An exploration of constructions of racial and national identities in US and EU climate security discourses

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Grounded in a methodology of critical discourse analysis and semi-structured interviews, this thesis investigates constructions of racial and national identities in US and EU climate security discourses. Utilizing a theoretical framework based on ‘essentializing logics’ (a concept developed to analyze how naturalized assumptions and associations about populations are held in relation to possible climate-insecure futures), the thesis argues that intersectional racial and national identities are constructed in context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourses and are underpinned by multiple biopolitics of unequally valued lives. This argument is elaborated in three empirical chapters. First, the thesis examines the racialization of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrant populations in particular, situated moments of climate security discourse. The second empirical chapter focuses on discursive representations of interconnections between climate change and terrorism and how such interconnections represent important points of intersection for racial and national identities in climate security. The final empirical chapter examines representations of American nationhood in US climate security discourse. These include constructions of American exceptionalism, the impacts of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy for conceptions of American national identity, and the development of ‘climate-resilient’ American nationhood. The thesis concludes by reflecting on the project’s findings. I argue that multi-scalar interpretations of environmental justice (grounded in a manifesto for ‘abundant futures’ (Collard et al (2015)) and Koopman’s (2011) feminist ‘alter-geopolitics’) could provide a tentative means through which to think about more just, situated environmental securities.
List of contents

Title and Abstract (p.2)
List of contents (p.3)
List of tables and figures (p.6)
List of abbreviations (p.6)
Declaration and statement of copyright (p.9)
Acknowledgements (p.10)

Chapter 1: Situating ‘climate security’: Introduction and research questions (p.11)
1.1 Introduction (p.11)
1.2 A brief history of climate security (p.12)
1.3 Discourses of climate security (p.16)
1.4 Research questions and objectives (p.21)
1.5 Thesis structure (p.25)

Chapter 2: A methodological framework to study climate security discourses (p.28)
2.1 Introduction and research questions (p.28)
2.2 Critical discourse analysis – justification and conceptual basis (p.28)
2.3 Practical implementation (p.33)
   2.3.1 The CDA sample and political context (p.33)
   2.3.2 Descriptive coding (p.38)
   2.3.3 Textual analysis (p.44)
   2.3.4 Analytical coding and contextual analysis (p.47)
2.4 Semi-structured interviews (p.50)
   2.4.1 Methodological justification (p.50)
   2.4.2 Sampling procedure for semi-structured interviews (p.52)
   2.4.3 The interview process (p.53)
   2.4.4 Interpretation of interview data (p.56)
2.5 EU fieldwork and semi-structured interviews (p.57)
Chapter 3: Essentializing logics in US and EU climate security discourses: a theoretical framework (p.61)

3.1 Introduction and research questions (p.61)
3.2 Said’s anti-essentialism (p.62)
3.3 Biopolitics (p.64)
3.4 Biopolitics of unequally valued lives (p.71)
3.5 US and EU climate securities as ‘discourses’ (p.73)
   3.5.1 Conceptions of ‘discourse’ (p.73)
   3.5.2 ‘Representations’ and ‘text’ (p.76)
   3.5.3 Power-knowledge relations and climate security (p.78)
3.6 Climate securities and possible climate-insecure futures (p.80)
3.7 Essentializing logics of US and EU climate securities (p.84)
   3.8.1 Racial logics (p.91)
   3.8.2 National logics (p.97)
3.9 Possibilities for environmental justice in US and EU climate securities (p.100)

Chapter 4: Exploring racial logics in US and EU climate security discourses (p.105)

4.1 Introduction and research questions (p.105)
4.2 Racial logics (p.106)
4.3 Naturalization (p.107)
   4.3.1 Historical context (p.107)
   4.3.2 Racial logics and a latent capacity towards terrorism (p.111)
   4.3.3 Racial logics and inherent cultural incompatibility (p.115)
   4.3.4 Racial logics and possibilities of containment (p.119)
4.4 Dehumanization (p.131)
4.5 Determinism (p.134)

Chapter 5: Representations of terrorism in US and EU climate security discourses (p.146)

5.1 Introduction and research questions (p.146)
5.2 ‘Terrorism’ and ‘radicalization’ – where do they sit in climate security? (p.147)
5.3 Historical contexts (p.151)
5.4 Complex causal chains connecting terrorism and climate change (p.153)
5.5 Biological metaphors in climate security discourses (p.159)
5.6 Intersectional, essentializing logics of climate change-terrorism debates (p.163)
5.7 Anti-Americanism and climate security (p.169)

Chapter 6: Representations of American nationhood and national logics in US climate security discourse (p.180)
6.1 Introduction and research questions (p.180)
6.2 American exceptionalism in US climate security (p.181)
6.3 Defensive American exceptionalisms (p.183)
6.4 Universalized American nationhood (p.192)
   6.4.1 American ‘values’ and ‘leadership’ (p.192)
   6.4.2 Human security (p.196)
6.5 Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy (p.203)
   6.5.1 Hurricane Katrina (p.203)
   6.5.2 Hurricane Sandy (p.207)
6.6 Climate-resilient American nationhood (p.209)
   6.6.1 A climate-resilient national subject? (p.209)
   6.6.2 Histories of resilience in the US (p.211)
   6.6.3 Climate resilience and American nationhood (p.214)

Chapter 7: Conclusion: Towards possibilities for just environmental securities (p.221)
7.1 Introduction and research questions (p.221)
7.2 Research findings and current contexts (p.221)
   7.2.1 Donald Trump and US climate security (p.225)
7.3 Just, situated environmental securities (p.228)
7.4 Contribution and future research directions (p.234)

Appendices (p.237)

References (p.249)
List of Figures

Figure 1: The ‘arc of tension’ (Werz and Conley 2012: 3) (p.125)

Figure 2: UK broadsheet newspapers citing climate change and terrorism in the same sentence (based on a NexisTM search), De Goede and Randalls (2009: 864) (p.152)

List of Tables

Table 1: A table of US descriptive codes (p.39)

Table 2: A table of EU descriptive codes (p.42)

List of Abbreviations

CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CIM – Climate-induced Migration

CNA - Center for Naval Analyses

COP – Conference of Parties

DHS – Department of Homeland Security

DNI – Director of National Intelligence

DOD – Department of Defense (United States)

E3G – Third Generation Environmentalism
EJ – Environmental Justice

EPA – Environmental Protection Agency

ESRC – Economic and Social Research Council

EU – European Union

FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency

GHG – Greenhouse Gases

ICCAF – Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Taskforce

IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

JOE – Joint Operating Environment

JuD - Jamaat-ud-Dawa

MAB – Military Advisory Board (from the Center for Naval Analyses)

MENA – Middle East and North Africa region

MOD – Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)

NAACP – National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

NGO – Non-governmental Organization

NIC – National Intelligence Council

OFDA – Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
Pentagon – Headquarters of and alternative name for the US Department of Defense

QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review

SHO – Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties

SIDS – Small Island Developing States

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNGA – United Nations General Assembly

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

UK – United Kingdom

US – United States

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

WGBU – German Advisory Council on Global Change

WMO – World Meteorological Organization

WWF – World Wildlife Fund
Declaration:

I, Andrew Jonathan Telford, declare that this thesis represents my own work and has not been previously submitted for the degree of any other degree or diploma. I certify that the use of material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

Statement of copyright:

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author’s prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
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Chapter 1: 
Situating ‘climate security’: introduction and research questions

1.1 Introduction

‘No challenge poses a greater threat to future generations than climate change ... The best scientists in the world are all telling us that our activities are changing the climate, and if we don’t act forcefully, we’ll continue to see rising oceans, longer, hotter heatwaves, dangerous droughts and floods, and massive disruptions that can trigger migration and conflict and hunger around the globe. The Pentagon says that climate change poses immediate risks to our national security. We should act like it ... I am determined to make sure that American leadership drives international action.’

Taken from his 2015 State of the Union address (delivered to a joint-session of Congress, Jan 20th), the above proclamations by US President Barack Obama capture something of the profundity of climate change as a political issue. He identifies that ‘no challenge’ poses a greater ‘threat’ to future generations than climate change, a threat that leads to ‘rising oceans’, ‘heatwaves’, ‘dangerous droughts and floods’ and thus requires ‘forceful action’. The ‘threat’ and ‘massive disruptions’ of climate change suggest a condition of climate insecurity: Obama (2015a) cites the Pentagon’s warnings about climate change’s ‘immediate risks’ to American security. Intriguingly, Obama says that ‘we’ will continue to see rising oceans, that scientists from around the world are telling ‘us’ about climate change, and that ‘we’ should act like it. Who is the ‘we’ Barack Obama refers to? Who counts as ‘us’ the scientists have been talking to? Who should ‘act’ like it? Who and what aren’t included in Obama’s collective commentary? His warnings suggest that climate change will be felt collectively by Americans, that he is speaking urgently to America as a nation, and that Americans should work together to listen to ‘scientists from around the world’ and ‘act’ on climate change. Barack Obama is invoking American identity – calling on ‘American leadership’ – to tackle the greatest challenge human beings face in the 21st century.
It is these questions, of culturally mediated (national and racial) identities and climate change and security debates, which animate this thesis. I explore how the collective ‘we’ and ‘us’ of American nationhood are constructed in US ‘climate security’ discourse, how these identities are mobilized in possible climate-insecure futures (for example food or water insecurities), and who or what is marginalized or excluded, the ‘Them’ to an American or European ‘Us’, in these unequal imaginative geographies. In asking these questions, the thesis investigates the intersections of racial and national identities in US climate security discourse. Throughout, I argue that ‘essentializing logics’, a concept developed from Stuart Hall (1986) and Ben Anderson’s (2010a) work to describe how racial and national identities are held in relation to possible climate-insecure futures (see chapter 3, section 3.7), inscribe unequal power relations in American climate change-security debates. To begin, this chapter contextualizes climate security and situates academic climate security debates (sections 1.2 and 1.3). It proceeds to outline the project’s research questions and objectives (section 1.4), before highlighting the thesis’ structure (section 1.5). First, I outline a brief, limited history of ‘climate security’ debates and their emergence in international politics.

1.2 A brief history of climate security

In 1988, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) founded the IPCC (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) to assess the current state of scientific knowledge on climate change and its impacts (IPCC 2016). The IPCC’s (2014: 4, original emphasis) Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers (from its Fifth Assessment Report) notes that: ‘Anthropogenic gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era ... and are now higher than ever ... Their effects, together with those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.’

In line with these conclusions, a formidable scientific (Alley et al 2003; Lenton et al 2008) and social scientific (Stern 2007; Hulme 2009) consensus has developed as testimony to the importance of climate change. Correspondingly, an international

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1 As Vidal (2016) reports, warming trends are accelerating, for example in the Arctic, where winter air temperatures (as of November 2016) have been 20°C higher than the average for this period of the year.
political system exists to formulate collective solutions to climate change: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed in 1992 and meets on an annual basis (the Conference of Parties (COP)) to negotiate international treaties and initiatives. Most famously, this resulted in the Kyoto Protocol (formulated in 1997), and the Paris Agreement (agreed in December 2015 and in effect as of November 2016).

The UNFCCC’s (United Nations 1992: 9, my emphasis) central objective is the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ The term ‘dangerous’ suggests questions of risk and securities are at the heart of climate politics. And, while international climate politics are often framed in terms of mitigation and adaptation, interconnections between climate change and security are increasingly a focus of discussion. Barnett (2003) notes climate security debates have multiple, contested histories. Early moments include a 1974 CIA report outlining interrelations between climatology and US intelligence capabilities and the 1988 Toronto conference ‘The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’ (Barnett 2003). Climate change is also cited in the influential Brundtland Report: ‘Environmental threats to security are now beginning to emerge on a global scale. The most worrisome of these stem from the possible consequences of global warming caused by the atmospheric build-up of carbon dioxide and other gases’ (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 294). But, the unambiguousness of this assertion belies the caution of the academic debate at this time. Brown (1989) reflects on the conceptual difficulties of marrying strategic studies’ realism with the scientific scepticism of climatology, whilst Deudney (1990) warns of the dangers of a militarization of environmental issues.

After the Cold War, a discourse of ‘environmental security’ developed oriented around natural resource management and links between environmental factors and conflict (especially the work of political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon) (Eckersley 2009). Geopolitical strategist Robert Kaplan also published ‘The Coming Anarchy’ (1994, in The Atlantic) in which he prophesized that the environment would become the ‘national-security issue of the twenty-first century’. However, whereas Floyd (2008)
contends ‘environmental security’ debates are important historical and conceptual precedents to ‘climate security’, Dabelko (2009) argues climate change concerns were sidelined in environmental security discourse in favour of resource scarcities and conflict. In the aftermath of 9/11, the ‘war on terror’ and 2003 invasion of Iraq dominated security thinking in Washington, D.C. (Diez et al 2016). The Bush administration rolled back the Clinton-Gore presidency’s environmental security policies, withdrawing US support for the Kyoto Protocol (Diez et al 2016). Despite this ‘lull’ post 9/11 (Jhaveri 2011: 977), climate change-security connections were highlighted in a Pentagon-commissioned report on the implications of an abrupt climate change scenario for US national security (Schwartz and Randall 2003). In this report, Schwartz and Randall (2003) construct a climate change scenario (patterned on a similar 100 year event which occurred 8200 years ago) and speculate on the range of national security implications this suggests for the US, for example resource competition and conflict. The then UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett is believed to have been the first to use the term ‘climate security’ (in a 2006 speech) (Trombetta 2008); under Beckett’s leadership, climate change was debated at the UN Security Council in April 2007 (UNSC 2007a and b). Climate security was moved to the General Assembly floor in 2009, where a resolution (UNGA 2009) and Secretary-General Report were mandated (Ki-moon 2009). A second Security Council debate was held in June (2011) at the behest of the German government (UNSC 2011a and b). Climate change has also been discussed twice more by the Security Council, with two Arria-Formula meetings (confidential, informal sessions held by Council Members with other invited parties (UNSC 2016)) held in February 2013 and June 2015 (Werrell and Femia 2015). The election of President-elect Donald Trump on November 8th (2016) casts doubts on the status of climate security agendas. Trump has given Republican Congressman Mike Pompeo (to direct the CIA), skeptical of climate policies, an important security role (Levitan 2016). Trump’s selection of the outgoing CEO and chairman of Exxon-Mobil Rex Tillerson (10th December 2016) to be his Secretary of State, despite Tillerson’s previous support of the 2015 Paris Agreement (Osborne 2016), also raises questions about the future of climate security politics and discourse in a US context.2

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2 Further reflections on Donald Trump’s politics can be found in chapter 7, section 7.2
A slew of reports were also released in 2007-8 in a range of national and supranational contexts (see, for example, Center for Naval Analyses ((CNA) 2007) and Campbell et al (2007) in the US, or Mabey (2008) for the UK). These contribute to what Liberatore (2013) has labelled the ‘2007 turn’, a period in which ‘climate security’ increasingly captured security analysts’ attention. In their study of climate security in media coverage in 9 countries, Schäfer et al (2015) note that overall the number of articles on climate change which use securitizing language (as a proportion of the total) jumps from 0.09% between 1996 and 2006 to 0.57% from 2007-10. Peaks in climate security language follow significant geopolitical events, for example the 2009 Copenhagen COP and the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 (Schäfer et al 2015). Of the countries analysed, newspapers in Western countries show the clearest trends towards securitization (US newspapers contain the highest proportion of climate change articles with securitizing language (at 28.1%, an annual increase of 1.2%), followed by the UK (at 26.3%, a 1.1% annual increase)). The findings for Canada (24.3%, a 1.1% rise), Australia (24.1%, a 2.1% increase), and New Zealand (22.2%, a 0.6% increase) also show annual increases. Singapore (19.4%) and Thailand (22.1%) exhibit lower proportions of coverage, but faster annual increases (4.6% and 7.6% respectively). In India and South Africa, by contrast, the annual rate of coverage decreased (2.3% in India, and 4.1% in South Africa) (Schäfer et al 2015). These findings indicate that whilst a discourse of ‘climate security’ has gained in prominence, this is not a global trend and is only prevalent in particular, context-specific settings.

To take this point further, with the exception of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the UN Security Council debates (Boas 2015), it could be that climate security debates are predominantly (but not exclusively) Western-centric. For example, Trombetta (2014) notes the securitization of climate-induced migration discourse in EU politics, whilst White (2011: 7) critiques a securitized climate-induced migration debate as about protecting ‘North Atlantic borders’. Boas (2015: 1) defines securitization as ‘the process through which non-traditional security issues … are discussed and/or acted upon in terms of security and thereby drawn into the security domain’. She (2015) argues the securitizing moves for climate-induced migration (in particular the 2007 and 2011 UNSC debates) were conscious, strategic attempts to convince international actors, especially developing countries, to take on GHG
(greenhouse gases) mitigation. Whereas the UK government has explicitly sought to cast climate change as a security issue (e.g. Margaret Beckett’s speeches), the Indian government has repeatedly rejected this framing (including at the 2007 UN Security Council debate), highlighting climate change’s sustainable development underpinnings and accusing Western governments of politicizing the issue (Boas 2015). However, instead of a historical judgment about whether climate change has been (un)successfully securitized, I approach a different, if interrelated, set of questions in this project. The thesis focuses on the role of identity constitutions, unequal power relations in climate security politics, and how climate security (predominantly in the US context) is constructed as a discourse.

1.3 Discourses of climate security

A fascinating series of discursive typologies have emerged to map climate security literature. In an analysis of the 2007 UNSC debate on climate change, Detraz and Betsill (2009) differentiate between environmental security and environmental conflict discourses. ‘Environmental security’ underscores negative impacts of environmental degradation for human beings, is associated with human security and the welfare of human populations, and utilizes a wide range of policy responses within its remit. ‘Environmental conflict’, by contrast, maintains a narrower focus on military solutions, the security of states, and conflict (Detraz and Betsill 2009). Detraz and Betsill’s (2009: 311) analysis suggests that, for UNSC delegates, the broad, human-security oriented ‘environmental security’ is ‘the dominant discourse linking security and climate change in the international arena.’ Oels (2013: 25), contrastingly, flips climate security and posits a ‘climatization of security’, whereby traditional practices of security, e.g. scenario planning, risk management and early warning systems, are applied to climate change politics (and vice versa with climate modelling practices).

For the American and German contexts, Von Lucke et al. (2014) argue climate security discourses should be understood through two dimensions. First is the security referent (which could be ‘territorial’ (for example a territorial nation-state), ‘individual’, or ‘planetary’, for instance an ecosystem). The second dimension focuses on differences between ‘risk’ and ‘danger’. Whereas ‘risks’ concentrate on potential uncertainties, are
more amenable to probabilistic calculation and are diffuse (e.g. ‘risk profiles’ or ‘groups’), ‘security threats’ or ‘dangers’ are discrete, existential and demand strategic, targeted responses, a logic of ‘threatification’ (Von Lucke et al. 2014; Diez et al. 2016). On the other hand, risks cannot be eliminated and alternative interventions include insuring against the risk and increasing the resilience of a referent object, a logic of ‘riskification’ (Von Lucke et al. 2014; Diez et al. 2016). This starting distinction provides an effective analytical framework through which Von Lucke et al. (2014) and Diez et al. (2016) outline their interpretations of climate security discourses.

From these parameters, Von Lucke et al. (2014) identify six discourses. First is a ‘territorial danger’ discourse, with nation-states and geographical regions as referent objects, a neo-Malthusian prognosis of ‘climate conflicts’, and short-term military interventions or adaptive strategies as proposed solutions. This discourse is common in US climate security documents, for example Schwartz and Randall (2003). Second is ‘territorial risk’, a discourse oriented around risk assessments of climate security issues and which frames ‘resilience’ and ‘preparedness’ as important political responses. This discourse plays a secondary role in both the US and German contexts, more often used to indicate climate change threats as long-term and incorporative of actors beyond the military (Von Lucke et al. 2014). Third is an ‘individual danger’ discourse that builds on human security and aspires towards protection of individuals/communities. It is associated with issues such as agricultural yields, water scarcity, and provision of adaptation measures and humanitarian support as responses (Von Lucke et al. 2014). This discourse is relatively common in all contexts, from UN based human security actors to national security think tanks. Fourth is ‘individual risk’, which does not specify individuals, but relies on risk assessments to generate populations deemed to be most at risk. It is relatively rarely found in both US and German documents (Von Lucke et al. 2014). Fifth is ‘planetary danger’: this discourse emphasizes symbiotic interdependencies of human beings with wider ecosystems. Proponents of this discourse advocate a range of measures, from conservation to GHG moratoriums (Von Lucke et al. 2014). Finally, in a ‘planetary risk’ discourse long-term threats to the planetary ecosystem (e.g. uncontrolled economic growth) are measured through statistical risk analysis. Measures include energy efficiency schemes to manage planetary risks (Von Lucke et al. 2014). Of analyses of climate security discourse, Von
Lucke et al (2014) provide an analytically rich account. However, whereas they identify several discourses, I argue they do not focus sufficiently on how Othering and subject positions are configured in the unequal power relations of climate security discourses.

Focusing specifically on the referent object, McDonald (2013) proposes four discourses: human security (with ‘people’ or ‘human beings’ as the security referent), national security (‘nation-state’), international security (‘the international community’), and ecological security (‘the ecosystem’). National security is undoubtedly a strong discourse in climate security discussions, with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation-state a key focus of protection. Alongside a variety of reports from security-oriented think tanks (e.g. CNA 2007 and 2014, or Campbell et al 2007), climate change is also cited in a range of American national security strategies (for example the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR)). The ‘human security’ discourse has also gained prominence in UN institutions and critical academic literature (Barnett et al 2010). For example, the 2009 UN Secretary-General’s Report (following the General Assembly debate) points to the security of individuals and communities as issues of paramount importance, with mitigation, adaptation, information provision and effective governance mechanisms all implicated in this approach (Ki-moon 2009). The IPCC’s (Adger et al 2014: 759) Fifth Assessment Report also includes a chapter on human security, defined (in the context of climate change) as ‘a condition that exists when the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity’. The authors argue there is ‘high agreement’ that climate change poses risks for human security, and that adaptation could minimize human security concerns (with multiple lines of evidence from conflict resolution to migration and food security) (p.777-778). However, whilst these discourses suggest an equivalent status for human and national security discourses in climate security politics, in practice these power relations are asymmetrically positioned in favour of national security (discussed below) (McDonald 2013).

For ‘international security’ discourse, climate change is viewed as a threat to internationalist norms (for example international trade or the rules of international law) and global cooperation is argued to be necessary for political progress in tackling
climate risks (McDonald 2013). UN bodies (for example UNEP (United Nations Environment Program)) are key proponents of an international security discourse. ‘Ecological security’, underscoring the integration of human communities into an interconnected biosphere (Dalby 1998), is perhaps the most radical and marginalized of all climate security discourses, with little uptake in international policy (McDonald 2013). Whereas McDonald provides a precise analytic schema to interpret climate security, I argue that instead of viewing climate security as a series of different but interconnected discourses, climate security should be conceived as a single, heterogeneous discourse. This is not to argue there are not multiple, variegated discursive threads in climate security, but rather to treat them as a heterogeneous ensemble to better comprehend their mutual interrelations. In this sense, ‘human’ and ‘national’ securities are not separated in this account and I explore how they are utilized and integrated into a broader climate security discourse. The thesis’ analytical dividing lines are instead geographical, focusing on particular sites of production of climate security discourse (US and EU think tanks, institutions, NGOs etc.). This could weaken the analysis. By not focusing on the intricate, specific contents of individual security concepts (‘national security’, ‘human security’ etc.), this could mean the analysis misses elements of their detailed constitution. However, by treating climate security as a heterogeneous but (in some respects) unitary discourse, I contend this approach offers a more holistic perspective to investigate points at which different concepts of climate security and identity constructions intersect in climate security politics. The specific geographical demarcations (US and EU institutions) and sample are discussed further in chapter 2 (section 2.3.1).

With the exception of Detraz and Betsill’s (2009) conclusions that environmental security discourses (leaning towards human security) are most prominent in the 2007 UNSC debate, there is a consensus among other writers that national, territorial security interpretations are among the most powerfully positioned in climate security. For Schäfer et al (2015), press reports emphasize national security concerns (on average) above human security in 8 of 9 countries (with the US the most prevalent, but also in the Indian, Singaporean, Canadian, New Zealand, South African, Australian and British coverage). Within the time frame of 1996-2010, only Thai press reports trend towards human security concerns (Schäfer et al 2015). Von Lucke et al (2014) concur,
arguing ‘territorial security’ is the strongest discourse in the US and that, although individual security and risk concepts are used, these are linked to territorial security and facilitate protection of the United States. Importantly, ‘discourses of climate security matter. They serve to define who is in need of protection from the threat posed by climate change; who is capable of providing this protection; and (crucially), what forms of responses to these threats might take’ (McDonald 2013: 49, original emphasis). McDonald (2013) argues that current dominant ‘national’ and ‘international’ security discourses are inappropriate for climate change issues: they preserve the status quo at a time when a fundamental reassessment of human beings’ relationships with their environments is required. I also argue that, particularly in a national security-oriented American empirical context, national security interpretations of climate change risk exclusionary Othering practices and inequalities. In this context, ‘Othering’ is grounded in Edward Said’s (2003 (1978)) work and describes discursive means by which binary, essentialized differences are constructed between populations and cultural groups (for instance ‘Self’/’Other’ or ‘Us’/’Them’; for further details, see chapter 3, section 3.2). The concept of ‘national security’ emerged after the Second World War and is grounded in the model of sovereign, territorially demarcated nation-states codified by the Peace of Westphalia (signed in 1648 (Krasner 1996)). In one interpretation, national security depends on the protection and preservation of nation-states from defined external ‘threats’ and ‘Others’; it relies on binaries of ‘domestic/foreign’, ‘inside/outside’ and ‘Self/Other’ (Campbell 1998 (1992)). With the Othering and subjectification practices implied by this conceptual basis (for instance of threatening externalized ‘Others’ to secure and defend against, or constructions of a collective national subject in the name of security), and the exclusionary inequalities these could instantiate, I argue it is important to explore these practices in US climate security discourse.

Biopolitical accounts of climate security could also be critiqued for a lack of consideration of collective human subjectivities. Whilst there are studies of how biopolitical government (the political rationalities and technologies through which ‘life’ and ‘populations’ are governed (Lemke 2011)) is implicated in constructions of climate-induced migrants (e.g. Bettini 2014), and Oels’ (2013) articulation of climate mitigation, adaptation and security in terms of biopolitical risk management, there are
relatively few accounts of how collective subjectivities (racial and national identities) are constructed biopolitically. Against a background of ‘turbulence’, Cooper (2006) classifies climate security as a new technology of American imperial power. Moreover, Grove (2010) explores disaster risk from climate effects, focusing on financial investments (e.g. catastrophe bonds) that collateralize negative impacts. Using the Canadian Boreal Forest as an example, Baldwin (2013a) also conceives of biopolitical climate security at the eco-systemic scale, discussing the forest as a crucial environment for the maintenance of life due to its capacities to generate tolerable intensities of the carbon cycle. However, despite these accounts of biopolitical climate securities at a range of scales, accounts of how biopolitics are implicated in Othering and subjectification processes in climate security discourse are sparse. Furthermore, whilst several studies (Barnett et al 2008; Matthew et al 2010) advocate a human security framework, there is a lack of clarification of what ‘the human’ means in these approaches. If climate security scholars postulate human security, it follows that they should define the referent point that anchors this conception. However, definitions are sparse, and accounts of the complex, multifarious and uneven ways through which human subjectivities are constituted are absent from climate security literature. How is ‘the human’ of climate security gendered, sexualized, racialized, nationalized and classed? These are the questions that preoccupy this thesis. While there have been a range of investigations of discursive shifts in climate security (Detraz and Betsill 2009; McDonald 2013; Von Lucke et al 2014; Diez et al 2016) and their unequal political dynamics, I focus on how identities are unevenly constituted in climate security discourse. In particular, the project centres on racial and national identities (and moments of intersection) in US and EU climate security discourse. To be more precise, I now outline the thesis’ research questions and objectives.

1.4 Research questions and objectives

1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?

Initially, the project’s key aim was to investigate interconnections between anti-
Muslim racism and climate change. As such, my starting research question was about how a ‘Muslim Other’ is constructed in climate security discourse. However, as the research evolved, it came to encompass a broader range of racialized identity constructions (‘African’ and ‘Muslim’ racialized identities) and the question was altered accordingly. This research question is inspired by a small number of studies that explore processes of racialization in climate security and climate-induced migration discourse. These include Baldwin’s (2012; 2013b; 2016) accounts of the racialization of climate-induced migration (see chapter 4, section 4.3.1), and Methmann and Rothe’s (2014) analysis of racialized imagery in climate security outputs. There are also longer histories of interconnection between environmental inequalities, racialized identities and racism in American contexts. In the late 19th/early 20th centuries, environmental determinists such as Ellen Church Semple argued that a temperate climate in North America and Europe enabled a hard work ethic (Livingstone 2002). In contrast, populations and communities in tropical climates were denigrated as lazy, idle and endowed with a poor work ethic (Livingstone 2002). Additionally, the environmental justice movement arose in the US (in the late 1970s) as a consequence of the disproportionate exposure of minority and low-income communities to different forms of pollution (‘environmental racism’), for example proximity to toxic waste dumps (Cutter 1995; Pulido 2000). However, other than these important historical examples, there are very few analyses of racialization in the context of US climate change and climate security politics and discourse. With a particular focus on naturalizing representations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations in climate-induced migration discourse, the first research question is designed to explore these questions further.

2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?

Furthermore, the thesis explores representations of terrorism in climate security

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3 The thesis uses quotation marks around the terms ‘African’ and ‘Muslim’ to indicate the constructed, naturalized and racialized dimensions of these identities. More information about this decision is provided in chapter 2, section 2.2.
discourse. I argue discussions of terrorism and radicalization, through constructions of biological/immunological metaphors, anti-Americanism discourses and masculinities, represent important points of intersection between racial and national identities in climate security. There are very few academic studies of links between terrorism, radicalization, and climate change (although see Renard (2008) or Siddiqi (2014), discussed in chapter 5, sections 5.2 and 5.4 respectively, for exceptions). However, connections are occasionally drawn in US climate security publications (e.g. Campbell et al 2007) and raised by prominent political actors, for example Bernie Sanders’ (15th November 2015) claim that climate change is directly related a rise in terrorist activity (citing the Syrian Civil War as a case in point (see chapter 5, section 5.4, for further discussion)). As a means to explore how representations of terrorism crystallize intersections of racial and national identities, I explore how climate change and terrorism interconnections are constructed in US and EU climate security discourses.

3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security discourse?

Although the research project was initially framed solely in terms of anti-Muslim racisms and climate change, I found that concepts of American nationhood (e.g. American exceptionalisms) were important identity constructions in US climate security discourse. Nationhood is understood in this sense as constituted through difference: national identities are constructed in relation to ‘Others’ against which they are contingently defined (Matless 1998: 17; for further information, see chapter 3, section 3.8.2, and chapter 6). As with racial identities and representations of terrorism, there are very few academic studies of nationalism, nationhood or national identity in climate security. This project contributes to bridging this empirical gap with study of how concepts of American nationhood are constructed in climate security. As McDonald (2013: 46) writes of national security and climate change: ‘a national security focus encourages viewing climate change as a threat to the extent that it precipitates military threats, undermines national economic growth or undermines the national ‘way of life’.‘ This suggests that in climate security debates, here interpreted in a national security orientation, ideas of what constitutes ‘American-ness’ and the American ‘way of life’ are interesting and important to examine. As such, and explored
in collaboration with racialized Othering practices, I examine constructions of American nationhood in US climate security discourse.

These research questions provide a comprehensive basis through which to explore constitutions of racial and national identities in climate security discourse. I use the words ‘in and through’ in each to suggest that not only are racialized and national identities constructed in moments of climate security discourses, but also that they carry effects beyond their representation. Gregory (2004a: 18, original emphasis) enunciates this point eloquently: ‘the citationary structure that is authorized by these accretions is also in some sense performative. In other words, it produces the effects it names.’ As such, the thesis studies the unequal power relations and identity constructions in US and EU climate security as well as the inequalities and exclusions these are linked to. This trajectory is also pertinent to my research objectives. Alongside an investigation of connections between anti-Muslim racism and climate change, one of my initial objectives was to explore possibilities for a more progressive environmental politics. As the project has evolved, I have increasingly thought about this not in terms of a single understanding of a ‘progressive environmental politics’, but instead possibilities for multiple, context-dependent and environmentally just securities. These ideas are underpinned by an anti-essentialist ethos (grounded in Edward Said’s (1994) ideas) and are critical of the exclusionary implications that racial Othering and national subjectivities suggest in climate security discourse. I conclude the thesis by reflecting on how these ideas, by bringing environmental justice and progressive, plural conceptions on security (Koopman’s (2011) ‘alter-geopolitics’) into conversation, could contribute to this research objective on environmental politics and more rigorous analytical accounts of climate security. As such, my research objectives have moved away from an explicit focus on anti-Muslim racisms and a general aspiration towards ‘a more progressive environmental politics’. They focus specifically on how racial and national identities are constituted in US and EU climate security discourses, and how can we think about possibilities for multiple, situated, environmentally just securities. To flesh out how these research questions and objectives are tackled in the thesis, section 1.5 introduces the dissertation’s structure and chapter outlines.
1.5 Thesis structure

I start with chapter 2, which outlines the project’s methodology. It introduces critical discourse analysis and semi-structured interviews as the key methods. The chapter first outlines a conceptual justification for critical discourse analysis (a concern with unequal power relations and the politics of representation) and provides a detailed reflection of the process and challenges I encountered along the way. I try to be critically reflexive with regards to my own positionality and imbrication in the unequal power relations of climate security discourse. Subsequently, the chapter outlines the process of conducting semi-structured interviews and their limitations. This is and will always remain an unsatisfactory, incomplete account, but the chapter tries to sketch out how I’ve attempted to reflect on these experiences throughout the thesis.

Chapter 3 outlines a theoretical framework for an exploration of the unequal power relations of racial and national identity construction in US climate security discourse. It is grounded in a conceptualization of biopolitics that critiques Foucault’s (2009 (1977)) focus on the rationalities and technologies of power – the ‘how’ questions and security apparatuses through which power relations are instantiated – and centres on discursive appropriations of valued lives and populations in possible climate-insecure futures. I take inspiration from Fassin’s (2009) concepts of ‘bio-legitimacy’ and ‘bio-inequalities’ to construct this argument. Unequal valuations of lives and populations are grounded in racial and national identity constructions in climate security. The chapter continues to develop the concept of essentializing logics to examine how racial and national identities in context-specific moments of US climate security discourse – essentialized identities – are held in discursive relation to possible climate-insecure futures (grounded in Stuart Hall’s (1996) and Ben Anderson’s (2010a) conceptualizations of ‘logics’). The project’s understanding of ‘race’ is developed from David Theo Goldberg’s (1992) definition, and of ‘nationhood’ from Angharad Closs Stephens’ (2013) work. The chapter concludes by introducing environmental justice perspectives as a means to challenge essentializing logics and think about alternative, multiple conceptions of securities (grounded in Koopman’s (2011) ‘alter-geopolitics’).
Chapter 4 is an empirical examination of essentializing logics in the production of a racial Other in context-specific moments of climate security discourse. I use the term *racial logics* to foreground the particular forms essentializing logics take in relation to racialized identity constructions in climate security. Specifically, the chapter’s empirical focus is on representations of possible climate-induced migration from the MENA (Middle East and North Africa region) to the European Union. I argue racialization functions in these representations through three tropes. The first is *naturalization*: repeated associations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations with a latent tendency towards terrorism and racialized violence, and of inherent cultural incompatibility with European societies. Second is *dehumanization*: the use of geopolitical metaphors that diminish possible climate-induced migrants’ agency and reduce their status to the ‘interests’ of receiving nation-states. Finally, I focus on a *compulsive determinism*, the idea that, presented with a range of adaptive strategies in climate-insecure futures, ‘African’ populations will inevitably or are very likely to turn to acts of violence and/or disruptive migrations. I argue that collectively these tropes contribute to the production of a racial Other in context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourse.

Chapter 5, in accordance with the thesis’ second research question, explores discursive constructions of terrorism in US and EU climate security discourses. The first third of the chapter introduces conceptual debates on climate change-terrorism interconnections and the historical context to these debates. Subsequently, I focus specifically on how multiple identity constructions are co-constituted in these moments of climate security discourse. First, I examine how biological and fertility metaphors are adopted to describe terrorism and climate change and argue these are underpinned by racialized, dehumanizing assumptions. The chapter then touches on constructions of gendered and racialized identities in context-specific moments of climate security, particularly the construction of young Muslim masculinities in climate-insecure futures. Finally, the chapter concludes by exploring how racialized assumptions about Muslim populations (in particular a capacity for radicalization/terrorism) are constituted in relation to ideas of anti-Americanism in climate security discourses. I focus on the motivations for American humanitarian
intervention following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami as an instructive example to highlight these debates.

The final empirical chapter, 6, investigates representations of American nationhood in US climate security discourse and the role of essentializing logics in orienting American-ness towards possible climate-insecure futures. Firstly, I focus on representations of American exceptionalism in US climate security. The chapter argues that in earlier climate security documents (2003-10), representations of an isolationist, fortressed America are prevalent. These are based on an exceptionalism grounded in relative adaptive capacity: that because the US has more sufficient resources and relative adaptive capacity in neo-Malthusian climate-insecure futures, the American state will build defensive walls to protect its own population/territory first. Second, the chapter argues that universalized accounts of American ‘leadership’ and ‘values’ are constructed in moments of US climate security discourse, alongside increased consideration of human security concerns among American defence actors. Finally, I focus on the development of a discursive strand of climate-resilient American nationhood and the unequal biopolitics of valued lives this suggests. Throughout the empirical chapters, I attempt to demonstrate the role of essentializing logics, discursive situations of racial and national identities in relation to possible climate-insecure futures, in constructing multiple, uneven biopolitics of unequally valued lives in US and EU climate security discourses.

To conclude, I reflect on the thesis’ three research questions and what the dissertation’s analysis suggests about responses to these (and brief remarks about their current situation in American and EU political contexts). Additionally, the concluding chapter reflects on the thesis’ contribution wider geographical literature and possible avenues for future research. In particular, the chapter elaborates on the project’s second research objective: the imperative to think about tentative possibilities for multiple, context-dependent and just environmental securities. I reflect on what work from feminist geopolitics and environmental justice can offer to this objective and the need to challenge reductionist, essentializing logics and their delimitation of multiple, possible environmentally-secure futures.
Chapter 2:

A methodological framework to study climate security discourses

2.1 Introduction and research questions

1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security discourse?

Before introducing the project’s theoretical framework and empirical chapters, I first outline and reflect critically on the methodology used for this research and challenges encountered along the way. This provides an important platform to explain the project’s practical underpinning and its historical evolution. I begin the chapter by describing the conceptual basis for the primary method, critical discourse analysis (CDA) (section 2.2). This is followed by an appraisal of my experience with CDA and difficulties encountered with understanding power relations underlying discursive phenomena (section 2.3). I move on to reflect on semi-structured interviews as a supporting method. The chapter notes their application alongside CDA and unequal power relations embedded in this process (section 2.4). Finally, the chapter reflects on the process of conducting semi-structured interviews and fieldwork in a EU context (section 2.5).

2.2 Critical discourse analysis – justification and conceptual basis

As the dissertation explores identity construction in climate security discourse, this infers questions of symbolic meaning, contingent and varied representations, textual genres, and underlying political contexts. Howarth (2000: 10) identifies discourse
analysis as ‘the process of analyzing signifying practices as discursive forms’; analysts ‘treat a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic material – speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, even organizations and institutions ... as ‘texts’ and ‘writings’ that enable the subject to experience the world of objects, words, and practices.’ Discourse analysis thus approaches climate security as a historically and geographically situated system of meanings, representations, practices and texts, all underpinned by unequal power relations (Howarth 2000). A Foucauldian inspired discourse analysis investigates power-knowledge relations: the rules and mechanisms governing the production and circulation of knowledge (Jäger and Maier 2009). Discourses demarcate which statements about ‘reality’ or ‘the world’ count as ‘say-able’ or ‘true’ (Waitt 2010). Fairclough (2003: 2) argues this approach relies on an abstract conception of discourse and doesn’t account for the linguistic, material moorings of texts. Both approaches are necessary: no textual analysis is sufficient without a theory of ‘discourse’, and no understanding of the social and political effects of discourse is possible without close examination of language-in-use (Fairclough 2003).

I follow Fairclough’s (2003: 124) identification of language as a fundamental constituent of social life. Whereas he (2003: 124) understands discourses as ‘ways of representing aspects of the world’ or ‘different perspectives on the world’, I adopt the definition of Bialasiewicz et al (2007: 406): ‘Discourse refers to a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible.’ This pertains to representations, practices, meanings and identities, all materially grounded cornerstones of what I seek to analyze. Importantly, texts, defined by Fairclough (2003: 3) as ‘any actual instance of language in use’, are embedded in sociopolitical contexts. As unequal power relations constitute climate security discourses, I argue critical discourse analysis, a method committed to contextualization of linguistic phenomena, practices and representations, is appropriate for this project. The ‘critical’ of CDA signals its orientation towards challenging discursive privileges that ‘enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice’ (van Dijk 1993: 252). This disavows a distanced, value-free and objective scholar (Harraway 1988), and recognizes the researcher as socially
situated and imbued in power-knowledge relations. As one of the project’s central objectives is to explore initial possibilities for just environmental securities in the US, CDA is an apt methodological vehicle to contribute to this objective.

With its focus on texts (and the representations produced in texts), CDA is limited in the degree to which it can understand the material, exclusionary effects of racialized and national climate security discourses. This claim is not to reinforce a binary between ‘language’ and materiality (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015), or to suggest that discourse analysis – and, by extension, the concept of ‘discourse’ (a more extended critical discussion of the concept of ‘discourse’ is provided in chapter 3, section 3.5) – is not grounded in material realities, but to focus on the limits of a methodology committed to specific analyses of texts. While this can render it difficult to understand the grounded, materially situated contexts behind documents’ production (Gill 1996), an overreliance on texts could also neglect analysis of the political and material effects of unequal, exclusionary climate security discourses. To tackle this limitation, this project explores material implications of racialized and national climate security discourses in several respects. This includes the examples of ‘sedentarist’ (Bakewell 2008) or ‘containment policies’ in response to climate-induced migration (see chapter 4, section 4.3.4), and discursive strands of anti-Americanism connected to humanitarian intervention following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (chapter 5, section 5.7). Throughout the thesis, I try to use contextual analysis to emphasize the unequal power relations undergirding representations of racial and national identities in climate security and what the political implications of such representations are (and could be in climate-insecure futures).

My positionality, as a critical discourse analyst of texts and discursively constructed as a particular subject (‘researcher’) (Jäger and Maier 2009), is interwoven into the research process. This position risks contradiction. It assumes I as the researcher and a particular ensemble (of texts, practices, representations etc.) labelled ‘climate security’ can be isolated and held in relation. However, as Rose (1997) identifies, the complexity of power relations in the research process renders it impossible for a scholar to completely and reflexively identify their ‘position’. To assume so would replicate the ‘god-trick’ that Harraway (1988) dispels in her account of situated knowledges (Rose
1997). But, to deny any possibility of situating ‘positionality’ also replicates the circular contradiction Hammersley (2003) identifies in CDA. If any text, including the researcher’s analysis, can be deconstructed, what Hammersley (2003: 765) calls the ‘reflexive application of DA [discourse analysis] to itself’, analysts are forced into a position of perpetual backtracking and are unable to settle at a point of explanation, both of the texts and their positionality. An infinite regression of discursive deconstruction ensues. I try to find a middle ground along this conceptual tightrope. This accepts it is impossible to fully locate one’s research position, but still allows for reflexive identification of contested moments, groups or texts (published by think tanks and government departments), and points of departure for analysis.

This position resonates with Edward Said’s anti-essentialism introduced in chapter 3 (section 3.2). It recognizes cultural boundaries are permeable, contingent and never fully knowable (the impossibility of an autonomous ‘researcher’ or ‘discourse’), but does not reduce them to the extent that analysis becomes impossible. Within the ‘milling mass of discourse’ (Jäger and Maier 2009: 35), there is a constant, irresolvable negotiation of positionality, power relations and analytical possibilities. In this case, Said’s (2003 (1978): 23) method of postcolonial analysis, of analyzing texts from imperial, metropolitan centres to highlight essentialized identities and Eurocentric assumptions, is an important starting point for the CDA. It focuses on documents produced by American institutions (and to a lesser extent the EU) and comprises of interviews with professionals in Washington, D.C., London and Brussels. One weakness of this approach is that with a sole focus on elite texts and the actors producing these texts, this reinforces unequal power relations in climate security and doesn’t allow space for alternative voices or perspectives. Additionally, there is a risk that in highlighting the role of Othering processes in context-specific moments of climate security discourse, this re-essentializes that which the project seeks to critique. With these risks in mind, I discuss alternative voices on climate security and environmental justice in several chapters, including religious environmental groups in chapter 4 (section 4.5), environmental justice campaigners in chapter 6 (section 6.5.1), and discussions about possibilities for more just, situated environmental securities in chapter 3 (section 3.9) and conclusion (section 7.3). This is not an attempt to ‘speak for’ or ‘on behalf of’ alternative actors, but to respect and recognize the complex,
multifarious constitution of climate security discourses beyond a national security frame. Additionally, whenever I refer to interpretations of racialized populations in the thesis, specifically ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations, these descriptors are qualified by quotation marks. This decision does not diminish the fact that, by reiterating these labels in a discussion of racialization, this reiteration in part reinforces the essentialization of such identities. However, while this strategy is fundamentally limited in this respect, it does provide one practical means of highlighting the constructed, essentialized condition of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ racial Others in climate security. Furthermore, I research as a white, male, heterosexual British geographer researching at an elite UK university. This dictates the project in myriad ways, for example the research topic (from a department with a strong political geography tradition), selection of case study (the Euro- and Anglo-centric fascination with American politics), and methodology (a personal interest in language and its political appropriation). My whiteness – as well as its unequal positioning of me as a British researcher at Durham University – also delimits the extent to which I can comprehend the cultural nuances of American national and racial identities. These facets are explored in more depth throughout the chapter.

An epistemological rift rests at the project’s heart. The semi-structured interviews derive from a constructivist perspective that rejects a singular, objective reality and encourages participants to construct narratives of their own social worlds (Fotheringham 1998). To an extent, this support’s the research’s historically situated, specific analysis. However, as the semi-structured interviews and CDA are required to help explain the surrounding political backdrop of American climate security, the data they provided must be cross contextual and stretch beyond individual accounts of social realities. Fairclough (2003: 14) writes: ‘the position I take is a realist one ... both concrete social events and abstract social structures ... are part of reality ... Reality (the potential, actual) cannot be reduced to knowledge about reality, which is shifting, contingent, and partial ... we should not assume that the reality of texts is exhausted

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4 Importantly, this does not mean that I employ quotation marks every time the words ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ are used. For example, if referring to ‘North African countries’ or ‘Green Muslims’ (a religious environmental organization) descriptively, I do not use quotation marks. They are used for specific instances where racialized interpretations of populations are described, e.g. a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other, or racialized ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations.
by our knowledge about texts.’ This highlights a clear methodological contradiction between a constructivism committed to socially constructed realities and a critical realist account that accepts a contingent external reality. Although this can only be bridged to a certain extent, I propose an interpretivist perspective as a partial solution (Greener 2011). This perspective accepts climate security discourses are historically contingent and contextualized, but this does not render them inaccessible – subject to mediation by cultural values, political beliefs and sensory perception – to a complex external reality (Greener 2011). Therefore, whilst climate securities are complicated by contextual idiosyncrasies and individual interpretations, they exist nonetheless as part of a multifarious external reality. This approach respects the situated individual histories and geographies that semi-structured interviewees construct, whilst facilitating for the contextual crossover and textual indices a CDA requires. Thus, an interpretivist perspective is employed as a partial resolution to this epistemological contradiction. With these tensions in mind, I now outline the CDA.

2.3 Practical implementation

2.3.1 The CDA sample and political context

Dittmer (2010) points out discourse analyses contain textual and contextual dimensions. Textually, the aim is to explore linguistic nuances in documents, whereas a contextual investigation analyses the power relations underpinning a text’s production and reception (Sharp and Richardson 2001). To respond to Dittmer’s (2010) guidance, texts were purposively sampled (more information on this process is provided below). The majority (96%) originate from US or EU-derived sources. The only exceptions are 5 publications by UN agencies (the UN Security Council, UNEP, General Assembly and IPCC), which are important international statements on climate security and crosscut the American and EU contexts (a full list of the number of documents per organization is provided in Appendix A). This does not mean climate security is limited to these contexts. But, given that the US and EU are prominent producers of climate security literature, these were the institutional contexts selected for the CDA.
I concentrated on documents produced by US and EU government departments and institutions, publications by think tanks working on climate security or with programs/publications dedicated to the topic, academic articles with a policy/national security leaning, and relevant reports by NGOs. The sample was restricted to policy literature and omitted other receptacles of climate security discourse, e.g. media outlets (a full list of the number of documents from each organization is provided in Appendix A). With the substantial size of the policy literature and time and resource constraints of the project, this was deemed to be an appropriate analytical cut-off point. The analysis begins in 1994 for the US (with Robert Kaplan’s article *The Coming Anarchy*) and 1999 for the EU (a report on the environment, security and foreign policy by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security, and Defense Policy). I start with these documents because they are important contextual precedents to climate security (grounded in environmental security debates). Although the timespan was initially left open (1994-present), the CDA stopped in mid-2015. This was for the pragmatic reason that, as my 2nd year finished in September 2015 and this necessitated analysis/writing-up, I was unable to continue on the CDA. Whilst this limits the analysis – particularly as it doesn’t incorporate outputs related to the 2015 Paris UNFCCC COP – it nonetheless provides a broad coverage of climate security publications.

Although the sample does not focus primarily on media sources, it does include testimony from publicly available interviews (for example with Barack Obama and John Kerry) in media outlets. As high-ranking figures in American climate security discourse – e.g. the US President – I argue that these represent important sources for the critical discourse analysis. Furthermore, although they do not form a part of the primary CDA sample, the documents subjected to descriptive and analytical coding, I also draw upon various media sources as part of the contextual analysis. These include, for example, the use of newspaper sources to discuss the political contexts of ‘Muslim rage’ concepts (in chapter 5, section 5.7), or online media sources, e.g. Breitbart (Martel 2014), for a discussion of the politics of attribution and complex causality with climate change and the Syrian Civil War (chapter 5, section 5.4). As Schafer *et al* (2015) note, media sources are significant mediums through which climate security discourses circulate. Therefore, as well as important sources of public testimony from
politicians involved in US climate security debates, media outlets also provide fundamental sources for the CDA’s contextual analysis and situation of analytical themes – e.g. terrorism-climate change interconnections – in relation to broader political developments.

Moreover, although the overwhelming majority of the thesis’ data are comprised of textual materials, I also draw upon an image (in chapter 4, section 4.3.4) from Werz and Conley (2012: 13) to analyze a geopolitical imaginary termed ‘the arc of tension’. The CDA follows Manzo’s (2010: 96) study of the iconography of climate change and focuses on the ‘geopolitical visions of the world’ reproduced in images of climate insecurities. In this sense, the CDA does not focus on the public reception of the image, but instead I explore the geopolitical imaginaries exhibited by Werz and Conley’s (2012: 3) ‘arc of tension’ and situate these within the broader trends identified in the CDA. In sum, notwithstanding the fact that textual, written materials constitute the majority of the CDA’s material, the analysis also consists of a visual image in the discussion of climate-induced migration (chapter 4).

I followed Waitt’s (2010) advice to select texts that would be meaningful and justifiable for my research topic. The analysis comprised of not only documents directly related to climate security, but also broader strategies which cite climate security or are relevant for the context of American security and climate change politics. Genres varied, from policy reports, executive memos, security strategies and think tank analyses to political speeches and Congressional testimonies. All were available online and in most cases downloadable as PDFs. Document lengths ranged from single webpages to hundreds of pages. After a rigorous search of academic literatures/bibliographies, online sources (Google searches and government website searches/archives) and think tank archives (for example the Center for Climate and Security’s ‘Resource Hub’ (2016)), I compiled the sample. Over the course of the year (from October 2014 to September 2015), this was added to as new reports were released or found online. The final sample is 155 documents, indexed by organization. This programme (numbers of documents per organization) is shown in Appendix A. Of the 155 documents, 91 derive from US-based sources and 59 from EU-derived sources. 48 originate from US government departments or agencies, 32 from US think tanks,
and 11 from other sources (academic articles with an affiliation to US national security (for instance if written by employees of security think tanks or government departments), or NGO publications). From the EU, 40 documents originate from EU institutions and agencies, 9 from government departments of EU Member States, 2 from the G7 (one of which is a report compiled by several think tanks), 1 from an NGO, 4 from think tanks (two from the German organization Adelphi in collaboration with the German Federal Foreign Office), and two from academic/online sources.

The sample is limited in several respects. Firstly, it is Anglo- and Eurocentric and doesn’t take account of climate security discourses outside of these contexts (see, for example, Israeli climate security publications (Weinthal et al 2015)). This is symptomatic of climate security more broadly; Diez et al (2016:11) note the literature is ‘highly uneven’, ‘with a heavy focus on the US’. To contest this unevenness, Diez et al (2016) conduct a comparative study of climate security debates in the US, Germany, Turkey and Mexico. Given differences in my dataset, e.g. the numbers of texts in the sample and between different organizations, this project does not employ a comparative, quantitative approach. Instead, I focus on US data and use segments from the EU dataset where they are appropriate and contribute to important themes/arguments. Additionally, although the project is Anglo-centric, American actors are the largest and most powerful producers of climate security discourses (Diez et al 2016). Accepting the influence American actors carry (e.g. the Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Reviews) and the possible exclusions or inequalities this suggests for climate-insecure futures and interventions, I argue it is important to study the US as a discursive context.

