A LOST LEGACY OF CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT: IBN AL-QAYYIM ON DIVINE DETERMINATION (qadar)

SLITI, ABDULLAH

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A LOST LEGACY OF CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT: IBN AL-QAYYIM ON DIVINE DETERMINATION (qadar)

by
ABDULLAH SLITI

A thesis submitted to
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for the degree of
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ABSTRACT

This research aims to challenge a popular contemporary Traditionalist trend of intra-Muslim theological disengagement and isolation, which is justified by a conception of a puritan Traditionalist theology entirely hypothetically based on scripture and a utopian monolithic understanding of the first three generations of Islam (the Salaf). One of the many inevitable consequences of such a popular trend is one of intolerance and hence sectarianism. Intra-Muslim theological disengagement amongst modern Traditionalists and the problems therein will be challenged by proving that the theology of the Traditionalist scholar, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350), whose work is a main reference for contemporary Traditionalists, is much indebted to his critical engagement and intra-Muslim dialogue with fellow non-Traditionalist theologians and philosophers. This will be evident in my analysis of Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussions on topics related to divine determination, which is a fundamental doctrine to Muslims. In fact, Ibn al-Qayyim successfully develops a compatibilist position of dual agency on the problem of free will and determinism, a traditionalist rational objectivism position in the debate on meta-ethics and a four-fold theodicy of optimism on the problem of evil. Ibn al-Qayyim’s theological developments evidently defy contemporary intra-Muslim theological disengagement and the conception of a puritan Traditionalist theology. At the core of this thesis is an implication which seeks to promote dialogue amongst contemporary Muslims and Traditionalist Islam.
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Declaration

This thesis results entirely from my own work and has not been previously offered in candidature for any other degree or diploma.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author’s prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father, Abderrahman Sliti (1961-2010); my uncle, Abdeslam Bouharat (1960-2012); my grandmother, Menana Bayoud (1935-2014); and my good friend, Amin Kasmi (1968-2015), all of whom passed away during the course of this research.
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INTRODUCTION

The Problem

This research aims to explore and evaluate five inter-relating concepts that are all relevant to contemporary Muslim theological authority.

Firstly, I explore the concept of a puritan Traditionalist theology that is purportedly based entirely on scripture and the understanding of the Salaf (early Muslims from the first three generations of Islam). This theology upholds that the knowledge of the Salaf is far more accurate than the developed knowledge that came thereafter. Hence, salvation is only attained by reference to the early generations with regard to the epistemology of Islamic sciences, theology in particular. This concept is typically employed by contemporary Traditionalists to justify their tendency towards theological isolation as opposed to intra-Muslim dialogue or critical engagement. The implication of this concept is that there is no need to engage with ‘the other’ on theological issues because the authoritative source is scripture and the understanding of the Salaf.

Secondly, this study seeks to challenge the Traditionalists’ prohibition of kalām (rational theology), which predominately involves reading and engaging with the works of the Mutakillimūn (rational theologians). This prohibition is another factor that prevents intra-Muslim dialogue and critical engagement vis-à-vis theology. Consequently, this leads to the widespread practice of taqlīd (uncritical religious imitation) and the inevitable suppression of critical thinking. The reason being is that according to contemporary Traditionalists, salvation is only attained by strict adherence to scripture and the understanding of the Salaf – even if this means restricting oneself to blindly following opinions.

As such, it is probable that taqlīd tendencies amongst contemporary Traditionalists promoted disengagement and the repetition of theological knowledge which may be regarded by non-Traditionalists as irrelevant doctrines enshrouded in the pretext of universal applicability.

Similarly, in the context of radicalisation, we witness the exploitation of transmogrified medieval opinions in order to propagate modern political agendas. And as such, it is these
scattered and undeveloped opinions which are frequently vulnerable to being exploited for indoctrination, control, disunity, intolerance and sectarian violent.

Thirdly, another aspect of my thesis seeks to investigate a potential Traditionalist philosophical theology which, in many aspects, is similar to rational theology in that it engages and develops philosophical issues such as: human agency, free will, meta-ethics, causality, evil and theodicy. Hence, I will investigate whether there is a Traditionalist stance on the philosophical issues above, despite the purported Traditionalist prohibition on engaging with philosophy or rational theology.

This aspect of Traditionalist philosophical theology will be apparent throughout my thesis given that it was my main motivation and rationale for this research. I had two inquiries that I wanted to study in detail. Firstly, how does the doctrine of qadar (divine determination) reconcile with the concept of divine justice? By this I mean, how is God’s justice justified with the Traditionalists’ view that some people will be destined to hell even though their acts were determined by God? Secondly, what is the Traditionalist view – if there is any - on the problem of evil, given that it is perhaps the strongest argument against theism in our modern age?

With the intention of answering these two questions, I read various Traditionalists works – both classical and contemporary – and found them to be mainly a systematic citation of scripture and opinions of the early religious authority and therefore very limited in critical analysis.

Nonetheless, I did come across very interesting critical analysis on the above two questions in the works of both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim. Since there was no existing PhD research on Ibn al-Qayyim on the same two questions above - despite his importance to contemporary Traditionalism and him having a corpus dedicated entirely on the same topic - I decided to focus on him.

Subsequently, the fourth aspect of my thesis seeks to explore an alternative depiction of Ibn al-Qayyim, which contrasts with the relatively common depiction of him held by contemporary Traditionalists as a polemical and negativist “disengager”. Again, this kind of depiction is used to justify the contemporary Traditionalist tendency towards theological isolation and hence the opposition to intra-Muslim dialogue, critical engagement and theological
development. I seek to reveal Ibn al-Qayyim as a positivist engager who critically engaged in intra-Muslim dialogue and thus contributed to the development of various theological issues.

This point of theological development leads to the last aspect of my thesis, which is to explore what exactly Ibn al-Qayyim’s project was. That is, what exactly was he doing and why? I will demonstrate that Ibn al-Qayyim’s project involved the development of Traditionalist theology. I will show that he achieves this by harmonising, synthesising, developing, ‘Traditionalising’ and systematising the positions of his predecessors from amongst the Mutakillimūn. And as such, his critical engagement with the Mutakillimūn on theological issues was crucial in aiding this project.

So a central implication of this research is to encourage intra-Muslim dialogue, critical engagement and development amongst Muslims - in particular contemporary Traditionalists - given that one of the most important Islamic disciplines, namely theology, went through this process. That is, many aspects and positions of medieval Islamic theology were the result of critical engagement and development. So the theological doctrine of qadar (divine determination), despite its complexities, is a fundamental doctrine to every Muslim and Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagements regarding this doctrine will be of vital importance to contemporary Traditionalists.

**Aims and Objectives of Research**

This research aims to critically explore and examine the role of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement in the development of Traditionalist theological issues on qadar. The first part will make up the core knowledge to the main study of my thesis and will trace and analyse intra-Muslim dialogue, critical engagement and development throughout the early period of Islam up until the era of Ibn al-Qayyim. The second part will make up my main research and will consist of a detailed study of five practiced thematic issues, articulations of qadar. As such, I will trace and analyse the intra-Muslim dialogue, critical engagement and development in regards to these five thematic issues.
The first thematic issue discussed will be Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with the debate on free will and determinism, and how he manages to develop a Traditionalist stance on this debate. The questions that I will investigate and analyse are: does man have free will - and if so - how is this will reconciled with the doctrine of divine determination? If man is divinely determined, then how is divine determination harmonised with human moral responsibility? Likewise, if man has agency then what are the properties that make up such agency?

The second thematic issue studied will be Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with the debate on meta-ethics and how he manages to develop a Traditionalist stance on this debate. The questions that I will investigate and analyse are: what exactly is a moral value, and where do moral values come from—what is the source of moral value? Is morality absolute in that it applies to all people at all times, or is morality relative in that it varies from person to person, or context to context? And how does morality affect the psychology of human agents? This debate will respond to such questions by examining the ontology of moral properties, and the epistemology of how we come to know moral values.

The third thematic issue considered will be Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with the debate on causation and the nature of divine acts, and how he manages to develop a Traditionalist stance on this debate. The question that I will investigate and analyse is: what is the nature of divine acts – does God act for a cause – and if so, what is the nature of such cause?

The fourth thematic issue addressed will be Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with the debate on evil vis-à-vis divine determination and how he manages to develop a Traditionalist stance on such debate. The question that I will investigate and analyse is: what is the nature of evil and how does it come into existence - is evil divinely determined?

The last thematic issue will be a construction of Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with the debate on the nature of divine justice in relation to the existence of evil and how he manages to develop a Traditionalist theodicy. The question that I will investigate and analyse is: how can God’s justice be reconciled with the existence of evil?
Method and Methodology

I will employ a purely qualitative method that will make use of textual and discourse analysis and also a hermeneutical approach. The textual and discourse analysis nature of my research will involve locating and analysing relevant debates through the employment of key-word search engines, such as al-Shamila. Additionally, I will also search, manually, the content pages and indexes of Ibn al-Qayyim’s theological works in order to compensate for the inevitable loss of context in key-word search engine results.

Subsequently, this will enable me to trace the various non-Traditionalist persons and sources with which Ibn al-Qayyim engages. As such, I will also be able to develop a table in my first chapter which includes information about the non-Traditionalist persons and sources which Ibn al-Qayyim utilises and the number of times he cites a particular person. For example, Ibn al-Qayyim uses over one hundred and twenty references in his most original theological work, Shifāʿ al-ʾalīl. Thirty of the one hundred and twenty belong to the non-Traditionalist schools; specifically twenty Ashʿarite works, seven Muʿtazilite works and three works of philosophers. Similarly, the Ashʿarite, al-Rāzī, is cited six times by name in the Shifāʿ, while the Muʿtazilite, Abu al-Husayn al-Baṣrī, is cited three times and the peripatetic philosopher, Ibn Sīnā, only twice.

So, given that the vast majority of Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussion on divine determination occurs in his Shifāʿ, these tables will give me an indication of who and what sources Ibn al-Qayyim engaged with; and will also help me trace Ibn al-Qayyim’s unreferenced arguments to their original primary sources. Furthermore, it is very likely that Ibn al-Qayyim engages with multiple persons and sources within each school. Nonetheless, the evidence of multiple engagements will support my primary thesis: the Traditionalist Ibn al-Qayyim critically engaged with non-Traditionalists, as opposed to undertaking the modern Traditionalist methodology of theological isolation. Ibn al-Qayyim’s positivist engagement helped him with his project of theological development, which is contrary to the tendency towards uncritical religious imitation of early opinions.

Likewise, the discourse analysis nature of my research will be apparent when I reveal the context and intellectual history of Ibn al-Qayyim’s thought. This will entail a historical and
descriptive approach in the study of Ibn al-Qayyim’s society, which allows us to appreciate the context in which he was writing.

Similarly, the discourse analysis aspect will also be evident when I trace and study the early theological developments of each school. Again, this will highlight the fact that such developments were an inevitable and natural phenomena that took place in the early history of Islam. Thus it is not necessarily essential that this natural process of theological development should cease and be substituted with the uncritical practise of taqlid.

Lastly, the hermeneutical nature and both the textual and discourse analysis of this study will all be manifested in my detailed study of the relevant texts of each debate. The hermeneutical aspect will require me to analyse the implications of the philosophical arguments and conceptions. Subsequently, through such a methodological approach we can appreciate how Ibn al-Qayyim positioned himself distinctly from his interlocutors; and also understand how and why he reached such positions. Only then can we fully appreciate the nature of Ibn al-Qayyim’s project of theological development.

**An Overview of the Research**

My first chapter contextualises Ibn al-Qayyim and his project of theological development. This project was made possible by the scholarly environment of Damascus, a centre for intellectual engagement and the development of knowledge in Ibn al-Qayyim’s era. An investigation into the various madrasas (schools), circles and scholars demonstrates that scholars did engage with one another despite their different theological affiliations. I also elucidate that Ibn al-Qayyim had studied non-Traditionalist texts under non-Traditionalist scholars, which probably indicates that he identified as an Ash’arite at some point in his early studies. Additionally, a construction of Ibn al-Qayyim’s library on works of theology enables me to trace the many sources and persons whom he engages with in his own works of theology. This is occasionally further supplemented by his own citation of sources and persons. Lastly, I develop a chronology of Ibn al-Qayyim’s works using dates, citations and thematic discussions - all of which are relevant to his theological scholarship.
My second chapter is an overview of the theological developments within the early schools and the formation of early Traditionalism. I examine the contemporary Traditionalist concept of a monolithic understanding of the Salaf - which theoretically leaves no room for differences of opinion regarding theological issues. As such, an elucidation on the various theological issues in which the Salaf differed will challenge this concept. Furthermore, I trace the early discussions on qadar and analyse its subsequent developments within each school. I also explore early theological diversity – including the multiple founding fathers of Traditionalism, such as Ibn Kullāb and Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal.

The debate of human agency and responsibility in the works of Ibn al-Qayyim is the topic of chapter three, which also traces the discussions to their original sources in each school so as to verify the accuracy of Ibn al-Qayyim’s depiction of the debate. This comparative textual analytical approach will also be employed in the remaining chapters of this research along with an emphasis on Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with both the Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites. Chapter three also explores how Ibn al-Qayyim utilises and alters the concepts of his interlocutors in order to develop his own position in the debate. For example, Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a compatibilist position of dual agency which entails that man’s causative ability allows him to be a free and responsible agent on a micro-level while God’s agency is justified by His creative ability which determines matters on a macro-level. As such, man acts according to God’s general will, which implies more freedom and responsibility for man than the limitations implicit in God’s specific will. Likewise, I illustrate how Ibn al-Qayyim introduces new terms into the debate such as: ‘conditions’, ‘partially causative’ and ‘general will’, and also argues that moral acts are attributed to both man’s causative ability and God’s general will, in an attempt to harmonise and synthesise the opposing views.

Chapter four explores Ibn al-Qayyim’s intellectual developments on the debate of Islamic meta-ethics and illustrates how he engages with non-Traditionalists in an attempt to develop a middle way Traditionalist stance on the debate. Ibn al-Qayyim agrees with the Muʿtazilites that some acts have essential and attributable characteristics of good and evil, which are inherent and known by reason. But he also upholds that the ontological and epistemological values of some acts are derived from scripture. Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim agrees with the Ashʿarites that religious
duty and accountability are only justified by revelation and God is not obliged by the human criteria of moral judgement. Lastly, I expound on how Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a double-sided approach in this debate. Firstly, his employment of rationalistic *ad hominem* arguments which are very Râzian in style; secondly, his introduction of Sufi aspects, such as rational morality being a legal conveyance and piety a strengthening tool of one’s rational morality.

The debate on the causation and nature of divine acts is the topic of chapter five. Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a similar position to the Mu‘tazilites, supporting that wise purpose and causation are inherent to the nature of divine acts. This position is contrary to the Ash‘arites, who hold that God acts by pure divine volition, a concept which Ibn al-Qayyim refutes extensively by employing both rational and linguistic arguments. Although Ibn al-Qayyim agrees with the Mu‘tazilites on this debate, he does differ with them in terms of their belief in the extrinsic nature of divine attributes, such as divine wise purpose, and also on their employment of non-scriptural terminologies.

Chapter six analyses Ibn al-Qayyim’s theological constructions concerning the concept of divine determination and its philosophical complexities. Ibn al-Qayyim critically engages with the theodicean writings of Ibn Sînâ and al-Râzî and opposes them by adopting the view that divine determination transcends evil. Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim grapples with the positions of both the Mu‘tazilites and the Ash‘arites, in order to harmonise the inconsistency of some divine attributes in relation to the existence of evil. As a result of his critical engagement, he manages to introduce new distinctions, such as divine acts and the objects of divine acts, both of which helped him develop his position on the transcendency of divine determination over evil.

My last chapter is a construction of Ibn al-Qayyim’s four-fold theodicies on the debate on evil. Again, Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the theodicean writings of Ibn Sînâ and al-Râzî; he adds to their categorisations of evil and employs demonstrative arguments which are potentially original contributions to the debate at hand. As a result, such a Qayyimian approach of critical engagement and development in the discipline of theology clearly challenges the contemporary Traditionalist methodology of theological disengagement, a utopian conception of theological sources and a puritan conception of Traditionalist theology. Additionally, his conclusions, which contain elements that could be traced back to Aristotle and Plotinus, namely evil as privation,
further distinguish his approach from that of the contemporary Traditionalists, as he does not limit himself entirely to scripture or the understanding of the Salaf. As Ibn al-Qayyim did engage in intra-Muslim dialogue he was able to successfully develop a four-fold theodicy of optimism, namely the theodicy of: relative evil, divine names and attributes, necessary opposites and divine wise purpose; which all ultimately argue for the relativity of evil and the optimism in creation; and thus the worthiness of God’s praise.
1-IBN AL-QAYYIM’S INTELLECTUAL MILIEU IN DAMASCUS

Introduction

In this chapter I will show how Damascus during Ibn al-Qayyim’s era was a safe haven for intellectual engagement despite the crises which came before this period. I will also elaborate on Ibn al-Qayyim’s intellectual characteristics, which were essential for his transmission and development of knowledge - this includes his critical engagements and conversion to Traditionalism. This will be illuminated by the influence of Ibn al-Qayyim’s non-Traditionalist teachers, the non-Traditionalist texts which he studied and the extensive library that he possessed which included numerous non-Traditionalist sources with which he engaged.

The Damascus Crises

There were three major crises which occurred just before the birth of Ibn al-Qayyim, all of which had an impact on society in Damascus. Firstly, there was the two hundred years crusade conflict in the Levant.¹ This included the 492/1098 crusade conquest of Jerusalem² and many other cities and ports in the surrounding region.³ It also included the battle of Ḥattīn in 583/1187, which resulted in the recapture of Jerusalem by Ṣalāḥ Dīn.⁴ Lastly, the recapture of all occupied cities and ports in 790/1388 and the final withdrawal of the crusaders.⁵

³ ibid
Secondly, there were numerous attacks made by the Mongols on Damascus and the surrounding regions, which lasted nearly sixty years.\(^6\) The Mongols first appeared in 615/1218, resulting in the invasion of Būkhārā, Samraqand\(^7\) and then Baghdād in 656/1258.\(^8\) It is reported that the killings in Baghdād at the hands of the Mongols lasted for a period of forty days, resulting in the destruction of Baghdād’s intellectual civilization.\(^9\) Shortly after, in 658/1260, Syria suffered a similarly swift invasion by the Mongols. The continuous struggle between the Mongols and the Mamlūk dynasty lasted up until the last battle of Shaqṭāb, (702/1303), in which Shaykh al-Īslām Ibn Taymiyya famously participated.\(^10\)

Thirdly, there was the ongoing internal power struggle between the Mamlūk rulers\(^11\), which perhaps resulted in the prevalent unrest amongst the Syrian people and the constant fear of foreign forces. These three major crises were responsible for various levels of social instability such as mass migration, unemployment, inflation and widespread hunger and corruption.\(^12\)

**Intellectual Engagement in Damascus**

Despite the crises, during the twelfth and thirteenth century Damascus became a central way-station in an interchange of scholars and ideas traveling East and West.\(^13\) As a result, Damascus became one of a few centres of knowledge in the Muslim world that witnessed the engagement and production of knowledge by partisans of numerous theological, legal and Sufi schools. These

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\(^6\) Ibn Kathīr, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 201-203.


\(^8\) Ibn Kathīr, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 201-203.

\(^9\) ibid


\(^12\)Amalia Levanoni, *op. cit.*, p. 101-114. For more on the political, economic, and social crisis see, ibid., p. 81-196.

\(^13\) Joan Elizabeth Gilbert, *The ʿUlamāʾ of Medieval Damascus and the International World of Islamic Scholarship*, University of California, Berkeley, PhD, 1977, p. 119.
included Hadīth Scholars, Shāfiʿī Ashʿarites, Ḥanbalī Traditionalists, Hanafīs, Shiʿites, philosophers and even a partisan of Ibn al-Rawandi\textsuperscript{14} - all of whom critically engaged with one another whether within a positivist or negativist framework. Consequently, during this period, Damascus witnessed the establishment of large numbers of madrasas (schools) which continued the transmission and development of the knowledge process.\textsuperscript{15} For example, Ibn Kathīr mentions thirty eight madrasas that were in operation during Ibn al-Qayyim’s lifetime.\textsuperscript{16}

These thriving madrasas produced profound scholars who have made important contributions to the vast body of Islamic literature. For example, the Ḥanbalī legalist, Ibn al-Qudāma al-Maqdāsī, the Shafiʿī legalist, Imām al-Subkī, the Traditionalist theologian Ibn Taymiyya and his students: al-Dhahabī and al-Mizzī, both hadīth scholars\textsuperscript{17}, Ibn Khathīr and al-Ṣafadī, both historians, and not to forget Ibn al-Qayyim, the polymath.\textsuperscript{18}

During this period, these madrasas also promoted continuous theological competition between the minority Ḥanbali Traditionalists\textsuperscript{19} and the majority Shafiʿī Ashʿarites.\textsuperscript{20} In the course of these theological competitions, it was the Ḥabalite Traditionalists who often suffered

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\textsuperscript{15} Michael Chamberlain, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{16} According to Dr. Ahmad al-Ṣamʿānī, these thirty eight madrasas do not include the following ten: Madrasa al-Zāhiriyā, Madrasa al-Jawzīyya, Madrasa al-Ṣudariyya, Madrasa al-Ḥādīliyya al-Kubrā, Dār al-Hadīth al-Asfāriyya, Al-Iqṣābīyya, Al-Khāṭūniyya al-Jawānīyya, Al-Khāṭūniyya al-Barānīyya, Al-Jawhariyya, and Al-Qumayrīyya. Furthermore, Dr. Ahmad al-Ṣamʿānī, argues that there were more than forty eight madrasas in Damascus during Ibn al-Qayyim’s era, see \textit{Shifāʾ al-Alīl}, ed. al-Ṣamʿānī and al-Ajlān, Dār al-Ṣamīʿī, Riyadh, 2008, vol. 1, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{17} The famous Historian, Ibn Ṭasākir, also lived during this period but he was not a student of Ibn Taymiyya, rather he was a partisan of the Shafiʿī Ashʿarite madrasas. \textit{cf}. Elisséeff, N. "Ibn Ṭasākir." \textit{Encyclopaedia of Islam}, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2015.

\textsuperscript{18} For more detail on the scholars of medieval Damascus, see, Joan Elizabeth Gilbert, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 23-58.

\textsuperscript{19} The Ḥabalite Traditionist were mainly third, second and first generation migrants, with the exception of Ibn al-Qayyim, who was native to Damascus. See, Joan Elizabeth Gilbert, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 94-95, 115, 153-162.

\textsuperscript{20} The Shafiʿī Ashʿarites were mostly natives to Damascus. See ibid; Michael Chamberlain, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 169-172.
imprisonment, and even nearly execution\textsuperscript{21}, at the hands of the authorities who favoured the Shaf’ī Ash‘arites.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{Ibn al-Qayyim’s Background and Characteristics}

Ibn al-Qayyim’s full name is Muḥammad Ibn Abī Bakr Ibn Ayūb and his epithet, Abū ʿAbd Allah and Shams al-Dīn, but he is most famously known as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (the son of the superintendent of the al-Jawziyya School).\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} Ibn al-Qayyim was nearly executed for his sermons in the cities of Quds and Nābulus; see, Muḥammad ʿAzīz Shams and ʿAlī Muḥammad al-ʿUmrānī, \textit{al-Jāmiʿ li-Sīrat Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya Khilāl Sab’a Qurūn}, Dār ‘Alim al-Fawāʾid, Mekkah, 1427AH, pp. 183-184.


Ibn al-Qayyim was born on 29 January 1292 (7 Safar 691AH) into a household renowned for their dedication in mastering and transmitting knowledge. Ibn al-Qayyim’s relatives are commonly described as possessing intellectual characteristics combined with piety and humility. Ibn al-Qayyim’s father, who was his first teacher, is described by Ibn Kathīr as,

…a righteous and honest man, who was persistent in worship. He learnt Prophetic Traditions from al-Rashīd al-Āmirī; he was befallen with a sudden death on a Sunday night on the nineteenth of Dhī al-Hijja at the al-Jawziyya School. His funeral prayer was after the Zuhur prayer in the al-Jāmiʿ after which he was then buried in the Bāb al-Ṣaghīr [cemetery]. His funeral was attended by a great number of people who praised him much; may God have mercy upon him. He was the father of the great scholar Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, the author of many great beneficial works.

Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim’s brother, Zayn al-Dīn, was a well-learned scholar who had nurtured outstanding students such as Ibn Rajab and his own son, ‘Imād al-Dīn. Also Ibn al-Qayyim’s son, Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd Allah Ibn Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, possessed an extraordinary intellect and memory; it is stated that he memorised the seventh chapter (Surat al-ʿArāf) in two days. When he was nine years of age, he led the prayer in which he recited the entire Quran. Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd Allah took charge of the al-Ṣadriyya School after his father Ibn al-Qayyim’s death.

Additionally, another of Ibn al-Qayyim’s sons, Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Ibn Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, was renowned for his knowledge of grammar and jurisprudence. He gave legal...
verdicts and taught in the al-Ṣadriyya school. He has two famous works: an explanation of the grammatical poem of Ibn Mālik entitled Ḯrāʾd al-Sālik ilā Ḧil Alfiyyat ibn Mālik\(^{29}\) and a long treatise on the opinions of Ibn Taymiyya entitled al-Masāʾil al-Fiqhiyya min Ikhtiyārāt Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya.\(^{30}\) Ibn Ḥajar records a dispute in which Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm supposedly took a disliking to Ibn Kathīr because he was an Ashʿarite; however, Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm did not believe this claim on the basis that Ibn Kathīr’s teacher was Ibn Taymiyya, an Ashʿarite critic.\(^{31}\)

It is also debated whether Ibn al-Qayyim himself was once an Ashʿarite\(^{32}\) and, though this may remain unclear, it is known that he had Ashʿarite teachers,\(^{33}\) students\(^{34}\) and that he even studied Ashʿarite theological texts, namely those of al-Rāzī’s al-Muḍābil and al-ʿArbaʾīn.\(^{35}\)

Ibn al-Qayyim is typically described as a Ḥanbali,\(^{36}\) however he was far from a bigoted Ḥanbali, as he was outspoken against any form of taqlīd\(^{37}\) (uncritical religious imitation). He was

\(^{29}\) Ed. Dr. Muḥammad al-Suhlī, Aḍwāʾ al-Salaf, Riyadh, 2002.


\(^{31}\) Ibn Ḥajar, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 60. Ibn Kathīr’s Tafsīr seems to promote Traditionalist doctrines in relations to divine attribute hence; this contradicts the claim that Ibn Kathīr was an Ashʿarite. See the verses dealing with divine attributes in Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr.


\(^{33}\) For example, Ibn al-Qayyim studied legal theories (Uṣūl al-Fiqh) and theology (Uṣūl al-Dīn) under Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Hindī, one of Ibn Taymiyya’s main Ashʿarite opponents. Cf. Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/ 271. Similarly, another Ashʿarite critic of Ibn Taymiyya who Ibn al-Qayyim studied under was, Muḥammad Abū al-Maʿālī al-Zamlakānī, see, ‘Iwād Allah al-Hijāzī, op. cit., p. 43.


\(^{35}\) cf. Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/271.

\(^{36}\) A follower of the Ḥanbalī School of legal thought which is ascribed to as the founder Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal.

an analytical scholar who developed his own positions and arguments which could ideally comply with his epistemological framework, which consists of: scripture, consensus of the Salaf, sound rationality (al-ʿaql al-sahih) and the natural disposition (al-fitra al-salima). But if there was no conclusive scriptural proof on a certain theological issue, Ibn al-Qayyim commonly engages, harmonises and synthesises the views of various theological schools in order to develop his Traditionalist positions. Hence, in this regard, he was open-minded with a positivist outlook on previous scholar’s opinions - regardless of their theological or philosophical orientations. This is also evident in the numerous differences between himself and his teacher, Ibn Taymiyya, and not to mention his strong inclination toward Sufism. Ibn al-Qayyim states that, to know the merits of the classical scholars of Islam, their prestigious knowledge and works for Islam, does not necessarily oblige us to accept everything they say. Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim states regarding uncritical religious imitation (taqlid):

> The jurist who fears his position in front of his Lord must be cautious not to give a legal verdict according to his school of legal thought (madhhab) in which he religiously imitates (yuqalidahu) while he knows clearly that another school is more correct on the issue than his school and is more correct in regards to the evidence.

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39 In his book The Soul (al-Rūḥ), he differed with his master on the exegesis of the Quranic verse, (39:42); similarly, the waiting period of a divorced girl, (al-ʿIdda) and also the reasons for the prohibition of interest, (ʿillat al-Ribā) alongside many more issues.


42 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 177.
Thus, it was foreseeable that he would differ from the mainstream views of his time. In fact, he was imprisoned on several occasions\(^43\) - and nearly faced execution\(^44\) - due to his unconventional legal and theological opinions.\(^45\)

Ibn al-Qayyim is also described with pietistic and intellectual characteristics by his contemporaries. His student Ibn Kathîr describes him as possessing fine recitation and manners. Ibn Kathîr goes on to describe Ibn al-Qayyim as very kind indeed; he never envied, harmed, belittled nor mocked anyone. He was instead well known for his piety and honourable character.\(^46\) Ibn al-Qayyim’s prayers were so lengthy, that many of his associates criticised him; however, this did not impede him.\(^47\) Similarly, another student, Ibn Rajab, portrays Ibn al-Qayyim as follows:

May God have mercy upon his soul; he was devoted to worship, night prayers, and had extremely long prayers. He was very fond of the Remembrance of God [\textit{dhikr}] in which he exalted much. He venerated the love and obedience of God, seeking forgiveness and the sole dependence on Him alone. He was a very humbling person, indeed…. I have never witnessed nor seen the like of him. I have never seen a scholar who possesses profound knowledge or knows the deep meanings of the Quran and Sunna - and the realities of faith like him. That is not to say that he is infallible but rather I have never seen the likes of him.\(^48\)

Ibn Ḥajar explains that Ibn al-Qayyim would routinely sit in the same place in the mosque after the \textit{fajr} prayer, while remembering God (\textit{dhkir}) until sunrise; he would say that ‘this is my sustenance, if I do not do this then I will have no strength’.\(^49\)

In addition to Ibn al-Qayyim’s pietistic characteristics, he also possessed such intellectual qualities that he had mastered many fields of Islamic knowledge from a very young age,\(^43\) Ibn Kathîr, \textit{al-Bidâya wa al-Nihâya}, Vol. 14, p. 202; Ibn Ḥajar, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 4, p. 23; Ibn Rajab, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, p. 448.

\(^44\) See, Muḥammad ʿAzîr Shams and ʿAlî Muḥammad al-ʿUmrâni, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 183-184.

\(^45\) See, Caterina Bori and Livnat Holtzman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 22-26.


\(^47\) ibid

\(^48\) Ibn Rajab, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, p. 450.

\(^49\) Ibn Ḥajar, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 4, pp. 21-22.
including major references of Arabic language which he had mastered by the age of nineteen.\(^{50}\) According to Ibn Rajab, Ibn al-Qayyim had reached competence in many subjects such as jurisprudence (fīqh), Quranic exegesis (tafsīr), theology (Uṣūl al-Dīn), Traditions (hadīth), legal theory (Uṣūl al-fiqh), Arabic, and rational theology (Kalām). Equally, he possessed profound knowledge of mannerism (sulūk) and Sufism (taṣwīf).\(^{51}\) Ibn al-Qayyim’s intellectual proficiency has also been described by Ibn Taghrī Bardī:

…he was proficient in many sciences, from exegesis, jurisprudence, Arabic language, grammar, Traditions, and both the fundamentals (Usūl) [Uṣūl al-Fiqh and Uṣūl al-Dīn] and the subdivisions (farā‘). He studied under Ibn Taymiyya after the latter had returned from Cairo, 712 /1312, and took from him [Ibn Taymiyya] plenty of knowledge until he became a major figure during his time and many benefitted from him.\(^{52}\)

Ibn al-Qayyim is commonly conveyed as being greatly passionate about collecting rare books\(^{53}\), which would have been fundamental in the development of his intellectual qualities and which also explains how he managed to engage with distinguished figures such as Ibn Sīnā, the Peripatetic philosopher and al-Rāzī, the Ash’arite philosophical theologian. Likewise, his passion for books also explains how he managed to produce a copious amount of authorship; hence, he was likely a workaholic bookish man who preferred pious scientific endeavours to confrontation of any kind.\(^{54}\) Furthermore, evidence that Ibn al-Qayyim possessed a huge medieval library\(^{55}\) is recorded in his extensive lists of references made in many of his writings. For example, in his book Ijtīmā‘ al-Juyush al-Islāmiya, which is one hundred and thirty five pages long, Ibn al-Qayyim makes reference to more than one hundred books in one section alone - namely Divine

\(^{50}\) Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 50.
\(^{52}\) Ibn Taghrībardī, op. cit., vol. 10, p. 249.
\(^{54}\) Birgit Krawietz, op. cit., p. 1.
\(^{55}\) Ibn Hajar states that after Ibn al-Qayyim’s death, his children were selling their father’s books which lasted a very long time (dahr ṭawīl)- except for what they keep for themselves. See al-Durar al-Kāmina fī ‘Ayān al-Mi‘at al-Thāmina, vol. 4, p 22.
Ascending (al-istiwā’). In his *Shīfā’ al-ʿalīl*, he makes reference to over one hundred and twenty books. His student Ibn Rajab emphasises ‘he very much loved his books, research, authoring and obtaining books that were rare.’

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Table 1: A Construction of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Theological Library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asha’rites</th>
<th>Books</th>
<th>Mu’tazilites</th>
<th>Books</th>
<th>Philosophers</th>
<th>Books</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibn Fūruk</td>
<td>Tajrīd Maqālāt Ibn Kulāb</td>
<td>Abū al-Ḥusayn</td>
<td>Al-Muʿtamad</td>
<td>Ikhwān Ṣafā</td>
<td>Rasā’il</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Bāqillānī</td>
<td>al-Tamhīd al-Ibāna al-Daqaʿīq Tamhīd al-Awā’il</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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58 This construction will help give us an idea with whom and what sources Ibn al-Qayyim was engaging with.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Works</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Works</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-Taqrīb</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ibn Rushd</td>
<td>Manāhīj Muqaddīma Tahāfut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Juwaynī</td>
<td>al-Shāmīl al-Irshād al-Nazzāmīyya</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Ghazālī</td>
<td>İlyâ Tahāfut al-Maḍnūn al-Basît</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ibn ‘Arabî al-Futūḥât Fusûs</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Āmadî</td>
<td>Abkār</td>
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<td>al-Sharastānî</td>
<td>al-Milal</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Qushayrî</td>
<td>al-Riṣāla al-Shikâya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibn ʿAsâkir</td>
<td>Tibîîn</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Ibn Ḥazm]59</td>
<td>al-Faṣl fī al-Milal al-Iḥkām Marâṭib</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

59 There is difference of opinion as to whether Ibn Ḥazm was an Ashʿarite. See discussion on page 65, note 196 and page 171, note 128.
Ibn al-Qayyim seemed to have integrated learning and teaching into his life from a very early stage, given that he was an imām in the madrasa al-Jawziyya, a teacher in the madrasa al-Šudriyya,\(^{60}\) an author of many books and one who gave legal verdicts as a jurist (faqīh).\(^ {61}\)

### Ibn al-Qayyim’s Education and Legacy

Ibn al-Qayyim studied under many teachers of various theological and legal orientations. By far the most influential teacher on Ibn al-Qayyim’s life was Shaykh al-Islām Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn ‘Abd al-Hālīm Ibn Taymiyya al-Ḥanbalī (d. 728/1328). Ibn al-Qayyim took Ibn Taymiyya as his dearest teacher sometime after the year 712/1312, in which Ibn Taymiyya arrived in Damascus.\(^ {62}\) Ibn al-Qayyim became a devoted student of Ibn Taymiyya until the latter’s death in 728/1328. Hence, Ibn al-Qayyim studied with Ibn Taymiyya for approximately seventeen years.

Al-Shihāb al-‘Ābir Aḥmad Ibn ‘Abd al-Rāhmān al-Nābulṣī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 697/1298) was one of Ibn al-Qayyim’s first teachers\(^ {63}\), under whom he studied dream interpretation (al-ta’bīr); however, due to Ibn al-Qayyim being so young, perhaps six or seven years of age, and the Shaykh, al-Shihāb al-‘Ābir, being so old, he was unable to complete this discipline.\(^ {64}\) Another early teacher of Ibn al-Qayyim was his father Abū Bakr Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 700/1300) with whom he studied the laws of inherence (al-farāʾiḍ) - given that he was very competent in this discipline.\(^ {65}\) The famous linguist, Abū al-Faṭḥ al-Baʿlabkī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 709/1309) was another teacher with whom Ibn al-Qayyim studied texts of Arabic grammar such as: the al-Mulakhkhas

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\(^{60}\) Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, *op. cit.*, p. 66. It is also likely that Ibn al-Qayyim taught elsewhere since al-Sakhāwī states that many prominent scholars befitted from him as he taught in various places. See, Ṣadīq Khān, *al-TĀj al-Mukallal*, p. 419.


\(^{62}\) ibid., p. 163.

\(^{63}\) Al-Ṣafadī, *op. cit.*, 2/ 270.


\(^{65}\) Al-Ṣafadī, *op. cit.*, 2/ 270.
of Abū al-Baqā‘, al-Juma of al-Jurjānī, al-Fiyya of Ibn Mālik, most of the al-Kāfiyya al-Shāfiyya and some of the al-Tashīl, both of Ibn Mālik. 66 Amongst Ibn al-Qayyim’s Ḥadīth teachers is the female Traditionist (muḥadditha), al-Fāṭima Umm Muḥammad bint Shaykh Ibrāhīm Ibn Jawhar (d. 711/1311).67 Ibn al-Qayyim also studied under one of Ibn Taymiyya’s teachers, named Zayn al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn ʿAbd al-Dā‘īm (d. 718/1318).68

Interestingly, Ibn al-Qayyim studied quite extensively under a few of Ibn Taymiyya’s critics. The Ash’arite Muḥammad Ṣafī al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Hindī al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 715/1315) 69, for example, with whom Ibn al-Qayyim studied both disciples of legal theories and theology - including al-Rāzī’s al-Arbā‘īn and al-Muḥāṣṣal.70 Additionally, another two interesting Ash’ārite scholars - both of whom commonly go unnoticed - whom Ibn al-Qayyim studied under were: Muḥammad Abū al-Mā‘āli Khāli al-Dīn al-Zamlakānī al-Shāfī‘ī (d. 727/1327)71 and Muḥammad al-Qāḍī Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamā‘a al-Shāfī‘ī (d. 733/1332).72 Kamāl al-Dīn al-Zamlakānī, who was the Judge of Aleppo, was a celebrated critic of Ibn Taymiyya’s theological opinions.73 Similarly, Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamā‘a74 was a staunch Ash’ārite who authored many works and held numerous positions as judge and teacher throughout the Levant and Egypt. It is not quite clear whether he was also a critic of Ibn Taymiyya, though it is very much likely given his apologetic Ash’ārite works. It is not quite clear when Ibn al-Qayyim studied with these Ash’ārite scholars - but it is likely that it was before the year 712/1312 when he met Ibn Taymiyya and took the latter as his teacher. However, the fact that Ibn al-Qayyim had apologetic Ash’ārite teachers and studied main Ash’ārite texts strongly implies that he was an Ash’ārite in some early stage of his learning. Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim mentions in his al-

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66 ibid
67 ibid
68 ibid
69 al-Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/ 270.
70 ibid
71 ʿIwaḍ allah Ḥijāzī, op. cit., p. 43; Ibn ʾImād, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 79.
72 al-Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/ 270.
74 For more on Ibn al-Qayyim’s teachers, see, Muhammad Muslim al-Ghunaymī, op. cit., p. 102; ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm Sharf al-Dīn, op. cit., p. 73; Bakr Ibn Ābi Zayd, op. cit., p. 161- 178.
that he had previously held similar views to the Ashārīs regarding the allegorical interpretation (ta‘wil) of divine attributes - something he later repented from. However, it was his Lord who relieved him from such doubts (shubuhār), when a man from the land of al-Ḥayrān–Ibn Tayyimyya took him by the hand and showed him what he believed to be the true way. Ibn al-Qayyim states that neither his actions nor tongue could ever thank Ibn Taymiyya as he truly deserves; for verily, he invokes God to bless him with grace, paradise and to be pleased with him for he is worthy of such pleasure.

In the poem, Ibn al-Qayyim begins with sincere advice from a sympathetic and compassionate brother who intends to help the people (al-qawm) and then mentions his experience, as he puts it, as ‘what he fell into’ and then was saved from. Hence, Ibn al-Qayyim was not foreign to rational theology (‘ilm Kalām) and the rational theologians (al-mutakalimūn), in particular the Ashārites. Nonetheless, this did not stop Ibn al-Qayyim from engaging with Ashārite texts, which helped him further develop doctrines he believed to inform correct Traditionalist positions, as we shall see in coming chapters.

Ibn al-Qayyim nurtured students who became scholars of outstanding calibre. These include: Ismā‘īl ‘Imād al-Dīn Ibn Kathīr (d. 773/1371), the author of Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr and al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya;90 and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī (d. 795/1393), the author of Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābilā and Sharḥ Sahih al-Bukhārī.91

Interestingly, the prominent Ashārite scholar of Damascus, Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī al-Shafi‘ī (d. 756/1355), was also a student of Ibn al-Qayyim92 and a popular critic of Ibn Taymiyya

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76 ibid., vol. 2, pp. 570–571.
77 ibid.
78 ibid., vol. 2, pp. 570.
81 Ibn Ḥajar has states that al-Subkī studied Prophetic Traditions (Ahādīth) under various scholars of whom include Ibn al-Qayyim. See, al-Durar al-Kāmina, vol. 3, p. 134.
then later Ibn al-Qayyim.\textsuperscript{82} Al-Subkī has many important works which include his biographical encyclopaedia of Shafi’ite scholars, his famous \textit{fatāwā} and his classical legal theory text, \textit{Jam’ al-Jawāmī’}, which synthesised the multiple methodologies on legal theories, namely the method of the jurists and the method of the rational theologians. Additionally, al-Subkī authored various epistles which refute Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim on various theological doctrines.\textsuperscript{83}

Another outstanding student of Ibn al-Qayyim is the Traditionist (\textit{muḥaddith}) and historian, Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad Ibn ʿUthmān al-Dhahabī al-Shāfiʿī (d. 748/1347)\textsuperscript{84}, who was at times also critical of Ibn Taymiyya.\textsuperscript{85} Al-Dhahabī has many classical works that are of great importance in Ḥadīth scholarship.\textsuperscript{86} Muḥammad Shams al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allah Ibn Aḥmad Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī (d. 744/1343)\textsuperscript{87} is another famous Traditionist scholar who studied under Ibn al-Qayyim\textsuperscript{88} and is the author of numerous important works.\textsuperscript{89} Lastly, al-Shawkānī states that the famous linguist Muḥammad Ibn Yaʿqūb Ibn Muḥammad al-Fayrūz ʿābādī (d. 817/1414) was also a student of Ibn al-Qayyim.\textsuperscript{90}


\textsuperscript{84} This is based on Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd’s discovery in a manuscript of Al-Dhahabī’s \textit{al-Muʾjam al-Mukhtasṣ}, which is located in the Islamic University of Madinah. See Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 181.


\textsuperscript{87} He is the author of many famous works in Hadīth and History.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibn Rajab, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, p. 450.


Despite the political and social difficulties during and around Ibn al-Qayyim’s era, it was necessary for him to engage in intellectual discourse in order to further develop and systematise ‘Traditionalist theology’, as it was a time and place where the Traditionalists and the Ash’arites were in an intellectual battle to claim title as the sole inheritors of orthodoxy and thereby make their mark on Islamic society globally. For this reason we find Ibn al-Qayyim, like his contemporaries, authoring numerous works on various topics, all of which contributed to the development of knowledge. Therefore, in addition to the many important students and works of Ibn al-Qayyim, perhaps his most distinct legacy was his development and systematisation of Traditionalist theology, incorporating debates in philosophical theology which were relative to his time. As we shall see in the coming chapters, Ibn al-Qayyim manages to further develop the positions of the Traditionalist school by engaging with various theological schools and intellectuals who then allowed him to synthesise, harmonise and, at times, introduce new concepts in order to avoid the difficulties faced by his predecessors. Such philosophical discussions are then presented under well organised headings within works dedicated to specific issues of philosophical theology.

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91 I would like to thank Jon Hoover for pointing this out to me, namely Ibn al-Qayyim systematising his theology—perhaps a pivotal difference between him and Ibn Taymiyya.

92 For a detailed list of Ibn al-Qayyim’s works, refer to: ’Iwad ’Allah Hijāzī, op. cit., p. 46-50; Muḥammad al-Ghunaymī, op. cit., p. 111-117; Dr. ’Abd al-ʿAẓīm Sharf al-Dīn, op. cit., p. 74-76; Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 199-309, 1423AH; Birgit Krawietz, op. cit., p. 28-60.

93 Ibn al-Qayyim’s intellectual development is evident in two of his methodological employment: firstly, his synthesis and harmonization of existing views so that his end result will usually avoid problematic implications and will tend to conform to his Traditionalist epistemology. Secondly, his ‘Traditionalistization’ of various disciplines which witnessed non-engagement by the Traditionalists prior to Ibn al-Qayyim; for example, the ‘Traditionalistization’ of philosophical theology in his Shifāʾ and the ‘Traditionalistization’ of Sufism in his Madārij. The second methodology also encompasses the first.

94 This approach will be evident in chapter three to chapter seven.

95 See the sub-headings and chapter outline of Ibn al-Qayyim’s philosophical theology works and compared it to that of Ibn Taymiyya’s.
Ibn al-Qayyim’s Works Related to Divine Determination

*Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī masāʾil al-Qadāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Hikma wa al-Taʿlīl*\(^{96}\) is the largest known work dedicated to the concept of divine determination and the interrelated issues therein such as human agency, meta-ethics, divine causality and evil. It is in this work that Ibn al-Qayyim’s original contributions in philosophical theology can be appreciated most as he seems to engage with various schools and figures; as a result, he experiments with ideas and develops his own positions.

