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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

1727 - 1731

by

Jeremy Martin Black

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Durham.

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Abstract

This work examines British foreign policy from the accession of George II, in 1727, to the diplomatic realignment of 1731. It is argued that foreign policy was the subject of debate, and that this debate was closely linked to struggles over power, patronage and domestic politics. An attempt has been made to survey foreign policy as a whole rather than to treat British relations with a particular state. However, as George II and his ministers were preoccupied with relations with only a few powers, there is little or nothing on diplomatic relations with many states.

The interdependence of British diplomacy emerges clearly; relations with individual states were greatly influenced by relations with other powers. The thesis illustrates the interdependence of British relations with France and the Empire. It also indicates that, far from being a sudden development in 1730, the quest for an Austrian alliance had been followed at various times since the accession of George. This throws doubt upon the solidity of the Anglo-French alliance in the late 1720's, and suggests that the diplomatic importance of the fall of Townshend has been exaggerated.

An examination of foreign policy throws much light upon the influence of George II, his relations with his ministers and the role of Hanoverian interests. It also suggests that some of the crises faced by Sir Robert Walpole can be directly linked to diplomatic problems.
# CONTENTS

Acknowledgements iii  
Abbreviations vii  
Note on spelling xi  
Note on dates xii  

Introduction 1  
1. The European and British Setting 13  
2. The Accession of George II 41  
3. From the Accession of George II to the Convention of the Pardo (Summer, 1727-Spring, 1728) 76  
4. Early 1728: The Session of 1728; Abortive Approaches to Austria 123  
5. The Congress of Soissons 152  
   The Hanoverian Dimension 165  
6. Autumn 1728: Growing Strain in the Anglo-French Alliance 174  
7. Early 1729: Parliamentary Disquiet; Approach to Austria 188  
   The Session of 1729 188  
   Prussian Interlude 200  
   Approach to Austria 203  
8. The Summer of 1729: The Dissolution of the Alliance of Vienna; Negotiations with the Wittelsbachs 225  
   The Dissolution of the Alliance of Vienna 225  
   Negotiations with the Wittelsbachs 235  
9. Summer-Autumn of 1729: Negotiations with Austria, War-Panic with Prussia, Settlement with Spain 257  
   Autumn-Winter 1729: Negotiations with the Wittelsbachs; Ministerial Rivalry 290  
10. Winter 1729-30: Ministerial Crisis 304
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>THE SESSION OF 1730</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE MINISTRY</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE DIPLOMATIC SITUATION IN SUMMER 1730</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>SPRING 1730: THE COLLAPSE OF BRITAIN'S NORTHERN STRATEGY</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DETERIORATION IN BRITAIN'S DIPLOMATIC POSITION</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>SUMMER 1730: THE COLLAPSE OF THE SEVILLE ALLIANCE</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>THE NEGOTIATION OF THE SECOND TREATY OF VIENNA</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE INVASION OF PARMA; THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>SPRING-SUMMER 1731: SPANISH ACCESSION; ANGLO-FRENCH WAR PANIC</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EPILOGUE</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIST OF CHARACTERS</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

In the course of several years' research on this topic I have been fortunate enough to receive help from a large number of individuals and institutions. This help has ranged from the loan of musty tomes to accommodation in a monastic community in Vienna. Without it I would have been unable to produce this work. I am very grateful for it.

The generosity of several institutions has been most helpful. The British Council provided the funds for a month's research in East Germany; the Gladys Krieble Delmas Foundation aided work in Venice. The Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst supported four months' work in West Germany, and the Zaharoff Foundation gave a grant towards one of the three research trips to Paris that have been so important for this thesis. Another of these trips was aided by the generosity of Merton College Oxford, which also granted funds for work in Vienna. The Department of Education and Science aided work in Italy and France, the Staff Travel Fund of Durham University work in Paris, Turin and Vienna, and the British Academy research in Hanover, Osnabrück and Wolfenbüttel.

Dr. Leopold Auer, H.D. Brückner, Dr. Marco Carassi, Dr. Gerhard Menk and Dr. Bernard Surholt provided hospitality in Vienna, Munich, Turin, Marburg and Münster. James and Janet De Groat and Dr. Andreas Laun helped with accommodation in Vienna. Professor Bruno Neveu, Hugo Mantoux, Rory Browne and Peter Tibber provided hospitality at Paris. Hospitality and assistance were provided by Dr. Michael Greenslade and Miss Marjorie Monks at Stafford, Jonathan Seville at Beverley, David Lawton at Norwich, Dr. Aubrey Newman at Leicester, Richard Wylde at Chichester, James Kellock at Bristol, James Lawrie at Maidstone, Bruce Pender at Chelmsford and by friends too numerous to mention at Cambridge, London and Oxford.
Many scholars have generously given their time and advice. The final draft of the work was read, in whole or part, by Dr. Leopold Auer, Peter Barber, Dr. T.C.W. Blanning, Dr. Eveline Cruickshanks, Graham Gibbs, Professor Ragnhild Hatton, Professor George Hilton Jones, Dr. Paul Langford, Dr. Derek McKay, Dr. Aubrey Newman, Dr. J.B. Owen, Dr. John Rogister, Professor Armin Reese, Dr. L. Bart Smith and Professor W.R. Ward. This generous assistance notwithstanding, the work here presented is the product of my own work. None of the scholars mentioned is responsible for the opinions advanced herein, and I know that some of them would disagree with my conclusions.

Dr. David Aldridge discussed Baltic affairs with me and Dr. Hugh Dunthorne answered questions about Dutch politics. Professor Armin Reese, Professor Charles Ingrao, Professor Uriel Dann, Dr. Steinbauer, Dr. Leopold Auer, Professor Peter Claus Hartmann and Peter Barber discussed German and Austrian politics with me, whilst A.D. Francis provided advice on Portuguese policy. Professor Derek Beales and Professor M.S. Anderson provided useful references. Dr. Michael Harriss made helpful suggestions about the role of the British press. Discussions with Dr. Aubrey Newman cast much light on George II. Notes, xeroxes of documents and unpublished articles were lent by A.D. Francis, Dr. M. Hughes, Dr. Hugh Dunthorne, Professor George Hilton Jones, Dr. Leopold Auer, David Taylor and Dr. Eveline Cruickshanks.

Five scholars in particular have made invaluable contributions to this study. Eveline Cruickshanks and Derek McKay have repeatedly provided encouragement and advice. Tim Blanning first awakened my interest in the eighteenth century and in British diplomacy. He has continued to assist my work since those distant days in Cambridge.
His valiant efforts have nearly cured my excessive use of the conjunction 'and'. Paul Langford supervised the first two years of my research, and, but for the avarice of the Oxford University authorities, would have seen this thesis through at Oxford. He played a major role in teaching me habits of scholarly research. At Durham my research was supervised by Reg Ward. He has provided the context within which I have been able to complete this thesis, and his stimulating insights have been very important in opening up new fields of enquiry.

Several typists have confronted my spidery handwriting. I would like to thank my wife, Sarah, Ros Samuel, Mary Holcroft Veitch, Karen Wolsey and Joan Grant for their marvellous assistance.

The assistance of my parents has been most helpful over the last few years. They generously provided funds that aided my research in British archives and permitted the purchase of many works not held in Durham Libraries.

My wife has often been bemused by my interest in the stygian depths of diplomatic history. It is largely thanks to her persistence that I continued with this thesis, and without her help I could never have finished the work. I hope that she is not too disappointed with the result.
I have been privileged to use several private collections of manuscripts in the course of my research. It is an honour to be able to head my list of acknowledgements with the name of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II by whose gracious permission I was allowed to use the Stuart papers. Prince Kinsky, the Duke of Richmond, the Earl of Egremont, the Earl of Harrowby, the Earl Waldegrave and Lady Lucas permitted me to consult their manuscripts.
## Abbreviations

### 1. Abbreviations relating to manuscript sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Add.</strong></td>
<td>Additional Manuscripts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AE.</strong></td>
<td>Paris, Quai d'Orsay, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AG</strong></td>
<td>Paris, Vincennes, Archives de la Guerre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AN, AM.</strong></td>
<td>Paris, Archives Nationales, Archives de la Marine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ang.</strong></td>
<td>Angleterre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASG.</strong></td>
<td>Genoa, Archivio di Stato di Genova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASM.</strong></td>
<td>Modena, Archivio di Stato di Modena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AST.</strong></td>
<td>Turin, Archivio di Stato di Torino.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASV.</strong></td>
<td>Venice, Archivio di Stato di Venezia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aut.</strong></td>
<td>Autriche.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B7</strong></td>
<td>Pays Etrangères series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BL.</strong></td>
<td>London, British Library, Department of Manuscripts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bodl.</strong></td>
<td>Oxford, Bodleian Library, Department of Western Manuscripts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bradfer Lawrence</strong></td>
<td>Norwich, County Record Office, Bradfer-Lawrence Collection, Townshend State Papers and Letters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C(H).</strong></td>
<td>Cambridge, University Library, Cholmondeley (Houghton) papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chewton.</strong></td>
<td>Chewton Mendip, Waldegrave papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CP.</strong></td>
<td>Correspondance Politique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CRO.</strong></td>
<td>County Record Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Darmstadt.</strong></td>
<td>Darmstadt, Staatsarchiv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dresden.</strong></td>
<td>Dresden, Hauptstaatsarchiv, Geheimes Kabinett, Gesandschaften.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EK.</strong></td>
<td>Englische Korrespondenz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fonseca.</strong></td>
<td>Nachlass Fonseca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GK.</strong></td>
<td>Grosse Korrespondenz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hull.</strong></td>
<td>Hull, University Library, Hotham papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ing.</strong></td>
<td>Inghilterra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kart.</strong></td>
<td>carton.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LM.</strong></td>
<td>Lettere Ministri.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Mem. et Doc. Mémoires et Documents.

Munich Munich, Hauptstaatsarchiv, Bayr, Gesandtschaft.

Münster Münster, Staatsarchiv, Deposit Nordkirchen, papers of the Plettenberg family

Nancy Nancy, Archives de Meurthe-et-Moselle, Fonds de Vienne, serie 3F.

Osnabrück Osnabrück, Staatsarchiv, Repertorium 100, Abschnitt 1.


RA. Windsor Castle, Royal Archives, Stuart Papers.

Rawl. Rawlinson Letters.

Sup. supplement.

Vienna Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilung.

Vienna, Kinsky Vienna, Palais Kinsky, Correspondence of Count Philip Kinsky.

Wolfenbüttel Wolfenbüttel, Staatsarchiv.
## 2. Abbreviations relating to published material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Armstrong</td>
<td>E. Armstrong, Elisabeth Farnese the Termagent of Spain (1892)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baudrillart</td>
<td>A. Baudrillart, Philippe V et la cour de France (5 vols., Paris, 1890-1901)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDI.</td>
<td>British Diplomatic Instructions 1689-1789 Camden Third Series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyer</td>
<td>A. Boyer, Political State of Great Britain (60 vols., 1711-1740)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Browning</td>
<td>R. Browning, The Duke of Newcastle (New Haven, 1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlisle</td>
<td>Historical Manuscripts Commission, Manuscripts of the Earl of Carlisle (1897)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobbett</td>
<td>W. Cobbett, Parliamentary History of England from ...1066 to ...1803 (36 vols., 1806-20)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Coxe</td>
<td>W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole, Earl of Orford (3 vols., 1798)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHR.</td>
<td>English Historical Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goslinga</td>
<td>A. Goslinga, Slingelandt's Efforts towards European Peace (The Hague, 1915)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatton</td>
<td>R. Hatton, George I (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCJ.</td>
<td>The Journal of the House of Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLJ</td>
<td>The Journals of the House of Lords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMC.</td>
<td>Historical Manuscripts Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Höfler</td>
<td>C. Höfler, Der Congress von Soissons, nach den Instructionen des Kaiserlichen Cabinets und den Berichten des Botschafters Stefan Grafen Kinsky Fontes rerum Austricarum, vols. XXXII, XXXVIII (Vienna, 1871, 1876)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Hughes

Ilchester
Earl of Ilchester (ed.), Lord Hervey and his Friends (1950)

King
Peter, Lord King, 'Notes on Domestic and Foreign Affairs during the last years of the reign of George I and the early part of the reign of George II', in appendix to P. King, Life of John Locke (2 vols., 1830) vol. 2

Knachtbull

Lodge

Marini
R.A. Marini, La Politica Sabauda alla Corte Inglese dopo il trattato d' Hannover 1725-1730 nella Relazione dell' ambasciatore piemontese a Londra (Chambery, 1918)

Michael

Plumb

Quazza
G. Quazza, Il Problema Italiano e l' Equilibrio Europeo 1720-1738 (Turin, 1965)

Recueil
Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France depuis les Traités de Westphalia jusqu'à la Revolution Française (Paris, 1884-)

Sedgwick

Williams
B. Williams, Carteret and Newcastle (Cambridge, 1943)

Wilson
A.M. Wilson, French Foreign Policy during the Administration of Fleury, 1726-1743 (Cambridge Mass., 1936)
Note on Spelling

Where possible well-established anglicized forms have been used for both place and personal names. The length of proper noble titles and of titles of office has dictated their shortening. In choosing titles and placenames it has proved impossible to please all. Some object to Sleswig, others to Schleswig, some to Sinzendorf others to Sinzendorff. Some to Plettenberg, others to Plettemberg. I have found it impossible to please all, and I only hope that readers will display tolerance in this matter.

In quotations from both manuscript and printed sources the spelling, capitalisation and punctuation have not been modernised. This has caused some problems, particularly with quotations from French. Readers of drafts of this study have expressed incredulity at some of the spellings, but in most cases, when reference has been made to the original document, the fault, if such it be, has been found to be with the original. Eighteenth century diplomats, nearly all aristocratic, would not have been impressed by being called to task for their spelling.

Unless otherwise stated the place of publication is London.

A reference to Walpole, without any first name, is a reference to Sir Robert Walpole and not to his brother Horatio. A reference to Kinsky, is a reference to Count Philip Kinsky, and not to his brother Stephen. A reference to Stanhope is a reference to William Stanhope and not his brother Charles; to Dehn, to Konrad Detlef Count Dehn and not to his brother, Frederick Ludwig; to Sinzendorf, to the Austrian Chancellor, and not to his relative at the Hague; to Finch, to William Finch, and not to his brother Edward.
Note on Dates

In this work the New Year is always taken as starting on 1 January. The convention by which the English New Year began on 25 March has been ignored. In the early eighteenth century Britain conformed to the Julian calendar. Dates recorded in this calendar are referred to as old style. Most of the continent conformed to the Gregorian calendar and recorded its dates in new style. In this work dates mentioned in the text are consistently given in new style (ns) which was eleven days ahead of old style (os). In the footnotes the dates given are those found on the documents cited except that the year is assumed to have started on 1 January. In the footnotes, unless otherwise stated, all dates are in new style. Where a number of newspapers or of letters from the same writer are grouped together (e.g. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 12 Mar. (os), 14 Apr. 1727), the notation (os) should be taken to refer to the whole group.
Introduction

This body of work began as a dissertation to be submitted for an Oxford Doctorate on the topic 'British Foreign Policy 1730-1740'. It was hoped to survey policy from the changes produced in 1730 by the fall of Townshend and the decision to seek to replace Britain's French alliance by an Austrian one, until 1740, when the death of the Emperor Charles VI, of the Tsarina Anna of Russia and of Frederick William I, the King of Prussia, produced a much altered political situation in Europe. It rapidly became clear that in order to understand the situation in 1730-1 it was necessary to examine British foreign policy in the late 1720's. It is a subject that has received far less attention than the foreign policy of Britain in the proceeding period, the reign of George I. In 1933, in describing the period between the summer of 1728 and November 1729, that 'fairly hardened explorer of diplomatic mazes', Sir Richard Lodge confessed that he 'found this particular maze very baffling'.¹ His conclusion is an understandable one, and in examining the period from 1727 till 1731 I rapidly found that it would be impossible to present my conclusions briefly. Therefore, when I came to Durham the title of this study changed from British Foreign Policy 1727-1741 to the more modest 1727-31. However, my work on the 1730's, aside from producing several articles which I believe to be relevant to this study, has also influenced my work on the earlier period. I believe that an examination of British foreign policy in the 1730's sheds light on the wisdom of the decisions taken in 1727-31, and I hope to illustrate this in future work.

The initial premise of this study is that in order to appreciate British foreign policy in the Walpolean period it is necessary to

consider not only British diplomacy, but also British domestic policies. A failure to study both has flawed several otherwise brilliant surveys, such as Chance's work on the Alliance of Hanover. It is too easy to treat the international system as the sum of the diplomacies of the various European powers, and to present foreign policy in a monolithic interpretation in which the actors are the 'British', 'French' etc. Instead it is clear that policy options were debated and discussed within each country. This is true not only of Britain but also of every major European country in this period. Furthermore, these discussions were not simply concerned with diplomatic options. Rather, the debates about foreign policy were heavily intertwined with struggles over power, patronage and domestic politics. This process was encouraged by the fact that the formulation and execution of foreign policy was generally not the job of a distinct bureaucratic institution unrelated to the strife of domestic politics. Instead foreign policy was shaped in the courts of Europe and a victim of the indistinct nature of much eighteenth century government. It would be helpful to reassess the process by which foreign policy was created in most of the European countries of this period. It is the intention of this study to consider the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in Britain from the accession of George II in 1727 to the Anglo-Austrian reconciliation of 1731. This is not therefore, strictly speaking a diplomatic study, insofar as such a study can be separated from broader issues of foreign policy. Nor is this a study of the European system in this period. The actions of other powers are considered largely in relation to the actions of Britain.

and their plans largely in relation to the fears and expectations of them held by the British Ministry. Thus, it is of importance that the British feared in 1728 that the Emperor intended to marry his elder daughter, Maria Theresa, to Don Carlos the son of Philip V of Spain. The fact that the Emperor had no such intention is of less importance for the purposes of this study. Clearly it is an artificial process to isolate the foreign policy of one state in order to study it, but limitations of time have produced such a method. The extensive consultation of continental archival sources that has played a large part in the research for this work, has, it is hoped, redressed any tendency to misunderstand the policies of other states by concentrating upon those of Britain.

The principal gap in the published work upon British foreign policy during the ministry of Sir Robert Walpole is that of the years 1727 to 1731. In 1727 the magisterial work of J.F. Chance and the stimulating study of Ragnhild Hatton come to an end. In 1731 Vaucher's important survey of Anglo-French relations commences. There is an only partially filled gap between these works. This gap does not exist for the foreign policies of the states. The works of scholars such as Baudrillart, Dureng and Wilson on France, Auer, Fraubach, Höfler and Mecenseffy on Austria, Quazza on Sardinia, and Dunthorne and Goslinga on the United Provinces has ensured that the European diplomacy of this period has been much studied.


of British foreign policy in this period have been examined. Cady's thesis throws some light upon the diplomatic background to the Treaty of Seville and Cudmore's thesis attempted to do the same for the second Treaty of Vienna. Dunthorne's excellent work on Anglo-Dutch relations in the 1720's and 1730's clarifies many aspects of British foreign policy, and, because of its quality, Anglo-Dutch relations in the late 1720's have been only glanced at in this work. Neither in his relevant articles, nor in his book on Anglo-Prussian relations, did Sir Richard Lodge contribute much to the study of this period, and the same is the case with Sir Adolphus Ward's work on Anglo-Hanoverian relations. Graham Gibbs' thesis is an important and valuable contribution to the study of the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics in the 1720's. However, Gibbs' concentration upon parliamentary debate to the exclusion of court politics meant that his thesis failed to clarify the role of George II. George's role has also been overlooked by most of the scholars who have worked upon British domestic politics in this period. The two historians whose contribution to the period is best known, Coxe and Plumb, were writing about Sir Robert Walpole, not George II, and the role of the King has been minimised in their works. Neither contributed much to the study of foreign policy. Coxe, whose scholarship was of the very highest standards, did not enjoy access to any


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diplomatic archive. Plumb's work concentrated upon British domestic politics. He made only a cursory study of the diplomatic papers of the period. Michael, whose survey of this period unfortunately has been neglected by many British historians, used European sources to cast much light upon British foreign policy.\(^1\) Browning's biography of the Duke of Newcastle overrates his importance and misunderstands his attitudes, giving him an undeserved consistency of attitude. Williams' work on Newcastle and Carteret suffers from similar problems.\(^2\)

There are several good reasons why so little attention has been devoted to British foreign policy in the period 1727-1731. Several of the major collections of papers dealing with the period are inaccessible. Permission has rarely been granted for scholars to work on the papers of Stephen Poyntz at Althorp, Townshend at Raynham or Horatio Walpole at Wolterton. It is largely due to this that so little is known about Poyntz, one of the British Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Soissons, and that Townshend lacks a biographer. Despite several efforts and the kind help of various historians, particularly that of Lord Dacre of Glanton, the author of this piece was refused permission to consult these archives. Permission for access to the papers of Edward Weston and to those of St. Saphorin were also refused. As a result, little can be said about the views of Poyntz and some of the conclusions advanced in this thesis have to be more tentative than would otherwise be desirable. Fortunately

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\(^1\) W. Michael, Englische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert (5 vols., Berlin/Basle and Berlin/Leipzig, 1896-1955). Volumes 3 and 4 (1934, 1937) are relevant to this thesis.

there is much Townshend material outside Raynham, both in the
Townshend papers in the British Library, and in the Bradfer
Lawrence collection held in the Norwich County Record Office.

The other major problem has proved to be the destruction
of papers. As Colley has recently pointed out there is very little
available relating to the Tories in this period. There are no
remains of the political correspondence of Lord Gower, Lord Bathurst,
Sir William Wyndham, Sir Watkin Williams Wynn and Sir John Hinde
Cotton. Potter has commented on the absence of Shippen material.
Aware of the interception of letters by the Walpole ministry, mem-
biers of the opposition preferred not to send letters by the post,
but to entrust them to messengers. In addition, politicians were
loath to commit their thoughts to paper. These reasons were no
doubt partly responsible for the paucity of material left by such
opposition figures as Hingbrooke, William Pulteney and Daniel
Pulteney.¹

In addition, the papers of many members of the ministry do
not exist. Many possibly never kept papers in the first place,
some collections have been destroyed, and some may yet be undis-
covered. Little remains of the correspondence of Carteret, or of
what has been termed the 'Wilmington-Dorset-Dodington group'. It
is therefore very difficult to comment on the cohesion or views
of this group.²

The notes left by the Lord Chancellor, Lord King, contain
large gaps, for example between July 1726 and June 1727, and in the

   (Cambridge, 1982) pp. 205, 311 n.34; Sedgwick, I, IX.

2. Williams, pp. 3-4; W. Earing Pemberton, Carteret: The Brilliant
   Failure of the Eighteenth Century (1936) VII; T. Riker, Henry Fox, 
   First Lord Holland (2 vols., Oxford, 1911) I, 8. For the
   destruction and loss of many of Walpole's papers, Coxe, I, XXIII.
winter of 1729-1730. Sir Robert Walpole's papers are a very incomplete series, as he destroyed many of them when he fell from office. Many of the major aristocratic figures in the ministry, such as Grafton, Devonshire, Scarborough and Godolphin left little that is useful.

Undue stress has been placed upon Parliamentary debates due to the lack of records for most council meetings in this period, and to the absence of much reliable material about court politics. It is therefore difficult to assess the struggles between ministers, as their strength at court is often a mystery. This is particularly the case with the problem of assessing the position of the candidates mentioned as potential secretaries of states. The situation is not improved by the nearly complete absence of material originating from George II and Queen Caroline, although in the Townshend material in the British Library there are a few comments made by George II upon dispatches he had been sent. ¹ Lord Hervey's Memoirs cover the period from 1727 onwards, but, aside from their dubious reliability, ² they were not begun until 1733, and therefore suffer from the problem of hindsight. Halsband has pointed out how Hervey treated the early years of the reign in very broad outline; and this is not surprising, as he went abroad in July 1728, and did not return until October 1729. This, combined with the destruction by the first Marquis of Bristol, of the section from May 1730 to the late summer of 1732, make the Memoirs a poor source for this period, and the fact that they were intended for publication can

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1. J. Black, 'George II Reconsidered. A consideration of George's influence in the conduct of Foreign Policy in the first years of his reign', Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs (forthcoming)

There is less material available for the parliamentary sessions of the late 1720's, than there is for those of the subsequent decade. The account of the sessions of 1726-1730 in the introduction to the History of Parliament is largely based upon the Parliamentary diary of Sir Edward Knatchbull. This diary ends on March 28th 1730, shortly before his death, but because of his failure to win reelection as a county representative of Kent in the elections of 1727, Knatchbull missed much of the first session of George II's first Parliament. This session began on February 3rd 1728, but Knatchbull was not sworn in until 19th March and he did not begin his diary for that year until then. This diary is particularly valuable because of the paucity of alternative sources. Viscount Percival's diary is of little use before 1730, the letters sent to the Earl of Carlisle are brief, Thomas Tower's notes are of some interest, but he was not elected until February 1729, and the printed collections omit much. In 1728 and 1729 the House of Commons attacked the coverage of Parliamentary activities printed in Robert Raikes' Gloucester Journal, and on March 8th 1729 passed a resolution, 'that it is an indignity to and a breach of the privilege of this House for any person to presume to give in written or printed proceedings of this House or of any committee thereof'. As a result of this ruling both the Political State of Great Britain and the Historical Register ceased for a while to print reports of debates, and in the session of 1730 there are several important debates for which there are no printed accounts at all. British accounts of parliamentary

proceedings can be supplemented by the reports of foreign envoys in London. Some, such as the Prussian resident Reichenbach and the Hesse-Cassel envoy Diemar, seem to have attended Parliament with some frequency. 1

Aside from the destruction or absence of material within Britain, there has been widespread destruction of material in European archives. Much of the material preserved in the Hanoverian Hauptstaatsarchiv, including the relevant foreign policy documents, was destroyed in the 1940's. 2 Allied bombing similarly destroyed some of the relevant material in the Staatsarchiv in Darmstadt. However, in some of the archives that were able to survive the Second World War without extensive damage the manuscript collections are not complete, and loss in the past must be assumed. This is the case both with the Wittelsbach diplomatic papers preserved in the Hauptstaatsarchiv in Munich and with the diplomatic papers of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel preserved in the Staatsarchiv in Wolfenbüttel. The political disturbances of the last two centuries, and in particular the French Revolution and the expropriation of aristocratic estates in eastern Europe, have helped to ensure that there are few collections of the private papers of diplomats accessible for study.


This work draws on several major collections of manuscript material that have received little attention. In Europe the diplomatic archives in Paris, Nancy, Turin, Modena, Parma, Lucca, Hanover, Genoa, Venice, Vienna, Dresden, Munich, Darmstadt, Marburg, Osnabrück, Münster and Wolfenbüttel have been consulted. In Paris extensive work has been carried out on the manuscript collections held in the Bibliothèque National and the Bibliothèque de L'Arsenal and on the collections in Archives des Affaires Etrangères and the Archives National. In the latter archive the Archives de la Marine Series B7, Pays Etrangères, has proved particularly rewarding. The reports of the French Consul General in Spain, D'Aubenton, have shed much light on Spanish politics in this period. D'Aubenton was both observant and well informed, enjoyed good relations with the British minister, Benjamin Keene, and regarded himself, with some reason, as being more perceptive than the French ambassador. The Archives des Affaires Etrangères produced much that was useful on French foreign policy. In addition, the intercepted correspondence of Frederick William I and his envoy in Paris, Chambrier, was a useful source for Prussian policy, and the material preserved in the correspondence Politique series for Brunswick-Hanover, Cologne and Allemagne for 1729 and 1730 contained useful material on Townshend's German policy.

The importance of the reports of Ossorio, the Sardinian envoy in London from 1730, has been commented upon by Gibbs.¹ His predecessor, D'Aix, Envoy Extraordinary from 1725 to 1730, was a man of considerable perception whose reports are of great interest. In addition the reports of the Sardinian envoys in Spain, France, Austria and the United Provinces provided much material on international relations in this period.

The most important German archives consulted were those of Dresden, Münster, Wolfenbüttel and Marburg. They provided much information about the German policy of the British government in the late 1720's. The reports of the Saxon envoy in London, Le Coq, are a very important source for British foreign policy in the winter of 1727-28. The papers of the Cologne first minister Count Plettenberg, now preserved in Münster, shed much light upon the Anglo-Wittelsbach negotiations in 1729-30.

The reports of several foreign envoys are preserved in British archives. In the Public Record Office, the series SP 107 contains most of the despatches intercepted by the British government. This series is of some use for 1730 and 1731, though there is little in it for the late 1720's. In the Bodleian Library the papers of Zamboni, the Saxon agent who also provided reports for the rulers of Hesse-Darmstadt, Modena, and Württemberg, have been found most useful. The Hotham papers in Hull University Library include valuable material for Sir Charles Hotham's mission in Berlin in 1730, as well as copies of most of the 1729 and 1730 correspondence between Reichenbach, and both Frederick William I and one of his principal ministers Grumbkow.

In the Public Record Office all classes of State Papers Foreign have been consulted, both those of major diplomatic importance and the reports from minor postings such as Hamburg, Genoa and Dunkirk. The latter have often proved to be very rewarding. In addition, other series have been consulted, including Domestic, Ireland, Scotland, Regencies, Admiralty and Miscellaneous, whilst through the kindness of Mr. Evans, material as yet unclassified has been made available for examination.
Aside from the state papers all the accessible private papers of relevance for the period, both those held in the British Library and those held in County Record Offices, have been examined. The most useful of these has proved to be the papers of James, first Earl of Waldegrave. Waldegrave, a gentleman of the bedchamber under George I, had already been sent to Paris in 1725 as an Envoy Extraordinary, to congratulate Louis XV on his marriage. In 1727 he was chosen to reestablish British representation at Vienna, but, because of diplomatic complications, he spent the second half of that year in Paris, and was left in charge of the Paris embassy when Horatio Walpole returned to Britain for the parliamentary session. Waldegrave finally reached Vienna in April 1728 and remained there until the summer of 1730, when he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Louis XV. At Chewton Mendip there are over seventy boxes of his papers. These include his correspondence with most of the British diplomatic corps, and an excellent series of letters from the Undersecretaries of State in London, which contains much information about political events in Britain. There is also at Chewton a journal which Waldegrave kept whilst at Paris in 1727.

In addition to these private papers, the archives of the Bank of England, General Post Office, House of Lords and Huguenot Society have all been examined, and extensive work has been carried out upon the press of the period.
CHAPTER 1
THE EUROPEAN and BRITISH SETTING

The general peace treaties of the 1710's that ended the various wars then afflicting Europe left many questions unsettled. Territorial and dynastic disputes affected large areas of Europe. Throughout the 1710's and 1720's diplomatic tension produced military mobilisations and the threat of war. Professor Hatton has viewed the period as one 'when progress was made in limiting wars and achieving a longish period of peace by conscious rational efforts .... (and when) .... the idea of the Society of Europe in which peace was regarded as the natural state was being transferred from the blueprints to reality on a practical level'. However, whilst Hatton has seen a generally rational, hopeful 'climate of opinion' that reached its apogee in a series of Congresses that served to 'deflate' problems and make them more amenable to solutions, the politicians of the period felt defeated by the interminable nature of the Congress system and its inability to settle issues. The French first minister Cardinal Fleury felt that Congresses were unhelpful, 'Un Congrès qui entraîne toujours de grandes longueurs, et qu'il est aisé encore d'allonger quand une des parties le croit nécessaire à ses intérêts, serait peu propre à calmer des inquiétudes'.

If the Congress system produced pessimism, the other major diplomatic innovation of the period that has been praised by historians, the system of collective security involving reciprocal guarantees,\(^1\) failed. The Congress of Cambrai, begun in 1724 was a failure, and by 1725 Europe was at the brink of war, split by two conflicting alliances, those of Hanover and Vienna.

The basic causes of European tension were twofold. Firstly, it proved difficult to adapt to the rather sudden shifts in the power of particular European states. Four changes posed major problems. In the Baltic, the rise of Russian and the collapse of Swedish power had been both sudden and frightening.\(^2\) Russia under Peter the Great had proved able to deploy troops inside Europe, in Mecklenburg and Jutland. The defeat of Charles XII of Sweden at Poltava in 1709, the conquest of the Swedish Baltic provinces, and the internal conflicts affecting Sweden in the 1720's had all helped to destroy the possibility of Sweden continuing to serve as an effective anti-Russian barrier. Frederick William I of Prussia was too scared of Russian power to seek the role, and Augustus II, King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, too weak to do so. The


attempt by Britain and France to force Russia to restore her Baltic conquests to Sweden had proved a failure.

The rise of Russian power would have been less threatening if Russia, once she had beaten Sweden had devoted her attentions to the conquest of territories from Turkey and Persia, as indeed seemed to be the case in 1723. However, for dynastic reasons, Peter I became deeply involved in German politics. In 1716 Peter's niece Catherine married Charles Leopold, Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and in 1725 Peter's daughter Anna married Charles Frederick, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Both these two German princes had interests that were espoused by Peter, interests that clashed with those of Hanover. The ducal lands of Holstein-Gottorp in Schleswig had been seized by Frederick IV of Denmark, and Britain, as well as France, had guaranteed Danish possession of them. Hanover had been authorised by the Emperor to intervene in Mecklenburg, where the conflict between the Duke and his nobility had deteriorated into a state of civil war. Russian support for the Duke challenged the Hanoverian position.1

Hopes were expressed in 1725, when Peter was succeeded by his widow Catherine I, that Russia would collapse into anarchy. The theme of a possible Russian return to barbarism was a common one in the diplomatic correspondence of the period and in the British press.2


Such hopes proved to be unfounded, and though the British government received reports of a decline in Russian naval strength, Catherine showed herself able to control Russia, and willing to aid her German relatives. She espoused the cause of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp with vigour, and ordered major military mobilisations in 1725-27 that threatened the other Baltic powers. Unpleasant rumours about Russian intentions began to circulate. In July 1725 Rochefort, the French agent in Hamburg, noted reports of an intended Russian attack upon Denmark, and suggestions of a Prusso-Russian agreement to despoil Poland and Denmark. By November 1725, the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, could inform Horatio Walpole, the British Ambassador in Paris, that war with Russia was probable. The Russian accession in 1726 to the Vienna Alliance, the alliance formed in 1725 by Austria and Spain, linked Baltic rivalries more firmly into the general pattern of European conflict. Russia appeared as an unpredictable, unstable power, able and willing to risk war, and averse to seeing its position limited by any Congress.

At the opposite end of Europe, the aggression by another state that had suddenly increased in power gave rise to tension. Under Charles II, who had ruled Spain from 1665 until 1700, Spain had been regarded as a cipher, and this view was reinforced by the War of the Spanish Succession, when Spain was fought over by other powers, and deprived of the bulk of her European empire, Sicily,

2. Rochefort to Maurepas, 2, 9, 20 July 1725, AN. AM. B7 286.
the island of Sardinia, the Milanese, Naples, and the Southern Netherlands. Louis XIV's second grandson, Philip, Duke of Anjou, had become King of Spain as Philip V, defeating the rival claims of the Austrian Archduke Charles, who became the Emperor Charles VI in 1711. Philip was a markedly eccentric character, prone to acute melancholia and bouts of hysteria, and strongly influenced by his second wife Elisabeth Farnese whom he married in 1714. Under Philip there was a marked increase in Spanish power, a development that owed much to the nadir reached during the 1700's, from which it could only improve, and something to the administrative reforms and Bourbon governmental methods that were partially introduced under Philip. A particular concern for other powers was the increase in Spanish naval power and a growing Spanish interest in schemes for commercial and oceanic trade. The growth in Spanish power, coupled with a desire to reverse recent territorial losses, most threatened the Austrians, who had acquired the bulk of Spain's Italian possessions. In 1717 the Spaniards conquered the island of Sardinia, and in 1718 invaded Sicily, beginning a war that lasted until 1720. The Austrians fought badly and their military system was shown to be singularly unable to defend their Italian possessions. It was a combination of British naval power, which smashed the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro in 1718 and isolated the Spanish army in Sicily, and a French invasion of Spain in 1719, that forced Philip V to abandon, for a while, his Italian schemes.

By the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, Britain had gained various concessions from the Spaniards. Gibraltar and Minorca, captured in 1704 and 1708 respectively, and ceded to Britain in 1713, were

believed to strengthen Britain's control over her Mediterranean trade and to improve her naval position. In the same year Britain acquired the asiento, the contract to supply the Spanish colonies with slaves. A clause in it permitted limited trade in British manufactures with New Spain, in an annual permission ship. The growth in Spanish naval power and commercial pretension, a growth particularly associated with Patino, intendant of the marine from 1717, challenged British rights as well as the more general British aspiration to gain a large share in the trade to America and the South Seas.1

Although the British would not have accepted the premise, the rise of British power was another cause of European instability.2 Under the later Stuarts Britain, wracked by internal conflict and willing to become the pensioner of France, could be dismissed as an effective force in European affairs. William III's success in smashing his opponents within the British Isles ended this state of affairs. It was not that William dragged Britain into European politics, as is customarily assumed. In the 1650's, 1660's and 1670's various British governments had sought to play a prominent role in Europe. Rather it was the brutal crushing successes of William in Scotland and, in particular, Ireland, and the consolidation of authority around the parliamentary monarchy, that permitted


2. Thomas Robinson, Secretary of the British Embassy in Paris, to Charles Delafaye, Under-Secretary of State in the Southern Department, 17 July 1728, PRO. 78/196 f. 58; R. Wodrow, Anacleta, or Materials for a History of Remarkable Providences Mostly Relating to Scotch Ministers and Christians (3 vols., Edinburgh, 1842), III, 361.
Britain to act in an effective manner as an opponent of France. There was a massive increase in the size of the British navy and army. The French fleet was defeated at La Hogue in 1692, and British control of the Channel was not to be seriously challenged again until 1744. From 1694-5, when the fleet wintered in the Mediterranean for the first time, using Cadiz as its base, British naval power became a major instrument of policy and influence in the politics of Southern Europe. British fleets were despatched to the Baltic, and under George I intervened in Baltic affairs with great frequency. British armies were regularly deployed on the Continent.

The accession of George I in 1714 led to increasing British involvement in Baltic and German affairs. Hatton has painted a rather charitable picture of George, but contemporaries, both in Britain and Europe, had little doubt that British strength was being used to support Hanoverian pretensions. Hanover’s formal acquisition in 1719 of the former Swedish Duchies of Bremen and Verden was widely attributed to British aid. For the Spaniards, concerned to defend their commercial position in the Indies and anxious to wipe out the humiliating concessions of Utrecht, the growth of British power was a major threat, a view shared by concerned Austrian ministers to resist Hanoverian pretensions, by Dutch ministers concerned about the threat to Dutch commerce, and by French ministers, uneasily aware of their need for a British alliance, but unhappy at growing British assertiveness. Though

1. S.F. Gardish, 'The establishment of British seapower in the Mediterranean, 1689-1713', Canadian Journal of History, 10, (1975) pp. 1-16. However, as the Duke of Parma pointed out, 'the English fleet could not reach him at Parma', George Tilson, Under-Secretary of State in the Northern Department, to Lord Waldegrave, British Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Vienna, 9 July 1728, Chewton.
some British ministers appreciated these feelings (George I, Stanhope and Townshend being willing, for instance, to return Gibraltar as the price for better Anglo-Spanish relations), most of the British political public failed to appreciate the degree to which Britain was regarded in Europe as a selfish, arrogant and aggressive power, and a source of tension. They were therefore surprised in the late 1720s when their Dutch and French allies proved willing to consider the abandonment of British pretensions as a reasonable price to pay for European peace, and when they were increasingly isolated in European diplomacy.¹

The fourth major power whose rise in strength was an important cause of instability was Austria. Between 1683 and 1720 Austria had witnessed a spectacular growth in territorial power, a growth only surpassed by Russia.² In Italy she had gained Naples, Sicily, Mantua and the Milanese, in the Balkans, Hungary, Transylvania, Little Wallachia, much of Serbia and the Banat of Temesvar, and further west she had acquired the Southern Netherlands.³ Accompanying


2. The Wittelsbach diplomat Gansinot wrote, 'L'Empereur est un monarque des plus puissant, que nous ayons eu depuis que l'Empire germanique a pris naissance', Gansinot to Plettenberg, 22 Dec. 1725, Münster, NB 259, f. 142. For Austria I have found particularly useful, M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen (5 vols., Vienna, 1963-65); H. Braubach, Versailles und Vien von Ludwig XIV bis Kaunitz (Bonn, 1952); McKay, Eugene; Quazza, pp. 25-43. The absence of biographies of Charles VI and of his Austrian Court Chancellor, Count Sinzendorf is a major gap and the loss of Sinzendorf's private papers in the Second World War creates many difficulties.

this expansion was a growth in military strength and reputation, and a determination to enforce Austrian power and Imperial authority in every area possible. In Italy, where she had become the strongest power, Austrian rule was marked by financial exactions and became bitterly unpopular. Diplomats of all powers believed that Italy was ready to rebel against Austrian rule, a belief which was shared by the European press.¹ Within the Empire, Charles VI appeared as an insensitive ruler, determined to use the legal instrument of Imperial authority, such as the Aulic Council, to enhance Austrian power. Charles was widely accused of seeking to establish a despotism within the Empire. The situation was exacerbated by the increase in religious hostilities within the Empire. The Emperor used Imperial authority to interfere in confessional disputes in a manner that appeared to Protestant powers, such as Hanover and Prussia, to be flagrantly unfair. To the Austrians these Protestant powers were selfish and disloyal members of the Empire.² The Commercial pretensions of Austria, Charles VI's attempt to establish maritime trading companies at Trieste and Ostend, worried Britain and the United Provinces.³

Aside from major changes in the power of particular European states, the second basic cause of European tension, was dynastic


3. M. Huisman, La Belgique Commerciale sous l'Empereur Charles VI. La Compagnie d'Ostende (Brussels, 1902); Dunthorne, pp. 57-74.
insecurity. Several major states had insecure dynasties, or successions that were unclear or could be challenged. The only children of Charles VI to survive for any length of time were three daughters, the youngest of whom died in 1730 aged four. Charles VI hoped to secure the undivided succession of his various territories for his own children rather than for the daughters of his elder brother, the Emperor Joseph I, Maria Josepha and Maria Amalia. This, rather than the stipulations of the indivisibility of the inheritance and the reversion to female in the absence of male descendants, was the most troublesome aspect of Charles' promulgation of the Pragmatic Sanction. Maria Josepha and Maria Amalia, born in 1699 and 1701, were considerably older than Charles' two eldest daughters, Maria Theresa and Maria Anna, born in 1717 and 1718. To reinforce the exclusion of the Josephine archduchesses, Charles ensured that their marriages were accompanied by solemn renunciations of all claims to the Succession. In 1719 the marriage of Maria Josepha and the heir to the Electorate of Saxony, Frederick Augustus, the future Augustus III, was preceded by a renunciation sworn to by bride, groom and groom's father. In 1722 the marriage of Maria Amalia to the heir to Bavaria, Charles Albert, was preceded by a similar renunciation. Neither the Saxons nor the Bavarians paid much attention to these renunciations. Both believed that neither the acts of parents nor renunciations could abnegate inalienable rights, and both were convinced that dynastic and inheritance rights were not transferable. In 1725, to fortify the position of the Bavarians, who had only won the younger of the Josephine archduchesses, Charles Albert's father Max Emanuel forged a copy of the Emperor Ferdinand I's will, purportedly awarding the Wittelsbachs the Austrian hereditary lands upon the extinction of
the dynasty's male line.¹

Charles VI's continued failure to produce a male heir and his efforts to secure European support for the Pragmatic Sanction helped to make the Austrian Succession more critical.² Under Charles VI Austrian policy became increasingly dominated by the issue, whilst powers opposed to Austria resorted to the device of encouraging pretensions upon the Austrian Succession, Saxon and Bavarian in the Empire, Sardinian and Spanish in Italy.³ Within the Empire, Bavaria fostered the development of a close alliance, a Hausunion, between the closely related Wittelsbach Electors of Bavaria, Trier, Cologne and the Palatinate, and made it clear, in response to Anglo-French efforts in 1725-26 to secure their alliance against Austria, that a commitment to help the Bavarian succession was expected.⁴

Until the birth of a Dauphin in September 1729 the succession to the young Louis XV of France was also very uncertain. As part of the Utrecht settlement Louis' uncle Philip V of Spain had renounced his claims to the French throne, leaving as the next in line Philip V's second cousin, Louis XIV's nephew, Philip II, Duke

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2. For Austrian pressure upon Britain over this issue, Memorandum by Newcastle of meeting at Walpole's on 9 Sept. (os) 1727, FL.Add. 32687 f. 155.


of Orleans, and, after his death in 1723, his son Louis. Philip V doubted the validity of the Utrecht renunciation and maintained his claim to the French throne. He showed particular interest whenever Louis XV was very ill, particularly during the time of his smallpox attack in late 1728. A formidable 'Spanish' party existed in France, and the Orleans family felt threatened. To safeguard their position, Orleans, as Regent for the young Louis XV, signed the Triple Alliance in January 1717 with Britain and the United Provinces. The alliance stated that all those articles of the treaty of Utrecht which concerned the three powers, including those relating to the successions to the crowns of Britain and France, should retain full force. Orleans therefore closely associated the British alliance with the exclusion of all claims by the Spanish Bourbons. After Orleans' death, the Duke of Bourbon, chief minister from 1723 to 1726, maintained a hostile stance to Philip V. Philip continued to aspire to the French throne, particularly after his shortlived abdication of the Spanish crown in 1724 convinced him that he had no real right to the Spanish throne. It was widely believed that secret Austro-Spanish agreements in 1725 included an understanding that Austria was to support Spain in any French succession dispute. Until Louis XV sired his eldest son much speculation persisted about the French succession.  

As a result of the Triple Alliance of 1717 France was committed to supporting the Hanoverian succession in Britain. The challenge of Jacobitism posed a major problem for successive British governments.¹ It was suggested at the time that the threat of Jacobitism was deliberately exaggerated to discredit opposition within Britain, and it has been recently suggested that the group most impugned, the Tories, were largely free from Jacobitism.² Such a view would have found little support from George I and George II both of whom believed that, although individual Tories were loyal and could be trusted, the party as a whole was factious and disloyal.³ Equally serious was the manner in which foreign powers, hostile to Britain and to her Hanoverian rulers could be encouraged to support Jacobitism, and were themselves encouraged in their stance by a belief in the strength of Jacobitism.⁴ Jacobite chances were seen to depend on help from European powers. The Jacobites were delighted by the Austro-Spanish alliance of 1725, and sought to enlist the support of both powers, for an invasion of Britain. The Jacobite factor was of greater importance by the late 1720's in British foreign policy, where it could influence the views of other states, than in British internal affairs.⁵

1. P. Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975); G.H. Jones, The Mainstream of Jacobitism (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); Lodge, p. 6. I would like to thank Professors Fritz and Jones for discussing the issue with me.


The insecurity of the Russian succession was closely linked in the eyes of the rest of Europe to the general belief in an imminent collapse of Russian power. The position of Peter's widow Catherine was believed to be threatened by his grandson Peter, who succeeded Catherine, supposedly killed by means of poison administered in a bottle of her favourite beer from Burton-upon-Trent, in 1727. Whether Peter II was to have a Russian or a foreign bride became a major issue of debate linked to the long-standing tension between foreign and 'Old Russ' influences within Russia. In 1730 Peter II died suddenly of smallpox leaving no child. He was succeeded by Peter I's niece, Anne, the childless widowed Duchess of Courland, but her position was challenged by an attempt to restrict her power in favour of the higher aristocracy. Peter I's daughters by his marriage to Catherine I, Anne the wife of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and Elizabeth, who eventually became Czarina in 1741, also possessed strong claims to the throne. A Holstein coup in Russia such as was rumoured in 1727, or Russian support for the Holstein interest, were major threats to Baltic stability, as Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp claimed not only Schleswig but also, as the son of Charles XII of Sweden's elder sister, Hedvig Sofie, the throne of Sweden. Britain and France supported Frederick I, the elder son of Landgrave Karl of Hesse-Cassel, who had become King of Sweden in 1720 upon the abdication of his wife Ulrika Eleonore the younger sister of Charles XII. There was a powerful Holstein interest in Sweden and Russia attempted to coerce the Swedes to accept Charles Frederick either as King or as the heir to the childless Frederick I. Russian policy was greatly affected by the succession of so many monarchs within a short interval. Catherine I did not pursue
her husband's policy of Caspian expansion and devoted much attention to Baltic affairs. Peter II, who showed much favour to Old Russ families such as the Dolgorukiis, reaffirmed Catherine I's alliance with Austria and promised to send Russian troops into Europe in support of the Vienna alliance, but during his reign Russian military action declined, the Baltic fleet was allowed to rot and a reversion of Russia to barbarism was widely anticipated. Anne in 1730 reaffirmed the Austrian alliance and adopted a much more active stance in European politics.

Aside from influencing the disputed succession in Sweden, Russian power was also of great importance in another country whose unsettled succession was a major cause of instability in eastern Europe, Poland. There were two kings of Poland alive. Stanislas Leszczynski, after 1725 the father-in-law of Louis XV, had been set up by Charles XII of Sweden as King of Poland in rivalry to Augustus II Elector of Saxony. The Russian defeat of Charles XII at Poltava in 1709 had led to Stanislas being driven into exile. Stanislas maintained his claim to the Polish throne, and the existence of a strong anti-Saxon movement within Poland, able to express itself freely thanks to the somewhat anarchic nature of the Polish system of government, encouraged European opponents of Augustus to consider supporting Stanislas.¹ Poland was an elective monarchy and Augustus' attempts to have his son accepted as his successor failed. Saxon aspirations clashed with Prussian determination to prevent Saxony from becoming a major power. Frederick William I was very interested both in the Polish succession, and in the

¹ Stanislas' daughter married Louis XV in 1725.
succession of the Polish Vassal-Duchy of Courland, where the dynasty was dying out. The growing ill health of Augustus II and his unrelenting addiction to the bottle and the chase of both deer and women, led to frequent reports of his death: that he was to survive until 1733 came as a great surprise. ¹

Aside from these major territories there were several other states whose succession was uncertain and contested. Several European dynasties were failing to reproduce themselves. The Cirksena family, the Dukes of East Friesland, were one of these and their extinction in 1744 had been long anticipated. In 1691 a mutual succession agreement between Hanover and East Frisia providing for the eventual succession of the Welfs to East Friesland if the Cirksenas died out was confirmed. Three years later the Emperor Leopold I granted Frederick III of Brandenburg-Prussia a right of succession. Danish and Dutch interest in the area compounded the tension, and a civil war broke out in the 1720s between the ruler George Albert and the powerful Estates. The East Friesland issue embittered Hanoverian-Prussian relations, and the exercise of Imperial authority in the dispute fortified fears about Austrian intentions. ²


2. Hughes, pp. 84-95, 99-100, 281-362; Du Bourgay to Townshend, 17 Feb. 1725, PRO. 90/18; 'Memoire abrége sur les différents entre le peé. d'ost frise et les Etats de ce pays; AE. Mem. et Doc. Hollande, 60 f. 65-124.
Further south the Wittelsbach family was in dynastic difficulty largely due to its policy of donating too many younger sons to the rule of such ecclesiastical principalities as Liège, Cologne, Münster, Paderborn, Hildesheim and a clutch of South German bishoprics. The Elector Palatine, Karl Philipp, who was to die childless in 1742, ruled, besides his Electorate to which the Wittelsbach house of Palatine-Sultzbach had a clear right to succeed, the Rhenish Duchies of Julich and Berg. These were a part of the old succession of the house of Cleves which had been provisionally divided between the two principal claimants, the Elector of Brandenburg and the Count Palatine of Neuberg in 1614, a division confirmed, after much conflict, in the partition of 1666. The rights of the house of Palatine-Sultzbach to succeed in the Jülich-Berg inheritance were open to dispute, and Frederick William I made it clear that he intended to pursue his claims with vigour, and, if necessary, with violence. Though Frederick William claimed to be ready to accept a compromise, the Wittelsbachs displayed no such readiness.¹

In Italy the Medici Grand Dukes of Tuscany and the Farnese Dukes of Parma were dying out. The succession to both Duchies was claimed by the eldest son of Philip V and Elisabeth Farnese, Don Carlos. Though John Gaston, the last Medici Grand Duke was not to die until 1737, and the last of the Farnese died in 1731, the succession issue had been much discussed in the 1720s. Imperial authority (and Austrian power) was involved, as both Tuscany and Parma were within the Empire, and the Austrians did not wish to see their strong position within Italy challenged by Carlos. Elisabeth Farnese sought to have Carlos' succession confirmed by the introduction of Spanish garrisons into the principal strongpoints in the Duchies, and by permission being

¹. A. Rosenlehner, Kurfürst Karl Philipp von der Pfalz und die jülichische Frage, 1725-1729 (Munich, 1906); Wilson, pp. 153-5; Schmidt, Karl Philipp.
granted for Carlos to reside in them. The Dukes, disinclined to see their authority infringed, and supported by the Austrians, opposed any such scheme.  

The role of dynastic concerns is difficult to evaluate. G.H. Jones has pointed out that the problem of the succession to the territories of an extinct ruling house was one of the major diplomatic problems of the period and J.H. Shennan has referred to 'rampant dynasticism'. Certainly there were dynastic claims that were not pushed very hard, such as the Saxon claims to the Jülich-Berg inheritance. However, in general, it could be suggested that the dynastic element should be stressed at the expense of any analysis that centres on factors such as commercial factors. Foreign policy was the most essential prerogative of majesty, and the attitudes of individual rulers are central to any analysis of international relations in this period. Any attempt at model building fails before the stubborn facts of personal whim.

The Austro-Spanish treaties of April 30th/May 1st 1725 came as a considerable surprise to the rest of Europe. The two parties had been considered irreconcilable because of their differences over Italy. Early in 1725 a Dutch adventurer, Ripperda, arrived in Vienna. He had been sent secretly by Elisabeth Farnese to offer a Spanish guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction and concessions for Charles VI's favourite commercial scheme, the Ostend Company, in return for guarantees for Don Carlos' succession to Parma and Tuscany, and marriages between

her eldest sons, Carlos and Philip, and two of the Emperor's daughters. The eventual treaties avoided committing Charles on the fate of his daughters, but provided for Carlos' rights in Italy, the mutual recognition and guarantees of each ruler's possessions and successions, trading concessions to the Ostend Company and Austrian support for the return of Gibraltar and Minorca from England.

The treaty created a lot of unease in Britain and France. Bourbon's ministry was concerned about the prospect of Austrian support for Philip V's claim on the French throne and the British were worried by rumoured secret articles in support of the Pretender, fears that were unfounded insofar as the actual Austro-Spanish agreements were concerned.¹ Both powers feared that the threat to the balance of power represented by the new treaty could force them into making concessions in the myriad of disputes in which they were involved. On September 3rd 1725 Britain, France and Prussia signed the Treaty of Hanover guaranteeing each other's territories and rights inside and outside Europe. This provoked a new Austro-Spanish treaty two months later. Spain promised Austria subsidies, and in return Charles VI agreed that two of his daughters should marry the sons of Philip and Elisabeth.

The next eighteen months saw a period of acute diplomatic tension, aptly described by McKay as a 'cold war'.\(^1\) Each of the alliances sought to acquire new allies. The Hanover alliance gained Sweden, Denmark and the United Provinces, the Vienna alliance, Russia, and, largely thanks to Prussian fears of Russia and the prospect of Austrian support over Jülich-Berg, Prussia. Most of the German powers, whichever alliance they formally joined, followed an ambivalent policy. This was true of Saxony, Bavaria and Hesse-Cassel,\(^2\) whilst Sardinia attempted to conduct an auction for her support. The period saw massive military mobilisations. Britain dispatched three large fleets, one to the Baltic to persuade Sweden and Denmark that an accession to the Hanover alliance would not leave them vulnerable to Russia, one to the West Indies to blockade the Spanish treasure fleet and thereby prevent Spain from being able to provide Austria with subsidies, and one to Spanish waters to menace invasion and prevent a blockade of Gibraltar. The Spaniards fired the first shots when they besieged Gibraltar in February 1727. George I anxious about Hanoverian vulnerability to Prussian and Austrian attack persuaded France to move large forces towards the Rhine. War plans were drawn up and Townshend considered naval action against Sicily and an invasion of the Austrian Netherlands.\(^3\)


3. Dunthorne, pp.113-126.
Throughout the period of tension negotiations had continued between some of the powers of the two alliances. Cardinal Fleury, Louis XV's former tutor, became chief minister of France in 1726 and he was determined to avoid war. He attempted to restrain the more aggressive British ministry, and this led to some British doubts about the degree of his commitment to the Anglo-French alliance. Fleury realised that Austria was less interested in conflict than Spain. An ultimatum was sent to Austria threatening war if she would not agree to 'quelques articles preliminaires, qui puissent faire envisager une prompte conciliation'. Charles VI, averse to war, in a difficult fiscal position due to disappointments over Spanish subsidies, and hopeful that he would be able to gain advantages at the Congress table, agreed.

On May 31st 1727 the Preliminaries of Paris, the terms for a pacification of Europe, were signed by the representatives of Britain, France, the United Provinces and Austria. Spain did not have an envoy in Paris and it was agreed that the Spanish envoy in Vienna, Bourdonville, should be asked to sign there on behalf of Spain. Two weeks later on June 14th George I embarked at Greenwich for a visit to his Electorate and eight days after that, on the 22nd, he died at Osnabrück. On the 23rd the news of his death reached The Hague, on the 26th, Paris and on the 28th, Vienna. On Wednesday June 25th towards 3 p.m. the news

2. Dunthorne, p. 138; Chance, Alliance of Hanover pp.731-5. The text of the Preliminaries can be found in A. Pribram, Österreichische Staatsverträge: England bis 1748 (Innsbruck, 1907) pp.457-64.
reached Whitehall by means of a courier, sent by Townshend who had been following George V to Hanover. Walpole gave the orders to double the guard throughout London and then left for Richmond to inform George Prince of Wales that his father had died. That evening George came to London and the following morning was proclaimed King. ¹

It might seem that George I left on his last trip to Europe and George II came to the throne against the background of impending peace. After the Preliminaries had been signed the ministerial press was full of praise for a government that had brought peace to Europe. Hope was held out that British trade would revive. The day before George died Stanley's News Letter reported,

'The merchants and traders of the City of London are overjoy'd at the prospect there is, that both our domestick and foreign trade, which has for a considerable time met with obstructions from the undeserved ill usage this nation had met with, will by the great wisdom and conduct of our wise administration flourish again; some of these good effects being already to appear among our woollen and silk manufacturers here'.

Prosperity at home would be accompanied by peace abroad. It was confidently predicted that the Jacobites would see their chances of foreign support disappear, and, indeed, many of the Jacobites were very pessimistic about the consequences of the Preliminaries. ²

1. There is a good account of these events in the newsletter sent to the Prince-Bishop of Osnabrück on 27th June. Osnabrück 294, f. 43-4.

Owen O'Rourke, the Jacobite agent in Vienna reported, 'all doors seem to be shutt upp by the preliminaries agreed upon'.

However, alongside these tidings of peace, sounds of war and notes of discord were still heard. Some diplomats doubted whether Austria was sincere in its desire for peace. Fears were expressed that the Preliminaries would lead to France abandoning Britain and joining Spain and Austria. It was well known that there had been much Anglo-French tension over the conduct of negotiations. These doubts and fears were to grow in intensity after the accession of George II, and it was to be speedily realised that the Preliminaries of Paris had not improved the British diplomatic situation to any appreciable extent.

1. O'Rourke to James III, 14 June 1727, Vienna, England, Varia, 8.
2. Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 13 June 1727, PRO. 78/308 f. 845; Townshend to Newcastle, 19 June 1727, PRO. 43/9; Townshend to Admiral Norris, 24 June 1727, BL. Add. 28156 f. 221.
3. Tilson to Delafaye, 19 June 1727, PRO. 43/9; Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 30 July 1727, BL. Add. 32751 f. 127.
When George II acceded, the principal British ministers were Sir Robert Walpole, who ran the Treasury and led the ministerial group in the House of Commons, Lord Townshend, the Secretary of State for the Northern Department, and the Duke of Newcastle, his colleague in the Southern Department. Opinions varied and still vary as to the abilities of each and their relations with each other. The last five years of George I's reign, the period after the deaths of Stanhope and Sunderland, have received very little scholarly attention. The ministerial rivalries of this period, and in particular the falls of Carteret and Cadogan, have received far less attention than the feuds of the first five years of the reign, and the latest biographer of George I, Hatton, is disappointingly brief in her survey of these years. Hatton sees the last years of George's reign as years of political quiescence, 'The consensus among ministers achieved by the Townshend-Walpole coup of 1724 .... the absence of factional strife made for relative ease of cabinet business'.


2. Hatton, p. 276. Hatton argues that George I was not a captive of his ministers, pp. 256, n.1, 276, 296.
It was certainly the case that Walpole and Townshend acted to remove those of different views and put in their place people they could trust.\textsuperscript{1} Former adherents of Sunderland were removed, such as the Duke of Roxburgh, Secretary of State for Scotland, sacked in 1725, Lord Carteret, sent to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant in 1724 (a form of exile in the view of many),\textsuperscript{2} and the Earl of Macclesfield, impeached successfully as Lord Chancellor in 1725 in a move that some blamed on Walpole.\textsuperscript{3} Diplomats closely associated with Carteret, such as Sir Luke Schaub\textsuperscript{4} and the Earl of Marchmont, were denied posts. However, as George Baillie had pointed out in 1723, 'Walpole doubtless has secret enemies',\textsuperscript{5} and the conduct of several ministers in 1727, when George Dodington, a Lord of the Treasury, and the Duke of Dorset, the Lord Steward, deserted Walpole for Compton, confirms this view.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Chammorel to Morville, 4 Jan. 1725, AE. CP. Ang. 350 f. 20.
\item Carteret, a diplomat of considerable experience, had been Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 1721-4. He was jockeyed out of this position by Townshend, Walpole and Newcastle.
\item Sedgwick, I, 35. Baillie was MP. for Berwickshire and a Lord of the Treasury.
\end{enumerate}
The respective roles of the three principal ministers are difficult to distinguish, because of the paucity of private correspondence surviving between them. Newcastle seems to have followed the lead of his colleagues. He was not noted for his abilities, and was profuse in his protestations of loyalty towards Walpole and Townshend.\(^1\) He also stressed his willingness to follow the advice of the senior Secretary, Townshend. However, Newcastle was a stubborn man determined to protect his position and desirous of seeming to influence policy. Despite his apparent pliancy, he was increasingly adopting views of his own.\(^2\) In 1725 he sought to block the dispatch of Lord Waldegrave to Paris on an embassy to congratulate Louis XV on his marriage. The details are obscure, but it appears that Newcastle resented an appointment in his own department of someone he did not approve of. Newcastle failed to block the appointment.\(^3\) Possibly the increased speculation about Newcastle being replaced as Secretary, speculation that is particularly noticeable in the winter of 1726-1727, reflected real tension within the ministry, but, if it did, there are few other signs of such tension. Newcastle accepted both a position as ministerial second fiddle in the House of Lords, and the independent attitude and position of Sir Robert Walpole's brother, Horatio, who held Paris, the most important embassy in Newcastle's department.\(^4\)

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2. Williams, pp. 60-66; Plumb, p.195; Browning, pp. 49-50.
3. 'Notes relating to my coming here', no date, notes in Waldegrave's handwriting, Chewton.
4. Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 7 Jan. 1727, Osnabrück 299 f.84. Newcastle describing his position in the 1720's noted that he 'then, never thought, nor could be thought by anybody, but to act a subordinate part in the House of Lords', Newcastle to Hardwicke, 14 Oct. (os) 1739, BL. Add. 35046 f. 165. W. Coxe, *Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole* (1802) pp. 46-171;
The relations between Townshend and Walpole are unclear. Differences of opinion existed about a range of matters, and historians have been able to draw attention to clashes between the two ministers.\textsuperscript{1} However, it would be absurd to suppose that differences should not have existed. Any attempt to define respective spheres of interest, with Townshend dealing with foreign affairs, and Walpole with the House of Commons and fiscal matters, needed to cope with the interdependence of these spheres.\textsuperscript{2}

Foreign policy entailed fiscal obligations that had to be supported by Parliament. Plumb has suggested that tension between the two men steadily increased, that Walpole acquired sufficient self-confidence to challenge Townshend's control of foreign policy, that Townshend resented Walpole's growing strength in Norfolk politics, symbolised by the building of his grandiose seat at Houghton, and that the death in 1726 of Walpole's sister, who had been Townshend's wife, helped to weaken the links between the two men.\textsuperscript{3}

Against this must be set the continued successful partnership of the two men and the relative absence of contemporary suggestions of division between them. Contemporary commentators were always very keen to see signs of conflict, and they are, within limits, a guide to the perception of tension in this period. George I's ministry, when he set out for Hanover, in the summer of 1727, was a successful administration. The three principal ministers were united and the jealousy of them that existed within the ministry was held in check by governmental success and royal favour.

\textsuperscript{1} J.B. Owen, \textit{The Eighteenth Century 1714-1815} (1974) p.28.

\textsuperscript{2} During Townshend's absences in Hanover, Walpole was involved in the conduct of foreign policy, Walpole to Newcastle, 19 Sept. (os) 1725, PRO. 35/58, f.50.

\textsuperscript{3} Plumb, pp. 132-3,151,171; Hervey, I, 80-5; Dickinson, \textit{Walpole} pp.123-4; Owen, Eighteenth Century p.29.
Bolingbroke was foolish to believe that George was going to dismiss Walpole. Nevertheless Walpole, aware of opposition within the ministry, was conscious of the need to maintain royal support.

Walpole's relations with George, Prince of Wales, were not particularly good, though they were not as bad as the Prince's relations with Newcastle. During the mid-1720s the Prince had played little part in politics and had led a rather retired life. The spectacular disputes with his father of the late 1710s had been replaced by a mutual coldness.

There is little sign of any difference of opinion between father and son over policy, but there was tension over the Prince's position. George I refused to have his son as Regent in England, during his absences in Hanover, and he vetoed his request to have a military post in any European conflict that might involve Britain.


3. Hervey, I, 29; Williams, p.39.


5. Chammorel to Morville, 11 June 1725, Broglie to Morville, 2 June 1727, AE.CP.Ang. 351, f.172, 359,f.180; Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 20 June 1727, ASV.LM.Ing. 96, f.569; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 26 June 1727, AST.LM.Ing.35.
The ministry sought to smooth matters. Townshend was instrumental in securing the Garter for the Earl of Scarborough, the Master of the Horse to the Prince of Wales, and one of his principal favourites.¹ The Prince was kept informed of government policy through the Duke of Devonshire, who had close connections with the Princess, Caroline of Ansbach.² Foreign diplomats had little hope that the accession of George II would alter British policy, which suggests a belief that the Prince was as committed to the French alliance as his father.³

Though his views on policy might be a mystery, the Prince was known to possess a distinct group of friends and confidants, some of whom were distinctly at odds with his father's ministers.⁴ This group has never received major scholarly attention, and its importance and potential strength have been underrated. Its leading member was the Honourable Spencer Compton, son of the third Earl of Northampton and M.P. for Sussex.⁵ Throughout George I's reign he was Speaker of the House of Commons and Treasurer to the Prince of Wales. In 1722 the ministry, seeking to please the Prince, bestowed on Compton the extremely lucrative office of Paymaster General. In her diary Lady Mary Cowper


2. Coxe, I, 283; Plumb, p.163; Le Coq to Marquis de Fleury, 3 May 1726, Dresden, 2674 f.41. William, second Duke of Devonshire was made Lord Privy Seal in March 1725 and held the post until his death in 1729.

3. Le Coq wrote of George, ...'étant encore Prince de Galles, il a toujours approuvé le present sisteme et toutes les mesures prises, en consequence, chose certaine et connue de tous ceux, qui ont eu l'honneur de l'approcher...'. Le Coq to Augustus II, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676, vol.18a, f.128.

4. Essex was 'a scarce-disguised enemy to Sir Robert Walpole', Hervey, I,96.

presented Compton as an active politician seeking to create a party that would include some of the Tories, but views of Compton's effectiveness and abilities varied. Browning has referred to 'the peculiarly gutless manner that characterised so much of his public life'; and this view is widely, if less vividly, held. Compton's abilities and influence are difficult to assess, but in 1727 he was held to be a plausible candidate for chief minister.

Prince George's circle had a distinctly artistocratic tone. Aside from Compton, prominent members included Frederick Nassau, third Earl of Grantham, Richard Lumley, second Earl of Scarborough, William Capel, third Earl of Essex and Philip Stanhope, fourth Earl of Chesterfield. Aside from Compton, few members of this group possessed any governmental experience and none had distinguished himself in Parliament. Aside from Compton, the group was relatively young, younger than George II, who acceded in his forty-sixth year. Scarborough had been born in 1688, Chesterfield in 1694. The abilities of these men were unknown, their political interest untested. None was a great borough patron.

2. Chammorel was impressed by Scarborough's parliamentary behaviour in March 1726, Chammorel to Morville, 4 Mar. 1726, AE.CP.Ang. 354, f.183
The other confidant of the Prince who was believed to enjoy great influence was his mistress Henrietta Howard, Countess of Suffolk. She had links with the parliamentary opposition and was in touch with the critics of Walpole. After George II came to the throne she enjoyed little power, but this had not been predicted, and George's earlier favour for her had been seen as a sign that Walpole would not survive the change of monarch.

1. Hervey, I, 39-44; Coxe, I, 276-81; L. Melville, Lady Suffolk and her Circle; Letters to and from Henrietta Countess of Suffolk edited by J.W. Croker (2 vols., 1824).
CHAPTER TWO

THE ACCESSION of GEORGE II

George II came to the throne determined to be his own master. He had no intention of being a roi fainéant, and made it clear from the beginning of his reign that he wished to control all the activities of government. Such a wish was not new, and, particularly since Louis XIV's bombastic remarks of 1661, every monarch at his accession to power spoke of his intention to rule himself. George energetically threw himself into the business of government, and contemporaries noted this. Mr. Le Coq, the Saxon Envoy Extraordinary, a diplomat who had had considerable experience of the British court, where he had been accredited for several years, noted of George,

'Il s'occupe beaucoup aux affaires du government et prend connoissance de tout .... Il voudroit introduire, dans les affaires de son Royaume, le même ordre, qu'il avoit etabli, dans celles de sa maison'.

The Sardinian envoy, the Marquis D'Aix, noted that George wanted to be informed of everything and that he worked hard; points frequently made in the diplomatic correspondence of this period,

'Il paroit que S.M.B. veut être informée de tout, et il travaille sans disontinuation depuis dix heures du matin, jusqu' à trois après midi.'

1. Le Coq to Augustus, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676, Vol.18a, f.133. 'The King, when he came to the throne, had formed a system both of men and things, and to make alterations in several offices, as to their power... ', King, p.47.

2. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 11 Aug. 1727, AST.LM.Ing. 35; Marini, p.80; newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 11 July 1727, Osnabrück, No. 299, f.49.
Indeed he worked so hard that fears were expressed about his health. On 22nd July Le Coq noted 'on craint, que cette trop grande application ne nuise a sa santé', and a month later he reported that George had gone to Richmond to rest,

'Comme S.M. apporte une grande application a tout a qui elle fait, et qu'elle aime une prompte expedition dans les affaires, on n'a pas été sans quelque apprehension, qu'une si grande contention d'esprit, surtout après avoir mené jusqu'à présent une view assez tranquille, ne causat quelque prejudice a sa santé'.

Hill Mussenden informed his brother Carteret Leathes, soon to be elected an M.P. for Sudbury, that George was determined to sit in person on the Admiralty, Treasury and War Office Boards. When George came to the throne he spoke of his intention to supervise the Treasury in person, and of his determination to cut pay, particularly for officials who held more than one post. It was believed that he would cut the number of pensions paid from the civil list, and Le Coq, who referred to George as 'un Prince d'ordre et très bon occonomie', believed that these changes were due not to George's avarice, but to a coherent fiscal and political strategy, an attempt to reduce the need for governmental borrowing and the dependence upon Parliamentary grants. There is no independent evidence for this suggestion, but it is symptomatic of the belief that George was seriously attempting to intervene in the processes of government.


2. Hill Mussenden, M.P. Harwich 1741-47, to Carteret Leathes, 20 June (os.) 1727, Ipswich, East Suffolk CRO., Leathes papers, WA403/1/10. Mussenden was writing from London: Le Coq to
George's initial determination to rule himself survived the summer of 1727. He continued to work hard. D'Aix noted in December 1727,

'Le Roy d'Angleterre travaille fort par lui-même, et l'on croit qu'il continuera cette méthode'.

In contrast to some of his ministers, such as Harrington, there were never any complaints of George being indolent, and he did not allow his strong interest in the chase to detract from the business of government. Throughout the autumn and winter of 1727 he showed that he was determined to maintain his authority. Carteret's new instructions as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, drawn up in October, limited his power over the Irish army and increased that of the King. Two months later the French manuscript newsletter sent regularly from London to George's uncle, Ernst-August, the Prince-Bishop of Osnabrück, reported that George was intervening in the pay of his household and guard officers, and devoting 'beaucoup d'attention au Reglement de l'Etat Civil et Militaire'. The role of George in government patronage is indicated by a remark in Sir Edward Knatchbull's parliamentary diary. In March 1728 Knatchbull was brought in

1. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 15 Dec. 1727, AST.LM. Ing.35.
2. Colley is inaccurate in referring to George as 'fundamentally indolent', Colley, _Defiance_ p.208.
on the government interest for Lostwithiel, which Knatchbull claimed, 'was directed to be done by the king on the Duke of
Dorset mentioning to him the hardship I had in Kent ......
Walpole concurred in this, and executed the king's commands
in my behalf with great willingness.' It is noteworthy that
Dorset consulted George rather than Walpole, and, despite
Knatchbull's claim, it is probable that Walpole was less than
pleased at having to bring in for a safe government seat, a
man whose voting record showed strong signs of political
independence.1

Countering these signs of royal activity there were others
that suggested that George was, as one biographer has claimed,
a 'king in toils'.2 The Earl of Strafford informed James III
that,

'The same violent and corrupt measures taken by the
father will be pursued by the son, who is passionate, proud
and peevish, and though he talks of ruling by himself, he
will just be governed as his father was.'3

The continued power of Walpole, the few ministerial changes and
the decision not to change government policies led many to adopt
Strafford's conclusion. By the autumn of 1727 Walpole's
continued power was regarded as unremarkable, and this has led
historians to ignore just how surprising such a continuation was.4

1. Knatchbull, p.73. Lostwithiel being a borough in the Duchy
of Cornwall was within the patronage system of the Prince of
Wales, but until Prince Frederick arrived from Hanover in
1728.


3. Strafford to James III, 21 June (os.) 1727, cited in

Eight days before the death of George I, the London weekly newspaper, Applebee's Original Weekly Journal printed a letter from 'Terre-Filius', warning 'all designing statesmen, and unwary Politicians', that

'as their power only depends upon the Breath of their sovereigns, an angry blast of that flings them at once from the summit of their glory, and height of their ambition; or at most, their authority generally determines with the life of their Prince, it being very rarely found that the most expert statesman can continue a favourite to two Princes successively.'

Many endorsed this view, and the accession of George II led to widespread expectations of Walpole's fall. Most of the major Tory peers and MP.s flocked to court, hoping that George would drastically reconstitute the ministry. On June 26th the Earls of Strafford and Lichfield, and Lords Gower and Scarsdale came to court and kissed George's hand. Strafford and the Duke of Somerset accompanied George to the Royal Chapel on July 6th. These visits were public and were well reported, both in Britain and Europe. Stanley's Letter, a manuscript newsletter used by many of the provincial newspapers, such as the Ipswich Journal, as a source of London and European news, reported on July 5th that 'there is the greatest court that has been known, most of the Popish and Tory Lords so called, have been to wait on their Majesties and were very graciously used'. The newsletter sent to George's uncle Ernst-August noted that many notables who had not been to court for years such as Somerset, Strafford, Scarsdale,

1. Applebee's Original Weekly Journal 3 June (os.) 1727.
2. Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 29 June, Fonseca to Sinzendorf, 7 July 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11 f.251,254.
the Duchess of Marlborough and the Earl of Arran had paid their respects to George and been received very graciously. Tories such as Lord Bathurst hoped that George would turn to them. The Earl of Oxford wanted to go to court, though according to the Countess of Strafford, he was dissuaded by his wife. Charles Caesar, soon to be elected M.P. for Hertfordshire, informed James III that 'several of the Tories... had formed to themselves ridiculous notions of favour from the Prince', but he suggested that some of the Tories who went to court had mixed motives, 'hoping to so lull the government asleep that they would disband some of their forces and seeking to defeat the plans of those Tories who would serve George.'

George did make a few moves in the direction of the Tories. He was most gracious to those who came to court, sufficiently so that there was speculation that some such as Sir Thomas Hanmer, (Tory M.P. for Suffolk, would be raised to the peerage, and he took steps to increase the number of Tory Justices of the Peace.


2. Caesar to James III, 29 June, Orrery to James III, 30 June, Graham to O'Rourke, 1 Aug.1727, RA.107/141, 107/150, 109/3. George Lockhart made the same suggestion, Lockhart Papers II, 351.

On July 27th he instructed the Lord Chancellor, Lord King, to 'put into the commission of the peace all gentlemen of rank and quality in the several counties, unless they were in direct opposition to his Government.' Lord King consulted several notables, including Hamner, but when the Lord Lieutenant of Suffolk, the Duke of Grafton, complained of Hamner's suggestions, (which included Tories such as Sir Robert Kemp, the former M.P. for Dunwich) George ordered King to follow Grafton's advice.1

Indeed the Tories were swiftly disabused of their hopes of George.2 On August 5th the newsletter sent to Osnabrück noted that most Tories were no longer going to court because they realised that George would not include them in the ministry.3 Bathurst did not obtain the Earldom he had hoped for from George and he was angry that the king did not help him over the Cirencester election.4 Charles Caesar noted on August 12th that the Tories were increasingly conscious of the vanity of their hopes.5


2. 'Till we saw King George the second's speech to this Parliament it was pretty generally said that severall of the principle Torys would be employed, but now that rumor is less credited', James Hamilton to James III, 14 July, Thomas, Earl of Strafford to James III, 1 Aug., Sir Henry Goring to James III, 15 Sept. 1727, RA.108/73, 109/2, 110/49.


5. Caesar to James III, 1 Aug. (os) 1727, RA.109/6; Sedgwick, I, 513-17.
It is most doubtful whether George ever intended to do anything more than make a few concessions to the Tories, and to favour individuals whom he liked, as his father had done. As Prince of Wales in the 1720s, George had had little to do with the Tories and the aristocratic clique he mixed with was overwhelmingly Whig. Compton, earlier in his career, had considered an alliance with the Tories, and there were later to be suggestions that he was willing to make such an alliance, but there are no signs that he considered one in the summer of 1727. When George gave Lord King his instructions about altering the composition of the Bench, he told him to 'still keep a majority of those who were known to be most firmly in his interest', though he ordered him to keep that part of his instructions secret, a move which suggests that George was really seeking to curry popularity. There are no signs in this period that George seriously thought of turning to the Tories, and this appears to have been a decision that stemmed from George's personal distrust of Toryism and his concern about the Jacobite sympathies of many Tories, rather than being the product of Walpole's persuasion.¹

Soon after the accession it was clear that the Tories had little to expect. On July 3rd Hill Mussenden noted, 'Tis said the Tories begin to despair of having more success in this reign than in the last'.² It was unclear whether Walpole would continue in power. His principal rival for that position was Compton.

¹ King, pp.49-50. Le Coq reported that the Tories had not been opposed to George I, but only to his government, and he added 'c'est bien autant la recherche des emplois que la différence de sentiments, et de principes sur les affaires du gouvernement qui forment les partis.' Le Coq to Augustus II, Dresden, 2676, vol.18a, f.127.

² Hill Mussenden to Carteret Leathes, 22 June (os.) 1727, Ipswich, HA 403/1/10.
On the day that George was proclaimed king, June 26th, Newcastle wrote to Townshend of 'the concern and distraction we are all in here .... we can make no judgement of affairs here, in all probability the speaker will be the chief man'. As Lord King noted, 'the king, when he came to the throne, had formed a system both of men and things', and, to most, the first point in this new system seemed to be a replacement of Walpole by Compton. Arthur Onslow, the M.P. for Guildford, who was in London at the time, noted

'that everybody expected, that Mr. Compton the Speaker would be the Minister, and Sir Robert Walpole thought so too, for a few days .... the new king's first inclination and resolution, which were certainly for Mr. Compton .... who had long been his treasurer, and very near to him in all his counsels. It went so far as to be almost a formal appointment, the king, for two or three days directing everybody to go to him upon business ... but by the Queen's management, all this was soon over-ruled, with a sincere regard, I am persuaded, to what she believed to be most for the king's real service, with, perhaps, at the same time, a little vanity to have the person deemed the ablest Minister in Parliament .... to be a dependent of hers, which the other was not, or much in her esteem'.

1. Newcastle to Townshend, 15 June (os.) 1727, BL.Add. 32687 f.212.

Onslow's interpretation was shared by many others. It was generally believed that George was heavily influenced by his wife.\(^1\)

In March 1726, in a memoir drawn up by the French foreign ministry for their envoy in Britain Count Broglie, Caroline was stated to possess a lot of influence over George.\(^2\)

In November 1727, Walpole, telling Lord King 'of the great credit he had with the king' attributed it to 'the means of the Queen, who was the most able woman to govern in the world'. A month later Le Coq noted, 'V.M. n'ignore pas, que la Reine entre en tout, et qu'il ne se fait rien sans qu'on l'ait consultée'.\(^3\)

The contrast between the Queen's bright sparkling, witty nature and George's more dour, boorish demeanour greatly influenced contemporaries such as Lord Hervey, and led both them and later historians to attribute great power to the Queen. Coxe regarded George as a puppet manipulated by his wife, 'Caroline .... almost entirely governed the king .... contrived that her opinion should appear as if it had been his own'.

By such guileful methods Caroline earned a reputation as a shrewd intriguer, and it was due to this reputation that contemporaries and later historians have largely attributed Walpole's continuance in office to the Queen. Coxe stated that the Queen 'solely occasioned the continuance of Sir Robert Walpole in the ministry' and Vaucher argued that Walpole owed his success to the fact that he had 'deviné l'influence irrestible que la Reine Caroline saurait exercer sur l'esprit violent mais borné du Roi'.\(^4\)

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2. Mémoire pour servir d'Instruction au Comte de Broglie, 9 Mar. 1726, AE. CP. Ang. 354 f.170; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 30 June 1737, AST.LM.Ing.35.
3. King, 24 Nov. (os) 1727, p.50; Le Coq to Augustus, 12 Dec. 1727, Dresden 2676, vol.18a, f.413; Chesterfield to Mrs. Howard, 15 July BL.Add.22626, f.87 Marini, pp.78,84; continued/
3. Ferdinand Albrecht, Duke of Brunswick-Beven to Ludwig Rudolf, heir to the Duchy of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, 22 Oct. 1727, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt. 22 Nr. 529 f. 61.

