Identification, interests and influence : voting behaviour in four English constituencies in the decade after the Great Reform Act.

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IDENTIFICATION, INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE; VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN FOUR ENGLISH CONSTITUENCIES IN THE DECADE AFTER THE GREAT REFORM ACT.

VOLUME 2 OF 2

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History Department, 1992
Preparing for the first "reformed" election held in Durham City, Lord Londonderry's strategic options were limited: Lord Durham was reported to be "excessively out of humour" with him following the House of Lords Reform Bill debates,¹ Londonderry's finances were in a precarious state because of the cost of building Seaham Harbour, to the point where Buddle was begging him not to commit himself to any more electioneering expenditure,² and those of Londonderry's freemen who lived outside the new seven mile limit faced disenfranchisement. Buddle attempted two solutions to these difficulties. Firstly, he made a secret approach to Sir William Chaytor, father of the sitting M.P. for the City, and shortly candidate himself for the new borough of Sunderland, with a proposal for an "offensive, and defensive"³ electoral alliance to replace the defunct coalition with the

¹ D/Lo/C142(24) Buddle to Londonderry, 3rd May 1832.
² D/Lo/C142(24) Buddle to Londonderry, 3rd February 1832; R.W. Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business: The Third Marquis of Londonderry as Coalowner and Portbuilder (Durham 1975), Chap. 6, passim, and p77.
³ D/Lo/C142(24) Buddle to Londonderry, 23rd January 1832.
house of Lambton, prompted by the "ticklish situation" which had arisen since Chaytor, whose bank had taken over from Backhouse's the handling of much of Londonderry's colliery finances, had granted Londonderry some much needed credit in the summer of 1832. Chaytor dared not coalesce politically with Londonderry, for fear of affecting his own popularity as a reformer should any agreement become public, and Buddle did not even report to Londonderry that he had made the approach until after the election.

Secondly, on Londonderry's instructions, steps were taken to try to maximize the size of the freemen interest before the first registration got underway in August:

The resident Freemen (within 7 miles) which have been dismissed, are to be employed again - although not wanted - but this we consider to be less expensive, and more certain, than having to get them as we can, at the Election - allowing us to lose 10/- a man per week on their work, and Oliver is to get as many as he possibly can, housed within limits before the registry takes place.

When, however, it became apparent that the contest was going to be delayed until at least the end of the year, Buddle greatly resented the dead-weight of these "useless freemen" on the collieries' pay-bills. Their

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4 D/Lo/C142(24) Buddle to Londonderry, 24th and 25th December 1832; Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, p87.
5 D/Lo/C142(25) Buddle to Londonderry, 25th December 1832.
6 D/Lo/C142(25) Buddle to Londonderry, 24th June 1832.
7 D/Lo/C142(25) Buddle to Londonderry, 28th June 1832.
number is not precisely discernible, but the linked pollbook records reveal just under thirty post-1832 Tory freemen who changed residence into areas of known Londonderry influence, most of them moving from Sunderland or Seaham to Rainton, Pittington, Houghton-le-Spring or Low Grange. About half of them did not vote in 1832, and indeed Buddle acknowledged that the manoeuvre had not, at least in the context of the 1832 election, been largely successful, noting "the disqualification of so many of the Household Troops" because they had not been resident within limits for the necessary twelve months.8 The Liberals later claimed that seventy to eighty of the Londonderry freemen who had been relocated by his agents had been unable to vote: the Chronicle rather more accurately put the figure at probably fifteen or sixteen.9 The structural damage that Londonderry had forecast would be suffered by his interest with the implementation of the Reform Act's franchise qualifications largely did not significantly materialize. Certainly, very few individual voters who had been resident, for example, in Seaham before 1832 did not appear at some stage in the post-Reform electorate. There were, of course, Londonderry voters among the over sixty living in Sunderland who were now excluded from the Durham electorate, and the nearly ninety London residents who

8 D/Lo/C142(25) Buddle to Londonderry, 24th and 25th December 1832.
9 Durham Chronicle, 11th May 1838.
did not vote again, but their loss to the interest was more than compensated for by the corresponding Liberal loss, especially among the London freemen.

The first registration, for both the City and North Durham, and the subsequent revising barristers' courts, took place amidst much confusion and allegations of cynical party activity. Lord Durham had foreseen that the delays and furore involved in the passing of the Reform Act had left little time for people to be "acquainted with its details". From St. Petersburg, Durham urged Grey not to enter upon the elections before the results of the first registrations were known, prophesying that the constituency for the first reformed elections would unavoidably be narrower than for later contests, and that Tory "superior activity, and application of pecuniary means" might give them the edge "when they are notoriously in a minority of actual votes".¹⁰ In the event, electors themselves in many cases did fail to appreciate the need to ensure that they were correctly registered, and the partisan newspapers struggled to rid their readers of a common misapprehension: "A notion, we believe, exists that voters under the old system need not register ... But this is an error. No person can vote

who is not registered". Confusion was not limited to the electorate. It was to take one of the revising barristers for Durham another year before he could correctly interpret the freeman qualification.

The speed with which interested groups recognized the advantages to be gained from coordinating the process of getting electors registered, or at least in offering directions to them as to how the system worked, was crucial in this context. The clergy of the College carefully registered all of their servants as county voters, "not excepting the French Cook". As the Chronicle put it, "... there is not a creature connected with the Church who has the slightest chance of being transformed into a voter who has not been cramped into the registry ...", and the paper called on reformers to set up parish committees to superintend the registration of their own voters. That the respective parties were beginning to realize the potentials of the registration system, as a means of optimizing one's own support whilst attacking the

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12 Dul/31/152, T.S.Brandreth (revising barrister) to the Mayor of Durham, 19th September 1833 (D.C.R.O.).

13 Raine Mss., 6, f.47 (1st September 1832).

14 Durham Chronicle, 7th September 1832; Electors' Scrap Book, pp24-5.
support base of other parties, was evident at the revising barristers' court, which was turned into "four days of political wrangling, strife, uproar and dissipation".\(^{15}\) Liberal objections to known Tory voters - which meant that individuals had to attend, and probably lose a day's work, to defend their claim to the franchise - were condemned by the Advertiser, which pointed out that poor voters were apparently being targeted, and that the frivolous nature of the objections was demonstrated by their immediate withdrawal when the first sign of a defence was made.\(^{16}\) It appeared that most of the objections were lodged not by "the professional gentlemen" hired by the Liberal candidates but by "other agents - one of whom actually declared that when he signed the objections he did not know what he was putting his name to".\(^{17}\) The result was that the City register was reduced from the 930 electors who had stood on it in September, to 806.\(^{18}\)

Activity in the county registration showed that it was not only the Liberals who were using the objection procedure. Both Lambton's and the Tory Braddyll's committees offered assistance to those of

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\(^{15}\) Tyne Mercury, 23rd October 1832.

\(^{16}\) Durham Advertiser, 26th October and 2nd November 1832.

\(^{17}\) Durham Advertiser, 2nd November 1832. The agent named was Jopling, working for Chaytor.

\(^{18}\) Tyne Mercury, 4th September and 23rd October 1832; P.P. 1833 (189) XXXII.129 ("Electors Registered and Returning Officers' Charges").
their supporters who faced an objection, and Braddyll's agents allegedly objected to 249 voters in the Sunderland district of the Division alone, and were thought to have successfully expunged half of them from the register. In Gateshead, the Conservatives objected to 139 electors, whilst the reformers objected to only one. It was pointed out, however, that many of those who had failed to get on to the 1832 register through ignorance of the procedure would re-emerge in later contests, and this proved to be the case.

The contests took place within six weeks of the completion of the registers. In Durham City, the three contenders had been in the field for a full seven months, the two sitting M.P.s, Trevor and W.R.C. Chaytor, having announced that they would stand again upon dissolution and being joined by William Harland, a young lawyer, son of a Recorder of the City, and related by marriage to the leading Whig Shafto family. Trevor suffered from the start of his campaign from the stigma of his very vocal hostility to the ten pound householder franchise in the Reform Bill debates, and for his position as "the sitting Member

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19 Sunderland Herald, 9th and 16th November, 1832; Durham Advertiser, 9th November 1832; Brockett Mss., Vol. III, pp355, 363.

20 Tyne Mercury, 23rd October 1832.

for Lord Londonderry ... to whose mandates alone he must refer, and whose smiles and favours are given in exact proportion to the extent to which he can stifle his conscience...".22 The "free and intelligent" portion of the electorate, trumpeted the Chronicle, could not be induced to poll for a candidate who was "the enemy of all improvement" and therefore "unsuited to the spirit of the age".23 Trevor denied that he had ever denigrated the householders of Durham, his criticisms of the franchise having been general in nature and aimed at the populations of other cities:

I stated that in the City I had the honour to represent, the £10 franchise would throw the constituency into a most respectable body of the people ... I was aware that in such places as London, Birmingham, and Manchester, the constituency would be thrown into the hands of a different class of people ...24

It was clear, however, that the basis of Trevor's canvass was the soliciting of the freemens' gratitude for his defence of their rights, with this issue dominating his addresses and handbills, and his attention concentrated on the poorer classes of voters.25 As the Chronicle lampooned it, Trevor's canvass consisted of "the kissing of a fish-woman, or a

22 Electors' Scrap Book, pp4-5.
23 Electors' Scrap Book, pp5 and 11.
24 Durham Advertiser, 29th June 1832; Electors' Scrap Book, pp17-19.
25 Raine Mss., 5, f.34 (5th July 1832); Durham Advertiser, 29th June 1832; Electors' Scrap Book, p18.
promenade with a drunken freeman ..." 26 There were accusations that Trevor himself was drunk and abusive during the canvass. 27

The Conservatives' defence against accusations that Londonderry was playing too large a rôle in the promotion of candidates was to argue that the Marquis was only doing more openly what Lord Durham, despite his pronouncements in the Reform bill debates, was doing tacitly, especially in the case of his brother's candidacy for North Durham. "Why should not", demanded a letter in the Advertiser, "Lord Londonderry have his partiality of sentiment, or his particular friend, as well as Lord Durham his overbearing family connexion, in so small a county?". 28 Electors were also reminded, by a Tory electioneer masquerading as "A Radical", of Lord Durham's polling of his Chester-le-Street tenants en masse for Gresley in 1830 after Sir William Chaytor had been led to believe that they would be permitted to poll as they pleased. Moreover, it was suggested that Lord Durham had in the days after the passage of the Reform Act commissioned a trigonometrical survey "to draw...an arc of a circle of seven miles radius on his Lordship's territories, the centre of which is to be the City of Durham", confuting his assumed indifference to the extent of his influence, and hinting that

26 Electors' Scrap Book, p5.
27 Electors' Scrap Book, pp18 and 23.
28 Electors' Scrap Book, p23.
"personal motives of ambition, of self-aggrandizement" had, after all, lain behind his advocacy of Reform.29

The Liberal candidates, Harland and Chaytor, denied that there existed a formal coalition between them, but acknowledged the similarity of their reformist principles, and that "the friends of those principles might probably vote for them both". It was, therefore, a coalition of sorts, but "a junction formed, not to maintain the ascendancy of an individual, or a family, as in days gone by, but a union for a far higher purpose".30 Later events were to prove the basis of truth behind this statement. Harland presented himself as an unqualified supporter of the Reform Act, having taken part locally in the previous year's reform meetings, and as an advocate of political economy, the abolition of slavery, the ending of monopolies, and the maintenance of civil and religious liberty.31 Rumours of an agreement between Chaytor and Trevor, circulating despite Buddle's care, were abruptly denied while canvassing and on nomination day as "monstrous" by Chaytor.32

With the Chronicle calling for Liberal voters not to split their votes and return "an oil and vinegar

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29 Durham Advertiser, 8th June 1832; Electors' Scrap Book, pp8-9.
31 Durham Chronicle, 4th May 1832.
32 Durham Advertiser, 29th June and 14th December 1832.
representation", 33 Trevor correspondingly canvassed hard for plumpers, telling his supporters that "Plumpers are the only support of one man against a joint interest". 34 "I believe", he stated at the nominations, "you all know that one and one make two...". 35

Ultimately, the reformers did double-vote "almost to a man", 36 with the victorious Harland/Chaytor partnership obtaining over 47% of all vote combinations cast, but a solid body of 283 Tories, three-quarters of them freemen (37% of the electorate) heeded Trevor's advice and polled only one vote (See Table 5.1). 37

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<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Trevor</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaytor</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaytor/Trevor</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harland/Trevor</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harland/Chaytor</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N=765</strong></td>
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The splits, although small in number, seemed to have determined the result. If the 30 Chaytor/Trevor voters and 70 Harland/Trevor voters had plumped for Trevor, he would have been returned at the head of the

33 Electors' Scrap Book, p6.
34 Raine Mss., 5, f.51 (10th December 1832).
35 Raine Mss., 5, f.52 (10th December 1832); Durham Advertiser, 14th December 1832.
36 Tyne Mercury, 18th December 1832.
37 1832 Durham City Pollbook.
poll, and some Tories claimed that the election had been lost solely through the splitting of "injudicious friends". In the light of later events, they were wrong to assume that all of these splitters were primarily Tory voters. That a disproportionate number of them were householders (66%) and members of Category I ("Gentlemen and Professionals"), together with their later voting, suggests that a significant number were Whigs registering anti-Chaytor inclinations in a pre-echo of the Liberal schisms to come.

Other reasons for Trevor's defeat were hypothesized. Buddle, for one, thought the causes were largely unavoidable; the disqualifications among the "Household Troops", and the dual effort made by the reform candidates. He refuted Lady Londonderry's charge that the defeat could be attributed to a lack of exertion on the part of the Tory agents.

In fact, Buddle suggested that a material factor might have been the behaviour of the clergy of Durham during the election. The College was said to have threatened, in their zeal to ensure Trevor's return, to withdraw their custom from tradesmen if they did not

38 Durham Advertiser, 5th December 1832.

39 Chaytor claimed that 61 householders who had promised him their votes had actually polled against him. Sunderland Herald, 21st December 1832, Durham Advertiser, 29th June 1832.

40 D/Lo/C142(25), Buddle to Londonderry, 24th and 25th December 1832.
poll a Tory plump.41 Certainly, after the election, the Chronicle listed Liberal shopkeepers and craftsmen who had not been invited to the traditional annual Residentiary dinner, and named clerics who had paid off Reform tradesmen for voting "according to the dictates of their consciences".42 Trevor insisted that clerical support proved only "their conviction ... that in my hands their interests would not suffer", and declared himself pleased to be perceived as the champion of the Church;43 Buddle, however, thought that such active electioneering on the part of the clergy had "become so decidedly obnoxious, that as far as I am able to judge ... whatever side the clergy take must lose, in all situations where any thing like freedom of election prevails".44

41 Durham Chronicle, 14th December 1832.

42 The clerics named were Gilly and Townshend. Durham Chronicle, 11th January 1832.

43 Durham Advertiser, 1st February 1833. D/Lo/C96(25) Peel to Londonderry, 4th March 1839: "Lord Dungannon [Trevor] has always taken as respects Church matters rather an extreme course, partly as I supposed from his own feelings, partly from it being congenial with the views of his friends at Durham". The story circulated during the campaign that Trevor had come up to Durham "... in company with a batch of miners ... he spent several hours in piously exhorting them to read Fox's Book of Martyrs, instead of the newspapers of the district"; Electors' Scrap Book, pp15-16.

44 D/Lo/C142(25) Buddle to Londonderry, 24th December 1832. T.J.Nossiter, Influence, Opinion, and Political Idioms in Reformed England (Hassocks 1974), pp122-123, gives voting in the College (Cathedral Close) in North Durham in 1832 as 51% Conservative, 43% Liberal, 6% split.
The result was taken by the Liberals to indicate that the Reform Act had secured freedom of election in Durham City (with the unfortunate and anachronistic exception of those persecuted by the clergy), and that the "domination of the House of Wynyard" was defeated. "Lord Londonderry's Chain" was symbolically cleft, and the pieces given to the triumphant candidates, their proposers and agents.

The voting of those new to the electorate - four in ten of those voting - seemed to both sides to imply that the power of influence had waned, or had at least been critically altered. The new voters, 85% of whom were householders, were not dramatically more Liberal in their voting (54% double-voting, as opposed to 47% among those who had voted in either 1830 or 1831), but Londonderry registered his impression that the householders as a body "paid but little attention to any person occupying a prominent and influential position". The voting of those of the Londonderry interest who had retained their franchise, however, remained stable despite the Reform crisis, and Buddle could not find one example of an employee who had

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45 Electors' Scrap Book, p11.

46 Durham Advertiser, 14th December 1832.

"deserted the cause, which is certainly very creditable to them".  

In the wider arena of the North Durham election, Buddle reckoned there to be in mid 1832 "very little chance of any tory members being returned - if whigs can be found ...", but an attempt was made in the shape of Edward Braddyll, who had been approached by Londonderry in 1831, and had willingly pledged himself to come forward "to check the progress of dangerous innovation and to support and protect our constitutional rights". He was brought into the field, however, only after requisitions had been sent from Sunderland, Gateshead and Durham to Sir Henry Hardinge, who declined to stand on the ground that he had already promised to stand for Launceston. Braddyll was the son of Col. T.R.G. Braddyll, who owned land in Cumberland and Lancashire, as well as an estate at Haswell, and was the chief proprietor of the new South Hetton Colliery. Perhaps most significantly, Col. Braddyll had lent £17,000 to Lord Londonderry in

48 D/Lo/C142(25) Buddle to Londonderry, 24th December 1832.
49 D/Lo/C142(25) Buddle to Londonderry, 20th June 1832.
50 D/Lo/C141, Braddyll to Londonderry, 17th April 1831.
1828. His son had to face, as had Trevor, jeers that he was Londonderry's nominee: this he denied, describing himself as grateful only for "the friendship of that noble Lord" and as differing from him on "some political matters". He insisted throughout the campaign that he was "no Party man", promoting himself as the independence candidate opposed to "the Clamour and Intimidation" of partisanship as had been fired by the Reform Act, and whose continuance in 1832 he blamed on Lord Durham and the Liberals of the county.

The Tories strove to exploit weaknesses inherent in the Liberal candidacies. That Hedworth Lambton was Lord Durham's brother engendered more allegations that Durham was disproving his claims of non-interference, and packing the newly-created constituencies. Lambton was an unprepossessing candidate who had "appeared but

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53 One being the Corn Laws. Raine Mss., 6, f.56 (11th September 1832); Durham Advertiser, 14th September 1832; Electors' Scrap Book, p69. Braddyll fought a duel with Williamson over being called Londonderry's nominee; he also duelled with Russell Bowlby after the latter's remark that Braddyll was "a chicken hatched under the wings of Mother Church". Durham Advertiser, 28th September 1832.

54 Raine Mss., 5, f.64; 6, f.85; Durham Advertiser, 31st August 1832. The Liberals suggested, however, that Braddyll was receiving funds from the Conservative Club in London.
little in political life" and had, unlike his brother, no great stake in the county beyond "a bare freehold qualification" and no direct connection with the industrial and commercial interests of the region. He later admitted that he had gone to the electors unknown, and that it was - as voters had told him on his canvass - the recommendation of being Lord Durham's brother that was the foundation of his support. It was therefore not surprising that Tories strove to persuade electors not to be "dazzled by the high-sounding name of Lambton".

Far more vulnerable to attack was Sir Hedworth Williamson, Bart., sitting M.P. and owner of extensive property in Whitburn and Monkwearmouth, because of his unpopularity in both South Shields and Sunderland. In Shields, Williamson's opposition to the South Shields and Monkwearmouth Railway Bill, which had been defeated by one vote on its second reading, had incurred the displeasure of the voters. Far more damaging, however, was his status in his home town of Sunderland, because of his determination that should Sunderland

55 Durham Chronicle, 15th June 1832.

56 Raine Mss., 6, f.38 ("The Sunderland Electioneering Register") (14th July 1832); Durham Chronicle, 8th November 1832.

57 W.Brockie, History of the Town, Trade, and Port of Shields, and its Surrounding Districts (South Shields 1851), p175.
build the new docks the town so badly needed, they should be on the north bank of the river (where his property was) and his consequent opposition to the south docks scheme favoured by the shipowners and the town as a whole. His vote in the House of Commons in March 1832 against the South Docks Bill, which was lost by three votes, brought opprobrium down upon him, shattered the Liberal consensus in Sunderland that had flourished in the agitation for the town's enfranchisement, and ensured that Sunderland would be the primary focus of attention in the county election. By this action, designed to "add to the value of his own property", Williamson had it was said, "forfeited for ever the confidence of the people of Sunderland", who were particularly aggrieved since he had been returned to Parliament free of expense in 1831. Erstwhile reformers in Sunderland were among the signatories of the requisition to Hardinge, driven by the "great offence" that Williamson had done the town, chief among them being the attorney J.J.


60 Raine Mss., 6, 31, 38 (14th March and 14th July 1832); Durham Advertiser, 7th September 1832.

61 Tyne Mercury, 31st July 1832.
Wright, who shortly afterwards revealed his spectacular defection into the Londonderry camp. Wright (who was ever afterwards labelled "Judas" by the Liberal press) became an invaluable Londonderry ally in Sunderland, because of the Marquis' support for the South Docks Bill when Sunderland's appeals to Lord Durham for assistance had been apparently unheeded. Wright believed Williamson to be both under the secret patronage of Lord Cleveland and dependent for his nomination on a handful of "domineering Whigs" in Durham who had resolved to get him back in defiance of Wright's attempts to find another Liberal candidate.

Williamson attempted to defend his actions over the South Docks Bill, claiming that he had worked against it because it was "crude, ill-digested, and ill-concerted" and would have been too dangerous if implemented and so costly that the high taxation would

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62 Sunderland Herald, 14th September 1832; Durham Advertiser, 14th September 1832; Raine Mss., 6, 38, 61 (14th July and 3rd October 1832); D/Lo/C142(24), Buddle to Londonderry, 15th June 1832; Lambton Mss., William Bell to Lord Durham, 30th May 1832. Wright's electoral participation dated from working on Col. Chaytor's behalf: Durham Chronicle, 26th April 1832.

63 Durham Advertiser, 14th September 1832. See Lambton Mss., Williamson to Lord Durham, 26th April 1831. Heesom, "Legitimate versus Illegitimate Influences", p296; Nossiter, "Dock Politics", pp81-82. Londonderry had in fact opposed part of the Bill that related to a duty on coal, but was believed not to have used any influence against it. The other County M.P., Russell, voted against the Bill; Trevor abstained. Raine Mss., 6, f.32 (24th March 1832).
have driven ships elsewhere.\footnote{Durham Advertiser, 21st September 1832; Tyne Mercury, 18th September 1832; Electors' Scrap Book, pp67-69.} He denied that he had opposed it merely because it was on the south side of the river, and pledged himself, if elected, to work on behalf of the town for a dock "on the south side or north side, for the Dock ought to be on the south side on account of the population".\footnote{Raine Mss., 6, ff.53, 54, 60 (10th, 11th, 15th September 1832).} The tag of "Enemy of Sunderland" followed Williamson through his canvass, and it was noted that he did not attempt to canvass certain of the "lower parts" of the town.\footnote{Durham Advertiser, 21st September 1832; Electors' Scrap Book, p52; Raine Mss., 6, f.113 (n.d., December 1832).}

Braddyll, however, was not permitted to make free use of this controversy. He too was vulnerable to accusations from Sunderland that his own economic interests potentially lay counter to the port's. It was pointed out that he was "a total stranger and foreigner to us". Williamson was at least a Sunderland man: the only connection Braddyll had to the county was his father's "new colliery, now sinking near Hetton ... from which, if successful, every coal will be sent to Seaham and Hartlepool".\footnote{Raine Mss., 6, f.50, 54 (5th and 11th September 1832); Electors' Scrap Book, pp68-69. Braddyll was a shareholder in the Hartlepool Railway and Dock Company.} Londonderry's construction of Seaham Harbour - designed to give him an alternative to Sunderland from which to ship his own coal - was the
subject of much criticism in Sunderland, amidst rumours of a proposed railway from Durham to South Shields, running through the Londonderry collieries of Penshaw, Rainton, Grange and Old Durham, to haul Londonderry coals to Shields in the winter months when "the Duck-Pond" of Seaham was unusable. There were prophesies of doom for Sunderland:

If the Durham and Shields Railway succeeds ... the trade of the Port is lost. We have seen how Seaham Harbour affects us; but this will be found little indeed, compared with the injury which the Durham and Shields Line will effect ...

It was said that the public were not aware of the full extent to which Londonderry had worked against the South Docks Bill, and even that Braddyll (or his father) had subscribed £300 towards its opposition.

During the election, however, Braddyll promised his future backing for a south docks scheme, and that South Hetton coals would be shipped from Sunderland.

Londonderry influence in Sunderland was on the increase in 1832, centred on his "Agents, or Fitters ..., each of whom derives a benefit of £500 or £600 per

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68 Raine Mss., 6, ff.64, 67, 68, 73 (October-November 1832); Durham Advertiser, 27th October 1832.

69 Raine Mss., 6, f.73 (26th November 1832) John Spence.

70 Raine Mss., 6, f.61 (3rd October); Sunderland Herald, 7th September 1832; Brockett Mss., Vol. III, p337.

71 Raine Mss., 6, ff.49, 56, 103 (September-December 1832).
annum from the sale of his coals".\textsuperscript{72} Toryism had benefitted from a decline in Lambton popularity over the previous decade after the employment of the coal "fitters" had been hit by the decision that Lambton coals should be shipped in their tubs, rather than loaded from the tubs from the ships. Lord Durham, it was said in 1832, had not benefitted "the shipping interest, the Fitters, the seamen, the Keelmen, or the poor industrious hard working Casters ...".\textsuperscript{73} As Buddle cheerfully pointed out to Londonderry, the fitters were the key to political influence in Sunderland, as they "give the cue to the mob-ility dependent on them": they were "the real moving political pivots" in the town.\textsuperscript{74} Thus Williamson, as he told Lord Durham, faced a hostile coalition in Sunderland comprising the authority of Londonderry and the Church together with "the ship-owners, all Lord Londonderry's coal fitters, and Mr. Wright", as well as a growing number of discontented middle-class shopkeepers. He warned Lord Durham after the election that "the influence of the ship-owners and Lord Londonderry's fitters has proved fully as great, if not

\textsuperscript{72} Durham Chronicle, 26th April 1832.

\textsuperscript{73} D/Lo/C142(1) Buddle to Lord Stewart, 15th April 1820; Raine Mss., 6, f.38 (14th July 1832); Heesom, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Influences", p296.

\textsuperscript{74} D/Lo/C142(3) Buddle to Lord Stewart, 28th September 1832.
greater, than I expected, while yours has proved less". 75

In fact, Lord Durham had gravely miscalculated sentiment in Sunderland. His candidate for the borough election, George Barrington, a son-in-law of Grey, was - as was obvious even during the contest - mentally incapable, and in fact suffered from a full breakdown early in the next year. 76 In a town which prided itself on being "the sheet-anchor of independence in the county", 77 such a candidate was an insult, smacking as it did of nomination and outdated electoral practices. If Lord Durham was allowed such a free rein, Sunderland it was said was in danger of sinking as low as "the City of Durham under the old interest of Lambton and Tempest". 78 Lambton was sharply critical of his brother, who seemed to have misunderstood the political state of affairs in Sunderland:

75 Lambton Mss., Williamson to Lord Durham, 26th December 1832.

76 Raine Mss., 6, f. 39; 7, ff. 1, 7 (21st July 1832, March 1833).

77 Raine Mss., 6, f. 47 (1st September 1832).

78 Raine Mss., 6, f. 38 (14th July 1832).
...whenever you do send a candidate down ... be very very careful to send someone who is most highly eligible in every respect - your friends are very numerous in Sunderland, but they are your friends because they admire your political conduct, and not because they are your dependents ... The fact is in these times the middling class (and it is there where all your admirers are) are so intelligent and well informed that it will require very delicate handling indeed on your part to preserve your influence - if you try anything like positive dictation the whole fabric falls - but handle them with great tact and delicacy ... and your influence will become stronger and stronger every day, not only in Sunderland] but all over the County ... 79

In other words, Durham had stepped across the thin but distinct line separating legitimate from illegitimate: the danger was that he would pay for it most among those whose developed political sensibilities made them the most inclined to his brand of Radicalism, the shopkeepers. 80

The Lambton/Williamson campaign, therefore, faced problems that Liberal candidates might not have anticipated in the first election after the Reform Act. The Tory agents were "active and zealous" 81 and condemned Lambton and Williamson for their coalition


81 Durham Chronicle, 14th September 1832.
when the two were reported to be canvassing together. 82 The Durham Chronicle was distinctly uneasy about the identification of Lambton with Williamson, and feared Williamson would, because of his unpopularity in Sunderland, lose the reformers the elections, and recommended him to voters only as a lesser evil to Braddyll. 83 Support could be anticipated, however, from the Whickham polling district which contained both the Radical Gateshead voters, still smarting from the insults to their character from Hardinge and Londonderry, and thankful for Williamson's defense of their right to be enfranchised, 84 and the influence of Lord Ravensworth, who although a Tory himself, was Williamson's father-in-law. Although the Ravensworth tenantry were canvassed for Braddyll by his lordship's own agent, Braddyll was not welcomed when he came himself to canvass, and complained "my friends have

82 The coalition was warmly denied by Lambton: Electors' Scrap Book, pp64-65, 67; Raine Mss., 6, ff.52, 77, 107 (10th September, 30th November, 17th December 1832); Brockett Mss., Vol. III, pp107, 125, 183.

83 Durham Chronicle, 31st August and 14th September 1832.

been forcibly attacked, my band half murdered, and my plumpers compelled to split their votes".\textsuperscript{85}

The results confirmed these expectations. Lambton and Williamson were returned comfortably enough, obtaining nearly 2,000 double votes, over 50% of the vote combinations polled. Braddyll received over 1,000 plumpers, 27% of the total. The Lambton/Braddyll split was polled by one in eight voters, and anti-Williamson feeling was also evident in the variations between the polling districts (See Table 5.2).\textsuperscript{86}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Lambton/ W'son (%)</th>
<th>Braddyll (%)</th>
<th>Splits (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whickham</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chester-le-Street</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Shields</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanchester</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=3,841</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Plumping for Lambton and splitting

Lambton/Braddyll were at their highest in the town (rather than the district) of Sunderland, where the Liberal double vote amounted to only 28.6%. The Docks Question was said to have cost the Liberals "at least


\textsuperscript{86} North Durham Pollbook 1832.
There was also a disproportionate tendency to plump for Lambton in his home territory of Chester-le-Street. Braddyll did best, not surprisingly, in the Londonderry colliery villages (Pittington, Rainton, Houghton-le-Spring) where his plumps accounted for almost 50% of vote combinations polled, and with his own tenants at Haswell (73%).

Londonderry had not managed to return one of his candidates in 1832, but retaliated with the founding of the County of Durham Conservative Association in 1833, based in Durham but designed to represent the Conservative interest throughout the County and to form "a bond of union between individuals of every rank in society ... possessing Conservative principles, and to enable them to act, in these eventful times, with promptitude and vigour ...". Londonderry claimed the association to be the first of its kind for a county, and always emphasized the centrality of his own role in its establishment: "I called a few gentlemen together ...", as he later described it. The work of the

87 Morning Chronicle, 22nd December 1832.

88 Report of the Speeches Delivered at the First Anniversary of the County of Durham Conservative Association, p8 (F.D.Johnson); Durham Advertiser, 8th February 1833.

association - which was very much more concerned with the balance of power in the Northern Division than it was with the Southern\textsuperscript{90} - was to be partly in morale-building (to counter the impression that Reform was a universally popular measure in Durham)\textsuperscript{91} but was also more concretely concerned with those forms of electoral organization to which the Reform Act had given significance, especially registration. The zeal of the Tory agents in the 1832 campaigns had been noted\textsuperscript{92} (despite Londonderry's doubts), and it was perceived that although the reformers had been able to get some of the machinery of local organization (such as "registration clubs" and local committees)\textsuperscript{93} into existence more swiftly, it was the Tories who had been best able to marshall a central coordination and a unified set of tactics.\textsuperscript{94} It was as the agency of registration activity that the Conservative Association was "the machine designed to work out the political regeneration of this county".\textsuperscript{95}

The Liberal response, in Durham as nationally, peaked in the registration of 1835, in the state of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[90] Durham Advertiser, 11th January 1839.
\item[91] Report of Speeches ... 1834, p6 (Londonderry).
\item[92] Durham Chronicle, 14th September 1832.
\item[93] Durham Advertiser, 10th November 1836; Durham Chronicle, 14th May 1831. Reformers' organizations were described as "those modest companies now fixed in every hamlet", Electors' Scrap Book, p13.
\item[94] Electors' Scrap Book, p24.
\item[95] Durham Advertiser, 6th February 1835 (John Spence).
\end{footnotes}
high political excitement generated that year by the Conservative gains in January and the passing of municipal reform. Lord Durham had provided impetus and leadership in his 1834 speeches, in which he urged reformers to copy Tory organization. "The great nail to drive home", he wrote to Parkes, "is the formation of political associations in every village of the Empire", and this argument was the crux of his speech in Newcastle in November 1834. His paper, the Durham Chronicle, took up the call before the following year's registration: "As the Conservatives say, the battle is to be fought in the Revising Barristers' Courts". Reform Associations were established in the major towns of the division "for watching the registrations", individuals were appointed to act as "official organs of communication" in each district, and reformers were requested to pass on any information that might prove useful. Printed forms of objection were made available to anyone wanting them. Immediately prior to the registrations in August, there was satisfaction that "the organization of the reformers ... is now


98 Durham Chronicle, 26th June 1835.
complete". The difference that these organizational changes made was tangible. In Durham, all the pensioned clergymen found themselves objected to, and forty parsons and schoolmasters in Hunstonworth were said to have been struck off the register. In Gateshead, where Kell and Brockett were superintending the registration, the new Liberal vigour took the Conservatives completely by surprise, and not a single objection was registered against a reformer. The Advertiser reported an "unaccountable apathy" amongst Conservatives in the County, and Col. Beckwith was able to write to Lord Durham that probably five-sixths of the new voters on the registers were reformers.

The effort, however, had revealed to reformers the degree to which their unity in the Division had been undermined since 1832. Lord Durham's assumption of the mantle of Radical leadership in 1834 after

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99 Durham Chronicle, 17th April and 26th June 1835.

100 Prest, Politics in the Age of Cobden, p38; Durham Chronicle, 6th November 1835.

101 Lambton Mss., Kell to Beckwith, 29th August 1835; N. McCord, "Gateshead Politics in the Age of Reform", in Northern History, 4 (1969), pp167-183. Some Conservative objections for the Whickham area were never registered because they were sent by mistake to the Radical son of a Conservative Association agent, Durham Advertiser, 16th and 23rd October 1835.

102 Durham Advertiser, 14th August 1835; Lambton Mss., Beckwith to Durham, 29th August 1835.
resignation from the Cabinet\textsuperscript{103} had been achieved at the local cost of alienating both ultra-Radicals and Whigs. His celebrated snub of Charles Attwood and other members of the Northern Political Union at a dinner in Gateshead in late 1833 had signalled the end of the reform-generated coalition of the left,\textsuperscript{104} and coincided with a dramatic decline of confidence in the government, especially among the more respectable of the county. Durham complained to Parkes:

There is in this part of the world not the slightest confidence in them - either in their intentions or power of execution. It is lamentable to see the extent to which they have lowered themselves in public estimation.\textsuperscript{105}

Grey had noted that his son-in-law's speeches in Glasgow and Newcastle, in which he reaffirmed his belief in the Ballot, rated household suffrage and shorter parliaments, were "completely Radical".\textsuperscript{106}

Durham himself denied that they were either new in content or dangerous. To Londonderry, he explained "my Glasgow declarations ... are as far removed from Radicalism as Toryism. They are those which I have

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{104} Nossiter, Influence, pp28-29, 72; Lambton Mss., Durham to Parkes, 24th and 31st October, and 10th December, 1833; The Speeches of the Earl of Durham, p276; D/Lo/C461, Liddell to Londonderry, 8th July 1838.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Lambton Mss., Durham to Parkes, 31st October 1833.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Cooper, Radical Jack, p195; Thomas, "Durham, the Radicals, and the Canada Mission", pp361-362; Nossiter, Elections and Political Behaviour, pp107-112.
\end{itemize}
always made, and excite the animosity of the mad Radical Attwood and the 'lying' Tory Newcastle Journal". The Tory - and increasingly the Whig - press played on the extremism of Durham's politics through 1834, acting to drive home the wedge that had been inserted between radical and moderate reformers in the disappointing years after 1832. The conflict was apparent nowhere more than in Durham. The successes of the 1835 registrations were very clearly the work of individual Radicals, with "a general reluctance even amongst those of decidedly liberal opinions, to come forward ...". Williamson and his supporters in Sunderland had done nothing, and had even shown open hostility to Lambtonite activity, Lord Durham was told, and "the Whigs in the City of Durham have not stirred one single step". As Beckwith concluded, "the separation of the moderates from us appears indeed most decided".

These strains had made themselves manifest in the City election at the start of the year. After some

107 Lambton Mss., Durham to Londonderry, 28th April 1837.

108 Durham threatened legal action against the papers that circulated the most scurrilous rumours about him - for example, that he had a tricolour flown from his yacht. Lambton Mss., Durham to Parkes, 9th, 24th and 31st August 1835.

109 Lambton Mss., Beckwith to Durham, 29th August 1835; Durham Chronicle, 24th July 1835.

110 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 9th August 1835.

111 Lambton Mss., Beckwith to Durham, 29th August 1835.
confusion, Chaytor announced his intention not to stand for re-election only a fortnight before the contest.\textsuperscript{112}

There was a core of Whig discontent lying in a body (termed the "Bailey Whigs" by the Radicals) under the unofficial leadership of Dr. Fenwick, for whom Lord Durham's radicalism, especially as regarded Church reform and triennial parliaments, had passed beyond the pale.\textsuperscript{113} Harland's position had changed since 1832: originally a member of the pro-Durham group in the House of Commons,\textsuperscript{114} his voting had turned increasingly Whiggish, to the extent that the Tory Advertiser could declare that his behaviour as an M.P. "meets with our unqualified approbation". Harland had chosen not to ally himself with the Radicals, but had acted "to the support of religion, morality and public credit".\textsuperscript{115} His campaigning speeches in 1835 demonstrated his opposition to any separation of Church and state, any extension of the Reform Act, and to the Ballot and shorter parliaments.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{112} Durham Advertiser, 5th and 19th December 1834, and 2nd January 1835. Durham Chronicle, 12th December 1834, said Chaytor was not standing because he was ill.

\textsuperscript{113} Durham Chronicle, 16th and 23rd January 1835; Lambton Mss., Durham to Parkes, 31st October 1835, and Chas. Tennyson to Lambton, 7th January 1828.

\textsuperscript{114} Nossiter, Elections and Political Behaviour, p337; Bean, Parliamentary Representation, p115.

\textsuperscript{115} Durham Advertiser, 10th October 1834.

\textsuperscript{116} Proceedings and Poll at the Durham City Election ... 1835 (Durham 1835), pp4-5; Stenton, Who's Who, pp180-181; Tyne Mercury, 12th January 1835; Durham Advertiser, 9th January 1835.
Under normal circumstances, the Tories had accepted Harland as "a useful representative".\textsuperscript{117} Closer to the election, however, sensing Liberal disquiet in the City and hoping to minimise the number of votes split on to Liberals, they brought forward a second Conservative as a partner for Trevor, in the shape of Charles Edward Grey, a political unknown who had been out of the country for twelve years. "The return of two staunch Conservatives for this City", declared the Advertiser, is a matter of easy accomplishment".\textsuperscript{118} Grey's candidacy, however, was short-lived, as he retired on discovering that nearly all of the voters had already promised their votes.\textsuperscript{119}

In the light of Harland's moderate politics, Lord Durham brought forward a protégé, T. C. Granger, to represent Radical opinion.\textsuperscript{120} Granger, who declared himself proud to be labelled a "destructive", echoed Durham's political views and condemned the timidity of the Whigs, especially in their distrust of the people, as well as pouring scorn on Peel and the Conservatives' new-found acceptance of the Reform Bill:

\textsuperscript{117} Durham Advertiser, 5th December 1834 and 2nd January 1835.

\textsuperscript{118} Durham Advertiser, 5th, 12th, and 26th December 1834, and 2nd January 1835; Raine Mss., 5, f.69 (1st January 1835); Durham Chronicle, 2nd January 1835.

\textsuperscript{119} Durham Advertiser, 9th January 1835; Durham Chronicle, 9th January 1835.

\textsuperscript{120} Morning Chronicle, 6th January 1835 : "A Reformer of the Durham School"; Lambton Mss., Granger to Durham, 14th December 1836; Bean, Parliamentary Representation, p149.
They had wished to strangle the infant in its cradle. They were unable to succeed in that; and now they sought to have the bringing of it up. 121

With no second Conservative, Trevor as in 1832 called on his voters to cast plumpers, 122 and this they convincingly did, with Tory plumpers accounting for 39% of all voting acts (see Table 5.3). 123

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.3 : Voting, Durham City, 1835</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harland/Granger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevor/Granger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevor/Harland</td>
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<tr>
<td>N=829</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Trevor headed the poll, however - and Granger came last - because of the number of votes split between himself and Harland, and also the number of Harland plumpers. As Granger and his patron saw it, the Bailey Whigs were entirely to blame. Granger's own supporters had split on Harland "trusting too much to the belief that the generous devotion they felt towards independence was equally shared by others affecting the same sentiments". If Granger had not expected "friendship and assistance" from the Whigs, he had at

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121 Proceedings and Poll 1835, pp6-7; Durham Advertiser, 2nd and 9th January 1835; Durham Chronicle, 2nd and 9th January 1835.

122 Proceedings and Poll 1835, pp3-5; Durham Advertiser, 9th January 1835.

123 Durham City Pollbook 1835.
least anticipated "a fair and open neutrality";\textsuperscript{124} instead, he had encountered an overt hostility, derived from the Whigs’ belief that his candidacy was an attack by Lord Durham on Harland "because he did not go as far as your Lordship".\textsuperscript{125} Fenwick was said personally to have canvassed the College against Granger, and had given the lead to the Whigs by polling a plumper for Harland on the second day of voting.\textsuperscript{126} A quarter of the Harland plumps were given by residents of the Bailey; all of them bar one were polled by voters living in the heart of the City (in the Market Place, Saddler Street, Claypath, Elvet etc.).

The Trevor/Harland splitters were, as Granger correctly assessed, a mixture of "red" and "blue" voters polling tactically to keep him out.\textsuperscript{127} However, they were more likely to be Tories than Whigs: only 22 (out of 112) had been Liberal double voters in 1832, whilst 56 had been Trevor plumpers or cross-party votes.

Despite Harland’s protestations of innocence, and attempts throughout 1835 and 1836 to keep Whig/Radical

\textsuperscript{124} Proceedings and Poll ... 1835, pp29, 32; Handbill, Durham, 13th January 1835 (Election Material, P.G.L.).

\textsuperscript{125} Lambton Mss., Granger to Durham, 14th December 1836; Nossiter, Elections and Political Behaviour, pp337-339.

\textsuperscript{126} Durham Chronicle, 16th January 1835. All but a couple of Harland’s plumps were cast on the second day; Durham Advertiser, 16th January 1835.

\textsuperscript{127} Durham Chronicle, 23rd January 1835.
communications amicable, the City election had introduced a mutual suspicion that was critically to affect the ability of the left in the county to operate in union. Whilst the 1835 registration was being conducted, a county meeting of reformers was thought impossible because of the number of absentees there would be among Williamson supporters, Fenwick and the Harlandites and "hoc omne genus". The 1836 registration was characterized by apathy among all but the most committed Lambtonites. Beckwith reported to Durham that the work of the district committees was lax (especially at Sunderland, where no agent could be found who was a match for Wright), and that Fenwick had suggested the abolition of the Durham committee in favour of using only paid agents. Morton, decrying the "supineness" of the Whig gentry generally, told Durham "but for your own agents the Tories might have done as they chose".

Had it not been for the inefficiency of the Tory attendance to the registration - largely put down to the drunkenness of one of Londonderry's agents, Hunter - the Liberals would have faced considerable

128 Proceedings and Poll ... 1835, p32; Lambton Mss., Granger to Durham, 14th December 1836 and Beckwith to Durham, 29th February 1836.

129 Lambton Mss., Kell to Beckwith, 29th August 1835.

130 Lambton Mss., Beckwith to Durham, 29th August 1835, 29th February, 29th March, 30th April and 9th September 1836; Morton to Durham, 30th October 1836; Granger to Durham, 14th December 1836.

Tory gains. As it was, they had to acknowledge that the momentum of 1835 had been dissipated, and that the Tories had been allowed to score some heavily symbolic successes, for example in Chester-le-Street and Gateshead.\textsuperscript{132}

That Liberal morale was low was also evident in the unease that greeted the appointment of a Whig, Maltby, as Bishop of Durham. Beckwith, who had earlier feared that the Tory strategy in North Durham after 1835 might be to exploit Williamson's unpopularity by advancing a second candidate "unconnected with the Aristocracy - a Dissenter and professing Radical opinions" to destabilize the left-wing of the Liberal alliance,\textsuperscript{133} now warned Durham and his brother that a Whig-Tory attack on the Lambton seat was more probable now that the monolithic Toryism of the Dean and Chapter was broken. The Tories - and especially Londonderry - had been annoyed that the lack of a suitable candidate had left North Durham uncontested in 1835, and had promised a challenge at the earliest opportunity:\textsuperscript{134} the prospect of their making common cause with the Whigs

\textsuperscript{132} Durham Advertiser, 11th November 1836; Durham Chronicle, 19th and 26th October, 5th, 11th and 18th November, shows the greater number of objections made by the Conservatives.

\textsuperscript{133} Lambton Mss., Beckwith to Durham, 29th February 1836 and Beckwith to Hedworth Lambton, 29th March 1836.