Similarly, the organisation of chapters in the *Shifāʾ* is one of many examples of Ibn al-Qayyim’s systematisation of Traditionalist theology, categorising discussions on a given topic under one given chapter. This is unlike Ibn Taymiyya, whose discussions on a given topic are scattered throughout his many works.\(^{97}\) For example, the chapter outline of *Shifāʾ* is as follows: *Introduction*; Chapter One: *Measuring the Divine Determining (Taqdīr al-Maqādīr) before the creation of the Heavens and Earth*; Chapter Two: *The Divine Determining of Misery, Happiness, Sustenance, Lifespan and Actions of the Slaves before their Creation*; Chapter Three: *The Dialogue between Adam and Moses and the Prophet’s Reaction*; Chapter Four: *The Divine Determination of the Foetus in the Womb and Harmonising the Conflicting Traditions Concerning it*; Chapter Five: *The Night of Divine Determining, (laylat al-qadar)*; Chapter Six: *The Daily Divine Determining*; Chapter Seven: *Divine Determination Does Not Equate to Complusionism*; Chapter Eight: *An Exegesis of (21: 101) of the Quran*; Chapter Nine: *An

\(^{96}\) See, *Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qadāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Hikma wa al-Taʿlīl*, eds. ʿĀhmēd al-Samʿānī and Aḥlāl al-Ajlānī, Dār al-Ṣumayī, Riyadh, 2008. This edition is based on a complete manuscript that includes both the introduction and chapter twenty two- found in Yūsif Āghā Library, Konya, Turkey, No. 5440.

Exegesis of (54: 49) of the Quran; Chapter Ten: The Levels of Divine Decree and Determination (Divine Knowledge); Chapter Eleven: Divine Writing (al-Kitāba); Chapter Twelfth: The Divine Volition (al-Mashī'a); Chapter Thirteen: Divine Creation (al-Khalq); Chapter Fourteen: On Guidance and Misguidance: its Levels, its Determining and Non-determining for the Creation; Chapter Fifteen: The Ability of Good Deeds and the Inability of Good Deeds; Chapter Sixteen: The Creation of Man’s Actions in The Traditions; Chapter Seventeen: On Acquisition (Kasb) and Compulsionism (Jabr); Chapter Eighteen: On Action (ji’îl), More Efficacious (af’îl) and Passivity (infi’îl); Chapter Nineteen: A Dialogue between a Compulsionist (jabrī) and a Sunnī; Chapter Twenty: A Dialogue between a Qadarite and a Sunnī; Chapter Twenty One: The Exclusion of Evil from the Divine Decree and Determination; Chapter Twenty Two: The Affirmation of Divine Wisdom behind the Creation; Chapter Twenty Three: Refutations on the Denial of Divine Wisdom; Chapter Twenty Four: The Explanation of the Salaf regarding Good and Evil in Divine Determination; Chapter Twenty Five: On Evil and God’s Actions; Chapter Twenty Six: An Exegesis of a Traditional Supplication (1); Chapter Twenty Seven: An Exegesis of a Traditional Supplication (2); Chapter Twenty Eight: On the Contentment of Divine Determination and the Differences of Opinion; Chapter Twenty Nine: On the Division of Divine Decree: Universal and Legislative; Chapter Thirty: On the Natural Disposition (fiṭra).

Table 2: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in Shifā

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-Ash’arī</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>al-‘Allāf</td>
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<td>Ibn Sīnā</td>
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<td>al-Ishārī Shifā’</td>
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<td>Ibn Fūrak</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tajrīd</td>
<td>al-Nazzām</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Baqillānī</td>
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<td>al-Tamhīd</td>
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<td>al-Juwaynī</td>
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<td>al-Nazzāmiyya</td>
<td>Abū ‘Alī</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This table illustrates whom and what sources Ibn al-Qāyyim was engaging with and how many times he referred to a particular individual.
Table 3: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in Miftāḥ

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<tr>
<td>al-Rāzī</td>
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<td>al-Mabāḥith al-Nihāya al-Maṭālib</td>
<td>al-Zamakhsharī</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Al-Kashshāf</td>
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</table>

*Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿāda wa Manshūr wilaya al-ʾilm wa al-irāda* is one of Ibn al-Qayyim’s early works which discusses the human attributes of knowledge and will, both as means of attaining happiness and success. As important is Ibn al-Qayyim’s comprehensive discussion on meta-ethics, which is directly relevant to my study given that he engages with various schools and figures in order to develop his positions on meta-ethical problems related to divine determination.

See ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Ḥassan Ibn Qāʾid’s edition, Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1432AH.
Jabbār

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
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<th>Mu’tazilites</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Books</th>
<th>Philosophers</th>
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<td>Abū ‘īsā al-Rumānī</td>
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<td>al-Rāzī</td>
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<td>Tafsīr</td>
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<td>Manāqīb</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

ʻTarīq al-Hijratayn wa Bāb al-Sā’ādatayn\(^{100}\) is an early work which discusses the significance of worshiping God alone and spiritually imitating the Prophet in the spiritual journey towards God. Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussion on the origins and nature of evil and its relationship to divine determination is again directly relevant to my study.

**Table 4: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in ʻTarīq**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asha’rites</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Books</th>
<th>Mu’tazilites</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Books</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-Ash’arī</td>
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<td>Maqālāt</td>
<td>Abū ‘Alī</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibn Ḥazm</td>
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<td></td>
<td>al-Zamakhsharī</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Al-Kashāf</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Bāqillānī</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>al-Qushayrī</td>
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<td>al-Rāzī</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Al-Mabāhib</td>
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</table>

Badā‘i’-al-Fawā` id\(^{101}\) is a compendium which consists of essays on diverse topics such as grammar, Arabic language, law and theology. The exegesis of chapter one hundred and thirteenth of the Quran - The Twilight (*al-falaq*) - illuminates Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussions on evil, which is also relevant to my study due to its connectedness with divine determination.

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\(^{100}\) See Muḥammad Ajmal al-Iṣlāḥī’s edition, Dār ‘Ālim al-Fawā’ id, Mekka, 1429AH.

\(^{101}\) See Alī Ibn Muḥammad al-‘Umārān’s edition, n.d.
Table 5: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in *Badā‘i‘*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asha’rites</th>
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<th>Books</th>
<th>Mu’tazilites</th>
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<td><em>Marāṭib</em></td>
<td>al-Zamakhšārī</td>
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<td>al-Juwaynī</td>
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<td><em>Al-Nazzāmiyya</em></td>
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<td>al-Rāzī</td>
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<td><em>Al-Sirr al-Maktūm</em></td>
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*Madārij al-Sālikīn bayn Manāzīl iyyāk na’bud wa iyāk nasta‘īn*\(^{102}\) is one of Ibn al-Qayyim’s largest works on moral theology. It is the exposition of Imām al-Harawī’s *Manāzīl al-Sā‘īrah*, which discusses the various spiritual stations in the journey towards God.\(^{103}\)

Table 6: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in *Madārij*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asha’rites</th>
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<th>Books</th>
<th>Philosophers</th>
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<td>Aristole</td>
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<td>al-Juwaynī</td>
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<td><em>Al-Shāmil</em></td>
<td><em>Al-Irshād</em></td>
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<td><em>Al-Nazzāmiyya</em></td>
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<td>Ibn Sinā</td>
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<td><em>Fusūs</em></td>
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<td>al-Qushayrī</td>
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<td><em>Al-Risāla</em></td>
<td><em>‘Arabī</em></td>
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<td><em>Iḥyā‘</em></td>
<td>al-Suhrawardī</td>
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<td><em>‘Awārif al-Ma‘ānī</em></td>
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\(^{102}\) See the joint edition by Dr. Nāṣīr al-Sa‘wī, Dr. Alī al-Qar‘āwī, Dr. Ṣaliḥ al-Tawayjri, Dr. Khālid al-Ghunaym and Dr. Muḥammad al-Khudaryrī, Dār al-Ṣumayrī, Riyadh, 2011.

Ijtima’ al-Juyūsh al-Islāmiyya ‘alā al-Mu’attila wa al-Jahmiyya\textsuperscript{104} is a work dedicated to the doctrine of God’s transcendence above His creation; within it Ibn al-Qayyim engages with philosophers and theologians.

**Table 7: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in Ijtima’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asha’rites</th>
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<th>Philosophers</th>
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<th>Books</th>
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<td>Aristotle</td>
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<td><em>al-Amānī</em></td>
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<td><em>Iḥbāt al-Sīfāt</em></td>
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<td><em>Al-ʿUmd fī al-Ruʿya</em></td>
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Ibn Fārak  2  *Al-Mujarrad*  (Tajrīd)  Ibn Sīnā  2  

al-Bāqillānī  5  *Al-Tamhīd*  1  *Manāḥij*  (al-Kashf)  Ibn Rushd  1  

al-Juwaynī  3  *Al-Irshād*  *Al-Nazzāmiyya*  

al-Īṣfārāyīnī  2  

al-Qushayrī  1  

al-Rāzī  3  *Aqsām al-Lladhāt*  

Ibn ʿAṣākir  1  *Tībīyīn*  

Ḥādī al-Arwāḥ ilā Bilād al-Afrāḥ\textsuperscript{105} is dedicated largely to a description of Paradise but it also contains a discussion on the duration of Hell.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{104} See Zā’īd Ibn ʿAḥmad al-Nushayrī’s edition, Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1431AH.  
\textsuperscript{105} See Zā’īd Ibn ʿAḥmad al-Nushayrī’s edition, Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1428AH.
Table 8: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in Ḥāḍirī

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asha’rites</th>
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<th>Books</th>
<th>Mu’tazilites</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Books</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-Ash’arī</td>
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<td>Maqālāt</td>
<td>al-‘Allāf</td>
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<td>al-Rāzī</td>
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<td>Tafsīr</td>
<td>al-Jubbā‘ī</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Qushayrī</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Al-Risāla</td>
<td>al-Zamakhsharī</td>
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<td>Al-Kashshāf</td>
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*Mukhtāṣir* ¹⁰⁷ al-Ṣawā‘īq al-Mursalā ‘alā al-Jahmiyya wa al-Mu‘aṭṭila ¹⁰⁸ is one of Ibn al-Qayyim’s last works. It discusses the methodological allegorical interpretation employed by theologians and philosophers regarding divine attributes. ¹⁰⁹

Table 9: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in al-Ṣawā‘īq (Mukhtasar)

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<td>al-‘Allāf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(4)¹¹⁰ Maqālāt ghayr al-Islāmiyyīn</td>
<td>Pythagoras</td>
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¹⁰⁸ See Dr. ʿAlī al-Dakhīl Allah’s edition, Dār al-ʿĀṣima, Riyadh, 1408AH.


¹¹⁰ The numbers in parenthesis represent the number of citations in the *Mukhtāṣir*. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author of Work</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Al-Nazzām</td>
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<td>al-Bāqillānī</td>
<td><em>Al-Tamhīd</em></td>
<td>Al-Khayyāt</td>
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<td><em>Al-Ibāna</em></td>
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<td><em>Al-Daqāʿīq</em></td>
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"al-Kāfiyya al-Shāfiyya fi al-intiṣār li-al-Firqa al-Nājiyya," also known as al-Qaṣīda al-Nuniyya, is a theological poem which summarises most of Ibn al-Qayyim’s theological works in a six thousand line ode ending in the letter nūn.

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111 See the joint edition by Muḥammad al-ʿArīfī, Nāṣir al-Hunaynī, ʿAbd Allah al-Hudhayl and Fahd al-Masāʿīd, 1428AH.
112 Ode rhyming in the letter ‘nūn’ at the end of each stanza.
A Chronology of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Works

Table 10: A Chronology of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Works
The chronological order starts from top to bottom. The solid arrows indicate that the work is cited whereas the broken arrows denote a lack of citation but contain similar themes.

Eventually, Ibn al-Qayyim died on a Thursday night, the thirteenth of Rajab (751/1350), at the age of sixty. His funeral prayer took place the next day, after the zuhr prayer, in the Umayyid Mosque and then in the Jarrāḥ mosque - which is beside his place of rest in the Bāb al-Šagḥīr cemetery, Damascus. Ibn Kathīr states that his funeral was full: many attended amongst the Judges, the Notables and the Scholars. People swarmed and rivaled to carry his coffin.118 Ibn Rajab reports a dream of Ibn al-Qayyim, just before his death, wherein Ibn al-Qayyim asked Ibn Taymiyya about his level in Paradise - the latter responded by pointing to the top, above some

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114 Both Joseph Bell and Livnat Holtzman, state that *Ṭariq al-Hijratayn* is a later work; however, it has been cited in *Ijtīmāʿ al-Juyūsh* and also discusses similar topics found in *Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl*. Hence, if it was after *Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl* then Ibn al-Qayyim would have most probably referred to it during the similar discussions- as is very common of him. Cf. Joseph, N. Bell, *Love Theory in Later Hanbalite Thought*, State University of New York Press, 1979, pp. 97-98, 102; Livant Holtzman, ‘Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah’, in *Essays in Arabic Literary Biography 1350-1850*, eds. Joseph Lowry and Devin Stewart, 2009, Wiesbaden, pp. 202-203, 218-219.

115 Livnat Holtzman includes this in Ibn al-Qayyim’s middle works while Joseph Bell includes it in the early works. Both seem to be inconsistency with the fact that it cites *al-Ṣawāʾiq al-Mursala*, which was written after *Ḥādī al-Awrāḥ* (745/1344) - six years before Ibn al-Qayyim’s death. Cf. Joseph Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 95, 102; Livant Holtzman, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-203, 215.

116 This is the smaller work on Rūḥ (the soul) and not the now lost *Maʿrifat al-Rūḥ wa al-Nafs* which is cited in *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, ed. Muhammad al-ʾIshāḥī, Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1432AH, p. 108. Similarly, two manuscripts of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, contain the phrase rahimahu allah, after the citation of al-Qāḍī Nūr al-Dīn Ibn al-Šāʿīgh who died 749/1348; hence it is likely that *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* was summarised after this year, unless the phrase was inserted by a scribe.


major scholars. Then Ibn Taymiyya said to Ibn al-Qayyim: *you nearly caught up to us but you are now on the same level as Ibn Khuzayma* (a Traditionist of the tenth century).\(^{119}\)

Lastly, al-Ṣafadī states that he used to hear Ibn al-Qayyim recite the following poem, which resonates with the idea of a humble scholar:

> This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, whose sins are numerous.
>   Hence the one who decries him is not to be blamed [for doing so]!
> This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who is ignorant of himself.
>   He is also ignorant of the Divine Command, and why should he have knowledge of it at all?
> This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who has taken the front seat for himself.
>   So he disseminates knowledge, while he himself has none.
> This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who aspires to a communion with the Sublime.
>   While sins are his main interest and occupation.
> This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who wishes to ascend to the Heavenly Garden of Retreat.
>   Although he has no determination to do so.
> This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who sees the benefit in things that are bound to become extinct and perish.
>   Those [are the] things in whose abandonment is actually the greatest prize of all.
> This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who is bound to fail in his efforts.
>   Since he has no share in doing good deeds.
> This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who is, as his Creator says, ‘fretful’ and ‘ungrateful’. He is described as sinful and foolish.
> This is the little boy of Abū Bakr and his like became those who lead the creatures
>   By issuing their fatāwā [formal legal opinions].
> However, they have no ability when it comes to real knowledge, piety and asceticism.
> Their main concern is worldly things.
> I do declare, had the Prophet’s companions seen the most meritorious amongst the little boy of Abū Bakr and his like,
>   They surely would have said: They are ‘deaf and dumb’.\(^{120}\)

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Conclusion

In this chapter I have illuminated how Damascus during Ibn al-Qayyim’s era was a centre for intellectual engagement and the development of knowledge. Similarly, I have elaborated upon those of Ibn al-Qayyim’s intellectual characteristics which were essential for his transmission and development of knowledge, including his critical engagements and his likely conversion from Ash‘arism to Traditionalism. Lastly, I have also elucidated the fact that Ibn al-Qayyim had studied non-Traditionalist texts under non-Traditionalist scholars and also that he possessed an extensive library which included an abundance of non-Traditionalist sources, all of which he had engaged with on his project of theological development. In the next chapter, I shall investigate the extent to which contemporary Traditionalist conception bases its puritan theology on a utopian monolithic first three generation of Islam that apparently never differed on theological issues. In addition, I shall also explore early critical engagements and theological developments in the various schools of theology.

2- EARLY CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTS AND THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Introduction

What I intend to show in this chapter is that the early Muslim generations also engaged with each other and differed in their opinions on theological concepts, which promoted developments over the centuries by both individual theologians and collective schools of theology. As such, the answers to the problematic implications of some theological concepts were not always found in scripture or a utopian monolithic first three generations of Islam.

Early Theological Differences amongst the Companions: Monolithic or Pluralistic?

One factor that contributes to the theological intra-dialogue of disengagement in contemporary Traditionalists and their isolation from non-Traditionals schools is the presence of authoritative statements which completely deny any form of theological differences between the Companions.\(^1\) As such, these statements imply that a Traditionalist puritan theology is based on the monolithic theology of the Companions.\(^2\). However, this concept of a monolithic theology

\(^{1}\) For contemporary religious authorities who advocate this statement, see, ʿAbd Allah Ibn Muhammad al-Ghulayfī, ʿIlām al-Muʾminīn bi-ann al-Ṣaḥāba lam yakhtilifū fī al-ʿAqīda wa Uṣūl al-Dīn, Khalīfa, Mekkah, n.d. These statements go on further to claim that the Salaf (first three generations) never differed on theological issues. On the contrary, we find that there were theological differences amongst the Salaf- whether it be fundament or subsidiary theological issues- such as: ruling by other than revelation, excommunication of the Kharijites, duration of Hell-Fire, description of general divine nearness, description of had (limit) for God, description of divine descending, does divine descending consist of movement?, does the divine throne become empty of God?, the creation of Adam in His image, does God have a soul?, utilizing the status of the Prophet in invocations, the permissibility of swearing oath by the Prophet, etc.

\(^{2}\) Likewise is the case with the implication that a Traditionalist puritan theology is based on a monolithic theology of the first three generation of Islam, namely the Salaf, whom never differed on matters concerning theology.
amongst the Companions is not entirely correct. For example, the wife of the Prophet, 'Ā‘isha differed with the companion Ibn 'Abbās on whether the Prophet saw his Lord during his heavenly ascension (al-mi`rāj). 'Ā‘isha denied such vision whilst Ibn 'Abbās affirmed it. Additionally, 'Ā‘isha also differed with 'Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb on whether the dead are punished as a result of people wailing over them and also whether the dead can hear those who talk over their graves. In both instances, she stated that 'Umar was mistaken in believing that the dead get punished for other peoples’ sins, such as wailing, and that the dead can hear the living. Unlike 'Umar, 'Ā‘isha found support in the Quran: Each soul earns only on its own account, nor does any laden bear another’s load. Truly you cannot cause the Dead to listen... But you cannot make those to hear who are (buried) in graves.

In another instance, we find that 'Ā‘isha, 'Abd Allah Ibn 'Amr, Ibn Mas‘ūd, and Ibn 'Abbās, all differed on whether it was permissible to wear amulets which contain scriptural inscriptions, since such practice could be a form of associationism (shirk) as one may believe that something other than God, namely the amulet, is capable of protection. 'Ā‘isha was of the opinion that it was permissible to wear such things but only after a tribulation to prevent the belief that the amulet gives protection. 'Abd Allah Ibn 'Amr, Ibn al-‘Āṣ held that it was permissible at all times to wear it, regardless of the timing of any tribulations. Standing in

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3 The following theological differences amongst the Companions is not a comprehensive attempt, bearing in mind that political and legal issues are not included.


6 Muslim, ibid.

7 Quran 6: 164. Also see, Quran 17: 15; 35: 18; 39: 7; and 53: 38.

8 ibid., 27: 80.

9 ibid., 35: 22.


opposition to these two opinions were Ibn Mas‘ūd and Ibn ‘Abbās, who believed that wearing an amulet with scriptural inscriptions was completely forbidden.12

Similarly, Ibn Mas‘ūd differed with Ibn ‘Abbās on the interpretation of the ‘Shin’ in the verse: the Day when the Shin shall be laid bare and they shall be called to prostrate, but they shall not be able to do so.13 Ibn Mas‘ūd took the literal meaning that the Shin was the Shin of God;14 whereas Ibn ‘Abbās opted for a allegorical interpretation wherein the Shin stood for the Severity (al-shidda)15 of the Day of Judgment.

Lastly, we find that ‘Umar also differed with Abū Bakr on his view of the excommunication of the Arab tribes who had refused to pay the zakāt (alms tax).16 ‘Umar held that the fact these tribes upheld the testimony of faith (al-Shahāda) was a clear indication that they were still Muslims, whereas Abū Bakr held that whoever differentiates between prayer and alms tax, provides evidence enough of their apostasy.17

**Early Debates on Divine Determination**

The early debate on qadar (divine determination) which involved Ma‘bad al-Juhanī (d. c. 80/699) is another clear indication that theological differences, engagement, and development

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12 ibid.
13 Quran 68: 42.
16 Bukhārī, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 15, no. 6924.
17 There is an opinion which states that the differences here was regarding whether it was permissible for Abū Bakr to go to war with these tribes rather than whether or not these tribes were Muslims. However, Ibn Taymiyya states, that this opinion is incorrect and that the differences here is whether these tribes have apostatised. See, Ibn Taymiyya, *Minhāj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya fi Naqd Kalām al-Shī‘a al-Qadariyya*, ed. Muhammad Rashād Sālim, Jāmiʿa al-Imām Muḥammad al-Nāṣir al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 1986, vol. 4, p. 501; idem, *Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā*, vol. 28, pp. 518- 519, 548. Also see, al-Shāfi‘ī, *al-Umm*, Dār al-Ma‘rifā, Beirut, 1990, vol. 4, p. 277; al-Baghawi, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, p. 489.
did occur amongst the Salaf. In fact, most heresiographers\(^{18}\) state that Ma’bad al-Juhanī initiated the debate on qadar, that is, the debate on whether or not human acts are caused by divine determination or by man’s free will.\(^{19}\) The affirmers of the latter were known as the Qadarites\(^{20}\), represented by Ma’bad and his followers. The upholders of the former were known as the ‘Affirmers’ (Ahlu Ithbāt) of divine determination and were mainly Traditionalists.

There is an alternative opinion which states that the first to initiate the debate on qadar were a group of people from Hijāz, rather than the Qadarites. However, not much is mentioned about these people other than what is recorded in Ikmāl al-Mu’lim,\(^ {21}\) that while Ibn Zubayr was stranded in Mekkah, the Ka’ba caught fire. Some said that the cause was attributable to divine determination (qadar-Allah) while others denied this and attributed it to man’s will. This is one of many recorded debates on the problematic implications of qadar, which along with others will later give rise to the development of theological schools engaging with issues pertaining to qadar.\(^ {22}\)

The debate was likely born from political context\(^ {23}\), given that the Umayyid rulers were reported to have exploited the doctrine of qadar in order to legitimise their authority.\(^ {24}\) In the


\(^{20}\) The Traditionalist labelled them qadariyya, since they ascribe qadar to man rather than God. Likewise, this label fits the description given in a famous Prophetic tradition and as a result the masses would abstain from them. The tradition reads: ‘The qadariyya are the Manicheans (Majūs) of this nation (umma) [see, Abū Dāwd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Muḥammad Muḥī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, Beirut, n.d., vol. 4, p. 222, no. 4691]. This is because the Persian Manicheans worshipped two Gods, the God of good and the God of evil. As such, some scholars argued that the qadariyya held a similar concept, as the creator of good being God and the creator of evil being man.


\(^{22}\) There is a third opinion which states that the first to deny divine determination was a man by the name of ʿAmr al-Muqsūs. See, Dr. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, Ṣ. al-Maḥmūd, al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar fī Dawʾ al-Kitāb wa al-Sunna wa Madhāḥib al-Nāṣ fihi. 2nd ed., Dār al-Waṭan, Riyadh, 1997, pp. 166-167.

\(^{23}\) There are some scholars who argue for a foreign (Hellenic and Christian) influence on the debate. See, William, M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Aldine Transaction, USA, 2009, pp. 37-90; Joseph
same sense that every Muslim holds dear to the belief that God determines things in their everyday life, the Umayyids argued that God has also determined their leadership and hence every Muslim should be pleased with what God has determined. This exploitation was met with a critical reaction by scholars who advocated that humans – including rulers - have free will and are responsible for their own acts. For example, Ma‘bad is reported to have said to al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī:

O Abī Sa‘īd, verily those kings shed blood of the Muslims and take their money. They do such and say, ‘verily our actions are but from the determination of God!’ (al-Ḥasan) said: the enemies of God have lied.

In addition to the political context of the debate, the ambiguity of scripture must be influential, since in order to support any given theological position in Islam one must resort to scripture for support. Consequently, one can find Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions which support both sides of the debate on qadar between the upholders of divine determination and the advocators of human free will. For example, the following passage may be employed in support of divine


See, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī fi ʿabwāb al-Tawhīd wa al-ʿadāl, eds. Dr. Ṭaha Ḥusayn and Dr. Ibrāhīm Madkūr, Maṭbaʿa al-Qāhira, Cairo, 1960-1968, vol. 8, p.4.This form of exploitation is known as ihtijāj bi al-qadar (using divine determination as a justification for sins).


Although these two labels have been commonly employed by scholars such as William M. Watt, they are not entirely accurate, as those who have been typically labelled as advocators of free will also uphold hold divine determining when referring to God’s omniscience. Similarly, those who have been labelled as upholders of divine determination also advocate some sort of free will which is usually interpreted as kasb, as we shall see shortly in the next chapter.
determination: *Say, nothing will happen to us except what God has decreed for us. He is our Protector and in God let the believers put their trust.*  

28 Similarly, a Prophetic tradition reads:

Adam refuted Mūsā whereby Mūsā said: O Adam, you are our father; you prevented and expelled us from paradise. Adam replied: You are Mūsā whom God honoured with His speech and wrote for you the Torah with His own hands. Do you blame me for what God had determined (*qaddara*) for me forty years before I was created? The Prophet then said: Adam refuted Mūsā, Adam refuted Mūsā.  

29 Conversely, the following scriptural passages may be read to advocate human free will: *Say, that truth has come from your Lord, Let him who will, believe, and let him who will, disbelieve.*  

30 Likewise, *God is never unjust in the least degree*; this could be interpreted as meaning that divine determination of human acts is a form of injustice since he is accountable for acts which he has no agency. A similar Prophetic tradition reads:

God says: O my servants, I have forbidden injustice for myself and have made it forbidden amongst you, so do not treat each other unjustly. O my servants, it is your deeds for which I will call you to account. So whoever receives prosperity should thank God and whoever misfortune befalls should blame none but himself.  

32 Additionally, some scholars have argued that the doctrine of *qadar* originated from Greek and Christian thought. It would be hard to deny any influence as early Muslims did accuse Ma'bad

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28 Quran 9:51.
29 al-Bukhārī, *op. cit.*, vol.4, p.158, no. 3409.
30 Quran 18:29.
31 ibid., 4:40.
32 Muslim, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, p. 1994, no.2577.
al-Juhanī of having similar views to the Christians. Likewise, Ma‘bad’s teacher, Sūsan, was a Christian and Ma‘bad’s student, Ghaylān was of Coptic descent. On the other hand, the first ancient Greek text translated into Arabic was the dīwān during the caliph Hishām Ibn ‘Abd al-Malik’s reign (724-743) as is mentioned by Ibn Nadīm. Additionally, texts on philosophy were translated during the reign of the caliph al-Ma‘mūn (813-33). As such, Ma‘bad was alive before both of these reigns as he was executed during the reign of the caliph ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Marwān (699). Therefore, this potentially rules out any possibility of Greek influence on the debate of qadar.

Nonetheless, Watt says: ...suggesting that Islam is nothing but a revision of Christian or Jewish or Hellenistic ideas, is misleading and a belittling of the uniqueness and originality of Islam. Similarly, Julian Obermann stated:

...the qadar (divine determination) ideology was the direct and inevitable out-growth of the deed of Muhammed; and that, accordingly, the theory of its foreign origin, vaguely repeated ever since the time of Alfred von Kremer should be abandon once for all.

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35 Steven Judd argues that most of these reports can be traced to al-Awzāʿī, the leading anti-qadarite figure in late Umayyad Damascus, see, ‘Ghaylān al-Dimashqī: The Isolation of a Heretic in Islamic Historiography’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 31, 1999, p. 165.
39 Julian Obermann, op. cit., p. 158.
Ma’bad al-Juhani

Ma’bad al-Juhani (d. c. 80/699) was originally from the Ḥijāzī tribe of Juhayna, located around the outskirts of Madinah. He resided in Madinah, Makkah, Basra, and Damascus throughout his lifetime. But it was in Basra, where Ma’bad studied, that he became famously known as the originator of the doctrine of qadar. During Ma’bad’s time in Basra, people were sinning openly, to the extent that the apparent religious duties began to diminish over time. In fact, it was common practice to employ the concept of divine determination (qadar) in order to justify sins, as people could argue that had God not determined their sins then they would not have sinned. This fatalistic justification is known as ihtijāj bi-al-qadar (using qadar to justify ones’ shortcomings). As such, this led Ma’bad to openly argue that there is no divine determination (lā qadar) which strips man of free choice. This could be interpreted as an attempt on Ma’bad’s behalf of trying to restore religious duty.

Ma’bad is considered to be a Successor (tābi’i), defined by Sunnī Muslims as: everyone who saw the Companions of the Prophet and died as Muslims. In other words, they were the second generation after the Prophet. Yet, many historians have it that Ma’bad lived during the time of the Prophet but never saw him. If such is the case, then Ma’bad would be categorised as a mukhdram, who are defined as all those who lived during the Prophet’s lifetime but never saw him and also died as Muslims.

Ma’bad was certainly not foreign to Islam and the early generation of Muslims, as he learnt Prophetic traditions directly from major Companions of the Prophet. Ma’bad is reported to have narrated from the following Companions: ‘Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, Ḥudhayfa Ibn al-Yamān, al-Ḥasan Ibn ‘Ali, al-Ḥārim Ibn ‘Abd Allah al-Zubaydī, Ḥamrān Ibn Abān, al-Shu’ab Ibn

42 ibid.
43 ibid.
44 ibid.
46 ibid., vol. 4, p. 157.

Another teacher of Ma‘bad was supposedly a Christian scholar by the name of Sūsan, who converted to Islam and then later allegedly reverted back to Christianity. The two resided in Baṣra and in many narrations Ma‘bad is accused to have been influenced by Sūsan:48

The first to have spoken about qadar was a man from Iraq by the name of Sūsan. He was a Christian who converted to Islam then after reverted back to Christianity. Ma‘bad al-Juḥānī took this doctrine from him then after Ghaylān from Ma‘bad.49

Similarly, there were major early Muslim figures who narrated Prophetic traditions from Ma‘bad such as: Qatāda, Mālik Ibn Dīnār, ‘Awf al-‘Arābī, al-Hasan al-Baṣrī, Zayd Ibn Raff Al-Jazarī, Sa‘ad Ibn Ibrāhīm, ‘Abd Allah Ibn Fayrūz al-Dānāj, Mu‘āwiyah Ibn Qūra.50 As a result, we can clearly see that there were early figures in Islam who took their knowledge directly from figures who are historically considered as ‘unorthodox’ such as Ma‘bad and his followers; hence, the conception of a utopian monolithic first three generations can be somewhat challenged.

Despite Ma‘bad’s ‘unorthodox’ position, he was still portrayed as a pious and active figure who was concerned with the betterment of his society - whether in his active transmission of knowledge51 or his keenness for competent caliphs.52 People referred to him, to the extent that

48 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Mizzī, op. cit., vol. 28, p. 245. Additionally, Ma‘bad’s teacher, Yūnis al-Aswārī, (also known as Sībawayh, Abū Yūnis Sistawayh, Sīsūh) was also reported to have been the first to advocate the doctrine of qadar alongside Sūsan and ‘Aṭāʾ Ibn Abī Maymūna. See, ibid., vol. 16, p. 136; Abū Ja‘far al-‘Uqaylī, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 403; idem, vol. 4, p. 217; Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, Lisān al-Mizān, ed. Dā‘ira al-Mu‘arraf al-Niẓāmiyya, Mu‘assassat al-‘Alamī, Beirut, 1971, vol. 3, p. 131; idem, vol. 6, p. 335.
50 ibid.
he played some sort of mediatory role during a conflict between some Companions of the Prophet. Abū Ishāq al-Jawzajānī (d.259/873) speaks of Maʿbad’s competence and piety:

There were people who advocated the doctrine of qadar others took from them because of their religious exertion (ijtihād), honesty and faithfulness. They were never thought of as liars—even though they had wrong views. Amongst them were Qatāda and Maʿbad al-Juḥānī, who was the head.  

On the one hand, Maʿbad seemed to have had good relationships with the rulers of his time. The caliph ʿAbd al-Malik Ibn Marwān (d.86/705) in Damascus appointing Maʿbad as a teacher for his son Saʿīd Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik, is evidence of this. However, his pious concerns nevertheless seem to have paved the way to his fatal execution, which was not punishment for his heretical views, rather for his active revolt against the injustice of the rulers during his time. Though, some narrations do state that it was his doctrine on qadar that led to his execution as it was a heresy which caused many controversies between the masses, causing some scholars to warn against him.

al-Hasan al-Baṣrī was one such scholar who warned against Maʿbad’s ideology, although he initially shared similar tendencies on qadar, it is claimed he later changed his

54 Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, ibid.
55 Josef van Ess, ibid.
57 al-Hasan is reported to have said: ‘Beware of Maʿbad for verily, he is misguided and misguides others’, see, Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, ibid.
views. Ma’bad, on the other hand, was persistent on his views until he was reported to have regretted not listening to al-Ḥasan, just before he was executed:

Ma’bad al-Juhanī was the first to talk about qadar in Basra and it was as if Aṭa’ Ibn Abī Maymūna’s tongue was magic. They both [Ma’bad and ‘Aṭa’] held the doctrine of qadar and approached al-Ḥasan saying: ‘O Abī Saʿīd, verily those kings shed blood of the Muslims and take their money. They do such and say, ‘verily our actions are but from the determination of God!’’ (al-Ḥasan) said: the enemies of God have lied. [The narrator] said: ‘they [Ma’bad and ‘Aṭa’] cling on to doubtful matters like these and then say al-Ḥasan is of those who adhere to the doctrine of qadar’.59

The student of Ma’bad, Mālik Ibn Dīnār (d. 130/747-8), states,

I met Ma’bad al-Juhanī in Makkah after Ibn al-Ash’th [after his crisis], Ma’bad was wounded because he was fighting against al-Ḥajjāj. He said, [regrettably] ‘I came across many scholars and jurists, none were the like of al-Ḥasan, O woe to me, only if I had listened to him.60

As a result, the last stage of Ma’bad’s life was one of solitude and loneliness:

We were sitting in the mosque of Benī Uday, and with us was Abū al-Sawārī al-Addawī. Then entered Ma’bad al-Juhanī upon which Abū al-Sawārī said: I will not allow this person to enter our mosque; do not let him sit with us.61

58 al-Ḥasan is a very interesting figure, many schools claimed that he belong to them. The Mu’tazilites claimed he was an advocate of free will while the Traditionalists claimed he was in favour of divine determining. See, Sulaimān ‘Alī Murād, Early Islam between Myth and History: Al-Ḥaṣan Al-Baṣrī (d. 110H/728CE) and the Formation of His Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship, Brill, 2006; Abdullah Sliti, ibid.
60 Abū al-Qāsim Ibn Ḍākir, op. cit., vol. 59, p. 324. Sulaimān ‘Alī Murād argues that this report is historically unlikely because Mālik Ibn Dīnār was still very young; see, Sulaimān ‘Alī Murād, op. cit., p. 34-5.
Similarly,

Abū Zubayr al-Makkī and Ṭawūs passed by Maʿbad al-Juhanī who was sitting alone in the mosque. Abū Zubayr said to Ṭawūs: Is this the person that speaks of qadar? So Ṭawūs approached him, he stood erectly in front of him and said: Are you the one who lies about God with no knowledge? Maʿbad replied: It is lies attributed to me! Abū Zubayr said: We then went to Ibn ‘Abbās and informed him about those who speak of qadar, upon which he said: Woe unto you, show me them!’ We said: what do you intend to do? He replied: By Him in whose hand my soul is in, if you show me one of them I will surely place my hand on his head and strike his neck!62

In conclusion, there are two conflicting trends within narratives of Maʿbad’s death. The first states that the Caliph ʿAbd al-Malik crucified him in Damascus during the 80th year- due to his heretical position on qadar. The second states that the General Yūsif Ibn al-Ḥajjāj killed him after relentless torture, during the year eighty or before the year ninety, due to Maʿbad’s attempted revolt. However, the latter seems to be the most common narrative and is cited in the vast majority of historical references.63 It may be plausible that Maʿbad did not die from crucifixion but rather he was released after which he was executed by Yūsif Ibn al-Ḥajjāj, as al-Dhahabī reports, that al-Ḥajjāj tortured Maʿbad severely, although he did not fright nor plead for help, after which he was then killed.64

Lastly, there is not much detail given on Maʿbad’s opinions;65 nevertheless, his Qadari views influenced the prominent leader of the Qadari movement in Damascus, Ghaylān al-
Dimashqī, who will further elaborate the Qadarī views. For this reason, Ghaylān is perhaps the true founder of the Qadarite movement.

**Ghaylān al-Dimashqī**

The Damascene Qadarite Ghaylān al-Dimashqī (d. 122/740) managed to further elaborate on the doctrine of qadar and to write them down freely, evidenced by his many works on theology and numerous followers, to the extent that they were amongst the first true followers of the qadariyya and were labelled the Ghaylāniyya, a namesake from their teacher Ghaylān.

Ghaylān engaged frequently with the most prominent legal and theological figures of late Umayyad times, including ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Makḥūl al-Shāmī, Maymūn Ibn Mīhrān, and al-Awzāʿī.66 Furthermore, in addition to Maʿbad al-Juhanī, Makḥūl al-Shāmī was another major Qadarite teacher of Ghaylān.67

Ibn al-Nadīm in his *Fihrist*, states that Ghaylān compiled letters that reach up to two thousand pages in length68, but none of it survives. Yet, the limited synopses which portray Ghaylān’s beliefs are contained in a sermon given by Ghaylān and recorded in Ibn Qutayba’s *ayūn al-akhbār*69 and three recorded debates, found in Abū Nuʿaym’s *Ḥilyat al-Awliyāt*.70 In the first debate, which was with al-Awzāʿī, it is evident that Ghaylān is not given much opportunity to defend himself; the debate concluded in the justification of Ghaylān’s execution (122/740) in

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68 Abū al-Faraj Ibn Nadīm, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 149.
the presence of the Caliph, Hishām Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 105-25/724-43). In the second debate, which was with Dāwūd Ibn Abī Hind, there is not much information given on the nature of the arguments except short questions and answers on the epistemological position of the intellect (ʿaql); Ghaylān’s side of the debate is not even given. Likewise, the last debate, which was with Rabī’ Ibn Abī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, is another very short question and answer discussion on sins. Despite the short description of the latter two debates, Ghaylān is portrayed as the instigator and seems very confident and active, unlike in the first.\footnote{ibid.}

Additionally, Ibn al-Murtadā, in his al-Maniya wal-ʿamal, has two works of Ghaylān. The first is a letter to the caliph ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, in which much information is given on Ghaylān’s arguments on qadar, evil, and the fatalistic justification of sins, namely those that invoke God’s determination to justify their disobedience.\footnote{ibid.} The second is a debate with ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, which supposedly resulted in Ghaylān repenting from his views on qadar.\footnote{ibid.} However, many historical accounts report that Ghaylān had reverted back to his qadarī views after the death of ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz.

Lastly, two of the oldest recorded books on the doctrine of the Qadarite movement are Kitāb al-Qadar and Kitāb al-Ḥikma, both by Wahb Ibn Muniba (d. 110/728).\footnote{Dr. Fuʿād Sazkīn, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 4, 463, 513.}

**Early Schools and Their Theological Developments**

The Muʿtazilites

The legacy of the Qadarite movement is recognisable in the early Muʿtazilites who adopted the doctrine of qadar and further developed it, as is evident in their discussions and engagement with concepts and arguments related to human agency and divine determination.

\footnote{ibid.}
\footnote{ibid.}
\footnote{ibid. For more on Ghaylān’s works see, Dr. Fuʿād Sazkīn, ibid.}
\footnote{Dr. Fuʿād Sazkīn, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 4, 463, 513.}
Wāṣil Ibn ‘Aṭā’ (d. 131/748-9), who was born in Madinah (80/699-700) and later lived in Basra, founded the Mu’tazilite School after he disassociated himself from his teacher al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. Wāṣil left the circles of al-Ḥasan to form his own school, because of their differences with regards to one who commits a grave sin, whether he is to be considered a believer or a disbeliever. Unlike al-Ḥasan, Wāṣil held that the grave sinner is neither a believer nor disbeliever but rather in a state between the two (manzila bayn al-manzilatayn). After this, ‘Amr Ibn ‘Ubayd (d. c.144/761) also left al-Ḥasan’s circles for Wāṣil, after which they together became the fore-runners of the Mu’tazilite School in Basra.75

Ibn al-Nadīm wrote in his Fihrist, an extensive survey of Wāṣil’s works that would have been of great importance to the early theological discussion of the Mu’tazilites. However, much of these works are lost76 - other than a sermon which he gave in the presence of ‘Abd Allah Ibn ‘Umar Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (d. 132/749–50) in Iraq.77 Nonetheless, accounts of Wāṣil’s theological discussions on divine attributes, divine determination and the status of a sinner are available; all of which were not fully developed.78 It is clear that Wāṣil engaged with people such as al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and the Jabrites who argue for divine determination in order to justify their shortcomings. He also quite possibly engaged with the Kharijites.79

We find a more elaborate, developed account by Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d.227/842), an indirect disciple of Wāṣil. Abū Hudhayl discusses and further develops the philosophical issues which are intertwined with divine determination. Abū al-Hudhayl argues that man acts on

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77 Dr. Fu’ād Sazkīn, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 18- 19.
79 See the opponents of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in his treatise on divine determination in Abdullah Sliti, op. cit. pp. 375-391.
the basis of two faculties, namely will (irāda) - both innate and acquired through reflection - and power (qudra); hence man is accountable. Nonetheless, man’s decision regarding whether or not to act depends on an external agent such as God - or sometimes Satan - who must create an impulse (khāṭir) in the mind (‘aql). Therefore, as long as man has will, power and an impulse to act, then his acts are attributed to his own free will or else to God. Abū al-Hudhayl also argues that man has free will in this life but will be compelled in the hereafter, since there is no religious duty (taklīf).

Abū al-Hudhayl also has a much more developed position than Wāṣil on divine attributes; he engages with problematic conflicts between divine essence and divine attributes. As such, Abū al-Hudhayl stresses that divine attributes are in fact God’s essence, in order to avoid plurality within God. A similar discussion is seen in his engagement with the conflict between intentions and voluntary acts. Abū Hudhayl’s discussion on meta-ethics is quite minimal in that he advocates the concept of rational moral obligation. This was perhaps due to the fact that he developed upon the issues discussed by his teachers. Similarly, he engaged in theological debates with fellow Muʿtazilīs such as al-Naẓẓām, regarding God’s ability to do evil; the early Shiʿities, such as Hishām Ibn al-Ḥakam, on the doctrine of the Imāmate; the Jabrites, such as Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān and Ḥafṣ al-Fard, on the doctrine of jabr (compulsionism);

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81 ibid.
82 ibid.
83 Dr. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Madhāhib al-Islāmiyyīn, Dār al-ʿilm lil-Malāyyīn, Beirut, 2008, p. 133.
84 ibid., Mourad, Suleiman A. op. cit.
85 Dr. Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī, op. cit., p. 134.
86 ibid., p. 134-5.
87 Mourad, Suleiman A. op. cit.
88 ibid.
the Traditionalists, such as Ibn Kullāb, regarding anthropomorphism; and the numerous theological sects in Iraq.

However, it is during the final phase of Mu'tazilism, during which al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbar (d.415/1025) was the chief figure, where one finds more comprehensive developments of the Mu'tazilites' positions on the philosophical issues related to divine determination, which include: human agency, capacity, causation, evil, divine justice, purposefulness of divine acts, and meta-ethics. This was perhaps a consequence of his efforts to develop the previous concepts dealt by his predecessors and also due to his critical engagement with the Ash'arites, the Baghdādī Mu'tazilīs, and the Mu'tazilīs of his own school - the Başrīs.

The Jabrites

The Jabrites, who are also known as the Jahmites, followers of Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān (d. 128/746), are another theological school who engaged in philosophical debates concerning human agency and divine determination. In fact, on the issue of divine determination, they held an entirely opposite view to that of the Mu'tazilites, namely the doctrine of jabr (compulsionism): that man is compelled to act and hence has no real agency.

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92 See the many issues discussed in his al-Mughnī.
Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that the accounts of the Jahmites are given to us by their opponents who naturally sought to refute their views. Therefore, most of these accounts are polemical and indoctrinating. A list is given by Ibn Taymiyya of the theologians who wrote refutations on the Jahmites, the majority of whom were Traditionalists. For example, there is a letter attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās (68/687–8) in which he refutes a group of Jahmites from the Levant and similarly another letter by Ḥasan Ibn ʿAṭī which refutes a group of Jahmites from Basra. Both of these sources also indicate that the doctrine of jabr (compulsionism) is as old as the doctrine of qadar.

The Jahmites School is typically described as having four stages of development. Firstly, the stage of Jaʿad Ibn Dirham (d. 124/742) who was supposed to have engaged with the Jews and the philosophers of Ḥarrān, as is claimed by his opponents. Jaʿad seemed to have been mainly concerned with philosophical problems regarding anthropomorphic attributes, which he denied.

The second stage is evident in Jahm Ibn Safwān’s engagement with Jaʿad’s ideas and with the Sumaniyya philosophers. As such, Jahm further develops the positions of Jaʿad on divine attributes and expounds on further issues such as: the duration of heaven and hell, the denial of all the divine names, and attributes and acts - since Jahm made a clear distinction between God and ‘things’ because God’s being absolutely transcends the being of every

Similarly, Jahm also allegedly questioned the epistemic status of solitary reports and hence he rejected the various notions of eschatology found in scripture,\(^{104}\) such as, seeing God in the hereafter, the bridge over Hell, the scale that weighs man’s deeds and the pond (hawd) of the Prophet in the hereafter.\(^{105}\) Jahm also discussed issues related to concepts of belief and disbelief, the nature of God’s knowledge and the creation of the Quran.\(^{106}\) On the issue of human agency, Jahm was a Jabrite in that he emphasised that there is no real agency in reality except the agency of God alone, therefore man has no real choice to act just as he has no choice in determining his colour or height.\(^{107}\) On human agency, the Jabrites are divided: some deny man’s agency entirely because they distinguish between the transcendental God - the only true actor - and the worldly being, who can never be an agent in the full sense of the word.\(^{108}\) Jahm belonged to this strand of Jabrites. The others assert that man possesses some sort of power; however, this power is non-causative, in the sense that it cannot cause the existence of an act.\(^{109}\) Those who believed in this came to be known as the upholders of divine determination (ahlul-Ithbāt)\(^{110}\) which is ascribed to Dirār Ibn ‘Amr (d. 200/815), Bashīr Ibn al-Marrīsī (d. 218/833), and his student al-Najjār, who died at the end of the third century AH.

