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Understanding the Umma as an Islamic "Global" Society

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Abstract

Traditionally the concept of society was in practice bound by state or tribal boundaries. However, the aspiration to move beyond the boundaries and establish a global society has been present in mankind's history. Roland Robertson calls this kind of aspiration "global consciousness". One such aspiration can be found in Islam. Islam encourages the believers to spread the religion and establish a global society, which in Islamic vocabulary is called the *umma*.

In this thesis, I seek to explore how early Islamic society developed global consciousness and how the concept of the *umma* developed in relation to the concept of global consciousness and to the concept and historical formation of a global society. I argue that the early Islamic society developed global consciousness through reflecting the spiritual teaching of Islam and through several networks. In order to trace the development of global consciousness in early Islamic society, I follow Clifford Geertz's assertion that religion is a cultural system and discuss how basic doctrines and religious rituals in Islam cultivate the development of global consciousness in the minds of the believers.

Subsequently, in order to understand the global characteristics of the *umma*, I observe the historical development of several instruments fundamental to the emergence of translocal networks in the Muslim world, namely the intellectual networks of Muslim scholars, the caliphates, and Sufi brotherhoods. The presence of networks of intellectuals, integration under the caliphates, and the spreading Sufi brotherhoods are invoked as indicators that the *umma* was a social reality and had the characteristics of translocal society. Yet, while the aspiration to establish a global society is strong within Muslim society, I argue that historical data show that the *umma* is a translocal, rather than a global, society.

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Declaration

I hereby declare that no portion of the work that appears in this study has been used in support of an application of another degree in qualification to this or any other university or institutions of learning.

Statement of Copyright

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my late Mom and Dad
Also to my wife and son
You are the lights of my soul.

Understanding the *Umma* as an Islamic "Global" Society

Introduction

Background

Society has been a crucial part of our political life. It has been present since the ancients and persistent until today in our modern time. It is a term which is very familiar to us and everyone thinks he knows the meaning of it, yet whether this conviction is true or not, that remains to be seen (Elias, 2001b, p. 3). While our ancestors regarded society as part of a greater cosmic order (Outhwaite, 2006, p. 1), the modern conceptions of "society" range from "emphatic" to "society as the outcome of a process of interaction and social constitution" to a "modern form of association" (Outhwaite, 2006, pp. 2–9).

Traditionally, up to the Second World War, the concept of society was in practice bound by state or tribal boundaries. Thus, the intensification of trade networks and relations between various actors starting in the late twentieth century is seen as challenging this traditional notion of society (Elias, 2001a, pp. 162–163). Instead of focusing on a local, geographical part of the world, society is "widening" and "encompassing the whole world". By the end of the twentieth century, values, norms, ideas are moving freely without regard to their cultural background or even geographical position (Roy, 2004). This phenomenon shows that our world is moving toward "a single, integrated and interdependent world". This process is labelled "globalisation" (Jaffe, 2006). As Friedman (2007) famously says, "our world has become flat".

These changes, inevitably, instigate changes in how we conceptualise and perceive society. Sociologists were the first to respond. Luhmann (1997) argues

that in our modern context, we are left with two options, whether to adopt a global system of regional societies, or a single world society. Others disagree and provide alternatives arguments about the future of society. Robertson (1992, pp. 78–82) describes four types of world order, which range from the world as "a series of relatively closed societal communities" to "planned world organisation". This argument is parallel with various international relations theorists, starting with Burton (1972) to Buzan (2004) and many others. The debate on the concept of "society" is fundamental because it shows that what we call as society is debatable and changeable by the ocurring debates. Thus, it is possible to "construct and deconstruct" the concept of a society, assuming a strong enough idea is present to do so.

The globalisation process in the late twentieth century, which transformed our society from a local to a global one, is often perceived as a unique phenomenon of the digital age. Yet, it is not necessarily so. While the diminishing of national borders, as we know, has indeed happened since the twentieth century, the awareness that our world is one and humans are all interconnected to one another is an idea as old as humanity itself (Robertson, 1992; Wilkinson, 2006). Robertson (1990; 1992; 2006; 2011) wrote a series of books and articles on how the consciousness that the world is interconnected and interdependent had been prevalent during various times in the history of humanity. Our contemporary "modern" globalisation is just one occurrence among many similar processes. Thus, the "modern global society" that emerged from the concept is also not a unique, nor even the first, phenomenon of a globalised society.

In conjecture with Robertson's idea, Abu-Lughod (1987; 1989; 1996) argues that the world has seen interactions and networks on a global scale before the advent of the European world economy in the sixteenth century. Examining trade patterns throughout history and consistently using empirical evidence such as navigation manuals, trade contracts and such, Abu-Lughod asserts the existence of trade patterns which encompassed the then-known world as early as the thirteenth century (Abu-Lughod, 1987). She further argues that this world system was supported by various regional actors whose activities maintained and regulated the flows of trade and interactions between various locales. Among these regional actors were various Muslim political entities, such as the Mamluks or the Ottomans (Abu-Lughod, 1989; 1996).

Although she goes into detail on trade relations and routes, Abu-Lughod, however, does not adequately explain the less materialistic aspects of the network, such as the presence of global consciousness proposed by Robertson or anything equivalent to that. Thus, this thesis seeks to investigate that particular aspect, enquiring into the presence of global consciousness in Muslim society. Since the Muslims are known to have their own, distinctive, vocabulary on society, known as the *umma*, this thesis further argues that the *umma* can thus be acknowledged as an interconnected, translocal society with global aspirations.

Research Questions

There are two questions that this thesis seeks to address:
1. How did the early Islamic society develop global consciousness?
2. How was the concept of the *umma* developed in relation both to the concept of global consciousness and to the concept and historical formation of a global society?

Hypotheses

1. This thesis proposes that the early Islamic society developed *global consciousness* through reflecting the spiritual teaching of Islam and through intellectual chains of knowledge transmission and diffusion, political and legal institutional networks and mystical networks.
2. This *global consciousness* solidified into a broader, translocal society, but not truly global, which in the Islamic vocabulary is called the *umma*

Research Significance

This thesis will have significance in several ways.

First, this thesis also contributes to the development of global politics by placing focus on the development of the early Islamic society as a global actor. In a small way, therefore, it may help to redress the Western-centric bias of the Westphalian conceptualisation of international relations, as questioned in the works edited by Acharya and Buzan (2009), which both question why there is no non-Western approach to international relations and provide several non-Western

alternatives, and also the work of Vucetic (2011), which highlights the presence of an Anglosphere identity in contemporary international relations.

Second, this thesis will expand on the historicisation of the concept of globalisation by tracking the transference of idea before and during the early Islamic society. The time span of this thesis will therefore be from the early Islamic society in the seventh century to the beginning of the Tanzimat movement in Ottoman Empire in 1839. While the temporal range is thus wide, the pre-modern period is formative and there are well-established Muslim and non-Muslim historical accounts that document the developing translocal consciousness and networks in this period.

Third, this thesis contributes to development of Islamic studies by relating the concept of the *umma*, which is intrinsic to the religious terminology of Islam, with the concepts of global consciousness and global society, which are rooted in a social and political vocabulary.

Research Approach

This thesis will use social constructionism articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966) as the basic theoretical orientation. According to Berger and Luckmann, social reality is something that is constructed by humans. A person's reality is constructed from how his or her consciousness puts meanings on objects around them. The collection of meanings then shape his or her reality's common knowledge, which can then be maintained to the point that the individuals take it for granted as the 'truth'. It is possible to question reality, but to do so, one has to be make a deliberate and extreme effort (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 33–37).

Reality that has been shared among individuals and maintained thoroughly will become social reality. In essence, to produce social reality, humans have to go through three processes: externalisation, objectivation and internalisation. By *externalisation*, humans project their ideas to material objects or particular signs. Through *objectivation*, those artefacts then become 'object' of consciousness for people in the society, continuously accepted as part of their social reality to the point that they are inevitably taken for granted, they become part of the 'natural' order of the society. These 'natural' objects then become the tools to *internalisation* of the common knowledge to the younger generations, affirming

that the 'knowledge' of the society is embedded in their consciousness (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 68–84).

It is in this context that this thesis examines the presence of a global consciousness in Islamic teaching and the formation of something which might be perceived as a global society in Muslim history. This thesis defines global consciousness as defined in the work of Roland Robertson (1990; 1992; 2006; 2011). Subsequently, this thesis follows the approach articulated by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) in their norm diffusion theory to engage with the concept of global consciousness and its transference process to become a commonly accepted norm in a society, which then presumably leads to the establishment of global interactions and networks based on this consciousness in the society. This thesis then seeks to elaborate the concept of global society by reviewing the relevant literature in the study of international relations, namely world system theory, cosmopolitanism and the English school tradition. The complete elaboration of this process will be presented in Chapter One.

After establishing a conceptual framework of global consciousness and its transference process and the definition of global society, this thesis describes how the teachings of Islam bring a message of global consciousness to its adherents. This global consciousness was then transferred by Muslims through their interactions and established networks, which resulted in historical phenomena that might be categorised as a global society. While using religion to analyse social and political processes is problematic, this thesis finds supporting theoretical framework in Geertz's work, *Religion as a cultural system* (1973), which describes how religious activities have the capability to induce moods and provide motivations to the believers to act in certain ways. Therefore, Chapter Two will implement this theoretical framework into Muslim historical accounts and explain how Islam shaped Muslims' consciousness and motivated them to try to establish a global society.

This thesis's argument that the manifestation of global consciousness existed in Muslim historical accounts will then be examined empirically in Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six of this thesis. This thesis therefore will use historical representation to collect the data. As Hacking (1999, pp. 19–21) argues, historical analysis is the most fundamental method of conducting social construction research. Dunn (2008, p. 79) describes the difficulties inherent in

analysing the representation of an object over time and space. How an object is represented is important since it conveys a message by which people act and react to the object in question. Continuous use of the representation will produce a "regime of truth" that commands obedience and is capable of delivering rewards and punishment. Application of this method to Muslim history will lead this thesis to be able to discern various symbols used to represent global consciousness in Islamic teachings and the ways in which these symbols constructed a "regime of truth" that supported the establishment of the *umma*.

There are two principal limitations inherent in this thesis. The first is the possibility of bias introduced by using books written by Muslim scholars. This is understandable since every narrative has the chance to introduce its own bias. Chase (2005, pp. 656–658) argues that while narratives might provide valuable information, narratives also express emotion, thought and, most importantly, the interpretation of the narrator. In order to reduce this possibility, this thesis balances the Muslim-written narratives with books produced by Western and non-Muslim scholars. The second limitation lies in the fact that I do not command Arabic fluent enough to be able to access primary sources in that language. While this is unfortunate, this thesis seeks to address this limitation by using well-established translations or secondary sources written by respectable authors. R. Stephen Humphreys (1991), an eminent scholar of early and medieval Islam, provides a good selection of secondary sources that I can access[1]. This thesis also accesses various books translated into Bahasa Indonesia that do not have English translations to provide a richer set of data, especially concerning the spread of Islam to Indonesia and the dynamics within Muslim society there.

This thesis will be divided into several chapters, with a general overview of each chapter as follows:

1. **Chapter One: Global Consciousness and the Formation of Global Society**: explaining concepts of global consciousness, transference process and theories related to global society as the conceptual framework of this thesis, which will be applied to the historical material of subsequent chapters.

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[1] I have not used a precise transliteration scheme for Arabic words. I have dropped the *ta marbuta*, but otherwise follow common spellings used in English-language sources.

2. **Chapter Two: Towards the Development of Islamic Global Consciousness**: describing the historical context and how Islamic teachings and rituals presumably instilled a global consciousness in the early Islamic society.

3. **Chapter Three: Intellectual Networks and the Integration of the *Umma***: explaining how teacher-student relations between Muslim intellectuals had formed various intellectual chains which played an important part in diffusing the idea of a global consciousness to various locals in the Muslim world.

4. **Chapter Four: The Conceptual Development of the Caliphate**: describing how the idea of the *umma* instigated the necessity for Muslims to develop an institution of authority. This led to the development of the "caliphate". This chapter seeks to show that the caliphate was an evolving concept, in accordance to the interpretation of the holy texts and the actual condition of Muslim society.

5. **Chapter Five: The Integration of the *Umma* under the Caliphates:** describing the structural development of the caliphate, how it grew and became more complicated with differentiation of roles among various apparatuses. This chapter also seeks to argue that the institutional development of the caliphate, while perhaps driven by political motives, inevitably provided a functional framework in which the idea of the *umma* thrived.

6. **Chapter Six: Integration through the Sufi Orders**: explaining Sufi networks which as non-political institutions contributed to the promotion of global consciousness throughout Muslim lands. While the main goal of the Sufi networks was mystical, they unwittingly integrated Muslims by promoting shared values and rituals, which paved the way to greater integration among Muslim locals.

7. **Chapter Seven: The *Umma* as a Symbolic Universe**: analysing the development of the *umma* using a global society framework and how each facet of society promotes the global consciousness by embedding the *umma* as a symbolic universe in the minds of Muslims. This chapter then evaluates whether the corresponding society, the *umma*, can truly be categorised as a global society.

Chapter One:
Global Consciousness and the Formation of Global Society

Global consciousness

The term *global consciousness* can be explained as the "consciousness of the world as a whole," interconnected and interdependent (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, p. 30). Someone adopting this global consciousness tends to feel attached to the world as a whole, instead of a particular tribe, state, or part of the world. He or she identifies himself or herself as global citizen. He understands that his actions will have a profound effect on others, and at the same time, he will be affected by others' actions too. This new identification will change his behaviour towards the local unit which he previously identified himself with. The shift of attachment will decrease his or her loyalty to the local unit, and give a broader, global perspective on day to day activities (Rosenau, 1992, pp. 281–283).

This consciousness can be seen in practice when facing problems such as endemic disease and ecological degradation. When facing global threats that trespass local borders and that no contemporary local units (states, tribes, etc) can handle, people discovered the need to band together to solve the problem, regardless of citizenship, race or ethnicity. Lee, Buse, and Fustukian (2002) for example, explain how interconnectedness in our world led to the spread of endemic diseases. Kay and William (2009) then argue that these health problems required global, coordinated, policies to be dealt with. With regard to environmental issues, Vertovec and Posey (2003) believe that actions from all elements of the global society are necessary to reduce environmental degradation. Interestingly, Vertovec and Posey base their call on a "global consciousness of connections', the awareness that the world is integrated as one, and the action in one part might influence another part (Vertovec and Posey, 2003, pp. 2–3).

Acknowledging global consciousness and the globalisation process leads us to questioning parochial consciousness, which has a different view of the world.

Parochial consciousness grows when people that live within a certain geographical area develop commonalities. This can result in various political concepts, such as tribalism (Hodgson, 1974a, pp. 148–149), ethnicity (Said and Simmons, 1975) or nationalism (Anderson, 2006, pp. 37–46). This consciousness then transformed into a political entity and guided the people inside the area with a common mission and promoted uniformity inside its territory (Bauman, 1990, p. 153).

Since parochial consciousness is inherently related to a certain geographical area, it is inevitable that the world is consisted of many parochial societies, each cautious toward another. While parochial consciousness promotes uniformity inward to the members of its societies, it also imposes discrimination to those deemed as "outsiders". This discrimination. for example, can be observed in tribal laws. In our modern world, the expression of parochial consciousness can be seen in the concept of "nation-state". The process of uniformity and discrimination within a nation-state continues and the world has become a place where people in one nation-state often look to others as outsiders. Anyone who is not the member of a nation-state is considered as outsider. The outsiders then receive different treatment, and sometime even are denied access to certain services and goods (Riesenberg, 1992, p. 24; Kim, 2001, pp. 31–35). This practice has been ongoing since ancient times and legitimated by the concept of "citizenship" (Riesenberg, 1992, p. xvii).

Global consciousness is crucial for the development of human interactions that encourage humans to transcend their parochial boundaries, to the point of eliminating the said boundaries. Social phenomena bearing the characteristic of global consciousness can be observed in our contemporary history. Starting from the early fifteenth century to mid eighteenth century, the modern idea of society slowly replaced the medieval one. From the nineteenth to mid twentieth century, the idea of modern society and how the national societies interact with each other in an international society was established, and completely eliminated the medieval system. During these stages, the idea that the world is a whole place with interconnected relations emerged in our modern society and gained momentum to become a popular idea such as it is today (Robertson, 1992, pp. 58–59).

The world wars, the establishment of the League of Nations and then the United Nations, and the presence of conflicting ideologies were developments that

occurred within the framework of modern global consciousness. The end of the Cold War marked the end of a chapter in the modern globalisation process and also heralded the beginning of a new one. Modern global consciousness keeps on growing and changing, to the point that Friedman (2007) declares that we are entering the age of "Globalisation 3.0", during which the free flow of information and people gives individuals the opportunity to collaborate globally, something that was unimaginable decades before. This globalisation, Berger (2003, pp. 4–6) argues, brings within itself a global culture originated from the West, more precisely from America, which penetrates the larger populations. One of the significant evidence of this cultural penetration is the near-absolute hegemony of American English as the popular language in contemporary globalised world.

The phenomenon of globalisation is an acknowledged feature of our modern world and has attracted many studies. But unlike global connectivity which becomes the centre of attention from globalisation theorists, global consciousness has not attracted a sufficient amount of study (Robertson, 2009, p. 121). This is underwhelming since, according to Robertson (2011), the issue of consciousness is at least as important as connectivity. He puts emphasis on the importance of consciousness by arguing that a global vision is necessary before we could start a discussion on the world as a "whole". It is the presence of a global consciousness that enables socioeconomic interactions to transform into a global network of connections and culture (Robertson, 2011, pp. 1336–1338).

While current, modern, globalisation is the product of a specific development in our history, the presence of global consciousness and the development of connections through the whole world is not uniquely a modern phenomenon. Robertson and Inglish (2006, p. 30) argue that global consciousness had existed before the current modern era. They used Greek and Roman culture and philosophical thinking to illustrate this argument. For example, during the ancient Greece period, Stoic thinkers such as Zeno and Diogenes had voiced concepts such as *kosmopolites* (a citizen of the universe) or brotherhood for all humanity. These concepts can be seen as the Greek version of global consciousness (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, pp. 31–32).

The expansion of Greek influence under Alexander the Great further promoted this global consciousness. During the Hellenistic period, the Greeks felt more comfortable to be considered as citizens of a general Hellenistic world

instead of citizens of a particular polis (Heater, 1999, pp. 44–46). This expansion also promoted a *lingua franca* for the known world, and established a "universal historiography" (*katholou ton praxeon istoria*). The Greeks sought to narrate history in a global perspective. Not only did this allow Greek historians to record the history of the world, it also showed the interconnectedness of the world. Geographically diverse locales were connected in an intricate web of relations, constituting one whole world. This departed from the previous tradition that narrated history from a local and disjointed perspective (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, p. 32).

The Romans adopted this and started their own "universal historiography." Polybius, a Greek historian who resided in Rome between 167 and 150 BC, recorded the history of the world under the Roman Empire as *somatoeides* (organic whole). The history was considered as a whole body, consisting of smaller parts that worked together and inter-related in very complex ways. Polybius deliberately wrote that he is "weaving together the various strands of history into a single tapestry" (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, p. 33). As Roman dominion grew rapidly, and encompassed most of the inhabited world at that time, Polybius' works helped in building global consciousness among the Romans. His works were circulated among the Roman elite and were internalised as the self-understanding that the Roman Empire was a global power.

By the first century AD, the Roman Emperor and the city of Rome were viewed in global terms; the Emperor as "guiding spirit of the whole world" and Rome as "the centre of the earth" (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, pp. 33–34). In the practical sense of common people, the *pax Romana* indeed brought geographically distant areas into one union, with the Roman Empire at its centre. Roads the Romans had built and the Romans' protection of the Mediterranean had made people able to travel across the known world (Aristides, 1953, p. 906, in Robertson and Inglish, 2006, p. 34). This condition had created waves of migration and social mobility. In this sense, the Roman Empire was an essential mechanism that allowed the flow of goods and people, thus creating unprecedented configurations of persons and places (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, p. 35).

Transference of Idea

The idea of a whole, interconnected and interdependent world, termed aptly by Robertson and Inglish (2006) as global consciousness, recurs throughout our history and inspires people to develop forms of society which aspire to transcend parochial boundaries. This process, in which a global consciousness tries to manifest itself in a society, is in line with the theoretical framework articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966). Society, according to Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 33–42), is the product of humans' consciousness. In order for an idea to be able to affect society, it has to go through the three stages of externalisation, objectivation and internalisation.

The first stage, externalisation, is done when humans are expressing their subjective ideas to other humans. The second stage, objectivation, happens whenever humans put their ideas into signs or material objects available to them, allowing other humans to perceive their idea and agreeing to it. This forms the intersubjectivity which then affects their perception of the society. When this particular idea has gained enough followers to be the dominant idea, the society transforms itself, adjusting itself to the new dominant idea. What had been a subjective idea now becomes "objective" and the third process, internalisation, begins when the society teaches the idea as the objective reality to the next generation (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 68–84).

Berger and Luckmann's description of the translation of an idea into societal reality mirrors contemporary research on norms and their life cycle. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, pp. 895–896), there are stages that a particular norm needs to go through in order to establish its dominance and be adopted by the general populace. At its first stage, *norm emergence*, a new norm requires support and campaigns so that the masses notice and adopt it. Adopting foreign norms is not a trivial matter. Norms are an essential part of constructivist analysis. A norm (or, norms) is the foundation in which actors derive their identity, which in turn will define their interests. Norms influence the international context by providing intersubjectivity among actors, and determine what behaviour is appropriate (Zehfuss, 2002, pp. 3–4).

Since actors are often reluctant to adopt a new norm, the devout initiators and advocates of such a norm, called *norm entrepreneurs*, have to mount a

campaign for the norm and try to diffuse it as broadly as they can. In this early stage, norm entrepreneurs persuade other actors to embrace the new norm. It is possible that, at this stage, norm entrepreneurs have to make a bargain with the other parties, providing necessary incentives for them to embrace the norm. Since humans have the tendency to maximise their gains, then it is possible that the other parties will adjust their behaviour in accordance with the norm but without believing in it (Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 1999, p. 12).

If enough masses adopt this new norm, it will pass a tipping point and enter phase two of its circle of life. It is essential for a norm to pass this tipping point because if it fails to pass, it will be neglected and, eventually, forgotten. However, if norm entrepreneurs manage to gather enough support, the norm will enter its second stage, *norm cascade*. At this stage, norm entrepreneurs seek to recruit more supporters for their championed norm through socialisation of the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). Norm entrepreneurs then engage with other parties using argumentative discourse in order to challenge the established narrative, seeking to usurp it with the championed norm and to change the identity of the other parties to conform with the new norm (Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 1999, p. 13). During this process, it is possible that the other parties will still maintain their pragmatic interests but at the same time, will become more deeply entangled with the moral discourse brought by the norm entrepreneurs (Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 1999, pp. 15–16).

The diffusion process continues, until the norm starts its final phase, internalisation. By becoming internalised, the norm acquires a taken-for-granted status and no longer becomes the topic of debate (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, pp. 895–896). At this mature stage, actors act in conformity with the norm because "it is the normal thing to do" (Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 1999, p. 17). This mature stage is mirroring the habitualisation process in Berger and Luckmann's work. According to Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 70–72), an idea becomes habitualised when it becomes an accepted pattern in the society. The conforming pattern then frees the individuals from "the burden of 'all those decisions'" and provides them with psychological relief. A further step will institutionalise the idea within a society and lead to it being perceived as "objective" reality.

Other than deliberate diffusion by norm entrepreneurs described above, there is also an unintended process of normative diffusion known as transference. *Transference* can be understood as the act, or process, of redirecting something to others. Transference of ideas is one defining characteristic of modern globalisation (Friedman, 2007). Bartelson (2000, p. 184) uses the term *transference* to describe one facet of globalisation. He argues that, as transference, globalisation allows the process of exchange between certain units in many sectors. This exchange happens as an unintended consequence of the interaction between various parties. Although unintended, this exchange operates at the conscious level of both agents and recipients. This process transcends boundaries but does not change the units or the boundaries. Bartelson (2000, p. 184) draws an example of transference from the writings of Keohane and Nye who argue that complex interdependence might change a state's concern for military security, but it does not change the states or the system itself.

Manners (2002, pp. 244–246) describes how both deliberate and unintended diffusion methods have been at work in promoting EU norms. The first method is *contagion*, in which EU norms spread as the result of diffusion of ideas during discussion with other political actors, which lead the other actors to adopt EU norms. Manners uses the example of how the integration process in Mercosur mimics the process of EU integration. The second method is the *informational process*, whereby EU norms spread as the result of strategic communications done by the EU, such as when the EU publishes its policy initiatives, makes declaration on certain issues, etc. This is an intentional process by the EU to disseminate its norms and persuade other interested parties.

The third method described by Manners (2002, pp. 244–246) is *procedural diffusion*, when the EU spreads its norms by institutionalising its rules and binding its partners to them. The most prominent example of this method is when the EU sets specific norms, rules and criteria to be acquired and met by aspiring states before they can be members of the EU. The fourth method, *transference*, occurs whenever the EU provides aid and assistance programmes to third parties. Through these interactions, EU norms will spread indirectly and, maybe, unintentionally. By interacting with the EU, the third parties would be exposed to the norms and standards of the EU and again, maybe unintentionally, would adopt these norms in conformity with the EU. The fifth method, *overt diffusion*, is the

result of the EU's physical presence in either third states or in various international organisations. Manners cites the EU monitoring missions in the former Yugoslavia as one of the examples of this method.

It is important to note that despite an idea's dominance in a society, the idea will always require certain forms of legitimation in order to maintain its position. Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 112–115) describe levels of legitimation that help legitimate an idea. The most fundamental is the transmission of language whose vocabulary defines and supports the idea, providing tools for conversation on the idea. The next levels are the development of theoretical propositions and the articulations of theories to further explain and justify the idea. The highest form of legitimation is the establishment of a *symbolic universe*. A symbolic universe is the amalgamation of bodies of theoretical traditions which support the idea. It encompasses all socially objectivated meanings. History of the society and biographies of its members are seen as events taking place within the symbolic universe. It creates a whole world and by accessing this knowledge, humans are affirmed of their position in the world.

During the internalisation process of a symbolic universe, variance of interpretation might occur and this might give rise to the establishment of a "deviant" version of the symbolic universe. If sufficient people within the society support this "deviant" narrative, they might challenge the established narrative and begin what Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 124–125) define as the "problem of heresy". To protect itself from such a problem, a symbolic universe develops conceptual machineries which maintain the systematisation of cognitive and normative legitimation processes within the society, making it in accordance with the "official" narration of the symbolic universe. Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 127–134) identify four conceptual machineries of universe-maintenance: mythology, theology, philosophy and science. Each provides ways to enforce the narrative of the symbolic universe into societal life.

According to the theoretical framework described above, this chapter argues that in order to establish a global society, the proponents of a global consciousness have to initiate a campaign to promote this idea. These norm entrepreneurs externalise their idea of a global society to the masses. They can use persuasion and bargain at first, recruiting supporters by exchanging favours or other material necessity requested by the other actors. After the global

consciousness reaches its tipping point, then the norm entrepreneurs start to undermine the status quo by using argumentation over their cause. At this time, new supporters are recruited through dialogues and debates that challenge the validity of the established discourse and transform their identity. After reaching its final stage, the idea of a global consciousness becomes the "natural" condition of the society, adopted and articulated by actors of various interests.

At the same time as with this deliberate process, there is also another transference process that helps the diffusion of global consciousness. Every person who has adopted a global consciousness might inadvertently transfer the message of an interconnected world to other parties. Even those who are not a keen supporter still could be an agent of transference. There are several characteristic of the transference process, as follows: (i) relations between two or more units; (ii) the creation of networks and connections; (iii) the crossing of boundaries; (iv) the often lack of deliberateness of the transfer. Collins' work (1998) on how teacher-student relations formed intellectual chains across various geographical areas and periods of time, which will be elaborated further in Chapter Three, is an excellent example of such transference. This transference process will build upon and reinforce each other, to the point where the idea expands beyond the tipping point and is accepted as the norm of the society.

This chapter further proposes that to further legitimate the idea of a global consciousness and to fulfil the aspiration of a global society, the society will produce various tools to help maintain the idea's dominance. In the case of the *umma*, these developments are reflected in the development of the institution of caliphate, which will be elaborated further in Chapters Four and Five, and the development of Sufi networks, which will be elaborated in Chapter Six. These institutions support and advocate global consciousness to the general populace by performing what Manners (2002, pp. 244–246) describes as "transference of norms". Transference enables the actors to deliver a message without their knowing the transfer process and/or the message itself. The message becomes deeply overtly imbedded in the behaviour of the norm entrepreneurs, in everything that he or she does; it transfers a message to other people. The process also becomes genuine, without both the norm entrepreneurs and the other person aware of a deliberate process of communication, thus removing psychological barriers that might arise in the process.

Global Society in International Relations

While the manifestation of the global society is obvious and study of it thrives in the field of international relations, the debate surrounding the *concept* of global society is more problematic. In contemporary discourse there are many terms which might or might not intersect and overlap with *global society*. There are terms such as *international system, international society*, *world society* and *world civilisation,* to name a few. This section will discuss various concepts in the study of international relations and assess their relevance to the discussion of global society undertaken in this thesis. While the concepts discussed in this section might not be explicitly about global society *per se*, there might be some relevance of their definitions to the concept of global society that this thesis seeks to develop.

Study of World System Theory

The argument that a global society has existed before our modern globalised society is to some extent parallel with the argument proposed by the proponents of world system theory. Within world system theory, the main argument is that there exists a worldwide economic system that connects and integrates various regional and local systems. While Wallerstein (1974) argues that the world system starts at 1500 AD, his opinion is contested by various others. Abu-Lughod (1989) argues that a world system had existed at 1250 AD before being replaced by the current modern world system. Frank and Gills (1996) draw the starting line of a world system even further back to 5000 BC.

In addition to the debate on when the world system existed for the first time, there is also a debate on the nature of the world system. Abu-Lughod (1996, p. 279) describes the complete debate as follow:

> "1) Has there been *only one* world-system, the one that began with the *sixteenth century*?
> 2) Have there been *several successive world-systems*, each with a changing structure and its own set of hegemons?
> 3) Or has there been only *a single world-system* that has continued to evolve *over the past 5,000 years*?"

According to Abu-Lughod (1996, p. 279), Wallerstein supports the first position in the debate: that there is only one world-system and that the world

system is our contemporary modern globalised world-system, whose development was started in 1500 AD. Abu-Lughod herself supports the second position: that there were several world-systems and that when a world-system collapsed, another rose in its stead. According to Abu-Lughod, the contemporary modern globalised world-system emerges after the fall of the previous world-system, in which China and the Middle East played prominent parts. Frank and Gills support the third position: there is only one world-system which started 5,000 years ago and is continuously changing. In their view, our modern globalised world is the newest mutation of this world-system.

Participating in the aforementioned debate, this thesis stands in line with Abu-Lughod's argument that there have been several world-systems that replaced each other. Our contemporary globalised world is the most recent world-system. This position is also in line with Robertson's, who argues that while global consciousness is a recurring feature throughout human history, contemporary globalisation is the product of unique interactions among various components (Robertson, 1992, p. 27). A different source of global consciousness might require a different model, such as Islam, which Robertson explicitly states possesses a "globalising thrust" (Robertson, 1992, p. 28).

Drawing further upon Robertson's (2011) argument about the importance of global consciousness, this thesis also argues that a global consciousness is necessary for the formation of a world-system, which in turn lays the foundation for the formation of a global society. While according to Frank and Gills (2000, p. 4), world-system's emphasis is on economic activities, this thesis suggests that a global society constitutes all aspects of human life. Therefore, while the economic connections that characterise a world-system will play an important part in a global society, a global society is more than worldwide economic interactions.

Following this line of argument, this thesis proposes that it is possible that the collapse of a world-system would lead to the disruption of the global society that relies upon it. The collapse of a world-system might be the result of rivalries among various actors promoting their version of global consciousness, or the result of contestation between actors promoting global consciousness and those working against it. When the global consciousness ceases to permeate or a strong form of a parochial consciousness undermines it, the world system would collapse and the global society would cease to exist. It would eventually be replaced by a

new world system based on a renewed global consciousness, which would provide the foundation for a new global society and begin the cycle anew.

Cosmopolitanism

Another research tradition that provides a detailed discussion seemingly in parallel with the development of a global society is cosmopolitanism. The idea of cosmopolitanism stems from ancient Greek philosophy, especially the Stoic tradition. It has the literal meaning of "citizen of the world." It seeks to promote universal rights and establishes a universal bond among humankind as a world citizen, beyond nationality or citizenship (Nussbaum, 2010). Held (2005, p. 10) describes cosmopolitanism's objective as "to disclose the ethical, cultural and legal basis of political order where political communities and state matter, but not only and exclusively." While there are many strands in this movement, Fine (2007, p. 2) argues that all cosmopolitans share three basic values: (1) breaking national presuppositions and prejudices; (2) recognising the necessity of global interdependence for the benefits of humanity; (3) developing normative and prescriptive theories of world citizenship, global justice and cosmopolitan democracy.

Miller (2010, pp. 377–380) distinguishes between moral cosmopolitanism and political cosmopolitanism. Moral cosmopolitanism seeks to promote the idea that all humans are equal and subject to the same set of moral laws. Thus, people should respect and treat each other equally, regardless of nationality, citizenship or place of residence. Political cosmopolitanism believes that the idea can only be achieved when there is one authoritative figure that enforces the law to all. In the moral sphere, cosmopolitanism is concerned with identity and belonging. There exists the tension between the local and cosmopolitan, constantly questioning whether a person should have greater loyalty to his local environment or should supplant national ties with world citizenship. This tension is made more complicated by different interpretations of weak cosmopolitan and strong cosmopolitan. Miller (2010, pp. 383–388) provides an excellent illustration on this recurring dilemma: do we prioritise social justice over global justice, thus willing to inflict harm to other people in order to fulfil our local duty? Or do we prioritise global justice over social justice, thus willing to sacrifice limited local resources for the betterment of foreigners?

In the political sphere, cosmopolitanism rejects "methodological nationalism" which rationalises the presence of nation-states as the nature of human condition. According to cosmopolitan theorists, the formation of nation-states is not natural; instead, they are the product of human history (Fine, 2007, pp. 3–10). At one time, the concept of nation-state might be important for humankind. However, according to Held (2005, p. 10) this concept should not be considered as "privileged" entities. Cosmopolitanism also rejects the logic of anarchy which puts the state as the ultimate actor and sole source of power in the field of international relations. Cosmopolitanism then seeks to strengthen international law and expand its authority beyond state sovereignty, since states or its apparatus might threaten and violate human rights (Fine, 2007, pp. 3–4). While criticising the emphasis on nation-state in modern political life, cosmopolitanism does not radically negate the presence of the nation-state and its possible role in fulfilling the cosmopolitan vision. Instead, it seeks to establish a multi-layered global order that consists of nation-state, transnational political community and global consolidation of international institutions, movements and laws to regulate relations between states and to protect global citizens' rights (Fine, 2007, p. 39).

The concept of cosmopolitanism is relevant to this thesis. Both global society and cosmopolitanism seek to disclose the presence of a global consciousness among humans transcending their local environments. Both concepts acknowledge that the consciousness might motivate various actors to interact and to establish connections, which might lead to the manifestation of a society with global characteristics. However, cosmopolitanism puts too strong an emphasis on a common world value, norm or morality, which dominates in the name of "universalism" and shapes actors' behaviour into a uniformed standard. The case of cosmopolitan democracy is one of the examples of such universalism. This is different from the depiction of global society used in this thesis that does not require members to adopt uniform behaviour. One way to connect these two concepts, however, is to draw a continuum of a human group, whereby the left end stands for a human group without a uniform, universal culture and with myriads of local cultures and the right end stands for a human group with an ultimate, uniform, universal culture. The concept of global society used in this thesis is in the middle of the continuum, signifying a balance between global cultures and the persistence of various local ones. The concept of

cosmopolitanism, by way of contrast, is in the central-right portion, or even at near the right end.

English School

John Burton's World Society

The first influential work on this tradition is John Burton's *World Society.* Burton (1972) starts his discussion on this matter by posing the question: why study world society at all? He proposes five reasons for studying world society: to recognise our social responsibilities as citizens of a particular state and the world; to keep our interest secure by adjusting to changes in the larger environment; to understand the pattern of behaviour and draw lessons from the pattern; to better understand parts of the world, and the relations between the parts; to study norms of behaviour on a universal basis (Burton, 1972, pp. 1–10).What exactly does Burton mean by *world society*? In a later chapter, he starts his definition of world society by differentiating it from *international relations*. Burton argues that while international relations focuses its study on the state, the study of world society is not restricted to the dynamics of states or state authorities (Burton, 1972, p. 19). While it is possible to study the dynamics of states and inter-governmental institutions, the study of world society is wider than that.

Burton's choice in employing the term world society results in logical consequences. According to him, the scope of the study needs to be broadened. It can include any level of social organisation, from the individual to the state to the world. It is the choice of the researcher to determine which levels of behaviour are relevant, by moving up or down. Burton urges researchers to take levels of behaviour only as one consideration in their analysis, not ignoring other aspects of behaviour that can be observed and analysed (Burton, 1972, pp. 20–21). While the field of international relations tends to be descriptive, the study of world society tends to be analytical and conceptual (Burton, 1972, p. 22).

The broad scope of world society makes studying it a never ending exploration, not unlike collecting a jigsaw (Burton, 1972, p. 23). This presents a challenge as to how to conduct the study. It is impossible to conduct simultaneous analysis of the whole world, in both physical and social aspects. Scientific progress tackles this impossibility by establishing a division of labour, specialised

fields, experts and methodology that engage with specific parts of the world. The study of world society requires, then, a multi-disciplinary approach (Burton, 1972, pp. 24–25).Burton also realises that his conception of world society faces challenges on a practical level. The presence of states might be contradictory to the establishment of one, unified world. Burton acknowledges that states might be suspicious of external forces meddling in their authority and be defensive in terms of their own external behaviour. Also, even taking the assumption that all states are willing to cooperate to the extent of integrating into one unified world, an assumption which Burton calls "an absurd one', conflicts and aggression are still possible (Burton, 1972, p. 118).

But this is not the means to the end for the world society. Burton (1972, pp. 119–120) notes that in the contemporary and conflict-oriented real world, there are services that are provided by international institutions. Thus the integration process might come about slowly, step-by-step. It might come in the form of both decentralisation of a state's power to local government and centralisation of power from states to international institutions. It also might come from the introduction of multiple, simultaneous identities and loyalties between those political institutions. These can be done by determining what values and goals of people are best satisfied by local authorities, and what values and goals of people are best satisfied by international institutions because of their universal nature.

Martin Wight's System of States

The second important work to be addressed for this discussion is Martin Wight's *System of States*. In contrast with Burton, Wight focuses his book on the relations between states. His work is nevertheless important in this discussion since Wight's idea has inspired the development of the English school of international relations, whose theorists focus on the dynamics of international society.Wight categorises the worldview of the contemporary world into three traditions: *Kantian*, *Machiavellian* and *Grotian*. The Kantian tradition has a messianic and missionary worldview. It emphasises the necessity of world unity, to the point of rejecting the necessity of the state system. The Machiavellian tradition has a pessimistic worldview. Proponents regard the state-system as natural and see all interactions as survival of the fittest. The Groatian perspective is a middle way between the two which accepts the state-system as a

contemporary condition, but does not discourage cooperation between states (Wight, 1977, pp. 38–39).

Wight's work in the *System of States* derives from this Groatian tradition. He credits the contemporary Western states-system to the Westphalian system (Wight, 1977, p. 110). It was Grotius who had brought the word "system" into international politics, a legacy that Wight continued to use (Wight, 1977, p. 113). Wight wrote a detailed account on the systems of states. He distinguishes systems of states into two categories: an international states-system, and a suzerain state-system. In an *international states-system*, the system is composed of sovereign states. In a *suzerain state-system*, the system is composed of one supreme state that maintains control over the rest. This domination is permanent and unchallengeable. While the fundamental principle of the international states-system is maintaining the balance of power, for the suzerain state-system it is *divide et impera* (Wight, 1977, p. 24).

Wight also differentiates systems of states into: a primary states system, and a secondary states system. *The primary states system* is a system composed of states. *The secondary states system* is a system composed of systems of states, such as the relations between Western Christendom, Eastern Christendom and the Abbasid Caliphate in the Middle Ages (Wight, 1977, pp. 24–26). According to Wight (1977, p. 34), a states-system cannot be established without a certain cultural resemblance between the member states. Thus, it is necessary to make further inquiries to the cultural community of the states. There are several characteristics of this community. First, it has a cultural unity among its member states. The degree of the cultural unity also determines the degree of its sense of distinctness from the other. Higher internal unity leads to more pronounced differences with the others, even a higher discrimination against others, which, according to Wight, might culminate in the concept of Holy War (Wight, 1977, pp. 34–35).

The second cultural characteristic of this community of states is the presence of internal factionalism. The stronger the factionalism is inside a community, the bigger the strain is being put upon the states-system. A strong sense of factionalism can lead to the denial of other factions' right to exist within the states-system. Wight draws on historical evidence, starting from the factionalism inside the ancient Greek states-system, the Religious Wars in the

European state-system, to contending schools of thought in the Chinese states-system (Wight, 1977, pp. 35–39).

Hedley Bull's Anarchical Society

Bull draws heavily upon Wight's ideas and developed some more on his own. Bull affirms the necessity of the state-system but put more emphasis on the non-state aspect of the world. Bull also makes a distinction between *system* and *society*, something that was lacking in Wight's writing. Bull opens his explanation on world society by explaining order in society. Bull defines order in a society as "a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary or universal goals" (Bull, 2002, p. 4). These particular goals can be, but are not limited to: (1) the desire to preserve life; (2) to ensure compliance on promises and agreements; and (3) to maintain a certain degree of stability in property and possession (Bull, 2002, p. 4). These three goals, simplified by Bull (2002, p. 5) as goals of life, truth and prosperity, are elementary in the sense that the expectation of these goals is the foundation of a society. Without these expectations, a group of people is not a society at all. They are also primary, since the fulfilment of these goals becomes the precondition for the fulfilment of other goals in a society. They are also universal, because they are prevalent in all actual societies, without regard to the conventional boundaries of time and place (Bull, 2002, p. 5).

Putting this concept into international relations, Bull (2002, p. 8) defines *international order* as "a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society'. Bull then further identifies necessary elements in international order: state, international system and international society. *State*, according to Bull (2002, p. 8) is an independent political community, the government of which has both the right of sovereignty over a particular territory and particular people, and the capability to actually exercise it. Sovereignty possessed by a state comes in two forms, internal sovereignty, which means "supremacy over all other authorities within that territory and population," and external sovereignty, which means "independence of outside authorities'.

A *system of states*, or *international system*, will form whenever two or more states have intensive enough contacts with one another, thus creating relations that influence one another and making them behave as parts of a whole.

Without the intensive contacts and influences affecting one another, these independent states do not form a system of states even though they exist in the same time frame (Bull, 2002, p. 9). The formation of a system of states might be the result of direct relations between states. Or, it might be the result of indirect chains of relations between states (Bull, 2002, p. 10). A *society of states*, or *international society*, is a collection of states which have common interests and common values, bound together by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and that adhere to a common institution, such as the international law and customs of war (Bull, 2002, p. 13).

In addition to the goals of social order, international order has its own specific goals. The goals of international order are: (1) the preservation of the system and society of states itself; (2) maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states; and (3) maintaining peace among member states of international society, resorting to war only in special circumstances according to generally accepted principles (Bull, 2002, pp. 16–17). Peace, in this sense, is subordinate to the first and second goals. While states are the dominant type of social groups, there are possibilities that people may be grouped in another form. Also, while people are grouped into states, it is possible that at the same time, they are grouped in other ways too. Thus, it is important to think on a deeper scale and contemplate the social life of mankind as a whole, not limited to the social interactions of the states. The presence of order in human activity that advocates the elementary and primary goals of mankind as a whole is dubbed by Bull as *world order* (Bull, 2002, p. 19).

Bull (2002, p. 21) notes that are three distinctions between world order and international order. First, world order is wider than international order because it encompasses not only order among states but also order inside a state (municipal or provincial) and order within the wider world. Second, world order is more fundamental than international order because it is concerned with individual human beings, who are permanent, while states (or any other human groups) are not permanent. Third, world order is morally prior to international order. Values embedded in world order are related to humankind, thus must be treated as a primary value.

The world order can be inhabited by many political systems. Bull (2002, pp. 19–20) describes the evolution of political systems, some of which carried the

potential for world order. These range from no political systems at all, to the eighteenth century when world order was a concept without fulfilment, to the current system of states. Bull also explores several alternatives to the system of states, including one he dubs as a world political system. Bull further differentiates between *world political system* and *world society*. The first is characterised with global interdependence and global awareness between political actors. The latter is characterised by common interests and common values of all mankind (Bull, 2002, p. 279). Thus, actors might promote global integration of a political system, but at the same time they do not promote world society. Promoting integration of the political system means these actors integrate the world under their dominant culture rather than integrating the world into common interests and values.

Barry Buzan's idea of Global Society

Barry Buzan both continues and criticises the legacies of Wight and Bull. According to Buzan, the concepts of "international society" and "world society" are the flagship ideas of the English school, which he is part of (Buzan, 2004, p. 1). But Buzan also criticises English school theorists for the lack of clarity with regard to the concept of world society. He sets out to build a coherent conceptualisation of this concept (Buzan, 2004, p. 2).

Figure 1. The classical 'Three Traditions' model of English school theory
Note: Titles in ( ) are Wight's labels; titles in [ ] are the analytical focus; titles along the border zones are where the traditions blend into each other

Figure 1. The English School's "The Three Traditions"
Source: Buzan (2004, p. 9)

Buzan starts his critique by reconstructing the English school's basic approach to international relations. World society is one of the English school's triad; the other two are international system and international society. These concepts are often perceived in terms of the three traditions adopted by Wight and Bull: realism, rationalism and revolutionism (or, Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian). While the conjunction between international system and realism, and between international society and rationalism, poses no serious difficulties, the conjunction between world society and revolutionism "rings several alarm bells" (Buzan, 2004, p. 27).

Indeed, the incompatibility between world society and revolutionism is the first problem with the concept according to Buzan. The second is, world society lacks a world system counter-part. According to Buzan, Bull offered the concept of world political system as the physical counterpoint of world society, but he never developed it because of the dominance of the states-system (Buzan, 2004, p. 28).

The third problem is the different views about the relationship between world society and international society. One position declares that world society exists as a prerequisite for the establishment of international society. This view, mainly adopted by those concerned with development of world society, draws especially from Wight. A second position, adopted by those concerned with the maintenance of international society, is more problematic. On the one hand, it suggests that the development of world society undermines the states and the international system. This antagonistic relation can be seen in the dynamics between individual rights and state sovereignty. On the other hand, there are several universal concepts which strengthen the states and international system, such as the right of self determination (Buzan, 2004, pp. 28–29).

Buzan's theoretical construct of world society begins by making clear the distinction between state and international society on one side, and non-state and world society on the other. In doing this, Buzan acknowledges the special place of states in international relations, while, at the same time, recognising the importance of non-states (Buzan, 2004, pp. 91–92). Elaborating his theoretical construct, Buzan (2004, p. 92) presents his definition of *state* as "any form of post-kinship, territorially-based, politically centralised, self-governing entity capable of generating an inside-outside structure". He leaves out "sovereignty"

and "hard boundaries" deliberately from the characteristics of "state" so that it would encompass broader political entities.

The separation between state and non-state produces consequences for the conceptual construct of the English school. First, it removes Kantianism from world society and places it into solidarist international society. Second, it also removes coercive elements from the world society and moves them to the realist spectrum. Third, it also rejects the notion of world society as the sum of states and non-states. Fourth, it creates a distance between world society and the solidarist tradition, which often uses concepts as "the protective nature of the state" as justification for non-intervention (Buzan, 2004, pp. 93–94).

Buzan's second revision is by abandoning the physical-social distinction. The argument was based on the premise that there is a high degree of overlap between the physical and social. Eliminating the distinction between the two does not mean taking the physical out of the analysis, but it does reduce the importance of the physical aspect; it no longer differentiates one international system from another. Thus, by doing this, Buzan merges the *international system* and *international society*, and eliminates the necessity of world system (as the physical counterpart of world society). At this stage of the argument, the English school's triad has become a dyad between state and international (Buzan, 2004, pp. 98–102).

Buzan then tackles the distinction between society and community. *Society* is defined as a rational, contractual bond between members of the group. *Community* is defined as a sense of membership, identity and responsibility towards other members of the group. Society is about certain expected behaviour between members. Community is about shared identity between members (Buzan, 2004, pp. 110–111). International society is the more developed concept in international relations, particularly in the English school's writings. International society is about all norms, rules and institutions created by states to bring order in their relationships with each other. On the other hand, international community is under-developed in comparison. It is formulated around shared identities among states but how it really works is yet unexplored. At the minimum, Buzan states, international community could share the mutual recognition of sovereignty of the states. Stronger shared identity will give rise to a problematic question: is it possible to create a universal community with (or without) an "Other"? (Buzan,

2004, pp. 121–122). He is here flagging the thorny problem of self-definition by way of implicit or explicit opposition to an 'outsider'.

Buzan (2004, p. 123) argues that the formation of individual and transnational society and community independent of the states-system is "taking one away from much of history and onto unfamiliar ground." It is practically impossible for contemporary individual humans to develop "world society" consisting only of individuals, without the help of any other actors. It is more possible for individuals to develop *world community* by adopting a shared identity. The practice of adopting shared identity has been in the nature of humans without any agential intermediary. The community will enlarge itself whenever it is able to temper the parochial effect of its identity, often by adopting another shared identity and merging with other small groups. Thus, in the end, a world community rests on multiple shared identities, all overlapping between smaller groups, integrating them and moderating the need to identify the "Other" (Buzan, 2004, p. 124).

Addressing transnational actors, Buzan argues that it is possible for them to develop world society among themselves since they are similar to collective units formed by states. But in order to build an "autonomous" transnational society, one has to destroy states, which is difficult to do. Buzan cites the network of guilds in the medieval period as the example of a functioning transnational society without interference from states (Buzan, 2004, p. 125). Yet, it is harder for transnational actors to develop community since there are vastly different types of association, whereby one association might be in a zero-sum competition with another, or one association could claim indifference to another that is distinctly different. There is still a possibility for similar types of transnational actors to form a community, but this would be very segmented and thus unfit to be called "world community" (Buzan, 2004, pp. 126–127).

The different emphasis between individual and transnational actors discussed above leads Buzan to argue that it is proper to divide non-state actors into two groups: individuals and transnational actors. This restores the triadic structure of the English school defined by a distinct type of unit: states, individuals and transnational actors (Buzan, 2004, p. 127). The resulting diagram of the revised concept is as follow:

Plan View = *What* Dimension

SHALLOW
COERCION
CALCULATION
DEEP
BELIEF

Elevation View = *How/Why* Dimension
(Mode/Depth of Internalisation)

Figure 2. "The Three Traditions" revised by Barry Buzan

Source: Buzan (2004, p. 133)

In this revised version of English school traditions, there are three distinct pillars. These are not a spectrum as in the previous version; instead these represent different actors: states, individuals and transnational actors. Thus, these pillars can never overlap one another. While the differentiation between states and non-states is important (since states have privilege as in the study of international relations), the commonalities between individuals and transnational actors are limited. Thus, the two "non-states" are put into different groups, unlike the previous version in which they were put together in "world society" (Buzan, 2004, p. 134).

The individual (or, interhuman) pillar is divided based on how strong its identity integration is. The lowest integration is "fragmented', where interhuman relations form the most basic society: family/clan. The next is "imagined communities', such as nations, religions and other kinds of networks. The highest integration is "universal identities', ranging from the recognition of each other to interhuman relations capable of adopting various shared identities and creating a world civilisation. With humans' complexity and their ability to adopt multiple identities simultaneously, this spectrum does not portray staged, mutually exclusive positions. Thus, it is possible for these forms to exist simultaneously.

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Even the formation of world civilisation would not erase the other forms in this spectrum (Buzan, 2004, p. 135).

The second pillar is transnational actors. This pillar is divided into a spectrum based on how strong the transnational society is. The weakest of all is "no transnational actors'. This condition will happen if there is no single non-state actor, or if any non-state actor's activities are constrained inside a state's territory. At the other end of the spectrum is "pure medievalism', where the transnational actors managed to secure recognition from one another, managed to achieve understanding of the rights and responsibilities of one another and to maintain independence, to a certain degree, from the influence of the states (Buzan, 2004, p. 136).

The third pillar is states, which collaborate into interstate societies. Since the "social" in international relations encompasses broad activities, from enemies to rivals to friends and allies, it also encompasses the Hobbesian model of international relations at one extreme and Kantian at the other. In the middle of these is where the continuum of pluralism-solidarism takes place. Buzan (2004, p. 140) states simply that "pluralism is what happens when pessimists/realists/conservatives think about international relations, and solidarism is what happens when optimists/idealists/liberals do so." The example of pluralist interstate society would be the Westphalian model of the states-system, while the example of solidarist society would be one union of states or a global federation among states (Buzan, 2004, p. 140).

Conceptualising "Global Society"

The challenge in developing a theoretical framework for this thesis is that there is no clear definition of "global society" to use. Each theorist provides his or her own explanation. They even use different terms, with permutations of the usage of various concepts: "international" or "world" or "global"; "society" or "community" or "civilisation". This condition requires me to determine my own definition of global society to use in this thesis. Before doing so, I will describe the definition of several key concepts, the first being "global." While there are many definitions of this term, this thesis will draw upon the definition of Martin

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Shaw in *Theory of the Global State*. According to Shaw (2000, p. 10), *global* is "the quality involved in the worldwide stretching of social relations."

The second concept is "society." Based on a translation from Weber's *Gesellschaft* done by Waters and Waters (2010, pp. 154–155), society is then defined as a group that is held together by rational and utilitarian interactions, connectivities and shared interests. This is in contrast with "community" (*Gemeinschaft*), which refers to a group held together by shared identity and emotional ties. Buzan (2004, pp. 110–111) also follows this distinction. Contrasting society and community like this, however, is taking matters to the extreme. It is probably impossible to find a human group with purely pragmatic motives and utilitarian interactions among them, without the presence of even a trickle of emotion and shared identity to bind them. It is also probably impossible to find a human group that relies solely on shared emotion, common identity and culture to bind their group, without the presence of a single pragmatic motive or self-interested interactions between them.

Consequently, rather than adopting such a stark definition which denies the importance of culture and identities to a society, I propose that there is a continuum between (conceptual) society at one end and (conceptual) community at the other. A human society's position is between these two idealised concepts, thus signifying a mixture of pragmatic interactions and shared identities inside the group. I choose to use "society" in this thesis to put highlight on the establishment of pragmatic interactions and its nuances among humans, which then create a global network and channels in a particular human group, rather than investigating the shared culture or identities among them. Combining the definitions of society and global described above, this thesis then adopts a final definition of "global society" as: "a manifestation of the consciousness that the world is an interconnected and interdependent whole, which binds a group of people in a network of interactions, both in physical and non-physical aspects of human relations".

Building from social constructionism articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966) and the theory of norm life cycle articulated in various works such as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999) and Manners (2002), I focus this thesis on the translocal interactions which might aspire to the formation of a global society. The interactions described in this thesis might be

considered as pragmatic and utilitarian in nature and are not necessarily designed specifically to promote global consciousness and its manifestations. However, as shown in the extensive works by Abu-Lughod (1989), Held (2005) and Buzan (2004), to name a few, even interactions with mundane interests or self-interested motives can bring a hidden message of global consciousness within, which then may unintentionally be transmitted to the other parties in a transference process. These interactions eventually strengthen the translocal connections and become the fabric that constitutes the formed society. How this theoretical framework is applied to the concept of the *umma* and its implementation in Muslim societies is explained in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

Chapter Two:
Towards the Development of Islamic Global Consciousness

The previous chapter has provided a theoretical framework for the concepts of global consciousness and global society. As articulated by Robertson and Inglish (2006, p. 30), global consciousness is the idea and understanding of the world as an interconnected and interdependent whole, unseparated by any boundaries. This idea has emerged throughout history and is fundamental to the aspiration of certain groups of people to form a society transcending local borders. In order for actors to have the notion of global society, not to mention to try to establish one, a global vision is necessary (Robertson, 2009, p. 121; 2011, pp. 1336–1338). The idea that a vision has the power to shape social reality is in line with Berger's and Luckmann's work (1966) on social constructionism. A global consciousness, therefore, will inspire people to establish global connections, which eventually might establish the foundation of a global society.