\textsuperscript{134} Durham Advertiser, 2nd January 1835 and 15th July 1836; Report of the Speeches delivered at the Conservative Meeting ... January 28th 1835 (Durham 1835), p5 (Londonderry), p47 (Braddyll); Londonderry to Peel, 24th January 1835, Peel Papers, B.Lib., Add. Mss., 40411, f.186.
filled Beckwith with trepidation. Whigs and Tories had already been seen working together on the Grand Jury of Assizes during discussions about the new University.\textsuperscript{135} Although others, notably Morton and Granger, did not think the threat so serious, Lambton thought it better at the end of 1836 to hold back his opinions on certain subjects (like peerage reform) for fear of driving the Whigs further into the arms of the Tories.\textsuperscript{136}

In fact, Londonderry had since 1832 been anticipating a movement of disillusioned moderate reformers away from Lambtonite Radicalism and towards Toryism, and had frequently emphasized the fundamental differences between Radicals and Whigs ("those who have no property against those who have").\textsuperscript{137} The Conservative Association, he explained, had been expressly founded because of the need for "moderate Whigs and Conservatives" to unite against Radicalism.\textsuperscript{138} The 1835 election had, he argued, proved him correct:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{135} Lambton Mss., Beckwith to Hedworth Lambton, 29th March 1836 and Beckwith to Durham, 30th April 1836.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Lambton Mss., Granger to Durham, 10th June 1836, Morton to Durham, 30th October 1836, Beckwith to Durham, 13th December 1836.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Report of the Speeches delivered at the First Anniversary of the County of Durham Conservative Association ... 1834, pp6-8.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Report of the Speeches delivered at the Third Anniversary Dinner of the Durham Conservative Association ... 15th February 1836 (Durham 1836).
\end{itemize}
I stated to you ... that ... there were two parties of nearly equal strength; but that there was a third party more formidable to the institutions of the country ... and that the only mode in which we could look to the preservation of those institutions, was by the amalgamation of the two former parties, to the annhilation ... of the third. I will ask you whether this has not in some degree been verified?139

Durham's correspondence with Joseph Parkes in 1836 confirmed that the government was rapidly losing popularity (as Durham saw it, because they had neglected his own ability to rally opinion140) and that the short Peel government had consolidated the post-1832 reaction.141 Durham was concerned that "Every crevice, every hole has been watched in the public mind, and instantly crammed with Tory stuffing", and quizzed Parkes and Morton regarding Londonderry's stated opinion that both the electorate and operatives "are becoming fast Conservatives".142 Morton was reassuring, seeing in the north east "not ... the slightest change in political feeling since 1832", but

139 Durham Advertiser, 6th February 1835.

140 Lambton Mss., Durham to Parkes, 23rd July, 6th and 20th August 1836.


142 Lambton Mss., Durham to Parkes, 11th November and 20th December 1836.
he did warn Durham that the working classes "feel no interest in Irish questions", and that Dissenters' anti-Catholicism made them vulnerable to Tory issues such as opposition to the Appropriation Clause. In spite of all the difficulties encountered in the registration, the Liberals thought themselves ahead on both the Durham City and North Durham registers at the end of 1836.

The death of the King in June the following year precipitated an unforeseen general election. The City contest was dominated by repercussions from events in 1835. Firstly, there was the Radicals' uncertainty as to whether the Bailey Whigs would "play the same neutral game they did last time". There was also a new tension between freemen and ten pound voters following the debates over municipal reform. The proposal that freemen should be disfranchised, coupled with the Attorney General's denouncement of them as "poor, wretched, degraded and demoralized persons" who

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143 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 15th January 1837.

144 Lambton Mss., Granger to Durham, 14th December 1836 and Beckwith to Durham, 13th December 1836; Durham Chronicle, 11th November 1836.

145 Liddell to Londonderry, 21st April 1837, Add. Deposit (1979), 1193 (D), Box 4: "...little or no chance of a dissolution this year"; Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 14th May and 4th June 1837; Lockey Harle Mss., Tyne/Wear Archives 429/14, William Hutt to William Lockey Harle, 16th June 1837.

146 Lambton Mss., Granger to Durham, 14th December 1836.
acted to taint the whole electorate, was greeted with
dismay and anger among freemen in Durham, where Trevor
and the Conservatives again stepped forward to defend
them. The Liberals declared it "quite amusing" to
see the Tories so insistent on "the immaculate virtue
of the Freemen". The ill-feeling rumbled on after
the Municipal Corporations Bill was passed. Trevor, in
the debate of a Bribery Bill in August 1836, made a
stinging attack on the ten pound householders, which
was not forgotten the following year; Harland, for his
part, found that his vote for the Municipal
Corporations Bill still required explaining in mid-
1837. The papers added to the conflict, with the
Chronicle condemning Londonderry's freemen, "stained
with the guilt of bribery", and concluding that the
freeman franchise should be removed, and their votes
given to all householders. The Advertiser responded
with examples of householders who had allegedly taken

147 Morning Chronicle, 24th June 1835;
G.B.A.M. Finlayson, "The Politics of Municipal Reform,
1835", in English Historical Review, 81 (1966), pp673-
692.

148 In gratitude for his defence of their interests,
the freemen granted Trevor a public entry into the
City, accompanied by Londonderry's colliers. Durham
Advertiser, 3rd July 1835; Durham Chronicle 31st July
1835.

149 Durham Chronicle, 24th July 1835.

150 Durham Chronicle, 12th August 1836 and 23rd June
1837; Durham Advertiser, 28th July 1837; Proceedings
and Poll ... 1837 (Durham 1837), p7; Lambton Mss.,
Granger to Durham, 10th June 1836.
When Harland and Trevor announced themselves to be standing for re-election, with Granger making another attempt for a seat, the gulf between the two franchise groups was a central factor in party strategies. The Conservatives urged on their voters the importance of not splitting on Harland as the return of a Whig majority would mean the end of the freemen's voting rights, something the Conservatives openly acknowledged they as a party could not afford to lose. Abortive attempts were made to find a second Conservative candidate to reduce the danger of splitting, but when it was determined that one could not be found, it was suggested to voters that Granger, who was "a friend to the freemen", should be supported in preference to Harland, the justification being that once Trevor was safe, split Tory/Radical votes would be "a fair act of retaliation" against the Whig.

The Whigs and Radicals were meanwhile spectacularly failing to find common ground. The "good, pure, old and consistent Whigs", as Granger mocked them, would not condone Granger's advocacy of the Ballot, triennial parliaments or suffrage extension and were made suspicious by rumours that

151 Durham Chronicle, 5th May 1837; Durham Advertiser, 12th May 1837.

152 Durham Advertiser, 7th, 14th and 21st July 1837; Londonderry to Peel, 4th June 1837, Peel Papers, B. Lib. Add. Mss., 40423, f.259.

153 Durham Advertiser, 7th, 14th and 21st July, 1837.

154 Proceedings and Poll ... 1837, p30.
the Reform Club was furnishing Granger with the funds to oust Harland. Ultimately, the Chronicle came out openly against Harland, telling Liberal voters to plump for the candidate whose views were most acceptable to them, when it became clear that the Whigs were actively canvassing against Granger. At the nomination, both he and Harland asked for plumpers, and when Granger was beaten into third place, the acrimony was furious (see Table 5.4).

Although Trevor denied any knowledge of it, Granger claimed to have evidence of Tory agents - especially John Gregson - producing splits for Harland from Tory voters: Granger also alleged that Harland's agents had brought unregistered householders to poll, and that Whig splitting on Trevor had been aimed at demonstrating "that it was impossible that two Liberal candidates should be returned". He threatened to petition against the "unfair and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>% change (from 1835)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Granger</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>+14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harland</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>+6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevor</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>-11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harland/Granger</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>-18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevor/Granger</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>+5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevor/Harland</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>+3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N=856</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

155 Granger acknowledged that he was not "the gentlemen's candidate", and that he was opposed by "all the men of rank, authority and influence in the town". Durham Chronicle, 11th August 1837.

156 Proceedings and Poll ... 1837, pp27-32.

157 Durham City Pollbook 1837.
unjustifiable" means employed by the Harlandites. Feelings were running so high that, at the chairing of the victorious Harland and Trevor, the editor of the Chronicle was stabbed, supposedly by one of Harland's supporters.\textsuperscript{158}

The degree of plumping for Liberal candidates quantified the schism: the share of the total poll given to Liberal double votes had plummeted nearly 20% since the last election, with the number of voters dropping by more than half (see Table 5.3). Grangerites, however, overstressed the Whig element in the body of Trevor/Harland splitters - less than 10% of them had been Liberal double voters in 1835, and the voting of those who remained in the electorate in 1843 reveals the rest to have been predominantly Tories voting tactically.\textsuperscript{159} Trevor/Granger splitters were also mostly Tories, and three-quarters were freemen, presumably following their instructions to prefer Granger to Harland: 10% of the normally solid Tory voters from the Londonderry colliery villages of Pittington, Rainton and Chilton Moor split to Granger from precisely this motive.\textsuperscript{160} Trevor's popularity - and conversely Harland's unpopularity - among the freemen had reaped a clear reward. Freemen were twice

\textsuperscript{158} Durham Advertiser, 4th August 1837; Proceedings and Poll..1837, pp27-32; Durham Chronicle, 11th August 1837.

\textsuperscript{159} Durham City Pollbooks, 1835, 1837, April 1843.

\textsuperscript{160} Durham Advertiser, 25th August 1837 and 22nd May 1840.
as likely to have plumped for him than were householders, and half as likely to have plumped for Harland or split on him.

Much of the Bailey Whigs' dissatisfaction with the way Liberal politics had developed in Durham was blamed firmly on Lord Durham. They believed, as the Advertiser put it, that Durham had some "unaccountable pique" against Harland and had refused to divide his interest among the "reform" candidates; this the President of the North Durham Reform Association was left to deny:

...if his interest had gone otherwise than in support of the two liberal candidates, it had been beyond his express wishes and directions.¹⁶¹

Morton, writing secretly for the Chronicle, fired the accusation of treachery back at the Whigs, arguing that "all the evils which have befallen the Reformers in the City of Durham are assignable to the narrow-minded, bigoted, and exclusive policy of the Whigs".¹⁶² Harlandites and Grangerites turned the 1837 registration into a three-way contest, objecting to and striking off each others' voters, much to the Conservatives' delight.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Durham Advertiser, 27th April 1838.

¹⁶² Durham Chronicle, 4th and 11th May 1838; Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 13th May 1838. For Durham's financial support of the Chronicle, see Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 9th August 1835.

¹⁶³ Durham Chronicle, 6th October 1837; Durham Advertiser, 13th October 1837.
Harland's return was only aborted when it was pointed out firstly, that although the evidence that Harland had distributed money was strong, there was equally convincing evidence of Granger's use of bribery in both 1835 and 1837, and secondly, that if it were prosecuted, the Whigs would withdraw their support from Lambton in the county.

The 1837 North Durham contest had presented the Liberals with a different set of problems than those of the City. Having declared their registration to be "in fighting order", the Conservatives early in 1837 seemed confident of capturing one county seat. The Liberals' claim to have retained a lead of 700 in the 1836 registration belied their nervousness at the worsening disunion within their ranks, discontent with the government, and the effects of Lord Durham's

164 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 12th and 16th November 1837 ("of course I don't know anything of it myself ...") and Granger to Durham, 20th December 1837 (two letters); P.P. 1843 (433) vi.33, "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the Durham City Election Petitions" (testimony of John Richaby).

165 Lambton Mss., Granger to Durham, n.d. (March 1838); D/Lo/c107(13) Dungannon to Londonderry, 5th March 1838; Durham Advertiser, 2nd, 9th and 16th March 1838; Durham Chronicle, 11th May 1838.

166 Report of the Speeches delivered at the Fourth Anniversary Dinner of the Durham Conservative Association ... 10th January 1837 (Durham 1837), p23 (Johnson).

continued absence from the country, which deprived the Liberals of much-needed leadership. The reformers' activity was coordinated by the Durham Reform Committee, "entirely people of the middle rank in business and of small means ... without influential men of fortune to assist and lead them onwards": with only one exception (Beckwith) "there is not even a person of the rank of a county squire". 168

Although a dissolution was not expected, the sudden announcement by Williamson of his intention to stand down at the next general election because of ill-health and the pressure of private affairs ("which means the docks" commented Morton wryly169) created a dilemma. As Morton complained, it would have been much better if Williamson had either resigned immediately - so that a straight Liberal/Conservative contest could be fought without Lambton's involvement - or had kept quiet about resigning until a dissolution, so as not to alert the Tories to Liberal difficulties: that he had done neither was apparently on the advice of Dr. Fenwick in Durham.170 The Liberals realized from the start that finding a partner for Lambton would not be easy. In the light of the Whig/Radical tensions, Morton's main concern was that the Lambton interest be

168 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 5th July 1837.
169 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 10th March 1837; Durham Advertiser, 10th March 1837.
170 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 10th and 24th March 1837, 12th June 1839.
kept free of all imputations of coalition with a second Liberal. The Reform Committee sent (to Morton and Beckwith's disapproval) a deputation to Fenwick, who stated that he and his party ("the Toryfied Whigs" as Beckwith called them\textsuperscript{171}) "would vote for any independent liberal candidate ... but ... he expressed great fears about the Lambton influence being predominant". Beckwith interpreted this as "rancorous hostility" towards Durham.\textsuperscript{172} Morton's inclination was to stay aloof from the discussions at this stage, looking only to the Lambton interest, and awaiting Durham's return from Russia.\textsuperscript{173} Approaches to prospective candidates, however, had to be made, especially after the Tory candidate, T.H. Liddell, entered the field and started canvassing in May.\textsuperscript{174}

Fenwick informed the Reform Committee that he had applied to Mr. Witham of Lartington, of whom Morton approved since he was a "staunch and straightforward reformer". He, however, declined because of the expense of moving his family to London. Others approached also declined, including Silvertop and Cols.

\textsuperscript{171} Lockey Harle Mss., 429/13, Beckwith to Lockey Harle, 12th March 1837.
\textsuperscript{172} Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 10th and 24th March 1837 and Beckwith to Durham, 29th March 1837.
\textsuperscript{173} Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 16th April 1837 and Beckwith to Durham, 29th March 1837.
\textsuperscript{174} Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 15th January, 24th March, 9th April and 14th May 1837; Report of Speeches ... Fourth Anniversary Dinner, pp29-30; Durham Advertiser, 20th January and 5th May 1837.
Caradoc and Hildyard. Backing either Witham or Silvertop would have caused the Liberals problems, thought Morton, as both were Catholic and would suffer from the Tory "Church in Danger" rallying cry, and from hostility from "those crazy bigotted Methodists". The anti-O'Connell theme had already been established as a leading Conservative tenet for a forthcoming election. Kell in Gateshead suggested Lord John Russell as "a liberal man that would unite all parties": Morton strongly objected on the grounds that Russell would not come north to canvass and would therefore throw greater expense and strain on the Committee. As he concluded on the whole business of finding a candidate, "money is the great difficulty".

Morton recommended William Hutt, the M.P. for Hull, and a subscription of £1,500 was offered to him, but was declined. Party leaders in London were consulted for advice to no avail: an eminent public man could not be found. Local possibilities presented idiosyncratic problems. John Williamson, Sir Hedworth's nephew, was unacceptable to Beckwith and the Gateshead Radicals as a Fenwick man, but also bowed out of the reckoning.

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175 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 24th March and Beckwith to Durham, 29th March 1837; Heesom, "Bowlby Letter", p29.

176 Eg. Durham Advertiser, 20th January 1837.

177 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 24th March 1837.

178 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 16th April 1837.

179 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 14th May, 9th and 16th April and 5th July 1837; Heesom, "Bowlby Letter", p30.
because of the cost. Beckwith ruled himself out too because of lack of funds, but could also not be contemplated because of his unpopularity with other reformers, and especially with the Committee, due to his being "too violent and peremptory in his manner", and too uncompromising in his hostility to Whiggism. A violently Radical speech in Gateshead in March was thought to have "quite ruined his reputation there", and Morton considered that he would be "worse to carry through Sunderland than Sir H. Williamson was in 1832". More critical, as Beckwith revealed to Durham, would be his susceptibility to accusations of being "too much under your influence, who they declare to be too powerful already ...".

The only Liberal who seemed keen to stand was not welcomed with open arms. Sir William Chaytor, who had stood down as Sunderland's M.P. in 1835, approached Morton to say that he was "quite ready to come forward ... (and) will not ask for money but fight the battle himself". Chaytor was a figure of some ridicule in the county, lacking in political sophistication, and "certainly not presentable at a public meeting".


181 Lambton Mss., Beckwith to Durham, 29th March 1837 and Morton to Durham, 24th March and 9th April 1837; Durham Chronicle, 5th May 1837.

182 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 9th and 24th March 1837; A.J. Heesom, Durham City and its M.P.s (Durham 1992), p50, notes the caricatures of Chaytor that turned up in a number of political novels.
had the advantages, however, of being a reliable voter in the House of Commons (compared to Williamson), and having already spent £20,000 on Durham elections, and Morton thought he could be carried through a county contest, but only in the absence of any other Liberal coming forward.\textsuperscript{183} When, in May, it seemed that a candidate acceptable to all shades of Liberal opinion had been found, Chaytor was overlooked.

Charles Towneley of Lancashire, "a staunch, unflinching Liberal, uncompromising and determined"\textsuperscript{184} looked like an answer to Morton's prayers. Although he was a Catholic, he had a Protestant wife, and was "too accomplished to be a bigot". As an advocate of a £5 household suffrage and quinquennial elections, he gained Fenwick's public support. Morton was delighted: "his principles are certainly very good".\textsuperscript{185} Almost as soon as his candidacy was publicly advertised, however, word came that Towneley's father would not allow him to stand. Morton was despondent: "God knows where a candidate is now to be found".\textsuperscript{186} The Tories were jubilant: "The Division has ... been hawked about in

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{183} Durham Advertiser, 14th July 1837; Liddell to Londonderry, 21st April 1837, Londonderry Mss., Add. Deposit (1979), 1193 (D), Box 4. See Heesom, "Bowlby Letter", pp31-32, for the financial negotiations between Chaytor and the Reform Committee.

\textsuperscript{184} Durham Chronicle, 19th May 1837.

\textsuperscript{185} Durham Chronicle, 26th May 1837; Durham Advertiser, 19th May 1837; Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 14th May 1837.

\textsuperscript{186} Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 26th May 1837.
\end{flushleft}
all quarters. Papists, Sectarians, and Anythingarians, have all been applied to, but in vain!" 187

Meanwhile, the Conservatives were canvassing. Liddell was the eldest son of Lord Ravensworth (and Williamson's brother-in-law), a scholar and poet, condemned as a "butterfly litterateur" by the Liberals, 188 but with the "unity of action" of Londonderry and the Tories behind him, was making inroads into Liberal support through his uncontested possession of the field. Successful canvasses were reported in Whickham, Winlaton and the Gateshead area ("the stronghold of the Whig-Radicals in 1832"), South Shields, Sunderland and even Chester-le-Street, with electors reacting well to Liddell's anti-Poor Law and anti-Catholic stance. 189 Liddell reported to Londonderry that he had "the publick voice and support", picking up promises in the area between Sunderland ("an enemy's country") and Ryhope, and in Easington and Seaham, where he anticipated seventy plumpers. 190 Wright in Sunderland was also canvassing hard, "applying to many electors no less than twelve or

187 Durham Advertiser, 30th June 1837.
189 Durham Advertiser, 26th May and 2nd June 1837; Sunderland Herald, 21st July 1837.
190 D/Lo/C461(2), Liddell to Londonderry, 1st June 1837.
thirteen times". 191 Morton reckoned that Liddell was
gaining "a decided advantage", especially among the £50
occupiers and "the lowest class of freeholders",
despite there being little chance of a dissolution for
eighteen months or so: "... if Liddell is suffered to
walk the course alone for the next 12 months ... he
will succeed". 192

The Liberals awaited Durham's return, hoping that
some event would occur to "create a popular excitement"
which could defeat Liddell. A last appeal to
Williamson not to step down failed. 193 Time was not,
however, on the Liberals' side. The death of the King
"destroyed the opportunity of obtaining a proper
candidate" 194 and made the situation desperate. At a
meeting in Chester-le-Street, the reformers rushed out
a pledge that Liddell would under no circumstances be
allowed an uncontested return, and decided, after some
deliberation, to support Chaytor as the second Liberal.
Morton was not sanguine. Chaytor was "not a very
suitable candidate to present to a large and
influential County", and the lateness of his adoption
made his return much more problematic. Above all, he
needed Durham's backing. The reformers deferred to his

191 D/Lo/C489(1), Wright to Londonderry, 23rd July
1837.

192 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 14th and 26th May,
and 4th June 1837.

193 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 26th May and 4th
June 1837.

194 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 5th July 1837.
judgement, as did Chaytor. As Morton informed Durham, "he told me yesterday that if you disapproved, he would retire". 195

Immediately on his return, Durham signalled his backing for the Liberal defence of both seats, as well as his return to domestic politics, with a letter to the Durham reformer Russell Bowlby, in which he restated his political views. 196 In it, he promised the reformers of North Durham, following the Chester-le-Street meeting, "every support that I can constitutionally give", decrying "supineness and apathy" within Liberal ranks and rallying reformers around the new Queen, who had "placed herself unreservedly in the hands of a Liberal government". Durham set out his own political goals: "I wish to rally as large a portion of the British people as possible around the existing institutions of the country". 197 In the context of national politics, the letter - which had been written for publication - was taken to reflect a softening in Durham's Radicalism. The Durham Advertiser, for example, welcomed its "exceedingly mild terms", whilst the Tyne Mercury noted that some reformers were finding fault with it because

195 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 5th and 8th July 1837.
196 Heesom, "Bowlby Letter", passim.
197 Eg. The Times, 13th July 1837.
it was "not sufficiently strong in [its] language". Durham himself regarded it as a return to his position in 1834, a means of rallying public feeling to the government. It was intended "to recal (sic) to the memory of my countrymen the principles I had ever supported".

In the context of the North Durham election, the Bowlby letter had a very specific message: Durham supported Chaytor's candidacy. Liddell was furious. "This coalition between Lambton and Chaytor", he fumed to Londonderry, "is one of the most insolent attempts on the independence of a great county that ever was made - that Lord Durham is at the bottom of it I have not the smallest doubt". At the nominations, Liddell condemned Durham's influence being used behind two candidates, and came close to accusing him of "dictation".

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198 Durham Advertiser, 14th July 1837; Tyne Mercury, 18th July 1837. The Surrey Standard (15th July 1837), to give one non-local example, praised Durham for his apparent transformation from "a fierce and somewhat intolerant Radical, into a mild and temperate Conservative".


200 Heesom, "Bowlby Letter", passim.

201 D/Lo/C461(3), Liddell to Londonderry, 19th July 1837.

A desperate last-ditch effort to keep Liddell out, with Liddell complaining of coercion and intimidation being employed against voters who had promised their votes to him. To Londonderry, however, Liddell was confident that "there is nothing to fear". He had, he thought, 2,700 promises, and anticipated heading the poll. Londonderry now saw the election as a private battle: "The contest appears to be between Radicalism and Conservatism, and between Lord Durham and myself".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>1832 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liddell</td>
<td>1732</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaytor</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>(Tory plump)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambton</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambton/Chaytor</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambton/Liddell</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>(Lib. double)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liddell/Chaytor</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=4,828</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the end, Liddell did not top the poll, but came very close (see Table 5.5). His return was a triumph for the Conservatives, in "a Whig-ridden Radical Co[unty]" only five years after the Reform crisis.

The Tory straight-party vote (in both cases a plump) had increased its share of the total poll by over 13% since 1832, a success that both sides

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203 D/Lo/C461(3) & (4), Liddell to Londonderry, 19th and 20th July 1837.
204 D/Lo/C257(2), Londonderry to Buddle, n.d. (1837).
205 Londonderry to Peel, 8th August 1837, Peel Papers, B. Lib., Add. Mss., 40424, f.33-34.
attributed to a combination of long-term and short-term political activity. Liddell had conducted a "perfect canvass" over the space of three months, and had consequently a "personal knowledge and intimate acquaintance with the feelings of the electors" which the last-minute Liberal campaign had not been able to emulate. There were complaints at polling from electors resentful that they had not had a personal canvass from the Liberal candidates. The Conservatives' organizational performance in getting voters to the poll had also perceptibly outclassed the reformers. Of greater significance, however, had been the underlying movements of electors on and off the register, and the parties' respective abilities to interpret them. The Liberals' confidence in the last registration had been misplaced, and their "want of preparation" shown up. As Bowlby admitted, the feeling of the electorate should not have been gauged solely from the registration returns. The Advertiser, along with J.J. Wright, thought the basis of the Conservative victory lay in the registration of

206 Proceedings and Poll ... 1837, pp10, 97; Durham Advertiser 11th August 1837; Durham Chronicle, 11th August 1837.

207 See Chapter 6.

208 Durham Chronicle, 24th March 1837; Proceedings and Poll ... 1837, pp95-98.

209 Proceedings and Poll ... 1837, p98; Durham Chronicle, 11th August 1837.
Conservative freeholders since 1832. As both sides recognized in their post mortems of the election, the competition had been between the parties as media of recruitment and mobilization: that the Liberals had done badly could not be wholly blamed on ideological disunity.

The geographic distribution of Conservative support reinforced the accuracy of Liddell's canvass (see Table 5.6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Liddell (%)</th>
<th>Lambton/Chaytor (%)</th>
<th>%change*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Shields</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>-20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanchester</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>-14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whickham</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>-30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>+14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chester-le-Street</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>-8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=4,282
* as share of total vote, from 1832 Liberal double vote (see Table 5.2)

The swing to the Conservatives in South Shields had been anticipated, as had the decline in Conservative fortunes in Durham City, where Liddell plumps accounted for only 37.6% of the vote combinations polled, compared to 49.2% for

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210 Durham Advertiser, 18th August 1837; D/Lo/C489, Wright to Londonderry, 17th June 1837.
Lambton/Chaytor. The failure of Liberal organization was also blamed for the 30% fall in the Liberal double-vote in Gateshead since 1832, but a reaction of moderates against the Radical element within the town's politics was undoubtedly also a factor. Londonderry, in calling for a union of moderate opinion, often used the "destructives" of Gateshead as the best illustration of its necessity. Ravensworth influence in the district (Whickham) had been exerted to the full on Liddell's behalf. Williamson's influence in Monkwearmouth, however, had not been used for his brother-in-law, which reformers united to applaud, and the Liberal vote in Sunderland as a whole had revived from its subdued anti-Williamson position in 1832. The Conservatives claimed that the Liberals had exercised widespread coercion in Sunderland in forcing voters to break their promises to Liddell, and that

211 D/Lo/C489, Wright to Londonderry, 23rd July 1837; Durham Advertiser, 2nd June 1837. Conservative success in South Shields may have been influenced by the fact that nearly all the property in the town was leased from the Dean and Chapter. Brockie, History of ... Shields, p171; G.B.Hodgson, The Borough of South Shields from the Earliest Period to the Close of the Nineteenth Century (Newcastle-upon-Tyne 1903), pp157-164; Nossiter, Influence, p23ff.

212 Eg. Durham Advertiser, 6th February 1835; Nossiter, Influence, pp109-114; McCord, "Gateshead Politics", passim; Rogers, Gateshead, pp11-22

213 Lambton blamed "apathy and indolence" for the poor Liberal showing in Gateshead; Tyne Mercury, 22nd August 1837; Sunderland Herald, 11th August 1837; McCord, "Gateshead Politics", p173.

214 D/Lo/C489, Wright to Londonderry, 23rd July 1837; Tyne Mercury, 25th July 1837; Morning Chronicle, 28th July 1837.
there had also been examples of personation, which in Sunderland was facilitated by the number of voters away at sea at any given time.\textsuperscript{215}

The operation of personal influences in North Durham in 1837 received much attention. It was generally agreed that, although the Dean and Chapter had again been involved in Tory campaigning, the influence of the Church had been applied more discreetly than previously because of the politics of the new Bishop, and indeed Maltby let it be known that his own tenants had been left to the free exercise of their franchises.\textsuperscript{216} The Conservatives claimed that individual Liberals were guilty of using undue pressure on dependents: William Hutt, for example, was said to have issued his Gibside tenantry with a "peremptory order...commanding them to vote for Lambton and Chaytor".\textsuperscript{217}

It was, however, the Londonderry and Lambton influences over their respective interests that dominated discussion. Lord and Lady Londonderry had issued, at a time of intense canvassing by Liddell, a

\textsuperscript{215} Proceedings and Poll ... 1837, pp96-99; Sunderland Herald, 8th September 1837, claimed that the "serfs of Wynyard" were the first to start a system of personation; D/Lo/C489 Wright to Londonderry, 2nd August 1837; D/Lo/C461(3) Liddell to Londonderry, 7th August 1837.

\textsuperscript{216} Durham Chronicle, 11th, 18th and 25th August 1837; Proceedings and Poll ... 1837, pp96-99; Tyne Mercury, 22nd August 1837.

\textsuperscript{217} Tyne Mercury, 15th and 22nd August 1837.
memorandum to all Londonderry "agents, ... employed, and Tenants" calling for solid support for Liddell: 218

We assure all those who answer this solemn appeal ... that the sense of the obligation to us personally will for ever be registered in our memories, and that the gratitude of ourselves and our family to those who live around us and upon our property will be in proportion to this important demand we make upon them to prove their fidelity and attachment to our sentiments, and confidence in our opinion.

The letter concluded that Liddell had been asked "especially to report to us those who answer zealously our call and those who are unmindful and indifferent to our earnest wishes". Leaked to the Chronicle, which reprinted it in full, the "Wynyard Edict" brought the question of influence back to the forefront of the political agenda. 219 Whilst Liberals denounced it as a blatant example of Wynyard tyranny, and painted Londonderry as "utterly unscrupulous as to the means by which he makes his word law unto his dependents", 220 Conservatives justified it as "an affectionate appeal" to friends and "patriotic and feeling". 221 However,

218 D/Lo/C257(8) 18th July 1837.

219 Durham Chronicle, 8th and 15th September 1837. There was some suspicion that the "Edict" might have been a piece of Liberal propaganda. Nossiter, Influence, p48, was also sceptical of its authenticity, but the discovery of the original in the Londonderry Mss., together with correspondence on the subject, has established that it was genuine: A.J.Heesom, "The "Wynyard Edict" of 1837", in Durham County Local History Society Bulletin, 21 (1978), pp2-7.

220 Durham Chronicle, 8th September 1837.

221 D/Lo/C489 Wright to Londonderry, 23rd July 1837; Durham Advertiser, 29th September 1837 (Liddell addressing Dinner in South Shields).
Londonderry was, in promulgating this "appeal", not merely attempting to minimize defections from the ranks of his voters; he was also concerned about the functioning of his interest's organizational structure - meaning, in practice, the capacity (and will) of his agents to mobilize the interest to its maximum effect.\textsuperscript{222} From the start of Liddell's canvass, there had been fears expressed that gains among individual voters might be negated by practical difficulties of mobilization. Liddell, having "laboured morning, noon, and night", was afraid that voters would be "ill-marshalled at polling time", especially those who had to poll in the Lambton territory ("an enemy's camp") of Chester-le-Street.\textsuperscript{223} These apprehensions were fuelled by the apparent lack of effort being made by some of Londonderry's agents, chiefly John Gregson, whose behaviour Liddell thought "extraordinary":

\begin{quote}
Not only will he not vote for me but he has had his tenants canvassed for the opposite party and none of them support me.\textsuperscript{224}
\end{quote}

Regular complaints about Gregson from Liddell spurred Londonderry to tackle him directly. Although, as Londonderry told him, Buddle's lukewarmness to Conservatism could be tolerated because he "has always

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{222} Heesom, "Wynyard Edict", passim.
\textsuperscript{223} D/Lo/C461(3) & (4), Liddell to Londonderry, 19th and 20th July 1837.
\textsuperscript{224} D/Lo/C461(2) & (3), Liddell to Londonderry, 1st June and 19th July 1837.
\end{footnotes}
kept out of Election matters"; Gregson was in charge of Londonderry electioneering and should therefore "know and feel in Elections the Agents and Solicitors of the Patron are far more important and greater than himself". Above all, Londonderry wanted from his agents the same zeal as Lord Durham's exhibited, and the call was therefore put out to them to show "active, constant, and personal exertion".

The interest itself behaved admirably (in Londonderry's terms). Over 60% of those resident in Pittington and Rainton (among whom Londonderry freemen numbered) plumped for Liddell, with 10% splitting on Lambton and less than a quarter polling a Liberal double vote. Lord Durham's Chester-le-Street voters were even more emphatically partisan, well over three-quarters registering straight Liberal votes, and less than 10% plumping for Liddell. Liddell's canvassing

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225 This was an over-statement on Londonderry's part. See C.E. Hiskey, John Buddle (1773-1843): Agent and Entrepreneur in the North East Coal Trade (Unpubl. M.Litt., Durham 1978), pp108-114, for the extent of Buddle's involvement (albeit reluctantly) in elections.

226 D/Lo/C730, Londonderry to Gregson, 25th July 1837. Gregson's reply was that he objected to Liddell as a representative of the Ravensworth family, which the House of Wynyard had historically opposed. It was not, however, Gregson who leaked the "Edict" to the Chronicle, as some suspected. D/Lo/C504(7), Gregson to Londonderry, 30th July 1837; D/Lo/C463, Maynard to Trevor, 2nd November 1837.


228 Chester-le-Street (and Lumley) voters = 161; Pittington and Rainton = 141. North Durham Pollbook 1837.
strategy after Chaytor's candidacy was announced, of asking Lambton voters to poll plumpers rather than splitting on Chaytor, had proved almost wholly unsuccessful.229

For the Conservatives, however, Liddell's victory (and Granger's defeat in Durham City) was a victory for independence over Durham's "despotic power which had for so long swayed the destinies of the county",230 and for Londonderry a triumph of mobilizing Conservatism under his leadership. In both elections, the number of voters under direct Londonderry influence was relatively small. Although the Chronicle tried to claim that Londonderry's freemen constituted a third of the City electorate, other estimates (including Buddle's) consistently put the figure at around 80 to 100,231 and this number was liable to decline whenever employees had to be laid off at the collieries, as in 1835 after the Londonderry pits had been placed under Trustees, and in early 1843 when some fifty freemen

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229 "He had never requested a man to vote for him who might be injured by his interest lying another way; but he had certainly requested electors to vote for that person alone under whose influence they lived", Proceedings and Poll ... 1837, p11.

230 Report of the Speeches delivered at the Fifth Anniversary Dinner of the County Durham Conservative Association ... 1838 (Durham 1838), pp7-8 (Londonderry).

231 Durham Chronicle, 23rd January 1835; D/Lo/C77(12), Fitzroy to Londonderry, 4th June 1842; Morning Chronicle, 6th April 1843 (Bright).
lost their employment. In the county electorate of well over 4,000 voters, the core group of the Londonderry interest was a tiny fraction of the whole, despite Londonderry's attempts to manufacture votes through "Building Clubs". In a close contest, however, like 1837 (where only thirty-five votes separated Lambton and Liddell) their quasi-bloc voting could be very useful. The Lambton interest, in other words those directly dependent, was even smaller in numbers. Buddle reckoned publicly that it was "greatly exaggerated. The electors supposed to be within the scope of [Lord Durham's] influence do not exceed ten or a dozen". Even his opponents did not put the figure above twenty-five. Explanations for the voting behaviour of the majority of the electors must therefore be sought elsewhere than in ties of dependence: North Durham does not conform to Joseph

\[\text{Durham Chronicle, 11th May 1838; Lambton Mss., Granger to Durham, 10th June 1836; Gateshead Observer, 7th January 1843; D/Lo/C77(22), Fitzroy to Londonderry, 12th January 1843; Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, pp91-94 and "The Londonderry Trust 1819-1854", in Archaeologica Aeliana, Fifth Series X (1982), pp179-192.}\]

\[\text{Eg. in Seaham. Durham Chronicle, 6th November 1835.}\]

\[\text{Durham Chronicle, 11th May 1838; Lord Adolphus Vane to Bright, June 1853, Londonderry Mss., Add. Deposit 1979), 1193 (D), Box 4.}\]
Parke's model of county voting in which "the poll book is almost a topography of the estates".\textsuperscript{235}

Even among a core of tenants and employees, influence could not be operated as a one-way process.\textsuperscript{236} Allegations that Londonderry mobilized his freemen "as certainly as if had been permitted to write his name on the poll books with a hundred votes opposite it" underestimated the participation of the voters in the process.\textsuperscript{237} Buddle's exasperation with the demands for attention and funds made by Londonderry's freemen continued after 1832. As was reported to Londonderry, their gratitude and therefore electoral loyalty needed constant nurturing: "... the electors in your Lordship's employ are generally speaking the most difficult to satisfy, and each vote costs considerably


\textsuperscript{237} Morning Chronicle, 6th April 1843 (Bright's speech to Anti-Corn Law League, Drury Lane, 5th April).
more ... " It was, nevertheless, considered cheaper in the long run than obtaining the allegiance of voters at election time:

the application of about £40 per annum ... in assisting the freemen in distress would effect more than the spending of £500 in treating at the Election ... 239

It was also absolutely indispensable. When Londonderry's financial crises led to neglect of the freemen after 1841, the fabric of the interest was severely weakened. 240 Moreover, although Londonderry expected that ''all my colliery freemen and others depending upon me must act as my honor and interest require'', and others characterized his employees as political "serfs", 241 he - like other landowners and employers - lacked the capacity to enforce his voting requirements absolutely. Coercion, whatever Londonderry's opponents alleged, was not an efficient or much-used instrument in his arsenal, although there were occasions when pique at others' ingratitude led Londonderry to utter threats which were largely

238 D/Lo/C463, Maynard to Londonderry, 27th November 1837; Heesom, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Influences", pp290-293.

239 D/Lo/C463, Maynard to Trevor, 2nd November 1837.

240 D/Lo/C77(12) and (22), Fitzroy to Londonderry, 4th June 1842 and 12th January 1843; D/Lo/C132, Maynard to Londonderry, 5th August 1841; Durham Chronicle, 13th January 1843; Sturgess, "Londonderry Trust", passim; Nossiter, Influence, p120. Londonderry's financial problems were due (amongst other reasons) to the slowness of Seaham to generate a profit, and the fire that gutted Wynyard in 1841.

241 D/Lo/C153(110), Londonderry to Wright, 24th July 1843; Durham Chronicle, 31st March 1843.
ineffective. Dismissing colliers for electoral disloyalty was a latent threat, but one to which evidence suggests Londonderry rarely, if ever, resorted. Buddle dismissed Chaytorite rumours that he had threatened freemen with the loss of their jobs in 1830 with disdain.\textsuperscript{242} It has also been shown that Londonderry's colliery workers - including those at Penshaw, Rainton and Pittington - were mostly long-term employees, and unlikely to have been suffering significantly from the danger of instant dismissal for any but economic reasons.\textsuperscript{243} Certainly, the freemen were not so intimidated that they could not, when necessary, state electoral preferences that were contrary to those of their employer. The freemen were very firmly to tell Londonderry's agents in July 1843 that they did not want a second Tory brought forward - an opinion to which Wright, for one, attached great weight.\textsuperscript{244}

Attempts to shore up the loyalty of others less directly dependent on Wynyard - for example, shopkeepers and craftsmen who supplied the collieries - were also far from universally successful. A list drawn up in 1843 of sixty-six tradesmen in the region (mostly rope-makers, timber merchants, smiths, etc.)

\textsuperscript{242} D/Lo/C142(21), Buddle to Londonderry, 28th July 1830.

\textsuperscript{243} Heesom, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Influences", pp292-293, 299-300.

\textsuperscript{244} D/Lo/C153(95) & (109), Wright to Londonderry, n.d. (16th July 1843) and 23rd July 1843.
identified twenty-eight with whom there were to be "no further dealings" because of Whig or Radical voting.\(^{245}\)

There is, however, little or no sign from the subsequent voting of those on the list that such pressure had worked as a deterrent; the threat seemed, rather, to satisfy Londonderry's annoyance that those to whom he gave custom were "ungrateful enough to turn against the hand that gives them bread".\(^{246}\)

However clumsy his methods and language sometimes were, Londonderry's expectations of other's behaviour towards himself and his family were markedly similar to Lord Durham's. Both regarded it as "a mark of great disrespect if not something worse" for an employee not to follow the family interest in his voting.\(^{247}\) Durham as "Radical Jack", however, was obliged to stress that he did not expect, or desire, a blind loyalty, or one extracted under any fear of penalties. He impressed upon fellow reformers the need to encourage "amongst themselves, their friends and neighbours, habits of free, fair, open and tolerant discussion".\(^{248}\) In particular, he agreed with Parkes that "the ballot alone can emancipate us", and the necessity of

\(^{245}\) D/Lo/C148, A List of Tradesmen Patronised by the Marquis of Londonderry ... 1843 and 1844. The list included only three businesses in Durham City.

\(^{246}\) Heesom, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Influences", pp292-293; Durham Advertiser, 21st July 1837.

\(^{247}\) Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 14th November 1837.

\(^{248}\) Speech of the Earl of Durham, p5.
protecting voters against the weight of undue influence was a constant theme of his 1834 speeches:

the ballot is the surest safeguard against corruption, and the most certain protection for that independent exercise of the right of voting, which is absolutely necessary for insuring the rights and liberties of the people.249

Both Londonderry's and Durham's greatest problems when exercising their respective influences after 1832 derived from misinterpreting their relationships with middle-class electors rather than working-class ones. Durham's faux pas in Sunderland in 1832 was an early illustration of the sensitivity of the new electorate to anything that resembled nomination, and an indication that borough élites would not tolerate patronage which impinged on their own self-esteem. Neither would they necessarily follow a socio-political leader deferentially into politics more extreme than their own inclinations, as the "Bailey Whigs" demonstrated to Lord Durham. The dropping-out of the gentry and professional men from the ranks of the reform activists noted by Morton,250 which left the reform association in the hands of a few committed Durhamite Radicals, was a symptom not only of the national sense of disillusion after 1832 but also of a drift away from Lambton's, or any other brand of,

249 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 5th July 1837; Speeches of the Right Honourable the Earl of Durham, p390 (Newcastle, 19th November 1834).

250 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 5th July 1837. The reform association was reconstructed in 1837 as The North Durham Reform Society.
influence - irrespective of Durham's public statements assuring his constituency of his respect for their independence. Durham and Londonderry were equally offended by the growing indifference - and at times hostility - to their opinions among some middle-class voters who had previously supported their candidates, since both thought it natural and necessary that their social positions should entitle them to a corresponding degree of political leadership. As Durham put it to Parkes:

The various coteries and parties [in the towns] must have some one to look up to - to follow - or they never move. 251

Londonderry formulated his claim to social leadership from his wealth, and his political leadership of the Conservatives from his willingness to expend his money in the electoral service of the party. The former led him to justify his son Seaham's future candidacy for North Durham as founded on the "true and legitimate base" of "the great and increasing power of our Collieries and Estates in that quarter", 252 and the latter his right to lead the Conservatives on the grounds that he had sponsored candidates in Durham "whose contests throughout, petitions and expenses near to £50,000 I alone have borne". When faced with ingratitude (as he saw it), this was a frequent

251 Lambton Mss., Durham to Parkes, 6th August 1836.
252 Londonderry to Liddell, 9th July 1841, and "July 19th 1843: Statement of Lord Londonderry Relative to the City of Durham Elections", Add. Deposit (1979), 1193 (D), Box 4.
Londonderry theme: "20 years fighting Durham entitles me to instruct those who wish to support Conservatism".\textsuperscript{253} For local Conservatives, the money that Londonderry was prepared to spend on elections (frequently against Buddle's advice) was a strong incentive to support him as far as they felt they could.\textsuperscript{254}

Londonderry's agents and candidates had, from 1837 onwards especially, to inform Londonderry of the limits beyond which deference could not be pushed, as Hedworth Lambton had his brother in 1832. Cartwright, a Conservative agent, had to warn Londonderry that he should not take too prominent a part in the formation of a Conservative Association in Stockton:

... it should appear to originate with the middle classes ... so widely has the decomposition of society extended in this country that even for the maintenance of a principle the essence of which is the assertion of a just gradation, policy requires a careful alteration to the actual prevalence and influence of the democratic taint - the many must direct the few.\textsuperscript{255}

This did not prevent Londonderry being gravely offended when the new Association asked him merely for his "patronage and support" when he wanted to be its President, and he characteristically replied that he

\textsuperscript{253} D/Lo/C134(58) Londonderry to Freemantle, 6th July 1843; D/Lo/C80(3) Londonderry to Graham, 8th November 1841.

\textsuperscript{254} Heesom, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Influences", pp299-300.

\textsuperscript{255} D/Lo/C447(1), Cartwright to Londonderry, 21st December 1837.
would consider it inappropriate for "large Landed proprietors" to be subordinate in such an organization "to the Gentlemen in the town". Liddell was provoked into pointing out to Londonderry in 1841 that he overrated his influence with many electors. Although he was "the acknowledged head and leader of the Conservative interest in our County", the regeneration of Conservatism rested upon other foundations besides influence. Liddell's return had required

the strenuous cooperation of a considerable portion of the landed Gentry and Clergy of the County, of its Mercantile and Shipping interests, and of the large and independent portion of the constituency.

Such voters needed delicate handling, and the distinctions between them and other voters who could be bought or manipulated needed to be clearly maintained. Of neither of these was Londonderry consistently capable, although he did exhibit a grasp of the distinctions between those under "absolute influence", those "partially connected", and men of independent standing, and between the electoral behaviour of all

\[256\] D/Lo/C447(4), (5) & (6), Hon. Secs. of Stockton Conservative Association to Londonderry, 14th February 1838, Londonderry to Stockton Cons. Assoc., 15th February 1838, and Cartwright to Londonderry, 16th February 1838. Cartwright begged Londonderry to "proceed with some dexterity and self denial ... and a degree of caution that amalgamates but ill with your natural frankness".

\[257\] D/Lo/C87, Liddell to Londonderry, 27th May 1841.
three. The political support of independent men was worth most in terms of legitimacy and prestige: Seaham, for example, had to have a county seat and could not be allowed to stand for a borough, especially one like Durham which was "venal".

The intermittent failure of both Durham and Londonderry to convey to these voters that they shared their perception of the ways in which social relationships related to political ones, gave an added dimension to the party battles in Durham City, producing bodies of intelligent, articulate voters on both sides who at times chose to support candidates other than those provided by their "patrons". The Harlandite/Grangerite splits of 1835 and 1837 were followed by dissension within the Tory ranks with criticisms of Londonderry’s behaviour during the 1841 election.

Since 1837, the relationship between Londonderry and Trevor, who had become Viscount Dungannon on his

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258 D/Lo/C153, "Memorandum to Mr. Buddle, 23rd July 1843". See D/Lo/C153(100) & (110), Londonderry to Wright, 22nd and 24th July 1843, for Wright’s disgust at Londonderry treating him as if he were in a "condition of degrading servility or vaunted dependence", and Londonderry’s clear acknowledgement of Wright’s independence.

259 D/Lo/C134C(69), Londonderry to Freemantle, 4th July 1843; Londonderry to Liddell, 9th July 1841, Add. Deposit (1979), 1193 (D), Box 4. See D/Lo/C107(41), Dungannon to Londonderry, 23rd May 1843, for an example of the greater power of patronage connected to a county seat.

father's death in late 1837, had deteriorated. In the period immediately following his father's death, beset by family problems, Dungannon was in low spirits and indeed appears in his correspondence to have been close to a breakdown.\textsuperscript{261} Feeling unappreciated by the Conservative party, he urged Londonderry to find another candidate for Durham, arguing that while he remained the candidate on Londonderry's interest, "so long will there be Contest after Contest". With another candidate, Londonderry might be able to "come to a compromise with the other Party by which you could possess quietly one seat".\textsuperscript{262} Londonderry grew impatient with Dungannon's inability to travel north for public meetings, and especially with his failing attendance in the House of Commons,\textsuperscript{263} and saw in both, Dungannon's awareness that his new status altered the balance of their relationship. It was relayed to him that Dungannon had been referring in communications with others in Durham to his own independence, and although Londonderry acknowledged that Dungannon's "new honour and fortune" gave him the right to do as he chose, he could not

\textsuperscript{261} D/Lo/C107(1-18), Dungannon to Londonderry, and replies, January-May 1838.

\textsuperscript{262} D/Lo/C107(2), (13) & (16), Dungannon to Londonderry, 15th January, 5th March and 26th April 1838.

