The fifth column? An intellectual history of Southern Sudanese communities in Khartoum, 1969-2005

KINDERSLEY, NICOLA, DAWN

How to cite:

Use policy
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales (CC BY-NC-SA)
The fifth column?
An intellectual history of
Southern Sudanese communities in Khartoum,
1969-2005

Nicola Dawn Kindersley

Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
History Department, Durham University, 2016
Abstract

This is a study of vernacular political thought and organisation among southern Sudanese residents of Khartoum during the last Sudanese civil wars. Characterised variously as dangerous revolutionaries at the heart of the Sudanese state, or as collaborationist sell-outs, southern Sudanese displaced and migrant residents of Khartoum were engaged in multiple and often competing or contradictory nationalist and ethno-nationalist projects; this thesis is a study of home-grown political philosophies.

Based on archival sources and ethnographic research conducted in 2012-13 and 2015 in South Sudan, this thesis draws on retrospective accounts and on personal archives of literature, poetry and song produced within Khartoum to explore these residents’ multiple political projects to articulate, engage and mobilise a “southern” community. It evidences the slippery plurality of personal and political identification, and the messy intellectual work of imagining radical futures while getting by in the violent everyday realities of civil war.
**Table of Contents**

**ABSTRACT**

**ILLUSTRATIONS**

**ABBREVIATIONS**

**GLOSSARY**

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

**SOURCES**

**NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS**

**INTRODUCTION**

**Khartoum**

**RESEARCH IN SOUTH SUDAN**

**STATES AND NATIONALISM IN THE SUDANS**

**VILLAGE NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL EDUCATION**

**BLACKNESS, SUDANESE-NESS, AND SOUTHERN-NESS IN KHARTOUM**

**BROTHERHOOD, AND A FEDERAL MORAL COMMUNITY**

**TERMINOLOGY, METHODOLOGY, AND APOLOGY**

**STRUCTURE**

**CHAPTER ONE**

**THE “SOUTHERN” PROBLEM: ELITE IDEAS OF “SOUTHERN SUDAN”**

**URBAN HISTORIES OF THE “SUDANI” AND “JANUBI”**

**THE 1960S AND 1970S BOOM IN KHARTOUM**

**SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS, AND EMERGING URBAN POLITICS**

**SOUTHERN POLITICAL ELITES, THEIR CONSTITUENTS, AND POLITICAL SPACE IN KHARTOUM**

**AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL SPHERE**

**CHAPTER TWO**

**KHARTOUM’S GEOGRAPHY, 1960S-1980S**

**FAMINE, MURDER, AND FLIGHT, 1985-1989**

**DAR ES SALAAM: THE FIGHT FOR SPACE IN KHARTOUM, 1988-1992**

**ORGANISATION, SOLIDARITY, AND MUTUAL SPACE**

**CONCLUSION**

**CHAPTER THREE**

**ARABIZATION AND ISLAMIZATION**


**ASSIMILATION, RESISTANCE AND SELF-EXPRESSION**

**SOCIAL CONTROL**
Illustrations

Figure 1  Map of pre-separation Sudan  17
Figure 2  Satellite images of Aweil town  22
Figure 3  Bassan’s hand-drawn map of Khartoum southern populations, April 1987  97
Figure 4  Youth in Khartoum  135
Figure 5  “African women”  139
Figure 6  Street sales of locally-produced Dinka and Arabic-language pamphlets  170
Figure 7  Photocopied image in Dinka Primary 4 Reader, captioned ‘Slavery in Wau, where people are chained’  184
Figure 8  ‘Sell-outs at the table with the Arabs’  209

Abbreviations

ANF  African National Front
AYU  Aweil Youth Union
CMS  Church Missionary Society
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DCS  Dinka Cultural Society
DUP  Democratic Unionist Party
HAC  Humanitarian Aid Commission
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP  Internally Displaced Person
IOM  International Organisation for Migration
JIU  Joint Integrated Unit
KNA  Kenya National Archives
MEDU  Middle East Documentation Unit, Durham University
MPC  Multi Purpose Centre
MSF  Medicins Sans Frontières
MSWZD  Ministry of Social Welfare, Zakat and the Displaced
NCP  National Congress Party
NDA  National Democratic Alliance
NGO  Non Governmental Organisation
NIF  National Islamic Front
OLS  Operation Lifeline Sudan
PDF  Popular Defence Forces
PVO  Private Voluntary Organisation
RRC  Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SAD  Sudan Archive Durham
SAF  Sudan Armed Forces
SANU  Sudan African National Union
SCC  Sudan Council of Churches
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>Save the Children Fund (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Southern Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIL</td>
<td>Summer Institute of Linguistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLO</td>
<td>Sudan Open Learning Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>South Sudan Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSNA</td>
<td>South Sudan National Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>South Sudanese Pound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USALF</td>
<td>United Sudan African Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAP</td>
<td>United Sudan African Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary

Arabic

*abd* (pl. *abiid*)  slave
*Ashara Wilayat*  lit. Ten States; southern Sudanese ethnicised court system established in Khartoum, c. early 1980s
*janubi* (pl. *janubiin*)  a southern Sudanese person
*jellaba*  a historical slur against Arab traders, now more broadly against Arabs
*jellabiya*  a traditional long garment popular in the Nile Valley
*malakiya*  suburbs established by ex-slave soldiers and their descendants, common across Sudan
*murahaleen*  southern Darfur and southern Kordofan armed raiding parties
*muwaaliid*  slave descendants
*rakuba*  basic shelter
*sanduq*  small-scale collective savings scheme, lit. “box”
*Sudani*  a Sudanese person

Dinka

*Akut Jieng*  lit. Dinka group; Dinka Cultural Society
*Akut Kuei*  the Eagle Group; political song group established in Khartoum, c. 1991
*gol*  extended family group, sometimes translated as clan
*huuma*  the government
*jeng*  the Dinka (sing. *muonyjang*)
*jok*  spirit, power
*wut*  cattle camp, a grazing community or territorial section of the Dinka
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
Acknowledgements

So many people in South Sudan gave their time, knowledge and effort on this project, and I can only hope that I have done some justice to their work here. I owe much of this thesis to my indefatigable friend and interpreter Joseph (Gai Thok) Tong Ngor, and to the support of his wife Ahok and cousin Abuk Deng, who was my namesake and advisor in Aweil. I am deeply grateful to my friends Richard Tongu Loboka and Lazarus (Makom) Lual Bol Ker for their advice and support throughout this project, and to Santino Lual, Deng Daniel, and Dau Maduok for welcoming me in Aweil and for looking after me so well. I was also very fortunate to work with Dominic Chol Autiak Malek on my return visit to Aweil, and with my enthusiastic Dinka translators Parek Madut Jok, Ngor Santino Akech Chol, and Wol Aluk Chol on many of the texts, poems and songs in this thesis.

In Aweil, I will never forget the generosity, patience and warmth of Joseph Malual, Ayak, and their family, who welcomed me into their home; it was an honour and a privilege to be part of your household, and I miss everyone, including my fabulous little roommates Akec and Akuei. I would also like to thank Dhieu Kuol Lual, my fellow historian, teacher and friend, the Maper Akot chess club team, and Josephine, Awen, Raja, Susan, little Bakhita, and all the ladies of Apada; thank you for looking after me as a lonely woman in Aweil.

There is not enough space here to thank the many people in Aweil, Kuajok and Juba who gave me invaluable advice and support in this project; including Dut Anyak Dit; James Acek of Akut Kuei; Atak Deng Deng; James Garang of the Aweil Musicians’ Union; General Paulino; Edward Jubara; Stephen Ochalla; Melanie Itto; Santino Atak Kon; Angelina Majok Juac; Diing Chen Diing; Martin Kiir Wol and the Dinka Cultural Society of Aweil; William Manyang Tong; Marco Mathiang Deng; and Lual Lual Aguer Ayam, among many others.

The new civil wars and their horrific violence began shortly after I left Juba in 2013. Many of the people I had spoken with have been forced to flee violence, enlisted or been conscripted; several people have died, including Arou Piol Adam, a young teacher and writer who became a friend over the course of this project. I am intensely angry and sad for his
loss, and the terrible circumstances facing South Sudanese people today. I hope that this thesis evidences the intellectual and emotional efforts of those in South Sudan who have long worked for a just and inclusive community in extreme adversity.

Work for this thesis depended on the invaluable support of the Rift Valley Institute, and the trust of John Ryle in giving me the opportunity to work on what is now the South Sudan National Archives. I am very grateful to Jok Madut Jok and the South Sudan Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports for their institutional support, and to my Ministry colleagues: the Director Youssef Onyalla, a friend and mentor; and Opoka Musa Obalim, Becu Thomas Alex, Nyarek Youannes Reik, James Lujang Marino, Aluel Isaiah Kulang, and Rofina. I was also inordinately lucky to have Douglas Johnson as a colleague and pillar of wisdom in the archives. I would also like to thank Leben Moro, Christopher Oringa, Chaplain Kenyi and the Centre for Peace and Development Studies at Juba University, and my Arabic teacher and Juba mother, Wafaa’ Housseini.

I am grateful to the ESRC for making this project financially possible, as well as for financial support from the Royal Historical Society, the History Department, Hatfield College, and the Institute for Hazard, Risk and Resilience at Durham University, and the logistical support of the Rift Valley Institute, AECOM, and UMCOR during work in South Sudan.

In Durham, I am ever fortunate for my supervisors: Justin Willis’ continued patience, encouragement, trust and attention, and CherryLeonardi’s enthusiasm and reassurance. I have been immeasurably lucky to have their time, guidance and knowledge.

I continue to learn from the wonderful Sudan and South Sudan research community: Feri Dávid Marko, Mohamed A. G. Bakhit, Eddie Thomas, Laura Mann, Martina Santschi, Peter Justin, Diana Felix da Costa, Sebabatso Manoeli, Jane Hogan, Mareike Schomerus, Naomi Pendle, Angela Impey, Dan Large, Christopher Tounsel, Tom Allen and Wendy James have all knowingly or unknowingly contributed to this project. I have been lucky to meet a fellow historical magpie in Øystein Rolandsen, and Zoe Cormack has always been an inspiration. At Durham, I have found great friends and colleagues in Chris Vaughan, Willow Berridge,
Tamador Khalid-Abdalla, Poppy Cullen, Natalie Moss, Reetta Humalajoki, Matthew Benson, Ade Browne, Sarah Marriott, Rob Doherty and the whole PhD community.

Finally, I am endlessly grateful for a lifetime of (often baffled) support from my parents, Linda and Peter Kindersley.
Sources

I have been given permission to translate and reproduce the photographs and documents used in this thesis by their authors, owners, or subjects, although I do not own the translations or originals of this work, and I have not used photographs of subjects wholly unknown to me. Although many people originally asked for their comments to be attributed to them by name in this study, with the unpredictable political climate in South Sudan all interviews have been either anonymised or referenced only by the person’s initials and the date of interview (for example, “PM, 18 August 2013”).

Note on translations

This thesis was researched in a combination of English, Sudanese Arabic, Juba Arabic, Bari and Dinka languages. Dinka orthography is not standardized, and transliterations of Arabic and Bari terms vary; as such, this thesis follows the transcriptions and standards used by its subjects and interpreters. Translation work relied on contextual and social methods, often with the authors of the original texts themselves; the longer Dinka-language texts were translated in Kampala by a small group of young men, some of whom had travelled to Khartoum or had relatives resident there and who were also engaged in their own Dinka-language literary and theatrical projects. All of these translations involved extensive negotiation, annotation and sometimes argument, due to the ambiguity of many of the songs in particular, but also due to the nature of the political ideas being expressed. I have recorded any linguistic disputes and alternative translations throughout.
Introduction

At the moment, South Sudan is only slightly more than a geographical expression.

*Jok Madut Jok, Diversity, Unity, and Nation Building in South Sudan (US Institute of Peace, 2011), p. 2.*

There is currently a standard reading of the short national history of South Sudan: that the overwhelming vote for secession in 2011 was an expression of a negative nationalism, more an anti-colonialist mass sentiment against Sudan’s successive violent and exclusionary regimes than any coherent idea of a post-independence nation.¹ This reactionary anti-Sudan vote disguised a fundamental lack of national identity and community, which allowed the growth of a corrupt, rent-seeking and factionalised military kleptocracy, alienated from a citizenry that is still predominantly rural, and which prioritises ethnic affiliation and local society. The very few South Sudanese people who try to take on the role of “civil society” – often in diaspora – face real risks in criticisms of the new state, and find little practical power or protection in ideas of responsibility to the nation.²

This overview, focused as it is on the “root causes” of South Sudan’s current predicament, is linked to a generalised characterisation of the “ordinary people” of South Sudan. Jok Madut Jok, a high-profile South Sudanese anthropologist, wrote in 2005:

> Listening to so many Sudanese who are not men or women of political power, those whom one might characterise as "ordinary people", I rarely hear them discussing the


causes or the histories of the conflicts. Their discussions, heated as they may be, are rarely about the issues of wealth and power-sharing that are usually identified as the root causes of the conflicts: these are focused on by the leadership and without popular discussions. Where they do discuss national politics, wealth and power-sharing at the centre, it is easy to see that the interviewees have merely adopted the discourse handed down to them by their political leaders, rather than thinking independently about these issues.³

In this reading, South Sudanese people are mostly passive subjects of elite conflicts, disengaged from national interests, and focused on either – viewed ungenerously – an ethno-nationalist politics of the belly,⁴ or – more sympathetically – on local community protection and moral orders in the face of extractive and violent “national” regimes. Either way, in this view, there is little emotional content or intellectual substance to a country-wide South Sudanese nationalism.

**Khartoum**

This study is a history of vernacular political thought on South Sudanese national futures, from the 1970s to the present.⁵ It aims to populate, complicate, and deepen this contemporary teleological narrative of a united nationalist fight for state independence through exploring histories of political discussion among southern communities resident in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, roughly since the end of Sudan’s first civil war in 1972.