Unlike global consciousness, the concept of global society is not as easily defined because while global society is a popular term and regularly used in the field of international relations and by various other literatures, there is no single, *global* definition on this term. As Chapter One has illustrated, scholars use this term in a broad way and often differ in their definitions. The debate becomes increasingly complex if it takes for consideration the many permutations of global society such as "international" or "world" or "global"; "society" or "community" or "civilisation." Do these terms refer to one definition? It is most certainly not the case. Are these terms interchangeable? Some would say yes, but terminological differentiation is also possible. Thus, to provide a comprehensive framework, in Chapter One, this thesis proposes its own definition of global society as "a manifestation of the consciousness that the world is an interconnected and interdependent whole, which binds a group of people in a network of interactions, in both physical and non physical aspects of human relations".

With those definitions as the framework, this thesis seeks to address two questions in relation to the Islamic concept of the *umma*: "how did the early

Islamic society develop global consciousness?" and "how is the concept of the *umma* related to the concept of global consciousness and to the concept and historical formation of a global society?". Answering these questions will require extensive discussion, which will be broken down in several chapters of this thesis. This chapter in particular will discuss the development of global consciousness in early Islamic society through the reflection of Islamic teaching and participation in Islamic religious rituals. Subsequent chapters will describe the manifestation of the Islamic global consciousness in Muslim society.

Near East in Late Antiquity

The universal empires

In order to understand how Islam instils global consciousness to its adherents, it is important to understand the pre-existing context surrounding the advent of Islam from the perspective of global consciousness, or the lack thereof. Islam emerged from Arabia in the sixth century CE, in a period defined as "Late Antiquity" by scholars (Donner, 2010, p. 1). Arabia at that time was surrounded by two great empires: the Byzantine Empire and the Sasanid Empire. By the late sixth century, the Byzantines were the rulers of the Mediterranean basin while the Sasanids were the ruler of thriving valleys between the Euphrates and the Tigris, and the land beyond (Durant, 1950). The expansion of both the Byzantine Empire and Sasanid Empire is crucial to the discussion of global consciousness since both the Byzantines and the Sasanids were seeking to establish a universal empire as the manifestation of global consciousness in their societies.

The concept of "universal empire" had deep roots in Roman culture. Long before the Byzantine Empire was established, this concept was proposed by Stoic thinkers such as Zeno and Diogenes who had voiced concepts such as *kosmopolites* (a citizen of the universe) or brotherhood for all humanity. These concepts can be seen as the Greeks' version of global consciousness (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, pp. 31–32). The expansion of Greek influence under Alexander the Great further promoted this global consciousness. Whether Alexander himself was harbouring an intention to unite mankind is open to debate. Tarn (1948, p. 435) claims that Alexander had developed the idea that because God is the common Father of mankind, mankind should be united in a brotherhood of man.

Alexander's expansions brought people from various cultural backgrounds under his banner ostensibly so that they could become one and live in unity, which might be called "the unity of mankind".

Badian (1958) disagrees with this and meticulously constructs arguments which disprove Tarn's assessment. According to Badian, despite reports on Alexander's view of the common fatherhood of God validating Tarn's claim, Badian argues that Alexander also displayed a claim of superiority over the rest of mankind by stressing his heritage as the son of Zeus-Ammon (Badian, 1958, pp. 426–427). He also questions Tarn's treatment of source materials, accusing Tarn of pro-Alexander bias and either mistranslating or misdirecting the readers (or both) (Badian, 1958, p. 432). Thomas (1968), while agreeing with Badian's methodological criticisms, considers that Alexander did play an important role in changing the world's outlook. According to Thomas (1968, p. 258), although Alexander might never have envisioned the unity of mankind as Tarn has claimed, his actions can be understood in that sense.

There are several actions of Alexander which can be perceived as promoting the unity of mankind. Alexander had imagined the fusion of races, especially Greek and Persian, and did so by marrying his soldiers and Persian women. By establishing cities, which served as trade networks and cultural diffusion centres, Alexander also promoted the diffusion of cultures. These developments spurred a shift in philosophical debates on the concept of *Homonoia*, or unity of mankind. While this concept had existed in Greek philosophical thought before Alexander's reign, after his death the concept of *Homonoia* evolved. Instead of being confined to relations between Greek and Greek, it expanded to include non-Greeks. This inclusion of non-Greeks in the concept of *Homonoia* was a step further towards the unity of mankind, which might have never been envisioned by Alexander but gained some traction from Alexander's actions (Thomas, 1968, pp. 258–260).

That Alexander had an important role in expanding the concept of unity of mankind, whether he intended or not, is also supported by other scholars. Heather (1999, pp. 44–46) notes that during the Hellenistic period, Greeks were feeling more comfortable to be considered as citizens of a general Hellenistic world instead of as citizens of a particular polis. Robertson and Inglish (2006, p. 32) further argue that Alexander's expansion also promoted a *lingua franca* for the

known world and spurred the establishment of a "universal historiography" which sought to narrate the history of the "whole world" through a cosmopolitan perspective. Not only did this induce Greek historians to record the history of the known world, it also showed the interconnectedness of the world. Geographically diverse locales were connected in an intricate web of relations, constituting one whole world. This departed from previous traditions that narrated history from local and disjointed perspectives. Thus, whatever intention was driving Alexander to expand his empire, his act gave precedence to the establishment of a global consciousness among people under the Hellenistic empire and kingdoms.

Alexander's legacy did not end with the Hellenistic kingdoms. The Romans adopted this philosophy and practice, and started their own "universal historiography." Polybius, a Greek historian who resided in Rome between 167 and 150 BCE, recorded the history of the world under the Roman Empire as *somatoeides* (organic whole). The history was considered as a whole body, consisting of smaller parts that worked together and were inter-related in very complex ways. Robertson and Inglish (2006, p. 33) note that Polybius deliberately wrote that he was "weaving together the various strands of history into a single tapestry". Polybius' works helped in building global consciousness among the Roman elite. His works were circulated among the Romans' elite and internalised as the proper self-understanding of Romans as a global power. By the first century AD, the position of the Roman Emperor and the city of Rome were viewed in global terms: the Emperor as "guiding spirit of the whole world" and Rome as "the centre of the earth" (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, p. 34).

In the practical sense of common people, the *pax Romana* manifested itself in more mundane, yet no less powerful, ways. Roads the Romans had built and the Romans' protection of the Mediterranean had made people able to travel across the known world. This condition had created waves of migration and social mobility. Pax Romana indeed brought geographically distant areas into one fold, with the Roman Empire at its centre. In this sense, the Roman Empire was an essential mechanism that allowed the flow of goods and people, thus creating unprecedented configurations of persons and places (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, p. 35). Provinces such as Britain, Greece and Syria experienced economic development thanks to the infrastructure provided by the Roman Empire. The agricultural surplus from North African provinces were exported to various places

around the Mediterranean, which stimulated the flourishing of the provinces (Bang, 2007, pp. 14–17).

The flowering of Christianity further developed the global consciousness in the Roman Empire. Early Christianity had been Jewish in composition and in conception, but it was then transformed into a universal movement by St. Paul, embracing both Jewish and Gentile populations in the Roman Empire (Burns, 1991, p. 11). Christianity also brought a strong message of universality and egalitarianism. In pagan Roman society, women had a lower position than men and slaves were below freemen but Christianity ensured that all Christians are equal before the Father (Burns, 1991, p. 15). While there were tensions with imperial institutions, Christianity ultimately tolerated the continuous practices of the pagan Roman Empire and refashioned some to fit its tenets. Only practices that gave associations to paganism were eliminated (Angelov and Herrin, 2012, p. 154). In this light, the doctrine of universal empire from the ancient Roman Empire was both continued and modified to fit the Christian faith.

Like the Hellenistic and then pagan Roman philosophy, Christianity also espoused a type of global consciousness and delivered the message of universal brotherhood using the metaphor of Christians as the body of Christ. By promoting virtues such as hospitality, Christianity helped in establishing broader travel for pilgrims, which in turn provided a sense of unity among Christians (Meeks, 2006, p. 171). Christianity also transformed the symbols and narratives of the pagan empire concerned with global consciousness and universal empire. One important example is the narrative of one ruler for the whole world. In pagan Rome, Caesar was associated with a deity, or even deified, thus entitled to rule the whole world. In Christian Rome, Caesar was seen as the regent of One God on earth, and was therefore granted the divine right to rule the whole world. Constantine's conversion to Christianity had strengthened the universal claim of the Roman Empire (Burns, 1991, p. 32). To support this, Eusebius in his oration argued that the empire of Constantine was the reflection of God's kingdom in Heaven. Since there is one God, there must be only one emperor who derived his power from God (Burns, 1991, p. 52).

This idea of a universal Christian empire lasted even after the split of the Roman Empire. Emperors of Byzantium, acknowledging themselves as the true successor of the Roman Empire, dreamed of a universal state in which all subjects

were loyal politically to the emperor and religiously to the church, headed by the Patriarch of Constantinople (Donner, 2010, p. 5). Byzantine Christian authors enforced this idea by declaring the Byzantine Empire as the fourth great empire in the Book of Daniel, the great empire that would last until the end of time and facilitate the Second Coming of Christ (Angelov and Herrin, 2012, p. 171). Byzantium's efforts to subjugate the known world under its banner was the main cause of tensions between the Byzantine Empire with another rival universal empire, the Sasanid Empire.

While the Byzantine Empire built their claim of universal empire on the foundation of Greek philosophy, Roman legacy and Christian eschatology, the Sasanid Empire based their claim of supremacy on the teaching of Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrianism had been the religion of the Persians long before the Sasanid dynasty, but the Sasanid kings possessed a special relationship with Zoroastrianism. Ardashir I, the founder of the Sasanid dynasty, was not of noble descent. While he had managed to defeat Ardaban of the Arsacid dynasty and this victory had made him the ruler of Persia, he did not have the legitimacy to rule. Thus, he turned to Zoroastrianism, using religious propaganda to establish his legitimacy as the king of kings (Boyce, 1979, pp. 101–102).

In order to build Ardashir I's legitimacy, a priest named Tansar portrayed Ardashir I as a religious reformer; he did his conquest to restore Zoroastrianism into its "pure" form. Tansar then helped Ardashir I to create a single Zoroastrian church and establish a single canonical text. The church and sacred text provided control over Zoroastrians, both inside and outside the empire's borders (Boyce, 1979, pp. 102–103). Zoroastrianism teaches that God willed mankind to achieve the good life in the mundane world through social order, and this order was manifested in the form of the Sasanid dynasty (Zaehner, 1961, p. 284). Thus, the Sasanids were considered to have divine right to rule Persia. Not only did they claim legitimacy from divine rights bestowed by Ahura Mazda, the God of Light in the Zoroastrian faith, the kings also claimed themselves as divine persona. The Sasanian kings were considered as the manifestation of the divine in the mundane realm (Kennedy, 2004, p. 7).

In addition to establishing a legitimate claim to rule Persia for Ardashir I and his descendants, Zoroastrianism also provided the Sasanid emperors the necessary reason to establish a universal empire. Since there was only one God,

and the God acted through the Sasanid royalty, then it was the duty of the Sasanid emperors to lead mankind to the ultimate salvation of the world through the adoption of Zoroastrianism (Zaehner, 1961, p. 300). Since they were the representation of Ahura Mazda over the world, Sasanid kings felt that they were the true master of the world, above petty kings and other earthly powers, including the Byzantines (Donner, 2010, p. 20).

Arabia and the Arabs' identity

Before Islam, Arabia was caught between the two great empires. Arabia itself was named after its people; it means "the land of the Arabs' (Donner, 1981, p. 11; Hoyland, 2001, p. 5). Hoyland (2001, pp. 2–3) notes a classical description of Arabia from various sources. Herodotus (d. c430 BCE) designated Arabia as parts of eastern Egypt, Sinai and the Negev. In Persian administrative records from the reign of Darius (521-486 BCE), a district called *Arabaya* was located between Assyiria and Egypt. According to Hoyland (2001, p. 3), it might be possible that the Persians' designation of Arabia included Herodotus' Arabia with the addition of parts of the Syrian Desert.

The Muslim historian al-Mubarakpuri (1996, pp. 8–9) explains that, linguistically, "Arab" means deserts and barren land without water and vegetation. The way of life in Arabia was shaped by these physical conditions such as climate, the availability of water and the landscape formation. In the southern part of Arabia, in the mountainous area of Yemen, Hadramawt and 'Asir, the winds from the Indian Ocean brought enough moisture to trigger rains. The inhabitants there developed agriculture techniques such as irrigation to better their life. Southern Arabia developed fairly dense population which then opened the possibility of artisans and craftsmen. In other parts of Arabia, where rainfall was too erratic for farming, the inhabitants depended on the presence of oases or reliable subterranean water to provide water for their plants.

Settlements in the Hijaz region, which would be the heartland of Islam, were built around these oases, where people could plant palm groves or other kind of crops (Donner, 1981, pp. 11–14). There were also nomads, Arabian people who roamed the vast steppe and desert environment with their herds. According to Donner (1981, p. 16), there was only a small fraction of Arabs who adopted a purely nomadic life. Most of them were semi-nomads, who practised both

nomadic pastoralism and settled local agriculture in varying degrees. Despite these various differences, there was unquestioningly a shared identity of "being Arabs' in Arabia. Hoyland (2001) argues that there was an Arabisation process that occurred, thus turning the various kingdoms and tribes into one identity: Arab. According to Hoyland (2001, p. 230), the Arabs' homeland was north and central Arabia, from the Fertile Crescent southward to the borders of Yemen, from the west Arabian mountains eastward to Dahna and the Rub al-Khali desert. The Arabs shared a language, the same tribal structure and various religious practices and institutions, and through these Arabisation occurred (Hoyland, 2001, pp. 230–231).

Arabisation itself occurred gradually. During the first millennium BCE, the Arabs existed in their homeland area, sharing the Arabic language as their main identifier (Hoyland, 2001, p. 230) At the first and second centuries CE, several Arab groups from south of Arabia migrated. There was no clear reason as to why these tribes migrated, but several sources such as al-Tabari (1989a, p. 745) propose that the migration was caused by population growth and war. Others such as Mas'udi (2007) suggests that the migration was caused by the breaching of the Marib dam. During the fourth century CE, there were various accounts of settled and nomadic Arabs in various regions of Arabia. There were also treaties between various Arab tribes and also between Arab tribes and both the Romans and Persians (Hoyland, 2001, pp. 238–240). The interactions between Arab tribes and the empires of Byzantine and Sasania also introduced the concept of dynastic rule to the Arabs (Hoyland, 2001, p. 241). As the power and prestige of these dynasties grew, they started to employ poets and artists, mimicking the Byzantines and Sasanians by establishing their own courts in Arabia. This in turn encouraged the development of Arabic poetry, which reached its peak in the early sixth century CE (Hoyland, 2001, pp. 241–242).

There were several instruments that were imperative in constructing Arab identity. First was poetry. Hoyland (2001, pp. 242–243) explains the importance of poetry in building the Arab identity. Using poetry, poets established an idealised version of Arab virtue (*muruwwa*) such as courage, generosity, fidelity and loyalty. These values were promoted in each and every poem, and a great act on these values would be exulted in poems. To be immortalised in a poem was considered as a great honour among the Arab people. The ideals promoted by

these poems became a shared identity and bonds among the Arabs. Poetry was also imperative in the construction of Arab identity by introducing the "high" language of poetry. Arabic poetry used distinctive dictions which transcended local dialects. This language of poetry was not only the language of arts; it also a symbol of intelligence and class. It unified the elites and learned ones from various tribes into one intellectual community. Poetry also served as storage for collective memory. The poems sought to immortalise virtuous deeds done in a tribe and, subsequently, commemorate these stories into the common history of the Arab people.

The second instrument for the development of Arab identity was kinship. Kinship played a very crucial part in constructing Arab identity (Kennedy, 2004, p. 16). Since resources were very scarce in Arabia, families banded together and helped each other in basic survival. Larger families grouped together for general economic purposes. Yet, even larger, kinship based families sharing common ancestors grouped together for political strength (Hodgson, 1974a, pp. 148–149). These kinship based groups often called themselves, and were called by others, after the name of a late ancestor (Kennedy, 2007). Outsiders were addressed cordially, but were never part of the tribe unless they pledged their loyalty to the tribe (and thus, leaving their old tribe). This condition made the rights of outsiders limited. Tensions also existed in the daily relations between a member of a tribe and a member of another. Injuries caused by outsiders to a member of the tribes were regarded as injuries to the whole tribe, caused by the whole group where the perpetrator belonged (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 149).

The third instrument was religion. While the Arabs were polytheists and each tribe or society venerated a particular god, all Arab religions shared certain characteristics, which made it possible for these religions to coexist and provide common ground for interaction. The most important element that bound the Arabs together and made cooperation among them possible, even when water and food were scarce and conflicts were common, was the concept of *haram. Haram* was a sanctuary where Arabs worshipped their gods (Serjeant, 1999, p. 169). It was forbidden to shed blood or to engage in violence inside the *haram* boundaries and its surrounding area (Kennedy, 2004, p. 25). This made the *haram* a place where people could meet safely for both religious and mundane reasons such as visiting a market, settling quarrels and arranging marriages and alliances between various

tribes (Donner, 2010, p. 30). The guardian of the *haram* and his descendants were considered a holy family which had certain privileges and authority (Serjeant, 1999, pp. 171–173).

These unique characteristics unwittingly impacted on the political structure of the Arabs. The variation in way of life determined the form of political institution that the tribe adopted. The Yemen, which had relatively plenty of water and had been able to settle more comfortably in their territory, developed more complex political institutions than the rest of Arabia (Donner, 2010, p. 28). There had been kingdoms in this area, and several were well-known even to non-Arabs such as Saba' or Hadramawt. These kingdoms eventually gave way to even more complex political institutions, such as the kingdom of Himyar. In other parts of Arabia, where life was harsh and vital resources were scarce, tribalism was the prominent form of political institution. Unlike kingdoms, tribes have no specialised institution as a mean to maintain law and order. Therefore, a person's life, honour and goods were protected by his relatives. If something bad befell the person, then his whole family was obliged to assist him during the troubles (Hoyland, 2001, p. 113). Such a society knitted its members together in tight relations. Each member had to pledge to help other members of his tribe in good or bad conditions. Because the support of the tribe was vital to survive in a desert environment, one placed his or her utmost loyalty on to the tribe (Kennedy, 2007, pp. 37–39).

The Arabs were further divided into two large groups: those who dwelled in cities (*ahl al-qura*) and those who roamed the desert as nomads (*ahl al-badiya/al bawadi*). At times, the city dwellers and the nomads were of the same tribe. For example, Lecker (2009, p. 158) noted an historical account describing that there were farmers from the Sulami tribe who tended their tribe's plantation at Suwariqiyya, and there were also nomads from the Sulami tribe who tended the cattle, especially camels. Both of these elements were part of the same tribe and had a share in the plantation worked by the farmers. Between these two elements, they shared strong bonds which made alliances and cooperation between city dwellers and nomads possible.

During the sixth century, there were several strong political entities in Arabia. In south Arabia, there was the Arabian kingdom of Himyar. The last of the Arabian southern kingdoms, Himyar, forged alliances with several

neighbouring warrior tribes of Kinda, Madhhij and Murad to ensure its safety and influence. In central and northern Arabia, there was no kingdom present. The tribes were independent and engaged in complicated oaths of alliances and vendettas against each other. In general, there were two types of tribal confederation in central and northern Arab. The first type were confederations dominated by warrior nomads. This type of confederation was characterised by the lack of *haram* as its spiritual centre and with a high value on the military prowess of the leader. The strongest warrior tribe then became the leader of this confederation, the one who established and enforced order, and the one who protected other members, using arms and military prowess if necessary (Donner, 1981, p. 42). The second type of confederation was dominated by dynastic nobility. This confederation was led by a family of "nobles", who were not a warrior tribe but capable of controlling nomadic groups in their area using diplomacy and religious legitimacy (Donner, 1981, p. 45).

Global and parochial consciousness in Arabia

Despite located far from the centres of larger civilisation, Arabia was not isolated from the dynamics of the region. Arabian people was connected to both the Byzantine and Sasanian Empires through economic, cultural and religious interactions. Both Christianity and Zoroastrianism were present in pre-Islam Arabia, along with various Jewish tribes, providing Arabs with spiritual guidance alongside their traditional pagan religions (Donner, 1999, pp. 4–5). Arabia was located in a strategic position for both empires but its vast desert and arid climate provided difficulties for foreigners and invaders. Even though it was important for the Byzantines and Sasanids to establish their presence in Arabia in order to fulfil their vision of a universal empire, it was difficult for both empires to subjugate and directly control all of Arabia. Thus, the empires chose an indirect route to control the peninsula (Lecker, 2009, pp. 163–166).

The Byzantines' strategy was to build alliances with the warrior tribes. The Byzantines chose a warrior tribe called Banu Ghassan to be the leader of their allies and to provide military auxiliaries to the empire. The Ghassanids were a tribe that had immigrated into Syria around 400 CE and built up a strong network of alliances a century later (Donner, 1981, p. 43). The chiefs of Ghassan were recognised by the Byzantine Emperor as *phylarch*, a tribal affiliate of the empire.

They received money and weapons from the Byzantines and, in return, were expected to fight for the empire's cause (Donner, 2010, p. 32). The Sasanids, on the other hand, chose to ally themselves with several noble families of Arabia. The best known of Sasanids' allies was the Lakhmid dynasty of al-Hira. Their seat was located in the lower part of contemporary Iraq. The leaders of the Lakhmids were crowned as kings, strengthening their status and prestige in the eyes of local tribes (Donner, 1981, p. 45). These Lakhmid kings appointed governors to the territories from Iraq to Bahrayn. Each of these governors then worked together with a Bedouin chief to manage the territory and provide security for their patrons' interests (Lecker, 2009, p. 164).

Both the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids were bound to give military assistance to their respective patrons. They were involved in various Roman-Persian wars. The Ghassanids even attacked the Lakhmids' capital of al-Hira at 570 CE. Other than direct military assistance, the Ghassanids and Lakhmids also supported their patrons' interest by extending Byzantine and Sasanid influences in Arabia. Both tribes competed in gaining the loyalty and obedience of various Arab tribes. They also provided security to any Byzantine or Sasanid interests in Arabia. The Ghassanids were especially tasked with preventing other nomad groups from raiding and plundering Byzantine settlements in Syria (Donner, 2010, p. 32). This is also recorded in Muslim historical accounts. Muslim historian Mubarakpuri (1996, p. 21) highlights how at that time, Arabs of Iraq could face Arabs of Syria in battle despite their shared ancestry because they served different empires.

By becoming Byzantine and Sasanid vassals, the Ghassanids, the Lakhmids and other Arab tribes unwittingly embraced the consciousness of a universal empire, with their respective patron as the leader of this universal empire. That these Arab tribes were having pragmatic motives in their relations with the empires was without question. After all, the study of norms by Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999, pp. 15–16) describes that it is possible for parties to maintain their pragmatic agendas while adopting a certain normative discourse. In the case of the Arab tribes, these pragmatic motives did not preclude the Arab vassals' adoption of a broader consciousness. On the contrary, the pragmatic motives further strengthened or provided incentives for these vassals to embrace the global consciousness introduced by the empires.

A tribe entering an agreement with the Byzantine Empire or the Sasanid Empire acknowledged the legitimacy of the empire's claim of universal rule and willingly put themselves inside that frame of thought as a subservient party. By entering in agreement with the empire, the tribe became an integral part of the empire's vision of a universal empire, perhaps unwittingly acting as a promoter of global consciousness in the form of universal empire. The tribe would strive for the benefits of its patron, and would receive benefits in return. Without the existence of their patrons, and without their patrons' ambition to establish the universal empire, these vassals would lose their privileged status and also would lose the source of their income and other material benefits.

This behaviour was in contrast with the behaviour of the Quraysh, the Arab tribe that inhabited Mecca. The Quraysh of Mecca were not strangers to the outside world. The city of Mecca was one of the great trading centres in Arabia (Lecker, 2009, p. 166). From Mecca there were two major trade routes. One connected Yemen and the Indian Ocean in the south to the Mediterranean lands and Syria in the north. The other connected Persian territories in the west to Abyssinia and Africa in the east (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 154). During the sixth century, the Quraysh were merchants and often journeyed far to trade. The Quraysh arranged trade caravans and established trade routes from Yemen to Syria and back again to Yemen, with Mecca as the hub (Kennedy, 2007). They interacted with Byzantines and Persians and their vassals during their voyages.

There was another reason that established Quraysh's reputation as one of the important tribes in Arabia. Mecca was the home of the Ka'ba, an ancient shrine deemed holy by the Arabs. The presence of the Ka'ba ensured Mecca's status as a *haram* land, where various people routinely made their pilgrimage. The Quraysh as the guardians of the shrine were thus considered religious aristocrats among the Arabs (Serjeant, 1999, p. 179). Combined with its strategic location and security provided by the *haram*, Mecca developed into a well-established centre of trade fairs and religious pilgrimages and the Quraysh enjoyed an elevated status among the Arabs (Kennedy, 2007).

Yet, while they were well known by the great empires and their vassals, the Quraysh were very careful in maintaining a neutral stance in conflicts between Byzantines and Sasanids. Hodgson (1974a, p. 147) explains that during the heightened rivalry between Byzantines and Sasanids, the people of Mecca and the

surrounding area of Hijaz managed to remain neutral. This was not an easy feat. Maintaining a stance of neutrality between two great empires required a great deal of information, networking and political shrewdness from the Quraysh leaders. During this period, the Quraysh and the Arab tribes in Hijaz saw Byzantines, Persians and their vassals as the "Other." Hodgson (1974a, pp. 153–156) states that relations between the Quraysh and the "Other" were purely financial. The Quraysh were very careful to stay neutral from the contestation between the empires.

Peters (1999, p. xlvii) describes that the only intense interaction between the Quraysh and the outsiders was Abraha's assault on Mecca. The assault, according to Peters, was part of a series of efforts by the Byzantine Empire and its vassals intended to secure their interests in the area and to hamper the Sasanids' influence. The attack against Mecca was preceded by the persecutions of Christians by Dhu Nuwas, the king of Yemen. With the support of the Emperor Justin I, Abraha dispatched a contingent of soldiers to attack Dhu Nuwas. After succeeding in conquering Yemen, Abraha was proclaimed the king of Yemen and then attacked Mecca (Huxley, 1980). This action, according to Peters (1999, p. xlvii), was intended to hamper the perceived Sasanids' influence over the territory. This expedition was an important turning point in the manifestation of Byzantine global consciousness and the Quraysh's rejection of it.

Islamic sources confirm this event and remember it as the War of the Elephant (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, p. 20). This event was described in detail by the classical Muslim historian, Ibn Ishaq, in his *Sirah*. According to Ibn Ishaq (1967, p. 20), Abraha was a soldier in the army sent by Christian Abyssinia, which was a Byzantine vassal, to attack Dhu Nuwas, a Jewish king of Yemen who had massacred thousands of Yemeni Christians. After conquering Yemen, Abraha overthrew his leader and became the governor of Yemen. He ruled Yemen as a vassal of Abyssinia, which in turn was a subject of the Byzantine Empire. Ibn Ishaq (1967, pp. 21–22) described that Abraha built a great cathedral in Sana'a and intended to make the cathedral the centre of religious activities in the region. Jealous of the status of the Ka'ba, he then decided to attack Mecca. The Quraysh, who at that time were under the leadership of Abdul Muthallib, the Prophet Muhammad's grandfather, were trying to prevent the attack by diplomacy, to no avail (Ibn Ishaq, 1967, p. 24). At the end of the day, it was not political

shrewdness that saved the Quraysh. Abraha's attempt failed because, according to Islamic tradition, of divine intervention. God sent armies in the form of flocks of birds which threw stones at the soldiers and the war elephants, injuring and killing them (Ibn Ishaq, 1967, p. 26). This event was mentioned in the Qur'an, in *sura* number 105, *al-Fiil* (the Elephants).

This expedition was the result of global consciousness projected by the Byzantine Empire and inevitably bound the Abyssinians to comply. Abyssinians then manifested the global consciousness into an action: sending soldiers to revenge the Christians of Yemen. While this also gave practical and political benefits to the Abyssinian king, who extended his sphere of influence to Yemen by proxy, this action also enforced the universality and globality of Christianity under the patronage of the Byzantine Emperor. After Abraha had secured the throne of Yemen, he became another actor whose actions inevitably enforced the idea of a universal empire under the Byzantine Empire. His decision to attack Mecca, whether to increase his status in the region, to comply with Byzantine pressure to counter the Sasanids' movements or both, was the manifestation of a Byzantine-centred global consciousness. If he was to succeed in conquering Mecca, then without a doubt, Mecca would be assimilated into the Byzantine Empire's sphere of influence. But since he failed, Mecca maintained its independence from both empires. Whether there was divine intervention or not, Abraha's failure reinvigorated the religious faith of Arab tribes in Hijaz. The gods of Mecca were victorious against Christ. This elevated the Quraysh's authority as guardian of a *haram*, bolstered their pride and strengthened the parochial consciousness of the Quraysh.

Message and Rituals

The previous sections of this chapter show that during Late Antiquity, there were two competing ideas of universal empire in the Near East, supported by the Byzantine Empire and the Sasanid Empire. These ideas can be categorised as a global consciousness, since both ideas acknowledged the existence of the world outside their boundaries and sought to incorporate the foreign local into the union and establish the aspired world union. While neither the Byzantine Empire nor the Sasanid Empire was able to create a complete global society, they managed to

create a sense of globality inside their respective domains. Any institutional establishment within their domain further promoted global consciousness by enforcing the idea of universal rule and facilitating the promotion of pragmatic interests within the boundaries of the empires.

The Byzantine Empire's and Sasanid Empire's efforts to manifest their universal empire also affected various Arab tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. Unable to control Arabia directly, the empires chose vassalage as the viable strategy. While it did not assimilate the Arab tribes into a Byzantine or Persian society, this strategy unwittingly bound the vassal tribes into the universal empire frame of thought promoted by the two empires . The vassals became active actors who diffused the global consciousness and, for several reasons, worked hard to achieve the goal of universal empire. At least, the vassals sought to maintain the status quo, since without their patrons these tribes would have lost their privileged positions. The Ghassanids, the Lakhmids and various other Arab tribes were unwittingly adopting global consciousness and by ensuring their own interests, inadvertently contributed to the manifestation of a global society.

The Quraysh of Mecca adopted a distinct attitude from that of the other Arab tribes. Instead of adhering to the great empires' schemes, the Quraysh maintained a standoffish neutrality to the empires. They managed to establish trade routes to various territories under the influence of both empires but avoided any commitments or hostilities to both. When Abraha, an agent of Byzantium's global consciousness, sought to subsume Mecca into Byzantium's sphere of influence, his plan failed. This incident justified the status of the Quraysh as the guardian of the sacred site, the Ka'ba, and reinforced their policy of neutrality. This decision to stay away from "outside" affairs while acknowledging their presence can be addressed as the manifestation of parochial consciousness embedded in the Quraysh.

The position of the Quraysh in the sixth century with their parochial consciousness is in contrast with their position in the seventh century. Instead of maintaining their parochial consciousness through a policy of neutrality, the Quraysh became the motor of an Arabian expansionary force. More than engulfing all Arabia, this force challenged the great empires and managed to destroy the Sasanids. By the eighth century, they were establishing an empire of their own, one that continued to grow for centuries. The Quraysh's parochial

consciousness no longer existed. Instead, there was a global consciousness that drove the people to continue expanding through various means.

This thesis thus argues that this development within Quraysh society was caused by the advent of Islam. Islam instilled global consciousness among the Quraysh, transforming them from a standoffish society into an active society aspiring to establish their version of a global society. There are several doctrines and rituals in Islam that when taught by Muhammad, inspired a global consciousness in the Quraysh of Mecca and other people who decided to embrace Islam during the early years. To bring evidence to this argument, the subsequent section of this thesis will explain the message and rituals of Islam that instilled global consciousness. The first is the concept of *tawhid*, or the Oneness of God and *taqwa*, the appraisal of someone's worth in front of God. The second is the concept of *rahmatan lil 'alamin*. The third is the moment of *hijra*. The fourth is the ritual of *hajj*. By learning these doctrines and performing the rituals, Muslims in the early years of Islamic history were taught to think beyond their parochial consciousness. The result was the expansion of Muslims outside their traditional domain.

The role of Qur'an and hadith as references

The teaching of Islam is codified in two main sources: the Qur'an, as the words of God conveyed through Muhammad, and the *hadith*, the sayings and habits of Muhammad narrated by chains of reputable scholars. The majority of Muslims will accept these as the authoritative texts in Islamic tradition. Therefore, in order to understand the Islamic message and rituals that introduced global consciousness, this section will use the Qur'an and *hadith* as references. This section will also use the works of Muslim scholars which provide context and explanation for the texts of the Qur'an and *hadith*. Using religious texts to explain social and political behaviour might be considered problematic, at the very least, because of the temptation to turn the analytical work into a *deus ex machina* type of explanation. However, abandoning religion as a driving force in social and political activities would be equally unwise, since most of human societies possess religious patterns and expressions which play fundamental roles in the development of society. This thesis therefore will use religious texts and rituals to

explain social and political phenomena, cautiously using Geertz's work (1973), "Religion as a cultural system", as a guiding framework.

According to Geertz (1973, p. 96), religious activities have the ability to induce motivations and moods in the believers. Motivation is a persisting tendency to perform certain sorts of acts and experience certain sorts of feelings in a certain sort of condition. Motivations are "made meaningful" with reference to the end. Moods occur when a person is properly stimulated by religious activities. Moods are "made meaningful" with references to the conditions that produce them. Geertz then concludes that religion can play an important part in social activity, with the activity in turn gaining the attribute of 'religious'. A charity, for example, can be called a "Christian charity" when it is enclosed in the Christian concept of God's purpose. Optimism can be called a "Christian optimism" when it is based in a particular Christian conception of God's nature (Geertz, 1973, pp. 96–98).

Geertz notes that when a person embraces religious belief, he or she accepts the authority of the religion or the institutionalisation of the symbols of the religion. The believer complies with the conception of order that the symbols of the religion have formulated (Geertz, 1973, p. 109). During religious rituals, which fuse motivations and moods with conception of order, a person experiences the merging of the world as lived and the world as imagined. This will leave the person with a profound effect which will transform his worldview even after completing the rituals (Geertz, 1973, p. 112). But since religious ritual is spatially and temporarily limited, no person will live in religious rituals for all of the time. According to Geertz, the most important function of a religious ritual, outside the boundaries of the ritual itself, is that the ritual provides the believer a tool to reflect back on the conceptual world order as determined by the religion so that the individual could take it as a bare fact and internalise it (Geertz, 1973, p. 119).

Geertz's observation on the power of religious symbols and rituals can be further elaborated using Kertzer's (1988) work on the importance of rituals in politics. While not limiting the use of the terminology to religious rituals, Kertzer does include religious rituals in his work. Kertzer argues that religious rituals and worship of god are the symbolic way of a people to worship their society. Thus, religious rituals are important in political activities (Kertzer, 1988, p. 9). Participating in rites establish links for the people to abstract concepts such as

citizenship and the greater world outside. According to Kertzer, people have tendencies to assign sacred, cosmological meanings to their society. It is through rituals that people justify their society as a "proper" order and relations between individuals and groups (Kertzer, 1988, p. 37). More so, rituals also introduce a particular worldview to the people and make it possible for the people to build emotional attachment to the worldview (Kertzer, 1988, p. 40). By participating in, and maybe manipulating, a ritual, political actors can ascertain their position as the ruling class in a certain society (Kertzer, 1988, pp. 40–41).

Using religion in explaining social and political behaviour, as this thesis will do, therefore is not an effort to conjure a *deus ex machina* explanation, but to seek the ways in which religion and religious rituals inspire and transform social and political behaviour. After all, religion is sociologically interesting not because it describes the social order, but because it shapes it (Geertz, 1973, p. 119). This position is also supported by the theoretical framework previously discussed in Chapter One. As Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 127–134) describe, mythology and theology can become legitimation instruments for a symbolic universe. In the case of this thesis, the symbolic universe is the concept of the *umma* and the teaching and rituals of Islam are part of the instruments which legitimate it.

Still, using the holy texts, in this case using the Qur'an and *hadith*, as the basis of a scientific inquiry is a matter of contention. Crone and Cook (1977, p. 3) argue that there is no hard evidence that the Qur'an had existed before the last decade of the seventh century. Crone (2003, pp. 5–7) claims that the situation in Arabia during the first century after Muhammad's death was so turbulent with internal tensions and external polemics that their narration of history was irrevocably damaged. According to Crone (2003, p. 7), the religious tradition of Islam was built during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, disconnected from the real history of Muhammad. Therefore, Crone (2003, p. 8) criticises the usage of *hadith* as the basis for reconstructing the first century of Islamic history.

Peters (1991), however, argues to the contrary. Regarding the authenticity of the Qur'an, he stated that there are no variants of great significance in the Qur'anic texts. This is due to the careful preservation of the text, after Muhammad's dictations to the Companions, through the scribes' and secretaries' efforts to codify them (Peters, 1991, pp. 293–295). Qur'anic texts were preserved with a great care as to exclude redactional bias (Peters, 1991, pp. 298–299). On

the authenticity of *hadith*, Peters's opinion is more cautious. While he acknowledges critics of the authenticity of *hadith*, including Crone, he also acknowledges the usefulness of using *hadith* as a historical source through the process of arranging the *hadith* in a coherent order or to deduce the evolutionary thinking in Mecca from a comparison with other religious cultures (Peters, 1991, p. 307).

In line with Peters' argument, this thesis, instead of completely disregarding the Qur'an and the *hadith*, will draw upon these holy texts to better understand the process of thought and the development of the global consciousness of Muslim society. However, far from using the Qur'an and *hadith* as a divine power that provides unchallenged explanation, it will see the Qur'an as the source of inspiration of global consciousness which was then articulated by Muhammad, or using Berger's and Luckmann's (1966) terminology, externalised by him. This thesis will see the *hadith* as the instrument of objectivation of the idea of a global *umma*, in which Muhammad put his idea into languages and material instruments available to him. Further, this thesis will observe how the Qur'an and the *hadith* create moods and motivations which affect the believers, consistent with Geertz's (1973) concept of religion as a cultural system. In other words, this thesis will position the Qur'an and *hadith* as the texts that inspire global consciousness in early Muslims, but the manifestation of global consciousness and the development of a global society were social and political processes and phenomena, not divine ones.

Tawhid

The first and foremost doctrine of Islam is *tawhid*, or the Oneness of God. The Islamic conception of God is clearly stated in *sura* 112, al-*Ikhlas* (The Fidelity) verse 1-4:

> Say: He is Allah, the One and Only
> Allah, the Eternal, Absolute;
> He begetteth not, nor is He begotten;
> And there is none like unto Him.

According to al-Suyuti (2008, p. 649), this *sura* was revealed when a group of unbelievers asked Muhammad for a description of Allah. According to Ibn Kathir (2000b), this *sura* has another name, which is al-*Tawhid* (Oneness of God). The *sura* declares the name of God as Allah. It puts emphasis on the

characteristics of God: that He is One and Absolute. He has no contemporaries, no parent, spouse or child. This complete rejection of other gods or supernatural beings is also reflected in the Islamic statement of belief, *laa illaha illa Allah*, there is no god but Allah. Al-Qaradawi[2] (1995, pp. 39–41) elaborates the doctrine of *tawhid* further by stating that as God is One and Absolute without contemporaries, then mankind must only direct their fear and hope at God. There is no one who can put others at harm or give benefits, without His consent. Accordingly, mankind should strive for their ultimate goal: to gain His approval. There are several Qur'anic verses that provide details on the proper behaviour approved by God.

Since there is only one God, Islam as the religion blessed by Him calls on the whole humanity. This concept of universalism of Islam is called *fitra*. According to Rubin (2003, p. 74), Islam's self-image as the religion of *fitra* became the justification for spreading of Islam. Embracing Islam means coming back to the very fundamental nature of mankind, regardless of one's racial, social or cultural background. On the societal level, this self-image is reflected in Islamic historiography, which identifies Islam as the message brought by prophets since the first human, as described in the Old Testament. This kind of attitude is supported by Islamic religious accounts that call previous prophets and their followers as "Muslims"[3]. Thus, to be a Muslim means following the footpath of not only Muhammad but also those of Jesus and Moses and the patriarchs of Israel. More than that, it also means following Abraham, Noah and other figures to Adam, which Rubin considers as "pre-national" (Rubin, 2003, pp. 78–87).

Yet, despite this universalism of Islam, racial discriminations were observed in early Muslim society, quite in contrast with the message of *tawhid*

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[2] Al-Qaradawi is a renowned modern scholar of Islam. He is best described as a modernist-traditional Muslim scholar. He seeks new interpretations of various Islamic teachings, which would fit with modern situations, but he still is rooted deeply in traditional sources. While there might be controversies about him and his opinions on certain issue, al-Qaradawi's influence on constructive dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims is notable. See Mandaville (2005) "Toward a Virtual Caliphate" for a discussion on why al-Qardhawi is a prominent figure in contemporary Muslim world.

[3] An example of such religious accounts is Qur'an *sura* 2 *al Baqara* verse 136. Translation of the verse by Sahih International is as follows:

Say, [O believers], "We have believed in Allah and what has been revealed to us and what has been revealed to Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the Descendants and what was given to Moses and Jesus and what was given to the prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and we are Muslims [in submission] to Him."

and *fitra*. In regard to racial discriminations, there is one important verse to be taken into consideration:

> O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you (*taqwa*). Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted.
> *Sura* 49 *al-Hujurat* (Inner Apartments), verse 13.

Al-Suyuti (2008, p. 530) provides context and explanation to the above verse. The verse was revealed to admonish a racial act conducted after the victory of Muslims over the pagan Quraysh of Mecca. At that time, Muhammad had asked Bilal, one of his trusted companions, to perform the call to prayer (*adhan*) as a symbol of Islam's triumph over paganism. Bilal then climbed the Ka'ba and started the call for prayer. Seeing a black man and former slave had been bestowed with this privilege, some people complained that surely there were better candidates to perform this sacred duty than a former slave. Others snickered and mocked Bilal because of his skin colour and status. The verse was then revealed to reproach this racist behaviour.

This verse conveys a strong message about universal brotherhood of mankind in Islam. Theologically, *tawhid* teaches Muslims to reject the existence of another being as god or pseudo god, whether it has human or supernatural characteristics. Islam was eliminating the power of god kings, tyrants and despots. A Muslim should never consider himself as a god, nor consider other humans as a god or a god-like figure. A human should never bow, prostrate or kiss the ground before any other human. The Muslims understood this point abstractly. But the incident of racism against Bilal proved that, in practice, it was hard to eliminate a deep-rooted prejudice. Slavery had been considered normal and slaves with different skin colour were considered as sub-human. Even after "being liberated" by Islam, for some people, a black, former slave, was still considered as sub-human regardless of his status as a beloved Companion of the Prophet. Therefore, this verse was very important to the Muslims at that time since it directly admonished racism and symbolically enforced the message that Islam seeks to eliminate racist behaviour among the believers, bringing them back to the *fitra*, the basic nature of humanity, of universal brotherhood.

Surat al-Hujurat verse 13 also provides an alternative to measure one's standing in the society. Instead of using racial background, social status or material possession, this verse introduces *taqwa* as the best indicator to evaluate a person. As a religious concept, *taqwa* can be defined as "observing the Divine ordinances in every walk of life." Other Qur'anic verses provide a description of the behaviour of people with *taqwa*:

> And hasten to forgiveness from your Lord and a garden as wide as the heavens and earth, prepared for the righteous [people with *taqwa*]
> Who spend [in the cause of Allah] during ease and hardship and who restrain anger and who pardon the people - and Allah loves the doers of good;
> And those who, when they commit an immorality or wrong themselves [by transgression], remember Allah and seek forgiveness for their sins - and who can forgive sins except Allah? - and [who] do not persist in what they have done while they know.
> Those - their reward is forgiveness from their Lord and gardens beneath which rivers flow [in Paradise], wherein they will abide eternally; and excellent is the reward of the [righteous] workers.
> *Sura* 3 *Ali Imran* (The Family of Imran), verse 133-136.

Since God condemns racism and measures people by their good behaviour, the early Muslim society also adopted *taqwa* as a social measurement. People were admonished no longer to look at racial attributes, social standings and material possessions to determine one's position in the society. Instead, the early Muslim society used the quantity and quality of one's good behaviour as the social measurement. This was reflected in daily activities among the Prophet's companions. Al-Suyuti (1881, p. 39) narrates a story from Abu Daud and al-Tirmizi where Umar ibn al-Khattab gave half of his property for alms and felt satisfied about his good deeds. Umar thought that, this time, he had given more than Abu Bakr. But to his disappointment, Abu Bakr came and donated more than what Umar had. This event had kindled genuine admiration from Umar ibn al-Khattab for Abu Bakr for the latter's good deeds were greater than other Companions in that time.

The narrative's goal of looking at other's good behaviour, and maintaining one self's good behaviour, became ingrained and formed the idealised basis of an Islamic society where material achievements and social status were relatively unimportant. In this society, various conditions that would usually conjure barriers to human mobility were to be considered insignificant. People would perform

horizontal mobility without being worried about racial background. People could also move up vertically in society without being overly concerned about wealth or lineage. But in this society, piety became an important factor to improve one's standing in the society. Therefore, one century after the Prophet's migration from Mecca to Medina, piety became a valued instrument of social and political mobilisation. People would out-piety others to improve their social and political standing. This is especially true in the political sphere, where political actors used piety to gain legitimacy for their political actions. The instrumentalisation of piety will become an important aspect of discussion in the later part of this thesis.

Rahmatan lil 'alamin

The second doctrine of Islam that introduced global consciousness to the early Muslims is the doctrine of *rahmatan lil 'alamin*. Qur'an *sura* 21 *al-Anbiya'* (The Prophets) verse 107 states that:

> And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a mercy to the worlds.

The Islamic terminology *rahmatan lil 'alamin* is translated as "mercy to the worlds." Ibn Kathir (2000a) explains that this verse was directed to Muhammad, to indicate that his teaching is for mankind in the whole world, not only to certain tribes or people. Anyone, regardless of his or her ethnicity, social status and other conditions, will receive mercy if he or she is willing to accept his message. Even someone who is not a Muslim might benefit from the mercy of Muhammad's teaching. Muslim in his *Sahih* (vol. 32/6284) reported a narration from Abu Hurayra that someone asked Muhammad to curse the polytheists but he replied, "I was not sent as the invoker of curse, rather I was sent as a mercy." This *hadith* shows that, to Muhammad, even the polytheists had rights to receive the mercy of Islam.

The doctrine of *rahmatan lil 'alamin* is the underlying force which motivates Muslims to spread the teachings of Islam to all corners of the world. The doctrine appeals not only to cognitive reasoning of the people of Arabia familiar with the existing rivalries among the empires: since the Byzantines and the Sasanids sought to establish a universal empire, then connectivity is a must? It also appeals to a normative dimension of the believers, that their active

participation is part of a greater good. Who does not want to be part of a movement which spreads mercy to all? This is in line with the legitimation process according to Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 111). Further, this doctrine encourages the development of a sense of social justice among the believers. According al-Qaradawi (1998, pp. 277–279), there are five basic rights in Islamic teaching, known as *al-dharuriyyat al-khams* that need to be protected and preserved. These five basic rights are: the right to live, the freedom of religion, the freedom of thought, the protection of family and bloodlines and protection of property and wealth. Only after every man and woman in the world has their basic rights fulfilled will the world reach the condition of *rahmatan lil 'alamin* prescribed by the verse above. As mercy can only ensue if all five basic rights are prevalent in the whole world, it highlights the nature of Islam as a universal religion (al-Qaradawi, 1995, p. 93).

Muhammad took this mission of mercy seriously. In order to spread the mercy of Islam, Muhammad appealed to tribes and nations beyond the Quraysh through personal visits, sending envoys or diplomatic correspondence. Al-Mubarakpuri (1996, p. 147) notes the first attempt to establish external contact was done by Muhammad by visiting the city of al-Ta'if, approximately 60 kilometres from Mecca. In the summer of 619 CE, accompanied by his freed slave Zaid ibn Harithah, Muhammad spent ten days in al-Ta'if to meet the elite and general populace, inviting them to Islam. Unfortunately, this first attempt was met with failure. Instead of embracing his message, the people of al-Ta'if gave him a hostile reception, forcing Muhammad and Zaid to leave with wounds on their bodies.

Islamic tradition provides a *hadith* on this incident which further highlights the message of mercy brought by Muhammad. Al-Mubarakpuri (1996, p. 150) narrates from al-Bukhari who recorded from 'Urwah ibn al-Zubair, that when Aisha, the Prophet's wife, asked Muhammad whether he had a day worse than the day of Uhud, he recounted his experience in al-Ta'if. Going back from al-Ta'if with wounded body and broken heart, Muhammad saw the angel Gabriel in the sky, calling him and saying that God had sent the angel of the mountains to him. Muhammad was free to order the angels anything he wished, including toppling the mountains and burying al-Ta'if under the mountains. Muhammad instead

forgave the people of al-Ta'if and prayed that God would spare them so that their children could embrace Islam in future.

After the incident in al-Ta'if, Muhammad continued to contact tribes outside the Quraysh. Al-Mubarakpuri (1996, pp. 153–161) notes Muhammad's efforts to contact various tribes and introduce Islam. Classical scholars such as Ibn Ishaq (1967, pp. 194–197) and al-Tabari (1988a, pp. 88–92) also documented Muhammad's attempts. These efforts were futile, since most of these tribes were not interested in a religion that they perceived as a cult of the Quraysh. After some time preaching without success, Muhammad finally gained support from six men from the city of Yathrib. At the next year, the delegation from Yathrib came again, this time numbering twelve men. After twelve years of prophethood, finally there was some good news for Muhammad. He then sent Mus'ab ibn 'Umair as the first ambassador to Yathrib (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, p. 172). This mission succeeded and, in the next year, Yathrib was ready to accept Muhammad. The city then changed its name into *al-Madina al-Munawarra*, or the Radiant City, commonly known as Medina.

Muhammad's mission to spread Islam intensified after he performed *hijra* to Medina. He dispatched ambassadors to the kings of Abyssinia, Bahrain, Alexandria, Yamama, Oman, and Ghassan. He also sent a letter to Heraclius of Byzantium through Jerusalem and another letter to Khusrau II of Persia through al-Madain (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, p. 391). These letters were invitations to Islam and bearing Muhammad's personal seal which consisted of three words: Allah (God), Rasul (Prophet) and Muhammad. For letters to Christian kings, Muhammad included a verse of the Qur'an that addressed the Christians (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, p. 392). These diplomatic missions were met with various results, ranging from a friendly reception from the Negus of Abyssinia and Cyrus the Patriarch of Alexandria, well-known with his Arabic name as al-Muqawqis, to the hostile reception by Khusrau II of Persia (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, pp. 390–405).

Hamidullah (1945) describes how Muhammad also received foreign envoys. He usually received them in the Great Mosque, where they then exchanged gifts and greetings. The whole procession during Muhammad's time was simple, in contrast with the more complex and grand reception in later caliphates (Hamidullah, 1945, pp. 137–139). During their stay in Medina, the

envoys were entertained in special guest houses and enjoyed privileges. For example, the Christian envoys from Najran were allowed to perform their religious prayer inside the Grand Mosque of the Prophet (Hamidullah, 1945, p. 140).

The other efforts of spreading mercy were paradoxically done through wars. Since mercy in the world can only be achieved through the fulfilment of rights, Islam takes oppression as a heavy offence against humanity. Islam teaches Muslims to stand up against oppression and to liberate oppressed people. As strange as it seems, Islam also teaches that mercy can be spread by waging war. Mercy can also be found during war and in the battlefield, as well as in peace missions and diplomatic correspondences. There are verses of the Qur'an that justify the war against oppressors:

> So let those fight in the cause of Allah who sell the life of this world for the Hereafter. And he who fights in the cause of Allah and is killed or achieves victory - We will bestow upon him a great reward.
> And what is [the matter] with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah and [for] the oppressed among men, women, and children who say, "Our Lord, take us out of this city of oppressive people and appoint for us from Yourself a protector and appoint for us from Yourself a helper?"
> Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve fight in the cause of Taghut. So fight against the allies of Satan. Indeed, the plot of Satan has ever been weak.
> *Sura* 4 *al-Nisa'* (The Women) verse 74-76.

Ibn Kathir (2000a) explains that the city with oppressed people referred to in the verses is Mecca that was still under the Quraysh's rule at the time of revelation of this verse. But the verses also speak of a more general condition, about cities where people are being oppressed and justice is non-existent. Thus, it is taught to Muslims to stand up and fight against oppression whenever it exists. To achieve this objective, al-Qaradawi (2004, pp. 17–21) argues that Muslims require a state which accommodates the Islamic orientation of global justice. State in Islam is not an egoistical entity concerned with its national interests. It is not merely the "security device" to protect the *umma* and its interests. But state in Islam is a tool of education, both educating its people and the global world on the virtues of Islam, an actor that actively creates a positive environment for global justice and serves as the vanguard against oppression.

The doctrine of Islamic just war found precedents in Muhammad's sayings to his Companions. Ibn Kathir (2006) narrates several *hadith* in which Muhammad encouraged the Companions to explore beyond Arabia. In one *hadith*, Muhammad foretold several of his Companions that they would conquer Egypt. When they did so, he expected them to treat the Egyptians with good manners and provide them with security (Ibn Kathir, 2006, p. 22). In another *hadith*, Muhammad promised Paradise for the first Muslim army who crossed the sea. Umm Haraam, a female Companion of the Prophet, asked him whether she would be in the army, and he answered that she would (Ibn Kathir, 2006, p. 26). Islamic tradition believes that what Muhammad said was a foretelling of the future. The fulfilments of those events are part of his miracles. While the divine nature of these messages is debatable, Muhammad did send a strong message to his Companions to think beyond the land of Arabia in their mission to spread mercy to the world. In this sense, the expeditions that were launched after his death brought his foretelling into reality. This can be seen as the evidence of Muhammad's divine guidance but it also can be interpreted as the self-fulfilling manifestation stimulated by a strong vision from a charismatic leader. Whichever it was, Muhammad's message, through the use of religious symbols and promise of salvation, had managed to motivate the believers, as Geertz (1973) has described.

The effect of Islamic teaching on the implementation of global justice can be seen in the Muslim historical account which reports dialogue between Rib'i ibn Amir, the envoy from the Muslim army, and Rustum, the leader of the Persian army, before the Battle of Qadisiyya. When Rustum sent a message to Sa'ad ibn Abi Waqqash and asked an envoy from the Muslims, Rib'i was sent to meet the Persian general. During this meeting, Rustum asked Rib'i, what the Muslims truly wanted and what their true mission was. Rib'i answered with, "Allah, the Almighty, sent us to free people from worshipping subjects and make them worship Him alone, and to get them out of difficulties of this life to its easiness and spaciousness, and from injustice of dogmas to the justice of Islam" (al-Qaradawi, 2004, p. 21)[4].

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[4] It is ironic to note that while the Battle of Qadisiyya, in which this dialogue took place, was perceived in the classical literature as one of the defining moments of the unification between Arabia and Persia under the rule of the Muslim empire, it

The results of diplomatic missions and wars during the time of Muhammad were varied. Some were successful and some were not, but the message from these practices was clear: Islam is a universal religion for all people regardless of ethnicity, social status and race. Muhammad had broken the barrier of seeing people as the "Other" that characterised the parochial consciousness of the people of Quraysh. Instead of maintaining aloofness and indifferent attitudes to people outside their tribes, Muslims now actively reached out to the people from other tribes and kingdoms.

It is important to note that the obligation to wage war was not placed on individuals; thus the obligation was not mentioned in the five Pillars of Islam, which constitute the primary obligations for all Muslims. Instead, the obligation to war was placed upon the community. Khadduri (1955, pp. 60–61) describes two important implications of this. First, it means that not all Muslims must perform the duty. Some Muslims might be exempted from this duty, such as those old, weak or with disability. Second, placing the obligation on the community made the conduct of war a state instrument. While any state has the power to declare war and conscript the populace to support war, the Islamic state is authorised in particular by religious texts and motivations to do so. This provided the state with an additional mechanism to control the population, which is beneficial to the universe-maintenance process as described by Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 127–134).

