“Have Tunisian civil society organisations exhibited the civil political culture required to fulfil a democratic function through the post-2011 transition?”

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“HAVE TUNISIAN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS EXHIBITED THE CIVIL POLITICAL CULTURE REQUIRED TO FULFIL A DEMOCRATIC FUNCTION THROUGH THE POST-2011 TRANSITION?”

Alexander Peter Martin

A thesis submitted to Durham University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Government and International Affairs
Durham University
2016
Abstract

This thesis asks whether the post-2011 transition has allowed Tunisian civil society to fulfil the democratic functions attributed to it by civil society and democratisation theorists. It uses an understanding of civil society as playing a democratising function through Oppositional-Resistance and Liberal-Associative roles, both of which rely on the existence of a civil political culture. The thesis examines the existence of a civil political culture, identified through the presence of the six criteria of Freedom, Equality, Pluralism, Tolerance, Trust, and Transparency. This thesis uses Welch’s theory of political culture, which recognises that political culture manifests as both discourse and practice. In order to understand civil society's discourse and practice, Welch’s theory is developed into a methodology of three research methods, drawn from both positivist and interpretivist approaches of social science research. The role of civil society in the Tunisian transition is assessed in relation to its counterpart - the state. A triangulation of methods - a quantitative attitude survey, structured interviews, and ethnographic participant observation – examines inter-CSO relations, how CSOs interact with the state, and the internal CSO dynamics in addition to CSO institutional culture. This approach enables the assessment of the discourse and practice of civil society organisation (CSO) members' political culture.

The Tunisian case demonstrates the validity of the argument that the state must allow civil society sufficient public space to accomplish a democratic function. Simultaneously, civil society, in both Oppositional-Resistance and Liberal-Associative understandings, must exhibit civil political culture in order to fulfil a democratic function. It further demonstrates that only through a multifaceted research approach that addresses discourse and practice can political culture accurately be assessed. This thesis concludes that civility is developing in Tunisian civil society as CSO relationships with the state, other CSOs and its own members evolve, which has enabled CSOs to fulfil a democratic function.
**List of Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>ATFD</td>
<td>Tunisian Association of Democratic Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Civil political culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JID</td>
<td>Young Tunisian Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTDH</td>
<td>Tunisian League for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>The Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEPI</td>
<td>The U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitute Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>Neo-Destour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONAT</td>
<td>Tunisian Lawyers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Constitutional Democratic Rally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGTT</td>
<td>General Union of Tunisian Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTICA</td>
<td>Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts</td>
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Statement of Copyright

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to all the Tunisians who participated in the revolution and those who are contributing to the country's new beginning.
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INTRODUCTION

The 2011 Tunisian revolution of “Freedom and Dignity”, the first in the wave of uprisings commonly known as the Arab Spring across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, was unexpected given the apparent political stability and economic prosperity of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali’s dictatorship. The revolution brought an end to 24 years of corrupt leadership by Ben Ali, his mafia-like family, and the majority of the ruling elite who were removed from their positions of power and privilege. Despite halted economic progress, rising unemployment rates, political assassinations, and episodes of political deadlock in the years since 2011, democratisation progress in this small North African state has been hailed as a success in its path towards removing authoritarian, one-party state governance. The political transition has brought Tunisia closer to becoming a democratic country than the other Arab states that experienced uprisings: Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. Although comparisons between these Arab Uprising states can be made, they are, however, limiting because each country has experienced different aftermaths to their revolutions. Furthermore, in addition to the specific dynamics of each country, each had undergone different colonial and post-independence experiences prior to the uprisings.

This thesis focuses on understanding the factors that are unique to Tunisian civil society and Tunisian political culture and how they have influenced Tunisia’s post-revolutionary transition. Therefore, it seeks to answer the following research question; Have Tunisian civil society organisations exhibited a civil political culture and how has this influenced their ability to fulfil a democratic function through the post-2011 transition?

Three sub-questions that emerged from the primary research question are 1) Has civil society in Tunisia exhibited political civility through the democratic transition? 2) How has political civility in civil society organisations supported the democratic transition? 3) How does this inform the theoretical understanding of civil society’s position in democratic transition?

The revolution liberated Tunisian civil society by enabling the proliferation of CSOs that have performed an active role in guiding the transition and ensured democratic, non-authoritarian outcomes were achieved. However, this thesis argues that it was
not simply the increased space for CSO activity or the state of their activities that enabled them to play this role. It demonstrates that a civil political culture has been a requirement for civil society, enabling it to effectively assist a transition, fulfil a democratic function, and complete a democratic consolidation. Political culture studies in the MENA context have been inhibited by the presence of authoritarian government which restricted access to on the ground, micro-interpretivist research methods. Prior to the Arab Uprisings, the study of civil society in MENA was conducted in the context of authoritarian governments and dictatorial regimes, where only Israel and Lebanon could be considered exceptions. As Tunisia is in a transition away from authoritarian government, the opportunity is provided for this thesis to offer a revised approach to the study of political culture that implements Welch’s theory of political culture (2013) and which includes direct observation of discourse and practice. The literature review in this thesis identifies weaknesses in other political culture works that apply one or two methods. This thesis is a contribution to studies in political culture by demonstrating that an approach to political culture research which includes the application of three separate research methods (structured interviews, ethnographic participant observation, and online survey questionnaire) creates a complex assessment that provides inquired, observed, and subject self-assessed understandings of culture that outweighs the weaknesses of each individual method. This approach is effective for capturing a current political culture, as it does not seek recourse to Culturalist, macro-interpretivist, written or historical sources, therefore making it appropriate for studying political culture while the state is in transition.

As an application of civil society theory to a post-authoritarian MENA context, this thesis also contributes to empirical studies of MENA civil society organisations. The Tunisian transition towards democracy demonstrates that civil society in Tunisia had previously been shaped by the authoritarian regime. This thesis diverges from the Culturalist argument that MENA civil society is shaped by Middle Eastern or Arab culture, or the consequent assumption that this renders MENA civil society undemocratic. In doing so, it argues that civil society can significantly contribute to democratic consolidation if CSOs are provided sufficient public space and if their practices and discourse exhibit a civil political culture. This thesis also argues that prerequisites of democracy existed in Tunisia and that the country’s progress towards democracy is partly due to its history of constitutionalism, political
institutionalism, and civil society activism. This has meant Tunisia's pre-existing culture of consensus and political moderacy has aided the transition.

Chapter One establishes that the concept of civil society has evolved to hold a pro-democracy meaning, therefore it can influence democratic transition on the condition that a political culture of civility is exhibited. MENA civil society is not inherently different, but it has been described differently to western civil society because it emerged in the contexts of colonialism and authoritarianism. Therefore, MENA civil society has not been able to influence democratic transition because it existed under authoritarianism and a political culture of civility has been heavily restricted.

Chapters Two and Three identify six criteria of civil political culture (Freedom, Equality, Pluralism, Tolerance, Trust, and Transparency), as derived from civil society, democratisation, and political culture literature. They respectively define the methodology and methods required to study Tunisian civil society organisations and to assess the extent to which their political culture is civil. This methodology was developed through the application of Welch's theory of political culture, MENA literature on the use of political culture, and a critical assessment of other studies in political culture. Both chapters posit the hypothesis that, if Tunisian CSOs demonstrate civility, then they can perform their democratic functions of maintaining freedom and equality which prevent despotism.

Chapters Four and Five offer an historical overview of Tunisian political history with a focus on the function of civil society. Chapter Four uses literature on Tunisian history which demonstrates that Tunisian civil society was limited and restrained under colonialism and authoritarianism. Chapter Five uses news reports, press releases, international non-governmental organisation reports, and academic work published since 2011, to emphasise the vital role that civil society has played in Tunisia's transition and that Tunisia is no longer under authoritarian conditions. Chapters Four and Five provide an historical and contextual background to the research period and illustrate the relationships between the Tunisian state and civil society.

Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight each present the results of the data collected from the three methods: an online attitude survey, structured interviews, and ethnographic
participant-observation respectively. These results are based on 10 months of fieldwork research, conducted by the researcher while living in Tunisia (2013-2014). They represent the methodological contribution of the thesis; that a multi-layered, micro-interpretivist approach is optimal to researching a political culture. Through analysis of CSOs’ relationships with the state, other CSOs and their own members, these three chapters present evidence that the six criteria of civil political culture are interconnected and are developing at different rates in Tunisian CSOs.

The concluding chapter demonstrates that, in a post-authoritarian context, Tunisian civil society has been allowed to flourish through the state’s provision of an enabling legal framework. This research project provides evidence that civil political culture, conducive to democratic consolidation, is emerging amongst civil society organisations in Tunisia. The concept advanced by democratisation theory, of civil society requiring space from the state, is validated in this research as this occurred in Tunisia.

This thesis aims to understand CSO political culture from three different directions in order to gain a multi-layered understanding of the complexities of the political culture of a civil society in a political transition from authoritarianism to an emerging democracy. Therefore, it aims to address the research question by seeking to understand internal operation of CSOs through observing behaviour, CSO’s relationships with other CSOs and the state, and attitudes and values of CSO members.
CHAPTER ONE – CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS, TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY, THE ROLE OF POLITICAL CIVILITY IN SUSTAINING DEMOCRACY

1. Introduction

This thesis demonstrates the potential that a civil society can possess in assisting the establishment or maintenance of a democratic system, providing two conditions are met. Firstly, when the political environments and structures allow it to exist through the absence of authoritarian government and existence of suitable legal protection, and secondly, if the organisations that constitute the civil society exhibit a political culture that is conducive to establishing and maintaining a democracy; civil political culture.

In order to establish this argument, the first section defines what civil society is by analysing the evolution of its different conceptualisations. This process identifies ten functions that civil society has historically and theoretically performed which lead to the current pro-democracy understanding and manifestation of civil society. The collective action of coordinated civil society members in civil society organisations (CSOs) is explained because the study of CSOs is the primary focus of this thesis. Why civil society might, or might not, lead to democracy and the role of civil society in democratic transition are also addressed to explain the importance of suitable political environments and structures.

In the second section, with reference to the specific regional case study of this thesis, this chapter establishes that the current body of literature indicates that civil society in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) context has been shaped and limited by the persistence of authoritarian governments which have co-opted voices of dissent and restricted the free public space required for a civil society to flourish. This is contrary to the Culturalist assumption that Arab societies are inherently incompatible with democracy. The third section brings together the two concepts of civil society and political culture, this chapter defines how the concept of political civility manifests and its importance to the maintenance of a democratic political system.
2. Civil society

As this thesis is a study of CSOs, this section - divided into five subsections - provides a definition of civil society and, in the second subsection, explains how its functions have evolved due to its historical implementation and theoretical conceptualisation by scholars in different periods. Both Gramscian and Tocquevillian conceptualisations of civic associations are outlined in the third subsection to provide a functional definition of CSOs. These definitions are essential to the establishment of the theoretical basis for the argument advanced in the fourth subsection; that civil society has the capacity to lead to democracy. The final subsection identifies the role that civil society can perform in a democratic transition.

2.1. Definition of civil society

This subsection defines civil society but it is also essential to this thesis to note the etymological similarities of civil society and the other major terms of this thesis, political civility and the political culture of democracy, to their Latin origin of *citivas*. While *civitas* refers to the city, it also denotes the concepts of citizen rights, citizenship, and the community within the city and/or state. Lewis provides an abstract definition of *civitas*: “the condition or privileges of a (Roman) citizen, citizenship, freedom of the city, upon its conditions”, in addition to a concrete definition: “the citizens united in a community, the body - politic, the state, and as this consists of one city and its territory, or of several cities, it differs from *urbs*, i.e. the compass of the dwellings of the collected citizens” (Lewis, 1879). DeLue and Dale claim that “*citvitas* represents the ideal character of society, which in no sense can be found in completed form” (2009: 281). Civil is derived from the Latin *civilis* and relates to a citizen and public life. From this, civility is related to good citizenship, civilisation, and the state of being civilised while civil society originated in Aristotle's work when he used the term *koinōnia politike*. This was to describe a portion of society which is separate from government but consists of a community of citizens with shared interests (Davis, 1996).

Civil society is a non-governmental entity as the elements do not seek election or power. As Held summarises, “Civil society constitutes those areas of social life – the domestic world, the economic sphere, cultural activities and political interaction –
which are organised by private or voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct control of the state” (1993: 6). It can loosely be defined in three categories; institutions (e.g. legal system, citizenship, family), organisations (e.g. Non-Governmental Organisations) and individuals (e.g. membership, organising events). Media, however, falls under several categories since it has institutional, in addition to organisational and individualistic characteristics. The complexity of the concept means there are several perspectives regarding what is civil society. Rather than using an abstract definition, Walzer’s definition is suitably encompassing:

“Civil society is the sphere of uncoerced human association between the individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and the market.” (1998: 123-4)

Scholte adds another dimension to this definition by arguing that “pure” civil activities “involve no quest for public office and no pursuit of pecuniary gain” (2002: 283), thus excluding political parties, firms, and commercial mass media. Considering this viewpoint, Scholte notes that civil society is present when rules that govern society are influenced by voluntary associations and lists the actors as:

“academic institutions, business forums, clan and kinship circles, consumer advocates, development cooperation initiatives, environmental movements, ethnic lobbies, faith-based associations, human rights promoters, labour unions, local community groups, peace movements, philanthropic foundations, professional bodies, relief organisations, think tanks, women’s networks, and youth associations.” (2002: 283)

McLaverty (2002) analyses scholars Hall, Perez-Diaz, and Gellner who have defined civil society through expressing the importance of its normative aspects. Hall and Gellner focus on factors such as opposition to despotism, the role of controlling the state through acting as a counter-balance, volunteerism, and modular members of autonomous groups. Perez-Diaz lists the socio-political institutions that civil society includes; “rule of law, limited and accountable public authority, economic markets, social pluralism and public sphere” (1998: 211). Seligman expands the Ethical-normative component by arguing the “ethical ideal of the social order that if not overcomes, at least harmonises the conflicting demands of individual interest and
social good” (1992: x). These works suggest that independence from the state and legal protection by the state are required for civil society to perform an opposition to despotism function. Furthermore, they raise issues of the normative and the ethical perspectives that because a civil society is non-power seeking entity that engages civic or philanthropic purposes, it is an inherently ‘good’ force.

To summarise, in an ideal and non-co-opted form, civil society is defined by its independence from the state, enabling it to challenge government policy but acting within the rule of law and not in order to seek power. The definition of civil society that this thesis will be implementing is based on Anheier’s (2001) contextual definition.

“Civil society is a collective of institutions, organisations, and individuals located among the family, the state and the market, in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests. It functions primarily as a check on state power.”

2.2. Functions of civil society: i-x

Scholars who have worked on the concept have largely been in agreement regarding its economic and political functions. It is a citizen-led force that helps to represent the interests of private citizens and maintain a balanced relationship between the state and non-state actors. The present day agreement is that civil society is a separate entity from the state as it is the “state-guaranteed realm of commodity production and exchange of private property, greedy market competition and private rights” (Keane, 1988: 32).

By surveying the literature, in addition to building on the analysis produced by Keane (1988), it appears that there are 10 functions to civil society. As the academic conceptualisation of civil society has evolved through history, its functions have also developed. Although there are overlapping understandings of civil society between thinkers, this review of the literature focuses on the development of the functions that civil society has performed.

Firstly, civil society was a term referring to the means of resolving conflict. In western antiquity, the term was originally understood by Socrates, Plato, Cicero, and Aristotle to emphasise the ‘good society’ and resolution of conflict through reasoned
arguing. Secondly, it was used to enable the protection of citizens through a social contract. Bodin, Hobbes, and Spinoza argued that to safeguard against the natural state of all against all war (Hobbes, 1651), strong government is required to protect the citizens, who in turn submit to sovereign authority through a social contract. “Hobbes's justification of the ‘security state’ thus rests upon a dramatic contrast between war and civil society” (Keane, 1988:37). Civil society is seen as equivalent to the state and its laws but civil society is controlled by the state (Keane, 1988:35). Rousseau’s *The Social Contract*, 1762, recognises how Man used to exist in a pre-societal ‘State of Nature’ where freedom and equality naturally existed. The process of civilisation to modern society that progressed over time has subverted freedom and created social and economic inequality, as summarised in the renowned opening sentence, “Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains” (Rousseau, 1998: 5). Therefore, in order to return to freedom and equality, without returning to the state of nature, a social contract is required between rulers and ruled. This arrangement leads to a civil society.

Thirdly, to ensure the division of state and non-state institutions, scholars of the ‘Age of Enlightenment’ such as Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith (1650s to 1780s) produced literature on differentiating the ‘state’ from the ‘non-state’. These formed notably different interpretations, which Keane (1988) summarises, where civil society was primarily analysed regarding the state of nature or absolutist government and the term itself remained synonymous with the state or political society approximately until the end of the eighteenth century. J.S. Mill, a proponent of liberal democracy, saw state government as necessary but that its desire for power also made it dangerous. Therefore, *On Liberty* (1859) discusses the need for the state to be separate from society, and that a truly civil society must function to always guarantee the liberty of its citizens.

Fourthly, to maintain a Constitutional state. Locke spoke of “civil government” in addition to, and as an alternative term for, “civil or political society”, while Kant saw it as the constitutional state that enables political evolution to occur (Kumar, 1993: 376). Locke and Kant’s approaches developed a constitutional state model, whereby “Civil society consists of a complex of stable interactions among free, equal and independent male individuals, whose properties are secured politically through their subjugation to state which monopolises the process of formulated, administering and
enforcing laws” (Keane, 1988:39). This led Kant to define civil society as a political arrangement which secures “mine and thine” through public law (Kant, 1970) and the patriarchal household naturally forms collectively as a defence against common enemies. Property owning individuals have respect for others in a similar situation and therefore peace is maintained. This view established limitations of authority, as in Locke’s civil society no individual should be exempted from the Rule of Law (Locke, 1963:409). Further conditions of the constitutional state are that political power is held by trust and legislators are subject to elections (Keane, 1988:41).

Fifthly, civil society acts as the protection from despotism and an opposition to the authoritarian state. This line of thought was inspired by Ferguson (1767) and Paine (1792), who both saw civil society as protection from the “abuse of power by political leaders” (Sater, 2007:3). Clear separation of state and non-state are evident in Paine’s The Rights of Man (1791) which pitched civil society against the state and established the ‘minimum state’ concept; a critique of despotism and over-government. Paine viewed the state as a necessary evil and a delegation of social power for the common benefit of society. A good civil society, however, ‘regulates its own affairs’ and therefore has less need for government. Furthermore, he supported “the need for citizens to resist state power which encroaches upon their liberties” (Keane, 1988:44). De Tocqueville thought that civil society “should function as a counterweight to the state to ensure freedom of citizens” (Sater, 2007:3). In addition, civil society offers a revolutionary function. Gramsci developed the anti-authoritarian dimension of civil society as the nucleus of independent political activity, which was influential in the struggle against dictatorships in Eastern Europe and Latin America.

Sixthly, civil society acts for the protection of commercial and economic interests. A notable paradigm shift in the literature occurred in 18th and 19th century European understanding of civil society, as it was viewed instead within the development of the commercial sphere and the modern state. Alagappa argues that modern accounts of civil society can be traced to works by the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson (2004: 27). “Ferguson regarded associations for commercial ends, associations which were not primordial, as characteristic of civil society” they were also “pluralistic, outside the family, and not assimilated into the state” (Shills, 1991: 5). The commercial aspect was expanded under the Marxist view of civil society which regarded civil society as the social organisation evolving directly out of
production and commerce. Marx saw the market as a bourgeois separation from the state and that civil society develops with the bourgeoisie. Therefore, “the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy” (Marx, 1962: 362). Engels made the same distinction that “The State- the political order - is the subordinate, and civil society - the realm of economic relations - the decisive element” (1980: 394-395). The Marxist view of civil society, as only the market, lost credibility as Goulder (1980: 370) argues it is reductionist. Hegel’s writings, which had inspired Marx, also saw civil society as a market-related entity and “the realm of economics and economic relationships” (Stillman, 1980: 623) that was separate from state institutions. However, his conceptualisation of civil society, as a universal state, also encompasses the protection of individual rights and the French revolutionary goals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Hegel also saw civil society as being necessary in order to secure freedom and the solution to societal problems, such as poverty.

Seventhly, the Liberal-Associative model, which was created when another paradigm shift occurred with de Tocqueville, whose work took civil society away from the economic, and back to the socio-political, realm. While accepting the liberal democratic form of government, he urged the importance of protecting and renewing civil society, understood as a self-organising, legally guaranteed sphere, which is not directly dependent on the state. De Tocqueville’s notion of the Democratic State, as the name suggests, includes “pluralist and self-organising civil society, independent of the state” which is additionally “an indispensable condition of democracy” (Keane, 1988:51). His work draws from Hegel but highlights the political dangers of the Universal State. He argued this could lead to popularly elected state despotism, which is “the principal danger confronting modern nations” (Keane, 1988:49). He also brought a third aspect to the state vs. society distinction; the state and then a division between political society and civil society. Therefore, civil society’s role is to be an obstacle to state power that prevents elected despotism, protects the freedom of citizens, and prevents democracy from being sabotaged by an overbearing state. This is called the Liberal-Associative model because de Tocqueville argued strong institutions and associations are required to ensure democratic freedom and equality. His work mentions the “independent eye of society” which refers to “interacting, self-organised and constantly vigilant civil associations” (Keane, 1988:51). This is not, however, an anti-state position because it recognises the
centralised state is required for civil associations to exist but argues the excesses of the state must be controlled.

Eighthly is the Oppositional-Resistance function derived from the revisionist, cultural Marxist works of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci separates himself from the Marxist tradition by stating that civil society is not solely concerned with economics. His analysis is similar to the three-part distinction that de Tocqueville also makes, “Between the economic structure and the State with its legislation and its coercion stands civil society” (Gramsci, 1971: 208-209). However, Gramsci discusses the revolutionary potential of civil society in the removal of a regime, and that civil society must be radically transformed if revolutionary change is not to degenerate into “economic moralism”. Regarding the Oppositional-Resistance dimension of Gramsci’s understanding of civil society, he argues that political parties (in opposition) can be part of civil society and that “the institutions of civil society can also exercise coercive force” (Ransome, 1992:142). Furthermore, through the concept of hegemony, institutions of civil society can provide ideological or consensual control, to individuals, which voluntarily join, in order to challenge the state’s monopoly. Gramsci’s theorising overcomes the negative depiction of civil society, as being inherently dominated by hegemonic interests of the state, but would also provide an important site for action, specifically that of gradual resistance via ‘the war of position’. The Gramscian perspective also established the notion that civil society can be associated with radical agendas and limited to resistance within authoritarian regimes (Edwards and Foley, 1996: 40).

Ninthly, by acting as an intermediary between the state and society, civil society has the function of applying pressure on the government. Through civic organisations, citizens can express their feelings to the government; they are a channel to voice their concerns. This can influence state decision-making process by private citizens who are outside of government. Also, civil society relieves pressure from the government. Contrary to totalitarian government, “privatisation and other market reforms offered civil society the chance to step in as governments retracted their reach” (Carothers, 1999: 19). Gramsci also saw civil society as an entity essential to the state, as situated behind the state or within the superstructure, giving the state its stability and power, leading to his formula; “State = political society + civil society” (Gramsci, 1971: 262). This is how civil society can assist social renewal and allow a
method of civil engagement that is an alternative to political parties. In addition, a
general assumption is made in democratisation and development literature that civil
society has a positive connotation as it works against ‘uncivil’ institutions e.g. those
who encourage disrespect of human rights, organisations who advocate violence or
individuals who nurture ethnic or religious prejudice (Anheier, 2001). In discussing
the functions of civil society, Carothers (1999) unpacks some of the myths regarding
civil society. He addresses how the state and civil society work together regarding
the formulation of policy, and how the increasing strength of civil society does not
simultaneously weaken state power; rather the two are mutually beneficial. He adds
that civil society is not always “good” and it is a “misleading conception (that civil
society) is only noble causes” (1999:20).

Tenthly, civil society seeks to ensure the democratic function of a state. In the 20th
century, as democracy became the increasingly favoured method of government, civil
society became more closely associated with being a pro-democratic vehicle that
facilitated a balanced relationship between the state and non-state actors. This
contrasts to sixteenth-century English political thought of understanding civil society
as being part of the state (Scholte, 2002: 283) but draws on works from Locke, Hegel,
and de Tocqueville who saw that it can act as a check on state power. This pro-
democratic function was also largely influenced by Gramsci’s definition of the non-
state or private sphere consisting of the economy, churches, the education system,
trade unions, cultural associations, political parties, and the family. In other words,
all the organisations and institutions outside the process of production and the
state’s authority. Although Gramsci saw civil society as the intellectual battleground
between the capital and labour classes, he also recognised it was the “sphere of all
the popular-democratic struggles” (Simon, 1982:69).

Civil society can play numerous functions, depending on what a political system or
society requires it to perform. Civil society is defined by the functions it fulfils
relative to the state, which may be economic, political, or both. The literature,
therefore, identifies ten possible functions of civil society, although fulfilling all
simultaneously is impossible. However, the collective and historical development of
these functions, as discussed in this section, have created a compounded 20th Century
pro-democracy understanding, which became particularly germane in the post-Cold
War era. Within the pro-democracy understanding, Foley and Edwards (1996)
classify the two distinct strands as the Liberal-Associative model, based on the works of Ferguson, de Tocqueville, and Putnam, in contrast to Gramscian Oppositional-Resistance model. The similarities and nuances between these two alternative approaches will be elaborated on in the following subsections.

2.3. Civil society organisations (CSOs)

The focal point of research in this thesis is the study of Tunisian CSOs, the organisational groupings that constitute civil society. Therefore, this subsection provides a working definition for CSO and identifies the theoretical origins and significance of the CSO from works of Gramsci and de Tocqueville.

Tvedt emphasises the need for employing precise language in the categorisation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as each category (VO, CSO, CBO, IO...) can “emphasise one aspect while downplaying others” (1998: 12). Therefore, despite admitting the value of the common denominator term of NGO, he provides separate legal, economic, functional, and structural-operational definitions based on the functions of organisations (1998: 12-18). This thesis uses CSO because its research is focused on the practices and behaviours of indigenous Tunisian organisations that position themselves within civil society, rather than international NGOs, aid or developmental type organisations.

CSOs is a broad term for organisations that are defined by their non-state, non-economic, non-commercial, and non-governmental status. They are organised groups that operate within the public space, between the state and the marketplace, therefore differing from the economic sector in their non-profit status. However, organisations can be voluntary or have salaried staff members. These foundations, charities, advocacy groups can also be both national and international. A list of CSO types is provided in Section 2.1. CSOs are formed for different reasons but their existence is often linked to the belief that the state is in some way insufficient and requires organised citizenry to draw attention to, address or confront an issue (Lewis and Wallace, 2000). Therefore, they often seek to inform and influence public policy or exert influence on political decisions. Their work is often related to a particular domain whereby a common interest is pursued. However, CSOs represent different ideologies and vary in their focus which often leads to a lack of homogeneity.
within any civil society. Although his work was often rooted in criticism of the Italian state’s authoritarianism and he regarded civil society as an integral part of the state, Gramsci’s notion of revolution against dominant classes required the organisation of both political parties and civil organisations. “Without strong national political parties, the people, including the majority of the bourgeoisie, cannot participate in the formulation of a national agenda and a cogent government policy” (Buttigieg, 1995: 17). For the Forma Mentis (shape of the mind or ideology) of the population to change, Gramsci “insisted adamantly that the revolutionary transformation of society starts in civil society” (Buttigieg, 1995: 19). He recognised that individuals who oppose aspects of government could be easily dismissed as rebels. When organised, however, individuals became groups which would begin the ‘cultivation of a broad-based revolutionary culture’. Therefore, it was the duty of the ‘the revolutionary party’ to encourage “the development of an independent socio-cultural and political consciousness among the subaltern classes and by promoting the formation of self-regulated autonomous organisations among workers and peasants” (Buttigieg, 1995: 19). Gramsci also acknowledged that in the process of being organised and in order to become effective, freedom must be taken from those in power. “It is through their activities and autonomous organisations in civil society that the subaltern masses must first acquire their freedom or independence from the ruling classes and the allied intellectuals, that they must first learn to become themselves a leading force” (Buttigieg 1995: 20). This notion is problematic because, under authoritarian conditions, any attempt to acquire freedom would be met with repression. However, it identifies the importance of CSOs possessing autonomy.

Aware that the age of aristocracy was in its twilight period, as liberal though was gaining popularity and the masses sought greater rights and political equality, de Tocqueville recognised two threats to European societies; firstly, a form of despotism through a populist leader and secondly, a form of tyranny of the majority established through democratic means (Howell, 2001: 42-43). Therefore, de Tocqueville championed the notion of a participatory citizenship that is active in civil society associations or organisations as a critical barrier to despotism. He argued it nurtures self-rule and encourages debate, vital for developing a pluralist society. Furthermore, “de Tocqueville showed how associationalism could preserve individuality from the pressure of conformity to the will of the enfranchised masses” (Howell, 2001: 44). In
addition to the democratic functions, which are addressed in the following subsections, de Tocqueville also argued that CSOs should serve as ‘schools of democracy’ (1969: 517) and that freedom of association is essential for developing democratic culture.

2.4. The relationship between civil society and democracy

As this thesis seeks to establish a connection between civil society and democracy, following a neo-Tocquevillian approach, Keane argues “a pluralist and self-organising civil society independent of the state is an indispensable condition of democracy” (1988: 51). This subsection explains civil society’s relationship with democracy and why civil society might lead to democracy. As the third wave of democratisation was carried out in Latin America and Eastern Europe, driven principally by civil society, a common assumption began formulating in the 1990s that civil society was synonymous with democracy. This was based on the postulation that a diverse and vibrant civil society may encourage democratic practice and political participation. Without using the term civil society, “de Tocqueville was the first to attribute the importance of associationalism and self-organisation for democracy” (Kaldor, 2003: 19).

A neo-Tocquevillian position was established in the works from a series of scholars such as Putnam, Fukuyama, and Diamond. It reflected the linkage of civil society to democracy and became a key element of the post-Cold War zeitgeist (Ishkanian, 2007: 58). Putnam argued that civil society is crucial to "making democracy work" and that “Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society” (1993). This is because civil society holds the state to account and enables society to reach agreement on values and norms, as mentioned in section 1. Furthermore, as Entelis notes:

“without a well-developed civil society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to have an atmosphere supportive of democracy. A society that does not have free individuals and group expression in non-political matters is not likely to make an exception for political ones” (1996:47).

Scholars in the field of transitology maintain this view; that an active, functioning civil society is necessary for democratic transition. However, transitology tends to
argue that the role of civil society is necessary for democratic consolidation, the
latter stages of transition, rather than recognising that civil society can initiate
political change or steer a country through a transition. Classic transitology can be
 traced back to Rustow's 1970 work which stated that there are no particular social
and economic preconditions are required in order for reforms towards democracy to
be enacted. The experience of the Latin American states’ political transitions from
authoritarianism to democratisation in the 1980s further inspired the concept of
transitology which became a sub-field of the democratisation literature. Transitology
looks to explain and create a framework for, the conditions required for democratic
government, structures, norms, and values to become embedded in society after
dictatorships have been removed. These works use empirical data to challenge
previously made assumptions on democratisation. Deconstructing Lipset (1959),
that democracy only comes from modern (urbanised, educated, and mass media
consuming) industrial societies, and Dahl (1971), that higher social-economic
development increases the possibility of democracy, O'Donnell (1973,1988)
questions these assumptions pointing to high and low levels of modernisation in
South American states, yet a lack of democratisation. Contrary to the assumption that
religion is an obstacle to democratisation, Karl (1990) acknowledges the role of the
Catholic Church as opposition to authoritarianism.

Regarding civil society, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) recognise mass mobilisation
and the “resurrection of civil society” as being crucial to the democratic transition
process, however, as a later stage in transition, rather than from the start of a
transition process. This thesis diverges from this perspective by arguing that in the
Tunisian case, civil society has been central to the transition process. Doorenspleept
identifies cases of Argentina, Chile, Spain, Peru, the Philippians, and Korea that show
the positive role of civil society in liberalisation and creating disunity amongst ruling
elites, in addition to noting that literature on the collapse of the communist regimes
in Eastern Europe and democratisation in Latin America attribute the role of civil
society (2005:5). Furthermore, Doorenspleet argues that civil society promotes
democratic transition since:

“Civil society can alter balance of power between state and society, by
organising opposition against the state, by mobilising the citizens of the state
in opposition against the present non-democratic regime and providing
information, which may inspire citizens to protest against the regime” (2005:6).

Transitology largely champions civil society as “the antithesis of the totalitarian conception of the state as the single institution possessing legitimate authority” therefore defined by being “not central but dispersed; not hierarchically or vertically organised, but horizontally structured (or indeed completely unstructured); not official but private and voluntary. It was not despotic or controlling or part of the power structure” (Armstrong, 2011:4.) This is not to say that transitions and the process of democratic consolidation are always a success. Regarding the countries described as ‘transitional’, and therefore trying to achieve democracy, there have been successes, moderate successes, and failures. However, most countries fall into what Carothers (2002) describes as 'Grey Zone', where the state has both democratic features and democratic deficits. Within the Grey Zone there is vast diversity and creates a series of terms for these qualified democracies, “including semi-democracy, formal democracy, electoral democracy, façade democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak democracy, partial democracy, illiberal democracy, and virtual democracy” (Collier and Levitsky, 1997: 430-451).

The works of De Tocqueville, in addition to J.S. Mill, argue that “many social benefits flow from membership of voluntary organisations in the community” (Newton, 2001: 202). Newton (2001) principally agrees but is more sceptical in his belief that empirical evidence to support the claim that civil society organisations (CSOs) generate trust between citizens is lacking. Instead, he argues that “the relationship between social and political trust and democracy is more complex and indirect than appears to be the case at first” (Newton, 2001: 202). In spite of highlighting these differences, Newton agrees that civil society is a boon for democracy. His work identifies that they are said to teach trust, social understanding, empathy, the art of compromise and cooperation, in addition to breeding and enforcing reciprocity (Newton, 2001: 206). Regarding the relationship between civil society and democracy, Newton makes a positive correlation;

"Poorly developed civil societies are unlikely to sustain developed democracies. As social capital is created in civil society so it is easier to create political capital as well, but the link between the social and the political is not
necessarily close in any given case, though it is generally found in most nations” (2001: 212).

In contrast to the literature that suggests active civil society is required for democracy, works that are more critical of civil society have been produced that argue civil society itself is not guaranteed to be sufficient and the assumption that a strong civil society ensures democracy is misleading. Berman (1997) uses the case of Weimar Germany to describe how, in certain conditions, a civil society that is too strong and influential can undermine democracy and subvert, rather than solidify, democratic and liberal values. However, this unique case is an anomaly. Equally, there is no certainty that democracy guarantees a strong civil society. Carothers points to how Japan, France, and Spain have stable democratic governments and weak civic associations (1999:23).

Despite the recognition of these exceptions and critical perspectives, the positive impact of civil society on democratisation features predominately in the literature. Scholte discusses the democratizing possibility civil society offers and how democratic deficits can be reduced through civil society activism (2002: 281). Also, in contrast, this work expresses caution that civil society has the potential to both detract from and add to democracy: “civil society is not inherently a force for democracy any more than the public sector or the market” (Scholte, 2002: 299). By addressing the assumption that civil society is “a way to enhance public participation, consultation, transparency and accountability” (2002: 293), Scholte looks at six potential contributions that civil society might offer to the process of democratisation. Firstly, civil society gives a voice to stakeholders by opening political space which can enable organisations to inform governance agencies. This also empowers civil society members, leading to greater participatory democracy. Secondly, since democracy requires an “informed citizenry”, civil society can fulfil the role of educator. Thirdly, democracy also requires “vigorous, uninhibited discussion of diverse views” (2002: 293), therefore civil society can help to fuel debate by facilitating discussion opportunities and creating openings for dissent. Fourthly, civil society enacts regulatory frameworks so that institutions are subject to public scrutiny. Fifthly, “Increasing the public accountability of the regulatory agencies concerned” (2002: 294), has a democratic accountability function. Finally, the aforementioned five points combined, help with creating legitimacy. When citizens
respect the legitimacy of the government they, therefore, acknowledge its right to
govern and their duty to obey. Furthermore, legitimate government tends to be more
effective, more productive and less violent than illegitimate rule. Civil society
working with regulatory bodies can “give stakeholders a voice, improve public
education, promote debate, raise transparency and increase accountability” (2002:
294). Also, the space created by civil society allows dissent to be expressed at what is
deemed illegitimate. However, this thesis argues that the legal status of civil society,
determined by the state, plays a major role in developing and shaping the public
space. This consequently determines the type of civil society that is permitted to
exist.

Noting that democracy may also be damaged by civil society, Scholte qualifies that
civil society can only fulfil the role described above if it improves its own practices
(2002: 296). A voice must be given to all stakeholders and all must have equal access
and opportunity to participate. If not, “civil society can reproduce or even enlarge
inequalities” (2002: 296). In some cases, the cultural base of civil society
organisations is too narrow as they consist of western-styled, western-funded NGOs
that are led by Western elites. Regarding education, civil society can fail to educate if
behind the scenes lobbying takes precedent or they misinform the public. Debate can
be stifled if civil society members are co-opted, or they stop fuelling debate. Also, if
civil society's discourse is co-opted, it can be recast by official institutions. In
agreement with Anheier (2001), Scholte also recognises that civil society is not an
intrinsically virtuous space; rather that “it includes destructive elements...who seek
to deny the democratic rights of others” (2002: 296). Firstly, through practices like
lobbying, democratically legitimate processes can actually be undermined by CSOs.
Secondly, professionals in civil society can become convinced their views are correct
to the detriment of the masses they consequently ignore. Finally, CSOs are often not
transparent themselves. Scholte concludes that if civil society is to be a force for
democracy, it needs to demonstrate its own democratic credentials. Also noting the
importance of the civil society's own practices but without arguing that civil society
either helps or hinders democracy, McLaverty concludes that those who think that
civil society is the best way of enhancing democracy may be mistaken. He argues
“CSOs may represent important democratic initiatives; in reality, they often fall short
in democratic principles” (2002:314) which emphasises the importance of
democratic values existing in civil society.
To summarise this section, De Tocqueville, Keane, Entelis, Putnam, Fukuyama, Diamond, and scholars in transitology argue that a vibrant civil society can lead to democracy. However, the works of Berman, Carothers, Scholte, and McLaverty recognise that civil society is not intrinsically a force for democratisation and that analysis of a civil society through a critical perspective is essential for assessing its democratic function. This thesis takes a similarly critical stance towards civil society’s democratising potential and these works pose fundamental observations regarding the importance of civil political culture within civil society is addressed, which are addressed in section 4. The functions of civil society mean that it has developed a relationship with democracy, on the condition that it is an entity which is removed or has a degree of separation and autonomy from the state government. Furthermore, both Liberal-Associative and Oppositional-Resistance strands can have the capacity for a democratising effect. While Liberal-Association civil society offers a supportive stance for a liberal government, Oppositional-Resistance civil society is equally necessary for the democratising role by acting as a more vigorous check on state authority while posing a greater challenge to ideational state hegemony.

2.5. The role of civil society in democratic transition

Civil society can serve different purposes depending on the political situation. Civil society in an established democracy behaves differently to one that operates under authoritarian conditions. This subsection addresses literature that recognises the important role that civil society plays in order for democratic transition, and later democratic consolidation, to take place. It concludes by suggesting that civil society can contribute to democratic transition and consolidation if certain pre-conditions are met.

This thesis recognises the value of transitology, as a framework for understanding transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, but argues that the lack of recognition it gives to civil society’s potential in a political transition means it is a flawed paradigm. Classic transitology identifies three stages in the process of transition: an opening of the authoritarian regime, a breakthrough to democracy where a democratic government comes to power via elections and, lastly, the long-term process of consolidation where democratic habits become entrenched, the state institutions are reformed, and civil society is established and strengthened. This
thesis, however, disagrees with the prescriptive sequencing of transition transitology describes whereby civil society’s contribution is only during the democratic consolidation phase. This thesis demonstrates that civil society can play a vital role throughout a transition, as was the case in Tunisia.

In a post-authoritarian context, where a democratic transition is occurring, civil society can play various roles to aid this process. In the earliest stage of transition after revolution, anti-corruption watchdogs, pro-democracy associations and political mediator CSOs are of greater urgency as a platform for opposition needs to be established to ensure authoritarianism does not return. As democratisation and consolidation occur, the role of civil society develops to include interest groups, human rights organisations, professional associations, development and social services NGOs, and political reform movements. However, the development of these CSOs would be unique to each case.

Diamond (1999) argues that civil society advances democracy in two ways; by helping generate a transition from authoritarian rule to elected democracy and by consolidating democracy. This thesis focuses on Tunisian civil society’s role in both of these concepts. His work highlights the importance of the public in the third wave of democratisation drawing on O’Donnell and Schmitter’s analysis of citizenship revival and civil society resurrection, which occurs when weaknesses in authoritarian rule appear (1986), and Collier and Mahoney’s work on protests and strikes destabilising authoritarianism (1997). Diamond forms a comprehensive ‘thirteen points’ list of how civil society assists democratic development which draws on both Gramscian and Tocquevillian conceptions of civil society (1999: 239-250). Two points are of particular note from his thirteen-point assessment. Firstly, civil society can play a role in checking, monitoring, and restraining the exercise of state power by holding it accountable. This function helps avoid corruption and adds legitimacy to new governments by demonstrating their accountability, transparency, and responsiveness to the public (Diamond, 1999: 239-240). Secondly, civil society can stimulate and increase political participation, which “strengthens the legitimacy and the institutionalisation of democratic government, which are essential for consolidation” (Diamond, 1999: 242).

As addressed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, civil society can facilitate learning of democracy. Helping the population understand the practices and procedures of democracy is an
important aspect of transition in which CSOs can partake. de Tocqueville regarded associations as ‘schools of democracy’ and the associational model of civil society, that scholars such as himself and Putnam advocate, affirms that civil society can assist a state in transition by endorsing the norms and values of political civility (See section 3). This occurs within associations by imparting ‘habits of co-operation, solidarity and public-spiritedness’ on its members (Putnam, 1993:89-90).

Due to the lack of MENA examples where civil society has successfully influenced a democratic transition, cases from Latin America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia are considered. Friedman and Hochstetler identify that civil society in Brazil continues to influence the intermittent transition. Cooperation between Brazilian state actors and CSOs to create regular consultation and participation through institutionalised interactions in councils has helped transform a military dictatorship into an either cooperative or deliberative democracy. Yet it is social movements that play a vital, Gramscian ‘confrontation with state’ role in reaction to “incomplete democratisation and the impact of economic transformation” (2002:37). Referring to the levels of political influence and organisational capabilities, Ekiert and Kubik argue that “the post-communist experience as a whole, however, attests to the positive and important role that civil society can play in democracy's consolidation.” (2014: 53) They cite Polish unions and farmers’ groups’ ability to defeat or delay proposed economic and social reforms as evidence.

“In the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand, without the participation of the masses or civil society, democratisation would not have been achieved. Although their role was only supportive, it lent popular weight to the democratic transition and helped deepen democracy” (Bunbongkarn, 2004: 137).

Bunbongkarn asserts that civil society contributes to democratic consolidation, firstly, by creating political pressure on the government to implement reform. Thailand is an example of pressure from a developed business sector and urban middle class on the military leadership whereas the Philippines drew on their pre-existing democratic consciousness in response to electoral irregularity. Secondly, organisations and groups must commit to democracy. In doing so they can propagate democratic principles and ideas that lead to ensuring that both political elites and the majority of the people believe democracy is the best form of government (2004:
South Korean civil society became increasingly critical of the authoritarian government. These efforts “empowered the people, making them more assertive in the political arena” (Bunbongkarn, 2004: 142).

In order to identify the objective of a transition, Linz and Stepan describe the process of democratic transition as complete when,

“sufficient agreements have been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with bodies de jure” (1996: 3).

Of ‘the five areas’ that Linz and Stepan (1996: 7-13) describe as requirements for consolidated democracy’, three of these interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions mention the role of civil society. Firstly, conditions for the development of a free and lively civil society must exist. Secondly, civil society should not make way for ‘political society’ during democratic consolidation. Instead, civil society should continue to be a field for alternative viewpoints and to monitor the government’s progress in transition. Thirdly, that the rule of law, which protects and embeds civil and political society in a spirit of constitutionalism, is required. Linz and Stepan see these three as “virtually definitional prerequisites of a consolidated democracy” (1996: 10). The other two, ‘democracy as the form of government’ and an ‘economic society’ do not directly address civil society but they argue that democracy is an interacting system and these five conditions support one another.

This establishes the prerequisites of a consolidated democracy. However, this thesis argues that the preconditions of state must be considered when assessing a democratic transition. A state’s history, including its civil society traditions, is relevant when considering its chances of successful democratic transition. Although transitology does not have a single party-line, there are certain works in the field that hold a no preconditions assumption: that any country can achieve democracy and that the underlying conditions in transitional countries will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process. This thesis does not subscribe to perspective. Also, these works include the secondary assumption that
the required level of ‘state building’ to make a coherent, functioning state is not an obstacle to democratic transitions (Carothers, 2002). The list of countries from the third wave of democratisation that have not transitioned to democracy but remain in the Grey Zone between dictatorship and democracy is testament to the naivety of the transitology paradigm and demonstrates that states which lack necessary preconditions are significantly disadvantaged when attempting to make a successful transition.

Jankauskas and Gudžinskas (2008) argue that a state faced with the triple transition of state-building, market reforms, and democratisation is more likely to end up in the Grey Zone. They argue the importance of preconditions and that a functioning state is a pre-requisite to democratic transition, and therefore state-building should take priority. This suggests that transitology was only related to a specific set of countries at a specific time or that the Latin American experiences are non-transferrable to other world regions. Chapter Four illustrates this point by identifying the significance of the historical development of Tunisia’s civil society.

Diamond asserts that “civil society can, and typically must, play a central role in building and consolidating democracy” (Diamond, 1999: 259-260) but adds that the deconstruction of any patron-client relationship with the government is crucial as it would prevent an independent civil society from functioning effectively. Furthermore, a level of co-operation with the state government is required. Civil society can remain ‘in opposition to the state’, what Diamond refers to as an 18th-century conception, but if this relationship is over-confrontational or civil society overwhelms the state with demands, which can be the case after long periods of authoritarianism, it becomes a counterproductive force to democratisation.

The assumptions that preconditions to democratisation are irrelevant demonstrate the weaknesses of the transitology paradigm. Chapters Four and Five demonstrate that Tunisia had the preconditions necessary to transition from dictatorship to democracy due to its pre-existing constitutional and civil society history which meant that extensive state building was not required. However, this thesis recognises that civil society should be viewed critically. It is not an inherent force for good but has the potential to be corrupted. Therefore, CSO activities should not be viewed as necessarily assisting democratic transition. This section demonstrates the definition and functions of civil society and how CSOs are defined and operate. It also
demonstrates that if certain preconditions are met, then civil society can have an active role in a state’s democratic transition.

3. **Civil society in the MENA region**

The conceptual work on civil society in section 2 represents an ideal manifestation of civil society and how it contributes to democracy. This section demonstrates that civil society has been present in the MENA region but has been constrained by the political contexts of colonialism and authoritarianism. The authoritarian context required MENA scholars to entertain a different view of civil society. Therefore, studies on MENA civil society were forced to adopt an exceptionalist stance, which sought to understand civil society with a ‘local concepts to describe local people’ approach or to argue that civil society was non-existent. This thesis does not agree with the exceptionalist approach but affirms that the MENA context literature only deviates from the Gramscian and Tocquevillian framework, established in section 2, because MENA civil society exists and operates within an authoritarian context where free public space is largely restricted or co-opted by the government. Since MENA civil society has not been completely autonomous, literature on its development prior to the 2011 Arab Uprisings has therefore focused on ways in which it operates within the context of an authoritarian state.

To address civil society in the MENA region, it is important to acknowledge how the term is linguistically understood in Arabic. The operational translation is *al-mujtama‘ al-madani*. “The Arabic word for society, *mujtama‘* is a noun of the place derived from the root *jama‘* (to join together or assemble)... the root has more of a connotation of unity and totality than the English *society*” (Browers, 2006: 62). *Madani* derives from *madina* (city) but it pertains to civility, civilisation and civil society as Browers notes that *madani* (civil) “also contains the same root as the verb *madan*, meaning to civilise or refine” (2006, 106). This confirms that meaning of civil society has not been distorted through translation.

The MENA CSO context is relevant to this thesis as it constitutes an accurate representation of the Tunisian CSO landscape prior to the 2011 revolution. Therefore, the works on Tunisian civil society were conducted under the constrained authoritarian context. This thesis argues that as Tunisia transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy, its civil society continued to exhibit a gradual move
from the MENA CSO landscape, defined in pre-Arab Uprisings\(^1\) literature, to one that aligns more closely with the Gramscian and Tocquevillian models.

This section analyses the existing literature on civil society in the MENA region by addressing the debates on its existence and its functions. It argues that civil society is a universal concept - as opposed to a Western model that is inapplicable to the MENA region - but the lack of autonomy from authoritarian governmental structures has limited and shaped MENA civil society and defined its functions. This argument is framed within the Culturalist-Structuralist debate and demonstrates that, rather than the MENA civil society being limited by the region’s inherent cultural incompatibility with Gramscian and Tocquevillian civil society conceptualisations, as the culturalist argument claims, its functions are constrained by the authoritarian environment, as per the Structuralist argument. These restrictions also meant MENA civil society’s impact on democracy was limited.

Paine argued civil society should be unhindered by state institutions (Keane, 1988: 45). The civil society literature presented in section 2 largely reaches an agreement with Paine; that for civil society to be effective, vibrant, and varied, it must be a separate entity from the state. Furthermore, the state must guarantee civil society’s freedom for it to function autonomously. Authoritarian governmental structures in MENA states, however, have prevented the development of an autonomously functioning civil society.

Despite the authoritarian presence in MENA states, Bellin notes that the term civil society is “sufficiently elastic” to be adaptable to different political contexts (Bellin, 1995: 121). Owen, however, criticises this lack of clarity in the term and argues that it is “too slippery and ambiguous” (2004: 201), making it an ineffective analytical tool. This conundrum is made apparent in the lack of agreement regarding the existence of MENA civil society. Focusing solely on Westernised NGOs devoted to non-partisan public interest advocacy work on national issues, hurried civil society assessment missions by democracy promoters declared that “very little civil society exists” in the Middle East (Carothers 1999: 248). Such assessment missions neglect the literature asserting that civil society in the MENA region exists but has different attributes and operates differently to its Western counterpart. Culturalists and Structuralists alike argue this divergence of MENA civil society is due to its lack of

\(^{1}\)The series of protests and uprisings that occurred in Arab states during 2010 and 2011.
autonomy from the state. However, while Structuralists attribute this lack of autonomy to organisational and material causes, Culturalists emphasise the MENA region’s different beliefs and values system. Owen argues that the Western definitions and understandings of civil society are not necessarily suitable for the MENA context but maintains that civil society may “exist in a wide variety of political vocabularies” (2004: 200). Civil society is certainly a part of the MENA political vocabulary, yet it is used “to criticise authoritarian government in the name of social justice and human rights” in addition to non-religious or tribal alternative forms of mobilisation (Owen, 2004: 201). The MENA authoritarian context heavily limits the space in which civil society operates.

In addition to the limited space, the MENA civil society is fragmented and subservient to the state. Zubaida considers that MENA civil society is “a number of islands of independent endeavour, heavily dependent on the state itself to provide the clear legislation and institutional mechanisms which alone guarantee their autonomy” (Zubaida, 1992:2-3). He adds the lack of precise legislation and unpredictable treatment of CSOs makes them dependent on the state. Confirming this dependency relationship, Owen prefers the term “informal politics” over civil society for the MENA context since he considers it more suitable as he argues that a distinct state and non-state division does not exist (2004: 201). This analysis of MENA civil society demonstrates that the division between the state and civil society are not always entirely clear. This thesis does not support MENA exceptionalism. Rather, it recognises that due to the presence and persistence of authoritarian governance, which limited public space, state interference in MENA civil society is prominent.

Once the analysis of civil society by Age of Enlightenment thinkers began to recognise a separation of state and non-state institutions, definitions from the Western body of literature began to assume that civil society should be autonomous from the state and that a division between public and private is also apparent. In the MENA region, however, authoritarian political conditions have made the divide between the state and the civil society less apparent and subsequently civil society has had severely restricted autonomy. The distinction between the private and public sectors is more suitably imagined as a spectrum of varying degrees rather than a clear division.
3.1. Culturalist Vs Structuralist debate

The role and status of civil society in the MENA region is addressed in the Culturalist-Structuralist debate. Culturalists argue that the MENA region’s culture prevents civil society from developing. However, this thesis agrees with the Structuralist argument which identifies that the political conduct of authoritarian MENA government structures has constrained the development of MENA civil society. The argument in this section is positioned within the Structuralist side of the debate, while the relationship between culture and civil society is addressed in the civility section.

The Culturalist argument makes the case that civil society is an exclusively Western concept that is not applicable to other regions with different historical experiences. Therefore, a Western understanding of civil society is not possible in MENA. Gellner (1994) argues that Western liberalism is defined by civil society. For Gellner, being modular, free to join or leave societies or groups who have open memberships, is essential to civil society. Therefore tribal, religious, and kinship groups, which people are born into, are not a genuine part of civil society. Modularity requires commonality of values and practices, which requires a population ‘trained’ for this high culture. Gellner and Mardin reached similar conclusions that Middle Eastern and Muslim countries lack civic associations for civil society; claiming that civil society is based on the “uniqueness of the Western cultural tradition” (Niblock, 2005: 488). Mardin believes that Muslim society, as set out in the Quran, promotes social cohesion rather than ‘Western individual rights’, and Islamic cities are ‘segmented on religious and ethnic communities’, leading to no hegemony of the bourgeoisie. This makes ‘Islamic civil society’ a different entity that almost is incomparable because people are prevented from being modular.

Contrary to the analysis of civil society being alien to the MENA region, S. E. Ibrahim makes an historical case for the existence of civil society in MENA by identifying a public space “shared by Ulama, merchants, guilds, Sufi orders, and sects” (Ibrahim, 1995: 30). Furthermore, Niblock partially accepts Gellner and Mardin’s perspective but argues that although the emergence of civil society in MENA has followed a different historical and cultural experience to the West, primordial groups can perform the same function of checking government power as modular civil society organisations. MENA civil society may not be modular, yet tribal and religious groups, even in a sphere controlled by the government, can still limit government
power and can mobilise large selections of the populations with legal authority. Addressing the case of Kuwait, Tetreault (2000) notes that public space developed through the participation of Islamist groups and Diwaniya institutions of social, economic, and political interaction. These cases show that MENA civil society can perform an active democratic functional role, insofar as being a public space, but not to the extent of being the thorn in the side of political power (Keane, 1988). Instead, it can apply pressure on the state without fully holding it to account and can also negotiate with the state. Furthermore, Niblock disregards the importance of being modular, noting the Western world is not culturally homogenous as people hold notably different values.

The Structuralist argument suggests that the lack of democracy in MENA is due to the structural characteristics of the state (See Crystal (1994) Salamé (1994) Brynen et al (1995) Kamrava (1998). Varied and vibrant civil society is a universal concept which is only absent from MENA due to authoritarian governmental structures preventing autonomy and democracy from flourishing. Corporatist structures in politics and society (Murphy, 1999) and the dynamics of rentierism (Luciani, 1990) have maintained authoritarianism and prevented political liberalisation from occurring. Therefore, civil society has not been afforded the space to develop and civic activity ceased in the face of repression.

The Structuralist approach, that Western economic penetration has strengthened the MENA state's power also features in Niblock’s analysis. This limited the scope of civil society and its effectiveness was further reduced by the social contract that placed the needs of the state before citizens through the promotion of economic growth and stability over public discourse (Niblock, 2005: 492). Since gaining independence from colonial powers, the MENA states have been ruled by an authoritarian government. In order to maintain control, they have excluded, silenced or co-opted civil society and invaded the space in which the civil society would have operated. MENA states have either prevented civil society from existing or, when it has allowed civil society to exist, has ensured it was constrained. For example, following their unsatisfactory developmental, political, and economic performance in the 1960s, MENA states enter a period of economic and social liberalisation during the 1970s. Despite the lack of democratisation, this opening allowed expression of discontent and civil society re-emerged (Kramer, 1992). This resulted in a large growth in the
number of NGO's from 20,000 in the 1960s to 70,000 in the 1980s (Mazlish, 2006:51). In the 20th Century, regimes banned civil society organisations on a national level but satellite and Internet technology has enabled associations to organise and transmit their views due to the internationalisation of civil society (Niblock, 2005: 493). Although civil society expanded in these periods, regimes limited CSO autonomy and activity. However, it further supports the Structuralist view by demonstrating that the MENA region is not an exception to civil society growth, if the conditions are not constrained.

3.2. MENA civil society Vs the MENA state

Furthering the perspective the MENA civil society is predominantly deferent to the state, Ayubi applied Gramsci’s idea, of the state dominating civil society, to the MENA context. Power in the MENA region has been largely seized forcefully by regimes, then maintained through administration and policing. The ruling class, with no intention of relinquishing power, has not been subject to public scrutiny since it maintains power through politically co-opting or isolating opposition (Ayubi, 1995:25). The MENA state was also able to maintain control over the public despite periods of economic liberalisation. MENA regimes “occupied the prize position in the economy (of their state)” during the ‘state capitalism’ phase of the 1950s but financial crises from the 1960s onwards forced the encouragement of private enterprise and initiative (Tripp, 2001:212). Ayubi (1995) thought the economic openness would lead to political openness. However, the period of economic liberalisation occurred in such a way that enabled authoritarian regimes to increase their maintenance of control over their citizens. Economic liberalisation produced “licensed entrepreneurs, dependent capitalists, politically indebted cliques, and cronies of the rulers,” who, instead of becoming economically liberated, became part of the system of patronage (Tripp, 2001:224). Tripp explores three aspects of the MENA state that define its omnipresence; a community based on Islam, a hierarchical system of neo-patrimonialism, and a coercive apparatus centred on security services. He summarises that within all three, a system of patronage and the blurred lines between what lies in the public and the private sections are key to maintaining authoritarian state control. Niblock (2005) maintains that civil society can still perform the function of pressuring the state in an undemocratic political climate. He argues that MENA civil societies do not conform to the Western conceptualisation of
civil society but can still perform some functions of civil society. Therefore, despite being considerably restricted, MENA civil society still plays a role and should therefore not be discounted as unhelpful, just not analysed by Western-liberal criteria. He adds that either tribal, religious, kinship groups, or other primordial groups can perform the function of civil society. However, even if various associations exist, all representing different non-modular or primordial groups; this does not represent a vibrant and varied civil society. Autonomy from the state and volunteerism is required for civil society to be considered vibrant and varied. Chapter Four demonstrates that prior to the 2011 Revolution, Tunisia boasted many associations, addressing various aspects of human and women’s rights, in addition to professional associations (lawyers, trade unions). However, they were controlled by the state through co-option or were eliminated if their agendas diverged from the state’s. Due to its lack of autonomy, Tunisian civil society could not be considered vibrant nor varied. For example, Women’s associations in Tunisia under Ben Ali and Bourguiba existed but were not fully autonomous and were forced to operate within the state’s agenda in a top-down liberalisation process. Therefore, the rights that constituted the state-feminist agenda, the rights that the state wanted women to have, were promoted to the advantage of liberal-secular women, since their interests coincided with those of the state, the state allowed them to exist and promote rights that were mutually agreed. Women’s associations could pressure the regime, pursue goals of mutual interest, and work with, rather than against the state. However, critiquing, openly challenging, or presenting views antithetical to those of the state was not permitted. The Tunisian secular-liberal Women’s movement was still able to make considerable strides in terms of achieving legislation that supported women’s rights, but could not stand against any state-imposed constraints. This is akin to the Gramscian idea of how civil society can emerge within an oppressive or totalitarian state, as was the case in Algeria between 1988-1992 where groups had goals that did not threaten the power or legitimacy of the regime (Entelis, 1996:47).