Another limitation of the sample is its limited coverage of the diversity of American climate security politics. Firstly, whilst this project’s focus is climate security discourse at the national level in Washington, D.C. (though with documents reporting most often on international geopolitics), there have been state actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change, e.g. in California (California Climate Strategy 2016). Additionally, this research does not account for climate security debates and legislative proposals in Congress (the Senate and House of Representatives). To date, no comprehensive federal legislation has been passed on climate change (Diez et al 2016). However,
there have been several bills proposed and Congressional debates. For example, Bernie Sanders introduced the ‘Global Warming Pollution and Reduction Act’ in 2007 which cites climate change as a national security issue; the Liebermann-Warner Climate Security Act was also proposed in 2007; and the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security Act was introduced in 2009 (Diez et al 2016). Although all of these bills utilize language couched in climate and energy security, none were passed into law. A successful example of legislation was the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (the legislative tool governing the Department of Defense’s (DOD) expenditures (US Congress 2008)). This includes a mandate for military planners to consider the implications of climate change for DOD facilities, capacities and missions, as well as a requirement to include information in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and other proximate national security strategies (e.g. the 2010 National Security Strategy) about the consequences of climate change for DOD missions and plans (US Congress 2008: 288). In these two respects – state-level policies and Congressional debates and legislation (even if very little legislation has been passed) – the dissertation is restricted in its consideration of US climate security politics.

As such, the sample is fundamentally limited in the extent to which it can cover the diversity of American climate security politics. As Diez et al (2016: 51) note, and as is reflected in the sample, ‘think tanks dominate the debate’ (more so than environmental NGOs and climate science bodies). This is for multiple reasons. One is that think tanks, for example the Center for Naval Analyses’ Military Advisory Board (CNA 2007), are often staffed by high-ranking military or governmental personnel and it is not uncommon for political officials to move between government and think tank positions. Also, often think tanks have good connections with politicians and the media and can provide an effective platform with which to promote a particular issue (Diez et al 2016). Crucially, this is not to draw political equivalence between different climate security actors in the unequal power relations of US climate security discourse. In a network analysis, Diez et al (2016: 55-6) find that US climate security discourses are primarily targeted at the defense sector and security-oriented think tanks (with the CNA, Center for a New American Security, DOD, Army, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy and Air Force all highly cited). Environmental organizations, for example the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), receive far fewer
citations. Congress and the White House receive many citations, but these are restricted to security policy; the UN and IPCC are also cited to a large degree, but primarily because climate security reports often contain a section on climate science (Diez et al 2016: 55). Particular individuals, e.g. Sherri Goodman, former Executive Director of the CNA’s Military Advisory Board (‘discursive entrepreneurs’ (Diez et al 2016: 26)), are also important actors in the production of US climate security discourses. Given the unequal power relations these analyses suggest, the sample’s orientation towards think tanks and national security institutions does capture something of how powerful actors appropriate climate security. But, it is still limited (its Anglo-centrism and Eurocentrism, and lack of consideration of Congressional or state debates). These limitations hinder the project’s scope and coverage of climate security politics, but were based on pragmatic decisions about which organizations/institutions to cover and the research’s time constraints.

With these limitations in mind, the sample has provided for a productive CDA. Because it includes a large number of publications, this limits the extent to which I can provide an ingrained, detailed analysis of the production and reception of each individual report. Instead, I focused on landmark reports for contextual depth and otherwise tried to locate discursive trends (e.g. resilient American nationhood) within the political contexts of US and EU climate security. As the sample is restricted to a particular empirical backdrop, generalization is difficult if not impossible (Hammersley 2003). A quantitative analysis – through comparison of a chosen example with a different linguistic corpus (group of texts) to test the statistical significance of above-chance combinations of words (‘collocations’) – may produce more generalizable conclusions, but holds back qualitative examination of sociopolitical contexts (Baker et al 2008). Whereas the relative size of my sample means I could not pursue an in-depth investigation of each document’s provenance, it did facilitate for a contextual analysis of climate security discourse overall.

2.3.2 Descriptive coding

In October 2014, I started analyzing documents. This commenced until March 2015 and EU documents were analysed from March-June 2015. They were ordered
according to organizations of authors and, within each of these clusters, analysed chronologically. First was descriptive coding. Cope (2003) recommends an inductive immersion into the texts (a ‘grounded theory’ approach unencumbered by prior hypotheses or preconceptions (Waitt 2010)). However, in practice a purely inductive approach is very difficult and the analyst always enters the process with some assumptions (Greener 2011). In my case, some descriptive codes emerged from the texts (e.g. ‘science’). Mostly, they were related to research questions (for example ‘migration’, ‘determinism’ and ‘generalization’) and influenced by reading (‘geopolitics’). I read each text closely (several times where there were ambiguities/difficulties in understanding) and copied and pasted sections pertaining to these codes into Word documents. This meant that as I continued to read publications, long Microsoft Word files developed which catalogued highlighted excerpts from individual reports. For many excerpts, multiple codes overlapped (‘discursive knots’ (Jäger and Maier 2009)). In this scenario, the same excerpt would be copied into the corresponding file for each respective code. On occasion, this meant that several descriptive code files contained the same excerpts; although repetitive, this ensured every documentary reference to particular codes was accounted for. Descriptive code files were archived in a folder entitled ‘US discourse analysis’. A full list of US descriptive codes is provided in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code name and Word file length</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilization-progress (17 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to points in which a civilization narrative is adopted, references to ‘civilized’ or ‘uncivilized’ parts of the world, teleological narratives of civilization etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of security/anarchy (69 pages)</td>
<td>This code referred initially to moments in which conceptualizations of security were cited (definitions or typologies of security, e.g. ‘human’ or ‘environmental security’). This also includes conceptions of ‘anarchy’, ‘absences’ of security and changes to the ‘security environment’, as well as security and anarchy held together dichotomously.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental determinism (16 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to moments where climatic changes are linked to changes in human behavior (through direct causation), e.g. violence/conflict, protest, or migration. It later evolved into an analytical, interpretive code (based on certainties about how people will react in climate-insecure futures) described as a ‘compulsive determinism’ in Chapter 4 (section...).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History-context (28 pages)</td>
<td>Used to describe citations of authors and organizations, legal and political contexts, and documents’ historical situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanity (25 pages)</td>
<td>Used to describe moments where ‘humanity’, ‘humankind’ or ‘human beings’ are referred to as a collective. It is also linked to ‘human security’ concepts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latent threat to the West-fortress metaphor/geopolitics (53 pages)</td>
<td>Originally, this was used to describe a trend whereby the US is articulated in terms of external threats that could impact its interests or territories. It also encompassed representations of the US as an isolationist, defensive country: as ‘walled’, ‘fortressed’ etc. Later, this contributed to an analytical code to describe variations of ‘American exceptionalism’ (see Chapter 6, section 6.2). However, as the analysis evolved, it gradually came to represent American ‘geopolitics’ more broadly; the United States’ position in a world of climate insecurities, possible world orders etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration (54 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to moments where human migration is discussed, including references to internal displacement, ‘climate refugees’, and international migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict (47 pages)</td>
<td>Notes descriptions of climate change and conflict, historical relationships, resource scarcity, and relations between migration, livelihoods and conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention (48 pages)</td>
<td>Documents moments where interventions are noted; it includes the need for military intervention, humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (20 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to evocations of religions, religious activities, or religious identities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Othering (29 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to specific instances of ‘Othering’ practices, whether of populations or explicit ‘Us/Them’ divisions. Overlaps with ‘civilization/progress’ and ‘racialization/generalization’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racialization/generalization (43 pages)</td>
<td>Documents (interpreted) cases of generalization/naturalization of particular traits with certain population groups, e.g. of Muslim or African populations with terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science (15 pages)</td>
<td>Notes references to climate science, especially in relation to the security implications of climate change impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism (32 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to moments in US climate security where documents discuss terrorism and radicalization. Includes specific connections between climate change and these issues, and how climate security is situated in the War on Terror.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US National Security (49 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to US national security. This includes definitions, threats to national security, and actions taken to ensure national security in the face of climate change impacts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: US descriptive codes**

Descriptive codes changed as the CDA progressed and different themes became more or less prominent. For example, whereas ‘civilization’ discourses are referred to in earlier climate security literature (prior to 2011), this decreases in later documents. Similarly, the generalization/racialization themes are mainly found from 2003-10, as are narratives of American isolationism. This resulted in changes to some codes. For example, the ‘latent threat to the West’ expanded to encompass ‘geopolitics’: this reflects the fact that concepts of a defensive ‘America’ in climate-insecure futures remain important, but the range of representations diversifies over time. The most
consistent, enduring descriptive codes are those with the longest Microsoft Word files (e.g. ‘latent threat/geopolitics’, ‘migration’, ‘conflict’, ‘concepts of security/anarchy’ and ‘US national security’, see Table 1). Another reason for these variations relates to my practice with CDA and exposure to the data. Both Potter (1996) and Dittmer (2010) caution that discourse analysis is a difficult approach to use initially, with very few signposts. I found that as I continued to read publications and codes developed, this helped establish a more rigorous, consistent descriptive coding scheme. When it came to the EU discourse analysis (March 2015), the process was much smoother and this is reflected in Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code name and Word file length</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilization/progress (10 pages)</td>
<td>Describes narratives of ‘civilization’, of ‘civilized’ or ‘uncivilized’ parts of the world, and of ‘progress’. It also includes teleological accounts of these themes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of security/insecurity (41 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to concepts of ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’, definitions of ‘climate security’ etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental determinism (9 pages)</td>
<td>Describes deterministic language, e.g. drawing direct causal relations between climate impacts and violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU supranational security (39 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to concepts of ‘European’ or ‘EU’ security. This could be in relation to a collective notion of EU security, threats to EU security, its relationships with other securities (e.g. US national security or human security) etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalization (13 pages)</td>
<td>Notes moments where traits about populations appear to be naturalized, essentialized or generalized. It is broader than generalizations based on racialized identities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitics (28 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to ‘geopolitical’ themes in EU climate security documents, discussions about how the EU is seen in international politics, its place in ‘world orders’, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History-context (19 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to moments where dimensions of historical or political contexts are raised, e.g. authorship, organizations’ ideologies, information about the production and reception of the text, or about the broader political context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanity (11 pages)</td>
<td>This refers to collective representations of ‘humanity’, ‘humankind’ etc. It ties in to concepts of ‘human security’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration (34 pages)</td>
<td>Cites climate-induced migration, migration in general, ‘climate refugees’, internal displacement, international migration etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict (17 pages)</td>
<td>References to climate change and conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention (23 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to discussions of intervention, e.g. humanitarian intervention, diplomacy, or military interventions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Othering (12 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to evidence of ‘Othering’, drawing ‘Us’/‘Them’ divides between different groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (8 pages)</td>
<td>Describes different religions, religion as a category, or religious identities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science (12 pages)</td>
<td>Notes discussions of climate science and its connections to climate security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism (11 pages)</td>
<td>Refers to terrorism, both in terms of its connections to climate change and the broader political context, e.g. the War on Terror.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: EU descriptive codes**
Many EU codes are similar to US counterparts, e.g. ‘religion’, ‘migration’ and ‘intervention’, but more coherently delineated as my practice with CDA as a method improved. For example, ‘concepts of security/anarchy’ became ‘concepts of security/insecurity’ to reflect the broader conceptual scope of ‘insecurity’. ‘Latent threat to the US’ becomes ‘geopolitics’ to mirror the variety of geopolitical representations. ‘Racialization/generalization’ becomes ‘generalization’ to indicate the multiple ways in which populations can be generalized in climate security. The smaller sample explains why less time was devoted to the EU CDA (March-June) than the US CDA (October-March). Whilst my method of archiving codes did create cumbersome Microsoft Word files, it did help spot trends in the data. To investigate this further, and as a stepping-stone between descriptive and analytical codes, I conducted a textual analysis of the data in each Microsoft Word file (each file representative of a different descriptive code). This was done as I read the reports and they were descriptively coded. If I found a relevant segment in the report, I would copy and paste this into the Word file for the corresponding code(s) and read this more closely to examine its linguistic features. The textual analysis is described in further detail in section 2.3.3.

2.3.3 Textual analysis

For the textual analysis, I utilized Norman Fairclough’s (2003) guidance of what to look for in how language is used. This involves semantic relations between words and texts: how do word meanings change? How do particular meanings (e.g. ‘climate security’) change in different contexts? Grammar, for example sentence structure or verb tense, is also important. Pragmatics and sub-textual relations are also significant, including arguments’ underlying assumptions, inconsistencies or contradictions, implicit statements and inter-textual correspondences in meaning (Fairclough 2003). Underlying assumptions could refer to value systems or assertions of ‘objectivity’, representations about what is ‘true’, what is possible, or what is axiomatic or necessary. For representations of social actors, Fairclough (2003: 145) suggests several useful features for investigation. First are mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion (with two types of exclusion (‘suppression’, in which an actor/subject is not in the text at all, or ‘backgroundering’, where they are mentioned, but need to be inferred more regularly in
the text)). Waitt (2010: 236) seconds this, noting the importance of ‘silences’ and which voices are heard/not heard. Second are pronominal choices: is the actor realized as a pronoun (‘I’, ‘we’, or ‘you’) or as a noun? Does pronoun usage indicate an Othering or ‘Us/Them’ dynamic? Third are grammatical roles in which actors are referenced, the active or passive tense. This relates to the active/passive positioning of the social actor: are they the person with agency, or affected by others’ actions? Are actors classified and are there hierarchical designations within these classifications, or between them? Modality is also important (Fairclough 2003). Are modal verbs used to indicate strength of commitment to statements or possibilities (‘may’, ‘might’, ‘could’ or ‘should’)? Are modal adjectives used (e.g. ‘possible’ or ‘probable’)? The genre of text matters too, with different textual choices for a political speech, policy report, webpage etc. Hammersley (2003: 763) argues discourse analysis is too preoccupied with rhetoric to the extent the author is reclassified as ‘Homo Rhetoricus’. However, US and EU climate security discourse stretches beyond political speeches or policy reports to incorporate academic texts and other forms. I argue these are all relevant questions and investigative tools to explore the unequal power dynamics of US and EU climate security discourses and their relations to possible climate-insecure futures.

For each copied-pasted excerpt from the texts in the CDA sample (pasted into its respective Word file for the relevant code), I read through it several times. I noted arguments and assumptions, significant linguistic features (and their meanings/arguments), and whose voices are present in the text (including authorial voices) and whose may be absent/excluded. If any patterns developed, I noted these down and references to any academic/theoretical literature that could inform the analysis. For relevant methodological points, I typed these up in a separate Word document akin to a computerized research diary. As a brief example, I include an excerpt from *The Age of Consequences: The Foreign and National Security Implications of Climate Change* (Campbell et al 2007). Stylistically, this is one of several long quotes used as evidence in the thesis. Whilst burdensome at times, I argue it is an important strategy to include detailed quotations in order to more accurately contextualize and situate the authors’ claims and my interpretations of these claims. *The Age of Consequences* is a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Center for a New American Security. Speculating on connections between climate change and terrorism, Campbell *et al* (2007: 82 and 87) write:

‘Another growing threat also holds out the possibility of mass damage and loss of life in this century: religiously-rooted terrorism. The scope of death and destruction sought by the perpetrators of this sort of terrorism is also something most people find difficult to envision. This chapter later addresses terrorism (a “malevolent” rather than “malignant” problem such as climate change) because of a somewhat surprising confluence: the aspects of our energy systems that help create the risk of climate change also create vulnerabilities that terrorists bent on massive destruction are likely to target.

‘Our society, our way of life, and our liberty face series current challenges beyond the infrastructure fragility exacerbated by climate change. The most salient is attack by terrorist groups or an enemy state, or a combination thereof, aimed at massive damage and massive casualties. These are not unintentional “malignant” results of our habitual behavior but are rather “malevolent” and planned carefully by those who want to do far more than many terrorist groups in the past: namely, to destroy our entire civilization and way of life.’

In both of these segments, collective pronouns are used repeatedly to show the threat of climate change and terrorism to the American nation. A range of semantic constructions is also used to reinforce this connection, e.g. ‘our society’, ‘our way of life’, ‘our liberty’ and ‘our entire civilization’. The repetition of the collective, possessive pronoun ‘our’ and semantic choices associated with American nationhood (e.g. ‘way of life’ and ‘liberty’) construct an image of a collective American nation threatened by terrorism and climate change. The lexical choices in these excerpts are also informative. For example, the physical geographic term ‘confluence’ reinforces the notion of two ideas from different sources intersecting in potentially dangerous, surprising and processual ways. The modal noun ‘possibility’ also orients climate change and terrorism linkages to climate-insecure futures. Fascinatingly, whereas the label ‘malevolent’ endows terrorism with a particular evil intent, ‘malignant’ suggests something developing incrementally and could be ‘unintentional’. The term ‘malignant’ also carries connotations of biological contagion or virulence, linked to the use of racialized fertility metaphors to describe terrorism in moments of climate change.
security discourse (see chapter 5, section 5.5). As this brief example shows, I explored a range of textual features (modality, lexis, semantics etc.) in relation to how American nationhood and racialized metaphors are constructed in climate security. By no means were all excerpts as detailed as this (and some were more instructive), but it does reflect on the productiveness of a textual analysis to understand the grounded linguistic, material forms which make discursive representations, rules and meanings possible.

2.3.4 Analytical coding and contextual analysis

The textual analysis took varying amounts of time for each excerpt. At the end of the process for both US and EU sources (June 2015), I had compiled 15 long Word documents, one for each descriptive code. Within these documents were all of the excerpts for these codes alongside information from the textual analysis. From June-mid November, I worked on the ‘analysis’ stage of the CDA and produced analytic codes. This involved reading through the Word files in more detail to investigate emergent trends/themes. There were two important facets to this. First was that documents were read together and collectively. This meant that descriptive codes weren’t treated as isolated discursive silos, but in relation to one another, with many crosscutting themes. Second is that the reading was selective. With a large amount of material (545 pages for US codes, and 287 for EU codes (832 in total)), although I read through the data several times, focus was directed towards the most prevalent trends, those codes most relevant to my research questions, and interesting, unexpected findings with analytic promise.

First, I focused on questions of racial identity and Othering and amalgamated elements from several codes, including ‘Othering’, ‘determinism’, ‘religion’ (all small codes), as well as ‘generalization’, ‘migration’, ‘geopolitics’ and ‘terrorism’. Several things stood out. First is that ‘migration’ and ‘terrorism’ are key themes for racialization in US climate security. Geographically, climate-induced migration from Africa to the EU is a prominent example in earlier publications (2003-10). From this analysis, I produced a series of analytical codes under the heading of ‘racial logics and climate-induced migration’. These included racialization based on a latent tendency towards radicalized
violence and inherent cultural incompatibility, discussions of climate-induced migration in terms of dehumanizing geopolitical labels (‘waves’, ‘reverberations’ etc.), and a trend towards determinism governed by assumptions about certainty or near certainty in climate-insecure futures. Second, I analysed American nationhood in climate security and produced several analytic codes. These include a discursive strand of ‘climate resilience’, another towards defensive US nationhood, and a trend towards human security. Working from the racial logics chapter, I also decided to focus on the theme of terrorism/radicalization in climate security. From this, analytic codes of anti-Americanism (and its relationship to humanitarian intervention), a terrorism and climate change binary, and narratives of complex causality emerged. At the end of November 2015, I produced a full plan for the thesis. It would include three empirical chapters, one on racial logics and climate-induced migration, one on US nationhood, and a bridging empirical chapter between racial and national identities on terrorism in climate security discourse.

Throughout the CDA, two important methodological limitations persisted. One relates to an unequal alignment of power relations in my favour throughout the research (Jäger and Maier 2009). Throughout the CDA, power relations gravitated unequally in my favour as the researcher. I selected the sample and chose which descriptive codes would be used to organize the analysis. After this, I decided which theoretical tools to utilize – e.g. critical race studies and critical nationalism scholarship – and on the particular interpretation of different quotations and underlying assumptions of documents. My position as a sole English speaker limited the extent to which I could engage with texts from climate security contexts outside of the US and UK/EU. This is reflected in the strong contingent of UK government departments and organizations in the EU CDA (e.g. E3G and the Ministry of Defense). CDA also risks the positioning of me as a researcher ‘outside’ of the texts, able to ‘survey’ climate security discourse from a distanced position, ‘select’ texts for analysis, ‘choose’ the interpretive lens applied to these, and ‘write up’ the analysis in ‘my own’ words, what Paasi (2006: 217) terms ‘geopolitical remote sensing’. He (2006: 217) writes of an emerging tendency in critical geopolitics to ‘accentuate the value of deconstruction, discourse analysis, or the critical analysis of representations so that the use of these textual strategies often took place “at a distance” and “out of context.”’ This distance, with its assumptions of a
‘here’ (my position as a researcher ‘outside’ of the texts), ‘there’ (the ‘texts’ or ‘field’) and autonomous researcher capable of understanding their ‘position’, risks evacuating ‘the field’ of power relations and situated-ness altogether and, as Rose (1997) argues, replicating Harraway’s (1988) ‘god-trick’.

It could be that CDA is particularly susceptible to this problem because the research subject does not refer to specific individuals, but instead to texts. It could be that if unequal power relations are more readily apparent in methods involving interpersonal interactions, this is less the case with CDA where the research subjects/objects are texts and the closest alternative is their ‘author’. The distance this creates – between the researcher, the text (with its multitude of possible interpretations), and the author/organizations behind the text and potential readers – influences power relations in several ways. In one way, it highlights a particularly acute inequality in political dynamics, where I as the researcher exercise unchallenged control over the selection and interpretation of texts (with a greater distance between the producer of the data and I as its interpreter and no immediate ‘right of reply’ on behalf of authors). However, in another way this replicates the distance critiqued above and obfuscates the power dynamics behind texts and my implication as a researcher in this process.

As a partial solution to this, Dittmer (2010) notes it is important to situate texts in their political contexts. As with textual analysis, there is little guidance about how this is conducted. Gill (1996: 155) writes that ‘all discourse is occasioned: there are no trans-historical, transcultural, universal accounts except those that might be produced by the ‘universality’ of the research context.’ However, she provides no information about how to investigate the ways in which all discourse is ‘occasioned’. I followed Waitt’s (2010: 225) technique of ‘familiarization’. This involves conducting background research on the texts, their authorship, their technological medium, audience and reception. Key questions include: when and how were the texts produced? Does the author have a particular ideological perspective? How does the audience engage with the text? How is it stored? For these questions, the ‘history-context’ descriptive code proved to be invaluable (see Tables 1 and 2). It provided me with a direct source of information about the authors and their in-text biographies, links to think tanks and departments producing reports, and information about the political and legal contexts.
behind each report’s mandate. Contextual analysis also operates at multiple scales. As well as background information for each report, I attempted to situate it in its broader political and historical context. This involved examination of reports in relation to broader shifts in US climate security, for example a shift from defensive representations of American nationhood (2003-10) to an emphasis on climate resilience and human security (2010-15). Contextual analysis also required situation in US political debates related to but distinct from climate security, for example highly polarized Congressional climate politics and the geopolitics of the War on Terror. For the chapter on climate-induced migration, it required broader situation in the politics of migration from Africa to the EU and academic debates on climate-induced migration, for example the ‘climate refugee’ and ‘migration-as-adaptation’ discourses.

Throughout the CDA, I tried to emphasize the situation of US climate security both at the level of background to individual publications and the broader historical and geographical context of American politics. However, although this larger scale and ‘meso-scale’ of contextual analysis can be approached in CDA, it is more difficult to ascertain the micro-scale politics of each text’s production and reception. This includes debates among authors about which aspects to prioritize, omissions and administrative procedures of drafting/editing/finalizing the report. How is the readership(s) targeted? What are the outcomes of dissemination? These contextual questions are difficult to reach with CDA, a method dominated by interrogation at the scale of the text. To assist with this limitation, I used semi-structured interviews as a supplement to the CDA.

2.4 Semi-structured interviews

2.4.1 Methodological justification

Semi-structured interviews were used for two reasons. First is as a more detailed means to support the CDA’s contextual analysis. To illustrate this point, I draw upon an example. Although the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA 2007: 3) report lists individual members of the Military Advisory Board, there is relatively little information provided about how the MAB was initially formed (e.g. the role of former MAB Executive
Director and DOD employee Sherri Goodman (Diez et al 2016)). Whilst it is possible to find information about the MAB’s historical context from online sources (e.g. CNA 2016), there are few details about specific mechanisms (meetings, forms of communications etc.) Interviews with climate security professionals based in Washington, D.C. provided a partial means through which to address this problem and gain a more detailed contextual insight. Although brief and partial, this example indicates means through which semi-structured interviews provided important and supporting contextual depth to the CDA. Indeed, though the thesis does draw on interview testimony in relation to Hurricane Katrina and American national identity (chapter 6, section 6.5.1), all but one of the citations from the dataset originates from the CDA. As such, this contextual role for the semi-structured interviews – for situation of the project in American climate security politics – was a fundamental underpinning justification for this methodology. One limitation to using semi-structured interviews in this manner – and, by implication, to my research timetable – was that in conducting semi-structured interviews before the CDA (September 2014), this constrained the extent to which I could follow up with contextual questions arising from the CDA. However, whilst this question of timing did hinder contextual analysis, I had already engaged in readings of important climate security publications beforehand (when applying for the ESRC scholarship, during my Masters course, and during the first year of the PhD). This preparation helped to provide some contextual questions and mitigate the scheduling limitation to a certain extent.

As a rich and revelatory method (Winchester 1996), one which allows participants to explicate their own social circumstances, opinions and lived worlds (Kvale 2006), I also deemed interviews to be an instructive means to build an ingrained, proximate picture of climate security politics. Semi-structured interviews also provided a means of ‘triangulating’ my findings (Baxter and Eyles 1997): they would add an extra source of information to the overall dataset and means to corroborate/dispute results from the CDA. This is not to argue that the CDA and interview data fold seamlessly into one repository of information. Although the same descriptive codes were applied to interview transcripts, they are a fundamentally different kind of linguistic data (one textual, the other conversational) with unique sociolinguistic characteristics (Fairclough 2003). As such, whereas I explored discursive representations/meanings
for both types of data, I did not apply the same rules of textual analysis to the interview transcripts.

2.4.2 Sampling procedure for semi-structured interviews

I adopted a purposive sampling strategy to select potential interviewees. Whilst this doesn’t subscribe to a positivist ideal of random population selection (Greener 2011), the research required pragmatism. McDowell (1998: 2315) acknowledges this, and writes that ‘the reality ... is a lot messier. A great deal depends on luck and chance, connections and networks, and the particular circumstances at the time.’ Initially, I drew up a list of potential interviewees. These were from government departments and think tanks, environmental justice organizations, environmental NGOs and religious groups. For large organizations with no contact details, I used the ‘Contact us’ section on their websites. For think tanks, I focused on those with staff linked to climate security debates, with climate/environmental security divisions, and those devoted entirely to environmental or climate security concerns. Similarly, I contacted government offices on the basis that their competencies related to climate security/environmental/climate change issues. The reason for contacting organizations/individuals outside of ‘climate security’ was to build a wider coalition of perspectives on constructions of American identity and climate change. In May/June 2014, as my Progression Review was completed, I emailed prospective participants. With a US fieldtrip in September 2014, establishing contact 3-4 months in advance was an important step. Cormode and Hughes (1999) agree, arguing that professional interviewees often have busy schedules. I sent out an initial scoping email and interview request. In general, I received a positive response, with most respondents open to an interview. I travelled to the US for a three-week fieldtrip from 1st-22nd September 2014. The first week (1st-8th) was spent in New York (with several environmental organizations and think tanks based there). However, with a majority of think tanks, government departments and NGOs headquartered in Washington, D.C., I spent two weeks there (8th-22nd September). 21 semi-structured interviews were conducted in total. 3 took place in New York and 18 in Washington, D.C. (a full list of anonymised US and EU interviews, including interviewees with pseudonyms if cited in the thesis, is provided in Appendix B).
15 interviews took place in person (in locations chosen by the interviewee), 5 by telephone, and 1 as an email discussion (I distributed a Word document to the interviewee with questions and she completed this before emailing back). Interviews ranged in length from 30 minutes to just under 3 hours. With the exception of telephone interviews (with a poor loudspeaker the Dictaphone could not capture), all interviews were recorded. 19 of 21 interviews were conducted with a single person; of the others, 1 was conducted with 2 people and the other with 3 staff members. I also kept notes of interesting developments in interviews, e.g. shifts in tone/body language, and used ‘snowballing’ to ask interviewees for any individuals they recommended I get in touch with.

2.4.3 The interview process

I drew up a list of general themes but kept this as open as possible to allow interviewees to freely construct their own accounts of US climate security. The purpose of a thematic list was to guide the discussion and ask interviewees about particular dimensions of climate security, but not prescribe a set of closed questions. This allowed interviewees to reflect on specific questions, draw up their own detailed, subjective accounts, and for complementary, follow-up questions to interesting points (Rapley 2001). Following Dexter’s (2006) advice, I started each interview with a broad, general question to situate the discussion. This asked interviewees to describe the ‘current landscape of climate change politics in the US as they see it’. The second question would locate the research specifically, asking respondents ‘what the term climate security means to them’. After these questions, although there were some themes I tried to discuss in each interview, e.g. migration, American nationhood and climate security politics, themes were based on preparatory research. A fuller list of themes raised in interviews is provided in Appendix C. Before each discussion, I would spend several hours reading up on interviewees’ career biographies and writings (academic articles, newspaper pieces, online blogs etc.) and select relevant topics to include. Overall, this meant that the list of questions/themes tended to differ depending on individual meetings.
Interviews are laden with unequal power relations (Tarrant 2014). Researchers often determine the scope and content of the project, direct the trajectory of interviews, control interpretation of findings and dissemination outlets (Kvale 2006). For the most part Washington, D.C. based professionals employed by national or international think tanks, NGOs or federal government departments, it could be argued my interviewees constitute ‘elite’ informants. Whilst power relations lean towards the researcher in some respects (e.g. management of the project), it is a case of ‘studying up’ in others (Smith 2006). However, the term ‘elite’ should be approached with caution. Smith (2006) argues it depends on a structural concept of power ‘possessed’ by elite actors. This assumes first that elites are discrete categories of ‘powerful people’ distinguishable from ‘non-elites’, and second it presumes that power bestowed upon professionals will transfer into the interview space (because they ‘hold’ and can inscribe power as such) (Smith 2006). Woods (1998) shares this critique, underlining that a structural conception of ‘elites’ depends on a clearly stratified, vertical model of society, doesn’t account for the shifting power relations and multiplicity of elites (changing members, boundaries, social status etc.), and doesn’t take note of the discursive/social construction of particular elite groups. For these reasons, I follow Smith’s (2006: 646) lead in not using the term ‘elites’ to describe the project’s interviewees. They are referred to as ‘climate security professionals’, ‘climate change professionals’ or ‘environmental activists’ throughout; this recognizes their occupational status (often embedded in influential networks), but refuses to pigeonhole individuals into a homogenized category of ‘elite’ or ‘elite actors’.

Largely, interviewees occupied research or policy positions in Washington, D.C. Many had rotated professional positions in their careers. Power dynamics were in their favour in choosing to grant me an interview and the opportunity to share their expertise. However, in most cases, interviewees made no explicit attempt to enforce a hierarchical position or superiority. Often with backgrounds as researchers, with Masters or PhD qualifications and cognizant of current academic literatures, interviewees would frequently attach value to academic research and empathize with the idiosyncrasies of fieldwork (Herod 1999). Some interviewees sympathized with the more monotonous features of academic work (e.g. transcription), and others asked if they had provided sufficient answers to questions (e.g. ‘I don’t know if that’s what you
wanted’ or ‘I don’t know if that answers your question’). While this contributed to a more relaxed, equitable exchange as researchers, it also reinforced an unequal power relation in my favour: interviewees might have perceived the discussion as an instrumentalized process about what they could give me as the PhD researcher (Kvale 2006).

Along with academic status, McDowell (2010) highlights that identity markers, e.g. gender or age, can inflect an interview’s power dynamics. In the US, cross-cultural Anglo-American identifiers became an interesting marker of difference. This wasn’t only related to differences in national identity – between the US and UK – but more specifically the nuances of Washington, D.C. politics. For example, prior to traveling to Washington, D.C., although I had read about American politics, I was relatively unfamiliar with terms such as ‘the Beltway’, and the wide range of acronyms, e.g. ‘EJ’ for environmental justice, used in environmental policy circles. In all cases, interviewees were warm and engaging. This dynamic also applied to interviews with multiple participants. Although both discussions could be considered too small to be focus groups (with 2 and 3 discussants respectively (Pratt 2009)), there is relatively little research on the dynamics of group interviews (Heaphy and Einarsdottir 2013). At risk of one participant leading the conversation and unsettling the interview’s power dynamic, Bjørnholt and Farstad (2012) dispute this and argue a group interview can enrich conversational output as each participant adds to the other’s commentary. In practice, both group interviews were convivial encounters. The first, with three respondents from an environmental NGO, was constructive with each interviewee taking turns to elaborate their views on a particular theme and follow this up with comments to corroborate/contest their colleagues’ answers. The second, with two climate security interviewees at a Washington, D.C. think tank, operated in a similarly collegiate manner.

Whilst my original intention was to transcribe all interviews in October after returning to the UK, the timescale required for this and a range of other activities (the CDA, teaching responsibilities etc.) made this ambition unrealistic. Instead, I committed to spend 2 hours of every working day on transcription and the remainder on other tasks. Although I didn’t always meet this target, it remained largely consistent throughout
the academic year (2014-15). I used F5 transcription software that, with its integrated audio-transcription mechanism and ‘pause’ button, made the process more efficient. The same set of descriptive codes was utilized as for the CDA (see Tables 1 and 2), and I read each transcript several times in the coding process. Transcripts, with full stops enclosed by brackets ‘(.)’ to indicate pauses and two dashes ‘//’ for an interruption, were saved as Word documents and the Tracker function was used to highlight relevant segments of transcripts, code these and make accompanying notes. These were read alongside the CDA’s analytical codes from June-November 2015 to identify common points of interest, disagreements, and important contextual details.

2.4.4 Interpretation of interview data

As Kvale (2006: 485) states, interviewers conventionally hold a ‘monopoly of interpretation’ over interviewee statements. This means that while there may be contestation over truth claims, the researcher maintains privilege over how this is interpreted and which theoretical schemas attend to it (Kvale 2006). Hammersley (2014: 530) cautions that this is especially acute for critical research, where ‘what those informants say who are regarded as representing, or being implicated in … dominant practices is especially likely to be subject to negative evaluation in terms of its veracity, implications, functions, etc.’ I agree with Hammersley (2014) that critical research can lean towards an especially critical take on datasets, and that it is selective (necessarily so as it focuses on social inequalities (Fairclough 2003)), but I disagree that it is always preoccupied with ‘dominant practices’, or that criticism is invariably distorted towards a negative evaluation. Critical research is undertaken with a wide range of inequalities and injustices, and is not always committed to critiquing every aspect of established social systems and ideologies. In this project, I have always attempted to include a substantive amount of contextualized evidential sources and theoretically rigorous interpretations to support my arguments. There are no claims to generalization – the phrase ‘context-specific moments of US climate security discourse’ is a frequent fixture of the thesis – and I stress these are partial, specific strands in limited time periods of American climate security discourse. My argument is about how naturalized assumptions are constructed in relation to climate-insecure futures. This is especially pertinent in a supposedly American ‘postracial society’, in which the
‘key conditions of social life are less and less predicated on racial preferences, choices, and resources’, despite the continued persistence of racism, racist expressions and racialization (Goldberg 2015: 1). In this context, of a ‘postraciality’, a social condition ‘close to, or ought to be living outside of debilitating racial difference’ (Goldberg 2015: 2-3), it is especially important to study the underlying logics through which racial identities are essentialized and racial inequalities persist. I argue logics help explain the ways in which underlying, hidden assumptions, premises and associations facilitate construction of naturalized racial and national identities. They provide an additional analytic through which to challenge essentialized identities in context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourse.

As a final precaution in the interview transcription and interpretation/analysis stages, I have tried to ensure that interviewees’ identities remained anonymous and their data is treated confidentially throughout. Transcripts are stored on a university computer and a memory stick, both password-protected. Each (cited) interviewee is accorded a pseudonym and this is applied accordingly in the thesis. Aside from using relatively well-known English language names (in the US and UK), there are no specific rules or strategies for anonymization. Referring to interviewees’ contexts, I have tried to keep this as general as possible without hampering necessary contextual information. As such, respondents are referred to as ‘climate security professionals’, ‘environmental activists’ and so forth. Pseudonyms are not watertight, especially with a specific, well-networked group of individuals and the sophistication of online search engines (Tilley and Woodthorpe 2011). However, I have always referred to individuals with generic – if not completely decontextualized – labels and also interpret the dataset as a collective, historically situated corpus at different points in the thesis. Before concluding the chapter, I discuss briefly the EU segment of fieldwork.

2.5 EU fieldwork and semi-structured interviews

One of the methodology’s focal points in the Progression Panel Review (June 2014) was the need to think about more ingrained, experiential methods beyond textual materials. My reviewers suggested a period of ethnographic fieldwork with a climate security-focused institution to address this limitation. Because the fieldtrip in the US
was already in motion at this point, I decided to use the period for semi-structured interviews with EU representatives, in March-April 2015, to scope possibilities for ethnographic fieldwork. Kuus (2013) is skeptical of such possibilities for foreign policymakers and civil servants. Whereas it is possible to examine the impacts of foreign policies, she (2013) remarks it is much more difficult to study the dynamics of institutions in which they are formed. Public relations departments are well versed in how to deal with researchers, they will often only be provided with surface glimpses or the ‘party line’ of institutions, and forging relationships with employees is very difficult as they are constantly on rotation (Kuus 2013). Kuus (2013) concludes that ethnographic fieldwork may not be the most appropriate approach for foreign policymakers, and in fact that most work (with foreign policymakers) described as ‘ethnographic’ is predominantly interview and documentary analysis based.

Mindful of Kuus’ (2013) contentions, I began to contact EU institutions and think tanks in October-November 2014 about a fieldwork period in March-April 2015. Whilst most institutions did reply and couldn’t accommodate this type of fieldwork – citing lack of office space and staff – the majority offered an interview with a staff member in replacement. However, one organization offered me the opportunity to work from their office, interview staff members, and collaborate in organizational activities. I wouldn’t be allowed to take ethnographic notes of institutional politics and meetings, but would be allowed to use their office as a base to complete the EU CDA and interview climate security professionals from EU institutions, agencies and affiliated think tanks. In total, this resulted in one month resident with the think tank as an ‘intern’ (18th March-20th April) and a three-day trip to Brussels in April 2015 to conduct interviews. In total, I conducted 17 interviews in this period (listed anonymously in Appendix B).

My positionality differed with EU interviewees. Nationality was an important feature, especially in discussions of British Euroscepticism and the (then) forthcoming ‘Brexit’ referendum (23rd June, 2016). Often, this led to interviewees asking for my thoughts on the UK context, the referendum, and its relations with climate security (especially as the UK is an important site of climate security discourse). As with the CDA, I was limited by a lack of linguistic diversity. With English as my first language, I was unable
to carry out interviews in other European languages. It could be that some of the intricacies of climate security politics in different Member States, e.g. Germany, France or the Netherlands, were lost due to my lack of ability to converse in more than one language.

After returning to the UK, I followed the same procedure of transcribing interviews for a few hours each day. EU derived interview transcripts were coded using the same descriptive codes as the EU CDA. As I carried out the analysis and analytical codes emerged, I decided to move away from EU identity – itself too broad a topic for a single empirical chapter – and focus instead on a single theme, terrorism in climate-security discourse. Consequently, the EU dataset is only used in limited, very specific capacities in the thesis. This is as a support for the chapters on terrorism and climate-induced migration. The primary case study for the latter is climate-induced migration from North Africa to the EU and the analytical codes ‘geopolitics’ and ‘migration’ have been very important for this section. However, this leaves a whole tranche of EU material unused. In one way, this is inevitable: given the substantial size of the dataset and millions of words involved, any write-up is only going to draw upon a small percentage of available materials. The internship also proved to be an immensely valuable experience. It provided an excellent platform to better comprehend the complexities of climate security politics in a think tank context and its interconnections with other institutional backdrops. Despite its limited uptake in the dissertation’s output of empirical chapters, EU fieldwork contributed substantially to its development.

Overall, I hope this chapter has provided some methodological, personal and political contextual details (both the power relations of climate security and my imbrication within these as a researcher) to situate the thesis’ questions and objectives. Working from these methodological foundations – a critical discourse analysis grounded in a material, embedded concept of discourse, and semi-structured interviews with climate change professionals in the US and EU contexts – the thesis next illustrates their application to the project’s theoretical and empirical contexts. I begin by outlining a theoretical framework grounded specifically in the contingent constitution of racial and national identities in climate security discourse, essentializing logics held in
relation to possible climate-insecure futures and constitutive of unequal biopolitics. Subsequently, chapters 4 (on racial logics and climate-induced migration), 5 (interconnections of terrorism and climate change), and 6 (representations of American nationhood) explore the interrelations of these methodological and theoretical frameworks with the project’s empirical contexts.
Chapter 3:

Essentializing logics in US and EU climate security discourse: a theoretical framework

3.1 Introduction and research questions

1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security discourse?

Following from the broad contours of the project’s methodology and historical development, I now move on to introduce the theoretical and empirical analyses that define the thesis. To begin, this chapter outlines an overarching theoretical framework, inspired by several strands of social theory, used to interpret and understand my empirical data. Most fundamentally, the theoretical framework is grounded in anti-essentialist cultural identities – framed through Edward Said’s (1994) work (section 3.2). I then develop a particular, context-specific interpretation of American climate security that is biopolitical, grounded in discursive power-knowledge relations, and incorporates essentializing logics that orient racial and national identities towards possible climate-insecure futures. The biopolitical is inspired by Foucault’s biopolitics and Didier Fassin’s (2009) ‘bio-legitimacy’ (sections 3.3 and 3.4). I focus on discursive constructions in which particular lives and populations, delimited by nationhood and racialization, are valued differently to others in climate-insecure futures. Power-knowledge is situated in Foucault’s (1977) conceptualization of power relations and a conception of discourse adapted from Bialasiewicz et al (2007) and David Campbell’s (1998 (1992)) understanding of security (sections 3.5 and 3.6). Subsequently, I argue essentializing logics (bringing together different frameworks from Stuart Hall’s (1996) and Ben Anderson’s (2010a) works in a particular, limited way (see sections 3.7 and
3.8) provide an appropriate analytics to explore how biopolitical climate securities – in particular, partial and context-specific moments – discursively appropriate racial and national identities in climate-insecure futures. Finally, the chapter reflects on how Sara Ahmed’s (2002) work on ‘otherness’ and Sara Koopman’s (2011) ‘alter-geopolitics’ could contribute to more situated accounts of environmental justices and securities (section 3.9). First and foremost, however, I begin with Edward Said’s theorizations of anti-essentialist cultural differences.

3.2 Said’s anti-essentialism

There are many traditions of anti-essentialist thought. Writing from a cultural studies and critical race studies perspective, Stuart Hall (2002: 145) postulates that essentialized, fixed logics of identity are ‘for good or ill, finished’. He (2002: 145-146) contends that ideas of a continuous, self-sufficient ‘self’, and of collective, homogenous identities (‘race’, ‘class’, ‘gender’, ‘nation’, etc.), spatially organized and differentiated by boundaries of self and other, inside and outside, are being ‘de-centred’ by critical social theories (e.g. psychoanalysis), technological change, neoliberal globalization and porous national boundaries. Exploring situational understandings of Blackness and British identity, Hall (2002) argues that there is no single, general politics around which anti-essentialist ideas of identity as composed in relation to Others and in opposition to closed totalities, can gather. This project subscribes to Hall’s (2002) conclusions about essentialized collective identities and the difficulties of a general politics to challenge these. I adopt a vision of anti-essentialism garnered from Edward Said’s (1994) work. This is not only because the CDA follows Said’s (2003 (1978)) method of analysing elite texts, but also because Said (2003 (1978); 1994) articulates a critique of essentialism specifically grounded in the geographies of essentialized identities. Williams (2004: 69) writes that, for Edward Said, ‘concepts of unitary, essentialized or monolithic identities, not least in the form of racist or xenophobic nationalisms, were at the root of much suffering and oppression.’ These essentializations (e.g. ‘nations’, ‘mentalities’, ‘races’, ‘the Orient’, or ‘Europe’) produce what Said (2003 (1978): 71) terms ‘imaginative geography’. He argues that if human beings make their own history, geography is also socially constructed. Portions of space are constructed to house (essentially) different groups.
and demarcate boundaries between ‘Us’ (imperialist powers in Europe and North America) and ‘Them’ (‘the Orient’). Once this partition is established, it becomes possible to make political claims about the superiority of colonizing societies (modern and scientifically advanced), and the inferiority of colonized societies (supposedly culturally backward) (Gregory 2004a). Said’s (2003 (1973); 2004) critiques are undergirded by the humanist contention that human action drives historical and geographical change; Said (2004:11) writes (following Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico): ‘the core of humanism is the secular notion that the historical world is made by men and women, and not by God’. In this project, I argue that Said’s (2004) secular, active human agent, the contention that human beings make their own geographies, does not necessarily presuppose an autonomous, a priori subject or agent in the sense of ‘intentional creation, re-creation and transformation of discourse … while limited by the restraining features of a discourse’ (Müller 2008: 236). Whilst drawing on Said’s critiques of cultural essentialism, the thesis subscribes to Spivak’s (2012 (1987): 204) observation that a ‘subject-effect’ – a sovereign, determining and operating subject – is produced by ‘heterogeneous determinations’ and discursive ‘knottings’ of politics, ideology, economy, etc.

Said (1994: 36) writes: ‘If at the outset we acknowledge the massively complex and knotted histories of special but nevertheless overlapping and interconnected experiences – of Women, of Westerners, of Blacks, of national states and cultures – there is no particular intellectual reason for granting each and all of them essentially separate status.’ Recognizing intermingled cultural geographies, it is possible to challenge the non-porosity of essentialized, fixed identities. However, Said (1994) relies on a delicate balance: cultural identities are irretrievably contingent, but this does not dissolve cultural differences to the extent that analytical distinctions become impossible. A key limitation of Said’s work is that he does not always manage to maintain this balance: at points Said risks re-essentializing as part of his critique of cultural essentialism (Jasanoff 2006). For example, in Covering Islam, Said (1997 (1981): xxxv) reflects on Islamism: ‘by surreptitiously justifying a policy of single-minded obduracy that links Islamism, however lamentable it is, to a strategically important, oil-rich part of the world, the anti-Islam campaign virtually eliminates the possibility of any sort of equal dialogue between Israel and the Arabs, and the West
and Israel.’ By talking about ‘the West’ as a single actor capable of holding an ‘equal dialogue’, Said (1997 (1981)) reduces the immense political complexity of these groups to single labels. To a certain extent this is very difficult to avoid (with terms needed to analyze and describe generalized phenomena), and it demonstrates a precise politics of bordering practices. However, permeable differences do exist and are subject to geographical scrutiny. This overarching, nuanced critique of essentialism informs the thesis’ analytics of essentializing logics (racial and national) in climate-insecure futures.

A subtle anti-essentialist critique, one in recognition of the permeable, contingent and constructed composition of cultural differences, underpins the critiques of imaginative geographies and essentializing racial and national logics in the thesis (chapter 3, sections 3.2, 3.7 and 3.8). It also underlies my understandings and interpretations of environmental justice and securities (chapter 3, section 3.9 and chapter 7, section 7.3), the means through which racial and national identities intersect (chapter 5, section 5.6), and the conceptual foundations for my critical discourse analysis and methodology (see chapter 2, section 2.2). Importantly, I contend the inequalities suggested by essentializing logics in climate-insecure futures involve multiple, context-specific valuations of ‘lives’ and ‘populations’ in racial and national terms, what are termed ‘biopolitics’ in this project.

3.3 Biopolitics

Reflecting on the diversity of the concept, Coleman and Grove (2009) note biopolitics could be conceived as any ‘postsovereign’ account of power. Whereas ‘bio-power’ can denote a mode of power with life as its object, biopolitics refers to specific rationalities and technologies employed to secure and develop collective life (Grove 2014). Anderson (2012: 30) identifies two characteristics of bio-power: it involves a referent object (either living beings or life itself), and aims to optimize some form of valued life against a presumed threat, ‘to make life live’. I argue biopolitics are enmeshed in unequal power-knowledge relations and subscribe to Lemke’s (2011: 31-2) argument that ‘the meaning of biopolitics lies in its ability to make visible the always contingent, always precarious difference between politics and life, culture and nature’. Biopolitics emphasize the contingent, shifting relations of ‘politics’ and ‘life’. In order to elaborate
a context-specific theorization of biopolitics, I turn first to Michel Foucault’s variegated writings on this subject.

Foucault (2009 (1977): 1) defines bio-power as ‘the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human race become the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or ... how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that humans are a species.’ He (2004 (1976): 240-1) identifies that in the 19th century the sovereign right to kill, ‘the right to take life or let live’, is joined by a new right, that of bio-power: ‘the right to make live and let die’. Sovereign power is embodied in the monarch’s absolute authority and is exercised over territories (Foucault 2009 (1977)). Its essential power relation is between the sovereign and his/her subjects, one reliant on ‘the subject’ as endowed with natural rights, founded in legal systems, and attempts to unify and centralize power (Foucault 2004 (1976)). In contrast, the new politics of life functions at two scales. First, an ‘anatamo-politics’ of discipline exercises power over bodies and utilizes technologies of surveillance to increase the productivity of individual bodies in systems of ‘enclosure’ (e.g. schools, prisons, army barracks or hospitals). Second is a ‘biopolitics of the human race’, focused on political technologies at the scale of ‘population’ or ‘man-as-species-being’ (Foucault 2004 (1976): 242-3). Three aspects characterize Foucault’s biopolitics. First is a focus on population as an object of power. Second, biopolitical phenomena are ‘aleatory’ (uncertain events measurable only at the level of population). Finally, biopolitics, as a power regime that ‘makes life live’, is exercised through security mechanisms designed to filter random elements of populations and establish ‘homeostasis’ (Foucault 2004 (1976): 246-7). However, despite Foucault’s focus on mechanisms through which lives are ‘made to live’, Weheliye (2014: 4) argues that Foucault’s biopolitics does not adequately address the centrality of race (especially in a colonial context) in determinations of ‘humanity’ or ‘the human’. As such, Foucault’s (2004 (1976); 2009 (1977) emphasis on technologies, rationalities and mechanisms of biopolitical security do not sufficiently encompass the political subjections, violences, or processes of hierarchization of human lives in biopolitical securities (Weheliye 2014).
Foucault’s biopolitical mechanisms are clarified (Foucault 2009 (1977): 6) as an ‘apparatus (dispositif) of security’ with four dimensions. Firstly, the ‘space’ of the security apparatus is a ‘milieu’: a series of uncertain elements and events within which security regulates flows and circulations (of materials, human beings etc.). Apparatuses of security also operate with an orientation towards the ‘aleatory’ (risky, uncertain etc.); they accept uncertainties, filtering beneficial circulations from detrimental flows. For this second dimension, Foucault links biopolitics to the emergence of liberalism in the 18th century, not as an ideology but instead an ‘art’ of governing human beings (Foucault (2008 (1978)); Lemke 2011). Liberal governmentality organizes around principles of laissez-faire freedom and security (facilitated by freedoms of movement and circulation of goods and flows). Thirdly, whereas disciplinary normalization posits an optimal model and works to achieve conformity to this, ‘normalization’ in security operates along ‘different curves of normality’, moving between multiple distributions of normality to construct ‘the norm’ as ‘an interplay of differential normalities’ (Foucault 2009 (1977): 63). Finally, apparatuses of security witness the emergence of ‘population’ as an issue of government. I argue Foucault’s preoccupations with ‘population’ and ‘aleatory futures’ are important constituents of context-specific, multiple biopolitics of US climate security. However, I also contend that Foucault doesn’t account for the contingent ethical and political implications of biopolitical security apparatuses (what Weheliye’s (2014) critique highlights in the specific contexts of racist dehumanization and political subjection), the ‘content’ of government in Didier Fassin’s (2009: 52) terms.

In this regard, Foucault conceptualizes biopolitics in relation to the emergence of modern racism in 19th century Europe (Venn 2009; Rasmussen 2011). Prior to this, emergent in 17th century European countries, Foucault (2004 (1976): 65-6) identifies a binary discourse of ‘race war’ that separates European societies: a social ‘struggle’ of ‘political-historical’ divides challenging dominant discourses of sovereign right, power and victory. However, this concept assumes formerly cohesive, autochthonous European populations within which fissures develop (Weheliye 2014). Importantly, Foucault’s account neglects the importance of colonization to biopolitics: ‘Colonialism was clearly outside Foucault’s analytic concern, to him clearly a byproduct of Europe’s internal and permanent state of war with itself’ (Stoler 1995: 28). Foucault does note
the importance of colonialism, but his is ‘a historiography so locked in Europe and its
discursive formations that colonial genocide and narratives about it could only be
derivative of the internal dynamics of European states’ (Stoler 1995: 57). As such,
although Foucault discusses the role of colonial and imperialist violence in the
constitution of modern racisms, this is only as a secondary influence to his Eurocentric
accounts of ‘race war’ and subsequent biopolitical racisms. This negation thus
constitutes a fundamental omission in his historical account.