\textsuperscript{263} D/Lo/C107(5), (8) and (18), Dungannon to Londonderry, 23rd and 26th January, 18th May 1838.
in justice to my political power, the expense I have been at, and my ... future prospects allow my seat at Durham to become a nullity or even a pairing concern. 264

Dungannon for his part was concerned at the financial demands that Londonderry's agents were placing on him for the maintenance of the Londonderry interest. Bills were unpaid from the 1837 contest, and the Durham committee was £1,000 in debt with electioneering and registration expenses, and was in some doubt as to whether it could afford to participate in the 1838 registration at all. The latter was of particular concern to Londonderry, who knew from previous experience that it was his voters, especially those at Seaham, who would be hardest hit by Liberal objections. 265 Registration activity in Sunderland could only be undertaken because the committee there had paid £500 since 1832 out of their own pockets. 266 In desperation, Maynard sent to Dungannon for money, for the last election and for the continuous expense of obtaining freedoms, which Dungannon partially provided, but not without questioning the fairness of the situation:

264 D/Lo/C107(17), Londonderry to Dungannon, 10th May 1838 (copy).

265 There were 1,500 objections to Liddell voters at the 1839 registration. Durham Advertiser, 30th August 1839.

266 D/Lo/C489, Wright to Londonderry, 17th June 1838 (in which Wright points out that Londonderry has not paid his own subscription); D/Lo/C463(2), (4), (5) & (6), Maynard to Trevor, 2nd November 1837, Maynard to Londonderry, 27th November 1838, and Moore to Londonderry, 2nd December 1837 and 22nd May 1838.
I came to the determination of retiring at the next General Election ... having done this was I to bear the expense of keeping up the interest? 267

The money that Dungannon forwarded, however, was instrumental in ensuring that the Conservatives maintained their lead among freemen admissions up to 1840. 268

The breach widened with Dungannon's vote on the Ecclesiastical Bill in March 1839, 269 but the timing was not propitious for Londonderry to start a new candidate. His financial difficulties were weakening the interest among the freemen, and the fight seemed to have gone out of local Tories. Wright reported to Londonderry that the City Conservatives appeared to be on the retreat, with "none of the respectable inhabitants" any longer involved in the organizational activities of the party. Gregson characterized those left in charge of the Durham committee as "a set of men without either Interest or Influence". The County Association seemed also to be in a state of terminal

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267 D/Lo/C107(10) & (21), Dungannon to Londonderry, 2nd February 1838 and 16th December 1839.

268 Durham Advertiser, 22nd May 1840.

269 D/Lo/C96(33), Peel to Londonderry, 4th March 1839; Liddell to Londonderry, 4th March 1839, Add. Deposit (1979), 1193 (D), Box 4, "being the Conservative member of a great Cathedral town with an influential Chapter ... he probably considers himself bound to shew a High Church spirit ..."; D/Lo/C107(28), Dungannon to Londonderry, 18th May 1840. For Londonderry's relationship with Dungannon into 1841, and the latter's abortive attempt to stand at the 1841 by-election in Sunderland, see A.J.Heesom, "The Sunderland By-Election, September 1841", in Northern History, IX (1974), pp62-79.
collapse. All in all, "there is no rousing our party" complained Maynard.\textsuperscript{270}

Party politics generally seemed to have subsided in the city after the furore of 1837. Whigs and Radicals had accomplished an unofficial reconciliation, at least as far as registration activity and municipal elections were concerned,\textsuperscript{271} and Lord Durham's death in 1840 had removed one source of tension although at the cost of leaving the Liberals without leadership. The Liberals were, if possible, in a worse financial position than the Conservatives. Chaytor had loaned £2,000 to the Reform Committee in 1837 which could not be repaid; the Committee was said to be "in debt throughout the length and breadth of the whole division", one estimate putting their total debts at well over £3,000.\textsuperscript{272} In 1840, Hedworth Lambton informed his agents that he would not be spending any money at that year's county registration, and suggested to Conservative agents that a party truce be established at the registration courts to save expense on both sides.\textsuperscript{273}

\textsuperscript{270} D/Lo/C463(2-4), Maynard to Londonderry, 2nd and 27th November 1837, 27th June 1838; D/Lo/C504, Gregson to Londonderry, 30th July 1837; D/Lo/C489, Wright to Londonderry, 23rd July 1837, 17th June 1838.

\textsuperscript{271} Durham Chronicle, 19th January 1839; Dul/31/162, E.E.Deacon (Revising Barrister) to Town Clerk (Hutchinson), 15th September 1838 (D.C.R.O.).

\textsuperscript{272} Durham Advertiser, 12th June and 7th August 1840; D/Lo/C489, Wright to Londonderry, 17th June 1838.

\textsuperscript{273} Durham Advertiser, 7th August 1840.
Harland had bowed out of any future City contests, ostensibly because of the drain on his own resources, but when Granger announced that he would stand again, and canvassing began in 1841, it remained unclear as to what portion of the Whigs would be prepared to vote for him: Londonderry was told that the majority - including Fenwick - had said that they would not.

Londonderry brought forward his nephew, Captain Robert Fitzroy, a naval officer who was not a local man, and was to admit that he "did not profess to know much of the County of Durham". The Chronicle scoffed that "the Marquis of Londonderry might as well have brought the Electors of Durham a Turk from Constantinople ..." There was a second Conservative, in the shape of William Sheppard, "son of a Bristol merchant", who called on voters "to come constitutionally to the rescue of the Altar, the Crown and the People". Sheppard, however, declared himself "unconnected with Party, unfettered by local or other ties", and his public addresses describing his desire for "courtesy" (and by implication, little more) from Fitzroy were adduced by observers to be "very

274 Durham Advertiser, 22nd May and 5th June 1840, 21st May 1841.

275 D/Lo/C132/2(2) & (3), Maynard to Londonderry, 22nd and 28th May 1841.

276 3 Hansard 63, p165 (5th May 1842); Durham Chronicle, 28th May 1841.

277 Durham Chronicle, 4th and 18th June 1841.
insulting" to Londonderry. In funding and organization, Sheppard far exceeded either of the other candidates, having seven agents to Fitzroy's two, and spending money in a manner that local party men could only envy.

A Fitzroy/Sheppard coalition was advocated by Conservative electors, not only "the freemen ... but the higher classes even into the College", and when Fitzroy's canvass encountered almost universal refusals to plump, Fitzroy agreed to work with Sheppard out of concern that the Londonderry interest would suffer from the bad feeling that was beginning to be generated amongst the "reds". Coalition brought the added advantage of an agreement to share expenses, payable on a daily basis. Fitzroy's campaign badly needed an injection of cash, the lack of ready money generating hostility among the freemen, who would not be satisfied without it, since it was forthcoming from both of the other candidates. Maynard pleaded with Londonderry to send more: "it will be impossible to do without it". When the Conservative coalition was avowed, Granger, Londonderry was told, was said to be "extremely

278 Durham Chronicle, 28th May 1841.
279 D/Lo/C132/2(2) & (3), Maynard to Londonderry, 22nd and 28th May 1841.
280 D/Lo/C132/2(4), (7), (8) & (12), Maynard to Londonderry, 30th May, 11th and 16th June, 5th August 1841. Londonderry, shortly after the fire at Wynyard, was reduced to sending his agent post-dated cheques.
disconcerted at the Union of your Influence with the young Merchant's purse".  

Londonderry and Fitzroy, however, were not playing fairly with Sheppard. Londonderry's colliery voters were instructed to plump for Fitzroy, and only to split on Sheppard once Fitzroy was safe. When Sheppard discovered this - and he attributed it to Londonderry's dislike of his Urquhartite anti-Russian views - he abandoned his campaign and left Durham, leaving local Conservatives dismayed and indignant, first with him for his "unaccountable desertion", and then, when events were clarified, with Londonderry. It was left to Maynard and Fitzroy to persuade Londonderry that another Wynyard candidate could not, because of the degree of anger amongst Durham Conservatives, hope to be successful. "The constituency", wrote Maynard, "would not submit to return two candidates connected with your Lordship". When attempts by Sheppard's supporters to find another

281 D/Lo/C132/2(1), Maynard to Londonderry, 21st May 1841; D/Lo/C132/3, Fitzroy to Londonderry, 21st and 28th May 1841; Durham Advertiser, 21st and 28th May 1841.

282 D/Lo/C132/2(2), Maynard to Londonderry, 22nd May 1841.

283 D/Lo/C132/3, Fitzroy to Londonderry, 21st June 1841; Durham Advertiser, 10th September 1841.

284 D/Lo/C132/3, Fitzroy to Londonderry, 23rd June and 20th September 1841; D/Lo/C132/2(9) & (11), Maynard to Londonderry, 24th June and 3rd August 1841; Durham Advertiser, 25th June and 2nd July 1841.
candidate were also unsuccessful, Granger and Fitzroy were returned unopposed.\footnote{285}

The rupture between Londonderry and the Durham Conservatives had serious implications for the Londonderry interest. Although there were endeavours to pass it off as a "temporary misunderstanding", the Liberals were able to assert that there was "a determination in the minds of the independent Conservatives no longer to submit to [Londonderry's] dictation".\footnote{286} Unpaid election bills worsened the rift. Resentful of Londonderry's inability to repay money forwarded to pay for the election, Maynard turned against Londonderry, making public his grievances. Maynard made it clear to Londonderry that, should his lack of money to settle accounts and fund the freemen go unremedied, the interest would be destroyed. It was money that was the basis of Londonderry's influence: defections to the independent Conservatives would be inevitable if "energetic measures" were not taken. "Lord Londonderry", fumed Maynard,

\footnotesize

\footnote{285} D/Lo/C132/2(9) & (10), Maynard to Londonderry, 24th and 25th June 1841; D/Lo/C132/3, Fitzroy to Londonderry, 23rd June 1841; Durham Advertiser, 25th June 1841.

\footnote{286} Durham Advertiser, 2nd July 1841.
is little aware of the difficulty of keeping together the "Interest" ... [he] will not be convinced but that his influence and popularity is very much greater than it really is.287

A parallel revolt against Londonderry highhandedness took place over the County representation in 1841. Liddell, fully aware that Londonderry meant his son Seaham to have the seat for North Durham (both of them knowing that North Durham would not return two Conservatives288), criticised Londonderry's failure to consult with the independent section of county opinion over the matter. During the 1841 election, at the height of Londonderry's financial troubles, Liddell did not know whether Londonderry would support his campaign should a second Liberal be put up.289 An inconclusive series of letters followed, leaving Liddell, like the Conservatives of the City, to complain that Londonderry was exercising "a degree of dictation not warranted by [his] situation". Londonderry's reply was that his financial sacrifices for Conservatism in the past justified his actions, and

287 D/Lo/C132/3, "Extracts from Mr. Maynard's Letters Between August 24th and September 17th 1841" and Fitzroy to Londonderry, 14th October 1841; D/Lo/C132/2(12-14), Maynard to Londonderry, 5th and 10th August, 11th October 1841.

288 Londonderry to Liddell, 9th July 1841, Add. Deposit (1979), 1193 (D), Box 4.

289 D/Lo/C87, Liddell to Londonderry, 25th May 1841. The Liberals were originally determined to oust Liddell, and looked for a candidate from 1839 onwards, but were stopped by Durham's death and the fear of an expensive contest. Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 13th and 16th May, 12th June 1839; The Standard, 6th July 1841.
he accused of his critics of ingratitude: "the past unhappily in my instance seems always forgotten". 290

The fractured relationship between patron and M.P. could not be mended after the election. Liddell informed Londonderry that he considered himself an independent: "I should never consent to represent a great County without the consciousness of sitting ... as an independent member". 291

The lengths to which Londonderry was prepared to go to defend his influence against encroachments of "independence" were, or so his critics claimed, revealed in the events of the two Durham City by-elections of 1843, which attracted national attention. Dungannon had come bitterly to regret his resignation of the City seat, and when Fitzroy, after two years of conflict with his uncle over the payment of his expenses, 292 was offered the Governorship of New Zealand, Dungannon was once again Londonderry's

290 Londonderry to Liddell, 9th July 1841, Add. Deposit (1979), 1193 (D), Box 4; D/Lo/C87, Londonderry to Liddell, 3rd July 1841.


candidate. The Durham Chronicle declared Dungannon's reintroduction "one of those daring defiances of public opinion with which Lord Londonderry is daily testing the forbearance of his own party", and called on the Liberals to ensure that the election was contested; Londonderry and Dungannon, who had known of the approaching contest for several months, were clearly hopeful that no Liberal candidate would be found, after Chaytor, Beckwith and Spearman had all apparently been unsuccessfully approached. At the very last moment, however, the Quaker and Anti-Corn Law Leaguer John Bright arrived from Rochdale and announced that he was standing, having seen letters from Veitch, editor of the Chronicle, to other Leaguers, Gisborne and Col. Thompson. Bright did not, apparently, initially intend to offer himself as a candidate, arriving in Durham meaning only to weigh his chances. His address to

293 D/Lo/C107(30) & (40), Dungannon to Londonderry, 26th July 1841, 19th March 1843; D/Lo/C134C(56), Freemantle to Londonderry, 20th March 1843; Bean, Parliamentary Representation, p140; Durham Advertiser, 31st March 1843.

294 Durham Chronicle, 31st March 1843; D/Lo/C142(38), Buddle to Londonderry, 27th March and 1st April 1843; D/Lo/C153(83), Wright to Londonderry, 1st April 1843.

the electors appeared only on polling day, whilst his canvass lasted only two and a half hours. 296

Despite the lateness of his arrival in the contest, Bright had a number of factors in his favour. There was a perceptible eagerness in the City for Free Trade discussion, and with the organizational machinery of the Anti-Corn Law League behind him, Bright far outstripped Dungannon - even in the short time available - in his ability to promote himself as the representative of real issues. Every elector was supplied with free trade literature. 297 Dungannon admitted that his opponent was "a gentleman of superior talents", and that Bright knew better then he did "how to handle a clap-trap subject". 298 Dungannon's lack of understanding of free trade was evident, indeed he avoided discussion of all specific issues (with the one exception of the Poor Law, which he declared himself in favour of amending), stating that his political views were too well known to require elaboration. 299

Bright's anti-monopolist arguments against "class legislation for class objects", and his attention to the level of distress among working men in Durham (a

296 Durham Chronicle, 7th April 1843.


298 D/Lo/C107(38), Dungannon to Londonderry, 7th April 1843; Proceedings and Poll, pp19-20; Durham Advertiser, 7th April 1843.

299 Durham Chronicle, 7th April 1843.
subject that had not previously attracted much attention at City elections) won the support of many in the large crowds that heard his speeches, although it was clear that the unenfranchised formed the bulk of his audience.  

Bright also had the advantage of Whig backing. The Lambton interest was subsequently said to have been operated forcefully against Dungannon, whilst "the Granger party" and the Bailey Whigs all polled for Bright, the latter including a number of clerics who might have been thought likely to have objected to a Quaker.  

A Tory ploy to frighten Whig voters by putting up briefly a Sunderland Chartist, James Williams, was seen through. Bright's foundation of his addresses on the twin themes of Free Trade and "your right to be a free and independent constituency" undoubtedly tapped a rich vein of sentiment. His proposers stressed that his candidacy was aimed against Londonderry's "domination", and that purity of election was of crucial importance: it was an opportune moment for both propositions.

300 Proceedings and Poll, passim; Durham Chronicle, 7th April 1843.

301 Quakers "from all parts of the County" came to Durham to assist Bright's canvass. D/Lo/C153(77) & (79), Wright to Londonderry, 5th and 15th April 1843; D/Lo/C142(38), Buddle to Londonderry, 27th March and 16th April 1843; D/Lo/C107(38), Dungannon to Londonderry, 7th April 1843.

302 Proceedings and Poll, pp1-2; Durham Chronicle, 78th April 1843.

Dungannon's victory by 102 votes was short-lived. The payment to Tory voters of a sovereign as "head-money" a month after the election prompted a Liberal petition which resulted in his unseating.\textsuperscript{304} There was more than a little irony in this development for the Tories, who had taken scrupulous and unprecedented care during the election not to give Bright cause to petition by engaging in any of the pecuniary practices habitual to Durham contests. Wright in particular had emphasized to Londonderry and Dungannon that such practices as "10/- tickets", the employment of "runners" and other forms of treating as had previously been employed could no longer be used, partly because the money was not available to pay for them, but more importantly because recent legislation had expressly defined them as constituting "bribery". "Now", Wright therefore argued, "is the time to begin a new system".\textsuperscript{305} This Dungannon had done, deliberately stating at the start of his canvass "that not one glass of ale, wine or spirits, should be provided for any of the voters".\textsuperscript{306} The results had been appreciable.

There was general agreement that it was "a very sober

\textsuperscript{304} Durham Chronicle, 12th May 1843; P.P. 1843 (433) vi.170 ("Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the Durham City Election petitions"); 3 Hansard 70, pp1190-1196 (Ld. Ashley). Dungannon was cleared of personal knowledge of the payments.

\textsuperscript{305} 5 & 6 Vict., C120, s.20; D/Lo/C153(76), Wright to Londonderry, 25th March 1843; Durham Chronicle, 26th May 1843.

\textsuperscript{306} D/Lo/C153(77), Wright to Londonderry, 5th April 1843; Durham Advertiser, 16th June 1843.
and decorous sort of election", compared to previous contests, and Bright himself said that he never witnessed fewer excesses at an election.\textsuperscript{307} The lapse which cost Dungannon his seat was thus doubly unfortunate, caused as it was by "a thickhead of a Parliamentary Agent" (as Wright dubbed him) who mistakenly advised Dungannon's agents Ward and Wilkinson - who were in charge of the campaign only because Wright was ill - that giving a sovereign and a copy of the pollbook to each Conservative voter at such a late stage would be safe because the time for petitioning had elapsed, and because a prior arrangement with voters had not been entered into.\textsuperscript{308} Dungannon was distraught that he should face a petition "after all the caution and care that I took and urged on others". As he complained to Londonderry, his unseating meant "there is no man [who] can get elected who is not open to the accusation".\textsuperscript{309}

Even before the petition result was known, however, Londonderry and Dungannon's relationship had deteriorated to the point where Dungannon would have resigned whatever the outcome. Dungannon resented

\textsuperscript{307} Durham Chronicle, 7th April 1843; P.P. 1843 (433) vi.209ff. (testimony of Robert Hoggett, Returning Officer/Mayor, and John Richaby).

\textsuperscript{308} D/Lo/C153(76), (83) & (84), Wright to Londonderry, 25th March, 1st April and 20th May 1843; D/Lo/C107(42), Wright to Dungannon, 24th May 1843; D/Lo/C142(38), Buddle to Londonderry, 16th July 1843.

\textsuperscript{309} D/Lo/C107(43) & (45), Dungannon to Londonderry, 27th and 29th May 1843.
Londonderry's implications that he was somehow responsible for the petition, whilst Londonderry was suspicious of the vehemence with which Dungannon, facing Bright's accusations that he was party to a "contract" with Londonderry whereby Durham City was being handed on from Fitzroy to himself, had publicly insisted on his independence during the campaign.\footnote{310}{Durham Chronicle, 7th April 1843; D/Lo/C107(57), Dungannon to Londonderry, 9th June 1843; G.Barnett Smith, The Life and Speeches of the Rt. Hon. John Bright, M.P. (London 1882), pp35-38.}

Although Wright maintained to Londonderry that Dungannon had acted correctly in playing down Londonderry's involvement in his addresses ("it would never do either inferentially or expressly to admit much less trumpet forth in the face of the electors that any ... interference or power accomplished [his election]"),\footnote{311}{D/Lo/C153(82) & (83), Wright to Londonderry, 12th and 15th April 1843.} Londonderry chose to see disloyalty "to the interests of the family" in Dungannon's declarations, and demanded to know whether he still considered himself "as our member or as acting in an independent position in Parliament". Having received from Londonderry nothing towards the costs of the contest, Dungannon was aggrieved at this demand. "But surely", he wrote to Londonderry, "as I paid every shilling of the last contest, you do not quite consider me in the same position as I stood before in".\footnote{312}{D/Lo/C107(47-61), Dungannon to Londonderry and replies, 1st to 27th June 1843; Large, "Election of John Bright", pp19-21.}
The by-election in July saw open warfare between Londonderry and the Durham Conservatives over the candidacy of Thomas Purvis, a Chancery lawyer and owner of 1,200 acres on the outskirts of Durham. Purvis, with his advantages of being a local man and having plenty of money to bring to an election, had been approached by Londonderry in 1841 as a potential replacement for Sheppard, but had withdrawn on finding that he was in danger of compromising Fitzroy's return. Believing that he had on that occasion given pledges to stand again, Purvis now apparently considered it a matter of personal honour to come forward - to Londonderry's disgust, doing so before the petition against Dungannon had been decided, with the backing of the independent Conservatives, and without referring to him to ascertain whether he was putting up his own candidate. As Londonderry and Wright later described the event:

... Mr. Purvis determined to pursue his own selfish object ... and determined to treat as insignificant and set at defiance any interest of the noble personage, not even condescending to solicit it.

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313 D/Lo/C153(46), W.L. Wharton to Dungannon, 28th June 1841; Londonderry to Peel, 8th February 1838, Peel Mss., B. Lib., Add., Mss., 40424, f.325-7; John Griffith to Hardinge, 7th July 1843, B. Lib., Add. Mss., 40617, f.144-6.

314 D/Lo/C134(7) & (8), Purvis to Londonderry, 8th and 13th July 1843; D/Lo/C153(91), Wright to Londonderry, 8th July 1843.

315 D/Lo/C153(106) "Durham City Election. Statement from Authority" (in Wright's hand).
The move seemed a blatant attempt by the City Conservatives, with the disaffected Maynard prominent among them, to establish themselves as "a distinct party" independent of Wynyard. Londonderry saw in this turn of events the hand of the government, whom he suspected of plotting against his influence in Durham. Although it was warmly denied by all of his correspondents, Londonderry accused "the secret committee at the Carlton Club" of being in communication with Purvis, and of having instigated Fitzroy's surprise appointment to New Zealand in 1841. Despite being applied to repeatedly, Peel and other members of the government refused to involve themselves, and would not, as Londonderry requested, discountenance Purvis, an act which Londonderry regarded as treasonable. Hardinge urged him to put aside his paranoia and come to an agreement with the Purvisites, but Londonderry, infuriated by the disrespect that he felt was being shown him, was adamant that a candidate of his own should stand, whilst acknowledging that it was likely he would be defeated. He warned Hardinge, "it is better the Government should know ... that I would rather see the

316 D/Lo/C153(91) & (93), Wright to Londonderry, 8th and 13th July 1843.

317 D/Lo/C96(56), Peel to Londonderry, 22nd June 1843; D/Lo/C134C(57-69), Freemantle to Londonderry, July 1843; D/Lo/C134(48), Dungannon to Londonderry, 8th July 1843.

318 D/Lo/C134C(60) & (61), Hardinge to Londonderry, 8th July 1843 and Londonderry to Hardinge, 10th July 1843.
Quaker Bright returned than the man Purvis forced upon me".  

Lord Seaham could not, according to his father, contest a borough seat, but Londonderry's son-in-law, Blandford was considered more appropriate, and his candidacy announced. He, however, did not appear in Durham, and the delay in getting a Londonderry candidate into the field proved a turning point. Whilst awaiting another possible candidate, Londonderry's nephew Ward, Wright reported the widespread "desertion" of a large number of Conservatives to Purvis during his canvass, "not only the lukewarm but all the leading and staunch, both Freemen and Householders", largely (thought Wright) out of fear of Bright but also in positive appreciation of Purvis as a county man. The Conservative Association could not be persuaded to support a second Conservative candidate - there was no proposer or seconder for Ward "from any of the higher classes of voters" - and at the same time the freemen made it absolutely clear to Wright that they were

319 D/Lo/C134(23), Londonderry to Hardinge, 17th July 1843.

320 D/Lo/C134C(69), Londonderry to Freemantle, 14th July 1843; D/Lo/C153(91), Wright to Londonderry, 8th July 1843.

321 D/Lo/C153(92) & (95), Wright to Londonderry, 12th July 1843 and n.d. (16th July 1843); Durham Advertiser, 21st July 1843; Durham Chronicle, 21st July 1843.

322 D/Lo/C153(92-96), Wright to Londonderry, 12th to 18th July 1843.
opposed to splitting the Conservative vote.\textsuperscript{323} Londonderry's agents were made to recognize that forcing a candidate on an unwilling interest risked material damage to voter loyalty, and joined the independent Conservatives in urging Londonderry to abandon the attempt: "collision with the people" would bring the danger of ruining the interest for ever.\textsuperscript{324}

The line that Londonderry was to take in a contest between Bright and Purvis was intensely debated. The Advertiser, which had come out for Purvis, felt assured that Blandford's withdrawal added to Purvis' canvass book all those Conservatives who had held back their promises.\textsuperscript{325} Wright, who had originally advocated that Londonderry should withhold any support from Purvis so that his defeat would act to "show them [the dissident Conservatives] their own weakness [and] the Government their own mistake if they think the City theirs without you"\textsuperscript{326} felt after the Conservative Association meeting that, since it appeared possible both that Purvis might beat Bright without the Londonderry freemen, and that Londonderry would incur enormous unpopularity were his freemen to be the cause

\textsuperscript{323} D/Lo/C153(95) & (109), Wright to Londonderry, n.d. (16th July 1843) and 23rd July 1843; D/Lo/C134(1), F.D. Johnson to Londonderry, 18th July 1843.

\textsuperscript{324} D/Lo/C134(42) Wm. Henderson (one of the Durham Conservatives) to Londonderry, 20th July 1843.

\textsuperscript{325} Durham Advertiser, 14th, 21st and 28th July 1843.

\textsuperscript{326} D/Lo/C153(91) & (92), Wright to Londonderry, 8th and 12th July 1843.
of Bright being returned, Londonderry should be seen to be putting his interest behind Purvis. To do so would strengthen his hand for the future: such a "stretch of generosity", especially if the government were made fully conscious of it, would greatly increase the Conservatives' obligations to him.\(^{327}\) Purvis' supporters counselled Londonderry that their priority - and that of all true Conservatives - should be "at all hazards to prevent the return of Mr. Bright ...".\(^{328}\)

Wright recommended the acceptance of the terms of a proposition, forwarded from Hodgson Hinde, M.P. for Newcastle, from Purvis (who was now saying that the offence that had been given to Londonderry was "all a mistake"), by which Londonderry would support Purvis in return for a candidate of his own receiving preference at the next general election.\(^{329}\) This Londonderry refused to do, dismissing Hinde's suggestions as "needless, unintelligible, and almost insulting". "I may", he stormed, "be circumvented and my efforts in Durham forgotten, but for me to be a party to my own abandonment is rather too much surely".\(^{330}\) Right up to the day of polling, it remained unclear to observers

\(^{327}\) D/Lo/C153(95) & (98), Wright to Londonderry, n.d. (16th July 1843) and 19th July 1843.

\(^{328}\) D/Lo/C134(55), Rev. Geo. Townshend to Londonderry, n.d. (c.18th July 1843); D/Lo/C153(108), Tiplady to Londonderry, 25th July 1843.

\(^{329}\) D/Lo/C153(100) & (101), Wright to Londonderry, 22nd July 1843 (copy) and Hinde to Londonderry, n.d. (copy).

\(^{330}\) D/Lo/C153(103), Londonderry to Wright, 22nd July 1843.
what instructions had been given to Londonderry's voters.  

The result - a victory for Bright by 78 votes appeared to have clarified Londonderry's position, and he was roundly condemned. The London papers portrayed him as having "moved heaven and earth to secure Mr. Bright's return". Leading Conservatives were furious with him, Peel himself refusing to communicate with Londonderry on the matter, believing that "towards the close of the contest you exerted your influence for the purpose of effecting the return of Mr. Bright in preference to that of Mr. Purvis". Londonderry's own immediate explanation to Peel of the result did not appear to contradict this interpretation:

Had Mr. Purvis been returned the seat was lost to myself and my family forever. Now I have shown my power and nothing can prevent my regaining it, altho' I admit the present evil.

Psephologists and Bright's biographers have almost without exception accepted this picture - which

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331 Durham Advertiser, 28th July 1843.

332 Bright = 488 votes, Purvis = 410 votes. The Poll at the Election of One Citizen ... City of Durham ... With the Addresses (Durham 1843).

333 Morning Herald, 28th July 1843. See also The Times, 27th July 1843, Morning Chronicle, 27th July 1843.

334 D/Lo/C96(57) & (59), Peel to Londonderry, 28th and 31st July 1843.

even Buddle presented\textsuperscript{336} - of Londonderry's interest being actively operated for Bright.\textsuperscript{337} It is not, however, correct to place all of the blame for Bright's return on Londonderry's shoulders. As in April, Bright's campaign was efficient and keenly-focussed, with Bright, assisted again by Anti-Corn Law League propaganda methods, making a strong appeal to voters, and especially freemen, to act as the defenders of the rights of the poor and the unenfranchised.\textsuperscript{338} "Free Trade was the only watchword", reported Bright, and "the people were convinced".\textsuperscript{339} His campaign was undoubtedly aided by Purvis' incompetence as a speaker.\textsuperscript{340} As also in the previous election, Bright carried the Whigs' support. He also ran a conspicuous "purity of election" campaign that deprived his opponents of the possibility of using some of the market tactics to which Durham voters were accustomed.


\textsuperscript{338} Durham Chronicle, 21st and 28th July 1843; Durham Advertiser, 21st and 28th July, 11th August 1843; The Poll ... with the Addresses.

\textsuperscript{339} Bright to John Taylor Brook, 29th July 1843, Bright Mss., Friends' Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania; Bright to Cobden, 20th July 1843, B. Lib., Add. Mss., 43383, f.135-6.

\textsuperscript{340} Durham Chronicle, 21st and 28th July 1843.
especially in the light of what had happened to Dungannon.\textsuperscript{341}

Bright's supporters therefore felt justified in rejecting Purvis' claim that the election had been his until the Londonderry freemen started polling, contending that only "20 or 30" votes for Bright from Rainton could be ascribed to Londonderry influence.\textsuperscript{342} They denied absolutely that there had been any kind of agreement or understanding entered into with Londonderry. Purvisite rumours of a Lambton/Londonderry agreement were based on aborted discussions between Morton and Buddle, of which Bright had been ignorant, and the suggestion of which Londonderry had "immediately spurned".\textsuperscript{343}

Bright's victory rested on an increased share of the freeman vote, the householder voter remaining constant between April and July (see Table 5.7). Bright had acquired 79 more votes in July than in April, while Purvis fell 133 short of the number that Dungannon had polled.

\textsuperscript{341} Nossiter, Influence, pp120-122.

\textsuperscript{342} Durham Chronicle, 28th July 1843; Durham Advertiser, 28th July 1843; The Leeds Mercury, 29th July 1843 believed that even had all of Londonderry's freemen polled for Purvis "Mr. Bright's majority would still have been 18".

\textsuperscript{343} Bright to Henderson, 10th August and 4th October 1843, Uncat. Bright Mss., D.U.L.; D/Lo/C142(38), Buddle to Londonderry, 16th July and 1st August 1843; Morton to Bright, 15th July 1843, Uncat. Bright Mss., D.U.L.; Durham Chronicle, 8th September 1843.
Longitudinal analysis confirms that there was a body of voters who had switched from Dungannon to Bright, eighty-nine in total. Of these, thirty-two were new voters in April, but nearly half were Trevor plumpers in 1837, adding to the picture of them as confirmed Tory voters. Large demonstrates that Bright polled thirty-five more votes in certain "Londonderry districts" in July than he had in April, although his argument is weakened by the inclusion of Chester-le-Street in his calculations: because of Lambton influence, the same factors cannot be said to have been at work there as may have been in Rainton, Pittington, Chilton Moor and Houghton-le-Spring. Nossiter claims to be able to identify only thirty-three of the Dungannon/Bright converts as Londonderry outvoters: in fact, very nearly 70% of them (forty-seven) were resident in the areas of greatest Londonderry influence (for example, ten in Chilton Moor, nine in Houghton-le-Spring, fifteen in Rainton), and those resident in the City were not necessarily any less "Londonderry" voters.

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Table 5.7: The Voting of Freemen and Householders for Bright, April and July 1843

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>April</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freemen</td>
<td>205 (38.1%)</td>
<td>284 (55.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householders</td>
<td>201 (53.6%)</td>
<td>204 (53.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

than were the outvoters. There were, for example, nine confirmed Tory voters who polled for Bright in July from Gilesgate and Gilesgate Moor, which Londonderry owned. Almost without exception, the eighty-nine were craftsmen or minor retailers, with the trades allied to colliery work well represented - joiners, ropers, tinworkers. Purvis' claim that he would have polled "at least a hundred more" votes were it not for Londonderry, was backed up by the evidence of the hurriedly-published pollbook, which showed that amongst the number who had switched from Dungannon to Bright, there was an undeniable bloc of 45 to 50 Londonderry voters, together with a substantial number of abstainers (161), 67 of whom had been Dungannon voters at the April by-election. 

The question remains, however, as to Londonderry's intentions. Despite contemporary and subsequent assumptions that the voting figures reflected a cynical mobilization of the Wynyard interest against the "set of low attorneys and malcontents" who backed Purvis, there is surviving

345 J.T.W. Bell, Plan of the Hartlepool Coal District in the County of Durham. Including Part of the Wear District in the Same Quarter (Castle Eden 1843); Nossiter, Influence, pp120-122.

346 The Durham Advertiser, 4th August 1843 stated "45 electors of the Marquis of Londonderry have ... voted for a Chartist"; D/Lo/C142(38), Buddle to Londonderry, 25th July, puts the number voting for Bright at around fifty. The pollbook was being advertised for sale ten days after the election.

evidence that clearly shows that up to polling day, Londonderry was adamant that those under his "absolute influence" should not poll for Bright but should "stand aloof", i.e. abstain. As described in instructions to the agents, the aim was to prevent Purvis' return by any means "short of any of Lord L's direct influence voting for Bright, which should compromise his politicks". Whilst those who voted for Purvis would be regarded as enemies, it was equally important that those who were in Londonderry's employ should not be seen to be polling for Bright, although there was more than a little ambiguity in the directive that

There may be a class of persons under no absolute influence of the collieries but independent and only partially connected with them ... these of course might vote if they wished for Bright.\(^{348}\)

That forty-five of those under direct influence did poll for Bright must therefore be explained. Ten years later, Londonderry was vehement in correspondence with Bright that it had been an "accident",\(^{349}\) and indeed a picture does emerge from the events of polling day which suggests that either Londonderry or one of his agents was provoked into countermanding the original instructions to voters. Purvis, through his chief agent, Tiplady, had after a failed last-minute

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\(^{348}\) D/Lo/C153(104), "Memorandum for Mr. Buddle, 23rd July 1843. Copy"; D/Lo/C134(50), "Instructions to Agents, 19th July 1843"; D/Lo/C134(47), Londonderry to J. Ward, 23rd July 1843; D/Lo/C153(110), Londonderry to Wright, 24th July 1843.

\(^{349}\) Londonderry to Bright, 18th June 1853, Add. Deposit (1979), 1193(D), Box 4.
bid to obtain from Londonderry an assurance that his freemen would vote for him,\textsuperscript{350} apparently distributed a letter persuading outvoters that a reconciliation had been effected, and sent carriages to Rainton to collect voters,\textsuperscript{351} and it was in direct retaliation to this tactic that seventy-five Londonderry voters were marshalled in the Rose and Crown Inn in Durham by Hunter, and forty-five of them late in the afternoon led out to poll for Bright.\textsuperscript{352} Debate after the election hinged on whether this was a unilateral action on Hunter's part – his drunken inconsistencies as an agent were well documented\textsuperscript{353} – but the public line taken that "if any of the freemen in [Londonderry's] employment polled for Mr. Bright, they did so at their own option" is betrayed by a note scribbled by Londonderry on polling day:

\begin{quote}
The rascal Tiplady's felons attempt to kidnap our people. Orders sent by me to poll for Bright if one of our men was deceived and taken off.\textsuperscript{354}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{350} D/Lo/C153(108), Tiplady to Londonderry, 25th July 1843.

\textsuperscript{351} Durham Advertiser, 28th July, 4th and 18th August 1843; Durham Chronicle, 28th July; D/Lo/C142(38), Buddle to Londonderry, 25th and 28th July 1843.

\textsuperscript{352} Morning Herald, 28th July 1843; Durham Advertiser, 18th August 1843.

\textsuperscript{353} Lambton Mss., Beckwith to Durham, 9th September 1836; D/Lo/C142(38), Buddle to Londonderry, 9th April and 29th July 1843, and "A True Conservative" to Londonderry, 11th October 1843; Hiskey, "George Hunter", pp53-54; Heesom, "Entrepreneurial Paternalism", p255.

\textsuperscript{354} D/Lo/C153(107), John Hilaly to Londonderry, n.d. (Londonderry note on back).
It was this instruction, sent from Seaham Harbour, that led Hunter to poll the forty-five freemen for Bright, as the agent explained to Londonderry afterwards: Purvis would have won "but for the means which I felt bound to adopt in order to thwart his objects, and this I never would have attempted had I not believed I was doing precisely what your Lordship wished ...".\(^{355}\)

Whether or not Londonderry could maintain his defence of having kept a "strict neutrality",\(^{356}\) outraged Conservatives were not to be placated. Even those who accepted the grounds of his hostility towards Purvis intimated to Londonderry that his justifications for his actions were not adequate:

> there is a strong belief that if you possess the "power" at Durham which you attribute ... to yourself, you could have prevented your people, at least, from voting for Bright ...

\(^{357}\)

Moreover, Londonderry was hampered in his attempts to publicize his view of the rôle he had played by the need to protect himself from accusations of having breached the House of Commons' standing orders which prohibited peers' interference in elections.\(^{358}\)

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\(^{355}\) D/Lo/C149(185), Hunter to Londonderry, 13th August 1843; Morning Post, 29th July 1843.

\(^{356}\) D/Lo/C142(38), Buddle to Londonderry, 2nd and 7th August 1843.

\(^{357}\) D/Lo/C134C(28), Strangford to Londonderry, n.d. (?4th August 1843).

\(^{358}\) D/Lo/C153(114), Wright to Londonderry, 8th August 1843; Heesom, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Influences", pp282-285.
The idiosyncratic nature of the voting of some of the Durham City electorate in July 1843 acts as a clear reminder of the necessity of having a firm foundation of contextual evidence on which to base quantitative behavioural analysis. The latent risks - under particular circumstances - in using party labels as the delimiters for such conceptual notions as partisanship or independence, amidst the confusion of individual election campaigns and the ebbs and flows of influence politics, is well demonstrated by Londonderry's Bright-voting freemen, many of whom had never before cast anything but Tory votes, but whose mobilization and motivation in this contest remained, we can assume, largely constant in relation to previous contests.\footnote{359} The confrontation between loyalty to party principle (which Londonderry, paradoxically after his long-term championing of Conservatism in County Durham, scorned in 1843 as the "phantom of expediency")\footnote{360} and divergent interpretations of what constituted legitimate influence politics, a conflict that was played out among the élites of electoral management in Durham, but about which the voters themselves also expressed strongly-held opinions, generated electoral behaviour

\footnote{359} Despite criticizing Londonderry's "tyranny" over his voters, Bright chose to interpret the votes he got from Londonderry's freemen as the latter having been "allowed to vote" for him, rather than having been coerced into doing so. 3 Hansard cxxviii.221 (14th June 1853).

\footnote{360} See D/Lo/C153(110), Londonderry to Wright, 24th July 1843; D/Lo/C134(9), Londonderry to Hardinge, 8th July 1843, where he contrasts party principle with "the sterling and loyal line of acting and proceeding".
which, it will be argued, appeared more radical than it in fact was. In other words, the short-term factors peculiar to this election can be fitted into a picture of behaviour over time, but only if the context of voting is fully appreciated.

Ironically, despite the national calumination which Londonderry attracted after the election, the immediate determination of the Durham City Conservatives to implement a future policy that Conservatism should "stand preeminent to any individual or family interest" and the destruction of the Conservative Association that he had founded, Londonderry appeared before long to have been vindicated in his assessment that Bright's return was a lesser evil than Purvis' would have been, in terms of the resultant effect on the interest. Seaham was returned for North Durham in 1847; another son, Adolphus Vane, was returned as the official Conservative candidate for Durham City in 1852, although soon afterwards unseated on petition. The Conservatives of Durham, despite the depths of their resentment in 1843, proved incapable of maintaining an electoral independence from Wynyard, primarily, it has been suggested, because there proved to be no alternative source of funding for political battles

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361 Durham Advertiser, 28th July 1843 (Henderson); D/Lo/C153(112), (113) & (118), Wright to Londonderry, 4th and 6th August, 7th September 1843; D/Lo/C134(20) & (30), Johnson to Londonderry, 15th and 26th August 1843; D/Lo/C134(12), Ravensworth to Londonderry, 21st August 1843.
equal to that which Londonderry, despite the intermittently perilous nature of his finances, could provide. With Whig suspicion of Lambton influence also largely subsiding by the late 1840s, a fairly stable core of influence politics was left to coexist with other means of electoral mobilization.\textsuperscript{362} The "legitimate influence of reason and argument"\textsuperscript{363} proved in practice not necessarily exclusive of "that fair and legitimate influence which property ought to give", and even those Conservatives who had been most critical of Londonderry's manner (including his own candidates) could, at least in hindsight, be seen to have been more concerned, provoked by individual instances of Londonderry highhandedness, with redefinitions of legitimacy rather than with subversion of the structure of influence.\textsuperscript{364}

\textsuperscript{362} Heesom, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Influences", pp298-300.

\textsuperscript{363} Durham Advertiser, 1st September 1843.

\textsuperscript{364} See for example, D/Lo/C132, "Extracts from Mr. Maynard's Letters ... 1841", and D/Lo/C134(7), Purvis to Londonderry, 8th July 1843, crediting Londonderry's "position in society and your very great influence in the City of Durham" with a corresponding political obligation from others.
Analysis of electoral behaviour implies the dual focus of the aggregate and the individual. Here, attention will largely be not on the individual voter (or any of the subdivisions of the electorate to which he belonged, in the form of franchise groups, electoral wards, occupational categories etc.), but rather on the interrelationships between the voter and the electoral system within which he operated after 1832; in other words, on the structural characteristics of electoral politics. The structure of the system necessarily determined the ways in which political sentiments could be transmitted, most fundamentally of course by determining who was entitled to participate and who was not, but also - through the double-vote system which prevailed in most constituencies\(^1\) - by defining the nature and the number of the configurations which voting could take, affecting not only the ways in which voters polled, but also their perception of political choices. The decision of how to vote was however

\(^1\) Over three quarters of English constituencies were two-member: N. Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel: A Study in the Technique of Parliamentary Representation 1830-1850 (London 1953), p65; J. Prest, Politics in the Age of Cobden (London 1977), p310.
preceded by another affected by structural as well as environmental factors - whether to vote at all.

Turnout

Turnout levels were high before the Reform Act. Although the absence of systematic voter registration makes the calculation of percentage levels of turnout before 1832 much more problematic (and at the time meant that there existed a "fog" of confusion as to who was qualified and who was not, that must itself have militated against maximum turnouts\(^2\)), several studies have succeeded in demonstrating that levels of participation in the second half of the eighteenth century at times out-matched levels either immediately before Reform or soon after. J.A. Phillips found "exceptionally high" late eighteenth century turnouts in his boroughs; in Maidstone approaching 90%, in Chester seldom under 90% and in Lewes frequently over that figure.\(^3\) O'Gorman has similarly revealed an average borough turnout rate from the mid-eighteenth century to 1831 of around 80%, with turnouts above that figure occurring twice as often as those below.


Turnouts were not uncommon in the range of 90% to 95%, and occasionally registered above 95% (in O'Gorman's sample, in Minehead in 1754 and 1796 and in Dover and Reading in 1826, for example). The consistency with which high turnouts were generated led O'Gorman to conclude that participation at the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth was qualitatively as well as quantitatively different to that earlier, when despite occasional high turnouts, levels generally ranged from 55% to 75%: the difference was attributed to improvements in communication (both in the speed with which information could travel, and the ease with which voters could get to the poll); more effective voter mobilization; and higher levels of community interest and involvement.

The significance of these turnouts, in terms of the degree of political identification - or commitment to participating in the system - they demonstrate, has been challenged. It has been pointed out that whilst individual constituencies can provide a picture of large-scale participation, the norm at general elections up to 1831 remained that the majority of

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5 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, pp183, 186-7; G.Holmes, The Electorate and the National Will in the First Age of Party (Kendal 1976), pp18-23, which points out that communications improvements were especially relevant to county contests. Voters in Rye in 1715 had to take eight days off work to travel to Chichester to poll in their county election.
constituencies would go uncontested, leaving relatively small aggregate numbers of participants nationally. One contest with a high turnout might be the only occasion (or one of very few) on which the electorate had the opportunity to vote during their electoral lifetimes. The natural tendency among historical psephologists to concentrate their attention on those constituencies with fairly frequent contests (because of the desire to have enough data for meaningful longitudinal analysis) may thus have somewhat exaggerated the degree of participation that was actually taking place, and under-stressed the extent of the changes that 1832 brought in terms of actual numbers voting. While it should be borne in mind that there were other means of both acquiring and displaying politicization beyond the act of voting in a parliamentary election, it remains true that, when given the opportunity to cast their votes, pre-1832 electorates proved remarkably keen to do so.

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7 Beales, "Electorate Before and After 1832", p143; Phillips, Electoral Behaviour, pp100-113, gives examples of pre-Reform uncontested elections where prolonged and highly partisan campaigning took place before it became apparent that there was not to be contest, and also highlights the rôle played by municipal politics in electoral politicization. See also Idem., "Municipal Matters to Parliamentary Principles", in Journal of British Studies, 27 (1988), pp327-351, and R.W.Smith, "Political Organization and Canvassing; Yorkshire Elections Before the Reform Bill", in American Historical Review, LXXIV (1969), pp1538-1560.
In this context, turnout figures after 1832 for the four constituencies studied here, although dramatic are not necessarily revolutionary (see Table 6.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Guildford (%)</th>
<th>Leicester (%)</th>
<th>Durham (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td></td>
<td>88.0*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td></td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>83.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>94.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td></td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=figures from O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p184
NC=No Contest at general election

A few points should be made about the way in which these figures have been calculated. Despite the existence after 1832 of electoral registers and official returns of the numbers registered, it remains impossible either to be completely precise as to the ratio between those qualified and those who actually voted, or to be sure that results between constituencies are strictly comparable. The borough turnouts have been worked in up to four ways. Firstly, where pollbooks either number or describe abstainers, the percentage of voters has been worked without recourse to the registers.\(^8\) In some pollbooks, a numerical analysis of voting and non-voting was

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\(^8\) Pollbooks for Leicester 1832, 1837, 1839, for Guildford 1835, for Durham April and July 1843. See Table 1.1. Such pollbooks were very rare before 1832; O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p187.
included for the benefit of the reader, and this provides an additional check of the internal consistency of the pollbook. The size of the registered electorate can also be obtained at times from the parliamentary returns, but the accuracy of the figures cannot be assumed, largely because of their general failure to distinguish the number of those qualified in more than one respect. As has been discussed above (see Chapter 1), those with multiple qualifications could comprise a substantial portion of a constituency's electorate: each voter could, of course, only vote once per election. So, for example, the registered electorate for Guildford in 1835/6 is given as 537, when in fact only 401 individuals stood on the register in that year. In such cases, the number of actual persons registered was worked manually from the register, by eliminating "extra" qualifications, a tiresome task when householders and

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9 Eg. Guildford Pollbook 1835; Durham Pollbooks April and July 1843.