4. Hervey, I, 39, 44-5, 47-8; Coxe, I, 282, 285-6, 288; Williams, p. 67; Vaucher, Robert Walpole, p. 35; W. Sichel, Bolingbroke and his Times (2 vols., 1902), II, 270; King, p. 111; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, I, 44; Ward, Great Britain and Hanover p. 133; King, 2 Sept. (os) 1729, p. 110.
Without overthrowing this analysis, it is possible to suggest that Caroline's influence has been exaggerated and that there were other reasons for Walpole's continuance in power. In her diary Lady Mary Cowper, a Lady-in-Waiting to Caroline as Princess of Wales, suggested that Caroline and others overestimated her influence. The picture of George as a headstrong, blinkered boor, manipulated by his wife and by Walpole, is one that has enjoyed much support but is largely based on the malicious views of a few contemporaries such as Hervey. Many of the statements used by historians to support this interpretation of the events of 1727 are open to question. Hervey and Onslow both wrote their accounts several years later. Hervey did not begin his memoirs until 1733 or 1734, whilst Onslow's account is based upon papers and correspondence that no longer exist but were transcribed by his son in 1769. These papers were certainly drawn up after Walpole's death in 1745 and their accuracy is open to question.

The notes made by Lord King are a more useful source as they were made at the time of the occurrences recorded or only shortly afterwards. King's account of the failure of Compton does not mention the Queen, but suggests that George was persuaded, by personal experience, to continue Walpole in power.

1. *Diary of Mary Countess Cowper*, pp.163-4. The Duchess of Marlborough came to the same conclusion, Marlborough to Captain Fish, 'bearleader to her grandsons', 31 July (os.) 1727, BL. Add. 61444 f.147.

'.... by his constant application to the king by himself in the mornings, when the Speaker, by reason of the sitting of the House of Commons, was absent, he so worked upon the king, that he not only established himself in favour with him, but prevented the cashing of many others, who otherwise would have been put out.'

There were several obvious reasons why it would have been foolish to remove Walpole at once. The accession of a new monarch meant that Parliament had to be summoned, the Civil List settled and elections held for a new Parliament. Walpole was needed for these purposes. Parliament sat from July 8th to July 28th, and during this time Walpole made himself extremely useful to George, securing an enlarged Civil List of £800,000 per annum. Vaucher has suggested that this was one of the reasons for Walpole's success. As Prince of Wales, George had accumulated substantial debts; Le Coq suggested that they exceeded a million pounds. Furthermore the king had a reputation for avarice and meanness.

1. King, p.46.
2. Coxe, I, 290-1; Marini, p.79.
3. Vaucher, Robert Walpole p.35. Newcastle noted that George 'talked a great deal to Sir Robert about the Civil List', Newcastle to Townshend, 15 June (os) 1727, BL.Add.32687 f.212; Hervey, I,30,47.
importance to George of the enlarged Civil List, it is certain that Walpole's command of the House of Commons and the ease with which he secured parliamentary consent for the new fiscal arrangements were very impressive, \(^1\) though it is doubtful whether politicians seeking to win royal favour would have found it helpful to oppose the Civil List in Parliament.

Possibly more significant was Walpole's success in the elections. Le Coq suggested that Walpole was given an opportunity to display his skill to the king, and that George had decided to delay any governmental changes until after the elections, in order to be in a state to gratify those who had helped with the elections and those whose help would be needed in the subsequent Parliament. \(^2\) If this was so, Walpole certainly passed the test with flying colours. After the election petitions were heard, the new House of Commons consisted of 415 ministerial supporters, 15 opposition Whigs, and 128 Tories, a government majority of 272, the largest since George I's accession. The comparable figures after the 1722 election were 389 Whigs and 169 Tories, a majority of 220. \(^3\)

In his lengthy and thoughtful dispatch of July 22nd Le Coq had reported that other reasons were being advanced as to why it was against the king's interest to change the government.


2. Le Coq to Augustus II, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a. f.130; Le Coq to DeBrosse, 29 July 1727, Dresden, 663, f.135; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 21 July 1727, AST.LM.Ing.35.

Firstly, Walpole's influence with Parliament and with the great chartered corporations - the Bank of England, East India Company and South Sea Company - were held to be very important for the credit-worthiness and stability of the government. Secondly, to change the government was held to be inadvisable for British foreign policy. The current policy was the product of the Walpole/Townshend ministry, so it was held to be dangerous to replace them by men who were poorly informed about British foreign policy and the European situation. Furthermore, it was felt that such a change would alarm Britain's allies at a tricky diplomatic juncture.¹

The importance of these last factors in the mind of George II is difficult to evaluate. However interested he might be in the Civil List or in the general election, George was probably more concerned about the European situation, and during the first few years of his reign he was to display far more interest in European than in domestic affairs. Britain's allies certainly expressed some concern about the possibility of a change in the British government. Fleury pressed George II to maintain the Walpoles in power. Concern was expressed in the Hague. It is possible that the French view was of great importance to George as British foreign policy depended on a continued alliance with France.²

¹ Le Coq to Augustus II, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676 vol.18a, f.130-1; Robinson to St. Saphorin, 14 July 1727, PRO.80/61.
Whatever the reasons, Walpole's continuance in power was clear within a fortnight of George's accession. The achievement was however subject to two problems: firstly whether Walpole would be forced to accept many changes in the ministry, and secondly whether George would follow the advice of his ministers. Both these problems were to be of great significance during the first six months of the reign and each was to raise many questions about the stability of the Walpolean system. Though it rapidly became clear that the Tories had little to hope for from George, other politicians, both those associated with George, as Prince of Wales, and those Whigs who had fallen out with Walpole, had high hopes from the new monarch. The dismissal of Viscount Malpas, Walpole's son-in-law and the Master of the Robes to George I, the day after the accession, led many to assume that there would be major changes. On July 1st Newcastle had to confess to Lord Waldegrave, 'we can yett make no certain judgment what turn things will take here'. Hill Mussenden noted rumours 'that Sir Robt. will be continued in the Treasury, but not with the same authority, and that Ld. Carteret and Mr. Pulteney will certainly be brought into play in the room of some of Sir. Robt.'s friends'. The Saxon agent Zamboni reported rumours that the ministry was to be replaced by Pulteney, Chesterfield, Compton, ...
and other friends of George whilst Prince of Wales.\(^1\) D'Aix suggested that those who had the ear of George were Scarborough and Compton, and that Chesterfield would join the ministry.\(^2\) Suggestions were made that George's aristocratic friends would be raised in the peerage and that several would receive dukedoms.\(^3\) The press published these suggestions far and wide. On June 28th \textit{Stanley's News Letter}, for example, reported, 'We hear that Sir Spencer Compton, the Earl of Grantham and Lord Carteret will have some high post conferred on them'.

The rumours proved to be wildly exaggerated.\(^4\) Though such sound supporters of Walpole as Malpas and Sir William Yonge, one of the Lords of the Treasury, lost their places,\(^5\) they soon

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  \item Zamboni to DeBrosse, 11 July 1727, Rodl. Zamboni Papers, Ms. Rawlinson Letters (hereafter Rawl.) 120 f.10.
  \item D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 26 June, 4 Aug. 1727, AST.LM. Ing.35. Villars noted that Compton was to be chief minister, July 1727, p.77.
  \item Newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 22 Aug. 1727, Osnabrück, No.291, f.257; Hop, Dutch Ambassador in Britain, to the States General, 5 Aug. 1727, BL.Add. 17677KKK9 f.346.
  \item The changes that were predicted inaccurately included the appointment of Burlington as Grand Constable, newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 9 Sept. 1727, Osnabrück 291 f.123.
  \item Sir Henry Goring to James III, 21 July 1727, RA.108/105; Hervey, I, 357; Malpas losing his Mastership of the Robes was 'reckned a bad omen', Hill Mussenden to Carteret Leathes, 20 June 1727, Ipswich HA403/1/10. Broglie referred to Yonge as 'un des bras droits de Mr. de Walpole', Broglie to Chauvelin, 4 Aug. 1727, A.E.CP.Ang.361, f.135.
\end{enumerate}
gained others. Malpas became a Lord of the Admiralty and Yonge gained the same position in 1728.1 Francis Negus, M.P. for Ipswich, lost his Commissionership for executing the office of Master of the Horse, but gained a remunerative Purveyorship-general.2 Whilst dismissed supporters of Walpole thus gained compensation, the same was not true for Walpole's opponents. The accession of George and the subsequent changes in the ministry provided an opportunity to remove some of the opposition Whigs and it is difficult to believe that Walpole was not behind these removals.3 The Earl of Berkeley, First Lord of the Admiralty since 1717, was dismissed and his post given to Viscount Torrington, after the Earl of Orford had declined it on the grounds of age.4 The Chetwynd brothers were dismissed as 'Sir Robert Walpole's declared ill-wishers', William Chetwynd, a friend of Bolingbroke and Lady Suffolk, losing his Lordship of the Admiralty, and Walter Chetwynd his Rangership of St. James Park.5

2. Plumb, p.170.n.1; Sedgwick, II, 291.
5. Lady Chetwynd to Lady Suffolk, 29 July (os) 1727, BL.Add. 22627, f.79; Atterbury to James III, 20 Aug.1727, RA. 109/87; Hervey, I, 37; Sedgwick, I, 545-8.
George's aristocratic friends gained a few positions. Essex gained the Rangership of St. James's, one of the more important of the posts of its type as it gave access to the monarch. Grantham was raised to the Privy Council and made Lord Chamberlain to the Queen. Scarborough was made Master of the Horse. Sir Charles Hotham, a friend of George II's and M.P. for Beverley, was made a Groom of the Bedchamber. With all these men it is unclear how much personal ambition they possessed. Most seemed to have been content with honourable, fashionable and profitable posts in the Household and to have shown little interest in gaining the more arduous posts of power. Essex, a flashy womaniser, was to be Ambassador to Sardinia from 1732 until 1736, but during his embassy his principal concerns were seduction and securing leaves of absence so that he could visit the carnivals of Italy. Hotham's ambition was restricted to the army where he sought a regiment, a goal not attained until 1732. Scarborough is a difficult man to evaluate. He was highly intelligent and profoundly melancholic, a courtier who ended his life in suicide. He was never noted for his ambition and there is little record of him participating actively in the politics of the period until 1733, when he joined the opposition to Walpole and was credited with persuading George to drop the Excise Bill. Two members of George's aristocratic group were politically ambitious. Compton's maladroit conduct in June 1727 did not mean that he was the 'amiable nonentity' depicted by Basil Williams.


2. Hervey, I, 70-1. It was suggested that Scarborough would replace Newcastle, newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 27 June 1727, Osnabrück, 299, f.43. Sarah Marlborough to Fish, 4 July (os) 1727, BL. Add. 61444 f.139.

It is probable that Compton was disinclined to accept responsibility for the financial management of the crown.\textsuperscript{1} John Scrope, the Secretary of the Treasury, suggested that it was this in particular that led him to decline the Treasury. Compton was outmanoeuvred by Walpole, and lacked his ability, but it is difficult to accept Hervey's characterisation of him as a weak and vicious man. He has been used as a foil to Walpole's ability, but Walpole was clearly concerned about Compton and regarded his continuance in the Commons as a threat.\textsuperscript{2}

Chesterfield sought office as Secretary of State. He had no diplomatic or governmental experience, but in this he was little worse prepared than Newcastle who was only a year his senior and had never been abroad. Chesterfield's lively spirit attracted the notice of several foreign diplomats and he was seen as possessing considerable potential. Instead of being appointed Secretary he was named for the Hague Embassy as successor to William Finch. Some saw this as a form of diplomatic exile,\textsuperscript{3} and Chesterfield himself was less than keen to go and did not arrive at the Hague until May 1728. However, it was generally understood that the posting was a form of training, and that if Horatio Walpole was appointed as a Plenipotentiary at the forthcoming Peace Congress, Chesterfield would succeed him at Paris, the most important of the British embassies. It was believed that George hoped to appoint

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\item \textit{Dresden,}
\item \textit{Le Coq to Augustus II, 22 July 1727,} A2676, 18a, f.132; Atterbury to James III, 19 Jan. 1728, RA. 113/97; Hervey I, 46; Coxe I, 286.
\item Coxe, Walpole II 519-20; Egmont, II, 156-7.
\item Atterbury to James III, 20 Aug. 1727, RA.109/87. Hervey, I, 72.
\end{itemize}
Chesterfield Secretary of State after this training. Le Coq, who had already referred to the potential problem of ignorant politicians directing British foreign policy, wrote to Augustus II at the end of July 1727,

'Ce Lord Chesterfield est un des seigneurs, de la Cour qui passe pour avoir le plus d'esprit. On le croit aussi fort en faveur, et l'on s'etoit attendu à le voir honoré d'une des plus brillantes charges de la cour. Il est assez apparent, que le Roy a voulu, qu'il se formât premierement aux affaires, et que luy même a compris qu'il falloit en passer par là, pour aller plus loin. Sous le regne precedent il n'etoit aucunement bien en cour, et les ministres n'étoient point des ses amis, ni luy de leurs.'

Le Coq's last point was certainly correct. Chesterfield had never troubled to cultivate Walpole, and he had a reputation for being his enemy. Horatio Walpole was deeply disturbed by Chesterfield's apparent rise. On August 9th he informed his brother that should Chesterfield come to Paris, 'he will stand in the eye of the world, as the person designed by his majesty to be hereafter Secretary of State', and three months later he returned to the same point. Chesterfield's ambition and the favour in which George held him was to be a major problem for the Walpoles for several years.

1. Newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 1 Aug.1727, Osnabrück No.291,f.951; Le Coq to DeBrosse 29 July 1727, Dresden, 663, f.135; St. James' Evening Post 29 July (os.) 1727; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 4 Aug. 1727, AST.LM.Ing. 35. Chesterfield wrote of beginning his 'apprenticeship to diplomacy', Chesterfield to Francis Colman, British Resident in Florence, 20 Nov.1727 (not 1728 as printed), G. Colman the younger, Posthumous letters from Various Celebrated men addressed to Francis Colman and George Colman the elder (London, 1820) pp.16-7; Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 8 Aug. 1727, ASV.LM.Ing.97, f.9; Marini, p.84.
2. Le Coq to Augustus II, 29 July 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a, f.159.
3. Hervey, I, 71, 73; Plumb, p.170.
George's aristocratic friends were not therefore promoted to high office. Chesterfield received his embassy, and Compton was ennobled as Lord Wilmington in January 1728, but neither had gained what he sought. Their continued ambition, combined with their ease of access to George, was a major threat to Walpole. Others were similarly disappointed. Carteret was sent back to Ireland with diminished powers; the opposition Whigs under Pulteney were not heeded; while on July 8th Hervey, having dined the previous night with Walpole, was able to inform Stephen Fox that 'the political world rolls on just as it did'. A month later Newcastle informed Lord Blandford that George 'has been pleased to make but very few and those immaterial alterations amongst the late king's servants'. Having mentioned Berkeley's dismissal, he stated that 'the other changes are not worth troubling you with'.

1. Owen, Eighteenth Century p.28.
If Walpole had secured not only his own position but also that of his own colleagues and political allies, he was nevertheless still faced with the problem of defining a relationship with his new master. Mussenden, five days after the Proclamation, stated that 'All that can be gathered for the present is that whatever side be uppermost, they will not have the same authority, that the last ministry had, since the king seems resolved to enter into all manner of affairs himself.' Lord King was soon to be made aware of this fact. Early in July George told him that he expected to nominate to all benefices and prebendaries that the Chancellor usually nominated to, and when Lord King defended his prerogative George retorted that Lord Cowper, a former Chancellor, had told George that such nominations were a royal right.

George's wishes were not always translated into action. He did not persevere in his dispute with Lord King about the nominations, and allowed Grafton's views about the appointment of Suffolk J.P.'s to conquer his own wish to appoint Tory J.P.'s In 1732 Viscount Percival recorded a visit from his cousin Mary Dering, Dresser Extraordinary to the Princesses,

'She gave an instance how princes are imposed upon by their Ministers. She said that when the King came to the Crown, his resolution was to continue in his service as chaplains all those who had been so while he was Prince, and to fill up the number belonging to him as king with as many of his father's chaplains as could be admitted, but one of his chaplains he particularly named

to be continued on account of some extraordinary services he had done him when Prince. But when the then Lord Chamberlain... brought him the list to sign, he did it without further examination than observing the chaplain's name was there, yet afterwards it proved that the man was removed, and neither all his old chaplains, nor many of his father's, continued, but a good many new persons placed. ¹

There was simply not enough time for George to supervise all that he wished to control and for him to see that his orders were carried out. Some of the bold claims he made soon after his accession about what he would do as monarch can be attributed to inexperience and nervous excitement. In some spheres, such as the church and the law, George's interventions were episodic, though he could be extremely determined in the defence of his prerogatives. The ministry were to find it difficult to persuade George to prefer ecclesiastics he disliked.

In two spheres, the army and foreign affairs, George displayed particular interest from his accession. ² There was no doubt of his great interest in and affection for the army. ³ He enjoyed attending military reviews and drilling troops, both his own, whether British or Hanoverian, and those of his allies, such as the Hessians whom he usually reviewed on each trip to Hanover. ⁴ George was keen to discuss military matters, and he enjoyed the company of military men

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¹. Egmont, I, 228
². Dickinson, Walpole, p. 70
³. D'Aix to Victor Amadens, 4 Apr. 1729, AST.LM.Ing.35.
⁴. Newsletters to Prince Bishop, 1,5 Aug. 1727, Osnabrück, Nos.291, f.971, 986; Visconti to Sinzendorf, 29 Aug. 1727, Vienna, EK. Kart.65; Le Coc to Augustus II, 5 Aug,1727, Dresden,2676,18a f.177; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 11 Aug.1727,AST.LM.Ing. 35; L'Hermitage to the States General, 9 July 1728,BL Add. 17677 (cont)
such as Sutton, Hotham and William Stanhope. He also showed favour to foreign envoys who had a military background such as D'Aix and Broglie. George kept a close eye on military developments in other countries and followed European campaigns with great interest. He was determined to control military patronage within Britain and he refused to accept ministerial suggestions in this sphere. He had the Guards' regimental reports and returns sent to him personally every week, and when he reviewed his troops he did so with great attention to detail.

George associated the army with his 'gloire', and believed that the military reviews he conducted were the most obvious and impressive display of his power and importance. Possibly the fondest memory from his youth was of his campaigning in the Spanish Netherlands against the French in the War of the Spanish Succession. He had displayed great personal bravery, when, in 1708 at the battle of Oudenarde, he had charged the French at the head of the Hanoverian dragoons, and had his horse shot under him. George bored people with his reminiscences of this period for many years. In this he was not alone. His brother-in-law, Frederick William I of Prussia, had fought in Eugene's army against the French at Malplaquet in 1709, and held annual celebrations on the anniversary of the battle. For these German princes, the campaigns of the 1700s represented a time of youthful freedom and excitement that they later sought to rediscover.
For the British ministers, George's close personal interest in the army was only an occasional nuisance, although they would have preferred to enjoy some of the military patronage George wielded, and they were embarrassed by opposition attacks upon George's militaristic tendencies. Due to George's military interests, the government had less room for concession and parliamentary manoeuvring over such issues as the size of the British army and the policy of paying subsidies to secure the use of Hessian troops.¹ It was the effect of George's martial temperament upon his conduct of foreign policy that most concerned the government.

When George came to the throne he did not alter the direction of British foreign policy and, as a result, historians have concluded that the change of monarch made no difference to British foreign policy. In fact, George's accession made a substantial, twofold difference. Firstly, however much he may have followed similar policies, he did so in a distinctly aggressive fashion,² and secondly, from George's accession until the spring of 1730, there was considerable uncertainty as to which ministers enjoyed George's confidence in the field of foreign policy. This produced a general situation of tension and ministerial strife.

Pugilistic diplomatic methods were not unknown in early eighteenth-century British foreign policy. Due to Britain's insular position and small army they did not resemble the martial bravado of Prussian methods but tended to take a naval form. The best known instance was Commodore Martin's arrival at the head of a squadron in the Bay of Naples in 1742 and his peremptory demand that Naples should agree to remain neutral in the War of the Austrian

1. Zamboni to Manteuffel, 17 Aug. 1728, Bodl, Rawl 120, f. 27
2. Chavigny had predicted this, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 8 July 1727, AE.CP. Allenmagne, 373 f. 24; Villars, July 1727, p.77; Muret, Preponderance Anglaise p. 180; Ward, Great Britain & Hanover p.133
Succession or face destruction. The politics of bombardment were not unknown in the Walpolean period. John Hedges, British Envoy Extraordinary at Turin, suggested naval action against Genoa, whilst Lord Tyrawly, Envoy Extraordinary at Lisbon, was a strong believer in the efficacy of violence. In February 1729 he urged treating the Portuguese roughly and in July 1729 he suggested that the Portuguese should be brought to reason 'by the roughest means', adding that as Portugal lacked allies nobody would intervene if George 'had a mind to lay this country to ashes'. These views were controlled during peacetime, and Newcastle kept Tyrawly in order. Despite Townshend's reputation for being a noisy bully - Charlie Bluster was his popular nickname - the British ministry was far from inclined to use violence, a tendency reinforced by the vulnerability of Hanover and the unpopularity of increases in the size of the army.

The House of Lords' Address of February 7th 1728 referred to George as 'formed by Nature for the greatest military Achievements' and contemporaries were in no doubt of George's eagerness for conflict. The French general and politician, Marshal Villars, a member of the Conseil d'Etat, where the dispatches of French diplomats were read out, noted in his diary that George was believed to desire war ardently and to wish to lead his army into battle. Le Coq noted the fear that George would push British foreign policy with more vigour, but he argued that George's warlike penchant would be restrained by

1. Hedges to Delafaye, 8 Feb. 1727, PRO. 92/32 f. 128.
his allies' opposition to war, by just considerations of state, and by the fact that the views of a Prince of Wales were naturally different from those of a king of Britain:

'La situation différente fait envisager les objets différemment .... le penchant qu'un jeune Prince témoigne quelque fois pour la guerre doit être plus tot attribué au désir louable de se voir à la tête d'une armée, qu'à une conviction intérieure de la nécessité de la guerre.'

Whatever might be the generic case for heirs succeeding to a kingdom, George II did not lose his desire to serve at the head of an army. In the late 1720's and then again during the War of the Polish Succession of 1733-1735, ministers were made uneasy conscious of George's wish, though the king was not to achieve his objective until the Dettingen Campaign in 1743. This was a major reason for ministers seeking to dissuade George from visiting Hanover, for they felt, quite correctly, that in Hanover George's propensity for violent solutions would be harder to tame, and the Anglo-Prussian war scare of 1729 confirmed their fears. George's willingness to entertain the idea of war was closely linked to his personal wish to fight, and it was of great importance in the winter of 1727, when French knowledge of this point played a role in leading them to accept British demands that they reject Rottembourg's agreement with Spain.

More significant than George's pugilistic diplomatic methods was his decision to seek advice from whom he wished. Historians have been misled by the manner in which Walpole routed Compton into

1. Le Coq to Augustus II, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a f. 128-9
2. Villars, 28 Sept, 1727, p.96; Marchese Solaro di Breglio, Sardinian Minister at Vienna, to Victor Amadeus II, 5 Jan, 1729 AST. LM. Aut. 59
assuming that after a few days' uncertainty Walpole's position
was scarcely affected by the accession of George. This was not the
case. ¹ George allowed Walpole to run Parliament and the Treasury,
but he retained a tight control over foreign policy and proved
willing to listen to politicians who disagreed with Walpole.
From his accession George had made it clear that he wished to control
foreign policy. He read the dispatches of British envoys with great
attention and Le Coq noted in August 1727,

'Il a été en usage, de tout tems, a cette cour cy, que les
Ministres aux Cours entrangères ont ecrit aux secretaires
d'Etat et en ont recu les ordres. Le Roy ne change rien de cet
usage; mais il veut, que les Ministres ecrivent aussy
immediatement à luy meme. ²

There is no evidence to corroborate this statement, but it is clear
that George began to show an independence that alarmed his ministers.
His changes in the diplomatic corps were not of great significance,
but they indicated a willingness to reject ministerial advice.
The major diplomats of the last years of George I's war continued in
office with few changes in posting. William Stanhope, who was to
be much favoured by George II and to be one of the British Plenipotent-
riaries at Soissons, had been very well received by George I on his
return from Spain.³ Waldegrave, who had been ordered to go to Vienna

¹ Foord, His Majesty opposition p. 122
later Le Coq noted that George read all the diplomatic dispatches,
Le Coq to Augustus II, 26 Aug. 1727, Dresden, 2676, f. 224.
³ D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 21 Ap. 1727, AST.LM.Ing. 35;
newsletter sent to the Prince-Bishop, 3 June 1727, Osnabruck, 299
f.39.
as soon as good relations were restored had been a favourite of George I. He was regarded favourably by George II; on July 13th 1727 Townshend informed Waldegrave 'that H.M. expresses a very particular regard for your Lord'. Suggestions had already been made as to who would be the British Plenipotentiaries at the forthcoming Congress. Although the Daily Journal late in May had mentioned reports that Carteret and Stanhope would be selected, most suggestions included the names of those whom George II was eventually to appoint, Stanhope, Stephen Poyntz and Horatio Walpole.

Despite these signs of continuity there were indications of George's determination to appoint whomever he wished. Chesterfield was sent to The Hague. William Finch, a protege of Carteret's, who had been brought in as M.P. for Cockermouth by his brother-in-law the Tory Duke of Somerset, was informed that he would be replaced at The Hague, but he was assured of the Madrid embassy, a post which he never took up but for which he was paid after he returned from The Hague.

1. Townshend to Waldegrave, 2 July (o.s) 1727, PRO. 80/62 f.25
2. L'Hermitage, Dutch agent in London, to the States General, 6 June 1727, BL. Add. 17677 kk 9 f. 261: newsletters to the Prince-Bishop, 6 June, 11 July 1727, Osnabrück, No.299 f.36,49; Daily Journal 24 May (o.s.) 1727. William Finch was mentioned as a possible choice, Daily Journal 26 June (o.s.) Wye's letter 27 July 1727.
3. Townshend to Finch, 11 Aug. (o.s.) 1727, PRO. 84/294 f. 81; John Christian to Thomas Elder, 17 May (o.s.) 1728, Egremont (Cockermouth Castle) Mss., History of Parliament transcripts. It was also suggested that the Earl of Marchmont would be sent to Spain, newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 1 Aug. 1727 Osnabrück, No. 291, f.951.
His brother Edward, another protegé of Carteret's was sent to Sweden in 1728, after the Sardinian envoy had indicated that his Protestant zeal would make him an inappropriate envoy at Turin. Whilst Edward Finch's posting was undecided, British interests in Stockholm were represented by the new Hanoverian Envoy appointed by George II, Baron Von Diescau. Diescau was to embarrass considerably the British government by failing to cooperate with Finch. George decided to appoint the Hanoverian diplomat Friedrich von Fabrice as Hanoverian envoy in Dresden and considered giving him responsibility for British interests there. This was a particularly sensitive step for two reasons. Firstly, Saxony in 1727 was a very significant diplomatic posting, because Augustus II was trying to negotiate a neutrality for the Empire, a step that would provide for the security of Hanover, and because Augustus was willing to act as a go-between in the restoration of Anglo-Prussian and Anglo-Austrian relations. Secondly, Fabrice was an old enemy to Townshend with very different views on European matters. Townshend had failed in 1726 to get Fabrice sacked as one of George's chamberlains, and, thanks to their excellent system of postal interception and decyphering, the British ministry had discovered that Fabrice was in touch with hostile foreign envoys, in particular the Austrian Resident Palm and the Modenese agent Riva. He had used information supplied by them to seek to dissuade George I from anti-Austrian steps and to persuade him to sever his links with France.


2. Pozobueno to Ripperda, 23 May 1726, Coke II, 500-1; Coke, I, 248. Fabrice was secretly in touch with Berlin, Du Bourgay to Tilson, 6 Dec., 1725, PRO. 90/19. On Fabrice see Die Memoiren des Kammerherrn Friedrich Ernst von Fabrice (ed.) R. Grieser (Hildesheim, 1956). Fleury was concerned about the appointment of Hanoverian diplomats, Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 20 Dec., 1727, PRO. 30/147 f. 24.
George II's attempt to send Fabrice to Dresden failed due to Fabrice's excessive personal demands, but it is clear from Le Coq's dispatches that it had been a source of tension. Combined with the appointments of Chesterfield and Diescau it must have led Townshend to wonder whether he would have any influence in his department.

Irritating as these moves of George must have been, it was his attempt to consult whom he wished that created most trouble. Although George II paid little heed to Sir Luke Schaub, a diplomatic protegé of Carteret's who had been disgraced in 1724 and had hoped that the new reign would witness a revival of his fortunes, he showed sufficient confidence in St. Saphorin to upset Townshend and Walpole. Lieutenant-General Francois Louis de Pesmes, Seigneur de St. Saphorin, a Swiss Protestant, had represented British interests at Vienna from 1718 until he was expelled in April 1727. He had been widely blamed for the deterioration in Anglo-Austrian relations in 1725. 1

Townshend criticised St. Saphorin in the instructions he sent to his successor Waldegrave, and instructed him to inform the French Ambassador, the Duke of Richelieu 'that you chuse rather to imitate his example of politeness and good breeding, than to follow the steps of Mor. de St. Saphorin, who has been censured as having acted too rough and forbidding a part'. 2

1. Marquis de Fleury to General DeBrosse, Saxon envoy at the Hague, 12 July 1727, Dresden, 663, f.81. Pentenriedter described him as 'L'origin de tout mal', Pentenriedter to Fonseca, 14 April 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 21, f. 347

Having left Vienna St. Saphorin set off for a Swiss spa to take the cure, and went via Schaffhausen to Lausanne. He was then ordered to wait on George I at Hanover, but this was prevented by George's death. Hoping that he would find favour with the new King he travelled to London. Count Dehn, sent on a special mission to London by the Court of Wolfenbuttel, claimed that St. Saphorin's 'faux principe malignes' had no impact, and that 'il ne trouve pas ches le Roi l'ingres qu'il voudroit', but there are indications that Dehn was wrong. D'Aix reported that George saw St. Saphorin often, and it is clear from Le Coq's dispatches that George used St. Saphorin as a confidential intermediary with foreign envoys. St. Saphorin was the acknowledged expert on Austrian affairs, and Townshend sent Waldegrave St. Saphorin's 'Relation secrette sur la Cour de Vienne', noting that it included 'a great deal of truth'.

1. 'His health will no longer suffer the fatigue of business', George Woodward, British Secretary at Vienna, Jan-Apr. 1727, to Tilson, 29 July 1727, PRO. 80/61.

2. Townshend had instructed him to return to Switzerland, Townshend to St. Saphorin, 23 June, (o.s.) 1727, PRO. 80/61.


4. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 6 Oct. 1727, AST.LM.Ing. 35, Marini, pp. 89,102-4. The French were concerned about St. Saphorin's influence, Horatio Walpole to (Tilson) 3,21 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 48928 f.86,90

5. Woodward to Tilson, 29 July 1727, PRO. 80/61; Marquis de Fleury to Le Coq, 23 Jan 1726, Dresden, 2674, f.1

6. Townshend to Waldegrave, 26 Oct, (o.s.) 1727, Chewton. George had instructed St. Saphorin to write the report, St. Saphorin to Townshend, 4 Sept. (o.s.) 1727, PRO. 80/61. Fonseca was suspicious of St. Saphorin's activities, and noted, 'il y a un murmure sourd qu'il est alle en Angleterre pour tacher de faire quelque nouvel negociation, et se racрошer a notre cour', Fonseca to Sinzendorf, 10 Sept 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f.359
Seeking St. Saphorin's advice would not have mattered so much, was there not by the autumn increasingly obvious tension between George and his ministers. D'Aix reported in September 'Le chagrin des Ministres continue .... ils trouvent que le Roy les bride trop, qu'il est trop économie, et qu'il écoute trop des gens'. Le Coq pinpointed another area of tension when he suggested that George's attempts at financial reform were weakening the position of his ministers by denying them an undisputed control of governmental patronage. These tensions were made more serious by the apparently deepening problems with which British foreign policy was faced and by the growing possibility that this policy might change direction and Britain acquire different allies. The identification of the Walpole brothers and Townshend with the French alliance meant that such changes would have important repercussions in domestic politics.

1. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 29 Sept. 1727, AST.L.M. Ing.35; Marini, pp.85 88.

CHAPTER THREE

FROM THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE II TO THE CONVENTION OF THE PARDO

(Summer, 1727 - Spring, 1728)

Hard upon the news of George II's accession Britain's envoys and allies received profuse assurances that the new King would remain firm to his old alliances. ¹ Foreign envoys in Britain assured their rulers that this would be the case. ² Britain's French and Dutch allies received firm promises that Britain would not depart from the Alliance of Hanover, ³ whilst the Hessian envoy General Diemar was assured that George II was as conscious of the importance of Hessian troops for the defence of Hanover as his father had been. ⁴

Despite these assurances, many doubted that Britain would be able to help her allies. In particular, it was widely assumed in Catholic Europe that the accession of a new monarch would be accompanied by major disturbances, and, possibly, by a

¹ Newcastle to Waldegrave, 20 June (o.s.) 1727, Chewton; Townshend to Sutton, 20 June (o.s.) 1727, PRO. 81/122; Le Coq to Augustus, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a, f. 128; St. Saphorin to Tarouca, to Toerring, drafts, PRO. 80/61.

² D'Aix to Victor-Amadeus, 30 June 1727, AST.LM. Ing. 35

³ Newcastle to Townshend, 15 June (o.s.) 1727, BL. Add. 32687 f. 201-3 (misfiled in the 1726 diplomatic papers); Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 16 June (o.s.) 1727, BL. Add. 32750 f. 521-3; Sutton to Newcastle, 10 July 1727, PRO. 81/122; Fonseca to Sinzendorf, 7 July 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 254; Fleury to George II, 2, 11 July 1727, PRO. 102/7 f. 186, 196.

successful Jacobite uprising. Belief in such a development varied. The French government had few doubts about the stability of the Hanoverian succession and their representatives in London swiftly reassured them of the popularity of the new government. Broglie assured Fleury that George was popular and Chammorel the French chargé d'affaires noted, 'En un mot le zele et l'affection de ses sujets ne laisse rien a desirer'.

The Austrians were well informed of the weak state of British Jacobitism. Prince Eugene told the Jacobite envoy in Vienna, Owen O'Rourke, 'that whatever change might be expected hereafter, he was confident, the son would succeed quietly the father in the beginning'.

Two prominent groups anticipated disorders in Britain, the Spaniards and the Jacobites. The news of the death of George I led James III to leave his court at Bologna and set off for the Channel coast hoping that by the time he arrived an uprising would enable him to return to Britain. James was aware that France was unlikely to assist his scheme, but he hoped that Austria would send money and troops. Austrian assistance was crucial as, in the Austrian Netherlands, Austria controlled the only ports near Britain that were not held by a British ally. Over the previous years the Jacobites had pressed the Austrians to sponsor an invasion of Britain from Ostend which they believed to be militarily practical, proximity to the target offsetting the strength of the British navy, and they now hoped to execute the scheme.


Alarmist rumours circulated that the Pretender would receive major support from the Catholic powers, but these rumours were totally inaccurate. France refused to heed Jacobite requests, while on July 10th Eugene reminded O'Rourke of the principle he had frequently enunciated during the previous two years, namely that the Jacobites would receive no open support or military assistance until war was declared between Britain and Austria, and that until such a time the Austrians believed that all previous agreements between Austria and Britain subsisted. Eugene, therefore, refused to promise support telling O'Rourke that he believed James's journey precipitate and foolish, a view held by most commentators. Eugene and Sinzendorf refused to answer James's letter requesting support - They reaffirmed their refusal to help on the 15th, Sinzendorf declaring that there would be no help unless there was war, and that Austria was bound by the Preliminaries. These points were echoed by Eugene, who added the ominous advice that he did not believe James would be safe in the Austrian Netherlands.


2. O'Rourke to Graham, 15 July 1727, Vienna, England, Varia, 8; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus, 23 July 1727, AST. LM. Aut 58; Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 5, 13 Aug. 1727, BL. Add. 32751 f. 169, 197; Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 14 July, 3 Aug. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 262308
Despite reports to the contrary the Pretender did not reach the Austrian Netherlands, but ended his journey in the Duchy of Lorraine, whence, as a result of pressure on Duke Leopold, he moved to the Papal enclave of Avignon. Austria had proved to be a great disappointment for the Jacobites, which pleased the British. The British press praised the Austrians for their stance. Farley's Bristol Newspaper informed its readers in September that Charles VI had written in his own hand to George to assure him that he knew nothing of Jacobite plans.

The British were less satisfied with the attitude of the Spaniards. The Jacobite diaspora had spread over most of Europe but there was a major concentration of Jacobites in Spain, where considerable favour had been shown to them. Several Jacobites were prominent at court, where they encouraged the Spanish government to believe that the change of British monarch would lead to disturbances and make Britain weaker. Spain was dissatisfied with the Preliminaries of Paris and her belief that the Alliance of Hanover would be weakened by the accession of George II, encouraged her to press

3 Keene to Horatio Walpole, 6 Oct. Horatio Walpole to Keene, 6, 20 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 32752 f. 108, 96, 174; Waldegrave Journal, 10 Nov. 1727, Chewton.
for her own interpretation of the Preliminaries. Philip V maintained the blockade of Gibraltar, refused to return the South Sea Company permission-ship the Prince Frederick, and disputed the British right of trade in the West Indies. In addition, the privateering activities of Spanish ships upon British merchantmen, which had caused so much disquiet during the previous two years, continued. The Spaniards demanded that the British possession of Gibraltar and Minorca should be discussed at the forthcoming Congress. They also claimed damages for the disruption caused to Spanish trade by British maritime blockade. They suggested that pending discussion of British commercial pretensions at the Congress the Prince Frederick should be held by a third power such as the French or the Dutch.

These Spanish demands were skilfully presented in an attempt to sow dissension amongst the Hanover Allies. It was known that neither the French nor the Dutch were keen to fight either for British maritime pretensions or for the British possession of Gibraltar and Minorca. Both powers were jealous of the privileges the British had acquired at Utrecht and both had suggested the return of Gibraltar in order to placate Spanish feelings. The British refused to accept the Spanish

1 De Buy to Flemming, 8 July 1727, Dresden, 3015, f. 179.
position and demanded that the Preliminaries should be executed without alteration. As the Spaniards refused to withdraw their troops from before Gibraltar, the British refused to yield to Spanish demands that they should withdraw their squadrons from Spanish waters\(^1\). The British response to Spanish intransigence was slow, delayed by the government's concern with elections, which fully occupied Walpole and Newcastle, and by the illness of Townshend. British relations with Spain had been handled since the departure of William Stanhope, in March, by Francis Vandermeer the Dutch ambassador. George II confirmed this arrangement, but it was far from satisfactory, as Vandemeer's alarmism and self-importance made him an unreliable envoy\(^2\). There seemed to be only three means to end the Anglo-Spanish dispute: naval action\(^3\), French diplomatic pressure and Austrian diplomatic pressure. Austrian aid could not be relied upon, as Austria was believed to be encouraging Spain in its obduracy in order to delay European peace\(^4\). Waldegrave informed Tilson on September 12th that 'the professions made by the Imperial ministers of their masters sincere desire of peace are hard to be reconciled with

1 De Buy to Flemming, 4 Aug. 1727, Dresden, 3105, f. 187.
2 Gansinot to Plettenberg, 5 Sept. 1724, Munster, B 259\(^1\), f. 135
3 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 5 Sept. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32751, f. 482, 486.
the encouragement it's evident they give Spain to cavil and stand out'.

The British refused to exchange with Spain the ratifications of the Preliminaries of Paris. Due to the absence of diplomatic links between Britain and Spain it had been intended that Waldegrave should exchange the ratifications when he took up his post at Vienna, but as Waldegrave told the Austrian envoy in Paris Baron Fonseca on August 20th,

'..... till the Spaniards had agreed to the two points relating to Gibraltar and the Prince Frederick my going there could be of no use, for that it was not reasonable to suppose we could exchange ratifications with Spain whilst they dispute the construction and meaning of two of the articles, that our exchanging would be acquiescing to their interpretation which England would never submit to'.

Fleury had followed up the Preliminaries by making a major attempt to develop good relations with Spain, which he believed to be the best way to limit Austrian influence there. Despite British fears to the contrary, he did not aim to abandon the Hanover alliance but rather to broaden it to include Spain. He offered to

1 Waldegrave to Tilson, 12 Sept. 1727, PRO. 80/62, f. 63.
2 Waldegrave Journal, 21 Aug. 1727, Chewton; Fonseca to Sinzendorf 28 Sept. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 388. Fleury and Fonseca were angered by the way in which the dispute over the Prince Frederick prevented the settlement of other European problems, Fleury to Charles VI, 18 Sept. 1727, Vienna, Frankreich, Varia, 11, f. 33; Fonseca to Sinzendorf, 23 Sept. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 380-1.
3 The Austrians were suspicious of these French approaches, Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 10 Aug. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 320.
4 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 25 July (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32751 f. 161; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 22 Sept. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, 16, 20 Sept. 1727, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, 534, f. 40, 42-3; Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 26 Sept., 7 Nov., 1727, ASV. LM. Ing. 97, f. 42, 66.
attempt to settle Anglo-Spanish differences and those that still persisted between Britain and Austria. Despite governmental fears of the real purpose of the Franco-Spanish negotiations, the British government yielded to French pressure not to resort to naval action. On October 6th Newcastle informed Horatio Walpole that,

"His Majesty is willing as the Cardinal desires to suspend any further declaration, either to the Court of Vienna or Madrid, till the success of Count Rottembourg's negotiation and the letter wrote to the Duke de Richelieu is known".

Rottembourg, the French envoy at Berlin, was sent to Spain. He reached the Spanish court, at St. Ildefonso, on October 12th. Although his ostensible instructions, shown to Horatio Walpole, committed him to support the British position, he carried secret instructions which suggested that he should attempt to produce a compromise settlement, more in line with Spanish demands. The ambivalence of his mission was suspected from the outset, though the British government was surprised in December when news

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1 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 10 Sept. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32751, f. 555-7; Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 10 Sept. (OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f. 39, draft.
2 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 25 Sept. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32752, f. 91; O'Rourke to Graham, 27 Sept. 1727, Vienna, England, Varia 8. The Dutch politician Count Welderen, in London for George II's coronation, noted the impatience there to discover the result of Rottembourg's negotiation, Welderen to Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, 17 Oct. 1727, Marburg, Niederlande 661.
3 He was regarded as a supporter of the Anglo-French alliance, Waldegrave to Townshend, 25 Sept. 1727, PRO. 80/62, f. 66; Post Boy 30 Sept. (OS) 1727.
4 Tilson to Waldegrave, 27 Nov. (OS) 1727, Chewton; Newcastle to William Finch, 28 Nov. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/294 f. 305.
5 Baudrillart, III, 349, 355-63; Wilson, pp. 175-6.
arrived that Rottembourg had accepted a protocol which entirely surrendered the British position over the Prince Frederick.

By entrusting the settlement of Anglo-Spanish differences to Rottembourg, the British had surrendered the diplomatic initiative to the French\(^1\). This was a policy advocated by Horatio Walpole who prided himself on his close links with Fleury and believed that the replacement that summer of the anglophile foreign minister Morville by the relatively unknown Chauvelin did not threaten his position or the Anglo-French alliance\(^2\), a view doubted by many others\(^3\). The policy was a continuation of the reliance upon French diplomacy earlier in the year when the Preliminaries had been settled as a result of Fleury's initiative in arranging Franco-Austrian negotiations.

The Walpole ministry's close identification with the French alliance\(^4\) had produced considerable criticism\(^5\). Sir Edward

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1 Marquis de Fleury to DeBrosse, 30 July 1727, Dresden, 663, f.84; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 8 Aug (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32751 f. 216; Le Coq to Augustus, 23 Sept. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a, f.241; Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 15 Sept. (OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f.42, draft.


5 (See next page)
Knatchbull recorded that the Commons' debates on the Treaty of Hanover in February 1726 and on the Address in January 1727 were marked by opposition claims that France was an unreliable ally whose aggrandisement was dangerous. The French were aware of British jealousy and fear; Morville believed that it was essential to persuade the British that the Anglo-French alliance operated for the benefit of both powers. He wrote to Chammorol in June 1727,

'Vous vivez au milieu d'un peuple qui ne souffre pas patiemment qu'on le croye conduit par qui que ce soit, et toute apparence de vanité à cet egard seroit d'une dangereuse consequence. Vous devez donc faire envisager l'heureux succes de nos demarches communes pour la paix comme le fruit de l'union qui subsiste entre la France et l'Angleterre, et vous pourrez en tirer une preuve pour etablir autant qu'il sera possible l'opinion que le maintien de cette bonne intelligence est également convenable aux interests réciproques.'

Such a belief was held by the Walpole ministry. The war plans drawn up early in 1727, when war was envisaged against Spain and Austria, had placed great reliance on the French army, particularly for the defence of Hanover. The success of the Preliminaries led to an increase of ministerial confidence in the alliance. Newcastle drafted a dispatch for John Hedges,

5 (See previous page) Newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 24 June 1727, Osnabrück, 291, f.741; Broglie to Chauvelin, 6 Nov. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360, f.229.


2 Morville to Chammorol, 12 June 1727, AE. CP. Ang. Sup. 8. f.14.
British Envoy Extraordinary at Turin,

'.... the preserving and cementing the union betwixt England and France, which has proved so useful and advantageous to both kingdoms, is what His Majesty looks upon as a principle not to be departed from .... this prosperous turn of affairs, which, next to the wisdom of His Majesty's Councils, and the cheerful concurrence of his Parliament, must, in justice, be ascribed greatly to the constancy, firmness and upright behaviour of France.'

The next section of the draft was deleted, but it serves to illustrate the attitude in 1727 of Newcastle, a minister not later noted for his French sympathies.

'where the present administration appears to act upon different maxims from those which may have been produced in a former reign.'

This view was to be increasingly challenged in the autumn of 1727, and as the Anglo-French alliance failed to settle Anglo-Spanish difficulties, the foreign policy associated with the Walpole ministry came under increasing - and for the Walpoles worrying - strain. This strain was compounded by two other developments. Severe ill-health incapacitated and threatened to remove Townshend, leading to speculation as to who would be his successor. This was made yet more serious by

1 Newcastle to Hedges, 27 May (OS) 1727, PRO 92/32, f.387-8; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 28 May (OS) 1727, BL Add. 32750, f.415; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 9 June 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 22 June 1727, BL Add. 48982, f.37; Marini, p. 77.
increasing signs that the varied attempts made since the summer to improve Britain's relations with various German powers, attempts that George was closely identified with, would bear fruit and produce either a rapprochement with Austria or a system of German alliances that would have but a tenuous connection with Britain's French alliance.

Townshend had been dogged with ill-health before the autumn of 1727. In September 1727 Waldegrave noted that he had often and unsuccessfully pressed Townshend to look after his health. However, none of Townshend's illnesses was as serious as that which nearly killed him in 1727. Various diagnoses were offered at the time, ranging from gout, rheumatism and dropsy to more exotic illnesses, but the diagnoses only revealed the clumsy state of medical science in this period, as did the treatments which included the provision of horse medicines by Walpole. After Townshend returned to London on June 30th the first signs of illness were soon visible. On August 9th Waldegrave wrote to Townshend's under-secretary, George Tilson,

'I am sorry to find mylord has been laid up with the gout, but hope it will be no longer than what may contribute to his health and settle those humours I used to fear were floating about him.'

1 Waldegrave to Townshend, 25 Sept. 1727, PRO. 80/62, f.65.
2 I would like to thank Dr. A. M. Cooke F.R.C.P. and my wife, Dr. Sarah Black, for discussing Townshend's illness with me.
3 Poyntz to Tilson, 9 Aug. 1727, (referring to Tilson to Poyntz of 14, 18, 21 July (OS) 1727), PRO. 95/47, f.343; Sir Edward Dering to Viscount Percival, 22 Aug, (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 47032 f.45.
4 Waldegrave to Tilson, 9 Aug. 1727, PRO. 80/62 f.29.
Richard Edgcumbe, ministerial election manager in the South-West, to —, 27 Aug. (OS) 1727, PRO. 36/3, f.32.
Such optimistic notes were soon stilled when it became apparent that the illness was far more serious than had been believed. Medical cures were tried without success. Townshend was confined to his chamber and fears were expressed about his life. At one stage the doctors gave him up. It is impossible to state what Townshend was suffering from but it is conceivable that he had suffered a stroke. This seems to be the diagnosis that best fits the few symptoms that are recorded.

After being particularly severe in September the illness seems to have abated in October. During this period Townshend was able to discharge some of the functions of his office. He discussed with Diemar the Freudenberg affair, a dispute between Hesse-Cassel and Hanover. On October 20th, at his home, he was able to question Dehn about the size of the Wolfenbüttel army and to offer a subsidy treaty. He wrote himself the most sensitive section of Waldegrave's instructions, that dealing with George I's will. On November 14th he met the judges in the Exchequer Chamber at Westminster, where the Sheriffs were being chosen. On November 18th though 'in a very bad way with his rheumatism,' he was able to dine with Charles Delafaye. Thereafter his health seems to have declined again. On the 24th, the Daily Journal reported that on the 22nd Townshend 'was judged to be at the last extremity'. In December Townshend seems to have recovered a

1 Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, 24 Oct. 1727, Wolfenbüttel 1 Alt 22, Nr. 534, f. 69-70.
2 Townshend to Waldegrave, 26 Oct. (OS) 1727, PRO. 80/62 f. 80.
3 Daily Journal 6 Nov. (OS) 1727; Delafaye to Duncan Forbes, Lord Advocate of Scotland, 7 Nov. (OS) 1727, H.R. Duff (ed.), Culloden Papers (1815) p. 102.
4 Daily Journal 13 Nov. (OS) 1727.
little, although he continued weak and reports persisted that he was very ill. In mid-December he was still confined to his chamber, though able to walk. He did not recover until the spring, missing the opening of Parliament.

Townshend's illness produced a governmental crisis that has been ignored by historians. His illness put a lot of pressure upon his colleague as Secretary, Newcastle, who took over the correspondence with the British envoys in the northern department. Doubts were expressed about Newcastle's ability to cope.

Townshend's illness was given by Le Coq as the reason for the serious delay in diplomatic negotiations. Townshend excused himself to Du Bourgay, the British envoy at Berlin, for failing to write. The British diplomatic system appeared to be drifting into a state of chaos. Horatio Walpole complained that Newcastle was not keeping him informed, and he anxiously questioned his brother about Townshend's health.

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3 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 8 Dec. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35. Broglie reported that Newcastle would be removed, Broglie to Chauvelin, 6 Nov. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360 f.229.
5 Townshend to Du Bourgay, 27 Oct. (OS) 1727, PRO. 90/22.
6 Waldegrave Journal, 11 Nov. 1727, Chewton; Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 11 Nov. 1727, Coxe, II, 544. On 21 Sept. (OS) 1727, the Attorney General, Philip Yorke, wrote to Delafaye, 'I was told by Mr. Paxton, it was not yet proper mylord should hear much of business', PRO. 54/18 f.161. Discussing the Wolfenbüttel negotiations with Lord King, Walpole stated 'that Lord Townshend being sick, he could not attend to it', King, 24 Nov. (OS) 1727, p. 50. However, the following day, Townshend sent King the French draft of the intended treaty, p. 51.
In November Le Coq suggested that Townshend's death would cause a major problem, 'parce qu'il est seul au fait des affaires'. Fleury pressed Horatio Walpole on the matter, 'with the greatest concern', doubting Horatio's assurances that Townshend would recover. Speculation began as to who would replace Townshend, and suggestions were made that Newcastle would be replaced. Broglie informed his government that as soon as the diplomatic situation settled down Newcastle would be replaced.

Townshend's illness and the effective vacancy in the northern department, (for Newcastle displayed little interest in the affairs of Townshend's department and did not maintain an extensive private correspondence with the diplomats in it), meant that George's views on the conduct of Anglo-German relations were given free rein. Since his accession, George had been defining his own views on foreign policy, and in the winter of 1727-1728, he piloted a policy of his own with considerable independence. George's policy differed from that of his ministers in two important respects, one relating to the prime area of concern and the second to the best means for executing policy. Unlike his ministers George displayed very little interest in Anglo-Spanish relations and his concern for the issues at stake was at best fitful. He believed that the key to the diplomatic situation was Austria. Though Townshend certainly agreed with his analysis, he, in common with the other minister, gave great attention to parliamentary views on the diplomatic situation. These tended to concentrate on the

1 Le Coq to Augustus II, 25 Nov. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a, f. 379.
2 Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 11 Nov. 1727, Coxe, II, 544.
3 Broglie to Chauvelin, 6 Nov. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360 f. 229.
commercial disputes at stake between Britain and Spain and on Gibraltar, and to ignore the niceties of German politics. George was particularly concerned with the rights of Protestant German princes, such as himself, faced with what he saw as a despotic Catholic Austrian threat. Hanoverian grievances against the manner in which the Emperor exercised Imperial jurisdictional rights in the Mecklenburg and East Friesland disputes fortified his determination to force Charles VI to be a good Emperor. Allied to these particular Hanoverian interests was George's belief that Austria was to blame for European instability and that it was secretly encouraging Spain to resist British demands. It was felt that Austria hoped, by delaying peace, to weaken the Hanover allies and gain opportunities to split the alliance. This was a view shared by the British ministry. Townshend had informed Finch in September that 'all the difficulties we meet with come from the Imperial court'. Two months later Newcastle wrote to Finch, 'tho' the Emperor does not openly himself act contrary to the Preliminaries, yet the king sees plainly enough by the whole tenour of the conduct of Vienna and by many instances of the behaviour of Count Königsegg at Madrid during this negotiation, that at the bottom the design of the Impl. Ministry is, to encourage Spain in

1 St. Saphorin argued that 'toujours est il de la derniere importance de travailler avec soin dans l'Empire', St. Saphorin to Townshend, 2 May 1727, PRO. 80/61.


3 Townshend to Finch, 5 Sept. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/294, f. 165.
their dispute about the execution of the Preliminarys, and to endeavour to embroil the Allys of Hanover'. Newcastle made the same point to Horatio Walpole,¹ who had been informed in August by Vandermeer that Austria was directing Spanish policy.² Given this view it was not surprising that some attempt should be made to define British relations with Austria. Early in 1727 they had plummeted to a distinct low when the British expelled the Austrian resident Palm for making public a memorial he presented to George I which accused George of falsely impugning Austrian conduct in his speech to Parliament. This had led the Austrians to retaliate by expelling St. Saphorin, and the British to step up plans for a military conflict with Austria. In order to forestall an Austrian attack upon Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, an invasion of the Habsburg hereditary lands was considered. Relations were still frosty when George I left for Europe. The British were averse to reopening diplomatic relations with Austria. Waldegrave's instructions, drawn up at the end of May, noted

'We had many scruples and objections to the sending any minister thither till we have had some satisfactory explanation upon the ill treatment we have received from that Court in several respects.'³

The British had however yielded to French pressure⁴ and

¹ Newcastle to Finch, 21 Nov. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/294, f. 288; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 23, 30 Nov. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32753, f. 100, 178.
² Vandermeer to Horatio Walpole, 25 Aug. 1727, PRO. 94/98.
³ Instructions for Waldegrave, 26 May (OS) 1727, PRO. 80/62, f. 9.
⁴ Instructions for Waldegrave, 26 May (OS) 1727, PRO. 80/62, f. 9; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 27 May (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 48982 f. 5-6, 8; Townshend to Chesterfield, 6 Sept. (OS) 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 274.
decided to send Lord Waldegrave, a diplomat noted for his charm, affability and easy manner, and also for possessing the confidence of the French government, to Vienna. Waldegrave went as far as Paris, where he had been ordered to discuss matters with Fleury, but the unfavourable diplomatic scene that was produced by the death of George I persuaded him to go no further, and on June 22nd he informed Townshend:

'What weighed most with me and determined me to stay here, was the caution yr. Lordship had given me, not to proceed unless I had the strongest assurances of being well received, and in this I thought the king's honour too much concerned to run any hazard.'

British suspicions of Austria were increased, after the accession of George II, by the fear that the Austrians were secretly encouraging the Pretender. In addition, the French negotiations with Austria that had produced the Preliminaries had been viewed with some disfavour by the British. Suspicions that the French would betray the British position were openly voiced, and they were shared by some members of the government.

1 Newcastle stated that Waldegrave had been selected because he was 'known to be perfectly agreeable to the court of France', Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 27 May (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32750, f.409; Instructions for Waldegrave, 26 May (OS) 1727, PRO. 80/62, f.10; St. Saphorin to Tarouca, draft, 'Aug. 1727', PRO. 80/61.

2 Dehn and Slingelandt, the Dutch Pensionary, regretted the fact that Waldegrave had not continued to Vienna, Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, 23 Sept. 1727, Wolfenbüttel 1 Alt 22 Nr. 534 f.47. Fonseca told Waldegrave 'that my being at Vienna might and would certainly have facilitated matters, 24 Sept. 1727, Waldegrave Journal, Chewton. Waldegrave's decision was in accordance with his orders, draft memorandum for Waldegrave, sent to him 29 May (OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187, f.8.

3 Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 8 Aug. (OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f.10.
In particular, the French ambassador at Vienna, Richelieu, was distrusted. ¹

However, there was considerable ambivalence in British attitudes towards Austria. ² This ambivalence was best summed up in letters dispatched to Waldegrave on August 18th. In the instructions sent to the envoy he was ordered to co-operate with the Austrians. The hope was expressed that 'you will find an equal inclination at Vienna to suppress all reflections on past measures and to look forward only upon the best means for reestablishing a strict friendship for the future'. On the same day Townshend informed him that George was 'very sensible of the ill treatment which has been received from the court of Vienna'. ³ Suspicion was therefore coupled with a hope that it would somehow be possible to restore amicable relations, a possibility that appeared more likely when the Austrians clearly disavowed the Jacobites. Some understanding with Austria was needed if Britain was not to be totally outmanoeuvred at the forthcoming Congress, for otherwise France could act the role of arbiter of Europe, and Britain would be isolated if France should decide to support

¹ Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 30 Nov. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32753, f.178; Waldegrave Journal, 8 Nov. 1727, Chewton; Le Coq to Augustus II, 17 Oct. 1727, Dresden 2676, 18a f.303; Woodward to Tilson, 9 Ap., 2 May, St. Saphorin to Townshend, 16, 22 Ap., 29 May 1727, PRO. 80/61; Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 8 Aug. (OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f.11.
² For discussion of the possibility of an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation Post Boy 30 Sept. (OS) 1727; Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 19 Sept. 1727, ASV. LM. Ing. 97, f.39.
Spanish or Austrian pretensions. The advantage of some sort of agreement with Austria was clear, and, indeed, it was openly advocated by the opposition Whigs, but the French orientation of the Walpole ministry prevented any independent approach to Austria. The ministry did not wish to jeopardise French support by appearing to follow an independent German policy. Horatio Walpole assured Morville in July that Britain would only listen to Prussian proposals in concert with France.

In October 1727 O'Rourke wrote of the Austrians, 'their politicks are all passive, that is to say that like pretty women, they will make noe advances, but receave those that are made to them if to their liking, and take hold of such overtures, and occurrences, as offer of themselves.'

The Austrians, disinclined to upset their allies and quizzical about the stability of the Walpole ministry, had made no overtures to George II, but waited for Waldegrave's arrival in Vienna, hoping that he would bring proposals for them to

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1 It was in concert with France that Horatio Walpole proposed sending Waldegrave to Vienna, 'without a character... to see if the Emperor can be persuaded not to encourage Spain in so unreasonable demands as those now made', Waldegrave Journal, 21 Sept. 1727, Chewton. In the draft of a letter to Tarouca, the Portuguese envoy in Austria, St. Saphorin claimed that George II 'ne sera jamais éloigné de bien vivre avec la cour Imperiale, tandis qu'elle voudra avoir de bons procédés avec luy, et qu'elle n'entreprendra rien de préjudiciable à ses amis, et à la seurété de l'Europe ... il sera toujours disposé à se prêter à toutes les ouvertures d'une-pleine reconciliation, pourvu qu'on ne luy propose rien qui soit contraire à ses Traittés, et qui ne soit conforme à sa dignité et à sa gloire, St. Saphorin to Tarouca, Aug. 1727/PRO. 80/61.

2 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 30 July 1727, BL. Add. 32751 f.127.

3 O'Rourke to Graham, 1 Oct. 1727, Vienna, England, Varia 8.
consider. The Prussians had been more adventurous. Frederick William I greeted the news of George I's death with the tears then conventional upon the news of a father-in-law's death, and with assurances to Du Bourgay that a high ranking envoy would be sent to Britain to offer condolences. Baron Wallenrodt was sent to London to sound the British about the possibility of a new treaty. Noises were made in Berlin about the projected marriages between George's eldest son Frederick, now Prince of Wales, and Frederick William's eldest daughter Wilhelmina, and between the Prussian Crown Prince Frederick and the British Princess Royal, Anne. In his audience in July Wallenrodt gave George 'very strong assurances from the king his master of his friendship and affection, and of his earnest desire to live in a perfect good understanding with his Majesty'.

George's response to the Prussians was curt. Wallenrodt was told 'that as to any engagements or joint measures, he could enter into none, unless they were concerted with France likewise.' Du Bourgay was sharply reprimanded for exceeding orders in his

1 Despite Waldegrave's appointment, the Austrians did not name an envoy for Britain, St. Saphorin to Tarouca, draft, Aug. 1727, PRO. 80/61; O'Rourke reported that the Austrians wanted a reconciliation with Britain, O'Rourke to Graham, 1 Oct. 1727, Vienna, England, Varia, 8; Fonseca pressed Waldegrave to go to Vienna, 24 Sept. 1727, Waldegrave Journal, Chewton.


3 Wallenrodt was suspected of being anti-British, Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 26 July 1727, BL. Add. 48982, f.62, 64.

4 Townshend to Du Bourgay, 14 July (OS) 1727, PRO. 90/22; Suhm to Augustus II, 22 Aug. 1727, Dresden, 3378, IV f.171-2; Le Coq to Augustus II, 23 Sept. 1727, Dredsen, 2676, Vol. 18a. f.242-3.
discussions with the Prussians, and for 'meddling'. George denied that he had any plans for the marriage of his children, and stated that such marriages must wait until the European situation was more stable.\(^1\) George was criticised for his negative response to the Prussian approaches. The Reverend Henry Etough, rector of Therfield in Hertfordshire, kept extensive records of his conversations with Robert Walpole, Horatio Walpole, and John Scrope. He noted in his papers that Frederick William I had been tactlessly irritated by George's refusal to publish his father's will.\(^2\) George II did so because he wished to suppress the provisions it included for the eventual separation of Hanover from Britain. George I had stipulated that if his grandson Frederick should have more than one son, the first-born should inherit the royal crown and the second the electoral cap. If Frederick had only one son, that son should become King of Great Britain, while the Electorate would pass into the Wolfenbüttel branch of the house of Brunswick. Frederick William I believed that George II had deprived Frederick's wife Sophia Dorothea of her father, George I's, legacy to her, by suppressing the will.\(^3\)

1 Townshend to Du Bourguy, 19 Sept. 1727, PRO. 90/22. Le Coq was certain that George and Caroline wanted greatly to marry their children. Le Coq to Augustus II, 25 July, 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a, f.154; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus II, 29 Oct. 1727 AST. LM. Aut. 58.


Etough noted that 'the friends and foes of the present establishment were nearly unanimous in their opinion, that had this opportunity been improved to procure the amity of the King of Prussia, and had not been perverted to increase his enmity, all payments to Hesse Cassel might have been absolutely saved.'

Townshend excused the British response by claiming that Britain was being faithful to her allies. He informed De Bourgoy of 'the rule H. M. has laid down to go hand in hand with the most Christian king in all things that concern the publick affairs of Europe.' The French had already expressed concern that British support for Prussia would upset the Wittelsbachs, concerned over the Jülich-Berg inheritance.

In fact the British response was not simply due to compliance with French wishes, however much the British might attempt to persuade the French that this was the case. The British did not want to become embroiled in conflicts as an ally of Prussia. The Prussians had made it clear that they expected assistance over Jülich-Berg from their allies, and, in addition, the Courland

1 Etough, collections, f.49. St. Saphorin pressed for an Anglo-Prussian alliance as a way to limit Austrian power in the Empire, 'Relation sur les affaires du Mecklenbourg'; no date, by St. Saphorin, PRO. 80/61. Etough was referring to the subsidy treaty with Hesse-Cassel, which had been negotiated in order to commit Hessian troops to the defence of Hanover.

2 Townshend to Du Bourgoy, 14 July (OS) 1727, PRO. 90/22.

3 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 19 Aug. 1727, BL. Add. 32751, f.222; Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 24 Oct. 1727, C (H) corresp. 1485; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 21 Aug. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 48982 f.69.


5 Du Bourgoy to Townshend, 12 July 1727, PRO. 90/22; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus, 1 Oct. 1727, AST. LM. Aut. 58; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 16 Oct. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32752, f.217.
succession dispute, in which Prussia had a major interest, had erupted into violence. Furthermore, it was felt that Frederick William could not be trusted, and, as Etough pointed out, his 'inconsistent and deceitful practices, with regard to the treaties of Vienna and Hanover .... discouraged all political dependence'. Newcastle informed Horatio Walpole in October that George believed that Frederick William should be made 'to feel the effects of his late behaviour'.

In his rejection of Prussian approaches and his antagonism towards the Austrians George could be seen as a faithful ally, but he was showing considerable independence in his attempts to develop a league of German princes. A note of vigour was injected into Britain's German policy. Wallenrodt reported that George had told him that he was determined 'to maintain the constitution of the Empire, but if the Emperor trod upon his toe, H. M. would let him know, whom he had to do with'.

Horatio Walpole was informed that George wanted French support for the 'liberties of the Germanic Body', and George drafted
him instructions that demanded that France should provide a
declaration that she would respect the rights of Protestants in
the Empire.¹ Townshend informed Horatio Walpole that 'a stop
must be put to the absolute power which the Emperor is daily
acquiring in Germany'.²

During the period of near-conflict that had preceded the
Preliminaries of Paris the French had been eager to beat the
same drum, and had sought to develop an alliance with the
Wittelsbach princes, but after the Preliminaries the French
advocated a moderate approach to Austria. As a result the lead
in finding new supporters for the Alliance of Hanover was taken
by George II. D'Aix noted that George was trying to acquire a
party in the Empire and to persuade the Princes to demand
independent representation at the forthcoming Congress and not
to permit the Emperor to represent them.³ This was of great
importance for George because he feared that in any Congress
restricted to the Signators of the Preliminaries of Paris,
Britain would be isolated, and France and Austria would decide
German matters themselves and display no concern for the
grievances of the Protestant princes. Were the latter included,
George would be able to play a more prominent role at the
Congress. For this reason he pressed for the widest representation
possible, denied that the Emperor had the right to represent the

¹ Draft Instructions for Horatio Walpole, 1727, PRO. 78/187, f.1-7; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 21 May (OS) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f.206.
² Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 8 Aug. (quote) 1727, BL. Add. 32751 f.215-6, 345; Le Coq to Flemming, 7 Oct. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a f.284; Townshend to the Dutch nobleman d'Ittersum, 18 Aug. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/296 f.73; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 9 Nov (OS) 1727, BL.Add. 32752, f.482; Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 1 Sept. (OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187, f.27.
³ D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 3 Nov 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Marini, p.96
princes and urged that the Scandinavian powers should be admitted to the Congress. France gave only grudging support to this policy. A major motive for George's actions was concern over the security of Hanover. The Electorate was an exposed territory, lacking sound fortifications. Visitors to Hanover commented frequently upon its defencelessness. In 1729 Townshend wrote that George had 'a great extent of country to defend which is open and unguarded by any strong place.' A British visitor noted of the town of Hanover that 'the fortifications are not considerable'. Chauvelin argued that the conquest of the Electorate could be settled by one battle, because there were no fortifications that required a siege, whilst Boissieux, the French envoy to the Elector of Cologne, stated that the Electorate of Hanover would take less than three weeks to conquer.

The agreements between Austria, Prussia and Russia signed in 1726, had badly shaken George I. George II was very concerned at signs of military movements by these powers, and at their attempts to bring Mecklenburg, Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and Saxony-Poland into their system. In early October 1727, Le Coq reported a revival of earlier British fears that Augustus II was permitting the Austrians to construct magazines in Saxony, that an Austro-Saxon agreement existed for the assembly of Austrian

1 Le Coq to Augustus II, 17 Oct. 16 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a, f.305, 426; Marini, p.90.
2 Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 17 Aug. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32751, f.308.
3 Townshend to Chesterfield, 2 Sept. 1729, PRO. 84/305, f.93; Anon. travel account, Bodl. Rawl. letters, 72, f.2; Chauvelin to Chavigny, 21 Aug. 1729, Boissieux to Chauvelin, 13 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47, f.134, Cologne, 70, f.190.
troops to attack Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, and that August Wilhelm of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel was negotiating the entry of Austrian troops into the fortress of Brunswick. In October Augustus II's leading minister Count Flemming visited Berlin, ostensibly to discuss toll disputes between Saxony and Prussia. This explanation of his mission was believed by few, and, though Du Bourgay was unable to find out the true motive, Villars noted the belief that it was to discuss plans for war and commented on the improvement of relations between Austria, Russia and Prussia. Le Coq informed Flemming that he had had to reassure the British about the purpose of his mission.

Among the foreign envoys who arrived in Britain to attend the coronation were the Württemberg envoy Count Gravanitz and the Wolfenbüttel envoy Count Dehn. George opened discussions with both men about the possibility of an alliance with Britain. Gravanitz's dispatches do not survive, and it is difficult to discover information about his mission. Le Coq reported that the British were anxious to win the alliance of Württemberg, and both he and D'Aix believed that Württemberg was interested in such an arrangement, though, as Le Coq pointed out, she required subsidies.

To contemporaries Dehn's mission was charged with significance.

1 Le Coq to Augustus II, 3. 7 Oct. 1727, Dresden, 2676, Vol. 18a, f.265, 275-6; Waldegrave Journal, 8, 10 Nov. 1727, Chewton.
3 Le Coq to Augustus II, 24 Oct., 7 Nov. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a, f.318, 344-6; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus II, 21 Jan. 1728, AST. L.M. Aut. 58; Dureng, p.62. The British urged France to satisfy the Württemberg claim to Montbéliard. This policy had been advocated by St. Saphorin the previous Spring, St. Saphorin to Townshend, 22 Ap. 1727, 'Projet de Representation à la cour de France en faveur du Duc de Wirtemberg', by St. Saphorin, no date but after accession of George II, PRO. 80/61.
Dehn himself does not seem to have been a terribly impressive diplomat. Pöllnitz, the Prussian courtier who printed his travel notes in the 1730's, referred to Dehn in very disparaging terms as a frivolous politician who delighted in splendour, enjoyed balls and liked making treaties. Pöllnitz is not a reliable source. In some respects he was a German equivalent of Lord Hervey. However, his view was corroborated by Sutton who served as the British Envoy Extraordinary in Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel in 1729. Sutton, who managed to combine debauchery and ability thought little of Dehn who only managed the former. Largillière's portrait of Dehn, now hanging in the Herzog Anton-Ulrich museum in Brunswick, is a portrait of a shallow and flashy courtier.

Delayed by contrary winds Dehn arrived in London in early October. There he negotiated the Treaty of Westminster with Townshend. The agreement included a mutual guarantee of dominions, mutual assistance in case of attack, a British Subsidy, an arrangement under which the fortress of Brunswick was to be kept for the common safety of the house of Luneburg, and the delivery

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3 Sutton to Townshend, 8 Mar., to Tilson, 11 Mar., 17 May 1729, PRO. 81/123. Newcastle noted that 'Dehn is in his nature pretty forward', /Newcastle/to Horatio Walpole, 17 Ap. (OS) 1728, PRO. 78/189, f.136.
of the copy of George I's will held by Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. ¹
This was seen by the British as a considerable triumph. Newcastle informed Horatio Walpole that it would make Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel 'a Barrier against any attempts of the Emperor, who has certainly flattered himself with the hopes of making Brunswick a place of arms'. ² Fleury told Horatio that he was delighted by the treaty, and the government proclaimed it as a triumph of foreign policy, though they were less keen on advertising the amount of money promised to Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. ³

More attention was devoted to the suggestions that Dehn sought to achieve an Anglo-Austrian rapprochement. Reports to this effect circulated widely. ⁴ Zamboni informed the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt that the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, August Wilhelm, had decided to attempt such a rapprochement and that he had ordered Dehn to secure it. According to Zamboni the Austrians disliked the

¹ Treaty of Westminster, 25 Nov. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32753, f.260-3, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 534, f.104-8. The British ministers who signed were Walpole, Townshend, Newcastle, Devonshire and Lord Trevor, the Lord Privy Seal. The will was not mentioned in the treaty but George's ratification was conditional upon the will's delivery, Dehn to Townshend, 6 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32753, f.269; Townshend to Dehn, 25 Nov. (OS), Newcastle to Dehn, 25 Nov. (OS), Draft of a declaration to Dehn, - Nov. (OS) 1727, PRO. 100/15; King, pp. 50-54; Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich pp. 135-6; Fleury to Horatio, Walpole, 2 Aug. 1727, BL. Add. 48962, f.65.

² Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 2 Nov. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32752, f.406; Le Coq to DeBrosse, 13 Jan. 1728, Dresden, 663, f.151. The strength of the town's defences is clearly visible in a plan of Wolfenbüttel drawn in 1729 by F. B. Werner, Wolfenbüttel, Herzog August Bibliothek.

³ Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 20 Nov. 1727, BL. Add. 332752 f.473. In the previous year Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel had signed an alliance with Austria. The Duke was the uncle of Charles VI's wife, Schleinitz to Dehn, 3 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 48982 f.98. It was suggested that, in addition to an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, Dehn would arrange a marriage between George II's eldest daughter, Anne, and Ferdinand Albrecht's eldest son, Charles, Anon to Anon, no date, Vienna, England, Varia, 10 f.39. This interesting document had been dated by the archive as 1750?, but it clearly relates to the winter of 1727-8. Le Coq to Augustus II, 9 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a f.403. Dehn was very optimistic about the possibility of a reconciliation, Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, (cont. next page)
idea and persuaded August Wilhelm to desist.\footnote{1} From St. Petersburg
the French agent Magnan reported that the Danish envoy there,
Westphalen, was displeased at reports of an Anglo-Austrian
reconciliation, and that the Wolfenbüttel minister Cramm was
attempting to secure an Anglo-Russian reconciliation.\footnote{2} On
November 11th Waldegrave recorded in his journal,

'Mr Wal. told me that the Card, had taken notice
of him that the D of N had acquainted the French ambassador
at London with a proposal made the king by the Wolfenbüttel
minister about a private pacification with the Emp. but
had been rejected by the king, Mr. Wal. was surprised
that the D of N had taken no notice of it in any of his
letters to him'.\footnote{3}

The British certainly assured the French that they had

\footnote{1} Zamboni to Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, 16 Dec. 1727, Bodl. Rawl. 119 f.198.
\footnote{2} Magnan to Chauvelin, 15 Nov. 1727, Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo
Istoricheskogo Obshchestva (St. Petersburg 1867-1916), 75, p.126.
Cramm was suspected of being a British agent, Liria, pp.208-9.
In order to cover the costs of their envoy in Russia, whom they
claimed represented British interests, the government of Brunswick-
Wolfenbüttel sought money from Britain, Dehn to August Wilhelm,
13 July 1728, Wolfenbüttel, 2 Alt 3632 f.7.
\footnote{3} Waldegrave Journal, 11 Nov. 1727, Chewton. Chavigny, French envoy
at the Imperial Diet, and Broglie were both very suspicious of
Dehn's mission, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 16 Sept., 2 Oct. 1727,
AE. CP. Allemagne, 373 f.87, 103; Le Coq to Augustus II, 14 Nov.
1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a f.354-5. Dehn's brother, the Wolfenbüttel
envoy at Vienna, wrote that Austria sought better relations with
Britain and information from Count Dehn; he added, 'Le Prince
d'Eugene m'a dit encore une fois que pour cette fin on donnera,
selon que les circonstances l'exigeront, commission speciale au
Cte. de Dehn', Baron Dehn to Count Dehn, 20 Aug. 1727, PRO. 84/294
f.167.
rejected an approach from Dehn, but it is difficult to disentangle the course of events. Only a portion of Dehn's correspondence survives and it is not particularly helpful. It does however reveal that internal Wolfenbüttel politics may have played a major role in developments. The politics of the Duchy were notoriously intricate and unstable. August Wilhelm had no children and there was a strong reversionary interest in the duchy centered on his brother's son-in-law Ferdinand Albrecht, the Duke of Brunswick-Bevern, who was eventually to succeed to Wolfenbüttel in 1735. In October 1727 the principal Wolfenbüttel minister Munchausen fell. This upset Dehn who feared that he would follow Munchausen, a point Ferdinand Albrecht also made. This helped to make Dehn very cautious, and lent weight to Ferdinand Albrecht's advice that he should return to Wolfenbüttel and do nothing to upset the Austrians.

Dehn was notoriously keen to exaggerate the favour with which

1 Le Coq reported that the British, suspicious of Austro-Spanish links, rejected Dehn's suggestion of an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, Le Coq to Augustus II, 19 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, Vol. 18a. f.437, Tilson assured Horatio Walpole that Townshend had George's orders to reject any approach from Dehn. However, it is possible that Horatio was being misled, Tilson to Horatio Walpole, 12 Oct. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 48982, f.92. Townshend gave similar assurances, Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 21 Aug. (OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187.

2 Private Instructions for Sutton, as Envoy Extraordinary to the Duke of Wolfenbüttel, 21 Jan. (OS) 1729, PRO. 81/123.

3 Ferdinand Albrecht was a staunch supporter of Austria and a correspondent of Prince Eugene's. He had a private correspondence with Dehn.

4 Dehn to Townshend, 14 Feb., government of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel to Dehn, 3 Feb. 1728, PRO. 100/15; Ferdinand Albrecht to Dehn, 12 Sept. 27 Nov. 1727, Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, 31 Oct., 18 Nov. 1727, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22 534, f.23, 102, 59-60, 100-1; Ferdinand Albrecht to Christine Louise von Oettingen, wife of Ludwig Rudolf of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, 4 Nov. 1727, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22 Nr. 529, f.76.
his approaches were received. It is probable that had George received his approach with greater favour he would have made more of the matter. Equally, it is possible that George used the Dehn mission in order to frighten the French into lending him more diplomatic support. Whatever the truth of the matter it is certain that the episode increased uncertainty over George's intentions and over British policy in general.  

The Dehn mission was no secret, but British approaches to the Saxons that winter were, and have remained so. They have received no scholarly attention and the only evidence about the approaches is to be found in the Saxon archives. The uncorroborated nature of the evidence calls its veracity into question, but it should be noted that Le Coq's despatches reveal an intelligent and perceptive mind at work, and that the British never complained about the accuracy of Le Coq's despatches as they were to complain about those of other envoys, such as the Prussian Reichenbach. On December 12th 1727 Le Coq sent a messenger to Augustus II with a lengthy dispatch. This despatch, subsequently endorsed "lettre de Mr Le Coq contenant quelques ouvertures faites..."
par Mr. de St. Saphorin,' contained the details of several conferences between Le Coq and St. Saphorin. The conferences were undated, except for the last on the 10th. St. Saphorin, on the 10th, dwelt on the threat to the German princes represented by the alliance of Spain and Austria and argued that both powers intended that Don Carlos should marry Maria Teresa and succeed to the Austrian inheritance. He stated that to face this threat, a league in the Empire was necessary to defend its rights and liberties. He stated that he was sure that Bavaria would join, a view that probably owed something to his mission there in 1725, and suggested that Prussia would, despite the instability of its recent policy. St. Saphorin added that France would have to be excluded from any agreement between Britain and the German powers because France was distrusted in the Empire, a point he did not enlarge upon.1

Le Coq was at pains to affirm that St. Saphorin's approach was not a personal one. He reiterated that he was sure that St. Saphorin was speaking in the name of the king and he stated, 'il est apparent, que ce tour a été concerté avec S.M.B. même, pour pouvoir pressentir mieux les dispositions de V.M. avant que de pousser la chose plus loin'.2

St. Saphorin informed Flemming that Saxony had been approached first because the British hoped that Saxon approval would have a good effect upon other powers.3 He might have added

1 'Lettre de Mr. Le Coq contenant quelques ouvertures faites par Mr. de St. Saphorin,' 12 Déc., 1727, Le Coq to Flemming, 7 Oct. 1727, Flemming to Le Coq, 25 Oct. 1727, Le Coq to Augustus, 28 Nov. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a, f.406-17, 284; 286, 386.
2 Lettre de Mr. Le Coq ... f.412.
3 Le Coq to Flemming, 12 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a, f.421.
that there was no Wittelsbach representative in London and that Wallenrodt's death in October had reduced Prussian representation to a low level. Le Coq was further convinced that St. Saphorin was acting on royal instructions by the fact that on December 9th Le Coq had had an audience of over an hour with the Queen who had stated that George needed allies in the Empire and that an Anglo-Saxon alliance without France was necessary.¹

This approach to Saxony, rather than the response to Dehn's mission, confirmed that George was willing to adopt schemes of his own, and to ignore his ministers. Le Coq reported that Newcastle knew nothing of the matter and that George wanted St. Saphorin to handle the negotiation unbeknownst to his ministers or the French.²

George was not only challenging the French orientation of British foreign policy in the Empire. His anger at the French failure to settle Anglo-Spanish differences to the satisfaction of the British led him to demand that action should be taken against the Spaniards, a policy France opposed.³ During the autumn of 1727 criticism of France had been growing in London.⁴

¹ Lettre de Mr. Le Coq ... , f.412-3.
² Lettre de Mr. Le Coq ... , f.414-5.
³ Villars, 28 Sept. 1727, pp. 96-7; In September Townshend wrote, 'His Majesty thinks we ought to be determined as to our measures, in case the Emperor and Spain persist in their unreasonable way of acting', Townshend to William Finch, 19 Sept. (OS) 1727,PRO. 84/294, f.182. George also suggested that a date should be agreed upon by when the Prince Frederick should have been handed over, /Newcastle or Delafaye/to Horatio Walpole, — Sept. (OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187, f.53, draft; Horatio Walpole to [Tilson], 3 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 48982, f.86.
⁴ Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 4 Nov. 1727, Osnabrück, 291, f.409; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 15 Dec. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360, f.277.
British alliance. ¹ Horatio Walpole informed all and sundry that
this was the case. ² Horatio was, nevertheless, anxiously aware
that this was doubted and he feared that his brother was no
longer happy with the French alliance. On September 23rd he wrote
to him to reassure him on the point. However Horatio himself was
increasingly doubtful about the French. On September 21st he went
for a walk with Waldegrave who recorded that he 'seemed under a
good deal of uneasiness at his own situation' and that Horatio had
told Fleury that if he deceived him Horatio would probably be sent
to the Tower. The next day 'Mr. Wal. told the Cardinal that
everybody said that nothing but his answering for his Em. made
people believe him in earnest.' On the 25th Horatio showed
Waldegrave letters he had received the previous day from his
brother and from Newcastle. Newcastle's praised the conduct of
France towards Spain, but 'his brother's seemed a good deal
suspecting the worst in every point, and that Fr. Sp. and the Emp.
might have some underhand dealings to humble us'. ³

Robert Walpole's fears were shared by others. In the summer
the ministry had derided fears voiced by such varied sources as
John Bagshaw, the British Consul in Genoa, and d'Ittersum, the
Overyssel nobleman who was one of Townshend's principal informants
on Dutch affairs, of an alliance between Austria, Spain and

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¹ Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 4 Nov. 1727, Osnabrück, 291, f.409;
Villars, 12 Oct. 1727, p. 100; Visconti to Sinzendorf, 29 Sept.
1727, Vienna, Ek., 65; Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 19 Sept.
1727, ASV. LM. Ing. 97, f.37.

² Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 10, 18 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32753,
f.162, 284-5.

³ Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 23 Sept. 1727, C(H) corresp. 1481;
France. The failure of these powers to unite in support of the Pretender seemed to lend credence to the ministerial viewpoint, and the government had dismissed reports, encouraged by the Spaniards, that Spain had been responsible for the replacement of Morville by Chauvelin. However, Rottembourg's failure to settle Anglo-Spanish affairs to British satisfaction led to a revival of doubt about the French. George was very angry at the unsettled state of affairs and he vented his spleen on Broglie, who reported in December,

'Le Roy d'Angleterre est dans un estat si violent depuis l'arrivée du dernier courrier de M. de Walpole'.

George told Broglie that the delays angered him.

The Ministry were placed in a very difficult position by Rottembourg's agreement, a position made worse by the fact that the British Minister Plenipotentiary, Benjamin Keene, had signed the agreement, though 'without the least colour of order or instruction'. Waldegrave wrote of the Spaniards, 'they must think

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1 Townshend to d'Ittersum, 18 Aug. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/296, f.296; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 17, 21 Aug. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32751, f.308, PRO. 78/187, f.16; Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 6 Sept; Schleinitz to Dehn, 3 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 48982, f.75, 98; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 8 Sept. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35.

2 Waldegrave Journal, 2 Nov. 1727, Chewton; Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 4 Nov. 1727, Osnabrück, 291, f.409.


The agreement ignored the British position on the Prince Frederick.
that we should have very little reason to depend on allies, that would give way to such chimerical notions'. Had Britain refused to accept the agreement she would have risked angering the French by forcing them to choose between supporting, or breaking it. The latter course of action would have entailed the French sacrificing their new-found good relations with Spain. The former course could have led to the diplomatic isolation of Britain. If the ministry had accepted the agreement they would have faced tremendous domestic criticism and they would have found it very difficult to persuade Parliament that the French alliance was serving any purpose. The proximity of the Parliamentary session and the campaign in the opposition press attacking the French alliance made the decision more difficult.

Compounding the problem for the ministry was the fact that they were having to consider a successor to Townshend. On December 8th Waldegrave noted in his journal that Sir Robert Walpole, 'Seems under a good deal of difficulty on account of My lord Townshend's illness, which he says will be such as should he ever recover will not give him leave.

1 Waldegrave to Tilson, 4 Dec. 1727, Chewton; Le Coq to Augustus II, 23 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, Vol. 18a, f. 448-51.

2 Chavigny to Belle-Isle, French general, 6, 27 Jan. 1728, AG. A' 2643 No. 13, 40. Fleury complained about the British attitude, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 21 Feb. 1728, Chewton; Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 18 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32753, f. 284. Townshend claimed that, even should Britain yield, Spain would remain allied closely to Austria, Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 13 Dec. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 48982 f. 118; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 4 Jan. (OS) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 4, draft.

to do any business this winter, the Cabals are great about a successor or a substitute in case there should be a prospect of his recovery'.

There was no shortage of available candidates, and the names mentioned included Carteret, Chesterfield, Dodington, Stanhope and Sir Paul Methuen. Horatio Walpole does not appear to have been seriously considered as he was to be in 1729-1730 and again in 1733. Possibly this reflects the fact that Horatio was too closely identified with the French alliance, or that Sir Robert Walpole was politically on the defensive. There is very little evidence about the struggle to succeed Townshend. General George Wade, the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland was in London in November 1727. In a letter he sent to Duncan Forbes he claimed that he knew 'nothing of what passes in the Grand Monde', because he was confined to his chamber with the ague. This may be doubted, since he was then in touch with Newcastle, and visited by Stanhope, among others. He noted speculation that Methuen, Carteret, Stanhope or Horatio Walpole might succeed Townshend, but concluded that 'Methuen may have it if he pleases'. Zamboni agreed, though wrote to the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, that Townshend's successor was likely to be, 'Mr. Stanhope .... homme de merite et ami aussi du Chev. Walpole, en cas que le chevalier Methuen refuse cet employ, comme il y a toute apparence qu'il fera'.

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1 Waldegrave Journal, 8 Dec. 1727, Chewton; Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 10 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32753, f.162.
2 'Our coffee-house politicians have been laying out a secretary of state in case of Lord Townshend's death', Farley's Bristol News-Paper, 2 Dec. (OS) 1727.
4 Zamboni to Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, 16 Dec. 1727, Bodl. Rawl. 119 f.198.
Broglie reported that Methuen would succeed Townshend.\(^1\) Opinions of Methuen's ability differed. Hervey's unfavourable judgement is usually cited whenever he is discussed,\(^2\) but Broglie thought highly of him, and Methuen's experience of office was very impressive.\(^3\) He had represented British interests at Lisbon, Turin and Madrid, served as a Lord of both the Admiralty and the Treasury, and been Secretary of State for the Southern Department. In the 1720s he held household appointments, first as Comptroller and then as Treasurer, and acted as a leading Administration spokesman in the Commons.\(^4\) He would have made a good choice as Secretary but he lacked political connections and would have brought the Ministry little added weight in the Commons.

Methuen and Stanhope could probably have been relied on to support the Walpoles, though Methuen's resignation in 1729 was ostensibly on the grounds that he disapproved of general government policy.\(^5\) Carteret, Chesterfield and Dodington would have been less fortunate choices for the Ministry. Dodington had diplomatic experience, having proved an able envoy to Spain, and he had considerable governmental experience. However he was a friend of the Countess of Suffolk, and had urged Compton to supplant Walpole, turn to the Tories for support and make Dodington Secretary of State.\(^6\) Chesterfield was continually postponing his departure for

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\(^1\) Broglie to Chauvelin, 8 Dec. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360, f.273.

\(^2\) Hervey, I, 101-2.

\(^3\) Broglie to Chauvelin, 8 Dec. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360, f.273.

\(^4\) Zamboni to Manteuffel, 31 May 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f.67; Knatchbull, 24 Mar. (OS) 1726, 28 June (OS) 1727, 25 Mar. (OS) 1729, pp. 56, 72, 93; Sedgwick, II, 254.

\(^5\) Hervey, I, 101-2; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 31 May 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f.67. The History of Parliament is inaccurate in stating that he resigned in 1730, Sedgwick, II, 254.

\(^6\) Sedgwick, I, 501.
the United Provinces hoping to receive a domestic post.

Horatio Walpole was extremely concerned by the uncertainty as to Townshend's successor. He wrote to his brother in November,

'Should anything happen, the replacing of him will be of vast consequence to the management of affairs at home, as well as to the credit and influence of the Government among the foreign powers....' ¹

A month later Le Coq informed Augustus II that,

'L'arrangement dans les grands emplois; ou pour mieux dire, l'assortissement des sujets; est, ce qui donne le plus de peine à la cour. Il ne suffit pas, de trouver des sujets capables; c'est à quoy l'on fait quelque fois moins d'attention, qu'au reste. Il faut des sujets, qui assortissent avec ceux, qui sont deja en place, sans quoy elle court risque, d'être mal service'.²

This truism was of particular importance for Walpole because George showed signs that he was ready to break from the Walpolean policy of cooperation with France. As the parliamentary session approached, with no settlement in the Anglo-Spanish disputes, domestic pressure increased for naval action against Spain.³

George expressed openly his irritation at the diplomatic impasse.

¹ Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 11 Nov. 1727, Coxe, II, 544.
² Le Coq to Augustus II, 19 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a f.435. Speculation about a successor did not cease till Townshend's recovery in the spring.
It could be suggested that one of the reasons for his irritation was that Anglo-Spanish differences prevented a concentration upon German issues and the need to protect Hanover from a possible Austrian and/or Prussian attack.

The British fleet had remained in Spanish waters after the Preliminaries were signed. Reports that the Spaniards intended to mount an invasion of the British Isles in support of the Jacobite cause had led to a strengthening of the fleet in Spanish waters.¹ Admiral Norris was recalled from the Baltic and his ships used to strengthen Sir Charles Wager's squadron off Cadiz. On August 16th Townshend ordered Wager to destroy the Spanish fleet if it should sail towards Britain.² The Spaniards did not sail, and the British fleet remained in its blockading stations throughout the autumn.³ Rottembourg's initial failure to secure Spanish recognition of the British position led to domestic pressure for a war with Spain. The Spanish Indies were believed to be poorly defended and ripe for attack.⁴ Foreign diplomats reported that the British government

1 Anon draft to the Earl of Portmore, Governor of Gibraltar, 5 Aug. (OS) 1727, PRO. 36/2 f.118; Holloway, British Consul at Malaga, to Newcastle, 23 Sept., 11, 18 Nov. 1727, PRO. 94/215; Dormer, British Envoy Extraordinary in Portugal, to Vandermeer, 7 Oct., Wager to Vandermeer, 21 Oct. 1727, PRO. 94/98; L'Hermitage to the States General, 31 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 17677 kkk9 f.423; Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, 13 Sept. 1727, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 534 f.34; Baudrillart, III, 347, 350; Goslinga, p.167.

2 Townshend to Wager, 5 Aug. (OS) 1727. Similarly aggressive orders were sent by Newcastle to Wager, 12, 18 July (OS), 12 Sept. (OS) 1727, PRO. 42/78 f.101-2, 95, 98, 104-6.

3 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 25 Nov. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32753 f.125. Wager was ordered to seize the Spanish treasure ships, Newcastle to Wager, 18 Nov. (OS), 25 Dec. '1727, PRO. 42/78 f.133, 154. Newcastle feared that the arrival of these ships would make the Spaniards 'more insolent', Newcastle to Finch, 28 Nov. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/294 f.308.

4 Newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 4 Nov. 1727, Osnabrück, 291 f.409; Villars, 16 Nov. 1727, p.106; Le Coq to Augustus II, 26 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a f.462; Le Coq to DeBrosse, 13 Jan. 1728, Dresden, 663 f.152. The French feared that the British would attack the Indies, Horatio to Robert Walpole, 11 Nov. 1727, C(H) corresp. 1489; Fleury to Charles VI, 18 Sept. 1727, Vienna, Frankreich, Varia, 11 f.33.
was ready to fight Spain. Townshend informed Du Bourgay that 'we shall never submit to any terms, but what shall be entirely for the honour and interest of the nation'. Jacquemin, the Lorraine envoy at Vienna noted, 'on soupconne toujours que l'Angleterre veut absolument la guerre'.

War was considered, though there is little information available as to who supported and who opposed this option. Marquis Saramuccia Visconti, an Austrian diplomat in London without character, was in correspondence with Sinzendorf. Judging by his letters he was a very well-informed source. He was aware that one of the major reasons for the large subsidy paid to Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel was the need to gain its copy of George I's will. The British government thought him sufficiently important to order the interception of his mail. He was in close touch with many of the foreign diplomats in London and with several members of the British government, being received by Townshend on February 1st. On January 13th 1728 he informed Sinzendorf,

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1 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 5 Jan. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Townshend to Du Bourgay, 17 Jan. 1728, PRO. 90/24; Jacquemin to Duke Lepold, 14 Feb. 1728, Nancy, 139, No. 122. Fiorelli reported the possibility of a British naval bombardment of Spanish ports, Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 23 Jan 1728, ASV. LM. Ing. 97 f.106.

2 In early January, in order to facilitate possible naval action, Newcastle ordered Wager to get the British merchants to withdraw their ships from Spanish ports, Newcastle to Wager, 25 Dec. (OS) 1727, PRO. 42/78 f.154. D'Aix reported that George II wanted war with Spain, Marini, p.95. Townshend informed Finch that "His Majesty must, and will, sooner enter into a war... than suffer his own Honour and Royal Dignity, and the Interests of his own people to be treated in so ignominious a manner", Townshend to Finch, 12 Dec. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/294 f.332.

3 Townshend to the Postmasters General, 18 July (OS) 1727, PRO. 36/2 f.46.

4 Zamboni to Manteuffel, 6 July 1728, Bodl. Rawl. 120, f.19.
It was probably on the basis of this report that Count Berkentin, the well-informed Danish envoy in Vienna, noted that the Austrians had been informed from London that 'la pluspart des ministres, et surtout le Duc de Argile pour complaire au Roy, avoient, presque tous generalement opiné pour une guerre'. There is little evidence to support this account in the British sources. Lord King recorded a ministerial meeting on January 13th to discuss Rottembourg's new instructions, but there is no mention in his account either of Gibraltar or of Argyle's presence. In his account of the Cabinet held at Lord Townshend's on January 31st he

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1 Visconti to Sinzendorf, Vienna, EK, 65.
2 Ferdinand Albrecht noted, 'l'envoye de Dannemarck qui prend soin en secret aussi des affaires d'Hannovre ...', Ferdinand Albrecht to his mother-in-law, 3 Ap. 1728, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22 529 f.132; Carrard, St. Saphorin's secretary, in charge of British affairs in Vienna during St. Saphorin's absence, to Townshend, 5 Sept. 1725, PRO. 80/56, f.22; St. Saphorin to Townshend, 26 Aug. (OS) 1727, PRO. 80/61.
3 Berkentin to —, 17 Mar. 1728, PRO. 80/326.
notes Argyll's presence and a discussion whether the British possession of Gibraltar could be discussed at the Congress, but he gives no details of the views of individual ministers.¹ He recorded the presence of thirteen ministers, some of whom — Scarborough, Wilmington and Dorset — were not noted for their support of Walpole. Argyll, who had replaced Cadogan, as the Master General of the Ordnance, had close links with George II, due to their shared political views.² Visconti's account may have been correct, but, even if he was in error, it was true that Walpole's policy was in difficulties. Parliament had to be prorogued until the international situation became clearer, and it was widely believed that Walpole's success in the Parliament would depend upon this situation. Duncan Forbes, then in London, informed his brother, 'Whether we shall in the ensuing Parliament have any heats will probably depend upon the state of foreign affairs'.³

The British Ministry urged the French to support their case with Spain, arguing that if they failed to do so the Ministry might fall and the Anglo-French alliance be destroyed.⁴ Urgency was lent

¹ King, pp. 54-5.
² Dickinson, Walpole pp. 52-3. It was believed that Argyll had first persuaded George to indulge in extra-marital affairs, Wodrow, Analecta III p. 459.
to this pressure by the proximity of the session. Horatio Walpole pressed Fleury to force the Pope to expel the Pretender from Avignon, to produce a declaration that France would stand by Britain, and to order Rottembourg to present Spain with an ultimatum. Fleury was told that this was 'the only means to stop the mouths of the malintentiones en Angle'. Fleury was persuaded to send fresh instructions to Rottembourg on December 19th 1727 ordering him to insist on the implementation of the Preliminaries without any conditions. The British attempted to persuade the French and the Dutch that in case Spain refused to comply, their envoys should immediately leave Spain, a move that would have been regarded as a prelude to war. Britain's allies refused to accept this proposal, and Horatio Walpole was very concerned about the support he could expect from them. The Pretender was expelled from Avignon thanks to French pressure. Waldegrave noted in his


3 King, 2 Jan. (OS) 1728, pp.54-5; De Böy to Flemming, 16 Jan. 1728, Dresden, 3105, 2 f.8; Villars, pp.111-2; Goslinga, pp.192-3, 196; Wilson, p.189.


6 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 27 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32758 f.466.
journal on December 9th 'tho' the Card. did not directly say that France must declare war, yet he satisfied Mr. Wal. that he was sincere in his design of acting vigorously'. However, Horatio feared that when it came to the crunch Britain would be isolated and the French alliance discredited.

Fortunately for the British, French hostility towards Spain was increased by the high *indulento* or duty imposed in 1727 on the cargo of the Spanish *flotilla*, in which French merchants had a major interest. Waldegrave argued that it was this that persuaded Fleury to discard his policy of moderation. Furthermore on January 13th 1728 Elizabeth Farnese accepted a project largely in accordance with the British interpretation of the Preliminaries. She was discouraged by lack of Austrian support and by continued French backing for the British, but she was chiefly affected by the chronic ill-health of her husband whose death appeared imminent.

The Dutch and the French approved the new project, details of which reached London on the evening of January 30th. The Cabinet considered the project next day and approved it having concluded that it did not allow Spain to raise her pretensions to Gibraltar at the Congress. With a minor addition, designed to ensure that the engagements between Britain and Spain were made reciprocal, the

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2 De Bény to Flemming, 16 Jan. 1728, Dresden, 3105, 2 f.9.
3 De Bény to Flemming, 16, 26 Jan., 9, 15 Feb. 1728, Dresden 3105 f.10, 14, 17, 19; Königsegg to Pentenriedter, 4 Mar. 1728, Vienna, Frankreich, Varia, 12; Villars, p.120; Armstrong, p.221.
4 Baudrillart, III, 385-99; Goslinga, p.204.
project returned to Paris and the Hague where the British amendment was accepted.\(^1\)

After delays, largely caused by Britain's unintentional failure to provide Keene with the correct credentials,\(^2\) and some anxiety as to whether the agreement would in fact be settled,\(^3\) the project, later known as the Convention of the Pardo, was signed in Spain on March 6th. Spain promised to raise immediately the blockade of Gibraltar, deliver up the *Prince Frederick* and its cargo to the South Sea Company, and restore the *indulto* to its usual rate. Britain agreed to withdraw its fleet from Spanish and Spanish-American waters and accepted that the Congress could discuss 'all the respective pretensions on each side', including 'the contraband trade and other causes of complaint which the Spaniards might have in relation to the ship *Prince Frederick*'. Both powers promised to abide by the decisions of the Congress.\(^4\)

The news that Spain had largely accepted the British position was received in London with delight. The government press hailed it as a triumph for British diplomacy, for the willingness to prefer negotiations to force, and for the French alliance.\(^5\)

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1 King, Jan. 1728, pp.55-6; Goslinga, p.206; Townshend to Finch, 21 Jan (OS) 1728, PRO. 84/299 f.49.
3 William Finch to Townshend, 10 Feb. 1728, PRO. 84/299 f.92.
4 There is a text and an English translation of the Convention in PRO. 103/110. Königsegg to Pentenriedter, 7 Mar. 1728, Vienna, Frankreich, Varia, 12.
5 Daily Journal, 28 Mar. (OS) 1728; Ipswich Mercury, 10 Feb. (OS) 1728. The stocks rose, Whitehall Evening Post, 9 Mar. (OS) 1728. Königsegg argued that the Convention was largely the result of Fleury's hard work, Königsegg to Pentenriedter, 7 Mar. 1728, Vienna, Frankreich, Varia, 12.
CHAPTER FOUR

EARLY 1728

THE SESSION OF 1728; ABORTIVE APPROACHES TO AUSTRIA

The Parliamentary session of 1728 had been preceded by a major pamphlet and press war. The attack upon the government had been concentrated on its foreign policy and on the failure of the Anglo-French alliance to secure British interests. The news of Spain agreeing to most of the British demands destroyed the opposition case. George II was able to tell Parliament on February 7th that he had received from France and the United Provinces 'the greatest proofs of their sincerity, and a renewal of the strongest assurances imaginable, that they would effectually make good all their engagements,' and that 'a general pacification' was at hand. The Lords' Address was a lengthy defence of ministerial foreign policy. It argued for 'the absolute necessity of supporting your allies' and stated that 'the late disagreeable situation of affairs' could not have been prevented by 'human prudence', an answer to opposition arguments that the government had been responsible for the diplomatic imbroglio Britain had been trapped in. George II's martial instincts were acknowledged and the Walpolean view that negotiation was preferable to war stated in the Address,

1. Hervey to Stephen Fox, 9 Jan. (os) 1728, Ilchester p. 27; The Leeds Mercury, 30 Jan. (os) 1728, referred to a 'paper war.'

2. Newcastle to Waldegrave, 29 Jan. (os) 1728, BL.Add. 32754, f. 186-9; Hervey, I, 75; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 9 Feb. 1728, AST.LM.Ing. 35; Carlisle, p. 53.
which referred to the 'noble self-denial of all the success and glory that might attend your Majesty's arms in the prosecution of a just and necessary war, when put in balance with the ease, quiet, and prosperity of your subjects. It is a disposition of mind truly great in your Majesty....to choose rather to procure peace for your subjects, than to lead them to victories.'

The debates on the Address were a triumph for the government. This was attributed to the new diplomatic situation. Newcastle informed Waldegrave that 'the good news you have sent us, has made the opening of our Parliament very successful.' The rest of the session went very well for the Ministry. Much time was spent on petitions arising from the recent elections. These served to increase the governmental strength in the Commons. The Lords were very quiet and in the Commons the government enjoyed large majorities. In the

1. House of Lords' Journals 23, pp. 167-8; House of Commons' Journals 21, p. 30. Townshend wrote that the Lords' Address 'is conceived in stronger and more zealous terms than any that has been ever made to His Maty.'s predecessors', Townshend to Finch, 30 Jan. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/299 f. 76.

2. Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 20 Feb. 1728, ASV.LM.Ing. 97, f. 121.


5. Delafaye to Waldegrave, 29 Jan. (os) 1728, Chewton; Newcastle to the Earl of Carlisle, 10 Feb. (os) 1728, Carlisle, p. 54.
debate over the subsidies for the Hessians the majority was 280 to 86, and in the army estimates debate 290 to 86.¹

Townshend informed Sir Cyril Wich that 'the grand affairs of session have been dispatched in less time that ever was known in any Parliament, and with a greater majority than was ever remembered in any reign.'²

Ministerial foreign policy was fully debated. Horatio Walpole spoke at length in defence of the French alliance. According to the newsletter sent to Ernst-August, he convinced most M.P.s that it was a sound policy.³ The opposition 'let themselves into the whole state of publick affairs from north to south,' but their attacks had little success. The debates simply served to convince foreign diplomats that the government was in control. The French were impressed by the ministerial successes, as were the Austrians and the Spaniards. D'Aix noted that 'le Parlement est de deux, et souvent de trois contre un,' and Visconti informed Sinzendorf that the degree of harmony between government and Parliament was unprecedented.⁴

The government argued that, despite the forthcoming Congress, it was necessary to remain prepared for war. The royal speech referred to the need to continue British military

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1. Tilson to Waldegrave, 15 Feb. (os) 1728, Chewton; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 23 Feb., 12 Ap. 1728, AE.CP.Ang. 362, f. 111, 169; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 19 Feb, (os) 1728, Chewton. Colley has argued that many Tory MPs were absent, Colley, Defiance p. 209.


4. Waldegrave to Townshend, 26 June 1728, PRO.80/61, f. 13; Keene to Newcastle, 22 Mar. 1728, RL.Add. 32754, f. 471; Broglie to
preparations and the Lords Address spoke of the possibility of having to fight. Both in Britain and in Europe opinions were divided as to whether the forthcoming Congress at Soissons would bring peace. The royal speech proroguing Parliament predicted a successful Congress and Sinzendorf declared that it would only last five weeks, but other more pessimistic notes were sounded. Fears were expressed that Spain or Austria might delay the Congress and refuse to be conciliatory. The British opposition claimed that Britain would be duped and Bolingbroke's wife stated that the Congress would meet to judge Britain. The British government were concerned about the possibility of the disintegration of the Hanover alliance. Horatio Walpole attempted to persuade Fleury that the Hanover allies should settle their claims among themselves and agree to stand by them at the Congress. He also argued that their envoys at the Congress should be given common instructions.

4. cont. Chauvelin, 26 Feb., 15 Mar. 1728, AE.CP.Ang. 362; Chauvelin to Chammorel, 4 Mar. 1728, AE.CP.Ang. sup. 8., f. 33; Visconti to Sinzendorf, 5 Mar. 1728, Vienna, EK., Kart 65; Le Coq to DeBrosse, 2, 9, 16, 23 Mar. 1728, Dresden, 663, 2, f. 165, 167, 169, 171; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 15 Mar. 1727, AST.LM.Ing. 35. The Dutch were also impressed, Finch to Townshend, 29 Mar. 1728, to Tilson, 2 Mar. 1728, PRO.84/299, f. 114, 122, 116.

1. Robinson to Waldegrave, 14 June 1728, Chewton; Le Coq to DeBrosse, 9 Mar. 1728, Dresden, 663, 2, f. 168; Waldegrave to Delafaye, 13 Feb. 1728, PRO.78/188 f. 33.

2. Fonseca to Eugene, 14 June 1728, Vienna, GK.85a.

'I thought it might not be amiss, if some plan was drawn up in writing by way of instructions to our respective Plenipotentiaries, founded upon the Preliminary articles, to be a sort of a general rule and guidance to them.'

Fleury agreed that the union produced by the Treaty of Hanover should continue and that the Preliminaries of Paris should serve as the basis for the actions of the Hanover allies, but he refused to accept the idea of common written instructions arguing that it would be impossible to keep them secret.¹

Behind this dispute lay British fears that Fleury would settle with the Austrians.²

By temporarily shelving the differences between the major powers the Convention of the Pardo had a kaleidoscopic effect. It freed the powers from some of their most pressing engagements and created opportunities for major realignments. This created a difficult situation for the British ministry at a time when they were still unsure about their relations with George II.³

Ministerial strife had persisted during the winter of 1727-8, fuelled by speculation that Walpole would fall over his foreign policy.⁴ The ministers opposed to Walpole seem

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to have considered that Britain should break with France and turn to Austria, though there is very little definite information about their views. In February Visconti informed Sinzendorf that he had been told by a very well informed source, whom he did not name, that a court cabal existed determined to ruin Walpole 'dans l'esprit du Roy.' According to this account the Walpoles had fabricated evidence that Compton, Berkeley and Pulteney were in correspondence with the Austrians and had urged them to refuse British demands. One of the three was supposed to have informed George of the Walpolean fabrications, and he, livid, had determined to dismiss Walpole at the end of the session. On January 24th O'Rourke sent James III a variation of the story, '...without being entirely sure, there is this good while a private correspondence betwixt some ministers here and the new vying faction in Engd. wch. actually aims at the ministry, I have had some imperfect glimpses of Pultney and Compton's being mentioned and I doe not doubt but this court backs with all

1. The previous April St. Saphorin had claimed that the Austrians wished.... embarrassant le Ministere de la Grand Bretagne, et de les perdre dans l'esperance qu'un autre entrerait après cela dans toutes les vues de l'Empereur contre la France', St. Saphorin to Townshend, 22 Ap. 1727, PRO.80/61.

2. Visconti to Sinzendorf, 3, 10 Feb. 1728, Vienna, EK., Kart 65.
their industry any such change.'

There are no signs of any letters from Wilmington, Berkeley or Pulteney in the Viennese archives and the suggestions mentioned by Visconti and O'Rourke are probably inaccurate, but it is clear that there was still much tension in the ministry, particularly between Wilmington and Walpole. George's independent habits were a major difficulty, particularly to Townshend; according to D'Aix,

'Ce susd. Milord qui a gouverné jusqu' ici absolument ne pouvant s'accoûter à partager l'autorite, à suivre les projets qu'il n'a pas fait, et à voir le Roy d'Angleterre partager sa confiance, et agir par lui même.'

There is no evidence to support D'Aix's claim that Townshend told George he would retire at the end of the Congress, but there are other suggestions of tension over George's attitudes. The newsletter sent to Ernst-August reported on March 12th that the Queen proposed accompanying her husband to Hanover on his projected trip that summer and that this worried Walpole,

'que ses envieux et ses vivaux, ne profitent de son eloignement de l'oreille du maître pour ébranler son credit, auquel ses enemis tachent tous les jours de

1. O'Rourke to James III, 24 Jan. 1728, Vienna, England, Varia. 8. The previous summer, Charles Caesar had written, 'I have reason to believe that the Empr.s measures in regard to England have been very much informed for some time by Mr. Pultney,' Caesar to James III, 29 June 1727, RA.107/141. Dr. Steinbauer has searched the Viennese archives, without success, for signs of a correspondence between Pulteney and the Austrian government. I would like to thank Dr. Steinbauer for discussing the issue with me.

donner quelque nouvelle atteinte: Et ses inquietudes sont d'autant plus grandes, que la santé mal-assurée du Vicomte de Townshend ... ne lui permet pas d'encourager le Roy.'1

George and his ministers clashed over the instructions for the British Plenipotentiaries at Soissons. George was determined that no marriage should take place between Don Carlos and any daughter of Charles VI. He was convinced that such an event would be a major threat to the balance of power, and a challenge to the position of the major German princes.² The British ministry felt that it was unlikely to take place anyway, and that it was impractical to raise the matter at the Congress as Austria would resent the discussion of such a sensitive dynastic matter. Furthermore they, and Fleury, hoped that by seeming to acquiesce in the marriage they would win Spanish support and embarrass the Austrians forcing them to publicly oppose the marriage, and thus endanger Spanish support, or approve of it, and anger those German powers, such as Saxony, Prussia and Bavaria, who had already made clear their opposition to the match.³ According to D'Aix, Townshend had persuaded

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1. Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 12 Mar. 1728, Osnabrück, No. 295, f. 164. This is supported by Le Coq to deBrosse, 23 Mar. 1728, Dresden, 663, 2, f. 171; Fiorelli to Doge of Venice, 16 Apr. 1728, ASV. LM. Ing. 97, f.150.

2. These arguments had also been advanced the previous summer by Horatio Walpole. He had urged the necessity of discussing the Austrian succession at the Congress, Horatio Walpole, 'considerations qui peuvent servir a donner quelque idee des Mesures prealables que les Allies devroient concerter entre eux pour regler leur conduite au Congres...', PRO.84/294, f. 131-3.

3. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 14 Aug. (os) 1727, 23 June (os) 1728, BL.Add. 3275 f. 291; Bradfer-Lawrence; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 26 Mar. (os), Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 24 Ap. 1728, BL.Add. 32755 f. 124-5, 291; Chesterfield to Townshend,
George that no other power would support Britain in attempting to block the marriage, but that by an unnamed 'autre voie', George had been informed that Townshend was lying. ¹ Sardinia, fearful of the establishment of Don Carlos in Italy, was opposed to the marriage, and D'Aix was unsympathetic to Townshend. He hinted that George had given Stanhope secret instructions, and reported that on the eve of the Plenipotentiaries' departure,

'Le Roy d'Angleterre en l'absence de ses ministres leur a changé plusieurs choses dans leurs instructions, et entre autres l'article qui concerne les mariages, aux quels il ne veut en aucune façon conniver, ni faire semblant de conniver. Il a donné sa confiance particulière au Colonel Stanhopp, et a fait le même changement dans les instructions de Milord Chesterfils.'²

3. continued. 25 June, 6 July 1728, PRO.84/300 f. 275-6, 84/301 f. 20. The Dutch expressed support for this idea, Finch to Townshend, 13 Ap. 1728, PRO.84/299 f. 175.

1. The 'autre voie' was St. Saphorin, Marini, p. 106. The British ministry had been willing to insinuate to Elisabeth Farnese that the marriage of Carlos and an archduchess would be supported, 'under proper regulations for preserving the Balance of Europe', (Newcastle) to Horatio Walpole, - Ap. (os) 1728, PRO.78/189 f. 130.

2. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 9 May 1728, AST.LM.Ing. 35; Marini, p. 105. The Plenipotentiaries were Horatio Walpole, Stanhope and Poyntz.
Saxon sources suggest that Stanhope received secret instructions when he left London and, according to Le Coq, Stanhope informed him that Townshend knew nothing of the matter.¹ Owing to the few drafts that have been preserved in the British State Papers Foreign Series it is usually impossible to check statements, such as D'Aix's, that instructions have been altered.² However, there is among the Townshend papers a letter from George to Townshend which confirms that George was in favour of blocking the prospect of an Austro-Spanish marriage.

'You will have seen by Lord Chesterfield's letter, that the pensionary reasons in the same way, as I allwais did, both in relation to the provisional treaty, as of the fear he is in of the princes of the empire submitting to the match, in case we should not shew all sort of vigour in opposing it. I think, mylord, you should tell him more strongly, that it is my opinion, and as you conclude this letter, desire his sentiment how to bring those princes into our measures, and how to make everybody concern'd in this affair act with the spirit they ought to do.'³

George's tone is unmistakable. The impasse in the European diplomatic situation had to be ended. Furthermore, the letter confirms his concern about the attitude of the German princes.

¹ Instructions for Count Hoym, Saxon representative at Soissons, 30 June, Le Coq to Augustus II, 11 Aug. 1728, Dresden, 2733 f. 27, 58.

² In the volumes of drafts preserved in the PRO, there are no drafts of these instructions, PRO.109/7 and 8.

³ George to Townshend, no date, reply to Townshend to George of 2 July (os) 1728, Coxe, II, 521.
Anxiety over the German situation had increased early in 1728 with reports of an improvement in relations between Saxony and Prussia. The British informed Le Coq that they were pleased with this development, but in fact they were extremely concerned. Frederick William's visit to Dresden was followed with great attention. Concern increased when suggestions that the Prusso-Saxon reconciliation had been viewed with disfavour by the Austrians were replaced by a growing conviction that Austria was behind the reconciliation. Suggestions were made that a marriage between Maria Theresa and the Crown Prince of Saxony was being negotiated or that the Austrians were supporting a Saxon scheme to make the crown of Poland hereditary, and that Prussian compliance was to be


2. Le Coq to DeBrosse, 27 Jan. 1728, Dresden, 663, 2, f. 156; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 14 June 1728, AST.LM.Ing. 35.


4. Du Bourgay to Townshend, 9 Mar. 1728, PRO.90/23. It had been suggested that Augustus and Frederick William were negotiating a partition of Bohemia, Geffroy, French Consul at Hamburg, to Maurepas, 16 Mar. 1728, AN.AM.B7.294.

5. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 3 Nov. 1727, AST.LM.Ing.35.
obtained by the cession of Elbing and the bishopric of Varmia.¹ The French Consul at Hamburg, Geffroy, noted that it was generally held that Augustus II was to abdicate and be succeeded in Poland by his son, whilst Prussia was to receive Polish Prussia.² The Dresden archives are not very helpful about the state of Prusso-Saxon relations in this period, as the key arrangements were made in discussions between the two monarchs. Du Bourgay noted that most of the Prussian ministers were not consulted about the talks at Dresden.³

The British government was assured that the agreement signed between Prussia and Saxony was only defensive.⁴ However they feared that though its intentions might be directed towards Poland and the settlement of conflicting Saxon and Prussian claims over Jülich-Berg, it would nevertheless have a wider

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1. Du Bourgay to Townshend, 28 Feb., 2, 6, Mar. 1728, PRO.90/23; Berkentin to -, 7 Ap. 1728, PRO.100/5; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus II, 7, 21 Ap. 1728, AST.LM.Aut. 58; Jacquemin to Duke Leopold, 11 Ap. 1728, Nancy, 139, No. 138; Chauvelin to Russy, French Chargé d'affaires in Vienna, 17 May 1728, Recueil, Autriche edited by A. Sorel (Paris, 1884) pp. 240-1; Chesterfield to Townshend, 20 June 1728, PRO.84/301, f. 93; Waldegrave to Du Bourgay, 26 June 1728, Chewton.


3. Du Bourgay to Townshend, 7 Feb. 1728, PRO.90/23.

impact. In January the British had rejected Prussian suggestions of a reconciliation, Townshend informing Du Bourgay that 'the proceedings of your Court are such, that there can be no certain and solid judgement made of them, and consequently H.M. can have no positive orders to send you upon the various and fluctuating state of matters where you are.' This view was not an unreasonable one born simply of George II's malice. It was a widely held view that Frederick William was capricious and unreliable. However much they may have been correct, this British response, combined with the Prusso-Saxon reconciliation, made the German situation more serious. Fearful of an attack upon Hanover, George resorted to an attempt to develop his German alliance system and to French aid. Major efforts were made to secure the support of Württemberg. Pressure brought to bear upon


2. Townshend to Du Bourgay, 30 Jan. (os) 1728, PRO.90/23.


4. There was concern about possible Austrian troop movements towards Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Townshend to Diemar, 14 Mar. 1728, Marburg, 195.

5. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 25 Dec. (os) 1727, BL.Add. 32753 f. 533-4; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus, 21 Jan. 1728, AST.LM.Ant. 58; (Delafaye or Newcastle) to Horatio Walpole, 3 Oct., 2 Nov. 1727, PRO.78/187 f. 70-1, 93.
France succeeded in persuading the French to threaten Prussia. Chambrier, the Prussian envoy in Paris, informed Frederick William that Fleury had told him that if Prussia used violence against the Hanoverians in Mecklenburg France would support them 'to the utmost.' Dehn had pressed George to enter into the treaty of amity and union concluded in July 1727 between Württemberg and Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. George supported the idea and believed that it could serve as the basis for an association of 'a considerable number of princes in the Empire to defend and support the rights and immunitys of the whole Germanick Body against any usurpations or encroachments on the part of his Imperial Majesty.' It could also serve to protect Hanover though George was less keen to advance this point as the major rationale for the alliance. Horatio Walpole was instructed to suggest to Fleury that it would be best if George entered the treaty as Elector of Hanover, rather than as King, as this would reduce the danger of the Austrians discrediting it as an alliance with foreign powers. George suggested that a convention should be signed between him and Louis XV, in which the French should desire George to accede as Elector to the treaty and should undertake to provide help if trouble arose on account of the new treaty, 'as if it had been in pursuance of

1. Du Bourgay to Townshend, 15 Jan. 1728, PRO.90/24. The best accounts of Hanoverian-Prussian quarrels over Mecklenburg can be found in Hughes, and Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich. George was concerned about the Austrian sequestration of the county of Hadeln to which Hanover had a claim, Townshend to Waldegrave, 26 Oct. (os) 1727, enclosing 'Remarques sur le Pais d'Hadeln', PRO.78/187 f. 87-9.
the Treaty concluded at Hanover.  

George's personal diplomatic strategy was therefore well defined by the Spring of 1728. It centred on German problems and advocated a German solution, a league of German princes, supported, in the last resort, by French military aid. Le Coq had reported in December 1727 that Britain felt that the prospect of a French war would dissuade Austria from any attack upon Hanover. The same hope lay behind George's policy in 1728 and, for George, it was the essential purpose of the Anglo-French alliance. By maintaining this alliance George was secure whatever became of his diplomatic initiatives in Germany, and this alliance in turn made these initiatives more hopeful.

The instructions George sent to his Plenipotentiaries at Soissons, where he was represented at the Congress table only as King, not as Elector, were in accord with this strategy. By opposing the idea of a marriage between an archduchess and Carlos, and by demanding that the issue be raised in order to be publicly rejected, George hoped to establish his credentials as the great power both most willing and best placed to represent

1. Private instructions for Horatio Walpole, 10 Mar. (os) 1728, BL. Add. 48982, f. 125-8; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 13 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32765, f. 272-5.

2. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 16 Ap., 13 June (os) 1728. BL. Add. 32755, f. 304, 32756, f. 275; George II to Townshend, no date, BL. Add. 38507 f. 232. Newcastle noted in February, 'His Majesty thinks that great attention should be had to the affairs of the North,' Newcastle to Waldegrave, 27 Feb. (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32754, f. 372; Townshend to Diemar, 5 July 1728, PRO. 100/15.

3. Le Coq to Augustus, 26 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 18a, f. 463.
the interests of the German princes. ¹ He would then be able to negotiate from strength both in German disputes and with the great powers. In particular his freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre would be increased as France would not be able to treat him as a junior power, and as he would be able to force Austria into accepting his pretensions and reaching an agreement with him.

Hints of a latter development were strong in the first half of 1728. O'Rourke's suggestion that the Austrians were keen on better relations with Britain was substantiated to some extent by approaches made in March to Horatio Walpole by the Imperial representative at Paris, Pentenriedter. ² Pentenriedter told Walpole that the Emperor wanted good relations, that Austrian conduct had been misrepresented by St. Saphorin and that it was Spain that prevented the conclusion of a firm peace. Walpole was unimpressed. He told Pentenriedter

1. Newcastle to the British Plenipotentiaries, 14 June (os) 1728, Rl.Add. 32756, f. 286, 289. George was particularly concerned about the fate of the German Protestants, Townshend to Chesterfield, 14 May(os) 1728 PRO. 84/300, f. 73-4.

2. O'Rourke to James III, 24 Jan., 28 Feb. 1728, Vienna, England, Varia. 8; Waldegrave was convinced that Pentenriedter was attempting to split the Anglo-French alliance, Waldegrave to Townshend, 11 Jan. 1728, Chewton. Ferdinand-Albrecht of Brunswick-Bevern, then in Vienna, denied reports of an impending Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, Ferdinand-Albrecht to Ludwig Rudolf, of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, 6, 10 Mar. 1728, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt. 22, Nr. 529, f. 93, 103.
that the Austrians were responsible for Spanish policy and informed Fleury that Pentenriedter despite his general assurances was still intransigent when it came to detailed discussions. Walpole also reported to Newcastle that Pentenriedter's approaches were not restricted to the British. The Austrian diplomat had sought to win over the Dutch and the French. Walpole clearly hoped that by telling Fleury about the approaches, he would encourage him to remain firm to British interests, and would discredit the Austrian approaches to France.

The Sardinian ambassador in Vienna, Marquis Giuseppe Solaro di Breglio, reported in February, 'malgré l'animosite qu'on a contre les Anglois a mesure de la crainte des changemens de l'Espagne on souhaite de se rapprocher avec l'Angleterre, et le Comte de Sinzendorf n'a pas pu se defendre d'avoiter qu'il le desire ardemment.' It was suggested that Horatio Walpole would be sent to Vienna to manage a reconciliation and that the Austrians would support George II over his demand to receive the formal investiture of Bremen and Verden. Waldegrave was ordered to set out for Vienna, and it was widely believed that he had been instructed to arrange an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation.

1. Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 20, 23 Mar. 1728, BL.Add. 32754 f. 459-60, 480. Chambrier reported that Pentenriedter had suggested an alliance of Austria, Spain and France, Chambrier to Frederick William I, 12 Mar. 1728, AE.CP.Prusse, 88. George II suspected that this was the purpose of his mission, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, - Dec. (os) 1727, PRO.78/187 f. 179.


He arrived in Vienna at the beginning of May and made a conspicuous impact as a popular social figure. O'Rourke wrote slightingly,

'Waldegrave is looked upon here as a mild polite man, of noe great reach, and therefore for their purpose.'

Others were more complimentary. Count Tarouca, the Portuguese Ambassador in Vienna, informed Townshend that Waldegrave's good qualities had won him universal esteem, and his skill at cards soon commended him to Eugene, a noted card-player. The Austrians told Waldegrave that they were in favour of an improvement in relations. Eugene told him of 'his sincere desire to see a perfect reconciliation with England,' and the leader of the Spanish interest at the Court of Vienna, the Marquis Ramon de Rialp, Secretary of Charles VI's Spanish Council, blamed bad relations on St. Saphorin and said that he would be delighted to see good relations restored. The


1. O'Rourke to James III, 8 May 1728. His opinion improved after he met him, O'Rourke to James III, 17 June 1728. Vienna, England, Varia. 8.

2. Plettenberg's brother, Christian von Plettenberg, representative of the Elector of Cologne at the Diet to Plettenberg, 22 Ap. (not Aug. as endorsed) Münster, NB104, f. 38; Tarouca to Townshend, 14 May 1728, PRO.80/326; Wackerbarth, Saxon envoy in Vienna, to Manteuffel, 19 May 1728, Dresden, 3331, f. 21-3; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 26 Feb. (os) 1728, Chewton. Waldegrave claimed that 'play (was)...as necessary here for a minister as writing,' Waldegrave to Townshend 24 July 1728, Chewton.

3. Waldegrave to Townshend, 7 May 1728, PRO.80/62. D'Aix reported that Waldegrave was on good terms with Eugene, but not Sinzendorf
Emperor bowed to Waldegrave as he was about to mount his horse 'a mark of great distinction I am told.'

Zamboni reported from London that

'les ministres paroissent être fort contents de l'accueil qu'on a fait à Vienne au nouvel ambassadeur Mylord Waldgrave, qui avoit deja commence à conferer sur les affaires dont il a été chargé: ils sont aussi persuadés de la necessité qu'il ya de remettre les choses sur l'ancien pied, et de retablir la bonne intelligence entre les deux cours. Mylord Townshend en dernier lieu s'est explique même assez sincerement là dessus avec une personne qui traite ici sous main les affaires de S.M. I et l'on commence à regarder de mauvais oeil le pouvoir de la France qui devient tous les jours plus arbitraire et despotique.'

Zamboni was almost certainly referring to Visconti as the secret Austrian agent and it was probably from him that he derived his information. Zamboni's report might appear to be an exaggeration.


2. Zamboni to Manteuffel, 21 May 1728. Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 11-12. The French were concerned about reports that Austria was seeking to improve relations with Britain, Chauvelin to Chammorel, 8 July 1728, AE.CP.Ang., sup. 8, f. 40.
of whatever interest the British government was showing in an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, but it is partially substantiated by material in the Saxon archives. In the spring of 1728 Le Coq left London and travelled to Dresden to inform Augustus II personally of diplomatic approaches he had received from George II. There is no account of his audiences with Augustus and the evidence for this episode is the instructions drawn up by Augustus for the representatives he sent to the Congress of Soissons, Le Coq and Count Hoym, the Saxon representative in Paris. The instructions, drawn up at the end of June, referred to British requests made via Le Coq for Saxon help in settling Anglo-Austrian differences. The British had expressed a willingness to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction and an interest in reviving the old Anglo-Austrian diplomatic alignment. They had asked the Saxons to approach Sinzendorf only and to act in concert with Stanhope, 'a qui seul S.M. Brit. en a confié le secret.' In addition, according to the instructions, the British had suggested an Anglo-Saxon alliance.¹

From Le Coq's subsequent reports from France it is clear that St. Saphorin had been responsible for handling the London

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¹ Instructions for Le Coq and Hoym, 24, 30 June 1728, Dresden, 2733, f. 7-18, 27. D'Aix noted that Stanhope, 'étoit entièrement dans les Principes du General St. Saphorin,' and that George II was very favourable to him, Marini p. 109, D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 21 Ap. 1728, AST.LM.Ing. 35; Newcastle to Stanhope, 3 June (os) 1728, Coxe, II, 629; Broglie to Chauvelin, 26 Aug. 1728 AE.CP.363 f. 117-18. Sinzendorf was the First Austrian Plenipotentiary at Soissons.
discussions about the possibility of a Saxon mediation of Anglo-Austrian differences. Le Coq reported that it was St. Saphorin's idea that only Sinzendorf should be approached, and that Stanhope had told him that he had received instructions from George II to cooperate with the Saxons on this approach and that Townshend knew nothing of these secret instructions.  

It is difficult to obtain evidence to support this account. St. Saphorin's papers survive, but are in private hands and inaccessible. The present whereabouts of Stanhope's papers are a mystery, though they certainly survived until at least the end of the eighteenth century, when Coxe printed some of them. Whereas the Anglo-Austrian talks conducted through Waldegrave attracted a lot of contemporary attention and gave rise to much rumour, there are no signs that the projected Saxon mediation attracted any attention. This can possibly be accounted for by the precautions taken to ensure the secrecy of the project. According to the instructions for Le Coq and Hoym George II had insisted that nothing should be committed to paper and that the approach to Sinzendorf should be oral. No

memorials summarising the British proposals were to be given to Sinzendorf. These were sensible precautions given the notorious breaches of security that occurred in this period. They were also intended to prevent the Austrians exploiting the approach in order to sow dissension between the Hanover Allies. It is also possible that George feared that if the approach failed the Austrians might reveal it to the British opposition, and thus embarrass the government in Parliament. William Pulteney had attempted to gain documentary evidence from foreign diplomats of George I's promise, given to Spain in 1721, to try to gain Parliamentary agreement for the return of Gibraltar.

The lack of complementary documentary evidence is not therefore proof of anything more than a sensible disinclination to entrust important information to paper. It does not disprove the Saxon material. It is unlikely that Augustus II would have drawn up formal instructions to his envoys to attempt a mediation unless he believed that his efforts were desired. Were it not for Stanhope's confirmation to Le Coq that he had received secret instructions from George, it could be thought that the whole scheme only existed in St. Saphorin's fertile brain. It therefore seems likely that the Saxon material is accurate and that George did make approaches to the Saxons for their help in arranging an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation.

Granted that this is the case, it is necessary to reconcile George's action with the fears of Prusso-Saxon reconciliation voiced earlier in the year. Unfortunately, it is impossible to date St. Saphorin's discussions with Le Coq about an approach
to Sinzendorf. They may have taken place in December 1727 
at the same time as the two men discussed the need for a 
league of German princes, but, if so, it is likely that the 
confidential courier who took the report of these talks to 
Dresden would also have taken a report on the other matter. 
Le Coq was still in London at the end of April 1728 and it is 
likely that he would not have remained so long in London had 
the confidential approach been made to him in December 1727. 
St. Saphorin probably approached him after it became clear that 
a Congress would be held, and this was not clear until the 
news of Spain's capitulation to Anglo-French pressure arrived 
in London in January. It is, however, conceivable that the 
approach was made earlier and that George envisaged an approach 
to Sinzendorf through the Saxon envoy in Vienna. 

Despite hostility towards Augustus II as a Catholic ruler 
suspected of desiring the re-catholicisation of Saxony, and bad 
relations after the Thorn affair of 1724, neither the Hanoverian 
monarchs nor the British ministry viewed Saxony with 
particular disfavour. Saxon territorial aspirations and 
dynastic hopes did not conflict with either Hanoverian or 
British interests. The Saxon claim to Jülich-Berg did not 
present any particular difficulties, whilst Augustus II's 
schemes to make Poland a hereditary monarchy aroused little 
concern in London. The Saxon interest in the Habsburg 
inheritance did not feature prominently in the diplomacy of 
the period, although both the British and the French were 
aware that the death of Charles VI would have a disruptive 
effect on the international situation.
It was therefore the prospect of increased support for Prussian schemes, rather than any fears about Saxon intentions, that led to concern about the Prusso-Saxon agreement. Why George, despite this concern, still entrusted Saxony with the handling of the approach to Sinzendorf is unclear. Various speculations could be advanced. Possibly he hoped to use Augustus to restrain the Prussians, or hoped that the growing strength of his alliance system in the Empire would persuade Saxony, Prussia and Austria, together or individually, to take him more seriously. Possibly, as Zamboni suggested, George sought to discard the French, and the abortive attempt of 1728 was a precursor of the successful Anglo-Austrian negotiations of 1731.

Whatever George intended, nothing came of the Saxon approach. Le Coq arrived at Soissons on July 14th 1728. A fortnight later he informed Augustus that Stanhope had told him that, though his secret instructions were unaltered, he wanted to write to both George and Caroline to seek confirmation of them. Le Coq suggested that he should follow St. Saphorin's suggestion and approach Sinzendorf with the project of an Anglo-Austrian understanding as if it originated from the Saxons. Stanhope decided that it was best if he sought new instructions before any moves were made.¹ On August 11th Le Coq reported that Stanhope, having received no new instructions for three months, was worried that George had changed his mind. Moreover St. Saphorin had promised Stanhope that on his return to his native Switzerland he would go via Paris, and his failure

¹ Le Coq to Augustus, 28 July 1728, Dresden, 2733, f. 50-1.
to do so worried both Stanhope and Le Coq. Stanhope feared that the British ministry had discovered the scheme and that he would fall into disfavour. The more phlegmatic Le Coq suggested that the Saxon intervention simply depended on how much George needed it as a diplomatic expedient.¹

Why the Saxon intervention was allowed to peter out is unclear. Possibly the answer lay in the fears Stanhope voiced to Le Coq, that an alliance between Saxony, Prussia, Russia and Austria would harm George’s interests, and include a Saxon guarantee of the Jülich-Berg inheritance to Prussia.² Possibly George was angered by the decree on the Mecklenburg affair issued by the Aulic Council on May 11th. This angered George because it threatened the Hanoverian position in the Duchy and because it emanated from the Aulic Council in Vienna and not from the Imperial Diet.³ The British ministry argued that this decree confirmed their views of the Austrians as a

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2. Le Coq to Augustus, 28 July 1728, Dresden, 2733, f. 51; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 20 July 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 126. McKay has pointed out that as Austro-Spanish links weakened, 'an eastern bloc of Austria, Prussia and Russia (with tacit Saxon support)' acquired greater importance, McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, p. 131.

3. Chesterfield to Townshend, 8 June 1728, PRO.84/300 f. 196; Marini, p. 110; Goslinga, p. 242; Dureng, pp. 67-72; Hughes, pp. 380-1; Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich p. 140. There is a copy of the decree in PRO.100/115; 'Reflections on the Imperial Resolution about Mecklenburg', late May 1728, PRO.100/115. Ferdinand Albrecht had predicted the Austrian decision in March, Ferdinand Albrecht to Ludwig Rudolf, 10 Mar. 1728, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 529 f. 103.
despotic threat in the Empire. Townshend informed Chesterfield that,

'if the Emperor should establish such a despotism over Germany, as he plainly aims at by his way of disposing of the Dutchy of Mecklenburg, all his neighbours will soon feel the effects of such an overgrown power, and be convinc'd, tho' too late, how boundless Imperial ambition is, when back'd with the weight and force of an arbitrary sway in the Empire.' ¹

Townshend's letter was written in order to persuade the Dutch that, though they were not guarantors of the Treaties of Westphalia, they should nevertheless intervene in the Mecklenburg dispute. Nevertheless, it is clear that George was greatly concerned by the matter. ² On August 11th Townshend sent Horatio Walpole an anxious letter,

'His Majesty's thoughts upon the points of Mecklenburg and Sleswig, on which he is very earnest and would not suffer the least delay to be made .... I never saw the king more displeased in my life than he

1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 31 May (os) 1728, PRO.84/300, f. 186; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 15 July (os) 1728, Bradford-Lawrence; Tilson to Waldegrave, 23 July (os) 1728, Chewton; Newcastle to the British Plenipotentiaries, 26 July (os) 1728, BL.Add. 32757, f. 302-3; Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 5 Aug. (os) 1728, L.G. Wickham Legg (ed.), BDI France, 1727-1744 (1930) p. 40; Private and Additional Instructions for Edward Finch as Envoy Extraordinary to Sweden, 30 Sept. (os) 1728, J.F. Chance (ed.), BDI Sweden, 1727-1789 (1928), pp. 6-7; Townshend to Diemar, 5 July (os) 1728, PRO.100/15.

2. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 15 Sept. (os) 1728, BL.Add. 32758, f. 197.
was upon reading what was said in this project and your despatches upon those two articles .... For God's sake, Dear Horace, do your best, both your reputation and mine are at stake.¹

The Mecklenburg resolution, combined with the lack of real response Waldegrave encountered in Vienna, destroyed the basis for an Anglo-Austrian rapprochement.² The British felt that Austria was trying to stir up trouble between Hanover and Prussia in Mecklenburg.³ They also blamed the Austrians for Spanish intransigence. Despite Waldegrave's sweeping social successes he found that the Austrian ministers in Vienna, and in particular the influential Eugene, were far from accommodating. He informed Townshend that the Austrians were cautious about discussing matters, haughty in their attitude to any reconciliation and prone to differentiate between the English nation and the house of Hanover. On June 5th he complained that 'not a word has been said to me that has the least tendency to business'. Thus neither of the approaches that had been intended to improve Anglo-Austrian relations had succeeded.

The 'official' approach through Waldegrave had met as little

1. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 31 July (os) 1728, Bradfer-Lawrence. The 'project' referred to was the proposal for a Provisional Treaty. Austrian support for the claims of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp led to George's concern over Sleswig.

2. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 16 May, 3 June (os) 1728, Bradfer-Lawrence. Waldegrave complained, 'there is a set of people here that pretend to love the English nation ...without having the least regard for His Majesty.' Waldegrave to Townshend, no d., Chewton.

3. Chammorel to Chauvelin, 24 June 1728, AE.CP.Ang. 362, f. 245; Dureng, p. 70; Sühm to Augustus II, 17 Aug. 1728, Dresden, 3378, vol. V, f. 155. George was angry at the Austrian decision to include Prussia among the administering powers of Mecklenburg.
success as the 'unofficial' one through Stanhope and the Saxons. 1

It was not surprising that the Austrians were unresponsive to Waldegrave and insensitive over Mecklenburg. In the Empire their ties with Saxony, Prussia and Russia made them oblivious to Hanoverian views. 2 At the Congress the possibility of Austria detaching France from her allies appeared to be strong. Sinzendorf was convinced that he would be able to manage Fleury and thus acquire the glory of having given peace to Europe. 3 This optimism caused the Austrians to pay less attention to British views. 4 Without French help Britain would be forced to compromise, and this opinion, widely held, led to little attention being paid to British interests at the beginning of the Congress. Horatio Walpole had feared that this would happen and had therefore pressed unsuccessfully for a set of common written instructions for the Plenipotentiaries of the Alliance of Hanover powers. 5 His fears were to be

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1. Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 4 June 1728, ASV.LM. Ing. 97, f. 172. Toerring noted that 'suivant les maximes de la cour de Vienne, tout ce qu'elle fait, doit être reçu comme une grace', Toerring to Plettenberg, 28 May 1728, Münster, N.A. 148 f. 88.

2. (Newcastle) to Horatio Walpole, 21 May (os) 1728, PRO.78/189, f. 208.

3. Berkentin to -, 17 Mar. 1728, PRO.80/326; Sinzendorf told Horatio Walpole that 'he had been much reproach'd for being too good an Englishman' and that Charles VI was 'Bon Anglais still', Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 4 July 1728, RL.Add. 32756, f. 397.

4. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 13 June (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 254.

5. Horatio Walpole, 'Considerations qui peuvent servir a donner quelque idée des Mesures prealables que les Allies devroient
proved correct. 1

5. Continued. concerter entre eux pour regler leur conduite
au Congres...1 PRO 84/294 f. 119, 133; George II to Fleury,
22 Jan. (os), Newcastle to Chauvelin, 22 Jan. 1728. PRO. 78/
189, f. 30, 34; Townshend to Finch, 19 Sept. 1727, PRO. 84/
294 f. 181; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 14 May (os) 1728,
PRO 78/189 f. 191.

1. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 27 June (os) 1728,
PRO. 78/189, f. 271.
'No one can be more eager than myself to get out of this negotiation by the shortest way possible, provided it be good and safe'.

Townshend to Horatio Walpole July 4 1728.

The talks that began at Soissons in mid-June 1728 soon revealed the incompatible interests of the participating powers. The views of Spain and Britain were irreconcilable. Spain demanded the restitution of Gibraltar and an end to illegal British commercial activities in the Indies. Britain demanded that Spain should renounce all claim to Gibraltar and Port Mahon and recompense British merchants for the effects of Spanish depredations. Such a difference had been predicted. The British ministry had been aware that Spain would make such demands, and they had been informed that, despite the approaching Congress Spain was preparing for war. There was a difference of opinion within the

1. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 23 June (os) 1728, BL.Add.9138, f. 104.


3. Tilson to Waldegrave, 25 June (os) 1728, Chewton; Baudrillart, III, 570-2; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 13 June (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 254; Abstract of the instructions to the Spanish Plenipotentiaries, PRO. 78/188 f. 224-9.


5. Chesterfield to Townshend, 21 May 1728, PRO.84/300, f. 71.
British ministry as to how to respond to the Spanish demands. Officially the British government trusted in the continued unity of the Alliance of Hanover. Townshend had informed Chesterfield in May, 'it must be expected that that Court of Spain will be always giving jealousys, and neither think nor act right, till they see by the strict union between England, France, and Holland, that their artifices are of no use, and that they must submit to such a peace as the Allys shall jointly judge necessary for the quiet of Europe.'

The British hoped that France would repeat her performance of the previous winter, and support Britain in her demands upon Spain. They hoped that a bait could be offered to Spain by France and Britain in the form of support for Spanish pretensions in Italy and possible compliance in Spanish marital schemes. This cosy view was shaken by anxieties over Fleury's response to Sinzendorf's approaches. Should France and Austria reach an agreement they might seek to assuage Spanish resentment by supporting her claims against Britain. Both Fleury and Slingelandt believed that Britain ought to return Gibraltar, a view which

1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 14 May (os) 1728, PRO.84/300,f.76.
3. Chesterfield to Townshend, 3 Aug. 1728, PRO.84/301 f.154;
   Marini, p. 105
   f. 54; Le Coq to Augustus II, 11 Aug., 18 Sept. 1728,
   Dresden, 2733 f. 59. 102.
5. Chesterfield to Townshend, 3 Aug. 1728, PRO. 84/301, f. 152-5;
   Atterbury to Hay, 24 Feb., Graham to Hay, 12 Ap. 1727, RA.
   104/27, 105/159; Chauvelin to Broglie, 24 June 1728, AE.CP.
   Ang. 362,f.239; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle,
   20 July 1728, BL.Add.32757, f. 125; Marini, p.116; Goslinga,
   pp.258-9, 261-2, 265-8. In this period both France and the
   United Provinces made clear their dissatisfaction with the
   British possession of asiento. Horatio.Walpole to Townshend,
   24 July 1728, Bradfer Lawrence; British Plenipotentiaries to
   Newcastle, 10 Aug. 1728, BL.Add.32757, f.326.
found support within the British ministry. Alongside the attitude that Britain's allies were obliged to support fully her claims against Spain was the view that Britain should seek to win over Spain by the return of Gibraltar. Poyntz, one of the British Plenipotentiaries, suggested that, if Britain succeeded in retaining Gibraltar at the Congress, the Spaniards would continue to oppress British commerce in the hope that that would persuade the British to return it. He believed, in common with most commentators, that however much the Queen of Spain might be determined to succeed in Italy and to gain an archduchess, for one of her sons, the King and 'the true Spaniards' were more interested in Gibraltar. He therefore suggested that, provided some face-saving equivalent could be found, Gibraltar should be restored.

Such a project was to be suggested on several occasions in the late 1720s but discussion of it was quashed in 1728 on the grounds that it would be fatal in domestic political terms. Townshend, who himself believed that it should be restored, rejected Slingelandt's and Poyntz's suggestions of a restoration, arguing that they would 'put the whole nation in a flame'. Correct as this assumption was, it restricted Britain's freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre. Unable to settle with Spain themselves, they were

1. Poyntz to Townshend, 9 June 1728, Coxe, II, 628-9; Townshend to Poyntz, 3 June (os) 1728, BL.Add.48982 f. 132-3, 136-7.

2. Townshend to Poyntz, 3 June (os), to Chesterfield, 9 July (os), to Slingelandt, 23 July (os) 1728, BL.Add.48982, f.137, PRO. 84/301, f.80, 84/580, f.37-8; O'Rourke to James III, 28 Feb. 1728, Vienna, England, Varia, 8; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 22 July 1728, AE.CP.Ang. 363, f.30; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 11 Apr. 1729, AST.LM.Ing. 35; Goslinga, pp.265-6. The retention of Gibraltar had been a reiterated theme in the addresses presented to George II on his accession, Boyer, 34, pp.39-40, 43,167-9.
obliged to rely on France or Austria being willing to bully Spain into compliance. Developments in the Congress made this less likely. In an effort to divide France from Spain, Sinzendorf secretly sounded Fleury on the possibility of an Austro-Spanish marriage and on Spain's Italian pretensions. Sinzendorf hoped to trap France into agreeing to the marriage and thereby anger the German princes and undermining the Anglo-French attempts to develop a party in the Empire, or refusing and thereby alienating Elizabeth Farnese. Fleury declared his approval of the marriage but refused to commit himself to paper. George was 'strongly ... inclined to have the marriage brought before the Congress,' but Fleury, fearing that it would draw the Congress out, refused and George gave way. Stanhope argued that the best way to please Spain and persuade her to drop her pretensions to Gibraltar was to agree to the marriage but he accepted that it would be difficult to make such an arrangement.

When these matters were being discussed, a new issue came increasingly to dominate the deliberations at the Congress. This

1. Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 20 June 1728, BL. Add.9138 f.100, 102; Poyntz to Chesterfield, 13 July 1728, PRO.84/301; De Buy to Manteuffel, 19 July 1728, Dresden, 3105, vol. 2, f.57; Baudrillart, III, 435-6; Goslinga, pp.248,251,270-1. Newcastle was livid with one of the Dutch Plenipotentiaries, Hop, for telling Sinzendorf that the marriage was acceptable, Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 27 June (ós) 1728, PRO.78/189 f.271.

2. Townshend to Chesterfield, 25 June (ós),2, 26 July, 2, 13 Aug. 1728, PRO.84/300 f.296, 84/301; Poyntz to Chesterfield, 13 July 1728, PRO.84/301; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 26 July (ós) 1728, BL. Add.32757 f.299.

3. Stanhope to Newcastle, 14 July 1728, BL. Add.32757 f.44-5; Sinzendorf also supported this scheme, Townshend to Chesterfield, 9 July (ós) 1728, PRO.84/301 f.80.
was the proposal, variously attributed to Sinzendorf and Fleury, for a provisional treaty. As first drafted by Sinzendorf, this treaty proposed that the Ostend Company should be abolished, peace be established on the basis of the preliminaries, and all other outstanding differences be referred to special commissioners appointed by the parties concerned. Fleury, although he would have preferred a definitive treaty, agreed to the new proposal.

The British response was far less favourable. On July 7th the Cabinet met and its minutes noted, 'The King certainly wishes to conclude things, but is doubtful how that can be done by a provisional treaty'. George was opposed to a provisional treaty because he believed that it would give France an opportunity to act as the arbiter of Europe whilst Britain was trapped in a diplomatic impasse, her pretensions endlessly debated by commissioners. He believed Fleury to be unduly pliant and urged the French to be firmer in the defence of their allies. George told Broglie that he expected

1. Poyntz to Chesterfield, 13 July 1728, PRO.84/301 f.75; King, p.69.

2. Goslinga, pp.252-3; Huisman, p.441; The proposed treaty 'was little more than the Preliminaries new modelled, and digested into the form of a treaty, without any specific explanation of those points which most immediately affected the interests of Great Britain', J Ralph, A Critical History of the Administration of Sir Robert Walpole (London, 1743) pp.419-20.

3. Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 9 July, Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 28 July 1728, BL. Add.32756 f.498-500, 32757 f.196; Poyntz to Chesterfield, 13 July 1728, PRO.84/301 f.75; Goslinga, p.253; Wilson, p.202. Fleury told the British Plenipotentiaries that a delay would give Philip V time to abdicate and die, and Spain would then become more reasonable, Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 13 July 1728, BL. Add.32757 f.32.

4. Cabinet Minutes, 26 June (os) 1728, PRO.36/7 f.70. Present were Devonshire, Newcastle, Townshend, Trevor and Walpole. Stanhope to Newcastle, 14 July 1728, BL.Add.32757 f.44.

5. Townshend to Chesterfield,25 June (os) 2, 26 July (os), 2 Aug. (os) 1728 PRO.84/300 f.297-8, 84/301, f.164; Goslinga, pp.257-8; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 23 June (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence.

6. Chesterfield to Townshend, 27 July 1728, PRO.84/301 f.121-2; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 15 July (os) 1728, PRO.80/326.
France to support his pretensions, and that he was ready for war. 1 The Dutch approved the British attempt 'to excite the Cardinal to act with more spirit and vigour'. 2

However, George's views were not shared by all of his ministers. 3 On July 26th Townshend informed Horatio Walpole, 'the king was so much set at first against hearing of the marriage and the provisional treaty .... all that could be done was to withhold H.M. from putting an absolute refusal upon them .... this matter has been softened little by little'. 4

There are signs that Townshend and George were not working well together. Tilson informed Horatio Walpole in August that George was still altering diplomatic instructions and maintaining his opposition to the provisional treaty. 5 In July D'Aix reported that Townshend and St. Saphorin were still bitter enemies, that the Queen was in close touch with St. Saphorin and that

1. Broglie to Chauvelin, 16 Aug. 1728, AE.CP.Ang. 363, f. 91-2; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 12 July 1728, AST.LM.Ing. 35; George II to Townshend, no date, commenting on Townshend to Slingelandt, 12 July (os) 1728, BL.Add. 38507, f. 244.

2. Chesterfield to Townshend, 27 July 1728, PRO. 84/301, f. 121.

3. Stanhope and Horatio Walpole supported the idea of a provisional treaty, Stanhope to Newcastle, 30 July 1728, BL.Add. 32757 f.221.

4. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 15 July (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence.

5. Tilson to Horatio Walpole, 26 July (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence.
Townshend was very worried by D'Aix's contacts with the King. 1 St. Saphorin told D'Aix that George was willing to embrace the first opportunity to drive the Emperor out of Italy. 2 An anonymous writer informed Horatio Walpole that his conduct was being bitterly criticised by St. Saphorin. 3 It is possible that, in order to retain Sardinian interest in an alliance with Britain and to prevent her from settling with Austria, George and St. Saphorin exaggerated their willingness to oppose Austria. Their comments to D'Aix do not correspond to the approaches made earlier in the year to Le Coq. However Austria's provocative actions in the Empire could well account for discrepancy. D'Aix despatches suggest that George was pushing his schemes for a German league with renewed vigour. On July 20th he reported that George 'a fort gouté le projet de se faire un partie en Allemagne'. 4 George pressed for the accession of Hesse-Cassel to the Württemberg-Wolfenbüttel treaty, and the accessions of Denmark and Sweden, in their capacities as Princes of the Empire, and of Würzburg were discussed. 5 Worried about the apparent concert of Prussia,

1. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 4, 11, 20 July 1728, AST.LM.Ing.36; Marini, pp. 112, 115.
2. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 11 July 1728, AST.LM.Ing. 36; Marini, p. 106.
3. J.D. to Horatio Walpole, 18 July (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence.
4. D' Aix to Victor Amadeus, 20 July 1728, AST.LM.Ing. 36; Chesterfield to Townshend, 1 June 1728, PRO. 84/300 f. 143; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 3 June (os) 1728, PRO.78/189 f. 225.
5. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 13 June (os) 1728, BL.Add. 32756 f. 273; William Chetwynd to Sutton, 28 June, 8 July 1728, PRO.81/122; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 3 Aug. 1728, AE.CP. Allemagne, 374 f. 271.
Austria, Russia and Saxony, George pressed for Imperial matters to be discussed at the Congress and for the German princes to be permitted to send representatives. The British accused Fleury of failing to support them on this issue. George feared that the provisional treaty would allow Fleury to abandon his support of the German princes and of Hanoverian interests.

1. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 20 July 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 36; Chesterfield to Townshend, 1 June 1728, PRO. 84/300 f. 143; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 3 June (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 225.

2. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 13 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32756 f. 273; William Chetwynd to Sutton, 28 June, 8 July 1728, PRO. 81/122; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 3 Aug. 1728, AE. C.P. Allemagne, 374 f. 271.

3. Townshend to Chesterfield, 2 July (os) 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 43; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 15 July (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 157. There was also concern about the possibility of Denmark joining the Austro-Prussian alliance, Townshend to Glenorchy, 2 July (os) 1728, PRO. 75/51 f. 163; Chesterfield to Townshend, 13 July 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 60.

4. Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 29 Aug. (os) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f. 20; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 29 Mar. (os), Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 15 Sept. 1728, BL. Add. 32755 f. 137-8, 32758 f. 96; B'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 17 May 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 21 May (os), Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 12 Sept. 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 210,395; Tilson to Horatio Walpole, 4 July (os) 1728, Bradfer-Lawrence; Townshend to Chesterfield, 6,13 Aug. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 175, 185; Philippi, Landgraf Karl p. 546.
George's concern was apparent to many. According to Zamboni he blocked a ministerial proposal to reduce the size of the army, ¹ and D'Aix reported in August,

'Le Roy d'Angleterre est fort inquiet, et je scai de bonne part, qu'il s'est expliqué, qu'il aimeroit mieux la guerre que les longeurs et l'incertitude ou il est, mais je scai aussi, que jusques à present la France est dans des dispositions differantes, et toujours pacifiques'. ²

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1. Zamboni to Manteuffel, 17 Aug. 1728, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 27.

2. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 23 Aug. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35; George II to Townshend, 3, ---, July (os) 1728, BL. Add. 38507 f. 242, 244; Marini, pp. 116-7. Zamboni noted the anger of the government at diplomatic developments, Zamboni to Manteuffel, 7 Sept. 1728, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 30.
Given George's attitude it is necessary to explain why Sinzendorf's proposal was accepted. Early in August 1728 discussions between the Plenipotentiaries of the Hanover allies produced an expanded version of Sinzendorf's document, and in mid-August a draft provisional treaty was formally communicated to all the powers at the Congress. The British attitude changed to a grudging acceptance of the need for a provisional treaty. On August 13th Townshend informed Chesterfield that George wanted 'a general and definitive pacification' but had been forced to change his mind by Fleury. The change followed close upon the departure of St. Saphorin. St. Saphorin was given a very generous pension, but he failed to gain the Vienna embassy and was sent back to Switzerland, without being permitted to stop off at Soissons. His departure might be seen as a victory for Townshend but D'Aix had written of the latter in May,

'Il paroit que ce ministre prend le parti de se conformer aux volontes du Roy d'Angleterre, et de la Reine, qui sont tres fermes la dessus et veulent se gouverner'.

1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 13, 20 Aug. (os) 1728, PRO.84/301 f. 185, 209; Zamboni to Le Coq, 9 Sept. 1728, Rodl. Rawl. 120 f. 31.

2. Townshend to Chesterfield, 2 Aug. (os) 1728, PRO.84/301 f. 169.

3. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 12 June 1728, AST.LM.Ing.35; 'J.D.' to Horatio Walpole, 18 July (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence; Le Coq to Augustus II, 11 Aug. 1728, Dresden, 2733 f. 58. St. Saphorin had sought leave to retire on health grounds, claiming that the air of London was very bad for him, St. Saphorin to Townshend, 20 May (os) 1728, PRO.80/61.

4. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 19 July 1728, AST.LM.Ing. 35.

5. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 17 May 1728, AST.LM.Ing.35; Marini, p. 108.
Townshend, whose health still gave cause for concern, seems to have been somewhat milder and more co-operative with George in 1728 than in the previous year. In May Delafaye had informed Horatio Walpole that George approved of Townshend's corresponding with him without Newcastle's knowledge. Newcastle in his turn had a confidential correspondence with Stanhope, who blamed Sir Robert Walpole for his failure to get a peerage and for his brother's blocked promotion. Despite Poyntz's claim that the British plenipotentiaries were united, the opposite appears to have been the case. It is difficult to disentangle the secret ties of the period. The few scraps of evidence that survive might suggest that the St. Saphorin-Stanhope link that had been responsible for executing George's German policy earlier in the year had been broken by St. Saphorin's departure and by the absence of a confidential correspondence between Stanhope and George. Stanhope made it clear


2. Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 14 May (os) 1728, Coxe, II, 623; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 21 Aug. (os) 1728, 29 Oct. 1728, BL. Add. 48982 f. 70, Bradfer-Lawrence; Tilson to Horatio Walpole, 12. Oct. (os) 1727, BL. Add. 48982 f. 92; Townshend to George II, no date, - July 1728, BL. Add. 38507 f. 230, 245. Horatio Walpole suspected correctly that there was a confidential correspondence between Poyntz and Townshend, Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 20 June 1728, BL.Add. 9138 f. 100. Townshend complained of 'the difficulties that arise often with the D. of Newcastle upon forming the draughts of orders', Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 10 Oct. (os) 1728, BL. Add. 9138.


4. Poyntz to Townshend, 9 June, Townshend to Poyntz, 3 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 48982 f. 131, 135; Stanhope to Newcastle, 8 June 1728, Coxe, II, 626-7.

5. Poyntz to Delafaye, 19 May, 2 July 1728, PRO. 78/188 f.103, 162; Stanhope and Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 28 July 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 191.
to Le Coq that he feared that he had lost royal favour. Though Newcastle assured Stanhope that he still enjoyed 'the entire confidence' of the king, Stanhope was greatly disappointed by his failure to get a peerage.¹

The evidence suggests that George had transferred his confidence, at least in part, from St. Saphorin and Stanhope to Townshend.² Within his own department Townshend's authority increased. He developed a good working relationship with Chesterfield at the Hague. He was on very good terms with Edward Finch, sent to Stockholm in 1728, Richard Sutton the envoy to Hesse-Cassel, and Waldegrave. Postings that might have created difficulties, such as St. Saphorin to Vienna and Fabrice to Dresden, were not made. His confidential correspondences with Horatio Walpole and Doyntz gave him more influence over the Soissons negotiations than that possessed by Newcastle. George's anger with Austria over the Mecklenburg Question, by shelving his interest in an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, brought his views more into line with those of Townshend, though D'Aix's evidence would suggest that the process was mutual. George agreed to support the provisional treaty, and thereby save the Anglo-French alliance from serious trouble, whilst Townshend cooperated with George's German schemes. It was the need to retain the French alliance that was probably the most persuasive reason from George's

¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, 3 June (os), Stanhope to Newcastle 8 June 1728, Coxe, II, 629, 626-7.
² Marini, pp. 112-3
point of view. Prussian pressure to move troops into Mecklenburg\textsuperscript{1} and heightened concern over Jülich-Berg issue made the German situation more serious. The illness of the Elector Palatine made a conflict over Jülich-Berg appear imminent.\textsuperscript{2} Renewed difficulties in East-Friesland over the conduct of the Imperial commissioners sent into the Duchy by the Aulic Council increased tension with Austria.\textsuperscript{3}

Given this situation it was not surprising that the British clung to the French alliance and sought to persuade Fleury and the Dutch to adopt a more forceful approach to German problems. The price of French support was British compliance with the draft provisional treaty. This draft confirmed the major international agreements from the Treaty of Utrecht to the Convention of the Pardo and agreed that special commissioners were to be appointed to deal with such outstanding problems as Spanish depredations and British contraband trade in Spanish America.\textsuperscript{4}

The widely held view that Austria was able to dictate Spanish policy\textsuperscript{5} was disproved by Spain's response to the project, described

\begin{enumerate}
\item Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 18 July (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence; Chesterfield to Townshend, 17 Aug. 1728, PRO.84/301 f. 180.
\item Chesterfield to Townshend, 13 Aug., 19 Nov. 1728, PRO.84/301 f. 173, 84/302 f. 109; Kinsky to Eugene, 11 Nov. 1728, Vienna, GK. 94 (b) f. 5; Goslinga, pp. 217-8.
\item Goslinga, pp. 279-82; Wilson. p. 202; Baudrillart, III, 442.
\end{enumerate}
by Tilson as 'a medley of Spanish phrases, neither refusing nor accepting positively; but shuffling as usual, in a wayward manner'. 1 Spanish policy had been plunged even more than usual into chaos in the summer by Philip V's ill health and his attempt to abdicate once more. 2 Elizabeth Farnese had succeeded however in preventing the attempted abdication and had taken advantage of her husband's weakness to consolidate her control of Spanish policy. She disapproved of the projected treaty because it failed to safeguard Carlos' Italian pretensions and brought a Habsburg marriage no nearer. 3 Negotiations continued at Paris in an effort to produce a more acceptable project, and a new article was agreed in which Britain and France confirmed their undertaking of 1721 to assist in the establishment of Don Carlos in Italy and accepted the need to introduce Spanish garrisons. 4 One of the Spanish plenipotentiaries, Rournonville, left Spain in October, with the new project. It was hoped that Spanish agreement would permit the signing of the provisional treaty, a move that would allow the British government to assure Parliament that peace was secure.

The Hanoverian Dimension

The Congress had not developed therefore, as the British had hoped. Though Fleury had not abandoned his allies, as had indeed

2. De Muy to Manteuffel, 21, 28 June, 19, 26 July, 2 Aug. 1728. Dresden, 3105, vol. 2, f. 52, 55, 61, 66, 68; D'Auberton to Maurepas, 8, 28 June 1728, AN AM. R7292; Waldegrave to Townshend, 3 July, 1728, PRO, 8O/61 f.18; Pentenriedter to Eugene, 5 July 1728, Vienna, GK 102 (a), f. 360; Dering to Percival, 20 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 47032 f. 64-5.
been feared, his willingness to negotiate in secret had kept the British plenipotentiaries in the dark for much of the time, and had enhanced Fleury's position as the arbiter of Europe.\(^1\) The Congress sessions at Soissons had soon ceased to be of any significance, with important matters being handled privately in Paris.\(^2\) The British had been unhappy about this development, but they had been forced to accept it. Their wish to raise the marriage at the Congress had been thwarted, as had their attempt to turn the Congress into a platform for challenging Imperial authority. Initial hostility to the provisional treaty had been replaced by support for it. In September Townshend informed Chesterfield that, 'there is more of name and sound, than of substance and reality between a definitive treaty, and a provisional and suspensive one, as now proposed; By the present project all our engagements are answered, our former treaties are renewed, and things brought back to the foot they were before the making the dangerous Treatys of Vienna .... as Treatys commonly last, and are interpreted according to times and circumstances, nothing could be so decided, as to expect a longer duration than this intended treaty provides for'.\(^3\)

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1. Slingelandt had predicted that Fleury would be the de facto mediator of the Congress, 'Heads of ye Pensionary's paper', 2 Ap. 1728, PRO.103/110. George was opposed to such a development, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, - Ap. (os) 1728, PRO.78/189 f.132.


3. Townshend to Chesterfield, 6 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO.84/301 f.271-2.
This sober reflection was doubtless true, but it represented a different attitude to the more blustering and self-confident tone that had characterised British diplomacy the previous winter and spring. It was the deterioration in the German situation and the smaller range of British diplomatic manoeuvre that accounted for this change. The bold talk of reconciliation with Austria, Prussia, Saxony and Russia had been replaced by fears about the intentions of these powers, fears sharpened by the suspicion that Denmark was about to join them. The schemes for an alliance of German princes had met less success than anticipated. Saxony had preferred to retain its links with Austria and Prussia. Chesterfield's approach to the Wittelsbach envoy Gansinot had been met with caution. The Bavarians did not wish to anger their powerful Austrian neighbours. The Hessians were not too enthusiastic about angering Austria or fighting Prussia, however much they welcomed British subsidies.

1. Villars, 11, 18 April, 28 November 1728, pp. 128, 156; Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 24 April, 5 November 1728, BL. Add. 32755, f. 291, 32759 f. 51-2; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 15 July (os) 1728, PRO. 80/326; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 26 July (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence; Whitehall Evening Post 8 August (os) 1728; Le Coq to Augustus II, 30 August 1728, Dresden, 2733 f. 87; Townshend to Glenorchy 6 September (os), Glenorchy to Townshend, 21 September 1728, PRO. 75/51 f. 218, 228; Sutton to Townshend, 13 September 1728, PRO. 81/122; Waldegrave to Townshend, 16 October 1728, PRO. 80/61 f. 161; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 20 July 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 126; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 26 September (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 413.


3. Törning to Plettenberg, 26 August, 23 September 1728, Münster, N.A. 148, f. 108-9, 120; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 14 September 1728, AE. CP. Allemagne, 374 f. 329. The British were opposed to subsidies for the Wittelsbachs, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 22 August (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 364.

4. There were also doubts about the reliability of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 31 August 1728, AE. CP. Allemagne, 374 f. 319.
As George realised, the German princes needed to have their resolve stiffened by Anglo-French assistance, for it was these princes who would be the first to suffer Austrian attack. Without France, Britain did not seem strong enough to tempt German support, and Fleury's talks with Sinzendorf, talks that were as well known as their contents were mysterious, suggested to many that Britain could not count on French support.