Khartoum itself can be seen as Sudan in microcosm.⁶ The city is often used as a synecdoche for describing the central government of Sudan and its elite local power base around the junction of the two Niles: Africa Watch observed in 1995 that “for the ruling elite, socially

---

⁵ Vernacular is used here to refer to these “masses” in the general literature on the Sudans: the non-elite, everyday understandings and discussions of those with little “voice” or influence in political affairs. It does not, however, mean that these people or their discussions were geographically static or parochial.
and culturally speaking, the city is Sudan.\footnote{African Rights, \textit{Sudan’s invisible citizens}, p. 14.} It has a complicated place in the imagination of the people of its surrounding regions as a symbol and seat of oppression, as well as a place of opportunity, refuge and education. Khartoum’s political geography is, however, shaped by the politics and violence of Sudan’s peripheries. With the independence of Sudan in 1956, the lifting of ordinances restricting migration within Sudan – including the colonial closed districts ordinances that served to isolate the southernmost areas of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile – encouraged Khartoum’s rapid expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. This migration increasingly included people from these three regions, as well as the neighbouring areas of Southern Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The extreme famine in Darfur in the early 1980s, and the increasing violence of the second civil wars in southern Sudan by the mid-1980s, were the catalyst for mass migration across central and northern Sudan and to Khartoum.

This rapid self-managed movement of people to Khartoum’s fast-expanding suburbs created a tense, changing urban geography, where often the state has been either absent, or present through ambiguous local proxy. By the late 1980s, the sprawling peripheries of the city – an uncontrolled and generally frightening prospect for its core residents – were pejoratively named the “black belt.” This period also saw the rise of central Sudanese Islamic elites to economic and political dominance, with the Sudanese government increasingly monopolised by the National Islamic Front (NIF) (later the National Congress Party (NCP)) after a 1989 coup. By the early 1990s, under Omer el-Bashir’s populist Islamicist regime, and with southern and central Sudan experiencing intense violent conflict, famine and displacement, Khartoum’s landscape was heavily politically charged, requiring the everyday negotiation of political significances, meanings and boundaries by its southern and other peripheral migrant residents.
Figure 1: Map of pre-separation Sudan
The Khartoum context was markedly different to other “Internally Displaced Persons” (IDPs)’ refuges in and outside of Sudan. Khartoum’s massive new suburbs of dense settlements and networks of heterogeneous individuals and families from south, east and west developed right next to the centre of Sudanese government imaginaries and applied state power, and experienced little substantive international engagement until the early 2000s. But while the Khartoum context was unique, it was not necessarily isolated. The city’s population was (and is) highly mobile, particularly in the 1990s and 2000s, with networks of communication, family, work and residence extending across Sudan and into neighbouring countries. This intense, heterogeneous and self-managed context made Khartoum a fertile site for political discussion.

By the early 1980s, Khartoum’s new marginal “southern” populations were largely seen as apolitical victims in aid discourse. For the successive national and city administrations, their supporters and pro-government press, they were suspected “fifth columnists” for the rebel group the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA): particularly those who were, or were believed to be from Dinka and Nuer tribes, and people who were otherwise physically similar. Latterly, after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the SPLA’s civil war in 2005, this suspicion of the political disloyalty of ex-Khartoum communities has re-emerged in the south; since many returned southwards from 2006 to 2015, ex-IDPs have had a further designation in South Sudan, as “sell-outs”, wartime cowards, and “jellaba”, a common slur against northern Sudanese elites historically used against exploitative traders. These wartime “displaced” have long experience of being differentiated, stereotyped and resented.

---

8 See, for example Tom Masland, ‘Khartoum Bursting With Refugee Slums’, Chicago Tribune, 30 September 1988: ‘some officials warn that the teeming shantytowns could breed a “third column” in support of the Dinka-based guerrilla movement of John Garang, a former army colonel leading the rebels in the south. “Every southerner is considered a Garang supporter,” said Martin Kiir Majote [sic], an official of the Aweil Youth Union.’ Martin was interviewed during research for this thesis.

9 Mark Duffield, ‘Aid and Complicity: The Case of War-Displaced Southerners in the Northern Sudan’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 40:1 (March 2002), p. 87. Also see Archbishop Gabriel Zubeir to Caritas Germany, 4 July 1986, Comboniani, 6734.21.1, 8159-8166. This was an experience reported by several interviewees during research: for instance, PM was suspected or accused of being an SPLA member when working as a cook for a petroleum company: PM, 17 October 2013.
Taking up Cherry Leonardi’s research on the productivity of urban margins for articulating personal identifications and political community,¹⁰ this thesis examines Khartoum as a site for the negotiation and construction of specific “southern” Sudanese moral and political community. As with most scholarship on urban life, it evidences the productivity of the city in propagating community organisation, in which it was maybe better than the “home” context that these organisations most often reference. This study examines only part of this community organisation, but emphasises that this work was not isolated or insular, and not limited to “southern” communities. Increasingly globalised urban living, the prejudicial and violent forces of the civil war, and the dynamics of close-built squatter space demanded new forms of self-explanation in national and international frames.¹¹ Instead of being passive local receptors of elite ideological narratives, many people in Khartoum were invested in constructing emotional content for their own ideas of political collectives, that included layered understandings of ethnic, pan-ethnic, regional and racial solidarities. This creative Straussian bricolage of moral and political associations – in response to the primarily internal community stresses of Khartoum living – was led, or articulated most clearly, by people who were simultaneously spanning Derek Peterson’s typologies of ethnic patriots and iconoclastic nationalists, who held multiple, and sometimes paradoxical, ideas of theoretical and practical future communities.¹² This study demonstrates Lonsdale’s point that

thought and practice are contradictory. They can be ethnically honourable and tribally factional. They can be paternally authoritarian and democratically plural, theologically liberal and fundamentalist... contradictory political culture may be contributing to a nation-in-formation.¹³

---


This Khartoum testing-ground is an example of the messy intellectual and practical work of building southern Sudanese and Sudanese political communities, and the more essential discussions of the moral knowledge, values, and practical work needed to underpin these potential nations. A small part of these men and women’s work is examined here: this is a history of idealism, anger, necessity and constraint in the construction of "southern" Sudanese communities in Khartoum.

**Research in South Sudan**

Research for this study was undertaken initially through an exploration of the scattered English language archival record of southern Sudanese Khartoum residents since the 1960s in archives in the UK, Europe, Kenya and South Sudan, and then largely through interviews with networks of these recently returned Khartoum residents living in South Sudan in 2012, 2013 and mid-2015. Most of these urban residents were displaced from northern parts of southern Sudan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly from areas of intense violence and famine in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Unity, Upper Nile, Abyei, Lakes and Warrap states, which are also regions with historical trading and labour routes northwards. Southern residents of Khartoum mostly returned southwards under the changing political context in Sudan after 2005, and particularly with the increasing certainty of a vote for the secession of southern Sudan by 2010.

There were no reliable statistics for the southern population of Khartoum at the time of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, when the peace prompted massive “return and rehabilitation” work by the United Nations and other agencies. By the early 1990s, with huge numbers of new arrivals in the thousands per week from Darfur, Kordofan, and southern Sudan, observers began rounding estimates to the nearest hundred thousand, and

---

14 I did not conduct research in Khartoum for this thesis, in part because of previous personal issues with immigration and security in Khartoum, and because the majority of the southern population of Khartoum had returned to the south by the time of research for this study, and were more likely to be able to speak freely about recent experience than those struggling to continue to reside in Khartoum under new nationality restrictions and on-going political pressures.
then to millions, with about one and a half to two million being the most common estimate for all southern Sudanese people in Khartoum in the 2000s.\textsuperscript{15} Over 2006 to 2012, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimated that about two and a half million “IDPs” would return to South Sudan from Sudan and neighbouring countries, a majority of whom would be coming from Khartoum.\textsuperscript{16} Most of these people returned from 2010 to 2012, to Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and to Juba, the new capital:\textsuperscript{17} the highest rates of resettlement were seen in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, where around half a million people settled between 2007 and 2012, mostly from Khartoum. In many areas of the state, these new residents make up well over half of the population.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{17} IOM, \textit{Sustainable Reintegration of South Sudanese: Final Draft Strategy} (March 2012), p. 2.

\textsuperscript{18} Larissa Carol Meier, ‘Returning to Northern Bahr el Ghazal, South Sudan’ (Lund University thesis, 2013), p. 2.
Figure 2: Satellite images of Aweil town
Aweil town in 2003 (above) and 2015 (below), showing part of the massive suburban growth of the town. My rented room is marked by the black star. Images copyright Google Earth.
Most research work within South Sudan focused on Aweil town, the capital of Northern Bahr el Ghazal state, and the surrounding villages in Aweil North and East counties, partly because of this critical mass of returned Khartoum residents. This region suffered a devastating famine in the late 1980s, partly due to intensive government-sponsored militia raiding against villages and settlements, including the destruction and depopulation of areas along the train line supply route from southern Darfur. The area itself is relatively homogenous, with most people belonging to the Malual division of the Dinka. The Malual, like the Rek, Twic, and others across southern Sudan, are locally referred to as a tribe of the Dinka. “The Dinka” – or in Dinka, monyjiang, or jieng – have, however inaccurately, long been considered as a broad ethno-political collective, although united more by common language and mutual cultural practice than as a coherent “tribal” entity.

This study therefore cannot be representative of Khartoum experience, or of a “southern intellectual history”; it is predominantly shaped by the understanding of Dinka people, and Dinka-language songs, poems and texts. However, ethnic intermarriage has been increasingly common, particularly among Khartoum and urban residents, and this research included interviews with Darfur, Nuba, Dinka Ngok, and Shilluk informants, as well as the local minority Jur Col (Luo). The ethnographic imbalance of this study was also somewhat redressed through work in Juba in autumn 2013, including interviews and group discussions with Nuer, Bari, Kuku, and Zande residents, and work in Kuajok, Warrap State in mid-2013, although further research in Yambio and Torit was stopped by violent conflict and the split in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) in December 2013. This thesis

---

19 476,143 returnees were registered by IOM from 2007 to 2013 in Northern Bahr el Ghazal alone, 100,000 more than in the whole of the three Equatorian states: IOM, *Village Assessment Survey Report 2013*. The constraints of insecurity in Jonglei, and the horrific political crisis in December 2013, prevented me from conducting further research outside of Juba and Aweil. This thesis therefore is based mostly on discussions with Dinka Malwal people, with Dinka of other clans and sub-clans resident in the Aweil area for marriage or work, with some Jur Col residents, and with Nuer, Kuku and Bari communities in Juba. This is somewhat problematic, even if justifiable in terms of the ethnic composition of Khartoum's southern populations. This study does not claim to be representative, and is also not seeking to be a “proportionate” survey by ethnicity. A focus on ethnic representation would be at variance with the central intents of this thesis, and in all discussions, people emphasised collaboration, translation and replication of associational and cultural work across ethnic boundaries.

also makes no claim to accurately render the trauma, stress and violence of the civil war and return home, though it does draw on people's own explanations of how they coped with and contextualised their experiences, fears and pain.

This study is based on retrospectives, researched mostly from mid-2012 to the end of November 2013, a period of intensive return, hope, and reframing of wartime experiences in a new social and political context. Many of these ex-Khartoum residents are reconstructing social orders and personal lives in peri-urban areas and villages across South Sudan, in settlements that are often colloquially known as “New Khartoum.”²¹ These new citizens of South Sudan – particularly the younger “returnees” – have brought with them a distinct urban and Khartoum-shaped understanding of southern community and identity.²² This is thus also a study of these people's making sense of their histories: my research in Aweil and Juba became part of people's on-going conversations and plans for education, organisation and community governance. It echoes the memorialisation of Khartoum life since 2005 by its southern residents: in the late 2000s, for instance, one woman bought a photo album and began paying for studio photography sessions with friends from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and other Sudanese communities in her Khartoum neighbourhood ‘for memory,’ as she said that “we know that in future we are going to scatter in different places and we need to remember ourselves.”²³

**States and nationalism in the Sudans**

Current histories of Sudan – that is, of the former Sudan, as it existed from the nineteenth century to 2011 – generally describe violent, extractive and exclusionary central state regimes acting upon and against marginalised peripheries, based on histories of racism and slavery that span at least two centuries across Sudan’s vast and diverse geographies and societies. Sudan’s heterogeneous topographies of language, skin colour and social

---

²¹ This colloquialism appears to be fading in usage in areas of mass settlement, such as in Gudele in Juba, having been a common local name from roughly 2008 to 2010; “New Khartoum” remains in use in other places, particularly in specifically-made returnee villages and suburbs, such as the New Khartoum outside of Kuajok.

²² See the conclusion for more discussion of these retrospectives.

²³ AMJ, 16 July 2013.
organisation have been drafted by successive colonial and post-colonial governments into national racial and cultural hierarchies and extractive economies since at least the 1800s, particularly through histories of slave raiding, slave armies and slave labour.\textsuperscript{24} Slave armies and their large supporting communities have been fundamental to the creation, centralised power, and national imaginaries of the state in Sudan, from 1820s Turco-Egyptian conscriptions to private armies in southern Sudan and Darfur in the 1850s, which formed the basis for the Mahdist slave army in 1882; these armies extended into Uganda and Kenya under colonial rule.\textsuperscript{25} The understanding of these slave/ry histories, racial discrimination and state marginalisation among the people of these “peripheries” will be discussed further on in this introduction, and forms the backbone of the thesis.

This political geography of Sudan’s centre versus its peripheries, most explicitly set out by Douglas H. Johnson, is a reconfiguring of older ideas of the Sudanese civil wars as a self-contained “north-south” conflict, specifically in 1955 to 1972 and 1983 to 2005: the twentieth century Sudanese civil wars as a whole are now widely understood as multiple manifestations of a centre-periphery conflict, based on failures of power- and resource-sharing underpinned by these racialised histories of state weakness and violence.\textsuperscript{26} This is also the geography of dependency theory, and now makes up the standard, and statist, approach to analyses of Sudanese political history.

However, the “north-south” conflict remains a powerful idea in both politics and research, encouraged by a focus over at least the last two decades on the apparently essential binary


\textsuperscript{26} This summary is both the mainstream political analysis of the civil wars, and a political ideology that underpinned the SPLM/A. For a detailed discussion of this approach, and the SPLA’s use of it, see Edward Thomas, \textit{South Sudan: A Slow Liberation} (London, 2015), pp. 27, 115.
choice between “southern secession or south-north unity”, reified by the CPA in 2005. The landscape of Sudanese political discourse has been narrowed and flattened further by the nature of research on Sudan, and now on South Sudan. Secession in 2011 singled out South Sudan as an “exceptional” case in African geopolitics, and has quickly separated “South Sudan” studies from “Sudan studies”; more broadly, limited academic study in the south, because of conflicts and problems of access, has encouraged a kind of exceptionalism in research on Sudan. This study links Sudanese and South Sudanese political history to wider current questions of nationalism and popular political cultures in African studies: what makes up potential national communities? How do political communities find and articulate moral content and emotional power beyond anti-colonial resistance? And (how) does a broad territorial nationalism exist alongside other, potentially more powerful, personal identifications?