10 P.P. 1833 (189) XXVII ("Electors Registered and Returning Officers' Charges"); P.P. 1836 (199) XLIII ("Return of the Number of Electors Registered at the Last General Election"); P.P. 1837-8 (329) XLIV ("Return of the Number of Electors Registered in Each County, City and Borough").

11 BR/PAR/1/2, Electoral Register 1832-1843 (Guildford Muniment Room); P.P. 1836 (199) XLIII.390.
freemen were listed separately.\textsuperscript{12} In a very few cases, there exists extra contemporary evidence as to the number of those who were prevented from polling by death, illness, absence from the borough or disqualification, which allows - for example, for Leicester in 1832 and 1837, and for Durham for the July 1843 by-election\textsuperscript{13} - for a base-line abstention figure (or alternatively, "real" turnout) that is not elsewhere possible.

Post-1832 turnouts for these three boroughs therefore range from 82\% to 97\%, giving an average of just under 89\%. There is a tendency for by-election turnouts to fall below the general election levels, but there are a number of factors which need to be taken into account for Leicester in 1839 and Durham in April and July 1843 before the discrepancy can be ascribed to any lesser voter interest in by-elections. The eccentric nature of the pollbook for Leicester's 1839

\textsuperscript{12} In only one case, that of the 1839 Leicester by-election, did multiple qualifications feature in a pollbook. Although this was an advantage in identifying those who were registered more than once, it also became clear that the pollbook compiler had missed some individuals and entered them (sometimes twice) as abstainers despite their having polled in one guise. A rough linkage procedure established that some 168 of the 682 abstainers named had in fact voted (more precise linkage was not possible because of the address and occupation variations that were naturally involved). The turnout rate was calculated on that basis, but may well still be an understatement.

\textsuperscript{13} The Poll at the Election of One Citizen ... Durham July 1843 (Durham 1843), p4; Leicestershire Mercury, 26th August 1837.
The electoral history of the Durham abstainers at the second 1843 by-election shows that sixty-seven of those who had voted in April but not in July (two-thirds of the total) were previous Dungannon supporters and may well have been Londonderry voters expressing an active political viewpoint by not voting.\(^{15}\)

These turnouts compare favourably with those found for other boroughs. Where the parliamentary returns give "real" numbers of those registered (with multiple qualifications and deaths taken into consideration) the resultant turnout percentages are correspondingly high (see Table 6.2).\(^{16}\) Average turnout for these boroughs is also just under 90%. Even where uncorrected for multiple entries, turnout figures can be useful. Working the parliamentary returns of those registered and voting in English and Welsh boroughs in 1835 and 1837 gives average turnouts as high as 83.6% and 80.2% respectively,\(^{17}\) even including in the calculation those largest constituencies where it proved impossible for

\(^{14}\) See note 12.

\(^{15}\) See Chapter 5.

\(^{16}\) P.P. 1836 (199) XLIII. 381-406; P.P. 1837-8 (XLIV.581-653. Only those constituencies for which it is explicitly stated that the true number of individuals registered is given have been used.

\(^{17}\) As above. T.J. Nossiter, Influence, Opinion and Political Idioms in Reformed England: Case Studies from the North East (Hassocks 1974), pp215-217, got uncorrected figures of 82.4% and 76.8% for two-member boroughs in his six northern counties.
contemporaries to gauge how many appeared more than once on the register.\textsuperscript{18} There is little evidence from these figures of the "high degree of electoral apathy" (attributed to the depersonalization of political relationships) found in Manchester by Gatrell.\textsuperscript{19} Despite the methodological difficulties, there is a clear picture of a consistently high desire to participate in elections, which could overcome potential obstacles.

\textsuperscript{18} See Chapter 1. Eg. Liverpool, Bristol, and the London constituencies, for all of which the Town Clerks admitted they could not return accurate figures of those registered. The City of London had a register comprising 18,288 entries in 1835, giving a "turnout" of under 59%; the City of Westminster's turnout, if worked from the parliamentary figures, would be under 33%. P.P. 1836 (199) XLIII.395 and 404.

\textsuperscript{19} V.A.C.Gatrell, "Incorporation and the Pursuit of Liberal Hegemony in Manchester 1790-1839", in D.Fraser (ed.), Municipal Reform and the Industrial City (Leicester 1982), pp16-60.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borough</th>
<th>1835 (%)</th>
<th>1837 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedford</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berwick</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolton</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridport</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devizes</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liskeard</td>
<td></td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maidstone</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northampton</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Albans</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrewsbury</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamford</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tewkesbury</td>
<td></td>
<td>91.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td></td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is evidence too of the lengths to which voters would go to ensure their vote was recorded. Torrential rain in Durham on April 4th 1843, for example, could not quench the "great spirit" with which voters came to the poll.\(^{20}\) The freeman who set off from his workplace in Seaham to travel to Durham to vote, travelling for some reason via Stockton, and arriving too late, is not an isolated case of voting enthusiasm.\(^{21}\) In Leicester in 1832, in an incident paraded by the Leicester Chronicle as exemplifying the strength of the people's attachment to their political views and their awareness of their civic duties, a voter named Ireland insisted on being carried, dripping blood, to the polling booth after his thigh was broken in an accident involving the carriage bringing him to vote. As the Chronicle admiringly concluded:

\[
\text{the } \textit{amor patriae} \text{ burst forth even at the risk of life or at least of the chance of permanent lameness }\ldots\]^{22}

Despite having, at least potentially, much greater distances to travel to poll than their borough counterparts, North Durham's electorate achieved very

\(^{20}\) Proceedings and Poll ... April 1843 (Durham 1843), p17.

\(^{21}\) P.P. 1843 (433) vi.201-203 ("Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the Durham Election Petition"). John Grievson did not explain why, despite living in Durham, he had not known about the election before his daughter informed him of it on polling day, or why the Tory agents had not established how he, presumably a Londonderry employee, was going to get to the poll.

\(^{22}\) Leicester Chronicle, 15th December 1832. He voted for the Reform candidates.
similar turnout rates to the boroughs' of 90.0% in 1832 and 82.9% in 1837, which seem to have been at the top end of the range of county turnouts. According to the parliamentary returns, no county contest registered a turnout of 90% in 1835 (although only a quarter fell under 80%), whilst in 1837 nearly 60% of counties going to a poll had turnouts which did not reach 80%. The constituencies studied here, however, suggest that physical distance from the polling booth was not a prima facie factor against the likelihood of individual electors turning up to vote. The turnout of "non-resident" Leicester freemen (who could live up to seven miles from the borough limits) is a good example. In 1837, only thirteen non-residents did not poll - 3% of the total registered - so that abstention among the non-residents was slightly lower even than the impressive rate for the whole electorate at that election (see Table 6.1). In 1839, the proportion of qualified non-residents not voting was again lower than that of resident freemen or (to a much greater extent) that of the householders.

Organization was the key to the mobilizing of electorates to high turnouts, but this was especially true of those who had to travel any distance to poll.

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23 P.P. 1836 (190) XLIII.373-380 ("Return of the Number of Persons Qualified to Vote at Elections for Counties"), P.P. 1837-8 (329) XLIV.554-574.

24 Leicester Pollbook 1837; Leicestershire Mercury, 26th August 1837.

25 Leicester Pollbook 1839.
Candidates - like Liddell in North Durham in 1837\textsuperscript{26} - and their agents fully appreciated that whatever efforts and expense had been invested in registration and canvassing, it was ultimately only the marshalling of the voters at the polling booths that counted.\textsuperscript{27} The provision of transportation for voters by interested parties not only got them to the place of polling, but delivered them in a body which was easily supervised and could be protected from interference, allowing agents quickly to subdivide them into "tallies" and poll them, as well as providing a spectacle which could dent the morale of opponents. Such organizational techniques may account for the high turnouts of Leicester's non-residents. "Sixty or so" outvoters "in the interest of the Earl of Stamford" were delivered together to the poll in 1832;\textsuperscript{28} in 1837, the voters of Newton Linford and Grooby were, according to the Liberals, driven up to vote "like pigs to the market".\textsuperscript{29} In 1832, non-resident voters arrived en masse to vote in carriages from Oadby, Belgrave, Thurcaston, Syston and other villages, accompanied by flag-bearers and bands.\textsuperscript{30} According to James Hudson,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{26} D/Lo/C461(3) & (4), Liddell to Londonderry, 19th and 20th July 1837. See Chapter 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p186; Phillips, Electoral Behaviour, pp86-88.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Leicester Journal, 14th December 1832.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Leicestershire Mercury, 15th July 1837.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} Leicester Chronicle, 15th December 1832.
\end{itemize}
many of the villages which had ten or so voters had a habitual practice of "cooping":

as soon as the canvass commences, two houses are generally opened ... one by each party, and the voters are collected as soon as possible into those houses, where they are generally locked up ... till the polling, and then they are corned pretty well; they are put into pretty good condition, have a good meal given them ... and carriages are sent from Leicester to bring them over to the hustings.31

Londonderry and Lambton voters in Durham were transported to the poll to maximize their electoral impact; Tory county voters from Seaham Harbour were taken to Sunderland to vote, their carriages pulled by horses from Londonderry's collieries.32 Purvis' sending out of carriages to Rainton for the Londonderry voters in 1843 backfired horribly. Their return empty, signalling the failure of the "ruse de guerre", was greeted back in Durham market-place with "shouts of derision from the crowd".33 Sometimes agents were noticeably more keen to see that outvoters came in to vote than to ensure that they got home safely, as the Chester-le-Street voters discovered in 1843: once the poll had been declared, the Liberal agents were nowhere to be found, and the voters were left to walk home.34

31 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.126-127; Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p139; A.T.Patterson, "Electoral Corruption in Early Victorian Leicester", in History, XXXI (1946), pp113-124.

32 D/Lo/C463(3), Maynard to Londonderry, 27th November 1837; D/Lo/C86, Durham to Londonderry, n.d. (1830).

33 Durham Chronicle, 28th July 1843.

34 Durham Advertiser, 14th July 1843.
The full mobilization of resident voters also had organizational as well as political aspects, as William Biggs' success in Leicester in 1837 showed. Ward organizers canvassed voters "again and again and again", and then spent polling day patrolling their streets to capture stray voters and convince them to poll. Liberal employers were urged to give their workmen nomination and polling days off work, and Biggs exhorted committed Liberal voters to

... crowd early to the poll in such numbers as to draw with you the waverers and undecided ...\(^{35}\)

The inference that electors with committed politics would lead the polling was natural. In that, they conformed to the modern-day pattern that "the more strongly attached to a party an elector is, the more likely he is to turn out to vote".\(^{36}\) Leicester also, with the clarity of its party-based definition of politics, clearly linked to nationally identifiable political alignments, fulfilled another of the key criteria encouraging high turnouts.\(^{37}\) Although many short-term factors influenced turnout (as with the near-total poll in Leicester in 1837), they augmented -

\(^{35}\) Leicestershire Mercury, 22nd July 1837.


as well as being largely derived from - the longer-term state of party politics in the constituency. The closer the parties in strength (and so, the greater the uncertainty as to the result), the more intense was the need to ensure that individual voters recognized the importance of polling. The political environment affected the degree of polling organization, and both determined how aware voters were of the significance of voting, as well as how they voted.\textsuperscript{38} In Leicester, the battle for municipal power found partisan expression in parliamentary elections as it did in Town Council elections after 1835, in vestry elections, in elections to the Board of Guardians, even in the elections for Surgeons for the Infirmary.\textsuperscript{39} The Tories in particular felt the effects of this "continual agitation of the passions of the multitude, by means of the almost incessant excitement of Parliamentary, Municipal, and


Perhaps not surprisingly, the Liberals saw it somewhat differently, especially as regarded municipal elections after 1835:

> life is always to be preferred to stagnation, even though its exuberance may not always be profitably bestowed, and it can do no harm to a constituency to rouse itself into a state of fervour, over the exercise of its municipal rights, at least once a year ...

The frequency of contests (in Leicester, four parliamentary elections in seven years, in Durham seven in thirteen years, in Guildford six in eleven years) undoubtedly aided turnout levels by constantly reinforcing voters' self-awareness as political participants, and by permitting political agencies to hone their mobilization techniques.

As has been described for the pre-Reform period, tendency to abstain was biased towards the "top" end of the occupational hierarchy. In all three boroughs, the numbers of Category I ("Gentlemen and Professionals") electors failing to vote is the most striking feature of abstention analysis (see Table

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40 Annual Report of Leicester Conservative Society ... 25th August 1836 (Leicester 1836), p8. Fraser's investigations of the range and intensity of urban electoral activity led one reviewer to conclude that "Ratepayers...must sometimes have been engaged in some election or another all the year round": D.E.D. Beales, "Victorian Politics Observed", in Historical Journal, 21 (1978), pp697-707.


42 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, pp186-187. Concepts of "hierarchy" and "status" are here used only under the terms set out in Chapter 1.
6.3). In Guildford in 1835, nearly half of all non-voters fall into Category I. Ratings assessments and

Table 6.3: Occupational Structure of Abstention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Categories (%)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Leicester 1837</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Abstainers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Durham 1843 (April)</strong></td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N (abstainers) | Guildford 37, Leicester 240, Durham 169 |

franchise information back up the occupational analysis. In Leicester in 1837, of abstainers who can be linked to ratings assessments, 62% are rated for properties worth more than £20, whilst two-thirds of all abstainers are Householders, and only 27% Freemen. "Gentlemen" and "Professionals" are naturally likely to be over-represented among those with more than one qualification (in Leicester, for example, there is a marked pattern of "gentleman" being used for residential property that gave a qualification, and "hosier" or "warehouseman" or other business titles being used for commercial property, which must have made the pollbook compilers' task more

43 See Chapter 1 for discussion of the linkage of rates to pollbooks. The franchise group proportions of the electorate as a whole in Leicester in 1837 were Freemen 47.1%, Householders 36.5%. Leicester Pollbook 1837.
complicated) and it must be borne in mind that this, in Leicester if not in the smaller boroughs, may be influencing the figures. The trend is strong enough, however, and consistent enough between the constituencies, to assume that it represents some conscious political decision-making. James Hudson's determination in 1835, after years of active political service, to have nothing more to do with elections in Leicester, may be one (albeit extreme) example of the unease felt by some of those who had positions of social, and commercial, leadership to protect as to the effects that partisanship was having on social tranquillity. Their independent standing perhaps made the choice not to poll easier for "gentlemen" than for other groups, since they were potentially less vulnerable to external pressure (from party managers or the unenfranchised) or the mercenary motivation that encouraged some voters to the poll booths. There was also a sensitivity to being exposed to the clamour of the mob. As the Tories in Leicester complained in 1832, the reform sentiments of the crowds - most of whose members had no vote - dissuaded some of their most respectable supporters from voting:

The difficulty of persuading the friends of Mr. Leigh, all of whom were gentlemen and men of respectability, to encounter the abuse of the mob, increased the advantage of his opponents.  

44 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.124-138; O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p187.

45 Leicester Journal, 14th December 1832.
This is perhaps understandable, given that the crowds, who were always vocal, and not occasionally violent, numbered anything up to 15,000 strong. The justification of the polling "pens" in 1826, to which the reformers had taken such objection, was that to take votes any other way would "place the weak at the mercy of the strong", and although the Liberals pointed out that increasing the number of polling booths (to fourteen) had lessened the problem since 1832, voting must still have required some courage. In Durham as well, although the size of the crowds was smaller, polling was occasionally accompanied, in the confined space of the market-place, with much jostling and ill-temper. The clamour at polling in 1835 in the market place, during which the polling clerk's table was overturned and the Mayor decided to adjourn the proceedings, has already been mentioned. Under such

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46 Leicestershire Mercury, 15th July 1837.
48 Dul/57/106, 13th January 1835, Minutes of Election (D.C.R.O.); Durham Advertiser, 16th January 1835. On the other hand, the elections of 1837 and 1843 seem to have been conducted quietly, for which the participants were praised, Durham Advertiser, 28th July 1837; Durham Chronicle, 7th April 1843.
circumstances, it was perhaps not surprising that the more sensitive should choose to stay away.\textsuperscript{49}

All these factors may help to explain why Category I electors were relatively reluctant to cast their votes. It is interesting to note that Hudson's claim that "a number of retail shopkeepers" in Leicester dared not poll for risk of alienating either one portion or the other of their customers\textsuperscript{50} is not necessarily reflected in the occupational breakdown of abstention, Category III in Leicester showing no disproportionate propensity to abstain: the figures must, however, cover a range of motivations behind the failure to vote.

"Exclusive dealing" was not the only leverage that the unenfranchised had over the enfranchised. There was also the less direct but still potent emotional appeal to voters to regard their qualification as

\begin{quote}
a sacred trust to be exercised by you, not only for your own benefit, but for that of millions of your less fortunate countrymen ...
\end{quote}\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{49} Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, pp137-153, describes the extent of electoral violence remaining after 1832 and concludes "It was not uncommon ... for the decent and the timid to look forward with dread rather than interest to a parliamentary election" (p152).

\textsuperscript{50} P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.131.

\textsuperscript{51} G.3246 (handbill), n.d. (1835) (G.M.R.).
Biggs' desire in Leicester to stress the legitimacy of parliamentary electoral involvement (and its effectiveness in comparison with mass meetings, which by the mid-1830s were likely to encourage public criticism of the Liberal élite in Leicester) led him to put particular emphasis on the moral obligations of the franchise:

The election of Members of Parliament is one of the highest duties we are called upon to exercise ... This is a proud distinction for an elector, if he understands his position - to be a member of the government of the first country of the world. 52

Such language encouraged electors to prize their right to vote, and to maximize its potential by voting whenever possible. To some extent, this factor operated separately to the party battle, but it could be co-opted for party or "class" purposes (or indeed, for religious ones). John Bright, in the two 1843 by-elections in Durham, frequently encouraged the unenfranchised to solicit the votes of their "more favoured brethren", and especially of the freemen as fellow members of the working classes. Non-voters, he argued, should "talk reason with freemen, and ask them

53 See Chapter 8.
to vote for you who have no votes". In Leicester, William Biggs, too, suggested a highly personal (not to say intimidating) role for non-electors in making sure that as many Liberal voters as possible polled:

Let any man who is not otherwise employed, lay himself alongside of an elector, and take him to the poll.

Turnover

The electorate that turned out at any given election was significantly different to either that of the previous contest or that of the succeeding one, in personnel terms. Nominal linkage allows for the tracking of individuals into and out of the electorate, and reveals that, even given the relatively short inter-election periods of the 1830s, the rate of turnover greatly affected the composition of the electorate from one election to the next. After the personnel changes of 1832 - due to both franchise and boundary changes - new participants continued to come

54 Durham Chronicle, 21st and 28th August 1843. Bright drew the line at exclusive dealing, although some of his supporters advocated it: Durham Advertiser, 11th and 18th August 1843. See T.J. Hoppen, Elections, Politics and Society in Ireland, 1832-1885 (Oxford 1984), pp71-72, for the influence on turnout levels in Irish elections of activity by those who had no vote.

on to the electoral registers and to appear in the pollbooks in large numbers. In all three of the boroughs studied here, the numerical impact at each election of "new" voters (who could emerge as the result of either a newly-acquired qualification or a new desire to vote) was considerable (see Table 6.4). The figures are naturally affected by the length of time between elections, and the associated factor of uncontested elections. There were, for example, 69 months between the 1837 election and the April 1843 by-election in Durham, and only another three months before the second by-election. More important, perhaps, was the number of registrations - which constituted the only opportunities for formal recruitment to the electorate - which took place between a pair of elections. Between the 1832 general

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Guildford (%)</th>
<th>Leicester (%)</th>
<th>Durham (%)</th>
<th>N. Durham (%)</th>
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<td>52.1</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>42.1</td>
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<td>1835</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>NC</td>
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<td>1841</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
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<td>1843a</td>
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<td></td>
<td>32.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1843b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.6</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NC=No contest, at general election

election and that of 1835, and between 1835 and 1837, there were two registrations, and the rate of admissions across the boroughs over these four registrations would appear to have been fairly constant, in numbers as well as in ratio to the rest of
the electorate. At elections in Leicester and Guildford after 1832, around a quarter of the electorate would be voting for the first time; in Guildford in 1841, over a third of the electorate which replaced two Conservative M.P.s with two Free Traders had not voted before. These figures are very similar to results obtained for other constituencies, although they do not immediately reflect the peaks of recruitment linked to registration activity by local parties that have been discerned elsewhere. In Guildford, after the 1832 election, recruitment of voters occurs at the steady rate of 3 to 4 voters per month of interval between elections; in Leicester the rate is 20-25 voters per intervening month; in Durham, a very consistent 4 to 4.5 voters per month (with the exception of the second 1843 by-election, which appears to have drawn previously unpolled but registered men out to vote in greater numbers than usual - bearing in mind that there was no registration between the two by-elections).

56 See Chapter 3.


58 The figures, worked from the linked pollbooks, are: Guildford 1832/5, 3.48; 1835/7, 2.78; 1837/41, 3.02. Leicester 1832/5, 26.08; 1835/7, 25.17; 1837/9, 19.75. Durham 1832/5, 4.6; 1835/7, 4.23; 1837-April 1843, 4.29; April-July 1843, 13.67.
The proportion of inexperienced voters at these post-Reform elections tends to be noticeably smaller than that described for some constituencies before 1832, most probably because of the longer periods between contests and the higher incidence of uncontested elections, but the contrast is not extreme. O'Gorman found that around one fifth to one third of pre-Reform electorates would be "new" voters, whilst Phillips notes the high percentage of experienced voters at late eighteenth century elections in the boroughs he has studied, compared to some other pre-Reform constituencies with similar time intervals between elections. 59

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Guildford (%)</th>
<th>Leicester (%)</th>
<th>Durham (%)</th>
<th>N. Durham (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>37.4*</td>
<td>46.2</td>
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<td>1835</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>NC</td>
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<td>1841</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>NC</td>
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<td>1843b</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.8</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NC=No contest at general election
*=Resident voters only

The entry of new voters into the electorate has to be examined in relation to a parallel loss of experienced voters at each contest. Voters might not

return to poll for a number of reasons, including, of course, death and disqualification.\textsuperscript{60} A sizeable portion of those voting at every election did not return at a subsequent contest (see Table 6.5).

The higher non-return rates for Leicester and Durham in 1832 represent the loss, after boundary changes, of large numbers of pre-Reform voters and especially of out-voters (which Guildford did not have), and, in Leicester's case, the long interval since the last election (that of 1826). With the exception of 1832, there is a comparable rate of voter-loss between the three boroughs, of around one in five to one in seven voters between those elections which took place within a couple of years of each other. Where the interval was greater, decay was naturally greater, so that, for example, a third of Guildford's voters in 1837 failed to reappear among the 1841 electorate. Figure 6.1 charts the decay of one cohort,\textsuperscript{61} that of 1832 in each of the borough constituencies, over its first eleven years. As has been found elsewhere, the pattern was for the

\textsuperscript{60} Phillips, Electoral Behaviour, pp90-92, has a calculation for the unreformed period of the adjustment to consistent participation rates necessary to take into account the "natural shrinkage" of the electorate due to mortality, so that return rates are representative of the real size of the electorate.

\textsuperscript{61} A cohort comprises those voters who appear for the first time in a given election. The 1832 cohort thus theoretically contains nobody who participated in the unreformed system. In practice, this may be incorrect in some cases, since votes before 1830 in Guildford and Durham, and before 1826 in Leicester, are not built into the linked files.
Figure 6.1: Decay of 1832 Cohorts, Boroughs

Source: Linked Pollbooks
membership of a cohort to decline rapidly, to less than 50% of its original size within twelve years. In Leicester, only 61.3% of the 1832 cohort voted at the 1839 by-election; in Guildford, only 47.5% appeared in 1841; in Durham, very nearly half were not evident in the April 1843 pollbook. The decay of the 1832 cohort, however, perhaps because of the circumstances under which it had been recruited, was slightly slower than that exhibited by the cohorts of following elections. The new voters at Guildford's election in 1837 had already declined to 47.6% of their original numbers by 1841, and were proportionately less likely to have voted then than those who had first voted in 1832. The same picture is apparent in Leicester, where the 1835 and 1837 cohorts had both lost well over 30% of their membership by the 1839 by-election, and were therefore only fractionally better-represented than the 1832 cohort, and in Durham, where the 1837 cohort was actually smaller, relative to its original size, in April 1843 than either the 1832 or 1835 cohorts.

Part of the explanation for this lies in the general pattern, shared by the three borough constituencies, and by others which have been analysed, for cohort participation to register its most extreme decline at the first election after the original vote (as long as another contest was not immediate), and then to decline more slowly (if elections occurred at

fairly regular intervals) afterwards. In other words, a large percentage of each cohort - between a quarter and a third - did not vote more than once, but those who did return to poll a second time were more likely to remain to vote again.

This pattern can also be viewed across the electorate (see Figure 6.2). Analysis of all those voters who participated at the first four post-Reform elections in each of the borough constituencies shows that voters were most likely to have polled on only one of the four possible opportunities. This does not take into account the date at which individual voters began their electoral careers, so that the results are censored both to right and left. Those voters who polled only once, for example, may have been finishing a long succession of votes in 1832, or beginning a long run in 1841. A single appearance is therefore not necessarily an isolated one, but in this context it is pertinent that the incidence of multiple appearances is so strong, and especially that the percentage of those who polled at all four opportunities is so high; 21.7% in Guildford, 28.5% in Durham, 31% in Leicester. The persistence of voting experience that this represents,  

63 Mitchell and Cornford, "Political Demography of Cambridge", p266.  
64 The John Grievson who gave evidence to the 1843 Durham Election Petition Select Committee, for example, said he had voted at every election since 1802, and the possibility of long electoral careers outside the chronological limits in effect here must not be overlooked: P.P.1843 (433) VI.203.
Figure 6.2: Voting Experience, First Four Post-Reform Elections

Source: Linked Pollbooks
All-1832, 1835 & 1837, plus Guildford
1841, Leicester 1839, Durham April 1843
accumulated over a very short period of time (in electoral terms), is striking.\textsuperscript{65}

Whether or not consistent participation can be related to the ways in which voters polled, and the significance of high levels of turnover - new voters entering the electorate, experienced voters leaving - to party performance, and consequently to party activity, requires a definition of the forms that votes could take, and their meaning.

\textbf{The double-vote system}

Inferring "partisan identification" purely from the behavioural data contained in pollbooks, in the absence of any systematic attitudinal information, is a dangerous practice. As Phillips has argued, the best answer to this problem is to concentrate attention on the search for measurable partisan behaviour, which he defines as "quite simply, politically coherent behaviour".\textsuperscript{66} In essence, given the double-vote system, political coherence means supporting the representatives of one political party, either by


\textsuperscript{66} Phillips, Electoral Behaviour, pp212-213.
giving them both votes or by "plumping" (casting only one vote) where that was necessary, most commonly because there was only one candidate from that party standing in a three-cornered contest. "Unnecessary" plumping - voting for only one candidate although there was a second candidate for the same party standing - was not a fully partisan choice. Although it might well be predicated on party allegiance, it implied the conscious rejection (since it was the norm to cast both votes) of one of the party's candidates, and is therefore here treated as a failure to demonstrate full partisan behaviour. 67

"Split" voting, the dividing of the two votes between candidates of two parties, is clearly non-partisan behaviour, and this feature of the double-vote system has been described as a major inhibitor of moves to mobilize the electorate fully within a party system.

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after 1832. It has been suggested that the splitting could stem from there being different motivations behind the giving of each of the votes. There might be competing influences, for example, which the voter could assuage by evenly distributing his votes. Perhaps more likely, especially in the boroughs, was that it allowed the voter to "give one vote for principle and another for interest". It has already been noted that concepts of "legitimate" influence prescribed that only one vote should be sought from the elector. On the other hand, "a few" voters, according to an experienced commentator in 1868, "try to get all they can from both parties". In short, however, to cast a split vote was to "fail the party test".


71 Cox and Grady, "New Law and Practice", p.lx.

72 Phillips and Wetherell, "Great Reform Bill", p635.
Nossiter has calculated average split-voting levels in English boroughs to have been over 25% in 1832, 18% in 1835, 15.1% in 1837, and 8.6% in 1841. Elsewhere, figures adjusted to cover all constituencies - counties as well as boroughs - give 15.6%, 18.8%, 10.6% and 7.3% respectively for the first four post-Reform general elections. Aggregated figures, however, do not reflect the range of experiences of split-voting between constituencies after 1832. Studies of individual boroughs have thrown up highly divergent pictures. Splitters outnumbered party voters, for example, in Bradford in the 1860s; in Sunderland, there was only one occasion out of six elections between 1847 and 1865 when less than a third of voters split across party lines, and three times when half or more did so. On the other hand, rates of splitting could be consistently low, especially in large boroughs. In Leeds between 1832 and 1841, cross party voting only once exceeded 5% and was twice under


76 T.J.Nossiter, "Dock Politics and Unholy Alliances 1832-1852", in H.Bowling (ed.), Some Chapters on the History of Sunderland (Sunderland 1869), p87. For George Hudson's part in the promotion of "interest" as opposed to "partisan" voting in Sunderland, see A.J.Heesom, "Parliamentary Politics 1830 to the 1860s", in Sunderland: River, Town and People (Sunderland 1988).
3%; in Liverpool it amounted to less than 2% in both the 1837 and 1841 elections.\(^77\) Variations in split-voting could be as great within constituencies as they were between them: Shrewsbury, for example, registered a rate of 31.5% in 1832, and one of 2.9% in 1841.\(^78\)

Much of the variation in split-voting levels is attributable to structural factors. Voters were more likely to split in three-way contests - in other words, where one party did not field a candidate for each seat - because of their reluctance (whether for financial, social, or electoral reasons) to "waste" a vote. Three-way contests, which were more normal than four-way ones,\(^79\) were therefore more demanding on the partisan voter. For those voters whose party had only one candidate standing against two opponents, the casting (or not) of the second vote was problematic, and required, if the single candidate's chances of success were to be maximized, a degree of sophisticated tactical thinking. The strategic use of the second vote for the less politically offensive of the other candidates (as a means of ensuring the defeat of a more extreme opponent) was possible, and such tactical splitting was considered by voters and agents an


\(^78\) Phillips and Wetherell, "Great Reform Bill", p630.

important weapon in double-member seats. Joseph Parkes declared himself suspicious of the effect that any introduction of the Ballot would have on three-way contests, believing it would deprive voters of their "constitutional and proper" right to alter their voting intentions according to the state of polling.\textsuperscript{80}

However, it needed careful consideration, since any support for an enemy was potentially dangerous. One historian has labelled tactical split-voting "a double-edged sword", since the utility of such a deployment of the second vote was balanced on finely-drawn calculations, within which political preferences played only a partial rôle, and some doubt has been cast on the ability of early nineteenth century voters, or indeed the political agencies instructing them, to appreciate the mathematical implications involved.\textsuperscript{81}

In this context, the degree of "necessary" plumping displayed is a significant measure of fairly sophisticated partisanship, since the deliberate non-use of a vote constituted "counterintuitive

\textsuperscript{80} P.P. 1835 (547), VIII.404. For this reason, Parkes thought, if the Ballot were introduced, it would be fairest to continue to "declare the poll periodically" in double-member seats.

behaviour" that implied the recognition of the supreme importance of party-based choices.

Trends in partisan voting up to 1832 suggest that "politically coherent behaviour" was prevalent before the Reform Act. Recent descriptions of the "unreformed" political system have highlighted its participatory nature, and its familiarity with partisan behaviour and party issues, as evidenced in voting at individual elections. Moreover, party behaviour was not confined to the decades immediately preceding Reform. The "rage of party" at the beginning of the eighteenth century generated some remarkably high levels of partisan voting, which in a number of constituencies persisted to the mid-century and later. Although some at least of these results may be due to irresistible forces of corruption or coercion, the widespread impact of partisan voting through constituencies of a variety of sizes and types is

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82 Phillips and Wetherell, "Great Reform Bill", p627.


84 D.C.Moore, for example, argues that lack of split voting at pre-Reform contests shows the extent to which "influence" could enforce voting patterns: "The Other Face of Reform", in Victorian Studies, V (1961), pp7-34.
convincing evidence of political sophistication.\textsuperscript{85} Plumping in four-way contests seems to have been "very rare indeed" by 1831; in three-way contests, there is some evidence (although it is not universal) that "necessary" plumping was increasing.\textsuperscript{86} Split voting levels in Phillips' boroughs of Norwich, Maidstone, Lewes and Northampton fluctuated over time, influenced by competing local and national political pressures, but at times were very low. Norwich, for example, experienced an almost complete absence of splitting in 1784 and 1802.\textsuperscript{87} Similarly low split voting rates have been discovered elsewhere. At Great Yarmouth in 1818, 1820 and 1830, split voting was almost unknown.\textsuperscript{88} Three-cornered contests, however, did register significantly higher degrees of split voting than four-way ones, at times consistently over 30\%, and the


\textsuperscript{87} Phillips, Electoral Behaviour, pp214-217.

\textsuperscript{88} O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p371.
evidence for any general decline in cross-party voting is unclear. 89

The danger of comparing aggregate voting behaviour across time and constituencies is that the rôle of circumstances peculiar to individual contests will not be recognized. This problem for the pre-Reform period - when local issues and voting contexts were likely to be even more influential on behaviour than after 1832 - has been fully acknowledged. 90 The candidate structure of each election, the interplay of national and local issues, influence and "party", the nature of the constituency itself, all provide a unique interpretative framework for voting behaviour, the framework within which political coherence must be judged.

This is well demonstrated by the figures for split-voting and plumping in the four constituencies covered by this study (see Tables 6.6 to 6.9). Split-voting rates vary enormously between the three boroughs, but the underlying determinants are frequently election-specific, and suggest that direct comparisons from these summary figures need to be qualified with contextual information.

89 Ibid., pp372-374 and Phillips, Electoral Behaviour, p324. There are, however, examples given of high percentages of party voting in three way contests pre-1832, especially where religion was a factor, or where a constituency was accustomed to four-way contests.

The extremely low level of split-voting in Leicester is striking. In 1826, in a four-way contest fought under highly partisan conditions, only 220 out of 4,774 voters split across party lines; in 1837, not a single voter out of 3,270 split (indeed, there was complete partisanship, taking the one voter who plumped as the exception that proves the rule) (see Figure 6.3 and Table 4.3). Voting of this sort says much about the ability of the electorate to perceive the party framework, and the local as well as national context of their voting, and that of both parties to mobilize that perception. Although the Liberals were in the ascendant after the capture of municipal power in 1835, and it was Biggs' rallying calls to Liberal voters in 1837 that dominated the campaigning, it is clear that it was not only Liberals who responded to the need to "act with a party": the Conservative vote was as monolithically partisan as was that of their opponents.

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Table 6.6 : Split-Voting Rates, 1826-1841

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Guildford (%)</th>
<th>Leicester (%)</th>
<th>Durham (%)</th>
<th>N. Durham (%)</th>
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</tr>
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<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>0.7*</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>0.0*</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>9.1*</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NC=No contest at general election
*=Four-way contests

91 See Chapter 2.
92 Leicestershire Mercury, 1st July 1837. See Chapter 4.
similarly focussed in intent by the ferocity of the party battle in the town, despite the fact that they now appeared to be losing it. Indeed, Tory voters demonstrated their disinclination to vote across party lines, in spite of structural inequalities which might have encouraged it. At the only three-way election in Leicester in this period, that of 1832, there were only 176 split votes (out of 2,776) compared to 1,087 plumps for Leigh, the solitary Tory candidate. This "necessary" plumping constituted 98% of all the plumping at this contest (see Table 6.8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Guildford (%)</th>
<th>Leicester (%)</th>
<th>Durham (%)</th>
<th>N. Durham (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>4.6*</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>8.0*</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.0*</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>0.0*</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>3.2*</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NC=No contest at general election
*=Four-way contests

Leicester from 1826 to 1837 presents a view of a constituency where non-partisan voting was hardly an option - as is supported by evidence of voting behaviour at the first municipal elections. Despite the multiple-vote system of municipal voting, which theoretically at least greatly expanded the range of voting combinations, Phillips, "Municipal Matters", pp336-337, gives evidence for partisan voting in municipal elections in Maidstone.

impressively low. At the first elections to the Town Council in December 1835, only 7% of burgesses who participated split their votes between Liberal and Conservative candidates, a very comparable level of partisanship to that on view at the parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{94}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Guildford (%)</th>
<th>Leicester (%)</th>
<th>Durham (%)</th>
<th>N. Durham (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>00.0*</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>00.0*</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>00.0*</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>00.0*</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>95.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>00.0*</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NC=No contest at general election
*=Four-way contests

In contrast, non-partisan behaviour in Durham appears to have risen steadily over the first three elections after Reform.\textsuperscript{95} Splitting doubled in size from 13% to over 26% between the elections of 1832 and 1837, with a parallel growth in plumping from 39.6% to very nearly 60% in 1837 (see Tables 6.6 and 6.7). Perhaps most significant as a measure of the destabilizing of politically coherent behaviour (given

\textsuperscript{94} Worked from Figures in G.R.Searson, A Quarter of a Century's Liberalism in Leicester (Leicester 1850), p54 and Idem., Leicester Municipal, Borough and County Pollbook, pp19-20.

\textsuperscript{95} Splitting in 1830 was largely not voter-led, but determined by the operation of the Lambton/Londonderry anti-Chaytor coalition. See Chapter 2.
that these were all three-cornered contests), is the falling ratio of "necessary" to "unnecessary" plumping (see Table 6.8).\textsuperscript{96} Whereas in 1832 over 93% of all plumping was accounted for by "necessary" plumping for Trevor, as the only Conservative candidate against two Reformers, in 1837 Trevor plumpers made up under half of all plumpers, the rest (265 voters in total) being voters choosing to poll one vote either for Harland, the Whig, or Granger, the Radical. The significance of the deterioration between 1835 and 1837 is increased by the knowledge that it cannot be blamed on changes of party personnel, the same three candidates standing in 1837 as contested the 1835 election.\textsuperscript{97}

Trevor and the Conservatives early recognized the dangers of the three-way structure of an election to the outnumbered candidate. From 1831, Trevor urged on his supporters the necessity of not using their second vote:

\begin{quote}
Let every man who votes for me, on an occasion as important as this, be a PLUMPER. Say to those who ask you to split, we must first see our own candidate safe.\textsuperscript{98}
\end{quote}

In 1832, faced with a semi-avowed reformist coalition, the Conservatives were very clear that Tory voters should plump. Trevor laid out the mathematics for them:

\begin{quote}

\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{96} For national levels of non-partisan plumping over these elections, see Cox, "Development of a Party-Orientated Electorate", pp201-203.

\textsuperscript{97} See Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{98} Durham Advertiser, 6th May 1831.
I believe you all know that one and one make two ... 

Trevor's defeat on that occasion was subsequently blamed on "reds" ("injudicious friends") splitting, especially on Harland. Although Trevor had received a substantial body of plumpers (283), the seventy Trevor/Harland splits, together with thirty Trevor/Chaytor ones, had swung the balance against him, although (as has been discussed above) there is somewhat better evidence that the Trevor/Harland splitters in 1832 were cautious Whigs rather than moderate or tactically-inclined Tories.

Two years later, with the collapse of Whig confidence in Lord Durham's Radical vision, and the growing dissatisfaction in particular of the Bailey Whigs, Whig/Tory splits assumed an entirely new significance, as the Radicals realized. Whilst the Bailey Whigs mostly plumped for Harland, others among Harland's supporters joined with Conservatives to poll tactical votes whose primary aim was to ensure that Granger, as Lord Durham's candidate, was not returned. Longitudinal patterns show that such cross-party voters were more liable to have been fully partisan Tories or splitters in previous elections, but previously straight Liberal double-voters were represented. This success, however, did not change the attitude of

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99 Durham Advertiser, 14th December 1832.
100 See Chapter 5.
101 Durham Chronicle, 23rd January 1835.
local Conservatives to tactical splitting, in public at least. In 1837, despite the all-out warfare by then raging between Harlandites and Grangerites, Tory voters were still being instructed to plump:

We have no fear of Mr. Trevor's success, unless it be from a mistaken notion of his very superior strength inducing one elector to split upon Mr. Harland and another upon Mr. Granger, whilst the blues divide their votes between the latter gentlemen.\(^{102}\)

It was especially important - for reasons of principle, rather than party tactics - that Conservative voters should not split upon Harland because of his support for freeman disfranchisement: the Advertiser told its readers that "the individual who splits upon Mr. Harland is no Conservative".\(^{103}\) That the plumping level was so high in 1837 can be attributed to the fact that both of the other candidates also actively canvassed for plumps.\(^{104}\) In the light of the acrimony between Whigs and Radicals, the Conservatives afterwards claimed that "the splits between Mr. Trevor and either Mr. Harland or Mr. Granger must have been derived from the friends of Mr. Trevor alone ...".\(^{105}\) Grangerite accusations that the Conservative agents had, once they had seen which way polling was going, manufactured splits for Harland from Tory voters so as to make sure

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102 Durham Advertiser, 7th July 1837.

103 Durham Advertiser, 7th and 14th July 1837. See Chapter 5.

104 Durham Advertiser, 28th July 1837; Durham Chronicle, 11th August 1837; Proceedings and Poll ... 1837 (Durham 1837), pp27-32.

105 Durham Advertiser, 25th August 1837.
that Granger came at the bottom of the poll, may account partially for what splitting there was (Table 6.6).  

In comparison with the borough, North Durham had relatively low rates both of splitting and "unnecessary" plumping (Tables 6.6 and 6.8) although levels did vary between polling districts, for example in 1832 because of the mixed response among Liberals to Sir Hedworth Williamson (see Table 6.9). Tory complaints in 1837 that the Liberal "coalition" was canvassing only for double Lambton/Chaytor votes would seem to have been justified. Certainly, Liddell's attempts to persuade Lambton voters to poll plumps were unsuccessful. North Durham, therefore, has a stable partisan voting rate of around 80% (77.5% in 1832; 84% in 1837, see Figure 6.3), but one which, unlike those for the boroughs, can be spatially related (at least partially) to the workings of "influence". As discussed in Chapter 5 above, non-urban partisan voting was strongest in those areas where known influences were at work, although it is also true that influence could manifest itself in those areas either in tactical splitting or in the sort of cross-pressuring that led to splitting (it is impossible to know which motivated

106 Durham Chronicle, 11th August 1837.
107 Proceedings and Poll ... North Durham, 1837 (Durham 1837), pp94, 103; Durham Advertiser, 11th August 1837.
108 See Chapter 5; Proceedings and Poll ... North Durham, 1837, p11.
Table 6.9: Split-Voting, by Polling Districts, North Durham 1832 and 1837

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1832 (%)</th>
<th>1837 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whickham</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chester-le-Street</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Shields</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanchester</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

individual voters). Splitting Lambton/Braddyll in 1832, for example, was proportionately as high in the "Londonderry villages" of Pittington, Rainton and Hetton-le-Hole as it was in the town of Sunderland, where the anti-Williamson vote was more germane. In both, it constituted a protest vote, but it may be assumed that in the former case it was likely to be Braddyll voters splitting on Lambton, and in the latter the other way around. In Houghton-le-Spring, where the Londonderry and Lambton influences territorially overlapped,\(^{109}\) splitting for Lambton/Liddell in 1837 was proportionately double the size it was in the rest of the division (17.9% compared to 9.6%). Cross-pressuring is impossible to prove, let alone quantify, but it is not enough, especially in the light of all the contemporary discussion in North Durham of what constituted the bounds of "legitimate" influence, to assume that electoral influence, where it existed, necessarily directed the giving of both votes without

\(^{109}\) Londonderry Mss., D/Lo/C142(3), Buddle to Londonderry, 10th October 1821; D.Large, "The Election of John Bright as M.P. for Durham City in 1843", in Durham University Journal, XLVII (1954-5), pp17-23.
the involvement of other considerations.\textsuperscript{110} Influence was simply not so complete.

The partisanship of Guildford's voters is the most complex to map, and the most dependent on contextual explanation. In every election from 1830 to 1837, the magnitude of split-voting can be ascribed to the ideologically-flexible, anti-"party" stance adopted by Charles Baring Wall. The attraction of the Wall/Mangles moderate combination to voters was maintained through a series of three-way contests until 1837, when Wall acquired a Conservative running-mate. Tory "necessary" plumping was infrequent whilst there was confidence in Mangles' moderation. In 1832, only just over 10\% of all vote combinations were Wall plumps, despite his being the "third" candidate; in 1835, with Wall again standing against two Liberal opponents, Tory plumps stood at only just over 7\%, whilst the cross-party Wall/Mangles combination, apparently condoned by both candidates, accounted for over half of all vote combinations (Tables 6.6 and 6.7).\textsuperscript{111} The pattern of non-"party" voting was broken in 1837 with Conservative disillusion with Mangles' parliamentary record since 1835 and their decision to run an ultra-Tory, Scarlett. Liberal voters proved to


\textsuperscript{111} See Chapter 3. For Mangles' soliciting of moderate Tory support, see G.28a (petition), 10th April 1835 (G.M.R.).
have a greater inclination for "necessary" plumping in 1837 than had the Conservatives previously. "Necessary" plumps for Mangles accounted for over 93% of all of the plumping that occurred (Table 6.8), in a more stark partisan contrast to the straight party voting (Wall/Scarlett) of the Conservatives than had hitherto been experienced in the constituency. Ironically, this apparent transformation to "partisan" voting was emphasized in 1841 despite the fact that Wall had by then switched to the Liberals. In the first four-cornered election for ten years, there was 87.8% straight party voting (see Figure 6.3).

It should be asked, however, whether the pre-1837 voting patterns in Guildford, or indeed the voting in 1835 and 1837 in Durham, really constituted non-partisan behaviour. Although in strict party-label terms the inability of Whig and Radical voters to operate together in Durham and the preference of moderate opinion for expressions of political consensus in Guildford are "irrational", the contexts within which both forms of behaviour took place argue strongly that there was both coherence and anti-"influence" considerations at work. Phillips accepts that defining partisan behaviour as pure party support may be "unduly inclusive".112 It is true that in Guildford, voters were actively choosing, whilst they had M.P.s whose political behaviour they trusted, not to behave in a

party-based fashion at the polling booths. However, Mangles and Wall were, for a time, the joint representatives of a real body of political inclination which did not conform to the extreme polarization of political opinion that some other constituencies, like Leicester, were experiencing. Once one or other section of this body of opinion had its political sensibilities offended, as happened to the Conservatives when Mangles revealed his unqualified support for Liberal religious reforms after 1835, voting behaviour immediately adapted to meet the changed situation. In other words, when the circumstances of an election were such as to encourage what has here been defined as "partisanship", as in 1841 with a four-way election with ideologically-homogeneous pairs of candidates, the electorate responded in an appropriately "partisan" way.

In Durham, the restraining force on "party" voting might well be defined as too much rather than too little partisanship. It should be pointed out, that if "partisan" voting was taken (as it is elsewhere) to include "unnecessary" plumping, the levels of partisanship at the 1835 and 1837 elections would appear differently to those displayed in Figure 6.3: 82.0% and 73.5% respectively, compared to 72.6%

113 Nossiter, Influence, pp179-180, and "Aspects of Electoral Behaviour", pp165-166, in particular notes the importance of "distinct political positions and attitudes which, though quite widespread among the electorate, did not fit the conventional party format".
and 42.5%. This would, however, act to mask the impact of the forthright mutual hostility behind the Whig and Radical plumping in those elections, and especially in 1837. Although the situation was founded on local antagonisms (Whig resentment of Lord Durham's appeal to the working-classes and what they perceived as his non-attendance to their opinions, followed by Radical indignation that the Whigs could contemplate the destruction of the Reform consensus), there was, as in Guildford, a real body of moderate opinion that required expression, but one which, unlike Guildford's, was unable to express itself appropriately given the candidate profile of the post-Reform elections and the involvement in Durham elections of local influence-wielders.