The representative of the Duke of Mecklenburg at The Hague, Sande suggested to Chesterfield, 'that he thought the king's Hannover dominions were so much concerned in the fate of Mecklenburg that they might almost give the law to his Majesty upon this occasion'. Although Chesterfield rejected this suggestion and Townshend corroborated his rejection, it is indeed possible that the key to British policy should be sought in the myriad complexities of German politics and, in particular, in the need to protect Hanover. The Hanoverians in the German Chancery in London enjoyed little power and the few contemporaries who considered their role gave it little prominence. No Hanoverian in the late 1720s wielded the influence that Bernstorff and Bothmer had enjoyed in their heyday. Though Bothmer survived until 1732 he lacked influence with George II. Fabrice had returned to Hanover. The principal officials of the German Chancery in London, Jobst and

1. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 13 June (os), 22 Aug. 1728, BL.Add. 32756 f. 275, PRO. 78/189 f. 362; Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 5 Aug. (os), 12 Sept., BL. Add. 32757 f. 401-2, PRO 78/189 f. 395.

2. Chesterfield to Townshend, 6 July 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 24.

Andreas von der Reiche and Johann Philipp von Hattorf were credited with little power, and they represented less of a challenge to the British ministry than Schaub and St. Saphorin, though Hattorf was to pay a major role in the unsuccessful attempt to bring Britain into the Polish Succession War.¹

Nevertheless, despite the weakness of the Hanoverian representatives in London, there is no doubt that George was very concerned about the defence of his Electorate. Under his father the Electorate had been greatly strengthened by territorial consolidation and expansion. In particular, the acquisitions of Lauenburg, Bremen and Verden had represented a considerable expansion towards the north and had given the Electorate a coastline. There is little evidence in the late 1720s that George II intended to continue his father's expansionism, although contemporaries were unsure about his intentions in Mecklenburg and the schemes he entertained in the 1740s suggest that he was not averse to the idea of territorial expansion.² He was certainly determined that his

1. Augustus II, in his instructions to Watsdorf, appointed Saxon envoy in London in 1730, wrote, 'Il observera neantmoins de s'attacher principalement aux Anglois, puisque ce sont eux, qui ont toute la direction même en ce, qui regarde les interêts généraux des Etats d'Hannovre. à l'exclusion des ministres Hanoveriens, que le Roi ne tient auprès de sa personne...'. Augustus to Watsdorf, 12 Oct. 1730, Dresden, 2676, vol. 1, f. 12. In 1729 Chavigny noted opposition by some of the Hanoverian ministers to Townshend's negotiations with the Wittelsbachs, and George's support for Townshend; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 19 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47, f.256. When the Hanoverian diplomat Reck was sent to the Congress, Townshend ordered the British Plenipotentiaries to tell him nothing about the negotiations for a Wittelsbach alliance, and he wrote, 'He has no powers nor anything to do at the Congress, and was sent by the King with no other view but to inform and assist your Ex.cies in the affairs of the Empire', Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 12 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 399. Horatio Walpole also urged that the negotiations with the Wittelsbachs be kept a secret from the Hanoverians, Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 12 Sept. 1728, PRO 78/188 f.273.

2. Chavigny to Chauvelin, 19 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47,f.257; Dureng, p.70; Hughes, pp.376-7; Nauman, Österreich England und das Reich p.152.
father's acquisitions should not be lost. This accounted for his opposition to the restoration of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, because he feared that this would endanger his hold upon Bremen and Verden, leading to Danish claims that it should serve as territorial compensation, or claims from the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp that he should enjoy the duchies as heir to their late possessor the Crown of Sweden.

George's attempt to develop a party within the Empire was clearly linked to his interest in the defence of Hanover, but it is necessary to consider whether this represented a distortion of British policy, insofar as there could be one without the King. The defence of Hanover dictated a choice of alliance between Austria and France. Although the idea of a Protestant league of Prussia, Britain, Sweden, Denmark, the United Provinces and Hesse-Cassel was to be advanced in the mid 1730s, it was not feasible in the late 1720s, due to the ties between Prussia and Austria and the poor relations between George II and Frederick William. George considered both an Austrian and a French alliance in 1728. He would have agreed with the London Journal in its claim that 'the balance of Europe has generally been agreed to be an equality of power in the hands of the Emperor and France' and that it was essential for the balance that the two powers did not become partners. Insofar as there were definable 'British' interests at issue in 1728 it is clear that both France and Austria were willing to accept the British point of view on most of them. This was not surprising as most of the issues - Gibraltar, Minorca and depredations upon commerce - involved Spain. Both powers were willing to discourage Jacobitism, and, though neither power was enthusiastic

about British commercial pre-eminence, both were willing to surrender their own commercial schemes. Sinzendorf agreed at Soissons to suppress the Ostend Company whilst in the summer of 1728 profuse French assurances quietened British fears about French intentions at Dunkirk. Neither France nor Austria cared deeply about the points at issue between Britain and Spain, though both found it useful to see the two powers divided, and neither wished to risk their own relations with Spain by supporting Britain fully.

It could be argued that Britain should have made more of an effort to satisfy Austria in 1728. Waldegrave could certainly have carried more conciliatory instructions, but there was more to the continuation of Anglo-Austrian differences than George's concern for Hanoverian interests and his anger over the Mecklenburg issue. In the months before the Congress, Austria was far from responsive to the idea of a British approach. Sinzendorf was more hopeful, correctly as it turned out, of an approach to Fleury, whilst Eugene was more interested in the friendship of Russia, Prussia and Saxony. An enthusiastic response to Waldegrave would have angered Frederick William. The lack of Austrian interest was shown by their delay in sending an envoy to Britain. They insisted that Waldegrave should arrive in Vienna before they named their envoy, but their choice — Count Philip Kinsky — was a lightweight and he did not reach London until September 1728. Eugene blamed George II for the bad relations between Britain and Austria.

1. Wackerbarth to Augustus II, 12 Jan. 1729, Dresden, 3331 f. 16.
3. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 20 Sept. 1728, AST.LM.Ing.35; Townsend to Chesterfield, 3 Dec. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f.190; Waldegrave to Townsend, 28 July 1728, PRO. 80/61 f.43. Kinsky's first audience with George II was on September 16th. He was only 24 when appointed. Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich p.141.
4. Eugene to Kinsky, 29 Aug. 1728, Vienna GK. 94(b); Braubach, Eugen, IV, 290-1.
but the Austrians made little effort to remedy this situation at Soissons. Though the British plenipotentiaries made several approaches to Sinzendorf, the response was poor, and Newcastle complained that Sinzendorf's statements to Stanhope were dark and unclear. The approach via the Saxons was discarded because, as Stanhope told Le Coq, George did not wish to upset his allies and the draft of the provisional treaty had caused George to change his mind about a personal approach to the Austrians. Stanhope could have added distrust of the Saxons and anger with Austria, but the reasons he gave were sufficient. Britain's abandonment of her approach to Austria in 1728 was not simply due to Hanoverian interests but reflected the need, when faced with Austrian lack of interest, to rely on the French. Had Britain abandoned the latter also she would have been isolated, unable to hope for help in her disputes with Spain and lacking influence in the diplomatic deliberations at Paris.

The anger D'Aix noted in George is understandable. By the autumn of 1728 his diplomatic strategy had been revealed as a failure. Fleury had ignored Britain's opinion on most matters. The Austrians had neither been intimidated by George's alliances nor responsive to his suggestions of a reconciliation. The King

1. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 15 July (os) 1728. PRO.80/326.
4. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and Stanhope, 6 Nov. (os) 1728, BL.Add.32759, f. 116-7; Tilson to Waldegrave, 8 Nov. (os) 1728, Chewton.
5. Stanhope to Newcastle, 9 Dec. 1728, BL.Add.32759, f.322; George II had no illusions about the amount of support he could expect from France, Townshend to Chesterfield, 6 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO.84/301 f. 272.
had been forced to accept the idea of a provisional treaty, not so much because of ministerial pressure but rather because of diplomatic developments. Despite hopes to the contrary the Austro-Spanish alliance had persisted, whilst Fleury and Sinzendorf had developed a good working relationship that threatened to develop into a broader arrangement.¹

¹ Stainville to Duke Leopold, 27 Sept. 1728, Nancy, 86. No.173. In conversation with the author Dr. Auer has suggested that Fleury had no intention of creating an alliance with Austria.
'You will inform him that it is the unanimous voice of our people whose interests as they are dearer to us than all other considerations we must consult in the first place, that we have been too long amused with fruitless negotiations, and that after all ye moderation that has been shewn on our part, and the endless chicanes and delays on that of ye courts of Vienna and Madrid it would be entirely giving up the dignity of our Crown and ye Honour of ye Nation to suffer things to continue any longer in ye same situation'.

In the autumn of 1728 three developments undermined further the British diplomatic situation and caused fresh doubts about the policies then being followed. Louis XV's smallpox attack threatened the Anglo-French alliance with the possibilities of civil war in France or the accession of Philip V as King of France. Spain rejected the provisional treaty and Bournonville's mission failed to justify the hopes that had been raised that he would succeed in persuading Elisabeth Farnese to accept the treaty.

The Austrian ministry decided to disavow Sinzendorf's diplomatic approaches to the Hanover allies, to reject the provisional treaty and to reaffirm their Spanish alliance. The combination of these

1. Deleted section of draft instructions to the British Pleni-
   potentiaries, no date, early spring 1729, PRO. 103/110.

2. De Buys to Manteuffel, 15, 29 Nov. 1728, Dresden, 3105, 2f. 97, 98.
developments led many within Britain to question the wisdom of British policy, and these doubts, voiced by members of the government, as well as the Opposition, created a dangerous political situation as the Parliamentary Session approached.¹

The ministers assembled at Soissons had hoped that Spain would be persuaded, by the loss of Austrian support, to accept the project of a provisional treaty. The British ministry had hoped that Bournonville would succeed in persuading Elizabeth Farnese to accept the treaty, though sceptical voices had been raised.² The Dutch had suggested that Bournonville had lost all credit at Madrid. However, it was from Vienna that the blow that destroyed the provisional treaty came. On October 10th the Austrian conference of ministers rejected the project, and made it clear that they would not act against Spain.³ All hope of coercing Spain was therefore lost. This sudden and unexpected⁴ decision was widely attributed to the result of a struggle for power within the Austrian ministry between Eugene and Sinzendorf. It was believed, correctly, that Sinzendorf's French approach was rejected in favour of Eugene's policy of alliances within the Empire and with Spain and Russia.⁵ This decision was a surprise, although there had been considerable

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¹ 'Some loose Thoughts upon the present state of the negotiation and of affairs abroad', anonymous memorandum possibly by Stanhope, no date, autumn 1728, PRO. 103/110.
² Waldegrave to Townshend, 23 Oct. 1728, PRO. 80/61 f. 170.
³ Baudrillart, III, 479; King, pp. 68-9.
⁴ Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 12 Nov. 1728, Bradfer-Lawrence.
⁵ Townshend to Stanhope and Horatio Walpole, 14 Nov. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 457; Kinsky to Eugène, 1. Dec. 1728, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 8; McKay, Eugene pp. 218-19.
disquiet over the possibility of collusion between Austria and Spain. George II, according to Townshend, believed that the two powers were in league to spin out the Congress and delay matters.\(^1\)

It was feared that both Spain and Austria wished to postpone developments until after the arrival of the treasure fleet due from the Indies. Austria hoped that Spain would use her treasure to pay the subsidies due to Austria which would in turn enable Austria to satisfy her obligations to her German allies.\(^2\)

The reaffirmation of the Austro-Spanish alliance,\(^3\) a development that bore testimony to Elizabeth Farnese's continued hopes that the Austrian alliance would produce advantages for Don Carlos,\(^4\) was rendered more serious by Louis XV's smallpox attack in late October. This caused Philip V to prepare for the seizure of power in France, and produced suggestions of a civil war between his supporters and those of the Duke of Orleans, the son of the former Regent. All Europe followed the news and rumours of the illness with great attention. St. Saphorin wrote to Townshend from his Swiss estate, 'je suis saisi des agitations les plus vivant'.\(^5\)

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1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 24 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f.18.

2. Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 8 Nov., Stanhope to Newcastle, 9 Nov. 1728, BL.Add. 32759 f. 66, 90; Waldegrave to Horatio Walpole, 8 Dec. 1728, BL.Add. 9138 f.132-3.

3. Newcastle to Stanhope and Horatio Walpole, 6 Nov. (os), Keene to Newcastle, 20 Dec. 1728, BL.Add. 32759 f. 112, 396-7; De Buy to Manteuffel, 29 Nov. 1728, Dresden, 3105, 2 f.99; Keene to Newcastle, 30 Nov. 1728, BL. Add. 9138 f. 116; Eugene to La Paz, - Dec. 1728, Vienna, GK. 102(a); A. Beer, 'Zur Geschichte der Politik Karl VI', Historische Zeitschrift 19, (1886) p.44.


5. Keene to Newcastle, 8 Nov. 1728, BL. Add. 32759 f. 80-1; De Buy to Manteuffel, 8 Nov. 1728, Dresden, 3105,2 f.95; D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 15,22 Nov. 1728, AN.M.B' 293; St. Saphorin to Townshend, 16 Nov. 1728, PRO. 80/61; Baudrillart, III, 415, 455-478
The news that Louis definitely had smallpox reached London on October 31st.\(^1\) It caused a fall in the stocks,\(^2\) and widespread speculation as to the likely consequences of his death. **Farley's Bristol Newspaper** suggested that if he died, the French government would rely on British aid to keep Philip V out.\(^3\) British policy was paralysed, as the government awaited news of Louis' fate. To a certain extent the crisis was simply an exacerbation of fears that had been expressed for a long while that French policy would change with the death or replacement of Fleury. Such an opinion had been widely voiced within Britain, France and Europe.\(^4\) Late in October 1728 Rialp, probing Waldegrave on the possibility of an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, informed him that the Anglo-French alliance depended on the life of Fleury, 'and that he was of opinion that were the cardinal to dye, those who would succeed him in the administration would not be so zealous for England as he was'. Waldegrave's reply was rather lame. He assured Rialp that Louis XV had been so persuaded of the importance of the British alliance that a change of ministry could not lead to an alteration in French policy.\(^5\)

1. Foratio Talpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 27 Oct. 1728, BL. Add. 32758 f. 449; Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 27 Oct. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 342
4. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 16 Nov. (os), Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 4 Dec. 1727, BL.Add. 32752 f. 56, 110-112;Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 29 Nov. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11. f.436; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 14 May (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f.194; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 23 June (os) 1728, BL. Add.9138 f.105; Townshend to Chesterfield, 25 June (os) 1728, PRO.84/300 f.298-299; Horatio Walpole, 'Considerations relating to the marriage between Don Carlos and the eldest Archduchess and the notion of a Provisional Treaty', 19 July 1728, Bradfer-Lawrence.
5. Waldegrave to Townshend, 30 Oct. 1728, PRO. 80/63 f. 189-190.
Such assurances convinced few, and within Britain there was not only opposition to the French alliance but also doubts, among its supporters, as to how long it could last. Combined with the apparent failure of the Congress of Soissons to settle international problems, this produced a major debate in the press about British foreign policy. The government was attacked for its failure to protect British commerce from Spanish depredations, for the threats posed by the developing strength of the French nation, and for signs of French commercial and maritime activity, ranging from repairs to the harbour at Dunkirk, to French colonial activities in North America and the West Indies.\(^1\) The difficulties affecting trade and industry were blamed on the international situation. The uncertainty in European affairs was blamed on the government, which was accused of being subservient to the French and unduly tolerant of Spanish activities.\(^2\) Anxiety also affected the price of stocks. This was noted by the press and by foreign diplomats, such as Chammorel. Other diplomats noted the increase in opposition to the government.\(^3\)


The increase they were reporting was that of London. Diplomats were often unduly influenced by the opinions held by colleagues, by their links with members of the opposition, and by the, to them, unusual freedom of the press in Britain. However, the strong attacks mounted in such provincial newspapers as Farley's Bristol Newspaper suggest that not only London was influenced by criticisms of the government's foreign policy. The degree of concern felt throughout Britain is impossible to measure, but the ministry were certainly worried by the impending session.¹

It was widely held in diplomatic circles that the government would encounter major difficulties with Parliament. Chesterfield was told by an Austrian supporter at the Hague, 'that if nothing were concluded before the meeting of the Parliament, the nation, that was already uneasy at the expense, would be extremely exasperated at the continuance of it'. Kinsky informed Eugene that the ministry were worried about what they would be able to tell Parliament and feared that the continued uncertainty of affairs would make them unpopular. Chesterfield wrote to Townshend that it was believed in the Hague that there would be trouble in Parliament, and that Slingelandt had asked him whether the government majorities were secure in both houses of Parliament.²


2. Chesterfield to Townshend, 1 Oct., 28 Dec. 1728, PRO.84/302 f. 11, 217; Kinsky to Eugene, 25 Sept. 1728, Vienna, GK. 94(b); Anon. French memoire, 8 Nov. 1728, AE.CP.Ang. 364 f. 313, 316; Fonseca to Eugene, 14 Nov. 1728, Vienna, GK. 85a f.206; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus, 5 Jan. 1729; AST.LM.Aut. 59; Knatchbull, 31 Jan. (os) 1729, p.82. Poyntz reported, 'The Court of Madrid have rec'd letters from England wch. give them great hopes from divisions in the insuing session, with an acct. of a strong Imperial party in England, and the approaching ruin of Los Walpole.'. Poyntz to Delafay, 25 Dec. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 420. St. Saphorin noted that 'la Cour Impériale se flatoit, à chague ouverture du Parlement, que les choses y prendroient un tour désagréable a fe' sa Majesté', St. Saphorin to Townshend, Aug. 1727 PRO. 80/61.
The Jacobites spread reports that there would be trouble in Parliament. The Prussians hoped that 'the business of Ostfrise and Mecklenburg might make a noise amongst us'.

Given these expectations it was obvious that the ministry had to ensure a successful session in order to maintain their credibility in Europe. Chesterfield wrote 'to suggest the necessity of the strongest addresses imaginable from both houses at the meeting of the Parliament, in order to undeceive people abroad'. Walpole's political position seemed secure so long as the diplomatic situation did not deteriorate. There are few hints of any serious challenges to Walpole from within the ministry in the second half of 1728. Despite press reports that Carteret would be promoted he remained in Ireland. There are a few scraps of evidence that suggest that tension still existed between Walpole and the ministers allied to Wilmington. Chammorel reported in November that it had been believed that Dorset, Scarborough and Wilmington would be removed. Zamboni reported that Scarborough would be dismissed. The anonymous French 'Memoire sur l'Etat present de la Grande Bretagne', written on December 31st noted

1. Waldegrave to Horatio Walpole, 8 Jan., Tilson to Waldegrave, 31 Jan. (os) 1729, Chewton; Poyntz to Delafaye, 29 Jan. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f.92; De Buy to Manteuffel, 29 Feb. 1729, Dresden, 3105, 2, f.107; Sutton to Tilson, 11 Mar. 1729, PRO. 81/123.
2. Chesterfield to Townshend, 28 Dec. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f.271.
4. Farley's Bristol Newspaper 2 Nov. (os) 1728; Newcastle Courant 2 Nov. (os) 1728.
5. Walpole claimed that Wilmington was responsible for George's inconvenient demand that Parliament make good the deficiency in the Civil List funds, Hervey, I, 100-1.
that George still had a lot of confidence in Wilmington. However, these suggestions do not amount to much, and most contemporaries felt that Walpole was in secure control of the government. Relations with George had improved following the departure of Carteret, Chesterfield and St. Saphorin. George's early enthusiasm for intervening in all the departments of government had waned, and Walpole's control of financial affairs was unchallenged by the autumn of 1728.

George was not so easily satisfied in the sphere of foreign policy. His response to the Spanish and Austrian disavowals of the provisional treaty was to argue that they must be coerced into accepting the treaty. He hoped that the return of Sinzendorf to Vienna might lead the Austrians to reverse their disavowal of his actions, but he had no intention of relying on persuasion only. On November 16th, when it was already clear that Louis XV had fully recovered from his smallpox attack, Townshend informed Chesterfield that 'a right spirit shew'd on the part of the Hanover Allys will be a justification of Sinzendorf's conduct'. He added,


2. Kinsky to Eugene, 25 Sept. 1728, Vienna, GK. 94(b). The following February, D'Aix reported, 'Le Ministère a gagné Le Roi d'Angleterre, qui se laisse gouverner', D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 5 Feb. 1729, AST.LM.Ing. 35.

3. Walpole, however, claimed that he had been forced to ask Parliament to make good the deficiency in the Civil List funds by royal pressure, 'the King had intimated to him, if he could not or would not do it, His Majesty would find those who were both able and willing', Hertey, I, 100-1.

4. George also advocated the seizure of the Ostend Ships as a way to coerce Austria, George's comment, no date, on Newcastle to George II, 31 Oct. (os) 1728, PRO. 36/8 f. 268.
'H.M. is of the opinion that the Allys of Hanover should fix a time to the Emperor and to his Catholic Majesty for accepting the said provisional Treaty, declaring .... that if the Emperor and the King of Spain shall not accept .... the Allys of Hanover .... will endeavour jointly to do themselves and their subjects justice'.

This approach failed due to an absence of support from Britain's allies. The Dutch opposed the scheme and Fleury argued that an ultimatum would only serve to exacerbate matters. Both Fleury and the British Plenipotentiaries argued that the acceptance of the provisional treaty was delayed by 'misunderstandings' between Spain and Austria, and not by disputes involving Britain. Fleury felt that before the Hanover allies made any moves they should wait for a clarification of the relations between Spain and Austria. He hoped that the alliance between the two powers would collapse and that it would then be easier to negotiate with them from a position of strength.

The British therefore abandoned their scheme, Fleury having 'given hopes to Mr. Walpole that our common interests shall not suffer by this forbearance, and that he will bring matters to a

1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 5 Nov. (os), 17 Dec. 1728, PRO.84/302 f. 101-2, 245; King, p.70; 'Some loose Thoughts ....' anon memorial, autumn 1728, PRO. 103/110. Waldegrave argued that Charles VI should be 'very hard pressed', Waldegrave to Horatio Walpole, 8 Dec. 1728, BL.Add. 9138 f. 132.

2. Horatio Walpole to -, 28 Nov. 1728, PRO.78/188 f. 368; Chesterfield to Townshend, 23 Nov., 14 Dec. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 132, 208.

3. Townshend to Chesterfield, 26 Nov. (os), Chesterfield to Townshend, 14 Dec. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 149-150, 208; Stanhope and Horatio Walpole to Keene, 29 Nov., 7 Dec. 1728, BL.Add.32759 f. 232, 293; Horatio Walpole to [Delafaye], 30 Nov. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 370.
greater certainty before the meeting of the Parliament'.

The abandonment was made with a bad grace. The British were dissatisfied with the Dutch and the French, and suspicious of French attitudes. Newcastle ordered the British envoys in Paris to persuade France to act vigorously, but the British government realised that France was disinclined to do so. Despite Horatio Walpole's assurances about Fleury's firmness, the government was displeased with the French, largely on account of what Horatio called 'the darling point of Mecklenburg'. George argued that the French were failing to support him over Mecklenburg. He believed that Fleury should have insisted in his talks with Sinzendorf that a settlement of the question was a major priority, and he adopted the somewhat surprising argument that his difficulties over Mecklenburg were due to his French alliance. Townshend, who, in his correspondence with the British plenipotentiaries, paid much attention to German matters and Hanoverian pretensions, argued that 'the King can never submit to see his Prussian Majesty brought into Mecklenburg by the influence of the court of Vienna, and placed there as an instrument of their wrath and vengeance agt. H.M. for continuing to cultivate that strict union with France...

1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 26 Nov. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 150.
2. 'Some loose Thoughts ...' anon., no date, PRO. 103/110. Horatio Walpole confessed that he was 'quite sick with these useless cautions and fears' of the French, Horatio Walpole to [Delafaye], 28 Nov. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 368.
He also claimed that should any power seek to drive the Hanoverian troops out of Mecklenburg, George would have the same right to the assistance of his allies, by the defensive clauses in the Hanover treaty, as if they should attack his troops in any part of his own dominions.¹

Tension was not restricted to the Empire, where George also felt that the French were neglecting to keep him informed about their negotiations with the Wittelsbachs and failing to support the Dutch over the East-Friesland question.² The French and the Dutch were very anxious about suggestions that the British would undertake naval action against the Spaniards, and, in particular, seize the Spanish treasure fleet. Chammorel noted that there was a lot of talk in London about the need for naval action against Spain, while Zamboni reported that an attack on the galleons had only been prevented by pressure from Britain's allies. Hop, the Dutch envoy, pressed Townshend against such an attack. The French, who had a very large interest in the cargo of the treasure fleet, also made their opposition clear.³

The Hanover alliance was therefore in bad shape at the end of

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1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 29 Nov. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 176; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 10 Oct. (os) 1728, BL. Add. 9138 f. 11; Kinsky to Eugene, 11 Jan. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 17.

2. Townshend to Chesterfield, 3 Dec. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 188; Newcastle to Stanhope and Horatio Walpole, 3 Dec. (os) 1728, BL. 32759 f. 341.

3. Townshend to Chesterfield, 6 Dec. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 203; Zamboni to the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, 24 Dec. 1728, Darmstadt, D. EI. M 10/6; London Evening Post, 26 Dec. (os) 1728; Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 31 Dec. 1728. ASV. LH. Ing. 98 f. 89; Le Coq to Augustus, 4 Apr. 1729, Dresden, 2733 f. 145. Horatio Walpole was concerned by Spanish naval armaments, Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 29 Oct. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 345.
1728.1 The British had disliked their secondary role at Soissons and distrusted Fleury's secret diplomacy, but they had been willing to accept the situation, albeit grudgingly, whilst this diplomacy had appeared successful. The failure of the provisional treaty and the collapse of the Soissons negotiations2 made it clear that Fleury's diplomatic control was not going to produce the necessary solutions. Fleury's response, a hope that Sinzendorf would regain control in Vienna and a reliance upon the incompatibilities of Austria and Spain as partners,3 was too passive not only for George, but also for the British ministry. Many of the British diplomats were heartily fed up with the French alliance.4

Fleury believed that, in order to encourage the breakdown of the Austro-Spanish alliance, it was necessary to avoid antagonising either power, as he feared that that would serve to unite the two powers more strongly. Therefore, he resisted George's demands for forceful French intervention in German politics, and opposed any idea of an attack upon the Spanish treasure fleet. Nevertheless, French policy was not totally passive. Within the Empire, France was actively wooing the Wittelsbach Electors.5 In so doing she was looking not only to the immediate future but also to the more distant future. By gaining the Wittelsbachs France would succeed

1. Zamboni suggested that the Anglo-French alliance, 'dans toute apparence ne saurait etre d'une longue durée', Zamboni to Manteuffel, 10 Dec. 1728, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 46.
4. Stanhope to Newcastle, 9 Dec. 1728, BL. 32759 f. 322; Waldegrave to Finch, 5 Jan. 1729, Chewton; Poyntz to Delafaye, 25 Dec. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 421.
5. Poyntz to Chesterfield, 13 July 1728, PRO. 84/301, f. 76; Wilson, pp.193-4.
in matching Britain's alliance system within the Empire and in weakening Austrian influence. In addition, there are signs that several French ministers, such as their envoy at the Imperial Diet Chavigny,¹ and Belle-Isle² were giving serious thought to the possibility of undermining Austrian power by supporting a Bavarian candidature for the Imperial throne on the death of Charles VI. There are few hints about British views on this matter. The absence of a British series in the State Papers comparable to the French 'Memoires et Documents' makes it difficult to piece together British views on long-term diplomatic strategy. In 1725 Townshend had written that,

'if His Impl. Majesty will drive us to a necessity of doing our utmost against him, there are Princes enough to be found, who having France and England at their head, would under their influence and with their assistance, undertake to tear the greatest part of his dominions from him'.³

Such an attitude persisted in the early years of George II's reign, but alongside it was the view that Austria should be chastened in order to persuade her to follow sound policies. The idea of policies 'natural' to each particular state was very common in the period. Each state was believed to possess naturally only one policy, and any alteration from it was a distortion, a perversion of sound policy wrought by corruption or incompetence, the product of misguided

¹. St. Saphorin thought highly of Chavigny, St. Saphorin to Townshend, 22 Ap., Woodward to Tilson, 2 May, St. Saphorin to Tilson, 1 Aug. (os) 1727, PRO. 80/61.
². From his base at Metz General Belle-Isle controlled a network of informants within the Empire.
³. Townshend to Du Bourgay, 29 Oct. 1725, PRO. 90/19.
monarchs and evil ministers. For the British in this period there was no doubt that a British alliance was the 'natural' policy for Austria, a policy made inevitable by immutable Austrian interests.\textsuperscript{1} Such a mechanistic interpretation was in accord with and essential to the concept of the balance of power. A few brave spirits dismissed the balance of power as a childish and erroneous concept, but most saw it as essential to any correct operation of the international system.\textsuperscript{2}

By allying with Spain and antagonising Britain, Austria was being not only foolish but perverse, but opinions were divided as to what Britain should do about it. The problems posed by the French alliance, and the uneasy awareness that the marriages of the Austrian archduchesses could wreck the precarious stability of the European system, lent added weight to talk of an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation. From the end of 1728 till the following summer a reconciliation was to be seriously considered as a means to escape from the position of diplomatic nullity and failure that the French alliance had produced.

\textsuperscript{1} St. Saphorin to Tarouca, \textsuperscript{[- Aug. 1727]}, PRO. 80/61; Horatio Walpole referred to the French as being 'naturally in a constant state of rivalship and opposition to the Austrian family', Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 1 July 1728, Bradfer-Lawrence.

CHAPTER SEVEN

EARLY 1729

PARLIAMENTARY DISQUIET; APPROACH TO AUSTRIA

'Il y aura des debats et des harangues violent du parti contraire, mais la cour s'en mocquera comme des cris en l'air, sans force et sans effet'

anonymous French memoir of December 1728.

The opening of the Parliamentary session on February 1st 1729 saw a sustained attack upon the government's foreign policy. Vernon attacked the French as a threat to British commerce and a false ally; John Norris proposed that the King should be addressed to break the alliance with France; Sir Wilfred Lawson argued that it was dangerous to trust to French mediation, adding that, if war broke out, France would never support Britain against Spain, a view held by many diplomats. Those ministerial speeches that are recorded did not dwell on foreign affairs, but attacked the opposition press. The government's majority was a large one, 249 against 87, but its size owed something to divisions among the opposition. The Tories and the opposition Whigs had not cooperated on their parliamentary tactics, which led William Shippen, the Jacobite, to abuse

1. Anon., 'Memoire sur l'Etat present de la Grande Bretagne', 31 Dec. 1728, AE.CP.Ang. 364, f. 395; Broglie to Chauvelin, 3 Jan. 1729, AE.CP.Ang. 365 f. 6; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 15 Nov. 1728, AST.LM.Ing.35.

2. Egmont, 21 Jan. (os) 1729, III, 330-2; Knatchbull, 21 Jan. (os) 1729, PRO. 81/123; Broglie to Chauvelin, 3 Feb., Chammorel to Chauvelin, 3 Feb. 1729, AE.CP.Ang. 365 f. 70, 72; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 7 Feb. 1729, AST.LM.Ing. 35; Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 18 Feb. 1729, ASV.LM.Ing. 98 f. 113. There was no division upon the Lords' adress. Norris, "P. for Rye, first spoke against the government on this issue. Lawson, MP. for Cockermouth, was one of the leading opposition Whigs.
Pulteney in the House. Ten days later, in the debate on the size of the army, a debate that did not produce a division, the government was again helped by the divided state of the opposition. Foreign diplomats commented on this and noted reports that the government was attempting to profit from the splits. Broglie reported that George and Caroline were wooing the Tory leader Sir William Wyndham, and that the ministry hoped to detach Pulteney from Bolingbroke.

However, attacks upon the government persisted and became more serious. Sir Thomas Saunderson, a brother of Scarborough's, who had been refused a peerage by George, went over to the opposition and launched a strong attack upon the French alliance. The alliance was unpopular but the government was better able to defend it than their position over Spanish depredations. A petition had been prepared by merchants trading to America and the West Indies, complaining of the depredations. On March 24th, during the debate on the petitioners' evidence, the government carried a procedural point by a majority of only 180 against 145. Zamboni reported that,

2. Knatchbull, 31 Jan. (os) 1729, p. 82; Duncan Forbes to John Forbes, 1 Feb. (os) 1729, Duff, Culloden Papers p. 104; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 14 Feb. 1729, AE.CP.Ang. 365 f. 103.
'Le parti opposé au présent ministère a commencé a gagner de l'avantage. Dans la dernière division il y eut 145 voix .... contre 180; et il est aussi à savoir que 20 membres du premier parti étoient absents lorsque la division arriva. Ceci donne de l'apprehension aux présens minitres.'

He added that it was generally believed in Britain that wherever the opposition vote in parliament exceeded 150 the government would fall.1

The government majority fell during the session. In the early debates they had enjoyed substantial majorities,2 though less than those of the previous session. The government won their motion to refer the mercantile petition to a committee of the whole House, rather than a private committee, by 240 against 129; Lord Morpeth's motion asking for an address to enquire about the help France had given Britain for the preservation of Gibraltar was defeated on February 16th by 235 against 80;3 the subsidy for the Hessians was renewed by 298 against 91 on February 18th,4 and a financial debate a week later produced a majority of 257 against 90.5

1. Zamboni to Manteuffel, 29 Mar. 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 59; Knatchbull, 13 Mar. (os) 1729, pp. 91-2; Sedgwick, I, 38; Thomas, House of Commons p. 275.


Thereafter the majorities, as recorded in Knatchbull's parliamentary diary, fell. On April 1st, in the debate over the Lords' resolution relating to Gibraltar and Minorca, the opposition proposal to insist 'that all pretensions on the part of the crown of Spain to the said possessions be specifically delivered up' was defeated by 267 against 111. Lady Irwin informed her father that Walpole had been so pressed that he had asked George for permission to retire to the Lords.¹ On April 6th in the debates over the contested elections for Newton and Great Bedwyn the majorities were 166 against 147 and 150 against 119.² After the Easter recess the majorities in the debate on April 27th on the deficiency in the Civil List were 181 against 106, and 154 against 101, although, in the debates on the same subject on May 4th, the majorities rose to 296 against 122 and 241 against 115.³

The reason for these falling majorities is unclear.⁴ Division lists survive for only one debate in the session, that on May 4th for making good the arrears in the Civil List. Thus, an analysis such as that undertaken by Langford for the 1733 session, from which three division lists have survived, is impossible for the 1729 session. Judging from the votes it is clear that the decreasing majorities were due not to the small increase in the opposition

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1. Lady Irwin to Earl of Carlisle, 22 Mar. (os) 1729, Carlisle, p. 59; Vignola to Doge of Venice, 15 Ap. 1729, ASV.LM.Ing. 98 f. 137; Knatchbull, 21 Mar. (os) 1729, pp. 92-3; Marini, p. 127.
4. Zamboni claimed that George's avarice limited the financial inducements at Walpole's disposal, Zamboni to Manteuffel, 24 May 1729, Bodl.Rawl. 120 f. 67.
vote but to the major drop in the ministerial vote.¹

Possibly the abstentions reflect a feeling among governmental M.P.s that the ministerial majority was too strong to be shaken, and that they were therefore free to absent themselves, after the major debates at the beginning of the session. Colley has suggested that the voting discipline of the Tories was stronger than that of the ministerial Whigs, which may account for the situation.² It was widely argued by the opposition, in Jacobite circles and in Europe that the government was able to dominate Parliament thanks to corruption, to the tempting prizes that it could offer. On February 11th William Pulteney stated in the Commons that

'the power of pensions and places is so great that there are at least 200 men in employment of the House who are so convinced of the rightness of the measures taken, and always taken, they never give a wrong vote'.³

This was an argument rejected by the government. The ministry argued that it enjoyed its majorities thanks to an ability to persuade Parliament of the wisdom of its' policies. Townshend informed Poyntz in February that Fleury was,

'mistaken, if he thinks that the Parliament is influenced by money, to be thus unanimous in the supporting H.M. in all he has done. This zeal proceeds from the chief men in both houses being convinced, that the measures H.M. has hitherto taken are right; but these persons, tho' they have heartily concurred in what

2. Colley, Defiance p. 81.
3. Egmont, 31 Jan. (os) 1729, III, 341; Marini, p. 124; Dickinson, Walpole, pp. 81-2; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 15 Nov.1728, AST. LM.Ing. 35; Pentenridter to Fonseca, 22 Mar. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 21, f. 341.
has been done hitherto, are under the greatest anxiety, at the uncertain state of our affairs; and will not be kept much longer in suspense'.

Townshend was writing in order to persuade Fleury to act 'a friendly part towards the king'.¹ Foreign diplomats often argued that the British ministry exaggerated their difficulties with Parliament in order to persuade their allies not to force them to undertake policies they disliked, such as the restitution of Gibraltar. There was probably some truth in this view, particularly when it came to the British government explaining why they were forced to take commercial steps, such as import prohibitions, unfavourable to their allies. However, in general, Townshend's claim was better founded. There is very little evidence surviving as to how the 'Robinocracy' operated in practice; evidence for Walpole's management of the Parliamentary sessions of the late 1720s is scant. The seductive lures of place and pension doubtless existed for many but their operation in practice is difficult to confirm for M.P.s. It is too easy to resort to the glib view that Walpole's control over the resources of the Treasury ensured his control over Parliament. In practice the ministerial M.P.s, and their counterparts in the Lords, were capable of considerable independence.² Many were extremely well-informed about European

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 12 Feb. (os), 21 Feb. (quote) 1729, Coxe, II, 639, DL.Add. 48982, f. 150; Fleury to Horatio Walpole, 6 Feb. 1729, AE.CP:Ang. 368 f. 40-1; Newcastle to Poyntz, 20 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 96. Waldegrave discussed the same point with Sinzendorf, Waldegrave to Horatio Walpole, Jan. 1729, Chewton. Later in the year Townshend replied with similar arguments to the French suggestion of a secret British declaration promising peacetime subsidies to the Elector of Cologne, Townshend to Broglie, 3 Nov. (os) 1729, PRO. 100/9.

² Dickinson, Walpole pp. 82-4, 90-1; Plumb, p. 143.
events, and foreign travel, personal contacts and correspondence, and the press helped to spread knowledge about Europe. The quality of Parliamentary debates upon foreign affairs has recently been savagely attacked by J.R. Jones,

'Wilful misrepresentation of facts, sensationalism and pandering to popular prejudices, partisanship and appeals to xenophobia characterised most parliamentary debates .... the issues could be dramatised and presented in black and white terms of national honour or disgrace, of commercial prosperity or ruin, bravery or cowardice'.

An examination of the debates in the late 1720s would suggest that this is an unfair conclusion. The House of Commons contained several diplomats or former diplomats and some of these contributed their knowledge to the debates. Though envoys such as Edward Finch and William Finch rarely attended Parliament and are never recorded as having spoken, this was not the case with such former envoys as Sir Robert Sutton, Methuen, Hedges and Dodington. The debates recorded for the session of 1729 reveal a high standard of argument. Much information was presented to the Commons, Horatio Walpole beginning his speech on February 11th, in defence of the continuation of the same number of land forces


1. Sedgwick, I, 140.
as in the preceding year, by 'an account of the proceedings of several courts of Europe and the Ministers employed at them'.

The speeches that are recorded reveal a knowledge of European developments and of the major points at issue in British foreign policy.

In the debates in 1729 the Walpoles found themselves forced to defend the Anglo-French alliance against strong attacks. They did so by claiming that France was a good ally to Britain as a result of structural factors in the international situation. Horatio Walpole 'affirmed France to be the most faithful to us though the whole course of these late differences, and for a good reason, she being the irreconcilable enemy to Austria.' Sir Robert Walpole declared 'that where some had compared Galica fides with Punica fides, we were to consider that states govern themselves by their interest and that the close alliance of Austria, the ancient enemy, with Spain made them as entirely sure to our alliance as heretofore they were enemies when they aimed at universal monarchy'.

These arguments were, however, being made increasingly redundant for two reasons. Firstly, public distrust of France had grown to obscure the earlier antagonism to Austria, and, secondly


2. Knatchbull, 31 Jan (os), 5 Feb. 1729, pp. 81, 84; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 18 Apr. 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Newsletter from London, 12 Mar. 1729, AG, A 2655, No. 24.


4. Public distrust of France had never been obscured, Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 4 May 1728, BL. Add. 32755, f. 362.
the ministry was increasingly ready to consider the possibility of an Austrian alliance. Linking these two developments, Chammorel reported in early April that in the face of opposition arguments for an Austrian alliance the ministry might adopt such an alliance rather than fall from power.¹

Foreign diplomats were very impressed by the ministerial control displayed in the early debates in the session,² but by March their attitude had changed. Increasingly they suggested that the ministry was losing control of the situation, and they identified foreign policy as the area where the government was most under strain. On March 7th Broglie reported that the different parties in the nation had united to demand that as soon as the galleons had arrived in Spain, Austria and Spain should be presented with an ultimatum demanding that they accept or refuse the provisional treaty. He added that the government, not being strong enough to resist the opinion 'commun de toute la nation, sont obliges d'y consentir'.³ Other diplomats attributed British suggestions of naval action against the galleons to popular pressure. The desire to act, rather than pressure for any specific action, was indeed strong within Britain.⁴ Due to the availability of naval power and the strong anti-Spanish nature of public opinion, pressure for action was directed against Spain. Over the preceding three

1. Chammorel to Chauvelin, 6 Ap. 1729, AE.CP.Ang. 366 f. 21; Villars, 1 May 1729, p. 171.
2. Robinson to Waldegrave, 10 Feb. 1729, Chewton; Kinsky to Eugene, 8 Feb. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 24.
years there had been a marked development of anti-Spanish feeling within Britain. Spanish depredations upon British commerce were viewed with considerable anger, as was the Spanish attempt to regain Gibraltar. The Spanish siege of Gibraltar in 1727 had been followed with great attention by all sections of the British press. In comparison, expressions of anti-Austrian feeling were more muted, a fact noted by the Austrians.  

The ministry could not ignore the pressure for action. Townshend informed Waldegrave that it was 'the universal sense of this nation, that a speedy decision, should one way or other be obtained .... how necessary it is thought here to get out of the present uncertain situation of affairs'.  

It was no longer sufficient to argue that Britain should trust to the path of negotiation and the aid of France. The Walpoles adopted this attitude in Parliament, although it is not clear how far they were disillusioned with the French alliance. Horatio Walpole informed Fleury that Parliament was satisfied with governmental assurances of French fidelity, but he pressed the need for an end to diplomatic uncertainties and argued that the Hanover allies should come to a joint resolution to present an ultimatum and take action as in the spring of 1727. This method was still

1. Sinzendorf told the Dutch envoy in Vienna, Bruyninx, that the Austrian ministry 'thought the Parliament of England might advise H.M. to a rupture with Spain but was in no apprehension that the Parliament would meddle with the Emperor'. Waldegrave to Townshend, 15 Jan. 1729, Chewton.

2. Townshend to Waldegrave, 4 Feb. (os) 1729, Chewton; Le Coq to Augustus, 4 Apr. 1729, Dresden, 2733 f. 144; De Brais to Augustus, 29 Apr. 1729, Dresden, 2735, I, f. 24-5.

being rejected by the French in early 1729 as it had been late in the previous year. Nevertheless the French assured Britain of their continued support for the alliance, providing George with conspicuous diplomatic support over Mecklenburg in the winter of 1728-9. Chambrier was informed that France would oppose any Prussian attempt to occupy Mecklenburg and would give military support to Britain if Hanover were attacked.¹

French opposition also blocked any idea of an attack upon the Spanish treasure fleet. Faced with this situation and with the failure of the Austro-Spanish alliance to disintegrate, as had been hoped for by the French, the British ministry was in a difficult diplomatic situation. Hopes that Sinzendorf and Bournonville would persuade Austria and Spain to accept the provisional treaty had proved abortive. Suspicion increased that both powers were only trying to delay matters until the return of the galleons. D'Aix, noting the threat to the government's position in Parliament and the pressure for war, reported that the ministry were opposed to following the French lead and continuing the negotiations to persuade Spain and Austria to accept the provisional treaty.² It was

¹. Chambrier to Frederick William I, 10 Dec. 1728, 10 Jan. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 135, AE.CP. Prusse, 88; Schleinitz to the Duke of Wolfenbüttel, PRO. 78/190 f. 24; Poyntz to Newcastle, 14 Jan., 6, 27 Feb., 11 Mar. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 38, 135, 235, 280. Pressure was also brought to bear on the Austrians: Fonseca to Eugene, 12 Dec. 1728, Vienna, GK., 85a, f. 210; Hughes, pp. 382-3. Pleasure was expressed at the French stance over Mecklenburg, Newcastle to Poyntz, 25 Dec. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 479.

². D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 27 Dec. 1728, 18 Ap. 1729, AST.LM.Ing. 35; Zamboni to Mantuuffel, 1 Mar. 1729, Bodl., Rawl. 120 f. 56. Frederick William doubted that the Anglo-French alliance could survive its failure to satisfy the views of the British nation, Frederick William to Chambrier, 1 Jan. 1729, AE. CP. Prusse 88.
against this background that Britain responded to initiatives for a reconciliation from Prussia and Austria.¹

¹ The diplomatic situation led to predictions of a possible Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, O'Rourke to James III, 11, 17 Dec. 1728, Vienna, England, Varia, 8 f. 215, 216.
In autumn 1728 George II received a letter from his sister Sophia Dorothea, the Queen of Prussia, proposing, in the King of Prussia's name, the marriage of Frederick, Prince of Wales, and Wilhemina, the Prussian Princess Royal. Queen Caroline sent a very vague reply, which produced an enthusiastic Prussian response. George then told Caroline to inform Sophia Dorothea that he wanted not only the marriage of Frederick and Wilhemina, but also that of the Prussian Crown Prince, Frederick, and a British Princess, though not the Princess Royal, who was intended for William IV of Orange.  

George's response was cautious and reflected his suspicions of Frederick William and his views upon his reliability. Chesterfield however was sufficiently optimistic to seek appointment as the ambassador to be sent to Prussia to arrange the marriages and Townshend was willing to help him in this. The Dutch ministers expressed pleasure at the prospect of the marriages. For them Anglo-Prussian diplomacy was safer than the scheme for a British marriage for William IV of Orange, a scheme that was to embitter Anglo-Dutch relations in 1729. Townshend sent a despatch to Stanhope and Horatio Walpole which reflected an optimistic view of Prussian intentions, 'tho' his Prussian Majt. has a great mind to get some

1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 12, 29 Nov. (os), Chesterfield to Townshend, 25 Dec. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 126, 184-5, 257; Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 12 Nov., Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 3 Dec. (os) 1728, BL.Add. 9138 f. 120-1. 123; Marini, pp. 123, 125.

2. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 11 Oct. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 427-8; Townshend to Chesterfield, 12 Nov. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 126; Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 18 Dec. 1728, Bradfer Lawrence.

3. Chesterfield to Townshend, 30 Nov., Townshend to Chesterfield, 29 Nov. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 153, 180.
hold of Mecklenburg at this juncture, by the means of this new commission, yet he is desirous of doing it with our Master's good liking, and in concert with him; which by the help of this match, and of one of our Princesses with the Prince Royal of Prussia he hopes may be compassed.' Fleury, when approached, said that France approved of the scheme for a double match with Prussia so long as Jülich and Berg were clearly assigned to the Sulzbach claimants. The British replied by stating that it was not in Hanover's interests for Prussia to acquire Jülich-Berg, and that Britain would only support Prussian schemes if France failed to help Hanover. However, the Jülich-Berg issue proved to be a major stumbling block to the attempt to combine the British and French strategies for German diplomacy. The French, keen to acquire the support of the Wittelsbachs, demanded that George should guarantee the Sulzbach claim to Jülich-Berg as a precondition for any French action under the guarantee she was already engaged to with respect of Mecklenburg.

Prussia was believed to favour a reconciliation due to a deterioration in her relations with Austria, but the urgency of the Jülich-Berg issue produced by the ill-health of the Elector Palatine, and the need to retain French support for the session, helped to block the development of good relations. Frederick William was more hopeful of gaining his way by a deterioration in Anglo-French relations, and the British were unwilling to guarantee the Prussian claim to Jülich-Berg. The approach therefore came to nothing. It is difficult to establish

1. Townshend to the British Plenipotentiaries, 3 Dec. (os) 1728, BL.Add. 9138 f. 123-4. The same attitude had been expressed in May 1728, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 21 May (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 209-10.
how seriously George and Frederick William were willing to make an effort to establish good relations. Sophia Dorothea was always keener on British marriages than her husband, and Frederick William never displayed much enthusiasm for the double marriage project. He was keener on a single marriage, that of Wilhemina and the Prince of Wales. Neither side displayed much willingness to yield over Mecklenburg, and both were unwilling to risk alienating their principal ally for the uncertainty of marital negotiations. By 1730 the situation was to have changed, but by then Austria appeared less able to support Prussia, and the British ministry was divided over the French idea of an alliance with the Wittelsbachs.
In October 1728 Rialp, sounding Waldegrave on the possibility of an Anglo-Austrian rapprochement, observed that 'it was the natural interest of both powers to be well together; that we could never be jealous of each other's greatness'. The arrival of Kinsky, the only envoy of any of the powers in the Vienna alliance in London, led to speculation in the autumn of 1728 that Austria desired a reconciliation with Britain. Soundings were taken by both sides during the late autumn and winter, and in the early spring of 1729 the British ministry took a major initiative in an attempt to produce an Anglo-Austrian alliance. The British approach was to fail, largely because of a poor Austrian response, but it was of great importance because it revealed the lack of support within the British ministry for the French alliance. Anglo-Austrian negotiations in this period have received little scholarly attention, and it is necessary to examine them in some detail in order to piece together the train of events.

The disavowal of Sinzendorf, suspected by the British of being overly keen on a French alliance, led to hopes in Britain that the Austrian ministry would be more sympathetic to British

3. Eugene to Kinsky, 20 Feb. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 19.
interests. Eugene was believed, correctly, to be more interested in approaching Britain rather than France. The Austrian envoy at the Hague 'made the strongest and most publick declaration imagi-
nable of the Emperor's good dispositions towards England and this Republic.'\(^1\) Kinsky was ordered to attempt to improve relations.

The initial moves to improve relations failed. Kinsky reported in early December that there was no prospect of his approach succeeding and the British displayed little confidence in him.\(^2\) Chesterfield argued that neither Kinsky, nor the Austrian envoy at The Hague, Sinzendorf, the son-in-law of the Chancellor, had any real knowledge of Austrian intentions.\(^3\)

In late January 1729 the situation changed. Queen Caroline and Stanhope pressed Kinsky with the idea of an alliance, and Kinsky reported the revival of discussions with Townshend.\(^4\) Kinsky himself knew little of the intentions of his court,\(^5\) and the British, who had a low opinion of him, made it clear that they preferred negotiations to be handled at Vienna. In the summer of 1729 Stanhope informed Kinsky's brother, Count Stephen Kinsky, one of the Austrian plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Soissons, that he had been instructed to approach Philip Kinsky by George II and Queen Caroline.\(^6\) From the evidence that survives it seems that

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1. Chesterfield to Townshend, 26 Oct., 12 Nov. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 67, 99; Chesterfield to Waldegrave, 10 Dec. 1728, Chewton.
2. Kinsky to Eugene, 1 Dec. 1728, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 7.
3. Chesterfield to Townshend, 5, 12 Nov. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f.85, 99.
4. Kinsky to Charles VI, 18, 25, 28 Jan. 1729, Vienna, EK. Kart. 65; Kinsky to Eugene, 8, 25 Feb. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 26; Tilson to Waldegrave, 21 Jan. (os) 1729, Chewton; Townshend to Waldegrave, 25 Mar. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 175.
5. Kinsky to Eugene, 8 Feb. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94 (b) f. 26.
the negotiations in London were undertaken, under royal instructions, by Townshend and Stanhope. The choice of Townshend, knowledgeable in German affairs, was an obvious one, as Vienna was in his department. It is, however, interesting that Stanhope, then, like Horatio Walpole, in England for the parliamentary session, should have been chosen to talk to Kinsky. It seems that Horatio Walpole knew nothing of the approach.¹

Kinsky told Stanhope 'that his master was most earnestly desirous to be reconciled to the King', and he bitterly attacked both the Spanish alliance and the projected marriages between the Austrian archduchesses and the sons of Elisabeth Farnese. He sounded Stanhope on George's views on a marriage between Maria Théresa and Francis, the heir to the Duchy of Lorraine. Stanhope replied that George was very much in favour of the match. The Lorraine match had been canvassed for some time, but France was opposed to it, due to the traditional antagonism between the Dukes of Lorraine and the Crown of France, and to the fear that, whatever renunciations might be made, a Duke of Lorraine who was in control of the Imperial title and Austrian resources, might seek to reverse the seventeenth-century settlement of France's eastern border. By indicating his support for the match George was revealing that on the important issue of the future of the

¹ Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Keene, 17 Sept. 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 458. According to Zamboni, when George questioned them as to whether France would, in case of necessity, act vigorously and sincerely to support Britain, Horatio Walpole said yes, but Stanhope refused to commit himself, Zamboni to Mantegfelf, 18 Jan. 1729, Rodl. Rowl. 120 f. 50. Horatio Walpole was distrusted by the Austrians, 'puisqu'il etoit toujours à presumer que Walpole feroit un mavis usage près du Cardinal de la moindre ouverture qu'on pourroit luy faire directement', Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 24 Aug. 1729, Höfler, I, 110.
Empire his views were opposed to those of France.¹

Townshend told Kinsky that Austria must agree to sign the provisional treaty. Kinsky replied that Austria did not want to lose her Spanish subsidies, and feared that in order to win Spanish support Britain might lend Spain unfair aid in her attempt to secure Carlos in Italy.² The terms of the Treaty of Seville were to prove Kinsky correct but Townshend told him that Britain would be bound by the terms of the Quadruple Alliance in her Italian policy. This alliance, signed in 1718, provided that Carlos's right to the Farnese and Medici successions be recognized but stipulated that the duchies be treated as Imperial fiefs and that Carlos's right should be protected by neutral rather than Spanish garrisons. By declaring his continued support for these terms Townshend made it clear that Britain was willing, as part of the price for any Anglo-Austrian rapprochement, to support Austrian interests in Italy. In support of his demand that Austria should sign the provisional treaty Townshend argued that,

"by his Imp. Maty's signing the said treaty, the system of Europe would be put precisely upon the same foundation it stood upon before these late disturbances began; which would naturally, and without any violence offered to any engagements, throw their court and ours into the old Friendship and good correspondence, that had so long subsisted between them".

1. Townshend to Waldegrave, 16 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 90-1; Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 19 Ap. 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13, f. 497.

2. Kinsky had predicted that Austro-Spanish relations would inhibit an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, Kinsky to Eugene, 11 Jan. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 17.
Kinsky accepted Townshend's argument and promised to do his best to persuade the Austrian government to accept the idea. He told the British that he lacked the necessary instructions to open negotiations and would seek orders from Vienna. The British thought little of Kinsky and distrusted his links with 'those whose views naturally lead them to keep up the misunderstanding between his majesty and the Emperour.' Townshend complained that Kinsky, 'who seems not to be much versed in business and therefore may be more susceptible of jealousies and misapprehensions, is very apt to give ear to the dreams of little and underlying agents. If he follows such advisers .... he will give things a wrong turn, and exasperate matters'.

Tilson complained that 'our Dear Count is often hot and cold; sometimes easy, and sometimes out of humour, as fancys are inspired into him.'

One of these 'agents', the Modenese envoy Riva, persuaded Kinsky that Britain was secretly negotiating with Spain against Austria, and the British ministry was very suspicious of Riva.

1. Townshend to Waldegrave, 16 Feb. (os) 1729, Chewton.
3. Townshend to Waldegrave, 4 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 45.
4. Tilson to Waldegrave, 18 Mar. (os) 1729, Chewton; Waldegrave to [Tilson], 5 Feb. 1729, PRO. 80/64.
5. Townshend to Waldegrave, 4 Feb., 28 Mar. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64; Tilson to Waldegrave, 18 Mar. (os) 1729, Chewton; Townshend to Newcastle, 24 May (os) 1726, PRO. 35/62 f. 56; Wackerbarth to Augustus II, 22 June 1729, Dresden, 3331.I.f. 233-234. Vignola reported that secret Anglo-Spanish negotiations were being conducted in London, Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 25 Mar. 1729, AST.LM.Ing. 98 f. 126; Baudrillart, III, 495, n.1.
and of the Prussian and Saxon agents in London, Reichenbach and Zamboni. They were all close to Kinsky and were believed to possess strong links with members of the opposition. Townshend therefore decided to transfer the negotiations to Vienna where the envoy, Waldegrave, was a friend who owed his position to Townshend's support.

On February 27th Townshend sent Waldegrave secret instructions via Brigadier Richard Sutton, then at Cassel. Sutton was instructed to choose a servant 'whose diligence and secrecy' could be relied upon and send him secretly to Vienna. Carrington, the courier taking Townshend's instructions was delayed nearly a week at sea by contrary winds. He arrived at Cassel on March 5th, but further delay was caused by the fact that Sutton had travelled to Wolfenbüttel, and the instructions were not forwarded until the 10th. Caillaud, Sutton's domestic secretary reached Vienna with them six days later.

Townshend's instructions demanded satisfaction for Hanoverian claims,

'If the court of Vienna is sincerely desirous to renew the perfect friendship and harmony, which so long subsisted between them and us, they will of themselves see the necessity of doing H.M. as Elector justice upon several points, upon which the King, and his father, have so long, and with so much reason, complained. These are

1. Watzdorf to Augustus II, 5 Jan. 1731, Dresden, 2676, 1 f. 118.
2. Townshend to Sutton, 16 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 81/123; Sutton to Waldegrave, 10 Mar. 1729 Chewton.
3. Sutton to Townshend, 11 Mar. 1729, PRO. 81/123; Waldegrave to Townshend, 19 Mar. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 168.
matters of so little importance to the Emperor, and his Imperial Matj. has them so entirely in his own power, that it will be impossible for him ever to convince us that he sincerely desires our friendship, unless he does explain himself clearly and explicitly to the King's satisfaction upon those several articles. ¹

As Zamboni observed, 'Le Roy George demande beaucoup de l'Empereur'. ²

The secrecy of the British approach was soon lost. ³ Zamboni had reported it as serious on February 25th, ⁴ and the Saxon envoy in Vienna, Count Wackerbarth, was soon investigating the matter. On March 19th he suggested that talks were being conducted through Kinsky and on April 20th he noted the rumour that Waldegrave had received a secret courier. ⁵ On April 14th Chauvelin sent Chammorel the copy of a report that he had received from London. The report claimed that Britain was determined on an alliance with Austria and had sent Riva to Vienna to negotiate the matter. Chauvelin ordered Chammorel to investigate the report. ⁶

1. Townshend to Waldegrave, 16 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f.89-91.
3. Poyntz to Delafaye, 6 Feb. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 139.
5. He had already reported in January his suspicion that Britain would seek a reconciliation with Austria, Wackerbarth to Augustus II, 15 Jan., 5 Feb. 19 Mar., 13, 20 Ap., 4, 14 May 1729, Dresden, 3331, 1 f. 20, 66, 109, 111-2, 133, 139, 162, 187.
6. Chauvelin to Chammorel, 14 Ap. 1729, Anon'-report, 4 Ap. 1729, AE.CP.Ang.Sup 8 f. 111, 112; Tilson to Horatio Walpole, 10 Ap. (os) 1729, BL.Add. 48082 f. 157; Vignola to Doge of Venice, 1, 8 Ap. 1729, ASV.LM.Ing. 98 f. 132, 133. Seckendorf claimed that there would soon be an Anglo-Austrian alliance, Woodward to Tilson, 23 Ap. 1729, PRO. 88/35. Fleury questioned the British Plenipotentiaries 'upon the report of H.M.'s being concerned in a private negociation with the Emperor by the canal of Monsr. Riva', Plenipotentiaries to Newcastle, 25 Ap. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 412. Eugene noted that reports of Kinsky's discussions were widely disseminated, Eugene to Kinsky, 2 May 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 25.
Riva set out for Vienna carrying a letter from Townshend instructing Waldegrave to support his negotiations over some lawsuits pending between the Duke of Modena and the Emperor. Townshend sent a separate letter to Waldegrave informing him that George had no interest in the lawsuits the Duke of Modena had sought his support for, and that Riva was 'a dangerous and ill intentioned person'. Many were however convinced that he had been commissioned to undertake the Anglo-Austrian reconciliation. Waldegrave declared that Riva had nothing to negotiate on behalf of Great Britain, but Wackerbarth doubted this and noted that it was not usual for the representatives of small courts to dine with Sinzendorf, as Riva did on his arrival.

The Austrian response to Waldegrave's approach was a negative one. Waldegrave had warned Townshend at the beginning of January that Austria was unlikely to abandon its Spanish alliance, and that she was likely to delay all diplomatic moves until after the arrival of the galleons, so as not to jeopardise her claim to a share in the treasure. He had also warned that Sinzendorf had not lost influence, as had been believed, and that Sinzendorf, who had opposed the choice of Kinsky as envoy to Britain, intended that Kinsky's mission should fail. Waldegrave informed Townshend

1. Townshend to Waldegrave, 26 Mar. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 176; Vignola to Doge of Venice, 22, 29 Ap. 27 May 1729, ASV.LM.Ing. 98 f. 141, 146, 154.
2. Townshend to Waldegrave, 28 Mar. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64; Wackerbarth to Augustus II, 22 June 1729, Dresden, 3331, 1 f.233.
3. Wackerbarth to Augustus II, 28 May, 8 June 1728, Dresden, 3331, 1 f. 203, 211; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 29 Mar. 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 59; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus II, 22 June 1729, AST.LM.Aut. 59.
4. Waldegrave to Townshend, 1 Jan., 23, 26 Feb. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 7, 109, 122; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 11 Mar. 1729, Bodl.Rawl. 120 f. 57.
5. Waldegrave to Townshend, 1, 15 Jan. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 4-5, 30.
that when Viscounti told the Emperor that George and the British
nation supported a reconciliation with Austria, Charles gave the
curt reply, 'leurs actions ne le montrent guère.'

Replying to Townshend's instructions, Waldegrave reported
that the Austrian ministers did not keep him informed and that
they were opposed to the provisional treaty. Townshend mean-
while had had second thoughts, and on April 5th ordered Waldegrave
not to open himself to the Austrians unless they did so to him.

The Austrians 'response froide' did not end all moves towards
a reconciliation, although it led the naturally brusque George II
to show his displeasure to Kinsky. The Austrians distrusted
George. Eugene informed Kinsky that the British were negotiating
with Spain and Prussia and seeking to begin talks with the
Russians. He therefore urged Kinsky to be very cautious in his
conversations with the British ministers, although he was still
very keen to discover whether the British were sincerely in favour
of a reconciliation. Tension within the Empire increased
difficulties. Both the Mecklenburg and East-Friesland disputes

1. Waldegrave to Townshend, 18 Mar. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 172.
2. Waldegrave to Townshend, 19, 18, 26 Mar. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 168-
70, 172, 181. The Austrian government was also firm over the
Mecklenburg issue, Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 14 May, Memoire pour
servir d'instruction au Baron de Fonseca, 14 May 1729, Vienna,
5. Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky, 26 June 1729, Vienna, Fonseca,
13 f. 368; Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 31 Aug.
1729, Höfler, I, 117, 133; Beer, 'Geschichte der Politik Karl's
VI, pp. 53-4.
7. Eugene to Kinsky, 11 May 1729, Vienna, GK. 94 (b).
gave rise to serious concern in the spring of 1729. ¹ George was very angry about the Austrian attitude to both disputes, and he was determined to protect the Hanoverian position in the Mecklenburg dispute. ² Eugene argued that the Hanoverian position did not suggest any interest in a reconciliation, and added, 'le Roy songeant ne moins aux interets de l'Angleterre qu'à l'aggrandissement de se pays en Allemagne'. ³ Anglo-Austrian contacts persisted during the late spring of 1729, but the negative Austrian response to the initial approaches and George's determination not to be snubbed too frequently reduced the pace of the British approach. The British were also dissatisfied with the Austrian position at the Congress. The Austrian Plenipotentiary Baron Fonseca made it clear that the Austrians did not intend to depart from the position they had taken after the disavowal of Sinzendorf. He stated that they were determined to maintain the Ostend company, to demand an equivalent for the claims of the Duke of Holstein-Göttertorp, and 'to hang all matters upon the concurrence of Spain'. In London, Kinsky stressed that the Austrians were determined not to abandon their allies. Though he told the British that the Emperor was

1. Villars, 6, 30 Mar. 1729, pp. 163, 166; Townshend to Diemar, 1 May 1729, PRO. 100/15.

2. Newcastle to the British Plenipotentiaries, 5 May (os), Charles VI to George II, 8 Ap. 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 184, 186-9; Kinsky to Charles VI, 3, 8 Feb., 22 Mar. 1729, Vienna, EK. 65; Kinsky to Eugene, 8 Feb. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94 (b); D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 21, 28 Feb., 23, 30 May 1729, AST.LM.Ing. 35; Marini, pp. 125-6; Villars, 30 Mar. 1729, p. 166; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 26 Ap. 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 62.

3. Eugene to Kinsky, 2 May 1729, Vienna, GK 94 (b). Sutton reported that the Hessians were hopeful that the Austrian actions in the Mecklenburg dispute would sustain the situation of tension their subsidy depended upon, Sutton to Townshend, 24 Feb. 1729, PRO. 81/123.
'not averse to the Provisional Treaty', he was in fact ordered to withdraw from active negotiations.'

The reasons for the Austrian response were clear. As Waldegrave had stated, Austria, in grave fiscal problems and threatened with a serious weakening of its position within the Empire unless it could honour its subsidy treaties, was too dependent upon the prospect of Spanish gold to risk endangering its Spanish alliance by negotiating new treaties.

Eugene had assured the Spanish government that Austria was firmly determined to maintain its Spanish alliance and would not sign the provisional treaty without Spanish consent.

To agree to George's proposals would also have endangered Austria's Prussian and possibly its Russian alliance. In Russia, although Peter II's government was less sympathetic to the claims of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp than Catherine I had been, there was still a powerful Holstein interest.

'The affairs of Mecklenburg are at present the only object of the King's [Frederick William] and Prussian ministers' attention',


2. Waldegrave to Townshend, 19, 26 Mar. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 171, 182.

3. Eugene to La Paz, - Dec. 1728, Vienna, GK. 102 (a) f. 172-4.

4. Austro-Prussian links had been strengthened by the secret Treaty of Berlin of 23 Dec. 1728. Charles VI promised assistance in the Jülich-Berg dispute and Frederick William recognised the pragmatic sanction. For Austrian concern about the Prussian point of view, Instructions for Seckendorf, 30 June 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 271; Eugene to Kinsky, 20 Aug. 1729, Vienna, Kinsky, 2(b). The Austrian government was opposed to abandoning the interests of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, Instructions for Fonseca, 14 May 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13, f. 235.
Du Bourguy had reported in April. In March favourable sentiments expressed by the Prussian minister Borcke about the possibility of an agreement over Mecklenburg had led Townshend to write to him 'desiring to have a plan formed upon the principles he had laid down'. However, the British rejected Borcke's plan as unsatisfactory, and relations sharply deteriorated. The Austrians were therefore correct in concluding that satisfying George over his Hanoverian demands would endanger their Prussian alliance.

There was to be a revival in Anglo-Austrian contacts in June, but, by then, the collapse of the Austro-Spanish alliance had greatly changed the diplomatic situation. In the two preceding months the British had lost hope of a reconciliation with Austria and had turned back to the French alliance. The government reassured the French about their talks with Prussia and Austria. George's fears about Prussian intentions in Mecklenburg led him to reverse his attitude towards the Wittelsbachs. He declared his willingness to authorise Fleury 'to answer for him, to the Electors as to the guaranty relating to Juliers and Bergues in the manner His Eminence desired'. As George came into line behind French policy in the Empire, abandoning his approach to Prussia and showing increasing favour to Wittelsbach views, he

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2. Newcastle to Stanhope, 12 June (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 644.


4. Townshend to Newcastle, 13 Ap. (os) 1729, PRO. 43/77; Chesterfield to Townshend, 17 May 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 95.
also began to cooperate with French schemes to win Spain from Austria. By May 1729 the Anglo-French alliance had been reaffirmed, and the passivity and disunion of the previous winter had been replaced by an active cooperation.

The relationship between differences of opinion among the British ministers, and developments in British policy in the first five months of 1729 is obscure. Although there are suggestions of serious differences of opinion, it is difficult to paint even a partial picture of the situation.\textsuperscript{1} Evidence does not accumulate to any real extent until the summer of 1729, when Townshend accompanied George to Hanover. The correspondence between Townshend and Newcastle that has been preserved in the series State Papers, Regencies is a useful source for the clashes in policy that summer, but there is nothing comparable for the preceding months.\textsuperscript{2} This is a serious omission because it is clear that the clashes of the latter half of 1729, clashes that were to conclude finally, with Townshend’s resignation on May 26th 1730, did not owe their origin to the issues and events of the summer, but rather to already existing suspicions and differences of opinion.

In the autumn of 1729 these personal and policy differences produced two groups, one led by the Walpoles, Stanhope and Newcastle and the other by Townshend, Poyntz and Chesterfield.\textsuperscript{3} This

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\textsuperscript{1} In February 1729 Townshend wrote, with reference to the Anglo-French alliance, of ‘the reproaches I have with patience born upon the account of the share I had in forming this allyance’, Townshend to Poyntz, 21 Feb. (os) 1729, RL.Add. 48982 f. 152.

\textsuperscript{2} R. Sedgwick, ‘The Inner Cabinet from 1739 to 1741’, \textit{EHR} 34, (1919) pp. 295,301.

\textsuperscript{3} Newcastle to Stanhope, 15 Ap. (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 643.
division was to a certain extent the accidental product of the fusion of several disparate disputes. One of the major disputes was that between the two secretaries of state. Such clashes were not new, because the policy of dividing responsibility for British foreign policy and British diplomats between two roughly equal ministers, was one that was naturally inconvenient and productive of disputes.¹ In the mid 1720s Newcastle, without experience in diplomacy, tended to follow Townshend's advice. He announced, 'I shall in everything act in concert with my Ld. Townshend and according to the advice and instructions I shall have the pleasure of receiving from him.' Newcastle's biographer has suggested that this situation had altered by 1727, and that by the spring of that year Newcastle had defined a different policy to Townshend, one that was anti-Spanish rather than anti-Austrian.² Browning saw Newcastle as gradually gaining in experience, confidence and authority, and argued that by late 1728 'it was customarily Newcastle, not Townshend, who transmitted notes to the King about foreign affairs, even if the problems discussed fell solely within the sphere of the northern secretary'.³ No evidence is produced to support this assertion, and Browning's account of the struggle between Newcastle and Townshend is largely based upon Coxe, and is overtly hostile to Townshend.⁴ There is no evidence to support the claim that Newcastle had 'assumed command of foreign affairs' by late 1728. There is no sign of Newcastle playing any role in

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¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, 22 May (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 641–2; Browning, p. 45; B. Kemp, Sir Robert Walpole (1976) p. 51.
² Browning, pp. 49–50.
³ Browning, pp. 54–5.
⁴ Browning, p. 19.
the talks with Kinsky early in 1729. It is clear that the secret correspondence between Townshend and Poyntz met with royal approval; and Townshend stated that his orders to Poyntz to press Fleury to action originated with the King. Rather than Townshend vainly resisting the growing strength and pro-founder ideas of Newcastle, as Browning suggests, it seems to be the case that Newcastle was angered by his own weak position. Townshend corresponded with the British Plenipotentiaries at Soissons without consulting Newcastle, and there are no signs that Newcastle was consulted over the activities of Townshend's department, such as the instructions sent to Waldegrave. Townshend was determined to retain control of British foreign policy, or rather of those areas of policy that he regarded as being most important. Great play has been made of the fact that in the summer of 1729 control of Anglo-Spanish negotiations was transferred from Townshend and the King at Hanover to the British Plenipotentiaries in France operating under the orders of the Queen and the ministers in London. This has distracted attention from the fact that no such transfer occurred in the case of Anglo-Austrian negotiations. These were securely vested in the hands of George and Townshend. When Kinsky approached Newcastle and Robert Walpole, after George and Townshend had already left London for Hanover, they referred him to Hanover.

1. Townshend to Poyntz, 21 Feb. (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 640.
2. Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 14 May (os) 1728, Coxe, II, 623.
3. Cady, p. 214; Townshend to Newcastle, 29 July, 2 Sept. 1729, PRO. 43/79 f. 64-5, 43/80; King, 2 Sept. (os) 1729, p.110; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 4 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 211. In fact George and Townshend did intervene in the Anglo-Spanish negotiations, Townshend to Keene, 18 June, Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 11 Sept. 1729, PRO. 94/100, BL.Add. 32763 f. 253-7.
The British Plenipotentiaries received no instructions about negotiations with Austria despite the fact that the Austrian representatives in Paris, Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca were senior to Philip Kinsky, and, in the late summer of 1729, ready to negotiate with the British.¹

Determined to retain control of the important areas of British foreign policy Townshend clashed not only with Newcastle, but also with the Walpoles. Sir Robert was increasingly concerned about the domestic repercussions of British foreign policy, and he differed with Townshend over the best policy to follow. Newcastle and Sir Robert Walpole favoured making up with Austria, but Townshend 'differs toto coelo'.² Linked to these clashes were the conflicting ambitions of several major politicians. Methuen sought to become Secretary of State as did Chesterfield. Stanhope wanted a peerage and an end to diplomatic postings. When Methuen resigned, as Treasurer of the Household, Stanhope attempted, un成功fully, to gain the post.³ Horatio Walpole denied any interest in becoming Secretary of State, but his protestations were doubted by many. The British representatives in France, Poyntz, Stanhope and Horatio Walpole operated in an atmosphere of mutual distrust receiving contradictory instructions from

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1. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 22 Sept. (os) 1729, BL.Add. 32763 f. 264-5. When Fonseca and Stephen Kinsky approached the British Plenipotentaries they were referred to Hanover, Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Keene, 17 Sept. 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 458.

2. Newcastle to Stanhope, 2 June (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 641; Kemp, Walpole p. 51. In the summer of 1728 Horatio Walpole made clear his total opposition to any Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 1 July 1728, Bradfer Lawrence. The Austrian government regarded Townshend as particularly anti-Austrian, Charles VI to Kinsky, 26 June 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13 f. 368.

London. Poyntz was in close touch with Townshend, Stanhope with Newcastle.

These varied ambitions and disputes were already of considerable importance before George and Townshend left for Hanover, though it is very difficult to distinguish their relation to developments in British policy. In particular, their influence upon the abortive Anglo-Austrian talks of the early months of the year, is unclear. The talks held in London are particularly obscure. It is not clear whether Stanhope or Kinsky made the first advances. After the talks had collapsed, both sides claimed that the other had made the first approach. The Austrians sought to embarrass Britain with their allies, whilst the British were determined to defeat any such attempt and to show that they had rejected Austrian approaches and been faithful to their allies. Nevertheless it could be asked why, if Kinsky made the first approach, he made it to Stanhope and not to Townshend whose department such negotiations were part of, and why, if the British made the first approach, it should have come from Stanhope and not Townshend. One answer was advanced by the Austrian Plenipotentiaries in Paris. In November 1729 they informed Charles that in the previous summer Stanhope, then in Paris, had explained the situation to Stephen Kinsky,

2. Newcastle to Stanhope, 22 May (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 642.
'il me donna à connoitre ... que la Reine sachant qu'il n'y avait pas encore alors la plus parfaite intelligence et familiarité établie entre le comte Philippe Kinsky, et autant que je me souviens, mylord Townshend, elle n'avoit pas voulu se servir de ce Ministre pour faire ces ouvertures'.

Whether the Queen also attempted to keep Townshend in the dark is unclear, but, if so, she failed. It could be suggested that the moves Townshend made in February 1729 were designed to hinder the Anglo-Austrian negotiations or at least to bring them under his personal role and restrict the participation of the Queen and Stanhope. By moving the negotiations from London to Vienna he brought them under his own control. This was further secured by the fact that they would be conducted by his own protégé Waldegrave, and that the security of his communications with Waldegrave would be controlled by his friend Sutton. Having brought the negotiations under control, he remoulded them to conform to his own views. Waldegrave's instructions were firm, if not harsh, making it clear that Austria would have to discard


2. Kinsky complained to Chesterfield, 'of the unkind reception he had met with in England, and that notwithstanding his master's good disposition, and his own earnest endeavours to accommodate matters, he had found no willingness in England to contribute to so desirable an end', Chesterfield to Townshend, 11 June 1729, PRO. 84/304, f. 43.
Prussian interests and submit to the indignity of having a Prince of the Empire dictate to the Emperor the settlement of several Imperial disputes. Townshend also denied the Austrian claim that the Queen had sent for Kinsky, and, going further than Stanhope, had made advances for a reconciliation. ¹

Whether Townshend would have acted thus without George's approval is doubtful, but, unfortunately, the King's role in the abortive Anglo-Austrian negotiations, is unclear. Given the insistence upon Hanoverian demands in the instructions to Waldegrave, it could be suggested that George had intervened in order to block any reconciliation that ignored Hanoverian interests, but equally it could be argued that Townshend used the Hanoverian issue in order to persuade George to support his own more sceptical approach to the reconciliation. The interest expressed in the marriage of Maria Theresa points towards the active participation of George II who had caused such a fuss over the issue in the spring of 1728 and who was largely responsible for demands that the Austrians should commit themselves over the choice of partner. It also reveals that much more was at stake than a simple settlement of Austro-Hanoverian disputes.

Despite the prominence given to Hanoverian demands in the instructions sent to Waldegrave, it would be a mistake to conclude that the negotiations failed due to this issue or that they revealed that George and Townshend were selfishly concerned with Electoral points to the detriment of wider interests. Whichever party is held to have made the initiative, it would have been easy for Austria to respond favourably to the British position, talk about 'natural allies' and then, once the British had committed

¹ Waldegrave to Townshend, 18 Mar., Townshend to Waldegrave, 25 Mar. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 172, 175.
themselves to a formal advance, betray it to France, Spain or
the British opposition.¹ The Austrians were suspected of seeking
to destroy the Hanover alliance,² and the British would have
been quite correct to suspect Austrian statements advanced through
a relatively low-grade diplomat, even were he not as volatile as
Kinsky. Kinsky lacked the rank of Sinzendorf or the contacts of
Seckendorf.³ In addition, the disavowal of Sinzendorf's approval
of the provisional Treaty must have warned the British to be
cautious about committing themselves to the Austrians, and to be
suspicious of the ability of Austrian diplomats to influence their
country's policies. The stress in Townshend's instructions upon
Hanoverian demands was therefore, at one level, a sensible diplomatic
move, for the settlement of them would prove Austrian sincerity.
Whatever the talk about shared interests, natural allies and the
balance of power, it was only possible, in the first instance, for
Austria to indicate its good intentions, by a satisfaction of
Hanoverian demands.⁴ This could be done speedily and would not
fatally compromise Britain in the eyes of her allies.

Whether the decision to tie progress in any Anglo-Austrian
reconciliation to the settlement of Hanoverian demands was approved
of within the British ministry, or even debated, is unclear. It is

¹ Fears were expressed that the Austrians would follow such a
policy, Chesterfield to Townshend, 12 July 1729, PRO. 84/304
f. 220.

² Sinzendorf denied that the Austrians had any intention of
settling without France, Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 19 Feb. 1729,
Vienna, Fonseca, 13, f. 90.

³ Waldegrave to Townshend, 15 Jan. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 30.

⁴ Chesterfield complained to Kinsky of the Austrian 'professions,
which consisted only in words, at the same time that no one
action of that court corresponded with them; but on the
contrary seemed rather calculated to exasperate than to
quiet affairs', Chesterfield to Townshend, 11 June 1729,
PRO. 84/304 f. 143.
possible that the great care taken to keep Waldegrave's instructions secret from Britain's allies was matched by a determination to keep many of the British ministers in the dark. Newcastle and the Walpoles do not appear to have had any role in the matter, and it is possible that Newcastle's complaints about not being informed refer to this episode. In the Commons debate on the Address there was an interesting hint that Sir Robert Walpole was aware of the prospect of a reconciliation. Knatchbull noted in his diary,

'Sir Robert urged that, for argument sake suppose the Emperor was any way inclined to a coolness with Spain and was any ways looking towards us, would it be prudent to anger him at this time'.

Prior to the summer of 1729 the views of ministers on foreign policy issues are largely unclear. It is possible to use the views advanced in the summer as an indicator of attitudes held in the spring but this is a rather dangerous procedure. For example, the fact that Townshend in the summer was opposed to naval action against Spain does not prove that he held the view in the early spring, because the commencement of Anglo-Spanish negotiations in the late spring could have altered his views. The views advanced by various ministers during the summer represent as much their response to recent events or predicted developments as they do their long-term views on the European situation, and it is necessary, though difficult, to attempt to disentangle these different threads whilst accepting that for some ministers they may have been inextricably confused. During the summer of 1729 attitudes were to be affected by three

major developments. From May onwards the prospect of an alliance between Spain and the Hanover alliance became more apparent.¹ The discussions about an alliance between Britain and the Wittelsbach Electors, hitherto desultory, became of growing importance, and the projected alliance became a major and divisive issue. In August a threatened Prussian attack upon Hanover led to a reinterpretation of George II's relations with his allies. These three related developments increased the urgency of foreign policy decisions but the unpredictability of developments made the decisions harder to take. Whereas in the previous summer negotiations had centred round the rather cosy world of Soissons and Paris, in 1729 there was an altogether more upsetting atmosphere of volatility and violence.

¹ In 1730 Poyntz was to claim that 'the conduct of the Imperial court in relation to the Provisional Treaty forced us into the arms of Spain', Poyntz to Waldegrave, 19 Jan. 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 26.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SUMMER OF 1729

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ALLIANCE OF VIENNA;
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WITTELSBACHS

'The common people huzza'd his Excellency, and cry'd, God bless our good King George, a lasting peace, and a flourishing trade'.

In the spring of 1729 many of the British ministers who had spent the winter in London set off for the Continent. The trials of parliamentary attendance over, they crossed the sea, determined that the success of their negotiations would prevent a recurrence next session of the difficulties the ministry had faced in defending their policies. The British Plenipotentiaries to the Congress of Soissons travelled to Paris where the Congress was now in effect being held. Horatio Walpole arrived there on April 18th, Stanhope two days later. In May George and Townshend set off for Hanover. The Queen was left in charge of the government at London with Newcastle and Sir Robert Walpole as her principal advisers in the field of foreign policy.

By the time of this dispersal it was already clear that one of the basic elements of the European political system since 1725, the alliance of Spain and Austria, was, if not already destroyed, in serious danger of dissolution. Spanish pressure for a firm Austrian commitment to a speedy marriage of Maria Theresa and Don Carlos failed to elicit anything more than prevaricating answers. The Austrians argued that the Archduchesses were too

2. George left London on May 17th (os).
tender for matrimony and that Don Carlos must wait. It is probable that Charles VI had no intention of making Carlos his son-in-law, and the favour with which Francis of Lorraine was treated at Vienna suggests that he was seen already as the likely husband of Maria Theresa. In the short term it is probable that other factors also played a role in postponing the Austrian decision. Waldegrave suggested that the Austrians had decided to postpone all decisions until they saw whether Spain intended to honour her promise to pay Austria the arrears of her subsidy out of the proceeds of the treasure fleet. The acute fiscal crisis then affecting Austria lends substance to Waldegrave's suggestion, for without her subsidy Austria was unable to pay the subsidies she had promised to various Princes of the Empire.