As MENA civil society was largely constrained, this has implications on its relationship with democracy. The Norton project on MENA civil society (1995) found that there was no linkage between active civil society and democracy in the Middle East. It did, however, claim that liberal civil society “provides both the structural underpinning of representative democracy and the terrain on which an organising working class can develop” (Sater, 2007:4). Hawthorne (2004) explains why
American support and funding for MENA CSOs has had little impact on authoritarianism and that MENA civil society activity has not been “the magic missing piece of the Arab democracy puzzle” (2004:6). Firstly, the limited space that civil society has been allowed to operate within has not been permitted further expansion; rather the growth of civil society has been due to ‘top down’ liberalisation. Secondly, Arab regimes are “successful in maintaining control and quashing dissent” (Bellin, 2004), therefore NGOs focused on culture, rather than politics to avoid repression. Finally, authoritarian rule has bred political apathy and primordial allegiances have remained strong because civic participation and active membership has been low. Moreover, not all CSOs are pro-democracy and a lack of civil political culture is evident.

This section summarises that civil society literature on MENA has had an exceptionalist stance but this does not require a fundamental re-thinking of the concepts established in section 1. It is conducive to this thesis to note the diverse groupings that might be labelled under the heading of civil society as some have been more relevantly investigated in MENA countries than in the West. Research and analysis of civil society in the MENA region is different from theoretical civil society literature because pre-Arab Uprising understandings of civil society in MENA had been shaped and constrained by the continued existence of authoritarian forms of government. This has made MENA appear incapable or inhospitable to a Western conception of civil society, hence the apparent MENA exceptionalism towards democracy.

MENA civil society is incomparable to the West, not due to factors offered by Culturalist explanations but because authoritarian conditions have persisted and prevented an autonomous civil society from developing, a view consistent with the Structuralist approach. MENA civil society has often been manipulated to function as a means of legitimising the state but it has also been effective, in some cases, at performing a limited mediation role between society and the state. However, it remains the case that when civil society is not completely autonomous, it is unable to fully function.

Pre-Arab Uprising MENA civil society literature is important because it represents how MENA civil society was forced by the state to conform and be co-opted or be marginalised and oppressed. Indeed, Tunisian civil society has a legacy of operating
under a corporatist-authoritarian context that has influenced its development. Now that Tunisia is in a democratic transition and not under authoritarian conditions, the question posed in this thesis on how civil society in a MENA context should be addressed where authoritarianism is not present gains importance. The lack of an independent public space between citizens and government means that a political culture that focuses on protecting the rights of the individual, in relation to other individuals, did not develop.

4. The political culture of civil society required to maintain democracy

This chapter has established firstly, the connection between civil society and democracy, and secondly, the role of civil society in democratic transition. This section builds on these connections to propose that civil society needs to have a democratic culture in order for it to play a democratising role in a democratic transition. Therefore, it defines the concept of political civility, which derives from studies of political culture and establishes the significance of political civility, by explaining its importance as the culture of democracy and how it can be vital to installing democracy. It concludes that six criteria form the components of political civility and can assess if a political culture is democratic. Also, both Oppositional-Resistant and Liberal-Associative versions of civil society activism and types of CSOs require political civility to be demonstrated in order for civil society to perform a democratic function.

4.1. Political culture

This thesis is a study of political culture, therefore it is important to explain the term in order to clarify its meaning and relevance to this work. Political culture is problematic to define; for example, Chilton (1988) developed nine criteria for political culture conceptions due to the lack of consensus over a definition from social scientists. It can also be misused to offer a sweeping, reductionist analysis of political action or to create an uncritical causality between political culture and political action e.g. a population behaves in a certain manner because of its political culture or a political culture causes a population to act in a certain manner. Shklar notes that political culture makes a convenient tool for policy makers and that “it can be used by informed political observers to devise intelligent questions” but admits
that “its scientific standing is poor” (1987:106). The anthropological use of culture employs a broad definition that includes behaviour, a concept that also differs from attitude.

Political culture, as a concept, was introduced into political science by Almond, who saw it as the “particular of orientations pattern of orientations to political action” in which “every political system is embedded” (Almond, 1956: 396). Almond notes the diverse origins and various disciplines that influenced the inception of political culture, such as European sociology, social psychology, and psycho-anthropology. However, he credits the development of the attitude survey as the ‘catalytic agent’ in the conceptualization of political culture (1989: 10-16).

The first major political culture work, which also employed the attitude survey method, was Almond and Verba’s *The Civic Culture* (1963). The study used opinion survey data, as the raw material, to explain the stability of a country based on how closely it adheres to the model of civic culture. Despite their study being Western-centric, it enabled political culture to be more easily defined. It identified that individuals and their attitudes are connected to the overall political system structure through a political culture. The aggregated reading of individual’s attitudes and collection of statistical data enabled political culture studies to become positivist works.

Political culture is, collectively, traditions of society, spirit of public institutions, passions and collective reasons of citizens and style and operating codes of its leaders. Therefore they are not just random but products of an historical experience. For an individual, political culture provides controlling guidelines for effective political behaviour, therefore ideals and operating norms. “A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of individuals who currently make up the system” (Pye & Verba, 1965:8).

Political culture is also about predictability; individuals accept the norms of their society which ensure the society is given structure. In addition, the laws that govern the individual affect the society’s culture. Political culture refers to “the system of beliefs about patterns of political interaction and political institutions” (Pye & Verba, 1965: 516) in addition to what people believe about political happenings. Verba (1965) expansively explains political culture, addressing the relationship between
political culture and political structures, belief in political structures, culture and political culture, and the homogeneity of culture. Furthermore, he identifies when it is most suitably applied; “Political culture is a helpful concept in understanding and explaining political change and modernisation.” (Pye & Verba, 1965: 517). Conversely, when political culture is less useful; as an explanatory term, for example, the political culture of nation X, therefore, determines political structure Y. “Rather one must specify what aspects of political culture – what beliefs about what subjects – are the important elements for explaining the operation of political systems” (Pye & Verba, 1965: 518). Verba justifies and defends its use and importance as if he recognises that political culture lacks the academic currency of other approaches within political science.

Based on the interpretations of other political culture works, Welch (1989) identifies two differing ways of viewing political culture: subjectivist and comprehensivist. The ‘subjectivist’ sees political culture as the subjective orientation to politics (Tucker, 1987: 3) while the 'comprehensivist' view sees it as the “attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located” (White, 1979:1).

This thesis recognises both subjectivist and comprehensivist approaches to political culture and, as Almond noted that political culture study was founded on the attitude survey method, Chapter Three develops suitable methods for exploring these approaches. This thesis also recognises the fluidity of political culture; that it is not static and that beliefs and attitudes, in addition to norms and behaviours, within a country can change, dependent on what that country experiences.

4.2. Political Civility: the six criteria of civil political culture

Rather than “politeness, manners, and civility”, features of what Ferguson calls a civilised, polite, or polished society in Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), the civility that this thesis addresses is the culture required to establish and sustain democracy. Almond and Verba’s work (1963) sought to argue that civic culture “is the type of political culture most conducive to stable democracy” (Welch, 1993: 15). Inglehart, a proponent of The Civic Culture argument concurs by adding that “stable democracy reflects the interaction of economic, political, and cultural factors” (1988: 1220). To summarise The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba identify three kinds of political culture; participant, subject, and parochial. Participants are people who are
politically informed, as they are aware of the political process and the institutions of government, and are confident with intervening in politics. Subjects are also politically informed but are more passive and have trust in politicians and the political system, therefore, do not seek to intervene or be politically active beyond voting. Parochials are politically uninformed and therefore do not seek to intervene in politics. Almond and Verba's argument emphasises that democratic theory has placed greater emphasis on the importance of active citizenry whereas deferential citizens, subjects, are also vital to the maintenance of a democratic system. Critics of this argument believe it encourages political apathy, which may be seen as anti-democratic. However, the balance of participants and subjects advocated by Almond and Verba enables a political system to function while the sufficient trust that is placed in the government on the part of the deferential citizens implies that the social contract between the government and citizens is being upheld. Almond and Verba argue that an excess of participants at the expense of subjects could undermine the political system. The comparative approach to their work highlighted the political culture of the stable, and therefore civic, democracies of Britain and the United States, in contrast to countries where the citizens had lower levels of trust in their governments and lacked political civility; Italy and Mexico.

There are various aspects to political civility. “In very generic terms civility can be presented as a set of rules and behaviours shared by individuals and communities that conform to and are conducive to a social order that is deemed ‘civilised’—a depiction that is particularly important in relation to the organisation of violence” (Volpi, 2011: 828). Non-violence is a primary requirement of political civility. Regarding behaviour, discourse, and discussion, citizen interactions must be non-violent, with civility as “the centralisation and monopolisation of 'legitimate' violence by the state, as national ruling elites seek to encourage the formation of docile and productive citizens” (Volpi, 2011: 282). In addition to citizen agreement, Habermas deemed that the “notion of civility as a reflection and embodiment of a state-guaranteed ‘non-violent’ space for discourse and behaviour becomes a hallmark of the rise of powerful and self-regulated national bourgeoisies in modern Europe” (Volpi, 2011: 830). Notions of national community and citizenship are established in the liberal perspective, which considers that the link between civility and civil society means that: “the attitude and ethos that distinguish the politics of a civil society is
civility, i.e., solicitude for the interest of the whole society, a concern for the common good” (Shils, 1992: 1).

In addition to non-violence, this thesis recognises the following six criteria of political civility: Tolerance, Equality, Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency. Principally based on themes stemming from DeToqueville’s Democracy in America and Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture, this set of criteria is derived from the existing literature on civil society, political culture, political civility, and democratisation addressed in this Chapter, and are the components and characteristics of political civility. These criteria are central to this thesis as they are operationalised for the purposes of this research as measures of assessing political culture. Chapter Two clarifies how each criterion is developed into lines of inquiry. The extent to which there is evidence of these criteria in a political culture exhibits the degrees of political civility.

Tolerance of different opinions and beliefs may reluctantly develop within a political culture. However, respect and tolerance of differing opinions is an essential aspect of civility and is derived from the civic culture literature. Drawing on J.S. Mill’s interpretation of the Truth Principle, “toleration is connected with the willingness and the ability to acknowledge the presence of different viewpoints that are remote from oneself” in the case of the possibility that alternative viewpoints are indeed closer to the truth (Cohen-Almagor, 2016). If the “vigorous, uninhibited discussion of diverse views” (Scholte, 2002: 293) is to take place, Tolerance is required. If this principle is prevalent, it amounts to a culture of respectful, considerate and co-operative interactions, on behavioural and discursive levels, between the state and civil society. Tolerance can be described as “the willingness of individuals to accept disparate views and social attitudes; to accept the profoundly important idea that there is no right answer” (Norton, 1995: 12) or “a mutual accommodation of differences in everyday dealings” (Volpi, 2011: 835).

Equality refers to permission for all citizens to participate, in the understanding that all voices and opinions are equally valid. DeToqueville’s writing discusses the importance of “equality of conditions” to the existence of democracy. Equality, through liberal approaches, addresses the issues of fairness and open communicative action (Volpi, 2011: 837). If certain voices in a political system or a civil society are
suppressed or considered unacceptable, then equality is not given to the population and the culture cannot be considered to exhibit civility.

Pluralism is derived from the Weberian concept of the multi-dimensionality of power and, in the case of this thesis, refers to the presence of a range of voices expressing a range of opinions. Pluralists place particular weight on the process created by and resulting from, individuals combining their efforts in groups in the competition for power (Held, 2006:159). Pluralism is a key tenant of liberal democracy and DeTocqueville’s work also saw the plurality of numerous associational groups as a means to prevent majoritarian democracy from becoming tyrannical. He also identified that these groups could increase citizen independence by performing tasks previously undertaken by the state. Indeed, Gramsci denotes the value of pluralism in civil society as a means to challenge the ideational hegemony of the state. Diamond describes Pluralism as a feature of civil society as “no organisation that is civil can claim to represent all the interests of its members” (1999: 231-233). Therefore, the diversity of views in a variety of organisations ensures pluralism.

“Freedom of the city” e. i. citizenship (Civitas) refers to the condition or privileges granted to citizens. Indeed, Rousseau discusses the importance of citizens retaining freedom, characteristic of the state of nature, while remaining in the modern era through a social contract. In the same vein, de Tocqueville understood that civil society helps ensure freedom of citizens by counterbalancing state power. Indeed, the various aspects of the concept of freedom are central to civility. The first aspect is freedom of speech and expression: the liberty of not being at risk from state censorship or persecution. The second aspect is freedom of participation: the ability to freely join any association and to leave without the risk of persecution. The third aspect is the condition that freedom must also be defended by the state and legally enshrined. In addition to the literature analysed in this chapter, further deconstruction of the notion of freedom, the differences between freedom to (positive liberty) and freedom from (negative liberty), derived from Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty (1958), are also significant to the understanding of freedom in political civility. Freedom to act as an individual with autonomy and self-sufficiency is central to the understanding and practice of freedom, as J.S. Mill argued that “the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way” (Mill, 1859: 27). However, Berlin argues positive liberty must be tempered by
negative liberty in order to prevent an authority acting with impunity, as is the case in authoritarianism. Indeed, Habermas’ conception of democracy and a strong civil society requires freedom from domination (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 219).

Trust is recognised as a “democratic character” quality by Almond and Verba based on Lasswell’s assessment of personal characteristics (1963:11). Indeed, trust is a “non-political” attitude, but a norm of citizen behaviour. It could be manifested through trust in other members of one’s organisation, in members of different organisations, and in the political system. Trust is an important norm for the development of a political civility. Political trust; trust between citizens and political leaders, differs from social trust; trust between citizens. At civil society level, the latter is relevant and, according to de Tocqueville and J.S. Mill, developing trust through participation in voluntary associations is a major benefit of civil society action. “Trust is a—probably the—main component of social capital, and social capital is a necessary condition of social integration, economic efficiency, and democratic stability” (Newton, 2001: 202). Identifying whether trust is developing in civil society is, therefore, an important indicator of the development of political civility. Newton adds that “Individual social trust helps to build the cooperative social relations on which effective social and political organisations are built—a bottom-up process” (2001: 211).

Transparency, pertaining to the notions of openness and accountability within government, is imperative to civility. If Almond and Verba argue that the democratic citizen is expected to be actively involved in politics and to make informed, rational political decisions (1963: 31), then transparency within political processes is required. Diamond asserts that “transparency is a precondition for accountability and reform” (1999: 240). Furthermore, the lack of transparency can lead to corruption which “undermines democratic capacities of associations within civil society by generalising suspicion and eroding trust and reciprocity” (Warren, 2004: 329). Although civil society may seek transparency from the state, Scholte (2002) discusses the importance of transparency from the perspective of civil society’s practice as a means of exhibiting its democratic credentials.

In summary, the interplay between these six criteria would vary in each political system or civil society, as it would be implausible to expect any one political culture to simultaneously express all attributes to a complete degree. Although they
represent normatively ideal attributes for a civil political culture, some evidence of all six would be required to consider a political culture as civil. This thesis uses civic culture as the model or ideal type to determine if Tunisian civil society exhibits the criteria of civil political culture.

### 4.3. Role of civility in sustaining democracy

As section 2 establishes the potential that civil society has in establishing and maintaining a democratic system, this subsection asserts that political civility is the political culture required for democracy and that political civility within the civil society is also required in order to establish and maintain democracy. Therefore, this thesis argues that if the organisations that constitute a civil society possesses civility, then they have the potential to be a force for democratisation.

The so-called ‘civil society argument’ is based on the premise that a robust, strong, and vibrant civil society strengthens and enhances liberal democracy (Walzer, 1992). While the characteristics of civil society being robust, strong, and vibrant are important in maintaining its autonomy and fulfilling its pro-democracy functions, it cannot strengthen or enhance liberal democracy if it fails to exhibit the aforementioned values of political civility. Berman (1997) argues civil society in the German Weimar Republic was vibrant and well-organized but its strength and over-vibrancy was a responsible element in the destabilisation of the government and the rise of the Nazi movement. This is why *The Civic Culture* recognises that although ‘participatory’ civil society actors are required, there must also be a passive element of civil society that trusts the government, rather than constantly protesting or opposing it. Furthermore, Chambers and Kopstein (2001) identify that strong organisations might build trust and solidarity among members, but if they cultivate hatred, violence, and sectarianism then they inhibit the establishment of democracy. Therefore, the type of civil society that promotes democracy is one that exhibits political civility. Indeed, Merkel stresses the importance of political civility and a civil society as “two closely intertwined dimensions” that support a stable democratic system (Merkel, 2007: 57). Merkel creates a distinction in the multi-levels of democratic consolidation; constitutional, representative, behavioural, and fourthly ‘the consolidation of civic culture and civil society’ (Merkel, 2007: 40). He places civil society last because he argues that can disrupt democratisation and turn it into a “defective democracy” (2007: 57) adding that “only after democracies are
consolidated can emancipatory civil societies contribute fully without major risks to the democratisation of democracy.” (Merkel, 2007: 59)

In conclusion to this section, regarding the approach to my research question and the structure of this thesis, this section identifies the significance of political civility in democratisation and the role that a civil society can play in that process. The literature explains the importance of political civility by underscoring its contribution to democracy. Political civility is also crucial to a functioning democratic system. The institutions and procedures of democracy also require the culture of democracy; which can be identified through indications of Tolerance, Equality, Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency.

5. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter established that the functions of civil society have been identified through analysing the historical conceptualisations of the term. These functions are: resolving conflict, protecting citizens through a social contract, division of state and non-state institutions, creating a constitutional state, protection from despotism and an opposition to the authoritarian state, commercial and economic functions. These have culminated into a modern, pro-democratic force that manifests in both Liberal-Associative and Oppositional-Resistance forms. It is possible for a sufficiently vibrant and diverse collection of CSOs to address these functions simultaneously or in reaction to when required.

Having identified the relationships between civil society and democracy, political civility and democracy, and civil society’s impact on democratic transition, this thesis suggests that a civil society that exhibits political civility can positively assist a state’s transition to democracy, if pre-existing conditions of a suitably functioning political society and state institutions are met. Furthermore, this thesis proposes that CSOs can help to build and strengthen democracy, if both the political conditions are suitable and CSOs possess a civil political culture.

The existing literature on MENA civil society states that the region was an exception, ultimately because of the persistence of authoritarian forms of government. Therefore, pre-existing work on MENA civil society has been written under a context of authoritarianism, which suggested that it lacked autonomy and political civility. However, it was authoritarianism that prevented civil society from performing a
democratic function. As Chapter Four will establish, Tunisia has been in a post-authoritarian context since 2011.

Democratic transition is a fragile process and although civil society can have a positive effect on the process, the aforementioned caveats demonstrate that it must also act with caution. Civil society has a democratic function but, considering that civil society is not intrinsically a force for democratisation, the presence of political civility within civil society is required to achieve this democratic function. A civil society that lacks civil political culture can hinder a democratic transition. The literature has highlighted that in order to study a civil society, analysis of the functions and characteristics of the civil society in question must be included. Studying and evaluating a civil society in a transitional context, such as Tunisia’s, requires focusing on the following aspects of CSOs; their relationship and dealings with the government, their internal practices and external behaviour, and their goals and aims. This helps to determine whether they are assisting or inhibiting democracy. The State must enable CSOs by providing them with sufficient public space to operate. In addition, as civil society is not an inherently good entity, the state is required to regulate and protect civil society from itself by producing rules and a legal framework. Furthermore, it is important to address their beliefs, insofar as; how CSOs and civil society actors understand the meaning of civil society and what they think their role should be. Therefore, the criteria of political civility; Tolerance, Equality, Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency, provide the variables through which Tunisian CSOs are analysed.
CHAPTER TWO – POLITICAL CULTURE THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

1. Introduction

Developing on the theoretical framework provided in Chapter One, which demonstrated how this thesis understands the terms civil society, CSO, political culture, and civility, this chapter identifies how the research conducted for this thesis measures the political culture of Tunisian CSOs. Measuring the civility of their political culture is required to assess their ability to fulfil a democratic function through the transition. This chapter also addresses the various approaches to studying civil society and political culture by analysing the advantages and weaknesses of comparable works, specifically those relevant to the MENA region context.

The method of inquiry in the thesis is one of Triangulation: a juxtaposition of two or more methods whereby the weakness in one will be compensated by the strength in others (Mays & Pope, 2000:51). This thesis further advances Welch’s theory by applying it practically to develop suitable methods to studying discourse and practice. The three methods employed in the research are a quantitative attitude survey, qualitative structured interviews, and ethnographic participant-observation. These three methods are recognised as positivist, interpretivist, and a combination of both. They are selected based on their suitability for capturing discourses and practices required for studying political culture. Furthermore, they are employed because they are suitable for studying the political culture of CSOs in the Tunisian context. For example, Tunisia has sufficiently high internet access and penetration rates to conduct an online survey. However, this does not imply that this methodological approach is inapplicable to other states or political culture studies. For secondary reasons, these three methods are employed to counter deficiencies of each individual method, thus providing greater dynamism in the research, which improves upon previous political culture studies.

2. The difficulties of measuring political culture and deficiencies of other political culture studies

This section addresses the understanding and measurement of political culture. As established in Chapter One, this thesis rejects Culturalist approaches to the study of political culture. The two main ontological and epistemological approaches to social
science research, Positivism and Interpretivism, are addressed. The positivist approach is an objective process that seeks to employ scientific methods of inquiry in order to gain a logical understanding of society. Comte is credited for pinioning this approach in *The Course in Positive Philosophy* through his claim that natural law could be applied to the study of society. Positivist research “considers that knowledge of things can only be advanced by framing hypotheses, testing them by observation and experiment, and reshaping them in the light of what these reveal” (Acton, 1951: 291). In positivist inquiry, predominantly qualitative methods are employed as research instruments to capture reality. The positivist researcher is largely distant from the research subjects and is limited to interpreting collected data. Rather than using a natural science understanding of society, Interpretivism employs human interpretation, perception, and cognition to explain any actions therefore to all analysis in the social sciences (Green, 2002: 6). This approach is drawn from Weber’s assertion that human sciences should be concerned with understanding rather than explaining (Weber, 1964:88). The interpretivist approach contrasts by placing the researcher as central to the collection process and produces data that is subjective to the researcher’s experience and environment. These approaches, therefore, utilise different methods of capturing political culture. There are inevitable positives and negatives to each of these approaches, which are addressed in this chapter.

Firstly, a discussion of the Culturalist approach and Orientalism is conducted through an examination of other political culture works. This demonstrates the deficiencies in their approaches and methods and subsequently enables the delineation of how these considerations shape the method of inquiry employed in this thesis. The distinction between the macro-interpretivism approach of culturalism and the micro-interpretivism approach of ethnography is made while the former is rejected and the latter advocated. Secondly, the problems regarding the use of only one research method or only using a positivist or interpretivist approach is addressed. Thirdly, analysis of the recommendations from the Hudson and Anderson debate (1995) shaped this thesis’ approach to studying political culture in the MENA context. Fourthly, how this thesis overcomes the deficiencies of other political culture studies and incorporates recommendations is explained in Welch’s dualistic understanding of political culture and the substantive implementation of triangulation. Fifthly, how organisational culture works - including positivist-
culturalism of Hofstede’s survey approach, DiMaggio and Powell’s Isomorphism, and ethnomethodology - have influenced the method of inquiry is addressed. Finally, through the understanding of civil society as organised into CSOs and the disaggregated use of institutional culture, the research question is established.

2.1. Orientalism and Culturalism

The value of other political culture works; such as Hofstede’s use of survey methods, Tucker’s separation of cultural norms and behaviours, and the breadth of Lukin’s study and his acknowledgement of subcultures, are recognised in this chapter. However, the weaknesses in these works; such as overgeneralisation, causality, the use of historical literature, and reliance on one method, are also noted. This thesis seeks to overcome such methodological pitfalls and complete a more robust political culture study. As previously stated, this thesis rejects the culturalism approach to studying political culture. In the face of these obstructions and with insufficient survey data, the study of political culture in the Middle Eastern Studies has often resorted to the use of history, tradition, or religion as explanatory variables for political culture. The use of cultural explanations to describe political situations has also been a feature of Middle Eastern studies. As noted in Chapter One, this thesis rejects the Culturalist approach due to its reductionism and unrepresentativeness, its static conception of culture, and its tendency to commit Orientalism.

Said’s influential work, Orientalism (1978), criticises the Culturalist approach by highlighting the false assumptions and prejudices that Western writers express against the Orient as they depict Arab or Islamic peoples as inferior, irrational, illogical, sexualised, and violent. These works conversely portray the West as intellectually and culturally superior. This thesis does not present a full analysis of Said’s work but seeks to identify the methodological and ethical problems Said highlights of reducing studies of MENA, such as relations to democracy, to cultural explanations and then further presenting said culture as a static entity. Said did not state that Westerners should not work on MENA issues, as he rejects the argument that “only a black can write about a black, a Muslim about Muslims” (1978:322). However, he argues that the Middle East is more complicated and cannot be summarised, studied or understood from a distance. In addition to the Orientalist
critique, Structuralists\textsuperscript{2} recognised the weakness of the Culturalist approach by being sceptical of its methods such as the generalisations towards Islam and Arab or Bedouin practices. The Structuralist approach, discussed in Chapter One, instead focuses on structural determinants such as political regime, political economy, and institutional legacies (see Brynen et al. 2012). The focus on political structures changes the approach to studying the MENA region rather than addressing the problems with the study of political culture. This thesis seeks to implement an improved study of MENA political culture.

The Culturalist approach is characterised by invoking Middle Eastern cultural traits of fatalism, individualism, primordial chauvinism, and herd instinct. Arab world political culture writers often fall into two categories: reductionists and empiricists. Reductionists make grand generalisations about the region, its people and their beliefs. Writers like von Grunebaum, Lewis, and Gellner used Islam as their starting point. “Islamic political culture (in the reductionist presentation) permits no autonomous public sphere, and no separation of the spiritual and the temporal” (Hudson, 1995:66). Empiricists such as Berque, Hourani, and Patai use Arab peoples as their explanatory variable through stereotyping and looking at the Bedouin substructure of the Arab personality, shame, honour and the Islamic component of the Arab personality. Kedourie concluded that Arab culture is non-democratic and Pryce-Jones blames Islam, tribalism, shame and honour culture for the lack of democracy, even stating “an Arab democrat is not even an idealisation but a contradiction in terms” (Pryce-Jones, 1989: 406). Both versions of the culturalist approach, adopted in the writings of the aforementioned scholars, are guilty of Orientalist tendencies.

In addition to studying attitudes and values of political culture, this thesis recognises that study of behaviour is essential to a political culture work. As noted, the second approach to political culture is interpretivism; the antithesis of positivism. Interpretivism does not implement a scientific approach to research, but looks at understanding and interpreting social actions. It focuses on specificities rather than general patterns or trends. Regarding political culture, interpretivism focuses on methods that feature observations and the recording of behaviour (practice). In recognising the disparity between the manifestations of practice and discourse,\

\textsuperscript{2} Critics of the essentialist/Culturalist approach to Middle Eastern studies and the lack of democracy in the MENA region.
Welch (2013) advocates the importance of observation to understanding behaviour in the duality of political culture based on the premise that patterns of behaviour are not always the same as what people say about their patterns of behaviour. As White adds, political culture is “the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located” (1979:1).

The manner in which practice is studied is vital. Therefore, it is important to recognise the variation within interpretivism and that culturalism is indeed a form of interpretivism. The fundamental distinction is the scale at which the interpretivist approach is conducted. Culturalism is an approach that is macro in style because it provides an interpretation of the culture through the use of historical synopsis or generalisation. This thesis rejects the use of culturalism because it is a defective form of interpretivism as it does not consider detail, is essentialist, and views culture statically. Said’s work is in opposition to the synoptic culturalism and macro-interpretivism, meaning studies that use these approaches suffer from the possibility of committing Orientalism.

2.2. The disadvantage of a singular method or approach

Analysing the methodological approach from works on Russian political culture and the weakness of relying on only interview data influenced the research design. Due to their similarity to works on the MENA region attempting to study political culture in authoritarian conditions, works on Russian political culture were also considered. Lukin’s study of Russian political culture (2000), which invokes the approaches of Geertz and Welch, recognises that political culture is a belief-system and that changes in beliefs occur. The primary criticism is that Lukin relies heavily on interviews. It is a comprehensive study where 67 interviews were conducted in nine major cities with 19 different parties and groups, which demonstrates that a wide range of opinions were considered. It also highlights important concepts to political culture, such as commonly-shared or typical beliefs. Lukin emphasises the importance of sub-cultures, instead of mass-culture, and that studies of values and behaviours do not often produce uniform results. Lukin’s work is criticised for its recourse to historiography and reliance on a singular method. Despite the volume of data collected, implementing mostly interviews meant that there was no triangulation or alternative method to verify his findings. Furthermore, interview transcripts are not provided, meaning his conclusions are harder to verify.
Tucker (1987) looks at the important influence of leadership and individual leaders on a political culture in the case study of Soviet Russia. The majority of his work still has recourse to historical explanations, which is an approach that this thesis considers methodologically simplistic and reductionist. However, he highlights the difference between cultural “norms” and cultural “behaviour”. Political scientists have tended to focus on cultural norms, but Tucker, like Welch, argues that political culture should include the study of behaviour, in addition to values, attitudes, and beliefs. In recognising the split between political scientists and anthropologists, Tucker emphasises the value of anthropological methods in the study of political culture. This study further demonstrated the importance of conducting ethnography in the analysis of cultural behaviour. White’s 1979 work is a commendable political culture study for the great range of survey data that it accumulated. It addresses sub-cultures and cleavages in Soviet society, rather than making wider national culture claims. It also notes the revolutionary upheaval and effect on political culture. This highlights the question of whether there has been enough time for a civil political culture to develop in Tunisia, or whether the political culture of the Ben Ali era still exists.

However, there are major criticisms of the methodologies in Tucker and White’s studies that this thesis seeks to avoid. Using secondary literature, where culture is determined by historical literature, presents two dangers. Firstly, when using religious and historical texts, it is likely that attitudes have changed since they were written. Secondly, “It is also not clear that classic texts reflect the broader canvas of varying cultural attitudes across social groups or give adequate voice to disadvantaged groups” (Brynen, 2012: 104). McAuley (1984) is particularly critical of White’s historical, synoptic use of political culture for its inaccuracy. White states that Russia has a traditional political culture; a central characteristic that is autocratic and anti-democratic, therefore beliefs and values are informed by historical experience rather than current political institutions situations. Indeed, culture requires time to change, but this approach presents it as static and McAuley argues that Russian history is more complicated than White portrays.

A synoptic-historical view of macro-interpretivism, as used in the Culturalist approach, is problematic because it tries to interpret too much from a distance and can seek to reduce the explanation of political culture to simply historical
explanations. Welch argues that part of political culture is habitual patterns of behaviour, therefore history is an explanatory variable. McAuley does not reject analysis of history and recognises that history reveals insights into the formation of a political culture, as she states “of course it must, but the question is how” (1984: 21). What she rejects, however, is the manner in which White packages Russian history into a single formula i.e. that Russian political culture is more greatly influenced by personalistic Tsarism than Marxist-Leninism. According to Said, White’s work would be guilty of committing Orientalism, but without the same political inflection as in a MENA context. White still expresses a generalisation of Russian political culture based on history in addition to the notion that the East can be grasped by the Western mind in its entirety, synoptically, as a whole.

Indeed, this thesis acknowledges Tunisian history as a factor in explaining the political culture of civil society but the historical analysis is provided as background detail in order to represent a cultural sensitivity that is required to perform the micro-interpretivism of ethnography. Contrary to White’s study, this information is not the substantive findings of the thesis. Chapters Four and Five establish that an influential civil society has been active in Tunisia prior to European colonialism, and it played a role in the independence struggle, the revolution, and the period of transition. Tunisia’s political culture has been influenced by authoritarianism and the inclusive, cooptive, one-party state republicanism’s tendency to build consensus, which has led to attitudes and practices of cooperation and reaching agreements. This sets the Tunisian case apart from the uprisings and coups in Libya and Egypt, where cooperation and agreements have been more problematic to achieve. However, the methodology of this thesis does not exclusively use the history of a state (Tunisia) to explain its political culture. Furthermore, this thesis does not reject interpretivism as a school of thought, only the macro approach. It is against reliance on history as an explanatory factor and advocates for the use of micro-interpretivist methods to ascertain a current political culture.

Although the importance of implementing positivist approaches in a political culture study are mentioned in subsection 2.1 of this chapter, the disadvantages of these methods must also be noted. Hofstede’s works produce systematic, quantitative data on organisation culture which were used to draw conclusions and assumptions regarding national culture; that a ‘national norm’ (1980b: 45), or a ‘central tendency’
exists and can be determined from observing subcultures. McSweeney (2002) presents a detailed criticism of Hofstede’s use of data by highlighting how making assumptions and universal claims undermine the credibility of a study. This thesis looks for evidence and elements of civil political culture in CSOs but does not make assumptions that all CSOs are the same or that the political culture of CSOs is a reflection of a national Tunisian political culture. In addition, it is important to demarcate culture as civil political culture is identified, by its supporting literature, as a distinct type of culture.

A criticism of political culture studies is the causality it implies. Hofstede credits strong, often absolute, causality to national cultures (1991:170). Essentially, he endorses national cultural determinism (McSweeney, 2002:91). McSweeney concludes that a more sophisticated approach towards political culture is required.

2.3. The Hudson and Anderson debate: political culture studies in MENA

With regards to studying political culture in the MENA context, Hudson and Anderson (1995) produce separate chapters regarding the conceptualisation of political culture and how to study political culture in MENA states. They produce recommendations to studying political culture in the Middle East, because other works have been unsatisfactory, and point towards the use of positivist and micro-interpretivism approaches. Both reject culturalism-reductionism approaches, as does this thesis, but the debate focuses on the use of positivist approaches, namely surveys, to political culture. Hudson is aware of the weaknesses of political culture works that essentialise the region’s culture but argues it "is hard to ignore culture" in seeking to understand conditions that foster democracy and a civil society (1995: 71). Rather than reject political culture as a tool for analysing the MENA region based on the weakness of the Culturalist approach, Hudson argues the process needs to be developed and refined rather than throwing out “the political culture baby with the Orientalist bathwater" (1995: 65). Hudson’s work focuses on practicalities and considerations regarding methods. It does not address what is political culture and does not undertake a theoretical discussion of methods but clearly identifies the

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need for positivist political culture research in MENA, citing the weaknesses of Culturalist studies that essentialise the region. Hudson argues that political culture work is not fully developed in the Middle East because there is a lack of surveys and systematic interview data. The recommendations that Hudson makes on studying political culture in MENA, in order to produce higher quality and more rigorous works, were fundamental to the research design and are incorporated into the methodology of this thesis.

1. Avoid reductionist concepts and essentialist assumptions.
2. Disaggregate political culture, therefore look at Sub, elite, popular and mass cultures
3. Regard different levels; formal ideologies, opinions, attitudes, and on a deeper level; collective values and orientations.
4. Group identities, orientations towards authority and principals of equity and justice.

In response to these recommendations, this thesis also rejects the culturalism approach and disaggregates political culture by addressing the political culture of CSOs, rather than of the entire Tunisian population. Chapter Three discusses the methods used in the research and demonstrates how opinions, attitudes, and values, group identities (of CSOs), orientations towards authority and the principals of equity and justice are included in both the rationale and formulation of survey and interview questions and observation criteria.

Despite criticising academic works that utilise a political culture approach, Anderson agrees that it can produce useful analysis if accurate, unrestricted survey work is performed (1995: 79). Anderson concurs with Almond and Verba’s work: that political culture is ascertainable through survey research (1995:79). The method and accuracy of the latter’s work *The Civic Culture* (1963) was criticised for “depicting a culture based upon individual interviews (survey questionnaire) and that the approach was ethnocentric and more prescriptive than objective and empirical” (Barrington, 2009: 108). However, this is the case when a study seeks to make over-
arching claims; as The Civic Culture did. If survey data results are balanced against results from interpretivist research that address practices of political culture, it would have produced the dualistic view of political culture that this thesis advocates.

In the MENA context, positivist survey work has not, until recently, been possible, due to the interference of authoritarian governments, or entirely accurate, due to the fear of government repression as a consequence of participating in a survey. A lack of civil liberties and a reluctance to publicly express political opinions under authoritarian rule has therefore impeded the collection of reliable survey data. Therefore, positivist work has been marginalised in favour of other methods of data collection. This was also the case with Russian political culture works by White and Tucker.

However, the approach to studying political culture through conducting surveys, as Hudson and Anderson propose, suffers from Welch’s critique that “Positivist political culture research has marginalised theory in favour of operationalisation and data collection” (2013:11). Contrary to this aspect of Welch’s theory of political culture, this thesis argues that his criticism is overstated for two reasons. Firstly, this thesis argues that positivism is essential in understanding political culture. It is not only for data collection purposes, its implementation is halfway to understanding political culture (see fig.1). Almond noted that political culture is founded on the survey method and that the development of the attitude survey was the “catalytic agent in the conceptualization of political culture” (Almond, 1989: 15). Structured interviews are both positivist and interpretivist, due to the systematic method of data collection and the presence of an interviewer who interprets and interacts with the respondents. However, an entirely positivist method, such as a survey questionnaire, is therefore also required for a complete positivist understanding of the political culture of Tunisian CSOs. Secondly, in addition to being systematic, survey data is a crucial aspect of understanding political culture from a positivist perspective. As this thesis recognises that both the positivist and the interpretivist approaches must be addressed to obtain a complete understanding of political culture, an appropriate method to studying this aspect of political culture is required.

The body of literature on positivist political culture, the mainstream of political culture studies, recognises that survey data is a highly appropriate method of ascertaining a political culture. This is based on the “folk psychology” notion that
individual’s behaviour is shaped by their attitudes and values (Welch, 2013:207). Positivism argues that asking subjects what their attitudes and values are, via an attitude survey, is sufficient for determining behaviour. Welch argues that the folk psychology justification for positivist research is inadequate because it assumes motivations are part of a fixed “portfolio of beliefs and desires”? (Hindess, 1988: 48-9) whereas, contrary to this rational choice model, people’s motivations can, and do, change (Welch, 2013:67-70). Hindess (1988) and Wilson et al. (1996) argue that the attitudes people express in a survey are not the same as what motivates their behaviour i.e. a disparity between what is said and what is done (Welch, 2013: 145-6). Furthermore, this social psychological literature suggests people do not always know their own motivations. Therefore, surveys do not always discover what is causally significant because attitude surveys assume people know their own attitudes. Surveys retain values in measuring discourse, one element of political culture, but should be treated critically and carefully when providing a rationalisation for behaviour, the ‘practice’ element of political culture. Further implications of employing survey data as a method are addressed in the following chapter.

3. Triangulation and Welch’s understanding of political culture

The approach that sufficiently incorporates Hudson’s recommendations and Anderson’s apprehension to political culture, in addition to providing a solution to the aforementioned deficiencies of political culture works, is the implementation and application of Welch’s theory of political culture to the research conducted in this thesis. This requires a triangulation of three separate research methods to satisfactorily capture this conceptualisation of political culture. As discussed, single research method studies are insufficient, which therefore encourages a triangulation, mixed-methods approach. Political culture is dualistic and therefore requires different methods to understand it. Political culture calls for the use of different methods, making this implementation of triangulation more substantive than using mixed methods merely to compensate for the others methods’ deficiencies. Furthermore, as discourses and practices are studied at both micro and local levels, the risk of committing Orientalism in this research is reduced.

The approach of this thesis is not a case of satisfying the criteria or needs of either positivist or micro-interpretivist approaches, but that Welch argues that
understanding political culture is approaching the research from both positivist and interpretivist perspectives. Welch’s theoretical understanding frames political culture as the manifestation of discourses and practices; essentially, what people say and what people do. Therefore, the application of both positivist and micro-interpretivist methods is required in order to comprehend the phenomenon. One perspective without the other is not sufficient because one perspective in isolation, and its subsequent methods, cannot capture both discourse and practice.

Unlike the rigid separation between researcher and subject in positivist research methods, interpretivist research requires interaction between researcher and subject in a relationship that is more interactive, cooperative, and participative. In addition, it is subjective and implicit: how Geertz describes culture as “mental programming” and “software of the mind” (1980a), therefore requires a degree of interpretation. Therefore, as this thesis also concurs with Welch’s work (2013), that political culture manifests as both discourse and practice, the employment of different research methods is required to capture both these observable and subjective expressions, in addition to qualitatively measurable attitudes and values (norms) of political culture. Capturing both objective and subjective aspects of political culture provides a multi-layered data set that enables more nuanced analysis of political culture. Attitudes and values (discourse) can be ascertained via surveys and interviews, whereas understanding behaviour (practice) requires observation.

Triangulation enables the advantages of qualitative and quantitative research methods to be combined in one study. Furthermore, the credibility and validity of results are increased through the use of mixed methods (Schwandt, 1997). By providing the rationale of why this thesis employs three methods – quantitative attitude survey, qualitative structured interviews, and ethnographic participant-observation – this chapter establishes that the investigation of a concept should be the starting point of a research project, rather than the research being dictated by the method. Rather than agreeing with Eckstein’s assertion that “Almond and Verba got the concept exactly right” (1996: 473), this chapter establishes that the attitude surveys, on their own, are insufficient for understanding political culture. The triangulation methodology of this thesis is justified by the implementation of Welch’s theoretical understanding of political culture. In Welch’s conceptualisation, political
culture can only be understood in the unification of two opposing schools of social science research, positivism and interpretivism, because "both positivism and interpretivism leave a gap where theory should be" (Welch, 2013: 37). This is because political culture then manifests dualistically as both discourse and practice (Welch, 2013). This research’s approach of employing Welch’s political culture theory work overcomes the difficulties of measuring political culture.

**Fig. 1**

This section expands on how studies in institutional culture and ethnomethodology have influenced the method of inquiry. Following Hudson’s second recommendation to address culture specifically and disaggregate culture, and since this research focused on the political culture of CSOs rather than an overgeneralised national Tunisian political culture, two methods and approaches of institutional culture studies have been incorporated into this thesis; isomorphism and ethnomethodology. Indeed, the operations and goals of a CSO are not akin to a business or company, but the procedures and decision-making processes are comparable due to both having a formalised structure of bureaucratic procedures. However, the form of management and hierarchy might be less strict and the settings less formal. This has enabled additional lines of enquiry regarding the internal organisational culture in relations to assessing CSOs political culture.

4. **Institutional culture**

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The positivist approach of Hofstede's organisational culture studies is a conventional collection of attitudes and use of survey data. This approach has influenced the survey design in this thesis. However, as mentioned, his works seek to make generalisations about the country through the study of an organisation. This thesis disagrees with this form of positivist-culturalism and therefore the research conducted differs greatly with regards to the conclusions Hofstede sought to draw from his results. This research focuses on the culture of CSOs and the collected data is not used to make generalisations or estimations beyond the sub-culture; Tunisian CSO members.

The DiMaggio and Powell (1983) study on the process of institutional isomorphism shaped this research. Institutional isomorphism is where organisations become increasingly homogeneous and more similar to one another in terms of their values and practices, due to their need for efficiency. However, this potentially constrains their ability to change in later years (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148). This leads to inquiring whether institutional isomorphism is occurring amongst Tunisian CSOs. CSOs may embark on various projects but this thesis recognises civil society as an organisational field. Therefore, this research can ascertain if Tunisian CSOs are similar regarding their values and practices as institutions, and therefore are facing isomorphism, or if there is no similarity between them. Collective results from survey and interview data should indicate the similarity or diversity amongst them. Considering isomorphism for my work regards the development of norms in the CSO field. If isomorphism is occurring or has occurred, there should, therefore, be evidence of central tendencies or norms which help to address if an organisational culture is emerging amongst Tunisia CSOs. If there is no isomorphism, no central tendencies, or no common norms, this suggests that there is no singular culture amongst Tunisian CSOs. The survey data might be more suitable for identifying ‘central tendencies’ or ‘norms’.

To frame the study of institutional culture, this thesis draws upon ethnomethodology, a sociological field of inquiry to studying actions and practices of everyday life. The term's creator Garfinkel, states that “Ethnomethodological studies analyse everyday activities as members’ method for making those same activities visibly-rational and reportable for all practical purposes, i.e. accountable, as organisations of commonplace everyday activities” (Garfinkel, 1967: vii). In The
Practicalities of Rule Use (1971), Zimmerman’s focus on the use of rules, how they are established, and the degree to which they are implemented through observation served as an example of how the CSOs establish their own procedures. Also, to determine if decisions made on an ad hoc basis where a precedent has not been established (1971: 223). Rather than only paying attention to the aspects of observing procedures and investigating the variety of practices, as per Zimmerman’s work, these observations were used to understand the CSO’s political culture. Observation combined with the scrutiny of the CSO’s Charter or Internal rules provided a comparative analysis of any disparity between their practice and discourse, using Zimmerman’s terms, “the formal plan to actual conduct” (1971: 224). Furthermore, the extent to which rules are ‘bent’ in order to perform tasks, in addition to who bends them and for what purposes, would also demonstrate the aspects of the organisations. This could highlight if some principles or values established by the CSO are more flexible than others or whether the CSO rigidly adheres to its own bureaucracy. Welch discusses the relation between rules and practice, recognising that tacit knowledge is gained through partaking in practical skills. Considering that, “the acquisition of skills requires repeated action, and results in a new bodily capacity. At the same time, instruction by others, if not essential, is almost always involved, and gives rise to a community standard of correctness” (2013:118). In addition, “A dualistic view of culture: a duality, that is, of practice—exemplified by skill—and discourse.” (2013:131). Therefore, addressing the habits and routines of CSO members can be used to establish ethnographic inquiry research questions. Understanding the style of interaction and whether changing the member in an organisation leads to a change in style, assists in the understanding of what skills CSO members possess.

As the analysis of everyday activities and the study of procedure, these ethnomethodological works were of particular relevance to constructing the framework and processes of observation. For the ethnographic participant-observation work such as describing CSO practices (see Chapter Eight), ethnomethodology seeks to investigate the grounding rationalities of members’ behaviour and how normal practices are established. Furthermore, applying the approach used by Zimmerman (1971) in addressing the establishment and implementation of rules also informed this research as for how rules and practices
were established and to what extent members adhered to them was also a purpose of investigation. However, ethnmethodology features in all methods employed in this thesis. It also proved relevant for questions in the survey questionnaire e.g. describe the culture of your organisation (see Chapter Six) and the structured interviews; e.g. describing the leadership and management of the CSO (see Chapter Seven).

5. The Research Question

The research question of this thesis is “Have Tunisian civil society organisations exhibited a civil political culture and how has this influenced their ability to fulfil a democratic function through the post-2011 transition?” This is based on the assertion made in Chapter One that democracy requires a civil political culture. This requires identifying the civil society actors and assessing their political culture, in order to determine whether they exhibit traits and components of civil political culture, aka civility, established from the literature of political culture as Tolerance, Equality, Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency.

Chapter One identifies the criteria and characteristics of a CSO in a non-authoritarian context: independent from the state and political parties, not power-seeking, and pursuing civic, non-partisan goals. Therefore, in order to determine whether they exhibit traits of civility, the approach of this thesis aims to understand three aspects; internal operation of CSOs through observing behaviour, CSO’s relationships with other CSOs and the state, and attitudes and values of CSO members.

Each method is employed as a window into understanding various aspects of the political culture of Tunisian civil society. Therefore, this triangulated methodological approach to a political culture study aims to address the research question from three different directions in order to gain a multi-layered understanding of the complexities of the political culture of a civil society in a political transition from authoritarianism to an emerging democracy. This also utilises Welch’s political culture theory and provides what this thesis argues to be the optimum approach for studying political culture; one that unifies positivist and interpretivist approaches.

This thesis rejects macro-interpretivism of the Culturalist approach to the study of political culture. Therefore, positivism and micro-interpretivism are implemented. The positivist approach is an objective process, as the researcher is distant from the
research subjects and is limited to interpreting collected data. The micro-
interpretivist approach contrasts by placing the researcher as central to the
collection process and produces data that is subjective to their experience and
environment. These approaches, therefore, utilise different methods of capturing
political culture. Inevitably, there are positives and negatives to these approaches,
which are addressed in the following chapter.

Welch’s theory understands political culture as the manifestation of discourses and
practices. Therefore, the application of both positivist and micro-interpretivist
methods is required in order to comprehend the phenomenon. Capturing both
objective and subjective aspects of political culture provides a multi-layered data set
that enables more nuanced analysis of political culture.

6. Chapter Conclusion

In order to answer the research question posed in this thesis, it is necessary to assess
the extent to which the six criteria which determine the presence or absence of
civility are exhibited in civil society. This is required to assess the extent to which
Tunisian civil society possesses or is developing the prerequisite democratic political
culture for fulfilling its democratic function. Therefore, to fulfil a democratic function,
civil society has to exhibit a democratic political culture which comprises of the six
attributes; Freedom, Equality, Pluralism, Tolerance, Trust and Transparency.

After the theoretical framework established the understanding of political culture,
this chapter has primarily established an improved and multi-faceted approach to
measuring civic political culture. The approaches and methods that measure values
and attitudes, in addition to behaviours, are essential to understanding political
culture. Furthermore, the weaknesses and shortcomings of other political culture
studies enabled the development of a methodology and informed the rationale of the
methods this thesis employs. The critique of other political culture works recognises
the weaknesses of applying one or two methods.

This chapter has established that the critique of Culturalism and macro-
interpretativism includes discarding this defective form of interpretivism that
features essentialist, static, large-scale analysis that makes generalisations and
derogations of the subjects. This thesis addresses political culture but is not
Culturalist because it is specifically concerned with the political culture of Tunisian
CSOs. It does not essentialise the country or the region. Furthermore, rather than misuse of primary text and historical sources, it uses positivism and interpretivism on a micro level. McSweeney's call for a more sophisticated approach towards political culture further supports Hudson’s recommendation to disaggregate political culture, prevents the reliance on only positivist approaches, and justifies the three method approach that focuses on a specific subculture. The institutional culture literature has also framed the method of inquiry. Understanding civil society as organisations (CSOs) will enable understanding of how they interact with the state, each other, and their internal practices.
CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODS

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter explains and justifies the use of the research methods employed in the fieldwork of this thesis. It addresses the advantages and deficiencies of the three methods this thesis employs and examines general concerns faced when conducting research. These methods are from both Positivist and Micro-Interpretivist approaches and, when conducted in concert, seek to understand and measure both discourse and practice manifestations of political culture.

The literature review of political culture and analysis of political culture studies suggests that a sophisticated, mixed methods approach that focuses on one aspect or sub-culture of a political culture is the most satisfactory means of undertaking a political cultural study. As the previous chapter has established, political culture has two major manifestations of discourse and practice, which therefore require appropriate methods with which they can be ascertained. This section explains why this thesis employs a mix-method approach to studying political culture and explains the rationale for each method.

In response to the issues that Hudson's work raises, structured interviews were conducted and an online survey in Arabic was developed and disseminated to ensure the resulting data was systematic. Therefore, this research avoids recourse to historical, traditional, or religious explanations by disaggregating national culture to focus on the sub-culture of civil society members. Rather than using Hofstede's causal approach to understanding a national culture, Hudson, White, and McSweeney's recommendations to disaggregate political culture were adhered to therefore this thesis focuses on the culture of CSOs. In response to Lukin's work lacking diversity by relying on interviews and McSweeney and Hudson's separate recommendation to conduct methodologically multifaceted studies, three separate research methods are employed. Through adopting these three methods, it is possible to identify different levels of political culture. With this information considered, a methodology for studying political culture was developed that focused on the questions; how is political culture demonstrated and therefore measured? What methods are suitable for obtaining information on attitudes and values?
Hudson (1995) suggests that results from ethnographic observation work are triangulated with quantitative data from opinion surveys and therefore complement each other. Furthermore, mixed-methods approach increases credibility when findings either confirm or confound each other (Greene 2005:207). Another advantage of triangulation is that “all methods have inherent biases and limitations, so the use of only one method to assess a given phenomenon will inevitably yield biased and limited results” (Greene et al. 1989:256).

2. Quantitative Survey Questionnaire

As established in Chapter Two, at least one entirely positivist method of measuring political culture was required for this work. Therefore, an online, Arabic language, self-completion survey questionnaire to measure attitudes and values of working members of Tunisian CSOs was developed. The questionnaire was administered online with Bristol Online Survey (BOS) software. When designing this questionnaire, the following issues were considered regarding the questions; type, style, wording, format, and ensuring the questions were phrased in close-ended structure. Dillman (1978:80) identifies five different types of question content; behaviour, beliefs, knowledge, attitudes, and attributes. “An awareness of the 5 types of information that can be collected should lead to the systematic development of question for each type rather than a haphazard set of questions” (de Vaus, 2002: 95). The design process ensured the difference between these question types was considered to improve the clarity of the research.

The behaviour aspects of the work are addressed in the ethnographic study and participant’s personal details are not necessary. Therefore, the survey focuses on determining beliefs and attitudes – perceptions people hold, their thoughts, feelings, ideas, judgements, and ways of thinking. The questionnaire begins with “Attribute” questions to determine respondent demographics. These are designed to produce “information about the respondent’s characteristics...questions about age, education, gender, and ethnicity” (de Vaus, 2002: 95). These questions will determine ‘variables’ through which the results can be analysed. Belief questions determine what respondents believe to be true or false. This is useful for the current ‘transition in progress’ situation in Tunisia because beliefs are central to political culture e.g. “CSOs should make their accounts and financial donors available for public access” (True / False). Considering that “attitude questions try to establish what [respondents] think
is desirable” (de Vaus, 2002: 95), therefore attitude questions could show how respondents want civil society to be. The survey questionnaire design of this thesis is modelled based on Hofstede's research design from his surveys on political culture (1980 and 1991). These predominately ask closed-ended questions to ensure that systematic, quantitative data is produced. Despite using a similar template to Hofstede, this research differs greatly with regards to the conclusions he sought to draw from his results. This focuses on the culture of CSOs and collected data is not extrapolated to make speculative claims regarding trends in culture at a national level. Civil society members represent a disaggregated section of Tunisian society. I have considered the short-comings of Hofstede's assumptions yet his research design, neutral phrasing of questions and statements, and use of a five-point Likert scale are appropriate methods for determining political culture (see Chapter Six for survey results analysis).

The questions were designed as ‘close-ended, multiple choice’ statements that are on a five-level, Likert scale for the following reasons. Firstly, a five-scale allows respondents the option to select a midpoint, which gives neutral response, thus not forcing them into an answer. Secondly, the options are ‘value’ options, which are less confusing or ambiguous than numerical ranking scales. Finally, ordered response choices create an attitude scale with 1 reflecting ‘strongly agree’ and 5 reflecting ‘strongly disagree’. The rationale for the predominant use of close-ended, rather than open-end, questions is as follows. Firstly, the given answers can be easily processed into systematic data. This quantitative data is more comparable than qualitative answers. Secondly, for the respondent, a selection of options is easier to complete and less time consuming than writing answers. In other words, when choices are provided, it is less demanding for the participant. Thirdly, the limited selection of answers clarifies the meaning for the respondent. Finally, “open-ended questions rarely provide accurate measurement or consistent, comparable information across the whole sample” (Salant and Dillman, 1994: 80). Closed answer questionnaires have disadvantages, which I addressed in my design. Firstly, a limited selection of answers can force respondents into making a choice. To counter this, I included ‘none’ or ‘would rather not say’ options. Secondly, in an interview, lack of clarity can be addressed through the interviewee asking the interviewer to explain the question. Forced choice answers must be extremely clear to prevent confusion, which could
affect the validity of results. Piloting the survey sought to reduce any confusion. (For piloting results, see Chapter Five.)

The same style and format of questions can help prevent the questionnaire from being confusing. The testing of different issues or themes requires different measurements formats and an attitude scale is not appropriate for all questions. Some questions will require unordered response choices. For example, “How would you describe your manager’s leadership style?” is provided with (Autocratic, Bureaucratic, Delegator, Participative, Laissez-Faire) options.

The average number of CSOs is important because “using a large number of respondents does not of itself guarantee representativeness” (Bryman, 1988). Having too many respondents from CSO ‘A’ and fewer from others reduces the representativeness of the research. All those surveyed in my study are part of CSOs which adds a focus to my research and prevents me from making over-arching claims or generalisations. I can state that they share an occupation, but whether they have a common occupational culture remains to be seen.

To increase the response rate, after conducting the executive interviews, I sent a follow-up email again thanking the president/chairman for their time and if they would circulate my survey to their members. Also, I posted the survey on my Facebook page and asked friends in Tunisia to disseminate the survey. I also asked CSO members I met at conferences or civil society fairs for their email addresses in order to send them my survey.

2.1. Opinion Surveys in Middle East Context

During the development of my opinion survey, other surveys which have been administered in the MENA context were considered for comparison of question design, survey length, the number of respondents, and results. This was in order to ensure the suitability and appropriateness of my questions, ensure ‘best practice’, and recognise what should be avoided in this context.

Ismael and Ismael (1993) conducted an opinion survey on the Gulf war through informal and open-ended interviews on the topics of Nature of Arab society, Diagnosis of the crisis, and Prescriptions for change and improving the Arab World. By speaking exclusively to academics and professionals their work focused on two
population demographics but having spoken to 264 people from various Arab countries, their conclusions on the antagonisms between politics and popular political culture, and popular political culture and public political culture are too far reaching. Furthermore, their informal and open-ended work was not systematic.

Tessler (2002) produced a short survey questioning Islam’s compatibility with democratic political culture from public opinion data collected in Palestine (West Bank and Gaza), Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt. The hypothesis is based on evidence from USA and Europe that religious beliefs influence political attitudes. This is an unusual survey for two reasons. Firstly, that it asked slightly differently phrased questions under 3 subheadings; ‘Attitudes toward Democracy’, ‘Personal Piety’ and ‘Islam and Politics’ in each country, and secondly that the number of questions varied for 7 questions in Morocco to 12 questions in Egypt. Both factors reduced the collective data’s comparability yet it concludes that “Islam appears to have less influence on political attitudes than is frequently suggested by students of Arab and Islamic society” (Tessler, 2002: 348). As this survey provided an example of a political culture study that also includes a religion demographic, a religion question was included in this research’s survey. For country specificity, I looked at surveys conducted in Tunisia by Zogby International, Gallup, Pew Global Attitudes Project, World Values Survey, and Arab Barometer, and BBC Media Action (See Appendix).

Borrowing from the design and structure of these surveys helped inform the construction of the survey in this thesis and ensured it conformed to norms of these international research companies. Also, the manner in which the results are displayed informed the layout of the 5th chapter. All were conducted with face-to-face interviews using Arabic, however, the approach used in this thesis is an online survey completion, predominantly for time efficiency in data collection, to ensure respondent anonymity and to avoid the need for additional researchers (see Chapter Six for further details and analysis of results). This research, however, is more focused on civil society members and organisations than those above, which are general opinion surveys.

2.1.1. Problems of Opinion Surveys in Middle East Context

There are a number of problems that exist with survey data in the MENA region. Firstly, rural underrepresentation must be considered in the distribution of my
surveys. 54% of the population live in capital or east coast, Sahel regions\(^4\) as a consequence of Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s policies that marginalised the interior and southern regions leaving them underdeveloped. This has resulted in a Coastal/Interior economic cleavage. The majority of CSOs are based in the capital with some in the coastal regions and fewer in the interior (see table on p. 160). I, therefore, ensured that my survey was completed by CSOs in the southern and interior regions. Furthermore, I attempted to address the Urban/Rural divide. I met with CSOs in interior cities such as Gabes, Sidi Bouzid, and Gafsa but I also distributed my survey amongst CSOs that focus on issues that affect rural areas. I interviewed CSOs from the smaller interior towns of Regeub, Zaghoun, and Medenine, then asked the managers of those CSOs to pass on my survey. The demographics question no.5 ‘Which area in Tunisia are you originally from?’ helped to ensure a degree of regional representation. Secondly, I ensured that my research did not suffer from Female underrepresentation. The first demographics question, What is your gender? ensured an equal response. By addressing dynamics of patrimonialism and male-dominated management, I sought to select enough CSOs with female leadership. Of the 64 interviews I conducted with CSO leaders, 20 were with women. There were many females working within CSOs and the survey results were more balanced with 51% men to 49% women. Thirdly, authoritarian interference was not a problem since the Ben Ali regime has been removed and a freedom of association law had been passed after the Revolution. I did not have any issues with governmental interference with survey data collection in post-Revolution Tunisia.