The third stage of the Jahmites School’s development is represented by Bashir al-Marrīsī, which exposed the school to detailed refutation by polemical opponents. Arguably a unique feature of this stage is al-Marrīsī’s sophisticated approach to divine attributes which entails al-Marrīsī’s allegorical interpretation (ta’wīl), rather than the straightforward rejection of his predecessors, Ja’ad and Jahm. Al-Marrīsī also developed Jahm’s stance on human agency and

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\(^{103}\) Tilman Nagel, *op. cit.*, p. 102.


\(^{106}\) ibid.


\(^{108}\) Tilman Nagel, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

\(^{109}\) In the following chapter I shall discuss this position in depth.

maintains the belief of man’s temporal power, rather than denying any such power entirely - like is the case with Jahm.

The last stage is the spreading of Jahmite ideas into other theological schools such as the Mu’tazilites, Kullabites, Ash’arites and Māturidites. It is these schools who engaged with and further expounded on Jahmite ideas in order to develop their own consistent positions.

Lastly, the fact that many of the Jahmites belonged to the Hanafī School of Law111 may explain why the Jahmites tended to be rational towards theological issues and hence gave precedence to reason over scripture.112

The Shi’ites

Inevitably, early Shi’ites were mainly preoccupied with political issues, namely political legitimacy, and less so with metaphysical issues such as divine determination, divine corporality and the nature of divine knowledge.113 The Kūfan Hishām Ibn Al-Ḥakam (d. 179/795) was probably the first to elaborate on the theological issues which later formed the foundation of the ‘Twelver’ Shi’ite School.114 Hishām adopted the idea that human acts are created by God and at the same time man is responsible for such acts.115 He also adhered to the concept of God’s corporality (tajsīm) and considered God’s divine attributes to be anthropomorphic.116 It is interesting to note that most of Hishām’s positions on human acts and divine attributes were maintained amongst later Shi’ite ‘Twelvers’, after which they adopted positions very similar to

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112 Dr. Nāṣir ʿAbd al-Karīm al-ʿAql, op. cit., p. 16; William M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, p. 77.
the later Mu'tazilites. In Hishām's dialogue with the early Mu'tazilite, Abū Hudhayl al-'Allāf, it is clear that Hishām supports the concept of *al-badā'ā*: that God comes to know of things after they have occurred.\(^{117}\) Hishām is also known to have engaged with scholars of various theological orientations in Kufa, such as the dualists, Abū Shākir al-Dāysānī and the Ibāḍī scholar, 'Abd Allah Ibn Yazīd.\(^{118}\)

There is an alternative narrative of early Shi'ite discussion on divine determination, in which the sixth 'Twelver' Imām, Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765), is reported to have said: 'It is neither determinism nor free will but something between the two'.\(^{119}\) Similarly, the fifth 'Twelver' Imām, Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 116/733), and his successor were reported to have said that 'God loves His creation so much that He will not force them to commit sin and then punish them; God is so powerful that whatever He commands comes to be'.\(^{120}\) Lastly, the sixth Imām Ja'far upheld that 'God is so generous that he does not make it a duty for men to do what is not in their power. He is so powerful that nothing comes into being in His kingdom which he does not will'.\(^{121}\) These quotations demonstrate early allusions to a potential compatibilist position where neither divine justice nor human responsibility is compromised.

During the fourteenth century, we witness the further development of issues related to divine determination with the 'Twelver' Shi'ite theologian, Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), who predominantly engages and adopts the theological positions of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-BAṣrī (d. 436/1044)\(^{122}\), whilst simultaneously uses al-Razī's terminologies.\(^{123}\) It is evident that al-Ḥillī engaged with other theological schools which allowed him to construct a coherent 'Twelver' Shi'ite theology, seen in his works of theology.\(^{124}\) Similarly, it is worth noting that al-Ḥillī's contemporary, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 727/1326), who is an important reviver of the

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\(^{118}\) Madelung, W., ibid.


\(^{120}\) ibid.

\(^{121}\) ibid.


\(^{123}\) ibid.


The Kharijites

The Kharijites was an early movement that formed as a direct consequence of the assassination of ʿUthmān Ibn ʿAffān (d.35/655), the third caliph, which also resulted in the battle of Ṣiffin (37/657) between the partisan of ʿAlī (d. 40/661) and the partisan of Muʿāwiyya (d. 60/680).\footnote{Levi Della Vida, G., "Khāridjītes", Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online.} The Kharijites quite possibly debated issues relating to divine determination, such as human agency and responsibility. Evidence for this lies in the Kharijites’ emphasis on man’s responsibility; they were the first to revolt against injustice perpetrated by rulers.\footnote{William M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, p. 9- 14.} According to the Kharijites, authority was given to the Quran in all spheres of life as it represents God’s will on earth and as a result man’s political authority was undermined.\footnote{ibid., p. 14- 15.} Similarly, sins were deemed an act of disbelief and as such they excommunicated the sinners\footnote{ibid., p.15.} - including those amongst the rulers - in order to justify their revolution and the killing of those who disagreed with their theology.\footnote{Levi Della Vida, G. ibid.}

Although not much is stated explicitly on the Kharijites’ theological doctrines on free will and divine determination, one may assume that they were advocates of free will and human responsibility given their active participation against injustice.\footnote{ibid.} However, one problem with this claim is that the Azāriqa or Azraqites, led by Nāfi’ Ibn al-Azraq (d. 65/685),\footnote{William M. Watt, op. cit., p.20.} are a direct
off-shoot of the Kharijites,\textsuperscript{133} and they hold a compulsionist view\textsuperscript{134}, similar to the Jabrites. Nonetheless, the debates related to divine determination during this period were still very primitive in that philosophical issues related to meta-ethics and theodicy were perhaps out of the question.

\section*{The Murji‘ites}

The Murji‘ites (upholders of \textit{irjā́} (to give hope or to defer)) formed as a direct opposition to the Khārijite position on grave sinners as apostates. In fact, al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥanafiyya,\textsuperscript{135} the author of \textit{kitāb al-irjā́}\textsuperscript{136}, was one of the first Murji‘ites to propagate the doctrine of \textit{irjā́}, which is: that acts are not a principle part of faith (\textit{imān}) in that if the act is removed then so too is faith.\textsuperscript{137} For this reason, one cannot excommunicate Muslims based on their actions – which is contrary to the Khārijites - since faith is only belief, or confession of belief, which excludes acts.\textsuperscript{138} Some scholars have argued that the doctrine of \textit{irjā́} was developed in order to protect the Umayyads\textsuperscript{139}, while others argue that it was intended to protect the Muslims from the violent extremism of the Kharijites, in particular the Azraqites.\textsuperscript{140} In this

\begin{footnotes}
\item[135] The date of his death is unknown, but it must have been either during the caliphate of ʿAbd al-Malik (i.e. before 86/705), in 95/714 or during the caliphate of ʿUmar II (99-101/717-20) at the latest. See, van Ess, J. "al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya", \textit{Encyclopaedia of Islam}, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, Brill Online.
\item[137] Dr.ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 1, p. 117.
\item[140] Dr.ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 1, p. 120.
\end{footnotes}
sense, many of the early Traditionalists were influenced by *irjāʾ* teachings, since they fundamentally opposed any armed revolt or killings of Muslims. These early Traditionalists include Abū Ḥanīfa (d.150/767), the leading representative of *irjāʾ* doctrine in Iraq at the time and perhaps the first to philosophise this doctrine from amongst the Traditionalists. Abū Ḥanīfa’s teachings later formed the basis of all subsequent Ḥanafī Murjiʿite theology, including Māturīdism or Māturīdites.

**The Māturīdites**

On the nature of faith (*imān*) the Māturīdites are another school which has Murjiʿite tendencies in that they limit faith to belief - excluding verbal and physical acts. On the concept of divine determination, Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) who was the founder of the Māturīdites School and a contemporary of Imām al-Ashʿarī, seems to advocate that human acts are created by God in one respect (*jiha*), and in another respect from man’s free choice (*Ikhtiyār*). Furthermore, obedience to God’s commandments is the initial choice of man according to the Māturīdites. This betrays another potential compatibilist stance on divine determination.

Al-Māturīdī was keen to expand upon the theological doctrines of Abū Ḥanīfa as transmitted by the Ḥanafī scholars of Balkh and Transoxania. He was renowned as being pro-

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141 Traditionalism, or Ahlu al-Sunna (the People of Prophetic Traditions), is a title that is claimed by the Māturīdites, Ashʿarites, and the typical Traditionists who were predominately scholars of ḥadīth; such as Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, al-Bukhārī, Ibn Khuzaima, etc. Nonetheless, as Ibrāhīm Madkūr and Muḥammad ‘Amāra both state, the title Ahlu al-Sunna accurately describes the Traditionists in the sense that they strictly adhere to scripture- Quran and Sunna- and preferred transmitted traditions over deductive inferences and scripture over reason. See Dr. Ibrāhīm Madkūr, *Fī al-Falsafa al-Islāmiyya: Manhaj wa Taṭbīqahu*, Dār al-Maʿārif, Cairo, 1976, vol. 2, pp. 30-35; Dr. Muḥammad ‘Amāra, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 93.

142 Madelung, W., ibid.

143 Dr.’Alī Sāmī al-Nashshār, ibid., p. 119. Ibrāhīm Madkūr states that it was Ibn Kullāb who was the first Traditionalist theologian who philosophised the Traditionalist theology- since, he engaged with both Abu al-Hudhayl and ‘Abbād Ibn Sulaymān (c. 250/864) from amongst the Muʿtazilites and developed doctrines which differentiated between divine essence and attributes, and also denied the attributes of divine acts- so as to avoid temporality in the nature of God. See al-Nashshār, ibid., pp. 142-157; and Ibrāhīm Madkūr, ibid., p. 32.

144 Madelung, W., ibid.

actively engaged in theological debates with the Mu'tazilites, Abū al-Qāsim al-Balhūkī al-Ka'bī and Abū ʿUmar al-Bāhillī, the Sunnī traditionalists and the Shiʾites, both Imāmites and Ismaʿilites. That is not to say that he did not engage with other religions. On the contrary, he rebutted the views of Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Manichaeans, Bardesanesites and Marcionites.146 As a result, al-Māturīdī and later Māturidite scholars, such as Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d.507/1114), managed to develop concepts and doctrines into a coherent school of theology - unlike the early Ḥanafites who came before al-Māturīdī.147 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that succeeding Ashʿarite and Māturidite scholars state that there are only twenty two theological differences between the two schools.148

The Ashʿarites

In contrast to al-Māturīdī, Imām Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935), the founder of the Ashʿarite School, sought to develop the doctrines of Ḥanbalī traditionalism149 so that they could

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148 Although al-Ashʿarī was also deeply influenced by Ibn Kullāb (d. 241/855); see, al-Nashshār, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 137. Ibn Kullāb was later to be known as the leader of the Kullābīte School with students as such, Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Qalānisī (c. 255/ 869) and al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857). Ibn Taymiyya talks about two trends in the Kullābīte School, the Kullābites of Iraq and the Kullābites of Khurasan, the former being closer to Aḥmad Ibn Hanbal and the Traditionalist (Aḥlu Sunna) than the latter (see, Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ Taʿāraḍ al-ʿAqīl wa al-Naqīl, ed. Dr. Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, Jāmiʿa al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 268- 270). According to al-Nashshār, the later Kullābites were completely merged into the Ashʿarī School with the coming of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. (see, Dr.ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār, Nashʿat al-Fikr al-Falsafī fī al-Īslāmī, Dār al-Salām, Cairo, 2008, vol.
exist in harmony with both reason and scripture. As a result, numerous theological doctrines were developed, such as: the doctrine of acquisition, responsibility, divine command theory, the divine volition theory and other theories regarding evil - all of which are involved with divine determination. There are five distinct stages of the Ash'arite School which all promoted the development of theological issues by subsequent Ash'arite theologians.

The first stage is embodied by the Baghdādī theologian, Īmām Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'ārī, who succeeded in bringing harmony and synthesis to the two opposing positions of his time, namely the anthropomorphism of Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān (d. 150/767) and the denial of divine attributes by Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān. As a result, al-Ash'ārī took a middle ground stance between the rejection and affirmation of divine attributes. Īmām al-Ash'ārī also adopted a version of scripture and reason with regard to the epistemology of theology, making him different to the

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1. p. 293-294; also see, Ḥādī bint Nāṣir al-Shalālī, Ārā’ al-Kullābiyya al-ʿAqāʾidiyya wa Atharahu fī al-Ashʿariyya fī Dow’ ‘Aqīda Aḥl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, Maktabāt Rushd, Riyadh, 2000, p. 50.) Many Ashʿarite theologians claimed Ibn Kullāb to be amongst their founding fathers and hence referred to him as: ‘from our school’ (min aṣḥābinā), ‘our teacher’ (shaykhanā), ‘the teacher of the Traditionalists (shaykh Ahul Sunna), see, Tāj al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-Kubrā, eds. Dr. Maḥmūd al-Tannāḥī and Dr. ‘Abd al-Nadīm Ibn Ṣafwān. While on the other hand, Ibn Nadīm hints that Ibn Kullāb held some Christian beliefs; see, Ibn Nadīm, op. cit., p. 224.


153 ibid.


majority of Traditionalist theologians before him who only employed scripture when developing their theology.\textsuperscript{157}

Al-Ash'ārī was also famous for his doctrine of acquisition (\textit{kasb}) which argues that man acquires his act, while God creates them. This doctrine had been clearly outlined before al-Ash'ārī, by Dirār (d. 728-815).\textsuperscript{158} Al-Ash'ārī was also famous for his in depth knowledge of the Mu'tazilite doctrines, gained from being a direct student of Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī. As such, al-Ash'ārī played a vital role in transmitting early Mu'tazilite doctrines. Perhaps due to al-Ash'ārī capacity to engage critically with various theological schools, he managed to develop his own coherent school, which then became the chief Sunnī theological school in terms of its vast following and scholarship. This was perhaps made possible by the political support the Ash'ārites received from the Saljūqites, Ayūbites and Mohidites dynasties.\textsuperscript{159}

Much of al-Ash'ārī’s early theological developments related to divine determination can be found in his works: \textit{Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn},\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Risāla Istiḥsān al-Khawāḍ fī ‘ilm al-Kalām},\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Kitāb al-Luma},\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Risālat al-Imān} and \textit{Kitāb al-Ibāna}.\textsuperscript{164}

The figurehead of the second stage was the Baghdādī theologian Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī who is considered as the first to implement a rational systematic methodology in Ash'ārī rational theology.\textsuperscript{165} Al-Bāqillānī is said to have endowed reason with more importance in theological issues than his predecessor, perhaps due to his critical engagement, dialogue and debate with

opponents in their own cities. As a result, more rational refutations were produced against the Ash’arites’ opponents.

During this stage, the school became more coherent and refined, moving away from past ambiguities. There were also further developments and divergences away from al-Bāqilānī’s predecessors, evidenced by his stance on a causative temporal power and his adoption of Abū Hāshim’s statuses (al-Ahwāl).167

The third stage is represented by the Naysabūrī theologian, Imām al-Juwaynī, who made excessive allegorical interpretations (tā’wil) and possessed thorough philosophical ideas. He was deeply influenced by both Greek and Mu’tazilite philosophies - especially Aristotelian logic - and as such he employed logical and philosophical proofs to further support Ash’arite doctrine.170 Al-Juwaynī was competent in philosophical dialogue; perhaps a consequence of extensive experience debating with his opponents.171 He was said to have always rigorously defined his terminologies and concepts before embarking upon a dialogue on a certain issue.172 As a result, al-Juwaynī contributed to the clarification of the Ash’arite doctrines.

The fourth stage of Ash’arite development occurred as a result of al-Ghazālī’s divergence to an anti-philosophical trend of theology, which gave rise to his pragmatic introduction of Aristotelian logic as a methodological tool in rational theology.174 Some also argue that al-Ghazālī later diverged to a theological epistemology more closely associated with Sufism, whereby he replaces sense and reason faculties with taste (dhawq) and discovery (kashf). Nonetheless, perhaps the most important development of the Ash’arite School was al-Ghazālī’s

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166 Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, op. cit., p. 363.
168 Dr. Abd al-Majīd al-Ṣaghīr, op. cit., p. 113; Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, op. cit., p. 409.
169 ibid., p. 410
171 Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, op. cit., p. 409-410.
172 ibid., p. 410.
174 Ayman Shihadeh, op. cit., p. 144, 148; Dr. Hasan Qarīb Allah, op. cit., p. 89.
175 Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, op. cit., p. 457.
influential teachings which contributed to the vast spread of Ash’arite doctrine throughout the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{176}

The final stage of Ash’arite development is witnessed through al-Rāzī’s great synthesis of rational theology and philosophy, only to give rise to an Islamic philosophy which Orthodox theologians can relate to.\textsuperscript{177} This approach parted from the Ghazālian anti-philosophy trend in terms of argumentation and nature. That is, unlike the Ghazālian trend, al-Rāzī’s positivist philosophical theology employed demonstrative arguments rather than typically negativist Ash’arite \textit{ad hominem} methods of argumentation.\textsuperscript{178} As a result, al-Rāzī moves from apologetic objectives to philosophical inquiry as is distinct in his later works.\textsuperscript{179} This new development is to have a major influence on later Ash’arite theologians as is noted by Ibn Khuldūn.\textsuperscript{180}

\textbf{The Traditionalists}

With the early Traditionalists, we witness the beginning of theological positions concerning divine determination which are in accordance to scripture. Similarly, we find that the early Traditionalists were also engaging with other schools in order to refute positions which they deemed unorthodox. Hence, their theological engagement was more or less of a negativist, apologetic nature. Moreover, many of the early Traditionalists were strict upholders of divine determination\textsuperscript{181} with only primitive discussions on the nature of human agency and

\textsuperscript{176} ibid., p. 456.
\textsuperscript{177} Ayman Shihadeh, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 156, 162, 172, 178.
\textsuperscript{178} ibid., p. 164.
\textsuperscript{179} ibid., p. 170.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibn Khuldūn, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 589- 591; It is evident that al-Rāzī was well engaged with philosophical and theological doctrines of a wide range of schools- as is seen in his \textit{book Muhāṣṣal Afkhār al-Mutaqaddimīn wa al-Muta’akhkhirīn min al-‘ulama’ wa al-ḥukamā’ wa al-mutakallimīn} (Compendium of the Thoughts of Ancient and Later Scholars, Philosophers and Mutakallimīn).
\textsuperscript{181} This is inevitable due to the Traditionalists’ epistemic methodology which gives precedence to scripture over reason. As such, a Traditionalist is obliged to adopt the doctrine of divine determination of human acts, as if found in many Prophetic traditions, regardless of the philosophical problematic complexities inherent in such doctrine.
responsibility. Many of the early Traditionalists authored treatises refuting the views of Qadarites - some of which date back to the first century of Islam. Al-Baghdādī provides a list of the authors, which includes: Abū Aswad al-Du‘ła‘ī (d. 69/688), Yahyā Ibn Ya‘mar (d. 89/707), al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammed al-Ḥanafiyya,183 ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz (d.101/720), al-Shaʿbī (d. 103/721).

Unfortunately, only some of these early treatises still exist. One of these is a treatise attributed to the caliph ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, found in Ḥilyat al-Awliyā’ by Abī Nuʿaym.184 The Ijāza (licence) of al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī on the narration of this treatise confirms its authenticity.185 This treatise provides valuable insights into the early Traditionalists’ stance on issues relating to divine determination.

Furthermore proof resides in the works of al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammed al-Ḥanafiyya, the grandson of ʿAlī Ibn Abī Ṭālib, as we mentioned earlier, such as Kitāb al-Irjā’, and his extensive refutations against the Qadarites. Ibn Baṭṭa (d. 387/917) also states that al-Ḥasan excommunicates both the Qadarites and Kharijites due to their heretical theological positions.186

At a later date, during the Abbasid period, the Traditionalists also wrote extensive apologetic refutations against the Jahmites. In these works, it remains clear that issues related to divine determination were neither well defined nor philosophically developed. Rather, a specific issue would be argued either for or against, using scripture as the sole epistemic reference of argument. For examples of this one can look at Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal’s (d. 241/855) al-Radd alā al-Jahmiyya wa al-Zanādiqa and Kitāb al-Sunna and Abū Saʿīd al-Dāramī’s (d.282/894) Naqd alā al-Marrisī al-Jahmī and Kitāb al-Radd alā al-Jahmiyya. Also, Ibn al-Khuza‘ayma’s (d. 311/924) Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa Ithbāt Šifāt al-Rabb, and Makhūl al-Nasafī’s (d. 318/930) al-Radd alā ahlu al-Bida’ wa al-ahwā’. In these works, many issues are left unmentioned, such as the causative

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183 This is the same al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammed al-Ḥanafiyya discussed in the Murji‘ite section.
186 (see, al-Ibāna, n.d. p.32) this might be an attempt, by the Traditionalist, to claim al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammad as a puritan Traditionalist since this alleged excommunication opposes Murji‘ite theological tendencies such as faith being only belief, or confession of belief, both of which the Qadarites and Kharijites fulfil.
capacity of human agency, responsibility, rational morality, divine justice and evil. Perhaps the authors of these works had not yet been exposed to such debates.

Nonetheless, Abū Muḥammad Ibn Qutayba al-Daynūrī (d. 276/889) was perhaps the most shrewd and engaging of Traditionalists during this period. His work, *al-Ikhtilāf fī al-Ilafz*, is an example of an engaging Traditionalist text which demonstrates a reflective understanding of the reasons behind theological differences being largely due to the lack of fully defining terminologies. Ibn Qutayba potentially owes this insight to his linguistic background. Likewise, Ibn Qutayba seems to have developed theological rules concerning the positions of the *Salaf*, such as: they believe in divine attributes without giving them modality (*kayfīyya*), limit (*ḥad*), and analogy (*qiyyās*). Interestingly, Ibn Qutayba is critical of a Traditionalist trend, positioning himself as different in that Traditionalists do not theologically engage with issues unmentioned by the *Salaf* - as this is tantamount to heresy, according to them. As a result, this type of trend is very limited in terms of theological development. Similarly, Ibn Qutayba mentions some Traditionalists who went so far as to claim that faith (*imān*) is uncreated, did so in fear that they would be imposed to hold that the testimony of faith (*lā ilah ill allah*) is created. In addition, Ibn Qutayba seems to distinguish himself from an early *taqlīd* (uncritical religious imitation) tendency, which he criticises as having multiple narrations on the ‘Creation of the Quran Debate’, each attributed to Ahmad Ibn Ḥanbal, a contemporary Traditionalist, and each group claims its own narrations. In these circumstances, Ibn Qutayba argues that such narrations hold no epistemological weight in theological debates.

Nonetheless, there are still many important issues related to divine determination that are not discussed in Ibn Qutayba’s works, such as: the nature of human agency *vis-à-vis*

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190 ibid., p. 58.
191 ibid., p. 65.
192 ibid., p. 58-59.
193 ibid., p. 59.
responsibility and the multiple category of both divine will\textsuperscript{194} and evil\textsuperscript{195} with reference to divine determination.

Perhaps the two most remarkably distinct figures of the Traditionalist School in terms of critical engagement and theological development are Ibn Taymiyya and his disciple Ibn al-Qayyim.\textsuperscript{196} In the works of both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, it is evident that they engaged with rational theology and with the various schools of such discipline. Moreover, they also went further by engaging with philosophy - something unprecedented in the Traditionalist works prior and post the Taymiyyan era. The modern day Traditionalist School is much indebted to the works of these two Damascene scholars - perhaps due to the many relevant issues discussed and developed in their works, making them two of the most important figures after Ahmad Ibn Ḥanbal.

Their critical engagement with philosophical theology was perhaps prompted by a need to reform Traditionalist doctrines on contemporary debates, so as to provide the masses with a more orthodox substitute\textsuperscript{197} - instead of the state supported doctrines of the Ashʿarite School. Thus, this may be seen as a ‘Traditionalisation’ of kalām and falsafa.

For example, Ibn Taymiyya states that God’s attributes are species and genera (ajnās wa anwā), that is, they are the most general universals. This statement is perhaps a development of

\textsuperscript{194} Such as the universal will and the legislative will, as we shall see in chapter six.

\textsuperscript{195} Such as evil of privation and relative evil as we shall, see in chapter seven.

\textsuperscript{196} If we accept Ibrāhīm Madkūr’s opinion of Ibn Ḥazm belonging to the same Traditionalist trend as Ibn Taymiyya, then Ibn Ḥazm should also be mentioned amongst the list of important Traditionalists who partook in critical engagement and theological development. See, Ibrāhīm Madkūr, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, pp. 32-33.

the Muṭṭazīlī Ābian al-Jabbārī’s (d. 321/933) middle ground\textsuperscript{198} theory of attributes being states (\textit{aḥwāl}). This theory was then developed to mean that states are universals that exist only in the mind and do not have any objective reality.\textsuperscript{199} Hence, Ābian Hāshim’s statement that states are neither existence nor non-existence is understood to mean that states do not exist in the objective world but do exist in one’s mind.\textsuperscript{200} It is from this notion that Ibn Taymiyya’s theory of attributes as species and genera can be appreciated as a further development not only towards determining the nature of divine attributes, but also towards understanding an ontological purpose of why God creates. For this reason, attributes which are denoted as species and genera have, by necessity, particulars which are the existence, which God had created.\textsuperscript{201}

\section*{Conclusion}

In this chapter I have challenged the contemporary conception that Traditionalist theology is derived entirely from scripture, as is interpreted by the monolithic understanding of the \textit{Salaf}. This was made evident by the illustration of early theological differences between individuals within the \textit{Salaf}, the first three generations, whom engaged with one another on theological concepts, which prompted long term developments by theologians of different schools. As such, these theological developments were, more or less, based on critical engagement and not entirely

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{198} Between the early Muṭṭazīlites who hold that only names (\textit{asmāʾ}) indicate the essence of God, not attributes (\textit{sifāt}), so as to avoid the problem of multiplicity in the nature of God. And the early Ashʿarites, on the other hand, who hold that names only indicate the attributes of meanings (\textit{sifāt al-\(m\)aʿānī}) and not the essence. For example, the name \textit{al-Ālim} (the Omniscience) indicates the attribute of knowledge which resides in the essence of God and does not indicate the essence directly. See, ‘Abdel Hakim, Ajhar, ‘The Forgotten Rational Thinking in Hanbalite Thought with Special Reference to Ibn Taymiyya’, in \textit{Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies}, vol.14, 2004, p. 144.
\item \textsuperscript{199} See al-Shahranstānī, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 63; Ajhar, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 145.
\item \textsuperscript{200} Ajhar, ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{201} Ajhar, ibid. For more on Ibn Taymiyya’s theological developments which were the result of his critical engagements, see his theory of eternal creation of substances not \textit{ex nihilo} and causality as reflecting the agency of God, in Abdel Hakim Ajhar, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 146-152; \textit{idem.}, \textit{The Metaphysics of the Idea of God in Ibn Taymiyya’s Thought}, PhD Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 2000, pp. 46-61, 201-216, 185-201.
\end{itemize}
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on scripture or a utopian monolithic first three generations of Islam. In the remaining chapters, we evaluate how Ibn al-Qayyim critically engages with various theologians and philosophers on topics related to divine determination and thereby investigate his original theological notions which remain relevant in the theology adhered to in the contemporary Traditionalist School.
3- FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: IBN AL-QAYYIM’S COMPATIBILISM OF DUAL AGENCY

Introduction

In this chapter I will demonstrate how Ibn al-Qayyim engages with both the Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites on an important aspect of divine determination: the nature of divine and human agency in respect to action. Similarly, I will illustrate how Ibn al-Qayyim shows a profound understanding of the differences inherent within each school. As a result of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement, I will argue that he develops a compatibilist position of dual agency - where both human responsibility and God’s omnipotence exist without compromise. Additionally, I will elucidate some of Ibn al-Qayyim’s original developments on the debate of human agency and evaluate how he succeeds in harmonising found difficulties by synthesising the opposing positions of the Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites.

Defining the Debate

As we saw in the previous chapter, Ma’bad al-Juhani is commonly identified as having been the first to initiate this debate in Basra, due to the widespread practise of ihtijāj bi-al-qadar – using divine determination to justify one’s sins. The debate is then subsequently developed in the works of the theologians and can be found under various titles such as: qadar, khalq afāl al-ʿibād (creation of man’s acts), or ta’thīr al-qudra al-muhdatha (causation of the temporal power). Moreover, the questions that are typically dealt with include: does man have free will or are his acts determined? Or, from a different angle: are man’s acts created or does he independently bring about his own acts? Does man have a causative ability? And importantly, is
man a responsible agent and how can such responsibility be justified if his acts are determined by God?

The schools involved in this debate generally agree that man is a responsible agent; however, they do differ as to how such responsibility is justified. It must be noted that each school also differs internally vis-à-vis different issues within this debate, as we shall see shortly.

In summary of the positions in this debate, the majority of the Muʿtazilites hold that man is the sole originator of his own acts, which are the result of his own power and will. Thus, man is a responsible agent. However, some of the Muʿtazilites disagree that man is the creator of his own acts.

The majority of the Ashʿarites hold that man’s originated power has no causative ability; rather an act is solely the cause of God’s pre-eternal power. Additionally, some Ashʿarites believe that while man is incapable of causing an act, he is capable of defining the ethical nature of an act, that is, whether it is an act of obedience or disobedience. On the other hand, some Ashʿarites maintain that man does have the ability to cause an act but only with the aid of God. Lastly, some Ashʿarites went further, upholding that man does have the ability to cause an act without divine aid.

Ibn al-Qayyim adopted the position of dual agency of one act, which means that an act is the result of both God’s pre-eternal power and man’s originated power. This entails that man’s originated power has a causative ability but only partially causative in order to leave room for God’s omnipotence.

**Ibn al-Qayyim on the Muʿtazilites**

On the debate of human agency, Ibn al-Qayyim claims that the Muʿtazilite School unanimously agree that man is the sole agent of his actions - which are the result of his own power and will.¹

However, Ibn al-Qayyim states that the Mu’tazilites do differ on whether God is described as the inventor (mukhtari’), originator (muḥdith) or creator (khāliq) of man’s actions and whether God has capacity over (qādir alayhā) such actions. Ibn al-Qayyim states that the majority of the Mu’tazilites deny the above whereas those who are closest to the Sunna (Prophetic traditions) affirm it. Nonetheless, upon analysis one does realise that the issues Ibn al-Qayyim bands together are where the differences occur within the Mu’tazilite School. I found that such a simplistic generalised depiction as ‘the majority who deny and the minority who affirm’ is not quite accurate. Ibn al-Qayyim’s simplistic depiction of the differences within the Mu’tazilite School is as follows:

**The Majority Position**

Mankind is the originator of their actions in which they invent (mukhtariʾūn) by their own will (irāda) and power (qudra). God is not to be described as capable of man’s capabilities (muqḍūr), nor do man’s actions come under His power, just as man is not described as capable of God’s capabilities and His actions do not come under their power.

**The Minority: al-Shaḥḥām and some Qadarites**

…the action of man is the same action as that of God’s; with the condition that man performs it while God eschews it. This is not to say that man performs it and God is the agent, since it is impossible for a product to be the result of dual creators.
Firstly, there are a number of issues which Ibn al-Qayyim groups together which should in fact be considered separately, such as: (1) Is God described as the creator of man’s actions? (2) Are man’s actions determined (muqaddara) by God? (3) Is God capable (qādir) of man’s actions? And lastly (4) did God empower man to originate his capability to act? As for the first issue, there is a consensus mentioned that the Muʿtazilites unanimously deny this particular description of God as the creator of man’s actions. So perhaps, the minority of the Muʿtazilites who Ibn al-Qayyim states that affirm such, is ʿAlī ibn Ṭabar, as is mentioned by Imām al-Ashʿarī. The Muʿtazilī, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, also mentions this consensus whereby he says:

The People of Justice (Ahlu Ḥadīth) have agreed that the actions of man, from rising to sitting, are originated (ḥadda) by them...there is no agent or originator other than them [man] and whosoever says that God is the creator and originator of such actions has fallen into great error.

I do not think it is accurate for al-Qāḍī to claim consensus upon such a position due to the fact that Dirār and al-Najjār, both of whom are Muʿtazilīs, hold a different position from that mentioned by al-Qāḍī above. Al-Shahrastānī quotes al-Najjār’s position as follows: ‘Verily God is the creator of man’s actions, the good and the evil, the pleasant and the unpleasant; and man is the acquirer of it.’

Likewise, al-Qāḍī mentions the different position held by Dirār, that the action of man was not originated by him, but instead it was created by God. Al-Shaḥḥām is another Muʿtazilī who differed from the vast majority of the Muʿtazilīs. Al-Shaḥḥām holds that both God and

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10 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, op. cit., vol. 8, p. 3; Ibn Mattawayh, op. cit., p.364.
man have the power to act and in both cases their power should be independent. It is possible that God can perform man’s actions as long as both God and man are independent of one another. It must not be said that God is the agent of man’s actions, particularly those actions clearly performed by man. For example, God has the power to make a tree fall whilst man has the power to cut down a tree; the latter action should only be ascribed to man and not God. Hence, both actions are independent of each other and each action-taker has agency. But, according to al-Shaḥḥam, God acts out of necessity (iḏtirāran) while man acts by way of acquisition (iktisāban). Ibn al-Qayyim commented that ‘this position is the exact same as the school that holds that the occurrence of an object by dual agents is compatible in a way that is interchangeable.’

Hence, the difference of opinion between Dirār, al-Najjār, al-Shahhām and Şāliḥ Qubba with the rest of the Mu’tazilites clearly indicates to us that there is no such consensus, as claimed by al-Qāḍī, upon the opinion that man is the creator (khāliq) of his actions. So perhaps Ibn al-Qayyim was right in this case to depict the differences as a majority position versus a minority.

There is another difference of opinion that occurs amongst the Mu’tazilites and is related to issue (1) aforementioned. That is, although the Mu’tazilites hold the position that man is the originator (muḥdith) of his actions, they differ regarding the term khāliq (creator), specifically whether man can be described as the creator of his actions. There are three different opinions concerning the meaning of khāliq (creator).

One opinion states that the khāliq (creator) is he who is determined (muqaddar) to act and whosoever is determined to act is the creator of that action - regardless of whether it is from God’s pre-eternal (qadīm) power or man’s originated (ḥadīth) power. Hence, man can be described as the creator of his actions. Al-Jubāʾī and his followers belong to this first position.

A second opinion upholds that the term khāliq (creator) means he who acts, neither with a tool (ālah) nor by an originated power (quwa mukhtiri a). Thus, whoever acts without a tool or the originated power is to be described as the creator of his actions. Additionally, whoever acts

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14 al-Ashʿarī, op. cit., p. 549.
by an originated power is not to be described as the creator of his actions.\(^\text{17}\) Hence, this position does not go so far as to suggest that man creates his actions, but rather that he originates them.\(^\text{18}\)

A third position does not distinguish between agent (fā'il) and creator (khāliq); both terms have the same meanings. However, this position does not ascribe the noun creator to man because the revealed law (sharī'a) has prohibited this.\(^\text{19}\) On the contrary, al-Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār allows for the attribution of such term to man, since it has been used linguistically (lughatan).\(^\text{20}\) Perhaps for this reason, many of the early Mu'tazilites abstained from attributing the term khāliq to man, instead using terms such as ijād (bring about) and ihdāth (originate). It has been mentioned that Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī was the first to declare that man is the creator (khāliq) of his actions, given that this attribute is present in man.\(^\text{21}\) Al-Jawaynī says:

> The early Mu'tazilites use to abstain from attributing the term 'creator' to man as they were close to the era of the early consensus of the Salaf that 'there is no creator except God'. Then the later of them were bold enough to name man the creator literally (haqīqa).\(^\text{22}\)

Ibn al-Qayyim’s reading of issue (2), which states that the majority of the Mu'tazilites deny divine determining (muqaddara) of man’s actions, is perhaps correct if the term ‘determined’ means created.\(^\text{23}\) However, if the term ‘determined’ means knowing (‘ilām) and informing (ikhbār) then it is possible, according to the Mu'tazilites, that man’s actions are determined by God in the sense that God has knowledge of such actions.\(^\text{24}\)

As for the third issue, I believe that Ibn al-Qayyim was incorrect in his interpretation of God being capable of man’s actions as meaning that God empowers man to originate his actions.

\(^\text{17}\) ibid
\(^\text{18}\) There is no mention of who holds this position. cf. ibid.
\(^\text{19}\) ibid, p. 273.
\(^\text{20}\) Ibn Mattawayh, op. cit., p. 414.
\(^\text{23}\) ʿAbd al-Jabbār, op. cit., pp. 771-772.
\(^\text{24}\) ibid
Additionally, Ibn al-Qayyim claims that issue (3) is in fact issue (4) because the apparent meaning of issue (3) is impossible according to the Muʿtazilites.\(^{25}\) The term *qādir alayhā*, in issue (3) literally means God’s capacity over man’s actions; however, Ibn al-Qayyim insists that the term – as used by the Muʿtazilites – really means God created in man a power (*qudra*) to originate (*iḥdāth*) actions. For example, if a man lifts a stone, he does so with his own power, but this power was initially created in him by God. Thus, man can only perform that which God has given him power to do. Therefore, Ibn al-Qayyim is interpreting issue (3) as issue (4). Ibn al-Qayyim confirms his proposed interpretation of issue (3) as follows:

This is not to say, that God’s capacity over it [man’s actions] means He is able to perform the action as it is impossible\(^{26}\), according to them [Muʿtazilites], but rather His capacity over it, is God’s empowerment of man to originate such actions. Hence, man originated the action by God’s power, empowerment and enablement; and these are the closest Qadarites\(^{27}\) to the Sunna.\(^{28}\)

The claim put forth by Ibn al-Qayyim, that the Muʿtazilites maintain it is impossible for God to perform the same acts as man, is not entirely accurate. I have found that al-Ashʿarī mentions al-Shaḥḥām to affirm that God is capable of man’s actions and as such, it would be considered an act of necessity (*darūra*).\(^{29}\) So, it is unclear why Ibn al-Qayyim interprets issue (3) as issue (4), bearing in mind that Imām al-Ashʿarī does mention both issues (3) and (4) on the same page,\(^{30}\) so it is possible that Ibn al-Qayyim confused the two issues.

Similarly, I have found that Ibn al-Qayyim’s reading of issue (4), being that the majority of Muʿtazilites deny God’s empowerment of man with the ability to originate, is misinformed. In


\(^{26}\) This is according to the majority of the Muʿtazilites; see al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn*, ed. Muhammad Muḥī al-Dīn ʿ Abd al-Ḥamīd, Maktaba al-Nahda al-Miṣrīyya, Cairo, 1950, vol. 1, p 251. However, as we shall see shortly in the next section dealing with al-Shaḥḥām’s position which holds that it is possible for God to perform man’s actions.

\(^{27}\) Many of the classical Sunnī scholars refer to the Muʿtazilites as Qadariyya due to the fact that they affirm *qadar* to themselves and not God, i.e. man determines his actions not God. See, Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā li Ibn Taymiyya*, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, Beirut, 1987, vol. 1, p. 83.


\(^{29}\) al-Ashʿarī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p 251

\(^{30}\) Ibid
fact, there seems to be a consensual agreement amongst the Mu’tazilites that God empowered mankind to originate their own actions.\(^{31}\) Ibn al-Qayyim states that only a minority held such a view.\(^{32}\) Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār says:

The People of Justice (Ahlu ‘Adil) have unanimously agreed that man’s actions— from rising to sitting—are originated (ḥāditha) by them; and it was God who empowered them with such [ability]…\(^{33}\)

**Ibn al-Qayyim on the Mu’tazilites’ Arguments**

The Mu’tazilites argue that every rational person knows intuitively that they are the agents of their own voluntary actions, which result from their intentions and motives; unlike the shivering and compelled persons.\(^{34}\) Ibn al-Qayyim agrees that man knows intuitively that he is the agent of his acts; however, does this answer whether God created their actions or that man created his own actions? Moreover, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the Mu’tazilites have not presented a sound argument to disprove that God is capable (qādir)\(^{35}\) of man’s actions.\(^{36}\)

I think it is likely that the term ‘created’ (khalaq) is understood and employed differently by both the Mu’tazilites and Ibn al-Qayyim. I do not think the Mu’tazilites suggest that man creates his actions in the same sense that God creates. Al-Qāḍī argues that man cannot create essences (jawāhir) and attributes (‘ārād); however, God can.\(^{37}\) Therefore, the meaning of

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\(^{31}\) ibid


\(^{35}\) It is strange to see that Ibn al-Qayyim switches to a different word such as, ‘capable’, while the original word used is, ‘created’. This perhaps supports my opinion that both parties employ words ambiguously without properly defining what exactly they mean by the word they employ and thus results to different understandings.


‘created’ and its employment in regard to man’s acts is different from the meaning when used in relation to God - according to the Mu’tazilites. Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim’s disagreement is a result of his failure to understand ‘created’ being used differently in regards to God and to man. Hence, there is no difference when the term ‘created’ relates to God or to man, according to Ibn al-Qayyim. For example, if one states that man can create his own actions then, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, this ‘created’ is the same as when God creates. Consequently, the difference of opinion between the Mu’tazilites and Ibn al-Qayyim can be seen as a difference of definition - the Mu’tazilites mean one thing and Ibn al-Qayyim means another.

The Mu’tazilites also argue that if man was not the agent of his sins then such sins would not have been attributed to him, as is found in the Quran. So accordingly, sins are attributed to man for the simple reason that he originated it, while good deeds are attributed to God since He has commanded and legislated them. God says: Whatever befalls you of good (hasana) is from God, but whatever befalls you of evil (say’a), is from yourself.

Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the Mu’tazilites were incorrect in thinking the verse refers to sins and good deeds; he argued instead that they refer to blessing and tribulations. The words ḥasana (good deeds) and say’a (sins) are sometimes used in the Quran to refer to blessings and tribulations. For example, God says: If a good (ḥasana) befalls you, it grieves them, but if some evil (say’a) overtakes you, they rejoice at it. In other parts of the Quran ḥasana and say’a are used to refer to voluntary acts, such as, sins and good deeds. For example, God says: Verily, the good deeds (ḥasanat) remove the evil deeds (say’at).

Additionally, Ibn al-Qayyim makes use of the grammatical structure of the verse in order to further support his position that the verse employed by the Mu’tazilites refers to blessing and tribulations. He argues that there is no subject mentioned in the part of the verse which reads: whatever befalls you (mā ‘ašābak). This indicates that the verse refers to blessings and

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38 Cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 449; ibid, vol. 2, pp. 466-467. However, at times Ibn al-Qayyim does seem to agree that the term ‘creator’ can refer to man; see, ibid, vol. 2, pp. 794 ff; also see, al-Ash’ari, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 273.
40 Quran, 3: 120.
41 Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid.
tribulations - over both of which man does not have agency. Had the verse read: whatever I [cause to] befall (mā ʾaṣabtu) or whatever I acquire (mā kasabtu), where there is a subject mentioned, the verses would refer to voluntary acts, such as, sins and good deeds.42

In the first instance, I think that a subjective interpretation of the verse can be used to oppose Ibn al-Qayyim. The Muʿtazilites interpret hasana as good deed and sayʿa as sin, both of which are valid in the Arabic language. On the other hand, Ibn al-Qayyim interprets hasana as blessing and sayʿa as tribulation; again both are valid in the Arabic language. Hence, in this regard, both parties employ subjective interpretations that are linguistically valid. Nonetheless, Ibn al-Qayyim’s analysis of the grammatical structure of the verse does provide a strong case in support of his position.

Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the verse: Whatever befalls you of good (hasana), is from God, but whatever befalls you of evil (sayʿa), is from yourself does not support the Muʿtazilites’ position. The reason being, there is a clear distinction between the attribution of hasana and the attribution of sayʿa in the verse. Sayʿa (interpreted as ‘sin’ according to the Muʿtazilites) is clearly attributed to man, whereas hasana (interpreted as ‘good deed’ by the Muʿtazilites) is clearly attributed to God. Contrary to this, the Muʿtazilites hold that both sins and good deeds are attributed to man since he is the sole agent. Thus, they do not distinguish between the attribution of both sins and good deeds, unlike the verse. Therefore, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, this verse does not advocate the Muʿtazilites’ position.43

However, I think that a part of the verse does support the Muʿtazilites’ position on the agency of man, as the verse attributes sin to man. Despite this, Ibn al-Qayyim does spot an inconsistency in the Muʿtazilites’ employment of scripture, as a part of the verse which attributes good deeds to God clearly contradicts their position - bearing in mind that the Muʿtazilites argue for the sole agency of man with regard to voluntary acts. Therefore, Ibn al-Qayyim’s claim that the verse does not support the Muʿtazilites’ position is slightly exaggerated, as a part of it clearly does: but whatever befalls you of evil (sayʿa), is from yourself.

Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ashʿarites

The classical Ashʿarites hold that man’s voluntary actions are created solely by God’s power and man has no cause to such actions. Hence, God originates (iḥḍāth) man’s actions while man acquires (iktisab) them. On the other hand, there are those amongst the Ashʿarite School who hold a different position. These different positions are perhaps the result of the various explanations for the theory of kasb (acquisition). The wide range of different views and approaches arguably makes the Ashʿarite position more difficult to discern and also distinguishes them from most other theological schools. Furthermore, the Ashʿarites were not the only school that attempted to synthesize both the position of the Jabrites and Qadarites; as such, they were not Traditionalists in the same sense that was adhered to by Ibn al-Qayyim, as is commonly mistaken. Additionally, there are major differences between the Ashʿarites and Ibn al-Qayyim, and equally within the Ashʿarite ranks themselves.

Ibn al-Qayyim states that al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935-6) holds man’s actions to be the literal actions of God and only metaphorically of man’s. On the other hand, al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) presents al-Ashʿarī’s position slightly differently. Al-Rāzī states that the cause of an action is by God’s power, while man’s power has no cause to the existence of the action. Additionally, al-Rāzī states that al-Ashʿarī is in agreement with those who hold that man has no power to cause neither his actions nor his attributes.