Enraged at the Austrian refusal, Elisabeth Farnese determined to discover whether France and Britain were willing to support her interests. At the end of March the Spanish minister La Paz wrote to Fleury offering to reopen negotiations on the basis of the introduction of Spanish garrisons into those Italian duchies whose succession Carlos claimed. Neither the Austro-Spanish

1. Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 15 Mar. 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13, f. 128; Waldegrave to Townshend, 23 Feb. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 114; Waldegrave to Poyntz, 26 Feb. 1729, Chewton; De Buyl to Manteuffel, 29 Mar. 1729, Dresden, 3105, 2, f. 111-2; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus II, 23 Feb., 3 Mar., 4 May 1729, AST.LM. Aut. 59; King, pp. 72-4, 77-85; Goslinga, pp. 325-8, 331-3.

2. Waldegrave to Townshend, 15, 29 Jan., 23, 26 Feb. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 28, 47, 109, 122; Waldegrave to Poyntz, 26 Mar. 1729, Chewton. The Austrians were aware of the danger that Spain might approach France, Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 8 Jan. 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13, f. 13.

3. La Paz to Fleury, 29 Mar. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 419-21; Wilson, p. 206; Baudrillart, III, 500-1; Goslinga, pp. 338-9.
tension nor the Spanish approaches to France remained secret for long, but optimism within the camp of the Hanover alliance was tempered by several factors. Firstly, as the British Plenipotentiaries noted, Spain seemed to expect support over the Spanish garrisons without being willing to promise anything more than a renewal of negotiations at the Congress.¹ The British were determined that their position in Gibraltar and Minorca should be secured and Spanish depredations halted, whilst the French were very concerned at the projected indulto upon the cargo of the treasure fleet.² Secondly, the Hanover allies were worried about Elisabeth Farnese's real intentions for Carlos. Fleury feared Elisabeth's 'vastes projects'³ and wondered how it would be possible to get Austrian consent to the introduction of Spanish garrisons.⁴ Thirdly, the unpredictability of the Queen of Spain in particular and of Spanish policy in general made Spain seem an undesirable ally.⁵ Fears were expressed that Spain would dupe the Hanover allies and use her negotiations with them to scare Austria into accepting her demands.⁶

1. Plenipotentiaries to Newcastle, 25 Ap. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f.409. The same situation had been noted the previous autumn, Stanhope and Horatio Walpole to Keene, 4 Oct. 1728, BL.Add. 32758 f.233.
2. Le Coq to Augustus II, 4 Ap. 1729, Dresden, 2733 f. 143; Goslinga, p. 347.
5. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 5 May (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 179; Le Coq to Augustus II, 4 Ap. 1729, Dresden, 2733 f. 143.
6. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 5 May (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 179; De Büy to Manteuffel, 12 May 1729, Dresden, 3105 f. 120.
These factors encouraged a cautious response to the initial Spanish approach. This caution was particularly marked in the British case, for the early months of 1729 had seen rumours of Anglo-Spanish military conflict, rumours which had persisted into the late spring and had attracted much diplomatic attention. The British government was concerned at Spanish military moves, worried by her naval preparations and anxious about the possibility of a new Spanish attack on Gibraltar. Keene was ordered to report on Spanish military moves. Admiral Cavendish reported concern over Gibraltar whilst Chesterfield informed Townshend of a report that a siege was intended. The arming of the Spanish navy was followed by foreign diplomats, and by the British press. In late April the Daily Post Boy noted that Spain had twenty-one men of war in its Spanish ports. On May 5th the representative of the French Ministry of the Marine in Spain, D'Aubenton reported that eleven ships of the line were arming at Cadiz.

The natural British response was naval armaments, and the British decided to send a squadron to protect Gibraltar. Zamboni noted that the British were concerned about the Spanish preparations

1. Fleury to La Paz, 14 Ap. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 422-3; Chesterfield to Townshend, 6 May, Vandermeer to Van Hoey, 28 Ap. 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 73, 103-4; Baudrillart, III, 498, 503-6; Goslinga, p. 339; Wilson, p. 206.

2. Newcastle to Keene, 1 Ap. (os), Keene to Newcastle, 12 May 1729, PRO. 94/100; Poyntz to Delafaye, 6 Feb. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 139; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 29 May (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 204; Tyrawly to Newcastle, 5, 16 Jan., 25 Feb., 25 Mar., 8 May 1729, PRO. 88/35 f. 127, 131, 139, 143, 145. 159; Chesterfield to Townshend, 29 Ap. 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 59; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 1 Mar. 1729, AE.CP.Ang. 365 f. 156; Cavendish to Burchett, 25 May 1729, PRO. 42/19 f. 346; D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 5 May 1729, AN.AM.B' 296; Lady Irwin to the Earl of Carlisle, 22 Feb. (os) 1729, Carlisle, p. 57; Daily Post Boy 29 Ap. (os) 1729; London Evening Post 10 May (os) 1729; Fog's Weekly Journal 10 May (os) 1729; Marini, p.128.
and unsure what they were intended for, 'l'on a destiné l'armement naval de l'Espagne pour tant d'endroits, savoir pour l'Amerique, pour Gibraltar, ou Port Mahon, pour Livourne, et pour la Sardaigne'.

Given the scope of possible Spanish action, major British preparations were clearly felt to be necessary. During the late spring a sizeable fleet was prepared. On May 17th Tilson informed Waldegrave that the fleet would be ready for 'any action that may be render'd necessary'. These British preparations alarmed Spain and worried Britain's allies. The Saxon representative in Spain, De Büy, informed Count Manteuffel that the Spanish decision to send more troops to the Indies was taken in response to fears that the British would attack their possessions there. Britain's allies feared that the despatch of a large British fleet to Spanish waters would increase tension and might lead to war.

Fortunately for the negotiations between Spain and the Hanover allies, the representatives of Britain and France in Spain were not alarmists. Keene, D'Aubenton, and William Cayley, the British Consul at Cadiz, took great care to report both the intended Spanish preparations and their limited success. On May 15th Cayley commented on the movement of the Spanish warships from the

1. Zamboni to the Marquis de Fleury, 24 May, 22 July 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 67, 73.
2. Tilson to Waldegrave, 6 May (os) 1729, Chewton; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 16 May 1729, AST.LM.Ing. 35; Marini. p.129.
3. D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 24 Mar. 1729, AN.AM.B 7 296; Plenipotentiaries to Newcastle, 25 Ap. 1729. PRO. 78/190 f. 408; Cayley to Newcastle, 17 May 1729, PRO. 94/219; Keene to Townshend, 23 June 1729, PRO. 94/100.
inner harbour at Cadiz into the Bay, 'It can hardly be with any other design than to make a noise and show of readiness, in which they are far from really being'.

It is likely, though there is no confirmatory proof, that these reports damped the pressure within Britain for naval action against Spain. The British fleet was still ordered to assemble off Spithead and to prepare for an expedition to Spanish waters, but, alongside these preparations, the British showed a willingness to negotiate with Spain. The failure to secure a rapprochement with Austria left Britain little choice but to follow the French lead in replying to the Spanish approach. On May 9th instructions drafted jointly by the British and French ministers were sent to the French ambassador in Spain, Brancas, and to Keene, to assure the Spanish government that in return for an immediate Spanish acceptance of the provisional treaty, France and Britain would attempt to gain the agreement of Austria and of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany to the speedy introduction of the Spanish garrisons. France yielded to British pressure and agreed to threaten Spain with war should she reject the Anglo-French approach.

Fleury, however, had not only no intention of fighting Spain, but also did not wish to run the risk of Austria refusing to accept any settlement of the Italian problem devised by the Hanover allies and Spain. The introduction of Spanish garrisons

1. Cayley to Newcastle, 19 Ap., 21 June, 9 Aug., PRO. 94/219; Cayley to Keene, 15 May 1729, PRO. 94/215; Keene to Newcastle, 9 June 1729, PRO. 94/100; D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 26, 31 May 1729, AN. AM. B 296. Tyrawly was more concerned about the Spanish preparations, Tyrawly to Newcastle, 25 Mar. 1729, PRO. 88/35 f. 143
3. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 5 May (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 180-1; Poyntz to Delafaye, 9 May 1729, PRO. 78/191 f. 42.
had not been specified in the Quadruple Alliance, and Fleury feared that Austria would reject the idea, seeing it as a threat to Austrian hegemony in Italy. He therefore suggested that neutral, rather than Spanish, garrisons should be specified; during the summer various expedients involving British, Papal, Sardinian and Swiss troops were advanced. Elisabeth Farnese was totally opposed to any such arrangement and in late May she threatened to return to the Austrian alliance. The Austrian ambassador Count Königsegg declared that Austria would accept Spanish garrisons, and he worked hard to restore the Austro-Spanish alliance. By June 23rd De Búy could report that the Hanover allies had lost the chance of a Spanish alliance due to Fleury's opposition to the Spanish garrisons.

1. D'Arvillars to Victor Amadeus II, 26 May 1729, AST.LM.Spagna. 61; De Búy to Manteuffel, 9 June 1729, Dresden, 3105, 2 f. 131; Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 5 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 28; Marini, p. 131.

2. D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 5 June 1729, AN.AM.B 297; Holzendorf to Delafaye, 10 June 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 139; Keene to Townshend, 2 Aug. 1729, PRO. 94/100; Villars, p. 175.

3. Keene to Townshend, 26 May 1729, PRO. 94/100.

4. Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 5 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 20; Keene to Townshend, 10 July 1729, PRO. 94/100; Marini, p. 132.

5. De Búy to Marquis de Fleury, 23 June 1729, Dresden, 3105, 2 f. 138-9. The British government feared that the Austrians would offer new and better proposals to Spain, Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 12 June (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 282-3; Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 5 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 28.
'By all the conversations I have had with Mor. Patino I am more and more persuaded that it will be impossible to content the Queen of Spain without the introduction of Spanish troops into Tuscany and Parma and that upon this condition Spain will not barely resume the course of the negotiations at Soissons as laid down in the Marq. de la Paz's letter of the 29th March to the Cardinal but will finish and conclude all matters depending between the two courts by a formal and decisive treaty!.

Whereas the French response to the prospect of a Spanish alliance was hesitant and affected by the animosity between Fleury and Elisabeth Farnese, the British were more positive in their response to the Spanish demands, though it was they, not the French, who were preparing for military action against Spain. A major reason for this was the willingness of the Spaniards to drop the issues of Gibraltar and Minorca, provided they secured their goal of the Spanish garrisons. The British seemed to be more favourable to the prospect of Spanish garrisons than the French, though they too would have preferred neutral garrisons. De Buys reported on June 16th,

1. Keene to Newcastle, (quote), 19 May, to Townshend, 26 May 1729, PRO. 94/100; Newcastle to Queen Caroline, 3 June (os) 1729, PRO. 36/12 f. 19; D'Arvillars to Victor Amadeus II, 2 Ap. 1729, AST.LM.Spagna., 61.
'Telles sont les vicicitudes des choses humaines, les Anglois, qui etoient il y a quatre mois l'horreur de leurs Mmtes Catholiques se trouvent aujourd'hui ceux, surqui elles fondent leurs esperances et à qui elles font un pont d'or, ils ont beau jeu, s'ils en savent profiter, mais s'ils echapat cette occasion, nous verront immanquablement resserves, plus que jamais'.

The issue of the Spanish garrisons might seem to be a rather petty one, but in fact it was of the greatest importance both at the time and subsequently. They were seen not so much as a minor infraction of the Quadruple Alliance, but as a possible means by which Spain might destroy the equilibrium in Italy and launch herself on a career of Italian conquest. The Hanover allies were intensely suspicious of the intentions of Elisabeth Farnese. They were warned by their representatives in Spain that she intended to use the Spanish garrisons to further aims of her own totally incompatible with the Quadruple Alliance. Keene informed Newcastle that,

'the Queen's great view is the securing D. Carlos's succession and next to that to have her revenge upon the Emp. for having so long amused her, both which points she thinks will be gained by the introduction of Spanish garrisons into Italy'.

1. De Büy to Manteuffel, 16, 30 June 1729, Dresden, 3105, 2 f. 134-5, 144.

2. Waldegrave to Poyntz, 12 Feb. 1729, Chewton; Instructions for Seckendorf, 30 June 1729, PRO. 78/193, f. 272. Brancas and Keene urged the Spaniards, 'that at least in the publick treaty some regard should be had to cover our resolutions to introduce Spanish troops that it might not appear that we went directly contrary to the express words of the Quadruple Allyance', Keene to Townshend, 2 Aug. 1729, PRO. 94/100.

3. Keene to Newcastle, 12 May 1729, PRO. 94/100; Chauvelin to Brancas, 5 July 1729, Baudrillart, III, 526 n.1; London Evening Post 19 Aug. (os) 1729.
However, a refusal to accept Spanish garrisons would have led to a failure of the negotiations with Spain. Spain, already fooled by one ally (Austria) suspected neutral garrisons as an attempt to trick Don Carlos out of the succession to Tuscany and Parma. By insisting on the Spanish garrisons, Spain intended to serve two purposes; to secure Carlos' succession, and, by holding the Tuscan ports of Leghorn and Portoferrario, to retain the ability to move large numbers of troops into Italy. This tested the views of the Hanover allies on the major issues of the European balance of power. The talk of the previous four years of reordering the territorial order in Italy and driving the Austrians out of all or part of the peninsula suddenly ceased to be speculation. Though some argued that territorial changes in Italy were of no importance to the European balance of power, this was not a generally held view, and it was commonly believed that regional balances, whether in Italy, the Empire, or the Baltic, were an integral part of the general European balance of power. By aiding the introduction of Spanish troops into Italy, the Hanover allies, however circumscribed their intentions were, could be accused of helping to destroy the regional balance of power, and, indeed, this accusation was to be made over the next few years.

1. Chauvelin wrote, 'Nous sommes bien dans le principe où Md. Townshend vous a paru estre que l'engagement de faire entrer des troupes Espagnoles en Toscane, même malgré l'Empereur, est bien moins à redouter que la continuation de l'union entre l'Esp. et la cour de Vienne', Chauvelin to Chavigny, 21 Aug. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47, f. 134.

2. Chesterfield to Townshend, 28 June 1729, PRO.84/304,f.192.

Challenging the Austrian hegemony in Italy by supporting Spanish interests was not the only policy possibly incompatible with long term British aims being pursued by the British government in the summer of 1729. Just as the British risked committing themselves to a troublesome and unpredictable Italian policy, so their negotiations with the Wittelsbachs entailed the risk of a similar commitment in the Empire. Although these negotiations have received very little scholarly attention, they are of considerable importance and throw much light on British intentions toward Prussia and Austria in the second half of 1729. The only scholarly work devoted, at least in part, to the negotiations is a short but important work by Dureng. Dureng's book suffers from being based exclusively upon the French archives, and from adopting too credulous an attitude to his principal source, the despatches of Anne Theodore Chevignard de Chavigny, the French envoy to the Imperial Diet. Chavigny was sent to Hanover in the summer of 1729, in order to persuade George II to accept an alliance with the Wittelsbachs on the latter's terms. An attempt to supplement Chavigny's despatches encounters several major problems. Firstly, there is surprisingly little material extant that can throw light upon the attitudes of George and Townshend to the negotiations, or upon the talks held at Hanover that summer. As D'Aix pointed out, there were few foreign envoys

1 Dureng, pp. 85-6
in Hanover that year\textsuperscript{1}. Only four men participated in the talks at Hanover: George, Townshend, Chavigny, and the Wittelsbach representative, Count Plettenberg, the principal minister of Clemens-August the Elector of Cologne\textsuperscript{2}. Chavigny's despatches are unreliable. George left no record of his role and Townshend's record is restricted to his correspondence with Newcastle and with the British Plenipotentiaries in Paris. In this correspondence he gave a less than full account of his meetings with Chavigny and Plettenberg.

Fortunately, Plettenberg's papers have survived and are accessible. The large deposit of his papers held in Münster contain his correspondence with most of the prominent Wittelsbach ministers, such as the Bavarian Count Toerring, with the Elector of Bavaria, with the Bavarian representative at Paris, Count Albert, the Prince of Grimbergen, with Chavigny and with Townshend. Unfortunately he did not keep a diary or rather none has survived, and he preferred to entrust confidential matters to verbal communication. Thus, he left very little material about his

\textsuperscript{1} D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 16 June 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35.

conferences with George and Townshend. The ease of movement between Hanover and the courts of the Electors of Cologne, Mainz and the Palatinate, at Bonn, Mainz and Mannheim respectively, meant that Plettenberg was able to report in person on his conferences at Hanover to the Electors.

Aside from the problem of discovering what actually happened at Hanover, it is difficult to ascertain what the Wittelsbach intentions actually were. The major source for Wittelsbach intentions is the correspondence of Plettenberg, but it is a source that has to be handled with care as it tends to stress the interests of the Elector of Cologne rather than those of his relatives.

To coerce Austria into abandoning her provocative policies and to block her schemes for areas such as Mecklenburg and East-Friesland at the Imperial Diet, it was necessary to secure the alliance of a number of German Princes. A long-term policy of weakening Austria and gravely restricting her authority and power required the assistance of the Wittelsbach Electors. They wielded great potential power, controlling several votes in the Electoral College, the College that

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1 There is an excellent recent study of the financial aspects of Wittelsbach diplomacy, P C Hartmann, Geld als Instrument europäischer Machtpolitik. Studien zu den finanziellen und politischen Beziehungen der Wittelsbacher Territorien Kurbayern, Kurpfalz und Kurkolin mit Frankreich und dem Kaiser von 1715 bis 1740 (Munich, 1978). This study does not, however, consider Anglo-Wittelsbach relations, and Hartmann does not appear to have been aware of the work of Dureng, nor to have used the Plettenberg papers. I would like to thank Dr Hartmann for discussing the subject with me. Schmidt's Karl Philipp provides a very brief coverage, based solely upon the archives in Vienna and Munich. On 16 April 1728 the Electors of Bavaria, Trier, Cologne and the Palatinate signed a treaty stipulating common action in support of their various pretensions, Dureng, pp.77-8. There is a copy of the treaty in PRO.103/110.
elected Emperors. In addition, when the bishoprics held by members of the family were taken into account, they controlled most of the area of Catholic Germany that was ruled by the Austrians. As such, they were an obvious ally for France, and, in particular, for those French ministers who wished to see a fundamental reordering of the European situation. For Chauvelin, Chavigny and Belle-Isle the best way to accomplish such an aim was to have a Wittelsbach elected as the next Emperor, and to woo the Wittelsbachs from their commitments to the Austrians.

In 1727-1728 the British had displayed less interest than the French in seeking the alliance of the Wittelsbachs. After St. Saphorin left Munich in December 1725 no British envoy visited the city until Onslow Burrish's mission in 1746, though Isaac Leheup received credentials as British representative in 1726, and Sir Thomas Robinson in 1745. Leheup was also accredited to the courts of Cologne, Mainz and Mannheim, though he did not present his credentials. In the late 1720s there were no British representatives at any of the Wittelsbach courts and diplomatic relations between them and the Electorate of Hanover were similarly bad. George II, in 1727 and 1728, preferred

1 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 13 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32756 f. 272; Dureng, p. 78.

2 15% of Imperial territory was ruled by the Wittelsbachs. Hartmann gives a map of Wittelsbach territories in 1724, including the ecclesiastical principalities, Hartmann, Geld p. 79.

3 The British government was aware of the potential importance of an alliance with the Wittelsbachs, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 13 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32756 f. 272; Townshend to Horatio Walpole 3 June (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence; Newcastle to the Plenipotentaries, 15 July (os) 1728, PRO. 80/326. Townshend distrusted the Wittelsbachs, and was opposed to granting them subsidies, Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 22 Aug. (os), Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 26 Aug. 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 475, 523.
to leave the negotiations with the Wittelsbachs to the French, and to concentrate on his attempts to create a Protestant German league. It is possible that George's view of the Wittelsbachs was affected by their response to his father's approach in 1725, as a member of the Alliance of Hanover, for an alliance. The Elector of Bavaria, Max-Emmanuel, had demanded that he receive peacetime subsidies and a guarantee of the Bavarian claims to the Austrian succession. These demands, and the treaty signed on September 1st, 1726 between Charles VI and Charles-Albert, the new Elector of Bavaria, ended Britain's interest in a Wittelsbach alliance.

Interest was reawakened in late 1728 and the issue brought to the fore by French pressure. In 1727-1728 France had had considerable success in severing the ties between the Wittelsbachs and Austria, but for a variety of reasons France wanted Britain to participate in her new agreements with the Wittelsbachs. The cost of subsidising the Wittelsbachs was a major reason and the French believed that George II both could and should bear his share of the subsidies. However, important though they doubtless were, it was not the subsidies that were the major issue at stake. By seeing the negotiations between George and the Wittelsbachs in 1729 as a matter

1 Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 29 Aug. (os) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f. 20-1.
3 Agreements between France and Bavaria, and France and the Palatinate were signed on 12 Nov. 1727 and 15 Feb. 1729 respectively, Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich pp. 136-7; Hartmann, Geld pp. 127-140 238-9; Schmidt, Karl Philipp pp. 184-7; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 11 Oct. 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 428; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and Stanhope, 6 Nov. (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32759 f. 116; Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 14 Dec. 1728, Vienna, Fonseca, 12 f. 125.
4 Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 26 Aug. 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 475.
of money, and be drawing attention to this issue in the quarrel between Townshend and Walpole, historians have misunderstood the essential issues at stake. The alliance between Britain and the Wittelsbachs was intended to last many years, and the latter sought a commitment for the long-term payment of subsidies. As such, the negotiations were of great significance for long-term British, and indeed Hanoverian, diplomatic strategy. An alliance with the Wittelsbachs would have committed Britain to a long-term anti-Austrian policy and would have made support for Wittelsbach pretensions a central feature of British policy. Because of the Wittelsbach demands that Britain should guarantee the Sulzbach claim to the Jülich-Berg inheritance, it would also commit Britain to an anti-Prussian policy and serve to drive Prussia and Austria further together. The consequences of these commitments were clear. The traditional Hanoverian interest in a league of Protestant German Princes and in close dynastic ties between Hanover and Prussia would be replaced by a non-confessional league tied to Wittelsbach interests.

George II’s policy of creating a position of strength, from which

1 Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 20 July 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f.126; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Townshend, 12 Sept. 1728 PRO.78/188 f.275; Townshend to Platen de Linn, Palatine Minister in London, 14 May (os) 1729, PRO.78/193 f.292; Papers relating to the succession of Berg and Jülich, 1729-32, PRO.103/112.

2 Townshend to Finch, 15 Aug. (os)1727, PRO.84/294 f.84-5; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Townshend, 12 Sept. 1728, PRO.78/188 f.275; Townshend to Newcastle, 13 Ap. (os)1729, PRO.43/77. Frederick William was concerned about the possibility of the Wittelsbachs gaining allies, Frederick William to Chambrier, 18 June 1729, AE.CP. Prusse 88. The Palatine court argued that a Prussian acquisition of Jülich-Berg would threaten Hanover, 'Contre-Remarques Palatines avec Remarques faites par Mynlord Townshend ... sur le Traité d'amitié', 8 Aug. 1729, PRO.103/110.

3 As Elector of Hanover George was involved in disputes with the Electors of Cologne and the Palatinate. He had been unenthusiastic about the Elector of Cologne's election as Bishop of Osnabrück, and he was in dispute with this prelate over the municipal rights of Hildesheim, Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 12 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO.78/189 f.398-9.
the Emperor could be coerced or cajoled into being a good ruler, would be replaced by a commitment to confront the Austrians and support those determined to destroy their power. It would open the way to a territorial recasting of the Empire. Despite the noted anti-Austrian attitudes of Townshend and George, both angered by Austrian intransigence in European matters and obstinacy over Hanoverian interests, neither sought the destruction of Austrian power. The negotiations over the Wittelsbach alliance exposed an important ambivalence in the Anglo-French alliance, that towards Austria. George II and those British ministers who were hawks in Anglo-Austrian relations - Townshend and Chesterfield - were essentially short-term hawks\(^1\). Their French counterparts, particularly Chauvelin, were long-term hawks, and though the British knew that Fleury was not interested in war with Austria, and was on good diplomatic terms with the Austrians, they both suspected his real views and feared that his death would cause French policy to become more strident, if not violent\(^2\). The negotiations of the summer of 1729 with the Wittelsbachs were therefore of major importance. They brought into prominence a major difference of opinion between Britain and France over diplomatic policy. The British had had a poor view of the negotiations between France and the Wittelsbachs. In November 1728 Horatio Walpole and Stanhope informed Newcastle that the French government was neglecting to keep them informed of the negotiations.

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1 Townshend to Chesterfield, 14 June 1729, PRO.84/304 f.153. Horn referred to Townshend's 'bellicose anti-Hapsburg policy', Horn, Great Britain and Europe pp.51,121. I have benefited greatly from discussions with Derek McKay and Peter Barber concerning this issue.

2 Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 6 July 1729, Höfler, I, 32. The Dutch minister Fagel 'was persuaded in case the Emperor should die, France would again lay its hands upon the Austrian Netherlands', Chesterfield to Townshend, 28 June 1729, PRO.84/304 f.192. Robinson referred to 'Chauvelin's predilection for the House of Bavaria', Robinson to Harrington, 19 Aug, 1730, BL Add.9139 f.100; Dureng, pp.80-82.
They also attacked the incompetence of Chauvelin, 'who, instead of making a solid and good plan of union with the four Electors for the publick tranquility of Europe, has given the Guaranty of France to the Palatine family for the succession of Bergh and Juliers, for an exchange of a neutrality only on the Elector Palatine's side, and for some concessions for the benefit of France in Alsace......'  

In the winter of 1728-1729 the French altered their policy and decided to involve Britain more actively in the negotiations. The British Plenipotentiaries were told that French support for Britain's Prussian policy, whether it involved seeking Anglo-Prussian marriages or attempting to block Prussian moves in Mecklenburg, was dependent on British support for the French German strategy, and, in particular British support of the Sulzbach claim in Jülich-Berg. This was not favourably received by the British, but a combination of concern over Mecklenburg, the failure to improve Anglo-Prussian relations, and, no doubt, the abortive Anglo-Austrian reconciliation led Britain to adopt a more receptive attitude. George did not send any envoys to the Wittelsbach courts, possibly because they did not want to provoke Austria by such a step, but he agreed to receive Plettenberg at Hanover. This contrasted with his refusal to see Count Seckendorf, the Austrian envoy at the Court of Berlin and the confidant of Frederick William I. George's decision to refer the negotiations

1 Stanhope and Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 30 Nov. 1728, BL. Add. 32759, f.251-3.
2 Newcastle proposed that British support for the Wittelsbach over Jülich-Berg should be linked to Wittelsbach support over Mecklenburg, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and Stanhope, 30 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO.78/189 f.419. When, in the autumn of 1728, George was sent the project of a treaty between the Alliance of Hanover and the four Electors he expressed general approval, but requested a more moderate wording of the article concerned with Jülich-Berg, Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 12 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO.78/189 f.397.
to Hanover was interesting as talks between the French government, the British Plenipotentiaries and the Wittelsbach envoys were already in progress in Paris. In May 1729 a project for a treaty had been presented to the British and the French by Count Albert. The projected treaty called for subsidies and a guarantee of the Sulzbach claim to Jülich-Berg\(^1\). By referring the talks to Hanover, George indicated his great interest in the matter, and his determination to gain personal control of the negotiations\(^2\).

Plettenberg reached Hanover on July 14th. He had an audience with George on the 15th and several lengthy conferences with Townshend over the following week. The substance of their conversations is a matter for dispute, and in particular it is unclear exactly what Plettenberg demanded and how far George and Townshend indicated a willingness to meet his demands. The position is confused by the fact that in the autumn, when the negotiations had run into difficulties, Townshend accused Plettenberg of a lack of consistency.

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\(^1\) Albert to Plettenberg, 11, 19, 26 May 1729, Münster, NB.33\(^1\) f.104, 120-124, 130; 'Draft of the Electoral Treaty', PRO.103/110; 'Formulaire d'un art. touchant Bergh et Juliers - as given by Albert', in British Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 1 June 1729, PRO.103/112. The Elector of Cologne requested subsidies, assistance for Wittelsbach claims to episcopal vacancies and a satisfactory settlement of the Hildesheim issue. The treaty was projected for 14 years. Bavaria and Cologne expected compensation for the arrears in their subsidies from Austria. Bavaria sought 400,000 ecus of German money p.a. and a British guarantee of the payment by Spain of one million piastres owed under treaties signed by Charles II of Spain. In George's view the projected treaty entailed excessive fiscal demands and inadequate support over Mecklenburg, Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 11 June 1729, PRO.78/193 f.216-7.

\(^2\) In late July Townshend informed the Plenipotentiaries that George had 'referred the farther transaction of this matter to your Excys', Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 22 July, Tilson to Horatio Walpole, 5 Aug. 1729, PRO.78/193 f.284, 282-3. However the next stage of the negotiations was handled by Townshend and Chavigny, and Albert claimed that they had been referred to Hanover, because Horatio Walpole lacked the necessary instructions, Albert to Plettenberg, 9 Aug. 1729, Münster, NB.33\(^1\) f.174.
in the demands he had presented on the behalf of the Wittelsbach Electors.

Opinions differed as to the success of the talks in July. An optimistic note was struck by Charles-Albert and by Chavigny. Charles-Albert replied to a report by Plettenberg by stating that the negotiation was nearly complete and that Britain had only to change her policy a little in order to satisfy the Wittelsbachs. Chavigny, whose arrival in Hanover was delayed by the poor state of the roads that summer, presented Townshend as being totally committed to the idea of an alliance with the Wittelsbachs. On August 18th, he informed Chauvelin that Townshend sought the alliance with the Electors, 'pour l'apologie et la justification de sa conduite', and four days later he wrote,

'Md. Townshend considère aujourd'hui cette union comme l'époque la plus glorieuse de son ministère .... Md. Townshend qui veut plaire à son maître et qui veut peut-être se faire valoir plus qu'il n'a fait jusqu'ici par la relation de ses États d'Alemagne avec les affaires générales, ne veut pas perdre cette occasion de signaler son zèle et sa prévoyance pour la seureté de l'Electorat de Hanovre.'

1 Townshend wrote that he and Plettenberg had declared 'that nothing that had passed between us, should be looked upon as binding or conclusive on either side', Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 22 July 1723, PRO.78/193 f.284.

2 Charles Albert to Plettenberg, 26 July 1729, Munster, NB.184 f.37. Boissieux reported that Plettenberg was very pleased with the manner in which he had been received at Hanover, and with George's willingness to settle various points at issue between the Elector of Cologne and the Electoral government of Hanover, Boissieux to Chauvelin, 25 July 1729, AE.CP. Cologne, 70 f.144.

3 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 1 Aug. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.101. D'Aix had commented on the absence of a French representative at Hanover, and Schleinitz had argued that Chavigny's presence was necessary, D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 30 June, 7 July 1729, AST.LM. Ing. 35; Schleinitz to Fleury, 1 July 1729, PRO.103/110.

4 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 18,22 Aug.1729, AE.CP. Allemagne, 375 f.151,159.
Those who struck a less optimistic note seem to have been nearer to the truth. On July 21st Plettenberg sent Charles-Albert and Count Albert copies of Townshend's comments upon the Wittelsbach alliance project. He informed Count Albert that the British thought that France should pay the entire subsidy demanded by Bavaria. Townshend also pressed for the inclusion of the Elector of Mainz, the Wittelsbach Franz Ludwig, Duke of Neuburg, in the alliance, and declared that Britain was not prepared to accept an alliance for fourteen years, but was determined to fix a limit of two years. Plettenberg was suspicious of the British views on the Jülich-Berg inheritance. Count Toerring, the Bavarian foreign minister, commented,

"Je juge par les remarques de Mylord, que nous sommes encore loin de notre compte avec le Roy d'Angleterre, et qu'il voudroit avoir l'Electeur de Baviere à trop bon marché."

Toerring argued that it was unlikely that France would be willing to pay all the Bavarian subsidy and that Britain should not only agree to pay half the subsidy, but be keen to do so in order to have greater influence upon Bavarian conduct. He also stated that the British demand for Wittelsbach assistance over the Mecklenburg question

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1 George had made it clear to Schleinitz on 26 June that he would not accept the Bavarian financial demands, Schleinitz to Fleury, 1 July 1729, PRO.103/110.

2 'Projet d'un Traité avec les Electeurs' with marginal comments by Townshend and Plettenberg, PRO.103/110; Plettenberg to Albert, 21 July 1729, Münster, NB.33 f.171-2. George was reported to be in favour of an alliance with the Electors, but dissatisfied with their proposals, Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 11 June, Tilson to Horatio Walpole, 5 Aug. 1729, PRO.43/9, 78/193 f.292-3. Fleury proposed a conference by which George, as King and Elector, would undertake to make no engagements over Jülich-Berg incompatible with a Sultzbach succession. George and Townshend approved of this compromise, Schleinitz to Fleury, 1 July, Chauvelin to Schleinitz, 3 Aug. 1729, PRO 103/110. It was rejected by the Elector Palatine who demanded an explicit commitment to the Sultzbach succession, Chauvelin to Schleinitz, 24 July, 'Contre Remarques Palatines...', 8 Aug. 1729, PRO.103/110.
was likely to meet with opposition, particularly from Mainz.¹ Albert pressed Chauvelin about Wittelsbach anxiety over the British attitude to the Jülich-Berg question. He was assured that France wanted Britain to give a guarantee for the succession similar to the French one and that Chavigny would be ordered to lend the Wittelsbachs all possible assistance on the matter. Both Chauvelin and Albert were dissatisfied with the British position. Chauvelin argued that the British demand for an inclusion of Mecklenburg within the terms of the provisions for mutual defence was unacceptable², and that the only thing George could expect was an agreement to defend Hanover if it were attacked as part of a dispute involving Mecklenburg. The French and Albert agreed that the British demand for the inclusion of Gibraltar and Minorca was also inadmissible. Albert also informed the French that from the Wittelsbach point of view, 'que c'étoit même les insulter que de leur proposer de les louer pour deux ans comme on feroit un carrosse de fiacre pour deux ans'.³

The difficulties Plettenberg encountered were soon to be faced by Chavigny. He took over the task of persuading George and Townshend to accept the Wittelsbach case whilst Plettenberg set off on a tour.

¹ Toerring to Plettenberg, 30 July 1729, Munster, NA.148 f.186. George was very concerned about Mecklenburg, Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 11, 23, June 1729, PRO.78/193 f.216-7; Toerring to Plettenberg, 18 June 1729, Munster, NA.148 f.169; Townshend to Chesterfield, 21, 28 June 1729, PRO.84/304 f.163-4, 181; Schleinitz to Fleury, 27 July 1729, AE.CP.Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.96; Promemoria, Bavarian views on British project concerning Mecklenburg given to Plettenberg at Hanover, 5 Aug. 1729, PRO.100/15.

² The British sought the same agreement as part of the projected treaty with Spain, King, p.107.

³ Chauvelin to Schleinitz, 24 July 1729, PRO.103/110; 'Contre Remarques Palatines...', 8 Aug. 1729, PRO.103/110; Albert to Plettenberg, 9, 16 Aug. 1729, Münster, NB.33 f.173-4, 176, 182-4; Schleinitz, memorandum about the negotiations, no date, PRO.103/110; 'Reponse de S.A.S.E. de Baviere sur les Remarques faites à Hannover par Mylord Townshend, et Monsr. le Comte de Plettenberg, sur le projet du traite a faire avec les quatre Electeurs', PRO.103/110.
of the Wittelsbach courts designed to counter Austrian intrigues at Mannheim and to discover how much of the British case would be accepted by the Electors. On August 12th Chavigny reported that Townshend was firm on the subsidies and the Jülich-Berg guarantee. Chavigny argued that Britain should concede on the Jülich-Berg issue in return for help over Mecklenburg, but Townshend replied that the Dutch would never accept the Sulzbach succession, a somewhat misleading argument, for Chavigny realised that the British were more concerned with the Prussian than the Dutch response. Townshend argued that it was impossible to pay any new subsidies because Parliament would reject any such obligations, and, according to Chavigny, he claimed that

'la seule proposition excitera contre le ministère des criailleries dont l'effet ne peut qu'alterer notre union avec l'Angleterre'.

Chavigny replied by stating that the response in Britain would depend upon the manner in which the issue was presented to Parliament.

The exchange between the two men is interesting, in that it illustrates that Chavigny, despite his trip to London in 1723, still, at least publicly, subscribed to the manipulative interpretation of Parliament so condemned by Townshend. Townshend, however, was, or at least claimed to be, very concerned about the British response. He and George were certainly ready to send the Wittelsbach project for a treaty, presented by Plettenberg, to London, in order to elicit the views of the 'Lords of the Council' on the matter. These 'Lords'
constituted a form of cabinet appointed by George II to advise the Regent, Queen Caroline, during his absence in Hanover. The only records of their deliberations that survive are to be found in Lord King's Notes, and the reports of their proceedings sent to Hanover. Lord King was a member of the group, but unfortunately he did not attend many of the sessions. He makes it clear that he was frequently ignored by Sir Robert Walpole, and preferred the seclusion of his seat at Ockham to the strains of Whitehall, strains that did not do his gout any good\(^1\). Unfortunately neither the Notes nor the reports preserved in *State Papers Regencies* specify the views of individual ministers.

On August 22nd the 'Lords of the Council' met at Sir Robert Walpole's house in Chelsea to discuss the Wittelsbach project. Present were Lord King, Walpole, Newcastle, the Lord Privy Seal, (Lord Trevor), the Lord Chamberlain (the Duke of Grafton), and the first Lord of the Admiralty (Viscount Torrington).\(^2\) They argued that though an alliance would be useful, as it would increase the number of troops within the Empire at the disposal of the Hanover alliance, the terms proposed by the Wittelsbachs were unacceptable. They objected to the provisions concerning the succession to Jülich-Berg as being too anti-Prussian. They were opposed to the projected time-span of the treaty, and approved of Townshend's suggestion that it should only last for two years. They argued

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\(^1\) King, p.107.

\(^2\) Care was taken to prevent ministers, not in the inner circle, from gaining information about government policy, King, 16 May (os) 1729, p.86. Though King did not name any ministers it is probable that Newcastle was referring to Carteret and Wilmington.
that the preamble of the projected treaty, confining it simply to 'the good of the Empire', and the provisions that specified that the Wittelsbachs were under no obligations if conflict arose over Gibraltar or the Ostend Company, were unacceptable and might cause political difficulties in Britain. It was however the Seventh article of the projected treaty that they most disapproved of. By this article George undertook not to give any guaranty to any power whatsoever not included in the projected alliance, without the consent of all the contracting powers. As the Lords in London pointed out this referred principally to the guaranty of the Pragmatic sanction.1

The reasons advanced in the deliberations of the Lords sent to Townshend on August 23rd are of great interest as they indicate the long-term views of the group of ministers left in London, or, at least of the most powerful of them. They argued that such an undertaking,

'would be an unnecessary tying up H.M.'s hands from doing a thing, which perhaps hereafter upon a change of circumstances, H.M. may think advisable, if the Emperor should ever make such proposals as H.M. might think advantageous for himself and his people, and safe and honourable for his allies. Their Lordps. have the greatest dependence upon the present good disposition of the court of France; But as considering the particular circumstances of that court, the same confidence

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1 In 1727, Horatio Walpole in his 'Considerations qui peuvent servir à donner quelque idée des mesures préalables que les Alliés devroient concerter entre eux pour regler leur conduite au Congrès' had proposed an article in a Treaty by which the German princes allied with the Alliance of Hanover '... qu'aucune des dites parties ne feroit aucun Traité ou marché de quelque nature qu'il pût être (par report au cas de la mort de l'Empr. sans issue mâle) à moins que ce ne fut de concert et conjointement avec tous les autres...', PRO.84/294 f.133.
may not always be preserved, their Lordships have ever lookt upon it as the wisdom of H.M.'s councils, that hitherto nothing has been done that should make ye friendship of that Crown absolutely necessary, or a reconciliation with the Emperor impracticable.\(^1\)

This statement is probably the best summary of British policy in the summer of 1729. It indicates the fears held about future developments in French policy. Persistent reports over the previous two years that Fleury would fall, or die, to be replaced by ministers less interested in pacific measures or the British alliance, had helped to sap confidence in the Anglo-French alliance. Instead of being seen as a stable feature in European diplomacy and an essential aspect of British foreign policy, a view that had been strongly advanced following the formation of the Alliance of Hanover, it was increasingly seen as a temporary measure, an expedient necessary for the pursuit of better Anglo-Austrian and Anglo-Spanish relations.

The difficulty was to determine how the Emperor was to be persuaded to offer advantageous proposals. Attempts over the previous two years to negotiate with the Austrians whether alone or in conjunction with other powers, as at Soissons, had failed. The logical conclusion of this failure, that an attempt should be made to coerce the Austrians, by diplomatic isolation and the threat of violence\(^2\), was in the summer of 1729 forcing the British ministry to crystallize their views and assumptions about foreign policy, and adopt specific

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1 Account of Council Meeting, 11 Aug. (os) 1729, PRO.43/80; King, pp. 122-5.

2 Townshend to Chesterfield, 14 June 1729, PRO.84/304 f.153. Kinsky blamed the failure to negotiate an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation on the rigidity of the Austrian negotiating position, Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 2 Sept. 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt, 22, Nr.580 f.2. Horatio Walpole and Stanhope referred to 'the usual haughtiness of the Imperial Court', Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Townshend 4 July 1729, PRO.78/192 f.10.
policies by agreeing to treaties that involved major commitments both in the short and the long term. In a sense, the summer of 1729 was the first major opportunity for fresh thinking since the Alliance of Hanover in the autumn of 1725, since it saw the need for the discussion of two treaties that represented novel alignments. In the intervening years the treaties negotiated by Britain had largely been the consequence of the Alliance of Hanover and had mostly been with powers considerably weaker than Britain. The negotiations had usually been about the amount of money Britain was prepared to pay to secure the alliance of other powers. In the case of the negotiations of 1729 with Spain and with the French-supported Wittelsbachs, money was not the major issue.

The report of the 'Lords of the Council' showed that the vague talk of the need for an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation that had been expressed in public by various government figures over the previous years represented not only a nostalgic feeling for the triumphs of the Grand Alliance in the 1700's, but also a considered response to the long-term European situation. The relationship between the approach made to Austria in the early spring of 1729 and the views expressed by the Lords of the Council in August is unclear since it is not known how many of the Lords were aware of the approach and of its failure. What is clear is that the British ministry was

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1 Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 20 Sept. 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt, 22, Nr. 590 f. 2. Horatio Walpole and Stanhope expressed their fear that Britain might 'be pushed and engaged by Spain...... into new and extravagant projects for troubling the tranquillity of Europe, contrary to former Treatys, or to carry things any farther, than what is necessary to secure the succession of Don Carlos by the Introduction of Garrisons...'; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Townshend, 4 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 9.

seriously interested in a reconciliation. It will therefore be necessary to consider why Austrian approaches made in the summer of 1729 failed.

While Plettenberg, Chavigny, Townshend and George II were holding talks in Hanover, a dispute was in progress between the Lords of the Council and Townshend over Anglo-Spanish negotiations. The Lords of the Council, worried that Spain intended to dupe Britain and concerned at the prospect of having nothing definite to present to the next session of Parliament, argued that Spain should be persuaded to settle by the presentation of an ultimatum supported by the threat of naval action from the fleet assembled at Spithead. A blockade of Spain and the Spanish West Indies was suggested, and an attack on Porto Rico proposed\(^1\). Townshend believed that this course of action was too hasty. He felt that Spain would produce a satisfactory answer to the British approaches and argued that any British action would meet with French and Dutch disapproval. He therefore blocked the plan by persuading the Dutch to add a squadron to the fleet assembling under Wager. As he had predicted, the difficulties of ensuring cooperation between the British fleet and the Dutch naval command helped to delay plans for an expedition. Townshend also made it clear to the Lords of the Council that he regarded their policy as precipitant\(^2\). The Lords agreed to defer their plan until mid-July, and Newcastle informed Townshend that if, by then, no satisfactory Spanish answer had been received naval squadrons would be sent to Gibraltar and

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\(^1\) Newcastle to Townshend, 13 June (os), Delafaye to Tilson, 3 June 1729, PRO. 43/77.

\(^2\) Townshend to Chesterfield, 1 July 1729, BL. Add. 48982, f.160; King, 17 June (os) 1729, pp.90-1.
the West Indies. These steps by Townshend did not mean that opinion at Hanover was opposed to the possibility of coercing Spain. On June 1st Townshend ordered the Plenipotentiaries to press Fleury to set a date, preferably in July, for initiating operations against Spain if she had not, by then, returned a suitable answer. Similar instructions were sent a month later. However, though Townshend was prepared to consider the possibility of action against Spain, he believed that the time was not ripe, and that negotiations had to be attempted first. He therefore did his best to thwart the Lords of the Council. Accompanying his instructions to the Plenipotentiaries on July 1st was a private letter to Horatio Walpole,

"You will see that the orders your colleagues receive by this messenger take their rise from England. I am glad that orders fall into wise hands, who if they can do no good with them, will however not let them do harm. I am persuaded for my own part that we shall finish with Spain, and therefore cannot help fearing that our friends are too hasty."

It is not clear whether this flagrant incitement to disobey orders was made with George's knowledge. Indeed, the extent to which Townshend's opposition to the plans for naval action stemmed from royal views is a mystery. However, it can be suggested that opinion in Hanover was affected by French pressure. The French

1 Newcastle to Townshend, 13 June (os) 1729, BL. Add.9161, f.80-1.
2 Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 1 June, 1 July, 1729, PRO.43/9 BL. Add.48982, f.164; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Townshend, 4 July 1729, PRO.78/192 f.6.
3 Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 1 July, Townshend to Chesterfield, 1 July 1729, BL. Add.48982 f.166,160.
were very concerned about the matter. They feared that it would hinder negotiations, and, indeed, Keene informed Townshend that the Spaniards were very angry about the naval preparations. Chavigny was ordered to press George II against the despatch of the fleet and to make him realise that it would probably lead to the revitalization of the Austro-Spanish alliance and an Austrian attack upon Hanover. Chauvelin attacked 'l'extrême vivacité du ministère Anglais' and believed that pressure on George was the best method to thwart it.

Whether George and Townshend opposed naval action because of fear of French reaction is unclear, although it should be noted that this factor had been important in preventing such action over the previous two years. It is likely that Townshend's claim that the negotiations with Spain looked too promising to risk was an important factor. Equally important was the relation between the negotiations with Spain and those being conducted at Hanover. As the Wolfenbüttel minister Schleinitz, then at Hanover, pointed out, the progress of the negotiations in Spain was of great importance in determining the response at Hanover to the Wittelsbach propositions. Should Spain reject the Anglo-French proposals and return to an Austrian alliance, then an alliance with the Wittelsbachs would be necessary to offset an increase in Austrian strength and to bind France clearly to a British alliance in opposition to Austrian interests. There would be little chance of Austria responding favourably to British approaches if she were sure of Spain. If the Spaniards accepted the

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1 Keene to Townshend, 23 June 1729, PRO.94/100.
2 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 26 June, 7, 21 July 1729, AE.CP. Ang. sup.8, f.117,118,119; 'Memoire pour servir d'instruction au S de Chavigny allant a Hannover', 26 June, Chauvelin to Chavigny, 3, 24 July, 21 Aug., Chavigny to Chauvelin, 18 Aug. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.48,61,83,134,148; Dureng, p.83.
3 Schleinitz to Fleury, 19 July 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.85. It was also of the greatest importance for Anglo-Prussian relations, Du Bourguy to Townshend, 18 June 1729, PRO.90/24.
Anglo-French proposals then there would be less need for the Wittelsbach and their alliance could be secured on easier terms.

The coordination of these two sets of negotiations required too much intelligence to be easy. Whereas the previous summer negotiations had been centralised at Soissons and Paris, in 1729 the distances between the peripatetic courts of Philip V and George II were large, so considerable skill was required in coordinating the varied British negotiations. The Spanish determination to hold their negotiations in Spain and not at Paris, and George's decision that his negotiations with the Wittelsbachs should be held at Hanover, not Paris, meant that the British Plenipotentiaries enjoyed less influence than in the previous year. Virtually no important foreign envoys spent the summer in London, where anyway there were no accredited representatives of Spain or of the Wittelsbachs.

It may seem to be a rather questionable exercise to assess the skill displayed by various ministers in relating the two sets of negotiations particularly when there are no personal memoranda on which to base the conclusions. However, it could be suggested that some of the clashes over policy within the British ministry stemmed not only from differences of opinion over policy but also from varying abilities to integrate the diffuse negotiations. Walpole, Newcastle and the other 'Lords of the Council' appear to have viewed Anglo-Spanish

1 Townshend to George II, 1 Oct. (os) 1729, PRO.103/110.

2 Newcastle to Townshend, 24 June (os) 1729, PRO.43/78. Horatio Walpole complained that he was not being informed, either speedily or fully, of the negotiations with the Wittelsbachs, Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 29 July, Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 4 Aug. 1729, PRO.78/192 f.137,178; Chauvelin to Schleinitz, 7 Aug. 1729, PRO.103/110. Townshend told Chavigny that George was more concerned than his father 'de paroître tout voir, et tout déterminer par lui-même', Chavigny to Chauvelin, 12 Aug. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.112.
relations in isolation and not to have related them to German matters\(^1\). They do not seem to have grasped as well as George, Townshend and Chesterfield that Spanish policy was not determined by fear of British naval action, that securing the active cooperation of France was essential if Spain were to be persuaded to adopt a favourable policy and that French help over Anglo-Spanish disputes was linked to British support for French policy in the Empire. France viewed both sets of negotiations as parts of an anti-Austrian policy but the 'Lords of the Council' were both disinclined to adopt the French analysis and unable to produce a satisfactory alternative. Had Spain rejected an ultimatum then the policy of naval action would have been a failure because it would have produced the risk of British isolation. Spain would probably have returned to her Austrian policy\(^2\), possibly with French connivance, and Austrian pressure upon Hanover would have forced the British to seek French help, and therefore to submit to French direction of Britain's Spanish policy. There are no signs that this was grasped in London, despite the knowledge that Austro-Spanish negotiations were continuing in Spain\(^3\).

1 Chauvelin criticised the British Plenipotentiaries for the same fault, Chauvelin to Chavigny, 21 Aug. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.134.

2 Chesterfield to Townshend, 7 July 1729, PRO.84/304. f.209.

3 Chavigny wrote of Townshend, '...personne en Angleterre n'est plus convaincu que luy de la relation necessaire des affaires de la couronne d'Angleterre avec celles d'Allemagne', Chavigny to Sickingen, 23 Jan. 1730, Münster, NB.286 f.80.
CHAPTER NINE
SUMMER-AUTUMN OF 1729
NEGOTIATIONS WITH AUSTRIA, WAR-PANIC WITH PRUSSIA,
SETTLEMENT WITH SPAIN.

'L'Empereur a voulu me susciter des embarras et des affaires,
jauray tort ou tard ma revanche'.

George II to Chavigny, 4 Sept. 1729¹.

A further element in the diplomatic situation in the summer of
1729 was the continuing contact between Britain and Austria. Given
the increasing commitments being envisaged that summer as part of the
strategy to coerce Austria, (support for Spain in Italy and for the
Wittelsbachs in the Empire), given the opposition of the British
ministers to war with Austria; and given the obvious difficulties that
faced the coercive strategy, (dependence upon the quixotic Elizabeth
Farnese, Hanoverian vulnerability to Austrian and Prussian pressure,
and the likelihood of successful Austrian resistance in Italy), it was
not surprising that talks with Austria were considered. After the
abortive British initiative in the early spring neither Britain nor
Austria made any approaches in the late spring. The British were more
concerned to exploit Austro-Spanish differences and they may have been
affected by French disquiet at the Anglo-Austrian contacts earlier in
the year. Adopting a charitable interpretation, it could be suggested
that the Austrians were waiting until they could discover Spanish
intentions². A less charitable view would suggest that in the late

1 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 4 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47
f. 220.

2 Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 4 July 1729, PRO.78/192 f.7. Uncert-
ainty over the degree to which Spain, once it had broken with Austria,
would take anti-Austrian steps was an important factor, Instructions
for Fonseca, 14 May 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13 f.236.
spring the Austrian government, and in particular its foreign policy, was affected by the lethargy that seems to have crept over it so often during the reign of Charles VI1. This indolent and prevaricating monarch preferred hunting to the difficulties of decision making2. Eugene was also disinclined to commit himself to unpredictable courses of action, whilst Sinzendorf had suffered for his forwardness at Soissons. The unwillingness to take decisions at Vienna complicated a foreign policy already handicapped by the disorganized nature of the Austrian diplomatic corps. Both Eugene and Sinzendorf maintained extensive private correspondences with Austrian envoys. Sinzendorf had close links with Fonseca, one of the Austrian Plenipotentiaries at Paris, whilst Eugene had similar links with, among others, Seckendorf, Kinsky and Wratislaw the Austrian envoy in Russia. Braubach has drawn attention to the range of Eugene's system and to the way in which he used it to follow a private diplomacy of his own, often in opposition to that of the Chancery under Sinzendorf. The effect of this confusion was that most Austrian envoys received contradictory instructions, and were uncertain about what to do. Seckendorf's claim that most Austrian envoys, himself naturally excepted, were unaware of the true intentions of the Austrian government, was partially true, though it begged the question whether

1 Waldegrave to Townshend, 1 Jan. 1729, PRO.80/64 f.5; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Townshend, 4 July 1729, PRO.78/192 f.7; Poyntz to Waldegrave, 19 Jan. 1730, BL.Add.32763 f.24. 'Icy l'on vit dans une tranquilité sans pareille, on ne met non plus en peine de ce qu'il se passe en Europe que si cela ne nous regardoit ny en blanc ny en noir...', Visconti to Zamboni, 3 July 1729. Visconti was writing from Vienna. Bodl. Rawl.129 f.163-4.

2 I have benefited from discussions on this point with Leopold Auer, Peter Barber and Derek McKay.
there were any concerted views at Vienna.  

In late May 1729 the Austrians approached the British asking for talks. Sinzendorf, 'quite out of patience with Kinsky', approached Waldegrave, and suggested that he meet George II at Hanover and convey Austrian proposals for talks. Kinsky approached Newcastle and intimated that Austria was ready to come to terms with Britain. Newcastle stated that Austria would have to sign the Provisional treaty as a condition of any peace. Kinsky was against such a condition and told Newcastle that the treaty was bad for both Britain and Austria. He claimed, correctly, that the treaty would not settle the dispute over Gibraltar, and 'hinted to me that perhaps the Emperor might be disposed to go further lengths with us against Spain, in support of our pretensions, than possibly France would do'. Newcastle replied that Britain was perfectly satisfied with French conduct. Since France was known to be opposed to Britain's proposals for action against Spain this untruthful reply hardly suggested a British willingness to reply to Austrian approaches.

On May 30th Kinsky had a long conference with Sir Robert Walpole. They met in secret, in the house of the Duke of Grafton, who acted as an interpreter in order to prevent any misunderstandings. Kinsky was

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1 M. Braubach, Die Geheime Diplomatie des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen (Cologne, 1962); K. Muller, Das Kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden; 1648-1740 (Bonn, 1975) pp. 46-5, 222-6; Pretsch, Manteuffel; Colman to Newcastle, 10 July 1725, PRO. 98/25; Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 31 May 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13 f. 263; Waldegrave to Townshend, PRO. 80/65 f. 211. D'Aix wrote that Kinsky 'paroit creature du Prince Eugene', D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II 15 Nov. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35. The bad relations of Kinsky and Seckendorf were notorious, D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 7 July 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Kinsky to Eugene, no date, late August 1729, Vienna, Kinsky, Kart. 3(a).

2 Waldegrave to Tilson, 18 June 1729, Chewton.
more detailed in his approach to Walpole than he had been with
Newcastle, Kinsky argued that nothing was so desirable, or so much
in the interests of both Austria and Britain, as a 'return to
the old system of politicks in Europe', and a renewal of the
alliance between the two powers. He blamed the fate of the
approaches earlier in the year upon the British arguing that
their stance had been both too general and too harsh, and stated
that the Emperor would never sign the provisional treaty in its
present form. Kinsky said that his efforts to persuade Vienna
of the good dispositions of Britain for a reconciliation had
been hindered by the conduct of certain British envoys, but that
he had eventually received full powers for negotiations from
the Emperor. Kinsky stated that the Emperor would never comply
with the unreasonable demands of Spain over the Spanish garrisons
and the marriages of the archduchesses, and that these demands
had freed the Emperor to do what he could not previously have
done with honour. He argued that the provisional treaty was
not only unsatisfactory for the Emperor but also insufficient
to secure British interests in Gibraltar and Minorca.

Walpole asked Kinsky to reconcile his protestations of
good Imperial dispositions with the behaviour of the Emperor
over Hanoverian interests. Kinsky attempted to differentiate
between British and Hanoverian interests, but he suggested that
a general reconciliation would produce a settlement of the
Mecklenburg question that would be agreeable to Hanoverian
interests. Kinsky told Walpole, as indeed he told the Queen,
that he had powers to sign the provisional treaty.

Walpole's response was apparently unfavourable. He avoided
'saying anything more than what was absolutely necessary'. He
told Kinsky that his request that Britain should make no
diplomatic moves until Austria had made proposals to George II at Hanover was unreasonable. He urged Kinsky to travel to Hanover at once and there make his proposals to George and Townshend, but he refused to adopt an encouraging note. Aside from the official report upon the conference it is unclear what Walpole's reactions were. Three days after the conference between Walpole and Kinsky, a conference of which Newcastle was fully informed, Newcastle wrote to Stanhope of his preference for an alliance with the Emperor to one with Spain. He did not advance as his reason, a belief in the importance of Anglo-Austrian relations as of essential importance to the European System, but claimed both that the consequences of a breach with Spain were less serious than one with the Emperor, and that a peace with the latter could probably be done 'at a cheaper rate' than one with the former. Although he did not expand on his argument it is probable that he was referring to the dangers of committing Britain to Spain's Italian policy. The negotiation with the Wittelsbachs does not appear to have been an issue before the summer. It may have been this negotiation that Newcastle complained of the secrecy of on April 26th, and there are few rumours or reports about it before July.

Newcastle, certainly, and Sir Robert Walpole, possibly, were advocates of an Austrian alliance by the late spring. It may then be asked why they did not succeed in their views, given that it is generally held that the two ministers succeeded in defeating Townshend and his policies the following winter. Several reasons can be advanced to explain the situation; some

1 Newcastle to Townshend, 20 May (os) 1729, PRO.43/77. Newcastle to Stanhope, 22 May (os) 1729, Coxe II, 641.
2 Newcastle to Stanhope, 22 May, 12 June (os) 1729, Coxe,II,641-2, f.44.
refer to the role of Newcastle and Sir Robert Walpole in the formation of foreign policy, and some to the prospects for Anglo-Austrian reconciliation. Both Plumb and Browning have attributed too much influence to the two men. It would have been unthinkable for them to have detained Kinsky in London and sought to negotiate with Vienna through him. The King, jealous of his prerogatives and vitally concerned by relations with Austria, would never have accepted the situation. Equally there were limits to the amount of pressure that the ministers in London could bring to bear upon Hanover. They made clear their disinclination to commit Britain to long-term support for the Wittelsbachs, but this was a view also held in Hanover. Given George's anger at Austrian opposition to Hanoverian interests and his suspicion that Austria was stirring up Prussia, it would have been foolish to press persistently the Austrian cause, and there are no signs that it was pressed during the summer.

Furthermore, such a course of action would have endangered Newcastle's Secretaryship and threatened Walpole's position. It was probably for these reasons that comments from London tended to refer to peripheral aspects of British foreign policy, such as the cost of subsidies. The few comments that were made upon the desirability of particular alliances tended to be in response to demands from Hanover for the opinion of the London

1 Browning, p. 56; Plumb, p. 198.

2 The Austrians argued that Hanoverian demands threatened the Imperial constitution and the judicial position of the Emperor. 'Quoique nous souhaitions et désirions sincèrement de rétablir l'ancienne intelligence avec ce Roy, nous ne voulons pas pour y parvenir employer des moyens derogatoires à notre grandeur...', Instructions for Seckendorf, 30 June 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 280.
ministers, as when Townshend communicated the Wittelsbach project for a treaty. George would never have accepted dictation over his foreign policy, but he did realise the need to seek consent and advice over the financial aspects of foreign policy. It was therefore through their opposition to extensive subsidy commitments that the ministers in London were able to attempt to influence general policy. Discussions in State Papers Regencies of general diplomatic strategy are rare.

Particular problems faced any attempt to improve Anglo-Austrian relations in the summer of 1729. As Newcastle pointed out, Kinsky 'seems to drive at a separate treaty with us'\(^1\). This raised the problem of the relationship between such an alliance and the already existing Anglo-French alliance, with its prospect of expansion to include Spain. Newcastle may have preferred settling with Austria to settling with Spain, but, like the members of the Opposition who advocated the same policy, he failed to make clear what was to be done with Anglo-French relations, or to face up to the fact that French help was likely to be needed in order to restrain Spain in the Mediterranean; for however willing Austria might be to approach Britain, she could not be supposed to be willing to satisfy those very Spanish demands that had recently caused her to break her Spanish ties. In addition, there was the danger that Austria might use any British response to discredit Britain with her allies.

Aside from the possibility of separate negotiations with Austria there was also the option of linking the negotiations with Spain with talks with Austria\(^2\). There were several

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\(^1\) Newcastle to Townshend, 20 May (os)1729, PRO.43/77.

\(^2\) Fleury was reported as being 'determined not to agree with Spain separately from the Emperor', Chesterfield to Townshend, 6 May 1729, PRO.84/304 f.73.
problems with this solution. It would have reintroduced the questionable element of French arbitration. The course of negotiations at Paris over Anglo-Wittelsbach relations, with France pressing Britain to accept the Wittelsbach position, suggested that negotiations in Soissons or Paris would not serve British interests. They would also be unpopular in Britain. More dangerous was the probability that a fusion of the negotiations would both delay matters, and, thus, increase the possibility that Austria would regain the alliance of Spain or the Wittelsbachs. Stanhope and Horatio Walpole informed Townshend of their concern that Austria might seek to enter the negotiations, and to spin them out over the Parmesan and Tuscan successions.

Thus, despite disquiet over the negotiations with Spain and the Wittelsbachs, there was little pressure from London for a settlement with Austria or for the inclusion of Austria in the negotiations. There was more interest among the British Plenipotentiaries, Stanhope, in particular, making favourable comments to the Austrian Plenipotentiaries, but the British received no instructions for negotiations with the Austrians.

1 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 19 Sept. 1729, AE.CP.Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.254; Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 2 Dec. (os)1729, PRO.78/192 f.551. Kinsky was instructed to argue that the way was open for an Austro-Spanish reconciliation, Charles VI to Kinsky, 26 June 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13 f.369.

2 Stanhope and Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 4 July 1729, BL.Add. 32761 f.268-9; Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 4 July, Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 4 Aug., Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 2 Dec. (os) 1729, PRO.78/192, f.21,175,551.

3 Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 22 Aug. 1729, Höfler, I,10f.

4 Fonseca had been ordered to sound the British and Dutch Plenipotentiaries about a possible guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, Instructions for Fonseca, 14 May 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13 f.241.
The issue of talks with Austria was left to George and Townshend and their control of the matter was unchallenged during the summer.

The Austrians made further direct approaches for talks with George through Seckendorf and through Kinsky. Kinsky's reports had given the Austrians room to hope that George was willing for a reconciliation, and Seckendorf sought to handle the negotiation. However his projected mission to Hanover was blocked by two developments: firstly George refused to notify his arrival in the Empire to the Emperor, which Charles VI chose to regard as a slight; secondly, Seckendorf, who had asked the Emperor to appoint him to carry the compliments that were the traditional response to this notification, found that George made it clear that he did not wish to see him. Both Townshend and Hattorf denied Seckendorf's statement that letters had been sent to him inviting him to Hanover. The British decision was taken by George and related, not to any disinclination to listen to Austrian proposals, but to a deep suspicion that Seckendorf, despite his professed interest in improving Anglo-Prussian relations, was actually seeking to keep the

1 Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 15 July 1729, PRO.78/193 f.265-6; Eugene to Kinsky, 16 July 1729, Vienna, CK. 94(b) f.37; Gansinot to Plettenberg, 19 July 1729, Münster, NB.259 f.181; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 21 July 1729, AST.LM.Ing.35; Seckendorf to Diemar, 30 July 1729, Marburg, 195; Marini, pp.132-3.

2 Schleinitz to ---, 12 July 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover,47 f.78.
two powers apart\(^1\). It is very possible that George and the British exaggerated Seckendorf's influence in Berlin and minimised Frederick William's antipathy to George II. A major reason for this was their understandable wish to persuade themselves that if only Frederick William ceased hearing anti-British reports he would at once settle with George on George's terms. Such a view was foolish, but the reports from Berlin which stressed Seckendorf's malevolent role make it understandable.

The refusal to permit a visit to Hanover did not end Seckendorf's hopes. He attempted to establish a correspondence with George through Diemar, and he suggested that Townshend and Diemar could meet him in Hamburg. Seckendorf urged Diemar to tell George of his good intentions and to communicate his letters to George. Diemar, unwilling to take such a step without the authority of his court and probably disinclined to associate Seckendorf with Anglo-Hessian relations, declined to do so, and George persisted in his refusal to receive Seckendorf.\(^2\)

Kinsky, rebuffed at London, set off for Hanover, but on the way he chose to spend several days at the Hague. This led Townshend and Chesterfield to surmise that his delay was in order to give the Austrians time to ascertain the success of their efforts to regain Spain and they concluded that the

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\(^1\) Kinsky to Eugene, 27 July 1729, Vienna, GK.94(b); Du Bourgay to Townshend, 11 Sept. 1729, PRO.90/25. Townshend was suspicious of the 'extraordinary intimacy... and very close and extensive engagements between the Emperor and the Kings of Prussia and Poland', Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 15 July 1729, PRO.78/193 f.265.

\(^2\) Seckendorf to Diemar, 30 July, 9 Aug. 1729, Marburg, 195.
Austrians were not sincere when they talked of reconciliation. Townshend had informed Newcastle that the King was very satisfied with the manner in which Newcastle and Walpole had spoken to Kinsky. Kinsky, when he arrived at Hanover, received as negative a reply as he had got in London, though it does not seem that he made a particularly strong approach. On June 21st he had a long conversation with Townshend. Kinsky stated that the Austrian government doubted that Britain was at all interested in the resumption of good relations, and he drew attention to Townshend's personal commitment to anti-Austrian policies. The two men quarrelled over the fate of Tuscany and Parma, and Kinsky claimed that the Emperor was not bound to stand by the terms of the Quadruple Alliance unless they were confirmed by the Treaty of Vienna, a statement Townshend contradicted. Townshend complained that Kinsky was very hesitant in explaining himself and far from forthcoming, but this was not surprising, given Townshend's refusal to consider any extension to the Anglo-Austrian talks earlier in the year, and his insistence that Britain would take no steps without the concurrence of France and the Netherlands, and that she was

1 Townshend to Newcastle, 14 June 1729, PRO.43/9; Chesterfield to Townshend, 28 June 1729, PRO:84/304 f.191. Kinsky did not leave The Hague until June 13th. In discussions with Chesterfield, 'he insisted strongly upon the affairs of Ostend and Mecklenburg, and declared the Emperor could never give up those two points', Chesterfield to Townshend, 14 June 1729, PRO.84/304 f.155. Kinsky reached Hanover on June 18th and saw Townshend on the 19th.

2 Townshend to Newcastle, 10 June 1729, PRO.43/77.
entirely satisfied with French conduct\(^1\). Given the British unwillingness to tie their hands by agreeing not to negotiate without the concurrence of the Wittelsbachs and given the conduct of Britain earlier in the year, Townshend's statement must have seemed rather harsh. It reflected the determination of George and Townshend not to endanger the negotiations with Spain by holding talks with Austria\(^2\). Thus, it naturally complemented their opposition to the despatch of a fleet to Spanish waters.

The flexibility of the Austrian negotiating position increased as the summer progressed. On June 26th Charles VI sent Kinsky plenipotentiary powers for a negotiation, ordering him to press the British on a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. Charles urged compliance with the system of the Quadruple Alliance; claimed that as Austria had guaranteed the Hanoverian succession so Britain should guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, and declared that Maria Theresa would not be married in such a way as to threaten the balance of power\(^3\). Two months

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1 Townshend to Newcastle, 21 June 1729, PRO.43/77; Townshend to Kinsky, 9,10 Aug., 20 Sept. 1729, PRO.100/11; Kinsky to Eugene, 5 Sept. 1729, Vienna, GK.94(b); Chavigny to Chauvelin, 12 Aug., 4 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.130-1, 203; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Keene, 17 Sept. 1729, PRO.78/192 f.458. Kinsky suggested that the negotiation of Hanoverian demands, the so-called 'Electoral Points', should be handled after British demands had been discussed, Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 23 June 1729, PRO.78/193 f.252. Chesterfield suggested that the Austrians hoped to use Seckendorf's mission to sow discord among the allies, Chesterfield to Townshend, 12 July 1729, PRO.84/304 f.219.

2 Plenipotentiaries to Keene, 19 Aug. 1729, BL.Add.32762 f.221.

3 Charles VI to Kinsky, 26 June 1729, Vienna, Fonseca,13 f.368-70.
later Eugene informed Kinsky that the sole Austrian demand was the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. He argued that it was essential for the balance of power, and suggested that Britain and the United Provinces were concerned in the balance, at least, if not more, than other powers.

This change in the Austrian attitude, a change doubtless produced by the growing tension in Austro-Spanish relations, led to fresh approaches by the Austrian representatives in Hanover and Paris. In September Waldegrave, who had been ordered to perform the duties of the Secretary of State in the gap between the departure from Hanover of Townshend and of George, recorded a conversation with Kinsky. Kinsky outlined a settlement of Anglo-Austrian differences that included a suppression of the Ostend Company, an Austrian signature of the Provisional Treaty negotiated by Fleury and Sinzendorf, Austrian concessions over Mecklenburg, Bremen and Verden, British support for the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, and a British guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, 'but the guarantee not to extend to any P. of the house of Spain or to any other P. who by his other dominions might endanger the Libertys of Europe.'

The Austrian Plenipotentiaries were more active in August than they had been during the preceding months. On July 2nd Horatio Walpole complained that Stephen Kinsky, 'has not opened his mouth since his arrival to any purpose but that of eating and drinking. We are feasting him plentifully each in his turn, and when he seeks to take you aside,'

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1 Eugene to Kinsky, 25 Sept. 1729, Vienna, GK.94(b) f.44-5.
2 Undated note in Waldegrave's 'Journal of his Embassy in France', Chewton.
and affects to talk in confidence, it is a routine discourse
that we have heard often; general professions; secrecy as to
what he shall say; enquiry about our having made any new
engagements, ancient friendship and ye old system; and at last
ends; when he has received no more than generall answers, to
his general questions; with insisting upon a limited commerce
[for the Ostend Company]. Never any court acted so unaccount-
able a part ....I flatter my selfe we shall end with Spain
without ye Imperiall court, and then I think we shall have
nothing to fear from it'.

More concrete Austrian proposals were advanced in August.
Stephen Kinsky informed the French ministry and the British
Plenipotentiaries that Charles VI would never accept any alter-
ation to the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, and would fight
rather than accept Spanish garrisons. He told the British
Plenipotentiaries that the issue of the Ostend Company would
be settled to British satisfaction if George II, as King, would
agree to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction under the condition
that the guarantee would only be binding if George II approved
of Maria Teresa's spouse.

The Plenipotentiaries assured Stephen Kinsky of British
good intentions towards Austria, but informed Townshend that
they thought Stephen Kinsky's purpose was 'to interrupt or
slacken our present transaction with Spain, and to create
jealousies between His Majesty and France'. The British and

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1 Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 2 July 1729, PRO.78/192 f.2-3.
2 Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 4 Aug. 1729, PRO.78/192 f.174-5.
3 Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 3 Aug. 1729, Höfler,
I, 90; Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 4 Aug. 1729, PRO.78/192
f.175.
the Dutch Plenipotentiaries made clear their support for the
Pragmatic Sanction and their belief that it was vital for the
balance of power, but they informed the Austrians that they
had no instructions on the subject, and that the Austrians
should address themselves directly to George II and the Dutch
government. On August 1st Stanhope told Stephen Kinsky that
'sa cour' held the same views that had been expressed the
previous winter in discussions with Philip Kinsky,

'mais comme it n'avait présentement là dessus ny ordres,
ny instructions il ne pouvoit pas s'y avancer'¹.

The crisis over relations with Prussia intervened at the
end of August, with the British accusing the Austrians of
stirring up Prussia, accusations Austria denied². By then,
however, the negotiations with Spain were sufficiently advanced
to lead Britain to rebuff Austria, a situation Eugene had
foreseen³. Whilst Britain needed French help to obtain a
Spanish guarantee of British commercial and territorial claims,
it was understandable that Townshend should rebuff Kinsky, and

¹ Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 3, 22, 24 Aug.,
26 Sept. 1729, Höfler, I, 88-90, 105,110,227. Keene reported
that the Spanish ministry was keeping a close watch on Stephen
Kinsky's negotiations, Keene to Plenipotentiaries, 25 Aug.
1729, BL.Add.32762 f.253-4.

² Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 5 Aug. 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13 f.324;
Townshend to Chesterfield, 2 Sept. 1729, PRO.84/305 f.93;
D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 4 Sept. 1729, AST.LM.Ing.35;
Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 22 Aug., 1,26 Sept.,
Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 8 Oct. 1729,
Höfler, I, 102,200,247,250-2; Horatio.Walpole and Stanhope
to Keene, 17 Sept. 1729, PRO.78/192 f.463. Stephen Kinsky
had spoken of 'letting the Russians, Prussians and Poles
loose upon the Empire', Poyntz to Delafaye, 7, 12 Aug. 1729,
PRO.78/192 f.200, 215.

³ Eugene to Kinsky, 24 Aug. 1729, Vienna, GK.94 (6) f.42.
claim that Britain would do nothing without her allies.

Negotiations with Spain had progressed more slowly than the British had hoped. This led to renewed pressure in August for the presentation of an ultimatum to Spain, and Newcastle instructed the British Plenipotentiaries to have the project of a treaty with Spain, agreed with France and the United Provinces, delivered to Spain as an ultimatum\(^1\). Such a method was unnecessary as Spain had already rejected the approaches made by the Austrian envoy in Spain. Königsegg had suggested that Austria would accept Spanish garrisons in Tuscany and Parma\(^2\). However, he failed to receive sufficient support from Vienna, where Eugene and Sinzendorf disagreed over the extent to which Austria should make concessions to Spain\(^3\), and the Spaniards rejected his promises as too vague\(^4\).

On June 14th new instructions had been sent to Keene and Brancas, ordering them to agree to the Spanish garrisons if

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1 Newcastle to the British Plenipotentiaries, Horatio Walpole, Stanhope and Poyntz, 29 Aug. (os) 1729, PRO.43/80; King, pp.88-9; Goslinga, pp.344, 348.

2 Keene to Townshend, 10 July 1729, PRO.94/100; British Plenipotentiaries to Newcastle, 21 Aug. 1729, BL.Add.32762 f.209. The Austrian Plenipotentiaries suggested that Austria would declare the marriage of Don Carlos and an Archduchess, and make Carlos King of Naples, Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 11 Aug., Poyntz to Tilson, 12 Aug. 1729, PRO.78/192 f.210,215.

3 Bussy to Chauvelin, 27 July, 17 Aug. 1729, AE.CP. Aut. 163; Newcastle to Stanhope, 17 July (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 651; Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 4 Aug. 1729, PRO.78/192 f.175; Keene to Townshend, 1 Sept. 1729, BL.Add.32762 f.315.

4 De Buy to Marquis de Fleury, 30 June, 14 July 1729, Dresden, 3105,2, f.145, 148; Frederick William-I to Chambrier, 20 Aug. 1729, AE.CP. Prusse, 88.
Spain insisted on the issue. This satisfied Elisabeth Farnese, but negotiations were delayed as a result of the idiosyncratic nature of the Spanish government. Writing to Townshend on July 28th, Keene commented, 'Your Lordship must be justly surprised and impatient of these delays .... I cannot attribute to any other cause than to its [Spain's] natural and invincible slowness ... to their catholick Majesties unaccountable conduct with regard to their two ministers ....' 

Attempts to persuade Spain to accept neutral garrisons failed, and they only served to increase Spanish suspicion of France and Britain. The British believed that the Spaniards were deliberately delaying the negotiations in order to benefit from British difficulties with Austria and Prussia. Once Britain was fully and openly committed against these powers, it was possible that she would have to offer Spain better terms. The British, suspicious that Spain would reserve difficulties to the last moment in the negotiations and hope to profit, thereby, from the government's need to settle matters before the beginning of the parliamentary session, also feared that

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1. Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 11 June 1729, PRO.43/9; 'Instruction particulière et secrete pour Mgr. Keene et Mr de Brancas', enclosed in Plenipotentiaries to Keene, 14 June 1729, BL.Add.32761 f.162-8; King, p.89; Baudrillart, III, 520-1; Goslinga, p.347; Conn, pp.106-7.


3. Keene to Townshend, 28 July 1729, PRO.94/100; Tilson to Waldegrave, 23 June 1729, Chewton.


Spain would commit Britain to an aggressive warlike policy in Italy\(^1\). It was, therefore, decided to send Stanhope to Spain. It was believed that his diplomatic skills, combined with the high regard that the Spanish court held him in, would enable him to finish the negotiations and sign a treaty. It was also felt that the despatch of such a high-ranking diplomat would convince Spain that Britain was in earnest. Furthermore, the decision to supersede Keene, a decision resented by the latter, possibly owed something to a fear that Keene would yield to pressure as he had done with Rottembourg in 1727\(^2\).

Setting out from Paris on September 21st, Stanhope moved at great speed, despite the bad roads, made worse by heavy rains, and the difficulty in securing enough mules for his baggage in north Spain\(^3\). On October 5th he reached Pamplona, on the 12th Madrid, and on the 25th, in the late morning, Seville. That evening he was received by Philip V and Elisabeth Farnese and treated 'extremely graciously'\(^4\). D'Aubenton, who was both suspicious and jealous of Stanhope, had predicted major difficulties for him unless he brought new concessions\(^5\). De Bûy shared these views, and, in common

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1 Keene to Townshend, 5 Oct., Keene to Newcastle, 13 Oct. 1729, BL.Add.32763 f. 281,353.

2 Horatio Walpole to Keene, 18 Oct. 1729, BL.Add.32763 f.385; D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 20 Oct. 1729, AN.AM.B'299; George Lyttelton to Sir Thomas Lyttelton, -- Sept. 1729, Wyndham, Chronicles of the Eighteenth Century I, 19. Stanhope's mission was closely linked to his desire for a peerage.


4 Stanhope and Keene to Newcastle, 27 Oct. 1729, BL.Add.32763 f.446.

5 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 20 Oct. 1729, AN.AM.B'299; Chauvelin to Chammorel, 3 Nov, 1729, AE.CP.Ang.sup. 8 f.148.
with D'Aubenton reported that neither Philip nor his wife approved of Stanhope,

'c'est une chose generallement connue icy que Mr. de Stanhope n'est point aime du Roy et beaucoup moins de la Reyne'.

Both were to be proved wrong. On November 3rd De Büy reported that the Spanish rulers were very content with Stanhope. Stanhope succeeded in settling matters, and at 7 p.m. on November 9th the Treaty of Seville was signed, a treaty which in the words of De Büy 'donne un terrible echec ä la puissance de la maison d'Autriche'.

The treaty settled outstanding differences between Britain, France and Spain, and committed the two former powers to the support of Spanish pretensions in Italy. The treaty stipulated that Spanish garrisons should be introduced into Leghorn, Porto Ferrajo, Parma and Piacenza. Four months were to be devoted to securing the consent of the Emperor and the Grand Duke of Tuscany to this stipulation. If they refused consent, force was to be used, and the garrisons were to be introduced not later than May 9th, six months after the signature of the treaty.

The British had been less successful than the Spaniards in achieving their goals. Despite efforts to obtain an explicit confirmation of their rights to Gibraltar and to trading privileges in the Spanish Empire, the Spaniards proved unwilling.

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1 De Buy to Manteuffel, 6 Oct. 1729, Dresden, 3105,2 f.174-5.
2 Königsegg to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 8 Nov, 1729, Vienna, Frankreich, Varia, 12 f.60-1; De Buy to Manteuffel, 10 Nov. 1729, Dresden, 3105, 2 f.187; Baudrillart, III, 540-2.
3 Treaty of Seville, PRO.108/490.
to make any such declaration\textsuperscript{1}. The British attempted to gain French support for their efforts, arguing that if they failed, Parliament would reject the settlement. The French proved unwilling to support the British demand, and disagreement over this point played a part in increasing Anglo-French tension on the autumn of 1729\textsuperscript{2}. Major differences of opinion over negotiations both with Spain and the Wittelsbachs helped to increase suspicion, and to ensure that discussions over the response to the Austrian demand for the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and over the best method to ensure Austrian compliance over the Spanish garrisons, took place within an alliance made unstable by distrust\textsuperscript{3}.

The Treaty of Seville stipulated that any articles of the Treaty of Vienna which conflicted with articles in treaties signed prior to 1725 were to be revoked. British and French commercial privileges were to be restored to the pre-1727 situation. Although the Prince Frederick was to be immediately restored, outstanding claims relating to the activities of illicit British merchants and to the depredations of Spanish guardacostas were to be referred to a specially created commission. This was also ordered to consider the Spanish claim for the restitution of the Spanish ships taken by Byng

\textsuperscript{1} Horatio Walpole and Poyntz to Newcastle, 13 Aug. 1729, PRO 78/192 f.222; Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 4 Sept. 1729, Höfler, I, 206.

\textsuperscript{2} Chauvelin to Chavigny, 21 Aug., 4,19 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.135,210,254; Chauvelin to Brancas, 24 Aug. 1729, AE. Mem. et Doc., France, 499; Keene to Townshend, 1 Sept., Horatio Walpole and Poyntz to Stanhope, 27 Sept. 1729, BL.Add.32762 f.316, 32763 f.231-2; Chauvelin to Chammorel, 3 Nov. 1729, AE.CP.Ang.sup.8 f.148; King,p.109.

\textsuperscript{3} Chavigny, however, assured Fleury of George II's confidence in Fleury's intentions, Chavigny to Fleury, 12 Oct. 1729, AE.CP. Allemagne, 375 f.185.
after the battle of Cape Passaro. These terms, combined with the failure to mention Gibraltar specifically, were not as good as the British ministry had hoped, and they were indeed to lead to press and parliamentary criticism in Britain. There was a widespread suspicion that the government was failing to protect British interests, and it was thanks to this suspicion that credence was given to reports which suggested that, by a secret clause in the treaty, the ministry was engaged to restore Gibraltar and Minorca within six years and to bring this restoration before Parliament within three years\(^1\). It was partly due to this already strong disquiet over ministerial intentions that the opposition was able to make so much headway in February 1730 with claims that the government had failed to prevent the improvement of the harbour and fortifications of Dunkirk. This atmosphere of distrust obliged the ministry to move sharply over the issue\(^2\).