In the specific European context in which he writes, Foucault (2004 (1976)) contends
modern racism emerges in the 19th century. For Foucault, different modes of power
are interrelated; sovereignty, discipline and governmental management do not replace
one another, but constitute a ‘triangle’ (Foucault 2009 (1977): 107). Informed by
appropriations of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, modern racism emerges at the
point at which bio-power, concerned with how to ‘make life live’, confronts the
question of sovereign power’s right to take life (Foucault 2004 (1976)). Racism has two
functions. First is to separate groups within the population into ‘races’, a way of
introducing a partition between which human lives must live and which must die
(Foucault 2004 (1976): 245-5). Racism’s second function is a positive relation whereby
the more lives one takes – those deemed ‘abnormal’ or ‘inferior’ – the healthier the
population will be overall. ‘Killing’ or ‘taking lives’ is not restricted to murder, but also
includes political expulsion, rejection and subjugation. Broadly put, ‘racism justifies the
death function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the
death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or
a population’ (Foucault 2004 (1976): 258). Therefore, modern racism enables
sovereign power’s capacity to ‘take lives’ in order to ‘make the population live’ as a
whole. Racism is not bound up with ideologies of rule – although this is also
undoubtedly the case – but is a technology of power: racism is a horrific technique of
biopolitical government and exercise of sovereign power (Foucault 2004 (1976): 258;
Stoler 1995). In Foucault’s account, racist technologies are realized most vividly in the
totalitarianisms of Nazi Germany and USSR, where violence and murder were
normalized throughout society (against ‘inferior races’ in Nazi Germany and ‘class
enemies’ in the Soviet Union) on the justification that this increases the general health
of the social body (Foucault 2004 (1976); Weheliye 2014).
Stoler (1995) critiques Foucault’s account for its lack of consideration of interactions between race, imperialism, citizenship and nationhood. These relations suggest that not only is racism a product of nineteenth-century biopolitics and sovereign power, but also of nationalism (nationalists distinguished between those deemed citizens and those not, were assisted by prescribed hierarchies of moral conduct, and by racial politics of exclusion) (Stoler 1995). Nor does Foucault address the gendered characterization of racisms: ‘gendered assessments of perversion and subversion are part of the scaffolding on which the intimate technologies of racist policies meet’ (Stoler 1995: 93). His genealogies of biopolitics and biopower (Foucault 2004 (1976); 2008 (1978); 2009 (1977)) are also critiqued for rigid periodizations between ‘sovereign power’, biopower, ‘discipline’ and ‘race war’ grounded in relatively imprecise empirical foundations (Collier 2009; Rutherford and Rutherford 2013). Furthermore, Foucault’s attribution of racism to biological imperatives also lacks consideration of cultural racisms, for instance racialization of religious identities or racial exclusions governed by cultural incompatibilities (Meer 2013).

However, Foucault’s biopolitics does provide several assets for study of US climate security. First is that ‘population’ is not only an object of government, but a subject: ‘The population as a political subject, as a new collective subject … is appearing here in its complexity … You can already see it appearing as an object … towards which mechanisms are directed in order to have a particular effect … as well as a subject since it is called upon to conduct itself in such and such a fashion’ (Foucault 2009 (1977): 42). Populations are not only incorporated into possible climate-insecure futures as ‘objects’ (for example suggested outcomes of containment for ‘African’ climate-induced migrants), but also as collective subjects, e.g. a ‘climate-resilient’ American nation. Secondly, Foucault locates biopolitical security in conditions of future uncertainty and riskiness (‘the aleatory’). Given that many US climate security documents (e.g. Schwartz and Randall 2003 or Campbell et al 2007) speculate on uncertain future scenarios, this corresponds to mechanisms of a biopolitical strategy. Thirdly, Foucault is concerned with the regulation of milieu; here, an objective of biopolitical management is the filtering of positive and negative circulations. In context-specific moments of US climate security discourse, I argue this biopolitical
technique infiltrates discourses of climate-induced migration through racial logics associating ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations with radicalized violence. At this point, climate security becomes a task of ensuring beneficial circulations of human mobility whilst denying those constructed as dangerous or risky. Each of these points is elaborated in chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Fourthly, and most significantly, Foucault’s conclusions imply an unequal valuation of lives and populations in regimes of biopower and sovereign power. Questions arise as to which lives are taken, which lives are made to live, and which lives are left to die. Subsequently, these questions of value raise further questions of subjectification and Othering of valued lives. Two contradictions arise at this point. First is that Foucault (1982) does not engage with questions of values and inequalities in his work on biopolitics. However, if biopolitics imply unequal governmental management of populations, these are crucially important questions. Foucault focuses primarily on ‘how’ questions: specific technologies, rationalities and techniques of modes of power (Foucault 1982). He (1982: 786) imagines a conception of power uniting questions of why, what and how: ‘I would say that to begin the analysis with a “how” is to suggest that power as such does not exist ... “How,” not in the sense of “How does it manifest itself?” but “By what means is it exercised?”’ As such, Foucault is not dismissing the ethics of biopolitics, but seeks a theory of power that does not reinforce it as an essential property to be controlled or held.

The second contradiction concerns subjectification and identity construction in biopolitics. Weheliye (2014: 4) argues bare life and biopolitics overlook theorizations of the ‘human’ and racism and depend on an indivisible, absolute and universal biological substance anterior to subjectification. He (2014: 7) writes: ‘Bare life and biopolitics discourse ... is plagued by a strong ‘anti-identity politics' ... as uncontaminated by and prior to reductionist or essentialist political identities such as race or gender.’

Contrastingly, Weheliye (2014: 4) formulates ‘racializing assemblages’ as sets of sociopolitical processes dividing humanity into ‘full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans.’ In line with a concept of biopolitics as different or prior to, or incompatible with subjectification, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2009) introduce a ‘political imaginary of species-being’ (p.2) as a biopolitical imaginary with life as its
object of governance. This involves contestation over which life counts as valuable, measurable, and livable. The moment life ‘exceeds or fails the grammars determining what it is to be a living thing’ sets ‘the biopolitical grammar of enmity going’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009: 7). However, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008) also differentiate between sovereign (geopolitical) and biopolitical modes of security. Geopolitical security emerged following the Peace of Westphalia (1648); it revolves around preventative measures and interests to preserve an *a priori* subject or object from external threats (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). Biopolitical security functions as a ‘game’ through which radically contingent, emergent life is secured through promotion of its transactional capacities (Dillon 2008: 315). Life constantly in transformation is not amenable to ‘inscription within the bounds of an identity, a territory or the cogito’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 271), or discursive construction as a Self-Other dialectic (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 268). This does not mean identity construction does not feature, but is only one possible set of effects (‘cogito-effects’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 271)) to emerge from biopolitical circulations. Therefore, discursive identity constructions are not integrated into mechanisms of biopolitical security and this is problematic for a concept of biopolitics underpinned by discursive appropriations of valued – racial and national – lives.

Whilst Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero’s (2008; 2009) argument is persuasive, I argue it is limited in several respects. They recognize ‘grammars of enmity’ and acknowledge Foucault’s work on race (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009: 71), but there is little explanation of which forms of subjectification inform these valuations. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008) claim biopolitical securities exist in correlative – but distinct – relation with discursive identifications, but do not provide a detailed explanation of how these connections work, how ‘cogito-effects’ emerge in security apparatuses (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 271). Despite these limitations, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2009) argue ‘contingency’ and ‘circulation’ have emerged as ‘quasi-transcendental’s’ in contemporary biopolitical security. This is supported by Dillon’s (2008: 314, original emphasis) assertion that ‘contingency ... becomes the epistemic object for biopolitics of security in the 21st century.’ These claims – about contingency in situated biopolitics – are important for understanding current security practices. However, their generalizing tenor detracts from the fact they rely on a context-specific
understanding of ‘life’ grounded in late 20th/early 21st century science. As such, their claims about life and life processes do engender a particular ontological conception – discursively articulated – of what ‘life’ is (‘connected’, ‘contingent’ etc.). This is subsequently used to generalize and make claims about contemporary biopolitics. This analysis does not rely on a particular delimitation of life working to define biopolitical security in general (or a separation of biopolitics from racialization dependent on a universalized biological substrate (Weheliye’s (2014) critique)). Instead, I argue that biopolitics of climate security are multiple, context-specific, and moulded through contingent discursive appropriations of what counts as ‘valued’ lives and populations in possible climate-insecure futures.

3.4 Biopolitics of unequally valued lives

My starting point is Didier Fassin’s (2009) claim that ‘another politics of life’ is possible. Fassin (2009: 48-9) notes: ‘My idea is similarly not to give a definition or even a delimitation of life. It is to render its full meaning and its multiple senses when it is not confined to a biological phenomenon … It is to consider how life can be grasped by a political and moral anthropology, how it simultaneously shapes and is shaped by the political choices of contemporary societies.’ Fassin understands morality and ethics not as the establishment of values or distinction of right from wrong, but rather how norms develop in specific historical and geographical contexts (Lemke 2011: 48-9). This is intended to deepen political analysis and ask which normative value systems guide a politics of life (Lemke 2011: 86-7). Fassin (2009: 48-9) is concerned not only with normalizing practices and technologies of bio-power, but inequalities (‘bio-inequalities’) governing which lives may live and those neglected, subjugated or left to die. At this point, Fassin (2009: 50) introduces the concept of ‘bio-legitimacy’, not so much power over life, but the power of life: discursive claims to the ‘right to life’ or the ‘sacredness of life’ in its own terms. Fassin (2009) situates these claims in a critique of humanitarianism and its presumed ‘higher mission’ to ‘save lives’. Using the example of French migration policy, he (2009: 50-1) writes that since 1974 it has become increasingly restrictive against migrants, their families, asylum seekers and refugees. During the 1990s, the number of adults granted asylum decreased six fold as a consequence of punitive deterrence policies and rejection of asylum claims (Fassin
Simultaneously, under pressure from NGOs, the French state created a new criterion whereby undocumented immigrants could be legalized if suffering from a severe illness untreatable in their home country (Fassin 2009). This clause (known as 'humanitarian') works as an exception to the rule and the number of beneficiaries multiplied by seven during the 1990s. Consequently, Fassin (2009: 51) questions which 'sort of life' is valued by the French state: the life of the refugee is marred by the label 'false refugee', whereas that of the ill migrant is in need of 'humanitarian' aid. With its inferred bio-inequalities, Fassin (2009: 52) contends bio-legitimacy emphasizes the production of meaning and values of life, not just strategies of control; it is 'moving from the 'rules of the game' to its stakes. These perspectives are not contradictory: by analyzing the new forms of the art of governing, one may apprehend what its political content is ... Who should live and in the name of what it definitely a political question.'

Fassin (2009) acknowledges Foucault (2004 (1976)) comes closest to 'bio-inequalities' when distinguishing between bio-power (that which 'makes life live' and 'lets die') and sovereign power (that which 'takes life'). He (2009) also acknowledges bio-inequalities function – partially – through a lens of population, e.g. nutrition programmes, public health and social security. ‘Bio-inequalities’ and ‘bio-legitimacy' not only refer to specific ‘forms’ of power, but also contestation over what constitutes life (p.57). Fassin (2009) affirms the importance of subjectification for these differences, noting the biopolitics of racial segregation in Apartheid South Africa. He (2009: 57) concludes that bio-legitimacy not only raises questions about technologies of power, but about 'the concrete way in which individuals and groups are treated, under which principles and in the name of which morals, implying which inequalities and misrecognitions.' Processes of exclusion, Othering and inequality are thus central to Fassin’s (2009) ‘bio-legitimacy’. With this in mind, I argue that key to studying the unequal, multiple biopolitics of climate security is not to posit a single definition of 'life', but to explore the situated valuations of lives and populations in context-specific moments of US climate security discourse. This approach necessitates conceptualizing biopolitics as plural: the research’s focus is not a question of what biopolitics is (a strategy, regime or mode of power), but of what biopolitics are (multiple, situated and unequal discursive articulations of valued lives and populations). Following Fassin (2009), this theorization involves consideration of the power-knowledge relations underwriting
discursive appropriations of life and the inequalities bound up in these processes (Lemke 2011). It also involves analysis of how power-knowledge relations are intricately embedded in subjectification and Othering: which living beings and populations are valued in possible climate-insecure futures, and which Others are deemed security threats?

3.5 US and EU climate securities as ‘discourses’

3.5.1. Conceptions of ‘discourse’

In making an argument that multiple biopolitics of US and EU climate securities are grounded in discursive articulations of unequally valued lives, I contend that US and EU climate securities can be conceptualized as discourses. For Foucault (1972 (1969): 37), a discourse is loosely categorized as a ‘group of statements’. This is clarified with the notion of discursive formation (Foucault 1972 (1969): 37, original emphasis):

‘Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts or thematic choices, one can describe a regularity ... we are dealing with a discursive formation.’

Despite this definition, discourse remains theoretically ambiguous, with uncertainty as to where practices, materiality and language belong within the concept’s remit (Müller 2008). Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams (2015) critique IR theorists’ adoption – including David Campbell, a contributing author to Bialasiewicz et al (2007), used in this chapter – of a restrictive conception of discourse premised on meaning-making and representation (if incorporative of non-linguistic phenomena). This restriction risks relegating “the material realm’ of social life to the status of an inert or apolitical backdrop, which can only acquire political significance via linguistic or visual representation’ (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015: 5). This move negates the material constitution of politics and premises political meaningfulness on discursive articulation. By extension, it also constructs a hierarchical dichotomy between ‘materiality’ (as an apolitical backdrop) and ‘discourse’ (as politically constitutive). In this sense, discourse theory assumes that ‘all objects are objects of discourse, as their meaning depends on a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 2, original emphasis).
Such an expansive constitutive role (discursive production of identities, subjects, objects, social relations etc.) does not capacitate for the constitution of discourses by embodied materialities. In her study of University of Edinburgh students’ perceptions and fears of crime, Mehta (1999: 69) introduces the concept of ‘embodied discourses’ to articulate how living bodies and recurrent everyday practices (e.g. routes to walk home) constitute discursive norms (for example ‘public safety’). Furthermore, Hyndman (2004) articulates a feminist geopolitics aimed at challenging embodied (re)productions of geopolitical orthodoxies and critical geopolitics’ concern with elite texts. Whilst it is crucial to understand the embodied, material and affective registers of imaginative geographies, I agree with Sharp’s (2011: 298) statement that ‘discursive analysis is important. Geographical imaginaries are transmitted through institutions of the state, education and media and … these representational schemas provide the language through which understandings of the world are communicated, understood and contested.’ I do not argue for a disembodied, omnipotent conception of discourse as a monopolized provider of meaning. I contend discourses are thoroughly material: the materiality of bodies, language, texts (‘language in use’ (Fairclough 2003: 3)) and policies constitute climate security discourses (Jäger and Maier 2005).

However, it could be that broader concepts, e.g. ‘assemblage’, can help to better encapsulate climate securities. Weheliye (2014: 46), following Deleuze and Guattari, writes of assemblages: ‘Assemblages ... constitute continuously shifting relational totalities comprised of spasmodic networks between different entities (content) and their articulation within “acts and statements” (expression).’ Assemblages have two axes: a horizontal axis moving from ‘content’ (machinic components) to ‘expression’ (enunciative statements), and a vertical axis between ‘territorialization’ and ‘deterritorialization’. The vertical axis refers to the delineation of an assemblage from others (which components work to stabilize or ‘territorialize’ the assemblage, and which are moving away or ‘deterritorializing’ from the assemblage) (Dittmer 2014). Anderson et al (2012) contend ‘relations of exteriority’ characterize assemblages: entities are affected by their relations with other components, but not fully determined by these terms. Importantly, assemblages are emergent and heterogeneous, ‘entering into polyvalent becomings to produce and give expression to
previously nonexistent realities, thoughts, bodies, affects, spaces, actions, ideas, and so on’ (Weheliye 2014: 46; Müller 2015). Assemblages are a potentially productive means through which to explore US climate security. US climate securities are composed of many different elements, e.g. human beings, legal statutes, publications and think tanks, for which ‘assemblage’ could provide a more dynamic perspective. However, I argue that because the project’s specific focus is representations of US climate security, discourse represents the most targeted, appropriate concept for this analysis.

In doing so, I argue that variants of assemblage theory (specifically Dittmer’s (2014) ‘geopolitical assemblages’) risk a theoretically underdetermined conception of discourse. Following DeLanda (2006), Dittmer (2014: 387-8) notes that one means of (de)territorialization is ‘coding/decoding’, mechanisms (linguistic or generic) that solidify assemblages’ identities. He (2014: 387-8) writes: ‘This process has been known in critical geopolitics as discourse; however, in this more materialist, embodied form of geopolitics we must also include non-linguistic forms of coding, such as DNA’. Whereas Dittmer (2014) locates ‘discourse’ in ‘assemblages’, this is associated with ‘linguistic’ entities in particular and Dittmer differentiates discourse from ‘more materialist’, ‘non-linguistic forms of coding’. Although Dittmer (2014) situates discourses in geopolitical assemblages, this is still associated with linguistic entities and presumed different to materialist, embodied forms. I argue this represents a limited conception of discourse. Müller (2008) proposes an expanded concept of discourse inclusive of linguistic phenomena, representations and non-linguistic phenomena (concrete practices). In line with this, I adopt the definition of Bialasiewicz et al (2007: 406): ‘Discourse refers to a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible.’ Because discourses lean towards constitutions of meanings and identities (‘representations’ and ‘practices’), they are important conceptual cornerstones for the thesis.

Discourses’ capacity to orientate conditions of possibility for political and ethical outcomes is a crucial tenet of how American identities are situated in climate-insecure futures. Discourses thus mediate between present significations of identity and what
these meanings render possible in uncertain futures. Bialasiewicz et al (2007: 406, following Butler (1990)) submit that imaginative geographies in US national security publications are ‘performative’: they perform the effects they name and subjects and objects of which they speak. Through iteration and citation, constrained by cultural and historical meanings and realities, discourses give rise to new possibilities and formations (Bialasiewicz et al 2007). In this ‘performative geopolitics’, previous articulations are reworked to ‘provide the conditions of possibility for current and future action’ (p.417). Thus, as geopolitical discourses, US and EU climate securities are comprised partially of representations and political practices/power relations, manufacture identities and subjectivities, and are performatively constitutive of future possibilities.

3.5.2 ‘Representations’ and ‘text’

In arguing that US and EU climate securities are geopolitical discourses comprised of ‘representations’ and ‘practices’, I do not contend that ‘representations’ are restricted to ‘texts’ (understood in a narrow sense as linguistic representations of ‘language-in-use’ (Fairclough 2003: 3)). Whilst the CDA focuses primarily on excerpts from publications (for example think tank reports or testimonies to the US Congress), I also draw upon interview testimony – predominantly from publicly available sources – and images (from Conley and Werz (2012: 3), see chapter 4, section 4.3.4). As ensembles of representations and practices, US and EU climate securities are intertwined with and indissoluble from their material composition: both as constituted from material realities, and as performatively of material effects. This conceptualization resonates with Butler’s (2009) theorization of ‘frames of war’ (in the particular context of the US-led ‘War on Terror’). As Butler (2009: 26) writes: ‘such frames do not merely reflect on the material conditions of war, but are essential to the perpetually crafted animus of that reality.’ Thus, ‘frames’ portray the material realities of war, but also actively contain, selectively interpret, produce and enforce what will count as ‘reality’ (Butler 2009). ‘Frames’ are an operation of power; they work to delimit visual fields of ‘perceptibility’ and ‘representability’ on the basis of normative assumptions about which lives and populations count as ‘grievable’ or ‘livable’. Butler (2009: 74-5) writes that ‘there are norms, explicit or tacit, governing which human lives count as human and as living, and
which do not. These norms are determined to some degree by the question of when and where a life is grievable and, correlatively, when and where the loss of a life remains ungrievable and unrepresentable.’ Importantly, Butler (2009: 74-5) contends that norms can be enacted through both ‘narrative’ and ‘visual’ frames. Therefore, ‘frames’ are comprised of both ‘textual’ – e.g. poetry – and ‘visual’ (for instance photographs) representations, are founded in material, affective resonances, and are implicated in unequal political delimitations about which lives count as ‘livable’ or ‘grievable’.

In common with Butler’s (2009) conceptualization, I argue that US and EU climate security discourses are grounded in unequal relations of power. As noted, although the CDA focuses primarily on linguistic representations and ‘texts’ (interpreted in a strict sense here), this analysis, following from Butler’s (2009) application of ‘frames’, utilises a broadened understanding of representations as comprised of ‘textual’ materials, interview testimonies and images. Butler (2009) contends that ‘frames of war’ are implicated in divisions between which lives are considered to be ‘livable’ or ‘grievable’ in conditions of war and US state violence. Although this analysis is grounded in an understanding of biopolitical inequalities, I contend that these, for US and EU climate security discourses, are based on a delimitation of unequally valued lives in possible climate-insecure futures. ‘Valuation’ is not based in this case on ‘grievability’ according to specific norms, but specifically on situated, context-specific racialized and national identities and the possibilities these circumscribe in conditions of future climate insecurity. Thus, whereas this analysis shares Butler’s (2009) broader understanding of representations, their material ‘animus’ and performative power, and their saturation in unequal operations of power, I locate inequalities in terms of racialized and national biopolitical identifications. This project’s theoretical framework is also oriented specifically towards a conception of identity constructions in possible futures. I also explore the role of essentializing logics – located at the scale of underlying assumptions and argumentation – as an important concept for analysing the performative constitution of outcomes in climate-insecure futures. However, before outlining these claims in more detail, the next section explores the understanding of ‘power relations’ underpinning the project.
3.5.3 Power-knowledge relations and climate security

To outline these aspects in more depth, Foucault (1991 (1977): 27) contends power and knowledge are interconnected: ‘We should admit that ... power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.’ His (1991 (1977): 26) ‘micro-physics’ of power is circuitous: it is an omnipresent, circulatory phenomenon (the ‘capillary model’) and manifests as unequal relations between subjects. Power is exercised rather than possessed; it is ‘not the ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions’ (Foucault 1991 (1977): 26). Said (1986) rebukes Foucault’s conceptualization and offers four possibilities for how power can be imagined. First is to imagine what you could do with power; second is to speculate about what you would imagine if you had power; third is to assess what power you would need to remove present power; and fourth is to postulate a list of eventualities or things that cannot be imagined or commanded using present power. Said (1986) argues that because Foucault is preoccupied with the first two imaginations, about how power operates and is employed, he does not account for how it can be challenged. Said (1986: 152) writes: ‘Foucault’s imagination of power was by his analysis to reveal its injustice and cruelty, but by his theorization to let it go on more or less unchecked.’ Said’s (1986) critiques suggest a negative conception of power that can be owned and allied to domination. Power is something that can be ‘needed’, something that can be ‘used’ to do things with, and something that somebody could ‘have’ (Said 1986). These imaginations all imply ‘power’ as an entity that can be possessed. Additionally, Said (1986: 152) identifies the ‘injustice’ and ‘cruelty’ of power. In Culture and Imperialism, Said (1994) writes that ‘domination and inequities of power and wealth are perennial facts of human society’ (p.20), and that ‘the twinning of power and legitimacy, one force obtaining in the world of direct domination, the other in the cultural sphere, is a characteristic of classic imperial hegemony’ (p.252). As such, in both of these instances, Said equates power with ‘domination’, ‘inequities’, and ‘direct domination’. These brief examples suggest that Said’s (1986; 1994) important critiques of Foucault’s power relations are underpinned
by an understanding of power as characterized by domination and inequalities, and as something that can be ‘used’ or ‘possessed’.

However, I argue that, although Said’s (1986) critiques are fundamentally important to highlight the injustices of unequal power relations, he does not account for the range of enabling possibilities that Foucault’s conception of power capacitates for. If power is equated only with ownership, centralized domination and inequality (something which is used for repression or, conversely, is to be resisted and fought against), this reduces the possibilities of relations of power. Importantly, Foucault (1982) distinguishes at this point between relations of power and of violence. A power relation acts upon others’ actions: ‘an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future’ (Foucault 1982: 789). A relation of violence ‘acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities’ (Foucault 1982: 789). As such, power relations are not univocal, absolute or co-terminous with domination: they consist of ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’ to influence the field of possibilities and actions.

Significantly, power relations ‘can neither be established nor function unless a true discourse is produced, accumulated, put into circulation, and set to work. Power cannot be exercised unless a certain economy of discourses of truth functions in, on the basis of, and thanks to, that of power’ (Foucault 2004 (1976): 24-5). Power relations involve constant classification and monitoring of individuals and populations; relations of power are ‘truth-effects’, and discourses of truth ‘power-effects’ (Foucault 2004 (1976): 24-5). Each society has its politics or ‘regime of truth’: ‘the types of discourse it harbours and causes to function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true from false statements, the way in which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures which are valorized for obtaining truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true’ (Foucault 1977: 13). In this understanding, ‘truth’ refers to the systems implicated in the regularization, circulation and production of statements (Foucault 1977: 14). As such, discourses as regularities of statements, representations and practices are imbued with regimes of truth that maintain this regularity. Discourses function to establish – in US climate security – which lives are discursively constructed as valuable: allocations of
membership to a collective national (American) subjectivity, and which possible climate-induced migrants are cast as racially Other. Climate security discourses are also oriented towards future risks of climate impacts. Building on a conception of discursive power-knowledge relations as operative within a field of possibilities, and as shaping future outcomes based on a performative iteration and citation of historic and current significations of cultural identities, I argue US climate security is premised on a risk calculus of ‘possible’ futures.

3.6 Climate securities and possible climate-insecure futures

At this point it is important to distinguish between ways of understanding ‘the future’. Massumi (2002) distinguishes between ‘potentiality’ and ‘possibility’. Potential is defined as ‘the multiplicity of possibilities materially present to one another ... Potential is like a motor force, a momentum driving a serial unfolding of events’ (Massumi 2002: 136). Potentiality is engrossed in a field of perpetual emergence, dynamic thresholds and phase shifts, with no boundaries of interiority or exteriority. Naturalization in this sense cannot refer to a constructivist account where the natural becomes the cultural; instead, ‘nature’ is about the ‘universal tendency for arising events to strike with a force of indeterminacy’ (Massumi 2009: 163). Potentiality is prior to signification, territorialization, essentialization and discursive naturalization and constitutes an ontogenic field that cannot be pre-scripted (Massumi 2002; 2009). Possibility, in contrast, is ‘back-formed from potential’s unfolding ... implicit in the determination of a thing’s or body’s potentiality is a certain set of transformations that can be expected of it by definition ... These possibilities delineate a region of nominally defining – that is, normative – variation’ (Massumi 2002: 9-10). Whereas potentiality is about conditions of emergence, possibility is about re-conditionings of the emerged. One is ontologically at one with becoming, the other sets the normative parameters for history: ‘the possible interactions of determinate individuals and groups’ (Massumi 2002: 9-10). Possibility thus has a complicated temporality: it is both about the possible transformations a body or thing can undergo, but as it ‘positions’ or ‘prescripts’ the parameters of normative variation, it feeds back against the unbounded immanence of potential. It is conceived as a ‘combinatoric’, a series of
possible ‘solution-cases’ analyzable and amenable to quantitative probability (Massumi 2002: 113; 135).

Massumi (2002: 7) postulates signification is located in a zone ‘of arrest’, a derivative ‘second-order movement between back-formed possibilities’. In terms of cultural and social determinations of position (e.g. gender or race), Massumi (2002: 8) notes these are secondary in the sense that they back-form their reality. This does not establish an ontological separation from potentiality: Massumi (2002: 8) maintains cultural determinations feed back into their processes of emergence. They are inseparable, but there is nonetheless an ontological difference between the field of emergence and positionings emergent from this. Importantly, Massumi’s (2002) concepts of ‘possibility’ and ‘potentiality’ are grounded in a universalized reading of futurity, one that (arguably) does not account for the historical, contextualized means through which bodies – racialized, gendered, sexualized, etc. – relate to differentiated, unequal futures. This echoes Tolia-Kelly’s (2006) critique of Western-centric emotional and affective geographies literatures (at that time): they can imply a ‘universalist’ impulse that negates the historically specific, material and uneven geographies through which bodies affect and are affected. To resist a universalizing tendency, this project focuses on the situated instantiations of futures in relation to context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourses. Based on his theorizations of signification and social and cultural determinations of position, Massumi’s (2002) conceptualization suggests that racial and national identities are oriented towards possible climate-insecure futures. As such, in the context of this dissertation, I argue that racial and national identities – in specific moments of US and EU climate securities – are constructed in relation to discursively rendered possibilities.

In contemporary US security practices, Amoore (2013) notes ‘low probability, high consequence’ events are a key part of sovereign decision-making in the War on Terror. She (2013: 1) writes: ‘From terrorist attacks and cybercrime, from flood risk to the crisis of inadequately-priced finance, the idea of uncertain futures – however probabilistically unlikely – has captured the Zeitgeist.’ This is at heart a technology of ‘risk’, about managing uncertainty and rendering the future knowable (Amoore 2013). Whereas insurance-based risk models calculate future likelihoods based on
probabilistic reasoning (Aradau and van Munster 2007), possibility-based risk analysis is more speculative and incorporates anticipation of uncertain futures through techniques of imagination (e.g. scenario-planning). It is still a technique of risk, based on differing degrees of safe or dangerous, vulnerable or adaptable, but exceeds strict probabilistic reasoning to preempt unknowable futures in their conditions of emergence (Amoore 2013). Amoore (2013) contends this new risk calculus has four characteristics. First, it is grounded in a temporality that imagines a population not yet known, seeking to act preemptively to render uncertain futures actionable in the present. Second is that it functions according to circulatory ‘mobile norms’ subject to deviation in aleatory populations (Amoore 2013: 65). The spatiality of this risk calculus arrays series of possibilities to be acted upon: ‘it allows for multiple possible sequences of events to be held together horizontally within a single purview’ (Amoore 2013: 68). Finally, security embraces positive dimensions of risk; securing becomes about facilitating beneficial circulations and opportunities. Amoore (2013: 157) calls for a critical politics to sustain conditions of potentiality and open windows that are indeterminate, creative and unexpected.

A ‘politics of possibility’ is also affiliated with what Corry (2012: 246) terms ‘riskification’ in environmental security. Corry (2012) maintains an idea of securitization inherited from the Copenhagen School. In this reading, Buzan et al (1998) argue that securitization operates through discursive speech acts: once a ‘security threat’ is named, this justifies exceptional, emergency measures to mitigate the problem. Boas (2015) contends that the Copenhagen School situates securitization in the realm of ‘high politics’ (both the declarers of securitizing speech acts and institutions mobilized to mitigate security ‘threats’, e.g. judges, governments or bureaucracies). The Copenhagen School theorizes securitization as dependent upon ‘friend-enemy’ logics, a politics of exceptionality, and uncertainties about what the ‘audience’ of securitizing speech acts may be (Boas 2015). Contrastingly, Corry (2012) argues discursive constructions of risk follow different logics. Whereas security leans towards specific, identifiable threats to be defended against, targeted and overcome, riskification points to ‘the existence of conditions of possibility or ‘permissive causes’ of future possible harmful events’ (Corry 2012: 246, original emphasis). As such, ‘risk-security’ operates on a basis of ‘conditional causality’, ‘a second-order security politics
that directs attention to the level of conditions of danger or harm’ (Corry 2012: 246-7). Risk-securities are future-oriented and suggest interventions to ‘govern’ and ‘manage’ risks, not defend against or eradicate ‘threats’. They do not depend on a ‘friend-enemy’ grammar or externalizing ‘Othering’ implied by security logics, but focus instead on the referent object itself and its conditions of possibility (Corry 2012). Risk management interventions can still suggest exclusionary profiling strategies, but not defined as an existential Other (Corry 2012). Corry (2012) argues that to the extent climate solutions are long-term, attempt to mitigate its causes and depend on global cooperation and international governance, climate change is a ‘riskified’ issue.

Solutions suggested by military actors, e.g. the Center for Naval Analyses, are more often linked to mitigation and adaptation, not militarized defense strategies (Corry 2012). In Corry’s (2012: 248) terms, climate change is only securitized to the extent ‘that the precautionary principle is replaced with a ‘no holds barred’ logic of exceptionality in relation to an existential threat, as identified by the Copenhagen School’. Mayer (2012) agrees, arguing that climate change is increasingly framed in terms of risk as opposed to security.

However, in making these claims, Corry (2012) depends on particular conceptions of ‘securitization’ and ‘security logics’ against which he can juxtapose ‘risk’ (or ‘risk-security’ in Corry’s (2012) broadened terms) and diagnose current climate security practices. I agree with this expansive concept of security (Diez et al 2016), and argue accordingly that a risk calculus of a ‘politics of possibility’ (Amoore 2013) and ‘riskification’ are central constituents of contemporary US climate security discourses. However, the project departs from Corry’s (2012) rejection of Othering processes in the riskification of climate security (and his (2014) discussion of resilience, see chapter 6, section 6.6), or his emphasis – derived from a particular, Copenhagen School based reading of securitization – that security practices are grounded on that which is ‘existential’ or ‘present’. Instead, I argue that Othering processes are contingent and discursively constituted (in context-specific moments) in possible climate-insecure futures. This is not to deny that climate change impacts are existential or presently serious in many instances, but to talk about particular discursive constructions in moments of future-oriented US climate security.
Indeed, as Anderson (2010b) notes, an ambition of security is to manage the future – to ensure threatening events do not come to pass and ‘valued lives’ are preserved and protected. Security can be conceptualized as a ‘condition’, the condition of being safe and free from danger (Barnett 2003). It can also be a ‘process’, the continuous processes of securing life (Anderson 2010b). As Aradau et al (2008) state, security is conventionally about the production, interpretation and management of threats, dangers or risks; it relies on binaries of ‘Self’/’Other’, ‘friend’/‘enemy’, security/insecurity. Indeed, Campbell (1998 (1992): 1) writes: ‘Danger is not an objective condition … danger is an effect of interpretation. Danger bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is said to derive.’ This conceptualization is connected to a conception of difference and identity in security discourse which ‘contains … no foundations that are prior to, or outside of, its operation … the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside,” a “self” from an “other,” a “domestic” from a “foreign”’ (Campbell 1998 (1992): 9). I work from this understanding of US climate security discourse, embedded in unequal power-knowledge relations and oriented towards possible futures. US climate securities are located at the intersections of present and future: futures are rendered knowable discursively (as ‘possibilities’) in current and historical articulations of climate security. I argue the concept of essentializing logics provides a productive analytic to explore how these present-future relationships – discursive framing of national and racial significations in climate-insecure futures – operate in context-specific moments of US climate security discourse.

3.7 Essentializing logics of US and EU climate securities

The term ‘logics’ is widely utilized in critical race studies and critical security studies, but often goes undefined. In a 2010 exploration of ‘race logics’ in global geopolitics, Zimmerman (2010: 1) classifies a ‘logics’ as: ‘a manner of thinking and acting’. His ‘race logics’ are sovereign exception (the ability to define international norms and laws, to exempt oneself from adherence to those norms, and to determine non-sovereign actors marginalized from these legal norms); political economic logics of racism, exploitation and inequality internationally; and a kinship logic which attaches different
‘races’ to particular patterns of descent. In *White Logic, White Methods*, Bonilla-Silva and Zuberi (2008) challenge racialized epistemological foundations and methods of social research. They (2008: 17, original emphasis) write: ‘By speaking of logic, we refer to both the foundation of the techniques used in analyzing empirical reality, and the reasoning used by researchers in their efforts to understand society. *White Logic* ... assumes a historical posture that grants eternal objectivity to the views of elite Whites ... and classifies “others” as people without knowledge.’ In an analysis of the securitizing practices used in climate-induced migration discourses, Boas (2015: 19) defines logics as ‘that which determines or endorses the types of security measures induced or endorsed by the securitization process ... The logic of security measures thus suggests how to handle a security issue’. Boas’ (2015) interpretation suggests reasoning processes by which particular measures are justified. Building on these critiques, David Theo Goldberg’s work also offers insights on ‘logics’.

Susan Searls Giroux interviewed Goldberg (2014) about ‘the raciologics of militarizing society’. However, ‘raciologics’ remains undefined. Similarly, David Theo Goldberg’s (2015: 60) book *Are we all postracial yet?* contains a chapter on ‘postracial logics’, but the term ‘logics’ goes without definition. In 2009, Goldberg published a critique of methodological comparativism in critical race studies. Acknowledging the important insights of case study research, he contends the field is preoccupied with an assumption that racisms are context-dependent and existent independently of multi-scalar relations. Goldberg (2009) argues that, although emergent in particular localities, racisms are relationally constituted and imbued with multi-scalar political, economic and social processes. The ‘logic’ of this perspective is ‘this abstract methodological form of relationality’, which ‘may be common across cases’ (Goldberg 2009: 1281). These disparate conceptions suggest ‘logics’ share several commonalities: 1) they are rooted in abstract ideas of reasoning, justification and epistemology, 2) they are interwoven with unequal (racialized, gendered, militarized, securitized etc.) power relations, and 3) they are cross-contextual. To delve into these questions further, histories of ‘Logic’ as a branch of philosophy are briefly discussed.

As a philosophical tradition, ‘Logic’ stretches back at least 3000 years. Phillips (2006: 97) understands it as ‘the rules according to which we use our understanding in
thought and knowledge.’ Conventionally, ‘logic’ is argued to originate with Aristotle and his attempts to find common strands between all branches of knowledge – *episteme* (science), *praxis* (action) and *poesis* (production) (Phillips 2006). However, as Turner (2006) points out, ‘logic’ symbolized a variety of ideas in Aristotle’s works, including abstract reasoning, deduction, explanation, and the rule of law. In the 9th century, Greek interpretations of logic were translated by Islamic scholars, garnering new insights about relationships between logic and language, as well as logical applications of Islamic law (Turner 2006). In spite of these developments, a parochial, Eurocentric reading has reduced Islamic scholarship to the status of a ‘conduit’ between Greek and Renaissance philosophy, excluding the profound achievements of these scholars (Turner 2006). Modern formal logic developed in the 17th and 18th centuries with the writings of Locke, Leibniz and Descartes. Further standardized by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell in the 19th and early 20th centuries, formal logic seeks to explain logical principles (rules of deduction, inferential reasoning, contradiction etc.) using symbolic, algebraic formulae (Turnbull 2006). A cornerstone of this is unearthing necessary rules of ‘Logic’ – *contra* ‘logics’ – that are universal and applicable outside of empirical data or content. As Darity (2009: 479) writes: ‘Logic is logic ... The principles of valid reasoning are the same no matter what the subject, and are expressible in symbolic notation that is concerned only with the form, rather than the content, of what is uttered.’ Presumably, this also empties logic of its politics: the unequal power dynamics with which ‘logic’ and ‘reason’ are deployed, and the visage of an autonomous, objective actor conducting pure logic ‘from an armchair’ (Darity 2009: 479).

To situate a critical theoretic understanding of ‘logics’, I argue the above account is limited in several respects. First, it provides a Western-centric reading of ‘logic’ and marginalizes alternative schools, e.g. Buddhist logicians in India (contemporaneous with Aristotle) (Priest 2000). This negates the intermingled, multifaceted histories of logic and reduces its ‘inherent richness ... to a singularity’ (Turner 2006: 87). Secondly, the notion of an autonomous, *a priori* producer of logical arguments runs counter to the discursive construction of human subjectivity, saturated with unequal power relations. Working with both initial conceptualizations from critical race studies, and the critiques of Western rationalism proffered here, I now consider two more in-depth
theorizations of ‘logics’ from different areas of critical theory: Stuart Hall’s (1996) conceptualization of ideology, and Ben Anderson’s (2010a) critical account of anticipatory action and future geographies.

Whereas Hall (1986) writes from a materialist, cultural studies perspective and seeks an anti-essentialist, non-determinist ‘Marxism without guarantees’, Anderson’s (2010a: 778) viewpoint is grounded in a Foucauldian analytic of how uncertain futures are governed. Hall (1986) critiques poststructuralists – including Foucault – for promoting discursive construction, leading to an unmooring of ideologies from their material, historically specific contexts. Importantly, this is not to argue that poststructuralist theories do not involve political or ideological claims (for example the importance of deconstructing binaries, or an ethics of openness to the Other) (Murdoch 2006). However, as Jäger and Maier (2009: 37) point out: ‘contrary to a common misconception … discourse theory is not an idealist theory … Discourses may be conceived as societal means of reproduction.’ Discourses, in a Foucauldian sense, are not separate from society, but are active, material constituents of social change (Jäger and Maier 2009). Foucault does not deny ideological production coexists with regimes of power, but that the key points of intersection are between power relations and regimes of knowledge production (instruments of recording, measurement, verification etc.), the regimes of truth governing which statements are ‘true’ and ‘valid’. I argue it is at this scale that Hall’s and Anderson’s (Foucauldian-inspired) different accounts can be read together in a productive way. In Hall (1996), before ideological consensus stabilizes, logics at the level of statement, assumption and proposition naturalize particular assertions as ‘true’. Similarly, although Anderson’s (2010a) piece draws upon a wider assemblage of elements, of which ‘statements’ form an important component of ‘styles’, discursive significations are significant for his account of anticipatory action. Thus, although Hall’s and Anderson’s accounts are from radically different schools of critical thought and cannot be simplistically equated, I contend there are some instructive points of intersection in their respective works.

Stuart Hall (1986: 29, original definition) theorizes the problem of ideology. This is how, within a materialist Marxist framework, social ideas arise and are contested within social formations. Hall (1986: 29) defines ideology as ‘the mental frameworks – the
languages, concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works.’ His account is built around the concept of ‘articulation’, the ‘non-necessary conditions that create structural unities among linguistic and historical conditions’ (Makus 1990: 496). Such structural unities are implicated in the struggle over meaning, and it is important to situate specific connections between ideological elements and social, political, economic and technological practices or structures (Makus 1990). Hall (1996: 131, original emphasis) argues meaning is socially constructed: ‘the active work of selecting and presenting, or structuring and shaping: not merely the transmitting of an already-existing meaning, but the mere active labour of making things mean. It was a practice, a production, a meaning: what subsequently came to be described as a signifying practice.’ Contestations over meaning are part of a broader shaping of ideological consensus, the winning of universal validity for partial worldviews (Hall 1996), or what Makus (1990: 498) describes as ‘that part of the truth which takes it for the whole truth.’

In this sense, ideological constructions tender whole ‘logics’ as ‘the common sense’ of a culture: they rely on a whole series of taken-for-granted assumptions about what is known about reality, the ‘reality effect’ of ideology (Hall 1996: 141). As Makus (1990: 499) states: ‘When events and practices are represented as if they were ahistorical truths, problematic events or situations get cast unproblematically into the terms of what appears as “natural” within a society. Losing their propositional status, premises are transformed into narrative statements that are resistant to alternative interpretations of events.’ As such, these premises – and the ‘logics’ they comprise – are essentialized as natural narratives and truths: ‘not grounded in nature, but producing nature as a sort of guarantee of its truth’ (Hall 1996: 144). Crucially, logics are not considered as a chain of necessary, valid premises; indeed, they are only one possible form of discursive arrangement. Hall’s (1996: 140) definition of ‘logic’ is ‘an apparently necessary chain of implication between statement and premise.’ The ‘apparently’ is a key ingredient: it is not that premises must pass logical rules of validation to affirm the statement, but rather that they are reified as externalized narratives or ‘truths’ that, when ordered as this chain of reasoning, represent ideological consensus as ‘reality’.
Hall adds that discourses, through processes of narration, are fundamental vehicles for signalling what would be ‘legitimate’, ‘natural’ conclusions to given logics (Hall 1996). This is connected to two important points. First is that the production of social and ideological knowledge functions through ‘coding’. Codes refer to the meaning signified by signs – they ‘refer signs to the ‘maps of meaning’ into which culture is classified’ (Hall 1980: 134). They have a whole range of social meanings, practices and power relations written into them and are the foundations for how ideology is embedded into culture (Hall 1980). Second, ideologies are not the manufactures of an autonomous, a priori agency; the ‘speaker’ or ‘author’ is also subject to ideological construction and ‘ideologies … create the lived realities of their subjects’ (Makus 1990: 500). These components: of ‘logics’ as socially constructed and unattached to necessary, absolute rules; as embedded in processes of signification and discourse; and as formulated independently of an autonomous, antecedent subject, are important facets of how Stuart Hall’s conceptualization of logics departs from analytic philosophical approaches.

I argue Ben Anderson’s (2010a) conception of ‘logics’ can be drawn together with Stuart Hall’s account (his theorization of logics as constituents of ideological consensus) in a limited, partial, and potentially productive way. Anderson (2010a) conceptualizes the assembling of various elements – statements, affects, material objects, policies and programmes – as modes of ‘anticipatory action’ that govern futures and protect valued lives in liberal democracies. There are three modes in particular, ‘styles’ (statements through which the abstract notion of ‘the future’ is disclosed and related to), ‘practices’ that give content to specific futures through acts of performing, imagining and calculating, and ‘logics’ which legitimize and enable action (Anderson 2010a: 779). ‘Logics’ are ‘a programmatic way of formalizing, justifying and deploying action in the here and now. Logics involve action that aims to prevent, mitigate, adapt to, prepare for or preempt certain futures’ (Anderson 2010a: 778-9). Anderson (2010a) locates three anticipatory logics in particular. ‘Precaution’ acts upon a threat once it has been identified, accepting a degree of uncertainty but intervening before dangers become irreversible. ‘Preemption’ is similar, but can act on a threat that has not yet appeared; it is immersed in its conditions of emergence.
Finally, ‘preparedness’ is distinct because, whereas precaution and preemption work to mitigate a future before it materializes, preparedness adapts to the aftermath of a threatening episode and manages its effects (Anderson 2010a). In this formulation, ‘logics’ do not have a primary actor, target or spatial form; they co-exist across contexts (e.g. terrorism, climate change or disease epidemics) and exceed any particular case. But, they are not totally detached and ‘are continually being reassembled in attempts to govern different domains of life’ (Anderson 2010a: 788). In summary, ‘logics’ in Anderson’s (2010a: 788) schema involve two constitutive elements: interventions to mitigate, avoid or adapt to a future that has – through styles and practices – been ‘rendered actionable’, and rationalizations that value some lives over others in liberal democracies.

Working from Hall and Anderson’s theorizations, logics are argued to be contingent, discursively constructed series of essentializing propositions, assumptions or associations that rationalize and legitimize particular possible future outcomes or interventions. Although constructed in specific constellations of power relations, ‘logics’ are applicable across contexts (qua Hall’s, Goldberg’s and Anderson’s conceptions). Moreover, they are not grounded in an a priori, autonomous agency, but differentially constituted in unequal power relations. Following Anderson, they are not only oriented towards historic or present significations, but also towards possible futures and interventions legitimized in connection to these futures. This relation is performative in the sense that current and historic significations of what particular populations – of ‘African’ migrants or the American ‘nation’, etc. – represent function to demarcate possibilities for what could happen in climate-insecure futures.

Essentializing logics are not always explicit statements about what a particular population ‘is’ and how it ‘might’, ‘would’, ‘could’ or ‘will’ react in climate-insecure futures, but also underlying assumptions associating groups – e.g. possible ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants – with particular traits, for example a latent tendency towards terrorism. Essentializing logics are not generalized across US climate security discourse, but in partial, context-specific moments in which significations of cultural identities – racial and national – are articulated in key publications. As essentializing logics refer to how particular populations are cast in uncertain, aleatory futures, they also infer particular biopolitics. With biopolitics conceptualized as
discursive appropriations of valued lives and populations in US climate security, essentializing logics function not only as an important conceptual crossroads between the present and possible futures, but also in how populations and lived are ‘valued’. I argue that racial and national identities (identified as ‘racial’ and ‘national’ logics, particular forms of essentializing logics in climate security) represent a core dimension of these significations and valuations in US climate security.

3.8 Racial and national logics in US and EU climate security discourses

3.8.1 Racial logics

Working from this standpoint, I adopt Goldberg’s (1992: 553) flexible, malleable conception of ‘race’: ‘a fluid, transforming, historically specific concept parasitic on theoretic and social discourses for the meaning it assumes at given historical moments.’ ‘Race’ is argued to be a socially constructed, parasitic force that leaps onto biological (e.g. skin colour) and cultural (for example religious affiliation) traits for its conceptual content (Goldberg 1993). Depending on the social conditions of the time, ‘race’ will espouse multiple meanings in different places and attribute these meanings to arbitrarily defined populations. Crucially, Goldberg (1992: 559-60) doesn’t vacate ‘race’ of all theoretical weight: ‘The minimal significance that race bears in itself is not of biological but naturalized group relations.’ Along with other socially constructed identities (e.g. ‘nation’ (Campbell 1998 (1992)) or ‘gender’ (Butler 1990)), ‘race’ naturalizes biological and cultural traits in its name to the extent that they appear as innate, immutable group characteristics. This adorns ‘race’ with an image of eternality, of fixedness through time (Miles 2002). It is this combination of features – an explicit emphasis on the historically constructed, contingent status of racialized attributes, and on ‘naturalization’ to demonstrate the power of ‘race’ as a signifier – that defines the understanding of ‘race’ in this project. If ‘races’ are socially constructed, processes of construction are fundamental. Goldberg (1992: 561) critiques the term ‘racial formation’ (Omi and Winant 1987) as too concerned with the ideological, structural determinants of racial significations and inattentive to intersubjective constituents of ‘race’. He (1992: 561) favours the term ‘race creation’. To maintain an overarching, inclusive view of these strategies, I use the concept ‘racialization’. Following Barot and
Bird (2001), racialization is the process whereby socially constructed racial markers are attached to population groups. Elaborated further in chapter 4 on climate-induced migration, I focus on the racialization of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations in possible climate-insecure futures.

Anti-Muslim sentiment has generated incendiary academic discussions in the wake of 9/11 (Hopkins 2008a). Commonly termed ‘Islamophobia’, a widely cited definition comes from the Runnymede Trust (1997: 4): ‘Islamophobia refers to unfounded hostility towards Islam. It also refers to the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream social and political affairs.’ To supplement this definition, the report’s authors offer an open/closed views typology that underpins seven statements to measure Islamophobia (Runnymede Trust 1997). These include whether ‘Islam is seen as monolithic and static, or as diverse and dynamic’, whether ‘Islam is seen as inferior, or as different but equal’, and if ‘Islam is seen as an aggressive enemy or as a cooperative partner’ (Runnymede Trust 1997: 4). The report’s authors decry the binaries that dominate stereotypes of Islam (e.g. ‘Islam versus the West’), but in a sense this framework replicates the dichotomous structure they aim to criticize (Allen 2010a). Allen (2010a: 190) defines Islamophobia as ‘an ideology, similar in theory, function and purpose to racism … that sustains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meanings about Muslims and Islam … that inform and construct thinking about Muslims and Islam as Other.’ Allen (2010b) contends these ideological inclinations contribute to exclusionary outcomes for Muslims. More specifically, Anand (2010: 265) classifies Islamophobia as ‘a coherent and identifiable set of prejudices and stereotypes that generates fear of Islam and fuels a reaction to counter it’. However, whilst anti-Islamic discourses are an important concern, especially the religion’s essentialization and reduction to singular (mis)interpretations, Islamophobia’s dangerous effects are felt most severely by Muslims, a trend ‘Islamophobia’ struggles to encapsulate (Allen 2010a). Its focus on ‘Islam’ collapses the diversity of Muslim cultures around the world, restricting Muslims to their religious identity (Halliday 1999). To account for this particular problem, I treat Islamophobia as a racialized identity. I explore how Muslims are racialized: how naturalized, innate traits are
ascribed to Muslim populations, and how these essentialized identities are handled to instantiate racial differences.

This conceptualization requires several qualifications. First is a presumed distinction between ‘race’, ‘racial difference’ and ‘racism’, and ‘religious difference’ and ‘religious discrimination’. Allen (2010a) draws this boundary to create an autonomous concept with analytical clarity; his intention is to ‘finally establish, better define and conceptualize an independent and distinct Islamophobia’ (Allen 2010a: 157). Going further, Kong (2001: 212) laments overlaps between ‘race’ and religion: ‘In many instances, in the same breath that race, class and gender are inevitably invoked and studies as ways by which societies are fractured, religion is forgotten or conflated with race.’ This division is premised on a contention that religion cannot be folded into ‘race’. Because religious adherents can choose their faith and undergo conversion, their religious identity cannot be classified in terms of innate, naturalized characteristics, i.e. in racial terms (Meer 2013). However, empirical examples question the universality of this assumption. For example, as Thomas (2010) documents, Jewish people were considered intrinsically different to their Christian counterparts in 13th century Spain; bloodlines were contaminated to the point that conversion was longer an adequate route to redemption. Moreover, individuals are often born into faith communities: they do not decide their religious identity, but are ascribed this identity by others (Kundnani 2007).

Additionally, the race-religion distinction relies on a dubious conception of ‘race’. If ‘religion’ is different from ‘race’ because to belong to a ‘race’ requires innate, immutable characteristics, this posits an essential ontology of what ‘race’ is. But, as critical race scholars attest to, these characteristics are not natural, but socially constructed as such: racialization invokes a process of naturalization whereby biological and cultural markers are attached to social groups as external, pre-given elements of their identity (Goldberg 1992). Therefore, when scholars argue religion cannot be associated with race because it is voluntary, this mischaracterizes ‘race’ as reliant on a priori natural traits, rather than seeing these traits as naturalized. Although this is a subtle difference, it is important. Racial traits are not natural, but are socially constructed to appear as natural (Goldberg 1992). Thus, abandoning the assumption of
'race' as a naturalized category that a race-religion binary depends upon, I argue that, in the case of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations in moments of US climate security, religious identity is racialized. Muslim identities are racialized across a range of biological – e.g. skin colour (Rana 2007) – and cultural signifiers (for example inherent cultural incompatibility (Kundnani 2007)).

Thinking about racialization in relation to uncertain futures, Mitchell (2010) begins with Anderson’s (2010b) claim that security involves the protection or preservation of some form of valued life. Instead of those lives that are secured, she (2010) focuses on abandoned life, ‘surplus life’ (p.240). She starts with two understandings of risk and uncertain futures: ‘what/if’ and ‘when/then’ scenarios. The former attempts to predict the future using known or controllable factors. What/if scenarios are based on institutional norms, surveillance and the constant simulation of possible futures in an effort to shape contemporary variables (Mitchell 2010). When/then scenarios are predicated on an inevitable future, one that is known in advance and incorporates a sovereign right of political knowledge. They carry a degree of fatalism (that certain events cannot be stopped) with only privileged sovereign figures enabled to plan and manage these eventualities (Mitchell 2010). What/if scenarios are linked to a form of neoliberal governmentality – in liberal democracies – that tries to control uncertainty and promote entrepreneurial speculation in risky situations (Mitchell 2010).