The overall picture of partisan voting which appears from these four constituencies is therefore - with the exception of Leicester, which acts as the politicization yardstick against which the others are measured - doubly muddled, by variations in election structure and by specific local context. If the impacts of both are isolated, underlying similarities in voting behaviour can be hypothesized. When the right conditions for partisan voting were created, electorates responded to them, except in Leicester, where voters made uniformly partisan choices even in structurally unconducive situations. Despite the symptoms of grave disunion in Durham in 1835 and 1837, which the double-vote system acted to encourage and
emphasize, Whigs and Radicals were again visibly acting in concert at the two 1843 by-elections, when there was only one anti-Conservative vote to be given.\textsuperscript{114} Whilst maintaining the idioms of independent individual politics, and largely in the absence of organized party activity (at least, compared to the other boroughs), Guildford's electorate in 1837 and to an even greater extent in 1841, displayed a willingness to poll in party formation.

Perhaps more telling, however, will be examination of behaviour over time, which has been termed "the real test of partisanship".\textsuperscript{115} The consistency of allegiances may reveal more about their meaning to the individuals involved, especially because of the discipline, multiplied with a succession of votes, which the double-vote system required of the voter. Where partisanship might be inferred from a single, static vote, the likelihood of its being followed by similar voting, or of being diffused by splitting or "unnecessary" plumping, or contradicted by full support for the other party, gives insight into the real weight of partisanship as a decision-making criterion.\textsuperscript{116} Longitudinal analysis of behavioural persistence thus requires that the individual becomes the prime focus of attention.

\textsuperscript{114} See Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{115} Phillips, Electoral Behaviour, p227.

\textsuperscript{116} Phillips and Wetherell, "Great Reform Bill", pp628-646.
Both long-term and short-term factors militated against voting consistency. The number of choices facing a voter at one election - to plump, split or give a straight party vote - were met again at subsequent contests under different conditions; different candidates, local issues, national issues, and influence pressures. Straight party votes could become splits, or plumps, or vice versa. The aim of the following examination is to ascertain: whether length of voting experience affected the propensity to cast consistent votes (either partisan or non-partisan); whether the acquisition of voting experience before the passage of Reform implied any generational differences in long-term voting as compared to the voting of those participating only after 1832; whether the two main parties\textsuperscript{117} experienced long-term partisanship differently; and what the implications (if any) of voting persistence over time were for the agencies of electoral recruitment and mobilization.

The format in which the results of longitudinal analysis, obtained from the linked pollbooks, are

\textsuperscript{117} Here labelled Liberal and Conservative for comparative purposes, despite their lesser applicability to pre-1832 than afterwards: in all four constituencies, these are relevant (if at times incomplete) labels for the post-Reform decade.
presented follows that pioneered by John Phillips.\textsuperscript{118} Votes over time are conceptualized as a series of propensities, with an assessed risk of a propensity changing after one or more elections giving an index of "loyalty" to a particular type of vote as voting experience is accumulated. Here, voting behaviour is divided into three types: fully partisan Liberal votes, fully partisan Conservative votes, and non-partisan votes. Unlike Phillips' calculations, "unnecessary" plumps are (as discussed above) treated as non-partisan votes, even though they are exclusively votes for one party, because of their incompleteness and the need to describe levels of hostility to other candidates. Essentially, what is being analysed is the "risk" that partisan or non-partisan preferences will change, and the results are given as "hazard rates", which can be read as percentages.

\textit{Leicester}

Tables 6.10 and 6.11 give two sets of hazard rates for Leicester, the first for the electorate of 1832 over the next three elections, and the second for the resident voters only over the four elections following the election of 1826. It is important to note that the inclusion of a by-election (1839) is on

\textsuperscript{118} For example, in Electoral Behaviour, pp226-252; "Partisan Behaviour", passim; Phillips and Wetherell, "The Great Reform Bill", passim.
different terms to those elections where two M.P.s were elected. There was, of course, no splitting or

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections:</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>NP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (1835)</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (1837)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (1839)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NP=non-partisan votes (splits and "unnecessary" plumps) *=by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections:</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>NP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (1832)</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (1835)</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (1837)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (1839)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NP=non-partisan votes (splits and "unnecessary" plumps) *=by-election

plumping at by-elections, since voters had only one vote to give. The option remained to vote for a different party to that chosen on former occasions, but hazard rates for by-elections will naturally tend to be lower, with the reduced number of choices available. It is also important to point out that these tables (and similar ones below) do not represent the behavioural persistence of cohorts, but of whole electoral populations from a given starting-point, since old and new voters are not distinguished and "Election 1" in each case (eg. 1835 in Table 6.10 and 1832 in Table 6.11) is therefore not necessarily only
the second election in which individual voters took part.\textsuperscript{119}

As might have been anticipated from the political environment in which post-Reform elections took place, and from the static analyses of voting, consistent partisanship was extremely high in Leicester, in spite of the tendencies, in other political spheres, to Liberal dissension. Once a voter gave a partisan vote, he was unlikely to cast a different vote-type at any successive election, and the general trend was for the danger of his doing so to decline with the more partisan votes he gave. Political conversion of voters took place only in very small numbers, with the single possible exception of Tory resident voters between 1826 and 1832. In that instance, over a quarter of those who voted straight Tory in 1826 and then returned to poll in 1832 gave a Liberal or a non-partisan vote. In contrast, Liberal straight voters in 1832 (either in the whole electorate or only among residents) ran only a 10\% risk of splitting; casting an incomplete Liberal vote or voting Conservative, if they voted again in 1835: after twice giving a straight Liberal double-vote, the risk declined to 3\%, and it declined again after a third Liberal vote. A divergence from the

\textsuperscript{119} That hazard rates in these and following tables is tied to a given first election in every case is another point at which the methodology deviates from Phillips' (see, eg., Tables 3 and 4 of Phillips and Wetherell, "Great Reform Bill", pp644-645) and is due to the limited, but chronologically compact, numbers of elections being studied.
pattern of declining "hazard" with voting experience occurred among Conservatives (both resident and in the whole electorate) at the 1837 election, but the risk remained inconsiderable, at 12%. In other words, 88% of those who had voted straight Tory in both 1832 and 1835 did so again in 1837 if they were still voting, and 94% of those who had identically voted Tory since 1826 did so again in 1837 (if they turned out to vote).\textsuperscript{120}

Leicester's voters, then, were overwhelmingly not "floaters". Despite the levels of turnover which have been described (see Tables 6.4 and 6.5), both parties had significantly-sized core groups of voters who participated at every contest and never deviated from fully partisan behaviour. At the 1839 by-election, for example, 688 Liberal voters out of a total electorate of just over 3,700 and a total Liberal body of just under 1,670, cast their fourth successive straight Liberal vote. The Conservatives, who unlike the Liberals had required their voters to poll plumpers at one contest (that of 1832), mobilized over 550 straight party voters in 1839 who had polled the same way since 1832. For both parties, around 40% of support at the 1839 by-election came from voters who had polled an

\textsuperscript{120} Many, of course, did not vote: just over 30% of the original 1832 Conservative body, and 53% of the original resident Conservatives voting in 1826, were not part of the 1837 electorate. The actual number of conversions to Liberal or non-partisan voting among former Tories was 35 (out of 954) resident Tories from 1826 and 45 (out of 1044) of the 1832 Conservatives.
unbroken succession of straight party votes since Reform. Of these two bodies of partisans, a not inconsiderable number had voted identically since 1826; of resident voters, 211 Tories and 223 Liberals. These are the voters who were, in Phillips' words, "locked into a behaviour" and are the epitome of consistent participatory partisanship in action. However, as the hazard rates show, deviation from a previously-given partisan vote was unusual in Leicester, however many times an elector had voted, and the consistency of pre-Reform voters was, certainly for Liberals, no less over time than was that of the mixed electorate after 1832. William Biggs was undoubtedly right in 1837 to believe

... of course there will be no compromise, the line will be drawn, and whoever is not for us is against us. Waverers and neutrals are of no importance.  

Conversely, non-partisan voters, who were always vastly out-numbered in Leicester elections (see Table 6.6), were much more likely to be converted to casting a different vote-type. Never less than 80% of former non-partisan voters at any election who returned to poll were transformed into partisan voters: there were, for example, only twenty-two non-partisan voters in 1832 who gave another non-partisan vote in 1835. Given that split-voting and "unnecessary" plumping were, in static analysis, such unusual votes in Leicester and cannot be related to either any ideological homogeneity

121 Phillips and Wetherell, "Great Reform Bill", p644.  
122 Leicestershire Mercury, 1st July 1837.
between candidates across party lines or heterogeneity within party candidate-pairs, it is perhaps not surprising that non-partisan voting was behaviourally inconsistent. By 1837, non-partisan voting effectively did not exist, either among experienced or new voters.

In this environment, the recruitment of new voters to the electorate had a special significance, in spite of their normally being out-numbered by experienced voters. At each election, returning voters, with their partisan stability, contributed heavily to the corpus of support polled by each party. For example, in addition to the 40% derived from politically constant voters who had taken part at every election since 1832, both parties in 1839 received most of the rest of their support from voters returning after having given votes in either 1835 or 1837. Because of the relatively short interval since the last election, experienced voters in 1839 made up 86-88% of each party's support, and new voters only 12-14% (see Table 6.4 and Figure 6.4). In 1835 and 1837 three-quarters of voters had participated before. However, inexperienced voters, those new at each contest, formed sizeable bodies whose voting could significantly diverge from that of experienced voters, and with the dependability of partisan choice exhibited by

123 Cox, "Development of a Party-Orientated Electorate", p207

established members of the electorate, could act as a major mechanism of political change. That recruitment of new voters was a significant factor in the outcome of Leicester's elections is shown by comparing the voting of "old" and "new" voters (see Table 6.12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Voters (%)</th>
<th>&quot;New&quot; (%)</th>
<th>&quot;Experienced&quot; (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832:*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=Resident Voters only
NP=non-partisan voting (splits and "unnecessary" plumps)

The lead taken by the Conservatives in recruitment to the newly-defined and registered electorate after the 1832 election shows up clearly in these figures. The anti-Tory predisposition of new resident voters in 1832, brought on to the register immediately after the passage of Reform, stands in contrast to the situation in 1835, when nearly 60% of those voting for the first time were Conservatives, whilst experienced voters were evenly split between the parties. The Conservatives enjoyed a lead of more than
130 newly-recruited voters over the Liberals at the 1835 election, and it was only by reversing this trend that the parliamentary seats could be won back to the Liberals. Whilst experienced voters were the bed-rock of partisanship, and transmitted the ethos of stability in time to each successive cohort, it was new voters who signalled the political effects of party activity and underlying movements of opinion. Modern studies have noted the tendency for new voters to reflect the immediate political climate more dramatically than those who have voted before:125 with the registration procedures that were in effect after 1832, the phenomenon may be argued to have been felt even more directly. Biggs' analysis that superior Conservative registration techniques in 1834 and 1835 underlay the Liberal defeat in 1835 was correct:

Neglect of the Registration will diminish a majority to a minority; vigilance and attention will transform a minority into a majority. In this Borough ... give me the party who will attend to the Registration; and I will answer for the result at an election.126

Within two and a half years, improved Liberal organization, galvanized into existence by the shock of the 1835 defeat,127 reaped its rewards among first-time voters. Nearly 65% of new voters in 1837 were Liberals, and only 35% Conservatives, a difference of


126 Leicestershire Mercury, 5th August 1837.

127 See Chapter 4.
some 225 voters (the margin of Liberal success was 363 voters). Whereas new voters had constituted over a quarter of the aggregate Conservative vote in 1835, they were only just over 18% of it in 1837, whilst the proportion of new voters in the electorate remained stable between the two elections at 23.1% (see Table 6.4 and Figure 6.4). Liberal momentum was maintained at the 1839 by-election, where new voters again outnumbered their Conservative counterparts. Their impact on that occasion, however, was more limited, not because the Liberal victory was by an increased majority, but because the body of first-time voters in 1839 was half the size of that in 1837.

**Durham**

The persistence of partisanship in Durham does not match the voting discipline in Leicester (see Tables 6.13 and 6.14): the risk of voters casting divergent votes at successive elections (as represented by the "hazard rates") does not, except in a few cases, correspond to the low levels seen in Leicester, nor does it appear that there was any steady decline in risk with voting experience, either for Liberals or Conservatives. The intrinsic tendencies behind the voting instability evident here, however, can be isolated as being largely post-Reform in origin. The electorate of 1830 polled very consistently at the 1831
Figure 6.4: Percentage of Support
Derived from "New" Voters, Leicester,
1832 - 1839

Source-linked pollbooks. NP=non-partisan
voting (spits/unnecessary plumps). See
Table 6.4 for percentages of new voters.
by-election, less than 10% of either party's supporters changing sides. A third vote in 1832 was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections:</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>NP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (1835)</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (1837)</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (1843a)</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (1843b)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NP=non-partisan votes (splits and "unnecessary" plumps)  
*=by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections:</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>NP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (1831)</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (1832)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.82+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (1835)</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (1837)</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NP=non-partisan votes (splits and "unnecessary" plumps)  
*=by-election  
+=calculated from 1830 non-partisan voters

also unlikely to be either for another party or for a non-partisan vote combination (Table 6.14), although nearly one in five Liberals did stray from the path of full partisanship. For both 1830 and 1832 Liberal electorates, 1835 marked the turning-point in Durham. A third of both failed to give another fully partisan Liberal vote, because of the Whig move towards anti-Radical plumping, and the situation was markedly worse in 1837, when 65% of the Liberal electorate of 1832 who returned to vote chose not to give a full Liberal vote, and 70% of the pre-Reform Liberal electorate. This tendency was highly election-specific, as the immediately decreased risk in 1843 shows. Of those who
maintained their full Liberal partisan voting through the trying times of 1835 and 1837, few strayed in either April or July 1843 (of course, being by-elections, neither contest allowed for the possibility of split voting or protest plumping). Contemporary evidence that the Whigs were content to vote for Bright is thus borne out.128

Whig and Radical electoral tactics had a knock-on effect on Tory persistence. The comparable hazard rates of 27% (for the 1830 electorate) and 31% (for that of 1832) for Conservative voting in 1837 derive from Conservatives ignoring Trevor's advice to plump and attempting to exploit the situation by polling tactical splits against Granger. In this context, as with the static results, it seems harsh to define their voting as politically inconsistent.

Also attributable to the effects of Liberal voting is the pattern of declining hazard rates for non-partisan voting from 1832 to 1837. Unlike in Leicester (and in other constituencies for which similar analysis has been done129), splitters and "unnecessary" plumpers were not necessarily the most likely voters to change their voting at subsequent elections. Indeed, the persistence of returning 1832 voters in giving non-partisan votes in 1837 matches the

128 See Chapter 5.

highest levels of loyalty displayed by any of the partisan groups for the whole period, at 92% (Table 6.13). Whig persistence in plumping in 1837, together with consistent Trevor/Harland (Tory/Whig) splitters since 1832,\(^{130}\) account for this non-partisan persistence.

Because of the 1835 to 1837 breach in the non-Conservative electorate, the number of voters who polled fully consistent votes at every election was lower among Liberals than Tories. At the July 1843 by-election, seventy-two Conservatives returned to vote for the fifth time since 1832 (over a quarter of those who had voted Conservative in 1832), compared to thirty-seven Liberals (only 10% of Chaytor/Harland voters in 1832). Of the 1832 electorate, twenty Liberals (6.8%) and 62% (20.6%) returned in 1837 to poll their fifth consistent vote.

If the definition of partisan voting is altered to include "unnecessary" plumping (so as to allow that Harland and Granger plumpers were "party" motivated, despite their ideological suspicions of each other that prevented full Liberal voting in 1835 and 1837), the change in the hazard rates is dramatic (see Table 6.15).

---

\(^{130}\) 40% of those who split Trevor/Harland in 1832 and returned in 1835 voted the same way again; 63% of Trevor/Harland splitters in 1835 who returned in 1837 again voted Trevor/Harland.
Table 6.15: Recalculated "Hazard Rates", Durham, 1832-
July 1843

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections:</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>NP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (1835)</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (1837)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (1843a)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (1843b)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NP=non-partisan votes (splits and "unnecessary" plumps)
*=by-election

Working the hazard rates this way recognizes that to some extent in 1835, and certainly in 1837, there was in effect a three-party rather than a two-party system at work in Durham. The image of Harland and Granger agents striking each others' voters off the electoral register in the autumn of 1837 with more fervour than they showed in challenging Conservatives, sufficiently justifies this interpretation.\textsuperscript{131} Such a conception of the structure of elections demanded from the various sections of the electorate an altered perception of what constituted rational voting.

Liberal and Conservative partisan persistence, viewed in this framework, appear much more similar, with the exception of the Conservative tactical splitting in 1837. Formerly consistent Liberals were never more than 16% likely to give a Conservative or a split vote at a subsequent election, although their propensity to deviate from past voting does not show the same decline with accumulated experience that might be expected. The capacity of long-term Liberal voters

\textsuperscript{131} Durham Chronicle, 6th October 1837; Durham Advertiser, 13th October 1837; see Chapter 5.
to follow up a vote for Bright in April 1843 with another in July is, at 98%, perhaps not surprisingly greater - given the vagaries of the Londonderry voters between the two by-elections\textsuperscript{132} - than that of Conservatives to follow a vote for Dungannon with one for Purvis. The number of fully consistent Liberal voters from 1832 to 1843 (taking "unnecessary" plumps as being consistent with former partisan double-voting) rises to 120 (31% of the Liberal electorate of 1832), somewhat higher than the number of Conservatives.

The movement of individuals into the Durham electorate appears to have been on relatively equal party terms (Table 6.16), except in 1832. At the first reformed election, only a quarter of new voters were Conservatives, compared to 45% of those who had voted before. At later elections, the party implications of recruitment are complicated by the percentage of new voting that took the form of plumping. Liberal recruitment, 1835 to 1837, acquired 53.5% of first-time voting in 1837, but all but 11% of that was plumping, with nearly one in three new voters plumping for the Radical Granger. New voters, brought into the electorate at the height of the Whig/Radical conflicts, were thus significantly more inclined to give "protest" plumps than were experienced voters. A fifth of all "unnecessary" plumps were given by new voters (see Figure 6.5). Inexperienced voters in 1832 displayed a

\textsuperscript{132} See Chapter 5.
Figure 6.5: Percentage of Support Derived from "New" Voters, Durham, 1832 - 1843

Source-linked pollbooks. Non-partisan splits and "unnecessary" plumps. See Table 6.4 for percentages of new voters.
Table 6.16: The Voting of "New" and "Experienced" Voters, Durham, 1832-1843

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All Voters (%)</th>
<th>&quot;New&quot; (%)</th>
<th>&quot;Experienced&quot; (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Granger plumps)</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Harland plumps)</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843 (April):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843 (July):</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NP = non-partisan voting (splits and "unnecessary" plumps)

greater inclination to cast a cross-party vote than those who were continuing an electoral career begun before the Reform Act - nearly 60% of splitters (which were nearly all Trevor/Harland votes) came from first-time voters, and it was these who were to bear the brunt of the blame for Trevor's defeat.

Over the relatively long interval between 1837 and 1843, party recruitment died down in intensity, and both parties benefitted equally from the allegiances of first-time voters (who made up nearly a

133 See Chapter 5.
third of all voters - see Table 6.4): Dungannon's victory was based on the unequal party support of experienced voters.

North Durham

Assessing the partisan stability of North Durham's electorate is undermined by the paucity of contests. However, the risks of 1832 voters casting different votes on their return in 1837 can be examined (see Table 6.17).

Conservatives from 1832 were very unlikely to vote differently if they returned in 1837: 84% polled consistently. Liberals appear to have been less consistent, with over one-fifth of 1832 double-Liberal voters who came back to vote splitting, giving a Liberal plumper, or voting for the Tory Liddell in 1837.

In an election determined by a margin of less than 4% of all votes cast, and in which new voters - since there had been no election since 1832 - were a third of the electorate (see Table 6.4), the nearly 8% greater inclination of new voters to vote for Liddell was crucial (see Table 6.18). As Figure 6.6 shows, Liddell's lead among first-time voters was slight, but

The margin by which Liddell beat Chaytor into third place was 261 votes. North Durham Pollbook 1837.
Figure 6.6: Percentage of Support Derived from "New" and "Experienced" Voters, North Durham, 1837

Source=linked pollbooks. Non-partisan splits and "unnecessary" plumps. See Table 6.4 for percentage of new voters

following 458
Elections:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>NP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (1837)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NP=non-partisan voting (splits and "unnecessary" plumps)

sufficient to make the difference in a tightly-run contest.

Table 6.18: The Voting of "New" and "Experienced" Voters, North Durham, 1837

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Voters (%)</th>
<th>&quot;New&quot; (%)</th>
<th>&quot;Experienced&quot; (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1837:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NP=non-partisan votes (splits and "unnecessary" plumps)

Guildford

As in Durham, voter acquisition of accumulated partisan stability in Guildford was complicated by factors specific to the constituency. The calculation of hazard rates is also at times unduly affected by the smallness of the electoral population: the rates for 1837 and 1841 in Table 6.20 and for 1841 in Table 6.19 are worked from the behaviour of less than half a dozen individuals.

Nevertheless, some trends are discernible, for instance the determined move away from split voting
after 1835 by those who remained from the 1832 electorate (and also that of 1830). Partisan stability over time was much influenced, as might be expected, by Wall's two changes of party, but the earlier switch - from Reformer to anti-Reformer in 1831 - seems to have caused more disruption to continued partisanship than did his changeover from Tory to Liberal between 1837 and 1841.

### Table 6.19: "Hazard Rates", Guildford, 1832-1841

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections:</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>NP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (1835)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (1837)</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (1841)</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.92</td>
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</table>

NP=non-partisan votes (splits and "unnecessary" plumps)

### Table 6.20: "Hazard Rates", Guildford, 1830-1841

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections:</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>NP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (1831)</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (1832)</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (1835)</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (1837)</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (1841)</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NP=non-partisan votes (splits and "unnecessary" plumps)

In 1831, only 17% of Tories and 48% of Whigs from 1830 polled consistent votes, because of the encouragement that Wall's defection gave to cross-party voting (which in 1831 accounted for 40% of all voting - see Table 6.6). In 1841, Wall/Scarlett double Conservative voters from 1837 (who had voted Conservative since either 1830 or 1832) polled exclusively Conservative votes, choosing to stick with their party rather than with Wall (see Table 3.7 for the illustration of this
among all voters who took part in the 1837 and 1841 elections). If Guildford's electorate was indulging in "personality" politics in their votes for Wall from 1832 to 1837, they seem to have deserted it by 1841. Whilst the mid-1830s in Guildford were characterized by a moderate political environment which was content to return the mixed-party combination of Wall and Mangles, and which therefore acted as a constant encouragement to voters to fall from the ranks of the consistently partisan, the 1837 election established the patterns of partisan voting which were continued and reinforced in 1841 despite Wall's own political inconsistency.

Recruitment of new voters was fairly evenly split between the voting types (straight Liberal, straight

Table 6.21: The Voting of "New" and "Experienced" Voters, Guildford, 1832-1841

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conservative (%)</th>
<th>&quot;New&quot; (%)</th>
<th>&quot;Experienced&quot; (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>52.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1835:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>63.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1837:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>23.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1841:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
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<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NP=non-partisan voting (splits and "unnecessary" plumps)
Conservative, and non-partisan) (see Table 6.21), except on a few occasions. The proportion of new voters in 1832 prepared to give straight Liberal votes was greater than that among pre-Reform voters, and new voters in both 1835 and 1837 were more likely to give split votes than were their more experienced co-voters, at the expense of partisan voting of both sorts. At all four elections, new voters thus expressed more strongly (although not by a large margin), the underlying political movements within the constituency - they were proportionately more partisan for the Liberals in 1832 (when new voters made up over half of the electorate - see Table 6.4), more prone to cross-party voting in the two following elections, and (slightly) more likely to poll for the winning side in 1841. In no election, however, did their voting swing the outcome away from the preferences of the whole electorate, so that their relative numerical strength (see Table 6.4) complemented the behavioural trends of experienced voters. Only in 1832, when 59% of double-Liberal support came from new voters (and thus only 41% from experienced voters) can the new voters be said to have signally deviated from the voting of returning electors (see Figure 6.7) and even then, in not enough numbers to prevent the loss of one Liberal seat to Wall.
Figure 6.7: Percentage of Support Derived from "New" Voters, Guildford, 1832 - 1841

Source-linked pollbooks. Non-partisan splits and "unnecessary" plumps. See Table 6.4 for percentages of new voters.
Methodology: the Preference Codes

Since all of the preceding longitudinal results obtained from the linked pollbooks are dependent on the links made between the voting records, it is appropriate here to report on their performance. The labelling of each linked voter entry with a preference code which defined the bases on which the link was determined, and by implication the degree of confidence in its "trueness", allows for this, and gives the opportunity of better establishing the grounds for certainty that the nature of the data (or the human judgement involved in their collection) is not unreasonably affecting the results.

In fact, because so many of the linkages - due to the completeness and systematic structuring of the identifiers given in the pollbooks for these constituencies for this period - could be given "high" preference codes (specifically, Codes 1 and 2), variations in the behaviour of the preference code groups do not seriously affect the overall results, but they do indicate the necessity of awareness that linkages made on different grounds will generate apparently different longitudinal behaviour patterns.

In the first respect, the situation with post-Reform data would seem to be different from that

135 See Chapter 1 for a full discussion of the linkage algorithms and coding process.
encountered with eighteenth century data, where linkages, for a variety of reasons including less standardized surname spellings and less full data for other sorting keys, are far less likely to fall into the "more certain" categories. Here, links were coded 1 and 2 in very consistent proportions between borough electorates (Code 1 indicates unique and identical identifiers, and Code 2 identical identifiers with the exception of a surname spelling discrepancy). 75.6% of Leicester linked clusters (containing data over five elections) were resolved into entries which were coded either 1 or 2; 79.2% of Durham's (over seven elections), and 81.4% of Guildford's (over six elections). In contrast, one study of an eighteenth century electorate (that of Hull) over three elections


137 With some qualifications, for explanation of which see Chapter 1.
established Code 1 links which "could be considered certain" for only some 55% of linked entries.  

Behavioural differences between the preference code groups are apparent, and suggest that the methodological acceptability of analysis either on the basis only of one hundred per cent "certain" links or from selectively exclusive linkage types is questionable - or at least, that results obtained from such analysis will not enable behavioural differences to be taken into account when the results are examined. Here, they are explicit. For example, as is evident in the eighteenth century Hull linkages, the coding levels used do affect such aspects of behaviour as repeat voting. For all three boroughs, the "less certain" the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes 1-2</th>
<th>Voted 1835* (%)</th>
<th>Codes 1-4</th>
<th>Voted 1837* (%)</th>
<th>Codes 1-6</th>
<th>Voted 1835* (%)</th>
<th>(Codes 3 &amp; 4)</th>
<th>Voted 1837* (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Codes 5 &amp; 6)</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>(Codes 5 &amp; 6)</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=after voting in 1832

links included in the calculations, the greater the percentage of voters returning to vote at successive elections. For example (see Table 6.22) for Leicester,

the percentage spread between results generated by including voter entries coded 1 and 2 and those for entries coded 1 to 6 as to what percentage of voters who had voted in 1832 returned to vote in 1835 and 1835, is nearly 4% (from 74.2% to 78.0%). For Guildford, the equivalent spread is 2.8%, and for Durham 3.5% (see Tables 6.23 and 6.24). There is, however, a far larger spread between the individual preference codes' performance: 1832 voters in Leicester whose voting entries were coded 3 and 4 are 14.5% more likely to return to vote in 1835, and those coded 5 and 6 are over 15% more likely to reappear, than are voters whose linked votes were coded 1 and 2. Similar patterns are visible in the other two borough constituencies (Tables 6.23 and 6.24).

However, the threat that this poses to the integrity of the results given for the whole electoral populations is minimized by the relatively small numbers of links coded 3 to 6 in the completed data sets. For Leicester, they amount to less than a quarter of all links, with those coded 5 and 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes 1-2</th>
<th>Voted 1835* (%)</th>
<th>Voted 1837* (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Codes 1-4</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codes 1-6</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Codes 3 &amp; 4)</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Codes 5 &amp; 6)</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=after voting in 1832
Table 6.24: Repeat Voting, by Preference Code Level, Guildford, 1832-1837

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Voted 1835* (%)</th>
<th>Voted 1837* (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3 &amp; 4</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5 &amp; 6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=after voting in 1832

accounting for only just over 4% of all the constructed links. For Guildford and Durham, their frequency is even lower. The aggregated results are therefore not unduly affected by behavioural discrepancies. Whereas the percentage spreads for the exercise above are here all under 5%, a similar exercise worked on the eighteenth century Hull pollbooks generated spreads of up to 25%, and thus threw comparatively much greater doubt on the utility of the results obtained from different linkage parameters.

The conclusion is two-fold. Firstly, the longitudinal statistics employed here are not unreasonably influenced by the nature of the linkage procedures employed, but, secondly, it remains important - for post-Reform as well as pre-Reform electoral databases - to be as explicit as possible as regards the linkage operation and its implications.

139 Baskerville, "Preferred Linkage", pp118-119.
The Franchise Groups

As was described in Chapter 1, the definition between pre- and post-Reform franchise groups is potentially (and certainly, for two of the three boroughs examined here) not as clear as it appears in contemporary reports and most pollbooks. Despite the prevalence of language which starkly contrasted the electoral behaviour of freemen (and the other "Ancient Rights" voters) against that of the ten pound householders, on the basis of the supposed economic dissimilarity between the two groups, the social and behavioural differences between them are muddied both by the economic heterogeneity within the ranks of the householders\(^1\) and by the extent of the overlap between the two franchises. This overlap is almost impossible to discern for individual voters from cross-sectional pollbook analysis since information on multiple-qualification is rarely given. The Leicester pollbook of 1839 is a welcome exception.

\(^1\) See Chapter 1.
The degree of multiple-qualification in the Leicester, Guildford and Durham City electorates has been described. Although the franchise titles given for Durham voters proved, on comparison over time and against the electoral registers, constant and unambiguous (in that there were only a dozen or so freemen who were also qualified to vote as householders, and that they always voted as freemen), those in the Guildford and Leicester pollbooks concealed substantial degrees of multiple qualification. In Guildford, over a quarter of all voters who participated at elections between 1832 and 1841 (and thus appear in the linked files) were holders of more than one qualification (in other words, both a pre-Reform and the post-Reform one), and the electoral registers and parliamentary figures give an incidence of multiple-qualification of 32% (see Figure 1.4). Of the ninety voters who were jointly qualified either as freemen and householders or as "Ancient Rights" voters and householders, all but three voted as "Householders"

2 See Chapter 1.

3 Dul/56/1-5, Durham City Electoral Registers 1832-1841 (D.C.R.O.); linked pollbooks, 1832 to July 1843. See Chapter 1.

4 P.P. 1837-8 (329) XLIV.602, "Return of the Number of Electors Registered in Each County, City and Borough"; BR/PAR/1/2, Guildford Electoral Register, 1832-1843 (G.M.R.); linked pollbooks, 1830-1841; See Chapter 1.

5 In Guildford, "Ancient Rights" indicated those who had voted as resident householders before 1832. BR/PAR/6/1, "Memorial of the Mayor and Inhabitants of the Town of Guildford ..." (n.d., 15th July 1831); A Handbook to Guildford and its Environs (Gardner and Stent, publishers, Guildford 1859), p22. See Chapter 2.
(or rather, were so designated by the polling clerk) at
the 1837 election. This was in contrast to the
situation in Leicester, where those multiply-qualified
- who constituted over 16% of the electorate at the
1839 by-election and nearly 19% of those on the
register of 1837-8 (see Figure 1.5) - overwhelmingly
chose to poll under their older franchise title,
presumably because of the historical resonances
involved. The economic distinctiveness of that part
of the electorate which remained qualified to vote only
in respect of franchises defined before 1832, which was
the basis for Liberal remarks like Paget's that it was
"impossible to imagine a more truly wretched set of
beings under any circumstances than the corrupt freemen
of Leicester", and the parallel belief that the more
affluent householder voters as a class were "superior
to bribery", is therefore obscured by the inclusion
within the freeman body of many individuals who also
met the conditions of the property franchise. The
truth of the contemporary perception that, except in

6 BR/PAR/2/9a-c, Guildford Pollbooks (mss.) 1837
(G.M.R.); P.P. 1837-8 (329) XLIV.602.

7 Leicester Pollbook 1839 (L.R.L.); P.P. 1837-8 (329)
XLIV.609-610.

8 See Chapter 1 for discussion. 95% of those given in
the 1839 pollbook as possessing more than one
qualification had previously voted as freemen.

9 Leicestershire Mercury, 20th May 1837.

10 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.124-125, "Report from the
Select Committee Appointed to Consider the Most
Effectual Means of Preventing Bribery, Corruption and
Intimidation in the Election of Members to Serve in
Parliament" (James Hudson's testimony).
those cities where high property values reduced the exclusivity of the householders,¹¹ there was a distinctive tenor to the voting behaviour of each group, can only be properly tested by isolating what might be termed the "real" freemen.

Linkage to property-value data¹² indicates, even when the linkage is only to one property value (as was the norm) that, both in Leicester and Guildford, the multiply-qualified were emphatically not poor voters. This might not be thought surprising, given that they necessarily met the conditions of the ten pound property qualification. However, in Guildford, those voters who held joint freeman/householder or "Ancient Rights"/householder qualifications and could be linked to rating data were much less likely to be rated for property valued at under £20 than were those who were only householders (41.5% to 65.2% - see Table 7.1). Thirty percent of the multiply-qualified were assessed for properties worth in excess of £40, compared to under 12% of the other householders. In contrast, the freemen who appeared in the 1836 rate books and were not also householders (who numbered only three) all fell into the under £20 category.¹³

¹¹ See Chapter 1 for the Reform Bill debates on borough franchises.

¹² The ratings data and the linkage procedure used are described in Chapter 1.

¹³ There were no "Ancient Rights" voters who did not possess a second - householder - qualification.
Table 7.1: Voters' Assessed Rates, by Franchise Group, Guildford 1836

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Franchise Group</th>
<th>Under £20 (%)</th>
<th>£20-39 (%)</th>
<th>Over £40 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freemen</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householders</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiply-Qualified</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=Freemen 3, Householders 136, Multiply-Qualified 106)

The multiply-qualified also display a slightly wider property value distribution than the householders, and a much greater one than the freemen. The highest value attributed to a multiply-qualified voter is £131, compared to £116 for the householders. The highest value assessed for a property linked to a freeman who was not also a householder voter is for £17.14

This picture of the relative "wealth" of multiply-qualified voters - which can be linked to the disproportionate ownership of commercial property, itself in many cases the reason for a second entry in the electoral register - conforms to patterns found elsewhere,15 and can be replicated for Leicester (see Table 7.2), where the distribution of values exhibited

14 The other two freemen were assessed for property below £10. BR/HT/3/5, Rating Assessment, Holy Trinity, 3rd May 1836; BR/MA/3/5, Rating Assessment, Blessed Virgin Mary, 3rd May 1836 (G.M.R.). See Chapter 1 for an analysis based solely on values given for "Houses".

Table 7.2: Voters' Assessed Rates, by Franchise Group, Leicester 1837

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Franchise Group</th>
<th>Under £20 (%)</th>
<th>£20-39 (%)</th>
<th>Over £40 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scot and Lot</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freemen</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householders</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiply-Qualified</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=Scot and Lot 14, Freemen 52, Householders 87, Multiply-Qualified 121)

by the multiply-qualified and the other householders is very similar. The contrast between those who only possessed a pre-Reform franchise and those qualified to vote as householders (whether or not the property value franchise was held in conjunction with another franchise) is clear. Whilst only just over a third of the householders in the linked population, and 40% of those multiply qualified, fell into the under £20 value category, only four of the fifty-two freemen not also qualified as householders who were linked to the rate books were assessed for rates in excess of £20 (and none of the fourteen Scot and Lot voters), underlining the necessity of knowing - before political preferences can be examined in context - the real composition of the franchise groups as they are given in the pollbooks.\(^{16}\)

Occupational breakdown, with the electorates divided so as to identify the multiply-qualified

\(^{16}\) Leicester rate books used (see Chapter 1 for a fuller description): 7D67/21; 7D67/220; 7D67/260; 7D67/455; 7D67/480 (all 1837) (L.R.O.).
separately either to the freemen (in Leicester) or the householders (in Guildford) with whom they voted, strongly corroborates that the multiply-qualified bore a close resemblance to the other householder voters. The occupational structure of the body of multiply-qualified voters participating in the 1837 election in Guildford, for example, is at most points directly comparable to that of the other householders, with the exception of a stronger showing in Category I ("Gentlemen and Professionals") and a weaker one amongst the "unskilled" of Category VI (see Table 7.3). The incidence of multiple-qualification, perhaps unsurprisingly given the link established above (see Figures 1.6 to 1.8) between "wealth" and the occupation categories, was strongly affected by occupation category: half of the Category I voters in Guildford in 1837 possessed more than one qualification, compared to only a third of the Craftsmen (Category IV) and only 5% of the "unskilled" members of Category VI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Categories (%)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Householders</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiply-Qualified</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 The numbers of freemen and "Ancient Rights" voters were too small to allow for meaningful analysis.
The occupational structure of Leicester's franchise groups also demonstrates a tendency for multiply-qualified voters to appear in disproportionate numbers among the Category I voters: exactly a fifth of all Category I voters at the 1839 by-election were indicated in the pollbook as possessing more than one claim to the franchise, compared to only just over 10% of craftsmen and 8% of unskilled. However, thirty percent of the multiply-qualified were Craftsmen, and the bias towards Category I membership was only a relative one (see Table 7.4).

Comparison of the franchise groups as they appear in the Leicester pollbook for 1837 (where multiple-qualification was not distinguished) and in that of 1839 shows the extent to which lack of explicit information - at the level of the individual - as to qualification can affect results (see Tables 7.4 and 7.5).

The concentration of the freemen in Category IV ("Craft") increases by over 10% (from 57% to 67%) once those who were also householders are removed, and the percentage of freemen voters in Category VI also increases. However, the separation of those of the multiply-qualified who voted in the ranks of the householders (a very small number compared to those who voted with the freemen) leaves the householders' occupational configuration almost unchanged: indeed, 18

18 Leicester Pollbook 1839.
the occupational breakdown of those holding more than one franchise (like their rate values profile) is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.4: Occupational Structure of Franchise Groups, Leicester 1837</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupational Categories (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scot and Lot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Resident Freemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=Householders 1192; Freemen 1541; Scot and Lot 124; Non-Residents 413)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.5: Occupational Structure of Franchise Groups, Leicester 1839</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupational Categories (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scot and Lot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiply-Qualified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Resident Freemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=Householders 1083, Freemen 1009, Scot and Lot 61, Multiply-Qualified 486, Non-Residents 401)

strikingly similar to that of the householders as a whole, and equivalently distinct from that of the freemen. Less than a third of multiply-qualified voters represented craft occupations (IV) whilst over two-thirds of freemen did (and the "Craftsmen" sector in the other pre-Reform franchise group, that of the Scot and Lot voters, was almost equally high at over
60%). Nearly one in five of the multiply-qualified voters was a member of the relatively well-off "Drink Interest" category (V),\(^{19}\) whilst there was negligible "Drink" representation amongst the freemen. The "unskilled" (VI) formed the smallest sector of multiply-qualified membership as they did also among the householders, whilst at the other end of the occupational spectrum, the multiply-qualified were proportionately slightly better represented among the "Gentlemen and Professionals" (I) than were the other householders (16.3% to 14.3%), and much better represented than the freemen (6.9%).

For Guildford, the need to keep the multiply-qualified separate for analytical purposes is less important than it is for Leicester, because of the preference for the "Householder" title, and the tiny percentage of voters whose right to participate rested only on a pre-Reform franchise - and also because of the general absence of any discernible franchise group "consciousness" of the sort conspicuous in the other two boroughs. Freemen were created in very small numbers (four in 1833, and three in both 1834 and 1835, for example).\(^{20}\) "Franchise" politics appear only once in Guildford in this period, with Mangles' votes in

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\(^{19}\) See Figures 1.6 and 1.7.

\(^{20}\) P.P. 1837 (4) XLIV.49; by 1840, the number of freemen in Guildford was down to 61, P.P. 1840 (379) XLI.533; R.Sykes, Politics and Electoral Behaviour in Guildford and West Surrey 1790-1886 (Unpubl. Ph.D. Thesis, Surrey 1975), p70.
1835 for the proposals to alter freemen's voting rights. Even then, the matter received only one mention at the next election.\textsuperscript{21} In Durham, the small number of freemen who were also householders (all but three of whom were either craftsmen or small retailers\textsuperscript{22}) were psephologically insignificant, but existed in an atmosphere of franchise group conflict founded on high levels of political and economic differentiation.

In terms of occupational structure, the franchise groups in Durham represented very different constituencies (see Table 7.6).\textsuperscript{23} Although the retail sectors (Category III) professing each franchise were of equivalent relative sizes, the craftsmen (IV) were largely concentrated in the ranks of the freemen. Of the 436 "craftsmen" voting in 1837, 347 were freemen:

\textsuperscript{21} Surrey Standard, 4th and 25th July, and 1st August 1835; G.3270 (poster), 19th July 1837 (G.M.R.).

\textsuperscript{22} Du/56/1-5, Durham City Electoral Registers, 1832-1843. In 1836 they comprised two plumbers, two joiners, one tailor, two grocers, two ropers, and three "gentlemen" (one of whom was a Lt. General). Du1/56/3 (D.C.R.O.).

only one in five was a householder. That the guild structure within which the freemen were enrolled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Categories (%)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freemen</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householders</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=Householders 342, Freemen 514)

should be reflected in the occupational make-up of the franchise group should not be surprising: that more of the craftsmen do not appear in the register as meeting the £10 property qualification is perhaps more significant. Only twenty-six freemen (including three who were multiply-qualified) can be included within Category I, compared to 111 householders, very nearly a third of the total. Importantly, the occupational distinctiveness of the two groups had not diminished since the Reform Act; if anything, it had marginally increased. In 1832, craftsmen had comprised 60% of the participating freemen; for 1837 the figure is 67.5%. The percentage of freemen who can be included amongst the "Gentlemen and Professionals" falls from 9.6% in 1832 to 5.1% in 1837, whilst the householder percentages in Category I are very consistent (31.9% in 1832, 31.3% in 1835, 32.5% in 1837). In fact, the occupational structure of the householder franchise shows little change at all over the first three

24 See Chapter 1.
elections after the Reform Act, with the single exception of the craftsmen, who fall from 16% of the householder group in 1832 to 6.8% in 1835 and 6.4% in 1837. The widening structural difference between the two franchise groups is therefore ascribable to the increasing predominance of the freemen craftsmen.

As in Leicester, but not in Guildford, relative franchise group membership in Durham had a directly-felt electoral significance. In Durham's case, the ability of interests (especially Lord Londonderry's) to facilitate the entry of freemen on to the electoral register by assisting the buying of their freedoms, and to gather the political rewards of their subsequent voting - and in turn, the householders' political self-definition in reaction to such activity among the freemen - affected the voting behaviour of both groups. It has been argued that the franchise division in Durham constitutes the best framework for the examination of patterns of voting behaviour, for these reasons. It is certainly true that there were considerable and consistent differences in their voting (see Table 7.7).

The freemen were on every occasion between 1832 and 1843 (with the single exception of the July 1843 by-election, fought under what might be pleaded, with regard to at least some of the freemen, as extenuating

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circumstances\textsuperscript{26}) considerably more inclined to vote Tory, i.e. to plump for Trevor, at the general elections.\textsuperscript{27} In 1832, with memories of the national

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal (%)</th>
<th>Conservative (%)</th>
<th>NP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Freemen</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Householders</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Freemen</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>23.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Householders</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>23.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1837:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Freemen</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>55.3</td>
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<td>- Householders</td>
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<td>April 1843:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Freemen</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Householders</td>
<td>53.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1843:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Freemen</td>
<td>55.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Householders</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>46.9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NP=non-partisan votes (splits and "unnecessary" plumps) and local debates over the retention of freemens' voting rights, in both of which Lord Durham and Trevor were prominent, still fresh,\textsuperscript{28} the difference was nearly 20%: in the following three contests, it was a steady 15-16%. A straight Liberal double vote was correspondingly always more likely from a householder than a freeman, but with a reduced margin due to the

\textsuperscript{26} See Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{27} See also Nossiter, Elections and Political Behaviour, pp310-313; Stoker, Elections and Voting Behaviour, pp225-227.

\textsuperscript{28} See Chapters 1 and 2.
householders' greater susceptibility to non-partisan behaviour in response to Whig-Radical conflicts (which were at their most virulent at the elections of 1835 and especially 1837, but are already apparent in householders' minds in 1832, given that one in five householder vote combinations can be classed as "non-partisan" at that election).

The marked "Conservatism" of freemen was not a phenomenon restricted to Durham. The freemen of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, for example, exhibited a voting preference for the Conservatives in 1836 (at a by-election) and 1837 that was diametrically opposed to the pattern of Liberal voting displayed by householders. It was an accepted political dictum that "the freemen vote in the Conservative interest more frequently than the Radical".

There were several reasons for this relative inclination to the Tories. A freemen-Tory alliance in Maidstone, for example, was hypothetically founded on their mutual hostility to the Reform Bill's attack on natural "birthrights", but has been argued to have owed more to the fact that "the freemen were simply less reluctant to be purchased" by Tory money, than to any.

29 Nossiter, Elections and Voting Behaviour, p150.
high-flown political principles. Contemporaries drew a direct link between freemen's Toryism and their involvement in market politics. Conservative gains in some of the larger boroughs in 1835 (such as in Leicester) were widely attributed to the connection between the existence in those constituencies of large bodies of freemen voters and the heavy use of bribery and other voting incentives.

Given Londonderry's deliberate recruitment and political manipulation of freemen from the 1820s onwards, and the Liberal sentiments of the freemen in Lambton employment, it was perhaps natural that the householders in Durham, as elsewhere, should cast themselves as "the independent portion of the electors", free from the pressures to which those less independent were subject:

If a £10 householder votes against his landlord, the very idea of his being turned out of his house would be ridiculous and contemptible.


33 See Chapters 2 and 5. The presence of Liberal freemen should not be forgotten: for example, 22% of freemen gave a "plump" vote for the Radical Granger in 1837.

34 Electors' Scrap Book (Durham 1832), p6.

35 Tyne Mercury, 7th June 1831.
Although the 1843 petition showed it to be a fallacy that there were no Durham householders willing to take money,\textsuperscript{36} in general the householders' relative independence made the balance of householders' political opinions more difficult for the various electoral agencies to gauge. As the disillusioned Buddle pointed out to Londonderry, the freemen could be counted on, if their demands had been met, but householders' views were more obscure:

whether a Candidate be Conservative, Whig or Radical, matters not a straw [to the freemen] - the man who most freely will afford them the means of indulging their beastly appetites during election time, and allow them to leech him afterwards, is the man for them. It is not, therefore, from them, that an observant By-stander can judge the state of public feeling. This can only be known from those of a different grade ...\textsuperscript{37}

Londonderry certainly felt the householders' want of what he saw as respect for his right to political influence, blaming Trevor's defeat in 1832 (after a campaign firmly based on an appeal to freemens' loyalty for Trevor's support of their rights in 1831) on the fact that

\textsuperscript{36} P.P. 1843 (433) VI.193 and 205: John Richaby, a householder, testified to receiving Dungannon's head-money, and Thomas Egglestone saw householders amongst those in the queue.