However, the actual position of al-Ashʿarī is debated much amongst researchers though Ibn al-Qayyim confirms that this position is the last opinion on which al-Ashʿarī settled.

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44 Ibn al-Qayyim states that the Muʿtazilites, Ashʿarites and Ahlu Sunna wa al-Ḥadīth (Traditionalists) all employ kasb but all intend different meanings; see Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 758, 789. For Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussion on kasb and jabr, see Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 749-805.
45 Cf. al-ʿAllama al-Ḥillī, Minhāj al-Karrāma fī ʾIthbāt al-ʾIimāmā.
49 Aḥmad Muḥammad ʿUmar, al-Muṣṭalaḥāt al-Kalāmiyya fī ʿAfāl illāḥ, Umm al-Qura, Mekkah, 1414AH, p. 244.
on. That is, man's power (al-qudra al-muhdatha) cannot bring into existence that which was determined for it (muqdūrihā), namely an act. Similarly, an act along with its attributes is not brought about by man; rather, it comes from God's pre-eternal power (al-qudra al-qadīma). In this regard, Ibn al-Qayyim supports al-Rāzī's position on al-Ashʿarī, namely that al-Ashʿarī denies man's causative ability.

However, it must be noted that al-Rāzī does not quote al-Ashʿarī directly as denying man's power to bring about his acts; instead, al-Rāzī simply attributes this position to al-Ashʿarī. In fact, contrary to al-Rāzī's quotation, al-Ashʿarī explains what he means by kāshb in his book al-Luma'. He defines it as 'the reality of acquisition is that a thing occurs by the acquirer from his originated power'. Also, in his Maqālāt, he states: 'the true meaning of al-Iktisāb (acquisition) is that something occurs by way of the originated power, thus it is considered acquired by he in whose power it was with'. Based on the latter two quotes, one may argue for some sort of causative ability in man's originated power and nowhere does he claim that man's power cannot bring about his actions. Thus, this arguably indicates a different position of al-Ashʿarī to what is commonly attributed to him by al-Rāzī - namely, denying man's causative ability.

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50 Which literally translates as the originated or temporal power.
51 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., p. 127.
55 al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn, p. 542.
Furthermore, Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015) upholds that when al-Ashʿarī explains what he meant by *kasb*, he always employs the phrase ‘it is what is obtained by the originated power’. Similarly, the actual *kasb* occurs by both the originated power and the pre-eternal power; so the difference is with regard to the meaning of occurrence (*wuqūf*). When it occurs by means of God’s pre-eternal power, it means originated; when it occurs by man’s originated power, it means acquired. The failure to thoroughly define the different terms when employed to explain a concept could be the cause of the confusion regarding the conflicting positions attributed to al-Ashʿarī. For example, when al-Ashʿarī seems to argue in favour of man’s originated power in bringing about an act, he employs the terms ‘*waqa’a*’ (occur) and ‘*iktasaba*’ (acquire). This is the position mentioned in al-Ashʿarī’s *Maqālāt* and *al-Luma* and also mentioned by Ibn Fūrak and Ibn Taymiyya. Whereas, when al-Rāzī attributes the position to al-Ashʿarī, who denies man’s causative ability, the term ‘*ta’thīr*’ (cause) and ‘*aḥdatha*’ (originate) are employed. Hence, it is possible that these different terms, badly defined, in actuality imply different issues and concepts, namely, the ‘occurrence’ of an act versus the ‘cause’ of an act and the ‘acquisition’ of an act versus the ‘origination’ of an act. To recapitulate, it is quite possible that al-Ashʿarī affirms man’s ability to acquire and make an act occur, while also denying man’s causative ability and origination of an act. If such is the case, then this will resolve the differences of opinion with regard to al-Ashʿarī’s position(s) discussed above.

Ibn al-Qayyim explains the position of al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) who holds that man’s power cannot cause the existence of an action; rather, his power can only have a cause to the attribute of an action. This is how al-Bāqillānī explains *kasb*, which means man’s power can cause the attribute of an action, otherwise said whether the action is good or evil. Al-Bāqillānī argues that acts of obedience and disobedience are made up of movements - none of which are

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58 Ibid.
60 al-Ashʿarī, *al-Luma*, p. 76.
61 Ibn Fūrak, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
63 Ibn Taymiyya also alludes to this; see ibid, vol. 3, pp. 31, 209.
distinct from each other except in regards to the attribute. That is, one set of movements makes up an attribute of obedience whereas the other set of movements make up an attribute of disobedience. As such, the movements and its existence are both caused by God’s power, whereas, the attribute of the act is caused by man’s power. Thus, God’s pre-eternal power determines the ontological status of an action, while man’s originated power determines the ethical status of an action. Al-Bāqillānī describes the latter as *kasb*.

Ibn al-Qayyim explains that this position is close to what he believes to be the correct position; however, he states that al-Bāqillānī ‘did not do it full justice’. Ibn al-Qayyim says that in order for an act to have an attribute of obedience or disobedience it must comply with divine commandments or transgress them. As such, the act of compliance and transgression is either man’s action - which is the result of his power and choice - or it is not man’s action. If the former is true, then it has been established that man’s action is the result of his own power and free choice. However, if it is not man’s actions, then it has been established that man has no free choice, no action and no acquisition. Ibn al-Qayyim seems to agree with the first premise and comments that the Ash’arites have not established anything soundly on *kasb*; hence, it is said that the unfeasible theories are three: the acquisition (*kasb*) of al-Ash’arī, the states (*ahwāl*) of Abū Hāshim and the leap (*tufra*) of al-Nazzām.

Ibn al-Qayyim expands another Ash’arite position, belonging to Abū Ishāq al-Asfārīnī (d. 418/1027). Abū Ishāq maintains that God’s power is the independent cause for an action - unlike man’s power. However, if God’s power is added (*iḍāfa*) to that of man’s power, man’s power would have an independent cause to an action. Therefore, in order for man’s power to be capable of an independent cause, it must be aided by God’s power which entails divine permission and empowerment for the cause of an action to take effect.

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64 Ibn Qayyim, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 452.
This position seeks to preserve God’s power and independent cause to any given action and, in doing so, it tries to avoid compulsionism\(^69\) as it offers a power and cause to man. Moreover, in order to advocate man’s responsibility, Abū Isḥāq argues for man’s independent cause (\(tā’thīr\)) to his actions. However, this is virtually impossible to achieve if God is to have an independent cause as well as man. Thus, Abū Isḥaq concluded in the partnership (\(ishtirāk\)) of two independent powers: God’s power aids man’s power to achieve an independent cause so that man may be solely responsible for what he acquires.

Ibn al-Qayyim is quite critical in pointing out that if one independent cause is dependent on another independent cause then it is a contradiction to the term ‘independent’ itself. John cannot be the independent cause to buying a can of Coke from a drink machine and at the same time John is dependent upon his mother\(^70\) to wheel him there. Thus, John’s action must not be considered independent since he is dependent upon his mother. So, the fact that John’s mother helped him buy a can of Coke contradicts the premises that John was independent from the start. Ibn al-Qayyim says:

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\text{\ldots this position is not free from error, as it claims that man’s power is independent with the aid of God’s power. This takes us back to the issue of dual causes of one effect. But the power and cause of one of them depends on the power and cause of the other. It is like saying that God’s power is independently the cause to the existence of man’s power; and then man’s power is independently the cause to the existence of an action. This is also mentioned by a group of rationalist (\(uqalā’\)).}^71
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Ibn al-Qayyim further demonstrates that man’s power does not necessitate an act nor is it an independent cause; since any form of existence, such as a cause, is dependent upon God’s will.

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\(^{69}\) Ibn al-Qayyim sometimes refers to the Ashʿarites as Jabriyya (compulsionists) and refers to the Jahmiyya as Ghulāt al-Jabriyya (extreme compulsionists).

\(^{70}\) I must mention that the analogy I used is different from the position put forward by Abū Isḥāq, given that one cannot compare John’s mother to God, since they are two completely different concepts. However, I am trying to simplify Abū Isḥāq’s abstract position and make it more understandable and relatable to the reader.

\(^{71}\) Ibn Qayyim, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, p. 455.
Thus, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, man’s power cannot be the independent cause for the existence of any given action, as existence depends on the will of God. For this reason, it is inaccurate to say that man’s power is the independent cause to an action. Ibn al-Qayyim states:

And again this position is not free from error, since it claims that man’s power is independent in causing the existence of that which is probable (al-maqdūr) [the action] and this is unsound. Given that the utmost degree of man’s power is a cause (sabab), rather a part of the cause; and the cause is not independent in obtaining an effect (musabab) nor does it necessitate the effect. There is nothing in existence that necessitates the existence of that which is probable (al-maqdūr) [the action] except the will of God alone (mash‘ī/atahu).  

Imām al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) is another Ash‘arite scholar, whom Ibn al-Qayyim praises for his position on human agency. Al-Juwaynī seemed to have developed his first position - which was in agreement with the majority of Ash‘arites - to a position that marks a major development. He affirms that man’s power has the ability to cause the existence of an action. He states that to affirm a power which has no capability to cause is like denying the power itself. This is perhaps an indirect refutation of the majority position which denies that man’s power is capable of causing an action. As a result, al-Juwaynī was attacked by various Ash‘arite scholars who excused him of adopting the Muʿtazilites’ position or even adopting the philosopher’s

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72 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 457. Ibn al-Qayyim further adds that the people of this position also claim that God gave man the power and will (irāda) to act and eschew while unattended by God Himself. Hence, man has the capability to act and eschew with his own power and will which God had entrusted him with. Cf. ibid.
77 Muḥammad ʿAmāra, op. cit., p. 206.
position. Some scholars went further to deny that al-Juwaynī developed a different position and instead they claimed that it was forged and attributed to him.

Perhaps Ibn al-Qayyim’s only critique of al-Juwaynī’s later position is that he failed to acknowledge that God dislikes man’s acts of disobedience despite that it has been determined by God. Al-Juwaynī based this on the famous principle of whatever God wills, He also likes. So if God determines sins, then this means that He wills and loves them. The implication of this principle is a fallacy according to Ibn al-Qayyim.

Ibn al-Qayyim engages with another Ashʿarite position which he attributes to an anonymous group (tāʿifā) instead of mentioning their names. This anonymous position holds that an action can be caused by both God and man’s power, independently of each other. As a result, both God and man’s agencies are preserved.

Moreover, this anonymous position can potentially be traced to one of the two probabilities put forth by al-Rāzī. He argues that the cause for the existence of an action is both God and man’s power. Al-Rāzī further argues for two probabilities of this position. Firstly, either both God and man’s power are independent in bringing about an action, given the fact that both independent causes of one effect is possible. This first probability is perhaps the anonymous position mentioned previously by Ibn al-Qayyim. The second probability is that God’s power is an independent cause while man’s power is a dependent cause. So if God’s power is combined (ินدامما) with that of man’s power, man’s power would have an independent cause for an action with the aid of God’s power. This is the position of Abū Ishāq al-Asfarāyīnī, as we saw earlier.

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82 al-Rāzī, ibid
83 al-Rāzī, ibid, p. 11.
Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the position of dual independent causes of one effect, namely, an action can be caused by both God and man’s power, independently of each other. Ibn al-Qayyim states:

They say: There is no inconsistency in two independent causes of one effect. Similarly, one object being the result of two subjects [dual agents] and one probable act by two capable persons (maqdi'r bayn qādirayn)… we witness two independently capable (qādirayn) persons, each partaking in the cause and agency of an act while each of them are acting independently. They say: the only argument employed against this position is that the one independent agent of an act contradicts the other independent agent of the same act. So to claim dual independent agency of one object is self-contradictory.  

Ibn al-Qayyim acknowledges that this argument contains ambiguity (ijmāl) and needs further elaboration. He says that dual agency of one object is possible when both agents are dependent on each other; such as, two persons collaborating in an act which is not possible to achieve alone.  

Similarly, it is also possible for the dual agency of one object, each being independent of each other by way of exchange.  

Ibn al-Qayyim also argues that it is possible for the dual agency of one object, both in partnership and both capable of performing the act independently of each other. This can be illustrated by imagining two persons carrying something whilst knowing that each of them is able to carry it alone.  

Ibn al-Qayyim then argues that the one possibility of dual agency of one act which proves false is the claim that both agents are autonomous in performing the one act. When both are the independent agent of the same act, the autonomy of one agent opposes that of the other.  

So Ibn al-Qayyim states the problem lies within the ambiguity of this position. He shows that some outcomes of this position, once elaborated upon, are possible. However, the possibility of an act carried out by two separate persons each independent of each other in one instant, is

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85 Ibid
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid, pp. 454-455.
88 Ibid, p. 455.
practically impossible. For example, it is impossible to say that both John and Jimmy, two separate persons, bought the same can of Coke from the same drink machine, both independently of each other and at the same time.

Al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) also believes that it is possible for dual agency to exist in one act, if the two agents’ capabilities are different. As such, man’s actions are from God in one respect and from man in another and so does man have a choice in the existence of his actions.\(^89\) Al-Ghazālī states:

The correct position is that the cause is from dual powers, God’s power and man’s power. So man’s acts are from God’s divine decree and determining; however, man has a choice. So the determining (\(\text{\textit{taqādīr}}\)) is from God and the acquisition is from man. This is the position of the Ahlu Sunna, which is a middle way position between the Jabrites and the Qadarites.\(^90\)

Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the position of both Dirār Ibn ‘Umar (ca. 110–200/ca. 728–815) and al-Ḥusayn Ibn Muḥammad al-Najjār (d. end of 3rd/9th century). Although they do not belong to the Ash’arite School\(^91\), Ibn al-Qayyim seemingly groups them with the Ash’arites’, given that their position is comparable to that of the Ash’arites. Dirār and Al-Najjār hold that it is possible for an act to occur as a result of dual agents with different attributions (\(\text{\textit{nīṣāb}}\)) - one being the originator, the other being the acquirer.\(^92\) This position seems remarkably similar to al-Ash’arī’s position, as al-Ash’arī is famously known for having invented the theory of acquisition (\(\text{\textit{kāshb}}\)). It was used a century before him by Dirār and his student al-Najjār, but al-Ash’arī had the best account of this doctrine, hence why he receives recognition for it.\(^93\)

Ibn al-Qayyim highlights two differences between the position of both Dirār and al-Najjār and the position of al-Ash’arī. Firstly, Dirār and al-Najjār both hold that man is the real


\(^{90}\) Ibid

\(^{91}\) al-Shabrastānī describes them as moderate Mu’tazilites; see, al-Shahrastānī, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 44.


agent even while he has no choice and is not the originator of the action. Conversely, al-Ashʿarī holds that man is not the agent even though the action is attributed to him; rather, the real agent is God and none besides Him.94 Secondly, Dirār and al-Najjār, both say that God is the originator and man is the agent95 while al-Ashʿarī says that God is both the originator and agent and man is merely the acquirer.

Consequently, Dirār and al-Najjār both affirm that man has the capability to cause an act; they label this as ‘acquisition’. On the contrary, al-Ashʿarī denies that man has the capability to cause an act96 and instead he affirms man’s acquisition of an act. This is perhaps the fundamental difference between the position shared by Dirār and al-Najjār and the position of al-Ashʿarī; the former affirm man’s causative ability while the latter denies it.97

In summary of the Ashʿarite opinions, the majority hold that the originated power has no cause to an act; an act is solely the cause of the pre-eternal power.98 This was upheld by al-Ashʿarī, Ibn Fūrak, al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037), al-Rāzī, and al-Ijī (d. 756/1355). Al-Baqqillānī believed that the originated power had no cause to an act but instead was capable of causing the ethical nature of an act, that is, whether it is an act of obedience or disobedience. Abū Ishḥāq maintained that the originated power has the ability to cause an act only with the aid of the pre-eternal power; whereas, al-Juwaynī was perhaps the only one to have adopted the position that the originated power has the ability to cause an act without the mention of divine aid. Al-Ghazzālī seemed to have adopted his master, al-Juwaynī’s position. This position displays resemblance to the possibility put forth by al-Rāzī and may have its traces to Dirār and al-Najjār.

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96 According to the position attributed to al-Ashʿarī by al-Rāzī and Ibn al-Qayyim as we saw earlier.
Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ash‘arites’ Arguments

Al-Rāzī argues that knowledge is a condition of man’s agency instead of power. That is, if man did truly bring about an act, then this would imply that he must have known the specifics of that particular act. As such, it is impossible for man to know the specifics of a particular act - as this requires that man knows what he chooses and intends. For example, the conscious or unconscious people whom are unaware of the many specific aspects that makes up their particular movements.99

Al-Rāzī’s argument assumes that knowledge is a condition of man’s agency while, the Mu‘tazilites assume that power is the condition of man’s agency. These positions are argued for in a separate debate on the agency of an unconscious or insane person.100

Unfortunately, Ibn al-Qayyim does not deal with the agency of a conscious person - nor do the Mu‘tazilites. Instead, they discuss the agency of an unconscious or an insane person. This is perhaps to support their position that power alone is required for the existence of an act rather than knowledge. Ibn al-Qayyim comments on the agency of an insane person, whose movement resembles that of an animal or a child who lacks awareness (al-tamyīz). This insane person has a motive (dā‘ī), will and power; however, these are not like that of a sane person. The same applies to a heedless person who is unaware of his act even though such an act is the result of his power; because without his power there would be no act. Therefore, this heedless person has a will but he is unaware of it101.

It seems that Ibn al-Qayyim did not refute al-Rāzī’s argument; indeed the Ash‘arites may argue that Ibn al-Qayyim is proving precisely their point. As, in all cases which consider the agency of conscious, unconscious and insane persons, the knowledge of specifics is absent; hence, these people did not bring about their actions. Instead, Ibn al-Qayyim merely claims that power or general knowledge is necessary for the existence of an act and not its specifics. It seems

101 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., p. 149.
that both parties are talking over each other, the Ash’s rites claim that knowledge is required for an act to exist, while the Mu’ tazilites and Ibn al-Qayyim claim that power is necessary for an act to exist. So perhaps a sound argument would be one that disproves the condition of their opponent, instead of citing examples to support their own condition.

Furthermore, I think that attempting to disprove any of the conditions for the existence of an act might be subjective. To argue against the condition of knowledge, for example, fire burns and the sun can cause forest fires, both without knowledge. In both examples, an Ash’rite can simply state that it is not the fire or sun that burns, rather it is God. Hence, a subjective view claims that power is required, whereas, another subjective view claims that knowledge is required; and thus only God has knowledge of specifics. Similarly, to argue against the condition of power, for example, imagination can create anything imaginable in the mind of a person simply based on knowledge alone. Similarly, feelings can bring about tears when one is sad and also physical signs of happiness when one is happy - both of which are based on knowledge from one’s imagination. But then again, an Ash’rite can simply claim that it is not the imagination or feelings that create, rather it is God. Hence, the subjective views are repeated.

Ibn al-Qayyim engages with another argument that he attributes to an ambiguous Jabrī. In fact, it is clear that the unnamed Jabrī is al-Rāzī and the unnamed Sunnī is Ibn al-Qayyim himself. This is obvious because Ibn al-Qayyim actually names Ibn al-Khaṭīb, who is al-Rāzī, in a few sections in the debate. Similarly, in the books of both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Rāzī is often used as a representative of the Ash’rite School. Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim describes al-Rāzī in his book *shifāʾ*, as the best of the later Ash’rites and likewise, the editor, Ahmad al-Ṣamʿānī, of the *Shifāʾ* edition 2008, ascribes the Jabrī’s arguments to al-Rāzī.

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Lastly, most of the Jabrī’s arguments discussed by Ibn al-Qayyim can be found in al-Rāzī’s, and also al-Āmadī’s, works.107

Al-Rāzī argues108 that if man’s originated power was capable of causing the existence of an act, then this would imply that his originated power is capable of causing the existence of anything. He argues that existence is one entity (qadiyya); regardless of whether it differs in circumstances (ahwāl) and modalities (jihāt). [So, to claim that the originated power is capable of causation is false, since it cannot cause the existence of bodies (al-ajsām) or accidents (al-a’rād) - except actions (al-afāl) like: tastes, colours and smells. So, if the latter is false then the former is also false].109 That is, if man’s originated power cannot cause the existence of bodies and accidents then consequently it cannot cause the existence of anything.

Al-Rāzī’s argument implies that the cause to each and every thing that exists all have the same nature and therefore are of the same kind of cause. For example, there are many things which man cannot cause to exist; hence, this implies that he does not have the ability to cause anything to exist - since they are all the same kind of cause. Nonetheless, al-Rāzī then goes on to argue that man’s power can cause things like tastes, colours and smells. This seems to contradict the main premise of the argument, namely, if man’s power is able to cause the existence of something then it also has the ability of causing the existence of anything, both of which are false according to the Ash’arites.110

Ironically, al-Āmadī argues for similar implication when he says: ‘when we argue that man’s power is incapable of creating or bringing about something from nothing (ibdā’), this also applies to what we affirm when we say that man’s power can cause some things other than


108 It is likely that this argument belongs to Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī as is implied by al-Āmadī. See al-Āmadī, op. cit., p. 215-216; idem, Abkār al-Afkār fi Uṣūl al-Dīn, ed. Ahmad Muhammad al-Mahdī, Dār al-Kutub wa al-Wathāʾiq al-Qawmiyya, Cairo, 2004, vol. 2, p. 385. If such is the case then this means that Ibn al-Qayyim was picking arguments of various Ash’arite scholars as to represent the Jabrī in the long Sunnī vs. Jabrī dialogue cited in Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 829-871.


... others... Al-Āmadī then goes on to state that this argument can also be used against al-Qādī, since he holds that man’s power is able to cause the attribute (sifā) of an act. ‘There is no escape for him’, as al-Āmadī puts it.

So in order for the Ash’arites to avoid such problematic implications, it was necessary for them to adopt the doctrine of kashb, which argues that man’s originated power has no cause whatsoever; rather man acquires, while God alone causes.

Ibn al-Qayyim argues that what al-Rāzī [or al-Bāqillānī] is actually implying is that if man is able to lift a stone then he is also able to lift a mountain; if he is able to carry a litre then he would also be able to carry one hundred thousand litres. Ibn al-Qayyim is furthermore critical of the implications by insisting that if man’s power is able to cause the existence of certain acts, such as eating, drinking and praying, then he is also able to cause the existence of the heavens and the earth and everything in between. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that a common feature shared amongst all existing things, i.e. that they exist, does not mean that one type of existence is possible for all types of existence. Likewise, it does not mean that a fly is equal to an elephant, or that bodies (al-ajsām) are equal to accidents (al-a’rād). Ibn al-Qayyim also mentions the same ironical implication that was mentioned by al-Āmadī. He states that some of the Ash’arites admit that man’s power has the ability to cause some accidents. So, if the Ash’arites use this argument to disprove man’s causative ability, then this includes all of man’s causative ability, even some of the accidents which they hold that man is able to cause.

**Ibn al-Qayyim on Human Agency**

Ibn al-Qayyim adopts the position of dual agency of one act, which means that an act is the result of both God’s pre-eternal power and man’s originated power. As such, Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that man’s originated power has a causative ability which can potentially bring about the existence of an act - where the existence of an act is dependent on divine volition. So due to

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111 al-Āmadī, ibid.
112 Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī.
113 al-Āmadī, ibid.
114 Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid.
man’s causative ability, he is considered a literal agent (fähigīqī) according to Ibn al-Qayyim,\(^{115}\) given that God had created man with the ability to cause his own acts.\(^{116}\) Ibn al-Qayyim says:

> A movement is the result of man’s power and will (irāda)\(^{117}\) both of which God had placed (ja‘ala) in man; since, if God wants man to act, He creates in man the power and motive (al-dā‘ī)\(^{118}\) for that particular act. Thus, the act is attributed to man’s power like the effect is attributed to the cause and it is [also] attributed to God like the creation is attributed to the creator. Hence, it is possible for there to be dual agents of one act, since one power [man’s] is the effect of the other and also partially causative [whereas] the other power [God’s] is independently causative.\(^{119}\)

So in order for man’s causative ability to take effect, certain conditions are necessary. These include the presence of man’s originated power, motive\(^{120}\) (dā‘ī) and God’s divine volition (mashī’a).\(^{121}\) God’s divine volition means he is also considered a literal agent, according to Ibn al-Qayyim.

On the question of human motives,\(^{122}\) Ibn al-Qayyim uniquely argues that man’s motive does not necessarily cause an act; rather it is a condition for the causation of an act.\(^{123}\) This implies that the necessary conditions to cause an act, such as man’s motive and power, are only

\(^{116}\) The concept of dual agency and man’s causative ability resembles the concept of secondary causality.
\(^{117}\) Ibn al-Qayyim tends to use irāda (will) quite loosely by interchanging it with mashī’a (volition) during his discussion on divine and human agency.
\(^{118}\) Again, Ibn al-Qayyim tends to interchange dā‘ī (motive) with irāda (will) during this discussion. Moreover the dā‘ī (motive) is sometimes interpreted as knowledge, belief (i’tiqād), thought (zunn), or will (irāda) and sometimes it can be interpreted as all of them; cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-Sunna, vol. 3, p. 250 ff.
\(^{120}\) Also translated as desire.
\(^{122}\) For an interesting discussion on motives and its effect on causation see Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 837- 846.
partially causative\textsuperscript{124} in the sense that they depend on God’s volition to preponderate the effect.\textsuperscript{125} Ibn al-Qayyim states that an act occurs by the originated power just like an effect occurs by its cause and simultaneously, the agent and tool (\textit{al-ālah}) are all caused by the pre-eternal power.\textsuperscript{126}

It is important for Ibn al-Qayyim to argue for the independency of the divine cause and the dependency of all other causes, such as man’s causative ability, or else it would be tantamount to affirming dual independent creators or a created thing without a creator.\textsuperscript{127}

Ibn al-Qayyim’s position on man’s motive can be appreciated as an attempted synthesis of both the Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites’ positions. The Mu’tazilites hold that man’s motive necessitates the causation of an act;\textsuperscript{128} the Ash’arites deny that man’s motive can potentially cause an act.\textsuperscript{129} As a result, Ibn al-Qayyim harmonises the two opposing positions by arguing that man’s motive is a necessary condition for the causation of an act and consequently partially causative. Thus, man’s motive does not necessitate an act as is the case of the Mu’tazilites nor is it totally free of any part in the causation of an act as is the case of the Ash’arites. In essence, Ibn

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{124} Ibn al-Qayyim \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, pp. 843, 853.
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Ibn al-Qayyim \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, pp. 853, 843-844, 845-846.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Ibn al-Qayyim \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, p. 853.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} This also includes man’s power; so both man’s power and motive has no causative ability. See Ibn al-Qayyim \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, pp. 837, 839, 843; al-Rāzī, \textit{al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya}, vol. 9, p. 10; \textit{idem}, \textit{Muḥaṣṣal}, p. 455; al-Juwaynī, \textit{Luma’ al-Adilla}, p. 121; al-Shahrastānī, \textit{al-Milal wa al-Nihal}, vol. 1, pp. 97-98; al-lijji, \textit{al-Mawāqif}, vol. 1, p. 66. Abū Ḥishāq and al-Juwaynī both hold that man’s power along with God’s power, both have a causative ability; see al-Juwaynī, \textit{al-ʿAgīda al-Nazāmīyya}, p. 43; al-Rāzī, \textit{Muḥaṣṣal}, p. 455. Also, al-Bāqillānī holds that man’s power can cause an attribute of an act; see al-Rāzī, \textit{al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya}, vol. 9, p. 9-10; \textit{Muḥaṣṣal}, p. 455; al-Shahrastānī, \textit{al-Milal wa al-Nihal}, vol. 1, pp. 97-98; al-lijji, \textit{al-Mawāqif}, vol. 2, p. 113.
\end{itemize}
al-Qayyim introduces the terms ‘conditions and partially causative’ to the debate in order to harmonise both the positions of the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites.

Ibn al-Qayyim’s compatibilist position of dual agency is another example of synthesis between the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites’ position. The Muʿtazilites’ position advocates man has sole agency of his moral acts; man’s free will necessitates his sole agency and God has no agency over such moral acts. Conversely, the Ashʿarites deny man has agency of his moral acts, given that it would be tantamount to dual creators and hence associationism. For this reason, the Ashʿarites assert that it is only God who possesses sole agency while man acquires that which has been pre-determined for him. Somewhere in between these two opposing positions is where Ibn al-Qayyim’s dual agency position can be appreciated as an attempted synthesis. Ibn al-Qayyim’s dual agency can be understood as God’s agency of moral acts being justified on a macro-level, whereby God is the sole creator of everything - including man’s causative ability and the object of such ability; such as, man’s ability to see and the object of his sight.\(^{130}\) Equally, man’s agency of moral acts is justified on a micro-level in that he possesses a causative ability which has the potential to bring about an act - providing that all the conditions are present with no obstacles.\(^{131}\) So Ibn al-Qayyim attempts to resolve the two opposing positions by arguing that God’s agency on a macro-level is compatible with man’s agency on the micro-level. Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim adheres to the concept of dual agency where man has free will and argues that this is compatible with man also being pre-determined.\(^{132}\)

A final aspect of Ibn al-Qayyim’s attempted synthesis concerns the implications of the opposing positions - namely the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites. The Muʿtazilites hold that man’s moral acts are attributed to man’s causation and not God’s, since man is a free agent in regards to his moral acts.\(^{133}\) On the other hand, the Ashʿarites argue that the causation of moral acts is attributable to God given that He is the sole creator while man is the acquirer. It is worth bearing in mind the diverse differences within the Ashʿarite School regarding the meaning of kasb

\(^{130}\) Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 840; 843- 844; 846.
\(^{133}\) See previous section Muʿtazilites on Human Agency. Also see, Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 459-450; ‘Abd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, vol. 8, p. 3; Vasalou, Moral Agents and Their Deserts, p. 141-144.
So, the Muʿtazilites’ concept of responsibility is justified by the fact that man is a free agent whereas, the Ashʿarites justify man’s responsibility based on his acquisition. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that moral acts are attributed to God by way of divine creation, power, knowledge and general will. Equally, they are also attributed to man by way of his free agency and causative ability such as his power and motive both of which are conditions for the causation of a particular act. Thus, man’s responsibility, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, is justified by man’s free will, power, motive and acquisition of a given act.

Ibn al-Qayyim refines ambiguous terms in the Muʿtazilites’ denial of attributing moral acts to God. He says:

As for your stance of denying the attribution of moral acts to God, this needs further clarification. If you deny the attribution of moral acts based on your understanding that God is literally carrying out such acts, responsible for them and His names are derived from them, then this is correct [it is not a solely theocentric causation process according to Ibn al-Qayyim]. If you deny the attribution of moral acts based you your understanding that God has no knowledge, power, general will and creation over such acts then this is incorrect [it is not solely a humanist causation process according to Ibn al-Qayyim]. Therefore, both God and Man are involved in the causation process - since it was God who created the tools and object of the actions, namely, senses and the object of the senses such as the scene and sound.

If man created the sight and hearing then did he create the object of it (maḥal) [i.e. the scene and sound]?
Subsequently, it is clear that Ibn al-Qayyim attempts to avoid diminishing God’s part in the causation of moral acts, because he argues that man’s sight, hearing and their objects - the scene and sound - are created by God. Thus, moral acts can rationally be attributed to God in this regard.\footnote{Also see Ibn al-Qayyim’s dual agency in the example of opening one’s eye, Ibid., vol. 2, p. 843; and Ibn Taymiyya’s dual agency using the example of reciting, Majmū’ al-Fatāwā, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Qāsim, Majma’ al-Malik Fahad, Madīna, 1995, vol. 8, pp. 121 ff.}

On the other hand, Ibn al-Qayyim also avoids diminishing man’s freedom by advocating divine general will in this debate. Divine general will (\textit{al-mashīa al-āma}), in the context employed by Ibn al-Qayyim, denotes that things occur according to God’s general will, meaning that within man God created the ability and motive to act and at the same time there is no continuous intervention by God before each act - as is the case with divine specific will (\textit{al-mashīa al-khāṣṣa}). For example, when a person moves and breathes, he/she does so by God’s general will; for, had God have willed every breath or movement of that person then it would have been done by God’s specific will. God intervenes each time man wants to act by creating in him the power and motive to act. Consequently, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that man’s agency is the result of God’s general will and hence, each movement is not conditional upon God’s specific will in order for it to be executed.\footnote{Ibn al-Qayyim \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 1, p. 178; ibid, vol. 2, p. 971; \textit{idem, Ταριχ al-Hijratayn wa Bāb al-Sa‘ādatayn}, ed. Muḥammad Ajmal al-Īsāhi, Dār Ālim al-Fawā’id, Mekka, 1429AH, vol. 1, p. 88; cf. \textit{idem, Madārij al-Sālikīn bayn Manāzil iyāka na‘bud wa iyāka nasta‘īn}, ed. Muḥammad al-Baghdādi, Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabi, Beirut, 1996, vol. 1, p. 180; \textit{idem, Miṣfāh Dār al-Sa‘āda wa Manshūr wilāyat al-‘Ilm wa al-Irāda}, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1998, vol. 2, p. 45.} This stance seems to be contrary to that of Ibn Taymiyya’s, which advocates the existence of things by God’s specific will,\footnote{See Jon Hoover, \textit{Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism}, Brill, 2007, pp. 150, 164.} hence Ibn al-Qayyim’s stance indicates a potentially original development. Similarly, I think that Ibn al-Qayyim is seeking to develop a synthesized position where both free will and divine determinism are not compromised. So, to argue that man’s agency is the result of God’s general will - which was perhaps executed in pre-eternity - gives more freedom to man - within a theistic framework - than the limited freedom which results from God’s specific will. As such, Ibn al-Qayyim avoids limiting man’s freedom without compromising God’s will over all things; thus, he advocates divine general will instead of divine specific will in this debate.
Conclusion

To summarise, in this chapter I have demonstrated that Ibn al-Qayyim engages with both the Mu’tazilites and Ash’arites on aspects related to divine determination, such as divine agency, human agency, human motives and causative ability, and the divine general will. Similarly, I have argued that Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a compatibilist position of dual agency - where man’s causative ability allows him to be a free and responsible agent on a micro-level. Similarly, God’s agency is justified by His creative ability which determines things on a macro-level. I have also illuminated a potentially original development in Ibn al-Qayyim’s position: man acts according to God’s general will. This entails more freedom and responsibility for man; unlike the limited freedom and responsibility implicit in God’s specific will. And lastly, I have shown how Ibn al-Qayyim manages to harmonise and synthesise the opposing positions of the Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites by introducing terms such as ‘conditions’, ‘partially causative’, and ‘general will’ to the debate and also by arguing that moral acts are attributed to both man’s causative ability and God’s general will. In the next chapter, I will discuss Ibn al-Qayyim’s view on how far human agency comprehends good and evil, independently of divine agency as represented in scripture. Additionally, I will discuss whether Ibn al-Qayyim took good and evil to be characteristics that are inherent in actions or whether he believed that the ontological values of actions are derived from scripture.
4- IBN AL-QAYYIM’S TRADITIONALIST RATIONAL OJECTIVISM

Introduction

In this chapter I will show how Ibn al-Qayyim takes over from his teacher, Ibn Taymiyya, by developing a middle way (waṣaf) position between the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites in the debate on meta-ethics. This will be evident in two approaches of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement, namely, a rationalistic and a Sufi approach. The rationalist facet of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement is clear in his adoption of a Rāzian (Fakhr Dīn al-Rāzī) style of argumentation, characterised by a systematic employment of ad hominem arguments. The Sufi approach will be evident in his contribution of rational morality as a form of legal conveyance (ḥujja) and piety as a strengthening tool of one’s rational morality.

Defining the Debate

Islamic rational morality¹ is a medieval debate on meta-ethics. The debates date back to 103AH/722CE² as it is recorded that the first to speak about this debate amongst the Muslims was Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān.³ This is deduced from his famous principle: ‘to affirm knowledge by reason before revelation’ (ijāb al-maʿārif bi al-aqal qabala warūd al-sharʿ).⁴ Moreover, the

¹ In Arabic it is commonly referred to as al-taḥṣīn wa al-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqliyyan.
³ Some researchers say it was Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī that was the first to talk about rational morality (see, Imān Yaḥyā Muṭahhar, al-Akhlāq al-Islāmiyya wa Uṣūliyya al-ʿAqadiyya bayn Miskawayh wa Ibn Taymiyya, MA Thesis, Umm al-Qurā University, 1418AH, vol. 2, p. 495.) and others say it was the Muʿtazilites (Ḥasan al-Shāfiʿī, al-ʿAmadī wa ʿarḍhu al-κalāmiyya, Dār al-Salām, Cairo, 1998, p. 442). Ibn Taymiyya also states that this debate started in the year 300/913; see Ibn Taymiyya, al-Tasʿīniyya, ed. Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm al-ʿĀjlān, Maktaba al-Maʿārif, Riyadh, 1999, vol. 3, p. 908.
debate on Islamic ethics deals with questions such as: is the intrinsic value of an action good (husn) or detestable (qubh)? How do we know that an action is either good or detestable? The first question focuses on the ontological status of values in ethics and the second question focuses on the epistemology of such values. In short, ethics in general is a practical science that seeks to establish which actions should be done and which avoided. Thus, it has considerable implications in theology, as we shall see. Furthermore, each theological school argues for its position on the debate and defines exactly where they differ in regards to the terminologies adopted; hence, each school has its own implications.

According to Ibn Taymiyya, the different meanings of al-husn (good) and al-qubh (detestable) on the debate are defined as follows:

1. A perfect (al-kamāl) attribute or an imperfect (al-nuqsān) attribute, like knowledge and ignorance. This seems to be an ontological question.

2. An inclination (al-mulāma) and disinclination (al-munāfara), this type is also known as benefit (maṣlaḥa) and detriment (mafsada) or tasteful (al-ladha) and distasteful (al-alam). This seems to be an aesthetical question.

3. The actions that are praiseworthy or blameworthy in this life and has a reward or punishment in the hereafter. This seems to be an epistemological question.

The Muslim theologians are in agreement that both (1) and (2) are comprehended by reason (al-ʿaqal). Ibn Taymiyya further adds that definitions (1) and (2) really have the same meaning.

Therefore, it is in definition (3) where the differences occur between the Ashʿarites and the Muʿtazilites. According to the early Ashʿarites definition (3) of good and detestable is only

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known by revelation, divine command, and not reason. On the contrary, the Muʿtazilites hold that definition (3) of good and detestable is known by reason. Unfortunately, most secondary English sources tend to compare early Ashʿarism with later Muʿtazilism on the debate. I believe that it would have been fair to compare the two mature stages of each school on the debate, namely later Ashʿarism with later Muʿtazilism. The difference between the two later traditions is very subtle, given that later Ashʿarīs such as al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī, al-Rāzī, al-Shahrastānī, and al-Āmadī concluded that definition (3) of good and detestable is known by reason, like their Muʿtazilite counterparts.

On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyya seems to synthesise the two latter positions and advance into much more detail. He categorises definition (3) into three categories. Firstly, that the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of an act in this life is known by reason. Secondly, that the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of an act in the hereafter is known by revelation. Lastly, that the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of an act in this life is a test, known only by revelation. This kind of critical engagement which allows for a synthesis or developed middle way position is what Ibn al-Qayyim will employ in this debate.

In summary, the positions on the debate of Islamic meta-ethics are as follows. The first position holds that good and evil are physical attributes that are intrinsic to acts and the epistemological tool of good and evil is reason. Moreover, the ontological status of good or evil in a given action is either from the essence (dhātihi) of an action or from one attribute of its many attributes that is an essential part of the action itself or from the implications of such given

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action (li wājūh wa ʾtibārāt ukhrā), which perhaps becomes apparent through difference in circumstances. Also, revelation only manifests and illustrates such attributes. Therefore, according to this position man is accountable for his moral acts before or absent of revelation. This position is held by the Muʿtazilites.¹³

The second position upholds that God is not obliged to do anything by reason and nothing is obligatory upon man before revelation. Thus, reason does not indicate what is good or evil before revelation nor does it indicate the qualification of religious duty (ḥukum al-taklīf). Rather, good and evil are only known by revelation and all the divine commandments and prohibitions are merely a test. This position is famously held by the Ashʿarites.¹⁴

The third position, which is held by Ibn al-Qayyim and his teacher, Ibn Taymiyya,¹⁵ is more detailed and takes up a middle way position between the two previous positions. This position adopts a threefold typology of actions. Firstly, an action that essentially consists of either benefit (mašlaha) or harm (mufsada) and is known independently of revelation; just as it is known that justice is beneficial for the world and oppression is detrimental. This type of action can be either good or evil - both of which are known by reason and also by revelation. However, this does not imply that the agent is accountable to punishment in the hereafter, if revelation did not confirm the good or evil of the action. This is a crucial point that differentiates position (3) from position (1).

Secondly, an action that becomes either good or evil as a result of revelation which commands or forbids it. There are no examples given for this type of act. Nevertheless, the

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¹⁵ This position is also held by the Sufis and the Muslim philosophers, see, Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 8, pp. 434-436; Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wazīr, Ḳithār al-Haqq ʿalā al-Khalq, al-Adab wa al-Muʾayyid, 1318AH, pp. 377-379; Hasan al-Shāfaʿī, op. cit., p. 444.
Prophetic practices and heretical innovations perhaps can be used as examples. The Prophetic practices become good due to scriptural commands and likewise acts of innovation become evil due to scriptural prohibitions. Hence, the ontological and epistemological values of such acts are derived from revelation.

The last type is an action which is commanded by revelation merely to test the individual on whether he obeys or disobeys such commandments. So, to physically carry out the action is not intended. The common examples for this type of action are: Abraham’s sacrifice, the Prophetic tradition of the three defective men and God’s commandments of fifty prayers a day instead of five. Hence, the purpose for this type is the commandment itself and not what is commanded. The last two types of action were supposedly not understood by the Mu’tazilites - as Ibn Taymiyya mentions.

Ibn al-Qayyim on the Mu’tazilites

The Mu’tazilites believe that the criterion to know what is morally good and evil is within the essence of the action itself. That is, actions essentially possess attributes of good and evil. In addition, the praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of such actions are known by human rationality, intuitively or by way of analytical verification without recourse to revelation. Hence, according to this position, rational morality is universal in that what is rationally good was also morally good before it was revealed in divine scripture and vice versa. For example, justice was good before it was commanded in divine scripture and oppression was detestable.

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16 Quran 37: 103-107.
18 Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, vol. 1, p. 145, No. 162.
19 Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 8, pp. 434-436; However, this is not the case with the latter Mu’tazilites such as al-Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār who concludes that some acts acquire its attribute of good or evil from divine commands and prohibitions. Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, op. cit., pp. 377-379; Hasan al-Shāfaʿī, op. cit., p. 444.
before it was forbidden in divine scripture. Hence, revelation came to either confirm that which was already known by reason or to disclose that what the rational intellect did not know.\textsuperscript{21}

The anti-rational moralist puts forth an argument against rational morality which states that such a position implies the imposition of religious duty before or in the absence of revelation. This means that God’s commandments and prohibitions are obligatory requirements on man even in the absence of revelation. Ibn al-Qayyim explains that the Mu’tazilites admit to this implication - the rational obligation of religious duty before or in the absence of revelation - and hence, this differentiates the Mu’tazilites’ ethical theory from that of the Traditionalists. Ibn al-Qayyim states:

They [the Mu’tazilites] say that divine obligations are necessary in the presence and absence of revelation; and likewise, its praiseworthiness and its blameworthiness. As for [the affirmation of rational] punishment they differ and the detail of such is that those who affirm it, their affirmation [of the punishment] is not the same as an obligatory affirmation [like] after the sending of a messenger. Instead they say, verily the affirmed punishment [as a result of] divine revelation is a different type of punishment from the affirmed punishment as a result of rational obligation. This is how they answer the verses that nullify punishment in the absence of revelation. As for rational obligation and prohibition in the absence [of revelation], they explicitly support this and explain that it is necessary for God’s wise purpose.\textsuperscript{22}

The Ash’arites refute this by arguing that religious duty in the absence of revelation implies that legal conveyance (ḥujja) is established independently of a messenger; however, this is impossible since God only establishes legal conveyance by way of His messengers.\textsuperscript{23} Ibn al-Qayyim agrees with the Ash’arites on this to a certain extent. But he explains that the meaning of obligation and prohibition is to attain the necessary reward or punishment even if this means that


\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, p. 432.
the necessary reward or punishment is prevented by an obstacle or by the absence of a condition. This explanation is supported by the following Quranic verse:

Otherwise, if disaster should afflict them because of that which their own hands have sent before (them), they might say: Our Lord! Why did You not send us a Messenger? We should then have followed Your revelation and been of the believers.²⁴

Ibn al-Qayyim explains:

God has informed us that the reason for their punishment is because of what their hands brought forth and hence, God sent His messengers and revealed His scriptures so that they may not say ‘Our Lord! Why did You not send us a Messenger? We should then have followed Your revelation.’ This verse shows the invalidity of both positions, those who say that actions in the absence of revelation is not detestable (qabiḥa) essentially (li-dhāithā); but rather it became detestable only by divine prohibition. And those who say that actions are detestable [in the absence of revelation] and therefore necessitate rational punishment without divine warning.²⁵

Additionally the Mu’tazilites argued that rational obligations are placed upon God, based on their position that reason alone can comprehend the essential attributes of good and evil within actions. Consequently, this equates to the obligation that God must do good and eschew (tark) evil. For example, they hold that God must: act according to grace (al-lutf), perform the best and even better (al-ṣalāḥ wa al-aṣlah), recompense those whom have been harmed (al-ʿiwaḍ ʿin al-ālām), and He must reward and punish. Al-Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār says regarding this:

And we have shown that there is nothing obligatory upon God except for that what He makes obligatory by religious duty (taklīf), such as: consolidation (tamkīn) [for his slaves], graces (al-

²⁴ Quran 28: 47.
²⁶ Because God made it obligatory upon man so whatever is considered befitting to man is also befitting to God and whatever is detestable to man is also detestable to God. Hence, it is an analogy of man’s actions to that of God’s.
For this reason, Ibn al-Qayyim labels the Muʿtazilites as *al-Muʿaffila al-Mushabbiha* the Deniers and the Resemblers), because they deny God’s attributes and compare His actions to those of man. Ibn al-Qayyim explains that the Muʿtazilites were led to deny God’s attributes because of their anthropomorphic meanings. Nonetheless, they simultaneously fell into that which they were trying to avoid, namely making a likeness between God to man; by obliging certain acts upon God based on their rational analogy of man’s actions.