When/then scenarios depend on a ‘sovereign pre-knowledge’ that guarantees a known future and how devalued lives will change or behave in such scenarios (Mitchell 2010: 243). The constitution of pre-known risk failure, with its abandonment of particular, devalued lives, does not have to take the form of financial capitalism, but also the production of other ‘surplus populations’, e.g. deported asylum seekers or incarcerated young people. Those ‘likely to fail’ are associated with racial formations. Mitchell (2010: 243-4) writes: ‘those who are perceived as able to take advantage of what/if scenarios and control them to privilege certain futures are or become “White”.’ Those who are drafted into when/then scenarios in positions other than state authority, are or become “Black”.’ If in when/then scenarios the future is inevitable, this invokes a situation whereby populations are ‘pre-known’ as risk failures, the formation of ‘pre-Black’ populations (Mitchell 2010: 244). For populations demarcated as ‘pre-Black’, as risk failures, this can produce anticipatory banishment and
dispossession. Therefore, in Mitchell’s (2010) schema, the historical and geographical contingencies of racialization are implicated in a risk calculus where futures are rendered knowable and dispossess ‘surplus life’.

Baldwin (2012) identifies a ‘future-conditional’ relation between racialization and climate-induced migration (CIM). Although he states there are other modes of alterity in climate change discourse (e.g. ‘indigeneity’, ‘the Muslim’ or ‘the terrorist’ (Baldwin 2012: 627)), Baldwin (2012) centres on a form of postcolonial alterity related to the future. As opposed to a dialectical different-from relation critiqued by postcolonial theorists, alterity in CIM discourse conceives of the Other as yet-to-come. Baldwin (2012: 636; 2013b, see chapter 4) defines the climate migrant in the future-conditional tense: ‘climate change and migration discourse expresses race not as historical signification, but as future-conditional potential … race … is something that bodies can become; it is a future-conditional attribute of bodies. Race, in this sense, is an emergent phenomenon’. In this dissertation, I agree with Baldwin’s diagnosis of racialized climate-induced migration as future-conditional, but argue it is not only in a condition of potentiality this is realized, but also possibility.

Baldwin (2016) supplements this analysis with the concept of ‘white affect’, a form of affective intensity located at intersections of the actual and virtual. White affect is not a racism indicated by discursive significations or an exclusionary value system, but an affective relation felt prior to ‘cessation’ (following Massumi 2002). Affect is virtual intensity: it is not purely indeterminate or processual, but located in the interplay between process and position. Baldwin (2016: 6) defines white affect as ‘an intensity that prefigures and animates ‘whiteness’, an intensification or closing down of the myriad futures available to bodies in a way that confines them to a set of constraints expressed as ‘whiteness’.’ He (2016) is careful to stress this does not translate into a universal whiteness, but that whiteness is variegated across contexts. It is grounded in a premediative security apparatus that imagines multiple possible futures through techniques such as magical realism, scenarios and quantitative modelling (Baldwin 2016). White affect is also situated in a context of the ‘post-racial’ (Goldberg 2015). This is a neoliberal racialism in which the social is supposedly shorn of racisms and race (or these are privatized from the public sphere to individual abuses), despite the
persistence of institutional racisms. Finally, white affect is based on an affective fear, one of the climate migrant as a potential, indeterminate threat in a world of constant transformations (with concomitant anxieties about the durability of white supremacy) (Baldwin 2016). Thus, in Baldwin’s (2012; 2013b; 2016) conceptualizations of racialization and futurity, climate-induced migration is articulated as a virtual, ‘yet-to-come’ racialized figure emergent prior to (but interconnected with) discursive signification or dialectical identity formation, and one existent in a ‘future-conditional’ orientation towards potential climate changed futures.

Both Mitchell’s (2010) and Baldwin’s (2012; 2013b; 2016) understandings of race and uncertain futures are important for essentializing logics. I share Mitchell’s (2010) argument that racialized inscriptions of ‘risky’ populations are cast into assumptions about eventualities in climate-insecure futures. Essentializing logics are also – following Foucault and Fassin’s injunctions about biopolitical inequalities – grounded in politics of ‘abandonment’ and ‘surplus life’. However, notwithstanding Mitchell’s (2010) recognition that White and Black individuals can switch between what/if and when/then scenarios, I disagree with her assumptions that those lives characterized as biopolitically surplus (‘Black’ or ‘pre-Black’) are situated solely in a when/then scenario whereby the future is absolutely knowable and anticipatory dispossession is what will happen. Whilst there is a context-specific trend of how ‘African’ populations will or are very likely to react in climate-insecure futures (what is called a compulsive determinism in chapter 4, section 4.5), I contend that essentializing logics also configure possible climate-induced migrants in terms of what they might or could do.

This is more akin to Baldwin’s (2012) future-conditional orientation in climate-induced migration. However, whilst I agree with Baldwin (2012; 2013b; 2016) that racialized logics in climate-induced migration are held in a future-conditional orientation and invoke anxieties about climate-induced migrants, this chapter situates racial identities on a platform of discursively rendered possible futures, not as potential or ‘prefigured’ phenomena. This is not to say that ‘race’ in CIM does not take these forms, but that specific present-future relations exhibited by essentializing racial and national logics (in US and EU climate securities) are in the domain of possibilities. They are at the intersections where historic and current significations of racial Others inform what will,
is likely to, might or could happen in climate-insecure futures. In particular, racialized, essentializing logics operate, in context-specific moments of US climate security, through tropes of ‘naturalization’, ‘dehumanization’ and ‘determinism’ (explored further in chapter 4). In addition to racial logics, I also argue that essentializing – national – logics configure constructions of American nationhood in context-specific moments of US climate security discourse. Nationhood and national logics are elaborated in section 3.8.2.

3.8.2 National logics

Benedict Anderson (2005 (1991): 49, original emphasis) defines the nation as ‘an imagined political community … It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members … yet in the minds of each lives their image of communion … The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them … has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.’ The nation is imagined as sovereign because, at the time the concept emerges in late 18th century Europe, les philosophes of the Enlightenment were challenging the notion of a divinely ordained, dynastic realm (Anderson 2005 (1991)). Confronted with the pluralism of religious differences, the nation, associated with the sovereign state, came to be seen as the collective subject to guarantee freedom and sovereignty over divided territories. Finally, the nation is imagined as a ‘community’ because, although national populations have been (and are) characterized in many instances by inequality and exploitation, nationhood is nonetheless conceptualized as a form of horizontal solidarity, a collective togetherness (Anderson 2005 (1991)).

Anderson (2005 (1991)) notes that ‘nation’ emerged in 18th century Europe from three interconnected conditions of possibility. First is the notion of a particular script-language that offered guarantees of universal truth (Latin in Medieval Europe); second is the idea that society was hierarchically organized around higher orders (the monarch under a form of divine rule). Third was a form of temporal reasoning in which history and cosmology are indistinguishable, grounding the origins of humankind in the natural order of things (Anderson 2005 (1991)). Under these conditions, two historical developments in medieval and early modern Europe are identified as important: first is
the invention of the printing press in 1440 and development of a publishing and bookselling industry in the early 16th century. And second is the beginning of the Reformation, with Martin Luther’s German-language theses about the limitations of Catholic Christianity (published in Wittenburg in 1517 (Anderson 2005 (1991))). It was this combination of linguistic diversity (modifications of Latin in this period and publication in other European languages) and a technology of communications (print) that Anderson (2005 (1991)) identifies as conditions of possibility for the emergence of nations as imagined communities.

Fundamental to the temporality of Anderson’s (2005 (1991): 52) ‘imagined communities’ is ‘homogenous empty time’, a notion of background, calendric time into which the nation’s trajectory as a collective subject is injected. This feeds into a national teleology in which ‘nations’ spring from an immemorial past and are destined to a unified, limitless future. As Anderson (2005 (1991): 51) writes, ‘it is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny’. In his essay *DissemiNation*, Bhabha (1990: 270) critiques this linear, teleological temporality and points out an ambivalent ‘double time’ in the Western nation. On the one hand, it is the object of a pedagogical national ideology that posits an origin and trajectory for ‘the people’, and on the other people are the ‘subjects’ of a process of signification in which the national sign is reiterated and reproduced in a variety of everyday situations (Bhabha 1990). There is a split between the continuous, linear time of the pedagogical, and the repetitive, recursive time of the performative (Bhabha 1990). Bhabha (1990) argues it is at the interstices of these temporalities a homogenous, linear nationhood can be challenged.

Closs Stephens (2013: 17) contends that whilst Anderson’s ideas are important for demonstrating the constructed-ness of nationhood, they are characterized by a ‘double connection’ in which a linear understanding of time not only encapsulates the nation-form, but also forms the grounds of knowledge for critical understandings of nation and nationalism. Whereas Anderson (2005 (1991)) critiques the teleological narrative of nationhood, he still depends upon a linear temporality charting how the nation ‘emerged’ historically and constitutes an important dimension of the political ‘future’ (Closs Stephens 2013). Closs Stephens (2013: 111, original emphasis) proposes that whilst ‘nation’ is an important ‘tag-phrase’ to elucidate the repetition and
narration of nationhood, it does not account for the politics of nationalism. She (2013: 111, original emphasis) notes: ‘it doesn’t always allow us to ask how we might resist the repetition of the nation-form and the persistence of nationalism in the contemporary world.’ Instead, Closs Stephens (2013) concludes that in order to imagine political futures outside of nationalism, scholars need to think in terms of multiple future temporalities. This understands the future as unfolding in multiple ways and not shackled to the nation-form. It implies ‘politics might not be understood as that which takes place within a common unitary framework but rather, as struggles over different ways of practicing political community. This does not mean a battle between ‘our’ community and ‘their’ community, but ... struggles over the very ways in which political community is conceptualized, negotiated and actualized’ (Closs Stephens 2013: 115, original emphasis). Thus, Closs Stephens’ (2013) argument implies a need to pluralize ways in which the temporalities of nationhood and political nationhood are conceived. With this critique in mind, I adopt the concept of national logics (a type of essentializing logics) to understand how context-specific representations of American nationhood are oriented towards possible climate-insecure futures.

As such, I explore the interplay of current and historic significations of American nationhood with future possibilities of climate insecurity. This includes concepts of American exceptionalism, human security, and resilience in the construction of a climate-secure America (elaborated in chapter 6). Essentializing logics of US nationhood (termed ‘national logics’ in chapter 6) are constructed along multiple lines of discursive intersection between presents and futures. On the one hand, historic and current significations of what America ‘is’ or ‘stands for’ play into representations of how the United States will react in climate-insecure futures. In this sense, national logics of American nationhood are oriented similarly to, and in intersection with, racial logics in moments of climate-induced migration debates. On the other hand, the national logic alters so that it is not about present significations informing future possibilities, but instead that the outcomes of climate impacts inform future representations of American nationhood (for example inscriptions of a defensive American exceptionalism shaped by climate impacts).
For these multiple forms of essentializing logics – inscribed by racial and national identifications – inequalities are postulated in possible climate-insecure futures. These inequalities are not only about who has a stake in the collective subjectivity of American ‘nationhood’, but about which groups are constructed as racially Other – ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations – in climate-induced migration debates. Through a focus on discursive constructions of terrorism in climate security, I also explore how racial and national logics intersect at multiple, context-specific moments (chapter 6). As such, essentializing logics function to demarcate discursive, biopolitical divisions between particular valued lives and populations in possible climate-insecure futures. However, whereas these logics function to maintain or instigate inequalities in conditions of climate insecurities, section 3.9 explores options for an affirmative, critical discussion of alternative environmental securities or justices.

3.9 Possibilities for environmental justices in US and EU climate securities

In her reflections on the category of the ‘stranger’, Sara Ahmed (2000) warns against its figuration as the Stranger, a figuration that masks the social and political relationships of its constitution and produces a certain fetishism. She (2000: 5, original emphasis) writes: ‘stranger fetishism is a fetishism of figures: it invests the figure of the stranger with a life of its own insofar as it cuts ‘the stranger’ off from the histories of its determination.’ In a later piece, this theorization is scaled up to ‘the Other’: ‘To negate or give up on the particularity of others would involve its own violence: the transformation of others into the figure of the other involves its own betrayal of the future, as the possibility that others might be other than ‘the other’ or as the possibility of being faced by other others’ (Ahmed 2002: 560-1). Thus, although Ahmed subscribes to a notion of radical alterity and the impossibility of fully knowing the other – each with its own histories of determination, sociality, power relations and so forth – she cautions against the homogenization of particular others into the Other, a figuration which negates these differences. A key point in arguing that essentializing logics (with racial and national logics as particular forms of essentializing logics) orient national and racial identities towards climate-insecure futures is that they cut off these histories of determination and sociality that Ahmed (2002) documents. This is not only to the extent that essentialized conceptions of racial and national identity circumscribe
contemporary discourses of US climate security, but also that they delimit possibilities for alternative socialities and futures to emerge. They are a ‘betrayal of the future’, closing off ‘the possibility that others might be other than ‘the other’’, and ‘the possibility of being faced by other others’ (Ahmed 2002: 561).

In order to challenge this centralizing trend of essentialization – towards the figure of the Other – I argue situated, context-specific conceptions of environmental justice and securities are important. This is not to reinforce a universalized conception of social solidarity. For example, in his critique of a ‘futurism’ in liberal democracies prioritizing ‘future generations’ and preserving a liberal, national ‘Same’ above actually existing ‘Others’, Hannah (2011: 1049) argues an affirmative biopolitical solidarity should redefine the ‘Same’ to incorporate all currently existing lives. This translates into ‘massive redistribution of the political, economic and environmental means for the self-determined fulfillment of life sideaways across the globe’ (Hannah 2011: 1050, original emphasis). It is a biopolitics characterized by an ‘immanent or devolved futurism’, a ‘programme of human security’ (p.1050, original emphasis). Notwithstanding the fundamentality of care and redistribution, I argue Hannah’s (2011) case for universal human security, an extension of ‘the Same’, does not recognize the multiple, situated ways in which environmental securities and justices are conceptualized and experienced in the US. Consequently, he risks reinforcing an essentializing tendency that engulfs or denies these differences. Consistent with Said’s (1994) anti-essentialism, this chapter does not deny the importance of globalized identities or solidarities, but seeks to identify situated, context-specific and multi-scalar articulations of these constructions. It seeks to recognize the contingent, permeable boundaries signifying cultural differences – of diverse ‘others’ – without encapsulating these within an all-encompassing Other.

I argue a decentralizing anti-essentialism in practice could take inspiration from environmental justice perspectives. Walker and Burningham (2011) accept there is no generally agreed definition of environmental justice, but that two questions are usually implicated: how social inequalities relate to environmental issues, and how to evaluate inequalities in light of just, fair outcomes (allocations of responsibility, how policy could change etc.). The term ‘justice’ is especially important here: it indicates a move
from victimhood towards citizens with rights to be asserted, claimed and protected. Additionally, it focuses on why inequalities exist, making connections between injustices and inequitable relations of power. Environmental justice focuses attention to the multi-scalar character of environmental injustices, with claims in local, situated contexts articulated across scales (Walker and Burningham 2011). Environmental justice (EJ) perspectives emerged in the US in the late 1970s and are concerned with the unequal exposure of particular communities (communities of colour and low income) to environmental hazards, e.g. proximity to toxic waste sites (Bickerstaff and Agyeman 2009). Subsequently, localized EJ struggles have highlighted the imbrication of environmental inequalities with racism and class injustices (Bickerstaff and Agyeman 2009). Environmental (in)justice is preferred to the term ‘environmental racism’ in this instance (Pulido 2000). This is not to undermine the racialized differentiations that present in particular, context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourses, but to recognize that environmental injustices and insecurities are also intertwined with other identity constructions (notably nationhood in this project) (Cutter 1995). Studying ‘environmental formations’ in Latin America, defined as ‘the historically contingent articulations between environmental imaginaries, natural resource allocations, and political economies’ (p.569), Sundberg (2008) argues racialization, alongside nation-building and legal frameworks, is central to environmental injustices.

This project subscribes to such an environmental justice perspective. Environmental justice provides an important framework through which the contingent, historically situated struggles for environmental justice in the US can be approached without engulfing these in an essentializing schema of the Other. Importantly, I do not disregard the concept of ‘security’, but rather emphasize the interconnections between environmental securities and environmental justices. Although the centralizing, militarized practices of national security in environmental politics have been critiqued (Barnett 2001), Dalby (2014) points out security is a foundational organizing concept for many societies, including in the US. Instead of exclusionary, essentializing securities demarcating ‘Us’ from ‘Them’, ‘inside’ from ‘outside’, the focus should be on creating what Koopman (2011: 280) calls ‘alter-geopolitics’. She defines this as ‘a feminist geopolitics as done through action. It is people coming together to
build alternative nonviolent securities’ (p.280). It is feminist because it targets inequitable relations of power: ‘alter-geopolitics’ brings people together in action, creating shared, multi-scalar securities (Koopman 2011).

As Koopman (2011: 281) notes, ‘alter-geopolitics works to build security in a broader, multiple sense ... It is people coming together across difference not just to stay alive and be safe, but to live well, with dignity and justice.’ Alter-geopolitics seeks to deliver multiple, shared securities across differences. It draws clear connections between security and justice: that the building of collective securities is co-dependent with ‘dignity’ and ‘justice’. If geopolitics or security are not to be ‘a Great Game to be played by Great Men’, an alter-geopolitics ‘means not only pieces moving themselves on a map ... but also changing who gets to move what, where, when, how and why. This does not mean groups doing alter-geopolitics are advocating any one set of rules, for these will necessarily be different across contexts’ (Koopman 2011: 281). Thus, an alter-geopolitics of US climate securities focuses not only on the unequal power relations of climate security politics, but also the need for multiple shared securities across contexts. It is this combination, of plural, situated accounts of environmental securities grounded in environmental justice concerns, that I argue could represent limited, tentative possibilities for productive critiques of essentializing US climate securities. After chapters 4, 5 and 6 offer empirical elaborations of essentializing logics, I return to a discussion of what decentralizing (anti-essentialising), justice-oriented environmental securities could offer to climate security discourse in the thesis’ concluding chapter (section 7.3).

To conclude, this chapter has outlined a theoretical framework for study of racial and national identities in US climate security discourses. Inspired by Said’s (1994) anti-essentialism, I contend US climate security discourses are embedded in multiple biopolitics of unequally valued lives (based on Foucault’s (2009 (1977)) and Fassin’s (2009) models). Such biopolitics are multiple and rendered discursively knowable in possible futures. They are valued as national and racial identities. In context-specific moments of US climate security, essentializing logics orient historic and current significations about racial Others and American nationhood towards climate-insecure futures (from Hall’s and Anderson’s accounts). Chapters 4 (on racial logics in climate-
induced migration discourse), 5 (discourses of terrorism in US climate security), and 6 (national logics and constructions of a climate-secure American nationhood) explore this theoretical analytic in more empirical depth.
Chapter 4:
Exploring racial logics in US and EU climate security discourses

4.1 Introduction and research questions

1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourses?
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security discourse?

This, the first of the thesis’ empirical chapters, explores racialized identities in context-specific moments of US (and to a lesser extent EU) climate security discourse. I argue essentializing logics – composed of naturalized discursive assumptions – orient a racial Other towards possible climate-insecure futures. First, the chapter introduces racial logics (a type of essentializing logics focused on racialized identities) and situates climate-induced migration (CIM) debates in US climate security (section 4.2). It outlines three modalities racial logics take. First is naturalization: (re)construction of a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other with a latent tendency towards terrorism/radicalization and as inherently culturally incompatible with European societies (section 4.3). Second is dehumanization: geopolitical narratives that undermine possible climate-induced migrants’ agency (section 4.4) Finally, the chapter touches on compulsive determinism. This trope builds on neo-Malthusian foundations to suggest that, presented with a range of adaptive strategies, ‘African’ communities are compelled towards acts of violence or disruptive migrations (section 4.5). These modalities are illustrated with reference to moments of US climate security discourse (assisted by instances from EU-derived data) and the case of CIM from the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region to the European Union (EU). I argue racial logics in CIM debates are
underpinned by biopolitics of unequally valued lives, with racialization an important marker of these differential valuations.

4.2 Racial logics

This section introduces *racial logics* as a particular form of essentializing logics oriented towards racialized identities. Essentializing logics are introduced in Chapter 3 (section 3.7) as *contingent, discursively constructed series of essentializing propositions, assumptions and associations that rationalize and legitimize possible future outcomes or interventions*. Although different in each case, essentializing logics are applicable across contexts, do not assume prior agency, are constituted in unequal power relations, and are oriented towards both historic or present significations and possible futures. Essentializing logics are performative in that significations of what particular populations ‘are’ or ‘represent’ can demarcate possibilities for what might happen in climate-insecure futures. They facilitate Othering of populations and ‘imaginative geographies’ (Said 2003 (1978)). In moments of US climate security discourse, climate change is represented as a ‘threat multiplier’ that exacerbates existing threats, e.g. conflict and terrorism (Buxton and Hayes 2016). As climate change invokes both first- and second-order insecurities (Methmann and Rothe 2012), this does not mean that human subjects produced as Others are the ‘direct enemy’ around which security institutions mobilize. As racial Others, they are constituted from *naturalized assumptions*. ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations are not inherently prone to terrorism or cultural incompatibility, but socially constructed as such; they are ‘not grounded in nature, but producing nature as a sort of guarantee of its truth’ (Hall 1996: 144). Naturalization sediments particular assumptions or claims as the ‘common sense’ or ‘the truth’ of ideologies and cultures (Hall 1996: 141): identities are fixed and divorced from their contingent politics. I argue naturalized assumptions about a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other underwrite – in a partial, context-specific manner – possible climate-insecure futures. Section 4.3 discusses naturalized racial markers of a latent tendency towards terrorism and inherent cultural incompatibility in context-specific moments of climate security discourse. I follow this up with two specific manifestations of naturalized racial logics: dehumanizing geopolitical representations
(Section 4.4), and a compulsive determinism directing climate-induced migrants’ choices in conditions of climate insecurity (Section 4.5).

4.3 Naturalization

This section introduces the empirical context of climate-induced migration from the MENA region to the EU and naturalized, racial Others constructed in representations of this context. It is a partial, particular context through which racial logics function in US climate security: most references to racial logics and CIM occur from 2007-10. Prior to a discussion of naturalization as a racial trope in US climate security documents, I first outline histories of migration from the MENA region to the EU to situate this discussion before moving onto debates of climate-induced migration.

4.3.1 Historical context

Migration from Maghreb and MENA countries to Western Europe has been especially prominent since at least the 1950s. Numbers increased after Algerian Independence (1962) with a series of bilateral recruitment agreements; Morocco signed these with West Germany (May 1963), France (June 1963), Belgium (February 1964), and the Netherlands (May 1969) (White 2011). After the OPEC embargo and oil crisis (1973/4), European governments have increasingly restricted migration and drafted readmission agreements for irregular migrants’ repatriation. Morocco signed agreements with France (1993), Germany (1998), Spain (1992), and from the late 1990s readmission agreements have been delegated to the European Commission (El Qadim 2014). However, despite securitization of external borders – facilitated by the 1985 Schengen Agreement and establishment of FRONTEX (the EU’s border agency) in 2004 – migration from MENA countries to the EU continued. In 1998, 1.6 million Moroccans lived in Northern Europe; an estimated 300,000 Tunisians were living abroad in 2003; and 800,000 Algerians by 2000 (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). Most irregular migrants in Southern European countries overstay tourist visas (Dines et al 2015). Of those who arrive by boat, Spain reported an increase in interceptions from 1573 (in 1976) to 11781 migrants in 2005, whilst the Italian Government reported 12,737 interceptions in 2004, most arriving to the island of Lampedusa (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). Libya, as a
‘transit country’, has become increasingly important to the EU. The Italian and Libyan governments signed an agreement (2003) whereby immigration liaison officers would be exchanged between the two nation-states: Libyan police would attend border enforcement training courses and immigration centres would be commissioned on Libyan territory (Lutterbeck 2009).

These histories of migration became increasingly intertwined with climate change narratives from the mid-late 2000s. Theories connecting environmental drivers and migration stretch back to the 19th century; writing in 1891, Ravenstein argued that environmental factors (e.g. climatic changes) were one of the many causal variations that could influence migratory decisions (Piguet 2013). Essam El-Hinnawi brought the term ‘environmental refugee’ to the fore in a 1985 UNEP report as a means to grapple with the problems of individuals forced to leave their homes due to natural disasters (Weinthal et al 2015). ‘Environmental refugees’ were also later cited in the influential Brundtland Report (1987) (Boas 2015). Norman Myers (2005) predicted the existence of 200 million climate-induced migrants by 2050, but Methmann and Oels (2015) point out this figure assumes every person resident in an area with predicted climate change impacts, e.g. coastal erosion, would be forced to move. It takes no account of the complexities of migration (mediated by social, economic, political and cultural dynamics), or the range of adaptive strategies (for example livelihood diversification or flood defence investment) available in affected areas. From the mid 2000s, CIM received attention from security institutions and Boas (2015) contends the 2007 and 2011 UN Security Council debates on climate change are key historical developments. In 2008, the EU’s High Representative Javier Solana and European Commission produced a report noting the possibility of mass migration from Africa to the EU. They (2008: 8) write: ‘In Southern Africa, droughts are likely to intensify … Migration in this region, but also migration from other regions through Northern Africa to reach Europe (transit migration) is likely to intensify’. This report represents one of the EU’s first statements on climate-induced migration (Trombetta 2014). It is paralleled by a series of US publications (see, for example, CNA (2007) and Campbell et al (2007), discussed below) speculating on mass CIM from Africa to the EU. In her analysis of CIM debates,

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5 As Brown (2008: 8) notes, Myers admits himself that his estimate, though based on the best available data at the time, relied on some “heroic extrapolations”.
Oels (2016) proposes three discourses. First is ‘climate refugees’, disseminated by security institutions and NGOs and which casts CIM as a security threat justifying harsh measures, e.g. strict border controls. Oels’ (2016) second discourse is ‘human security’: this looks to ‘save’ climate-induced migrants and directs attention towards risk management strategies, international development and humanitarian intervention. Finally, CIM is presented as an adaptation strategy; individuals are encouraged to utilize migration strategically to build resilience and economic opportunities (Black et al 2011; Oels 2016).

Geovanni Bettini (2013) identifies four discursive frames used to describe climate-induced migration. First is the scientific frame (epitomized by IPCC reports); second is ‘capitalist’ (for instance the Stern Review (2007)); third a humanitarian platform (encapsulated by NGO reports); and finally a radical Southern platform, captured by climate justice interpretations of climate-induced migration (Bettini 2013). In a later piece, Bettini (2014) differentiates between securitized ‘climate refugee’ and ‘migration-as-adaptation’ – underpinned by ideas of human security, adaptation and resilience – registers in his account of the biopolitics of climate-induced migration. The ‘security’ register symbolizes a dangerous, non-developed, ‘pathologically unfit’ climate-induced migrant engaged in ‘bad circulation’; conversely, the ‘migration-as-adaptation’ register constructs adaptable, resilient and entrepreneurial neoliberal subjects, ‘good circulation’ (Bettini 2014: 191). Chaturvedi and Doyle (2015: 109) write that imaginative geographies of contemporary climate securities envision ‘millions of Afro-Asians being uprooted and displaced from their habitat and crossing borders in search of the greener and securer pastures.’ Discussing a possible convergence of climate-induced migration discourses around an apocalyptic narrative, Bettini (2013: 68) warns this can produce neo-Malthusian narratives of mass migrations and conflict tied to ‘restrictive/xenophobic policies’, a point reiterated by Hayes (2016). However, whilst Bettini’s (2013; 2014) accounts touch on the biopolitics and exclusions of climate-induced migration discourses, they do not account for the mechanisms through which they are racialized and the inequalities racialized identities suggest in climate-insecure futures.
Summarizing the security, ‘threats’-based CIM narrative, Oels (2016: 192) states: ‘the discourse spreads fear about climate refugees. It constructs climate refugees as a threat to the national security of states, and mobilizes defence as the mode of securing.’ She (p.192) contends this is ‘undeniably racist’, and drawing upon Baldwin’s (2013b) analysis of Michael Nash’s 2009 film Climate Refugees, argues it draws upon racist stereotypes of Western experts assisting poor victims of climate impacts in a ‘dangerous’ Global South, representing climate-induced migrants as victims and threats simultaneously. As described in Chapter 3 (section 3.8.1), Baldwin (2012: 627) identifies a range of modes of alterity in climate change discourse, e.g. ‘indigeneity’, ‘the Muslim’ or ‘the terrorist’, but centres on a relation of postcolonial alterity oriented to the future. As opposed to a dialectical different-from relation critiqued by postcolonial theorists, alterity in CIM discourse conceives of the Other as yet-to-come. Baldwin (2013b) argues ‘the climate migrant’ is racialized through three tropes. ‘Naturalization’ refers to the way climate-induced migrants are represented with nature idioms (e.g. migrants are forced to relocate for natural reasons and not internal reason). ‘Loss of status’ refers to trans-boundary migration and depictions of climate migrants as an excess of international political order. ‘Ambiguity’ racializes climate migrants as indeterminate: a product of multifactorial causality (e.g. economic opportunities, land tenure or conflict), and in excess of calculation (Baldwin 2013b).

Baldwin (2016) also formulates the concept of ‘white affect’, an affective fear of the climate migrant as an indeterminate threat in a world of constant potential transformations and anxieties about European white supremacy. Baldwin’s (2012; 2013b; 2016) conclusions suggest a ‘yet-to-come’ racialized figure emerging prior to discursive identity formation and existent in a ‘future-conditional’ orientation. Highlighted in Chapter 3 (section 3.8.1), this thesis also explores the racialization of CIM, but in the specific domain of climate security discourse. It does not locate racialization in a prefigured potentiality, but rather in discursively rendered possibilities. In this sense, I argue that Baldwin’s (2013b; 2016) accounts of racialized climate-induced migration debates do not adequately account for the discursive means through which populations are racialized in climate-insecure futures. His (2016) account is situated a temporality of potentiality located prior to signification, but this chapter contends that discursive, signified racialized identities (essentializing logics and
a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other) are important, context-specific constituents of CIM discourses. Additionally, whilst Baldwin's (2013b) concept of naturalization (epitomized by the adoption of nature idioms) is important, for example biological and immunological metaphors to describe terrorism-climate change interactions in chapter 5 (section 5.5), I understand naturalization in Hall’s (1996) terms as the rendering of statements or assumptions as inherent, ‘common sense’, decontextualized and temporally fixed. Naturalization is used to capture the ways essentializing (racial) logics are implicated in the (re)construction of a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other in climate-insecure futures.

4.3.2 Racial logics and a latent capacity towards terrorism

This analysis builds on Oels (2016), Baldwin’s (2012; 2013b; 2016) and Bettini’s (2013) concerns about racialization and xenophobia in the context of US and EU climate security discourses. I start with the landmark November 2007 report The Age of Consequences: The Foreign and National Security Implications of Climate Change (Campbell et al 2007). Published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security (two US based think tanks), this report is one of several seminal moments from what Liberatore (2013) calls the ‘2007 turn’. Alongside the UN Security Council debate on climate change (19th April (UNSC 2007a and b)), the Center for Naval Analyses Military Advisory Board released their influential publication National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (CNA 2007). As an important early example from the CDA and worthy of quoting at length, Campbell et al (2007: 59) discuss migration from Africa to the EU:

‘While most African and South Asian migration will be internal or regional, the expected decline in food production and fresh drinking water, combined with the increased conflict caused by resource scarcity, will force more Africans and South Asians to migrate further abroad. This will likely result in a surge of the number of Muslim immigrants to the European Union (EU), which could exacerbate existing tensions and increase the likelihood of radicalization among members of Europe’s growing (and often poorly assimilated) Islamic communities. Already, the majority of immigrants to most Western European countries are Muslim. Muslims constitute approximately 5% of the European population,
with the largest communities located in France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark. Europe’s Muslim population is expected to double by 2025, and it will be much larger if ... the effects of climate change spur additional migration from Africa and South Asia.

The degree of instability this generates will depend on how successfully these immigrant populations are integrated into European society. This process has not always gone well (as exemplified in 2005 by the riots in the poor and predominantly immigrant suburbs of Paris), and the suspicion with which Europe’s Muslim and immigrant communities are viewed by many would be greatly intensified by an attack from a “homegrown terrorist.” Given that a nationalist, anti-immigrant backlash could result from even a small or unsuccessful attack, the risk that such a backlash will occur is high.

If the backlash is sufficiently severe, the EU’s cohesion will be tested ... Thus far, the EU has responded to this challenge with ad hoc measures, such as creating rapid reaction border guard teams. While the influx of immigrants from Africa – Muslim and otherwise – will continue to be viewed by some as a potential catalyst for economic growth at a time when the EU has a very low fertility rate, the viability of the EU’s loose border controls will be called into question, and the lack of a common immigration policy will invariably lead to internal political tension.’

Here, Campbell et al (2007) speculate on an increase to Europe’s Muslim population in response to climate insecurities. Several linguistic features stand out. First is the negative lexis describing migration and its consequences, e.g. ‘suspicion’, ‘exacerbate existing tensions’, ‘internal political tension’, ‘attack’ and ‘homegrown terrorist’.

Campbell et al (2007) make a number of assumptions about cross-border migration, including a ‘degree of instability’ generated by an increase in the EU’s ‘Muslim’ population and that, even if ‘an influx of immigrants’ acts as ‘a catalyst for economic growth’, this is counteracted by the claim that ‘the lack of a common immigration policy will invariably lead to internal political tension.’ These assumptions and lexical articulations are all premised on a negative view of intercontinental migration to the EU (‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’).

There are also associations between climate-induced migration and terrorism in the report. This observation suggests that, in certain, context-specific moments of a
securitized climate-induced migration discourse, the figure of a ‘climate terrorist’ is
discursively constructed (Chaturvedi and Doyle 2015: 135). A latent vulnerability
towards or capacity for radicalization and terrorism is repeated multiple times in The
Age of Consequences. In the above passage, Campbell et al (2007) assert a ‘surge in the
number of Muslim immigrants ... could increase the likelihood of radicalization’, and
that ‘the suspicion with which Europe’s Muslim and immigrant communities are
viewed by many would be greatly intensified by an attack by a “homegrown terrorist.”’
Later in the document, Campbell et al (2007: 106) also stress that ‘an influx of Muslims
into Europe ... could lead to new tensions over foreign policy priorities (e.g. towards
Muslim countries or Islamist terrorism).’ In all of these quotations, ‘Muslim’ migrants,
communities and minorities are linked to the possibility of radicalization and terrorism.
It could be that repeated associations naturalize radicalization and terrorism to
‘Muslim’ populations in particular and by extension produce a racialized ‘Muslim’
Other as fixed and decontextualized. Modal verbs like ‘could lead to’ or ‘would be’
construct ‘Muslim’ migrants in the future-conditional tense and orient a racial ‘Muslim’
Other towards possible futures. A naturalized tendency towards terrorism becomes an
additional variable in climate-insecure futures: because ‘Muslims’ are associated with
latent possibilities of terrorism, this could or might lead to radicalization and terrorism
from ‘Muslim’ subjects in different futures. Thus, in the particular context of The Age
of Consequences (Campbell et al 2007), I argue that a racial logic of naturalized
assumptions (historic and current significations) could operate to delimit a ‘Muslim’
Other’s future possibilities.

An attachment of Muslim populations to violence corresponds with histories of
essentializing Islam and Muslims in American political and media contexts. In Covering
diverse Muslim world, reducing them all to a special malevolent and unthinking
essence. Instead of analysis and understanding as a result, there can be for the most
part only the crudest form of us-versus-them.’ Said (1997 (1981)) focuses on 20th
century depictions of Islam and Muslims, for example the 1973/4 oil crisis, 1979
Iranian Revolution (Herzog et al 2008), and the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-81) in
which the American embassy in Tehran was unlawfully occupied on 4th November,
1979. Said (1997 (1981)) argues the intense media scrutiny surrounding this event is
connected to the (re)emergence of common stereotypes about Iran, Muslims and Islam as linked to fundamentalism and violence. There are also longer American associations with anti-Muslim sentiment (Rana 2007). In the early 20th century, a period of state-mandated segregation, applications for American citizenship were rejected on grounds that Muslim migrants’ religious identity was indicative of a non-white background (Bayoumi 2006). Gregory (2004a) also critiques the imaginative geographies through which Islam – and Muslims – have been constructed as the United States’ inferior, violent Other during the ‘War on Terror’. In government policy, Bayoumi (2006) examines the ‘special registration’ programme (introduced in 2002). This act required all non-immigrant males in the US – from select countries – to be fingerprinted, photographed, and interviewed about their legal status, proof of identity and employment, and political and religious beliefs. With the exception of North Korea, all of the target countries were Muslim-majority states and, despite 83519 registrations, not a single charge of terrorism was levied (Bayoumi 2006). These complex, intertwined histories demonstrate the enmeshment of racialized Muslim identities with American geopolitics and security institutions.

However, such histories are only tendentiously related to US climate security discourses. The connection is not a direct association, but instead about how historic significations of ‘Muslim’ populations, naturalized assumptions of terrorism and radicalization, feed into American climate security debates. The racial logic is therefore about how historic and current significations of racialized ‘Muslim’ identities are (re)configured in a specific discursive context. Of this, Hartmann (2014) identifies a ‘Malthusian anticipatory regime’ in US and EU climate change discourse: NGOs (Hartmann (2014) cites the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation as an example) are creating overly simplistic, deterministic relationships between climate impacts, resource depletion, population growth, and mass migration to the EU. Population growth is blamed for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Sub-Saharan Africa, notwithstanding the fact that African countries are amongst the lowest polluters (between 1950 and 2000, the continent of Africa contributed only 2.5% of the world’s GHG emissions) (Hartmann 2014). In a visual analysis of 140 EU and US climate security documents, Methmann and Rothe (2014) found all images were of people of colour, mostly female, and portrayed (as ‘climate refugees’ and ‘victims’ of human
insecurities) in passive roles that diminish their agency. This contributes to a broader securitization of the EU’s relations with the MENA region around issues of terrorism, climate change and migration; Methmann and Rothe (2014) contend that the European border regime (e.g. FRONTEX) is noticeably absent in these images. This gendered and racialized imagery indicates that tropes of racial Others permeate context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourse. Alongside racialized constructions of a latent tendency towards violence, I also argue that inherent cultural incompatibility is a component of racial logics in moments of American climate security discourses.

4.3.3 Racial logics and inherent cultural compatibility

As a starting point, Campbell et al (2007: 74) write (describing the geopolitical consequences of a severe climate change scenario (one in which average global surface temperatures rise by 2.6°C over 30 years (from 2007))):

‘Environmental pressures will accentuate the migration of peoples to levels that effectively change the ethnic signatures of major states and regions. In Europe the influx of illegal immigrants from North Africa and other parts of the continent will accelerate and become impossible to stop, except by means approximating blockade. There will be political tipping points marked by the collapse of liberal concepts of openness, in the face of public demands to stem the tide. As the pressure increases, efforts to integrate Muslim communities into the European mainstream will collapse and extreme division will become the norm.

The beginnings of these trends are present now. But severe climate change will cause them to become far worse. One of the casualties of this process may be the prospect for the cultural, much less the political integration of Turkey into the EU. Even if Turkey were to be admitted, the increasing reaction of Europeans against Islam may alienate the Turkish people, thereby destroying the hoped-for role of Turkey as a bulwark against radical Islam. At severe levels of climate change, civil disorder may lead to the suspension of normal legal procedures and rights.’

This excerpt draws upon the notion of ethnic divisions with the claim that environmental pressures ‘will change the ethnic signatures of major states and
regions.’ Strong phraseology such as ‘extreme division’, ‘blockade’, and ‘collapse’ further sediments a notion of intense, deep-seated differences between ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’ communities in European countries, albeit for an severe climate change scenario. These claims are concretised with the example of Turkey’s integration into the EU. Campbell et al note that Turkey’s ‘cultural’ and ‘political’ integration could be affected under a severe climate change scenario and state that the ‘increasing reaction of Europeans against Islam may alienate the Turkish people’. One consequence of this would be the destruction of Turkey’s role as a ‘bulwark against radical Islam’. Using the example of Turkey, ‘cultural’ differences between European and Turkish populations, articulated in the context of an ‘increasing reaction of Europeans against Islam’, are highlighted under a severe climate change scenario. Thus, it could be that a racial logic suggests that, in possible future conditions of severe climate insecurities, inherent cultural differences between European and non-European ‘Muslim’ populations could produce conditions of ‘civil disorder’, ‘extreme division’ and the ‘suspension of normal legal procedures and rights’. I argue that this construction, of ‘Islamic’ or ‘Muslim’ societies as fundamentally different to ‘Western’ societies, is also partially reflected in limited, context-specific moments of other US national security publications. In the 2008 Joint Operating Environment (JOE), a strategy that forecasts the future security environment and military requirements (US Joint Forces Command 2008), also discussed in section 4.4, the US Joint Forces Command (2008: 34) state:

‘The problems in the Arab-Islamic world stem from the past five centuries, during which, until recently, the rise of the West and the dissemination of Western political and social values paralleled a concomitant decline in the power and appeal of their societies. Today’s Islamic world confronts the choice of either adapting to or escaping from a globe of interdependence created by the West … If tensions between the Islamic world’s past and the present were not enough, the Middle East, the Arab heartland of Islam, remains divided by tribal, religious, and political divisions, in which continued instability is inevitable. Combining Islamic dogma with the internet, intricate financial networks, and the porous boundaries of weakly governed states, radical Islamists have created a networked organization with global reach … No one can harbour the illusion that the developed world can win this conflict in the near future … What will matter most will be the winning of a “war of ideas,” much of which must come from within the Islamic world itself.’
In this excerpt, explicit divisions are drawn between the ‘Arab-Islamic world’ and ‘the West’ or ‘developed world’. It could be that this reiterates an imaginative geography in which ‘Western political and social values’ are cast as superior to the ‘problems’, ‘decline’, ‘instability’ and ‘tribal, religious, and political divisions’ of the ‘Islamic world’. Importantly, the Joint Operating Environment does state that these differences are not irreconcilable, noting that the ‘Islamic world’ must ‘adapt to’ a globalized world created by ‘the West’. However, it could be that by constructing an imaginative geography of a superior ‘West’ against the ‘Arab-Islamic world’, this essentializes these geographical categories and reduces their heterogeneous differences and interactions. For example, the authors assert that a “war of ideas” (against Islamist extremists) must involve action from ‘within the Islamic world itself’. Through the use of the preposition ‘within’ to describe ‘the Islamic world’, this suggests that there is an ‘inside’ to the ‘Islamic world’ that can be distinguished from an essentially different ‘outside’. Additionally, it may be that the pronoun ‘itself’ implies that the ‘Islamic world’ is a singular, unified entity that is discernably different to ‘the West’ and ‘developed world’. In this excerpt, I argue that the ‘Islamic world’ is thus constructed as essentially different and inferior to a more advanced, globalized ‘West’. Furthermore, whilst a slight deviation, these constructions demonstrate that essentialized differences between ‘Islam’, the ‘Arab-Islamic world’ and ‘the West’ are present in broader US national security publications from 2007-10. Translated into the specific context of climate-induced migration of ‘Muslim’ populations from the MENA region to the European Union, these essentializations suggest possible climate-insecure futures of ineffective ‘assimilation’ and ‘social disruption’. For example, writing about the consequences for international migration of a ‘catastrophic’ climate change scenario (an aggregate global temperature rise of 5.6°C by the end of the 21st century and a rise in global sea levels of 2 metres over the same period), Campbell et al (2007: 86) report:

‘Even a Europe made colder by the degrading of the Gulf Stream may experience substantially increased levels of immigration from south of the Mediterranean, both from sub-Saharan Africa and from the Arab world. Many of Europe’s Muslim minorities, including Russia’s, are not well-assimilated today, and the stress of major climate change and sea-level rise may well foster social
disruption and radicalization. Russia and Europe may be destabilized, shifting the global balance of power.’

In this quote, Campbell et al (2007: 86) reiterate a specific association of ‘Muslim’ communities with a possibility for ‘radicalization’. Alongside a reference to the European Union’s ‘poorly assimilated’ ‘Islamic communities’, Campbell et al describe ‘many of Europe’s Muslim minorities’ as ‘not well-assimilated today’. It could be that the concept of ‘assimilation’ implies that ‘Muslim’ minorities or communities are incompatible with European societies because an assimilationist approach necessitates abandonment of the migrant’s culture and gradual adoption of the ‘host’ culture (Fekete 2004). Cast in terms of possibilities in climate-insecure futures, an assimilationist logic of cultural incompatibility could suggest outcomes of ‘social disruption’, ‘radicalization’, and a condition of ‘destabilized’ geopolitics for ‘Russia’ and ‘Europe’. This is not to deny there are cultural differences, but rather populations are constructed as inherently incompatible with European societies and climate insecurities could generate clashes or a need to assimilate. The racial logic implies that with climate insecurities, existing cultural incompatibilities will produce greater tensions between ‘European’ populations and a racial ‘Muslim’ Other in possible climate-insecure futures. Conceptions of ‘poor assimilation’ of ‘Muslim’ communities feed into broader historical narratives about the inherent incompatibility of a ‘Muslim’ Other in European countries.

In a comparative study of media representations of Jewish migrants to Britain in the late 19th century and Muslim migrants in the 21st century, Meer and Noorani (2008) discover many of the racialized stereotypes are similar: Jewish migrants were also accused of irreconcilability with ‘secular’, white Christian Brits, leading to a self-segregating refusal to interact with the local population. Judith Butler’s (2008) conception of ‘secular time’ is also insightful. For Butler (2008), the progression of rights in European societies is measured as temporal progress. Zeroing in on Dutch citizenship tests and applicants shown a picture of two individuals of the same sex kissing and asked if this is acceptable, Butler (2008) worries that LGBTQ rights should not be used to discriminate against other groups, e.g. Muslim migrants. At a bigger geopolitical scale of ‘civilizational’ differences, Islam (and Muslim-majority
populations) has also been constructed as the culturally inferior, backward Other to an enlightened European ‘Self’ (Mamdani 2004). As these brief examples indicate, assumptions of a ‘Muslim’ Other as inherently culturally incompatible with European societies also intermingle with broader histories and geographies. In section 4.3.4, I argue that racialized identities (a ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other) are intertwined, in partial, context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourse, with possibilities of exclusionary containment policies in climate-insecure futures. Thus, the racial logic connects naturalized assumptions and associations about ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations (a latent capacity for or vulnerability towards terrorism, and inherent cultural incompatibility with European societies), with delimitations of what such associations suggest for interventions in future conditions of climate insecurity (containment policies). This logic underpins a biopolitics of unequally valued lives in climate-insecure futures (Duffield and Evans 2011), a biopolitics that suggests demarcations about which populations are permitted access and freedom to circulate in European spaces (and which populations are excluded from these spaces).

4.3.4 Racial logics and possibilities of containment

To begin this section, I contend that racial logics are expressed in context-specific moments of the 2009 US National Intelligence Estimate on climate change. The National Intelligence Council (NIC), an interagency group that supports the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the President’s highest advisor on national security issues), produced this report. The NIC publish long-term analyses for the US intelligence community (e.g. the Department of State, CIA and National Security Agency) (DNI 2015). For the Estimate, the NIC also produced a series of regional reports and consultations about the geopolitical implications of climate change (to 2030). Importantly, as products of consultations, these documents do not represent the views of the US government (NIC 2009a). In a (2009a) regional report and consultation about North Africa, specifically in reference to CIM, the NIC (2009a) observes:

‘North African immigrants form a major segment of Europe’s Muslim population, and North Africa is the primary focus of
European concerns about immigration ... The demographic ascension of Europe’s Muslim population is an increasing concern to European governments, both in terms of the alteration of European cultural, ethnic, and religious composition and the threat from Islamic extremism. As a result, North African immigration is a high-priority security and foreign policy issue for Europe’ (p.29-30)

‘Europe seeks to build a *cordon sanitaire* against Sub-Saharan migration in North Africa. European states may be willing to turn a blind eye to North African human rights abuses of migrants as long as migration flows are kept under control’ (p.31)

‘Because of the direct threat it poses to Europe, the migration issue could become the strongest bargaining chip for North African states ... they might resort to outright blackmail, threatening to unleash unimpeded flows of migrants unless granted massive amounts of foreign aid. In a more general sense, they might play the “climate change card,” citing the threat of climate change-induced regional crisis to garner Western aid, as they have done with the “terrorism card”’ (p.34)

In line with a trope of inherent cultural difference and incompatibility, the authors contest that the ‘demographic ascension of Europe’s Muslim population is an increasing concern to European governments’ because of the ‘alteration of European cultural, ethnic and religious composition.’ While ‘ethnicity’ can denote a range of different facets, e.g. religious affiliation, language, dress, cultural practices and traditions (Meer 2014: 37), it appears these aspects are encompassed by the terms ‘religious’ and ‘cultural’. It could be that this leaves ‘ethnic’ with a more racialized condition of cultural difference. As such, when the NIC (2009a) argue that Europe’s ‘ethnic composition’ is being changed by the ascension of its ‘Muslim’ population, this produces a binary between ‘Muslim’ ethnic identity and ‘non-Muslim’ ethnic identities in European countries. In lieu with previous documents, negative lexical choices are used to describe migration, e.g. ‘increasing concerns’, ‘unimpeded flows’, ‘high-priority security issues’, and ‘cordon sanitaire’. *Cordon sanitaire* is originally a French phrase describing a barrier erected to prevent the spread of infectious disease and plagues, with its earliest references in 1826 and 1847 (Oxford English Dictionary 2016a). It also denotes a geopolitical a ring of buffer states constructed to prevent invasion of a protected political authority. With connotations of disease control and prevention, a
**cordon sanitaire** promulgates a pernicious vision of measures to stop ‘African’ migrants. Its geopolitical meaning also renders an image of threats or contagion against quarantined, internal ‘European’ spaces.

Reflecting on the racial assumptions of portraying migrants as pollutants or contaminants in CNN’s immigration reporting, Cisneros (2008: 591) writes: ‘Images of immigrants as dangerous and destructive pollutants dehumanizes immigrants by constructing them as threatening substances, denying them agency and reinforcing common stereotypes … Their brown bodies are portrayed as dirty and dangerous because of their ethnicity.’ These metaphorical tropes work not only to naturalize migrant populations according to undesirable characteristics, but also to justify repressive containment policies in climate-insecure futures. In a seminal 2007 report by the WGBU (the German Advisory Council on Global Change, an independent scientific advisory group established by the German Federal Government in 1992 in the run-up to the Rio Summit), one of a series of biennial reports on important topics of global change chosen by Council Members, the authors (WGBU 2007) write on the subject of CIM to Europe and possibilities of containment:

‘With no prospects in any of the countries of the region, many young people see migration to Europe as their only opportunity … Towards the middle of the 21st century the northwards migration of predominantly young men from the countries of the Sahel takes on the proportions of a “Völkerwanderwung”, i.e. mass migration such as was seen in Europe during the Dark Ages. Every year hundreds of thousands of people from the Sahel and the tropical areas of West and Central Africa arrive in the North African coastal regions. As a result, enormous slum settlements housing stranded migrants arise in the urban agglomerations of the Maghreb’ (p.125)

‘The year 2020 sees the start of serious social and political destabilization in all the countries affected by this migration … The situation of economic hopelessness generates enormous potential for political destabilization among young people who have no prospects; the urban slums threaten to become lawless areas. This creates a breeding ground for the further radicalization and spread of extremist religious movements’ (p.125)

‘Developments in North Africa have a significant impact on Europe. The European countries that are the primary destination
of migrants have a need for workers, but the need is far exceeded by the number of illegal immigrants. Because illegal immigrants are not integrated into society, there is increased ghettoization of North African immigrants. Xenophobia increases, and the immigrants react to their dangerous circumstances by turning in large numbers to radical religious groups (a choice favoured by the huge popularity of these movements in migrants’ home countries). European countries fear that immigration from North Africa will allow the infiltration of more and more members of extremist groups into Europe, and they take steps to strengthen ‘Fortress Europe’ (p.126).

‘The risk of destabilization applies not only within these countries [Maghreb countries]; the situation can have consequences for the stability of the entire region. One result of climate change will be further emigration from rural areas to cities and migration via the countries of North Africa to EU countries. Migration issues will therefore become increasingly sensitive; in Southern Europe this could trigger potentially violent conflicts (e.g. the youth riots in France in 2005)’ (p.137)

In these excerpts, the WGBU are concerned by a picture of disruptive climate-induced migration from Africa to the EU. As is discussed in chapter 5 (Section 5.6), a gendered representation of ‘young men’ is reproduced as well as associations with a possible capacity for extremism or radicalization. Examples include the possibilities of immigrants ‘turning to radical religious groups’ inspired by similar movements in their home countries, ‘urban slums’ in North African cities as a ‘breeding ground for the further radicalization and spread of extremist religious groups’, and worries about the ‘infiltration of more and more members of extremist groups into Europe’. Although not named as ‘Muslim’ in these instances (for a more detailed discussion on this politics of naming, see section 4.4), this reinforces a construction of young, male migrants with a latent vulnerability or capacity towards radicalization (Puar and Rai 2002). Biological, fertility metaphors are also utilized to capture the capacity of climate-stressed populations in North African cities to turn towards radicalization and extremist groups, e.g. ‘breeding ground’ (for a longer discussion of fertility metaphors in US and EU climate security discourses, see chapter 5, section 5.5). An image of social tensions is reinforced by the WGBU’s (2007: 137) speculation that ‘potentially violent conflicts’ ‘could trigger’, as well as the example of the 2005 Paris unrest (also cited in the Age of Consequences (Campbell et al 2007: 59)). Thus, although these assumptions
are not directly associated with ‘Muslim’ populations, the WGBU (2007) still worry about associations of ‘African’ migrants with a capacity for radicalization and sociocultural tensions. The negative, disruptive effects of mass migration are compounded with the term ‘Völkerwanderung’, originally a German word denoting a large migration of people en masse, for example in Europe during the Roman Empire or Middle Ages (Oxford English Dictionary 2016b). Discussing the consequences of these movements, the WGBU note that ‘xenophobia’ will increase, conflicts could arise, and European leaders will ‘take steps to strengthen ‘Fortress Europe’’. Like the possibilities of a cordon sanitaire envisaged by the NIC, the WGBU caution that a fortressed, walled EU could be a consequence of CIM from African countries.