Southern Sudan has commonly been described as a product of statist outsiders and their interference. These external agents have generally been credited for producing the idea of southern Sudanese identity in the first place, as ‘an external identity imposed upon the region and its people’ based upon the region’s apparent distinctness, at least from the outside, as a environmentally and personally hostile area only touched by militarised slaving parties, and with racially “African” physiognomies. These ideas – of hostility, lawlessness, African backwardness, and cheap labour – were continued by the British authorities under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, who maintained the area as closed districts under a “southern policy” from 1930.

---

27 See, for example, Xan Rice, ‘Nearly all southern Sudanese voted for secession’, The Guardian, 30 January 2011; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, pp. 23–56. For a critique of this approach, see Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought’, Centre for Peace and Development Studies, University of Juba (2014), pp. 24–5.
28 For example, Peter Woodward, ‘South Sudan: exception or precedent?’, Royal African Society (2011).
29 Thomas argues instead for the exemplary nature of South Sudan as a postcolonial state; Thomas, South Sudan, p. 278.
30 For example, see Gérard Prunier, Darfur: the ambiguous genocide (London, 2005); Jok, Sudan.
31 Johnson, ‘Sudanese military slavery’, p. 4.
32 Ibid., p. 4.
Southern Sudanese nationalism is thus broadly seen as the product of these external delineations; most studies of nationalist movements since the 1940s have approached the above questions of the structure and content of southern nationalism through the common postcolonial African narrative of “resistance,” based on a zero-sum reaction to Sudan: “the state’s use of violence to assert itself produc[ed] greater commitment among the marginalised populations to break away.” Even when the idea of a “southern Sudan” is problematised in academic literature, the term itself is restrictive, and there is often a basic circularity to its coherence: “southerners” fight together because of their similarities, and build similarities through fighting together. Many academic studies, while emphasising the geographical and ethnic heterogeneity of the “southern” population, generally conclude that the one real similarity that is shared amongst the people of what is now South Sudan is a history of neglect and exploitative incursions associated with the slave trade and imperial economic exploitation.

These broad characterisations of a loose collectivity born of “resistance to common oppression” capture an important truth. But they also actively assert that there is a dearth of “national” content to that collectivity; that South Sudan is a nation based only on mutual experiences of suffering. Most texts that deal with a national Sudanese or South Sudanese history, including those by regional political leaders, begin with a disambiguation of the plurality of the – implicitly or explicitly more operative and important – local and ethnic identities that together constitute “southern” Sudan. For instance, discussions of the constitution of southern Sudan have struggled, since the 1990s, with ideas of a “nation of

34 Jok, *Sudan*, p. 48.
35 LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan*, p. 3.
36 Theoretically, ‘resistance’ is, as Tymoczko says, restrictive because it is a reactive concept. Maria Tymoczko (ed.), *Translation, Resistance, Activism* (Amherst, 2010), p. vii.
nationalities” and “unity in diversity”, but also with fears of exacerbating inter-ethnic confrontation through promoting “ethnic federalism.” This approach implies a segmented regional population, ethnically distinct and delineated, and which privileges ethnicity above other forms of identification and differentiation.

In this sense, South Sudan suffers from the same idea of zero-sum politics found in postcolonial Africa since the 1960s: that ethnic loyalties had to die away in order to create a united nation, and tribalism was a retrograde step in the postcolonial march towards progress, modernity and state-building. The last decade of South Sudanese politics has reflected this idea of an “either/or” between ethnic and territorial nationalisms: ‘the ethnic identities so many fall back on hamper the creation of a strong sense of a common South Sudanese purpose and identity.’ Much recent discussion of the problems of independent South Sudanese “nation-building” has centred on getting people to identify primarily as South Sudanese, as President Salva Kiir exhorted in his Independence Day speech in 2011: ‘remember you are South Sudanese first!’

This thesis is part of new African intellectual histories that do not necessarily see ethnic groups and nations as separate spheres of social, cultural and political imagination, and do not privilege ethnicity as an alternative frame for personal and political action. Ethnic communities are powerful forums for debate, providing the linguistic and cultural tools, histories, and context for discussions of power, responsibility, and mutual futures, but they are not sole – or separate – ‘communities of argument.’ Political imaginations are inherently pluralistic: monolithic ethnic “peoples” are one part of overlapping personal and political affiliations in South Sudan and abroad. Various political projects and imagined

38 These ideas have been most clearly put forward by Jacob Akol, and supported by Riek Machar; for a summary of this, see Leonardi, *Dealing with government in South Sudan*, p. 187.
41 ‘President Kiir’s Independence Speech In Full’, *Gurtong*, 14 July 2011.
communities share contents and concepts, and cannot be neatly categorised as ethnic or territorial nationalisms.\textsuperscript{44}

A recent literature on nationalism has centred on intellectual histories of discourse and examined the embedding of ideas of potential collectives into common, comprehensible metaphors and practices.\textsuperscript{45} This scholarship has focused on the development of common literary worlds in shaping horizontal political communities,\textsuperscript{46} particularly emphasising the power of missionary education and the spread of literacy and print media in imagining a common public. This produced what Meredith Terretta has called “village nationalism,” the hybridisation and domestication of multiple political ideas in local terms.\textsuperscript{47}

This new literature is the grounding for this study, which draws on political theorist Warren Magnusson’s critique of the statist ontology of “the political.”\textsuperscript{48} Most current academic work on Sudan continues to analyse conflicts in terms of a multitude of Sudanese states, including the colonial administration, the “guerrilla governments” of rebel movements, and Khartoum’s regimes; but this focus on state and anti-state action does not necessarily engage with the

ways in which people ‘made claims on new possibilities.’ Similarly, the state has been central to much of the recent literature on marginal and marginalised communities – even where these studies are of explicitly anti- or extra-state survival. While I do not want to downplay the extensive suffering of Khartoum’s urban poor, and the state-driven economic and political violence they were forced to negotiate, this dissertation is not focused on the rights demanded by the marginalised from the state as citizens, or leveraged through manipulation of the state’s structures and language. Magnusson argues instead for seeing a multiplicity of political authorities in different registers, ones that are there for different purposes and heed the call of different drummers. Many of these authorities claim that they are not political – only cultural, economic, religious, communal, or whatever – and such a move often enhances their autonomy. … The proliferation of forms of political authority reflects the diversity of human purposes, only one of which is to achieve good government.

Recent literature has focused on these authorities on the margins of the state and on the intermediation and translation of state power and citizenship. New work by Cherry Leonardi, Simon Simonse and Ahmed Sikainga has demonstrated the intellectual productivity of this historic engagement with state and government in Sudan, particularly on urban fringes. Chiefs and churches were (and still are) some of the most visible actors in this brokerage in Khartoum since the 1940s, and the position of “traditional authorities” as interlocutors has lately been powerfully explored by Leonardi. This thesis builds strongly on Leonardi’s work: many people described the intermediation of parastatal community

---

51 Magnusson, Politics of Urbanism, pp. 2, 4, 8.
52 Hunter, Political Thought and the Public Sphere; Englund, ‘Anti Anti-Colonialism’; Brennan, Taifa; Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan.
authorities in Khartoum suburbs, working to ‘secure spaces where “the soldiers never go.”’
But this work negotiating access and protection to/from the state was explained to me as primarily important for its overall outcome: they ‘managed to keep people safe,’ creating community-governed spaces at a distance from state powers, that could give room for ‘real work.’

**Village nationalism and political education**

This “real work” was explained generally in interviews in South Sudan as “education”, and this study uses education as its central metaphor. Education has long been both a political issue and a topic of academic study in Sudan, but most research has focused on formal schooling, despite the fact that informal, local, adult self-organisation has characterised intellectual and educational life, particularly in southern Sudan, throughout the post-colonial period.

Education is both a core demand and progenitor of anti-colonial nationalist movements, and Africanist academia has produced a wealth of literature on the interplays of literacy, nationalism and ethnogenesis. The study of educational and intellectual activity is a fertile way of engaging with internal explanations of inclusion, behaviour and ideals: what debates

---

54 Leonardi, *Dealing with government in South Sudan*, p. 220; also pp. 87, 79.
55 LLAA, 15 August 2013.
57 Not least in South Sudan: the SPLA mobilised many of its recruits through education, and many of its soldiers worked as teachers. Haumann, *Travelling with Soldiers and Bishops*, pp. 41, 51–2, 62.
58 For example, Adrian Hastings, *The Church in Africa: 1450-1950* (Oxford, 1994); Berry, *Chiefs know their boundaries*. There is also a wealth of research on subversive education in African American scholarship, for example Heather Andrea Williams, *Self-Taught: African American Education in Slavery and Freedom* (November 2009); Shevaun E. Watson, “‘Good Will Come of This Evil’: Enslaved Teachers and the Transatlantic Politics of Early Black Literacy”, *College Composition and Communication*, 61:1 (2009), pp. 66–89.
are encouraged, what terminologies are used, what worldview should be taken to heart, and what actions and ideas are beyond the pale. In Khartoum, this "real work" was a broad debate over the meanings and practice of liberation, responsibility, and rights in the broadest sense of the term: both for contemporary practical problems of community order, and in preparation for a theoretical better future.59 Examining this intellectual history complicates the general characterisation of southern Sudan’s broad (if vague) popular desire for self-determination and independence, instead evidencing complex discussions over the meanings and possibilities of these terms, beyond “unity versus secession.”

This study is thus situated within a renewed academic focus on vernacular political imaginations, part of a long-running concern with agency in Africanist scholarship.60 Building on the early work of Peel and Feierman, this turn towards intellectual history has focused on ‘pioneers’, particularly those engaged in vernacular literacy projects, newspapers, books, histories, autobiographies and auto-anthropologies.61 This scholarship, particularly that of Derek Peterson, has increasingly looked beyond English-language middle-class intelligentsia and missionary schools, towards the work of vernacular historians and local intellectuals, their research projects, teaching, and the critical reception of their own work.62 This thesis argues against any clear contrast between Peterson’s tribalist and traditionalist ethnic patriots, and his innovative and potentially supra-ethnic iconoclastic nationalists: instead, it

59 Hunter and Thomas have both recently argued for this approach; Hunter, ‘Dutiful Subjects, Patriotic Citizens, and the Concept of “Good Citizenship” in Twentieth-century Tanzania’, The Historical Journal, 56:01 (March 2013), and Thomas, South Sudan, p. 27.


aims to depict a varied field of what could be termed southern Sudanese “civil society” in Khartoum, from militias and street gangs to church football associations and comedy groups.  

Delineating these “actors” is problematic: teachers, government employees, traditional and state court workers, market traders, and army or militia members are not discrete categories in a socio-economic setting where many men and women had multiple occupations and projects. The most artificial category was that of “student”: while the title was a political marker for the tiny minority of southerners at Khartoum universities, arguably most people in Khartoum could be described as students, including working women who studied their children’s textbooks and engaged in evening classes. One man who discussed this project with me over the course of research is a representative example of this plurality of affiliation: a former rebel fighter in the first civil war from the mid-1960s until 1972, he moved into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), then retired to Khartoum in the late 1980s during the second Sudanese civil wars, having briefly fought against the SPLA. In Khartoum, he worked as a private driver, a church committee member, a vernacular school teacher in the evenings, and a local multi-ethnic southern court member; he became a formal member of the SPLA’s political wing, the SPLM, in 2005 when a Khartoum regional office opened.

This work was not purely theoretical or philosophical. Practical versions of various shapes of collectivities were already in play in Khartoum, from the development of multi-ethnic, federalised customary court systems and more exclusionary ethno-regional militias to subversive pan-regional political organisations and pan-Sudanese artists’ collectives. These vernacular and context-specific trials of a variety of local and international political philosophies were made accessible, and were critiqued themselves, through place names, jokes, slurs, and caricatures.

---


64 MMD, 14 April 2013, 3 August 2013, 15 August 2013 and 17 August 2013.

This study focuses on networks of these self-taught educators, community and school organisers, part-time literati and artists in Khartoum, particularly since the late 1980s. These men and women constituted what Trudell calls a vernacular-language ‘counter-elite’ which incorporated international and national elite literature and radio political discourse into common languages, older vernacular stories and local histories, and neologisms. This work extended beyond print. Much like Moorman’s recent work on Angola, the most referenced “political parties” in interviews in Aweil and Juba were music groups, particularly the work of Akut Kuei (“Eagle Group”). Khartoum residents were usually at most semi-literate, and songs (and their composers and singers) were the most referenced form of this intellectual debate during research. Angela Impey’s recent work on songs argues for their interpretation as the ‘active mediation... of ideas, opinions and ideologies.’ The most memorable of these songs were recounted by men and women throughout research – including across ethnic lines, as translations and re-writes – emphasising their ability to condense, articulate and mobilise, while remaining open to individual interpretation.

Blackness, Sudanese-ness, and southern-ness in Khartoum

This thesis asks: what type of “South Sudanese” community, what structures and concepts of being “southern”, were people imagining and articulating in Khartoum – in theory, as ideals, for a future state, and as practical working lines for Khartoum living? This study demonstrates how people were striving to fit parameters, emotional value and detail to a specifically southern political community, through discussions over the limits of who and what was considered “southern”, how being southern should be articulated, and how

---

66 Trudell, ‘When “Prof” speaks, who listens?’, p. 248; see also Sugarman, ‘Imagining the Homeland’, p. 429.
67 Moorman, Intonations.
southern community should be structured; overall, the practical content of an imagined alternative national community.

This vernacular cultural work did not necessarily indicate clear-cut parochial and patriarchal ethno-nationalism, demanding adherence to the homelands and chiefly authorities: one section of a pamphlet produced by a Dinka cultural group in Khartoum was titled 'The advantages and disadvantages in Dinka culture.'