The concept *rahmatan lil 'alamin* has provided both rational justification of the existence of the *umma* and moral legitimation to take part in the expansion efforts of the Muslim *umma*. It further ingrained the global consciousness in Muslims' mind by providing a vision of global mercy and global justice that Muslims should strive to accomplish. Since the doctrine of *rahmatan lil 'alamin* is inherent in Islamic teaching, Islamic rituals or educational efforts inevitably will play as instruments for internalising the idea of the *umma*, further strengthening the concept as a symbolic universe. A good Muslim is not only caring for his or

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was interpreted by Saddam Hussein as a moment of perpetual conflict between the Arabs and Persians. He even erected a monument to the Battle of Qadisiyya to commemorate the conflict, which he argued was alighted anew in the war between Iraq and Iran from 1980 to 1988. See: Kanan Makiya, *The Monument: Art and Vulgarity in Saddam Hussein's Iraq* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004).

her personal happiness. A good Muslims should also actively promote the idea of mercy and justice to the whole world, as part of his or her holy duty from the God. The ultimate reward for Muslims who advocate these values are, according to Islamic traditions, the perfect harmony in earth and the joy of Paradise – a powerful normative encouragement.

Hijra

The third important concept in Islam that plays a fundamental role in breaking parochial consciousness among Muslims and instils Islamic global consciousness in their minds is *hijra*. In itself, *hijra* was a general Arabic term for migration thus having a social connotation in it. Later developments in Islamic history made it gain a significant religious meaning. After Muhammad asked his Companions to migrate from Mecca to Yathrib, *hijra* became a sacred duty of all Muslims. This migration was done in series, and culminated with Muhammad's own migration. Later, Muslims considered *hijra* as a defining moment in the development of the early *umma*, thus attributing the first year of Islamic calendar to the year where Muhammad did his migration, not to his birth or the time he received his first revelation.

As described earlier in this chapter, there were three instruments that defined the Arabs: Arabic poetry and poetic language, kinship and religion with its *haram* sites. Before the *hijra* to Yathrib, Muslims were affected by these same social instruments as their fellow Meccans. During its earlier phase, Islam had been considered as just another cult that would become part of Meccan polytheism since its prophet was from the religious family of Quraysh and its rituals revolved around the Ka'ba. Al-Tabari (1998, pp. 92–97) describes how, at first, the Quraysh had tolerated Muhammad's preaching but then became increasingly wary and outright hostile after Muhammad had firmly rejected their polytheism and idolatry. Al-Suyuti (2008, pp. 644–645) explains that *surat al-Kafirun* (The Unbelievers) was revealed to counter the pagans' request for a compromise: the pagan would pray to God during one year and the Muslims would pray to pagan gods the next year.

Yet despite this religious difference, Muslims were still considered as a part of Meccan society even though some of them met unsavoury treatment from the Quraysh elite. Al-Mubarakpuri (1996, pp. 92–94) describes how the laws and

customs of Meccan society still protected Muslims and gave them certain rights within the society. Muslims from noble families or wealthy ones could live relatively free from harassment. They still became victims of discrimination and harassment from within their own family, but, generally, they were protected by the customs. The ones who suffered the most were Muslims from poor and weak families, or slaves. Muhammad himself was subject to harassment, mostly verbal but sometimes also physical (Ibn Ishaq, 1967, pp. 130–131), but none directly threatened his life because he was from a noble family and had esteemed status in the society (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, p. 94).

Frail as it was, kinship and tribal customs provided some forms of security to Muslims in Mecca. While their lives were at a disadvantage, they were comforted by the fact that they were still part of the society. Even during the years of boycott during the seventh to tenth prophetic years (c. 617-619 CE), the kinship system protected the majority of Muslims. During this period, the pagans from various clans boycotted the clans of Hashim and al-Mutallib until they agreed to lift their protection from Muhammad. Abu Talib, Muhammad's uncle and the patriarch of the clans, instead of relenting to the demand, chose to withdraw to a valley on the eastern outskirts of Mecca and faced the boycott valiantly. The Muslims and members of the two clans followed him. The boycott lasted for three years before a group of kinsmen protested against it, invoking the sentiments of kinship and tribal customs to end the boycott (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, pp. 127–130).

Their ties to Mecca ran so deep to the point that despite continually received harassment and torture, Muslims did not think of permanently leaving Mecca. Before the *hijra*, there were occasions of Muslims leaving Mecca for trade or other affairs but they always came back despite knowing the unsavoury treatments that they would receive in the city. During the fifth year of Prophethood (c. 615 CE), there were scores of Muslims who were sent to Abyssina and lived there under the protection of the Negus (al-Tabari, 1988a, pp. 98–101). But this migration was temporary, because as soon as they heard that the pressure against Muhammad had lessened, they tried to move back to Mecca (al-Tabari, 1988a, p. 109). There was little attraction to spend their life in other land beside their homeland, away from their kinsmen and tribe.

The command to do *hijra* and make permanent migration to Medina was a revolutionary call. The word *hijrah* came from the root of HJR. It literally means "to abandon", "to break ties with someone" or "to migrate" (Masud, 1990, p. 30; Abu-Shahlieh, 1996, p. 37). This can be translated further as "he cut himself off from friendly or loving communication or intercourse…he ceased…to associate with them" (Armstrong, 2006, p. 109). In a culture where family ties and tribal customs are instrumental in defining a person, asking the person to cut all ties to his or her kin and defy the customs is the same with deconstructing his or her whole world. Instead of continuing their life in a world defined by their blood relations and tribal laws, Muslims from Mecca were required to migrate to a foreign city, to place their fate in the hands of strangers (Masud, 1990, p. 31). This was an act of both defiance to the old world of tribalism and acceptance of the new world of the Islamic *umma*.

Hijra was an event that shook the core of the parochial nature of Arab tribes, thus enabling Muslims to build a community based on broader consciousness. Hodgson (1974a, p. 172) states that by *hijra*, Muslims could finally escape from old confinements and were able to build a new societal order based on Islamic values. By severing the ties to their tribe, Muslims could create new bonds based on religious brotherhood. By leaving their birthplace, Muslims were encouraged to see foreign territories as their home. By this act, a Muslim was not only cutting all ties to the primordial connections but he was also forming a new connection. This was a drastic move which served to deconstruct a Muslim's worldview and his or her imaginary of 'society'. Since those who migrate, *Muhajirin* in Islamic terminology, were without society and would never survive without one, Muhammad created a new society by bonding each Emigrant from Mecca with one resident of Medina into a brotherhood. This brotherhood was the embryo of the new society based on Islamic teaching and values: the *umma*.

In Islamic tradition, there is a popular story of how Muhammad established the bond of brotherhood between the Emigrants and the *Ansar*, or the Helpers, people from Medina who helped the Emigrants (Watt, 1960, p. 84). In Islamic tradition, Bukhari narrated in his *Sahih* (vol. 5/book 058/no. 124) that when Abdur Rahman ibn 'Auf arrived at Medina, Muhammad established a bond between Abdur Rahman and Sa'ad ibn ar-Rabi. In accordance with this bond,

Sa'ad offered to divide his property with Abdur Rahman, but the latter declined this offer. Instead, he asked Sa'ad to show him the way to the market. While the accuracy of this story remains debatable, changes in the society of Medina to accommodate the arrivals of the Emigrants were observed. This narration is an example of how Muhammad built the fabric of the new *umma*. In Berger's and Luckmann's (1966) work on social constructionism, what Muhammad did is a process of objectivation. At first, he expressed the idea of universal brotherhood in a series of signs and symbols, such as defining and calling for *hijra*. Then, he put the idea into social practice, by bonding two strangers in "the brotherhood of Islam". Other than the immediate societal effect, this narrative also serves as an instrument for internalising the idea of the *umma* to younger generations, with teachers routinely citing this *hadith* as an example of the universal brotherhood among Muslims[5].

The stories of *hijra* for the first generation of Muslims provide strong encouragement for Muslims to travel, leaving their homeland. While later generations of Muslims might not share similar predicament with the Muhajirin, the moment of *hijra* has provided a general sense of detachment toward particular locales among Muslims. Since every part of the Earth belongs to Allah and Muhammad himself had inspired his Companions to travel outside their traditional area, Muslims performed travelling as part of their social and religious life. Commenting on the concept of migration in Islamic society, Abu-Shahlieh (1996, pp. 39–45) describes that the spirit of *hijra* increased social mobility in Muslim society, to the extent of a fluid mobility in future years. Later jurists put some restrictions on the migration of Muslims for safety and political reasons. These jurists, such as Ibn Hazm (d. 1064 CE) or Ibn Rushd (d. 1198 CE), both of them from Cordoba, especially discouraged travelling to the territory of infidels, which was termed as *dar al-harb*. These could be seen as reactions toward hostilities between Muslims and Christian kingdoms in Europe. Contrary to these

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[5] The power of this narrative is strong among Muslims, even to this day. This can be seen in how the Muslim activists in Indonesia reacted to Rohingyan refugees. While the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia were hesitant to accept the refugees, local fishermen from Aceh and, later, Muslim organisations in Indonesia embraced them as fellow brothers and sisters of Islam. They saw the waves of Rohingyan refugees as the "new Muhajirin" and themselves as the "new Ansar" providing the refugees with help and care, as can be seen in an article entitled "All Muslims are Brothers": http://aceh.tribunnews.com/2015/05/22/muslim-itu-bersaudara

restrictions, Muslims were travelling as far as China and Southeast Asia, bringing Islam and their concept of a universal *umma* to these distant areas.

The journey of Ibn Batutta (d. 1369 CE) provides such strong evidence of the global nature of Islamic medieval society. During his thirty years of journey, Ibn Batutta explored various parts of the known world at that time, and his journal provides an insights into the global nature of the community he visited (Waines, 2010). There were also detailed documentaries on the journey and career of Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406 CE). Menocal (2002), in describing part of the journey taken by the young Ibn Khaldun, indicates how he visited the court of Peter of Castile in 1364 CE as the ambassador of Granada and charmed the Christian king to the point of being offered the position of *wazir* of Castile. While Ibn Khaldun declined the offer, this short fragment of his personal life fits properly with the argument of this thesis, that Muslim individuals have established a translocal network, driven by their aspiration for a global *umma*. The journeys of these men were different from the journeys of the pre-Islamic Quraysh because, during their journeys, both Ibn Batutta and Ibn Khaldun showed detachment towards a certain geographical place, unlike the Quraysh which had held Mecca dearly. At the same time, Ibn Batutta and Ibn Khaldun also showed willingness to adopt and be adopted by alien lands, to a certain degree. This can be seen by the travellers' attitudes, spending more on their journey than residence in their home town, and the attitudes of their hosts, who disregarded the cultural background of these men and provided them with strategic opportunities.

Ibn Batutta and Ibn Khaldun were not the only ones who took such journeys. Eickelman and Piscatori (1990) detail the activities of Muslim travellers, travelling various routes in search of knowledge and in the quest for spirituality. Collins (1998) has written an extensive work on the master-pupil connections in various world cultures, starting from China to India, to Arabs and Europe. Using Collins' work, we can understand how Muslims had established extensive chains of intellectuals throughout the Muslim world and how global consciousness spread across distant areas, and even across time frames. These journeys were not only beneficial for the development of science and religiosity, but also serve as the instruments in their aspiration to establish a global *umma*. Nasr (2002, p. 173) notes that this fluidity, or what he called the *nomadic element*, is one distinguishing element of Islamic medieval society, as this thesis will explain

further in later chapters. All of these provide evidence of the development of a larger consciousness among Muslims and how this consciousness instilled an aspiration to Muslims to form a global society called the *umma*.

Hajj

Hajj is one important ritual in Islam. For Muslims who are able, *hajj* is compulsory to perform at least once in their life. The majority of Muslim scholars agreed that *hajj* was prescribed at the sixth year after *hijra* (Sabiq, 1992, p. 1). There was a narration of *hadith* that commends *hajj* as one of the best deeds, after belief in God and His Prophet and striving in the cause of God. Sabiq (1992, p. 2) also narrates another *hadith* in which the Prophet declared that whoever performs *hajj* for Allah and frees themselves from lewdness and sins during the procession, will be freed from all sins, as if he was just born from his mother's womb. This puts *hajj* as a strong and valued religious ritual which, calling on Geertz (1973), could invoke strong moods and provide a powerful motivation to Muslims performing it.

Muhammad did his *hajj* during the tenth year after *hijra*, or 632 CE. He was accompanied by ninety thousand to one hundred and forty thousand Muslims (al-Tabari, 1988b, p. 125). This event was known as the Farewell Pilgrimage or *hajj al-wada'*, since, in the next year, Muhammad passed away. During his sermon, Muhammad gave an important speech that further promoted the message of a universal brotherhood of Muslims. According to Ibn Ishaq (1967, p. 651), the part of Muhammad's speech related to the universal brotherhood of Muslims is as follows:

> Know that every Muslim is a Muslim's brother, and that the Muslims are brethren. It is only lawful to take from a brother what he gives you willingly, so wrong not yourselves.

This message was simple yet powerful, more so when one considers the context around the message. Muhammad delivered this message after the victory over Mecca, at a time when the power of Muslims was thought unstoppable, or in the vocabulary of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 902), Islam had reached its "tipping point" in Arabia. This victory lent credence to the messages of Islam and Muhammad; as noted by Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 138), an idea is considered to be superior to other rivalling ideas not by its virtue or intrinsic

qualities but by its applicability to serve the social interests of the carrier group. With the victory of Muslims over Mecca, the people of Arabia saw that Islam had managed to "make" the Muslims victorious, thus enforcing the soundness of Islamic messages.

That the sermon was done during the *hajj* is also important. According to al-Qaradawi (1995, p. 81), the *hajj* teaches Muslims to purify themselves from material luxuries. During the *hajj*, Muslims are demanded to live in simplicity, humility and abstinence from material possessions. The peak of the *hajj* is the gathering in Arafat, which is considered an obligation for all pilgrims, even those of old age or on their sick beds. This event determines the validity of someone's *hajj*. It is also reported by Muslim and other narrators that Aisha heard Muhammad say that during the gathering in Arafat, God grants his mercy to all attending Muslims (Sabiq, 1992, pp. 94–96). Thus, when Muhammad made his speech during the *wuquf* or gathering in Arafat, his speech became part of a powerful ritual that symbolised God's mercy upon mankind. At the same time, the gathering of thousands of Muslims from various tribes and races was not a common happenstance and, consequently, this might further instil a sense of awe among the attendants. As Geertz (1973, p. 113) has noted, a religious ritual can be considered as a "cultural performance" whose elaborate symbols shape the worldview of the adherents. This sermon was one of the grand rituals, if not the grandest, in Muslim history and it imprinted a compelling imagery of a global *umma* in Muslims' minds, not only on those who were present during the sermon but also on later generations.

The Hajj Ritual

While Muhammad's sermon and his message of universal brotherhood was unique, a one of a kind grand ceremony unparalleled by other *hajj* rituals, Peters (1994) describes each *hajj* as an extraordinary event. The *hajj* is not like other types of pilgrimages known later in Muslim rituals. Its time is fixed. The *hajj* can only be performed in the eighth, ninth and tenth days of the last month in the Muslim lunar calendar. It is not just a few days in Mecca or doing a single act in sacred places, but involves a series of rituals to be performed and travelling for miles for the completion of the process. Each ritual of the *hajj* is attributed to the experiences of Abraham and his son, Ishmael. Muslims performing *hajj* re-enact

the struggle of the family, and this journey culminates in *wuquf*, performing a contemplative and reflective break in the field of Arafat. Quoting Peters (1994, p. xxii), "*hajj* is not so much an act as an experience." This observation is in accordance with Geertz's (1973, pp. 119–123) observation on the transformative powers of a religious ritual, which can shape the world of a believer.

Peters' (1994) collection on various accounts of the *hajj* is valuable as one of sources of how transformative their *hajj* experience is for the pilgrims, so that by the end of their pilgrimage, the pilgrims not only gain the title of *Hajji* but also gain a profound change in their worldview. The experience of *hajj* begins when the pilgrim departs from their homeland. A nineteenth century *hajj* account from John Lewis Burckhardt describes how the Muslim pilgrims from a region called Taka, now part of Sudan, embarked on their journey to the holy city of Mecca. Quoting Burckhardt, Peters (1994, pp. 96–97) describes the pilgrims' preparation for the hard journey ahead. They were also prepared for the possibility of facing various perils during the journey: death by fatigue, being robbed, lost in the desert etc. Despite the dangers, the number of pilgrims did not lessen over time. A particular pilgrim, a blind man who was continually led by a stick during his *hajj*, recounted his experience using these passionate words, "I am blind, but the light of the word of God and the love of His Prophet illumine my soul and have been my guide from the Sudan to this tomb."

Approaching the *haram* of Mecca, the pilgrims are required to perform a ritual of purification and don plain, white clothes. This ritual, called as *ihram,* produces profound effects on the pilgrims. Peters (1994, pp. 114–115) narrates Al-Ghazali's (d. 1111 CE) musing that *ihram* is a symbol with multiple meanings and interpretations. *Ihram* could be interpreted as the purification of the pilgrim from anything else besides God. By donning the *ihram*, the pilgrims confirm their intention of doing *hajj* solely because of God; they cast away any lingering worldly motives that might lurk inside their hearts. By donning the *ihram* and uttering the *talbiya*, a ritual chant during the entrance to Mecca, pilgrims are answering the call from God. The pilgrims are now guests in God's house, and should rely on God's grace and generosity, nothing else. *Ihram* also symbolises the shroud that each Muslim will be wrapped in after their death; thus buying and donning the *ihram* is a reminder of the pilgrims' mortality and their afterlife.

As we have seen, the *wuquf* in Arafat is the peak ritual of the *hajj*. A narration from Muhammad said that "*hajj* is *wuquf* in Arafat," thus making this ritual obligatory for all pilgrims. This is a spectacular moment, where all pilgrims gather in one location. Ibn Jubayr described his awe when performing this ritual. How the chant "God is great!" arose from the whole plain, the pilgrims were deep in their meditative prayers with such humility and in tears. Social stratification was neglected in this time. In the assembly were Arabian, Maghribi, Persian, and Khurasani pilgrims. With both men and women, the mass was beyond counting (Peters, 1994, pp. 123–125).

It is this elaborate set of experiences that instil and enforce global consciousness among Muslims during the *hajj*. Since it can only be done during a specific time and place, all Muslims who are going to perform *hajj* in a certain year will meet and mingle. It also requires Muslims to wear a specific garb, modest in style and white in colour during the ritual. Since during the *hajj* the values of universality, simplicity and abstinence from material possession are enforced, and differences in ethnicity, social status or wealth are muted, the *hajj* is where the idea of universal brotherhood meets reality. This engrains the sense of uniformity and globality in Muslims and generates necessary moods and motivations to continue the global consciousness. If Muhammad's sermon during the *wuquf* ingrained the message of universal brotherhood of Muslims for the early generation, the annual experiencing of how a multitude of Muslims from various racial, social and cultural backgrounds gather together in a common ritual might drive the message home for later generations. The gathering has become a powerful tool for objectivating the message, that there *is* a universal brotherhood of Muslims[6].

On "Islamic" global consciousness

Universalism is a fundamental part of Islam. There is one God, one religion calling for one humanity. One people forming one society, the *umma*. Verses of the Qur'an speak about this in subtle ways, instilling a global

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[6] Modern pilgrims undergo the same transforming experience. One notable example of modern Muslims who underwent a life-changing experience during the *hajj* was Malcolm X. His experience during the *hajj* was so profound that he concluded that Islam was a means by which racial problems could be overcome. For a detailed account of Malcolm X's *hajj* experience, see Malcolm X's autobiography (1968).

consciousness to Muslims, calling them to expand and connect, to establish the global *umma*. Muhammad, as the religious and social leader of the early Muslims, enforced this message through various events and rituals. *Hijra* and establishing a bond of brotherhood between the Emigrants and the Helpers were part of Muhammad's strategy to deconstruct and reconstruct the concept of society among Muslims. The spreading of Islam outside Arabia and expansion of Muslim society afterwards could be seen as the efforts to achieve this idea of a global *umma*.

However, there are sceptics who argue that the movement of Muslims out from Arabia was not motivated by the teachings of Islam. One classic scholar who expressed this view is Ernest Renan. Unlike other nineteenth century scholars on Islam, Renan was quite sympathetic to the figure of Muhammad and his teachings. In his essay "Mahomet and the origins of Islam", Renan (1864) repeatedly stressed the virtues of Muhammad, stating that he was a gentle, benevolent man (Renan, 1864, p. 236), not an ambitious or heartless Machiavellian (Renan, 1864, pp. 247–248), a master of his own thought (Renan, 1864, pp. 251–252). Without a doubt, Muhammad was a man who had believed in his sacred mission and had faith in everything that he did (Renan, 1864, p. 252).

Yet, when contemplating how much the early Muslims believed in the prophetic mission of their master, Renan was a sceptic. He stated that in the circle of Muhajirin and Ansar, faith was absolute (Renan, 1864, p. 253). Yet, leaving these groups, faith was replaced with pragmatism. Renan describes that the first century of Muslim history was but a struggle between the forces of true believers, those of the Muhajirin and Ansar, and the sham ones. In the second group, there were Quraysh elite families, led by Abu Sufyan of the Umayyads, who, according to Renan (1864, p. 257), had never been a genuine believer. After the death of Umar, the Muhajirin and Ansar lost their main defender, and wilted under the pressure of the Umayyads and their allies, which culminated in the assassination of Ali, the murder of Muhammad's grandson, Husain, and the siege of Medina by the Umayyad's troops (Renan, 1864, pp. 258–259). With the defeat of the Medinans, Umayyad rule was uncontested in the Muslim world and brought to an end the generation of true believers (Renan, 1864, p. 260).

Using what he perceives as rivalry between the true and sham believers during the first century of Muslim history, Renan concludes that after the

ascension of the Umayyads, the Muslims had lost their true faith. He states that the Muslim movement after the first century in Muslim history was "started almost without religious faith" (Renan, 1864, p. 259). What developed later in the Muslim world was no longer inspired by Islam, but was instead driven by the power of tribal politics and elite families who competed with each other to expand their domains. The ascension of the Abbasids marked the triumph of Persian philosophy over the true teaching of Islam. While Muslims were expanding fast and the Arabic language was adopted in large areas of the world, the true spirit of Islam was forgotten (Renan, 1864, p. 265).

Lewis (2002a) provides another sceptical view on the expansion of Muslim society. He describes the expansion of Muslims after the death of Muhammad as driven by pragmatic motives (Lewis, 2002a, p. 50). It was a means to establish a political supremacy over Arab tribes in Arabia. The death of Muhammad was perceived as the end of the bonds between various Arab tribes and Medina. These tribes, which had formerly associated themselves with Islam, severed their bonds with Medina and ceased their tribute. Abu Bakr as the successor was compelled to launch military expeditions against these tribes to maintain Medina's hegemony over the region. The conquests also provided a solution to the economic problem of the peninsula. Expansion into the rich kingdoms in northern Arabia generated income which was necessary to consolidate Medina's hegemony in the area. Without the economic benefits gained from the expedition to the north, Medina might have not succeeded in forcing the various Arab tribes into submission. Lewis subsequently provides details on how Medina gained various benefits by conducting expansions and conquests. Most of these benefits were economic in nature, some were political. None was religious (Lewis, 2002a, pp. 50–57).

Taking into account these critical assessments, there are two arguments delivered by the critics of "Islamic" expansion that disagree with the notion of an "Islamic" global consciousness. First, there was no Islamic global consciousness because the true believers of Islam were decimated during the first century of Muslim history. This rendered Islam as a body of ideas and norms irrelevant in the later expansions of Muslim society. Second, there was no Islamic global consciousness because there were other motives guiding the expansions of

Muslim society; thus the society and its motives could not be called "Islamic" but were pragmatic instead.

This section will provide counter-arguments to these two propositions. First, in order to answer the proposition that there were no true believers after the fall of Medina, this section will raise an argument based on *the prevalence of the spirit of Islam in the society*; that the Muslim society developed at the end of first century was still using Islam as the foundation of their society. Second, to answer the concerns that pragmatic motives were observed in later generations, thus diminishing the "Islamic" characteristics of the society, this section will describe *the instrumentalisation of piety*: in other words, that the presence of pragmatic motives did not automatically bar the presence of religious motive in the Islamic community. Rather, pragmatic motives required the presence of piety and religious symbols to gain legitimation.

Prevalence of the spirit of Islam in the society

This section seeks to counter the claim that one century after the death of Muhammad, there were no true believers of Islam and that Islam had ceased to be the foundation of the emerging society. This sceptical view is based on what was perceived as rivalry between true and sham believers in the first century of Muslim history (Renan, 1864, pp. 257–260). This sceptical view further argues that the ascension of Mu'awiya as the Caliph and the subsequent creation of the dynasty of Umayyads as rulers of the Muslim world indicated that the later Muslim movement was motivated by dynastic politics, not by Islam.

These concerns can be addressed in several ways. The first is to engage the concern with the theoretical framework discussed previously in this thesis. Drawing on Berger and Luckmann (1966), the *umma* was built upon the foundation of Islamic values and rituals. *Tawhid* and *rahmatan lil 'alamin* as fundamental principles of Islam motivated the believers to act in certain manners. Islamic religious rituals further ingrained the values in the believers' minds, in accordance with the process described by Geertz (1973). The moment of *hijra* marked a clean break from a parochial, tribal idea of society and signified the emergence of a global idea of society based on Islamic values. Watt (1956, pp. 251–252) observed that the resulting society expressed an interesting characteristic unlike any other societies at that time: it lacked attachment to a

particular territorial basis. This observation further strengthens the argument that a broader consciousness was present in the early Muslim society.

Although there were conflicts between true and insincere believers after the death of the Prophet, there was a constant acceptance among them that Islam was the ideal foundation of the society. In other contexts, the changing of the ideal foundation is observable in various societal conflicts; the conflicts between the Byzantine Empire and the Sasanid Empire were characterised by constant rivalry over their respective values. Later conflicts between these empires with the emerging caliphate also showed the rivalry between the empires' values against Islamic ones. One could even cite the Wars of Ridda, which involved the fledging caliphate and secessionist groups. During this period of conflict, there were constant attempts to uproot Islam from parts of the *umma*, changing it with new religious forms that were brought by new prophets or prophetesses, or changing it back to old, pre-Islamic ways of tribalism. Yet, there were no recorded attempts to uproot Islam from the society during the conflict between various Muslim groups. On the contrary, each faction founded their political aspiration on an Islamic basis, arguing that other parties were not Islamic enough in their behaviour.

Thus, from the perspective of the theoretical framework established in Chapter One, the internal conflict during the first century of Muslim society cannot be understood as an attempt to remove Islam from the society. Instead, it can be seen as the maturing process of the society. If we consider Islam as a norm in Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle theory, Muhammad was its most prominent norm entrepreneur. His words and actions were practical guides in efforts to establish an *umma*. With his death, this guide was lost and some groups had differing opinions on how to continue their societal activities within the framework of the *umma,* which led to violent conflict. While the violence was unfortunate, the presence of different interpretations within a symbolic universe is common, as described by Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 124). They (1966, p. 125) further argue that the presence of such conflict usually leads to efforts to systematise the theoretical conceptualisation of the symbolic universe. This did happen in Muslim history, as can be seen in the development of various theological traditions, both to satisfy the intellectual and spiritual needs of Muslim and to provide legitimation to the political establishment governing the *umma*. Further discussion of this will be detailed in Chapter Four.

The second is to examine Mu'awiya's status among the believers using historical accounts, both from inside Muslim intellectual tradition and from outside sources. While the Khajirites and Shiites vilified Mu'awiya, Sunni sources agree that, regardless of the controversies over his political activities, Mu'awiya was a true believer of Islam. He was one of the scribes of the Qur'an, and the brother-in-law of Muhammad. These two statuses were not easily granted by Muhammad to a random person. Supporting this argument, there were narrations from the Prophet, describing Mu'awiya's virtues. Al-Suyuti (1881, pp. 47–48) reports one of such narrations, recorded by Ahmad and at Tirmizi, from Anas ibn Malik, that Muhammad had praised Mu'awiya:

> The most compassionate of my people unto my people is Abu Bakr, and the most zealous of them-in upholding the commands of God, Omar, and the most truly modest among them, Othman, and the most learned of them in things lawful and unlawful Mu'ad-b-Jabal, and the most skilled in the law of inheritance, Zayd-b-Thabit, and the most learned of them in the Kuran, Ubayy-b-Kaa'b, and in every people, there is one that is confided in, and the trusted one of this people is Abu U'baydahb-u'l Jarrah." Abu Ya'la has taken this from the tradition of Ibn Omar and added to it: "and the best of them in adjudication, A'li." Ad Daylami quotes this in his Musnad u'l Firdaus from the tradition of Shaddad-b-Aus and added: "and Abu Darr, the most devout of my people and the most sincere, and Abu'd Darda, the most pious of my people, and the most Godfearing and Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, the most benign of my people and the most magnificent."

That Mu'awiyya's policies had invited criticism, even from the earlier generation of Muslims, is indeed true. Al-Tabari (1987) narrates in his book several occasions where Mu'awiya allegedly ordered his followers to insult Ali and his family and to abuse Ali's followers (Tabari, 1987, pp. 5, 123, 149). However, Humphreys (2006) raises doubt on whether Mu'awiya had actually ordered these offences or that this was part of a black campaign against him, which started to happen in the Abbasid period. Humphreys (2006, pp. 3–10) describes how the Abbasids publicly condemned him and his family. In detail, the habit of condemning Mu'awiya and the Umayyad clan was started by the first 'Abbasid Caliph, Abu al-'Abbas al-Saffah (r. 749-754 CE) during his speech in Kufa (Humphreys, 2006, p. 4). Apparently, this move was to gain sympathy from the followers of Ali and was, at the same time, a strategy to delegitimate the Umayyads and to legitimate the 'Abbassid coup. Other Abbasid Caliphs continued

this practice. Al-Ma'mun (r. 813-833 CE) and al-Mu'tadid (r. 892-902 CE) were trying to take the condemnation further: they tried to paint Mu'awiya not only as a corrupt, bloodthirsty tyrant, but also as an apostate (Humphreys, 2006, pp. 4–6).

Sunni scholars who were not part of Abbasid machinations to sully Mu'awiya's and the Umayyads' name were undecided on Mu'awiya's personality. Personally, Mu'awiya had been a trusted Companion of the Prophet, as proven by various *hadith*. Yet, on the other hand, he had been against the Prophet at the beginning of Islam. Mu'awiya had been a good administrator, political leader and military general. But he also had deliberately refused to acknowledge Ali as the fourth Caliph. If only at that time Mu'awiya was bringing peace and unity to the *umma*, he would be a great, unblemished, hero in Islamic history. Ultimately, there was so many controversies around him, making scholars reluctant to grant him the status of hero but also unable to condemn him. Nevertheless, Humphreys (2006, p. 10) says that Sunni scholars concluded that disagreements based on Mu'awiya's political behaviour were not enough to condemn Mu'awiya.

The third counter against the proposition that there was conflict between true and sham believers is to argue that this proposition fails to understand the true nature of conflict during the first century of Islam. Berkey (2003, p. 71) argues that the tensions within the *umma*, which worsened after the assassination of Uthman and culminated in the civil war between Ali and Mu'awiya, was not a conflict between true or sham believers. It did not prove that there were groups which tried to uproot Islam as the foundation of the society. On the contrary, the conflict happened and became so prominent in the Muslim society precisely *because* Islam was the religious foundation for the conflicting actors. In their aspiration to create the perfect *umma*, the conflicted parties accused their rival as "imperfect" thus unsuited to be the leader of the *umma*.

Muslims took the incapability of their leaders seriously. According to Islamic teaching, someone's soul is reflected in his/her unconscious activities. *Akhlaq* is the part of the soul which inspires unconscious activities. It is formed through repetitive practice of the Islamic rituals and internalisation of its values, and will appear in spontaneous behaviour (Esposito, 2003, p. 89). Thus, when the Muslim community saw that their leaders performed actions that they perceived as injustices, they saw these as the reflection of their flawed souls and spirituality. Social and economic gaps were not only reflecting the leaders' bad leadership

skills, but also their violation of Islamic principles, making it a problem of spiritual quality. During the leadership of Uthman (643/44-656 CE), parts of the Muslim society were dissatisfied with his leadership because they saw his behaviour was not in line with the principles of modesty and piety that Islam had taught. The perceived unbalanced division of wealth and status among the society might be upsetting to some, but the lack of resolve in Uthman's leadership to address this inequity and his perceived nepotism was infuriating to the believers because it transgressed the spirit of social justice brought by Islam (Donner, 2010, pp. 151–152).

The religious interpretation of the conflict is also apparent in the way Muslim scholars referred to the conflict as the first *fitna*, or tribulation, among the community (Berkey, 2003, p. 71). That various tribal instruments were also at play during the conflict and the later history of the society was understandable since the presence of Islam as religious foundation was not necessarily contradictory to the presence of tribalism in the society. The interaction between the teaching of Islam and tribal elements need not be a zero-sum interaction, and it is possible for both to be present in a multi-layered society (Berkey, 2003, p. 72). Further discussion on the conflict and its effects on the formation of the *umma* will be elaborated in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis.

Instrumentalisation of piety

Observation of later periods in Muslim history reveals the prevalence of pragmatism shown by various political actors. The presence of political rivalries or economic gains are the most common characteristics observed. This has led to the proposition that later generations of Muslims were no longer Islamic. However, it is inappropriate to dismiss the presence of religion entirely despite the presence of pragmatism or material benefits in certain actions. On the contrary, since Islam has a profound effect in Muslims' minds, Donner (1988, p. 98) explains that Muslim society was built upon the foundation of piety. Religious piety has become a social and political currency. While this might be perceived as diminishing Islamic values, Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999, pp. 15–16) have observed that it is possible for parties to maintain their pragmatic agendas while adopting a certain normative discourse. Thus, instead of erasing or diminishing

the religious motive, the presence of political rivalry or economic benefit may even strengthen the need to display religious symbols and perform religious rituals.

During early Muslim history, Islam was heavily used to legitimate political claims, to solve social problems, to gain economic benefits, even to justify wars. During a rivalry, each faction sought legitimacy from Islam and would try to "out-piety" the others. This excessive use of Islam subjugated the society to Islamic authorities which were manifest in government and the *'ulama* and *sharia* courts. Berkey (2003, p. 79) states that the Umayyads built their caliphate as the centre of authority both in religious and in political issues, playing the part of just religious judges and pious political actors to appease the citizens. Princes and governors sought to increase their influences by performing the *hajj*. The *hajj* became their instrument to attain political power not because *hajj* gave them control over the populace but because during the *hajj*, they could show their piety and could 'out-piety' rivals. Yet, at the same time, these princes and governors were subjecting themselves to entering the cultural performances that would instil a broader consciousness, of the universalism of Islam and brotherhood of people of the faith. The *hajj* also induced normative and affective dispositions that these princes and governors would carry back to their domains.

Another example on how the Umayyads were eager to incorporate Islamic symbols and rituals into their political instruments is the decision of Abdul al-Malik (r. 685-705) to mint new coinage with the *shahada* and Qur'anic verses inscribed on the sides, a departure from the common design of Byzantine coins (Donner, 2010, pp. 203–217). Other caliphs, such as Sulayman (r. 715-717 CE), patronised poets whose poems then exalted the Caliph as the great leader, saying in effect that there had been no other leader like him since the death of the Prophet (Rubin, 2003, pp. 93–94). Moreover, in al-Walid's (r. 743-744 CE) letter about his choice of successors, he tried to anchor his position as a Caliph as the successor of the Prophet. He started his letter in a long narrative praising God and the Prophet, subtly shifting the letter to him as the Commander of the Faithful and successor of the Prophet in protecting the religion and the believers. He thus deserved due respect and loyalty from the populace. Only then did he end the letter by calling for support for his successors (al-Tabari, 1989b, pp. 106–112). The Umayyads also possessed relics and regalia which they claimed had been handed down in a

successive hereditary line originating from Muhammad, such as Muhammad's sword, his pulpit (*mimbar*) or his signet ring of authority (Rubin, 2003, pp. 95–99).

The effect of the instrumentalisation of piety was not only that religious symbols and rituals were being used to enhance legitimacy, but also that political actors were required to adopt religious symbols and perform religious rituals to gain power. The involvement in religious practices might be initially based on purely pragmatic motives, as commonly happens in the spread of contemporary normative discourse as Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999) notes. But this involvement would inadvertently submit the political actors to the authority of the religion. According to Geertz (1973, p. 109), submitting oneself to a religious authority is the embodiment of belief. Thus, like it or not, understanding it or not, every time a person uses Islamic symbols or rituals to strengthen his or her political legitimacy or to gain practical benefits from it, he or she submits to Islamic authority in effect and confirms at least a tacit adherence to belief in Islam. The more he or she draws from Islam, the more he or she interacts with its symbols to the point that Islamic symbols would provide him or her with orientating motivations.

Such a consequence can be seen in the flourishing of Islamic knowledge during the Abbasid period. The Abbasids started their claim over the leadership of the *umma* by riding the wave of a messianic movement which believed that a member of the family of the Prophet will come and lead the Muslims towards an era of justice and prosperity (El-Hibri, 1999, p. 3). In order to maintain this legitimacy, early Abbasid caliphs were invested in various enlightenment projects which ushered in a Golden Age of Islamic learning. According to Robinson (2004a, p. 91), the Abbasids were responsible for the initiating and thriving of learning institutions, integrating various locales in one judicial system and government and promoting Arabic language as the language of learning. Other than that, the infrastructure developed during the early Abbasid period also made travel easy, thus allowing for the collection of *hadith*.

From Islamic Global Consciousness to Islamic Global Society?

Based on historical observations, there are signs of global consciousness in previous empires. Robertson and Inglish (2006) describe the development of

global consciousness in Greek and Roman civilisations. This consciousness fuelled the rapid expansion of these civilisations in both their economy and politics. In contrast with such civilisations, the Quraysh did not develop any signs of global consciousness. Yet, after the advent of Islam, the Quraysh became a proponent of a translocal movement, which then resulted in the Umayyad Empire spanning from al-Andalus to Persia. This thesis argues that the reason behind the change of behaviour in the Quraysh was Islam. Islamic teaching provided the Quraysh with a sense of consciousness beyond their traditional locale, an awareness of belonging to an *umma*. This consciousness then propelled them to form a wider society, essentially trying to establish the *umma* as social reality. While this awareness of a broader world clearly had practical constraints built into it, that it stemmed from Islamic teaching and was motivated by common Islamic goals are sufficient to consider it as an Islamic global consciousness (Geertz, 1973, p. 98).

Other than providing a motivational goal, Geertz (1973, pp. 96–98) also explains that religious activities could influence the moods of the believers by conditioning the believers to do or avoid certain actions. This behavioural-shaping ability is mainly achieved through the practice of religious rituals. By attending religious rituals, believers shape their worldview in accordance with the religion's. They then conform their actions to the values embedded in this particular worldview. Geertz's assertion of the influence of religion on the societal activities of the believers is important in understanding the transformation of the *umma* from a religious idea to a societal phenomenon. Through Muhammad, Islam introduced the notion that human society is characterised by faith, instead of by blood. In the time and location where tribalism was the prevalent societal system, it was a revolutionary idea.

The *umma* as an idea had to go through stages of objectivation described by Berger and Luckmann (1966) before it could emerge as a social reality. The transformation of the *umma* from a religious terminology into a symbolic universe occurred through the possibility of religious activities inducing motivation and moods in the believers. As detailed by Geertz (1973, pp. 96–98), religious activities motivate the believers by providing the believers with the underlying cause they strive for. In the case of the Muslim *umma*, it is plausible that the social activities done by Muslims were within the framework of the Islamic *umma* when

the Muslims perceived their actions to be required steps to achieve the Qur'anic virtue of *rahmatan lil 'alamin*. For example, when Muslims went to faraway places in order to spread Islam to the people of other cultures and to integrate them in a greater Muslim enterprise, this action of travelling and spreading Islam could be considered as motivated by the concept of the *umma*.

Later chapters of this thesis will show the efforts done by Muslims to establish the *umma* as social reality through building various translocal networks and interactions that connected distant areas. Chapter Three will describe the establishment of Muslim intellectual networks, which blended Islamic religious teaching and foreign intellectual traditions, and how these networks played an important role in connecting geographically separated lands and in allowing the movement of both ideas and people between those lands. Chapter Four will discuss the development of the concept of the caliphate as Muslim scholars seek to address the question of authority in the Muslim *umma* after the death of Muhammad. The practical implementation of the caliphate itself and how these political instruments helped the integration process in the Muslim *umma* are detailed in Chapter Five. In Chapter Six, this thesis will describe the development of Islamic mystical movements, the Sufi orders, whose religious expressions further helped to strengthen the image of a global *umma*. All of these will illustrate the transformation process from global consciousness in the form of the <u>idea</u> of an *umma* to the efforts to build a global society named the *umma*.

Chapter Three:
Intellectual Networks and the Integration of the *Umma*

The presence of connections and interactions among the inhabitants of various parts of the known world can be traced throughout history. The Silk Road, for example, was one of the main routes of trade and travelling between the area of contemporary China and Europe. There were also naval routes that connected various ancient cities and ports in Africa and Asia. Through this and many other routes, people exchanged goods and wealth, incorporated into what Abu-Lughod (1989) concludes as a "world economy system". Integrated in this translocal activity was the tribe of Quraysh, an Arabian tribe which would play important part in the advent and spreading of Islam, and the formulation of the Muslim *umma*.

The tribe of Quraysh was not a stranger to this translocal activity and the record of their trading activities was generally accepted by various historians. Muslim historian al-Mubarakpuri (1996, pp. 45–46) describes that trading had become the main economic activity for the Quraysh. As we saw in the previous chapter, this account is supported by Hodgson, who argues that there were two major routes where the Quraysh's trade routes thrived. One of the routes connected Yemen and the Indian Ocean in the south to the Mediterranean lands and Syria in the north. The other was part of the Silk Road, connecting Persian territories in the west to Abyssinia and Africa in the east (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 154). While there is a small number of scholars who argue to the contrary, such as Crone (1987), the majority of historians such as Hoyland (2001, pp. 102–110) and Kennedy (2004, pp. 23–24) acknowledge the prominence of Meccan trade routes and their importance as the main income for the Quraysh.

The presence of translocal activity, however, does not warrant the presence of a global society that unites the participating actors. As has been previously explained in Chapter One, social reality is the product of human consciousness (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 33). Therefore, in order to develop a global society, it is necessary for members of a society to have the consciousness that

acknowledges the world as an interconnected and interrelated unity, instead of comprising multiple, independent locales. This lack of a global consciousness was what had held back the Quraysh in becoming a part of the Byzantine or the Sasanid efforts in establishing their vision of global society before the spreading of Islam despite their translocal activities. The discussion in Chapter Two reveals that while they conducted extensive trade activities with various foreign actors, the Quraysh had not considered their interaction with other actors as a form of unification. They also did not perceive their trading partners as part of themselves; instead, they saw those actors as "the foreigners." This parochial consciousness remained prevalent in Qurayshi society until the adoption of Islam, which brought a new paradigm of universal brotherhood of Muslims to the Quraysh.

While the question of "how did the early Islamic society move towards a global consciousness?" was discussed in Chapter Two, this chapter and the subsequent ones will address the next question, "how is the concept of the *umma* related to the concept of global consciousness and to the concept and historical formation of a global society?". In particular, this chapter will address how the global consciousness inspired by Islamic teachings and rituals was objectivated in the Muslim society and transferred through Muslim intellectual networks to various locals. The first part of this chapter will explain how a network of Muslim scholars in an intellectual chain could play an important part in the objectivation and transference process of Islamic global consciousness among the Muslims. The second part will provide empirical evidence of this intellectual chain which connected Muslim society in various geographical areas, thus encouraging the sense of unity among them.

Intellectuals and Global Society

The Importance of Intellectuals

Following Berger and Luckmann (1966), human consciousness of social reality stems from ideas about the self and the surrounding environment that an individual has. Each individual projects his or her idea on to objects outside his or her body, and presents the subjective idea to the society through signs and languages. While there might be freedom to some extent for each individual to present his or her subjective narrative, the collection of narratives requires what

Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 49-62, 110-146) call objectivation and legitimation processes before it can be considered as the social reality. After that, the social reality undergoes an internalisation process and becomes embedded in the individual members of the society.

Intellectuals play a significant role in the objectivation and legitimation processes of knowledge. According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), subjective personal knowledge requires several steps in order to evolve into an objective social reality. In the first step, *habitualisation*, it is necessary for the knowledge to be repeated frequently into a certain pattern. The presence of pattern will simplify the decision-making process an individual should face, and will relieve the individual from the psychological burden that accompanies each decision-making process. This will provide the individual with free energy, which he or she can spend for deliberation or innovation (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 70–71).

In the second step, the processes that already fall into patterns will be *institutionalised* when various individuals reciprocally designate a certain habitualisation to a certain group of actors. For example, when individuals acknowledge that punishment should be delivered by a certain class or caste, while harvesting should be done by another class or caste, then the habitualisation of delivering punishment and performing harvest is already being institutionalised (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 72–76). Institutionalised practice then will gain an objective characteristic, in the sense that it is acknowledged by the individuals as a natural part of the society, that it is an undeniable fact, that it is "out there", an external condition to one's body and unchangeable by one's wishes or wants. At that moment, the institution becomes a social reality and gains a measure of control over the population (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 77–78).

It is important to note, however, that the "objectivity" inherent in an institutionalised practice is a product of social construction. Therefore, it is possible, albeit not easy, to deconstruct it and replace it with other types of social construction. The changing nature of slavery is one of the examples of institutionalised practice that had gained objectivity and had been considered as a natural condition of the world for a time, before being dismantled by the anti-slavery movement. Today, slavery is no longer being considered as the natural condition of the world by the majority of individuals. Under the same premise, Chapter Two has elaborated the changes within the Quraysh before and after the

spread of Islam. While they had been maintaining a stance of neutrality in the rivalry between the Byzantine and the Sasanids, after embracing Islam and instilled with Islamic global consciousness, the Quraysh had the aspiration to establish the *umma*.

Eventually, institutionalised practices must be transmitted to the next generation. Since the next generation is lacking the first generation's history and social processes which lead to the adoption of the practice into an institution in the beginning, they require a second order process to be able to perceive the practice as a social reality. This second order process is defined by Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 110) as the *legitimation* process. The legitimation process endorses the practice as a natural part of social reality by providing cognitive validity to its meanings. At the same time, the legitimation process also justifies the practice by ascribing a normative dignity to it. Legitimation not only teaches the next generation on *what* the social reality is, it also teaches *why* this is what it is. Therefore, the production of knowledge that both intellectually validates and morally justifies is imperative for the success of the legitimation process (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 111). While the common usage of signs and language plays an important part as the first level instrument of legitimation and is then strengthened by the usage of theoretical propositions such as proverbs and wise sayings, higher level legitimation processes require the development of elaborate and complex knowledge such as the production of scientific theories in support of the practice by certain specialised personnel (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 112–113).

In the Islamic world, the duty to produce complex knowledge to support the *umma* falls largely to the Muslim scholars. It is through the works of the scholars that Muslims teach the next generation about social reality according to the Islamic teaching, constructing the children's imaginary of self and the environment, introducing which behaviour is proper and which is not, what actions they should do and what they should avoid. The codification of Islamic practices led to the establishment of the schools of thought (*madhhab-s*) within the Islamic intellectual world. The presence of the schools of thought and their development throughout the Muslim world assisted the habituation and legitimation processes of Islam, establishing familiar patterns of Islamic social

reality which then culminate in, borrowing from Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 113), a *symbolic universe* for the next generation of Muslims to adopt.

Therefore, the Muslim intellectuals during the earlier age of Islam held two fundamental tasks in the development of the *umma* as an Islamic global society. *First*, Muslim intellectuals provided the theoretical framework for the existence and the development of a new and comprehensive social reality for the next generation of Muslims. Muslim scholars drew from the abstract concept of global consciousness found in the verses of the Qur'an and traditions of the Prophet as detailed in Chapter Two, which usually allude to characteristics such as the equality of mankind in front of God and the brotherhood of mankind, and transformed it into a theoretical conceptualisation and the practical application of their vision on a global society called the *umma* in accordance with the relevant conditions of their time. This development of knowledge was necessary to initiate the objectivation and institutionalisation processes of the global consciousness alluded to in the holy texts.

Second, Muslim intellectuals through their teacher-student relationships and intellectual connections provided empirical evidence of the presence of a global connection among Muslims. Through this chain of relationships, Muslim scholars were engaged in journeys, both in the literal, physical journey from one geographical area to another in search for knowledge, and in the metaphorical, intellectual journey of reading the work of other scholars far away from his or her domicile. This connection allowed the process of transference of ideas from one locale to another, and passionate scholars often became important figures and established their own centres of learning (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 93), or in Risse-Kappen and Sikkink's (1999) terminology, they became "norm entrepreneurs". Thus, it was possible for the Shafi'i school of thought that originated in Egypt to flourish and continue spreading to India and Indonesia, becoming the most established Islamic school of thought in various places thousands of miles away from its original centre (Shafi'i, 1987, p. 48).

The presence of a translocal intellectual chain in the Muslim world and the ease of Muslim scholars in undergoing literal and metaphorical journeys were important in their efforts to develop a (to certain degree) unified Muslim society in the later period. Not only did this intellectual chain function as the theoretical foundation that validated and justified the establishment of the *umma*, it also

functioned as the evidence itself of the emergence of the unified Muslim world. The intellectual chains among Muslim scholars were the fibre that put the fabric of Muslim society together. Therefore, when the Islamic intellectual society was disrupted by the infiltration of Western ideas, which culminated in the Tanzimat Movement in the Ottoman period, an integrated *umma* also became more difficult to establish and maintain.

Theory of Intellectual Chains

The transference process of ideas previously described is an abstract process but the manifestations of the concept are plenty, and often exist in interactions seemingly small and common around us. In the case of the *umma*, the transference process could be seen in various interactions among Muslims. A relation between teacher and student in an intellectual network is one such transference process. While it might be considered as small and simple, the interaction between teacher and student actually consists of a complex set of intellectual rituals that also belong to a larger intellectual chain. It is through these intellectual rituals that the transference process happens from one intellectual to another. Therefore, the intellectual chain is directly relevant to relations that formulate a global society because the chain both connects people from various locales into one network and integrates them through the adoption of intellectual rituals.

This process of intellectual rituals is extensively detailed by Randall Collins in his work *Sociology of Philosophies* (1998), a book on the network of intellectuals and transference of ideas among them. Collins's main argument is that "intellectual life is about conflict and disagreement" and that the study of intellectual history is the observance of patterns of rivalries between small warring camps of intellectuals (Collins, 1998, p. 1). While it is possible for intellectuals to be solitary and not attached to a particular network, there are benefits that an intellectual will gain from joining a certain network/chain. It is therefore important to take into account the development of intellectual groups and the dynamic interactions inside an intellectual group or between groups (Collins, 1998, p. 21).

According to Collins (1998), in order for an intellectual to be able to produce new or important ideas, the person needs to possess emotional energy,

cultural capital and an opportunity structure. The first factor, *emotional energy*, is the surge of enthusiasm that runs through an individual participating in an interaction ritual in his or her intellectual network. This emotional energy connects the individual to the ritual, and instils the group's mood into the said individual. It motivates individuals to do heroic works, which might result in an intellectual breakthrough. The emotional energy exists even after the ritual is over and the individual is alone, before it eventually diminishes and fades away. In order to replenish the energy, an individual needs to attend and participate in another ritual (Collins, 1998, pp. 23–24).

The second factor, *cultural capital*, is a collection of symbols that are created or gathered during the ritual. Unlike other rituals which produce sacred symbols important to their own group, intellectuals produce sacred symbols that are important to both their own group and the public: their claim to "truth". Through various modes of interactions such as lectures, conferences and discussions, intellectuals debate their notion of truth. This academic interaction and debate about truth can be equated to performing a ritual ceremony in which the intellectuals "worship" their sacred object (Collins, 1998, pp. 24–26). Individuals who are able to defend their claim of truth through face-to-face interactions will accumulate cultural capital in his or her network, which will lend greater authority for his next work. (Collins, 1998, p. 32) The development of writing and printing services enables intellectual networks to objectify their sacred symbols into books, and to distribute them widely. Thus, books are often perceived as sacred symbols of the intellectual networks, but books in reality represent a form of objectivation of the true sacred symbols: the claim to truth. Without the face-to-face rituals described above, writings and books would never be able to transfer emotional energy and be no more than emblems of a dead religion (Collins, 1998, p. 27)

The third factor, *opportunity structure,* is one's standing in the network of intellectuals, which often provide a structural constraint to a person's individual achievement. The more egalitarian a network, the better opportunity structure for its members since an egalitarian network allows individuals with little cultural capital to gain credibility and fame using the network's assets. A permissive opportunity structure then can be converted into a greater route to achievement by the network's members (Collins, 1998, pp. 29–30). A network with good

opportunity structure will also help to distribute various assets that its members have, which in turn will help members to progress better in a network than in a solitary environment.

One of the benefits of a good network is the distribution of cultural capital and emotional energy to its members. While cultural capital and emotional energy typically influence each other, these two are independent variables. It is possible for someone to have one, but not the other. If someone is having high emotional energy but no cultural capital, his or her enthusiasm will wane, and it is possible that he will end up disillusioned. Young scholars who are very enthusiastic in their research but lacking the necessary books and sources of information are a good example of having emotional energy but lacking cultural capital. This will lead to their frustration and perhaps withdrawal from current research (Collins, 1998, pp. 44–45). On the other end of the spectrum, a senior researcher might possess a wealth of information and collections, but his lack of enthusiasm blocks him from being productive (Collins, 1998, p. 46). The presence of a network with a good opportunity structure will help to alleviate these issues, either by providing members with high emotional energy through participating in intellectual rituals or by distributing cultural capital to energetic members needing it.

The last benefit of being a member in an intellectual network is the greater chance to distribute one's work. Collins (1998, p. 59) states that to achieve greatness, an intellectual requires more than creativity. A great intellectual is determined by how interested people are in his works after long periods of time. Thus, in addition to creating a qualified work, an intellectual has the burden of distributing his work. Since the best way to distribute intellectual works is by using chains of personal contacts (Collins, 1998, p. 65), then joining an intellectual network and creating successive links in the chains become even more essential for assuring the impact of one's work (Collins, 1998, p. 66). Furthermore, personal interactions with fellow intellectuals (not to mention greater intellectuals) can provide significant benefits such as larger intellectual capital, higher emotional energy and experience in rivalry (Collins, 1998, p. 73).

Collins's conceptualisation of intellectual ritual is reminiscent of Geertz's (1973) conceptualisation of how religious rituals affect the believers that was expounded upon in Chapter Two. In order for an intellectual group to flourish, Collins argues that it needs to establish rituals in which its members should take

part. These rituals employ symbols, which then manipulate the initiates' emotions and drives, something akin to Geertz's concept that religious rituals are capable of manipulating the believers' moods and motivations. This does not necessarily mean that an intellectual ritual should be religious in nature, or that religious ritual should accommodate intellectual activities. Often, one ritual is completely devoid of the other. However, this similarity between intellectual rituals and religious rituals becomes more apparent in the Islamic intellectual world due to its characteristics, which will be discussed in the next section.

Characteristics of the Islamic intellectual world

In the Islamic intellectual world, religious rituals and intellectual rituals are indeed inseparable. This is because Islam teaches that learning is part of the duty of the believers. There is a *hadith* from Muhammad that made seeking knowledge an obligation for all Muslims. This well-known *hadith* is recorded by Ibn Majah in his *Sunan* (vol 1/224), "seeking knowledge is a duty upon every Muslim". This intertwined and intimate nature between the intellectuals and the religious in Islamic intellectual rituals is the first defining characteristics of the Islamic intellectual world. Both rituals often affect one another or one activity can be interpreted as intellectual, religious or both. Throughout Islamic history, it was possible for a Muslim scholar to gain intellectual emotional energy by performing religious rituals as well as engaging in intellectual debate. At the same time, religious Muslims usually put priority on seeking knowledge, to the point of travelling far away for the sake of knowledge, as will be detailed later.

Other than simple faith from a scholar who believed that his intellectual activities would benefit him in the hereafter, practices related to knowledge and knowledge sharing were also infused with religious symbolism and rituals. A *shaikh* giving a lecture should be in a pure condition before teaching, as should students receiving '*ilm*, or knowledge, from the *shaikh*. The class should be clean and the session should start with a prayer. Before a copyist could copy a book, he was advised to perform ablution first, to maintain his purity while copying the knowledge. Even papers that contained the name of prophets, angels, companions of the prophets or respected '*ulama* were considered sacred and should not be pulped again (Chamberlain, 1994, pp. 125–130).

Grunebaum (1955, p. 111) explains that this nature stems from the early period of Islamic society, when Muslims developed their knowledge to fulfil the needs of the society to learn Islam. Therefore, at first, Islamic knowledge was developed with a focus on learning the Qur'an and *hadith*. Intellectuals focused their efforts in studying the holy text and preserving the records of Muhammad's deeds and sayings, which culminated in the codification of the *hadith* by various scholars (Peters, 1973, p. 213; Kennedy, 2000, p. 20). At the same time, the expansion of the Islamic empire from the Umayyad period onwards exposed Islam to non-Arabs in an unprecedented intensity. It was necessary to develop Arabic into a systematic body of knowledge in order to explain the Qur'an and *hadith* to people from various non-Arab backgrounds. Philology thus became a sacred science, imperative for Muslim intellectuals to learn, since it was required to connect the holy scriptures to the masses (Peters, 1973, p. 213).