Another difference between the Muʿtazilites and the Traditionalists is that the latter hold no obligations upon God except for that what He made obligatory upon Himself or prohibited for Himself. The difference here is that the Muʿtazilites oblige things upon God as a result of rational analogy. The Traditionalists hold that it is by way of Divine commands or Prohibition and not human reason. Ibn Taymiyya states:

As for obligating or prohibiting things upon God by way of analogy (*qiyās*) of His creation, this is the stance of the Qadariyya and it is an innovation. The Ahlu Sunna are in agreement that God is the Creator of everything and what He wills is, and what He wills not is not. And man does not make anything obligatory upon Him. For this reason, we find those from Ahlu Sunna who held this stance [obligating things upon God] say: verily, He wrote upon Himself mercy and prohibited for Himself oppression, not that man has a right upon God for something.....until he said: and the rights for His slaves is by His favour (*fadlīhi*) and benevolence (*ihšānihi*) and not by way of compensation (*muʿāwda*), nor from something made obligatory upon Him by other than Him; for verily He transcends that.

Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim reiterates:

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And the third group, the People of Guidance and Correctness say: nothing is obligatory upon God by way of man’s deeds, [whether the obligation is for] salvation or success. Nor are anyone’s deeds going to guarantee him paradise. By God’s favour and generosity, He emphasises His benevolence that He made obligatory upon Himself a right for His slave as a promise. And His generous promise is enjoining even by [phrases such as] ‘maybe’ and ‘perhaps’.30

Therefore, the Traditionalists do not absolutely consider things to be obligatory upon God nor do they completely deny it. Instead, they affirm only that which God has made obligatory upon Himself and by His favour (faḍlīḥ); hence, they deny that anyone can place obligations upon God.

This point of difference may be due to language. If a person does a good deed for which God promises a certain reward, one may argue that it was the person who made it obligatory upon God; whereas, the other may argue that it was God who made it obligatory upon Himself. Nonetheless, the difference then remains, how do we know of this obligation upon God: it is by reason or revelation? The Muʿtazilites say that it is through reason whereas the Traditionalists say that it is through revelation.

Ibn al-Qayyim on the Muʿtazilites’ Arguments
Firstly, al-Qādī ʿAbd-Jabbār argues that God is obliged to act according to certain moral standards that are known to human reason. He states:

God knows the evilness of evil (qubḥ al-qabīḥ) and He is in no need of it (mustaghnī ʿinhu). Additionally, He knows that He is in no need of it, thus if such is the case, then He will never choose evil in any form whatsoever.31

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Secondly, al-Qādī emphasises this further in the following argument while also showing that certain acts are also obligatory for man, such as, good manners in the absence of revelation. He states:

If a great powerful king sees a weak person near destruction, verily, he will be inclined to save him and he will see it as a good thing…

Therefore, the king will still see it as a good deed and from this the Mu’tazilites derive the obligation of acts, such as good manners, even in the absence of revelation. Similarly, they use this as an analogy for God’s actions, namely that God is obliged to act according to what human reason perceives as good. This is also supported by the following argument. Al-Qādī says:

If a rational person was presented with a need (ḥāja) and was able to fulfill it by either a [statement of] truth or lie; both of which are equal in order to fulfill this need. Verily, he will opt for the truth and choose it. His natural disposition (tab’hu) will incline towards it for no other reason than its goodness. Therefore, if lying did not have an attribute, that one should be cautious of, then telling the truth would not have exceeded it (tarajjah).

From this, we can extract the following premises that probably led the Mu’tazilites to hold that acts are obligatory for man in the absence of revelation and similarly, for God by human reason. The premises are as follows: (1) Good acts are obligatory by revelation (2) Good acts are good in essence or in attribute (3) Therefore, good acts in essence or attribute are obligatory even without revelation; that is to say, by reason. The same applies to evil acts.

Ibn al-Qayyim willingly accepts that acts have value in essence or in attribute. However, he does not accept the predicate (3) the obligation of acts by reason. This is clear in Ibn al-Qayyim’s refutations in the section below, entitled Ibn al-Qayyim’s Arguments.

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33 Ibid.
Additionally, Ibn al-Qayyim cites a further eighteen *ad hominem* (*ilzāmāt*)\(^{34}\) arguments as refutations against the Muʿtazilites’ view on the obligations and prohibitions upon God. Ibn al-Qayyim states:

The ninth *ad hominem*: is that what Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿārī imposed on al-Jubāṭī, when the former asked him a question regarding the fate of three brothers\(^{35}\); [the dialogue is as follows.]

Al-Ashʿārī: O Shaykh, what do you say regarding the fate of three people [in the Hereafter]: a believer, an unbeliever, and a child?

Al-Jubbāṭī: The believer is among the [honored] classes; the unbeliever is among the doomed; and the child is among those who escape [perdition].

Al-Ashʿārī: If the child should desire to ascend to the ranks of the honored, would it be possible?

Al-Jubbāṭī: No. It would be said to him, “The believer simply earned the rank through his obedience, the likes of which you do not have to your credit.”

Al-Ashʿārī: If the child should respond, “This is not my fault. Had You allow me to live longer, I would have put forth the same obedience as the [adult] believer”?

Al-Jubbāṭī: God would respond, “I knew that had I given you [additional] life, you would have disobeyed Me, for which you would have been punished. So I observed your best interest and caused you to die before reaching the age of maturity [at which time you would have become responsible for obeying Me according to the religious law].”

Al-Ashʿārī: what if the [adult] unbeliever should then protest: “O Lord, You knew my fate just as You knew his. Why did you not observe my best interest as You observed his?”

At this, al-Jubbāṭī is said to have fallen silent.\(^{36}\)

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\(^{34}\) These rational impositions are found in: Ibn al-Qayyim, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 370-375.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., vol. 2, p. 371.

\(^{36}\) The translation of this dialogue is taken from, Sherman A. Jackson, *Islam & the Problem of Black Suffering*, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 75-76. For a study on this dialogue see, Gwynne, R. W., ‘al-
This *ad hominem* response evidently seeks to expose the inconsistency in the Mu'tazilite position that God must act in the best interest of man. This is clear in the fallacy that God must act in the best interest of the child but not the adult unbeliever. Therefore, this implies that God does not always act in man’s best interest, as is perceived by man’s rationality. Ibn al-Qayyim further argues:

The seventieth *ad hominem*: there is not a ‘best interest’ (*ašlaḥ*) except that there is an even better interest than the previous (*Ašlaḥ minhu*) and to limit it to one level is like limiting it to practicality (*ṣalāḥ*). Thus, there is no meaning to your position that it is obligatory [upon God] to maintain the best interest (*murāʿāt al-ašlaḥ*) [for man] since there is no end to it; therefore, it is not possible for the action to be maintained [according to the best interest of man].

In this *ad hominem*, Ibn al-Qayyim attempts to argue for the multiplicity and relativity in the Mu'tazilites’ concept of ‘best interest’. The reason being is that ‘best interest’ is a relative concept and therefore there will always be a better ‘best interest’ than a particular ‘best interest’.

This rational *ad hominem*, like the many others mentioned in Ibn al-Qayyim’s *Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿāda*, is very much Rāzian stylistically. Furthermore, this style of debate is not common in Ibn al-Qayyim’s other works. Hence, these rational *ad hominem* reveal either a possible Rāzian influence on Ibn al-Qayyim in the domain of Philosophical Theology or that these *ad hominem* possibly belong to al-Rāzī without Ibn al-Qayyim citing it as such.

Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues:

The twelfth *ad hominem*: verily, they [the Mu'tazilites] should maintain that it is obligatory on God, to whom belongs might and majesty, that He should cause to die all the children whom He knows that if they grow they will disbelieve and become stubborn. So if He causes them to die then there is no doubt this is for their best interest. Or they [the Mu’tazilites] should deny His knowledge, glory be to Him, of what will happen, before He created the universe just as their foul predecessors imposed…..there is no escape for them from these two *ad hominem* except by...
adoption of the positions of the Ahlu Sunna wa Jamāʿa, that God’s actions are not to be deduced by analogy to the actions of man, nor is it comprehended by their narrow minds. Rather, His actions do not resemble that of His creation nor are His attributes or His essence like theirs; There is nothing like Him and He is the All-Seer the All-Hearer.³⁹

In this ad hominem, Ibn al-Qayyim paves the way to two false implications based on the Muʿtazilites’ position that God must act in the best interest of man. Firstly, God must either cause all unbelieving children to die if He is to act according to their best interest - as is found in the previous debate between Abū al-Hasan al-Ashʿarī and al-Jubbāʾī. Or Secondly, God must have no knowledge of the future, as is the position of the early Qadarites. Consequently, the only option left, according to this argument, is to hold that divine acts transcend the acts of man and hence cannot be comprehended or deduced by rational analogy.

**Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ashʿarites**

Ibn al-Qayyim engages with three different approaches of the anti-rational moralist’s arguments. Firstly the approach of Abū ʿAbd Allah Ibn al-Kaṭīb, who is also known as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Then the approach of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Āmadī; lastly, the approach of al-Qādī al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī. Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a systematic employment of ad hominem arguments in order to refute these three Ashʿarite approaches.⁴⁰

Firstly the approach of Ibn al-Khaṭīb is that:

Man’s actions are not the result of free will and whatever actions that are not the result of free will are neither morally good nor detestable by consensual rationality (‘aqlan bi-itifāq). Since, those who hold the opinion of rational morality admit that such is the case only if it results from free will; and we have proven that they [the actions] are necessitated (idtrārī), thus, it is

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⁴⁰ The arguments that I shall cite in this section are not the sixty arguments against the Ashʿarites as are mentioned by Ibn Qayyim in Madārij, vol. 1, p. 175 and Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 381-438. Nonetheless, one does notice that Ibn Qayyim’s style of refutation in these sixty arguments is very similar to that of al-Rāzī. Hence, it is possible that Ibn Qayyim had a copy of al-Rāzī’s arguments nearby and refuted them point by point. If not, then it is a clear indication of some possible Rāzian influence on Ibn Qayyim.
necessarily (yalzam) not described as either good nor detestable according to the [theological] schools. As for proving that it [an action] is not out of free will, this is because if man cannot perform or eschew an action then this is clear [that he has no free will]. And if he can perform or eschew an action then this is possible (jāʾz). However, if the action depends on a contingent (murajjiḥ) that will result in the preponderance (tarjīḥ) of performing over eschewing (tark), then [firstly], if it has no dependence then it is accidental (ittifāqī); and whatsoever is accidental is neither described as good nor detestable. And [secondly], if it [the action] depends on a preponderant, then it is according to its preponderance- whether it be necessary (lāzim) or possible (jāʾz). If it is necessary then it [the action] is necessitated and if it [the preponderance] is possible then the categorisation is repeated, either it [the preponderance] ends up becoming necessary and hence [the action] is necessitated or not [i.e. the preponderance becomes possible] and ends up in a infinite regress (tasalsal); and it is impossible to become accidental so it is neither described as good nor detestable.

Al-Rāzī’s aim in this argument is to prove that man’s actions are not the result of his free will, rather they are necessitated. If such is the case, then they are neither described as good nor detestable since they are not from his own free will. He then argues that actions which are possible (in terms of it being possible to either perform or eschew them) are either dependent on a preponderant or are accidental. If the actions are accidental, then they are neither described as good nor detestable since the act came about by chance. Nevertheless, if the action depends on a preponderant, then either the preponderant is necessary or possible. If the preponderant is necessary, the act is not by man’s free will hence it is neither good nor detestable. However, if the preponderant is possible then the whole categorical process repeats itself and results in an infinite regress. Therefore, al-Rāzī’s carefully devised argument only allows room for necessitated actions which in turn is neither described as good nor detestable.

Ibn al-Qayyim refutes this argument in twelve different points (awjuh). Firstly, he argues that al-Rāzī’s argument also applies to God’s actions. As a result, to possibly imply that God has no free will – which no Muslim theologian would accept - proves the falseness of al-Rāzī’s argument. Ibn al-Qayyim states:

The second point: if the argument is true then it will imply that God has no free will regarding His actions since the categorisation and repetition mentioned also applies to Him. Like saying, His actions are either necessary or possible, so if it is necessary then it [His action] becomes necessitated. And if the action is possible, then it either requires a preponderant (murajiḥ)- which results in the categorisation being repeated- or, it is accidental (itifāqī). And the implication of God having no free will is sufficient in proving the falseness of this argument.\textsuperscript{42}

Ibn al-Qayyim also argues that al-Rāzī’s argument implies the rejection of scriptural morality. The reason being is that divine commands and prohibitions require that one can perform such commandments or eschew such prohibitions. Therefore, divine commandments and prohibitions do not seek acts that are necessitated or accidental, since this may contradict the concept of responsibility. As a person who acts or eschews by free will is rightly responsible and not one who acts or eschews by necessity or accident. Ibn al-Qayyim says:

The third point: if the argument mentioned is true then it would necessitate (lazima) the nullification of scriptural morality [al-ḥusn wa al-qubh al-sharʿīyan] because man’s action is necessitated (darūrī) or accidental (itifāqī); and if it is such, then divine revelation (al-sharʿ) neither [deems it] good nor detestable. This is because [divine revelation] is not concerned with religious duty (taklīf) [that is necessitated or accidental] and even more so not concerned with morally good or detestable [acts that are necessitated or accidental].\textsuperscript{43}

Ibn al-Qayyim explains that al-Rāzī’s argument in fact proves that man acts by free will. He states that:

The sixth point: this same argument mentioned, is proof that it [man’s action] is by free will because it has been obliged (wajaba) by free will (ikhtiyār) and whatsoever is obliged by free will is nothing but free will; or it would be free will without free will and this is combining between two contradictions. The argument just mentioned is proof of your false position and that an obliged action by choice is free will.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{42} Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, p. 343.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
This argument can be simplified into the following premises. Firstly, man’s act is obligatorily dependent on a preponderant. Secondly, the preponderant is subservient to man’s free will. Therefore, man is obliged to act by his free will. For example, if a person is presented with some food, this person may be obliged to act or shun, according to one or more of many preponderances such as: he is hungry, the food smells nice, he is full, the food smells horrible, he is busy, etc. However, the obligation to act or eschew according to one or more of these many preponderances does not contradict the fact that he has free will. One can still choose not to eat even when one is hungry, perhaps because he does not like the look of the food or he is busy. So, his free will is intact, although his is obliged by free will.

Ibn al-Qayyim stresses that al-Rāzī’s argument assumes that all necessary actions means that the agent has no free will. In Ibn al-Qayyim’s previous counter refutation, he shows that an agent’s free will is still intact even while his action is necessary; even when he is obliged by free will. So Ibn al-Qayyim explains that al-Rāzī should convince us that necessary actions are precluded from being declared good or detestable and not actions where the agent has no free will - since Ibn al-Qayyim agrees with this. Consequently, al-Rāzī’s argument fails to tackle the point of disputation which is: are necessary actions precluded from moral judgments? Again, the disputed point is not: are actions where the agent has no free will precluded from moral judgments? According to Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Rāzī confuses the two notions, necessary actions and no free will, in that al-Rāzī equates them to the same thing. Ibn al-Qayyim states:

The tenth point: the aim of this argument was to prove that an action is necessary (lāzīm) when the cause (sabab) is present. You did not put forth an argument to prove that whatever is [necessary] is precluded (imtana’/uni02BFa) from being declared good or detestable other than a mere claim. So where is the evidence, that whatever [action] is necessary is precluded from being declared good or detestable? But rather your argument only proves that whatever actions are not the result of free will is precluded from being declared good or detestable. The argument does not tackle the disputed point (maḥl al-nizā’); [instead] what the argument tackles is agreed upon and its premises are correct, hence, your argument did not benefit in anything.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 344}
Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim also argues:

The eleventh point: regarding what you said ‘thus, it is necessarily (yalzam) not described as either good nor detestable according to the [theological] schools’, this is false. Since, those who dispute with you only preclude an action from being described as good or detestable if it is not associated with power (qudra) and free will (ikhtiyār). As for what is the result of power and free will, then they do not help you, by not describing it as good or detestable.\(^{46}\)

According to this counter refutation, both Ibn al-Qayyim and the Muʿtazilites hold that actions which are the result of power and free will are described as good or detestable - this includes necessary actions. Once more, al-Rāzī assumes that necessary actions are actions that are not associated with power and free will. This is not the case with other schools such as the Muʿtazilites, as Ibn al-Qayyim maintains.

As for al-Āmadī’s approach, he argues that if a good action is an extra quality (amran zā’dan) from its essences then this would imply that meanings (ma’nā) are brought about by meanings; and this is impossible since accidents (‘arḍ) are not brought about by accidents.\(^{47}\)

Ibn al-Qayyim refutes this argument as follows:

This [argument] is just as false as the one before it given that it is contradicted by the many meanings that are described by meanings such as, necessary knowledge (‘ilm darūrī), acquirable knowledge (‘ilm kasbī), absolute will (irāda jāzima), fast movement, slow movement, round movement, straight movement, pleasant nature, devious nature…..and much much more of that which is uncountable, of meanings and accidents that are described as existing meanings and accidents and whosoever claims they do not exist then he is arrogant.\(^{48}\)

Lastly, we consider the approach of al-Qādī al-Bāqillānī, al-Juwaynī and Abū ʿAmmar Ibn al-Ḥājib, the latter two are later Ashʿarite scholars. They argue as follows:

If good and evil are inherent qualities then they would not have differed according to different circumstances, relations (mutaʿliqāt), and times. Nor would it be inconceivable for the abrogation

\(^{46}\) Ibid. For more on Ibn al-Qayyim’s refutations of al-Rāzī’s arguments see Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 342-344.

\(^{47}\) Ibid; Also see Ibn Taymiyya, al-Tasʿīnīyya, p. 909.

\(^{48}\) Miftāḥ, p. 344. For more refutations against al-Āmadī’s argument cf. Miftāḥ, p. 344-345.
of actions, since, an inherent quality is permanent…It is known that lying is good if it is to save a Prophet or believer, and if it was an inherent quality it would be evil in all scenarios. Likewise with the abrogation of revelation, if it was inherently good then it would not legalise evil [like Abraham’s sacrifice] and if it were inherently evil then it would not legalise good by abrogation [like the abrogation of certain worships such as, the fifty prayers a day instead of five].

Ibn al-Qayyim again refutes this argument with five very lengthy points. Firstly, he points out that they have misunderstood what is meant by ‘good and evil in essence’. According to Ibn al-Qayyim, this does not always mean that it is an intrinsic quality. Secondly, he argues that lying is always evil regardless of the circumstance. But what is allowed is an antonomasia (tawriyya), which is to use a word or phrase that may be understood in two different ways. Ibn al-Qayyim then goes on to explain the divine wise purpose of actions or laws that have been abrogated and importantly the wisdom behind Abraham’s sacrifice.

Ibn al-Qayyim explains:

And from here is where our disputers have misunderstood us and have rationally imposed on us things that should not have been imposed. What we mean by good and evil in essence or attribute is that it is inherently the source of benefit (muṣlaḥa) and harm (muḥṣada). And the disposition (tartīb) of the two [benefit and harm] in relations to it [good and evil in essence] is like the disposition of effects (musababāt) in relation to causes (asbāb) which is a consequential precondition. [For example] this disposition is like feeling full (al-shab) after eating or like the benefits and harms in foods and medicines.

Ibn al-Qayyim argues, regarding lying:

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52 Ibid, p. 346.
Nay, lying is nothing but evil. As for what is considered good is an indirect statement (taʿrīḍ) or an antonomasia (tawrīya) just as is stated in the Prophetic tradition that Abraham indirectly stated to the oppressive king: this is my sister, regarding Abraham’s wife. Also, like he said: verily, I am ill. So he indirectly stated (ʿaraḍ) that he was ill in his heart because of their polytheism, or he will become ill one day. Similarly when Abraham said: Nay, this one, the biggest of them (idols) did it. Ask them, if they are able to speak? Ibn al-Qayyim claims that these were not lies as we may understand them to be, instead they were true according to the intentions of the speaker, namely Abraham, and misunderstood by the receiver, as was intended by the speaker. Ibn al-Qayyim concludes that these are the strongest arguments of the anti-rational moralists (al-nufāt) and it is sufficient that they themselves admit that all of their arguments besides these ones are weak (daʿīf). So there is no need to mention and falsify them since the morning light is clear to he who has sight.

**Ibn al-Qayyim on Morality**

Firstly, Ibn al-Qayyim defines the point of differences in this debate by two principles. First, do actions according to definition (3) contain attributes of good and evil, in that good and evil are intrinsic to the action itself? Secondly, how do we know the reward for good actions and the punishment for evil actions: is it by reason or revelation?

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53 Ibid., p. 354; Quran 21: 63.
55 There is another argument put forth by the Ashʿarites which I thought was quite interesting but the refutations were also lengthy, hence, I will only cite it as follows: ‘If good and evil were from the essence or attribute of an action, then this would imply that God has no free will regarding His qualification (ḥukm). Given that, the qualification from God would be according to [man’s] reason and it would not be fitting for Him to leave it [i.e. differ with man’s reason]; hence, this undermines God’s free will.’ *Cf.* al-Taftāzānī, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 151. The refutation of this argument is found in the following places, Ibn al-Qayyim, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 355-360; Ibn Taymiyya, *Iqtīḍāʾ al-Ṣirāṭa al-Mustaqīm*, vol. 2, pp. 776-777; al-Taftāzānī, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 151 ff.
57 I will interchange the translation of qubḥ as detestable or evil according to the context of the discussion.
Ibn al-Qayyim goes on to show that the Muʿtazilites hold that the two latter principles are inseparable (*talāzum*), in that good and evil are intrinsic to acts and thus the moral judgments of such acts are known by reason.⁵⁹ Conversely, the Ashʿarites deny the two principles given that actions do not contain intrinsic attributes of good and evil but rather good and evil are only known by revelation.⁶⁰ So, whatever God commands is good and whatever he forbids is evil.

Ibn al-Qayyim states that the Muʿtazilites were incorrect in upholding the two principles as inseparable and likewise, the Ashʿarites were incorrect in denying the two principles altogether.⁶¹ Ibn al-Qayyim holds that the two principles are not inseparable and also actions are good and evil just like they are beneficial and harmful. Nevertheless, there is no reward or punishment as a result of the actions except by divine commands and prohibitions.⁶² Likewise, in the absence of revelation, punishment is not obligatory for evil actions, even though evil is an essential attribute of the act itself. God only punishes after He sends a warner, namely a messenger. Thus, to prostrate to the devil, to lie, to fornicate, and to oppress are all essentially evil, but the condition of punishment for them is revelation, as Ibn al-Qayyim argues.⁶⁴

On the point of differences regarding the debate at hand, Ibn al-Qayyim converses with himself as follows:

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⁵⁹ However, I must point out that Ibn al-Qayyim does not differentiate between the early and later Muʿtazilites. The position mentioned here belongs to the early Muʿtazilites; whereas, the later Muʿtazilites hold that sometimes moral judgments are known by revelation and do not necessarily consist of an intrinsic attribute of good or evil. Cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, eds. Muhammad ʿAlī al-Najār and ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm al-Najār, vol. 11, pp. 135 ff; ibid., vol. 14, pp. 149-161; ibid., vol. 5, pp. 19 ff; Muḥammad Śāliḥ al-Zarkān, *Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī wa Āraʾūh u al-Kalāmiyya wa al-Falsafiyya*, Dār al-Fikr, Cairo, 1963, pp. 523 ff; Hasan al-Shāfaʿī, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 176. Again, Ibn al-Qayyim fails to differentiate between the early and later Ashʿarites. It is the early Ashʿarites who hold the position mentioned by Ibn al-Qayyim. Whereas, the latter Ashʿarites hold that some acts have intrinsic attributes of good or evil and hence is known by reason, cf. Hasan al-Shāfaʿī, *op. cit.*, p. 436.


⁶² By Ibn al-Qayyim holding that the two principles are not inseparable, he is agreeing with his teacher, Ibn Tymiyya's second types of acts in his threefold typology of actions; namely certain ontological and epistemological values in acts are derived from revelation, as we shall see shortly.

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Ibid
If it is said, the point of differences is that the action’s essence (dhāt) or attribute (wasf) is essential (lāzim) to the action itself hence it is necessarily good and evil. However, these two conditions oppose each other as it is not possible for each of them to be an essential attribute since; essentiality (al-lāzim) prevents the [action from being] separable to it [namely the attributes or essence].

It is said (qiīl), the meaning of good and evil being essential to the action’s essence or attribute is that, good originates (yanshā) from its essence or attribute by a certain condition and evil originates from its essence or attribute by another condition. Therefore, if the condition is not present or there is an obstacle to the essentiality [of the action and its essence or attribute] then the essentiality is removed in regards to the essence or attribute because of the absences of the condition or the presence of an obstacle.

So, one of the points of differences is the ontology of value, whether or not an action has an essential essence or attribute to it. According to those who opposed the ‘essentiality’ of an action, there is a potential problem in that the action’s essence or attribute cannot be essential to the action itself, given that essentiality means that it is inseparable. This is clearly contrary to the different circumstance of an action where the same action could be good at certain times and evil at others. Ibn al-Qayyim refutes this argument by explaining that this ‘essentiality’ is conditional upon the presence of its condition and the absence of any obstacles. Hence, the essentiality of an act’s essence or attribute is not always inseparable. However, he did not show how this was possible but rather said that ‘this is very clear’ (hadhā wādiḥ jiddan).

Ibn al-Qayyim defines another point of difference in the debate which deals with the epistemology for the accountability of moral value. How do we know the reward or punishment for actions: is it by revelation alone or by reason or both? Ibn al-Qayyim states:

The anti-[rational moralists] (al-nafāṭ) agree that the good or evil of an action, which is defined as inclination (al-mulā’ma) and disinclination (al-munāfara) or perfect (al-kamāl) and imperfect (al-

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65 This is based on the argument put forth by al-Qādī al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwanynī that, if good and evil were essential to an action, then the action would not have been different as it is in different situations and times. For example, lying can be good if it was to save a Prophet and is evil in other situations. Thus, evil is not an essential attribute or essence to the action itself. (Cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, p. 345.

66 Ibid

67 Ibid
nuṣṣān), is known by reason. They say, we do not argue with you on the good and evil that is defined by these two notions. But rather we argue whether reason can know the praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of an action in this life and the reward or punishment for it in the hereafter. According to us, reason has no say in this, only revelation alone. They [anti-rational moralists] say that the good and evil that is defined as inclination and disinclination is known by reason. And [the good and evil] that is defined as perfect and imperfect is also known by reason. And [the good and evil that is] defined [as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and its] prerequisite of reward and punishment is where the differences arise.  

Ibn al-Qayyim then continues by elaborating how this point of difference could become consensual (itiḥādiyya) if it was given its full rights and all were to abide by its impositions (lawaṣīmuḥ).  

As we can see from previous positions, there are clear differences between Ibn al-Qayyim and the other theological schools on this debate. Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the Muʿtazilites in that he holds punishment to be determined by revelation and not reason alone. Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim maintains that nothing is obligatory for God except for obligations He has placed upon himself as is befitting of His divine names and attributes; this is known by revelation and not by human reason. Likewise, Ibn al-Qayyim advocates that religious duty (taklīf) is only known by way of revelation and not reason; therefore, nothing is required of man in the absence of revelation. Thus, while Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the Muʿtazilites on these points he is also agreeing with the Asḥārites.

On the other hand, Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the Asḥārites on the following points. Ibn al-Qayyim is a pro-rational moralist who believes that good and evil are found in the essence and

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68 Ibid., p. 362.
69 Ibid.
71 A potential research avenue is to study the different notions of self divine necessity- namely Ibn Sīnā’s natural necessity theory, the Muʿtazilites’ divine moral obligation, the Asḥārites’ divine volition obligation, and Ibn al-Qayyim’s divine wise purpose obligation.
73 Ibid., p. 432, 380, 378,
attributes of acts and are known by reason. Furthermore, revelation sometimes further emphasises the moral value of certain actions. So while Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the Ash’arites on this point, he is also agreeing with the Mu’tazilites. In this sense, Ibn al-Qayyim is engaging with both the Mu’tazilites and Ash’arites in order to develop his own position, which could be seen as a middle way (waṣat) position. He also introduces new concepts to his middle way developed position, such as: rational moral values as a form of legal conveyance and piety as a means to strengthen ones’ rational moral values.

Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God has established two kinds of legal conveyance (ḥujuja) upon man: rational moral values and a messenger - the former which is firmly embedded in man’s intellect so that he may differentiate between good and evil. Additionally, Ibn al-Qayyim considers that the highest form of defectiveness is when one lacks rational moral values and hence fails to distinguish right from wrong and good from evil. That is to say, the more you get to know God the clearer your rational moral values become. Nevertheless, punishment is not justified by rational moral values; it is a messenger who makes punishment justified. Ibn al-Qayyim says:

The verified position in this great doctrine (asl) is that detestability (qubh) is firmly inherent within action[s] and God does not punish for it only after legal conveyance (ḥujuja) has been establish by a messenger. This is the point that both the Mu’tazila and Kallābiyya missed.

It is likely that Ibn al-Qayyim initially followed his teacher, Ibn Taymiyya, in the process of engaging with the Mu’tazilites and Ash’arites in the debate on meta-ethics. As a result of this

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75 Madârij, vol. 1, p. 250.
76 Ibn al-Qayyim claims that the Traditionalists hold a middle way position between other theological schools on the debate at hand, See, Miftâh, vol. 2, pp. 61, 243.
79 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, p. 32.
critical engagement, a middle way Traditionalist position, which agrees with the Mu’tazilites on certain points and the Ash’arites on others, was developed.

Ibn Taymiyya categorises the meta-ethics of declaring good or evil (al-tahsīn wa al-taqrīb) into two types of actions. Firstly, actions which are both beneficial and inclined towards by the agent or that are harmful and disinclined away from by the agent. This type of action is known by reason and all theological schools are in agreement with this. The second category is made up of actions which are the cause to blameworthiness and punishment. The moral judgment nature of this category is where differences occur between the different theological schools. The Mu’tazilites say that evil, oppression, associationism, lying, and indecency (al-fawūḥish) are known by reason and the agent of such is worthy of punishment in the hereafter, even if no messenger was sent to him. The Ash’arites on the other hand say that moral judgment is valid by revelation. They maintain that there is no such thing as good, detestable or evil moral judgments before the coming of a messenger. Instead, the moral judgment of good is only that which revelation says ‘do’, namely the commandments. Equally, a moral judgment of ‘detestable’ is only that which revelation says ‘do not do’, namely the prohibitions. Consequently, the Ash’arites denied any wise purpose in divine commands and prohibitions - instead such rulings are the result of arbitrary divine volition.

Ibn Taymiyya confirms the Traditionalists’ position which holds that oppression, associationism, lies, and indecency (al-fawūḥish) are detestable even in the absence of revelation; however, punishment is only justified after the sending of a messenger, namely revelation, after which man can no longer use ignorance as an excuse.

86 For a study on Ibn Taymiyya’s ethics see, Sophia Vasalou, ‘Ibn Taymiyya’s ethics between Ashʿarite voluntarism and Muʿtazilite rationalism: a middle road?’ in Rediscovering Theological Rationalism in Medieval World of Islam: New texts and Perspectives, ed. Gregor SchrARB, Sabine Schmidtke, and Lukas...
I think the Ash’arites’ anti-rational morality position was perhaps inevitable due to their opinion of compulsionism (*jabr*). If man is not the agent of his actions then none of man’s actions are detestable since God is the sole agent; therefore morality is only determined by God, and not reason. Al-Rāzī clearly emphasises this by saying, ‘man is compelled (*mujbūr*) to act detestably, and hence, none of his actions are detestable.’ Ibn Taymiyya comments on this:

This opinion is like the argument of the polytheist who use qadar to justify their sins, [they say]
‘Had God willed, we would not have ascribed unto Him partners neither had our fathers, nor had we forbidden aught’

It is also likely that Ibn al-Qayyim contributed some Sufi aspects to the debate, given that he commonly argues for a particular theological position in order to encourage piety, worship and love of God. At times, he argues that sins corrupt human rational morals. The more pious one is the clearer one’s rational moral judgment, namely the ability to distinguish right from wrong and good from evil. Ibn al-Qayyim also maintains that a living heart has a strong rational morality and a dead heart is one that has a weak rational morality. As such, one may argue that one side of Ibn al-Qayyim’s theology has a Sufi aspect to it which seeks to better man and his relationship with God while the other side is rationalistic, especially considering his intellectual critical engagement with rational schools of theology.


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89 For more on Ibn al-Qayyim’s encouragement of love, see Joseph, N. Bell, *Love Theory in Later Hanbalite Thought*, State University of New York Press, 1979, chapter six to chapter nine. For more on Ibn al-Qayyim encouragement of worship, see chapters six and seven of this study.
Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim points out even animals possess rational morality, which seems to be his main point; he talks at length about different kinds of animals. However, there is a Prophetic tradition that I think would be somewhat troublesome to Ibn al-Qayyim, which states that every living thing will receive justice in the hereafter even a goat with one horn which was hit by a goat with two horns. This tradition indicates that even animals will be punished for the evil they do, which seems to support the Mu'ʿtazilites’ position of punishment by reason in the absence of revelation. Unless, of course, Ibn al-Qayyim can argue that this is a weak tradition since it opposes the clear verses in the Quran. Yet, a problem still remains, namely, this type of punishment is different from the ones mentioned in the Quran, as the Muʿtazilites suggest.

Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim concludes his extensive discussion on ethics by stating that God had facilitated his effort (fataḥa ʿalaya) in that much of the fine details herein will not be found in the works of the theological schools.

**Ibn al-Qayyim’s Arguments**

Firstly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues for an epistemological objective rationalism of moral values. He asserts that God established rational proofs in divine scripture which reveals that good and evil are things that are inherently so in essence or by attribute, which can be grasped by human reason. God does not use His commands or prohibitions as proof; instead He uses rational arguments which require that man uses his sound reason and natural disposition (fiṣra). For example God says:

> O mankind! A similitude has been coined, so listen to it: Verily! Those on whom you call besides God, cannot create a fly, even though they join together for the purpose. And if the fly snatched

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94 And We do not punish except until We send a messenger. Quran 17: 15.


97 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 430.

away a thing from them, they would have no power to release it from the fly. So weak are (both) the seeker and the sought!\textsuperscript{99}

God has put forward a rational similitude which indicates the evil of worshipping other than Him and also that the evil of this practice is something embedded in all reason, even in the absence of revelation. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that there is nothing more rationally evil than to worship something unable to create or defend itself from a fly, and at the same time, to abandon the worship of He who is the Creator, the Omniscient, the Omnipotent, and the One who there is nothing alike Him: ‘do you not see!’\textsuperscript{100}

One must note that Ibn al-Qayyim does not necessarily deny that God’s commands or prohibitions give moral value to certain acts. Rather, divine commands and prohibitions further emphasise the moral value of an act. Hence, an action can be inherently just and simultaneously emphasised as such by the divine commands. Subsequently, the act is morally good from two points: by reason and by revelation.\textsuperscript{101} As for the Mu’tazilites, they uphold that revelation unveils (\textit{kashf}) that what reason may have become unclear about. Hence they avoid saying that revelation adds further emphasis to the moral value of an act, perhaps to give human reason exclusivity in comprehending moral values, thus overstressing human responsibility. On the contrary, the Ash’arites maintain that it is only revelation which decides the moral value of an act. In this regard, Ibn al-Qayyim’s position can therefore be seen as middle way position between the Mu’tazilites and Ash’arites.

Secondly, Ibn al-Qayyim further argues for an ontological status of moral values. He explains that the fact that God never commands \textit{al-fahshā}\textsuperscript{102} (abomination) is evidence that evil is an intrinsic quality, which exists either in essence or by attribute. Similarly, this also indicates that \textit{al-fahshā}’ is a phenomenon and not something that God labels as \textit{al-fahshā}'. If such were

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid; Quran 22: 73.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, p. 326.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., vol. 2, p. 327.
\textsuperscript{102} As the verse reads: ‘And when they commit a \textit{fāḥisha’}, they say: \textit{We found our fathers doing it, and God has commanded us of it. Say: Nay, God never commands fāḥisha’}. Do you say of God what you know not?’ Quran 7: 28.
the case, then God would say: *I do not command that which I prohibit* instead of *God never commands al-fahshā*. Additionally God says:

> Say: My Lord has commanded justice and that you should face Him only in each and every place of worship, in prayers, and invoke Him only making your religion sincere to Him.

Ibn al-Qayyim comments:

So He has informed us that He is far above commanding *al-fahshā*, rather all His commandments are good by reason and accepted by the natural disposition (*fitra*). So He commands justice not oppression and to worship Him alone none beside Him, and to call upon Him sincerely and not by association (*shirk*). This is what He, the Most-High commands and not *al-fahshā*.

Thirdly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues for a divine exclusivity on human accountability, such that punishment is only justified after a messenger legally conveys moral judgments. So, performing evil is not sufficient reason for receiving punishment, instead it is the conveyance of moral judgments which validate punishment. This implies that there are no obligations upon man while in the absence of revelation - which is a contrary belief to that of the Muʿtazilites. Ibn al-Qayyim insists that obligations and prohibitions upon man in the absence of revelation is invalid, since if such were the case, legal conveyance (*huṣṣa*) can be established independently of a messenger. Hence Ibn al-Qayyim is not willing to compromise or undermine the role of revelation in legal accountability - that is, it is God alone who set the laws and also it is He who holds man accountable for them. Ibn al-Qayyim supports his stance with the following verse: *In order that mankind should have no plea against God after the Messengers.*

Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that although human reason can recognise (but not legislate) religious duty in the absence of revelation, it certainly has no role in the accountability for religious duty. Ibn al-Qayyim states that if obligations and prohibitions were affirmed by

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103 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 327
104 Ibid; Quran 7: 29.
105 Ibid
107 Ibid; Quran 4:165.
human reason - while in the absence of revelation - then there would certainly be no accountability for such obligations and prohibitions.\textsuperscript{108} He argues that God has invalidated any form of punishment in the absence of revelation. This is supported by the following verses: God says, ‘And We never punish until We have sent a Messenger [to give warning].’\textsuperscript{109} Similarly, God says:

\begin{quote}
Therein they will cry: Our Lord! Bring us out, we shall do righteous good deeds, not that [evil deeds] we used to do. Did We not give you lives long enough, so that whosoever would receive admonition, could receive it? And the warner came to you.\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

From the above verses, we can clearly see that God uses a ‘warner’ to legally convey (\textit{hujja}) moral judgments, so that man has no excuse in avoiding punishment.\textsuperscript{111}

Fourthly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that rational morality does not necessarily mean that God is obliged to act according to human moral criteria - like the Mu'tazilites uphold. Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim states that God is not asked about His action: \textit{He cannot be questioned as to what He does, while they will be questioned.}\textsuperscript{112} He argues that human reason can never possibly know what is obliged upon God; this is something which is concealed from us. Hence, Ibn al-Qayyim follows an agnostic approach in this regard. Moreover, he argues that we do not know whom God is pleased with or displeased with, who He shall reward or punish, since reason cannot inform us of this nor have we been informed of it; hence, reason alone cannot indicate what is obliged upon God. So, Ibn al-Qayyim sarcastically argues that this leaves us with only one option, which is to draw a comparison between God’s actions and to that of man’s. Ibn Qayyim is adamant that is the most false of analogies and the greatest of vanities.\textsuperscript{113} Ibn al-Qayyim states:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{109} Quran 17: 15. \\
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, 35: 37. \\
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid; For more on Ibn Qayyim’s arguments against the validity of punishment in the absence of revelation, see, \textit{Miftāh}, vol. 2, pp. 357, 369-70, 433; \textit{Madārij}, vol. 1, p. 247. \\
\textsuperscript{112} Quran 21: 23. \\
\textsuperscript{113} Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{Miftāh}, vol. 2, p. 370.
\end{flushright}
Just like there is nothing similar to Him in His essence or His attributes, likewise, there is nothing similar to Him in His actions. How does one then make analogy of His actions to that of His creation? They make good for Him what is good for them and evil for Him what is perceived evil to them. Despite this, we see many things that are evil to us and good to Him the Most-High; such as, the pain of children and animals….some scholars were asked about this, so the questioner recited:

*Evil is an action by other than you to me so when You perform it, it becomes good*\(^{114}\)

Likewise, we perceive the abandonment of a drowning person or someone being destroyed, as evil. But if He the All-Praised, drowns or destroys them, it would not be considered evil by Him.\(^ {115}\)

Ibn al-Qayyim further confirms, in Sufi language, that certain actions may be perceived as evil by man but in fact they are considered good by God. He says:

As long as man is in the level of dispersion, he sees certain actions good or evil given its essence and what is scattered from it. However, when he passes [this level] and perceives [things] from its first source (*al-muṣdr al-awwal*), deriving from the specified command (*ʾain al-ḥukūm*), and the union of everything in that specified [command], and the withdrawal of the additional will from it, and the union of the source (*waḥda al-muṣdr*) which is the general will. For it [the actions] in regards to the source of the command and the specified will, is not described as either good or evil. Since, good and evil only applies to it when in contact with the universe and pursues the same way as it. For it is like the singular essential sun ray in and of itself without colour- it is not described as red, yellow or green. However, when in contact with the object of colour, only then is it described according to the object (*al-maḥāl*), because of its attachment and contact with it. Thus, he perceives red, yellow, and green but in fact it is free from all of it.\(^ {116}\)

\(^{114}\) This is a literal translation of a two stanza Arabic poem that is mentioned in ibid.

\(^{115}\) Ibid

Conclusion

In this chapter I have illustrated how Ibn al-Qayyim critically engages with the Muʿtazilites only to agree with them that some actions have essential and attributable characteristics of good and evil, which are inherent and are known by reason. Nonetheless, following on from Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim also upholds that the ontological and epistemological values of some actions are derived from revelation; in this instance, he differs from the Muʿtazilites. Similarly, I have demonstrated how Ibn al-Qayyim also critically engages with the Ashʿarites and agrees that religious duty and accountability are only justified by revelation; that God is not obliged by the human criterion of moral judgment. However, Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the Ashʿarites on the essential and attributable characteristics of good and evil which are known independently of revelation. As such, I have revealed how Ibn al-Qayyim develops a position which can be considered a middle way (waṣfat) position between that of the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites. Lastly, I have shown how Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a double sided approach on the debate on meta-ethics. Firstly, his employment of rationalistic *ad hominem* arguments which are very Rāzian in style; secondly, his introduction of Sufi aspects, such as rational morality being a legal conveyance and piety a strengthening tool of one’s rational morality. In the next chapter, I will investigate Ibn al-Qayyim’s position on whether divine acts take into account human comprehension of moral values or whether divine acts transcends such values.
5- IBN AL-QAYYIM ON WISE PURPOSE AND CAUSATION IN DIVINE ACTS

Introduction

In this chapter I will analyse Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement with both the Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites - in particular al-Rāżī. I will argue that Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a position, similar to the Mu’tazilites, of wise purpose and causation inherent to the nature of divine acts. I will illustrate how this position opposes that of the Ash’arites, who hold that God acts by pure divine volition, a concept which Ibn al-Qayyim refutes extensively by employing rational and linguistic based arguments. I will also demonstrate how Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the Mu’tazilites on their belief in the extrinsic nature of divine attributes, such as divine wise purpose and their employment of non-scriptural terminologies in this debate.

Defining the Debate

Ibn al-Qayyim explains that wise purpose (al-hikma) is to do what is required, in the most suitable manner and at the required time.1 As such, he also believes that wise purpose involves praised objectives that are required in God’s creation and commands as He creates, determines and commands due to these praised objectives. It is also an intrinsic attribute of God, similar to His other attributes such as: His hearing, sight, power, will, knowledge, living and speech.2

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2 Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 501-502; Also, Muhammad ‘Abduh defines wise purpose as, all actions that result in preserving order and refraining harm, whether it be specific or general. If it were revealed to any rational person, he will understand it and consider the action to be free from aimlessness and jest. Thus, it is an intended act that causes benefit and is non-arbitrary. See, Risāla al-Tawḥīd, Dār al-Naṣr, Cairo, 1969, p. 50; Muḥammad Rabī’ al-Madkhalī, al-Hikma wa al-Ta‘īl fi Af‘āl Ilḥāl ta‘ālā, Maktaba Līna, n.d., p. 23.
Similarly, al-Jurjānī explains that a ‘illa (cause), according to the philosophers, is that which the existence of something is dependent upon; what is needed for a thing to exist. For example, the existence of a bed depends on the material wood and a carpenter. In addition, the meaning of cause in this debate is a teleological cause, which means that actions have an intended objective and, because of this, the agent acts.

Muslim theologians generally agree, unlike Muslim philosophers, that God’s acts come from His divine will and knowledge; thus He has free choice. They also agree that God is wise (ḥakīm) in His actions and hence, His actions are free from being considered aimless (‘abath).

However, they differ with regard to the nature of this wise purpose (ḥikmah); is it something intended by God, or is it just a natural consequence of the action? Similarly, they also differ with regard to the causality of His actions (ta’ilu af‘alihi). Are His actions the cause of wise purpose and benefits (mašālihi)? The latter was an inevitable difference born of the former, because if God intends wise purpose in His acts then as a result His acts will be the cause of the wise purpose and benefits in His creation.

On the other hand, some hold that God is by essence obliged to act and hence God does not act for a particular purpose; instead He acts by necessity. This is also known as the natural

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5 Such as, Ibn Sinā in his theory of natural necessity, as we shall see in the next two chapters.
7 Ibn al-Qayyim commonly attacks Ibn Sinā on the natural necessity theory because this theory, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, entails that God acts without a wise purpose. However, this is perhaps only true if the necessities in God’s acts are the same as a cause and effect, in that there is neither choice nor wise purpose. On the other hand, if the necessities in God’s acts are dictated by His essence, then I do not see why there is no wise purpose in such acts since His essence can also entail a divine wise purpose. In this respect, the perceived differences between Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Sinā, is a terminological one (khilāf lafẓī). Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, *Minhāj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya wa Naqd Kalām al-Shī‘a al-Qadariyya*, ed. Muhammad Rashād Sālim, Jāmi‘a al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Sa‘ūd al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 1986, vol. 1, p. 406.
necessity theory as is the position of the philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā, who Ibn al-Qayyim will analyse at length in the last chapter of this research.

In this debate, Ibn al-Qayyim tends to categorise the various positions as the ‘Deniers’ (al-nufāt) of divine wise purpose, namely the Ashʿarites and those who agree with them, and the ‘Affirmers’ of divine wise purpose, namely the Muʿtazilites and the Traditionalists, including Ibn al-Qayyim.