\textsuperscript{37} D/Lo/C500(4), Buddle to Londonderry, 7th April 1837. The Durham Advertiser also argued that the support of freemen was more predictable than that of the householders, as the latter were more likely to break their promises: eg. 12th May 1837.
the new interest - the £10 interest - which the recent change had created, paid but little attention to any person occupying a prominent and influential position.\footnote{Report of the Speeches Delivered at the First Anniversary of the County of Durham Conservative Association ... 13th January 1834 (Newcastle-upon-Tyne 1834), pp31-32.}

Because there was so little overlap between the two groups, freeman and householder politics in Durham retained their distinctiveness - and their mutual mistrust - through the 1830s.\footnote{See, for example, Durham Advertiser, 1st February 1833 and 12th May 1837; Durham Chronicle, 12th August 1836.} The determination of the Londonderry interest to continue the practice of buying freedoms (as a cheaper means of creating Conservative voters than direct bribery at elections),\footnote{See Chapter 2. D/Lo/C132, "Extracts from Mr. Maynard's Letters ... 1841", 10th August 1841.} also ensured that the question of franchises remained central to the political debate, not least by helping to ensure that the freemen maintained their numbers relative to the householders for the first post-Reform decade, their 62.7% share of the electorate in 1832 dropping only to 57.2% by July 1843: 58 more freemen voted in the first 1843 by-election than had voted in 1832. In part, this was due to a fairly constant rate of freeman admission in the years immediately after 1832 and a burst of admissions
in the later 1830s (for example, over 50 in 1838), but the size of their continued presence can also be explained with reference to the mobilizing forces at work on existing freemen. Freemen made up around 40% of new voters at each of the 1832, 1835 and 1837 elections (numbering 45-50 voters each time): 126 "new" freemen, actually a mixture of those admitted to their guilds before and after 1832, voted in April 1843. Non-returning freemen, conversely, were balanced by the rate at which householders dropped out of the electorate. At all of the post-Reform elections to July 1843, freemen were lost from the electorate at a rate, relative to their size, which ran below that experienced by the householders. For example, at the April 1843 by-election more householders than freemen who had voted in 1837 did not reappear.

The disfranchisement proposal in the Municipal Corporations Reform Bill renewed the freemens' defensive alliance with Trevor in 1835, as well as acting to re-invigorate the inter-franchise hostilities. The Durham Advertiser, defender of the freemens' character throughout the 1830s, waged a

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41 P.P. 1837 (4) XLIV.47, "Return of the Number of Persons Admitted to the Freedom of Cities and Boroughs ...", and P.P. 1840 (379) XLI.536, "Return of the Number of Freemen in Cities and Boroughs in England and Wales Entitled to Vote". The Durham Advertiser, 22nd May 1840, claimed that three-quarters of new freemen created after 1837 were Conservatives (see Chapter 5).

virulent campaign against Harland in 1837 for his vote "against" the freemen in 1835,\(^43\) whilst acknowledging the Conservative dependence on freemens' votes:

\[\text{... is the Conservative cause so strong, that the party can afford to lose the support of the freemen? Return a Whig majority, and the freemen would be knocked off immediately.}^{44}\]

At the same time, the Durham Chronicle summed up its objections to the freemen (and its reasons for calling for their votes to be removed and re-allocated to householders:

\[\text{... they afford facilities to bribery which it is desirable to cut off, for their tendency to corrupt the representation. We apprehend this is too notorious to be denied.}^{45}\]

After the 1843 election petition, at which proceedings the freemen were again condemned as "generally speaking, very poor persons, easily open to any species of corruption",\(^46\) it was left to John Bright to attempt their political redemption, deliberately appealing as he did to the freemens' consciousness of themselves as working men:

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\(^{43}\) Durham Advertiser, 28th July 1837; Proceedings and Poll..1837 (Durham 1837), p7; Lambton Mss., Granger to Durham, 10th June 1836.

\(^{44}\) Durham Advertiser, 12th May and 14th July 1837.

\(^{45}\) Durham Chronicle, 5th May 1837.

\(^{46}\) P.P. 1843 (433) VI.175ff., "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the Durham City Election petitions" (Mr. Cockburn, Q.C.); Durham Advertiser, 14th July 1843.
Who are the freemen of Durham? The artisans of Durham. And who are they, as freemen? Is not every working man who has a vote - may he not be considered the representative ... for a number of men who have no votes, but with whom he works ... and with whom he has kindred interests? 47

The Advertiser labelled such campaigning an insult to the freemens' intelligence, describing Bright's concentration on them in his addresses as evidence that he "considered the ten-pounders too sensible to be gulled by his mis-statements" but thought that the freemen could be fooled and that

... the very idea of cheap bread will make them forget that if such men as John Bright had ruled the roost they would long ago have been disfranchised ... 48

There was also a clear Tory-freeman link in Leicester (see Table 7.8), at least in relative terms. At the first three general elections after Reform, the freemen, as they are given in the pollbooks, are consistently the least "Liberal" of the resident voters (the "dismally Tory" 49 non-resident freemen from the villages around Leicester were operating within a different political environment, and need to be discussed separately). That this freeman bias to the Tories was not solely a function of their pre-Reform franchise is suggested by the voting of the much smaller body of the Scot and Lot voters (who numbered

47 Durham Chronicle, 28th July 1843.
48 Durham Advertiser, 14th and 28th July 1843.
210 in 1832, but were reduced to 61 by 1839),\(^50\) which
was convincingly more Liberal than the freemen's (in
1832 the margin of difference was over 20%, despite

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Liberal (%)</th>
<th>Conservative (%)</th>
<th>NP (%)</th>
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<td>Freemen</td>
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<td>7.2</td>
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<td>31.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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<td>71.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<td>47.1</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Householders</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>42.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>32.6</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1837:</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>46.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Householders</td>
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<td>34.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>Scot and Lot</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>30.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Residents</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>68.3</td>
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</table>

NP=non-partisan votes (splits and "unnecessary" plumps)

their sharing of a similar occupational structure (see
Tables 7.4 and 7.5). In fact, the Scot and Lot voters
were more Liberal even than the householders.

The explanation at least partly lies in the
continued close relationship, until 1836, between the
freemen and the highly-partisan Tory Corporation. The creation of freemen - the power which the Corporation

\(^50\) The Scot and Lot voters were geographically concentrated in West St. Mary's and All Saints' Wards. Leicester Pollbooks 1837 and 1839.
had so over-used in 1826\textsuperscript{51} - continued, though in diminished form (except for a burst of 195 admissions in 1835 on the eve of the Corporation's demise).\textsuperscript{52}

More significant was the continuation of the established Corporation practice of influencing freemens' voting by the distribution of gifts within its control - school and hospital places, charity funds, publicans' licenses, etc. Sir Thomas White's charity money, for example, was notoriously given exclusively to freeman Tory voters, many of them licensed victuallers also receiving preferential access to liquor licenses, and this figured regularly in Liberal complaints about Corporation partisanship.\textsuperscript{53}

The Municipal Corporations Commission was unequivocal in its condemnation of the political advantage that the Conservatives gained from the activity of the Corporation:

\textsuperscript{51} See Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{52} There were 300 new freedoms created from 1833 to 1835, P.P. 1837 (4) XLIV.51; Nossiter, Elections and Political Behaviour, p19. James Hudson testified that both parties were known to pay for the admission of freemen, P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.137.

this mode of distributing charities cannot be considered otherwise than as a species of bribery. There can be no doubt that its effect is to give to the Corporation an influence which they would not possess as members of society ... We were assured by several witnesses who had taken part in the elections, that when canvassing they had repeatedly been told by the poorer voters that their wish was to vote for them, but that they were prevented from doing so by a fear of losing the Corporation charities.  

For freemen, as the Liberals argued, there was "scarcely any stage in life in which these charities do not hold out any immediate or prospective benefit".  

James Hudson went so far as to attempt a quantification of the influence over freemen wielded by the Corporation:

I consider the Corporation influence, by means of their charities and other monies ... at least six or seven hundred.  

This influence was separate to that gained for the Conservatives (and the Liberals) by direct money payments at election-time to corrupt freemen, whom Hudson reckoned to number "at least 600" more.  

There was general agreement that cash bribery was confined to the freemen, a fact that was attributed to their lower economic standing (see Table 7.2) and their adherence  

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54 P.P. 1835 (116) XXV. 508-509, "First Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Municipal Corporations of England and Wales".  

55 Leicester Chronicle, 3rd January and 21st February 1835.  

56 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII. 129.  

57 Ibid., p128. Joseph Parkes agreed, putting the percentage of the total electorate receiving bribes at "one-sixth or one-fifth" (p93).
to ancient electoral tradition.\textsuperscript{58} Treating tickets were not given to householders, and the Liberal view (at least in public) was that the householders "with very few exceptions, are not capable of being bribed".\textsuperscript{59} Liberal victories in 1832 and 1837 were hailed as the triumph of the incorruptibility of the householders, and defeat in 1835 as the effect of Gladstone family money on the freemen,\textsuperscript{60} and Thomas Paget's much resented outburst against freeman venality at the 1837 election -

\begin{quote}
The Freemen of Leicester are a body of men - no not of men, they are REPTILES, who will sell their birthright for what is worse than a mess of pottage - a bottle of gin!\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

- both highlighted and intensified the friction between middle-class Liberalism and elements within the body of working-class freemen. The corrupt freemen did not conform to William Biggs' model of informed, morally-driven, voters responding at the pollbooths to their sense of civic responsibility.\textsuperscript{62} Referring obliquely to the freemens' retention of their votes in 1832, Biggs declared it

\begin{footnotes}
\item[59] P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.125-128.
\item[60] See Chapter 4. Leicester Chronicle, 19th January 1833; Leicestershire Mercury, 29th July 1837.
\item[61] See Chapter 4. Leicester Journal, 20th May and 21st July 1837. The Leicester Chronicle, 20th May 1837, denied that Paget had restricted his allegations to freemen.
\item[62] See Chapters 4 and 6.
\end{footnotes}
always a matter of regret that political power is in the hands of men who know not how to exercise it; giving, or allowing them to retain, the franchise, is like putting a sword into the hands of a madman or a fool.63

Ironically, although the Liberals were to be proved right that it was freemen taking bribes, it was not to be Conservative bribery that was most publicly exposed. Nearly all of the witnesses before the Select Committee into the petition against the result of the 1847 election who admitted they had taken money were freemen (and the agent who had made the payments was the Chairman of the Freemens' Deputies) - but the M.P.s whose elections were consequently voided were Liberals.64 The Liberal holier-than-thou attitude, maintained throughout the 1830s, was ultimately seen to be hypocritical. William Biggs, who had published his view that

... the unfortunate girl upon the town who prostitutes her person for money, is not half so bad, so extensively mischievous, as the man who knows the nature and value of a vote, and by selling it becomes a party to the ruin of his country,65


64 P.P. 1847 (381) XIII.243-397, "Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the Leicester Election Petition". The Chairman of the Freemens' Deputies was Lawrence Staines. Patterson, "Electoral Corruption", pp117-120; G.R. Searson, A Quarter of a Century's Liberalism in Leicester (Leicester 1850), p140.

65 Biggs, Letter to the Leicester Reform Society, p7.
thought it prudent after his management of the Liberal campaign in 1837 to be out of the country on business when the election petition was being heard.\textsuperscript{66}

In any case, corruption - either of the poorest freemen through cash bribery or of those "in a more elevated sphere"\textsuperscript{67} who accepted Corporation patronage - is not a sufficient explanation of voting behaviour variations between franchise groups. As events in 1847 showed, bribery was not the monopoly of one party, and the Corporation's stranglehold over municipal influence was broken with the first Town Council elections at the end of 1835. Although there were Conservative accusations that the new Town Council in turn used its powers of patronage to political ends,\textsuperscript{68} the freemen still voted with a Conservative bias (of 12% over the householders, and 16% over the Scot and Lot voters - see Table 7.8) in 1837. Contemporaries used the behaviour of a portion of the freeman body - and Hudson had his own reasons (in addition to the usual Liberal ones) for overstating the size of that portion - to exaggerate the clarity of the distinction between the freemen and the householders.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} Leicester Chronicle, 31st March, and 14th and 28th April 1837; Patterson, "Electoral Corruption", p116.
\item \textsuperscript{67} P.P. 1835 (547), VIII.129.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Eg., Leicester Journal, 14th, 21st and 28th July and 11th August 1837; Leicestershire Mercury, 15th July 1837; Journal of the House of Commons, Vol.93, p111 (4th December 1837).
\end{itemize}
If the multiply-qualified are put into the equation, the situation can be seen to be rather more complex (see Figure 7.1). Reworking the franchise group voting patterns from the linked pollbooks (with the exception of the 1839 results, which are given as they appear in the single pollbook) narrows the political margin between the freemen (i.e. those who are only qualified as freemen) and householders - indeed, in 1832, because of the greater propensity of the householders to give a non-partisan vote (see Table 7.8), the percentage of householders polling a straight Liberal double-vote for Evans and Ellis was actually slightly less than that of freemen.

That this is so is due to the greater Conservatism of the multiply-qualified, who emerge as second in the strength of their Tory sentiments only to the non-resident freemen. This same pattern has also been noticed among the multiply-qualified of Bath, who were also "usually richer than the elector with a single qualification".\(^6^9\) In both 1837 and 1839 in Leicester, the multiply-qualified were alone among resident voters in going against the overall result; in 1839 they polled only 49% Liberal, compared to the other householders' 63%. The consistency of their voting suggests that some previous assumptions about the motivations behind franchise voting behaviour, especially those concerned with the respective wealth

\(^6^9\) Drake, Introduction to Historical Psephology, pp87-88.
of the franchise groups, or with the connection between pre-Reform franchises and the Conservatives, need to be re-evaluated. The joint householder/freemen of Leicester shared much with the other householders, yet their voting was so dissimilar; the Scot and Lot voters and the freemen shared a pre-Reform tradition of participation, as well as economic and occupational attributes, but their voting was also consistently different. In neither of the boroughs examined here which employed franchise group membership as electioneering slogans can it, therefore, be said that "there was no correlation between the voters' behaviour and their electoral qualifications": it may be true that the difference in their voting was not directly a function of their qualification (as Moore suggests) - although the evidence from Leicester and Durham shows a picture of strongly self-defined groups - but rather was derived from inherently different social or economic orientations that were secondary to franchise group membership. The relationships between occupation and voting will be discussed below, as will that between religious denomination and voting.

Given the stability of franchise group electoral preferences, the relative size of the franchise groups was of primary political significance. For the

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71 See Chapter 8.
Conservatives in Leicester, the Liberal recruitment of householders in large numbers after 1832 held out the prospect of long-term electoral decline for themselves while the householder bias to the Liberals persisted. Through the 1830s the freemens' share of the electorate declined, from nearly 70% in 1832 (52% if the multiply-qualified are counted separately) to 53% in 1835 and 47% in 1837 (32%, without the multiply-qualified). This decline was largely not due to any failure of freeman recruitment to keep pace with losses from the electorate (not until 1839 did "non-returning" freemen out-number "new" freemen), but to the rate at which their recruitment was outpaced by that of the householders. In 1832, householders constituted only 41% of "new" voters; by 1839, they formed over 61% of "new" voters, compared to the freemens' 24% (see Figure 7.2). The turning-point - as Liberal party activity suggested - came at the 1837 election, when 416 "new" householders appeared, and only 240 "new" freemen; in 1839, another 235 householders new to the register polled, to only 91 freemen. The effects of the dynamics of "new" voter mobilization on party fortunes have already been seen - see Tables 6.4 and 6.12 and Figure 6.4. Overall, the number of householders voting increased from under 650 in 1832 to nearly 1,200 in 1837, an increase of 85%, while freemen numbers

72 P.P. 1833 (189) XXVII.149; P.P. 1837-8 (329) XLIV.609-610.
73 See Chapter 4.
Figure 7.2: "New" Voters, by Franchise Group, Leicester 1832-1839

Source=linked pollbooks
"Freemen" in 1832 includes non-residents. "MQ"=Multiply-Qualified.
remained relatively static at around 1,500. Freemen left the electorate in larger numbers than did householders, but the difference between their "drop-out" rates was not as dramatic as that between recruitment rates. The impact of the householders' growing numbers on the Conservatives' electoral fortunes was tangible. Whilst over three-quarters of Leigh's support in 1832 (i.e. the straight Conservative vote) had derived from freemen, the extent to which the Tories could depend on their freeman support was steadily eroded, until by 1837 less than half of Conservative support was given by the freemen, and in 1839 the percentage was only 31%. The built-in advantage enjoyed by the Liberals in householder recruitment, in other words, fully justified William Biggs' belief in the power of registration activity, and his (and other Liberals') attribution of victory in 1837 to it.

On the other hand, the Conservatives were the consistent recipients of non-residents' support. Although the non-resident freemen were marginalized participants in other forms of political activity in Leicester (living up to seven miles from the borough), their voting was of real benefit to the Tories: while only around 7% of the Liberal constituency at any

\[74\] P.P. 1837-8 (329) XLIV.609-610, gives 1,075 registered householders; the 1837 pollbook has 1,192 voting householders and 1,541 freemen.

\[75\] This figure includes the non-resident freemen, as they are not distinguished in the pollbook.
election was non-resident, around one-fifth of the Conservative vote came from non-resident electors. Many of these voters after Reform came from the same villages whose polling freemen in 1826 had been described as "processions of tenantry, headed by hired agents, bailiffs and middle-men".\textsuperscript{76} In 1837, of the fifteen villages who sent more than nine voters, only four registered Liberal majorities, and the four that did, exhibited a Liberal preference as extreme as that to the Conservatives elsewhere (see Table 7.9).

Hudson and the Liberals accredited such voting to the influence pressures applied by what Easthope's Morning Chronicle called "the parsonocracy and squirearchy".\textsuperscript{77} Grooby and Newton Linford's voters, for example, all of whom voted Conservative in 1837, were apparently "driven up to poll ... like pigs to market", and had been "coerced to vote for the Tories".\textsuperscript{78} On the other hand, the Liberals also accused the non-residents of being the most "buyable" of the constituency's voters. The "cooping" to which non-residents, easily identifiable in their respective villages, were habitually subjected, has already been described.\textsuperscript{79} James Hudson told the 1835 Select Committee that he would "strongly recommend" that the

\textsuperscript{76} Leicester Chronicle, 28th August 1826; Patterson, Radical Leicester, p150.
\textsuperscript{77} Morning Chronicle, 25th July 1837.
\textsuperscript{78} Leicestershire Mercury, 15th July 1837.
\textsuperscript{79} See Chapter 6.
non-residents should lose their borough votes, because they were "of a lower class" and nearly the whole of them are the very worst of the voters, those that are to be bought...\(^{80}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Liberal (%)</th>
<th>Conservative (%)</th>
<th>N= (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Grooby</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountsorrel</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newton Linford</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oadby</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratby</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rothley</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syston</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thurcaston</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thurcaston</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wigston</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Village voting" of the sort exhibited by Leicester's non-residents has been used to uphold models of deferential behaviour in the post-Reform electorate. A number of studies have used county-based "unanimous" voting to argue for the existence of voters acting as "members of geographically definable blocs", whose politics were determined by vertically-arranged social relationships.\(^{81}\) It is important, however, not to exaggerate the degree to which non-resident voting

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\(^{80}\) P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.137.

was qualitatively (as opposed to merely politically) different to that of electors living within the borough boundary. Certainly Leicester's non-residents displayed (in the context of deference) high levels of what has been termed "dissidence":\textsuperscript{82} Newton Linford and Grooby, in this respect, were untypical in their unanimity. Moreover, the smallness of the voting populations of these villages allows for the possibility that other "social" motivators - especially family relationships - may have been at work.

Leicestershire as a whole county electorate before 1832 displayed a comparatively high dissidence rate (and a correspondingly low uniformity rate)\textsuperscript{83} that suggested that influence pressures were not the only forces operating. Hudson's testimony that borough politicians of both political hues were involved in the mobilization of non-resident voters ("... there is generally an agent from each party in the village ...") through the traditional electoral agency of the public house is also strong evidence that what pressures there were on voters were not solely founded on a rural, anti-urban, Toryism,\textsuperscript{84} as was the large presence among the non-resident body of frame-work knitters, dependent on, and therefore orientated towards, the industrial

\textsuperscript{83} O'Gorman, "Electoral Deference", pp417-419.  
\textsuperscript{84} P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.126-127.
activity of the borough. Knitters made up around a third of non-resident voters.85

Leicester Liberals' antipathy to "county"-dwelling voters who had - anomalously, they felt - been allowed to remain in the borough electorate was only one facet of a general hostility to county politics, from which the Liberal-radicals had largely withdrawn after 1832 (symbolically, with Paget's retirement as M.P. for the County) until the South Leicestershire contest of 1841.86 The party balance-of-power in the County was very different: after 1835, the southern division returned only Conservative M.P.s, until 1867.87 Leicester was, as a result, extremely conscious of its political opposition to its surrounding countryside.88 The town had, after all, been deliberately placed in the southern division by the framers of the Reform Act, with the object

... of separating the manufacturing from the agricultural Population ...89

85 There were, for example, 157 framework knitters among the non-residents in 1839.


87 Moore, Politics of Deference, p259ff.

88 Vincent, Pollbooks, p121; Patterson, Radical Leicester, pp322-323; Moore, Politics of Deference, pp259-268.

89 P.P. 1831-2 (141) XXIX.137 ("Report from the Commissioners on the Proposed Division of Counties and Boundaries of Boroughs"). See Map 5.
The decision for Paget to run alone in 1830, because of the farmers' "disregard" for radical politics, was an pre-echo of the separation to follow.\footnote{Paget Mss., DG47/DE365/301, 9th and 10th August 1830; Braye Mss., 23D57 Part II. (Leicestershire Record Office). See Chapter 2.} Leicester had been, and continued to be, safeguarded from the operation of "county" interests (such as the pre-Reform ones attempted by the Manners and Frewen families\footnote{Thorne, House of Commons, iv.240-243; J.H.Philbin, Parliamentary Representation (New Haven 1965), pp118-119. See Chapter 2.}) by its size and the articulacy, cohesion and economic weight of the Liberal opposition élite - as well as by the seven mile qualification limit after 1832. As John Biggs recognized at the South Leicestershire contest in 1841, distance from the borough equated directly to anti-Liberalism:

> The greater part of the Electors, who espouse old Tory principles, are furthest from the Polling Places ...\footnote{Leicestershire Mercury, 5th June 1841; Moore, Politics of Deference, p260.}

Although borough Conservatives after 1836 sought to re-establish links to the county ("for the purpose of mutual co-operation and support"),\footnote{Annual Report of Leicester Conservative Society, 25th August 1836 (Leicester 1836), p5.} Liberals studiously attacked the legitimacy of rural politics. Thomas Paget, as the new Mayor in 1836, attacked the Lord Lieutenant's "fifty pound slaves"; William Biggs, in his maiden speech to the House of Commons in 1853,
was to decry (in terms which also illustrated the
distance travelled by the Liberals from their union
with popular radicalism in 1832) the link between the
county gentlemen and "the rabble", whom he declared
"united by their depraved tastes". Distaste for
their shared Conservatism, however, may have been as
powerful an incentive for such remarks as was dislike
for supposedly illegitimate electoral techniques. As
Hudson acknowledged, partisanship acted to stifle
objectivity in such matters:

We generally, I think, give our opponents the
worst motive rather than the best; we do not
put the most charitable construction upon
their conduct.

Whilst "rural" voters remained on borough
registers, "urban" voters, despite the Reform Act's
stated intention of separating interests, continued
to influence county elections. They continued as a
voting force despite, too, the general disinterest of
Leicester Liberals in the county registration
process. At the South Leicestershire election of

94 Searson, Liberalism in Leicester, p68; 3 Hansard
126, pp1090-1093 (4th May 1853); R.H.Evans, "The Biggs
Family of Leicester", in Transactions of the
Leicestershire Archaeological and Historical Society,
XLVIII (1972-3), p37.

95 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.130.

96 See Chapter 1. D.E.D.Beales, "The Electorate before
and After 1832: the Right to Vote and the Opportunity",
in Parliamentary History, II (1992), pp139-150,
describes the extent of the cross-over between county
and urban voters.

97 John Biggs was an exception: Moore, Politics of
Deference, pp260-264; see Chapter 4.
1841 - instigated by the borough Liberals as revenge against the Tories for their contesting of the borough by-election in 1839\textsuperscript{98} - county voters resident in Leicester polled convincingly differently to the "rural" voters and those who lived in the market-towns which served as the division's other polling places (Hinkley, Market Harborough, Lutterworth) (see Table 7.10). At an election which returned two Conservatives (Halforde and Packe), the Leicester voters, nearly 800 in total, gave a majority to the two Liberals, Gisborne and Cheney. These figures differ from those given for the same contest by D. C. Moore because Moore based his analysis only on the pollbooth used by each elector: in fact many non-Leicester residents came into the town to poll; conversely, a number of Leicester inhabitants polled elsewhere in the county. This explains why Moore found that "the Leicestershire Liberals even failed to gain a majority of the votes cast by the voters who qualified in respect of property in the borough",\textsuperscript{99} when in fact they demonstrably did

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Liberal \quad (\%) & Conservative \quad (\%) & N= \quad (\%) \\
\hline
"Leicester" voters & 53.7 & 45.8 & 796 \\
Rest-of-County & 25.1 & 74.1 & 3056 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{"Urban" Voting, South Leicestershire 1841}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{98} See Chapter 4.

have the support of most of those in Leicester. The Leicester voters provided over 35% of the total Liberal support in the contest - and only 14% of the Conservative vote - proving John Biggs right in his forecast that over a quarter of Liberal voters would live "within ten minutes walk of the Polling booth".\textsuperscript{100}

The retention by borough residents of county votes was not exclusively of benefit to Liberals. In Guildford, around half of the borough electorate (in other words, about 150 individuals) possessed a West Surrey qualification (see Map 6),\textsuperscript{101} and in the first three elections after Reform they proved consistently liable to give more support to a Conservative candidate than did the whole division electorate. In 1835, the difference was not great, the Guildford voters giving only a 2% greater share of their poll to the single Conservative candidate (Barclay), but in 1832 and 1837, the Conservative candidate topped the poll among Guildford voters while either failing to be returned (Sumner in 1832) or coming second to a Liberal (as Perceval did in 1837) in the total poll. In both elections, the Guildford voters' Conservatism ran seven to eight percentage points ahead of that of the rest of the West Surrey electorate. In 1832 this could be explained by their familiarity with George Holme Sumner, who had been their M.P. in 1790 and again in

\textsuperscript{100} Leicestershire Mercury, 5th June 1841; Searson, Liberalism in Leicester, pp100-101.

\textsuperscript{101} West Surrey Pollbooks, 1832, 1835 and 1837 (G.L.).
1830, and whose home at Hatchlands Park lay just outside the town.\textsuperscript{102} At the 1837 election, the Conservative George Perceval - son of the Lord Lieutenant - undoubtedly benefitted from the wave of Conservative feeling in the borough, inspired largely by the Government's Irish reforms, which returned Wall and Scarlett in the borough election.\textsuperscript{103} Surviving election material charting the Conservatives' campaigns in Guildford points also to the consistent appeal (at least up to 1837) in the town of agricultural issues. Sumner in 1832 promoted himself more as an agriculturalist than a Tory, an opponent of the "Manufacturers" supposedly dominating elections elsewhere, and a representative for all those dependent on the condition of agriculture.\textsuperscript{104} Both Barclay (an extremely wealthy brewer) and Perceval, in the subsequent elections, also stressed the primacy in their platforms of the Corn Laws.\textsuperscript{105} There was also rivalry between Guildford and the more radical towns of West Surrey - especially Godalming - acting to define Guildford's "Conservatism". Resentment at radical "Godalming influence" on the Board of Guardians of the

\textsuperscript{102} See Chapter 2. Thorne, House of Commons, v.322-324. Sumner's return for Guildford in 1806 was overturned on petition.

\textsuperscript{103} See Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{104} Sykes, Politics and Electoral Behaviour, pp196-201; G.3295 and G.3206 (handbills), n.d. (1832) (G.M.R.).

\textsuperscript{105} Eg., G.3242 (handbill), n.d. (1835); G.3214 (handbill), 3rd January 1835; G.3215 (handbill), 10th December 1834 (all G.M.R.).
Guildford Poor Law Union spilled over, for instance, into both borough and county elections. Guildford therefore exhibited in county contests before 1840 little of the alienation from rural politics demonstrated by Leicester. The county town was, for example, considered the natural home of a district branch of the West Surrey Conservative Association in early 1836 which pre-dated the foundation of any Conservative borough electoral organization.

The effect of "urban" voting on a county constituency was most pronounced in North Durham where, as has been described, less than 40% of those taking part in the 1832 election were not resident within a parliamentary borough (see Map 3). Of the "urban" voters, the majority were 40s. freeholders: nearly all of the county voters in the new parliamentary boroughs of Gateshead, Sunderland and South Shields were freeholders, but there were numbers of tenants and copyholders living in Durham (see Table 7.11). Three-quarters of the tenants-at-will lived in "non-urban" parts of the Division, whilst only just over a quarter of freeholders were "non-urban".

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106 G. 3404 and G. 3282 (handbills), n.d. (1837); see Chapter 3. For detailed discussion of these West Surrey contests, see Sykes, Politics and Electoral Behaviour, pp193-203, 223-235, 249-266.

107 County Herald, 9th January 1836; Surrey Standard, 9th January 1836; Sykes, Politics and Electoral Behaviour, pp250-252. The other branches were in Dorking and Chertsey.

108 See Chapter 2.
Table 7.11: Franchise Distribution, North Durham 1832

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification (%)</th>
<th>Freehold</th>
<th>Occupier Leasehold</th>
<th>Copyhold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Durham&quot;</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;South Shields&quot;</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Gateshead&quot;</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Sunderland&quot;</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;County&quot;</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(See Chapter 2, especially Figures 2.2 and 2.3)

The contemporary anticipation that a county voter's franchise would have an appreciable influence on his political preferences after 1832 was pervasive. Durham Whigs, following Lord Durham's lead, greeted the enfranchisement of the occupiers with grave suspicion:

The £50 occupiers of farms, are by far the most servile and stupid class of voters ... wrote one local Whig to Brougham, while Joseph Parkes, writing to Lord Durham, was typical in his attribution of the counties' swing to the Conservatives after 1832 to the tenants-at-will:

We have palpably by the Reform Bills exchanged the "Borough-Mongers" for "County-Mongers".


110 James Losh to Brougham, 1st December 1832, in E.Hughes, The Diaries of James Losh (Newcastle 1959), ii.219. Elsewhere, Losh described the £50 tenants as "as bad a constituency as could well be devised".

111 Lambton Mss., Parkes to Lord Durham, 26th August 1837.
Conversely, the urban freeholders were nationally and locally regarded as "a formidably active party against the aristocratic influence of the landed gentry".\textsuperscript{112}

In practice, and in contrast to what transpired in some other county constituencies,\textsuperscript{113} the voting of the four franchise groups in North Durham does not appear to have reflected any distinct qualification-based voting pressures, or opinions. The leaseholders were in 1832 and 1837 the least likely to poll a straight Liberal vote, and the copyholders were the least likely to be Conservatives (see Table 7.12): the two groups, however, were numerically insignificant in comparison with the freeholders and the occupiers.\textsuperscript{114} Neither in 1832 or 1837 did the voting of the freeholders as a whole differ greatly from that of the £50 tenants.


\textsuperscript{114} In 1832 there were 84 leaseholders and 193 copyholders out of an electorate of over 3,800; in 1837, there were 139 and 283 respectively, out of nearly 4,300 voters. North Durham Pollbooks 1832 and 1837 and P.P. 1837-8 (329) XLIV.552.
As examination of North Durham's voting by polling district suggested (see Tables 5.2 and 5.6), however, voting was influenced by factors specific to urban locality, and this was also evident in analysis based on voters' place of residence (see Figure 7.3). The "urban" voters in 1832 reflected their own town's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.12: Voting, by Franchise, North Durham 1832 and 1837</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1832:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Freeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Occupiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Leaseholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Copyholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1837:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Freeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Occupiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Leaseholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Copyholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NP=splits and unnecessary plumps)

reaction to the candidates. Although the party balance - calculated from straight party votes only - amongst "urban" and "non-urban" voters was identical (at just over 50% for Lambton/Williamson and 27% for Braddyll), there was considerable difference between the "Durham", "Sunderland", "Gateshead" and "Shields" voters who made up the urban contingent. The depressed Liberal straight vote in Sunderland (and, to a lesser extent, in Shields) was the manifestation of hostility to Williamson, while the emphatic Liberalism of Gateshead's county voters reflected the strength of
radicalism in that vicinity.\textsuperscript{115} This "marked sensitivity to the political complexion of the immediate neighbourhood" has been used to buttress the argument that "the best guide to county voting behaviour ... was the pattern of landownership", even in an industrialized county.\textsuperscript{116} Linking voting geographically - and by franchise - to the events of individual elections does not support this thesis, at least for North Durham. That numbers of voters in very specific localities could display extreme preferences has been acknowledged, as has the intervention of what may be termed "direct" influence in a very few, constrained, circumstances.\textsuperscript{117} The voting of most of North Durham's electorate, however, cannot be explained merely by the workings either of market or influence politics.

From Table 7.12, it seems highly problematic to justify the Liberals' condemnation of the £50 tenants as "a plague spot in the constituency".\textsuperscript{118} They certainly did not flood on to the register. In 1832 only 750 voted; in 1837, under 500.\textsuperscript{119} There was, instead, considerable evidence that, because of their

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} See Chapter 5.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Nossiter, Influence, pp60-61, 170-171.
\item \textsuperscript{117} See Chapters 2 and 5.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 26th May 1837.
\item \textsuperscript{119} North Durham Pollbooks 1832 and 1837; Prest, Politics in the Age of Cobden, pp28-31, notes that nationally the tenants were not the fastest to be registered after 1832.
\end{itemize}
numerical superiority in the Division, it was freeholders who were more likely to figure in any real or alleged illegitimate electoral practices. Henry Morton, for example, reported to Lord Durham that there are a very large number of 40s. Freeholders who are ready to sell themselves in the event of an election, chiefly pitmen and labourers ... 120

The geographical distribution of Liberal support, however, among the urban freeholders in 1832 - with Gateshead and Sunderland as extreme examples - strongly suggests that issues and real opinions were the deciding factors. Both Liberals and Conservatives privately confided uncertainty and concern over freeholder opinion, so that, for example, while Morton could feel in 1837 that the "lowest class of freeholders ... are under the domination of the Tories", J.J. Wright the next year could inform Londonderry that it was precisely among this "lower class of freeholder" that "we were weak at the last election". 121

120 Lambton Mss., Morton to Lord Durham, 30th October 1836; Nossiter, Influence, pp59-60.

121 Lambton Mss., Morton to Durham, 26th May 1837; D/Lo/C489, J.J. Wright to Londonderry, 11th January 1838.
"Wealth" and Spatial Voting Patterns

The process - and pitfalls - of inferring voters' wealth was defined in Chapter 1. Here, the results of tabulations between pollbook and rate-book data are used in three ways: correlations between rateable values and voting preferences are attempted for individual electors in Guildford and Leicester (where rate-books survive); in more general terms, a broader picture of the relationship between voting and "wealth" geographically within the boroughs (i.e. between the wards in Leicester and Guildford, and between selected areas of Durham City) is also undertaken, and throughout, "wealth" assessments provide both a source of cross-reference and support for the occupational categorization which will also be used to examine voting behaviour. The aim, in other words, is to test R.S. Neale's conclusion (after studying the voters of Bath) that

property distribution and its location were important in influencing class consciousness and voting behaviour. Regarded as indicators of income and social stratification... rental calculations show that stratification along a spectrum rich to poorer did help to shape voting preferences.\textsuperscript{123}

\underline{Guildford}

Interpreting the voting of those Guildford voters who could be linked to rating assessments (just over two hundred), gives no immediate clear-cut picture of an electorate divided economically. Only a few cautious hypotheses are possible. In both 1835 and 1837, voters splitting on Wall and Mangles constituted the "poorest" of the electorate, their rating assessments being more likely to fall into an under £20 band than were those of straight party voters at those two elections (see Table 7.13). This was more marked in the latter election, when the number of cross-party splitters was significantly reduced by the opportunity to give a straight Conservative double vote (Wall/Scarlett) for the first time since 1832: the Wall/Mangles constituency fell from 177 to 61 in the whole electorate\textsuperscript{124} and from 97 to 38 in the rates-linked population. The increased tendency to party-based voting in Guildford in 1837, as described in Chapter 6, appears to have occurred most forcefully among "wealthier" voters, with those who continued to


\textsuperscript{124} See Chapter 3.
choose the split vote falling into the lowest rating assessment bands. This can be seen most clearly by reaching an "average" rateable value for the three different voting bodies in 1837: the mean value for straight Conservative voters was £26.4, and that for the Liberal plumpers (for Mangles) £28.9, whilst the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Assessment</th>
<th>Under £20 (%)</th>
<th>£20-39 (%)</th>
<th>Over £40 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1835:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Conservatives</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Liberals</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Wall/Mangles split</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Conservatives</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Liberals</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Wall/Mangles split</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=201 in 1835, 207 in 1835)

Wall/Mangles splitters have an average assessment of only £10.4 (with only three assessments out of 38 being for properties worth over £20).¹²⁵

As these figures suggest, drawing an economic distinction between Liberal and Conservative voters is more problematic. The variation in the profile of the Conservative voters between 1835 and 1837 (see Table

¹²⁵ All three of the properties rated at over £100 were linked to Conservatives. Sykes' study also found only a narrow margin between the rateable values of Liberal and Conservative properties: Sykes, Politics and Electoral Behaviour, p260. See Nossiter, Influence, p172 and "Aspects of Electoral Behaviour", p176, for another example of a small borough (Gateshead) where Liberal aggregate property values topped Conservative ones.
7.13) does not necessarily mean that any significant structural change had taken place in the Conservative vote: the very low number of straight Conservatives in 1835 (only 14 in the linked sample) may render the 1835 result unrepresentative. The profile of the larger Conservative body (108) in 1837, however, may indicate the success of the Wall/Scarlett combination in attracting the support of an economically-diverse constituency.

The two parishes which formed the core of the borough, Holy Trinity and St. Mary's, display analogous wealth profiles and occupational structures, as the Boundary Commissioners in 1831 had predicted they would (see Tables 7.14 and 7.15). They shared the retailers and professional men of the High Street.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Assessment</th>
<th>Under £20 (%)</th>
<th>£20-39 (%)</th>
<th>Over £40 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holy Trinity</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Mary's</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

whilst having the same distribution of Craftsmen (IV), by far the largest occupational group. In contrast, the further-flung areas of St. Nicholas, Stoke and Shalford, which ringed the town and collectively formed the third electoral ward, had an occupational bias to

126 P.P. 1831-2 (141) XL.75-79.

127 Sykes, Politics and Electoral Behaviour, pp64-66.
Categories I and VI akin to that demonstrated by Leicester's non-residents, reflecting the different industrial structure of the surrounding countryside: two-thirds of the borough's "Gentlemen" and half of all "Labourers" were resident in the St. Nicholas, Stoke and Shalford ward. Moreover, while the percentage of voters who fell into Category VI increased throughout the borough in the decade after Reform, the growth of the "Unskilled" vote was fastest in the latter area. By 1841, over one fifth of all voters in the ward were in Category VI.

![Table 7.15: Occupational Structure, by Parish, Guildford 1835](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Categories (%)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holy Trinity</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Mary's</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Nich, S &amp; S</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=Holy Trinity 121, St. Mary's 112, St. Nicholas, Stoke and Shalford 105)

Discernible voting differences between the parishes occur only between St. Nicholas, Stoke and Shalford on the one hand and the two "core" parishes on the other. The clearest pattern is that of a greater - but diminishing - tendency for the St. Nicholas, Stoke and Shalford voters to cast a Wall/Mangles vote in preference to a Liberal one (see Figure 7.4). In 1832, they gave 55% to the Wall/Manges combination while Holy

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\[128\] Rural patterns of land ownership in St. Nicholas, Stoke and Shalford prevented any linkage of voters to ratebooks. See Chapter 1.
Figure 7.4: Voting for Wall/Mangles, by Parish, Guildford 1832-1841

Source: Pollbooks 1832-1841, St Nicholas, Stoke and Shalford

St Nicholas, S & S - St Nicholas, Stoke and Shalford
Trinity and St. Mary's electors polled 33% and 38% respectively. The margin of political difference between the three declined until 1841, when with Wall and Ross Donnelly Mangles in a new Liberal partnership, the three wards polled very similarly.

Leicester

The effect of property value distribution on voting behaviour has more often, for methodological reasons, been tested on the larger boroughs.¹²⁹ Analysis of Leicester's electorate, therefore, has the advantage of comparison against results obtained, for example, for such places as Leeds, Liverpool and Bath.¹³⁰

As found for other boroughs, there is an observable link between individual wealth and voting preference in Leicester. In the two elections whose pollbooks were linked to the ratebooks, "wealthier" voters tended to vote Conservative, and "poorer" ones

¹²⁹ Notable exceptions being Nossiter's demographic study of Gateshead (see note 125 above) and Phillips' examination of pre-Reform Maidstone and Norwich in Electoral Behaviour, pp272-278.

Liberal. However, the phenomenon is more distinct at the election that the Tories lost (that of 1837) than in 1835, which they won (see Table 7.16): the rating assessments of Liberal and Conservative voters in 1835 in fact correspond very closely. In 1837, the preference of "poorer" voters for the Liberals, with 70% of those who were assessed at under £20 voting for Duckworth and Easthope, is stronger than that of those in the over £40 bracket for the Conservatives (where the balance was 52%/48% in favour of Gladstone and Goulburn).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.16: Voters' Assessed Rates, Leicester 1835 and 1837</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rating Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under £20 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Conservatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Conservatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Liberals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=303 in 1835, 261 in 1837)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.17: Average Rating Assessments, Leicester 1835 and 1837</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, dividing voters into aggregated value brackets does not reveal the whole situation. In fact,

131 Drake, Introduction to Historical Psephology, pp86-88.
at both elections, the average rating assessment value for Conservative voters was higher than that for Liberals (see Table 7.17), the difference being more pronounced at the second contest.

Plotting the relationship between wealth and voting spatially confirmed the nineteenth century assumption that each ward's economic status influenced its political character.\textsuperscript{132} There were certainly wide variations in both the voting behaviour and the rating profiles of the seven electoral wards (see Map 7 for ward layout).\textsuperscript{133} A parliamentary report in 1837 proposed a new ward structure (which was not adopted) for the town precisely because of the inequitable distribution through the existing parish divisions of the various ratepaying "classes".\textsuperscript{134}

The major problem, reported the Commissioners, was St. Martin's, which lay in the centre of the town and had a disproportionate ratio of property to houses, … the proportion of the latter being very far inferior, not exceeding one-half of that in the smallest of the remaining Wards. This Ward, therefore, contains an undue proportion of the wealthier classes …

\textsuperscript{132} Eg. G.R. Searson, The Leicester Municipal, Borough and County Poll Book (Leicester 1883).

\textsuperscript{133} P.P. 1837-8 (238) XXVII.183ff.; the basis for Map 7 (to which ward boundaries have been added) comes from V.C.H., iv.340.

\textsuperscript{134} P.P. 1837 (238) XXVII.183ff. ("Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Report and Advise Upon the Boundaries and Wards of Certain Boroughs and Corporate Towns"); V.C.H., iv.365.
MAP 7: Central Leicester, Showing Municipal and Electoral Wards After 1835.
Small Boroughs are generally Conservative; the same is true of Wards. St. Martin's contains the least constituency, and returns the greatest number of Conservative Councilmen.\footnote{138}

The Tory character of St. Martin's shows clearly in its voting in 1837 and 1839 (see Table 7.19). Despite Liberal victories at both elections, St. Martin's voters gave Conservative majorities, the only group of resident voters to do so. The Liberals, canvassing in 1837, deliberately chose to go to the St. Martin's voters - in the "Headquarters of Toryism" - first, as an expression of their confidence.\footnote{139}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\hline
Ward & 1837(\%) & 1839(\%) & Rank & Rank \\
\hline
St. Martin's & 55.9 & 57.4 & 1 & 1 \\
North St. Margaret's & 38.1 & 36.6 & 4 & 5 \\
Middle St. Margaret's & 33.8 & 34.7 & 6 & 6 \\
East St. Margaret's & 49.7 & 53.8 & 2 & 2 \\
East St. Mary's & 42.6 & 41.7 & 3 & 3 \\
West St. Mary's & 37.9 & 39.6 & 5 & 4 \\
All Saints & 33.7 & 33.2 & 7 & 7 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Conservative Voting, by Ward, Leicester 1837 and 1839}
\end{table}

St. Martin's position as a "Tory island in the midst of a Liberal lake"\footnote{140} went further than its participation in parliamentary and municipal elections. Anglicanism in the parish had a particularly political character. St. Martin's was the only parish to carry a Church rate in 1839, in opposition to the Dissenters' campaign against them, which had been stepped up in

\footnote{138}{Searson, Leicester Poll Book, p9.}
\footnote{139}{Leicester Chronicle, 7th July 1837.}
\footnote{140}{Fraser, Urban Politics, p51; Patterson, Radical Leicester, p15.}
1836. It was the St. Martin's vestry which was responsible in 1840 for the seven month imprisonment, and subsequent martyrdom, of William Baines, for non-payment of the levied rate. Against the pattern of what had happened in every other parish, St. Martin's managed to levy a rate until as late as 1849.

The relative political loyalties of the wards were remarkably consistent between elections (Table 7.19). In fact, their political characters, according to Searson, changed little over the fifty years after 1835. The difference between the most Conservative ward (St. Martin's) and the least (on both occasions, All Saints) was over 20% in both 1837 and 1839. Much of the contemporary reasoning for this situation revolved around the variations in economic make-up evident between them.

East St. Margaret's, for example, second to St. Martin's in Conservatism in 1837 and 1839 (Table 7.19), and the only ward to return any Conservatives to the first Town Council, owed its politics, thought Searson, "to its comparative "respectability"", something that shows in its voters' occupational

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141 Fraser, Urban Politics, pp49-53; V.C.H., iv.207-208; Searson, Liberalism in Leicester, pp85, 92-96, 146.