Many people rejected the idea that their ethnicity was the essential or sole basis to their personal and political identification, and grounds for their actions. Work in the ethnic vernacular – the textual basis for the majority of this thesis – was practical, tactical, and less narrow than it necessarily appears: these men and women prided themselves on their multilingual skills and translation of ideas across ethnic and regional lines. Working in vernacular languages provided multiple benefits: fundamentally, it allowed these workers to situate their activity in the comparatively apolitical arena of “ethnic culture and tradition”, a space relatively uninteresting to Khartoum government security agents, and commonly seen as unintellectual, primordial, and thus unthreatening, a field for “elders” and reminiscence rather than for political activism. Vernacular languages were practical, and at least superficially private, for instance through the use of local metaphors and references to old stories – of elephants and hunting, or of lions and monkeys – that provided subtle ways of communicating political points or even news on the progress of the war.

These workers also drew upon broader political and racial registers from the violent history and geography of Sudan. Race is likely an inappropriate translation of vernacular terminologies: black was the most common shorthand in vernacular and English-language discussions during research, and was the primary marker of self-identification in many people's accounts of community structures in Khartoum. Blackness as used in these explanations needs disaggregation; it has served both as a summary of political and global racial consciousness following Fanon, and also a marker for understanding and participation.

70 Magazine of Dinka Culture, sections 26 and 13, my emphasis. For details on this magazine, see chapter four, p. 175.
71 Brendan R. Tuttle, 'Life is Prickly. Narrating history, belonging, and common place in Bor, South Sudan' (January 2013), p. 323.
in local affiliations, experiences and behaviours in the close Khartoum context, beyond being “southern.” As Jemima Pierre has emphasised, race is a relational and malleable concept that can only be understood in the context of its deployment. This study thus attempts to document and explore this work of relating “blackness”, Sudanese-ness, southern-ness, ethnicity, regionalisms, and political ideology as a means of mobilising a new nationalism.

This racial content of southern nationalism has remained relatively unexplored. Racial expression has often been written into “southern identity” without question, as with Howell, who argues that south Sudanese saw themselves as “southerners” by 1970 because they were self-describing as ‘we black people.’ Academically, discussions of race in literature on the Sudans have stalled at racism. This is despite the fact that, as Edward Thomas recently noted, ‘the whole of Sudan was organised around race in the nineteenth century,’ and ‘race and racial oppression are references to a system for explaining and justifying dramatic new forms of inequality that emerged then.’ But in one of the few discussions of race in the Nile valley, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and kharyssa rhodes have commented that in scholarly discussion ‘race has been underrepresented, submerged, or ignored.’ Racial discourse and terminologies are old weapons in the moral and social geography of Africa, even if being “black” in Africa seems axiomatic.

74 J. Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’ (Ph.D., University of Reading, 1978), p. 256. Thomas notes the continued ‘accidental constructivism’ of most accounts of ‘African’ and ‘Arab’ race issues; Thomas, *South Sudan*, p. 31.
76 Thomas, *South Sudan*, p. 17.
The reintegration of blackness into histories of southern Sudanese political consciousness is important: histories of blackness, racism and slavery were at the core of this educational work in Khartoum. Sondra Hale calls this the ‘backdrop’ to Sudanese history: there are significant historical, social, and political tensions over who the “black people” are in Sudan, the variants of being black, and who is not black in Sudan. This racial topography is linked fundamentally to histories of slavery and other exploitations of Sudan’s people by external and Sudanese state elites. Through the 1800s and early 1900s, slave-raiding was a state activity, fuelling the expansion of extractive state authority from Khartoum and northern regional economic power, patronage and violence: experience of extensive, systematic slave raiding for fuelling Sudanese labour markets were widespread across Sudan and continued into the British-Egyptian Condominium period from 1898 to 1956. Extensive forced recruitment throughout the 1800s in various Turko-Egyptian, Mahdist, and private armies across Sudan underpinned both state power and state understanding in the communities who were drawn on for slaves and support, in Southern Darfur, the Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains and southern Sudan: areas that by the 1910s ‘had a long history of dependency on the periphery of state systems.’ The British “abolition” of the slave trade in this period did not fundamentally change Sudanese economic structures which relied on enslaved labour. The fundamental need for a cheap mobile labour pool both sustained slavery in the central regions of the Sudan through the 1930s, and maintained old ideas of labour control. A “Sudanisation” process enlisted ex-slaves into the army and agricultural schemes, and the Central Labour Bureau was established in 1907 for, as Sikainga put it, ‘reconciling reluctant

---

79 Sondra Hale, ‘Nationalism, “Race”, and Class’, p. 181. Hale notes a continuing broad hierarchy of racial terms: blue-black (azrag, or aswad for black), green (akhdar, for a dark northerner), brown (asmar), and yellow (asfar, suggestive of whiteness). Class and socio-economic status are interferences in this hierarchy. See also Al-Baqir al-Arif Mukhtar, ‘The crisis of identity in Northern Sudan: A dilemma of a black people with a white culture’, A paper presented at the CODSRIA African Humanities Institute Tenured by the Program of African Studies at the Northwestern University, Evanston, (2004) for a discussion of this racial terminology.
80 Wendy James, ‘Perceptions from an African slaving frontier’, in Archer (ed.), Slavery and other forms of unfree labour, p. 133.
liberated and runaway slaves to regimented wage-labour.\textsuperscript{82} Slaves became “servants” under both domestic slavery and in cheap labour markets:\textsuperscript{83} people from these enslave-able areas continued to be socially, economically, and racially positioned as cheap wage labour; the term \textit{abd} (slave, pl. \textit{abiid}) was, and is, still commonly used by many self-describing Arab, non-black, and/or better-off Khartoum residents to describe people in this racial, political and socio-economic position, in what Jok calls a ‘self-perpetuating’ system.\textsuperscript{84} Twentieth century Sudanese society has developed many slurs and shorthands for these historical identifications. For people on the edge, or outside of, this racial, regionalised and increasingly religious definition of Sudanese identity by Sudan’s independence in 1956, being “black” was in many ways a shorthand for an historical, political, experiential position within Sudanese history – without clear boundaries, and both a slur and a statement of politico-historical experience.

This history underpins tensions over national identification as \textit{Sudani}. The term \textit{Sudani} (the Arabic for Sudanese) has a similar racialised legacy as a generally derogatory word for those of slave descent, and therefore collectively for all black people.\textsuperscript{85} Claiming to be Sudanese – as a national marker – has thus been problematic for the many elite, Arab self-defining, and “non-black” ethnic communities living in the riverain state centre of Sudan, particularly around the juncture of the Niles at Khartoum; for many people, being Arab, Muslim and \textit{Sudani} (derived from the Arabic for ‘black people’, and associated with servility) were mutually contradictory.\textsuperscript{86} These associations were not resolved by the developing imagining of a \textit{Sudani} national identity among the growing nationalist movement, particularly among the small Khartoum elites incorporated into the colonial state in the 1930s and 40s: by the early 1960s and 70s, where this study starts, there was – as Al-Baqir al-Afif Mukhtar

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{82} Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, ‘Slavery, labour, and ethnicity in Khartoum: 1898-1956’ (c. 1980s), SAD.307/6/1-65, pp. 7–8.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Jok Madut Jok, ‘Post-independence racial realities’, p. 193.
\item \textsuperscript{85} The term was used broadly in the Nile Valley and by the British in the early 1900s; James, ‘Perceptions from an African slaving frontier’, p. 130; Sharkey, ‘Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan’, p. 29.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Sharkey, ‘Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan’, pp. 28–29.
\end{itemize}
observes – ‘a wide consensus among Sudanese, Northern and Southern alike, that the country is in a state of crisis of national identity.’

However, as Hale notes, ‘Southerners and westerners have rather dropped out of this analysis.’ This unwritten history – of how those living in the southern, eastern, and western areas of Sudan articulated, claimed, and used this historically-rooted racial vocabulary – is too large for this thesis, but is the conceptual basis for the work of the “southern” Khartoum residents examined here, and the background and terminology used in many interviews with men and women in Aweil and Juba. This thesis thus moves away from a tight focus on a history of popular expressions of specifically “South/ern Sudanese” identity, to include other claims on African, ethnic, regional, and Sudanese belonging instrumentalised in the broader detailing of a new nationalist cause. By the 1950s and 60s, some Sudanese men – particularly those from southern Sudan – increasingly claimed a specifically “African” identity, articulating this alongside broader African nationalist movements and, later, the rise of apartheid, and compounding their other ideas of a clear binary between themselves and the “Arab-Muslim” Sudanese elite. Alex De Waal emphasised the role of global and regional pressures for the simplification and binarisation of essential identities, by the 1970s onwards, in the resurgence of “African majority” languages in Garang and the SPLA’s rhetoric. Maybe more popularly, many people from eastern, southern and western Sudan have long laid claim to being “truly” Sudanese – drawing on its old, black, slave history meanings, and its old Arabic definition of the “lands of the blacks”: a theme throughout this study is this continued claim to being the real Sudanese people, autochthonous and invaded, as well as laying claim to a distinct, potentially new national, “Southern” identity.

These multiple registers of identification and discrimination are a theme of this study, and are never quite disentangled. This is reflective of these Khartoum residents’ own struggles in

---

89 As well as the use of the terms zurug (“blacks”) or abiid (“slaves”) by northern Sudanese about Darfuri people, the first erasing older and more complex racial terminologies, and the second being broadly historically inaccurate. Alex de Waal, ‘Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African identities, violence and external engagement’, *African Affairs*, 104:415 (April 2005), pp. 197, 199.
their complex and ambiguous linguistic, literary, educational and cultural work: “black people” is used alongside “Dinka”, “Equatorian,” or “southern”, for example, in interviews with a variety of residents and in texts from Khartoum, and “black”, southern, ethnic, clan, and regional identifiers and descriptives were scattered throughout texts and interviews. Explanations and translations of the literary, artistic and educational canon for this study have also been subject to a continual struggle, not least between interpreters, translators and informants, over the overlapping and ambivalent use of racial, ethnic, political and geographical terminology; the translations used here are unresolved and still subject to an on-going debate. This code-switching heightens the plurality and ambiguity of these categories, and emphasises the importance of personal interpretation and opinion. This study tries to be reflective, insofar as possible, on the use of these shorthands, most obviously the term “southern”, increasingly used by the late 1970s to indicate a bundle of ideas and identifications.

Brotherhood, and a federal moral community

This work articulated these plural layers of affiliation, social solidarity, and mutual political hopes formed amidst the intense political and practical pressures of living in Khartoum. This solidarity was explained by many men and women across the various socio-economic and ethnic communities in Aweil and Juba as “brotherhoods“, and maybe best articulated academically as a kind of moral federalism. These brotherhoods are plural versions of Anderson’s mutualities and horizontalities, both across people identified by the speaker as “southerners”, and with wider circles of black, peripheral, marginalised Sudanese-ness, especially people from the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and southern Darfur: people who were also defined by successive Sudanese states as black, enslave-able, and either non- or not-the-right-type-of-Muslim, and who lived in, or came from, areas that were similarly exploited and ignored by the central Khartoum state. The most well-known attempt to spell out this more inclusive Sudanese political philosophy is John Garang’s idea of “New Sudan”, a Sudan that would be ethnically plural and representative of its multiple African black
“nationalities”, articulated most explicitly in the 1994 SPLM national convention.\(^90\) The limits to New Sudan were perpetually unclear, partly because the idea was – as Johnson put it – as much a tactical position for approval of Ethiopian backers as a principle.\(^91\) Who would be included in this self-determination, the position of other Sudanese “marginalised peoples”, the ultimate aims of self-determination, and the form of “federal” political self-government this New Sudan – or New South Sudan – would take, remain unresolved questions.\(^92\)

The term \textit{federalism} is used consciously, with reference to the long history of debates over federalism within Sudan and South Sudan. Federalism has been used to describe many different political ideas over the last seventy years: it has been both an alternative to southern secession, and a fundamental part of it. The term is probably best described as an acronym for various discussions of how to structure and represent Sudanese communities, and how these communities could or should relate to each other politically and personally as a national unit, and as part of broader attempts to delimit the content and aims of southern and Sudanese political community.

There were limits to this collective relationship as “marginalised black Sudan”: being black Sudanese and southern Sudanese were never interchangeable ideas, and definitions of southern-ness were not necessarily positive. They included calls for retribution and recollections of collective suffering that were aimed not at the "grand other" of "Arab" Sudanese elites, but at the peripheries of this "southern" community, particularly those classed as sell-outs, and - secondly - at communities, particularly from Darfur, that had engaged in violence against fellow peripheral, “marginalised” and southern communities as “stooges” of the regime.\(^93\)


\(^92\) See Johnson, ‘Federalism’, pp. 24–25. Until very recently, discussions of federalism were a “red line” for President Salva Kiir, and debating federalism is still often interpreted as “disloyal” to the current government.

\(^93\) For a Tanzanian comparative, see Brennan, 'Blood Enemies’, p. 413.
Similarly, there were many much more restrictive conceptions of the constitution of "southern Sudanese" moral and political community. An ethnically-based federal idea of southern Sudan was, for many, a fundamentally pragmatic project, based on longer histories of vernacular, regional, and ethnic associations in Khartoum, when migrants from Sudan’s southern regions were a tiny and mobile minority. These men, and some women, emphasised ethnic groupings as the fundamental unit of “southern” federal identity, clarifying and uniting what many would call pan-ethnic groups such as the Dinka and Nuer through community associations and re-imagined (or, to their agents, re-created) systems of traditional authority. It provided practical self-protection and day-to-day administration of ethnically-organised court systems, clan and familial arbitration, and cultural and linguistic self-preservation. This “traditional” or “customary” ethnic associational life was inducted into existing political systems of local sultans and neighbourhood committees in the early 1980s – as detailed in chapter one – and provided a practical form of political intermediary to a variety of local and national state actors in Khartoum. This was underwritten politically – and for some, financially – by Bashir’s regime from 1989, with some of these Khartoum community chiefs being co-opted, or co-opting themselves, into the regime’s systems of “customary” authority, in exchange for some social and political protections and powers, and for many the chance of a salary: the most successful of these men gained significant political power, such as Deng Macham, who established the fundamentally ethnic federalist “southern” umbrella court system called Ashara Wilayat (Ten States) in Khartoum in the late 1980s, with the recognition, and thus associated legal powers, of the Khartoum government. By the 2000s, Bashir’s partly co-opted southern militia leaders, including Paulino Matip and other various militia commanders collected under the umbrella of the “Southern Sudan Defence Forces” under the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997 had positioned themselves at the highest levels of these Khartoum “southern” political-ethnic structures, with their own court systems, police, administrations, and ability to enforce decisions and punishments for “their” southern communities. This particular imagining of a southern Sudan federally united as a specifically ethnically-composite “nation of nationalities” also has a long history: the idea of representing, and giving political power to, Sudan’s plural “nationalities” as discrete ethnic units under a national umbrella was most clearly articulated by Riek Machar and other
proponents of the idea of a ‘House of Nationalities’ in the early 2000s. This regional, ethnic system was a form of ethnic federalism, with its citizens identifying and participating primarily as “ethnic groups”, from specific “home areas,” and being represented communally as such, in what is best described as a communitarian worldview.