**Ibn al-Qayyim on the Muʿtazilites**

The Muʿtazilites hold that God began creation for a cause (liʿilla). Cause here signifies that God created for a wise purpose, which is created and is extrinsic to Him, but at the same time this wise purpose reflects His gracefulness to His creation. Moreover, according to the Muʿtazilites, it is false to state that God did not create for a cause, since this implies that God creates aimlessly and without any wise purpose. Thus, to say that one acts without wise purpose is akin to saying that one acts aimlessly.

Ibn al-Qayyim differs from the Muʿtazilites on this debate on three points. Firstly, their position that God’s wise purpose is extrinsic to Him and reflects solely on His creation. This belief results from their denial of God’s divine attributes, which they deny because of their anthropomorphic implications. As a result, God does not benefit from His divine wise purpose.

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9 See the *Principles to Ibn al-Qayyim’s Four-Fold Theodicies* in chapter seven.


Unlike His creation.14 Secondly, their stance that God is obliged to act according to the human criterion of wise purpose, which we discussed in the previous chapter.15 Thus, God must do only that which man sees as wise. Lastly, their employment of the term *gharad* (motive) with regard to divine acts; this term carries negative connotations in the Arabic language, such as to oppress in order to gain a motive16. As such, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that we should only describe God according to divine scripture - and nowhere does He mention *gharad*.17

On the first point of difference, Ibn al-Qayyim employs a *fortiori* analogy against the Mu'tazilites; this was also employed by his teacher, Ibn Taymiyya, for the same purpose as we shall see shortly. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that any action which has no purpose - from the agent’s side - nor benefit, is not worthy of thanks-giving even if there were some sort of unintended beneficial outcome. Rather, the one who intends a benefit, wise purpose and praised objective, but is unable to execute his will, is worthier of thanks-giving than someone who is able to execute his will who acts without wise purpose, benefit or good intent. Thus, we can deduce that there is no one worthier of thanks-giving than God, because He acts for a wise purpose which demands His praise. So, whosoever is wiser in purpose is also worthier of greater thanks-giving; if there is no intended wise purpose then there is no justified thanks-giving.18

This type of analogical reasoning is also quite common in the works of Ibn al-Qayyim’s teacher, Ibn Taymiyya. Furthermore, it is perhaps one of the more strict forms of analogy, namely, *qiyās al-awlāfī,* or a *fortiori* analogy. Ibn Taymiyya employs this same analogy: *God is all the worthier (awlāfī) of whatever judgment of perfection is applied to creatures than are the creatures themselves*19 in order to refute the Mu’tazilites:

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15 In the Mu‘tazilites’ stance that God is obliged to act according to the human moral criteria, in the previous chapter.
18 Ibn Qayyim, *Shifā’,* p. 221.
The people said to [the Mu’tazilīs], “You are contradictory in this view because beneficence to another is praiseworthy by virtue of the fact that a judgment from it returns to its agent on account of which he is praised. [This is] either because [he is] perfecting himself through this, because he is pursuing praise and reward through this, because of gentleness and pain that he finds in himself—he drives this pain away through beneficence—or because of his pleasure, his gladness, and takes joy in beneficence. For the generous soul rejoices, is glad, and takes pleasure in the good that proceeds from another. Beneficence to another is praiseworthy by virtue of the fact that a judgment comes back to the beneficent from his act on account of which he is praised.

If it were supposed that the existence of beneficence and its non-existence relative to the agent were equal, he would not know that the likes of this act would be good coming from him. Moreover, the likes of this would be considered aimless in the minds of the people endowed with reason. Anyone who commits an act in which there is no pleasure, benefit, or profit for himself in any respect, sooner or later, is aimless and not worthy of praise for this. You [Mu’tazilīs] have ascribed causes to His acts in order to flee from aimlessness, and thus, you have fallen into aimlessness. For aimlessness is an act in which no benefit, profit, or advantage returns to the agent.”

As a result, according to Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Tayimyya, God also benefits from his acts as well as His creation. Hence, divine wise purpose subsists in God’s essence. This intended wise purpose can be seen as a perpetual utilitarian ethical effect of God’s acts, where every living thing benefits and continues to benefit from His divine acts.

Lastly, following on from Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that the term gharaḍ (motive) is a heresy (bid’a) since it was not used in scripture, nor is it used by anyone from amongst the Salaf. Therefore, one should avoid using such terms in relation to divine acts.

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21 Ibn al-Qayyim’s arguments against the Mu’tazilite stance that God is obliged to act according to the human criterion of wise purpose, is very similar to his arguments in the previous chapter against the stance that God must act according to the human moral criterion.
In addition, Ibn Taymiyya emphasises that the term *hikma* should be used instead of *gharaḍ*, since it is commonly used in divine scripture; whereas, *gharaḍ* with respect to God’s act, may connote injustice and need in common usage. Ibn Taymiyya explains: When people say, “So-and-so did that for a gharaḍ” and “So-and-so has a gharaḍ toward someone”, they often mean by this some blameworthy intention such as injustice, abomination, etc.²⁴

Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ashʿarites

The Ashʿarites uphold that God acts by pure volition (*maḥḍ al-mashiʿa*) and will (*irāda*); but not for a cause (*ʿilla*), motive (*dāʾ*), objectives (*ghāyāl*), nor a reason (*bāʾith*).²⁵ Al-Āmade states:

The position of the People of Truth (*mudhāb ahl al-haq*) is that the Creator created the world and originated it, not for an objective in that His origination may be ascribed to [that particular objective]; and not for a wise purpose in that His creation may be conditional upon [that particular wise purpose]. But rather what He originates of good and evil, benefit and harm, is neither from a derived objective nor an intention that obliged Him to act.²⁶

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Ibn al-Qayyim argues that this position is problematic; in the Quran the causes to certain actions are clearly indicated in the linguistic structure of lām al-ta’llīl (Purpose lām prefix). An example of this can be seen in the following verse: ‘And I created not the jinns and mankind except that they should worship Me (illā liya’badūm).’ In this verse, the ‘Purpose lām prefix’ clearly indicates that the cause to the creation is to establish God’s worship.

The Ash’arites deal with this potential problem by negating any ‘Purpose lām prefix’ in the Quran and instead claim it to be ‘Consequential lām prefix’ (lām al-‘āqiba), as is found in the following verse: ‘Then the household of Pharaoh picked him up, that he might become for them an enemy and a (cause of) grief.’ That is to say, Pharaoh had no knowledge that Moses would become his enemy and cause of grief; these were the consequences of taking Moses into his household. Hence, the term ‘Consequential lām prefix’ is derived.

It must be remarked that the Ash’arites completely deny any form of personal aims (al-aghrād) and absolute causes for God’s actions. As for wise purpose, they only deny that His actions are conditional upon it. Thus, wise purpose is an unintended consequence of His actions. From this, we can observe the point of difference between the Affirmers of divine wise purpose and the Deniers of divine wise purpose; the latter hold that divine wise purpose is not intended by God nor is it conditional for His actions, whereas the former hold the contrary.

Al-Rāzī, the best of the later Ash’arites, as Ibn al-Qayyim puts it, presents five arguments in defence of the anti-divine wise purpose and anti-causality position. Firstly, al-Rāzī argues that if God acts in order to benefit himself, this necessitates that He is imperfect and is thus perfected by this benefit. He states:

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28 Quran 51: 56.
29 Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid.
31 Quran 28: 8.
32 As is represented in this chapter by the Muʿtazilite and Ibn al-Qayyim.
33 As is represented in this chapter by the Ash’arites.
Anyone who acts in order to achieve a benefit or to ward off harm, if that achievement of benefit is better than not achieving it, then the agent of such action has indeed benefited from it. Thus, if this is the case then such person is imperfect in essence and becomes perfected [by something] external of His essence, and this is impossible for God.

And if the achievement and non-achievement is equal, then there is no out weighing preponderance (al-rujān), thus there is no achievement [of such benefit].

Ibn al-Qayyim counterattacks this argument thoroughly with sixteen arguments. Firstly, Ibn al-Qayyim seeks clarification by posing two questions: do you mean that the necessary divine wise purpose in God’s acts is obtained by God from something external to Him? Or do you mean that it is independent of Him and at the same time He is perfected by it? The first possibility is void since there is no God or Creator save Him. Thus, He does not benefit from something external to Him, rather the entire universe benefits from His perfection and His perfection is in no way the result of Him benefitting from the universe.

The second possibility is that the wise purpose is His attribute and this attribute is not independently external to Him (ghayrun lahu). But instead, His wise purpose is a part of Him, in that He is the all-Wise who possesses wise purpose, just like He is the all-Knower who possesses knowledge. Thus to affirm His wise purpose does not necessitate that He is perfected by something external to Him. Similarly, His perfection by His divine attributes does not in any way benefit from something external to Him.

Ibn al-Qayyim further argues that if God acts to fulfil something that He loves and also if the existence of it is as much beloved to Him as its non-existence, then the imposition of such an act indicates the highest of perfection and the non-existence of such an act indicates

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38 Ibid
imperfection. He is able to achieve what He loves, at the time He loves, and by the means He loves. Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that this is perfection in a true sense. Unlike the one who has no love, or has love but is unable to act accordingly.\(^{41}\)

Secondly, al-Rāzī argues:

If God acts only for a wise purpose, then this wise purpose is either pre-eternal or originated. If it is pre-eternal, then this either necessitates the action [also] being pre-eternal or does not necessitate it. If it is necessitated [the action being pre-eternal] then this is impossible; since, pre-eternity and an action is contradictory. And if the pre-eternity of the wise purpose does not necessitate the pre-eternity of the action then it [the wise purpose] existed without the action. And if it [the wise purpose] does not necessitate the pre-eternity [of the action] and the action existed without it, then the wise purpose is not gained by the action since, it existed without it. Thus the wise purpose is not conditional upon the action and therefore, the action is not conditional upon the wise purpose and this is what was intended.

And if the wise purpose is originated by the originated action, then it [the action] either requires an agent or does not require an agent. If it does not require an agent then this necessitates the origination (hadīth) of [something] originated (hādīth) [namely, the action but] without an agent and this is impossible. And if it requires an agent then this agent is either God or other than Him and it is [clearly] not permissible to be other than Him since there is no Creator except God. So, if it is God, then either His action has a personal aim (gharaḍ) or there is no personal aim in it. So, if it is the former then it is the same as the beginning part [of this whole argument] which entails an infinite regression (tasalsul). And if it is the latter, then verily, His action is free from personal aim and this is what was sought after.\(^{42}\)

In this argument, we witness al-Rāzī paving the way to two dead ends for his opponent. The first part of the argument is designed for his opponent to fall into an infinite regression, arguing that every cause must have a cause. The second part is designed to prove that God does not,

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conditionally, act for a personal aim; since this personal aim will suffer the same manipulation as the ‘wise purpose’ in the first part of the argument. Hence, it either falls into an infinite regression or is proven that divine acts are not conditional upon something in order for it to be executed.

Ibn al-Qayyim presents ten refutations against al-Rāzī’s argument. In his third refutation, he argues against the infinite regression conclusion that the origination of a cause must have another cause and states it to be void. According to Ibn al-Qayyim, this will only prove true if we were to say that everything that is originated must have a cause, which he does not agree with. Rather, he says that God acts for a wise purpose in that the object, namely the wise purpose, is intended (murād) and loved by the agent, namely God. The meaning of love here is that, at times, it is intended for the agent Himself and at times it is intended for His creation. Nonetheless, whatever is intended for His creation is ultimately going to be intended for Him. This consequently denies any form of infinite regression because it leads to His divine will, a divine attribute that has no cause as it is a part of God’s essence. Ibn al-Qayyim further clarifies this as follows:

This also applies to Him creating for causes (asbāb), that is to say, he creates such and such for such and such cause and also for such and such cause until it ends to a cause that has no cause other than His divine will. Likewise is the case, when He creates for a wise purpose and that wise purpose for another wise purpose until it ends up with a wise purpose that has no wise purpose above it.

In his fourth refutation, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that this case is not simply ‘black and white’, where God either acts for Himself or for others, or like al-Rāzī puts it, for a personal aim or no personal aim. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that there is no harm in saying that some of His acts are intended for his creation and also intended for Him, perhaps to avoid an infinite regression. Consequently, one may conclude that God acts for multiple causes, which are intended for both

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Himself and His creation. Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that this is more probable (awlā bi-jawāz) than the claim that all of His creation or acts are solely intended for Himself. The same applies for His divine love, where the loved things are loved by His creation and at the same time loved by Him.\[^{46}\]

Thirdly, al-Rāzī states that:

> The obtainment of all personal aims (al-aghrād) boils down to two things: to obtain pleasure and delight, and to ward off pain, grief, and depression. God –the exalted- has the power to obtain these two things without intermediaries (al-wasā’īt) and whosoever has the power to obtain an aim without intermediaries then the obtainment via an intermediary becomes aimless (‘abath); and this is impossible for God.\[^{47}\]

This argument is an attempt at establishing that God - the All-Powerful - can create without any causes, that is to say whatever He wants; He can just say ‘be’ and it is. Thus, for Him to use an intermediary in such a case is aimless. Ibn al-Qayyim disagrees with this idea of non-causal creation and contests it in eleven refutations.\[^{48}\]

Firstly, Ibn al-Qayyim highlights that God is the All-Powerful (ina allah ‘alā kuli shay’in qadīr). However, this does not imply that whatever is possible (mumkin) to exist can exist without the wise purpose that was intended for its existence. Or more simply, an object cannot exist without its cause. One cannot get a son without his father. Hence, the necessary object (al-malzūm) is solely dependent upon the necessary cause (al-lāzim) and without it, it is impossible in the sense that combining two contradictions is impossible. Ibn al-Qayyim clarifies what he means by impossible, which is not to say that He is unable to do (al-‘ajīz). Since, impossible (al-muhāl) translate as non-existence, and hence, does not concern His power. On the other hand, God’s power over everything includes only that which is possible (mumkin).\[^{49}\] It is similar to

\[^{46}\]Ibid. For more on Ibn al-Qayyim’s refutations of this argument, see, Shifā’, vol. 3, pp. 1099-1110.
\[^{47}\]Ibid
\[^{49}\]Ibid
asking: can God create a square circle? This does not concern God’s power because a square circle is non-existent.

Secondly, Ibn al-Qayyim states that al-Rāzī was wrong to claim the aimlessness of using intermediaries to obtain a personal aim; even more so when the intermediary is a cause (sabab) or condition (shart). Aimlessness is that which has no benefit. Contrary to this, the intermediary condition, cause or substance (al-māda) has a benefit in that it originates objects and is thus far from aimless.  

Lastly, al-Rāzī argues:

Verily, the evidence has been established that He is the creator of everything, so what is the wise purpose or benefit in creating disbelief (al-kufr), immorality (al-fasāq), and disobedience (al-īṣāyān)? And what is the wise purpose in creating a person who [God] knows will disbelieve, be immoral (yafṣuq), oppress, and corrupt the world and religion? And what is the wise purpose in creating poison and harmful things? And what is the wise purpose in creating Iblīs (Satan) and the devils? And if there is a wise purpose in their creation then what would the wise purpose be in leaving him [Iblīs] until the end of time; and the deaths of the Prophets and Messengers? And what is the wise purpose in expelling Adam and Eve from paradise and their children being exposed to great tribulations while it is possible for them to be in the best of health? And what is the wise purpose in the suffering of animals? Even though there is a wise purpose in the suffering of the mukallaflīn (those accountable for religious duty); so what is the wise purpose in the suffering of other than the mukallaflīn, such as the animals, children, and the insane? And what is the wise purpose in creating a creation that He will eternally punish [in hell] and it will not come to an end? And what is the wise purpose in empowering His enemies over His pious slaves (awliyāʾiḥi), afflicting them with horrible torment, killing, imprisonment, punishment, and enslavement?  

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50 Ibid
51 Ibn Qayyim emphasises that al-Rāzī’s fourth argument is the exact same as is encompassed in his second argument, hence, he will not cite it; so this is al-Rāzī’s fifth argument. See Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1111.
Ibn al-Qayyim considers this argument extensively, as it contains many points. He dedicates forty arguments, which take up one hundred and ninety pages, to refute al-Rāzī’s argument. Due to the length, I shall only focus on a few points which I believe are most relevant to this chapter.

Before Ibn al-Qayyim answers any of al-Rāzī’s thought provoking questions, he starts off by stating that these objections (i’tirādāt) are in no way stronger than the Atheist’s (Ahlu Ilḥād) objections towards the existence of God and also the eighty arguments against Prophet-hood, which al-Rāzī himself cites. Likewise, the arguments against God’s perfect attributes and also the Jahmites arguments which attempt to refute God’s highness (‘alūwihi wa istiwā’hui) and His divine speech.

Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim implies that al-Rāzī is familiar with these arguments and refutations, since he cites them himself in his works. Despite this, Ibn al-Qayyim still summarises what he believes to be the divine wise purpose behind the existence of apparent evil within God’s creation. For example, disbelievers exist so that God may establish His perfect attributes. The establishment of His perfect attributes is evident when exercising His divine will with regard to the disbelievers. God judges between His slaves by His divine rule (ḥukum) and differentiates between them by means of His divine knowledge. So, when evil comes into existence by man, certain attributes of God become apparent; thus, making God alone worthy of praise for His perfect attributes. God says: They will be judged by the truth, then it will be proclaimed all-praise and thanks to God the Lord of the universe.

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54 I will discuss al-Rāzī’s points at length in the last chapter, Ibn al-Qayyim’s Fourfold Theodicy of Optimism.
55 Ibn Qayyim mentions that there are forty arguments that attempt to disprove the existence of God. A possible research avenue would be to trace and analyse these forty arguments. See, Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifā’ al-ʿAlīl fi Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, Dār al-Ḥaḍrāʾ, Beirut, 1978, p. 217.
56 Ibid
57 Ibid
59 Quran 39: 75.
Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God’s wise purpose concerns that which exists and is originated. As for disbelief, evil and sin, these are all the result of disobeying God’s commands, thus they are nothing to do with God’s acts. Ibn al-Qayyim holds that God’s acts have a wise purpose and intended objective. As for what God eschews, this is not a concern of Ibn al-Qayyim’s position.

Also, Ibn al-Qayyim shows that evil is in no way attributable to God since it is the non-existence of good and its causes (‘adam al-khayr wa asbābihi); and non-existence is nothing just like the noun indicates.

Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that God avoids creating anything that has no wise purpose. Hence, He abandons it because He has no love for its existence, or its existence would mean the loss of something more beloved to Him. As a result, the wise purpose for its non-existence outweighs the wise purpose for its existence and to combine the two is incompatible. Thus, the preponderance (tarjīḥ) of a greater wise purpose is of utmost wisdom (ghāya al-hikma). Ibn al-Qayyim demonstrates that God’s creation and commands are based on utilitarian criterion, that is, they are based on obtaining the absolute benefit (taḥṣīl al-maṣāliḥ al-khāliṣa). Consequently, these divine acts, which are utilitarian in nature, are clear evidence of God’s wise purpose.

Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that he does not claim that God’s wise purpose and its detail (tafṣīl) must be - or is able to be - comprehended by man. This is what is perhaps implied in al-Rāzī’s argument. For Ibn al-Qayyim, it is not a necessary feature for God’s wise purpose to be understood. For that reason, there is no harm in there being a wise purpose for every point that al-Rāzī mentioned and at the same time man being unaware of it. This implies, as Ibn al-Qayyim argues, that only God has knowledge of the wise purpose. As He said to His

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60 According to Ibn Qayyim, there is also a wise purpose for that which God abandons; see, Shifā’, vol. 3, p. 1123.
61 See chapter 21 and 25 of Shifā’.
63 Ibn Taymiyya argues something similar to this, that ‘only a God who acts according to utilitarian criteria and His own self interest is rational and worthy of praise.’ See, Jon Hoover, An Islamic Theodicy, p. 111.
angels regarding the creation of man: *Verily, I know that which you know not.*\(^{65}\) Thus, those who hold the view that divine acts and commands have a wise purpose, do not necessitate that the creation must have knowledge of God’s wise purpose.\(^{66}\) From this refutation, we can deduce that not only does Ibn al-Qayyim uphold that God’s acts are universally wise in their purpose, but also is sometimes agnostic with regard to comprehending such divine wise purpose. So, he argues that just because we do not understand the divine wise purpose, this does not necessarily mean that it does not exist. Ibn al-Qayyim’s agnostic approach is further developed in the following:

Surely there is nothing like God’s essence, attributes, and acts. Hence, there is a wise purpose in everything you \([al-Rāzī] mentioned and other things; however, it is not the same kind of wise purpose [known to] man. Just like His actions are not similar to the actions of man, nor are His power, will \((irāda)\), volition \((mashi‘a)\), love, pleasure, and anger similar to that of man’s attributes.\(^{67}\)

Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim is agnostic when seeking to understand God’s wise purpose or any of His attributes. Furthermore, he puts forward an interesting argument which implies that whatever God does is good and wise in purpose, regardless of man’s perception. However, elsewhere,\(^{68}\) Ibn al-Qayyim argues that evil and aimlessness do not come from God’s actions. As such, Ibn al-Qayyim avoids both the Ash‘arites’ ethics of ‘subjective theistism’\(^{69}\) and the Ash‘arite theodicy which we will look at in the next chapter.

Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim states that divine wise purpose follows from divine knowledge and power. Thus, whosoever is more knowledgeable and powerful has the utmost wise purpose and perfection in His actions. So if God has the most perfect knowledge and power; the same then

\(^{65}\) Quran 2: 30.

\(^{66}\) Ibn al-Qayyim, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 1124.

\(^{67}\) Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 1124–1125.

\(^{68}\) See, *Shifā‘*, vol. 3, chapters: twenty one, twenty two and twenty five.

\(^{69}\) This means that all values are determined by the will of God; see, George F. Hourani, *Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 57 ff.
goes for His divine wise purpose which accords to His divine knowledge and power. Ibn al-Qayyim states:

So if the deniers of divine wise purpose agree that God has the most perfect knowledge and power, then they must also agree that His actions have the most perfect wise purpose since it is in accordance to His divine knowledge and power.  

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**Ibn al-Qayyim on Causality**

From Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement with both the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites, we can gather that he was an affirmer of causality in divine acts. That is, divine acts encompass a cause which has a divine wise purpose as is reflected in God’s divine attribute al-ḥakīm (the All-Wise). Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim holds that it is not a necessary requirement that humans should recognise God’s wise purpose nor is God obliged to act according to the human criterion of wise purpose. In addition, like Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim believes that divine acts are based on a utilitarian criterion of absolute benefit. Also, instead of using terms such as gharaḍ (motive) to describe the nature of divine acts, Ibn al-Qayyim opts to use scriptural terms such as hikma (wise purpose). This method of replacing non-scriptural terms with scriptural ones may be seen as a ‘Traditionalisation’ of kalām (rational theology), in particular the theology of the Traditionalists.

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70 Ibid, p. 1125.
71 Ibn al-Qayyim, *Miftāḥ*, vol. 2, pp. 466-467. Before Ibn al-Qayyim, the Karramites held a very similar position, that God acts and commands for a praised wise purpose that is intrinsic to Him, subsisting in His essence, and in accordance to His divine knowledge. As such, God creates in order that He is praised, glorified, and exalted. See, Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā*, vol. 8, p. 39.
Ibn al-Qayyim argues\textsuperscript{76} that scripture contains numerous examples of divine wise purpose in God’s acts and there is no way of grasping them all. For this reason, Ibn al-Qayyim only cites twenty-two examples and under each example he mentions various sub-examples, all of which are intended as arguments against those who oppose divine wise purpose in God’s acts.\textsuperscript{77}

Firstly, he argues that God explicitly uses the word ħikma (wisdom)\textsuperscript{78}, such as: \textit{and We have sent down to you the book and wisdom.}\textsuperscript{79} Additionally, \textit{He grants wisdom to whom He pleases, and he, to whom wisdom is granted, is indeed granted abundant good}.\textsuperscript{80}

Wisdom in this context, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, signifies beneficial knowledge which in turn leads to righteous deeds.\textsuperscript{81}

Secondly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God informs us of the given purpose behind his actions or commands.\textsuperscript{82} For example: \textit{Surely, We have sent down to you the Book in truth that you might judge between men by that which God has shown you.}\textsuperscript{83} The purpose mentioned in this verse comes after the conjunction ‘that’. Similarly, the same goes for the following verse: \textit{Thus did we show Abraham the kingdom of the heavens and the earth that he be one of those who have Faith with certainty}.\textsuperscript{84}

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\textsuperscript{76} This section is based on the only available version of chapter twenty-two of \textit{Shifāʾ}, entitled \textit{The affirmation of God’s wise purpose in His creation, commands, and to mention the intended objectives for them}, (\textit{fī ithbāt ħikma al-Rubb taʿālā fī khalqihi wa amrīhi wa ḥikir al-ghāyāt al-muṭlūba lahu bi-dhālik}). This chapter seems to be missing in all of the other publications of \textit{Shifāʾ}, that I have come across. The only available version of this chapter, according to my knowledge, is the edition of, Dr. Aḥmad al-Ṣamʿānī and Dr. ʿAlī al-ʿAjlān, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2008.

\textsuperscript{77} See \textit{Shifāʾ}, vol. 3, pp. 1025-1085.

\textsuperscript{78} In this context of the Quran, I think the word ‘wisdom’ would be a more suitable translation of ħikma than wise purpose.

\textsuperscript{79} Quran 4: 113.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 2: 269.

\textsuperscript{81} There seems to be a mistake in either the print or manuscript, since it reads that wisdom is beneficial knowledge and righteous deeds. This makes no sense in the context of the verse which would then imply that God sends down righteous deeds. There seems to be something missing or a mistake in either the manuscript or the publication. See, \textit{Shifāʾ}, vol. 3, p. 1026.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 3, pp. 1026-1028.

\textsuperscript{83} Quran 4: 105.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, 6: 75.
The Ash’arites claim that all the verses in the Quran which indicate some sort of purpose, these purposes are not intended since they are a direct consequence of God’s action. Thus, they hold that all the purposes mentioned in the Quran take the form of ‘Consequential lām prefix’ (lām al-ʿāqiba) rather than a ‘Purpose lām prefix’ as is held by the Muʿtazilites and Ibn al-Qayyim. Ibn al-Qayyim refutes this by arguing that a ‘Consequential lām prefix’ is for he who is unaware or unable to avoid the consequences of the action; such as in the case of Pharaoh in the following verse: the household of Pharaoh picked him up, that he might become for them an enemy and a cause of grief.\(^{85}\) Hence, we can clearly see that Pharaoh was unaware of the consequences of bringing Moses up, in that Moses was later to become Pharaoh’s enemy and cause of grief. Likewise, Pharaoh was also unable to avoid the consequences of his action. For this reason, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that this is certainly not the case with divine actions, which take the form of a ‘Purpose lām prefix’ in the Quran and as such imply that God has a wise purpose and cause for His actions.\(^{86}\)

Thirdly, the explicit ‘prepositional cause of kay’, translated as ‘in order that’, in the Quran as is seen in the following verses:

No calamity befalls in the earth or in yourselves but is inscribed in the Book of Decrees (al-Luwḥ al-Mahfūz), before We bring it into existence. Verily, that is easy for God. In order that you may not be sad over matters that you fail to get, nor rejoice because of that which has been given to you.\(^{87}\)

Ibn al-Qayyim explains that God informed us that He has decreed calamities in order that we may not be saddened over matters we fail to achieve or even be delighted over matters we achieve, since it was written before our existence. Thus, it was unavoidable and so we must be pleased with that which God has decreed for us.\(^{88}\)

Similarly, the numerous ‘Adverbial Qualifications of Purpose’ (al-mafʾūl lahu) in the Quran, clearly indicate the cause of the actions. For example:

\(^{85}\) Ibid, 28: 8.  
\(^{87}\) Quran 57: 22-3.  
Then, We gave Moses the Book, to complete upon those who would do right, and explaining all things in detail and a guidance and a mercy that they might believe in the meeting with their Lord.  

So, everything mentioned after ‘the book’ is an Adverbial Qualification of Purpose, that is, God gave Moses the book so that He could complete His favour upon those who do righteousness, as a guidance, a mercy, and an aid so that they may also believe in Moses’ meeting with their Lord.

Additionally, there are also verses where God explicitly mentions the cause for His commands, such as:

Because of that We ordained for the Children of Israel that if anyone killed a person not in retaliation of murder, or to spread mischief in the land - it would be as if he killed all mankind, and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of all mankind.

This is because murder is such a great sin; the highest form of oppression and corruption (fasād). For this reason, it is greater than any other sin. Thus, to kill one person is like killing the whole of mankind; in both cases the agent is doomed to hell.

Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim cites as part of his seventh example, numerous verses in the form of the ‘Purpose preposition as la‘lla’, which is translated as ‘so that’. For example: O mankind! Worship your Lord, Who created you and those who were before you so that you may become righteous. And likewise, Fasting has been prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you, so that you may become righteous. Hence, the cause of God’s actions comes after the phase ‘so that’, usually known in Arabic as the ‘illa (causal) la‘lla.'
In addition, Ibn al-Qayyim also states that everything God creates is by wise purpose and this wise purpose encompasses two things. Firstly, the wise purpose is an attribute that subsists in God which He loves and is pleased with. Secondly, the wise purpose that relates to His creation, such as His blessing which man is delighted with and finds pleasure in. These include God’s commandments and creation. Ibn al-Qayyim argues:

Verily, sound reason and the perfect natural disposition (al-fitra al-salīma) indicates exactly that what the Qur’an and Sunna have both indicated, that He –the exalted- is Wise and does not act aimlessly; instead He acts for a meaning and a benefit. Wise purpose is the intended objective of His actions. Precisely, His actions –the exalted- proceed from an utmost wise purpose which is the sole reason He acts; [similarly,] just like it proceeds from causes (asbāb), which due to it He acts. Both of these are indicated in His words and the Prophet’s words in numerous places.

In summary, it was probably inevitable that the Ashʿarites would hold such position, given that they believe in a complusionist view of man’s actions: man’s power has no cause to anything but instead man’s capability is to be acquirer rather than cause. Likewise, there is predictability in the Muʿtazilites view on the debate at hand. They say that divine wise purpose is reflected in man rather than God, perhaps because man is the creator of his own actions. And lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim holds that the divine wise purpose is reflected in both God and man, given that he believes in a dual agency of one act, namely God and man.

If there is a wise purpose and cause in divine acts, then there must be a theodicy for evil, but one based on and according to the positions on this debate, that is, if these positions are consistent. In other words, the Muʿtazilites and Ibn al-Qayyim, who both hold that divine acts are wise in purpose, must also hold that there is a wise purpose for the existence of evil, if they are to be consistent with their position of causality in divine acts. Whereas the Ashʿarites, who hold that divine acts exist according to arbitrary will, must perhaps hold that the existence of evil is also the result of arbitrary will. This is what I will be discussing in my next chapter.

Conclusion

In conclusion I have analysed Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement with both the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites - in particular al-Rāzī. I have argued that Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a position similar to that of the Muʿtazilites, supporting that wise purpose and causation are inherent to the nature of divine acts. I have also shown that this position is contrary to that of the Ashʿarites, who hold that God acts by pure divine volition, a concept which Ibn al-Qayyim refutes extensively by employing both rational and linguistic arguments. Although Ibn al-Qayyim agrees with the Muʿtazilites on this debate, I have also highlighted where he differs from them on their belief in the extrinsic nature of divine attributes, such as divine wise purpose and their employment of non-scriptural terminologies. In the next chapter, we shall see how Ibn al-Qayyim explains the existence of evil in view that wise purpose and causation are inherent to the nature of divine acts - as is demonstrated by God’s divine determination.
6- DIVINE DETERMINATION TRANSCEDES EVIL

Introduction

In this chapter I will demonstrate how Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the theodicean writings of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, in the debate on the source of moral evil. I will also discuss how Ibn al-Qayyim wrestles with the positions of the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites in order to develop a Traditionalist position free from the difficulties and problematic implications found in the positions of his interlocutors. As a result of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement, I will show how he manages to introduce new distinctions to the debate and develop his position that divine determination transcends evil.

Defining the Debate

On the question of whether evil is inclusive in divine determination, both Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī entitle their chapter: Showing the Manner of the Entry of Evil in Divine Predestination.1 Ibn al-Qayyim, conversely, entitles his chapter: Showing the Transcendence of Divine Determination Over Evil and its Entry in the Determined.2 This implies that Ibn al-Qayyim was directly engaged with the theodicean texts of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, as his title seems to be in direct opposition to that of the latter two. Secondly, it shows us that Ibn al-Qayyim was very concerned with the adopted theological language as he seems to opt for the exclusion of evil in divine determination even while the discussion and arguments presented in the theodicean texts of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī show great resemblance to the discussions and arguments of Ibn al-Qayyim. Thus, one may conclude that they were all discussing and arguing for the same concept of evil

but Ibn al-Qayyim opts for the exclusion rather than inclusion, perhaps due to his intended audience including the average layman. Nevertheless, although Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussions on evil are very similar to the discussions of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, his conclusions and principles are very different. Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim’s title - which mentions the exclusion of evil in divine determination - fits in well with his overall theodicean discourse which is very optimistic in manner, as we shall see.

On the definition of natural evil, it is likely that Ibn al-Qayyim sought to avoid the difficulties inherent in al-Rāzī’s definition, which is: ‘evil is the privation of what is necessary to a being or beneficial to them’. Upon contemplation, one ascertains that this definition is prone to the problem of subjectivity; what may be beneficial to a being is subjective from one person to another. Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim adds to the definition, saying that evil is the privation of what is necessary for existence, continuance, or perfection, such as the privation of breathing, reproduction and good health.

Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim explicitly defines moral evil as suffering and the cause of suffering. He states that evil is sins and the effects of sins such as punishment. So, one may deduce that sins are also causes of suffering. Thus, evil can be both a cause and an effect - like sin and consequential punishment. Hence, there is no inconsistency between the two definitions of moral evil offered. Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that evil can be both a cause and an effect, given that the effect is a necessary result of the cause, unless something prevents it from occurring, such as faith and good deeds - both of which prevent the punishment of sins. Ibn al-Qayyim states:

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3 See, al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 548; also see Ibn Sīnā’s al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, eds. Georges C. Anawātī, and Sa’īd Zāyid, Cairo, 1960, p. 417, which mentions the same definition.

4 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 987. This is the definition of accidental evil of privation.


Evil is suffering and its causes (asbābīhā). So sins, disbelief, associationism, and the types of oppressions⁸ are all evils; regardless if the person has a motive or pleasure in them- they are all evil. Since they are causes to suffering and lead to it just like all causes lead to their effects. As a result, the consequence of suffering to its cause is like the consequences of death after taking deadly poison.⁹

Therefore, if Ibn al-Qayyim locates moral evil in sins and subsequent punishment, where both the cause and effect are evil, this then leads us to question: what is the source of sins? This source must also be evil - given that it is a cause of evil.

Ibn al-Qayyim establishes this infamous source as two central features of man. Firstly the ‘appetitive self’ (nafs), which is the hidden internal disposition of man and, secondly, the apparent and external actions of man.¹⁰ These two features are derived from the Prophet’s sermon- as Ibn al-Qayyim states:

…evil is none other than sins and its punishment just as is mentioned is his sermon, ‘All praise is due to God, we seek refuge with Him and seek His forgiveness; and we seek refuge with God from the evil of ourselves and from the evil of our actions.’¹¹

Consequently, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, the source of moral evil - being ourselves - is also evil. But it does not necessarily represent that this evil of ‘ourselves’ is detestable. In fact, it could be desirable and at the same time still have an evil effect, such as suffering. It is similar to, as Ibn al-Qayyim puts it, delicious¹² food that is desired but contains poison, when the person

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⁸ Ibn al-Qayyim also defines evil with the same definition as oppression which is, ‘to place things in other than their correct place’ (cf. Shifā’ vol. 3, p. 976). Thus, to place things in other than their correct place results in suffering and sins; such as, oppression. I will talk about this definition further in section: Ibn al-Qayyim on Divine Justice, of this chapter and Theodicy of Divine Names and Attributes, in the next chapter.
⁹ Ibid
eats it, he fulfils his desire for a while until the effect takes place, namely death. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that this is the case with all sins, the effect must occur even if God did not inform us of its evil nature, since reality and experience are witness to it.\(^\text{13}\)

Ibn al-Qayyim finds support for his definition of moral evil within the supplications of the Prophet, more specifically, in the things that he sought refuge against. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that everything the Prophet sought refuge against falls within the boundaries of these two principles, namely suffering or the causes of suffering. He gives the example of the four things which the Prophet famously sought refuge from after every prayer: the punishment of the grave, the punishment of hell (both of which are sufferings), and the trials and tribulations of life and death, along with the trials and tribulations of the Masîh al-Dajjâl;\(^\text{14}\) again, both of which are causes to sufferings.\(^\text{15}\)

We know that the evil of ‘ourselves’ is the cause of the evil of our acts, such as sins; but how does this occur? What does evil of ‘ourselves’ actually mean? Is it something intrinsic or extrinsic? Also, is it a voluntary or involuntary quality?

The source of moral evil, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, is man’s \textit{nafs} (self) which is something intrinsic to him.\(^\text{16}\) The \textit{nafs} can be made up of good characteristics, such as knowledge and wisdom; it can also be made up of evil characteristics, such as ignorance and oppression.\(^\text{17}\) These two types of characteristics which are a part of man’s \textit{nafs} are either the result of God’s favour - when man’s good characteristics are present - or it could be the result of God’s abandonment - when man’s evil characteristics are present. Therefore, one can assume that evil is a natural characteristic of man, given that if God abandons him, he is then left to his natural

\(^{13}\) Ibid
\(^{15}\) Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, p. 713.
Ibn al-Qayyim adds that God knows best who is worthy of His favour and is able to accept it. He states:

So the essence of God is a necessary requirement (mustalzima) of wisdom, good, and generosity; and the essence of the slave [man] is a necessary requirement of ignorance and oppression. And what it [essence of man] contains of knowledge and justice is attained by the favour of God upon him; hence, this is something external of his self. So, whosoever God wants good for, He gives him this favour after which the necessary acts occurs from him such as benevolence, dutifulness, and obedience. And whosoever God wants evil for, He withholds such favours and abandons him to the desires of his self, attributes, and its outcomes. Hence, all sins and disgraceful acts proceed from the necessary ignorance and oppression [of his self]. And this is not to say that God’s prevention is oppression, since it is [also] His favour, and the prevention of His favour is not oppression especially when the object (maḥal) cannot accept it and is not worthy of it.

So does this mean that moral evil is to be attributed to God, since, He is the creator of everything?

On the question of whether the prime source of moral evil is attributed to God or not, Ibn al-Qayyim engages with three positions which often arise in his theodicean writings. Firstly, the Muslim Peripatetic, Ibn Sīnā, who upholds that God acts by His essence, which is neither by motive nor choice; rather it is like the beams of light rays emitted from the sun, the hotness of fire and coolness of water. This position is famously known by Muslim theologians as mawjiban bi-ḥāt (necessary by essence), or the natural necessity theory.

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18 This seems to be inconsistent with Ibn al-Qayyim’s view on natural disposition (fitra) where he argues that man is created with a natural inclination to do good deeds and worship God. Cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifā’, vol. 3, pp. 1401, 1414-1415, 1455 ff.
Secondly, the Mu’tazilites affirm a divine wise purpose that is extrinsic of the agent, namely God. Hence, God acts by a wise purpose that does not reflect in Him but rather in man. Similarly, they placed an obligation on God to observe providence (riʿāya maṣāliḥ) – a position which likens God to man, regarding such interests. They also legislate using their reason by obliging and prohibiting certain acts upon God, according to their rational legislation. So, whatever is considered good to man is also considered good to God and whatever is considered evil to man is also evil to God. Hence, God only acts according to human moral standards. Nevertheless, they affirm that God acts freely (fā ilan bi-ikhtiyār) (acts by choice) and that God does not create, will, determine nor act evil.

Thirdly, the Ash’arites deny that God creates in accordance with purposes and motives (taʿlīl). Instead, He acts purely by His arbitrary divine volition. Therefore, God is not to be deemed far above acts of evil but rather all determined acts are possible for God. Thus, God can perform an evil act that is seen as evil according to human standards; however, such an act would not be considered evil by God. Likewise, God creates and wills evil given that evil exists and God is the creator of all that exists. They also hold that God acts freely; both the Mu’taziltes and Ash’arites differ with the philosophers on this point.

The Mu’tazilites on Evil

The Mu’tazilites undertake the problem of evil based on their second principle, divine justice, which means that divine acts are all good and free from evil.

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28 Ibn al-Qayyīm’s position also holds that God acts by choice; see, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p.310.
Furthermore, the Mu’tazilites have a specific understanding of evil which is defined as ‘harmful evil’ (al-ṣarar al-qabīḥ) and whatsoever leads to it.  

30 The opposite, which is good, is defined as ‘beneficial good’ (al-nafṣ al-ḥasan) and whatsoever leads to it. As we can see, the two definitions of good and evil are of a consequential nature in that it is concerned with either a beneficial consequence in the case of good, or a harmful consequence in the case of evil. Similarly, the consequence should be within the framework of a good (ḥusn) or evil (qubḥ) act.

31 As we can see, the two definitions of good and evil are of a consequential nature in that it is concerned with either a beneficial consequence in the case of good, or a harmful consequence in the case of evil.

32 So if evil is defined as ‘harmful evil’, according to the Mu’tazilites, then can such evil be attributed to God’s divine determining? The answer to this question will be clear after considering the categorisation of acts by the Mu’tazilites into two types: divine acts and human acts.

**The Mu’tazilites on Divine Acts**

Divine acts according to the Mu’tazilites are all good (ḥasana) and free from evil (qabīḥ). This is known by drawing an analogy between the unseen world and the seen world.  

33 ‘Abd al-Jabbār says:

What indicates that whosoever is upon such state does not choose evil whatsoever, that is, we know by way of necessity in the present [world] that if one of us knows the evilness of evil and is
in no need of it and [he also] knows of his self-sufficiency, then this person will never choose evil. For surely, he does not choose it because he knows that it is evil and he is in no need of it.\(^\text{34}\) Consequently, divine acts are free from evil, as in ‘harmful evil’ and oppression (\textit{zulm}), which is \textit{every harm that has no benefit, nor can one repeal it and it is undeserving}…\(^\text{35}\) Hence, it is not befitting of God to do injustice, even though He is capable of it.\(^\text{36}\) However, due to His divine justice and wise purpose, He eschews it.\(^\text{37}\)

Secondly, God is all wise and this indicates that evil (\textit{shar}) in the world must be perceived in light of divine wise purpose. Consequently, this means that divine acts must have an objective (\textit{ghāya}), since acts that are aimless are described as vain (\textit{‘abath}) acts and God is free from vain acts. According to the Muʿtazilites, the objectives of divine acts must not benefit God; rather it is for the benefit of man.\(^\text{38}\) Abd al-Jabbār says:

If an agent is aware of his act, then such act must be for a motive. If such is the case, then this motive is either free from evil (\textit{qubh}) hence making it good; or either, it is not free from evil and hence making it evil… If God is aware of everything then His act must have a motive that is good (\textit{al-hasan}), since, if His act were motiveless then it would be defined as vain (\textit{al-ʿabath}) which is evil (\textit{qubh}).\(^\text{39}\)

Thus, God creates for a wise objective which ultimately benefits man. As a result, the presence of evil in the world is justified by the Muʿtazilites through this wise objective and its benefit or


\(^{35}\) Abd al-Jabbār, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 351.


\(^{39}\) Ibn Mattawayh, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 260.
compensation for man. As such, trials, tribulations and all types of sufferings, are attributed to God, but these sufferings are not really evil (qubḥ) . Rather, they are good and beneficial for creation. In fact, the real evil according to the Mu’tazilites, is moral evil such as sins and disobedience, which are performed by the will and power of man and not from divine determination. ‘Abd al-Jabbār says:

It is correct in saying that God creates good (al-khair) and evil (al-shar) if what is meant is harm (al-darar) only. But if what is intended is the apparent meaning of ‘harmful evil’ (al-darar al-qabīḥ) then it is not correct to attribute this to God.

The Mu’tazilites also say:

If what you mean [by evil] is that immoral acts (al-fujūr), sins (al-fusūq), lies, deception, oppression, disbelief, indecent acts (al-fawāḥish) and evils (qabā’īḥ) are all from God, then we seek refuge in God from saying this.

As a result, the Mu’tazilites have no problem with attributing natural evil to God as this type of evil is metaphorical, given that the suffering from it has a wise and just objective that is of benefit to man. In fact, it is moral evil that is evil in reality and hence should not be attributed

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to God\textsuperscript{48}, since moral evil is the result of man’s agency\textsuperscript{49} which does not come under divine determination.\textsuperscript{50}

Lastly, the Muʿtazilite stress that God’s purpose is to benefit mankind.\textsuperscript{51} This is apparent from their two concepts of divine assisting (\textit{al-lutf al-ilāhī})\textsuperscript{52} and compensation for pain (\textit{al-ʿiwad ʿalā al-ālam}),\textsuperscript{53} both of which further emphasise the goodness and justice of God. Divine assistance means that God assists man in choosing obedience and eschewing evil (\textit{qubh}) and sins. Likewise, divine compensation of pain means that God will compensate man for any pain, suffering or illnesses that are caused. Thus, such compensation is good and beneficial to man and at the same time it shows that God is free from oppression or real evil - such as \textit{qubh}.

The Muʿtazilites on Human Acts

According to the Muʿtazilites, divine justice implies that man is the agent of his own acts, which include moral evil. As a result, man is deserving of reward or punishment.

The Muʿtazilites categorise human acts into three types: good acts, permissible (\textit{mubāḥ}) acts and evil (\textit{qabīḥ}) acts, all of which relate to divine moral judgment. Good human acts include the legally obligatory and recommended acts, all of which God commands, wills, loves and dislikes their omission.\textsuperscript{54} Permissible acts are those that have no additional attribute of good. These kinds of acts are neither willed nor disliked by God.\textsuperscript{55} Lastly, evil human acts which have a ‘harmful evil’ (\textit{al-ṭarar al-qabīḥ}) attribute, are not willed by God; He dislikes it. Hence, they are legally prohibited (\textit{ḥarām}) and disliked (\textit{makhūh}).\textsuperscript{56} As a result, the Muʿtazilites maintain that

\textsuperscript{48}ʿAbd al-Jabbār, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 8, p. 322; Ibn Mattawayh, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 420.

\textsuperscript{49}ʿAbd al-Jabbār, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 14, p. 41; Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Sayyid, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 137.