I translated both the survey and the interview questions face-to-face with a private Arabic teacher. This translation process was an interesting and reflective experience. Trying to find the correct nuances of the translation from English to the appropriate combination of French and Tunisian Arabic helped me to reconsider the questions I am asking. The one-to-one translation process gave me, the researcher, more control in the outcome of the questions. Instead of relying on just a translator, we worked together to ensure that the translation really conveyed the meaning of the questions in English. For example, there is no difference between ‘delegate’ and ‘instruct’ in

\(^4\) Institut National de la Statistique Tunisie (http://www.ins.nat.tn/indexen.php) [accessed 11/12/2013]
Tunisi. Often we had to use French words since they are more suitable and natural in Tunisian speech patterns and sentence structures.

3. Structured Qualitative Interview

In order to analyse the relationships CSO members have with their colleagues, other CSOs, and the state, it was necessary to conduct a significant number of one-to-one, structured qualitative interviews with presidents and bureau exécutif/committee members of CSOs (seventy-five). In addition, eight interviews with journalists, international NGO staff, CSO consultants, and the member of the National Constituent Assembly in charge of Relations with civil society were conducted for the purposes of data verification. All eighty-three interviews were conducted in Tunisia between January and July 2014.

The choice of organisations examined resulted from an effort to identify actors who are active in the public space. Furthermore, I included a variation of CSO types; established institutions (the Quartet: UGTT, LTDH, ONAT, and UTICA plus FTDES) Watchdogs (Al Bawsala, l-Watch, Mourakiboun) democracy builders and citizenship promoters (Tounesa, Destourna, Kolna Tounes), developmental (TAMSS and Association Tunisienne pour la Promotion du Droit à la Différence) women’s associations (Femmes Democrates) youth (WeYouth, JID, Sawty, La Voix de l’enfant rural) regional (Gabes Action, Sousse Demain, Association Cepsa) and Think Tanks (CSID, Jasmine Foundation)

While the Jamiaty.org database platform was used to find other active CSOs, interviews were also based on which organisations were available (Rachid Kahlani of UGET arranged to meet twice and unexpectedly cancelled on both occasions) and accessible (some organisation did not have functioning telephone numbers or email address). Predominantly, urban-based organisations constitute this thesis’ research subject. I did not interview organisations with particularly Islamist goals, such as Quranic associations. Donker (2013) identifies two types of Islamist activism in post-revolutionary Tunisia based on their goals: activism aimed at societal change and that aimed at political influence. Interviewing either of these types of organisations proved problematic because they did not publicly advertise their Islamist agendas making it difficult to identify them. The ruling Islamist Ennahda party was largely blamed for the rise of terrorism due to their perceived leniency towards Salafist
Islamist groups. Ennahda were criticised for allowing groups such as the Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution (LPR) to operate and spread political uncivil, even extremist, discourse and behaviour. The assassinations of secular-leftist politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi reinforced the belief amongst many Tunisians that Islamist groups who were suspected of having ties with the ruling party were responsible for perpetuating violence and discrimination based on religious grounds. Within this context, CSOs were reluctant to publicise any Islamist agendas and actively distanced themselves from the “Islamist” label. It is worth mentioning that Article 4 of Decree 88 published on 24th September 2011[1] states that “Associations are prohibited from the following: One: Adopting in their bylaws, data, programs or activities any incitement for violence, hatred, fanaticism or discrimination on religious, racial or regional grounds.” Of particular importance is “discrimination” because CSOs that require members to be religious are not legally permitted to exist.

The line of questioning and type of questions employed are vital to constructing an interview specific to the research needs. Qualitative interviews are often semi or unstructured in nature as they seek to “explore topics unanticipated by the interviewer, facilitate the development of a subtle understanding of what happens in the case and why” (Mabry, 2009:218). However, structured interviews to create systematic data were constructed for this thesis in order to obtain a greater reliability than unstructured conversations because “interviewees are given exactly the same context of questioning” (Brymen, 2001: 107). It was important to maintain the structure of the interview because using a consistent question order also reduces variation error (Brymen, 2001: 116). Once the variability is reduced by the interviewer asking the same questions in the same order, the ‘true’ or ‘real’ variation from the participant should be revealed. Furthermore, as Hudson (1995) argues that political culture work is not fully developed in the Middle East, due a lack of surveys and systematic interview data, the interview process of this research adopts a more systematic and less conversational style-structured interviews with a defined set of questions that are asked to all CSOs bureau executive members. This also addresses the ‘conversational style’ interviews that were considered a weakness of Almond and Verba’s approach (Barrington 2009: 108). Therefore, the same questions asked to all interviewees produces directly comparable results.
Questions were asked that sought to obtain answers on two levels; firstly the respondents answer and secondly the values that can be ascertained from their answer. For example, in the question ‘How is the leadership of your organisation chosen?’ if the interviewee knows, they state the method of selection e.g. election by members, consensus after discussion or are the people who founded the organisation the leaders. If the response is an undemocratic selection method, it is possible that they justify why they have not implemented democratic methods. This would indicate that they believe that democratic methods are preferred. However, if the interviewee does not know, they attempt to fabricate an answer or saw how they think their organisation should select their leaders. Therefore, the values and justification of the answer are more reflective of political culture than the answer itself.

As I needed to quickly gain trust from the interviewee, convince them that I am listening to them and that I am not entering the interview with pre-conceived notions, the initial trust-building questions were general and open-ended. Considering that “Questions should be grouped into sections, since this allows a better flow than skipping from one topic to another” (Bryman, 2001: 117). To ensure the interviews flowed, I grouped and ordered questions by themes; independence, co-operation, democratic practices, relations with the government, and funding, then finishing by asking for their charter or constitution. Grouping by theme meant that I had to jump between questions about civil society in general and the respondent’s own CSO. This required me, or my interpreter, to clearly state the difference. Since “general questions should precede specific ones” (Bryman, 2001: 117) I, therefore, asked “Does Tunisian Civil Society, in general, receive sufficient funding?” followed by “Do you know who funds your CSO?” As “potentially embarrassing questions or ones that may be a source of anxiety should be left till later” (Bryman, 2001: 117), I saved the funding questions until as close to the end of the interview as possible since funding is a potentially invasive subject, even though CSOs should be financially transparent according to Decree 88.

Prior to each interview, permission to record our conversation was granted from the interviewee. I considered that verbal consent was sufficient because, in the Tunisian context, permission forms are unexpected, likely to make the situation feel more formal, and were more likely to arouse suspicion. My interpreter and research
assistant, Myriam Ben Ghazi, told me that “Tunisians don’t like to sign documents because they feel like they are bound to it. If they do, it feels like you have leverage over them.” To the interviewees who asked what the data was to be used for, I explained it was for my PhD thesis and that I was not a journalist. Therefore, names and organisations were not anonymous. Only one interviewee had to remain anonymous, due to their INGO’s neutrality and privacy policy, but interviewees were often proud of their association and therefore had no desire to hide their name. The material and issues we talked about were not especially sensitive therefore I do not believe the use of voice-recording inhibited free discussions. Furthermore, CSOs often hold press conferences, therefore some individuals who were interviewed are semi-public figures. Sensitive matters were said off-record e.g. names of politicised organisations, accusations of corruption or lack of transparency. However, some interviewees were happy to make accusations on tape.

3.1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Structured Interviews

Structured interviews allow a controlled environment to be created. During an interview, the interviewee cannot skip through and look at later questions because the interviewer determines when the questions are asked. "If a respondent doesn’t understand a question, you can probe for more complete data" (Bernard 2011: 190). This allowed me to ask more complex questions than in a survey. I probed where necessary, to clarify terms or for a more detailed response, but in order to maintain a structured interview, I returned to the systematic order of questioning. In order to maintain consistency, I used the same explanation of terms to all respondents.

Structured interviews were selected for the following reasons. Firstly, because the same questions were asked, the results produced are easily and directly comparable. I wanted to collect systematic data, as recommended by Hudson, in order to counter the issues political culture studies face. Secondly, time constraints were a consideration. The people I interviewed are often very busy, because if they are in a professional CSO, they are sacrificing their working hours by speaking to me, or because they are in a part-time CSO, and they were giving up their spare time. Therefore, it was not possible to engage in long, open-ended, unstructured interviews that ran for two or more hours, as did Weinstein in his study of Rebel groups in war-torn regions (2006). Neither could the managers nor bureau members manage this amount of time nor very busy interviewees, e.g. with ONAT and UTICA, I
was only afforded 30mins. Thirdly, I was not looking for extensive narrative accounts and the structured format kept the interviewees’ responses relevant. The story of how CSOs operate is not sensitive and can usually be summarised succinctly.

There are various disadvantages of the structured interview method, which I aimed to address wherever possible. Firstly, the Feminist critique addresses the imbalanced power relationship that occurs when the researcher has total control over the agenda of the interview (Hesse-Biber, 2007: 116). Furthermore, “The structured interview epitomises the asymmetrical relationship between researcher and the subject” (Bryman, 2001: 124). This method is, therefore, exploitative by the researcher, treating the interviewee as objects of investigation while providing nothing in return. Requiring written consent would also enhance the validity of the feminist critique. Indeed, I could offer little in return to the subjects for their time and the information they gave me. I was not a journalist and could therefore not promote their CSO. However, the interviews were entirely consensual and their willingness suggests they did not feel exploited. When I was asked for my opinions, I offered advice and willingly answered any questions in an attempt to reciprocate. I interviewed equal numbers of men and women, the female voice and experience are not excluded or marginalised in my research (Harding, 1989) and I regularly used a female interpreter to redress the gender imbalance.

Furthermore, although the Feminist critique was acknowledged in the research design, I find it to be overstated as it impedes the possibility of producing findings. The unequal power relations issue could not be resolved methodologically because this research sought systematic data as the collection of conversational data was a criticism levelled at The Civic Culture (1963). Therefore I could not pay closer attention to the personal feelings and emotions of the interviewees. However, I endeavoured to be sensitive in the way I asked questions and conducted interviews, maintaining a sense of naivety and genuine interest. The interviewees also retained power as they were the ‘owners of knowledge’ which I sought, therefore I needed them, rather than they needed me.

Secondly, despite trying to develop a friendly rapport with the interviewee, I avoided too much familiarity because it is a bias that can negatively affect results. As Bryman notes, “Questions asked by respondents (for example, about the research or about the topic of the research) should be politely but firmly rebuffed on the ground that
too much familiarity should be avoided and because the respondent’s subsequent answers may be biased” (2001: 121). This is contrary to the feminist interview method in which a more reflexive and reciprocal approach seeks to reduce the hierarchy between the researcher and the researched (Hesse-Biber, 2007: 128). However as mentioned above, I find this critique to be overinflated. The majority of my interviews did not feature any personal questions. After briefly explaining the purpose of my work, interviewees were content with proceeding with the interview and rarely had questions for me.

Thirdly, there are various biases that qualitative interviews can also reveal. Face-to-face interviews lack anonymity which can affect the responses that interviewees give. There is a possibility that interviewees are more guarded or less honest when their anonymity is not protected. It is also possible that interviewees will seek to present their own organisation and Tunisian civil society generally, in more favourable terms. Therefore, interviewee dishonesty remains a risk. Some interviewees were refreshingly honest about the deficiencies and problems, Amira Yahyaoui at *Al Bawsala* for example, but many presented an optimistic spin on their work. However, these interviews were not a search for a universal truth. Respondent's dishonesty regarding their own CSO might suggest their beliefs and attitudes towards how it should be run.

### 3.1.1. Intrusive and reactive research issues

Interviews require skill in administering questions without getting answers the interviewer initially seeks (Bernard, 2011). In some occasions I was the only person conducting the interviews, so the reactivity was reduced. On the occasions when an interpreter is present, this changes slightly. I used three different interpreters but one for the majority of the work. There are cost factors, in terms of time and money, associated with interviewing. Finding a representative sample to interview is time-consuming, especially for ‘hard to find’ respondents. However, it was important for me to ensure a range of respondents/interviewees otherwise the sample would have become homogenised and therefore less representative. To counteract this I conducted interviews in 10 different cities (Tunis, Bizerte, Zaghouna, Sousse, Sfax, Sidi Bouzid, Gafsa, Gabes, Medenine, and Djerba) to ensure the data was representative.
Despite conducting structured interviews, qualitative rather than statistical data was produced which required a framework to analyse the data. The framework consisted of the six criteria of civility; Freedom, Equality, Pluralism, Trust, Tolerance, and Transparency. The data was analysed by employing two methods; inductive (reading the interview data to look for emerging themes and patterns) and deductive (searching for the criterion of civility, developed from the literature review, in the interviewee responses.)

4. Participant-observation ethnography

Baiocchi and Connor consider the study of CSOs as political ethnography and identify how the method enables the researcher to engage in close-up, on-the-ground and real-time observation of actors involved in political processes (2008: 139). The study of behaviour from a political culture perspective requires the anthropological technique of ethnographic participant-observation. The focus of my work is to observe the internal operation of a Tunisian CSO and behaviour of its members.

Ethnographic observation can be described as “immersion of the observer in the social setting in which he seeks to observe the behaviour of the members of that setting and to elicit the meaning they attribute to their environment and behaviour” (Brymen, 2001:163). It is largely an anthropological method but is key to observing and understanding cultures and cultural phenomena. It helps to understand what people ‘do’ rather than what they ‘say’ (Welch: 2013). Culture is not always easy to verbalise but can also be expressed through behaviour. Brymen notes the advantages of observation; that it is “almost certainly more accurate and effective than getting people to report on their behaviour through questionnaires” (2001:166).

As this thesis rejects synoptic and essentialist understandings of political culture, it also recognises that political culture is not static and does not require generations to change. The ethnographic chapter implements Geertz’s approach, as approved by Said in Orientalism (1978, 326), to understanding culture that emphasises close proximity to research subjects. This chapter addresses some of the general inadequacies of studies in political culture and those specific to the MENA region context. Anderson’s critique of political culture studies in the MENA context and Hudson’s recommendations for a more sophisticated approach, including disaggregated political culture by focusing on groups rather than national level, has
informed the development of the methodology in this thesis to incorporate ethnographic work.

Almond and Verba established the concept of civil political culture in *The Civic Culture* and identify the criteria through which democratic culture can be measured. The reliance of their work on questionnaire data makes it appear weak in light of Anderson and Hudson’s contributions. This thesis expands Almond and Verba’s work by using ethnographic observation to further uncover the criteria of civil political culture.

An ethnographic study enables this thesis to apply Welch’s theoretical understanding of political culture (2013) into practice with empirical evidence. There are various approaches to understanding culture and an ethnographic study enables behaviour, rather than discourse, to be measured. There are methodological issues associated with ethnography that I sought to address prior to and during my research. Brymen identifies four criticisms of observation. Firstly, that it focuses on ‘observable’ behaviour and proceeds to neglect the ‘intention’ or the ‘meaning’ of the behaviour. Secondly, that it generates lots of ‘bits’ of data but fails to produce an overall picture. Thirdly, it neglects the context in which the behaviour takes place (2001:173). Fourthly, the quality of ethnography – “to what extent can individual observation and anecdotal evidence provide a firm enough basis upon which to base broader theories of political psychology?” (Brymen, 2012:105)

From a positivist point of view, ‘representativeness’ of the findings is a key issue. Therefore, I recognise that observing just one CSO will reduce the generalisability or the external validity of the findings. However, interpretivism is key to noting specificities and smaller details. The other methods used in this thesis have greater generalisability. In addition, poor data collection methods can lead to research losing validity.

Observation suffers from the risk of reactivity; a phenomenon that occurs when individuals alter their performance or behaviour due to the awareness that they are being observed (Heppner, Wampold, & Kivlighan, 2008: 331). This is commonly defined as the ‘Hawthorne Effect’, the central idea is that subjects alter their behaviour because they are aware that an observer is present. Yet Jones asserts that “Contrary to the conventional wisdom in much research and teaching, I found
essentially no evidence of Hawthorne effects, either unconditionally or with allowance for direct effects of the experimental variables themselves” (1992:467).

Reflexivity and bias should also be considered before conducting ethnography. Critical Ethnography asserts that the relation between the fieldworker and those being researched, the self and the other, should be considered (Armstrong, 2009: 59). Therefore, greater awareness and acknowledgement of my biases as the researcher plays a role in what is observed from my perspective. As a Caucasian, middle-class, British, 28/29-year-old male who is non-fluent in French or Tunisi, entering a Tunisian context would impact on the data I obtain. I acknowledge that my Tunisi or French language skills are to a working knowledge, rather than native standard, therefore I focused on interaction with members who were competent English speakers. However, I conducted interviews with non-English-speaking members of the organisation I worked with, Jeunes Indépendants Démocrates (JID), through an interpreter in an attempt to level this bias. Furthermore, the interviews as an addition to observations allowed the research subjects to act as interlocutors in order to introduce a greater polyphony into the ethnography. Although I am working with the concept of ‘civility’ in a time frame of post-revolutionary Tunisia, I have no ulterior motive to find either civility or incivility. I recognise that I would like to see Tunisia complete a successful transition and consolidation into a democratic state but this personal hope did not interfere with the process of observing whether or not JID exhibited behaviour and practice of democratic culture.

Sampling is not specifically used in ethnographic research. This is because “Ethnographers are forced to gather information from whatever sources available and whoever is prepared to divulge details” (Bryman, 2001: 301). As a result, it is the duty of the ethnographer to access a wide range of perspectives from relevant individuals in order to reduce bias. The whole sample for the ethnography is the members of JID and the larger number of people observed reduces ‘sampling error’. I sought to observe male and female, junior and senior, recent and established members but this was limited to who was present at each meeting. Informants within the CSO played an important role in helping verifying and adding information but I ensured their contributions did not alter the direction of the study.
The ethnographic work of this thesis can be placed in the literature on democratisation in the MENA region, specifically Tunisia. It was conducted in the context of reassessing the previously held exceptionalist view of the region, even if Tunisia does prove to be an anomaly or the only ‘winner’ of the Arab Uprisings. However, the single-case of this ethnography and specificities of Tunisia undergoing transition mean the findings from this chapter alone cannot be generalisable.

5. General Research Issues

Events overtaking the research period and issues of reliability, internal validity, external validity and reflexivity are relevant concerns to all three methods undertaken in this thesis. In a country experiencing a political transition, it was a possibility that during my time in Tunisia (2013-2014) events or drastic political changes could occur that would have an impact on the themes and tones of the interviews. 2013 saw political assassinations and a political deadlock that was eventually overcome through the National Dialogue. I, therefore, made sure that the research was conducted in one period, from January to August 2014, after the constitution was finished and before the elections scheduled for October. This period was reasonably uneventful; the Ennahda-led ‘troika’ coalition government had stepped down and an appointed, technocratic government had taken power. The data should, therefore, have greater consistency and reliability. This period allowed interviewees to compare the Troika and the technocratic government, and comment on civil society’s role, especially by the Quartet, in the National Dialogue. I chose to wait until the Constitution had been adopted on 26th January 2014 before starting to conduct research, for continuity and so that CSO members who had been reporting and lobbying were available for interviews. I was also fortunate that no major events happened during this period to dramatically alter the content and character of my interviews.

If “a reliable measurement is one where we obtain the same result on repeated occasions [and therefore] if people answer a question in the same way on repeated occasions then it is reliable” (de Vaus, 2002:52) then more than one question on the

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5 A civil society alliance formed in 2013 to overcome a political deadlock. It consisted of four major Tunisian organisations; The Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers (ONAT).
same subject needs to be included to ensure the reliability. The survey has a degree of repetition as it was divided into criteria of civil political culture: Tolerance, Equality, Freedom, Pluralism, Trust, Democratic Practices, and Financial Transparency. Repetition to achieve reliability was difficult in interviews as it would appear I had not listened to the interviewee's responses, but derived from the criteria of civil political culture, the 5 themes of the interviews questions - Independence (Freedom), Co-operation (trust and pluralism, Democratic Practices (Equality and Pluralism), Relations with the government (Trust) and Funding (Financial Transparency) - contain similar questions e.g. “12) How would you describe Civil Society’s relationship with the government?” And “14) Does your CSO work with the government?” The ethnography was conducted over many meetings, therefore any repetition of habits and interactions could be observed.

Considering that “the validity of a measure depends on how we have defined the concept it is designed to measure” (De Vaus, 2002:53) the internal validity, or credibility, of this work was ensured because as the criteria of civil political culture is a defined concept, the measure is clearly defined. The external validity, or transferability, of these results determines whether they can be applied to other settings. Although Tunisia is the case study of this thesis and has its own particularities and qualities, the results could be compared to other Arab Uprising countries or any civil society with newly granted freedom.

Although mentioned with particular importance when conducting an ethnographic study, reflexivity, defined as “a critical look inward and reflecting on one’s own lived reality and experiences” (Hesse-Biber, 2007: 129) is crucial in every aspect of this research. My background has given me a lived experience of relative privilege that is absent of discrimination. My reflexivity addresses the concerns raised in the articles by Abaza (2011) and Zevallos (2012) of the ‘neo-Orientalism’ displayed in foreign researchers exploiting local academics and claiming superiority in their analysis of the Egyptian revolution, which is more relevant to interviews and observations than the survey. When I arrived in Tunisia to begin my research, it was my 6th visit to the country in 3 years. I proceeded to live in Tunisia from October 2013 until July 2014, therefore the research period was extensive rather than a brief trip. However, I appreciate the position of privilege I have, as I can critique the practices and beliefs
of Tunisian CSO members then return to the UK while commenting on a country that is not my own.

My work uses Tunisia in comparison to literature on democracy, political culture, and civil society but does not seek to portray otherness any more than studies of transition in Latin America, Eastern Europe, or South East Asia. Ever since Orientalism was written, sensitivity has been required from Western researchers in the MENA region, especially when working on cultural issues or democratic deficits. However, this work in no way seeks to pass normative judgments on Tunisian culture, but it rather seeks to establish how the colonial and authoritarian legacy has shaped Tunisian political culture.

Tunisians were the ‘objects of observation’ but I did not seek to present myself as the ‘knowing subject’ (Abaza, 2011). Rather I was the unknowing subject. I knew the literature on political culture and civil society, Tunisian history, and I was already familiar with Tunisia, having visited and researched on five previous occasions, but I was not ‘knowing’ of the internal workings and relations between Tunisian CSOs. Retaining the naivety in the questioning attempted to convey that I was not the expert, but rather they were the experts on their own lives. Most crucially, my work does not seek to take precedent over any other similar work by local academics or weaken their research voices in the creation of academic discourse Zuleyka (2012).

6. How the research project is shaped by my approach

The research project is fundamentally shaped by the dualistic understanding of political culture that marries approaches of positivism and interpretivism and seeks to understand and measure discourse and practice manifestations through the application of three different research methods. It is also shaped by the theoretically understanding of civil society as possessing the potential to perform a democratic function. As Tunisian CSOs in 2014 were not subjected to severe security apparatus scrutiny, the acquisition of data was without authoritarian state interference. The political conditions in post-revolutionary Tunisia were transitional yet they could no longer be considered as authoritarian. The legal framework that Decree 88 published on 24th September 2011, passed by the interim unity government before the 2011 elections, created a context in which organisations could operate within by providing clear requirements of CSOs and providing protection that was previously not
afforded to them. For example, Article 6 protects associations from public authority interference. Therefore, recourse to reductionist concepts or essentialist assumptions is entirely avoided in this thesis because the Tunisian context is suitable for both uninhibited positivist and interpretivist political culture research to be conducted.

7. Chapter Conclusion

The methodology of the thesis consists of an application of Welch’s theoretical understanding of political culture. This is based on the understanding that the use of exclusively positivist or interpretivist methods is an insufficient approach to identifying the six attributes of political culture. As Welch determines political culture manifests as both discourse and practice. Therefore, the use of a singular method approach does not adequately and fully encapsulate these criteria. The unique and original contribution of this thesis is the application of Welch’s theoretical work on political culture which has been used to develop a triangulated, three methods approach to studying political culture in a post-authoritarian context. The use of structured interviews, ethnographic participant observation, and online survey questionnaire implements a triangulation approach to political culture creates a balanced assessment that provides inquired, observed, and subject self-assessed understandings of civil society’s political culture. This approach is effective for capturing a current political culture as it does not recourse to written or historical sources, therefore making it appropriate for studying civil societies in transition. The weaknesses, shortcomings, and critiques of the methods this thesis employs are also acknowledged in this chapter but the implementation of a three methods approach overcomes the weaknesses of each individual method.
PART II: HISTORICAL CONTEXT
CHAPTER FOUR – HISTORY OF TUNISIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

1. Introduction

This chapter shows how Tunisia's history and tradition of civil society, that existed prior to the Revolution, allowed it to fulfil different functions (see Chapter One) but was also shaped by the context of authoritarian government. Different degrees of autonomy afforded by Ottoman rule, French colonial administration, and the post-independence authoritarian presidents to Tunisia's civil society has had various influences but demonstrates that a long-standing tradition of civil society activism had nonetheless existed prior to the 2011 Revolution. This chapter addresses the manner in which four periods in Tunisia's historical experience impacted the development of civil society: Ottoman semi-autonomy, European colonialism, the independent nationalist regime, and Ben Ali’s false liberalisation. These phases represent a consistent historical tradition of civil society activity in which organisations were able to perform different functions, despite operating under colonial rule and authoritarian oppression.

2. Tunisian civil society from 1574-2010

Under the Bey, civil society developed a market-oriented function that was able to constrain the head of state's power. The colonial period enabled civil society to absorb many of the values of French republicanism, constitutionalism, and aspects of liberalism. However, it also developed into an oppositional-resistance function during the nationalist struggle for independence. During the post-independence period of authoritarianism, civil society existed within the constraints of an inclusive government system. Bourguiba modified civil society into a co-opted corporatized set of associations, which enabled citizenship but prevented them from developing into democratic organisations. Under Ben Ali, the brief political openings in a phase of pseudo-democratisation allowed a proliferation of CSOs but the oppositional role these organisations sought to play was suppressed after the regime cracked down on political Islamist opposition. Attempts to pressure the state to implement democracy were retrained. Therefore, authoritarian government structures prevented civil society from performing its democratic function. Any form of opposition or attempts to speak out against Ben Ali’s dictatorship, not only from civil society, was met with arrest, police harassment, or deportation.
The lack of violence by civil society, in most cases, points to some evidence of civility, but freedom, equality and pluralism were constrained by firstly the nationalist struggle and later corporatist state structures. Leftist opposition views were incorporated into the one-party state while dissidents were suppressed. Regime imposed secularism remained a key criteria of citizenship to combat the threat of Islamism. Repressive security state apparatus and violent secret police methods created a general ambience of mistrust, in both the regime and others in society (Hibou, 2006: 187).

This chapter concludes that prior to the 2011 revolution, Tunisia had a pre-existing history and tradition of civil society that operated in various and limited forms under colonial and authoritarian rule and, furthermore, that Tunisian civil society was shaped and characterised by the systems of government which it operated under. Therefore, in a post-authoritarian context, Tunisian civil society can be re-evaluated. It is appropriate to apply civil society and political civility literature and to ask new questions about the quality of Tunisian democratic practices.

2.1. Phase 1 - Ottoman Semi-Autonomous rule

Before France colonised the country under the auspices of a protectorate, Tunisia was a semi-autonomous Ottoman province governed by a succession of Beys from 1574 until 1881. During this period, until the decline of the Bey’s power due to European encroachment, a civil relationship existed between the Bey and society. The Ottoman government was primarily concerned with their provinces collecting revenue and “many of the Beys proved to be capable administrators and reformers, and Tunisia developed a strong tradition of central control and functioning government” (Murphy, 2001: 19). On the condition that taxes were paid, the Bey governed society in a laissez-faire manner and the state did not interfere with religious and commercial affairs of the main actors in this period: guilds, tribal leaders, the bourgeoisie, and the Ulama. Requiring a functioning economy, however, the Bey could not afford to ignore the interests of the guilds. Granted independence, guilds “made and enforced rules that governed who could practice particular trades, quality of their work, prices, and taxes” (Alexander, 2010:13). Furthermore, “Tribal leaders traded tax collecting and peacekeeping duties for autonomy” (Alexander, 2010:13).

6 The scholarly class of Muslims with specialist knowledge of Islamic law and theology.
Joffe recognises that North African states’ pre-colonial experience impacted the development of state and society relations, particularly between the state and the urban bourgeoisie whose vested economic and political interests were “reflected in their close interrelationship with central authority” (Joffe, 2009: 931). Although they could not challenge the state’s power, the Tunisian Ulama were able to ‘check’ the Bey did not abuse power.

This demonstrates that the Tunisian context was contrary to the notion that the Orient is “all state and no society” and, conversely, there was not a complete “absence of the autonomous individual exercising conscience and rejecting arbitrary intervention by the state” (Turner, 1994: 34). The plurality of socio-political actors in this period filled the space between state, market, and family, and therefore constituted a civil society. This emerging civil society was co-operative, since its autonomy was ensured by a non-meddlesome state, but also limited the Bey from acting as an absolute ruler. Murphy argues that “the institutionalism of the political system which has existed since Ottoman days” has had a lasting impact which even managed to restrain President Ben Ali’s hold on power (1997: 120) and Stepan adds that medieval and Ottoman Tunisia had cultural roots of tolerance and openness in its liberal and rights-friendly political system (2012: 97) which would have impacted the nature of civil society.

**2.2. Phase 2: French Colonialism**

Tunisian civil society was weakened under French control and reacted to the injustice by adopting an oppositional-resistance stance. After the Tunisian state was declared bankrupt in 1869, France stepped in as ‘Protector’ of their extensive investment on May 12th 1881 with the signing of the Treaty of Bardo. The 1883 protectorate treaty signed at La Marsa created a ‘facade of independence’ that gave France ultimate power in Tunisia, allowing the bureaucratic administration of the local state to be retained, strengthened and extended (Anderson 1986:9). Through centralising power, land reforms, and privatisation while strengthening existing central state institutions, the French undermined and severely weakened the autonomy of local political authorities and economic institutions without destroying them (Alexander, 2010: 21). Resentment towards the colonial power grew as inequalities with the French became more evident (see Alexander, 2010). As the
income and influence of the traditional elite and bourgeoisie came under greater threat, it gave rise to Tunisia’s nationalist movement; initially led by the Young Tunisians, then later the Destour and the Neo-Destour parties. Anderson (1986) notes how these three stages of the movement engaged and mobilised the Mamluk aristocracy, the Bourgeoisie, and the hinterlands respectively. Civil society activism worked against the French Protectorate in the form of an independence struggle. Political parties, trade unions, and influential figures orchestrated boycotts and strikes, wrote critical journals, and courted foreign dignitaries for international support. The movement’s absence of violent means represents a degree of civility; with the major exception being the 1938 Neo-Destour party instigated riots in response to the arrest of their party leaders (Perkins, 2014: 107). Civil society activism in an independence struggle is in line with the Gramscian oppositional-resistance understanding of civil society. An independence struggle represents an ideational hegemony is not held over the population. By the social grouping of civil society confronting the coercive apparatus or repressive institutions of the state, it seeks to challenge the dominance of the state, or in this case, colonial power (Ransome, 1992: 138-141) or identifies resistance within an authoritarian regime (Edwards and Foley, 1996: 40).

The nationalist struggle was initiated by the Young Tunisian movement, who were weakened by almost exclusively hailing from *baldiyya* families, which “distanced them from the bulk of the population and prevented them from embracing changes that would negatively affect their class interests” (Perkins: 2014:76). Their published journal, *Le Tunisien*, from 1907 was a means of expression and acquired sympathisers to their cause, while their Alumni Association of Sadiqi College encouraged greater educational reform that better equipped students for professional life (Perkins: 2014:75). Although not responsible for its instigation, the 1911 riots over French land confiscation of the Jellaz cemetery led to a clampdown on Young Tunisian activity and for their organisation of the 1912 transportation boycott in the capital, their leaders Bach Hamba, Abdelaziz Thâalb, and Hassan Guellaty were exiled to the southern city of Medinine. Despite this bringing an end to the Young Tunisians, these actions unified society against the French officials (Perkins: 2014:77). The 1915-1916 al-Hana uprisings caused problems for the French but did not spread throughout the country (Ziadeh, 1962:89) The Young

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7 From Merchant families
Tunisian movement's impact remained limited, however, as it did not question the legitimacy of the protectorate nor demand independence. (Anderson, 1986: 160).

1920 saw the establishment of the Destour\cite{8} party, whose more revolutionary goals were the restoration of the 1861 Constitution and the liberation of Tunisia from French control. Executive positions in the party were taken by Sadiki College graduates from Sahelian\cite{9} background, while Zitouna\cite{10} graduates, who had also adopted an anti-French stance, formed the lower and medium cadres of the party (Micaud, 1974:93). Destour leaders showed some support for strikes organised by the *Confédération générale des travailleurs tunisiens*\cite{11} (CGTT) but saw union tactics of demonstrations and strikes as “vulgar and dangerously provocative” which weakened their alliance (Perkins: 2014:91). The Parti Communiste Tunisien (PCT) also had uneasy relations with Destourians which hampered the latter’s chances of creating alliances with leftists in Paris. With the nationalist movement divided, in 1926 the French Resident General banned political criticism, criminalised various political activities, and restricted the press. The Tunisian monarch Amir Bey supported the Destourians, but his successor Mohammed Bey saw greater cooperation with the French as more prudent for Tunisia’s interests. Ziadeh (1962) is complimentary about the Destourian movement's approach and tactics in the national struggle as their activities, organisation and ability to cause disruption laid important groundwork for Neo-Destour. Their divergence of opinions represented a plurality but their leaders’ disagreements concerning ‘methods and means’, further internal disputes, and Abdelaziz Thâalb’s departure for Italy weakened the national movement (Ziadeh, 1962:121).

### 2.2.1. Rise of Neo-Destour under colonialism

Following a split from the Destour at a party conference, the Neo-Destour (NDP) was established in 1934. Learning from the elitist approach of their predecessors, the NDP held a wider appeal and encouraged nationwide participation. Membership not only included upper-middle class urbanites and Zitouna graduates but attracted merchants, artisans, businessmen, and landowners who thought the NDP were more likely to further their interests. The *Union Tunisien de l’Artisant et du Commerce*...
(UTAC) backing the NDP represented support from the business community (Perkins: 2014:121). The NDP engaged youth and forged ties with youth organisations that saw the Destour as a failure but managed not to isolate Sadiki or Khaledunyya\textsuperscript{12} alumni. The creation of NDP ‘cells’, as a decentralised organisation structure, in all districts of major cities, in addition to rural areas, ensured the hinterlands were not neglected. Presenting itself as the party of the whole nation, the ND attracted “all elements of the population” whose commonality was being explicated by the protectorate (Anderson, 1986: 175).

Sorbonne law and political science graduate and former Destourian Habib Bourguiba emerged as the leader of the new party. He originated from the Sahel and advocated for ‘elites regaining contact with the masses’ (Anderson, 1986: 168). Furthermore, he managed to combine the defence of the nation with the defence of Islam by portraying the French as ‘meddling with Islam’ (Perkins: 2014:95-97), while he argued the PCT’s imported communist ideology was at odds with Tunisia’s traditional values. (Perkins: 2014:115) Zitouna graduates formed an important part of the ND movement, mosques became meeting places, and the nationalist struggle became intertwined with defending the faithful as “Islam provided both a simple way to distinguish the vast majority of Tunisians from their European rulers and a legitimisation of the struggle to which the party urged the people” (Anderson, 1986: 175). The NDP also adopted less traditional protest methods and employed aggressive tactics that defied the protectorate such as refusing to pay taxes, boycotting French goods, and refusing to appear for military service (see Perkins, 2014:100-101 and Anderson, 1986).

The national movement (Young Tunisians, Destour and Neo-Destour) remained quiet during the Second World War but the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), established in 1946, stood apart from the French ran CGTT and took a leading role in opposing French rule by organising a general strike. The UGTT remained focused on nationalist goals but rejected overtures from the World Federation of Trade Unions and remained at odds with the communist Franco-Tunisian Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs Tunisien (USTT).

\textsuperscript{12} An educational society that opened a window to the west for Arabic-speaking Tunisians (Perkins: 2014:71) and was “designed to furnish the students at the Zitouna Mosque with a Europeans style compliment to their Islamic education” (Anderson, 1986: 159).
Amin Bey used his limited political power to aid the national movement by preventing the UGTT from being dissolved and publically aligned himself with the NDP (Perkins: 2014:123). During the 1950s relations between NDP and UGTT remained close as UGTT leader Farhat Hached lead the struggle for independence while nationalist movement leaders were detained or fled abroad. Despite the leadership struggle with the NDP between Secretary-General Salah ben Yusuf and Bourguiba, both managed to remain united to the goal of independence.

In addition to NDP bridging societal differences and the use of Islam as a unifying factor, Sadiki attributes the rise of Tunisian “ethnonationalism”13 as a reaction to French colonialism. He points to how identification was predominantly through tribal background until colonisation created an ‘us Vs. them/ Tunisian Vs French’ dichotomy which instilled a ‘Tunisianess’ and “marked the onset of state-orientated ethnic nationalism,” which included the liberal notion of national identity and the commonality of race, history, and language (Sadiki, 2008:115-6). These notions were not dissimilar to the identity building process other MENA nations fighting a colonial background faced (see Pratt, 2007). Furthermore, the Tunisian singularity, the one-people narrative, had profound implications for the future of Tunisian politics and society since a focus on consensus restrained the development of pluralism, critical opposition, and alternative opinions as they could be considered un-Tunisian.

2.3. Phase 3: New Nationalist Regimes in the Post-Independence era

Unlike Algeria’s bloody war with France, independence was negotiated in 1956. This represented a degree of civility as the national movement established behavioural norms of non-violent approaches in addressing dispute. Emancipation from France could have created ‘citizens’ in Tunisia, but “Colonial hegemony was replaced with an indigenous hegemony” (Sadiki, 2008:118). The French colonial legacy meant that at the time independence was achieved, Tunisia was “an established bureaucratic state” (Salame, 1994: 16-17). In addition to their wide support base, this enabled the NDP to gain comprehensive control over the state. The NDP’s formal structure was modelled on that of the French Social party with the use of cells where “their executive committee were freely elected at annual branch assemblies” (Micaud, 1964: 84) making it both democratic and centralised.

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13 Nationalism based on a common ethnicity.
Civil society can be articulated, in the Gramscian sense, as opposition to a regime, but Henry argues that because it is “shaped by laws, regulations, and historical legacies of conflict and co-operation with authorities” (1999:12-13) it is the state who facilitates the existence or oversees the repression of civil society. In Tunisia’s ‘First Republic’, newly appointed President Bourguiba’s approach to civil society was somewhat destructive. Under Bourguiba’s rule, discourse and policies of ‘national unity’ by the NDP, perhaps a necessary and unifying strategy during the national movement and uncertainty of the immediate post-independent era, soon became an entrenched strategy which was intolerant of alternative views.

Despite pluralistic tendencies at the beginning of his rule, Bourguiba moved forcefully to create a system that revolved around him and his party. The ‘national organisations’ (NOs), such as the UGTT and the UGAT, ostensible intermediaries between state and society, which had served Bourguiba’s cause faithfully under colonialism, saw their autonomy even more constrained after independence. L’Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat (UTICA) and l’Union Nationale des Agricultures Tunisine (UNAT), major economic associations, were political creations of the NDP. Although the UGTT could claim some independence, it remained close to the state because its leaders were also ND members enabling the Union to be utilised for political purposes. Henry notes that the vibrant civil society that existed at independence was redesigned by the one-party government “into administrative hierarchies paralleling those of the government” (Henry, 1999: 17). Civil society could not be considered independent as it was brought into national associational life. This incorporatism prevented the development of oppositional voices and the distinction between state and the non-state, and between political and civil societies, became less apparent. Therefore national associational life was constrained by the single party state rule.

The divisive institutions which were united in the struggle for independence were largely banned or co-opted as a mass movement turned into an authoritarian party. Henry (1965) discusses how all NOs were eventually quietened and co-opted to become arms of the NDP. Even the powerful UGTT and the outspoken Union Générale des étudiants de Tunisie (UGET) found themselves politically weakened and under the control of the single party state. Despite allowing a small degree of freedom, the NDP “subordinated professional interests to the national interest, they helped to maintain
Tunisia's cohesion; but party control sapped their vitality and tended to divorce them from their members” (Henry: 1965: 159).

After independence, the single–party state’s national agenda made opposing the NDP akin to acting as an enemy of the state. After cohesion between the party and organisations in the struggle for liberation, NOs became a threat to the NDP. “After independence, the national organisations threatened to become free-wheeling pressure groups, rivalling the supremacy of the party” (Henry: 1965: 160). By turning NOs into branches of the one-party state, the NDP removed the vibrancy and autonomy from Tunisian civil society. NOs acted as arms of the party as “party control seemed to be exercised at all levels” (Henry: 1965: 164-5). Party members were also trade unionists and the merry-go-round of organisation leaders played to Bourguiba’s advantage. Furthermore, the political positions of the UGTT were similar to those of the government. “Ben Salah and Ahmed Tlili as trade unionists both identified themselves with national rather than class interests” (Henry: 1965: 162). When a trade union no longer prioritises working class interest, or even harmonises the interests of labour and management, it fails to effectively represent its members (Clarke and Pringle, 2008: 85).

The leftist views from the **Union Générale des Etudiant Tunisienne** (UGET) were suppressed as leading members were arrested and public rallies were overrun by the NDP Youth organisation. Therefore, realising the restrictions on their organisation, students began using UGET as a launch pad for a career in politics. UGET became closer to a state institution instead of a movement. “In politics, there was little feeling of participation because the party’s small ruling clique dominated political life” (Henry: 1965: 180). The constitutional state, akin to Locke and Kant’s model, did not exist in Tunisia, instead a clientelistic ruling culture was the reality (Krichen, 1992: 119-120).

The emancipation of women, via the 1956 Personal Status Code (PSC), led to greater freedom and equality, such as equal divorce rights for both women and men. Bourguiba endeavoured to “portray himself not as sweeping aside Islam, as had [Turkish leader Mustapha Kemal] Ataturk, but rather as reinterpreting it through *ijtihad*[^14^], or independent reasoning – a process esteemed by 19th and 20th century Islamic reformers as well as Bourguiba, for whom the rationalism instilled by his

[^14^]: "Independent reasoning" - An Islamic legal term.
French education ranked among the most noble of human qualities” (Perkins: 2014:140-141). For the sake of progress and sovereignty of the Tunisian people, women occupied a central position in the nation-building process because Bourguiba believed that social reform was closely related to the emancipation of women (Voorhoeve, 2012). *L’Union Musulmane des Femmes de Tunisie* had been founded in 1936 but was a conservative organisation and would not have effectively served the government’s modernising programme. In order to educate women and run health programmes, Bourguiba established the *Union Nationale des Femmes Tunisiennes* (UNFT). “Neo-Destour officials knew that providing girls with a modern education would influence the social values they would impart to their families when they became wives and mothers” (Perkins: 2014:143). By the 1980s, in response to the Islamic resurgence, the Bourguiba government developed a less secular discourse on family law and women’s rights. In addition, they “sought to strike a balance between often contradictory demands from different groups in society, such as the Islamists and the women’s rights organizations” (Sonneveld, 2015: 5). This suggests that Bourguiba’s approach to citizenship and secular society aimed to reduce the Islamic traditions and create loyalty to Tunisia rather than the patriarchy of fathers and husbands. Empowering politically and productively active women was a way to solidify on a broader base Tunisian national identity. Furthermore, this was a utilitarian move, in the sense of reinforcing the ethnoreligious national identity. The PSC was considered a forceful reform by the *Ulama* and conservatives who opposed this form of Quranic reinterpretation (Touati, 2014:164), but in comparison to Ataturk’s reform programme, the Tunisian approach was more restrained. In order to reduce the appeal of leftist politics, the NDP renamed itself *Le Parti socialiste destourien* (PSD) in 1964 and enacted state-led economic development programmes. In the early 1970s, after this socialist experiment proved largely unsuccessful, Tunisia embarked on an economic liberalisation programme to encourage private investment and export-led development. It also saw the creation of the breakaway *Mouvement des démocrates socialistes* (MDS) party but did not lead to further democratisation or a plurality of parties. The switch from socialism to economic liberalism increased economic disparity while Bourguiba’s “preferences for authoritarian personalised rule ultimately undermined corporatist structures” and left the party incapable of addressing the conflicting interests of the national organisations (Murphy, 1999: 78-79).
University campuses became fields of ideological conflict between the leftists and Islamists who struggled to become the mantle of opposition to Bourguiba. Both, however, sought to challenge the corporatist vision in the late 1970s early 1980s and in some ways it shaped both forces for the subsequent era. As the communist criticism of the new economic policies became increasingly vocal on University campuses, Bourguiba allowed the establishment of the Association for the Preservation of the Quran because “a culturally oriented Islamist organisation could provide a useful counter to his critics on the left” (Alexander, 2000: 470). The 1970s also saw the creation of the Mouvement de La Tendance Islamique (MTI) by Rashid Ghannouchi, which later became Ennahda Movement. Initially, Islamists avoided class related issues and lacked access to worker networks.

“In the mid-1970s, Tunisian Islamists became increasingly critical of Habib Bourguiba’s authoritarianism. But they said nothing about economic liberalization (infitah), and they ignored the labour movement while the UGTT developed into the country’s most powerful opposition force. Islamist rhetoric became more sensitive to labour issues in the early 1980s, but the movement still did not develop an explicit union strategy” (Alexander, 2000: 466-467).

A change of strategy occurred for Islamists in the early 1980s when, borrowing from Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s ability to refame leftist themes in explicitly Islamic terms, Ghannouchi “published a tract that defended workers’ rights and extolled the Islamic virtues of trade unions” (Alexander, 2000: 471-472) and MTI created a more populist message.

2.4. Phase 4: False Liberalisation

Tunisia was not an exception to the liberalisation trend that was symptomatic of the MENA region from the 1980s onwards, as ineffective and failed economic policies forced governments to make reforms. Foreign aid was received by pro-democracy and human rights groups yet governments failed to grant any real autonomy to civil society. While the rest of the world seemed to be liberalising, Arab state leaders made promises of liberty and democracy as a tactic to improve the flimsy state of their legitimacy amongst the population in the face of progressively worsening
economic conditions. These ‘top down’ reforms did not, however, provide the essential basis for the growth and development of a civil society. Instead, they were measures to increase government control masked in the rhetoric of liberalisation. Instead, the liberalisation phase fragmented civil society and the reforms strengthened central power. (Anderson, 2006, 195) For example, NGOs were established by political and economic elites “in order to feel the people’s pulse and manipulate interests” (Schlumberger, 2004: 374). Also, CSOs that were legally created then had ‘a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes’ imposed upon them, which allowed the state to closely monitor their activities, thus increasing central state control (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 43).

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Tunisia witnessed the beginnings of a new plurality in political life. UGTT leader Habib Ashour “turned trade unionism into a fairly dynamic and autonomous, and at times, confrontationalist, branch of civil society” (Sadiki, 2008:119). One of the MENA region’s first human rights organisations, la Ligue Tunisienne des droits de l’homme (LTDH), was founded in 1977 (Hawthorne. 2004:8). A non-state Islamic organisation, the origins of the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI), was established (Hermassi, 1991) and student groups were allowed to operate as political organisations (Belkhodja, 1998:249).

Yet no opposition party gained the required 5% of the vote in the 1981 parliamentary election in order to be legalised, enabling the PSDU-UGTT ‘National Front’ coalition to maintain its hegemony. Furthermore, the trade union movement, that was already a political heavyweight in its own right, remained part of the ‘corporatist system’ (Waltz, 1995: 50). Tunisia’s civil society seemed to be developing in this period (Alexander, 1997) but Bourguiba’s preoccupation with national unity and his patrimonial manner of rule meant that his “brand of nationalism left no room for any free space for non-governmental or non-party actors” (Moore, 1988: 178). The rise of Ennahda Movement in that era saw the emergence of the Union Générale Tunisienne des Etudiants (UGTE) student union as an opposition to the leftist UGET. Antagonism between the two student unions resulted in violent clashes across Tunisian universities.

“By the mid-1980s, Islamists had established themselves as the best organised and most influential force on the university scene. This willingness to engage
in a prolonged, often violent, campaign against the left on campus makes it difficult to believe that ideology is what kept them away from the unions” (Alexander, 2000: 466-467).

This continued until Tunisia’s Second Republic was established by a bloodless coup on 7th November 1987 in which Interior Minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali seized the Presidency from the erratic and senile Bourguiba who official doctors had declared medically unfit to rule. Despite suggestions of democratic opening and promises to implement democratic political reforms (Alexander, 1997), it was singularity, national unity, and collective interest that remained the themes of the Tunisian elite. Ben Ali implemented reforms that were “cast in a language that suggested a deeper commitment to democracy” (Alexander, 2010: 54). In addition, tangible gestures towards pluralism were made, for example, Islamists were released from prison and joined in the national debate while opposition parties were legalised. Although this liberalisation would ultimately prove false, the opening of the civic space allowed for a proliferation of associations. Political liberalism moved to implement new freedoms for the press as “press department rules were relaxed and television and radio stations were instructed to be more objective in their coverage and to concentrate less on PSD affairs” (Murphy, 1999: 168). Current and former members of the LTDH, an internationally recognised, 3000-member organisation, Hamouda Ben Slama, Saadedine Zmerli, and Mohamed Charfi found themselves co-opted and included in Ben Ali’s new cabinet, which “clearly illustrated Ben Ali’s incorporative intentions” (Murphy, 1999: 168). In contrast, LTDH Secretary-general Khemais Chemari was arrested in 1987 for ensuring jailed MTI leaders received suitable treatment (Perkins, 1997:100).

Within the false liberalisation, there were periods when a Liberal-Associative civil society could operate. The rise of women’s organisations was important but was also incorporated into the party system. L’Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le Développement (AFTURD) was government organised but independent women’s organisations, such as L’Association Tunisienne des Femmes Democrat, (ATFD), established in 1989, also appeared. AFTD and LTDH, established in 1977, were two exceptions that both managed to retain a degree of political independence yet were confronted with the operational difficulties from
suppression and arrest to infiltration and manipulation from party loyalists (Alexander, 2010:65).

2.4.1. National Pact and destruction of Islamists

In September 1988, 16 organisations, made up of legal opposition parties, trade unions, national organisations, in addition to representatives of the MTI were invited by Ben Ali to reach a national consensus, the National Pact, regarding commitment to liberal reform. This document appeared to be a pathway towards reform but was a reassertion of the corporatist state model that included dissenting voices in order to weaken their appeal as opposition.

At a political level, Ben Ali intended the National Pact to foster a formal national political consensus in the period leading up to the first election of the post-Bourguiba era” (Perkins, 1997: 133). Opposition figures and intellectuals joined the re-named ruling party, The Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) and accepted positions in the new government with the intention of implementing the reforms they demanded (Belhassen, 1998). To obtain legal status and obey the law which prohibited party names from containing religious references, “in early 1989, MTI renamed itself Hizb Ennahda (the Renaissance Party) to comply with Ben Ali’s stated position that no single group should monopolize the claim to be Islamic since all Tunisians were Muslim” (Esposito and Piscatori, 1991: 431). This political liberalisation was not, however, a step towards democracy but a strategy to gather information and identify opposition. By listening to their grievances and making appropriate changes, Ben Ali removed the opposition movement’s potency. The RCD learnt how to rule more effectively and co-opted opposition into government through appointing their most influential leaders.

The implications for civil society were that, after an opening for potential change, Tunisia’s Second Republic remained an authoritarian state; manipulating the fear of Islamism and terrorism to weaken Tunisian civil society. The National Pact “reinvigorated the role of national organisations as partners with the state, rather than potential and sometimes actual combatants” (Murphy: 1999: 173). As part of the state, the national organisations were legal and part of the system but lacked independence. A subordinate UGTT was required for Ben Ali’s economic reforms to be implemented. By 1993, a younger and more technocratic minded leadership had
replaced the older and confrontational members and the UGTT was left ‘weak and internally divided’ (Murphy: 1999: 187-192). An alternative student’s union, Union Générale Tunisienne des Etudiants (UGTE), was established to compete with and divide UGET members. However, it created more independent bodies that could think independently and challenge national associations; whom the regime would later be forced to co-opt.

CSOs could only exist when at least partially co-opted by the regime. Opposition organisations, those not established by the regime, had little impact and high risk of arrest. Therefore, since they were forced to participate and operate within the parameters of the regime, there were overlaps in personalities between political parties and CSOs. For example, the LTDH members in Ben Ali’s cabinet meant that the RCD claimed to include opposition and voices. By allowing grievances to be aired within the regime, thus potency of opposition voices was reduced. When organisations relied on the governments for funding, or when the government established associations to compete with existing ones, e.g. Le comité supérieur des droits de l’Homme et des libertés fondamentales against the LTDH, they became progressively undermined and controlled by the regime.

“Ben Ali’s effort to break the connection between elite and popular politics has also created a profound strategic malaise for the organizations that long constituted the bedrock of associational life. As elsewhere in the region, the struggle for meaningful autonomy from state control has dominated the lives of workers’ and students’ unions, human rights groups, women’s groups and Islamist organizations in post-independence Tunisia. At the same time, though, these organizations have always understood that the line between state and civil society is blurry at best. For more than 30 years, establishing alliances with individuals and factions of the governing elite and playing on tensions within party and state bureaucracies was a fundamental part of these organizations’ strategies for influencing government policy. The dissolution of these ties, the end of opposition politics as it operated for so long, has left Tunisia’s traditionally vigorous civil society adrift” (Alexander, 1997).

Having secured electoral victory and defeated his main opposition, Ben Ali strengthened his own position by using the Algerian Civil War and Islamic terrorist
attacks against France in the 1990s to emphasise the Islamist threat and shift to a hard-line policy towards Islamic activists (Esposito and Piscatori, 1991: 432). As a pro-Western Arab leader he used the situation to strengthen his hold on power by crushing Islamic opposition at home, and continuing authoritarian measures, knowing he had the complete backing of Europe. The Algerian case allowed Ben Ali to convincingly argue that “democracy needed to be introduced gradually or Tunisia would follow Algeria’s descent into instability and violence” (Wood, 2002:97).

Faced with growing apathy at the lack of opportunity in the unfair election process and government harassment of Ennahda, the movement’s spokesman, Ali Laarayedh, accused the government of being incapable of dialogue but argued that Ennahda should, “Continue the fight because there is no longer any means of reaching an agreement with the government. Through demonstrations in the street, we fight for our rights and the country’s” (Marouki, 1990: 33). As a response, Ennahda became more militant through increased protests and lifting their ban on violence (Soudan and Gharbi, 1991). Ben Ali countered Ennahda with suppression when 200 Islamic activists were arrested in December 1990 (Alexander, 2010:60). On 17th February 1991, three Islamic activists attacked the RCD office. The government claimed it was an assassination attempt on Ben Ali. In response, government oppression dramatically increased and between 1990 and 1992 over 8000 allegedly dangerous or threatening Islamists were arrested (Waltz: 1995: 72).

While political parties based on religion remained illegal, they were permitted a limited existence in civil society. The role of religion was recognised in the UGTE, the student organisation that had close relations with MTI, which was legalised in September 1988, while a new cabinet position, sectary of state for religious affairs, was created in November (Murphy, 1999: 179). “Hoping to encourage Islamist moderation, Ben 'Ali promised MTI/Ennahda leaders that he would legalise their party if they would keep peace at the universities and give him time to consolidate his position” (Alexander, 2000: 474). Ennahda gained 15% of the vote in the 1989 and performed better than the secular opposition. Now that they represented the only genuine threat to the RCD, Ben Ali reneged on his promise to legalise Ennahda. This prompted the party’s more militant elements, especially students, to argue that “the government’s refusal [was] proof that trading moderation for legalisation would
never pay off” (Alexander, 2000: 476). A protest and repression exchange followed until Ennahda was depleted and their leaders imprisoned or exiled.

Partly as compensation for severe violations of political and civil rights, women’s rights were enhanced under Ben Ali while some pressure on Islamists was relieved, such as the ban on university students wearing the veil was not strongly enforced (Sonneveld, 2015: 5). However, “Islamist opposition, which expressed the frustrations of masses either unrepresented by secular parties or suppressed within the national organisations, was not to be tolerated at all” (Murphy, 1999: 79). The Islamist UGTE was also suspended in 1991 under the accusation of stockpiling weapons (Khlifi, 2013). After the Islamist threat was crushed, the voice of the legal opposition was also limited.

### 2.4.2. Human Rights and Western Support

Ben Ali sought to control human rights and lawyer's organisations by implementing a new Law of Associations in 1992 to restrict membership and activities. This included clauses whereby LTDH members could not hold office in other associations or political parties. Therefore, the overlap between party and CSO personalities ended and LTDH lost active leaders. Former LTDH leader Moncef Marzouki responded by establishing the *Comite National pour la Defence des Prisonniers d’Opinion* (CNDPO) but while the government allowed them to exist, they also monitored their membership and activities. The regime denied the existence of political prisoners or torture cases, instead seeking to highlight the improvements in human rights and political freedom which they had implemented. Ben Ali postured as a human rights supporter while simultaneously quashing genuine activists (Murphy, 1999: 205-207). Mohammed Moada, leader of the legal MDS party, was sentenced to 11 years in jail for an open letter that called for a gradual move towards a pluralist culture and democratic choice. Marzouki was arrested for running as a Presidential candidate in the 1994 election, and the Tunisian press was suffocated as journalists were routinely harassed. An additional example of Tunisian state oppression was the case of Judge Mukhtar Yahyaoui, whose open letter to President Ben Ali on 6th June 2001[^15] criticised the oppressive control over the judicial system, was consequently

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dismissed from the body of magistrates and had his property was confiscated (Marzouk, 2015).

Wood acknowledges how Tunisia’s poor Human Rights record was constantly overlooked by the French government despite the French, and international press highlighting the problem. The ‘special relationship’ between France and Tunisia and their mutually profitable trade added to Ben Ali’s confidence that he was somehow untouchable. In addition, Ben Ali’s speed at denouncing the 9/11 terrorist attack and pledging support for the US ensured international pressure on his regime would be alleviated. Perhaps Ben Ali would have become less repressive as French and international pressure to liberalise intensified in the late 1990s but the 9/11 attack helped Ben Ali galvanise French and EU support for Tunisia as an anti-terrorism, pro-Western Arab regime. Furthermore, the situation allowed authoritarianism to increase. The structures supporting authoritarianism were not only deeply rooted but capable of adaptation to modern conditions—thus keeping ahead of the developing societal forces. While civil society was benefiting from new information technologies, regimes could also use these instruments to their own advantage to enhance surveillance capabilities. This is evident in Tunisia as by December 2001, FBI involvement in Maghrebi counter-terrorism significantly improved the Tunisian security services (Wood, 2002). Human rights activists were often imprisoned, in particular prior to a UN-sponsored world summit on information in November 2005, there was an increase in state repression focused against leading human rights activists (Rishmawi, 2007).

On a social-welfare level, the Caisse 26-26 and 21-21 Funds, established to help the poor and needy, aimed to reduce inequality and prevent “the rise of NGOs that could utilise charity as a springboard for political recruitment” (Sadiki, 2008:127). However, the non-existence of freedom of information acts and the lack of transparency meant that how these funds were spent or to where they were transferred remained unknown (Henry, 2012: 668). Indeed, open-governance was not prevalent and authoritarian rule had not encouraged the practice of transparency. A Word Bank report cites the ‘lack of transparency and rampant abuse by cronies’ in Tunisia’s economy as major factors behind the anger that caused the revolution (2014: 27).
Economic corruption increased during the 1970s as the state implemented a privatisation programme from which data was either inaccurately reported or not published. Under Ben Ali, levels of crony-capitalism and mafia-style family control of businesses became rampant as rules were manipulated to serve their interests.

"Members of the ruling family - as the parents, brothers, sisters and allies of Ben Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi, are known - have been the main beneficiaries of the privatisation of public companies, dubious bank loans and the flourishing black market. Several have one foot in the public sector and the other in the private. They use their position for personal gain, acting as brokers" (Labidi, 2006).

