuclear negotiations underwent substantial changes.

As Ray Takeyh and Hussein Mousavian argued, the beliefs of the ‘new right conservatives’ based on Iran’s unique geopolitical status in the Middle East and its inevitability of becoming a regional hegemon made the Ahmadinejad administration more audacious in its diplomatic decisions. Moreover, as the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan became exacerbated, the new Iranian regime evaluated that the US would have to negotiate with Iran, who could play a critical role in stabilizing the situation in both countries.

1) The Collapse of Iran Nuclear Negotiation and the Re-Initiation UEP

373 “Determined to Continue Civilian Nuclear Programme – Official”, Financial Times, Jun 24, 2005
374 “We should not negotiate our rights,” Kayhan, Sep 11, 2005.
As the unreasonable coercive diplomacy, which lacked justification, compensative inducement, and dialogue continued in Bush’s 2nd term, Iran reinitiate the nuclear conversion programme even under the rule of a reformist Khatami who himself suspend its nuclear enrichment programme.

On 29 June 2005, Bush issued executive order 13382 to freeze all the US assets related with AEOI to prevent other countries from engaging in business with AEOI. 377 It was US counter measure on Paris agreement. As the Bush administration continued its coercive diplomacy of ‘pure coercion’, Iran decided to respond. On 18 July 2005, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Rouhani sent a proposal to EU3 for the commencement of operations at the Isfahan UCF at a low level capacity. 378 On 1 August 2005, the Khatami administration sent a letter to the IAEA to inform them of the re-initiation of the nuclear conversion programme, which had been suspended for more than two years. It meant the collapse of a dialogue channel with the reformist group in Iran who has been struggled to negotiate its nuclear programme with reason.

When Khatami declared the re-opening of the Isfahan conversion facility, the EU3 immediately sent a letter to ElBaradei arguing Iran had seriously damaged the 2004 November IAEA resolution and the Paris Agreement. However, Iran was adamant about their decision. Iran counter coerced EU3 for the compliance on agreeing to Iran’s uranium enrichment by stating it would suspend restarting the nuclear enrichment if the EU3 submitted draft proposals by 7 August 2005. 379

On 5 August 2005, compelled by Iran, the EU3 presented a proposal that it would fully cooperate with the nuclear development for Iran’s indefinite suspension of the enrichment programme and abandon the Arak heavy water reactor. On the day EU3’s proposal was offered, the senior nuclear negotiator for Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Hossein Mousavian, announced that Iran would reject the European Union’s

package of trade and technology incentives because it required Tehran to abandon all the nuclear fuel technology.  

380 Again, Iran displayed its ‘strength of motivation’ on its objective of counter coercive diplomacy; the full-fledged nuclear programme.

The Ahmadinejad administration, which inaugurated its term on 7 August 2005, also clarified its rejection of the EU3 proposal and decided to executed the ‘gradual turning of the screw’ to push the compliance of the US and the EU3 to approve Iran’s full-fledge nuclear programme. On 8 August 2005, Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of the AEOI, announced the Isfahan uranium conversion facility had resumed nuclear activities.  

381 On 9 August 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors meeting was held to discuss Iran’s nuclear programme. However, like the US, the IAEA board members had no specific measures to stop Iran who had not clearly violated NPT regulation. Thus, the IAEA Board of Governors meeting decided to discuss Iran’s nuclear programme after the results of the IAEA comprehensive report on 3 September 2005.  

On 10 September 2005, ElBaradei announced the IAEA inspection of Iran in 2004 November and the re-initiation of Iran enrichment conversion facility in Isfahan at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting. The report stated that a trace of HEU, which brought suspicion on Iran’s nuclear programme, was cleared from accusations that it had been created outside of Iran. However, it drew concerns about the P-2 centrifuge programme and the trace of LEU contamination could not be determined at this time.  

383 As the IAEA report pointed out several issues on the Iran nuclear programme, the US and France claimed the IAEA report was sufficient enough to take Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC.

On 19 September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors meeting was held in Vienna. After a weeklong meeting, the resolution was ratified that Iran’s nuclear programme would be ‘notified to the UNSC’ if Iran failed to take corrective measures for its full

verification to the IAEA. 384 The resolution of the 2005 September IAEA Board of Governors meeting accused Iran of breaching the NPT Safeguards Agreement, which constituted a noncompliance in the context of the IAEA Article XII, Paragraph C. 385 However, the IAEA resolution which stipulates possible application of Article XII, Paragraph C was immoderate since IAEA inspection did not find any new evidence to verify Iran’s noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement. The coercion base on weak evidence could not consolidate the multilateral coercion let alone inducing behavioural change of Iran.

As ElBaradei later stated “The eventual referral…was primarily an attempt to induce the Security Council to stop Iran’s enrichment programme, using Chapter VII of the UN Charter”, 386 the resolution was based more on the will of the US coercive diplomacy to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment not an actual finding of the IAEA inspection. It could be also referred to the statement of Adam Ereli, US State Department deputy spokesman on 21 September 2005 during the IAEA Board of Governors meeting that the US would not withdraw its threat to refer Iran to the UNSC, with their claim that, “Our goal is to build the broadest possible consensus…it is a question of not if, but when.” 387

The Bush administration attempted to use Iran’s declaration of reopening the uranium enrichment programme as leverage to push the IAEA for referring the Iranian nuclear dossier to the UNSC. However, again the US accusation without any clear evidence of violation only created space for Iran’s counter coercion.

Nevertheless the US succeeded in referring Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC, it appeared to be a difficult task to ratify the UNSC Resolution on Iran. On 22 September 2005, during the IAEA Governor meeting, Chinese Ambassador Wu Hailong of the permanent mission to Vienna stated the Iranian nuclear issue should be resolved through

the IAEA and continued dialogue. On 15 October 2005, the Foreign Minister of Russia Sergei Lavrov stated that Iran has the right to enrich uranium and Moscow does not support sending the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme to the UN Security Council. Moreover, the Western allies of the US, France and Germany expressed the possible nuclear cooperation with Iran.

As a part of the counter coercive diplomacy, Iran took measures to consolidate international support by building justification of their nuclear programme. Iran complied with the IAEA demand and provided detail information on P1, P2 centrifuges. On 3 November 2005, Iran approved UN nuclear inspectors to access Parchin military complex which IAEA had suspected it to be a nuclear weapons development sites.

As Iran counter coerced the US coercive diplomacy, the situation progressed differently from the US’ aim of CVID on Iran nuclear programme. On 10 November 2005, Russia purportedly offered a compromise that would allow Iran to continue with their uranium conversion at the Isfahan facility. Unnamed officials added that the US and EU also proposed a deal in which enrichment would be performed in Russia and the conversion of uranium into uranium hexafluoride gas would be done in Iran. Although US secretary of the state Condoleezza Rice denied US participation in the EU proposal by stating, “There is no US-European proposal to the Iranians,” on 13 November 2005, the director of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, expressed support for the EU proposal, calling on Iran to move its uranium enrichment programme to Russia.

However, Iran firmly proclaimed its sovereign rights on uranium enrichment in its territory. Although the EU and Russian proposal approved the conversion process of uranium yellowcake into UF6 at the Isfahan facility, Iran rejected its offer since the proposal would permanently suspend Iran’s reprocess of nuclear fuel programme in

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390 Iran has Turned Over Centrifuge Details to International Nuclear Inspectors, Officials Say”, Global Security Newswire, Nov 1, 2005.
Natanz and increase Iranian nuclear dependence on Russia.

On 18 November 2005, Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani confirmed the conversion process of uranium started at the Isfahan nuclear facility. Once again, the Bush administration had to back down its stance on Iran. On 18 November 2005, without any coercive inducement to implement, the US approved the proposal that allowed Iranian enrichment programme through the joint venture between Iran and Russia.

On 21 December 2005, Iran and EU3 met in Vienna to negotiate Iran’s nuclear programme for the first time after the breakdown of the talks on August 2005 with Iran’s initiation of the uranium conversion process. During the negotiation Iran implement its counter coercion to pressure EU3 to acknowledge Full-fledge nuclear programme of Iran. On 3 January 2006, Deputy of AEOI Mohammad Saeedi disclosed that Iran had resumed nuclear fuel research. However, he clarified the resumption of nuclear fuel research did not mean the actual resumption of the enrichment process.

A day after Iran’s announcement, the US Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on two Iranian companies, Novin Energy Company and Mesbah Energy Company, for their support of the proliferation of WMD in connection to the AEOI. The decision was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13382. However, the economic sanction could not compel Iran to stop its enrichment process. On 10 January 2006, Iran broke open internationally monitored seals on at least three of its nuclear facilities, clearing the path for the resumption of nuclear fuel research under the supervision of the IAEA. Seals were removed at the Natanz enrichment facility and at two related storage and testing locations known as Pars Trash, near Isfahan, and Farayand Technique. It was a bold action of Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy since it had a high risk of Iran to be referred to the UNSC.

Iran’s re-initiation of their nuclear conversion facility was not a violation of the NPT

397.“Iran announces further resumption of atomic work”, Reuters, Jan 3, 2006.
Safeguards Agreement. However, it was a clear denial of Iran on IAEA’s demands that to suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing-related activities for the nuclear negotiation. The US promptly utilized Iran’s re-opening of the Isfahan facility as the momentum to gather the consolidation of global powers and the UNSC on Iran’s nuclear programme. On 22 January 2006, representatives of China, Russia, the United States and EU3, which later formed P5+1, announced a statement requiring IAEA to report Iran’s nuclear dossier to UNSC on 31 January 2006. The <Figure 4-9> displays how the contention leads to re-initiation of Iran UEP.

<Figure 4-9> The Contention which leads to the re-initiation of Iran UEP

Notwithstanding failure of its strategy and policy in 1st term, the Bush administration sustained the coercive diplomacy of pure coercion. Since the US clearly demanded the Iran’s behavioural change of suspending the nuclear programme, therefore not deterrence strategy, it not only failed to implement the efficient inducements but also degraded its coercive diplomacy by using weak evidences as the base of its coercion. As the US isolate it-self by not talking to Iran as the punishment, Iran achieved its objective of counter coercive diplomacy by preserving its nuclear capability and minimize the repercussion of international community on re-initiation of nuclear enrichment programme.
2) A Divided Parallel Negotiation and UNSC Resolution 1696 and 1737

On 31 January 2006, the P5+1 reached an agreement to report Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC in a meeting in London. However, as China and Russia opposed using sanctions or threats of sanctions to solve Iran’s nuclear programme, they decided to ‘report’ Iran’s nuclear case to the UNSC.  

As agreed in the first P5+1 meeting, on 4 February 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors emergency meeting put Iran’s nuclear issue to a vote to decide whether to report Iran to the UN Security Council. The IAEA statement called on Iran “to heed the clear message” of the international community and urged Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and processing activities, cooperate fully with the IAEA, and resume diplomatic negotiations. Iran was given until the following IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 6 March 2006 to come clean on its nuclear activities.

However, with the situation of an international consolidation against Iran, the Ahmadinejad administration decided to increase its level of the ‘gradual turning of the screw’ of counter coercive diplomacy. On 13 February 2006, Iran began to inject UF6 gas into a limited number of centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear conversion facility. In order to raise the tension and display strength of motivation, Iran also announced possible seizure of additional protocol that was on voluntary temporal implementation since 2003.

The provocation of the Ahmadinejad administration was due to the discrepancy on the perception of the nuclear fuel cycle. Iran thought of its conversion process under IAEA supervision as a legitimate R&D activity which could run parallel to its nuclear suspension, whereas the US considered any activities related to enrichment as unacceptable. As ElBaradei state “It hardly seemed likely that the Security Council would take action against Iran given that most of Tehran’s ‘noncompliance’ had been corrected over the previous two years, and its small enrichment operation was after all

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legal”, operating a small R&D enrichment cascade at the pilot plant Natanz was a ‘calculated risk’ by Iran who wanted ground breaking start to secure its full-fledge nuclear programme.

The coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration was simple. As Condoleezza Rice stated during her talk with ElBaradei, “Iran is not North Korea…Iran does not want to be isolated. It will buckle under pressure”, the US wanted to coerce absolute surrender of Iran not even allowing one centrifuge. When Condoleezza Rice sabotaged the Iran-Russia proposal of controlled enrichment programme on 5 March 2006 after the meeting with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, the US aim of CVID and no enrichment on Iran nuclear programme had revealed once again.

On 29 March 2006, after 20 days of negotiation, the first UNSC Presidential Statement on Iran’s nuclear programme was released. The presidential statement noted with serious concern on Iran’s nuclear programme, including Iran’s decision to resume enrichment-related activities, research and development, and to suspend cooperation with the IAEA. Thus, it requested a report from the Director-General of the IAEA within 30 days on the process of Iranian compliance which will be requested by the IAEA Board of governor meeting.

Although Iran’s nuclear dossier was dealt with in the UNSC for the first time, the Ahmadinejad administration decided not to comply with its request but to intensify its counter coercion by further turning the screw. Iran’s objective was clear from the beginning, approve of full-fledge nuclear programme which is guaranteed in NPT. On 11 April 2006, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of the AEOI presented a 27 minute report on Iran’s nuclear programme that Iran had succeeded in enriching 3.5 percent uranium. He further added that the achievement was a big leap since it technically allowed the enrichment process at an industrial scale in Iran. He also disclosed Iran’s plan to build a 3,000 centrifuge complex by March 2007.

402 IBID, p. 195.
As the deadline of the UNSC on the IAEA’s Iran nuclear report approached, on 25 April 2006, Ali Larijani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator further displayed ‘Sense of Urgency’ and ‘Strength of Motivation’ Iran counter coercive diplomacy on securing the Iran nuclear programme by adding, “If you take harsh measures, we will hide this programme. Then you cannot solve the nuclear issue.”

On 2 May 2006, a P5+1 meeting was held in Paris to draft its resolution on Iran’s nuclear programme. The US once again displayed its firm stance of coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. Under Secretary of State Nicholas R. Burns stated, “the Security Council has no option but to proceed under Chapter 7” and argued if the UNSC failed to do so, the US would form a coalition of countries to impose independent sanctions on Iran. However, since Iran played its counter coercive diplomacy with in the NPT, the US could not go any further in implementing coercive measures. As China and Russia argued, the UNSC initiative to punish Iran with lack of legitimacy would only escalate the crisis. Even an ally of the US, the German chancellor Angela Merkel, called on Bush to start direct talks with Iran.

Although the Bush administration wanted to consolidate multilateral coercion to create ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’ over Iran’s ‘Strength of Motivation’ of protecting the full fledge nuclear programme to derive compliance of Iran’s nuclear dismantlement, the US had no efficient inducement to do so. Thus, On 15 May 2006, the EU and the US offered a proposal that support Iran to obtain the most advanced civilian nuclear technology if Iran completely suspended its uranium enrichment.

It was big policy change of the US who had been pertinacious with its pure coercion and prerequisite for the dismantlement of Iran enrichment programme for any further negotiation. However, since the package deal could execute more severe sanctions and coercion in case the engagement failed, it could be referred to as a ‘Hawk Engagement’

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of coercive diplomacy, which applied to North Korea.

It was first coercive diplomacy of Bush administration which observed the theory of compellence with its logic. The EU3 had also disclosed sixteen punitive inducements for the noncompliance of Iran. However, since the proposal set the suspension of Iran’s enrichment programme as a precondition, it was not a change of the US’ zero enrichment.\footnote{Steven R. Weisman and John O’Neil, “Rice proposes path to talks with Iran on Nuclear Issue”, the \textit{New York Times}, May 31, 2006. \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/31/world/middleeast/31cnd-iran.html?pagewanted=all}} Shortly after the US’ approval of the package deal, President Bush made a ‘tacit ultimatum’ for the prompt response of Iran, by saying “We’ve given the Iranians a limited period of time you know, weeks, not months.”\footnote{“Bush stresses Iran time pressure”, \textit{BBC}, Jun 9, 2006 \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5065380.stm}}

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On 2 June 2006, P5+1 agreed to provide incentives to induce Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment. The package deal was a two-track proposal with incentives and penalties based on Iran’s response. According to ElBaradei, it was a much more ‘generous’ proposal compared to previous ones. However, although P5+1 offered the provision of nuclear technology, it repeated the request for the suspension of Iran’s enrichment as a prerequisite for negotiations. Iran was given about 40 days to confirm to the atomic offer before the G8 Summit in mid-July.\footnote{Louis Charbonneau, “Iran has until July to consider atomic offer: Austria,” \textit{Reuters}, Jun 9, 2006.} On 12 June 2006, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Assefi stated that Iran would take “as long as necessary” to reply to the P5+1 package deal and claimed they would confirm before August 22, 2006.

Although the US maintained the precondition for further Iran nuclear negotiation, providing the reasonable inducement enhanced its coercive diplomacy which was not the case for bush administration’s pure coercion. As Bush administration executed its coercive diplomacy as the theory, multilateral coercion was consolidated.\footnote{Mohamed ElBaradei, “\textit{The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times}”, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2011, p. 197.} On 12 July 2006, P5+1 agreed to refer Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council to suspend all the enrichment activities of Iran. It was a quite a success of the US administration since Russia and China, who had
been reluctant to refer Iran’s case to the UNSC, supported the US’ demand.

On 31 July 2006, the UNSC passed Resolution 1696, demanding Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities by 31 August 2006. Under Article 41 of Chapter VII in the UN Charter, Iran had to face possible economic, politic sanctions, and even the military intervention. Despite the situation of Iran’s nuclear dossier been referred to the UNSC, and the possible imposing of a UN sanction, on 21 August 2006, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made a televised announcement that turned down UNSC Resolution 1696. Moreover, Iran denied access to the IAEA inspectors to the main nuclear facility in Natanz.

Although Iran decided to deny the UNSC resolution 1696, it was keen on its counter coercive diplomacy to create rift among P5+1. On 22 August 2006, Iran formally submitted a written response to the P5+1 proposal that Iran is comprehensively in content with the proposal and willing to make a dialogue over the request. However, Iran questioned the ambiguities of P5+1’s offer on Iran’s enrichment programme and insisted on its continuous development. Since the suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment was a key request of the P5+1 proposal, it was considered a rejection but surely, Iran had shaken the solidarity in P5+1 by showing possible negotiation on the P5+1 proposal.

On 31 August 2006, Mohamed ElBaradei released an IAEA report as requested by the UNSC Resolution 1696. Although the IAEA admitted Iran had provided access to Iran’s nuclear material and facility, the report appraised that Iran had ignored the UN Security Council resolution that demanded suspension of all enrichment related activities.

UNSC Resolution 1696 could be considered a success of the US coercive diplomacy since it had officially announced Iran’s nuclear programme as a security threat of the international community, built a platform for further coercion if Iran failed to comply

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414 “Iran will continue pursuing nuclear technology, supreme leader says”, USA Today, Aug 21, 2006.
with the UNSC Resolution and coerced the implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol, which Iran had yet to ratify. However, Resolution 1696 was like a house of cards since it excessively applied IAEA Article XII, Paragraph C to refer Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC without clear evidence of the IAEA on Iran’s nuclear programme. Thus, it had difficulty further consolidating the ‘international support’ on the implementation of coercive inducements to Iran.

On 15 September 2006, French President Jacques Chirac stated referring Iran to the UN Security Council was not the best way to resolve the crisis. He argued the best way forward for Iran’s nuclear programme would be a negotiation without any preconditions, and suggested a dialogue between Iran and the P5+1. On 20 September 2006, Jacques Chirac proposed a P5+1 dialogue with Iran to George W. Bush at the UN General Assembly in New York. Again with lack of any possible inducement against Iran, the president Bush agreed to put on hold a push for UNSC sanctions, giving EU3 more time to persuade Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and resume negotiations over its nuclear programme.

On 6 October 2006, the P5+1 gathered in London to discuss the level of punitive actions over Iran’s nuclear programme. The US and United Kingdom favoured immediate punitive sanctions whereas Russia and China refused to implement coercive measures. On 11 October 2006, P5+1 failed to reach a decision over Iran’s nuclear programme. Although the general agreement was that the Security Council must take some action against Iran, disagreement persisted over specific measures that should be part of the resolution. While the US insisted on a total ban on nuclear and missile technology sales, Russia and China favoured softer measures.

Admittedly, the China and Russia who soft balances the US was a disadvantage in strategic environment of coercive diplomacy. However, although the excessive US
demand without ‘smoking gun’ evidence was the main contributor which created the rift of consolidation for multilateral coercion or at least utilized by the both countries as an excuse, the US was not willing to make the adjustment on its demand to create more strengthened coercion.

According to ElBaradei, the sanction insisted by the US was ‘far too harsh’ and illogical; “travel bans on Iranian officials”, “freezing Iran’s foreign assets”, and “suspending or restricting the IAEA’s technical assistance”. It was more of a cornering Iran into accelerating its enrichment programme and to withdraw from the NPT rather than induce Iran to the compliance. On 23 October 2006, this fear became a reality. When it appeared that the approval of P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear enrichment is zero to none, Iran launched a second cascade of 164 centrifuges at its pilot fuel enrichment plant. The contention model of <Figure 4-10> shows how it leads to the escalation of crisis and UNSC resolution 1737.

<Figure 4-10> The Contention which Leads to the 1st UNSC 1737 Sanction

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On 25 October 2006, as it appeared that a sanction insisted by the US would make the situation worse, EU3 circulated its own draft resolution which approved, to a certain degree, Iran’s nuclear development. On 23 December 2006, in a unanimous vote, UNSC Resolution 1737 was ratified. However, the sanction was much more moderate compared to the US’ request of a total ban on Iran. The UN sanction ban on supplying Iran with nuclear-related technology and materials and a freezing of the assets of specific individuals and companies who had supported Iran’s enrichment programme.

3) Squandered Opportunity by the US Coercive Diplomacy and the End of the Bush Administration

UN Resolution 1737 requested the IAEA to submit a report verifying Iran’s ‘full and sustained’ suspension on uranium enrichment and the construction of a heavy water reactor in Arak within a 60 days’ time period. However, on 19 January 2007, Iranian government spokesman Gholam-Hossein Elham announced a nuclear enrichment plan that aimed to install 3,000 centrifuges at the Natanz conversion facility by the end of the Iranian year which was a direct denial of UNSC Resolution 1737.

On 22 February 2007, the IAEA submitted Iran’s report to the UNSC. The report concluded that Iran had accelerated its uranium enrichment activities, continued construction of a heavy water reactor, transported nine tonnes of gaseous feedstock to the main facility in Natanz and planned the expansion of centrifuge installations to 3,000 centrifuges.

Based on the IAEA report, the UNSC unanimously ratified Resolution 1747. The Resolution enhanced key sanctions of Resolution 1737 with an extended amendment. It expanded the blacklist of individuals and companies to be banned due to its direct association and provision of support on Iran’s nuclear activities. It also expanded the list of items prohibited for export to or import from Iran. Once again, Resolution 1747 gave Iran an ultimatum of 60 days to suspend their nuclear programme.

423 “Iran poised to start installation of large-scale uranium enrichment programme, say diplomats”, Associated Press, Jan 19, 2007.
However, despite the series of UNSC Resolutions, on 10 April 2007, Iran announced it had achieved uranium enrichment with 3,000 centrifuges. The coercive diplomacy of Bush administration was creating the escalation of crisis not the escalation of pressure to induce Iran nuclear dismantlement. As ElBaradei later distressingly recalled in his memoir as “One year earlier the build-up of Iran’s enrichment programme could have been halted at thirty to forty centrifuges”, the ‘pure coercion’ of Bush’s coercive diplomacy rather increases Iran nuclear capability. On 15 May 2007, ElBaradei announced Iran has accumulated ample knowledge of nuclear enrichment and possibly construct 8,000 centrifuges before year end.

On 24 May 2007, the IAEA submitted Iran report to the UNSC, which concluded that Iran had defied the implementation of Resolution 1747. However, the IAEA admitted Iran’s cooperation with the agency by providing required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection to the declared nuclear material and facilities. Although a weakly justified US coercive diplomacy succeeded in referring Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC, it again created weakly justified UNSC resolutions which excessively applied Article 41, Chapter VII of the UN Charter that turned out to be no avail to induce the dismantlement of Iran enrichment programme.

In order to cut the escalation of crisis, ElBaradei requested US to make dialogue with Iran. Based on the evaluation that Iran could only achieve its nuclear weapon capability by 2010 at its maximum level, which is an impossible task for Iran, he asserted that there was ample amount of time to solve Iran’s nuclear programme through dialogue and negotiations. He proposed a so-called ‘double suspension,’ in which Iran and UNSC simultaneously freeze its enrichment programme and resolution to initiate negotiation.

With the situation being at a stalemate, there were five ways in which Iran’s nuclear issue could be settled: 1) Iran would voluntarily surrender its nuclear programme, 2) military intervention or an air strike to demolish Iran’s nuclear facility, 3) engage Iran

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for the temporal suspension of the nuclear programme while building a more concrete measure of the IAEA to control and supervise Iran’s nuclear programme, 4) maintain the stalemate and increase coercive inducements to derive Iran’s nuclear dismantlement, and 5) the US acknowledges Iran’s full-fledge nuclear programme. Since the possibilities of Iran’s surrender and the US’ approval of Iran’s nuclear programme were slim to none, there were three options for the P5+1. However, as Iran successfully increased its knowledge and capabilities of the nuclear programme and deterrence through the sanctions, the engagement to suspend Iran’s nuclear programme and negotiate for Iran’s nuclear settlement was the most rational method.

However, the US policy stance of ‘pure coercion’ was sustained. On 15 May 2007, as Under Secretary of State for Policy, Nicholas R. Burns, revealed in an interview with the *New York Times*, the US maintained ‘no enrichment’ and its coercive diplomacy to implement more severe coercive measures to derive Iran’s compliance. 428 On 23 May 2007, US Ambassador to IAEA, Greg Schulte pressured IAEA by stating, “Americans could treat the IAEA budget like that of the Universal Postal Union and reduces its mandate”. He also requested ElBaradei to stop circulating the proposal of reinitiating the Iranian nuclear negotiation which is dividing the international community and undermining the Security Council and the IAEA Board.429

As the US coercive diplomacy suffered from lack of evidence, the strategic environment becomes more favourable to Iran. Thus, Iran who had disclosed its willingness to consider freezing the enrichment activities at the R&D level before UNSC 1747, enhanced its counter coercive diplomacy of limiting enrich uranium beyond five percent. Through the three UNSC Resolutions, Iran successfully expanded its enrichment operations and nuclear capabilities rather than complying with the resolutions. While allowing IAEA inspections, Iran increased its nuclear capacities within the permissible levels of the IAEA and NPT regime. On 14 July 2007, Iran approved an IAEA inspection for the Arak nuclear facility and simultaneously announced its Arak research reactor would make isotopes for medical and other peaceful uses, replacing an older

1970s light water reactor in Tehran. 430 Iran’s declaration of creating isotopes for medical use meant the possible increase of its enrichment level to 20 percent.

As the gap between the US and Iran showed no signs of narrowing, the IAEA and chief Iran nuclear negotiator Larijani attempted to focus on other issues to build cooperation upon a common interest. On 27 August 2007, Iran and the IAEA made a three month plan to conclude Iran’s nuclear issues that had been under IAEA investigation for four years. Iran agreed to resolve the suspicion on its past experiments of plutonium which include documents that was acquired from Abdul Qadeer Khan. 431 As ElBaradei later reiterated, it could be a comprehensive plan to derive a solution to Iran’s nuclear dossier. 432 However, the Bush administration who had set its Iranian nuclear policy as intensifying the coercive diplomacy with the UNSC Resolution did not take any action towards the IAEA and Iran’s plan. Adversely, the US criticized the IAEA by arguing the plan only weakened the chance of prodding China and Russia into imposing further sanctions. 433

Although the US displayed ‘strong motivation’ for its coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme, since the IAEA had not found any undeclared facilities nor any weaponization activities in Iran, the US’ ‘pure coercion’ without a negotiation started to lose its international support. P5+1 could not make any progress since Russia and China denied their support on another set of Iranian sanctions. On 14 September 2007, as Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated “We would advocate a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation”, China urged the IAEA and Iran to initiate a new round of negotiations. 434 On 17 October 2007, in a speech at the meeting of the five Caspian littoral states, the president Vladimir Putin asserted its support on Iran’s nuclear programme. 435

However, Bush administration did not back down its policy stance. On 26 October 2007, the US announced a tougher sanction against three of Iran’s largest state-owned banks: Bank Melli, Bank Mellat and Bank Saderat. The sanction was designed to increase pressure on the Iranian government by cutting it off from financial institutions around the world. The sanction was also imposed on key branches of Iran’s military: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Quds force, nine Iranian companies, and five Iranian officials.  

Indeed, the Bush administration well-sustained its framework of coercive diplomacy. However, the continuous coercion without a clear violation of Iran’s nuclear programme created an unfavourable international strategic environment for the US. To make the situation worse, the US National Intelligence Estimate Report was released that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons programme since 2003 which directly contradicted the Bush accusation on Iran.

Iran cleverly took the advantage of the situation. On 18 December 2007, Russia delivered the first of eight fuel shipments to the power plant in Bushehr and by January 25, 2008, Iran received a sixth batch of nuclear fuel from Russia. On 9 February 2008, Iran’s Ambassador to Russia, Gholamreza Ansari, announced the construction of a 360-megawatt plant is under way at Darkhovin. Moreover, as it was revealed by ElBaradei’s visit to Iran on January 2008, the state of art nuclear lab was on the operation with the numbers of prototypes P-2 centrifuge in the pilot enrichment facility at Natanz. By countering the US coercion Iran made the advancement in its nuclear capability.

On 22 February 2008, a new IAEA report was released after the January inspection which both the US and Iran claimed that the report reinforced their own argument. From Iran’s perspective, the accusations regarding the low-and high-enriched uranium traces detected at various locations in Iran had finally closed as Iran was able to successfully explain its polonium experiments, activities at the Gchine mine, and the procurement activities of Physics Research Centre. It was accepted by the IAEA as a valid

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438 “Iran’s nuclear programme expands: ambassador claims Tehran building second power plant”, National Post, Canada, Feb 9, 2008
explanation.\textsuperscript{439} Whereas, for the US, as the alleged weaponization studies was yet clarified, the US argued the IAEA report revealed Iran’s ill intention on nuclear armament. However, as ElBaradei stated the US allegation as “No one knew if any of this was real… the US said only that their source had gotten it from a third party and that there was reason to believe this person was now dead”\textsuperscript{440}, US evidence against Iran nuclear weapon programme was flimsy.\textsuperscript{441}

As the IAEA report again failed to discover Iran’s violation or to declare Iran’s fulfilment of the UNSC Resolution, it seemed the stalemate of P5+1 would continue. Thus, IAEA director ElBaradei and France proposed a double-suspension to initiate the nuclear negotiation. The plan was that Iran and UNSC simultaneously suspend its enrichment activities and sanctions. IAEA set three principles for the proposal: 1) acknowledge Iran’s nuclear rights including the enrichment and suspension of Iran enrichment as a temporary measure for an agreement, 2) full cooperation of Iran with IAEA verification for the establishment of nuclear transparency, and 3) commitment of the US and Iran for the full normalization of the military, economy and politics. However, as the US was sceptic of the word ‘normalization’ and Iran’s right to enrichment, the proposal of double-suspension could not break the impasse.

However, the Bush administration was adamant to keep ‘no enrichment’ and suspension of Iran’s nuclear programme as a precondition for negotiations. Rather than negotiate with Iran for the nuclear dismantlement, the US urged IAEA and ElBaradei to support UNSC resolution on Iran nuclear dismantlement. Awkwardly, it contradicted the US’ criticism on IAEA being ‘politics’. However, the IAEA could not make any statements that favoured the UNSC sanction since it could not find any evidence accusing Iran of violating the NPT.

On 3 March 2008, two days before the IAEA Board of governor meeting to discuss

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ElBaradei’s proposal on Iran, the Bush administration pressured the UN Security Council to ratify a third round of economic sanctions against Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment work per UNSC Resolution 1803. The sanctions banned dual-use goods from being traded with Iran. UNSC Resolution 1803 was similar to the sanction imposed on Iraq during the first Gulf war, which approved land, air and maritime inspection of shipments suspected of carrying any banned items.

However, any severe coercive inducement that derived by weakly justified US coercive diplomacy could not consolidate the actual implementation of multilateral coercion. It neither could isolate the Iran nor create the image of possible military intervention or a war which are the important context valuables of coercive diplomacy theory. Moreover, it failed to make Iran to believe the cost of incompliance will be large.

On 9 April 2008, during a visit to Natanz, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced the plan of installing 6,000 IR-2, P-2 centrifuges and the uranium enrichment process of four percent U-235. It was a clear counter coercive diplomacy to put pressure on the US and EU for their abandonment of ‘no enrichment’.

Against the Iran provocation, the US could not execute its coercive diplomacy except imposing the new sanctions. On 11 June 2008, President Bush and EU leaders embraced new financial sanctions which targeted Iranian banks, unless Iran fully disclosed its covert nuclear weapons activities and allowed the IAEA for a full verification. However, Bush’s accusation was a bit tricky since the NIE report declared Iran’s nuclear weapon programme, if there had ever been one, had stopped since 2003.

On 8 August 2008, the EU raised its trade sanctions against Iran. The new sanctions went slightly beyond the scope of the UN sanctions and were designed to deny public loans or export credits to companies trading with Iran. European governments also agreed to monitor banks dealing with Bank Saderat and would increase inspections of

ships and airplanes traveling to Iran. On 12 August 2008, the US Department of the Treasury designated five entities: the Nuclear Research Centre for Agriculture and Medicine, the Isfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre, Jabber Ibn Hayan, Safety Equipment Procurement Company and Joza Industrial Company, for their attempts to Iran’s nuclear programme.

Unfortunately, the increased economic sanction which lacks its justification could not stop Iran from its nuclear development but a dead end. On 30 August 2008, Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Reza Sheikh Attar announced Iran’s nuclear enrichment of 4,000 centrifuges and its plan to install an additional 3,000 at Natanz facility. On 16 September 2008, the IAEA had to announced the “dead end” since Iran who had been gradually reducing its cooperation with IAEA after UNSC Resolution 1803, finally stopped its cooperation of providing information on ‘possible military dimension’; 1) the conversion of uranium dioxide to UF4, or ‘green salt’, 2) development and testing of high voltage detonators, a possible nuclear explosive device, 3) design of a nose cone for Shahab 3 Missile, which could be used as the nuclear delivery system.

On 28 September 2008, as the June P5+1 proposal failed to reach an agreement or to consolidate international support on the US coercive diplomacy, UNSC Resolution 1835 was ratified without imposing a new sanction on Iran. As the <Figure 4-11> displays, the second term of the Bush administration ended in failure to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme or decreased the nuclear capability of Iran.