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid

\textsuperscript{51}Margaretha T. Heemskerk, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 159; Ayedh al-Dosari, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 506.


divine will is necessitated by divine command, that is, divine command indicates divine will. So whatever God commands is also what He wills. Similarly, divine will also necessitates divine love and favour, which means that what God wills, He also loves and favours. Consequentially, this is how human acts, such as moral evils, are excluded from divine determination.

**Ibn al-Qayyim on the Muʿtazilites**

Ibn al-Qayyim’s main concern with the Muʿtazilites on the problem of evil is three-fold: the consequences of their concept of divine justice, their conception of divine compensation and their understanding of divine will.

According to Ibn al-Qayyim, the Muʿtazilites’ concept of divine justice undermines divine omnipotence, as divine justice is preserved by excluding human acts of moral evil from divine power, will and creation, so that these moral acts are not attributed to God. That is, the Muʿtazilites argue for a purely human agency of moral evil that is independent of God’s power, will and creation. As a result, the Muʿtazilites’ concept of divine justice opposes the perfection of God’s divine power and will; hence, it undermines divine omnipotence, according to Ibn al-Qayyim.

The Muʿtazilites were led to this conception of divine justice, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, by two fallacies. Firstly, the fallacy of what Ibn al-Qayyim labels as ‘human legislation applied to God’ (al-tashrīʿ alā allah), such as obliging that God acts for the benefit of man, which is known by the Muʿtazilites as divine observance of providence (riʿāya al-mašāliḥ). Hence, divine justice requires that God must act for the benefit of man which is according to the

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human moral criteria. That is, whatever is considered good or evil, right or wrong by man, God must abstain or act according to this human criterion; otherwise, God would be unjust.

The second fallacy is their analogy between the unseen world and the seen world, which again likens divine acts to human acts. So, the human conception of good and evil is also the divine conception. Thus, the Mu'tazilites are referred to as mushabbahat al-af'āl (the ‘Likeners’ of acts), due to their false analogy.

As for the Mu'tazilite conception of divine compensation, this means that God must compensate those afflicted by natural evil, such as undeserved suffering, otherwise there would be no benefit and God would be unjust. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the problem of suffering really troubled and confused the Mu'tazilites. Ibn al-Qayyim talks about a three-fold Mu'tazilite theodicy of suffering, whereas I have come across a two-fold Mu'tazilite theodicy of suffering, as is mentioned in Mu'tazilite primary and secondary sources.

Ibn al-Qayyim’s readings of the Mu'tazilite three-fold theodicy of suffering is categorised into three points. Firstly, the presence of evil which is labelled as deserved suffering - for example, punishment. Secondly, suffering that results in a compensation for the ‘sufferer’. Lastly, suffering that has a consequential preponderant benefit. Ibn al-Qayyim states:

They [the Mu’tazilites] say: the sufferings that God does is either deserved, such as punishment in this life or the hereafter, or either for compensation (taʾwīd), or either for a preponderant benefit (maṣlaḥa rājiḥa).

This means that the three-fold Mu’tazilī theodicy of suffering only applies to the present world. As for the unseen world, all sufferings are deserved, according to the Mu’tazilites. However,
saying this, Ibn al-Qayyim does cite\textsuperscript{73} a potential weakness in this claim: deserved sufferings are only good (hasan) in the present world as the victim is only content once he has gained revenge. Consequently, to draw equivalence between this deserved suffering and the deserved suffering in the unseen world is not possible.\textsuperscript{74} But then again, in the researcher’s opinion, God can punish man for his evil actions by way of justice rather than revenge, hence making the analogy sound.

As for sufferings that are for a preponderant benefit, Ibn al-Qayyim cites an example of child suffering, where the benefit could be in the development\textsuperscript{75} of that child. This is similar to the Muʿtazilites’ concept of suffering for a beneficial lesson (al-ʿitibār).\textsuperscript{76} Ibn al-Qayyim mentions\textsuperscript{77} a potential weakness in this concept: if a child sees his teacher disciplining another student because of his carelessness and playing. There is no doubt that there is a lesson and benefit for the first child when witnessing the student being disciplined. Moreover, perhaps the first child would benefit from this incident more than the student who is being disciplined. However, this is only good (hasan) if the student being disciplined deserved it. This example ends with a rhetorical question: ‘so where is the deserved suffering of children and animals?’\textsuperscript{78} I think this potential weakness argued by Ibn al-Qayyim is also weak; one can easily say that the student’s disciplining was deserved because of his carelessness at the wrong time and place.

As for animal sufferings in the present world, this is for the benefit of humans,\textsuperscript{79} since humans sacrifice animals for consumption. However, I think that this preponderant benefit would not apply to animals that suffer, for example, in forest fires.

As for the sufferings of humans, the Muʿtazilites draw likeness between the benefits gained from an employer and a worker. The worker suffers but gains financially from the work.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid
\textsuperscript{73} This citation perhaps belongs to the Ashʿarite School, since Ibn al-Qayyim quotes it in the third person, ‘they said’.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibn al-Qayyim, \emph{Tariq al-Hijratayn}, vol. 1, pp. 320-321.
\textsuperscript{75} This shows resemblance to Ibn al-Qayyim’s theodicy of divine wise purpose, where some sufferings are necessary for the spiritual and educational development of man. (see, \textit{Ibn al-Qayyim’s Theodicy of Opposites}, in chapter seven).
\textsuperscript{77} This citation perhaps belongs to the Ashʿarite School, since Ibn al-Qayyim quotes it in the third person, ‘they said’.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 1, p. 321.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, p. 316.
he is carrying out for the employer and vice-versa.\textsuperscript{80} However, Ibn al-Qayyim names another potential weakness with this analogy: God could grant benefit without the medium of suffering. This also clearly opposes the worker/employer analogy, since the employer gains benefit via the worker’s suffering; whereas, in the case of God, He is far exalted from benefiting via the sufferings of His creation.\textsuperscript{81}

In addition, good health is the property of God, which He loans to humans. Hence, He can withdraw it whenever He wills and, as a result, sufferings would necessarily replace it.\textsuperscript{82}

As for my readings of a Mu‘tazilite two-fold theodicy of suffering, this can be summarised into two points: deserved sufferings and sufferings that have compensation. These two points are the preponderant benefits of sufferings that apply to the creation and not to God.

Therefore, according to the two-fold theodicy, Ibn al-Qayyim\textsuperscript{83} shows the weakness in the idea that God must compensate on the Day of Judgment those who have suffered, by applying this to animals. Since, according to divine law, animals are not legally responsible, hence they are neither rewarded nor punished.\textsuperscript{84} However, Ibn al-Qayyim cites that some of the Mu‘tazilites uphold that God will, in the unseen world, bring forth the animals that have suffered in order to compensate them.\textsuperscript{85}

Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim deals at length with the Mu‘tazilites’ theodicy of suffering by engaging and refuting the differences of opinion on sufferings within the Mu‘tazilite School.\textsuperscript{86}

The Mu‘tazilites’ understanding of divine will dictates that God cannot will evil since He would be evil. Hence, human moral acts are excluded from the divine will and determination.\textsuperscript{87}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid, p. 316.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, p. 320.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, p. 318. This is similar to Ibn al-Qayyim’s concept of evil as privation of what is necessary for being, continuance, and perfection, (see, \textit{Ibn a-Qayyim’s Categorisation of Evil}, in chapter seven). Likewise, it is similar to his theodicy of necessary opposites, as suffering is a necessary opposite of good health. (See, \textit{Theodicy of Opposites}, in chapter seven).
\textsuperscript{83} It seems that Ibn al-Qayyim is citing refutations of another school, perhaps the Ash‘arites, against the Mu‘tazilites, because he mentions at the beginning of each refutation ‘qālū’ (they said). \textit{Cf.} Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{Tariq al-hijratayn}, vol. 1, pp. 318-322.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, p. 16; Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{Shifā‘}, vol. 2, p. 454.
\end{flushleft}
The reasons for this incorrect understanding, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, are two fallacies. Firstly, the Muʿtazilites claim that divine acts are the same as the objects of His acts (fiʿl Allah 'in mafʿūlahu). This very obscure and not straightforward concept can be simplified as follows. Divine acts such as ‘God wills good’ are the same as the objects of His acts (mafʿūlahu), such as good human acts. Similarly, divine acts such as God wills, creates and commands charity and prayer, is the same as the objects of His acts, as such charity and prayer exist. Therefore, divine acts are also the objects of His acts; but, not all human acts are the objects of His acts and hence, divine acts. Evil acts, such as the existence of oppression, are not the same as divine acts; God does not create, will or command oppression.

This is one of the fallacies, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, that led to the incorrect Muʿtazilite understanding of divine will. Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that divine acts are not the same as the objects of His acts. For example, the act of creation - namely the divine act - is not the same as the act of the created: man’s act.

The second fallacy which led to the incorrect Muʿtazilite understanding of divine will is that they failed to differentiate between universal divine will and legislative divine will, the latter of which entails divine commands and love; whereas the former entails only divine volition. Ibn al-Qayyim says:

Whoever does not differentiate between divine volition and divine love, will necessarily end up with two false conclusions. Either God loves moral evil, or either God did not will, determine, or decree moral evil.
Therefore, given that moral evil is neither loved nor commanded by God, according to the Mu’tazilites, they were led to believe that moral evil is excluded from divine will, power and determination.

However, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God’s divine love and commands necessitate divine legislative will; and does not necessitate divine universal will. God only loves and commands that which He wills legislatively and religiously. Whereas His universal will includes everything that exists, as well as evil.93

The Ashʿarites on Evil

The Ashʿarites are seemingly the school with which Ibn al-Qayyim contests at length, given their pre-dominance during his milieu and their direct rivalry for orthodoxy. However, on the attribution of evil, one must differentiate between the general Ashʿarite School on the one hand, and al-Rāzī on the other. The latter seems to shift towards the natural necessity theory in some of his works, unlike the former who hold that God acts freely.

Moreover, it is clear that the Ashʿarites main theological focus is to preserve divine omnipotence; hence, they focused on attributing everything that exists to God, including evil. This is manifested in the following debate between Abū Ishāq al-Iṣfārāyīnī - the Ashʿarī - and al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār - the Muʿtazilī:

general will and divine specific will- as in chapter three- where natural evil is from God’s divine general will due to His creation of the laws of causation and privation.


Al-Qāḍī said: exalted is He who is free from immorality (faḥshāʾ). al-Isfārāyīnī replied: exalted is He Who wills everything that occurs in His dominion. So al-Qāḍī said: Does our Lord will [that we] sin? al-Isfārāyīnī replied: Does our Lord force [us to] sin? So al-Qāḍī said: If [He] has prevented me from guidance and decreed for me destruction; has [He] wronged me or done me well? al-Isfārāyīnī replied: If He had prevented you from what is yours then He has wronged you; but if He has prevented you from what is His then He grants His mercy upon whom His wills.95

This dialogue conveys the different divine attributes that each school emphasises when dealing with the problem of evil. The Ashʿarites’ primary emphasis is placed upon God’s omnipotence. Therefore, nothing can exist except that which God wills, otherwise it would undermine God’s omnipotence.

The Ashʿarites’ All Encompassing Divine Will

Throughout the different stages of the Ashʿarite School, different scholars argued that divine will is all encompassing. Hence, there seems to be a general consensus that God had created and willed all that which exists, including evil. Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī says:

It is obligatory to know that God had created all the originated entities (ḥawādith), beneficial, harmful, faith, disbelief, obedience, and sins… and it is [also] obligatory to know that all originated entities occur by the will of God. It is unimaginable that something occurs in this world or the hereafter without God willing it.96

Similarly, al-Juwaynī says:

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Our school holds that God willed the origination of all originated entities and His divine volition is not specific to one particular type of originated entity. Rather, God wills all that which exists of: good, evil, belief, disbelief; since He is the originator and creator of everything.\(^97\)

Lastly, al-Rāzī emphasises the same point when he says:

Verily God, the Exalted and Most High, wills the totality of existence such as disbelief, belief, obedience, disobedience, good, evil, benefit, and harm; all of this is by God’s divine decree and determination.\(^98\)

This is the general consensus of the Ash'arites: that God creates and wills everything that exists in totality. However, when concerning the specification of things, the Ash'arites differ; such as, does God will disbelief, sins and evil? Some Ash'arites hold that it is permissible to specifically attribute evil to the will of God. Some abstain from this as people may think that whatever God specifically wills, He orders and encourages.\(^99\) Some Ash'arites say that when it comes to attributing specific evils to the will of God, one must add to such attribution - for the sake of clarity - that God wills disbelief for the disbeliever as a punishment or as an evil acquisition for man.\(^100\) Lastly, others stress that it is only permissible to attribute specific cases of evil to God’s will in an education setting; as for other settings, it is not permissible as it displays ill manners towards God.\(^101\)


\(^99\) It is perhaps possible that Ibn al-Qayyim built on this differentiation of specific and general divine will in his two-fold universal and religious divine will?

\(^100\) This distinction does not contradict the Ash’arite position that divine will necessitates divine love, because the distinction between specific and universal will was developed by the later Ash’arites; so it is likely the position that divine will necessitates divine love is only common amongst the early Ash’arites.


It is clear that the Ash’arites are not willing to compromise God’s omnipotence in that nothing occurs in the world except that which God wills. Hence, the Ash’arites’ primary emphasis on divine omnipotence and divine will inevitably lead them to a different conception of divine justice.

**The Ash’arite Conception of Divine Justice**

Although the Ash’arites hold that God is the creator of all things and nothing exists except by the will of God, including evil, one must bear in mind that they do not label it as evil when it comes from God. They\(^\text{103}\) adhere to the principle that *nothing proceeds from pure good except good*.\(^\text{104}\) But this type of good, according to the Ash’arites, is different from other theological schools. This is due to their conception of divine justice, which stresses the idea that everything which exists is within God’s dominion. Thus, whatever God does is good and just - as everything is rightly His. Al-Shahrastānī says:

> As for justice according to the Ahlu Sunna, it is that God is just in His acts, meaning that He is the conductor (*mutaṣarif*) in His universe and dominion; He acts and rules however He wills. Hence, justice is to place things in their [proper] places; and this is, to conduct in [ones’] dominion according to knowledge and volition. Oppression is opposite to this, thus it is unimaginable that He oppresses in His rulings and conduct.\(^\text{105}\)

Similarly, al-Baghdādī defines justice as:

> It is what the agent does. If it is said: this implies that all disbeliefs and sins are just, since you hold that they are from the acts of God and He can perform it. The answer is: everything from Him is just, and it is only transgression (*jawr*) and oppression from the acquirer [man].\(^\text{106}\)

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\(^\text{103}\) Most theological schools, including the Mu’tazilites and the Traditionalist, adhere to this principle; cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, *Tariq al-Hijratayn*, vol. 1, p. 311.


This means that human acts which comply with divine commands are just and human acts which comply with divine prohibitions are transgressive.\textsuperscript{107} Accordingly, God is not subjected to human moral criteria, as He is the sole creator of all things; He can do as He wills, create whatever He wills and as a result He would not be unjust. Injustice is to ‘act freely in someone else’s property’\textsuperscript{108} and in the case of God, everything is His property. Al-Rāzī says:

There is no evil (qubẖ) in His actions nor is it permissible to described them as evil because He – the exalted and high- is the universal owner of all things (mālik al-mulk). And whosoever is the universal owner of everything- when He acts- He acts in his dominion; and whosoever acts in His dominion, none of His acts are evil.\textsuperscript{109}

However, upon contemplation, this seems to deny all agencies other than God, as is consistent with the Ashʿarite view in chapter three. Likewise, it undermines the reality of good and evil since the human standards of good and evil does not apply to God. This is closely related to the Ashʿarites’ view of theistic subjectivism, that is, good is whatever God commands and evil is whatever He prohibits.\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ashʿarite Conception of Divine Justice}

Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the concept of justice according to the Ashʿarites contradicts the reality (haqīqa) of justice, since the Ashʿarite conception of justice is whatever is possible for God.\textsuperscript{111} That is, whatever God does is just, as everything in existence belongs to Him and He can act freely in His dominion. Therefore, according to this conception, injustice is impossible for

\begin{footnotes}
\item[107] Ibid
\item[109] al-Rāzī, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 61.
\item[110] Cf. Chapter Four, on debate of Meta-ethics.
\end{footnotes}
God. Furthermore, injustice, according to the Ash’arites, is to act freely within someone else’s property; in the case of God, everything is His property.

Similarly, the Ash’arites went on further to say that God acts purely by volition (mashi’ā) and not for a wise purpose or motive. Hence, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, this consequential conclusion clearly undermines the concept of reward and punishment, since, God does not reward the good-doer for his pious deeds nor does He punish the evil-doer for his evil deeds, rather He acts purely by divine volition.

Likewise, another Ash’arite point that Ibn al-Qayyim refutes on justice is that they also deny the reality of good (husn) and evil (qubh). Ibn al-Qayyim argues that there is no difference between truthfulness and lying, justice and injustice, according to the Ash’arites, as good and evil are simply divine commands and prohibitions. So if God were to prohibit all that He has commanded and command all that He has prohibited, then such would define good and evil, since God sets the rules of morality.

Ash’arites on Divine Will and Divine Love

The majority of the Ash’arites support that divine will necessitates divine love and divine contentment (ridā). This implies that divine will, love and contentment all mean the same thing. For example, If God wills X, then He also loves and is content with X. Similarly, if God loves X, He wills X and is content with X. This lack of differentiation was perhaps the result of puzzling questions on how God can will something that He does not love or is content with. Also, how can there exist something that God forbids?

114 Ibid
We find that the early Ash’arites either refrained from distinguishing between the meanings of divine will, love and contentment, or they supported that all of these attributes mean one and the same thing. The founder, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, did not differentiate between divine will, divine love and divine contentment. Similarly, al-Bāqillānī underlined that there is no difference between divine will, divine volition and divine love. Also, al-Juwaynī claims that divine love means the same thing as divine will and contentment; hence, God loves disbelief and is content with it, as it is a punishment for the unbeliever. The same stance is taken by al-Shahrastānī; he argues that divine command indicates divine will. That is, whatever God commands, He is content with and hence He wills it.

Conversely, al-Ghazālī seemingly parts from the traditional Ash’arite stance and mentions briefly that one can only avoid the baffling questions by adopting the view that divine command is distinct from divine will. That is, divine contentment does not necessarily mean divine will. Likewise, al-Āmadī goes further to imply a distinction between universal divine will and legislative divine will, a concept that both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim profoundly emphasise and use against the Ash’arites and the Mu’tazilites.

Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ash’arite Conception of Divine Will and Divine Love

Ibn al-Qayyim argues that whoever fails to distinguish and differentiate divine will from divine love will consequently come to one of two false conclusions. Either that God does not love sins

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hence He did not determine or will sins; this is the conclusion held by the Muʿtazilites. Or, all types of evils occur according to divine volition and will. Therefore, God loves it and is pleased with such evils. This is the Ashʿarites’ conclusion.¹²⁷

It seems that al-Ghazālī, al-Rāzī and al-Āmadī are the only Ashʿarites who differentiate between divine will and divine command¹²⁸ - the latter of which entails divine love.

A Potential Two-Fold Ashʿarite Theodicy

Based on Ibn al-Qayyim’s works on the Ashʿarites, it is possible to derive a potential two-fold (maybe more) Ashʿarite theodicy. Firstly, the concept that God acts by pure volition (mahd al-mashī’a). This concept perhaps resulted from the Ashʿarites’ denial that God acts for a cause (taʿlīl), wise purpose (ḥikma) or motive (gharad).¹²⁹ The reason being is that if God were to act for a cause, wise purpose or motive, then He would be more complete and perfect if He achieves such cause, wise purpose and motive. Consequently, this implies that God would also be less complete and imperfect without such cause, wise purpose and motive. For this reason, the Ashʿarites opt that God acts out of pure volition instead of a cause, wise purpose or motive.¹³⁰

This concept is in some ways similar to the natural necessity theory, as they both entail that God acts without purpose and that at the same time He is free from any responsibility of evil in the creation. Nonetheless, the natural necessity theory implies that God is without choice. Whereas, the Ashʿarites clearly emphasise that God acts freely.¹³¹ Then again, if everything that God does is by way of divine volition, then does He really have a choice to act freely? That is,
can God act without divine volition? According to the Ash’arites, this can never be the case as God always acts by His divine volition.¹³²

Furthermore, such divine volition is above human laws of morality because God is so superior to human beings that He transcends moral law.¹³³ Just as human moral judgments cannot be applied to volcanoes, perhaps it is the same with respect to God’s divine volition.¹³⁴

Once more, the argument that human moral judgments cannot be applied to divine volition, or that divine volition is above human laws of morality, bears very similar traits to the natural necessity theory; in both cases, God is not accountable to human laws of morality.

The second facet of Ash’arite theodicy that is clear through Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussion is the concept that divine acts are in fact the objects of His acts (mufūlātihī) - as is also supported by the Mu’tazilites. This concept was adopted in order to avoid the claim that God is evil, because the Ash’arites clearly say that God created and willed evil. The Mu’tazilites imposed this consequential conclusion on the Ash’arites as a counter attack. The Mu’tazilites argue that, linguistically, rationally and legislatively speaking, the agent of evil is evil just like the agent of oppression is an oppressor.¹³⁵

In response, the Ash’arites argue that God does will evil and He also acts (fi’ilahu) evil; given that evil exists, it must have been created, and there is no creator save God. Thus, God wills and acts evil. Moreover, God creates by His divine will, so whatever is created is also willed by God and it is His act. Hence, divine acts are the exact same as the objects of His acts (al-fi’il ‘in al-maf‘ūl) and the creation is the same as the created.¹³⁶ As a result, evil is created by God and at the same time it is the object of His acts; that is, it is His act, His creation and occurs by His divine will.

As for the counter attack - whoever wills or acts evil, is evil - the Ash’arites refute this conclusion in two ways. Firstly, they object to the premise that an evil person is he who acts evil;

¹³² Ibid., vol. 1, p. 324; al-Shahrastānī, op. cit., p. 397.
¹³⁴ Ibid., p.264.
the act of evil is not done by the essence of God, because evil actions are not performed by Him - His essence - but rather they are performed by the objects of His acts - His creation. As a result, they argue names have been derived for them such as, adulterer, sinner, etc. Secondly, they argue that divine names are tawfiqiyah (formulated only by God and not man), and God named Himself only by the best of names - amongst which the name ‘evil’ or any of its derivatives are not found. At the same time, there is nothing within His dominion that He did not create or will; indeed God is the dominator and not the dominated. Thus, He is not evil, in His essence, but He is the creator of everything, including what man perceives as evil.

Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim believes the reason that both the Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites at times upheld incorrect theological positions was due to false rational principles that they adhered too and gave precedence over scripture.

**Ibn al-Qayyim on Divine Acts and Evil**

Ironically, although God is the creator of all things, including evil, evil is not to be attributed to divine acts, according to Ibn al-Qayyim. Firstly, scripture alludes to the fact that all of God’s acts are good and, hence, evil is not to be attributed to His essence, His names, His attributes and His divine acts. God says: *In Your hands is the good. Verily, You are able to do all things.* Similarly, a Prophetic tradition reads: *I am at Your service, abundant happiness to You, all of the good is within Your hands and evil is not from You.*

Utilising the above quotes, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that only good is from God and evil is from some of His created objects.

Secondly, Ibn al-Qayyim distinguishes himself from the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites by saying that the divine act (*fi'ilahu*) is not the same as the objects of His acts (*maf'ūlatihī*).
Similarly, the act of creation (khalq) is not the same as the act of the created (makhlūq); evil is only attributed to the latter. For Ibn al-Qayyim, this distinction between divine acts and the objects of His acts is important in order to avoid making the same error as the Muʿtazilites - in compromising God’s omnipotence - and the Ashʿarites - in attributing evil to God’s divine acts.

The Muʿtazilites fail to distinguish divine acts from the objects of His acts, hence they consequently concluded that, just as evil is not a part of divine acts, it is also not a part of the objects of His acts. Therefore, human moral acts are not created by God.\textsuperscript{144} Similarly, the Ashʿarites consequently concluded that as evil is from the objects of His acts, likewise it must also be from God’s divine acts, creation and will too.\textsuperscript{145} As a result, the Muʿtazilites excluded mans’ evil acts from God’s creation and will, whilst the Ashʿarites included it in God’s divine acts, creation and will.\textsuperscript{146}

According to Ibn al-Qayyim, whatever God brings into existence (ahdathahu) is separate from Him and is carried out by the created object; so, it is the objects of His acts and not His act. Similarly, whatever man brings into existence is his act and is carried out by him; hence, a noun is derived from his act as a result of it - for example the noun ‘killer’. If Tom killed John, then Tom’s act of killing John is the object of the divine act as it was brought into existence and carried out by Tom. Nevertheless, it was also brought into existence by God since it occurred by His divine will, determination, and initial creation - as it was God who created Tom and Tom’s ability. Regardless, Tom is the responsible agent as he carried out the act, not God. For this reason, Tom is named the ‘killer’.

Despite this, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God’s essence, names, attributes and acts are all pure good and perfection; whereas, the acts of the created beings or the objects of His acts are capable of evil.\textsuperscript{147}

Al-Ḥāfiẓ al-ʿAṣbahānī says: The [act of] creation (al-khalq) is not [the act of] the created (al-makhlūq). The [act of] creation is an attribute of God’s essence, whereas, the [act of] the created is originated (muḥdath).\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., vol. 2, p. 550.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid, vol. 2, p. 461.
Consequently, from Ibn al-Qayyim’s distinction between the divine acts and the objects of His acts – and also between the creation and the created - we can deduce that divine acts are good, even though there is perceived evil in existence. Sins, illnesses and natural disasters are part of God’s creation; however, they are not carried out by Him, rather they are carried out by objects of His acts. God only carries out that which is good, wise and beneficial (maṣlaḥa).\textsuperscript{149}

We witness Ibn al-Qayyim wrestling with the positions of the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites in order to develop a position which attempts to avoid the difficulties and problematic implications he sees inherent in their two positions. Hence, Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement helped him to draw a distinction between divine acts and the objects of divine acts - something that his interlocutors failed to distinguish.

In addition to making a distinction, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that evil is to place things in other than their proper places and God only places things in their most suitable places, which accord with His wise purpose.\textsuperscript{150} Thus, evil is excluded from God’s divine acts.

Similarly, as we mentioned earlier, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the cause of evil is the appetitive self (nafs) and the actions of man.\textsuperscript{151} Ibn al-Qayyim also argues that what man might perceive as evil such as illnesses and natural disasters is not pure evil. That is, it is not evil from all perspectives rather it is relative evil\textsuperscript{152} - as we shall discuss shortly.\textsuperscript{153}

**Ibn al-Qayyim on Divine Will and Evil**

On the concept of divine will, Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a different stance to the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites. Ibn al-Qayyim holds that it is incorrect to affirm that God wills evil - like the Ashʿarites\textsuperscript{154} - or to nullify it, as is the case with the Muʿtazilites.\textsuperscript{155} Such affirmation or
nullification is in danger of affirming an incorrect meaning or nullifying a correct meaning, given that divine will has various meanings. Therefore, the correct method, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, is to go into detail and define exactly what is meant by divine will. This is necessary as the divine will can mean divine volition, divine love and divine contentment (al-ridā).

For example, God says: *And when We will to destroy a township…* The type of divine will used in this verse means divine volition. Similarly, when God says: *God wills for you ease and He does not will for you hardship.* The type of divine will referred to in this verse represents divine love and contentment.

According to Ibn al-Qayyim, the divine volition necessitates the occurrence of the action but, at the same time, it does not necessitate that God loves and is content with it. Whereas, the divine love and contentment does not necessitate the occurrence of the action but necessitates that God loves and is content with it.

Furthermore, if God’s will relates to His own actions then such an action is good, loved and favoured. Whereas, if His will relates to man’s actions then such divine will would either mean the divine volition or the divine love and contentment, as we have seen above.

Therefore, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that ambiguous terms need to be defined rigorously to avoid incorrect conclusions. Thus, the correct stance according to him is that evil is not to be associated to God, neither His acts nor attributes. Similarly, God is not to be named evil or a term derived from it; rather, evil is associated with the objects of His acts (maf‘ūlātihi).

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155 Ibid
157 Quran 17: 16
158 Ibid 2: 185
160 Ibid
161 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 553.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have illustrated that Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the theodicean writings of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī only to oppose them on evil being inclusive in divine determination. Similarly, I have demonstrated how Ibn al-Qayyim grapples with the positions of both the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites, in order to harmonise the inconsistency of some divine attributes in relation to the existence of evil. Lastly, as a result of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement, I have revealed that he manages to introduce new distinctions, such as divine acts and the objects of divine acts, both of which helped him develop his position on the transcendency of divine determination over evil. In the next chapter, I will analyse how Ibn al-Qayyim outlines and develops a four-fold theodicy of optimism which is based on the doctrine that divine determination transcends evil.
7- IBN AL-QAYYIM’S FOUR-FOLD THEODICY OF OPTIMISM

Introduction

In this chapter I will illustrate how Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the theodicean writings of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, with regard to their categorisation of evil. Similarly, I will show how Ibn al-Qayyim engages in philosophical inquiry - unlike contemporary Traditionalists - in matters concerning divine acts. Likewise, I will demonstrate that Ibn al-Qayyim engages with non-Traditionalists, such as Ibn Sīnā, and that his conclusions were not always derived from scripture or the understanding of the Salaf. Lastly, as a result of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement, I will demonstrate how he develops a four-fold theodicy of optimism, which ultimately argues for optimism in creation and encourages the praise of God.

Principles of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Four-Fold Theodicy

Ibn al-Qayyim’s four-fold theodicy consists of five principles. The first three are a direct refutation against Ibn Sīnā’s natural necessity theory - as is advocated by al-Rāzī - and the last two are aimed at the Ash‘arites’ position on divine acts. These principles clearly distinguish Ibn al-Qayyim’s theodicy from that of Ibn Sīnā; even though their metaphysical categories of evil are similar, as we shall see shortly. Ibn al-Qayyim deals directly with al-Rāzī’s stance that in order to avoid the problem of evil one must accept that God acts by essence, not by will or choice.

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Rāzī concluded as such as a means of answering such questions as: why does God allows the burning effect of fire to take place in undeserving circumstances? Forest fires which destroy animals, for example.

Ibn al-Qayyim says that one must, first and foremost, affirm divine omniscience. That is to say, God has knowledge of all things; nothing is hidden from Him. This principle is a direct refutation against both the philosophers, who claim that God has no knowledge of particulars, and the extreme Muʿtazilites who claim that God does not have any pre-knowledge of man’s acts, neither did He decree or will such acts. Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that the philosophers imply that God has no knowledge of existence; since everything that exists is a particular. Ibn al-Qayyim resorts to divine scripture to support his first principle, which challenges the latter two positions based on scriptural arguments.

Secondly, one must believe that God is the All-Living in reality (ḥaqīqatan) and His living (ḥayātahu) is the most perfect and complete living. Thus, this necessitates that He acts by choice, since everything that is living is an agent; the level of its agency depends on the completeness of its living. So the more complete one’s living is the more complete their actions become.

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7 Such as the Wāṣiliyya, who are the associates of the early Muʿtazilī, Wāṣil Ibn ʿAṭāʾ, all of whom denied God’s attribute of knowledge; since, according to them, to affirm any divine attribute along with its meaning is tantamount to dualism. Al-Shahrastāni states that this position at this stage was undeveloped. See, al-Shahrastāni, al-Mīlāl wa al-Nihāl, Dār al-Kutub al-ʾIlmiyya, Seventh Edition, 2007, vol. 1, p. 40.
Thirdly, one must affirm divine choice, given that living (*al-hayāt*) rationally necessitates actions which are the result of choice, will and power (*qudra*).\(^{11}\) Someone who acts by essence is properly described as producing ‘effects’ (*āthār*) rather than ‘acts’ because acts that result from essence are not produced by power, nor by choice. Examples of effects rather than acts include the effect of burning from fire, or the effect of drowning from water, or the effect of heat from the sun.\(^{12}\) Nonetheless, Ibn al-Qayyim’s third principle is that divine acts are results of power and choice, which is a direct refutation against Ibn Sīnā and the conclusion of al-Rāzī.\(^{13}\)

Fourthly, one is required to believe in causality, which affirms that God binds effects to their causes, legislatively (*shar’ān*) and universally (*qadarān*); both being the object of His divine wise purpose.\(^{14}\) Lastly, to affirm God’s divine wise purpose, which means that God does not act vainly, rather He acts for a praised wise purpose.

Therefore, one may conclude that God’s wise purpose is grasped through the creation of causality. So, the burning effect of fire resulting from the laws of causality is the best of possible worlds from God’s choice of creation and He created it according to His general will.

Ibn al-Qayyim states that there are over ten thousand examples in support of causality (*al-asbāb*) in divine scripture.\(^{15}\) He clearly argues that causality does not undermine divine unity (*tawhīd*). In fact those, namely the Ash’arites, who consider causality to be metaphoric in divine scripture, have an incorrect understanding of divine unity.\(^{16}\)

Lastly, it is evident that the principles of Ibn al-Qayyim’s theodicies are a direct result of his critical engagement with Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī, the Mu’tazilites, and the Ash’arites. The first three refute Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī, and the extreme Mu’tazilites; while the last concentrates on the Ash’arites.

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\(^{11}\) Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1012.
\(^{13}\) Cf. al-Rāzī, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 550-551.
Ibn al-Qayyim’s Categorisation of Evil

On the metaphysics of good and evil, Ibn al-Qayyim builds on the logical categories mentioned by both Ibn Sīnā\(^\text{17}\) and al-Rāzī\(^\text{18}\), which essentially argue that creation only contains essential evil of privation\(^\text{19}\) and existing evil which is accidental\(^\text{20}\) (henceforth, accidental evil); both of these categories imply that good is predominant.\(^\text{21}\)

First and foremost, Ibn al-Qayyim categorises evil into two types: pure evil (\(\text{shir maḥd}\)) from all perspectives and relative evil (\(\text{shir nisbī}\)) from certain perspectives.\(^\text{22}\) The first type of evil is non-existent given that, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, there is no such thing as pure evil in existence.\(^\text{23}\) The second type of evil is the one that exists and has two sub-categories, evil of privation and accidental evil.\(^\text{24}\) As for evil of privation, Ibn al-Qayyim states that its privation is either\(^\text{25}\) [1] for the necessary (\(\text{darūrī}\)) existence of something else, [2] for the necessary

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\(^{22}\) Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 3, p. 987. Ibn al-Qayyim also discusses a similar category on the existence of good and evil. It reads as follows: (1) Pure good which exists, (2) Good greater than evil which also exists, (3) Good equal to evil which is non-existent, (4) evil greater than good which is also non-existent, (5) Pure evil which is non-existent, (6) No good nor evil which does not exists too; cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 3, pp. 995-998. Ibn al-Qayyim seemed to have added the last category, no. 6, which is not mention by both Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī. Cf. Avicenna, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 345-6 and al-Rāzī, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, p. 549.

\(^{23}\) Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 3, p. 995.

\(^{24}\) Accidental evil can also be read as incidental evil or relative evil.

\(^{25}\) Compare this categorisation with Ibn Sīnā, in Avicenna, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 341 and al-Rāzī, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 2, p. 548. However, the only difference is that Ibn al-Qayyim adds an extra category, no. 2, and uses different examples for each category- all of which differ from the original examples used by both Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 3, pp. 987-988, idem., \textit{Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn}, vol. 1, pp. 334-337. Perhaps, Ibn al-Qayyim is attempting to simplify the original categories with clear examples.
continuation of something else’s existence for the necessary perfection of something else, or it may not be necessary for the existence, continuation, or perfection of that something else, even while its existence is better than its non-existence. The first is like the privation of sense, movement, and breathing for animals. The second is like the privation of power to nourish, grow, and reproduce for animals. The third type is like the privation of health, hearing, sight and strength. The fourth is like the privation of knowledge that consists of detailed information, where knowledge of it is better than ignorance, but at the same time it is not necessary.

As for accidental evil, the term encompasses all that opposes life, continuation and perfection, such as illnesses and suffering and their causes (asbābihā). Similarly, the existence of impediments which prevent the obtaining and reaching of good to the place that accepts it and is ready to accept it; such as substances which prevent the nourishment of limbs within the body. Also, the false beliefs and corrupt intentions which prevent true beliefs and good intentions from reaching the heart.

Ibn al-Qayyim argues that accidental evil is a direct consequence of the evil of privation, in order to avoid attributing accidental evil to God. For example, the privation of knowledge and justice, necessarily results in ignorance and oppression; both of which exist. Similarly, the privation of health and moderation, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, necessarily result in suffering and harm; both of which exist.

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26 The second category here is what Ibn al-Qayyim added to al-Rāzī’s original categorisation, since the latter only mentions three categories. As such, Ibn al-Qayyim clearly sees a distinction between existence and continuation, perhaps the privation of the latter being long-term while the former is short-term. Compare al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 550-551 with Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 987-988, 1004 and idem., Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, pp. 334-337.


28 These examples belong to the additional category added by Ibn al-Qayyim.

29 a-Rāzī’s example reads, blindness (al-ʿamā), cf. al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 548.

30 Ibn Sinā and al-Rāzī both use philosophy as an example, in their last category. However, Ibn al-Qayyim clearly opts for detailed knowledge, instead of philosophy, perhaps to avoid a negative reaction from his contemporary puritan Traditionalists.


So, the implication is that God is free from having agency over accidental evil, since it is the result of privation and privation has no agent because causal agency deals with things that actually exist. Thus, one cannot say accidental evil comes from God, bearing in mind that an agent is only necessary with things which have actual, external existence. This is why, Ibn al-Qayyim explains, that some Muslims say: ‘whatsoever God wills is and whatsoever He wills not is not’, hence, everything in existence is due to the will of God and everything that does not exist is because God did not will it.\textsuperscript{34}

Furthermore, it is in this same problem, namely, tracing the source of accidental evil, where we can appreciate an example of Traditionalist engagement in philosophical inquiry and employment of demonstrative arguments which are potentially an original contribution; such a demonstration is not found in either Ibn Sīnā or al-Rāzī’s theodicean works. Hence, this example clearly challenges the conception that all intricate Traditionalist doctrines are directly imported from scripture or from a utopian understanding of the Salaf. Ibn al-Qayyim demonstrates that the necessary consequence of accidental evil from privation is not by way of cause and effect, but rather by way of lack of condition (‘adam shart) or presence of an impediment (wujud mani’). A lack of conditions for acquiring knowledge, necessarily results in a person’s ignorance. This is by way of necessity (mulazama), as Ibn al-Qayyim argues, and not by way of effect (ta’thīr). Effect entails a cause, unlike necessity. So in short, the lack of condition necessitates the lack of necessary contingent (mashrūf),\textsuperscript{35} like the requirement of books and a teacher for the acquisition of knowledge. Hence, privation is not effected, but rather it is necessitated simply by the absence of its opposite.

For this reason, it is said that the cause of privation is the privation of a cause.\textsuperscript{36} In simple terms, if one were to ask: why is there privation of knowledge? The answer is because there is no cause. Or, why is there privation of faith? Once more, it is because there is no cause. So the reason man is deprived of perfection is due to his inaction and hence lack of cause.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, vol. 1, p. 215.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 216.
In this sense, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that just as an originated thing is attributed to the originator’s agency, will, and choice; the privation of a thing is attributed to the privation of agency, will, and choice. Thus, what God wills, exists and what He does not will, does not exist, due to the privation of divine will.

So, examples of accidental evil, which is a necessary consequence (lawāzīm) of the evil of privation, are false beliefs and corrupt intentions. That is to say, whenever man lacks beneficial knowledge and piety, the necessary result that takes its place is that of evil, ignorance, and its consequences. Man must be occupied with one of these opposites, either the pious beneficial opposite or the corrupt harmful opposite. Ibn al-Qayyim upholds that this type of accidental evil is created by God, since there is no creator save Him and He is the creator of all things. However, this is not inconsistent with the fact that accidental evil is a necessary consequence of the evil of privation and at the same time uncaused, as might be assumed. Consequently, this line of argument prompts a problematic question, that is, can God create something whilst at the same time not being the agent or cause of it? According to Ibn al-Qayyim’s demonstration, God created accidental evil, such as ignorance, according to the laws of privation and necessity; contrary to the laws of cause and effect. Hence, God’s omnipotence is still intact since He is the ultimate Creator of the cosmos and the laws within it. Similarly, God’s justice is also intact since He is not the agent of accidental evil; rather it is a necessary consequence of privation, which is uncaused. As such, ignorance is not created directly; it is inherent within the laws of privation and necessity.

Ibn Sīnā seems to be alluding to something vaguely similar, when he states:

Hence, the good that are generated by these things have been primarily willed in the manner where it would be appropriate to say: ‘God, exalted be He, wills [all things], and evil was also willed in the way of what is accidental. Since, He knew that it exists by necessity, He paid it no

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38 Ibid
39 Ibid
40 Ibid., p. 217.
heed.’ The good, hence, is necessarily required essentially, while evil is necessarily required accidentally — everything being by predetermination.\textsuperscript{41}

Nonetheless, everything that God creates must have a wise purpose behind it; He creates due to His divine wise purposes. Ibn al-Qayyim explains that had God not created the harmful opposites such as ignorance, then the wise purpose would have been missed (\textit{fāt}).\textsuperscript{42} Similarly, he argues, it is not wise of God to omit a wise purpose that is more beloved to Him than the good that may exist due to its non-existence. So, indeed there is an even greater wise purpose and objective for the existence of this evil than the non-existence of it, universally. Thus, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, this requires that He be praised. Also, it should be noted, that the existence of the obligated (\textit{malzūm}) without its obligator (\textit{lāzimhu}) is impossible (\textit{muntani···}),\textsuperscript{43} thus the existence of ignorance is a necessary consequence of its deprived opposite, knowledge.

This then leads us to question why God created the world in such a way that the ‘evil necessities and opposites’ must occur? Why did God not create ‘good necessities and opposites’ instead of evil ones? Ibn al-Qayyim explains:

We have shown that the necessities (\textit{lāwāzīm}) of this creation, this origination, and this world must occur. If we imagine the non-existence of such necessities, then it would not be the same world, but rather another world, another origination, and another creation.\textsuperscript{44}

From Ibn al-Qayyim’s explanation one can deduce that the laws of privation and their necessities are a part of this world and that the creation would not be the same without them; thus, this is the best of all possible worlds, although Ibn al-Qayyim does not explicitly state this. Similarly, this creation is more beloved to God than the non-existence of ‘evil necessities and opposites’, since the creation has a great wise purpose.


\textsuperscript{42} Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{Tariq al-Hijratayn}, p. 217

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, p. 218.
Ibn al-Qayyim’s explanation here seems influenced by his engagement with Ibn Taymiyya; on the same topic he says:

I said to Shaykh al-Islām: that it was possible [for God] to create such things free of these detriments and only entailing pure benefit. So he said: the creation of this nature without its necessities is impossible, for indeed, the existence of an obligated (malzūm) without its obligator (lāzīm) is impossible; and if it were created in other than this way, it would be a different creation and hence it would be another world other than this one.45

Ibn al-Qayyim then states to ask such question is like saying: why is it that rain and rivers are also able to cause drowning, obstruction, destruction and all types of harm? Why is the sun also able to cause burning, simoom and other types of harm to living beings? Why is it that the nature of being is not free from suffering, death, etc.? Why is it that giving birth is not free from the burden of pregnancy, labour (jalc) and the suffering of delivery? Also, why is man’s body not free from suffering, agony and the different natural dispositions that obligate the change of his state? Lastly, why is it that the different seasons of the year cause extreme cold, which is fatal, and extreme heat which is harmful? Does a rational mind accept these questions or even ask them?46 Ibn al-Qayyim again emphasises that such necessities and opposites are necessary (lawāzīm) attributes in this world, if they were not, then it would be a different possible world.

Ibn Sīnā, on the other hand, argues that a creation that is pure good and free from evil is only possible in absolute existence; only things that have emanated from the First Governor and come to exist in intellectual, psychological and celestial things.47

**Ibn al-Qayyim’s Four-Fold Theodicy**

All of the aforementioned principles and categorisations form the base of Ibn al-Qayyim’s four-fold theodicy of optimism, which explains the necessity of some things that man may perceive as

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46 *Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn*, p. 218.
evil by (1) Relativity (2) Divine names and attributes (3) Necessary Opposites and (4) Divine Wise Purpose.

**The Theodicy of Relative Evil**

In the theodicy of relative evil, Ibn al-Qayyim distinguishes between two levels of perception when dealing with evil.\(^{48}\) The first is that of God, which views everything within existence as having some sort of good for its existence. The second is that of man, who perceives evil within creation as evil only because he has been harmed by it; hence, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that it is a relative evil.\(^{49}\) But this does not mean everything that necessitates existence is good and everything that necessitates privation is evil - as is the position of Ibn Sīnā.\(^{50}\) Rather, the existence may necessitate the inferiority (*marjūḥ*) of evil and the privation may necessitate the preponderance (*rājis*) of good. Examples of the former are fire, rain, heat, cold, ice and the existence of harmful animals. All of these exist and, at the same time, they entail relative evil, which goes unremarked, eclipsed by the vast good that exists from them. The example of the latter is like the privation of good deeds, which necessitates repentance; given that there is no repentance without sins. This is another crucial difference between Ibn Sīnā and Ibn al-Qayyim. Ibn Sīnā clearly adheres to the statement that ‘all good is everything in existence along with its necessities (*lawāzimhu*) and pure evil is everything in non-existence along with its necessities’.\(^{51}\) On the contrary, Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that this statement is ambiguous and needs further clarification:

If what is intended by this statement that everything God had created, brought into existence, and its existence is better than its non-existence; and also, everything that He did not create, nor willed, and remains in its origin of non-existent and thus there is no good in it. Since, if there were good in it, God would have created it, for verily, within His hands is good. Then yes, this meaning of the statement is correct; seeing that the ‘non-existing evil’ is the non-existence of

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\(^{48}\) The two level perceptions is also found in the debate of free will and divine determinism.