Importantly, the WGBU (2007: 126-7) do also include a positive scenario whereby successful adaptation policies (e.g. strategies for sustainable resource management and soil cultivation), assisted by international partners, could reduce social problems and conflicts. Under this scenario, EU states would reach agreements with North African states for managed quotas of possible climate-induced migrants (WGBU 2007: 126-7). However, despite this less disruptive case, I argue that, embodied in the WGBU’s concerns about a negative CIM scenario, a racial logic (dependent on current and historic significations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations as associated with a latent capacity for terrorism) could suggest outcomes of containment policies in possible climate-insecure futures. The verbs used in the excerpts, e.g. ‘migration issues will therefore become increasingly sensitive’, and the claim that ‘lawless’ urban areas ‘creates a breeding ground for ... further radicalization’, as opposed to the modal verbs (‘could’, ‘might’ etc.) in the NIC (2009a) and Age of Consequences (Campbell et al 2007) reports, suggest a more certain, deterministic orientation to the racial logic. The chapter identifies this as a compulsive determinism (discussed further in section 4.5). First, however, I discuss the unequal power relations and biopolitics of suggested containment policies in context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourses.

As Duffield and Evans (2011: 94, original emphasis) state, containment policies are inextricable from the increasing association of development policy with security and a global biopolitical life-chances divide: ‘What could be called ‘underdeveloped life’ has
been routinely geographically *contained* in order to better manage the life-chance divide separating the Global North and South ... Out of an initial concern with the welfare of those less fortunate, poverty and violence have reformulated themselves as problems *to be solved locally*. As such, a biopolitics of mobility is at play in which ‘under-developed’ populations are contained and migration prevented. Bakewell (2008) terms this the ‘sedentary bias’ of development policy and locates it within colonial histories of European interactions with African populations. Early European colonizers controlled migration patterns to provide labour for mineral extraction, colonial administration, plantations, and most horrifically with the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Bakewell 2008). Attempts to control migration patterns continued into 20th century development policy, e.g. the promotion of remittances as a development strategy and negative perceptions of migration in industrialized countries (Bakewell 2008). White (2014: 835) notes a ‘fortress mentality’ from the stigmatization of migration can exacerbate environmental insecurities and be built ‘upon a platform of state, corporate, and organized group wrongdoing and injustice.’ The representation of a *cordon sanitaire* also demarcates a hierarchy between North African states and Sub-Saharan African migrants. As Lutterbeck (2009) and de Haas (2008) state, this feeds into discourses creating fear about millions of poor Africans determined to reach the EU’s ‘promised land’. It constructs a teleological geopolitical imagination of the EU as the pinnacle or highpoint of migration outcomes. This imagination functions not only in terms of the EU as the ultimate destination for CIM, but also as the final arbiter of security policy. For example, on p.29 of the NIC (2009a) report, the authors state:

‘North Africa is both a source of migrants and a transit region for external migrants. Both of these dynamics are likely to be significantly expanded by climatic stress in Africa, and both are directed primarily at Europe. Although migration probably will have less direct adverse impact on North African states and other climatic challenges, it is likely to be the principal manifestation of climate change-induced spillover into Europe ... As climate change impacts are felt more strongly in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa ... they will become leading drivers behind the larger African migration pattern northward toward Europe.’

Here, Europe is the ‘final destination’ for presumed climate-induced migrants. By talking about migration as ‘directed primarily’ at Europe, ‘spillover’, and the ‘larger
African migration pattern’ into Europe, this portrays Europe as the primary target of CIM, the primary recipient of the effects of this change (‘spillover’), and as the key protagonist in a ‘larger’ migration pattern. I argue that this reasoning constructs a hierarchy in which Sub-Saharan African migration is connected – via North African states’ mediating transition – to the geographical ‘endpoint’ of Europe. ‘Europe’ is cast as the pinnacle, North African states are ‘in transit’, and ‘Sub-Saharan African’ migrants are at the bottom of this order. In a 2012 report by the Center for American Progress and Heinrich Böll Foundation, part of a series of papers exploring the climate change, migration and security nexus in different regions of the world, Werz and Conley (2012: 2, original emphasis) locate an ‘arc of tension in Northwest Africa comprising Nigeria, Niger, Algeria and Morocco.’ The ‘arc of tension’ sits at the intersection of water stress, disruptive migrations, ‘climate conflicts’ and insecurities, and is represented in Figure 1:

**Figure 1:** The ‘arc of tension’ (Werz and Conley 2012: 3)

In this report and Figure 1, Werz and Conley construct a geopolitical imaginary in which Nigeria, Niger, Algeria and Morocco are analysed as a contiguous unit. They (p.18) write:

‘Ultimately, the combination of climate change, migration, and security will pressure these states from all sides. The northward
movement of migrants into the Maghreb, whether driven by conflict, climate, or other factors, will provoke increasing pressure from the European Union to control illegal border crossings into the continent. At the same time, Algeria and Morocco will confront internal pressure for reform in the face of the Arab Spring uprisings to their east. Whether and how they manage these competing tensions will have important ramifications for regional stability and thus for U.S. security interests more broadly.’

Werz and Conley (2012: 18) argue a climate change-migration-security nexus in Northwest Africa ‘will provoke increasing pressure from the European Union to control illegal border crossings into the continent’. Alongside the northward facing arrow in Figure 1 – its severity emphasized with the red colour – this suggests a EU endpoint to CIM and its effects on American security interests. The phrases ‘tension’, ‘instability’, ‘internal pressure’ and visual presence of the red arrow and red-filled countries (in Figure 3) adds to a geopolitical representation of dangerous, ungoverned spaces in the ‘Global South’ threatening the EU. Similarly to the NIC (2009a), Werz and Conley (2012) indicate stricter control over migration flows could be imposed as a consequence of threatening CIM. This implicates North African states and the EU in the possible construction of a cordon sanitaire (to use the NIC’s (2009a: 31) phrase) to restrict migration from Sub-Saharan Africa.

In this regard, the 2003 agreement between the Libyan and Italian interior ministries contributes towards an externalization of EU border controls (White 2011). With CIM, this manifests in several respects. First is the promotion by European states of a narrative of migration as maladaptation or as an undesirable adaptation strategy, reminiscent of the ‘sedentary bias’ thesis (Bakewell 2008). In a study of environmentally-induced migration as an adaptive approach in the Senegal River valley, Scheffran et al (2012: 122, original emphasis) contend: ‘European states have the tendency to use development strategies to achieve immigration control following the adaptation-to-prevent-migration path, which can sometimes lead to cooperation failures’. They cite the case of Mali. From the early 2000s, the Malian government sought to encourage participation of emigrants in development projects to build networks with the Malian diaspora. In a 2002 bilateral programme with France (Priority Solidarity Fund Co-development Mali), the Malian government started to fund
co-development projects (Scheffran et al 2012). This includes education projects in the region of Kayes along the Senegal River valley and, through investment of $7.8 million between 2000-2004, nearly every village in the region had a school by 2005. Electrification projects have also been carried out, part-funded by the French companies Total and EDF (Scheffran et al 2012). However, in 2009 France discontinued its support for the programme because the Malian government refused to sign an agreement enforcing repatriation of irregular Malian migrants from France.

However, several EU institutions have remained cautious about CIM from the MENA region. For example, in a 2013 paper produced by the European Commission to accompany the EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change, there is reticence about possibilities for mass, international migration to the EU. The Commission (2013) notes that migration is multi-causal and it is difficult to pinpoint the role of environmental factors in migratory decisions. Whilst ‘climate change is highly likely to impact on population movements’, interregional and international migration require substantial resources and the Commission (2013: 11) submit that ‘the impact of climate change on migration flows to the EU is unlikely to be substantial’. Similarly, in a ‘Futures of Borders: A Forward Study of European Border Checks’ report by FRONTEX’s Research and Development Unit (2011), FRONTEX construct scenarios of future migration patterns and implications for EU border management. Although some “environmental refugees” may arrive to the EU and climate change is expected to cause displacements globally, this is not articulated in terms of mass, disruptive migrations to the EU. Thus, although direct evidence is sparse for mass migrations to the EU and enforcement of a ‘sedentarist’, anti-migration narrative of CIM from Sub-Saharan Africa, the study of Scheffran et al (2012) study demonstrates such instances exist.

White (2011: 74) writes that ‘transit states began to amp up the idea of climate refugees as a threat in the late ‘00s ... CIM may be an emergent trump card that builds on the already powerful immigration card ... CIM has been stirred into broader security imperatives designed to thwart irregular migration and cast as a new, deeper threat.’ White (2011) reveals how CIM started to be publicly enunciated as a security issue in 2009. In September 2009, Morocco hosted the meeting of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and King Mohammed VI gave a speech directly
referencing CIM and its implications for food security, desertification and sea-level rise. He also affirmed the importance of Morocco between North and South in these debates (White 2011). On December 8th, 2009, Moroccan Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi read one of Mohammed VI’s speeches at the second EU Africa Summit in Lisbon that cites environmental factors as causal contributors in migration (White 2011). Although nascent in foreign policy discourses, these speeches indicate an involvement of North African governments – specifically Morocco – in CIM politics.

The NIC report (2009a, excerpts on p.119-20 of this thesis) also perpetuates naturalized assumptions about Muslim populations and terrorism. Europe’s ‘Muslim’ population is again associated with ‘the threat of Islamic extremism’ (p.29-30). Talking about leverage North African states can exploit to garner ‘Western aid’, the authors coin the label “climate change card” and compare it to the “terrorism card” (p.34) (language also used by White (2011: 74)). By claiming a “terrorism card” is something that North African states are able to play, this suggests it is a part of their ‘deck’ or ‘hand’ so to speak. The repeated use of modal verbs, e.g. ‘might’ or ‘could become’ (p.34), constructs a relationship between the capacities a naturalized ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other is assumed to embody, and the possibilities this suggests for what might happen in climate-insecure futures. As such, the racial logic combines naturalized assumptions about ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations (a vulnerability towards or capacity for extremism, terrorism or radicalization), and directs this towards possible outcomes (containment policies or human rights abuses from North African states) in climate-insecure futures. Coupling of racialized characteristics (a latent tendency towards violence and inherent cultural incompatibility) continues in a 2010 report by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Founded in 1972 by a financial donation from the West German government, the organization seeks to embody ‘the spirit of the Marshall Plan’ and promote transatlantic cooperation (German Marshall Fund 2015). As part of a series about climate change-security linkages, Joshua W. Busby, Associate Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs and Distinguished Scholar at the Strauss Center of the University of Texas (Austin), and author of a number of important studies on climate security, headed a report entitled Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa. At the beginning, Busby et al (2010: 1) note:
‘The brittleness and weakness of regimes in the region and the wider continent, coupled with the low level of human and economic development, enhance Africa’s vulnerability to a variety of ills, including climate change but also terrorism, armed conflict, and piracy. For Europe and the United States, two problems – migration and terrorism – are particularly salient and potentially combustible, given the intersection with broader cultural and political currents in Europe about immigrants and Islam and concerns about ungoverned spaces and the rise of terrorism.’

This excerpt makes a clear connection between ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islam and concerns about ungoverned spaces and the rise of terrorism’. Referring to broader ‘cultural currents’ in Europe, Busby et al (2010) construct dichotomies between cultural groups; on p.5, they write: ‘For Europe, emigration from North Africa, particularly given some of the emergent cultural and political fault-lines, is a specific concern.’ Given the relation between ‘cultural’ and ‘Islam’ in the first quotation, this suggests that the ‘cultural fault-lines’ are between ‘Islam’ and ‘non-Muslim European’ populations. The phrase ‘fault-line’ designates an essentialized division between these groups. It also connotes vulnerability within this division, as if it were prone to faults, tensions and struggles. It could be that the text therefore reproduces – at the scale of underlying assumptions – naturalizing associations between ‘Muslim’ populations and terrorism, and of cultural tensions or ‘fault-lines’ between European populations and those that are ‘culturally’ different.

The repeated co-occurrence of inherent cultural incompatibility and a latent vulnerability towards or capacity for radicalized violence with ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations (in particular moments of US and EU climate security discourses) naturalizes these traits to those populations. Naturalized assumptions associate violence and incompatibility with what ‘Muslim’ populations represent and how they act. Combined with projected climate impacts, e.g. declined food production, this delimits future possibilities in conditions of climate insecurity. Naturalizing racial logics associate ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations with a capacity for terrorism or inherent cultural incompatibility, but also orient this towards how they could, might, may or would react in possible climate-insecure futures. Racial logics function also as a form of
valuation of unequally valued lives in US climate security discourses. As such, biopolitics are not only about technologies of security to regulate population movements – through the construction of a *cordon sanitaire* in climate-insecure futures, for instance – but about how this inscribes racial inequalities. Biopolitical security is about *how* populations and contingent flows and circulations of possible climate-induced migrants are secured in aleatory, uncertain futures, but this thesis also explores *unequal valuations* of lives in biopolitical power relations. Following Fassin (2009: 48-9), biopolitics are also ‘bio-inequalities’, about the inequalities governing which lives may live, how they live, and which are subjugated or left to die. Grounded in ‘bio-legitimacy’, about the ‘right to life’ or ‘power of life’ in its own terms (Fassin 2009: 50), Fassin (2009: 52) moves from ‘the ‘rules of the game’ to its stakes’. Racial logics suggest multiple biopolitics of US and EU climate-induced migration discourses, the management of population flows and biopolitical policies of containment, are inscribed with racial inequalities, the ‘political content’ or ‘stakes’ in Fassin’s (2009) terms.

Therefore, in particular, context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourses, a biopolitics of unequally valued lives is inscribed by racial logics. In suggesting ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations are characterized by a latent tendency towards terrorism or inherent cultural incompatibility with European societies, this casts them as fundamentally different to and endowed with negative characteristics not shared by ‘non-Muslim’ European populations. Unequal biopolitics also suggest that the ways in which racial logics value lives unevenly could produce exclusionary outcomes for ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations. It leads to possibilities of stricter border controls and exclusions of climate-induced migrants, of a *cordon sanitaire* erected to prevent the access and circulation of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations in European spaces, and differential outcomes from ‘sedentarist’ development policies designed to deter migration. In all of these respects, not only do debates on CIM suggest multiple biopolitics of US climate security discourse, but also *unequal* biopolitics inscribed by racial logics and possible exclusionary responses. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 explore these inequalities with the tropes of ‘dehumanization’ and ‘determinism’.
4.4 Dehumanization

Goff et al (2008) argue dehumanization is central to European and North American racisms. They (2008: 293) state: ‘dehumanization is viewed as a central component to intergroup violence because it is frequently the most important precursor to moral exclusion … Groups that are morally excluded do not count in a moral sense.’ Dalsklev and Kunst (2015: 29-30) contend dehumanization can take various forms in which groups are denied human characteristics, aspects of a human “essence.” Human ‘essence’ involves a capacity for language, cognition, complex emotions and politeness (Dalsklev and Kunst 2015). This chapter does not adhere to an essentialist reading of dehumanization predicated on an *a priori* ‘essence’, but refers to dehumanizing strategies as those which deny or negate important facets of ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations’ and migrants’ agency or cultural identity. This includes markers through which cultural identities are articulated, or representations that diminish their agency as responders to climate impacts. I argue a politics of naming is central to dehumanization in CIM narratives. Focusing on the labels ‘terrorist’, ‘bandit’ and ‘rebel’, Bhatia (2005: 6-7) posits that ‘the politics of naming is about … examining how names are made, assigned and disputed, and how this contest is affected by a series of global dynamics and events.’ Naming is an exercise of power and continent assignations about what can be known about a subject, place or group (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005). In the cases discussed so far, the words ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ are linked to terrorism, cultural incompatibility and status as a ‘concern’, ‘problem’ or ‘threat’. This is most apparent in *The Age of Consequences* (Campbell et al 2007: 59-60), where the words ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ are mentioned 7 times. I argue repeated associations of Muslim populations with these issues contribute towards naturalization of a ‘Muslim’ Other. It is arguably just as important to interrogate the politics of refusing to name. For example, in the 2007 publication *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change* by the Center for Naval Analyses Military Advisory Board, the authors (2007: 18) write:

‘A third form of international migration involves not only crossing international borders but moving across vast regions while doing so. Since the 1960s, Europe has witnessed this kind of “South to North” migration, with an influx of immigrants from Africa and
Asia. The shift in demographics has created racial and religious tensions in many European countries, as evidenced by the 2005 civil unrest in France.’

This excerpt describes many of the issues in earlier examples – demographic change and international migration to Europe – but uses the terms ‘racial’ and ‘religious’ without referring to Muslims specifically. In another case from the 2010 German Marshall Fund report, Busby et al (2010: 6-7) chart the risks of migration:

‘In the European context, whether or not migration will lead to violent conflict in the short run may be less important than the political ramifications of migrants coming from particular parts of the world. Not only are anti-immigrant parties gaining more of a political footing in Europe, the potential radicalization of diaspora populations from North Africa and other parts of the world have troubled European policymakers in countries where immigrant populations have been implicated in terrorist activity.’

‘Violent conflict’, ‘radicalization’ and ‘terrorist activity’ are all stated, but not associated with ‘Muslim’ populations explicitly. Instead, the closest the authors come to geographical or cultural specificity is ‘North Africa’. Migration from ‘particular parts of the world’ is cited alongside ‘diaspora populations’ and ‘immigrant populations’. It could be that, given Busby et al (2010) refer specifically to ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ populations elsewhere in the report (p.1 and p.7 respectively), the authors expect the audience to know that these terms refer to ‘Muslim’, ‘African’ or ‘Asian’ migrants. In this scenario, the inferential reasoning deployed, that when we refer to ‘immigrant’ or ‘diaspora’ populations in association with radicalization and terrorism, you will be able to guess that we’re referencing ‘Muslims’ or ‘Africans’, relies upon a naturalized interpretation of a ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ Other without having to name that Other as ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’. Importantly, this is only one interpretation of how the excerpt could be read, but again associates categories found in other US climate security documents, of immigrant and migrant populations, with possibilities for political instability or radicalization. Significantly, as Busby et al (2010) clarify (p.7), this does not mean they are actively promoting an association of ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations with radicalization, and they note that despite rhetoric, most Africans do not migrate to Europe and most migration to European countries is not from Africa.
Thus, although there are underlying associations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations with possibilities for radicalization in context-specific moments of texts, this does not mean that authors accept, promote or endorse such associations. Instead, it highlights a politics of naming in which authors attempt to avoid a naturalization of ‘Muslim’ populations by refusing to name these populations as ‘Muslim’.

Geopolitical metaphors are also employed to describe climate insecurities. In the NIC (2009a) report, the terms ‘flows’ and ‘spillover’ (p.34 and 28) are used to describe climate-induced migration. Through a diminution of climate impacts, including CIM, to the status of US security interests, national security threats and the interests of receiving nation-states, I argue that this could dehumanize climate-induced migrants by denying them agency. In this sense, dehumanizing narratives are similar to what Goldberg (2015: 48-9) terms ‘thingification’, a form of dehumanization in which human beings are reduced to the status of useable or discardable ‘things’: they are rendered ‘objects of pure control rather than the interlocutors of (sometimes contentious) relation.’ It could be that possible climate-induced migrants’ agency as adapters to climate change is negated if they are conceived as ‘interests’ of receiving states.

Although I argue geopolitical metaphors reduce the agency of climate-induced migrants (through a consideration of migration and migrants’ possible actions (e.g. radicalization) as a security threat to the US, rather than what migrants think and do in their own terms), in another sense geopolitical narratives do afford agency to actors deemed threatening to national security. The following excerpt, not from a climate security publication but also from the Department of Defence in the 2007-10 period, illustrates this point. It originates in the Joint Operating Environment (JOE), a strategy that forecasts the future security environment and military requirements (US Joint Forces Command 2008). Issued every 2 years, in the 2008 JOE the US Joint Forces Command notes (p.5):

‘In coming decades, Americans must struggle to resist judging the world as if it operated along the same principles and values that drive our own country. In many parts of the world, there are no rational actors, at least in our terms. Against actors capable of mobilizing large numbers of young men and women to slaughter civilian populations with machetes or to act as suicide bombers in open markets; enemies willing to die, for radical ideological,
religious, or ethnic fervour; enemies who ignore rational borders and remain unbounded by the conventions of the developed world; there is little room for negotiations or compromise.’

Here, explicit divisions are drawn between the US and ‘many parts of the world’ where actors are assumed to generate violence. This is demonstrated by the pronoun ‘our’ drawing a clear distinction between the supposedly rational United States and irrational, ideological and violent actors in ‘other’ parts of the world. The assumption that ‘in many parts of the world, there are no rational actors’ (US Joint Forces Command 2008: 5) casts some human subjects as ‘rational’ and others as ‘irrational’. Dehumanization functions here through denial of some human subjects’ capacity for rational thought. This section has argued that, alongside the role of essentializing logics racializing a ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ Other according to naturalized markers, it is also important to consider that which, despite its possible contribution to naturalization of populations, is not included or named. Dehumanization does not reinforce an essential ‘humanness’ from which traits are ‘missing’ or ‘lost’, but suggests that discursive constructions of what populations ‘lack’ or are not ‘identified with’ is an important strategy through which naturalization functions in moments of US climate security discourse. Biopolitics of unequally valued lives do not only depend on essentializing, racial logics affirming how ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations could react in climate-insecure futures, but also on how their agency and identity is negated or refused in these futures. Thus, racial logics are not only about what ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations are or represent, but about the discursive politics of naming them as ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’, and how what they lack or do not have could influence their actions in climate-insecure futures. Section 4.5 explores a deterministic trend in particular, context-specific moments of US climate security discourse.

4.5 Determinism

As a particular form of argument in essentializing logics, I argue determinism reflects not a series of naturalized traits inflecting ‘African’ populations’ actions in conditions of climate insecurity, but rather a compulsion which grounds migration or acts of violence in a probability of high likelihood or certainty. In conditions of resource scarcity,
instead of adopting a wide range of adaptive strategies, e.g. cooperative resource allocations, education or livelihood diversification, ‘African’ populations will or are likely to be compelled towards acts of violence, conflict, or disruptive mass migrations. Determinism means that ‘African’ populations will or are likely to engage in violence and migrate, not that they might, could, or may act in these ways. It relies on a notion of compulsion: that ‘African’ populations are compelled towards violence and mass migrations under climate-insecure conditions. By implication, a compulsive determinism draws on assumptions about the direct influences of climate factors on adaptive choices, and is grounded in neo-Malthusian narratives about resource scarcities, population growth, poverty, competition, disruptive migrations and violence (Hartmann 2010).

Verhoeven (2014) traces neo-Malthusian narratives about African populations to 19th century European imperialism and argues they are based on four suppositions. First is that African environments are overwhelmingly significant in defining human behaviour, acquiring an almost moral status. One example is the ‘Garden of Eden’ metaphor: landscapes at risk from population growth and agricultural disruptions; another is the ‘Heart of Darkness’ metaphor, of environments difficult to penetrate and threatening to European colonizers (Verhoeven 2014). Second, African populations are conceived of as poor stewards of these environments, resulting in mismanagement. Third is that this mismanagement produces infighting for resources. Finally, the environment is viewed as an a-political causal entity, evacuating these discourses from analysis of their appropriation by political elites (Verhoeven 2014).

Hartmann (2006) traces deterministic discourses’ infusion with Malthus’ (1798) argument that geometric population growth – for which he blamed poor peoples’ excessive fertility – would outstrip arithmetic agricultural development from the 1960s and their adoption by population NGOs to promote reproductive health programmes. She (2010a and b) asserts that environmental degradation has supplemented demographic change in the neo-Malthusian narrative, with water and food scarcities contributing to resource competition, disputes, and the categories of ‘climate conflicts’ and ‘refugees’.
But, as Brown et al (2007: 1148-9, original emphasis) caution: ‘The potential impacts of climate change for Africa do indeed hold the potential for food and water supplies to become more unreliable ... livelihoods may be undermined, key resources may become scarcer, and an overall decline in the quality of life may result ... we should be extremely cautious before assuming a straight-line progression from scarcity to conflict will ensue across Africa.’ They underline a range of adaptive strategies to climate insecurities. This is not to deny there are possible links between climate change and conflict, but these should not be reduced to an automatic, compulsive tendency towards violent outcomes. However, although Brown et al (2007) frame the argument in a way as to avoid a deterministic compulsion, Verhoeven (2014) argues a deterministic trend contributes partially to climate conflict debates. This analysis argues that deterministic interpretations of essentializing logics are multi-scalar, framed at the levels of individual behavioural choices (compulsions) and larger geopolitical, regional units in context-specific moments of US climate security discourse. To start, I refer to Robert Kaplan’s highly influential article The Coming Anarchy (published in The Atlantic (1994)), an examination of post-Cold War geopolitics and the importance of environmental issues and resource scarcities to future international relations. Kaplan (1994) writes:

‘It is time to understand The Environment for what it is: the national-security issue of the twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh – developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts – will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War.’

Reflecting on the implications of these environmental changes for social inequalities, Kaplan contends that:

‘We are entering a bifurcated world. Part of the world is inhabited by Hegel’s and Fukuyama’s Last Man, healthy, well fed, and pampered by technology. The other, larger part, is inhabited by Hobbes’s First Man, condemned to a life that is “poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.” Although both parts will be threatened by environmental stress, the Last Man will be able to master it; the First Man will not.

The Last Man will adjust to the loss of underground water tables in the western United States. He will build dikes to save Cape Hatteras and the Chesapeake beaches from rising sea levels, even as the Maldive Islands, off the coast of India, sink into oblivion, and the shorelines of Egypt, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia recede, driving tens of millions of people inland where there is no room for them, and thus sharpening ethnic divisions.’

In the first excerpt, Kaplan (1994) asserts that environmental issues are important ‘national-security issues’ for the ‘twenty-first century’. Subsequently, he lists a range of environmental concerns, for example ‘air pollution’, ‘social erosion’ and ‘rising sea levels’ in regions such as ‘the Niger Delta and Bangladesh’, and notes that these ‘will’ ‘prompt mass migrations’ and ‘incite group conflicts’. As opposed to modal verbs operant under a racial logic that functions to demarcate future possibilities (e.g. ‘would’ or ‘could’), the verb ‘will’ reduces future outcomes to a condition of near certainty. As such, it could be that this relation – at a generalised geopolitical scale of ‘mass migrations’ – is one that compels: Kaplan’s remarks suggest a deterministic relation of what will happen in possible climate-insecure futures. In the second and third segments, Kaplan (1994) argues that ‘we are entering a bifurcated world’ and differentiates between the ‘Last Man’ (derived from Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’ thesis) able to survive in this world (‘healthy, well fed and pampered’), and the ‘First Man’ condemned to a life of Hobbesian cruelty. A range of adaptive strategies are possible for the ‘Last Man’ – including building ‘dikes’ and ‘adjusting’ to ‘the loss of underground water tables’. However, for those resident next to receding shorelines in ‘Egypt, Bangladesh and Southeast Asia’, rising sea levels will drive ‘tens of millions of people inland where there is no room for them, and thus sharpening ethnic divisions’.

In both of these excerpts, and in particular for ‘First Man’, I argue that Kaplan (1994) constructs a deterministic logic of what is happening or will happen in climate-insecure futures, one which forecloses alternative adaptive strategies (and strictly delimits future possibilities) for ‘First Man’ populations.
Interestingly, through his use of the terms ‘First Man’ and ‘Last Man’ to highlight global inequalities, it could be that Kaplan also touches on other multi-scalar differences. On the one hand, the metaphorical constructions of ‘First Man’ and ‘Last Man’ refer to abstracted populations; on the other, the reference to ‘Man’ could locate these changes at the scale of individual human beings and communities. However, I argue that Kaplan’s classification also masks other inequalities. His adoption of the term ‘Man’ assumes a gendered representation of human populations more broadly. Furthermore, differences between ‘First Man’, condemned to a ‘short’ and ‘nasty’ Hobbesian existence, and ‘Last Man’, ‘healthy’ and ‘well fed’, construct a teleology in which ‘Man’ progresses from this ‘First’ stage to the ‘Last’ stage, analogous in Kaplan’s (1994) metaphor to Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’ thesis. I argue that this teleology resonates with Goldberg’s (2002) distinction between ‘racial historicism’ and ‘racial naturalism’. Racial naturalism assumes that human populations are inherently different (grounded in racial hierarchies of superior and inferior ‘races’) and leans towards segregationist actions to maintain a separation between racialized groups. Racial historicists postulate that some populations are more ‘civilized’ and ‘moral’ than others and posit a process of ‘development’, ‘assimilation’ or ‘integration’ to enable greater homogeneity between these populations (Goldberg 2002). It could be that Kaplan’s distinction between ‘First Man’ and ‘Last Man’ follows a racial historicist teleology in which ‘First Man’ occupies a less developed, more precarious position and ‘Last Man’ is at a higher stage of this development pathway. If this is transposed to the context of possible climate-insecure futures, Kaplan’s (1994) hypothesis suggests differing degrees of agency and determinism. Thus, although ‘both parts’ – ‘First’ and ‘Last Man’ – will be affected by environmental stress, it is only ‘Last Man’ that will be able to ‘master it’. A range of adaptive strategies (and thus a broader range of possible outcomes in climate-insecure futures) is available to ‘Last Man’, whereas ‘First Man’ ‘will not’ be able to master environmental stresses (a compulsive determinism).

With specific reference to ‘African’ populations, the CNA’s Military Advisory Board (in the seminal report National Security and the Impacts of Climate Change (2007: 22)), write:

‘As climate changes and agricultural patterns are disrupted, the geopolitics of the future will increasingly be the politics of scarcity.'
Potential rainfall decreases in North Africa would likely exacerbate the problem of migration to Europe. Reduced rainfall and increasing desertification of the Sub-Saharan region will also likely result in migrations to Europe, as well as migrations within the African continent.

Here, claims are asserted with high probability to near certainty. This includes the claim that the geopolitics of the future ‘will increasingly be the politics of scarcity’. The verb ‘will’ asserts certainty about future geopolitics. The phrases ‘would likely’ and ‘will likely’ referring to migration to Europe also impose migration as a likely outcome. Migration as a ‘problem’ repeats a key critique in Bakewell’s (2008) ‘sedentary bias’ hypothesis: that migration requires a solution and is better if prevented. In debates about determinism and ‘climate conflicts’, the Darfur Genocide represents a central case. In a post-conflict environmental assessment, UNEP (2007) conclude: ‘Environmental degradation, as well as regional climate instability and change, are major underlying causes of good insecurity and conflict in Darfur – and potential catalysts for future conflict through central and eastern Sudan and other countries in the Sahel belt’. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (Washington Post, June 16th, 2007) wrote an op-ed claiming that ‘amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change.’

Hartmann (2010) and Verhoeven (2011) contest these evidential claims, citing economic and political inequalities between Khartoum and rural populations as contributory causes (Hartmann 2010). When the insurgency broke out in 2003, it involved proxy militias with government forces in supporting roles, transfer of exploitative assets to government-backed militias (e.g. land and coffee), and impunity towards livelihood destruction for opposing Darfurians (Verhoeven 2011). Thus, the Darfur Conflict represents an important, contested historical moment in debates about ‘climate conflict’. However, post 2007, (my interpretations of) deterministic statements diminish significantly in the CDA sample. Alongside the empirical data used for the naturalization and dehumanization tropes (2007-10), this coincides with a decline of climate security discourse from national security actors. As Diez et al (2016: 47) write: ‘After several political setbacks at the international and domestic level [for example the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen COP] … from 2010 on the climate security
argument gradually faded away and funding for climate security reports decreased’. However, in 2014, with the release of the IPCC chapter on human security in its *Fifth Assessment* (Adger *et al.* 2014) and the *National Climate Assessment* (the signature scientific statement for climate change impacts in the US (US Global Change Research Program 2014)), a number of climate security reports emerged. With a 2014 reassessment of accelerating national security risks of climate change, the Center for Naval Analyses’ Military Advisory Board state (p.2):

‘In many areas, the projected impacts of climate change will be more than threat multipliers; they will serve as catalysts for instability and conflict. In Asia, Africa and the Middle East, we are already seeing how the impacts of extreme weather, such as prolonged drought and flooding – and resulting food shortages, desertification, population dislocation and mass migration, and sea level rise – are posing security challenges to these regions’ governments. We see these trends growing and accelerating.’

The MAB no longer use the term ‘threat multiplier’ (CNA 2007), which suggests a range of factors climate changes might exacerbate, and declare climate change is a ‘catalyst for instability and conflict’. By the 2014 report, ‘we are already seeing’ these impacts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, including ‘population displacement and mass migration’. This corresponds with Dalby’s (2016) analysis that the primary difference between the 2007 and 2014 reports is that, whereas the 2007 publication highlights future possibilities, this report locates them in the present. Barack Obama echoes a near certainty about climate insecurities in his West Point speech (28th May, 2014), an important symbolic address delivered to graduates of the West Point Military Academy. Discussing the collective spirit of US Armed Forces and the need to mobilize for 2015’s Paris COP Summit, Obama remarks:

‘That spirit of cooperation needs to energize the global effort to combat climate change – a creeping national security crisis that will shape your time in uniform, as we are called upon to respond to refugee flows and natural disasters and conflicts over water and food, which is why next year I intend to make sure America is out front in putting together a global framework to preserve our planet.’
Additionally, in the Department of Defence’s 2014 Climate Adaptation Roadmap, an adaptation strategy published in October 2013, the DOD asserts in the Foreword that:

‘Among the future trends that will impact our national security is climate change. Rising global temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, climbing sea levels, and more extreme weather events will intensify the challenges of global instability, hunger, poverty, and conflict. They will likely lead to food and water shortages, pandemic disease, disputes over refugees and resources, and destruction by natural disasters in regions across the globe’

In both of these sources climate change is asserted as a problem that ‘will’ lead to conflicts. The use of a war metaphor (the need to ‘combat’ climate change) confirms the urgency of Barack Obama’s rhetoric. The collective pronouns (‘we’) and reference to ‘America’ as a single actor foster an image of American unity. Furthermore, he asserts (without empirical qualification) that climate change will affect the military personnel’s careers as they ‘are’ called upon to respond to ‘refugee flows’ and ‘conflicts over water and food’. In the DOD’s climate adaptation strategy, the authors argue that ‘rising global temperatures’ and other climate effects ‘will intensify … global instability, hunger, poverty, and conflict.’ Whilst Obama treats these impacts as given, the DOD clarifies this with the unambiguous terminology ‘will intensify’. The language is less acute, but the authors maintain that these impacts ‘will likely’ lead to ‘disputes over refugees’. In both excerpts, about migration and conflict more generally, I argue a deterministic trend of compelled violence and migration is present.

Deterministic compulsion narratives imply unequal power relations. As Meierding (2016) notes, neo-Malthusian, deterministic accounts of ‘climate conflict’ could localize blame for climate insecurities (conflicts and disruptive mass migrations) onto ‘African’ populations and away from the climate injustices of industrialized, ‘Western’ elites. Additionally, they can reduce the culpability of local elites in the propagation of violence and human rights abuses (Hartmann 2010). Finally, deterministic narratives also reduce the immense complexity of these issues. While there may be connections between climate change, socioeconomic dynamics and conflict, a deterministic logic stipulating that populations – especially ‘African’ – ‘will’ or ‘are likely turn to’ violence and mass migration rather than less costly and painful adaptive strategies does not
help study of these analytical complexities. Importantly, whilst it is by no means similar to a racial logic that naturalizes traits to ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations, deterministic compulsion in moments of US climate security discourse continues to contribute towards biopolitics of unequally valued lives. Determinism implicates a dislocation of responsibilities for climate insecurities away from elite, wealthy actors in ‘Western’ states and onto populations in ‘African’ countries. Populations are valued or devalued on the basis of their responsibility for possible conflict or disruptive migrations.

Compulsive determinism does not racialize as naturalization tropes do, but is related to underlying assumptions – a key dimension of essentializing logics – that are racial. Part of deterministic narratives’ propagation ‘lies in the ways they draw on deep-seated fears and stereotypes of the dark-skinned, over-breeding, dangerous poor’ (Hartmann 2010: 239-40). As Bettini (2015) describes, environmental discourse ‘has always been haunted by a fear of dangerous, unruly populations in the “global South” – a spectre that arguably still lingers in climate politics. This leads to apocalyptic talk, usually with a strong racial undercurrent, of hordes of refugees threatening “our” security.’ In line with Hartmann (2010) and Bettini’s (2015) conclusions, I argue that compulsion narratives do not racialize according to explicit traits naturalized to different populations, but rather at the scale of underlying assumptions and indications about which populations will or are likely to resort to violence. Deterministic, compulsion narratives are only a small, specific dimension of moments of US climate security discourse, but function as a modification to essentializing, racial logics (and the openness of the possibilities they suggest) in these specific moments. Thus, although they do not racialize in the same way as naturalization, deterministic narratives are nonetheless interwoven with underlying, assumed racial logics and contribute towards biopolitics of unequally valued lives in US climate security discourse.

Importantly, although essentializing logics are implicated in constructions of racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Others in moments of US (and EU) climate security discourses (and the circumscribed futures these logics suggest), this does not exhaust possibilities for alternative Muslim or African voices in American climate change debates. Crucially,
I do not argue that this discussion constitutes a ‘subaltern politics’ or representations of ‘subaltern voices’. Spivak (2005: 475) defines ‘subaltern’ as ‘to be removed from all lines of social mobility’. She (2005: 476) clarifies: ‘Subalternity is where lines of social mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the basis of a recognizable basis of action … No one can say ‘I am a subaltern’ in whatever language. And subaltern studies will not reduce itself to the historical recounting of the details of the practice of disenfranchised groups and remain a study of the subaltern.’ Chakrabarty (1998) argues that ‘subaltern pasts’ resist attempts to incorporate marginalized groups into a mainstream narrative or discourse of history (e.g. ‘the nation’). This account does not seek to study ‘the subaltern’ or speculate on ‘subalternity’ in particular, but rather presents alternative Muslim and African voices in American climate change debates. As the example – of ‘Green Muslims’ – maintains identification as ‘Muslim’, it does not rest outside of identity or ‘a recognizable basis for action’ (Spivak 2005: 476). Instead, it could be an instance of Spivak’s (2012 (1987): 205, original emphasis) notion of ‘strategic essentialism’: a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest. To present an alternative reading of ‘Muslim’ subjects in American climate change politics is not to present a fixed, homogenized category of ‘Muslim’, but rather to locate strategic essentializations of ‘Muslim’ identities that challenge dominant US climate change discourses. This strategy is not in opposition to the anti-essentialism that underpins the thesis’ theoretical framework, influenced by Said’s (1994) conceptualization, and recognizes that contingent, porous subjectifications and collective identifications can manifest in different contexts. ‘Strategic essentialisms’ also recognize the ‘constitutive paradox’ of antihumanist, poststructuralist thought: ‘that the essentializing moment, the object of their criticism, is irreducible’ (Spivak 2012 (1987): 205). As such, whilst this project does adopt an anti-essentialist framework, this does not negate possibilities for strategic essentializations – the example of ‘Green Muslims’ – in order to present alternative voices to predominant US climate change debates.

Green Muslims is an environmental organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. It was founded in 2007 by a small group of Muslims hosting a ‘zero-trash’ iftar (a meal held after sunset during Ramadan). This group aimed to ‘raise awareness of global environmental issues within a Muslim community while hoping to create a language of
Muslim-based environmentalism that would precipitate across communities’ (Green Muslims 2016a). Thus, from its inception Green Muslims has not only sought to raise awareness of environmental issues within specific Muslim communities, but is multi-scalar and aims to promote a broader ‘language of Muslim-based environmentalism’. Green Muslims’ vision is ‘to be a source in the Muslim community for spiritually-inspired environmental education, reflection, and action. We aim to serve locally while serving as a national resource’ (Green Muslims 2016a). Green Muslims’ mission is of ‘Muslims living in the environmental spirit of Islam’ (Green Muslims 2016a). The organization is involved in a range of different activities. These include building tools to share knowledge and practical suggestions in relation to environmental issues, a ‘Green Scripture’ initiative focused on interpretations of religious texts, leadership and capacity-building tools (for example consultations with schools and mosques), and community action programmes (e.g. park cleaning projects) (Green Muslims 2016b).

As an organization, Green Muslims embodies a multi-scalar approach, involved in local projects but also identified as a ‘national resource’. It thus speaks not only to projects led and initiated by Muslim actors (not reduced or dehumanized to the status of a racial Other), but also distinctly Muslim-American identities and practices of climate action and environmental values. Significantly, this is not to argue that ‘Green Muslims’ is not without imbrication in networks of unequal power relations (it remains centred in Washington, D.C., for instance). Or, that there are many other forms of community solidarities promoting climate action independently of a national security frame. Green Muslims represents but one example of the multifarious, dynamic voices contesting discourses and meanings of climate politics in the US.

In this chapter, I have argued that essentializing, racial logics delimit discursively future possibilities for climate-induced migration. Racialized identities function to demarcate the specific ways in which lives are valued in migration from the MENA region to the European Union. I have argued that biopolitics are not only about the rationalities and technologies of the government of populations, but also that bio-inequalities function through a lens of population (e.g. migration policy) and subjectification and Othering practices (partially) define these processes. For Fassin (2009: 57), biopolitical management of populations is about ‘the concrete way in which individuals and groups are treated, under which principles and in the name of which morals, implying
which inequalities and misrecognitions. Through representations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations as racially Other and tropes of dehumanization and determinism, biopolitics of unequally valued lives are constructed in context-specific moments of US climate security discourse. Importantly, with the brief example of ‘Green Muslims’, the chapter has argued that essentializing national security interpretations are not the only means (in fact, only one among many) through which climate change action can be discursively constructed in an American context. Chapter 5 analyses these relations with an examination of how terrorism and climate change interconnections are discursively constructed in climate security and intersections of racial and national identities in these constructions.
Chapter 5:

Representations of terrorism in US and EU climate security discourses

5.1 Introduction and research questions

1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security discourse?

This chapter explores constructions of terrorism in US and EU climate security discourse. The chapter first contextualizes ‘terrorism’ in climate security, before discussing how essentializing logics orient intersectional – racialized, nationalized and gendered – identities to climate-insecure futures. I outline academic debates on ‘terrorism’ and ‘radicalization’ and their conceptualization in relation to environmental security (Section 5.2). Whilst there are accounts of climate change and terrorism interconnections (e.g. Renard 2008), there are few examinations of discourses of terrorism in climate security. In accordance with other empirical chapters, I build on a CDA (using Fairclough’s (2003) guidance) to elucidate findings. In doing so, the chapter explores intersections of racial and national identities and bridges chapters 4 (racial logics and CIM) and 5 (American nationhood). Section 5.3 sets out the historical context of climate change and terrorism interconnections and their binary construction. I then discuss how narratives of complexity (Section 5.4) and biological tropes (dehumanizing fertility and immunology metaphors) (Section 5.5) are employed in context-specific moments of climate security and constructions of intersectional racialized and gendered identities (Section 5.6). Finally, the chapter touches on interrelations of anti-Americanism with racial logics in climate security discourse,
focusing on the US government’s intervention in Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Section 5.7).

5.2 ‘Terrorism’ and ‘radicalization’ – where do they sit in climate security?

Sedgwick (2010) notes that, whilst ‘radicalization’ was used by academics prior to 2001, its greatest increase in usage by the press was from 2005-2007 with terrorist attacks in Western Europe (e.g. the 7th July bombings in London (2005)) and counter-radicalization strategies by European governments. Radicalization’s meaning is highly contested; Sedgwick (2010) contends it can be conceptualized as absolute and relative. A relative understanding posits a continuum between those deemed ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ and denotes movement along this continuum, raising the political question of decisions about what constitutes the continuum and concomitant definitions of ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ (Sedgwick 2010). ‘Absolute’ conceptions assume self-evident divisions between ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ and radicalization becomes a zero-sum game governed by essentialized, ‘with-us-or-against-us’ imaginative geographies. Richards (2015), writing about the UK’s CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, argues these terms are complicated by the concept of ‘extremism’; here, the tools employed in political violence are not emphasized, only the ideological underpinnings to these actions. This risks alienating individuals that condemn terror tactics but sympathize with their underpinning ideas. Richards (2015) critiques the tendency of ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalization’ to direct too much attention at individual agency and actions (how a person is ‘radicalized’, how they commit ‘terrorist attacks’, ‘lone wolf’ attackers, an individual’s ‘de-radicalization’, etc.), at the expense of the underlying socioeconomic and political dynamics behind radicalization.

‘Terrorism’ is a similarly problematic concept. Chalecki (2001: 3) introduces the US government’s definition (from Title 22, Section 2656 of the U.S. Code): ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.’ She (2001) argues acts of terrorism have four primary characteristics: motivation (ideologies and motives), means (technologies and methods used to execute political violence), target (targets of the attack), and enemy (the perceived enemy violence is
directed against). However, Coleman (2003) argues that by naming an action as ‘terrorism’ or identifying ‘terrorists’, this immediately demarcates an imaginative geography around the ‘we’ targeted and in need of protection. The figure of the terrorist is constructed as ideologically extreme and divorced from the mainstream, deviant and secretive, and prone to violence (Puar and Rai 2002). Heath-Kelly (2010) critiques terrorism studies from a number of fronts. First is its overreliance on secondary information and lack of empirical case studies (Heath-Kelly 2010). Second is state-centrism: a critique of terrorism studies’ attribution of political violence solely to non-state actors and closeness to state funding/influence. Finally, terrorism studies has been critiqued for a positivist ethos and lack of accountability for the unequal power-knowledge relations in its constitution (Heath-Kelly 2010). Instead of prescribing particular definitions of ‘terrorism’ or ‘radicalization’ in this chapter, I instead focus on how these concepts are discursively rendered in climate security and their imbrication in essentializing logics.

A strong critique relates to the securitization of Muslim communities in counterterrorism strategies (Kundnani 2009). For example, Heath-Kelly (2013) uses the idea of a ‘counterfactual’ (describing what might have happened should certain events/interventions not have occurred) to demonstrate how radicalization is adopted as a type of risk knowledge to render future terrorism governable. She (2013) describes how the UK PREVENT counter-radicalization strategy (introduced in 2009 to direct funds to local authorities with a Muslim population of 5% or higher for recreational activities, education programmes, and arts/creative initiatives) renders Muslim communities as simultaneously ‘risky’ and ‘at-risk/vulnerable’. Further, Eroukhmanoff (2015) claims that ‘radicalization’ is implicated in a process of ‘remote securitization’ of Muslim communities in the US. Organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security and NYPD have adopted strategies such as euphemistic language (of an extremist ‘fringe’ that ‘hijacks’ Islam), metaphors (for example ‘fertile grounds’ or ‘seeds’ of radicalization), or constructions of radicalized violence as an autonomous, closed system with rational agents and logical pathways, to discursively produce a ‘Muslim’ Other ontologically different to and remote from the securitizers (Eroukhmanoff 2015). This reinforces geographies of suspicion towards Muslim communities and justifies intensive security measures. Working from Heath-
Kelly’s (2013) and Eroukhmanoff’s (2013) foundations, this chapter explores discursive constructions of climate change and terrorism linkages, their relations to essentializing racial and national logics, and relationships with climate-insecure futures and the outcomes or interventions they legitimize.

However, there are very few studies investigating links between climate change and terrorism. Renard (2008) proposed one of the first attempts to model these connections. He (2008) identifies three types of causal factors linking climate change impacts and a likelihood for terrorism. First are ‘instigating causes’; second are ‘permissive factors’; and third are ‘precipitant events’. Instigating causes are deep-rooted causes of terrorism: basic factors necessary for terrorism to develop but that do not automatically produce terroristic violence. They include poverty (individuals with poorer livelihoods supposedly have more reason to rebel, though this is contested by the often middle-class composition of terrorist groups (Jackson 2006)); inequalities between social groups; and large-scale societal changes, e.g. migration, which can relate to marginalization in host societies. Regime instability and type (with corrupt governance and authoritarian regimes invoking resentment from subjugated populations) are also instigating causes linked to terrorism (Renard 2008). ‘Permissive factors’ facilitate the use of violence: they are not sufficient or necessary for terrorism, but can contribute to its development (Renard 2008). They include sociocultural groups that can aid mobilization of assailants from similar backgrounds. ‘Weak’ or ‘failed’ states could provide space for terrorist mobilization outside of legal authority, while regime openness can facilitate opportunities for dissemination of extremist materials. Globalization – international travel, financial transactions and IT – can also provide a more permissive environment for terrorist activities (Renard 2008). ‘Precipitant events’ are triggers, the final events necessary to start a process of violence, e.g. loss of a family member or a natural disaster.

Climate change could exacerbate these factors in a multitude of ways. It could increase poverty (with reduced agricultural yields and affected livelihoods) or inequalities (with scarce resources captured by elites, or grievances invoked by climate injustices), which could act as instigating causes for terrorist activity (Renard 2008). Renard (2008: 44) subscribes to the CNA’s (2007) conclusion of climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’:
'like for the impacts on the instigating causes, climate change will not create new permissive factors. But it will exacerbate existing factors [for example food and water scarcities]. The level of violence could increase in the world, which could create a favorable environment for terrorists.' Mass et al (2013) argue it is unlikely large-scale environmental terrorism will occur in the immediate future, but locate two possible future pathways through which it might develop. First is ‘evolution’, in which environmental resources would contribute to the tools or targets of existing terrorists. Second is ‘emergence’ of new organizations with different ideologies, strategies etc. (Mass et al 2013: 212). They argue that whilst opportunities to use environmental resources in terrorism are increasing, e.g. the development of biotechnology, it is very difficult to predict how terrorist organizations might develop and to prepare contingencies for every possible form of attack (Mass et al 2013). Whilst these constitute important contributions on climate change and terrorism linkages, I argue they do not explore discourses of climate change and terrorism interconnections in climate security. It is at these moments, discursive constellations of climate change and terrorism linkages, that unequal identity construction is constituted in relation to possible climate-insecure futures.

However, in proposing that environmental technologies could be used as tools or resources for terrorism, I argue they draw on older debates on ‘eco-’ or ‘environmental terrorism’. Chalecki (2001: 3) defines environmental terrorism as: ‘the unlawful use of force against in situ environmental resources as to deprive populations of their benefit(s) and/or destroy other property.’ Dangerous attributes of environmental terrorism include dislocation (environmental resources cross borders, making security mobilizations difficult), perpetrator safety/security (natural resources are often less well guarded than government buildings, airports etc.), and political and economic impacts (terrorist attacks, e.g. poisoning of water supplies, could disrupt economic activities). Chalecki (2001) differentiates between ‘resource-as-target’ terrorism (ecosystems are the focus of the attack), and ‘resource-as-tool’ terrorism (environmental resources are coopted as tools of violence). Schwartz (1998: 484) agrees, contending: ‘the term ‘environmental terrorism’ should be reserved for incidents in which the environment itself is disrupted or threatened by the perpetrator as a symbol that elicits trepidation in the larger population over the ecological
consequences of the act.’ Thus, the environment becomes a tool or target of political violence, seeking to evoke fear in populations. O’Lear (2003) critiques this from two viewpoints. First is to ask what ‘the environment’ means in this scenario (is it restricted to natural ecosystems, or does it include energy systems such as dams)? Second, are non-state actors the only perpetrators of environmental terrorism; does state violence play into these debates? More specifically, ‘eco-terrorism’ describes the destruction of property by radical environmental groups motivated by biocentric ideology (calling for all living things to have equal moral status and (in some cases) the rollback of industrial societies) (Chalecki 2001). Notoriously, the Earth Liberation Front (a radical environmental group founded in the UK and active in North America) burned down a ski lodge in Vail, Colorado in October 1998, resulting in $12 million worth of damage (Allhoff and Buciak 2013). However, although this provides a more detailed, historically grounded account, there is relatively little written on the empirical contexts in which climate change and terrorism interlink, the discourses framing these interconnections, and how they implicate racial and national identities in climate security. In a context-specific, partial manner, this chapter elucidates on these dimensions in more detail. Section 5.3 outlines a brief historical context for these discourses.

**Section 5.3 Historical contexts**

In 2008, the FBI declared ‘eco-terrorism’ the top terrorist threat to the US (Allhoff and Buciak 2013). However, in an analysis of illegal activities with an environmental motive in the US (1970-2007), Carson et al (2012) identify 39 incidents in 1989, through to a peak of 159 in 2001, followed by a decrease of 79% through to 2007. Despite the FBI’s claims, crimes (let alone terrorist crimes) with an environmental dimension declined sharply in the US from the early to mid-2000s. This is reflected in discursive constructions of climate change and terrorism as important issues with similarities, but nonetheless absent of causal relationships. For example, in *Science* magazine, the then UK Chief Scientific Advisor Sir David King (2004) discusses the Bush administration’s failure to produce climate policies. King (2004: 174) notes: ‘in my view, climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today – more serious even than the threat of terrorism.’ King draws an explicit hierarchy of priorities (on a scale of ‘severity’ and ‘seriousness’) and states unambiguously the urgency of climate change.
Furthermore, Hopkins (2008b) writes in the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* ‘climate change and the war on terror mix like oil and water’. He warns against a militarization of climate policy (2008b, original emphasis): ‘we must collectively agree *not* to consider military action when it comes to security issues that are rooted in environmental degradation ... climate change and violent extremism *must* be delinked in the eyes of the public.’ Thus, Hopkins (2008b) separates climate change from terrorism in order to avoid a militarization of environmental policy. This feeds into broader critiques of a militarization of environmental issues (Deudney 1990). Gilbert (2012) warns that, whilst national security can be a useful frame to mobilize policy, it goes against the grain of climate change as a global problem and doesn’t draw attention to socioeconomic and political structures implicated in environmental degradation, e.g. oil dependency. National security depends on an externalized concept of nature as ‘the commons’: something to be controlled and organized for the benefit of American military power (Gilbert 2012). However, as De Goede and Randalls (2009) note in their analysis of preemption and apocalyptic futures, terrorism and climate change are increasingly constructed together, with the number of citations of both issues in the same sentence (in the UK broadsheet press) increasing from 2002-2007 (Figure 2):

![Figure 2](image-url)

**Figure 2:** UK broadsheet newspapers citing climate change and terrorism in the same sentence (based on a Nexis™ search), from De Goede and Randalls (2009: 864)
De Goede and Randalls (2009: 864) connect this rise to comparisons between climate change and terrorism as apocalyptic, unmanageable issues in the media, by NGOs and security institutions. The trend does not suggest the two issues are causally connected, but rather is a useful discursive tool to compare climate change and terrorism and highlight their unpredictable, complex qualities. Climate change and terrorism are discussed in proximity, but not in terms of their causal interconnections. I argue that whilst these discursive tactics provide important historical context (Section 5.3) and conceptual background (Section 5.2), they do not account for causal debates on climate change and terrorism interconnections (with the exception of conceptual accounts of terrorism-climate change interconnections (e.g. Renard 2008)), the points at which national and racial logics (with concomitant biopolitics of unequally valued lives) are discursively constructed in relation to climate-insecure futures. To begin, I discuss complex causal chains linking climate change and terrorism in US climate security.