Despite his failure during his first term, the second Bush administration again set its objective of Iran’s nuclear policy as ‘no enrichment’ and implemented an aberrant coercive diplomacy without negotiation to subdue Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment programme as a precondition. Admittedly, after analysing it needs international consolidation for efficient coercion, the 2nd term of Bush administration established the P5+1, to put multilateral coercion on Iran’s nuclear programme. However, without clear evidence of Iran’s violation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and securing its justification for the coercive diplomacy, the US failed to raise the level of coercive inducement to bring the behavioural change of Iran. Although the Bush administration displayed its strength of motivation and sense of urgency to succeed in referring Iran’s nuclear dossier to UNSC and ratified a series of UNSC Resolutions: 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1835, it failed to derive a consensus to put a tougher sanction on Iran. The excessive strategy of pure coercion had no bargaining power to induce not only Iran but also other participants of P5+1 to support the US coercive diplomacy.

Nevertheless ElBaradei claimed the approach of providing a ‘face saving’ measure for establishing more concrete IAEA supervision on Iran was a much more logical and rational method to prevent the increment of Iran’s nuclear capability. The Bush
administration sustained the coercive diplomacy without negotiation and dialogue. Moreover, the US went even further to threaten IAEA to support its implementation of severe measures and neglected the IAEA report while consolidating international sanctions on Iran.

The US displayed ‘Strength of Motivation’ of the coercive diplomacy by pushing UNSC and IAEA to support its Iranian nuclear policy. However, the Bush administration was lacking in evidence and failed to consolidate the international support that had created a room for the Ahmadinejad administration to play its own counter coercive diplomacy. Iran strengthened its diplomatic ties with not only Russia and China but the EU countries to make them more engaged with Iran to increase the enforcement cost of the US coercion. Moreover, according to the situation that had built up, Iran willingly accepted an IAEA inspection and cooperated with the international community to reduce its incompliant costs, which would be imposed on Iran for the noncompliance of US’ coercive diplomacy. Iran also successfully utilized its provocation within the limit of the IAEA regulation to induce the participation of the international community on the Iran nuclear programme.

Through its counter coercive diplomacy, Iran did not only keep its nuclear programme but also succeeded in increasing its nuclear capability. The Ahmadinejad administration had built a nuclear centrifuge up to 6,000 at Natanz facility which was only several hundred when the second term of the Bush administration was began in 2006.

During its two terms of presidency, the Bush administration wanted to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme through its coercive diplomacy. However, as the former US ambassador to UN John Bolton claimed, the US was the ‘true loser’ of Iran’s nuclear negotiations, and although the Bush administration succeed in forming P5+1 and referred Iran’s nuclear dossier to UNSC, it failed to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme and managed only to exacerbate the case by allowing Iran’s increment of nuclear capability. Although Bush administration was confidence on nuclear dismantlement of Iran through the victory of Afghan and Iraq War and the nuclear dismantlement of Libya, the US compellence strategy that was distant from the theory only create chances for Iran. Therefore, the US could not utilize its asymmetry of power to induce Iran to abandon its nuclear programme let alone containing Iran.
4.5 Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Obama Administration and Counter Coercive Diplomacy of Iran

4.5.1 Background

4.5.1.1 The Subprime Mortgage Economic Crisis and Obama’s ‘Smart Diplomacy’

In 2009, the first policy priority of the newly elected Obama administration was the management of the US economic crisis. The collapse of the subprime mortgage, which broke out in August 2007, hit the US economy hard and reached the point of ‘credit crunch’ across the global financial market. Thus, as 62 percent of the voters of the US presidential election answered, the economic issue was the most important political agenda in the CNN exit poll, the environment of the US’ domestic politics was focused on the economic issue.

The Obama administration could not afford implementing more severe coercive inducements on Iran’s nuclear programme without the support of the international community. It was clearly revealed in Obama’s policy review on May 2010 in the National Security Strategy report. By stating it would ‘build its power at home and shape it abroad’, the US decided to firstly gain its strength and assets before projecting it into a global issue. The NSS admitted it was not possible for one country to prevent the global security threats of terrorism and its network, along with nuclear proliferation, cyber space attacks, climate change, etc. Thus, it argued for the need of ‘comprehensive engagement’ by the alliance and the international community.\(^{447}\) In order to get the cooperation of ‘comprehensive engagement’ to function, the US emphasized the ‘whole-of-government approach’, which would utilize military, diplomacy, and development aid and humanitarian assistance, provision of security, international institutions and the alliance. In short, it was the US’ declaration of executing a ‘smart diplomacy’.

During his presidential campaign, Obama denounced Bush’s ‘War in Iraq’ and argued the terrorists that had attacked the World Trade Centre in 2001 had no connections to

Iraq. Thus, if he were elected president, he overtly claimed that he would withdraw two brigades a month to evacuate the US Forces in Iraq and complete redeployment within 16 months by the summer of 2010. He asserted the evacuated US Forces would have to be placed in Afghanistan, the breeding ground of Al Qaida.

Since change in the US’ foreign policy on Iraq and Afghanistan needed much Iranian support to achieve success, there was the hope of eased tension and dialogue over Iran’s nuclear programme. Although Obama insisted the tougher sanctions could be implemented on Iran and the US military superiority in Middle East would be sustained, as he stated, “The notion that somehow not talking to countries is punishment to them…is ridiculous”, Obama revealed his Iranian policy would be more of an aggressive, principled and direct high-level diplomacy. This change of US’ approach was based on Obama’s plan to put more emphasis on ‘soft power’, believing that the provision of opportunity, such as education, medical assistance, and various humanitarian aid, would benefit the national interest of US instead of solely implementing the ‘hard power’ as done by the Bush administration.

Coupled with a fundamental change in US posture, Obama’s nuclear policy started to show its true colours. The US nonproliferation policy started to materialize, starting with the famous ‘Nuclear Free World’ in Prague on 5 April 2009. In the speech, the Obama administration divided its nuclear policy into three parts: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of atomic energy. 448

Like as the US conventional nonproliferation strategy, Obama asserted the US would solve the nuclear issue based on the international institution and regime. Using more aggressive tactic than his predecessor, Obama declared he would double its allocation and support the establishment of the International Nuclear Fuel Bank in order to strengthen the IAEA and NPT regime to directly pressure Iran and North Korea on their nuclear programme. Moreover, Obama also declared the continuation of implementing Bush’s PSI, and bolster the system with the institutionalization of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, to counter proliferate the nuclear development of Iran and North Korea.

The ‘Nuclear Free World’ speech in Prague was later documented as an official policy with the release of the 2010 *Nuclear Posture Review*. The 2010 NPR review dealt with five agendas as the aim of the US’ nuclear strategy.\(^{449}\) The Obama administration focused its nuclear policy as nonproliferation through the cooperation with the international community for a ‘nuclear free world’, whereas the Bush administration declared war on terrorism and focused on counter-proliferation. While Bush put an emphasis on building more efficient US military power to demolish nuclear proliferation, terrorist groups and the ‘axis of evil’, the Obama administration put more weight on the dismantlement of the nuclear weapon programme than the expansion of war against the terrorist group and regime.

However, it did not mean that the Obama administration had abandoned its coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme which had been imposed since Clinton administration. The ‘New Triad’ system of the Bush administration, which was mentioned in the 2002 NPR and later constructed to build absolute military superiority under any provocation, was sustained by the Obama administration. Moreover, the ‘negative security assurance’ of Iran that the US could execute nuclear strikes against any type of Iranian aggression was valid through the first term of the Obama administration. That is, although the nuclear policy of Obama on Iran indeed meant the change of ‘pure coercion’ of the Bush administration, it was not the abandonment the framework of the US coercive diplomacy. It was more of the utilizing of the US’ ‘smart power’ on Iran. With its absolute military strength of ‘escalation dominance’, the Obama administration wanted to impose its soft power of the US to consolidate international support to derive the compliance of Iran on its nuclear dismantlement.

4.5.2 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy between Obama and Ahmadinejad

4.5.2.1 Obama’s ‘Try and See’ Coercive Diplomacy and Iranian Presidential Election

Although the Obama administration announced the change of its approach on Iran’s nuclear programme, Gregory Schulte, a supporter of Bush’s ‘pure coercion’, remained in place as US ambassador to the IAEA until June 2009. As ElBaradei stated in his memoir “I was eager to engage anew with Washington on Iran… There were no calls for a Washington briefing, no attempts to build on what the IAEA had learned”\textsuperscript{450}, the rhetoric and the stance of Obama’s engagement on Iran seemed slightly different than what people had first had perceived it to be. As Obama had stated at the AIPAC on June 2008, “Israel’s Security is sacrosanct. It is non–negotiable,” and ElBaradei’s memoir of the US’ concern over the possibility of Iran’s request on the dismantlement of Israel’s nuclear weapons programme in early 2009, the direct talks and dialogue by Obama already had set the limit.

On 11 January 2009, at the ABC news programme This Week, president-elect Barack Obama stated, “Iran is going to be one of our biggest challenges,” and clearly displayed his concern that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology might trigger the arms race in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{451} He also reiterated, “It is very important for us to make sure we are using all the tools of US power, including diplomacy, in our relationship with Iran”. The nuance of the rhetoric had changed so that other coercive inducements were still on the table.

The Obama administration aimed to approve Iran’s nuclear programme as a real global security threat and dealing with it as an important international agenda would be the key to resolution. Thus, the declaration of Obama’s direct talks and dialogues on Iran could be perceived as a dual mean. That was, if talk of authenticity failed to draw a resolution, Iran could be accused of having no intention of cooperating, which then would be easy for the US to execute its coercive diplomacy by consolidating international support. The Obama administration wanted to secure the consensus of the international community at the US’ side and through its consolidation, wanted to implement the multilateral coercion of the IAEA, UNSC and P5+1 according to Iran’s response. Thus, the US took a step further and announced the participation of P5+1 negotiation with Iran as a “full participant,” which the Bush administration had refused to do unless Iran ceased its uranium enrichment programme.

The audacious approach by the Obama administration to initiate diplomatic talks with Iran was not based on blind optimism but the enhancing its ground work for the coercive diplomacy. It became clear when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton revealed the plan at the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the US would impose a “crippling sanction” if diplomatic efforts failed.\(^{452}\) On 18 May 2009, after a summit with Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Obama stated, “It is not in (Iran’s) interest to pursue a nuclear weapon and...they should change course,” and urged Iran to demonstrate a procedure to stop the nuclear programme by the end of 2009. He added, “We’re not going to have talks forever.”\(^{453}\)

Obama’s stance was the ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy with the persuasive inducement to observe the development of the situation. However, Iran was not insensible to the US stance. Thus, when Obama sent the Nowruz message to Iran on March 20, Supreme Leader Khamenei responded there would be no change in relations between the two countries unless the US brought an end to the US hostility policy to bring “real change.”\(^{454}\)

The persuasive inducements such as inviting Iran as the full member of P5+1 and displaying good gesture could not decrease ‘strength motivation’ of Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy on achieving full-fledge nuclear programme. Thus, Iran who had decreased the uranium enrichment production in response to Obama good gesture,\(^{455}\) decided to gradually turn the screw to indicate its ‘strength motivation’ on its enrichment programme.

On 9 April 20, on the following day of being offered to be a full participant to the P5+1, the head of AEOI Gholamreza Aghazadeh reported that Iran had increased its centrifuge

\(^{452}\) Nicholas Kralev, “‘Crippling sanctions’ for Iran an option; Talks preferable, Clinton says”, \textit{The Washington Times}, Apr 23, 2009.


count to 7,000. Iran counter coerced the US to initiate the nuclear negotiation by displaying the Iran enrichment programme is about to cross the threshold. As later verified by IAEA report, Iran successfully increased its centrifuge of 7,200 centrifuges with 1,339 kg enriched uranium.

In early May of 2009, President Obama sent a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei to show his willingness for direct talks to engage with Iran nuclear programme. However, as there was Iranian presidential election in June, no other action was followed. As some experts argued, the US’ gestures towards the talks could work positively to pressure Iranian citizen to vote for a reformist candidate who was more favourable to the US. However, the Iranian nuclear issue was not that simple. Besides the argument that weather the decision of Iran nuclear programme could be changed by the presidential leadership, all the president candidates, including reformist Mir-Hossein Mousavi was adamant about pursuing Iran’s right for the nuclear programme due to the failure of Bush’s pure coercion. The Obama administration was not in a situation that could create a substantial change in Iran if there is no change in US coercive diplomacy that aimed ‘no enrichment’.

4.5.2.2 The Success of US Coercive Diplomacy or Push for 20 Percent Uranium Enrichment of Iran?

1) The Successful US coercion: Revelation of the Fordow Nuclear facility

The result and the aftermath of the 2009 Iranian presidential election became a snag in Obama’s attempts for a dialogue with Iran. When the suspicion on fraud election initiated the ‘Green Movement’, the Obama administration decided not to push for nuclear dialogue or the subject matter that related with the election until the domestic disturbance of Iran was stabilized. Thus, the US sustained its ‘Try and See’ coercive

456 Fredrik Dahl “Iran says running 7,000 enrichment centrifuges,” Reuters, Apr 9, 2009.
diplomacy until the Iranian proposal of the package deal was offered to P5+1 on September 2009.

Despite the domestic unrest and international criticism on Iran’s handling of the anti-government protest, Ahmadinejad gradually formed his second administration. The director of the AEOI, Gholamreza Aghazadeh was replaced with the ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, who had a Ph.D. in nuclear physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The appointment of Salehi who was considered a logical and soft spoken person was perceived by the West as a positive sign for nuclear negotiations. 460 However, as a competent nuclear scientist, Ali Akbar Salehi knew Iran nuclear enrichment programme is not a breach of NPT regime. On July 2009, Salehi stated “legal and technical discussions about Iran’s nuclear case have finished... and there is no room left to keep this case open,” and demanded US to cease hostility towards Iran for the resolution.461

With its policy objective of no enrichment on Iran nuclear programme, the ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy of Obama which utilized the direct talk and dialogue could not create ‘sense of urgency’ and ‘asymmetry of motivation’ of coercion to derive the behavioural change of Iran. In this environment, Obama could only implement the same inducements as his predecessor. On 2 August 2008, the secretary of the State Clinton warned the possible economic sanction on petroleum product if Iran does not pledge to join nuclear negotiation talks before the September UN general assembly. 462

Iran refuted the September deadline but approved the IAEA inspection as its counter coercive diplomacy to decrease the possible multilateral coercion and its incompliant cost. On 24 August 2009, Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the heavy water reactor under construction at Arak to avoid isolation from the international community. Moreover, Iran displayed a gesture of goodwill to the international community by allowing the increased IAEA supervision on Natanz uranium enrichment facility. 463

Despite the tone downed rhetoric and will to dialogue, the 1st term of Obama

461 “West must close Iran nuclear file: new atomic chief”. Agence France-Presse, Jul 18, 2009.
administration continued the policy of his predecessor. The ‘zero enrichment’ which had been degrading the US coercive diplomacy was also the red-line of Obama administration and continued to request Iran to provide alleged nuclear weapon programme to the IAEA which had been another obstacle for further negotiations. 464 However, as IAEA revealed in the report, the unidentified information which were mainly provided by the US and the Israel to accuse Iran was ‘serious concerns’ but all the allegations were ‘baseless’ and that the data have been ‘fabricated’. 465 With the impaired justification, the US coercive diplomacy could not consolidate the international support to build the strong coercion to pressure Iran.

As Iran’s cooperation seemed highly unlikely and the ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy of ‘no enrichment’ started to crumble, the Obama administration change its coercive diplomacy to the ‘gradual turning the screw’. On 3 September 2009, the US held high-level government officials meeting of the P5+1 and issued a joint statement calling on Iran to formally accept the nuclear talks within weeks for the fast opening of nuclear negotiation. As a response, on 9 September 2009, Iran submitted its amended package deal to P5+1 through the UN which was the amended package proposal of P5+1 in April 2009. 466 Since Iran successfully buys time through offering proposal, on 21 September 2009, the US executed its coercive diplomacy by disclosing its intelligence information on the covert Iran nuclear facility in Fordow. The revelation of Fordow facility was to increase tension and consolidate multilateral coercion on Iranian nuclear programme.

As CIA director Leon Panetta stated in the interview with Time magazine, the US had already been aware of the Fordow facility since 2006. 467 That is, the US revealed matters regarding the Fordow facility just before the P5+1 nuclear meeting and opened a discussion of the issue at the 2009 September UN general assembly. This was a high level diplomacy to increase tension and consolidate multilateral coercion on Iranian nuclear programme.

sanctions. Whether this appraisal was true or not, it worked positively for US coercive diplomacy. On 24 September 2009, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev agreed to impose sanctions against Iran.468

The construction of Fordow facility itself does not form a violation of NPT since Iran had not yet ratified the 97 additional protocols.469 Moreover, the construction of Fordow facility believed to be initiated in 2006 when the Iran’s voluntary temporal implementation of additional protocol was on and off due to the conflict between Iran and P5+1. Iran refuted that the Fordow facility was built as a backup facility in 2006 when the possibility of a military strike by the US and Israel on Iran’s nuclear facility was heightened.470 However, the existence of a covert nuclear facility was a big disadvantage for Iran not only in the following P5+1 nuclear negotiation but the justification of its counter coercive diplomacy.

With the unfavourable strategic environment which was successfully created by the US, Iran had to accommodate most of the requests from P5+1. On 1 October 2009, Iran accepted the request to deliver 1200kg of 1600kg low enrichment uranium, which was a major portion of its enriched uranium reserves, to the third country in exchange for Tehran’s nuclear reactor fuel. Many Iranian nuclear experts, whether they are reformist, conservative, or pragmatist, opposed the deal since it would lose Iran’s bargaining power and leverage in future nuclear negotiations. However, Iran did not have other option. It was first success of Obama’s coercive diplomacy.

If the asymmetry of motivation is created it is likely that the behavioural change of the agent could be induced. When the strength of motivation of the two conflicts, the asymmetry is created base on the interest. In Iranian nuclear programme case, the US and Iran both had a balanced motivations on the nuclear enrichment programme, the US

469 IAEA, Communication dated 4 September 2009 received from the Resident Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the implementation of safeguards in Iran, INFCIRC/768 ,IAEA, 2009. [Accessed 17 Jul 2014]
wanted no enrichment whereas the Iran wanted its full-fledge nuclear programme to be approved. However, when the covert Fordow facility revealed, the balance of ‘strength of motivation’ had changed. First, China and Russia who soft balances the US and supportive on Iran shifted its position to impose sanction on Iran. Second, the justification for US coercive diplomacy to use military inducement had increased. On the contrary, for Iran, the stockpiled enriched Uranium can be abandoned if Iran could keep its nuclear enrichment programme. Thus, Iran decided to forfeit the majority of low enriched Uranium for the fuel exchange. It was clear evidence on how the secured justification of coercive diplomacy and limiting its objective could bring the behavioural change of Iran. If the US decided to use the momentum to argue the total dismantlement of Iran enrichment programme which is vital interest of Iran, Iran’s behavioural change probably would have failed. It was soon proved during the nuclear fuel swap deal.

2) The Nuclear Energy Swap Deal or Push for Iran’s 20 percent nuclear Enrichment?

From 19-21 October 2009, talks between P5+1 and Iran were held in Vienna to conclude the deal of supplying Iran with nuclear fuel in exchange for its LEU. IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei circulated a draft agreement that reportedly envisaged the shipment of Iran’s low-enriched uranium to Russia for further enrichment and then to France to produce fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. This was schemed as a dual structure to magnify the IAEA’s control on the nuclear fuel provision for Iran. However, Iran was not happy with the draft agreement. Since the nuclear deal already included Iran’s loss of its bargaining power by giving out its massive amount of nuclear material outside their territory for the fuel exchange, the extra process to obtain the nuclear fuel through France made Iran feel as if they were giving up too much of their rights. According to the P5+1 and IAEA plan, the process could take up to a year or more for Iran to acquire nuclear fuel.

As the situation progressed disadvantageously for its vital interest of protecting the full-fledge nuclear programme, Iran tried to create rift for the break through. On 29 October 2009, Iran counter-proposed an alternative that the exchange of Iran LEU and France nuclear fuel would occur simultaneously in Iran’s territory or that the two sides would
carry out the swap in smaller batches.\textsuperscript{471} It was Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy to provide persuasive inducement. However, as P5+1 adhered to the original plan and demanded Iran to comply, on 18 November 2009, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki announced that Iran would not ship its low-enriched uranium out of the country.

As the negotiation collapsed, the US, along with P5+1, decided to raise its level of coercion on Iran. On 20 November 2009, P5+1 met in Brussels to discuss the next steps after Iran rejected a nuclear fuel deal. Iran responded to impose counter coercion to display its ‘Strength of Motivation’ and the deterrence power to increase the enforcement cost of the possible US military intervention. Thus, Iran executed a massive military exercise to protect its nuclear facilities against any potential attacks which covered approximately one-third of Iran territory\textsuperscript{472} and declared the production of twenty percent enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor.

However, as unjustified US coercive diplomacy had been self-degraded by losing the multilateral support and coercion, the unjustified counter coercive diplomacy of Iran was in favour to the US. The IAEA, who had been discreetly dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme, made a bold move. On 27 November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution urging Iran to comply with the UNSC resolutions that demanded the suspension of enrichment activities, including the construction at the Fordow. Since Iran utilized IAEA report and inspection as the efficient tool for decreasing its incompliant cost for counter coercive diplomacy, it was a loss for Iran. As being in the cornered, on 2 December 2009, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared the production of twenty percent enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor.

The US started the ‘gradual turning the screw’ to pressure Iran after the inauguration of Ahmadinejad’s second term. By speculating the covert Fordow underground nuclear facility, Obama successfully won the consolidation of the international community on Iran’s nuclear programme. As it is explained in <Figure 4-12>, it was considerable success of US coercive diplomacy regarding nuclear negotiation. However, as it again

\textsuperscript{471} Paul Richter and Borzou Daragahi, “Iran reply on nuclear deal ‘inadequate’; Tehran appears to seek to slow and reduce any export of atomic fuel”, The Los Angeles Times, Oct 30, 2009

pursue the objective of swift implementation of ‘no enrichment’ by enhancing the nuclear fuel control, it failed to close the deal and made Iran declared the 20 percent nuclear enrichment.

<Figure 4-12> The Contention which Leads to initiate 2009 Nuclear fuel Swap Deal

It was once again proved when the US enhanced the justification of coercive diplomacy with hard evidence and reasonable policy objective—in this case reducing Iran enriched Uranium stockpile and the fuel control not the ‘Zero enrichment’—the US succeeded to consolidate the multilateral coercion. As the US induced Iran to energy swap deal rather than demanding the dismantlement of its nuclear programme, the face-saving and reasonable request, Iran had to comply with the US coercion.

4.5.2.3 Escalation of Contention and the UNSC Resolution 1929

The collapse of the negotiation had adverse effects on Iran on the global strategic environment over its nuclear programme. On 16 February 2010, the US, France and Russia sent a letter to the IAEA Director General expressing regret over Iran’s unwillingness to agree to the TRR fuel swap arrangement. The letter reiterated the need for implementing the IAEA proposal and reaffirmed their full support. The request from the three countries including Russia to the IAEA was not beneficial to Iran. Moreover,
as WikiLeaks disclosed in a confidential US document that the newly elected ‘Yukiya Amano was solidly in the US court on every key strategic decision’, the new leadership of the IAEA was not favourable for Iran.⁴⁷³

On 18 February 2010, the first IAEA report from the new leadership of Yukiya Amano on Iran’s nuclear programme was released to the IAEA Board of Governors meeting. As Hossein Mousavian argued, Amano’s IAEA report was evaluated as more ‘harsh’ and inclined to the West compared to previous IAEA reports of ElBaradei as its director.⁴⁷⁴ The alleged possible military dimensions of Iran, which the IAEA questioned the related information during ElBaradei’s rule, were become ‘credible’ evidence that IAEA should inspect.⁴⁷⁵

Iran immediately sent a letter to denounce the IAEA report as being biased and claimed all the declared material in Iran was supervised by the IAEA and accounted for. On 22 February 2010, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of AEOI, announced that Iran would continue with its plan to build ten more enrichment sites and identified twenty sites for the new facilities.⁴⁷⁶ It was to display its ‘strength of motivation’ of counter coercive diplomacy and increase the enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy on Iran nuclear programme. However, the 2010 February IAEA report provided a favourable strategic environment to implement its coercive diplomacy. The EU was reportedly drafting new sanctions that would target Iran’s energy and financial sectors which was the first time that the EU considered the coercive measures targeting the entire Iranian economy including Iran Central Bank.⁴⁷⁷

Since the possibility of an agreement seemed remote and the additional coercion to be implemented, Iran decided to increase its nuclear capability to counter coerce the US to the negotiation. As president Ahmadinejad declared the production of twenty percent enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor, on 12 February 2010, Iran succeeded

in producing twenty percent enriched uranium and achieved the ability to enrich more than the LEU.  

The twenty percent Uranium enrichment was the border line of NPT regime. Thus, it was deliberate threat to send the message that the possibility nuclear deal on limiting Iran’s full fledge nuclear programme at a certain level, 3 to 5 percent, is about to close. On 19 April 2010, Iran released a statement that it would start the construction of new enrichment plants. The director of the AEOI, Akbar Salehi, stated that Iran would start the construction of two enrichment sites by March 2011. Iran did not inform the IAEA of the location and designs of the new sites, claiming it did not need to do so until six months before the nuclear materials were introduced to the facility. It clearly displayed Iran’s perception on the Additional Protocol that it was not yet signed and ratified to limit Iran’s nuclear activity.

As contention between the US and Iran continued, the Obama administration utilized other persuasive inducement to induce Iran. On 27 April 2010, when Brazil offered to act as a mediator between Iran and the US to prevent a further round of sanctions against Iran, the US gave a green light. Therefore, Brazil’s Foreign Minister Celso Amorim suggested a proposal to work with Turkey to formulate an agreement which was more acceptable to both sides. On 17 May 2010, Iran, Brazil and Turkey signed a joint declaration, the ‘Tehran Declaration’, on Iran’s exchange of low-enriched uranium for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. The terms of the agreement were practically identical to the failed October 2009 proposal. The only difference was that Turkey was to be the location for the fuel swap.

When the ‘strength of motivation’ of coercive and counter coercive diplomacy between the US and Iran again become parallel, the Turkey and Brazil found the middle ground to make a compromise deal; for the US, massive reduction of Iran enriched uranium and implementation of enhanced control over Iran nuclear fuel, and for Iran, place the energy swap location near Iran to kept certain degree of energy independence. However, the US who successfully consolidated the multilateral coercion and support decided to turn down the Teheran agreement and increased its coercion. It was the clear

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evidence that the US became adamant with its policy objective of 'no enrichment'.

On 19 May 2010, after consultations with Russia, China and other major powers, the Obama administration submitted a draft U.N. Security Council Resolution that would tighten sanctions against Iran. Hillary Clinton called the fuel swap deal of Turkey and Brazil was a “transparent ploy” on Iran’s part to avoid new sanctions. However, considering the fact that the US supported the talks and that the proposal was quite similar to the IAEA and P5+1 proposal of September 2009, allegations that the ‘Tehran declaration’ was a decoy of Iran was illogical.

On 9 June 2010, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1929. UNSC Resolution 1929 imposed a fourth round of sanctions against Iran, including tighter financial measures and an expanded arms embargo. Resolution 1929 demanded Iran to, “suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities as well as work on all heavy water related activities,” and requested the IAEA to report Iran’s implementation of the UNSC Resolution within 60 days.

<Figure 4-13> The Contention which Leads to the UNSC Resolution 1929

As shown in <Figure 4-13>, by utilizing US coercion, Iran succeeded in producing twenty percent enriched uranium which boasted its nuclear capability and the bargaining power in nuclear negotiation. However, it also lost a certain degree of support from Russia and China on Iran, which allowed them to participate on ratifying UNSC Resolution 1929.

The UNSC Resolution 1929 was a meaningful success for the Obama administration. Unlike the Bush administration, the Obama administration displayed its willingness to talk with Iran and provided a meaningful compensative inducement, such as a nuclear fuel swap that recognizes certain level of Iran nuclear enrichment, to magnify international support.

Although the participation of Russia and China on UNSC Resolution 1929 could be devaluated as their attempt to secure the energy trade with Iran, the justified US coercive diplomacy which pushed them to the fourth round of the Iranian sanction could be considered a success. However, as the US displayed its coercive diplomacy of ‘no enrichment’ on turning down the Teheran agreement, it left Iran counter coercive diplomacy to avail.

**4.5.2.4 The End of Obama’s First Term and Iran’s Enhanced Nuclear Capability**

1) The Coercive Diplomacy of ‘No Enrichment’ and the Dead End

As UNSC Resolution 1929 was ratified, the US prepared to execute its coercive diplomacy with intensified economic sanctions. On 1 July 2010, Obama signed a joint bill that could sanction any person who provided Iran with goods, services, technology or information with a market value over $1 million or any agent – meaning individual, organization or institution – that made an investment of over $20 million in Iran’s petroleum industry. 482 This was the tool with which the US administration would gradually turn the screw on Iran’s capacity to finance its nuclear programme and deepen its isolation.

However, increased coercion with economic sanctions was not able to create an asymmetry of motivation regarding uranium enrichment as it was a vital interest for Iran. The P5+1 fuel swap proposal, which designated Russia and France as suppliers of nuclear fuel to Iran, meant a possible delay of the energy swap of more than a year. This meant a permanent effect on the Iranian nuclear programme, reducing Iran’s nuclear capability more than occurred when Khatami suspended the enrichment programme for more than 2 years during his presidency. Thus, without a compromise and without Iran having the bargaining power of a fully fledged nuclear programme, the p5+1 deal demanded by the US was too excessive for Iran to accept.

In order to create the an ‘asymmetry of motivation’ that could coerce Iran into dismantling its enrichment programme, the Obama administration needed clear evidence of Iran’s violation or near-violation of the NPT, such as construction of the Fordow facility or a ‘global strategic environment’ such as 9/11, to justify its coercion and consolidate multilateral support. However, revelation of the construction of the Fordow covert facility site, which had not yet initiated operations, was insufficient to create an ‘asymmetry of motivation’ which could lead to ‘zero enrichment’ by Iran. Therefore, the US either needed to compromise the objective of its coercive diplomacy by aiming lower, such as at a nuclear energy swap deal, or else negotiate with Iran with other inducements. However, the US refused to do either of these things and instead increased its economic sanctions. As a result, the contention between coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy continued, which only bought the time for Iran to develop its nuclear capability.

On 11 July 2010, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the AEOI, announced it had produced 20 kilograms of twenty-percent-enriched uranium and that it was initiating the production of its own fuel plates.\(^{483}\) This research on plate-type fuel may have been a cause of grave apprehension for the international community since plate-type fuel process creates a neutron flux, a material which is essentially used to study nuclear weapons. The progress of Iranian nuclear development was clear evidence that Obama’s coercive diplomacy was failing to create an ‘image of war,’ isolate Iran, consolidate international support to induce an Iranian behavioural change or decrease its nuclear capability.

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Conversely, as Iran recovered enough bargaining power in the absence of negotiations, it started to degrade the US coercive diplomacy by displaying its nuclear capability and will to engage in nuclear negotiations. On 26 September 2010, Ahmadinejad stated that Iran would end higher level uranium enrichment if the world powers would send nuclear fuel for its research reactor. Soon, Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki requested a nuclear dialogue with the P5+1 within the framework of the ‘Tehran Declaration.’

On 20 October 2010, the head of the AEOI, Ali Akbar Salehi, announced that they had stockpiled 30 kg of twenty-percent-enriched uranium U-235. Since the amount was nearly double the 17 kg of June 2010, Iran had again successfully increased its bargaining power in nuclear negotiations. Again, on 5 December 2010, Ali Akbar Salehi declared Iran self-sufficient in the production of yellowcake, a uranium concentrate powder. The first batch of domestically produced yellowcake was shipped from the Ghchine mine to the uranium conversion facility in Isfahan under the supervision of the IAEA. Since Iran was continuing to enhance its nuclear capability under the NPT treaty, the Obama administration had no other option than to initiate negotiations.

There were three possible methods that the US could employ in its coercive diplomacy against Iran’s uranium enrichment: 1) escalate the possibility of military conflict to force dismantlement; 2) consolidate critical multilateral sanctions and the isolation of Iran through the UN; or 3) put US unilateral sanctions on Iran and any third party that had transactions with Iran. However, apart from unilateral sanctions, it was a difficult task to employ these methods with its weakly justified coercive diplomacy. Despite the US’s escalation dominance on Iran, with its struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan the US could not implement an ‘image of war’ by escalating military tension. It simply could not make a possible military intervention seem credible. Moreover, Iran’s missile and military deterrence could cause casualties, which made it even more difficult for the US to utilize a limited military option. If it escalated into a war, it would be a failure of the coercive diplomacy. Above all, as long as Iran developed its nuclear programme under the NPT, there was not much space in which to execute coercion.

On 6 December 2010, the nuclear talks between the P5+1 and Iran, which had ceased for over a year, were finally resumed in Geneva. However, the US, which aimed at ‘zero enrichment’ by Iran, could not offer more than the previous P5+1 nuclear energy swap deal,\(^\text{486}\) which led to an impasse in the negotiations. The Obama administration, which had inaugurated its term promising ‘direct talk and dialogue,’ came closer and closer to following the trajectory of Bush’s ‘pure coercion’ diplomacy.

2) Back to Pure Coercion? An Absence of Negotiation with Increased Sanctions

Since a satisfactory resolution of the Iranian nuclear negotiation seemed remote due to the differences over uranium enrichment, the Obama administration notably shifted the main focus of the US’s foreign diplomacy from Iran’s nuclear programme to the issue of democracy and human rights abuses in Iran. Thus, the US became increasingly outspoken on the Arab uprising, on issues of democracy, and on how change was needed in the Middle East. After years of failure to reach a resolution on Iran’s nuclear programme, the Obama administration reassessed that the nuclear talks only bought time and momentum for Iran’s nuclear development. Thus, the US decided to swing its Iranian nuclear policy from direct talks and negotiation to patiently squeezing compliance by Iran. On 23 May 2011, the Obama administration enacted Executive Order 13574 to sanction seven foreign companies involved in supplying Iran with refined oil. It also blacklisted sixteen firms and individuals involved in Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes.\(^\text{487}\)

On 13 July 2011, in order to break the impasse in the Iranian nuclear negotiation, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov proposed a phased plan to restart the talks between Iran and the P5+1.\(^\text{488}\) The Russians proposed the following steps: 1) Iran would limit enrichment activity to the Natanz nuclear facility, suspend the instalment of any additional centrifuges, and halt the production of advanced centrifuges. In return, the P5+1 would suspend the financial sanctions and ship inspections which were imposed according to UNSC Resolution 1929; 2) Iran would agree to provide centrifuge and nuclear facility design information to the IAEA under Code 3.1, cap its enrichment level


at five percent, and allow greater IAEA monitoring of its centrifuges. In return, the P5+1 would suspend the UN sanctions except those related to nuclear supplier groups and gradually lift the unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran; 3) Iran would implement the Additional Protocol. In return, the P5+1 would suspend all UN sanctions in a phased manner according to the level of Iranian implementation of the Additional Protocol; and 4) Iran would suspend all enrichment-related activities for three months. In return, the P5+1 would lift all sanctions and begin to implement the group’s proposed incentives.