\(^{50}\) Shams C. Inati, *op. cit.*, p.66.

good. On the contrary, if what is intended by this statement is that everything which necessities existence is good and everything which necessities non-existence is evil, then this is incorrect. Since, the existence may necessitate the inferiority \((\text{marjūh})\) of evil and the privation may necessitate the preponderance \((\text{rājih})\) of good. The example of the first category is like fire, rain, heat, cold, ice, and the existence of all harmful animals. All of these exist and at the same time they entail relative evil that goes unnoted with regards to the [vast] good that exists from it.\(^{52}\)

In other words, people may suffer from the above mentioned but the suffering is minor compared to the vast good in them. Similarly, God’s commands may necessitate suffering and hardship but, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, this hardship is trivial in comparison to its consequential good.\(^{53}\)

**Principles of Relative Evil**

Ibn al-Qayyim also emphasises that when one says God is the creator of good and evil, one must bear in mind two principles. Firstly, that what is perceived by man as evil or comprising of evil is in actual fact only the objects of His acts, which are separate from God and are not a part of His attributes or acts. Secondly, in spite of the fact that it is perceived as evil by man, this perception is subjective. Given that it is good when it is related to divine acts, creation and will; all of which result from a great wise purpose which God may allow some of His closest slaves to grasp. This viewpoint can be understood as the divine perspective. Additionally, it is evil when it relates to the person who views it as evil, namely man’s perspective.\(^{54}\) An example of this can be seen in the creation of fire. According to Ibn al-Qayyim, the burning effect of fire is the object of divine act, that is to say, it is not God specifically making it burn at that given moment; rather it was created with the nature of burning by God’s general will,\(^{55}\) just like the effect after a cause. Thus fire will always burn as long as the necessary conditions are present without impediment; as is


\(^{53}\) Ibid


also the case with the effect after its cause. So, it is the fire that is burning and it is God who created fire to burn as a result of His general will - perhaps at the moment of the first creation. Ibn al-Qayyim introduces the concept of general will in this debate, perhaps in order to distance God from both natural and moral evil. In both cases, the cause of evil by man or by fire is the result of God’s general will which he possibly created in pre-eternity according to the laws of ‘cause and effect’ or ‘privation and necessity’. Nonetheless, fire is not evil from the divine perspective, given its many useful benefits to man, but it is seen as evil by the person who is harmed by it; thus its labelling as evil is subjective.

Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the Traditionalists (Ahlu Sunna) do not see divine omnipotence and His praise-giving as conflicting. That is to say, both the Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites found the two problematic hence the former denied that evil is within His dominion and the latter implied the denial of His Praise-giving since He acts purely by His arbitrary volition and not for a wise purpose.

Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that whatever God creates and legislates, He does so with a great wise purpose and a perfect blessing (ni’matin sābīgha); hence, He is worthy of praise. Just like God is praised for His beautiful names and attributes, He is also praised for His actions, which are the result of His wise purposes and praised objectives. Additionally, given that God is perfect in essence, names and attributes, He only performs acts that are compassionate and according to His wise purpose, which requires His praise and love; thus He would not have acted otherwise.

58 Ibid. Also see the example of fire as relative evil in both Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī’s discussions in Avicenna, op. cit., p. 346 and al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 548.
62 Ibid
63 Ibid, p. 323.
The Theodicy of Divine Names and Attributes

According to this theodicy, all of God’s names and attributes are beautiful and free from evil. Some divine names and attributes require the existence of evil in order to manifest.\(^{64}\) Furthermore, some evil leads to a greater good that is more beloved to God and hence reflects some of His attributes. However, the fact that all His names and attributes are beautiful and some require evil to manifest does not necessarily mean that His names and attributes conflict. God says in the Quran:

Say: O God Possessor of the kingdom, You give the kingdom to whom You will, and You take the kingdom from whom You will, and You endue with honour whom You will, and You humiliate whom You will. In Your Hand is the good. Verily, You are Able to do all things.\(^{65}\)

Ibn al-Qayyim illuminates the above verse saying that complete dominion belongs to God alone and He conducts it how He wills. He conducts according to justice, wise purpose and benefit, all of which are good and thus He should be praised and thanked for it just as He is praised and thanked for being free from evil.\(^{66}\)

Additionally, just as all of God’s names are beautiful\(^{67}\) (ḥusn) and free from evil, the same applies to His attributes, they are all free from imperfections. The same applies to His actions, none of which are without a wise purpose and benefit.\(^{68}\) Thus, God is described with good names and complete attributes, both of which also indicate that He is far above the opposite of His good names and perfect attributes.\(^{69}\)


\(^{65}\) Quran 3: 26.


\(^{67}\) ḥusn can also be translated as good.


\(^{69}\) Ibid, vol. 1, p. 244.
For example, His divine name al-Quddūs, which means the Most Holy who is pure and free from all evil, imperfections and deficiencies. The divine name al-Salām, who is the Giver of Peace, is also free from all deficiencies and imperfections. Interestingly, Ibn ‘Arabī also mentions similar meanings to the divine names al-Salām and al-Quddūs, where the latter is free ab initio, namely, free of defects and imperfections while al-Salām is free of defects.

Al-Ḥamīd, the Praiseworthy, to whom belongs all praises and the perfection of such praises, requires that evil, sins and imperfection are not attributed to Him. That is, such evils must not be attributed to His names, actions or attributes.

Ironically, His beautiful names (asmāʾīhi al-ḥusnā) prevent evil, sin and oppression from being attributed to Him, even while He is the creator of everything. He is the prime creator of man, man’s actions and speech. When man acts evilly, Ibn al-Qayyim says, he is described as sinning, despite it being God who allowed him (jaʿal) to act. Also, God allowing him to act is the result of His justice and wise purpose. Thus, God is good with regard to His acts and man is evil with regard to his evil acts. So, God allowing man to act is good, wise in purpose and beneficial; even while the deed may be imperfect and evil on man’s part. Similarly, God allowing man to act in such a way is simply placing things in their correct place, which is Ibn al-Qayyim’s definition of justice. Ibn al-ʿArabī echoes similar lines, that al-Ḥakīm (the Wise) is He who brings down everything to its rightful place.

An example of a person placing things in their correct place and who is thus considered good and just, is one who places rubbish in the bin; this displays wise purpose (ḥikma), motive

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74 The term jaʿal here literally means to make, however, I do not think the term ‘to make’ expresses the full and correct meaning in relation to Ibn al-Qayyim’s compatibilist position in chapter three.
76 Refer to the previous chapter.
Ibn al-Qayyim argues that whoever places a turban on his head, shoes on his feet, Kohl on their eyes and rubbish in the bin has certainly placed them in their correct places and in no way has this person oppressed the shoes or the bin since this is its correct place. Contrary to this, a foolish and oppressive person is he who places things in other than their correct place.

God’s divine names and attributes reflect His divine Justice as divine names and attributes entail that things are placed in their correct place. Hence, He is the Acceptor of Repentance (al-Tawwāb) to those whom repent; thus repentance is positioned in its correct place. He creates man with the ability to act and holds him accountable for his actions; hence, ability and accountability are placed in their correct places. Consequently, God’s names and attributes reflect His divine Justice which, as a result, requires that He must be praised as it is simply placing thanks-giving in its correct place.

This also implies that all of God’s creation, from the divine perspective, is good; this includes both natural and moral evils. But the presence of evil - as man perceives it - is only considered evil from man’s perspective; this includes man’s acts but not divine acts. Since, God acts for a wise purpose and benefit as is indicated in His divine names and attributes and He places things where they are meant to be; thus, everything that God does is good.

Similarly, what man perceives as evil is necessary for the manifestation of God’s names and attributes - as Ibn al-Qayyim asks in rhetorical questions:

…and is the apparent effect of God’s names and attributes in the universe only but essential for God’s lordship and dominion?’ Can He be the Sustainer, the Forgiver, the Pardoner, the Compassionate, and the Forbearer without there being the person to sustain, forgive, pardon, be

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79 Ibid. There are other examples given in Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 207.
compassionate to, and also forbear? Similarly, is His retaliation only but essential to His lordship and dominion?82

In other words, who shall He retaliate against if He has no enemies to retaliate against? From Ibn al-Qayyim’s above rhetorical questions, one may conclude that perhaps any relative evil that exists is essential for the manifestation of God’s names and attributes.83

God Wills Sins for a Greater Good

So far we have learnt that all of God’s acts are good, hence, everything God commands is good and everything He prohibits is evil. So why then does God will the non-existence of His commands - specifically, why do some people not carry out God’s commands? Similarly, why does God also will the existence of His prohibitions, as some people sin by carrying out these prohibitions? These questions are critical when considering that God only wills that which is good.

Ibn al-Qayyim argues that sins may entail something that is more beloved to God even while its non-existence is better than its existence.84 Ibn al-Qayyim does not indicate what ‘this more beloved thing’ is but rather concludes that he will deal with this matter in the chapter entitled ‘The Union of Divine Determining and Divine Legislation’ (bāb ijtīmā’ al-qadar wa al-shar’). It must be noted that this chapter is nowhere to be found in Ibn al-Qayyim’s works; moreover, he makes reference to this chapter in two places in his book Shifā’. This may indicate that perhaps it is a missing chapter of the same book. However, gathering from Ibn al-Qayyim’s works holistically, one assumes that the ‘more beloved thing’ mentioned is none other than repentance, since, regarding sins, what could be more beloved to God than repentance?

83 Ibid
Divine Names and Attributes are Free from Evil

Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God’s names are derived from both His attributes and acts, not by what He created (makhlūqātihī). Therefore, we cannot name Him ‘the mover’, ‘the stationary’, ‘the tall’, ‘the short’, ‘the white’ or ‘the black’, even though He is the creator of these attributes. But rather, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, his names are derived from the acts and attributes that are intrinsic to Him (qāʿimun bi-hi). So, He is not to be described with what He created which is extrinsic to Him. Therefore, the natural conclusion is that God is not to be described with what is a part of man’s attributes - such as evil.

Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that evil is not a part of God’s attributes nor His acts; similarly it is not a part of His essence. His essence is complete perfection; there is no imperfection in it from any perspective. Such is the case with His attributes; it is complete perfection, no deficiencies nor imperfections whatsoever. Also, the same applies to His actions, which are all purely good and free from evil. Had God have acted evilly, there would have been a name derived from it and hence, not all His names would have been beautiful. Further, the punishment of His slaves is just because they are deserving of it; in this regard, it is pure good because it is additionally pure justice and wise in purpose from the divine perspective.

So, to give God negative attributes, or extrinsic attributes is to in fact deny His attributes and their meanings. This would imply that He is named by all the acts and attributes that He created such as ‘the tall’, ‘the short’, ‘the evil’, etc., since we cannot choose some extrinsic attributes over others.

Lastly, God is named ‘the Self-Sufficient’ (al-Ghanī) and ‘the Praiseworthy’ (al-Ḥamīd). Contrary to this, the agent of evil does not do evil except to gain something which, in this case, contradicts the name ‘the Self-Sufficient’, which is free from all needs. Likewise, the agent of

86 Ibn al-ʿArabī also argues that evil is not from God and hence His divine names indicate that He is free from evil. See, Muḥī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, p. 257.
88 Namely, to deny all His affirmed attributes mentioned in divine scripture.
89 For example, He is named the Just, however, a justice that is created by Him and separate from His essence.
evil acts evilly; this is an imperfection and deficiency, both of which contradict the name ‘the Praiseworthy’, who is worthy of all thanks-giving due to the pure goodness of His actions. Thus, it is impossible for God ‘the Self-Sufficient’ and ‘the Praiseworthy’ to do evil, even though He is considered the creator of good and evil,\textsuperscript{91} bearing in mind, the two levels of perspectives, the divine and the human.

\textit{Opposing Attributes}

On the question of apparently opposing attributes, Ibn al-Qayyim’s standpoint is that there is no contradiction between divine omnipotence (\textit{al-quadra}) and divine wise purpose (\textit{al-hikma}); the perfect divine omnipotence creates the opposites and the perfect divine wise purpose places them in their correct places. The true scholar, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, is he who does not ‘conflict’ divine omnipotence with divine wise purpose. That is, if he believes in the divine omnipotence, then he should not criticise the divine wise purpose and thus deny it; such is the case of the Ash’arites when it comes to sins.\textsuperscript{92} Equally, if he believes in the divine wise purpose, then he should not criticise the divine omnipotence and oppose it; such is the case of the Mu’tazilites with regard to sins. Rather, the true scholar, as Ibn al-Qayyim argues, is he who ties both the divine omnipotence and divine wise purpose together and knows that they encompass all which God has created and continues to create. Just as things come into existence by His divine will and omnipotence, equally things also come into existence by His divine wise purpose.\textsuperscript{93} Ibn al-Qayyim states:

\begin{quote}
If man cannot comprehend this detail, then it is sufficient to believe in what he knows and what he witnesses of it. After which he can reason out the absent by the present\textsuperscript{94}, [i.e. what he does not know by what he does know].
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{al-Badā’i’ al-Fawā’id}, vol. 2, pp. 719-720.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{Tariq al-Hijratayn}, vol. 1, pp. 221-222.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Ibid, vol. 1, p. 222.
\end{itemize}
Ibn al-Qayyim then cites a verse from the Quran which shows that God has created things for man which have numerous benefits and at the same time entails relative evil. It reads:

He sends down water from the sky, and the valleys flow according to their measure, but the flood bears away the foam that mounts up to the surface, and from that which they heat in the fire in order to make ornaments or utensils, rises a foam like unto it, thus does God show forth truth and falsehood. Then, as for the foam it passes away as scum upon the banks, while that which is for the good of mankind remains in the earth. Thus God sets forth parables.95

The Theodicy of Opposites

Ibn al-Qayyim seemingly develops another way of dealing with evil: a theodicy of opposites.96 This is apparent in various sections of his works. For example, when he deals with an objection as to why God did not make all hearts accept good and reject evil? Ibn al-Qayyim despises this question and states that it is akin to asking, why did God create opposites? Why did God not make everything one? Why did He create the night and the day, the above and the beneath, the hot and the cold, the disease and the cure, the angels and the devils, the pleasant and the unpleasant odour, the sweet and the sour, and the good and the evil?97 He states:

Can the least of a rational person allow the likes of such questions, which indicates the insanity of the questioner and the defectiveness of his rationality? Indeed, this is from none other than the necessity of God’s Lordship, Deity, Dominion, Omnipotence, Will, and Wise Purpose. It is impossible for the necessity of His perfect attribute to abandon it [namely the creation of opposites].98

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95 Quran 13: 17
96 Jon Hoover, op. cit., p. 123. al-Ghazālī also discusses a similar theodicy of opposites in his writings; see, Eric L. Ormsby, op. cit., pp. 65- 68, 80, 223- 225.
98 Ibid
Consequently, the creation of opposites in this world is a necessary facet of God’s divine wise purpose and divine omnipotence as God’s divine attributes are manifested. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that created things are only manifested by their opposite. Therefore it is a necessary creation within the world; without it, it would be another world.

Ibn al-Qayyim views the creation of opposites in this world as an indication of God’s attributes. He states that the creation of opposites is one of the greatest signs of divine omnipotence and divine will, as God is the creator of the heavens and earth, light and darkness, Paradise and Hell, water and fire, metal and air, good and evil, hot and cold, beautiful and ugly. Ibn al-Qayyim also argues for an epistemological necessity, in that:

… The perfection of goodness in an opposite is manifested in the creation of its opposite. Indeed, the goodness of an opposite only becomes manifested by its opposite. If it were not for ugly, the virtue of beauty would not be known. If it were not for poverty, then the value of wealth would not be known.

Contrary to this, Ghazâlî’s theodicy of opposites argues for a metaphysical necessity, in that, the existence of an opposite is a requisite for the existence of its opposite; without one, the other would not exist. This Stoic argument potentially confuses contraries with correlatives; the latter being mutually implicative, unlike the former.

Ibn al-Qayyim also argues that the creation of opposites is necessary for the educational development of life. That is, the perfections of man are attained by sufferings and hardships, such as the attainment of knowledge and courage. Ibn al-Qayyim’s theory is that the best of pleasure is covered in pain and the worst of pain is covered in pleasure. This may be evident in the continuous application of obedience or disobedience. Hence why some rationalists say: ‘blessing is not known (yudrak) by blessings, relaxation is not attained by relaxation and

99 Ibid, and also see Ibid, pp. 221- 222.
100 Ibid., pp. 218- 217.
101 Namely, the physical intensity of hard vs. soft.
whosoever opts for pleasures misses pleasures’, as Ibn al-Qayyim states.\textsuperscript{106} In other words, relaxation is only understood after experiencing exhaustion and pleasure after the endurance of hardship.\textsuperscript{107}

At times Ibn al-Qayyim explains that evil, or in this case suffering, is crucial for the development of man. This could be understood as a spiritual development and also an educational development of life in general. He states that suffering and its necessities (\textit{tawābi'}) and causes (\textit{asbāb}) are necessary for the development of man, who was not created extrinsic from it. Heat and cold, hunger and thirst, fatigue and exhaustion, grief and depression, weakness and inability: these sufferings form the necessities for the development of man and animals; if man were free from such sufferings then he would not be man but rather another creation.\textsuperscript{108}

Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim simplifies his theodicy of opposites by explaining that there is no happiness for he who has not experienced sadness, nor is there pleasure for he who has not experienced patience.\textsuperscript{109} Additionally, there is no blessing for he who had no calamity and no relaxation for he who had no hardship.\textsuperscript{110} Thus, the attainment of goodness arrives via the necessary experience of evil opposites; namely, hardship and sufferings.

\textbf{The Theodicy of Divine Wise Purpose}

It may be construed that all the previous theodicies mentioned ultimately conclude to the theodicy of divine wise purpose, which again distinguishes Ibn al-Qayyim from Ibn Sīnā. In this theodicy, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that everything in creation has a wise purpose behind its existence as it was created by God who acts according to His intrinsic attribute which is reflected in His name the Wise (al-\textit{ḥakīm}): He who places things correctly. This means that there is a wise purpose for what God wills and what He wills not, and what He creates and what He does not

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{106} Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1235.
\item\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, vol. 1, p. 285. This theodicy is very similar to the Mu\textsuperscript{‘}tazilites’ theodicy of suffering; see, Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{Ṭa\textsuperscript{‘}iq al-Hijratayn}, vol. 1, p. 316.
\item\textsuperscript{109} I think what is meant by patient here is in fact pain.
\item\textsuperscript{110} Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{Miftāḥ}, vol. 2, p. 333.
\end{itemize}
create; for what He commands and what He does not command.\textsuperscript{111} Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim
deems it sufficient to prove one benefit or wisdom for any given accidental evil and, as a result,
he has proven his optimistic theodicy of wise purpose. Nevertheless, divine wise purpose is not
dependent on man’s grasp of a given wise purpose, since there is always a wise purpose behind
everything, even if man fails to comprehend it. As a result, this perpetual wise purposefulness
deserves perpetual praise; hence, the worship of God is encouraged.

Ibn al-Qayyim explains that God is characterised with magnified wise purpose, abundant
grace and absolute thanks-giving for everything He created and commanded; everything that He
did not create, had He willed, He would have created. Similarly, His \textit{tawfiq} (divine facilitation)
which necessitates His obedience and His \textit{khidhlān} (desert), which necessitates His
disobedience, are also the result of His wise purpose.\textsuperscript{112}

In addition, God has a great wise purpose for whatever occurs to man, in terms of harm
and grievance. Such wise purpose is realised through the creation of causality (\textit{asbāb}). The
existence of such causality is also the result of divine wise purpose.\textsuperscript{113}

Moreover, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, divine knowledge and omnipotence which is free
from wise purpose does not attain perfection and goodness, but rather divine knowledge and
omnipotence only attains perfection and goodness by wise purpose. The divine name of the Wise
(al-Ḥakīm) encompasses His wise purpose in His creation, commands and His will, both
universal and legislative.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, one may assume that God’s divine names and attributes, along
with their necessary result of creation, ultimately concludes to the essential attribute of divine
wise purpose. That is, God acts by a wise purpose which is a part of His essence and the
fundamental aim is His praise.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{al-Ghazālī} also argues that divine acts proceed from divine wisdom; See Eric L. Ormsby, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 197.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid, vol. 1, p. 234.
\textsuperscript{115} Jon Hoover, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 124.
Examples of Wise Purposes

Ibn al-Qayyim states that the prerequisites of divine wise purpose mean that God must place things in their correct places. Ibn al-Qayyim supports this statement by a *fortiori* analogy, showing that humans who do not place things in their correct places are not considered wise. For example, to place rubbish and impurities in clean and good fragrant places is not considered wise. Likewise, to place punishment in the place of kindness and vice-versa is also not considered wise. Thus, He whose wise purpose dazzles the people of understanding and great minds; how is He then supposed to place things in other than their correct places?

A similar *fortiori* analogy is presented concerning the placement of good and evil souls on different levels in the hereafter. Ibn al-Qayyim explains that he who wants the evil and lowest of souls to be on the same level as the pure and highest of souls, surely wants something that opposes divine wise purpose. For example, if a king were to place his closest relatives and attendants on the lowest and poorest ranks of society, people will consequently speak ill of his kingship and wisdom, as he is placing people in other than their correct places. Therefore, Ibn al-Qayyim insists that the same applies to the good souls, whom are closest to the greatest of kings, the King of kings, namely God.

A Survey of Wise Purpose

Ibn al-Qayyim identifies four unspecified groups in relation to the attributes of divine omnipotence and divine wise purpose. The first are those who deny divine omnipotence and wise purpose, as they hold that God acts by essence and not choice. This group can easily be identified as the philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā. Secondly are those who affirm divine

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116 This shows that divine justice and divine wise purpose both complement each other since they have the same definition according to Ibn al-Qayyim.
118 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 219-220
119 Ibid
omnipotence and will but deny divine wise purpose;\(^{122}\) God, according to them, acts by pure will (\(al\)-\(mashīa\) \(al\)-\(mahḍ\)). This group is a suitable description of the Ash’arites. Then there are those who affirm divine wise purpose, causes and motives in God’s acts but they deny the perfection of divine omnipotence. That is to say, He has no power over the actions of Angels, Jinns, and Mankind; this also includes their acts of obedience.\(^{123}\) The reason being is that in order to preserve divine justice, man needs to be the sole agent of his deeds if he is to be held responsible. This description fits in well with the Mu‘tazilites’ position. Lastly, there are those who affirm both divine omnipotence and wise purpose as is in accordance to divine scripture.\(^{124}\) Ibn al-Qayyim belongs to this last group.\(^{125}\)

Consequently, Ibn al-Qayyim derives three major principles\(^{126}\) regarding the debate on divine omnipotence and divine wise purpose. Firstly, he asserts that one must affirm the complete divine omnipotence, as is lacking in the position of the philosophers entirely and the Mu‘tazilites partially. Secondly, one must affirm the divine wise purpose, as is lacking in the position of both the Ash’arites and the philosophers. Lastly, one must also affirm all thanksgiving to God, namely to worship Him as a result of His divine omnipotence and divine wise purpose. Ibn al-Qayyim claims that all the schools impliedly denied the perfection of thanksgiving to God, since they either deny divine omnipotence or divine wise purpose, or both. God’s thanks-giving is a necessary result of both divine omnipotence and divine wise purpose.\(^{127}\) That is to say, how is one truly supposed to worship a god who has deficient powers and no wise purpose in his acts?

**Wise Purpose for the Creation of Iblīs**

Although Ibn al-Qayyim’s initial engagement with the purpose for the creation of Iblīs (Satan) seems to align with al-Rāzī, his optimistic arguments are very likely his own original

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\(^{122}\) Ibn al-Qayyim, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 235.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 236.

\(^{124}\) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 237.

\(^{125}\) Ibid

\(^{126}\) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 239.

\(^{127}\) Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 246-250
development - given that none of his sources of reference in his *Shifāʾ* tackle the problem in an optimistic manner. As such, Ibn al-Qayyım admits that the source of all evil is Iblīs, with reference to al-Rāzī’s problematic questions\(^ {128}\) vis-à-vis evil, such as: what is the good in enduring Iblīs until the end of time? What greater good is there in a creation that nine hundred and ninety-nine are deemed to Hell and only one will enter Paradise?\(^ {129}\) What greater good is there in the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise and as a result the affliction of their children; had we stayed in paradise, would all evil cease to exist? And if God has created us for His worship then how is it that His wise purpose requires that most of the creations are deviated from His worship and only aids the fewer of them to it? What is the greater good in the creation of disbelief, sins, disobedience, oppression and transgression? What is the good in the suffering of those who are not religiously obliged (*mukallaf*) - such as children and animals?\(^ {130}\)

Ibn al-Qayyım replies that indeed the creation of Iblīs holds many wise purposes, benefits and good, which are all a direct result of his existence; no one knows the entirety of them except God.\(^ {131}\) Ibn al-Qayyım speaks of fifteen wise purposes in the creation of Iblīs.\(^ {132}\) Firstly, the creation of Iblīs allows for the completion of the levels of worship (*marātib al-ʿubūdiyya*) for God’s close servants.\(^ {133}\) By this, the continuous struggle against the enemy of God, namely Iblīs and his party, is established. Thus, one can love and hate for the sake of God, seek His help and turn to Him. Secondly, the fall of Iblīs acts as a deterrent against sins, for the Angels and Mankind. As a result, their fear and vigilance will become much greater.\(^ {134}\) Likewise, it is a lesson in order that one may see the end result of those who are disobedient and arrogant to the commands of God. Moreover, God tested the fathers of both Man and Jinn; the latter persisted

\(^ {128}\) These questions are found in both: Ibn al-Qayyım, *Shifāʾ*, vol. 3, pp. 999- 1000 and *idem., Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn*, vol. 1, pp. 339- 340.


\(^ {130}\) Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 999- 1000.


\(^ {132}\) Cf. Jon Hoover, *op. cit.*


\(^ {134}\) Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1186- 1187.
upon his disobedience, namely Iblīs, whereas the former – Adam - repented and turned to God.\textsuperscript{135} Also, the creation of Iblīs serves as a test for mankind in order that God may distinguish the pure from the evil amongst them.\textsuperscript{136} Similarly, God can manifest the perfection of His divine omnipotence in the creation of angels and devils since they are one of many opposites within His vast creation.\textsuperscript{137} As God loves to be praised, the existence of God’s enemy encourages and establishes countless thanks-giving to Him.\textsuperscript{138} Obedience and guidance become appreciated; especially when it is the result of divine facilitation. The existence of Iblīs also encourages self-struggle (\textit{jihād}) and sacrificing for the sake of God. Hence, this continuous struggle establishes various forms of worship that are beloved to God, such as love, seeking help (\textit{al-ināba}), reliance (\textit{tawwakul}), patience, contentment and so on.\textsuperscript{139} Besides, in the creation of Iblīs God can manifest His great signs and miracles, such as the ones mentioned in divine scripture,\textsuperscript{140} as these miracles were the result of resistance, disapproval and hostility towards the Prophets. Lastly, God can manifest His names and attributes, such as the ‘Abaser’ and the ‘Exalter’, the ‘Honourer’ and the ‘Humiliator’. These names, like others, require consequences (\textit{muta’alliqāt}) in which their excellence (\textit{iḥkām}) becomes manifest.\textsuperscript{141}

\textbf{Wise Purpose for the Creation of Moral Choice}

One may assume that God creates without a wise purpose when probing into questions such as: why was man not created to do only good? Seeing that He acts by divine wise purpose, if He saw His slaves killing, corrupting and oppressing each other, and is able to stop them, then His wise purpose would not let Him abandon them upon such evil behaviour.\textsuperscript{142} Therefore, Ibn al-Qayyim

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1187.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1187- 1188.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1188- 1190. al-Nasafi also states that Iblīs is the evil opposite of perfection; see, Ian R. Netton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 237. Also see the Sufi discussions on the science of opposites in relation to Iblīs in Peter J. Awn, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 106- 107, 122- 141.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1190.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid; Also see, Jon Hoover, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 130.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibn al-Qayyim, \textit{Shifā’}, vol. 3, p. 1228.
argues there are three possibilities: God is either unaware of man’s evil acts, He is unable to prevent man from doing evil or God does not act by motives and wise purposes. Ibn al-Qayyim states that the first two are impossible in the case of God; therefore, we are left with the third possibility. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the third doubtful issue (subha) is based on a false principle which relies on comparing God’s acts to that of man’s; though at times Ibn al-Qayyim is also guilty of such practices.¹⁴³ That is to say, whatever is considered good by man should also be considered good by God and whatever is considered evil by man should also be considered evil by God.¹⁴⁴

For this reason, Ibn al-Qayyim states that to draw analogy of a divine act to that of man’s acts is the most false of analogies. Similarly, when one draws analogy between God’s wise purpose and man’s wise purpose and God’s attributes to that of man’s attributes.

Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God clearly knew that man would commit disbelief, oppression and sins; He was able to have abstained from creating humans as one nation who only do what is good. However, His wise purpose rejected such a form of creation and demanded that mankind be how they are, namely able to do both good and evil.¹⁴⁵

Furthermore, God created different types of souls (nafūs): souls that only do good, such as the angels, and souls that only do evil, such as the devils; also, souls that are able to do both good and evil, namely man. So, whoever amongst man is predominately good becomes associated with the first type, namely the angels. Whoever is predominately evil becomes associated with the second type, namely the devils. As a result, if divine wise purpose demands the existence of the second type, namely the devils, then the first type has greater reason for existence. Divine omnipotence, honour and wise purpose require the existence of the opposites of essences, attributes and acts.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ See for example the fortiori analogies used by Ibn al-Qayyim when dealing with divine attributes in this chapter.
¹⁴⁴ Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1228.
¹⁴⁵ Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1229.
¹⁴⁶ Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1229, 1188.
Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim states that great ignorance and misguidance questions why the whole of creation was not of one type, namely pious, as this suggests false impressions that are not holistically possible.\textsuperscript{147}

\textit{Wise Purpose of Suffering}

Ibn al-Qayyim asserts an optimistic principle that all good is from God and all evil is from objects of His acts (\textit{maf\'ulātīhi}), but this evil is subjective,\textsuperscript{148} as the evil of suffering is good with regards to God but evil with regards to man. This principle is perhaps intended to encourage optimism in the theistic sufferer. Ibn al-Qayyim stresses that one should hold steadfast to this principle and never part from it, whether in minute or momentous suffering, and that one should judge according to it at all times.\textsuperscript{149}

Nonetheless, everything that befalls the believer is good, even if it includes suffering, since suffering can lead to the believer’s spiritual development and hence come closer to God.\textsuperscript{150}

Ibn al-Qayyim discusses the wise purpose for trials and tribulations, claiming that they exist to promote man’s patience, thanks-giving, reliance (\textit{tawwkul}) and self-struggling (\textit{jihād}). Also, it extracts man’s perfection which is concealed within him, that is: his power, his action, his ability to prevent causes and destroy things by its opposites. As a result, man will become certain that there is only One Omnipotent and it is impossible for Him to have an equal, but rather omnipotence and divine unity are inseparable.\textsuperscript{151}

Similarly, suffering or lost blessings may necessitate that the believer receives further blessings in the hereafter.\textsuperscript{152} This assertion is very similar to the Mu'tazilite concept of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[147] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1230.
\item[149] Ibid.
\item[150] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 292.
\item[151] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 301. I do not see how all of this answers the question on sufferings of children and animals? For more on the wise purpose for suffering cf. al-Qayyim, \textit{Shifā'}, vol. 3, pp. 1234- 1238.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
compensation (taʿwīd).\textsuperscript{153} So ultimately, whatever God decrees for man is good and a just decision; hence, He can be praised.\textsuperscript{154}

Lastly, sufferings may deter man from sins, since one may apprehend that God’s punishment in the hereafter is far greater than any earthly sufferings. Ibn al-Qayyim’s theory is that God has placed in this world some of the effects (āthār) of His wrath, such as punishments, sufferings, trials and afflictions of individuals (a’yān), in order that one may deduce the even greater discomforts in the ‘Abode of Misery’, Hell.\textsuperscript{155}

\textit{Wise Purpose for the Eternity of Hell}

On the wise purpose for the eternity of Hell, Ibn al-Qayyim presents a potential question as to what pleasure or good originates from the serving eternal punishment of Hell? But before Ibn al-Qayyim sets out to answer the question, he starts off - as is his common practice - by discussing the positions on this issue at hand and then concludes with his opinion.

Firstly, the Asharites uphold that the eternal punishment comes from the pure divine volition of God and there is no wise purpose or motive for it. As a result, they hold that God can punish the people of obedience (ahl tāʿā) and at the same time bless His enemies - those who associate partners with Him. Hence, everything is possible for God and to attribute such acts to God or their opposites, equate to the same thing. Furthermore, the Ash’arites claim that there is no escape from this question, namely the eternity of Hell, except by adopting the principle that God acts by pure divine volition.\textsuperscript{156} Ibn al-Qayyim maintains that the Ash’arites here are mistaken by not combining the evidences on the eternity of Hell and the evidences on divine justice and wise purpose, and also the contigence of things upon its causes. They have also


\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., vol. 1, p. 298.

fallen into error regarding their understanding of the Quran; just as they are mistaken with their
description of God doing acts that do not befit Him.\footnote{Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1241; also cf. *Idem, Miftāḥ*, vol. 2, pp. 456, 518-519.}

In contrast, the Mu'tazilites claim that the only way to avoid the evil of this position, namely the eternal punishment of Hell, is by what they have affirmed of divine wise purpose and causation (*al-ta'ālīl*). However, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, they have fallen into an even greater evil than the Ash'arites because they obligate God to cast eternally into Hell those who have spent their entire life in the obedience of God but then die upon a grave sin without repentance. Whereas the Ash'arites, on the other hand, hold that it is possible for God to cast His obedient slaves into Hell for eternity.\footnote{Ibn al-Qayyim, *Shifāʾ*, vol. 3, pp. 1241-1242; also cf. *Idem, Miftāḥ*, vol. 2, pp. 456, 519.} Thus, the difference here is that one group hold that God is obliged to punish for eternity and the other say it is merely a possibility for God to do so.

Ibn al-Qayyim also discusses two other groups regarding the eternal punishment of Hell; he does not however mention them by name. The first are described as ‘the people of scrutiny and research’ (*ahl al-nazar wa al-baḥth*) who say that the concept of eternal punishment in Hell is merely a deterrent that has no actual reality, given that the eternity of Hell opposes divine wise purpose, mercy, justice and benefit (*maṣlaḥa*).\footnote{Ibn Sīnā upholds this position; he asserts that Hell is only a deterrent and the presumed punishment in the Hereafter will only be imagined by each individual.\footnote{I would like to thank Prof. Yahya Michot for pointing this out to me. See, Avicenna, *op. cit.*, p. 356; George F. Hourani, *op. cit.*, pp. 230, 238-239; Ivry, *op. cit.*, pp. 160, 169; Shams C. Inati, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-164.}} Ibn Sīnā upholds this position; he asserts that Hell is only a deterrent and the presumed punishment in the Hereafter will only be imagined by each individual.\footnote{Ibn al-Qayyim, *Shifāʾ*, vol. 3, p. 1242.} The second group are those who say there is no such thing as Hell, but rather all existence is one. Moreover, there is no such thing as obedience and disobedience, they are one and the same thing; to differentiate between the two is a false impression and delusion. So therefore, heaven and earth, this life and the hereafter, pre-eternity and eternity and good and evil, are all one and the same thing.\footnote{Ibn al-Qayyim, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 1243. It is possible that this position belongs to Ibn al-'Arabī, since he believes in the doctrine of monism (*waḥdat al-wujūd*): that all of existence is one thing; including Paradise and Hell. See, A. E. Afifi, *The Mystical Philosophy of Muḥyiddīn Ibn al-‘Arabī*, Cambridge, 1939 and also see, Chittick, W.C., ‘Waḥdat al-Ṣūḥūd’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, Brill Online,}
Ibn al-Qayyim claims that people have been brought up between these four groups and know of no other position or school except these. He then presents his position on the debate after seeking God’s help and divine facilitation (tawfiq). Ibn al-Qayyim argues that reason, divine scripture and the natural disposition (fitra), indicate that God is the All-Wise and the All-Merciful; both His divine wise purpose and divine mercy reject the eternal punishment of souls in Hell. Meaning, these souls will not continue to receive punishment as long as God continues to live, namely for eternity. Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim rejects the concept of eternal punishment because it contradicts God’s divine wise purpose, divine mercy and the notion that God created in man the natural disposition (fitra) of belief in Him. Similarly, God mentions in the Quran that the fitra can never perish completely; hence, an unbeliever will only be punished and purified in Hell until his fitrā is completely restored.

Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that no one can know the intricate details of God’s divine wise purpose. Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that if it were not for the creation of opposites, the impudent enemies of God and the testing of His close slaves (awliyā’) by way of these enemies, then the extraction of pure worship from His slaves would not be possible. Additionally, if it were not for the empowerment of desires and anger, along with their urges (dawaṭ) in man, then there would be no achievement of patience, self-struggle (jihād al-nafs) and preventing one’s desires purely for the love of God.

Thus, the praising of God is the cause...
for creation and its motive. By praise, He brought it into existence and for praise it came into existence. 168

Conclusion

In this chapter I have illustrated how Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the theodicean writings of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, to the extent that he employs and adds to their categorisations of evil. Similarly, I have shown how Ibn al-Qayyim clearly engages in philosophical inquiry when tracing the source of accidental evil and, as a result, he employs demonstrative arguments which form potentially original contributions to the debate at hand. Likewise, I have argued that this Qayyimian approach to theology clearly challenges the contemporary Traditionalist trends of theological disengagement, a utopian conception of theological sources and a puritan conception of Traditionalist theology; given the importance of Ibn al-Qayyim, amongst contemporary Traditionalists. Additionally, I have shown that Ibn al-Qayyim engaged with non-Traditionalist philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā, and also that his conclusions were not entirely derived from scripture or the understanding of the Salaf; rather they were the result of his critical engagement which helped him develop a theology which contains elements that could be traced back to Aristotle and Plotinus; namely, evil as privation. Lastly, I have shown how Ibn al-Qayyim, as a result of his critical engagement, succeeds in developing a four-fold theodicy of optimism, namely, the theodicy of: relative evil, divine names and attributes, necessary opposites and divine wise purpose; which all ultimately argue for optimism in creation and thus, the worthiness of God’s praise.

CONCLUSION

In this research I have argued that Ibn al-Qayyim’s methodology of critical engagement contests the contemporary Traditionalist trend of theological disengagement; since Ibn al-Qayyim did actively engaged in intra-Muslim dialogue, whether Muslim theologians or philosophers. As such, Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagements – his efforts to harmonise, synthesise, develop, ‘Tradionalise’ and systematise various kalām discussions - aided him in his project of theological development.

Ibn al-Qayyim’s attempts to harmonise and synthesise were apparent in his critical engagement with the conflicting views on the debate of human agency, by introducing terms such as ‘conditions’, ‘partially causative’ and ‘general will’ to the debate. Accordingly, man’s motive and power do not necessarily cause an act; rather they are conditions for the causation of an act. In this sense, man’s motive and power are merely partially causative in that they depend on God’s volition to preponderate the effect. This arguably middle way position is an attempt to harmonise and synthesise the Mu’tazilite view that man’s motive and power are independently causative and the opposing Ash’arite view that man has no causative ability. The former view excludes God from the equation of cause and effect; whereas the latter excludes man. Conversely, Ibn al-Qayyim’s position allows scope for both God and man to operate in the equation of cause and effect.

This tendency to harmonise and synthesise conflicting views can be further appreciated in Ibn al-Qayyim’s argument that moral acts are attributed to both man’s causative ability and God’s general will. In this sense, God wills all that exists – including moral acts - by way of His general will, which is compatible with the fact that such moral acts are brought about by man’s causative ability. Thus, moral acts can be rationally attributed to both God and man, thus avoiding diminishing both God and man’s part in the causation of moral acts. The implication of Ibn al-Qayyim’s effort to harmonise and synthesise the opposing views in these debates may be seen as an endeavour to strike a balance between two divine attributes of omnipotence and
justice, whereby the Ash'arites emphasise the former and the Mu'tazilites emphasise the latter. As a result, Ibn al-Qayyim believed that both the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites failed to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between divine omnipotence and the praiseworthiness of God. The Mu'tazilites deny that evil is within God’s dominion and hence they undermine God’s divine omnipotence. On the other hand, the Ash'arites insist that God acts purely by His arbitrary volition and not for a wise purpose. Hence, the Ash'arites implicitly deny the praiseworthiness of God, given that praise is only deserved when acting for a purpose rather than an arbitrary volition.

It is precisely this aspect of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement that evidently attempts to harmonise and synthesise conflicting views in theological debates, which may be employed as an alternative to the contemporary Traditionalist methodology of theological disengagement and isolation. Given that the latter methodology inevitably leads to the opposition of intra-Muslim dialogue and intolerance – both of which feature distinctly in sectarian disputation and violence.

The developmental nature of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement is proven by his introduction of new concepts to various discussions, such as his position that the necessary consequence of accidental evil results from the laws of privation and necessity, which implies that some accidental evils are uncaused. Also, his argument that human acts occur according to God’s general will, so as to give man more freedom and responsibility than what results from God’s specific will. Similarly, in his discussion of divine determination transcending evil, Ibn al-Qayyim makes the distinction between divine acts and the objects of divine acts, in order to preserve God’s omnipotence and justice. Divine acts entail that God creates and commands good by way of His legislative will, which necessitates divine love for the object of His legislative will. Additionally, God creates and commands the existence of evil by way of His universal will, which does not necessitate that God loves the object of His universal will. As such, God’s justice remains largely intact, because He does not love or legislatively will evil; rather the existence of evil occurs by way of the laws of cause and effect and the laws of privation and necessity - both of which are the objects of God’s universal will. Hence, divine omnipotence remains also intact. Moreover, it is within the domain of God’s universal will that the objects of divine acts – man’s acts – operate and thus sins exist exclusively within this domain.
Ibn al-Qayyim’s four-fold theodicy of optimism is another example of the developmental aspect of his critical engagement. The Theodicy of Relative Evil argues that, on a macro-level, everything which exists entails some sort of good for its existence – this includes perceived evil. On a micro-level, man perceives evil things as evil because he specifically experiences harm or suffering as a result of their existence – regardless of the good it may entail. Therefore, evil is relative when one takes into consideration these two levels of perception.

The Theodicy of Divine Names and Attributes states that all of God’s names and attributes are beautiful and necessitate that He is free from evil and imperfection. But at the same time, God’s names and attributes ironically require the existence of evil in order to manifest. That is, how can God be the Pardoner without there being the person to pardon – namely, a sinner?

The Theodicy of Opposites argues that created things are only truly manifested by their opposites. If it were not for ugliness, the virtue of beauty would not be known and if it were not for poverty then the value of wealth would not be known. Therefore, this epistemic necessity is an essential aspect of creation within this world; without it, it would be another world.

Lastly, the Theodicy of Divine Wise Purpose argues that everything in creation has a wise purpose for its existence. This wise purpose is the criterion according to which God acts, since it is His intrinsic attribute which is reflected in His name, the Wise (al-hakim): He who places things correctly. Thus, there is a wise purpose for what God wills and what He wills not. As such, man may comprehend a given wise purpose or he may not. Nevertheless, if one does comprehend a particular benefit or wisdom for a specific accidental evil, then that is sufficient indication of an optimistic theodicy of wise purpose. Essentially, all of the aforementioned constructed theodicies ultimately argue for optimism in creation and thus encourage the worthiness of God’s praise.

Once again, it is this developmental nature of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement which clearly opposes the contemporary Traditionalist concept of a puritan theology which asserts that their theological positions have no human or foreign influences; rather they are solely the product of the divine as is found in scripture. The purity of source implies that there is no need for further development or contribution to religious knowledge, since human input will only
corrupt the pure. This kind of concept is perhaps one of the many factors responsible for the stagnation in the development of religious knowledge.

The ‘Traditionalising’ aspect of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement can be seen in his adoption of a middle way position in the debates on meta-ethics and causation in divine acts, where he accepts some aspects of the Mu’tazilites’ position and some of the Ash’arites’ position. He maintains that there are acts which consist essentially of either benefit or harm and can be known by reason and also by revelation. However, this does not mean that man is accountable based solely on reason, since punishment is only justified if revelation confirms the good or evil within an act. Essentially, Ibn al-Qayyim accepts whatever he believes to conform to his Traditionalist epistemological framework of scripture, consensus of the Salaf, sound reason and natural disposition.

Ibn al-Qayyim’s preference of scriptural terminologies over kalām or falsafa terminologies is another example of him ‘Traditionalising’ the debate on causation in divine acts. Ibn al-Qayyim opts to use scriptural terms such as hikma (wise purpose) to describe the nature of divine acts, instead of the term gharad (motive), as is commonly employed by the Mu’tazilites and Ash’arites.

Once more, it is this ‘Traditionalising’ aspect of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement which cannot be easily reconciled with the contemporary Traditionalist concept of a monolithic utopian history of salvation – where salvation in only attained by means of uncritically imitating the early generations, the Salaf. Otherwise, Ibn al-Qayyim would have simply dismissed engaging in intra-Muslim dialogue and opted to uncritically adhere to the position of the Salaf in relation to these debates, if there ever existed such positions.

Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim’s systematic approach to critical engagement is evident in the title of his books and chapters within, which are dedicated to specific topics of theology - such as his Shiṣṭa’ - or in response to fellow theologians and philosophers, such as al-Rāzī and Ibn Sīnā.

It is this calibre of multifaceted critical engagement which can serve as a model in the history of Traditionalism, where a scholar of authority undertook a project that was relevant to the challenges of his time, ‘Traditionalising’ kalām debates to form Traditionalist positions as a substitute to the widespread status quo Ash’arite position. Contemporary Traditionalist scholars
may revive and operate in the framework of Ibn al-Qayyim’s lost legacy of critical engagement and development in order to harmonise the challenges of modernity with the medieval positions that are typically the object of uncritical religious imitation. Nonetheless, a separate study will be needed to examine how Ibn al-Qayyim’s methodology of critical engagement can be employed to tackle modern challenges which, again, will foreseeably require further debate and research.

In essence, the implication of this study alludes to two conflicting authoritative Traditionalist methodologies. Firstly, the contemporary Traditionalist methodology of theological disengagement and uncritical religious imitation, which was briefly mentioned in the introduction of this study as being vulnerable to exploitation for indoctrination, control, disunity, intolerance and sectarian violence. For this reason, I sought to challenge this methodology by expounding on a second Traditionalist methodology of critical engagement and development, as was employed by Ibn al-Qayyim in the debates related to the theological doctrine of qadar. Likewise, given Ibn al-Qayyim’s authority amongst contemporary Traditionalists – due to his knowledge and theological affiliation to Traditionalism – his methodology has the potential to serve as an alternative framework within which contemporary Traditionalist scholars can tackle the many challenges relevant to the modern Muslim. That is not to say that traditions should be divorced from our modern era, rather that traditions should be critically engaged with and developed in order to retain relevance in our many complex societies. And as such, the doors to intra-Muslim dialogue should be opened to competent contributions based on critical engagement rather than the repetitive and rigid contributions of taqlīd. In this sense, my thesis seeks to convey a very small point in relation to contemporary Muslims and Islam: to promote dialogue, in particular to call contemporary Traditionalists to come together in determining relevant debates and thus the future of Islam in the modern age.
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