For example, of the 220 businesses owned by family members, the World Bank determined that while these firms accounted for only three percent of economic output, they controlled 21 percent of net private sector profits (World Bank report, 2014). Corruption was facilitated by the lack of adequate participation, transparency, and accountability in the management of public affairs. Consequently, corporatism, paternalism and corruption permeated all levels of Tunisian society (see Hibou, 2011) which left transparency absent.

3. Civil society before the Revolution

Hawthorne summarises the state of Tunisian civil society, prior to the revolution, as follows,

“Tunisia's civil society is dominated by a very large service-NGO sector and a few labour unions and professional associations. Its handful of prodemocracy groups suffer continuous state harassment and have a precarious legal status. Tunisia’s Islamic sector consists primarily of associations tied to the government. This is due to Tunisia’s history of state-enforced secularism, which intensified in the late 1980s and 1990s with the government's attempts to eradicate an incipient Islamic opposition movement, Al Nahda, and any other independent Islamic activity” (Hawthorne, 2004:8-9).

Overall, civil society activity was heavily regulated and limited due to the authoritarian tendencies of the regime. Of the few that functioned, even fewer escaped the regime's corporatist civil society mechanisms. CSOs were not able to do
more at this point because they were constrained by the risk of their organisation being closed and members arrested. The majoritarian view (Alexander, 2010:120) prevented debates and dissent were not tolerated. Civil society faced constraints in the form of ambiguity between press and government, which meant the media was forced to self-censor, and CSO activities received no coverage of their events which were in any way against the majority view.

The government operated under a “with us or against us” policy, the same approach that had been prevalent since Bourguiba’s disagreements with Youceffists. The decade-long Algerian civil war helped ingrain the idea that political-Islam would threaten economic prosperity; therefore the RCD’s secular and liberal economic approach was the only acceptable option for stability and prosperity. Worker grievances were addressed in the UGTT, which was also largely co-opted by the regime. This left opposing or criticising the government akin to an act of treason.

4. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter identifies that Tunisia has a history of civil society action but authoritarian government systems limited civil society from fulfilling a democratic function. Tunisia’s historical experience placed the country in a position that was more conducive to the successful completion of a democratic transition. This is because extensive building of state institutions would not be required (Jankauskas and Gudžinskas, 2008) and that a civil society, a crucial element to a democratic transition (established in Chapter One), had existed, survived and developed from Beylical rule via French colonialism to the 21st Century. However, the analysis of the four historical phases outlined in this chapter cannot sufficiently account for the existence of civil political culture within the civil society. Despite organisations’ commitment to survive by working with the regime or challenge the regime from the periphery of the legal constraints, in addition to their use of non-violent approaches, it cannot entirely explain how organisations operated or what values and beliefs their members held.

A civil society, which prevented despotic government tendencies of the Bey, existed prior to French colonialism. French rule centralised power and largely dismantled pre-existing civic traditions by weakening local political and economic institutions. As the nationalist movement against the French developed under the Young
Tunisians, Destour, and Neo-Destour, each party respectively learned from their predecessor and progressively engaged greater sections of society. Resistance to colonialism created Tunisian identity based on ethno-nationalism (Sadiki, 2008) and links across society encouraged homogenisation.

The ethno-nationalism of Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s authoritarian rule created an exclusive “us vs. them” dichotomy, which was coupled with the incorporation of dissident opinions within the ruling party structures and the suppression of Islamic identities. To some extent, the nationalism struggle encouraged peaceful cooperation, however, the post-Independence leadership’s suppression of opposition succeeded in inhibiting the development of socio-political pluralism or tolerance towards alternative visions, as the National Associations became increasingly state-controlled. Civil society may have been co-opted and constrained, however, the political openings during the 1978 strike, riots in the early 1980s, the small window of opportunity after Ben Ali came to power in 1987, and the involvement in the 1988 National Pact contributed to maintaining the tradition of an active civil society. Indeed, civil society was able to exhort influence on government and had a role in affecting change. The extensive networks of the UGTT, for example, demonstrated an oppositional-resistance capacity through their large membership base and the ability to call a general strike.

The ‘false liberalisation’ that Ben Ali applied was not unique to Tunisia and is concurrent with the analysis of civil society in Liberalised Autocracies throughout the MENA region. As Brumberg noted at the time, CSOs have not been able “to pierce the armour of liberalised autocracies” (2002: 63). Albeit under the conditions of authoritarianism, Tunisia has a history of “elected parliaments and opposition politics, a smattering of nongovernmental Islamic societies, professional associations, clubs, and prodemocracy groups” (Hawthorne, 2004:8). Chapter One highlights that certain preconditions are necessary to a successful democratisation process. Therefore, the breath of civil society institutions described in Hawthorne’s summary implies that, based on the assumption that a “political society” and state institutions must exist prior to civil society (Stepan and Linz, 1996) and (Bodenstein, 2013), extensive state-building would not be required in Tunisia.
While relevant historical experience is important to beginning a democratisation process, historical experience must not be over-emphasised as an explanatory variable to summarise a political culture, as per the historical-synoptic assessments of political culture critiqued in Chapter Two. However, as Anderson identifies political culture as “the values that might support or undermine a particular set of political institutions, the particular distribution of patterns of political orientations-attitudes towards the political system” (1995: 7), the evidence of CSOs existing and operating, despite authoritarian conditions restraining their activities, could account for the basis of a civic culture. The only way CSOs could operate was therefore, working within the system as ‘loyal’ co-opted opposition. While the regional branches retained greater independence, the upper echelons of the powerful and mostly independent UGTT fell under government control (Perkins, 2014). Liberal-Associative forms of civil society were permitted to operate if their aims and goals were consistent with regime’s agenda. The public space was controlled by the regime and any opposition to the government or Oppositional-Resistance forms of civil society were suppressed or dismissed as enemies of the state. The false-liberalism and the end of Bourguiba’s rule presented an opportunity for an opening in civil society. However, Ben Ali, using the threat of radical or political Islam, ensured pluralism did not develop. He used the same threat throughout his rule which meant that contesting the government through civic action remained effectively criminalised. National cohesion was gained by fostering tacit consensus. Salamé points to how national unity has been a cloak for authoritarianism (1994:4-6) while Sadiki describes it as a straightjacket that that “has historically compromised pluralism and plurality” (2008:113). Furthermore, the ethno-nationalism created during independence “lacked a democratic imagery” (Sadiki, 2008:118). With the exception of the national organisation, prior to the revolution, Tunisian civil society was not entirely autonomous and therefore could not effectively challenge or constrain the state from a fully independent stance. Instead, their activity was constrained by the state because it was not sufficiently separate from the state. Therefore, civil society could perform a limited oppositional function, but not a truly democratic function. As far as can be ascertained, the patrimonial nature of the regime and influence of authoritarianism was reflected in civil society’s political culture. There was mistrust and scepticism of the government and RCD due to civil society’s experience with government manipulation tactics.
Civil society held an unclear position towards Islam as organisations like LTDH would have shown no prejudice towards Islamists and defended human rights of Tunisian regardless of political views. However, state-imposed secularism and the suppression of Islamism meant that all organisations had to appear secular as Islamist organisations would not have been permitted to exist under Ben Ali’s rule, with the exception of pre-schools run by Imams to teach Arabic through study of the Quran.

What makes Tunisian civil society unique, however, is the manner in which it’s continuous evolution, which began prior to colonialism, survived through French occupation, and then became a vital part of nationalist struggle. In post-independence Tunisia, civil society might have been weakened and depleted – through arrests, exile of key figures, and was heavily constrained by harsh authoritarian state repression – but it was never completely destroyed. Although it existed to serve the regime and appeared as a façade of liberalisation, it was organised and nationally networked as opposition groups, at home or in exile, were connected. This meant that it was somewhat prepared for the revolution. The following chapter explains in depth civil society’s unique role in the revolution and transition. Indeed, activists who had gained experience from operating in a restricted and co-opted civil society were vital at the start of the revolution. For example, the UGTT existed nationwide, but while the higher ranks were co-opted and close to the party-state, they were still connected to regional branches who had greater autonomy. Also, experienced activists who had been forced underground or abroad were prepared.
Chapter Five – Civil Society Activity in the Revolution and Transition Period

1. Introduction

This chapter examines the vital role of Tunisian civil society in the democratic transition. Furthermore, the political culture of Tunisia's civil society is evaluated by addressing its character, evolution, and contribution to the transition. The history of civil society in Tunisia, established in Chapter Four, serves as a platform for this chapter’s detailed discussion of the revolution and subsequent transition. Tunisia's pre-revolution government, albeit a liberalised autocracy bolstered by sustained economic success and protected by an inflated security apparatus, appeared politically stable. Tunisia had no history of violent or revolutionary transformation, instead “reform, not revolution, was the core demand of Tunisian nationalists from the Young Tunisians through the Neo-Destour” (Alexander, 2010:111). Hibou argues “the myth of "reform" has been used in Tunisia to disguise from the world the deepening corruption, nepotism and stagnation of a one-party state, dominated by what is, in effect, a president-for-life” (Applebaum, 2007). However, the bottom-up protests that culminated into the revolution still took the world by surprise (Gana, 2013:1).

This chapter tells the story of the revolution and consequent transition, until the new government was formed after the 2014 elections, and identifies the agency and the role played by civil society. This chapter demonstrates that Tunisia has politically moved from authoritarianism to post-authoritarianism and is in the process of transitioning towards democracy. Additionally, civil society has played an active role in the revolution and transition due to Tunisia's historic tradition of civil society activism and the political weight organisations such as the UGTT hold in influencing state decisions, as established in Chapter Four. This chapter expands on sub-national civil society activism, through the role of regional UGTT branches in mobilising and organising protests both during the 2008 Gafsa uprising and at the outset of the 2011 revolution.

2. Bloody Roots

The 2008 Gafsa uprising demonstrates that civil society was active and, in the regional ranks, took an oppositional stance even when the co-opted central or head offices were too constrained by the authoritarian regime to take such a position. The
roots of the revolution can be traced to this expression of Oppositional-Resistance civil society activity. The uprising was a series of protests and riots in the Mining Basin due to levels of high regional unemployment, the worsening economic situation, and the corrupt recruitment processes of the Gafsa Phosphate Company (CPG). In January 2008, CPG, the major employer in the mining region, opened a call for applications. Residents held that the recruitment process was nepotistic, as over 60 positions were offered to citizens from a neighbouring governorate, the hometown of the Gafsa governor and his two cousins- the CPG president and the director of the local chemical factory (Bakchich16, 2008). Subsequently, four unemployed graduates went on hunger strike when their names were not included in the list of accepted applicants. This was followed by a peaceful procession by hundreds of high-school students, trade unionists, unemployed people and their families and a one-hour sit-in opposite the CPG head office in Redeyef, one of the four major mining cities in Gafsa (La Riposte17, 2008). Regional UGTT members and leaders were active in organising the uprising, while LTDH Gafsa section leaders were active alongside demonstrators and “were sometimes able to serve as mediators in the negotiations with the local authorities” (Gobe, 2011:19). This level of CSO coordination and cooperation demonstrates the existence of tolerance and trust between different organisations, criteria of civility.

These protests continued sporadically until July 2008. Security and military forces responded heavily by firing live rounds at protesters, injuring 26 and fatally wounding two on 6th June (Nawaat, 2009). Information surrounding the Gafsa uprising remains limited due to media blackouts and authoritarian constraints, therefore some details remain unclear. However, these events demonstrate that while oppositional civil society activism existed in the regions, it was largely covered up by the regime. Due to lack of access and information opacity, regional civil society activism remained understudied in the literature on Tunisian civil society. A sycophantic report from the state-owned La Presse newspaper on 11th April 2008 stated that protesters were pro-regime, that they were marching in support of Ben

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16 This article was censored on its original website but is available at http://tunisie.tumblr.com/post/33088735/gafsa-la-rebelle-est-en-%C3%A9bullition (Accessed 28/1/16).
Ali, were thanking him for initiating measures to improve the environment in the mining basin region, and were in support of his re-election in 2009\(^\text{18}\).

In contrast, political prisoner Boubaker Akrem told Aljazeera that “Protests were censored, there was no media and no Facebook, and people were scared to tell their stories because the regime was too strong” (Moshiri, 2011). As reports surrounding the Gafsa riots were spread on Facebook, the regime responded by blocking the site for two weeks. The extent of the online repression was reflected in the 2009 Freedom House Internet freedom index which ranked Tunisia lower than Iran and China.\(^\text{19}\) Tunisian CSO and news blog Nawaat reported that, between April and June 2008, 300 people were arrested across Gafsa including labourers, teachers, trade unionists, members of the Movement of Families of Striking Miners, and human rights activists. Many of the detainees were tortured, violated, and had family members threatened. Another 150 people were arrested in Redeyef in June and July after demonstrations while at least 200 people were prosecuted in connection with the protests. Some were given eight-year prison sentences after unfair trials where defence lawyers were not permitted to present their cases or medical evidence of torture (Nawaat, 2009). UGTT pressuring the government to release those arrested during the protests demonstrates a degree of civil society independence and its performance of the role of ‘protecting from despotism and opposing the authoritarian state’ function of civil society à la Paine. The consequent release of union activist Adnane Hajji proves the success of UGTT pressure in influencing state decision making.

3. \textbf{La Révolution}

The revolution occurred because the economic based social contract between Ben Ali and Tunisians had been broken. High levels of state corruption and unemployment led to calls for freedom and dignity. In the immediate months and years after the revolution, various opinion-based works have been published (see Bettaïeb, 2011) leaving the narrative of the revolution and a consensus of the events not entirely agreed upon. However, the act of self-immolation by street vendor Mohamed La Presse (2008) ‘Marche populaire de soutien au Président Ben Ali à Gafsa’ (republished on All Africa) http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200804110902.html (Accessed 4/6/2014).

Bouazizi on December 17th 2010, outside the governorate office in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid to protest against police interference and a lack of economic opportunities certainly sparked the revolution. The sudden and widely unexpected event was an act of defiance against the Tunisian state’s undignified treatment of its people. Feeding on local anger over high unemployment rates and a lack of political and socio-economic freedom, the Tunisian revolution would eventually claim 338 lives in the violent demonstrations where police and protesters clashed (Ajmi, 2012).

Although the early stages of the revolution were the result of individuals coming together in near spontaneous action, from the unemployed and working classes in the interior regions to equally disappointed lawyers, doctors, and middle classes from the coastal cities, the overthrow of Ben Ali was driven to its conclusion by organised civil society. The protests in response to Bouazizi’s suicide demonstration did not spread like wildfire, as a romantically constructed narrative suggests. Yet civic activism has been credited as a major factor in Ben Ali’s downfall, particularly as military and foreign powers were apparently not involved. CSOs, which had become accustomed to state repression, collectively mobilised to form a protest movement against the heavy-handed response of the regime. The focus on opposition to the regime and the demand for rights united diverse groups around the common objectives of *khubz, hurriya, karama watanya* (bread, freedom, national dignity). “Tunisia’s “spirit of solidarity” signalled the start of the revolution and the starting point for freedom of association and institutional reform for civil society activity” (Deane, 2013:5). Furthermore, Deane attributes the effectiveness of Tunisian CSOs as revolutionary actors to their homogeneity.

“Despite regime regulations and repression, Tunisia’s civil society groups benefited from the relatively cohesive, tolerant make-up of Tunisian society, a society free from ethnically driven conflict. Historically, economic cleavages proved the most pervasive cause of social conflict in Tunisia leading to the revolution” (Deane, 2013: 8).

The UGTT played a fundamental role in the Revolution through organising and co-ordinating demonstrations which represented ‘grassroots’ involvement. From the outset, after Bouazizi’s self-immolation, local trade unions were echoing his sentiments of social and economic injustice. On 24th December, when police opened
fire on protesters in Menzel Bouzaienne, the UGTT disseminated news that two protesters had been fatally wounded. Major protests were held in Sfax, Kairouan, and Ben Guerdane on December 25th, then in the capital Tunis on 27th next to the UGTT headquarters in downtown Tunis. On December 28th, the regime acknowledged the situation when Ben Ali addressed the nation in a television broadcast, warning that protests are unacceptable and will negatively impact the economy. Ben Ali criticises the "use of violence in the streets by a minority of extremists" and says the law will be applied "in all firmness" to punish the “thugs” responsible for the riots (Rifai, 2011). Ben Ali later tried to pacify protests with concessions, in addition to dismissing the governors of the Sidi Bouzid, Jendouba, and Zaghouan governorates. He also dismissed the ministers of communication, trade and handicrafts, and religious affairs for reasons related to the uprising, the Arabiya news channel reported. Meanwhile, local union activists informed international news channels of their situation on the ground. UGTT management levels authorised the regional sections of Sfax, Kairouan and Tozeur to organise strikes (Piot, 2011), and subsequently UGTT leadership called for a general strike on 6th January.

The protests were initially against corruption and demanding better economic opportunities. However, when the regime responded heavy-handedly, the nature of the protests altered to demanding political freedom, regime change, and an end to Ben Ali’s rule in favour of a representative government. This occurred between 8-12th January after the killings in Kasserine and Thala by masked gunmen who shot at protesters from rooftop, killing 22 people and injuring approximately 200 (Ryan, 2013a). UGTT leadership changed its mediating stance and fully supported the protest movement, calling for another general strike on 11th January. When the third general strike was called on 14th January, thousands took to the streets of the capital. Protesters gathered outside the feared Ministry of Interior on the central Avenue Habib Bourguiba to demand that Ben Ali stand down, famously chanting Dégage (get out). This marked the fall of the Ben Ali regime, as he fled to Saudi Arabia the same evening.

Similarly to UGTT, the Tunisian national lawyers association (ONAT) played a crucial role in the revolution. Under the Ben Ali regime, the judicial system remained under the control of the executive whose “influence over the judiciary persisted due to the failure to adopt long-awaited reforms of the judiciary” (Human Rights Watch, 2013).
However, Gobe (2010) points to growing discontent amongst lawyers from 2000 onwards. Lawyers who were not loyal to the regime and opposed the system were arrested and the ease with which their protests were suppressed meant their politicisation and mobilisation failed to destabilise the system. The judiciary was co-opted but ONAT was able to work against the system. It became a limited space for dissent and “one of the few institutions of civil society that has managed to preserve its autonomy and independence” (Gobe, 2010: 338). Gobe adds that it was “one of the only areas where politics can be expressed through professional demands... [and] ...an arena of political protest by default, a sort of alternative political field” (2010: 334). Using their political leverage and professional duty as defender of rights, lawyers protested against the use of governmental repression against the uprising on December 31st 2010. This was significant as it meant that elites, in addition to the youth and the working class, were joining the revolution. The mobilisation of ONAT contributed to bestowing legitimacy and credibility on the protesters’ demands and the revolutionary process, by demonstrating that grievances with the regime cut across socio-economic cleavages to resonate with the middle class and the wider population. This sentiment was reinforced when the lawyers’ protests were also subjected to police brutality (Ryan, 2010). Tunisian Blogger, Lina Ben Mhenni, argues that the 300 lawyers, who protested in front of the Court of Justice in solidarity with Sidi Bouzid, criticising the government, and asking the president to leave, represented a turning point in the revolution (Ben Mhenni, 2010). On 6th January 201120, 95 per cent of Tunisia's 8,000 lawyers participated in an ONAT-organised strike in protest against beatings they said they received from police at sit-ins in Tunis and other towns in the previous week and violence by security services against protesters.

Diwan (2012) addresses the numerous factors surrounding the important role of middle classes in the Arab uprisings, arguing that the middle class, who were vital in helping Arab autocrats maintain their legitimacy, could no longer be co-opted. Economic liberalisation in the 1990s led to a market oriented middle class and greater inequality led to the development of a wealthy Arab 1% while insufficient job creation and high unemployment amongst educated youth created suitable

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conditions for uprising. Middle class youth, rather than hardened Islamists, leading the Arab uprisings (2012:6) support his theory.

No independent press existed until after the revolution, only foreign press who worked with CSOs. Therefore, citizen journalism, blogging and cyber-activism as well as investigative journalist CSOs such as Nawaat, were pivotal in the revolution. The regime recognised their influence when bloggers Slim Amamou and Azyz Amamy, were arrested on 6th January21. While journalists were surveyed by the regime, social media could spread information from Sidi Bouzid, initially, and other protest locations then upload the information to international media outlets such as Al Jazeera and France 24. In particular, Al Jazeera's coverage and broadcasting of citizen generated media in the form of mobile phone video uploads from protesters in Tunisia helped spread awareness. Lynch adds that “Al Jazeera has played a vital, instrumental role in framing this popular narrative by its intense, innovative coverage of Tunisia and its explicit broadening of that experience to the region” (2011). Cyberattacks from hacker activist group Anonymous crashed the websites of the Tunisian Stock Exchange, the Ministry of Industry, the President, and the Prime Minister (Kushner, 2014). Anonymous are not Tunisian but their activism inspired students who responded by protesting the following day in cities across the country.

The importance of social media co-ordination, however, has been over-emphasised. Wolfsfeld et al (2013) summarise the cyber-enthusiasts Vs cyber-sceptics debate regarding the importance of social media in uprisings but argue that analysis of political context should take precedence and social media should be viewed as a dependent variable. Social media is only one channel of communication and just one aspect of the protest movements. Norris notes that “structural factors, such as corruption, hardship, and repression” were the overriding causes of the uprising (2012: 5). Furthermore, the same social networks that may contribute to empowering citizens, may also be used against them for control and repression (Benkirane, 2012).

Civic action played a significant role in Ben Ali’s downfall and pressure from a re-emerging and new civil society has continued to ensure reforms are undertaken. Deane describes a ‘new social capital’ of “social networks and associated norms of

reciprocity created by activists and organisations, in the capital and the interior, united in their opposition to the Ben Ali regime” (2013:15). Opposition politicians under Ben Ali were also members of major, legal CSOs such as the Tunisian League of Human Rights (LTDH), the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (AFTD), the Tunisian Association for Struggle against Torture (ALTT), the National Committee for Liberties in Tunisia (CNLT), and UGTT. For example, throughout his career, Mustafa Ben Jaafar remained an oppositional political figure through the Democratic Socialist Party and later the Democratic Forum of Labour and Liberty (FDTL) a.k.a Ettakatol, one of the few legal opposition parties under Ben Ali, but he also held membership in the UGTT and LTDH. In addition, Moncef Marzouki was chairman of LTDH and later ran for the presidency against Ben Ali in 1994, while Maya Jribi co-founded the Progressive Democratic Party and founded the Association of Research on Women and Development. However, political figures such as Hamma Hammami (leader of Worker’s party) and his wife Radhia Nasraoui (lawyer and Human rights activist) were too critical of the regime and became targets for state arrest, intimidation, and torture. Notwithstanding, the connections between the political and public space had allowed civil society to remain in existence but, in some cases, on the periphery of political life under Ben Ali. Opposition parties that avoided antagonising the regime, however, lacked the infrastructure and grassroots support and could therefore not play an influential role in the revolution. In contrast, CSOs such as the UGTT, had the networks and organisational structures to unite people from different political and economic backgrounds, and in different regions, particularly the interior. As this narrative has shown, CSOs played a role in shaping the events leading up to 14th January through demonstrations, applying pressure on the government, and UGTT-organised and lawyers’ strikes.

4. Degage

The breakthrough in a democratic transition is “the collapse of the regime and the rapid emergence of a new, democratic system” (Carothers, 2002:7). This description does not entirely apply to the Tunisian situation in which the slow 10-month process that led to the October 2011 elections did not result in a democratic system. Ben Ali and the close members of the ruling Trabelsi family fled, but the RCD state-party was yet to be disbanded. Members of the regime stayed in government and tried to

control the aftermath of the revolution and Ben Ali’s departure. Technocratic Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi tried to assume the presidency but protests forced him to defer to the legal interpretation of the constitution that the Speaker of the Lower House, Fouad Mebazaa, was entitled to take the vacancy (Murphy, 2013: 232). This importantly prevented a power struggle and enabled a new interim government to be appointed. Ghannouchi announced the new cabinet on 17th January, which included 11 leading opposition and civil society figures among its 23 ministers (Murphy, 2013: 233). However, this was an attempt to control political unrest and ensure the RCD could retain power by incorporating the disaffected into the system and implementing sufficient reforms to regain control of the country. Opposition leaders objected to the inclusion of RCD members in the unity government and further protests sustained pressure on Ghannouchi. On 22nd January, approximately 2000 police officers, calling for better working conditions and a new union and seeking to disassociate from Ben Ali’s repressive regime, joined the thousands of civilian protesters who were calling for the complete removal of all RCD members from the interim government.23 The following day, members of the ‘Liberation caravan’, who had travelled from different parts of the Sidi Bouzid governorate, broke the night curfew and joined the continuing protests against former RCD ministers who were remaining in government.24

In response to these protests, on 24th January politicians created the ‘Council of the Defence of the Revolution’. Formed by 12 leading opposition parties and members of UGTT, ONAT, LDTH and the Association of Judges, the council was tasked with overseeing the interim government and ensuring that reforms continued to be made.25 Tunisia’s interim government promptly reformed state laws by encouraging greater civic participation and the creation of new political parties and civic organisations. Realising pressure from civil society and the wider population, which became progressively more organised, Ghannouchi increasingly surrendered control of the process until 27th February when he and all ministers who had served in Ben Ali governments, Ahmed Najib Chebbi, Ahmed Brahim, Elyes Jouini, Afif Chelbi and


Mohamed Nouri Jouini announced their resignation. Beji Caid Essebsi was appointed prime minister by Mebazaa the same day. In further reforms, the interim government established the Higher Authority for the Realization of Revolutionary Objectives, Political Reform and the Democratic Transitions on 18th February 2011 (Nouria, 2011). This body “instituted new laws of association, providing a number of positive protections for NGOs” (Deane, 2013:12).

An announcement was made in early March that the RCD would be formally dissolved, “thereby eliminating the key institutional bases of the ancien regime” (Murphy, 2013: 234). Following this, the Islamist Ennahda party was legalised on 11th March marking significant democratic changes. Doubts remained whether the ‘old guard’ of the RCD had been entirely removed. Prime Minister Essebsi was an RCD member and had served in Bourguiba’s cabinet, but not Ben Ali’s. Essebsi dissolved political police and security apparatus, “a central demand by protesters and political forces, thus building national consensus” (Paciello, 2011:11). It was an important break from the old regime and a step towards dismantling power structures.

The Higher Commission for Political Reform created a new electoral law for the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) elections. This included 33 constituencies, higher allocation of seats to south and south-Western constituencies to redress the regional imbalance, representation for Tunisian diaspora, 50% of nominations on lists were women and 1 had to be under 30 years old. The electoral system used closed party lists and the ‘Hare Quota with Largest Remainders’ proportional representation system to ensure no one party monopolised the election. The decision to implement an electoral system that disperses power and fosters inclusiveness proved to be important as it prevented Ennahda from dominating the assembly (see Carey, 2013). In other measures to ensure fair elections, “judges, regional governors, local officials, military personnel and former senior officials of the RCD were banned from running” (Murphy, 2013: 235). Decree-Law No. 2011-87 established an Independent High Commission for Elections (ISIE) that was tasked with ensuring that elections are democratic, pluralist, fair and transparent. ISIE rescheduled NCA elections.

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elections from 24\textsuperscript{th} July to 23 October to allow more time for preparation and voter registration. During this period CSOs actively encouraged citizen mobilisation and voter registration, while also pushing Tunisians to defend their rights. These measures represent the success of legal structures for the elections as new, democratic institutional structures are established to oversee democratic transition.

As “new democracies must be institutionalized, consolidated, and become legitimate” (Lipset, 1993:7), institutionalising the democratic process increased the new system’s legitimacy. Furthermore, Murphy notes an attempt to install civil political culture,

“The norms of civility – freedom, equality and tolerance of plurality – were woven into both the process and the legal construction, although retaining the role of the state in curbing uncivil behaviours, including those which might challenge equality on the basis of gender or religious belief and those who were implicated in the repressive incivilities of the ancien regime” (Murphy, 2013: 237).

Decree 88-2011\textsuperscript{28} provided a new legal framework that strengthened civil society, creating a new context within which organisations operate by providing clear requirements for CSOs and providing protection that was previously not afforded to them. It guaranteed the freedom to form and to join associations and to implement activities. This strengthened the role of civil society and their development and enshrined their legal independence. Article 3 of Decree 88 encourages the criteria of civil political culture: democracy, plurality, transparency, equality, and human rights, while Article 4 prevents incivility by prohibiting associations from adopting bylaws that call for “any incitement of violence, hatred, fanaticism, or discrimination of religious, racial, or regional grounds.”\textsuperscript{29} Human Rights Watch said that 2011-88 “replaced earlier repressive legislation that criminalized participation in officially unrecognized associations. It had been hailed as an important step toward bringing Tunisian national law into line with Tunisia’s obligation under international human


rights law to uphold freedom of association.” Chomiak (2012) also argues that civil society is an additional guarantor of Tunisia’s new political openness. CSOs became easier to establish, although they still had to be registered centrally. As a result, approximately 7,000 to 10,000 new associations, unions, and professional organisations were registered within 10 months of the revolution.

5. October 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections

On 18th April 2011, interim President Mebazaa issued Decree-Law 27 establishing ISIE. This commission oversaw the October 23rd elections to form a 217-member National Constituent Assembly (NCA), tasked with drafting a new constitution. Despite some infractions, 4,308,888 Tunisians voted (a 52% turnout rate) in elections that were adjudged to have been free and fair. Ennahda won 40% of the popular vote and, due to the proportional representation election system, formed a ‘troika’ government with the Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol parties. The nationwide, societal involvement in the elections suggested a “general consensus in favour of democratic politics” (Murphy, 2013: 239). 113 political parties and independents representing a wide spectrum of political ideologies registered in post-revolutionary Tunisia, in comparison to only nine registered parties who participated in elections under Ben Ali’s regime. The gender parity law, passed in April 2011, ensured that 27 percent of the seats were allocated to female candidates (Chomiak, 2012:3).

Civil society played a vital role in the election process by observing practices at polling stations across the country.

“A number of old and new civil society organisations had formed election observatories, including the Association Tunisienne pour l’integrite et la democracies des elections (L’ATIDE), Mourakiboun, Reseau Ofiya, the National Election Observatory and I-Watch Tunisia. They were joined by over 500 international observers from the National Democratic Union, the African

Union, the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Carter Centre” (Murphy, 2013: 239).

Stepan called this election a “successful democratic transition, albeit not yet a consolidation of democracy” (2012:89) having met the democratic transition criteria Linz and he prescribe; firstly “sufficient agreement” on “procedures to produce an elected government.” Secondly, a government that comes to power as “the direct result of a free and popular vote.” Thirdly, this government’s de facto possession of “the authority to generate new policies,” and fourthly, “the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure” such as military or religious leaders (Linz and Stepan, 1996:1).

The NCA elections are an indicator of transition, insofar as a new democratic government takes power, but in the Tunisian case, it does represent an entirely successful transition. Despite Stepan’s argument and application of his criteria, it is naïve and reductive, in the Tunisian case, to say after one election and less than a year after the revolution that democratic transition had successfully occurred when the deep state, established by the former regime, still largely remained. Tunisia is different to the South American or eastern European cases from which Stepan determined criteria for transition. As established in this chapter, the Tunisian uprising and revolution were internally motivated, bottom-up process insomuch as popular protests forced Ben Ali’s departure and the gradual dismantlement of the remaining regime, giving way to democratic reform. This is in contrast to cases where the national government initiated and negotiated the transition e.g. Brazil, national government under US government pressure instigated transition e.g. Chile, or the whole political system changed due to external control being relinquished e.g. Poland. O’Donnell and Schmitter emphasise they do not address revolutionary cases in order to maintain the project’s focus and normative bias (1986, Vol. 3: 10). Further work on these transitions is detailed in the Transitology literature, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. In October 2011 the Tunisian government needed to implement these electoral changes, in response to societal pressure, in order to achieve transition. This process could later lead to a democratic consolidation, rather than asserting that transition had been achieved.

Diamond (1999) identifies various criteria in the process of democratic consolidation, all of which Tunisia needed to enact to achieve transition. After the
October 2011 elections, the Tunisian government still needed to reform the police (1999: 94-95), the judiciary (1999: 111), local government (1999: 121-122), and the state bureaucracy (1999: 93-94). Corruption and malpractice (1999: 91) by the former regime also needed to be addressed. Further transition and change were required rather than consolidating democracy on the foundations of a bureaucratic, corporatist one-party state.

6. The vital role of state institutions in the early stages of transition

The Tunisian transition did not require an institution-building process after Ben Ali’s departure. The bureaucracy that the French colonial powers established remained after independence and placed a firmer grasp over the population throughout the dictatorship. Hibou noted the upholding of Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime through his party’s monopoly over state institutions, gradually becoming “a state bureaucracy regulating the whole of daily life and imposing its logic down to the smallest detail” (Hibou 2011: 110). However, it was these institutions that helped maintain stability through the revolutionary turmoil and prevented Tunisia from descending into chaos or civil war. Driven by the desire to maintain their power and positions of privilege, RCD elites ensured a swift constitutional handover of power which enabled RCD to dominate, to varying degrees, the following two interim governments (Paciello 2011: 10). This peaceful and leaderless handover of power reinforced the strength of state institutions and set the tone for a largely peaceful transition. As a result, the revolution did not immediately lead to the removal of the state's institutional foundations, which remained functional throughout and in the aftermath of the revolution. Indeed, "where in the world would you find a people who made a revolution on Friday and went back to work on Monday?"(Omri, 2013).

Tunisia’s neighbour Libya demonstrated that despite removing the Gaddafi regime, democratic prerequisites are necessary for democratic transition. The lack of institutions and pre-existing structures, amongst other factors such as the new government’s inability to control its borders or provide security for its citizens, has made its transition chaotic (Engel, 2014).

Transition could not have continued were it not for pre-existing political parties, institutional structures, and democratic culture of compromise and consensus. The importance of pre-existing institutional power and the Tunisian tradition of constitutionalism and following the legal procedures helped the transition as laws
were upheld. e.g. Ghannouchi complying with Articles 56 and 57 of the 1959 Constitution to allow Mebazaa to be President. The fact that “Tunisian politics had reverted to what it has historically known best – constitutionalism” (Murphy 2013:232) ensured that the following democratic sociotransition was peaceful. The top two layers of the Tunisian state, Ben Ali’s extended family and the RCD, were rapidly removed, but bureaucratic state institutions continued to function for a short period with an interim president and government.

The role of the also pre-existing and influential civil society that pushed the government for greater transparency ensured the constitution drafts met popular expectations. Further protests against the presence of RCD members in the cabinet resulted in the resignation of Ghannouchi and the remaining two ministers who served under Ben Ali on 27 February 2011 (Paciello 2011:10). Furthermore, in 2013, the first draft of Constitution Article 28 included an ambiguous definition of the status of women. In response, women from trade unions and organisations of all political persuasions, such as AFTD, protested against what appeared to be an infringement on women’s rights.

The period between Ben Ali’s departure in January and the October elections in 2011 was precarious for Tunisia. Although the transition period has been marked by a constant struggle to maintain a balance between breaking from old guard institutions and the “undoubted resistance of RCD elites to whole-scale change” (Murphy 2013:233), bureaucratic state institutions, active and organised civil society, the lack of military interference, and political culture of consensus, helped Tunisia navigate the uncertain process leading to elections.

7. **Interim government, the constitution drafting process and the 2011-2014 interregnum period.**

The constitution drafting process was a fragile time for Tunisia where the transition could have been de-railed and the newly elected entity could have used their democratic legitimacy to reinstate authoritarianism. However, a “spirit of solidarity” (Deane, 2013) and a desire for political consensus saw the country make strides away from dictatorship.

Civil society utilised the new freedoms it was afforded to positively influence the constitution drafting process. The 1959 Constitution guaranteed the freedom of
political conscience; Article 5 emphasised the principle of pluralism and Article 8 guaranteed freedom of opinion and expression. However, the Ben Ali police-state had suppressed these rights and forced the population to accept only the state-prescribed one-party inclusive secular republicanism. After the revolution, Tunisians could enjoy these rights which were further guaranteed in decrees 2011-87 and 88 issued by the interim president. Regarding the constitution, civil society groups were active in voicing their demands and disapproval against articles they considered unsatisfactory. For example, OpenGovTN’s campaign #7ell (Open Up), which was adopted by a number of NCA members during the constitutional drafting process, led to pressure resulting in the access to information laws (Decree 21) and Article 62 of the Constitution which states “Public information is the rule, secrecy is the exception” (Keskes, 2012). L’Association Tunisienne de Transparence dans L’énergie et Les Mines (ATTEM) mobilised 14 CSOs focused on transparency in natural resource governance to work with the head of the NCA energy committee in the drafting of articles 12, 13, and 136 which ensure “transparency and accountability in the governance of Tunisia’s resources” (Karam, 2014) and that part of natural resource revenues are allocated to regional development. Al Bawsala played an important oversight role in enhancing transparency during NCA plenary sessions by “publishing NCA documents and posting on social media the attendance records of deputies and their individual votes.”

Outside of the NCA, CSOs also continued to play an active role in the transition and fulfil an anti-despotism function in pressuring for employment and judicial reform. A report by Foundation for the Future (FFF) notes that many of the newly created, post-revolution organisations, were “heavily involved in the democratic transition” (2013:11). The report cites unions - such as L’Confédération Generale des Travaileurs Tunisiens (CGTT), the UGTT, the Union of Tunisian Judges (SMT), the Union of administrative Judges (UJM) and the Free Union of Industrialists and Traders (UICL) - and associations working for democracy, citizen action, transparency and freedom such as the Tunisian League for Citizenship and Touensa. Unemployed youth associations, e.g. Association of Young Tunisian Democrats (JDT), maintained pressure on the government for employment and development while CSO networks


Civil society efforts during the constitution drafting process and pressure for overall reform created a public space that became an arena for debate, reconciliation, and learning to accept difference. Al Bawsala helped to provide this space by organising debates between politicians and members of the public. A by-product of this opening was that action and direction for civil society during this phase became incohesive. Having worked together as a unified actor against Ben Ali, the free and open public space in which civil society could now operate lent itself to contradictions and discord. This left individual CSOs searching for their relative positions within this social habitus (Bourdieu, 1985). Some actors within civil society continued to act in a Gramscian, ‘against the state’ manner while others looked to work with the state. Despite this struggle to define themselves and their purpose, Tunisian civil society had a positive impact on the political transition and performed a collective pro-democracy function by holding the state to account. Nevertheless, civil society became a reflection of the national political situation: polarised.

7.1. Religious-Secular polarisation of Tunisian society

This subsection demonstrates that the polarisation which existed within the political and civil society spaces reveals a degree of political incivility. The end of government oppression meant that civil society and political parties were no longer forced to adopt the government’s state-secularist agenda. In reaction, Tunisians exercised the newfound freedom afforded to them which resulted in expressions of freedom to (positive liberty) and pluralism. However, the expansion of freedom and pluralism led to a division as society learnt to accept the diversity of opinions in socio-political matters. This division largely manifested itself as a polarisation between those who wanted religion to be entirely in the private space away from state control and those

34 Lam Echamal homepage. Available at http://www.lamechaml.org/qui_sommes_nous.php
who favoured the inclusion of Islam in the new constitution: secularists and Islamists respectively. This secular-religious polarisation in society, which also manifested in civil society, confirms the ‘intolerance of opposition’ legacy from the previous regime remained and that civil society was not entirely civil or democratic. A mistrust in the intentions of the political other led to a lack of tolerance and equality. Civil society was unable to entirely fulfil a democratising role because not all criteria of civil political culture were shared across civil society actors. The polarisation did not, however, prevent civil society from performing an effective oppositional function that pressured and scrutinised the government and NCAs progress therefore continuously driving the transition. This subsection addresses how the process of Tunisia confronting this social polarisation was an essential part in maintaining transition towards democracy and democracy learning (Sadiki, 2015) by developing trust and tolerance in harmony with freedom and pluralism while agreeing in equality for all.

Following the 2011 NCA election, the winning Islamist party Ennahda formed a ‘troika’ coalition with two centrist parties. Yet, mistrust and suspicion existed throughout the Tunisian population regarding whether Ennahda’s election victory was the first step in a long-term project with the intention of Islamising Tunisia. This period was fraught with delays and disputes over the constitution and charges by the secular opposition that Ennahda was packing the bureaucracy with its followers (Brown, 2014). Secular civil society groups played an effective oversight role in the constitution drafting process as they worked towards ensuring Islamic law was not forced into the constitution. For example, the first draft article on blasphemy (Article 3) called for insults on the sacred to be punishable; “The state guarantees freedom of religious belief and practice and criminalises all attacks on that which is sacred”. Concerned that this would lead to reduced freedom of speech, civil society drew public attention to the risks of including such an article in the constitution. In response, Ennahda removed ‘criminalisation’ and takfir (accusation of apostasy) was prohibited. The previously mentioned civil society opposition to the inclusion of complementarity of women to men also led to the phrasing of Article 28 being changed to equality. Ennahda eventually compromised and confirmed it would not impose Sharia as the main source of legislation.
Stepan argued that Tunisia adhered to the “Twin Tolerations” relationship between religion and politics during the 2011 elections, whereby religious citizens accept democratically elected officials of the state to govern and legislate. In turn, the state must permit religious citizens to express their views and values (Stepan, 2012). “In a democracy, religion need not be “off the agenda,” and indeed, to force it off would violate the second toleration” (Stepan, 2000). This may have been the case in the election but secular civil society still needed to exhibit tolerance towards the presence of Islamists in politics, therefore religion was not ready to be removed from the agenda. As an Islamist and leading party of the troika, Ennahda were under greater pressure than other parties to prove their democratic credentials and ability to compromise with other political actors. The post-election, constitution-writing period was marked as a time of reconciliation between the secular and Islamist differences in Tunisia’s national identity. This societal divide also manifested in civil society as groups supported different ideologies and parties. Understanding the difference between social and political activism is an aspect of a democracy learning process (Sadiki, 2015). In addition, civil political culture is not an inherent civil society characteristic but is developed through the democracy learning process. As theories of democracy assert, civil society is a contributor to democratic transition and, as such, also needs to exhibit greater civility. A further aspect of understanding and measuring democratisation is assessing the extent to which civil political culture is imbedded.

Donker (2013) addresses the difference between social and political Islamic activism. Under Bourguiba and Ben Ali, social expression of Islam was prevented via state repression and societal exclusion of religion while Islam in politics was branded a threat to the Tunisian economic model. The Ennahda election victory shattered this myth and highlighted “the necessity for Tunisian society to reconcile its effective social and political pluralism not only with categories of Western modernisation, but also its Muslim-Arab identity” (Merone and Cavatorta, 2013: 254). Ennahda had accepted democracy in the 1980s and favoured embracing a civil state; which led to

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36 Transitology emphasises the importance of transitional justices but says little about social reconciliation. O'Donnell and Schmitter, ‘Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies’ (1986: 28-36) addresses the importance of transitional justice at state level, e.g. trials for perpetrators of state-ordered injustice, violence, or rights violations, but not at the social level of accepting difference political and religious views between people in the same populous. Grosescu’s work offers an additional critique of transitology’s overgeneralisations by concluding that “the comparative analysis of southern European, Latin American and eastern European cases indicates that there is no clear link between transitional justice and democratisation” (2013:6).
disagreement with pro-Sharia Salafists (Merone and Cavatorta 2013: 255), yet Ennahda’s intentions and credentials were constantly questioned. Indeed, Tunisians Leftists, such as the Democratic Patriots’ Movement, remained suspicious of whether Ennahda, in conjunction with Islamist CSOs, were pursuing an ‘Islamist project’: with the eventual goal of turning Tunisia into an Islamic state.

The aftermath of the revolution allowed previously marginalised people and suppressed opinions into the political sphere. With the former RCD at one end, Salafists represent the other end of the spectrum and are an important political and social actor. Furthermore, it also was an important part of the reconciliation for Tunisians to accept that Salafism is the product of both external and domestic factors. Merone and Cavatorta (2013) emphasise the indigenous origins of Tunisian Salafism in contrast to the assumption that the ideology was entirely imported after the revolution but, in addition, that it represents disenfranchisement with the dictatorship. When Ennahda embraced democratic practices and ideals, members disaffected with this approach formed the Tunisian Islamic Front (TIF) in 1986 (Torelli, Merone, and Cavatorta, 2012:148). These members were drawn from those who had been either jailed or engaged in jihad in Bosnia or Afghanistan/Pakistan. Tunisia’s Salafi-Jihadists returned after the revolution and others were released from prison in amnesty. Ennahda, which “represent a new form of political Islam” (Torelli, 2012: 6), was a unique case of being an Islamist party that was playing a mediating role between Salafists and secularists. Ennahda had to dispel secularist fears of using Sharia as a source of legislation, while being the only actor capable of negotiating with Salafists (Torelli, 2012: 11-13). Rashid Ghannouchi, who was a compromising democratic Islamist and the focal point of Ennahda, was key to this mediation. “Ghannouchi, whose experience in exile during the Ben Ali regime, in particular, appears to have fostered a commitment to principles of liberal democracy and pluralism” (Carey, 2013:2). Ennahda’s attempt to moderate and include Salafists in the political process demonstrates an attempt at pluralism and accepting difference rather than exclusion. Ennahda tried to integrate Salafists into the political process as Ghannouchi had hoped they would become “moderate over time” (Merone and Cavatorta, 2013: 267). Ennahda legalised the Salafist Jabhat al-Islah party on 29th March 2012 as a representation of political pluralism, to mobilise ultraconservatives away from jihadi-Salafism, and as an opportunity to embed Salafism in the political process. Merone and Cavatorta argue that the political system needs to integrate
Salafist demands, despite their incoherence, as the transition process will be strengthened by ensuring the disaffected are recognised (2013: 268). Al-Islah developed a political programme that addresses social, economic and cultural issues while referencing respect for pluralism, alternating power, and non-violence. However, their program represents incivility as Islam takes precedence over liberalism, the personal status code would be abolished, and the state would enforce only what religion has determined to be right (Torelli, Merone, and Cavatorta, 2012:147).

Secular-Islamist tensions were expressed prior to the October 2011 NCA elections when Nessma television channel broadcast the animated film *Persepolis*, in which God is depicted as an old man. Perhaps this was a deliberate move by Nessma to test the limits of freedom and media censorship in the run up to the elections. Angered by this scene which they consider blasphemous, thousands of conservative Tunisians marched in defence of public Islam as they felt *laïques* (seculars) were damaging Tunisia’s Islamic identity (Donker, 2013: 211). Some protests turned violent as 50 demonstrators were arrested and Nessma chairman Nabil Karoui’s home was firebombed. Karoui was later fined 2,400 dinars (£964) for "troubles to the public order" and "offence to good morals" (The Guardian, 2012). This incident demonstrated that freedom of expression was not unlimited with regards to religious matters. US Ambassador Gordon Grey added that the conviction “raises serious concerns about tolerance and freedom of expression in the new Tunisia” (Fisher, 2012).

Part of Tunisia's social reassessment and subsequent need for reconciliation was the way Islamism had entered the political and public discourse. Public piety and levels of religious charity and education increased. The opening of political and social spheres meant Islamists were visible and active: “more women began to wear the headscarf, more men started growing a beard and some started wearing *jalabas* – previously impossible in public. Mosques opened between prayers, religious classes started and attendance of mosque prayers rose markedly in the first period after the revolution” (Donker, 2013: 211). Furthermore, use of Islam became more prevalent in public debates, including televised debates that gave Salafists a platform (see Merone and Cavatorta, 2013:252-253).

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37 A long loose-fitting unisex traditional North African outer robe.
Similar to the UGET/UGET clashes in the 1980s, the expression of Islam in universities focused attention on wearing the face-covering *niqab* in public institutions. Forbidden under Ben Ali, the *niqab* became an issue of freedom of religion and identity. These debates developed between those who believed in maintaining the secular character of higher education versus those who felt that radical secularists keeping elite positions e.g. the university dean, represented maintaining the old regime (Donker, 2013: 217). Clashes at universities coincide with the re-emergence of the UGTE in the wake of the revolution. UGET circles believed that “supporters of the Ennahda Movement remember very well that they managed to make their presence felt in the political arena during the 1980s and early 1990s, primarily through their activities within the university” (Zabas, 2012). The Manouba University demonstrations were a turning point but highlighted the fracture in Tunisian society. Salafists joined protests and threatened staff over the right for female students to wear the *niqab* and the right for prayer space which spokesman for the Salafi students, Mohammed Bakhti, said is allowed in the United States, Britain and Germany (Middle East Online, 2012). However, replacing the red and white Tunisian flag with the black, Salafist flag that bears the *shahada* 38 was controversial in Tunisia, especially in the midst of the polarised context which spread from Manouba to other universities as it mixed political issues with personal matters which “offended most Tunisians” (Mamelouk, 2012). Mamelouk summarises of their difference as follows: “Secularists view the Salafis as long-bearded closed-minded intolerant religious zealots and in return the Salafists view secularists as atheistic Francophiles who are anti-Arab and anti-Islam” (2012). It was this unwillingness to accept difference that characterised the societal polarisation.

While some Islamists civil society groups focused on teaching or charity work and ensuring freedom of expression, CSOs that aimed to implement political or political-religious agendas appeared to represent incivility that could threaten the transition. The issue was the confusion and ambiguity between two types of Islamist activism; one aimed at societal change and the other aimed at politically influencing post-revolutionary Tunisia. Indeed, Donker notes that “sometimes board members were Nahdaoui (members of the Ennahda party) but they would always explicitly state that their organization was independent from the party” (2013: 212).

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38 The Islamic declaration of faith: *there is no God but God and Muhammad is His prophet.*
Despite Ennahda's efforts to appear moderate and committed to democratisation, civil society was divided along secular and Islamist lines. The ensuing dynamics between the two polarised camps suggested a relationship of intolerance and mistrust, which was exacerbated through violence. Mongi Rahoui, head of the Democratic Patriots' Movement, says he and other outspoken politicians experienced threats in what he viewed as a deliberate campaign by Ennahda to silence dissent (Ryan, 2013b). These threats were carried out by the Leagues for the Protection of the Tunisian Revolution (LPR); an example of violent incivility that was present in civil society. Formed in 2011 while Essebsi was interim Prime Minister and granted legal status in June 2012, the LPR “claiming to fight corruption and old-regime remnants” (Patel & Belghith, 2013). However, these neighbourhood groups, who were often Ennahda members and former political prisoners under Ben Ali, used aggression and violence to support an Islamist cause. They were accused of trying to intimidate opposition parties and incurred hostility from more secular types. In December 2012 the LPR violently broke up a trade-union rally\(^{39}\) while a pro-Ennahda rally in February 2013 contained many league members.\(^{40}\)

The attack on the American Embassy led by Salafi extremists in September 2012 was the first incident in a series of events that altered Ennahda’s relationship with Jihad-Salafists. The destruction clearly demarcated what were considered acceptable levels of protest or political expression. The attacks were a response to a US made video that deprecates Islam but became a decisive moment in the relationship between Ennahda and Salafists, with Ghannouchi openly declaring that (Jihadi) Salafists were a threat to the nation (Donker, 2013: 220).

Freedom and pluralism existed which maintained an active civil society that could express themselves and affect NCA proceedings but the lack of trust, tolerance and equality in civil society meant that civility was only partially developing. The political assassinations in 2013 were a turning point in both Tunisia’s transition and the development of political civility.

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7.2. Assassinations and Political deadlock in 2013

Civil society protests became progressively less frequent from 2011 onwards, however, people continued to take to the streets when crises occurred. In response to the assassinations of leftist opposition politicians Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi, on 25 July 2013, protests were held against Ennahda\textsuperscript{41} for the country’s security failings and the perception that the Islamist party’s ruling coalition had been too lenient on hard-line Islamists. These protests and calls for Ennahda to step down led to a political deadlock where members of the NCA froze their membership and NCA activities were officially suspended, meaning no progress was made on the constitution. Ennahda further distanced themselves from extremists, yet their apparent leniency on Jihadi-Salafism meant other political actors and the general public lost faith in their ability to govern and maintain security. The assassinations, however, had an important effect of unifying the nation. Similar to the 2011 elections, it highlighted the vast majority’s preference for a peaceful transition, regardless of ideological difference, and identified who was against democracy.

7.3. National dialogue and Ennahda’s step down

The four largest and oldest CSOs, the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), the Tunisian Bar Association (ONAT), the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Crafts (UTICA) and UGTT, collectively also known as the ‘The Quartet’, played a vital role in overcoming this deadlock by establishing a ‘national dialogue’ (hiwar watani). The dialogue reduced political polarisation and paved the way for the Ennahda-led troika government to step down. In this process, major political party representatives were brought together to address the challenges posed by the deadlock and to negotiate agreements on how the transition could progress. This ad hoc civil society coalition was the only actor capable of securing the buy-in of all conflicting political parties, while simultaneously possessing the popular trust necessary to lead this process at such a critical juncture in the country’s democratic transition. The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the quartet in 2015 is a testament to the significance of their achievement. Frazer (2014) notes that the initial recognition of interests was a key step to trust building between participants and could lead to the success of the process.

“Some members of the Quartet were also known to be close to the opposition and, as representatives of different sections of Tunisian society, all Quartet members had a stake in the outcome of the dialogue. For these reasons, Ennahda’s leaders were sceptical that the process could lead to a fair outcome. Initial tentative discussions between the parties and the Quartet, therefore, focused largely on the Quartet’s own interests in mediating. Only once the Quartet had explicitly acknowledged its own interests could it build trust and the discussions move forward.”

Houcine Abassi, UGTT secretary general, “initiated a marathon of negotiations with representatives of political parties, civil society organizations and foreign ambassadors” (Ben Hamadi, 2015). The hours of negotiations, which he personally oversaw, included a secret meeting between opposition party Nidaa Tounes leader Beji Caid Essebsi and Rachid Ghannouchi in a Paris hotel. Prime minister of Ennahda government, Ali Larayedh, agreed to step down under the terms of the UGTT proposed roadmap which included the Islamist led government being replaced with a technocratic government to finalise the constitution and the formation of an independent electoral body to organise new legislative and presidential elections.

Ennahda relinquished power in government but only because the players in the system found a compromise that revived the process forwards towards finishing the constitution and the next round of elections. Pikard (2015) praises Ennahda for the concessions and compromises they made, including the removal of references to Sharia law, in order to ensure that a constitution could be drafted which included external and public input and satisfied the vast majority of the NCA. He also credits all Tunisian political leaders for their part in the constitution making process. Ennahda’s political action had a reconciliatory effect on a divided Tunisian society as it allayed fears from secularists that Ennahda’s political intentions were to cling to power.

Regarding the role of the UGTT, Samir Cheffi, deputy secretary-general, stated that “National dialogue and national consensus are the best solutions to solve disagreement.” Adding that Tunisian politicians had little choice but to engage in order to maintain transition, “away from making judgments about one party or another, we believe that our mission is to bring all parties closer, based on the initiative that we are proposing at the UGTT”. Comparing Tunisia to Algeria and
Egypt and noting Tunisia’s lack of economic resources, Cheffi emphasised that “the most important thing for us right now is to save the country from descending into violence” (Ryan, 2013c). Sadiki argues that the UGTT’s leading and moderating role in the National Dialogue process “has helped tone down ideologically driven divides and mutually exclusive political agendas, voices and forces” (Sadiki, 2014).

Ennahda stepping down was a major turning point in the transition and an indication of civility in the political sphere. The inclusion of disparate actors, including a major role from the quartet from civil society, demonstrates pluralism and equality. It also implies that trust has been built; trust in the quartet’s mediation of the process and the roadmap, and trust in other political actors who would establish the new technocratic government. In addition, by demonstrating that the Islamist party had put Tunisia before their party interests, it helped develop trust between Ennahda and secular liberals’ who feared the former were aiming to transform the country into an Islamic state.

7.4. New Constitution ratified and technocratic government appointed

A draft that was deemed suitable to Islamist, secularist, leftist politicians alike, in addition to civil society insofar as it did not generate major objections, was accepted in NCA on 27th January 2014. 200 assembly members voted in favour, 12 against, and 4 abstained, therefore greatly exceeding the two-thirds majority required for passage (Dreisbach, 2014). Compromises had been made throughout the two years of drafting, including the removal of references to Islamic law as a consensus was achieved. Although a constitution is only meant to establish broad concepts that the laws and decrees are left to elaborate on and the roles and rights of Tunisian CSOs are delineated in detail under Decree 88, there is a fleeting reference to civil society in the 2014 Tunisian Constitution. Article 139 mentions that “Local authorities shall adopt the mechanisms of participatory democracy and the principles of open governance to ensure broader participation by citizens and civil society...”42 Rather than guaranteeing rights to civil society, it enshrines their participation in the political process. The creation of a liberal constitution represents the establishment of a democratic institutional structure (Carothers, 2002: 7). This occurring three

years after the collapse of the old, authoritarian regime demonstrates, however, the slow pace of transition in Tunisia.

Ennahda stepping down enabled the Mehdi Jomaa\textsuperscript{43}-led technocratic government, which largely consisted of independents and technocrats, to temporarily take power, while preparing for parliamentary and presidential elections, as established in the national dialogue’s roadmap objectives. The Jomaa government represents the outcome of civil society action in creating, mediating and encouraging debate between political parties that facilitated the resolution of a political crisis. The non-partisan, caretaker government seemed to be more popular than had the Troika and did not divide Tunisian public opinion to the same extent. An opinion poll by the Sigma polling agency after Jomaa assumed office, showed that nearly 70\% percent of the public shared the view that the country “is heading in the right direction”, compared to the previous October, when only 15\% shared this view (Romdhani, 2014).

The Jomaa government oversaw a greater step towards transparency as Tunisia joined Open Government Plan (OGP). In order to qualify to join OGP, the government had to undertake reforms relating to transparency, openness and citizen participation. The 2-year national action plan, finalised in September, included the government’s commitment to include CSOs in decision-making and the OGP steering committee includes government and CSO representatives. The implementation of the action plan, which has 22 commitments related to transparency reform along most sectors, is being monitored and later evaluated by CSOs: a step that would be consolidating democracy. Further evidence that incivility and violence were not tolerated in civil society was demonstrated when the LPR was banned on May 26 2014. The group was accused of using violence to advance its political goals (Ben Said, 2014). Despite these reforms and commitments, CSOs also oversaw the implementation of the government agenda. For example, Tunisian youth CSO I-Watch\textsuperscript{44} established the ‘Jomaa Meter’\textsuperscript{45} to monitor government performance related to promises made.

\textsuperscript{43} Former Engineer for Hutchinson/Total in France and Minister of Industry in Tunisia.
\textsuperscript{44} I Watch homepage. Available at http://www.iwatch-organisation.org/ [Accessed 19/2/2014]

A second successful post-revolution election was another important indicator that Tunisia was becoming a consolidated democracy. Nidaa Tounes won a parliamentary majority with 85 of the 217 seats (39.17%) while Ennahda came second with 69 seats (31.79%), significantly less than the 89 seats (42%) they had held in the National Constituent Assembly following the 2011 elections (Martin, 2014). Nidaa’s presidential candidate, Beji Caid Essebsi, who had served in both Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, also won. In the build-up to the elections, civil society had encouraged voter registration and participation in the election process. Using their experience from 2011, civil society watchdogs and monitoring bodies ensured the election process was, once again, free and fair by designating more than 14,000 observers to supervise the elections in addition to personnel from the EU and Arab League (Chekir 2014: 4). Despite the large numbers of mobilised civil society actors monitoring polling stations, it did not prevent violations, which CSOs also noted. A report by The Tunisian Association for the Integrity and Democracy of Elections (ATIDE) criticised the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) for their poor management of the elections.46

After post-election negotiations, an inclusive coalition government was formed on 6th February 2015 and was approved by 166 of 217 members of parliament.47 The unity government including the two main parties, Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda, with two other smaller parties, Afek Tounes, and Union Patriotique Libre (UPL) and led by Prime Minister Habib Essid. Despite winning 103,000 votes and therefore 8 seats, Afek Tounes’s campaign focused on the party’s identity and unique characteristics, rather than battling the two major parties. Likewise, UPL’s 140,000 votes (16 seats) were largely gained by its promises to voters in rural and border regions (Chekir 2014: 7-8). Although part of the opposition, Popular Front’s 124,000 votes (15) ensure leftist views are represented in the national assembly. This indicates that after splits and defections in the first years after the revolution (Sadiki, 2012), the

Tunisian political party landscape began to develop character and an identity partly due to the institutionalisation of tolerance of difference, plurality, and a developing democratic culture beyond the former regime’s myth of reform. This also can be attributed to a consolidation of democracy.