The sacred characteristic of Islamic intellectual life also influenced the behaviour of Muslim scholars. Since the absolute truth in the Islamic intellectual world was already determined by God in the Qur'an and further refined by Muhammad in his *hadith*, there was little need to build sacred symbols upon the intellectuals' perception of truth. The Qur'an and *hadith* themselves were sacred symbols for all Muslim intellectuals. Cultural capital was then gained by showing deep comprehension of the holy texts. This is the reason why mastering branches of knowledge that led to better understanding of the holy text, such as philology, also provided a Muslim scholar with tremendous cultural capital, bestowing on him or – to a lesser extent -- her the authority to speak on a wide range of issues (Peters, 1973, pp. 215–235).

Only after the fundamentals of the sciences of the Qur'an and *hadith* had been laid down, the Islamic intellectual world expanded its attention to the development of the more mundane sciences (Grunebaum, 1955, p. 113). Yet, even the mundane science had been tinged by sacredness because many of those developments were initiated to satisfy daily life necessities as a Muslim, such as the development of astronomy and mathematics that were required by Muslims travelling far to determine the direction of Mecca for their prayers. Thus, Muslim scholars maintained their characteristic as masters of both religious and mundane sciences. Complementing their inquiry into their specific field of investigation, Muslim scholars were still required to master the verses of the Qur'an and the

hadith, in order to ensure that their knowledge seeking activities were within acceptable boundaries. Saliba (2007, pp. 183–204) describes in detail how Muslim scholars proficient in astronomy were also proficient in religious knowledge, and how they used Aristotle's work on astronomy selectively to suit their need: adopting his mathematical model but at the same time disregarding the astrological implication of his cosmology since the cosmology model was not suitable to the Islamic worldview.

Watt (1963, pp. 15–16) notes that by the time of the Abbasids, there were many Muslims of non-Arab origin. They, perhaps inadvertently, included their scientific traditions in the development of a new body of knowledge, which many consider as Islamic. As the consequence of this intellectual tradition, there was no differentiation between "religious scholars" and "worldly scientists" which is common in the contemporary world. Instead, the Muslim scholars were categorised under one large umbrella as *'ulama* or "those with knowledge". There were scholars who attained specialisation in some subject areas but the trend was that scholars should be proficient in multiple subjects. This can be seen from the profile of famous Muslim scholars such as al-Ghazali, who was not only proficient in theology but also in philosophy and mysticism (Ormsby, 2008).

The second characteristic of the Islamic intellectual world is the strong concern about political issues. During his life, Muhammad had become the centre of Muslim daily life. He was the spiritual teacher and also the political leader. He was the personal friend of many Muslims and yet he also the general that led them all to battles. The death of Muhammad removes a significant foundation of Islam and it shook Muslims on both personal and communal levels. The death of Muhammad raised many questions for the Muslims, the foremost was whether any political cohesion that had been built during Muhammad's time should survive after his death. Many Bedouin tribes who had submitted considered his death as the end of their allegiance, further weakening the fledging state (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 197).

In order to avert the crisis, Muslims had to address the question of leadership. Eventually, Abu Bakr was chosen as the successor of the Prophet. According to Donner (1981, pp. 83–84), Abu Bakr gained the majority's support because of several reasons: first, he was universally respected for his strong attachment to Islam and to the Prophet. Second, he was accepted by the Muhajirin

because of his Qurayshi origin and by the Ansar because of his loyalty to the Prophet. Third, Abu Bakr was well known for his expertise in tribal genealogy. In a political culture that heavily relied on tribal connections and lineages, the knowledge of genealogy was held in high regard. Genealogists did what contemporary political analysts do: examine the relations between political actors and the power relations among them. Donner's argument as to why Abu Bakr was chosen indicates, again, the importance of knowledge in lending credibility and legitimacy to Muslims' political activities. Abu Bakr was chosen not only because he had political connections but also because his scholarly knowledge provided further credibility to his political aspiration.

Abu Bakr was faced with a great task right after his election as Muhammad's successor. He needed to find ways to maintain the unity of the *umma* in the face of various secession movements. There were two types of opposition that threatened the unity of the *umma*. The first type were groups that challenged the political position of the *umma*. Included in this group were various tribes that had been allies of Medina but then refused to pay fealty tax to Medina, considering that their agreement had ended with Muhammad's death. The second type were groups that challenged the religious claims of Islam. These groups were led by false prophets and prophetesses and sought to establish their own creeds as the hegemonic ideology of the area (Donner, 1981, p. 85).

In Islamic tradition, the wars against these opposition groups were collectively called the Wars of Ridda. *Ridda* is the Islamic term for apostasy or repudiation of Islam, thus implying the spiritual nature of the wars. Donner (1981, pp. 85–86) argues that the first type of opposition did not reject Islam *per se*, that they only rejected the political superiority of Medina. Islamic tradition, however, disagrees with Donner's argument. Ibn Kathir (2006, pp. 76–78), for example, argues that it was not secular taxes that the tribes were reluctant to pay, but it was zakat, the religious alms obligatory on all Muslims according to their wealth. Thus, their reluctance was an affront to Islamic teaching. Baladhuri and Hitti (1916, pp. 143–162) give a detailed account of the causes of the wars, and while many of them were related to conflicts over policy or governance, they were still called "apostasy" since the rebels were revolting against the successor of the Prophet and broke from the unity of the *umma*.

Abu Bakr managed to quell the rebellions and defeated the armies of false prophets and prophetesses. Despite his successes, Abu Bakr's succession was disputed by some. His and other subsequent succession processes sparked the intense debate on leadership in Islamic tradition. At first the debate was theoretical with two different positions formulated: one which supported the succession through popular means and one which supported the succession through bloodlines. Yet the division escalated further, transforming the intellectual positions into political camps which intertwined with religious sanctity and sacredness. Islam was fragmented into conflicting denominations, with Sunni and Shia as the two largest ones (Robinson, 2009, p. 194). The transformation of the intellectual positions into political and religious movements, the conflicts between those denominations and the connotation these conflicts brought to the concept of *umma*, will be discussed further in Chapter Four.

This strong concern for political issues has remained a distinguishing characteristic of the Islamic intellectual world even today. Kennedy (2000, pp. 18–19) argues that this is because Muslims feel the need to establish a theoretical foundation for their political activities. Normally, new political entities are built from reflection through history, sometimes referencing their past and the good ol' days of certain leaders. But this was not the case with Islam. The advent of Islam made the ideals of the past irrelevant, thus forcing Muslim intellectuals to develop their own theory of statecraft. How the intellectuals developed the political theory of the caliphate and how the *fiqh* schools were established as the legal institution of the caliphate will be elaborated further in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.

It is important to note that while all Muslim scholars shared these defining characteristics of the Islamic intellectual world, the intellectual life inside this world was not a monolith or uniform. Even though all Muslim scholars drew from the Qur'an and *hadith* as their main inspiration, their intellectual process could not be considered as objective and independent from their subjective experiences. On the contrary, the subjective experiences of each scholars and the condition of their environment were important in their intellectual formation and thus influenced the knowledge that they produced. One prominent example of how subjective, personal experience might influence the process of knowledge production is illustrated by Khadduri (1987). In his introduction to Shafi'i's *Risala*, Khadduri explains how the renowned Muslim scholar, Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i (d.

820 CE), had publicised his influential work only to criticise his own work later and changed his opinion on various issues while he was older and gained a wealth of experience (Shafi'i, 1987, pp. 7–15).

Far from being monolithic, the works of Muslim scholars were vibrant and even often in conflict with one another. However, since all scholars developed their work from the holy texts, these dynamic interactions took place in a shared symbolic universe. Thus, instead of destroying the social reality that the Muslims had built, the debates among Muslim scholars were essential in strengthening the Islamic worldview as their shared symbolic universe. They were all working within a common normative framework. These specific characteristics of an Islamic intellectual network were taught and transmitted to the corners of the Islamic world through various chains of interactions both vertical, comprising master-pupil relations, and horizontal, comprising relations between contemporaries, peers and even rivals (Collins, 1998, p. 65).

The Schools of Thought (*madhhabs*)

One prominent feature which highlights the dynamic nature of Islamic intellectual life is the existence of different schools of thought or *madhhab* in Islam. There are four well known schools of thought in Sunni tradition: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. While there were political and legal consequences of the development of the schools, which will be explored further in Chapter Four, the initial development of these schools was presumably driven by intellectual inquiries as the result of interactions between the infallibility of the Qur'an and the changing subjectivity experienced by Muslims. The schools seek to establish methodology by which Muslim scholars could contextualise the ideal principles of the Qur'an to the contemporary conditions in order to provide better guidance to Muslims. All Islamic schools of thought build their methodology and logic reasoning upon the foundation of the Qur'anic texts. They, however, differ in the methods of extracting a legal opinion from the Qur'an in order to answer a specific problem. Some put more emphasis on the usage of logic while others put more emphasis on the literal readings of the text.

There is considerable debate on when the development of Islamic schools of thought, which then evolved into schools of law, started. Schacht (1964; 1979)

argues that these schools developed in the second century of *hijra*, or approximately the eighth century. Schacht used the development of *usul al-fiqh* or the theoretical sources of laws by Shafi'i as his starting point for the development of Islamic legal thinking. Before Shafi'i, Schacht argues, there was no definite methodology in Muslim legal practice (1964, p. 28). The learning centres presented at that time were defined by their geographical distribution instead of methodological differences, thus Schacht's addressing them as "regional schools" of Hijaz and Kufa. These "schools" were then challenged by Shafi'i, resulting in their transformation into more cohesive schools which adopted allegiance to a certain master. The school of Kufa was transformed into the Hanafi school, while the school of Hijaz became the Maliki school (Schacht, 1979, p. 10).

Schacht's argument that Islamic legal thinking was developed in the second century of the *hijra*, however, is criticised by Motzki (2002). According to Motzki (2002, pp. 18–45), Schacht tends to downplay the importance of scholarly works before Shafi'i. Schacht also rejects the authenticity of *isnad*, or the chains which narrate a *hadith*, and considers them to be fabricated and the narrators as unreliable or even randomly selected. Motzki (2002) then provides a detailed study of the development of Islamic thinking in Mecca during the first two centuries of Muslim history. Using the work of 'Abd al-Razzaq (d. 744 CE), *Mushannaf*, which is dated earlier than manuscripts that Schacht had used for his research, Motzki constructs a theory on how Islamic scholars of Mecca developed Islamic laws during "the last three decades of the first/seventh century" (Motzki, 2002, p. 297), much earlier than Schacht's starting point.

Motzki (2002, pp. 287–291) then elaborates the development of Islamic thinking by the Meccan scholars. The foundation of their school of thought was based on the teaching of 'Abdullah ibn al-Abbas. During the years of 660-685, Ibn Abbas resided in Mecca and laid a foundation for Meccan scholarship. After Ibn Abbas passed away, his students continued the school. The famous students of Ibn Abbas were Mujahid and 'Ata ibn Abi Rabah. The characteristic of this school was that instead of relying on the holy texts, they primarily expressed their own opinions and cited authoritative holy texts only to a limited extent. There might also have been consensus among Meccan scholars and they might have consulted with each other. These characteristics were prevalent up to the time of Shafi'i, who had studied under one of the Meccan scholars, Muslim ibn Khalid, before

studying under Malik ibn Anas (d. 795), the eponymous founder of the Maliki school.

In Kufa, a different development occurred in Islamic thinking. Instead of consensus, the scholars of Kufa had different positions on various issues. Adding to that condition was the freedom of the people to follow the legal opinion of a scholar in one time and to follow another in yet another time, making it hard to relegate the term "school" to Kufa. What had developed in Kufa was intellectual culture where individual scholars developed their own methodology and disciples learned from various scholars (Hallaq, 2001b, p. 21). One of the most prominent scholars in Kufa was Abu Hanifa (d. 767). His methodology put emphasis on using reason for conducting *istihsan* or juristic preference. According to Abu Hanifa, scholars and jurists must exercise their reason to get the most appropriate result from the Qur'an regarding a case. At the time of Abu Hanifa, the science of *hadith* had not developed at all; thus he ruled that juristic preference could be done without relying on the *hadith*. After the third century of the *hijra*, when the science of *hadith* had produced a massive collection of prophetic literature, scholars of the Hanafi school changed the rule so that juristic preference could only be done based on the presence of supporting *hadith* (Hallaq, 1997, pp. 107–111). In later centuries, the Hanafi school became the largest school of thought in the Islamic world, gaining large followers in Persia, Central Asia, Turkey and the Indian peninsula.

The intellectual tradition of Medina enjoyed a period of prominence during the time of Malik ibn Anas. Malik was a distinguished scholar, well known for his compilation of *hadith*, *al-Muwatta*. His methodology was founded upon the Qur'an, the *hadith* of the Prophet, the traditions of the people of Medina and then the use of reason to judge the benefits of a legal ruling (*masalih mursala*) (Hallaq, 1997, pp. 112–113). Ibn Khaldun described the three branches within the Maliki school: Cordoba, Qayrawan and Iraq. All three played an important part in Muslim world affairs. The Maliki school was introduced in al-Andalus by the time of Caliph Abdurrahman ibn al-Hakam (822-852) and soon gained considerable prestige. The Maliki school in Qayrawan extended the influence of the school to Africa and inspired the politico-religious movement of the Almoravid dynasty. The Maliki school in Baghdad was important as the fore-runner of the classical Shafi'i school (Melchert, 1997, pp. 156–177).

The Shafi'i school was considered the amalgamation of the previous traditions and Shafi'i's own genius. Shafi'i (d. 820) tried to find the middle ground between the use of reasoning and the holy scriptures. Shafi'i's book, *al-Risala*, was considered the foundation of the science of Islamic law and it had a profound effect on the future of Islamic intellectual life. As mentioned in the previous section, Shafi'i wrote two books entitled *al-Risala*. The old *al-Risala* was written during his time in Baghdad while the new one was written later, during his time in Egypt. The later book was considered more mature, reflecting the accumulation of his wealth of knowledge and experience (Shafi'i, 1987, pp. 21–25). In *al-Risala*, Shafi'i put down his methodology on Islamic thinking: using the Qur'an, the *hadith*, consensus from the Companions of the Prophet and then using reason in the form of *ijtihad* (personal reasoning) and *qiyas* (analogy). Although allowing the usage of reason, Shafi'i limited it to a lesser degree if compared to the extent of reason in Abu Hanifa's methodology (Shafi'i, 1987, pp. 32–40). The Shafi'i school gained considerable influence in the Muslim world, especially in Egypt, eastern Africa and Southeast Asia.

The fourth school of thought in Islamic world was founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855). Among the four schools of thought, the Hanbali school was the most traditional, in the sense that it strongly advocated the usage of holy texts, from both the Qur'an and the *hadith*, and at the same time limited the usage of reason in legal reasoning (Melchert, 2006, pp. 61–62). Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyah (d. 1350 CE), a Hanbali scholar, summarised the Hanbali methodology as founded upon (in order of importance): the Qur'an, well-attested prophetic *hadith*, well-attested opinions from the Companions of the Prophet, opinion closest to the Qur'an and the *hadith* if the Companions disagree, weakly-attested *hadith*, and finally *qiyas* or analogy (Melchert, 2006, p. 77).

This free and fluid academic culture that allowed for the rise of diverse legal schools was changed in the later centuries, when attachment to a scholar became stronger. This fierce attachment, known as *taqlid*, banded people to a certain scholarly figure, proclaiming their allegiance to him and his teaching to the point of being hostile to the followers of other scholars (Hallaq, 2001a, pp. 81–85). Schacht (1964, pp. 70–71) argues that the *taqlid* phenomenon had closed the door of *ijtihad* at the end of fourth century of the *hijra*/tenth century CE, consequently deeming that the Islamic intellectual world had been in stagnation ever since.

However, while acknowledging the presence of movements which were promoting *taqlid* instead of *ijtihad*, Hallaq (1984b; 1986; 2001a) disagrees with Schacht's notion on the closure of the door of *ijtihad* and argues that the door of *ijtihad* had never been closed. Scholars and jurists such as al-Tabari (d. 310), al-Mawardi (d. 450), al-Ghazali (d. 1111) and many more were performing *ijtihad* to address contemporary matters in their time.

Nevertheless, the intellectual life in the Islamic world then became a fierce competition among scholars. Schools were formed around competent and knowledgeable scholars, each defending a particular methodology as their sacred symbol. Scholars in one school perceived scholars of the other schools as rivals for the accumulation of, in Collins' terms, cultural capital and an opportunity to expand their influence and strengthen their position in the Islamic intellectual world. Each desperately sought to consolidate their influence in order to command greater authority in front ofthe masses.

Intellectual Networks and the Integration of the *Umma*

The intertwined rituals of religion and intellectual activity provided the impetus for the development of Islamic intellectual networks. During medieval times, Islamic intellectual networks flourished and travels for the sake of religious scholarship became a trend. These travels were expressed by the term *rihla* (travel), but later gained a specific term as *talab al-'ilm* (seeking for knowledge) to distinguish it from other kind of travels in Muslim culture (Gellens, 1990, p. 53).

The popularity of *rihla* was likely driven by several motives. The first motive was that travelling in search of knowledge was considered as a religious obligation for all Muslims, following various *hadith* from Muhammad that encourage learning activity. There are many *hadith* in which Muhammad was recorded commending those who travel to seek knowledge. Muslim in his *Sahih* (vol. 35/6518) narrated that Muhammad praised several good characteristics of Muslims, one of those is "…he who treads the path in search of knowledge, Allah would make that path easy, leading to Paradise for him." This *hadith*, and others like it, literally identify seeking knowledge with physical travelling and its promise of Paradise as the reward has surely provided religious motivation to

Muslims to conduct *rihla*. The second motive was that travelling provided the opportunity for young scholars to expand their knowledge by learning from experts in distant cities, to exchange ideas and books, and also to establish links and networks to other scholars. It was essentially an intellectual ritual that, again, combined religious conviction with intellectual processes, a characteristic recurring in Islamic intellectual life.

In his comparative study on medieval Muslim societies, Gellens (1990) describes how *rihla/talab al-'ilm* as social phenomena permeated the Muslim society. This culture of *rihla* propelled the establishment of extensive intellectual networks from all corners of the Muslim world. Muslims performed *rihla* not only to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, but also to various centres of learning in Jerusalem, Baghdad, Cairo and Nishapur. In Egyptian accounts, Gellens found that Egyptians during the first four centuries rarely performed *rihla*, but instead became the destination of people from other cities. While never rivalling the illustrious Baghdad, Egypt had developed its own centres of learning and Egyptian scholars were often cited by Muslim intellectuals (Gellens, 1990, p. 58).

Intellectual life in al-Andalus, in contrast, was centred on *rihla*. There are thousands of biographies that recorded *rihla* and these documents portray its importance to Muslims in al-Andalus. Gellens (1990, pp. 59–60) attributes its importance to two factors: geography and politics. Geographically, al-Andalus was in the western periphery of the Muslim world. Whereas the study of *fiqh* was developing in al-Andalus, the study of *hadith* did not. Therefore, it was natural for Muslims in al-Andalus to travel for knowledge to other cities, especially those with a strong tradition of *hadith* to study under scholars in this discipline. Politically, Muslims in al-Andalus faced continuous conflicts with Catholics. During the sixth century AH/twelfth century CE, the escalation of conflict prompted emigration of Andalusian Muslims to North Africa and Egypt, diminishing the intellectual life in Spain and thus making travel even more imperative.

The relationships that had been established during *rihla* did not diminish even though the travel had ended. On the contrary, the relations between Muslim scholars persisted and constituted a greater chain of connections: the Islamic intellectual chain. After they had finished their studies, students acquired a certificate (*ijaza)* and, more importantly, a continuous link to their teacher, and the

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teacher of their teacher, and the teacher of the teacher, and so on. This continuous link, called *isnad*, was the formal symbol of their inclusion in the intellectual chain. Not only signifying their mastery in the subject, the certificate and the *isnad* also functioned as cultural capital that lent credibility to the young scholars (Berkey, 1992, pp. 31-33, 176-178).

The intellectual activities in the Muslim world and its various rituals and symbols such as the *rihla*, *isnad* and *ijaza* described above did not only benefit the development of science. It also provided the Muslim society with a common platform in which Muslims from various locales could interact and establish bonds which surpassed geographical and racial boundaries. During these interactions, the notion of an interconnected broader society of Muslims, idealised in the teachings of the Qur'an, unwittingly spread both through the proliferation of theological concepts and social theories produced by Muslim scholars and through the actual connection through the practices of common intellectual rituals and inclusion in common intellectual networks. In the following sections, this thesis will describe the cases of Islam in Africa and Islam in Indonesia as two such networks that not only played an important part in the distribution of Islamic knowledge but were also vital in the integration process of Africa and Indonesia into the Muslim world.

Expanding the network: the Case of Islam in Africa

The first case to show the extensive networks in Islamic intellectual world is the spreading of Islam in Africa. Islam arrived in Africa through several methods. Islam reached the northern part of the continent by the method of military conquest. The Arab army under Umar ibn Khattab conquered Egypt and, while it was not accompanied by forced conversion, it established political, social and economic conditions which were favourable to the spreading of Islam (Fasi and Hrbek, 1995). From Egypt, Islam extended in three directions: through the Red Sea to the eastern coastal areas, up to the Nile valley to the Sudan and across the western desert to the Maghrib (Levtzion and Pouwels, 2000, p. 2).

The spreading of Islam to the southern part of Africa did not occur in a single process. Robinson (2004b, p. 28) summarises the expansion of Islam in Africa through three stages. The first stage was introduced by Muslim merchants involved in the Trans-Saharan trade routes. At first, the merchants were of

Arabian origin but later, there were many Muslim merchants of African origin (Fasi and Hrbek, 1995, p. 91; Levtzion and Pouwels, 2000, pp. 2–4). The presence of Muslim merchants initiated the establishment of Muslim quarters and enclaves in cities where pagan and non-Muslims were still the majority. The second stage was often recognised as "court" Islam since the main feature of this stage was the adoption of Islam by rulers and members of the ruling class. During this time, Islam had a strong presence in cities but with no significant presence in the rural area. The third stage was the expansion of Islam to the rural area and villages, where the majority of the populace were (Robinson, 2004b, p. 28).

Scholars played an essential role in the expansion of Islam in Africa. Scholars from Islamic schools of thought were involved in the expansion, both as missionaries and as advisors to the Muslim merchants, and in later the stage of Islamisation, advisors to the Muslim rulers. Often, scholars were also regarded as holy men as they claimed to possess mystical powers (*baraka*) or as people attributed mystical powers to them (Lewis, 1966, p. 27). The presence of these scholars, their guiding African Muslims to understand Islam better and their advising on practical issues were invaluable for the development of African Muslims' spiritual life. At the same time, the presence of these scholars also helped the development of African Muslims' intellectual life. In addition to introducing the Qur'an and Islamic law, the scholars initiated the establishment of learning centres in Africa. It was in these learning centres that complex social interactions among Muslims from various origins were established. It was from these learning centres that common ethical and legal norms emerged that would transform the societies in Africa for the next centuries. More importantly, these learning centres provided the Muslims of Africa with links to the outside world, inadvertently promoting a cosmopolitan view for Africans (Reichmuth, 2000, pp. 419–420).

There were many Islamic learning centres in Africa, with the most notable being Timbuktu. Timbuktu was initially an important market city in the Trans-Saharan trade route. It then developed into an independent city, known as the "City of Scholars" under Malian and Songhay rule. Around the sixteenth century, Timbuktu had established close relations with Maliki scholarship centres in Middle East and North Africa. By the seventeenth century, the scholars of Timbuktu had gained considerable authority for the Maliki school (Reichmuth,

2000, pp. 426–428; Conrad, 2005, p. 41). Other important Islamic learning centres in Africa were Jenne and Harar. Jenne was an important city during the height of the Mali Empire. It was located along the Niger river, and had been said to be more famous than Timbuktu because of its gold deposits (Conrad, 2005, p. 54). According to Sa'di (2003, p. 18), Jenne became a Muslim city in the eighth century after its ruler, Sultan Kunburu, converted to Islam and his people followed his example. Harar was a centre of Islamic learning in East Africa. It also functioned as a trade hub between the Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula and the outside world. Harar was well known as the "City of Saints", where the shrines of hundreds of saints existed and were venerated by Muslims from the surrounding area (Caulk, 1977, p. 372; Gibb, 1999, p. 92).

The presence of such prestigious Islamic learning centres provided benefits not only to Muslims, but also non-Muslims. Islamic learning centres provided services that were accessible to non-Muslims, such as education on mundane sciences, healing services and divination practices. Kings and leaders valued Islamic learning centres since the presence of Muslim scholars benefitted their kingdoms. These scholars brought with them not only knowledge but also extensive networks to the outside world, which could then be utilised to establish trade or political connections between the African kingdoms and other powers in the Muslim world (Lewis, 1966, pp. 30–31; Reichmuth, 2000, p. 421). Kings from Bornu and Songhay sought the attention of the West African scholar Jamal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 1505), hoping that by gaining his service in their courts, the scholar could help the kings in obtaining formal recognition as vice-regents of the Abbasid caliph (Reichmuth, 2000, p. 427).

The presence of a Muslim intellectual network in Africa impacted not only intellectual life but also political and military life. Through their connections, African Muslims played an important role in various aspects of Muslim history. One of the examples where an intellectual network resulted in political activity is the establishment of the Almoravid dynasty (r. 1062-1147 CE). The dynasty was born as the direct result of the presence of the Maliki school's penetration of Africa. Without the intellectual foundation provided by the Maliki school, the the Almoravid dynasty would never have never been established and the fall of al-Andalus would had been occurred earlier than what it was.

The history of the Almoravids began in 1038 CE, when Yahya ibn Ibrahim, the chief of the Sanhaja confederation of tribes in the Western Sahara, was on pilgrimage and met a Maliki scholar, Abu Imran al-Fasi. Yahya sought the scholar's wisdom and asked the scholar to send a disciple to accompany him back and to teach Islam to members of his tribe. Unable to recommend another scholar to go with the chief, Abu Imran al-Fasi sent Yahya to meet one of his former students, Wajjaj ibn Zalwi, who had established a school called *Dar al-Murabitin* in Sus al-Aqsa, northwest of Sahara. Accepting the tribal chief and his former teacher's letter, Ibn Zalwi then commissioned his disciple, Abdullah ibn Yasin, to go with the chief and to teach Islam to members of the Sanhaja confederation (Messier, 2010, pp. 2–4).

It was the teaching of Ibn Yasin that served as the ideological foundation of the tribe and transformed it into one powerful dynasty. The Islamic ethos hammered by Ibn Yasin remoulded the tribesmen and provided them with the motivation to expand their dominion, again showing how Islamic consciousness is capable of transforming a society. Even after Ibn Yasin's death, his legacy persisted. The Almoravid dynasty continued to flourish to the point that under the leadership of Yusuf ibn Tashfin, it was capable of sending an army to help al-Andalus and defeat a Christian army in the Battle of Sagrajas on 23 October 1086 CE. After their defeat in this battle, the Christian kings had to halt their invasion to al-Andalus for several generations to recuperate (Messier, 2010, p. 82).

Even after the demise of the Almoravid dynasty in 1147 CE, the Maliki school still held a prominent position in West Africa. Local Islamic scholarship was heavily influenced by Khalil ibn Ishaq's *Mukhtasar*, which in the sixteenth century had become the most authoritative textbook of the Maliki school of law. The popularity of *Mukhtasar* in West Africa's Islamic scholarship was initiated by Mahmud ibn 'Umar Aqit (d. 1548 CE), then the *qadi* of Timbuktu. Journeying back from his pilgrimage in 1509-1510 CE, Ibn Umar Aqit visited Cairo and met the leading Maliki scholars such as Ibrahim al-Maqdisi, Shaikh Zakariyya al-Ansari and al-Qalqashandi. After coming back to Timbuktu, Ibn Umar Aqit wrote the first known local commentary on *Mukhtasar* which directly stimulated the popularity of the book throughout West Africa (Sa'di and Hunwick, 2003, pp. 54–55).

Connecting the "Periphery" to the "Centre": the Case of Islam in Indonesia

The second case to consider is the spreading of Islam to Indonesia. Indonesia has been deemed as the "periphery" of the Muslim world. In his book *Islam Compared*, Geertz contrasts Morocco and Indonesia, saying that while Morocco had been in the periphery, it, at the very least, was in the immediate vicinity of the great Islamic civilisation of al-Andalus. Indonesia, on the other hand, had never been near any major centres of Islamic civilisation (Geertz, 1971, p. 70). Since its place is in the fringe of the periphery, the common opinion is that Indonesia was excluded from the intellectual networks connected to the Muslim world. Islamic intellectual networks had only been established in the early nineteenth century (Geertz, 1971, p. 71).

The dichotomy of "centre" and "periphery" in the Muslim world suggests the presence of hierarchy between various locales and even exclusion of certain locales, such as Indonesia, from the established networks. The hierarchy was conceived on the basis of proximity to the sacred space of Muslims, the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The proximity to the centre will imbue a person with sanctity, lending him or her greater authority in religious or political legitimacy (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1990, p. 12). However, Eickelman and Piscatori (1990, pp. 12–13) argue that the presence of translocal networks and movements, to some extent, has provided a challenge to the established hierarchy of various places, as can be seen in the case of Indonesia below.

How and when Islam came to Indonesia is a subject of considerable debate. The most famous opinion, generated by European historians, is that Islam came to Indonesia through the merchants of Gujarat, India in the twelveth or thirteenth CE (Winstedt, 1917, pp. 171–173; Drewes, G. W. J, 1968, pp. 439–440). Some Indonesia historians, however, argue that Islam came to Indonesia through Arabs from Egypt since the Shafi'i school adopted by Indonesians originated from Egypt (Hasjmi, 1989). Attas (1969, p. 11) provides yet another opinion by stating that Islam arrived in the Indonesian archipelago and what is now Malaysia during the seventh century. This argument was supported by the report of Chinese merchants who observed the presence of small Muslim communities in Indonesian coastal cities. After that, the Islamisation process went through several phases. In the first phase, between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, Islam was spread by jurists

from the Shafi'i school teaching *fiqh* to the locals. The second phase, between the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries, was the continuation of the first phase with the addition of the arrival of members of Sufi orders to the archipelago. The third phase, the sixteenth century onwards, saw the arrival of the West to various territories in the archipelago, starting the westernisation process (Attas, 1969, pp. 29–30).

If we follow Attas' (1969) argument, then an Islamic intellectual chain had been established, connecting Indonesia and the Arab region from at least the eleventh century by the presence of Shafi'i jurists in Indonesia. This argument found a strong empirical base since Shafi'i then became the prominent school of thought in Indonesia, even today. The intellectual chain became more prominent during the seventeenth century. Azra (2002) describes that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, students from Yemen, India and Southeast Asia had come to study in various learning centres such as Mecca and Medina. They then completed the study and were awarded the *ijaza* and included in the *isnad*, connecting their hometown to the intellectual chain of the Muslim world. Most of these young scholars then went home and established their own schools, extending the intellectual chain to their hometown. A few students were chosen to stay at their schools and became respected teachers.

In his work, Azra (2002, pp. 69–71) narrates the life of Sayyid Shibghat Allah ibn Ruh Allah Jamal al-Barjawi (d. 1606), a scholar from Bharuch, India. Shibghat Allah came from a Persian family in India. He learned Islam from various teachers, the most popular of them was Wajih al-Din al-Gujarati (d. 1589). After completing his training in India, Shibghat Allah taught for a while, before going on *hajj* in 1591. Coming back from *hajj*, Shibghat Allah decided to travel across India, staying for a while in Ahmadabad and Bijapur before returning to Mecca in 1596. After his second *hajj*, Shibghat Allah decided to stay at Medina where he was warmly received and taught in Masjid al-Nabawi. During his time in Medina, a contingent of pilgrims from Aceh, Indonesia attended his lecture, became entranced with him and brought his teachings back to Aceh (Azra, 2002, p. 71). Azra (2002, pp. 97–106) then identifies further links between Ahmad al-Qushashi, the student of Shibghat Allah, with several Indonesian students. Al-Qushashi apparently had succeeded in establishing his own reputation as a Sufi master, thus enhancing his appeal to young scholars who hoped to learn from him.

Among his disciples, there were at least two students from Indonesia, who were known as "Jawi people" – Jawi was the colloquial term for Indonesians at that time since the concept of "Indonesia" had not been established. Of these two students, Shaikh Yusuf Taj al-Khalwati al-Maqassari was from Makassar, while 'Abd al-Rauf al-Sinkili was from Aceh. Both of them brought the teachings of Shaikh Ahmad al-Qushashi to Indonesia and established Islamic education centres in Indonesia which then became the means of integration of Indonesian Muslims at that time to the long chains of a Muslim intellectual network. Al-Sinkili was especially prominent in Sumatra, due both to the vastness of his knowledge and to the extensiveness of his networks. He managed to establish connections from Aceh to Mecca, working both as scholar and as diplomat to the point that the Sharif Barakat of Mecca sent a delegate to meet the Sultana Zakiyyat al-Din of Aceh in 1683 CE and forged close ties between the two places (Azra, 2004, p. 78).

Unlike al-Sinkili who promptly returned to Indonesia after his graduation, al-Maqassari spent several decades travelling and seeking for knowledge before returning to his home town. He, however, was not welcomed in Makassar since he sought to abolish anti-Islamic practices such as gambling, drinking, using opium and the like. He then departed to Banten, West Java, and started his school there (Azra, 2004, p. 94). While in Banten, al-Maqassari was increasingly pulled into the political arena, especially during Banten's wars against the Dutch imperialist forces. He was captured by the Dutch, sent to Ceylon and then exiled to the Cape of Good Hope in 1694. Despite being an exile, al-Maqassari's influence was great. He survived only five years but before his death in 1699, he had laid the foundation for the establishment of Islamic society in the Cape of Good Hope. His tomb was enshrined by his followers and is considered a holy site in the Cape Peninsula (Blij, 1969, pp. 246–247).

Later generations of Indonesian Muslim scholars forged even closer relations between Indonesia and Mecca, further diminishing the hierarchical nature of the previous relations. One of the prominent Muslim scholars from Indonesia in the early nineteenth century was Shaikh Muhammad Nawawi al-Bantani from Banten (d. 1897). He went to Mecca to study Islam when he was fifteen and completed his education after three years. Reluctant to go home to Indonesia because of Dutch colonialism, he chose to stay in Mecca. One Meccan scholar, Shaikh Ahmad Khatib, gave the opportunity for al-Bantani to substitute

for him as *imam* of Masjid al-Haram, thus allowing al-Bantani to start his own class at the mosque. Al-Bantani was famous at this time, to the point that he received the title "Sayyid al-Ulama al-Hijaz" or "prominent scholar of Hijaz", the region encompassing Mecca and Medina (Hanifa, 2013). Hurgornje depicts Nawawi al-Bantani as an intelligent and courteous man, who stayed humble even after he wrote twenty highly acclaimed books (Hurgronje, 2007, pp. 287–296).

The life of Shibghat Allah and the connections between him and Indonesian students are but small examples of membership in an Islamic intellectual chain. It was through this Islamic intellectual network that Muslims from Indonesia could integrate and become part of a greater Muslim society. Bowen (1989) explains how the ritual of *salat* had been used by the Acehnese to project their position in the universal society of Muslims. New intellectual chains had also been established after the nineteenth century, predominantly by Indonesian Muslim organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama, which share intellectual connections with various learning centres in the Islamic world even today (Federspiel, 1970; Jones, 1984).

The relations between Mecca and Indonesia were hierarchical at the beginning: Muslims from Indonesia were included in the intellectual network as students, seeking *'ilm* (knowledge) from masters in the supposed centre of the Muslim world. However, exploration in historical accounts of Indonesian Muslim scholars in later centuries would provide us with information that Indonesian Muslim scholars were no longer only "taking" knowledge from the centres of the Muslim world but also contributing to the intellectual activities. Shaikh Al-Maqassari contributed to the penetration of Islam in the Cape of Good Hope and established the first cohesive Islamic society in southern Africa. By establishing a Muslim society in southern Africa, Al-Maqassari inadvertently established a connection between Indonesia and Africa, a connection that is still existent. Other scholarly figures such as Imam al-Nawawi al-Bantani contributed to the Islamic intellectual world by participating in the education system in Mecca, becoming the respected teacher and master in the heart of Islamic religious authority. Their intellectual achievements were not only benefitted the Islamic intellectual world but also served as bridges, intimately connecting Indonesia to Mecca and making the relationships between the two more reciprocal.

Intellectual chains as framework for integration

The description of networks and connectivity between various Muslim scholars in the two cases above illustrates how intellectual activities helped in integrating the Muslim world and fostering a larger sense of belonging. The influence of Muslim scholars and the school of thought where they belonged can be seen even until today. Since Islam spread to West Africa from North Africa where the Maliki school flourished, the majority of Muslims there follow the Maliki school. On the other hand, Islam spread to East Africa through the Arabian peninsula, thus the majority of Muslims follow the Shafi'i school that prevailed in Arabia (Anderson, J. N. D, 1969, pp. 38–40; Levtzion and Pouwels, 2000, p. 2). In Indonesia, the majority of Muslims follow the Shafi'i school, contributing to the argument that Islam arrived in Indonesia directly from the Arabian peninsula and that the Shafi'i jurists were critical to the process (Attas, 1969, p. 11; Hasjmi, 1989).

Along with providing tangible connections between various Muslim localities, the intellectual chains in the Muslim world also provided the populace with various branches of theology and science. As described by Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 127–129), these kinds of knowledge were essential in legitimating the presence of an interconnected *umma*. While there were differences between centres of learning, or even rivalry among them, the intellectual activities transmitted the same characteristics of the Islamic intellectual world, thus they belonged to the same symbolic universe. The chains of interactions themselves not only helped the transmission of messages from one scholar to another, they also helped the objectivation of an integrated society among Muslims. This could be seen in the case of Timbuktu which established strong scholarship connections with Maliki centres of learning in North Africa or how students from Indonesia embarked on the perilous journey to Mecca and Medina to study from renowned scholars.

The implication of a globalised consciousness was that Muslims from one locale possessed greater awareness of the conditions of Muslims from another locale. This could be seen in the way that the Almoravid dynasty, which consisted of Muslims of African origin, showed their concern to Muslims of al-Andalus who were threatened by the Christian kingdoms. The political and military actions

of the Almoravids sending armies to al-Andalus should be considered as the fruit of the global consciousness instilled through the chains of intellectuals brought to them by Abdullah ibn Yasin. While other motives such as political and military expansions, marriage and trade relations undoubtedly existed and to some extent influenced the decision to send an army to al-Andalus, the underlying framework of Muslim solidarity should not be ignored. To quote Geertz (1973, p. 98), "Charity becomes Christian charity when it is enclosed in a conception of God's purposes".

Another, more specific impact of Muslim scholars on the maintenance of the concept of the *umma* is the development of the concept of caliphate. A symbolic universe, such as the concept of the *umma*, requires institutions to protect and maintain its presence (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 122–141). In the history of Islamic society, one such institution was the caliphate. Watt (1963, pp. 15–16) describes that the caliphate contributed to the unity of the *umma* by providing a common judiciary and governance system and various policies such as promotion of the Arabic language as the *lingua franca* of the Muslim world. Yet, both the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions did not provide details as to how Muslims should manage the caliphate. Therefore, the duty to provide conceptual and operational definitions for the caliphate fell to the scholars, which will be explained further in Chapter Four.

Chapter Four:
The Conceptual Development of the Caliphate

The advent of Islam initiated a new wave of development of knowledge in the Muslim world. Influenced by Islamic teaching, Muslims developed a distinct intellectual framework which integrated religious rituals into intellectual practices. Seeking and producing knowledge are perceived not only as an intellectual pursuit but also as religious endeavour that Muslims should aspire to. The chains of relations between teacher and student in the Islamic intellectual world are considered as sacred relations, in which not only knowledge is transferred but also religious values and authority are bestowed, as has been discussed in the previous chapter. These scholars also diligently produced bodies of knowledge in their efforts to explain Islam and bring its values into practical applications. Together, these intellectual practices provided the fundamentals which constituted a greater tradition: the *umma* as a symbolic universe.

A symbolic universe is the amalgamation of meanings, produced by both the subjective experiences of individuals and the objectivation process of the society. It encompasses every historical and biographical event that takes place in the society. It provides a worldview by which people can identify their self and their position in the larger world and determine what is appropriate for their everyday activities. A symbolic universe is the highest form of legitimation of an idea, more powerful than languages, propositions and theories. It provides an idea with cosmological attributes giving various experiences a shared, overarching meaning (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 113–115). The development of bodies of knowledge, particularly mythology, theology, philosophy and science will strengthen a symbolic universe by providing rational explanation and normative justification for the idea established as the symbolic universe (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 127).

It is possible for a society to develop different interpretations of its symbolic universality, especially during transmission of the idea from one generation to another. If this differing interpretation is shared by enough members

in the society, it will also undergo the objectivation and institutionalisation processes, resulting in an alternative definition of the social reality. The group that carries it will become what Berger and Luckmann call "the heretics" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 124). Heresy is a major danger for any society, yet, at the same time, it often becomes a turning point which inspires those who espouse the "official" interpretation of the idea to produce a more systematic conception of the symbolic universe, resulting in the development of various bodies of knowledge to support and defend the idea (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 125–126).

In the case of the development of the concept of the *umma*, Berger's and Luckmann's (1966) theoretical framework can be applied as follows: the concept of a Islamic global society firstly acquired legitimation when Muhammad uttered the concept in Arabic and attached the concept of a global society to the word "*umma*". As this chapter will elaborate shortly, the usage of the word "*umma*" in the Qur'an subtly shifted the word's meaning so that by the end of the Prophetic era, the word "*umma*" had a particular meaning attached to the concept of an Islamic global society. Attaching the idea of an Islamic global consciousness to the word "*umma*" was important since it opened the opportunity for dialogue on this concept among the Meccans and, later, among the Medinans. It also made the transference process of the idea to other parts of the larger Arabian society possible.

When the number of Qur'anic verses articulating the concept of the *umma* was increasing, this concept became more and more divine. At the same time, the Prophetic traditions kept it practical. This made the concept of *umma* to be perceived as a divinely sanctioned social practice, transcending any other ordinary social practices. At this time, the *umma* became a symbolic universe in the minds of Muslims. As a symbolic universe, the *umma* may be said to connect a person to another person or identify a society, but also to connect the said person to God and identify his or her place in a cosmological order. The conditions of the *umma* are considered as the mirror of God's Mercy towards mankind. A joyful occurrence in the society is seen as a form of blessing from God while any turbulence in the society reflects back on the holy texts and gains meaning and position in the Islamic cosmology, whether as a trial or as a divine punishment.

The works and activities of Muslim intellectuals in later periods further strengthened the position of the *umma* as a symbolic universe in the minds of

Muslims. As discussed in Chapter Three, Muslim intellectuals, through their chains of intellectuals, provided the empirical evidence for the presence of a translocal connection among Muslim individuals. Yet, not only that, the scholars were also fundamental in the development of theoretical bodies which helped the maintenance of the idea of the *umma* in the minds of Muslims. Through interpretation of the holy texts in the Qur'an and *hadith* and reflection on their personal observations and experiences, these scholars expanded the Islamic bodies of knowledge, such as codifying the *hadith*, developing the Islamic jurisprudence and, as this chapter will demonstrate, the development of governmental theories supporting the caliphate as the governing institution of the *umma*.

Conceptual development of the *umma*

The umma in Medina

Before Islam, Arab tribes had not developed any form of political institution advanced enough to unite all Arabia (Grunebaum, 1963, p. 6; Watt, 1956, pp. 238–239). Instead of relying on political institutions to govern their affairs, the Arabs had relied on their tribal structure to provide them with basic needs and protection. Without a tribe, a person would not be able to survive in the harsh environment of the desert (Hodgson, 1974a, pp. 148–149; Hoyland, 2001, pp. 113–117). The few Arab states in the northern part of Arabia had been acting as dependencies to larger political institutions, the Byzantines and the Sasanids, as can be seen in the case of the Ghassanid kingdom that owed fealty to the Byzantine Empire or the Lakhmid kingdom, which was the vassal of the Sasanid Empire (Grunebaum, 1963, pp. 6–7). These kingdoms' existence had been influenced by the whims of the great empires, evident in how Khusrau II abolished the Lakhmid kingdom of Hira in 602 CE and replaced the Lakhmid king with a Persian governor (Kennedy, 2004, p. 11).

Islam changed the Arab society by introducing the concept of *umma*. The *umma* was a revolutionary concept with both transcendental and social characteristics. According to Denny (1975), in the Qur'anic term, *umma* refers to a body of people who are objects of the divine plan of salvation. The term

ummatun wahida, such as in the Qur'an 21:92[7], implies a concept of human unity which is bound collectively in a special, religious way (Denny, 1975, p. 48). The terms *ummatun muslima* and *ummatun wasatan*, which are mentioned in the Qur'an 2:128[8] and 2:143[9], are specifically referring to the society of Muslims which upholds and enforces God's Law, faithful and obedient to His teachings and will achieve success by doing so (Denny, 1975, p. 69). In the Qur'an sura 3:110, *kuntum khayra ummatin ukhrijat linnaasi*[10], the meaning of *umma* gains a global perspective: that the society of the Faithful is the best society ever created during the history of mankind (Denny, 1975, p. 69). In this verse, the connection of faith and the *umma* is very strong; faith has become the fundamental attribute of the *umma* and it is faith that will make the *umma* as the best society among the history of mankind (Denny, 1977a, pp. 36–38).

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[7] The full verse of the Qur'an *sura* 21:92 and its English translation by Sahih International:
*Inna haadhihi ummatukum **ummatan wahidatan** wa ana rabbukum fa' buduun*
[Indeed this, your religion, is one religion, and I am your Lord, so worship Me].
[8] The verse of the Qur'an surah 2:128 should be put into the larger context, a prayer from Abraham to God, which is described in the Qur'an surah 2:127-129 as follow (with English translation by Sahih International):
Wa idh yarfa'u ibrahimu al-qawa'ida min al-baiti wa isma'ilu rabbana taqabbal minna. Innaka anta as-sami'ul-'alimu. [127]
[And (mention) when Abraham was raising the foundations of the House and (with him) Ishmael, (saying), "Our Lord, accept (this) from us. Indeed You are the Hearing, the Knowing.]
*Rabbanaa waj'alna muslimain laka wa min dhurriyyatina **ummatan muslimatan** laka wa 'arinaa manaasikanaa wa tub 'alainaa. Innaka anta at-tawwabu ar-rahimu.* [128]
[Our Lord, and make us Muslims (in submission) to You and from our descendants a Muslim nation (in submission) to You. And show us our rites and accept our repentance. Indeed, You are the Accepting of repentance, the Merciful.]
Rabbanaa wa-b'ath fiihim rasuulan minhum yatluu 'alaihim aayaatika wa yu'allimuhumu al-kitaba wa al-hikmata wa yuzakkiihim. Innaka anta al-'azizu a1-hakim. [129]
[Our Lord, and send among them a messenger from themselves who will recite to them Your verses and teach them the Book and wisdom and purify them. Indeed, You are the Exalted in Might, the Wise."]
[9] The verse of the Qur'an *sura* 2 verse 143 should be put into the context of moving the *qibla*, or direction of prayer, from Jerusalem to Mecca; thus it addressed the Muslims specifically.
Sayaquulu as-sufahaau min an-naasi maa wallahum 'an qiblatihimu al-latii kaanuu 'alaihaa. Qul lillahi al-masyriqu wa al-maghribu. Yahdii man yashaau ilaa syiraati mustaqiim. [142]
[The foolish among the people will say, "What has turned them away from their qibla, which they used to face?" Say, "To Allah belongs the east and the west. He guides whom He wills to a straight path."]
*Wa kadzaalika ja'alnaakum **ummatan wasatan** litakuunuu shuhadaa-a 'alaa an-naasi wa yatakuuna ar-rasuulu 'alaikum shahiida. …* [143…]
[And thus we have made you a just community that you will be witnesses over the people and the Messenger will be a witness over you….]
[10] The full verse of the Qur'an *sura* 3:110 and its English translation by Sahih International:
*Kuntum **khayra ummatin** ukhrijat linnaasi. Ta'muruuna bil ma'ruufi watanhawna 'aani almunkari wa tu'minuuna billahi wa law amana ahlu alkitabi lakana khayran lahum minhumu almu'minuuna wa aktharuhumu alfasiquun*
You are the best nation produced [as an example] for mankind. You enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong and believe in Allah . If only the People of the Scripture had believed, it would have been better for them. Among them are believers, but most of them are defiantly disobedient.

Building a new Muslim society based on this concept would, inevitably, weaken the established political practice based on the tribal mechanism. It shifted the foundation of Arab society from loyalty to kinship to commitment to the teaching of Islam, the Oneness of God and the leadership of Muhammad as the Prophet of God. Blood relations were no longer prominent, since brotherhood in religion is preferable (Kennedy, 2007, p. 38). It also required a new institution, since tribal institutions with their heavy emphasis on kinship and blood relations could not accommodate the concept of the *umma*. To provide the concept with an institutional foundation, Muhammad then formulated what is commonly called the Constitution of Medina (variously referred in Arabic as *Dustur al-Madina* or *Sahifat al-Madina*), which is hailed by Hamidullah (1968) as "the first written constitution in the world."

This document has been scrutinised by many scholars and considered by most scholars as authentic. Watt (1956, pp. 225–228) provides a detailed account of an investigation into the authenticity of the document before finally asserting that the document is authentic. He, however, acknowledges the possibility that the document is actually a compilation of several documents written in different times. Analysing the content of the document and its social and political implications, Watt (1956, pp. 239–242) argues that the *umma* born from the Constitution supplanted tribal social and political mechanisms. The society in Medina was no longer founded upon kinship but based on religion. This fundamental change was epitomised in the *hijra*. Not only moving physically from one locale to another, *hijra* was a symbolic proclamation of cutting oneself off from his or her kin and binding oneself to the *umma*. *Hijra* has physical, societal and ideological implications, negating the practices of old and embracing the new society of the *umma*, as has been elaborated in Chapter Two.

At the same time, however, Watt (1956, pp. 243–246) notes that the *umma* did not entirely discard already established tribal practices. Instead, it took particular instruments of tribal practices and adapted them in accordance with Islamic values. For example, Muhammad would bestow certain rights and protections to Muslims considered as members of the *umma*, in parallel with how a tribal chief would protect and provide for the members of his tribe. The enemies of the *umma* were those who rejected the religious claim of Islam. Yet, the behaviour of the Muslims toward their enemies was in accordance with the

established practices among two hostile tribes. While some tribal instruments were adapted to the new *umma*, the Muslims would disregard the established practices if those were related to the pagan religions, consistent with their efforts to maintain the purity of Islam.

The Constitution of Medina provided the Muslims with detailed legal guidance. Through the Constitution, Muhammad clearly defined the *umma* and described both the rights and obligations that bound its members. The Constitution is quite explicit on that, as documented by Ibn Ishaq (1967, pp. 231–233). There is, however, debate on which groups constituted the *umma*. Did the *umma* described in the Constitution only refer to the Muslims or also included the Jews? Watt (1956, p. 241) considers that the Jews were included in the *umma*, just like Muslims. The Jews were specifically allowed to practise their own religion, making the *umma* a religiously inclusive society. Denny (1977b, p. 44), however, argues that the Jews constituted a separate group beside the Muslim *umma*. The Constitution of Medina was a political-military document in which the Jews were considered as a special group, or a "sub-*umma*" to use Denny's terminology, and that the two groups agreed on working together but kept their distinct religious characteristics. This argument is in line with his definition of the *umma* that puts emphasis on the presence of a common religion as its defining characteristic.

Observing the Constitution of Medina from a sociolegal perspective, Arjomand (2009, pp. 564–570) opines that the document was vital to the establishment of the *umma*. The first and second article of the Constitution effectively declared the creation of the *umma* as a united society. Muslim emigrants from Mecca and Muslims from the tribes of Aus and Khazraj were regarded as the soul of the *umma*, but the *umma*'s legal protection also encompassed the polytheists and Jews who were members of the Muslim clans' clients and allies. As Muhammad's power grew, the Constitution of Medina also encompassed Arab tribes in the surrounding area which decided to be his allies, essentially establishing a Pax Islamica around Medina (Arjomand, 2009, p. 271). This thesis agrees with Arjomand's observation and further argues that the expansion of the *umma* in later periods put more non-Muslims under the jurisdiction of the *umma* with their own rights and obligations, making them an inseparable part of the society.

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The question of authority and the birth of the caliphate

After Muhammad, the Muslim society gradually expanded. With each victory, the Muslims both spread the message of Islam to other people and put more territories under their rule. The <u>vision</u> of a global society named the *umma* became more vivid with each passing day; the idea became imaginable. Yet, at the same time, there was a problem of internalisation of the idea to both younger generations of Muslims and foreign people later integrated in the society. As described by Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 112–114), in order to survive, a symbolic universe needs to develop supporting bodies of knowledge. In the history of Muslim *umma*, the expansion of the Muslim world was then followed by the development of various bodies of knowledge to support the idea of an integrated *umma*, such as the science of *hadith* and *fiqh* or the development of Arabic language. In later period, Muslim scholars also attempted to formulate a more coherent theory on Islamic governance to further support the idea of a global *umma* and the presence of a centralised authority over it, which took form as the caliphate.

In their attempts to develop the science of governance, Muslim scholars would base their works on the Constitution of Medina and develop further from there. The greatest challenge in this scholarly endeavour was addressing the practical application of authority. According to Islamic teaching, the ultimate authority is in God's hand. However, since God did not rule the *umma* directly, there had to be someone who has the authority to control the *umma* and lead it to success as God has promised in the Qur'an. During the time of the Prophet, Muhammad himself became the source of authority. As the Prophet of God, his policies were divinely sanctioned, thus requiring no further explanation or legitimation. Khadduri (1955, p. 10) describes this era as if God was the titular head of state and Muhammad was the head of government. After Muhammad's death, however, the *umma* lost its authoritative figure. This was a grave matter for Muslims since without an authoritative figure, how could the *umma* work to attain the success that God had decreed? It was thus essential for the *umma* to develop institutions as the embodiment of the concept of authority.

The Muslim society managed to get through this ordeal by appointing Abu Bakr as the successor of the Prophet. While the decision was not without

controversy, it was considered as a sound decision in a time of turbulence. Unlike Muhammad with his sacred authority, Abu Bakr declared that he was merely administrator of the Muslim affairs and enforcer of the divine law. Ibn Kathir (2004, pp. 71–72) provides a historical account of Abu Bakr's sermon after his appointment, in which Abu Bakr stressed his nature as a common man, just like the rest of the *umma*. In the sermon, Abu Bakr also emphasised that he would only follow Muhammad's path in guiding the *umma*. He also asked for advice from the Muslims and even encouraged them to reprimand him when they perceived him at faults. Abu Bakr's sermon managed to win the loyalty of most Muslims[11]. Thus, the caliphate was established.

Etymologically, the word *khilafa* means "succeeding to someone." The term was then adapted in the political context and came to refer to the office of the person who succeeds Muhammad as the leader of the *umma* but not as the Prophet of God (Ahmed, 1962, p. 93; Donner, 1999, pp. 10–11). Abu Bakr's appointment and his sermon signified fundamental characteristics of a caliph: he essentially was only an elected executive of the state, with no power over divine legislation and with the limited judiciary function of interpreting the sacred law. Khadduri (1955, pp. 9–11) asserts the traditional Sunni view that the election of Abu Bakr took into account the "popular opinion" from the Muslims and this somewhat put the caliphate in accordance with the social contract theory of state, whereby the Caliph established a contract with the Muslim society to lead them within the boundaries of the divine law. It follows, accordingly, that a caliph should be responsible to the people as long as the people deem him faithful in enforcing the divine law. However, the later concept of the caliphate developed by Muslim

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[11] The figure of Abu Bakr as the first caliph of the Muslim world has become a powerful political symbol in Muslim history. Abu Bakr and his sermon signify the establishment of a political institution that plays a crucial role in safeguarding the *umma*, both as an idealised concept and as a social truth. In our modern age, where there is no political institution as the agent of the *umma*, some political actors seek to establish their authority over the *umma* by associating themselves with Abu Bakr and quoting his sermon, linking symbolically their rule to the first caliphate. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the so-called caliph of the Islamic State, quoted the first Caliph during his inaugural sermon on 5 July 2014. Several months after that, Afghan president Ashraf Ghani also quoted the same line during his inaugural speech in September 2014. Abu Bakr's famous line that was quoted by both is: "If you see me [Abu Bakr] doing the right-hood, help me, and if you see me on falsehood, advise me and lead me to the right path."
For the video and transcript of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's speech:
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/webtv/reports/2014/07/07/ISIS-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdidi-first-Friday-sermon-as-so-called-Caliph-.html
For the transcript of Ashraf Ghani's speech: http://president.gov.af/en/news/36954

scholars deviated from these characteristics and, instead, put the caliph into an exalted position to be unreservedly obeyed (Khadduri, 1955, p. 13).