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1 Ferdinand Albrecht was sent a copy of the supposed article by both Kinsky and Seckendorf, Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 25 Feb., Ferdinand Albrecht to Kinsky, 13 Mar., Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 4 Mar, 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr.590 f.32-3,35, Nr.585 (d) f.70-1.

2 Stephen Kinsky claimed that there was a secret article in the Treaty for restoring Sicily and Naples to Spain, Poyntz to Delafaye, 24 Nov. 1729, PRO.78/192 f.537.
'We are on the verge of war in the middle of our negotiations for peace, and upon a matter that has no connection with the differences we are trying to settle.'

The diplomatic situation was made more urgent in the late summer of 1729 by the threat of a Prussian invasion of Hanover. When George II had arrived in Hanover Anglo-Prussian relations had been far from cordial, but there had been no talk of war. The Anglo-Prussian marriage talks had failed because of what the British saw as a negative Prussian attitude, but the British still hoped for an improvement in relations. Their refusal to guarantee the Sulzbach succession to Jülich-Berg was seen in this light, and there were rumours of a projected meeting between George and Frederick William I. No such meeting took place, and George seems to have made no attempt to arrange one. He dismissed proposals that Seckendorf should visit Hanover, and Seckendorf's proposals for a confidential correspondence with George, through the Hessian envoy Diemar, were rejected by Diemar. George appears to have thought

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1 George Lyttelton to Sir Thomas Lyttelton, - Aug. 1729, M Wyndham, Chronicles of the Eighteenth Century: Founded on the Correspondence of Sir Thomas Lyttelton and his Family (2 vols., 1924) I, 18.
2 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 23 June 1729, A.ST. LM. Ing. 35.
3 Chesterfield to Townshend, 17 May 1729, PRO.84/304 f.95.
4 Wackerbarth to Augustus II, 2 July 1729, Dresden, 3331,2, f.2-3; London Evening Post 13 May (os) 1729; Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 24 May 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585 (b) f.93.
5 Sühm to Augustus II, 5 July 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI f.139-40; Schleinitz to Fleury , 8,12 July 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover,47 f.74,78. Sauveterre suspected that Seckendorf's object was to reopen Anglo-Prussian marriage talks, Sauveterre to Chauvelin, 21 June 1729, AE.CP.Prusse,89. The British acquired a copy of Seckendorf's instructions, Townshend sending them to the Plenipotentiaries on 15 July, Instructions for Seckendorf, 30 June 1729,PRO.78/193 f.268-83.
that any approach to Prussia was pointless until Prussia could be
persuaded that she was not powerful enough to defy Britain. This
would happen when successful negotiations with Spain and the
Wittelsbachs had weakened Austria and Prussia, and, until then, it
was best to wait for Prussia to make approaches, as it was necessary
to convince Britain's allies that George did not intend to neglect
their interests that were threatened by Frederick William. For
these reasons George did not use the opportunities for personal
diplomacy, presented by his trip to Hanover, to launch any initiatives
for a Protestant German league, as was to be suggested on his 1735
and 1736 trips.

The responsibility for the Anglo-Prussian crisis of 1729 rests
with both monarchs. Frederiek William's determination to increase
the size of his army had produced vigorous recruiting policies that
infringed the rights of his neighbours most of whom he had upset
by the summer of 1729. George retaliated in July by arresting various
Prussian soldiers then in Hanover. According to Charles VI this was
unreasonable, as the soldiers had valid passports and were on the
public way, and because George refused to see the Prussian minister
Kannengieser sent by Frederick William to discuss the matter.
Charles argued that for Hanover to arrest Prussian soldiers as a
reprisal for Prussian recruiting methods was against the constitutions
of the Empire which forbade reprisals. George argued that the

1 The Dutch and French were opposed to Prussian schemes for Jülich-
Berg, the Swedes suspicious of Prussian views on Swedish Pomerania.
2 Schleinitz to [Fleury], 8 July 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.74
3 Sühm to Augustus II, 5 July 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI f.142;
Schleinitz to Fleury , 12 July 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47
f.78; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 21 July 1729, AST.LM. Ing.35;
Marini, pp.131-3.
4 Charles VI to Fonseca and Stephen Kinsky, 31 Aug., 10 Sept. 1729,
Höfler, I, 144-6,211; Marini, p.136.
Prussian methods were a breach of the peace of the Lower Saxon circle. The somewhat petty dispute, no different in character from several that had occurred between Prussia and other powers over the preceding decade, was made more serious by a Prussian military mobilization in mid-July. George appears to have neglected to consider the possibility that Prussia would react violently. On July 12th Sühm, the Saxon envoy in Berlin, noted,

'on affecte plus de tranquilité, qu'on ne se repand pas en menaces, et qu'il paroit qu'on a le coeur ulceré et rempli d'un desir de vengeance, dont l'exécution dependroit de peu de chose, et ne manque de la moindre incitation'.

He reported that Frederick William had ordered the encampment on the Elbe near the frontier of Hanover of fifty two battalions by mid August. Sühm commented that Prussia had made warlike preparations before, but that hitherto they had been done openly. He believed that the secret nature of the current preparations indicated that Frederick William intended to attack, though he stated his conviction that Seckendorf would prevent this. However when Seckendorf told Frederick William that he could expect no Austrian help if he was the aggressor, the latter replied that he only wanted an absence of Austrian opposition, and that Prussia was ready to attack alone.¹

Despite Prussian suggestions of a joint commission, to settle the troubles, George continued to arrest Prussian soldiers, and Frederick William continued to assemble his troops, though George made no similar moves.² The Prince of Anhalt, one of the leading

¹ Sühm to Augustus II, 12 July 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI f.146; Guy Dickens to Du Bourgay, 19 July 1729, PRO.90/24.
² Sühm to Augustus, 19 July 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI f.157.
Prussian generals, was sent to reconnoitre the valley of the Elbe down which the Prussians hoped to advance, cutting off Mecklenburg from Hanover. On July 19th Guy Dickens, Du Bourgay's secretary, reported from Berlin that Frederick William was eager for action, 'the King of Prussia waits with impatience for an opportunity to do some action, which, to use his own expressions, may make some affronting stroke on the side of Hanover'.

The Hanoverian response to the Prussian suggestion of a mediating commission was too general to please the Prussians, but opinions differed as to Prussian intentions. Prussian war preparations continued. On the 6th August Du Bourgay informed Townshend that the constant tergiversations of Frederick William made it difficult to form any firm conclusions but that 'the general opinion is that he will not undertake anything'. Du Bourgay dismissed the suggestions, made to him by the Prussian minister Knyphausen, that Prussia was really in earnest, and that Seckendorf was secretly encouraging this policy. Three days later Sühm argued that the fact that both powers were still negotiating their dispute suggested that there would be no conflict. Sutton, then at Brunswick, noted Prussian preparations at Magdeburg, and Halberstadt, but stated that no Prussian troops had yet left their quarters.

The response at Hanover had been muted in July and early August, but by mid August the continued Prussian preparations led to a change.

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1 Sühm to Augustus, 23 July 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI f.163.
2 Dickens to Du Bourgay, 19 July 1729, PRO.90/24.
3 Sühm to Augustus, 26 July, 2 Aug. 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI f.172,174.
4 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 9 Aug. 1729, PRO.90/24; Sühm to Augustus, 26 July, 9 Aug. 1729, Dresden, VI f.166,181.
5 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 6 Aug., Sutton to Townshend, 12 Aug. 1729, PRO.90/24, 81/123; Villars, July 1729, p.183; Marini, p.135; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 28 Aug, 1729, AST. LM. Ing.35.
in tone. The British pressed their allies to urge Prussia to desist from violent measures, and to prepare to support their representations by force. The French were asked to press the Prussians and to encourage other powers to do likewise. The French secretary in Berlin, Sauveterre, declared to the Prussian government that France would support George II if he was attacked. The French ministry gave the British Plenipotentiaries assurances to this effect, and pressed Denmark to assure Britain of her support. On August 23rd the situation suddenly became more serious. Townshend received reports from Du Bourgay stating that Prussia had decided to attack. Requests for assistance were despatched the same day to Britain's allies. Copies of these reports were sent by express to Cassel with a call for military assistance. Sutton was ordered to travel to Copenhagen, and persuade Denmark to hold ten or twelve thousand troops ready to march to assist George either in repelling a Prussian invasion of Hanover, or the movement of Prussian troops into Mecklenburg. Townshend also ordered Chesterfield and the British Plenipotentiaries to secure Dutch and French support.

On the 25th Townshend sent Newcastle copies of the recent despatches from Du Bourgay and commented on the envoy's statement.

1 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 20, 23 Aug. 1729, PRO. 90/24; Declaration by Sauveterre, 22 Aug. 1729, Höfler, I, 146; Marini, p. 136; Chauvelin to Chavigny, 21 Aug. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47, f. 139.

2 Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 21 Aug. 1729, BL. Add. 32762 f. 226; Chavigny to Plelo, French envoy in Denmark, PRO. 100/5.

3 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 21, 22 Aug. 1729, PRO. 90/24; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 23 Aug. 1728, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 162-5. The previous day Frederick William had written to Ferdinand Albrecht, 'Je me prepare à la guerre et tout sera prêt pour la marche vers le 17 de septembre', Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 532 f. 32.

that Frederick William intended to attack,
... 'these advices are confirmed from all hands,
so that there is not the least room to doubt of
these being his Prussian Mty.'s present intentions
...the King of Prussia's temper and character is
such that we shall not be justified either before
God or man if we do not take all necessary
precautions'.

Townshend informed Newcastle that if war broke out George
would order a sizeable section of the British army to Hanover, and
he conveyed George's orders that 'the Lords of the Council' should
send an account of the state of the regiments in England, and an
estimate of how long it would take for these regiments to be
prepared for shipping to Germany¹.

Frederick William hoped that George's allies would desert him.
He ordered Chambrier, his envoy in Paris, to press France not to
intervene, and he sounded his own allies, Russia, Austria and Saxony
about the possibilities of assistance². Frederick William was
swiftly disabused. None of his allies was willing to send troops,
whilst George's allies produced a generally good response. The
Government of Hesse-Cassel received the British request on August 25th

¹ Townshend to Newcastle, 25 Aug. 1729, PRO.43/80; Marini, p.136;
King, p.108.
² Frederick William to Chambrier, 20 Aug., 3 Sept. 1729, AE.CP.
Prusse, 88; Du Bourgoye to Townshend, 20,27 Aug. 1729, PRO.90/124;
Woodward to Townshend, 8 Sept. 1729, PRO.88/35; Pretsch, Manteuffel
pp.56-7. Prussia exerted diplomatic pressure on Hesse-Cassel,
Chetwynd to Tilson, 9 Sept. 1729, PRO.81/123. The Austrians pressed
France not to intervene, arguing that the conflict was an internal
affair of the Empire, Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca,
31 Aug., Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 1,4 Sept, 1729,
Höfler, I, 145-6, 201, 206.
and at once ordered all their regiments to be ready to march at the first warning. The Dutch readily promised assistance, and the States General voted 8,000 troops to go to the aid of Hanover. The French promised aid, as did the Danes. The Elector of Cologne refused to give the Prussians permission to move troops across his Westphalian possessions.

The British were delighted by the response of their allies and attributed to it the Prussian decision not to invade Hanover. George was particularly grateful for the Hessian assistance. On September 6th Townshend informed Newcastle,

'I am by the King's express command to acquaint your Grace that H.M. thinks himself in a very particular manner obliged to the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel upon this occasion,

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1 William of Hesse-Cassel to Diemar, 27 Aug. 1729, Marburg, 195; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 28 Aug. 1729, AST.LM. Ing.35; Caillaud to Tilson, 29 Aug. 1729, PRO.81/123. The Swedish government was also willing to help, Poyntz to Tilson, 12 Sept. 1729, PRO.78/192 f.426.

2 Chesterfield to Townshend, 2,9 Sept. 1729, PRO.84/305; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 4 Sept. 1729, AST.LM. Ing.35; Marini, p.136.

3 Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 31 Aug., to Tilson, 9 Sept., Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 2,3,12 Sept. 1729, PRO.78/192 f.279,343,283-4,281,349; Sutton to Townshend, 30 Aug. 1729, PRO.81/123; Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 1 Sept. 1729, Höfler, I, 201; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 4 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.209; Titley to Townshend, 13 Sept. 1729, PRO.75/53; Woodward to Townshend, 21 Sept. 1729, PRO.88/35; Chauvelin to Chammorel, 3 Oct. 1729, AE.CP. Ang.sup. 8 f.131-2.

4 Boisseaux to Chauvelin, 2 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Cologne, 70 f.178.

5 Newcastle to Plenipotentiaries, 19 Aug. (os) 1729, BL.Add.32762 f.276; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 11 Sept. 1729, AST.LM. Ing.35; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 15 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Ang.366 f.264; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 19 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover,47 f.264; Worms newsletter, 23 Sept. 1729, AG.A1 2655 No.196.
who by his great fidelity and readiness in executing his engagements, has extremely contributed to the happy turn which this affair seems now to have taken; his Prussian Majesty's present peacable desposition being, in the King's opinion in great measure owing to the early motion of the Hessian troops, and to the apprehensions of a strong diversion on that side in favour of H.M.¹

The reiterated reference to George's personal view would not have been lost on Newcastle whose conclusion, advanced on September 9th, was a good deal less specific,

'The king's Allies have, with so much justice, vigour and resolution, exerted in the support of His Maty., which must have undeceived those, who vainly imagined that H.M. would not have had their assistance upon this occasion'.²

It is probable that the swift response of George's allies was the decisive factor in persuading Frederick William not to attack. As Townshend pointed out, the Prussian dominions were far-flung and many of them were vulnerable to attack³. In particular, Frederick William's Rhenish territories of Cleves and Mark, and his Westphalian lands of Minden, Lingen and Tecklenburg, as well

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¹ Townshend to Newcastle, 6 Sept. 1729, PRO.43/80; Townshend to Sutton, 11 Sept. 1729, PRO.81/123; Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 3 Sept., Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 12 Sept., 1729, PRO.78/192 f.291,424. Chavigny claimed that Townshend wished to show that George II could count on French help in all circumstances, and that it was a good opportunity for the French ministry to ingratiate itself with George and the British nation, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 4 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.207-8.

² Newcastle to Townshend, 29 Aug. (os) 1729, PRO.43/80; Newcastle to Chesterfield, 2 Sept. (os) 1729, PRO.84/580 f.321; Newcastle to Poyntz, 22 Jan. (os) 1730, BL.Add.32765 f.144.

³ Townshend to Du Bourgay, 25 Aug. 1729, PRO.90/25.
as the Prussian possession of Upper Guelderland were all vulnerable to French and Dutch attack. Indeed Chesterfield, who seems to have welcomed the opportunity to humiliate Prussia, suggested that Cleves might be offered to the Dutch.

Whatever the reason, Prussia changed her tone in the last week of August. Though she continued her military preparations, and Du Bourgoye indeed urged George to maintain his, Prussia indicated a willingness to negotiate. Frederick William suggested an arbitration of Prusso-Hanoverian differences, and on September 6th Du Bourgoye and the Prussian ministers Borck and Knyphausen signed a convention in Berlin, by which both powers agreed to submit their differences to the arbitration of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and Saxe-Gotha; the powers chosen by Britain and Prussia respectively. They agreed that the arbitrators should hold a Congress at Brunswick and that until a settlement had been reached the men seized by both sides were to be detained by the arbitrating powers. The convention arrived at Hanover on the 8th and was immediately ratified by George.

The consequences of the Anglo-Prussian war scare are difficult to elicit and its relationship to British diplomatic thinking and foreign policy in 1729 has therefore received little study. Quazza, suggesting that Austria was responsible for the crisis, argued that it failed to delay the negotiations in Spain. Dunthorne argued that the crisis made the defence of Hanover an important priority, and therefore persuaded Britain to adopt a more conciliatory attitude

1 George II pressed for the French and Dutch to threaten Cleves, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 23 Aug., 4 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.164,203.
2 Du Bourgoye to Townshend, 30 Aug. 1729, PRO.90/25.
3 Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 4 Sept. 1729, BL.Add.9139 f.39; Townshend to Sutton, 6,9 Sept. 1729, PRO 81/123.
towards Spain\textsuperscript{1}. Dunthorne is certainly correct in suggesting that the crisis highlighted the vulnerability of the Electorate of Hanover. Writing to Sutton on September 2nd Townshend stated,

'You are very well acquainted with the exposed situation and extent of his Majesty's frontiers, and that, as he has no fortifications to defend it, if he be not supported by a considerable body of his allies, there will be great danger from the first impression'.\textsuperscript{2}

This may well have been realised by Townshend, by George II and Sutton with their military training, and by visitors to the Electorate, but it is questionable how far they were aware of the acute nature of the situation prior to the 1729 war-scare. Prussian boasts that they could conquer the Electorate in less than four weeks were far from foolish\textsuperscript{3}. Whatever the views held by George and Townshend there seems to have been little awareness in Britain of the vulnerable nature of the Electorate, and the war-scare must have come as a nasty surprise. Though preparations had been made in early 1727 for the movement of British troops to the United Provinces, the prospect of British troops fighting for the defence of Hanover as a result of local disputes was very different from the situation in 1727, when an attack on Hanover could have been presented as part of an attack upon the Hanover alliance, an alliance formed to protect British interests.

The Prussians argued that the British people would be unwilling to support a war fought for the benefit of Hanover. Sasstroff, the Prussian resident in Cassel, stated that Parliament would never

\textsuperscript{1} Quazza, p.129; Dunthorne, p.183.

\textsuperscript{2} Townshend to Sutton, 2 Sept. 1729, PRO.81/123; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 12 Aug., Chauvelin to Chavigny, 21 Aug. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.120,134.

\textsuperscript{3} Du Bourgay to Townshend, 27 Aug. 1729, PRO.90/25.
support George II in any war he might undertake for the defence of Hanover, and he claimed 'that the Hessian troops being voted for by Parliament, were not to act in any cause that did not regard Great Britain in particular'. George Woodward, the British resident at the Court of Augustus II, reported that Manteuffel had told him that he doubted whether George would enjoy the support of the English ministers. There was no doubt that there was little enthusiasm within Britain for a war with Prussia. Stock prices fell on the news of the crisis. What is unclear is how far the crisis affected the views of the 'Lords of the Council'. In their correspondence with Hanover they made clear their willingness to support George, and there is no reason to doubt that had Prussia attacked, British troops would have been sent to the defence of the Electorate. Such a move however would have been costly and unpopular. It could be suggested that the prospect of an unpopular war made the ministers in London, and in particular Walpole and Newcastle, less happy with the direction of British foreign policy. The anti-Austrian policy, represented by the negotiations with Spain and with the Wittelsbachs, did not make a conflict over Hanover less likely, and it was possible that next

1 Caillaud to Tilson, 5 Sept. 1729, PRO.81/123. In attempting to persuade George to accept arbitration Chavigny argued that, should he refuse, the Opposition would claim that Britain had no obligation to defend Hanover, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 4 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.206.

2 Woodward to Townshend, 29 Aug. 1729, PRO.88/35.

3 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 15 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Ang.366, f.264; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 2 Sept. 1729, Bodl.Rawl.120, f.76-7.

4 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 5,15 Sept. 1729, AE.CP.Ang.366, f.248-9,264.

5 Delafaye to Tilson, 22 July (os) 1729, PRO.43/79. Townshend seems to have been concerned about the amount of backing he could expect from London, Townshend to Newcastle, 25 Aug. 1729, PRO.43/80.
time Prussia would be supported by her allies. The vulnerability of Hanover in a cause that had no obvious bearing upon British interests had not been an issue for many years. When it became one in the summer of 1729 it posed major problems for British foreign policy and for the position of the government in Parliament. For these reasons it is not surprising that the relations between Hanover and Austria, Prussia and the Wittelsbachs became of greater concern to the British ministers in the autumn of 1729, and that they were increasingly less willing to leave British policy in the Empire under the control of George and Townshend.
'At present things are at a stand, and in all likelihood there will not be much to do until we hear the success of Mr Stanhope's journey'.

The lengthy negotiations with Spain led to most other issues being placed in abeyance. Austrian approaches to the Plenipotentiaries at Paris, requesting negotiations over a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, were met with delaying tactics. It was agreed to defer the answer to Austria until the success of Stanhope's mission was known. This decision was taken, despite the wish of Slingelandt to combine the negotiations with Austria with those with Spain. The British were against any such combination. They believed that the state of negotiations with Spain depended heavily on the state of relations between Austria and the Hanover allies, and that Spanish pliancy depended on Spanish fears of an

1 Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 3 Oct. 1729, Chewton.
2 Horatio Walpole and Poyntz to Newcastle, 5 Oct. 1729, BL.Add.32763 f.267; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 17 Oct., 1729, AST.LM.Ing.35.
3 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 26 Oct., 9 Nov.1729, BL.Add. 32763 f.441,502.
4 Kinsky claimed that Townshend wished to finish both sets of negotiations at once, but he advanced no evidence for this assertion, Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 8 Nov.1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr.590 f.9.
that Townshend was misleading Chavigny, and that he had less trust in him than the latter believed. As with the Wolfenbüttel minister Schleinitz, and the Swedish diplomat Gedda, it is clear that the British were capable of taking foreign diplomats they distrusted into their apparent confidence and using them for negotiations.

On September 28th Chavigny sent Townshend the project for a treaty with the Wittelsbachs. Townshend's response was hostile. On October 18th he despatched angry letters to Plettenberg and Chavigny. Plettenberg was informed that the project for a treaty sent by Chavigny included points that Townshend had told Plettenberg George II would not accept. Townshend noted the reports that Plettenberg was to visit London to further the negotiations and he urged him to do so. Such a development would remove French participation on the negotiations. The letter to Chavigny was lengthy, angry and suspicious. Townshend proclaimed his commitment to an alliance with the Wittelsbachs, but he rejected the project sent by Chavigny.

'Le traité en question est un ouvrage favori, que nous avons tous deux entièrement à cœur; nous avons tous deux les mêmes sentiments de vouloir affermir par toutes sortes de moyens cette union si heureuse et si respectable entre la grande Bretagne et la France. Nous souhaitons

1 Townshend to Plettenberg, 12 Dec. 1729, Münster, 5474 f.42.
2 Townshend to George II, no date, PRO.103/110; Tilson to Poyntz, 20 Oct. (os) 1729, Bradfer Lawrence.
3 Chavigny to Townshend, 28 Sept. 1729, AE.CP.Ang.sup.8 f.133-4, PRO.103/110; secret article concerning Jülich-Berg guarantee, enclosed in Chavigny to Townshend, 28 Sept. 1729, PRO.103/112.
4 Townshend to George II, 1 Oct. (os) 1729, PRO.103/110.
egalement de mettre de justes bornes à L'autorité Impé, et d'établir par la le bonheur de L'Empire, aussi bien que la tranquillité de toute L'Europe; et je seray l'inconsolable si nous ne pouvons pas réussir à perfectionner ce traité, qui doit nous assurer ces grands et glorieux avantages'.

However much he might claim to regard the projected Wittelsbach treaty as a touchstone of the Anglo-French alliance, Townshend was not prepared to accept the project sent by Chavigny. He claimed that it included points that even Plettenberg had not insisted upon when they had met at Hanover. He drew attention to the demand for a guarantee of the Wittelsbach inheritance of Jülich-Berg, dissented from the project's provisions with regard to Mecklenburg and noted that George was amazed to see himself charged with half the Bavarian subsidy 'contre ce que j'ay declare aussi souvent en son nom'. He replied to the suggestion that George should give a secret assurance to pay peacetime subsidies to Cologne, with a comment that revealed sensitivity to public pressure, 'il n'y a nul exemple que le Parlement ait donné des subsides en temps de paix, et que toute assurance secrete par écrit au contraire ne fera autre chose qu'aigrir les esprits icy, et de brouiller le Roy avec son peuple'.

The project had proposed that the reciprocal defensive guarantee should explicitly exclude Wittelsbach commitments in the event of hostilities that might arise over Gibraltar or the Ostend Company. Townshend rejected this as dishonourable and politically dangerous. Having dismissed virtually the entire project, he urged Chavigny to have it altered.

1 Townshend to Chavigny, 7 Oct. (OS) 1729, AE.CP. Ang. sup. 8 f. 142-7; PRO. 103/110; Townshend to George II, 17 Oct. (OS) 1729, PRO. 103/110; Townshend to Broglie, 3 Nov. (OS) 1729, PRO. 100/9. Chavigny to Chauvelin, 20 Dec. 1729, AE.CP. Allemagne, 375 f. 288.
The Wittelsbachs judged Townshend's reply inadequate. The Elector of Bavaria wrote a memorandum on the subject. He was willing to accept George's views on Mecklenburg, and, in view of the approaching peace with Spain, to include Gibraltar in the provisions of the Treaty, but he made it clear that he supported the Palatine demands over the Jülich-Berg succession and that he expected Britain to pay subsidies to Bavaria. The Elector's stated reasons for demanding that "Britain should pay peacetime subsidies to Cologne are an interesting indication both of the discrepancies between British and European views of the parliamentary system, and of the differing time-scales of diplomatic planning.

Whilst most of the British ministers were concerned with a time scale that lasted simply to the end of the next parliamentary session, the Elector of Bavaria was concerned about the diplomatic situation after the next peace,

'n'étant pas naturel d'exiger de S.A.E. qu'elle se maintienne à ses propres frais et dépenses pendant un temps si considérable, dans l'état qui convient pour se garantir du mal qu'on voudroit lui faire en haine de cette alliance. S.M.B. trouvera donc bien les moyens de payer des sommes si modiques sans être obligée d'en rendre compte à son Parlement, mais quand elle devroit passer par le suivant les constitutions du Royaume, il y a dans le Parlement d'Angleterre des gens trop habiles et trop affectionnés à leur Roy pour regretter la petite dépense qu'il s'agit de faire pour asseurer à S.M. l'alliance d'un maison aussi considérable dans l'Empire que celle de Bavière unie avec la
The Elector told his foreign minister, Count Toerring, that, far from being accommodating, George's attitude was distancing any chance of a settlement, and he instructed him to convey to Chavigny the Elector's anger at the French failure to alter the British attitude. The Bavarians were firm on their financial demands, and the Elector Palatine on the Jülich-Berg guarantee.

Far from being a simple quarrel about money, the negotiations were closely related to the issue of British diplomatic strategy in the Empire. Suggestions had been made that Britain should use the talks at Brunswick as a springboard for an Anglo-Prussian alliance, an alliance that would isolate Austria, facilitate negotiations with Russia, reduce dependence upon France and the Wittelsbachs, lessen tension over Mecklenburg and solve some of the marital problems of George's children. The need to avoid committing themselves over

1 'Remarques de S.A.E. de Bavière sur la lettre écrite par Mylord Towsent à Mr de Chavigni', Münster, 5474 f.29-32. The French were certain that Parliament would provide the necessary funds, Chauvelin to Chammorel, 29 Jan. 1730, AE.CP.Ang.sup. 8 f.154. Charles VI was deeply suspicious of Bavarian plans over the Austrian succession, Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 16 Nov. 1729, Höfler, I, 338.

2 Toerring to Plettenberg, 2 Nov.1729, Münster, NA.148 f.211.

3 Toerring to Plettenberg, 11 Nov.1729, Münster, NA.148 f.214-6; Schmidt, Karl Philipp p.196. Chavigny supported the stance of the Elector of Bavaria, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 10 Nov.1729, AE.CP.Allemagne, 375 f.216.

4 Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 4 Nov. 1729, Coxe, II, 659-665; Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 30 Mar. (os) 1730, BL.Add.32766 f.332; Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 1,8 Nov. 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt.22, Nr.585 (c) f.57,59.
Jülich-Berg was therefore clear. Toerring noted that it was over this issue that the British and Wittelsbach points of view were furthest apart. The Cologne minister Bellanger was aware of this. After his conferences with Chesterfield at the Hague he informed Plettenberg that George wished to do nothing over Jülich-Berg that would upset Prussia. The following day he wrote to Chavigny of

"une negotiation que l'on crée sur le tapis à Berlin entre le Roy d'Angleterre et le Roy de Prusse. Si cette negotiation avoir lieu, or qu'elle réussit, l'alliance avec la maison B... ne seroit plus d'une grande consideration pour le Roy d'Angleterre".

Chavigny was informed that there was a danger that the Anglo-Prussian settlement would be effected before the treaty with the Wittelsbachs could be signed. On October 21st Bellanger had received (from Chesterfield) Townshend's reply to Chavigny's project. He had been most surprised by Townshend's failure to propose any expedient for adjusting

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1 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 28 Aug. 1729, AST.LM.Ing.35; Townshend to George II, 17 Oct. (os) 1729, and George's undated reply, PRO.103/110; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 10 Nov. 1729, AE.CP.Allemagne, 375 f.208.

2 Toerring to Plettenberg, 11 Nov. 1729, Münster, NA.148 f.214. Chavigny claimed that a British guarantee of the Sulzbach inheritance would be 'un sujet presque perpétuel de separation de veues et d'intêrets' for Britain and Prussia, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 18 Aug. 1729, AE.CP.Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.150.

3 Bellanger to Plettenberg, 28 Oct. 1729, Münster, VE. 133 f.18; Bellanger to Chavigny, 29 Oct. 1729, Münster, VE. 133 f.10-14, AE.CP.Cologne, 70 f.271-7; Bellanger to Chavigny, 5 Dec. 1729, AE.CP.Cologne, 70 f.321; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 10 Nov. 20 Dec. 1729, AE.CP.Allemagne 375 f.208,288-9. Kinsky was aware that the British ministry was opposed to new engagements with the Wittelsbachs, Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 20 Sept. 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr.590 f.2.
the points at dispute. British obstinacy was unhelpful, but so too was the difficulty in securing agreement among the Wittelsbachs. Bellanger suspected that the Palatine court was seeking to delay or block the negotiations. This court was notoriously unpredictable and unreliable, riven by faction and open to bribery. Plettenberg's tour of the Wittelsbach courts in the summer had revealed major differences of opinion between them and these were still an important factor in the autumn. Bavaria and Cologne were principally concerned with subsidies, the Palatinate with Jülich-Berg. Thus, Toerring was willing to accept a compromise over the latter. Angry at the British reply, the Wittelsbachs urged France to press Britain to alter her policy. They displayed little interest in altering their demands. They hoped that the British would change their attitude, as a result of French pressure, and the return to Britain of Chesterfield, regarded as sympathetic to the Wittelsbachs.

The French put pressure on the British to accept the Wittelsbach claims, Broglie pressed the government in London.

1 Bellanger to Chavigny, 29 Oct. 1729, Münster, VE.133 f.10. Townshend had proposed that only a 'civil, dilatory .... answer in general' be sent, Townshend to George II, 1 Oct. (os) 1729, PRO.103/110.

2 Bellanger to Plettenberg, 28 Oct. 1729, Münster, VE. 133 f.21. Townshend was suspicious of Austrian approaches to the Elector Palatine, Bellanger to Gansinot, 5 July 1729, PRO.64/304 f.225.

3 Toerring to Plettenberg, 18 May, 20 July 1729, Münster, NA.148 f.163,176.

4 Toerring to Plettenberg 11 Nov. 1729, Münster, NA.148 f.214-215.

5 Bellanger to Chavigny, 29 Oct. 1729, AE.CP.Cologne, 70 f.277. The Wittelsbachs counted on a British change of mind, Albert to Plettenberg 24 Jan. 1730, Münster, NB.33 f.7.
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whilst the British envoys in Paris were repeatedly urged to yield. Townshend assured Plettenberg that he was still determined to secure the treaty, but he rejected the French expedient of a secret guarantee of the Cologne claim to peacetime subsidies. Townshend refused to yield over subsidies to Bavaria and peacetime subsidies to Cologne, and he continued to press for George's demands over Mecklenburg, Jülich-Berg and the inclusion of Gibraltar and the Ostend Company in the reciprocal provisions of the treaty. British obstinacy had some effect. By January the Bavarians had dropped their demands for a peacetime subsidy, though no agreement had been reached over the Cologne peacetime subsidy. Rejecting the latter in December, Townshend could nevertheless inform Horatio Walpole and Poyntz,

1 Maffei to Victor Amadeus, 4 Dec. 1729, AST.LM.Francia, 164; Villars, 4 Dec. 1729, p. 200; Marini, pp. 138, 141; Poyntz to Newcastle, 11 Jan. 1730, BL.Add.32765 f.4-5,7-9; Albert to Plettenberg, 23 Oct., 28 Dec. 1729, Münster, NB.33 f.221, 229; Townshend to Broglie, 3 Nov. (os) 1729, PRO.100/5; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 28 Nov. 1729, AST.LM.Ing.35; Townshend to Plettenberg, 12 Dec. (os) 1729, Münster, 5474 f.42; Chauvelin to Chammorel, 29 Jan. 1730, AE.CP.Ang.sup.8 f.154-5; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 9 Feb., Broglie to Chauvelin, 23 Feb. 1730, AE.CP.Ang.369 f.174,210-213; Minutes of proceedings at Conference of Newcastle, Townshend and Broglie, 10 Feb. (os) 1730, PRO.36/17 f.97-8.

2 Townshend to Plettenberg 11 Nov. (os), 12 Dec. 1729, Münster, 5474 f.33-4,42.

3 Townshend to Broglie, 3 Nov. (os) 1729, PRO.100/5; 'Account of the Difference between the several projects of the Treaty with the Four Electors', PRO.103/110.

4 Townshend to Chavighy, 11 Nov. (os) 1729, Münster, 5474 f.34-6; Poyntz to Newcastle, 11 Jan., 10 Feb. 1730, Newcastle to Poyntz, 6 Feb. (os) 1730, BL.Add.32765 f.4,206,269-70.

5 Toerring to Plettenberg, 13 Jan. 1730, Münster, NA.148 f.232.
the Treaty with the Electors is in a manner adjusted, in every particular except the subsidies. The lengths H.M. has gone in this affair, particularly in the point relating to Berg and Juliers, in compliance with the court of France, will he hopes, convince the cardinal, that H.M. has nothing more at heart than the preservation of the present system, and the continuance of that perfect union, which has hitherto subsisted between the two crowns, so much to their mutual advantage and glory.

The British yielded to French pressure to give the Elector Palatine a secret guarantee of the Wittelsbach claims to the Jülich-Berg inheritance. The French were informed of George's determination to finish the Electoral Treaty.

Despite these hopeful signs major differences still existed, and neither among the British ministry nor amongst the Wittelsbach Electors was there a whole-hearted commitment to the treaty that matched the French determination to secure its signature. A significant deterioration in Anglo-Wittelsbach

1 Townshend to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 11 Dec. (os)1729, BL.Add.48982 f.205.

2 'Proj. of letter to C Broglie - turned as a pro mem:r', no date, 'Mem: delivered to C Broglie', 8 Dec. (os)1729, PRO.100/5; [Tilson] to Poyntz, 20 Jan. (os)1730, BL.Add.48982 f.218; on 12 February (os) 1730 Newcastle sent a project for the Treaty to Paris. Negotiations then languished till June.

3 Townshend to George II, 17 Oct. (os)1729, PRO.103/110; Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 4 Nov.1729, Coxe, II, 659-663. The Elector of Mainz displayed little support for the projected treaty, whilst George was angered by the conduct of Mainz and Cologne at the Imperial Diet, D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 24 Oct.1729, AST.LM.Ing.35; Albert to Plettenberg, 24 Jan.1730, Münster, NB.34 f.7. Newcastle wrote, 'His Maty. thinks it by no means advisable that this Treaty should be concluded till we can see further what turn the publick affairs are like to take', Newcastle to Poyntz, 12 Feb. (os)1730, BL.Add.32765 f.325.
relations was caused by a major quarrel over the municipal rights of the town of Hildesheim. The Elector of Cologne, as Bishop of Hildesheim, sought to limit those rights, rights guaranteed by the Elector of Hanover. Conflict was only narrowly averted and the French blamed the ministers in Hanover for endangering the new alliance. Chavigny attempted to defuse tension, by assuring Plettenberg that the ministers in Hanover had acted without royal authority\(^1\). However, the Wittelsbachs were livid at the Hanoverian conduct, which threatened the authority of the Elector of Cologne in all his Westphalian bishoprics, and which evoked memories of the struggles earlier in the decade over the municipal and religious liberties between the Wittelsbachs and the protestant German powers. Toerring informed Plettenberg that the Elector of Bavaria was scandalized at Hanoverian conduct. His anger was shared by Fleury and the French ministry\(^2\).

Far more significant in delaying matters, than the dispute over Hildesheim, was the struggle for control within the British ministry. This struggle persisted until the resignation of Townshend in May 1730. It is a struggle that has received singularly little scholarly attention. The absence of a biography of Townshend is particularly serious for this period.

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1 Poyntz to Newcastle, 11 Jan. 1730, BL.Add.32765 f.8; Chauvelin to Chavigny, 22 Feb., 7 Mar. 1730, AE.CP.Allemagne, 376 f.77,114; Baron Stain to Chavigny, 20 Feb. 1730, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 48 f.13; Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich p.164. Chauvelin regarded the Elector of Cologne's anger over Hildesheim as very important, Poyntz and Harrington to Newcastle, 12 Ap. 1730, BL.Add.32766 f.343.

2 Chavigny to Plettenberg 26 Dec. 1729, Münster, NB.286 f.62; Toerring to Plettenberg, 24 Dec. 1729, Münster, NA.148 f.225; Albert to Plettenberg, 31 May, 3 July 1730, Münster, NB.331 f.11,22; Chavigny to Townshend, 28 Sept. 1729, PRO.103/110.
as is the restricted or prohibited access to the papers of Townshend, Horatio Walpole and Stephen Poyntz now held in Raynham, Wolterton and Althorp. Given the restricted nature of the archival sources available it is not surprising that scholarly comment on Townshend's fall has been brief, and, at times, superficial. Browning argued that it was Townshend's loss of control over foreign policy to Walpole and Newcastle, that made his fall inevitable, 'If he could no longer command foreign policy, it seemed but a matter of time until he either left or was asked to leave the government.' 1 Speck also saw foreign affairs as decisive. He stated that Walpole 'negotiated the Treaty of Seville .... behind Townshend's back .... this independent initiative in foreign policy brought to a head a growing antagonism between the two ministers .... After some months waiting for events to justify him, Townshend resigned.' 2 Langford's analysis was similar, 'Once Walpole began to formulate his own line in foreign policy, there could be only one conclusion, and that a direct clash ... Townshend was committed to a strategy ..... based on the assumption that the Emperor was the greatest menace to the peace of Europe and to the interests of Britain. Walpole, under the pressure of his domestic difficulties, could only see that Spain.... posed an equal threat .... Walpole's chief concern was.... peace and retrenchment. There could be no compromise ..... Townshend, in no position to challenge Walpole's

1 Browning, p.57.

2 Speck, p.232. The claim that Walpole negotiated the Treaty of Seville behind Townshend's back is unfounded.
predominance at court and in the commons .......\(^1\).

The general consensus, therefore, is to link Townshend's fall to a major difference of opinion over foreign policy, and to regard it as the inevitable consequence of his disagreement with Walpole. Walpole is not seen as having been in danger, and George's role is discounted\(^2\). Such an analysis underestimates the severity of the crisis and ignores its longevity. Government policy, particularly its foreign policy, was seriously affected by the clash between the two ministers, a clash made more serious by its coincidence with the commencement of the parliamentary session. Had Walpole been as strong as is believed he would have removed Townshend before May 1730. Once the attempts of George and Caroline to reconcile the two men had failed at the end of 1729, there was no reason for Walpole to keep Townshend in the ministry, unless either he feared his opposition in the House of Lords, a possibility that casts doubt on Walpole's control of the peers, or he was unable to persuade George to dismiss him, a possibility that casts doubt on Walpole's influence with his royal master.

The parliamentary session of 1730 witnessed a determined effort by the opposition to use foreign policy issues to ensure the removal of Walpole. This coincided with a continued lack of control by Walpole over the ministry. Wilmington, Dorset and Dodington were unreliable, and the government lost the support of Townshend, Carteret and Winchelsea. George's support for Walpole was unclear; it


was widely believed, in diplomatic circles in late 1729, that George preferred Townshend's policies to those of Walpole. If this is correct then the crisis of 1729-1730 is of greater importance than historians have perhaps recognised. 1730 could be seen as a foretaste of 1742 and 1744, when George was forced to part with Walpole and Carteret respectively, against his better judgement.

A lengthy examination of the available archives does not permit any definite conclusions. It does, however, suggest that the situation was more complex than has been realised hitherto, and that differences of opinion over diplomatic issues were crucial to the quarrel between Walpole and Townshend.
CHAPTER TEN

MINISTERIAL CRISIS

'Il paroit aussi depuis son retour en Angleterre, qu'il a laissé tous ses intérêts d'Allemagne en deçà de la mer, n'agissant en Angleterre, que suivant les principes et les intérêts de la nation Angloise'.

Count Toerring of George II¹.

The views of George II in the winter of 1729-30 are unclear. There are only a few hints as to his opinions, and most of them are not completely reliable. In particular, George's views with regard to relations with Austria, France, Prussia and the Wittelsbachs are unclear. In addition, there is little evidence about his relations with Walpole, Townshend, and the principal, actual or potential competitors for the Secretaryships of State, Chesterfield, Methuen, Stanhope and Horatio Walpole². The major source for George's views is the despatches of foreign diplomats in London. The King's attitudes were only rarely alluded to in the correspondence.

¹ Toerring to Plettenberg, 13 Jan.1730, Münster, NA.148 f.232. Chavigny complained, 'Je ne reconnois point Mylord Townshend non plus que vous depuis qu'il a repassé la mer', Chavigny to Plettenberg, 16 Feb.1730, Münster, NB.286 f.90.

² Scarborough and Henry Pelham were also mentioned, Farley's Bristol Newspaper 11 Oct.(os)1729, Lady Mary Howard to the Earl of Carlisle, 27 Dec.(os)1729, Carlisle, p.62. Reichenbach reported that the principal contenders were Chesterfield, Harrington and Horatio Walpole, Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 24 Mar. 1730, PRO.90/27.
of the leading British ministers.

The surviving evidence suggests that George was interested in an alliance with the Wittelsbachs, but only upon his own terms. He did not wish to pay large subsidies, had little interest in supporting the Wittelsbach claim to the Jülich-Berg succession, and demanded that the Wittelsbachs support him over Mecklenburg. George's attitude towards Austria was not one of simple hostility. Rather, like Townshend, he was deeply suspicious of Austria, but hoped to persuade or force the Austrians into good relations. On November 11th, before the news of the Treaty of Seville had reached London, but when it already seemed likely that Stanhope would succeed in his negotiations, Townshend informed Waldegrave of his views on Anglo-Austrian relations,

'however the Maritime Powers may be engaged in interest to prevent any division of the Austrian territories, this is by no means a proper time to propose a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction'.

He argued that much would depend on Maria Theresa's marriage, and stated that it was best for Charles VI,

'to put an end to the present disturbances as soon as possible, and by so doing put the Maritime Powers in a condition to renew their ancient friendship with him'.

1 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 20 Dec. 1729, AE.CP.Allemagne,375 f.287.


3 Chesterfield to Townshend, 7 July 1729, PRO.84/304 f.212. Poyntz shared this view of the need to coerce Austria, Poyntz to Delafaye, 8 Ap. 1730, PRO.78/194 f.77.

4 Townshend to Waldegrave, 31 Oct. (os), to Chesterfield, 10 Oct. 1729, PRO.80/65 f.216-8, 84/305.
This was hardly the language of the anti-Austrian hawk, seen by many historians. It seems that George shared Townshend's views. As soon as Austria was prepared to cooperate in the Empire with Hanover, and in Europe with Britain, then an alliance could be negotiated. There were two problems with this approach. Firstly, it left the future of the French alliance in doubt. Broglie noted on January 2nd 1730, 'Le Roy d'Angleterre a de conserver nostre alliance pour soutenir ses etats en Allemagne'. However, if Anglo-Austrian or Anglo-Prussian relations improved then this situation would not pertain, and, whatever the British ministry might need France for, George II would need her for nothing.

It was only partly due to Hanoverian territorial interests in Bremen, Verden and Mecklenburg that George wanted an Austrian, and/or Prussian alliance. The principal spur for him came from the more general need for Hanoverian security. Thus, far from George being defeated on March 16 1731, when the Second Treaty of Vienna was signed and Hanoverian territorial demands shelved, albeit temporarily, the treaty was a triumph for George because it brought Hanover security.

Broglie was sceptical about the degree of commitment against Austria shown by both Townshend and George. On December 1st he reported that Townshend wanted to maintain an Austrian presence in Italy, and to diminish, not destroy, Austrian

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1 There is, however, no evidence supporting the claim advanced in the Amsterdam Gazette that George had written two letters to Charles VI promising never to execute the Treaty of Seville by force, Poyntz to Keene, 14 Feb. 1730, BL.Add. 32765 f.250.

2 Broglie to Chauvelin, 2 Jan. 1730, AE.CP.Ang.369 f.10. In the first two months of 1730 the British pressed the French to threaten Prussia with military action in the event of a Prussian attack upon Hanover, Newcastle to Poyntz, 22 Jan (os), Poyntz to Keene, 9 Feb. 1730, BL.Add. 32765 f.143-4,162.
authority in the peninsula. 1

Aside from French support, the second major problem with Townshend and George's Austrian policy was that Walpole was impatient with the progress of British foreign policy. It was not that Walpole disagreed substantially with Townshend's Austrian policy. Browning's claim that 'Walpole and Newcastle, by repudiating Townshend's anti-Habsburg policy, were preparing for the day when the artificial situation that induced Britain and France to be allies had dissolved,' is inaccurate. 2 Townshend's policy was not 'anti-Habsburg', and his insistence that a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction was dependant upon an Austrian commitment over Maria Theresa's husband, was to be maintained, after his resignation, in the negotiations for the Second Treaty of Vienna. Walpole's concern was rather with the cost, in time and money, produced by Townshend's policy. He wanted a swift settlement of European problems, an end to heavy British military expenditure and extensive subsidy obligations, and a reduction in taxation. The political cost of the French alliance, in terms of providing ready issues for the parliamentary opposition was also a factor, and in 1730, disputes with the French over Dunkirk and St. Lucia made this problem more serious. 3

Whether Walpole, in the autumn of 1729, already sought to discard the French alliance is unclear. 4 It is more likely that the acute parliamentary crisis over Dunkirk in February 1730 and the

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1 Broglie to Chauvelin, 1 Dec. 1729, AE.CP.Ang. 367 f.176-8.
2 Browning, p.56.
4 Dureng argued that the Walpoles had already determined upon a reconciliation with Austria, Dureng, p.90.
return of the pro-Austrian William Stanhope to Britain in the summer of 1730, led Walpole to this conclusion, and that he had not already decided to abandon France at the time of his quarrel with Townshend. At that time it is probable that Walpole had already determined to seek to lessen British dependence upon France. This was a wish shared by George and Townshend, Chesterfield and Stanhope. Thus, both Walpole and Townshend had a similar long-term diplomatic strategy: a rapprochement with Austria, the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, upon terms, and a lessened dependence upon France. Such a situation would permit Walpole to retrench, and leave Townshend and George in a glorious diplomatic position.

In diplomatic circles there was little doubt of George's support for Townshend, and hostility to Walpole’s attempt to supplant him.

"Je n'ay de bonne part que le Roy d'Angleterre, n'aime ny n'estime dans le fond le Chev.

Robert Walpole". 

There was less agreement as to the cause of the dispute between the two Ministers, though most blamed it on differences over the Wittelsbach negotiations, and, in particular over the subsidies. It was generally held that Townshend was in favour of the latter and Walpole against. 

1 George II to Townshend, no date, Coxe, II, 536-7.
2 Broglie to Chauvelin, 28 Nov. (quote), 15 Dec. 1729, AE.CP.Ang. 367 f.170-1, 212; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 19 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.256; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 5, 19, 26 Dec. 1729, AST.LM. Ing. 35; Tilson to Poyntz, 20 Jan. (OS) 1730, BL.Add. 48982 f.218.
3 Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 4 Nov. 1729, Coxe, II, 659-60; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 17 Oct. 1729, AST.LM. Ing. 35; Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 28 Oct. 1729, ASV.LM. Ing. 98 f.203. Townshend kept his correspondence with Chavigny a secret from his colleagues, Townshend to George II, 1 Oct, (OS) 1729, PRO. 103/110.
February 1730, by Plettenberg and Chavigny. On February 5th, Plettenberg informed Chavigny that the cause of the dispute was a project, concerted between Townshend and the Wolfenbüttel minister Schleinitz, by which the Elector Palatine was to be offered the payment of all the money owed him by Britain if he agreed to desist from demanding George II's guarantee for the Jällich-Berg succession. Townshend stated that the money could be found by George II, but that Walpole had to be kept in ignorance of the project. According to Plettenberg, Schleinitz informed Fleury by a letter of part of the scheme, and Fleury received it when with Horatio Walpole whom he showed it to. The latter immediately informed his brother, by courier, and, though Townshend said that he knew nothing of the scheme and claimed that the project was Schleinitz's, a breach was caused.¹

Eleven days later Chavigny confirmed, in part, Plettenberg's account. He claimed that the Palatine debt was 'une obligation publique avouée et reconnue de toute la nation, représentée par le Parlement', and that this had authorised Townshend to promise his help in repaying it. He informed Plettenberg,

''J'ay sué de Mylord Townshend luy même ce qui a donné lieu a la jalousie que Messieurs Walpole ont conçu contre luy''.²

¹ Plettenberg to Chavigny, 5 Feb. 1730, AE.CP. Cologne, 71 f.44-5; Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 4 Aug., to Walpole, 4 Aug. 1729, PRO. 78/192, f.180-2,184-5.
² Chavigny to Plettenberg, 16 Feb. 1730, Münster, NB. 286 f.90-1, AE.CP. Allemagne, 376 f.88-9. A similar account was sent by D'Aix, Marini, pp.137-8. The Elector Palatine, Karl Philipp, had made it clear to the British that support over Mecklenburg was dependent upon the payment of the debt, and British support over the Jällich-Berg succession, Karl Philipp to Gansinot, 30 June 1729, PRO.84/304 f.223. The debt arose from the expenses of Palatine troops who had fought in Catalonia during the War of the Spanish succession under terms of a subsidy agreement with Britain and the United Provinces. The Elector Palatine had pressed hard for the payment of the debt, memorandum about arrears demanded by Elector Palatine, enclosed with Schmidman, Palatine resident in London, to —, 6 Feb. 1728,
Coxe included in his biography of Sir Robert Walpole an explanation that also attributed the rift to actions and policies commenced by Townshend, a contrast to the view of Townshend as dispirited, enfeebled by illness, and largely passive in the face of Walpole's growth in authority and power. Coxe claimed that Townshend was resolved to form 'a new administration', and sought to replace Newcastle by Chesterfield. Coxe's account is not very sympathetic to Townshend: 'He became more obsequious to the King's German prejudices, paid his court with unceasing assiduity, and appeared to have gained so much influence, that he thought himself capable of obtaining the appointment of Chesterfield'.

According to Coxe, the Queen, never a supporter of Chesterfield, whom she thought a client of Lady Suffolk's, helped Walpole to block Chesterfield's appointment, and Townshend's second choice, Methuen, failed also, though Coxe does not explain the latter failure. Coxe's account attributes much to the influence of the Queen, and there was general agreement among the diplomats in London that Caroline actively backed Walpole against Townshend. How important this support was is less clear.

2 (cont. from note 2 on previous page) Townshend to Schmidman, 17 May 1728, PRO. 100/15; Platen de Linn, Palatine Minister in London, memoranda to George II, 6 Ap. 1730, 30 Jan. 1731, PRO. 106/16. Townshend complained that the Elector Palatine was unwilling to discuss the terms of an alliance with the Wittelsbachs unless his financial demands over the Spanish debt were met, Townshend to Baron de Beveren, 18 Aug. 1729, PRO. 103/110.


2 It was widely reported that Chesterfield was to be appointed secretary, Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 28 Oct. 1729, ASV.LM.Ing. 98 f. 203; O'Rourke to James III, 5 Nov. 1729, RA. 131/165.

3 Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 8 Nov. 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 590 f. 9.

4 Foreign diplomats were certain of Caroline's great influence in this period, Broglie to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE.CP.Ang. 370 f. 29.
Caroline might have been in preventing the appointment of Chesterfield, Walpole failed to remove Townshend at the end of 1729. It seems to be the case that Walpole attempted to transfer Townshend to the Lord Presidency of the Council, a post made vacant by the death of the Duke of Devonshire. Zamboni attributed the ministerial rivalry to this issue,

'La brouillerie ... entre Walpole et Townshend, j'ai été assuré de fort bonne part que la mort du Duc de Devonshire ... a cause tout cela, d'autant que Walpole, qui vise depuis long temps à procurer la charge de secrétaire d'Etat à son frère ... ayant immédiatement après la mort du dit seigneur conseillé et pressé Mylord Townshend de vouloir s'accommoder de l'employ de President du conseil pour faire place à son frère, Mylord ... rejeté cela avec la dernière fermeté.'

Peter Wentworth clearly had a different source for two days later he noted that Townshend was to have the Presidency added to his Secretaryship. It would be easy to multiply these various reports, but such a process is not very helpful. All the single-causal explanations of the rift are dubious, and it is probably more helpful to note that the divisions over policy seem to have been linked to differences over the composition of the Ministry and

1 Zamboni to Manteuffel and the Marquis de Fleury, 4 Oct. 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f.79; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 17 Oct. 1729, AST.LM. Ing. 35; Ferdinand Albrecht to Kinsky, 24 Oct., Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 8 Nov. 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 590 f.6, 9; Broglie to Chauvelin, 28 Nov. 1729, AE.CP.Ang. 367 f.170; Zamboni to the Duke of Modena, 13 Jan. 1730, AS. Modena, LM.Ing. 19; Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 13 Jan. 1730, ASV.LM.Ing. 98 f.237. Robinson wrote to Horatio Walpole of the possibility of his 'coming to the chief direction of foreign affairs', Robinson to Horatio Walpole, 7 Feb. 1730, BL.Add. 9139 f.48.

2 Peter Wentworth to his brother the Earl of Strafford, 25 Sept. (OS) 1729, BL.Add. 22227 f.92.
quarrels over place. The relationship between the disputes over policy and those over place is an obscure one. Comments such as Hervey's, 'they say the conclusion of this treaty has not secured Don Carlos's succession in Tuscany more effectually than it has defeated the hopes of Ld. Chesterfield in the cockpit,' are unclear. Whether ministers supporting the same policy naturally coalesced and sought posts for each other, or whether the quest for office took precedence, is difficult to ascertain. Given the fact that negotiations with the Wittelsbachs only became a divisive issue in the early autumn of 1729, whilst Townshend had been actively sponsoring Chesterfield, and Newcastle, Stanhope, from before this period, it is clear that, however much these negotiations provided an occasion for conflict, they were not the original cause of division. It could be suggested that a conflict fuelled by ambition for office required an issue of policy in order to give credibility to the dispute, but it is hardly likely that Walpole would have chosen the Wittelsbach negotiations out of preference. The personal interest of the King, and Townshend's knowledge of, and willingness to support, Hanoverian interests, made it a dangerous issue. Townshend was heavily criticised by the other ministers for his pro-Hanoverian stance. In January 1730 Horatio Walpole informed Poyntz of Townshend's 'endeavours to make all measures electorall, preferrable to all other considerations, which is entirely agreeable to the King's sentiments'.

Of all the ministers Townshend was the most sensitive to Hanoverian interests, and this shared concern of king and minister is

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1 Hervey to Stephen Fox, 18 Nov. (OS) 1729, West Suffolk CRO.941/474 p.94.
2 Townshend to Chesterfield, 22 (OS), 25 Ap.1729 PRO. 84/304 f.61,65.
3 Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 21 Jan. (OS) 1730, Coxe, II, 667.
more in evidence in the winter of 1729-1730, than the few signs of personal disagreements between the two.

Aside from the Wittelsbach negotiations another diplomatic issue developed that winter that attracted George's personal interest and was directly related to Hanoverian interest: an alliance with Prussia. The progress of the Congress held at Brunswick, to settle Anglo-Prussian differences, was, despite hopes to the contrary, slow.¹ British suspicions of Prussia continued, and, indeed, at the beginning of 1730, the British pressed Sweden to increase their garrisons in Swedish Pomerania. Anglo-Swedish subsidy talks were seen, by the British ministry, as a basis for securing Swedish forces against Prussia, in the event of war.² The Electorate of Hanover remained on a war-footing, to the anger of Frederick William.³ The British were very concerned by the improvement of Prusso-Saxon relations over the winter, and feared that the journey which took Frederick William to Dresden in February had produced a secret treaty. On January 31st Townshend informed Edward Finch that he had been instructed by George to instruct him 'that he has received secret advices concerning the warlike preparations of the King of

¹ Du Bourgay to Townshend, 20 Sept. 1729, PRO. 90/25; Tilson to Waldegrave, 21 Oct. (OS), 4 Nov. 1729, Chewton; Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 8 Dec., Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 23 Dec. 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585 (c) f.89, 590 f.16-17; Ferdinand Albrecht to Kinsky, 16 Jan. 1730, Vienna, Kinsky, Kart. 2(b); Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 6, 20 Jan. 1730, ASV.LM.Ing.98 f.235, 243; Townshend to Baron Stain, 21 Nov. 1729, PRO. 100/15; Townshend to Diemar, 27 Jan. 1730, BL.Add. 32765 f.105; Post Man 5 Feb. (OS) 1730; Daily Post Boy 7 Feb. (OS) 1730.

² Townshend to Edward Finch, 3 Feb. (OS) 1730, PRO. 95/54 f.27-9; Poyntz to Newcastle, 10 Feb. 1730, BL.Add. 32765 f.204-5.

³ Frederick William to Ferdinand Albrecht, 24 Feb. 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 532 f.64; London Journal 31 Jan. (OS) 1730; Post Man and Historical Account 7 Feb. (OS) 1730; Daily Post Boy 9 Feb. (OS) 1730; Du Bourgay to Townshend, 21 Mar. 1730, PRO. 90/26.
Prussia, and his dangerous designs of disturbing the peace of that part of Germany. These advices have been confirmed from several quarters, and we also learn from Holland, that the King of Prussia reinforces his garrisons on those frontiers and appears inclinable to do all the mischief he is able, as soon as he can have a proper occasion. His scheme seems to be, if the Emperor does not agree with the allies of the Treaty of Seville, to begin hostilities by attacking the King's German Dominions. ¹

There was no doubt of Townshend and George's fears of Prussia.² Equally, Frederick William made no secret of his anger with George and his ministers, particularly his Hanoverian ministers, and he blamed George for the slow progress at Brunswick.³ Caroline and Walpole hoped to end these disputes and to secure a marital union between the houses of Hanover and Prussia. It was probably this that accounted for their marked opposition to Wittelsbach pretensions. The repeated entreaties of Sophia Dorothea, the Queen of Prussia, had finally born fruit, even if they had had more effect upon her sister-in-law, Caroline, than her brother,

¹ Townshend to Edward Finch, 20 Jan. (OS) 1730, PRO. 95/54, f.5; Newcastle to Poyntz, 21, 22 Jan. (OS) 1730, BL. Add. 32765, f.105-6, 143-4; Titley to Townshend, 21 Feb. 1730, BL. Add. 32766, f.67; Du Bourgoy to Townshend, 3, 17, 21 Jan. 1730, PRO. 90/26. It was believed that Frederick William intended to attack Hanover and Swedish Pomerania, Sauveterre to Chauvelin, 7 Feb. 1730, AE.CP. Prusse 90, f.73; Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 4 Mar. 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585(d), f.80; Poyntz to Delafaye, 8 Feb. 1730, PRO. 78/194, f.39; Titley to Tilson, 25 Feb. 1730, PRO. 75/54, f.114; Townshend to Diemar, 27 Jan. (OS), to Baron Stain, 27 Jan., to Dehn, 20 Feb. 1730, PRO. 100/16; Villars, 8 Jan., 1 Feb. 1731, pp.205, 210; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 31 Jan. 1730, Marburg, 199.

² George II to Townshend, no date, Coxe II 538; Diemar to Landgrave Karl, 7 Feb. 1730, Marburg, 198.

³ Ferdinand Albrecht to Kinsky, 16 Jan. 1730, Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 30 Jan. 1730, Frederick William I to Ferdinand Albrecht, 10 Feb. 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 590, f.26-7, Nr. 585 (d), f.38-9, Nr. 532, f.61.
George. Caroline resumed her efforts to secure a marital alliance. Lodge, who referred to Caroline as 'an ardent patroness of the scheme', nevertheless saw Walpole as its prime exponent, although, he produced no evidence for his view.

"His first expedient for the preservation of peace was a supreme effort to detach Prussia from the Austrian alliance."²

There is not much evidence to support this assertion, though Reichenbach, the Prussian agent, informed Grumbkow on April 7th,

'Le Chev. Walpole a dit à un de ses amis qu'on devroit detacher Le Roy de Prusse de l'Empr. coute qu'il coute, ...
le même Chev. Walpole qui est à present le favori unique de la Reine a conseillé àu Roy d'Angleterre de ceder dans l'affaire de Bronswic, ayant allégé pour raison qu'on pourroit obtenir des avantages plus grandes d'un autre coté et qu'on pourroit absolument obliger par La Mr L'Empr. de faire la paix. Le Chev. Walpol est aussi d'accord avec La Reine d'Ang. par rapport aux marriages ...'³

There is no doubt of George's lack of enthusiasm for a new approach to Prussia. His correspondence with Townshend about the projected mission of a British diplomat to Berlin to propose a marital alliance, reveals distrust of Prussia and dislike of the mission. He believed, correctly, that the mission would fail, and he feared that it would irritate France and Spain. George was also

worried that his honour would be insulted by Frederick William. He realised that the mission was incompatible with the negotiations with the Wittelsbachs, and he made it clear to Townshend that he regarded the latter as 'of much more consequence'.

Given this attitude it might be suggested that the eventual despatch of Sir Charles Hotham to Berlin was as much proof of George's inability to control the situation, as the failure of the Wittelsbach negotiations, the fall of Townshend, and the defeat of the aspirations of Chesterfield, a diplomat who had received much praise from both George and Townshend since he began his mission at the Hague. If such an interpretation is adopted then Walpole can be seen to have defeated both Townshend and George in 1730. However, this was not the case. The selection of Hotham for the mission seems an interesting indication of George's power. Hotham was a Gentleman of the Bedchamber to George II, and a serving army officer. Grumbkow referred to him as a 'creature' of George II, and noted the description of him as 'un fort aimable homme, bon vivant, officier

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1 George was correct in this view. The Prussians demanded British support over the Jülich-Berg inheritance as one of the conditions for any Anglo-Prussian marriage, Hotham to Townshend, 13 May, Frederick William to Reichenbach, 13 May 1730, PRO. 90/28. George told Chavigny that Frederick William was contemptible and could not be trusted, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 4 Sept. 1729, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f.221. The Palatine court argued that the increase of Prussian territorial power was a threat to Hanoverian interests, 'Contre-Remarques Palatines...', 8 Aug. 1729, PRO. 103/110.

2 George to Townshend, no date, in reply to Townshend to George, 8 Feb. (OS) 1730, Coxe, II, 534-5. Townshend argued that once the treaty with the Wittelsbachs was concluded the issue of the Spanish garrisons could be brought before the Imperial Diet, Tilson to Poyntz, 20 Jan (OS) 1730, BL.Add. 48982 f.222-3.

3 Gansinot to Plettenberg, 13 Sept. 1729, Münster, NB. 259 f.209; Broglie to Chauvelin, 15 Dec. 1729, AE.CP.Ang. 367 f.214.

et chasseur et on la choisi pour l'humeur du Roy ...' Reichenbach had a low opinion of him, and commented on his lack of experience. Whatever his merits as a diplomat the crucial factor about Hotham, who was also Chesterfield's brother-in-law, was that the King could rely upon him. Du Bourgay the British Envoy Extraordinary at Berlin had, in 1727, been severely reprimanded for exceeding orders, and it is clear that, in 1730, George no longer trusted him. It is possible that the reason for this distrust was Du Bourgay's close contacts with the Queen of Prussia and the ministers linked to her. George wanted his children married, but he had no intention of yielding to Prussian political demands. The element of personal hostility between the rulers of Britain and Prussia was already significant.

In this context, the selection of Hotham, and the orders he received, suggest that it was George and Townshend who were in control of the negotiations with Prussia. This is a contrast to Reichenbach's report,

'que La Reine d'Angl. et le Chev. Walpole diront en congediant Mylord Townshend qu'on l'avoit sacrifié pour rendre justice a S.M. Pr. parcequ'il avoit ete la cause de toutes les Brouilleries, ce qu'on dira pour faire un grand compliment au Roy de Prusse'.

In fact, Hotham was ordered to insist on the double marriage of Frederick Prince of Wales and Wilhemina, the Prussian Crown Princess, and of Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia and Anne, the Princess Royal of Britain. This was despite the fact that it was

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2 George to Townshend, no date, in reply to Townshend to George of 8 Feb. (OS) 1730, Coxe, II, 534.
known that Frederick William was keen on the former marriage,¹ but opposed to the latter, as he believed that it would serve to increase the ties between the Crown Prince and his Hanoverian uncle. Seckendorf was correct in claiming that even the single marriage project was full of difficulties, as Frederick William would not hear any talk of conditions.² When Hotham reached Berlin he found that Frederick William was determined on the single marriage.³ Despite Hotham's reports, and the knowledge that Frederick William had already declared the marriage of the Prince of Wales and Wilhemina, George and Townshend remained firm. On April 27th Townshend sent Hotham fresh instructions,

'The King continues firm in the resolution of having the double marriage, as most expedient, and most proper and desirable on both sides. And from this he will never depart, or be brought by any means to consent to make the one, either without, or at any distance of time from the other'.

In reply to the Prussian suggestion that, if there was to be a marriage between Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia, or Anne, one of them should be created stadtholder of Hanover, and the Electorate placed under their authority, Townshend noted that George was willing for Anne to be stadtholder on condition that Anne and Frederick should first come to England ' and make such stay there as H.M. shall judge convenient'. Finally, George expected Frederick William to settle the Mecklenburg issue on George's terms.⁴

¹ Horatio Walpole to Harrington and Poyntz, 23 Ap.(OS)1730, Coxe, II, 692.
² Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 25 Nov., 28 Nov. 1729, 8 Ap. 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585(c) f.75-6, (d) f.7, (e) f.6-7. Seckendorf feared that Hotham would propose the single marriage, but on April 4th Frederick William assured Seckendorf that he would not hear any talk of conditions, Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 4 Ap.1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr.585 (d) f.82,85.
³ Hotham to Townshend, 4 Ap.1730, PRO.90/106; Hotham to Poyntz, no date, Hull, DDHO 3/2.
⁴ Townshend to Hotham, 16 Ap. (OS) 1730, PRO.90/27.
These instructions were hardly calculated to produce good relations. Frederick William could not be expected to yield on Mecklenburg, nor on the departure of his heir for an unspecified term to England. Townshend's ability to send these instructions indicates that he was still in control of at least the important negotiations with Prussia a month before his resignation, and that George still trusted him to draw up these crucial instructions. Whatever the significance of his failure to enlist support for the Palatine arrears and the other Wittelsbach demands, Townshend had clearly not been crushed in the disputes with Walpole in late 1729.

Since at least October 1729 Townshend had been threatening to resign. On March 3rd 1730 his son Thomas Townshend wrote to his father's old friend Stephen Poyntz informing him of his father's intention to resign. However, despite the talk of resignation, Townshend continued very active. Horatio Walpole doubted his intentions, and noted that despite Townshend's declaration that he would acquiesce in the views of others and 'barely give his opinion', he was in fact 'as active and eager in business as ever I knew him'. Six weeks later, Horatio still doubted Townshend's intention of resigning, and Newcastle shared his scepticism. Townshend's continued activity with foreign diplomats aroused disquiet, and it is clear that he criticised his rivals for failing to support

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1 In August 1730, Newcastle told Degenfeld, the new Prussian envoy to Britain, that he had strongly disapproved of Hotham's conduct in Prussia, Degenfeld to Grumbkow, 15 Aug. 1730, PRO.107/2.
2 Poyntz to Townshend, 11 Oct.(OS)1729, Poyntz to Thomas Townshend, 26 Nov.(OS)1729, 26 Mar. 1730, Newcastle to Harrington, 16 Mar,(OS) 1730, Coxe,II, 659,666,674-5,676.
3 Poyntz to Thomas Townshend, 26 Mar.(OS)1730, Coxe, II, 674.
4 Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 21 Jan.(OS)1730, Coxe,II, 666-7, Hervey, I, 118.
5 Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave 13 Mar.(OS), Newcastle to Harrington, 24 Mar.(OS)1730, Coxe,II, 673, 679; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 5 May 1730, Marburg, 199; Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 24 Mar. 1730, PRO.90/27.
Hanoverian interests,

'His Lordship has represented us, as giving up Hanover quite, and has worked much upon the king upon that head; and also, that we had neglected pushing the plan of operations ... I must begg you would do all you can about the German points, Mecklenburgh etc.... Lett us have some brisk resolution about the plan of operations, and some strong assurances about Hanover, and we shall be able to defy him, and all he can do.'

'Hanover is Lord Townshend's great merit, and we have been all represented as wanting zeal'.

'We have here great hopes of the king of Prussia ......

'You may imagine somebody will not be sorry that things should miscarry hereafter'.

It is clear from the instructions sent to Hotham that Townshend was indeed very concerned with Hanoverian interests, and that he and George were able to control the mission, and, in the event, so direct Hotham that it failed. It is also clear that the ministerial dispute, far from being centred on the Wittelsbach issue and the late months of 1729, was still of great importance in the early spring of 1730. It was not until the beginning of May that Townshend signified his determination to resign at the end of the session. Coxe attributed this to the success of Walpole and the Queen in overturning Townshend's strategy that before any proposals of accommodation should be presented to the Emperor, a plan of hostile operations should be concerted between the Seville allies. Townshend

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2 Townshend to Waldegrave, 21 Ap.(OS), Newcastle to Harrington 23 Ap.(OS), Horatio Walpole to Harrington and Poyntz, 23 Ap.(OS)1730, Coxe,II, 686, 689, 691; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 4 May 1730, AE.CP. Ang.370 f.15; Diemar to Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, 5 May 1730, Marburg, 199.
believed that the news of such a plan would cause Prussia and Austria to submit, and George agreed. Townshend also argued that if it was decided to delay the formulation of the plan until after the negotiations with the Austrians had commenced,

'I very much fear that considering the temper and disposition of the Cardinal, as well as of the Dutch, no plan of operations will be formed; and in that case any declaration to be made at Vienna, will rather be insulted than agreed to. And your Majesty will be next year at the meeting of the parliament under the same difficulties you at present labour, not only with regard to Prussia, but likewise in regard to the affairs in general, and one may easily foresee the evils that must attend such a situation'.

Townshend was to be proved correct. The Seville allies, their disputes notorious, failed to persuade the Austrians to accept the Spanish garrisons, and the attempt to concert a plan of operations to coerce Austria collapsed in confusion and recrimination. Why George allowed himself to be persuaded into accepting the policy of delaying the formulation of the plan is unclear. Though Reichenbach claimed that Townshend was fed up with George's brutal manners, it was widely accepted that Townshend was still George's favoured minister. Reichenbach reported on March 28th that George did not want Townshend to go,

1 Townshend to George, no date, George to Townshend, no date, Newcastle to Harrington, 24 Mar. (OS), Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 24 Mar. (OS) 1730, Coxe, II, 540-1, 541, 678, 680, 684, I, 337; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 18 May 1730, AE.CP.Ang. f.58; Chauvelin to Broglie, 9 May 1730, BL. Egerton Mss. 3134 f.276; (Tilson/to Poyntz, 20 Jan.(OS)1730BL.Add. 48982 f.218-223, Poyntz agreed that a plan of operations should be formulated speedily, Poyntz to Newcastle, 1 Feb. 1729, BL.Add. 32765 f.132. On the plan, see p.229.


3 Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 5 May 1730, Marburg, 199.
'mais comme le Chev. Walpole lui doit procurer l'argent il sera obligé de carresser plus Walpole que Townshend.  

Townshend resigned; George did not dismiss him. He appears to have finally decided to resign because of his frustration at the constant opposition of Walpole to his plans, rather than because of his anger over any particular issue. Reichenbach noted that Walpole 'veut que tout soit fait uniquement selon sa volonté et Md Townshend ne voulant se laisser traiter en petit garçon' ... Horatio Walpole also suggested that Townshend's stance was due to his general feeling of frustration rather than to anger over a specific issue. It is also probable that the ill-health Townshend told Chammorel about was indeed a factor: 'que sa santé toujours chancelante depuis sa grande maladie ne luy permettoi plus de soutenir les fatigues du Ministere.'

As in 1733, when Walpole was unable to persuade George to dismiss Harrington and Scarborough, so in 1730, Walpole had to wait for Townshend to resign. He had clearly succeeded in making life difficult for Townshend, and, by May 1730, Townshend was refusing to do anything that involved cooperation with Walpole. The differences

1 Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 28 Mar. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3.
2 Hervey, I, 118.
3 Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 24, 28 Mar., 9 May 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; Kinsky to Charles VI, Vienna, EK, Kart. 67; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE.CP.Ang. 370 f.32.
4 Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 19 May 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3.
5 Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 21 Jan(OS) 1730, Coxe, II, 667.
6 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE.CP.Ang. 370 f.32. The conversation took place that day. On Townshend's ill-health, Dehn to the Duke of Wolfenbüttel, 4 June 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 2 Alt 3631 f.25; Townshend to Du Bourgay, 21 Oct. 1729, PRO. 90/25.
7 Claims that Walpole 'sacked' Townshend are inaccurate, McKay, Eugene p.221.
8 Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 19 May 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; Hervey, I, 118.
between the two men certainly involved foreign policy issues, but by
the spring of 1730 these had become expressions of a struggle for
power and control. Walpole succeeded in thwarting Townshend over the
plan of operations and the negotiations with the Wittelsbachs, though
Townshend and George had their way over Hotham's mission.
Exasperated and unwell, Townshend resigned even though he still
enjoyed the confidence of the king. The crisis was not a defeat for
George, however. Though he failed to make Chesterfield Secretary of
State, George's protege William Stanhope, recently ennobled for his
success at Seville, as Lord Harrington, replaced Townshend. Zamboni
stated that Walpole and the Queen had attempted to gain the post for
Horatio Walpole, but had been thwarted by George. ¹

Newcastle, Harrington and the Walpoles were forced to consider Hanoverian
interests and to press the French to support Hanover. ² George could
not have hoped that the ailing Townshend would continue Secretary
for many more years. He succeeded in gaining a pliant successor
whose tenure of the Northern Secretaryship was marked by very few
disagreements with the king. ³ Indeed, Harrington was a more
dependable Secretary than Townshend had been. It is unclear how far
Horatio Walpole sought to become Secretary, but he was too independent
for George, and it is possible that the king would have found
Chesterfield a difficult subordinate for the same reason. If anything,
the replacement of Townshend by Harrington, however difficult for
George, helped to increase his power in the direction of British
foreign policy.

¹ Zamboni to Manteuffel, 7 Ap.1730, Bodl. Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht,
8 Nov.1729, Wolfenbüttel 1 Alt. 22, Nr. 590 f. 9; Ossorio to Victor
Amadeus II, 3 Ap.1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37. Horatio Walpole denied that he
was interested in the post, Egmont, 5 Mar.(OS)1730, I, 77, Poyntz to
Thomas Townshend, 26 Nov.1729, Coxe, II, 666.
² Newcastle to Harrington, 24 Mar.(OS)1730, Coxe, II, 678; Maffei to
³ Broglie to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 30.
Vous pouvez compter Mgr. que son éloignement des affaires ne causera aucun changement dans les principes qu'on a suivis jusqu'à présent:

Chammorel on the impending resignation of Townshend. 1

The prolonged crisis within the ministry in the winter of 1729-1730 and the following Spring, coincided with an unstable international situation and a troublesome parliamentary session. The Treaty of Seville had stipulated an approach to Austria, in order to obtain Austrian agreement to the admission of the Spanish garrisons. Opinion in London was divided over whether the Austrians would accept the proposal. The government argued that the choice of Spanish garrisons, instead of the Swiss ones stipulated in previous treaties, was a minor variation, 2 and encouraged an optimistic attitude to the possibility of Austrian agreement. 3 Others were less sure, and noted reports of Austrian military moves, and, in particular, of the beginnings of an Austrian build-up in Italy. 4

1 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE.CP.Ang.370 f.33.
2 Townshend to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 2 Dec.(OS)1729, BL.Add. 48982 f.194.
3 Delafaye to Clutterbuck, 27 Dec.(OS)1729, PRO.63/391 f.287.
4 Maffei to Victor Amadeus II, 16,23 Jan., 20 Feb.1730, AST.LM. Francia 165; Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 11 Jan., 26 Ap.1730, Vienna, Fonseca, 14 f.6, 83; Frederick William I to Chambrier, 11,21 Mar. 1730, AE.CP. Prusse 91 f.17, 19; Grumbkow to Reichenbach, 6 Mar. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; Marini, p.142.
Partly as a result of Austrian diplomatic approaches in the autumn, the Dutch, particularly the Pensionary Slingelandt, were greatly in favour of associating the approach to Austria for an implementation of the Seville treaty, with the offer of a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. The French were opposed to the idea. Both powers pressed Britain for her view, and it is interesting to note that the supposedly 'anti-Habsburg' Townshend was not unwilling to support the Pragmatic. He argued that it was not the time to offer the Austrians the guarantee, as it would upset Spain and Sardinia, but that the Emperor ought to be informed that a settlement of the points at issue would lead to a negotiation of the guarantee. Townshend did not wish to anger the Dutch and delay their accession to the Treaty of Seville, but it is clear, in December 1729, that Townshend was being consistent with the Austrian policy he had advocated over the previous three years, namely that, once Austria indicated its readiness to satisfy the demands of other powers, including Hanover, Britain should commit herself to the long-term stability of Austria. It was a policy that was to be encapsulated in treaty form, by the Walpole ministry, in the Second Treaty of Vienna of March 16th 1731, and this indicates the continuity of policy between Townshend and Walpole.

1 DeBrais to Augustus II, 10 Oct.1729, Dresden, 2735, 1, f.213; Goslinga, pp.365-6; Huisman, pp.451-2.
2 Tilson to Waldegrave, 12 Dec.(OS)1729, Chewton; Maffei to Victor Amadeus II, 2 Jan.,1730, AST.LM. Francia, 165; Goslinga, pp.353, 368-71,379-85; Villars, 20 Nov.1729, p.199.
3 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 25 June 1728, BL.Add.32756 f.293-4; Wilson, pp.104-7,216-7; Mckay, Eugene p.218.
4 Townshend to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 2 Dec.(OS)1729, BL.Add. 48982 f.193-5; Townshend to Broglie, 4 Dec.(OS)1729, PRO.100/5. With regard to the Pragmatic, George was 'of opinion not to declare my intention about this matter, as long as it will be possible', George to Townshend, no date, in reply to Townshend to George of 15 Dec.(NS?)1729, BL.Add.38507 f.250.
The Austrians had no intention of complying with the introduction of the Spanish garrisons. On December 28th the Emperor informed his representatives in Paris that he would not accept the garrisons, and this decision was swiftly conveyed to the Seville allies. The allies continued, until the summer, to harbour the hope that the Austrians would change their mind, if the terms offered were slightly improved, or if they were frightened by the allies' preparations. Negotiations with the Austrians continued, but, largely under pressure from the British and the Spaniards, an attempt was made to devise a plan for operations against Austria. Conferences were held at Fontainebleau and several different schemes were proposed. The major issue discussed was whether operations in Italy should be matched by operations north of the Alps. The French were very interested in an invasion of the Austrian Netherlands, a scheme opposed by the British and the Dutch. The latter powers were concerned about the security of Hanover and the Netherlands, and wanted the deployment of a French army specifically designed for their protection. The Dutch wanted to confine offensive operations to

1 Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 28 Dec. 1729, Höfler, I, 438; Eugene to Kinsky, 25 Jan. 1730, Vienna, GR. 94(b) f. 53; Mckay, Eugene pp. 219-20.

2 Holzendorf to Tilson, 3 Jan. 1730, PRO. 84/307 f. 1; 'Copy of the Paper which Ct. Kinsky read to Ld. Townshend, as the Empr.'s answer to the communication made to his Imperial Majesty of the Treaty of Seville', 4 Feb. (OS) 1730, PRO. 100/11; Wilson, p. 215; Albert to Plettenberg, 24 Jan. 1730, Münster, NB. 33 f. 6; Daily Post Boy 4 Feb. (OS) 1729.


4 Poyntz to Keene, 6 Mar., Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 25 Mar. 1730, BL. Add. 32766 f. 59-60, 206; Maffei to Victor Amadeus II, 6 Mar. 1730, AST. LM. Francia, 165; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus II, 10 July 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37; Viscount Percival's Newsletter, 14 Mar. (OS) 1730, BL. Add. 27981 f. 65. Sinzendorf had predicted that this would divide the alliance, Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 4 Feb. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 14, f. 32-3; Daily Post Boy 8 June (OS) 1730.

5 'Draft to Mr Poyntz relating to the Advices from Berlin as it was sent to Your Majesty yesterday morning', 21 Jan (OS) 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 125-6; Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 12 Ap. 1730, BL. Add. 32766 f. 341.
Italy. The British tended to concur with this view.¹

There was less disagreement over operations in Italy. It was generally agreed that, if the Tuscan ports were closed to the Spaniards, Sicily should be invaded, whilst the French should seek to gain Sardinian support and should invade the Milanese. However, there was a dispute over the timing of the intended invasion of Sicily, and over the French demand that no offensive moves should be undertaken until agreement had been reached on war aims and on the extent and nature of the territorial changes that should be sought in the war. This was referred to as a treaty of equilibrium, and it had indeed been specified in the event of war, in the Treaty of Seville. This angered both the British government and the Spaniards, who saw it as an indication of French unwillingness to fight.² 'Patino turned upon the old topicks against the Cardinal, who demanded a plan for the operations of a war before he was resolved to undertake one.'³ Furthermore, the Spaniards, anxious to regain their former Italian possessions now held by Austria, did not wish to see their potential gains confined by treaty. Rather than wanting the simple introduction of their garrisons, the Spanish government, and, in particular Elisabeth Farnese, wanted a war that would provide opportunities for Italian conquests.⁴

These delays, and suspicion of the views of her allies, worried the British ministry. Aware of Spanish impetuosity, they were

² Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 2 Aug.1730, Coxe,III,11; 'Short Abstract of what has past about ye Treaty of Equilibre', anon, memorandum drawn up in summer of 1730, PRO.103/113; Keene to Poyntz and Harrington, 16 Mar.1730, BL.Add.32766 f.347.
³ Keene to Poyntz and Harrington, 24 Mar.1730, BL.Add.32766 f.349
⁴ Harrington and Poyntz to Keene, 1 Ap., to Newcastle, 27 Ap.1730, BL.Add.32766 f.354,32767 f.2; De Böy to Manteuffel, 1,22 Dec.1729, Dresden, 3105, 2, f.193,200; Chesterfield to Harrington, 25 Aug., 1730, PRO.84/307 f.204.
particularly concerned with the delays caused by the French insistence on the need to concert a treaty of equilibrium. They feared that it would cause Spain to doubt the commitment of her allies to the introduction of Spanish garrisons, and that this might lead Spain to renounce the Treaty of Seville and resume negotiations with Austria.¹ There was no doubt that such a course of action would be disastrous for the British government, both diplomatically, and for internal political reasons. Diplomatically, it would increase Austrian power, thereby make Prussia less likely to settle with Britain, and the Wittelsbachs less willing to offend Austria, and thus force Britain into greater dependence upon France. In Britain the ministry had proclaimed the commercial clauses of the Treaty of Seville as a great triumph. If Spain renounced them, and the ministry had nothing to show for the preceding years of diplomatic effort, military expenditure and higher taxation, then the opposition would be handed a brilliant basis for press attack and parliamentary criticism.