Ltifi argues that comparing the 2011 to the 2014 elections shows that the polarisation was one of the community rather than political views and that Nidaa’s victory does not represent the return of the ancien regime. The Mouvement Destourien, headed by Hamed Karoui, a former prime minister during the reign of Ben Ali, and Kamel Morjane, a former foreign minister, won four seats and performed poorly in the presidential election. “The victory also represents a change from the dilemma of Islam, the key word in the 2011 elections, to a new dilemma: that of the state” (Ltifi, 2014: 4) and from political Islam to national identity. Having already been removed after the national dialogue, the electorate registered their dissatisfaction with Ennahda’s failures at moderating Jihadi-Salafists, preventing the violent acts from the LPR, and improving the faltering economy. Ltifi believes the results are a sign of Tunisia leaning “towards greater political rationalism and realism” (Ltifi, 2014: 7).

Despite the relative achievement of starting to overcome ideological polarisation, both Ltifi and Chekir (2014) recognise the significance of a lower youth turnout representing young people's dissatisfaction with the transition process, poor results in improving employment prospects, and lack of faith in political actors. Youth engagement in the political process is key for continued democratic consolidation and is another mission in which civil society could further engage.

9. Chapter Conclusion

The Revolution was not a military or palace coup but a form of grassroots, civil action in response to worsening economic conditions, blatant state corruption by the ruling family, and police-state oppression which subsequently increased as a response to popular protests. Sustained popular pressure on the government to implement reform led, in turn, to pressure on political leaders from Ben Ali to Habib Essid. This popular pressure represented an oppositional-resistance manifestation of civil society action that demonstrated a confrontational relationship between the state and civil society. Top RCD figures, such as Mohammed Ghanouchi, may have played a
role in encouraging Ben Ali to leave but the RCD was dismantled in response to continued protests. In 2013, NCA members chose to suspend their activities but Ennahda stepped down in the face of continued civil action and mediation from the Quartet, demonstrating both confrontational and co-operational relationships between the state and civil society.

The role of civil society was significant during the revolution and fundamental throughout the transition period that followed. During the revolution, civil society acted together against Ben Ali and then the remaining RCD politicians who sought to remain in power. After the revolution, newfound freedom established by the increasingly less authoritarian state in Decree 88 created a larger public space. This enabled civil society to dramatically expand and begin to perform a pro-democratic function by encouraging greater pluralism. Liberal-Associative CSOs operating in this space demonstrated democracy learning processes within organisations through increased freedom and pluralism. However, variation in ideological perspectives caused polarisation across society and shaped the manner in which CSOs interacted with each other. Mistrust and intolerance existed in relationships between CSOs with vehemently secularist or Islamist agendas.

Tunisia’s post-revolution freedom has been established in the context of an authoritarian government legacy. Political culture does not change suddenly with a revolution or elections and, as a consequence of the authoritarian legacy, the macro-level practices and discourses in Tunisian civil society have demonstrated political incivility during the democratic transition. For example, intolerance and mistrust of alternative socio-political perspectives, often regarding religion or support of political parties, has been evident. Nevertheless, civil society played a role in guiding Tunisia though the revolution and transition towards democratic consolidation.

Tunisia’s democratic prerequisites have been vital to the transition’s success. Extensive state-building procedures and programmes were not required, as major elements of a political society already existed e.g. judiciary, state bureaucracy. After Ben Ali’s departure, the Tunisian government proceeded to function effectively and the country did not descend into civil war. Although a new constitution was drafted and ratified in 2014, it was largely inspired by the 1959 constitution, a document that guaranteed individual and political freedoms but which had not been respected by the former authoritarian regime.
Despite Tunisia’s transition not being rapid or meeting the great expectations that came with the revolution, this chapter has demonstrated civil society has been present, active, and influential since the 2008 Gafsa uprising and throughout the 2010-2015 period. The 2011 elections did not immediately lead to a consolidated democracy and the transition process stopped during the 2013 deadlock. However, the civil society-led national dialogue convinced the troika to relinquish power in order to see that the transition continued. Furthermore, civil society has been active and influential throughout the transition ensuring democratic consolidation has been occurring since January 2011, not only in the aftermath of the 2011 or 2014 elections. Watchdog organisations (Al Bawsala, I-Watch, Mourikbouun) and democracy building, sensibilisation groups who have helped Tunisians transition from subjects to citizens and understand the meaning of citizenship, (CSID, JID, Touensa) had been working towards creating democracy in Tunisia since their inception.
PART III: FIELDWORK AND RESEARCH RESULTS
CHAPTER SIX – QUALITATIVE SURVEY OF MEMBERS OF TUNISIAN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

1. Introduction

This chapter addresses this thesis’ development, use, and analysis of an online, self-completion attitude survey for members of Tunisian civil society organisations (CSOs) to assess the extent to which their political culture is civil. Firstly, it covers the theoretical and methodological considerations in the designing of this positivist method, including the piloting processes and subsequent alterations. The criticisms of the survey and issues of sample size are addressed. Secondly, it addresses the stages of data analysis that were undertaken: the use of frequency tables and bar graphs produced from Bristol Online Survey (BOS) and re-coding, index creation, cross-tabulation, t-test and ANOVA correlations created from the SPSS software package.

From the small yet generalisable sample size, this chapter concludes that, after analysis of the discourse of Tunisian CSO members’ attitudes, values and beliefs, distinct characteristics of civil political culture (CPC) are evident in Tunisian civil society. While CPC is generally evident in attitudes of CSO members, the results identify variation within the surveyed CSO population. Female respondents are more likely to hold attitudes of Trust and Pluralism than males. Furthermore, when comparing responses based on ages groups and regions, ‘non-youth’ and ‘Interior region’ respondents are more likely to hold attitudes of Trust than ‘youth’ and ‘coastal’ or ‘capital’ regions. This is significant because it identifies that all criteria of civil political culture do not develop simultaneously. This survey seeks to understand the political culture of CSOs but recognises disparity will exist amongst a heterogeneous selection of the overall Tunisian population. Questions that produced inconclusive results and reflections on survey process are also acknowledged.

This chapter contributes statistical data analysis on attitudes, values and beliefs to this thesis. This creates understanding regarding the discourse manifestation of political culture while assessing its civility. This survey, like any other survey in isolation, is a ‘snapshot’ of Tunisian CSO political culture. However, it is just one of three methods, in addition to qualitative interviews and ethnographic participant observation. Therefore, this survey is a fundamental tool to understanding the attitudes, values and beliefs of Tunisian CSO members; the norms and discourses aspect of understanding political culture.
2. Hypotheses

Hypotheses are required for effective data analysis and to determine what is expected to be seen in the data. One general hypothesis was made relating to civil political culture and an additional three hypotheses relating to the demographic differences. These differences are important because political culture is not static and Tunisian civil society does not exist in a vacuum; both are responsive to regional, generational, socio-economic, and gender differences. Furthermore, CSOs are often homogenous with regards to their members, who are more or less representative of a certain group, for example JID members are mostly middle-class youth from affluent neighbourhoods in the capital (see Chapter Eight). The experiences and changes affecting gender, age, regions in post-revolution Tunisia regarding their place in society in relation to others may affect members’ rate of CPC development.

I. I expect to see evidence of civil political culture.

This thesis seeks to demonstrate whether civil political culture (CPC) is evident in Tunisian CSOs and as this survey arranges questions pertaining to the six criteria of CPC into sections, from which indexes can be created, it will demonstrate which are more evident or more strongly believed than others.

Tolerance is easier to develop and show as it can manifest itself as an almost begrudging recognition rather than a deep acceptance of the ‘other’. However, I expect to see less evidence of Trust because Tunisian citizens had lived under a dictatorship where they did not trust the government. Regarding Hibou’s description of a general ambiance of mistrust in both the regime and others in society (2006: 187), I predict Trust might require more time to develop.

I expect the discourse of CSOs to reflect the desirability of financial transparency, while they may not necessarily adhere to or practice it. This would be due to the large number of CSOs in post-revolutionary Tunisia (approximately 18,000) and the government’s inability to enforce this ruling. Furthermore, the CSO law (Decree 88) does not provide a sufficiently clear financial framework. Therefore, some CSOs fail to abide by the financial regulations either due to a lack of understanding of or

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attention to the framework, or their use of the Decree’s ambiguity to not declare funding.

Freedom may be desirable for CSO members but respondents may be selective as to who they think is deserving of freedom. Tunisia’s Personal Status Code from 1956 has enshrined gender equality and I expect to see this expressed. However, other forms of equality may not be evident as respondents may also be selective as to who they think is deserving of equality or not. These limitations of freedom and whether equality should be granted to all is evident in the polarisation that occurred between supporters of an Islamist political vision and those in favour of maintaining secularism. This political divide that manifested in society and might also be present in the public space and in the attitudes of CSO members.

I expect to see evidence of Pluralism. In contrast to the co-opted political landscape of dictatorship, in post-revolutionary Tunisia there is a plurality of voices in the political sphere while democratic processes are occurring and being installed at national level. However, CSOs may still be organised and operate with ‘strong man’ leadership styles because the delegation abilities of CSO leadership may be less prevalent due to the lack of familiarity with collaborative work.

Organisational culture of CSOs might also remain influenced by the vertical or hierarchical structures of dictatorship and CSOs operate as petit dictatorships whereby unilateral decisions are made by presidents which reflect their opinions and personality. It is equally plausible that this mode of operation is entirely rejected in a reaction against the dictatorship style of management and the new norm of operations is horizontally structured, free discussion based organisations.

II. I expect to see a difference between youth and non-youth.

Roy describes how the youth in the MENA region as changing and “feel less strongly bound to patriarchal customs and institutions that have been unable to cope with the challenges facing contemporary Middle Eastern societies” (2012:8). Indeed, the youth are credited with instigating the revolution (Ben Hassine, 2011) and factors of globalisation and Internet exposure suggest the Arab Youth does not share the values of their parents’ generation. Whether this makes the youth more or less inclined to exhibit CPC remains to be seen. However, for under 26-year-olds, the definition of youth employed in this survey, their formative years were under Ben Ali rule.
Therefore their beliefs and values may have been shaped by dictatorship rather than global influences. While they might be quicker to reject dictatorship cultures, it is also plausible that youth have adopted individualism rather than the co-operative elements required to foster CPC.

III. I expect to see a difference between men and women’s responses.

Tunisia’s Personal Status Code of 1956 is progressive in terms of rights for women, but Tunisia has remained a patriarchal society. Men may not be used to having their authority challenged, which suggests that women might show a greater affinity to democratic values.

IV. I expect to see a difference between the regions.

Interior regions are more socially conservative than the coastal or capital regions, which may demonstrate less progressive attitudes. However, social conservatism may not be contradictory to civic democratic culture. Larger urban areas, mostly found on the coast or capital may produce more individualism, while interior regions, with stronger community connections, could see greater evidence of trust and co-operation values. The historical neglect and lack of development that the interior regions have experienced might manifest in greater resentment towards government bodies and institutions.

3. Design Process

Chapter two establishes that the attitude survey questionnaire is a positivist method and outlines the use of surveys in political culture studies, the strengths and weaknesses of the method, and how they have influenced the design of the survey employed in this thesis. This thesis asserts that political culture manifests as Practice and Discourse, and the survey method focuses on the latter. To do so, it seeks to understand whether the beliefs, attitudes, and values of CSO members demonstrate CPC, which this thesis argues are required for CSOs to perform a democratic function.

Therefore, the design process considered question types which were most suitable in understanding the criteria of CPC: Tolerance, Equality, Freedom, Pluralism, Trust and Transparency. The survey also asks questions that address behaviour (practice) of CSO leaders and members (survey sections 7, 8 and 9) but cannot observe the behaviour; it only accepts what respondents say about their practice: the discourse of the practice, so to speak. This subsection addresses question rationale, decisions to
conduct the survey online and in Arabic, the piloting process and results, overcoming disadvantages of the survey method and the criticisms received.

3.1. Question rationale

The rationale behind the development each question in the survey is established below and thematically addresses why questions were included, what issues they sought to uncover and what was aimed to be learned from them. More extensive details are included in the technical appendix. To start, the ‘About You’ section was designed to determine respondent demographics and ensure a representative sample. The six criteria of civil political culture (CPC), Tolerance, Equality, Freedom, Pluralism, Trust, and financial Transparency, were each given their own section. Section 7, ‘Democratic Practices’, inquires about attitudes towards democracy and which democratic practices exist in the respondent’s CSO. Section 9 specifically addresses organisational culture and Section 10 seeks to understand how respondents think civil society should be.

3.2. Design considerations

Seeking a high response rate, the survey was designed to be as easy to understand and easy to complete as possible. Therefore, continuity in question type was provided where possible. Firstly, when choices are provided, it is less demanding for the participant. Furthermore, “Open-ended questions rarely provide accurate measurement or consistent, comparable information across the whole sample” (Salant and Dillman, 1994: 80). With the exception of questions 48 and 49 (which gave an ‘other, please state’ option) and 57 (which asked for the name of respondents’ organisation) respondents only had to ‘select’ questions from a continuum (ordinal) or list of options (nominal). Therefore the majority of questions are statements with close-ended, multiple choice response options with a five-point Likert scale. The use of a four-point Likert scale does not provide a midpoint and therefore forces respondents to answer. Therefore, this survey uses a five-point scale which allows a midpoint of a ‘do not know’ option and which does not force respondents into a definite answer or into a decision if they are genuinely undecided. An ‘Other’ option to the questions was not included and the online survey was also designed to not permit respondents to continue to the next page until they had completed all the questions. This was to ensure that respondents provided answers to every question,
rather than leaving gaps in the data. The use of values (agree/disagree) instead of ranking numbers (1-5) is also less confusing. Hofstede used five-point value scales in his works on institutional culture (Hofstede et al, 1990). This survey draws inspiration from Hofstede’s methods and survey design due to the similarity between CSOs and intuitions (established in Chapter Two).

Lewin’s 1939 study on leadership styles influenced Question 51: “Describe your manager’s leadership style.” In Lewin’s study, 10-year-old boys were assigned to different activity groups led by an adult who employed different leadership styles (Autocratic, Participative, Delegative) while the boys’ behaviour was observed over the course of 5 months. The name of each leadership style was not included because without an explanation they can be interpreted differently. Also, once translated into Arabic, their meaning could be distorted. Therefore Autocratic was defined as “makes decisions which reflect his/her opinions and personality” and Participative as “acts as a member of the team” (see Survey Questionnaire in Appendix). Bureaucratic was also included to see how much disparity there is between practices and discourse amongst CSO managers and to their adherence to rules.

Similar and recent attitude surveys conducted in the Tunisian context were used as a comparison and to aid the design of my own. Despite the differences in style and subject, surveys from Gallup, World Values Survey, Pew Global Attitudes Project, Zogby International, Arab Barometer, and BBC Media Action were used in the design process. The method of these surveys differs from an online one as they are conducted face-to-face by an interviewer who records the answers. This method for surveying was not implemented because it is too labour intensive, time-consuming, and lacks anonymity.

I have chosen not to use a “refused” option because these questions are not sufficiently controversial to warrant refusal. Therefore, a “refused” or ‘I do not want to answer’ options have not been included. The ‘I don’t know’ midpoint option is sufficient if the participant decides to opt-out of a question. In addition, the anonymity of the questionnaire should be sufficient to ensure respondents are not concerned by the repercussions of which option they select. Furthermore, “Nonresponse can distort the sample when individuals refuse to respond or cannot be contacted. Nonresponse to specific questions can distort the generalizability of the responses to those questions” (Schutt, 2011: 161).
The BBC Media Action (2013) survey uses a grid layout. A grid is more economical with space, but this layout had not use been used because it does not encourage the participant to read each question individually and increases the likelihood that the participant will ‘chose at random’. Buckingham and Saunders note that a clear and attractive layout is especially important for a self-completion survey (2004: 84). In addition, following the YouGov49 online opinion survey website’s format, one question at a time is more aesthetically pleasing and easier for the respondent to understand. All the questions from each section were placed on one page.

The decision to conduct the survey using Arabic language was made for the following reasons. The use of only French would exclude certain sections of the Tunisian population, particularly residents of the south where French is less commonly spoken. Tunisians are more likely to read Arabic than French fluently because the education system is more orientated towards Arabic than French. Public school students start learning French as a foreign language in the third grade while maths and sciences are only taught in French at high school level. Furthermore, fluency in French is related to social class making it an elite language. Despite French not being an official language, it is widely understood in Tunisia due to the French colonial presence from 1881-1956. Therefore, because French is the language of colonialism, its use in a foreign researcher’s survey could have been seen as an Orientalist practice. Newspapers, television news, official government statements in Tunisian are in Modern Standard Arabic50 (MSA) and using Arabic creates a more equal power balance between researcher and respondent. In addition, the 2014 Tunisian Constitution says “Tunisia is a free, independent, and sovereign state. Islam is its religion, Arabic is its language, the republic its system.”51 The 1959 Constitution states the same: “La Tunisie est un État libre, indépendant et souverain ; sa religion est l’Islam, sa langue l’arabe et son régime la république”52. The use of MSA for written questions was more appropriate than Tunisian Arabic because the latter is considered a dialect and is not a codified language, which would have been

49 YouGov. Available at https://yougov.co.uk/#/ [accessed 18/11/2013]
50 Based on Classical Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) is the standardized and literary form of Arabic used and understood throughout the Arab world in spoken in formal situations, higher education, sermons, media, and in courts of law.
problematic to create widely understood questions. Furthermore, the survey might not have been taken seriously since Tunisi is commonly used in informal contexts. Therefore, the survey did not benefit those who are more comfortable speaking French. Had the survey only been available in French, this would have been convenient for upper/middle class residents of Tunis aka Tunisois but would have excluded the majority of the population. Therefore survey respondents would have been from a particular demographic of CSOs and would have been less representative of the wider CSO population.

The decision to conduct the survey online was made for logistical and methodological reasons. Through the piloting process with Tunisia Live and my experience of working with JID in the ethnographic study (see Chapter Seven), I realised that the initial plan of conducting the survey in paper format would be an unsuitable solution for the following reasons. Firstly, CSOs do not always operate like businesses, some are voluntary, and therefore they are not ‘in the office’ all together at the same time, making it difficult to be present to clarify any questions. Secondly, the practical and logistical issues of distributing and collecting surveys, in different parts of Tunisia, in addition to the data entry process would be time consuming. Indeed, Watt et al. note that “using web-based evaluation questionnaires can bypass many of the bottlenecks in the evaluation system e.g. data entry and administration” (2002: 327). Therefore, an online survey’s support software will automatically organise the date and would not require me to manually input the results.

Furthermore, conducting a survey online has various advantages which made it suitable for my study. 1) It has greater outreach as an online survey does not require me to personally give the surveys to each respondent or CSO. I emailed the survey’s online link to the bureau exécutif of each CSO, which I asked them to send and forward to their members. An online survey has the potential to increase the number of respondents because it does not require the researcher to physically distribute and collect the survey form. 2) Greater convenience for the respondent as the survey can be completed in the respondent’s leisure or in own time. 3) Easier data monitoring as the support software instantly indicates what data has been collected and makes the data easier to organise. 4) The data will be compatible with SPSS, standard academic operating software for the analysis process. 5) By electronically,
instead of personally, distributing and collecting the surveys, and automatic instead of manual data entry, the time costs will be considerably reduced.

3.3. Piloting process

In addition to possessing suitable knowledge of the subject matter during the survey creation process, piloting a survey before undertaking research is an important and necessary process. The piloting process ensured that any ambiguities in the phrasing of the questions were removed and any unclear terms were clarified. Moser and Kalton refer to piloting as a dress rehearsal and describe various benefits of the process (1985, 47-52), such as ensuring that research is not conducted with unsuitable questions because this increases the likelihood of producing inaccurate data. Considering how respondents may react to questions is another vital matter to address. The questionnaire was piloted in order to test the following issues.

1. Flow; whether the questions fit together, if there are smooth transitions, and one question leads into the next or if the order is confusing.
2. Do questions jump from one topic theme to another?
3. Timing; how long it takes to complete? Whether some elements should be cut?
4. Whether the respondent interest and attention levels are tested; if respondents get bored or if the questionnaire is too long.
5. If the wording or the phrasing of questions is ambiguous.
6. If the respondents feel as if they are being led to give certain answers.
7. If there are any questions likely to offend or make the respondent uncomfortable.
8. If there are any problems with the quality of the translations.
9. If respondents felt like they wanted to explain any of their answers or give more details.

For further details on the pre-piloting and piloting processes, see Chapter Six Technical Appendix.

The pre-piloting process produced the following recommendations. The options in certain questions required clarification e.g. in Q3 because the education systems in Tunisia and UK are different. In Q6, the terms ‘Atheist’ and ‘Agnostic’ were explained. Certain terms needed developing, for example ‘media’ in Q14 was developed to
include a specific definition; newspapers, television, radio, etc. Some questions used academic language which made them inaccessible. Ambiguous or Western-centric ideas, like gender equality, were rephrased, to just men and women. Some questions, particularly those regarding management style and working culture were too vague and included terms that required explanation. In the Arabic translations for Q49 and Q51 on leadership and culture, the terminology was dropped, because it was misleading, and only descriptions were given.

Following the results and feedback from the piloting process, major improvements to the following questions were made. In Q6 the ‘Salafi’ and ‘Spiritual Muslim’ options were removed, so that the question only includes ‘practising Muslim’ or ‘non-practising Muslim’. These options remove any prejudgment about how the respondents chose to pursue Islam, which may have caused discomfort. How respondents chose to practice Islam is a personal and possibly highly nuanced variable. If it is suggested that there is a difference between someone who pursues Islam in their private life but does not see it as having a public role (political, Jihadi, Salafi, Sufi, Spiritual etc), this implies a prejudgement. Instead, the recognition of the variation will have to be revealed through reconciling respondent answers to this question with their answers to the other survey questions.

Q17, “CSOs should be allowed to pursue any goals they desire”, was unclear, therefore “as long as their means and methods are non-violent” was added to the statement. Even the most liberal and tolerant person would not be prepared to admit that violence is an acceptable method of operation for a CSO. In Tunisia, The National Leagues for the Protection of the Tunisian Revolution (see Chapter Four) became unpopular due to their aggressive methods and the Tunisian government forced them to cease operating when they adopted violent means. Weber argues the state holds ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’ (1946: 334) to which citizens defer as part of a ‘state-citizen’ agreement. If the state monopolises violence, there is no space for CSOs to employ violent means. Therefore, if respondents disagree with Q17, it suggests that the CSO population find some goals acceptable and others not, even if they are non-violent.

Respondents found Q22 had ambiguity regarding some groups as they asked, ‘What do you mean by ‘some/certain groups?’’ Suggesting that not allowing certain groups to operate, irrespective of their goals, implies a degree of intolerance. Holding the belief
that certain people or groups cannot be involved is not a true manifestation of liberal democracy. Indeed, there are limitations to freedom and a line should eventually be drawn regarding groups that incite hatred or violence. A UK group like the English Defence League might be unpopular yet they are still legal and are allowed to express their voices. This, and other extreme groups, may be largely unpopular, but on the condition that their methods are not violent and their presence and activities do not present a danger to the public, they should be allowed to operate. Freedom and Democracy are not about agreeing with everyone, but creating a platform for people to freely express themselves, so long as this does not encroach on other people’s freedoms. Q22 was therefore rephrased as “There are some groups or organisations which are too dangerous to the common good to be allowed to operate”

In Q49 and Q51 the ‘terms’ were removed so respondents could focus on just the explanations. This enables the respondents to focus on the meaning rather than just a term, which can be interpreted differently by different people. Terms like ‘Autocratic’ and ‘Bureaucratic’ often imply negativity, while both can have positive attributes, for example ‘Autocratic’ can mean the organisation is efficient and if the president is a passionate and driven leader, that can be inspirational for the staff. It does not necessarily mean that the organisation is undemocratic or corrupt. ‘Bureaucratic’ has the advantage of being potentially more rigorous, or that its procedures help to form a certain culture in the organisation or to help the organisation operate in a certain way.

Not every issue from the pilot test was amended. To some respondents, Q16 was ambiguous and various rewordings were offered. I disagreed with their assessment as there is no ambiguity to the statement ‘Non-Muslim Tunisians are entitled the same rights as Muslim Tunisians.’ It tests the respondent’s prejudice to towards non-Muslims. Suggesting that Tunisians should be treated differently based on whether they are Muslim or not is an indicator of intolerance.

3.4. Overcoming disadvantages, sampling methods and boosting response rate

There are disadvantages to conducting an online survey which can influence the sampling method. This online survey is designed to be as clear as a paper copy. An introductory statement is included to explain the purpose of the research to ensure
respondents understand what is being asked of them providing further clarity. Each page of the survey is for each section and simple instructions are given.

The survey sample needs to be representative of the wider CSO population in order to have valuable data. This subsection identifies how these two interconnected problems were addressed. Firstly, only CSO members with Internet access can complete the survey in this format. As of 31/12/2013, less than a month before my survey was launched, the number of Internet users in Tunisia was 4,790,634; 43.8% of the population and 37% of homes have Internet access53. According to the BBC Media Action survey results, “29% of Tunisian households have access to at least one desktop computer, and 34% have access to at least one laptop computer. 30% of Tunisians used the Internet “today or yesterday” and 60% access the Internet at least once a day.”54 These rates of Internet connectivity in Tunisia were sufficiently high for an online survey and, for the majority of my research, I contacted CSOs who had websites or Facebook pages55. Tunisian CSOs often conduct their activities via Facebook, because it is cheaper than paying for their own website. The sample population of an Internet survey presents a bias in favour of Internet literate users and CSOs. Small, rural community CSOs may be less frequently using the Internet but I concluded that sufficient numbers of CSOs members will have Internet access; either at home or through their organisation. This online survey regrettably excludes those who are not Internet literate, those who do not have Internet access, and ‘hard-to-reach’ respondents.

Secondly, the inclusion criterion for the survey was that the respondent had to be a member of a CSO, therefore I had to ensure that only members of CSOs completed it. Besides reading from the IP address of the respondents, there is no way to check who is responding to an online survey. Therefore, the opening page clearly explained that the survey is for CSO members only. Furthermore, a 57-question survey is sufficient to deter non-CSO member time wasters. Regarding distribution, I controlled who the survey website address was given to by contacting the bureau exécutif of the CSO and asked them to privately distribute the website of the survey

55 On Dec 31st 2012 Tunisia had 3,328,300 Facebook subscribers, a 31.0% penetration rate. Tunisia Available at http://www.Internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#tn [Accessed 1/12/2014]
to their members. I also shared the link directly by targeting organisations via email to reduce the response rate from the people I did not want to include.

The survey maintains anonymity, despite being online, because respondent names were not collected. The last question asks which organisation the respondent works for. This was not to jeopardise the anonymity of the questionnaire but to ensure only civil society members answered the survey and a sufficient range of organisations were collected to ensure that the survey sample is representative. The survey does not include highly controversial questions, therefore, I did not anticipate revealing the respondent's organisation being a problem. However, the survey did receive some erroneous answers e.g. “I don’t want to say” and the falsely named “the union of blabla”

The third issue was regional distribution. Although the population of Tunisian civil society members will be smaller and different to the Tunisian population in general, I have used INS statistics from the ‘2013 Population Census’ to develop a guideline which ensures a representative survey sample. The Tunisian Population is 65% Urban / 35% Rural and 51% Male / 49% Female. Question 5 of the survey questionnaire asked: “Which region of Tunisia are you ‘originally’ from?” This is an ‘attribute’ question which is used to determine the parameters and variables through which the survey data will be analysed and to establish the demographics of the survey population. In addition, it ensures that the population sample is representative of the Tunisian population. I grouped the 24 governorates into 7 regions. By using statistics from the 2013 Population census56, a population spread by region estimation can be created.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Governorates</th>
<th>Population Percentage</th>
<th>Percentage of CSOs in region</th>
<th>Survey response percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand Tunis</td>
<td>Ariana, Tunis, Ben Arous, Manouba</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Bizerte</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>El Kef, Béja, Zaghrouan, Jendouba</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Coast</td>
<td>Nabeul, Sousse, Monastir, Mahdia, Sfax</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Kairouan, Kasserine, Siliana</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central</td>
<td>Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Tozeur, Gabès, Kebili, Medenine, Tataouine</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a CSO member data sample that is accurately comparable to the Tunisian Population, it was necessary to ensure that none of these 7 regions was widely over or under-represented in the survey. The table above demonstrates reasonably similar distribution albeit notable overrepresentation of Grand Tunis and underrepresentation of the North West and Centre regions. However, the population of CSO Members is not entirely similar to the Tunisian Population and no source could provide a reliable figure. Further data from Ifeda, a CSO information platform, shows that the majority of CSOs are based in the Grand Tunis and West coast regions (24.2%) but the former is overrepresented in the survey. The North is also overrepresented while the North West and Centre are underrepresented. However, the number of CSOs in each region does not correlate to the number of members in each organisation.

A fundamental challenge of a survey is the ability to reach respondents and online surveys have their own unique limitations. Firstly, as mentioned above, online surveys exclude those who are Internet illiterate. Those who do not have Internet access become hard-to-reach respondents. However, this was not a major obstacle considering the demographics of the respondents, the survey population is CSO members, not for example nomadic peoples in regions without electricity. Secondly, there are possible cooperation problems. Although online surveys in many fields can attain response rates equal to or slightly higher than that of traditional modes,

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Internet users today are constantly bombarded by messages and can easily delete your advances.

Two sampling methods were used for this survey; targeting and snowballing. People in CSOs were specifically targeted by emailing their organisation’s websites and Facebook pages asking them to complete the survey. After conducting interviews with a CSO manager or lead (Chapter Six), I politely asked him/her to complete the survey and encouraged them to distribute it to their members. Personality goes a long way and entering an office ‘in person’ can increase the probability that CSO members complete the survey. Wherever possible, I tried to greet as many members of the organisation, after the interview, as possible and asked them to complete the survey. This face-to-face trust aspect is important in the Tunisian context.

Informally, through meeting people at civil society events, I told them about the survey, collected their email address, and sent the survey to them also asking them to send the survey to their colleagues. Through social media, I posted the survey on my Facebook wall and asked my friends to ask their friends to re-post the survey on their Facebook walls. This ‘word of mouth’ process of promoting the survey represents a ‘snowballing’ approach to sampling. These targeting and snowballing approaches of distributing the survey meant that there was no way to calculate the overall response rate, other than comparing to the number of responses I hoped for; 1000.

Boosting the response rate was necessary because the problem of a lower than expected response rate was encountered after the survey was launched. Nulty’s judgement, that “Response rates to online surveys... are nearly always very much lower than those obtained when using on-paper surveys” (2008: 312) was correct in the case of this research as it became difficult to impress upon people to complete the survey. Two approaches to boosting my survey response rates were used. Firstly, issuing repeat reminders the names of the organisations represented, then I reminded non-respondent organisations who I had already interviewed. As recommended by Zúñiga (2004), I ‘persuaded respondents that their responses will be used’ for the purpose of my Ph.D. research in the hoped that this would make them realise the value of their response. Secondly, a ‘snowballing’ method whereby the people who had been asked to complete the survey (study subjects) would ask more subjects, from among their acquaintances to also complete the survey was also used. Since the
CSO community often knows each other, through mutual projects and events, this was considered to be effective. There are implications and caveats with snowballing because there is less control over who the survey reaches and it can create a community bias which makes the survey sample less random and driven by the respondents. However, a diverse range of people and types of organisations within civil society and geographically across Tunisia had been interviewed which means the community bias would have been weak. Diversity is evident as 55 different organisations were represented. See Technical Appendix for a full list of organisations.

Incentives or prizes for completing the survey were not included because that would require respondents to include their email address and therefore compromise the anonymity of the survey. Based on the piloting survey results, respondents were informed completing the survey would only take about 15 minutes and respondent of anonymity was affirmed on the first page of the survey.

“This survey is anonymous and your responses will be treated as confidential, i.e. the survey results will be reported in aggregate only and no individual details will be disclosed”.

3.5. Criticisms of the survey

In the feedback I received from people who completed the survey, there were two main complaints; length of the survey and the question about religion. Firstly, the survey was long because it aimed to address a number of issues, and was therefore divided into 10 sections. Quinn (2002) recommends the obvious by suggesting keeping questionnaires brief because “the less time it takes for a student to complete a survey, the more likely it is they will do so” (Nulty, 2008: 305). Indeed, four different people who had completed the survey told me that it was a struggle to complete. However, the survey was long and included questions of a similar nature to increase reliability. It was considered in the design process that because Gallup, World Values Survey, Pew Global Attitudes Project, Zogby International, Arab Barometer surveys were over 100 questions in some cases, then 57 questions would have been acceptable.
Although the five-point Likert scale and ‘tick the box’ format made the survey easy to complete, it became evident, unfortunately, that 57 questions for a self-completion online survey are too arduous.

Secondly, Question 6, about religious beliefs, caused some problems for respondents.

Q6. How would you describe your religious belief?
   □ Practicing Muslim
   □ Non-Practicing Muslim
   □ Agnostic (Belief the existence of God cannot be proven or disproven)
   □ Atheist (Belief there is no God)
   □ Other
   □ Not sure

The majority of the problems with this question were addressed during the piloting and feedback from various Tunisians and academics, for example by changing the phrasing of the question and by removing the ambiguous and inappropriate options of ‘Salafist’ and ‘spiritual Muslim’. However, two people with whom I had conducted one to one for Chapter Six, with emailed me explaining their refusal to distribute the survey because it made them ‘uncomfortable’, they thought it was not relevant, and they did not want to talk about religion. Sonya Ben Yahmed, Association Tunisienne Femmes Démocrates, told me that religion is not part of their association and that “We are a secular society and our religious choices concern only us” (Email dated 13th March, 2014). Sami Tahri, UGTT Spokesman, also took issue with the religion question saying that,

“With regards to the questionnaire, I think it poses a serious problem in the question relating to the faith. This is not an issue within the Tunisian society, or some parties would like to impose this issue that is foreign to Tunisia. The questions should be oriented towards the social aspects for NGOs dealing with social issues and otherwise for other NGOs. That’s why I cannot disseminate the questionnaire.” (Email dated Monday, June 09, 2014)

In retrospect, the sensitivity of this question should have been recognised and that the inclusion of “I do not want to answer this question” or “refused” options would have meant that respondents who felt uncomfortable with this question could have still completed the survey. However, this decision was not taken because this survey sought to collect fully useable answers rather than missing data. Also, the Tessler (2002) survey study on Islam and political culture (reviewed in Chapter Two) gave
the impression that questions regarding religion were appropriate. Unfortunately, the BOS survey does not allow modifications to a survey once it has been launched, therefore it was not possible to address or amend this issue once complaints were received.

Perhaps there would have been a far greater number of responses if the demographic ‘religion’ question was not included, yet the unwillingness to answer this question suggests to me that sensitivity regarding religion and “religious belief” potentially indicates an underlying intolerance in a society; either by the respondent or how he/she will think others will perceive them. 102 responses were received and only 2 direct complaints were made. It is also possible there were others who did not register a complaint but chose not to complete the survey because of their sensitivity to this question. Although it proved problematic for the survey results, the aversion from some respondents to the religion question suggests that respondents who did not want to answer the religion question are sensitive about religion. It might also imply a default secular position that some CSOs hold. The UGTT email does not indicate a rejection of religion as a divisive political category, but rather that the organisation does not want to proliferate the existence of an Islamist/Secularist divide in Tunisia. On the other hand, it could represent their aversion to a white, European researcher trying to study them from within a narrow box defined by their supposed religion or trying to correlate their attitudes, values, and CSO practices with Islam.

4. Survey Results

4.1. Data analysis process

The survey was available for 7 months from 20th January to 20th August 2014. It was not kept open for longer to avoid the risk of socio-political events overtaking, and therefore influencing, the research period. After closing the survey, the data was analysed by using the following different statistical models and data manipulation tools, each of which has a particular focus: Frequency tables, data-recoding, the creation of indexes, t-test and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test.

Firstly, the results were organised into descriptive statistics of frequency tables that featured bar charts and percentages for each question in the survey. During this analysis of individual variables through figures and charts, the following questions
were asked: Do patterns occur? Which results are anomalies? Which questions produced inconclusive results? Disaggregated data analysis was conducted by analysing the data question by question and looking for overall conclusions in each section of the survey. For these results in frequency tables with bar charts, see technical Appendix.

Secondly, recoding of the data helps produce more accurate crosstabulations, therefore recoding the demographics of Age and Region into dichotomous and trichotomous variables for more precise analysis. Recoding and disaggregating the survey population by Age, Gender, and Region might highlight nuances in the data. Question 2 demonstrated that the data is skewed because 50% of respondents are under 25 years old and 50% over 25. This was re-coded into a Youth Vs Non-Youth dynamic. Also, due to the low number of responses from North, North West, Centre, South Central and South regions, these were pooled into one group (Interior) in order to create a more meaningful comparison to Capital and Coast. This may appear reductionist but the Interior regions have been historically neglected and left underdeveloped by the former dictatorships, therefore the people may have different attitudes from those who lived in the more economically and infrastructurally developed coastal and Capital areas. The crosstabulation table below demonstrates a more even distribution between 3 regions than 6. See frequency table for Q5 in Technical Appendix. The income, education level, and religious belief variables were not used for SPSS analysis because they were not useful or did not require further analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your gender?</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thirdly, indexes were created by pooling the sections of the survey in groups of questions which are related to the six criteria of civil political culture (CPC). This was performed in order to highlight trends or associations between demographic variables (Age, Gender, and Region) and criteria of CPC (Tolerance, Equality, Freedom, Pluralism, Trust, and financial Transparency). Creating Indexes averages a range of variables into an index. By merging questions on the same subject, such as
Section 2: Questions 7, 8, and 9 which address values and beliefs regarding tolerance, a Tolerance Index was created. Indexes for the other aspects of CPC (Equality, Pluralism, Trust, and financial transparency) except Freedom were created.

It was not possible to create an effective or meaningful index for Freedom because a score of 5 in Q17-19 and 27 represent greater values of freedom than a score of 1, whereas in Q21, 24, 26 a score of 1 represent greater values of freedom. Therefore, the index would be misleading and inaccurate. Furthermore, the questions address different aspects of freedom; respondent’s values of freedom in addition to the freedom they are afforded by the Tunisian state. Despite the questions being significant on an individual basis, it was only during the indexing process that I realised the questions in the Freedom Section should have been phrased in a manner which can be grouped. Values and beliefs in freedom were instead analysed via descriptive statistics of Frequency Tables. Creating an index for institutional culture questions was also not possible because the questions' options were not all ordinal/numerical on a five-point Likert scale and some were frequency questions and some were nominal variables. Therefore, these questions produced different types of answers which could not be grouped into an index.

Using the average scores from all respondents demonstrated which of the six aspects of CPC are most prevalent in the respondent's attitudes. The score is from 1-5, 1 lowest and 5 highest, based on the five-point Likert scale choices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Index average scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

166
Fourthly, after re-coding demographic variables and creating indexes, it was possible to perform T-tests. By testing two ‘independent’ means, these tests display whether a ‘degree of association’ or correlation between a dichotomous demographic variable (Youth/Non-Youth and Gender) and an index existed or not. These tests look at the differences between two different groups. Like Crosstabulation, a T-test requires a theoretical reason to compare a variable to an index in order to check for an association. These t-tests were conducted to test the four hypotheses on pages 146-148.

Finally, the region variable has three categories, a trichotomus variable, which cannot be run with the T-Test function. Therefore an ANOVA test was required to test the means of three or more groups. These tests show whether an overall difference exists between the three groups of Capital, Coast, and Interior populations when tested against the 5 Indexes from aspects of CPC (Tolerance, Equality, Pluralism, Trust, and financial transparency.)

4.2. Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of responses</th>
<th>102</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Gender representation | 51% men  
49% women |
| Highest represented age group | 74.5% between 18-35 |
| Age distribution | 50% Over 26  
50% Under 26 |
| Number of different organisations represented | 55 |
| Highest represented region | Greater Tunis (36.3%) |
| Educational Level | 89.2% undergraduate degrees or higher |
| Religious beliefs | 78.4% Muslim  
21.6% Agnostic, Atheist, Other, or Not sure. |

The results show an even gender distribution but a skew towards capital and coastal cities meaning the interior regions were less represented. The number of respondents was lower than anticipated which means the results cannot claim to be entirely representative of Tunisian CSOs members. However, the regional, age, and

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58 An Independent variable is used to explain or predict a response, outcome, or result. It is thought to be the cause of some effect. Field, Andy (2013). Discovering Statistics using IBM SPSS Statistics, London: Sage Publications Ltd, 4th edition
gender distributions in relation to the Tunisian populations, the range of organisations represented, in addition to the inclusive factor of the survey being conducted in Arabic means that the results are fairly generalisable. Therefore the results constitute indicative data.

To summarise the results, the values, beliefs and attitudes that are in accordance with CPC are evident amongst the Tunisia CSO members who participated in this survey. There are some inconclusive issues, that are addressed on an individual basis, but the frequency table analysis and indexes largely demonstrate CPC. A similar organisational culture is not evident which suggests that institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) does not exist amongst Tunisian CSOs. This finding demonstrates the vibrancy and diversity of CSOs in Tunisia. The following paragraphs analyse the results from each section of the survey and of each criterion of CPC.

Section 1 – Demographics (1-6) – show that while Gender, Age, and Region were useful variables for comparison, Education level demonstrated that the CSO population is highly educated. The monthly income question proved to be inaccurate because some respondents are students, whose income is provided by their families. This made it difficult to determine any coloration between income and class. Most respondents are practicing or non-practicing Muslims (78.4%) while 21.6% were Agnostic, Atheist, Other, or Not Sure. This indicates that personal faith and religious beliefs are not related to civil society values. Furthermore, that civil political culture is not at odds with Islam.

Section 2 – Tolerance (7-9) – demonstrates high levels of tolerance towards working together with other CSOs, co-operating for mutual goals, and other CSOs pursuing their goals on the condition that they are peaceful. This is represented in the Tolerance Index average score of 4.3. The t-test results demonstrate that Women were more tolerant (See appendix for table). The P value of 0.011 is less than 0.05, therefore there is some evidence that there is an association between Gender and Tolerance. The comparison of means displays a 0.28 difference between Men (4.17) and Women (4.45). This indicates that male respondents demonstrate fewer values of tolerance than female respondents. This result confirms the hypotheses of difference in results between Men and Women.
Section 3 – Equality (10-16) – demonstrates almost complete agreement with equality to female participation, access to media, right to pursue cultural preference of choice and Non-Muslim Tunisian's participation in Tunisian civil society. There is less agreement regarding CSOs with secular or religious agendas and the inclusion of former RCD members. The complete agreement in all but two areas is demonstrated in the Equality Index average score of 4.

Questions 10 and 11 show no overall agreement regarding whether groups with specifically secular or religious agendas should be active in civil society. There is more acceptance of groups with secular agendas, 62.8% (47.1% and 15.7%), than groups with religious agendas, 46.1% (36.3% and 9.8%). This suggests Tunisian CSO members are unsure and in disagreement as to whether CSOs should be allowed to have political agendas but demonstrates less suspicion of secularist CSOs. Question 12 shows no overall agreement regarding the inclusion of former RCD members in civil society. 40.2% (34.3% and 5.9%) agree with their inclusion while 43.1% (22.5% and 20.6%) think they should not be included and 14.7% don't know. This suggests that Tunisian CSO members are unsure and in disagreement as to whether former RCD members deserve to be active in the public space. See Crosstabulation for further analysis.

Section 4 – Freedom (17-27) – results appear somewhat contradictory. The majority are against government interference and 87.2% believe the government should allow civil society organisations to operate freely. However, a vast majority also believe that the government should protect society from offensive opinions and 81.3% think there are some groups that are too dangerous to the common good to be allowed to operate. There is no agreement regarding whether the state should be determining what is offensive and whether respondents believe the freedom of association laws in Tunisia provide sufficient protection for CSOs. Questions 19, 20, 21 and 27 show almost complete agreement towards freedom of expression, that racially offensive views should be silenced, that religiously offensive views should be silenced and in favour of the concept of universal human rights. This suggests the limits of freedom and that race and religion are taboo subjects. Question 17 shows 59.8% (39.2% and 20.6%) support for CSOs being allowed to pursue any goals they desire, as long as their means and methods are non-violent. 27.4% (23.5% and 3.9%) disagree which
suggests either that there is not complete acceptance or that the question is too ambiguous.

Section 5 – Pluralism (28-32) – demonstrates that values of Pluralism are evident because respondents understand that disagreement is inevitable but they also believe that higher quality decisions are made by groups than individuals. Furthermore, 99% have tolerance and respect for alternative opinions. Question 30 shows no trend towards CSO members changing their minds. This question sought to understand if respondents had the willingness to accept different views but this does not account for the quality of the argument.

### 30. I often change my mind when I hear other people’s arguments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>2.0% 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I do not agree</td>
<td>32.4% 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I do not know</td>
<td>23.5% 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>I agree</td>
<td>39.2% 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>2.9% 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Pluralism Index average score of 3.72 is the lowest score but this is caused by the result to Q30. If this question is disregarded, there is strong evidence of other pluralistic values. The t-test results demonstrate that women expressed greater values of pluralism. The P value of 0.022 is less than 0.05, therefore, there is evidence that there is an association between the Gender dichotomy and the Pluralism Index. The comparison of means displays a 0.24 difference between men (3.60) and women (3.84). This suggests that men demonstrate fewer values of Pluralism than women. This result, in addition to women expressing greater levels of Tolerance (Section 2), could be explained by a patriarchal mentality residing in Tunisia. Despite being one of the most liberal Arab societies, roles being defined by gender and male authority are common features of society (Ghribi, 2014). This result confirms the hypotheses of difference in results between men and women.

Section 6 - Trust (33-35) - suggests high levels of internal trust but shows no trend towards CSO members trusting other CSOs. The Trust Index average score was 3.73,

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making it the second lowest score but this is due to the lack of trust in CSO members outside of the respondents own CSO. Despite hypothesising that trust would be low, the result that trust within a CSO (internal) is greater than trust external levels is congruent with Putnam's "social capital" argument on the benefits of liberal-associational civil society. In *Making Democracy Work*, he asserts that trust is fostered among people through their social interaction and cooperation in associations (1993). This highlights a disparity between CSO member's discourse, regarding their willingness to co-operate and work with other CSO, and their practice, of not trusting other CSOs enough to work with them. The intention is evident, yet the practicalities may be more challenging.

The t-test result shows that Non-Youth (Over 26 years old) respondents demonstrate greater levels of Trust than Youth respondents. P-value 0.014 is under 0.05 which means there is significance between ‘Youth/Non-Youth and Trust Index’. The comparison of means displays a 0.3 difference between Youth (3.58) and Non-Youth (3.89). It is possible that this indicates that youth have less experience and are less acquainted with working in co-operation. This age difference is similar to the Pew Global survey ‘Tunisian confidence in Democracy’ (2014) which concludes that older Tunisians are more favourable toward democracy than the young.

Using the ANOVA Test, the 'Region Vs Trust Index (Q33-35)' ANOVA test was the only one to show any notable difference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.6306</td>
<td>3.3743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.7000</td>
<td>3.4503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.8667</td>
<td>3.7115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>3.7320</td>
<td>3.6050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the means of the Capital (3.63) and Interior (3.87) regions displays a 0.24 difference. The Interior has a higher index score which shows that, on average, respondents from the Interior regions demonstrate greater levels of trust or are more trusting than Coastal and especially Capital respondents. For full tables of
results from T-tests and ANOVA tests, see Technical Appendix. The Trust results confirm the hypotheses of regional difference and difference in results between youth and non-youth.

The content of Section 7 - Democratic practices (36-38) and Section 9 – My CSO (47 and 48) – are appropriate to be ‘pooled’ together. CSO leaders are not considered infallible rulers as, for example, 92.2% believe in being allowed to express disagreement with their CSO’s management. Questions 47 and 48 are related to democratic practices in decision making and selecting positions and/or leadership. Question 47 shows that 75.5% say that the decision-making process is ‘consultative at all levels’. Question 48 shows that 88.3% use democratic methods to determine positions in the organisation; 60.8% use ‘elections' and 27.5% use ‘consensus after debate’.

73.5% believe their organisation has a well-defined organisational structure but this contrasts with 56.9% who think job descriptions are flexible and authority within their organisation is questioned. As job descriptions of some organisations show fluidity, this suggests that there is flexibility in the appointment of roles and responsibilities. This could mean that either horizontal management structures are in place or could also imply internal disorganisation.

Section 9 – My CSO (43-46) – assesses trends in ‘organisational culture’ and observes if there are similarities, or even cases of institutional isomorphism, within Tunisian CSOs. This section’s results demonstrate no obvious trend regarding institutional culture which means the survey data does not provide firm evidence that institutional Isomorphism exists. Many of the questions in this section cannot be pooled; in particular, questions 43 to 51 require individual or paired analysis in order to make conclusions. It is not obvious what conclusions can be drawn from Question 43 apart from that CSO members have a range of experience and most have only been involved in CSOs in the post-revolution period; only 25.4% (17.6% more than 5 years and 7.8% more than 10 years) have been active pre-revolution. At the time of the survey, the revolution had taken place 4 years earlier. 93.1% of CSO members were volunteers with a smaller 6.9% being professional, paid members. This 6.9% might also include people are who unemployed but are paid by the ministry of work to work for a CSO. As 4.9% of organisations meet daily, this suggests that a small, professional core of CSOs exists. There is no agreement as to a
trend regarding the working environment of Tunisian CSOs. 4.9% and 6.9% responded with ‘very formal’ and ‘very informal’ respectively, meaning the remaining 88.4% was split between ‘formal’ (53.9%) and ‘informal’ (34.5%). Question 49 shows no clear trend in the culture and philosophy of CSOs, although Person culture scores highest with 44.1%. Question 50 shows that 92.2% of organisations have an internal law or constitution. This suggests that the remaining 7.8% are either disorganised, are breaking the 2011-88 law, or are in the process of writing their internal law or constitution.

Section 8 - Financial Transparency (39-42) - shows 85.3% of respondents know who funds their CSO and agreement towards practices of Financial Transparency in CSOs. 80.4% think funding that CSOs receive should be made public while some respondents in Q42 show unsureness (9.8%) or reluctance (9.8%). This is reflected in the Financial Transparency Index average score of 4.4, the highest Index score in the survey.

Section 10 asks ‘What is desirable?’ (52-56) and shows very strong approval of CSO independence, respect for other CSO objectives, and internal democratic practices. Question 54 shows 66.7% disagreement that CSOs should be obedient to government. 20.6% don't know and 12.8% agree which demonstrates a majority but no central trend exists. There was also no trend agreement regarding limitation to CSO activities.

4.2.1. Inconclusive results

As this survey collected 102 responses, it is difficult to generate precise inferences given the sample size. Instead, the value of this research is the indicative data of the Tunisian CSO population’s beliefs, values, and attitudes it provides. Indeed, they established some very clear results and quite notable trends. However, the responses from the following individual questions did not produce clear or notable results. For example, Questions 10 and 11 suggest that Tunisian CSO members are unsure and in disagreement as to whether CSOs should be allowed to have political agendas. Therefore, this subsection addresses these inconclusive results.

Q10. Groups with an explicitly religious agenda should be allowed to participate in civil society.
Q11. Groups with a specifically secular agenda clear should be allowed to participate in civil society.

Q12. Members of the former RCD members should be allowed to participate in civil society.

Q17. Civil society organisations should be allowed to pursue any goals, as long as their means and methods are non-violent.

Q23. Freedom of association laws in Tunisia provide sufficient protection for civil society organisations.

Q26. The state determines what is considered offensive and improper.

Q30. I often change my mind when I hear other people's arguments.

Q35. I trust members of other organisations

Q46. Describe your working environment? 58.8% formal / 41.2% informal

Q49. Describe the philosophy and culture of work within your organisation.

Q51. How would you describe the way the leadership of the head of the organisation?
Acts as a member of the team: 45.1%

Q56. The activities and campaigns of CSOs should be limited.

The statistical tool of crosstabulation was used to compare inconclusive issues. A crosstabulation allows the comparison between two or more variables and determines whether a relationship exists between them. Crosstabulations also disaggregate survey responses to allow closer examination of results. For this reason, I used crosstabulation analysis on individual questions results from the survey that produced inconclusive responses: Q10, Q11, Q12, Q17, Q23, Q26, Q30, Q35, Q46, Q49, Q51, and Q56. By dividing the results of these questions by the recoded demographic variables (Youth/Non-Youth, Gender, and Region), I hoped to see a clearer explanation of the manner in which the respondents answered.

Crosstabulations for Questions 10, 11, 46, 49, 51 did not produce any further explanation and nothing could clearly be ascertained from Q35 due to the large amounts of ‘Don’t know’ responses. However, Q12 produced a significant finding. To the ‘Q12. Members of the former RCD members should be allowed to participate in civil society.’ I expected to see more respondents from the Interior disagreeing with the statement because the party-state apparatus was more unfavourable to these regions, therefore people associated with the Party, do not deserve to be active in the public space.
Members of the former Constitutional Democratic Rally should be allowed to participate in civil society?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>I don’t know</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This crosstabulation demonstrates there is slightly greater unfavourability towards former RCD members participating in civil society from respondents in the Interior; 48.6% (28.6% + 20.0%) disagree, compared with the 37.8% from the Capital and 43.4% from the Coast. Also, fewer respondents from the Interior agree with their inclusion, 34.3% compared to 45.9% and 40%. This relates to my hypothesis that there are greater resentment and less acceptance towards those associated with the former regime who should, therefore, be afforded less liberty.

Q17 showed that slightly more Non-youth respondents (66.4%) agree that ‘CSOs should be allowed to pursue any goals, as long as their means and methods are non-violent’, than Youth (52.9%) Also, slightly more Youths (31.4%) disagree with the statement than Non-youths (23.6%). This suggests that Youths are less accepting of difference while Non-Youths are more accepting of difference, a result I found surprising because I predicted the younger generations to be more tolerant.

Closer inspection of the results for Q23 demonstrates the inability for most to answer the question (most selected Don’t Know) which suggests a widespread (across Gender, Youth/Non-youth, and Region) unfamiliarity with the Freedom of Association laws. This may suggest that CSO members could be more familiar with CSOs laws.

Q26 showed that more Youth (41.2%) agreed that “The state determines what is considered offensive and improper” than Non-Youth (27.4%). In addition, more Women (40%) than Men (28.8%) agreed with the statement. This might suggest
women are more socially conservative or perhaps want more legal protection against indecent behaviour. It could indicate that Young women want more state protection against the offensive and the improper but this is dependent on how the respondents interpreted the question.

For Q30, more Non-Youth (52.9%) agreed with the statement that “I often change my mind when I hear other people’s arguments” than Youth (31.4%). 39.2% of Youth disagree with this statement, compared to 29.4% of Non-Youth. Furthermore, more females (64%) agreed with the statement than men (21.2%). Also, 50% of men disagree with this statement, compared to 18% of Non-Youth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your gender?</th>
<th>I often change my mind when I hear other people’s arguments.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This more significantly demonstrates that Men, young men, in particular, are either more stubborn or think they know better or are harder to convince during an argument.

Q46 showed that 71.4% of respondents from the Interior describe their working environment as ‘Formal’, compared to 50% from the Coast and 40.5% from the Capital. Furthermore, 10.8% of Capital CSOs are ‘Very Informal’ compared to only 2.9% in the Interior. Maybe this suggests that Interior CSOs take their work more seriously or that CSOs in the Capital more frequently social club/associational CSOs than activist organisations with clear goals. It is also possible that respondents have different understandings of what formal and informal means or that the degree of formality is seen as less important than the context of the work.

Crosstabulations for Q56 demonstrated that Non-youth Men from the Interior are more likely to disagree with the statement ‘the activities and campaigns of CSOs
should be limited.' This may suggest that this demographic is more rebellious and less willing to accept limitations. It could also suggest that they have greater aspirations for what CSOs can do and achieve. Crosstabulation analysis was useful in some cases, such as Q12 demonstrating greater suspicions from the Interior Regions’ for RCD participation. However, to find answers to the results would require estimation and speculation or further research beyond the scope of this thesis.

4.3. Reflections on the Survey process

Conducting an online survey proved to be a bold and ambitious research method strategy because, although the Internet penetration rates in Tunisia were considered to be sufficiently high and the piloting process had rectified all major problems, it yielded a smaller than anticipated sample size. While the small sample size means that any conclusions cannot make over-arching claims, clear indications of trends in the opinions, attitudes and values held by this sample of CSO members were evident in the results collected.

If the survey had been conducted verbally through face-to-face interviews, as per surveys on Tunisia by Zogby International, Gallup, Pew Global Attitudes Project, World Values Survey, and Arab Barometer, I predict that more responses would have been collected. However, for methodological reasons, such as face to face interview offering no privacy to respondents, and logistical data collections reasons, the decision was made to use an online survey. If the survey were to be repeated, the religion question would have been removed to enable greater participation as fewer CSOs would have objected to distributing the survey. However, the refusal by some to engage with this question indicates the sensitivity surrounding this subject in Tunisian CSOs. Also the length of the questionnaire would be reduced to around 30 questions. This would make the completion less strenuous for respondents and might also boost response rate.

5. Chapter Conclusion

The data collected in this survey addresses the three relationships of civil society - with the State, with other CSOs, and with organisation’s own members. The results suggest that the criteria of civil political culture are evident in Tunisian civil society, which are enabling it to start fulfilling a democratic function. While CPC is generally evident in attitudes of CSO members, female CSO members are more likely to hold
attitudes of Trust and Pluralism. Furthermore, Trust is more prevalent amongst respondents from Interior regions and non-youth respondents.

The frequency tables and bar charts suggest the following results. Section 2 largely suggests tolerance, respect, and cooperation in and between CSOs. Section 3 shows agreement towards female participation, accesses to media, right to pursue cultural preference of choice and Non-Muslim Tunisian's participation in Tunisian civil society but disagreement regarding politicised and religious CSOs and the inclusion of former RCD members. Section 4 suggests that Tunisian CSOs members believe freedom should exist but it should be a freedom that has limitations such as causing religious offense, rather than American-style unrestricted freedom of speech at all costs. It is also expressed that the government has a duty to determine what is offensive or improper. Furthermore, CSO members express their unwillingness for the government to interfere but are also unsure that sufficient legal protection is given to CSOs. These contradictions might demonstrate the different understandings of freedom amongst CSO members with some preferring greater limitations. Section 5 shows agreement towards the value of including various points of view and collective decision-making processes but less towards this process swaying people's decisions. Section 6 suggests high levels of internal trust within a CSO but less towards other organisations. Section 8 largely shows agreement towards practices regarding financial transparency. Sections 7 and 9 show agreement towards democratic practices. Section 10 shows very strong agreement that CSOs should be independent of the state, should respect the objectives of other organisations, and should operate with internal democratic practices. Also, there is strong agreement that CSOs should not be obedient to their government. These results demonstrate normative acceptance of civil political culture.

Tunisian CSOs are predominately run by voluntary members on a part-time basis. Regarding organisational culture, they are mostly consultative in decision making and determine positions through internal elections or consensus after debate. Q49 and Q51 demonstrate that organisational culture and leadership styles vary, therefore trends do not exist.

By using SPSS software and running cross-tabulations and correlations tests, it was possible to analyse the survey responses more deeply by dividing the responses by demographic category variable. Furthermore, the Indexing process allowed each
section of the survey, corresponding to each criterion of civil political culture (CPC), to be grouped together. This allowed general trends to be observed. The indexes show there is evidence of CPC but that Tolerance, Equality, and Financial Transparency were more prevalent than, Pluralism, and Trust. Financial Transparency (Q40-42) was evident from looking at the frequency tables and bar graphs but SPSS analysis showed it was the most prevalent value. With the dividing and indexing processes used together, SPSS software data analysis was able to demonstrate where CPC was present or absent and who was more likely to demonstrate it.

Regarding any ambiguity in the results, SPSS could not add further analysis than Frequency tables and bar graphs regarding Institutional Culture. The crosstabulations were successful at disaggregating unclear individual responses, such as Q12 demonstrating that slightly greater unfavourability towards former RCD members participating in civil society from respondents in the Interior. However, the results from other crosstabulations posed further questions or required additional hypotheses to understand the results.