Rosenthal (2009) provides another observation on the nature of the caliphate. Instead of highlighting the civil governance attribute of the caliphate like Khadduri, he put emphasis on its divine origin. Rosenthal draws the philosophical foundation of the caliphate from various verses in the Qur'an and categorises the caliphate as an absolute theocracy (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 26). This is in contrast with Khadduri, who argues that since a state is regarded as a theocracy if it claims to be governed by a god or gods, then the caliphate is not a theocratic state since it has never been governed by God. Khadduri instead offers the term *nomocracy* to better reflect the nature of the caliphate, which is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as "a system of government based on a legal code; the rule of law in a community," again emphasising the civil governance attribute of the system (Khadduri, 1955, pp. 14–16).

Despite having a different view of the nature of the caliphate, Rosenthal shares the same opinion with Khadduri that the nature of the caliphate was transformed during the later period. The reign of Mu'awiya and his dynasty changed the caliphate into an absolute monarchy (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 26). During the Abbasid period, Rosenthal further suspects that the Muslim scholars had deliberately developed a distinct theory of statecraft in order to validate the divine purpose of the caliphate and, at the same time, to support the Abbasid regime against insurgents (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 27).

The development of theoretical knowledge on the caliphate and general authority over the *umma* and the practical implementation of such authority are both important to this thesis since both support the maintenance of the imagined *umma*. The development of knowledge affords the *umma* with rational and normative justifications (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 127). During the Prophetic era, the development of theoretical knowledge was mainly mythological. The *umma* was how the Qur'an and the Prophet willed it to be. During the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and the Umayyads, the theoretical knowledge was expanded to theological knowledge, evident with the development of *fiqh* to further refine Islamic knowledge to support the idea of the *umma*. In the Abbasid period and later, the development of knowledge advanced further into the realm of philosophy, if not also entering the domain of science.

The presence of an actual social group as the perceived embodiment of the *umma* further enforces the idea that the *umma* is truly present in practical and actual levels (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 134). In the Prophetic era this social group were the Companions of the Prophet. After Muhammad's death, there were the Rightly Guided Caliphs and their supporters who supported the *umma*. When the power moved to the Umayyads, this social group was the Umayyads and their client families. Yet, during the time of the Abbasids, there were many social groups within the *umma*, some espousing alternative narratives of the idea of the *umma*; thus rivalry between such groups was inevitable. This rivalry was reflected in the different paradigm found in various scholarly works on the issue of caliphate and authority over the *umma*. With this in mind, we can explore the works of several prominent Muslim scholars on the issue of the caliphate and authority over the *umma* in order to understand the dynamics within the conceptualisation of the *umma* and also to observe the interplay between social groups and intellectual actors within the *umma*.

Theoretical foundation on the caliphate: Al-Mawardi's Ordinances

One of the most influential scholars developing the theory of the caliphate or statecraft in Islam is al-Mawardi. His book, the *Ordinances of Government* or *al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya*, is considered one of the authoritative books on this subject (Hodgson, 1974b, p. 55). Al-Mawardi was a Shafi'i jurist in the service of the Caliph al-Qadir (r. 991-1031 CE). The condition of the caliphate after 940 CE was contentious at best. The caliph steadily lost power and could not control the power of the *amirs* in surrounding areas. In order to keep his position, the caliphs had to appoint a new position, *amir al-umara* or the commander-in-chief, whose duty was to protect the well being of the caliph. In truth, the *amir al-umara* was the de facto leader who held the real power in the caliphate. This position was coveted by the regional and local polities, which competed against each other to control Baghdad and the caliphate. Starting from 945 CE, this position was held by the Buyid dynasty, which adopted Twelver Shi'ism as their religion and since 964 CE had encouraged the development of distinct rituals of Twelver Shi'a, separated from other Shi'ism and even more so from Sunnism (Kennedy, 2004, p. 227).

Al-Mawardi wrote the book approximately in circa 1050 CE to defend the caliph's position against the growing power of the Buyid dynasty. In this book, Al-Mawardi lays out the theory of statecraft in the Muslim world. Al-Mawardi opens his book by directly stating that the *Imamate* is the successor of prophethood. It exists as "a means of protecting the *deen* [*din*, religion] and of managing affairs of this world" (Mawardi, 1996, p. 10). Al-Mawardi then goes on to elaborate the divine nature of the caliphate, arguing that since the Qur'an orders mankind to obey Allah, His Messenger and *ulil amri* or those in authority, then Muslims have the obligation to obey whoever is in command of them. He also cites a *hadith* from Muhammad that encourages Muslims to obey a person in authority whether he rules them by uprightness or not. This *hadith* declares that if the governor is rightful then the benefits will fall to the governor and the people who obey him. If the governor is corrupt then the people will still obtain benefits in this world while the corruption will be held against them in the next (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 10–11).

In order to be a caliph, someone is required to fulfil seven characteristics according to al-Mawardi (1996, p. 12): be just, knowledgeable and able to perform *ijtihad*, have good health in hearing, sight and speech, be sound in limbs guaranteeing free movement, have sound judgement and be courageous and brave to defend the territory of Islam and of the family of the Quraysh. Al-Mawardi then offers two methods for electing an *imam*. The first method is through election by qualified electors, those with justice (*'adl*), knowledge (*'ilm*) and wisdom (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 12–16). The second method is through designation by the previous *imam* (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 23–26). If an *imam* is appointed through one of those methods, then it is binding for the whole *umma* to obey him. Al-Mawardi also stresses the importance of unity, to the point that when there are two *Imamates*, he prefers the first person to receive the oath of allegiance as the legitimate imam. If both of the *imams* received the oath precisely at the same time, then according to him, both of the oaths are considered null and there should be a new oath to one of them, or to another person other than those two (Mawardi, 1996, p. 17).

After describing the divine texts which could be perceived as supporting the existence of the imamate and the obligation for Muslims to obey the *imam* and maintain unity, al-Mawardi then describes the duties of the imam. First, the *imam*

must guard the faith, maintain it on its established principles and guard it against innovations. Second, he presides over legal matters and preserves justice. Third, he must protect the territory of Islam and defend the people against threats. Fourth, he has to uphold *hudud* law, in accordance with God's rule in the Qur'an and to protect the rights of the people. Fifth, he is obliged to fortify borders and perform military actions against enemies. Sixth, he must make *jihad*. Seventh, he must collect the spoils of war and *zakat*. Eighth, he should distribute the fund from *bait al-mal* punctually. Ninth, he must ensure the employment of trustworthy counsellors. Tenth, he must personally observe the affairs of the *umma* (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 27–29).

Al-Mawardi then dedicates a large part of his book to providing details on the delegation of authority from an *imam* to various officers. He provides divine support for the delegation of authority by quoting Qur'an sura 20, *Taha*, verses 29-32, in which Moses prays to God to appoint Aaron as his *wazir* (Mawardi, 1996, p. 37). He then describes the name of the offices and their officers, the job description and the extent of authority each office has, as well as the legal contract uttered by the *imam* to the officer during his selection for the office and guidance for interactions among the officers. There are several offices that are relevant to this thesis, thus deserving brief elaboration. The first is the *wazirate*, with the officer being a *wazir*. There are two types of *wazir*: a delegation minister and an executor minister. A delegation minister is an officer appointed by the *Imam* on whom the Imam endows his authority. Thus, the delegation minister could act with all the authority that the Imam has and to perform duties that the Imam should perform. Al-Mawardi, however, cautions both the *Imam* and the minister that the *Imam* should oversee the minister's work and the minister should always keep the *Imam* informed. An executor minister is an officer tasked by the *Imam* to perform a certain duty. If the officer is not making judgements in this duty, he is more fitting to be called "mediator" or "ambassador" (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 37–47).

The second is the *amirate*, with the officer being an *amir*. An *amir* is the governor of a territory. An *amir* could receive his appointment either from the *imam* or from the *wazir*. If the appointment is from the *imam*, then the delegation *wazir* could subject the *amir* to the *wazir*'s control and monitoring, but could not dismiss or move him to another territory. If the appointment is from the *wazir*, then the *wazir* could dismiss or move him to another territory. Also, if the *amir*

was appointed by the *wazir* and the *imam* dismisses the *wazir*, then the *amir* would also be dismissed unless the *imam* affirmed his appointment and renewed the *amir*'s authority in the territory. The *amir* has the authority to manage his territory, including collecting taxes and *zakat* and using funds from taxes for army provision while using funds from *zakat* for improving social welfare (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 48–56). There is a special office of *amirate*, which al-Mawardi calls the *amirate of jihad*, which is an office particularly concerned with fighting the unbelievers, as well as fighting renegades, rebels and bandits (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 57–97).

The third is the judiciary system. Al-Mawardi stipulates seven requirements for a judge. First, he must be male and have reached puberty. Second, there must be consensus that he is competent and capable of solving complex cases. Third, he must be a free man, not a slave. Fourth, he must be a Muslim since he would be required to have legal standing in an Islamic court. Al-Mawardi acknowledges that Abu Hanifa allows non-Muslims to be appointed as judges for their own people but refuses this appointment as part of the Islamic judiciary system. Instead, non-Muslim judges should be considered as the leader of their people and their judgements are binding because of their people's respect for them. Fifth, he must be of just character. Sixth, he must be sound of hearing and sight so that he would be able to attend to the people's rights and claims. Seventh, he must possess the knowledge of *sharia* laws to the point he could make *ijtihad* and issue *fatwas*.

Al-Mawardi notes that Abu Hanifa allows those without the capability to make *ijtihad* and issue *fatwas* as judges but his opinion is that those appointments should be considered void. While he himself was of the Shafi'i school, al-Mawardi clearly expresses his approval that followers of Abu Hanifa could be appointed as judges. He even states that a follower of Shafi'i could adopt an opinion of Abu Hanifa, if his *ijtihad* leads him to do so. Other than these issues, al-Mawardi provides in detail the code of conduct for a judge, from forbidding them to receive gifts to how to treat litigants waiting trial (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 98–115).

Following the description of al-Mawardi's book, there are several points in the book that this thesis seeks to discuss further in order to discern his interpretation of the *umma* as a symbolic universe and the caliphate as, using

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Risse-Kappen's and Sikkink's (1999) terminology, norm entrepreneur for the idea of the *umma*. First, al-Mawardi uses the term *imamate* instead of *caliphate*. Ahmed (1962, p. 93) argues that the these two terms are interchangeable. However, while it is a trans-sectarian term, the term *imamate* had been more popular as a Shi'i term and, during 'Abbasid times, there were tensions between the Sunni and the Shi'a in Baghdad. Thus, there might be something more than an unintentional use of the term. It might be possible that by using the word "*imamate*" and linking the term to his vision as a Sunni scholar, al-Mawardi implicitly asserts that there is only one legitimate form of leadership in the Muslim world, the Sunni concept of caliphate, which he then described in detail in his book.

Looking from the theoretical perspective developed by Berger and Luckmann (1966) and considering the political context during the writing of the book, al-Mawardi's usage of *imamate* as a leadership term could be seen as an attempt to usurp the Shi'a's interpretation of the *umma* and the leadership over it. It also could be seen as an effort, by way of contrast, to impose his Sunni perspective on the term. The readers might then be persuaded by his arguments of Sunni *imamate*, thus undermining the rival Buyid version of social reality. This is an example of how scholars defend their interpretation of the symbolic universe and attack the offending, heretical, alternative narrative when a schism emerges. Whether al-Mawardi did use the term to affirm his conception of caliphate or not is open to debate but his work set the precedent for subsequent Sunni scholars to use the term "*imamate*" when addressing the conceptual leadership of Muslim society.

Second, when he elaborates on the nature of the *imamate* at the beginning of his book, al-Mawardi raises the question of whether the obligatory nature of the caliphate is derived from the rational inclination of men to submit to authority or is derived from the *sharia*. In this engagement, he never takes into account the option that the caliphate is not obligatory at all. This is in contrast with the de facto condition of the period, when the caliphate was weak and any valuable positions of power were in the hand of the Buyids. Therefore, it is possible al-Mawardi deliberately composed his wording to provide the illusion that the caliphate is the natural condition for a political society. Indeed, Mattson (2000, pp. 400–401) also offers the same conclusion, that through his book, al-Mawardi tried

to interpret the existing political order using an Islamic framework and sought to establish a legitimacy for the Abbasid caliphate, despite its apparent weaknesses.

Third, by dismissing rational inclination as the possible cause for the existence of the caliphate, al-Mawardi takes his position against the Mu'tazilites whose doctrine was based on human rationalism. One of the controversies initiated by the Mu'tazilites was that the Qur'an was the product of a created accident and could not be considered as eternal (Fakhry, 1999, pp. 278–280). The development of Mu'tazilism was encouraged by earlier Abbasid caliphs and reached its peak under the patronage of the caliph al-Mamun (r. 813-833 CE). In 833 CE, al-Mamun, with the support of Mu'tazilite scholars, instigated the *mihna*, a religious inquisition to eradicate all other branches of Islamic theology and established Mu'tazilism as <u>the</u> official school of thought in the caliphate. This effort was also supported by the subsequent caliphs and lasted for about fifteen years before it ultimately failed in dominating Islamic theology. Instead of increasing their authority over the scholars, the *mihna* damaged the reputation of the Abbasid caliphs permanently (Donner, 1999, p. 27). While during al-Mawardi's time Mu'tazilism largely had ceased to be an influential political movement, there were still Mu'tazilite thinkers and teachers in Baghdad (Kennedy, 2004, p. 225). It might have been considered wise by al-Mawardi to use this opportunity to further disapprove Mu'tazilism and to put considerable distance between the caliphate and the Mu'tazilites in order to gain support from the Sunni scholars.

Fourth, with regards to the methods of electing an *imam*, al-Mawardi accommodates both election by qualified electors and designation by the previous *imam*. However, Rosenthal (2009, p. 33) notes that al-Mawardi puts more efforts on legitimising the designation succession method. Al-Mawardi even claims that designating three successive heirs is in accordance with the *sharia*, despite no Qur'anic text or Prophetic tradition supporting it. This view could be understood as a way to maintain both the order and the authority of the caliphate. If al-Mawardi admitted that both the Qur'an and *hadith* do not provide support for the designation succession method, then he essentially would have judged the entire Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates as un-Islamic and a breach of the holy scriptures. This would have created chaos and might have benefited the Shi'a, something that al-Mawardi would not want to do.

Fifth, examining al-Mawardi's conception of the powers of the *Imam* and how to exercise them, Hodgson (1974b, p. 55) observes that al-Mawardi is very concerned to legitimate the delegation process of *imamate* authority to subordinates, such as *wazirs* and *amirs*. Mattson (2000) identifies several passages in the book that justify the overbearing presence of the Buyids by painting it as if the Buyids were appointed by the Caliph. Thus, their "managing" of the caliphate was not an affront to the Caliph; instead, it was presented as a deliberate action by the Caliph to appoint the Buyids to help him in fulfilling his duties. It is also curious to note that al-Mawardi specifically provides a detailed explanation on a type of *amirates* that he calls *amirate of conquest*. According to Mawardi (1996, p. 53), the *amirate of conquest* is an *amirate* that forms as an *amir* takes possession of a territory by force. The Caliph then legitimates the conquest and he grants the *amir* with the authority to rule the territory. Al-Mawardi describes the rules in establishing the *amirate of conquest*, the first and foremost is that the *amirate of conquest* has to serve to protect the office of the imamate, which means that the *amir*'s military endeavours should not threaten the Caliph. Relating his work to the actual situation during his time, this thesis assumes that the inclusion of these various offices was part of al-Mawardi's efforts to justify the existence of various powerful actors other than the Caliph without undermining the caliphate.

Scholars like Rosenthal (2009) and Mattson (2000) advocate caution in approaching al-Mawardi's book. In their view, it cannot be treated as the blueprint for the caliphate in Islam, as divinely ordained by God or as directed by the Prophet. It could not even be considered as treatise on the ideals of the caliphate. It was, above all, a documentation of the existing practice in statesmanship and politics during his time. It also served as a tool to reinforce Caliph al-Qadir's legitimacy by framing his actions and conditions with Qur'anic texts and Islamic history, especially the history of the Four Rightly-guided Caliphs. Political propaganda, if you will. While I agrees with this caution, this thesis appreciates the book as a form of intellectual endeavour to further articulate the abstract concept of the *umma* into a more practical application, in this case through the authority of the institution of the caliphate.

Later developments: contestation of authorities

Al-Mawardi's *Ordinances* had been valuable in maintaining the authority of the Abbasid caliphate. Using religious texts and rhetoric, al-Mawardi intertwines the spheres of religion and government into one inseparable union of *al-din wa al-dawla,* where one could not exist without the other. In order to maintain the Caliph's temporal authority, al-Mawardi interprets the relations between the Caliph and the *amirs* as a hierarchical one, with the *amirs* in subordinate position to the Caliph. His book was part of efforts to maintain and expand the authority of the caliph by providing intellectual support to the cause (Hanne, 2004, pp. 67–68).

Despite these efforts, the caliphate continued to decline. Caliph al-Qaim (r. 1031-1075) eventually had to accept the protection of the Seljuk Sultan Toghril-beg to be able to get rid of the Buyids. The Caliph then bestowed upon the Sultan the title of *al-sultan al-mu`azzam*, or "the mighty Ruler". With the title went all the actual authority over political and military affairs in the caliphate to the Sultan and his successors (Hodgson, 1974b, p. 43). In contrast to the declining caliphate, the Seljuk sultanate's military prowess brought fame and increased their reputation in the eyes of the Muslims. Toghril-beg's successor, Alp Arslan, was renowned for his military conquests, including the victory over the Byzantines in the Battle of Mazinkert (1071 CE). His son and successor, Malik Shah, managed to take control of the Holy Cities and expanded the sultanate's influence to Yemen (Hodgson, 1974b, pp. 44–45).

Critical to the success of the Seljuk sultans was not only their military prowess but also the political acumen of their *wazirs*. Toghril-beg's *wazir*, al-Kunduri was fundamental in orchestrating the alliance between the Caliph al-Qaim and Sultan Toghril-beg, if their relations could be called as an alliance. Alp Arslan and Malik Shah I's *wazir*, the capable Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092 CE), maintained the alliance between the Abbasid caliphate and the Seljuk sultanate. He also developed the political ideology supporting the sultans' interests and the establishment of a bureaucracy and tax system to provide necessary funding for the sultans' endeavours (Hodgson, 1974b, pp. 43–46). His book, *Siyasat-nama* or *Siyar al-Mulk* or the *Book of Government*, which was presumably compiled in 479

H/1086 CE by the order of Sultan Malik Shah, contains his thoughts on governance in the Islamic world (Mulk, 1960).

Nizam al-Mulk opens his book by declaring that God always chooses one man in every age and time to lead the human race and close the doors of corruption, confusion and discord. In his contemporary age, argues Nizam al-Mulk, this divine mandate had fallen to Malik Shah I, and granted him virtues as possessing royal lineage for generations, high moral qualities and great devotion to the faith (Mulk, 1960, pp. 9–11). In Malik Shah I laid the powers and merits that "had been lacking in the princes of the world before him," (Mulk, 1960, p. 10). Even the caliphs were inferior to him since their rules were never free from unrest while Malik Shah I's was blessed by stability. He then again emphasises Malikshah's superiority by stating that "he has no need of any counsellor or guide" (Mulk, 1960, p. 11). The rest of the book describes various governmental offices and functions that could help a sultan in administering his realm.

The political thought espoused by the *Book of Government* provides a different political structure compared to that of al-Mawardi's *Ordinances*. The first difference is the marginalisation of the caliphate. Instead of relying on the caliphate as the only instrument of power and authority, this book suggests the division of authority between the caliphate and sultanate, with the greater proportion of power attributed to the sultan. In the *Ordinances*, it was the caliph who gains divine mandate and acts as the leader of the Believers, in both temporal and spiritual matters. Sultans are the deputies of the caliph. Their authority was derived from the caliph who delegates a part of his to them. But in the *Book of Government*, the sultan has become a more prominent figure than the caliph. He is portrayed as a sovereign and his authority comes directly from God. According to Lewis (1988, pp. 51–53), while the term "sultan" had been utilised in Muslim history to refer to a position of power before the time of the Seljuks, it gained a new sense during this period. The term "sultan" during this time referred to the claim of a universal empire. For the Seljuks, there was one sultan to rule the Muslim world, as there was one caliph.

The *Book of Government* still acknowledges the presence of a caliph, but it assigns a lesser role to the caliph compared to the *Ordinance*s while assigning the greater roles as political and military leader to the sultan. The distinction between a sultan and a caliph in the time of the Seljuks did not signify a separation

between religious and worldly affairs in Muslim politics, though, because, as described in the *Book of Government*, kingship and religion are like two brothers and disorder in one will affect the other. Therefore, it is imperative for a king to have sound faith to be able to master both (Mulk, 1960, p. 63). The *Book* also describes extensively the religious duties of a sultan (Mulk, 1960, pp. 62–65). A sultan, however, was regarded as having more political and military powers while a caliph was regarded as the spiritual symbol of the Muslim world.

Another difference between the *Book of Government* and the *Ordinances* is that the *Book of Government* promotes an absolutist rule against the *Ordinances'* more constitutional one. In the *Ordinances* even the caliph has to adhere to what al-Mawardi called "the contract of the *imamate*", essentially a set of rights and obligations between the caliph and his subjects. The *Ordinances* also put great power on to the scholars including, theoretically, to elect a new caliph. These elements are conspicuously absent in the *Book of Government*. Instead, the *Book* describes that a rightful king is determined by God's will, which spontaneously will bestow authority, power and capability on to the recipient. There is no mention of the involvement of other agencies in the selection of a sultan nor the sultan's contract with his subjects such as the "contract of the *imamate*" developed by al-Mawardi (Simidchieva, 2004, p. 103). Thus, in the *Book of Government*, while a sultan is placed as the central figure in the Muslim world, he is also portrayed as a character detached from the rest of humanity, more so than a caliph in the *Ordinances*.

The *Book of Government* instigates three profound shifts in the construction of the political conception of the *umma*. First, it shifts the figure of authority in the Muslim world from the caliph to the sultan. Second, it shifts the character of the political institution from constutionalism to the absolutism of a sultan. As the sultan is portrayed as elected by God Himself, he consequently has limitless authority. Who would defy God's will? As his responsibility was conferred on him directly by God, he answers only to God, eliminating any kind of civil obligation that might be attached to his office. Third, it also demands passive obedience from the people to the sultan. As the sultan attained the divine mandate, he also gained supreme qualities and virtues, making him superior compared to other humans. Thus, his opinion is always the best. It is enough for the common people to obey him, rather than challenge him or offer him advice.

Nizam al-Mulk's conception of political leadership in the *umma* was endorsed by al-Juwayni, a scholar who was chosen by Nizam al-Mulk as the head of al-Madrasa al-Maymuna al-Nizamiyya in Nishapur. Presumably between 1072 and 1085 CE, he wrote a treatise on government titled *Ghiyath al-Umam* (Hallaq, 1984a, pp. 27–28). In this book, al-Juwayni agrees with the importance of the *imamate* to preserve the unity of the *umma*. However, according to him, the form and the rulings of this institution are open to discussion because the Qur'an and the *hadith* do not provide detailed explanations. Al-Juwayni then expounds upon the ideal characteristics of the *imamate*. By emphasising the ideals, he implicitly portrays the weaknesses of the Abbasid caliphate. Next, he presents a hypothetical condition where the *imamate* is extinct. He argues, that in this condition, military leaders and scholars should take affairs into their own hands. This structure allows al-Juwayni to argue against the Abbasid caliphate and, at the same time, present an alternative structure that centred on the hands of the Seljuk sultanate (Hallaq, 1984a, pp. 30–31). According to Hallaq (1984a, p. 32), al-Juwayni's attitudes stemmed not from grudge against the Abbasids but from his fear that the weaknesses of the caliphate would bring discord and chaos to the *umma*.

Al-Juwayni's disciple, al-Ghazali, took a middle position between his teacher's and al-Mawardi's, as can be seen in his books. In *Kitab al-Mustazhiri* (*Book of the Mustazhiri,* 1094-1095 CE), he defends the caliph al-Mustazhir (r. 1094-1118 CE) as the legitimate *imam* and argues that all Muslims should obey him. This book was supposedly written at the request of al-Mustazhir (Ormsby, 2008, p. 89). His further books show that while he supports al-Mawardi's conception that the ultimate authority in the Muslim world lies in the caliph and no other institution is valid unless emanating from him, al-Ghazali acknowledges the importance of the sultanates and seeks to incorporate the sultanates into his theory of statecraft. According to Lambton (1981, p. 115), al-Ghazali lays the fundamentals of his theory in *Iqtisad al-I'tiqad*, which has been translated as *Moderation in Belief*. Later works such as the famous *Ihya ulum al-din* do not add or advance his theory; they only further reamplify it and provide an explanation of its consequences .

In *Iqtisad al-I'tiqad*, al-Ghazali opens his discussion on the imamate by affirming the obligatory nature of the imamate (Ghazali, 2013, p. 229). He argues that this obligatory nature originates from the *sharia*. The ultimate goal of the

sharia is to guide Muslims in achieving success in religious affairs. Yet, to achieve this, Muslims need someone to establish order and provide them with basic needs and security in worldly affairs. Thus, the presence of an authoritative imam is necessitated by the *sharia* (Ghazali, 2013, pp. 230–231). Al-Ghazali then describes three aspects that should exist in an *imamate*: first is the power to maintain order, second is the representation of the collective unity of the Muslim society and third is its functional and institutional authority from the *sharia*. In the event an *imam* does not have enough power by himself, al-Ghazali states that the *imam* could be designated by a person, or persons, of influence, whose allegiance to the *imam* would force others to obey the *imam* (Ghazali, 2013, p. 232).

This thesis argues that by acknowledging that a powerful and influential man can support a caliph, al-Ghazali provides a legal and doctrinal basis for the existence of the Abbasid caliph and, at the same time, acknowledges the importance of the Seljuk sultans as the power behind the caliphate. This reflected not only the actual situation in his time but also his conceptual position which differed from al-Mawardi's. Binder (1955, pp. 238–239) agrees with this observation and further argues that the exchange of oath of allegiance between a sultan and a caliph and the subsequent oath of appointment from the caliph to the sultan formed the established governmental practices in al-Ghazali's period. This exchange of oaths rendered the sultan's position stronger in al-Ghazali's conception of politics than it was in al-Mawardi's. Instead of being considered a servant of the caliph, a sultan now held his own authority and power, which the caliph needed to establish his. The consequence of this conceptual construction was, according to Lambton (1981, p. 116), the shifting articulation of obedience in the Muslim world. Not only did the people have to affirm their allegiance to the Caliph, they also had to obey the Seljuk sultans as the holder of de facto power.

Conceptual development after the destruction of Baghdad

Despite its weaknesses, the Abbasid caliphate served the majority of Muslim society as the source of authority and their symbol of unity. It is true that the Abbasids had to contend with the claims of the Fatimids in Egypt and the Umayyads in Andalusia but the Abbasids managed to outlast the other caliphates, somewhat securing its position as the symbol of the *umma*. Medieval Sunni scholars commonly attributed the application of the Islamic leadership concept to

the Abbasids, and their books on Islamic governance either support the authority of the Abbasid caliphate or at the very least acknowledge its presence as granted. The Abbasid caliphate was an integral part of the debate in defining and legitimising the instrument of authority in Muslim society.

This, however, changed when the Abbasid caliphate was destroyed by the Mongols in 1258 CE. The destruction and loss of knowledge and wealth from the invasion were astounding but it paled in comparison to the mental shock that swept the Muslim world when they heard about the death of the Caliph and destruction of the caliphate. Caliph al-Musta'sim was not merely a political leader, though admittedly of limited capacity; he was also the symbolic leader of the *umma*. He was the embodiment of the concept of a universal leader which was necessary for the embodiment of the concept of a universal society of Muslims. Since the death of Muhammad, Islamic leadership and unity were symbolised in the caliph's person, starting from the Rightly Guided Caliphs, to the Umayyads, to the Abbasids. There were times when there were contending caliphs, but there had never been a time since the death of the Prophet without a caliph.

Al-Musta'sim's death and the destruction of the caliphate were considered as heralding the end of the *umma*. Consistent with the nature of a symbolic universe, events in the society are considered as the reflection of cosmology. In Islam, the destruction of the caliphate thus acquired religious undertones. Muslim historian al-Suyuti (1881, pp. 500–503) describes this period as "a world without Caliph" and quotes elegies lamenting the destruction of Baghdad. This period without caliph lasted for three and half years, before finally al-Muntansir Billah arrived in Egypt and was acknowledged as the next Caliph in 1261 CE. Despite managing to satisfy the general Muslims' need for a unifying symbol, the new caliphate lacked everything it had before. Not a single actual power left and the trauma inflicted by the destruction of Baghdad inevitably affected the minds of Muslims, especially scholars who then sought to conceptualise a different interpretation of the *umma*; the one without the caliphate as the unifying institution.

The destruction of Baghdad brought profound effect on the scholars' opinion on Islamic leadership and governance. This can be seen in Ibn Taymiyya's (d. 1328 CE) *al-Siyasa al-Shari'yya* and Ibn Khaldun's (d. 1406 CE) *al Muqaddima* which put less emphasis on the caliphate and more on legitimising

the presence of various sultanates, a common political practice during their time. Ibn Taymiyya opens his book by declaring it as a short treatise on divine government (*al-siyasa al-ilahiyya*) and prophetic counsel (*al-ayat al-nabawiyya*) (Ibn Taymiyya, 2005, p. 2). He, citing a saying from Muhammad, argues that leadership is a trust that all Muslims should shoulder (Ibn Taymiyya, 2005, pp. 13–14). To manage the public affairs in Muslim society, however, Muslims require public officers. Therefore, it is the obligation of the ruler to choose the best man available to hold the public office -- he who has capacity and loyalty. If a ruler has to choose between a candidate with greater capability and another with greater loyalty, Ibn Taymiyya advises that the ruler should choose the candidate with greater capability (Ibn Taymiyya, 2005, pp. 20–21).

Lambton (1981) observes that in *al-Siyasa*, Ibn Taymiyya uses the term *wali al-amr* to refer to the individuals with actual power and uses the usual *imam* or caliph to refer to the abstract concept of Islamic governance. Lambton assumes that Ibn Taymiyya maybe intentionally avoided linking the term *imam* or caliph to an actual person or position of power since there was no longer a powerful caliph to provide leadership to Muslim society in his era. The Abbasid caliphate in Egypt was a mere shadow of its former self, whose function was only to provide legitimation to the Mamluk sultans (Lambton, 1981, pp. 144–151). Malkawi and Sonn, in their work on Ibn Taymiyya's political thought, also arrive at the same observation as Lambton's that Ibn Taymiyya differentiated Islamic governance in its abstract form and in its practical form, and attributed different terms to each. They also observe that he did not provide great details on the form of government but put more emphasis on its duties instead (Malkawi and Sonn, 2011, p. 117).

In line with the observation above, this thesis presumes that Ibn Taymiyya's choice of terminology was a move to reinterpret the concept of *umma* to fit the practical condition of his time. Since the caliphate had lost much of its power, it no longer could serve as the instrument of authority required to assist the development and legitimation of the *umma*. Ibn Taymiyya then sought a new instrument that could assume the role, and he found it in the form of sultanates. However, he also realised that the institution of sultanate was a relatively new institution in Islamic governance and did not enjoy a strong relationship with Prophetic history. Thus, he put forward his idea that the obligation to establish Islamic governance falls to all Muslims, not a particular family or group.

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Moreover, the most capable and powerful among Muslims should be chosen for the role while allowing for personal defects in personality or character, unlike previous conceptions of authoritative figures which relied on the perceived superior characteristics of the figure (Ibn Taymiyya, 2005, pp. 20–22).

Ibn Taymiyya's argument on the decentralisation of Muslim leadership legitimates the presence of various sultanates as the authoritative figures in various Muslim territories. Theoretically, since everyone is obliged to lead and the most capable should lead, the sultans' efforts to rule is within an Islamic framework. Because they are capable, it is thus within their duty to provide leadership to the general populace. The sultans could find a legal foundation for their rule despite not getting their authority from the caliph nor having a long established history with the Prophet's family. There is no need to re-establish the caliphate as the sole authoritative figure in the Muslim world because, despite its perceived moral or spiritual virtues, the caliphate had failed to show its practical capacity as the leader of the believers.

Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406 CE) further deconstructs the theory of authority in Muslim society in his *al Muqaddima* by attributing the source of vitality which enables empires to thrive to *asabiyya*. The term *asabiyya* was not coined by Ibn Khaldun. On the contrary, *asabiyya* had been a familiar term in pre-Islamic Arabic vocabulary. In his foreword to the English translation of *al Muqaddima*, Rosenthal describes that, according to custom, the definition of *asabiyya* is "making common cause with one's agnates". This kind of sentiment could lead to one's blind support for his group, an expression which had been criticised by Muhammad. Rosenthal argues that, as a man of knowledge, Ibn Khaldun must have been aware of this negative view; thus Ibn Khaldun's *asabiyya* should be understood as a different attribute than the pre-Islamic *asabiyya* (Ibn Khaldun and Rosenthal, 1967).

Rosenthal notes that Ibn Khaldun differentiates *asabiyya* into pagan *asabiyya*, which is condemned by Islam, and natural *asabiyya*, a condition which is inseparable from human basic instinct. It is the later *asabiyya* which Ibn Khaldun expounds upon. According to Ibn Khaldun, natural *asabiyya* is present in the affection that someone feels towards a brother or a neighbour when one of them is treated unjustly. This *asabiyya* is strong in people of primitive culture (*umran badawi*) and not as strong in people of civilised culture (*umran hadari*). In

primitive culture, the people (*badu* or bedouin) live in a natural environment which hones their bravery, self-reliance and affection to one's family or group in order to survive. Blood ties (*silat al-rahim*) become paramount in the establishment of a social group in that culture, followed by alliance (*hilf*) and clientship (*wala'*). The strong solidarity among the members of the group provided by these attachments is what Ibn Khaldun calls *asabiyya* (Ibn Khaldun and Rosenthal, 1967).

Asabiyya is characterised by alertness, dynamism and violence, attributes necessary to survive in such environment. It defends and protects all members of the group and is also important in offensive action against the enemy of the group. The leaders of *asabiyya* hold high esteemed positions which help them to settle internal problems and to shape the future of the group. With *asabiyya*, the primitive society is united and able to survive (Rabi', 1967, pp. 49–52). This strong pressure to survive is minimal in people of civilised culture who inhabit the cities (*hadar*). The presence of various instruments such as walls and guards provide the inhabitants with a sense of security, which in turn dull their sense of alertness. The development of a form of government, which usually takes the form of kingship (*mulk*) and its enforced law, weakens and later completely replaces the need for *asabiyya* from the city dwellers. Rather than being alert and dynamic, the city dwellers are immersed in their own pleasure and become complacent (Rabi', 1967, pp. 52–53). When threats arise, instead of relying on their *asabiyya* to solve it, the monarch employs mercenaries to consolidate his internal power and to defend his dynasty against fresh primitive groups (Rabi', 1967, p. 54).

Ibn Khaldun asserts that kingship is always established by force. Whoever has the necessary force to seize power, can do so. While *asabiyya* provides kings with this necessary power, Ibn Khaldun argues that religion is also important for the formation of kingship due to its nature to further solidify the social group formed by *asabiyya* and to eliminate shortcomings in the group (Lambton, 1981, p. 160). According to Ibn Khaldun, there are two types of governmental regime, one which takes its rule from the religion (*siyasa shar'iyya*) and one which is based on rational choice (*siyasa aqliyya*). *Siyasa shar'iyya* is based on God's commands and the examples set by the Prophet. Its ruler seeks to establish the good of the ruled in this world and the hereafter, as captured in the principle of *rahmatan lil 'alamin*. The ruler of *siyasa aqliyya* might seek the good for the ruled in this

world but also might seek the good for the ruler in this world. This type of regime requires the presence of rational law to prevent it from oppressing the people. Yet even the rational law is inferior to the *sharia*, which ensures the wellbeing of men in their temporal and spiritual interests (Lambton, 1981, pp. 162–164).

Using this theoretical framework, Ibn Khaldun assesses the historical development of Islamic governance. He rationalises the rise and fall of various Muslim governments by explaining the societal force working, or waning, around the involved actors. He uses the dynamics of *asabiyya* as a secular point of view in explaining the rise the fall of the caliphates, a distinct approach compared to the works of previous Muslim scholars (Rabi', 1967, p. 91). For example, Ibn Khaldun sees the conflict between Ali and Mu'awiya not as a theological conflict but as a necessary result of *asabiyya* (Lambton, 1981, p. 172). Also, unlike al-Mawardi who tries to explain and legalise the waning power of the caliph and the increasing power of the sultans in his work by framing them under the *sharia* law and procedures, Ibn Khaldun frankly describes this shift as the failure of the Abbasid's *asabiyya* to maintain supremacy over the younger, more dynamic, tribes (Rabi', 1967, p. 94). This unwavering focus on *asabiyya* made Ibn Khaldun become fascinated with Timurlane as a figure of power who could amass and command the great asset of *asabiyya.* In his view, Timurlane and his Mongol horde were the embodiment of his theory (Fromherz, 2010, pp. 2–4).

Despite being the fundamental force allowing the formation of a tribal society, *asabiyya* in Ibn Khaldun's conception is not racist in character (Rabi', 1967, pp. 59–61). He did not promote the supremacy of a particular tribe over the other. On the contrary, his theory of *asabiyya* is universal in the sense that the cycle of *asabiyya* is observable in any tribe in the history of mankind. Any tribe with strong *asabiyya* can achieve greatness and any great society which loses its *asabiyya* will crumble against the onslaught of tribes with stronger *asabiyya*. Ibn Khaldun's harsh observations on the Umayyads and the Abbasids and his fascination with Timurlane attest to this non-racist interpretation of *asabiyya*. Bland (1984, pp. 37–39) echoes this assertion by describing Ibn Khaldun's evaluation of Jewish history. In *al Muqadimma*, Ibn Khaldun uses *asabiyya* to explain the history of the Jews, putting them on an equal footing with other tribes he assesses in his work.

The absence of racism in the concept of *asabiyya* works well with the vision of forming a global *umma*. Since the theory of *asabiyya* is universal, it conceptually supports the rise of non-Arab tribes to be the ruler of the whole *umma*. Ibn Khaldun openly disagrees with the notion that *imam* should be of Qurayshi descent. He argues that the stipulation was put in place because, at that time, the Quraysh possessed *asabiyya* which was necessary to consolidate the Muslims into one society. Yet, their *asabiyya* later weakened as the consequences of their complacency and luxurious lives. Acknowledging that general opinion supports the notion of a Qurayshi *imam* to rule the *umma*, Ibn Khaldun argues that forcing this while the Quraysh no longer possess *asabiyya* is the same as selecting an incompetent *imam*. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the *umma* to choose another tribe, one with the strongest *asabiyya* among the *umma* (Lambton, 1981, p. 170).

This sentiment was well received by the non-Arab tribes, especially by the Ottomans. The earliest known Ottoman source familiar with the work of Ibn Khaldun is dated 1598 CE. By the middle of the seventeenth century, Ottoman scholars had cited Ibn Khaldun directly, showing a degree of familiarity with his work. By the eighteenth century, Ibn Khaldun was popular in Ottoman scholarly circles. Mustafa Naima (d. 1716), a prominent scholar often thought to be the first official historian of the Ottoman Empire, prefaced his history of the Ottomans by citing Ibn Khaldun on his formulation of the rise and decline of societies and on the five stages of the life of dynastic states (Fleischer, 1984, pp. 47–48). The popularity of Ibn Khaldun and his works among the Ottomans is understandable because, due to their non-Arab origin, the Ottomans faced constant attack with their legitimacy questioned on the grounds they were not from the Quraysh. This attack occurred not only in the early Ottoman period but also during the late Ottoman period in the late nineteenth century with the rise of Arab nationalism. There were proponents of an Arab caliphate such as Rashid Rida who based their rejection of Ottoman rule using the so-called "Quraysh condition". To answer these attacks, both in early and in late Ottoman periods, the Ottoman scholars cited Ibn Khaldun's assertions on *asabiyya* and his dismissal of the Qurayshi descent as an indispensable element of the caliphate (Ardiç, 2012).

"Alternative" Interpretation: Shi'a's interpretation of the *umma*

"Alternative" history and the birth of the Shi'a Imamate

As noted in Muslim historical accounts, the appointment of Abu Bakr to the position of caliph was not unanimously accepted. Some Muslims were dissatisfied by this and considered that the mantle of caliph should fall onto Ali instead. The dissatisfaction grew when Umar and then Uthman were chosen as the second and third caliphs respectively. Ali was finally chosen as the fourth caliph after Uthman's assassination. However his reign was troubled by internal strife among Muslims. Some high profile Muslims such as Aisha, the widow of the Prophet, and Thalhah and Zubayr, both among the most eminent Companions of the Prophet, stood against Ali and rebuked him for not punishing Uthman's murderers. Ali then left Madina and moved his capital to Kufa, hoping to get more followers from the Iraqis but pressures against him did not lessen. Finally the two groups met in a physical confrontation, well known in Muslim history as the Battle of the Camel, in 656 CE (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 214; Kennedy, 2004, pp. 75–76).

Unfortunately, the trouble did not end with the battle. Ali managed to win the battle, but the unity of the Muslims had been shattered. Tension was still palpable and another war broke out when Mu'awiya ibn Abu Sofyan, then the governor of Syria and the cousin of Uthman, revolted against Ali. The armies clashed in Siffin in 657 CE. There was no conclusive result of the war, until Mu'awiya's army started to raise the Qur'an and asked for arbitration to end the conflict. Ali accepted. A part of his army rebelled against Ali's decision for a negotiated settlement and followed their own commander. While most of them were obliterated by Ali's remaining army, their movement spread and became known as the Kharijites (or *Khawarij*), "those who go out" (Hodgson, 1974a, pp. 215–216).

The Battle of Siffin was not a battle for the caliphate since Mu'awiya at this stage had not made any claims to the caliphate. He was avenging Uthman's murder, something which Ali could not do because the party thought responsible for the murder were his supporters in Kufa (Kennedy, 2004, p. 78). However, the result of the arbitration process was that there would be another arbitration in one year's time which would decide who should be the *amir al-mu'minin* (Donner,

2010, p. 163). The consequence of this arbitration was that Ali's authority was severely reduced. Meanwhile, Mu'awiya was getting bolder. He claimed the caliphate over Syria. Soon, Egypt was lost to Ali. His appointed governor was killed in a rebellion and Egypt declared for Mu'awiya. There was even a near-mutiny against Ali in Basra, inside his own territory (Donner, 2010, p. 164). In 661 CE, Ali was assassinated by a Kharijite, ending his reign and the period of *Khulafa al-Rashidun* in Muslim history (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 216).

That was the story from the Sunni side of history. The Shi'a have another narrative, one which puts emphasis on the figure of Ali and how Muhammad had bestowed upon him the mandate as the Prophet's successor. There are several occasions that Shi'a point to as to when Muhammad appointed Ali as his successor. The earliest of these was just after Muhammad received his revelation and addressed his people of Quraysh. Muhammad invited them to a meal and, afterwards, he revealed his prophethood and asked the audience who would like to help him in this mission. None responded and Ali then said, "I, O Prophet of God, will be your helper in this matter." According to a narration from Ali, "And he [the Prophet] put his arm around my neck and said: 'This is my brother, my trustee and my successor among you, so listen to him and obey.'" (Momen, 1985, p. 12).

The more popular account of when Muhammad appointed Ali as his successor is the event of Ghadir Khumm. After returning from the Farewell Pilgrimage, Muhammad and an entourage of Companions stopped at a place called Ghadir Khumm. There the Prophet led a mid-day prayer and then, according to this narrative, the following happened; he took Ali by the hand and said to the people: "Of whomsoever I am *mawla*, then Ali is also his *mawla*. O God! Be Thou the supporter of whoever support Ali and the enemy of whoever opposes him" (Momen, 1985, p. 15). The word *mawla* had many meanings and while the Shi'a translate *mawla* to mean "lord", the Sunnis translate the word as "beloved". Relying on these accounts, the Shi'a believe Ali had the right as the successor of Muhammad. They view Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman as betrayers, taking away the caliphate from Ali (Shahabi, 1988, pp. 16–18).

After Ali's death, his son Hasan became the head of the house. While some of Ali's followers encouraged Hasan to take the leadership and claim the caliphate, he chose not to pursue this claim. The condition in Kufa was too

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disunited for him to face Mu'awiya. He then chose to abdicate in a treaty with Mu'awiya in 661 CE and retired to Medina. His abdication left Mu'awiyya without contender (Keshk, 2010, p. 42). Hasan then died nine years later, at 670 CE, at the relatively early age of forty-six. The Shi'i historical account claims that he was poisoned by his own wife under orders from Mu'awiya (Momen, 1985, p. 26). Hasan's younger brother, Husayn, then took the leadership of the house of Ali in 669 CE. During the reign of Mu'awiya, Husayn did not affirm a claim to the caliphate, out of respect for his brother's treaty with Mu'awiya.

After Mu'awiya's death in 680 CE, his son Yazid ascended the throne as per Mu'awiya's decree. While Mu'awiya's ascension had caused controversy among the Muslims, Yazid's caused outrage, especially among the followers of Husayn. Some messengers from Kufa arrived in Medina and persuaded Husayn to move to Kufa and assume leadership there. At the same time, the governor of Medina pressed Husayn to give allegiance to Yazid. He moved to Mecca and from there he left for Kufa. Unknown to Husayn, Yazid had replaced the Kufan governor with one of his followers, Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad, who according to Shi'a sources established a reign of terror and either intimidated Husayn's followers in the city or bribed them with money so that they would abandon Husayn (Momen, 1985, pp. 28–29).

A few of Husayn's supporters managed to flee from Kufa and joined him, bringing news on the condition there. Husayn decided to press forward to Kufa and his group was intercepted by al-Hurr al-Tamimi, a young commander leading a thousand strong soldiers. Husayn and al-Hurr negotiated and Husayn agreed to change his journey, away from Kufa. Shadowed by al-Hurr and some of his soldiers, Husayn and his group travelled on. They arrived at the field of Karbala on the second day of Muharram, 61 AH (2 October 680 CE). On the following day, another contingent of four thousand soldiers under the leadership of Umar ibn Sa'ad arrived. They were ordered by Ubaydullah to keep Husayn in Karbala until he pledged his allegiance to Yazid. Husayn tried to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ad but to no avail. For days, Husayn and his followers were stranded in Karbala, without a way out or access to water (Momen, 1985, pp. 29–30).

Ubaydullah then sent another order through Shimr: that Ibn Sa'ad was either to attack Husayn immediately or hand over the leadership to Shimr. On the morning of the tenth of Muharram, 61 AH (10 October 680 CE), the army of Ibn

Sa'ad attacked Husayn's camp. Of the 72 armed men in Husayn's camp, none was spared by the army. Even Husayn himself was killed by the order, and some accounts claim by the very sword of Shimr (Momen, 1985, p. 30). Husayn and the men fallen in combat were then decapitated and their heads were brought to Kufa, and then sent to Yazid in Damascus. Zaynab, Husayn's sister who was at Karbala with him, addressed Yazid's court and shamed him, so that he released the women and children captured in Karbala. This event was also recorded in Sunni historical accounts by scholars such as al-Tabari (Tabari, 1990a).

The Shi'i historian, Jafri (1979), provides his analysis of the events of Karbala. In Jafri's view, Husayn was well aware of the danger that he would face if he continued to travel to Kufa. If Husayn was seeking power alone, Jafri argues that he could have raised support in the Hijaz. However, he did not. This, according to Jafri, signifies that Husayn had other than military power on his mind. Jafri argues that Husayn was "planning for a complete revolution in the religious consciousness of the Muslims" (Jafri, 1979, p. 200). Jafri then explains that while Muhammad's action had managed to suppress the Arabs' conservatism, the same Arab conservatism reasserted itself and found embodiment in Yazid's character, who managed to deface Muhammad's teachings. Thus, Husayn sought to reactivate Muhammad's teachings by shaking the conscience of Muslims through his sacrifice. His death, his family's capture and their humiliation by Yazid were the means to broadcast his message to the Muslim society, something that Jafri finds was ultimately successful (Jafri, 1979, pp. 200–204).

Yazid died in 683 CE, loosening the Umayyad grip on many territories. In 684 CE, the former Kufan governor whom Yazid had displaced with Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad, Mukhtar ibn Abi Ubayd, returned to Kufa. He campaigned for a populist movement and rallied the sympathisers of Ali and Husayn under his banner. He called for the people to recognise Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, son of Ali by Khawla, as the *amir al-mu'minin*. He stated that this Muhammad was the *mahdi* or saviour of the Last Days, who had arrived to establish a just regime on earth. This incident is important since, according to Donner (2010, pp. 183–184), it was the first time in which the concept of the *mahdi* is evoked. It was also the first time that the call for arms was raised for someone of Ali's direct bloodline but not that of the Prophet's. This shows the subtle shift from the lineage of the

Prophet to the figure and lineage of Ali as the source of legitimacy and authority in Shi'a traditions.

While Mukhtar managed to control Kufa and the surrounding area for a while, ultimately his revolt was crushed by Mush'ab ibn Zubayr in early 687 CE (Donner, 2010, pp. 183–186). However, the followers of Ali continued their resistance against the Umayyads. At the centre of this resistance were the descendants of Ali. During the Abbasid uprising against the Umayyads, the Abbasids tried to win the support of followers of Ali. The Abbasids claimed the imamate both from their lineage to the Prophet's uncle al-Abbas ibn Abd al-Mutallib and also by the last will and testament of Muhammad ibn al Hanafiyya, a son of Ali. Using this propaganda, the Abbasids managed to gain support from the family and followers of Ali, and so won the caliphate (Robinson, 2009, pp. 206–207).

Still, the Abbasids neglected their promises and did not recognise the importance of the family of Ali in their caliphate. The influence of the Shi'a waxed and waned according to the policies of individual caliphs. Some Abbasid caliphs such as al-Mansur and al-Mahdi (r. 775-785 CE) accommodated the Shi'a by including them in their court. Others such as Harun al-Rashid (r. 786-809 CE) were suspicious of them and limited their access to the court (Donner, 1999, p. 25). The influence of the Shi'a in the Abbasid caliphate gained momentum again when the Shi'ite Buyid dynasty controlled large parts of the caliphate, conquered Baghdad and became the de facto ruler of the Islamic empire from 945 to 1055 CE (Donner, 1999, p. 30).

In time, the followers of Ali developed their distinct religious attributes and formed a distinct society that we know now as the Shi'a. They developed their own variant of *umma*, combining their interpretation of Islamic holy texts, strong sense of loyalty to Ali and his family and political motives (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 372). According to Lapidus (2002, p. 95), the Shi'i society was concerned with two endeavours. First, since the Shi'a denied the legitimacy of Abu Bakr and Umar, they could no longer be considered as authoritative figures in Islamic religious narration. Thus, the Shi'a rejected the collection of *hadith* reported through them and instead developed their own traditions, which centred on Ali. This resulted in the codification of *Najh al-Balagha* (*The Peak of Elegance*) as the Shi'a source of religious belief. Their political position vis-à-vis the Sunni

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caliphate drew them closer towards other political dissidents such as the Mu'tazilites, thus affecting the development of Shi'i theology in contrast to the Sunni one.

Second, the Shi'i scholars also needed to defend the legitimacy of their Imams in the face of growing body of political theory supporting the Sunni caliphate. Instead of drawing from the will of the people or the consensus of the jurists, the Shi'a developed their concept of imamate by emphasising the divine nature of their Imams (Ahmed, 1962, p. 99). According to Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765 CE), the sixth imam, the true ruler of the *umma* was chosen through *nass* (nomination or designation), the sacred will of each Imam which provided his successor with legitimacy to rule the *umma* and the authority to interpret the Qur'an and *hadith*. The Shi'a attributed the concept of *nass* to the *hadith* of Ghadir Khumm, which they believe was the *nass* from Muhammad to Ali as his successor (Berkey, 2003, p. 131). By the end of the ninth century, this concept had evolved into the infallibility and sinless nature, or *ma'sum,* of the imams (Lapidus, 2002, p. 95). This provides another breaking point with the Sunnis.

Contending interpretations: divisions within the Shi'a

The Shi'a's quest for unification under the *imamate* did not result in a united movement. Just like the Sunnis, which broke into several schools of thought, the Shi'a eventually also fragmented into several branches. The fundamental cause of fragmentation. which is relevant to this thesis, was the different interpretation over *imamate* succession. Momen (1985, pp. 46–59) identifies at least twenty-one sects in Shi'ism, some already extinct now. The most well known of them are three: the Zaydiyya, Isma'iliyya and Ithna Ashariyya. The Zaydiyya derived their name from their acceptance of Zayd, son of Ali, the fourth imam and grandson of Husayn, as the fifth Imam. The Isma'iliyya and Ithna Ashariyya both rejected Zayd and instead acknowledged his half brother, Muhammad al-Baqir, as the fifth Imam. After Muhammad al-Baqir and Ja'far al-Sadiq as the fifth and sixth Imams respectively, a new schism arose on the question of who the seventh Imam was. The Isma'iliyya believed the seventh Imam was Isma'il, son of Imam Ja'far. However, since Isma'il passed away before his father, some Shi'a believed that Ismail's imamate was annulled and the

imamate went to Ja'far's next son, Musa. This last group developed into the Ithna Ashariyya or the Twelvers (Lapidus, 2002, pp. 95–98).

There are points of differentiation between each branch. Zayd established the doctrine that the imamate belongs to any descendant of Ali and Fatima who is learned, pious and raises the sword to establish the imamate. He also established the doctrine of *Imamat al-Mafdul* that opened the possibility for a man with lesser quality to become the imam during the lifetime of a man of greater excellence. Using this doctrine, Zayd considered the rule of Abu Bakr and Umar as expedient since they ruled in the lifetime of Ali. Thus, the men were not considered as sinful for rejecting Ali's leadership (Momen, 1985, pp. 49–50). Since Zaydis required an imam to raise the sword, they rejected the concept of Hidden Imam and the return of the Mahdi. According to Zaydis, the imams were neither *ma'sum* nor capable of working miracles, yet another point of difference with the other branches of Shi'ism (Halm, 1991, pp. 206–207). The Zaydis managed to establish two imamates. The first was in Tabaristan, south of the Caspian Sea in 864 CE, but the imamate fell in 928 CE against the Samanids of Bukhara. The second imamate was established in Yemen in 893 CE and, despite attacks and occupations by the Fatimids and the Ottomans, managed to survive until the republican revolt in Yemen in 1962.

As briefly noted above, the Isma'iliyya, also known as the "Seveners", branched out on the question of who was the next imam after Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq. They believed that since Imam Ja'far had designated his son, Ismail, as his successor, the imamate fell to Ismail. After Ismail's death, his son Muhammad would be the next Imam. There are several unique doctrines the Isma'iliyya put forward. First, they adjudged a special role for Ali and started the imamate from Hasan. Thus, Imam Ja'far was their fifth Imam, unlike the other branches who considered Ja'far as the sixth Imam. Ismail was their sixth Imam and his son, Muhammad, was the seventh Imam (Halm, 1991, p. 162). Second, the Isma'iliyya believed that the Qur'an revealed two truths: the *zahir* or external, literal truth and the *batin* or internal, esoteric truth. In order to gain complete knowledge, one requires the guidance of the Imam who exemplifies both kinds of knowledge. Third, they combined active political activism and messianism, preaching equality and justice and the coming of the Mahdi (Lapidus, 2002, pp. 97–98). The Fatimid dynasty was one branch of Isma'iliyya Shi'a established by the fourth Great

Master of the sect. Unlike the previous leaders, he claimed himself as the Mahdi and adopted Caliph Abdallah al-Mahdi as his title in 910 CE. The Fatimids ruled Egypt for four generations and were in fierce competition against the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad (Halm, 1991, pp. 170–177).