However, the US, which had changed its political stance from ‘strategic patience’ to coercive diplomacy, planned to gradually increase its coercion until Iran showed integrity in the nuclear negotiations. Moreover, as the most severe economic sanctions on Iran were in the process of being set up by the US and the EU, the Obama administration did not need to jump into the negotiations.

The Russian proposal was a realistic package deal which could cap Iran’s nuclear enrichment at 5% and implement the Additional Protocol as the final resolution of Iran’s nuclear programme. The IAEA would have increased surveillance and control over Iran’s nuclear programme. However, on 30 September 2011, the US State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland stated “Ahmadinejad makes a lot of empty promises… from our perspective at the moment, this looks like a diversion from the real issue,” and so the US rejected the Russian proposal.

Although, Iran’s largest trading partner, the EU, decided to increase its sanctions to induce a behavioural change by Iran, the US had to compromise and negotiate to implement effective coercion of Iran within the strategic environment that included the soft balance of China and Russia in the region. Hillary Clinton has stated that “The biggest consumers of Iranian oil, and the hardest to convince to turn off the spigot, were in Asia. China and India, in particular, depended on Iranian oil to meet their rapidly expanding energy needs. The advanced economies of South Korea and Japan were also

highly dependent on imported oil from Iran.”

Thus, Iran was able to counter the coercive measures and decrease the cost of not complying with the US and EU coercive diplomacy.

On 8 November 2011, the IAEA released a new report on Iran that damaged Iran’s stance on its nuclear programme. For the first time, the IAEA report assembled the available evidence into one general overview that strengthened the allegation that Iran had continued with its nuclear weaponization since 2003. However, the IAEA accusation against Iran, which began with the phrase ‘the Agency has information from more than 10 Member States,’ was mainly based on US intelligence information, the credibility of which had been criticized in a previous IAEA report. Therefore, it faced strong resistance from Russia, China and the bloc of developing countries. Russia immediately announced its refusal to implement any sanctions against Iran. Its deputy foreign minister, Gennady Gatilov, rejected the US approach, arguing that further sanctions would only degrade the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also released a statement denouncing the IAEA report, stating that it had “departed from the standard verification language.” Even India, which had been supportive of the US, took the side of the NAM. A statement from China was the most critical. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, stated “sanctions cannot fundamentally resolve the case. We hope the IAEA will be fair and objective and actively committed to clarifying the salient issues through cooperation with Iran.” Again, US coercion based on a lack of evidence only increased the enforcement cost of coercive diplomacy.

The US had successfully created momentum for its coercive diplomacy by revealing the Fordow facility and thus inducing Iran to engage in negotiation over a nuclear fuel swap. However, the success of its coercive diplomacy was limited because it aimed at ‘no

enrichment’ rather than the reasonable objective of limiting Iranian nuclear enrichment.

By utilizing the favourable strategic environment that had been created, the US had the opportunity to force Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol and both control nuclear fuel and put a 5% cap on the Iranian nuclear enrichment programme. However, it missed the opportunity and fell back on its conventional pure coercion aiming at no enrichment, which had continually failed to produce an ‘asymmetry of motivation’ to induce behavioural change by Iran.

Despite criticism from the international community of the neutrality of the IAEA report, on 21 November 2011 the Obama administration enacted Executive Order 13590, which targeted the Central Bank of Iran and the oil sector. In what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called “a significant ratcheting up of pressure on Iran,” a list of companies involved in supporting Iran’s nuclear programme and in the production and sale of petrochemicals were targeted to induce them to cease business with Iran. It was the strongest economic sanction that the Obama administration could enact. The EU also decided to impose an oil embargo and freeze the European assets of Iran’s central bank on 1 July 2012 as part of the US-led Iran sanction campaign. Since the EU was the recipient of 20 percent of Iran’s oil sales, this was a staggering blow to Iran’s economy.

Coercive diplomacy aims to achieve a diplomatic solution by creating an artificial environment which favours the coercer. The coercer has to create an ‘asymmetry of motivation’ by threatening an image of war, consolidating multilateral support and isolating the coercee with inducements based on an asymmetry of power. However, the US coercive diplomacy aiming at ‘no enrichment’ failed to create an ‘asymmetry of motivation.’ Although the EU joined the severe economic sanctions against Iran, a fully fledged nuclear programme was a vital interest for Iran that could not be abandoned. As shown, this had become clear on many occasions during the long years of the contention.


process. Moreover, in the globalised neoliberal economic environment Iran could always find substitute trading partners to minimize the impact of sanctions as long as it succeeded in exerting its counter-coercive diplomacy under the NPT treaty. Thus, although its GDP growth plummeted by 6.6% in 2012 after the sanctions were imposed, in 2013 it recovered, increasing by 4%, and then reached its 2011 growth rate of 4.3%.

As the US coercive diplomacy only escalated the tension without any sign of rapprochement, concerns about the possibility of a military conflict arose among the international community. The US Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta, strongly believed there was a high possibility of Israel carrying out a pre-emptive strike in April, May or June. However, since Iran successfully enhanced its counter-coercive diplomacy by increasing the enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy, by protecting the nuclear site, securing justification for its nuclear development under the NPT, consolidating international and domestic support, and securing the ‘motivation of strength’ of its nuclear programme, no state could implement inducements other than economic sanctions.

Therefore, on 14 April 2012 the US again had to approve nuclear talks with Iran. In Istanbul, the P5+1 and Iran decided to adopt a step-by-step process with reciprocal actions in order to move towards a long-term solution. This was a setback for the chances of the US coercive diplomacy aimed at ‘zero enrichment’ being effective in any short period of time. Moreover, as Iran succeeded in developing its 20 percent nuclear enrichment programme and using it as a bargaining chip, it became tougher to reach an agreement on a nuclear deal.

Unfortunately, by the end of July 2012 the only inducement left to Obama in the nuclear negotiation was economic sanctions. After the end of the Istanbul nuclear talks, on 13

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July 2012 Obama imposed another economic sanction with Executive Order 13382. Companies and banks linked to the proliferation of nuclear and missile programmes were added to the US sanction list. In response, Iran doubled its production at the Fordow enrichment facility and succeeded in adding 43 kilograms of 20-percent-enriched uranium to its stockpile. 502 Moreover, as an IAEA report revealed, it continued to upgrade its nuclear facilities and construct a heavy water reactor. On 13 December 2012, with the US Treasury and State Department imposing new sanctions on seven Iranian companies and five individuals under Executive Order 13382 as a last measure, the first term of the Obama administration ended without the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme or a decrease in its nuclear capability.

The foreign policy of the Obama administration during its first term was a combination of ‘liberalism,’ which emphasized American values, and ‘realism,’ which stressed the national interest. During its first three years, the Obama administration held an ideal vision of justice, peace and security to build common ground in the international community. However, once

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it faced the realpolitik of international relations, the US set its stance as ‘progressive where possible but pragmatist when necessary.’ Therefore, some US foreign policy experts denounced the Obama administration for doing ‘damage control’ without having a grand strategy in its foreign diplomacy.\textsuperscript{503} Obama’s non-proliferation policy on Iran’s nuclear programme was not an exception.

While the Obama administration argued that the US was open for ‘direct talks and dialogue’ with Iran, when it came to nuclear negotiations Obama took a similar approach to his predecessors. The US continually imposed unilateral and multilateral sanctions while sustaining its ‘escalation dominance’ against Iran and keeping all military options on the table. Iran was continually excluded from a ‘negative security assurance’ regarding US nuclear weapons. However, the Obama administration showed its rationality by implementing substantial persuasive inducements in its coercive diplomacy. Unlike Bush’s ‘pure coercion’ and ‘no enrichment,’ it recognized a limited level of Iran’s nuclear right to enrich. Interestingly, when the US recognized Iran’s enrichment programme, there was progress in the nuclear negotiation.

However, tarnishing its declaration of a desire for a ‘Nuclear Free World,’ the Obama administration also denied Iran’s nuclear right to produce LEU, which was approved by the NPT regime. Admittedly, it was important to calculate Iran’s intentions and the future possibility of its enrichment technology being used for nuclear armament. However, the US stance of limiting Iran’s nuclear enrichment to below five percent, which was beyond the NPT regime, became a weak point in its coercive diplomacy. Therefore, the Obama administration could not achieve compliance by Iran in nuclear dismantlement and revealed the limits of its effective coercion.

During its first term, the Obama administration had succeeded in consolidating international support to impose more severe and efficient economic sanctions on Iran than its predecessor had. The unprecedented economic sanctions on Iran’s finance and oil industry hit its economy hard and sent its real GDP growth plummeting to -10% in 2012. The administration also successfully sustained its military superiority to prevent any provocation.

by Iran while it was increasing the coercive measures. From the perspective of executing coercive diplomacy, Obama indeed made a substantial achievement. However, when it comes to evaluating whether Obama’s coercive diplomacy was a success or a failure in terms of Iran’s nuclear dismantlement, the outcome is negative.

A gallop poll in 2013 revealed that 63 percent of Iranian citizens were in favour of continuing Iran’s nuclear programme even if it meant long-lasting economic repercussions on their daily lives. The poll also showed that only 10 percent of Iranian citizens blamed the Iranian government for their economic suffering whereas 53 percent blamed the US and Israel, which created a more favourable environment for Iran’s counter-coercive diplomacy.\(^{504}\) Moreover, the fact that Iran’s nuclear capability had increased and seemed to be continuing its development clearly showed that the US coercive diplomacy, which did not have a strong justification and made excessive demands on Iran’s nuclear programme, would have difficulty in achieving nuclear dismantlement.

4.6 Conclusion

The Clinton, Bush and Obama US administrations all stated that their nuclear policy aim for Iran was the dismantlement of its nuclear programme. Whether these administrations were fully aware of the concept of coercive diplomacy or not, and despite the differences in leadership, rhetoric and the composition of the cabinets, all three US administrations decided to enact a policy strategy of compellence to change Iran’s nuclear policy rather than to contain it. Their implementation of coercive diplomacy is clearly revealed in their series of policy reviews: the Quadrennial Defence Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, the Ballistic Missile Defence Review Report and the National Security Strategy reports.

In order to achieve the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme, all three US administrations commonly utilized economic sanctions and the possibility of restoring diplomatic ties, economic aid and investment to induce a behavioural change by Iran: the abandonment of its nuclear programme. Moreover, by sustaining absolute military

superiority and escalation dominance against Iran, the US kept Iran in a closed and isolated environment, which is an important context variable for the success of coercive diplomacy. To sum up, the framework of coercive diplomacy was naturally applied to Iran’s nuclear programme after the US became the hegemonic state in a unipolar system after the Cold War, which created the necessary favourable environment for it to extend its influence.

As shown in this chapter, the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme and the advance of its nuclear capability were the results of the contention between US coercive diplomacy and Iran’s counter-coercive diplomacy. Since there was no chance that Iran would voluntarily abandon its nuclear programme of its own free will, as the majority of experts and US decision-makers argued, coercion was the necessary US nuclear policy towards Iran. However, Iran also consistently displayed its ‘strength of motivation’ in its counter-coercive diplomacy to sustain its sovereign right to peacefully use atomic energy. Especially after witnessing the fall of Gadhafi in Libya, who had fully restored diplomatic and economic ties with the US by abandoning his nuclear programme, the already scarce possibility of spontaneous Iranian nuclear dismantlement diminished to none. Moreover, as long as Iran maintained the legitimate status of its nuclear programme under the IAEA and NPT regimes, the US coercive diplomacy lacked justification and evidence and so was clearly limited in its ability to implement proper inducements to achieve compliance by Iran.

Understanding this difficulty, the majority of experts argued that coercive diplomacy was not a prime choice for the US in its dealings with Iran’s nuclear programme. However, no one denied that coercive diplomacy was the ‘lesser evil’ policy choice among all the other alternatives, since the opportunity cost of appeasement or a war on Iran’s nuclear programme went beyond rationality. Thus, to successfully achieve non-proliferation by Iran, the US needed to face the Iranian nuclear issue squarely, form proper inducements and objectives, and fully understand the theory of coercive diplomacy, which became the fixed constant in US policy on Iran’s nuclear programme. However, as has been shown, from Clinton to Obama’s first term all three US administrations failed to do this.
Decision-makers should consider the mutuality of coercion when implementing coercive diplomacy. Since no unilateral coercion operates in the real world, the coercee’s counter-coercive diplomacy has to be considered in order to accurately assess effective inducements to achieve diplomatic bargaining. To reach the objective of US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme – dismantlement – the US needed to reduce its enforcement cost by consolidating policy support and creating common ground with Russia and China, which are soft balances of US hegemony in the Middle East. This was and still is not an easy task, since Iran also executes its counter-coercive diplomacy to do the exact opposite by decreasing the non-compliance cost created by US coercive diplomacy.

In this sense, although it made many mistakes because of its lack of understanding of coercive diplomacy, the Bush administration, which formed the multilateral P5+1 structure, created a meaningful framework within which to work towards Iranian non-proliferation. Although a bilateral negotiation would have had a greater chance of achieving direct communication and consent between Iran and the US, the strategic environment, which was intertwined with the different interests in Iran’s nuclear programme of neighbouring agents, was equally important and it influenced the policies of both the US and Iran. Therefore, including this valuable within the framework of coercive diplomacy was the right way for the US to ‘consolidate international support.’ Whether the results were satisfactory or not, the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme was dealt with through a process of contention between coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy between Iran and the US within the strategic environment of the P5+1 multilateral structure.

The US non-proliferation policy on Iran within the P5+1 structure did not and could not aim to be type C coercive diplomacy – persuading the opponent to make changes in its government or regime. The consensus among the P5+1 was that regime change in dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme was impossible. This was revealed in a series of UNSC resolutions. Although the UNSC resolutions referred to Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which includes possible military intervention, not only China and Russia but the EU 3 also opposed implementing any type of military measure. Therefore, within the multilateral framework, the viable options for US coercive
diplomacy were types A or B: persuading the opponent to stop short of the goal or to undo the action. As shown in this chapter, the US had to consolidate the support of the P5+1 to impose effective punitive measures and successful inducement of Iran was only achieved when the US secured their consent. Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic and political effort to resolve a crisis. The role of military action is to build credibility and to show the coercer’s will to mobilize a larger force if necessary as a diplomatic threat. Thus, if the use of total force or the use of military force escalates into a war, it is a failure of coercive diplomacy.

Compared to a total war, which could instantly devastate the adversary and make the regime change, coercive diplomacy, which can only implement economic sanctions, limited warfare and economic investment, cannot achieve a dramatic shift in the coercee. As in all other diplomatic and foreign policies, tangible success comes as a result of accumulated effort by the participants. It needs prudent trust-building among the partners throughout the negotiation process until it reaches agreement. However, none of the three administrations from Clinton to Obama’s first term succeeded in doing this.

Depending on the circumstances and the progress of the nuclear negotiation, the US often used type A coercive diplomacy, aiming to suspend Iran’s nuclear programme, but the ultimate goal was type B: the dismantlement of its nuclear programme. Admittedly, due to its successful counter-coercive diplomacy, Iran acquired a nuclear enrichment capability. However, from Clinton to Obama’s first term, the US did not approve of Iran’s fully fledged nuclear programme including 20% LEU, which was totally legitimate under the IAEA and NPT regimes.

The fact that the US coercive diplomacy did not have valid justification was in itself a big disadvantage for the US in its effort to achieve Iran’s nuclear dismantlement. As seen in this chapter, multilateral coercive diplomacy is like a double-edged sword. If the multilateral participants can reach a consensus and agree to impose an inducement as coercive diplomacy, the coalition of coercion can maximise the non-compliance cost to the coercee to achieve a behavioural change. However, ‘Bellum omnium contra omnes’ and the anarchy in international relations and politics makes creating a coalition of coercion not an easy task. In the case of Iran’s nuclear programme, consolidating a
binding consensus among the P5+1 to create efficient inducements needed extra effort. Since Russia and China softly balanced the US and publicly displayed their reluctance to impose a certain level of coercion on Iran, the US had to come up with an explicit reason to justify the coercion. As seen in this chapter, the US administration failed to do this. By denying the international regime and the treaty that approved LEU development as a sovereign right of states, the US degraded its justification for coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme.

This created room for Iran to enact its counter-coercive diplomacy by advancing its missile technology and nuclear capabilities, which increased the enforcement cost to the US. In 2006, when Russia made a proposal allowing Iran to operate a small R&D programme of thirty to forty nuclear centrifuges under IAEA supervision, and Ali Larijani, then Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, sent a positive signal that he would accept the offer, the US was adamant against the compromise and rejected it. The US supported its refusal by arguing that the United Kingdom had built its nuclear weapons programme using the knowledge gained from running only sixteen centrifuges. However, when Obama’s first term ended in 2012, the number of centrifuges in Iran was 10,414.

The US administrations dealt with the Iranian nuclear programme within the framework of coercive diplomacy. This set a behavioural change by Iran – nuclear dismantlement – as the objective of coercion and entailed various inducements to achieve compliance by Iran. To enhance the effectiveness of the inducements, the US created the P5+1 multilateral framework as a coalition of coercion and sustained its military dominance over Iran to secure escalation dominance. However, the US administrations showed a lack of understanding of the theory of compellence and coercive diplomacy when employing the actual policy on the ground. Iran was not a passive agent sitting still and reacting according to the inputs of US policy. Regardless of the asymmetry of power, Iran had resources with which to execute counter-coercion to change US behaviour and coercion during the contention of the crisis.

Coercive diplomacy is often misunderstood because it is a tactic of ‘influence of arms.’ However, it is still diplomacy: ‘forceful persuasion,’ a bargaining procedure that aims for
compliance by an adversary with an agreement. By setting dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme as the objective of its coercive diplomacy, the US provided a favourable environment for Iran to execute counter-coercive diplomacy. As a result, from the Clinton administration to Obama’s first term, the US neither succeeded in persuading Iran to dismantle its nuclear programme nor to decrease its nuclear capability.
5. An Analysis of Diplomatic Contention between the US and North Korea on Nuclear Nonproliferation after the Cold War

5.1 Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union who provided a nuclear umbrella and the assurance of national security, it was no secret that North Korea utilizes its nuclear capability and development as a tool to bargain compensation and military deterrence. North Korea has pursued a nonaggression treaty with US and normalization of the diplomatic relation for its regime security through its nuclear negotiation. Under this basic fact, there are diverse opinions among scholars whether North Korea’s nuclear programme can be resolved. It can be divided into three groups that believe it is possible, it is not possible, or it depends on how the environment is formed for the nuclear dismantlement.

The group that believes in the possibility of the nuclear dismantlement of the North Korea asserts if North Korea’s security dilemma is settled, such as by allowing them to be incorporated in an international system, North Korea’s nuclear programme will be resolved. According to Roland Bleiker, to label a particular country as a rogue state and considering it as not negotiable is inappropriate and irrational. He argued the representation of North Korea as a rogue state degrades the understanding of its nuclear programme and the possibility of the resolution. Through an analysis of the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis, he pointed out there was escalation of tension whenever the North Korean regime was been threatened. He emphasized the North Korean security dilemma under US nuclear threat as the key for a resolution. By implementing the proper assurance and inducements, he argued the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme is possible.\textsuperscript{505}

Lee Sang Hyun proposed the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programme which was applied to the Ukraine. He argued one should provide compensative

\textsuperscript{505} Roland Bleiker, “A Rogue Is a Rogue is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis”, \textit{International Affairs}, vol.79, no. 4, Jul 2003.
inducements such as economic aid and an assurance of regime security for North Korea to force them to accept the Ukraine Nonproliferation model. Since there is mistrust between North Korea and the US, Lee asserted the necessity of an international agreement on the North Korean regime security as well as an institutional plan of the economic development to provide North Korea could join the international community.\(^{506}\)

The other group of experts argues the nonproliferation of North Korea is not possible no matter how much punitive or compensative inducements are to be provided. Selig S. Harrison believes even if the US negotiate with North Korea, assuring them of their regime’s security, along with diplomatic normalization and economic compensation, none of these would be sufficient for bringing an end to the North Korean nuclear programme. Since the North Korean regime is sustained by its ‘military first’ policy and nationalist military elite group, which needs the nuclear programme as a crucial element in sustaining their strength, he argued it will only be dismantled when all of North Korean security threat is gone or the regime itself is toppled.\(^{507}\)

Kang Won Sik also evaluated the North Korean nuclear programme as non-negotiable agenda. Since he believes there is scant possibility of the North Korean regime to trust the US’ assurance of national security, it is more of a ‘chicken game’ that who would first abandon its own diplomatic objectives, not an agenda that could be solved through trust building process of negotiation.\(^{508}\) Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye both believed North Korea will never change their position on nuclear development and it is highly likely to be solved as that of Ukraine model only after the unification of the two Koreas.\(^{509}\)

Lastly, there is a group that sees the resolution of the North Korean nuclear programme

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is dependent on the strategic environment and inducements that creates the momentum. This group of scholars focuses on the opportunistic decisions of North Korea. They refuse to have a fixed concept on the North Korean nuclear programme and instead, focus on North Korea’s decisions which are influenced by international coercion and compensation. This group of scholars argues the North Korea does not have a categorical goal in achieving nuclear weapons.

According to Lee Jong Seok, the assumption that North Korea attempted to acquire nuclear weapons from the very beginning of their nuclear development cannot explain the fact that their nuclear test and possession of nuclear weapons capability occurred during the Bush administration and not the Clinton administration. However, he also asserted the argument of North Korean nuclear programme was only to maximize its ability to coerce compensation cannot explain the circumstance of the actual execution of the nuclear test. Therefore, Lee Jong Seok argues one should build an analysis based on the opportunistic decisions of North Korea: if the compensation is sufficient, North Korea will abandon its nuclear programme but if the international solidarity on North Korea’s nuclear programme is weak, North Korea will attempt to weaponize their nuclear programme. 510

Kim Keun Sik stated that the assumption of North Korea will keep their nuclear weapons to sustain the regime security is too risky and irrational behaviour. He argued the reason why the North continues to keep their nuclear programme is because if they succeed, it could be used as a nuclear deterrence and if not, it could still be used as a bargaining chip.511 Thus, if the environment of proper coercion is set, he asserts North Korea will change its nuclear strategy.

Graham Allison, who argued the Cuban missile crisis to be an example of successful coercive diplomacy, emphasizes the strong punitive inducement and giving a clear ultimatum would bring favourable conditions to solving Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programme. He asserted an unwillingness to wage war could offset the North Korean

opportunistic decision making environment and dismantle their nuclear programme.\textsuperscript{512}

The analysis on US foreign policy for resolving the North Korean nuclear programme among scholars could also be divided into three groups that support Appeasement, Engagement or the Regime Change policy. The group that suggests the appeasement policy on the North Korean nuclear programme asserts it would be more helpful in dismantling the North Korean nuclear programme if the US allowed North Korea to possess its nuclear weapons or if they normalized their relations with North Korea.

According to Gregory J. Moore, a favourable environment has to be set first to derive the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme. He suggested normalization between U.S, and North Korea and institutionalizing the six-party talks as a multilateral security cooperation regime would bring the behavioural change of the North Korea.\textsuperscript{513}

Bennett Ramberg expressed his concern that the North Korean nuclear weapons being used in reality. He asserted that accepting North Korea’s nuclear weapons and managing North Korea as a nuclear state would be much safer. Since the lack of information on North Korean nuclear weapon would result in intelligence failure that could lead in to a war, he argued confidence building predicated on the acceptance of a nuclear Pyongyang is much better policy choice.\textsuperscript{514}

However, the appeasement approach of the US towards the North Korean nuclear programme is highly unlikely. Historically, North Korea’s nuclear programme was unpardonable for any US administrations. Moreover, it contradicts the US nonproliferation policy that controls nuclear proliferation by the NPT and IAEA. The North Korean programme was largely focused on by all US administrations and the US intent to deal with the issue was once again officially announced at Obama’s ‘nuclear-free world’ speech in Prague. Therefore, neither the US appeasement policy on the nuclear programme of North Korea nor accepting the North Korean nuclear weapon is likely to happen.\textsuperscript{515}

\textsuperscript{512} Graham Allison, “The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: Lessons for US Foreign Policy Today”, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, no.4, Jul/Aug 2012, pp. 11-16.
The most extreme method, which is the regime change policy, literally suggests resolving the North Korea’s nuclear programme by changing the leadership in the country. Since there is no chance for North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme, they argue there is no need to evaluate and consider persuasive inducements. Moreover, they do not see the ‘compensative’ inducement is necessary in the case of North Korea.

Max Boot stated the critical threat to US is the development of WMD by rogue states and sharing them with terrorist groups. Thus, in order to secure US national security, he suggested a regime change is necessary policy measure in dealing Iran and North Korea. 516

Ralph C. Hassig and Kongdan Oh evaluated that the diplomatic agreement would never come across in solving the North Korean nuclear programme and estimated that the North Korean regime would not abandon its nuclear capability. However, since military intervention is very difficult in the case of North Korea, they insisted on provoking a bottom-up regime change and promoting democracy within North Korea by planting the plot information.517

Mark Fitzpatrick argues the North Korean regime needs to keep its nuclear capability and strength for their survival. As he evaluated the survival of the North Korean regime and its nuclear programme as one, Fitzpatrick insisted the US should pressure North Korea on the possibility of an overthrow. Moreover, since the North Korean regime would not forfeit its nuclear programme, he argued the US should implement a more severe sanction to North Korea.518

However, the regime change policy is not feasible in being implemented since neighbouring countries such as China and South Korea do not want and are not willing to tolerate any turmoil in the region. Also, the contradictions of national interest within East Asia, security of Japan and South Korea, hinder the US in executing such a policy towards North Korea’s nuclear programme. Moreover, with the fact that the US

administration officially announced they had no intention of pushing North Korea for a regime change, the possibility of implementing a regime change policy is low. A majority of scholars who study diplomacy regarding North Korea’s nuclear programme support the engagement policy. They argue the necessity of utilizing diplomatic normalization and the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula as an engagement frame and implementing the stick and carrot, the coercive diplomacy, in dealing with the North Korean nuclear programme. They believe it is, relatively, the path of least resistance.

According to David Kang, the economic reform action of North Korea in 2002 indicates its intention to change. He assumed North Korea is fully aware of the inevitability of economic reform and opening the markets. Based on this hypothesis, Kang argued North Korea’s nuclear programme would be resolved if the US negotiate with the nonaggression treaty, diplomatic normalization and the peace treaty.\(^{519}\)

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the US’ engagement policy on Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programme is not a simple policy that only provides positive inducements. It goes along with the containment and compellence on the nuclear programme of Iran and North Korea. However, as being temporary used during the engagement policy, the purpose of the containment is not just for the containment itself as it was for the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Scott Snyder and Charles Freedman argued the containment to be the easiest, most efficient and practical way in managing North Korea’s nuclear programme without causing any escalation. However, they also clarified it as an interim policy since the containment itself would not lead to the dismantlement of the nuclear programme.\(^{520}\) The containment that used in engagement policy on nuclear programme of Iran and North Korea is ultimately to coerce them to comply with the dismantlement of their nuclear programme. Thus, the engagement policy that the majority of scholars insist is actually ‘coercive diplomacy’ that occasionally utilize the containment as a method of

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‘wait and see’ under the coercion frame.

Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochiziki emphasized the concept of ‘grand bargaining’, which includes all possible measures such as diplomatic normalization, nonaggression and a peace treaty. They insist ‘grand bargaining’ is necessary in solving all intertwined North Korean problems: drugs, counterfeiting US dollars, human rights issues, missiles, the nuclear programme, etc. However, although they insist one shot solution than the negotiation process of coercive and counter coercive diplomacy between the US and North Korea, O’Hanlon and Mochiziki emphasized the importance of US government to sustain its coercive diplomacy to induce North Korea to accept the grand bargaining offer.521

According to Michell B. Reiss, the US coercive diplomacy has to be executed directly against the regime since North Korea puts its regime security as their first priority. Michell argued gradual coercion by imposing sanctions or cutting the economic, energy aid and food aid along with persuasive inducement, providing normalization, and an assurance of the regime’s security will lead to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear programme.522

Chae Gyu Cheol insisted that North Korea should be coerced to accept the Ukraine model by implementing the engagement policy combined with coercive diplomacy. As the means of coercion, Chae argued the reinforcement of the US force in South Korea; performing the Team Spirit joint military exercise, enhance capability of pre-emptive strike and even the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.523

Richard N. Haass also suggested the combination of engagement and containment when dealing with the North Korean nuclear programme. Admittedly, he pointed out in the shortcomings of this approach; the possibility of buying time for North Korea to develop nuclear capability and the possibility of North Korea continuing their nuclear

programme even if the agreement is reached. However, Haass added the proven fact that the ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’, economic sanction and politic inducements were more effective than containment in bringing change to the Soviet Union during Cold War. Therefore, even if there is the possibility of failure, Haass insists the engagement with coercive diplomacy dealing with North Korea’s nuclear programme.\textsuperscript{524}

Leon V. Sigal criticized the containment policy cannot be a possible solution to the North Korean nuclear programme. Using ‘pure coercion,’ a failure on the part of the Bush administration that led to North Korea’s nuclear armament rather than dismantlement, as an example, Leon V. Sigal argued the give and take diplomacy is the best policy option for the US.\textsuperscript{525}

For a more hard liner engagement policy, the hawk engagement policy by Victor Cha is a typical one. As Victor Cha evaluated the possibility of North Korea abandoning its nuclear programme as being slim to none, he argued the freezing of the North Korean nuclear programme should be a precondition to any negotiation. He insisted compensative inducement, should only be provided as a package deal and provided only after North Korea announces its dismantlement of the nuclear programme. In hawk engagement, inducement itself means to draw a consensus of coercion among the participants of 6 party talks. That is, if the engagement fails to get North Korea to comply, a more severe sanction and coercion will be implemented to coerce nuclear dismantlement of North Korea.\textsuperscript{526}

Colin Duke analysed the US and North Korea negotiations to be a failure. He believed North Korea’s main goal in negotiation is to squeeze out the maximum amount of compensation from the US, rather than reaching a nuclear agreement. Therefore, Duke shares the idea of hawk engagement as being an engagement policy that should be utilized as an initial step to severe sanctions and coercion in case the negotiation fails.\textsuperscript{527}

Nicholas Eberstadt criticized the Bush administration, which formed the 2.13 Agreement

\textsuperscript{524} Richard N. Haass, “Regime change and its limits”, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 84, no. 4, Jul/Aug 2005, pp. 66-78
\textsuperscript{525} Leon V. Sigal, “Asian Blunders” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 87, Jan/Feb 2008, pp. 202-203
with North Korea and insisted more severe sanction with a more heightened Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI.  

Since North Korea is like a black box, it is not possible to fully understand either their intention towards nuclear strategy or the proper US policy in resolving it. Therefore, as shown above, there are various opinions among scholars in dealing with the issue. However, since it is the most effective bargaining chip in drawing out compensation and regime security, and as witnessed during the first and second nuclear crisis on how North Korea conducts their strategy in keeping their nuclear ability and furthering their nuclear development, the analysis on North Korea of pursuing the nuclear ability is highly credible.

During the contention process of coercive and counter coercive diplomacy North Korea demanded an absolute assurance of regime security whereas the US demanded the Complete Verifiable Irreversible Dismantlement. However, as witnessed in Gadhafi of Libya, due to the nature of the self-help environment, absolute assurance of the North Korean regime is impossible. Therefore, whether slowing down North Korea’s nuclear development or completely dismantling it, the US has to implement a coercive diplomacy to achieve its aim. In reality, the US administration has been dealing with the North Korean nuclear programme with the engagement policy, which utilizes coercive and persuasive inducement.

In chapter 5, the US coercive diplomacy, which was implemented on North Korea’s nuclear programme after the Cold War, will be examined. Analysing the contention between the US’ coercive diplomacy post-Cold War and North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy on its nuclear programme, this chapter aims to analyse how the US’ coercive diplomacy failed short of reaching its objective.

5.2 An Analysis of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy on the Nuclear Programme of North Korea

5.2.1 The US Coercive Diplomacy on the Nuclear Programme of North Korea

The objective of the US coercive diplomacy on North Korea is the complete dismantlement of its nuclear programme. In order to achieve its goal, the US administration sets the type of coercive diplomacy during the process of contention of the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy: type A – persuading the opponent to stop short of the goal, type B – persuading the opponent to undo the action and type C – persuading the opponent to make changes in the government or regime.

Each goal differs from the other. In the case of North Korea’s nuclear programme, type A is to seize or freeze North Korea’s nuclear programme. That is, the objective of the type A coercive diplomacy is to seize the current capability of the North Korean nuclear programme and its capability. Type B is the complete dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme. It means more than a seizing or freezing of the current nuclear programme and its capability. It includes the dismantlement of the ‘past nuclear capability,’ which aims for the complete dismantlement of the entire accumulated North Korean nuclear programme and its capability. The goal of type C, the complete dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme through a regime change, goes even further to achieve the assurance of the ‘future North Korean nuclear programme’ by eliminating the North Korean regime, which is hostile to the US.

Although the final goal of the US coercive diplomacy is the complete dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme, the type of coercive diplomacy is changeable according to the process of contention between the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy. Therefore, as the contention proceeds, the US changes the inducements, the level of coercive diplomacy and what to demand from North Korea depending on the environment in each phase of the contention. Thus, the US indicates the ‘Strength of Motivation,’ which influences the North Korean counter coercive diplomacy and its ‘strength of motivation’. As Alexander George explained in ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’, the side employing coercion is more likely achieve success if they are more motivated than their opponents by what is at stake, and this is the basic determining factor behind the success of coercive diplomacy.
5.2.1.1 Favourable Conditions for the US Coercive Diplomacy on the Nuclear Programme of North Korea

Through a number of case studies, Alexander George elaborated Thomas Schelling’s five required conditions for the success of coercion and defined the eight conditions that favour the success of coercive diplomacy: Clarity of objective, Strength of Motivation, Asymmetry of Motivation, Sense of Urgency, Strong Leadership, Adequate Domestic and International Support, Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation, and Clarity Concerning the Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis.