Thus, by the time of Townshend's resignation, on May 26th, there was already disquiet about French intentions. On April 12th Harrington and Poyntz complained to Newcastle that the French were blaming the British for the delays in concerting plans, and were seeking to embitter Anglo-Spanish relations.² On May 4th Newcastle confessed his concern about the possibility of an Austro-Spanish reconciliation.³ The embittered nature of the Paris conferences,  

1 Poyntz to Keene, 19 Jan., Poyntz to Newcastle, 19 Feb.1730, BL.Add. 32765 f.13, 279.  
2 Poyntz to Newcastle, 10,14,19 Feb., Harrington to Newcastle, 12 Ap., Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 7 May(OS)1730, BL.Add.32765 f.20 242,277,32766 f.365, 32767 f.129; Keene to Poyntz and Harrington, 16 Mar.1730, BL.Add.32766 f.346.  
3 Poyntz to Newcastle, 11 Jan., Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 23 Ap.(OS)1730, BL.Add.32765 f.4-5, 32767 f.34.
the suspicion that the French did not want the Anglo-Prussian initiative to succeed, the anger at continued French sponsorship of the Wittelsbach claims and the growing irritation with the conduct of Broglie, helped to create a situation of great strain in the Anglo-French alliance.

The difficulties created for the Anglo-French alliance, by diplomatic disagreements, were matched by the strains placed upon it as a result of the parliamentary session of 1730. One of the factors encouraging the Austrians in their opposition to accepting the terms of the Seville allies, was their conviction that the British ministry would be defeated in the session. Assurances to this effect were also given to the Prussians, both by the Austrians, and by their Resident in London, Reichenbach, who was closely in touch with opposition politicians, such as the Earl of Strafford. Waldegrave noted the Austrian conviction that the British ministry would fall, and the ministry was intensely suspicious of links...
between the British opposition and the envoys of Austria and Prussia. Tilson suggested that bribery had played its part in the activities of the opposition, 'now the Emperor borrowing money here looked as if some at least was to stay among us and then it was not to be wondered that the language agt. the House of Bourbon, and in favour of that of Austria, and that all measures agt. the Emperor were condemned by the discontented'.

The governmental tendency to castigate opposition as treasonable, and to blame the difficulties of their diplomatic position upon the activities of the parliamentary opposition, must be treated with caution. Nevertheless, the excellent resources of the government's interception system, by producing decyphered interceptions of the correspondence between Reichenbach and Grumbkow, gave the ministry's fears a basis of truth. Reichenbach sought information from Berlin about the Hotham mission, information which he claimed the opposition had asked him for, and he conveyed to Berlin supposed opposition advice to reject Hotham's terms, and thus gain concessions.¹

It was unnecessary to believe that the opposition was manipulated by foreign envoys, in order to realise that the relationship between foreign policy and parliamentary developments was a close one. Horatio Walpole referred to 'the relation which the affairs here in Parliament must have with those abroad.'² The course of the session revealed the truth of this assertion, and also produced disquieting evidence of the fragility of the ministerial position, particularly over foreign affairs.

A troublesome session had been anticipated by ministerial and opposition figures, and by foreign envoys. Delafaye had predicted that there would be trouble over Dunkirk, St. Lucia and Gibraltar, points at issue between Britain and her allies, whilst Horatio Walpole and Lord Hervey expected that the major conflict in parliament would be over the governmental wish to continue the subsidies for the Hessians. Horatio claimed that the opposition had planned to attack the ministry 'for their indolence and neglect in suffering so patiently the insults of the Spaniards' upon British trade, but that the Treaty of Seville had forced them to change their tactics. There is no evidence for this assertion, though it seems probable. 2

The session began, on January 24th, with a royal speech setting out the benefits of the Treaty of Seville 3; and a debate in the Commons on the address. 4 The ministry claimed to be well satisfied with the debates, and British envoys were instructed to convey an optimistic view. 5 Britain's allies were certainly impressed by the ministerial success. 6 However, though there had been no division in

1 Delafaye to Waldegrave, 7 Jan. (OS) 1730, Chewton; Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 21 Jan. (OS) 1730, Coxe, II, 667; Hervey to Henry Fox, 24, 29 Jan. (OS) 1730, Ilchester, pp. 45, 46; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 20 Jan. 1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120, f. 93; Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 8 Nov. 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 4 Alt 22, Nr. 590, f. 9; Zamboni to —, 3 Feb. 1730, Dresden, 637, vol. 2, f. 35; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 27 Jan 1730, Marburg, 199.

2 Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 12 Mar. (OS) 1730, Chewton; Kinnoull to Delafaye, 14 Dec. 1729, PRO 97/25, Vignola noted that the Treaty of Seville plunged the opposition into confusion, Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 9 Dec. 1729, ASV LM Ing. 98 f. 223.

3 HJC XXI, 392; HLJ XXIII, 450; Hervey, II, 111.


5 Townshend to Du Bourgay, 13 Jan. (OS) 1730, PRO 90/26; Townshend to Edward Finch, 13 Jan. (OS) 1730, PRO 95/54 f. 3; Newcastle to Poyntz, 13 Jan. (OS) 1730, BL Add. 32765 f. 5-6.

6 Holzendorf to Tilson, 31 Jan. 1730, PRO 84/301 f. 19; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 27 Jan. 1730, Dresden, 637, 2 f. 21; D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 16 Feb. 1730, AN AM B'301.
the Lords, the opposition motion in the Commons to amend the address was defeated by 262 votes against 169, a government majority of 93. This compared with a majority the previous year of 162. Furthermore, the opposition vote was the highest recorded so far in the 1727 parliament, and was 36 votes greater than the previous best of March 17th 1729, when the ministerial majority had been 119.

Horatio Walpole saw this a success for the opposition Whigs' plan to create a workable alliance with the Tories.

...'the discontented Whigs had concerted a perfect coalition with the Torys of all degrees, and it had agreed to act heartily and vigorously in the same opposition, and that for the purpose a summons should be made of all the Torys to be present without suffering any excuse, and this was pursued with soe much zeal, that I believe there has been in town this year above 110 Torys, which is within a very few of the whole number elected.'

On February 6th, in the Commons, Lord Morpeth moved that the king be addressed to communicate to the House any engagements he had entered into for the payment of subsidies to foreign troops, or for the hire of foreign troops, which he had not laid before the House. The motion made little impact and the government maintained its majority of 93. Next day, Townshend spoke in favour of the ministry, when the Lords came to consider the Treaty of Seville. The opposition moved three motions, asserting that the Treaty of Seville violated the clauses of the Quadruple Alliance and threatened to involve the nation in a dangerous and expensive war, did not extinguish Spanish claims to Gibraltar, and provided for insufficient reparation for mercantile losses. The ministry defeated

1 Sedgwick, I, 68; Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 13 Mar. (OS) 1730, Chewton.
2 Egmont, I, 10; Carlisle, p. 65; Knatchbull, pp. 100, 143-5; HCJ, XXI, 421.

The opposition motion was defeated by 200 votes against 107.
the motions with votes of 86-31, 85-31 and 79-30.¹

The following day, February 8th, the Commons debated the estimates for the land forces for 1730, and, thanks partly to indiscreet expressions by the Jacobite M.P. Shippen, the debate was shorter than expected and the government majority rose to 122.² Given this situation it is not surprising that ministerial optimism was maintained, and that both Newcastle and Chauvelin were confident of the government's ability to retain control of the Commons.³

This optimism also reflected the ministerial success in carrying the Hessian subsidies. On February 9th, the majority in the commons fell to 68,⁴ and on the 15th, the day of the debate over the Hessians, to 79, but, despite these figures, the ministry could feel satisfied that they had carried the issue they had most feared trouble over.⁵ They were to be surprised by the storm that was to arise over the French restoration of Dunkirk.⁶ Since 1725 the facilities at the port of Dunkirk had been restored, despite

¹ Egmont, I, 11; HLJ. XXIII, 462-4; Cobbett, VIII, 773-4; Kinsky to Charles VI, 18 Feb. 1730, Vienna, EK. Kart. 67; Newcastle to Poyntz, 30 Jan. (OS) 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 169; Newsletters for Lord Percival, 27, 29 Jan.(OS) 1730, BL. Add. 27981, f. 25-6, 27; Vignola to the government of Venice, 10 Feb. 1730, ASV. LM. Ing. 98, f. 249.
² Egmont, I, 11-12; Knatchbull, pp. 101-2, 145-6. The opposition motion was defeated by 243 votes against 121.
³ Newcastle to Poyntz, 30 Jan. (OS) 1730, BL. Add. Mss. 32765, f. 169; Dayrolles to Tilson, 21 Feb. 1730 (referring to Tilson to Dayrolles, 6 Feb. (OS) 1730), PRO. 84/310, f. 43; Chauvelin to Chammorel, 16 Feb. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8. f. 158; Villars, 15 Feb. 1730, p. 212.
⁴ The debate was on an opposition address to seek a further reduction of the army by the end of this, or before the beginning of the next session, Egmont, I, 12-13; Carlisle, p. 66; Knatchbull, p. 102. The address was rejected by 201 votes against 133.
⁶ Egmont, I, 44; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus, 27 Feb. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37; Plumb, p. 208; Newcastle to Poyntz, 5 Feb. (OS) 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 263.
specific prohibitions in the treaties of Utrecht of 1713, and of the Hague of 1717. The British government had been well aware of this restoration, and had complained to the French in 1727, 1728 and 1729.\textsuperscript{1} The issue had been exploited by the opposition press over the previous three years, and it was widely known that the harbour at Dunkirk was capable of receiving fairly large ships.\textsuperscript{2} The existence of a regular trade between Dunkirk and London was no secret. The ministry were aware that Dunkirk might be used as an issue by the opposition in the session of 1730,\textsuperscript{3} though they appear to have taken no precautions to ensure that they could deflect criticism easily.\textsuperscript{4} On the evening of January 18th the Lords of the Admiralty met to consider the progress of the works at Dunkirk, and they noted that they were contrary to treaty.\textsuperscript{5} Given this governmental concern, and the knowledge that the opposition was keen to criticise the Anglo-French alliance, it is surprising that no precautions were taken. It might be suggested that the poor French response to previous approaches and the wish to win French cooperation over the negotiations with the Prussians and the Wittelsbachs led to a decision not to press France on the issue.

On February 21st, the House of Commons formed itself into a Committee of the whole house to consider a motion of Sir William

\textsuperscript{1} Townshend to Finch, 15 Aug.(OS)1727, PRO.84/294 f.83; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 14 May(OS)1728, PRO.78/189 f.196, 198.
\textsuperscript{2} Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, – July(OS)1728, PRO.78/189 f.281, draft; Daily Post Boy 21 Nov.(OS)1729.
\textsuperscript{3} Delafaye to Waldegrave, 7 Jan.(OS)1730, Chewton.
\textsuperscript{4} Horatio Walpole reported that the French government had respected the provisions of the treaty, and that improvements to the port were due to tidal action and to unauthorised work by the local population, Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 14 Dec.1729, PRO.78/192 f.564.
\textsuperscript{5} Wager to Delafaye, 8 Jan.(OS)1730, PRO.42/20 f.2.
Wyndham's for an examination of the state of the nation. After a lengthy attack upon the policies and practices of the ministry, Wyndham advanced, as a proof of the government's failure to protect national interests, the restoration of the harbour of Dunkirk. The ministerial speakers lost control of the house and were unable to prevent the hearing of evidence about the restoration. On the following day it was resolved to address the King for the laying before the House of all correspondence about Dunkirk. In order to give time for this to be prepared, the debate on the state of the nation was adjourned for a fortnight.

The seriousness of the situation was clear. The opposition had found an issue that captured the concern of many M.P.s over the French alliance. The historical concern over the use of Dunkirk as a privateering base made the issue a concrete and readily grasped example of the more general opposition criticisms of the ministry. Broglie noted that 'La chambre en général a paru approuver les raisons du parti opposé ...' Percival referred to it as 'so popular and national a point', and Charles Howard noted that most M.P.s believed that France was restoring the harbour. Support for the ministry certainly diminished in late February. On the 23rd the ministerial M.P. Anthony Duncomb complained that 'he saw the members fall every day from the Court, and ... at last there would be a

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1 It was the first committee on the state of the Nation since the Hanoverian succession.
3 Broglie to Chauvelin, 22 Feb.1730, Mantoux, Comptes rendus, p.52; Egmont, I,39; Carlisle p.67; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 24 Feb.1730, Marburg, 199.
majority against it'. An air of anticipation hung over Westminster. Opposition leaders scented the prospect of office, and foreign envoys speculated on the fall of the ministry. As Hervey noted on the 28th, 'People's expectations are mightily raised by the affair of Dunkirk'.

The previous day, Sandys had proposed in the commons that a bill be brought in to 'render the laws more effectual by disabling people that had pensions from the crown or offices in trust for them to be Members of the House of Commons'. The ministerial speakers 'were violently against it', but they lost the division by 134 to 144, an opposition majority of ten. Percival attributed the defeat to Whig defections, noted that 'above sixty persons who were used to vote with the court deserted Sir Robert on this occasion, some by voting for the motion, others by leaving the House'. He claimed that Walpole 'it is probable may date his fall from this day'. Kinsky was sufficiently impressed to send a courier to Vienna with the news of the defeat, and, in Austria, expectations were raised of the fall of the Walpole ministry. Holzendorf noted that the Imperialists at the Hague 'lay such a stress upon it as if the court had lost all their interest in the House'. Zamboni suggested that the government would be unable to win a majority in the Commons when

1 Egmont, I, 40; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 2 Mar. 1730, AE.CP.Ang.369, f.271; Plumb, p.212.
3 Egmont, I,50; Knatchbull, p.106; Diemar to the King of Sweden, 31 Mar.1730, Marburg, 201; Hill, Parliamentary Parties, p.201; George II to Townshend, no date, in reply to Townshend to George II, 19 Feb.(OS)1730, Coxe,II,536.
4 Tilson to Waldegrave, 24 Mar.(OS)1730, Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 24 Mar,(OS)1730, Chewton; Woodward to Tilson, 19 Ap.1730, PRO.88/36.
the debate on the state of the nation was resumed.¹

The ministry was therefore threatened not only with a loss of control in the Commons, but also with a collapse of European confidence in its ability to control Parliament.² It was not surprising that the French were pressed hard over Dunkirk. Poyntz and Armstrong, the British military representative at Paris, who was an expert on the Dunkirk issue, were instructed to secure the demolition of the works. Armstrong was informed by Newcastle that, could he but execute these orders, nothing would 'more contribute to damage the efforts of those who oppose his Majesty's measures and have chiefly in view to discredit our alliance with France'. Horatio Walpole sought Fleury's personal intervention.³

The British diplomatic pressure succeeded. Fleury gave an official assurance that the works at Dunkirk had been performed without the authorisation of Louis XV. Louis XV ordered their demolition and copies of this order were sent to Britain.⁴ On March 10th the Commons resumed their deliberations on Dunkirk. Wyndham produced fresh evidence of the French works at Dunkirk, but,

¹ Holzendorf to Tilson, 7 Mar.1730, PRO.84/307, f.47; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 3 Mar.1730, Bodl.Rawl.120, f.98; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus, 20 Mar.1730, AST.LM.Ing.37; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 24 Feb.1730, Marburg, England, 199.
² Chauvelin to Chammorel, 12 Mar.1730, AE.CP.Ang. sup.8.
⁴ Armstrong to Newcastle, 27 Feb.1730, The 'Order from the King of France', 27 Feb.1730, BL.Add.32766, f.3-4,7; Chauvelin to Broglie, 2 Mar.1730, AE.CP.Ang.369, f.229-30; Villars, 29 Mar.1730, p.224; Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 14 Mar.1730, PRO.90/27.
after a lengthy debate, the ministerial proposal for an address to thank the king for his care of the national interest over the Dunkirk issue and 'to declare satisfaction in the firm union and mutual fidelity, which so happily subsist, and are so strictly preserved, between the two crowns', was carried by 270 to 149, a majority of 121. The government was delighted, and proclaimed it as a proof that Parliament was really behind ministerial policy. The French assurances were printed in the newspapers, and British envoys were instructed to cite the debate as a demonstration of parliamentary support for the Anglo-French alliance.

'Since the Dunkirk affair has been quash'd, we have had calmer doings in the House, and I hope we shall have no more very troublesome struggles'. The period of the Dunkirk debates was the high-point of parliamentary tension in the session of 1730. After the government's victory, the opposition lost much of their energy. On the 21st, when the examination of the state of the nation was continued, a desultory debate on the Anglo-French dispute over the possession of St. Lucia ended with a government majority of 112.

1 Egmont, I, 71-5; Knatchbull, pp. 109-10; Carlisle, pp. 68-9; Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 14 Mar. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; Broglie to Chauvelin, 13 Mar. 1730, AE.CP. Ang. 369, f. 303-4; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus, 13 Mar. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37.

2 Townshend to Du Bourguy, 3 Mar. (OS), PRO. 90/26; Horatio Walpole to Harrington and Poyntz, 2 Mar. (OS) 1730, Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 13 Mar. (OS) 1730, Coxe, II, 669, 673; Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 2 Mar. (OS) 1730, Newcastle to Harrington, 2 Mar. (OS) 1730, BL. Add. 32766 f. 123, 127; Newcastle to Keene, 5 Mar. (OS) 1730, PRO 94/105; Townshend to Edward Finch, 3 Mar. (OS) 1730, PRO. 95/54, f. 51; Diemar to Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, 3 Mar. 1730, Marburg, 199. The pro-British faction at Berlin were delighted by the Dunkirk victory, Grumbkow to Reichenbach, 25 Mar. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3.

3 Tilson to Waldegrave, 6 Mar. (OS) 1730, Chewton; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 23 Mar. 1730, AE.CP. Ang. 369, f. 329.

4 Egmont, I, 778; Knatchbull, pp. 112-3; Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 24 Mar. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 23 Mar. 1730, AE.CP. Ang. 369, f. 329; Tilson to Waldegrave, 13 Mar. (OS) 1730, Chewton; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 21 Mar. 1730, Marburg, 199.
The dispute was a longstanding one, that arose from conflicting claims to the island. The interest of the British government in it was not particularly strong, especially since the British rights had been granted to the Duke of Montagu. The Duke had angered the ministry by his conduct, and the government had made it clear to the French that they were not greatly concerned by this issue, a view shared by Parliament. St. Lucia lacked the historical importance of Dunkirk, and in no way approximated to the latter as an issue capable of arousing anger and concern. Furthermore, the position, in international agreements, of St. Lucia, was obscure and contested.

The opposition failure over St. Lucia led to the end of the Committee of the State of the Nation, and to the departure of many opposition M.P.s from London. Parliament became more quiescent. On March 28th Tilson could write, 'we are somewhat in a state of indolence, no furious attacks, nor any vigorous defence at present', and on May 2nd, Horatio Walpole claimed that the 'skirmishes that have happened since the day of Dunkirk, have served only to expose the weakness of the opponents'. Many of these 'skirmishes' involved foreign affairs. On March 28th the Loan Bill, a measure designed to prevent loans to foreign powers without royal licence, was passed by the commons, after only a short debate, with the government receiving more than twice the opposition votes in a division on the opposition amendment. On the 30th the government enjoyed a substantial

1 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 22 Feb., 16 Mar. 1730, AE.CP.Ang.369 f.208,311.
2 Egmont, I, 78.
3 Tilson to Waldegrave, 17, 20 Mar. (OS) 1730, Chewton; Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 21 Apr., 1 May (OS) 1730, Chewton; Carlisle, p. 70.
4 Egmont, I, 81-2; Knatchbull, pp. 113-4. The opposition motion was defeated by 176 votes against 76; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 4 Apr. 1730, Marburg, 199.
majority in a Lords debate on the Pension Bill, a measure rejected on April 1st.1 On May 2nd Norris moved in the Commons for an address to the king to lay before the House the secret and separate articles of the Treaty of Seville, but the ministry defeated his motion by 197-78 votes. Horatio Walpole concluded, 'it plainly appeared by the debate and by the complexion of the house that they will support H.M. in fulfilling his engagements for the execution of the Treaty of Seville'. Though Parliament was not prorogued until May 26th, Norris' motion was the last major conflict that session involving foreign affairs, and after the debate was over Horatio Walpole wrote 'This session of Parliament is in a manner come to a conclusion'.2

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1 Egmont, I, 82-4; Carlisle, p. 70; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus, 3 Ap.1730, AST.LM.Ing.37; Newsletter, 21 Mar.(OS)1730, BL.Add.27981 f.71-2.
2 Egmont, I, 95-6; Carlisle, p.71; Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 21 Ap. (OS)1730, Chewton.
The Reconstitution of the Ministry

'... the endeavouring at least to fix the tranquillity of Europe on lasting foundations ... could not be too dearly purchased ...'

Poyntz. March 1730. 1

'Il suffit que le Ministere paroisse porté pour l'alliance de la France pour que les ennemis de la cour d'Angleterre se livrent aux principes contraires ...'

Chauvelin. February 1730. 2

In the session of 1730 the ministry found itself forced to defend the Anglo-French alliance against strong attacks. The parliamentary opposition based its assault upon the ministerial foreign policy on a strong attack on this alliance, and a demand for the revival of the Anglo-Austrian alliance of the first decade of the century. 3 In adopting this plan the opposition chose to discard the parliamentary strategy that had been largely followed the previous session, the attack upon the 'Hanoverian' bias of British foreign policy, and its consequences such as the Hessian subsidies. The French alliance had been attacked in previous sessions of the

1 Poyntz to Newcastle, 10 Mar.1730, BL.Add.32766 f.133.
2 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 26 Feb.1730, AE.CP.Ang. sup.8, f.159.
3 Egmont, I, 52; Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 14,24 Mar.1730, PRO.90/27.
Parliament, but never with the ferocity that marked the attacks of 1730, whilst, in the latter year, the attacks upon Hanover were not pressed so hard. This was despite the fact that the war-panic of the previous summer had threatened to drag Britain into a war with Prussia as a result of Hanoverian quarrels, and that the decision to continue subsidies to the Hessians in 1730 contrasted badly with ministerial assurances of a forthcoming peace.

However, in concentrating on the French alliance, the opposition chose well. The attacks struck a popular chord, appealing to the persistent francophobia of large sections of the British political nation. Furthermore, the opposition arguments that the balance of power in Europe and British interests would be endangered by a war with Austria, reflected disagreements within the ministry over the French alliance. Percival recorded in his journal a story of Lord Lovel arriving in London at the start of the session, and telling Chesterfield that he did not know how to vote. When the Earl replied 'with the Court', Lovel retorted, 'the Court is so divided that I don't know which way it leans'. On March 31st Zamboni reported that, 's'étant formé ici de ma certaine scienue un gros parti de plusieurs puissans seigneurs et autres (qui d'ailleurs ne sont ni mecontens, ne Jacobites, mais zeles pour le bien de la Patrie) les quels en cas qu'on vint à se resoudre de faire la guerre conjointement avec la France contre l'Empereur, ont determiné de parler clair au Roy, et aux ministres, et d'en empecher l'execution'.

Two weeks earlier Chauvelin had argued that the Austrians were fomenting opposition in Britain,

1 Ossorio to Victor Amadeus II, 20 Mar.1730, AST.LM.Ing.37; D.B.Horn, Great Britain and Europe pp.34-5.
2 Egmont, I, 10.
3 Zamboni to Manteuffel, 31 Mar.1730, Bodl.Rawl.120 f.103. Zamboni suggested that if the ministry did not abandon its anti-Austrian policies it would lose its parliamentary majority, Zamboni to Manteuffel, 24 Feb.1730, Bodl.Rawl.120 f.97.
'Il n'est que trop vrai que l'Empereur y fomente un parti, que ne cherche qu'a jetter de la defiance contre la France personnellement, l'exemple de ce qui a ete dit et fait a l'occasion de Dunkerque, en est une si grande preuve ...'  

Chauvelin's view, that the Austrians were behind the opposition, cannot be established, but Zamboni's suggestion of a powerful pro-Austrian lobby within the ministerial camp appears more convincing. It is very possible that this group was the same as that recorded by Percival on February 16th. That day Percival dined at Dodington's and noted,  

'I found by Mr. Dodington's free way of talking that I have not been in the wrong in thinking a long time past that the speaker is forming a party in the House of reasonable Tories and discontented Whigs, to rise upon the ruins of Sir Robert Walpole'.

By the 'speaker' Percival meant, not the current speaker Onslow, but his predecessor, Wilmington. On April 28th Percival referred to Wilmington as 'the head of the party which opposes Sir Robert Walpole', and Dodington, that evening, informed Percival that he was in favour of an Austrian alliance. The composition of Wilmington's party is a mystery, although it is probable that it included Dodington and Dorset, and may have comprised former members of the

1 Chauvelin to Brancas, 14 Mar.1730, AE.Mem. et Doc. Espagne 158 f.114. On 18 Mar. (OS)1730 the Daily Post Boy carried the following advertisement, 'This Day is published - Dedicated to his Grace the Duke of Bedford - "Remarks on the Proceedings of the French Court, from Charles VIII, to the latter part of the reign of Lewis XIV. Shewing what little regard has been had to the Faith of Treaties; the Ties of Blood, Marriages, Friendship and Oaths etc. Proper to be compared with the present Times, and to be perused by all True Englishmen; by which they may judge how far the French are to be depended on by their Allies, either in Time of Peace or War'.
2 Egmont, I,31.
3 Sedgwick, I,95.
4 Egmont, I,94,93-4.
court of George II, as Prince of Wales, such as Scarborough.  

Zamboni's reports were sometimes inaccurate, and he was no friend of the ministry, which had indeed sought his recall.  
Percival made mistakes, and Dodington was unreliable. The reports are of considerable importance, however, because in the government reshuffle at the end of the session Wilmington was given an important post, that of Lord Privy Seal. Horatio Walpole stated that this was 'done by a perfect union and concert with those already employed'. It was even suggested that Wilmington was considered as Townshend's replacement, though there is little evidence for this assertion. 
The struggles within the ministry were very important. However, it is very difficult to establish much more than the eventual disposal of offices. May 1730 witnessed major alterations in the ministry. The vacant Lord Presidency was conferred on Lord Trevor, Harrington succeeded Townshend, and Wilmington, created an Earl, succeeded Trevor, as Lord Privy Seal. Newcastle's brother, Henry Pelham, replaced Wilmington, as Paymaster-General of the Forces, and was in turn replaced, by Sir William Strickland, as Secretary at War.

1 Broglie reported that Wilmington was the head of a very strong group, that included Chesterfield and Scarborough, committed to removing Walpole. Broglie to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE.CP.Ang.370, f.28-9. The French ministry feared that if Walpole fell he might be replaced by a pro-Austrian government, Chauvelin to Broglie, 13 July 1730, AE.CP.Ang.370, f.184.  
2 Townshend to Woodward, 27 Feb.(OS)1730, PRO.88/36.  
3 Horatio Walpole to Harrington and Poyntz, 23 Ap.(OS)1730, Coxe,II, 693. Newcastle assured the Lord Primate of Ireland, Archbishop Boulter, that Dorset and Wilmington were acting with the ministry 'in the most perfect concert and union imaginable', 20 June(OS)1730, PRO.63/392, f.142. Broglie reported that Walpole, determined to prevent the entry of Wilmington into the ministry, had informed George II of links between him and Pulteney, Broglie to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE.CP.Ang.370, f.28-9. The continued prominence of Wilmington, Dorset and Dodington, throws doubt upon Will's claim that the ministry 'was now almost wholly composed of Walpole's nominees', Hill, Parliamentary Parties p.201.  
4 Broglie to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE.CP.Ang.370, f.28.  
5 Trevor's death, on 30 June 1730, led to Wilmington being appointed Lord President, and Devonshire Lord Privy Seal.
Dorset succeeded Carteret as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Carteret refused Dorset's place of Lord Steward, which was given to Chesterfield, and Carteret's political ally, Lord Finch, the new Earl of Winchelsea, declined Methuen's former place, of the Treasurership of the Household.¹ Reichenbach suggested that Walpole did not wish to give Carteret a place of importance,² but in fact household posts in the early Georgian period could be not only extremely remunerative but also very influential, and Horatio Walpole was made Cofferer of the Household in May 1730. Hervey suggested that Carteret declined the offered post as a result of Winchelsea's influence.³ Whatever the reason his decision had the important effect of removing from the court a major rival of Walpole's.

These changes were matched by new diplomatic postings. Harrington, Horatio Walpole and Poyntz were recalled from France, the last, a potential Secretary of State, to become Governor of the Duke of Cumberland. Neither Walpole nor Poyntz returned to Britain until September 1730, and, therefore, both of them were absent during the period when the decision was taken to resume negotiations with Austria. Britain's new representative in Paris was James Waldegrave, who had been created Earl Waldegrave the previous year.⁴ Leaving

¹ Williams, Carteret and Newcastle, p.80; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus, 29 May 1730, AST.LM.Ing.37. The appointment of Chesterfield to the Paris Embassy had been discussed, Harrington to Keene, 30 Jan. (OS) 1730, BL.Add.32765 f.232-3. Viscount Percival's newsletter noted the report that Carteret would succeed Trevor, 20 June (OS) 1730, BL.Add.27981 f.152.
² Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 19 May 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3.
³ Hervey, I, 120.
⁴ Browning is inaccurate in his suggestion about the reason for Waldegrave's transfer and he is wrong to state that Keene replaced Stanhope. In fact, Waldegrave was very popular at Vienna and Stanhope's posting to Seville had been intended to be temporary only, Browning, p.58. Townshend appears to have helped Waldegrave to obtain the Paris Embassy, Townshend to Waldegrave, 1 May (OS) 1730, BL.Add.48982, f.228. Newcastle had never been enthusiastic about (cont. on next page)
Vienna on June 7th, he arrived in Paris on the 21st, and received his instructions as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary the following month. He was replaced at Vienna by Thomas Robinson, who had been Secretary of the Embassy at Paris and was a protégé of the Walpole family, and, in particular of Horatio Walpole, and his brother-in-law, Isaac Leheup. Robinson, who arrived in Vienna on June 17th, symbolised the new role in the Northern Department of Walpole family influence.

Whatever their effect on Sir Robert Walpole's political position, the governmental changes led to the promotion of less anti-Austrian opinions. The resignation of Townshend, the departure of his protégé Poyntz from Paris, and the decision not to create Chesterfield Secretary of State, represented major blows for those who wanted Britain actively to confront Austria. The French had been in no doubt of Townshend's willingness to use force in order to make Austria reasonable. Equally the changes represented a victory for those who advocated milder methods with Austria. Newcastle had not been sent to replace Carteret in Ireland, as many had anticipated. The Austrians regarded Harrington as one of the more pro-Austrian of the British ministers. Robinson was disillusioned with the French alliance, and was to be accused, throughout the 1730s, of being pro-Austrian.

4 (cont. from previous page) Waldegrave, draft memoir by Waldegrave, no date, Chewton. Waldegrave suspected that Newcastle was pushing his cousin, Thomas Pelham, for the post, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 22 June(OS)1730, Chewton. Pelham had served as secretary of the embassy to the Congress of Soissons from 1728. He returned to Paris from a visit to London on 24 May 1730, and he apparently took charge of affairs, 15-21 June 1730. Horatio Walpole supported Waldegrave's appointment to Paris, Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 23 July 1730, Coxe,III,8.

1 Robinson to Waldegrave, 28 June 1730, Chewton; Robinson to Leheup, 4 Feb., to Horatio Walpole, 7 Feb.1730, BL.Add.9139 f.43-6, 48.

2 Newcastle complained to Chammorel about his preference for Townshend, Chauvelin to Chammorel, 12 June 1730, AE.CP.Ang.sup.8, f.168.
The exact importance of these governmental changes is difficult to ascertain. In particular, their influence upon the decision to resume negotiations with Austria is obscure. The timing of the approach, soon after the return of Harrington to England, could suggest that it was Harrington, a minister who had enjoyed close links with George II in recent years, who was instrumental in persuading George and the ministry to resume negotiations, a decision strongly opposed by Horatio Walpole. Harrington's role in the foreign policy of the 1730's is largely unknown, and too often the dismissive and witty phrases of Hervey are remembered. Harrington was doubtless indolent, but he also possessed ability and diplomatic skill, and his role in the negotiation of the Second Treaty of Vienna was an important one.

The session of 1730 closed with a considerably rearranged ministerial team. The government had survived a serious onslaught in parliament. French readiness to meet British demands over Dunkirk had played a major role in enabling the ministry to face the onslaught. However, the opposition claim that the nation would not accept endlessly an uncertain diplomatic situation, and a dangerous and expensive alliance system had come close to fruition. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1730 ministers surveyed anxiously issues, such as Dunkirk or the recruitment in Ireland for the French army.

1 Zamboni claimed that they would have no impact on policy, Zamboni to Manteuffel, 2 June 1730, Bodl.Rawl.120, f.118.
2 Harrington returned to London on the morning of 24 June 1730.
3 Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 16 Aug.1730, Coxe,III,15-18, 20.
that might produce trouble in the forthcoming session. It was normal, particularly in the early winter, to exercise such fears, but, in 1730, the level of anxiety, though unmeasurable, was certainly higher than in preceding years. A strong conviction grew in ministerial circles, a conviction that stemmed from opposition arguments and drew sustenance from the events of the preceding session. It was a conviction, not of the correctness of an Anglo-Austrian alliance, but rather of the need to escape from the situation of diplomatic uncertainty Britain was in. In the circumstances of 1730 this produced pressure, first, for an alliance with Prussia, and, after this had failed, for one with Austria. No tide of pro-Austrian sentiment swept ministerial circles in the summer of 1730. There was little sympathy for the Austrian case over the Spanish garrisons, and suspicion of Austrian chicanery and diplomatic dishonesty persisted. Instead the pressure for a new departure in British foreign policy, pressure that came from a variety of sources, led to a decision to attempt a reconciliation with Austria. It was a decision taken with few illusions. Ministers were aware of the difficulties that faced such a reconciliation. However, as Chammorel noted, 'un point sur lequel tout le monde convient c'est un grand désir de la paix'.

1 Zamboni to Manteuffel, 2 June 1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 118.
2 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 22 June 1730, AE.CP.Ang. Sup. 8 f. 169.
3 Waldegrave, Horatio Walpole and Poyntz to Robinson, 16 July 1730, BL.Add. 23780 f. 72; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 17 Aug. (OS) 1730, BL.Add. 32769 f. 143.
4 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 14 Aug. 1730, AE.CP.Ang. 370 f. 294.
The Diplomatic Situation in summer 1730

'Mr. Keen should be explicit, not only in our readiness but even our desires not to pass this summer in inaction'.

June 1730. Sir Robert Walpole.1

Whatever the importance of the alterations in the ministry, developments in the diplomatic situation made imperative a reconsideration of British foreign policy. Two developments were of particular importance. The first was the collapse of Britain's 'Northern strategy', her hopes of profiting from developments in Prussia and Russia. The failure of Hotham's mission marked the effective end of this approach, and it was replaced by fears that Prussia and Russia would profit from the revival of difficulties in Mecklenburg to attack Hanover. This in turn led to a consideration of the degree to which Britain could now rely on her allies for assistance. The second major development was the degeneration of the Alliance of Seville into a feuding and distrustful group of powers pursuing independent policies. Possibly this had been predictable, and was inevitable, once the alliance had failed to intimidate Austria into compliance with its demands. Tension between Britain and her allies was not new, but the increased hostility of the summer of 1730 marked the effective end of the Anglo-French alliance, and placed major strains on relations between Britain and Spain.

1 Walpole to Newcastle, 24 June(OS)1730, PRO.36/19 f.79.
'His Majesty has had intelligence that the Russians were making preparations to march a body of men to attack His Majesty's German Dominions and that they had sounded the King of Poland about granting them passage through his country, and that it was suspected that the King of Prussia was privy to this enterprize'.

In Britain, in the spring of 1730 there had been considerable expectation of a major alteration in the diplomatic situation in northern Europe. Great hopes had been raised about the Hotham mission, and it had been widely anticipated that a new period in Anglo-Prussian relations would be ushered in, with marital links between the ruling houses, a visit by Frederick William I to England, and Anglo-Prussian cooperation in European diplomacy. It had been felt that such a realignment would affect Saxony and Austria.

At the same time developments in Russia suggested other major changes. The surprising death from smallpox of the young Peter II, the grand-son of Peter I, led to the accession of Peter I's niece, Anne, the widowed Duchess of Courland. The greater aristocracy succeeded in making Anne's accession conditional upon her accepting a new constitution that drastically limited regal powers, and

1 Harrington to Woodward, 30 June (os) 1730, PRO. 88/37.
2 Paper sent to Ld. Chesterfield, 10 Feb. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 9139 f.51.
suggested, to various foreign commentators, the Swedish, Polish or British constitution. It was widely believed that Russia would revert to her pre-Petrine state, and that the circumscribed power of the new monarch would be too weak to prevent internal disorders and the reversion of Russia to what western-Europeans unfairly described as barbarism.

In the specific field of foreign affairs it was believed that the developments in Russia would harm their ally, the Austrians. In particular, the Russian treaty obligation to send 30,000 men to the defence of Austria, if attacked, seemed in danger, and the role of the Austro-Russian treaty in keeping Prussia in alliance with Austria was threatened by the apparent collapse of Russian power. It was also believed that the change in Russia would open the way to an easing of relations between Russia and the powers of the Treaty of Seville, particularly Britain. Percival noted in his diary, 'it is not improbable but that the apprehension of civil disturbances will induce the court of Muscovy to cultivate the friendship of all the Princes of Europe capable of hurting the present election, and particularly of Great Britain, and if so the late Czar's death, who was nephew of the present Emperor of Germany, will have a great influence over him to accede to the Peace of Seville.' Dayrolle suggested that the pro-Austrian British opposition would be upset by

1 Poyntz to Newcastle, 24 Feb. 1730, BL.Add.32765, f.376; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 24 Feb. 1730, Bodl., Rawl., 120, f.97; Stainville to Duke Francis of Lorraine, 24 Feb. 1730, Nancy, 86, No.63; Chavigny to Bussy, French chargé d'affaires at Vienna, 28 Feb.1730, AE.CP. Aut. sup.10, f.15; Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 28 Mar.1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; Titley to Townshend, 4 Mar.1730, PRO.75/54, f.124.

2 Wych to Townshend, 14 Mar. 1730, PRO.82/47, f.59.

3 Egmont, I, 49.
the death of the Czar. It was believed that the changes in Russia would cause Prussia to be more cautious in making anti-Hanoverian moves.

These hopes were to be shattered. Firstly, there was far less disorder than had been anticipated. The Duke of Liria, the Spanish ambassador in Russia, informed Prince Eugene, from Moscow, of the death of Peter II, and added, 'tout est d'une tranquillité admirable, chose qui n'a pas laissé que de nous surprendre, car dans cette catastrophe, nous nous attendions à quelque grande révolution'. Secondly, as a result of a military coup, Anne was able to capture her opponents and reject the new constitution. Thirdly, the new Russian ministry lost no time in promising Austria the 30,000 men, and Anne pledged herself to the Austrian alliance. On March 24th the Emperor sent his representatives in Paris a memorandum which included the claim 'Les nouvelles qu'on reçoit de Moscou, ne sçauraient être plus favorables aux intérêts de sa Majesté....'.

These developments upset British hopes, though the British government continued to claim that the new Russian government was less stable than it seemed, and that it would therefore be unable and unwilling to send troops to the aid of Austria. However, British institutions continued to support the new government, believing that it was less likely to face internal opposition.

1 Dayrolle to Tilson, 21 Feb. 1730, PRO.84/310, f.43.
2 Titley to Townshend, 21 Feb. 1730, PRO.75/54, f.100.
3 Liria to Eugene, 2 Feb. 1730, Vienna, GK.97 (b), f.133; Frederick William I to Chambrier, 25 Mar. 1730, AE.CP. Prusse,91 f.22.
4 Frederick William I to Chambrier, 11,25 Mar. 1730, AE.CP. Prusse,91, f.17,22; Grumbkow to Reichenbach, 7 May. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; Robinson to Harrington, 2 Aug. 1730, BL.Add.9139 f.86.
hopes of Russia had been far less than those of Prussia. Little attempt had been made to establish an alliance, and no high-ranking British diplomat had been either sent or selected for Russia. On May 27th the Consul-General, Thomas Ward, had been promoted to Minister Resident, and a new Consul-General, Claudius Rondeau, appointed. Both men had been in Russia for some time, and each had claimed that the possibility of an Anglo-Russian alliance existed. They had sought instructions from London. On May 22nd Rondeau informed Tilson that 'The goodness Count Osterman has had for me, makes me hope I shall be able, when I receive new instructions to settle a perfect good correspondence with this court'. However, no instructions were sent from London in 1730 until early June. On June 9th Newcastle informed Ward that it was time to put aside the disputes dating from Peter I's reign, 'as many changes have hapned since both in Muscovy and England and as those disputes were wholly personal it is to be hoped they are forgotten on all sides'. Ward was congratulated on his approach to Count Osterman, but Newcastle made it clear that Britain expected reciprocity to be the basis of any relationship.

'You did very right in shewing him the real instances His Majesty had given of the sincerity of his intentions to live in perfect amity with Russia, and it is very reasonable that His Majesty should find some proofs of a mutual good disposition on their side'.

The lack of instructions earlier in the year, and the guarded tones of those that eventually arrived made it clear that, whilst the ministry in London was actively interested in securing an alliance with Prussia, as indeed it was also, in 1730, with Saxony-Poland,

1 Rondeau to Tilson, 11 May (os) 1730, PRO.91/11, f.109. Osterman was the Russian foreign minister.

2 Newcastle to Ward, 29 May (os) 1730, PRO.91/11 f.101.
there was considerable caution about Anglo-Russian negotiations. There were several reasons for this hesitation. The apparently unstable nature of Russian factional politics, and the desire not to offend Sweden and Denmark, allies whose interests were incompatible with Russia, were important. The confused nature of Russian politics following the death of Peter II led to a revival in Sweden of schemes for a reconquest of the Baltic provinces surrendered, only nine years earlier, at the Treaty of Nystad. The ministry of Peter II had displayed little interest in supporting the anti-Danish interests of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and indeed, during the reign of Peter II, when the Russian capital returned to Moscow and 'German' influences were muted, Russian expansionism had not been a European problem, and relations with Russia were not a high priority in British foreign policy. The possibility that the new reign of Anne would see a revival in Russian expansionism could not but remind the British government of their treaty obligations to Denmark and Sweden.

There were probably other reasons that helped to account for the lack of a British diplomatic approach to Russia. Newcastle's mention of the importance of a good Russian disposition is significant. George II believed that any moves toward good relations had to be the product of efforts by both powers. It is also possible that the British ministry felt that, if they succeeded in winning Prussia, Austria would yield over the Spanish garrisons and Russia would be forced to avoid diplomatic isolation by settling her differences on the terms of Britain and her allies. Rather than compromising over the rights of the Dukes of Mecklenburg and Holstein-Gottorp, the

1 Responding to Swedish fears of Anglo-Russian negotiations, Newcastle had, in June 1728, given the assurance that 'no negociation of this sort will be entered into by His Majesty without previously communicating it to the King of Sweden and Count Horn, and having their concurrence and approbation', Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 20 June (os) 1728, PRO.78/189 f.260.
British ministry could hope that, by holding out, the Russians would yield. In the absence of material that could cast light on thinking within the British ministry about relations with Russia, the role of Townshend, never noted for his sympathies with Russian interests, is open to speculation. The decision to promote Ward, appoint Rondeau and despatch instructions, coincided with Townshend's resignation. Possibly Townshend, well-informed of Swedish views and seeking to persuade the Swedes to follow an anti-Prussian policy and increase their forces in Swedish Pomerania, simply preferred to avoid antagonising Sweden.

The reaffirmation of the Austro-Russian alliance after the consolidation of Anne's power would not have been a terribly serious blow to British foreign policy had it not been followed by the failure of Hotham's mission. The relationship between developments in Russia and Prussia is obscure. Frederick William I certainly revealed, throughout his reign, a well-developed consciousness of Russian strength, and the idea of using Prussian fears of Russia to hold Frederick William in check was recognised in the diplomatic plans of the period. However, in the spring and early summer of 1730, contemporaries did not ascribe the failure of Hotham's mission to Russian developments\(^1\), and there is no reason to doubt their views.

\(^1\) Holzendorf feared that Russian developments would influence Frederick William I, Holzendorf to Tilson, 4 Ap.1730, PRO.84/307, f. 67.
Arriving in Berlin in early April, Hotham found Frederick William more interested in the single than the double-marriage scheme. This was a serious blow, though the possibility of a compromise involving two marriages and the establishment of Crown Prince Frederick in Hanover was investigated. It is not clear that George II envisaged the succession of Frederick of Prussia and his intended wife Anne to both Prussia and Hanover and the eventual union of these two territories but the possibility of such a development was certainly more tempting for Prussia than their more usual schemes of a Hohenzollern ruling Courland and of dynastic links with the house of Brunswick-Bevern.

On April 12th Hotham reported to Townshend that his negotiations were complicated by Frederick William's inconstancy and 'excessive jealousy'. At the end of a drunken feast, an intoxicated King of Prussia had declared the marriage of his eldest daughter and the Prince of Wales, but eventual sobriety led the King to renege on this declaration. Hotham noted that a compromise, albeit a difficult one, was possible in the case of Crown Prince Frederick, 'It is very plain he will sell his son, but not give him'.
Good progress was made in the Brunswick Conferences, and there was optimism in Britain about the chances of a reconciliation. The press confidently predicted it. Slingelandt urged the British to demand only the single marriage, in order to avoid antagonizing Frederick William. On April 8th Frederick William wrote to his envoy in Paris, Chambrier:

'Comme les différends survenus entre le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et moi sont heureusement terminés, il est à presumer que cela fera un changement considerable dans les mesures que l'on a voulu concerter à Paris pour les opérations militaires'.

Hotham was less optimistic, and he cannot be accused of misleading the British ministry about the difficulties facing his mission. On April 18th he informed Townshend that he was finding it difficult to treat with Frederick William personally, and he noted 'how narrow a bottom our affairs are here'. A major problem confronting Hotham was the division between the Prussian ministers. Throughout the late 1720's the Prussian ministry had been badly divided, and the situation had not eased.


5 Frederick William I to Chambrier, 8 Ap. 1730, AE.CP. Prusse 91, f.27.

6 Hotham to Townshend, 18 Ap. 1730, PRO.90/28.
by 1730. At the risk of some simplification, the ministry can be divided into two factions, one led by General Grumbkow, and the other by Knyphausen. Frederick-Ernst Knyphausen, a diplomat of some experience, was associated, albeit not always to the satisfaction of the British ministry, with the policy of a British alliance, and with the schemes for Anglo-Prussian marriages. He had lost influence with the death of his father-in-law, the Prussian minister Ilgen, in December 1728, and in 1730 he relied heavily upon the British marriages, in order to restore his power. His principal rival Grumbkow was to be describe in 1732 by Chauvelin as 'un homme vif, pour ne pas dire féroce, sans principes, assez opposé aux Anglois...'.

He was closely associated with pro-Austrian policies, and with the very active Austrian envoy in Berlin, Seckendorf. Complicating Hotham's mission was the fact that he had been ordered to attempt to secure the disgrace of Grumbkow and the recall of Reichenbach, whose correspondence with Grumbkow had been intercepted by the British.

On April 19th Townshend sent Hotham the intercepted correspondence and ordered him to 'communicate them to Monsieur Knyphausen, and concert with him the use you are to make of them'. However, by linking Hotham to Knyphausen, Townshend was complicating the mission to a fatal degree. Possibly the marriages,

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2 Newcastle to George II, 4 Ap. (os) 1730, PRO. 36/18 f. 99. It had been argued that Prussian policy would not alter until Frederick William changed his ministers, Du Bourgay to Townshend, 30 Dec. 1727, PRO. 90/22; Fagel to Hop, 22 Sept. 1730, PRO. 107/2.

3 Townshend to Hotham, 8 Ap. (os) 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/1; Dr. Villa, confidant of the Queen of Prussia, to Dickens, 3 Mar. (os) 1730, PRO. 90/27.
and their desired consequence, a Prussian breach with Austria, could have only taken effect had Grumbkow been removed. If so, the mission's chances of success were limited, as Frederick William did not wish to see his choice of ministers dictated by foreign powers. Hotham sought to stir up the King against Grumbkow, but he had to inform Townshend of a lack of success.

On April 12th Hotham wrote,

'I see no one instance of Cnyphausen's superiority or Grumkau's credit being lessen'd .... He [Knyphausen] even told me himself that he stood alone, that the whole court was sold to the Empr. and I saw plainly, that he stands in that awe of the King, that he will never venture to lead his master into anything, which he does not see the King already disposed to: and it is most certain, that the few friends we have are timorous and indolent and our enemys enterprizing and active'.

Hotham's pessimism about his mission did not diminish.

On May 6th he informed Townshend that Borck, the Prussian minister then much in favour with Frederick William, 'follows Seckendorf's directions'. A week later, he reported that Frederick William, opposed to the idea of the Crown Prince leaving the country, had rejected the suggestions that the Stadtholderate of Hanover be conferred on Princess Anne, adding 'the proposal the King of Prussia has now rejected was sometime ago the thing in the world

1 Hotham to Townshend, 13 May 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/10.
2 Hotham to Townshend, 6 May 1730, PRO.90/28.
3 Hotham to Townshend, 13 May 1730, PRO.90/28.
4 Hotham to Townshend, 12 Ap., 27 May 1730, PRO.90/28.
6 Hotham to Townshend, 18 Ap., 6 (quote), 13 May, PRO.90/28.
he was the most fond of.\footnote{Hotham to Townshend, 13 May 1730, PRO.90/28; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus, 24 Ap. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37.}

However, Frederick William was also willing to order the recall of Reichenbach, much to the latter's distress, and to tell Hotham that he wished for nothing more than to live well with Britain\footnote{Hotham to Townshend, 9 May 1730, PRO.90/28.}. Hotham's conclusion was that the King was unreliable\footnote{Hotham to Townshend, 13, 20 May 1730, PRO.90/28.}.

Another factor complicating Hotham's mission was Frederick William's concern about its consequences for the Austrian cause in the Empire. Seckendorf was adept at exploiting the King's fears that a war would harm the Empire, and by defeating Austria, overturn the balance of power. At dinner with Hotham in Potsdam on April 21st, Frederick William 'always returned to that; that suffering the French to attack Luxemburg or invade the Low Countries would in the end have very pernicious consequences, and that we ourselves should soon be sensible to it, and that he did not doubt but in a year or two, we should return to the old system, as he termed it, and join hands against France...\footnote{Hotham to Townshend, 22, 26 Ap. 1730, PRO.90/28.}'

Several days later he told Hotham that Luxemburg and the Austrian Netherlands were too near his own possessions for him to permit an attack upon them in which he did not become involved. The relationship between Prussian fears, and British opposition, at the conferences at Fontainebleau, to war north of the Alps has not been brought out by those historians who have considered...
the conferences. A major reason why the British devoted so much energy, in April and May 1730, to persuading their allies that operations against Austria should be confined to Italy, was their awareness of the danger of Prussian military assistance to Austria, either by virtue of treaty obligations, or because of Prussian obligations as a member of the Empire. Frederick William expressed particular concern about Luxemburg, whilst he allowed Hotham to form the opinion that the Prussians would not send help to the Austrians, in the event of the war being confined to Italy.

By early May Hotham's mission had clearly failed. Whether it could have succeeded had George pressed for only the single marriage, as Slingelandt and the Wolfenbüttel minister Stain urged, or if George had offered the Stadtholderate of Hanover to Crown Prince Frederick, as some of the British ministers had urged, is unclear. It is probable that Frederick William's indecisiveness would have prevented him accepting any expedient until the European situation had been resolved by peace. The mission ended suddenly as a result of Hotham's attempt to

1 Newcastle to Waldegrave, 19 Nov. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32770 f.124.
2 Ossorio to Victor Amadeus, 1 May 1730, AST. LM. Ing,37; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 4 May 1730, AE.CP. Ang. 370 f.16.
3 Ferdinand Albrecht to Ludwig Rudolf of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, 2 May 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 531 f.38. This solution was feared by those who opposed an Anglo-Prussian reconciliation, Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 12 May 1730, PRO.90/28.
4 Horatio Walpole to Harrington and Poyntz, 23 Ap. (os) 1730, Coxe, II, 693. Frederick William sought this solution, and later in the year he blamed the failure of the marriage negotiations on the British refusal to accept the Prussian conditions, Frederick William to Chambrier, 30 Sept. 1730, AE.CP. Prusse, 91 f.59.
discredit Grumbkow by a revelation of the contents of Reichenbach's intercepted correspondence. Frederick William regarded the opening of his minister's letters as a personal insult, and he reacted violently when Hotham pressed him on the matter on July 10th. Treating the King's violent anger as an affront to George II, in the person of his envoy, Hotham left Berlin without an audience of leave.¹

¹ Hotham to Harrington, 11 July 1730, PRO.90/28; Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 14 July 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr.585(e) f.49; Gansinotto Meerman, Bavarian envoy in Vienna, 1 Aug. 1730, Munich, Wien, 184; 'Monsr. Börcke's acct. of what passed with Sir Charles Hotham', no date, PRO.90/106.
The failure of Hotham's mission was a serious blow to British foreign policy. The deterioration of British relations with Prussia and Russia led to a revival of fears that the two latter powers would initiate military action against Hanover. Earlier in 1730, when there had been fears of Prussian action against Hanover, Britain had turned to her allies, particularly France, for assistance, and had been greeted with promises of help\(^1\). In the summer of 1730 the situation was less promising, and the renewed perception of a threat to Hanover\(^2\) led to an awareness of the practical difficulties created by the distrust and disagreements that affected Anglo-French relations. Disagreement between Britain and France was particularly acute over the German policies of the two powers. The dispute over British subsidies to the Wittelsbachs had continued throughout the spring of 1730\(^3\). Just as the British felt let-down over Dunkirk, so the French felt that British parsimony was destroying the

1 Newcastle to Poyntz, 6 Feb. (os), Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 30 Mar, (os), Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 5 Ap. 1730, BL.Add.32765 f.267, 32766 f.331,320.

2 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 12 Ap. 1730, BL.Add.32766 f.341; London Evening Post 4,18 June (os) 1730; Toerring to Meerman, 17 June 1730, Munich, Wien, 182. On 3 May Townshend told Broglie that George II wanted France to hold a corps ready to assist Hanover in the event of an Austrian or Prussian attack, Broglie to Chauvelin, 4 May 1730, AE.CP. Ang.370 f.13; Townshend to George II, 6 May (os) 1730, Coxe, II, 542.

3 Villars, 8 Jan 1730, p.205; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 18 June (os) 1730, BL.Add.32768 f.23-5.
possibility of creating an effective anti-Austrian coalition within the Empire. The revival of the disputes over Hildesheim angered the French.\(^1\)

Without Prussia and without the Wittelsbachs the British position in the Empire was weak. The British had, in the spring, sought to benefit from the prospect of improved relations with Prussia by opening talks with the Saxons for an alliance. Woodward was ordered to press for good relations\(^2\), but on June 16th he had to report that the Saxon minister, Count Hoym, had informed him that the basis of any alliances would have to be British subsidies, and that it was the prospect of these that would be most likely to lead Augustus II to consider a treaty\(^3\). Suspicious of Prusso-Saxon links the British ministry was unwilling to offer a subsidy\(^4\). They were also sceptical of the value of any Saxon promises\(^5\). The well-known factionalism of the Saxon court made it appear particularly unstable\(^6\).

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1 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 June, Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 28 May (os) 1730, BL. Add.32767 f.239.354; Albert to Plettenberg, 31 May, 3 July 1730, Munster, NB.33 f.11,22.

2 Townshend to Woodward, 11 May (os) 1730, PRO.88/37; Townshend to Hotham, 24 Ap. (os), Hüll, DDHO 3/1; Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 14 July 1730, Wolfenbüttel,1 Alt 22, 585(e) f.46.

3 Woodward to Newcastle, 16 June 1730, BL.Add.32768,f.33,35.

4 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 18 June (os) 1730, BL.Add.32768 f.26; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 13 June 1730, Marburg, 199.

5 Harrington to Woodward, 14 July (os) 1730, PRO.88/37. Bussy, the French chargé d'affaires in Vienna, noted, 'Le Roy de Pologne ne veut prendre aucune engagement qui le mene trop loin', Bussy to Chauvelin, 26 July 1730, AE.CP. Aut.196 f.232.

6 Harrington to Woodward, 14 July (os) 1730, PRO.88/37.
The return of the exiled Duke, Charles Leopold, to Mecklenburg, aroused British fears that Russia, Austria and Prussia were seeking to create difficulties for Hanover. Robinson wrote of the possibility 'of drawing on an universal war from the least disturbance in lower Saxony', and informed Newcastle of the danger that Russian troops would be sent to Mecklenburg. Charles Leopold was the brother-in-law of the new Tsarina, and it was widely feared that she had been responsible for his return to Mecklenburg and was seeking to enlist support for him. Opinions were divided as to the extent of Austrian support for Charles Leopold, and both Robinson and Du Bourgay argued that Austria did not want to see a war break out in northern Germany. However, Chammorel reported that other British ministers believed that Austria was determined to persuade Russia to intervene in Mecklenburg either,

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1 Robinson to Harrington, 22 July 1730, BL.Add.9139 f.77; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus II, 10 July, 14 Aug. 1730, AST.LM.Ing.37; Daily Post Boy 19 June (os) 1730. Hanoverian troops were still in Mecklenburg.

2 Robinson to Newcastle, 5 July 1730, BL.Add.9139 f.66; Schleinitz to ---, 2 July 1730, AE.CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 48 f.71.

3 Rondeau to Newcastle, 13 July (os), Harrington to Rondeau, 18 Aug. (os) 1730, PRO.91/11 f.142,146; Titley to Robinson, 18 July 1730, BL.Add.23780 f.79; Dickens to Harrington, 5 Aug. 1730, PRO.90/29; Meerman to Gansinot, 19 Aug. 1730, Munich, Wien, 184; Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 30 June, 1 Sept. 1730, ASV.LM.Ing.98 f.323,348; St. James' Evening Post 20 June (os) 1730; Evening Post 26 Mar. (os)1730.

4 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 20 July 1730, AE.CP.Ang.370 f.221; Robinson to Harrington, 22 July 1730, BL.Add.9139 f.77. Holzendorf feared that Austria would support Charles Leopold, Holzendorf to Tilson, 20,27 June 1730, PRO.84/307 f.108,112.
'pour donner au Roy D'Angleterre la mortification de retirer ses troupes de ce pays la; ou s'il veut les y maintenir par la force, le mettre dans la nécessité de continuer les subsides aux troupes de Hesse et de Wirtemberg, dont il supose que la demande sera tres mal recue a la prochaine seance du Parlement'. 1

Developments in Mecklenburg certainly aroused the concern and anger of George II. Broglie reported that the Queen and Walpole were cooperating to quieten George's anxiety 2. The situation was made yet more serious by the continued deterioration of Anglo-Prussian relations. Frederick William had decided to replace Reichenbach by Count Degenfeld, and the British hoped that the arrival of the latter in Britain would provide an opportunity for a resumption of good relations. Borck and Harrington exchanged messages calling for such a resumption, and when Degenfeld arrived in London, Newcastle informed him that Hotham's folly was to blame for the failure of his mission, and that the marriage negotiations should be resumed by Degenfeld and the ministry in London 3. On July 25th Tilson informed Robinson...’.. the King of Pr: seems concerned at his sudden flirt of passion....we expect C. Degenfeldt here in all haste to set matters right...'

1 Chammorel to Broglie, 3,20 (quote) July 1730, AE.CP.Ang.370 f.179-80,221; Holzendorf to Tilson, 27 June 1730, PRO.84/307 f.111; Hotham to Harrington, 11 July 1730, PRO.90/28.

2 Broglie to Chauvelin, 2 July 1730, AE.CP.Ang.370 f.187. Ossorio noted George's anger, Ossorio to Victor Amadeus II 10 July 1730, AST. LM. Ing.37; Newcastle to Waldegrave, 19 Nov. (os) 1730, 'Paper relating to the affair of Mecklenburg', BL.Add.32770 f.131,133-4.

3 Borck to Harrington, 15 July, Harrington to Berck, 17 July (os) 1730, PRO.90/106; Degenfeld to Grumbkow, 15 Aug. 1730, PRO.107/2.
Zamboni was assured that Frederick William had relented of his conduct to Hotham. Degenfeld reached London in early August. According to Zamboni, who was well acquainted with Degenfeld, having known him before his mission to London, Hotham was sent to Degenfeld to ascertain whether he had been instructed to apologise for Frederick William's insult to George II, in the person of his minister. Degenfeld replied that he had not come to make excuses, and that it was rather the part of George to apologise for his minister's conduct. Zamboni added, 'mais cela non obstant il y a apparence que tout finira bien, les deux cours (et celleci encore plus que l'autre) etant portées à se reconcilier'.

He was to be proved wrong. Anglo-Prussian relations were not helped by George's refusal to give Reichenbach an audience of leave, and other difficulties, created by George, delayed Degenfeld's initial audience. When Degenfeld's audience finally took place on September 21st he was treated badly by the royal family. It was to be developments in Prussia, however, that proved Zamboni wrong. The attempted escape of the Crown Prince,

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1 Tilson to Robinson, 14 July (os) 1730, BL.Add.23780, f.102; Zamboni to Fleury and Manteuffel, 1 Aug. 1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f.129; Dickens to Hotham 8 Aug. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/1; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 8 Aug. 1730, Marburg,199; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 14 Aug. 1730, AE.CP.Ang.370 f.295.
2 Zamboni to Fleury and Manteuffel, 18 Aug. 1730, Bodl. Rawl.120 f.134; Delafaye to Waldegrave 17 Sept. 1730, Chewton. Newcastle approached Degenfeld and proposed new negotiations over the double marriage, Degenfeld to Grumbkow, 15 Aug. 1730, PRO.107/2.1
4 Zamboni to Fleury, 22 Sept. 1730, Bodl. Rawl, 120 f.144.
and the disgracing of those who had opposed Grumbkow, destroyed the chances of a reconciliation. Knyphausen was dismissed and banished from the Court on August 30th. On September 25th Borck declared to Guy Dickens that Frederick William would not consider any marriage, single or double. British anger at the treatment of the Crown Prince, and Prussian suspicion that George II was responsible for Frederick's attempt at escape, helped to embitter relations. Plans to send Sutton to Berlin were cancelled. Serious moves towards an Anglo-Prussian rapprochement were not to be made again until 1735, and the legacy of personal bitterness between the two monarchs was to wreck this attempt and the others made in the latter half of the 1730's. The failure to ensure good relations was to be a major handicap to British foreign policy in the 1730's.

1 Holzendorf to Chesterfield, 18 Aug. 1730, PRO.84/307 f.189; Dickens to Hotham, 11 Sept. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/1; Dickens to Harrington, 19,26 Aug. 1730, PRO.90/29.

2 Robinson to Tilson, 7 Oct. 1730, PRO.80/69; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 24 Oct. 1730, Marburg, 199; Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 14 Nov. 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, 585(e) f.96.

3 and 4 over page.
3 Frederick William to Degenfeld, 16 Sept. 1730, PRO.107/2. The British knew of the plan to escape and had attempted to dissuade Frederick from it, Hotham to Newcastle, 16 June, Harrington to Dickens, 20 June, Harrington to Hotham, 20 June 1730, PRO.90/28; Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 9 Sept. 1730, Wolfenbuttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585(e) f.67.

4 Frederick William I to Ferdinand Albrecht, 14 Oct. 1730, Wölfenbuttel, 1 Aot 22, Nr.532 f.86; Degenfeld to Grumbkow, 17 Oct. 1730, PRO.107/2.
'Horace cannot be spur'd too much upon the affair of Dunkirk'.
'Robert Walpole, July 1730'.

'Mr. Walpole shewed us this day a Private Letter from his brother Sr. Robt. in which Sr. Robt. seems very uneasy at the present situation of affairs in England, that we are in danger to break with France without being sure of the Empr.'.

Waldegrave's Journal, September 2nd 1730.

It is difficult to establish the nature or extent of the relationship between developments in Prussia, Russia and Mecklenburg on the one hand, and the British decision to pursue actively the option of an Austrian alliance, on the other. The British approach to Prussia had been intended as part of a diplomatic strategy aimed at restoring relations with Austria by isolating her and compelling her to sue for terms. Its failure, and the replacement of a reasonably satisfactory situation in northern Europe, by a threatening one, was paralleled by the failure of the conferences at Fontainebleau to produce much more than discord and distrust. Townshend had apparently

1 Walpole to Newcastle, 3 July (os) 1730, BL.Add.32687 f.376.
2 Waldegrave Journal, 2 Sept. 1730, Chewton.
3 Newcastle to Waldegrave, 19 Nov. (os) 1780, BL.Add.32770 f.126, 135.
been proved correct within a few months of his resignation. His belief that the only way to achieve the aims of the Treaty of Seville was its vigorous enforcement\(^1\) seemed vindicated by the discord at Fountainebleau. In April 1730 Chammorel had reported, "on regarde icy l'accomodement avec le Roy de Prusse comme l'ouvrage de M. le Chevalier Walpole."\(^2\) The failure of the Hotham mission, and the resumption of tension in northern Germany meant that, unless there were some major diplomatic changes before January, Walpole would be forced to ask for the continuation of the unpopular subsidies to foreign powers.

Parliamentary trouble could also be anticipated over Dunkirk\(^3\). Louis XV's promise had been followed not by the demolition of the works at Dunkirk, but by prevarication on the part of the French, and anger on that of the British. Maurepas, the Naval minister, was opposed to the destruction of the works, and took steps to ensure that whatever demolition took place was slow and partial\(^4\). Within a month of the French promise to demolish the works, British complaints at the failure to honour the promise began. The French representatives in London were pressed by the British ministers\(^5\), and, in response to frequently reiterated orders\(^6\), the British representatives in Paris urged the French

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1 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 27 Ap. 1730, AE.CP.Ang.369 f.396.
2 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 19 Ap. 1730, AE.CP.Ang.369 f.381.
3 Delafaye to Waldegrave, 10,20 Aug. (os) 1730, Chewton.
4 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 3 June 1730, BL.Add.32767 f.277.
5 Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 28 May (os) 1730, BL.Add. 32767 f.357; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 5,26 June, 31 July 1730, AE.CP.Ang.370 f.108-9, 155, 277.
6 Newcastle to Harrington, Poyntz and Horatio Walpole, 4 June (os) to Poyntz, Horatio Walpole and Waldegrave, 29 June (os) 1730, BL.Add.32767 f.367, 32768,f.185; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 27 July (os), 10 Aug. 1730, Chewton.
to fulfil their promise. Fleury complained about the degree of British pressure over Dunkirk. The British felt tricked by the French failure to honour repeated promises, and French questioning of their claims led to angry scenes. On August 23rd Waldegrave recorded in his journal a meeting which had taken place that morning between Fleury and Horatio Walpole,

'His Eminence seemed still to doubt whether the works that were now insisted should be demolished had been really so in 1713. Mr. Walpole took fire at this, and with a good deal of agitation told the Card. he was abused, and that he would go away, and not take his leave of the Court, for he could not say in his complement which would be undoubtedly made public in England that he was pleased with the good harmony etc. which ought to subsist between the courts whilst France was so little complaisant in an affair which was so clear.'

Sir Robert Walpole was clearly concerned about the danger of the issue being raised in Parliament, and this accounted for his instruction to his brother to present a memorial on the subject. Parliament would have to be convinced that the ministry had not been remiss over the issue. In the summer of 1730 the opposition press drew attention to the continued activity at

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1 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 3 June 1730, BL.Add.32767 f.277; Horatio Walpole to Fleury, 21 June 1730, AE. Mém. et Doc. France, 459 f.208; Delafaye to Newcastle, 4 Aug. (os) 1730, PRO.36/20 f.6; Waldegrave Journal, 28 Aug., 1 Sept. 1730, Chewton 2 Waldegrave Journal, 12 Aug. 1730, Chewton. Horatio Walpole thought that the pressure was excessive, Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 10 Sept. 1730, BL.Add.32769 f.258. 3 Waldegrave Journal, 1,2 Sept. 1730, Chewton; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 10,20 Aug., 11 Sept., 5 Oct. 1730, Chewton; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, Poyntz and Waldegrave, 28 Aug, (os 1730, BL.Add.32769 f.2.
the port of Dunkirk, and to the French failure to begin the demolition of the illegal jettys.\textsuperscript{1}

The importance of the Dunkirk issue in embittering Anglo-French relations cannot be overestimated. Far from being a 'little local difficulty', of no consequence for more general diplomatic developments, Dunkirk served to produce frustration and anxiety among the British ministers. It represented the manner in which the Anglo-French alliance was no longer producing any tangible benefits, but was instead threatening the parliamentary position of the British ministry.\textsuperscript{2}

At the same time as conferences were being held at Fountainebleau in order to produce an agreed allied strategy in the event of war with Austria, an attempt was made to settle by compromise the differences with Austria. The British and the French had rejected the Austrian attempt to link negotiations for the admission of the Spanish garrisons to a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. However, in order to keep the negotiations going, the Seville allies had informed Austria that they were ready to listen to further Austrian proposals. In addition, they decided to offer Austria a guarantee of the undivided

\textsuperscript{1} London Evening Post 6 June (os), Daily Post Boy 8 June, Flying Post or Post-Master 9 June, Fog's Weekly Journal 13 June, British Journal 13 June, 1730; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 21 Dec. (os) 1730, Chewton.

\textsuperscript{2} Borck to Degenfeld, 26 Sept. 1730, PRO.107/2; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 11 Sept. (os), 15 Oct. 1730 Chewton; Delafaye to Newcastle, 8 Dec. (os) 1730, BL.Add.32770 f.241.
inheritance of the Emperor's Italian dominions in return for
his consent to the admission of the Spanish garrisons. In late
May Fleury proposed this solution to the Austrian representatives
in the name of all the allies\(^1\). Charles VI rejected the idea\(^2\).

The continuation of negotiations with the Austrians created
tension between the Seville allies. Spain was opposed to talks\(^3\),
and Britain suspicious of links between France and Austria\(^4\).
Furthermore, the disagreements at Fontainebleau became worse
as the summer progressed\(^5\). The British suspected both that the
French did not want war but were seeking to shift the blame for
inaction upon them\(^6\), and, that if the French did decide to fight,
they would insist upon doing so in areas, such as the Austrian

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1 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 June 1730, BL.Add.32767
f.320-7; Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 1 June 1730,
Höfler, II, 188-93; Wilson, p.217; Huisman, Compagnie d'Ostende
p.472; Vaucher, Robert Walpole p.33; G. Steuer, Englands
dissertation, Bonn, 1957) pp.25-6; 'Paper delivered to Count
Königseck by the Cardinal May 28 1730', PRO.103/113.

2 Thomas Pelham to Robinson, 9 July, Horatio Walpole, Waldegrave
and Poyntz to Robinson, 19 July, 1730, BL.Add.23780 f.52,82;
Steuer Englands Österreichpolitik pp.31-2; Villars, 2 July 1730,
p.258. Newcastle had hoped that the Austrians would be so
impressed by the vigorous measures of the Alliance of Seville
that they would yield, Diemar to Frederick I, King of Sweden,
30 May 1730, Marburg, 201.

3 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 June 1730, BL.Add.32767
f.237.

4 Harrington to Newcastle, 12 Ap. 1730, BL.Add.32766 f.365.

5 De Brais to Augustus II, 8 May 1730, Dresden, 2735, 2 f.88;
Holzendorf to Tilson, 8 Aug. 1730, PRO.84/307 f.157.

6 Newcastle to Waldegrave, Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 27 July (os)
1730, BL.Add.32769 f.36-7; Waldegrave Journal, 23 Aug. 1730,
Chewton. The French were aware that they were being blamed for
delays by the British, D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 4 Aug. 1730,
AN.AM.B 7 303.
Netherlands, where the British were opposed to French gains. The British ascribed the Austrian refusal to negotiate to their knowledge of the divisions amongst the Seville allies. These divisions were indeed no secret. The Austrians were sure that there would be no hostilities in 1730, and anticipated the collapse of the Seville alliance and the fall of the British government. The latter was also expected by the French.

The Austrians were correct in their belief that delay would cause some of the Seville allies to change their tone. On August 2nd the British representatives in France reported that the Dutch government had ordered their representatives to propose 'a negotiation with the Emperor about granting him a general guaranty of his dominions'. The Dutch suggested that the Spaniards should accept neutral garrisons. Fleury rejected the idea, 'the Cardinal in a formal speech rejected what relates to the Guaranty of the Emperor's dominions on the foot of the Pragmatick Sanction, as what would bring a scandal upon the Alliance of Seville, disoblige the Princes of Italy and the Empire and subject them to a perpetual bondage to the Imperial Court.'

1 Newcastle to Waldegrave, Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 10 July (os) 1730, BL.Add.32768 f.259.
2 Waldegrave to Tilson, 10 Aug. 1730, PRO.78/194 f.206; Toerring to Meerman, 17 June 1730, Munich, Wien 182; Daily Post Boy 15 June (os) 1730.
3 Robinson to Newcastle, 5, 21 June, 5 July 1730, BL.Add.9139 f.67, PRO.80/68, BL.Add.32768 f.313.
5 Horatio Walpole, Waldegrave and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 Aug. 1730, BL.Add.32768 f.349–51.
It was therefore clear that the French would oppose any guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. Yet for the British this was increasingly looking like the only solution to their diplomatic difficulties. When Charles VI had rejected the suggestion of a guarantee of the succession to his Italian dominions, the British representatives in Paris had written to Robinson, 'You will easily conclude that this negotiation is at an end, and the allies must think of other means for bringing him to reason.' However, the resort to violence hinted at in this letter had been thwarted by disagreements among the allies. The Austrian rejection of the proposed expedient led the British to press their allies for an immediate attack upon Sicily. The British hastened their military preparations for such an expedition. French insistence on the prior settlement of a treaty of equilibrium thwarted the British plan. The British had wanted to see hostilities begin in 1730, and feared that without this Spain would attempt a fresh

1 Chesterfield to Harrington, 25 Aug. 1730, PRO.84/307 f.204.
2 Horatio Walpole, Waldegrave and Poyntz to Robinson, 19 July 1730, BL.Add.23780 f.82; Waldegrave Journal, 9 Aug. 1730, Chewton; Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 31 Aug. 1730, Vienna, Fonseca, 14 f.150.
3 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, Waldegrave and Poyntz, 27 July (os) 1730, BL.Add.32769 f.35-8.
alliance with Austria\(^1\). The French argued that it was better to settle plans for a general war in 1731, and that, before hostilities were commenced, efforts should be made to win the alliance of Sardinia and the Wittelsbachs\(^2\). Furthermore, the French argued that the major Austrian military build-up in Italy made any maritime invasion unwise, and that operations in Italy required Sardinian assistance. A.M.Wilson suggested that the French were disinclined to force the issue, because their interests were not being harmed by the protraction of peace\(^3\). This is probably correct, but it should also be noted that there were reasonable military considerations leading France to reject the British scheme. The military effort demanded of the French was large, for they were expected not only to invade Italy but also to protect Hanover and the United Provinces from attack.

The French view of the desired equilibrium was an ambitious one. On August 7th at a conference of British, French and Dutch representatives held at Compiegne Chauvelin 'explained himself more clearly... upon the Equilibre than ever I had heard him, his discourse tended to divest the Empr. of all the dominions he had in Italy...\(^4\) The British were unwilling to accept such a plan,

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3 Wilson, pp.221-1.

4 Waldegrave Journal, 7 Aug. 1730, Chewton.
and Chauvelin complained that they would only accept a scheme that did not harm the Emperor. On August 2nd the British representatives in Paris informed Keene that 'it never was His Majesty's intention to new model the possessions of Europe, and to make a new distribution of dominions and territories for pleasing the Queen of Spain.'

The Anglo-French alliance had therefore become, by the summer of 1730, the basis of a possible recasting of the European system. British foreign policy was to be tied to the abasement of Austria, which was to become a matter of planning and action, rather than speculation. Such a situation had been advocated by various British ministers ever since the signature of the Treaty of Vienna, but its practical implementation had become, by the summer of 1730, an entirely different matter. The Anglo-French alliance was no longer a defensive screen to protect Hanover, Gibraltar and British commercial privileges. It now

1 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 20 Aug. 1730, AE.CP.Ang. sup. 8 f.175; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus II, 24 July, 7 Aug. 1730, AST.LM.Ing. 37.

2 Horatio Walpole, Waldegrave and Poyntz to Keene, 2 Aug 1730, BL.Add.32770 f.384. Eugene feared that a misplaced complaisance for the views of Elisabeth Farnese would lead to the overturning of the European balance, Eugene to Kinsky, 17 June 1730, Vienna, Kinsky, Kart. 2(b).

3 Lord Percival's Newsletter, 4 June (os) 1730, BL.Add.22981 f.137; Holzendorf to Chesterfield, 11 Aug., Chesterfield to Harrington, 22, 25, 29 Aug., 1, 5 Sept. 1730, PRO.84/307 f.160,197,205,84/308 f.1,5,14; Baudrillart, IV,39; Hughes, p.375. In January 1730 Charles Albert of Bavaria told Chavigny that he wanted to succeed Charles VI as Emperor, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 17 Jan 1730, AE.CP. Allemagne, 376 f.29.
entailed projected subsidies to Sardinia\(^1\) and the Wittelsbachs, the possibility of a British guarantee of the Saxon succession in Poland, and a war to drive the Austrians from Italy. The Anglo-French alliance that the British ministry decided to abandon in the late summer of 1730 was being directed by the French toward goals very different from those that ministerial speakers had defended in Parliament for the previous five years. However difficult it had been to defend the alliance in those sessions, it would be even harder to confront the new session with demands for fresh subsidies. Horatio Walpole, aware 'of the clamour that may arise against our joyning with France to pull down the house of Austria', nevertheless urged, that in order to intimidate Austria, Parliament should be summoned to meet in November and asked to vote supplies sufficient to permit the raising of another ten thousand British troops\(^2\).

It is not surprising that Sir Robert Walpole chose to ignore his brother's advice to maintain the Anglo-French alliance\(^3\) when it was accompanied by suggestions that would have been politically disastrous had they been attempted. It was frequently claimed that Sir Robert Walpole's role in the direction of British foreign policy was minimal, and that he took his ideas and his information

\(^1\) Newcastle to Waldegrave, Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 24 Aug. (os) 1730, BL.Add.32769 f.191. Poyntz noted that Victor Amadeus would require, as the price of an alliance, a 'reward...out of the Emperor's Dominions in the Milanese .... or Great subsidys.' Poyntz to Holzendorf, 12 Feb. 1730, BL.Add.32765 f.258.


\(^3\) Wilson, pp.222-3. Horatio's view of the state of the Anglo-French alliance could be regarded as naively optimistic, Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 10 Sept. 1730, BL.Add.32769 f.258.
from his brother. On July 13th, Chammorel reported that Sir Robert Walpole relied on his brother for foreign policy matters, and he noted 'Le Chevalier Walpole se mesloit très peu des affaires du dehors'. Such an analysis was inaccurate. In the summer of 1730 Sir Robert Walpole read many of the diplomatic dispatches and took an active role in the drafting of instructions to British envoys. It seems reasonable to suggest that his awareness of the potentially fatal domestic repercussions of the continuance of the Anglo-French alliance played a large part in the decision to explore the possibilities of an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation. Equally, the views of Harrington must not be discounted. The Austrians were convinced that Harrington was the most pro-Austrian of the British ministers. On August 27th Charles VI informed his envoys in Paris that Harrington 's'est toujours montré plus equitable, que les deux frères Walpole, il pourrait chercher sous mains à conclure un accommodement entre l'Empereur, et le Roy'...

1 Ralph, Critical History of the Administration of Sir Robert Walpole p.404.
2 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 13 July 1730, AE.CP.Ang. 370 f.215-6.
5 Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky, Fonseca and Königsegg, 27 Aug.1730, Höfler, II, 260. Chauvelin shared this belief, Chauvelin to Chammorel, 27 Nov.1730, AE.CP.Ang.sup. 8, f.179. Harrington and Poyntz had informed Fleury 'of the absolute necessity of putting an end to the present state of uncertainty one way or other immediately, without which both England and Holland must think of new measures', Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 June 1730, Bl.Add.32767 f.237.
negotiation of the Second Treaty of Vienna suggests that he was also partly responsible for the decision to approach Austria. Though Browning claims that Newcastle played a significant role in the conduct of British foreign policy in the summer of 1730, the diplomatic papers of the period would seem to suggest that his role was largely confined to expressing increasing frustration with the French. He played little part in the negotiations with Austria.¹

¹ Browning, pp.59-60. On Newcastle's doing 'as he was told', in this period, Horn, 'Machinery', pp.233-4.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE NEGOTIATION OF THE SECOND TREATY OF VIENNA

'I continue in the opinion I have had a long while that nothing but fear of an impending danger will bring the Imperial court to reason'.

Waldegrave to Newcastle, October 1730.

On August 1st 1730 Kinsky reported to Charles VI that Harrington had hinted to him that the British were willing to sign a separate treaty with Austria, 'qu'on ne seroit pas eloigné en Angleterre d'accorder sans aucune restriction la garantie de l'ordre de succession établi dans la maison d'Autriche, en cas, qu'on voulut consentir... à l'introduction des garnisons Espagnoles, et terminer à la satisfaction de la cour d'Hannovre l'affaire de Mecklenbourg'.

The Austrian response to Harrington's approach, and to Robinson's proposed expedient of British garrisons in Tuscany and Parma, was cautious. Charles VI was not disposed to yield over Mecklenburg, fearing that it would upset Austria's allies, and he was worried that if Austria replied favourably to the British approach, the British would use the reply to discredit Austria with her allies. In addition, wishing to avoid a

1 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 17 Oct. 1730, BL Add. 9139 f. 106.

2 Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky, Fonseca and Königsegg, 27 Aug. 1730, Höfler, II, 258. As Secretary of State for the Northern Department Harrington was responsible for relations with Austria.
repetition of the dispute between Kinsky and Townshend in 1729, Charles wanted it to be made clear that the approach for a reconciliation had been initiated by Britain. He therefore decided that it was best for Austria to make no reply to Harrington's approach and to wait until better terms were offered. However, the Austrians made it clear that they would welcome a British approach. Sinzendorf proposed a separate Anglo-Austrian peace to Robinson, and Stephen Kinsky made the same suggestion to Waldegrave after dinner together on August 24th.