The Ithna Ashariyya were the followers of Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq. After the death of Imam Ja'far's apparent successor, Ismail, this group believed that the imamate devolved back to Imam Ja'far. Thus, after his death in 765 CE, the main body of Shi'a recognised his third son, Musa al-Kazim, as the seventh Imam. During the time of Imam Musa, the relations between the followers of Ali and the Abbasids soured, to the point that the Abbasid caliphs brought the Imams to their courts, put them under heavy surveillance and, according to Shi'a sources, poisoned them (Halm, 1991, p. 31). From the eighth Imam to the eleventh Imam, they died relatively at a young age and under the custody of the Abbasid caliphs. The eleventh Imam, al-Hasan al-'Askari, died at the age of twenty-eight or twenty-nine, in 874 CE. He left no son, thus creating a succession crisis and plunging the Shi'a into chaos. The prevalent tradition was that Imam al-Hasan had a young son, Muhammad, who had been hidden from the Caliph by his father out of caution (*taqiyya*). As the tradition grew, the Shi'a were waiting for the twelfth Imam to come, thus their moniker as "the Twelvers" (Halm, 1991, p. 35).

Since the Imams' movements and interactions were severely restricted by the caliphs, Shi'i scholars had to do without them. Eventually, the Ithna Ashariyya developed a distinct judicial system independent of the Imams but theoretically subservient to their authority. They also constructed a theological system based on a Hidden Imam and the prerogative of the scholars to interpret the Imam's will during his absence. They also needed to develop a distinct body of knowledge, independent from that of the Sunnis, to serve as the foundation of their theological system and imamate. The Shi'a then began the compilation of religious narrations in which Ali was the central authority. These texts were compiled, as we have seen above, into *Nahj al-Balagha* in the tenth century (Lapidus, 2002, p. 95). In the decades after the death of Imam al-Hasan al-'Askari, the Shi'i scholar al-Kulayni (d. 941 CE) compiled *Kitab al-Kafi* (*The Sufficient Book*) which plays a central part in Shi'a jurisprudence just like the compilations of al-Bukhari and Muslim in Sunni jurisdiction (Berkey, 2003, pp. 134–135).

The arrival of the Buyid dynasty in Baghdad provided the Ithna Ashariyya the chance to further develop their religious society. The Buyids provided political protection to Shi'a followers. They also developed distinct characteristics that would define the Ithna Ashariyya from the rest of the Muslims, especially the Sunnis. The first characteristic is the commemoration of the religious festivals of Ghadir Khumm on 18 Dhul Hijja and the mourning of Husayn's murder on 10 Muharram. The second characteristic was the veneration of tombs of the family of Ali and the development of pilgrimages to these tombs. The third was the public denigration (*tabarra'*) of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman as they were considered as usurpers, taking away the seat of leadership from Ali (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 225–226).

This distinct Ithna Ashari communal identity provoked a negative reaction from non-Shi'a Muslims in Baghdad. To counter the Ghadir Khumm festival, they developed their own festivals such as the Feast of the Cave. This festival was held eight days after the Ghadir Khumm and it commemorated the journey of the Prophet and Abu Bakr on their *hijra* and how they sought refuge in a cave. This feast emphasised Abu Bakr's close relationship to Muhammad (Kennedy, 2004, p. 229). The sectarian rivalry soon broke into physical conflicts. According to Kennedy (2004, p. 227), before 952 CE, there was no evidence of sectarian conflicts in Baghdad or the public denunciation of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman. But by 972 CE, the walls of Baghdad were full of slogans denouncing the three caliphs. The city itself was rife with sectarian conflicts and was divided into fortified quarters, each for a sectarian group. The caliphs were powerless to stop the conflicts since they did not possess any actual might. Only after the Seljuks emerged as a strong contender to the Buyids' power did the Caliphs start to assert their authority as the symbol of Sunnis, including by commissioning al-Mawardi to write his *Ordinances*, as described in the previous section.

Reflection on the conceptual development of the *umma*

By examining the works of Muslim scholars, we may gain insight into the conceptual development of the *umma* and also the development of the concept of the caliphate as the instrument of authority in the *umma*. The concept of *umma* was first externalised by Muhammad when he articulated a specific meaning for

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the word "*umma*". In the Qur'anic term, the word *umma* refers to a body of people who are objects of the divine plan of salvation (Denny, 1975). While at first the word referred to no particular group of people, eventually its meaning shifted to refer specifically to the Muslim society under the leadership of Muhammad. Later, the word gained a comprehensive perspective by the verse "*kuntum khayra ummatin ukhrijat linnaasi…*" ('You are the best nation [12] produced [as an example] for mankind') which put Muslim society into a wider context, both geographically and chronologically.

The usage of *umma* in Islamic terminology eventually initiated the development of a global consciousness in the minds of early Muslims. The Qur'an provided them with a vision of a universal, interconnected society blessed by God. By joining with this society, a Muslim would achieve salvation and, at the same time, become *rahmatan lil 'alamin*, a blessing to the world. Yet, the actual *umma* at that time was no more than the Arab people with Medina as their centre. To bring the conceptual *umma* into fruition, they needed the support of social organisation, in line with the theory articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 134–136). In early Islamic history, social organisation supporting the *umma* was embodied in the form of the caliphate. Thus, the development of the caliphate, on both conceptual and practical levels, was important to the endeavours to establish the idea of a global *umma*.

As time goes by, despite various political circumstances, the caliphate thrived and became a "fact of life", normalised as the embodiment of authority over the *umma* post-Muhammad. Yet, while the presence of the caliphate was an accepted and unquestionable social truth in Muslim society, it lacked the theoretical support which legitimated its presence. Threats from various groups within the *umma,* which espoused alternative interpretations of the concept, triggered scholarly endeavours to conceptualise the caliphate as the rightful embodiment of authority over the *umma*. Thus, al-Mawardi's book was published both as an argument to defend the caliphate and as a theoretical foundation for its past and future practices. Indeed, the lack of such theoretical explanations of the caliphate in the previous era made al-Mawardi's book one of the most

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[12] Sahih International translates *umma* as 'nation' – a common translation in the modern period. As we discuss throughout this thesis, however, *umma* has pre-national connotations as the idea of a broad, translocal Muslim society.

authoritative texts on Islamic statecraft. Later scholarly works built upon or proposed different ideas than al-Mawardi's, reflecting the nature of the caliphate as a socially constructed concept, not a divine one.

After the destruction of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad in the thirteenth century, scholarly works on Islamic authority shifted again to reflect the changed condition of the *umma*. While the caliphate had long lost its actual political power before the fall of Baghdad, it had been a powerful symbol which embodied the concept of the *umma*. Its destruction necessitated the development of new perspectives on Islamic authority. Ibn Khaldun, with his theory of *asabiyya*, managed to de-sacralise the caliphate and presented the dynamic nature of the caliphate as a sociological phenomenon. While Ibn Khaldun's conceptual work seems to legitimate fragmentation in the Muslim world, it actually promotes the idea that authority over the *umma* is universal; whoever manages to gather and command *asabiyya* will rule over Muslims. This concept eventually provided strong legitimation to the Ottomans during their campaigns to establish their authority over the Muslim world. Despite their non-Arab origin, despite possessing no link to the Prophet and his family, the Ottomans' rule was deemed to be valid on the grounds that they possessed the strongest *asabiyya* in the Muslim world.

The development of strong alternative concepts of the *umma*, such as the Shi'a's, could of course be seen as diminishing the conceptual unity of Muslims. Not only did they protest against particulars policies, but they also provided a comprehensive alternative perspective on the social history of Muslims. Instead of looking at the period of the first four caliphs as the ideal period, as the "official" Sunni interpretation does, the Shi'a considered it as a bleak period full of treachery. By putting emphasis on the event of Ghadir Khumm, the Shi'a completely rejected the Sunnis' interpretation of history and any type of legitimacy that was constructed based on that interpretation. Beyond just rejecting the political legitimacy of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman, the Shi'a also rejected their religious authority which was central to the Sunni tradition. They then developed distinct religious doctrines and festivals to support their interpretation of the *umma* and the *imama*. This put Sunnis and Shi'a into two mutually exclusive camps, each with their own interpretation of the *umma* and its social instrument.

Despite the split, this appears to be a good case of how mythology and theology have been used, in each case, to support and defend an interpretation of a symbolic universe (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 127). Indeed, the schism does not dissolve the concept of the *umma* as a common symbolic universe among Muslims. On the contrary, the schism provides evidence that the concept of *umma* is central to the Muslims' worldview to the point that even contending ideas are still centred on their authority over the *umma*. Regardless of their position on the debate over the caliphate, either Sunni or Shi'a, supporting or disregarding the Umayyads, the Abbasids or the Ottomans, the different norm entepreneurs used what they regarded as an 'Islamic' framework as the foundation of their works. As Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 124–138) have explained, the presence of different interpretations over a symbolic universe, "the deviants", is inevitable, and the interpretation that can gather the most support will become the next "official" one. In this perspective, the Sunnis and Shi'a are two social groups bearing different interpretations of the idea of the *umma*. Each consider themselves as the embodiment of the "official" narrative of the *umma* and consider the other as a "heretical" group for espousing a "deviant" narrative. Both, however, claim authority over the whole *umma* and seek legitimacy for their claim by providing different interpretations of Muslim historical accounts. Although the accounts differ as to the meaning of particular events, they relate to a cultural and social field understood as 'Muslim'. In a backhanded sort of way, their competition for the leadership over the *umma* and invocation of a common, though disputed, history, is evidence of the trans-sectarian importance of the *umma* idea.

Chapter Five:
The Integration of the *Umma* under the Caliphates

As society is the product of humans' consciousness, the idea of a particular form of society requires the presence of humans and their activities to define and embody the concept. To understand the state of a symbolic universe or its change, one must observe the social organisation in which the processes of defining and embodying are happening (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 134). In the case of the *umma*, the social organisation where we can observe these processes of defining and embodying is the *caliphate*. The previous chapter has discussed the defining process on the *umma* through observing the Muslim scholars' work on the question of authority. In this chapter, I will discuss the embodying process of the *umma*, particularly in how the historical caliphates fomented commonality and integration in practical, day to day, activities in their territories.

Before moving forward with observing the *umma* under the caliphate, I must address one important issue with the regard to the caliphate: internal conflict. It is true that Muslim history has never been free from contestation over authority. At times, there was more than one caliphate or more than one power within the Islamic world which claimed to be the caliphate and tried to establish their rule over the whole Muslim world. There were also dissident movements, big and small. These might be perceived as evidence of an absent unity in the Muslim world, thus standing in opposition to the idea of the *umma*. Looking back at the theoretical framework provided by Berger and Luckmann (1966), however, it is not necessarily so.

Berger and Luckmann (1966) state that, in interpreting the symbolic universe, social actors might come with different interpretations, especially in later generations which do not experience the initial founding of the universe. The tensions between these different interpretations will become more pronounced when the "deviant" version is shared and objectivated in a strong social group within the current society, thus challenging the "official" interpretation of the said symbolic universe. In order to maintain unity, the "official" interpretation will

perform either therapy or nihilation on the deviants. Therapy is done to "cure" the wayward from their deviations and bring them back to the "official" interpretation of the symbolic universe. In order to perform therapy, the society will develop a therapeutical body of knowledge which diagnoses the source of conceptual deviation and determines the curative process required to rehabilitate the deviants. Nihilation, by way of contrast, is a process which deny and liquidate everything outside the "official" interpretation of a symbolic universe (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 130–132).

Scholars are important since they are not only the producers of knowledge which constitute and legitimate the symbolic universe, but also producers of knowledge necessary to perform therapy and nihilation. It is through scholarly works that a symbolic universe exists and defends itself from the "deviant" reality espoused by the heresy –or for the "deviant" to defeat the "official" narrative. But in order to defeat the offending narrative completely, a symbolic universe also requires social groups to perform practical measures against the advocates of the opposing narrative. It is through these social groups that the symbolic universe becomes embodied and established as the "natural" condition to be embraced by all. While scholars debate how to defend their interpretation of a symbolic universe against the opposing narrative, the social groups put the theory into practice and battle to eliminate the practices of the opposing theory (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 136–138).

Berger's and Luckmann's depiction of tensions and conflict within a symbolic universe provides a useful theoretical reflection on the development of the *umma*. As a symbolic universe, the concept of the *umma* was perceived by Muslims as the social practice divinely sanctioned by God through the holy texts. Scholars expounded upon this and built a theoretical framework of the *umma* as the natural order of society. However, the concept of *umma* then required social groups as the embodiment of the concept. While Muhammad had laid the foundation of the *umma* through the Constitution of Medina and by propaganda and diplomacy (Kennedy, 2004, p. 45; Robinson, 2009, pp. 188–189), his work was far from complete. After Muhammad's death in 632 CE, the perceived divine concept of the *umma* then found agency in the form of tribesmen campaigning under the banner of the Caliphates (Robinson, 2009, pp. 192–193). Thus, the

Caliphates emerged as the social institution necessary for the implementation of the concept of the *umma*.

Contestation over the caliphate inevitably arose since some groups started to develop their own interpretation of the *umma*. This was started not long after the death of Muhammad, during the First Civil War (656-661 CE) with Ali and Mu'awiya each having different interpretations of the leadership over the *umma*. With the split of the Khawarij from Ali's army, this turned the conflict into a three-pronged war. At the practical level, the contestation often left the *umma* fragmented based on the dynamics of political power. At the conceptual level, however, this contestation reinforced the importance of the caliphate and the integrity of the *umma*. Thus, the *umma* continued to be pivotal to the Muslims' sense of self identity despite the various political conflicts and upheavals. Moreover, while the fragmentation might have limited the political integrity of the *umma*, it did not restrain Muslims from upholding the social-cultural integrity of the *umma*. This could be seen in the increasing level of integration of various Muslim locales into what we might deem as one *umma*, indicated by the increasingly complex interactions between the various locales as described in the following sections of this chapter.

Integration under the Khulafa al-Rashidun

Map 1. Integration of Islamic World (622-750 CE)
Source: Kishlansky *et al.* (2008, p. 203)

The Khulafa al-Rashidun provided the foundation for the emergence of an integrated *umma*. Each of the caliphs, perhaps inadvertently, contributed to the

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establishment of commonality among the Muslims, which then developed into a sense of community. Abu Bakr (r. 632-634) managed to defend the orthodox interpretation of the faith from various "divergent" others, embodied in the false prophets and prophetesses, as explained in Chapter Three. He also managed to maintain the political unity of the fledging caliphate and secured Hijaz as the base of the caliphate. Without Abu Bakr's insistence during the Wars of Ridda, the government in Medina would not have enjoyed its unchallenged authority and there would have been no foundation for the coming Muslim expansion (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 52–57). Abu Bakr's campaign against the separatists could be seen as a combination between therapeutic efforts to bring the separatists back to Islam and nihilation to completely destroy the apostles.

Umar (r. 634-644) expanded on what Abu Bakr had secured. He added to the caliphate various territories that were under the Byzantine and the Sasanid empires. But not only expanding the territories, Umar also played an important part in the integration of these territories into the *umma*. First, Umar provided amnesty to the tribes that had rebelled during the Wars of Ridda and incorporated them into the *umma*. These tribes then gained their popularity by contributing in various expeditions in the Fertile Crescent (Berkey, 2003, p. 71). Second, Umar made Islamic values and rituals as the fundamental characteristic of the *umma*. He was well known for sending teachers to various towns to teach the people the Qur'an. Being a strict disciplinarian, he also expected his governors and soldiers to act in a disciplined manner, such as demanding that every soldier perform the minimum prayer ritual. He also adopted the *hijri* calendar based on the year when Muhammad performed his *hijra*, providing the *umma* with a common chronological framework (Hodgson, 1974a, pp. 210–211).

Uthman's reign (644-656 CE) is often identified as the beginning of tribulations that plagued the *umma*. It is often argued that Uthman favoured the Quraysh aristocracy above others, a contrasting policy to Umar's, which distributed favour according to a person's closeness to Muhammad (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 212; Lapidus, 2002, p. 46). It is important to note, however, that the first half of Uthman's reign was deemed successful (Kennedy, 2004, p. 72). He oversaw expeditions to Nubia and North Africa. He also expanded the Muslims' naval presence in the Mediterranean under the control of the governors of Egypt and Syria. At 655 CE, the Muslim naval force won a decisive victory over the

Byzantines at the Battle of the Masts. He also completed the subjugation of the Sasanid empire (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 69–72). Nevertheless, the most important legacy of Uthman to the integration process of the *umma* was not territorial conquest. It was the codification and standardisation of the Qur'an (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 213).

Sunni Islamic sources highly praised Uthman's codification and standardisation of the Qur'an. Ibn Kathir (2004, pp. 349–352) considers the standardisation as the greatest service from Uthman to the *umma*. Azami (2003, pp. 87–97) provides an elaborate discussion of the event. From Azami's elaboration, there are several factors that drove Uthman to perform the standardisation. First, the death of many Companions who had memorised the Qur'an. Second, it was a symbolic act to signify the unification of the *umma*. Third, it was a natural response to the plurality of the Muslim society at that time, when many converts unfamiliar with the Qur'an and Arabic grammar, and having learned the Qur'an from different teachers with different dialects, were often in disagreement about the correct way to read the Qur'an.

There was a considerable debate on Uthman's decision to standarise the Qur'an. Hodgson (1974a, p. 213) recounts the resentment expressed by some Qur'an reciters, especially by Ibn Mas'ud. Donner (2010, pp. 153–155) further describes how the resentment arose perhaps not over the standarisation process itself, which some traditions described as involving a team of Companions led by Zaid ibn Thabit to collect and compare all copies of Qur'an manuscripts and also ask verification from the reciters. Rather, the resentment may have arisen over Uthman's decision to send the standard version of the Qur'an to various cities and order other manuscripts to be destroyed. Resentment over this policy would have added to disagreements over political and administrative issues, resulting in higher discontent at Uthman's leadership. It might be not purely coincidental that one of the Companions who refused to destroy his copy was Ibn Mas'ud, who resided in Kufa, and that one of the centres of the anti-Uthman movement was also in Kufa. Nevertheless, despite controversies, Uthman's decision to standardise the Qur'an provided the Muslim society with an important symbol of unity.

During Ali's rule (656-661 CE), the political unity of the *umma* had been shattered. The Battle of Camel, the Battle of Siffin and the emergence of the Khawarij were the most important events that are considered as the first great *fitna*

or revolt in the history of Muslims. These events, however, did not undermine the social integration of the *umma*. It was under Ali's patronage that the study of Arabic grammar was initiated. One of the leading Arabic grammarians, Abu al-Aswad al-Du'ali, was Ali's disciple. This helped the integration of non-Arabs into the *umma*, both by learning the Arabic language while keeping their faith or by learning the Qur'an and becoming a Muslim (Momen, 1985, p. 25). Ali also moved the capital from Medina to Kufa, a step which unwittingly provided the inspiration for various caliphs to move their centre of power to the best location. This increased the dynamics of Muslim politics and the fluidity of the caliphate also encouraged mobility among Muslims (Donner, 2010, p. 191).

While each of the Rightly Guided Caliphs ruled in a comparatively short period, they provided a strong foundation for the Islamic society to thrive in later years. The greatest question after Muhammad's death was whether the Islamic society should survive after him or not (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 197). Yet, despite constant opposition from various actors, the Rightly Guided Caliphs managed to maintain the unity of the *umma*. Abu Bakr managed to subjugate various tribes and deviant religious movements, cementing the unity of the *umma*. Umar built upon the foundation left by Abu Bakr, adopting an inclusionist policy which reintegrated defeated tribes into the *umma* and directing the attention of various factions towards external enemies (Berkey, 2003, p. 71). Uthman standarised the Qur'an, providing the *umma* with a uniform holy text, which was important in enforcing the unity of the umma, both by providing the 'mythological' text necessary for unity (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 129) and also for instilling mood and motivation in the believers (Geertz, 1973, pp. 96–98). Ali took the integration process further by providing patronage for the development of the Arabic language, providing the *lingua franca* for the *umma*. All of these played an important part in the formation of the *umma*, upon which the later leaders built their achievements.

Integration under the Umayyads

The next leader of the *umma* after the Rightly Guided Caliphs was Mu'awiyya. He was a highly controversial figure in the history of Muslims. Historians often paint him as a power-hungry figure who used Uthman's death for

his own benefit (Crone, 1980, p. 30). However, some disagree and portray him in a more positive light (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 76–77; Humphreys, 2006). Regardless of the controversy surrounding the figure, what Mu'awiya did for the unity of the *umma* was indispensable. Mu'awiya established a greater sense of communal integration and he ruled with general common interests as his priority (Hodgson, 1974a, pp. 217–218). He also developed the caliphate into a mature political institution, with features resembling a state such as standing army, solid bureaucracy and network of tax collectors (Donner, 2010, pp. 171–172). Yet, it must be acknowledged that he is also considered responsible and criticised for changing the nature of the caliphate into kingship with designation succession (Maududi, 2007, pp. 204–211).

The caliphate of the Umayyads, a legacy of Mu'awiya, was the only caliphate in the history of Muslims that ruled and commanded all areas of the then-known Muslim world. At the height of their power, the Umayyad's territory spanned from al Andalus in the west to Persia in the east. Thus, their achievement in building authority and acquiring legitimacy to rule over a vast territory with various people as their subjects is something that cannot be underestimated. More so when we take into account that there were rebellions against the Umayyads' rule, such as Abdullah ibn Zubayr's in Hijaz, the Khawarij rebellions and various rebellions by the sympathisers of Ali. These rebellions were taxing to the Umayyads. Some, such as Abdullah ibn Zubayr's, directly threatened their rule to the point that the Muslim scholar al-Suyuti (1881, pp. 215–219) affirmed his caliphate and included Ibn Zubayr as one of the entries in his book *Tarikh al-khulafa (History of the Caliphs)*. Nevertheless, the Umayyads managed to control and defeat these rebellions, and their rule prevailed until the Abbasids' revolt in 750 CE.

There are contending opinions on how the Umayyads managed to maintain their authority despite resistance and rebellions. Wellhausen (1927) argues that the Umayyads' source of authority was their ethnicity and that they relied on tribal affiliations in order to build a strong ruling elite. Further in his argument, Wellhausen considers that the Umayyads were not keen on Islam. Some of them even possessed hatred toward Muhammad and his teachings, thus allowing the tragedy of Karbala to occur (Wellhausen, 1927, pp. 157–158). Other scholars such as Lewis (2002b) and Rubin (2003) disagree with Wellhausen. Both Lewis and

Rubin describe that the Umayyads, without diminishing their pragmatic motives, understood the importance of Islam for their rule and thus sought legitimation in Islamic teaching and symbolisms. The founder of the Umayyads, Mu'awiya, exploited religious fervour by waging wars with the Christian Byzantines, thus enabling himself as the Champion of Islam (Lewis, 2002b, pp. 65–66). Abdul Malik ibn Marwan (r. 685-705) was known to put heavy emphasis on the figure of Muhammad and this led to the cultivation of *hadith*, essential to the instutionalisation of Islam, as discussed in Chapter Three (Donner, 2010, pp. 205–206).

To further strengthen their claim, the Umayyads also used Islamic symbols and relics as part of their regalia. In order to gain legitimacy over their caliphate, the Umayyads claimed that they were the successor of Muhammad, who had been the successor of a chain of prophets before him. Thus, it was their duty, and privilege, to lead the Muslim society, just as Muhammad and other prophets before him had (Rubin, 2003, pp. 92, 95). Poets in the Umayyad court exulted the fact that the Umayyads possessed the relics of Muhammad –for example, his pulpit (*mimbar*), his staff and his signet ring (*khatam*)-- and considered these as the tokens of authority for the caliphate (Rubin, 2003, pp. 95–96).

The Umayyads were also well known for their patronage of the development of various religious buildings that played an important part as the destinations of pilgrimages. The most notable of these buildings was the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem (Donner, 1999, pp. 22–25). The Umayyads also sanctioned their dynastic practice by associating it with the history of the prophets, in which the divine mandate was often passed from father to son, such as from Abraham to his sons, or from David to Solomon (Rubin, 2003, pp. 98–99). This practice set the precedent for the instrumentalisation of Islamic piety by political actors to gain legitimacy and authority as a fundamental trait of politics in the Muslim world, as I have described in Chapter Two.

The Umayyads' success in establishing legitimate claim to the leadership of the whole Muslim society was followed by their success in establishing institutional machinery to support the growing empire. Mu'awiyya (r. 661-680) established various administrative offices, such as *shahib al-shurta* and *shahib al-haras*, which oversaw the police force and guards respectively (Kennedy, 2001, p. 13). Abdul Malik ibn Marwan (r. 685-705) made further reforms by adopting

Arabic language as the official language of the caliphate (Hawting, 2000, p. 63) and minting coins with Arabic engravings, making the caliphate relatively independent from Byzantine coins (Saliba, 2007, pp. 50–51). Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (r. 717-720 CE) was well-known for his many reforms, including a new tax policy and making unpaid labour illegal (Gibb, H. A. R., 1955; Murad, 1985; Hawting, 2000). These reforms helped the Umayyads to establish an effective administrative body to support their rule. In return, the uniform governmental apparatus, regulations and practices provided a framework for the establishment of a general sense of identity among Muslims. They were speaking the same Arabic language, using the same coins and were administered by the same bureaucracy.

Under the Umayyads' administration, the usually divisive societies of western Asia and the Mediterranean were transformed into an integrated society. Corn fleets from the Nile supplied cities of Hijaz, Damascus and Basra. The people, assured of some justice and order, were able to marshal their resource to conduct trade to faraway lands. Trans-continental trade routes, both the sea route through the Red Sea and the combined route across the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Syrian desert, were under one control, invigorating trans-continental trade. As early as the eighth century CE, Muslim merchants and traders underwent journeys to China and South Asia, and in later centuries, to Southeast Asia, not only opening trade routes but also spreading the message of Islam (Chaudhuri, 1985, p. 44).

The common sense of identity among Muslims was augmented by the Umayyads' support for the establishment and development of an Islamic body of knowledge as well as their fierce opposition to "deviant" narratives, such as the Khawarij and the Shi'a. Muslim historians record how Abdul Malik ibn Marwan was considered as one of four most knowledgeable men in Medina (Suyuti, 1881, pp. 220–221) or how Umar ibn Abd Aziz was considered of the same quality as the four Khulafa al-Rashidun (Suyuti, 1881, p. 233). It was during the reign of the Umayyads that the Muslim territories expanded, up to the conquest of al-Andalus (Tabari, 1990b, p. 164). Despite their various shortcomings, the Umayyads were considered as the guardians of Islam, under whose rule Islamic knowledge and practices thrived and an Islamisation process unfolded ('Isy, 2007, pp. 423–425). Without a doubt, these Islamic attributes benefitted the Umayyads' rule and, at the

same time, they also accelerated the possibility of integration for the majority in Muslim society.

Integration under the Abbasids

The Abbasid caliphate came to power in 750 CE, when their revolution succeeded in destroying the already weak Umayyad caliphate. They, however, did not share the Umayyads' exclusive claim to the leadership of the Muslim society. Starting from 909 CE, the Abbasids had to share their claim to the leadership over the Muslim society with the Shi'a Fatimid caliphate in Egypt. Another contender rose in 929 CE, when Abdur Rahman III declared himself as the Caliph over his dominion in al-Andalus. Later, the actual control of the Abbasids also lessened as they relied more and more on the client tribes. That, however, did not lessen the impact of the Abbasid caliphate's achievements and the effects of those achievements on the integration of the *umma*.

The Abbasids started their rule by claiming authority over the *umma* by drawing on the general narrative that the *umma* would prosper under the leadership of the Holy Family of Muhammad. At that time, the Shi'a had not consolidated their conceptual and theological claims and there were many branches of Muhammad's family who contensted authority over the *umma* (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 123–124). The Abbasids claimed to start the caliphate anew, purging it from the evil Umayyads that had corrupted the institution and ushering in a new age of Islam (El-Hibri, 1999, p. 3). In order to symbolise their break, the second Abbasid caliph, al-Mansur (r. 754-775) built the city of Baghdad as the new capital on the side of the Tigris, in Iraq. His action of building a new capital to signify the start of a new era was considered a precedent by many Islamic rulers after him (Donner, 1999, p. 25). The Abbasids brought with them courtiers from Khurasan and placed these Persians into high ranking positions in their administration. The administration worked effectively in controlling the vast territory thanks to the development of an effective postal and intelligence service. These services proved vital in providing the administration with accurate information, relaying news both from and to provinces and transporting money and vital persons (Bennison, 2009, p. 28).

The Abbasids also revolutionised the army. During the previous caliphates, the Muslim society had not developed a professional army. Their soldiers at first were religiously motivated conscripts from various tribes (Mikhail, 2008, p. 275). The Umayyads tried to build a more professional army from the Arab tribes of Syria who owed their allegiance to the Caliph through tribal alliances. The early Abbasid caliphs adopted the same system with the Umayyads, only they relied on the tribes of Khurasan to support their army (Donner, 1999, p. 28). Wanting an army that was more professional than before and without tribal attachment that could disrupt their loyalty toward the Caliph, al-Mu'tasim (r. 833-842 CE) decided to build a new army composed from Turkish slaves, called *mamluks* (Kennedy, 2001, p. 121). The Turks brought with them new military skills, including the important skill of mounted archery (Kennedy, 2001, p. 123).

This development increased the strength of the military which helped in defending the caliphate. From the point of social mobility, the military reform allowed people from non-Arab origins and even slaves to advance their career. This allowed non-Arab citizens to access the power structure, something that had never happened before. It, however, also gave tremendous power to non-Arab military officers, especially the Turks, and sparked jealousy among Arab officers. Conflicts between these groups finally led to political and financial crisis among the Abbasid elite. It began with the assassination of al-Mutawakkil in 861 CE by his own Turkish guards. Then, civil war erupted between al-Musta'in and al-Mu'tazz and the siege of Baghdad by the army of Samarra in 865 CE. This fiasco drained the wealth from both cities and allowed other provinces to build their military force unchecked. This inevitably resulted in the weakening of the Caliph's power (Kennedy, 2001, pp. 134–142).

The stability that the Abbasids managed to attain during its Golden Age brought many benefits to the society. It opened various travel routes for mercantile purposes, religious pilgrimages or military conquests. Arabic had become the *lingua franca* of the caliphate, making social and economic interactions easy. These developments made possible the establishment of strong trade routes, which connected various trading routes into what Abu Lughod calls "one integral world-system" (Abu-Lughod, 1987, pp. 10–11). The territories that the Abbasids held during their zenith were vital to the trade routes that connected China in the east to the Byzantines in the west and various merchant cities in the

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Mediterranean region. Baghdad was positioned in the most lucrative trade route, making the city pivotal to economic activities and becoming one of the most important cities in the world (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 190). The Abbasids also controlled important ports and from there, established their rule over the Indian Ocean which connected the Indian sub-continent to the cities in the Persian Gulf and Africa. Even though the Abbasid caliphs' power waned during the later centuries, the Abbasid caliphate still played a vital part in the world-system. Only after the Mongols' invasion did the Abbasids' trading influence begin to crumble (Abu-Lughod, 1989, pp. 193–197).

The wealth that many had accumulated was then channelled into the development of science and knowledge. Those with a religious inclination funded the development of Qur'anic studies, prophetic studies or religious law and theology. During the Abbasid period, there were religious movements to collect and validate the *hadith*. Two prominent scholars in this movement were al-Bukhari (d. 870) and Muslim (d. 875); both left their compilations of *hadith* as an invaluable legacy towards the development of Islamic scholarship in the subsequent periods (Bennison, 2009, p. 168). The availability of knowledge and learning centres and the ease of travelling in the Abbasid period made it possible for Muslims from all over the then-known world to perform *rihla*, travelling to seek knowledge from famous scholars, which in turn established stronger and more varied intellectual chains among Muslims scholars, as described in Chapter Three.

Poetry became the soul of the culture and poets gained access to the most prestigious courts. One of the great Abbasid poets known to our contemporary world was Abu 'Ali al-Hasan ibn Hani' al-Hakami or better known by his nickname, Abu Nuwas (d. 814 CE). He was a very famous poet but also a scholar of *hadith* and *fiqh* (Kennedy, 2005, pp. 1–7). After moving to Baghdad, Abu Nuwas managed to gain patronage from al-Fadl ibn al-Rabi', the chamberlain of the Caliph Harun al-Rashid. It was perhaps through al-Rabi' that Abu Nuwas received the Caliph's acknowledgement (Kennedy, 2005, pp. 9–11). Another well-known poet was 'Umar Khayyam (d. 1131 CE), whose full name was apparently Ghiyath al-Din Abu Hafs 'Umar b. Ibrahim al-Khayyami (Davidson, 2004, p. 135). 'Umar Khayyam was known for popularising the *ruba'i* or quatrain style of poetry. During his life, 'Umar Khayyam had served many courts such as

the Qarakhanid court in Bukhara and the Seljuk Sultan Malik Shah's. Less well known is Khayyam's expertise in mathematics and astronomy. He was proficient in those sciences and was invited as the member of board tasked with reforming the Jalali calendar by Sultan Malik Shah (Struik, 1958).

The Abbasid elite also sponsored various translation projects and the development of history, philosophy and statecraft (Saliba, 2007, pp. 76–77). While at first the translation projects were a private endeavour among the elites, during the reign of Caliph Harun al-Rashid (r. 786-809), the Caliph expanded the translation project using funds from the caliphate's treasury and established a dedicated library for this project (Goodman, 1990, pp. 481–482). His son, Caliph al-Ma'mun, was even more supportive of the project. He also tried to entice the service of Leo the mathematician, a famous Byzantine scholar and the head of the imperial university at Constantinople to no avail (Goodman, 1990, pp. 484–485). Not only transmitting the knowledge, Muslim scholars also contributed to the development of the knowledge which then eventually passed to European scholars. The translation project could be considered as one of the greatest legacies of the Abbasids to the contemporary world since by translating Greek books, and also Persian and Indian books, the Abbasids unwittingly acted as a vital link between the old civilisations and the new ones (Bennison, 2009, pp. 175–176).

The Mongols' invasion and razing of Baghdad in 1258 CE was considered as one of the greatest catastrophes in Muslim history. Not only did they loot the wealth of the city and its inhabitants, the Mongols destroyed the most prominent symbol of the *umma* after the Prophet: the caliphate. Even though the Mamluks later established al-Mustansir II (r. 1261) as the Abbasid caliph under their "protection" in Egypt, the caliphate had passed its Golden Age and became no more than a spiritual symbol for the Muslim society. The Caliph had no actual power at all; his presence was only to bestow legitimation to the Turkish sultans (van Steenbergen, 2006, pp. 14–15). Actual political power was then held by various sultans and amirs, who were busy contending with each other as well as with foreign enemies. Thus, while according to Hodgson (1974b, p. 12) the political idea that supported the caliphate as a centralised government had broken down from 945 CE, the fall of Baghdad in 1258 CE signified the absence of political unity in Muslim society.

Nevertheless, despite lacking political unity, the translocal activities still prevailed. The intellectual chains that connected teachers to students and scholars to their fellows in various locales were still present. The Islamic judicial system developed and maintained by the scholars was also intact and provided some orderly structure to the society. It also enabled social mobility between various region since a well-respected judge from one area could easily move into another area or even enter the service of another sultan or amir (Berkey, 2003, pp. 185–187). Moreover, when faced with external threat, such as from the Crusaders, the call to jihad transcended political borders. Saladin, for example, could mobilise the translocal Muslim society for the liberation of Jerusalem (Humphreys, 1977).

Integration under the smaller caliphates: the Fatimids in Egypt, the Umayyads in al-Andalus and the Abbasids in Egypt

Having to defend their claims to leadership of the Muslim society against the bigger and greater Abbasid Caliphate did not deter the Fatimids and the Umayyads from contributing to the integration of Muslim society. The Fatimids managed to establish a caliphate in 909 CE by taking advantage of the weakening of the Abbasids following the period of anarchy at Samarra (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 313–314). The Fatimid Caliphate was the rival of the Abbasids since not only did it contest the claim to leadership over the Muslim *umma*, it also presented a different interpretation of the *umma*. Founded upon Ismaili Shi'ism, the Fatimids disregarded any Sunni religious legitimation that might be used to strengthen the Abbasids' claim. Thus, the struggle between the Abbasids and the Fatimids was not merely a political struggle but also an ideological one, between two differing interpretations of the idea of the *umma*.

The Ismaili *da'wa* movement established a complex learning system among the Fatimids, designed to create an elite class of *da'i*. To support the learning system, there was a wealth of literature produced by the Fatimids, much of it still in existence (Edde, 2010, pp. 234–235). The Fatimids also built a great institution as the centre of their intellectual activity: the al-Azhar. At first, the al-Azhar was built as a grand mosque to commemorate the conquest of Egypt by the Fatimids. It then grew into a centre of religious learning and especially a centre of disseminating Ismaili ideas to the general populace, who were still Sunnis (Dodge,

1961, pp. 10–13). While the Fatimids were to meet their demise at the hands of Saladin in 1171 CE, the al-Azhar was preserved by the Ayyubids even though it was no longer being used as a centre of learning (Dodge, 1961, p. 36). Al-Azhar's role as a centre of learning was revived under the Mamluks but as a centre of Sunni scholarship, and it remains as such until the present age (Dodge, 1961, p. 55).

In contrast with the Fatimids, the Umayyads in al-Andalus did not champion an alternative interpretation of the *umma*. They were Sunni Muslims, just like the Abbasids. If there was any conflict between them, it was political, even though the political contestation was disguised with religious rhetoric. Before the declaration of the Umayyad caliphate of al-Andalus by Abdurrahman III in 929 CE, the Umayyad amirs of al-Andalus did not claim the title but also did not acknowledge the caliphate of the Abbasids, thus making the Muslims of al-Andalus politically disconnected from the greater Muslim society (Fierro, 2005, p. 54).

It was unknown for how long he had considered taking the title but from the start of his reign as the Amir of al-Andalus in 912 CE, Abdurrahman had used religious rhetoric extensively, including by leading five expeditions of *jihad* against the infidels in the North (Kennedy, 1996, p. 84). The actual reason why he claimed the title is also uncertain. There are several assumptions about his motive, however. First, he saw the decline of Abbasid power as the opportunity to claim the caliphal title that his ancestors once wielded. At the time of his proclamation, the Abbasids was showing definite signs of weakness. It was ruled by the Caliph al-Muqtadir bi-llah who ascended the throne when he was still thirteen years old, and was even deposed twice during his reign by rival Abbasids. During this period, the Karmatis, a sect of the Ismailis, were able to plunder Mecca and steal the Black Stone of the Ka'ba, causing distress throughout the Muslim world including in al-Andalus and further weakening the authority of the Abbasids (Fierro, 2005, p. 55).

Second, the establishment of the Fatimid caliphate conjured up the old enmity between the Umayyads and the Alids. Furthermore, the Fatimids were expanding their territories into the Maghreb, which posed a serious threat to the Umayyads. If the Umayyads wanted to counter this expansion, they needed to be on the same level of authority with the Fatimids, thus requiring the title of caliph

(Kennedy, 1996, p. 90). After adopting the title of caliph, Abdurrahman III claimed his authority as the leader of the Sunni Muslims and mobilised Muslims in al-Andalus and the Maghreb against the Fatimids (Safran, 2000, p. 12). The battle against the Fatimids also occurred on the monetary front. In order to stop the distribution of Fatimid coins, which one could see as a tool of economy and propaganda, Abdurrahman III ordered the minting of Umayyad coins with an engraving claiming him as "the servant of God Abdurrahman, Commander of the Faithful, who brings victory to the religion" (Fierro, 2005, p. 59).

Third, Abdurrahman III's declaration of caliphate was designed to help his efforts in uniting the various princes and governors in al-Andalus. Because the Amirate of al-Andalus was in a weak condition before his ascension, Abdurrahman needed every shred of authority that he could get to subjugate them. In order to further increase his legitimacy, he encouraged the adoption of the Maliki school of thought and through the Maliki scholars, he established a strong link with Medina and its scholars, and through them established links to the legacy of Muhammad (Fierro, 2005, pp. 134–135). He, and Umayyad caliphs after him, also funded the development of centres of learning to rival Baghdad and commissioned works of Andalusian scholars which promoted the Umayyads' claim toward the caliphate (Safran, 2000, pp. 111–117). These learning centres and the works of various prominent scholars of al-Andalus, such as the astronomer al-Zarqali (d. 1087 CE) with his astrolabe invention or Abu al-Qasim al-Zahrawi (d. 1013 CE) whose works in the medical field were second only to Ibn Sina's *Qanun* or the philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), became the celebrated legacy of al-Andalus.

Another celebrated legacy of al-Andalus is its reputation as a centre of tolerance, which persists to our contemporary age. Intellectuals who have written on al-Andalus and its role as an exemplar of tolerance include Maria Rosa Menocal with her *Ornament of the World* (2002). In her book, Menocal describes the life in al-Andalus from several perspectives and shows how tolerance was achieved through the cooperation of all elements of the society. She also highlights the possibility of social mobility, as depicted in one of the figures she describes, Samuel ibn Naghrila, a Jew who fled from Cordoba after the fall of the caliphate in al-Andalus and gained a position as the *wazir* in Granada. According to Filios (2008), the history of Andalusia often invokes a sense of nostalgia and

longing for the lost paradise, especially for contemporary exiled intellectuals, such as Menocal herself.

Some authors, such as Filios (2008) and Collins (2012), however, express their scepticism as to whether tolerance was truly practised in al-Andalus and criticise what they perceive as its romanticisation. While it is ill-advised to portray al-Andalus as a perfect society where tensions did not exist, it is also unwise to completely disregard the Andalusian achievement. This thesis thus proposes to consider al-Andalus as a living, progressing society, and while having complex interactions among its inhabitants, it managed to achieve a certain level of pluralism. Certainly, there were clashes between social groups, political intrigues and wars. However, despite all those tensions, there were tolerance and acceptance of groups with different social and religious backgrounds. Hillenbrand (1994), Brann (2002) and also Menocal (2002) provide detailed descriptions of how the various elements of Andalusian society interacted with each other, progressed cautiously and achieved a level of tolerance as the result of social interaction, which in turn opened up opportunities for social mobility to the general populace.

The meaning of the Umayyad caliphate in al-Andalus for the construction of the *umma* is contentious. On one hand, it created another breach of unity in the Muslim society. Instead of one caliphate, there were three different caliphates vying for the leadership of the *umma*. Against the Fatimids, the Sunni scholars could vilify their existence as part of the "deviant" narrative of Shi'ism. But this kind of argument would not work against the Umayyads. Not only were the Umayyads Sunni, but they maintained a devout appearance, especially after establishing a link with Maliki scholars. But, on the other hand, the presence of a caliphate in the west made integration among Muslims in the West and North Africa easier. With the Umayyads' protection, the western part of the Muslim world entered a Golden Age of prosperity and social mobility, which enticed people from other areas to seek their fortune there. Because of close relations with Medina, the travelling route between al-Andalus and Medina teemed with scholars, students and pilgrims. Thus, while the establishment of the Umayyad caliphate splintered political unity, it intensified translocal social interactions within the Muslim society.

Starting from 1255 CE, the Mamluks established a new Abbasid caliphate in Egypt under their protection by installing a member of the Abbasid family, al-Mustansir, as the caliph. Because of hosting the puppet caliphate, they gained recognition from various territories as the defender of the faith, including the Sharif of Hijaz. Now, the Mamluks not only hosted the Caliph but also protected the two holy cities. Egypt under the Mamluks also played important part in maintaining the connections between various Muslim locales. To further their influence, the Mamluks became enthusiastic patrons of knowledge, sponsoring the establishment of mosques, *madrasas* and other centres of learning, including lodges for Sufi orders (Levanoni, 2010, pp. 239–240). Sufi orders were essential in the development of a unified moral code in the Islamic world, thus providing another set of connections and an instrument by which the Islamic global consciousness travelled to and objectivated in Muslim territories, as will be described in Chapter Six.

Economic activities also benefitted from the Mamluks' rule. They controlled trade over the Red Sea and from there enabled larger trade routes to India, Southeast Asia and China. Spices, sugar and textiles were the most lucrative commodities during this period (Abu-Lughod, 1989, pp. 212–236). The accumulated wealth also made the inhabitants of major cities in the caliphate more willing to spend their money to attain exotic luxuries from various parts of the world, stimulating a world-wide trade which would play a significant part in the spreading of Islam to various lands previously unreachable (Donner, 1999, pp. 32–34). It was because of the quest for exotic luxuries that Muslim merchants travelled to Southeast Asia, arrived in Indonesia and introduced Islam to the inhabitants of the archipelago, as was discussed in Chapter Three.

Integration under the Ottomans

Map 2. Integration under the Ottomans (1512-1683 CE)

Source: *The Ottoman Empire*,
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t253/e12/images/0195334012.ottoman-empire-the.2.jpg

After the destruction of Baghdad and the re-establishment of the Abbasid caliphate in Egypt under the protection of the Mamluks, the caliphate was no more than a shadow of its former self. The new age of the caliphate began when Suleyman I took the title in 1540; it remained in the Ottomans' hand until the abolition of the caliphate in 1924. During the Ottoman caliphate, the Caliph possessed great political power and made the caliphate a strong institution. Controlling the three holy cities of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, the Ottomans gained high prestige and were considered as the most powerful Muslim dynasty of their time. The Ottomans also managed to expel the Safavids from south-eastern and eastern Anatolia, controlling the western Mediterranean through Tunis and Algiers and conquering all territories of the Mamluks under the leadership of Selim I.

By the end of his rule in 1520, Selim I had doubled the size of the Ottomans and provided a solid foundation for his son, Suleyman I, to rule. After he ascended the throne, Suleyman (r. 1520-1566) added Belgrade, parts of the Kingdom of Hungary and other territories in Central Europe to the empire. In

1535 , the Ottomans took Baghdad from the Savafids and gained access to the Persian Gulf, increasing their presence in the sea (Imber, 2002, pp. 44–66). Suleyman I adopted the title of Caliph in order to gain higher authority over the Muslim world and to counter Charles V's election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519 (Imber, 2010, p. 350).

The Ottomans, understanding that they had no blood ties or shared history with the Prophet unlike the Umayyads or the Abbasids, adopted a peculiar instrumentalisation of Islamic piety to enforce their legitimacy as the ruler of the Muslim world. They became patrons of Islamic learning and scholarship, and also adopted various Islamic symbols and rituals. Selim I adopted the title of "Servant of the Two Holy Cities" after his victory over the Mamluks in 1517, signifying his protection over Mecca and Medina and, consequently, affirming the allegiance of the two holy cities to his rule (Veinstein, 2010, p. 349). Selim II, who ascended to the caliphal throne in 1566, added a ritual to his inaugural ceremony by making pilgrimage to Eyüp, a suburb of Istanbul where allegedly lies the tomb of Abu Ayyub, a Companion of the Prophet who fell during the first Muslim siege of Constantinople. This pilgrimage became an essential part of the inauguration ceremony of Ottoman caliphs (Imber, 2002, pp. 116–117).

To establish their reputation in the minds of the Muslim population, the Ottomans were keen in protecting and providing for Muslims doing their *hajj*. Ottoman sultans, and then caliphs, took great care in assuring the safety of the pilgrims by building forts and strengthening garrisons between Damascus and the Holy Cities. They also asserted physical presence in the Holy Cities using inscriptions of their names in the holy places, reminding the pilgrims of their role as the caliph and guardian of the two holy lands. They even tried to monopolise the provisioning for the local population in Mecca in order to gain their loyalty. This was important considering that the Ottomans were never able to directly conquer Arabia (Quataert, 2000, p. 95). Along with the adoption of Islamic symbols in their political rituals to enhance their legitimation in the eyes of the wider Muslim populations, the Ottomans also regulated taxes, established codes of law and a judicial system. These reinforced the subjects' sense of belonging to the same universe (Quataert, 2000, p. 32).

Developments in technology and infrastructure under the Ottoman rule further helped the integration of the *umma*. Under the sailing technologies

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employed by Ottoman ships, the journey from Istanbul to Venice could take fifteen days. From Alexandria to Venice, the journey would be longer, between seventeen to eighty days, depending on the winds. This allowed faster and easier mobility between various places, helping Muslim traders, pilgrims and other travellers (Quataert, 2000, pp. 117–118). While they did not directly control the whole Muslim world, the Ottomans took their leadership over the Muslim world seriously. In their rivalry against European powers, the Ottomans expanded their diplomatic missions and trade envoys to all corners of the then-known Muslim lands. They also formed military alliances with various Muslim sultanates such as Gujarat in India and Aceh in Indonesia to halt the Portuguese expansion in these territories (Cizakca, 2010, pp. 243–244). Suleyman Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, was said to sign a military pact with Sultan Alaaddin of Aceh and Turkish soldiers were observed helping the Acehnese during their battle against the Portuguese in Malacca in 1547 (Reid, 1969, pp. 401–402).

The Ottomans also established a military academy in the Sultanate of Aceh, to help the Acehnese in fighting future enemies. From this academy, a brave heroine emerged and became a celebrated figure in Indonesian history. Keumala Hayati, further recognised with her shortened name, Malahayati was a daughter of Acehnese Admiral Mahmud Syah. She graduated from the *askari bayt al-muqaddas* that the Ottomans had built and served at first as the Sultanate's Chief of Protocol but then became an admiral of the Sultanate of Aceh (Salam, 1995). She led the Sultanate's navy and managed to stop the Portuguese fleet from invading Aceh. She also managed to confront the Dutch fleet under the brothers Houtman when their fleet harassed Acehnese merchants and ships in the Strait of Malacca in 1599. When Prince Maurits sent his envoy to Aceh, it was Malahayati who acted as the chief negotiator for the Sultanate. Malahayati also acted as the chief negotiator when the envoys of Elizabeth I arrived in Aceh to negotiate safe passage and trading access to the Sultanate's ports (Sofyan *et al.*, 1994).

The Ottomans' ambitious relations with various Muslim territories were doubtless pragmatic in nature. At the very least, these relationships were intended to protect the interests of the Ottoman empire from its rival empires which started to establish their foothold in Asia and Africa. At the same time, however, they also showed a certain degree of Islamic solidarity and could be perceived as providing valuable assistance. Malahayati was only one among various heroes and

heroines in the history of Aceh that had close relations with the Ottomans. In the process, a sense of linkage between the Acehnese and the Turks developed, thus helping the establishment of a translocal identity between the two territories. In the case of the Acehnese, Ottoman help saved the Sultanate and, even more, gave birth to many celebrated heroes who fought against imperialist forces, Malahayati being just one of them. This close relationship between the Ottomans and the Acehnese has become an integral part of Indonesia's national memory today.

The Caliphates as an instrument of the *umma*

Khadduri (1955, p. 3) observes that Muslims embraced the societal nature of mankind unquestioningly. This philosophical position is based on Islamic teachings that state God is One and that men are created to live together. There were also the harsh conditions of the desert of Arabia which necessitated the presence of society to ensure the survival of individuals. The combination of Islamic teachings and the Arabian Desert environment provided the Muslims in Medina with religious, philosophical and practical justifications to embrace the *umma*, not only as an idealised concept but also as a fledging social practice. The figure of authority in the *umma* was Muhammad, both in his role as the Messenger of God and as the leader of the society. After his death, the *umma* lacked an authoritative figure and, if this was not addressed swiftly, it might cause the young society to crumble.

The Constitution of Medina and the appointment of Abu Bakr as the successor of the Prophet were the first two steps to address the issue of authority in the *umma*. It was also the starting point in the development of the caliphate as the embodiment of authority in the *umma*. The establishment of the Constitution of Medina provided the *umma* with a legal framework regulating interactions between various members of the society. It acknowledged the inclusion of non-Muslim groups as special sub-*umma* groups which retained their religious characteristics but were addressed equally by the law. The appointment of Abu Bakr developed the caliphate as a political institution that provided authority and order to the *umma* and, at the same time, helped to promote the idea of an integrated society beyond the Arabian Peninsula.

The devil, however, resides in the details. While the Qur'an provides moral guidance and characteristics of a good governance, it does not contain instructions on how to establish a political institution prevailing over the *umma*. Muhammad's practice and his principles of governance that led to the establishment of a polity were considered the best examples for a Muslim ruler. However, they often required further elaboration, especially when there were needs to address specific circumstances. Thus, the idea of the caliphate developed between the constant virtues guided by Islam and its religious teachings on the one hand, and the continuous evolution to fit with the conditions of a particular period in Muslim history, on the other.

During the time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the caliphate was a civil institution where the leader was elected by popular will, or at least after some consideration of popular opinion. The death of Uthman and the opposition against Ali brought the first schism into the society. Instead of one body of Muslims, there were at least three: the Khawarij, the Shi'a and the Sunni. All three, however, claimed the leadership over the whole *umma*. A power struggle ensued and resulted in the victory of Mu'awiyya, who then established a dynastic practice in the form of the Umayyad caliphate. In order to maintain their claim over the leadership of the *umma*, the Umayyads employed Islamic rhetoric, positioning themselves as the successors of Muhammad and the lines of prophets before him (Rubin, 2003). They were involved in battles against the "deviant" narratives of the Khawarij and the Shi'a and patronised various Islamic missions, such as the development of Islamic scholarship and the renovation of Islamic holy sites to further enhance their image as the guardian of the faith ('Isy, 2007).

The Abbasids revolted against the Ummayads by claiming greater connection to the Prophet, thus enhancing their claim to leadership over the *umma*. In order to subdue the influence of orthodox Muslim scholars over their rule, some Abbasid caliphs sought to enforce their political legitimacy by cooperating with scholars considered as "deviant", such as members of the Shi'a and the Mu'tazilites. The *mihna*, which tried to establish Mu'tazilism as the orthodox narrative in Islam and purge all other schools of thought (Nawas, 1994), bolstered the Caliph al-Ma'mun's legitimacy, but in long term, it damaged the reputation of the Abbasids and contributed to its waning influence (Donner, 1999, p. 27). By the 940 CE, the Abbasid caliphs had lost most of their power and became nothing

more than figureheads. The real power and authority lay in the hands of various political groups which paid minimal tribute to the Caliph.

As we have seen, al-Mawardi's *Ordinances* (1996) was written during the late Abbasid period and tried to address the declining influence of the caliph. On the one hand, he emphasised the sanctity of the caliph and the caliphate and the importance for Muslims to respect and safeguard it. On the other hand, he acknowledged the need to recognise power of various officials and framed this necessity as if the Caliph had delegated the power under his own will. Thus, with the proliferation of al-Mawardi's work during this period, the concept of the caliphate shifted from a powerful, centralised ruler to a much weaker one who had to share authority with other political actors. Yet, this decentralisation of power managed to prolong the reign of the Abbasid caliphate for several centuries.

The invasion of the Mongols in 1258 CE dealt a finishing blow to the Abbasid caliphate. Baghdad as the centre of the caliphate was destroyed, together with the caliph and the caliphate's ruling class. While the Mamluks managed to install al-Mustansir Billah (r. 1261 CE) as the next caliph in Egypt, he was no more than a figurehead used by the Mamluks to legitimate their rule. Gone were the rights and authority of the Caliph that al-Mawardi stipulated in his book. Instead, the Caliph was regarded only as a spiritual figure while the sultans and amirs claimed temporal authority over the society. Some scholars, such as Ibn Khaldun (1967), justified this practice by reasoning that the Mamluks were the guardians of the Caliph. Moreover, as we saw in the last chapter, he disagreed with the condition that a caliph had to be a Quraysh, opening the possibility for a non-Quraysh or even non-Arab figure to ascend the caliphal throne. The concept of caliphate shifted yet again to accommodate the contemporary condition in the Muslim world.

Despite the conceptual shifts and rise-and-fall in practical implementation, the caliphate gave considerable benefits to the development of an *umma*. As the caliphate expanded its territory and influence, various people ruled by this political institution increasingly considered themselves as part of an integrated *umma*. The development of various institutions of the caliphate such as the minting of coins, the presence of tax officers in many rural and urban areas, the promotion of the Arabic language as the lingua franca and the development of *sharia* courts as the universally accepted legal institution in Muslim territories

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enforced the sense of unity among Muslims, providing a tangible embodiment of an *umma* idea to them.

Since the integration was becoming more and more apparent during the caliphate era, this might invite the opinion that the *umma* was thus the result of the caliphate. However, as I have argued, even during political breakdown in the Muslim world, such as the presence of three contending caliphates or after the sacking of Baghdad, integration in society did not disappear. Thus, this thesis disagrees with the notion that the existence of the *umma* was the result of the existence of a political institution called the caliphate. Rather, as explained in previous chapters, this thesis argues that the *umma* came first as the concept of an Islamic symbolic universe inspired by the Qur'an which induced a global consciousness in Muslims. The caliphate as a political institution was only established after the death of the Prophet and formulated by scholars, centuries after his death.

This thesis further argues that, while the presence of a caliphate is not a fundamental prerequisite for the establishment of the *umma*, it helped to concretise the idea. The caliphate acted as an agent of integration, imposing uniform rule, institutions and, to some extent, identity on the inhabitants of its territory, in the process advancing the integration of the various locales into a translocal society that was called the *umma*. The caliphate also provided a framework for the establishment of various networks, such as intellectual and trading networks in which the idea of the *umma* could develop and spread. As Berger and Luckmann (1966) have articulated, the idea of a symbolic universe requires social groups to define and embody it and also to defend it from the development of deviant concepts.