In the case of the US coercive diplomacy on the North Korean nuclear programme, the ‘Clarity of Objective’ is clear, which is the dismantlement of its nuclear programme. However, methods on achieving dismantlement varies in implementing the coercive diplomacy: 1) Freeze the North Korean nuclear programme → Dismantlement, 2) Freeze the North Korean nuclear programme → Decrease North Korea’s Nuclear capability → Dismantlement, 3) Dismantlement through grand bargaining 4) Dismantlement through the regime change. Since the choice of which method to implement is determined by the contention between the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy, there is room for the ‘Clarity of Objective’ to be damaged. For example, suppose the US changes the type of coercive diplomacy from type A to type C during the contention of the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy. The discrepancies of the objective, the freezing of the North Korean nuclear programme and the North Korean regime change degrades the ‘Clarity of Objective’. Moreover, if the US coercive diplomacy fails to send a clear signal of what they are demanding from North Korea, it could be referred as an absence of ‘Clarity of Objective.’

The ‘Strength of Motivation’ indicates the willingness of how much and how far the US would accept the enforcement cost of the coercive diplomacy. It also displays the integrity of the US’ demands on North Korea in each phase of its coercive diplomacy. ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’ means the asymmetry of the ‘strength of motivation’ between the US’ coercive diplomacy and the counter coercive diplomacy of North Korea. It is the imbalance between the eagerness of the US in achieving the coercive
diplomacy and that of North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy. If there is an imbalance between the two occurs, ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’, the possibility of a successful coercive or counter coercive diplomacy is highly likely to achieve. Therefore, by utilizing the inducements, the ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’, the US degrades and minimizes the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy whereas North Korea implements its inducements of the counter coercive diplomacy to reduce the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of the US coercive diplomacy. The contention between these two have an impact on adjusting the ‘Sense of Urgency’; if the US is in a great sense of urgency to achieve its coercive diplomacy, it is more likely to generate an atmosphere that will make North Korea more amenable for compliance.

The North Korean regime has long been astute and well-managed to survive the sanctions and coercions of the US and the outside world. Therefore, in order to implement an efficient coercive diplomacy on North Korea, a ‘Strong Leadership’ is needed for a successful US coercive diplomacy. Moreover, ‘Strong Leadership’ is one of the core elements in bringing an ‘Adequate Domestic and International Support’. Historically, the US tried to maximize the incompliant cost and the risk for North Korea by combining the solidarity and assets of China, Russia, South Korea and Japan, who all share the same opposition of the North Korean nuclear development. However, it has been proven to not be an easy task. Although, China and Russia share the need for North Korea to dismantle their nuclear programme, they do not want to do so through coercion, which would harm the national security of North Korea and its regime. Moreover, China and Russia, who implemented ‘Soft Balancing’ on the US foreign diplomacy, do not accept any US military coercion against North Korea. Thus, ‘Strong Leadership’ is important in minimizing this gap and the ‘Adequate Domestic and International Support,’ which would maximize the inducements of the coercive diplomacy and is crucial for the US coercive diplomacy on the North Korean nuclear programme.

The ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ is the core task of the coercive diplomacy. US coercive diplomacy has to be planned ahead to maximize the incompliant cost of North Korean resistance. If the US coercive diplomacy succeeds in building the ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ of North Korea, the possibility of North
Korea changing its behaviour or being more compliant to the US demand would be maximized. The ‘Clarity of Objective’ militates in favour of building the ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’. For instance, if the US coercive diplomacy is not clear in setting its goal as a regime change or the temporary seizing of North Korean nuclear programme, establishing the ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ of North Korea will give space to implement North Korean counter coercive diplomacy.

The last condition that favours coercive diplomacy is the ‘Clarity Concerning the Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis’. When an agreement or compromise of North Korean nuclear programme is made as the result of contention between the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy, the accurate terms of agreements have to be clarified for the settlement of the contention. As we witnessed in the subversion of the Geneva Agreed Framework, the 2.13 Agreement and 10.3 Agreement of the six-party talks and the 2.23 Agreement of the US and North Korea, imprecise terms and articles lead to future conflict and collapse of the agreement.

The implementation of the US coercive diplomacy on North Korean nuclear programme begins by stating clear objectives and demands for North Korea. After it is set, the measures and inducements of the US coercive diplomacy are decided accordingly. When the objectives and means of the coercive diplomacy are settled on, the US manages its coercive diplomacy within the strategic environment by considering favourable conditions to derive the compliance of North Korea.

The US coercive diplomacy on nuclear programme of North Korea proceeds through the contention process of the two and as its result, it will move on to different phases. The ultimate goal of the US coercive diplomacy on North Korean nuclear programme is complete dismantlement. If the US succeeds in inducing North Korea to an agreement and the process of dismantlement progresses as agreed, the US coercive diplomacy could be evaluated as a success. However, if an agreement is just a principle which cannot be extended to practical implementations or if further agreement is necessary for dismantlement, it is a continuation of contention to the next phase between the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy.
5.2.2 North Korean Counter Coercive Diplomacy

North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy against the US nonproliferation policy has been the perseverance of its nuclear capability and nuclear deterrence. Strategically, North Korea often utilizes inducement, freezing or the decrease of nuclear capability to coerce compensation from the US and the international community. However, the ultimate objectives of its counter coercive diplomacy was the joining the international community without losing its nuclear capability and deterrence.

The will of preserving its nuclear capability, the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy, was witnessed during the negotiation of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994. In order to secure their concealed plutonium which was not reported to the IAEA, North Korea displayed their will to go on a war. Moreover, whenever the outlook of conflict escalated in the Korean peninsula or it appeared that the development of nuclear capability would favour the nuclear negotiation, North Korea executed nuclear and missile tests.

North Korea has always refused the nuclear dismantlement that could be completely verifiable and only accepts negotiations that based on the reported amount of plutonium and nuclear ability submitted by North Korean authorities. Moreover, North Korea demands compensation for every dismantlement process through the negotiation. If North Korea believed the compensation was inadequate or the negotiation process was leading to build up the demands of complete nuclear dismantlement, North Korea counter coerced the US by delaying negotiations or increasing their nuclear capability.

The utmost goal of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy is to join the international community without losing its nuclear capability. As the coercive diplomacy became the US nonproliferation policy against North Korean nuclear programme, freeze or decrease of nuclear programme after maximizing its nuclear capability became the most powerful tool for North Korea in achieving political and economic compensation from the US and the International community. That is, in order to achieve the objective of the counter coercive diplomacy, North Korea utilizes its efficient measures to maximize the enforcement cost of the US coercive diplomacy.
Since the coercive diplomacy is the ‘persuasion through its arms of influence’, it approves of the limited use of military force. Thus, if the coercee failed to display its readiness to counter-react with a military response against the coercer’s coercive diplomacy, a counter coercive diplomacy is not possible to exist. The coercee must imprint ‘image of war’ and collateral damage to the coercer to implement its counter coercive diplomacy. Therefore, North Korea continuously displays its willingness to go on a war with the US and struggles to maximize the enforcement cost of the US coercive diplomacy. Moreover, a totalitarian regime like North Korea has the high possibility of taking the riskier choice. It does not mean that North Korean regime is irrational. However, compare to democratic state, its rationality could be weighing on more of regime security not the security of its citizen. Thus, it makes more difficult for the US to utilize the military action.

The readiness of North Korea and its willingness to go on a war intensifies the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of the counter coercive diplomacy. It restrains the favourable condition of the ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ of the US coercion. The more North Korea creates the devastating ‘image of war’, the more damage would be done to the US coercive diplomacy for consolidating the ‘Adequate Domestic and International Support’. It makes countries in the Far East Asia, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan, whose first priority is the peace in the region, to be extra cautious in supporting the US coercive diplomacy. Thus, the ‘Strong Leadership’ of the US coercive diplomacy could also be damaged. Apart from displaying a willingness to go on a war, North Korea executes its nuclear tests, missile tests and threats of nuclear proliferation to third countries to maximize the enforcement cost of the US coercive diplomacy. Since the US policy’s objective for the Far East region is stability and peace and protecting its regional allies, the advent of North Korean nuclear and missile that could strike Japan and South Korea is a substantial enforcement cost for the US coercive diplomacy.

In addition, when the US implements a more severe and strict coercive diplomacy by applying only punitive inducements such as ‘pure coercion’ of Bush administration, North Korea extends their will to compromise and negotiate amongst the neighbouring states and legitimizes them for developing its nuclear capability since it is their only
option against the US Coercion. Again, the more the nuclear capability of North Korea increases through this vicious circle, the more of the enforcement cost for the US coercive diplomacy increases. The increase of North Korea’s nuclear capability by utilizing US coercion intensified the ‘strength of motivation’ of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy, whereas the ‘strength of motivation’ of the US coercive diplomacy is weakened. Eventually, it influences the ‘asymmetry of motivation’ to North Korea.

The other implementation strategy of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy is to minimize the incompliant cost that will be imposed by the US. In order to reduce the incompliant cost, North Korea first tries to degrade the legitimacy of the US coercive diplomacy. The legitimacy of the US coercive diplomacy lies on the justified demands for the coercion. Therefore, North Korea questions and refutes the demands of the US coercive diplomacy to minimize its justification. For example, when the first six-party talks was held in 2003, US delegation James Kelly revealed their knowledge of North Korea’s uranium enrichment programme to coerce North Korea. Immediately, North Korea strongly opposed this fact and requested proof of any uranium enrichment activity on their part. However, the Bush administration failed to produce evidence on North Korea’s enrichment programme except for the testimony of Abdul Qadeer Khan, a famous Pakistani nuclear scientist and a metallurgical engineer, and this restrained the other participants of the six-party talks from providing their expertise to support the US coercive diplomacy.

North Korea criticizes the demands of the US coercive diplomacy as being unilateral, imbalanced and unjust. Moreover, by expressing their will to negotiate and compromise, North Korea degrades the justification of the US coercive diplomacy. During the second North Korean nuclear crisis, the US coerced North Korea by demanding the dismantlement of its nuclear programme as a precondition for any further negotiations. However, North Korea counter coerced the US coercive diplomacy by accusing it of being unjust and proposed their own resolution, the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programme through the establishment of a non-aggression treaty. In the end, North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy eventually won the support of Russia and China, who wanted a ‘Soft Balance’ against the US in Far East Asia, which made it more difficult for the US coercive diplomacy to utilize severe inducements. According
to Alexander George, the ‘Strength of Motivation’ is not influenced by the justification of a cause but the balance of interest. That is, any attempt from North Korea that degrades America’s coercive diplomacy has its limit on influencing the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of the US coercive diplomacy. However, as mentioned above, it is valid in non-proliferation of North Korea since it gave a room for Russia and China to play their game against the US coercive diplomacy.

In order to minimize the incompliant cost for North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy, apart from degrading the legitimacy of America’s coercive diplomacy, North Korea also strengthens its diplomatic asset by intensifying its alliance with friendly countries. Through strengthened relations, North Korea restrains its allies from participating in America’s coercive diplomacy. Moreover, depending on the circumstances, North Korea accepts the demands of neighbouring countries including Japan and South Korea, to create diplomatic differences among the participants of America’s coercive diplomacy, which also would minimize the incompliant cost for North Korea. The following <Figure 5-1> shows the clear picture of how the US coercive diplomacy and counter coercive diplomacy of North Korea are competed.

<Figure 5-1> The Coercive & Counter-Coercive Contention Model of US & North Korea
Contestation between America’s coercive diplomacy and North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy is still currently underway. Thus, evaluating the success and failure of America’s coercive diplomacy on North Korea’s nuclear programme is a difficult task. Moreover, since it is an on-going and sensitive issue, there are limits on accessing relevant references that are crucial for an accurate analysis.

As the contention is still in process, even if North Korea succeeds in its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile test and in possessing several nuclear warheads, it cannot be used to determine the ultimate success of North’s counter coercive diplomacy. This is due to the fact that North Korea is under a more severe sanction according to the UN Security Council resolution and the objective of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy, which aims for normalization with the US and joining the international community, has become more difficult. Moreover, with there still being a possibility of North Korea abandoning its nuclear programme, this allows the assessment of the US coercive diplomacy to be even more difficult. Likewise, America’s coercive diplomacy on North Korea’s nuclear programme, which is apparently failing to achieve fruitful results, cannot be judged as an ultimate failure. This is due to the fact that even if America’s coercive diplomacy failed to coerce North Korea at a certain phase, if it could be evaluated as a partial success in reducing North Korea’s nuclear capability and programme or a success in drawing the support from among the neighbouring states, it cannot be determined a total failure.

However, similar to chapter four, if the analysis of the US coercive diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear programme and the counter coercive diplomacy of Iran after the Cold War could set a certain time period, the evaluation of the US coercive diplomacy as either a success or failure would not be difficult. Therefore, in this chapter, the contention between America’s coercive diplomacy and North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy during the three US administrations - Clinton, Bush and Obama - will be examined.

**5.3 An Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Clinton Administration and the Counter Coercive Diplomacy of North Korea**
5.3.1 Background

The nuclear development of North Korea was initiated in early the 1950s at the beginning of the Cold War. However, it neither caused tension nor was it considered a threat in the international community. Although the boundaries of nuclear technology between peaceful existence and military measures are unclear, the level of North Korea’s nuclear ability was just experimental and did not even have a means of delivery. Moreover, due to the existence of the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella, nuclear weapon development was not North Korea’s top priority.

By the late 1970s, the US Intelligence Agency started to closely observe North Korea’s nuclear programme and its development. However, it focused on finding the reasons why North Korea was delaying the Safeguards Agreement and not on North Korea’s nuclear development and capability. According to the 1983 CIA secret report, the US accessed North Korean nuclear weapon capability to be very low since there was no reliable information to believe that North Korea had a nuclear armament facility or nuclear materials. Moreover, for the delivery of nuclear weapon, the MIG 23 Aircraft was the only option for North Korea.

In 1986, when North Korea activated the nuclear reactor that could produce weapon-grade plutonium, the US did not seem to be particularly concerned. In the Cold War system, the US administrations trusted China and Soviet Union to a certain degree that they would prevent the nuclear armament of North Korea. However, by 1988, the CIA began to question North Korea’s new nuclear reactor and in 1989, the CIA report revealed its concern on a rapid increase of nuclear activity from North Korea. In 1991, during a visit to China, Reginald Bartholomew, the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, expressed concerns that North Korean nuclear programme might possess a sufficient amount of plutonium for nuclear weapons by the mid-1990s and urged China to pressure North Korea to comply with the IAEA Safeguard

530 Ibid, CIA, “A 10 Year Projection on Possible Event on Nuclear Proliferation Concern”, 1983
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the communist bloc in the early 1990s spurred the concerns on North Korean nuclear programme. It meant not only the loss of political and military protection for North Korea but also the dissipation of the Soviet Union’s deterrence on North Korean nuclear programme. Moreover, as North Korea failed to normalize relations with its Cold War adversaries, the diplomatic isolation of North Korea made Kim Il-Sung regime felt more vulnerable to survive. It was clearly revealed during the 1st high level meeting between South and North Korea on September 1990. North Korea argued that if the existence of the tri-system - China, the Soviet Union and North Korea - was threatened, North Korea had no other option but to possess a nuclear weapon.

Despite the abrupt change in international system, there seemed to be a way of solving North Korean nuclear programme in the early period of the post-Cold War. As the US president George Bush declared the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons that had been deployed all around the world, the nuclear warheads in South Korea were also withdrawn. In accordance to this action, the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement on December 1991 and Inter-Korean Denuclearization Pact on December 31, 1991 were agreed. Although these were the agreements between North and South Korea, the US pressured North Korea to include not only the prohibition of plutonium reprocessing but also the enrichment of uranium. The US responded by cancelling the 1992 US-South Korea team spirit joint military exercise which had been held annually since 1976 and a direct talk between the U.S and North Korea was held on January 22, 1992.

However, things started to change after the outbreak of the first Gulf War in 1991. Through the war, Iraq’s nuclear programme was revealed to be far more advanced and progressed than estimated, shocking the US and the international community. This caused a huge concern in regards to North Korean nuclear programme, causing the

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IAEA and US to take a more hardliner stance towards the programme.

Until 1991, IAEA inspections were limited to the nuclear facility and materials that were voluntarily reported by member states of the NPT. However, when Operation Desert Storm revealed information that Iraq, an NPT member state, had developed a nuclear weapon programme - the ‘crash program’ - at a secret facility near the IAEA inspection site, the IAEA was accused of incompetence. Thus, IAEA changed its inspection to use any information provided by other member states of the NPT and perform a special inspection on any suspicious sites at any time. With its changed regulation, the IAEA could acquire confidential information from the member states’ Intelligence Agency and images from their Intelligence satellite.

As North Korea was believed to have a similar nuclear facility as Iraq with their nuclear reactor, uranium enrichment programme and high explosive test site, it soon became IAEA’s first target who wanted to put their new capabilities and regulations to the test. On May 4, 1992, North Korea’s first nuclear report was submitted to the IAEA. According to the report, the IAEA initiated six inspections from May 1992 to January 1993.

5.3.2 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy in the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis

On January 1993, the IAEA requested a special inspection on two waste storage sites in Yongbyon that were discovered during the previous six inspections. It was an exceptional case since the IAEA had been inspecting the facilities where the NPT member state voluntarily provided. North Korea denied the IAEA’s request by asserting the two sites were military facilities, which was not under the remittance of the IAEA. North Korea denounced the request of the IAEA, saying that it was a criminal act by America in an attempt to disarm North Korea by utilizing the IAEA.

As the conflict between the IAEA and North Korea was not resolved, the Clinton

538 Worker’s Newspaper, Rodong Shinmun, Pyongyang, Feb 12, 1993, p. A01.
administration executed the team spirit military exercise on March 8, 1993 to pressure North Korea to comply with the IAEA’s request. (It was cancelled in 1992 for a rapprochement) The counter coercive diplomacy of North Korea was also initiated. North Korea thereupon announced a quasi-state of war and chose to withdraw from the NPT at the seventh session of the ninth Central People’s Committee on March 12, 1993. The deadline for North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT was set to June 12, 1993, as the withdrawal from the NPT only becomes effective 90 days after the declaration. It worked as the ultimatum of North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy since the US had to respond before that 90 days’ time line. On 29 May 1993, North Korea tested the Rodong Missile which had a range of over 1000 km to pressure Clinton administration by showing its deterrence power over South Korea and Japan.

On April 5, 1993, to increase the enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy, North Korea suggested direct talks with the US to solve the problem. The North Korean gesture successfully gathered international support. On April 8, 1993, the Foreign Minister of China announced their position to support North Korea, adding that it was not clear whether North Korea possessed nuclear weapons. China urged the dialogue between the U.S and North Korea by arguing it would be a more efficient method in solving the problem.

The direct talk with the US was the core objective of North Korea counter coercion at the height of the escalation in 1993. However, as shown in <Figure 5-2>, the Clinton administration had to comply to North Korea request and initiate a high-level talks with North since the impact of North Korea’s withdrawal would influence the upcoming NPT review and the extension conference in 1995.

During the first contention between the US and North Korea, the ‘asymmetry of motivation’ was slanted to North Korea. For the US, the negative impact of North Korean withdrawal of NPT to the extension conference was not a minor problem. Moreover, as given the direct talk to negotiate with North Korea for the full list IAEA inspection, it was not necessary for the US to raise the contention. Especially, since China and the regional ally, South Korea, wanted the high-level talks with the North, the ‘strength of motivation’ of US coercive diplomacy could not be stronger than the

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counter coercive diplomacy of North Korea.

During the first (June 2-11, 1993) and second round (July 14-19, 1993) of the high-level talks, the Clinton administration changed its stance to type A coercive diplomacy and provided many inducements; promises of continuous talks, the assurance of security and provision of a light water nuclear reactor which guarantees nuclear programme with less proliferation concern to North Korea. The hawkish analysts in Washington criticized the Clinton administration for being too weak against North Korea.  

540 However, as a result, when US congressman Gary Ackerman visited North Korea in October 1993, North Korea suggested a package deal that if the US ceased the team spirit exercises and nuclear threats against the North, then the North would accept the IAEA inspections before the third round of direct talks.  

541 In addition, during the direct talks, if the US agreed to provide a light water reactor and normalized relations with the North, North

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Korea would agree with several other requests of the US.

This package deal caused much debate in the Clinton administration since there was the possibility that North Korea was getting all the benefits without giving anything in return. However, implementation of type A coercive diplomacy was much rational policy choice for the US. The North Korean nuclear capability was not the level of grave threat in 1993 than risking the collapse of 1995 NPT review and extension conference. North Korea does not yet have the technology to minimize its nuclear warhead or the efficient nuclear explosive device. The US estimated if the nuclear deterrence of North Korea remains at a symbolic level, the overwhelming military superiority of the US is efficient enough to manage North Korean nuclear programme until it could achieve type C coercive diplomacy, the nonproliferation through regime change which was estimated within 10 years.

On June 11, 1993, a day before the designated date for North Korean withdrawal, the joint statement was announced and North Korea remained in NPT. However, no progress was made since North Korea and the IAEA could not reach an agreement about the level of the nuclear inspection. North Korea was very anxious about its exposure of full past nuclear activity. Since no one could estimate how the past nuclear activity would be used against North Korea, it could trigger the total submission of North Korea- accepting the full IAEA inspection was the irrational choice for North Korean regime. The full exposure of nuclear capability meant North Korea’s loss of most efficient negotiation power in international community and the last bastion of possible nuclear deterrence which could be used as the last resort. For North Korea, these were the vital interests for its national security. However, there were discrepancies among the US, IAEA and the regional allies. While the US stance was more open to accept type A coercive diplomacy, the IAEA, Japan and South Korea wanted to verify past nuclear activity of North Korea for the complete dismantlement. Thus, the US coercive diplomacy had to set its ‘clarity of objective’ – nuclear dismantlement or nuclear freeze-more prudently to create the ‘asymmetry

motivation’ for the behavioural change of North Korea.

As the compensative inducement of the Clinton administration seemed to reach its limit, the Clinton administration began to prepare its coercive inducements. While providing the compensative inducements in the early stages of North Korea nuclear crisis, it sought to enhance the US escalation dominance over any provocation of North Korea; dispatching patriot antimissile batteries, expediting the delivery of Apache helicopters and Bradley armed vehicles, stationing an aircraft carrier and sending air and ground reinforcement. The Clinton administration also planned to implement an economic sanction and urged the UN Security Council, especially China, to set a resolution.

On January 25, in order to coerce North Korea to agree on an IAEA inspection, the Clinton administration disclosed their plan to deploy a patriot missile, one of the measures to reinforce the United States Force in Korea. Moreover, on January 31, the 1994 team spirit exercise was announced to be resumed if North Korea does not accept the IAEA inspection. North Korea reacted immediately by stating ‘the US is responsible for the all tragic outcome created by its treachery’. However, without any other options to legitimize its resistance, North Korea had to comply with the US demand and accept the IAEA Inspection. The shows the US coercive diplomacy that leads the compliance of North Korea.

On February 15, North Korea agreed to an IAEA Inspection. The US secured the justification of coercive diplomacy by accepting North Korean demand for the talk and completed the following negotiation. Thus, when North Korea delayed the agreed joint statement of implementing the IAEA inspection, the US promptly redeployed its military to escalate the tension and ‘image of war’. Lastly, by announcing the possible ‘team spirit’ military exercise, the US successfully coerced North Korea to accept IAEA inspection.

However, with the two sides making opposing claims, there was a clash between North Korea and the IAEA. The IAEA announced North Korea agreed to the inspection in its entirety, whereas North Korea claimed IAEA inspection is limited “exclusively to access North Korea’s commitment for safeguards agreement”. The conflict escalated and began to get serious after the IAEA ordered the withdrawal of inspectors from North Korea on March 15, 1994.

The IAEA announced that they had been unable to verify through inspections whether North Korea exchanged the nuclear materials to nuclear weapons. On March 19, during the working-level talks for the exchange of envoys between North and South Korea, South Korea urged the North to approve of an IAEA inspection and threatened the North

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with the possibility of imposing sanctions. Park Young Sun, North Korean delegation, responded, “We are ready to respond with an eye for an eye and war for war. Seoul is not far away from here. If a war breaks out, Seoul will become a sea of fire.”

When the bilateral talks began with the US in 1993, North Korea realized the US was more flexible on the verification issue of its past nuclear activity. Thus, North Korea actively implemented its counter coercive diplomacy to degrade the cooperation among the US, IAEA and South Korea. North Korea carried out dialogue with the US with forward looking manner while dismissed the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission meeting and the IAEA's demand of full list inspection. North Korea wanted to simplify the negotiation channel as bilateral talk with the US and secure its nuclear capability through diplomatic bargaining and escalation of the tension, so called the brinkmanship.

However, the Clinton administration was prepared to secure escalation dominance on the crisis of North Korea. It was revealed on March 23, when Lee Byung Tae, the Minister of the National Defence of Korea revealed classified information on ‘Operational Plan 5027’ at the National Assembly Defence Committee. According to Lee, the combined forces of the ‘Operational Plan 5027’ of the US and the Republic of Korea already included retaliation to deter North Korean provocation. Thus, if the North caused any provocation, the combined forces would execute military action, which could be elevated to a unified military operation depending on the level of provocation from the North.”

On April 1994, US patriot antimissile batteries, Apache helicopters, tanks and advanced radar tracking control systems, arrived in South Korea. Additionally, the Clinton administration decided to mobilize support for sanctions in the UN Security Council.

On April 19, 1994, North Korea notified the IAEA that they would be extracting spent fuel from the 5MW reactor to the IAEA. On May 8, opposition from the IAEA notwithstanding, North Korea proceeded with the extraction without the approval and supervision of the IAEA. It was the bold action of North Korea to eradicate the possibility

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of verification on past nuclear activity. The North Korea clear displayed its ‘strength of motivation’ of counter coercive diplomacy that the nuclear freeze was the red-line.

On May 18, 1994, the US Secretary of Defence, William Perry, held a military operation meeting at the Pentagon to execute a military strike on the Yongbyon nuclear facility in North Korea. The US immediately considered the military strike on North Korean nuclear cite. However, since the US evaluated the nuclear freeze would lead to the dismantlement, the ‘sense of urgency’ to implement violent coercive inducement could not be formed. Moreover, as the thoroughly simulated war scenarios showed that the results would end with tragedy, the Clinton administration decided to take diplomatic measures and with gradually increasing the coercion.\footnote{Don Oberdorfer, \textit{The Two Korea; A Contemporary History}, Basic book, New York, 1997, p.315.}

From May 17-24, the IAEA dispatched inspectors to Yongbyon for an additional inspection on their radiochemical laboratory and to confirm the extraction of spent fuel from the 5MW reactor. However, their request for a sample was denied and the majority of the related documents were found to be unreadable.\footnote{Ibid, p.309} On June 2, the IAEA announced its inability to verify the North’s past nuclear activity since all the spent fuel rod had been extracted.

The US Department of State made a special announcement to cancel the third round talks with North Korea and the declared sanctions against North Korea would soon be discussed. On June 3, Kang Seok Ju, a North Korean delegate, denounced the US and would consider the sanction as a declaration of war. On June 13, North Korea withdrew from the IAEA and the tension reached its peak on the brink of war.

However, US did not abandon its intention to talk with North Korea while economic sanctions and military coercion were being prepared. On June 15, 1994, former president Jimmy Carter was sent to North Korea to make a final attempt to talk. On that same day, the US was circulating a sanction draft on North Korea that was to be submitted at the UN Security Council. Moreover, in case of a veto from China, who had been unfavourable against the sanctions on North Korea, the US had already planned to form a coalition with South Korea and Japan to impose an autonomous sanction.
Fortunately, the talks between Jimmy Carter and Kim Il-Sung were successful. During the dialogue, Kim Il-Sung insisted North Korea wanted to build a nuclear energy programme but not nuclear armament. Thus, if US cooperated with them by providing a light water reactor, North Korea claimed they would dismantle their graphite-moderated reactor, re-join the NPT and hold a summit meeting with South Korea. Carter’s visit to North Korea proved to be a great deterrent in resolving the first North Korean nuclear crisis, which might have resulted in war.

<Figure 5-4> The Contention of US - North Korea and the Geneva Agreed Framework
The summit meeting between North and South Korea floundered due to the sudden death of Kim Il-Sung on July 8, 1994. However, as it progressed shown in Figure 5-4, the negotiations continued with various diplomatic efforts and mutual concessions. The following diagram illustrates the chronology of events leading up to the first and second rounds of U.S.-North Korea high-level talks:

1st & 2nd round of U.S.-North Korea High level talk

- Coerced North Korea to participate full list IAEA inspection with positive inducement
- Suggest amended package Deal (11 Nov 1993)
- Disclosed the reinforcement plan of US Force in South Korea (26 Jan 1994)
- Announced the resume of Team spirit Exercise if North Korea does not comply IAEA inspection (15 Jan 1994)
- Pressured China to agree UN resolution on Nuclear program of North Korea (9 Feb 1994)
- Invited the IAEA inspectors to discuss the agreement (7 Jun 1994)
- North Korea refused the IAEA full list Inspection (21 Jan 1994)
- Agreed IAEA inspection but Declared only for the continuity of safe guard reason (15 Feb 1994)
- North Korea did not approve full list of IAEA inspection (15 Mar 1994)
- North Korea claimed a war if any sanctions and threat are imposed (18 Mar 1994)
- Announced the extraction of spent fuel from 5MW reactor (19 Apr 1994)
- Extracted the spent fuel with out IAEA supervision (8 May 1994)
- Declared the Withdrawal from IAEA (13 June 1994)

3rd Round of U.S.-North Korea High level talk

- Economic sanction & military option was seriously considered.
- U.S. circulated the draft resolution in the UN Security Council (15 Jun 1994)
- Approved Jimmy Carter to hold High level talk with North Korea(15 Jun 1994)
and <Figure 5-5>, the third round talks of the US and North Korea was held in Geneva and as a result, on August 12, 1994, they reached an agreement to open a liaison office.

Throughout the meeting, North Korea revealed its objective of the counter coercive diplomacy, the compensation for freezing its nuclear programme and the provision of security assurance from the US. On September 24, 1994, North Korean delegation representative and Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk Ju, announced North Korea would only freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and nuclear programme if the US guaranteed to provide the North with a light water reactor. Moreover, if the US deployed their aircraft carriers according to the rumours at the time, Kang Suk Ju threatened the US that all bilateral talks would be nullified.

Although there was the possibility of North Korea possessing several nuclear warheads, the Clinton administration estimated North Korean nuclear capability could be managed and solved if the programme was frozen. Thus, the US preceded with type A coercive diplomacy and finally, on October 21, 1994, the first North Korean nuclear crisis ended by adapting the Geneva Agreed Framework.

5.3.2.1 Results of the Contention: Geneva Agreed Framework

The 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework was an actual treaty that included mandatory clauses to create binding forces on both sides. The Geneva Agreed Framework consists of four articles; 1) cooperate to replace North Korean graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with a light water reactor power plant, 2) normalize political and economic relations, 3) cooperate for peace and security in a nuclear free Korean peninsula 4) have North Korea remain in the NPT and strengthen the NPT regime.554

The opinions among scholars diverge on the Geneva Agreed Framework. The group of scholars who see it as positive asserts the Geneva Agreed Framework opens North Korea to special inspections that make it possible to resolve North Korea’s ‘past nuclear

capability’. Moreover, they evaluated the Geneva Agreed Framework as having strengthened the NPT regime since it froze the nuclear programme of North Korea, guaranteed IAEA inspections on any future North Korean nuclear activities and made possible the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme. Oppositely, the group of scholars who view it negatively insists the Geneva Agreed Framework is a bad precedent that provided a light water reactor and alternative energy to an outlaw state, which only inspired other states to do the same. They evaluated the Geneva agreed framework is nothing more than the US submitting to nuclear threats from North Korea and paying the ransom to support their ill intentions.

The determining factor among scholars evaluating the US coercive diplomacy on 1st North Korean nuclear crisis as either a success or a failure is how they see the role of Jimmy Carter. Those who evaluated Carter’s visit as an external factor that happened by chance claim that the US coercive diplomacy was a failure, whereas the other side that sees it as a persuasive inducement of America’s coercive diplomacy see it as a success.

According to William Drennan, since Carter’s visit to North Korea was not planned and military conflict between the US and North Korea was inevitable without this accidental visit, he argues the US coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration was a failure. However, the coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration during the process of the first North Korea nuclear crisis was considerable success since the dramatic resolution of Carter’s visit is due to the successful implementation of the coercive diplomacy that created favourable conditions such as the ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’, ‘Sense of Urgency’ and ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ and the ‘Image of War’ on North Korea. During the interview with Se-Hyun Cheung, the former minister of unification of Republic of Korea, he revealed the Clinton administration demanded the Kim Young Sam government to accept the Carter’s offer of ‘at the spot’ negotiation with Kim Il-Sung indicates the intention of Clinton to send Jimmy Carter as special envoy.

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556 Ibid. p.22
558 Interview with Se-Hyun Chung at the Institute of foreign affairs and National Security, Seoul, Korea, Sep 9, 2013.
As mentioned above, indeed the clauses of the Geneva Agreed Framework includes the objective of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy, compensation for freezing its nuclear programme, political and economic normalization and secured the deterrence of the US military threat. However, it was the part of the US strategy that to freezes North Korean nuclear programmes and dismantles it later. Many of the US generals and experts in the political circle at Washington believed the collapse of North Korea was near.\textsuperscript{559} Since it takes more than 10 years to build a light water reactor, the Clinton administration believed it would be a sufficient time for North Korea to collapse or at least squeeze them to abandon their nuclear programme during the process.\textsuperscript{560} Moreover, the US also achieved a platform and process to derive the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme.

However, the Geneva agreement lacks favourable conditions for the success of the coercive diplomacy, ‘Clarity Concerning the Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis’. As it stated that ‘when a significant portion of the light water reactor is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPKR, North Korea will come into full compliance with its safeguard Agreement with the IAEA’, the third clause article 4 of Geneva agreed framework was full of ambiguity and discrepancies. North Korea claimed that the IAEA inspection was limited to verifying the freezing of its nuclear programme, whereas the US insisted that the inspection also included verifying the accumulated North Korean nuclear capability prior to that point. Moreover, since the definition of the ‘significant portion of the LWR project’ was ambiguous, it could not seal the agreement to end the nuclear contention. The process to the Geneva agreed framework was considerable success of US coercive diplomacy. However, the Geneva agreed framework itself was a considerable failure since it already created future crisis as the beginning.