143 See Leicester Chronicle, 7th July 1837.

144 Searson, Leicester Pollbook, p19. Of the three Conservatives returned (out of six), two topped the poll.
profile (Table 7.20). The three wards with the highest proportions of Category I voters ("Gentlemen and Professionals") were the three most Conservative in 1837 and 1839 (St. Martin's, East St. Margaret's and East St. Mary's). The three also had the highest ratios of householders to freemen (with 54%, 56% and 50% respectively in 1837), and the highest incidences of multiple-qualification: in 1839, over a quarter of St. Martin's voters possessed more than one qualification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Categories (%)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Martin's</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North St. Marg.'s</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle St. Marg.'s</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East St. Marg.'s</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East St. Mary's</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West St. Mary's</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Saints</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

St. Martin's, East St. Margaret's and East St. Mary's also had the lowest craftsmen percentages (IV) - all under 50%. In contrast, those wards where craftsmen (large proportions of them framework knitters) were the most dominant in the electorate were the most Liberal. The other two wards of St. Margaret's - by far the most populous in Leicester, containing about half of the population of the town and experiencing the most dramatic rates of growth in the
1830s\textsuperscript{145} - were considered to hold radical sentiments because their voters were "chiefly working men", and because they experienced hardships unknown to the enfranchised residents of East St. Margaret's. The fact that Middle St. Margaret's, in particular, had played such a "conspicuous part in the political agitations" of the 1830s and 1840s was attributed to "the energy of despair".\textsuperscript{146} If anything, however, North St. Margaret's was considered, and considered itself, more radical. The ward which brought John Markham to radical prominence, and was therefore dubbed "the Headquarters of Chartism", North St. Margaret's, took its voting, whether for parliamentary or Town Council seats, very seriously:

\begin{quote}
In this quarter of the town it has never been customary to talk of politics with bated breath, or to make the assertion of principles pleasant all round.\textsuperscript{147}
\end{quote}

The triumph of Liberal Dissent in St. Margaret's over the vestry of the parish - which, like that of St. Martin's initially strove to uphold its right to levy a Church rate - was largely due, as well as to the transformation in municipal power effected in 1835, to the pure weight of Liberal opinion in the parish. The

\textsuperscript{145} Patterson, Radical Leicester, p15; P.P. 1837 (238) XXVII.195: out of just under 10,000 inhabited houses in the borough, over 6,000 were in St. Margaret's.

\textsuperscript{146} Searson, Leicester Pollbook, pp10-13.

\textsuperscript{147} Searson, Leicester Pollbook, p10.
Liberals acquired control in 1838, when the St. Margaret's Churchmen made their final attempt to retake the parish. Until 1835, the Church in St. Margaret's operated effectively as an electoral agency closely allied to the Corporation. The Tory candidates in 1835, for example, were introduced to the electors at a meeting chaired by the vicar of St. Margaret's, the Reverend A. Irvine.

The two Wards of St. Mary's displayed differences in voting behaviour which could also be correlated to occupational structure (Tables 7.19 and 7.20). East St. Mary's, the third most Conservative in both 1837 and 1839, was designated by Searson "the Opulent Ward", containing as it did the "fashionable quarter" which included New Walk - which one visitor described as "the only solely respectable street in Leicester" - and the other elegant avenues of what were in the 1830s the suburbs of the town (see Map 7). Its Category I group was proportionately twice that of its sister ward (20.6% to 10.2%), which had a 10% greater Category IV presence (Table 7.20). West St. Mary's registered the

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148 See Chapter 4; Fraser, Urban Politics, pp49-51; V.C.H., iv. 256; Patterson, Radical Leicester, p247; Searson, Liberalism, p71ff.

149 Leicester Journal, 2nd January 1835; Patterson, Radical Leicester, p189, 222.

150 Leicester Chronicle, 10th July 1847; Patterson, Radical Leicester, p367.

151 Searson, Leicester Pollbook, p14; C.Ellis, History in Leicester (Leicester 1976), p111ff.; Patterson, Radical Leicester, pp166-167.
lowest percentage of householders (under 30% in 1837) and correspondingly the highest preponderance of freemen. Although the voters of East and West St. Mary's were, especially in 1839, not separated in their polling by many percentage points, their approaches to politics were thought (at least by Searson looking back later in the century) to be of a contrasting nature. While East St. Mary's was "tranquil and serious", West St. Mary's voters "in the good old times" openly enjoyed their political involvement:

political enthusiasm ... was raised to the appropriate pitch, by something stronger than tea, whatever that might be. It is, however, a fact that the excitement of victory sought relief in sheep roasting and beef eating, harmless celebrations said to conduce to party unity and strength.\(^\text{152}\)

The seventh ward, All Saints, gave the most enthusiastic reception, both in person and in political support, to Duckworth and Easthope in 1837, for which the Mercury praised it as "independent and public-spirited".\(^\text{153}\) The ward included "some of the narrowest streets, lanes, and most cribbed and confined courts to be found in Leicester"; the Boundary Commissioners reported that over three-quarters of the inhabited houses in the parish were assessed in 1837 at under £10.\(^\text{154}\) The percentage of craftsmen (IV) in All Saints was the highest in the borough (58.8% in 1837, see

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\(^{152}\) Searson, Leicester Pollbooks, pp15-16.

\(^{153}\) Leicestershire Mercury, 15th July 1837.

\(^{154}\) Searson, Leicester Pollbook, p17; P.P. 1837 (238) XXVII.195.
Table 7.20). It was in All Saints that Markham chose after the 1841 election, and the split with the Cooperite Chartists, to base his own brand of Chartism.\footnote{See Chapter 4. For All Saints' rôlé in Chartism, see T. Cooper, The Life of Thomas Cooper, Written By Himself (London 1874), pp143-185; S. Roberts, "Thomas Cooper in Leicester 1840-1843", in Transactions of the Leicestershire Archaeological and Historical Society, LXI (1987), pp62-76; C. Ellis, J. F. C. Harrison, "Chartism in Leicester", in A. Briggs (ed.), Chartist Studies (London 1959), pp99-146.}

The consistency with which the political environment of the wards was translated into partisan voting, and maintained over time, confirms the potency of highly localized influences. "Community loyalty" complemented the powerful identification with national political parties that Leicester's electorate showed throughout the 1830s. Elsewhere, local orientations (what Nossiter called the "great responsiveness to the political complexion of the immediate neighbourhood")\footnote{Nossiter, Influence, pp170-171 and "Aspects of Electoral Behaviour", pp172-173.} have been used to argue for the continuing power of geographically-specific "influence" pressures after 1832, and correspondingly the relative lack of contact with the context of national politics.\footnote{Eg., Drake, Introduction to Historical Psephology, p89, following Moore.} However, as Leicester showed, borough-wide involvement in nationally-defined partisan politics had crucial local dimensions, which reinforced rather than undermined the relevance of party labels. Party battles were being
fought out at all the different levels of the town's politics, and these, as well as the national context of the party balance, coloured the electoral responses of individual voters.\textsuperscript{158} Other studies of large boroughs have also shown these links between voting behaviour and very specific, spatially-defined, borough divisions. Municipal voting in Leeds and in Liverpool demonstrated extensive and consistent variations in party performance in their wards. However, attempts to correlate each ward's voting to its wealth proved in both cases only partially successful, and this was true also for Leicester, where economic rankings of individual streets bore only a limited relationship to the degree of Conservatism in the same streets (see Table 7.21).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Relationship of the Conservatism and "Wealth" of Selected Streets, 1835 and 1837}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
 & Economic Ranking & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Conservatism} \\
 & (see Table 1.7) & 1835 & 1837 \\
\hline
Gallowtree Gate & 1 & 2 & 1 \\
High Street & 2 & 3 & 6 \\
High Cross & 3 & 7 & 3 \\
Causeway Lane & 5 & 1 & 5 \\
Welford Road & 5 & 6 & 7 \\
Nicholas Street & 6 & 4 & 2 \\
Sanvey Gate & 7 & 5 & 8 \\
Jewry Wall Street & 8 & 8 & 4 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{158} Fraser, Urban Politics, passim.
Durham

It is much more difficult to talk about "wealth" distribution among voters in Durham City, because of the lack of surviving rate books for the period. Discussion here, therefore, is of a more tentative nature than that for the other boroughs. Some indication, however, of the relative prosperity of areas of the City can be gained from the calculations of the Boundary Commissioners in 1831 and in 1837, and from a socio-geographical study of the town as it was in 1850.\textsuperscript{159}

The wealthiest areas stand out in all three analyses. The College (consisting of the clerical residences behind the cloisters of the Cathedral) and the North and South Baileys, had very high average per capita annual house values in 1837 (£68.5, £40.5 and £23.4 respectively); all of the houses in the College and all but three houses in the Bailey qualified as £10 houses in 1832; all had, relative to the other parts of the City, extremely low proportions of houses rated at under £20. Together they formed the crux of the "socially distinctive" Peninsula:

\textsuperscript{159} P.P. 1831-2 (141) XXXVII.269-272; P.P. 1837 (238) XXVII.369-374; S.B.Holt, Continuity and Change in Durham City: An Historical Geography of a Nineteenth Century Small Town (Unpubl. Ph.D. Thesis, Durham 1979).
The situation is a very desirable one, being separated from the dense population of the Town, and protected from any risk of further building ... The houses are nearly all of a respectable class, and there is scarcely any poor population whatever.\textsuperscript{160}

In contrast, the overwhelming majority of rateable values for houses in places like Framwellgate, Crossgate and Gilesgate, were for less than £20 in 1850. The Boundary Commissioners considered there to be in Gilesgate

scarcely any respectable shops, and very few houses of a better class ...\textsuperscript{161}

In 1832, only around 40% of Gilesgate's houses were thought to be good enough to confer a £10 vote.\textsuperscript{162} Framwellgate too had "the appearance of great poverty".

These descriptions are confirmed by the occupational profiles of the voting populations of different areas of the town: those of 1835 are representative (Table 7.22). The voters of the College and the Baileys, and Elvet, shared a strong bias to Category I: all of the College electors in 1832, 1835 and 1837 belonged to the "Gentlemen and Professionals" group. Crossgate and Gilesgate - which contained many involved in the mining crafts (ropers, tinners,

\textsuperscript{160} P.P. 1837 (238) XXVI. 369-373; P.P. 1831-2 (141) XXXVIII. 271. Overall in 1850, 84% of houses in Durham were assessed at less than £20: Holt, Continuity and Change, pp399, 461-466, and especially Table "Rateable Value of Dwellings by Township, Durham 1850", p698.

\textsuperscript{161} P.P. 1837 (238) XXVI. 369-370.

carpenters)\textsuperscript{163} - contributed to the electorate large numbers of such (mainly freemen) craftsmen; in both areas, craftsmen (IV) constituted two-thirds of those entitled to vote. Claypath and the Market Place's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Categories (%)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The College</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claypath</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossgate</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elvet</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framwellgate</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilesgate</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Place</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Bailey</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Bailey</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

electorates unsurprisingly contained many retailers (III), amongst whom featured (here separated into their own Category - V) sellers of drink in disproportionate numbers.

Political preferences - here defined, because of the complications arising from the inter-Liberal conflicts, according to the degree of Conservative plumping - were stable over the first three elections after Reform (see Table 7.23). Correlation with either economic wealth or occupational structure, however, is low. While the Chapter members of the College only ever cast one non-Tory vote, the Baileys, despite

\textsuperscript{163} Holt, Continuity and Change, p447.

\textsuperscript{164} N=North Bailey 13, South Bailey 11, College 5, Market Place 37, Claypath 80, Gilesgate 97, Framwellgate 76, Elvet 47, Crossgate 26.
sharing with the College a similar socio-economic structure, were, as befitted the headquarters of Dr. Fenwick and the Durham Whigs, much more diffident in their support for Trevor. Between 1832 and 1837, never less than 55%, and twice around two-thirds, of North

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1832 (%)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>1835 (%)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>1837 (%)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The College</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossgate</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framwellgate</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilesgate</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>4=</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Bailey</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>4=</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claypath</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elvet</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Bailey</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Place</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and South Bailey voters failed to cast a vote of any sort for Trevor, even given their involvement in the Whig-Radical disputes. Elvet too, despite its dominant group of "Gentlemen and Professionals" (I) was in 1832 and especially in 1837 ranked low in Conservative plumping: there was, however, a significantly high percentage of Trevor/Harland (Tory/Whig) splitting in Elvet in 1837, deriving both from tactically-minded Conservatives and disgruntled Whigs.165 Gilesgate's relative Tory bias, on the other hand, may arguably be linked more to the operation of Londonderry influence, given the Marquis' ownership of much of Gilesgate,166 than on independently-determined party choices. This

165 See Chapter 5.
166 See Chapter 5.
behaviour was, as elsewhere, only relative, and does not equate to any absolute political distinctions.

Poverty or wealth, therefore, cannot for Durham be proved to have been a primary determinant of localized voting patterns. Franchise group membership, and - more arguably - occupational status (two factors interwoven with residential patterns) generated clearer lines of political division.
Occupational Voting Behaviour

The occupational structures of the three borough electorates, which in no case had undergone as drastic a transformation in 1832 as might have been expected,\(^1\) did not experience major changes during the first decade after Reform. The ratios of the occupational groups to each other remained fairly constant in spite of the degree of movement of electors on to and out of the registers described in Chapter 6 (see Table 8.1).

Also consistent were the wide variations between the voting patterns exhibited by the occupational categories: the margin of difference in their support for Conservative candidates, for example, never fell below 24% in any borough, and ranges of over 40% were not uncommon, being registered at at least one election in each constituency (see Figures 8.1, 8.3 and 8.4).

More important, however, is the consistency of the correlation between occupational groups and political preference. What was the meaning, if any, of

\(^1\) See Chapter 1, especially Tables 1.4 - 1.6.
Figure 8.1: Conservative Voting, by Occupation Categories, Guildford, 1832-1841

Source: Pollbooks 1832, 1835, 1837 and 1841. "Conservative Voting" = "plumps" 1832 & 1835, doubles 1837 & 1841
Figure 8.2: Wall/Mangles Voting, by Occupation Categories, Guildford, 1832-1837

Source: Pollbooks 1832, 1835 and 1837
Figure 8.3: Conservative Voting, by Occupation Categories, Leicester, 1832-1839

Source: Pollbooks 1832, 1835, 1837 and 1839
their electoral diversity? From the many studies which have done of the occupational biases to voting, the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Categories (%)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guildford:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1832</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1841</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leicester:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1832</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1839</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Durham:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1832</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1837</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Determining the relative allegiances of the occupational groups is complicated by those local factors which - except in Leicester - encouraged split-voting at some elections and thus made comparisons of behaviour over time more problematic. Partisan Conservatism in Durham, for example, was not incompatible with a Tory/Whig split in 1835 or 1837 (whatever Trevor and the Advertiser said), while the motivations behind different types of Liberal vote in those elections also varied enormously. In Guildford, the significance of voting for the Wall/Mangles combination (the phenomenon which kept Conservative

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2 Neither of the 1843 by-election pollbooks gives complete occupation information.

3 See Chapter 5.
straight voting so low in 1832 and 1835 - see Figures 8.1 and 8.2) underwent a metamorphosis by 1837. Such sea-changes in the basic attitudinal framework of voting behaviour must be retained as the analytical context of voting choices. Only in Leicester did the fundamental political significance of party preference - in the form of the vote combinations polled - remain constant over the decade.

Even given these caveats, the relative preferences of the occupation categories appear to demonstrate a measurable stability. When defined according to their "Conservatism" (taken as the percentage of straight Conservative votes polled), a pattern of stability over time emerges (see Tables 8.2 to 8.4), especially in Leicester, where the size of the Categories was naturally the largest, and the least prone to the over-influence of individuals in a small voting population (Guildford's Category II, for example, comprised only about a dozen individuals, and Durham's less than ten at each contest, while Leicester's numbered around two hundred).

| Table 8.2 : Conservative "ranking" of Occupational Categories, Leicester 1832-1839 |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| I     | 1  | 1  | 1  | 2  |
| II    | 5  | 6  | 6  | 6  |
| III   | 4  | 4  | 4  | 4  |
| IV    | 6  | 5  | 5  | 5  |
| V     | 2  | 2  | 3  | 3  |
| VI    | 3  | 3  | 2  | 1  |

*See Chapter 3.*
Category I: The Gentlemen and Professionals

The inclination of Leicester's "Gentlemen and Professionals" towards the Conservatives (see Figure 8.3 and Table 8.2 - only in 1839, when they came second to Category VI, was Category I not the most Conservative of all the Categories) is perhaps the clearest of the biases visible amongst Leicester occupational groups: at no election up to 1839 did their support for the Conservatives register less than 60%, so on three occasions running counter to the election result. At first sight, they therefore appear to corroborate Vincent's view of the professional urban classes as part of a

Table 8.3: Conservative "ranking" of Occupational Categories, Guildford 1832-1841

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1832</th>
<th>1835</th>
<th>1837</th>
<th>1841</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.4: Conservative "ranking" of Occupational Categories, Durham City 1832-1837

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1832</th>
<th>1835</th>
<th>1837</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
coalition of "outs", of those who could not quite be fitted in, operating under the hegemony of the outside forces of the countryside, as a fifth column within the gates of bourgeois Liberalism. 

Lawyers and doctors, at the core of this group, were in other citadels of urban Liberalism the leaders of this Tory voting, Vincent surmises, because of their necessity for patronage from the landed classes. In Leeds and Bradford, representatives of the legal and medical professions were emphatically Tory, "the champions of the existing order". In Leicester, Conservative lawyers and doctors outnumbered Liberal ones at every election.

In the far larger group of "Gentlemen", Conservatism was also dominant, except in 1839. Of the 163 "gentlemen" who voted in 1832, 95 (nearly 60%) were

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7 Doctors: 1832, 11 Cons., 6 Lib.; 1835, 13 Cons., 10 Lib.; 1837, 16 Cons., 10 Lib.; 1839, 15 Cons., 9 Lib. Lawyers (including Barristers, Attorneys, Solicitors): 1832, 3 Cons., 2 Lib.; 1835, 4 Cons., 1 Lib.; 1839, 13 Cons., 2 Lib.; 1839, 12 Cons., 1 Lib.
Conservatives; in 1835, the percentage was 68%; in 1837 56%, and in 1839, 49%.

As "wealthy" voters, the Conservatives of Category I might not elicit surprise. However, if the focus is shifted from the whole constituency to the wards, the influence of locality reasserts itself, and Vincent's stress on rural influence is validated. The voting of 1837 was typical (see Table 8.5).

Of the resident Category I voters, in fact only those of four of the six wards gave Conservative majorities. In the wards which have already been described as the most Liberal (especially All Saints and Middle St. Margaret's), the "Gentlemen and Professionals" proved themselves as least as Liberal as the rest of their electorates. The voting of the non-residents, who contributed nearly a quarter of the Category I voters in 1837, distorts the behaviour of the whole group, in a stark example of urban/rural

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**Table 8.5: Conservative Voting of Category I, by Ward, Leicester 1837**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Conservative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Martin's</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North St. Margaret's</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle St. Margaret's</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East St. Margaret's</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East St. Mary's</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West St. Mary's</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Saints</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Residents</td>
<td>88.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

8 See Vincent, Pollbooks, pp64, 125.
9 See Chapter 7.
division. If the non-residents are removed, the Conservative tendency of Category I falls appreciably — from 69% to 64% in 1835, from 64% to 54% in 1837, and from 65% to 57% in 1839. The resident "Gentlemen and Professionals" were always more Conservative than Liberal — but never as much so as the non-residents.

Category I in Leicester, overall, does not in this analysis appear to demonstrate one distinct, group-interest-based opinion of its own, instead reflecting immediate environment in a way which Nossiter thought more inclined to be found among voters "lower down the scale". However, there may be common forces at work across the borough affecting the Conservativism of Category I that are largely unquantifiable, for example the effects of higher education, given that "so much of higher education was an Anglican preserve", and therefore, also the question of religious affiliation.

Category I voters in Guildford registered predominantly among Wall/Mangles splitters in 1832 and 1835 (see Figure 8.2) and then strongly among Conservative partisan voters in 1837 and 1841 (Figure

10 Nossiter, Influence, pp170-171; Idem., "Aspects of Electoral Behaviour in English Constituencies 1832-1868", in E.Allardt and S.Rokkan (eds.), Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (New York 1970), pp160-189. Nossiter does agree that "The professional classes were themselves not immune from this local influence" but his definition of the "influence" at work is different to that used here.

11 Vincent, Pollbooks, p125.
8.1). The extent to which "wealthier" voters participated in the switch to more party-based voting in 1837 has already been noted. A correlation between rates of higher partisanship (for whichever party was chosen) and "élite" occupations within the pre-Reform electorate was also discovered by Phillips in at least one of his boroughs, leading him to conclude that "the higher an individual's standing on the social scale, the more likely he was to cast straight-party ballots". In Guildford, where the ruling powers of the town were all Conservative, it might have been predicted that the post-1837 partisanship of Category I would be more Tory than it was.

Durham provides a slightly different picture of Category I voting. "Plumping" for Trevor (the lone Conservative candidate from 1832 to 1837) ran at a consistent level (see Figure 8.4) of around one-third. Even before the inter-Liberal warfare of


13 See Chapter 7.

14 This finding was for Maidstone: J. A. Phillips, Electoral Behaviour in Unreformed England: Plumpers, Splitters and Straights (Guildford 1982), pp264-267.

1837, Trevor voters were liable to give splits to the Whig Harland (13% in 1832 and 17% in 1835).\(^{16}\) Straight Tory voters were always outnumbered by Liberals (in 1832, 48% of Category I electors gave a Harland/Chaytor vote), although a growing percentage of Liberal voting in 1835 and 1837 took the form of Whig or Radical plumps. As might be expected, Harland in 1837 did far better among Category I voters than did Granger, thanks to the Bailey Whigs and those who shared their diagnosis of Lord Durham's politics. A quarter of Category I votes in 1837 were for Harland (45% including splits with Granger and 62% including splits with Trevor) compared to only 6% for Granger.

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*Category II: "Merchants and Manufacturers"

The smallness of Category II in Guildford and Durham rendered their contributions to election results minimal. In no election in the 1830s did Durham's "Merchants and Manufacturers" comprise more than 2% of either party's support, and their impact in Guildford was not much greater.

Leicester, however, with its idiosyncratic industrial structure, not only had a much larger Category II, but also one with a qualitatively different political influence. Consistently around two hundred strong, the Category contained the major

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\(^{16}\) See Chapter 5.
employers of the town - minus those who appeared as "Gentlemen" in Category I - including the most prominent of the political élites of both parties. Manufacturers greatly outnumbered merchants and other dealers, who largely appear in the pollbooks as the single representatives of their occupations (with the exception of a dozen or so "Coal Dealers" and "Timber Merchants"). The backbone of the group was naturally provided by the hosiers, comprising 150 to 180 voters, or around 5% of the electorate. Cotton, glove, lace, lambs' wool, tape and worsted manufacturers supplied most of the rest of the Category's membership. Of the social élite identified by Freer among the Radical Dissenters in the 1830s, all belonged to business families, and all but one (the notable exception of Thomas Paget, who came from a family of bankers) to manufacturing businesses. Six of the eight were hosiery or spinning businesses. In both their

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17 See Chapter 1 for definition of the group, and Appendix 1 for its full composition.

political and industrial capacities, these voters wielded considerable electoral presence.\footnote{J. Garrard, Leadership and Power in Victorian Industrial Towns (1983), esp. Chapters 2 and 3; R. Trainor, "Urban Elite in Victorian Britain", in Urban History Yearbook (1985), pp1-17; D. Fraser, Power and Authority in the Victorian City (Oxford 1979).}

Their voting itself was staunchly Liberal (for the voting of the "hosiers" see Table 8.12 below). Only in 1832 were they not the most fervent anti-Tories of the occupational groups (Table 8.2 and Figure 8.3). In the Tory victory of 1835, it was only the Category II voters, together with the Craftsmen, who gave a Liberal majority (Table 8.6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1832</th>
<th>1835</th>
<th>1837</th>
<th>1839</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This picture of a committed Liberal group stands up to examination across the wards, 1837 again being typical (see Table 8.7 - since there were only three non-resident members of the Category, their voting has been omitted).

The Liberalism of manufacturers in Leicester mirrored that of other large industrialized constituencies. In Leeds, where one in five voters was a merchant or a manufacturer, the latter were heavily biased to Whig candidates (while merchants tended to be
more Tory). Woolstaplers and Wool Merchants were strongly Liberal in Leeds, but were Conservative in Bradford.

Table 8.7: Conservative Voting, by Ward, Category II voters, Leicester 1837

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Conservative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Martin's</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North St. Margaret's</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle St. Margaret's</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East St. Margaret's</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East St. Mary's</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West St. Mary's</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Saints</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was not, however, only in industrialized boroughs that these Liberal sympathies were evident. In places as diverse as Carlisle, Huddersfield, Ipswich, Liverpool, Maidstone, Oldham, Preston and Reading, merchants and manufacturers were more Liberal than Tory.


22 Nossiter, "Aspects of Electoral Behaviour", pp170-171; Vincent, Pollbooks, passim.; Fraser, Urban Politics, p228. However, Gatrell has shown that the Liberalism of merchants and manufacturers in Manchester in the 1830s was only lukewarm at the polling booths: Gatrell, "Incorporation", pp39-41.
Voting, however, was only one facet of this group's electoral involvement. Through leadership of political organizations - of which the Biggses, and especially William in 1837, were the epitome - members of Category II imposed their perception of both local and national politics on to the nature and tone of Leicester's elections. William Biggs' rhetoric, promulgated in the pages of the Mercury, was more responsible in 1837 for establishing the public face of Liberal partisanship, with its stress on the battle against ancient Tory corruption (in which battle, according to this philosophy, working men and their employers were united) than were the addresses of the candidates. As a group, the politically-minded manufacturers derived the legitimacy of their leadership from their identification with the interests of the town, and articulated it in ideological terms appropriate to their self-perceived rôle. This approach triumphed in 1835-7, with the final push for municipal power, but permeated the decade.23

Moreover, there were constant allegations that employers on both sides utilized their positions to exert pressure on their workmens' voting. The Mercury, after the election of 1837, claimed that fifty-five Liberals "in the employ of Tory manufacturers ... were either sent out of the way or compelled to vote against

23 Freer, Business Families, passim.
their consciences". The Conservatives retaliated with allegations against Liberal employers. During the contest, twenty-seven Liberal manufacturers, in supposed response to a Tory manufacturer's threats, publicly promised employment to any voter discharged for supporting Duckworth and Easthope: "No man, therefore, need vote contrary to his principles on this account". James Hudson, himself a manufacturer, also pointed out that the fact that there were both Liberal and Conservative hosiers in the town undermined the threat of lost work:

if trade is good, we are anxious to please our men, and do not contend the point with them; if trade is bad, a man does not dare vote against the wishes of his master; many are told, if you do not vote for me, I will take your frames from you; but that is generally met, as there is a considerable portion of manufacturers on both sides. In 1832 there were a great number of frames changed hands ... it was said, if you do not vote for us, we will turn you off; that brought forward the opponents, that work would be given to any men who lost their work by their vote.

More precise measurement of industrial deference, enforced or otherwise, is rendered impossible for Leicester in this period because of the multiplicity of relationships between masters and men in the

24 Leicestershire Mercury, 12th August 1837. See also Leicester Chronicle, 15th December 1832, 19th January 1833 and 3rd January 1835.

25 Eg. 9D52/2 (handbill) 15th July 1837 (L.R.O.); Leicester Journal, 14th December 1832.

26 Leicestershire Mercury, 15th July 1837.

27 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.131. Hudson claimed that the largest manufacturers in the town were "exceedingly anxious for the ballot" (p136).
unmechanized framework industry: it certainly cannot be quantified from the pollbooks.\textsuperscript{28}

\textit{Category III: "Retailers"}

Between the capitalist business-owners of Category II and the Retailers of Category III, there was a varying degree of economic distinction, from constituency to constituency. In Leicester, the economic separateness of the manufacturers was clear (Figures 1.6 and 1.7).\textsuperscript{29} For Guildford, however, the merchants/retailers division was less discrete (Figure 1.8), but also less crucial, because of the numerical insignificance of the Category II group.

How distinctive were the politics of the shopkeepers? Nationally, Nossiter ascribed to what he termed the "shopocracy"\textsuperscript{30} an ardent radicalism derived

\textsuperscript{28} For the rôle of Lancashire factory owners in electoral mobilization later in the century (and especially after 1867), see P.Joyce, Work, Society and Politics (London 1980), eg. pp201-239, which argues for the existence of factory-based deference blocs.

\textsuperscript{29} Freer, Business Families, p165: the merchants of Leicester were "undeniably part of the commercial capitalist class". See also Nossiter, "Shopkeeper Radicalism in the Nineteenth Century", in T.J.Nossiter, A.H.Hanson and S.Rokkan (eds.), Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences (London 1972), pp407-438.

from their "acute political consciousness, heightened by their marginal position in the social structure in the front line of class antagonism". Their organizational capacities led him to portray the shopkeepers of the North East as "a much more credible threat to the established order than the working man", especially in the light of their numerical weight on electoral registers after 1832. In the northern boroughs, shopkeepers constituted "rarely less than 30% and often as much as 40% of electorates". 31

There is general agreement that after the upheavals of the 1830s, shopkeepers played a central rôle in the creation and maintenance of an urban Liberalism defined by attachment to ideals of political individualism and self-respect, that they operated as a political body as a bridge between petit-bourgeois and working class concerns, and that they regarded their political involvement as legitimate. 32 For Hanham, shopkeepers typified Mill's model of the ideal


political activists.\textsuperscript{33} As the Sunderland Herald put it:

The tradesmen and middle orders of society ... are inferior to none in patriotism and intelligence, and probably unequalled by any for the steadiness and constancy of their attachment to their principles.\textsuperscript{34}

Leicester retailers were certainly sensitive to attacks on their own political legitimacy. When the Tories jeered at Wynn Ellis' candidacy in 1832 and 1835, labelling him "The Ludgate Hill Haberdasher", and questioning his value as an M.P. since he has a business to attend to, ... has no education, and has passed the greater part of his life being a counter,\textsuperscript{35}

the Liberals naturally sprang, indignant, to the defence of men of business generally, and retailers in particular:

Is it then any discredit that his father rose in the world by his industry and sobriety? Who but a senseless blockhead esteems the man who becomes rich by the accident of birth more than he who is honestly the architect of his own fortune?\textsuperscript{36}

However, the shopkeepers of Leicester were throughout the 1830s not as Liberal in their voting as


\textsuperscript{34} Sunderland Herald, 11 August 1837.

\textsuperscript{35} Leicester Journal, 21st September and 14th December 1832. In fact, Ellis was a "wholesale silk merchant ... latterly the largest in London": F.Boase, Modern English Biography (London 1965), p987; Patterson, Radical Leicester, pp186, 197.

\textsuperscript{36} Leicester Chronicle, 3rd January 1835.
either the Craftsmen (IV) or the Manufacturers (II) (Table 8.2 and Figure 8.3). In 1835, for example, they, together with the "Gentlemen and Professionals" (I), the Drink Interest (V) and Labour (VI) gave a majority of support to the Conservatives. Even taking into account the Tory bias of the non-resident freemen, the retailers in 1837 in the context of their wards were generally only as Liberal as was the whole borough electorate (Table 8.8). 37 St. Martin's and East St. Margaret's shopkeepers followed their wards' Conservatism.

Retailers were, therefore, not the standard-bearers of Liberal-radicalism in Leicester, although they did play a crucial supportive rôle. 38 Several factors militated against their taking the prominent position in politics that Nossiter observed elsewhere. They could not compete with the manufacturers and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Conservative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Martin's</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North St. Margaret's</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle St. Margaret's</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East St. Margaret's</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East St. Mary's</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West St. Mary's</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Saints</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Residents</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37 Excluding the non-residents, Category III voting in 1837 was 44% Conservative to 56% Liberal, nearly exactly the same proportions as the overall contest supplied.

38 Nossiter, "Shopkeeper Radicalism", p413.
professionals for control of campaigns or political organizations; their general absence from the ranks of the tightly-bound social élite, dominated by the large-scale capitalists, in the 1830s has already been mentioned. They were also subject to a different set of pressures than were the members of Category II. Shopkeepers were - along with beersellers - the most frequent recipients of Corporation patronage before 1835. Moreover, it was they who were most critically affected by the social antagonisms generated by partisan politics:

> It is scarcely credible what has ... been the effect of party spirit among all classes of society, even between gentlemen and the lower classes, and the consequences have been most injurious to shopkeepers ..." exclusive dealing" was practiced in Leicester by all ranks of society. Hudson reported one such incident:

> I heard of a conversation with a lady, and she said "We should not now think of dealing with a man who voted against us".

Although Hudson reckoned that working men in Leicester were "generally in debt to the shopkeepers" and

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40 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.129 (Hudson).

41 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.96 (Parkes).

42 Morning Chronicle, 6th January 1835.

43 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.131.
therefore not in a position to put pressure on retailers' voting, the instances of exclusive dealing reported in the Leicester press were uniformly blamed on members of the working classes. William Biggs denied responsibility for a pro-Liberal handbill in 1837 which urged:

Let no Man ... enter the shop or public house of the Man who votes against You!! Let their fruit rot in their gardens - their ale go sour in their Cellars - and their goods become moth-eaten upon their shelves!!

It was, he claimed, the work of "Working Men, who have since expressed regret". Ellis similarly condemned "a handbill ... put forth by the working classes" which was, he thought, "especially injurious to his interest, and to the principles of civil liberty". The impact of (or threat of) exclusive dealing was sufficient, however, to influence some shopkeepers' electoral behaviour:

there are an number of retail shopkeepers decline to vote altogether; they do not vote because they know they shall lose some of their customers if they do; the election is followed by a very ill feeling.

The exclusive dealing practiced in Durham (or rather, mainly attempted) by Londonderry and the clergy

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44 Leicester Journal, 21st January 1837.
45 Leicestershire Mercury, 22nd July and 19th August 1837.
46 Leicester Chronicle, 10th November 1832.
47 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.131.
has been noted above. The retail sector in Durham was rather smaller than that found by Nossiter in other northern boroughs - at around one fifth of the electorate (Table 8.1) - and was certainly less political than, for example, the shopkeepers of Sunderland, whose opinions Lord Durham was warned to cultivate. Although the members of Category II appear from Figure 8.4 to have been disinterested Conservative voters, they in fact increased the share of their votes to Trevor - particularly in the form of splits - during the 1830s. In 1832, Trevor received less than half the number of retailer votes of Harland (and many less than Chaytor); in 1837 he actually garnered more of shopkeepers' votes, two-thirds of them as splits, than either the Whig or Radical. This sort of Conservative support provided a contrast to the voting of the shopocracy in Newcastle, where

48 See Chapter 5; A.J.Heesom, ""Legitimate" and "Illegitimate" Influences: Aristocratic Electioneering in Mid-Victorian Britain", in Parliamentary History, 7 (1988), pp282-305; D/Lo/148, "A List of Tradesmen..1843 and 1844".


50 Lambton Mss., Williamson to Lord Durham, 26th December 1832, 18th March and 6th April 1833; Hedworth Lambton to Durham, 1st January 1833; Raine Mss., vol. 7, f.3 (11th March 1833); Sunderland Herald, 3rd June 1831 and 11th August 1837; Nossiter, "Dock Politics", pp78, 84-85; Fraser, Politics and the Victorian City, p42; Heesom, "Parliamentary Politics 1830 to the 1860s", in Sunderland: River, Town and People (Sunderland 1988), p93.

shopkeepers made up nearly half of the post-Reform electorate.\footnote{Nossiter, Influence, pp148-151; Idem., Elections and Political Behaviour, p162ff.; Stoker, Elections and Voting Behaviour, pp230-240.} The Conservative agencies may have targeted the Durham shopkeepers as disillusioned Reformers, especially after the split in "left" politics of 1835 and 1837. The Chronicle, for example, thought the high turnout of shopkeepers at the Conservative annual dinner in 1837 due to "gratuitous tickets".\footnote{Durham Chronicle, 20th January 1837. Londonderry, however, had almost constant trouble from Durham and Stockton shopkeepers because of his unpaid bills, eg. D/Lo/C142(21), Buddle to Londonderry, 2nd July 1830.} However, those Liberal shopkeepers in 1837 who did not choose to split on to Trevor were (unlike Categories I or II) much more likely to be Radicals than Whigs: only 9% of Category III gave a Harland plump, compared to 21% Granger plumps.

Category III in Guildford was in 1832 far more likely than any of the other groups to choose a straight Liberal double vote (Mangles/Norton) rather than a split on to Wall, or a Conservative plump: their resentment of Wall's opposition to Reform persisted.\footnote{See Chapter 2; Sykes, Politics and Electoral Behaviour, pp189, 206.} This relative preference for Liberal voting (which Tables 8.3 and Figure 8.1 only partially show) was also evident at the next three elections, although in diminishing contrast to the rest of the electorate (see Table 8.9).
The "respectable and independent" retailers ("for most of whom it was not necessary in order to live, to continue in business"\textsuperscript{55}) benefitted at first hand from the variety and prosperity of the town's commercial concerns in the 1830s. A trade directory described the advantages that Guildford enjoyed:

> the retail trade is very extensive, rarely subject to adverse fluctuations and derives material support from the great thoroughfare position of the town.\textsuperscript{56}

Their relative economic security, shown in the value of shopkeepers' houses, was shown in Table 1.8. These voters could not have been overly concerned about exclusive dealing pressures from below.\textsuperscript{57} There is some evidence, however, of attempts by members of the upper classes of county society to pressurize Liberal, and especially radical, shopkeepers to resist political identification with their working class customers, in line with advice given by the Surrey Standard:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & 1832 & 1835 & 1837 & 1841 \\
 & (%) & (%) & (%) & (%) \\
Liberal straight & 54.4 & 43.3 & 39.7 & 55.4 \\
(whole electorate) & 35.0 & 34.3 & 26.9 & 51.8 \\
Wall/Mangles split & 28.1 & 41.8 & 11.0 & \\
(whole electorate) & 40.9 & 52.4 & 17.4 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Voting of Category III voters, Guildford, 1832-1841}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{55} 3 Hansard 5, pp538, 29th July 1831 (Scarlett).

\textsuperscript{56} Pigot's Pocket Gazette of England (London 1837), quoted West Surrey Times, Our County Town (Guildford 1889).

\textsuperscript{57} Nossiter, "Aspects of Electoral Behaviour", p171.
Nothing is more natural than that a gentleman should prefer to deal with tradesmen who sympathise with him in political sentiments; let each Conservative, therefore, however trifling his consumption, follow the system now in general adoption by the destructive faction...  

In 1841, the Onslow family name, as well as Sumner's presence, was employed during Currie's canvass to intimate "to certain tradesmen" which way they ought to vote; Wall, looking to exploit the resentment that this caused, made a point of reminding electors that his campaign had been "unaccompanied by any of the great Aristocrats". When the later Mayor, Henry Peak, looked back at the elections of the period, he considered that "there were not lacking proofs that a blacklist was used against tradesmen".

**Category IV: "Craftsmen"**

Craftsmen numerically dominated all three borough electorates, accounting for just under 40% of all voters in Guildford, and around half the electorate in Durham and Leicester (Table 8.1). Nationally, their

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58 Surrey Standard, 29th July and 19th August 1837.

59 Morning Chronicle, 15th June 1841; G.6108 (handbill) n.d. (1841).


61 See Nossiter, "Aspects of Electoral Behaviour", p168, for some boroughs where the craftsmen were enfranchised in smaller numbers; O'Gorman, "Electoral Deference", p408, and Voters, Patrons and Parties, p203, discusses the predominance of craftsmen in the "unreformed" electorate, as does Green, "Social Structure, p239.
numbers on the registers entitled them, with the shopkeepers, to the title of "the electoral footsoldiers of Liberalism".62

In Guildford, only in 1841 did the craftsmen show themselves to be partisan Liberals (voting 59.7% Wall/Mangles to 33% for Scarlett/Currie). In previous contests, they had been much more liable than the shopkeepers, for example, to give split votes for Wall and Mangles in preference to a straight Liberal vote (Figures 8.1 and 8.2). Their relative reluctance to abandon split voting in 1837 may have reflected, in the light of their Liberal support in 1841, a greater personal attachment to Charles Baring Wall than some of the other occupational groups.

Durham's craftsmen, two-thirds of whom were freemen (Table 7.6), included many of the Londonderry colliery employees, and this may partially explain their comparatively strong Conservative showing and the dichotomous nature of their voting (Figure 8.4 and Table 8.4). In 1835 they gave the highest percentage of plumps for Trevor of any occupational group (44.6%). There was, however, a broad and tenacious Liberal allegiance within the group. Although the straight Liberal vote disintegrated among craftsmen voters by

62 V.A.C. Gatrell, "Incorporation and the Pursuit of Liberal Hegemony in Manchester 1790-1839", in D. Fraser (ed.), Municipal Reform and the Industrial City (Leicester 1982), p19.
1837, having registered in the first election after Reform at a high point of 45%, to 12% (see Table 8.10),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1832 (%)</th>
<th>1835 (%)</th>
<th>1837 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Double-Vote</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whig Plump</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Plump</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split on Trevor</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the degree of cross-party voting did not, unlike higher up the occupational ladder, significantly increase.

Instead, the Liberal craftsmen responded sharply to the Whigs' desertions in 1835 by plumping for Granger in 1837: craftsmen accounted for nearly two-thirds of the Granger plumpers given. In this respect, the Whig/Radical schisms after 1832 are revealed to have had a solidly social foundation. Together with the retailers, the Liberal craftsmen, when the division came, mostly followed Lord Durham's brand of politics whilst former Reformers among the professions and upper middle-classes chose Whiggism and compromise with Conservatism. Because of the numbers of craftsmen involved, the significance of their support was enormous. As Stoker argues, regarding the "shopocracy" as the basis of Radicalism is to underestimate, in Durham's case at least, the importance of craftsman support.63 For craftsmen, there was little cross-over

63 Stoker, Elections and Voting Behaviour, pp224-234. The same is true, of course, for Conservative support: at none of the three elections (1832, 1835, 1837) did craftsmen make up less than 55% of the total straight Conservative vote.
between the Conservative and Liberal camps in the intervals between elections (for reasons among which the "influence" politics of Lambtonite and Londonderry electioneering featured), suggesting that the "market" aspect of elections was not, in the polling context, an unduly destabilizing factor. 64

The domination of Leicester's craft sector by the framework knitters and others (for example, the spinners) with a set of relationships with both political élites interwoven with work-generated conflicts in the 1830s, gives an extra dimension to the patterns evident in the category's voting. Leicester's craftsmen do not, for instance, conform to Vincent's "urban peasant" description of the (much smaller) group of craftsmen voters in Rochdale, whom he found to be composed of many examples of a specific type of working-class voter:

... not a factory hand but a craftsman in a traditional skill, possibly a proprietor of a small workshop, more probably self-employed, and certainly able to aspire to a proprietary position.

While Rochdale craftsmen "were not, by mere fact of occupation, under the thumbs of an employing oligarchy", 65 those of Leicester's electorate who were stockingers (or glove hands, or lace hands, or wool or worsted spinners, or combers) largely, in the 1830s,

64 Nossiter, Elections and Political Behaviour, pp309-312.

65 Vincent, "Electoral Sociology", pp82-83. For a critique of the "free peasantry" notion, see Neale, Class and Ideology, pp62-74.
were. There were, of course, many enfranchised craftsmen whose work experience must have allowed them more autonomy; men like the cabinet makers, coach builders, saddlers, tailors, and watchmakers, the small producers belonging to a long-standing artisan tradition, who were geared either to a direct customer relationship or to a small, localized, retail outlet, and who might very well themselves be employers.66 Such craftsmen might look beyond "mere townspeople" for their customers, and form links to landed society,67 but were also "the heart and soul" of pre-Reform independence groups.68 There was also in Leicester (as in Nottingham) an occupationally diverse group, including such craftsmen as the framesmiths, involved in the "classically petit-bourgeois activity" of putting-out and frame-renting.69 However, workers in Leicester's staple hosiery and spinning industries did outnumber master artisans and middle-men in the electorate, the framework knitters alone constituting around 40% of the craft vote, despite the obvious fact


67 Vincent, Pollbooks, p15.

68 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, pp282-283.

69 Crossick, "Petite Bourgeoisie", p85; P.P. 1845 (609) XV.135.
that only a very small proportion of such workers possessed a vote.\textsuperscript{70}

As a group, the Craftsmen (IV) competed with the Manufacturers and Merchants (II) for the position of least Conservative (Figure 8.3 and Table 8.2). In 1832, only 30\% of craftsmen gave a Conservative vote, and only 37\% of Conservative support overall came from craftsmen voters (compared to 62\% of Liberal support). Alone with Category II, the craftsmen gave the Liberals a majority in 1835 (56\%): the Conservatives' triumph in capturing the seats was thus the greater for having been achieved without the concurrence of by far the largest occupational sector.

High percentages of Liberal craft support were not uniform in other boroughs. Nossiter concluded that craftsmen as a whole "were reasonably evenly divided between the three parties", whilst finding, according to local circumstances, large Liberal majorities in a number of places such as Newcastle, Sunderland and South Shields.\textsuperscript{71} In Bath, too, a craft group composed mainly of skilled and independent artisans proved, in their support for Roebuck, their Radical sympathies.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{70} See Chapter 2 for estimates of the total number of stockingers.

\textsuperscript{71} Nossiter, "Aspects of Voting Behaviour", pp170, 189, and "Voting Behaviour", p382 ("artisans outside the more venal market towns were ... substantially Radical").

\textsuperscript{72} Neale, Bath, p356 and Class and Ideology, pp45-46, 51-54, 70-71.
Broken down into the wards, Leicester's craft voters of 1837 show the borough-wide extent of their Liberal consensus (Table 8.11). Even in St. Martin's, Category IV voters were more Liberal than Conservative. The non-residents again are shown standing outside an urban accord, although their Conservative majority was not large.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Martin's</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North St. Margaret's</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle St. Margaret's</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East St. Margaret's</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East St. Mary's</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West St. Mary's</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Saints</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Residents</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike the hosiers among the manufacturer voters, the framework knitters in the craftsmen group proved more Liberal than their colleagues after Reform, in contrast to their voting in 1826 (see Table 2.2). Initially, in the election of 1832, the knitters were demonstrably more predisposed to give a Liberal vote than were their employers (who included in their number such Conservative luminaries as James Rawson); in 1835 and 1837, the gap had closed, and in 1839, with no appreciable decline in the Liberal framework knitter vote, the hosiers were the (slightly) more Liberal (Table 8.12).
That the knitters' Liberal electoral allegiance had been maintained since 1837 confirms that, a year after the establishment of Chartism, and despite both working-class hatred of the Poor Law, and Liberal suspicions of a Tory-Radical alliance, in 1839 the Tories had not succeeded in their attempts to drive a wedge between the working and middle-class sections of Liberal opinion at the level of the polling booth.\(^\text{73}\)

It can only be conjectured what might have happened to the knitters' voting had the Chartists succeeded in running Colonel Thompson as an independent candidate, or had the Conservatives found a candidate more to working-class tastes than Charles Hay Frewen.\(^\text{74}\)

\(^{73}\) See Chapter 4; Leicester Chronicle, 17th November 1838, and 16th and 23rd March 1839; Leicestershire Mercury, 27th October and 3rd November 1838; Patterson, Radical Leicester, pp302-308.

\(^{74}\) Patterson, Radical Leicester, pp307-308; Searson, Liberalism in Leicester, pp86-86.
Category V: "The Drink Interest"

Vincent's description of the late nineteenth century drink interest as

the perfect example of a pressure group - a sharply defined group of people organized to defend their economic interest by rational electoral pressure, uninvolved in general political issues and without ideological overtones,\textsuperscript{75}

does not hold true for the elections of two decades earlier. Whereas Rochdale's drink interest in 1857 operated as a single unit, beersellers alongside publicans and brewers,\textsuperscript{76} the drink interests of Leicester, Guildford and Durham in the 1830s were divided socially against themselves, and politically between constituencies by the local contexts within which they voted. As such, they act to back up

Nossiter's assertion that, for this period, the direct involvement of publicans in the events of election-times and the unpolicitized nature of brewing in general acted to produce diverse patterns of "drink interest" allegiance.\textsuperscript{77}

Unlike the drink trades in some northern towns (as in Oldham), which were apparently "the mainstay of

\textsuperscript{75} Vincent, Pollbooks, pp18-19.