Thus, the presence of a political institution sympathetic to the idea of the *umma*, whether it is called a caliphate or not, would benefit the idea of the *umma* and would help it to flourish. Whether these political instruments and political actors were sincere in adopting Islam was open to debate. It was very possible for them to have more than a singular motive, but one by-product was the effect they had on furthering the identity and encouraging the integration of the *umma*. Yet at the same time, without the presence of a political institution sympathetic to it, the idea of the *umma* would still have been present among Muslims. Social groups

supporting the *umma* do not necessarily have to take form in a political institution, as the next chapter will explain further.

To summarise, based on the discussion in Chapters Four and Five, this thesis argues that the relations between the concept of the *umma* and the caliphate as a type of political instrument unfolded in two ways. First, the concept of the *umma* existed prior to the caliphate; it existed as the result of the teachings of Islam. It was the presence of such a concept in the teachings of Islam that instigated the development of a political structure, which at later time would be called the caliphate. Second, the presence of a solid political structure helped further concretisation of the concept of the *umma* into a practical and functional translocal society. The caliphate created a framework in which the intellectual conception of the *umma* could further develop, spread and express itself. Intellectual endeavours to develop the caliphate would also unwittingly serve as the objectivation of the concept of the *umma*. This, in turn, would further benefit the political structure by providing credibility and legitimation to political claims of unity.

The development of political theories of the caliphate by medieval Muslim scholars could be considered as contributing to the development of the *umma* as a symbolic universe. Since Muslims considered the *umma* as the "natural course" of social practice, and a divinely sanctioned one, the institution of the caliphate as the embodiment of the authority of the *umma* was also considered the "natural order" of political practice. It became part of what Geertz calls the "common sense" of Muslim society. Their existence was taken for granted and, thus, Muslim scholars did not ask whether and why there had to be an *umma* and a caliphate. Their only concern was with the application of the concepts to fit prevailing conditions. This notable condition could explain why there were diverging theories on the political implementation of the concepts, especially during the periods of weak caliphs who had to share their temporal power with the sultans and amirs, and during the absence of the caliphate after the destruction of the Abbasid caliphate in 1258 CE to the establishment of the Ottomans in 1299 CE.

The development of the caliphate as the instrument of the *umma* reached its nadir with the implementation of the Tanzimat (1839-1876 CE). With the success of the Tanzimat, the Ottoman started its transformation, basing its

authority on secular principles, in contrast with its previous concept of authority which was based on the image of an Islamic empire (Voll, 2003, p. 244). While the reformers were not renouncing Islam, their source of inspiration was Western values. This in itself would invite suspiciousness from the *ulama*. In addition to that, the reforms put the Islamic institutions and imperial religious establishments in practice under greater bureaucratic control. For example, the office of *shaykh-al-Islam* continued to be of importance but had lower influence compared to the previous era (Voll, 1994, pp. 88–89). Thus, looking from the perspective of the *umma* as a symbolic universe, the Tanzimat was a point where the *umma* lost its prominence to new ideas brought by the reformers. This defeat on the conceptual level would then be mirrored on the practical level, signified by the disbandment of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924.

Chapter Six:
Integration through the Sufi Orders

As has been argued in the previous chapter, the caliphate played an important part as a social organisation supporting the idea of an integrated *umma*. The caliphate developed various institutions which, either intentionally or not, created a "shared universe" between Muslims. The presence of this tangible "shared universe" helped Muslims to perceive themselves as part of a greater society, which helped the imaginary of the *umma* to persist. The fall of Baghdad and the reduction of the Abbasid caliphate to a shadow of its former self afterwards somewhat disturbed the integration process. However, other instruments of integration existed and continued to connect Muslims in various territories into one translocal society.

One of the instruments vital to the maintenance of translocal Muslim society was the Islamic intellectual network. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Islamic intellectual network played an important part in maintaining networks between scholars, teachers and students in one academic environment transcending natural, political and cultural borders. *Madrasas* continued to serve as centres of learning for Muslims and attracted a constant flow of would-be students from various Muslim communities. Not only transferring knowledge, this network also transferred a worldview and code of ethics to the Muslims, further establishing a common identity and the foundation for Muslim community.

Religious rituals, such as the *hajj*, also provided not only the impetus for translocal movements for Muslims but also the necessary means for Muslims to connect and define themselves and their role in relation to the greater world. These connections provided by Islamic rituals were then acknowledged and understood by Muslims as the "objective", "normal" interpretation of the self and the world, providing further attachment for Muslims to each other and to their society. In periods of upheaval, Islamic doctrines and rituals functioned as the anchor for Muslims.

Troubled by what they perceived as rampant materialism and petty conflicts in Muslim society, individuals began to distance themselves from what

they deemed as the source of these disturbances to the harmony of Islam: things that they broadly categorised as "worldly pleasures" or, in Islamic terminology, the *dunya*. These individuals sought solace amidst the turbulent world by renouncing the *dunya* and intensifying their study of Islam through cultivation of the inner life. They developed intricate rituals by which they hoped to cleanse their souls, strengthen their spiritualism and achieve the ultimate goal of *tawhid*. As a symbol of their renunciation of the material world, these individuals clothed themselves in a coarse garment of wool, known as *suf*. Wearing woollen clothes, as opposed to the majority of Muslims who wore linen clothes, symbolised their protest against the world. The cloth symbol then became the source of their name, and these individuals became known as *Sufis* and their movement, in European languages, as Sufism (Nicholson, 1906; Trimingham, 1971, p. 1).

These ascetics eventually attracted like-minded students and then developed distinguished religious orders, known as Sufi orders or *tariqas*. The orders' main function was to serve the members' spiritual necessities through educating their members in the orders' philosophical views and propagating their rituals. Eventually, however, the Sufi orders played an important part in the development of what they deemed as the "mundane" aspects of Muslim society. The Sufi orders' contributions were especially invaluable in constructing a common identity among their members, promoting translocal movements and networks and, later in the eighteenth century, acting as centres of activism in the Muslim world.

The development of Sufism

Spiritualist movements had been prevalent in the Muslim world since the end of the second century of the Hijra (800-900 CE). The exact origin of this trend was unknown but several prominent figures were identified as the pioneers of this trend, such as Hasan al-Bashri (d. 110/728) and Rabi'a al-'Adawiya (d.185/801), both from Basra, Shaqiq al-Bakhli (d. 194/810) of Khurasan, Abu Sulayman al-Darani Muhasibi (d. 215/830) of Syria, Dhul Nun (d. 245/850) of Egypt and others. A Persian Sufi and poet, Abu Hamid ibn Abu Bakr Ibrahim (d. 617/1221), well-known by his pen-name Farid al-Din Attar, compiled the biographies of these

acclaimed figures in *Tadhkira al-Awliya'*, which was translated as *Muslim Saints and Mystics* by Arberry (Attar, 1976).

In the third Hijri century/ninth century CE, spiritualist movements began to thrive in Baghdad. The term "*sufi*" at first was specifically used to refer to a group of people of Baghdad who, distinct from other Muslims and other spiritual groups in Baghdad and outside it, wore the symbolic woollen shirt (Nicholson, 1906). As suggested above, these ascetics of Baghdad at a later time adopted the name and began to use it to refer to themselves vis-à-vis other pious groups (Karamustafa, 2007, p. 7). One of the prominent figures of the Sufi movement in Baghdad was Abu al Qasim al-Junayd (d. 298/910). A merchant and student of law, Junayd started his spiritual journey by renouncing worldly wealth or *zuhud*. According to Junayd, "the best mankind are the poor who are happy with their poverty." He, however, considered renunciation of the heart as a more advanced form of *zuhud*; thus those who possess wealth but are not attached to it are superior to those who are poor but covet wealth. He himself remained a merchant throughout his life but spent little for himself. Instead, he spent most of his wealth to help the poor (Ansari, 1983, p. 38).

Junayd advocated that, in order to affirm God's unity, individuals should discard any pretence of power or knowledge about God. He emphasised the concept of *fana*, the passing away of self-consciousness. Only after an individual abandoned his or her self and awareness, thus entering *fana*, only then he or she can truly discern and affirm the unity of God (Ansari, 1983, pp. 45–46). There is an archetype of human purity in the Qur'an, when God asked human souls prior their birth into the material world who their Lord is and the souls answered that only God is their Lord and affirmed obedience only to God (Qur'an 7:171). This event, considered as the Primordial Covenant, serves as the ideal to which individuals should strive (Schimmel, 1975, p. 24). Only after achieving this stage can a human be considered perfect, as he or she will have shied away from any false attachments and existed only by their connection to God. "At this stage," said Junayd, "you die as well as live, and you live in reality, for you die to yourself and live by God" (Ansari, 1983, p. 45).

However, since Junayd also stressed that *fana* is a condition that is granted by God, not something that can be achieved by human effort, Karamustafa (2007, p. 18) argues that Junayd's path of ascendancy is somewhat elitist. It would be

difficult except for a select few to completely discard their self-awareness and negate any human agency in their spiritual journey. Individuals who are able to do so could be considered as the Chosen Ones; Junayd himself used phrases such as "the choice of believers" (*safwa min 'ibad*) or "the pure one" (*khulasa min khalq*). Thus, Sufism in its early stage was not a populist movement; instead, it was an elitist one where a selected few embarked on their spiritual journey, forged a tight brotherhood and were privileged by God to ascend to a higher level of spiritual consciousness.

Since the days of Junayd, the Sufis of Baghdad had become spiritual teachers to students from other cities. Given the nature of the Islamic intellectual world, these students established a strong link to their teachers and when they went back home, they spread the teachings and practices further in their cities. During the fourth Hijri century/tenth century CE, Baghdad-centred Sufism spread to other major cities and cultural centres in the Muslim world, especially in the regions of Hijaz, Fars and Khurasan (Karamustafa, 2007, p. 56). In Shiraz, there were Hanbali scholars who also practised Sufi mysticism. There were also several Sufi settlements, also known as *ribat*, in the region. Some of them were open for women. One of the prominent Sufis in Shiraz was Abu Abdallah Ibn Khafif al-Shirazi (d. 371/982), who was also a scholar of *hadith* (Karamustafa, 2007, p. 57).

In Isfahan, there were Sufi mystics who were also followers of the Shafi'i, Hanbali and Zahiri schools. These Sufis were in direct confrontation with the Mu'tazilites who, as we have seen, were the proponent of rationalism. In Khurasan, the teachings of Baghdad Sufis absorbed various local spiritualist movements. The first Baghdadi Sufi who resided in Khurasan was Abu Bakr al-Wasiti (d. 320/932). He was of Iraqi origin but then migrated to Khurasan. His disciple, Abu'l Abbas al-Qasim ibn al-Qasim al-Sayyari (d. 342/953-4), succeeded in establishing a Sufi community in that region, which lasted for at least another century after his death (Karamustafa, 2007, pp. 58–61).

This wide acceptance of Baghdad Sufism, however, did not mean that there was uniformity or homogeneity in the teachings of Baghdadi Sufis. Each teacher had their own views and attitudes toward certain aspects of Islam. For example, Junayd's view on the ultimate goal of Sufism was different than al-Hallaj's. According to Junayd, the ultimate experience of a Sufi after negating oneself is an experience of One Actor (*wahdat al-fa'il*). In this view, while there

might be multiple beings in this world, there is only one Entity who becomes the One Actor in the Universe. The Sufi will feel the nearness to God, that God Acts through the Sufi and that only His will and actions are what matter (Ansari, 1983, pp. 51–52). Al-Hallaj (d. 309/922), on the other hand, asserted that the ultimate experience of a Sufi is the union with God into One Being (*wahdat al-wujud*), but this was considered blasphemy by Muslim scholars (Mason, 1995). The contrast between al-Hallaj's and Junayd's opinions can be found in pictures drawn from the tenth century CE, showing al-Hallaj as a drunken Sufi while Junayd is depicted as a sober one (Chittick, 2007, p. 35).

Despite their differences, there were some aspects on which Sufi teachers tended to agree. The spiritual journey that Sufis embarked upon was normally envisioned as a path (*tariq* or *tariqa*) marked by stopping places (*manzil*), stations (*maqam*) and states (*hal*) that a wayfarer passes through in his or her journey to attain perfect *tawhid*. When a Sufi has attained a certain *maqam*, it is expected for him or her to fulfil the obligations of that station (Schimmel, 1975, pp. 98–100). The centres of Sufi learning were usually called *ribat* or *khanaqa*. A Sufi teacher was called *murshid* while the student was a *murid* (Trimingham, 1971, pp. 3–5). These teachers, however, did not establish a systematic process to embark on this path. Instead, as can be understood in Junayd's teachings, they undertook the journey privately. On occasions when there were other Sufis who strove in the same spiritual process, individuals might meet and learn together. Yet, these collective journeys were only for a certain duration of time. At the end of the day, each Sufi had to travel his or her own private journey.

Three Stages of Development of Sufi Orders

First Stage

The early form of Sufism emerged as a spiritual quest which each and every individuals had to perform and experience privately. Individuals might join together as a group and forge a close relationship with one another. They might travel together on pilgrimage or on journey to visit a famous mystic. During physical journeys or periods of seclusion, groups might stay at a *ribat* together but some would continue their journey immediately while others would stay for longer period. At times, there were individuals whom others considered as having

more experience and possessing a wealth of spiritual knowledge. These individuals would be considered as teachers or masters and others might seek guidance from them. However, none of these was permanent and institutionalised. In this early stage of Sufism, the connections between Sufis were apparent but informal.

Trimingham (1971) describes this first stage in the development of Sufi orders as the Golden Age of Sufism. At the beginning of this stage, Sufism began to develop in Baghdad, as we saw above. Through chains of relations between Sufi masters and their students, Sufism spread to other cities in the Muslim world. The early Sufi masters put emphasis on experiencing the spiritual rather than theorising the movement. They guided the students through meditations so that the students directly acquired insights into the spiritual truth. Unlike a *madhhab* which provided a systematic and methodological approach to Islamic law, a *tariqa* was simply a method of contemplation. Al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) writes that, "this spiritual revelation can not be learned but only attained by direct experience, ecstasy and inward transformation" (Trimingham, 1971, p. 3).

By the eleventh century CE, the numbers of Sufis had increased but they still maintained this personalised characteristic. A *ribat* might serve as a learning centre but, mostly, it provided a safe place for travelling Sufis to stay for a certain period. Only minimum rules on day-to-day activities were institutionalised in a *ribat*. If a renowned master decided to stay in a place, students might come to visit and learn from him during his stay. But upon his death or leaving, this gathering of students would disperse. After the Seljuks gained control over Baghdad, as part of their strategy to win the hearts of the Muslims, they supported the development of *madrasas* and *ribats*, providing funds generously and thus allowing both the *fiqh madhhab* and Sufi *tariqa* to flourish (Trimingham, 1971, pp. 7–8).

It was during this time that al-Ghazali discarded his wealth and reputation to live as a poor Sufi. Al-Ghazali stated in his autobiography, *Deliverance from Error,* that he turned to study Sufism after he had found no satisfaction in his study of theology, philosophy and batinism[13]. His interests in Sufism found the opportunity to flourish because his teacher, al-Juwayni, from whom al-Ghazali had learned theology, was also sympathetic to Sufism (Watt, 1963, pp. 133–134).

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[13]*Al-Batiniyya* is what al-Ghazali called the teaching of Ismaili Shi'ism; it literally means "esotericism". For a detailed explanation of this, refer to Mitha (2002, p. 19).

Al-Ghazali left Baghdad in 1095 CE and for a time travelled the Muslim world in his journey to find the ultimate truth. He spent almost two years in Damascus, staying in retirement and devoting his time to spiritual exercises. He went on to Jerusalem and Medina and then went on a pilgrimage to Mecca (Watt, 1963, p. 144). It was after this spiritual journey that al-Ghazali wrote his masterpiece in religious studies: *Ihya 'ulum al-din* or *Revival of the Religious Sciences* (Schimmel, 1975, p. 94).

Ihya consists of forty chapters in four books. Forty is a number which the Sufis believe to symbolise patience, trial and almost infinity. By dividing *Ihya* into forty chapters, al-Ghazali likely meant to give *Ihya* a strong mystical connotation as the book that teaches patience against worldly trials (Schimmel, 1975, p. 94). In the first book, al-Ghazali criticises the established religious sciences. He felt that religious sciences gave too much attention to differences between the main legal traditions and elaboration of laws which had little relevance in practice and would not help the life of common people (Trimingham, 1971, p. 138). In the subsequent books, al-Ghazali explains the basic principles of Islam, the basic rituals from ablutions before worship to performing *hajj* and extracanonical devotions. The second quarter of *Ihya* deals with customs in Muslims' daily life such as eating and drinking, marriage, relations with family and friends and so on. The last two quarters deal with the cultivation of inner life, such as details on vices and virtues, repentance, patience and gratitude to God (Watt, 1963, pp. 151–154).

Reading *Ihya*, Watt (1963, p. 154) concludes that for al-Ghazali, rather than being a means to achieve an ecstatic state, Sufism is a way to improve one's character and gain reward in the hereafter. Schimmel (1975, p. 95) asserts that the whole of *Ihya* may be called the book which prepares the readers for death. All that al-Ghazali wrote in the preceding thirty-nine chapters culminates in the last one which expounds upon death with its terrible and yet lovable aspects. Ormsby (2008, pp. 116–119) agrees with this assertion and describes the architecture of *Ihya* as steps in a slow ascent that culminate in the highest pinnacles of insight. *Ihya 'ulum al-din* was not only al-Ghazali's *magnum opus* but also the greatest of Sufi literature guiding aspirants in their spiritual journey to the ultimate truth.

Ihya is also a book that talks to its reader in a personal, intimate way (Ormsby, 2008, p. 119). Instead of writing the work as a scholar lecturing the reader, al-Ghazali wrote it as an intimate guide for aspirants in their personal quest,

thus fitting in with the characteristics of the first stage of Sufism. Throughout the parts of the work, al-Ghazali speaks in the first person form, sharing, for example, stories of his own journey. Another outstanding characteristic of *Ihya* is how al-Ghazali manages to integrate the narration of a spiritual journey with theological arguments and careful observance of Islamic law. Reading the book is akin to conversing with al-Ghazali, fitting the pattern of a conversation between a Sufi guide and his disciples. Because of this, *Ihya* received acclaim not only from Sufis but also from average Muslims and even orthodox theologians (Schimmel, 1975, p. 96). This would help Sufism to integrate into the general Muslim populace, gradually losing its elitist view and seeding the development of a new Islamic culture (Karamustafa, 2007, p. 106).

Second Stage

The works of al-Ghazali and other Sufi mystics opened the pious movement to a wider audience. From the beginning of the thirteenth century CE, more and more students started to gather around Sufi masters in regular fashion and these masters then became the centres for Sufi learning. This marked the beginning of the second stage in the development of Sufi orders. In this stage, the *tariqa* had started to develop distinctive patterns, centred on the teachings, rules and mystical exercises of a certain master, or *shaikh*. Each *tariqa* established their own spiritual chain, or *silsila*, just as the *madhhab* and Muslim centres of learning in general also established their own intellectual chains, or *isnad*, as described in Chapter Three. The *tariqa*'s mystic knowledge was handed down only through this *silsila*, and would-be students were required to perform certain initiation rituals, including swearing an oath of allegiance to the founder of the *tariqa* and his deputy (Trimingham, 1971, p. 10).

The establishment of *silsilas* can be considered a step forward in institutionalising the Sufi movement. Sufism was no longer a personal spiritual journey that each aspirant had to undertake by his or her own. Instead, Sufism was transformed into a collective spiritual journey whereby the master would lead the students in their endeavour to achieve a higher understanding. The power structure in Sufism also shifted. In the first stage, it was somewhat egalitarian but, in the second stage, it became a hierarchical order between the master and the students. Even the students were separated into levels depending on their *maqam*. But, still,

the *tariqa* allowed some form of creativity; students could modify the teachings of the *shaikh* in accordance with their own mystical experiences. Thus, while the structure of the *silsila* introduced a certain degree of institutionalisation in the Sufi movement, the actual rituals and practices were still varied from one group to another (Trimingham, 1971, pp. 11–12).

The more central role of *shaikh* in the students' life occurred in parallel with the upheavals in the Muslim world. During the early stage of Sufi, the *shaikh* had been essential in the students' life when there was turbulence on a personal level. Thus, by the time the Mongols destroyed Baghdad and the caliphate in 1258 CE and order in the Muslim world apparently collapsed, the *shaikh* had become a steady anchor in many Muslim lives (Trimingham, 1971, p. 14). Following the destruction of Baghdad and its many learning centres and libraries, scholars fled from the Mongol threat to various remote corners of the world. Cities that were spared from Mongol invasion became safe havens where intellectual and mystical activities flourished. These centres became the centres where Sufism thrived. Some refugees fled to the outskirts of the Muslim world, such as to Anatolia in the north-west and Hindustan in the south-east, inevitably spreading the message of Islam and the rituals of Sufism with them (Trimingham, 1971, p. 22).

During these turbulent times, various powerful actors also established closer ties with various Sufi *tariqas*, for both spiritual and political reasons or a combination of them, as the support of a charismatic *shaikh* might bolster a Sultan or Amir's legitimacy in front of his people. One such relationship was formed in Anatolia, between the Seljuk sultanate and Persian Sufis who sought refuge in the region (Trimingham, 1971, pp. 23–24). The Seljuks had been exposed to Sufism since the days of the Caliph al-Nasir (r. 1158-1225) because his adviser, Umar al-Suhrawardi, was a prominent Baghdadi Sufi and had visited the region in 1221 CE (Cahen, 1968, p. 256). The arrival of these Persian Sufis were welcomed by the ruling elite of the sultanate. Thus began the flourishing of the Sufi tradition in Anatolia to the point of becoming the majority tradition of Islam there (Ocak, 2009, p. 391).

From this period, rose a great Sufi in the Muslim world: Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 672/1273). Rumi's father, Baha al-Din Walad, was a preacher and mystic himself. Rumi and his parents migrated from Khawarizm to various regions before they finally settled in the capital of the Seljuk sultanate, Konya in 1228 CE

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(Cahen, 2001, pp. 162–163). Educated in religion and mysticism since his youth by teachers in Damascus and Aleppo, Rumi became an expert in Islamic jurisprudence. Rumi was well-known to various groups, among both Muslims and non-Muslims, and attracted students from high-class circles. When he was thirty-eight, Rumi left his position and wealth and embarked on a spiritual journey to find his real self. During this journey, Rumi allegedly met a Sufi master named Shams of Tabriz and, through their dialogue, Rumi found the spiritual insight that he was looking for (Arasteh, 1972, pp. 36–41). His poetry, the *Masnavi*, gained widespread respect for its spiritual status and became the pinnacle of mystical poetry in his time (Schimmel, 1975, p. 316).

In Rumi's time, Konya developed into a centre of religion, learning and culture in the Muslim world, thanks to various scholars, mystics and artists that resided there (Schimmel, 1975, p. 312). After Rumi's death, his teaching and mystical exercises were instituted as a *tariqa* by his son, Sultan Walad. This *tariqa*, Mevleviye, gained popular support, especially in the urban area of the region. By the mid-fifteenth century CE, Mevleviye had gained considerable influence in the Ottoman Empire and continued to grow until the following centuries (Ocak, 2009, pp. 393–394).

Third Stage

The third stage in the development of Sufism brought the *tariqa* into being a formal and strict institution. This stage began formally in the fifteenth century CE, under the Ottoman's' rule, but had been going on gradually from the earlier century. There were essential changes within the movement, especially with regard to the position of the *shaikh*. While the *shaikh* was a teacher in the first stage and a guide in the second, in this third stage, he became the *wali* of God. The *shaikh* ascended into the status of a saint and possessed the spiritual power known as *baraka* (Trimingham, 1971, p. 26). *Baraka* itself can be understood as holy power inherently possessed by saints, distinguishing him or her from ordinary humans. It is conceived as a force that emanates from the saint, permeating the persons and objects around him or her. By exercising this *baraka*, saints are able to perform miracles, or *karama* (Karamustafa, 2007, p. 130).

The ascendancy of Sufi *shaikhs* into the status of *wali* brought another change to the rituals of Sufis. Believing that the *baraka* possessed by the *shaikh*s

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stayed even after their death, people began to flock to their tombs and venerated the tombs. For Sufis, travelling to the tombs of *walis*, or *ziyara*, were part of their spiritual journey. They hoped for a communion of spirits with the *wali* and to find a sacred place in which to meditate. For the laymen, however, this *ziyara* was intended to seek help from the deceased *wali* to act as an intercessor on the behalf of the pilgrims (Trimingham, 1971, p. 26). The presence of a living saint and the promises of his *baraka* made the Sufi orders increasingly popular with the general populace. While they did not partake in the initiation process, thus never becoming students, many Muslims attended the *shaikh*'s lectures, visited his places and even performed pilgrimages to his tomb in order to attain his *baraka*. Instead of embarking on a personal journey or following the rules of a spiritual group, Sufism in the third stage of its development was characterised by veneration of the *wali* and dedication to acquiring his *baraka* (Trimingham, 1971, p. 72).

The cult of saints and veneration of tombs encouraged more complex translocal travel routes for Muslims. If centuries before pilgrimages were focused on Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, by the end of seventh Hijri century/thirteenth century CE, there were many cities, holy places and saints' tombs for pilgrims to visit. The three holy cities still retained their supremacy against these new spiritual sites but the presence of these new destinations intensified translocal travel with new travel hubs and routes. An example of this intensification could be seen in the widespread publication of guide books for *ziyara*. Karamustafa (2007, pp. 132–133) listed five prominent guide books from various scholars which describe the pilgrim routes to various holy sites and tombs in Egypt, Central Asia and the Maghrib, showing the popularity of *ziyara* as a form of religious practice among the Muslims at that time.

Tapper (1990) describes a more complex picture of *ziyara*, beyond its spiritual or religious connotation. While the spiritual or religious aspect of *ziyara* is undeniable, there is also a social or cultural context of the activity. First, *ziyara* embodied the respect that the pilgrim had towards the saint whose tomb became the destination of *ziyara*. Second, the practice (or, disallowance) of *ziyara* also revealed the tensions between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in Islam, as sanctioned by the political and religious establishments. Therefore, *ziyara* was not a mere personal journey but one laden with social, political and theological meanings.

Chamberlain (1994, pp. 119–120) also highlights the social aspect of *ziyara* by asserting it as a method to acquire important social ties necessary to advance in Muslim intellectual and mystical networks. While many laymen visited holy tombs to gain *baraka*, learned *shaikhs* used the visitation to strengthen bonds between themselves. While it was an honour for younger scholars to be able to visit and learn from a senior *shaikh*, receiving visits was also a sign of distinction for the more senior *shaikh*.

The institutionalisation process of Sufism intensified to the point that Trimingham (1971, pp. 71–103) describes it as hierarchical and rigid, with an attendant loss of mystical creativity. In contrast with the first stage, where many Sufi scholars developed their own, original, mystical exercises, in this third stage, the *tariqa* focused solely on the veneration of the persona of the *shaikh* and followed his instructions without reserve. Because of his *baraka*, only the *shaikh* could discern the ultimate truth. Even the Sufi writers of this age did not produce original ideas in their books, instead only compiling, repeating and simplifying the ideas of previous masters. At the same time, in the third stage Sufism lost its elitist status completely and allowed the general populace to partake in some of the rituals without having to be initiated in the order. This openness combined with the centralised teachings allowed Sufi *tariqas* to bridge various Muslim local societies into a greater, translocal society, as seen in the example in the following section.

Revivalism of the Sufi Orders

The next wave of development in Sufi orders occurred in late eighteenth century-early nineteenth century CE. During this period, Sufi orders underwent a change of perspective. Unlike Sufism in previous stages, whose concern was mainly the improvement of self, this new Sufism focused attention on the socio-moral reconstruction of Muslim society (Rahman, 1979, p. 25). Theologically, this shift of paradigm was inspired by the work of Ibn Taymiyya who suggested that the obligation to implement *sharia* falls on to the shoulders of the whole Muslim society. Thus, Muslims must set up certain institutions in their society to help them implement God's will. The state is a vital instrument for the manifestation of God's will in the material world; in so arguing, the social virtue and justice of

Muslim movements was emphasised instead of personal virtue (Rahman, 1970, p. 637).

This shift in paradigm towards socio-moral reconstruction was also triggered by the socio-political conditions of Muslim society. The sultanates had become weakened with military defeats by the European powers and were burdened by ineffective administration. While the common people faced economic difficulties, the ruling elite often presented a wealthy image, causing discontent among the general populace (Voll, 1994, p. 29). These kinds of problems also plagued the Ottomans and some *wazirs* tried to revitalise the caliphate by adopting Western ideas, which culminated in the Tanzimat movement in 1876 (Voll, 1994, pp. 30–31). With each of the reform efforts introduced, the reform became more closely associated with European ideas and was influenced by the secularist trend. This marginalised the *ulama* and, in reaction, they became the strongest anti-reform faction in the empire (Voll, 1994, pp. 33–35).

It was against this background that revivalism within the Sufi orders commenced. This revivalism was not a concerted, deliberate effort to revive Sufism as a whole. It instead was initiated by three figures, each leading his own *tariqa*: Muhammad al-Arabi al-Darqawi (d. 1823), the leader of the Shadhiliyya *tariqa*; Ahmad al-Tijani (d. 1815), the leader of the Tijaniyya *tariqa;* and Ahmad ibn Idris (d. 1837), the leader of the Idrisiyya *tariqa*. Muhammad al-Arabi al-Darqawi focused his revivalist movement on moving Sufism towards spiritualism and eschewing the material world (*dunya*). His efforts managed to enliven spiritual fervour among his followers and stimulated the flourishing of Shadhiliyya branches in North Africa. Ahmad al-Tijani started his order in Fez, Morocco and it spread to Sudan and, in the next century, to the Senegambia region. His teaching focused on unity of the order. Ahmad ibn Idris started his order in Mecca. He sought to preserve the inner aspect of Islam and directly responded to the anti-Sufi sentiment unleashed by the Wahhabis. While their works were focused within their own *tariqa*, their efforts inevitably affected other *tariqas* and initiated a wave of revivalism in Sufism generally (Trimingham, 1971, p. 106).

Scholars such as Rahman (1979) and Voll (1994) define this revivalist movement as "Neo-Sufism" to signify the different characteristics of this wave of movements compared to the older Sufi movements. One of the prominent

characteristics of this new wave of movements was its concern towards social and political issues. It sought to restore Muslim society from degeneration. This wave of movements also instigated the transformation of Sufi orders into a more centralised and coherent organisation, larger in scale than the previous form of Sufi orders (Levtzion, 2002, p. 114). This new wave of movements also possessed a consciousness of a greater *umma* while operating in their local context (Voll, 1994, p. 294). Ahmad ibn Idrisi in particular harboured the spirit of pan-Islamism and advocated the unity of all Muslim lands (Trimingham, 1971, p. 106). While O'Fahey and Radtke (1993) disagree with the notion that this wave introduced something "new" to the Sufi orders, Voll (2008) argues on the contrary, asserting the aforementioned characteristics as unseen in the previous generation of Sufi orders.

The Activism of Sufi Orders

According to Trimingham (1971, pp. 2–3), early Sufism emerged naturally as the extension and intensification of religious expressions among Muslims. It sought to connect directly to God by putting emphasis on recollection of religious chants (*dhikr*) and ascetic rituals, instead of conforming to the increasing legalisation of Islamic laws. Sufis were not members of a particular *madhhab* nor were the disputes between the schools their interest. They diligently sought to internalise the values of Islam rather than conform with formalised rituals. As the saying of the famous Baghdadi Sufi, Junayd, put it, "Sufism is not [achieved] by much praying and fasting, but it is the security of the heart and the generosity of the soul" (Schimmel, 1975, pp. 12–14).

Though there were other ascetic, non-Islamic, traditions preceding Sufism such as Eastern Christian monasticism, and while those traditions were likely to have had some contact with the Sufis, Sufism was something unique and distinctively Islamic in nature. Schimmel (1975, pp. 24–27) explains that the development of Sufism centred on the Qur'an and the figure of Muhammad. The teachings of the Qur'an formed the foundation of Sufism's doctrines and its words were the cornerstones of their mystical recitations, helping the devout to achieve a higher level of understanding. The figure of Muhammad was vital as Sufis sought to connect their traditions to the Prophet's. In order to support their claims, Sufi

tariqas established a spiritual chain from teachers to students, with Muhammad as the first link. His spiritual journey was also considered as the path to which Sufis strove to adhere.

Because these characteristics of Sufism were simple yet heartfelt, they were able to attract sympathy from common people. These characteristics perhaps were felt to be natural and practical, thus appealing to the common sense of Muslims then. Geertz (1975, p. 18) describes "naturalness" and "practicalness" as two characteristics which appeal to human common sense as a cultural system. Unlike the scholars of law whose main interest was maintaining the proper <u>form</u> of religious rituals, Sufis put emphasis on the <u>essence</u> of the rituals, yet without neglecting Islamic law. The nature of Sufism which encourages the initiates to undertake a long journey and to establish hostels for other travellers enabled the Sufis to reach far-flung territories and to introduce Islam there.

In the time of turbulence after the destruction of the Abbasid, the presence of Sufi orders was invaluable. With their *da'wa*, the Sufi orders were capable of rousing an affective response, regardless of cultural background or social standing. Sufi orders, with their secluded lodges, also managed to penetrate and link various geographical locales which had been relatively untouched by various political actors in the era of the caliphate (Levtzion, 2002, p. 116). In later centuries, Sufi orders were also engaged in various social and political activism. This activism strengthened the role of the Sufi orders as social actors that supported the idea of an *umma*, as can be seen in examples detailed in the following sections.

Map 3. The Spread of Sufi Orders

Source: *The Rise and Spread of Sufism*,
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t253/e15/images/0195334012.rise-and-spread-of-sufism-the.1.jpg

The Naqshbandiyya is one of the prominent orders which managed to penetrate and expand to Central Asia and Indo-Pakistan, bringing Islam to the inhabitants and connecting them to the larger Muslim society. The Naqshbandiyya order gained its namesake from Baha al-Din al-Naqshbandi (d. 1389) but the order itself regards the founder of the order to be Abu Ya'qub Yusuf al-Hamadani (d. 1140) (Trimingham, 1971, p. 62). The Naqshbandiyya is an orthodox Sufi movement in the sense that its doctrine maintains a balance between *sharia, tariqa* and *haqiqa*. *Sharia* is the Islamic law formulated by scholars. *Tariqa* is the path designated by the Sufi master. *Haqiqa* is the ultimate inner knowledge that each Sufi possesses (Weismann, 2007, p. 3). At the core of its doctrine lie the eleven principles attributed to its founder and a distinct form of silent *dhikr*. They also claimed that their tradition is linked to the Prophet in an unbroken chain through the Prophet's Companion and first caliph, Abu Bakr. This makes the Naqshbandiyya distinct from other *tariqas* which link their tradition to the Prophet through Ali (Weismann, 2007, pp. 10–11).

Centred on Bukhara, the *tariqa* started to spread to neighbouring cities by the efforts of Baha al-Din's disciples. In the fifteenth century CE, cities such as Balkh, Herat and Samarkand had considerable influence over northern territories of the Muslim world. By spreading the order there, the Naqshbandiyya gained access to important figures in the Timurid dynasty which held the territories. One such important figure, who finally joined the order, was Ali Shir Nava'i (d. 1501), a Timurid minister who was a patron of literature and arts. With Nava'i's assistance, the *tariqa* managed to gain both financial and political support, including access to the ruler of the dynasty (Weismann, 2007, pp. 30–33). Since the early day of the *tariqa*, individual members travelled to the west, connecting the order to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. It was said that the founder of the *tariqa*, Baha al-Din himself, had made two pilgrimages to the holy cities. Some members went further and finally reached the land of Anatolia. It was said that a member of the Naqshbandiyya, Rukn al-Din Bukhari, settled in Amasya, where a lodge (*zawiya* in Arabic or *tekke* in Turkish) was built for him in 1405-6 CE (Le Gall, 2005, p. 18).

The next generation of Naqshbandis continued the institutionalisation and consolidation of the order. Under the leadership of Nasir al-Din 'Ubaydillah Ahrar (d. 1490), the order managed to establish an inter-regional network of Naqshbandi groups in Central Asia. Ahrar sent his spiritual successors, know as his *khalifas*, to various cities in the region. Abdullah Ilahi and Ahmad Bukhari settled in Simav, in western Anatolia before moving to Istanbul after the death of Mehmed II in 1481 CE. Another *khalifa* of Ahrar, Baba Ni'matullah ibn Mahmud, settled in Aksehir in central Anatolia. Abdullah Ilahi and his disciples were sent to disseminate the *tariqa* in parts of the Balkans. Ilahi himself spent the end of his life in Yenice-I Vardar, which is in contemporary Greece. Ilahi's *khalifa*, Bedreddin Baba, settled and became a *shaikh* in Edirne (Le Gall, 2005, pp. 18–19). In the sixteenth and seventeenth century CE, the Naqshbandiyya's position as the most prominent Sufi order in the region was uncontested (Weismann, 2007, p. 34). The heads of all independent states succeeding the Timurid dynasty favoured the order, honouring the leaders during their lifetime and after their death by building mausoleums over their graves and hostels for housing the pilgrims going there (Trimingham, 1971, p. 94).

The rise of the Safavids as a Shi'i empire provided great challenges to the dissemination of the Naqshbandi order. Arjomand (2009, pp. 109–121) asserts that the order was suppressed under the Safavids. By the end of Shah Ismail's rule (1501-1524), the order had been totally eradicated from Western and Central Iran. While she casts doubt on the total eradication of the order by the end of Shah Ismail's rule, Le Gall (2005, pp. 28–30) describes how the Safavids' rise provided significant challenges to the Naqshbandis, especially by obstructing communication and travel between Central Asia and the Ottoman lands, thus endangering or even stopping the travel of pilgrims, students and immigrants from Anatolia, Arabia and the Balkans. Yet, the hostilities shown by the Safavids over the order eventually stimulated it to make a stronger commitment to Sunni orthodoxy (Le Gall, 2005, p. 33).

In their activism, the Naqshbandis were keen on travelling. Foremost was travelling to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina to perform *hajj*. Other forms of travelling were to visit various learning centres or attending famous *shaikhs* in their lodges. After the Ottomans had managed to secure the loyalties of Mecca and Medina, gained the title of "Protectors of the Holy Cities", and established a pilgrimage route from Istanbul to the holy cities in the early sixteenth century CE, the Naqshbandis were observed following this route, detouring to Istanbul first before travelling to Mecca and Medina. In so doing, they enjoyed the security of the route and infrastructures laid down by the Ottomans (Le Gall, 2005, p. 171). Yet, the Naqshbandis not only benefited from the existing infrastructures. They also established their own infrastructures such as lodges for pilgrims and other travellers, attended by *shaikhs* from Bukhara. Such lodges were observed in Bursa, Istanbul, Erdine, Jerusalem and so on. These lodges became the resting places for travellers, and thus helped the integration process between these various places into one well travelled network (Le Gall, 2005, pp. 171–172).

The Naqshbandi *shaikhs* also contributed to the integration of the Muslim population through another method: by working across linguistic and cultural barriers. The Naqshbandi *shaikhs* themselves had various cultural backgrounds. Some of Ahrar *khalifas* were foreign students from faraway lands. By accepting these foreign students, Ahrar had cultivated a multicultural environment for the Naqshbandiyya (Le Gall, 2005, p. 20). Their rigorous training also made these *shaikhs* well versed in Perso-Islamic literary culture. Yet, at the same time, since

their audience were of Turkish and Arabic origins, the *shaikhs* were also trained to be able to produce Sufi literature in Turkish and Arabic, both as the translation form of Persian scholarly works, such as the *Masnavi*, or original works of their own (Le Gall, 2005, pp. 172–173). This ability to work in a multilingual and multicultural environment made the Naqshbandi *shaikhs* valued scholars, since, at that time, many Islamic learning institutions used scholarly works from Perso-Islamic culture. This ability also allowed them to build a bridge between the older Perso-Islamic heritage and the younger Turkish scholarship (Robinson, 1997).

The Activism of Tijaniyya Sufi Order

Map 4. The Spread of Sufi Orders in Africa

Source: *Islam and the Spread of the Sufi Orders*
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t253/e7/images/0195334012.islam-and-the-spread-of-the-sufi-orders.2.jpg

While the Naqshbandiyya order was centred on Transoxania and spread towards Central Asia and then to Arabia and South and Southeast Asia, the Sufi order of Tijaniyya was founded in Fez, Morocco, through the teaching of Ahmad al-Tijani (d. 1815). Ahmad al-Tijani was one of the proponents of revivalism in Sufi movements. He claimed that the *tariqa* was revealed to him by the Prophet through a vision; thus the *silsila* went directly from Muhammad to him (Vikor,

2000, p. 450). During his *da'wa*, Ahmad easily appointed local organisers (*muqoddam*) from anyone who professed allegiance to his order. Thus, at his death, the Tijaniyya was quite widespread and possessed a large number of followers (Trimingham, 1971, p. 108). After the death of Ahmad, the activism of Tijaniyya spread south to west Sudan, the Nilotic and then central Sudan. It then spread among the people of Tokolor of Senegambia (Trimingham, 1971, p. 110).

The spreading of the Tijaniyya order in rural areas of West Africa was coterminous with the spreading of other Sufi *tariqas* such as the Qadariyya to the region. With this development, a new class of religious scholars arose. These scholars, unlike the urban scholars often associated with traders or ruling aristocrats, were part of the peasantry. They articulated the voices of farmers, criticised the rulers and, eventually, led the *jihad* movement in the region (Levtzion, 2002, pp. 114–115). The transformation of the Tijaniyya into a more political and militaristic orientated movement happened under the leadership of al-Hajj Umar ibn Sa'id Tall of Tokolor (d. 1864). Umar himself was initiated into the order during his stay in Mecca in 1828-1831. He was then appointed as the *khalifa* of the order for West Africa. Invigorated by this appointment, Umar established various Tijaniyya lodges during his return journey from Mecca. He established Tijaniyya branches in Sokoto, Masina and Futa Toro regions (Vikor, 2000, p. 451).

In 1852, Umar declared a *jihad* against the rulers neighbouring his region of Futa Toro (present day Senegal) and declared the establishment of a Tijaniyya caliphate. The main supporters of his campaign were his students. These warriors were recruited into the order in 1846 and after. Umar's authority toward them was based on his title as the *khalifa* of the order, thus making the campaign not only military or political in nature but also spiritual. Umar developed his *tariqa* in two related ways: as a way to infuse identity into his military campaign and also as a way to establish and legitimise his authority over the campaign (Vikor, 2000, p. 452). Between 1855 and his death in 1864, Umar managed to capture various cities and integrated them into his growing empire. In 1855, he captured Nioro, a strategic town which then became a centre of Islamic learning and a leading market in the region. In 1860-1861, he occupied the seat of Bamana kingdom of Segu. In 1862, he occupied the capital of Hamidullahi (Lydon, 2009, pp. 116–117).

The campaign of Umar integrated a wide area in West Africa under the banner of his Tijaniyya caliphate. He controlled the area of present-day Guinea, Senegal and Mali. During his rule, Umar provided the people of his caliphate religious scholars to guide their spiritual life. It was during this time that the Tijaniyya order established a stronger presence in the area. He also tried to increase the welfare of the people by providing them with skilled craftsmen. One trade account noted that a trade caravan sent by Umar had recruited ten blacksmiths and farmers to teach their arts to the Tijani people (Lydon, 2009, p. 118). He endeavoured to open the trade route from his territory to the northern trade route towards Morocco, in so doing maintaining the connectedness of Africans across the Sahara (Lydon, 2009, p. 119).

Other than the legacy of Umar in establishing the Tijaniyya caliphate, which lasted for a half century, the Tijaniyya order also had significant achievements in the development of literary culture in West Africa. The history of the literary in the order connected the Maghreb, the origin of this order, with the entire Sahelian Belt of Africa. But not only that, the literary culture of the order also connected the locations with wider territories where members of the order resided, such as in Egypt, Hijaz, Turkey and Indonesia. The literary culture of the Tijaniyya started with the collections of al-Tijani's sayings and sermons by his students. The book of *Jawahir al-ma'ani (Pearls of Meaning)*, collected by Ali Harazim (d. 1797), was the first of such collections and was acknowledged as the authoritative account of life and teachings of al-Tijani (Seesemann, 2009, p. 306). Other than the *Jawahir*, the important books of the order are *Rimah hizb al-rahim 'ala nuhur hizb al-rajim (The Spears of the Party of the Merciful thrown at the Necks of the Party of the Accursed),* written by al-Hajj Umar ibn Sa'id Tall (d. 1864), the leader of the Tijaniyya caliphate, and *Bughyat al-mustafid fi sharh Munyat al-murid (The Object of Desire for One who Benefits from the Book 'The Aspiration of the Disciple')* by Muhammad al-Arabi ibn al-Sa'ih (d. 1892). The latter two are considered as essential handbooks by the Tijanis and the usage of these books was an essential part of the literary culture of the order (Seesemann, 2009, p. 308).

The relevance of Sufi orders' activism toward the idea of an *umma*

The decline of the caliphate had left Muslim society in a somewhat disorganised state. In the eyes of many, not only had the caliphate failed to impose order over the society in their role as the post-Muhammad instrument of authority, it had also failed to become the spiritual symbol of the *umma*. The disappointment towards the caliphate had permeated scholarly works in which Muslim intellectuals discussed and debated the issue of authority, as described previously. From the perspective, which many held, that the caliphate had failed to fulfil its function in maintaining the Muslim symbolic universe, it was reasonable that they tried to fill the void by creating a new social movement.

Since the caliphate had become weak and corrupted with rampant materialism, some Muslims sought to revitalise the Muslim society by developing ascetic movements. The leaders of these movements were normally possessing *'ilm* and having deep commitment to the mystic path (Weismann, 2001, pp. 1–2). Among these movements, the most popular one was the Sufi movement of Baghdad. This movement spread to many major cities in the Muslim world, bringing with it a new sense of spiritualism which tries to capture the essence of Islam instead of spending time and energy to debate the proper form of the religion. While Islamic orthodoxy emphasises the distance between God and man, Sufism approaches the relation between God and man as a journey: a spiritual one which will require great effort if Sufis want to complete it.

This new movement offered no particular organisation at first. Sufism was emergent as a somewhat elitist movement, only for the Chosen ones. Al-Ghazali's *Ihya* made Sufism not only appealing to the jurists but also to the common people. Yet, by the eleventh century CE, Sufism still maintained a personal characteristic in its movements. Only in later centuries did Sufism start to provide a more definitive structure. There were established learning centres, with each focused on a *shaikh*. Each *shaikh* would teach his method of spiritualism to the adherents and, after a certain period of learning, the adherents would receive the *silsila* from the *shaikh*, signifying their initiation into a certain stage in the *shaikh*'s method. This provided an alternative structure in the Muslim society, not only mirroring the *madhhab* with their *isnads* but more. The *shaikh* also played a prominent role in

their students' life as a spiritual guide, a role which was usually assigned to the Prophet, his Companions or the caliph.

When Baghdad fell in 1258 CE, Muslim society lost its most precious symbol: the caliphate. Yet for the adherents of a Sufi *shaikh*, the trauma was lessened by the presence of the *shaikh* as their personal spiritual guide. Thus, people were attracted to Sufism and sought solace from their turbulent life in the Sufis' life of piety and rigorous rituals. Sufism became a movement that provided distressed Muslims a route to escape from their plight. Rather than establishing the *umma* in the physical realm, Sufism was translating the concept of *umma* into a metaphysical realm, connected through *dhikr* and mystical rituals. Sufism taught that the ultimate unity that humans could achieve would not be actualised in the material world, as in the establishment of the Muslim caliphate, but in the spiritual realm, as in the return of Muslims' souls to the Creator. This enforced a new "interpretation" of Muslim identity, which oriented purely in the spiritual realm, unlike the previous sense of identity established by the legalistic view of the *madhhab* or by the political view of caliphal movements. The latter views, while also claiming spiritual authority, were, ineluctably, attached to the temporal world.

This adoption of Sufism can be understood in terms of the conceptualisation that Geertz (1973, p. 90) asserts. People sought to translate and find meaning for their life experience in the metaphysical experience of religious symbols and rituals -- in this case, Sufism. The rituals of Sufism were no longer an alternative way of interpreting Islam, but of interpreting the physical world in a metaphysical sense. In the frame of Berger and Luckmann (1966), adopting Sufism could be seen as the efforts of Muslims to perform a therapy for themselves so that they could still bear the vision of an *umma* despite the shattering of its embodiment. Sufism provided them with tools to analyse and justify the destruction of the caliphate (rampant materialism and corruption) and also a solution to the problem (embracing the spirit of Islam). Since their vision of an *umma* embodied in the caliphate had been destroyed, these Muslims were seeking to find a new embodiment of the *umma* within a Sufi order, in a more intimate relationship between a *shaikh* and his students.

While the destruction of Baghdad had been traumatic, at the same time, the loss of the established political and intellectual structures allowed the Sufis to come forward as a new structure in Muslims' life, which combined mystical and

religious legitimation as the source of their authority. The existing political actors sought cooperation with the Sufi *tariqas*, for a variety of reasons -- genuine admiration, religious piety and practical considerations – in order to bolster their authority. With the failure of the Mu'tazilites to impose their doctrine through the *mihna*, the majority of the scholars were either sympathetic to the Sufis or could not mount an adequate attack against the rising influence of Sufism. The publication of works such as the *Ihya*, which combines the mysticism of Sufism and the adherence to the law of the *fiqh* schools, further strengthened the Sufis' position as a "proper" movement in Islam, increasing its popularity among general Muslims and scholars alike. Sufism became what Schlegell describes as "the one cultural and intellectual constant that bound together elite and common Muslims throughout the Muslim world" (Schlegell, 2002, p. 578).

In the eighteenth century CE, when the social and political conditions in Muslim society floundered and degenerated, Sufi orders underwent a transformation. Leaders of several *tariqas*, in their independent efforts to address the social and political turmoil within the *umma*, revived the Sufi orders, changing their nature to become more active in addressing societal and political problems. The Sufi orders became not only a spiritual haven in the midst of a turbulent world but also a transformative agent that sought to address the problems and to create a better world in accordance with God's will and the *sunna* of the Prophet. This effort affirmed the neo-Sufi orders as carriers of the idea of the *umma*. As Voll (1994, p. 294) observes, the neo-Sufi movements had developed a strong popular basis for a universalist Islamic message while working in their local context.

Understandably, there were tensions that threatened the message of unity brought by Sufi orders. These tensions might have arisen in a particular order or appeared in the dynamics between two or more orders. Ay (2012) describes conditions which put Sufi *shaikhs* into different social groups in thirteenth to fifteenth century CE Anatolia. Other than difference in their Sufi orders, these *shaikhs* were differentiated between rural *shaikhs* and city *shaikhs*. Rural *shaikhs* lived in rural areas and usually evinced a more practical approach to mysticism. They lived with their families and often became the head of the village or tribe. The city *shaikhs*, on the other hand, pursued a more ascetic approach to mysticism. These city *shaikhs* were often also educated in the science of Islam, combining a

degree of familiarity in *fiqh* with their mystic *tariqa* (Ay, 2012, p. 6). In larger cities, there were also charismatic *shaikhs* whose influence transcended sectarian affiliations. These *shaikhs* gathered a large number of disciples and followers and often acted outside of their *tariqa* (Ay, 2012, p. 7).

A Sufi *shaikh* was often perceived as a holy man by the society. This image was more or less fostered by the Sufi tradition, which portrayed the 'path' as divided into various stations (*maqam*) and the Shaikh as the perfect human who had completed the spiritual journey. His status was then elevated to that of *wali*, or friend of God (Ay, 2012, p. 8). He, thus, had spiritual authority over the populace and, in return, the general populace would expect him to behave as a spiritually superior man, including being able to perform miraculous feats or to bless the populace with his *baraka*. This made the *shaikhs* important actors in their society (Ay, 2012, pp. 9–10).

This prestige occasionally would cause rivalry not only between the *shaikhs* but also between their families and students (Ay, 2012, pp. 13–14). This rivalry could take the form of criticism towards the other party's religious standing, accusations over their rituals or even physical fighting. One notable Sufi *shaikh*, Otman Baba (d. 1478), often entered into a dispute with other *shaikhs* he met during his travels (Ay, 2012, pp. 15–17). The objective of such dispute was to undermine the rival *shaikh*'s legitimacy and to deprive him of the source of his influence (Ay, 2012, p. 17). When the rival *shaikh* was deprived of religious prestige and social status, the winning *shaikh* could expand his teachings and influence, becoming more powerful both in religious and in social standing (Ay, 2012, p. 19).

Another form of rivalry can be seen in the document that records the law suit over the leadership of the Zayniyya Sufi community in seventeenth century Allepo. This document is preserved in Ottoman court records. The Zayniyya *tariqa* was a local *tariqa* in Aleppo, relatively unknown to historians. The order possessed a lodge in the city and agricultural land in support of the lodge (Salati, 2013, p. 207). The dispute over the lodge was between Shaikh Abd al-Rahman ibn As'ad against Shaikh Ali ibn Hajj Aslan. Shaikh Abd al-Rahman claimed to have the right over the lodge because he was a descendant of the founder of the lodge. Shaikh Ali the defendant, however, prevented him from exerciinge his right as descendant. After hearing witnesses who could identify Shaikh Abd al-Rahman as

the rightful descendant of the founder, the judge restored him his rights as the leader of the *tariqa* and over the lodge, and forbade Shaikh Ali from interfering with Shaikh Abd al-Rahman's affairs (Salati, 2013, pp. 209–210).

While it is easy to highlight the rivalries among various Sufi *shaikhs* to negate the message of unity brought by the *tariqas*, it is more beneficial to look at the bigger picture of the dynamics surrounding the Sufi orders. The rivalries between Sufi *shaikhs* were inevitable, just like rivalries between scholars of different *madhhabs* or rivalries between various political actors inside or outside the caliphate. Yet, despite the rivalries, the *madhhabs* were beneficial in the integration of the *umma* by providing Muslim society with intellectual structures connecting various lands and allowing the transmission of ideas from one centre of learning to another. The Sufi orders, despite local rivalries, also provided benefits to the *umma*, prominently with their role as the social actors which revitalised the concept of the *umma* and facilitated internalisation of it among the younger generation of Muslims, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.

One fundamental characteristic that allowed the Sufi orders to embody the idea of an *umma* was the non-exclusive nature of the orders. The rivalry between *shaikhs* was usually local in nature and stemmed from either personal dissatisfaction over the rival's teaching or rivalry over social achievements. In the more general tradition of Sufism, there was no problem with different interpretations of the mystic way exhibited by the various *tariqas*. It was even common for a *shaikh* to have been initiated in several different *tariqas*, mastering the *dhikr* and rituals of those *tariqas* before eventually chosing one in particular to serve (Levtzion, 2002, p. 114).

The practice of being initiated into multiple *tariqas* was quite common in the Naqshbandiyya order around the thirteenth to fifteenth century CE. One particular *shaikh*, Ahmad al-Nakhli of Mecca (d. 1717/1718), was initiated in three distinct *tariqas*: the Naqshbandiyya, Shattariyya and Khalwatiyya. For a while he practised all three and performed initiation in all three. Yet, one night he dreamt of a meeting with the Prophet. In that dream, the Prophet instructed him to sit on a prayer rug belonging to Shaikh Taj al-Din al-Uthmani, a *shaikh* of the Naqshbandiyya who had died some decades ago. Shaikh Ahmad considered this

dream as a vision and thus chose to affiliate solely to the Naqshbandiyya afterwards (Le Gall, 2005, pp. 168–169).

Sufism and the orders of mystics following the 'way' or 'path' were thus an invaluable social actor in the construction of the Muslim *umma*. The flourishing of Sufism had multiple beneficial effects in the maintenance of a global consciousness, of being part of a greater *umma*. Sufism was also important in maintaining the idea of the *umma* as a social reality through its unique attributes.. First, Sufism provided a powerful method to heal the trauma post-destruction of Baghdad. Sufism attached a new metaphysical dimension on to the concept of the *umma*, making it more bearable for Muslims to live and witness the destruction of the caliphate, which had been a powerful symbol of the *umma* for hundreds of years. Second, the Sufi practitioners and their orders also became the social groups supporting the *umma*, perhaps unwittingly at first but then more assertively as the neo-Sufism transformation gave them a more active role in propagating and defending the idea of a larger *umma*. The organisational structure of the Sufi orders became new networks that not only assisted Muslims in their travels but also provided new centres for disseminating the narratives of Islam, further strengthening the image of an integrated *umma*.