\textit{5.3.3 The Missile Negotiations and the Increased Deterrence of North Korea}


The missile development of North Korea was not merely a regional security problem. As North Korean missile system proved its capability of strike on all of South Korea and much of Japan, it could initiate the arms race in North East Asia in any time. Moreover, the possibility of North Korean chemical and biological weapons to be loaded as the war head was grave threat to the US’ crucial allies of the region. The proliferation of missile technology was another critical issue. Although it was seized in 1994, Israel was already on the negotiation with North Korea to stop the missile exportation to Middle Eastern countries by 1992. It was global security threat on the proliferation of WMD. Moreover, it was one of the critical measures which North Korean utilizes to increase the enforcement cost of the US coercive diplomacy. Therefore, the US wanted to coerce North Korea to join the Missile Technology Control Regime to limit North Korean missile development and its exportation.

The US utilized possible ease of sanction and remove of North Korea from state sponsors of terrorism to induce North Korea to join MTCR. North Korea refuted the US by arguing the missile development, production and deployment as the right of self-defence and dismissed the offer. However, after the successful launch of Intermediate-range ballistic missile, North Korea separated the issue and announced the possible negotiation on arms embargo to the third party. It was the clear statement of North Korea that its objective of counter coercive diplomacy would be the securement of missile deterrence and the acquiring the compensation.

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The first and second round of the missile talks ended without reaching an agreement. However, as mentioned, it started to heat up from the third round of the talks after North Korea test-fired the Taepo Dong 1 missile on August 31, 1998. It was the calculated counter coercive diplomacy of North Korea to induce the US to make an offer of more compensation by displaying its increased missile capability. Before North Korea tested the Taepo Dong 1 missile, the US estimated North Korea was developing a two-stage rocket missile. However, Taepo Dong 1 was designed as a three-stage rocket, which could be used as a space launch vehicle. That is, contrary to the estimations of the CIA, the Taepo Dong 1 project of North Korea meant the development of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.\(^{562}\)

According to Joseph S. Bermudez, if the 3-stage Taepo Dong missile is real 3 stage space launch vehicle as North Korea claims, it could deliver a 200kg warhead into the middle of the US and if the warhead was 100kg, it would reach Washington D.C. Moreover, if the larger North Korean Missile, Taepo Dong 2, was designed as a three-stage rocket, he asserted that it could deliver 700-1000kg warheads with a maximum range of 6700km.\(^{563}\) CIA intelligence officer Robert D. Walpole’s assertion was the same as that of Joseph S. Bermudez’s. According to Walpole, the original two-stage Taepo Dong 1 could deliver several hundred kg warheads up to a 2000km distance. However, if it was designed as a three-stage rocket missile, its maximum range would reach up to 5500km and if North Korea was able to miniaturize the warhead, the maximum range of the missile would increase accordingly.\(^{564}\)

The Taepo Dong 1 test in 1998, which displayed North Korea’s missile capability, was a shock to the US since it meant North Korea had a considerable amount of deterrence on the US coercive diplomacy. The level of North Korean missile technology and the danger of it being exported were enough to draw concerns of the US. Although, the missile capability of North Korea was not enough that they could confront the US, the level of its missile development was sufficient enough to deter the allies of the US,


\(^{564}\) Robert D. Walpole, North Korea’s Taepo Dong Launch and Some Implication on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dec 8, 1998. http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/walpole.htm
namely South Korea and Japan. Therefore, with their ability to strike South Korea and Japan, North Korea achieved an indirect deterrence on the US and the US coercive diplomacy.

The third round of US-North Korea missile talks was held in New York a month later on October 1-2, 1998. After North Korea’s missile test, it was more of the U.S sending North Korea a warning rather than a negotiation. The US requested North Korea to terminate the missile test and its missile exportation in exchange for easing economic sanctions. However, North Korea denied the offer since easing sanctions was already included in the Geneva Agreed Framework.

The fourth round of talks was held in Pyongyang on March 29-30, 1999. The agenda of the talks was focused on the exportation of North Korean missile and North Korea joining the Missile Technology Control Regime. Again, the talks ended without coming to any agreement. According to Robert Einhorn, the Assistant Secretary of State, who was the US representative at the fourth round of talks, ‘North Korea requested compensation should they cease to export missiles and was subsequently denied’.565

The difference between the US and North Korea was clearly revealed at the fifth round of bilateral missile talks in Kuala Lumpur on July 2000. Jang Chang Sun, North Korean representative and the American Affairs director of North Korean Foreign ministry, held a press conference that ‘North Korea requested corresponding compensation for any restraint on North Korean missile programme, which is a matter of its sovereignty’. According to his statement, North Korea demanded 10 billion US dollars for not exporting North Korean missiles or technology to a third party. Moreover, he stated missile development and placement within North Korea was not negotiable.

The sixth round of missile talks was held in Kuala Lumpur on November 1-3, 2000. The agenda and focus of the talks switched to negotiations on North Korean space rocket, since the stalemate on the missile development of North Korea was too difficult to solve at the time. The US offered to launch North Korean satellite excluding the participation of North Korean experts and in return, they requested North Korea stop developing

565 Yonhap (Seoul), 31 March 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990331000150, 31 March 1999
missiles that exceeded the maximum range of 1500km. However, North Korea postulated its right to the presence of their own experts and the right of developing a space launch vehicle, ultimately denying the demands of the US. The US engaged the negotiation to coerce North Korea to join MTCR and abandon its missile technology of 300km maximum range. Although the US sustained its escalation dominance on any provocation of North Korea, the circumstances were not favourable to the US to induce the behavioural change of North Korea. As Geneva agreed framework already being agreed, the US could not escalate tension to implement the ‘image of war’. Moreover, since the missile development and capability was vital interest that related to the regime security of North Korea, the US inducement of calling off the sanction, technical aid on space launch vehicle and delisting the state sponsor on terrorism cannot create the ‘asymmetry of motivation’ to the US which would favour the coercive diplomacy to bring behavioural change of North Korea. During the Clinton administration, North Korea achieved its missile capability which becomes efficient means to increase the enforcement cost against the US coercive diplomacy.

5.4 An Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Bush Administration and the Counter Coercive Diplomacy of North Korea

5.4.1 Background

After Bush’s inauguration on January 21, 2001, the Bush administration adopted a more hard-line stance on North Korea compared to previous the Clinton administration. The Bush administration concluded the Geneva Agreed Framework to be a failure and revealed its aversion towards North Korean regime and Kim Jong-Il.

Robert Joseph, the NSC Senior Director for Non-Proliferation for the first term of the Bush administration, postulated the Geneva Agreed Framework to be an appeasement policy that provided a lifeline for North Korean regime. Therefore, he believed the Geneva Agreed Framework needed to be abolished and such similar agreements prevented in the future.566 John Bolton, who was appointed as the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and

566 Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, St. Martin’s Griffin, 2009, p.44.
International Security, was also determined that the Geneva Agreed Framework was exploited by North Korea.567

Soon after the start of his term, the Bush administration suspended all the negotiations with North Korea and formed a committee on March 12, 2001 to reappraise North Korean policy. As a result, the comprehensive policy review was derived on June 6, 2001 which recommended continuous talks with North Korea. However, Bush administration was concerned about the possible North Korean manipulation of Geneva Agreed Framework for nuclear armament. According to Victor Cha, the Bush administration was convinced in determining North Korean regime as ‘evil’ through North Korea policy review.568 Thus, As Bush stated on the completion of North Korean policy review, the US included the renegotiation of the Geneva Agreed Framework as the agenda of the bilateral talk.

The renegotiation of the agreed Geneva Agreed Framework was the critical deterioration in the theory of coercive diplomacy. If the coercee thinks that there will be another request or demand after complying, the motivation to agree is declined. Moreover, it was the renegotiation to an agreement which was finalized 7 years ago. The excessive demand of the US later becomes the obstacle to consolidate international support and multilateral coercion that provide North Korea to implement its counter coercive diplomacy.

On September 30, 2001, the US Department of Defence submitted the QDR report to Congress. The report was to prevent threats against the security defence of the US Mainland, the prevention of the asymmetry weapon threat and the establishment of the US strategy based on its asymmetry weapon capability. The QDR aimed to deter and prevent any threats or challenges to the US’ national interest. In addition, if the deterrence failed, it approved pre-emptive use of all the US’ military options to prevent further challenges. The QDR was bolstered by the Nuclear Posture Review, which was announced in January 2002. The NPR stated seven countries that could be attacked by

US nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear states, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria were included along with the nuclear weapon states, Russia and China. On January 29, 2002, President Bush delivered the State of Union address, which labelled North Korea, Iran and Iraq as the ‘Axis of evil’. Moreover, on September 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which allows a pre-emptive strike on rogue states and adversaries, was announced. Although it stated ‘the United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression’, the Bush administration did not strictly distinguish the concepts between the pre-emptive and preventive strike to create a favourable environment in implementing its unilateral coercive diplomacy. It also denied distinguishing terrorists and the state that sponsored terrorism and stated that the US would not hesitate to act alone to exercise its right to self-defence.

At the 1st US-North Korea bilateral talks of its term, the Bush administration revealed the existence of North Korean HEU programme and announced no further implementation for Geneva agreed framework unless North Korea accepts the IAEA special inspection to come clean with the US accusation. However, the execution of coercive diplomacy without clear evidence on North Korean violation and existence of HEU programme seriously damages its justification. Moreover, the US had agreed in the article 3, provision 1 of Geneva agreed framework as ‘will provide formal assurances threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US’. Thus, the weakly justified US coercive diplomacy not only failed to derive multilateral coercion to induce North Korean nuclear dismantlement but lead to the 2nd North Korean nuclear crisis.

5.4.1.1 The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis

On June 6, 2001, the Bush administration announced the preconditions for the dialogue with North Korea. However, bilateral talks did not commence since North Korea rejected the preconditions, the dismantlement of its nuclear programme. The stalemate lasted about a year since the US announced a series of hard-line policy review reports on

North Korea after 9/11. The request of renegotiation is the one of the condition which degrades the coercive diplomacy; the coercer has to guarantee that the current surrender will not lead to more requests to the opponent. However, Bush administration inaugurated its presidency by demanding more requests which were already agreed.

On October 3, 2002, US delegations led by James Kelly visited North Korea to initiate the first bilateral talks of the Bush administration. However, there was friction from the onset of the negotiation. On the first day of the talks, James Kelly asserted the existence of North Korean HEU programme and demanded its dismantlement as a precondition for any further negotiations. The negotiation partner, Kang Suk Ju, the first Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, criticized the absurdity of the US’ accusations on uranium enrichment by comparing it to their prior wrongful suspicions of the Kumchang-ri and urged them to focus on the normalization agenda of the US and North Korea.

On the second day of the talks, James Kelly re-questioned North Korea on their HEU programme. As Kang Suk Ju replied “with the current relationship of the US and North Korea, we cannot discuss the matter like gentlemen. If we disarm ourselves we will become like the Taliban, beaten to death….What is wrong with us having our own uranium enrichment programme? We are entitled to possess our own UEP, and we are bound to produce more powerful weapons than that”, it was considered a confession to the existence of North Korean HEU programme. 571

On October 16, 2002, the Bush administration revealed this statement that North Korea admitted the UEP programme which violates the Geneva Agreed Framework. 572 Thus, the Bush administration demanded the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme as a precondition to any further negotiation. North Korea refused to comply with the US’ demands and responded with its counter coercive diplomacy that leads to the second North Korean nuclear crisis.

If North Korea had truly developed a clandestine HEU nuclear programme as accused by the US, it meant not only the violation of the Geneva Agreed Framework but also the 1992 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, NPT and the IAEA Safeguard agreement as a whole. That is, if North Korean violation was true, the US had acquired the high position to implement the coercive diplomacy on North Korea. As Alexander George stated, if the coercee clearly violates international regulations and law, it favours the coercer to implement the ‘defensive form’ of the coercive diplomacy and easily achieve ‘adequate domestic and international support’. However, the accusation of the Bush administration against North Korea was far-fetched.

The Bush administration failed to produce any evidence of North Korean uranium enrichment programme other than the confession of Abdul Qadeer Khan.\(^{573}\) Based on Khan’s confession, the US intelligence agency wrote a report that assumed North Korea had duplicated tens of thousands of nuclear centrifuges from Khan’s 20 centrifuges to establish its UEP.\(^{574}\) Although Joseph DeTrani, the mission manager for North Korea from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence analysed actual existence of the UEP was at a mid-confidence level',\(^{575}\) the Bush administration was confident about North Korea’s intention to acquire the UEP. However, they did not have any clear evidence of the actual existence of North Korea’s UEP.

Since the LEU is the sovereign rights of a state for the peaceful use of Atomic energy, if North Korean development was bound to LEU level and the nuclear fuel was yet to be injected to the nuclear centrifuges, the construction of nuclear facility itself was not the clear breach of the IAEA agreement. The lack of firm evidence and not distinguishing between HEU and LEU, which is permissible within the NPT regime, would degrade the future US foreign policy on North Korea. Unfortunately, it soon revealed in reality.

The coercive diplomacy is highly context-dependent. Thus, ‘Type of provocation’, a clear attempt of violation of North Korea helps the US obtaining international and domestic support. It helps to cut off North Korea’s international backing or protection

from its allies. Contrary, the weakly justified US coercive diplomacy cannot create domestic and international support to implement efficient coercion to North Korea. Moreover, it is easily counter plotted by coercee to decrease the incompliant cost from the coercion that would only make the coercer difficult to induce the behavioural change of the Coercee. The Bush’s consistent implementation of coercive diplomacy which lacked in its justification increasingly damaged US coercive diplomacy. As it made the efficient inducement on North Korea to diminish, it also affected the coercive diplomacy of Obama administration.

According to Michael F. Mazzar, it was a great opportunity for hardliners of the Bush administration to kill the Geneva Agreed Framework and implement a new US coercive diplomacy on North Korean nuclear programme. Therefore, he evaluated the revelation of North Korean UEP by James Kelly at the bilateral talks was a sign that the hardliners won the initiative of North Korean policy within the Bush administration. According to Glenn Kessler, the hardliners of the Bush administration was resolved to nullify the Geneva Agreed Framework since the US could no longer delay providing light water reactor supplies to North Korea.

North Korea refused to neither deny nor confirm the accusations of the US that North Korea had the UEP. On October 25, 2002, the Korean Central News Agency explained the statement of Kang Suk Ju as “North Korea has made it very clear to the special envoy of the US President that North Korea is entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence from the ever growing nuclear threat by the US”. However, it declined to verify the existence of the UEP.

If the US intended to execute type B or tacit type C coercive diplomacy on North Korea and denies the negotiation and dialogue, it creates more favourable environment for North Korea to implement its counter coercive diplomacy. It is because North Korea is

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easy to counter plot the US coercion with displaying its ‘sense of urgency’ with belligerence to advent it’s nuclear and missile development. Therefore, it is rational choice of North Korea to increase the tension when facing the weakly justified US coercive diplomacy for maximization of its interest. Thus, when the US delegation led by James Kelly revealed North Korea UEP and requested the dismantlement of its UEP as the precondition for any further negotiations, North Korea decided to respond with their counter coercive diplomacy. The North Korean foreign ministry stated, “if the US recognizes the sovereignty of North Korea, supports North Korean economic development and signs the nonaggression pact, which includes the nuclear strike, North Korea is then ready to resolve any US security concerns caused by North Korea.”

5.4.2 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy in the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis

5.4.2.1 US’ ‘Try and See’ Coercive Diplomacy and North Korea’s Denial

When the second North Korean nuclear crisis began on October 2002, the policy’s priority of the Bush administration was on Iraq. Since North Korean nuclear programme was pushed back on the Bush administration’s priority list, the US implemented a ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy on North Korea and monitored the situation closely. After the controversial bilateral talks with North Korea, the Bush administration emphasized the necessity of policy change on North Korea and set the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme as a precondition for any further negotiation.

On November 7, 2002, President Bush stated the US would implement diplomatic coercion to North Korea with its neighbouring states: China, South Korea, Japan and Russia. However, diplomatic coercion was the initial strategy of the coercive

diplomacy. On the same day of President Bush’s press conference, the Secretary of State, Colin Powell stated “all comprehensive measures must be put on the table to induce North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program.”

As North Korea denied accepting the US’ request of the dismantlement of its nuclear programme, the Bush administration decided to go a little further to coerce North Korea with the ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw’. The US immediately abrogated the Geneva Agreed Framework and ceased the energy provision that had been guaranteed in the agreement. On November 14, 2002, through the KEDO executive Board meeting, the decision to cut off the annual provision of heavy fuel oil to North Korea from December 2002 was made, if North Korea did not dismantle its UEP. Again, since the US firstly violated the implementation of Geneva agreed framework, it degraded the justification of the US coercive diplomacy.

**5.4.2.2 The Collapse of the Geneva Agreed Framework and the US’s ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw’**

North Korea immediately denounced the US for violating the Geneva Agreed Framework. The Foreign Ministry of North Korea announced “the only clause of the treaty that had been kept by the US has now been finally breached”.

Although North Korea is accused of making empty promises and the strategy of ‘brinkmanship’, there were elements that US’s breach of the agreement; 1) North Korea would freeze their graphite-moderated reactor and related facilities on the condition that the US would provide a light water reactor before the end of 2003. However, the light water reactor had not yet been provided. 2) Although the Geneva Agreed Framework guaranteed the security assurance from the nuclear weapons of the US, the policy reviews of the US included North Korea as a possible target of its nuclear arms. 3) The inspection on North Korean nuclear facility and programme was agreed to be performed

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582 George Gedda, “Powell: N. Korea Danger to Neighbors”, *Associated Press*, Nov 8, 2002. [Link](http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2002/Powell-N-Korea-Danger-to-Neighbors/id1de0b5ff73742dece4a9ba8fa59f18)

after the light water reactor project was fully completed. However, the US unilaterally
demanded North Korea to accept extra inspection before the provision of light water
reactor by accusing North Korea had violated the Geneva agreed Framework.

Since the concern of North Korean nuclear armament is caused by the security threat of
the US, North Korea counter demand non-aggression treaty of US for its nuclear
dismantlement. It was an efficient strategy of North Korea since a rejection of US would
damage the coercive diplomacy in consolidating international support.

As witnessed from the unwillingness of North Korea to comply with the coercive
diplomacy, the Bush administration executed a more violent coercive measure to North
Korea, seizing a North Korean vessel. On December 9, 2002, a multilateral force led by
a US executed naval operation, ‘Task force 150,’ captured vessel Sosan with the excuse
that it had not hoisted a national flag. Through inspection of the Sosan vessel, 15 scud
missiles heading to Yemen were found. However, as Ari Fleischer, a spokesman of the
White House, admitted, the US has no right to confiscate the cargo of a foreign state in
international waters. Thus, the US had to release the vessel.

The seizure of Sosan vessel had an impact on both the US and North Korea. It was the
point where North Korea stopped relying only on diplomatic negotiations and initiated
its aggressive counter coercive diplomacy. Since the legitimacy of US coercive
diplomacy was weak on capturing the Sosan Vessel, it gave a room for North Korea to
reinforce its counter coercive diplomacy against the US coercion.

North Korea did not officially lift its freeze of the nuclear programme when the Bush
administration decided to stop its energy supply as agreed on in the Geneva Agreed
Framework. It seems North Korea wanted to solve the dispute in a diplomatic dialogue
and restore relations with the US. However, after the seizure of the Sosan vessel, North
Korea decided to execute its counter coercive diplomacy. On December 12, 2002, one
day after the release of Sosan, North Korea sent a letter to the IAEA and stated they
would reactivate the nuclear programme, which they had frozen since 1994.

584 Jofi Joseph, “The proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?” Arms Control
On December 21, 2002, North Korea unsealed the 5MW nuclear reactors in Yongbyon, and then unsealed the spent fuel storage of 8,000 spent fuel rods that could be reprocessed to extract plutonium on December 22, 2002. On December 23, 2002, North Korea unsealed their nuclear reprocess facility, the Yongbyon radiochemistry laboratory.

On January 10, 2003, North Korea once again withdrew from the NPT. Although North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT meant the possibility of nuclear armament without any restraint, North Korea explained that their nuclear programme would only be limited to peaceful use and to produce electricity.\textsuperscript{585} It was strategy of North Korea to lower its incompliant cost of the US coercive diplomacy that would be imposed after the withdrawal of NPT. The \textless Figure 5-6\textgreater explains how the contention leads to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} North Korea nuclear crisis.

The covert missile exportation of North Korea to Yemen was ethically reprehensible in international community. However, since North Korea is not the member of MTRC, it was not the violation of any legal binding law. The illegitimate seizure of a Ship in international water could be considered as the declaration of a war in any sovereign state. The unjustified US coercive diplomacy was a great opportunity for North Korea to counter coerce. Thus, it swiftly declared the withdrawal of NPT, extracted the spent fuel from the nuclear reactor and unsealed its reprocessing facility without creating the discontent of international community and successfully enhanced its capability of counter coercive diplomacy.

\textless Figure 5-6\textgreater The Collapse of Geneva Agreed Framework and the 2\textsuperscript{nd} North Korea Nuclear Crisis

\textsuperscript{585} Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang, Jan 10, 2003.
5.4.2.3 The Multilateral Coercive Diplomacy on North Korean Nuclear Programme

The objective of Bush’s coercive diplomacy was the prompt Complete Verifiable Irreversible Dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme. Therefore, the US set the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme as a precondition and sustained it to coerce North Korea. However, North Korea refused the demands of the US and decided to counter coerce by withdrawing from the NPT. Thus, in order to be more efficient in their coercion, the Bush administration decided to implement a multilateral frame on North Korean nuclear programme.

There were various opinions on whether the bilateral or multilateral frame would work better for North Korea. However, the Bush administration wanted to put North Korea in a multilateral frame since it evaluated the bilateral talks of the Clinton administration as a mistake that ended with the Geneva Agreed Framework. The Bush administration saw the bilateral environment as limiting the measures and assets of the US in coercing North Korea. In an interview with ABC News on March 10, 2003, Condoleezza Rice, the US National Security Advisor stated “We have to bring the weight of the

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international community, in a multilateral fashion…so that North Koreans know that there is no way out… will bring maximum pressure on North Korea to actually this time not just freeze its weapons of mass destruction but begin to dismantle them”, She dismissed the suggestion of direct bilateral talks.587

The objective of North Korean counter strategy on the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration was the same as that of the Clinton administration, to receive compensation for decrement or freeze of its nuclear capability and receiving security assurance from the US. Thus, North Korea pursued the bilateral talks, which would be more convenient to be guaranteed the security assurance and the compensation from the US. As North Korea asserted “since the concern of North Korean nuclear development is due to the hostile policy of the US, there is no reason to discuss North Korean nuclear program with any other state except the US as they hold the key to a resolution”, 588 North Korea did not want to be placed in a multilateral environment which would increase the incompliant cost for its counter coercive diplomacy.

After North Korea declared it would unfreeze the nuclear programme on December 22, 2002, the Bush administration executed more severe inducements to pressure North Korea to accept the multilateral negotiation. On March 2, 2003, the US Air Force’s reconnaissance aircraft, the R-135 Cobra Ball, deliberately flew over North Korea Air Defence Zone which might have initiated the armed conflict.589 On March 5, 2003, the US revealed the reinforcement of 24 aircraft bombers, B-52 and B-1 at Guam’s US Airbase and explained its objective to support a pre-emptive strike if necessary on North Korean nuclear facilities.590 To back up Bush’s statement, the redeployed bombers executed a tactical nuclear strike exercise at the Anderson Airbase.591 On March 5, 2003, Donald Rumsfeld, the Minister of National Defence, revealed the redeployment plan of the USFK from out of North Korean artillery range. This was announced without prior consultation with South Korea. The redeployment plan could be

591 Hidaka Yoshiki, United States will nuclear strike the North Korea: the shocking scenario, 'mikuk eun bukhaneul pokgyeok handa’, Naraone, Seoul, 2003, pp. 8-32
considered as the abandonment of the ‘human trip wire’ and a pre-step towards a pre-emptive strike on North Korea.

North Korea was highly threatened by the US coercive diplomacy. North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il did not attend the annual Supreme People’s Assembly for the first time in six years\(^{592}\) and organized a council of war for 40 days at a military bunker. Kim Jong-Il cancelled all his activities from February to April 2003.

The Bush administration did not only implement the coercive inducement but also utilized the persuasive inducement to maximize its coercive diplomacy. Although North Korea neglected the US’ offer and demanded a legal binding nonaggression treaty,\(^{593}\) Bush’s presidential letter, which guarantees the security of North Korean regime, was delivered to degrade the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy.

Regardless of implementing the unjustified and weakly justified coercions that degraded the US coercive diplomacy, Bush administration successfully escalated the tension to display its ‘sense of urgency’, ‘image of war’ and credibility of coercion. However, it was not sufficient to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme which would be the most critical bargaining chip to compete with soon to be escalated US coercion. Admittedly, the US coercive diplomacy successfully implemented the ‘image of war’ not only to Kim Jung-II but also the neighbouring states to participate in North Korean nonproliferation. However, as North Korea ministry of defence stated ‘will retaliate against military action with military action and war with war’,\(^{594}\) it also induced North Korea to strengthen its motivation for counter coercive diplomacy to prepare the war game and reinitiate its nuclear programme.

### 5.4.2.4 The Shift of the Strategic Environment: The End of the Iraq War and the Establishment of the Multilateral Frame


The stalemate between the US and North Korea continued since neither one of them backed down and claimed a different frame of negotiation, multilateral for the US and bilateral negotiations for North Korea. However, the swift victory of the US in the Iraq war brought a favourable strategic environment for the US.

North Korea appealed to the international community not to support or realign with US military action and insisted the bilateral talks would be the solution without any armed conflict. Russia and China also emphasized the necessity of direct talks and urged the US to accept bilateral negotiations with North Korea. However, the possibility of bilateral talks diminished as the US achieved swift victory in the Iraq war.

The outbreak of the Iraq war displayed the willingness and capability of US military action that enhance ‘the strength of motivation ‘of coercive diplomacy. By witnessing the US’ preparation and execution of the Iraq war, China who insisted the fulfilment of the Geneva Agreed Framework and direct bilateral talks was seriously concerned North Korean nuclear programme would be the next target. China did not want an escalation of tension or an armed conflict in Korean peninsula, which would be a great harm to its national interest. Thus, China changed its stance and put an effort to arrange multilateral negotiations regarding North Korean nuclear programme.

The policy change of China could be referred to as a success of the US coercive diplomacy. The Bush administration displayed ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’, ‘Sense of Urgency’ and ‘Strong Leadership’ on North Korean nuclear programme by releasing a consistent policy review and implementing it to an action. On March 8, 2003, Qian Qichen, the Vice Premier of the State Council, visited North Korea to demand a multilateral five-party talk. When North Korea rejected the request during the meeting, Qian Qichen amended the request to a three-party talks.

The acceptance of multilateral talks was disadvantage on North Korea. However, attaining the bilateral talks with the US was not a vital interest of North Korea which could risk the possibility of military intervention or strike from the US military who had just gain their confidence from the victory in Iraq. Moreover, the three party talks that includes long-standing ally, China, was not far different from bilateral talks. In this circumstance, North Korea’s ‘motivation of strength’ of securing the bilateral talks
cannot be stronger than that of the US’s on multilateral talks. As it is indicated in Figure 5-7, Figure 5-8, the US successfully increased its coercion to induce North Korea to accept the multilateral talks.\footnote{Bruce Cumings, “Kim Jong Il Confronts Bush - and Wins. A New Page in North-South Korean Relations,” \textit{Policy Forum Online} 07-079A, Oct 19, 2007.}
5.4.2.5 Three-Party Talks: Absence of Negotiation

On April 23, 2003, the three-party talks was held in Beijing. However, As Colin Powell stipulated the three-party talks as “a way of bringing three countries in a multilateral setting”, there were differences in the negotiation posture of the US and North Korea. The US regarded the three-party talks was a pre-meeting for further expanded multilateral talks, whereas North Korea wanted to derive a substantial agreement through the negotiation. Thus, when North Korea presented a package deal of a four phase process, the so-called ‘bold resolution’, the US ignored the proposal and repeated its demand for dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme.

Due to the irreconcilable differences, the tension was high between the US and North Korea. On the second day of the talks, North Korea’s chief delegation, Lee Keun, announced North Korea would not participate in the plenary session if the US refused

the bilateral meeting. As the US responded that there will be no bilateral negotiation, the
three-party talks ended a day earlier than its schedule. Although it ended without
deriving an agreement, both sides agreed to meet again.

As Larry A. Niksch evaluated that the US’ strategy at the three-party talks was more
towards to regime change or diplomatic surrender of North Korea,\(^{597}\) the three-party
talks was far from a negotiation. It was rather a theatre where US displayed its strong
will towards North Korean nuclear dismantlement and the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of its
coercive diplomacy. Since North Korea realized the US has no intention of negotiation but
to utilize the extended multilateral talks as an efficient tool for the US coercive diplomacy, it
rejected the US demands of the multilateral negotiation and requested the bilateral talks.\(^{598}\)

Despite North Korea’s demands for a bilateral negotiation, the US ignored and increased its
implementation of coercive diplomacy. On May 5, 2003, the Bush administration declared
the possibility of a pre-emptive strike on North Korea.\(^{599}\) The US’s ‘strength of motivation’
was again confirmed on May 12, 2003, when Bush refused the demand of Roh Moo Hyun,
then President of South Korea, to rule out the military strike option on North Korea.\(^{600}\) On
May 31, 2003, the Bush administration disclosed the USFK reinforcement plan of 11 billion
dollars, which was 80% of the annual 2003 South Korean national defence budget. It was a
clear step of US coercive diplomacy to secure its escalation dominance against North Korea.

Moreover, the US mobilized multilateral support for its global nonproliferation project
to coerce North Korea. On June 1, 2003, the US requested the participation of PSI at the
G8 summit meeting in Evian, France and organized the first PSI meeting in Spain on
June 12, 2003. As Condoleezza Rice stated, the degree of PSI intervention cannot be
predicted, and the PSI could be the trigger to a military action or a war. It was an

\(^{597}\) Larry A. Niksch, “The preparation of Bush administration on military intervention of North Korea”,
“Dae Bukhan gunsan goryehago jimmeein Bush midaetongryung”, *International Affairs Journal*,


\(^{599}\) David E. Sanger, “After effects: The Asian Arena; Bush Shifts Focus To Nuclear Sales by North
sales-by-north-korea.html

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Roh+sees+Bush+doctrine+not+as+suitable+for+Korean+Peninsula.-
a0101643868
efficient coercion on North Korea who had experience the seizure of Sosan vessel. Indeed, North Korea considered the PSI, ‘a declaration of war’, a serious threat to its national security.601

By utilizing the momentum and the fear of WMD which was created after the 9/11, the Bush administration wanted to swiftly eliminate North Korean nuclear threat. Thus, the US set the dismantlement of nuclear programme, which was the objective of coercive diplomacy, as the prerequisite for any further negotiation and executed its coercion to derive the behavioural change of North Korea. However, this approach was far disconnected with the theory of compellence and the coercive diplomacy.

The successful coercion is created when target objectives are induced by the bargain of force or forceful persuasion. That is, both coercer and coercee must be persuaded that negotiating will bring more benefits than each pursuing their own interest by force. Thus, when North Korea is convinced that the dismantling its nuclear programme is more beneficial through the bargaining of punitive and compensative inducement, it will change its behaviour and abandon the nuclear programme. However, the Bush administration executed aberrant coercive diplomacy which omitted the negotiation process.

The Bush’s aberrant coercive diplomacy, which already lacked in justification from excessive nullification of Geneva agreement frame, had massive adverse effect to create the multilateral coercion in six party talks which was the main implementation body of North Korean nonproliferation.

As it is shown in <Figure 5-9>, On July 31, 2003, North Korea announced the acceptance of extended multilateral talks. In a first glance, as North Korea had been seeking bilateral talks and subsequent compensation and security assurance, it could be considered as failure on the part of North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy. Admittedly, North Korea submitted to the US coercive diplomacy and accepted its demands for multilateral talks without any clause of indemnity.

However, in the long term, North Korea successfully increased its nuclear capability by utilizing the US coercion as its diplomatic asset. When the Bush administration executed the aberrant coercive diplomacy that lacks in evidence and absence of persuasion, North Korea not only successfully defended its objective of preserving the nuclear capability but also increase its nuclear deterrence. On April 18, 2003, before the three-party talks, North Korea declared the extraction of 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor without any restraints from the international community. On July 8, 2003, North Korea achieved advanced nuclear deterrence and capability by finalizing the plutonium reprocessing that could make nuclear bomb. Moreover, by counterplotting the US coercion, North Korea reasons its nuclear deterrence as a means of self-defence so that Russia and China could support the ‘denuclearization of Korean peninsula’ not the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme. The US coercive diplomacy did induced North Korea to the 6 party talks. However, it was a ‘Pyrrhic victory’ which exacerbated the henceforth implementation of US coercive diplomacy by increasing nuclear deterrence of North Korea.

<Figure 5-9> The US Coercive Diplomacy and the Six Party Talks
5.4.2.6 The Six-Party Talks: The New Dynamics of the Contention

1) First - Third Round of the Six-Party Talks

The Bush administration wanted to derive prompt Complete Verifiable Irreversible Dismantlement from North Korean nuclear programme through the six-party talks. Therefore, the US wanted to derive a full agreement with North Korea instead of a phased manner agreement such as the Geneva Agreed Framework. It was a rational choice of the Bush administration as they believed North Korea deliberately stalled for time and enjoyed compensation through the Geneva Agreed Framework to develop their nuclear capability. However, it was impossible for North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme and capability within such a short period of time without any compensation. There is no regime that would give up the means of deterrence and bargain when facing an adversary with great asymmetry of power.

On August 27, 2003, the first round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing. During the first round of the talks, the US denied to sign the non-aggression treaty with North Korea and requested the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme as a precondition for any further negotiation. The Bush administration made it clear the political and economic compensation would only be provided when North Korean completes its nuclear dismantlement. Moreover, the US revealed that the full diplomatic normalization was only possible after the additional agreements are made on the issues of missiles, conventional weapon, forgery of US dollars, drug trafficking and human rights. Thus, even if North Korea dismantlement its nuclear programme, there were many other agenda which has to be sealed before the full normalization. It directly contradict the simple logic of coercive diplomacy; ‘The conviction that there will be no further demands after compliance’. If the adversary thinks that there will be another request or demand after complying, the motivation to agree will decline.

During the first round of the six-party talks, the other participants South Korea and Japan supported the US by claiming the CVID on North Korean nuclear programme whereas China and Russia focused on the nonproliferation of the Korean peninsula to
alleviate the possible coercion which might be imposed on North Korea. Due to the
differences, the first round of talks failed to reach an agreement or a joint statement. On
August 29, 2003 the 1st round of six party talks ended with the chairman’s summary that
the participants agreed to organize another six-party talks for a peaceful resolution.