Section 5.4 Complex causal chains connecting terrorism and climate change

In narratives of complex causality, environmental degradation is connected to regime instability and ‘ungoverned spaces’ extremists are able to exploit. Butts and Bankus (2013: 157) state: ‘Environmental security issues affect both state and human security ... As states fail, and ungoverned space grows, the increasing allure of Africa as a training base for external terrorist groups should be expected, and the likelihood that the presence of these forces will encourage the growth of local terrorism and insurgency is strong.’ In her study of responses to the 2010 floods in the Sindh region of Pakistan, Siddiqi (2014) documents her ethnographic work with Islamist group Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) as first responders for humanitarian welfare, e.g. food packages and healthcare. However, there was no linear relationship between withdrawal of government support and an upsurge in JuD support. There were blurred divisions in which JuD representatives interchanged with local politicians, community leaders, army employees and aid workers (Siddiqi 2014). Siddiqi (2014: 887) writes: ‘I argue that while Islamist groups did influence and affect the post-disaster political landscape in southern Sindh, the relationship between climatic disasters and such radical politics is not linear and requires a far more complex analysis.’ This means that although terrorism and climate change interconnections share commonalities with determinism
tropes (see Chapter 4, section 4.5), they do not reduce the likelihood of violence to a probabilistic compulsion and instead draw more complex causal chains. For example, in testimony before the Senate subcommittee on Foreign Relations in May 2014, Dr. Daniel Y. Chui, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy in the Department of Defense (p.7-8), reflects on possible consequences of climate insecurities (including droughts and natural disasters):

‘These developments could undermine already fragile governments that are unable to respond effectively or challenge currently-stable governments, as well as increasing competition and tension between countries vying for limited resources. These gaps in governance can create an avenue for extremist ideologies and the conditions that foster terrorism.’

In a similar line of thought, the 2014 National Intelligence Strategy (a document released by the Director of National Intelligence on a three-year basis which lays out the strategic risks for American intelligence agencies (Director of National Intelligence 2014)), declares (p.5):

‘Many governments will face challenges to meet even the basic needs of their people as they confront demographic change, resource constraints, effects of climate change, and risks of global infectious disease outbreaks. These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions – conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence. The risk of conflict and mass atrocities may increase.’

In these passages, the effects of climate change are connected indirectly to terrorism via chains of causation (including poverty, social tensions and political instability). These chains are articulated with reference to geographical terminology to offer direction, e.g. ‘gaps’ and ‘revenues’. Whereas determinism implies a compulsion towards violence (exhibited through verb choices such as ‘is likely to lead to’ or ‘will lead to’), causal chains are prefigured with modal verbs, e.g. ‘can create’, ‘could undermine’, or ‘can enable’. In these terms, openness to more variable outcomes is facilitated. However, despite this, causal chains are constructed in an almost
teleological fashion; here, climate changes figure at the beginning of the causal chain, and terroristic activity at its conclusion. This implies that terrorism is an endpoint or culmination of these prior events. In the National Intelligence Strategy quote, terrorist activity is not the endpoint, but ‘mass atrocities’. Thus, in this excerpt there is a sequence of progressively more violent outcomes (from social tensions, to terrorism, to mass atrocities) before reaching this extreme conclusion. And although authors stress these outcomes are only possibilities, a teleology with political violence as an endpoint suggests a process of inevitability or of falling dominos. Eroukhmanoff (2015) argues this discourse is premised on a ‘logic of unexpected consequences’, a consequentialist logic in which it is possible to infer outcomes in a system with autonomous, rational agents in full knowledge of their situations and actions. It could be argued that this focus on autonomous agency disconnects terrorism and climate change from their surrounding political contexts and the discursive construction of terrorist subjects in climate security. By extension, it becomes more difficult to locate culpability for political violence, where this sits in relation to sociopolitical contexts, and the climate injustices implicated in these relations.

A prominent example, and one I argue exemplifies these tensions, is the Syrian Civil War (2011-present). Two high-profile studies (Gleick 2014; Kelley et al 2015) analyze this topic in relation to climate change, with the latter asserting there is evidence the conflict in Syria is connected to climate change. The 2006-10 drought was the worst on instrumental record, leading to rural-urban migration of farmers to Syrian cities, dissatisfaction with the Assad Government’s agricultural policies, and therefore contributions to broader grievances behind the 2011 uprisings and Civil War. Kelley et al (2015) contend anthropogenic climate forcing made the 2007-10 drought three times more likely and conclude that climate change is implicated in the current Syrian conflict. However, in drawing these causal chains, it could be that there is an interesting politics of causal attribution and culpability. For instance, speaking at the Milan universal exposition (September 17th, 2015) on the themes of food security, climate change and sustainability, US Secretary of State John Kerry states:

‘It is not a coincidence that immediately prior to the civil war in Syria, the country experienced the worst drought on record. As
many as 1.5 million people migrated from Syria’s farms into Syria’s cities, and that intensified the political unrest that was beginning to brew. Now, I’m not telling you that the crisis in Syria was caused by climate change. No. Obviously it wasn’t. It was caused by a brutal dictator who barrel bombed, starved, tortured, and gassed his own people. But the devastating drought clearly made a bad situation a lot worse. Climate change is—to borrow a term from the US Department of Defense—a “threat multiplier.” Even if it doesn’t ignite conflict, it has the ability to fan the flames and to make situations much more complicated for political leaders to deal with.’

Similarly, in a speech to graduates of the US Coastguard Academy (New London, Connecticut, May 20th (2015b)), Barack Obama states:

‘Around the world, climate change increases the risk of instability and conflict. Rising seas are already swallowing low-lying islands, from Bangladesh to Pacific islands … Globally, we could see a rise in climate refugees. And I guarantee you the coastguard will have to respond. Elsewhere, more intense droughts will exacerbate shortages of water and food, increase competition for resources, and create the potential for mass migrations and new tensions. All of which is why the Pentagon calls climate change a “threat multiplier.”

Understand, climate change did not cause the conflicts we see around the world. Yet what we also know is that severe drought helped to create the instability in Nigeria that was exploited by the terrorist group Boko Haram. It’s now believed that drought and crop failures and high food prices helped fuel the early unrest in Syria, which descended into civil war in the heart of the Middle East. So, increasingly, our military and our combatant commands, our services—including the Coast Guard—will need to factor climate change into plans and operations, because you need to be ready.’

In these remarks, both Barack Obama and John Kerry draw indirect connections between climate changes, the Syrian drought, and the outbreak of conflict. However, both are very careful to nuance their statements about the causal chains connecting these phenomena. Using alliterative language, Kerry notes that the ‘devastating drought’ made the situation much worse and states that climate change ‘has the ability to fan the flames’. Similarly, Obama remarks that ‘climate change increases the
risk of instability and conflict’. Both speakers are careful to illustrate each stage of the causal chains connecting these phenomena: a drought, agricultural depletions, rural-urban migration, political unrest, and ‘war in the heart of the Middle East’. In a different example, Obama also links drought in Nigeria to instability and terrorist group Boko Haram. Both Obama and Kerry refer to the Department of Defense’s term ‘threat multiplier’ as a means to capture the nuance of these causal relations: climate change is not a direct cause of violent conflict, but can amplify other factors (e.g. agricultural depletion and rural-urban migration) that are related to its emergence. Interestingly, in illustrating these causal relationships, Obama and Kerry are both clear that climate change is not a direct cause of the war in Syria. Obama says: ‘Understand, climate change did not cause the conflicts we see around the world’. Kerry is also unequivocal, stating: ‘No, I’m not telling you that the crisis in Syria was caused by climate change’. Subsequently, he repeats the term ‘no’ as part of an affirmative simple sentence and the claim that ‘obviously it wasn’t’. Thus, in both excerpts, Obama and Kerry do suggest that climate change is related (through complex, indirect causal pathways) to political violence and conflict, but are categorical that climate change is not a direct cause. The reason for this cautious attribution of causality could be indicated by Kerry’s subsequent sentence: ‘It was caused by a brutal dictator who barrel bombed, starved, tortured, and gassed his own people’. Kerry is careful to clarify that although climate change is related to the underlying causes of political instability in Syria, it is the Assad Government’s violent repression that is the primary reason for the Civil War.

I argue that these excerpts highlight a nuanced, complex politics at play in the demarcation of conflicts and terrorist activities linked to climate change. Obama and Kerry – both committed to policies designed to mitigate and adapt to climate change – highlight the complex, indirect ways in which climate changes exacerbate political instability. However, they are both cautious to avoid the charge that climate change is ‘causing’ the Syrian Civil War or terrorist attacks (with the political implication that this reduces the culpability of political actors (e.g. Assad) for these violences). Writing for the sceptical think tank The Heritage Foundation (2015), Peter Brookes, a Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs, critiques the Obama administration’s associations of climate change and terrorism. Brookes (2015) writes that it is ‘substantively wrong to link climate change and terrorism – whether directly or indirectly. And relating the
two to create a sense of national security urgency is not only misleading – it is
dangerous because it distracts us from today’s very real, very immediate life-and-
death threats from terrorism.’ He (2015) claims that it is not only inaccurate to link
climate change and terrorism (in his view there are no empirical connections between
these phenomena), but also because this association detracts from the ‘very real, very
immediate life-and-death’ threats of terrorism. However, in making this argument in
the context of a sceptical think tank (the Heritage Foundation (Dunlap and Jacques
2013)), it could also be that Brookes wants to dissociate climate change and terrorism
in order to devalue climate change concerns in the US Government. From a different
perspective, that of the right-wing news outlet Breitbart, Martel (2014) reports on the
release of the 2014 Center for Naval Analyses Military Advisory Board’s report National
Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change. The title of Martel’s (2014)
piece is: ‘Climate change, not Islam, is catalyst for terrorism, Arab Spring, Syrian war’.
She (2014) also notes that ‘the report goes on to blame climate change for a number
of political phenomena that are notably linked by an obvious culprit: radical Islam’.
From Martel’s perspective, writing for Breitbart, it could be that drawing causal
relationships between terrorism and climate change is problematic not only because
climate change is considered an inadequate causal factor, but also because it detracts
away from other causes of political violence, i.e. ‘Islam’ and ‘radical Islam’. From an
examination of these varied sources, I argue that there is a multifarious, nuanced
politics of attributing causality in relation to terrorism-climate change
interconnections.

Although narratives connecting climate change impacts with terrorism suggest a
teleological pathway and relation to a compulsive determinism, their ontological and
epistemological foundations are grounded in complexity and this raises difficult
questions about where to locate culpability for climate changes and terrorism. I argue,
however, that national, racial, and gendered identities are also constructed
discursively in these complex causal relations. And whereas narratives of complex
causality indicate difficulties in attributing responsibility, I contend that the input of
essentializing logics into these causal interconnections constructs racial Others in US
and EU climate security discourses and intersects with constructions of (anti-)American
nationhood. In this vein, Section 5.5 examines biological metaphors in particular,
context-specific moments of US climate security discourse and their dehumanizing assumptions.

**Section 5.5 Biological metaphors in climate security discourses**

Biological fertility metaphors are occasionally employed in US climate security discourse to describe possibilities for terrorism. These include ‘breeding grounds’, ‘seedbeds’, ‘petri dishes’, ‘breeding soils’, etc. Fairclough (2003) notes metaphors can make abstract concepts more grounded, but also avoid direct reference to and political contextualization of the phenomenon under figurative iteration. Kruglanski *et al* (2007) illustrate that epidemiological metaphors are regularly adopted in counterterrorism and counter-radicalization discourses. They rely upon a partition between external agents, a susceptible host, an environment that brings them together, and ‘disease’ transmission via particular ‘vectors’ (Kruglanski *et al* 2007). Here, the ‘agent’ refers to ideologies terrorists utilize, ‘hosts’ are populations ‘at-risk’ from radicalization and political violence, ‘environment’ refers to broader conditions producing vulnerabilities in populations, and ‘vectors’ are conduits for transmission of ideologies, e.g. social media platforms. Kruglanski *et al* (2007) argue epidemiological metaphors can provide a framework for mapping longer-term causation behind terrorism, but are limited by neglect of the immediate requirements to respond to political violence. In Renard’s (2008) schema, it could be that epidemiological metaphors are an effective descriptor for ‘instigating causes’ or ‘permissive factors’. However, I argue that by seeing vulnerable human populations as a fertile ‘substrate’, as well as a lack of contextualization of the subjects of terrorist violence (with terrorism reduced to a ‘disease’ that afflicts human populations), this contributes to a dehumanization that negates human populations’ agency in these processes.

Importantly, whilst I contend that biological tropes contribute to a racial logic of dehumanization (the diminution of human agency to epidemiological processes), there is greater conceptual confusion with the term ‘naturalization’. In Chapter 4 (section 4.3.1), I adopt Hall’s (1996: 144) understanding of naturalization as that which ‘is not grounded in nature, but producing nature as a sort of guarantee of its truth’. Naturalization in this sense renders statements and assumptions as ‘common sense’,
‘taken-for-granted’ etc. However, with biological metaphors, Baldwin’s (2013b) concept of naturalization is relevant, especially its emphasis on the use of nature ‘idioms’ to describe CIM. Whilst biological metaphors describing terrorism and climate change interconnections do touch on ‘natural’ phenomena (e.g. seedbeds), others are based on ‘human-made’ phenomena (e.g. petri dishes). Although Baldwin’s (2013b) account of naturalization is applicable in this case, I focus on how essentializing logics – through strategies of naturalization (at the scale of underlying assumptions behind metaphors) and dehumanization – construct racial and national identities in climate-insecure futures. As a case in point, I draw on examples from the Center for Naval Analyses’ (2007) Military Advisory Board report. In a series of sections in which senior military personnel reflect on their insights and experience, retired officials Admiral Lopez (p.17) and General Anthony Zinni (p.31) state:

**Lopez:** ‘Climate change will provide the conditions that will extend the war on terror ... You have very real changes in natural systems that are most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for terrorism ... Droughts, violent weather, ruined agricultural lands – those are the kinds of stresses we’ll see more of under climate change ... More poverty, more forced migrations, higher unemployment. Those are conditions ripe for extremists and terrorists.’

**Zinni:** ‘You may also have a population that is traumatized by an event or a change in conditions triggered by climate change ... If the government there is not able to cope with the effects, and if other institutions are unable to cope, then you could be faced with a collapsing state. And these end up as breeding grounds for instability, for insurgencies, for warlords. You start to see real extremism. These places act like Petri dishes for extremism and for terrorist networks.’

Admiral Lopez’ argues climate impacts are likely to create ‘fertile ground’ for extremism. He lists a range of intervening factors, e.g. poverty and unemployment, before arguing these conditions are ‘ripe’ for extremists. Using phraseology associated with fertility, it could be this reinforces a notion of climate change as not a direct cause of terrorism per se, but something that creates an environment in which these phenomena can flourish. ‘Fertile ground’ suggests an abundant, fecund atmosphere for terrorist groups, whilst ‘ripe’ suggests that, with particular ingredients, e.g. poor
governance, these environments will be ‘ready’ for terrorism. Zinni uses a similar metaphor of ‘breeding ground’ to situate conditions in which ‘warlords’, ‘insurgencies’ and ‘real extremism’ could develop. ‘Breeding’ suggests extremism could also be perpetuated or reproduced. Alongside biological metaphors, laboratory-centred or medical metaphors are also adopted. This includes reference to ‘failed state’ spaces as ‘Petri Dishes’. This metaphor, as with ‘breeding grounds’, suggests a substrate upon which extremism might develop, but refers to a ‘Petri Dish’, a laboratory instrument used for cultivation of microbiological substances. Terminology associated with medical contexts in Zinni’s comments also includes descriptions of populations as ‘traumatized’ and being able ‘to cope’. In the 2009 National Intelligence Council report on the geopolitical implications of climate change in North Africa, the NIC (2009a) discuss the social impacts of climate-induced food scarcities:

‘Agriculture will be less able to act as an employment safety valve for underemployed or seasonally employed unskilled workers. Stress on rural communities may lead to civil unrest or encourage radicalization’ (p.13)

‘Conditions in the region’s burgeoning urban slums (“shanty towns”) – already incubators for extremism and urban unrest – will face the most degradation’ (p.14)

In these passages, another medical metaphor of ‘the incubator’ is used to highlight conditions – climate stresses on employment and agriculture – that create an environment in which radicalization or extremism could flourish. All of these metaphors (‘petri dishes’, ‘breeding grounds’, and ‘incubators’) suggest a platform upon which terrorism can develop. By reducing ‘ungoverned spaces’ and human populations to a substrate upon which the virus or contagion of terrorism can grow or ‘breed’, human agency is negated in these processes. In the above quotations, direct human decisions and agents are not noted; instead ‘terrorism’ or ‘radicalization’ is cast as an abstracted, independent phenomenon that acts upon vulnerable populations. Eroukhmanoff (2015) notes this dehumanizing effect (a diminishment of human agency in climate security debates on terrorism) of fertility metaphors in American radicalization debates. She (2015: 252) writes: ‘radicalization interpreted as a bad seed dehumanizes the individuals in the process of radicalization ... the security
practitioners place the Muslim community and their inherent potential for “growing” at a distance, where their “growth” is independent of the practices of the security actor or with the order they are living in.’ This dehumanization contravenes one of Sedgwick’s (2010) principal critiques of radicalization discourses: that they overemphasize individual human agency (and rational choice theory) at the expense of socioeconomic contexts.

The separation of the securitizer from the securitized, of ‘remote securitization’ in Eroukhmanoff’s (2015) terms, implies the ‘securitizers’ – American security actors – are detached from implication in abstracted, ‘inevitable’ teleologies of radicalization. As such, it could be that dehumanizing metaphors in US climate security not only diminish the agency of ‘risky’ and ‘at-risk’ populations, but also veil the unequal power relations constituting these discourses (as with discourses of complexity in terrorism and climate security more broadly (see section 5.4)). It is important to note that this is not a conscious dehumanization, but, through metaphors, assumptions about populations at risk from terrorism in climate-insecure futures are naturalized. Dehumanization in these quotes operates at the level of naturalized assumptions (facilitated by metaphors) and the negation of vulnerable populations’ agency that this confers in climate-insecure futures. The essentializing logic – formulated at the scale of naturalizing assumptions oriented towards climate-insecure futures – constructs distanced, dehumanized human populations (‘at risk’ from terrorism, or vulnerable to radicalization and terrorist infiltration) in conditions of future climate insecurities.

However, because vulnerability to terrorism is discussed in abstract terms (without reference to a particular population), while there is a racial trope of dehumanization in the examples – diminishment of human agency, as with geopolitical metaphors in Chapter 4 (section 4.4) – there is not a racialization of particular populations. In the first, abstract sense, this suggests geographies of ‘vacuums’, ‘ungoverned spaces’, of climate change-induced terrorism as a ‘contagion’ to be ‘contained’. However, in the case of the NIC Report (2009a: 14), there is a specific focus on the incubatory spaces of North African cities and ‘urban slums’. Lacher (2008) investigates these discourses in the construction of the Sahara, particularly its Southern borders (e.g. between Mali, Algeria and Niger), as a ‘breeding ground’ for terrorism. He (2008) charts the
simultaneous anxieties about a lack of security intelligence in the region and the scope it provides for a ‘political economy of danger’. While in the 1990s the Southern borderlands of the Sahara didn’t capture the attention of Northern policymakers, this changed post-9/11 with the broader securitization of ‘Africa’ (Abrahamson 2005). The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (created in 2004 to facilitate cross-border military and intelligence cooperation) extended US interests in the Sahara (Lacher 2008). Lacher (2008) contends that through this securitization, Saharan populations and spaces emerge as fields of intervention and ‘breeding grounds’ for terrorism. This is characterized by ‘ungoverned spaces’ and ‘porous borders’ amenable to terrorism, migration, clandestine crime (e.g. smuggling), demographic associations with high fertility and poverty, and a sociopolitical milieu in which some forms of knowledge are prioritized over others. In Lacher’s (2008: 400) terms: ‘what we encounter in the securitization of the Sahara is … actually existing security … a discursive struggle that produces the threats it relies on, performing and transforming the Sahara as a field of intervention, with unpredictable consequences.’ Following Lacher’s (2008) argument, I contend essentializing logics are not only about how possible futures are mediated in climate-insecure futures (about the ‘contagion’ of terrorism and dehumanizing assumptions about ‘risky’ or ‘at-risk’ populations), but also how interventions are legitimized in the present, ‘actually existing security’ (Lacher 2008: 400). This is discussed in more depth in Section 5.7 on anti-Americanism and humanitarian intervention in Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. More specifically, whilst essentializing logics – through a trope of dehumanization – are implicit in biological metaphors in US climate security discourse, I argue there are also moments of naturalization of specific populations in these discourses. Looking at intersections of racialized, gendered and national identities, sections 5.6 and 5.7 explore the role of essentializing logics in these particular identity constructions.

5.6 Intersectional, essentializing logics of climate change-terrorism debates

In this section, I explore gendered and racialized essentializing logics in particular, context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourse. Referring to these constructions as intersectional, I do not hold intersectionality to constitute totalizing connections between essentially different identities. Rather, following Krenshaw
(1991: 1296), intersectionality is viewed as ‘a way of mediating the tension between assertions of multiple identities and the on-going necessity of group politics.’ She (1991: 1245) differentiates between different forms of intersectionality. First is structural intersectionality, the multiple structural factors that make the experiences of women of colour fundamentally different to those of White women. Second is political intersectionality, the ways in which feminist and antiracist movements both fight against patriarchy, sexism, and racism, but do not always account for the particular inequalities experienced by women of colour. Third is representational intersectionality, concerned with the cultural construction of women of colour (Krenshaw 1991). This project, while it attempts to situate exclusionary intersectional identities in particular moments of climate security discourse, is limited in two respects. First is that, although the project discusses the unequal power relations of climate security discourse, my overriding emphasis is on discursive representations (‘representational intersectionality’ in Krenshaw’s (1991: 1245) terms). This emphasis neglects important structural (for example political-economic and technological regimes of border security in climate-induced migration discourses (Buxton and Hayes 2016)) intersectionalities in climate security politics. Secondly, the structure of the thesis – divided into research questions and empirical chapters on racial logics, national logics (each a type of essentializing logics) and connections between terrorism and climate change – undermines its ambition to explore identity intersections by partitioning these into chapters. Although this empirical chapter functions to bridge differences to a small extent, for example discussions of racialized identities and anti-Americanism in climate security, the thesis structure (chosen for analytical clarity) does limit the capacity for intersectional analysis. In this sense, the project is clearly limited in its consideration of intersectionality. Whilst I do touch on different moments of intersectional identity constructions, e.g. in discourses about migrants in North African cities (section 5.6), anti-Americanism and humanitarian intervention (section 5.7), and racialized constructions of nationhood in relation to Hurricane Katrina (section 6.5), the lack of these reflections is an important shortcoming of the project.

More broadly, ‘intersectionality’ has been critiqued for its presumed status as a ‘buzzword’ (Davis 2008). Such a status doesn’t account for the specific political context – as ‘an analytic that has a particular relationship to the fleshy materiality of black
women’s bodies’ (Nash 2016: 12) – in which ‘intersectionality’ developed. Importantly, this is not to argue that intersectionality cannot or should not be applied to different forms of identity intersections (e.g. sexuality), but rather to situate the concept (as decontextualized, broadened accounts do not always do (Nash 2016)) in a particular critical politics. Writing about the double, mutually reinforcing oppressions experienced by women of colour in the US, Krenshaw (1991) argues social construction and anti-essentialism are important to investigate the power relations of identity categories. However, she (1991) states that identity categories have material, exclusionary effects. Thus, while Krenshaw accepts identities’ constructed-ness, she contends it is important to understand their political appropriations (including for emancipatory causes) and interactions in shifting contexts. This interpretation mirrors Edward Said’s (1994) theorization of cultural identities. Cultural differences and boundaries are porous, constructed, and contingent, but not dissoluble to the extent that analytic distinctions or cultural differences are subsumed entirely.

Such a position, a cautious, critical and reflective acceptance of particular distinctions or contingent boundaries, still carries a risk of re-essentializing differences. For example, in the preface of Covering Islam, Said (1997 (1981): xxix, original emphasis) writes of American imperialism: ‘The tendency to consider the world as one country’s imperium is very much in the ascendancy in today’s United States. But whereas most other great cultural groupings appear to have accepted the United States’ role, it is only from within the Islamic world that signs of determined resistance are still strong.’ Through his use of generalized collective labels, e.g. ‘great cultural groupings’ or ‘the Islamic world’, it could be that Said replicates the cultural essentialism he aims to critique. Said’s (1997 (1981)) claim that resistance comes from ‘within’ the Islamic world suggests the ‘Islamic world’ has a discrete shape, a bounded inside contained from an essentially different outside. As such, whereas he critiques essentializing discourses, Said (1997 (1981)) risks perpetuating such essentialisms to a certain extent. These examples demonstrate the need for a careful, grounded appraisal of essentialized, intersectional identities in moments of US and EU climate security discourse. Krenshaw (1991) and Said (1994) accept cultural identities are permeable and contingent, but recognize important differences which make it possible to analyze points of intersections and unequal political dynamics and effects. I argue a particular,
context-specific point of intersection in US and EU climate security discourses is a figure of a young, ‘Muslim’, ‘African’ male with a capacity for extremism or terrorism. This is drawn several times in earlier (2007-10) climate security publications. For example, to return to the 2009 NIC Report on the geopolitical implications of climate change in North Africa, the authors note in a discussion about climate change impacts and North African cities (2009a: 15):

‘Cities like Cairo, Casablanca, Alexandria, Algiers, and Oran are already overflowing with thousands of angry and unemployed young men who congregate in ghetto-like environments passing their days leaning on walls with little to no hope of escaping their fate.’

Later in the document (p.19), these claims are elaborated:

‘Islamic extremists across the region may exploit climate change’s destabilizing impacts and ineffective state responses to promote the spread of militancy and anti-regime violence. Indeed, Islamist militants could point to climate-induced catastrophes as evidence as God’s wrath against “apostate regimes” whose un-Islamic behaviour has plunged the region into desperate circumstances ... Moreover, Islamic extremist groups could take advantage of dire socioeconomic conditions to recruit more followers, particularly among disaffected youth in the shanty towns of Morocco and Algeria. The concentration of unattached, unemployed young men in overstressed North Africa cities as well as disaffected, marginalized rural communities under acute climatic stress will provide ideal recruiting grounds for extremists.’

In these excerpts, a young, masculine subjectivity is constructed in terms of hopelessness, anger, susceptibility to Islamist extremist ideologies and disaffection. Adjectives such as ‘overstressed’ and ‘overflowing’ manufacture an image of overstretched urban environments and communities at ‘bursting’ or ‘boiling point’, a simmering anger and dissatisfaction. This is cultivated with the grievances of unemployment and ‘acute climatic stresses’. These excerpts also reinforce a subjectivity of fatalism and hopelessness among young men in North African cities, e.g. with the phrase ‘little hope of escaping their fate’. An image of fatalism is also engendered earlier in the report when the NIC (2009a: 18-19) claim: ‘North Africans
tend to hold a religiously-based view that “what will be, will be.” Owing to this fatalistic mindset, North Africans are unlikely to blame the state for climate related stresses.’ Whilst careful to avoid an overt, certain generalization with the phrase ‘tend to’, this comment continues to make a sweeping assertion about the ‘mindset of North Africans’. In one sense, this suggests a generalized fatalism that separates ‘North Africans’ from their agency to react in different ways to climate-insecure situations. This could be reinforced through the imagery of idleness implied by young men ‘passing their days leaning on walls’. A latent susceptibility to terrorism also accompanies these statements. As the second passage asserts, if young men are dissatisfied and unemployed, they may be vulnerable to Islamist ideas which ‘point to climate-induced catastrophe as evidence of God’s wrath against “apostate regimes.”’ Finally, young men are said to be ‘angry’ which could reinforce a racialized image of Muslim males as inherently aggressive or anger-fuelled (Razack 2008). Moreover, North African males are at their most ‘risky’ in congregation, with a ‘concentration of unattached, unemployed young men’ and ‘thousands of angry and unemployed young men who congregate in ghetto-like environments’. Hendrixson (2014) argues that such assertions of grand numbers are reductionist, strip young men of their agency and subjectivity, and do not account for the diversity of young male – and female – experiences.

It could be that these assumptions are underwritten by ‘youth bulge’ theory. Developed in 1985 by geographer Garry Fuller whilst a visiting scholar to the CIA’s Office of Global Issues, ‘youth bulge’ theory was designed to provide intelligence analysts with a tool to predict national security threats (Hendrixson 2004). A ‘youth bulge’ is a scenario whereby people aged 15-24 represent above 20% of a national population (Hendrixson 2004). It is argued to correlate – when combined with poor educational opportunities, unemployment and unequal resource allocations – with an increased propensity towards violence (Hendrixson 2004). A higher young population is not necessarily negative and can be interpreted as a ‘demographic dividend’ providing economic opportunities. Both schools of thought are gendered: ‘youth bulges’ are associated with young men, and a ‘demographic dividend’ promotes opportunities for young women (Hendrixson 2004). Dowd (2015) connects this to religious demography, rejecting any culturalist explanations of Muslim-majority
populations and terrorist violence. Summarizing its racialized underpinnings, Hendrixson (2004: 8) notes: ‘Personified as a discontented, angry young man, almost always a man of colour, the “youth bulge” is seen as an unpredictable, out-of-control force in the South generally, with Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia and Latin America all considered hotspots.’ It could be that a discontented, young ‘African’ male in particular moments of US and EU climate security discourses thus represents a particular crossroads of racialized and gendered ‘Muslim’ identities. To argue they intersect is not to say they are not contingent and context-specific, but to recognize that there are points at which multiple identities intersect to create a racialized ‘Muslim’ Other oriented towards possible climate-insecure futures (a racial logic).

As Hopkins (2004) points out, negative attitudes towards Muslim men have accentuated in the aftermath of 9/11. Focusing on experiences in Glasgow, he notes how biological signifiers (‘brown skin’ and beards) were employed to racially abuse Muslim men. Young men negotiate the interchange of their religious and Scottish identities – e.g. in relation to alcohol consumption or visiting nightclubs – to buttress defences against discrimination and assert religious solidarity (Hopkins 2004). The turban has been endowed with racist, culturally ignorant meanings, with Sikh males accused of suicide bombing and terrorism (Sian 2010). Heteronormative patriotism has also been apparent in sections of the US media (Kunstman et al 2010). Supposedly protecting US citizens from Islam’s inherent homophobia, ‘Muslim’ masculinities have been pathologised (for instance a diagnosis of terrorists’ martyrdom (based on the promise of sexual pleasure in paradise) as failed heterosexuality) and queered mockingly in opposition to a masculinist, nationalist US imaginary (Puar and Rai 2002). Collectively, these discourses manufacture a figure of a sexually deviant, violent, ‘Muslim’ male (Puar and Rai 2002). Projected onto terrorism discourses in climate security, they contribute to context-specific racial logics in which a gendered ‘Muslim’ Other is aligned to climate-insecure futures. However, I also argue that in particular, context-dependent moments of US climate security, American nationhood intersects with racial Othering (I use the American government’s humanitarian intervention in Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami as an instructive example). Essentializing logics are not only about series of naturalized assumptions which foreground a racial Other in uncertain or ‘risky’ futures, but also the interventions
these assumptions propagate and legitimize in pasts and presents. I turn to these assumptions in Section 5.7.

Section 5.7 Anti-Americanism and climate security

As Klaute (2011) identifies, anti-Americanism is a perpetually contested concept. Ceasar (2003) argues it centres on the idea that there is something fundamentally wrong with the US and American ‘way of life’. Anti-American sentiments originate in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in European countries, where stereotypes of Americans as uncouth, materialistic and superficial developed (O’Connors 2004; Pieterse and Peters 2012). Post-WW2, anti-Americanism became associated with anti-imperialist and anti-Vietnam War activists, whilst after the end of the Cold War anti-globalization movements and critiques of neoliberal capitalism were prevalent (Klaute 2011). Anti-American and anti-Western sentiments are also associated with Muslim-majority populations and countries. In their investigation of Twitter usage in Arabic-speaking countries in the MENA region, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Jamal et al (2015) postulate anti-American sentiments, notably around important events, e.g. the July 2013 coup d’état unseating President Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, or the Boston Marathon bombings in July 2013, are predominantly political. Their results suggest anti-Americanism is not sociocultural (directed against US society or culture), but rather critical of American foreign policy (Jamal et al 2015).

In a different reading of anti-Westernism, Cooper (2008) studies resonances between neo-fundamentalist, anti-imperialist Islamic thought and feminist and postcolonial scholars. Cooper (2008) argues that, in seeking alternatives which embrace irreducible alterity, postcolonial theorists unwittingly reinforce a sexual politics and heteronormative modes of desire: the foundation of absolute value in the intimate, pious construction of the feminine, what Cooper (2008: 27) labels ‘genealogical purification’. Instead, she (2008: 43) forwards possibilities of ‘postcolonial literatures of transit’ which, engaged with critical literatures on racialized and gendered dynamics of imperialism, can promote a critical politics that ‘can be pursued without seeking to reinvent a new, and absolutely pure, genealogical order’. In relation to climate change politics, Klaute (2011) notes an important source of anti-American sentiment has been
the US Government’s refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol. Touching on this, Osama Bin Laden commented in a 2002 letter to the American people (cited in Jasparro and Taylor 2008: 248):

‘You have destroyed nature with your industrial waste and gases more than any other nation in history. Despite this, you refuse to sign the Kyoto agreement so that you can secure the profit of your greedy enterprise and companies.’

In a later address (2007, cited in Jasparro and Taylor 2008: 248), Bin Laden added:

‘In fact, the life of all mankind is in danger because of global warming, which is largely due to emissions of the factories of the major companies; nonetheless, the representatives of those companies in the White House insist on not observing the Kyoto Accord, notwithstanding … the death and displacement of millions of people as a result.’

In these statements, Bin Laden refers directly to the US with the second person pronoun ‘you’ and to important symbols of American power, e.g. ‘the White House’. He utilizes negative lexis to describe the actions of American governments and companies, for instance ‘destroyed’, ‘greedy’, ‘danger’, ‘death’ and ‘displacement’. These discursive strategies indicate antipathy to US climate policy. Notwithstanding these general statements, anti-Americanism and anti-Western statements are also occasionally articulated with reference to Southeast Asia in climate security literature. In a 2009 report and consultation about the geopolitical implications of climate change for the region, the National Intelligence Council (2009b: 5) state:

‘The West is currently seen as the primary culprit, and as the climate change-induced challenges become more severe and apparent, this could bolster anti-Western sentiment in the region … The framing of climate change as a Western-generated phenomenon creates the potential for major anti-Western backlashes over virtually any climate change-induced crisis in the region.’
In this quote, climate insecurities are repeatedly linked to a perception of Western culpability and anti-Western sentiment, e.g. the West as ‘the primary culprit’, ‘anti-Western sentiment in the region’ and ‘major anti-Western backlashes’. Jasparro and Taylor (2008) contend climate change could be implicated in counter-terrorism debates in Southeast Asia, with increased poverty and lower state capacity as conducive to terrorism. Jasparro and Taylor (2008: 247) note that developed countries could be susceptible to terrorism due to higher historic greenhouse gas emissions; the US is ‘especially vulnerable in this respect due to its intransigence on Kyoto ... and the ineffectiveness of its public diplomacy.’ In these discourses, anti-American and anti-Western imaginaries are explicitly connected to climate change and terrorism. Through an examination of the US government’s response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in Indonesia, this section argues these imaginaries intersect with racial logics about a ‘Muslim’ ‘Other’ and terrorism. In several pieces on US climate security interests, ‘Muslim’ populations are specifically connected to a vulnerability towards or capacity for terrorist violence in an Indonesian context. In Smith’s (2007) academic account of climate change impacts and terrorism, he notes:

‘Normally terrorism and the environment are viewed as two unrelated phenomena, but the case of Indonesia suggests a much greater association than perhaps recognized previously. As the Southeast Asian country with the world’s largest Muslim population ... Indonesia is viewed by the United States as a pivotal state that will heavily influence the long-term goals of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism’ (p.273)

‘Unlike Indonesia, the Philippines is not a Muslim-majority state (the Muslim population is about 4.5 million out of a total of 91 million). However, for historical and geopolitical reasons, the Philippines is considered by the U.S. to be a critical anchor in countering terrorism in Southeast Asia’ (p.274)

Here, Smith – using a fact (Indonesia as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country) – associates Indonesia’s Muslim population with US goals in the ‘war on terrorism’. In the second quotation, Smith references the Philippines as a ‘critical anchor’ for countering terrorism in Southeast Asia, but still announces that the Philippines is ‘not a Muslim-majority state’. Therefore, in both contexts, Muslim populations and Muslim-majority states are associated with counterterrorism efforts. In a similar manner as the
NIC (2009a) and Age of Consequences (Campbell et al 2007) reports, albeit referring to very different backdrops, I argue a racial ‘Muslim’ Other is constructed through repeated, naturalized assumptions that discursively produce this figure. In his 2007 publication Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action, Joshua Busby writes:

‘Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population – about 88% of its 245.5 million people. Some have been radicalized, but most have not. Indonesia is also a fragile democracy and politically unstable with a history of separatist movements. Meanwhile, as an island archipelago with large forest reserves, the country is both vulnerable to climate change and important for climate mitigation. Climate change, through drought conditions or storms, might further destabilize Indonesia, and if the government provided a weak response to a future weather disaster, this could encourage separatists or radicals to challenge the state or launch attacks on Western interests.’

Busby begins by citing Indonesia’s status as the country with the world’s largest Muslim population, stating ‘some have been radicalized, but most have not.’ Whilst Busby is careful to note that ‘most’ Muslims have not been radicalized, this nonetheless associates Muslim populations in particular with a capacity for radicalization. After this, Busby (2007) claims climate change impacts (e.g. droughts) might ‘further destabilize’ Indonesia and encourage ‘radicals’ or ‘separatists’ to attack ‘Western interests’. I argue an important point of intersection is a racialized ‘Muslim’ Other and its naturalized assumptions (of a capacity for terrorism) with constructions of anti-Americanism. A key strategic objective of the US government has been to reach out to Muslim communities and populations around the world. In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the US’ central national security strategy produced by the White House (outlining key strategic priorities), the authors write (White House 2010: 4):

‘And our broader engagement with Muslim communities around the world will spur progress on critical political and security matters, while advancing partnerships on a broad range of issues based upon mutual interests and mutual respect.’

Further into the document, this ambition is clarified (p.22):
‘We will continue to stand up for the universal rights of all people, even for those with whom we disagree. We are developing new partnerships in Muslim communities around the world on behalf of health, education, science, employment, and innovation. And through our broader emphasis on Muslim engagement, we will communicate our commitment to support the aspirations of all people for security and opportunity. Finally, we reject the notion that al-Qaida represents any religious authority. They are not religious leaders, they are killers; and neither Islam nor any other religion condones the slaughter of innocents.’

As indicated by these quotations, a key objective of US strategy at this point is constructing ‘partnerships’ with Muslim communities worldwide. From a different perspective, a 2013 report by the Center for Climate and Security (a Washington D.C. based policy institute that carries out research, policymaking, and advocacy in relation to climate security issues (Center for Climate and Security 2015)) *The Arab Spring and Climate Change: A Climate and Security Correlations Series* affirms outreach to Muslim communities as a key US objective (Femia and Werrell 2013: 5). Translated to humanitarian interventions, Tobias Feakin and Duncan Depledge (for the German Marshall Fund) (2010: 6-7) state:

‘Being able to respond in a timely and effective manner can be hugely important for the way that the West is perceived in other parts of the world. For example, in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 – a disaster to which the United States responded by leading a huge international relief effort – public support for the United States in Indonesia dramatically increased. Similarly, Pakistani perceptions of the United States also improved after an earthquake in 2005 – again the United States was one of the first responders.’

In relation to humanitarian interventions after the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) and the Pakistan earthquake (2005), ideas of ‘outreach’ and ‘improving relations’ with Muslim-majority countries are employed. In the context of climate change and security, engagement with Muslim communities is also a factor. In these instances, I argue that a particular focus on outreach to ‘Muslim communities’ is fuelled by a perception of anti-Western or anti-American sentiment among Muslims ‘in other parts
of the world’ (Feakin and Depledge 2010: 6-7). This is not to say that there are not strong anti-American sentiments expressed among Muslim-majority populations (as, for example, studied by Jamal et al (2015)), but rather anti-Americanism or anti-Westernism are used in association with naturalized assumptions and associations about Muslim-majority populations and a vulnerability towards or capacity for violence. In its most extreme form, this feeling is characterized by the phenomenon of ‘Muslim rage’ (Lewis 1990). Reflecting on this concept, Bernard Lewis (1990) posits it developed from a ‘clash of civilizations’ (a phrase later adopted by Samuel Huntington (1993)) viewpoint and the decline of ‘Islamic civilization’ at the commencement of the European renaissance. Making a series of generalized assumptions, Lewis (1990) notes:

‘The Muslim has suffered successive stages of defeat. The first was his loss of domination in the world, to the advancing power of Russia and the West. The second was the undermining of his authority in his own country, through an invasion of foreign ideas and laws and ways of life and sometimes even foreign rulers or settlers, and the enfranchisement of native non-Muslim elements. The third – the last straw – was the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from emancipated women and rebellious children.’

In these passages, Lewis (1990) asserts that an ‘outbreak of rage’ has been instilled in a masculinist, angry ‘Muslim’ figure. More recently, this concept has emerged in discussions about anti-Western sentiment and anger in Muslim populations. On 17th September 2012, American magazine Newsweek published a cover entitled ‘Muslim rage’, a supposed anti-Western ‘rage’ derived from a series of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in Danish magazine Jyllands-Posten (30th September 2015) (Ali 2012; Daily Telegraph Foreign Staff 2015). On September 15th (2012), The Economist released an editorial entitled ‘Muslim rage: Why they won’t calm down’, discussing representations of the Qur’an. The Nation also contributed with an editorial (19th September 2012), underlining grievances among Muslim populations in terms of US foreign policy, especially support for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, there has been relatively little academic literature published on this concept, aside from Aydin’s history of anti-Western ideas in pan-Islamic and pan-Asian philosophies (2007) and Hallaq’s (2003) thesis of ‘Muslim rage’ as rooted in European colonialism and the coercive introduction of European legal systems (usurping Islamic
law) in Muslim-majority societies. In US climate security literature, I argue that ‘outreach to Muslim communities’ is premised on a need to improve relations due to assumptions about an anti-Western and anti-American ‘Muslim’ Other with a capacity for and vulnerability towards radicalized violence. Importantly, these assumptions are involved in the US humanitarian intervention in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.

Triggered by a magnitude 9 earthquake at 7.58am on 26th January 2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami was unprecedented, with waves reaching heights of almost 10m at landfall in Sumatra (New Scientist 2005). At least 226,000 people died. In Aceh – the worst affected Indonesian province – 167,000 people were killed and over 500,000 displaced (Zeccola 2011). Impacts included the loss of homes, infrastructure, livelihoods and community facilities (Rofi et al 2006). The total amount of humanitarian assistance pledged by the US government was $35,000,000 (USAID Fact Sheet 2005). Alongside the Department of Defense’s response – named Operation Unified Assistance – USAID committed resources to the humanitarian effort in Indonesia. On December 27th, the US Ambassador Lynn Pascoe issued a disaster declaration and an initial $100,000 was provided to the Indonesian Red Cross for disaster assistance; the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) also provided $2,000,000 for food, water, sanitation and shelter provision (USAID Fact Sheet 2005). Two planes were dispatched carrying supplies (e.g. plastic sheets and water containers), and on 29th December USAID/Indonesia donated $1 million for NGO relief activities in Aceh, Sumatra (USAID Fact Sheet 2005).

As Hyndman (2007) argues, the geopolitics of humanitarian interventions can be rooted in the production of fear and nationalism to favour certain political constituencies. In this sense, humanitarian mobilizations can hide injustices and unequal power dynamics (Fassin and Pandolfi 2010). Fassin (2010: 269) defines ‘humanitarian government’ as the ‘introduction of moral sentiments into the political sphere’, with an underlying assumption that humanitarianism, motivated by an ethical mission to ‘save lives’, is separate from politics. He (2010) challenges this and argues that humanitarian ethical and political concerns are deeply interconnected. For example, as Mamadouh (2008) documents, the Dutch government’s response to the
2004 tsunami played an important part in fostering national unity and reconciliation. After the murder of anti-immigration and anti-Islam politician Pim Fortuijn on 6th May 2002 and right-wing filmmaker Theo Van Gogh on 2nd November 2004 by a Dutch national of Moroccan descent (Mohammed Bouyeri), anti-Muslim sentiments and far-right politics were on the rise in the Netherlands (Mamadouh 2008). However, the Dutch response to the tsunami, for example raising 124.6 million euros (by 12th January) in donations to a common bank account operated by Dutch NGO Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties (SHO), was seen as a symbol of national unity and reconciliation (Mamadouh 2008). Concerning the 2010 Pakistan floods, Amoore and De Goede (2011: 193) point to the hesitant reaction of Western countries in providing aid, highlighting a geography where ‘the victim subjects of Pakistan are rendered the risky and suspicious population in which future terrorist attacks have their origins.’ Against a backdrop of drone attacks on the Afghan-Pakistan border and the tight regulation of aid monies to charities (e.g. Islamic Relief), Amoore and De Goede (2011) note a humanitarian politics in which populations in Pakistan are imagined as simultaneously risky and vulnerable to terrorism. Similarly, I argue that the geopolitics of US intervention is partially grounded in imaginaries of perceived Anti-Americanism and naturalized assumptions about ‘Muslim’ populations and a ‘Muslim’ Other. As McGrady et al (2010: 51, a report for the Center for Naval Analyses) note, the US government is not mandated to respond to ‘foreign disasters’. The decision is made by the OFDA and many considerations can influence it (including national security interests ‘surrounding the event and the populations affected’, availability of assets, and level of need and sense of urgency). For McGrady et al (2010: 68), the OFDA decision to supply humanitarian aid after the 2004 tsunami is at least partially motivated by political reasons:

‘The large-scale response by the United States to the 2005 tsunami was influenced by several factors, including the immense size of the disaster, the long-standing relationship between the Indonesian armed forces and US armed forces, and the US desire to engage and support the large Muslim populations that were affected. The destruction caused by the tsunami was massive, and the Indonesian government recognized that it did not have adequate capabilities to respond. The five countries that Indonesia initially approached for assistance, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the US, were chosen based on their
existing ties with Indonesian armed forces as well as the capabilities they could provide.’

As this passage contends, one of the reasons for US humanitarian intervention in Indonesia was ‘the US desire to engage and support the large Muslim populations that were affected.’ As with earlier proclamations, this isolates Muslim communities and populations specifically. Indeed, in January 2006, US nonprofit Terror Free Tomorrow conducted a survey that showed that favourable opinions towards the US in Indonesia had increased from 34% to 44% from January 2005. Terror Free Tomorrow cite humanitarian aid as the key reason for this shift, with 65% of those surveyed confirming humanitarian relief was an important part of their favourable views. With bullet points of the implications of this survey, the first listed is (Terror Free Tomorrow 2006: 2): ‘American humanitarian assistance can make a significant and long-term different in building goodwill toward the United States and eroding popular support for global terrorists.’ Foregrounding the favourable opinions, Terror Free Tomorrow (2006: 1) contextualize this against a background of ‘widespread stories on Koran desecration, Guantanamo, even the Danish cartoons’. Based on these disparate sources of evidence, and the particular political locus of US humanitarian intervention on engagement with Muslim populations in Indonesia, I argue that this is rooted partially in naturalized assumptions about Muslim populations’ associations with or vulnerability towards terrorism and how this inflects anti-American sentiments. Together, these assumptions ground a ‘Muslim’ Other with a capacity for terrorism and links to anti-American sentiment. Articulated in US climate security discourse, they legitimize a range of political outcomes (for example objectives to reach out and engage ‘Muslim populations’) and manifest as part of the reasoning behind interventions, e.g. US military and USAID responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Conceptualized this way, discourses of climate change, terrorism and the geopolitics of humanitarian intervention suggest the intersectional interplay of (anti-)national imaginaries and racial logics in particular, context-specific moments of US climate security discourse. They also suggest that essentializing logics do not only orient racial and national identities towards possible outcomes in climate-insecure futures, but are also important constituents to justify interventions in the ‘here and now’ (or recent past in the case of the 2004 Indonesian Ocean Tsunami).
I argue that this particular politics of humanitarian intervention in US climate security is also biopolitical. Fassin (2007: 500) contends that humanitarian action constitutes a ‘politics of life’: ‘politics that give specific value and meaning to human life’. This differs from Foucauldian biopolitics in that politics of life relate not only to technologies of power and ways populations are governed, but ‘to the evaluation of human beings and the meaning of their existence’ (Fassin 2007: 500). Fassin (2007) accepts that humanitarian actions are biopolitical in a Foucauldian sense, for instance the management of refugee camps or population movements and disease pandemics. However, humanitarian politics of life are invested in selections about ‘which existences it is possible or legitimate to save’ and what ‘sort of life’ is taken into account in the political work of humanitarianism (Fassin 2007: 50). This involves demarcations about which lives can only be sacrificed (populations for whom humanitarians intervene), as opposed to lives that can be ‘risked’ (aid workers). It involves lives with higher value (e.g. expatriate humanitarian workers as opposed to national staff), and differences between those who are narrated in the first person (the interveners), and those recounted in the third person (‘voiceless’ victims in whose name a ‘cause’ is created and interventions occur) (Fassin 2007). In the case of US government intervention in Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Indonesia’s population becomes a point of biopolitical intervention in a humanitarian crisis. Indonesian populations, partially because of their Muslim-majority status and assumptions about a need for American outreach, are ‘selected’ as lives ‘to be saved’ in Fassin’s (2007: 500) terms. In this sense, the construction is not a ‘Muslim’ identity as a dangerous Other in this case, but rather naturalized assumptions about its possibility to become this in climate-insecure futures (‘Muslim’ populations’ capacity to favour extremist groups and anti-Americanism as a measure of this).

Thus, whereas essentializing logics underpin how populations (identified in moments of US and EU climate security discourse at their gendered, racialized, sexualized and national intersections) are oriented towards climate-insecure futures, they are also underpinned by unequal biopolitics of valued lives in humanitarian interventions. This chapter (exploring discussions of terrorism in US climate security) has therefore argued that naturalized assumptions partially legitimize geopolitical interventions and
outcomes in the present (and past) as well as climate-insecure futures. To conclude the thesis’ empirical chapters, I now explore how another form of essentializing logics – *national* logics – are implicated in the production of American nationhood in context-specific moments of US climate security discourse.
Chapter 6:

Representations of American nationhood and national logics in US climate security discourse

6.1 Introduction and research questions

1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?

2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?

3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security discourse?

To conclude the thesis’ empirical chapters, this chapter explores constructions of American nationhood in US climate security discourse. I contend that essentializing (national) logics function to articulate representations of what America ‘is’ or ‘represents’, both in terms of how what America is ‘now’ impacts future outcomes, and of what America ‘will become’ in conditions of climate insecurity. These representations contribute towards multiple, unequal biopolitics of valued lives in moments of US climate security (inspired by Fassin’s (2009) account of ‘bio-inequalities’ and discursive appropriations of valued lives) and are grounded in context-specific, unequal dynamics of power. Sections 6.2 and 3 examine constructions of American exceptionalism in climate security, especially a defensive, ‘fortressed’ American nation. Section 6.4 investigates the universalized interpretations of American nationhood, particularly concepts of American ‘values’, ‘leadership’ and ‘human security’. Section 6.5 situates American nationhood in the contexts of Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy and climate security in ‘the homeland’, before the chapter concentrates on representations of a ‘climate resilient’ America in relation to climate insecurities (Section 6.6). I begin by introducing concepts of American exceptionalism and their integration into climate change politics.
6.2 American exceptionalism in US climate security

In his (1998 (1992): 90) book *Writing Security*, Campbell writes of American identity: ‘If all states are “imagined communities,” devoid of ontological being apart from the many practices that constitute their reality, then America is the imagined community par excellence. For there has never been a country called “America” nor a people known as “Americans,” from whom a national identity is drawn.’ Supporting his argument that national identities are founded on discursive appropriations of difference, the subjective construction of risky or threatening ‘Others’ to national security objectives, Campbell later (p.170) identifies the US as ‘the state that requires a discourse of danger probably more than any other.’ This invocation of American identity as particularly representative of Anderson’s (2005 (1991): 49) ‘imagined communities’ relates to longer historical associations of American exceptionalism with exclusionary Othering practices. It also highlights Löfflman’s (2015) injunction to analyze ‘American exceptionalism’ not as a positivist assessment of strengths and weaknesses, but a concept discursively imbued in unequal power relations. Löfflman (2015: 313) contends American exceptionalism plays a central role in the country’s geopolitical imagination, conventionally defined as a ‘special and unique set of social, political and economic features [that] elevates the historical development of the United States above and beyond that of other nations.’ American exceptionalism is intricately intertwined with processes of Othering and injustice. The providential, ‘self-evident’ example the United States represents (embodied by principles of liberty, individualism, and democracy) – the ‘We-ness’ of America’s foundational myth – belies histories of racist subjugations of colonial Others, for instance Native Americans, African Americans and Arab Americans (Nayak and Malone 2009). American ‘exceptional’ geopolitical identity, and the externalized imaginative geographies this produces (of a progressive ‘Western’ nation juxtaposed against a backwards, regressive Other), is also linked to regional ‘internal Orientalisms’ which construct the American ‘South’ as a xenophobic outcast to a forward-looking ‘America’ (Jansson 2007). I argue these readings of American exceptionalism, grounded in ideas of exclusionary Othering practices and the exclusions these legitimate, are important for interpretations of American exceptionalism in moments of US climate security discourse.
From another perspective, Dittmer (2011: 115) presents an alternative reading of American exceptionalism; it ‘can be understood as the notion that the United States is unlike other states in terms of its creation, settlement, and sense of wider mission in the world’. Nayak and Malone (2009) contend it is Puritan leader John Winthrop’s (1630, cited in Nayak and Malone 2009: 264) declaration aboard the Arbella that ‘we shall by as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us’ that plays a foundational role in American exceptionalism. Winthrop conceived of New England as a site for propagation of the Gospel to Native Americans (Winthrop 1629, cited in Merchant 2012: 77). Stoll (2012: 97) notes that in European Puritans’ eyes North America was a continent for the future, divorced from ‘the past’ or the ‘Old World’. This vision carried a variety of exclusions. Merchant (1989: 100) writes: ‘Puritan leaders often brought with them ideas that legitimated the subjugation of wilderness and the subjection of women. Assumptions about generation, virginity, and marriage supported the Puritans’ treatment of nature and their cultural superiority over it.’ Puritans viewed the land as ‘virgin’, wild, untamed and destined for ‘marriage’ with the industry and agricultural labour of men (Merchant 1989). This approach subjugated Native American ways of life and those of ‘ordinary people’ among early settlers, many of whom were not regular Churchgoers and retained a perspective of nature grounded in the realities of everyday subsistence (Merchant 1989). Concepts of superiority, settlement and divine providence are important constituents of American exceptionalism and have been evoked in seminal moments of US history and during heightened periods of American nationalism, e.g. assertions of American superiority in the War on Terror (Toal 2003).