T-tests and ANOVAs were useful for creating general trends, but the low-response, statistically insufficient and insignificant data means that these trends cannot be used to draw significant conclusions. The results are sufficient to suggest indications of attitudes from civil society members. The Interior's mistrust of the RCD Party members in civil society and Women showing greater CPC are similar to predictions made in the hypothesis. However, there were surprising results such as youth scoring lower than Non-Youth. I expected the Youth to demonstrate more democratic culture but in all cases, except Trust, there was no association.

The t-tests showed that a) Non-Youth respondents demonstrate greater Trust values than Youth and b) Women respondents demonstrate greater Tolerance and Pluralism values than Men. The ANOVA tests showed that Interior respondents demonstrate greater levels of trust than Coastal and especially Capital respondents. The means difference from the t-tests regarding Gender across three indexes enables a plausible generalisation to be drawn that the responses in this survey from Women in Tunisia CSOs demonstrate great evidence of civil political culture than Men in the areas of Tolerance, and Pluralism. The T-Test or ANOVA test results from Equality and Financial Transparency showed no level of association.
It is important to note some potential caveats with these results. Significance test analysis cannot be overly relied on because there are three implications regarding the data. Firstly, the sample size means these conclusions should not be overstated. Secondly, as discussed regarding the sampling methods and despite the range of CSOs represented, it is also plausible that the collected population sample is not sufficiently varied enough to be entirely representative of CSO members in Tunisia. Thirdly, although there is justification for re-coding the region demographic based on the Bourguiba and Ben Ali government’s systematic neglect of Tunisia’s interior regions, the recoded ‘Interior Region’ variable still groups together five separate regions and 15 governorates. To assume people from all these regions are like-minded would be making an over-arching claim. Despite these considerations, these survey results indicate evidence of CPC in Tunisian CSOs.

This attitude survey is a wide-reaching research method that identifies patterns and a broad spectrum of CPC values in civil society members. The operational use of Welch’s theory of political culture, implemented in this thesis, recognises that discourse is only one manifestation of political culture analysis. These survey results demonstrate discourse rather than practice, although the practices in which CSOs engage were questioned. As this entirely positivist method of inquiry lacks nuanced and personalised engagement, the interview process in Chapter Seven enables greater insight into details of CPC gained through human interaction-based research. Answers to the inconclusive issues that the survey data produced can also be uncovered when compared with interview data results.

In comparison to the pre-revolution era discussed in Chapter Four, this survey indicates a development and embedment of some aspects of CPC that would not have been possible in authoritarian Tunisia. Although the survey was not able to offer an assessment of whether CSOs are Oppositional-Resistance or Liberal-Associative, the questions help to provide assessments of the three relationships in which CSOs engage; with the State, with other CSOs in the public space, and the internal dynamics with their own membership. Indeed, the development of these CSOs relationships indicates where CSOs self-consciously position themselves against the state and other CSOs, if relationships with others have developed, whether they discriminate or not: all of which would not have been possible in a restricted public space. This chapter has demonstrated that an attitude survey can be an important research
method for providing a broad understanding of or identifying trends within the political culture of civil society. However, for a holistic understanding of political culture, micro-interpretivist approaches are additionally required.
CHAPTER SEVEN – STRUCTURED QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

1. Introduction

The function of this chapter is to examine the norms and values of CSO leaders as expressed through their discourses during a structured, one to one interview. 66 interviews with leaders of Tunisian CSOs were conducted between February 2014 and July 2014 with an additional 9 interviews with non-CSO members to verify the findings. All interviews were within the same period; after the new constitution had been ratified and no further major political events took place. Chapter Six demonstrated evidence of some aspects of civil political culture however some aspects were not so certain as there were 11 questions that produced inconclusive results. These interviews were conducted to provide human interaction with subjects and provide them with the opportunity to explain their norms and values, through their discourse, and to describe their behaviours in greater details than from within the limitations of studying subjects from a removed position through surveys. For the collection of more nuanced and personalised data, the personal interaction also provided the opportunity for follow up questions with CSO leaders. In the operationalisation of Welch’s theory of political culture, the interview method is required because it is a micro-interpretivist approach that provides interaction with subjects. Face to face interviews, like ethnography (See Chapter Eight) is preferable to studying remotely and deducing from historical sources because it reduces the risk of producing synoptic or Culturalist analyses.

2. Sampling

I sought to target important, influential and famous organisations. Of the highest priority were the Quartet of UGTT, UTICA, LTDH, and Ordre National Des Avocats De Tunisie (ONAT) due to their influential role in the democratic transition (See Chapter Five). Prior to the political deadlock in summer 2013, the Quartet had been an important force in Tunisian politics. In particular, the UGTT had been crucial in organising mobilisation during the revolution and early states of the transition. In addition, there were well-known organisations such as UGET, UGTE, and Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (AFTD) that were active before the revolution and mentioned in the Chapter Two, Three, and Four. Although hundreds of organisations have been established in the post-Revolution era, I aimed to speak to
CSOs who, based on my fieldwork preparation, had been important during the transition period such as *Al Bawsala, Mourakiboun, I-Watch*, and *Destourna*.60

The table of completed interviews (see Technical Appendix) shows the diverse range of organisations that were interviewed. Comparing older organisations, such as *Forum Tunisien pour Les Droits Economiques et Sociaux* (FTDES), who were active before the revolution, to the newer ones represented an interesting dynamic because their methods and approaches may vary. In addition to interviewing organisations that could be categorised as Liberal-Associative or Oppositional-Resistance, it was ensured that organisations who were working towards a range of different causes and issues were included e.g. Charity (*Inara, Alwen Tounes*) Youth (*JID, Sawty, Voix d'enfant rural, WeYouth*) Environmental (*Network of Sidi Bouzid, Oxygen, We Love Sousse*) Development and Training (*Tunisian Association for Management and Social Stability* (TAMSS) and *Culture* (*Verolution, Toupat Sidi Bouzid, Sfax Outdoor Sports & Sfax Mzyehna*). There were many organisations who worked on raising awareness (*Sensibilisation* in French) regarding citizenship and the culture of democracy (*Qairawanioun, Association Tunisienne Pour La Promotion Du Droit à La Différence, I-Lead*). I interviewed ‘single issue’ groups like *Mnemty* (racism) *Esslam* (Fairtrade for artisans) Reform (*police and security sector reform*), *Association Tunisienne Droits Constitutionnel* (ATDC) (*legal reform*), *Edupartage* (*educational reform*) and *Notre Santé D'abord* (*free healthcare*). Two movements, which were not strictly CSO but represented civic activism, were also interviewed. Sajin-52 were fighting against the oppressive Tunisian laws against cannabis possession that were established during dictatorship as a means of control and Open Gov were a network linked to the Open Governance Programme (OGP) in order to promote transparency at national and regional government levels. Although there is a skew towards organisations in the capital (36 of the 66 interviews are with Tunis-based organisations), it was ensured that the other regions were also represented in the interview process as organisations from *Bizerte, Zaghouan, Sousse, Sidi Bouzid, Regueb Gafsa, Gabes, Medenine, and Djerba* were included in the research. Furthermore, the dynamic that regional organisations often had more local and specific goals, such as *Sousse Demain,*

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60 *Al Bawsala, Mourakiboun and I-Watch* are political watchdogs who have influenced the transition by holding politicians to account and observing constituent assembly and electoral procedures. *Destourna* was a leading organisation in the civil society arranged the Bardo sit-in after the assassination of Mohammed Brahmi (July 2013) which led eventually to the National Dialogue and the Ennahda-led troika stepping down.
Djerba Ulysses, Association Cepsa, Gabes Action, than CSOs based in the capital was recognised. *Association Amis Bassin Minier pour l'environnement* is based in Gafsa but are an environmental pressure group that addresses issues outside of the region. The CSO platform Jamiaty\(^6\) was also utilised to find contact details for CSOs and my contacts, who work for and with CSOs, also provided names of other organisations.

Cultural organisations were included but those with religious objectives were not. This was in order to narrow the focus of this thesis but also due to the sensitivity regarding the secular/Islamist split in political, public, and private spheres. Quranic School and Islamic charity groups play a role in both the public and private spaces while *Dawa* movements are seeking to implement the political goal: the Islamisation of the state. Although not power-seeking, the objectives of these groups are blurring the lines between political and public space activism (Donker, 2013) therefore not entirely conforming to the definition of civil society established in this thesis. While religious organisations can add to a civil society’s vibrancy, their position in Tunisia remains contentious due to accusations that they are supporting an Islamist project.

3. **Interview methodology**

This subsection develops the approach to interviewing undertaken in this thesis as mentioned in the methods chapter. CSO leaders, presidents or members of the *bureau exécutif*, were chosen as interview subjects because they have an overview of the running of their own organisation and can comment on relations with other CSOs and the government. I conducted one to one, face-to-face interviews for the following reasons. Firstly, in one to one interviews, individuals’ responses are not influenced by another person’s presence, especially others in the organisation. This does not guarantee or increase honesty but it removes the possibility of influence from the other member of their organisation, respondents’ opinions being swayed and a ‘groupthink’ conclusion from being reached. Therefore, the expressed norms and values would be the interviewee’s discourse rather than an influenced discourse. Secondly, it is also easier to probe and ask follow-up or concept checking questions to unclear and ambiguous answers to individuals rather than groups. Thirdly, interviewees might not have agreed to conduct group interviews because if they were not expressing the realities of their organisation, the other member would be

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aware their answer was insincere. Where possible, one to one interviews took place but some were conducted as pairs as it would have been socially awkward and impractical to ask one person to leave, e.g. Khalid Ouazzani & Nizar Abdessaied from Associo-Med and Fahima Askri and her volunteer assistant, Houriya Ben Hassine, at TAMSS.

The questions are structured in a specific order that start with an ‘ice-breaker’, designed to establish a rapport with the interviewee, then are arranged in sections relating to aspects of civil political culture. Sensitive issues, such as finance and documents from the organisation, were placed last (See question rationale in Technical Appendix for further details). This did not undertake a piloting process, as with the survey preparation, but I discussed my questions and received feedback from supervisors and other academics who had North African fieldwork experience in the creation phase, which allowed me to improve the questions and ensure they were not confusing. The translation process for the questions was similar to the survey as I completed it with the assistance of trained interpreters to ensure any meaning was not lost in translation. This also helped to refine the questions and reconsider what they are asking.

4. Interview process

Interviews often lasted 45 minutes but varied from 30 to 60 depending on time constraints; for example, Boubaker Bethabet (ONAT) and Khalil Gharibani (UTICA) could only afford 30mins. These time constraints meant that some questions were missed. The headquarters of the CSO or a café were the most common interview locations while some were conducted in the members’ homes. Interviews were conducted in English, if comfortable for the interviewee, otherwise in French or Tunisian Arabic with the assistance of an interpreter; most frequently by Myriam Ben Ghazi (former Journalist) and also Dorra Agrebi or Hamza Zaghdoud (interpreters). Interviews were recorded with the verbal consent of interviewees.
5. Data interpreting process

This flow chart represents the stages of interpretation and analysis that took place with the interview data that was collected in this research.

After conducting an interview, the interpreter and I would discuss the flow of the interview, whether we found it difficult, and our thoughts on the answers the interviewee gave. I made notes after each interview, sometimes on the findings of the interview or as comments and pointers to myself about how to conduct future interviews. For example, after two interviews in Sousse, I reflected on the limitations of rapport building and professionalism.

“I think he (Qais Lahmar) found the comment (where I showcased my knowledge of Arabic profanity), and the interview in general, amusing, yet it is important that I don’t seem too friendly or comical with my interviewees. We laughed a few times during the interview, but the balance of building a rapport and trust, or making the interviewee think of me joker is a fine line. I want them to take me and my work seriously, yet also feel comfortable enough to open up and be honest. Funnily enough, in the next interview Faycal Labayed swore. I think it’s important for me to maintain my professionalism, even if interviewees chose not to. I think Qais still found me amusing rather than offensive, so I think I finished the interview with my reputation intact.”
The process of transcribing interviews provided me with the chance to make further notes on the findings because I was more focused on the answers than the interview process. The data was codified because interviews were structured and the same questions were put to all interviewees, in the majority of cases and when time constraints were not a factor. In March and June, I made notes of the themes and trends that I was starting to notice appearing in the data. Once all the interviews were completed and transcribed, I read them all searching for themes and trends. I also sought to recognise and pay attention to interesting individual responses or cases and unique responses. With these summarised themes I was able to compare the findings to the theoretical frameworks of this thesis; evidence of civil political culture and democratic values and evidence of what type of institutional culture exists.

6. Interviews with Non-CSO members

The additional interviews with non-CSO members were conducted in order to verify my findings and to provide a more critical view of civil society and civil society activities. The decision to conduct further interviews was made after interviewing Intisar Kherigi from Jasmine Foundation (a Tunisian Think Tank that brings CSOs, academics, and politicians together), who saw herself and her organisation as part of civil society yet separate and different from other Tunisia CSOs. Intisar mentioned the following problems with Tunisian CSOs. They are poorly informed because the government does not release sufficient information and they do not conduct their own research. They rarely have solutions but often simply highlight problems. They spend too much time talking, not enough acting, and fail to run their own CSOs efficiently. In addition, CSOs have an exaggerated belief in their impact and influence on public and political space.

These interviews provided alternative opinions of civil society and balance to the research. There is a risk that CSO members had not been entirely honest about their practice, provided favourably optimistic views of civil society or especially favourable assessment of their own organisations. This verification is also necessary because I was not able to observe the behaviour (practice) of all the CSOs I interviewed. These interviews were with people who have experience of dealing with Tunisian CSOs, journalists, consultants or members of Non-Tunisian/ International CSOs, and demonstrate how CSOs are perceived by them. Pre-arranged questions
were included but interviews were not fully structured to allow greater flexibility. In order to verify or discredit my interview results, I discussed some of my findings asking whether or not they concurred or disputed them.

7. Results and findings

In comparison to the more easily separable quantitative research results produced in Chapter Six, the interview process produced results that demonstrated the six criteria of civil political culture were more interconnected and expressed through different themes. Furthermore, the results showed neither clear evidence nor the absence of the six criteria of civil political culture but rather how the interviewees understood and demonstrated them while expressing their limitations.

7.1. Tolerance through Trust and Transparency

The first finding was the manner in which Tolerance is linked to Trust, Transparency, cooperation and collaboration, independence, and the Islamist/secularist polarisation of society that occurs in civil society. It became evident in the interview process that Tolerance was a complicated criterion of civil political culture because it could not be understood in isolation and was interconnected with, and linked to, other issues. For the interviewees. Tolerance is conditional on the criteria of Trust but also values, co-operation and collaboration, in addition to the secular/Islamist divide based on the long-term vision for the state. Furthermore, Tolerance is not simply either evident or absent, but rather on a scale and the degree to which CSOs express tolerance varies. The levels of Tolerance are therefore defined by different factors and Tolerance is a scale between CSO member’s acceptance of other people’s existence in the public space to a refusal to work with Islamist groups based on an assumption of the latter’s long-term vision for an Islamised society. Therefore, the primary indicator for tolerance is the Islamist/secularist divide in political ideology.

Democracy requires tolerance of voices and opinions that other members of society and the public space may dislike. This means that democracy is initially an internal process. Some of the interviewees, however, are externalising democracy but stating democracy starts with the other and whether they believe in democracy or not. The accusation expressed in interviews that “We believe in democracy, but they don’t” is not a fully tolerant position because it fails to include their right to espouse an alternative vision. People who take this position might think they are being tolerant
but their unwillingness to accommodate, in their own vision of tolerance, views for the future of the Tunisian state are fundamentally different to their own represents a degree of intolerance.

Emna Menif admits that Kolna Tounes can work with other CSOs, and even on different goals, but only if they have the same values. Emna is “not supportive of the normalisation of Islamists” and she qualifies this by saying those who are part of the ‘Islamist project’ are participating in politics and democracy with the ultimate objective of turning Tunisia into an Islamic state. She thinks their participation is just a strategy because they believe in something completely different. She says she has a Humanist and Citizenship background, they use the Quran. Emna is very pro-democracy but her fear of anti-democratic forces represents an intolerance towards difference.

In the political sphere and prior to the interviews being conducted, the Ennahda party as the major part of the Troika government had constantly compromised on constitutional issues and stepped down from power to allow a technocratic government to rule. However, Islamist groups are not fully trusted. Adel Nagati of Journalists Association of Kairouan states that “There are people who don’t believe in democracy but are using it to attack democratic people like Hizb-Ettahrir”. However, Hizb-Ettahrir is a political party that was legalised by the Tunisian Government on 17 July 2012.

The reality of how democratic Islamist groups are is not relevant as there is an ideological position on the part of some secular CSO members that is fundamentally intolerant because it constantly assumes the Islamist ‘other’ is not democratic before the Islamist other acts. This represents a degree of intolerance. This research demonstrates that, for some, the boundaries of intolerance start when a group has, or is perceived to have, an Islamist vision or objectives. Those with Islamist values that underpin their civic engagement in the public sphere are then excluded from the vision and understanding of tolerance. Importantly, none of the CSOs I interviewed proclaimed they have an Islamist vision nor were any interviewees willing to label other CSOs as Islamist.

As mentioned with Emna Menif’s position, the interviewees’ understanding of Tolerance extends beyond the legal and legitimate existence of other CSOs in the
public sphere. It also includes those who they actively co-operate with, and their willingness to work with, people who do not share their values, whether they are Islamists or not. CSOs recognise the existence of Islamist groups but some do not approve of them and have no intention of working with them.

Jawher ben Mabarek explained Dostournana had collaborated with UGTT, ATID, Femmes Démocrates, LTDH and stated, “We can collaborate with organisations that have different objectives but not with different values, for instance, we won’t work with an organisation that defends the Niqab.” He added, “We can debate or participate in a discussion with an association that has an Islamist background but not work on an action with them, it is forbidden (in Dostoura guidelines).”

Marwa Mansouri from Association Cultivons la Paix somewhat echoes this sentiment by expressing, “For me, democracy is to accept the other who is different from you and work together for positive change.” She added, “I think that if we are trying to establish democracy then we need to work with people from different backgrounds because that is how we move forward. Being different does not mean that we can’t collaborate; there is certainly a minimum of common ground that we can find and work with.” However, she seems to contradict herself by also stating that “we work with other CSOs on one condition, they have to share our values.” The bringing together of difference and the requirement of sharing values are mutually exclusive requirements. It suggests levels of Equality and Tolerance that are conditional on her terms.

The majority of interviewed CSOs, however, express Tolerance through their willingness to work with other CSOs and in coalitions, despite differences, without mentioning the exclusion of any groups due to their long-term vision of the state. The following quotes are examples of this co-operative and inclusionary attitude.

- “We have to work altogether because we cannot work by ourselves, the impact would not be so good.” (Selim Abbou, Tounesa)
- “The nature of our CSO obliges us to collaborate with the other CSOs in our network and they don’t necessarily have the same objectives as we do. We also work with CSOs in partnership for certain projects in a certain amount of time.” (Riadh Werghi, Union des Jeunes Démocrates Tunisiens)
• “We have to put our differences aside and work, which is, of course, difficult.” (Amel Chaherli, Alwen Tounes)

• “Yes, and it's happened a few times like when many work for the same thing. E.g. In the 1st draft – Complimentary to Women; FTDES worked with Women’s groups etc. More than 40 organisations worked together. It depends on the issue, social and economic ones are popular.” (Messaoud Romdhani, FTDES)

Romdhani makes a salient point that civil society becomes effective when a large number or network of organisations can rally behind campaigning on a single issue, combined with media attention, then the government is forced to listen. For the majority of CSOs, the fragmented ‘solo’ campaigns are less effective, have less impact, and are easier to ignore. In addition to Destourna and Kolna Tounes, a smaller number of CSOs expressed a view that they cannot work with CSOs who have an Islamist vision.

• “We don’t work with organisations that have ideological backgrounds, like the Islamists” (Amira Achouri, Association of Kairouaneees for a Culture of Citizenship)

• “The Quranic associations can't be considered part of civil society because they are working on their own agenda.” (Kamel Abid, ATPC)

Some CSOs expressed they only work with people and CSOs that they trust. This means issues of Trust and Tolerance are linked, not isolated. However, the nuance is that Tolerance is passive compared to Trust being proactive as the trust of another entity is not required to tolerate them operating. For example, interviewees express cases and examples of distrust but not intolerance towards a range of actors and groups such as a lack of trust in Political parties.

• “Today civil society is in much stronger position than political parties and in the most recent survey Tunisians trust 1st the army and 2nd the CSOs.” (Samir Kilani, Ofiya)

• “I don’t see them (political parties) as honest, they are not transparent enough, they are not trustworthy. Maybe some of them have changed a little but they still have the old way of building up a political party, they are hierarchical so it’s very hard to climb the ladder, and are undemocratic and
the decision-making is between 2 or 3 or 10 people and there are thousands in the party.” (Zied Boussen, Jeunes Independent Démocrates)

Zied's points of being more attracted to civil society work than joining a political party and also of equating honesty and Transparency with Trust are reiterated by other interviewees. Interviewees also noted that people find working in civil society is more comfortable than political parties. Parties are not that transparent which sets a bad example for civil society, and there is a lack of trust in political parties, for example,

- “Political parties have always been preserved as “not so good to be part of”. We have always had a lack of trust toward people with political agenda.” (Jawher ben Mabarek, Destourna)
- “The people are sick of how bad the political parties are, so they go to civil society.” (Mohammed Masri, Network of Sidi Bouzid Associations)

There is evidence that CSOs are not entirely trusted, by the government and the public. The following quotes are examples of cases where Trust is yet to be established.

- “Under Ben Ali, civil society was hated, but now it's tolerated but not taken into consideration. E.g. Terrorism and violence, 2 years ago when artists were attacked, that was a warning that was ignored by the government. Because the old reflex and mentality of ‘you’re with us or against us’ still prevailed in the government. The mentality of the government did not change enough.” (Messaoud Romdhani, FTDES)
- “The government nationally and locally still sees the civil society as the enemy. There is no trust between the two sides. In Sidi Bouzid there is some collaboration with the local authorities.” (Aida Daly, TOUPAT)
- “Two months ago we invited the parents of members to a meeting and showed them the activities of the association, what we are doing, to break the ice between parents and our association, to let them talk to us and show we are like a second family for our members, and we have to have their trust in the association.” (Anis Boufrika, We Love Sousse)
However, there are numerous examples in the interview data that demonstrate how trust has developed between CSOs and others bodies, and additionally that trust is exhibited via cases of CSO collaboration and co-operation. *Mouraikboun, I-Watch* and *Al Bawsala*, three influential, watchdog CSOs, mention how trust has developed between the government and their organisation due to continued engagement.

- “We have daily contact with the Election commission, the election management authority, and parliament because we are monitoring them. It wasn’t respectful in the beginning but after some months and years, when they understood that we are not ‘against them’, but just fighting for the rights of the people and for open data and transparency of political process. And we proved that we are non-partisan, not fighting for any political parties, so I think they now respectful, and we don’t have any problems.” (Rafik Halouani, Mourakiboun)

- “I-Watch has a good reputation with the government. They know that we are neutral and independent and have no political affiliations. If you go to our Facebook page, for example, you will see criticism from us against the government and parties, but we don’t belong to any. When there is something wrong, we say it strongly, when something is true, we say it. When something happens that affects the neutrality of Tunisian civil society, the government becomes suspicious and more scared it.”

  “We work directly with the government on one thing, in the organisation of ‘International Anti-Corruption conference’, it will take place from 21-24th October 2014, and this conference is the biggest platform that will gather 1500 experts from 130 countries. This is in partnership with Tunisian Government and Transparency International, and it is hosted by I-Watch. Therefore, we are part of a steering a committee with Government including ministries of Transport, Finance, Tourism, Interior, Defence, all the vital ones.” (Mouheb Garoui, I-Watch)

Ghada Louhichi from *Al Bawsala* thinks the determination, perseverance, motivation, and professionalism of the staff has made *Al Bawsala* a successful and trusted CSO, but also adds that because it is their job as they are full-time paid staff.
“I remember when we were first observing in the NCA (National Constituent Assembly), one of the deputies was angry with us, Tahar Hmila, he’s one of the oldest, he doesn’t like us much. He said to me and my colleagues ‘Go find a job’, and she (one of Ghada’s colleagues) said ‘this is my job’. But we love our jobs. Every day we have something new, something different, or unexpected."... "Some of the deputies, when they introduce us to anyone, yesterday, for example, we were talking with some students from the United State who were in the NCA and one member said, “Ghada comes to the NCA even more than some deputies.” This shows some confidence and trust we have built with the deputies. It wasn’t easy, at the beginning they were suspicious, like ‘Who are you? ‘Why are you here? What agenda are you implementing?’ all these conspiracy theories, you know. For the commissions, we’re there from the beginning to the end, even late at night. They saw us working and they know we are not just reporting on the bad things.”

Furthermore, Trust and Financial Transparency are also connected and influence the potential for CSOs to collaborate and co-operate. This is based on Transparency providing a good impression because it implies Trust. The following quotes demonstrate how CSOs are unwilling or hesitant to work with other CSOs with opaque funding sources.

- “(Revealing sources of funding) is important for transparency and building trust between citizens and civil society.” (Mouheb Garoui, I-Watch)
- “Now with the boom of CSOs the situation is different, there so many CSOs and they can’t all be trusted in terms of funding so we continue to work with our historic partners.” “...we collaborate with organizations that we trust like LTDH and Femmes Democrats.” “We can collaborate with organization that have different objectives than ours on certain occasions, for instance when we worked on elections, we collaborated with the medical association and students associations and so on.” (Imen Bejoui, l'Association Tunisienne des Jeunes Avocats (ATJA)
- “We can’t really work with the newly created CSOs because we don’t know where they get their funding from so we are very sceptical about it and also lots of political parties are behind some CSOs and that goes against our first value which is Independence. It is not up to us to say whether these small
CSOs are trustworthy or not but we have a set of standards that we abide by and work with.” (Boubaker Bethabet, ONAT)

- “There is a lack of trust between citizens and CSOs mostly because of the funding sources. People know it is all foreign funding and so they have doubts about it. And Political parties have also discovered that civil society can bring them money so they started CSOs of their own, this increased the amount of distrust between people and civil society.” (Adel Nagati, Journalists Association of Kairouan)

- “We don't find it difficult to find funding because we have a brand and are a known organisation by funders and we interact with other funders, we have worked with funders and completed projects, they trust us and know how our work is.” (Ghazoua Lteif, Sawty) Trust has been established between Sawty and funding bodies who they have been working with for 2 years.

The legal framework, established by Law 88, allows Islamist organisations to exist but Messoud Romdhani (FTDES) highlighted that Salafist groups who call for violence are breaking the law. Therefore, Romdhani understands the law as being the crucial criterion of Tolerance because Tolerance is defined by what is legal. Beyond the legal framework, there is no agreement of tolerance in civil society. While the law, indeed the Tunisian political system, remains in transition, discovering the limits of tolerance is a challenge for the new democracy.

Moez Ali of UTIL claimed his rejection of Islamism is based on freedom of conscience. UTIL is a Humanitarian CSO but worked on the ‘Bus Citoyen’ project with 5 other CSOs who all had different goals; Sawty (Youth), TOUENSA (Citizenship), ACT ‘khammem ou karrer’ (economic and cultural development of disadvantaged regions of Tunisia), Femmes et Dignité (Women’s Rights), and ATIDE (Transparency and Corruption-fighting). Ali explained ‘Bus Cityon’ aimed to encourage voting because “Women’s rights were threatened after the Revolution. Certain factions who do not believe in the role of women in society, Salafists and extremists, wanted women out of politics, cover their heads and to stay at home.” This represents the ability of CSO to cooperate and collaborate within their own circle of Tolerance. Ali explained his position and why the ‘Bus Citoyen’ project took place.

“We are a country that has strong Islamic roots that goes back to the 14th Century, so we are not in a position to take lessons from others to bring other
ways of thinking, other ideologies and insert them in our society. We have no lessons to take from the others. My grandmother and mother grew up in a moderate state with a modern Islam, that respects women, values of the family, and people in general. And it gives freedom of thinking, it’s mentioned in the Constitution as freedom of conscience. But people don't understand freedom of conscience, it’s to be judged for what we do and not what we think. This is the Islam we know, and these are the values Islam we know. So the people who want to insert the Wahhabism, which was created in the early 19th century, so they are not in a position to give us lessons about Islam. We grew up knowing that the only one who can judge us is God, not people. This is how we grew up and how we want Tunisia to be."

This suggests that Ali’s fundamental normative position is tolerant. His objection to Islamists is because, according to Ali, they do not want tolerance. Ali, therefore, cannot tolerate what he believes to be intolerance. Members of Tunisian civil society who reject what they perceive to be intolerant behaviour or attitudes demonstrates their ‘externalisation of democracy’; the manner in which their understanding of tolerance begins with their assessment or judgement of others. From the other perspective, Yassine Jebloui of Notre Santé d’Abord, a medical support CSO, is the only interviewee to explain any specific incidences of intolerance expressed by Islamists. This suggests that most interviewees exhibit bias against Islamists for only reasons of ideological difference. Yassine explained how his CSO was prevented from operating.

"We had one problem when we worked near Nabeul, people said you can’t come here because there were religious people, you know extremists, who didn’t want us to go. They didn’t want us to help with giving out glasses and I think there are a lot of associations who work with Ennahda and work as religious associations who mainly work in this area (healthcare) and they do not want to have competition."

"There was another problem that we had, sometimes you make an action, and then after you have people who are from Ennahda who said that 'we called them to help you'. This happened in Manouba."

"In Nabeul, there are a lot of problems and a lot of extremists. They were governing there, and if they say you can’t go, then you can’t go. Sometimes you
have associations who work there who say we only want the Islamic associations to work here, not the other ones.” (Yassine Jebloui, Notre Santé d’abord)

Despite interviewees criticising Islamists, the belief that Islamists organisations should be stopped or banned from participating in the public sphere was not expressed. This represents the attitude that freedom should still be afforded to these groups and an understanding of tolerance that is related to freedom of speech.

These results indicate that the boundaries of tolerance are dependent on trust, transparency, and exhibited through willingness or lack therefore, to co-operate and collaborate. Their approach to what should not be tolerated are certainly dependent on degree of acting within the law and in some cases but not exclusively, whether the ‘other’ is classified as Islamist or not. The extent to which Tunisian CSOs exhibit democratic culture is shaped by the perception of Islamist groups. There are interviewees who did not present in their discourse any expressed objections or reservations towards those with Islamist visions for Tunisia’s future. However, for those who did, this means their perception of democracy is exclusive of the Islamists vision. Islamism influences their understandings of and attitudes towards Trust, Tolerance, and Transparency. Furthermore, Islamism shapes whether a CSO is viewed as Independent or is considered plausible for cooperation and collaboration. Cooperation is a step further beyond tolerance as interviewees expressed that tolerance is a prerequisite for cooperation and collaboration. The reason some secularists express intolerance towards Islamist is because they are afraid of the non-democratic element of the Islamist vision.

7.2. Legally established Freedom

Freedom and Tolerance are linked by the civil society member’s understanding of the public space. Freedom to operate in this public space is a dramatic improvement in comparison to the Ben Ali era where even non-political CSOs were not granted legal status or were restricted. For example, physician Souhail Alouini, from Open Gov Tunisia, was prevented from forming a medical CSO in 2006 and Sfax Outdoor Sports President Zaher Kammoun told me they were not permitted to engage in caving because the Ministries of Interior and Defence linked it to terrorist activities. Freedom is understood as a technical, more neatly defined legal issue regarding how much room CSOs are permitted and where the boundaries of freedom are marked as
the use of violence and hate speech. CSO members recognise that freedom is required to ensure the quality of democracy. CSOs are protected by law 88 therefore interviewees explained that the government has not shutdown their operations, they have not experienced interference from religious groups, and rather than being pressured by the government, they feel that they are the ones who are applying pressure. Amira Yahyahoui (Al Bawsala) said “They wouldn’t dare” while Faycal Labayed (Sousse Demain) rhetorically asked, “Do I look like I give in to pressure?” There were only two cases where interviewees mention state interference and interruption of their activities.

- “We wanted to work on the rural women health but we faced resistance from male farmers and even the Ministry of Health, so many hospitals didn’t let us in. Police as well were following us for a while.” (Hachem Aydi, Cultural Association Mouwantaneen)
- “There is a lot of pressure on CSOs coming mainly from the ministry of interior, political parties, and some Salafist groups. Mainly Ennahda controls the south of Tunisia so they would vandalize our projects and events and they would even infiltrate the beneficiaries to sabotage us. As for the ministry of interior there were always correspondences and phone calls to have us change or shut down a project and we were arrested couple times during events in Sidi Bouzid and Kassrine. They had also shut down one of our project for security reasons (the project was by Chaambi Mountain.” (Riadh Wergi, Union des Jeunes Démocrates Tunisiens)

Cases such as the latter could provide a reason for intolerance towards Islamists groups that is based on a reaction and informed by experience rather than ingrained ideological intolerance. Riadh did not know if the people who have interfered with their work were connected to the Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution.

Interviewees understood that the freedom in the space that the state gives civil society is not limitless. The limits of the freedom afforded to CSOs are hate speech and calling for or implementing violence. The statistical results from Chapter Five also suggest that CSO members believe there should be limits to freedom of speech. Messoud Romdhani (FTDES) states that Salafists groups that are calling for violence and intolerance are breaking the law of associations. Indeed, Law 88 states,
“Article (4): Associations are prohibited from the following: One: Adopting in their bylaws, data, programs or activities any incitement for violence, hatred, fanaticism or discrimination on religious, racial or regional grounds.”

This demonstrates that the Tunisian state has played a role in ensuring that civil society is legally civil. This is also in agreement with the argument Jamal (2007) makes, that civil society is not an independent variable but is influenced the system of government.

7.3. Equality and Pluralism identified in the democratic practices, learning processes and Institutional Culture

Equality and Pluralism are criteria of civil political culture that are expressed through the CSO's internal dynamics and therefore more easily identified. Equality is equal opportunity for anyone (gender, age, ethnicity, religion, or sexuality) to become members and, once a member, the chance to influence the CSO or gain executive bureau positions. Equality is indicated, internally, by equal opportunities and lack of exclusion in CSO membership. By contrast, inequality is demonstrated by friends and family members, certain age groups, a gender or an ethnicity being given preferential treatment.

Pluralism is the inclusion of diverse opinions and the spread or decentralisation of power and decision-making. Pluralism is indicated by consultative, collaborative, or democratic decision-making processes in which there are mechanisms for members to influence the decisions and the membership of the executive bureau. Power is multi-dimensional rather than concentrated in the hands of the CSO president or founder. If organisations have consultative decision-making processes or a mechanism for members to influence decisions, this suggests that they are Pluralist. Whereas if decisions are top-down from the executive bureau or against the membership’s wishes, this implies a lack of Pluralism. There are limitations to pluralism with regards to members who are from political parties. Law 88 states that party members are not allowed to gain executive bureau positions in CSOs. However, most cases of equality and pluralism were expressed through the CSO's institutional culture: the extent to which their practices and their decision-making processes were democratic. The composition of a CSO’s bureau exécutif is also an indicator of

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equality and the following quotes highlight the extent of gender diversity in CSO bureaus.

- “We have an executive bureau that is composed of 7 members five of them are women and two are men. 30% of us are of youth. Every idea is welcomed whether it is coming from the executive bureau or from the members, we don’t make the distinction. We get together we talk about it and execute the plan.” (Saloua Ghrissa, ATPDD)
- “The bureau is divided equally between both genders.” (Yassin Nasr, President of Association Cepsa)
- “Democracy in Tunisia needs so much more time to be established. I think after the revolution women everywhere should be in decision-making position, you might say that I am only saying that because I am a woman but the truth is that I believe women should be given an equal opportunity to lead challenge because I believe in this transitional period we need finesse, flexibility and strength and women combine the 3.” (Imen Bejoui, ATJA)

The power relations between the bureau and regular members also expressed the extent of equality and pluralism. Jawhar’s description of Destourna, as “a completely decentralised, network of small cells”, was a unique case, but most CSOs described how their leadership takes the major decisions while being considerate to the membership. Amir explains how WeYouth’s bureau is receptive to feedback.

- “At the end of any project we made, we ask them (the members) for their opinions. Sometimes they are unhappy and say what they want.” “We have a good bureau but I support the idea that everyone is a normal member and we’re all the same. It’s not the era of the executive board giving all the orders.”... “I was a member of another Tunisian NGO, so when I feel that my work was just the Bureau’s gain and they want to force any idea or project, so I said I don’t feel comfortable so I quit. So I don’t want my members to quit.” (Amir Ben Ameur, WeYouth)

Furthermore, interviewee's explanations of their CSO’s decision-making processes and democratic practices, such as discussion, consensus, and voting, were also representations of Equality and Pluralism. The following quotes express how different CSOs implement inclusive practices.
“I am the President but we don’t support bureaucracy. But always, if I want to take initiative, I present the ideas to the board members and we debate and have discussions about that initiative and if this project will be ok, what would be gained, what obstacles we may face. So we make a kind of plan about the project, basically, we support democracy in our NGO.” “I think leadership is not about taking decisions or being authoritarian, but you have to have influence, if you have an idea and support it with arguments and motivation, all of us work like this, if you have an idea just suggest it.” (Amir Ben Ameur, WeYouth)

“I’m a team player, not a ruler. The CSOs is happy because of the teamwork. We listen to each other, there no one person who decides. We vote for which theme we are going to work on, and then we select three themes that are the most relevant to Sidi Bouzid and proceed to vote on them.” (Ghada Chokri, President of I-Lead)

“Most of the ideas are from the bureau because we are part of this environment and we know the needs and what the region lacks and we try to stay apolitical and keep the association out of the political feud.” (Abderrahamane Hadj Belgacem, Gabes Action)

“As for ideas, they usually come from the members and also the ideas that our followers on FB might suggest.” (Adel Nagati, Journalists Association of Kairouan)

“We have a Facebook page and whoever has any suggestions or anything can send a message to the inbox. We also have meetings once or twice a month.” (Amel Amraoui, Sajin 52)

“There is no president who gives orders. We all are presidents and members.” (Chedly Ben Messaoud, Association Djerba Ulysse)

“We are a very Horizontal association.” (Adel Hechimi, Friends of the Miners Basin)

“Inside these walls, we practice democracy, we have a book for suggestions or we can also accept suggestions in our weekly meeting and then we vote to determine which ones to execute.” (Naceur Yassine, Cepsa)

Sawty is a large CSO with regional chapters but Ghazoua explains the overall feeling of unity rather than having regional loyalty.
• “The members all feel like ‘we are Sawty’ first of all, they (each chapter) are not very independent of each other. They are trying to focus on each region because each region has its own specificities so they try to target the youth there and respond to their particular needs. But Chapters try to coordinate with each other when they work, and they all identify themselves as Sawty. The duty of the national board is to notice when a chapter is going far from the fields we work in and help try to remain focused on the collective aims. National projects and activities gather all the members.” (Ghazoua Ltaief, President of SAWTY)

• “We believe in unity, we have been trying to teach Tunisians to get over regionalism, tribalism, and nepotism.” (Sami Tahri, UGTT Spokesman)

Institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), whereby organisations hold similar attitudes, engage in similar practices and operate with similar management styles, was not evident in the survey results of Chapter Six. The inquiry into the existence of isomorphism is relevant because it seeks to establish whether a central tendency or similar trends exist in Tunisian CSOs or whether they are varied and heterogeneous. Isomorphism is conventionally applied to institutional practices. However, this research applies it to examine the extent of political culture norms convergence between CSOs. The interview data largely confirms that organisations are not necessarily becoming increasingly similar or are adopting a certain, singular approach to civil activism. This is partly due to the varying objectives of CSOs which require different approaches. Delivering their message and initiating or implementing change is a common theme for CSOs. However, political watchdogs, awareness raising groups, and charity or service providers operate differently, each according to their goals. Furthermore, the manner in which groups deliver their messages varies. Some use public displays in press releases and conferences or training workshops. Others target the general public through their projects. Some engage in seeking to influence National Constituent Assembly (NCA) members through lobbying in person or sending written recommendations. Oppositional-Resistance approaches of protests, demonstration, or sit-ins were also employed.

Regarding management style, interviewees often cited Al Bawsala as a great example of a CSO because they are effective and influential. However, their business model is not possible for all other CSOs to aspire to or even imitate. Al Bawsala is a unique,
professional reporting and watchdog association that became the most trustworthy information source on NCA activities. As the interview with Amira Yahyaoui demonstrated, they may have a pro-democracy agenda, but their institutional culture has been centred around Amira’s leadership and top-down mentoring rather than democratic practice and decision-making processes. In contrast, Ghazoua Lteif (Sawty) explains how she is inspired by various CSOs and tries to incorporate new ideas.

“We are trying to build our own model, as a Youth organisation we are different, and there are not really a big number of youth organisations working with youth so we do not have a model in Tunisia because 90% of the NGOs you see today were created post-Revolution so we are all in the stage of learning. Even the old organisations, for me, are not very inspiring models. When I travel and see organisations abroad, I am inspired. There are great initiatives. Every time I go to a foreign training session or exchange programme, I try to learn new tools and skills, and then transfer them to members of Sawty when I get back. Even from the Arab World, not just European or American models. US models are very professional but I’ve seen some great initiatives in Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt.”

In addition to different approaches civic activity CSOs seek to undertake, the variation in training CSOs receive adds to the diversity in civil society. The range of both Tunisian and International consultant-trainers and funding bodies that provide training for CSOs, such as British Council, British Embassy, The Department for International Development (DFID), USAID, The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), The National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) or GiZ (the German Society for International Cooperation), suggests a pluralism of approaches to civic activism.

Inquiry into issues of transparency demonstrated that most organisations require funding for their activities and some CSOs demonstrated similar discourses regarding their acquisition of funding. Energy Sector INGO Associate, Lucy Kamoun, noted that some Tunisian CSOs understood the norms and the language they must adopt to be successful with their proposal applications.
“As CSO associate, I had to evaluate a large number of local CSO proposals for our small grants program. Our INGO’s proposal template follows the same guidelines and structures many other international donors follow. I noticed that CSOs are aware of the ‘donor jargon’ and their proposals usually reflect what they believe the donor wants to hear, from the way their proposal objectives and outcomes are phrased to the operational and financial management style they adopt for their proposed projects. It is not a surprise that the ‘successful’ Tunisian CSOs such as Bawsala and I Watch are those well versed in grant proposal writing and who are more able to attract funding.”

In addition to using the international standard terminology, some CSOs tailor their projects to align with the donor’s requirements in order to gain funding. However, others reject funding if it contains conditions or does not suit their needs. Ghada Chokri explained how I-Lead refused support from a Danish organisation (VNG) because they could not agree on terms: I-Lead wanted training assistance but VNG could not provide it. Another CSO that did not bow to international donor’s requirements was Inara, a charity organisation that aims to provide logistics rather than operating with a budget. The founder Sami Chaherli explained how low means can still have a high impact and that it is possible to make positive change a without huge budgets and international funding. “I don't need money for the association; I can give you a list of 10 families, or 50 students, or schools. You can send them food, clothing, supplies, in the name of the association or by yourself. No money needs to go into the Inara account if people don't want.”

Despite variations in practices, similar trends in normative values were evident. Democratic practices, essential to civil political culture, were considered normatively desirable and appearing to be an independent was vital. Interviewees also conveyed the importance of members’ inclusiveness and members having equality and freedom to express themselves. While institutional isomorphism was not clearly present, the diversity in types of CSOs and the methods they employ demonstrates the vibrancy of Tunisian civil society.

7.4. Women and Racism: the limitations of Equality

The limitations of equality were evident when addressing the status of Women and the issue of racism. In contrast to the mentalité of male superiority that tangibly manifests within party leadership (Petkanas, 2013: 10), there are many female
leaders in Tunisian CSOs and 22 of the 66 interviewees were women. Article 3 of Law 88\textsuperscript{63} requests that CSOs observe equality and the interview data certainly suggests that women are not marginalised and gender equality is evident in civil society. CSOs were a driving force in protesting against the first draft of the constitution that included an article regarding Women’s ‘complimentary’ status in relation to men\textsuperscript{64}. Messaoud Romdhani (FTDES) explained how “\textit{More than 40 organisations worked together}” on campaigning against this article. Women’s rights are often vehemently defended in the liberal agenda against intolerance or Islamism. Anis Boufrika thinks the constitution is thanks to the hard work of NGOs and Tunisian Women. He also is adamant that Tunisian Women are a vital difference because “Women are harder to corrupt than men.” The statistical results in Chapter Six also suggest agreement with Boufrika.

Although the following issues cannot lead to generalisations but only point to underlying nuances, there were a few cases where gender-related issues were highlighted. Firstly, the perceived threat that Ennahda poses to women’s rights has made women an important post-revolutionary issue, but also something that can be exploited. Discussing why their organisation has refused advances from any political party, Wafa Garbout thinks parties try to work with CSOs for their own gains and to appear gender sensitive. “They’re using you just for their image, especially women, because they want to seem liberal and progressive” (Wafa Garbout, United Colleges Association (UCA). Secondly, both UGTT and LTDH talked about the need to change with the times, especially integrating more women and youth, which suggests these organisations are male dominated. Thirdly, although gender-parity exists in CSOs, women leaders still face the struggle of men challenging their authority. Imen Bejoui explained the difficulties she faces.

“As a woman, I have always felt that I was not in the decision-making process, I was respected but not included. Now being the president of ATJA I am the decision maker and it is not an easy task but I am up for the challenge.” (Imen Bejaoui, ATJA)

\textsuperscript{63} Decree Number 88 for the Year 2011 Pertaining to Regulation of Associations, Published on 24 September 2011, translated by International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Available at http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tunisia/88-2011-Eng.pdf

\textsuperscript{64} Wording on women sparks protest in Tunisia, (19 August 2012), Al Jazeera, Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/201281981854620325.html
Fourthly, despite being President, Amira Achouri explained, “I’m the only girl in the organisation, so it’s difficult to manage things in a group of men” (Amira Achouri, Association of Kairouanees for a Culture of Citizenship). It was unclear exactly what she meant but it could imply a degree of sexism or that, as a woman, it is harder to convey authority, she is not trusted or her ability to take the right decision would be questioned. Furthermore, nearly all of the strong female leaders are based in Tunis: Amira Yahyaoui, Selima Abbou, Emna Menif, Marwa Mansouri, Imen Bejaoui, Amal Amraoui, Intisar Kherigi, and Ghazoua Ltaief. As Amira Achouri is based in Kairouan, a more conservative city in the interior region, it possible that female leaders away from the capital are more likely to face these issues. Hasham Aidi, President of Cultural Association Mouwantaneen, a CSO based in Reugeb, a small town the Sidi Bouzid Governorate, explained the appeal of their organisation to women.

“For us here, people, especially girls and women, join in because it is an opportunity for them to leave their houses, their daily routine and to meet up with people (friends of the opposite gender) who she can’t meet elsewhere like in her house.”

This is not to suggest that organisations express inequality but this case highlights that female inclusion can be limited by the conservative social conventions in some parts of Tunisia regarding a woman’s role in society. Therefore, CSOs that have a neutral base of operations or headquarters (locale in French) have the social advantages of allowing women a more respectable location in the public space than the male-dominated café scene, thus potentially preventing further unequal participation. This suggests equality exists despite social norms. In addition, CSOs provide a democratic public space, which is a positive indicator of the role CSOs play in democratisation. Indeed, women’s participation, particularly from conservative areas, in CSOs cannot be reduced to the availability of a locale and this issue is beyond the scope of the study, therefore this thesis does not seek to make any wider claims about the status of women in Tunisian civil society.

No racism or race-related issues were expressed in any interview, except with Saadia Mosbah of Mnemty, an awareness-raising, pro-Human Rights, education, and development CSO. This is partly because Mosbah argues that racism is not recognised as a problem in Tunisia but that an underlying layer of racism exists in society and therefore civil society. For example, slave names are still on birth certificates and
how a teacher called a student using the term "slave". Mosbah explained how Mnemty asked the NCA to make committing racism a crime but they refused to discuss this topic. She thinks it contrary to the idea of Human Rights and equality if race issues are ignored. She acknowledges Mnemty are begrudgingly accepted.

“We are independent and that scares other organisations, so they feel obliged to invite us to their events, but at 11PM the day before it takes place. They are afraid that we will take the money of the funders, but we will prove them wrong, and we will show them that we can work without the money.”

As only one interview addresses racism, this thesis does not seek to make any wider claims about the status of racial equality in Tunisian civil society.

7.5. Independence and effectiveness: the limitations of Pluralism

The limitations of pluralism were also evident for two major reasons. Firstly, in the prevention of politicisation and maintenance of independence. Secondly, in favour of organisation efficiency where strong leadership, succession planning, and sustainability can take priority over democratic practices and therefore hinder the pluralism of the organisation.

Law 88 seeks to prevent the overlap between the political sphere and civil society activity by stating that “Article (9): Founders and directors of an association must not be among those who assume the central management posts in political parties.”65 Furthermore, organisations pride themselves on their independence from control or affiliation to political parties for reasons relating to Trust. In spite of a legal limitation to complete inclusion and pluralism, Mouheb from I-Watch explained how they maintain a balance of independence without being exclusionary.

“We have very strict rules, I-Watch doesn’t accept members that belong to political parties, however, the main principle in I-Watch is “No exclusion” so these members with political affiliations don’t have access and cannot be involved in lobbying and advocacy projects. You can be a member and watch what we are doing but you cannot get involved in the projects, especially the elections ones. If you want to get involved in I-Watch, you just gotta resign from your political party. We do not discourage young people from joining

political parties but we believe that the two don’t match or work together. Choose civil society or political parties. The board members are not in anyways allowed to join political parties, or even express on their Facebook page affiliation or alignment with political parties.” (Mouheb Garoui, I-Watch)

Whether an organisation that promotes or advocates for democracy has to, in fact, be democratic itself is a contentious issue. However, interviewees largely agreed that it was the case and even viewed it as a requirement.

Despite the normative desirability of internal democratic elections or voting procedures, either regarding the selection of leadership and bureau members or consultation with members regarding the organisation’s decisions or actions, CSOs are seeking to strike a balance. On one hand, having skilled personnel is vital to making the organisation run effectively and bring sufficient stability to enable the organisation to develop. On the other hand, applying democratic ideals, such as pluralism and equality, and including democratic practices to determine which member is given decision-making authority may increase the CSOs credibility. Implementing too many democratic practices too soon can, in some cases, be detrimental to the CSO’s effectiveness. Ensuring that the organisation is an established and functioning entity before power is transferred has been served to be a prudent approach for some. Presidents of professional (salaried) CSOs tend to have more expertise and have not stepped down because they are concerned that replacements would not have sufficient abilities to do their job. For example, Yahyaoui (Al Bawsala) and Masmoudi are both looking to eventually step down but are in the process of training or looking for suitable replacements. (Martin, 2015: 805)

“Of course I’m going to say it’s very participatory [laughs]. Unfortunately, until today all the ideas for the projects were mine. When I talk about the people who will take over this NGO, they are excellent at doing the work but don’t have enough initiative. In the beginning, I was involved in each detail, maybe this scared some of them because none of them were activists before, I am the only one who was active under Ben Ali, so they didn’t have the same way of thinking and treating Politicians.”
“The big problem I had was Al Bawsala was mine, and I used my name to promote it, I mean if it wasn’t me Sahbi Atig would never have given up one hour a week. I worked on the ground a lot and then over time I had to stay more in the office because when you read what the press was writing about Al Bawsala, its ‘Amira’s NGO’ or sometimes just my name …now the staff are becoming more independent and more involved, having more ideas” (Amira Yahyaoui, Al Bawsala).

To move away from this personification of Al Bawsala, Amira began sending other team members to radio shows, interviews, and conferences and stopped any involvement with the *Al Bawsala* website. Amira planned to leave *Al Bawsala* in one year’s time (and did so in June 2015) but was mentoring Ons Ben Abdelkarim to succeed her. This was not a democratic succession process, but a handover rather than an election took place to ensure the continued effectiveness of the organisation. Masmoudi points to a lack of ability in Tunisia.

“I would like to hire an Executive Director, who will work under me, and possibly in a few years I could quit, I have no intention of being President for life, but it takes time to build these skills, especially in Tunisia, they don’t have them. You have to be careful who you hire as Executive Director, we still haven’t found somebody we can trust to run the organisation.” ... “In civil society, in general, we don’t have the skills, these are new organisations, and we don’t have a lot of people who have experience in running organisations, especially non-profit ones.” (Radwan Masmoudi, CSID)

Some voluntary CSOs have decided to maintain stability and consistency with their managing personal and leaders. Moez Ali has been the only President of Union des Tunisiens Indépendants pour la Liberté (UTIL) as the other founding members left or pursued a career in politics. His years of pre-2011 experience with USAID had enabled the members to re-elect him. His family members are also not involved in UTIL because he considered that “this isn’t moral.” He is not, however, overly controlling as he explains UTIL project managers are given complete control over their work. He explained that he is looking to step down to enable “younger people to

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66 Amira is famous in Tunisia because her father, Mokhtar Yahyaoui, a judge and human rights activist, was a vocal opponent of the corruption undertaken by the Ben Ali regime.

67 Ennahda NCA member for Ariana and chair of Ennahda the parliamentary group.
take over.” The presidents of organisations I interviewed generally had the intention of, eventually, resigning and transferring leadership, recognising it is the right thing to do. Many echoed the sentiment of Saadia Mosbah, President of M’nemty, “It’s high time I stepped down at the next general assembly.” This suggests that remaining in power indefinitely would no longer be considered an acceptable practice. Conversely, Chawki Gaddes (ATDC) told me, ‘I tried to step down in the last General assembly but the whole bureau refused’ because they feared the organisation would not function as effectively without him. (Martin, 2015: 805)

Amira told me “Tunisians love to discuss, but never to work” and recalled an occasion when a CSO member told Amira she is like a TGV (French high-speed train), a testament to both Al Bawsala’s effectiveness and her strong leadership. She responded that they are like a yellow Tunisian bus; slow. If a CSO that has a strong leader with experience, expertise and is effective at ‘getting things done’, democratic practices can sometimes be bypassed or overlooked in favour of efficiency and effectiveness in CSO activity, even if the CSO promotes democracy. In this case, equality and pluralism are compromised.

Being a democratic CSO is a normatively ideal position, indeed many interviewees state we have to ‘practice what we preach’, for example, “You cannot advocate for transparency and participatory democracy if you are not applying this internally” (Mouheb Garoui, I-Watch). Anis Boufrika (We Love Sousse) concurs; “I am very convicted to democratic ways and democratic values, and if we defend these values, we have to apply them.” However, the balancing act between democracy and effectiveness is a logical and practical explanation for where the limits of pluralism exist.

What CSO members have been learning about democracy reveals the processes of change they have been undertaking and indicates degrees of Equality and Pluralism. Attempting to implement democracy has made members realise they need to be pluralistic and treat members equally. The following quotes demonstrate what, and the ways in which, CSOs have been learning about democracy in addition to how it is practically implemented.

- “For us, democracy also means involvement, if you are the president of a CSO that does not mean that you are always right when you discuss your ideas
with others and listen to their ideas, that is when you have better results.” (Radwan Fatnassi, FTDES)

- “The most important thing we have learned is the practice of democracy, the acceptance of other views and the tolerance and the importance of consensus.” (Zouhayer Hammoudi, Government Participative)

- “In democracy there are a lot of values that you might be totally convinced are correct and would be willing to fight to see implemented. However, because of democracy, other people may be convinced of the opposite, and if the vote favours them, you find yourself losing the battle. Learning to accept defeat is important” (Mohsen Mhadhbi, ARAA Pour la Civilisation et Citoyenneté)

- “We learned democracy in theory and we have the chance to practice it our CSO while having our elections, writing our status and discussing projects. We learned how not to be afraid to disagree and say it straightforward”. (Aida Daly, TOUPAT)

- “We learned that we have to listen to each other and that there should not be one person who decides.” (Ghada Chorki, I-Lead)

- “Decisions should not be taken vertically and there should be room for debates. Voting should be the way to solve our disagreement and we should resort to voting if consensus can’t be reached. Also, working with other CSOs contributed to our learning about democracy, doing this kind of activities should be very collaborative and so no CSO should dominate the decision making” (Adel Hechimi, Friends of the Miners Basin)

- “For me, civil society is like a smaller prototype for society. CS is a prototype of the society in general if we can work on being democratic in our organisation it is a start, and then we can move to applying democracy in the family and schools. So we don’t take unilateral decisions, we use voting instead.” (Myriam Belhaj, OVC)

- “We can say ‘no’ and we are allowed to disagree. The President of the CSO can be challenged and should listen to what other members have to say and do what the majority decides. We often disagree, so we resort to voting.” (Wissem Ksiksi, Oxygen)

Jawher Ben Mabarek (Destourma) found that the application of democracy is also different to how he had previously understood the concept. “I thought that
democracy was about laws and texts and I found out that is a culture of the people. The problem is we live in a country where the culture of people is not democratic so we need to rebuild this society.” Other interviewees concurred, describing how they understood that a specific culture is required to support the processes and institutions of democracy.

- “Elections are not the definition of democracy” (Marwa Mansouri, Association Cultivons la Paix)
- “Democracy is a process but it’s also a mentality. This is something you hear in lots of NGOs, that it’s about a revolution in mindsets, like a Cultural Revolution, and this is something we’re struggling with, how do we achieve this?” (Intisar Kherigi, Jasmine Foundation)

Furthermore, interviewees who described democracy as something new or unfamiliar to Tunisia, indicate that change and learning are occurring, despite the process being slow.

- “We are not used to democracy, before the revolution we didn’t have any, not in our political life and not even in our family life.” (Houda Khalil, Zaghoun Centre for Development and Democracy)
- “We learned a lot. In the beginning, there was a ‘diarrhoea of democracy’ where people don’t know the limits. Democracy is good, but there are limits of liberty; everyone has to know that your liberty stops where other’s starts. We learned through our organisation that you cannot ask for everything, there are limits. But we’re still learning. The process of learning democracy is not finished, it will take more time. We’re quick, for sure, but I think it will take 5 to 10 years and the new generation will fully understand the meaning and the rules of democracy.” (Souhayel Alouini, Open Gov TN)

In conjunction with the democracy learning processes, interviewees expressed the training opportunities with which CSOs can engage. These were chances for members to increase their organisation’s capacities in addition to their understanding of democracy. Interviewees indicated that knowledge and skills are passed on within CSOs, from trained to untrained, while CSOs are helping mentor others.
• “We were present at many conferences and capacity-building training sessions. We learned about democracy and elections. We even organised an event about how to do elections and the role associations play during elections, and how they must be equal and neutral but must observe.” (Abderrahamane Hadj Belgacem, Gabes Action)

• “Civil society is about ‘enabling people’ by giving them practical skills, and I think civil society is the perfect antidote to the education system. The Tunisian education system teaches people how NOT to think, it’s about groupthink and how to answer the question exactly the way they want you to answer it: memorise and regurgitate. Civil society is providing a much bigger space where people can do things in different ways and even fail. Our education system doesn’t allow failure. If you’re a failure it’s stamped on your forehead because everyone knows who repeated a year. Our education system is really theoretical, it’s abstract and lacks practice but civil society is an arena for tangible learning.” (Intisar Kherigi, Jasmine Foundation)

This learning process that all these CSOs describe relates to De Tocqueville’s idea that civil society is a school of democracy. In this process CSO members are learning that disagreement is not a problem but it can be overcome, learning to accept defeat, learning the practical aspects of democracy, learning the culture of democracy, and learning to be organised in order to be able to perform a democratic function towards the state. Rafik had a particularly interesting point about what democracy can reveal.

“I have discovered the real face of human beings. We are working on sensitive issues, elections and election results, sometimes people try to corrupt you, to bribe you, to threaten you. How people talk behind your back. It’s not easy, we discovered another face of people, and we learned how political parties and MPs are working. It confirmed suspicions and allegations he had about politicians” (Rafik Halouani, Mourakiboun).