As the ‘denuclization of Korean peninsula’ and the necessity of North Korean security
assurance being discussed as the agenda of six party talks, North Korea was convinced
that its counter coercive diplomacy had decreased the incompliant cost. Thus, North
Korea immediately rebuffed the continuous talks and condemned the US’ refusal to meet
‘action with action’ negotiation and its request of nuclear dismantlement as a
precondition.602 Moreover, North Korea extended its counter coercive diplomacy to
maximize the perseverance of its nuclear capability and possible compensation through
strengthen its diplomatic tie with China.

On October 30, 2003, Wu Bangguo, the Chairman of the Community Party Committee
Politburo Standing Committee, visited North Korea to talk about North Korea’s
participation in the six-party talks. During their meeting, Kim Jong-II disclosed the
possibility of resuming the six-party talks if the six-party talks proceeded to negotiate a
package deal on the basis of reciprocal method which the US refuses. On December
2003, after the meetings with Wang Yi, the deputy Ministry of Chinese Foreign Affairs,
both agree to implement reciprocal method in second round of the six-party talks. North
Korea succeeded to degrade the US coercive diplomacy by damaging the possible
multilateral coercion before the 2nd round of six party talks.

The second round of the six-party talks began on February 25, 2004 in Beijing. The US
was convinced of North Korean HEU programme and urged North Korea to officially
abolish the nuclear programme for further negotiation. North Korea responded that there
was no UEP and it would be only possible to discuss about the HEU programme if the
US could bring forth evidence about North Korean HEU.603 As the second round of the
six-party talks ended without any agreement other than to hold another round of six-
party talks in the near future, even South Korea and Japan, who had been supporting the

US, requested a change of the US for a reasonable agreement.\(^{604}\) The aberrant US coercive diplomacy that set its objective as a prerequisite for further negotiation was already losing its ground.

On June 23-26, 2004, the third round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing. Both North Korea and the US maintained its stances but there were changes in the US on how to implement the dismantlement. The US stepped back from their demand of dismantlement as a precondition, and offered North Korea a two-phase dismantlement process. However, the two-phase dismantle process of the US was not a big change from the previous ‘dismantlement as the precondition’. Basically, the Bush administration demanded North Korea had to initiate the first action. That is, if North Korea executed the dismantlement process, the US would provide economic and energy aid. After North Korea completed the CVID of the nuclear programme, the US would assure North Korea’s regime security and would initiate the diplomatic normalization process. The only difference between the two-phase process and the previous policy was the supply of energy aid as a compensation for North Korea’s good behaviour after the completion of the first phase.

On June 28, 2004, North Korea positively assessed the change of the US policy through its propaganda Rodong newspaper; “The freezing of North Korean nuclear programme must be accompanied by proper compensation… The terms of the nuclear freeze is solely dependent on US compensation… The US should provide 200 million KW energy aid apart from the assurance of regime security and the lifting up the sanctions”\(^{605}\) As similar to the first North Korea nuclear crisis in 1994, when the negotiation began, North Korea utilized its nuclear programme and its capability to deter US coercion and counter coerce the US for the compensation.

However, any sense of rapprochement that had been created by the US’ two-phase process of dismantlement at the third round of the six-party talks soon began to collapse.


when James Kelly stated the goal of the US is the CVID of North Korean nuclear programme at the senate hearing on July 15, 2004. As the US displays its ‘strength of motivation’ of coercive diplomacy by executing the joint PSI military exercises with Japan, North Korea immediately condemned the ‘duplicity’ of the US and announced its refusal of joining the 4th round of six-party talks on August 23, 2004.

If the US is pursing the type B: nuclear dismantlement, or type C: nuclear dismantlement through regime change as the variant of its coercive diplomacy, it directly collides with the vital interest, preserving nuclear capability and security assurance, of North Korea. In order to overcome the resistance of North Korea, who would attempt to keep its vital interest, and achieve the objectives of coercive diplomacy, the US has to either implement forceful persuasion on North Korea or coerce North Korea to submission without engaging a war. Specially, if the Bush administration aims the prompt CVID of North Korean nuclear programme as it claimed during the six-party talks, it needs to create tremendous ‘asymmetry of motivation’ over North Korean counter coercive diplomacy in a short period time. However, the Bush administration that prerequisite the CVID for further negotiation cannot create such kind of ‘asymmetry of motivation’.

If it is not a simple problem that could be resolved only with a force, the persuasion through various types of inducements is inevitable to create the ‘asymmetry of motivation’. The Bush administration did not acknowledge this basic logic of compellence and coercive diplomacy theory. Thus, it simply decided to implement more coercion by utilizing the multilateral framework of six-party talks on North Korea. However, the six-party talks is not a convenient universal tool box for the US. It is a multilateral security cooperation that based upon the principles of joint application, reciprocity and invisibility of welfare. Thus, the aberrant US coercive diplomacy which perquisite CVID of North Korean nuclear programme for the further negotiation made the absence of negotiation and reciprocity in six party talks that hindered the consolidation of multilateral coercion to derive the behavioural change of North Korea.

The US wanted to maximize the assets of the participants of six party talks to implement

a more severe coercive diplomacy on North Korea. However, with the absence of evidence on North Korean HEU programme, multilateral coercion could not be consolidated. Since the US failed to provide any evidence other than the confession of A.Q. Khan, half of the participants in the six-party talks, China, Russia and South Korea, expressed doubt on North Korean HEU Programme. 607

On the contrary, during the first to third round of the six-party talks, North Korea actively executed its counter strategy to minimize the incompliant cost which would be created by the US coercive diplomacy. First, North Korea claimed the necessity of security assurance to prevent US military intervention and in return, guaranteed the freezing of its nuclear programme. By addressing the reasonable offer, North Korea restrained not only its allies, Russia and China, but also South Korea from supporting the US coercive diplomacy. On the basis of the non-aggression treaty and the freezing of the nuclear programme, North Korea requested a reciprocal action process in reaching dismantlement. Second, North Korea degraded the legitimacy of the US coercive diplomacy by demanding proof of the existence of North Korean HEU programme. By damaging the legitimacy of the US’ demands on North Korean nuclear dismantlement as the precondition, North Korea prevented the other participants of the six-party talks to support and form a multilateral coercion.

The US coercive diplomacy during the 1st to 3rd round of six-party talks was a total failure. Since the US coercive diplomacy set the nuclear dismantlement as precondition for any further negotiation, the US could neither create, consolidate nor bargain for ‘asymmetry motivation’ to derive behavioural change of North Korea. Moreover, as the US repeatedly argued the CVID as the precondition for any further negotiation, it could not bring up the issues on 8,000 spend fuel rod extraction, nuclear fuel reprocessing process and accumulated weapon grade plutonium which took place right before the six-party talks. The enhancement of North Korean nuclear capability soon returned as another extraction of spent nuclear fuel rod and the 1st North Korean nuclear test.

2) The 2nd term of Bush Administration and the Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks

The impasse of the six-party talks and nuclear negotiation came to a stop when President Bush was re-elected. 'end tyranny to promote democracy’ became the US’ new foreign policy and North Korea was labelled as the ‘outpost of tyranny’. The Bush administration displayed its ‘strong leadership’ and planned to execute a more severe coercive diplomacy on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programme. However, the US who had failed to derive Type B coercive diplomacy did not have efficient means to change North Korean regime for its nuclear dismantlement. Moreover, the Bush’s doctrine of ‘end tyranny to promote democracy’ rather strengthened the ‘peace treaty ’claim of North Korea during the six-party talks.

Since the aberrant US coercive diplomacy of ‘CVID as precondition’ failed to consolidate the multilateral coercion in the first three rounds six-party talks, there were no inducements but the US unilateral military escalation and economic sanction to implement on North Korea. Although US had succeeded the behavioural change of North Korea to accept the 1994 Geneva agreed framework through its unilateral military escalation, it could be settled since the US had changed its objective of coercive diplomacy from the nuclear dismantlement to nuclear freeze of North Korea. The last minute bargaining brought the end of the escalation and induced North Korea to freeze their nuclear programme.

In case of Bush’s aberrant coercive diplomacy that aims prompt CVID of North Korean nuclear programme, it was impossible task to create ‘asymmetry of motivation’ to induce North Korea to comply with the US demand. Due to the many limitations; increased North Korean nuclear capability and its deterrence power, the aftermath of a possible war in Korean peninsula and the possible casualty of US military personnel, it was an excessive risk choice for the US to unilaterally implement the ‘unacceptability of threatened escalation’ to create ‘asymmetry of motivation’ against North Korean counter coercive diplomacy. In order to achieve the prompt CVID of North Korea, the multilateral coercion and support was a necessity. However, although the six-party talks was formed, the Bush administration sustained the aberrant coercive diplomacy of no negotiation and failed to consolidate the multilateral coercion to induce North Korea.

When the credibility US unilateral military action was eroded as the situation in Iraq
became worse in 2005, North Korea who had been successfully implemented its counter coercive diplomacy initiated its counter coercion. On February 10, 2005, North Korea changed its strategic ambiguity of ‘neither confirm nor deny’ and announced its nuclear armament and declared an indefinite postponement of the six-party talks until the US abandoned its hostile policy on North Korea. On March 31, 2005, North Korea asserted their change of agenda and the character of the six-party talks by claiming itself as a nuclear state. It claimed the six-party talks should be shifted as an arms reduction talks since North Korean nuclear programme could no longer be solved by the give and take process, compensation and nuclear freeze.

The verbal provocation of nuclear armament and refusal of nuclear negotiation were the good reasons for the US to engage and implement the coercion. However, as North Korea justifies the cause with absence of its security assurance, China and Russia displayed their concerns on nuclear armament but assent to its cause. It was clear evidence that North Korea was building higher ground by degrading the multilateral cooperation on the US coercive diplomacy. Thus, as convinced that the US unilateral military action or the multilateral coercion from the six-party talks was highly unlikely, on April 7, 2005, North Korea once again extracted the spent fuel rods at the Yongbyon 5MW reactor to enhance its nuclear capability. The US responded that North Korean extraction of spent fuel would be officially discussed at the UN Security Council. However, as China and Russia refuses, it even failed to release the Presidential Statements.

Without any efficient inducements left for Bush’s ‘pure coercion’, the only measure the US coercive diplomacy could implement is securing the escalation dominance on North Korean provocation. Indeed, the US successfully sustained its military superiority of instil fear on North Korea but the escalation dominance is the back drop of coercive diplomacy not the efficient inducement to derive the behavioural change of North Korea. Therefore, the US had to accept North Korean demand. On May 13, 2005, the Bush administration sent Joseph DeTrani, and James Foster as special envoys to meet with North Korea’s representatives at the United Nations. Through the meeting, the US confirmed North Korea as a sovereign state and disclosed it had no intention of military intervention. Moreover, the US revealed the acceptance of bilateral talks if North Korea resumed the six-party talks. On May 16, 2005, a vice-minister level talk between North
and South Korea was held after the 10 months of impasse and agreement of 20 thousand tons of food aid from South Korea was made. On June 17, 2005, Kim Jung-II disclosed to Chung Dong-Young, the minister of South Korea’s Unification department, that North Korea would re-join the six-party talks. The North Korea successfully achieved its enhancement of nuclear capability and the compensation through its counter coercive diplomacy. As the <Figure 5-10> indicates, the Bush had to accept North Korean request to resume the six party talks.

<Figure 5-10> The Failure of US Coercive Diplomacy and the 4th round of six-party talks
The fourth round of six-party talks was held as a two-phase process at Beijing; the first phase was from July 26 to August 7, 2005 and the second phase from September 13-19, 2005. From the beginning, North Korea and the US revealed its differences. North Korea insisted its rights to the peaceful use of atomic energy which included the UEP whereas the US insisted a CVID on the entire North Korean nuclear programme. The first phase of the fourth round of six-party talks had to call a recess due to the core differences on the delimitation of the dismantlement.

During the recess, on August 12, 2005, Kim Kye Gwan, the first Vice Minister of North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disclosed its will to secure a peaceful use of atomic energy and demanded the supply of light water reactor as the key to a resolution. It became clear that North Korean objective of the counter coercive diplomacy on the following second phase of the talks would be the compensation of the light water reactor and the approval of a certain degree of nuclear capability.

On September 13, 2005, the second phase of the fourth round of the six-party talks was
held and the two agendas mentioned by Kim Kye Gwan became the core issue of the negotiation. Although the US wanted a CVID on the entire North Korean nuclear programme, the US could not persist on full dismantlement since it violated the peaceful use of atomic energy recognized by the NPT. Therefore, the US had to accept the mediated offer of China allowing North Korea the peaceful use of atomic energy and supply of a light water reactor. On September 19, 2005, the six-party talks finally reached a joint statement. Again, it was facile victory of North Korea. The <Figure 5-11> clarifies how the contention of US and North Korea lead to the agreement.

<Figure 5-11> The Contention of US & North Korea and the 9.19 Joint Statement

The supply of the light water reactor delivered to North was a symbolic recognition of the US acceptance on North Korea’s peaceful use of atomic energy. This could be considered a failure of the Bush administration’s coercive diplomacy, which demanded the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme as a precondition. Moreover, the 9.19 joint statement, which recognized the peaceful use of atomic energy and the provision of the light water reactor, is very much similar to that of the Geneva Agreed Framework from 1994. That is, giving a though that the 2nd nuclear crisis initiated by the accusation of US on fallacy of Geneva agreed framework, it was coming back to square one.
The negotiation process that derived 9.19 joint statement indicates the problems of Bush’s aberrant coercive diplomacy which was absence in negotiation and bargaining. Although coercive diplomacy utilizes the force and violence as its means, it is still a diplomatic strategy. However, the Bush administration set its policy objective, CVID of North Korean nuclear programme, as the precondition for any further diplomatic negotiation. Thus, as there was not much ground to bargain or negotiate, the US become more isolated while North Korea implement its counter coercive diplomacy to expand its leverage. Admittedly, the US coercive diplomacy was the main driver which successfully formed the six-party talks that could create multilateral coercion to induce nuclear dismantlement of North Korea. However, the six-party talks does not mean the automatic multilateral coercion. Since the US decided to join the multilateral dialogue, it had to actively implement its inducements to create the asymmetry motivation over North Korea to consolidate multilateral coercion on North Korean nuclear dismantlement. However, the weakly justified US coercive diplomacy that omitted the diplomatic negotiation and bargaining process cannot bring the result that US aimed.

Although the US signed the 9.19 joint statement, the US statements at the closing plenary revealed the unchanged objective of Bush’s coercive diplomacy which directly contradicted the joint agreement. Christopher Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State, made a statement at the closing plenary of the fourth round of the six-party talks, which demanded the CVID on North Korean nuclear programme. He postulated the ‘appropriate time’ for the provision of light water reactor would be after the complete dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme. Moreover, Christopher Hill stated that diplomatic normalization with North Korea is only possible after North Korea took the proper measures on various issues: human rights, the missile programmes, the sponsor of terrorism and etc. The irony soon created the crisis.

3) Sanction on Banco Delta Asia and the Defamed US Coercive Diplomacy

As the 4\textsuperscript{th} round of six-party talks progressed to the US disadvantage, the Bush


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administration took a step to build unilateral coercive measures that could implement the efficient coercion on North Korea.

On September 15, 2005, while the fourth round of the six-party talks was in procession, the US Department of the Treasury designated the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao as the institution of primary money laundering. BDA was suspected of being a willing pawn for the corrupt financial activities of North Korea such as by distributing counterfeit dollars and laundering drug money. However, the sanction on BDA degraded the justification of US coercive diplomacy on North Korea. The evidence against BDA was not strong enough to hold up, let alone prove the involvement of North Korean government. The list of North Korean allegations accused by US treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network were missing basic factual data such as dates, sums of money involved and names of individuals or North Korean entities involved to confirm criminality.  

Despite the credibility of evidences, according to Section 311 of the U.S Patriot Act, the BDA was about to be prohibited from all financial transactions with approximately 5,000 banks and financial institutes of the US. On September 16, 2005, as 1/3 of the bank assets amounting to 133 million dollars were withdrawn from the BDA on one day, the Monetary Authority of Macao had to get involved and freeze North Korean account of 25 million dollars in BDA to stabilize the imbalance. As North Korean spokesman of foreign ministry strongly denounced, “Vicious act to suffocate whole system of North Korea”, it brought economic contraction since foreign banks refuses the financial transaction with North Korea.

The US Department of the Treasury claimed the execution of Section 311 of the Patriot Act had nothing to do with the nuclear negotiation with North Korea and the six-party talks. However, as Stuart A. Levey, the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence disclosed, “Our financial authorities complement other national security instruments, providing policymakers with a range of options for isolating and pressuring hostile regimes, terrorists, and proliferators of weapons of mass

destruction”, the BDA sanction was to coerce North Korea.\textsuperscript{610}

Moreover, US started to make the human rights issue to put leverage on North Korea. On August 2005, the Bush administration appointed Jay Lefkowitz as the human rights envoy to North Korea. The position was created on October 4, 2004, after the US House of Representatives passed North Korean Human Rights Act. It had been vacant for 10 months since the Department of States expressed its concern that the appointment might provoke North Korea. However, in order to utilize North Korea human rights envoy as another means of coercion, the Bush administration appointed Jay Lefkowitz before the beginning of the second phase of the fourth round of the six-party talks to pressure North Korea.

The implementation of unilateral coercion is the US sovereign right of foreign policy which is not violation of international law. Moreover, at a first glance, the extra US sanctions on BDA and the credible threat of possible sanctions on North Korean human rights issue seemed an efficient measure to derive the behavioural change of North Korea. However, it seriously degraded the US coercive diplomacy on North Korean nuclear proliferation in the prospect of the compellence and coercive diplomacy theory.

Firstly, the overly various agendas and coercion of the US on North Korea damaged the ‘clarity of objectives’ of coercive diplomacy.\textsuperscript{611} The ‘clarity of objectives’ helps the coercee to distinguish the possible loss if the coercee denies or accept the coercer’s demand. For instance, in a contention of the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy on North Korean nuclear dismantlement, the US has to convince North Korea that it is beneficial to accept the nuclear dismantlement offer than pursuing nuclear programme by resistance. However, the unilateral US coercion that aimed the omnidirectional pressure on North Korea cannot create forceful persuasion to convince them that the compliance is more beneficial.


\textsuperscript{611} Alexander L. George, “Findings and Conclusions,” \textit{The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,} Boulder; Westview Press, p. 280
Second, the accusation of North Korean money laundering and human rights issue is another agenda which could be the reason for the continuous US coercive diplomacy even after the nuclear deal is settled. It directly contradicts basic logic of compellence theory for success of coercion; ‘the coercer has to guarantee that the current surrender will not lead to more requests to the opponent.’\textsuperscript{612} If North Korea is convinced that there will be other forms of coercive diplomacy to face after abandoning its most efficient tool, nuclear capability, North Korea would resist keeping its nuclear programme base. However, the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration during the fourth round of the six-party talks seriously degraded this core element for success and sent a wrong signal to North Korea.

Since the 9.19 joint statement declared to solve North Korean nuclear programme ‘in a peaceful manner’ by ‘respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together’, the US unilateral sanction was the act of deviation from 9.19 joint statement. As Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman stated, “true effects of coercive strategy lie in the altered - in some cases, hardened – policy preferences or decision making calculi of the actors involved”,\textsuperscript{613} the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration hardened the policy preference of North Korea by giving the justification of its counter coercive diplomacy. On October 24, 2005, the spokesman of North Korean ministry of Foreign affairs announced a statement that North Korea would join the fifth round of the six-party talks to criticize the US policy and to hold the US responsible for the outcome.

4) The First Phase of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks and the First Nuclear Test

On November 9, 2005, the fifth round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing. As previously announced, North Korea condemned the US’ duplicity in implementing the sanctions during the negotiation. Kim Kye Gwan, the chief delegate of North Korea, protested that it would defer any nuclear dismantlement until the US lifted up the measures applied to the BDA. The US responded the implementation of the Patriot Act Section 311 on the BDA is in regards to money counterfeiting and laundering, a completely separate matter.

\textsuperscript{612} Thomas C. Schelling, \textit{Arms and Influence}, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 69.

from North Korean nuclear dismantlement. Due to differences, the first phase of the fifth round of the six-party talks ended without any further negotiations.

By witnessing the US had no intention to implement 9.19 joint statement, North Korea started to display its will to strengthen military deterrence including nuclear armament unless the US abandoned its ‘squeezing hostile policy.’ On December 3, 2005, North Korea denounced the US, accusing its policy as a regime change by labelling North Korea as drug traffickers and currency counterfeiters.614 On May 2006, Michael Green, the senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, and James Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State, disclosed the US had no intention of North Korean regime change at the first Seoul-Washington Forum. They described the US policy as a ‘regime transformation,’ which aims to change the attitude of North Korea, not the regime itself. However, a series of policy reviews, which were released for the second term of the Bush administration, could be highly interpreted as a regime change. On February 6, 2006, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report was released, stating the possible pre-emptive strikes including the use of nuclear weapons on North Korea. On March 16, 2006, in the second national security strategy of the United States, which clearly stated the objectives as being ‘promoting democracy’ and ‘ending the tyranny,’ North Korea was named at the very top as the target.615

Although the US agreed to sign 9.19 Joint Statement, it simultaneously implemented the previous coercive diplomacy that prerequisite the prompt CVID of North Korean nuclear programme for further negotiation. However, as examined through the chapter, successful negotiation on nuclear disarmament of North Korea involved compensation in security and economic benefits in return for abandonment of nuclear weapons capabilities. Without bargaining there would be no other solution but the type C coercive diplomacy; the nonproliferation through regime change. Since there was no participant of six-party talks who were willing to take the security risk and support a policy explicitly aiming for regime change, the US coercive diplomacy which aimed to consolidate the multilateral coercion and prompt CVID of North Korea without bargaining was at variance to induce North Korea for nuclear dismantlement.

The North Korea, who had been successfully implemented their counter coercive diplomacy by countering the aberrant US coercion since 2nd nuclear crisis, could not make the diplomatic bargaining as the US implement more aberrant coercive diplomacy of in between type B and Type C or tacit type C. Thus, although it would damage the justification of counter coercive diplomacy, North Korea decided to execute more bold action to display its strength of motivation and increase its deterrence power.

On July 5, 2006, North Korea launched ICBM Taepodong 2 to display its will and ability to counter strike against the US coercion. It was the end of North Korean self-moratorium on the missile test, which had come to a halt since 1998. After the Taepodong 2 Missile provocation, the US circulated a UN Security Council resolution on North Korean Missile programme. Due to its clear evidence, unlike the previous resolutions on North Korea, China and Russia agreed to support it. On July 15, 2006, the UNSC Resolution 1695 was adopted to urge the UN member states not to provide the material, technology and economic support that could be misused on North Korean missile development. It also urged an unconditional immediate return of North Korea to the six-party talks. However, China and Russia did not take any measures to cut economic links with North Korea. The aberrant US coercive diplomacy hindered to consolidate international support even in the face of North Korea’s clear missile provocation.

For North Korea, the launch of ICBM Taepodong 2 was half failure. It successfully displayed its ability of military deterrence, ‘strength of motivation’ of counter coercive diplomacy and confirmed the support of China and Russia to show the US that their aberrant coercive diplomacy would worsen the case. However, it decrease its justification of counter coercive diplomacy, failed to change the US tacit type C coercive diplomacy, and no longer freely postpone the 6-party talks to avoid the US aberrant coercion since the UNSC resolution 1695 was adopted.

As it was revealed in the launch of ICBM Taepodong 2, the US aimed to create regime

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transformation or credible threat of regime change in North Korea to coerce them for re-
joining the six-party talks.\footnote{Charles L. Pritchard, \textit{Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb}, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007, pp. 161-162.} Moreover, by utilizing US unilateral coercion and the multilateral coercion of six-party talks, the US wanted to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme. It indicates the US had sustained the aberrant coercive diplomacy that prerequisite for CVID of nuclear programme to further negotiation even after it signed 9.19 agreements.\footnote{Henry A. Kissinger, “A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy”, \textit{Washington Post}, May 16, 2006.} When UNSC resolution 1695 was adopted, there was opportunity for the US to engage in six-party talks to consolidate the reasonable multilateral coercion to pressure North Korea and derive more advantageous bargaining within the 9.19 agreement. Moreover, it could create better environment to pressure multilateral coercion since the US has the legitimacy to demand the China and Russia to join the multilateral coercion if the reasonable offer could be made to North Korea. However, as Bush administration sustained its aberrant coercive diplomacy. The US not only failed to dismantle North Korean nuclear programme but also push North Korea to the nuclear test.

When North Korea gradually escalated the tension by announcing the nuclear armament,\footnote{Rodong Shinmun, \textit{Worker’s Newspaper}, Pyongyang, Jul 17, 2006.} nullity of the armistice agreement at the Panmunjom\footnote{Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang, Aug 22, 2006.} and threatened the US with possible military action,\footnote{Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang, Aug 22, 2006.} the US sustained its unilateral coercive diplomacy that gradually turn the screw to squeeze North Korea with BDA related sanction.\footnote{Stuart Levey, \textit{Prepared Remarks Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence}, US Department of Treasury, Sep 8, 2006. http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp86.aspx} On October 3, 2006, North Korea answered the US coercive diplomacy by announcing its plan of the nuclear test. North Korea stated the nuclear test would be executed safely and North Korean nuclear warhead would never be first used nor proliferated.\footnote{Rodong Shinmun, \textit{Worker’s Newspaper}, Pyongyang, October 4, 2006.} On October 9, 2006, North Korea informed the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang that the nuclear test was about to be executed. At 10:36 a.m., North Korea executed the first nuclear test. It was the display of nuclear capability by a state accused of being the axis of evil. The failure of US coercive diplomacy lead to the first nuclear test of North Korea is briefly explained in the <Figure 5-12> below.
5) The Second Phase of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks and the 2.13 Agreement

As the contention of coercive and counter coercive diplomacy progressed disadvantageous for the US, the Bush administration attempted enhanced its aberrant coercive diplomacy by implementing more excessive coercion that are based on weak evidences and much deviated from the theory of compellence and coercive diplomacy. As the result, it failed to create efficient multilateral coercion even the phase of North Korean ICBM missile launch and the 1st nuclear test.

This was witnessed when the UNSC resolution 1719 was being adopted. On October 16, 2006, the Bush administration sent Condoleezza Rice to diplomatic visits to the member states of the six-party talks to consolidate strong multilateral coercion on North Korea based on the UNSC resolution 1719. However, even after North Korean nuclear test, the three member states of the six-party talks, China, Russia and South Korea, were against the tougher level of coercion that might cause the loss of control of North Korea. Thus, there were limits to the Bush administration to implement more severe measures for its coercive diplomacy.
In the phase of North Korean nuclear test, the most efficient and strong variants of the US coercive diplomacy was the ‘Ultimatum’. However, due to the successfully constructed counter coercive diplomacy of North Korea; massive prospected casualty, the uncertainty of Chinese and Russian response and the North Korean military deterrence on allies of the US,\textsuperscript{625} it was impossible to execute the ‘Ultimatum’. Moreover, as North Korea counter coerced by disclosing its will to resume the six-party talks, the Bush administration had no other alternatives than to negotiate with North Korea for the dismantlement. The \textlt{Figure 5-13} shows how the contention occurred between the first and second phase of fifth round of six party talks.

\textlt{Figure 5-13} The Chronicle of Contention between First and Second Phase of Six Party Talks

On October 31, 2006, the confidential three-party talks of the US, China and North Korea was held in Beijing. The three-party talks was revealed on the same day when China announced the agreement of the three parties to resume the fifth round of the six-

party talks. It was a compliance of US to North Korea’s demand of bilateral talks. As, Christopher Hill, disclosed the possibility of removing the BDA sanction, the second phase of the fifth Round of the six-party talks was agreed to be held in Beijing on December 18, 2006.\textsuperscript{626}

The objective of Bush’s coercive diplomacy was the prompt CVID of North Korean nuclear programme. Thus, to implement the swift coercive inducements, the US executed the coercion based on weak evidences. The more US being obsessed with prompt resolution on North Korean nuclear programme the more it created hasty decision that hindered the consolidation of multilateral coercion on North Korea. As examined, the US coercive diplomacy that lacked in justification and ‘clarity of objective’ only buy the time for North Korea for its nuclear advancement and building its justification for the cause. Thus, even after the 1\textsuperscript{st} North Korean nuclear test that Bush had stated it as ‘grave threat’ and not to be ‘ignored longer’,\textsuperscript{627} the US had no other efficient measure but to give in to the demands of North Korea.

As the level of North Korean capability on nuclear proliferation increases to a nuclear explosive device, the US had to accept the bilateral talks to negotiate with North Korea. Thus, the US shift its coercive diplomacy of CVID as the precondition to a phased process which was more time consuming and had to reciprocate with more compensation to dismantle North Korean nuclear programme.

On January 16, 2007, the US-North Korea bilateral talks was held in Berlin. The US indicated the bilateral talks as the preliminary meeting for the six-party talks. However, the fact that lift of the BDA sanction was deeply discussed by the two states could not be denied.\textsuperscript{628} During the talks, Kim Kye Gwan, the head of the North Korean delegation demanded the provision of heavy fuel oil as compensation for freezing the North Korean nuclear programme. The US counterpart, Christopher Hill, agreed to offer the supply of heavy fuel oil if North Korea froze the nuclear facility within 60 days.

\textsuperscript{628}Donh Young Yoon, Is the US giving up the multilateral approach?, Mi, Dae Buk Daehwa Hyeungsik Geumgi Huhmunah?, Yeonhap News Agency, Washington, Jan 17, 2007.
On February 8, 2007, the third phase of the fifth round of six-party talks was held in Berlin and finally reached the 2.13 Agreement. The 2.13 Agreement was the initial action for the implementation of the 9.19 joint statement. According to the 2.13 Agreement, the five working groups, Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Normalization of North Korea and US Relations, Normalization of North Korea and Japan, Economy and Energy Cooperation and Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism were agreed to be formed within 30 days to implement the 9.19 joint statement.

The 2.13 Agreement was based on the ‘action for action’ approach with two phase processes. That is, the moment North Korea froze all its nuclear facility and approved the IAEA to inspect and verify this within 60 days, bilateral talks between North Korea-US and North Korea-Japan would simultaneously be held for diplomatic normalization. Moreover, the participants of the six-party talks provided the 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. Second, after being verified that the North Korean nuclear freeze is fully executed, North Korea would initiate nuclear disablement. In return, 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil would be provided to North Korea in compensation and the US would initiate the negotiation of the peace treaty of the Korean peninsula. Apart from the two phase process, the US Department of State agreed to lift the BDA sanction within 30 days after the 2.13 Agreement.

The 2.13 Agreement is very similar to the Geneva Agreed Framework. Both are phased processes in that the US provides compensation according to the progress of the North Korean nuclear freeze or disablement. However, compare to 1994 Geneva agreed framework, the 2.13 Agreement was the tentative agreement that North Korea could regenerate the nuclear reactor whenever they pleased. The Geneva Agreed Framework was the ‘all or nothing’ package agreement which could control the whole process of the North Korean nuclear programme. It was a quite a setback from the previous agreement except for the fact that the 2.13 agreement was agreed in Multilateral framework that had more binding power. Moreover, the North Korean nuclear programme and capability has vastly improved after the Geneva Agreed Framework was collapsed in 1st term of Bush

Through the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration, North Korea acquired enough plutonium to produce 8-10 nuclear warheads. Moreover, the UEP, which triggered the second nuclear crisis, was not even discussed in the 2.13 Agreement. The <Figure 5-14> indicates the clear picture of how the 2.13 agreement was made through the contention and how North Korea secured the Geneva greed framework level of compensation with enhanced nuclear capability. Again the coercive diplomacy of the US revealed its failure as it gave in to the demand of North Korea only enhancing their nuclear capability.

6) The Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks and the Collapse of 10.3 Agreement

On June 19, 2007, as the North Korean frozen fund at the BDA was finally transferred, the dismantlement process had begun. On June 26, 2007, Olli Heinonen, the deputy director general of the IAEA, visited North Korea to discuss the freezing of the North Korean nuclear programme. The five nuclear facilities were agreed to be closed down;
the Yongbyon 5MWe reactor and the 50MWe reactor which was under construction, the Taechon 200MWe reactor, the reprocessing radiochemistry laboratory and the nuclear fuel rod manufacturing facility. On July 14, 2007, the IAEA sent 10 inspectors to North Korea to inspect and verify the freeze of the North Korean nuclear programme. The IAEA inspectors installed surveillance cameras at the sealed North Korean nuclear facilities. Ironically, it was first success of Bush administration to curb the North Korean nuclear programme after North Korean withdrawal of NPT in 2003. Yongbyon 5mw reactor was the one that extracted the plutonium for the 1st nuclear test.

On September 27, 2007, the second phase of the sixth round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing. As a result, the 10.3 Agreement, which is the second phase action for implementing the 9.19 joint statement, was announced. It was also the ‘action for action’ agreement that North Korea disable its nuclear facilities for the provision of heavy fuel oil and diplomatic normalization with the US and Japan.

After the nuclear test of North Korea, the US changed its policy objective of North Korean nuclear programme to phased manner dismantlement from prompt CVID. As the context of the contention between US and North Korea had changed to the subject of nuclear freeze, North Korea could not hold its ‘strength of motivation’ to resist the demand of the US and six-party talks. As the multilateral support for US nuclear freeze demand on North Korea was consolidated, ‘asymmetry of motivation’ on nuclear freeze becomes slanted to the US. Thus, North Korea could no longer resist negotiating its disablement process of nuclear weapon capability. Moreover, the US displayed its ‘clarity of object’ which had not the case during Bush administration. According to the agreement which was made with in the six party talks, the US prudently implements its coercive inducement to North Korea.

The changed US policy stance and coercive diplomacy kept its stability and composure in the unexpected crisis. On September 6, 2007, the North Korean cooperation on the Syrian nuclear programme was disclosed by the Israel air strike on the Syrian nuclear reactor. 631 If the North was helping the Syrian nuclear programme as accused, North

Korea was not only pursuing nuclear weapons but also spreading its nuclear programme. Moreover, it was suspected that North Korea was not providing ‘complete and correct declaration’ of all its nuclear programmes as agreed in the 10.3 Agreement. However, without the clear evidences on North Korean involvement on Syrian nuclear facility, the US did not implement any substantial coercion on North Korea outside the six-party talks agreement which would only exacerbate the case. Thus, the US deferred the process of lifting North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which was also the part of the 10.3 Agreement for diplomatic normalization.

When the implementation of the 10.3 Agreement became late, the US and North Korea held two bilateral meetings on February 19, 2008 in Beijing and March 13, 2008 in Geneva for the ‘complete and correct’ declaration of the North Korean nuclear programme. It was an active engagement of US to forcefully persuade the North Korea which was absence in previous coercive diplomacy of Bush administration.