Chapter Seven:
The *Umma* as a Symbolic Universe

The Prophetic *umma*

The concept of the *umma* is a central concept in the social life of Muslims. The *umma* was a fundamental concept with both transcendental and social characteristics. In Qur'anic terminology, the *umma* refers to a body of people who are objects of the divine plan of salvation (Denny, 1975). The Qur'an uses this term to refer to various people of faith, not only Muslims, such as implied in the term *ummatun wahida* (Qur'an 21:92[14]), *ummatun muslimah (*Qur'an 2:128[15]) and *ummatun wasatan* (Qur'an 2:14[16]), as described in Chapter Four of this thesis. Yet, in one of the Qur'anic verses, *sura* 3:110, *kuntum khaira ummatin ukhrijat linnaasi*, the Qur'an specifically addresses the Muslim *umma* and puts it in a

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[14] The full verse of the Qur'an, sura 21:92, is: *Inna haadhihi ummatukum **ummatan wahidatan** wa ana rabbukum fa' buduun*
[Indeed this, your religion, is one religion, and I am your Lord, so worship Me].
[15] This verse of the Qur'an should be put into the larger context: it refers to a prayer from Abraham to God, which is described in the Qur'an, *sura* 2:127-129, as follows:
Wa idh yarfa'u ibrahimu al-qawa'ida min al-baiti wa isma'ilu rabbana taqabbal minna. Innaka anta as-sami'ul-'alimu. [127]
[And (mention) when Abraham was raising the foundations of the House and (with him) Ishmael, (saying), "Our Lord, accept (this) from us. Indeed You are the Hearing, the Knowing.]
*Rabbanaa waj'alna muslimain laka wa min dhurriyyatina **ummatan muslimatan** laka wa 'arinaa manaasikanaa wa tub 'alainaa. Innaka anta at-tawwabu ar-rahimu.* [128]
[Our Lord, and make us Muslims (in submission) to You and from our descendants a Muslim nation (in submission) to You. And show us our rites and accept our repentance. Indeed, You are the Accepting of repentance, the Merciful.]
Rabbanaa wa-b'ath fiihim rasuulan minhum yatluu 'alaihim aayaatika wa yu'allimuhumu al-kitaba wa al-hikmata wa yuzakkiihim. Innaka anta al-'azizu a1-hakim. [129]
[Our Lord, and send among them a messenger from themselves who will recite to them Your verses and teach them the Book and wisdom and purify them. Indeed, You are the Exalted in Might, the Wise."]
[16] Sura 2, verse 143 should be put into the context of moving the *qibla*, or direction of prayer, from Jerusalem to Mecca; thus it addressed the Muslims specifically.
Sayaquulu as-sufahaau min an-naasi maa wallahum 'an qiblatihimu al-latii kaanuu 'alaihaa. Qul lillahi al-masyriqu wa al-maghribu. Yahdii man yashaau ilaa syiraati mustaqiim. [142]
[The foolish among the people will say, "What has turned them away from their qibla, which they used to face?" Say, "To Allah belongs the east and the west. He guides whom He wills to a straight path."]
*Wa kadzaalika ja'alnaakum **ummatan wasatan** litakuunuu shuhadaa-a 'alaa an-naasi wa yatakuuna ar-rasuulu 'alaikum shahiida. …* [143…]
[And thus we have made you a just community that you will be witnesses over the people and the Messenger will be a witness over you….]

global context. The Muslim *umma* is one of the many communities in the world and it can be the best through its faith and good deeds (Denny, 1977a, pp. 36–38).

Despite being originally framed in the religious terminology of the Islamic faith, the concept of the *umma* was eventually transformed into a social term and applicable practices. Not only did it permeate the daily life of the believers, it gave meaning to their existence; it also gave them a place in the broader context of the universe. The *umma* was becoming an overarching term that connected various institutions and social practices in the society and, to some extent, was taken for granted by the Muslims as the natural condition of a society. In the conceptual framework based on Berger and Luckmann (1966), discussed in Chapters One and Two, the *umma* had become a symbolic universe living in the Muslims' minds.

The transformation of the *umma* from a religious terminology into a symbolic universe occurred through the possibility of religious activities in inducing motivation and moods to the believers. As detailed by Geertz (1973, pp. 96–98), religious activities motivate the believers by providing the believers with the underlying cause they strive for. In the case of the Muslim *umma*, it is possible that the social activities done by Muslims are within the framework of the Islamic *umma* when the Muslims perceived their actions as required steps to achieve the Qur'anic virtue of *khaira umma* described in the verse above. For example, when a certain Muslim goes to faraway places in order to spread Islam to the people of other cultures and to integrate them in the greater Muslim society, this action of travelling and spreading Islam could be considered as motivated by the concept of the *umma*.

Other than providing a motivational goal, Geertz (1973, pp. 96–98) also explains that religious activities can influence the moods of the believers by conditioning the believers to do or avoid certain actions. This behavioural-shaping ability is mainly achieved through the practice of religious rituals. By attending religious rituals, believers shape their worldview in accordance with the religion's. They then conform their actions to the values embedded in this particular worldview. Geertz's assertion that religion influences the societal activities of the believers is important in understanding the transformation of the *umma* from a religious idea to a societal phenomenon. Through Muhammad, Islam introduced the notion that human society is characterised by faith, instead of by blood. In the

time and location where tribalism was the prevalent societal system, it was a radical new idea.

At first, Muhammad seemingly had tried to establish a Muslim society within the existing context of Arab tribalism in Mecca. Yet, it was soon apparent that the established societal structure in Mecca resisted these attempts (al-Tabari, 1988a; Donner, 1999, p. 8). Frustrated by the constant rejection, Muhammad then aspired to build a new society outside the existing establishment of Mecca. He sent the believers to other tribes and to far countries such as Abyssinia (Abu-Shahlieh, 1996, p. 37). When the people of Yathrib received his envoy warmly and pledged to support him, Muhammad was determined to build the new Islamic society in Yathrib. He then inspired the believers to take the religious journey of *hijra*, emigrating from Mecca to Yathrib, before finally doing so himself (Donner, 1999, p. 9). As soon as Muhammad had arrived in Yathrib, which was then renamed Medina, he established a society of the believers, which then became known as the initial form of the Islamic *umma* (Robinson, 2009, p. 187).

Hijra means to abandon or to separate oneself from their roots (Masud, 1990, p. 30; Abu-Shahlieh, 1996, p. 37). *Hijra* was considered as a sacred religious duty of the believers. Yet, it was also more than religious terminology. It surely had immediate non-religious implications. One such implication of *hijra* was the establishment of a new society in Medina, which, unlike other societies in Arabia at that time, was not based on blood or kinship but on Islamic values. To perform the *hijra* was not simply changing one's location from Mecca to Medina but it required the person to completely discard his/her allegiance, attachment and deference from the tribe and changed it to the *umma* (Watt, 1956, p. 242). It was a total societal change and it allowed the *umma* to mobilise its members, even against their former tribes and kin. *Hijra* and the establishment of the Muslim *umma* in Medina had been the beginning of what Donner (1999, p. 9) calls "Islam's long life as a political force".

Watt observes an interesting characteristic of the *umma*. While it was natural for tribes to have their own territorial basis, the members of the *umma* did not recognise such a basis for the *umma*. It is true that the *umma* was based on Medina and its core members were Muslims living in the city, but the *umma* was also thought of as vaguely translocal. This lack of territorial basis became more pronounced with the inclusion of various tribes outside of Medina after their

conversion to Islam (Watt, 1956, pp. 241–242). This observation is interesting because it recalls how the Qur'anic verses characterised the *umma*: that it is a society of mankind and is not limited to a certain territorial area. For example, a verse of the Qur'an that orders the believers to embark on *hijra* states:

> And whoever emigrates for the cause of Allah will find on the earth many [alternative] locations and abundance. And whoever leaves his home as an emigrant to Allah and His Messenger and then death overtakes him - his reward has already become incumbent upon Allah. And Allah is ever Forgiving and Merciful.
> *Sura* 4 *al- Nisa'* (The Women) verse 100.

Ibn Kathir (2000a, p. 430) describes in his *tafsir* that there were several historical accounts considered as the cause (*asbab al-nuzul*) of this verse. While these historical accounts vary in detail, they speak about the same event: that a person embarked on a journey, leaving Mecca for another city or country to perform the *hijra*, passed away before reaching his destination. Upon hearing the news, the Prophet then passed on the revelation, praising the person and commending his action. Ibn Kathir then concludes that this verse, among others, motivates the believers to do *hijra* and assures them that Allah will provide safety and sustenance wherever they go, despite the foreignness of the land of their destination.

This verse, and others like it, combine the order to do *hijra* with the vastness of the Earth that they can travel to (Qur'an 4:97), that Allah's Mercy is with the Emigrants (Qur'an 2:218), that Allah will provide and sustain them throughout their ordeals, both in this world and the hereafter (Qur'an 3:195, 16:41). These verses build a religious narrative breaking a common consciousness at that time which relied on kinship and was restrained by locality. Thus, coming back to Watt's observation on the lack of locality exhibited by the members of the early *umma*, it is possible that the early Muslims had decided to avoid claiming fixed territorial basis so as to align themselves with the spirit of the Qur'an. This thought process might had been done as part of their rational choice or, subconsciously in line with Geertz (1973), it might have been affected by the divine words of a religion to which they were devoted. In later stages of the development of the *umma*, this lack of attachment to a certain locale encouraged the Muslims to travel and to establish translocal connections, and provide an enduring basis for a global *umma*, as this thesis has argued in previous chapters.

The establishment of the *umma* in Medina put Muslims on an equal standing vis-à-vis the Quraysh of Mecca. Muhammad then used his position to forge unity among the Arab tribes. According to Watt (1960, pp. 142–143), the notion of unity among the Arabs before Islam was rudimentary. It was Islam that strengthened this sense of unity by implicitly alluding to the Arabs as an independent cultural unit. Muhammad then took this into practice by building what Hodgson (1974a, p. 187) calls an "Arab commonwealth". Soon, Muhammad contested the influence of the Byzantine and Sasanian Empires over the region. Hamidullah (1945) describes in great detail how Muhammad conducted activities such as correspondence and sending and receiving envoys to various regional powers -- practices which can be perceived, in our modern language, as international relations activities. The scholar al-Mubarakpuri (1996) also dedicates parts of his book to discuss these translocal interactions and networks that Muhammad tried to establish.

If the Qur'an had instilled a sense of global consciousness to the believers through its religious narrative, Muhammad then became the first one to embrace the idea. It was through him and his teachings that the global consciousness embedded in the Qur'anic verses was introduced to the believers and then, considering how eager the believers were to emulate the Prophet, became proliferated among the Muslims. The proliferation of this global consciousness not only occurred during high level meetings, such as when Muslims observed the sending and receiving of envoys. Muhammad also instilled this sense of consciousness through daily activities recorded by Muslim scholars. Ibn Ishaq (1967, p. 452) narrated an account from Salman al-Farsi, a Companion of Persian descent, that during the War of the Trench, Salman and other Companions were busy digging the trench but they found a rock which gave them trouble. Hearing this, Muhammad came to them and struck the rock. Sparks flared three times and Muhammad reportedly said, "Did you really see that, Salman? The first means that God has opened up to me the Yemen. The second Syria and the West. And the third the east."

Looking through the perspective of the theoretical framework of this thesis, this kind of interaction between Muhammad and his Companions could be considered as an act of externalisation, how a person communicates his/her consciousness and ideas to others around him/her and then constructs a socially

accepted intersubjectivity (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 34). Language, the choice of words, may become the sign bearing a certain meaning in the objectivation process (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 50–51); in the previously mentioned case, the words of the Prophet were accompanied by explicit reference to 'sparks' and eventual shattering of the offending rock, giving the process a much stronger impression in the believers' minds. When the attending Companions shared this occurrence with others, the idea that God had sanctified the victory of Medina over Yemen, Syria and both empires on the West and East was embraced by the Companions and became the socially accepted truth, or prophecy in this case. The Muslims kept spreading this to other believers and to the next generation, thus beginning the internalisation process of that idea in Muslim society.

The incident above not only motivated the believers against the upcoming war but, more profoundly, enlightened their conscious minds that the Muslims of Medina were on the same playing field with the Yemenis, Syrians and people of other nations. They were no longer isolated in their secluded, middle-of-nowhere corner. This kind of message, that the Muslims are part of the wider world, is consistently present in both the Qur'an and *hadith*. The Qur'an provides the fundamental idea of a global society and then Muhammad refined the idea and put it in application. The two have become the source of a new kind of awareness, a consciousness to see and think of Muslims as part of a wider world, and to provide the moods and motivations to Muslims to actualise the globality of this message. In the perspective of "norm life cycle" theory proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, pp. 895–896), when the Qur'an started to build its narrative of the idea of a global society and encouraged the believers to perform *hijra*, the Islamic global consciousness was entering its stage of norm emergence. Muhammad was the first and foremost norm entrepreneur who mounted campaigns and disseminated this global view as much as he could to the point of the establishment of Muslim society in Medina. His negotiation with the Arab tribes could be seen as his effort to negotiate the tribes' acceptance of the Qur'anic norm.

The conquest of Mecca and the emergence of the *umma* as a prominent regional actor could be seen as the point where the Islamic global consciousness reached its tipping point and entered its second stage, norm cascade. Islam had won against paganism, the Muslims were victorious against their archenemy, the

Quraysh. The people of Arabia acknowledged the superior force of the believers and they started to embrace Islam. The Qur'an illustrated the growing acceptance and the eagerness of the people of Arabia towards Islam in one of its *suras*, Al-Nashr (110):1-3. Ibn Kathir (2000b) in his tafsir of this *sura* describes a narration from al-Bukhari, that a Companion of the Prophet said after the Conquest of Mecca that the people rushed to the Prophet and professed their acceptance of Islam. Afterwards, in two years' time, the peninsula of Arabia was described as "laden with faith". Whether the later converts were sincere in their profession of faith or not, and whether their intention was mainly to adopt the message or to adapt to the new and decisive political reality, is irrelevant to this discussion. As stated by Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999, pp. 15–16), while the adopters of certain norms might maintain their pragmatic interests, unwittingly they become deeply involved in the moral discourse brought by the norm enterpreneurs, in this case, by Muhammad.

Yet, as Muhammad passed away, the seemingly perfect society of Muslims was shaken. It is fair to assume that the shock was multi-dimensional. It was a spiritual and religious shock, because Islam had lost its prophet, and also a social and political shock because the Muslims had lost their leader. It is important to note that the first generation of Muslim society had not developed a sophisticated explanation of how to bring the concept of the *umma* into realisation. During the first generation of Muslims, the *umma* was perceived as the divinely sanctioned form of social practice. Yet, the Qur'an does not provide a clear instruction on handling various societal and political issues (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 183). There had to be someone or some officials who had the authority to lead the Muslims and maintain the unity of the *umma*, and that position of leadership was shouldered by Muhammad, which intertwined and coexisted with his position as the Prophet. The social and political functions of the *umma* were inseparable with its nature as a religious community (Khadduri, 1955). Thus, the death of Muhammad posed a question: should the *umma* continue to exist after the death of the Prophet?

Institutionalisation in the historical *umma*

The death of Muhammad had taken away the authoritative figure from the emerging *umma* and posited the question on whether the fledging state should survive after him (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 197). The death of Muhammad forced the Muslims to question the *umma*. Thus, the Muslim society felt the need to appoint a leader and then to develop political theory both to define the leader's authority over the society and to support his political actions. Through political consensus, the *umma* had elected Abu Bakr as the first successor of Muhammad (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 198). Abu Bakr legitimated his authority not only on the basis of political consensus, though. Since the *umma* was founded based on religious values, he continued to use Islam as the foundation of his rule. Yet, because he was not a prophet and did not receive divine revelation, his authority depended on his closeness to Muhammad and how his behaviour mirrored the Prophet's way (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 207)

This arrangement did not, however, appease some groups of Muslims. Part of them then decided to follow new prophets and prophetesses as the replacement of Muhammad, which is anathema to Islamic teaching stipulating that Muhammad is the last Prophet. Another group of Muslims decided to reject the political authority of Medina and refused to pay *zakat*. Thus, the first Caliph was faced with secessionist groups challenging both the political authority of Medina over various other Arab tribes and the religious legitimacy of Islam. These secessionist movements culminated in the Wars of Ridda or wars against apostasy in Muslim historical accounts. The name confirmed the religious nature of the wars from the Muslims' side. While Donner (1981, pp. 85–86) argues that some of the groups were purely political and did not defy Islamic teachings, Muslim scholars such as Ibn Kathir (2006, pp. 76–78), for example, argue that the "political" groups were defying the obligation to pay *zakat*, which is part of the basic obligations for a Muslim. Thus, their seccesionist movements were religious in nature and the actors were considered as both political enemies and religious apostles.

As we saw in Chapter Five, during this period, the *umma* underwent a subtle change. While maintaining the complex nature as an amalgamation of political and religious society, the appointment of Abu Bakr transformed the *umma* from a society led by a leader-prophet to a society led by an elected leader.

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In some ways, the *umma* had evolved in place of the social contract of the state (Khadduri, 1955, pp. 9–11). Abu Bakr's successor, Umar, managed to strengthen the fledging society by appointing persons known as close companions of Muhammad, both from the *muhajirin* and the *ansar*, in various governmental posts (Lapidus, 2002, pp. 45–46). The *umma* emerged as a strong political entity to the point that it managed to defeat the aging Sassanid Empire. Within only a few years, the *umma* controlled a wide swath of territory from Egypt to Persia, including the holy city of Jerusalem (al-Suyuti, 1881, pp. 135–137).

The young *umma* was not without problems, however. Umar's policy to distribute favour based on a person's closeness to Muhammad and their perceived devotion to Islam drew the ire of the aristocrats. The Quraysh tried to re-establish their power in Mecca and Medina. Other old aristocratic families in outer provinces also did the same. Even the tribal chiefs were seeking to expand their influence and gain their share of power (Lapidus, 2002, p. 46). The rule of Umar, while recorded as an idealised period in Muslim tradition, was rife with conflicting interests. These conflicts are also recorded in Islamic history, such as Umar's decision to dismiss Khalid al-Walid from his position as the general of the Muslim army because Khalid was too famous (al-Tabari, 1989a, pp. 106–108). While the Muslim historical accounts assert that Umar dismissed Khalid to maintain the purity of intention among the Muslims, for them to serve under God instead of under Khalid, this event can be interpreted differently -- as part of the constant struggle of power and for popular support in the Muslim *umma*.

Further challenge awaited Umar's successors. During the rule of Uthman, the struggle for power between various political actors within the society sharpened, culminating with the assassination of Uthman (Lapidus, 2002, p. 46). Despite Ali's efforts to mend the rift, the different political aspirations within the *umma* hardened into a series of civil wars and took on the dimension of religious schism between the Sunnis and the Shi'a, and to lesser extent, the Kharijis, with each side claiming their authority over the whole *umma*. To support their claim, each developed their own system of leadership over the *umma* and provided different interpretations of historical events to support their claim. While the Sunnis considered the Qur'an and the traditions of Muhammad narrated through unbroken chains of scholars as their main sources of belief, the Shi'a put emphasis

on the loyalty to Ali and his descendants as their main source of belief (Lapidus, 2002, pp. 94–95).

After an idea is adopted as a social reality through the objectivation process, the idea goes through the habituation process, making it a habit of the members of the society; it thus further proliferates through the institutionalisation process. Through institutionalisation, the society controls its members and makes them conform to the agreed idea (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 70–77). In the case of the early Muslim society, the idea of Islam was externalised by Muhammad and had been accepted as the social reality in Medina by the time of the *hijra* and on the Arabian peninsula a few years after the conquest of Mecca. The Muslim society expanded from only Medina to most territory on the peninsula. Islam had become the social reality. Yet, suddenly Muhammad passed away and the cornerstone of this social reality vanished, disrupting the habitualisation process before the institutionalisation process had even begun. The period of the *al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun*, the Rightly Guided Caliphs, was a period of turbulence. After a brief moment of victorious surge, the death of Muhammad made the Islamic movement lose their adopters to the secessionist movements. The global consciousness introduced by Islam reverted back to the parochial consciousness of tribalism. The sign of this reversion of consciousness can be seen during the Wars of Ridda, from the way some of the tribes tried to separate themselves from Medina and go back to their tribal ways (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 197).

The early Muslims tried to adapt their society to address this development. Their first effort was to determine who should step up as the successor of Muhammad. This was a step in institutionalising the leadership upon the Muslims, from a charismatic person to an institutional office. There were contending views during this process. The Helpers were concerned that the conquest of Mecca reunified the Emigrants with their estranged families, the Quraysh, thus resulting in the subjugation of the Medinans. Yet, the Helpers had their old rivalry between the Aus and the Khazraj, making a unified front of Helpers difficult to achieve (Kennedy, 2004, p. 51). The succession was finally solved when Abu Bakr, Umar and Abu Ubaida ibn al-Jarrah, as the leaders of the Emigrants, went to meet the Helpers and they managed to reach an agreement, to choose Abu Bakr as the

successor of the Prophet based on his closeness to Muhammad (Kennedy, 2004, p. 52).

The appointment of Abu Bakr as the Caliph was an attempt to institutionalise Islam after Muhammad's death. With the appointment of Abu Bakr, the early Muslims tried to institutionalise the authority of Muhammad into an office, the caliphate, and they chose the holder of this office according to degrees of closeness toward Muhammad. According to Donner (2010, pp. 146–147), the Rightly Guided Caliphs were chosen by the Muslims because they had been close to Muhammad and were considered to embody the central values that the Believers believed in. At the same time, Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman were of different clans, with none of them from Muhammad's Bani Hashim. This, argues Donner, suggests that the Muslims did not value the genealogical or lineage factor as the main criterion for choosing a leader.

Deviation and Heresy

The secessionists, whatever their reasons were, disregarded the institutionalisation process. They expressed their disagreement towards the established Islamic society and this was not well-received by Caliph Abu Bakr, who then conducted a campaign against the secessionists. Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 130–134) argue that when a society is threatened by "deviants" who advocate ideas challenging the accepted social reality, the society has at the very least two options to deal with these "deviants". First, to perform therapy toward the deviants. To perform therapy, society needs to develop a body of knowledge or "therapeutic theory", which consists of theorising the source of the pathology, developing diagnostic methods and performing curative efforts to allow the deviants to embrace the societal truth and return to the society (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 130–132). Second, nihilation, by which society assigns a negative status to the deviants, giving them negative legitimation; in some circumstances, this might proceed to physical liquidation of the deviants (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 132–133).

The Wars of Ridda could be seen as attempts to discipline members of the society who had deviated and challenged the agreed idea. The wars seemed to be nihilistic in nature, as seen from the negative labelling of the secessionists as

"apostates" and labelling their actions as "apostasy". Donner (1981, pp. 85–86) argues that while some of the secessionists were not apostates, unlike some who claimed to be new prophets and prophetesses, the status of apostasy was used indiscriminately. Yet, Baladhuri and Hitti (1916) provide a detailed account of the wars which show that some of the apostates were forgiven and received once again as members of the Islamic *umma* after repudiating their secessionist efforts. These were both the rank-and-file members of the secessionist movements and their leaders, such as Tulaihah ibn Khuwailid, who had claimed to be a new prophet in Buzakhah (Baladhuri and Hitti, 1916, p. 146) and Sajah, who had claimed to be a prophetess and the wife of another false prophet, Musailamah. Citing the Muslim historian Hisham ibn al-Kalbi (d. 819 CE), Baladhuri reports that, after the defeat of her husband's army, Sajah accepted Islam, emigrated to Basrah and remained a good Muslim until her death (Baladhuri and Hitti, 1916, p. 151). These accounts show the theraupetic side of the Wars of Ridda.

During the Wars of Ridda, there were two sides of the society with different strengths of legitimacy to their claims. The side of Abu Bakr and the Companions enjoyed higher legitimacy over their claim to the office of caliphate thanks to their history with the Prophet. The question of legitimacy was more problematic on the secessionist side. First, there was no one, overarching secessionist movement. Second, the movements did not have a strong ideological narrative able to compete with the Islamic narrative. Some of the movements were based on tribal affinity, a movement to step back to the pre-Islamic tribal way and its parochial consciousness. The false prophets and prophetesses did claim trans-tribal leadership but there were too many of them, limiting their support to that of their own tribes and kin. The victory of Abu Bakr over the seccesionists strengthened the unity of the *umma,* at least until the next conflict arose.

Another kind of conflict occurred a few years later. Unlike the Wars of Ridda, the internal civil wars during the rule of Ali and in later centuries represented more fierce and systematic challenges to the leadership of the whole *umma*. These conflicts were not sporadic or tribal in nature but continuous throughout the Muslim lands. These conflicts consisted of conceptual and practical dimensions. On the conceptual level, there was the development of bodies of knowledge that provided different and contending interpretations on how the *umma* should be organised. On a practical level, there were conflicts and

contestations between various actors, each trying to promote and impose their interpretation on to the whole *umma*. Referring to the theoretical framework articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 124), these conflicts over the interpretation of a symbolic universe could be considered as "heresy".

The presence of "heresy" in the narrative of Islamic society started during Ali's rule. The death of Uthman was still unfinished business and Uthman's family demanded that Ali punish the wrongdoers before he could rule. Uthman's family was essentially ruling Mecca and Syria, blocking these provinces from giving allegiance to Ali (Donner, 2010, pp. 157–158) Meanwhile, Ali's major supporters, the Helpers of Medina, were rather unsympathetic to Uthman's family because they felt that Uthman's policy in appointing his cousin to oversee the market in Medina had undermined the Helpers' control even in their own city (Kennedy, 2004, p. 75). While the senior Companions were bickering and found themselves in different, conflicted camps, the general mood of the populace turned to the worse. Since the leadership was embroiled in disputes over wealth, land and status, the general populace assumedly thought that the leadership had strayed away from the principles of piety (Donner, 2010, p. 151).

As we have seen, divisions inside the *umma* did not end with the Battle of the Camel. During the first civil war, Ali and his supporters had to face Mu'awiya and supporters. Both parties had senior Companions with them. Both parties used the Qur'an and the teaching of Islam to support their claims. When a group splintered from Ali's camp and became what is known as the Kharijis, the division turned into a three-camps conflict, each claiming authority over the whole *umma*. Each of these factions then developed a sophisticated body of knowledge to support their claim. All of these movements intertwined the sacred and the profane. They were both political movement and religious doctrines.

Universe-maintenance: theological developments

The development of theology to support their particular idea of the *umma* is consistent with the mechanism of universe-maintenance. As argued by Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 127–129), there are four levels of knowledge which can be used to support an idea by providing rational explanation and normative justification to it: mythology, theology, philosophy and science. Mythology

provides the most basic legitimation to a conception of reality, explaining the penetration of the sacred into day-to-day social reality. Theology has a greater degree of systematisation than mythology. It also requires the development of disciplined bodies of knowledge to support it, such as was exhibited in Islamic history by the development of the fields of *hadith* and *fiqh* to support the theological positions of the Sunnis and Shi'a. Philosophy and science are, by way of contrast, a secular form of legitimation to the extent that science removes the sacred from day-to-day social reality.

This development was apparent especially in the case of the Shi'a. At first, the conflict between the Sunnis and the Shi'a was political in nature but then each side developed theological arguments both as the consequences of their political views or to provide higher moral and religious ground on their political view. According to Lapidus (2002, pp. 95–96) there were two concerns in Shi'i religious circles during the middle of the eighth century: to develop their own tradition of *hadith* and to defend the legitimacy of the Shi'i Imamate. These were imperative in order to support their political claim over the succession. These efforts were parallel with the efforts to codify the *hadith* and to develop theories of the caliphate from the Sunni side. Scholars like al-Mawardi to some extent might have developed their theories partly to defend the legitimacy of the Sunni caliphate against attack from Shi'i scholars (Hanne, 2004).

Not only Sunni and Shi'a developed their own bodies of knowledge. The Khariji movement to some extent also developed their own interpretation of the *umma* and its leadership, adamantly characterising a leader based on their rigid view of piety. It was very active as a political movement, despite its number being relatively low (Lapidus, 2002, p. 47; Donner, 2010, pp. 163, 167-168). The Mu'tazilite movement in later centuries also developed their own interpretation of the *umma* and tried to establish it as the correct interpretation through the *mihna*, in which the Abbasid caliph, al-Ma'mun (r. 813-833 CE), decreed that any religious judge, or *qadi*, had to embrace Mu'tazilism or be dismissed or jailed (Fakhry, 1999, pp. 278–281).

The presence of contending theological movements, such as Sunnism, Shi'ism, Kharijism and Mu'tazilism, is prevalent in the history of the *umma*. These theological movements were then supported by various groups within the society, each claiming the legitimacy of their cause by citing the theological

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framework developed and labelling the others as heretics. There was interplay between religion, politics and social movements in each case of heretical dispute. In the case of the Kharijis, for example, this group was formed by the pious believers of Kufa. They were against Ali's decision to end the civil war using arbitration. Their opinion was, by putting the matter to arbitration, Ali had supplanted God's will with human will (Donner, 2010, p. 162). The Kharijis then developed their own interpretation of the *umma* and its leadership. They put heavy emphasis on piety, using it as the sole characteristic for their *imam* (Hawting, 2000, p. 3). While this at a glance could be considered as an egalitarian movement, the extreme Kharijite branch advocated indiscriminate killings, including rejecting other Muslims not adhering to their principles, considering them sinful and liable to be killed unless they accepted the Kharijites' *imam* and their doctrine (Hawting, 2000, p. 4; Black, 2011, pp. 16–17).

The Shi'a assumed a different position. The Shi'a considered lineage was the ultimate prerequisite for an *imam*. According to the Shi'a, since Ali was the legitimate caliph, it would be imperative to maintain the succession through his bloodline. This view then evolved and Shi'i scholars developed a theological argument to support their claim over the leadership of the *umma*, arguing that the Prophet had designated Ali as his successor at the event of Ghadir Khumm (Berkey, 2003, p. 131). By the end of the ninth century, this concept had evolved into the infallibility and sinless nature, or *ma'sum,* of the Imams (Lapidus, 2002, p. 95). The Shi'a had been mainly supported by the close followers of Ali in Kufa but by focusing on under-privileged Muslims and consistently asserting their place as the opposition to the worldly Umayyad government, Ali's descendants gained the respect and support of many Muslims throughout Islamic lands (Kennedy, 2004, p. 77).

The group within the Muslim society now known as the Sunnis was not readily defined during the early century of the *umma*, unlike the Kharijis or the Shi'a. Schacht (1964; 1979) argues that Sunni legal thinking started to develop in the second century of the *hijra*, basing his argument on the development of *usul al-fiqh* in the Shafi'i school. Melchert (1997, pp. xxi–xxii) and Motzki (2002, pp. 287–291) argue that the development of Sunni legal schools had started by the end of the first century of the *hijra*, as can be seen in the development of the Hanafi school in Kufa and the Maliki school in Hijaz. With regard to the political

dimension, the Sunnis acknowledged the legitimacy of all four Rightly Guided Caliphs and primarily focused on supporting the unity of the *umma* (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 278). This group slowly built on their political conceptualisation of the *umma* and its leadership under the caliphate, as described in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.

Politically, the Mu'tazilites had been neutral in political contestation between these three factions. They were the rationalist scholars, putting reason above passionate piety. Yet, when the Mu'tazilites supported al-Ma'mun (r. 813-833 CE) and together enforced the violent *mihna* in 833 CE, it had become another political/religious faction within the *umma* (Black, 2011, pp. 26–27). Mu'tazilite scholar, al Jahiz, supported al-Ma'mun and the Abbasids in general. He argues that there are differences between the enlightened elite and the mass. Thus, it is impossible to leave the election of a leader to the masses, who do not even understand what the leadership is for and, instead, he relies on the elite to choose the leader. According to al-Jahiz, the important characteristics for a leader are intelligence, erudition and having good habits, and these qualities should be observable in a particular candidate, in contrast to the Shi'ite idea of a hidden leader (Black, 2011, p. 29). The violent *mihna* continued after the death of al-Ma'mun and lasted for fifteen years (833-848 CE). At the end of the day, the *mihna* failed and damaged the reputation of the Abbasids in general (Donner, 1999, p. 27).

Objectivation and Legitimation processes

The Islamisation process and the caliphate

The contestation between these various movements was one of the major themes in Muslim history. This contestation mainly affected the political unity of the *umma*. The institution of the caliphate, which was once anticipated to be a unifying force over the body of the *umma*, had failed to do so. As discussed in Chapter Five, the combination between constant conceptual contestation and constant territorial expansion had made it hard to maintain one, unified, caliphate throughout Muslim history. Yet, despite its shortcomings, the caliphate and the Caliph himself had become important symbols of, and to, the *umma* (Donner, 1999, p. 18). There were also various achievements done or ordered by various

Caliphs which inevitably helped the integration process between various Muslim locales. The Umayyads, for example, were considered the pioneers of the Islamisation process throughout the Muslim lands (Donner, 2010, pp. 203–217), which unwittingly provided the society with a common platform to interact.

The Islamisation process done by the Umayyads likely stemmed from their need to provide stronger legitimacy over their rule. Because of civil strife, it was considered prudent to adopt policies which would strengthen their rule. At the same time, unwittingly perhaps, these policies helped in the integration of the *umma*. Donner (2010, pp. 203–217) describes several policies of the Umayyads which were in line with the theoretical frameworks advocated by Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Geertz (1973), such as the minting of new coinages with the *shahada* inscription. Possibly in order to strengthen his image as a pious Muslim, Abdul al-Malik (r. 685-705) minted coins only with the *shahada* and Qur'anic verses inscribed on them. This design was considered a radical departure from the designs of common coins of Byzantine origin.

While this monetary policy might have financial intent and effect, it also served the objectivation process of a unified *umma*. The presence and utilisation of these coins helped the people inside the Umayyads' territory to build a consciousness that they were part of an integrated society. If people from Syria and Hijaz traded using the same coins as people from Kufa, surely they were part of the same society? And if these coins bore the holy inscriptions, surely this society was also blessed by God? The same policy of minting coins to empower political legitimacy was also adopted by Abdurrahman III, the Umayyad Caliph in al-Andalus. In order to stop the distribution of Fatimid coins, which could be seen as a tool of Shi'i propaganda, Abdurrahman III ordered the minting of Andalusian Umayyad coins with an engraving claiming him as "the servant of God Abdurrahman, Commander of the Faithful, who brings victory to the religion" (Fierro, 2005, p. 59).

Donner (2010, pp. 217–218) also states that the Umayyad rulers were involved in the elaboration of a story of Islam's origins. While the efforts to construct a unified narrative on Islam and early Muslim history were done by many people in the *umma*, the Umayyads invited and provided patronage to knowledgeable scholars. Through this story of Islamic origins, the society built a common history --of the Prophet, of the early society of Believers that he had

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established, of how this society continued to exist over the decades after Muhammad's death. The goal of this narrative, Donner (2010, p. 218) argues, was to legitimate the contemporary *umma* in general and to educate the next generation on the legitimacy of the *umma*. This is precisely a form of institutionalisation of history in order to introduce the socially accepted idea as the "objective truth" to the younger generation (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 70–77). It also provided legitimation to the institutions in the *umma* by ascribing meaning and cognitive validity through the presence of unified historical narrative of the Prophet, or *sira*, which further enforced the developing Sunni theology.

The Abbasid Revolution (746-750) resulted in the destruction of the Umayyads' political institution and supplanted it with the Abbasids' own. Yet, the Abbasids kept the Islamic narrative just like the Umayyads had done, which at that time had become the "objective truth" in the society. El-Hibri (1999, p. 3) describes the Abbasid revolution as part of a greater movement, which was believed to be messianic in nature and would usher in a new age of Islamic revival. According to Kennedy (2004, p. 123), in the ninety years of Umayyad rule, there was a growing general assumption among discontented Muslims that the problem of the *umma* could only be solved by a leader from what he calls the 'Holy Family' of Muhammad,. While in the later period of Muslim history the Holy Family was taken as the descendants of Ali and Fatima and their Shi'a followers, the *ahl al-Bayt,* during the end of the first century of *hijra*, the Shi'a were not consolidated enough to claim this exceptionalism. There were several branches of the Prophet's family who claimed the right to rule, one of whom were the Abbasids. Riding on this sentiment, the Abbasids then cultivated the narrative that the Holy Family consisted of descendants of Hashim, thus including the Alids and the Abbasids but excluding the Umayyads (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 123–124).

The Abbasids' claim of authority was not uncontested. The Shi'a were developing their political and theological concepts and continued to threaten the authority of the Abbasid Caliphs. For example, as early as 762 CE, the Shi'a orchestrated a massive revolt over the Abbasids' authority and undermined their legitimacy by accusing them of betraying their oath of allegiance to the Shi'i leader, Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya (El-Hibri, 1999, pp. 4–5). Later, a branch of Shi'ism, the Ismaili Shi'a, founded the Fatimid Caliphate in 909 CE which made Cairo the centre of learning for Ismaili Shi'a and challenged the Sunni part

of the *umma*, in both the East and the West for four generations (Halm, 1991, pp. 170–177). Starting in 945 CE, the Abbasid Caliphate itself was controlled by the Buyids, a military family who professed the Ithna'Ashari branch of Shi'ism (Kennedy, 2004, p. 227).

The constant attack on their legitimacy prompted the Abbasid Caliphs to develop more elaborate legitimation for their claim to authority. This drove the development of Islamic political theory to support the political practice of the caliphate. Although large territory was absorbed into the Muslim political entity, the wide variance of local cultures and social groups also necessitated the development of more sophisticated tools to maintain the unity of the *umma*. The Qur'an had provided Muslims with motivation to establish and maintain the *umma*. It, however, did not provide them with details on the operational part. Muslim intellectuals endeavoured to answer this challenge by developing derivative social and political concepts in relation to the *umma*. Usually, political entities drew their authority from historical milestones, be that the history of a nation or history of a certain personage. However, Islam cut ties to the past. Historical accounts of both Arab and non-Arab nations or personal lineage to some extent did not hold sway in Muslim society. It was imperative for Muslim intellectuals to pool their efforts and fill this theoretical void by developing a concept of authority in line with Islamic teachings, all to serve the *umma* (Kennedy, 2000, pp. 18–19).

One of the treatises that provides discussion of the political institution of the *umma* is the work of al-Mawardi, *al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya* or the *Ordinances of Government*. It is the perfect example of the levels of legitimation process articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 127–129). Before al-Mawardi's *Ordinances*, the *umma* and the caliphate were more of a myth, remnants from the time of the Prophet. The scholars of *sira* and *hadith* then developed it further, under the Umayyad's patronage, into a structured theological knowledge based on reliable narrators. Al-Mawardi took the legitimation step further by describing the *umma* and the caliphate in the language of political philosophy and political instrumentality. This effort increased the level of legitimacy supporting the institution of the caliphate and the Sunni interpretation of the *umma*.

The institution of caliphate was rejuvenated when Sulayman I of the Ottoman took the title in 1540 CE. Sulayman I adopted the title in order to gain equal footing with Charles V who had been inaugurated as the Holy Roman

Emperor in 1519 CE (Imber, 2010, p. 350). After taking the mantle of the caliphate, the Ottomans paid close attention to the affairs of the Muslim world, near and far. They expanded their diplomatic missions and trade envoys to various Muslim locales, for example.

While their initial motive in adopting the title of the caliphate was certainly not entirely altruistic, the Ottomans inadvertently adopted the framework of Islamic virtue and solidarity embedded in the Qur'an. They tried to be the "proper" caliph, as can be seen through both symbolic and practical efforts of the Ottoman caliphs. To further strengthen their authority over the *umma*, the Ottomans developed political legitimation based on Ibn Khaldun's *asabiyya*, thus lending them credence leading the *umma* by virtue of having a strong solidarity. The Ottomans also became patron of various Sufi orders, including the Naqshbandiyya. With this, they sought to become the legitimate ruler of the Muslim world and to integrate the *umma* under their banner. However, in late eighteenth century, the Ottomans, facing external challenges and internal inefficiencies, decided to adopt Western values and started the Tanzimat reform. This marked the defeat of Islam as a central political concept and the *umma* with it.

Intellectual networks and translocality

The flourishing of knowledge, especially during the Abbasid era, was driven by the believers' perspective that seeking knowledge is a sacred duty for Muslims. As detailed in Chapter Three, Muslim intellectuals were both motivated and conditioned by their Islamic environment; they established an intellectual culture distinctively Islamic by combining religious rituals with intellectual rituals. The result was the development of bodies of knowledge based on holy texts and Islamic worldviews (Grunebaum, 1955, p. 111). They were open to knowledge developed by other intellectual traditions but would made adjustments before adopting the foreign knowledge.

While they could work in a solitary environment, Collins (1998, p. 21) argues that scholars would gain benefits by being members of an intellectual network or chain. Through this intellectual network, scholars could participate in intellectual ritual and gain bursts of enthusiasm, which Collins calls "emotional energy". Scholars can also collect symbols acknowledged by the intellectual world -- what is termed "cultural capital" -- and increasing one's standing in the

intellectual world. The description of this intellectual ritual and its effects on the participating scholars are seemingly parallel to Geertz's (1973) definition of religious ritual and its effects on the believers. In the case of Muslim scholars, since they believed that pursuing knowledge was a duty according to the *hadith*, they did not make a distinction between intellectual and religious, thus intensifying the practice of intellectual/religious rituals and networks throughout the Muslim lands. Through intellectual networks, Muslim scholars gained knowledge and symbols important to their social standing, such as a certificate (*ijaza)* from prestigious schools in Mecca or Medina or being part of a student-chain (*isnad*) to a renowned scholar.

The presence of intellectual/religious networks throughout the Muslim lands connected various Muslim locales into a translocal network of intellectuals. This helped in bridging geographically distant areas into one, integrated, society and cultivating the development of a consciousness in the minds of Muslims that transcended their parochial consciousness. This integration could be seen in the culture of *rihla* among Muslim scholars. Gellens (1990) describes how *rihla* as a social phenomenon connected various parts of Muslim society in one interconnected web of interactions. Various learning centres such as Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Baghdad and Cairo had become the destination of Muslims throughout the world. When young scholars from Indonesia or Andalusia journeyed to the learning centres, they underwent a translocal journey which broadened their perspective. Even after they returned home, the experience would be embedded deep within their consciousness and it changed them.

Yet, not only Muslim scholars gained benefit from this extensive intellectual network. Kings and the general populace also reaped considerable benefit by connecting their realm with the greater *umma*. Thanks to the intertwined nature of intellectual and religious rituals, by joining the Muslim intellectual network, a local population gained not only religious knowledge but often access to better medicine or sanitation or other kinds of developments. With the network also came political influence and power. There is an account which describes how kings from Bornu and Songhay sought the attention of the West African scholar Jamal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 1505), hoping that by gaining his service in their courts, the scholar could help the kings in obtaining formal recognition as vice-regents of the Abbasid caliph (Reichmuth, 2000, p. 427).

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The established Muslim intellectual networks also helped the integration of the *umma* by promoting social mobility for Muslims, irrespective of their origins. Being a member of the network opened the chance for anyone to prosper and gain achievements. Islam came to Indonesia at least from the eleventh century and had been established as the majority religion in the area by the sixteenth century (Attas, 1969, pp. 29–30). Its location and limited influence on the supposed centre of the Muslim world might have attested to Indonesia's peripheral status. Yet, the presence of translocal intellectual networks allowed Indonesian Muslims to take a great role in the Muslim world. One such example, as we have seen in Chapter Three, is Syaikh Yusuf al-Maqassari (d. 1699). A scholar from Makassar, eastern Indonesia, he went to *hajj* and afterward stayed in Medina and studied under Sayyid Shibghat Allah ibn Ruh Allah Jamal al-Barjawi (d. 1606), a scholar from Bharuch, India. He is considered an influential figure in the spreading of Islam in the Cape peninsula where he had been subsequently exiled (Blij, 1969, pp. 246–247).

The Islamic intellectual networks became an instrument of the global *umma* by providing an intellectual narrative supporting the idea of the global *umma*, thus supporting the legitimation process, and transmitting this intellectual narrative to various locales within the Muslim world. It also became evidence of the global *umma,* thus helping with the objectivation process. The abstract global consciousness was realised in a tangible way and was an easy to understand phenomenon by allowing Muslims from one locale to move and gain cultural capital in another, for example by visiting Mecca and studying there. While not all Muslims were part of these intellectual networks, many others would be in connection and interaction with those who were. In this sense, the Muslim scholars had become the carrier of the global consciousness and interaction with them would trigger a transference process, maybe unwittingly "infecting" the other party with at least a partial consciousness that their territory was connected to a greater, larger Islamic world. This is in accordance with the transference process, which Friedman (2007) describes as one of the defining characteristics of contemporary globalisation.

Another Form of Transference: Sufi networks

The declining power of the Abbasids and the emergence of rival caliphates in Cairo and Cordoba did not disturb the intellectual networks. If anything, these political developments stimulated intellectual activities. After the establishment of the Umayyad Caliphate in al-Andalus, the flow of scholars from the Umayyad cities did not decline. Fierro (2005, pp. 134–135) describes that the Caliph Abdurrahman III encouraged the Andalusian scholars to adopt the Maliki school of law and foster strong cooperation with the Maliki scholars of Medina. Through this intellectual link with the legacy of Muhammad, Abdurrahman III managed to strengthen his claim as the Caliph and to counter both the Fatimids' and the Abbasids' propaganda against him.

The destruction of Baghdad in 1258 CE, however, was different. It shocked Muslim society. It halted many scientific and intellectual endeavours. It sacked one of the most beautiful cities in the Islamic world. The caliphate had been accepted as a natural course of the Islamic governance over the *umma*, yet suddenly it was destroyed. Muslim scholars considered this destruction as a divine portent and al-Suyuti (1881, pp. 500–503) quotes elegies lamenting the destruction. The Mamluks established the caliphate in Egypt several years later but it was without power or glory. It was no more than a shadow of its former self. The shock had been profound and felt widely, and this pushed the development of alternative forms of religiosity. The movement to capture the spirit of Islam through mysticism had been growing since the tenth century CE but Sufism gained true prominence in the Muslim society after the destruction of Baghdad (Trimingham, 1971, p. 22).

Sufi brotherhoods established networks through chains of *silsila* between teacher to student, not unlike the intellectual networks established by various schools of thought earlier. Sufism, however, strengthened these chains using a specialised form of chants (*dhikr*) and appropriating Sufi *shaikhs* as *walis*. This eventually developed Sufi orders into more cohesive and strongly bonded groups, comparable to the *madhhabs*. Their lodges could be found in rural areas, thus allowing the Sufis to penetrate geographical areas previously untouched by instruments of Muslim society. The scattered lodges also resulted in an intensified culture of travelling in Sufism. Sufis often travelled to visit *shaikhs* residing in

particular lodges or, after the *shaikhs'* death, travelled to visit their tombs. This activity, known as *ziyara*, stimulated travelling in various Muslim locales and providing other destinations for pilgrims other than the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Trimingham (1971) describes in detail the evolution of Sufi orders. Early Sufism could be considered as intensification of Islamic piety. Sufis sought to connect directly to God, finding no interest in the contestation and conflicts among the *madhhab*s (Schimmel, 1975, pp. 12–14). Later, Sufi orders started to put more emphasis on the role of the *shaikh* and developed their chains of studentship, just as the *madhhab* and Muslim centres of learning in general had also established their own intellectual chains, *isnad* (Trimingham, 1971, p. 10). Eventually, the *shaikh* ascended to the status of saint and only he could discern the ultimate truth. The orders lost their mystical creativity by institutionalising rituals according to the *shaikh's* instruction but, at the same time, this allowed the general populace to take part in the Sufi rituals without having to initiate themselves in deeper mysteries (Trimingham, 1971, pp. 71–103).

As discussed in Chapter Six, the flourishing of Sufism brought Sufi orders to various part of the Islamic world. The examples in Chapter Six, the Naqshbandiyya and the Tijaniyya, were capable of connecting disparate Muslim lands. The Naqshbandiyya was founded in Bukhara yet then spread to Central Asia and became a popular order in the area. In addition to connecting various territories, the Naqshbandi *shaikhs* also played an important role in cultural integration by translating important works from Persian into Turkish or Arabic (Le Gall, 2005, pp. 172–173). The Tijaniyya, on the other hand, was founded in Fez. Under the leadership of Umar ibn Sa'id Tall, the Tijaniyya established a caliphate that encompassed contemporary Guinea, Senegal and Mali, integrating the region to a wider trans-Saharan trade network (Lydon, 2009, pp. 116–118).

The *umma* as a global society?

Society has been an important part of our life. While traditionally the concept of society was in practice bound by state or tribal boundaries, it is no longer so (Elias, 2001a, pp. 162–163). Scholars have contested the claim of the nation-state to be the natural unit of organisation and affiliation, such as argued by Held (2005, p. 10). Indeed, with the intensification of translocal interactions and

networks due to the development of transportation and communication technology, the world is slowly integrated into "a single, integrated and interdependent world" (Jaffe, 2006). Yet, is this integration unique to our contemporary world? Scholars such as Abu-Lughod (1989) and Frank and Gills (1996) disagree. Although they differ as to the number of historic world systems, according to them, our world has been interconnected and integrated in a world system from long ago. Robertson (2011) does not give details on the form of world-wide connectivity as they do; instead, he usefully highlights the presence of a global consciousness that presupposes the global connection.

This thesis takes on this debate and further proposes that one candidate for historical world systems articulated by Abu-Lughod is the Islamic *umma*, and specifically seeks to answer two particular questions: "how did the early Islamic society develop global consciousness?" and "how was the concept of the *umma* developed in relation both to the concept of global consciousness and to the concept and historical formation of a global society?" To answer these questions, I build a theoretical framework based on social constructionism articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966) to illustrate the development of a social reality called "the *umma*". Geertz's (1973) explanation as to how religion and religious rituals are capable of providing mood and motivation to the believers is indispensable to understand how Islamic teaching could inspire and motivate the believers to create such a transformative social movement by forming and maintaining the *umma*. Conceptual developments in the field of international relations, especially those of the English school such as Burton (1972), Wight (1977), Bull (2002) and Buzan (2004) are crucial to the development of a definition of "global society" as an instrument to reflect on the development of the *umma*.

To answer the first question, "how did the early Islamic society develop global consciousness", I argue that the early Islamic society developed global consciousness through reflecting the spiritual teaching of Islam and through several networks -- namely, intellectual, political and legal-institutional and mystical networks. That the teaching of Islam had changed the societal practice in the Arabian Peninsula is supported by various accounts, from both classical Muslim tradition and contemporary scholars. The ease of the first generation Muslims in embracing the societal nature of the *umma* was based on their

understanding of the Islamic teaching that God is One and that men are created to live together (Khadduri, 1955, p. 3). This emphasis on unity is caused by the foremost doctrine in Islam, which is *tawhid* or the Oneness of God. There are also verses in the Qur'an which emphasise the unity of mankind according to Islam, such as Qur'an 49:13, which, according to al-Suyuti, was delivered to admonish the racial behaviour of early Muslims (Suyuti, 2008, p. 530). The teaching of the Qur'an sets the moods for Muslims to maintain unity in their society. Furthermore, the Prophet had also established a unified society in Medina, which then developed into what Arjomand (2009, p. 271) describes as the *Pax Islamica* movement. This is in line with what Robertson and Inglish (2006, p. 30) define as a global consciousness: a consciousness of the world as a whole, interconnected and interdependent.

Observing the efforts of Muhammad to build the *umma* through the perspective of the norm diffusion process, this thesis assumes that after the Qur'an had provided the Muslims with a type of global consciousness, Muhammad adopted it as a new norm and, as its first and foremost norm enterpreneur, set out to actualise this norm in the Quraysh society of Mecca. Finding resistance from the Quraysh, however, Muhammad embarked upon a social process, the *hijra*, which then triggered the establishment of the *umma* in Medina. The consciousness of the *umma* went through the norm life cycle discussed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, pp. 895–902). It emerged during the *hijra*, it reached the tipping point after the conquest of Mecca and entered the second stage, norm cascade, in the years afterwards. The death of Muhammad had been a blow to the development of this norm, as seen by the various secessionist movements challenging the unity of the *umma,* but Abu Bakr as the successor of Muhammad managed to reaffirm the dominance of the *umma.*

The later caliphs might have adopted the concept of *umma* in order to provide legitimation for their claim of authority over the vast territories of the Muslim world, but their continuous usage of Islamic rituals, symbols and rhetoric to strengthen their political position in turn helped to enforce the imagery of the *umma* in the mind of the general populace. Expressed in Berger's and Luckmann's (1966) terminology, they helped to foster the objectivation and institutionalisation processes of the idea of the *umma*, turning it into a coherent social reality. There is a possibility, of course, that this adoption of idea of the *umma* might have been

driven by non-religious motives, but, even so, it would not alter the fact that they had facilitated the actualisation of the idea. That norm adopters often adopt norms in accordance with their pragmatic interests is common, yet, doing so, they invariably engage with the moral discourse brought by the norm, as argued by Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999, pp. 15–16).

The institution of the caliphate was important in the maintenance of the *umma* because it also provided structural support for the idea. As Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 134–146) have described, an idea requires a social structure to support and maintain it. An idea is considered pragmatically superior against other contending ideas not by its intrinsic qualities but by its applicability to the social interest of the supporting group. Thus, the flourishing of the caliphate and its pragmatic achievements were considered as evidence of the superiority of the idea of the *umma*. It is understandable if the fall of the Abbasid caliphate was then considered as the fall of the *umma* itself. The same could be understood from the fall of the Ottoman caliphate. Yet, this thesis has demonstrated that despite the fall of the Abbasids, the *umma* was, to some extent, sustained. The networks of intellectuals and Sufi orders were among the evidence of the presence of the translocal connections and integration present in the Muslim world.

The development of bodies of knowledge to support the *umma* as the natural social order, such as the works of al-Mawardi, Nizam al-Mulk, al-Ghazali and many others, helped to establish the legitimacy of the *umma*. These books attempted to justify the presence of the *umma* and the figure of authority over it, be that the caliph or the sultan, in accordance with the political situation at their times. By engaging the concept of the *umma* with the reality of their time and trying to systematise their arguments on authority over the *umma*, these scholars raised the legitimacy level of the *umma* from that of mythology to philosophy (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 127–129). The networks of intellectuals then helped the proliferation of these philosophical debates and facilitated the transference of the embedded global consciousness to the corners of the Muslim world. More than being the medium of transference, this thesis argues that the presence of intellectual networks in the Muslim world connected various geographically distant locales and provided an avenue for social mobilisation among Muslim scholars. Thus, the networks also served as an indicator of the actualisation of the global consciousness into a translocal society.

The second question follows: "how was the concept of the *umma* developed in relation both to the concept of global consciousness and to the concept and historical formation of a global society?" I argue that the global consciousness embedded in the Islamic teaching solidified into a translocal, but <u>not</u> encompassing global, society, which in the Islamic vocabulary is referred to as the *umma*. The presence of the caliphate, and networks of intellectuals and Sufi orders extensively described in the previous chapters, are the indicators that the *umma* was a social reality and had the characteristics of translocal society. Yet, was this translocal society truly *global* in the sense that it, quoting Shaw (2000, p. 10), had "the quality involved in the worldwide stretching of social relations"?

Reflecting on the discussion in the previous chapters, I conclude that the presence of a truly global *umma* that connected and encompassed the whole world in networks of social relations was, and is, questionable. The Umayyad caliphate never ruled the entire world. Even during their peak, the Abbasids and the Ottomans had to share their authority with contending caliphates or other political actors. The networks of scholars in the Muslim intellectual world or the Sufi brotherhoods were expansive and extended well beyond the caliphate's political influence, especially in the later years, but there were still parts of the world which were not included in the network because of various reasons. The exclusion of non-Muslim societies from these networks is obvious but more subtle questions such as "should the non-Muslim intellectuals in the Muslim world be considered as part of the Muslim intellectual network" or "should the presence of an independent Sufi order be considered as part of a global Sufi movement" posit challenges to the idea that the *umma* was a truly *global* society.

This thesis then arrives at its conclusion that the "global *umma*" resided at the conceptual level of belief, calling Muslims to venture towards it. The Qur'an taught it. Islamic rituals provided the mood and motivations to actualise it. It perpetuated and permeated Islam and Islamic teaching and Muslims inevitably internalised the concept with their religious experience. As an example, a Muslim might have considered performing the ritual of *hajj* as his or her religious duty. In so doing, interacting in the charged multicultural environment of Mecca, pilgrims from various geographical areas were likely to envision the Muslim *umma* in global terms. Once home, the perceived global society would have formed an integrated part of their religious narrative – in this sense, an integral part of their

religious experience. Yet the global society as an established fact –a concrete, regularised and institutionalised existence– was and remains an aspiration. In a word, therefore: global consciousness has inspired the idea of a global society but the reality is of a translocal, rather than truly global, society.

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