8. Reflections

I chose to conduct one to one interviews, but there were some of the cases where I conducted interviews with two people at the same time, from the same organisation, produced interesting responses, for example with Khalid Ouazzanī & Nizar
Abdessaied from Associo-Med. Khalid regarded certain issues civil society as political, whereas in Nizar’s opinion they were purely civic. This debate is not unique to Tunisia and is a reflection of DeTocquevillian Vs Gramscian conceptualisations of civil society. Nizar was sceptical of civil society working with the government or in political fields and thought civil society should be like a hobby, where friends meet to do what they feel or undertake actions for the good of society that benefit the country; close to a liberal-associative model. Khalid thought differently and that civil society has to have an impact on the government or the government would never address the problems of society. Also, that civil society should be a power, which applies pressure to the government, if required; otherwise there is nothing else to check the government’s powers. This debate represented the diversity in the understanding of civil society in Tunisia.

9. Chapter Conclusions

This chapter reveals that the criteria of civil political culture are evident in the discourses of the interviewed Tunisian CSOs members. In particular, evidence exists of Equality and Pluralism as most CSOs express a degree of consultation between leaders and members and inclusive decision-making procedures. The quantitative survey in Chapter Six sought to independently measure each criterion of civil political culture in CSOs. The interviews discussed in this chapter, however, demonstrate that CSO members view some of these criteria as interconnected. The limitations of Tolerance in civil society are linked to Freedom, Trust, and Transparency. This impacts on the relationships between CSOs and is evidenced by the fact that CSOs’ ability to collaborate and co-operate is shaped by the perception of whether the ‘other’ in civil society is Islamist or not.

Regarding the internal dynamics of CSOs, despite recognition of the importance of practicing democracy, certain organisations sometimes chose to overlook Pluralism to a certain extent by focusing on efficiency and effectiveness of their work and the development of their organisation. This means practices and decision-making processes of a democratic nature are being bypassed. The learning process that CSOs are undergoing requires addressing how to balance ‘habits of co-operation, solidarity and public-spiritedness’ (Putnam, 1993:89-90) and internal democratic practices within the organisation with simultaneously running an organisation efficiently. Indeed, the Liberal-Associative “schools of democracy” model of civil society may
help members understand democracy through participation in a CSO, but unless the organisation is effective it struggles to fulfil a democratic function towards the state and other CSOs.

The inconclusiveness of the interviews lies in the fact that they assess the discourse and not the practice of CSO members. Therefore, it was not possible to verify if interviewees ‘do what they say they do’ or whether their discourse is at odds with their practice. Recognising this potential disparity between discourse and practice, it is possible that interviewees could be lying or trying to present a more positive image of Tunisia which suggests how they want civil society and CSOs to be. The methodology operationalised in this thesis, developed from Welch’s dualistic understanding of political culture, addresses this disparity. Having addressed CSO member discourse through survey and interview approaches in the results of chapters Six and Seven, this leads to the need to perform ethnographic participant observation to understand behaviour.

Regarding relations with the state, the results in this chapter provide evidence that some organisations are performing a democratic function of influencing the state through Oppositional-Resistance means. For example, I-watch, OpenGovTN, and Al Bawsala are seeking to enhance Tunisia’s democracy by making electoral and parliamentary processes more transparent. While Chapter Five demonstrated the vital role civil society played during the revolution and transition, this chapter evidences the extent to which civil society vibrancy has developed. Furthermore, the data reflects a genuine understanding of the Oppositional-Resistance role CSOs perform. Liberal-Associative organisations are also performing a democratic function and influencing their members and society through a democratic learning process. The vibrant discussions, that would have previously been permitted to occur, represent progression that is changing the nature of discussion in the public space. Civil society is filling the public space with discussions that are, in part, deliberative and democratic.
CHAPTER EIGHT - ETHNOGRAPHIC PARTICIPANT-OBSERVATION TO ASSESS THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE OF A TUNISIAN CSO.

CASE STUDY: JEUNES INDÉPENDANTS DÉMOCRATES (JID)

This was a largely productive meeting where everyone in the salon (living room) of Zied’s parents’ villa was sat on sofas, armchairs, or at the dining table working on their laptops. The new projector, donated by GiZ, was displaying JID’s manifesto on the wall. Zied was mostly delegating and overseeing everything that was happening. I felt a bit useless just watching people working with my notebook in hand, so I asked Zied ‘Kifesh najjem n3awen?’ (How can I help? in Tunisian Arabic dialect). He asked me to contact any professors or experts on political violence and find resources on the subject. Also, an email in English, to an American donor, needed to be proofread.

It was nice to witness a productive JID session rather than just a meeting that had no concrete outcomes. I noticed a great burden still seems to fall on Zied’s shoulders; not only as the host of the meeting but as the leader of the [Fight against Political Violence] project. He sometimes seems very happy and willing in his role, but at other times the pressure of leadership seems to affect him as an exasperated look falls across his face. It is difficult to tell whether he works harder than others because of his position in the organization or because he cares more.

It was nearly 9pm by the time we finished and everyone seemed tired. Emir insisted he gave me a lift home instead of me taking a taxi. The timing and duration of the meeting meant that we missed dinner, so we stopped at one of the many brightly lit, modern decor cafes on the main road in Ennasr for makloub (a Tunisian folded and oven-baked sandwich). I had met Emir before in a couple of meetings but cynically wondered if the reason for his insistence on driving me home was because he wanted to practice his English or because he was trying to figure out who this British guy is who observes his CSO meetings. I know the taxi fare rates double at this time of night but I doubted his motivation was to save me money. I also would not have minded walking around or waiting for a taxi considering that this middle class suburb of Tunis is very safe. Over dinner, Emir wanted to know my opinions about JID and
Tunisian civil society in general. We agreed participation in civil society is more rewarding when you feel some progress is being made, like during today's meeting. Looking back, I realise my cynicism about Emir’s motives was misplaced, as he was only being typically hospitable with his invitation.

[JID meeting, 9/12/2013, Zied parent’s House, Cite Ennasr, Tunis.]

1. Introduction

In contrast to the previous two methods in this thesis, that seek to make generalisations and comparisons about CSOs, ethnography focuses on the “small world” of everyday interaction (Lichterman, 2005: 1-2). The findings thus far may have relevance or highlight issues that are symptomatic of other Tunisian CSOs, but this chapter seeks to assess JID’s internal procedures, decision-making processes, and the extent to which civil political culture is exhibited within the organisation. In contrast to the other methods of this thesis which focus on discourse, this chapter asserts the study of practice requires observation and that the practice of civil political culture can be observed, measured, and assessed through ethnographic observations. The observation is however supported with interviews of JID members and analysis of their charter to determine their adherence to rules. This chapter concludes that JID underwent a democratic learning process and that the leadership transition fundamentally impacted on their institutional culture.

2. Theoretical considerations for ethnographic research

As Chapter Two establishes, assessment of political culture requires measuring of attitudes but also practice. Surveys have generalising and far-reaching value but they also have shortcomings and limitations, as explained in Chapter Six. Surveys alone are insufficient because they cannot observe practice, therefore making the observation of practice a requirement. Within the context of arguing that culture is not static and it does not take generations to learn democratic culture, this participant-observation study focuses on how individuals may undergo democratic learning, therefore acknowledging that this process that can be observed. Referring to changes in political structures in post-cold war Poland and the Czech Republic, Goldfarb discusses the reinvention and the radical transformation of political culture in addition to the impact of CSOs on this process (2011: 36 & 63-67). The learning
this CSO is going through is based on their own ‘trial and error’ processes and also from interaction with trainers and external consultants.

Despite being a research method that produces a large amount of additional and discursive data, the purpose of this ethnographic case-study is to observe absence or presence of the elements of civil political culture, expressed through the same set of criteria of civil political culture as in Chapters Six and Seven; Tolerance, Equality, Freedom, Pluralism, Trust, Transparency, and Democratic Practices. It is a focused study in which only one Tunisian CSO is observed. It looks to observe political culture of a CSO by asking the following.

- **Tolerance** - Are any prejudices expressed? Can ideology be observed?
- **Equality** - Who works for the CSO?
- **Freedom** - Any preventions or restrictions on their work?
- **Pluralism** - Is there any evidence of diversity?
- **Trust** - Internal trust between members? Does JID Work with other CSOs?
- **Transparency** - How much of their work, accounts are publicised?
- **Democratic Practices** - How are decisions made? What processes are used?

I sought to identify uncivil practices by asking the following questions,

- Are voices excluded?
- Is any form of intolerance or prejudice expressed?
- Are undemocratic practices evident?
- Are certain members afforded preferential treatment?

The nature of ethnographic research requires emersion into ‘the field’, which features as much interaction as possible, constant note taking, personal interactions and considering people’s personal lives to uncover the layers of culture, and maintaining naivety to observe without pre-conceptions while saving judgement for later. I sought to observe some factors addressing less obvious micro-cultures within the CSO types of interaction such as what and how people interact in addition to etiquettes and practices, and relationships between members. I also placed importance on out of office interactions, where JID members often spoke more freely about their thoughts, particularly if I had developed trust and a positive rapport with the staff.
2.1. Ethics

I ensured that the implementation of my ethnography was not deceptive by conducting overt, rather than covert, observation. In covert research the intentions of researchers are unknown to the subjects or the subjects are unaware they are being observed, thus deceiving them, which makes overt research a more ethical approach. My presence and the task of my research were made obvious to the JID members from our first meeting when I explained who I was, the nature of my work, and its purpose. This honesty helped develop trust which, I believe, facilitated the observation process.

JID’s name has been used but there was a possibility that members would not want their name to be used in the thesis. Therefore, I offered members the chance to remain anonymous and opt-out of the observation process if they so requested. However, initial members agreed to my presence and new members did not request to opt-out. I also offered the opportunity for participant analysis whereby JID members could approve, disapprove and comment on my work in case they found the observations and findings inaccurate or too critical. I explained to the CSO staff from the beginning of the ethnography that they would have an influence in the writing process. Indeed, they will be aware of my observation, however, it was my intention that honesty would make members at ease with my presence, reduce any suspicion regarding the intentions of my study, and help to foster further trust.

2.2. Insider/Outsider Dynamic

“Participant observers can be insiders who observe and record some aspects of life around them (in which case, they’re observing participants), or they can be outsiders who participate in some aspect of life around them and record what they can (in which case, they’re participating observers)” (Bernard, 2011: 260). Following Bernard’s definition, I set out to act as ‘observing participant’, because I intended to participate in JID work as part of my observations. However, for the majority of the time, I was a ‘participating observer’ because JID did not undertake a great deal of work, allowing me to focus on observing.

Weinstein (2006) discusses the important distinction between insider and outsider status in an ethnographic study. To a certain extent, I obtained insider status within JID because I was not only an observer but I paid the 10 dinars (£ 3.50) membership
fee. I was an active member because I attended their meetings and tried to be part of their cause. They understood that I was always willing to help them and I tried to help improve the organisation in any way I could. I was therefore an insider for their cause. My understanding of Tunisi helped. Since that first meeting I was made to feel very welcome at JID meetings and no one openly questioned or objected to my presence. Members refer to me as a friend, implying that they trusted me. They were very grateful for the essay I wrote for them; a comparison between British and Tunisian civil society essay that featured some recommendations. I enjoyed working with them but wished I could have helped more.

In the years following the revolution, a considerable number of journalists and academics have travelled to Tunisia to conduct research. Initially, people were enthusiastic to tell their stories but after a few years, a degree of exhaustion was felt by Tunisians as foreigners attempted to neatly summarise their experience. Furthermore, as highlighted in Abaza’s 2011 article “Academic tourists sight-seeing the Arab Spring” foreign academics have been guilty of utilising the local experts without giving them sufficient credit to the knowledge acquired from those locals, instead only portraying them as the subject. This approach can be especially troublesome if these foreign academics only travel to a place once and then proceed to create a narrative based on a portrayal of their findings from a particular point in time. I believe that living in Tunisia for a year and my ongoing work with JID enabled the members to distinguish me from the aforementioned researcher. Rather than treating JID as a laboratory experiment, I believe I was seen as a committed academic who was seeking to acquire a more sophisticated understanding of the changing contextual dynamics and to present nuanced findings.

I also felt that I connected with the members outside of JID activities. For a few examples, Sara invited me to attend her sister’s wedding party, where Selma was also present. When I told them I was leaving Tunisia, I expected to meet some for a coffee and say farewell, but they insisted on throwing a goodbye party for me. I returned to Tunisia in 2015, a year after finishing my research, and met with Souhayel, Emir and Zied. Researchers often establish connections with their research subjects beyond their work. Indeed my experience is not dissimilar to the bonding experience Geertz describes with Balinese villages at the illegal cockfight. The villagers were impressed with how Geertz and his wife had joined the locals in fleeing from the police and
“demonstrated our solidarity with what were now our co-villagers” (Geertz, 1973: 416). However, rather than using a similar trope to justify the authenticity of my work or make an overstated claim that my experience had enabled me to establish an intimate connection with the place and the people, there are various reasons why I remained, and will always be, an outsider. Acknowledgement of this fact prevents the blurring of subjectivity in this ethnography. Primarily, it is because I am not Tunisian. I did not achieve fluency in Tunisian Arabic and no matter how much I agree with or supported their cause, I will never have the ‘shared experience’ of being Tunisian and growing up in Tunisia. Furthermore, I do not think I did enough work for JID, but I also think they did not exploit my expertise enough.

Although it was my utmost intention to “make myself a part of their world” (Weinstein, 2006:364), I can assess that I walked the line carefully between insider and outsider. In comparison to the structured interviews (Chapter Six), where I remained very much an outsider and foreign interviewer, despite the interviewee’s knowledge that I was a resident in Tunis, and clearly had a firm understanding of the civil society and the public space in Tunisia. My understandings of French and Tunisian-Arabic improved dramatically since I arrived in Tunisia but I did not understand 100% of conversations that took place in meetings. The meetings often had pre-arranged agendas and the minutes were made available on the JID Facebook group which allowed me to compare what first Ines and later Oussama (general secretaries of JID) wrote to the notes I made. When more informal conversations took place and more colloquialisms were used, Zied, Mohammed, Souhayel, Oussama, or Sara helped to translate what was occurring. I also observed body language and non-verbal communication to help understand the interaction.

3. Case selection: *Jeunes Indépendants Démocrates (JID)*

As this ethnography is a single case study, is it relevant to establish why I worked with JID. I sought to work with a group that was consistent with the theoretical understanding of a CSO established in Chapter One: non-governmental, represents the will of a section of Tunisian citizens, and is working towards achieving civic goals, be they minority views or not. It was not necessary for the group to be a voluntary association; therefore, members could be full-time employees. However, the group must not be ‘power-seeking’ and looking to become part of elected or appointed government. I sought to work with an organisation that was new, Tunisian, not a
branch of an international organisation, and not affiliated with the Tunisian Government. Working with a new association would allow me to observe the steep learning curve that a CSO established after the revolution would experience in the undertaken of its democratic function.

*Jeunes Indépendants Démocrates* (JID), Young Independent Democrats, is a youth-led CSO from Tunis. The organisation is absolutely independent, meaning members are not allowed to be members of political parties. There are three membership requirements; 1) Young: between 18-35 years old, 2) Independent: no political party membership, and 3) Democratic: belief in democracy. JID was formed after the revolution in 2011, by a group of young Tunisians living in Tunis, mostly students of different disciplines (Law, Medicine, Languages, and Sciences) with shared civic and democratic values. Some members had experience from pre-revolutionary involvement in civil society through activity in university campus clubs, but not through activity in established and more militant CSOs that were active during the dictatorship e.g. Trade Unions, UGET, UGTE, or LTDH. Civil society activism in a free political environment is a new concept (3 years old at the time of the study) to Tunisia. JID is one of the many new, post-revolutionary associations whose members were learning how to engage in civil activity as they progressed.

Regarding access to conducting observation, from my positive experiences of interviewing and conducting ethnography in 2012 with Tunisia-Live68, I have found Tunisians open and welcoming to interviews and research. I, therefore, found access fairly easy to obtain and was confident I would be allowed to work with CSOs in survey, interview, and observation capacities. I used my contacts in Tunisia (Civil society members, Journalists, and academics) to help me find a suitable CSO with which to work.

Fabian Stroetges, a fellow Durham Ph.D. Candidate, recommended I speak to Zied from JID. I emailed Zied explaining the nature of my research. He agreed to meet and added 'Fabian's friends are my friends', demonstrating that a trusted mutual friend was sufficient to gain access and that personal connections are important facilitators. I was impressed with what he told me about JID’s work. JID are a post-revolution established, youth-led, local, secular, awareness-raising, non-political, part-time,.

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68 The first Tunisian news website in English, launched post-revolution Available at [http://www.tunisia-live.net/](http://www.tunisia-live.net/)
volunteer-run CSO. They seek to represent Youth-related issues, promote democracy, and are committed to remaining politically independent. Zied seemed happy for me to observe JID’s activities and invited me to their meeting the next day. This introduction process was informal and casual but being introduced via a mutual friend helped to establish trust more quickly between Zied and me. At the meeting the next day in Zied’s parents’ house, I introduced myself to the other present JID members and explained my work. The members seemed happy for me to be there and were very welcoming. Ines, the general secretary, added me to the mailing list and Facebook group. This was my unofficial acceptance into the group. I was introduced to other members when they came to meetings and, to my knowledge, no complaints were made about my presence.

JID has branches in two Governorates; Tunis and Monastir, although during my observation an attempt was made to create a branch in Gafsa. The observation was almost exclusively conducted with the Tunis branch (JID Tunis). Members of JID Tunis resided in the northern suburbs of the capital Tunis. These areas of Menzah 5, Menzah 6, Menzah 9, and Cité Ennasr are largely middle class with white painted gated and guarded villas and high-rise apartment bloc residences, modern shopping malls, private clinics, boutiques, and chic coffee shops, restaurants and patisseries. The streets are well-lit at night and noticeably less littered and dusty than the less affluent neighbourhoods of Tunis. JID members, who largely come from those neighbourhoods, are not rich but certainly above the Tunisian average. Indeed, JID largely represents a specific section of the population; middle-class youth from Tunis who are successful products of the national education system. The founding members are from the same neighbourhoods and universities. Although JID expanded to Monastir, the majority of JID Monastir members are from Tunis but are based there on studying medicine, dentistry or pharmacology.

JID was an interesting case study because they combined typical and atypical CSO characteristics. In addition to matching the aforementioned criteria of a CSO and the access I was granted, JID was a suitable and typical example of a Tunisian CSO to study for the following reasons. Firstly, they are one of the 10,000 organisations established post-revolution. Secondly, JID is one of the many part-time, voluntary organisations, a majority within Tunisian civil society. Thirdly, despite the number of

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69 Le centre d’information, de formation, d’études et de documentation sur les associations (IFEDA) Available at: http://www.ifeda.org.tn/ (Accessed 20/7/14)
politicised CSOs, many claim to be politically independent. Considering that ‘independence’ is literally JID’s middle name, it was interesting to discover the extent of their independence. Fourthly, JID is a Tunisian organisation, not the office or chapter of an international CSO, therefore does not represent a re-creation of an international institutional culture. Fifthly, JID is a pro-democracy advocacy organisation and, since there are many CSOs promoting citizenship and political awareness, their message is not a minority view.

Besides the aforementioned typical traits, JID is also an atypical CSO for the following reasons. Many CSOs talk about youth, however, JID is one of only a few that are youth-led and entirely youth-focused. Furthermore, studying a youth-led CSO is an interesting aspect to this research because it examines the new generation that has only recently become politically active in the post-revolution context. JID were not part of the old regime or pre-revolutionary CSOs who have different habits but represent a group engaging in a learning curve with the practice of democracy.

JID were an interesting CSO to work with for this study because their focus is on democracy promotion. This means they are more likely to be focused on the issues relating to democratic culture; the pro-democracy, political aspects, and practicing what they preach. In comparison to other types of CSOs, service providing and charity organisations are more likely to be concerned with the practical, on the ground work they are doing than their own democratic functioning and procedures. The regional CSOs tend to be focused specifically on their own region, governorate, or city. JID actively attempt to expand across Tunisia and their projects aim to address national, rather than regional, issues such as participation in elections.

In addition to their apolitical position, JID retains its independence by sourcing funding from various donors, although they are often funded by GiZ and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. One drawback of JID’s independence is that their activities are not funded by one specific donor and their diverse funding does not include operational costs. Therefore JID cannot pay for a permanent HQ (locale). Instead, meetings had to take place at members’ houses. The majority of meetings were held at Zied’s parents’ house, while he was President, but Mohammad also hosted. Both these large wall surrounded villas with polished stone floors and bright, spacious salons, were well above the Tunisian average. Otherwise, meetings were held in middle class, stylish
cafes with glass tables, comfortable booths, and cushioned seats in the Ennasr, Bardo or Menzah suburbs.

JID is a voluntary organisation. Therefore, the members either have jobs or are university students. The bureau executif consists of a President, Vice-President, General Secretary, Treasurer, Spokesperson, Human Resources Secretary, Internal Communication Officer, and website Editor. According to the JID Charter, their objectives are to:

- “Educate Tunisians (firstly the youth) on the issues of our revolution to encourage them to make their contribution to the building of our emerging democracy.
- Educate and communicate to all young people who want political, civic and citizenship education that is a necessary act to master;
- Inform about the evolution of political, social and economic events which Tunisia is going through and share with all the youth of this country information whose reliability has been verified;
- Bring the voice of young people that we represent to the highest levels of the State to enforce our rights and our will.”

4. Methods

4.1. Observation and Participation

I observed JID over an 8-month period. JID is a part-time CSO that only met at weekends on an ad hoc basis, usually every other weekend. This meant that a prolonged or daily observation was not possible. During my observation period, in addition to meetings, I attended a conference hosted by Sawty where Zied spoke and represented JID, and at a music concert/event that JID Monastir had organised. Using Ethnomethodology (see Chapter Two) as a basis for the observation, the methods I employed were, for the most part, systematic. I used a template to guide the observation. It featured the subheadings of a) Date, Location, and attendees, b) In meeting discussion/agenda, c) Interaction style, d) Out of meeting discussion, and e) Personal feelings. Wherever appropriate, or if I was asked explicitly, I would contribute to the meetings and offer my opinions or suggestions. The majority of the time I would not because I was conscious not to interfere in their work or be perceived as another Westerner in Tunisia telling them ‘how to do democracy’. I
would also ask questions during and after the meeting. I would not always ask the same informant to clarify the discussion or further develop an idea. Initially, I was most comfortable asking Zied, as he was the point of access but I also asked Oussama or Emir if they were giving me a lift home. After JID held internal elections for bureau positions in February 2014, Sara and Souhayel, the new President and VP respectively, were patient and conscientious to ensure that I understood what was taking place in the meetings. These five had very good spoken English skills which made them the most useful informants.

The use of literature produced by JID also aided the observation process. During the period of my observation, JID became increasingly efficient at posting the minutes (procès-verbal - PVs) from their meetings on the Facebook group page. These became a useful tool for noting any disparities or discrepancies. The PVs do not address style and manners of interaction. I also translated JID's charter to allow analysis of their discourse and observe consistencies, or inconsistencies with their practice and assess whether they followed and adhered to their charter.

My major contributions to JID were based on my academic knowledge and English language skills. I researched theoretical understandings of the concepts of political violence, structural violence, and violence against women for their project. I also met Dr. Christian Olsson (University of Brussels) to propose a training workshop. I suggested and researched foreign funding sources and proof-read letters to funders. Souhayel asked me to write a paper for JID that compares British and Tunisian CSOs. He also asked me to include recommendations for JID based on this comparison. Engaging in these tasks enabled me to be a participant-observer, rather than just an observer. This was important for trust-building, showing my commitment to JID and getting closer to ‘insider’ status.

4.2. One-to-One interviews with JID members

I complemented and verified the observations with one to one, semi-structured interviews with eight JID members. These were not a method for observing the members’ behaviours and practices, but I used them as an opportunity to comprehend the issues and the conversations that I did not understand and to verify or clarify information and incidents from meetings I observed. It is important that the observation data is verified due to potential misreading or misunderstanding. In
addition, the interviews revealed new information and enabled greater understanding of their more personal thoughts. These interviews also address the critique Crapanzano makes regarding Geertz’ ethnography which, he argued, only includes “a constructed narrative of the constructed native’s constructed point of view” (1986: 74). This ethnography, in contrast, includes an understanding of the JID members from their points of view and their voices.

Like the structured interviews with CSO bureau members in Chapter Seven, these also had a devised set of questions specific to uncovering aspects of civil political culture; to what extent the interviewees are tolerant, pluralistic, act and protect freedom and equality within JID. For example, I asked “Do you ever feel ignored?” to assess levels of pluralism and tolerance. But due to the familiarity between myself and the JID members, these interviews were more conversational. The interviews took place in cafes, either one to one or with an interpreter present. I trusted the information I was given in the interviews as JID members trusted me because they saw me at meetings, knew I worked for JID and saw me as a member on the inside of the organisation. They also knew I saw some of the events and situations they discussed in the interviews. I had already established some rapport with the members so I felt that allowed them to speak freely. The interviews did not yield particularly surprising results and often confirmed what I had observed. Members did not overly present critical perspectives of JID but admitted some of the deficiencies and areas which require improvement.

I also interviewed Moujib, a consultant in communications and MENA CSOs who had worked with NGOs and associations in Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco in addition to Tunisia. He used to live in France and Washington D.C. but he came back to Tunisia after the Revolution because he wanted to help; specifically NGOs that represent the LGBT community. Moujib explained to me that he developed his own methodology and approaches to CSO work and created his own training manual for CSOs. JID member Cyrine contacted him asking for help, explaining they were a new CSO that required institutional capacity building. He had been working with JID for two years. Moujib held a unique place in the research because, as a qualified NGO consultant, he is a non-member but is also an insider as a Tunisian. His responses during the interview were highly critical and offered more insight as he could also offer perspectives from both insider and outsider positions. He informed me of issues that
had not come to my attention through observation or interviews, such as the negative attitudes of certain members. He suggested certain members should leave JID because they were only seeking personal gain or to bolster their CV.

5. Results and Findings

5.1. Projects

Through ethnography of civil political culture, I was able to observe the projects and campaigns that JID undertook. There were three major projects that JID undertook prior to my observation.

1. ‘Ikhtiar (Choice)’ was a questionnaire platform to help guide people in their decision of who to vote for in the October 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections and featured a 30-question questionnaire\textsuperscript{70} that determined the Tunisian party whose agenda is closest to the respondent's answers.

2. ‘Forum 1.0’ (2012) was a 5-day conference that collaborated with associations from different parts of Tunisia to exchange knowledge and build relationships. The conference aimed to help CSOs understand how to function and work together, especially regarding work in the less developed southern Tunisian governorates.

Four workshop sessions within the activity focused on issues regarding society, politics, economics, and culture, and featured relevant experts in each session. By the end of the event, participants completed the drafting of a set of recommendations for the constitution. The expected impact of this project was to make the youth heard regarding the writing of the constitution. Therefore, members of the National Constituent Assembly from Ennahda, Ettakatol, CPR, and Nidaa parties were invited to the event in order to convey the recommendation to the NCA. However, JID members went to the NCA and saw that the documents and recommendations produced by Forum 1.0 were not presented to the legislature.

3. ‘High Schools’ (2012) was an educational project to inform high school students of the importance of voting, how it is a right in a democracy and the duty of citizens.

\textsuperscript{70}Available at \url{http://2011.ikhtiartounes.org/} (Accessed 12/8/14)
During my observation period, JID planned two projects. Ikhtiar 2 (launched in October 2014) was a revised and repeated project for the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential elections. This focused on the registered voters, especially youth, by helping them find a political party that matches their interests. This required JID to meet with politicians from 10 political parties to devise questions and answers that reflect their platforms. I observed the process of the website being redesigned. ‘The fight against Political Violence’ (2013-2014) aimed to raise awareness about what constitutes political violence, training the citizens in the fight against political violence; educating the general public about the forms of political violence and the dangers it represents to Tunisia. However, this planned and proposed project did not materialise because JID could not find a funder willing to support it.

5.2. Internal elections and Transition

During the period of my observation, JID went through a major leadership change through bureau exécutif elections in February 2014 that brought in the 3rd elected bureau. For the purpose of this thesis, I refer to the three different bureaus as JID.1, .2 and .3 respectively. Before the general assembly meeting in February 2014, there were 25 candidates for 9 positions. However, none of the members wanted to be president. They all thought they were not ready, needed more experience, or were too shy. This is partly because Zied (JID.2 President) was an effective leader and other members were apprehensive about following in his footsteps. The JID charter permitted him to run for a second term but he declined. Zied also discouraged the other members of the JID.2 bureau from running because he wanted new active members to run for JID.3 elections. Instead, he wanted the JID.2 bureau to mentor the new bureau members through the training and hand-over process. JID.1 and JID.2 were roughly the same members in different positions. For example, Hela and Zied were President and Vice-President respectively in JID.1, and then they swapped positions for JID.2. For this reason, Zied told me he wanted to have a change of leadership and a completely new bureau with no enduring members. He did not have the authority to make the decision of preventing current bureau members from running for election but they obliged.

JID want Tunisia to embed the concept of gender equality in all aspects of society and politics. Therefore, they operate accordingly, applying these principles to be an example for others. One manifestation of said gender equality is male/female
rotation of Presidency. After Zied, there must be a female President. Two members from *Al Bawsala*, a watchdog and political monitoring CSO, were present as observers to ensure election fairness by counting votes and observing the election box.

On the one hand, this transition gave other members an opportunity to ‘lead’. Zied was able to distance himself from being the face of JID but remained an active member and helped with the transition. This was important because of association personalisation. Indeed, as Moujib noted, by that time JID Tunis had already become ‘JID Zied’. On the other hand, by determining who should or should not run in the election is a limitation on pluralism and is to an extent undemocratic because it limits the choice of candidates. This was not a written rule but a decision that Zied thought would benefit JID and to which other members did not object.

In addition, JID.2 bureau members Hela, Khalil, Mohammed, Ines, and Salma became far less active after the election of JID.3. A drop in activity is a problem for voluntary associations, as members are under no obligation to attend or be active. However, it inhibited the transition. The old bureau exécutif was supposed to have the duty of training the new bureau members. Ahmed, Treasurer in JID.3, told me of his disappointment and frustration with the change of leadership, as the old members did not support or pass on the skills and knowledge they had developed and were not attending meetings. He expressed the most dissatisfaction with regards to the lack of information handed over to him by the previous treasurer, implying that CSO members do not work as hard when they are not in the bureau of an association. This might be the case for JID but further observation or interviews would be required to verify this claim for other organisations. After stepping down as President, Zied remained active and present at meetings and Emir is an active member and works hard to promote JID through his position as an advisor to the Minister of Youth and Sport.

Confirming Ahmed’s account, Moujib thought JID members seem to stop working when they no longer have a title or a bureau exécutif position e.g. Ines, Mohammed, Hela, and Salma. They all had a sudden drop of interest and he could not understand why they did not give the tools to the new bureau. After the February elections, Moujib thought the only hard working people were Souhayel, Yasmine, Khalil, Aicha, and Oussama. He credits Souheyel and Yasmine for being hardworking, preparing in advance, and taking the initiative. Towards the end of my observation, the...
aforementioned members were playing a more prominent role in the organisation. The election of a new bureau caused disruption but allowed new members to develop and grow into the ‘power vacuum’.

5.3. Expansion and restructuring

JID was founded on 15th January 2011 by 7 members in Tunis. Therefore, it operated as both a local and national bureau. They attempted to change the structure of the organisation during their 2014 general assembly in order to create a Gafsa regional bureau. This would have been a significant step in decentralising power from Tunis and empowering Monastir and the new Gafsa bureau. The attempted expansion to a JID Gafsa bureau was stifled and then halted indefinitely. This was due in part to insufficient trust developing that was required to form any agreement. JID Tunis thought JID Gafsa were only seeking money while JID Gafsa was concerned that JID Tunis wanted to dominate and exploit them. JID Gafsa members were insistent on being supplied with sufficient funds to have their own office. Gafsa is a more conservative region of Tunisia than the capital where it is less acceptable for women to meet in public cafes or non-family members’ houses; hence their demand for an office. JID has multiple donors who fund specific short-term projects rather than the organisation's operational costs and overhead. Therefore, JID Tunis does not have sufficient funding for their own HQ and do not have the funding necessary for a Gafsa bureau. As this situation could not be resolved, JID Gafsa suspended their operations. The lack of funding and organisational difficulties affected JID’s ability to expand. However, the attempt to expand signifies the level of JID’s ambition. Furthermore, not conceding to JID Gafsa’s financial demands demonstrates that JID Tunis did not compromise their principles of remaining independent, as they believed having a semi-permanent donor (e.g. funding for a three-year project) would compromise their independence. After the 2014 general assembly after the election of JID.3, JID Tunis became increasingly focused on their internal matters, such as task delegation and roles and responsibilities. Moujib confirmed that, as a result, JID Monastir and JID Tunis began to act increasingly independently. In comparison to Sawty, a similar Youth organisation, the latter’s regional chapters were more closely co-ordinated (see Chapter Six).
5.4. JID charter

Analysis of the JID charter is important for the observation of rule use and identifying consistencies, and inconsistencies, between the organisation's discourse and the members’ practice. I translated JID's charter with the assistance of Myriam, my interpreter and research assistant. She found the process annoying because the flowery, vague text was frustrating to read and translate. JID seemed to be trying to make the organisation sound more important and grandiose but produced a document that is imprecise and ambiguous.

Their objectives (see page 210) seem quite general but their projects demonstrate the ways in which they have attempted to implement them. The “High Schools”, Ikhtiar, and political violence projects were ways of ‘informing’ and ‘educating’, while to ‘Bring the voice of young people to the highest levels of state’ was attempted through Forum 1.0. Article 1 of the JID charter addresses the age limit for members (35) which ensures the ‘youth’ element of the CSO. Independence is maintained with the requirement for members to remain “completely independent of political parties.” Aspects of civil political culture are guaranteed through articles such as Article 23: "All decisions must be taken by consensus or by vote", which ensures pluralism and equality. Similarly, Article 26: “For each project, a project leader will be elected by a majority vote of the regional office” entrenches democratic processes.

The manner in which the bureau executif consists of 5 members demonstrates ‘power-sharing’ and pluralism is also embedded in the annual meeting of the general assembly where “an item must be included in the agenda if it is proposed by at least three (3) members” (Article 3). A degree of equality is implied in Article 4: “All members of the assembly may also propose projects for the Association.” Transparency of their work is not addressed. On the contrary, Article 32 states “confidentiality is a requirement of all members vis-à-vis internal meetings of the association and projects that are carried out by it”. This encourages a lack of transparency. The concepts of Tolerance and Freedom are not explicitly mentioned.

Regarding rule use, the roles of bureau members are clearly defined and during my observation I saw members conform to these roles.

The focus of my interview with Yosra (JID Monastir) was ascertaining where JID's discourse matches their practice. She admitted that their charter is not clear and there are problems with it, but added that JID is learning how to be an organisation
and the charter amendments that have been introduced are further evidence of this learning process. She added that they have improved the manner in which their meetings are conducted but were not always so effective at putting their ideas and planning into practice. In the meeting on 19th April 2014 where JID members discussed amendments to the charter of separation between national and regional bureaus, they mostly seemed disinterested in making amendments and wanted the meeting to finish as quickly as possible. Moujib had comments on the charter, adding “it doesn’t matter how good the charter is, people only turn to it when there are problems, like all CSOs in Tunisia.” He thought that a ‘set of internal rules’ would be more effective because he thought JID is defined by their lack of rules.

In comparison to other charters I translated (Mnemty, Cepsa, and Friends of the Mining Basin), JID’s contains far fewer rules and does not include responsibilities and rights of members. Mnemty’s charter, which seemed to be written in accordance with the Law of Associations (Decree 88), was stricter than JID’s, including a set of rules with references to punishments or disciplinary hearings. Cepsa’s charter included elements of freedom, equality, and tolerance, Article 11: “All members are bound to respect the thoughts and the decisions coming from colleagues and to speak in a civil way.” It also placed greater emphasis on pluralism, Article 8: “Suggestions are to be written in the book of suggestions in the headquarters, or during the regular meetings, or on the Facebook page.” Furthermore, the Cepsa charter clearly explains the financial aspects of the association. The Friends of the Mining Basin charter made more references to finance. Article 18 states that the association is a non-profit and defines financial rules and regulations, the duties of the accountant, and reporting of public funding were included.

Sawty President Ghazoua Ltaeif said their internal code is discussed and sometimes amended at each general assembly but some parts remain fixed. With the assistance of TAMSS and with MEPI funding, a mentor was assigned to Sawty to help them develop a manual of ‘procedures’ that is given to each new member and contains general rules. This is also updated and modified when deemed necessary. Chapter Seven demonstrated that other CSOs considered Al Bawsala to be an important and influential CSO. However, Ghada Louhichi (project manager) discussed the consistency between Al Bawsala’s practice and discourse and, although she has not even read it carefully, their charter was informal but had some general rules. “Being
young, fresh, and flexible is important for the current climate in Tunisia” she added. *Al Bawsala* also holds evaluation sessions every six months which provides the opportunity to make amendments as they learn more and evolve.

Upon examining these CSOs’ charter in order to extrapolate consistencies between discourse and practice, the following conclusions can be made. CSOs are required to create a charter by Decree 88 and seem to recognise that some rules are required and that some principles or values should be included. These cases demonstrate that CSOs maintain some flexibility and are open to change or adapt with the times. They are not a helpful indicator for JID’s practice, as members almost never referred to their charter. However, the use of the charter by JID members when “things go wrong” indicates its use as a legalistic device to settle disagreements and as a tool for checks and balances, rather than a code that informs their commonplace practice.

5.5. Decision-making processes

The decision-making processes in JID seem to be consensual. I witnessed a common trend of ideas and suggestions for projects being accepted or rejected depending on the strength of the argument of the member presents. For example, Salma has a strong personality and is a charismatic debater. She told me how she managed to convince the JID members in a meeting to side with her point of view. However, she also acknowledges how debates lead to decisions.

“I’m very vocal so I haven’t felt ignored. I always try to convince them. We once had a debate about participating as JID in the Bardo sit-in. We had a big debate about it and eventually we agreed that we shouldn’t participate. Another example: the congress against violence. 8 people were against participating in it as UGTT partners, I wasn’t. They were against it because UGTT is big and always tends to be dominant. JID participated in organising the event without even showing our logo. The UGTT liked the concept we proposed, but before we did all this, all of the members were against it because they were afraid that the event is going to be politics heavy. They said that we’re independent but this event is going to include Islamist associations and parties etc. so they wanted it to do it differently. So we debated it and I was successful in convincing everyone to participate, I told them that we can expand our network and that the workshops about political violence can be
beneficial for us, and even if this event doesn't work out, we can take what we learn and apply it in our projects against political violence. So personally, my voice was always taken into consideration. For example, USAID suggested that we distribute flyers to promote power separation during the constitution. I said that the project is sloppy; they would give us $20,000 to create and distribute the flyers without having a say in the content. I said that we don't do sub-contracting, it should be up to us to create the content of the flyers and the sponsor should only provide the funds. I don't like working with sponsors that tell us what to do. I said no even though they were going to give us a big amount of money.”

Emir's proposition to advocate against the harsh Tunisian law on cannabis was rejected. Emir argued that people caught in possession spend a whole year in jail. They often re-offend and get sent back to prison, proving that this aspect of the justice system does not work. He added that it is related to citizenship and that law 52 (relating to cannabis) is a form of structural violence and oppressive regime tactic. JID members decided they did not want to get involved with this because it does not fit with their objectives and Emir had to accept this collective decision. Although Emir's idea was considered, the discussion did not require a vote because no one else sided with him.

I did not observe cases of members being excluded from debates but there was an occasion, during a planning meeting for Ikhtiar 2, when Cyrine felt that the point she was trying to make about the layout of the website was not given due consideration. When we adjourned the meeting, she and I walked to a nearby hanout (small grocery shop) to buy some drinks. She said she understood that the meeting had to move on, especially because foreign trainers from GiZ were present, but she still felt a little bit overlooked.

6. Interpretations of results

From my observation and from what most members have expressed, it is possible to summarise JID in one sentence; too much talking and not enough action. Although they realise their lack of ability and admit to lacking expertise, JID members recognise that they are undergoing a learning process. Considering that the organisation's goals are focused on raising awareness, their projects require a more
‘intellectual’ approach than, for example, a service-providing charity organisation. JID struggled with the difficulties of turning ideas and concepts, like democracy, into workable awareness raising projects because they need to be better prepared and have a greater understanding of both democracy and Tunisia. Therefore, they were open to new ideas and understood that they needed further training. Moujib points out two types of members in JID, 1) The logical and realistic who know what is going on and how to work, and 2) Those who think they know what they are doing but they lack the capabilities and instead challenge everything but offer no solutions. He also added that there are opportunists in JID who are only looking to participate in an organisation or training sessions so it would look good on their CV.

The major issue Moujib highlighted was JID’s (mis)understanding of what they were working towards; democracy. To be working in democracy promotion, groups need to have a better understanding of democracy itself. Some members did not understand that democracy is accepting something with which you disagree in addition to respecting all human rights. In a training session that Moujib ran that I could not attend, he used his own methods where he trains people from the perspective of a homosexual to help them to understand what it feels like to be persecuted and treated like an outsider. This training exercise demonstrated that some members had homophobic attitudes. I was unaware that some members knew little about tolerance towards homosexuals. Moujib highlighted the importance of LGBT issues in relation to a CSO promoting democracy.

“You can’t not respect human rights or LGBT community and say we’re working for democracy. How can you work on democracy and human rights if you have problems with homosexuals? Where’s the acceptance and tolerance of difference? Imagine if a sexually confused student asked a JID member ‘What about the right to be homosexual?’ and the JID person says ‘it’s wrong’ or ‘they have no rights’, this means JID are preaching intolerance” (Moujib).

Therefore, before he could engage in any strategic work with JID, Moujib told me he focused training sessions on educating them about democracy. In a later training session, these members had become less homophobic. This demonstrates part of the democracy learning process these members had experienced and how they were developing an understanding of tolerance and equality by learning to treat people equally and by understanding that democratic culture is not exclusionary to anyone.
On a personal level, Moujib is proud of making members more tolerant and less homophobic. As this thesis argues, development of tolerance and equality are criteria of civil political culture. Before conducting an interview with Moujib, I was entirely unaware of the homophobia that some members had expressed. This is because issues of homophobia were not brought into the conversations and the members who had particularly homophobic feelings had no reason to express these issues. This demonstrates that, as Crapanzano indicates, talking to people and engaging with them about what is occurring is an essential part of ensuring that an ethnographic inquiry is representative of the subjects’ perspectives. Conducting interviews and verifying information with informants does not necessarily undervalue the observational status.

After the February 2014 election and the change from JID.2 to JID.3, the terms professional and professionalization became used more frequently. This did not refer to making JID a professional and salaried organisation as JID remained a part-time, voluntary CSO. There had been discussions about hiring a manager for a project, which would have been the first step towards financial professionalism, but a suitable project had not been devised. For JID, professionalization involved defining clearer job descriptions and more evenly delegated work and task. In JID.2, Zied, Farah, and Selma had been doing most of the work. Sara positively described Zied and Farah as “the Superman and Wonder Woman of JID” because of what they had achieved. However, as a consequence, Moujib thought that the transition from Zied’s to Sara’s presidency was poor. He argued that Zied did not seem to trust others to satisfactorily complete the work. Therefore, he did not share or delegate tasks or give others the opportunity to work and acquire skills and experience. In addition, Salma did not trust others to complete tasks correctly, so she did too much herself. Moujib thought Zied and Salma were guilty of caring too much, “When you love an association too much it can destroy it because you think it’s ‘your’ association.”

The move towards professionalization in JID.3 was not meant as an expression of criticism of the JID.2 leadership, but rather a recognition that practices had to change. This is primarily because, unlike JID.2, the members of the JID.3 bureau were not old friends. Therefore, the style of interaction at meetings needed to be different. Throughout my observation, I largely witnessed respectful, tolerant conversations at JID meetings. Two conversations taking place during a meeting is quite common. I
did not interpret this as impatience or impoliteness but that members were enthusiastic to contribute and that the atmosphere was generally relaxed. There were heated moments during meetings, but I interpreted these to represent passion and interest rather than intolerance or incivility. Founding members, however, interacted in a different way to newer members. They were friends long before they were colleagues in the same organisation. Therefore, their behaviour was different and they made comments that are more familiar, e.g. sexual innuendos and minor insults. For example, during one meeting Zied covered Salma’s mouth so the debating on that issue would end and the other points of the meeting could be addressed but this was done in jest. Salma knows she’s argumentative but justified the interaction; “Given the fact that we’re friends, sometimes the behavior, when seen from the outside, looks strange. We had a debate about Egypt and it got intense. They’re not professional relationships (laughs)” (Salma). Towards the end of a long meeting when people were getting tired and a point was being argued, Mohammed told Zied to “Sakker fammek” (shut your mouth). This is normally considered a rude phrase in Tunisia, but due to their long friendship, Mohammed knew he could speak to Zied in this manner without any repercussions. Oussama told me that “old friends can be rude to each other, that’s normal,” but he added that he would not accept being spoken to this way by the members of the JID.3 bureau. Therefore, as JID.3 interactions were still friendly but more formal with less bantering and joking insults, members considered this behaviour more professional.

Regarding meeting practice, professionalization also referred to the efficiency of meetings. In JID.2, Zied had the ‘final say’ but that was also because members looked to him for decisive leadership. In contrast, JID.3 more frequently came to a group decision without referring to an arbiter. On 20th April 2014, after discussing the responsibilities of each member, members decided that a clearer description of each bureau position was required, as the charter does not provide clear definitions. This demonstrates a step toward sharing responsibility, distributing power, and professionalism. JID.3 also held more organised meetings that were chaired more effectively and had specific agendas. On a few occasions, Souhayed even allocated time limits to each point to make meetings more efficient, which also encouraged decision-reaching discussions. The following are notes from a March 2014 meeting:
The meeting was under a time constraint therefore it was interesting to see how well JID worked under pressure. I think they worked efficiently in this meeting; all eight of the issues on the agenda were covered in just over an hour. Souhayel chaired the meeting; he was very effective at making sure the meeting kept to time and issues that were not on the agenda were not discussed. He even set a timer on his phone to make sure the meeting stayed on track. This seems to be a new ‘norm’ for JID meetings; letting everyone know the agenda at the start. It was interesting to see that Zied has returned to ‘member’ status and didn’t try to control the meeting. He was asked for his views and opinions, like any other member, but Souhayel led the meeting. I think that holding the meeting at Cafe Bonzai in Bardo, rather than at Zied’s parents’ house, changed the power dynamics as it did not give anyone host status. [JID Meeting, 23/03/2014]

As JID.3 were operating differently to JID.2, professionalization was also utilised rhetorically as motivation for being more active, making a difference, and having an impact, rather than just holding meetings and talking about issues. An aspect of the lack of action is based on the concern with maintaining a ‘good’ public image. Considering JID has a good external image, members are hesitant about engaging in an unsuccessful project for fear of damaging it. This highlights the point Intisar Kherigi makes (see page 213) that the Tunisian education system discourages students from learning through trial and error for fear of being labelled as failures. Regarding their efficiency and effectiveness, or lack thereof, there is a struggle with the part-time nature of JID’s work and members’ other commitments. Despite this balancing act, there were mixed opinions amongst members as to whether JID should professionalise and have permanent, salaried members of staff or remain voluntary.

Zied’s leadership and the transition from JID. 2 to .3 redefined the organisation’s democratic function. In JID.2, Zied was an effective leader. He was very approachable, pleasant, and welcoming, considerate and a team player but also ensured tasks were achieved. He was fluent in English, French, and Arabic and he had the personal skills necessary to develop good relations with funders. The drawback to this positive leadership was that it led to a cycle of members expecting Zied to undertake any task and Zied pre-emptively addressing tasks without asking others. This is not to say JID was acting like ‘petit dictatorship’ because freedom, pluralism, equality and tolerance
were evident in their interactions. It meant that members had become increasingly dependent on Zied.

Although the JID charter entitled Zied to run for a second term as President, it is notable that Zied did not want to hold on to power. He told me that people in other CSOs had begun to associate JID with Zied. For this reason, he thought JID certainly needed a new President. He said it was usually the case in Tunisia that CSOs are mentioned in the same breath as the President and he was keen to avoid this type of personalisation in JID. Indeed, Moujib confirmed this as he said ‘JID Tunis had become JID Zied’. Zied wanted to avoid further personalisation as he was aware of the dangers it posed to JID’s external image. For the internal operations of a CSO, if the leader is doing everything by themselves it creates a delegation problem. Other members are not given the opportunity to learn to do things and thus all the skills become concentrated in one person. This leads to the personalization of the CSO and makes a future hand over difficult. The dilemma for CSOs is whether they continue with someone who knows how to run a CSO and is an effective leader, or democratically change leadership to give others a chance to learn leadership skills.

As mentioned in Chapter Seven, CSO leaders I interviewed recognise that transferring power is normatively the ‘right thing to do’ but this ethnography has identified that personalisation, due to an effective leader in a CSO, can lead to a stagnation or the concentration of skills and expertise with a few members. Although in the case of JID this personalisation did not lead to a reduction of democratic practice in the long-term, as Zied chose to step down, other CSOs did not have a change of leadership in over three years. The two-term limit in JID’s charter prevented this from occurring in the long term. However, signs of this phenomenon could be observed during the JID.2 term. Other members did not want to run for President because they did not think they could do the job as effectively as Zied. This is also due to other members not developing the CSO knowledge and skills during Zied’s leadership prior to an election, either because they did not feel the need to learn or because these tools were not shared. I could also see, from our conversations, that Zied was becoming tired of being President and running JID. He had been interning with Democracy Reporting International\(^71\) but was looking to

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move his career forward. After the observation period finished, Zied became a full-time Advocacy Officer at Al Bawsala.

The problem at JID was the quality of their transition. The intentions of power sharing and giving other members a chance to lead were beneficial for JID's democratic credibility. When Zied stopped being president, it allowed the opportunity for others to participate. However, this was problematic because they were less effective. Zied made sure JID.2 bureau members did not run for JID.3. In some ways, this is limiting the election by determining who can and cannot participate, but it was to ensure non-Bureau members were given the opportunity to lead. It was a good intention, in terms of democratic practice, but was a tactical mistake because the transition overlooked the importance of skills and the handover of CSO skills did not occur. Moujib explained that Zied, Selma, and Farah, who were proactive members that completed most of the tasks, made way for Sara, Souhayel, and Oussama. The first three were trained by Moujib, who had given them the tools, documents, and work strategies, but these have not passed on their knowledge to the new three. After they were no longer in the bureau executif, their presence at JID meetings dropped remarkably. Ahmed, the JID.3 treasurer, was particularly annoyed by the insufficient handover of tools and skills from the previous bureau. Zied’s intent on the renewal of leadership and depersonalisation of JID led to a transition of power but did not ensure a transition of skills.

However, despite their struggles, JID have stayed true to the principles established in their charter. The political independence of members is paramount and is a rule that is observed, while political neutrality in their work remains highly prioritised. The environment of long-term friends and family-like interaction is changing to become more colleague-based and professional, but their friendliness remained despite the decreasing levels of 'bantering'. Members became increasingly included in decision-making processes. However, being an effective debater remained a helpful attribute in determining JIDs policies. The middle-class bias is recognised but it is something they admit they would like to address but remains a challenge.

7. Chapter Conclusions

“What Tunisians are experiencing is the smell of democracy but the problem is that too many people are waiting for change rather than working for change” (Moujib).
The members of JID do not fall into this category. The democracy learning process they have undergone in a CSO meant that, on an internal level, they developed aspects of civil political culture. Lacking knowledge of both democracy and the complexities of their own country has meant that JID was not able to accomplish as many projects as members had hoped, which reduced their external influence. However, the limitation of JID’s impact on the public sphere does not diminish the impact that participation has had on the members. The positive impact for JID is the Tocquevillian, school of democracy learning process that they have undergone in this period. This study demonstrates the learning progression that has taken place regarding the internal relations of a CSO. JID has therefore performed a democratic function predominantly through a Liberal-Associative form of civil society. In this school of democracy, the majority of the lessons were learned by the members as they tangibly engaged in embedding the values of democracy. In addition to the norms JID members developed, it was evident that trainers and consultants have a role in this democratic learning process. Members benefitted on a personal and organisational level from the capacities they acquired through their associative work by means of conscious and subconscious learning. Whether they use these skills to improve JID, another voluntary CSO, or to enhance their careers, the democratic values and organisational skills they have developed will have a positive impact on their role as members of a democratic system.

My observation period witnessed a developmental change from a group of old school friends to a more formal, colleague style organisation who also managed to stay true to their conviction of remaining politically neutral. They appear to be pluralistic with very few cases of members’ views being side-lined in discussion, and I observed evidence of equality, gender in particular. Some members were more socially conservative than others, but this did not impact on their work. JID were aware of the middle-class bias within their organisation but attributed it to the location of their organisation; a middle-class area of Tunis. During the observation I did not witness any expressed prejudice, only during an interview was the issue of homophobia from two members brought to my attention. Decisions were most often made through agreement after discussion, often leading to consensus, but voting was implemented for elections. JID.2 was strongly led by Zied and Farah, where Zied often had the last word and in 2012/2013 JID undertook more activities. They recognised that personalisation was occurring and sought to address it. The leadership learned that
taking on too much responsibility can hinder a CSO and is certainly not sustainable for a voluntary CSO. Although the leadership transition process could have caused less upheaval for the CSO if JID.2 had transferred their skills and knowledge to the new bureau more systematically, the leadership of JID.3 made the organisation more pluralist as responsibilities were shared and further personalisation was prevented.

The publishing of JID PVs online increased the group's transparency. JID did not experience any limitations to their freedom to operate in the public sphere. The preventions or restrictions to their work only occurred by the prohibition of CSOs from entering schools, which applied to all civil society. Internal trust between members was very high, which I experienced after being welcomed so quickly to the CSO in addition to new members who joined during my observation period. Regarding their relationships and co-operation with other CSOs, JID showed their willingness to work with other CSOs who shared their values, such as Sawty. Their attempt to expand to Gafsa demonstrated further willingness to work with others and also address their middle-class bias. However, like the political violence project, it was largely financial issues that prevented this extension from manifesting but sufficient levels of trust to co-operate were not established either. Their engagement with the state was more limited as they only worked with the state through Forum 1.0 and when conducting interviews for the Ikhtiar project.

The timing of the research was also significant as the majority of my observation took place during a politically quieter period. In 2014, the constitution had been ratified, the Ennahda coalition had stepped down, and a non-partisan technocratic government was running the country. There was less for CSOs to be active about. The revolution was now three years old and JID were somewhat reactive to the political situation. In addition, the first half of 2014 saw a degree of civic action fatigue and a dip of enthusiasm. JID.3 was unsure of how to progress as an organisation in this period and was already somewhat reinventing itself through professionalization. Towards July 2014, civil society became more active in the build up to the October 2014 elections and JID started to implement Ikhtiar 2. Interestingly, Zied played a prominent role due to his experience in organising the first Ikhtiar and his connections with the donors.

This ethnography has demonstrated that practicing democracy helps to imbed the values of democratic culture. JID were engaged in a learning process involving the
intricacies of democracy, the tolerance that is required, and how to implement
democracy. This ethnography has also made it apparent that civil society members
must improve their organisational skills, at personal and associational levels, in
order to influential the political and public spheres. JID’s organisational difficulties
affected their efficiency and effectiveness, as proven by the failure to implement the
political violence project. CSO impact and effectiveness are also dependent on
securing funding, and JID has been successful at acquiring funding for some projects.
However, even if JID have not been as successful or influential as their members had
hoped, individuals have undertaken a learning curve through which they acquired
organisational skills, and a deeper understanding of democracy, and the contextual
intricacies of where they want to make an impact: Tunisia.

Regarding rule use, the charter was barely to almost never referenced and I did not
hear anyone quote it. The norms of respectful interaction had been established. The
moments of disrespectful interaction appear uncivil but were representative of the
way old friends can interact rather than JID being an uncivil organisation. In spite of
all their problems and the fact that JID members do not always follow his advice or
the methods he prescribes, Moujib was surprised that JID still manages to function as
a CSO. This implies that he admits there are alternatives to his approach.
THESIS CONCLUSION

1. Introduction

The objective of the research conducted in this thesis was to address the gaps in the current literature regarding the contribution of civil political culture in enabling civil society organisations to positively influence the political transition from authoritarianism to democratic governance. Therefore, this thesis has asked “Have Tunisian civil society organisations exhibited a civil political culture”, and how has this influenced their ability to fulfil a democratic function through the post-2011 transition?”. Three sub-questions that emerged from the primary research question are 1) Has civil society in Tunisia exhibited political civility through the democratic transition? 2) How has political civility in civil society organisations supported the democratic transition? 3) How does this inform the theoretical understanding of civil society’s position in democratic transition? The historical chapters provide the structural factors which determine the context in which civil society operates. Civil society under authoritarianism was shaped by the lack of space provided by the state, while the post-authoritarian era demonstrates that civil society filled the opened public space. The fieldwork research chapters provide the political culture determinants and explain the nature of the Tunisian CSOs which occupy the public space. This concluding chapter presents the research’s key findings and summarises the results from the three research methods. It elaborates on methodological advances this study offers to further political culture research and the limitations of this research are addressed and potential further study possibilities are suggested.

2. Key findings

This thesis has demonstrated that the role of civil society has been important as Tunisian CSOs have played a democratising role in the country’s transition through activities aimed at the monitoring and oversight of governmental decisions and procedures and through engaging in a process of democratic learning. Through their practices in the revolutionary and transitional periods, CSOs have exhibited attributes of civil political culture. Oppositional-Resistance type CSOs, that challenge the state’s monopoly and pressure the government, and Liberal-Associative types, that seek to inform the citizenry and protect their freedoms from elected despotism and an overbearing state, are present in Tunisia. Both these types of CSOs can play a democratising role in a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. However, this
democratising role can only be fulfilled if CSOs exhibit attributes of civil political culture. After the 2011 revolution, the Tunisian state provided civil society with an increased public space, which civil society used to perform a democratic function by facilitating a balanced relationship between the state and non-state actors.

This research project was informed by the functions of civil society, as defined by civil society theory, by democratisation theories, and by civil political culture theories. These theories enabled the development of six criteria of civil political culture (Tolerance, Equality, Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency) to be employed as an analytical tool to measure CSO civility: the extent to which CSOs demonstrate civil political culture. These criteria were applied through quantitative, qualitative, and ethnographic research methods to assess civility in the three relationships in which CSOs engage; with the State, with other CSOs in the public space, and their internal dynamics with their members. The major finding from all three research methods is that civil political culture, required for stable democracy, is developing in Tunisian civil society.

3. Theoretical summary

The understanding of civil society has evolved through the ten various functions, described in Chapter One, it has performed in different historical periods to culminate into a modern, pro-democratic force. Both Oppositional-Resistance and Liberal-Associative conceptualisations are equally significant to enabling civil society to fulfil a democratic function. Oppositional-Resistance CSOs perform a democratic function by pressuring the state, ensuring the maintenance of democratic procedures, and acting as a more vigorous check on state authority while posing a greater challenge to ideational state hegemony. Liberal-Association CSOs can pressure the government but also offer a supportive stance for a liberal government but also encourage citizens to engage in a democracy learning process through participation in associative life. Civil society is not, however, intrinsically a force for democratisation. It can only perform a democratic function if it exhibits civil political culture (civility). This applies to both Oppositional-Resistance and Liberal-Associative forms of civil society. By denoting the importance of political culture, this thesis has demonstrated that political culture cannot be disregarded in the analysis of a political transition. This thesis contributes to civil society theory by highlighting
the theory's linkages with democratisation theories and civil political culture theories.

Democratisation theorists Diamond (1999) and Linz & Stepan (1996) argue that civil society remaining independent is vital to it performing a democratising role. Authoritarian government structures prevent civil society from freely existing and operating independently. Public space is largely restricted or co-opted by the government and the development of political civility is not encouraged. Therefore, studies of civil society in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) context have been shaped and limited by the persistence of authoritarian governments and have instead sought to explain how religious, kinship groupings can perform a civil society function or resorted to using Culturalist, macro-interpretivist approaches to argue that the region's culture prevents the existence of civil society and democracy. Other works disregarded the importance of political culture by focusing on Structuralist explanations for political conditions.