The US urged North Korea to provide a full declaration of all its nuclear activities, including the details on an alleged secret uranium enrichment programme and suspected nuclear technology transfers to Syria. However, North Korea denied all the suspicion and announced it would not provide a full declaration unless the US fulfilled its agreement. The two bilateral meetings ended without any results and no progress could be made as agreed in the 10.3 Agreement.

On April 8, 2008, North Korea and the US had another bilateral meeting in Singapore. The key difference between North Korea and the US was the declaration of suspicion that North Korea pursued the UEP and provisions of its nuclear technology to a third party, in particular Syria. North Korea did not want to admit to the suspicion at all whereas the US wanted at least leaves an official record, ‘a bill of particulars’, on the suspicion of North Korea proliferation. 632 That is, North Korea declare the correct amount of plutonium through an official ‘complete and correct’ declaration and the US would fill in a ‘confidential minute’ on suspicions of providing nuclear technology to Syria and the development of the UEP, which North Korea ‘acknowledge’ to but does

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/washington/14weapons.html?pagewanted=all_and_r=0

not officially challenge. 633

Fortunately, the change of US stance made the tentative agreement to continue the North Korean disablement process as agreed in the 10.3 Agreement. However, as Mitchell Reiss, the former State Department Director for Policy Planning stated, “We did not give North Korea a draft protocol for the declaration. We gave them a four-page paper on verification principles which is different from an operational protocol…it ended up the Bush administration had misled the public”, the agreed format of the disablement process was not the verification protocol of North Korean disablement process. 634

The Bush administration evaluated the most threatening and dangerous components of the North Korean nuclear programme were its capability of producing plutonium and the current amount it possessed. Thus, the US believed that if the disablement process continued and restrained the plutonium-based North Korean nuclear programme, other subordinate threats such as the UEP and proliferation issues would be eventually resolved.

It was an evidence of US coercive diplomacy that focuses ‘clarity of objective’ to induce the behavioural change of North Korea. The US attempt was to access the exact threat level of North Korean nuclear programme and dismantle the target according to the priority. However, it was also another testament that revealed the previous coercive diplomacy of Bush administration was built on the weak foundation. The 2nd North Korean nuclear crisis was initiated by the US allegation on North Korean HEU programme. Therefore, if the US agreed to change ‘the format’ of the ‘complete and correct declaration’ as to verify the North Korean plutonium programme, it contradicts all the US coercive diplomacy which built its reason accusing the North Korean HEU programme.

On May 9, 2008, North Korea submitted 18,000 pages of documents to the US about the nuclear activities from 1990 to 2008.635 North Korea stated 26 kg of plutonium had been

extracted for nuclear weapons and another 7-8 kg of un-extracted plutonium had been stored. However, there were discrepancies with the US’s estimated data of 40-50 kg of plutonium. Since the North Korean UEP and proliferation activities were excluded in the North Korean declaration, the participants of six-party talks, especially the US, South Korea and Japan, wanted a strict verification protocol on plutonium programme of North Korea.

As the US shifted to more efficient and authentic coercive diplomacy, it made the some progress that induced North Korea to the nuclear disablement process. However, as the North Korea increased its nuclear capability to a bomb level, the North Korean counter coercive diplomacy of North Korea became another level for the US to deal with.

On August 14, 2008, when the US delayed de-listing North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism due to the disagreement in the verification protocol, North Korea decided to counter coerce the US by ceasing the nuclear disablement process. North Korea unsealed the nuclear reprocessing facility and denied the access of IAEA inspectors to the site. Moreover, North Korea announced it would reinitiate plutonium reprocessing before the end of September. The Bush administration, which was at the end of its term, had no other choice but to negotiate.

On October 1, 2008, two states gathered in Pyongyang to negotiate the measures to confirm the verification protocol. After three days of the bilateral meeting, the US announced that scientific procedures including sampling and forensic inspection were agreed on to verify the North Korean nuclear disablement process. However, North Korea claimed they had never agreed to the sampling in the verification protocol. 636

On October 11, 2008, the US announced that North Korea was no longer in the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Before the announcement, Japan and South Korea requested the US to be more prudent in delisting North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism since there was no written document of verification protocol. Unfortunately, their worst fears were confirmed when North Korea made a statement that “the verification process should be limited to the site visit, reported documents verification and interview with the

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/asia/09diplo.html?_r=0

North Korean nuclear technician”.

Although the Bush administration that had been enforcing the aberrant version of coercive diplomacy made the substantial change after the 1st nuclear test, it was late and incapable to derive behavioural change of North Korea with its limited inducements that the US had created in a short period time. Although the multilateral support on the US had enlarged to freeze the North Korean nuclear programme, it did not have enough time to build momentum and justification of multilateral coercion through negotiation.

The denial of sampling could be considered as a proof that North Korea wished to maintain ambiguity on their nuclear capability. The sampling of spent fuel rod, nuclear waste from the reprocessing facility, and the environmental radioactive sample from the nuclear reactor, could be analysed to find the amount of plutonium production, the number of reprocessing activities, the period of nuclear reactor operation, the term of reprocessing and the quality of the extracted plutonium. Moreover, the state of art sampling technology could detect nano or pico levels of nuclear material, which could find the covert nuclear facilities and the North Korean UEP. North Korea argued the sampling inspection would only be confirmed after the second phase of 10.3 agreements is fully implemented.  

In the 10.3 Agreement, North Korea agreed to a complete and correct declaration of its entire nuclear programme. However, the North Korean declaration which was submitted to the six-party talks, only included the amount of North Korean plutonium. The number of nuclear warheads, the nuclear explosive devices, manufactures facilities of nuclear weapons and UEP were not in the declaration. Therefore, the US and other participants of the six-party talks requested a strict verification protocol with a sampling method which would cover the loopholes. On December 8-11, 2008, the 6 party chief delegation meeting was held at Beijing. However, it failed to make a consensus on the verification protocol since North Korea denied the sampling method. The six-party talks once again came to an end without the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme.

When the sixth round of the six-party talks came to an end, North Korea decided to strengthen its counter coercive diplomacy. In order to strengthen the ‘asymmetry of motivation’, on January 17, 2009, North Korea intensified the tension in Korean peninsula by nullifying all the peace agreements that had been set in place to ease diplomatic and military confrontation.\textsuperscript{638} The nullification of the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea was not an empty threat, later resulting in the sinking of the Cheonan Vessel and bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. However, as shown during the tentative 2.13 Agreement and the subsequent 10.3 Agreement, the US did not possess the coercive inducement that could be used as an effective tool to increase North Korea’s apprehension. Thus, after the 2.13 Agreement was signed, the Bush administration had to execute the coercive diplomacy of ‘Try and See’ by delaying and cutting the compensative inducement. As the <Figure 5-15> indicates, without any efficient means of coercion, the coercive diplomacy of Bush administration leads to the collapse of 10.3 agreement.

\textsuperscript{638} Korean Central News Agency, Jan 17, 2009.
The coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration, which had been initiated due to the suspicion on the North Korean HEU programme in 2002, had failed to achieve the CVID of the North Korean nuclear programme.

As witnessed in the first and second North Korea nuclear crisis, the ‘strength of motivation’ and the ‘sense of urgency’ of the North Korean counter coercive diplomacy were also equivalent to balance the US coercive diplomacy. Moreover, through China and Russia, who were ‘soft balancing’ against the US within the region, North Korea adequately neutralized the US coercion and successfully increased its nuclear deterrence and capabilities.

Besides the well-schemed North Korean counter coercive diplomacy, there were shortages on the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration, which degraded the success of the North Korean nuclear dismantlement. The coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration was based on suspicions of the North Korean HEU programme. By criticizing the North Korean HEU programme, the US urged North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programme within the multilateral frame of the six-party talks as the precondition for any further negotiation.
As the Bush administration was adamant that persuasive and compensative inducements such as diplomatic normalization, energy aids, lift of sanction and etc. would be the result of the North Korean nuclear dismantlement, the US could not execute the coercive diplomacy to induce North Korea to dismantle or decrease the nuclear programme. Without any other mean but force to create the ‘asymmetry of motivation’, the US could not derive the nuclear dismantlement which is vital interest of North Korea for regime survival and the efficient bargaining chip. That is, the Bush administration had planned to utilize ‘pure coercion’ which opposed to negotiations to obtain their objective of type B: dismantling North Korea’s nuclear programme. However, according to Alexander George and his theory of the ‘defensive use’ of coercive diplomacy, the ‘offensive use’ of Bush’s coercive diplomacy based on the suspicion of North Korean HEU programme could not achieve an ‘Adequate Domestic and International Support’ and ‘Strong leadership,’ which are the key elements to achieve the compliance of the coercée.

In his second term, due to the unsuccessful result of its coercive diplomacy, the Bush administration initiated the negotiation with North Korea and ironically, achieved the diplomatic success of the 9.19 Agreement. However, after the 9.19 Agreement, the Bush administration once again pursued pure coercion to pressure North Korea to accept the US’ demands. The Bush administration failed to understand the process of ‘forceful persuasion’ and executed the more aggressive coercive diplomacy with absence of negotiation. As it created a more favourable environment for the North Korean counter coercive diplomacy, the North Korea successfully tested its 1st nuclear test and achieve the nuclear warheads.

5.5 An Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Obama Administration and the Counter Coercive Diplomacy of North Korea

5.5.1 Background

During the presidential campaign, Obama set forth that ‘direct diplomacy’ and ‘direct dialogue’ would be applied to North Korea to solve the nuclear proliferation. On July
23, 2007, at the CNN first Democratic primary debate, Obama disclosed his will to meet with the leaders of the ‘rogue’ states such as North Korea, Iran, Cuba and Venezuela, without preconditions. On May 17, 2008, at the press meeting in South Dakota, presidential candidate Obama criticized that cutting the dialogue only made North Korea turn towards nuclear armament. However, he evaluated the six-party talks of the Bush administration as ‘not perfect but made some valuable progress such as the 9.19 and 2.13 Joint Statement’. Obama displayed his will to solve the problem with its adversaries through dialogue and diplomacy rather than only implementing the policy of containment and coercion.

After his inauguration on January 2009, the Obama administration insisted the necessity of international support to solve the North Korean nuclear programme and announced a direct and aggressive diplomacy would be executed to deal with the matter. However, although dialogue and diplomacy were emphasized, the frame of the US coercive diplomacy, which is based on its military superiority and economic sanction, was sustained. The foreign policy of the Obama administration sought to keep a balance between the ‘hard power’ based on Bush’s policy and the ‘liberal internationalism’ of democrats, which emphasises more on ‘soft power’.

The ‘balanced strategy’ of the Obama administration was well described in the US national defence policy. Roberts M. Gates, the secretary of National Defence, claimed ‘balanced strategy’ would do three things. First, it would try to prevail in current conflicts and prepare for other contingencies. Second, it would institutionalize capabilities such as counterinsurgencies and foreign military assistance and maintain the United States’ existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces, and lastly, retain those cultural traits that have made the US Armed Forces successful while shedding things that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done.639 As it was seen in the national defence policy, the changed policy of the US did not mean it would abandon its basic frame of the coercive diplomacy.

Like as his predecessors, the Obama administration also aimed the CVID of the North Korean nuclear programme. Thus, when North Korea executed a series of provocations

and its counter coercive diplomacy, the US decided to put off its ‘ready for dialogue’ engagement strategy with North Korea. Based on its military superiority and the escalation dominance, the Obama administration decided to utilize economic and diplomatic sanction to coerce North Korea until it changed its stance.

Facing the series of North Korean provocations which coincided with the inauguration, the ‘dialogue and diplomacy’ of the Obama administration on North Korea was amended to ‘benign neglect,’ or ‘strategic patience’. The ‘strategic patience’ was aimed not to compensate North Korea for its bad behaviour. Moreover, it was set to achieve initiatives in future negotiations with North Korea, which included the six-party talks for CVID on the North Korean nuclear programme.

The ‘strategic patience’ of the Obama administration was the US coercive diplomacy to coerce North Korea to change its position through the ‘Try and See’ with economic sanction. It was based on US military strength, which guarantees ‘escalation dominance’ at any North Korean provocation.

5.5.2 Well Schemed North Korean Counter Coercive Diplomacy and the 2nd Nuclear Test

When the sixth round of the six-party talks broke down on December 11, 2008, North Korea decided to implement its counter coercive diplomacy to achieve its nuclear advancement by taking advantage of temporal power vacuum in the US government transition period. Moreover, North Korea aimed to display its ‘strength of motivation’ and the ‘sense of urgency’ to newly inaugurated Obama administration to enhance its counter coercive diplomacy for the future contention.

On January 17, 2009, North Korea nullified all the peace agreements that had been made with South Korea to ease diplomatic and military tension. On February 24, 2009, North Korea announced the launch of Kwangmyeonsung-2, the space launch vehicle which could be used as the ICBM. The newly inaugurated Obama administration immediately responded with the ‘key resolve’ annual joint military exercise on February
27, 2009. The North Korea, who had been waiting for the most effective time to cause a
provocation, launched the Kwangmyeonsung-2 on April 5, 2009, the same day Obama
announced the nuclear free world doctrine at Prague. The launch of ICBM capable space
rocket that could deliver the nuclear warhead was a direct challenge on Obama’s nuclear
free world statement.

On April 14, 2009, the Obama administration responded by circulating its own
resolution at the UNSC to punish the launch of North Korean ICBM capable rocket.
However, as China and Russia exercised its veto power, only the presidential statement
urging article 8 of the Resolution 1718 was adopted. As witnessing the weak
consolidation of international support on US coercive diplomacy, North Korea
immediately announced the pulling out of the six-party talks and nullifying all the
agreements which had been made through the multilateral negotiation. On April 25,
2009, North Korea declared the reprocessing process of the spent fuel rod at the
Yongbyon Nuclear facility. On April 29, 2009, North Korea continued its provocation by
announcing its ICBM test, nuclear test and the production of fuel in the light water
reactor, which indicates uranium enrichment.640 On May 25, 2009, North Korea
executed the second nuclear test at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, Kilju County.

Since the series of North Korean provocations and the 2nd nuclear test were executed
smoothly within 4 months of time, it was considered as well-schemed counter coercive
diplomacy of North Korea.641 The Obama administration that had just initiated its term
could not do much to stop the ‘blitzkrieg’ style of North Korean counter coercion with
failed diplomatic legacy of Bush on North Korean nuclear programme.

Although the framework of US coercive diplomacy on North Korea was maintained through
legislative regulation, executive orders and the presence of US military forces, the Obama
administration did not have any proper inducement to coerce the North Korea to stop the
provocation since Bush administration had failed to build efficient means or strategic
environment for the US coercive diplomacy as examined.

640 Rodong Shinmun, Worker’s Newspaper, Pyongyang, Apr 20, 2009.
641 Seong-chang Cheong, “The Background of the 2nd nuclear test and challenge of North Korea strategy”,
bukhanwei 2cha hack sillum baegeoungkwa daebuk jeonrayk kwaje, Current Issue and Policies, No. 158,
Therefore, when North Korea executed its series of counter coercive diplomacy in the beginning of the Obama administration, the US only could execute the ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy with nonviolent inducement and sustain its ‘escalation dominance’ against the North Korean threats. The <Figure 5-16> explains the contention between Obama administration and North Korea which was lead to the 2nd nuclear test of North Korea.

<Figure 5-16> The Contention that Leads to the Second Nuclear Test

5.5.3 The Strategic Patience and the Continued Crisis

With the clear NPT violation of North Korea, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the UN Resolution 1874 on June 12, 2009. As Condoleezza Rice stated “a very robust, tough regime with teeth that will bite in North Korea”, the UNSC Resolution 1874 was much more severe to that of Resolution 1718 which was adopted after the first North Korean 1st nuclear test in 2006. It included the rights to sequestrate and dispose the North Korean freight related to WMD. Moreover, Resolution 1874 expanded its rights to prevent the provision of all arms and related materials, as well as to financial
transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance. North Korea immediately denounced the UN Resolution 1874 and disclosed its plan to weaponize all the extracted plutonium and the initiation of uranium enrichment.

As North Korean provocation continued, the Obama administration shifted its policy from ‘diplomacy and dialogue’ to ‘strategic patient’ in order to distance themselves from North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy. Since the US regarded the North Korean nuclear programme is a time consuming issue, the Obama administration decided to implement ‘try and see’ of coercive diplomacy to coerce the CVID of the North Korean nuclear programme through PSI and economic sections. Moreover, in order to maximize its coercive diplomacy, persuasive inducements were also provided to North Korea.

On June 11, 2009, Stephen W. Bosworth, the US Special Representative for North Korea Policy, implied the possibility of bilateral talks at the senate hearing if North Korea abided by its international obligation. On July 17, 2009, during the visit to South Korea, Kurt M. Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, disclosed the provision of the comprehensive package deal if North Korea took irreversible and sincere measures to abandon its nuclear programme. On July 20, 2009, Hilary Clinton, the Minister of the State Department, revealed in an interview with the ABC News that the comprehensive package deal would include diplomatic normalization, a permanent peace treaty, and financial and food aid. On July 23, 2009, at the ASEAN Regional security Forum, Hilary Clinton again stated the provision of comprehensive package deal if North Korea could adhere to the 9.19 agreement.

In return, on August 18, 2009, Kim Jong-Il disclosed his will to solve the problem through dialogue and compromise at the bilateral meeting with China. Kim Jong-Il stated that he would resume any type of talks to solve the North Korean nuclear programme. However, in order to maximize its counter coercive diplomacy, -induce the US to the negotiation and increase of its bargaining power- North Korea sent a letter to the chair of the UN Security Council on September 4, 2009, that the plutonium reprocessing was about to be finished and the extracted plutonium would be weaponized.

642 UN Security Council, Resolution 1874, UN Department of Public Information, New York, Jun 12, 2009.
accordingly.

As the real contention process initiated between the North Korea and the US after the 2nd nuclear test, the Obama administration responded with ‘strategic patient’ by strengthening its escalation dominance and sending its envoy to North Korea for a dialogue. On October 30, 2009, Walter L. Sharp, the ROK-US Combined Forces Commander, announced the military agreement of the US and South Korea that include of Operation Plan 5029, which is to eradicate North Korea’s WMD, would be conducted by the US command. While enhancing the war readiness and escalation dominance against North Korea, the US sent Stephen W. Bosworth as an envoy to Pyongyang for the bilateral talks. 643

On December 10, 2009, Stephen W. Bosworth wrote a report about his visit to North Korea and identified the necessity of the six-party talks and the importance of implementing the 9.19 Joint Statement. However, as Stephen W. Bosworth evaluated the time for the talks is not ripe after the bilateral meetings with North Korea, 644 the Obama administration decided to continue its ‘strategic patience’ with economic sanction and military deterrence until North Korea displays its integrity on nuclear dismantlement. On January 27, 2010, President Obama announced in the State of the Union Address that North Korea would only face more severe sanctions and isolation unless they displayed a true change in position.

As the US continued with its ‘strategic patient’ and ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy, North Korea utilized its diplomatic channel to induce the US to engage in the negotiation. On February 8, 2010, Kim Jong-Il disclosed his will on the non-proliferation of the Korean peninsula and urged action from the six parties to resolve the problem at the meeting with Wang Jiarui, director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. However, As Philip J. Crowley, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs responded, “North Korea is saying the right things, that the six-party process should resume…but the right words must be

followed by action. Words by themselves are not sufficient" 645, the US was firm to maintain its ‘strategic patience’.

When North Korea realized that the counter coercive diplomacy through their artillery exercises and diplomatic statements were not working, they decided to maximize provocation to escalate tension in the Korean peninsula. On March 26, 2010, North Korea attacked the South Korean PCC-722 Cheonan naval vessel. The battleship went down in an explosion, killing 46 sailors. As it is shown in <Figure 5-17>, again the contention escalated to another crisis and conflict not the resolution.

<Figure 5-17> The Contention which Leads to the Sinking of PCC-722 and Continued Conflict

In the prospect of compellence theory, Obama had more logical stance compare to Bush administration that neglected the importance of negotiation and bargaining process in coercive diplomacy. Even in the series of North Korean provocation, Obama handle the issue calmly by securing escalation dominance in Korean peninsula with ‘try and see’ coercive diplomacy. However, as the policy stance of ‘strategic patient’ with ‘try and see’ coercive diplomacy continued, it had weaken ‘sense of urgency’ of the US coercive diplomacy on North Korean nuclear programme and conversely, strengthen ‘asymmetry

of motivation’ for North Korean counter coercion which created the room for advent of its nuclear capability.

Admittedly, due to the failed coercive diplomacy of Bush administration, Obama inherited no efficient inducement to coerce the North Korea in the early period of its presidency. Moreover, as global economic crisis and the post management of war in Iraq being on the top US policy priority, the coercive diplomacy of Obama administration on North Korea had its limit. However, despite these unavoidable limitations, in the perspective of coercive diplomacy and compellence theory, the continued strategic patience and ‘try and see’ coercive diplomacy of Obama was no different from that of Bush’s ‘pure coercion’ in latter period of its term with no efficient inducements.

5.5.4 The ‘Gradual Turning the Screw’, Death of Kim Jung-II and the 2.29 Agreement

By witnessing the bold provocation of North Korea, the Obama slowly shift its ‘try and see’ coercive diplomacy to a ‘gradual turning the screw’. The Obama administration confronted the North Korean elevated provocation by executing the proper escalation of the coercive inducement. On April 6, 2010, the US announced the Nuclear Posture Review, which excluded North Korea from ‘negative security assurance’. The US pressured North Korea by not adopting the ‘No First Use’ of the US nuclear arms on North Korea. On June 26, 2010, the scheduled transfer of the South Korean wartime operational control in 2012 was postponed to 2015. It meant automatic engagement of US force would continue until 2015 if a war breaks out in Korean peninsula.

On July 20, 2010, joint statements were made by the US and South Korea that the US would provide sufficient military deterrence to South Korea including the nuclear umbrella, missile defence, and sustaining the USFK level to its maximum. Moreover, on July 25, 2010, US executed the largest scale of the tri-service joint military exercise ‘invincible spirit’ against North Korea to display substantial US military presence in Korean peninsula. It was a massive military exercise that even sparked strong opposition.

from China. The nuclear aircraft carrier USS George Washington, Aegis destroyers USS McCampbell, USS John McCain, nuclear submarine USS Buffalo, USS Houston and 200 aircrafts including a F-22 were deployed to South Korea for the joint military exercise. On August 5, 2010, the US–South Korea joint maritime military exercise was executed in the West Sea to confront the North Korean NLL provocation. On August 16, 2010, the US–South Korea joint military exercise ‘Ulgi Freedom Guardian’ was executed to exercise the smooth transition of wartime operation control to display the war readiness of US forces. Along with the enhanced escalation dominance, on August 30, 2010, Obama issued executive order 13551 to strengthen its economic sanction against North Korea.

Although it seemed belated, the Obama administration precisely increased its coercion according to the level of North Korean provocation. The US plan was to secure its strategic ‘patience’ and coerce the North Korea to six-party talks for the dismantlement. As the Obama administration seemed adamant and capable of keep its ‘strategic patience’ strategy, North Korea decided to counter coerce the US by revealing its advanced nuclear capabilities to induce the behavioural change of the US.

On November 9, 2010, North Korea invited Professor John Lewis and Professor Siegfried S. Hecker to disclose the North Korean uranium enrichment facility in Yongbyon. After the four day visit, Siegfried S. Hecker was astonished at the state-of-the-art-facilities of North Korea. He evaluated that North Korea had an 8,000 kg-SWU/yr capacity that could produce up to two tonnes of LEU or, if the cascades were reconfigured, up to 40 kg of nuclear weapon grade HEU. As North Korea convinced that the US was shocked by its uranium Enrichment capability, it also displayed its military deterrence for the possible military strike from the US. On November 23, 2010, North Korea carried out artillery fire on Yeonpyeong Island to display its ‘asymmetry of motivation’; in other words, the willingness to wage war if the Yongbyon nuclear

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facilities were under attack.

The disclosed North Korean uranium capability was not something that negligible with ‘strategic patience’. If the North Korea succeeded to acquire the HEU programme, it directly damages the US non-proliferation policy of ‘nuclear free world’. Thus, on January 19, 2011, the US set out the necessity of North Korean commitment to the 9.19 joint statement and urged the early resuming of the six-party talks at the summit meeting with China. 650

Although the Obama administration declared the resuming of the six party talks by breaking its strategic patience, it did not mean the abandonment of the US coercive diplomacy. On February 28, 2011, The US-South Korea joint military exercise ‘Key Resolve’ was executed with the participation of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington to secure the escalation dominance of US on North Korea. And On April 18, 2011, the Obama enacted the Executive Order 13570, which prohibited the importing of all North Korean products. However, since the behavioural change of the US was induced by the revelation of advent nuclear technology of North Korea, it could be considered the success of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy.

From its inauguration, the Obama administration had the limit in implementing the non-proliferation policy on North Korea. As Mike Chinoy once described as the total ‘meltdown’, the 8 years of aberrant coercive diplomacy of the Bush administrations had seriously damaged the efficient coercive inducements and the momentum of six party talks. Moreover, the series of well schemed North Korean counter coercion that occurred in the first 4 months of the presidency had entrapped the Obama administration from implementing the nuclear negotiation with North Korea. Despite these unavoidable shortages, the Obama’s nonproliferation policy on North Korea had unfairly criticized as ‘mere damage control’ or ‘the result of the inept grand strategy’. 651 However, even the inevitable disadvantages to be accounted for the accurate assessment of Obama’s policy, Obama administration made a clear mistake in the perspective of compellence and

coercive diplomacy theory in dealing with nuclear programme of North Korea.

Admittedly, the coercive diplomacy has the variant which intentionally maintain the status of quo with its coercee so called ‘Try and See’ approach. Thus, in the situation that lacked efficient coercive inducements and the absence of momentum in six-party talks, Obama administration implemented the ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy between the period of the 2nd North Korean nuclear test and the revelation of North Korean UEP facility.

However, nevertheless the US successfully secured its escalation dominance on North Korea to maintain the framework of coercive diplomacy, the Obama administration had failed to implement ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy as the real policy. Indeed, Obama administration verbally guaranteed package deal that include diplomatic normalization, a permanent peace treaty, and financial and food aid to North Korea. However, since Obama administration maintained the ‘no enrichment’ programme on North Korea that clearly surpasses the NPT regulation as the perquisite for the negotiation, any further negotiation and bargaining process of coercive diplomacy could not take place like as Bush administration.

As the result, Obama administration failed to curb the nuclear development of North Korea. Thus, the time was on North Korean side. During the impasse of the six party talks, the North Korea successfully increased its Uranium enrichment capability that enhanced its tool for the counter coercion. As the counter demands of North Korea become tougher with growing bargaining power, it became more difficult for the US to dismantle North Korean nuclear programme.

As agreed in US-China summit meeting, the process of resuming the six-party talks was set as ‘constructive inter-Korean dialogue’ → ‘the six-party talks’. However, the inter-Korean dialogue could not reach an agreement since the two had core differences on the sinking of the Cheonan naval vessel and the Schelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Thus, on February 8, 2011, the US offered the new process of ‘Bilateral talks of inter–Korean Chief delegate to the six-party talks’ → ‘the US-North Korea bilateral talks’ →

652 Ibid.
‘the six-party talks’ for the early resumption of the six-party talks. It indicates how shocked the US was by the North Korean nuclear advancement. As true effects of coercive strategy lie in the altered policy preferences or decision making calculi of the actors involved, the changed stance of Obama administration could be considered as success of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy.

On July 28, 2011, bilateral talks between the US and North Korea were held in New York. The US demanded the cease of nuclear testing and uranium enrichment, the return of the IAEA inspectors and the cease of military provocation as the precondition for the resumption of the six-party talks. North Korea confronted the US’ request by urging provision of food aid, lifting the imposed sanction, the initiation of a peace treaty and diplomatic normalization as the precondition. Moreover, the North Korea announced the launch of three stage space rocket to counter coerce the US. On October 24, 2011, the second round of the U.S-North Korea bilateral talks failed to reach an agreement.

The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il on December 17, 2011 cut off all diplomatic dialogue until the third round of the US-North Korea bilateral talks began on February 23, 2012 in Beijing. Through the third round of bilateral talks, on February 29, 2012, North Korea agreed the temporal freeze of its UEP, missile test and nuclear test for 240,000 tons of food aid.653 However, the 2.29 Agreement was rather derived by the necessity of domestic politics of North Korea that needed to consolidate its political power for newly succeeded leader Kim Jong-Eun and the intentions of both US and North Korea who wanted to sustain the momentum of the negotiation.654 Thus, the substantial consensus on the issue and exact term were not clarified in the agreement. For instance North Korea agreed not to conduct long range missile test but did not specify the space launch vehicle was included in that category. The failed clarity of precise terms leads to the failure of the 2.29 agreement. It was soon proved by the well planned launch of Kwangmyeonsong-3 which took place six weeks after the agreement.

As it briefly explained in <Figure 5-18> and how it progressed in <Figure 5-19>, both

the US and North Korea had implemented their coercive and counter coercive diplomacy. However, as the Obama administrations took the coercive diplomacy of his predecessor, no enrichment and nuclear dismantlement as perquisite for further negotiation, the US could not deter, decrease or dismantle the nuclear programme of North Korea. Thus, as being pressured by the losing the golden time for nuclear dismantlement, the US signed the rather sloppy 2.29 agreement with North Korea who came to negotiation table by the unexpected death of Kim Jong-II and abrupt leadership change.

<Figure 5-18> The Contention of US & North Korea and the 2.29 Agreement

<Figure 5-19> The Chronicles of Contention between the US and North Korea in the
**1st Term of Obama Administration**

**U.S.**

- Circulated the UNSC resolution and derived presidential statement which urged the article II of resolution 1718
- Adoption of UNSC resolution 1874 (12 June 2009)
- Coerced the CVID of North Korean nuclear program through PSI and economic sanction based on UNSC resolution 1874
- Revealed the comprehensive package deal as compensative inducement (20 July 2009)
- Announced the agreement of Operation Plan 5029 which includes eradication of North Korea WMD (30 Oct 2009)
- Announced the comprehensive package deal if North Korea observes the agreement of nuclear dismantlement (19 Nov 2009)
- The Obama administration decided to continue the economic sanction with military deterrence and escalation dominance after the bilateral talks with North Korea (8 Dec 2009)
- Announced the Nuclear Posture Review which excludes North Korea from 'negative security assurance' (6 Apr 2010)
- Postponed the scheduled transfer of South Korean wartime operational control (26 Jun 2010)
- Executed the largest scale of tri-service joint military exercise 'Invincible Spirit' (25 Jul 2010)
- Executed U.S.-South Korea joint maritime military exercise in the West Sea (5 Aug 2010)
- Executed joint military exercise 'Ulgi Freedom Guardian' (16 Aug 2010)
- Urged the North Korean commitment of 9.19 Joint Statement and the resumption of 6 party talks (19 Jan 2011)
- Executed joint military exercise 'Key Resolve' (28 Feb 2011)
- Announced the Executive Order 13570 which prohibited all the import of North Korean products (18 Apr 2011)
- Blacklisted the Dangabang bank of North Korea (19 Apr 2011)

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**North Korea**

- Nullified all the peace agreement which has been made with South Korea to ease the tension and Requested the normalization with the U.S. for the nuclear dismantlement (17 Jan 2009)
- Launched the Kwangmyeongsong-2 which could be used as a ICBM (5 Apr 2009)
- Declared the reprocessing process of spent fuel rod (25 Apr 2009)
- Announced Space Rocket test, nuclear test and the production of fuel in light water reactor (29 Apr 2009)
- Executed the 2nd nuclear test (26 May 2009)
- Kim Jung-il revealed its will to solve the problem through dialogue (18 Aug 2009)
- Sent a letter to the chair of UN Security Council plutonium reprocess is about to be finished and the extracted plutonium would be weaponized (4 Sep 2009)
- Requested the peace treaty with the U.S. (14 Oct 2009)
- Urged the peace treaty for nuclear dismantlement (31 January 2010)
- Fired artillery barrage on NLL sea (27–28 Jan 2010)
- Kim Jung-il disclosed his will of non-proliferation of Korean peninsula and urged the sincere action (8 Feb 2010)
- Attacked the South Korean PCC-722, Cheonan naval vessel (26 Mar 2010)
- Disclose the North Korean uranium enrichment facility in Yongbyon (9 November 2010)
- The artillery fire on Yeonpyeong Island (23 Nov 2010)
- Urging provision of food aid, lifting the imposed sanction, the initiation of a peace treaty as the perquisite for the negotiation. (28 July 2011)

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**Strategic environment**

- Death of Kim Jung-il

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**2.29 Agreement**

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**5.5.5 The Increase of North Korean Nuclear Deterrence, Kwangmyeongsong-3**
On March 7, 2012, the US-North Korea food aid talks were held in Beijing. On March 12, 2012, Ri Yong Ho, the North Korean vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced the return of IAEA inspectors to North Korea in the near future. The expectation on the resumption of the six-party talks grew as the follow-up action of the 2.29 Agreement continued. However, the mood of rapprochement collapsed when North Korea announced the launch of Kwangmyeonsong-3 satellite on March 16, 2012. It was obvious that North Korea wanted to increase its capability of counter coercive diplomacy through ICBM technology. North Korea claimed it as their right to launch satellites for peaceful use whereas the US considered the North Korean satellite launch as a violation of not only the UN obligation but of the 2.29 agreement. On April 13, 2012. Despite the opposition of the US, North Korea launched the Kwangmyeonsong-3 Rocket at the Tongchang-dong Missile and Space Launch Facility. The launch was a failure as the rocket exploded 90 seconds between the separation of the first and second stage.  

Although the North Korean attempt to improve its military deterrence had failed, the Obama administration swiftly took steps to coerce North Korea. On April 16, 2012, the UN Security Council adopted the presidential statement which ‘strongly condemned’ the launch of the North Korean ‘space launch vehicle’. On April 17, 2012, Mark Toner, the deputy spokesperson of the State Department, announced the suspension of the 2.29 Agreement, which guaranteed 240,000 tons of food aid to North Korea. On April 26-27, 2012, the first Korea-US Integrated Defence Dialogue (KIDD) was held in Washington D.C. in order to counter react against North Korean provocation. During the dialogue, the US and South Korea agreed on a collaborative research project to develop the counter strategy scenario against North Korean nuclear weapons and WMD. On May 2, 2012, three North Korean entities, Amroggang Development Banking Corporation, Green Pine Associated Corporation and Korea Heungjin Trading Company were added

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on the North Korean economic sanction list under UN resolution 1718. 658

Apart from the UN economic sanction, the US sustained its independent sanction to coerce North Korea. On June 18, 2012, President Obama sent a notice to the congress for the continuation of the national emergency with respect to North Korea under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of the Bush administration. It meant a one year extension of all the imposed US economic sanctions on North Korea. 659 Moreover, on August 20, 2012, the Obama administration executed the annual US-South Korea joint military exercise in Korean, ‘Ulchi-Freedom Guardian’ as planned.