I argue American exceptionalism folds into constructions of American nationhood in climate security. Describing his PhD research with US climate security professionals, David (2014: 375-6) recollects that ‘many speakers referred to American identity ... pushing the idea of American exceptionalism while arguing that the problem is of such monumental proportions that the US is the only country that can lead the response to this collective action problem.’ However, beyond this there are very few accounts of American nationhood in climate security. With this in mind, this chapter examines how essentializing, national logics – introduced in Chapter 3, sections 3.7 and 3.8 – direct
representations of American nationhood (and connections to racialized identities) towards climate-insecure futures.

6.3 Defensive American exceptionalisms

An important manifestation of exceptionalism is a defensive, fortressed America in response to possible climate insecurities. This is underpinned by two ideas. First is that the relative vulnerability of the US is such that it could use its stronger adaptive capacity to withstand climate insecurities at the expense of other populations. Secondly, egocentrism (interpreted in terms of national self-interest and preservation of resources) is also noted as a justification for prioritizing the security of American citizens above others. In his examination of Halford Mackinder’s early 20th century geopolitics and American imperial geopolitics in the War on Terror, Kearns (2006) identifies three similarities. First are claims of a historical rupture, a suddenly changed world requiring a new geopolitical strategy. Second is of geopolitics as struggles for survival between different groups: the world is viewed as a dangerous, competitive place where national superiority takes precedence (Kearns 2006). Finally, Kearns (2006) notes both geopolitical accounts characterize military strategies as oriented towards a resource-defined heartland in global geo-economics. In the War on Terror, this is oil reserves in the Middle East. Whilst there are important differences in these narratives with defensive American exceptionalisms, there are some significant resonances. Earlier US climate security discourses (documents published from 2003-10) include claims of new, unprecedented geopolitical conditions; they are grounded in neo-Malthusian narratives of conflict and competition between self-interested, survivalist populations; and they focus on disputes over resources.

A prominent example is found in the abrupt climate change scenario outlined in the Pentagon-commissioned (2003) report by Peter Schwartz (former head of planning for Shell Oil) and Doug Randall (Global Business Network) (Diez et al 2016). The report is a significant early moment in US climate security discourses and speculates on the national security implications of an abrupt climate change scenario. This replicates a similar 100-year period from 8200 years ago in which annual temperatures drop by 5-6 degrees Fahrenheit over Asia, North America and Europe and temperatures increase
by 4 degrees Fahrenheit in Australia, South America and Southern Africa. Drought intensifies in critical agricultural regions, and winds and winter storms intensify in Western Europe and the North Pacific (Schwartz and Randall 2003; Diez et al 2016). Discussing the political implications of climatic changes, Schwartz and Randall (2003) refer to ‘defensive’, ‘fortressing’, or ‘walling’ outcomes repeatedly:

‘As global and local carrying capacities are reduced, tensions could mount around the world, leading to two fundamental strategies: defensive and offensive. Nations with the resources to do so may build virtual fortresses around their countries, preserving resources for themselves’ (p.2)

‘The United States turns inwards, committing its resources to feeding its own population, storing up its borders, and managing the increasing global tension’ (p.13)

‘The United States and Australia are likely to build defensive fortresses around their countries because they have the resources and reserves to achieve self-sufficiency’ (p.18)

In these excerpts, verb choices indicate differing degrees of modality in conditions of reduced carrying capacity. On p.2, the authors (2003) document tensions ‘could’ mount and nation-states ‘may’ build defensive fortresses. This is set against a neo-Malthusian background of resource scarcities and competition: ‘a discursive map of the globe in terms of so-called ‘carrying capacity’’ (Chaturvedi and Doyle 2015: 16-17; Hartmann 2010). In subsequent quotations the likelihood of possible actions increases as the US ‘turns’ inwards and the US and Australia ‘are likely’ to build defensive fortresses. Unlike essentializing logics based on how historic or present significations of racialized populations orient outcomes in climate-insecure futures, I argue that Schwartz and Randall (2003) instead speculate about how American nationhood will be constituted in conditions of climate insecurities, especially resource scarcity.

Significantly, this does not mean that defensive American identities are only future possibilities and without historical precedents. I argue the repeated invocation of defensiveness in this document contributes to an essentialization of this representation of American-ness. What changes is the formulation of the essentializing logic: rather than identity significations informing possible futures, it is future outcomes informing possible identity significations. In both cases, essentializing,
national logics orient representations of American nationhood in conditions of climate insecurity.

Representations of a defensive American nationhood suggest a neo-Malthusian narrative of resource scarcity and competiveness. This narrative suggests that, when worded as an enhanced ability to ‘preserve resources’ (p.2) or ‘achieve self-sufficiency’ (p.18), American exceptionalisms premised on greater adaptive capacity could produce defensive, ‘fortressed’ solutions to climate insecurities. Possessive pronouns, e.g. ‘their’ (p.2 and 18) and ‘themselves’ (p.2), indicate actions whereby nation-states – the United States and Australia in above excerpts – preserve or manage their own interests and valued (American or Australian) populations foremost. This argument also hints at a constructed representation of egocentric American exceptionalisms: a defensive US underpinned by self-interest and preservation. In terms of what this representation of American nationhood suggests about climate-insecure futures, it could be that climate-induced migration (CIM) is an important issue. For example, in an interview with The Independent (Johnston 2016) in the run-up to the Marrakesh COP meeting (26th October), Major General Munir Muniruzzaman warns against defensive, nationalistic solutions to possible climate-induced migration. Muniruzzaman is a former military advisor to the President of Bangladesh and chairman of the Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change (GMACCC) (GMACCC 2017a). The GMACCC is a coalition of serving and retired military leaders (and associated institutions) formed in 2009 to highlight the security implications of climate change and advocate action, including by the military, to minimize these risks (GMACCC 2017b). Referring to the possibilities of large climate-induced migrations in his interview, Major General Muniruzzaman states (cited in Johnston 2016):

‘Imagine, with an international community unable to cope with a few thousand Syrian refugees, what will happen when millions of people are on the move ... I’m very strongly of the opinion that walls are never a solution. You cannot build walls to stop people when they want to go to safety’
Going on to discuss climate change challenges in relation to the current system of Westphalian nation-states, Major General Muniruzzaman notes (cited in Johnston 2016):

‘What has become more difficult now is that we have boxed ourselves into the Westphalian system of states ... That is in conflict with nature, with the movement of people ... we need to find a common ground ... We need leaders with vision ... we have to have a global solution to the problem, this is a civilizational problem ... If we want to solve [these problems] with narrow nationalistic instincts, we will be adding more problems, not solving them.’

In these excerpts, Major General Muniruzzaman laments the possibility of ‘walling’ solutions to climate-induced migration. Against the backdrop of the ‘refugee crisis’ and the construction of border fences (e.g. by the Hungarian Government), he comments unequivocally that ‘I am very strongly of the opinion that walling solutions are never a solution ... You cannot build walls to stop people when they want to go to safety’. As such, and without reference to a particular nation-state, Muniruzzaman cautions against defensive, ‘wall’ solutions in possible climate-insecure futures, particularly with regard to climate-induced migration and ‘climate conflicts’. Muniruzzaman also situates these possibilities against the international system of Westphalian nation-states: ‘we have boxed ourselves into the Westphalian system of states’. The term ‘boxed’ – with connotations of being enclosed in a restricted space – reinforces the idea of defensive, constrained boundaries as unsuitable to climate-induced migration. It could be that as another means to avoid divisive boundaries or ‘boxing’, Muniruzzaman uses the pronoun ‘we’ to refer to human beings collectively, not to draw imaginative geographies between national populations. Furthermore, Muniruzzaman’s use of the term ‘civilization’ could refer to human ‘civilization’ as a whole, constructing a collective concept of ‘humanity’. Barnett (2007: 1361-2) identifies the same critique whereby although global solutions to climate change are called for, ‘most analyses of climate change are underpinned by the same spatial imaginary that underpins most standard geopolitical texts in that they categorize emissions as coming from states ... and most often frame the analysis of impacts in terms of states and world regions’. Critiquing this nation-statist imaginary and its
potential exclusions, Muniruzzaman notes that ‘narrow nationalistic instincts’ will only create ‘more problems’, not contribute to ‘solving them’.

Muniruzzaman articulates a view of ‘nationalistic instincts’ and ‘walls’ as ‘narrow’ and as ‘adding more problems’. Thought of in these terms, it could be that a defensive American nationhood also manifests as an egocentrism rejecting possible climate-induced migrants to protect ‘our’ resources first, resources ‘we’ are ‘entitled’ to. ‘Egocentrism’ should not be synonymized as ‘selfishness’. This representation is not a selfish motive to possess resources and which forbids a welcoming American nationhood, but a perceived requirement for protection and preservation in neo-Malthusian futures of resource scarcities, competition and mass migrations (Hartmann 2010). For example, in relation to US humanitarian interventions in possible climate-insecure futures, Campbell et al (2007: 85) write in The Age of Consequences that:

‘In a world that sees a 2 metre sea level rise, with continued flooding ahead, it will take extraordinary effort for the United States, or indeed any country, to look beyond its own salvation ... Altruism and generosity would likely be blunted. In a world with millions of people migrating out of coastal areas and ports across the globe, it will be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, for the United States to replicate the kind of professional and generous assistance provided to Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami.’

Campbell et al (2007: 85) state that in possible climate-insecure futures of a ‘2 metre sea level rise’ and ‘millions of people migrating out of coastal areas and ports across the globe’, ‘altruism and generosity would likely be blunted’. Thus, the national logic suggests that in possible climate-insecure futures of high climate-induced migration and sea levels, US (‘or indeed any country’) national characteristics of ‘altruism’ and ‘generosity’ could be affected by a more egocentric focus on ‘its own salvation’. It could be that the use of the pronoun ‘its’ and adjective ‘own’ capture this sense of possession and nation-states preserving their ‘own’ interests above others. In terms of possible outcomes suggested by this national logic, Campbell et al (2007: 85) note that US international assistance – as with its intervention in Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami – would be ‘extremely difficult, if not impossible’. The use of the term ‘salvation’ also suggests that not only would US international assistance be affected by
a more egocentric, self-preservationist approach (at the expense of national characteristics such as ‘altruism’ and ‘generosity’), but also that this is framed in terms of existential survival, a neo-Malthusian question of whether the US would continue to exist in resource-scarce insecure futures. In a 2015 interview with Rolling Stone magazine (September 23rd), Barack Obama describes the security risks of climate change impacts:

‘What we know about climate change ... is that with increasing drought, increasing floods, increasing erosion of coastlines, that’s going to impact agriculture; it’s going to increase scarcity in parts of the world; it is going to result in displacement of large numbers of people ... If the monsoon patterns in South Asia change, you can’t move tens of millions of people without the possibilities of refugees, conflict. And the messier the world gets, the more national security problems we have. In fact, there have been arguments that, for example, what’s happening in Syria partly resulted from record drought that led huge numbers of folks off the farms and the fields into the cities in Syria, and created a political climate that led to protests that Assad responded to in the most vicious ways possible. But that’s the kind of national security challenge that we’re looking at with climate change. It will manifest itself in different ways, but what we know from human history is that when large populations are put under severe strain, then they react badly. And that can be expressed in terms of nationalism; it can be expressed in terms of war; it can be expressed in terms of xenophobia and nativism; it can be expressed in terms of terrorism. But the whole package is one that we should be trying to avoid, if at all possible.’

It could be that in this excerpt Obama (cited in Goodell 2015) moves between several different types of essentializing logic. At the beginning of the excerpt, his comments are similar to what is described in Chapter 4, section 4.5 as a compulsive determinism. As opposed to an array of varied possibilities for how human populations ‘might’, ‘could’ or ‘may’ react in climate-insecure futures, Obama assumes to already ‘know’ that ‘it is going to result in displacement of large numbers of people’. However, Obama’s next comment introduces an additional layer of complexity into the scenario: ‘And the messier the world gets, the more national security problems we have’. In the earlier comments Obama forwards knowledge of what will happen in climate-insecure futures, not only in terms of climate change impacts (‘increasing floods’, ‘erosions of
coastlines’, etc.), but also in relation to how human populations will react to these changes (‘large displacement’). But, it could be that when Obama injects further complexity into the projected outcomes – epitomised by the phrase ‘the messier the world gets’ – the extent to which climate impacts delimit human populations’ outcomes in climate-insecure futures becomes more uncertain. At this point Obama refers to the example of the Syrian Civil War and, in outlining the causal connections that link climate changes to this conflict, appears to exercise a greater degree of caution. For instance, he states that ‘there have been arguments that’, and that ‘what’s happening in Syria partly resulted from record drought’. For this point, Obama recognizes debate and disagreement over the issue (‘arguments’), and is careful not to locate too high a degree of causal attribution to the drought (‘partly’). These decisions could reflect contestation over the evidence (from Gleick 2014 and Kelley et al 2015) that links climate change, drought and the Syrian Civil War, but also a scalar question about the specificity of the case study. Whereas Obama utilizes clearer language to talk about how climate changes will impact human populations *in general*, he is more careful about the *specific case* of Syria. As is outlined in chapter 5, section 5.4 (for this case study), this caution could also reflect the political implications of attributing the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War to climate change too directly. In this regard, Obama also documents the ‘protests that Assad responded to in the most vicious ways possible’. Thus, it could be argued that in his descriptions of various outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures (resource scarcities, displacement and conflict), Obama moves between different degrees of causal attribution and their impacts on human populations’ actions (from a compulsive determinism to complex causal chains).

In terms of how this affects the construction of a national logic in Obama’s interview, I argue that both deterministic constructions and those with a higher degree of modality (a less strict delimitation of outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures) are linked together in an interesting way. Again – and with a degree of relative certainty – Obama asserts that ‘what we know from human history is that when large populations are put under severe pressure, then they react badly’. This statement, as with others in chapter 4, section 4.5, assumes that in conditions of climate insecurity (‘severe pressure’), populations will react ‘badly’ (e.g. engage in disruptive migrations or
conflict). In line with a compulsive determinism, Obama assumes that populations will or are highly likely to react 'badly'. This does not account a range of other adaptive strategies, e.g. cooperation over resource allocation or livelihood diversification, which could result from populations under 'severe pressure'. Whereas the two quotes from CNA reports in section 4.5 (CNA 2007: 22; CNA 2014: 2) refer to populations from African and Asian countries, Obama (as with the quote from his West Point speech in section 4.5) refers to 'human populations’ more generally. This could be because Obama seeks to avoid an association (and potential naturalization) of specific populations with particular characteristics, e.g. a compulsion towards violent conflict. As Brown and Crawford (2009: 6) note, deterministic, neo-Malthusian narratives tend ‘to assume the worst in people; that they will fight rather than cooperate over scarce resources’. Thus, whilst it could be that Obama’s statement carries this assumption, he attributes this to ‘human populations’ in general, rather than assuming ‘the worst in people’ from ‘African’ and ‘Asian’ populations specifically. Importantly, I argue that Obama does still rely on a deterministic logic that essentializes (one that ‘assumes the worst’ in human populations: that they ‘react badly’), but this is not an essentializing logic that constructs a racial Other through the naturalization of particular populations (that ‘African’ or ‘Asian’ populations are compelled towards violence and disruptive migrations).

Instead, it is another component of an essentializing logic (as conceptualized in Chapter 3), of how essentialized identities could be constituted in possible climate-insecure futures – as with the examples from Schwartz and Randall (2003) earlier in this section – that suggests the essentializing logic could be constructed as a national logic in this case. Here, although Obama uses a deterministic statement that ‘human populations’ will ‘react badly’, the flexibility of the adjective ‘badly’ allows him to introduce a greater range of possibilities into the essentializing logic. After he comments that populations ‘react badly’, Obama clarifies that ‘this can be expressed’ in terms of ‘nationalism’, ‘war’, ‘terrorism’, ‘nativism’ and ‘xenophobia’. Thus, the broad semantic field of the adjective ‘badly’ allows for multiple possible outcomes in futures of climate insecurity. The modal verb ‘can’ in Obama’s repetition of the phrase ‘can be expressed’ also indicates openness to a broader range of possibilities in climate-insecure futures. As with Major General Muniruzzaman’s concerns, Obama
warns that resource-scarce climate-insecure futures could produce divisive, defensive outcomes, e.g. ‘nationalism’ or ‘nativism’. The national logic is therefore reflected in Obama’s concerns that, in conditions of climate insecurity, national populations – motivated by resource scarcities – could turn to divisive nationalisms, xenophobia or nativism. Fascinatingly, as I have argued, it could also be that both compulsive determinisms (that populations will ‘react badly’) and possibilistic variations (a broader range of possibilities that ‘can be expressed’ because of a flexible interpretation of ‘react badly’) come together in a novel manner in the constitution of this national logic.

The testimonies of Barack Obama, Schwartz and Randall (2003), Campbell et al (2007) and Major General Muniruzzaman suggest a national logic in which, faced with a situation of climate insecurities, a discursively produced image of a defensive, egocentric American exceptionalism (and reactions of other nation-states) mediates possibilities for what might happen in these scenarios. I argue this perpetuates a biopolitics of unequally valued (American) lives in which a fortressed exceptionalism facilitates a US in which American lives are favoured in conditions of climate insecurities and the mobility of others, e.g. possible climate-induced migrants, is restricted and regulated. In this case, unequal biopolitics do not depend on a delimited biological understanding of ‘life’, but consider how it is grasped by a ‘political and moral anthropology’ (Fassin 2009: 48-9) that shapes exclusions. Biopolitics build on Foucault’s (2004 (1976): 255) account of the ‘death-function’ of racism deciding on which lives are ‘killed’ (submitted to death, political subjugation, rejection etc.) to focus on the possible ‘bio-inequalities’ (Fassin 2009) of American climate security discourses. Representations of a defensive nationhood facilitate bio-inequalities based on national logics in climate-insecure futures: in a world of resource scarcities and CIM, an egocentrism and relative adaptive capacity suggest American populations would be preferentially valued in a fortressed nation. This masks fundamental connections between climate insecurities and climate injustices. In a study of how Indian government officials view climate security discourse, Boas (2014) finds a dominant perspective is that climate security is a Western strategy to ensure India fulfils its climate mitigation obligations. Boas (2014: 148) critiques the discourse’s Western and Northern-centrism: ‘this alarmist type of discourse on climate change and security ... is
largely Western-based ... their arguments largely build on the assumption that climate
crashes and climate migration will predominantly originate in the Global South. This
tends to give the Global South a stereotypical image of a vulnerable and dangerous
actor that can weaken the stability and prosperity of the Global North.’ Instead, Boas
(2014: 151) insists an alternative set of questions need to be asked: how do
‘vulnerable’ communities in the Global South perceive the climate-security nexus?
Which voices in Southern states support this framing of climate change and which do
not? What alternative visions of climate change emerge from actors in the Global
South? A defensive American exceptionalism, preoccupied with other nation-state
actors as threats or competitors to be ‘isolated’ from, constrains these questions. As
White (2014: 844-5) argues, a ‘fortress mentality’ approach ‘opens the door to gross
violations of human rights within communities and societies and nation-states ... it ...
bolsters the view that social and ecological problems are caused by perceived
‘enemies’ externally (as well as internally), not by our own actions.’ These conclusions
of insular representations of American exceptionalism in moments of earlier US
climate security discourse suggest national logics not only promote a biopolitics of
unequally valued American lives, but in doing so also potentially reproduce and mask
climate injustices in possible climate-insecure futures.

6.4 Universalized American nationhood

6.4.1 American ‘values’ and ‘leadership’

Another variant of American exceptionalism posits the universality of American values
(e.g. ‘democracy’, ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’). As Phillpot and Mutimer (2005) outline, this
includes a concept of ‘American innocence’ that asserts American righteousness and
externalizes violences intrinsic to the formation of national identity. As part of the
promotion of a beneficent self-image, American nationhood is articulated as a
commitment to universal values in particular, context-specific moments of climate
security discourse, for example the 2010 National Security Strategy. This is a document
produced by the Executive Branch and it outlines the security objectives, goals and
interests of the US government (White House 2010). Initially mandated by the
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act (1986) to be released
annually, in practice strategies are published every 5 years (National Security Strategy Archive 2016). The authors write (2010: no pagination):

‘The international order we seek is one that can resolve the challenges of our times – countering violent extremism and insurgency, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials, combating a changing climate and securing global growth ... In all that we do, we will advocate and advance the basic rights upon which our Nation was founded ... we reject the notion that lasting security and prosperity can be found by turning away from universal rights – democracy does not merely represent our better angels, it stands in opposition to aggression and injustice, and our support for universal rights is also fundamental to American leadership and a source of our strength in the world.’

In this excerpt, American national identity, or the ‘basic rights upon which our Nation was founded’, is articulated in terms of ‘universal rights’ and ‘the international order we seek’. The report posits an American duty to promote universal values (‘a source of our strength in the world’) and plays into a concept of a ‘providential mission’ or ‘duty’ to spread US values (Phillpot and Mutimer 2005). Interestingly, there is ambiguous usage of the collective pronouns ‘we’ and ‘our’; when referring to ‘our Nation’ this implies an American collective, when phrased as ‘the challenges of our times’, it could be that this is magnified to represent humanity. These debates also translate into discussions of American leadership. For example, in his 2014 West Point Speech (an important symbolic address to graduates of the West Point Military Academy, New York), Barack Obama notes:

‘American influence is always stronger when we lead by example. We can’t exempt ourselves from the rules that apply to everybody else. We can’t call on others to make commitments to combat climate change if a whole lot of our political leaders deny that it’s taking place ... That’s not leadership; that’s retreat. That’s not strength; that’s weakness. It would be utterly foreign to leaders like Roosevelt and Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy.’

Obama utilizes a war metaphor (‘combating’) to describe actions to mitigate climate change. He makes the case for American leadership grounded on commitment to
international law, cooperation and the strength of ‘example’. Unlike the National Security Strategy, the collective pronoun ‘we’ fosters a unified sense of American nationhood and an explicit call to avoid isolationism in ‘combating’ climate change. He invokes historical examples of American Presidents to construct this image of strong US leadership and simple sentences partitioned by semicolons to juxtapose positive and negative qualities, e.g. ‘that’s not strength; that’s weakness’. As such, it could be argued that, under a frame of national logics, Obama draws upon historic and current significations of US nationhood (American leadership, ‘values’, ‘example’, rule of (international) law and so forth) in order to suggest how America should be oriented towards climate-insecure futures. In this case, futures refer to ‘combating’ climate change and the ‘commitments’ required for this. Obama’s rhetoric also indicates his approach to American exceptionalism and differences across administrations. Dalby (2003) critiques the imperialist unilateralism of George W. Bush’s foreign policy and its construction of ‘wild’, ‘untamed’ spaces in the Middle East (notably Afghanistan) as beyond the rule of law. However, as Hayes (2016) notes, it is with the election of Barack Obama in 2009, with an explicit agenda to formulate policies on climate change, that climate security becomes more clearly institutionalized in the US security sector (e.g. the Department of Defense). Toal (2009) argues in an early analysis that Barack Obama presents American exceptionalism through five scripted ‘speech acts’.

First is an ‘ineluctable globalized condition’ (the increased porosity of political and economic borders); second is a range of new threats (including climate change); ‘collective security as a fundamental truth’ (the idea that American security is dependent on international security); fourth is the Bush administration’s record of foreign policy failures; and fifth is the opportunity and promise of hope and redemption (Toal 2009: 393). Löfflman (2015) demonstrates that whilst Barack Obama continues to represent American military capacity, economic power and values as ‘exceptional’, he has attempted to shift away from a unilateralist interventionism towards a cooperative notion of ‘burden-sharing’ or ‘leading from behind’. This chimes with Obama’s utilization of American exceptionalism in climate change politics: as the excerpts from the National Security Strategy (White House 2010) and West Point Speech (Obama 2014) attest to, Obama promotes the universality of ‘American’ values and situates these in a cooperative international role for the US.
A universalized interpretation of climate-secure American exceptionalism masks its own exclusions. Not only in the intrusive assumption that US-centric principles are universally applicable, but also as it could shroud the climate injustices and the ineffectiveness of American climate politics behind a veil of ‘American innocence’ (Phillpot and Mutimer 2005). On this, Derek Gregory (2004b) notes the revelation that, in April 2004, the Abu Ghraib prison – 20 miles from Baghdad – had been used as a site of torture, humiliation and horrific violence. The response in the United States was one of ‘condemnation followed by immediate absolution’; treatment of prisoners was ‘unacceptable but un-American’; ‘inexcusable but an exception’, the work of ‘a few rotten apples’ and not a ‘vast poisoned orchard’ (Gregory 2004b: 318). The violences of these crimes are acknowledged, but as something exceptional, contrary to the ‘American way’. In the West Point speech quote above, Barack Obama (2014) notes the mistakes of ‘our political leaders who deny that it’s [climate change] taking place’, but situates this divisive lack of cooperation and scientific insight as contrary to American nationhood, ‘utterly foreign to leaders like Roosevelt and Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy.’ Notwithstanding the important historical and geographical differences between this example and Gregory’s (2004b) argument, here Obama points to mistakes by American politicians (predominantly elected Republicans), but counteracts these with an all-embracing representation of ‘American innocence’ to cast them as the exception. This is reinforced by the phraseology of ‘utterly foreign’, which explicitly differentiates these viewpoints from a universalized American exceptionalism or leadership. Thus, Barack Obama draws upon historic significations of American leadership – the figures of past presidents – to consolidate the need for this leadership (and the ‘innocence’ of its values and superiority) in climate-insecure futures and presents. However, whilst this approach occludes exclusions of American nationhood by underscoring these as exceptions, I also argue that universalized concepts of American climate security are imbued with unequal power relations that value the securities of particular populations over others. I now discuss this in relation to an uptake of human security in US climate security discourse.
6.4.2 Human security

Introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report, ‘human security’ has seven components: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (UNDP 1994). These securities are backed by four principles. First is a universal concern relevant to all people; second is that each element of security is interdependent with the others; third is a move towards early prevention strategies; and fourth is a shift in the security referent from states to human beings (UNDP 1994). Emphases on international humanitarian intervention and human rights are fundamental axioms of human security (Chandler 2012). The concept’s core proposition is a shift in security referent from nation-states to individuals (O’Brien 2003). It has been taken up by academics to explore environmental change (Barnett et al 2008). For instance, Barnett and Adger (2007) explore the intersections of climate change, conflict and human security to hypothesize which factors influence individuals – predominantly young men – to join guerrilla groups.

Human and national securities are also occasionally framed in opposition to one another in climate security (Edwards 1999; Schoch 2011). For example, as Jasparro and Taylor (2008: 233) declare in relation to transnational security threats: ‘As such they operate at the intersection of often competing notions of human security and traditional understandings of state/national security.’ Or, from Dabelko (2009: 16): ‘Within the traditional narrow view of security (as opposed to the broader “human security” view), there are a variety of ways actors perceive climate change as an appropriate area of concern’. This dichotomy is reaffirmed by Kaldor’s (2007) argument that human security moves away from state-based governance and is increasingly embedded in international frameworks. Whilst it is important not to essentialize a single, homogenized human security ‘project’ (Owen 2008), Chandler (2008: 427) christens human security as ‘the dog that didn’t bark’; it has been mainstreamed in international policy circles, but this integration only works to reconfirm existing inequalities of nation-state power. For Chandler (2008), this is enabled by three trends: increased recognition of post-Cold War security threats (e.g. environmental degradation), the location of security ‘threats’ in the ‘developing world’
and in requirement of humanitarian intervention, and the privileging of short-term decision-making at the expense of long-term, strategic foreign policy.

Although human security has received significant attention in climate security discourses, this is still substantially lower than national security appraisals of climate change (McDonald 2013). However, McDonald’s (2013) typology relies on distinct discourses of ‘human’ and ‘national’ security from which he can then identify inequalities between these discourses. Treating climate security as a single yet heterogeneous discourse, in this section I argue a key trend is increased uptake of human security concerns by American security actors from 2010 onwards. This trend represents an important objective to not only explore human security in international forums, but also how nation-states utilize the concept in connection with national security. In the specific case of the Department of Defense, it could be that this sublimates human security to national security interests. Therefore, as with a universalized American exceptionalism, human security promotes the idea of humanity as a reference point of US security actors, but this is ultimately subsumed within a ‘bio-normative geopolitics’ (Gerhardt 2009: 499) which privileges particular – American – populations over others. In an early piece, Liotta (2002: 473) locates the increasing prevalence of ‘non-traditional’ security threats: ‘climate change, resource scarcity, declining productivity … criminality and terrorism – the developed world was now confronted with human-centred vulnerabilities that had often been present previously only in … non-traditional challenges for developing regions.’ He postulates the future may witness a blurring of state security and human security concerns and the growth of non-discrete, non-immediate or clearly identifiable ‘vulnerabilities’ requiring complex, multi-scalar and multiagency responses (Liotta 2002). This trend – of increasing interconnections between human security and national security – is also reflected in moments of US climate security discourse. It could be that this reflects a trend towards increasing coordination of activities by USAID (United States Agency for International Development), the Department of State and the Department of Defense. For example, in 2009 USAID’s Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation produced a preliminary report that explores the interrelations between climate change, adaptation and conflict. The Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) was founded in 2002 to lead USAID’s efforts to understand and address sources of
political instability and violent conflict (USAID 2017). Discussing relationships between climate change and potential instability, USAID CCM (2009: 5) note:

‘Factors linking climate change and the potential for conflict include a number of powerful threats to human security, such as land degradation, water scarcity, decreased food production, increased mortality from diseases, unplanned migration, and hazards associated with extreme weather events. Populations will have to grapple with these severe challenges, and as numerous experts have noted, these effects are likely to be most acute in countries already struggling with low levels of development, persistent poverty, limited social systems services, and in some cases, pre-existing social and political instability. Such threats to human security, especially if unmitigated, have strong potential to increase dramatically grievances that are often precursors to conflict.’

In this excerpt, USAID CCM identify a range of factors that could be exacerbated by climate change impacts (e.g. ‘water scarcity’, ‘land degradation’ or ‘decreased food production’). They stress that these factors could be threats to human security and draw connections with the potential for violent conflict. For example, USAID CCM (2009) write of ‘powerful threats to human security’, that ‘populations will have to grapple with these difficult challenges’, and that ‘such threats to human security’ could ‘increase dramatically grievances that are often precursors to conflict’. Given USAID’s mandate to promote international development, it is understandable that these trends are situated specifically in relation to countries with a ‘low level of development’ and human security concerns – associated with human development (Kaldor 2007) – are emphasized above other concepts of security. However, I argue that the uptake of human security concerns is not limited to USAID, but also across other US Government departments. Overseen by then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, in 2010 the first Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review (QDDR) was published (Department of State 2010). The 2010 QDDR (p.21) states that: ‘development, diplomacy, and defense, as the core pillars of American foreign policy, must mutually reinforce and complement one another in an integrated, comprehensive approach to national security’. Through an elevation of USAID’s role in US foreign policy, and an emphasis that ‘development’ and ‘diplomacy’ are fundamental components (alongside ‘defense’) of an ‘integrated, comprehensive’ approach to national security, the QDDR
(2010) represents an explicit attempt to change how actors within the US Government conceptualize security. As a part of this agenda, the QDDR (2010: 42-3) emphasizes the importance of human security. The QDDR (2010: 42-3) states that in order to recognize this importance, the Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs would be reorganized into an Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights. Human security issues that the Department of State lists as important to its mandate include preventing and responding to conflicts, managing humanitarian and refugee crises, advancing human rights and democracy, and countering convergent transnational threats such as narcotics (Anderson 2014). As the QDDR (2010: 42-3) highlights:

‘Our national security depends on human security – on preventing and responding to crisis and conflict, securing democracy, and advancing human rights. Advancing human rights and democracy is a key priority that reflects American values and promotes our security’

In this quotation, the Department of State note clearly that human security is a fundamental ingredient to US national security. ‘Human security’ is qualified through concern for preventing ‘conflict’, ‘securing democracy’, and ‘advancing human rights’. The use of the collective pronoun ‘our’ with reference to ‘our national security’ and ‘our security’ affirms the importance of human security concerns for the preservation of American – ‘our’ – national security. However, it could be that although the Department of State refers to the importance of human security concerns – e.g. ‘advancing human rights’ – this is to underline the role of human security in the protection of American national security interests, not to promote human security more broadly. Thus, a human security agenda is promoted by the Department of State – including a heightened role for USAID – but this is not to promote human security (the security of human beings in its broadest sense) in and of itself, but to explore how human security concerns are implicated in US national security. Therefore, although the collective pronoun ‘our’ presages security, the ‘our’ denotes an American collective to be secured, not a collective at the scale of ‘humanity’ or ‘human beings’. All of these developments speak to a shift indicating increased attention to human security in American security debates and American climate security in particular, but
uncertainties about the implications of this shift. This analysis takes these uncertainties as its starting point and does not seek to reduce the complexity of security concepts in US climate security to a single narrative. Instead, I focus on one particular discursive strand from DOD publications and interpret this as accepting the influence of human security factors in climate insecurities, but only to the extent these bolster national security interests (as with the QDDR excerpt above (2010: 42-3). I start with the DOD’s 2011 Report of the Defense Science Board (a final publication of the Defense Science Task Force, a group convened by the DOD to explore the national security implications of climate change):

‘This report provides a set of recommendations on approaches to adaptation and dealing with the near-term effects on populations that impact US and international security interests. The report addresses the need and prospects to address the near-term impact on human populations and longer-term adaptation to climate change. The impact on human populations, near- and long-term, translates into impact on national and international security’ (p. VII)

‘The conventional view of national security is based on conflict and economic interests. Threats to a state are often seen in terms of territory, migration, access to resources (energy, water, food, and materials), or markets. Climate change threats are much less focused. Human security lies at the heart of the climate change threat to US national security. Conventional national security threats arise from human security origins. Dealing with climate change requires a human security-based strategy to prevent emergence of national security challenges’ (p.78)

These passages underscore the centrality of human security to national security imperatives. In the first quotation, the DOD stress that the near-term impacts of climate change on ‘human populations’ (and the long-term challenge climate adaptation) as being important for ‘national security’ and ‘international security’. As the DOD reports: ‘The impact on human populations, near- and long-term, translates into impact on national and international security’. Thus, human security concerns are fundamental to national security outcomes. This is also affirmed by the lexis ‘heart’ and assumption human security is at the ‘origins’ of national security in the second excerpt. Repeated qualification of national security as ‘conventional’ reiterates the
difference human security makes to traditional security concepts. In this sense, a teleological pathway is constructed in which national security threats ‘arise’ from human security ‘origins’, or a ‘human security-based strategy’ is required to prevent ‘emergence of’ national security issues. Whilst this establishes direct connections between human and national security, it does not suggest a usurping of national security or increased prominence of human security. National security remains the ‘endpoint’ or ‘pinnacle’ of the teleology. Discussing the dominance of territorial, state-based security concepts in US climate security discourse, Diez et al (2016) note that discourses of ‘individual danger’ (associated with human security) play a part, but are linked to ‘territorial danger’ concepts. They (2016: 49) write: ‘the individual security discourse is normally only part of a chain of argument that in the end focuses on territorial security considerations.’ This finding supports a teleological interpretation whereby human security figures in moments of US climate security discourse, but only as part of a chain of causal reasoning that poses national or territorial security interests or dangers as its conclusion. Therefore, it could be argued that human security is a cornerstone in DOD’s Report of the Defense Science Board excerpts, but only to the extent it relates to or produces national security ‘threats’. In the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of Defense (p.8) enunciates:

‘Climate change may exacerbate water scarcity and lead to sharp increases in food costs. The pressures caused by climate change will influence resource competition while placing additional burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions around the world. These effects are threat multipliers that will aggregate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions – conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence.’

Here, the DOD does not isolate human security directly. However, issues within the remit of human security discourses, e.g. poverty, environmental degradation and food costs (Kaldor 2007), are situated within the DOD’s climate security language. Human security stressors are again illustrated in a teleological form of argumentation in which ‘poverty’ and ‘political instability’ can produce ‘terrorist activity’ and ‘other forms of violence’ as endpoints – similar to discursive constructions of climate change-terrorism interconnections as a causal chain in chapter 5, section 5.4. In both of these examples,
concepts implicated in ‘human security’ discourses are given an important status in DOD strategies. However, in both texts this is part of a broader conception of national security: whether human security issues participate in the construction of higher order national security ‘threats’, or human security is instrumentalized for the pursuit of American national security interests. This is a hierarchical relation in which, although important to the DOD’s security objectives, human security is relegated below national security. Given these are positions of federal security bodies, it is unsurprising to find a preference for national security and this trend represents only one discursive strand of human-national security interactions in US climate security debates.

For this particular interpretation, I argue a human security perspective subsumed within national security interests contributes to biopolitics of unequally valued lives in context-specific moments of US climate security discourse. I contend these biopolitics – ‘bio-inequalities’ in Fassin’s (2009: 48-9) terms – are grounded in differential valuations demarcating which populations are designated as the referents of US climate security (whether this is ‘human’ populations more broadly, or ‘American’ populations in national security). The chapter employs Gerhardt’s (2009) concept of ‘bio-normative geopolitics’ to explicate these biopolitics. In this regard, my argument is not that national logics construct imaginative geographies that exclude less valued lives – e.g. possible climate-induced migrants – from a fortressed, ‘exceptional’ America. Rather, a discursive strand is constructed that perpetuates an American climate security premised on universal values (human security) and subsumes this within an uneven biopolitical hierarchy (national security interests). Gerhardt (2009) argues an important dimension of trans-territorial state power concerns the biopolitical reach of this sovereign power. This reach creates the possibility for a global ‘meta-sovereign’ with the capacity to intervene internationally to preserve ‘universal life’ (Gerhardt 2009: 495). Gerhardt (2009: 496) names this ‘bio-normative geopolitics’: ‘the calculations of the sovereign state with regard to the global organization of the valuation of life.’ Bio-normative-geopolitics is grounded in ‘global governmentality’, the practices and rationalities of governing responsibly for populations worldwide. This postulates a global ‘meta-sovereign’ (with normative principles of universal human rights) with a capacity to intervene in the protection of human life above the jurisdiction of nation-states.
In the absence of a universal meta-sovereign, Gerhardt (2009: 496) argues the US has pursued a ‘quasi metasovereign status’ unilaterally, underpinned by representations of American nationhood as the embodiment of universal values and humankind. A quasi-metasovereign status allows the US ‘to claim a global valuation of life while at the same time deflecting the practical requirements entailed in actually enforcing this valuation’ (Gerhardt 2009: 497). However, I argue the US’s role in a bio-normative geopolitics – its status as a quasi-metasovereign – fosters pervasive inequalities behind an imaginary of America as a universal assigner of values and preserver of human life. I propose this concept is applicable to the uptake of human security concerns by US defense actors. With ‘humanity, ‘human rights’ or ‘human beings’ as its referent point, it could be that human security is a ‘bio-normative’ concept, a universal valuation to preserve human life. If human security is subsumed within national security interests (with human insecurities as stressors for national security ‘threats’, or national security ranked as superior to human security), national security negates a universally equal valuation of human lives in conditions of climate insecurity. Instead, this national logic prioritizes the lives of those important to American national security interests in climate-insecure futures. However, whereas defensive readings of American nationhood are predicated on the assumption climate insecurities are generated outside the US, there is also increasing recognition climate change impacts US ‘homeland security’. Section 6.5 explores this trend in relation to essentializing, national logics of American nationhood – and their concomitant unequal biopolitics – in the contexts of Hurricane Katrina (2005) and Hurricane Sandy (2012).

6.5 Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy

6.5.1 Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina plays an important role in American histories of racism, neoliberalism, militarization, climate change, and disaster management (Bakker 2005). Katrina struck New Orleans at 6.10am on August 29th, 2005 (Merdjanoff 2013). Within 3 hours, the storm breached the floodwalls of the Lower Ninth Ward, flooding the city’s poorest neighborhoods and 80% of New Orleans (Merdjanoff 2013). Over 1
million residents were displaced from their homes, with the majority of the population of greater New Orleans evacuated, and 1000 people are known to have died (Bakker 2005). New Orleans has a history of high vulnerability to flood events and public works to manage this. Colten (2002) notes that from its founding in 1718 (by French colonists), the city has undergone a range of engineering projects, for example the extension of the sewerage system in the late 19th-early 20th century. There were a series of attempts to heighten the natural levees in the 20th century. But, while the draining of wetlands allowed for urban sprawl, this resulted in soil compaction and subsidence; accelerated by canalization to assist local oil industries, Louisiana had lost an estimated 1 million acres of coastal wetland since 1930 (Bakker 2005). Channelization and wetland reduction (to absorb flood impacts) also contributed to an amplification of storm surges in New Orleans (Bakker 2005).

Furthermore, Katrina exacerbated existing social inequalities in New Orleans. Merdjanoiff (2013) notes that prior to the storm 28% of the city’s population required federal and state assistance and median household income was 35% below the national average; this was particularly acute for African Americans, with 43% resident in neighborhoods with extreme poverty. Giroux (2006: 174) argues Katrina did ‘shatter the conservative fiction of living in a color-blind society’, laying bare the country’s ‘racial and class fault lines’. TV images emerged of bodies floating in the floodwaters and people shepherded into New Orleans’ Convention Center (19,000) and Superdome (24,000), stranded for days with limited medical assistance, food and water supplies (Bakker 2005). 80% of residents in flooded areas were non-White, whilst 52% of African Americans were without access to a car (for evacuation) compared to 11% of poor Whites (Rhodes 2010). On 1st September, martial law was declared and 65,000 military personnel were drafted into the city (Giroux 2006). Stories emerged of African Americans prevented from crossing the Mississippi River (into the affluent Gretna suburb) by armed police (Rhodes 2010). These images contributed to racialized, classed representations of poor African Americans in New Orleans as ‘looters’, ‘trespassers’ or ‘refugees’ (Rhodes 2010). As Giroux (2006) notes, the term ‘refugee’ implies New Orleans residents are external to their city, denied legal citizenship and rights. Gotham (2014) states that the Louisiana Road Home Program, launched in 2006 to provide compensation to homeowners and renters impacted by Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, was also exclusionary. Under program rules, grants were calculated on the basis of the lower of two numbers: a home’s pre-storm value and the cost of storm-damage (Gotham 2014). Therefore, if the pre-storm house price was lower than storm-damage costs, homeowners would receive a smaller grant. Because low-income African American communities resided in areas with depressed house prices, this disproportionately affected their chances of receiving an adequate repair grant (Gotham 2014). Reflecting on the racialized inequalities of Katrina and what this suggests about American nationhood and climate change politics more broadly, Naomi, an environmental justice professional in the US, notes:

‘Um ... to some extent I’ll start there because climate is still not even really ... it’s not like the whole country has embraced climate change is happening [inaudible] ... I would say more than anything um ... I would say it’s impacts in terms of disaster ... but with Hurricane Katrina as an example just the images of Hurricane Katrina and the language that was used from Hurricane Katrina around refugees and looters and so forth um ... in some ways it kind of deepens the divide because it dehumanizes the people who were affected by Hurricane Katrina ... so I think that while the impacts of climate change are exacerbating or perpetuating race-based perceptions [inaudible]’

Naomi argues the language of ‘refugees’ and ‘looters’ surrounding Katrina dehumanized those impacted by the hurricane. She highlights disasters – because they can underscore social inequalities – as a means through which American ‘race-based perceptions’ and ‘deepened divides’ are exposed. She is careful to point out the relation to American nationhood is more nuanced than this, and ‘it’s not like the whole country has embraced climate change is happening’. Although the final part of the excerpt is inaudible, the conjunction ‘while’ indicates a racialized response to disasters and American nationhood is only one part of the reality. In the specific context of Katrina, Giroux (2006: 175) argues the disaster response was exemplary of a ‘biopolitics of disposability’: ‘hyper-neoliberalism is now organized around the best way to remove or make invisible those individuals and groups who are either seen as a drain or stand in the way of market freedoms, free trade, consumerism, and the neoconservative dream of American empire.’ Poor Americans, especially people of colour, are expected to sustain themselves independently of state assistance. While
the New Orleans Army Corps of Engineers requested more funding to support the levees and there were repeated warnings about the city’s vulnerability, the Bush government cut the Army Corps funding by $0.5 billion in 2002 (Giroux 2006). Similarly, funding for FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), tasked with managing disaster response, had been cut by 10% since 2003 (Rhodes 2010). Giroux (2006: 181-2) identifies a biopolitics – oriented around race-class intersections – that ‘includes state-sanctioned violence’ and ‘relegates entire populations to spaces of invisibility and disposability’.

Braun (2005) contends that Katrina highlighted a biopolitics of ‘abandonment’. He (2005: 808) argues that ‘abandoned being is internal to American democracy … Katrina revealed that the potential for abandoned being is present and often realized in the spaces of the nation itself, in its cities, streets, sewers, markets, housing and hospitals.’ Braun (2005) and Giroux (2006) conclude that Katrina revealed unequal biopolitics of valued lives (and devalued as ‘abandoned’ or ‘disposable’), populations in American politics demarcated by racial, class and national intersections. Though difficult to attribute individual storms to climate change, Buxton and Hayes (2015) contend Hurricane Katrina was a ‘watershed moment’ in the need to focus on the welfare of present and future generations, not to produce a militarized response with American citizens as security threats. They (2015) worry a national security approach detracts from climate change as a social justice issue and compounds the injustice that ‘those least responsible for climate change will be most affected’.

However, American environmental justice groups and civil rights organizations have conceived of climate change in terms of injustice. For example, the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) has an Environmental and Climate Justice Program, premised on the notion that environmental injustices have disproportionate impacts on people of colour and low-income communities in the US and worldwide (NAACP 2016a). The program works to reduce harmful pollution (e.g. advocacy to enforce environmental regulations), operating at the state, federal and local levels to promote renewable energy schemes and incentives, and strengthening community resilience and liveability (e.g. promotion of participatory democracy) (NAACP 2016b). In a blog entry based on remarks given at the University of California,
Santa Cruz, on the ‘geopolitics of climate change’ (February 27th, 2016), Director of the NAACP Environmental and Climate Justice Program Jacqueline Patterson argues that the impacts and drivers of climate change are politically and geographically grounded. She writes that decision-making spaces (e.g. courtrooms, the UN and Congress) must transform to be ‘truly representing the needs of the people, the nations, and the planet they should serve’ (Patterson 2016). This call to action crosses political contexts: ‘Bound by darker hued skin, political disenfranchisement, and disproportionate impact, nations in the Global South and communities of color in the global North ... these communities and nations share common cause against the moneyed goliaths of the world’ (Patterson 2016). Patterson’s vision of the ‘geopolitics of climate change’ is explicitly grounded in racialized and classed inequalities. Her argument includes a multi-scalar perspective incorporating communities within the US and ‘nations’ from the ‘Global South’, and a call to transform the decision-making spaces and processes that embody these inequalities. In the case of the NAACP’s Environmental and Climate Justice Program (headed by Jacqueline Patterson), it could be that alternative visions of multi-scalar ‘climate security’ and ‘geopolitics’ – driven by principles of environmental justice – are proposed in a US context. As with the example of Green Muslims in chapter 4 (section, 4.5), these conceptions are embedded in unequal power relations, but nonetheless represent partial, alternative voices in American climate security discourse. On a similar theme of multi-scalar climate (in)securities, the case of Hurricane Sandy is now discussed.

6.5.2 Hurricane Sandy

Despite the significance of Katrina for American politics more broadly, in the particular context of US climate security debates interviewees noted Hurricane Sandy as an important turning point. Sandy was a post-tropical cyclone that swept through the East Coast in 2012 (Sharp 2012). The storm made landfall at 8pm (29th October), striking near to Atlantic City (New Jersey) with 80mph winds. As of November 1st, almost 4.7 million people (in 15 states) were without access to electricity and the storm led to $20 billion worth of property damage across the US Northeast. The confirmed death toll was at least 149 individuals, with 42 fatalities in New York and 12 in New Jersey (Sharp 2012). Though less severe than Katrina, poverty rates were on average higher in
flooded tracts of New York City than dry areas. African American communities were more likely to be flooded (alongside elderly Whites), and transport disruption had the greatest impacts for Asian and Latino neighborhoods in Queens (Faber 2015). It could be that Hurricane Sandy highlights a nuanced, multi-scalar politics that touches on climate change impacts in the US. Traveling to the US for fieldwork – in September 2014 – I remember encounters of personal stories from Sandy. Flying into John F. Kennedy airport, I was asked by the border guard at immigration control about the purpose of my journey (to validate my Visa Waiver application). After introducing the project as about American climate politics, she identified this as a contentious issue for New Yorkers and noted how many of her friends were still affected by displacement, damaged properties, and insurance claims after Hurricane Sandy. This example indicates individual anecdotes as a means to relocate climate (and human) insecurities to the scale of Americans’ everyday lives.

In contrast, Smith (2001) detects an inverse trajectory for the scalar politics of 9/11. He (2001) asks how in the aftermath of a terrorist attack that was simultaneously local (involving emergency services in Lower Manhattan) and global (with victims of many nationalities), 9/11 was rendered into a distinctly ‘American’ tragedy and infringement of ‘US’ national security by the Bush administration. Dalby (2003: 73) develops a scalar politics of nationhood further: ‘the lesson of 11 September may well finally be a recognition that the splendid isolation of America as a separate continent, a geopolitics of isolation, is longer possible.’ For Dalby (2003: 73), ‘the geographical categories of Americans’ are changing to calibrate their interconnectedness in a globalized world. These examples underline important differences between Katrina and Sandy. Katrina demonstrates how environmental insecurities (a hurricane) are implicated in the exposition and reproduction of racialized, classed and gendered inequalities ‘inside’ the American nation. Sandy – interpreted in response to a defensive, fortressed conception of American nationhood in which climate securities are perceived as ‘external’ – represents a turning point in how climate change threatens the security of ‘the American homeland’. I argue it is this idea that climate securities are perceived to impact Americans directly (rather than an ‘external’ threat or one which impacts particular populations rendered as ‘disposable’ (Giroux 2006)) that underpins a shift in US climate security discourse to incorporate the idea of
‘resilience’. This is not held in causal relation with Hurricane Sandy (which occurred in 2012 after climate resilience is first institutionalized in US government policy), however. National logics of a ‘climate-resilient’ American nationhood portray the US as adaptive, resourceful, and able to respond to a world of climate insecurities directly impinging American interests, territory and populations. Section 6.6 explores these representations in US climate security.

6.6. Climate-resilient American nationhood

6.6.1 A climate-resilient national subject?

The discursive subject position of a climate-resilient American nation is intricately interconnected with a multi-scalar politics of resilient subjectivities. Importantly, whereas I contend a climate-resilient nationhood is discursively constructed in US climate security, this contradicts parts of the critical resilience literature in which resilient subjectivities operate at several scales, including individuals, communities and globally, but move away from the nation-state as a resilient subject (Coaffee and Fussey 2015). Ecologist C.S. Holling (1973: 17) first defines resilience as that which ‘determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes ... and still persist.’ Resilience is an ability of ecosystems to absorb changes and continue to function; it can encompass socio-ecological dynamics within a complex adaptive system framework and is characterized by adaptation, survival and self-empowerment (Cooper and Walker 2011). A subject’s (in)security is not only dependent on the character, severity and unpredictability of potential threats (vulnerability), but also the resilience of the subject to these threats (Cavelty et al 2015: 4).

Anderson (2015) supplements this to argue that resilience is the latest ‘promise’ of security. Furthermore, in their study of ‘security-driven resilience’ practices in the UK, Coaffee and Fussey (2015: 95) note resilience’s ‘fluid’ and ‘complicated’ scalar politics, but nonetheless chart a shift from ‘national protection’ to ‘localized prevention and self-organizing responses’. A shift to localized scales of resilience also corroborates a similar development of individualized resilient subjectivities grounded in neoliberal
governmentality: ‘knowing when and how to exploit uncertainty to invent a new and better future is ... a prominent feature of the adaptable, flexible and enterprising subject of resilience’ (O’Malley 2010: 505-6). Chandler (2013b: 220) adds to this the concept of the ‘autotelic self’, an individual subject capable of self-governing in a world of ‘radical uncertainty’ and ‘contingency’, and which ‘turns insecurity into self-actualization’ and ‘growth’. Rather than a universalized liberal subject endowed with a will to know and secure its external world, the autotelic self is focused on the internal, cognitive development of an individual (Chandler 2013: 220). I contend that all of these examples exhibit a shift towards resilience produced as an adaptive, entrepreneurial subject flourishing in uncertain circumstances.