The tensions within this thesis, then, are over the ideals and practical necessities of the southern Sudanese residents in Khartoum, demonstrating not just a discussion of a future post-war, and what was being “fought for,” but also the various imaginations of the war’s outcomes, and the limits to personal agency as “rebel nationalists” in Khartoum. This study thus emphasises the creativity and opportunity within emergent nationalisms, as well as their xenophobia, violence and prejudice. Personal beliefs, hopes for the future, ethnic and linguistic ties and broader political ideas can be held in tension. Individuals’ ideas and actions could be deeply conservative, aggressive, and exclusionary, often on the basis of ethnic group and clan; but they could also be creative, inclusive, and ambitious. This thesis explores these Khartoum residents' complex vernacular discussions of this emotional and social content of this "nation of nationalities," and the limitations on this creativity and brotherhood. These men and women’s explanations of their potential and practical community does not necessarily resemble a coherent, single, or bounded “southern nationalism” or even “southern people”, but may also lend substantially more emotional and critical depth and weight to popular academic and South Sudan state nationalist definitions of essentially “reactive” and negative South Sudanese nationalism.

As such this thesis is a history of praxis: this intellectual work was not just a rhetorical hobby, but required practical application through systems of political action and social control, from revolutionary political subversion to ethnic self-protection militias. As Johnson recently said, self-determination is more than achieving independence, but ‘also means choosing a form of self-government’; this study demonstrates, however, that communities from the southern areas of Sudan have been testing out various forms of Sudanese

---

94 For further detail, see Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 187; Rift Valley Institute, My mother will not come to Juba: South Sudanese debate the constitution (Juba, South Sudan, 2013).
brotherhoods and ethnic nationalisms well before 2011. This intellectual experimentation demanded that people put themselves and their personal and familial suffering in political, social and historical context, in what Peterson calls 'self-posssession': emphasising, as a Nuer young man in Juba put it, that 'it was up to you, to be smart – and research for yourself, or be defeated.'

Terminology, methodology, and apology

This thesis also departs from the terminology of studies of “Internally Displaced Persons” (commonly called IDPs). Research produced on these Khartoum communities – largely undertaken during the peace processes from 2003 onwards because of renewed academic and international aid access to Khartoum – has focused primarily on these populations as “returnees”: this literature generally measures the desire, and requirements for, what was by then “repatriation,” and these returnees’ basic livelihood needs pending and post-return. This study avoids the term “internally displaced” or any attempt to delineate categories of “squatters”, “refugees”, or the geographical limitations of “southerners.” IDPs have a dubious position in migration literature anyway, challenging legal categories and programming, and much of recent migration studies literature is practitioner-centric, full of what Ferguson calls the ‘conceptual apparatuses’ of development. Pre-determined legal and geographical categories work against the premise of this thesis, which is interested instead in these communities’ own definitions of “southern” and “displaced”, and their use of these terminologies. Using these terms post-independence also implies distinctions between north and south, their boundaries and histories, and makes the idea of “return” apparently inevitable. The people I met during research were fully aware of the political baggage of their label, and of research produced under this category.

---

95 Johnson, ‘Federalism’, p. 28.
97 YM, 10 September 2013.
I was very much a student of these South Sudanese historians and teachers, including my interpreters and a group of female friends near my temporary home at the edge, then, of suburban Aweil. This thesis is built on networks of texts, photographs, people and ideas, as I tried to trace writers, teachers, organisers, fellow students and participants both in Aweil and across Juba, talking, for example, to Kuajok-based authors of texts I had found in markets in Juba, Aweil and in Kampala and to Juba-based songwriters cited in discussions in Aweil. More broadly, I tried to explore where their work had reached, hunting graduation certificates, posters, music tapes, MP3s, photographs, textbooks and pamphlets, both in people's personal collections and in markets across South Sudan and in Kampala. These genealogies are only partly explored here, but form what Jan Blommaert has called an ethnography of travelling texts.  

The cross-referencing I aimed at during research mimicked the practice of Khartoum intellectual life. Abandoning distinctions between literary or oral cultures gives room for the reciprocity of academic and elite writing, church, curriculum and vernacular self-written and published texts, poetry, and music of all kinds, and national, rebel and international media and radio. All were cross-referenced, repeated, creatively edited, copied and re-written. People cited everything from Dickens' *Tale of Two Cities*, to Holt and Daly's seminal book *A History of Sudan from the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*; and – more commonly – songs, texts, curriculum books, quotations and political speeches. This historiographical work was not just oral, but included reference to what David Zeitlyn terms 'radical archives,' personal libraries, notes, photograph albums and music catalogues. 

'I brought and I wrote [out] many copies in that book, but they have been burnt. ... I copied the situation of Southerners in the North, and even [made notes on] some

---

101 Holt and Daly, *A history of the Sudan*.
political rallies... I wrote something [in a diary], so that I can remember it when peace comes.\textsuperscript{103}

Most people explained that they had lost, seen destroyed or were unable to bring many of their personal possessions from Khartoum, and so had edited their most important belongings into a curated personal collection; this loss and reconstruction were a form of trope in these accounts of experience, return and remembering. While the extent of original collections may have been exaggerated, many people were willing to show me what they had brought, and were also engaged in on-going editing, re-writing and dissemination of this work, particularly of photos uploaded to Facebook, and the photocopying and typing-up of books, documents, songs and poems.

The texts and songs used here are thus not “relics” of Khartoum community thought from the 1970s to 2000s, but were often repeatedly reproduced – as are the texts of today – as a form of “Best Of” collection, an edit in themselves of earlier discussions and notes. These unstable songs raise methodological challenges: for instance, in translating several well-known songs from Khartoum, my group of interpreters argued that they knew “better versions” of the lyrics despite the fact that they had been provided, in written form, by the original artist. The song group Akut Kuei is still invoked on South Sudanese message boards, in news commentary, and on Facebook: ‘Shame on you [- it] seem[s] you have never been listening to Akut Kuei.’\textsuperscript{104} These songs, and their artists, are key reference points in continuing political debate, in what Impey calls a form of abbreviated 'vox pop that is invoked to validate or criticise.'\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{103} DKLK, 21 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{105} Impey, ‘The Poetics of Transitional Justice’, p. 65.
This study therefore contains ‘truths of various sorts.’\textsuperscript{106} These personal accounts of the intellectual history of Khartoum were and are continually open to negotiation and reinterpretation, not least during discussions between informants, interpreters, translators and myself. Based on retrospectives, the research was shaped by them: interviews conducted for this study were also discussions amongst informants, and with myself and my interpreters, of what was, and what is now, important to remember and talk about. But the result is not simply creative writing; the depiction here of the political landscape of Khartoum is built on hundreds of discussions over 2012, 2013 and follow-up meetings in 2015, including discussions of previous interviews, translations, and notes, cross-referenced insofar as possible to older versions of these conversations in the diaries, letters and other marginalia of archival records. The result aims to be a study of a collective intellectual life in Khartoum, which is still under debate; as a history teacher noted during a methodological discussion in Aweil, ‘you will get very many histories.’\textsuperscript{107}

My hope is that this study’s focus on the intellectual politics and activism of southern communities and individuals in Khartoum redresses some of the imbalances in how “IDPs,” “returnees,” and, more broadly, “ordinary people,” are engaged with and seen in South Sudan today. I also hope that my translation of and emphasis on the work of these local scholars and organisers goes some way towards redressing the imbalances of power and privilege in this study. The errors and assumptions in this thesis are my own.

\textbf{Structure}

This thesis is broadly presented chronologically, but this chronology is rooted in the idiosyncratic folk chronologies laid out by Khartoum residents, rather than the standard political chronology of the Sudans: the second civil war, for instance, formally declared to


\textsuperscript{107} DKLK, 4 July 2013.
begin in 1983, was dated by people in Aweil, Kuajok and Juba as beginning, variously, from 1976 up to 1992.

Chapter one takes up from this introduction's discussion of the category "southern", examining the history of migrant populations from Sudan’s regions and their political activity in Khartoum since the 1800s, and the construction of “southern” politics by a tiny elite in the 1920s to 1960s. The chapter interrogates the apparent 'physical and ideological isolation' of these elites from their constituency in Khartoum, and looks for the loci of political discussion for the regional residents of Khartoum until the 1970s, emphasising political organisation and collaboration that survived the closing down of formal and elite political space under Nimeiri from 1972.\[^{108}\]

Chapter two focuses on the creation of what might be called the “black” geography of Khartoum during the massive expansion of the city, mainly from 1986 to 1992. It examines attempts to control and make safe the peripheries of the city - both by state agents and local government forces, and by the new residents themselves - through community organisation, demolitions, competing names, and alternative social centres.

This community “resistance” is disaggregated in chapter three. Successive Khartoum regimes have been engaged in what many academics have seen as acculturation, collectively called “Arabization and Islamization”, particularly of poorer residents in the capital. This chapter examines what these “policies” meant in practice, particularly from the NIF coup in 1989, for local black and southern residents. It argues that the Khartoum regime aimed not at the assimilation of these communities, but at maintaining distance from them. Similarly, local residents were not primarily focused on resisting Arabization or Islamization as “Christian Southerners”, but on broader projects of civic and moral education in the face of multiple urban challenges. This chapter integrates the Sudanese and broader eastern African literature on gender and community politics, looking at these projects' ideas

of responsibility, responsibility, and belonging within the complex racial, ethnic and urban context of Khartoum.

Chapter four examines the content and production of these projects, focusing on the creative networks and historiography of the texts, songs and curriculums produced as part of this community work. These many projects were fundamentally internal, focused not on the Grand Other of the Sudanese regime, but on the various politically dubious or ignorant edges of what was considered as the community. This chapter explores the plural definitions and moral limits of “southern” social solidarity and brotherhood as discussed among these projects and intellectual networks in the 1990s and 2000s.

Chapter five looks at the political action encouraged by these projects, and the nature of “Southern resistance” until the death of John Garang in 2005. Political subversion, even personal, private and psychological “resistance”, was a testing ground for practical future communities and brotherhoods within and beyond the “southern” Sudanese in Khartoum. This chapter details accounts of these diverse practical projects in the 1990s and early 2000s, from radical black political activity to exclusive and conservative projects of ethno-regional parastatal authority under the South Sudan Defence Forces umbrella (SSDF), and discusses the practical limits to pan-Sudanese imagination.

---

109 Following Blommaert, *Grassroots Literacy*, p. 165.
Chapter One

When did South Sudanese nationalism begin? Most histories of southern Sudanese collective political consciousness have a common timeline, focusing on the struggles of a small number of early politicians in the 1930s to 1960s, their attempts to articulate a “southern” identity, and their struggles to mobilise popular support for “self-determination”. This chapter argues that this picture gives a skewed idea of “southern politics” as a coherent agenda for elected elites. The effort to trace a specific “southern Sudanese nationalism” back in time obscures broader urban histories of popular political and political identifications since the 1930s. The focus on elite politicians has over-emphasised an apparent gap between these elite politicians’ political philosophy, and the “politically unconscious,” ethnicised and parochial masses they were supposed to represent, and failed to discuss the extent to which these ordinary people had come to identify as “southern”, and how these people understood the term.

This chapter explores an alternative history of the development of a “southern” identification from the 1930s to the 1970s, through a history of urban and peri-urban migrant settlement within Khartoum. It draws this history from letters, student pamphlets, notes, diaries and other marginalia from archives in Birmingham, Rome, Durham, London, and Juba, as well as contemporary scholarship by Hale, Howell, Rehfisch, Barclay and others.¹¹⁰ This chapter thus sets the terrain and approach for the rest of this thesis, putting vernacular debates over “southern Sudanese-ness” in Khartoum in the context of the longer and wider history of migration to the city.

Khartoum grew massively through the 1930s to 1960s, fuelled in part by increasing numbers of new residents and cyclical migrants from southern and western Sudan. The early southern population of Khartoum grew from a combination of army recruitment, the

¹¹⁰ The Church Missionary Society archives, Birmingham (CMS); the Save the Children Fund archives, Birmingham (SCF); the Comboniani mission archives in Rome (Comboniani); the Sudan Archives Durham (SAD); the Royal Geographical Society archives, London (RGS); the Middle East Documentation Unit, Durham University (MEDU); the National Archives, London (TNA); the Kenya National Archives (KNA); and the South Sudan National Archives in Juba, South Sudan (SSNA).
movement of servants, drivers and low-ranking government agents, and particularly the demands of growing agricultural labour markets. Although there is no formal data before the 1955/6 census, a 1921 population count of Omdurman found in Khartoum University Library by Rehfisch in 1965 showed a southern population of 3.2 percent, and a western population of 2.4 percent; by the 1955/6 census, Omdurman had grown by 260 per cent, but southerners still made up 3.9 per cent of the population (out-paced, though, by the western Sudanese population at 5.5 per cent).\footnote{F. Rehfisch, ‘An unrecorded population count of Omdurman’, \textit{Sudan Notes and Records}, 46 (January 1965), pp. 34–5, 38.} After Sudan’s independence in 1956, and the removal of travel restrictions for southern residents, there was a widely recorded exponential increase in southern populations across Khartoum, particularly in 1962 due to flooding and famine in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal; this growth was not only from Nilotic regions, but included significant numbers of Equatorian migrants.\footnote{This Equatorian presence was demonstrated in Rehfisch’s self-described “unrepresentative” survey of Omdurman in 1960, using mostly Equatorian-origin students as surveyors; F. Rehfisch, ‘A study of some southern migrants in Omdurman’, \textit{Sudan Notes and Records}, 43 (January 1962), p. 51.}

This chapter argues that by the mid-1970s, the collapse of formal party politics in Sudan after the first civil war expanded space for substantive internal and vernacular political debate, particularly for the many people who moved northwards to Khartoum by this period. While electoral and representational politics was shut down for elites, who were restricted to being rebel or exile “southern leaders” on increasingly militarised terms, most of Khartoum’s growing southern migrant population were engaged elsewhere: migrant associational, educational networks had long been the normal forums of political expression for southern and other marginalised groups in Sudan, rather than political parties.