Possibly as a result of their experience the previous year the British decided not to base their negotiations for a separate treaty on Philip Kinsky. Having gained Dutch agreement to a joint guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, Harrington instructed Robinson to begin negotiations, on the basis of the offer of such a guarantee in return for Imperial acceptance of the Spanish garrisons, and an Imperial settlement of the Ostend, Mecklenburg, East Friesland and Bremen issues to the satisfaction of Britain and the United Provinces. Negotiations were begun, both at

2 Robinson to Harrington, 15 July 1730, BL.Add.32781; Waldegrave Journal, 24 Aug. 1730, Chewton; Eugene to Kinsky, 17 June 1730, Vienna, Kinsky, Kart. 2(b).
3 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 30 Jan., 2 Feb. 1731, Dresden, 2676,1, f.148,177.
4 Chesterfield to Harrington, 29 Aug. 1730, PRO.84/307 f.1-2.
Vienna, and, between Chesterfield and the Austrian ambassador, count Sinzendorf, (the son-in-law of the Imperial Chancellor), at The Hague. The principal difficulty encountered was the Austrian refusal to entertain the idea of the Spanish garrisons\(^1\), a refusal encouraged by the Dutch willingness to envisage the compromise of garrisons comprised of Spanish and Swiss troops, in equal proportions\(^2\). On the evening of October 25th Robinson pressed Chancellor Sinzendorf to admit the garrisons, and informed him 'qu'il souhaitoit la promptitude pour asseurer toute chose avant l'ouverture du Parlement'. He also stated that Britain, in regaining the Emperor's friendship, wished to do nothing to make Spain or France an enemy. Robinson claimed that Fleury would support anything that would produce peace\(^3\). The British frequently repeated the theme that an Anglo-Austrian alliance would be useless to Britain unless Spain was satisfied over the garrisons, because, without this, Anglo-Spanish relations would collapse, and Britain would be forced to defend Gibraltar and her commercial concessions\(^4\). Thus, on November 21st, Harrington informed Chesterfield that George II would 'insist upon the execution of the Treaty of Seville with respect to the introduction of the 6,000 Spaniards, as an absolute and indispensable condition of proceeding in this negociation\(^5\).

\(^1\) Robinson to Harrington, 28 Oct., 14,18 Nov. 1730, PRO.80/69; Chesterfield to Robinson, 27 Oct. 1730, BL.Add.23780 f.306.

\(^2\) Robinson to Tilson , 18 Nov., Chesterfield to Harrington, 22 Dec. 1730, PRO.80/69, 84/309 f.154.


\(^4\) Robinson to Harrington, 18 Nov. 1730, PRO.80/69.

\(^5\) Harrington to Chesterfield, 10 Nov. (os) 1730, PRO.84/309 f.12.
The Austrian reply to the British proposals was judged unacceptable. On December 15th Harrington informed Robinson that a prompt settlement was essential both for diplomatic and for domestic political reasons. George had to know what to tell Parliament. Harrington reiterated the link between the British guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction and the admission of the Spanish garrisons,

'the King is absolutely resolved in all events to execute his engagements with Spain, in relation to the said garrisons, to which his own, and the nation's honour, as also the interests of his subjects indispensably oblige him. The being enabled to compass that end without a war is what alone can induce the King to charge himself with the Guaranty of the Empr.'s succession'.

Another issue that caused difficulties was George's demand that the 'Electoral points' should be satisfied. In December 1730 Harrington wrote that it was the,..

'. .. highest injustice that those vexations and injuries done to H.M.'s Electoral rights, and interests purely on account of differences, and animosities unhappily arisen betwixt the Empr. and the crown of Great Britain, should not, upon the renewal of the ancient good understanding and friendship betwixt those two powers, be at the same time removed, and redrest'.

Charles VI's view was different. In August he had referred

1 Harrington to Chesterfield, 4 Dec. (os) 1730, PRO.84/309 f.123; Chesterfield to Robinson, 12 Dec. 1730, BL.Add.23780 f.386. Informing Waldegrave of the Anglo-Austrian negotiations, Newcastle wrote 'I can'by no means promise that it will at last succeed', Newcastle to Waldegrave, 30 Nov. (os) 1730, BL.Add. 32770 f.139.

2 Harrington to Robinson, 4 Dec. (os) 1730, PRO.80/69; Delafaye to [Newcastle?], 5 Dec. (os) 1730, BL.Add.32770 f.213.
to George's wish to have the Mecklenburg issue settled 'à sa fantaisie'.

The Imperial answer to the British approach, conveyed by a paper given to Robinson on November 17th, was unyielding, as far as the Electoral points were concerned. Though the demanded investiture of Bremen and Verden would not seriously anger any of Austria's allies, Prussia was concerned in both the Mecklenburg and East Friesland disputes, and Russia interested in the former. The British ministry were prepared to compromise on the matter. On December 15th, when Robinson was sent the full powers to conclude a treaty, he was instructed to insist on the Electoral points. However, the following day, Harrington sent him a letter written in his own hand, 'coming from a private friend and not from a minister'. Robinson was ordered to obtain a declaration from Austria promising satisfaction of the Hanoverian demands,

'but if the Court of Vienna should obstinately refuse to give such a declaration, you will not absolutely break the treaty upon that head, but send an account of everything with all speed to England, and if you find you are not likely to agree upon those points, I believe you would not do amiss, to dispose that court to send at the same time full powers and instructions to their minister here to conclude them if possible without any loss of time'.

2 Delafaye to [Newcastle?], 5 Dec. (os) 1730, BL.Add.32770 f.212-3.
3 Harrington to Robinson, 5 Dec. (os) 1730, BL.Add.23780 f.472.
Harrington's order reflected the realisation that the Austrians were not going to yield over both the Spanish garrisons and the Electoral points. It was essential to gain Austrian consent to the first, because otherwise Spain would be alienated, but, none of Britain's allies would be offended, if the Electoral points were not pressed. However, in December, Harrington did not dare to mention this in Robinson's instructions. The situation had not changed by early February. When, on February 8th, Harrington sent Robinson a new project of a treaty, to be presented to the Emperor as an ultimatum, there was no mention, in his official instructions, of the shelving of the Electoral points. It was in a 'private and particular' letter that Harrington ordered Robinson to postpone the consideration of the Electoral points until after the treaty was signed.

It is unclear how far George II was kept in ignorance of the decision to defer the negotiation of the Electoral points. It is possible that he was aware of Harrington's secret instructions to Robinson, but did not wish, for reasons of honour or prudence, to countenance them formally. Had George chosen to defy his ministers and insist upon the Electoral points he would have found himself in a very weak position. As Chesterfield, no supporter of the Electoral points, noted, if

1 Harrington to Robinson, 28 Jan, (os) 1731, Coxe, III, 83-7.
the Austrians satisfied the British demands, 'then for reasons too obvious to mention, it will be impossible to break upon the Electoral points'. If the negotiations were to be broken off upon these points it would provide the opposition with a marvellous opportunity to attack the government for its subservience to Hanoverian interests. The *Craftsman*, in its issue of January 13th 1731, had revealed the secret of the Anglo-Austrian negotiations, and the Austrians, had the talks collapsed, would have been able to provide the opposition with material that would harm the government.

This was a serious consideration, though it could be suggested that it may not have been decisive with George II. More important probably was the knowledge that Spain and France were considering or had actually begun negotiations with the Emperor. British suspicions, already strong in the late autumn, had produced, by early 1731, a realisation that Britain was taking part in a race, with France and Spain, for an Austrian alliance. Were Austria to settle with either or both of the other powers then George would not obtain satisfaction for the Electoral points anyway. Furthermore, an Anglo-Austrian settlement that excluded these points would nevertheless assuage George's fear of an attack upon Hanover, and it can be suggested that, for George, this fear took

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1 Chesterfield to Robinson, 2 Feb. 1731, Coxe, III, 88.
3 Holzendorf to Tilson, 24 Sept. 1730, PRO.84/309 f.27.
precedence over the more specific Hanoverian demands\textsuperscript{1}.

The reasons which induced George to finally accept the postponement of the Electoral points are unclear, but the importance of this postponement is not. As Thomas Pelham noted 'the German affairs ... have been the chief clog to this negotiation'\textsuperscript{2}. It is clear that the Austrians were concerned for more than Imperial authority. The Austrians had no wish to surrender their Russian and Prussian alliances for the sake of Hanoverian interests. Whilst the British ministry, however hopeful they might be of persuading Fleury to concur in the new diplomatic arrangements, realised that they were seriously jeopardising the Anglo-French alliance and taking what was in effect 'a leap in the dark,' the Austrians were ready to take no such leap. They did not intend to abandon their allies, and, their alliance sought by Britain, France and Spain, they were in a far stronger diplomatic position, at the beginning of 1731, than the British. The British government was aware of this, and it accounted for the somewhat frenetic and anxious tone of the Harrington-Chesterfield-Robinson correspondence in the first ten weeks of 1731. Weeks slipped by, the Austrians did not yield to the British demands, the Austrian diplomatic position became stronger as the Seville alliance publicly disintegrated\textsuperscript{3} and the British ministers wondered whether they were following the correct policy.

\textsuperscript{1} Watzdorf suggested that for domestic political reasons it was thought best to settle the Electoral points in a separate treaty, Watzdorf to Augustus II, 24 Ap. 1731, Dresden, 2676,1, f.324.

\textsuperscript{2} Thomas Pelham to Waldegrave, 23 Mar, (os) 1731, Chewton; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, '12 Feb., 19 Mar. 1731, AST.LM.Ing.38. George's concern over these matters is clear, Harrington to Newcastle, 11 Dec. (os) 1730, BL.Add.32770 f.250.

\textsuperscript{3} Delafaye to Newcastle, 13 Dec. (os) 1730, BL.Add.32770 f.258.
The negotiations were not confined to the Electoral points and 'the two great views of the Guaranty, and the Introduction'¹. The Austrians suggested that George and the Czarina should reciprocally guarantee their dominions, and that George should undertake to obtain an equivalent for the Duke of Holstein-Göttorp for the lands he had lost to Denmark². George rejected both suggestions, and insisted that Anglo-Russian relations should be settled by the two powers in separate negotiations³. By rejecting the Austrian proposals George showed his determination to maintain his alliances with Sweden and Denmark. The failure to include Russia, Prussia and Holstein-Göttorp in the Treaty of Vienna was to cause major problems. Russia and Austria abandoned effectively the Holstein-Göttorp cause in the Treaty of Copenhagen of 1732. However, in 1731-33 a fatal ambivalence affected Austrian policy in the Empire and Northern Europe. The conflicting diplomatic interests of, on the one hand Prussia and Russia, and, on the other, George II, proved very difficult to reconcile. Austria tended to support Prussia and Russia, and George II was angered and confused by actual or supposed Austrian support for the Prusso-Bevern marriages, the Prussian cause in Mecklenburg, the Prusso-Russian marriage project and the negotiations for the Treaty of Copenhagen, negotiations which were kept a mystery to the British. Disputes over these issues helped to embitter Anglo-Austrian relations, and, in particular, to anger George II, so that by early 1733 the Anglo-Austrian alliance was in a

¹ 'Observations relating to the Counter Project sent from Vienna', endorsed 'sent to Ld. Chesterfield and Mr. Robinson 28 Jan. 1731', (hereafter, Observations), PRO.84/311 f.108,114.

² Chesterfield to Harrington, 19 Dec. 1730, HMC. Weston Underwood, p.244.

³ Observations, f.118-120.
parlous condition.

It is doubtful whether these difficulties could have been avoided by widening the terms of the Treaty of Vienna to include Prussian and Russian interests. The postponing of the Electoral points meant that the negotiation of differences with Prussia was put off. The British refusal to undertake to guarantee Russian possessions was understandable given the strong fears that France would attempt to gain the alliance of Sweden and Denmark. In addition, there was simply not enough time to encompass these issues in the negotiations at Vienna. The initial requirements of secrecy demanded that as few powers as possible were informed of the negotiations, and the subsequent need for speed, and, in particular, the wish of the British ministry to inform Parliament of the Treaty, helped to ensure that the Vienna talks left many issues unsettled.

The British ministry was determined to attach one important condition to their guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. They wished to include in the treaty a stipulation that the guarantee would depend upon the husbands selected for the Archduchesses,

'His Majesty is willing still that none of the Arch-Dutchesses should be married to any Prince that might give any just grounds of jealousy as to the balance of power in

1 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 15 June 1731, Dresden, 2676, II f.81.

2 'You must avoid carefully any proposal of mutual guarantees', Harrington to Rondeau, 22 June (os) 1731, PRO.91/12. By the spring of 1731 there was no doubt of French approaches to Denmark and Sweden, Harrington to Edward Finch, 5 Mar. (os) 1731, BDI. Sweden p.19.
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The Emperor felt that it was dishonourable to have his daughter's marital choice restricted in a public treaty, and it was therefore decided that a secret article should be resorted to. This article released the Maritime Powers from their obligations to the Emperor in the event of a Bourbon or Prussian marriage for Maria Theresa. It is possible to suggest that George was responsible for this article. D'Aix had noted in 1728 that George had differed from Townshend in insisting upon such a stipulation 2, and the ban on a Prussian marriage reflected the fear that Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia would be forced to convert to Catholicism in order to enable him to marry Maria Theresa. The secret article served another important function. By linking the British guarantee to an exclusion of a Bourbon marriage it restricted the possibility of the Austrians reviving an Austro-Spanish alliance based on the 1725 agreements. This possibility was not a strong one in 1731, but it could not be discounted. In the event, Maria Theresa was married to Duke Francis III of Lorraine in 1736, and her sister married his brother Charles. These marriages had been strongly advocated by George II, who had been much impressed by Francis on his visit to England in the autumn of 1731 3. In the following years George urged the Austrians to declare that the marriage of Maria Theresa and Francis would

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1 Observations, f.109; Harrington to Robinson, 14 Sept. (os) 1730, Robinson to Harrington, 16 Jan. 1731, Coxe, III, 35, 58-9. On 20 May, at a conference at Fontainbleau between British, French, Dutch and Austrian diplomats, Konigsegg 'far from making any objection to the clause of the Emperor's not disposing of the Archduchesses in such a manner as to endanger the Balance of Europe... said it would be readily agreed to', Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 June 1730, BL. Add. 32767 f.231.

2 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 9 May 1728, AST. LM. Ing.35.

3 see following page.
take place. It is interesting to note, however, that, at the time of the War of Polish Succession, the Walpole ministry advocated an Austro-Spanish marriage as a way to settle differences between the two powers. They were less concerned than George about the possibility of a future union of Spain and Austria.

3 (from previous page)
F Hennings, Und Sitzet zur Linken Hand. Franz Stephan von Lothringen (Vienna, 1961) pp.139-40; Chavigny to Belle-Isle, 5 June 1731, A G.A'.2676, No.115. George had been a supporter of the Lorraine marriage before Francis' visit to Britain.
Negotiations were complicated by the sudden death on January 20th, after a brief illness of two and a half days, of Antonio, the last Farnese Duke of Parma. He left a will announcing that his wife, Henrietta, was pregnant, and declaring her Regent for the unborn child. In the will he called upon the Pope, and the rulers of Austria, France and Spain, to protect the Regency. The hopes of the Parmese government that the major powers would delay intervention until they saw the issue of the pregnancy were disillusioned. In the last week of January twelve battalions of Austrian infantry, accompanied by some cavalry invaded, and occupied, without resistance, the towns of Parma and Piacenza. The Duchess's complaints were ignored by the Austrian commander, General Stampa. On January 31st Count Arconati Visconti wrote from Parma, 'Je m'imagine, que cete mort donnera le branle aux affaires, et que nous aurons seurement ou paix ou guerre'.


2 Visconti to [Bellanger?], 31 Jan, 1731, Münster, NB.206; Gravenitz to Zamboni, 8 Feb. 1731, Bodl. Rawl. 127 f.103; Baudrillart, IV, 71.
It was widely suspected that the Austrians would seek to block Don Carlos' right to succeed in Parma. The news of the death of the Duke and of Stampa's invasion reached Seville on February 4th, and Patino promptly told Keene that he was sure that the Austrians would never accept Carlos in Parma. Degenfeld reported from London that the news from Parma worried the ministry considerably. In order to remove the Austrians it was possible that Spain would turn to France. Rottembourg informed the Spaniards that they could not rely upon the British to get Carlos put into possession of Parma. The French and the Spaniards formally complained about the Austrian invasion. The British dithered, regretting the invasion and seeking to persuade the Spaniards that the Austrians would withdraw, and the Austrians that they must avoid provocative actions.

The invasion of Parma underlined the British need for a swift settlement with Austria. It was necessary to show the Spaniards that the Austrians were willing to accept the introduction of the troops, in order to prevent Spain heeding French suggestions of an anti-Austrian alliance. Furthermore,

1 Keene to Newcastle, 5 Feb. 1731, PRO.94/107.
2 Degenfeld to Frederick William I, 9 Feb. 1731, PRO.107/3; Chesterfield to Harrington, 14 Feb., to Tilson, 16 Feb., to Robinson, 16 Feb. 1731, Coxe, III, 9, PRO.84/311 f.109, BL.Add. 23781 f.206; Fog's Weekly Journal, 6 Feb. (os) 1731.
4 Keene to Newcastle, 9,23 Feb.1731, PRQ.94/107.
5 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 15 Feb., Newcastle to Waldegrave, 11 Feb. (os) 1731, BL.Add.32771 f.324,347.
6 Robinson to Waldegrave, 10 Feb. 1731, Chewton.
7 Holzendorf feared a French-backed Spanish invasion of Parma, Holzendorf to Tilson, 9 Feb. 1731, PRO.84/311 f.139. The Spaniards believed that Henrietta's pregnancy was imaginary, Keene to Waldegrave, 23 Feb. 1731, BL.Add. 32772 f.24.
on January 23rd the Duke of Liria, a high-placed Spanish diplomat, (who was also Waldegrave's first cousin), reached Vienna, and on January 28th, Patino's brother, the Marquis of Castellar, the Spanish ambassador to France, solemnly announced Spain's repudiation of the Treaty of Seville. The unpredictability of Spanish diplomacy, the danger of separate Spanish agreements with Austria or France, explained the British government's determination to push for Spanish garrisons rather than 'Electoral points' in the negotiations at Vienna. Castellar's declaration undermined the British ministry's claims to have secured British commerce, and, despite efforts to keep it a secret, it was exploited by the opposition in Britain.

Fortunately for the British ministry the Austrians rejected the idea of a separate treaty with Spain. The Austrians were not interested in a Spanish marriage. The Austrians, despite British pressure for speed, moved slowly towards settling the terms of a treaty. Chesterfield feared Austrian chicanery, but Robinson was accurate when he reported on March 9th, 'I have more reason to impute those difficulties to a habit in this court of turning everything to its advantage and to the satisfaction of its innate pride, than to apprehend from such artifices any insincerity in the execution of what is now fixed'.

1 Castellar's Declaration, 28 Jan. 1731, PRO.103/113; Baudrillart, IV, f.3-4.
2 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 23 Feb. 1731, Dresden, 2676,I,f.201.
5 Robinson to Harrington, 28 Mar. 1731, PRO.80/73 f.57; Robinson to Waldegrave, 25 June 1731, Chewton.
6 Robinson to Harrington, 9 Mar. 1731, PRO.80/72 f.53.
A week later the treaty was signed. Britain, Austria and the United Provinces mutually guaranteed each others' territories, rights and immunities against attack. Britain and the United Provinces guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction with a secret proviso relating to a Bourbon or Prussian marriage for Maria Theresa. As security for Don Carlos' succession to Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany, 6,000 Spanish troops were to be immediately admitted. The Ostend Company was to be permanently suppressed, and the Emperor promised to satisfy the Dutch over East Friesland, as far as was consistent with Imperial justice. Two widely reported secret clauses that were not in fact in the treaty were an agreement to compel France and Spain, by force if necessary, to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, and a British undertaking to pay Austria the equivalent of the subsidies owed her by Spain under the first Treaty of Vienna.

In the following month, George and the Emperor reached a compromise agreement on the 'Electoral points'. The Emperor refused to give way over Mecklenburg, but George was granted the investitures of Bremen and Verden. The Mecklenburg issue continued to complicate relations with Austria over the next few years, but given the Austrian wish to maintain the Prussian alliance, a desire fortified in late 1731 by suspicions of a French-backed alliance of Saxony and

1 Copy of treaty, PRO.103/113; 'Stipulations about ye Garrisons in Tuscany and Parma in the Quadruple Alliance, Treaty of Seville, Treaty of Vienna', anon, undated memorandum, PRO. 103/113. The treaty was ratified by George on 9 April and by Charles VI on 21 April.

Bavaria, it was unrealistic to hope that Austria would satisfy George over Mecklenburg.

The treaty was proclaimed in Britain as a triumph for British diplomacy. The Flying Post or Post Master printed a poem by Joshuan Nun praising the true patriot, Sir Robert Walpole,

...'the Great Patriot whose propitious care, 
Averts the Horrors of all wasting War,
And bids our Isle with peaceful Pleasure crown'd 
Command the Wonder of the World around'.

More prosaic ministerial writers asserted that Walpole had brought peace to Europe and secured British national interests. Opposition claims that the government was guilty of inconsistency in now proclaiming the virtues of an alliance with a power, Austria, which had been treated as a threat for the previous six years, were dismissed. The Craftsman claimed that the government's new alliance had been negotiated as a result of the newspaper's call for an Austrian alliance, but it also asserted that the only proper alliance with Austria was an 'equal' one, not one that sacrificed British interests to those of Hanover. The government press denied that such a sacrifice had taken place.

Whatever the importance for the future of the press debate about the Austrian alliance it in fact took second

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1 Newcastle referred to 'the honour and credit which our Royal Master has so justly acquired, by having singly given peace to all Europe', Newcastle to Waldegrave, 26 Mar. (os) 1731, BL.Add.32772 f.113-4.

place in the spring of 1731 to the government's attempts to
counter opposition charges that their foolish diplomacy had
only served to unite France and Spain. The opposition chose,
thus, not to attack the new Austrian alliance, but rather
to claim that incompetent diplomacy had served to create a
Bourbon pact. The ministry claimed that Spain would accede
to the new treaty\(^1\), and France accept it. The opposition
challenged both these contestations\(^2\). Castellar's declaration
and the new Spanish fortifications near Gibraltar provided
grounds for public scepticism from January 1731. The events
of the following six months were to provide more material
for the opposition press, for far from being a triumphant
diplomatic success the Second Treaty of Vienna threw Anglo-
Spanish relations into total confusion, and produced in the
summer of 1731 an Anglo-French war-scare that has been over-
looked by historians. The Second Treaty of Vienna was to be
a failure in the end, and in the short-term it produced a
very difficult diplomatic situation for the British government.
However, in the circumstances of 1730-1 there had been no
sensible alternative.

\(^{1}\) Newcastle to Waldegrave, 15 Mar. (os)\(^{1}\)731, BL.Add.32772 f.66;
Broglie reported that the British government, despite public
protestations to the contrary, was very fearful that Spain
would not accede, Broglie to Chauvelin, 9 Ap. 1731, BL.Add.
32772 f.254.

\(^{2}\) Broglie to Chauvelin, 9 Ap. 1731, BL.Add.32772 f.255.
...our treaty with the Empr. It is I think as we can wish, and puts us above both our foreign and domestick ennemies, you cannot imagine what satisfaction it is here, and is universally thought so good, that people will have it, we must have given more for it than we own. The Empr. has certainly done handsomely ... Spain must be pleased .... it is the general opinion that both the card. and the Garde de Sceaux will in their hearts be glad of it, however they may pretend the contrary.\(^1\)

The British ministry failed to appreciate how their new alliance would be received in Europe. They were inaccurate in their supposition that French anger would be but superficial and that the French would accommodate themselves to the new settlement\(^2\). British attempts to excuse their action to Fleury met with rebukes. Fleury had little time for the efforts of Horatio Walpole and Waldegrave to argue that the new treaty simply ensured the provisions of that of Seville.

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\(^1\) Newcastle to Waldegrave, 1 Ap (os) 1731, Chewton.

\(^2\) Delafaye to Waldegrave, 30 Nov. (os) 1730, Robinson to Waldegrave, 31 Mar, 1731, Chewton; Waldegrave to Newcastle, 15 Feb., Waldegrave to Keene, 1 May 1731, BL.Add.32771 f.316-8, 32772 f.334; Villars, 19 Ap. 1731, pp.313-4.
Suspecting secret anti-French articles in the new treaty, the French attacked British duplicity. Chauvelin wrote to Chammorel that 'les coups d'infidélité ne sont pas un crime aux yeux de la nation, dans laquelle nous vivons'.

The French ministry had no intention of subscribing to any scheme that entailed the guaranteeing of the Pragmatic Sanction, and it made a determined effort to prevent Spain acceding to the new treaty, and to build up a party in the Empire and the Baltic pledged to resist the Pragmatic Sanction and Austrian power. Within a few months British diplomats were complaining of French activities in Spain, the United Provinces, the Empire and Scandinavia. The British ministry responded to these complaints, and urged the Austrians to take all steps possible to defeat French projects. By the summer of 1731 the British realised that it would be totally impossible to reconcile the French to their new scheme. Suppositions based on Fleury’s supposedly pacific dispositions were replaced by anxiety about French policy.

Plumb wrote of the Spanish response, 'Elizabeth Farnese and her husband greeted this treaty with delight and joined it with surprising alacrity'. This statement is inaccurate, and historians have done less than justice to the difficulties that affected Anglo-Spanish relations in the first half of 1731. The British ministry were to be proved wrong in their

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2 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 10 Ap. 1731, AE.CP.Ang.Sup.8 f.196.

3 Baudrillart, IV, 72-3, 86-91.

4 Plumb, p.229.
view that Spain would accept the new treaty without hesitation. Sir Robert Walpole informed Parliament in February that 'there was nothing negotiated with the Emperor but with a compréhension of Spain's interest and to effectuate the admission of Don Carlos into Italy, according to the plan of the Seville Treaty'.

However, as Chauvelin commented sardonically the following month, 'Les Walpoles vont beaucoup s'applaudir, même avant qu'on sache quel parti prendra l'Esp. '... British attempts to gain a speedy Spanish accession to the new treaty were defeated by the quixotic character of the Spanish government. The personal views of Philip V were a major difficulty, as, in the spring of 1731 at any rate, he had no wish to harm the interests of his native country, France. Furthermore, the perpetually imminent succession crisis that so confused Spanish court politics in the 1720s and 1730s was of great importance in this period. The eccentric lifestyle of Philip V, and, in particular, his irregular hours and disinclination to sleep, led to fears for his life. Some envoys, such

2 Egmont, 23 Feb. (os) 1731, I, 146.
3 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 26 Mar. 1731, AE.CP.Ang Supp. 8 f.195.
4 Information from the Sicilian Abbé enclosed in Waldegrave to Newcastle, 29 Mar. 1731, BL.Add.32772 f.96.
5 Keene to Newcastle, 11 May 1731, PRO.94/107.
6 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 13,20 Ap., 11,25 May, 1 June 1731, AN.AM. B 307; Baudrillart,IV, 73-4, 84-5.
as the Sardinian Marquis D'Arvillars took to cultivating his eldest son, the Prince of Asturias, (the future Ferdinand VI), who was believed to have little interest in his stepmother's Italian aspirations, and whose accession, it was believed, would undo all the British efforts. In this situation the diplomatic approaches of the British and French envoys, Keene and Rottembourg, were met with delay and prevarication. The French consul-general, D'Aubenton, reported on April 6th,

'L'on continue icy a ne vouloir prendre aucune sorte de party, ny faire de response sur les propositions que l'on y a faites.'

This refusal to accept their propositions was accompanied by two moves that disturbed the British, the continuation of the negotiations of the Duke of Liria, and the exacerbation of Anglo-Spanish relations by acts of hostility. Liria pressed the Austrians to sign an Austro-Spanish alliance that would exclude Britain, and demanded an archduchess for Don Carlos. The Austrians rejected Liria's proposals, but, as the British ministry realised, the success of their attempts to have the commercial clauses of the Treaty of Seville renewed, depended on the success of Liria's negotiations. On May 11th Keene informed Delafaye,

'if they could come at Parma by the Emperor's means, without us, there is no doubt but they would refuse to renew our Treatys of commerce and particularly that of Assiento, which Patino looks upon as the ruin of the Indies.'

1 D'Arvillars to Charles Emmanuel III, 1 May, 15 June 1731, AST.LM.Spagna, 63.
3 Keene to Newcastle, 14 Aug. 1731, PRO.94/108.
4 Keene to Delafaye, 11 May 1731, PRO.94/107.
Threatening Spanish moves near Gibraltar which had preceded the Second Treaty of Vienna did not cease with its signature. In December 1730 new Spanish emplacements near Gibraltar were constructed, and the Spaniards threatened to dominate part of the Bay of Gibraltar with their artillery. This development attracted much press comment in Britain. Fears were expressed that Gibraltar would be closely blockaded or attacked. Pulteney contrasted the British wooing of Spain and the Spanish threat to Gibraltar. On May 2nd Keene wrote to Waldegrave,

'Mr Rottembourg tells me he hears from France that the affair of Gibraltar makes great noise in England, and that I am to have very strong orders to execute upon it which they imagine will finish our negotiations with Spain.'

The Commander of the Gibraltar garrison was told to prepare against a possible Spanish attack; the British factory in Cadiz was warned that war was a possibility. Maritime insurance on ships trading with Spain rose considerably.

1 Gastaldi to the Senate of Genoa, 8 Jan. 1731, AS. Genoa, LM. Ing.11; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 30 Nov. (os), 21 Dec. 1730, Chewton; Waldegrave to Newcastle, 2 Jan. 1731, BL. Add.32770 f.281.


3 Dayrolle to Tilson, 29 May 1731, PRO.84/317 f.117; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 11 June 1731, AST.LM.Ing.38.

4 Pulteney to Colman, 12 June (os) 1731, G.Colman (ed) Posthumous Letters pp.32-3.

5 Keene to Waldegrave, 2 May 1731, BL.Add.32772 f.388.

6 Keene to Newcastle, 2 May 1731, PRO.94/107; Cayley to Newcastle, 8 May 1731, PRO.94/219.

7 Wye's Letter, 22 May (os) 1731.
The British merchantmen in the Bay of Cadiz left in May in order to avoid possible expropriation. Alicante was similarly abandoned. A report circulated that the Spanish ministry had ordered their governors in the West Indies to prevent all further trade with Britain. The Daily Post Boy announced the success of Rottembourg, and reports circulated of the disgrace of Elizabeth Farnese and the rise to power of the Prince of the Asturias. Spain was reported as being opposed to the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and as demanding the return of Gibraltar. Some commentators reported that the major British naval preparations of this period were intended to cajole Spain into acceding to the new treaty or to protect British trade in the West Indies from Spanish attack. Waldegrave reported on June 12th that it was believed in Paris that the British had ordered the immediate return of the 'annual ship' of the South Sea Company, and had sent instructions to Admiral Stewart in the West Indies to prepare for action. The Sicilian priests, Waldegrave's informants on Spanish affairs, informed him that Castelar had reported

1 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 11,18 May 1731, AN.AM.B7307; Watzdorf to Augustus II, 29 June 1731, Dresden, 2676,2,f.103; Evening Post 27 May (os) 1731.
2 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 25 May 1731, AN.AM.B7307.
3 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 25 May 1731, AN.AM.B7307.
4 Daily Post Boy 26 May (os) 1731; Watzdorf to Augustus II, 29 May 1731, Dresden, 2676, 2, f.51.
5 Daily Post Boy 28,31 May (os) 1731.
6 Daily Post Boy 1 June (os) 1731; Newcastle to Keene, 31 May (os) 1731, BL.Add.32773 f.27; Solaro di Breglio to Charles Emmanuel III, 26 May 1730, AST.LM. Aut.61.
7 Daily Post Boy 31 May (os) 1731.
that the British fleet was being prepared in order to intercept the galleons¹.

The British ministry were very anxious about Spanish intentions. Newcastle referred to the behaviour of the Spanish court as 'very extraordinary', and Robinson thought it 'very unaccountable'. Harrington noted, 'there is no forming any sure judgement upon the future conduct of so capricious a court as that of Spain ....', and he was to reiterate this theme on several occasions². This view was shared by British diplomats³. The prospect of a Bourbon alliance worried the ministry. Such a development would be harmful domestically, and dangerous diplomatically. On May 25th Harrington referred to 'France, who by such a union will be enabled to keep the affairs of Europe in a continual state of agitation and uncertainty, and perhaps bring on a general war...⁴

The tense situation in international affairs was made appreciably worse by the simultaneous arming of the British, French and Spanish fleets, and by a burst of reports about possible Jacobite action. The British ministry noted an upsurge of Jacobite activity, and received reports that James III had travelled secretly to France and met Louis XV

¹ Waldegrave to Newcastle, 12 June 1731, BL.Add.32773 f.12.
² Newcastle to Waldegrave, 7 May (os), Robinson to Harrington, 4 Ap. 1731, BL.Add.32772 f.407,263; Harrington to Robinson, 14 May (os), 18 June 1731, PRO.80/74, 80/75.
³ Chesterfield to Tilson, 27 Mar, 1731, PRO.84/312 f.53; Thomas Pelham to Delafaye, 23 May 1731, PRO.78/198 f.23; Keene to Delafaye, 7 June 1731, PRO.94/107.
⁴ Harrington to Robinson, 14 May (os) 1731, PRO.80/74.
and Fleury. Fears were expressed that France would support the Jacobites. British envoys were ordered to keep a close watch on Jacobite activities. On April 12th Newcastle wrote to Waldegrave, 'It is certain the Jacobites begin to conceive hopes of France, and thereupon the greatest attention imaginable should be given to that'. Waldegrave was sceptical about the chances of French aid, but his scepticism had little effect upon Newcastle. In fact, though James III did leave Rome, it was in order to visit Naples, and on June 2nd Waldegrave was able to assure Newcastle that Fleury had refused a Jacobite request for James to be given permission to visit France. Concern about possible Bourbon support for the Jacobites helped to increase ministerial concern about European developments, and, in particular, about Bourbon naval preparations.

Spanish preparations against Gibraltar and Spanish naval armaments were less of a military threat than French preparations. The Spaniards were greatly hindered by a lack of sailors, and, despite Patino's attempts to improve the Spanish

1 Chesterfield to --, 10 Ap., Colman to Waldegrave, 26 May 1731, Chewton; Chesterfield to Harrington, 10 Ap. 1731, PRO.84/312 f.83; Dayrolle to Tilson, 29 May 1731, PRO.84/317 f.117. Newcastle complained of Broglie 'having more than once said, talking of his own court, upon what has lately happened, qu'on n'avoir qu'a jouer le Pretendant', Newcastle to Waldegrave, 1 Ap. (os) 1731, Broglie to Chauvelin, 9 Ap. 1731, BL.Add.32272 f.193,255.


4 Allen, British Consul in Naples, to Newcastle, 25 May 1731, PRO.93/5 f.154; DeBrais to Augustus II, 18 June 1731, Dresden, 2735, 3 f.175.

5 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 2 June 1731, BL.Add.32772 f.486.
navy, it was still far from being a formidable force. Concern about French preparations had been expressed since April\(^1\). On May 5th Newcastle ordered Waldegrave to send spies to the French naval bases at Toulon, Brest, Port Louis and Rochefort to report on the condition of the French ships and arsenals and to ascertain whether the French were making any naval preparations\(^2\). Waldegrave's reply was far from alarmist. He reported the armament of a squadron of six or seven ships of the line at Toulon, and noted, 'this expedition is said to be chiefly intended for the instruction of the young seamen, and .... to awe the petty princes on the coast of Barbary'. Five weeks later Waldegrave, in denying the validity of reports of a French naval threat and of the capacity of the Toulon Squadron to support the Jacobites, informed Newcastle that the squadron consisted of only five ships of the line and one frigate, and he noted of the reports, 'I am almost ashamed to write such idle stuff'\(^3\).

Waldegrave was one of the very few diplomats not to be affected by the war hysteria of the summer of 1731, and his assurances were not believed. The British ministry was convinced that the French were arming a large fleet\(^4\). They were aware that their own armaments, intended to produce a squadron to escort the 6,000 Spanish troops to Leghorn, were viewed with concern in Spain and France\(^5\). On May 24th

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1 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 13 July 1731, Dresden, 2676,2, f.123.
3 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 16 May, 25,16 June 1731, BL.Add 32772 f.395, 168-9, 147.
4 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 29 May 1731, Dresden, 2676,2, f.49.
5 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 29 May 1731, Dresden, 2676,2, f.49.
Newcastle instructed Waldegrave to assure the French that the British squadron was only intended to aid the peaceful introduction of the Spanish garrisons. These assurances failed to quell French anxiety. The French were suspicious of the size and intended destination of the British fleet, and, as Waldegrave noted, believed 'the augmentation much greater than it is'.

Speculation over the destination of the British fleet varied greatly. It was to intercept the Spanish galleons, seize a base in Cuba, challenge the French possession of St Lucia, destroy the Spanish emplacements near Gibraltar, seize the Isle d'Origny, prevent the junction of the French and Spanish navies, or destroy the harbour at Dunkirk.

1 Newcastle to Waldegrave, 13 May (os) 1731, BL.Add.32772 f.463.
2 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 12,16 June 1731, BL.Add.32773 f.12, 147; Chauvelin to Chammorel, 17 June 1731, AE.CP.Ang.sup.8 f.213; Marquis D'Asfeld, French general, to Dangervilliers, French Secretary of State for War, 6,8 July 1731, AG.A 1.2676, Nos.182, 185.
3 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 16 June 1731, BL.Add.32773 f.147.
4 Anonymous, undated memorandum filed in French military records of the period, AG.A 1.2676, No.217.
6 Origny was an island 3 leagues off Cape La Hague from where it was feared Britain would be able to interfere with French coastal commerce, Chevalier de Caligny to --, 11 June 1731, AE.CP.Ang.374 f.36.
7 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 4 June 1731, AE.CP.Ang.374 f.27.
8 D'Aubenton reported that the Spaniards feared an attack on Spanish America, D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 1 June 1731, AN.AM.B 7 307.
In this situation of fear and uncertainty, the news of a French military build-up along the Channel coast proved explosive. On June 18th, fearing a British attack upon Dunkirk, the French Secretary of State for War, Dangervilliers, ordered the Marquis D'Asfeld to ascertain the British intentions and take defensive precautions. A substantial force of French troops was ordered to march towards Dunkirk, Gravelines and Furnes. These moves alarmed the British ministry. On July 10th Harrington informed Robinson of these moves and ordered him to secure a promise of Austrian assistance in the event of need. On the following day the Privy Council met in Whitehall. Grafton, Devonshire, Godolphin, Wilmington, Scarborough, Bolton, Newcastle, Harrington, Sir Robert Walpole and Sir William Strickland, the Secretary at War, discussed 'a design intended by France to make some attempt here'. They decided that an invasion was a possibility and ordered that a squadron should be assembled in the Downs. Orders were sent to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to make preparations for sending troops to Britain. Troops were moved from London to the Kent and Sussex coasts, and by the end of July

1 Waldegrave to Delafaye, 16 July 1731, PRO.78/199 f.203; DeBrais to Augustus II, 25 June 1731, Dresden, 2735.3 f.203. Waldegrave blamed Dangervilliers for the crisis, and suggested that Chauvelin, Maurepas and Dangervilliers were imposing their views upon Fleury, Waldegrave to Delafaye, 30 July 1731, PRO.78/199 f.213.

2 Maffei to Charles Emmanuel III, 9 July 1731, AST.LM. Francia 166.

3 Harrington to Robinson, 29 June (os) 1731, PRO.80/75. The United Provinces were also asked, Harrington to Chesterfield, 29 June (os) 1731, PRO.84/313 f.160.

4 Minutes of the Privy Council, 30 June (os) 1731, PRO.36/23 f.184.
most of the army then in England had been deployed along or near those coasts.

The British preparations in turn upset the French and contributed to the exacerbation of the situation. Reports circulated that the British had landed troops near Dunkirk and bombarded the town. At the same time, it was widely believed that the French were considering military action in the Empire. German newspapers claimed that the French intended to seize Luxembourg whilst the British press reported French military preparations near Metz and the hasty stocking of French magazines in French Flanders. Frederick William I feared that war would break out.

The war-panic was strongest in Dunkirk, the source of many inaccurate reports, and London. Ossorio noted that the French military moves 'allarme extraordinarement toute la nation'. It also caused a fall in the stock market. When they received reports that no troops had been embarked on the British fleet, the French realised that no attack upon

1 Peter Wentworth to Strafford, 1 July (os) 1731, BL.Add.22227 f.109; Le Beau to Ségent, 12 July 1731, AG.A.1.2676, No.193; Gastaldi to the Senate of Genoa,12 July, 1731, ASG.LM.Ing.11; Zamboni to the Duke of Modena, 13 July 1731, ASM.LM.Ing.19; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 16 July 1731, AST.LM.Ing.38.

2 Lascelles to Waldegrave, 4 July 1731, BL.Add.32773 f.351-2; Daily Post Boy 9 July (os) 1731.


4 Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 16 July 1731, AST.LM.Ing.38.

5 York Courant 6 July (os) 1731.
Dunkirk was envisaged\(^1\). The march of many of the troops ordered to Dunkirk was countermanded\(^2\), and the French assured the British that the reason for the concentration of troops near the coast was the need to find new areas of pasture for the cavalry\(^3\). The British did not withdraw their troops from the coast for some time\(^4\), but the countermanding of the march of most of the French regiments reassured the government. On August 17th the Ferrett sloop was sent to inspect the French ports from Dunkirk and Le Havre. Captain Smith reported on the 23rd that he had found only ordinary merchantmen in the ports, and no signs of naval or military movements\(^5\).

The war panic had not prevented the desired Spanish accession to the new treaty\(^6\). On July 22nd at Vienna the representatives of Britain, Spain and the Emperor signed an agreement recognising

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\(^1\) Waldegrave to Delafaye, 6 July 1731, PRO.78/199 f.197.

\(^2\) DeBrais to Augustus II, 9 July 1731, Dresden, 2735,III f.214.

\(^3\) Zamboni to Lagnasco, Saxon envoy in Vienna, 17 July 1731, Dresden, 637 f.108; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 9 July (os) 1731; PRO.78/199 f.199.

\(^4\) Watzdorff to Augustus II, 20 July 1731, Dresden, 2676,II f.140. The Guards were recalled from Rochester at the end of August.

\(^5\) Smith to Burchett, the Secretary of the Admiralty, 12 Aug. (os) 1731, PRO.42/20 f.498.

\(^6\) Rottembourg informed Patino that British fears of France would prevent the dispatch of a fleet to the Mediterranéan, an allegation denied by Keene, Keene to Newcastle, 3 Aug, 1731, PRO.94/108.
Spain's acceptance of the provisions of the Second Treaty of Vienna. Three days later, at Florence, the Spanish and Tuscan representatives signed a treaty which recognised Don Carlos as the heir to Tuscany. The new diplomatic alignment was symbolised by two journeys in the autumn. Francis of Lorraine arrived in England in October, and, in a tour that took him to London, Newmarket, Euston and Houghton, made an excellent impression upon the British court and ministry. Further south, Admiral Wager was very well received by Philip V and Elisabeth Farnese, and then convoyed the Spanish troops to Leghorn. The Parma pregnancy having proved a sham, Don Carlos established his court in Parma. France appeared humiliated, isolated diplomatically and harmed internally by constitutional and religious disputes.

The war-panic of the summer of 1731 may not, therefore, appear particularly important. Indeed, historians concerned to summarise the overwhelming mass of diplomatic developments in this period, can be forgiven for ignoring what might appear to have been an inconsequential event. Such a conclusion is inaccurate as the impact of the war-panic was probably of considerable importance for Anglo-French relations. It can be suggested that it played a role in worsening relations between the two powers, and helped to prevent the possibility of a British approach aimed at ascertaining the terms upon which France would agree to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction.

1 Copy of Treaty, PRO. 103/113; Pribram, Osterreichische Staatsverträge pp. 517-26; 'An account of what passed at Vienna relative to the Introduction of the Spanish Garrisons etc.', Mar.-Nov. 1731, PRO. 103/113; Baudrillart, IV, 103.

2 Baudrillart, IV, 103-4.

3 Delafaye to Waldegrave, 23 Aug. (OS) 1731, Chewton. Keene to Delafaye, 23 Aug. 1731, PRO. 94/108.
On July 30th Poyntz wrote to Waldegrave, 'The late alarm between us and France has astonished me above all the strange things I ever saw happen. I was in Norfolk when it first took rise, and had asserted to Ld. T. (who seemed to apprehend something of this kind) that during the Card.'s life, and our own inoffensive disposition at home, nothing of this kind could ever befall us; but upon coming back I found we have had secret intelligencers who - if I don't mistake had been infusing jealousys of us into the cardinal, and afterwards had been playing the same game here with regard to us'.

The identity or existence of these 'secret intelligencers' is unclear. Equally unclear are the views of the individual British ministers about the crisis. Chammorel claimed that, 'c'est le Roy d'Angleterre qui a voulu absolument que l'on fist tous les mouvements', whilst Zamboni asserted that, 'Le Comte Kinsky, qui assiste à la plupart des conferences de ces Ministres a principalement contribué que la cour d'Angleterre se determine à prendre les mesures qu'elle vient de prendre par raport à la marche des troupes, et à faire equiper d'autres vaisseaux'.

It is impossible to ascertain the truth of these remarks. If George II and/or Kinsky were responsible for the British moves it is necessary to consider whether they did so as a result of fears that France would invade, or because they wished to see a deterioration in Anglo-French relations. Possibly George wished to convince Austria that Britain was a powerful ally capable of a strong military response to provocation.

1 Poyntz to Waldegrave, 19 July(OS)1731, Chewton.
2 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 19 July 1731, AE.CP.Ang.374 f.91; Zamboni to the Marquis de Fleury, 13 July 1731. Bodl.Rawl.120.
In 1731 the possibility of Britain using the Vienna Treaty as a stepping stone for a European peace, of Britain persuading France to assent to the new arrangements, was lost. Possibly such an attempt would have failed, defeated by Chauvelin and by French unwillingness to accept a dictated settlement. However, without French consent no European peace settlement could be secure or long-lasting. Whilst France was isolated, her diplomatic efforts, such as the attempt to gain the alliance of Sweden and Denmark or the attempt to prevent the Imperial Diet accepting the Pragmatic Sanction, could be defeated. As soon as France could gain allies, as in late 1733 when she formed alliances with Spain and Sardinia, she was to prove a major threat.

The basis for any French accession to the Anglo-Austrian agreement was assumed to be a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. France was unwilling to provide such a guarantee but the eventual solution that was to be produced by the Third Treaty of Vienna, the acquisition of Lorraine, in return for the guarantee, had already been considered in the late 1720's and early 1730's. Should Maria Theresa marry Francis of Lorraine, the dynastic union of Lorraine and Austria would become a strong possibility. France could not be expected to accept this. Indeed, in June 1731, Count Toerring argued that an agreement over Lorraine was essential for the peace of Europe. Unfortunately, the legacy of Anglo-French bitterness dating from the spring and summer of 1731, ensured that

1 Villars, 27 May 1731, p.320.
2 Boye, Un roi de Pologne p.334.
3 Toerring to Plettenberg, 21 June 1731, Münster, NA.148.
4 Delafaye had hoped that the war-panic would only prove to be 'ye falling out of lovers', and he urged a policy of 'Forget and Forgive', Delafaye to Waldegrave, 9 July(OS)1731, PRO.78/199 f.199.
whilst Britain had pressed Austria to satisfy Spain and accept the introduction of the Spanish garrisons, she was unwilling to press Austria to satisfy France by the cession of Lorraine. Possibly the effort would have met with Austrian refusal, but the failure to make it was to have serious consequences. When the British ministry attempted to use its good offices to end the Polish Succession War, the absence of any substance underlying the assurances of regard exchanged by Horatio Walpole and Fleury was to defeat the attempt. France and Austria were to settle their differences, including the Lorraine question and the French guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, without Britain, and the British were to be consigned to diplomatic isolation in the second half of the 1730's.
Conclusion

In British politics the most important developments in the period 1727-1731 were the accession of George II, his decision to retain most of his father's ministers, the development of a working relationship between king and ministers, and the fall of Townshend. Compared to these events the activities of the Pulteney-Bolingbroke opposition, in both Parliament and the press appear of lesser importance. Foreign policy was of great importance in these political developments. Issues of foreign policy provided much of the currency of political debate in the Council, in Parliament and in the press. An examination of these issues can serve to elucidate some of the divisions within the ministry, but much still remains obscure. In particular, the exact impact of differences over foreign policy upon the dispute between Sir Robert Walpole and Townshend is unclear. This study has cast light upon the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics, but much has been left in darkness. The destruction of archival material and the attitudes of several manuscript owners are partly responsible for this; but the nature of politics in this period is a more significant factor. Much material survives about party disputes and it is relatively easy to undertake a study of parliamentary or press conflict. In these conflicts issues were publicly debated. This was not the case with divisions within the court or ministry, or between the king and his ministers. These disputes were
conducted within a small group where everybody knew everybody else and where opportunities for meeting were frequent. Issues were debated face to face, and conversations took the place of memoranda. There was no institution that recorded the audiences ministers had with the king, and there is no equivalent for the British council of the records of the Austrian Privy Conference. In the latter case the views of the individual ministers were recorded separately. Distinguishing the views of George II is not easy and it is no accident that historians have hitherto neglected George as the subject of a full-length biography. Little of his private correspondence has survived. In the official instructions to British diplomats, George's own ideas are invariably hopelessly intertwined with those of his ministers.

This study has indicated some areas in which the king's views can be reasonably asserted, but it has not proved possible to state definitively what George's attitudes and achievements were for more than a few issues. Equally, it has proved possible to cast light on only some of the aspects of British foreign policy in this period that were previously neglected. The discussions about the possibility of an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation have been rescued from an undeserved obscurity. An attempt has been made to indicate the importance of Hanoverian vulnerability in Anglo-French and Anglo-Austrian relations. The fragility of the Anglo-French alliance in the late 1720s has been stressed. However, much is still unclear about Anglo-Austrian relations in the late 1720s and it is still difficult to determine what led the British

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ministry to approach Austria in the late summer of 1730. The influence of Sir Robert Walpole upon British foreign policy in this period is nearly as difficult to determine as that of the king.

The value of this study therefore lies not so much in the answers it provides as in the questions it raises. It can be seen that the usual view of British foreign policy in this period, of Britain firmly behind the Anglo-French alliance until the summer of 1730, is inaccurate. The customary view, that of Townshend's anti-Austrian policy being replaced by Walpole's pro-Austrian schemes, is not supported by the evidence. Rather this study suggests that policy was far more complex and confused, that ministers were less fixed in their opinions than has been appreciated, and that the distinct administrative machinery for the formulation and execution of foreign policy was of less significance than the views and actions of individuals: George and his ministers. This highlights the uncertainty over the fall of Townshend, and raises the question of George's influence. Both of these questions still require study if British foreign policy and British politics in this period are to be understood.
Epilogue

The diplomatic development of the period up to the fall of Walpole in 1742 casts some light upon British foreign policy in the period 1727-1731. Despite much diplomatic effort Britain's attempt to use her good offices to end the War of the Polish Succession of 1733-35 failed. The terms of the treaty ending the war, that of Vienna, were not communicated to Britain. The new diplomatic configuration produced by this treaty, the Austro-French alliance that lasted until 1741, ignored British and Hanoverian interests. Austria and France attempted to settle many of the outstanding European problems, such as the Jülich-Berg dispute, without heeding British views. The British ministry retorted by considering alliances with Prussia and Russia. Discussions about the possibility of an Anglo-Prussian alliance having failed in 1735 and 1736, George II and the British ministry pinned their hopes upon Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia. They were to be swiftly disabused when he came to the throne but it is important to note that a conviction that his accession would produce an alliance led the British ministry to assume in the late 1730's that their diplomatic isolation would only be temporary. In late 1738 the British government launched a diplomatic initiative intended to produce an Anglo-Russian treaty. Though such a treaty was not signed until April 1741, this was due to Russian, rather than British, obstinacy.

It is thus clear that far from welcoming diplomatic isolation and seeking to cut itself off from the problems of Europe, the Walpole ministry sought to replace the French alliance that had failed in 1730 by an Austrian alliance and, after this had run into major difficulties in 1732 and finally collapsed in 1733-4, by an attempt to win the support of Prussia and/or Russia. This suggests that it would be inaccurate to argue that British foreign policy became isolationist after Townshend fell.¹ Whatever the views of the principal ministers, British foreign policy was committed to involvement in continental developments, by royal interests, by concern for the

1. This was suggested by Dunthorne, p. 237, and Lodge, review of Vaucher, Robert Walpole, EHR, 40 (1925) p. 440.
security of Hanover, and by treaty obligations. Hanoverian security was to remain a major problem throughout the period of the Walpole ministry. It complicated Anglo-Prussian relations in the Mid-1730's and early 1740's just as it had embittered them in the late 1720's. The possibility of Prussia attacking Hanover affected George II's stance in the War of the Polish Succession. The threats by Prussia and France to attack Hanover in 1741 produced the Hanoverian neutrality that so harmed the Walpole ministry, both domestically and diplomatically, in its last months. Thus, the Hanoverian issue continued to remain a problem. However successful Walpole might have been in persuading George II, in the Spring of 1731, to shelve temporarily the 'Electoral points', he did not succeed in preventing similar points from complicating British foreign policy in the subsequent decade. This continuity puts into perspective the supposed changes produced in 1730 by the fall of Townshend and the collapse of the Anglo-French alliance. The failure of the Hotham mission, combined with the continued importance of Hanoverian interests, condemned Anglo-Prussian relations to hostility throughout the 1730's, and this drastically limited the freedom of manoeuvre enjoyed by the British ministry in its foreign policy. Whilst the fall of Townshend was followed by an attempt at a reconciliation with Austria, no such attempt was made in the case of Prussia. George II's views dominated Anglo-Prussian relations to their detriment.

Walpole's ministry ended in war, the Anglo-Spanish conflict that began in 1739, and the War of the Austrian Succession that began with Frederick the Great's invasion of Silesia at the end of 1740. The Anglo-Spanish war was in no way inevitable. The issues at stake were not new, and Anglo-Spanish negotiations succeeded in resolving most of them by the convention of the Pardo signed in January 1739. The war that commenced that autumn was not 'necessary' in diplomatic terms. Room for negotiation remained. War was brought about by the political weakness of the Walpole ministry. Had the ministry been united there would probably have been no war, but the ambivalent attitude of many leading ministers, such as Newcastle, weakened the ministry to a fatal degree. It is interesting to contrast the events of 1739 with those of 1729. In 1729 the ministry had also been split over war with Spain, but the timing of the crisis had been different. Whereas in
1729 the issue was most serious in the summer, in 1739 it coincided with the parliamentary session. In 1729 the opposition had planned to use the issue of Anglo-Spanish relations as the basis for their attack upon the ministry in the 1730 parliamentary session. They had been pre-empted by the Treaty of Seville, whilst the ministers who had sought naval action against Spain were prevented from this by Townshend's skilful tactics. In both 1729-1730, and 1738-1739 British foreign policy was greatly affected by domestic political pressure. In the former case the ministry responded to it by linking the satisfaction of British mercantile complaints to the introduction of the Spanish garrisons and by breaking with a French ministry whose policies were creating parliamentary difficulties in London. In the latter case the room for manoeuvre was smaller. Spanish acquiescence in British commercial demands could not be purchased by British support for Spanish claims in Italy. Such claims still existed in the late 1730's. Elizabeth Farnese wished to reverse the territorial settlement of the Third Treaty of Vienna and to establish her second son, Don Philip, in Parma. However, the Austro-French alliance made such aspirations hopeless, and they could not be pursued until the alliance disintegrated in the opening stages of the War of the Austrian Succession. It was this alliance, supported so ardently by Bartenstein and Fleury, that 'circumscribed' Britain's diplomatic position in the period 1735-41, and it prevented a solution to Anglo-Spanish disputes by the methods utilised in 1729.

Whether it would have been wise to win Spanish support by promising aid in Italy is a different question. At the end of 1735 the Spanish government sought unsuccessfully, to enlist British support against the third Treaty of Vienna. The British ministry was no longer interested in schemes designed to limit the size of the Austrian Empire. This might seem to be a change from the policies associated with Townshend, but this change should not be exaggerated. In 1741-3 the British government helped to negotiate agreements by which Austria lost most of Silesia and much of the Milanese. Under the plans put forward by Horatio Walpole during the War of the Polish Succession, Austria would have lost Naples and Sicily. These agreements and plans were of course produced under the stimulus
of Austrian defeat, but many of the attitudes that had informed British foreign policy in 1727-31 can be seen in the later years of the Walpole ministry. The notion that Sardinia, rather than Austria, must be built up to resist Bourbon plans in Italy was not new. The interest in acquiring a Prussian alliance, whilst preventing Prussian expansion in Mecklenburg and Jülich-Berg, was hardly novel.

The British Commitment to the Austrian cause during the War of the Austrian Succession also followed on from the policies enunciated by George II and Townshend in the late 1720s. Then, whilst opposing the policies of Austria, they had nevertheless made clear their determination to preserve the Habsburg inheritance as an essential counterweight to France. The negotiations with the Wittelsbachs in 1729-1730 revealed a British ministry unwilling to contemplate major changes in the Empire, and Charles Albert was to find this attitude both in 1729-30 as Elector of Bavaria and in 1743 as the Emperor Charles VII.

There was therefore no decisive break in British foreign policy when Townshend fell. To assume such a break would be to neglect the role of the king and to misunderstand the position and attitudes of Townshend. The exact role of George II in many of the issues facing British foreign policy in the first decade and half of his reign is obscure. However, an examination of British foreign policy both before and after the changes associated with the fall of Townshend would suggest that his influence has been underestimated. A consideration of the King's actions would suggest that J.B. Owen's re-evaluation of the King, based upon his research on the 1740's can be corroborated by work in the early period of his reign.¹

Linked to the recent work of Gregg on Queen Anne² and Hatton on George I this would suggest that the case for a reinterpretation of the role of the monarchy in early eighteenth-century Britain is a strong one. By concentrating their researches on Parliament and party, historians have neglected, to some extent, the focus of political life in aristocratic Britain - the court - and have overlooked the activities of the arbitrator of court and ministerial conflicts, the King. It is

1. Owen, George II Reconsidered.

2. E. Gregg, Queen Anne (1980)
interesting to note that whilst several scholars have written biographies of Sir Robert Walpole, there is no scholarly biography of George II. Whilst such a situation pertains it will be impossible to arrive at a well-based understanding of British politics in the second quarter of the eighteenth-century.
## List of Characters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Env.</td>
<td>envoy</td>
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<td>Ambass.</td>
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<td>charge d'affaires/in charge of affairs</td>
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<td>rep.</td>
<td>representative</td>
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<td>d.</td>
<td>died</td>
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<td>m.</td>
<td>married</td>
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### Albert


### Allen

Edmund, British, Ch. 1728-9; Sec. 1729-34, in Sardinia.

### Andriani

Ambrosio, Lorraine rep. in Spain.

### Anne

1709-59, eldest daughter of George II, married William IV of Orange, 1734.

### Anne

1693-1740, Czarina of Russia, 1730-40.

### Argyll

John Campbell, 1678-1743, second Duke of; Duke of Greenwich in the British peerage.

### August Wilhelm


### Augustus II

1670-1733, Elector of Saxony, 1694-1733, King of Poland, 1697-1704, 1709-1733.

### Bathurst

Allen, First Earl, Tory peer.

### Bellanger

Secretary of State of the Elector of Cologne.

### Berkeley

James, Third Earl of, First Lord of the Admiralty 1717-27.

### Berkensteyn

Christian August von. Danish Env. Ex. in Austria, 1722-32.

### Berwick

French Marshal, illegitimate son of James II of England, father of Liria, uncle of Waldegrave.

### Beveren

Sebastian, Baron de, President of the Court of Justice of the Elector Palatine, mission to Hanover, 1729.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolingbroke</td>
<td>Henry St. John, 1678-1751, First Viscount, Secretary of State under Queen Anne, attainted 1715, returned to Britain, 1725; prominent figure in the opposition to Walpole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borck</td>
<td>Prussian Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brancas</td>
<td>Louis, Marquis de, French Ambass. Ex. in Spain, June 1728-Sept. 1730.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruyninx</td>
<td>Dutch Env. Ex. in Austria, 1700-38.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bussy</td>
<td>French Ch. in Austria, May 1728-Sept. 1733</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caroline</td>
<td>1683-1737, Wife of George II, Queen of England.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carteret</td>
<td>1690-1763, John, Lord, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 1721-4, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1724-30, opponent of Walpole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine I</td>
<td>1684-1727, Wife of Peter I, Czarina 1725-7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayley</td>
<td>William, British Con. at Cadiz.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chambrier</td>
<td>Prussian Min. Res. in France, 1721-51.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chambmorel</td>
<td>French Ch. in Britain. 1717-32.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles VI</td>
<td>1685-1740, Emperor, 1711-40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Albert</td>
<td>Elector of Bavaria, 1726-45, Emperor Charles VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Emmanuel III</td>
<td>King of Sardinia 1730-73.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Frederick</td>
<td>Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, 1702-39, son-in-law of Peter I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles-Leopold</td>
<td>Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwein, 1713-28, son-in-law of Peter I.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chavigny</td>
<td>French Min. Plen. at the Imperial Diet, 1726-31, mission to Hanover, 1729.</td>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christine Louise von Oettingen</td>
<td>Wife of Ludwig Rudolf of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clutterbuck</td>
<td>Thomas. MP. Liskeard 1722-34, Secretary to Lord Lieutenant of Ireland 1724-30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colman</td>
<td>Francis, British Res. at Florence, 1724-33, mission to Parma, July-Sept. 1731.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Compton</td>
<td>Spencer, Hon. Lord Wilmington, 8 Jan. (os) 1728, MP. Sussex, 1715-Jan. 1728; Speaker of the House of Commons, 1715-27; Treasurer to the Prince of Wales, 1715-27; Paymaster General, 1722-30; Lord Privy Seal, May-Dec. 1730; Lord President of the Council, 1730-42.</td>
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<td>Cramm</td>
<td>August Adolf von, Brunswick-Bevern. Min. in Russia, 1727-31.</td>
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<tr>
<td>D'Aix</td>
<td>Sardinian Env. Ex. in Britain, 1726- Jan. 1730.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangervilliers</td>
<td>French Secretary of State for War.</td>
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<tr>
<td>D'Arvilla</td>
<td>Marquis, Sardinian Ambass. in Spain, Sept. 1728-1732.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'Asfeld</td>
<td>Claude-François, Marquis d', French general.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayrolle</td>
<td>James, British Res. in the United Provinces, 1717-39.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeBrais</td>
<td>Saxon Ch. in France, Mar. 1729-1741.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Büy</td>
<td>Saxon correspondent in Spain, 1725-30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degenfeld</td>
<td>Prussian rep. in Britain, 1730-33.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehn</td>
<td>Friedrich Ludwig, Freiherr von, Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel Env. Ex. in Austria, 1726- June 1728, United Provinces, July - Dec. 1728.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delafaye</td>
<td>Charles, Under Secretary of State in the Northern Department, 1717-24, in the Southern Dept. 1724-34.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Biography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dickens</td>
<td>Melchior Guy, Captain, secretary to Du Bourgay, British Sec. in Prussia, 1730-40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diemar</td>
<td>Ernst, General, Hesse-Cassel Env. Ex. in Britain, 1725-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodington</td>
<td>George Bubb. MP. Bridgewater 1722-54, Env. to Spain, 1715-17; Lord of Treasury, 1724-40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>Lionel Cranfield Sackville, 1688-1765, First Duke of; Lord Steward, 1725-30; Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1730-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Du Bourgay</td>
<td>Charles, Brigadier 1727, British Env. Ex. in Prussia, 1724-30. Left Berlin 2 June 1730.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esquiluz</td>
<td>Spanish Ch. in Austria, May 1728 - Jan. 1731.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elisabeth Farnese</td>
<td>1692-1766, second wife of Philip V of Spain (m. 1746).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth-Christine</td>
<td>of Brunswick Wolfenbüttel, 1691-1750, wife of Charles VI (m. 1708).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugene</td>
<td>Prince, 1663-1736, prominent Austrian minister, Field Marshal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabrice</td>
<td>Friedrich Ernst von. 1683-1750, Hanoverian diplomat and courtier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fagel</td>
<td>Hendrik. Greffier of the States General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferdinand Albrecht</td>
<td>1686-1735, Duke of Brunswick-Bevern, son-in-law of Ludwig Rudolf, keen supporter of Austrian interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiorelli</strong></td>
<td>Giacinto, Venetian Sec. in Britain, 1717-Aug. 1728.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fleury</strong></td>
<td>André Hercule, 1653-1743, Cardinal, French first minister 1726-43.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fleury</strong></td>
<td>Joseph de Wicardel, Marquis de, Saxon Conference Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fonseca</strong></td>
<td>Mark, Baron de, Austrian Ch. in Paris, 1722-Dec. 1730.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forbes</strong></td>
<td>Duncan, MP. Inverness Burghs 1722-1737. Lord Advocate of Scotland, 1725-37.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forbes</strong></td>
<td>John, elder brother of Duncan Forbes. MP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fox</strong></td>
<td>Stephen, MP. Shaftesbury 1726-34, entered Parliament as Tory, and voted with Opposition on Hessians 1730.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frederick William I</strong></td>
<td>1688-1740, King of Prussia, 1713-40. Nephew and son-in-law of George I. Cousin and brother-in-law of George II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gansinot</strong></td>
<td>Jacob Anton, van. rep., in different capacities of the Wittelsbachs in the United Provinces, 1716-41.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gastaldi</strong></td>
<td>Giambattista, Genose Ch. in Britain, 1728-55.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geffroy</strong></td>
<td>French con. at Hamburg.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>George II</strong></td>
<td>1683-1760.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Glenorchy</strong></td>
<td>John Campbell, Lord, British Env. Ex. in Denmark, 1720-31, MP. Saltash, 1727-41.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Graham</strong></td>
<td>Sir John, Jacobite diplomat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grandville</strong></td>
<td>Bidé de la, Intendant of Flanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gravanitz</strong></td>
<td>Viktor Sigismund, Count, Württemburg, Conference Minister, rep. in Britain, Oct. - Dec. 1727, Min. in France, Dec. 1727-1728.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grumbkow</td>
<td>Prussian General and minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanmer</td>
<td>Sir Thomas, 1677-1746, MP. 1701-27. High Church Tory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrington</td>
<td>William Stanhope's title after ennoblement in 1730.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hattorf</td>
<td>Johann Philipp von. 1682-1737, head of the Hanoverian Chancery in London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hay</td>
<td>Jacobite Secretary of State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedges</td>
<td>John, British Env. Ex. in Sardinia, 1726-7, Treasurer to Prince of Wales 1729-1737, MP. Bossiney 1727-34.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holzendorf</td>
<td>Charles, Secretary to Chesterfield in United Provinces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hop</td>
<td>Hendrik, Dutch Env. Ex. in Britain, 1723-61.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>Henry, Viscount Morpeth, MP. Morpeth 1715-38, active in opposition, first son of third Earl of Carlisle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoym</td>
<td>Karl Heinrich, Count, Saxon Cabinet Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacquemin</td>
<td>Baron de, Lorraine rep. in Vienna, 1723-34.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl</td>
<td>1654-1730, Landgrave of Hesse-cassel, 1670-1730.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karl Philipp</td>
<td>Elector Palatine, 1716-42.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Keene Benjamin, British Con. at Madrid 1724-6, Min. Plen. in Spain Oct. 1727-34. Strongly attached to the Walpole interest.

King Peter, 1669-1734, Lord Chancellor, 1725-33.

Kinsky Philip, Count, Austrian Env. Ex. in Britain, Aug. 1728-1736.

Kinsky Stephen, Count, Austrian Ambass. in France, June 1729-1732.


Knyphausen Prussian minister.

Königsegg Joseph Lothar, Count, Austrian Ambassador in Spain, 1726 - Mar. 1730, Austrian Plenipotentiary to the Congress of Soissons, 1730.

Lagnasco Rupert, Count, Saxon Cabinet Minister, Saxon rep. in Austria, July 1730-1732.

La Paz Juan-Bautista, Marquis, Spanish Secretary of State for foreign affairs.

Leathes Carteret, MP. Sudbury 1727-34, brother of Hill Mussenden.

Le Beau French spy in London, 1731.


Leheup Isaac, British Env. to the Diet of Ratisbon, 1726-7; British Env. to Sweden 1727, brother-in-law of Horatio Walpole.

L'Hermitage René de Säuniers (1653-1729), Sieur de, Dutch agent and newswriter in London.

Liria James Fitzjames Stuart, Duke of, Spanish Ambass. and Min. Plen. in Russia, arrived Sept. 1727, left Nov. 1730, Ambass. Ex. and Plen. in Austria, arrived Jan. 1731, left 1733.

Louis XV 1710-1774, King of France, 1715-74.


Maffei Annibale, Conte, Sardinian Ambass. Ex. in France, 1723- Oct. 1731.
Magnan French Ch. in Russia 1726-33.

Manteuffel Ernst Christoph, Freiherr von, Saxon Conference Minister, correspondent of Eugene and Seckendorf.

Maria Theresa 1717-1780, eldest daughter of Charles VI.

Maurepas Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, Count of, Secretary of State for Marine 1723-49.


Meerman Franz Hannibal, Freiherr von, Bavarian Env. Ex. in Austria, 1730-6.

Morville Count, French Secretary of State for foreign affairs until 1727.

Newcastle Thomas Pelham-Holles, First Duke of, 1693-1768, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 1724-1746.


O'Rourke Owen, Viscount, Jacobite Ag. in Austria, 1727-

Orrery Charles Boyle 1676-1731, Fourth Earl of, Tory with Jacobite links.

Ossorio Giuseppe, Sd. Env. Ex. in Britain, arrived Jan. 1730.

Osterman 1686-1747, Russian Foreign Minister.

Palm Karl Josef von, Austrian Res. in Britain, expelled, early 1727.

Patino José, 1666-1735. Spanish minister.

Pelham Thomas, secretary of British embassy to Congress of Soissons, 1728-30, British Ch. in France, June 1730, sec. of British Embassy in France, 1730-41, MP. Hastings, dependent of Newcastle's.

Pentenriedter Johann Christoph, Freiherr von, 1678-1728, Austrian Plen. at Soissons, 1728.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peter II</td>
<td>1715-30, Czar, 1727-30, grandson of Peter I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip V</td>
<td>1683-1746, King of Spain 1700-46, uncle of Louis XV, Second grandson of Louis XIV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plettenberg</td>
<td>Ferdinand, Graf von. First Minister of Elector of Cologne, mission to Hanover, 1729.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plettenberg</td>
<td>Friedrich Christian, Freiherr von, Cologne representative at the Imperial Diet, 1724-33.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulteney</td>
<td>William, 1684-1764, MP. Hedon 1705-1734, Joint-founder of Craftsman 1726, leading opposition figure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reichenbach</td>
<td>Benjamin Friedrich von, Prussian Res. in Britain 1726-30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rialp</td>
<td>Marquis, 1663-1741. secretary of Charles VI's Council of Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richelieu</td>
<td>Louis, Duc de, French Ambass. Ex. in Austria, 1725-May 1728.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson</td>
<td>Thomas, Sec. of British Embassy in France, 1724-June 2nd 1730, Min.Plen. in Austria, 1730-50. MP. Thirsk, 1727-34. Close connection of Newcastle's from Westminster schooldays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochefort</td>
<td>French rep. in Hamburg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondeau</td>
<td>Claudius, British Consul-General in Russia, 1730-1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Saphorin</td>
<td>François Louis de Pesmes, Seigneur de, Lieutenant-General. British rep. in Austria, 1718-27, without character as not a British subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sauveterre</td>
<td>French rep. in Prussia, late 1720's, French Ch. in Prussia, Jan. 1730-1732.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scarborough</td>
<td>1688-1740, Richard Lumley, Second Earl of, Favourite of George II. Master of the Horse, 1727-34.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schaub</td>
<td>Luke, Sir, protégé of Carteret, British Ambass. in France 1721-4, special mission to Saxony-Poland, 1730-1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schleinitz</td>
<td>Johann Christoph, Baron, Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Env. Ex. in France, 1728-30. Correspondent of Fleury.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ségent</td>
<td>French commissioner of war at Dunkirk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shippen</td>
<td>William, MP. Newton 1715-43, prominent Jacobite.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinzendorf</td>
<td>Philip Louis, Count, Austrian Court Chancellor, mission to Soissons as first Austrian Plen. 1728.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinzendorf</td>
<td>Wenzel, Count, Austrian Ambass. in United Provinces, Sept. 1728-1734.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slingelandt</td>
<td>Simon van, 1664-1736, Secretary to the Dutch Council of State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solaro di Bregli</td>
<td>Giuseppe Roberto, Marchese, Sardinian Min. in Austria, 1720-32.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stafford</td>
<td>Thomas Wentworth; 1672-1739, 3rd Earl of, Tory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stühm</td>
<td>Ulrich Friedrich von, Saxon Env. Ex. in Prussia, 1720-30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton</td>
<td>Richard Brigadier, British Env. Ex. in Hesse-Cassel, 1727-9, 1730-1, Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, 1729, 1730-1; Special military mission to Denmark, Sept. 1729. Major General 1727; MP. Newark 1712-37.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilson</td>
<td>George, Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Department, 1708-38.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Titley Walter, British Ch. in Denmark, 1729-Nov.1730, British Min. Res. in Denmark, 1730-9.

Toerring Count, Bavarian foreign minister.

Torrington George, Viscount, First Lord of Admiralty, 1727-33.

Townshend Charles, Second Viscount, 1674-1738, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, 1721-30.

Townshend Thomas, MP. Cambridge University 1727-80.


Vandermeer Francis, Dutch Ambass. in Spain, 1723-43.

Victor Amadeus II 1666-1732, King of Sardinia, abdicated Sept. 3rd 1730, 1675-1730.

Vignola Girolamo, Venetian Res. in Britain, July 1728-Sept. 1731.

Villars Claude Louis Hector (1653-1734), Ducde, French Field Marshal.


Wackerbarth Joseph, Graf von, Saxon Min. Plen. in Austria, 1728-30.


Wallenrodt Johann Christoph, Freiherr von, Prussian Env. Ex.. in Britain, 1719-1726, July 1727-d. Sept. 4th 1727.


Walpole Robert, 1676-1745, MP. King's Lynn. 1713-42. First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1721-42.

Ward Thomas, British Consul-General in Russia, 1728-30, Min. Res. in Russia 1730-1.
Watzdorf Friedrich Karl, Graf von, Saxon Env. Ex. in Britain, 1730-2.

Wentworth Peter, brother of Earl of Strafford, d. 1739

Weston Edward, Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Department, 1729-46.

Westphalen Hans Georg, Danish Env. Ex. in Russia, 1718-20, 1722-33.

William of Hesse-Cassel Son of Karl of Hesse-Cassel, brother of Frederick I of Sweden, regent of Hesse-Cassel for Frederick, 1730-51, William VIII of Hesse-Cassel, 1751-60.

William IV of Orange, 1711-51, married Anne, daughter of George II, 1734.

Wilmington Lord, Title taken by Spencer Compton, 8 Jan. (os) 1728.

Wurmbrand Johann Wilhelm Count, President of Aulic Council, 1728-40, 45-50.

Wych Cyril, British Env. Ex. in the Hansa towns, 1725-41.

Wyndham William Sir. MP. Somerset 1710-40. 'Head of those calling themselves Hanover Tories' [Hervey]


Zamboni Giovanni Giacomo, Hesse-Darmstadt Ag. in Britain, 1723-52, Saxon Ag. 1726-51, Modenese Ag. 1729-36.
In the course of research for this thesis a large number of archives have been examined. Only those whose holdings relate to foreign policy have been listed; material of value solely for domestic developments has not been mentioned, for reasons of space.

1. Foreign Holdings

**DARMSTADT**
Staatsarchiv

**DRESDEN**
Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Geheimes Kabinett, Gesandtschaften diplomatic reports.
The following classes were of particular importance:-

- 637 Zamboni's reports and correspondence, 1728-1732.
- 2674 Le Coq's correspondence with Marquis de Fleury, 1726-9.
- 2676 Le Coq's and Watzdorf's reports from London.
- 3105 De Buy's reports from Spain.
- 3331 Wackerbarth's reports from Vienna.
- 3378 Söhm's reports from Berlin.

**FLORENCE**
Archivio di Stato
Lettere Ministri: Inghilterra, 45-47.

**GENOA**
Archivio di Stato
Lettere Ministri: Inghilterra, 10-11. Francia, 44.

**HANOVER**
Hauptstaatsarchiv
Calenberg Brief Archiv 11 EI.

**LUCCA**
Archivio di Stato
Documents 'al tempo della Liberta', Instructioni, Relationi, 633.

**MARBURG**
Staatsarchiv
MODENA
Archivio di Stato
Lettere Ministri: Inghilterra, 18-19.

MUNICH
Haupstaatsarchiv

MUNSTER
Staatsarchiv

NANCY
Archives de Meurthe-et-Moselle
Fonds de Vienne, series 3F. diplomatic reports.
The following volumes were of particular use, 139-140 (reports from Baron Jacquemin, Lorraine envoy in Vienna), 86 (reports from Stainville, envoy in Paris), 202 (reports from Andriani, resident in Madrid).

OSNABRÜCK
Staatsarchiv
Repertorium 100, Abschnitt 1, Newsletters to the Prince-Bishop. Volumes of particular interest are 291 and 299 (newsletters of 1727)

PARIS
Archives Nationales
a) Archives de la marine.
   1) B³ Service General Correspondance
   2) B⁷ Pays Etrangères
b) Archive Privé - entrée Fleury

PARIS
Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal
Nouvelles Ecclesiastiques
Archives de la Bastille: Gazetins
Secrets de la Police

PARIS
Bibliothèque Nationale
a) Nouvelles Acquisitions Francaises
   349 Blondel. Remarques et anecdotes politiques.
   9399 Mémoire sur la marine de Louis XV.
   9511 Reflexions sur le gouvernement de France, par M. D'Aube ... 1731.

b) Manuscrits Francais
   7177-7198 Villeneuve papers.
PARIS  Quai d'Orsay. Archives du Ministere des
Affaires Etrangeres
1) Correspondance Politique.
   Allemagne
   Angleterre
   Autriche
   Baviere
   Brunswick-Hanover
   Cologne
   Espagne
   Hesse
   Hollande
   Prusse
   Turquie
2) Memoires et Documents.
   Allemagne
   Angleterre
   Espagne
   France
   Hollande

PARIS  Vincennes. Archives de la Guerre
A1, Diplomatie.

PARMA  Archivio di Stato
   Carteggio Farnesiano. Lettere Ministri,
   Germania 12-13, Inghilterra, Francia.

TURIN  Archivio di Stato
   Lettere Ministri, Inghilterra, Francia, Autriche,
   Spagna, Olanda.

VENICE  Archivio di Stato
   Lettere Ministri, Inghilterra.

VIENNA  Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv
   a) staatenabteilung.
      Frankreich: Varia
      England: Korrespondenz, Varia, Noten
      Interiora, Intercepte, 1-2
   b) Grosse Korrespondenz
      The following volumes were of particular
      interest, 49, 60, 76a, 85a, 86a, 95a, 102c.
   c) Nachlass Fonseca, 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21.
VIENNA
Palais Kinsky
Correspondence and Papers of Count Philip Kinsky.

WOLFSBUTTEL
Staatsarchiv
Diplomatic papers. 1 Alt. 3, 6, 19, 22;
2 Alt. 3162, 3165, 6542-7.
The correspondence of Ferdinand Albrecht in
1 Alt 22 was of particular interest.

2. British Archives

AYLESBURY
Buckinghamshire Record Office
Trevor papers.

BEDFORD
Bedfordshire Record Office
Lucas papers.

BRISTOL
City Reference Library
Southwell papers.

BURY ST. EDMUNDS
West Suffolk Record Office
Grafton papers.
Hervey papers.

CAMBRIDGE
Cambridgeshire Record Office
Cotton papers.

University Library
Cholmondely Houghton papers.

CHELMSFORD
Essex Record Office
Mildmay papers.

CHEWTON MENDIP
Chewton Hall
Waldegrave papers.

CHICHESTER
West Sussex Record Office
Goodwood papers.

IPSWITCH
East Suffolk Record Office
Leathes papers.

LEICESTER
Leicestershire Record Office
Finch papers.

LONDON
Bank of England
Stock Ledger Books.
History of Parliament Trust
Ryder transcripts.

House of Lords Record Office
Proxy Books.

Public Record Office
State papers.
Domestic, Naval, Regencies, Scotland, Ireland,
Miscellaneous, Austria, Denmark, Dunkirk,
Flanders, France, German States, Hamburg,
Holland, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Prussia,
Russia, Sardinia, Spain, Turkey, Tuscany, Drafts,
Royal Letters, Treaties, Confidential, Foreign
Entry Books, Foreign ministers in England, Treaty
papers.

British Library
Loan 29: Portland Papers.
Loan 57: Bathurst Papers.
Egerton MSS: Bentinck papers.
Stowe MSS: 98, 158, 180, 186, 256, 308.
Additional MSS: Coxe, Strafford, Essex,
Newcastle, Egmont, Holland House, Hardwicke,
Townshend, Hatton-Finch, Skinner,
Mitchell, Keene, Blenheim, Bolingbroke, Tyrawly,
Robinson, Norris, Wager, Carewe, Carteret,
Wilmington, Pulteney, Dayrolles papers,
Transcripts from the Dutch archives.

Post Office Archives
General Accounts.

MAIDSTONE
Kent Record Office
Sackville papers.

NEWCASTLE
Northumberland Record Office
Delaval papers.

NORTHAMPTON
Northamptonshire Record Office
Isham, Finch-Hatton papers.

NORWICH
Norfolk Record Office
Bradfer Lawrence, Ketton Cremer, Townshend papers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Repository Name</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>OXFORD</td>
<td>Oxfordshire Record Office</td>
<td>Dillon papers.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Queens' College</td>
<td>MSS. 450 - Proprietors' Ledger of the Grub Street Journal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. John's College</td>
<td>Rawlinson papers.</td>
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<td>Bodleian Library</td>
<td>Zamboni (Rawlinson letters), North, Carte, Dashwood papers.</td>
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<td>PETWORTH</td>
<td>Petworth House</td>
<td>Wyndham papers.</td>
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<td>SANDON</td>
<td>Sandon Hall</td>
<td>Harrowby papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAFFORD</td>
<td>Staffordshire Record Office</td>
<td>Dartmouth, Leveson-Gower papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROWBRIDGE</td>
<td>Wiltshire Record Office</td>
<td>Savernake papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINCHESTER</td>
<td>Hampshire Record Office</td>
<td>Mildmay papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINDSOR</td>
<td>Windsor Castle, Royal Archives</td>
<td>Stuart papers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pamphlets

For reasons of space only a few titles can be mentioned. The extensive collections in the British Library and the Bodleian Library have been fully consulted. Several other holdings have been examined and useful pamphlets were discovered in the Public Record Office and the Library of Worcester College, Oxford. In tracing references I was greatly assisted by the help of Dr. L. Bart-Smith of the Eighteenth-Century Short Title Catalogue project.

Anonymous pamphlets are listed alphabetically under the first word, not an article of each title.

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The Better Sequel Better'd in a Dialogue betwixt the oak and the Dunghill (1729)
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