4. Methodological summary

The methodology developed for this thesis sought to overcome the shortcomings of other political culture studies, in particular, those in the MENA region and can contribute to the study of political culture, civil society, and democratisation. Implementing Welch's theory of political culture, which asserts that political culture is exhibited through practice and discourse, a methodology was specifically developed for a political culture research project that captures the two expressions of culture. Therefore, this thesis has operationalised Welch's theory into a practical methodological approach to studying political culture which posits the need to collect multi-layered data to gain a greater understanding of political culture. In addition, the use of Welch's theoretical conceptualisation of political culture is a more sophisticated analytical approach for assessing a political culture than works that do not sufficiently engage with the concept.

The understanding that political culture manifests as discourse and practice is the fundamental epistemological grounding of this thesis. Therefore, although ascertaining practice through asking subjects about their practice is sufficient to a certain extent, there is a discrepancy between what people say and what people do. This means that observation of practice is also required and a triangulation of
methods is necessary for the process of inquiry that requires the researcher to both ask about and observe political culture. The triangulated, mixed methods approach is implemented from the theoretical requirement to understand practice and discourse, rather than motivated by the novelty of using three methods. The three methods have enabled an investigation of civil society that addresses the three relationships in which CSOs engage; with the State, with other CSOs in the public space, and with their members and the internal dynamics. This multifaceted approach has created a greater understanding of how CSOs see themselves and how they internalise democratic attributes. By enabling CSO members to reflect on their own processes, it has enabled investigation of civil society not only in terms of what it does but how it sees itself. This degree of reflexivity has enabled investigation into how CSO members envisage their attributes internally.

This approach offers an improvement on political culture works that use a single method, a macro-interpretivist approach, or seek to make overarching generalisations. By focusing on a micro-interpretivism approach that employs three separate methods for measuring political culture. The recommendations Hudson (1995) makes regarding the study of political culture in the MENA region context, including the disaggregation of culture, are implemented as the research focuses on the political culture of CSOs specifically. Further claims regarding a Tunisian national culture are not made from the collected data and results.

This thesis has demonstrated that the analysis of political culture requires a multifaceted approach. The use of survey, interview, and observation methods combined is an optimal approach to studying political culture because it comprehensively addresses practice and discourse. The six criteria of civil political culture, developed from the theoretical framework chapters, were used to structure the method of inquiry. Questions and observation plans were designed regarding the extent to which Tolerance, Equality, Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency were present or absent in Tunisian CSOs. Addressing CSO’s internal practice is vital to the assessment of civility. In order to understand a CSO, the internal operations need to be analysed. This research has demonstrated that not only do the relations between CSOs and between civil society and the state matter, so too do the internal attributes of CSOs.
The methodological approach of this thesis contributes to an alternative understanding of civil society. The methodological approach was possible due to the lack of authoritarian government structures in place in Tunisia. This enabled an online survey and ethnographic-observation to be conducted without suspicion or censorship from subjects or state-interference.

5. **Historical summary**

Chapters Four and Five present an historical summary of Tunisian civil society, which was limited and restrained under colonialism and authoritarianism, and its influential role during the revolution and in the democratic transition. A civil society had existed, survived, and developed from Beylical rule via French colonialism to the 21st Century. The Tunisian monarchy, which was semi-independent from Ottoman control, allowed civil society to perform an independent financial function that limited the potentially despotic government tendencies of the Bey. During the French protectorate, civil society, which included oppositional political parties, developed an Oppositional-Resistance function to the imperialist presence. This developed into the independence movement, which, crucially for the development of political civility, did not engage in guerrilla warfare and was almost exclusively non-violent.

The vibrancy of civil society that existed at independence was lost in the post-independence era. The dictatorships of Habib Bourguiba, and later Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, controlled the population, restricted the public space, and ensured that CSOs were largely co-opted by the regime or determined a threat and therefore crushed. National trade unions played a vital role in the independence struggle, but their leftist tendencies posed a threat to the one-party rule. To prevent challenges to the state, their leadership structures were co-opted and constrained. Islamist organisations, previously permitted to exist as a counterbalance to leftist thought, were subsequently suppressed. Oppositional-Resistance forms of civil society were forced underground and some adopted oppositional political agendas as the political system did not permit pluralism. Liberal-Associative groups, which remained uncritical of the regime or whose goals aligned with those of the regime, were permitted to exist and provided some degree of consultation with the government. Ben Ali used the number of these loyal, largely uncritical CSOs as a false indicator of Tunisia’s democratic credentials. Neither form of CSO could effectively perform a
democratic function due to the constraints of authoritarian government and the lack of political pluralism.

Despite these constraints and lack of independence, major civil society groups who were organised and nationally networked as opposition groups, at home or in exile, were connected prior to the 2011 revolution. Although their leadership was largely co-opted by the regime, the UGTT could claim some independence and had the capacity to mobilise its large membership base. The 2008 Gafsa uprising demonstrated that a disparity existed between the UGTT’s co-opted upper-echelons and the oppositional stance of the regular members.

Tunisia’s historical experience and strong institutions placed the country in a position that was more conducive to the successful completion of a democratic transition. The extensive building of state institutions would not be required. Furthermore, this thesis has demonstrated that the foundation for an organised civil society and Oppositional-Resistance CSO activism existed prior to the revolution. The revolution and subsequent transition process demonstrated the importance of civil society in generating change. After the 2011 Revolution, the interim government provided civil society with a new legal framework (Decree 88) with fewer constraints and greater freedoms, which allowed it to develop a democracy promoting capacity.

The behaviour and decision-making processes of both political party leaders and members of the NCA in this transition period influenced the development of a civil political culture in Tunisia. For example, the formulation of coalition governments, the desire to achieve consensus in the constitution writing process, and Ennahda’s agreement to relinquish power to a technocratic government.

The work of Tunisian civil society in this transition period was also vital for the development of civility. The use of violent conduct and methods in civil society, such as that exhibited by the LPR, who were consequently outlawed in 2014, was not accepted as evidenced by its prohibition under Decree 88.

Chapters Four and Five use a macro-interpretivist approach to address the history of Tunisia civil society and civil society’s role in the revolution. Although this thesis considers this approach insufficient for understanding a political culture or representing findings of the thesis, this broad synoptic analysis represents a useful
overview for establishing an historical background and providing context to the research period.

6. Results summary

Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight demonstrate that political civility is growing and developing in the discourses and practices of Tunisian CSOs, enabling them to fulfil a democratic function. The six criteria of civil political culture are evident, to varying degrees, in CSOs in the Tunisian transition. Despite the interconnectedness of these criteria, this research has demonstrated that they do not develop simultaneously. Furthermore, the six criteria should be considered in gradual or nuanced terms rather than understood in the absolutist binary of present or absent.

Key to this development is the Tunisian state's relationship with civil society. It is vital because civil society exists in relation to the state with the state regulating the space in which CSOs operate. Although aspects of Decree 88 are imprecise, particularly those in relation to financial transparency, this legal framework provided freedom, equality, and the foundation for CSOs to operate in post-authoritarian Tunisia. CSOs expressed the absence of state interference in their activities.

The manner in which CSOs engage with each other is important to understanding the extent of their political civility. The coalitions and collaborations between CSOs, or at least their willingness to work with each other, demonstrate increasing levels of trust. Conversely, factors such as a CSO’s perceived political allegiances or ideological tendencies, the sources of their funding and the degree of its transparency, and the degree of their membership’s involvement with the former regime, cause suspicion on the part of other CSOs. This can lead to intolerance or a lack of trust or equality amongst other civil society actors.

The internal operations and procedures of CSOs are also significant in this research. The results showed that CSO members recognise the normative importance of democratic practices and values while imbedding democratic culture has been a more gradual process. For some, in particular, participation in a CSO has been akin to a Tocquevillian ‘school of democracy’, whereby both individuals and organisations engage in a process of democracy learning through their actions and interactions. Therefore, understanding the institutional culture and internal dynamics of CSOs was
important to assessing their political civility. This required addressing decision-making processes, the manner in which internal disputes are overcome, and the organisation's structure. The research showed that management styles largely included consultative processes that afforded pluralism and tolerance to members. In addition, positive relations between bureau exécutif and the membership suggested equality amongst members. In some cases, the depersonalisation of leadership, the establishment of routine practice, clearer definition of roles and responsibilities from CSO’s charter or internal rules was required.

Chapter Six demonstrates that civility is developing with separate analysis of each of the six criteria and the high-scoring criteria indexes created. These quantitative results demonstrate that greater levels of trust are exhibited towards respondents' own organisations than externally to other groups. General trends of tolerance, equality, and pluralism were exhibited, but disagreement regarding politicised and religious CSOs and the inclusion of former RCD members was also evident. While agreement towards the implementation of democratic practices and independence from the state was expressed, respondents also preferred some limitations to freedom.

Chapter Seven utilised a set of interview questions specifically designed to assess the existence of the six criteria of civil political culture. Unlike Chapter Six's analysis of each criterion in isolation, these results demonstrate the interconnectivity of the six criteria of civil political culture, in particular, the linkages between Trust, Tolerance, and Transparency. Therefore, the improvement of one criterion is linked to improvement in the others. CSOs become aware of the importance of Transparency because it leads to greater Trust, which leads to greater Tolerance. Conversely, the limitations of Tolerance in civil society are linked to Freedom, Trust, and Transparency. In particular, CSOs' ability to collaborate and co-operate is shaped by the perception of whether another CSO has Islamist sympathies or not. CSO operations and projects have meant that in some cases Pluralism is overlooked, to a certain extent, as leaders focus on the development of their organisation and the efficiency and effectiveness of their work. This may occur at the expense of democratic practices, which can reduce the development of democratic culture. However, aspects of the Liberal-Associative “schools of democracy” model of civil
society are evident as interviewees explained how they have gained a greater understanding of democracy through participation in a CSO.

Chapter Eight presents the ethnographic participant-observation results, which were essential to the theoretical understanding of the practice of civil political culture. These single case results from working with one youth-led, pro-democracy CSO, Jeunes Independent Démocrates, are less generalizable, but the previous two research methods were not able to verify if interviewees ‘do what they say they do’. Therefore, the observation of internal behaviour was the most effective and most valid method for understanding internal interactions.

The observation data demonstrates the problems of personalisation of leadership or when too much responsibility remains with a few members. To a certain extent, a lack of trust in other members of the CSO was evident as members may not trust others to perform tasks. This meant that the transition of leadership was problematic as somewhat personalised leadership could reduce the democratic function of the CSO and lead to anti-democratic outcomes. This can be manifest in leaders that seek to retain their positions or refuse to delegate, which in turn makes the CSO dependent on their leader for expertise, skills, and institutional memory.

The members’ partial but developing understandings of both democracy and the complexities of their own country has meant that JID’s impact in assisting the Tunisian transition had not met members’ expectations. However, the observation period established that JID members were engaged in a democracy learning process. Practicing democracy was assisting JID in imbedding the values of civility. Learning to work, co-operate, and collaborate with other members, through inclusive rather than exclusive interactions encouraged tolerance and acceptance of other views. In addition, the organisational skills they were developing, in particular the sharing of roles and responsibilities, helped in making the organisation more equal and pluralistic. Prior to undertaking this thesis, ethnographic observation of a Tunisian CSO had not been performed.

7. Potential further research

There were two issues that this research could not answer but require further investigation. Firstly, the question of whether the authoritarian state has been entirely dismantled and overthrown or has only been forced to retreat. Although the
authoritarian character of the Tunisian state has been changed, the extent to which a ‘deep state’, a political elite, or a particular socio-economic group remains in control of the country needs to be addressed. From a legal perspective, the authoritarian state has been overthrown. Ben Ali, the dictatorial figurehead of power, was removed and the Trabelsi clan were forced into exile, while the network-structure of control, the RCD party, was dissolved. Opposition political parties were legalised, new leaders elected, and the constitutional changes that include a greater separation of powers demonstrate that political structures have been changed. However, the networks of corruption and patronage that include politicians, businesspeople, officials and security officers, who are determined to keep their privileges, remain. For example, former RCD members have formed new parties. Even President Essesbi was a member of the Bourguiba government. Fethi Jemmi, from Echbika, stated, "The Tunisian revolution was largely peaceful, but it also meant that we inherited the whole administration intact and many of these civil servants are trying to hold on to the past and the privileges that they received" (Hussien, 2013). As this thesis has addressed the political culture of CSOs, rather than government or business circles, further research would be required to assess if an old elite is still entrenched in the country and to what extent this is obstructing the democratic transition.

Secondly, this thesis addressed the relationships between CSOs and the state, other CSOs, and its own members. It has not addressed the relations and interactions between CSOs and the Tunisian general public. A further study into the relations between CSOs and citizens could ascertain whether CSOs are imbedding civil political culture in the population. It would assess the impact of CSOs on encouraging democracy learning amongst Tunisian citizens or whether the practices and discourses of CSOs, whether they are politically civil or not, are influencing citizens and vice versa.

This thesis has also opened the potential for further ethnographic studies of CSOs to be conducted. The participant-observation was a single case study of one organisation. Additional secondary or tertiary ethnographies with different organisations would have been helpful for a comparative aspect to be included. Various comparative studies could be conducted with potentially illuminating findings regarding CSO political culture. For example, a comparison between JID and organisations from less affluent areas or from the interior or coastal regions in
Tunisia could address the middle class and regional biases JID represent. The regional variations highlighted by the findings of the Chapter Five attitude survey demonstrate that perceptions of democratic values differ across regional lines. Other possible comparisons could be drawn from observing an organisation with greater experience in civil society activity, such as a CSO that was established pre-revolution, which might have established rules and procedures but also potentially show less flexibility or willingness to adapt. If an organisation with different objectives is observed, such as a charity-based organisation, their focus might be on the delivery of aid or services rather than internal democratic practices. A unique further case study would be *Shams* or *Chouf*, two organisations that are fighting against homophobia and working for the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Tunisia. It would be an interesting representation of CSOs that are a target of prejudice (Tounsi, 2015) and could demonstrate a lack of tolerance or represent the boundaries of civil political culture in Tunisia. Some comparative perspective was gained through interviews with *Al Bawsala* (Ghada Louhichi) and Sawty (Ghazoua Ltaif) but the aforementioned possibilities represent the potential scope for further work beyond this PhD thesis.

Prior to ending this thesis, the following epilogue addresses significant events that have occurred after the research period. These events demonstrate the precariousness of transition by providing evidence that events in the democratisation process may progress, halt, or regress simultaneously or consecutively. Despite progress, Tunisian civil society faces ongoing challenges in the political transition, particularly amid the current volatile security context, which provides the state with the pretext to reduce the public space in which CSOs operate. This reinforces the ongoing importance of Oppositional-Resistance CSOs performing a democratic function.

**Epilogue**

This epilogue demonstrates the continuing importance of civil society and the extent to which this thesis, as a study of a transitional period, has been a snapshot of political culture. Furthermore, the political culture of Tunisian CSOs is not static but continues to evolve, particularly as the country’s transition is ongoing. Two of the major CSO achievements towards democratic consolidation after the period of
research (2013-2014) and some of the current challenges facing civil society are discussed below.

For their "decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia"\textsuperscript{72}, the Quartet was awarded the Nobel peace prize in October 2015. Interviewees noted that the Quartet (UGTT, LTDH, ONAT, and UTICA) were of vital importance in pushing the Tunisian transition forward. This collaboration of four major CSOs, responsible for steering Tunisia through the National Dialogue process out of a political deadlock, was rewarded and received international recognition for their invaluable contribution towards safeguarding the country’s democratic gains. This award was welcomed by the Quartet as recognition of the efforts of the Tunisian civil society in playing an oversight and support role throughout the most critical junctures of the country's democratic transition.

Protests on the fifth anniversary of the revolution, however, reminded political leaders that issues of economic disparity, unemployment, and corruption – the original causes of the revolution – have yet to be sufficiently addressed. The 2016 protests started in Kasserine, a neglected region with the highest national unemployment rate: 30\%\textsuperscript{73}. The regime responded with the imposition of curfews but recognised the validity of the protests. This represents the degree of change that has occurred in leadership but the extent to which protesters feel that not enough has changed and corruption still exists, implying that the deep state is still being removed 5 years on.

Furthermore, the securitisation of the state is threatening the public space in which civil society operates. An issue of current importance is the state’s security discourse in its response to terrorism, as civil society activists and human rights advocates have sounded the alarm about this discourse’s potential for limiting civil society freedom. National security and counterterrorism issues have become a priority for the Tunisian state. Since my research period ended, Tunisia has witnessed an increased number of attacks by Uqba Ibn Nafi Battalion militants have taken place against Tunisian soldiers at checkpoints in the Chaambi Mountains in 2014. 2015


saw three major ISIS-claimed attacks: the Bardo museum attack, that resulted in at least 22 deaths, the Sousse beach resort attack that claimed the lives of 38 tourists, and the Mohamed V Avenue bombing which targeted presidential guards, killing 12. The March 2016 failed ISIS incursion into the southeastern border town of Ben Guardane was the last of this series of attacks to date. The government’s response to each of the attacks has proven the state’s willingness to sideline individual and civil society freedoms on the account of combatting terrorism. The counter-terrorism bill advanced by the government in the wake of the Bardo attack was largely denounced by civil society for its infringement on individual rights and due process. Furthermore, the state of emergency, which has been the government’s kneejerk response after each terrorist attacks, has been used to quell and disperse legitimate and peaceful civil society movements and protests (Keskes, 2015). President Beji Caid Essebsi used a speech following the Sousse attack to accuse civil society groups, namely those responsible for “Winou El Petrol?”, a CSO social media campaign demanding transparency in natural resource revenue management, of destabilising the country and making it more vulnerable to terrorism.

Civil society has suffered previous government crackdowns using the pretext of counter-terrorism. In the wake of a 22 July 2014 terrorist attack that killed 16 national guardsmen near the Algerian border, the Jomaa Government forced 157 CSOs to suspend their activities ”for security reasons” and some were sanctioned for financial irregularities. Nawaat noted that the suspensions were based on Articles 10 and 11 of Law 52, dated 1975 (Bellamine, 2014), a vague law that grants power to Governors to “ensure the implementation of laws, regulations and government decisions” and “maintenance of public order”. However, this executive decision breeches CSO Decree 88 which gives the judiciary exclusive authority to determine whether a CSO should be dissolved, through a process that includes issuing a

77 Law No. 75-52 of 13 June 1975, establishing the powers of senior managers of the regional administration. Available at http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/28690?secondlanguage=ar&op=OK&form_build_id=form-cdb970e8d130bec0a652e4d20add37eb&form_id=dcaf_multilanguage_form_render
warning to the CSO in question, before suspending its activities for 30 days and dissolving it as a last resort. CSO freedoms have been negatively affected by government measures to counter terrorism and extremism and legal reforms have taken a backseat to security issues. CSOs have a new role in ensuring anti-terrorism laws do not contravene the 2014 constitution, reduce the newly-acquired public space, or jeopardise the recently gained liberties.

Finally, a notable achievement is the progress civil society has made with regards to the range of social problems it is addressing. Civil society is now tackling issues of homosexuality and racism, matters that were previously considered off-limits. Five years after the revolution, civil society groups have succeeded through continuous mobilization, awareness raising, and advocacy, in putting a spotlight on issues and rights long neglected or regarded as taboo by the society and the legislature. Homosexuality is perceived by most Tunisians as violating the Quranic scripture and thus being against Islam, leading some to note “LGBT Tunisians are treated as second class citizens” (Samti, 2015). Furthermore, Article 230 of the Tunisian Penal Code criminalizes “homosexual acts” with a punishment of up to three years in prison. In 2014, Moujib told me that LGBT CSOs operate “underground” because Tunisia was not ready for their activism. Two years later, regardless of the social stigma and the severe state penalisation, Shams, a group of young Tunisians committed to destigmatising homosexuality and advocating for legal rights for the LGBT community preserved in demanding its legal right to exist as a CSO. After having been refused authorisation in December 2014, in May 2015, “in what seemed to be a landmark victory for sexual and gender rights in the Middle East and North Africa, the Shams organization for LGBT rights became the first group of its kind to receive official authorization from Tunisia’s interior ministry” (Kilbride, 2016). This victory, however, revealed the intolerance of Tunisian society and an unwillingness to respect pluralism in beliefs and lifestyles. This was evidenced by the ensuing “rampant homophobic abuse in Tunisia’s national news, social media outlets, and community mosques” (Kilbride, 2016). Members of the group who appeared on national TV reportedly received death threats. The smear campaign that the CSO

was subjected to culminated in the Tunisian authorities filing a complaint to the judiciary to suspend the group’s activities. Article 45 of Decree 88, which “allows the executive to request the judiciary to suspend the activities of a registered NGO when it breaches the provisions of the law,” lead to a ruling to suspend the group’s activities. Shams has since filed a complaint against the Tunisian government and, on 23 February 2016, the group won the law suit against the state and is now free to pursue its activities legally.

Shams’ victory is but one example of the perseverance of CSOs in challenging legal and societal intolerance and instilling pluralism and equality. Mnemty, a CSO that aims to raise awareness about the rampant racial discrimination, began its activities in 2011 in a context where racism was not acknowledged by most as an existing issue. During my interview with Mnemty president Saadia Mosbah, in March 2014, she stated “we asked them (the legislature) to criminalize racism and we carried out the necessary procedures. They totally refused to discuss this topic in the main room of the assembly because according to them, the issue does not exist.” Two years later, Mnemty was making important strides towards publicizing race and racism issues in Tunisia: the CSO launched the Tunisian Movement for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, starting with a march against racism on 21 March 2016 in the main streets of Tunis and seeking “to establish a law that criminalizes all forms of racial discrimination” (Tarfa, 2016). In tandem, an ad hoc CSO coalition led by FTDES presented a draft law criminalizing racial discrimination to the parliament. While the parliament has yet to vote on the law, the issue of racism in Tunisia is gaining traction internationally thanks to civil society efforts, with outlets such as al Jazeera English running featured reportages on the issue.

By looking at the political culture of CSOs, it is evident that the process of democracy learning and the embedding of democratic culture is ongoing. The progress made by the cases of LGBT and Anti-Racism CSOs is a testament to this. Conducting large-scale, broad studies of civil society that produce evidence of general trends remain

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80 Ibid
valuable for formulating an overview. However, this thesis has demonstrated that the small stories in addition to the single cases observations of CSOs internal operations, provide micro-level, non-essentialist evidence that the processes of embedding civil political cultures, required for the long-term success of the democratic transition, is occurring. To further Michael C. Hudson’s 1995 work on MENA political culture, the case for bringing it back in, carefully, is to ensure that small-scale observation and individual cases are included.
APPENDICES

Chapter Three: Tunisia specific surveys

The Zogby survey (2013) titled ‘Divided and Dissatisfied with Ennahda’ focused on the general population’s trust and perception of the Ennahda led coalition’s performance in government. The results show a lack of confidence in Ennahda (only 28%) and “the majority of Tunisians are disturbed by the government’s ineffectiveness and its failure to deliver on the political and economic promises of their revolution” (Zogby, 2013:1). This survey was conducted via face-to-face, in-home personal interviews with 3,031 adults in Tunisia. This survey provided examples of how to phrase questions pertaining to Trust.

Gallup’s work in Tunisia during 2009 and 2010 was economic, standard of living, and entrepreneur focused, but was administered by face-to-face interviews in Tunisia with approximately 1,000 adults. Pew Global survey ‘Most Muslims Want Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life’ consisted of 120 questions mostly structured on 5 point scales e.g. for opinions towards various politicians (Favourable, Somewhat Favourable, Somewhat Unfavourable, Very unfavourable and Don’t know/Refused). Results for the survey in Tunisia are based on 1,001 face-to-face interviews. It came to the following conclusions; Tunisians are unhappy with the state of the country, but remain hopeful, democratic government is preferable but improved economic conditions are also of utmost importance. This demonstrated how to structure ‘preference’ and aspirations questions and justified the use of a 5-point scale. World Values Survey was long at 250 questions, was general, not country specific, and featured a wide range of topics and uses ‘Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree’ scales.

The Arab Barometer: 2012 Tunisian Country report no.2 used 5 point scales and asked 1,196 respondents questions divided into 8 sections with the aim of creating a

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85 Arab Barometer (2013) Tunisia, Survey Report II. Available at http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/arab-barometer-ii-tunisia [accessed 09/12/2013]
data set of social, religious, cultural and political values as well as evaluating confidence in public institutions, religious and political participation, and trends towards democracy. Results included, 68% believing that the economic situation was the biggest threat to Tunisia. 84% believe an authoritarian government is bad or very bad for Tunisia and 70% believe that a democratic system whereby all (left/right/Islamist) parties are considered by means of election is appropriate for Tunisia. Section 3: Attitudes to Democracy - 70% believe that, despite its issues, democracy is better than the alternative, 8% oppose, 22% neither. This result does not fluctuate much by region, education levels or age. Section 7, ‘Public Establishments and faith in their effectiveness’, was of particular interest because it tackled the issue of trust; an important part of civility and demonstrating a viable format for asking trust questions in Tunisia. This section demonstrated trust in state institutions from political parties and civil society organisations, in addition to 62% trusting the interim government. In addition, 89% trust in the army compared to 58% trust the police, who had closer ties with the former regime.

BBC Media Action survey (2013) on media consumption and preferences in Tunisia asked every respondent each question of the survey in an interview format. To collect 1,000 responses, a team of researchers was employed. Suleiman’s survey (1993) focused on youth culture and attempting to measure the political knowledge of 9-17-year-olds. It aimed to understand the political and social values students have absorbed and record their cultural and political norms while focusing on gender. The survey questionnaire also included six different definitions of democracy for students to agree/disagree with (Suleiman, 1993: 75).

**Language Considerations**

Where possible I conducted interviews in English. If the interviewee was not comfortable speaking English, I asked my questions in French. I wanted to conduct my interviews in Tunisian Arabic. Although I am far from fluent in Tunisi, I thought that the interviewees will respond more positively than if I was interviewing in English with a direct translator. I thought that the interviewee would have more respect and listen more intently. However, I realised the limitation of my language skills. When Westerners speak Tunisi with an unusual accent, it is often confusing for Tunisians. This is more a critique of my language skills than of Tunisians, therefore French or rephrased Tunisi by my interpreter was the most appropriate means of
communication. Before I began conducting the interviews, I translated the questions into French and Tunisian with the help of my interpreters to ensure the question meanings did not become lost in translation. During the interviews, the interpreters were strict with their rephrasing of the questions. My interpreters were all sufficiently tri-lingual (English, French, Tunisian) to cope with these situations.

For the majority of my research I employed Myriam Ben Ghazi, a Tunisian former journalist and member of Watchdog CSO Al Bawsala, as my research assistant because my Tunisian Arabic language skills were not sufficient. I had known her for two years and we negotiated a fair financial payment before we started working together to ensure she did not feel exploited. When working together, we talked about ‘we’ and ‘our work’ as part of the process that we were working together, rather than her working ‘for’ me. I trusted her judgement to ask follow-up questions or seek clarification in interviews, giving Myriam ownership of the research process. Despite being an already accomplished journalist and researcher, there was mutual benefit from the work as Myriam gained from my knowledge of research methodology and practice, and used the experience from our work to bolster her already impressive CV.
Chapter Six: Technical Appendix

This Appendix develops information that is included in Chapter Six and provides greater detail.

1. **Piloting Process**

The ‘Piloting’ process undertook the following stages.

1. Design Question
2. Feedback from PhD Supervisors (Prof. Emma Murphy and Dr. Steve Welch)
3. Pre-Pilot Feedback from Non-Tunisian Academics (Joel Rozen, Alice Alunni, and Anne Wolf)
4. Pre-Pilot Feedback from former Tunisia Live staff (Huda Mzioudet, Meriam Ben Ghazi, and Sana Ajmi)
5. Translation and feedback from Dorra Agrebi
6. 2nd Translation checks by Hamza Zaghdoud
7. Feedback from Tunisian Academics (He la Boujnah)
8. Pilot testing with Tunisia Live staff.
9. Assessing Pilot testing results and make improvements
10. Re-check translation
11. Launch survey for target population; members of Tunisian CSOs

2. **Pre-Pilot Test subjects**

By pre-pilot testing, I am referring to ‘ironing-out’ any potential problems before pilot testing, which made the pilot testing process less demanding on the Tunisia Live journalists. Pre-Piloting allowed me to gain critical perspectives of the questionnaire. I chose to ask a range of people to Pre-Pilot Test my survey. Firstly, I gave the survey to Tunisian Journalists Huda Mzioudet (Libya Herald and Former Tunisia Live), Meriam Ben Ghazi (*Al Bawsala* and former Tunisia Live) and Sana Ajmi (World Bank and Former Tunisia Live) for I have mentioned above the advantages of journalist’s perspectives. Tunisian Interpreters Hamza Zaghdoud (BBC Media Action Interpreter) and Dorra Agrebi (Linguistics Student and Interpreter) were specifically helpful with maintaining the quality of the translations. Being proficient in Arabic, French and English, the interpreters were specifically adept at assessing the quality of the translations to ensure no meaning is lost. Non-Tunisian Academics with fieldwork experience in Tunisia, Joel Rozen (PhD Candidate, Princeton University), Alice Alunni (PhD Candidate, Durham University) and Anne Wolf (PhD Candidate, Cambridge University) aided this process because, as foreign researchers, they had faced similar experiences, and helped me avoid pitfalls and warned of potential insensitivity. Tunisian Academic and civil society member, He La Boujneh (Faculty of Law, Sousse University), ensure the questions were suitable for the Tunisian context by adding her perspective on the Tunisian understanding of civil society, institutional culture,
and political culture. He La was also helpful for identifying if my questions were too European or Western-centric. The feedback helped to refine the questions, making them more appropriate and more understandable while avoiding potential confusion and making the piloting process easier.

3. **Pilot Test Sample – Tunisia Live journalists**

Tunisia Live (TL) is the first Tunisian news website in English, launched post-Revolution, by a group of Tunisians who felt the need to share the news of their country with the global audience. TL claims to be independent and aims to cover upcoming political and social events comprehensively. As a non-state news company it occupies a unique position between State and Civilian Journalism. These journalists are regularly asking questions to the wider Tunisian population, therefore they may offer insight into how the questions in my survey are likely to be received, whether they are likely to offend, be misunderstood, or contain too much jargon. They are multi-lingual and can also comment on the quality of the translations. Journalists who do not work for state-owned companies can be considered civil society actors, therefore, under this definition, TL is a CSO.

4. **Pilot Test Results**

Demographic questions 1-6 were ok except Q6 Religious belief which caused confusion rather than any offense.

- Q6) Ambiguity over the concept of Spiritual Muslim. Agnostic and Atheist require explanations, so too does Spiritual; “less emphasis on the legal aspects of Islam and closer to the personal, human element”
- Q6) Remove ‘Salafi’ Option because Salafis are likely to consider themselves as a ‘Practicing Muslim’. This same issue was highlighted in the pre-piloting; therefore is seems that the Salafi option is somewhat redundant.
- Q10) Agenda? What type of agenda?
- Q 14,15,16) typing and spelling errors
- Q16) Ambiguity regarding the question and various suggestions were made as how to rephrase it.
- Q17) “CSOs should be allowed to pursue any goals they desire” unclear wording – Perhaps I should include “As long as their means/methods are non-violent”
- Q22) ambiguity over some groups; ‘What do you mean by ‘some/certain groups’
- Q25) intervene as a regulator
- Q27) unpack/explain Human Rights a bit further. Confirm what Alunni says or delete Universal?
- Q43) Typing error
- Q49) requires a multiple choice answer because nobody answered it
5. Survey Question Rational

Section 1, ‘About You’, was to determine demographics of gender, age, income, regional representation and religious belief, and create the parameters and variables through which the data would be analysed. Establishing the demographics of the survey population also ensure the sample is representative of the population, regarding gender and regional distribution. As the Tunisian population is 51% Male and 49% Female, it would therefore be appropriate to acquire a similar distribution for the civil society population. Age and Income indicate which age groups and classes are most present in civil society. The population distribution by region is to ensure even regional as per table (page 11). I considered religiosity to be an important attribute to determine; however the phrasing of this question is critical as to obtain useful results [See Demographics study from Journal of North African studies]. This was not to establish a religion vs. democracy debate, but an aspect I would like to consider.

The sections 2-6 and 8 are groups of questions are related to the six aspects of political civility/ civil political culture (CPC); Tolerance, Equality, Freedom, Pluralism, Trust, and financial transparency. Q7-9 address tolerance, respect, and cooperation of and between CSOs. Q10-15 Equality section addresses respondent views towards the religious/ secular cleavage, gender prejudice, and treatment of non-Muslims and former RCD regarding their participation in the public sphere. Q16-27 tap into issues of freedom to operate and how much ‘freedom of expression’ CSOs think they should have and what other CSOs should have. In addition, the role of the state in securing that freedom and defending freedoms. Also issues of censorship, what is considered ‘offensive’, what should be done about groups that cause offense, and the state’s role in censorship? Regarding opinions on censorship, I am looking to find the extent to which people agree with it, on a scale rather than dichotomous responses. The Human Rights question (27) addresses the interest or lack of interest in Sharia law and preference for Islamic rights such as passing nationality to children, divorce laws etc.

The Pluralism questions look at co-operation, personal reflexivity, willingness to accept different views, and compromise. Trust is an aspect of political civility and is a key aspect towards co-operation. Whether trust exists firstly within a CSO and secondly between CSOs might give indications as to the nature of the public sphere, grounds for it being harmonious or fractured. Financial transparency issues relate to how the finances of the CSO are organised, how open the CSO is, and if they are following rules of the laws of association.

Section 7, ‘Democratic Practices’, studies attitudes towards democracy and which democratic practices exist in the respondent’s CSO. These democratic practices determine what aspects of democracy CSOs are embedding. Largely follows Putnam’s argument, that practicing democracy leads to/imbeds democracy.
Section 9, ‘Your CSO’, directly asks about the specifics organisation culture, leadership, decisions making in the respondent’s CSO. They are Organisational Culture questions that address the norms and standards that CSO members see within their own organisation, the styles of participation, and the type of leadership their bureau executif adopts. Inquiring how long members have with their CSO could identify whether members have only become active since 2011. Older, long-standing members of civil society may see things differently from new, post-uprising activists. It could also suggest members move frequently between CSOs. Addressing if CSO members are they employed or volunteers determine the extent of the cleavage between professional and volunteer CSOs and how many are making a living from civil society work.

Section 10, ‘what is desirable?’ attitude questions that address how respondents want civil society to be. This is indicated by the inclusion of should in the phrasing of these question. These questions can also help determine State and civil society relations.
**Survey Results**

**Section 1: About You**

1. **What is your gender?**

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<th>Male:</th>
<th>Female:</th>
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<td>51.0%</td>
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2. **What is your current age?**

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<td>1</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
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<td>14.7%</td>
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3. **What is your educational level?**

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<th>Primary education:</th>
<th>Secondary education:</th>
<th>Vocational training:</th>
<th>High education - professorship / vacation:</th>
<th>Master:</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
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<td>40.2%</td>
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4. **What is your monthly income in Tunisian dinar?**

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<td>1</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
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<td>6.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
5. Which region in Tunisia are you originally from?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Tunis - Ariana, Tunisia, Ben Arous, Manouba</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North - Bizerte:</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West - Kef, Zaghwan, Jendouba, Beja:</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast - Nabeul, Sousse, Monastir, Mahdia, Sfax</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre - Kairouan, Kasserine, Siliana:</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central - Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid:</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South - Tozeur, Gabes, Medenine, Tataouine:</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. How would you describe the religious belief?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim practitioner:</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-practicing Muslim:</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnosticism - belief in the existence of God cannot be proved or denied:</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist - faith that there is no god:</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure:</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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Section 2: Tolerance

7. Civil society organizations with common goals can work together.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree:</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not agree:</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not know:</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree:</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree:</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Civil society organizations with different goals can work together on projects of mutual interest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Level</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>1.0%</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I do not agree</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not know</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td>65.7%</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
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9. Each civil society organizations the right to achieve their goals peacefully.

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Section 3: Equality

10. Groups with an explicitly religious agenda should be allowed to participate in civil society.

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11. Groups with a specifically secular agenda clear should be allowed to participate in civil society.

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12. Members of the former Constitutional Democratic Rally should be allowed to participate in civil society.

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22.5% 23
20.6% 21
16.7% 17
34.3% 35
5.9%  6

13. Women should be able to participate as fully and freely as men in civil society.

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1.0% 1
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1.0%  1
14.7% 15
83.3% 85

14. Civil society groups should have equal access to the media: newspapers, TV, radio and other.

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2.0%  2
23.5% 24
73.5% 75

15. Every citizen has the right to pursue their own cultural preference.

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26.5% 27
72.5% 74
16. Non-Muslim Tunisians are entitled to the same rights as Muslim Tunisians.

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Section 4: Freedom

17. Civil society organizations should be allowed to pursue any goals, as long as their means and methods are non-violent.

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18. The government should allow civil society organizations to operate freely.

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19. Freedom of expression is essential in civil society.

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### 20. Racially offensive views should be silenced.

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### 21. Religiously offensive views should be silenced.

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### 22. Some groups represent a threat to the public interest and should not be allowed to practice their activities.

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### 23. Freedom of association laws in Tunisia provide sufficient protection for civil society organizations.

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### 24. The government has the responsibility to protect society from offensive opinions.

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25. The government interferes in civil society.

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Section 5: Pluralism

28. Decisions taken by individuals are usually of higher than the decisions taken by the groups that qualify.

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29. I respect viewpoints that differ from my own views.

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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>2.0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30. I often change my mind when I hear other people’s arguments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>23.5%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31. Disagreement is inevitable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
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<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
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<td>47.1%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32. Alternative opinions should be respected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 6: Trust

33. I trust the other members of the organization that I work within.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34. I trust the leadership of the organization that I work within.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1.0%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>26.5%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 35. I trust members of other organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<td>35.3%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3.9%</td>
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</table>

### Section 7: Democratic Practices

#### 36. CSO members should be allowed to express disagreement with the leaders and managers of their organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
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<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<td>55.9%</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 37. The hierarchy in my CSO is a well-defined organizational structure, where members are required to complete their work by going through the proper procedures and persons, and where authority is respected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2.9%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12.7%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 38. In my organization job descriptions are flexible and authority is questioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>22.5%</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>47.1%</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 8: Financial Transparency

### 39. I know who funds the civil society organization I work for.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>True</th>
<th>Error</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not know</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 40. The members of the civil society organizations should know who finances their organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not agree</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not know</td>
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<td>2.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 41. Civil society organizations should publish their financial accounts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>1.0%</td>
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<td>3.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td>60.8%</td>
</tr>
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<td>I do not agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 42. The sources of funding that CSOs receive should be made public.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
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<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
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<td>9.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>45.1%</td>
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<td>I do not agree</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>I do not know</td>
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<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Section 9: Your Civil Society Organization

#### 43. For how long have you been active with civil society organizations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 3 months</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 6 months</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 12 months</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 years</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5 years</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 44. Are you paid by the organization you work for or do you work voluntarily?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payment Method</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>93.1%</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 45. How often do the organization members meet?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 46. Describe your working environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very formal</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very informal</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 47. Describe the process of decision-making in your organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Method</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consultation at all levels</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle management has authority</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commands issued by senior management</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 48. How do you determine positions in the organization?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>1996 Results</th>
<th>1998 Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Consensus after the debate</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Appointment by the administration</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Appointment by family members</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Friends preference</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Another way: Please detail</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 48.a. another way: Please detail
- After applying allowances and interview.
- EVERY category and discipline and values / e.g. young underground had their place and their leading ships

## 49. Describe the philosophy and culture of work within your organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Philosophy and Culture</th>
<th>1996 Results</th>
<th>1998 Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Power is held by a small group or a central figure. There are few rules and little bureaucracy but decisions are often made quickly.</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Highly defined structure, clear roles, and hierarchical bureaucracy.</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Skilled and specialized people form small teams to solve problems:</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>All individuals believe themselves superior to the organization but each partner brings a particular expertise:</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Positions in the organisation are secured by outperforming others</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Members are put under pressure which makes them compromise in order to be effective:</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 49a. Other: Please State
I do not have a lot of experience to make the right decision
50. Does your organization have an internal law or constitution?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes:</th>
<th>92.2%</th>
<th>94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Do not:</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51. Describe your manager’s leadership style.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Makes decisions which reflect their opinions and personality:</th>
<th>14.7%</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ensures procedures are followed:</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gives responsibility to staff to make decisions themselves:</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Acts as a member of the team:</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Less controlling and acts more like a mentor:</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 10: Attitude Questions: what is desirable?

52. Civil society organizations should be independent of the state institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree:</th>
<th>1.0%</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I do not agree:</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I do not know:</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>I agree:</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Strongly Agree:</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53. Civil society organizations should respect the objectives of other organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree:</th>
<th>1.0%</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I do not agree:</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I do not know:</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>I agree:</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Strongly Agree:</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54. Civil society organizations should be obedient to their government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree:</th>
<th>32.4%</th>
<th>33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I do not agree:</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I do not know:</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>I agree:</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Strongly Agree:</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
55. Civil society organizations should operate with internal democratic practices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56. Civil society organizations the activities of and campaigns should be limited.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. List of Organisations who responded to the Survey

1. Association pour le développement sera Palmatin
2. Association de la créativité de la jeunesse
3. Association Jeunes Innovation Tozeur
4. Association Création et Créativité pour le Développement et l’Embauche (CCDE)
5. ASSOCIATION DEFI-TAHADI-CHALLENGE-DROITS DE L’HOMME A TRAVERS LES ARTS
6. Association Gabès Action
7. Association gouvernance participative
8. Association internationale des étudiants en sciences économiques et commerciales (AIESEC)
9. ASSOCIATION JEUNES LEADERS ZAGHOUAN
10. Association Paix et Proseperite
11. Association de la Promotion pour le Droit de la Différence (APDD)
12. Association tunisienne des Ingenieurs Agronomes ATIA anciennement UTIA
13. Association Un enfant Un espoir
14. alkachéfa attonisiya (scout)
15. alroki
16. ARAB YOUNG VOICES
17. Association des habitants Mourouj2
18. Inara
19. Association jeunes Science de Tunisie (AJST)
20. Nsitni
21. Association Tanitarts
22. Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD)
23. Association tunisienne des étudiants ne pharmacie
24. ATIDE "Association Tunisienne pour l’Intégrité et la Démocratie des Elections"
25. British Council
26. Forum des jeunes juristes atelier littéraire de walid solaiman
27. FST
28. Human Rights Watch
29. I Watch
30. Jeune Chambre international (JCI)
31. Jeunes Indépendants Démocrates (JID)
32. Jeunesses Sans Frontières - Tunisie (JSF)
33. L’Association Tunisienne Réforme des institutions
34. Mashreq’Shams Tunisia
35. M’nemty HEDUCAP
36. Notre Santé d’abord
37. Reform
38. Réseau Entreprendre Tunis
39. SAWTY
40. Sousse Demain
41. Sfax El Mezyena المزيانة صفاقس
42. TOUENSA
43. Tunisian Association for International Cultural Exchange (TAICE)
44. Tunisian Association for Management and Social Stability (TAMSS)
45. Tunisian Association of Dental Students (TADS)
46. Tunisian Center for Public Health (TUNCPH)
47. Tunisian Organization for Peace
48. Tunisie Propre
49. (UGET) L’Union Général des Etudiants de la Tunisie
50. Union des tunisiens indépendants pour la liberté (UTIL)
51. United Colleges Association (UCA) Youth Can Tunis ISLT debate club Youth Future
52. United Colleges Association- UCA
53. UTEE
54. WeYouth
55. The Space Of Wisdom

**Other**

- Je ne souhaite pas répondre à cette question
- Je peux pas désolé
- Aucune association
- international union of blabla
### T-test and ANOVA test results tables

1. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Tolerance Index (Q7-9) = No Association

**Group Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is respondent 25 or under?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tol Index Youth</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.2941</td>
<td>.63472</td>
<td>.08888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tol Index Not Youth</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.3137</td>
<td>.48722</td>
<td>.06822</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Independent Samples Test**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tol Index</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances not</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Difference in means are tested and the significance is greater than 0.05 (0.821)
The P-value of 0.861 is greater than 0.05 therefore there is no significance between ‘Age’ and ‘Tolerance Index’. There is not strong evidence that there is an association between the Youth/Non-Youth dichotomy and the Tolerance Index.

2. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Equality Index (Q10-16) = No Association


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Is the respondent under 25</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25 or under</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.9888</td>
<td>.60666</td>
<td>.08495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.0196</td>
<td>.50630</td>
<td>.07090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality Index</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>.166</td>
<td>.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P-value (0.781) is greater than 0.05, therefore there is not strong evidence that there is an association between the Youth/Non-Youth dichotomy and the Equality Index.
3. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Pluralism Index (Q28-32) = No Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Statistics</th>
<th>Is the respondent under 25</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism Index</td>
<td>25 or under</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.6824</td>
<td>.59622</td>
<td>.08349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.7529</td>
<td>.42443</td>
<td>.05943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Samples Test</th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism Index</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>1.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.689</td>
<td>90.321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P-value 0.493 is greater than 0.05 therefore there is not strong evidence that there is an association between the Youth/Non-Youth dichotomy and the Pluralism Index.
4. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Trust Index (Q33-35) = Non-Youth > Youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Statistics</th>
<th>Is the respondent under 25</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust Index</td>
<td>25 or under</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.5752</td>
<td>.73357</td>
<td>.10272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.8889</td>
<td>.50626</td>
<td>.07089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Samples Test</th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Index</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>3.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>-2.514</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P-value 0.014 is under 0.05 which means there is significance between 'Youth/Non-Youth and Trust Index'.

The comparison of means displays a 0.3 difference between Youth (3.58) and Non-Youth (3.89). This means Non-Youth (Over 25 years old) respondents demonstrate greater levels of Trust than Youth respondents
5. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Financial Transparency Index (Q40-42) = No Association

### Group Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transparency Index</th>
<th>Is the respondent under 25</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 or under</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.3203</td>
<td>.81911</td>
<td>.11470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 25</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.5229</td>
<td>.50002</td>
<td>.07002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Independent Samples Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency Index</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>4.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>4.023</td>
<td>.048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P value of 0.135 is greater than 0.05 = therefore there is not strong evidence that there is an association between the Youth/Non-Youth dichotomy and the Financial Transparency Index.
6. Gender Vs Tolerance Index (Q7-9) = Women > Men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Statistics</th>
<th>What is your gender?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance Index</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4.1667</td>
<td>.62796</td>
<td>.08708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.4467</td>
<td>.44979</td>
<td>.06361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Independent Samples Test**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.776</td>
<td>-2.580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>2.596</td>
<td>92.526</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P value of 0.011 is less than 0.05, therefore there is some evidence that there is an association between Gender and Tolerance.

The comparison of means displays a 0.28 difference between Men (4.17) and Women (4.45). This means that Male respondents demonstrate fewer values of tolerance than Female respondents.
7. Gender Vs Equality Index (Q10-16) = No association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your gender?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3.9808</td>
<td>.60875</td>
<td>.08442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.0286</td>
<td>.50073</td>
<td>.07081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality Index</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P value of 0.667 is greater than 0.05. Therefore there is not strong evidence that there is an association between the Gender dichotomy and the Tolerance Index.
8. Gender Vs Pluralism Index (Q28-32) = Women > Men

**Group Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your gender?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism Index</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3.6038</td>
<td>.56220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3.8360</td>
<td>.43835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Independent Samples Test**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism Index</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>-2.331</td>
<td>95.954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P value of 0.022 is less than 0.05 therefore there is evidence that there is an association between the Gender dichotomy and the Pluralism Index.

The comparison of means displays a 0.24 difference between Men (3.60) and Women (3.84). This suggests that Men demonstrate fewer values of Pluralism than Women.
9. Gender Vs Trust Index (Q33-35) = No Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Statistics</th>
<th>What is your gender?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust Index</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3.6538</td>
<td>.65666</td>
<td>.09106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3.8133</td>
<td>.63231</td>
<td>.08942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Samples Test</th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Index</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P value of 0.215 is greater than 0.05 therefore there is not enough evidence that there is an association between the Gender and the Trust Index.

The comparison of means displays a 0.24 difference Comparing means of Men (3.65) and Women (3.81). This could suggest that Women demonstrate more values of Trust than Men but the result is not statistically significant.
10. Gender Vs Financial Transparency Index (Q40-42)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your gender?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transparency Index</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4.2949</td>
<td>.73699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.5533</td>
<td>.60087</td>
</tr>
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Independent Samples Test

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P value of 0.56 is greater than 0.05, therefore there is not strong evidence that there is an association between Gender and Transparency Index
T-Test results – demonstrations of association

1. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Tolerance Index (Q7-9) = No Association
2. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Equality Index (Q10-16) = No Association
3. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Pluralism Index (Q28-32) = No Association
4. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Trust Index (Q33-35) = Non-Youth > Youth
5. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Financial Transparency Index (Q40-42) = No Association

= Non Youth respondents demonstrate greater Trust values than Youth.

6. Gender Vs Tolerance Index (Q7-9) = Women > Men
7. Gender Vs Equality Index (Q10-16) = No Association
8. Gender Vs Pluralism Index (Q28-32) = Women > Men
9. Gender Vs Trust Index (Q33-35) = No Association
10. Gender Vs Financial Transparency Index (Q40-42) = No Association

= Women respondents demonstrate greater Tolerance, and Pluralism values than Men.
ANOVA tests

Region Vs Tolerance Index (Q7-9) = No significant difference
Region Vs Equality Index (Q10-16) = No significant difference
Region Vs Pluralism Index (Q28-32) = No significant difference
Region Vs Transparency Index (Q40-42) = No significant difference
Region Vs Trust Index (Q33-35) = Notable difference between Interior and Capital

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Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Trust Index

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Chapter Seven – Structured Interviews: Technical appendix

Structured Interview to Manager of Tunisian CSO

1. “Can you tell me about your organisation? What are your objectives/goals, and how you operate?”

An introduction question that is designed to ‘warm’ the speaker and build trust. It is an easy, starter question to relax participant, encourage conversation, and build rapport. It also covers ‘what are your objectives’ and ‘what is your goal’ questions.

2. How effective is the informal politics/non-governmental sector in Tunisia?

This is a broad, open ended 2nd question that builds further trust and assures the interviewee that I am not coming to the interview with pre-convinced notions or looking for particular answers. It determines their opinions on the condition of civil society and state’s relation with civil society.

3. Is your CSO independent or is it affiliated with any other state or non-state body?

This determines whether the state, political parties, or external influence are infiltrating Civil Society. I expect Managers will most probably they will say ‘yes’, but later questions will reveal their understanding of independence and the extent of their CSO's independence. The question does not attach a ‘value’ judgement to either option.

4. How collaborative is the work within your CSO? (Prompt: Do you instruct and delegate? Or does a consultative process take place?)

This is designed to uncover internal practices and features of the organisation culture. Similar to survey question.

5. How do you think the staff would describe the leadership and management of your CSO?

This helps to understand if there is patrimonialism or a ‘petit dictatorship’ culture in the CSO. What is the management/leadership style? Similar to survey question. Also determines a degree of self-awareness and how ‘in-touch’ the leaders are with their members.

6. Do you collaborate with other CSOs? Have you worked with CSOs who have differing aims/differing objectives from yours?

This helps to understand the levels tolerance or if this CSO has engaged in any cases of alliance building or co-operation.

7. Can CSOs with different objectives work together for a common purpose?

This questions the extent to which they believe CSOs can exhibit tolerance and the ability to work together for wider goals. The extent to which they believe a
harmonious Public space or the concept of a collective ‘greater good’ or than narrow self-motivated goals.

**Democratic Practices**

8. **What do you think motivates people to engage with and participate in civil society activism? (Prompts - For the good of Tunisian society and development of democracy? For personal gain? To fulfil/implement their own ideology?)**

[What is compelling Tunisians to become involved in Civil Society? I have included 3 options to encourage a response if one was not provided, not with the intention of leading them towards a certain answer.]

9. **In business and politics all over the world, sometimes favours are granted to relatives regardless of their abilities. Do you think this practice is also common among Tunisian CSOs?**

This aims to uncover whether 'horizontal' lines of organisation (Putnam) exist and/or a *Wasta* (influence) culture exists in Tunisian CSO? General statement related to other sectors and not specific to Tunisia attempts to make the question less accusative.

10. **How did you get this position/ get your job?**

[Demonstrates how the leadership of the CSO is chosen, what democratic practices the organisation uses, E.g. elections. Addresses and verifies the nepotism issues]

**Relations with the government**

11. **How would you describe Civil Society’s relationship with the government?**

This looks for a broad understanding of relations between the State and civil society. Open ended explorative question the gives interviewee the opportunity to express a range of views, perhaps stories or examples.

12. **How have CSOs been contributing to debates over the constitution? How have CSOs been contributing to laws over freedom of association and freedom of expression?**

Some CSOs influenced the constitution writing process and debates but this question looks to uncovered what influence CSOs are having on shaping the future of Tunisia. Perhaps some CSOs are being excluded in this process?

13. **Does your CSO work with the government?**

This seeks to determine the nature of CSO activism, in particular regarding their approach; liberal-associative or Oppositional-resistance. Are they a co-operative and collaborative partner of the government or a thorn in the side of the government that fights and struggles for its demands and goals?
14. To what extent do you feel free to operate in Tunisian society?

[Determines whether levels of government interference, whether authoritarian tendencies still remain or the public sphere is free to operate]

15. Have you ever felt the pressure from governmental departments/religious institutions/other CSOs to modify your course of action?

Determines whether levels of tolerance and co-operating within the public sphere, and how free operations are there. Also regards freedom.

**Funding**

16. Does Tunisian Civil Society sector receive sufficient funding?

If Civil Society is to maintain its drive as an actor for representing public views, there may need to be a financial incentive for people to remain involved with maintaining the public sphere. If they reply that ‘yes, the government does not give us enough funding’ then an independent Civil Society does not exist and Tunisian Civil Society is made up of Quangos. Furthermore, funding does not have to be just from the Tunisian government and might be from foreign investment. It is also a gentler introduction to asking about funding of civil society ‘in general’ before asking specifically about their CSO’s financial situation.

17. How does your CSO fund its activities? How financially open is your CSO?
(Prompt - Are CSOs in Tunisia expected to reveal their sources of funding?)

This relates to issues of whether the CSO is independence or financially controlled. It also inquires whether their funding come with conditions and where it matters if the CSO is financially open or not? Addresses issues of transparency.

18. Do you personally receive a salary for your work with this CSO?"

I imagine most CSO members are volunteers but "professional" activists may act differently or have different procedures from "amateurs".
Structured Interview Questions for CSO manager – Tunisian Arabic

1. What are your objectives/goals, and how you operate?

Chneya al-hadaf m’ta3 al-jam3iya m’t3kum?

Independence

2. How effective is the informal politics/non-governmental sector in Tunisia?

Chneya al-hadaf illy el-sector non-governmental ye9dhanha lil Hayet el-si’ya’si’ya fii Tounes.

3. Is your CSO independent or is it affiliated with any other state or non-state body?

Hel al-jam3iya m’t3kum mustakilla wala la? Wa ila teb’3ah ay munthama o5ra?

Co-operation

4. How collaborative is the work within your CSO? Do you instruct and delegate? Or does a consultative process take place?

Kefa’sh ye’tim al-3mil de5il al-jam3iya

5. How do you think the staff would describe the leadership and management of your CSO?

Kefa’sh yusif 3dha al-jam3iya m’t3’kum tessir il –mektab al-temfedhi

6. Do you collaborate with other CSOs? Have you worked with CSOs who have differing aims/differing objectives from yours?

Hal tet’3am’lou ma jam3iyat o5ra? illy ahadafah mu5’telfa 3lykum

Democratic Practices

7. Can CSOs with different objectives work together for a common goal?

Has-bri’îk, il jam3iyat illy a3ndha mu5’telfa tnejim t5dim m3a badh’ha lel wus’ soul le hadafah wahid

8. What do you think motivates people to engage with and participate in civil society activism?

Has-bri’îk, chnowya illy j5ali al-nass yud5lou fil a3mel al-jam3iya’ti

9. In business and politics all over the world, sometimes favours are granted to relatives regardless of their abilities. Do you think this practice is also common among Tunisian CSOs?

298
10. How did you get this position/get your job?

Kefash t’hasalt al-munsib ha’tha?

11. What have you (and your organisation) learned about Democracy through your experience in Civil Society?

Chnoya illy t3lemtu (enti wil munathma m’te3ik) ala a-democratiyya min 5i-lal tej’rib fil muj’tema al-madani.

Relations with the government

12. How would you describe Civil Society’s relationship with the government?

Kefa’sh tusif ala9at bay’na al-muj’tema al-madani wa al-hukuma

13. How have CSOs been contributing to debates over the constitution? How have CSOs been contributing to laws over freedom of association and freedom of expression?

Kefa’sh kanit mushera’ket al-muj’tema al-madani fii 3meleyyat se3yat destour

14. Does your CSO work with the government?

Teta3mila m3 al-hukuma wala la?

15. Have you ever felt the pressure from governmental departments/religious institutions/other CSOs to modify your course of action?

3mur’kumshi hassitu b’thghudh min al-hukuma wa ila min ay mu’essessah o5ra?

Funding

16. Does Tunisian Civil Society sector receive sufficient funding?

Muassesset al-muj’tema al-madani 3ndha assez du financement bish t’nejem t5’dem?

17. How does your CSO fund its activities?

Kefa’sh tmouwlou n’shatat jamaitkum?

18. Does your organisation publish its finances?

Hal tun’shuru il temweel m’te3kum
19. Do you personally receive a salary for your work with this CSO?

   Est-ce que vous personnellement recevez un salaire pour votre travail avec l’organisation ?

20. Does your organisation have a written constitution? Do you have any documents or literature about the organisation?

   3nd’kum ni’dham da5ili?
Interview structurée: à l’administrateur d’une organisation de la société civile

1. Quels sont les objectifs de votre organisation? Et comment vous fonctionnez?

Independence

2. Est-ce que vous pensez que le secteur non-gouvernemental/société civile en Tunisie est efficace?
3. Votre organisation est-elle indépendant ou est-elle affiliée à une autre organisation étique ou non-étatique?

Coopération

4. Comment est la collaboration du travail au sein de votre organisation?
5. Selon vous, comment votre personnel/membres décrirait la gestion de votre organisation?
6. Est-ce que vous collaborez avec d’autres organisations? Avez-vous travaillé avec des organisations dont les objectives sont différent des vôtres?
7. Est-ce que c’est possible que des organisations dont les objectifs soient différents travaillent ensemble pour atteindre un but commun?

Practices démocratiques

8. A votre avis, qu’est-ce qui motive les gens pour s’engager et participer dans l’activisme de la société civile?

9. Dans les affaires et la politique dans le monde entier, parfois des faveurs sont accordés aux membres des familles indépendamment des leurs-capacités. Pensez-vous que cette pratique est aussi courante chez les organisations de la société civile en Tunisie?
10. Comment avez-vous obtenu votre poste?
11. Que-est-ce que vous avez (et votre organisation) appris sur à propos de la démocratie à travers votre expérience dans la société civile?
Relations avec le gouvernement

12. Comment vous décrivez la relation entre la société Civil est le gouvernement ?
13. De quelle manière les organisations ont-elles participé aux débats sur la constitution ? De quelle manière ont-elles contribué aux lois de la liberté d’association et la liberté d’expression ?
14. Votre organisation travaille-t-elle avec le gouvernement?
15. Avez-vous jamais senti de la pression de la part des départements gouvernementaux aux institutions religieuses au d’auteures organisations pour modifier votre plan d’action ?

Financement

16. Est-ce que le secteur de la société civile en Tunisie reçoive assez de financement ?
17. Comment votre organisation finance-t-elle activités ?
   (les organisations en Tunisie sont-elles sensées révéler leur sources de financement ?)
18. Est-ce que votre organisation publie ses finances?
19. Est-ce que vous personnellement recevez un salaire pour votre travail avec l’organisation ?

20. Est-ce que vous avez une constitution écrite, un règlement internale, ou des documents et de la littérature sur l’organisation ?
## Interviews completed

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**Interviews with JID members**

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