This chapter summarises the pre-1970s practical foundations of this urban organisation, which involved complex racial, socio-economic, regional and political lines and commonalities. This alternative forum of urban migrant political and social associational culture articulated complex relationships between blackness, southern-ness, and Sudanese-ness up to the 1970s. This chapter seeks to put this urban history of “southern identity” in the context of wider histories of urban othering and the making of political identifications.
from the 1930s to the 1970s, building on earlier research on particularly northern Sudanese Nubian migration to the city in the 1960s and 1970s, and on broader work on migrant urban identifications in Khartoum. This political space came into its own with the closing down of formal political space in the 1970s. The pressures of massive peripheral in-migration to Khartoum and the growing civil war in the southern regions by the mid-1960s fuelled (and was fuelled by) these more everyday experiences of local, ethnic, and historical frustrations and violent oppressions; the label “southern” emerged as a more common personal shorthand from the early 1970s onwards.

The “Southern” problem: elite ideas of “southern Sudan”

Many writers have argued that, by the 1970s, there was no general political consciousness as “southerners” among ordinary people in the southern parts of Sudan, and that this southern nationalism was only articulated by an elite minority: first by a tiny southern Sudanese leadership in the 1940s to 1960s, and then by their militarised successors in the early 1980s and 1990s. Roughly, this work has identified a cycle of “southern politics” in Sudan, in which the political and electoral optimism of the 1950s and 60s collapsed in the late 1960s and 70s, due to combinations of external pressures, internal failings and a lack of popular support, leaving leadership of the south in primarily military hands in the 1980s onwards. Studies have therefore asked questions of the failings of this civilian leadership, and how political discourse was restricted and undermined.

This “southern” intellectual history has particularly focused on its political elites: a tiny minority of men who had a monopoly on a limited-access missionary education system in

---


the southern regions – under the colonial policy of closing off the southern regions from northern Sudan – and who thus had a monopoly on access to state jobs; these men’s work has been well documented, not least by themselves. Sudanese politicians have produced an array of work on the history of southern Sudan and “the Southern problem” (a useful shorthand in Sudanese politics by the 1960s, including for beleaguered regional politicians in Khartoum needing a defined constituency); these men took up administrative and elected positions in which they were seen by their contemporaries, and often positioned themselves, as the first southern Sudanese political leadership. The “Southern problem” was an idea which worked with prevailing understandings of Sudanese politics amongst the northern elites in Khartoum and abroad, while challenging colonial and post-colonial depictions of ‘Southerners as antagonistic tribal groups who cannot rule themselves, if left alone.’

Khartoum served as a small hothouse for this intelligentsia after the independence of Sudan in 1956. Political figures such as Gordon Muortat, Lam Akol and other products of the University of Khartoum saw their intellectual achievements as both a justification and a requirement for their brand of political leadership; they were the only people from the southern regions who could apparently articulate the “southern problem” on a national and

international stage, in the correct language of global politics. They spoke this language to their only clear political constituency in Khartoum by the 1960s, the small number of students from the south and other peripheral regions of Sudan, as a route to being ‘directly accountable’ to ‘southern opinion.’ Attracting their support, and debating with these “new bloods” – who saw themselves as the next generation of these leaders – became a way of “representing” the south within a small extraverted community of self-replicating elites. Speaking “for the South” gave these few inexperienced and peripheral politicians a clear platform of black African regional difference, assuming the “South” as a distinct political collective, and providing arguing power in major discussions around political representation and democracy; however, it also restricted their ability to act other than as a regional lobby, based on a particular broad explanation of the apparently essential difference of “the southerners.” But the “southern problem” these politicians spoke of – and the national community they claimed to represent – was more complex than this rhetorical trap allowed.

These elites have been well-criticised, and criticised themselves, for being unrepresentative. Their distance from their alleged “southern” electorate increased through the 1960s as they were cut off from many areas of the south due to localised violence and travel restrictions, or forced into “political exile” and relative redundancy in east and central Africa.

These elite politicians’ failures by 1970 to engage their “constituents” – whom Howell identified in his research with these men in 1978 as their ‘own [ethnic] communities’ – on these terms encouraged a search for alternative loci of political leadership, with either the guerrilla groups or ‘the tribal leaders, and not the politicians, as the true representatives of the South.’ As Kwanai wrote to Aggrey Jaden, Joseph Oduho, Elia Lupe and Saturnino Lohure, all self-described political leaders with various followings working mostly across the Ugandan border in 1965,

---

119 J. Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the Southern Sudan,’ p. 143.
120 See Willis, ‘The southern problem’; also see Howell, ‘Political leaders in the Southern Sudan’, p. 4.
121 Foreign Office internal correspondence, 26 September 1966, TNA FO 371.190418 VS1015.56; by 1966, most civil servants from the south were posted to northern regions or living in Khartoum with the rumps of southern political parties.
122 Howell, ‘Political leaders in the Southern Sudan’, p. 3; Foreign Office internal correspondence, 26 November 1966, TNA FO 371.190418 VS1015.65.
How can we, for example, know who here in exile is truly a Southern Sudanese leader – unless he has been a member of the last Sudan Parliament; or a political leader, already noted by his people before his coming out? ...what contribution did they make to the liberation cause for them to be including [sic] on council of elder statesmen? And, who are we to incorporate them, anyway? ... Perhaps these bush leaders should be given the mandate to chose [sic] their political leaders among those who call themselves politicians now out of the country.\textsuperscript{123}

The political researcher John Howell, working in Khartoum with these politicians in the late 1970s, was particularly critical of their organisational weaknesses, personal rivalries and financial ambitions, writing that ‘attempts to build up political organisation in the South, although often weakly launched, have foundered on apathy and ignorance.’\textsuperscript{124} These men’s urbanisation, English and Arabic-language education, foreign travel, and involvement in high Khartoum politics, according to Howell, ‘set them far apart not only from the ordinary villages but also from the partly educated town-dwellers, a gap which continued into Sudan's period of independent parliamentary rule.’\textsuperscript{125}

This distance between these politicians and their constituents was apparently unassailable: regardless of who were the true representatives of “the South”, these men were confident in their collective understanding of their “southern” electorate, as an uneducated, illiterate, rural, parochial, and tribalised constituency, who were not aware of their own political identity because they had not yet seen the bigger picture, and who should ‘look to the educated Southerners for moral encouragement and direction.’\textsuperscript{126} As Gordon Muortat asserted in 1966,

\textit{it is the educated people who understand the wrongs committed against the South and it is they who can point out and speak against the sufferings of the Southern

\textsuperscript{124} Howell, 'Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan', pp. 75–6, 54; also see Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), \textit{The southern Sudan: the problem of national integration} (London, 1973), p. 86.
people. It is they who are the eyes of the illiterate masses in seeing that their political rights are secured and preserved.127

An anonymous letter to Father Saturnino Lohure – by then a rebel leader in the Anyanya anti-government movement on the border of Uganda – in 1964 summarised this general perspective on the makeup of the southern political sphere:

The Southerners form two major groups: one which includes 99% of the inhabitants; these are still in the stage of intellectual infancy after they were damaged by colonialism; they were left in a primitive state; they do not understand what is good and what is noxious in life, politics and rule. As for the other group, it consists of 1% most of whom are old pupils of churches and perhaps what comes out from them does not reflect their own opinion and life, but they bring the view of what the Church ... the [remainder] is suspected to bring a wrong opinion, unreliable, not speaking out of its own. Besides, it is too small and represents a negligible minority. If I want to listen to the true opinion of the Southerners, I must wait for a long time, until the majority will attain maturity and can speak for themselves, what they like and what they hate.128

These elites’ dominant understandings of “the southern problem” have been cemented as two standard starting points for writing about southern Sudanese political history. Firstly, “the southern Sudanese” as articulated by these politicians has been taken as a working starting point and an accepted rough territorial, racial and historical definition in most of the literature on Sudan. This idea of the south’s delineation as a de facto political unit has been consistently used across academic literature, with “the Southern people” or “peoples” neatly defined in an introductory paragraph or chapter, summarised on essential racial, religious, geographical, historical and psychological grounds, encouraged by the quasi-academic political literature of these “elite political intellectuals”, who themselves produce reams of definitive histories of the Southern conflict.129

Secondly, it has been widely accepted in this body of work that the vast majority (the “99 per cent”) of these southern Sudanese people had, and still generally have, only a limited or

---

129 See footnote 116, p. 55.
latent understanding of their regional commonality as “southerners.” Though, to many political elites, their constituents should apparently somehow *know* themselves as African, black, exploited, and marginalised as a clear collective, there has been a broad concern over the apparently under-developed national “political consciousness” among these local southern communities. This approach suffers from its own binaries, implying a lack of political debate beyond the local and ethnic within the rural majority, and positioning either “southern” or “ethnic” as the only two options for personal engagement. But I argue that there was, and is, a popular political discourse over being “southern” in Sudan by the 1970s, and that this went far beyond a parroting of the elites.

**Urban histories of the “Sudani” and “Janubi”**

This chapter abandons “southerners” as the *a priori* category of analysis, and so allows for a history of the popular, vernacular growth of self-definition as a *janubi* (southerner). It was not that there was no “southern” identification in Khartoum by the 1970s; rather there were a plethora of local, specific, contextual, and personal identifications, with “southern” emerging as a generalised experiential and political collectivity.

In this broader reading, the “southern” political organisations that emerged in northern and southern towns in the 1950s and 60s were not the “start” of black, regional or marginalised politics, nor did they represent the first southern communities in the north. Collective identifications in Khartoum have been shaped by migration, systems of slavery, migration and state formation since the 1800s. Migration to Khartoum was not new to the mid-twentieth century; slaves, slave soldiers and migrant workers had travelled across Sudan, particularly the Nuba Mountains and the southern regions, and from the horn of Africa and West Africa throughout the nineteenth century, as Sikainga and Ewald have documented.\(^{130}\)

The slave armies of the early Condominium period formed the foundation for ‘Nubian’ communities in Egypt and across East Africa, as well as in Sudanese cities. The name Nubian was an ambiguous descriptor that had little geographic or ethnic definition but incorporated ideas of ancient black Sudanese kingdoms of Nubia and Cush, primitive martial black races, and regions beyond state control. It references the Nubian Christian kingdom in northern Sudan, which dominated the Nile valley in the 8th century AD and which was subsumed within Arab territorial and political expansions by the 14th century.\(^{131}\) Nubia was broadly the source of slaves, particularly for 1800s slave armies, and this ‘frontier of enslaveable people shifted with political events’,\(^{132}\) by the turn of the century, the “Nubians” were therefore whoever was enslaveable.\(^{133}\) As James notes, ‘the slave-holding centre … required a boundary, beyond which it perceived its human reserves, and upon whose exploitation it depended for its own reproduction. …It would always entail a specification of non-members, non-citizens and non-kin without its limits, and would regard predatory violence against them as in some way legitimate.’\(^{134}\)

Colonial Sudanese job markets were fundamentally structured by this historical landscape of power, labour and exploitability. Following the abolition of the slave trade in 1899, many slaves stayed in Khartoum,\(^{135}\) by the end of the first world war the estimated population of slaves in Khartoum was 20,000.\(^{136}\) Ex-slaves congregated in the al-Diyum slums with other migrants, with Hayy al-Dubbat (the Officers’ Quarter) in Omdurman housing West African migrants, ex-slaves and others not claiming Arab ancestry; ex-slave soldiers and their descendants founded suburbs known as malakiyas in towns across Sudan.\(^{137}\) While migration from the South was heavily restricted by the closed district regulations such as the Passport and Permits Ordinance of 1922, many people – including wives and children of traders, and staff of civil servants posted to the south – moved or were moved to Khartoum.

---

\(^{132}\) Johnson, ‘Sudanese military slavery’, pp. 151, 144, 147.
\(^{133}\) Ibid., p. 151; for further discussion of the term Nubian, see Johnson, ‘The structure of a legacy’, p. 82.
\(^{134}\) James, ‘Perceptions from an African slaving frontier’, p. 133.
\(^{137}\) Sikainga, ‘Military slavery’, p. 29; Leonardi, *Dealing with government in South Sudan*, p. 83.
particularly during the late 1940s.\textsuperscript{138} The second world war prompted, as one contemporary observer put it, the ‘enrolment of children of the backwards areas into the army.’\textsuperscript{139} It also brought real financial incentives to move to agricultural schemes and towns at the centre of Sudan, because of improved wages after a 1950 ordinance.\textsuperscript{140}

The changing economic context and rapid urbanisation did not radically alter the characterisation and economic and social positioning of these non-Arab, less-educated, non-Muslim or otherwise non-elite new urban poor, but refocused concerns on urban labour markets and migrant morality. Moral and social judgements over the Nubian, racially black character – ‘the stereotypical slave’\textsuperscript{141} – continued under the Condominium. Concerns over the control of these new urban populations, the moral and social irresponsibility of slaves and ex-slaves, and their marginal economic position preoccupied state authorities from the 1900s.\textsuperscript{142} Government agents worried about freed slaves ‘inundating towns and forming “parasitic communities;”’ colonial officials believed that any loosening of bonds on slaves would lead to vagrancy, prostitution, crime, and drunkenness.\textsuperscript{143} New arrivals’ specific local and personal identifications and histories were to a large extent subsumed within these dominant paradigms.