\textsuperscript{76} Vincent, "Electoral Sociology", pp77-79.

the radical vote", the very small drink interest in Guildford turned out to have been composed of committed Conservatives, who switched with enthusiasm from Wall/Mangles splitting in 1832 and 1835 to Conservative double-voting in 1837 and 1841 (Figures 7.5 and 7.6). There were, however, only just over a dozen individuals in the group on each occasion. They were, as shown in Figure 1.8, on the whole, well-off voters.

The influence of alcohol on Durham and Leicester elections is more fully chronicled. In Durham in the wake of the Beer Act of 1830, Trevor headed criticism of the rowdy and largely unregulated beershops, and went as far as to introduce anti-beershop proposals into the House of Commons in 1832 (the same year in which he was himself accused of being drunk while canvassing). There was certainly plenty of drink available in the City. In a trade directory for 1834, ninety-one "Taverns and Public Houses" and ten wholesale retailers of beer are listed, exclusive of

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78 J. Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: Early Industrial Capitalism in Three English Towns (London 1974), pp52-55, 218; A.E. Musson, "Class Struggle and the Labour Aristocracy 1830-1860", in Social History, III (1976), pp335-356. See K.T. Hoppen, Elections, Politics and Society in Ireland 1832-1885 (Oxford 1984), pp39-43, for his contention that the drink interest was to be found among "the most reliable forces within the anti-Tory camp" in Ireland.

the more lowly, uncounted, beershops. The 1843 election petition highlighted the central rôle in electioneering played by the public houses, which acted as the candidates' head-quarters, the sources of treating for voters, the rallying-points from which voters on polling day were collected, and the scenes of post-election financial transactions. John Buddle appropriately used public house metaphor to bemoan the cost to Londonderry of winning freemens' loyalty (in this case, in 1830):

... the Tap is now open, and will continue to run, like a spout, until the election is over.

Well might John Bright urge voters in 1843: "... don't get drunk at elections - nor at any other time, I would say".

The enfranchised members of the drink trade had thus an added pecuniary interest in elections. Even if their businesses were not chosen specifically for election activity, they must all have benefitted from


81 P.P. 1843 (433) VI.169ff. The "head-money", for payment of which Dungannon lost his seat, was paid in "The Wheatsheaf" on Claypath.

82 D/Lo/C142(21), Buddle to Londonderry, 28th July 1830.

83 Durham Chronicle, 7th April 1843.
the increased consumption engendered by a contested election.\textsuperscript{84}

The political complexion of the innkeepers and publicans\textsuperscript{85} who made up the group was Liberal (Figure 8.4 and Table 8.4). In 1832 and 1835 half the drink interest polled a straight Liberal vote, and straight Conservative voting was correspondingly low. At the 1837 election, the Whig/Radical combination held up better among the representatives of drink than among any other occupational category, with over 30% support, which combined with the 25% Liberal plumps they gave, overshadowed the mere 16% given to Trevor.

In Leicester, innkeepers were said to have had a particularly direct relationship with election business. For a start, the chief agents of both parties at the 1832 election were themselves publicans.\textsuperscript{86} Joseph Parkes included Leicester in his description of boroughs where "innkeepers are ... subjected to a very direct bribery" because of the practice, employed by both parties, of "opening" a string of public houses in which to treat their voters:

\textsuperscript{84} Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, pp118-122; Harrison, Drink, pp343-345.

\textsuperscript{85} Eg. 1832 Durham Pollbook= 23 Innkeepers, 13 Publicans, 4 Brewers and Maltsters.

\textsuperscript{86} Lawrence Staines and John Adams. Patterson, Radical Leicester, pp196-197; Leicester Journal, 10th October 1834.
the innkeeper comes to the committee room and makes a most direct bargain, "If you do not open my house, I will not vote for you" ... 87

It was in these public houses that voters exchanged the "district tickets" (whose daily value was estimated at between 3s. 6d. and 5s.) entitling them to "meat and drink" without charge. Hudson denied any knowledge of overt bargaining of this sort on the part of the publicans, but agreed that "the opening of public-houses is a mode of bribing the publican" and that the practice had been especially prevalent at the 1835 election. 88

As Harrison points out, drink as electoral corruption did not necessarily equate simply into political influence. 89 Although sellers of drink in Leicester were among those who most visibly benefitted from Corporation patronage, 90 the Liberals before 1835 gained the gratitude of non-freeman beershop owners persecuted by the Corporation, for their unsuccessful campaign to ensure that the Corporation did not contravene the free-trade conditions of the 1830 Beer

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87 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.125-127. The other boroughs known to have the same practice were Stamford, Warwick and Stafford.

88 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.127, 130-131.

89 Harrison, Drink, pp343-344.

90 See Chapter 5; Patterson, Radical Leicester, pp95-96; Greaves, Corporation of Leicester, pp86-89; P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.130-131.
Act.\textsuperscript{91} How many of these men had the vote after 1832 is not clear; in general, though, the drink interest - most of them publicans - did do well out of the Reform Act. Numbering only 174 out of a total electorate of over 4,770 in 1826, the drink category had by 1839 grown to 271 voters out of only just over 3,000 voters, nearly 9\% of the electorate.\textsuperscript{92}

The influence of the Tory Corporation could, however, be seen on their voting (Figure 8.3), the Conservative vote dropping sharply away between 1835 and 1837, with the Liberal takeover of municipal power. From levels of 64\% in 1832 and 68\% in 1835, the publicans' and innkeepers' support for Conservative candidates plunged to 47\% in 1837 and 48\% in 1839 (a movement of opinion not reflected in Table 8.2). With their intimate relationship with municipal authority, the drink interest seems to have been the most immediately politically responsive of the occupational groups to the changed political conditions after 1835.

\textsuperscript{91} Leicester Chronicle, 5th February 1831; A Letter to the People of Leicester on Corporate Reform ... by "Z" (Leicester 1833), p10; Patterson, Radical Leicester, p186.

\textsuperscript{92} Leicester Pollbooks 1832 and 1839; Harrison, Drink, pp81, 343.
Unskilled electors were "virtually unrepresented in the newer industrial towns, and uncommon in the old" after 1832. In Leicester, which had a population of over 53,000 in 1841, no more than 280 "unskilled" voters participated at the 1839 by-election, and sixty of them were non-residents voting from outside the borough limit. In Guildford, there were only 54 Category VI voters in 1841. The Reform Act had effectively, and deliberately, structured the borough electorate for the task of resolving "supra-working-class" conflicts.

All three boroughs correspond to the model of general bias to Toryism amongst the voters at the bottom of the occupational scale that has been described for other constituencies (see Figures 8.1, 8.3 and 8.4). In almost every election, the Category VI Conservative vote is greater than that of the skilled craftsmen. On the one significant occasion on which this was not true, in Durham in 1835 (Figure

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93 Nossiter, Influence, p167.


95 Fraser, Urban Politics, pp222-223; Vincent, Pollbooks, pp26-32. See Chapter 1.

96 Vincent, Pollbooks, pp58-60.
the reduced Category VI straight Tory vote is attributable to tactical voting against Radicalism.

Vincent ascribed the phenomenon of Tory urban labourers to the accumulated effects of "their fewness and corruptibility", together with the fact that the unskilled lacked certain attributes necessary to the development of a radical political consciousness (namely "literacy and some leisure"), and that they shared little common experience, and indeed in some places possessed mutually hostile perspectives, with skilled artisans.97

If this last were true, it might be expected to be most clearly visible in Leicester, the most industrially-stratified of the three constituencies, and indeed, the margins of difference between the voting of craftsmen and that of the unskilled are at the greatest in Leicester (Figure 7.7). At all four elections after 1832, the unskilled were at least 20% more Conservative than the craftsmen. Together with the "Gentlemen and Professionals", they gave Conservative majorities at every contest, and the extent of this predisposition did not decline after the municipal turning-point of 1835.98

In Guildford, Category VI electors were - again in parallel with the Category I voters - conspicuous

97 Vincent, Pollbooks, pp16-17.
98 Vincent, Pollbooks, p59: voting of labourers in Leicester in 1847 - 17 Liberal to 30 Tory.
enthusiasts for Wall/Mangles splitting before 1837 (Figure 7.6) and among their number were those defined above as the "poorer" voters who remained as cross-party voters in 1837.

Religion

Until well after 1885 to know an Englishman's denomination was to know perhaps his most important electoral characteristic.  

Unfortunately, individual-level data on the attribute of religious denomination, which from so many contemporary accounts emerges as a (if not the) driving force behind some boroughs' voting, is the most troublesome to collect. Anecdotal evidence can, however, be supplemented with some contemporary aggregate data for Leicester, and the identification of a large body of Dissenters was possible for Guildford; in all the constituencies, a few voters whose religion was also their occupation could also be distinguished within the pollbooks.


The political confrontation between Church and Dissent permeated elections in the 1830s. At the level of national issues, the position and survival of the Established Church was a frequently-occurring Conservative election "cry", most effectively employed, in the form of the "Church in Danger" slogan, in 1835. In Leicester, disestablishment was a key tenet of Dissenting politics. On a more pervasive level, political momentum came from the urban social functions of religious affiliation and the behavioural framework it provided, giving individuals "a set of political objectives", growing naturally from denominational membership. Such political objectives were greatly heightened in relevance to individuals by the sense of severe grievance felt by Dissenters historically excluded from local power. In the municipal arena of towns with numerous and politicized Dissenters, the critical resolution of the obstacles barring them from full participation, and the establishment of a political infrastructure within which their views could find full expression, had a direct impact on the parties' relative electoral fortunes.

The development, for at least some constituencies, in the eighteenth century of a clear

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102 See Chapter 4.
103 Fraser, Politics and the Victorian City, pp32-33.
electoral relationship between Whiggism and Dissent has been described by O'Gorman and Phillips. In Northampton and Norwich, Dissent underlay the growth of partisan voting patterns, and correlated more strongly with voting behaviour than did other socio-economic determinants. Even where partisanship had not established itself as the basis of polling, religion - for nonconformists at least - acted to shape behaviour by defining and hardening political allegiances, and laid the groundwork for greater partisan sophistication. O'Gorman has estimated that, for around half of those constituencies where concepts of "party" behaviour prevailed (among which he numbered Leicester), religion provided a major impetus behind partisanship before 1832, for historical and geographical reasons as well as ideological ones. As after 1832, however, it is difficult to disentangle religion as a factor in individual electoral responses from voters' other social attributes. Although Phillips found his nonconformists to be evenly distributed, occupationaliy, through the electorate, and concluded that the voting preferences of Dissenters "were not hidden correlates of occupational and/or economic differences", electoral managers

105 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, pp360-362.
106 Phillips, Electoral Behaviour, pp300, 305.
acknowledged the difficulty of assessing the relationship between religion and other influences:

If a man is an avowed Constitutionalist, or Radical, you know pretty well how to count upon him; but if he is also a firm Churchman, a sturdy Dissenter, or a faithful Roman Catholic, it is almost impossible to estimate the consequences of the combination, and which impulse ... will give precedence ...


109 PF/GFD/157-161 and 164 (handbills), December 1835 (S.A.S.); Sykes, Politics and Electoral Behaviour, pp212-213.

Guildford

Dissenters in Guildford were neither influential nor particularly numerous.108 Municipal reform brought a reduced nonconformist influence on local politics, the first elections in 1835 leaving only one Dissenter among the sixteen elected to the Town Council, where there had been two non-conformists among the thirty-nine members of the Corporation.109

Religious issues were introduced into Guildford elections mostly in the form of Tory-Anglican fears of Ireland and Roman Catholicism. The Tory-Anglicanism of the local environment was deeply engrained: at the 1835 election, the bells of all three churches were rung to
celebrate the defeat of Russell in South Devon.110 A section of Conservative opinion, hitherto prepared to support Mangles in conjunction with Wall, made public its loss of confidence in him after the 1835 election when his support for liberal Irish and religious reforms became clear; the aggrieved were led by a prominent local Churchman, the Rev. Henry Beloe. In the same year, a Protestant Association was founded in the town.111 At the next election, Mangles, declaring his desire for the correction of Church abuses,112 was painted as the creature of "a Popish faction",113 and the Tory-Anglicans were given a candidate more to their liking in the shape of Scarlett, who promoted himself as the enemy of those who "seek ... to destroy the Protestant Church".114 Scarlett made no distinction in his election addresses between the various opponents of the Church, and was reported as saying in his 1841 campaign that he regarded "the union of the Protestant Dissenters with the Roman Catholics to attack the Protestant Church as most unholy".115 Wall, after his

110 Surrey Standard, 16th May 1835.

111 See Chapter 3; G.3262 (petition), 14th April 1836 (G.M.R.); Surrey Standard, 20th May and 17th June 1835.

112 G.3266 (handbill), n.d. (1835) (G.M.R.).

113 G.3272 (handbill), 19th July 1837 (G.M.R.).

114 G.3288 (handbill), 26th July 1837; G.3273 (poster), 12th July 1837 (G.M.R.).

desertion from Conservative ranks, chided Guildford voters for their anti-Catholicism.\footnote{116}

Enfranchised Dissenters were identified firstly from among the 152 signatories to a petition in 1843 protesting against Graham's Education Bill, which they thought not only

degrading and insulting to the principles of those of His Majesty's Subjects who dissent from the form of Religion as by law established,

but also "reproachful to the present liberal and enlightened age",\footnote{117} and secondly from the membership lists and other records of various nonconformist denominations.\footnote{118} A panel of eighty-six Dissenting voters was compiled for the period 1830 to 1841 through nominal linkage to the pollbooks.

This panel proved to be fairly occupationally representative of the electorate (Table 8.13), although somewhat over-represented among craftsmen (IV) and

\footnotetext[116]{C.B.Wall, Thoughts on Parliamentary Independence (Guildford 1839), pp18-23.}
\footnotetext[118]{Unitarians (No.1378); Particular Baptists (RB.01890); New Chapel (RG.42207); Wesleyans (RG.42716 and RG.42208); Quakers (124/1/8 and 124/1/9). All G.M.R.}
under-represented at the very top and the very bottom of the scale (I and VI).\textsuperscript{119}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
\multicolumn{1}{c}{Occupational Categories ($\%$)} & I & II & III & IV & V & VI \\
\hline
Dissenters & 10.5 & 2.3 & 27.9 & 47.7 & 5.8 & 5.8 \\
Whole Electorate & 19.4 & 3.7 & 20.9 & 37.1 & 6.9 & 12.0 \\
\end{tabular}
\caption{Occupational Structure of Dissent, Guildford 1837}
\end{table}

Examining their voting in the four elections, 1832 to 1841, showed them as emphatically Liberal supporters of Mangles, father and son (Figure 8.5). In 1841, only seven known Dissenters polled a straight Conservative double-vote for Scarlett and Currie. With the Dissenters on three occasions - 1832, 1835 and 1837 - polling over 30\% more of their votes to a straight Liberal ticket than did the rest of the electorate (in 1841, the margin had narrowed to 21\%), the correlation between Dissent and Liberalism was stronger than any other socio-economic relationship to voting.\textsuperscript{120}

Moreover, the Liberal consensus among Dissenters seemed to extend across the denominations equally: Wesleyan Methodists as much as the Baptists, Unitarians and Quakers, were Liberal voters. Dissenters' reluctance to split on Wall before 1841 was determined by his

\textsuperscript{119} See also T.A. McDonald, "Religion and Voting in an English Borough: Poole in 1859", in Southern History, 5 (1983), pp221-237.

\textsuperscript{120} Sykes, Politics and Electoral Behaviour, p622 concluded that in Guildford "Religion emerged as the only factor from which an elector's vote could reasonably be predicted".
Figure 8.5: Liberal Voting of Dissenters, Guildford, 1832-1841

Straight Liberal votes only
voting on tithes and against the abolition of Church rates, on which matters his and Mangles' voting cancelled each other out from 1835 onwards. Radical Dissenters were also said to be behind the personal attacks on Wall in 1835 and 1837 which referred to his trial and urged voters not to support him on moral grounds. Partisanship levels, measured as the percentage of strictly partly-based votes, were therefore higher among Dissenting voters immediately after Reform, and high levels were recorded through to 1841: the behaviour of the rest of the electorate adapted to a partisan framework only after 1835, but by 1841 had matched, and even marginally surpassed, the party discipline of non-Church voters (see Table 8.14).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dissenters (%)</th>
<th>Rest of Electorate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Durham*

In Durham, much of the influence of religious matters on electoral behaviour was thought to be

121 See Chapter 3; Surrey Standard, 18th March 1837.
122 See Chapter 3.
negative, in voters' hostile reactions to the power and political activity of the Tory Chapter. Buddle early identified an anti-Church basis to Lambtonite support, in 1820 pointing to the electoral alliance of Catholics and Quakers in the county contest:

The whole of the Catholics and Quakers ... are on the same side, and they are now talking of establishing clubs all over the County to support Lambton in any future contest.

Buddle thought their "anti-'priest'" sentiments unremarkable, given the behaviour of the Church in Durham, as political activists and as landlords:

almost every-body who has had anything to do with them has experienced the same sort of unmerciful treatment at their hands as we have done ourselves. It is enough to make us all turn reformers.  

With the aftermath of Reform, clerical participation in political matters did not diminish, despite Russell's hope that Durham after 1832 would no longer be "priest-ridden". Grateful to Londonderry and Trevor (whom Cuthbert Rippon dubbed "the conduit-pipe of the


124 D/Lo/C142(1), Ibid., plus Buddle to Iveson, 15th March 1820 and Buddle to Lord Stewart, 28th March 1820. As Cobbett pointed out, Stewart when he came to Durham himself was "but a tenant of the Dean and Chapter". W.Cobbett, Rural Rides (1912 edn.), p294 (1832). In 1820, Buddle and Londonderry were engaged in a series of disputes with the Chapter, most notably over the renewal of the lease for Rainton Colliery. Eg. D/Lo/C142(1), Buddle to Iveson, 22nd March 1820 and Buddle to Londonderry, 28th March 1820.

125 The Times, 27th May 1831.
overflowings of their religious bigotry and political rancour"\(^{126}\), the clerics studiously operated their influence in the Conservative cause. College servants were carefully registered for county votes; exclusive dealing was used against Durham tradesmen.\(^{127}\) There were exceptions: the Dean in 1832 asked all his tradesmen at Durham to dine with him and ... wished them all to be assured that his only desire was that every one of them shou’d vote as he thought right.\(^{128}\)

There were rumours that the Bishop, Van Mildert, was to supply Londonderry with £1,000 with which to fight North Durham in 1835;\(^{129}\) clerical organizational and mobilizational work, however, transcended in importance the personal influence of the Bishop, which even before 1836 was diminishing, and after that date was in the hands of a Whig, Maltby, who made it clear that his own tenants would be allowed to vote unhindered.\(^{130}\)

At the 1835 election, Durham epitomized for Liberals the power that Tory clergy wielded:

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\(^{126}\) 3 Hansard 28, p845 (17th June 1835).

\(^{127}\) Egs. Durham Chronicle, 7th September and 14th December 1832, and 23rd January 1835; Durham Advertiser, 1st February 1833. See Chapter 5.

\(^{128}\) Losh to Brougham, 29th January 1833, in E. Hughes (ed.), The Diaries of James Losh (Newcastle 1959), ii.222.

\(^{129}\) Durham Chronicle, 2nd January 1835; Raine Mss., Vol. 5, f.67 (30th December 1834).

\(^{130}\) See Chapter 5; Nossiter, Influence, pp54-57.
The Parson influence brought to bear this time exceeded all previous experience ... the entire Rookery ... worked like devils by day and by night, and their parish clerks out with lanterns at night ... The ballot alone can emancipate us.\footnote{Lambton Mss., Parkes to Durham, 18th January 1835; E.A. Smith, "The Election Agent in English Politics 1734-1832", in English Historical Review, 84 (1969), pp12-35.}

Liddell's return for North Durham in 1837 was also attributed to clerical involvement, although prominent individuals were said to have been more discrete than previously. Maltby was thought to have prevented the usual "weight of influence" being employed against Church tenants, but parish clergymen like Rev. Thurlow of Houghton-le-Spring who gave a public breakfast for Tory voters, ensured that Church "aid and influence [was] not the less surely or effectively rendered the Tory candidate".\footnote{Durham Chronicle, 11th and 18th August 1837; Durham Advertiser, 11th August 1837; Proceedings and Poll ... North Durham 1837 (Durham 1837), pp96-99.}

Those clergymen, identifiable by the prefix "Rev." in the pollbooks, were in 1837 overwhelmingly Conservative voters, in the City and the county division (Tables 8.15 and 8.16). Their partisanship was of similar proportions in all other elections of the period.\footnote{See Vincent, Pollbooks, pp102-103, for 1832 City voting of clergymen - 15 Trevor, 5 Harland, 3 Chaytor, and July 1843 - 13 Purvis, 1 Bright, 6 abstained.}

Liberal electoral relationships with non-Church opinion were not, however, straightforward. At times
"influence" blurred religious loyalties.\textsuperscript{134} Evangelical fervour, for instance the Primitive Methodism that took hold among the pitmen in the 1830s,\textsuperscript{135} mingled with

| Table 8.15 : Voting of Clergymen, North Durham 1837 |
|------------------------|-------|
| Liddell plump          | 79.6  |
| Lambton/Chaytor        | 14.8  |
| Lambton/Liddell        | 5.6   |
| (N=54)                 |       |

| Table 8.16 : Voting of Clergymen, Durham City 1837 |
|------------------------|-------|
| Trevor plump           | 78.6  |
| Harland/Granger        | 21.4  |
| (N=14)                 |       |

working-class antipathy to Catholicism.\textsuperscript{136} Morton reported to Lord Durham in 1837 that working-class Presbyterian and Methodist voters "feel no interest in Irish questions" and did not understand the Appropriation Clause.\textsuperscript{137} Their presence in the electorate, especially in Sunderland,\textsuperscript{138} made the task

\textsuperscript{134} Nossiter, Elections and Political Behaviour, pp523-527; Machin, Politics and the Churches, pp40-41.

\textsuperscript{135} Nossiter, Influence, p17.


\textsuperscript{137} Lambton Mss., Morton to Lord Durham, 15th February 1837.

of finding a Liberal candidate for North Durham more difficult, as several of the possible candidates were Catholics, which the "crazy, bigotted Methodists" would not tolerate. Liddell in North Durham in 1837 encountered political Dissent (which, he wrote to Peel, "prevails to a great extent in the Northern Division"): their "strong feeling against Church Rates" was made clear to him, although "temperately and sensibly expressed", during his canvass. Whig Dissenters were to be found in the core of Harland's support in Durham City, united in hostility to Trevor who - as champion of the interests of the Established Church - had, among other things, proposed that Dissenters should be ineligible for the post of Tithe Commissioner, and had objected to the payment of the new scheme of registration of births from the Poor Rates on the ground that Churchmen should not have to pay for something of benefit to Dissenters. With the resumption of Whig-Radical co-operation in 1843, Bright's constituency had a mixed religious tenor, including Whig Dissenters, prominent Whig Churchmen who


141 Durham Advertiser, 13th July 1832.

142 Durham Chronicle, 8th April 1836.
had previously failed to vote for Granger, and - naturally - Quakers.¹⁴³

Leicester

Of the four, Leicester - the "metropolis of Dissent"¹⁴⁴ - is the constituency for which it is most unfortunate that the linking of voters to religious denomination is so difficult. Only a handful of individuals can be identified directly from the pollbooks (without any previous knowledge of individual voters) as Churchmen or Dissenters, by their occupational titles, such as "Reverend", "Curate", "Catholic Priest" or "Dissenting Minister": their almost wholly polarized voting in 1837 is given in Table 8.17.¹⁴⁵

The religious affiliations of the political élites - Anglican Tories and Dissenting (especially Unitarian and Baptist) Liberals - are known precisely because for such men, political and denominational

¹⁴³ D/Lo/C153(79), Wright to Londonderry, 15th April 1843; Morning Herald, 31st July 1843; Durham Chronicle, 7th April 1843.

¹⁴⁴ Leicester Chronicle, 18th March 1848.

¹⁴⁵ See Vincent, Pollbooks, pp18, 67-69, 125-126, for the voting of Dissenting Ministers around the country, and for Leicester in 1832, 1847, 1859 and 1861 (over which four contests, only four Conservative votes were given): "No other occupation was so partisan, so militant, so un-floating, as the Dissenting Ministers" (p18).
fervency were so mutually reinforcing, so inextricably bound together; for the mass of voters, even if religious affiliation were known, the political significance of their religious membership could not be assumed to have had the same predominating influence over political identification.147

The political vigour of Dissent in Leicester was, however, a crucial factor in the development of partisanship in the eighteenth century.148 In part, this was a function of their numerical strength. Exact figures are hard to come by,149 but the Dissenters themselves estimated their number to constitute two-thirds of the town's population by 1834.150 More important, however, was the rise - as described in

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146 "Dissenting Ministers" included one Catholic Priest, who voted Liberal. See Vincent, Pollbooks, pp20, 57, 125.

147 Nossiter, "Aspects", p177.

148 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p359ff.

149 As Nossiter (eg. "Aspects", p177) argues, the 1851 religious census is inadequate for this purpose.

150 Morning Chronicle, 10th March 1834; Searson, Liberalism, p43: in petitions against Church rates, Dissenters claimed that only 11,555 of the 32,755 inhabitants of the town were members of the Church, and Dissenters totalled 21,000.
Chapters 2 and 4 - of the élite of Dissenting champions, containing manufacturers and other respectables, their sense of political separateness fired by their complete exclusion, despite their economic and social legitimacy, from municipal power. The vehemence with which this group held their religious and political partisanship established the form that the eventual political show-down, when it came in the 1830s, was to take.

The politico-religious battles of the 1830s, especially those over Church rates, were protracted and bitter, due to the entrenchment of Anglicanism, and the ire of Conservatives after suffering severe parliamentary and municipal defeats. Fought out through the vestries, particularly those of St. Martin's and St. Margaret's, the Church rate's conflict was dragged out in Leicester until 1849, whilst Dissent in other cities found the rates much easier to vanquish. Tory Anglicanism after 1835, like the radical Dissenting opposition before, used Leicester's parish structure for highly localized, intense conflicts in compensation for defeats elsewhere.151 There appeared to be few aspects of life in Leicester at this time not touched by the Church/Dissent struggle. Attempts to found an interdenominational school in 1835 foundered on partisanship; the

151 Fraser, Urban Politics, pp49-53; Patterson, Radical Leicester, p247ff.
appointing of Chaplains to the Board of Guardians in 1839 brought on another drawn-out wrangle.\textsuperscript{152}

Churchmen's interest in parliamentary electioneering, however, persisted alongside parochial politicizing. The pulpit of St. Mary's Church was, for the 1837 election (according to the Liberals)
"converted by the Vicar into the hustings".\textsuperscript{153}

Clergymen were among those Conservative activists ensuring that parish officials registered Conservative voters, and among canvassers. The Chronicle brought one alleged instance in 1835, when the survival of the Established Church was at the forefront of the Conservative manifesto, to public attention:

a Divine of the Church of England warned one of his flock "to give his vote for Goulburn and Gladstone because God wished it".\textsuperscript{154}

A religious sub-text permeated electioneering.

For leading Dissenters, the battle against the injustices of Tory exclusivity was couched in an almost biblical context, which demanded that Dissenting voters especially should recognize the significance of their franchise. Edward Miall, whose political activism

\textsuperscript{152} Leicester Mercury, 5th January 1839; C.J.Billson, Leicester Memoirs (Leicester 1924), p82; K.Thompson, "The Building of the Leicester Union Workhouse, 1836-1839", in D.Williams (ed.), The Adaptation of Change: Essays Upon the History of Nineteenth Century Leicester and Leicestershire (Leicester 1980), pp59-76; Searson, Liberalism, pp83-84.

\textsuperscript{153} Leicester Chronicle, 15th July 1837.

\textsuperscript{154} Leicester Chronicle, 15th December 1832 and 10th January 1835; Greaves, Corporation of Leicester, p129.
began in Leicester, provides a direct parallel to the (largely secular) language used by William Biggs to stress the importance of voting:

We ought not to trifle with our votes. We ought to consider that we have that power placed in our hands by the wisdom of God to bring advantage to his Church.155

The Morning Chronicle’s breakdown of the Leicester 1832 election result by religion provides one, tantalizing, view of the degree to which political identification coincided with the religious divide:

The number of the electors who polled ... was 2,260: of these 1,107 are Dissenters, 936 are Churchmen and 167 of unknown religious opinions. Of the 1,107 Dissenting voters, 1,024 gave their suffrage ... in favour of the Ministerial Candidates; on the other hand, 811 Churchmen voted for the anti-Ministerial Candidate ...156

If these figures are correct, only some 8% of Dissenters (who included Catholics) voted for Leigh, the Conservative candidate, and under 14% of Churchmen for Evans and Ellis, a strikingly precise cleavage that far outstrips in impact any of the other social divisions examined, and is remarkably similar to the voting patterns evident among the denominations' leaders (Table 8.17).157


Yet, even if at the polling booths the Church and anti-Church parties were so discrete, there were discernible fault-lines within the political unanimity of Dissent. The growing friction after 1835 between Unitarians and Baptist leaders over control of the policy-making of the more radical wing of Dissent, affected the cohesion of Liberal politics, but did not compromise the united electoral front against the Conservatives.\textsuperscript{158} The frustration felt by Dissenters at the inability of the Whig government to provide them with the reform that they most earnestly sought, the repeal of Church rates, failed to affect the dual polarity of parliamentary elections. The language of Dissent, perhaps the most pervasive of the shared experiences of Leicester's citizens, even managed to function as one sort of bond between middle- and working-class politics at the height of the Chartists' fury against the Liberal-Dissenters exercising municipal control after 1835.\textsuperscript{159}

Potentially, the widest gap in political identification among Dissenters was that between Methodists and more radical Dissent. Although

\textsuperscript{158} See Chapter 4.

Leicester's Wesleyans, according to Mursell and Miall's Mercury (the founding of which in 1836 was itself symptomatic of divisions within Liberalism along joint political-religious lines\textsuperscript{160}), largely supported the anti-Church rates campaign, against the instructions of their ministers,\textsuperscript{161} there were considerable doubts - as there were nationally - as to their political alignments. Nationally, the Wesleyan leadership's distrust of political involvement led to tensions with other non-Churchmen, and to wide variations in Wesleyan voting between constituencies.\textsuperscript{162} In Leicester, rows were reported in the Wesleyan Society between members and officials over the policy of support for the Established Church.\textsuperscript{163} The Conservatives sought to take advantage of the confusion as to how rank-and-file Wesleyans voted. At the 1835 election, Thomas Gladstone declared himself to be

\textsuperscript{160} See Chapter 4; D.Fraser, "The Press in Leicester c.1790-1850", in Transactions of the Leicestershire Archaeological and Historical Society, XLII (1966-7), pp53-75.

\textsuperscript{161} Patterson, Radical Leicester, pp248-249.


\textsuperscript{163} Eg. Leicester Chronicle, 10th January 1835.
looking with confidence for the support of some portion of the dissenters, who compose a body of His Majesty's most loyal and faithful subjects - I mean particularly the Wesleyans and Moravians; for I believe they consider their religious interests, to be bound up with those of the Church of England ...

Matters came to a head at the 1837 election, the Morning Chronicle - Easthope's paper - hailing Leicester's Wesleyans as characteristic of a new-found independence from "such ... short-sighted preachers as would restrain their flocks from the expression of any political opinion but Toryism". In response to Gladstone's reiterated claim that Wesleyans endorsed him, a handbill had been issued by a dozen Wesleyans, firmly asserting

from the knowledge we have of the members, that not one will vote for Messrs. Goulburn and Gladstone, and that there are but three or four of the congregation, who are at all favourable to Toryism.

That this analysis was the more reliable was demonstrated at the 1839 by-election, when reportedly (according to the Wesleyan Chronicle) only six of the sixty-six Wesleyan voters in Leicester voted Conservative.

164 Leicester Journal, 2nd January 1835.

165 Morning Chronicle, 10th August 1837.

166 Leicester Chronicle, 15th July 1837; Leicestershire Mercury, 15th July 1837; Morning Chronicle, 18th July 1837.

167 Vincent, Pollbooks, pp69-70, extract from the Wesleyan Chronicle (reprinted in The League, vol. 1 (July 1844)): presumably the reference to the "last election" means 1839 for Leicester, as there was no contest in 1841, but these may conceivably be figures for the last general election, i.e. 1837.
The people think, the people enquire, they read, in a word, they know.  

William Biggs

... those that have the best purse are sure to be returned; politics are comparatively immaterial.  

James Hudson

That such contrasting conceptions of their constituency's model of electoral participation could be held (and made public) by men such as Biggs and Hudson, with their equivalent depths of experience in electioneering but different perspectives, says much about the attempt to reduce voting behaviour after 1832 to generalizations. Guildford, Leicester, Durham City and North Durham have all demonstrated aspects of the three models of electoral behaviour discerned by Nossiter in the post-reform system - market politics, influence politics, and the politics of individual opinion - whilst none of them are to be stereotyped according to only one of these sorts of electoral strategy.

Whilst distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate forms of "influence" perhaps dominated the

1 Leicestershire Mercury, 22nd July 1837.
2 P.P. 1835 (547) VIII.125.
political language of Durham to a greater extent than elsewhere, discussion of electoral independence (from a variety of types of pressure) was an important common experience to all of the constituencies. The sensitivity of Guildford's electorate to any implication of interference with their ability (and right) to make free decisions was a match for that of the Durham householders resentful of the modes of electioneering employed by the Lambton and Londonderry interests, despite there being in Guildford little obvious post-Reform threat that undue influence would be attempted. The continuities with the pre-Reform system in this respect were apparent in each constituency, as they have also been in those constituencies described by Phillips and O'Gorman. In spite of the changes of personnel effected in 1832, neither the structures of participation nor the idioms of electoral conflict were revolutionized. The Reform Act did not, for example, despite Londonderry's

3 Thus making the use of Durham as a single case study problematic: see, eg. A.J.Heesom, ""Legitimate" versus "Illegitimate" Influences: Aristocratic Electioneering in Mid-Victorian Britain", in Parliamentary History, 7 (1988), pp19-42.


suspicions of Whig gerrymandering and jobbery, unduly affect the operation of interest mobilization in North Durham or Durham City; neither did it of itself (or even in conjunction with the Corporate Funds Act) substantially undermine Corporation influence in Leicester, or bring a transformation in the inter-élite struggles in the town (which was left, as the Liberals had always predicted, to municipal reform).

Even where changes do seem apparent in the 1830s, their genesis can almost always be perceived before 1832. The level of partisanship displayed structurally in Leicester after 1832, for example, through turnout percentages and extremely infrequent "irrational" (i.e. cross-party) voting, is not qualitatively different to that visible at the 1826 election, despite the new rôles for party organization and mobilization after 1832, which were pursued as vigorously in Leicester as they were anywhere. The greater party-based voting evident in Guildford at the 1837 and 1841 elections, which seems to contrast with the cross-party moderate consensus of 1832 and 1835, cannot be viewed in isolation from the concentrated issue-based voting which turned so decisively against Charles Baring Wall in 1830. Discontent with aristocratic monopoly (or attempted monopoly) of Durham City's representation can be heard rumbling at the 1830 election, and earlier, with attempted independent candidatures. The

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* See Chapter 6, especially Tables 6.1 and 6.6, and Figure 6.3.
particular problems associated with mobilizing freeholder opinion in North Durham are amply reflected in Buddle's communications with Londonderry, and in other sources, throughout the 1820s. Situations which came to a head in the 1830s had, in other words, strong pre-Reform roots.

Doubtless, the radicalism of the change effected in 1832 in voter behaviour would have been greater had the Whigs' original intentions of abolishing the borough "ancient rights" franchises and removing the urban freeholders from the county electorates been accomplished. Some of the greatest variations within voting behaviour have been shown to lie within the franchise qualification division (in the boroughs), or within the rural/urban division (at least, in the separation between the resident and non-resident voters in Leicester, in that between South Leicestershire and Leicester and between West Surrey and Guildford, if not in North Durham, where, despite having the greatest numerical effect, the urban voters seem to have responded to county voting primarily as inhabitants of their respective towns rather than as "urban" dwellers per se). The franchise groups' measurably different responses to "party" candidates after 1832 in the boroughs were shown to be only partially ascribable to socio-economic cleavages. Although the reactions of

7 See Chapter 2.
8 See Chapter 7.
non-Tory householders and freemen in Durham to the Whig-Radical conflicts in 1835 and 1837 had a social basis, the relative party preferences of the Leicester franchise groups were seen in some important respects (once multiple qualification had properly been taken into account) to run across economic divisions in the electorate, and to bear little relationship to any distinction between voting qualifications predating Reform and the post-1832 householder franchise, reflecting instead patterns of political alignment already in place by 1832.9

Even from the more limited evidence available on individuals' religious denomination, it appears likely that religion was the most powerful of the social attributes influencing voter behaviour. That this should be true for Leicester, where the Church-Dissent battle in all of the local spheres of political activity almost precisely mirrored the Conservative/Liberal (pro-Corporation/anti-Corporation) divide, is not, of course, surprising. Neither, perhaps, is the Conservative unanimity of Durham's clergymen, in the City and county electorates. The evidence from Guildford that, for Dissenters at least, religion could be a major force determining the extent of partisanship even in a small borough where religious matters did not have the same immediate local political

9 See Chapter 7.
import as they did in Dissenting strongholds, is perhaps more interesting.\textsuperscript{10}

The importance of a detailed account of the circumstances of the contests, as providing the contextual framework for assessing the real meaning of voting choices, was particularly demonstrated by the descriptions of rates of behavioural persistence.\textsuperscript{11} The significance of movements of opinion – distinguished on an individual basis with reference to past and future voting – could only be adequately delineated within the context of the complex local equation of interaction between national and local political issues, the candidates, their campaigns and their electioneering agencies, the workings of corrupt and coercive forces, the weight of "independence" sentiment, etc. Despite the awareness of Westminster politics, its party lines and supra-local policies, demonstrated in the constituencies, the continued primacy of local political culture was clear. Definition of the forms taken by polling was locally generated, and fed off wider political conflicts over the local balance of power.

This study has, ultimately, only highlighted the behaviour of four constituencies. Derek Beales' optimistic prophesy, that constituency studies will provide historians with work for the foreseeable

\textsuperscript{10} See Chapter 8.
\textsuperscript{11} See Chapter 6.
future, is confirmed by the clear need for local detail in the examination of early-Victorian voting behaviour.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} See Introduction.
APPENDIX : CONTENTS OF OCCUPATION CATEGORIES

CATEGORY I

Accountant
Actuary
Adjutant
Alderman
Appraiser
Archdeacon
Architect
Army Captain
Artist
Assistant Surgeon
Attorney
Attorney's Clerk
Auctioneer
Bailiff's Setter
Banker
Banker's Agent
Banker's Clerk
Baronet
Barrister
Beadle
Broker
Capt in Royal Marines
Capt in Royal Navy
Captain
Castle Keeper
Catholic Priest
Class Master, Gaol
Clergyman
Cleric
Clerk
Clerk of the Peace
Clerk, Bd of Guardians
Colliery Viewer
Conservative Clerk
Constable
Corn Inspector
County Police
Curate
Dancing Master
Dean of Lincoln
Dissenting Minister
Doctor
Esquire
Excise Officer
Farmer
Gaoler
General
Gentleman
Governor of Gaol
High Constable
High Sheriff
Inspector, Weights & Measures
Inspector
Land Agent Weights
Land Surveyor
Lawyer
Lawyer's Clerk
Lieutenant
Mace Bearer
Major General
Master of Hospital
Mayor
Medical Student
Minister
Music Master
Naval Officer
Musician
Organist
Parish Clerk
Physician
Poet
Police Officer
Policeman
Post Master
Proctor
Prof. of Dancing
Prof. of Music
Rector
Reform Agent
Registrar
Relieving Officer
Rent Collector
Reporter
Reverend
Road Surveyor
Schoolmaster
Scrivener
Sexton
Sherriff's Officer
Sec to Infirmary
Solicitor
Solicitor's Clerk
Surgeon
Surveyor
Tax Collector
Teacher
Toll Keeper
Toll Collector
Town Clerk
Town Crier
Town Servant
Turnkey
Verger
Vestry Clerk
Veterinarian
Vicar
Workhouse Master
Writer
CATEGORY II

Agent Lead Merchant
Barge Master Leather Dealer
Beast Dealer Leghorn Manufacturer
Bonnet Dealer Lime Merchant
Bonnet Manufacturer Merchant
Brace Manufacturer Metal Dealer
Brush Manufacturer Mop Manufacturer
Calf Dealer Oil Merchant
Cap Manufacturer Paper Dealer
Carpet Manufacturer Porter Merchant
Cattle Dealer Ribband Manufacturer
Cheese Factor Ribbon Dealer
China Dealer Soot Merchant
Coach Agent Stone Merchant
Coach Agent Tape Manufacturer
Coach Master Tea Dealer
Coal Agent Thread Merchant
Coal Dealer Timber Merchant
Coal Merchant Tobacco Manufacturer
Comb Manufacturer True Blue Sauce Maker to the King
Commission Agent Umbrella Manufacturer
Commission Hosier Wagon Master
Contractor Wholesale Druggist
Corn Merchant Wool Dealer
Corn Chandler Woollen Yarn Agent
Corn Dealer Worsted Manufacturer
Corn Factor
CATEGORY III

Baker
Barber
Bone Seller
Book Hawker
Bookseller
Butcher
Chandler
Chapman
Cheesemonger
Chemist
Chinaman
Clothesman
Coal Higgler
Coal Seller
Comm. Traveller
Confectioner
Corn Seller
Draper
Draper and Tailor
Druggist
Eatinghouse Keeper
Fellmonger
Fishmonger
Florist
Flour Seller
Fruiterer
Glass Dealer
Green Grocer
Grocer
Haberdasher
Hair Dresser
Hardware Dealer
Hatter and Hosier
Hawker
Hay Seller
Higgler
Hopseller
Hotel Keeper
Jeweller
Law Stationer
Leather Seller
Linen Draper
Mealman
Mercer
Milkman
Music Seller
Newsvendor
Pawnbroker
Perfumer
Pork Butcher
Poulterer
Provision Dealer
Salesman
Saltman
Sand Hawker
Sand Seller
Seedsman
Shopkeeper
Shopman
Silk Mercer
Slop Seller
Stationer
Tallow Chandler
Tobacconist
Toy Dealer
Victualler
Whip Seller
Woollen Draper
Bandbox Maker
Basket Maker
Blacking Maker
Blacksmith
Bleacher
Boat Builder
Bobbin Turner
Bonnet Maker
Book Binder
Boot Closer
Boot Maker
Box Maker
Brace Hand
Brace Maker
Brass Founder
Brazier
Bread Baker
Breeches Maker
Brick Maker
Brush Maker
Builder
Cabinet Maker
Carpenter
Carpet Weaver
Cartwright
Chain Maker
Chair Maker
Chair Man
Clock Maker
Clog Maker
Clothes Cleaner
Clothier
Coach Builder
Coach Maker
Coach Painter
Coach Smith
Coach Trimmer
Coach Spring Maker
Collar Maker
Colourman
Comb Maker
Compositor
Cook
Cooper
Cordwainer
Cork Cutter
Cotton Spinner
Cotton Winder
Gravat Maker
Currier
Cutler
Cutter
Dyer
Engine Turner
Engineer
Enginewright
Engraver
Farrier
Fitter Up
Fitter
Founder
Foundryman
Framesmith
Fringe Maker
Fuller
Furrier
Frame Work Knitter
Gaitor Maker
Gas Works
Gilder
Glazier
Glove Hand
Glove Maker
Glover
Goldsmith
Gravesstone Engineer
Gun Maker
Gunsmith
Hardwareman
Harness Maker
Hat Maker
Hatter
Horse Farrier
House Carpenter
Ink Maker
Instrument Maker
Iron Founder
Iron Turner
Ironmonger
Japanner
Joiner
Lace Hand
Lace Maker
Lace Dresser
Laceman
Lace Weaver
Lamb’s Wool Spinner
Last Maker
Leather Cutter
Locksmith
Loom Hand
Machine Keeper
Machine Maker
Mason
Mechanic
Mechanist
Military Ornament Maker
Miller
Millwright
Model Maker
Mold Maker
Molder
Nail Maker
Nailer
Needle Maker
Net Maker
Overseer
Painter
Painter and Glazier
Paper Maker
Parchment Maker
Patten Maker
Pipe Maker
Plasterer
Plater
Plumber
Potter
Printer
Pumpwright
Rope Maker
Rope Spinner
Roper
Saddler
Sawyer
Scourer
Setter Up
Shipwright
Shoeing Smith
Shoemaker
Silversmith
Sinker Maker  Wool Washer
Skinner  Worsted Dyer
Slater  Worsted Maker
Smith and Fitter  Worsted Spinner
Smith  Worsted Weaver
Sorter
Spinner
Stapler
Stay Maker
Stenciller
Stone Mason
Straw Bonnet Maker
Straw Hat Maker
Tanner
Tape Weaver
Tape Maker
Tinman
Tinner
Tinplate Worker
Top Maker
Toy Maker
Toymaker
Trimmer
Trunk Maker
Tuner
Turner
Twine Spinner
Umbrella Maker
Umbrella Mender
Upholsterer
Waggon-way Wright
Warp Loom Hand
Watch Maker
Weaver
Wheelmaker
Wheelwright
Whip Maker
Whitesmith
Wine Cooper
Wire Worker
Woodman
Wool Comb Maker
Wool Comber
Wool Sorter
Wool Spinner
Wool Stapler
CATEGORY V

Beerseller
Brewer
Innkeeper
Licensed Victualler
Liquor Merchant
Maltman
Maltster
Publican
Spirit Merchant
Tapster
Tavern Keeper
Vintner
Wine Merchant
CATEGORY VI

Bargeman
Bellman
Boatman
Brakesman
Bricklayer
Carrier
Carter
Chimney Sweep
Chorister
Coachman
Coal Carrier
Coal Miner
Collier
Comedian
Conveyancer
Countryman
Cow Keeper
Cow Leech
Cryer
Dairyman
Drum Major
Excavator
Fly Driver
Gamekeeper
Gardener
Gentleman's Servant
Groom
Guard on Railway
Horse Breaker
Horse Keeper
Hostler
Huckster
Huntsman
Husbandman
Inmate
Jobber
Journeyman
Labourer
Letter Carrier
Lighterman
Lime Burner
Livery- Stable Keeper
Mail Guard
Mangleman
Mariner
Messenger
Midshipman
Miner
Neatherd
Oilman
Ostler
Pavior
Pensioner
Pig Jobber
Porter
Post Boy
Royal Marine
Sailor
Scavenger
Sergeant Major
Sergeant
Servant
Shepherd
Soldier
Staff Sergeant
Stoker
Sweep
Town Crier
Traveller
Waggon Man
Waiter
Warehouseman
Watchman
Waterman
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