However, the continuous contention without the diologue and negotiation only begot the rise of the tension. On October 7, 2012, when the US strengthened its North Korean deterrence through the agreement of extending the range of South Korean ballistic missiles to 800 km, North Korea legitimized its development of the missile capability and announced the re-launch of Kwangmyeonsong-3 on December 1, 2012. The US immediately warned there would be a more severe sanction on North Korea. However, as it is explained in <Figure 5-20> and <Figure 5-21>, on December 12, 2012, North Korea successfully launched the three-stage rocket, Kwangmyeonsong-3, which could be utilized as ICBM. It was the curtain call for the first term of Obama’s coercive diplomacy on non-proliferation of North Korea.

<Figure 5-20> The Failure of US Coercion and the Launch of Kwangmyeonsong-3

- Dismantlement of North Korean nuclear program through phased process as agreed in 9.19 Joint Statement
- Type of Coercive Diplomacy: Type B. Dismantlement of Nuclear program
- Variant of Coercive Diplomacy: Gradual Turning the Screw

<Figure 5-21> The Chronicles of US - North Korea Contention and the Launch of Kwangmyeonsong-3

Announced the suspension of 2.29 agreement which guaranteed the 240,000 tons of food aid (17 Apr 2012)
Blacklisted three North Korean entities, Amrogang Development Banking Corporation, Green Pine Associated Corporation and Korea Haeunjin Trading Company under the UN resolution 1718 (2 May 2012)
Extended the unilateral U.S. economic sanction on North Korea which was imposed by Bush administration (18 Jun 2012)
Extended the range of South Korean ballistic missile to 800Km (7 Oct 2011)

Launched the Kwangmyeonsung-3 which could be used as a ICBM (13 Apr 2012)

The Second Launch of Kwangmyeonsung-3
5.6 Conclusion

The non-proliferation strategy towards North Korea of all three US administrations after the Cold War was coercive diplomacy. However, even after long years of implementing its compellence strategy, the US failed to either contain or dismantle North Korea’s nuclear programme. Conversely, North Korea succeeded in enhancing its nuclear capability through its counter-nuclear strategy against US compellence.

In order to achieve the policy objective of US coercive diplomacy of nuclear dismantlement by North Korea, the US administrations had to flexibly set appropriate types of coercion inducements according to the context and the strategic environment in particular circumstances. This is because coercion never works in a one-way direction. For coercive diplomacy to be successful, it needed to be understood that even though the asymmetry of power between the US and North Korea was overwhelming, North Korea also had critical tools with which to degrade the US coercion: consolidation of international support from its traditional allies, strengthening the justification for its nuclear programme and enhancing its deterrence by developing nuclear and missile capabilities that could strike the US allies within the region – South Korea and Japan.

Without understanding the mutuality of coercion and the contention between coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy, the coercer cannot evaluate the ‘strength of motivation’ of counter-coercive diplomacy and its counter-inducement to set appropriate means and types of coercion. If a suitable inducement cannot be formed, no coercive diplomacy can achieve compliance by the coercee. Unfortunately, as seen in this chapter, the three US administrations from Clinton to Obama’s first term not only failed to form effective coercive diplomacy but also provided ammunition with which North Korean counter-coercive diplomacy could achieve the enhancement of its nuclear capability.

All three US administrations set their coercive diplomacy towards North Korea’s nuclear programme as type B: persuading North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programme. Thus, the US utilized various inducements to compel North Korea to carry out a CVID of its nuclear programme. Naturally, the objective of North Korean counter-coercive
diplomacy was to maintain its nuclear programme and even increase its capability by countering the US coercion. Moreover, North Korea also planned to maximize the compensation for a freeze of or decrease in its nuclear capability if its counter-coercive diplomacy was put into a defensive corner. Through the contention between the coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy of the US and North Korea, the result of the US non-proliferation policy towards North Korean nuclear dismantlement was decided.

The objective of all the US administrations regarding the North Korean nuclear programme after the Cold War was a complete and irreversible dismantlement. However, since this limited the state’s sovereign right to peaceful use of atomic energy, the US policy aim of CVID degraded its justification for coercion of North Korea from the start. The damage to the US’s justification for its coercive diplomacy was counter-plotted by North Korea and resulted in increasing the enforcement cost of the coercion.

As the first government to be inaugurated after the US became the unipolar hegemonic power, the Clinton administration wanted to utilize its unchallengeable power to engage with North Korea to terminate its nuclear proliferation. The Clinton administration decided to break away from the conventional containment policy of ‘engagement and enlargement’ to resolve the North Korean nuclear threat. Thus, the US extended its diplomatic and military strength to force CVID by North Korea. By utilizing international institutions – the UN and IAEA inspections – Clinton pressured North Korea to come clean on its nuclear armament. The US also employed economic sanctions and the possibility of providing economic aid while securing escalation dominance against any provocation by North Korea to induce it to dismantle its nuclear programme.

When the first North Korean nuclear crisis began, the Clinton administration employed archetypal coercive diplomacy. It secured absolute military dominance over North Korea even close to the breaking point of a war. The US conducted a joint military exercise in the Korean peninsula and reinforced its aircraft carriers and the forces deployed in Korea to build a credible threat of military intervention. Moreover, it also utilized economic sanctions and the possibilities of an economic package deal and the provision of a light water reactor to induce behavioural change by North Korea if it complied with US demands.
The Clinton administration also displayed flexibility in implementing coercive diplomacy, which was never the case in the Bush and the first Obama administrations. By sending Jimmy Carter as a special envoy and a last resort before war, the Clinton administration efficiently pushed North Korea towards compliance. Moreover, by accurately evaluating the North Korean nuclear capability, the Clinton administration shifted its type B coercive diplomacy to Type A: persuading the opponent to stop short of its goal and succeeding in achieving the Geneva agreement framework to freeze the North Korean nuclear programme. This was a diplomatic success for Clinton’s coercive diplomacy, which accurately analysed the North Korean threat and the strategic environment to flexibly set its inducements and type of coercion to reduce North Korea’s nuclear capability.\(^{660}\) The Clinton administration at least kept the Yongbyon nuclear facility frozen during its term. Moreover, by establishing the multilateral cooperation of KEDO under the agreed Geneva framework, the Clinton administration laid the groundwork for a multilateral platform on the North Korean nuclear programme.

However, as shown in this chapter, the Geneva framework was agreed without ‘precise terms of settlement of the crisis.’ As a result, the agreement collapsed and failed to dismantle the North Korean nuclear programme. Moreover, as it maintained type B coercive diplomacy aiming at the CVID of the North Korean nuclear programme, which surpassed its right established by the NPT to the peaceful use of atomic energy, the Clinton administration failed to coerce North Korea to ratify the 93+2 additional protocol and prevent North Korea from furthering its nuclear advancement.

The Bush administration, which became more aggressive after the 9/11 crisis, evaluated the agreed Geneva framework as payment of a ransom to support North Korean ill intentions. Thus, after gaining confidence from its victories in Afghanistan and the Iraq war, the Bush administration adopted the unprecedented stance of aiming to swiftly dismantle North Korea’s nuclear programme. Clinton’s Geneva agreement framework provided for a dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme in a 10-year process. However, the Bush administration set North Korean nuclear dismantlement as the precondition for any further negotiation to conclude the North Korean nuclear

programme. This step was a big mistake and it damaged the US coercive diplomacy, which had already been degraded by demanding an excessive nuclear dismantlement by North Korea that went beyond its right to a peaceful use of atomic energy under the NPT. Thus, as seen in this chapter, it added more limitations to the US coercive diplomacy compared to that of the Clinton administration. Despite the ‘strength motivation’ and ‘strong leadership’ of Bush’s coercive diplomacy, the Bush administration could not consolidate proper inducements to coerce North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme in a short period of time as it had planned.

In 2002, at the administration’s first bilateral talks with North Korea, Bush raised suspicion of the North Korean HEU programme by citing a lack of evidence, and he initiated his ‘pure coercion.’ The Bush administration sustained its aggressive form of coercive diplomacy even when North Korea withdrew from the NPT and re-initiated nuclear centrifuging. Coercive diplomacy is forceful diplomatic persuasion that utilizes economic and diplomatic sanctions, military threats and limited military interventions to cause the adversary to expect sufficient costs and risks to cause him to stop what he is doing. However, Bush’s ‘pure coercion’ diplomacy that truncated the ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’ negotiation process did not even conform to the basic principles of coercive diplomacy and only increased the enforcement cost of its coercion. Moreover, as witnessed on the occasion of the freezing of the North Korean account at the BDA after the 9.19 agreement, the Bush administration severely harmed the basic condition for the success of coercive diplomacy that the coercer has to guarantee that a current surrender will not lead to more requests. The absurdity of Bush’s pure coercion, which lacked the basics of coercive diplomacy theory, was that the Bush administration could not implement any efficient coercion of North Korea except limited economic sanctions.

Admittedly, the ‘strong leadership’ of the Bush administration created a ‘sense of urgency’ to establish a multilateral framework of six party talks on the North Korean nuclear programme. This could be seen as a success of Bush’s coercive diplomacy. However, by wrongfully forming the inducements of coercion and making demands on North Korea that surpassed the NPT, the Bush administration not only failed to consolidate multilateral coercion of North Korea but also strengthened its counter-coercive diplomacy through the six party talks.
The ‘pure coercion’ that demanded the CVID of North Korea without negotiation created the space for Russia and China to strengthen the logic of exercising their veto power at the UNSC. Moreover, the degraded legitimacy of US coercive diplomacy also caused a rift among the US’s traditional allies of South Korea and Japan, which criticized the Bush administration. Thus, during his presidency, Bush was unable to prevent North Korean withdrawing from the NPT, two nuclear tests, advances in the North Korean uranium enrichment programme and the development of the Taepo-dong ICBM. This compares to the Clinton administration, which at least froze North Korean nuclear development.

The Obama administration, which had witnessed the total failure of Bush’s ‘pure coercion’ declared it would solve the matter by employing reasonable negotiations, ‘direct dialogue and diplomacy.’ However, it also maintained the demand for the CVID of the North Korean nuclear programme and did not approve the fully fledged nuclear programme which was recognized as the state’s sovereign right under the NPT. Therefore, the degraded US coercive diplomacy stayed the same and caused the failure of hopes to dismantle the North Korean nuclear programme.

Moreover, although Obama declared a willingness for dialogue and direct talks with North Korea, the US clearly argued for the necessity of North Korea displaying integrity in bilateral direct talks by dismantling its uranium enrichment programme. This was no more than a toned-down version of Bush’s precondition for further negotiations. Admittedly, Obama had shown a change of rhetoric on North Korea, but it was not enough to restore the damaged mutual trust between the US and North Korea and bring about substantial change in the North Korean nuclear programme or to consolidate proper multilateral coercion against North Korea. Therefore, the contention between coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy by the US and North Korea continued.

The Obama administration decided to implement a ‘strategic patience’ strategy in its dealings with North Korea. By gradually turning the screw with the escalation of economic sanctions, the Obama administration executed a series of ‘try and see’ coercive diplomacy moves to squeeze North Korea to the negotiation table. However,
this turned out to be a failure that only bought time for North Korea to advance its nuclear capability. As was revealed in 2010 when Siegfried S. Hecker visited the uranium enrichment facility in Yongbyon, North Korea succeeded in acquiring a nuclear enrichment capability beyond US expectations. Again, North Korea had successfully countered the US coercion to enhance its nuclear capability. Moreover, when North Korea successfully launched the Kwangmyeongsong-3, it achieved a missile capability that could strike at least Hawaii, Guam, Alaska and the west coast of the US.

The Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations executed coercive diplomacy to resolve North Korean nuclear proliferation. The shift in the international political environment to a unipolar system also naturally formed favourable conditions for the US to implement its compellence strategy. However, as has been seen in this chapter, all the US administrations implemented inducements and policies which contradicted the theories of compellence and coercive diplomacy despite building these policies within the structural framework of coercive diplomacy. The ironic self-degrading US coercive diplomacy provided ample ammunition for the counter-coercive diplomacy of North Korea and resulted in not only failure to contain the nuclear capability of North Korea but also in strengthening its ability to become a nuclear state. When the first North Korean nuclear crisis began, North Korea had the ability to extract plutonium from a spent fuel rod. However, after the contention process with the coercive diplomacy of Clinton, Bush and Obama’s first term, North Korea was right on the threshold of becoming a *de facto* nuclear state with a uranium enrichment programme and an ICBM capability that could reach US territories.
6. Conclusion

6.1 Origin of the Thesis and Main Objectives

This study has aimed to investigate the US non-proliferation policy against Iran and North Korea, two countries in different regions of the world that are causing concerns about global nuclear proliferation. The nuclear developments in these countries have long histories of making advances under economic sanctions and threats of military intervention from the US. Although the international political environment was favourable for the US compellence strategy after the Cold War, the coercive diplomacy of US administrations did not have tangible success in disarming the two countries of their nuclear programmes. Instead they increased their nuclear capabilities.

It is true that a nuclear deal has recently been reached in the Iranian case. However, one should remember the 10-year process of the 1994 agreed framework with North Korea and how it ended. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will take 15 years to complete the settlement and it seems that the framework of coercive diplomacy will be maintained over that period. Therefore, as this study has found, if the US fails to apply the right inducements as it executes its coercive diplomacy or commits the same mistakes which have been examined in the contention model in this study, a fruitful result cannot be expected to close the JCPoA as agreed.

In order to achieve a ‘nuclear-free world’ as the US declares it aims to do, US decision makers have to understand how the strategy of compellence and the contention process operate in its non-proliferation policy. Since the majority of scholars and decision makers perceived and still perceive the strategy of compellence and coercive diplomacy as the lesser evil among the other alternatives for dealing with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes, learning from past policy failures which were also based on coercive diplomacy will create a new possibility of reaching global non-proliferation.

This research project was planned to find the discrepancies between compellence and coercive diplomacy theory and its actual implementation as the US non-proliferation
policy from the Clinton administration to the first term of Obama and how it failed to achieve the dismantlement of the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. Thus, with the hypothesis that US coercive diplomacy departs from theory and that this is causing the failure of its non-proliferation strategy towards Iran and North Korea, the study has aimed to answer its research questions by applying coercive diplomacy theory and a comprehensive model to the actual implementation of US non-proliferation policy towards Iran and North Korea.

6.2 The Findings and the Contributions of the Thesis

In order to understand the US diplomatic strategy of non-proliferation after the Cold War, in Chapter Two this thesis first examined the international political environment, US foreign and security policy strategy and aims, and the four action plans it implemented in the post-Cold War period. By revealing the correlation between US post-Cold War foreign diplomacy and the pursuit of hegemony as a unipolar power, the chapter examined the US’s use of a compellence strategy and coercive diplomacy at the core of its non-proliferation and security policy. It also explained the validity of applying the framework of coercive diplomacy to examining the nuclear advances and strategies of Iran and North Korea. In addition, the chapter provided the justification for treating these two cases as case studies in this research.

Chapter Three reviewed the literature on compellence and coercion in order to build a comprehensive theoretical framework, theory and model for the research. Although ‘forceful persuasion’ is widely used in international politics, especially when it comes to international security and non-proliferation issues, there is no clear definition of the diplomacy of coercion. Since coercive diplomacy lacks conceptual clarity, many studies have built their own terminology rather than refining the work of others. This is evident from the various terms used more or less interchangeably as synonyms for coercion: compellence, coercive diplomacy, military coercion, coercive military strategy, behaviour change through sanctions paired with containment and deterrence, dual-track engagement, hawk engagement etc. However, building on the basis of previous work, the chapter elaborated a theory of coercive diplomacy and created a model with which to more accurately appraise US non-proliferation policy.
The validity of applying the model to US non-proliferation policy was also examined by analysing the contents of the official policy reports of successive US administrations, together with the validity of employing coercive diplomacy within the broader scope of traditional US diplomatic strategy. By comparing the stance of conventional US diplomatic strategy and its use of coercive diplomacy, the validity of applying the theory and the model developed in this research was examined.

Chapter Four applied the contention model of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy developed in Chapter Three to the US non-proliferation policy towards Iran’s nuclear programme. Using the comprehensive model, the study included all the independent variables and examined the contention between the US and Iran. The model incorporated the US, the EU3, the IAEA, the UN, Russia, Israel and China and examined how the influence of each variable was utilized by both the US and Iran as a means of inducement.

By dividing the many years of contention between the US and Iran into short phases within the theoretical contention model, the chapter examined and clarified the process and results of each phase for both Iran and the US. Thus, the chapter uncovered the fallacies involved in the foreign policies and inducements in the coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy between the US and Iran to derive a better understanding of the possibilities of resolving the situation. By modelling the whole contention process of the US’s coercive diplomacy and the counter-coercive diplomacy of Iran after the Cold War, the chapter examined the comprehensive dynamics of US non-proliferation contention with Iran and explained how its coercive diplomacy led to failure.

Chapter Five used the same methodology and model applied in Chapter Four, but this time applied to US diplomatic coercion regarding the nuclear programme of North Korea. As in Chapter Four, it included all the independent variables related to non-proliferation and North Korea. Thus, the policies of the US, South Korea, China, Russia, the UN and Japan towards North Korean nuclear development were examined within the contention model to see how these variables worked for or against non-proliferation and how they influenced the result in each phase of the contention process.
Since North Korea had already withdrawn from the IAEA, the context and the contention of US coercive diplomacy was more dynamic than in the Iranian case. North Korea’s counter-coercion during the contention process was more adamant and included nuclear tests and the launch of ICBM-capable rockets. However, this strong counter-inducement against the US did not always work favourably for North Korea. Both Chapter Four and Chapter Five found that withdrawal from the IAEA is a double-edged sword. Although North Korea could freely proceed with nuclear development above the NPT limit to provoke the US and maximize the inducements of counter-coercive diplomacy, the absence of IAEA protection entailed a drop in ‘international support’ and the loss of justification for its counter-coercion – important conditions for the success of North Korean counter-coercive diplomacy. Using the comprehensive contention model, Chapter Five examined the reasons for the results of US non-proliferation policy towards North Korea in each phase of contention and how they influenced the latter’s nuclear strategy and led to the failure of non-proliferation.

Overall, this study has clarified that US non-proliferation policy is based on a compellence strategy. Although the US approves of the nuclear development of certain countries such as India and Pakistan according to its national interests, the basic principle of its non-proliferation policy has clearly been revealed to be its compellence strategy. For this reason, this study has focused on the compellence and coercion literature to understand the theory of coercive diplomacy and build a comprehensive coercive diplomacy model to examine US strategy regarding nuclear non-proliferation.

The nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea were selected as the case studies for this research because they resulted in archetypical US non-proliferation coercive diplomacy. The study has examined how US coercive diplomacy was implemented and what caused its failure in disarming Iran and North Korea. Using the comprehensive model of coercive diplomacy, it has analysed the fallacies involved in the contention process. Despite the various differences between the two countries, the contention model has displayed its high applicability to the topic of non-proliferation and the state strategy of compellence.

The study has also revealed the dynamics of contention and how they proceeded to a
certain result in each phase of contention from the Clinton presidency to the first term of Obama. It has proposed a possible policy for more efficient US coercive diplomacy to bring a possible resolution in the future. Since the implementation of forceful persuasion in international politics is likely to continue as the foreign policy of strong states on various agendas, the contention model contributes to helping policy makers understand how to implement their coercive diplomacy when there is a clear asymmetry of power.

6.3 The Implications of the Research for Non-Proliferation in Iran and North Korea

Although the US had transitions of government three times after the Cold War, it sustained its compellence strategy, especially regarding the nuclear non-proliferation of states that could seriously damage the unipolar system of US hegemony. Despite differences in leadership, rhetoric and decision-making groups, all three administrations implemented coercive diplomacy against the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea by labelling them as rogues, ‘axis of evil’ members and ‘outposts of tyranny.’

However, despite the US administrations executing compellence against the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, it failed to understand the concepts of compellence and coercive diplomacy and to execute efficient coercion to achieve behavioural change in either country. Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic negotiation procedure that forcefully persuades the coercee to realize that compliance with the coercer’s demands is more profitable than resistance. However, with the exception of the coercive diplomacy that led to the 1994 Geneva agreed framework, the three US administrations set the CVID of Iran and North Korea as preconditions in their non-proliferation coercive diplomacy and refused to negotiate with them to induce behavioural change. Although coercive diplomacy utilizes limited military intervention as inducements, it is not a strategy of bullying or seeking total surrender of the coercee. Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic strategy to artificially create a win-win agreement for both the coercer and the coercee. The US coercive diplomacy from Clinton to Obama’s first term failed to utilize inducements to negotiate the compliance of Iran and North Korea and thus strayed from the basic logic of coercive diplomacy theory.
The erratic coercive diplomacy that pervaded in the US’s attempts to achieve the CVID of Iran and North Korea was based on confidence in its dominant strength. The administrations from Clinton to Obama’s first term believed the US had the ability to squeeze both Iran and North Korea into nuclear disarmament, or at least contain the advance of their nuclear capabilities by ‘gradually turning the screw’ of coercive diplomacy. However, as this thesis has shown, the US coercive diplomacy neglected the basics of compellence theory and was countered by Iran and North Korea and resulted in them enhancing their nuclear capabilities.

Since the nuclear development of Iran and North Korea ran counter to the national interests of neighbouring states, the US administrations calculated that if it displayed ‘strong leadership’ and ‘strength of motivation’ – despite some difficulties – a ‘consolidation of multilateral coercion’ would be formed to intensify the costs of non-compliance to Iran and North Korea to coerce them towards nuclear dismantlement. However, by not engaging in negotiation to justify the support of other countries such a coalition of multilateral coercion could not be formed.

As Chapter Four and Chapter Five showed, the US had several moments in which there were opportunities to induce Iran and North Korea to ratify the stricter 93+2 Additional Protocol and limit their nuclear enrichment to a few tens of centrifuges at the laboratory level. However, the US refused to negotiate anything other than the CVID of Iran and North Korea or anything surpassing the NPT.

Coercive diplomacy might not be a sufficient condition but it was inevitably needed to reach the dismantlement of the nuclear programmes, or at least to degrade the nuclear capabilities, of Iran and North Korea. As has been shown, in the contention process of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy the ‘motivation of strength’ and the ‘sense of urgency’ of Iran and North Korea were so high that they even considered going to war to keep their nuclear programmes. Of course, the wishful thinking of trusting the countries’ good will could not be the solution and the possibility of both countries abandoning their nuclear programmes or nuclear rights was slim or zero. Containment or appeasement could also not be alternatives as they would only buy time for their nuclear development. When the US took the stance of employing ‘try-and-see’ coercive
diplomacy, Iran and North Korea successfully increased their nuclear capabilities. The only times that the US succeeded in inducing Iran and North Korea to comply with its demands were when it offset their counter-coercive diplomacy by integrating flexible coercion with negotiation.

The tools that North Korea and Iran used in their counter-coercive diplomacy can be put into two categories: 1) military deterrence, including missile capability; and 2) strengthening of diplomatic ties with the international community, especially with Russia and China, which seek a soft, or sometimes hard, balance with the US. Therefore, in order to offset their counter-coercive diplomacy and induce them to abandon their nuclear programmes, a multilateral framework of talks and negotiation is crucial. Although a bilateral framework is very efficient in negotiations and for the implementation of inducements, unilateral coercion has a low chance of achieving the compliance of the coercee within a strategic environment of coercive diplomacy that is highly influenced by the context and the environment of the subject matter. This was shown when the Obama administration imposed the most severe sanctions on Iran in 2013, including on oil imports and exports. Although the sanctions hit the Iranian economy hard, they increased China’s influence and leverage power over Iran by making China Iran’s number one export and import partner.

As has been seen in this study, the consolidation of multilateral coercion is not an easy task. However, when the US created the momentum and legitimacy to lead the coercion it did make progress and induced Iran and North Korea to comply with its demands. Whenever it secured justification for stronger multilateral coercion, Iran and North Korea had to back down and suspend or decrease their nuclear capabilities.

Once the multilateral framework of P5+1 and six-party talks was established, US coercive diplomacy towards the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran could not go beyond type B within the geopolitics and strategic environments of the Middle East and East Asia. Type C coercive diplomacy – non-proliferation through regime change in the two countries – was too risky for the participants with different national interests in Iran and North Korea. Thus, the US had to focus on building common ground with common interests in order to dismantle their nuclear programmes. Non-proliferation by
Iran and North Korea could be achieved if the US secured justification for its coercive diplomacy and flexibly shifted coercion back and forth between type A and type B with efficient inducements according to the circumstances and strategic environment.

The failure of the US regarding non-proliferation by Iran and North Korea from Clinton to Obama’s first term was due to the inefficient policy which lacks on understanding of the theory of compellence and coercive diplomacy. This led to implementing inefficient inducements and an absence of negotiation by setting nuclear dismantlement as the precondition and not accepting the states’ sovereign rights to nuclear development which are assured under the NPT. That is, by setting the CVID of the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran as the precondition, the US attempted to achieve the objective of its coercive diplomacy too quickly. Therefore, it failed to build justification for the coercion or provide efficient inducements to compel the countries to abandon their nuclear programmes.

In the literature on compellence and coercion theory, the optimal coercive diplomacy for the US to achieve non-proliferation in Iran and North Korea is as follows. First, it should secure justification for its coercive diplomacy against their nuclear programmes to consolidate the multilateral coercion from the P5+1 and the members of the six-party talks. Second, as a result of consolidating multilateral coercion, it should induce the two countries to accept the 93+2 additional protocol, which would naturally involve severe inspections and surveillance by the IAEA and NPT. This would trigger an immediate UNSC resolution if they breeched the additional protocol. Third, with the assurance of the IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers Group would aid the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea and at the same time keep tight control on their nuclear fuel to prevent misuse of it for nuclear arms. Although there would be the possibility of Iran and North Korea reneging on their decisions and restarting the development of nuclear arms, the risk would not be great with the nuclear fuel being managed by the NSG and facilities being inspected under the 93+2 additional protocol. Moreover, a clear breech of the NPT would bring more favourable conditions for the US to implement various inducements including a possible air strike. If these procedures could be achieved through US coercive diplomacy, it would be a ground-breaking milestone towards a nuclear-free world.
6.4 The Limits of the Study and Potential Avenues for Future Research

Although both Iran and North Korea are located on the same continent of Asia, they are totally different countries in terms of geopolitics, culture, history, religion etc. However, as this study has shown, the nuclear strategies of the two countries during the contention process reveal many similarities, so that it has been possible to make a general policy proposal applicable to both. Moreover, since these two countries are archetypical states developing nuclear programmes despite US non-proliferation coercive diplomacy, there are important implications for understanding the strategy of any other state that may attempt to possess nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapon capability in the future. If research can identify the commonalities in the counter-strategies of Iran and North Korea against US non-proliferation policy, potential future nuclear proliferation threats can be dealt with efficiently to achieve stable resolutions.

Future research should focus on four common features shared by Iran and North Korea to not only guides US coercive diplomacy against nuclear proliferation by these two countries but also that by other potential nuclear proliferation states that share these commonalities. They are as follows:

(1) Patrimonial Rules and Neo-clerical Patrimonial Rules

Values which differs from those of democracy. Iran and North Korea share some similarity in their political systems that can be defined as patrimonial rules. North Korea is a typical totalitarian regime with patrimonial rules and Iran could be defined as neo-clerical with patrimonial rules. As Max Weber argued, “with the development of a purely personal administrative staff, especially a military force under the control of the chief, traditional authority tends to develop into ‘patrimonialism.’” Both supreme leaders have firm authority over their militaries. Moreover, North Korea and Iran both have dual structures of elected and unelected authority that protects their basic values: the Juche ideology and Velayat-e faqih. Maintaining Juche, which is a monotheistic religious-like faith in the Kim dynasty, and governance by Islamic jurists take priority over any other values in the respective states. Therefore, the state systems and
governance structures are also designed to uphold these values. Thus, Iran and North Korea have higher tolerance levels of coercive diplomacy in order to protect their regime security than democratic countries with similar deterrence capabilities. This means that they can sustain an ‘asymmetry of motivation’ in their strong counter-coercive diplomacy. As seen in the case studies in this thesis, Iran and North Korea displayed high levels of resistance against US coercion. Certainly, a simplistic comparison between a garrison state with a ‘military first’ policy and the theocratic Islamic republic of Iran, which has many more democratic features, cannot be possible. However, in the contention process of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy, they display similarity in their nuclear strategies.

(2) A Siege Mentality

Both Iran and North Korea share a siege mentality resulting from long-lasting economic sanctions and external military threats. The demise of the Soviet Union and the loss of its nuclear umbrella in 1989 made North Korea feel defenceless. In 1991, North Korea’s net profits from trade and exports had plummeted from 2.6 billion dollars to 300 million dollars due to the loss of trade with the Soviet Union. Moreover, while North Korea failed to normalize its relations with the US and Japan, South Korea restored full diplomatic ties with Russia in 1990 and China in 1992. Furthermore, it successfully normalized diplomatic relations with ten countries from the former Soviet Union. A sensation of marginalization made North Korea start to realise the importance of its nuclear programme for regime survival.

Iran has faced a number of the external threats since the 1979 Islamic revolution. These include the Iran-Iraq war, economic sanctions, the US 5th fleet in the Strait of Hormuz, surrounding US military bases, and possible air strikes by Israel. However, even though Iran and North Korea share the same siege mentality, their perspectives on their nuclear programmes are different. Unlike North Korea, Iran does not need nuclear weapons for regime survival. However, as Gallup discovered in a 2012 survey, 57% of Iranians support the nuclear programme while only 19% disagree. Furthermore, a World Public Opinion poll which was conducted after the controversial presidential election of Ahmadinejad in 2009 revealed that 90% of both the general public and supporters of the
reformist Mousavi supported the Iranian nuclear programme. The impact of the siege mentality on both countries is that the nuclear programme is not just a question of energy supply but one of pride and state dignity.

(3) The Utilization of International Politics

North Korea and Iran share another similarity in that they utilize international relations as a tool in their counter-coercive diplomacy. Since Iran and North Korea have been labelled members of the ‘axis of evil’ which opposes the US, both countries have built strategic relationships with Russia and China, which try to achieve soft balances with the US in each region. As the case studies have shown, North Korea and Iran use China and Russia to reduce the cost of non-compliance with US coercive diplomacy. China and Russia use their veto power in the UNSC and economically and technically support Iran and North Korea. By exploiting the balance of power in international politics, Iran and North Korea succeeded in increasing their nuclear capabilities.

(4) Missile Development

Missile development is an area in which Iran and North Korea had direct cooperation. Exchanges of missile technology between North Korea and Iran have been revealed in many government reports, news reports and studies. In 2006, Iran officially announced its relationship with North Korea and that it had purchased Scud missiles in the 1980s. Although the IRGC claims that aid from North Korea is no longer necessary due to advances in Iranian missile technology, Michael Elleman of IISS claims that Iran still imports key components of the Shahab missile from North Korea or third countries. Declassified US intelligence documents from the 2000s also assessed that North Korea-Iran missile cooperation was ongoing and significant in building both countries’ ICBMs.

Not only do the two countries cooperate on missile development but they both use missile development as a means of counter-coercive diplomacy. As shown in this thesis, in order to increase the enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy, both Iran and North Korea developed missile capabilities. With increases in their missiles’ maximum range and acquisition of the ability to strike allies of the US, both countries increased their
deterrence capabilities to gain more leverage over the US.

Regardless of the differences between them, Iran and North Korea show many similarities in terms of their nuclear strategies and their diplomatic contention against the US regarding their nuclear programmes. Examination of these commonalities in future research could lead to advances in US policy to solve nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea.

Like all academic studies, this research also has its limits. Although its theoretical framework has been derived from the work of many previous scholars in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of coercion, since the concepts of state coercive diplomacy and coercion come from the realism school of international relations, the ‘contention model of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy’ used to examine state foreign policy in this study shares the tenets of realism. Thus, if the findings and the model employed in this research remain without further investigation, they cannot overcome the limits of the realism school.

For example, although the theoretical framework and the contention model consider the mutuality of diplomatic coercion, they cannot explain all the decisions taken by the agents involved. Abandoning a fully-fledged nuclear programme in exchange for the rewards of diplomatic normalization, the lifting of sanctions, economic aid and the provision of nuclear fuel and infrastructure for the new nuclear facility could be seen as a rational choice for a state that maximizes its expected utility. However, as shown in this study, North Korea and Iran refused that offer and decided to maintain their nuclear programmes.

The rational choice theory of realism, which cannot explain this behaviour, easily leads to a perception that Iran and North Korea are irrational actors, a ‘mad dog’ and a ‘mad mullah.’ There is therefore a tendency to consider the nuclear strategies of North Korea and Iran as strategies of ‘brinkmanship,’ based on the risky choice of gambling. However, ironically, as shown in this study, Iran and North Korea displayed their rationality during the contention of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy to achieve their objectives. In each phase of the contention model, North Korea and Iran proved
that they are rational actors which shrewdly calculate risk and form their counter-coercive diplomacy.

Since the arguments of existing international relations theories such as realism, liberalism and idealism are based on the rational choice theory of economics, the rational choice to maximize profit has been naturally perceived as a precondition for decision makers in the policymaking process in international politics.

Mainstream international relations and politics theory focuses on analysing the possibility of international cooperation based on profit and gains for states or for agents. The question of loss and its influence on international cooperation between states and agents is relatively easily neglected. However, if a ‘gain’ in the national interest is an important variable in analysing international relations and politics, vice versa loss to a state or an agent is also an important variable. From this perspective, prospect theory has important implications for the analysis of a state that decides to make a risky choice in the decision making process which is seen as irrational by the coercer. This is relevant to the nuclear politics of Iran and North Korea.

Prospect theory sees rational choices by an agent as being affected by the status of the agent itself.\textsuperscript{661} That is, the preference of a state or an agent may change according to its status, domain of loss or domain of gain. Briefly, it can be explained that when an agent is situated in the domain of gain, in which either choice will bring a profit, an agent would have a tendency to avoid a risky choice. On the contrary, if an agent is positioned in the domain of loss, it becomes more audacious in making risky choices.

It is at this point that this study and its model could expand and further develop. To overcome the given limitations, future research should adopt actor-specific theories which could be bolstered by the behavioural economics of rational choice to further develop coercive diplomacy theory and the contention model.

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