This combination of moral, social and economic marginalisation and stereotyping resulted in particular forms of group identification. For example, Hale notes that Nubian workers dominated septic tank cleaning through the 1970s, and anyone else working in the same sector was automatically called a Nubian;\textsuperscript{144} the idea of “becoming Nubi” was still in use as descriptor for urbanised rural people in the 1980s, much like the term “malakiyan”.\textsuperscript{145} Similarly, southern, western and Nuba Mountains migrants have filled (and continue to fill) the low-status menial labour sector in Khartoum since the 1950s. These jobs were

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Rehfisch, ‘A study of some southern migrants in Omdurman.’
  \item \textsuperscript{139} Hasan Makki Mohammed Ahmed, \textit{Christian missionary activity in the three towns}, Khartoum, December 1983, Comboniani 674.20.4, p. 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} Din, ‘The Nature and Causes of Labour Migration’, pp. 428–9.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} Fluehr-Lobban and rhodes, ‘Introduction’, p. xvi.
  \item \textsuperscript{142} Jok Madut Jok, ‘Post-independence racial realities’, p. 193.
  \item \textsuperscript{143} Sikainga, ‘Slavery, labour, and ethnicity in Khartoum’, p. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{144} Sondra Hale, ‘Nationalism, “Race”, and Class’, p. 172.
  \item \textsuperscript{145} Johnson, ‘The structure of a legacy’, pp. 83–4.
\end{itemize}
'considered inferior and only for “lower” social groups’, and these Sudanese black and peripheral populations ‘were still regarded as culturally inferior and descendants of slaves.’\textsuperscript{146} Menial labour was ‘synonymous with slavery.’\textsuperscript{147}

By the mid-century, then, the fast-growing populations of Khartoum drew on a broad and deep-rooted spectrum of racial, historio-geographical, politicised descriptors and demarcators, in an ambiguous and shifting hierarchy. Barclay’s study of the village Burri al Lamaab, then on the outskirts of Khartoum, in 1964 provides a good example.\textsuperscript{148} In the late 1950s to early 1960s, during Barclay’s study, about half of the village were of ‘slave descent’, most of whom were from the Nuba regions of Kordofan, with some Dinka and Fertit from western Bahr el Ghazal, and half of whom were descendants of slaves owned by other village residents.\textsuperscript{149} These people were called \textit{muwaalid} (slave descendants) or \textit{abiid}. People from the broad southern regions of Sudan were noted by geographical origin as \textit{janubiin}, or by major ethnic group such as the majority Dinka and Nuer residents. Dinka and Nuer residents were divided between slave and non-slave descent, and were generally not Muslim.\textsuperscript{150} Sometimes the term \textit{abiid} was extended ‘to include anyone from the southern pagan tribes whether he has been a slave or not,’ because for other longer-term residents or newcomers from other “un-enslaved” areas of Sudan, the southern region was a source of slaves, and entirely black.

The term [\textit{abiid}] may also be applied to anyone who is particularly black in colour, but this is often done in jest. A definite preference exists for light skin. ...the minimization of all Negroid features, especially the skin colour, is most coveted.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{146} Sikainga, ‘Slavery, labour, and ethnicity in Khartoum’, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{149} Barclay, \textit{Buurri al Lamaab}, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., pp. 95–6.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., pp. 129–30.
This echoes Mukhtar and Boddy’s works on skin colour in northern Sudan; ‘the understanding was that the lighter the colour of the skin, the closer the person is to the centre, and the more authentic his or her claim to Arab ancestry.’\footnote{AI-Baqir al-Aff Mukhtar, ‘The crisis of identity in Northern Sudan’, p. 215; Janice Boddy, \textit{Wombs and alien spirits: Women, men, and the Zar cult in northern Sudan} (Madison, 1989).} Barclay noted the social visibility of Nuer, Nuba, western Sudanese and Dinka residents in Burri al Lamaab through their physiognomy and lifestyle, not necessarily only identified by their specific regions of origin.\footnote{Barclay, \textit{Buurri al Lamaab}, p. 96.} Slave descendants, in Barclay’s study, exclusively married other descendants; ‘according to the dominant group, “slaves” do not have as good “morals”’, because of their beer-brewing and sexual activity.\footnote{Ibid., p. 128.} Class, social standing, moral character and economic success could all temper or override colour;\footnote{Sondra Hale, ‘Nationalism, “Race”, and Class’, p. 181.} but Barclay also noted that people sometimes self-referenced as \textit{abiid}.\footnote{Barclay, \textit{Buurri al Lamaab}, pp. 129, 126–7. The appropriation and deployment of slurs and derogative terms has a wider literature than can be dealt with here; see Claudia Bianchi, ‘Slurs and appropriation: An echoic account’, \textit{Journal of Pragmatics}, 66 (May 2014), pp. 35–44; Cassie Herbert, ‘Precarious projects: the performative structure of reclamation’, \textit{Language Sciences}, 52 (November 2015), pp. 131–138; Tom W. Smith, ‘Changing Racial Labels: From “Colored” to “Negro” to “Black” to “African American”’, \textit{Public Opin. Q}, 56:4 (December 1992), pp. 496–514.}

The development of a “southern” identification cannot be abstracted from these histories of urban terminologies and collectives – the Nubians, malakiyans, \textit{abiid} and \textit{janubiin}, among many other more local and ethnic specificities – and their economic, political and moral weightings. These markers underpinned the politics of migration to Khartoum by the mid-century. Their history is ambiguous partly due to the various attempts at appropriation and re-ascription made by their constituents: being \textit{janubi} was increasingly preferential to the more pejorative \textit{abiid}, and self-referencing as Nubian or \textit{malakiyan} was a form of appropriation and reconditioning of older imposed identifications. The same period saw the re-appropriation of being \textit{Sudani} – being Sudanese, and being black, with the term’s Arabic roots in the colour. Claiming to be truly \textit{Sudani} could be both to avoid more derogatory terms and to assert claims to equal national status, as Rehfisch observed:
There is a growing tendency in the Three Towns to refuse to associate oneself with a tribe, since there is a feeling that tribalism is a factor leading to national disunity. Many educated and non-educated alike insist that they are not members of any tribe, being purely and simply Sudanese. Some of those classed as “Miscellaneous” [in the 1956 Census] are probably Southerners who were either born in the North or have lived there for a long time and do not wish to proclaim their origin, since Southerners in the North suffer from some prejudice and social disability.157

The 1960s and 1970s boom in Khartoum

With the 1964 October Revolution, the re-establishment of fragile civilian government in Sudan, and successive macro-economic plans, people flooded into Khartoum and other northern towns – ‘especially [the] Southerners and Nuba’, who travelled “under the impression that the streets are paved with gold.”158 At the same time, the civil war between government forces and various rebel factions, united as the Anyanya, intensified and widened: while most civil war refugees fled from Equatoria to East and Central African countries, the expulsion of Christian missionaries and collapse of the southern regional school system and civil service brought large numbers of aspiring students and low-grade wage labourers to towns across Sudan. The civil war amnesties declared repeatedly from 1966 onwards called on refugees and ex-combatants to return to Sudan,159 and many people responded from around 1968 onwards, particularly wage labourers, students, and those wanting access to towns and jobs in Sudan after working elsewhere in East Africa – a worker on 2s. a day in Juba would earn 7s. 4d. a day in Khartoum by 1971.160 The period

158 Din, ‘The Nature and Causes of Labour Migration’, pp. 428–9, quoting the Khartoum annual provincial report 1950. Many people in Aweil and Juba gave examples of familial migration experience: AT’s father and grandfather had been travelling north since 1910s (AT, 8 June 2013). This movement was reflected in the few population statistics available: Khartoum town at independence in 1956 had 93,000 inhabitants, and expanded to around 350,000 by 1973; Omdurman had similar levels of expansion, from 113,000 people in 1956 to about 300,000 in 1973. El-Sayed Bushra, An atlas of Khartoum conurbation (Khartoum, 1976); also see El-Sayed Bushra (ed.), Urbanization in the Sudan: proceedings of the seventeenth annual conference, Khartoum, 2nd–4th August, 1972 (Khartoum, 1972).
159 Foreign Office internal correspondence, 13 October 1966, TNA FO 371.190465 VS1821.6.
160 Foreign Office margin notes, 13 October 1966, TNA FO 371.190465 VS1821.6; Marvine Howe, ‘Promise of regional autonomy for Sudan separatists brings mass return to southern towns’, The Times, 1 January 1971, TNA FCO 39.687.
1969 to 1972 saw urban migration on a far larger scale than before, particularly from deprived regions of Sudan and from returning refugees.\(^{161}\) Interestingly, although most accounts emphasise that these migrants were overwhelmingly young men,\(^{162}\) contemporary small surveys show a significant number of women also moving to Khartoum from the peripheries; there was one woman for every two men from Bahr el Ghazal in Abdelrahman’s 1979 survey, and Rehfisch noted the oddity that 1956 census figures implied large numbers of self-described ‘southern’ single women in Omdurman – 33 per cent of women claimed to be born in the south.\(^{163}\)

For the authorities and urban planners in Khartoum, these experimental migrants were deeply worrying – a continuation of older fears over slaves, ex-slaves and other migrants in the Condominium period, where ‘any loosening of bonds… would lead to vagrancy, prostitution, crime, and drunkenness.’\(^{164}\) Southern newcomers were ‘commonly referred to as having come “straight from the bush” to earn money in order to buy cattle and to enable them to pay bridewealth.’\(^{165}\) These new residents, particularly those from such rural, “backwards” areas, were seen as overwhelmed socially and morally by the civilisation of the city:

> the audio visual media has great influence upon in-migrants as something new to them. The young are more susceptible to the effect of the Cinema, where they are stimulated to violence and crime by the highly coloured episodes which they see on the screen.\(^{166}\)

But those coming to Khartoum were not only motivated by cattle. The idea of separate rural and urban spheres was breaking down in practice by the 1970s. Chain and cyclical migration from the south increased with the extension of the railway line to Bahr el Ghazal in the


\(^{162}\) For example, Hutchinson, *Nuer Dilemmas*.


\(^{166}\) Abdullahi Mohammed Abdel Hadi, ‘The Impact of Urbanization on Crime and Delinquency’, in Bushra (ed.), *Urbanization in the Sudan*, p. 188.
1960s;\textsuperscript{167} ‘returning migrants... related tales of the glories of life in the North,’ and 83% of migrants surveyed by Abdelrahman in 1979 knew something about Khartoum life before they arrived, half of them because of previous visits, and the others from returned migrants.\textsuperscript{168} Popular reasons for migration from the south, as recorded by Abdelrahman in a 1979 social survey, included “life in the rural areas is often restricted by traditions”, “one is freer in Khartoum to do what one wants”, and “to be more important and civilised”.\textsuperscript{169} This was made easier by the extension of the train line down to the south in the late 1970s, a route many teenage men took in the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{170}

‘You know, we want to escape from the cattles [sic]. ...some of my age, you know, we planned to escape from the house; and then we travelled farther north. [It] was ’79... Then we escaped the family, we went to the nearest station where the train passed, and climb[ed] on, and went up to Khartoum.’\textsuperscript{171}

Khartoum in particular was a place of freedom, where ‘independence and prestige’ could be found, and you could ‘fulfil ambitions.’\textsuperscript{172} Khartoum was a prestige destination; as Bonsall, a chaplain at the Khartoum Episcopal church, wrote to the Foreign Office in 1976, ‘Khartoum is the kind of place where you do things you would not dream of doing at home.’\textsuperscript{173}

The dream for many people was education, in the broadest sense. Khartoum was an educative space, a place for gaining knowledge and access to opportunities as well as social

\textsuperscript{167} Abdelrahman, ‘Internal migration in the Sudan’, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{168} Rehfisch, ‘A study of some southern migrants in Omdurman’, p. 71; Abdelrahman, ‘Internal migration in the Sudan’, p. 155. By 1979, most migrants were making one visit home per year on average, and most Khartoum residents from southern Sudan had visitors at least once a year: Abdelrahman, ‘Internal migration in the Sudan’, pp. 189, 192.
\textsuperscript{169} Abdelrahman, ‘Internal migration in the Sudan’, p. 157. By 1980, al-Din noted that ‘there are more and more migrants whose attitudes and aspirations are increasingly out of keeping with the opportunities available in an essentially rural economy.’ Din, ‘The Nature and Causes of Labour Migration’, p. 433. This was also noted by DCS, 11 August 2013, and by Hassaballa Omer Hassaballa, ‘Displacement and migration as a consequence of development policies in Sudan’, in Eltigani El Tahir Eltigani and Hatim Ameer Mahran (eds.), The Displacement Problem in the Sudan: Essays on the Crisis, draft manuscript, June 1991, SAD.940/5/2, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{170} Including men interviewed in Aweil: DCD, 15 July 2013; WMT, 17 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{171} GMM, 11 August 2013; WMT told a similar story, 17 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{172} Abdelrahman, ‘Internal migration in the Sudan’, p. 157.
financing in the forms of a bicycle and a wife. In 1962, Rehfisch noted the large numbers of people from Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile trying to get into schools:

These have had to be satisfied with attending night classes given in so-called Cultural Clubs, as well as Mission Clubs. A real effort is being made in the Three Towns to combat illiteracy and to give some education to those who wish it. Many school teachers and other Sudanese are contributing much time and effort without pay to educate their fellow citizens.

This is particularly seen through traces of a comparatively large number of southern, south Darfurian and Nuba migrants attempting to access education since the 1940s in Khartoum, mostly in mission sources. The Church Missionary Society (CMS) Bible Society, formed in the early 1950s, was a catalyst for self-education, and was quickly taken over by Nuba Mountains priests (and later political leaders) Butrus Tia and Philip Abbas Ghaboush in their early careers. The Omdurman Christian Club was built by 1968 specifically to provide classes, and, at an elite level, the University of Khartoum noticed that it was taking a lot more students from Southern provinces: from no students in the 1955-6 academic year to forty in 1959-60. William, a Dinka man who had previously lived in Khartoum from the late 1970s to the early 1980s explained, in English:

‘It happened [a] long time ago that when your family have cows, then they cannot allow you to go for study. By there, we escaped to Babanusa in order to find the opportunity to go to school. ... [Before going north in 1982, we] were just cattle keepers. [We] don't even know what's so called literature. ... [We went] because of the studying. ... [Brothers] were taken to the Khartoum by those who went there before... after [I went to] Babanusa, [my] friend came from Khartoum ... this man was bilingual, he [wrote] in English, and [his] mother tongue. And [I felt] interested – that [I would] like also to learn like him. ... He told [us] that I've studied English and Dinka language, and the guy used to speak [a] different language every time! [Laughs] after that I said that also, I can go and study.