Resilience is also constructed at a universal scale, part of a global, liberal order of governmentality (Corry 2014). Evans (2013: 40, original emphasis) contends the resilient subject traverses a contingent, complex landscape defining ‘the topos of contemporary politics’ in which ‘late liberalism’ is characterized by contingency and immanence. Asked in an interview about whether the discourse of resilience is linked to ‘a new period in our civilization’, Reid (2016) replies: ‘Absolutely ... what is different today is the way resilience has become so powerfully discursive and self-evident ... It is so prevalent and obvious that you don’t have to read Adam Smith or liberal philosophy in order to see this theory of subjectivity on display ... Everything is resilience nowadays.’ However, with its acceptance of a world of perpetual insecurities, resilience can hamstring possibilities for resistance (Neocleous 2013). It can redistribute responsibility for insecurities or ‘lack of resilience’ away from governments and onto individuals or communities (Cavelty et al 2015). In the context of CIM, Methmann and Oels (2015: 64) critique resilience’s tendency to ‘eliminate the political’. They (2015) note how it shifts responsibility onto those affected by climate impacts (and possibly away from high emitting states), and naturalizes climate change as an inevitable fate people must endure. Corry (2014: 262) also critiques a presumed resilient neoliberal universality for first relying on a ‘theoretically overdetermined model of Foucauldian governmentality’ understood as neoliberal governmentality with a global reach; and second for postulating resilience as a totalizing, fully-fledged regime without any clinks. To challenge universalizing models of an individualized resilient subjectivity on the one hand, and of a globalized universality on the other, I
follow Brassett and Vaughan-Williams (2015) lead to explore the ambiguities and multiplicities of resilience. As such, I emphasize that resilience articulates heterogeneous subjectivities and refuses the possibility of ‘one resilient subject’ (Anderson 2015: 61).

In doing so, Anderson (2015) acknowledges that resilience does not require its subject to be an individual, but can involve collective subjectifications. I argue a climate-resilient nationhood is constructed in US climate security discourse. This is not to detach resilient subjectivities from neoliberal governance, or from the unequal power relations identified by Neocleous (2013) and Methmann and Oels (2015), but to situate these as particular (interconnected) articulations of resilience with nationhood. I argue national logics construct climate-resilient American nationhood in two respects: first, through the pursuit of a shared, resilient nation in conditions of climate insecurity; and second, with the use of historic and current significations to suggest climate-resilient American futures. Although they are different to racial logics which construct a racial ‘Muslim’ Other in conditions of possible future climate insecurities, all of these constructions contribute to uneven biopolitics of valued lives in particular, context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourses.

6.6.2 Histories of resilience in the US

Cooper and Walker (2011) point out that resilience was first utilized in 1970s US security policy when an alternative, decentralized grid was proposed to promote energy independence. However, it reached increased prominence with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, in November 2002, preceded by the Office of Homeland Security) and the 2002 and 2007 national strategies for homeland security (Neocleous 2013). In the 2002 document (Office of Homeland Security), homeland security is defined as (p.2) ‘a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.’ Here, the remit of homeland security concentrates exclusively on terrorism. Between the 2002 and 2007 strategies, Cooper and Walker (2011) argue that Hurricane Katrina blurred the distinctions between an unidentified terrorist threat, environmental disaster and
financial crisis, reinvigorating the need for ‘resilience’ and ‘national preparedness’. In the 2007 strategy, the DHS widened its vision to encompass preparedness for natural disasters. As George W. Bush (2007) writes in the foreword: ‘We have applied the lessons of Katrina to this Strategy to make sure that America is safer, stronger, and better prepared.’

However, the 2007 strategy does not contextualize homeland security in relation to climate change. In their testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, David Heyman and Caitlin Durkovitch (Feb 12th, 2014, on ‘Extreme Weather Events: the Costs of Not Being Prepared’) outline a history of Barack Obama’s resilience policy. They note the creation of a Resilience Directorate to establish ‘resilience’ and ‘security’ as the twin pillars of homeland security (in 2009). This was cemented with the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, published in 2010. In March 2011, the National Presidential Policy Directive on National Preparedness was released and defines resilience as ‘the ability to adapt to changing conditions and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies’ (cited in Heyman and Durkovitch 2014). It was followed in September 2011 by the National Preparedness Goal establishing what it means for the US to be prepared for a range of disasters across themes of prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery (Heyman and Durkovitch 2014). I argue these policies and directives represent important steps in the construction of a concept of resilient American nationhood. This is a nationhood that orients America towards insecure futures and posits national characteristics of adaptability and strength. For example, to return briefly to the 2010 DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, as one of the Strategy’s key objectives the DHS (p.15) state:

‘The challenge is to foster a society that is robust, adaptable, and has the capacity for rapid recovery. This concept is not new, and different eras in our history reflect an unwavering focus on building national resilience. The history of civil defense in the United States ... is marked by sweeping national debates about concepts that, if not by name, were nevertheless entirely about resilience. Notable among these was the debate spanning the Truman and Eisenhower administrations about whether to expend resources on sheltering individuals in the face of nuclear attack or to focus investments in a national highway system to facilitate
mass evacuation of urban populations ... The rapid evolution of national security threats and the arrival of the information age have increased the urgency of building up – and reemphasizing – our historically resilient posture.’

Here, resilience is characterized as a collective capacity to be aspired towards with ‘urgency’. Repetition of the collective, possessive pronoun ‘our’ affirms a sense of national unity and suggests resilience is something America can own or possess, ‘our’ resilience. A resilient ‘posture’ suggests a firm and strong America in the face of uncertainties, as does the verb ‘building’ national resilience. The DHS utilizes historic significations of what ‘our historically resilient posture’ represents in order to suggest how this should play into insecure futures (‘the rapid evolution of national security threats’ and ‘arrival of the information age’). Thus, instead of an endpoint or future condition to be aspired to, the essentializing, national logic draws upon historical analogies of what resilience ‘is’ to make the case for ‘what it can be’. The national logic posits a series of representations or assumptions, about what ‘national resilience’ looks like (historic and current significations), and positions these in an argument about what a resilient America should be in insecure futures. In this regard, the authors note that historical examples – civil defense, sheltering individuals from a nuclear attack and a highway system – may not have the same name, but are ‘nevertheless entirely about resilience’. This temporality draws upon present and historic discursive significations to articulate a resilient future American nationhood.

Contemplating the temporalities of resilience-security relations in her study of the bombsite of the Bali terrorist attacks in 2002, Heath-Kelly (2015) argues resilience discourses signify unpredictability and uncertainty as catalysts for security. Security failures thus become integral to the possibilities for better security in the future. Heath-Kelly (2015) contends that resilience redeploy past examples of security failure in order to promise a better future but does not act upon the visceral realities of the bombsite in the present (emergency triage and disaster recovery). This feedback loop – ‘securing through the failure to secure’ – reveals a temporal ambiguity and casts resilience as a ‘chimera’: something which utilizes past invocations of security failure and national trauma for anticipation of resilient futures, but is completely absent from the present (Heath-Kelly 2015: 70-71). Importantly, this temporality also draws upon
narratives of nationhood. Discussing how Australian journalists and politicians understood the Bali bombings, Heath-Kelly (2015: 76, original emphasis) writes: ‘Such responses frame violent events as evidences of the natural resilience of the nation’s people, and in doing this they act upon the past … retrospective attributions of resilient ‘national spirit’ function to ‘return’ the past to a palatable state where performances of nationhood are no longer disrupted by the memory of televised bodies and stricken survivors … it is the past which is reworked as success – not the future. It is resignified to speak of national endurance, identity and wholeness.’

In this regard, it could be that the DHS’s (p.15) invocation of civil defence in the Homeland Security Strategy functions partially as a temporal ‘feedback loop’ because it reworks historical significations of resilience – ‘our historically resilient posture’ – into assumptions about resilient American futures (‘a society that is robust, adaptable, and has the capacity for rapid recovery’). In one sense, it also negates discussions of present injustices, e.g. the unequally experienced impacts of climate change or failures of climate mitigation policies. Present injustices are hidden behind a feedback loop that situates resilience in the American past and American future. However, I also argue that ‘resilience’ is present in its discursive construction: whilst it is something that was ‘held’ previously or to be ‘acquired’ in the future, it is also discursively constructed in present national security discourses. Although a condition of resilience is unobtainable at present, the concept is present discursively in texts. Based on these observations, I argue that essentializing, national logics of a resilient American nationhood echo Heath-Kelly’s (2015) observations for one temporality: that which utilizes past invocations of resilience to articulate what a resilient American nationhood might look like in future insecurities. But, in another temporal possibility past significations of American ‘national resilience’ are not invoked and resilient American nationhood is constructed as a new phenomenon, one to be aspired towards in climate-insecure futures.

6.6.3 Climate resilience and American nationhood

It could be that a notion of ‘climate resilience’ first emerges with the establishment of the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force (ICCAF) in 2010 (ICCAF 2010).
The Task Force was co-chaired by the Council on Environmental Quality, the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy and consisted of more than 20 government agencies (ICAAF 2010). It was guided by a strategic vision of a healthy, resilient nation and key principles include: adaptation should be integrated into policymaking processes, and the most vulnerable should be prioritized. The best available science should be used, adaptation should depend on strong partnerships, adaptation planning should apply risk-management techniques, it should maximize mutual benefits, and performance should be continuously evaluated (ICAAF 2010). In 2010, the Task Force produced a report with key principles and policy recommendations (ICAAF 2010). This was followed in 2011 with a publication evaluating how these reforms were working in federal government agencies. In this report, resilience (ICAAF 2011: 2) is defined as ‘a capacity to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from significant multihazard threats with minimum damage to social wellbeing, the economy, and the environment.’ Such a definition chimes with that in the National Presidential Policy Directive (2011, cited in Heyman and Durkovich 2014), but broadens beyond ‘emergencies’ to the term ‘multihazard threats’. Additionally, it notes ‘the environment’ as an important aspect of resilience, expanding on ‘natural disasters’ and accommodative of environmental issues such as climate change. A significant point in both of these reports is the plurality of possible futures, of which one is a shared, unified American future. For example, in the conclusion of the 2010 report, the ICAAF (2010: 53) write:

‘Through the actions described in this report and the collective actions of stakeholders at all levels, we strive to be a Nation that better understands, and is better prepared for, the impacts of a changing climate. Adaptation across all scales and sectors will enable us to reduce the risks and seize the opportunities presented by climate change. These efforts, in tandem with advancing efforts to manage greenhouse gas emissions, are initial steps in what must be a long-term, iterative, and collaborative approach to make our Nation more resilient to a range of possible futures.’

In this excerpt, the ICAAF (2010) reiterate the impulse to be a unified, shared nation through collective pronouns, e.g. ‘we’ and ‘our’. The embodiment of the ‘nation’ as a collective subject is reinforced with verbs that personify American nationhood, e.g. a
Nation that ‘strives’ and better ‘understands’ climate impacts. However, the authors announce this resilient nationhood is compatible across ‘a range of possible futures’. This raises a fascinating politics of futurity in the sense that, out of a range of possible futures, a resilient American nationhood promotes a shared identity that is prepared for and can adapt to these futures. As such, ICAAF acknowledge a multitude of possible futures (and do not reduce American nationhood to a single national ‘destiny’) but instead argue that a resilient American nationhood is one possibility (a shared, unified vision) held in a relation of resilience with other possibilities (including ‘the impacts of a changing climate’). In a similar quotation from the 2011 ICAAF report, the authors (p.25, original emphasis) note:

‘Partnerships and actions across all scales will be necessary to more fully realize the Task Force’s vision of a resilient, healthy, and prosperous Nation in a changing climate. Agencies across the Federal Government are developing a diversity of non-Federal partnerships to maximize opportunities for coordination and collaboration, and to exchange information and lessons learned with cities, states, tribes, and other nations that are incorporating adaptation into their own decision processes. The Task Forces will work to align Federal efforts with those of communities, states, tribes, and regions to reduce the risks of extreme events and climate impacts through adaptation. These collective efforts will help advance the Nation toward a more sustainable future.’

Here, the notion of climate resilience as a shared, ‘collective effort’ is rearticulated. There is also the wide range of actors discussed (‘cities, states, tribes and other nations’) and emphasis on descriptors such as ‘coordination’ and ‘collaboration’. Additionally, a singular nationhood is reinforced with italicized segments outlining the Task Force’s (2011: 25, original emphasis) vision: ‘a resilient, healthy, and prosperous Nation.’ The ICAAF also proclaim the desire to ‘advance the Nation toward a more sustainable future.’ In this instance, ‘sustainable future’ is highlighted in the singular. However, this does not negate multiple futures, but instead posits a collective American national future held in relations of resilience with other possible futures, those of ‘risks of extreme events and climate impacts’. Thus, although the conclusion of this section is singular and not plural (as in the 2010 report), this emphasizes the
shared unity of a resilient American nationhood in relation to other futures and does not reduce all outcomes to a single narrative.

In 2013, Barack Obama authorized Executive Order 13653 – ‘Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change’ (White House 2013). The federal government used this initiative to promote ‘resilience’ and ‘preparedness’ as key concepts of climate adaptation. The Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force was dissolved and an interagency Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience created to integrate climate resilience in all areas of government (White House 2013; Hayes 2016). An Executive Order followed in September 2014 to facilitate ‘climate-resilient international development’: this calls for the integration of climate-resilience into all of the United States’ international development work, including investments, programmes, overseas facilities etc. The Order postulates that ‘collectively, these efforts will help to better optimize international development work and lead to enhanced global preparedness for and resilient to climate change’ (White House 2014). All of these political moves speak to a gradual change in climate security discourse. Boas and Rothe (2016) trace a discursive shift whereby earlier, conflict-based narratives transition towards a more nuanced climate security language grounded in complexity and resilience. Focusing on UK climate security debates, Boas and Rothe (2016) argue it was increasing uncertainty about the effectiveness of neoliberal, market-based mechanisms and the failure of international climate politics in the late 2000s (e.g. the 2009 Copenhagen COP) that explain the popularity of resilience. Its capacity to appeal to a range of policy communities (from international development to security and foreign policy) is also an important factor (Boas and Rothe 2016). I argue in the US case that the election of Barack Obama in 2009 (with a clear climate policy agenda (Hayes 2016)) and the realization that climate change impacts directly affect American populations and territories (see section 6.5), are important contributory factors to a discourse of climate-resilient American nationhood.

However, repeated invocations of a ‘collective approach’, of a ‘shared unity’ in climate-resilient American nationhoods, raise questions of power-knowledge relations and the positioning of different actors within this vision. As Simon Dalby (2002) notes, an
effective interrogation of security includes the following questions: *who* or *what* is to be secured, *what* is the threat to be secured against, and *how* will security be guaranteed? To mirror this, it is important to ask *who* is to administer or provide ‘resilience’, and *who* or *what* is to be made resilient or embody this capacity? In this manner, although the ICAAF (2010 and 2011) refer to a wide range of actors implicated in climate resilience, the Executive Branch still plays a central role in funding allocation, agency creation, and the discursive construction of climate-resilient American-ness. Furthermore, particular subject positions are constituted in unequal power relations of climate security and climate resilience. For example, in the 2014 Center for Naval Analyses report, written by the Military Advisory Board, a group of retired three- and four-star flag retired personnel from the Navy, Army, Air Force and Marine Corps (CNA 2016), the authors (p.III) note:

‘Political posturing and budgetary woes cannot be allowed to inhibit discussion and debate over what many believe to be a salient national security concern for our nation. Each citizen must ask what he or she can do individually to mitigate climate change, and collectively what his or her local, state, and national leaders are doing to ensure that the world is sustained for future generations. Are your communities, businesses, and governments investing in the necessary resilience measures to lower the risks associated with climate change? In a world of high complex interdependence, how will climate change in the far corners of the world affect your life and those of your children and grandchildren? If the answers to any of these questions make you worried or uncomfortable, we urge you to become involved. Time and tide wait for no one.’

In this excerpt, the authors appeal to readers (addressed through the second person pronouns ‘you’ and ‘your’) to take action on what they term a ‘salient national security concern’. An evocative simple sentence to conclude the excerpt, with the term ‘tide’ emphasizing links to climate change, adds to the severity of this message. As with the ICAAF strategies, the quote also highlights a broad coalition of actors implicated in climate action – including ‘necessary resilience measures’ – such as businesses, communities and governments. Based on these quotations and the shift towards a climate-resilient nationhood more broadly, I argue that these representations contribute to a possible biopolitics of unequally valued lives. Corry (2014: 269)
contends that resilience is not necessarily dependent on a ‘friend-enemy’ logic (the
definition of an external ‘enemy’ against which a protected referent is secured)
because shocks to the system can come from ‘non-actors’ such as systemic instability,
e.g. with the financial crisis. Boas and Rothe (2016: 617) agree with Corry (2014) in the
sense that resilience focuses on a system or community’s inherent vulnerabilities, not
external ‘threats’. But, they (2016) contend that at a secondary level, where
communities fail to adapt or become resilient, they could be cast as threatening to
Western nation-states. I argue that Othering practices operate in climate security in a
different sense: as a national logic about which (valued) populations are considered
part of a national, resilient collective, and which are excluded. In discursive
constructions of a resilient American nationhood in climate-insecure futures, this is
frequently posed in terms of ‘our’ nation or ‘we’ as a national collective. Whilst this
linguistic choice does draw upon a wide range of actors in the constitution of a
‘resilient America’, this is still within an umbrella of ‘our Nation’. For instance, in the
2014 CNA report excerpt (p.III in the report, see previous page), the MAB introduce a
wide range of actors implicated in resilient nationhood, e.g. ‘communities’ and
‘governments’, but this is still contextualized as the national security context of ‘our
nation’. The construction of a climate-resilient and climate-secure nationhood as ‘we’
or ‘our’ demarcates an imaginative geography around those included within this
national collective – those to be made ‘resilient’ – and those excluded from this
nationhood.

Whether national logics of climate-resilient American nationhood are constructed via
historic and current significations oriented towards climate-insecure futures, or
representations of a climate-resilient nationhood to be worked towards, they assume
a collective subjectivity that incorporates particular populations (‘our’ nation) and not
others. National logics thus construct a context-specific biopolitics of valued subjects –
‘governments’, ‘communities’, etc. – through the prism of resilience. This affirms
Foucault’s (2009 (1977): 42) claim that populations can be subjects of government:
‘The population is also a political subject, as a new collective subject … a subject since
it is called upon to conduct itself in such and such a fashion.’ In this case, a discursively
rendered American nationhood constructs a collective national subject in which
particular populations (American citizens, governments, communities and so forth) are
oriented towards climate-insecure futures. Because American populations are constructed with a capacity to obtain resilience (or reconstruct it based on historic significations) in these documents, this produces a particular, context-specific set of ‘bio-inequalities’ in which lives within a resilient American ‘nation’ are valued differently to those outside it.

To conclude, this chapter has explored how national logics filter multiple representations of American nationhood in particular, context-specific moments of US climate security discourse. Through an examination of defensive American exceptionalisms, universalized American nationhood and human security dynamics, the cases of Hurricane Katrina and Sandy, and a climate-resilient American nationhood, I have argued that each relates to different, yet interconnected, biopolitics of unequally valued lives. The first is constructed around a politics of exclusion built on egocentrism, relative adaptive capacity, and ‘fortressed’ populations. The second functions through a ‘bio-normative geopolitics’ (Gerhardt 2009) that states the universal value of human lives, but prioritizes national security referents over human securities. Finally, climate-resilient nationhood is discursively represented as two temporalities: one which draws upon historic significations of national resilience to articulate resilient futures, and one which postulates climate-resilience is yet to be achieved and represents it as an objective of climate adaptation and security. In both, a collective imaginary of the ‘resilient’ American nation is constructed that demarcates imaginative geographies about whose resilience is facilitated, and whose is not. To question the essentializing tendency towards which these representations are directed – of a collective American national subject, or of a racial Other in CIM and terrorism discourses – the thesis concludes by exploring the possibilities that an environmental justice perspective (grounded in the conception of ‘abundant futures’ from Collard et al (2015) and Koopman’s (2011) account of ‘alter-geopolitics’) can offer for US climate security discourses.
Chapter 7:

Conclusion: Towards possibilities for just environmental securities

7.1 Introduction and research questions

1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourse?
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security discourse?

This chapter reflects on the project’s research objectives and questions. For the first objective – to explore intersections of racial and national identities in US and EU climate security discourse – I return to each of the research questions to examine project findings and their situation in current contexts of climate security politics (section 7.2). The chapter subsequently turns to the thesis’ second objective: to explore possibilities for multiple, situated and environmentally just securities (section 7.3). This section builds upon the brief discussion of environmental justice in chapter 3 (section 3.7) and examines the second research objective in connection to Koopman’s (2011) ‘alter-geopolitics’ and a manifesto for ‘abundant futures’ (Collard et al 2015). Finally, to conclude the thesis (section 7.4), the chapter reflects on the project’s contribution to critical climate change (and security) literatures and outlines avenues for future research.

7.2 Research findings and current contexts

The project’s first objective was to explore intersections of racial and national identities in US and EU climate security discourse. To tackle this objective, I formulated three research questions. The first is concerned with constructions racialized ‘Muslim’
and ‘African’ populations in climate security; the second about discursive renderings of interconnections between climate change and terrorism; and the third about representations of American nationhood in US climate security discourse. This section reviews findings for these research questions and situates these in current contexts of US and EU climate security politics.

1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourses?

Elaborated in chapter 4, the thesis has argued that a racialized ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other is constructed in particular, context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourse. This trend is particularly the case for representations of climate-induced migration from the MENA region to the EU in earlier climate security documents (from 2007-10). I have argued racial logics function through three tropes. First is naturalization: the role of essentializing logics in constructing a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other based on naturalized assumptions about a latent capacity towards radicalization or terrorism, and as inherently culturally incompatible with European societies. These representations raise possibilities for policies of containment against possible climate-induced migrants in climate-insecure futures. The second trope is dehumanization, the use of geopolitical narratives that negate possible climate-induced migrants’ agency and carry assumptions about what populations lack or do not have (for example naming of their cultural identities or capacities for rational thought). Finally, I argue a trope of compulsive determinism is constructed in which ‘African’ populations are highly likely or certain to partake in acts of violence or disruptive migrations in climate-insecure futures. Throughout, I have argued that racial logics (a type of essentializing logic oriented towards racialized identities) are only a feature of particular, partial and context-specific interpretations of moments of US and EU climate security discourses. To situate these findings in the current context of migration from the MENA region to the EU, I discuss the ‘refugee crisis’ and imbrications of climate-induced migration in these issues.

What is referred to as the ‘refugee crisis’ is linked to the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings from 2011 onwards. By December 21st, 2015, 1 million refugees had arrived in the EU, with
942,000 claiming asylum in different EU countries (BBC 2015). The UNHCR (2015) estimated that 1 in 2 of 2015 refugee arrivals in Europe were Syrians, with a further 21% from Afghanistan and 9% from Iraq. In September 2015, the European Commission formulated a plan to relocate refugees among Member States, but this was rejected by several nation-states, including the UK and Hungary. A deal reached between the EU and Turkey came into effect in March 2016. The EU provides funds for refugee camps in Turkey (and Turkish security officials crack down on people smugglers) and a ‘one in-one out’ policy came into force whereby for every irregular migrant returned from Greece to Turkey, a refugee from Turkey is granted admittance to the EU (Cohen 2016). Rejection of refugees included Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s (September 4th, 2015) claim that Syrian Muslim refugees represent a threat to European Christianity (Traynor 2015). President-elect Donald Trump announced a complete ban on all Muslims entering the US (December 7th, 2015), later modifying this to strict vetting procedures for all migrants from countries with a ‘proven history of terrorism’ (June 13th, 2016) (Park 2016). However, there is sparse evidence that racial logics of CIM discourse are linked directly to the ‘refugee crisis’. It could be that climate change is considered an important contextual factor, a ‘threat multiplier’ for European geopolitics. O’Hagan (18th August, 2015) argues in The Guardian that mass migration is not a temporary ‘crisis’: ‘Thanks to global climate change, mass migration could be the new normal’. Solh (21st September, 2015, The Guardian) supports this, noting that ‘we need to recognize this migration crisis as the canary in the mine on climate change’. Although space is devoted to a discussion of the Syrian Civil War in Chapter 5 – on terrorism-climate interconnections in US and EU climate security discourse (section 5.4) – Wendle (2015) writes in Scientific American that, following the drought preceding the war, a number of Syrian refugees to the EU are ‘climate refugees’. Notwithstanding that such contemporary contexts suggest disconnects between refugee policy, racialized CIM debates, and ‘climate refugees’ from the Syrian Civil War (Wendle 2015), this project’s findings do indicate racialized narratives of CIM figure in context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourse. These conclusions are especially important for issues of care, justice, and protection in climate change politics. Bettini et al (2016: 8) caution that ‘the large numbers of deaths in the Mediterranean and the push to securitize borders within and around Europe are a warning against the conservative responses that could emerge
against those ‘disenfranchised’ by the impacts of environmental and climate change.’ Thus, even if CIM (and its racialized connotations) and the ‘refugee crisis’ are not linked discursively in a sustained manner at present, the possibilities of linkages (and the inequalities they suggest) render studies of this context important.

2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed in and through US and EU climate security discourses?

Exploring discursive constructions of interconnections between climate change and terrorism, the thesis has elaborated on a range of ways through which such connections are represented. They include narratives of climate change and complex causality (with the Syrian Civil War as a case study) and the difficulties of attributing culpability this raises. I have argued that representations of terrorism in climate security discourses represent important points of intersection of racial and national identities. This is partially through dehumanizing biological metaphors, but also intersectional racialized and gendered identities (especially the figure of a young, African, Muslim male) in limited, context-specific moments of climate security discourse. Finally, exemplified by the example of US intervention in the aftermath of the 2004 Indonesian Ocean tsunami, chapter 5 explored intersections of anti-Americanism with racial logics in US climate security discourse (section 5.7). Although there are very few academic accounts of climate change and terrorism interconnections (for exceptions, see Siddiqi (2014) and Renard (2008)), several important political figures linked these issues at the time of the 2015 Paris COP. Interviewed in September 2015, Connie Hedegaard, former European Commissioner for Climate Action, posits that if the conference doesn’t succeed she fears ‘there will be radicalization’ (Rowley 2015). Mary Robinson, former Irish President and climate justice campaigner, argued (December 6th, 2015) that ‘in a world where climate change exacerbates the stresses of daily life on people already disenfranchised by poverty or social standing, radicalization is very likely.’ Robinson and Hedegaard’s testimonies suggest that, particularly in relation to important political events (as Schäfer et al (2015) note, climate security discourses peak at significant political moments, e.g. annual COP meetings), terrorism, radicalization and climate change are framed as causally linked security issues. Given that an important finding of this thesis is that
these interconnections can be a partial, context-specific site of intersections of racial and national identities, I argue it is fundamentally important to study these interconnections in depth.

3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security discourses?

I have argued that American nationhood is constructed as multiple different representations in US climate security discourse. In earlier publications (predominantly from 2003-10, but also in more recent public interviews (e.g. with Barack Obama)), defensive, fortressed American exceptionalisms are situated in neo-Malthusian futures of resource scarcities, competition and conflict. Second, universalized conceptions of American nationhood are constructed based on ideas of American leadership, values, and an uptake of human security in US climate security politics. Chapter 6 (section 6.5) also reflects on Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy and their links to American national identity. Finally, the project has traced the emergence of representations of climate-resilient American nationhood in which a collective national subject is produced in relation to a condition of or aspiration towards resilience. For all of these representations (intersectional national and racial identities), I have argued throughout the thesis that they are grounded in multiple, unequal biopolitics of valued lives and populations. These include a biopolitics of containment to restrict possible CIM, an unequal biopolitics of American humanitarian intervention following the 2004 Indonesian Ocean tsunami, and a bio-normative geopolitics (Gerhardt 2009) in association with human security in US climate security politics. Unequal biopolitics are also conferred by imaginative geographies in discursive representations of American exceptionalism and climate-resilient US nationhood.

7.2.1 Donald Trump and US climate security

On 14th September (2016), the Climate and Security Advisory Group (CASG) released a briefing book with recommended policies (for the then unknown new administration) to address the security risks of climate change (CASG 2016). The CASG is a group of military, national security, foreign policy and homeland security professionals – chaired
by the Center for Climate and Security in engagement with George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs – that provide evidence and insights on climate security risks (CASG 2016). In the briefing book, they recommend that the President create a cabinet-level position for climate and security issues, that the Department of State create a Climate and Security Office (led by a Climate and Security Envoy), and that the Secretary of Homeland Security work with other agencies to develop a National Adaptation and Resilience Strategy to improve US resiliency and preparedness for climate extremes (CASG 2016). On 21st September (2016), Barack Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum requiring Federal departments and agencies to incorporate national security implications of climate change into their strategies (White House 2016). This includes the establishment of a Climate Change and National Security interagency working group, involving organizations such as the Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Defense and Department of State (White House 2016). The Group is mandated to produce an Action Plan and Federal Agency Implementation Plan to ensure relevant bodies take actions such as identifying climate-related national security risks to assets and programs and pursuing adaptation plans incorporative of national security dimensions (White House 2016). However, Donald Trump’s election (Nov 8th, 2016) has left American climate security politics in flux. Previously sceptical about anthropogenic climate change (including a 2012 Tweet that climate change was invented by the Chinese government (Wong 2016)), Trump later announced (November 22nd, 2016) an ‘open mind’ about whether the US would withdraw from the Paris Agreement (Milman 2016). However, his early appointments suggest a harmful scepticism towards environmental policy. Scott Pruitt, Trump’s EPA administrator, is sceptical about climate science (Revesz 2016). Trump’s selection of climate change sceptics for national security positions – for example Republican Congressman Mike Pompeo to head the CIA – also suggests that ‘the military and intelligence communities may soon turn a blinder eye towards some climate change-related threats’ (Levitan 2016).

In a blog entry on November 28th, 2016, co-founders and Presidents of the Center for Climate and Security Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell note that despite near-term uncertainties, e.g. the growth in nationalist movements and cyber-security threats to
democratic elections, longer-term risks remain prevalent, e.g. climate change (Werrell and Femia 2016). Similarly, in unpublished exchanges following his confirmation hearing (12th January, 2017) to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense James Mattis affirms that climate change poses risks to US national security. He states that ‘climate change can be a driver of instability and the Department of Defense must pay attention to potential adverse impacts generated by this phenomenon’ (Mattis 2017, cited in Revkin 2017). However, in an Executive Order issued on 28th March (2017), President Trump rescinded Barack Obama’s Presidential Memorandum (21st September, 2016) on climate change and security, and Executive Order 13653 (1st November, 2013) on ‘Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change’ (White House 2017). This Executive Order rescinds several of Barack Obama’s signature strategies to mitigate and adapt to climate change, including his 2013 Climate Action Plan (White House 2017).

At the time of writing, there is uncertainty as to whether the Trump administration will withdraw the US from the 2015 Paris Agreement. Milman (9th May, 2017) reports disagreement within the administration between Steve Bannon (Trump’s Chief Strategist) and Scott Pruitt (the EPA Administrator), who favour withdrawal, and Ivanka Trump, Jared Kushner (Trump’s daughter and son-in-law) and Rex Tillerson (the Secretary of State), who favour remaining in the accord. Milman (2017) reports that a final decision will not be made until after the G7 summit in Sicily (26-27th May). On May 8th, 2017, the Center for Climate and Security’s Advisory Board – comprised of professionals (e.g. military officials and academics) with climate security expertise – published two letters, one to Rex Tillerson and the other to James Mattis, recommending that they take the lead in addressing the security implications of climate change (Werrell and Femia 2017).

However, given the Trump administration’s scepticism and actions to constrain climate policies thus far, and his Executive Order (28th March) rescinding Barack Obama’s Presidential Memorandum, it could that these developments suggest a negative approach to US climate security more specifically.

In the broader context of Trump’s politics, Page and Dittmer (2016: 77) note a Trump ‘dissonance machine’ in which dimensions to his character that appeal to some supporters (White authoritarianism, apparent financial success, aggressive masculinity), simultaneously repel others (including other Republicans). Trump’s
embodied, affective performances of White, racist, sexist and capitalist masculinity are representative of his enactments of American populism (Page and Dittmer 2016). Simultaneously, Bernard (2015, cited in Derickson 2016: 2) has characterized contemporary racial politics in the US as ‘the Age of Ferguson’: a politics in which police brutality and technology (cell phone footage, social media and so forth) are connected to deeper structural inequalities of racism and a security state. ‘The Age of Ferguson’ is linked specifically to the shooting of unarmed black teenager Michael Brown by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri (9th August, 2014), and the subsequent development of the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement (Derickson 2016). The current context of American politics – Trump’s climate (and climate security) scepticism, authoritarian nationalism, and racist inequalities suggested by Trump’s politics and ‘the Age of Ferguson’ – suggest this project’s findings (on intersections of racial and national identities) are a relevant if limited addition to these debates. The chapter proceeds to discuss the project’s second objective: to explore possibilities for just, situated environmental securities.

7.3 Just, situated environmental securities

The thesis has argued that essentializing logics, directing racial and national identities towards climate-insecure futures, work to delimit future possibilities in US and EU climate security discourse. Racial and national logics foster biopolitical exclusions (which populations are valued or devalued, and which political interventions are attached to these exclusions). Chapter 3 (section 3.9) outlines a case for bringing environmental justice and critical environmental security into conversation. This is not the first account of environmental justice, climate security and climate-induced migration. Bettini et al (2016) explore different framings of CIM in the context of (in)justice, inequality and responsibility. Questions of climate justice rest on a logic that the harms of climate change are unjust because not everybody contributes to the problem of GHG emissions (Bond 2014). The effects (benefits and harms) of this are not equally distributed, not everybody has the adaptive means to cope with climate change impacts, and action should be taken to repair these wrongs (Bettini et al 2016).
Bettini *et al* (2016) note that a shift from a ‘climate refugees’ to ‘migration-as-adaptation’ narrative (after the 2011 Foresight Report (UK Government Office for Science 2011)) risks diminishing concerns about inequality, care, (re)distribution and injustice. ‘Climate refugee’ narratives infer the inherent rights of vulnerable persons and obligation of states to provide protections for environmentally displaced persons (for example through a legal extension of the Geneva Refugee Convention (1951)). A ‘migration-as-adaptation’ narrative displaces responsibility onto individuals; rather than the inherent rights of migrants, climate change provides ‘opportunities’ to move, find work, and build resilience (Bettini *et al* 2016). The authors (2016) do not advocate a ‘climate refugees’ concept as a solution, however. And whilst a ‘migration-as-adaptation’ narrative acknowledges the agency of migrants, ‘one step forward’, Bettini *et al* (2016: 7) are concerned that this approach doesn’t account for fundamental injustices and political questions of (re)distribution and inequality (‘two steps back’).

Baldwin (2016: 11) writes (in the context of a CIM debate with racial connotations): ‘the politics of climate justice really must come to terms with race and racism beyond simply recognizing that climate change will be disproportionately experienced by people of color, the majority world.’ This fundamental injustice – that those least responsible for climate change could be the most affected – is crucially important.

Baldwin (2016) draws upon Claire Colebrook’s (2014, cited in Baldwin 2016) injunction to think of mobility as a normal condition of human life, rendering a sedentarist, containment-oriented state the exception to the norm. However, whilst Bettini *et al* (2016) and Baldwin (2016) provide important analyses of the (racialized) injustices of CIM, they do not explicate in detail what an alternative politics of climate justice (other than Baldwin’s (2016) reflections on Colebrook) would look like. Nor, and understandably given the particular focus on CIM, do they consider interactions between (in)justice and (in)security. This account does not provide rejoinders to these limitations by any means. It attempts to locate tentative, initial possibilities through which environmental justice and security debates can be brought into meaningful conversation.

O’Brien and Leichenko (2010: 158), writing about global environmental change, argue that ‘equity-based approaches must first and foremost address human security, and in particular the underlying social, economic, political, and cultural issues that contribute
to inequities and insecurities’. O’Brien and Leichenko (2010) contend there is a need to resist ‘global’, universalized, or undifferentiated solutions to climate change and focus on differential vulnerabilities: whose security is at stake, and what are the underpinning factors that make some communities more vulnerable than others? Without restricting her account to a particular concept of security, Floyd (2011) proposes a normative framework to analyse ‘just’ securitizations. She (2011: 428) establishes three criteria to assess the ‘moral rightness’ of a securitization. First is that there is an objective existential threat (regardless of whether this has been perceived by any individual or institution) to an actor’s survival. Second is that the security referent is morally legitimate (it threatens human wellbeing and basic human needs). And third is that the security response is appropriate to the threat (the securitizer must be sincere in her/his intentions, and the response must be appropriate to the scale of the threat) (Floyd 2011). In line with O’Brien and Leichenko’s (2010) example, this section outlines an understanding of the multiple, situated and multi-scalar interrelations of environmental justices and securities.

The thesis has sought to critique centralizing, essentializing identities that engulf cultural differences and inequalities (‘the Other’). Chaturvedi and Doyle (2015: 61) argue that neoliberal climate solutions (e.g. carbon trading) risk creating a global ‘citizen-consumer’. This fosters an essentializing ‘global soul’ that elides differences of power, wealth, gender, race and class: material, intra-generational inequalities (Chatuverdi and Doyle 2015). Although in a different context, Hannah’s (2011) account of universal biopolitical solidarity is critiqued in chapter 3 (section 3.9) for inscribing a universalized humanity that negates differences within this category. I argue this critique also applies to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s analyses of climate change and ‘the Anthropocene’. Chakrabarty (2012: 9) writes: ‘Humans, collectively, now have an agency in determining the climate of the planet as a whole, a privilege reserved in the past only for very large-scale geophysical forces.’ Human beings constitute geophysical agents with a capacity to alter Earth systems (driven by fossil fuel extraction, consumption, and population growth) (Chakrabarty 2009; 2012). Chakrabarty (2009) proposes several theses to describe this condition. One is that distinctions between natural and social history dissolve with the emergence of humanity’s geophysical agency. Another is that this juncture requires a critical conversation between histories
of capital and the Anthropocene; critiques of capitalist globalization should be contextualized against human beings’ geophysical agency and deep geological time (Chakrabarty 2009). However, I argue that Chakrabarty’s (2009; 2012) figuration of ‘human beings’ as a collective geophysical force negates the injustices of climate change. Chakrabarty (2009) acknowledges that unequal impacts of climate change are undoubtedly linked to industrial development. He (2009: 219) points to climate change and humanity’s geophysical agency as ‘a shared catastrophe that we have all fallen into’. Whilst it is feasible that climate change is a ‘shared catastrophe’ for all human beings (albeit to differing extents), the collective term ‘human beings’ cannot encompass responsibility for the causes of climate change (specific histories and geographies of industrialization, fossil fuel extraction et c.). As Tolia-Kelly (2016) notes, the Anthropocene implicates erasures and destructions of histories and cultures (all interconnected) of both biological and human lives. Thus, by referring to ‘human beings’ as a ‘geophysical agent’ in the Anthropocene, Chakrabarty (2009; 2012) could be constructing an essentializing account that does not account for the inequalities within this classification. Drawing on alternative interpretations (Gibson-Graham 2011 and Collard et al 2015), I argue that environmental justice and climate change could draw upon multiple, situated and multi-scalar conceptions of environmental securities.

inequalities arise (including eradication of nonhuman, animal abundance). Abundant futures underline pluriversal, heterogeneous ways of living. They are made possible through multispecies entanglements, worlds of nonhuman animal abundance and autonomy, defined as ‘the fullest expression of animal life, including capacity for movement, for social and familial association, and for work and play’ (Collard et al 2015: 328). Throughout this thesis, I have argued that essentializing logics (based on historic and current significations of a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other) contribute to a delimitation of possible futures, for example containment of climate-induced migrants’ mobility.

A manifesto commitment to ‘abundant futures’, of pluriversal, diverse ways of being (human and nonhuman entanglements) that are cognisant of historical injustices, could provide an informative analytic lens to challenge essentializing logics’ biopolitical inequalities. However, my arguments fall far short of the specifications outlined by Collard et al (2015) and Gibson-Graham (2011). The thesis does not rely upon decolonizing or Indigenous scholarship and ethics. Through its focus on elite texts, the thesis also reproduces and re-essentializes the discourses it seeks to critique. The terms ‘subject’, ‘subjectivity’, ‘biopolitics’, ‘populations’ and ‘lives’ are also restricted to ‘human’ subjects, lives or populations. Whilst I argue that human (racial and national) inequalities are critical constituents of environmental injustices, the project negates entanglements of human and nonhuman lives that a manifesto for ‘abundant futures’ necessitates. As such, any resonances between an ‘abundant futures’ manifesto and situated, environmentally just securities must be qualified by the thesis’ limitations.

Nevertheless, I contend that a specific, qualified interpretation of ‘abundant futures’ could be applied productively to think about multiple, situated and just environmental ‘securities’. At this point, I return to Koopman’s (2011: 281) ‘alter-geopolitics’: a feminist geopolitics that acts to build shared, nonviolent securities founded on ‘dignity’ and ‘justice’. Alter-geopolitics is about geopolitics as it is being ‘done’: about bodies moving together in action to create safety and security (in a multiple sense) (Koopman 2011). Groups doing alter-geopolitics weave together multi-scalar securities and do not try to protect ‘Us’ from ‘Them’; they build connections across ‘Us’ and ‘Them’,
groups from past and present (Koopman 2011). Using the analogy of a chess game, Koopman (2011: 282) argues hegemonic geopolitics is about ‘Big Men’ moving pieces on the board. Alter-geopolitics, on the other hand, ‘is not only pawns but all sorts of pieces, from both sides, working together to move themselves into shapes that make them all safer’ (Koopman 2011: 282). A possible limitation to Koopman’s (2011) account is that it focuses exclusively on human actors, human communities and human-centred securities. This constrains the extent to which alter-geopolitics can be conceptualized alongside ‘abundant futures’ (Collard et al 2015). However, I argue that if (a qualified interpretation of) alter-geopolitics is considered with an ‘abundant futures’ manifesto (Collard et al 2015), this provides an opportunity to conceive of multiple, shared securities grounded in entanglements of human and nonhuman lives and oriented towards diverse, plural futures. As such, alter-geopolitical environmental securities could be abundant, open to multiple possible futures (and yet interconnected to and cognisant of unequal, imperial histories of exclusion), whilst situated, multi-scalar and grounded in shared calls for justice(s). This conceptual entanglement could therefore provide an appropriate means through which multiple, situated environmental justice(s) could be brought into conversation with multiple, shared environmental (alter-geopolitical) securities.

These possibilities must be situated in the context of this thesis. Koopman’s (2011) alter-geopolitics is an explicit critique and move away from elite texts and discursive representation, the cornerstone of this project’s analysis. However, despite the project’s specific focus, I do not argue climate and environmental securities are restricted to textual materialities; they are embodied, existential phenomena. Koopman (2011: 280) uses the example of ‘protective accompaniment’ in Colombia (individuals who are less at risk, for example international volunteers, accompanying people more at risk of attack whilst moving between places) to explore how these actions are involved in the ‘daily making of spaces of peace and alternative securities’. In the limited space of this thesis, it is difficult to conceive of what alternative, just, environmental securities would look like. As a challenge to essentializing logics, they could include the NAACP’s work on exposing environmental and climate injustices (elaborated in chapter 6, section 6.5). Or, they could involve faith and interfaith groups and initiatives providing alternative perspectives on environmental action and human
beings’ multi-scalar relationships with wider ecosystems (for example Green Muslims, see chapter 4, section 4.5). These examples are grounded in their own unequal power relations and represent only fleeting, partial moments in the thesis (a limitation of which is its central focus on essentializing identities in elite discourses). But, they do provide tentative scope for thinking through what the possibilities and politics for just, situated and multi-scalar environmental securities could be.

7.4 Contribution and future research directions

To conclude the thesis, this final section summarizes the project’s contributions to critical climate security debates and avenues for future research. First, I reflect on the theoretical framework underpinning the thesis.

**Theoretical directions: essentializing logics and biopolitics of climate security**

The thesis makes two theoretical contributions to debates in critical race studies, critical security studies, and critical climate security scholarship. First is the concept of ‘essentializing logics’, a specific formulation (bringing together Stuart Hall’s (1996) and Ben Anderson’s (2010a) theoretically different accounts) of how racial and national identities are configured in climate security. In particular, ‘essentializing logics’ demonstrate how essentializations (racial and national) can work at the level of underlying, coded assumptions and associations. Moreover, they provide an analytic to explore essentialization in relation to future possibilities: to suggest how essentializations of populations (‘Muslim’, ‘African’ and ‘American’) could configure outcomes or legitimize interventions in climate-insecure futures. In short, essentializing logics provide a means to investigate how identity constructions configure future possibilities. For future research, I hope this concept may contribute to understandings of other forms of essentialized identities (for example sexualized or gendered identity constructions) and their discursive configurations in possible futures.

Second, the project has offered a specific conceptualization of biopolitics as multiple and based upon discursive appropriations of unequally valued lives and populations.
This approach is inspired by Didier Fassin’s (2009) concepts of ‘bio-legitimacy’ and ‘bio-inequalities’. This conceptualization of biopolitics draws more specific attention to the roles of subjectification and Othering practices in configuring biopolitical inequalities.

A significant limitation of the thesis is the under-theorization of processes of ‘valuation’ throughout. While ‘valued’ and ‘devalued’ lives and populations are articulated in terms of racial and national identity constructions, the specific conceptualization of ‘valuation’ is underdeveloped in the thesis. As such, an interesting avenue for future research could be to think through what ‘valuation’ means in these contexts and its conceptual interrelations with subjectification, biopolitics and discourse.

Racial and national identities in climate security

Finally, there is a need for more work on racialized and national identities in climate security politics. The most important contributions of this thesis are context-specific interpretations of racialized identities and representations of American nationhood in US and EU climate security discourse. Specifically, this includes naturalized assumptions about ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations (predominantly in representations of possible climate-induced migration from the MENA region to the EU) and their construction as a racial Other. Furthermore, the thesis has examined different ways in which American nationhood is configured in climate security discourse. These include ideas of American exceptionalism, universalized American nationhood and human security, climate-resilient nationhood, and anti-Americanism in relation to humanitarian interventions. However, as areas for future research, a more explicit focus on intersectionality is needed. A key limitation of the project is a lack of clear, thematic analysis of intersectional identities. Future research could explore specific points at which racial and national identities (or gendered, sexualized and aged identity configurations, for instance) intersect and the political implications of such intersections. Interconnections between terrorism and climate change could provide a productive line of enquiry for this objective. Another limitation of the project is its lack of historical contextualization of racial and national logics in climate security. Alternative research could situate racial and national logics of climate security in
longer histories of race-nation intersections with climate change (for example environmental determinist tropes in the late 19th/early 20th centuries (Piguet 2013)).

Beyond this, future avenues for research could include specific subjectivities through which American nationhood and climate security are constructed. These include, for example, the figure of the ‘retired general or admiral’ (CNA 2007), or of the ‘veteran activist’ (see, for example, Operation Free (2016)). It is also important to research the potential for racist or xenophobic reactions against those who could be classified as ‘climate-induced migrants’, even if ‘climate-induced migrants’ are a difficult category to identify (Baldwin 2013b). All of these possibilities suggest this thesis, like any research project, can generate more questions than it answers. Throughout, the thesis has tried to examine and interpret inequalities and injustices in context-specific moments of EU and US climate security discourse. It is this ethos, one that is critical from start to finish (and beyond), that I hope is the lasting impact of this dissertation and its contribution to climate change scholarship.
### Appendices

#### Appendix A: Total CDA sample

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Appendix B: Full list of interviewees

**Note:** As this is a full list of interviewees, the number of individual interviewees listed is larger than the total number of interviews (to reflect the two group interviews). As such, there are 24 interviewees listed for the US based interviews, despite only 21 discussions taking place.

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## Appendix C: General interview themes

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<tr>
<th>Interview theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US interviews</strong></td>
<td><strong>Concept of ‘climate security’</strong>&lt;br&gt;This theme involved asking participants if they have come across the concept of ‘climate security’ and, if so, what it means to them. In some interviews, we also discussed different concepts of security in relation to climate change, e.g. ‘human security’, ‘national security’, and so forth.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Climate-induced migration</strong></td>
<td>This involved asking interviewees for their general thoughts on the topic of climate-induced migration. This included asking for their views on the concept, evidence of climate-induced migration, responses to climate-induced migration (e.g. prejudice or racism against possible climate induced-migrants), how the issue is discussed by politicians, in the media, and so forth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Climate change and conflict</strong></td>
<td>This theme included asking interviewees about the possible linkages between climate change and conflict, the academic and policy debates on this issue, possible examples (for instance the Syrian Civil War or the Darfur Conflict), and what government responses to conflicts linked to climate change could be.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Terrorism/radicalization**     | This theme involved asking respondents if they thought terrorism/radicalization and climate change were connected and the various types of
discursive and causal linkages drawn (by academics, the media, policymakers, etc.) between these issues. Discussions also touched on the ideological underpinnings to terrorism and radicalization connected to climate change, for example ideas of anti-Americanism. Finally, I would ask about the broader geopolitical context of the ‘War on Terror’ and if climate security is related to these debates in any way.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US climate change politics</th>
<th>Usually at the beginning of interviews, I would ask interviewees to describe the general landscape of American climate change politics as they see it. I would also ask interviewees for their views on Barack Obama’s climate change (and climate security) policies and initiatives.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change (and security) perspectives</td>
<td>This question, usually at the conclusion of the interview discussion, was two-sided. I would ask interviewees on the one hand what they think of climate security politics in the US, and on the other what they think ‘the rest of the world’ (using particular nation-states or constituencies of their choosing) thinks of the US when it comes to climate change policy and climate security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US nationhood</td>
<td>This theme discussed different images of American nationhood or nationalism. For example, several interviewees discussed the notion of a defensive, isolationist vision of the United States as a response to different forms of climate insecurities. American exceptionalism and ‘leadership’ were also themes raised frequently by interviewees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framings of climate</td>
<td>This theme discussed different types of</td>
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<td>Topic</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>change politics</td>
<td>Organizations involved in American climate change (and security) politics and the frames they employ to talk about the issue. This includes religious organizations (e.g. the ‘creation care’ movement), security bodies (intelligence agencies and the defense sector), health bodies, environmental NGOs, climate sceptics, and so forth. Interviewees discussed the varieties of different constituencies that could be reached by using different frames, their effectiveness, competition between different frames, and their usefulness for building political consensus on climate change issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US military</td>
<td>I would ask interviewees about their opinion on the US military’s involvement in climate security politics. Did they think this was useful, appropriate, politically effective, etc.? Could consensus among military actors drive bipartisan solutions in Congress?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>I would ask respondents about their views on the role of the UN in climate change (and climate security) politics. Did they think the UN Security Council should play a role? I also asked about the UNFCCC, IPCC and COP meetings in international climate negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental justice</td>
<td>Environmental justice was discussed in interviews, for example its relations to climate and environmental security, and racial and class inequalities in connection to climate security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Histories of American environmental politics/climate change</td>
<td>Interviews would often include discussions of historical moments in American environmental politics. For example, we would discuss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politics</td>
<td>environmental legislation (e.g. under the Nixon administration), the emergence of environmental and climate security discourses, the roles of Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and so forth.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU interviews</td>
<td>From the 2000s onwards, we consider the emergence of environmental and climate security discourses, the roles of Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and so forth.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU climate change politics</td>
<td>Firstly, I would ask interviewees to describe the general landscape of climate change (and climate security) politics in the EU as they see it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of climate security</td>
<td>This involved asking interviewees if they were familiar with the term ‘climate security’ and, if so, what did the concept mean to them. In some interviews, we also discussed different concepts of security, e.g. ‘human security’ or ‘national security’. In others, it also involved discussions of the concept of ‘security’ in relation to linked (but different) notions of ‘defence’ and ‘militarization’.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU leadership</td>
<td>The notion of EU leadership was often discussed in interviews. This included the idea that the EU is a leader in international climate politics (e.g. UNFCCC negotiations), how this relates to climate security debates, and so forth. Interviews also touched on relations between EU institutions and other bodies, e.g. NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Histories of EU environmental politics/climate change politics</td>
<td>Interviews would often involve discussions of historical debates and changes to EU environmental and climate change politics. For example, this included EU institutions’ roles in COP conferences (e.g. Copenhagen), as well as the development of climate security discourses in</td>
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<td>Topic</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU institutional contexts.</td>
<td>The EU as a political actor(s) This theme revolves around differences between the ‘EU’ as an international ‘actor’ (for example the role of the Commission’s DG CLIMA for climate change negotiations), and the multiplicity of political voices within this demarcation, e.g. different Member States (the roles of Germany and the UK were frequently cited in this regard), different EU institutions, and relationships with actors outside of the European Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UN</td>
<td>I would ask respondents about their views on the role of the UN in climate change (and climate security) politics. Did they think the UN Security Council should play a role? I also asked about the UNFCCC, IPCC and COP meetings in international climate negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU geopolitics</td>
<td>EU geopolitics This theme involved discussions with interviewees about the EU’s position in the world, its ‘neighbourhood’, relationships with the MENA region, and security concerns linked to this, for example the Syrian Civil War. This theme was also discussed in relation to migration, particularly the context of the ‘refugee crisis’ and climate-induced migration. The EU’s geopolitical situation was also discussed in relation to the US and its climate security initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate-induced migration</td>
<td>Climate-induced migration This involved asking interviewees for their general thoughts on the topic of climate-induced migration. This included asking for their views on the concept, evidence of climate-induced migration, responses to climate-induced migration (e.g. prejudice or racism against...</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
possible climate induced-migrants), how the issue is discussed by politicians, in the media, and so forth. In the context of the EU, I would also ask interviewees if they thought there would be prejudice or racism directed against possible Muslim climate-induced migrants from the MENA region.

<table>
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<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>‘EU’ and ‘European’ identity</td>
<td>For this theme, I would ask interviewees what they think of the idea of an ‘EU’ identity as opposed to a concept of ‘European-ness’ or ‘European’ identity. This included questions relating to political affiliations (e.g. which European countries are EU Member States), ‘European values’, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism/radicalization</td>
<td>This theme involved asking respondents if they thought terrorism/radicalization and climate change were connected and the various types of discursive and causal linkages drawn (by academics, the media, policymakers, etc.) between these issues.</td>
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