... The time I went to Khartoum, I go and spend only one night in the morning, I buy my exercise [book], and go straight to school. ... We save our lives, because

---

174 The motivations noted by Eric Parry in his annual letter, 1952, CMS ACC/693 F2/1.
176 Church Missionary Society North Sudan Standing Committee minutes, April 1958, CMS ACC505 Z3, p.3.
[Khartoum] is where you work for the daily wage. ...I was working in [a] sweet factory. And by there, we made our schedule to be evening classes, because in the morning everybody [goes] for work. By there, that’s how we get our power.’

These intellectual labourers were Howell’s “in-betweeners,” the part-educated southern interviewers Rehfisch employed to conduct his research in 1962.

Social and political associations, and emerging urban politics

The new migrants of post-independence Sudan entered into the organisational life of the peripheral populations of Khartoum, forming social organisations and seeking self-improvement in a variety of informal ways, including cultural clubs, mission schools and self-run evening classes. These were part of long-standing associational models: ex-slave, ex-army, and seasonal labouring communities maintained patterns of self-organisation established since at least the 1920s, including rotational credit associations, both on a small scale as sanduk (“box”) saving schemes, and larger village, regional and clan or ethnicity-based organisations. In the credit-based, highly mobile suburbs of Khartoum in the 1950s to 70s, this mutual aid and social support, which many people remembered including labour unions and sports clubs, helped people with shelter, advice and employment opportunities.

---

178 WMT, 17 August 2013; the same empowerment via urban migration is noted by Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 73.
181 Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, ‘City of steel and fire’: a social history of Atbara, Sudan’s railway town, 1906-1984 (Portsmouth, NH, 2002), pp. 78–9; Sikainga, ‘Slavery, labour, and ethnicity in Khartoum’, p. 8; see also Hale, The changing ethnic identity of Nubians; F. Rehfisch, ‘Rotating credit associations in the three towns’, in Pons (ed.), Urbanization and urban life in the Sudan, p. 690; David Pratten, Return to the roots?: migration, local institutions and development in Sudan (Edinburgh, 2000), pp. 31, 35.
182 Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, Organized labor and social change in contemporary Sudan, (Durham, 2003), pp. 7–8.
For the smaller populations from the far south, the various churches of Khartoum acted as these social centres, particularly with the growth of young male labour migration by the 1940s. This was not necessarily due to specifically Christian beliefs or high rates of conversion among southerners. A large majority of southern Sudanese residents had little to no church connections: Hillman, an Anglican missionary, estimated that among the roughly 300,000 southern residents in northern Sudan, the Anglican Church associated with maybe 300. The various Churches in Khartoum focused on catering to these new populations, particularly with the expulsion of missionaries from southern Sudan in 1964. The associations and clubs the Catholic and Anglican churches housed and encouraged by the 1950s provided a site for educational opportunity outside of formal schooling, through religious training, libraries, night schools, games clubs, reading and debate clubs, which were often only nominally religious. They also provided space and security in a variety of ways, for southern and Nuba Mountains migrants who spoke often poor or regional variants of Sudanese Arabic; Rehfisch’s 1962 survey found a fifth of southerners in Omdurman kept their savings in church offices or with missionaries.

This did not create a coherent "southern community", with tensions particularly between previously-settled residents and newcomers. Nor did it create a particularly political or religious community: outside of churches and night schools in the 1960s and 70s, beer drinking is the most cited migrant activity, although this is generally by outraged northern


185 For a particularly vitriolic explanation of this work, see Mohammed Ahmed, *Christian missionary activity*, pp. 1–3.

186 Rev. Canon Bewes, diary 1954, p. 29, CMS AF59 AFE AD3; Bertram to Hooper, 20 April 1938, CMS AF59 AFE AD1 729; Dr Roland Stevenson to Nuba Mountains Fellowship, January 1959, CMS AF35/59 G3 SN 1 Subfile 5; also see Rehfisch, ‘A study of some southern migrants in Omdurman’, p. 91.


189 This has been noted over several decades, firstly by Sikainga, ‘Military slavery’, p. 34, and by AAD, 14 August 2013. For a discussion of the Nuba Mountains urban experience in this period, see Ewald, *Soldiers, traders, and slaves*. 
sources. Rehfisch recorded that the beer houses were generally owned or operated by ex-slaves or their descendants, and were

the closest things to tribal associations found in the city. In quite a number of houses the clientele is almost exclusively made up of members of one tribe. In one, visited by the author, those present were almost all Dinka, and the unofficial leader of some of the Dinka tribes in the town makes this place his headquarters. He can be found there at almost any time of the day or night. On Fridays and Sunday afternoons and evenings many, many Dinka congregate there, drink, sing, dance and in other ways attempt to recreate as far as they are able their tribal environment. These houses act as a refuge where the Southerner goes to escape from the antagonism he encounters in the workaday world, and to forget that he is living in a hostile environment... very few Northerners visit the Merisa Houses. 190

Ten per cent of Rehfisch’s southern migrants spent their spare time at mission clubs, and another ten per cent went to night schools; other activities included libraries, the cinema, window shopping, visiting sex workers, and football. 191 One man recalled,

‘There was a club in which people played dominoes, and others playing cards. In the night also you can go for cinema. ... At that time there were no women... there are just those who rejected to make their own houses, those like street girls, but we don’t consider them as women. There was no shisha at that time... There were some local brews, the bangi, which is opium. ... people stay according to groups, and according to the certain area in the South, whom they know themselves ... mostly people separate themselves according to groups and according to tribes. ... Like in Aweil here – if you find that I’m from Aweil, you have to stay with me. Like also the Greater Bahr el Ghazal in general has to stay as Bahr el Ghazal. And for those of Upper Nile also who interact with Bahr el Ghazal, they have to come also and join you. ... Within the group of young men, there are already grown up people who are old enough, and they know most cultural activities and Dinka social life, so they have to inform those young men. And for that, we organize the social and cultural activities; like on Friday we used to practice a different dance, according to tribe. The Luo can dance alone, the Dinka Malwal, they dance alone, and the rest of the tribes, they also practice their traditional dance.’ 192

Political discussion grew out of the social lives and self-organisation of these migrant communities. As Bedri Omer Elias and Hassan Yassin Bedawi observed in 1972,

191 Ibid., p. 91.
192 MTL, 10 July 2013.
The squatters themselves began to acquire some political momentum and became more established. They formed social organisations, political parties, and group leaders.193

The various membership criteria of these small socio-political associations from the late 1950s to early 1970s is a demonstration of the complex interplay between “black”, ethnic, regional, Sudani, and “southern” collective identifications throughout Sudan’s history, and characterise the rest of this thesis. Among the earliest of these socio-political organisations were the White Flag League, established in the 1920s, and the Black Cooperative Society in the late 1930s, supported by many ex-soldiers and ex-slaves from Darfur, the southern regions and Nuba Mountains, as well as northern urban communities.194 The White Flag League’s insurgency in 1924 has been described as an ‘insurgency by “slaves”’; several of its leaders, including Ali Abd al-Latif, were self-described “black” officers of slave ancestry from the Mahdist or Muhammad Ali armies.195 Among many small and provocatively-named “groups” emerging in the 1930s and 40s, the Black Bloc (al-Kutla al-Sawda), a social organisation, campaigning group and nascent political party, gained prominence in the early 1940s. It was led by Dr Muhammad Adam Adham, whose father was an army officer from Daju in Darfur,196 and demanded northern political change as well as ‘economic and social equality for southern Sudanese in the northern Sudan,’ as well as for the Nuba Mountains and other peripheral regions.197 There is no standard history of this inchoate organisation. At the time, British intelligence recorded the Black Bloc as having about four thousand mostly southern supporters in 1948, but Howell later said it was made up of nas malakiya, or old slave soldier families, with little connection to more recent southern immigrants – an

194 Sikainga, ‘Military slavery’, p. 32.
197 Sikainga, ‘Military slavery’, p. 32; ‘Note on Dr Mohammed Adam Adham and the Black Bloc’, 15 February 1948, TNA FO 371.69209.
assertion matched by Stanislaus Paysama (a contemporary politician); Sikainga later emphasised its support from western and eastern Sudan. The colonial government responded by closing the Black Bloc’s social clubs, restricting its activities to social affairs and refusing to grant it political party status. It became an “underground” organisation by 1954.

Setting the "southern politics" of the Sudan African National Union (SANU) and Southern Front (SF) parties in this broader history of competing Sudanese political philosophies and racial, regional, Sudan black slave histories demonstrates a broader church of "southern" political thought into the 1960s. More recently arrived residents were more likely than older residents to associate under ethnic or regional banners such as the Southern Sudan Emergency Political Committee, Nuba General Union, or Darfur Union, organisations which in themselves had various membership terms: for example, the small 1950s group "Chairmen of the Committee for The Committee", led by the Legislative Assembly member Michael Watta, used the term abiid in describing its membership and constituency, and members of the Southern Social and Political Club limited their membership to “genuine southerners” whose homes lay south of the fourteenth parallel. These lines of membership, and thus definitions of "southern", evolved over the 1960s and early 70s, as debates over the "blackness" of nas Sudani (Sudanese people) incorporated contemporary anti-colonial and post-independence black African politics. As one new migrant to Khartoum in 1976 explained:

'I said why SANU? Because, [they said], in Kenya, it’s KANU. In Tanzania, it’s ZANU. And – in other [places], even in Zambia, [it’s] ZANU. So I say: why SANU? He said because we are African; that’s why it’s called Sudan - African - National - Union.'


199 Sikainga, ‘Military slavery’, p. 34. But name did not die: in 1969, the Voice of the Nile Republic recorded the death sentencing of seventeen people, including Philip Abbas Ghaboush, for an anti-government plot, which was ‘alleged to have been the work of a group calling itself the Black Bloc.’

Death sentences for alleged plotters,’ 15 November 1969, Comboniani A/86/21/3.


201 PKKM, 9 August 2013.
These racial and African ideas were expressed beyond SANU by student newspapers at Khartoum University in the 1960s, and by various small-enterprise "political parties" often found in embassy records in this period, for instance in a note on the arrest of members of 'the Free Negro Movement (Arabic: Harakat az-Zunuj al-Ahrar)’ in Khartoum in 1969. Some, like Philip Abbas Ghaboush, a prominent Nuba politician and proponent of Sudanese black solidarity, argued that this broader political vocabulary of political action – beyond a separate "southern politics" – was a demonstration of a clear, if not necessarily coherent, "Sudanese Black Movement” from 1948 to the 2000s.

By the late 1960s, the growing numbers of Khartoum residents from southern areas of Sudan were developing concepts of being “southern” as creoles of old and new Sudanese and international ideas. This discourse was not controlled or conditioned entirely by external or state forces – such as national narratives of "the southern problem", or exiled rebel politicians. While these organisations generally had a very small reach – particularly in southern Sudan – their history emphasises that there was a far broader market of political ideas and engagement beyond the forms expressed by the specifically “southern” political elites in the 1950s and 60s. Increasing numbers of urban residents may not have been politically engaged primarily as “southerners” in the 1960s and 1970s, but this did not necessarily mean their affiliations were always either primarily or only to rural localities, ethnicities, clans and cattle camps. Instead, southern residents were not just "locals" to isolated villages and rural areas, but generally had extensive familial and historical experience, political understandings, and detailed "local" knowledge of wider and often geographically far-ranging networks of blackness, slavery, urban migration and exploitation. Talking exclusively about the emergence of “southern political consciousness” obscures and homogenises this pluralism of ties.

202 Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 142.
203 Police conspiracy in Equatoria Province,’ newspaper cutting, 20 August 1969, TNA FCO 39.480.
205 Two members of the Black Bloc were later elected members of the Assembly for constituencies in Khartoum and Omdurman, campaigning in Wad Medani, El Obeid and Juba. Sikainga, ‘Military slavery’, p. 32.
By late 1960s – at the same time as this mass migration to Khartoum – the intensifying civil war in the south, particularly in greater Equatoria, cemented the idea of a discrete “southern problem” within high politics, at the same time as closing down formal political space. By 1967, many prominent “southern political leaders” had gone “into exile” in various ways – remaining in state civil service in Khartoum, going abroad to Europe or Cairo for education or refuge, or to Kenya, Uganda, Congo and the Central African Republic, establishing various independent movements on behalf of “the south” (including, for example, the Azania Liberation Movement, the new country of Alwa, the Kush Republic, Southern People’s Progressive Party, the Immatong Republic, and the Nile Provisional Government).\(^{206}\) The 1965 elections were so disrupted by insecurity that forty-three southern constituencies did not return candidates, and the remaining twenty seats were taken by mostly northern-origin MPs,\(^{207}\) who again took more southern seats in the 1967 and 1968 elections than the supposedly regionally powerful SANU and the Southern Front.\(^{208}\) Following his coup in 1969, Nimeiri banned party politics by the early 1970s under his new socialist national project, rendering these foundering parties and their politicians relatively redundant. Other forms of open organisation – like university unions, trade unions and the Communist party – were shut down or restricted in the early to mid 1970s.\(^{209}\)

Howell argued that this political marginalisation of the “southern” elites within Sudan, and the increasing migration of rural masses to the towns, contributed to the ‘large gulf between the educated elite and the great majority,’ with the new migrant worker populations ‘largely ignored by the politicians... beyond limited contact along clan lines.’\(^{210}\) But the alternative history of Khartoum migration, the growth of peripheral Sudanese urban communities, and vernacular political pluralism presented here challenges this apparent divide between the ‘urban elites’ and ‘rural masses’. This closing down of political space in the late 1960s and

\(^{206}\) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) internal correspondence, 30 August 1977, FCO 93.1184. An FCO officer has commented in the margin: ‘Oh! No! I cant cope with more new names. Where is Immatong?’


\(^{208}\) Willis, ‘The southern problem’, p. 281.

\(^{209}\) Sikainga, *Organized labor and social change in contemporary Sudan*, p. 16.

\(^{210}\) Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, pp. 89, 146.
early 1970s did not necessarily mean that these political elites were cut off from their "southern" constituents, or that political parties entirely "fell apart."

It is hard to see what banning political parties actually stopped. The major "southern" parties, the Liberal Party, Southern Front and SANU were by the late 1960s – as Howell put it – 'only marginally “parties” in the strictest sense of the term.'\(^{211}\) The family homes of prominent men in Khartoum were not only political party headquarters, but employment offices, dosshouses, schools and social clubs for others from his local or ethnic community in the south.\(^{212}\) Toby Maduot Parek, then a SANU MP, complained from his own experience that 'we may find 20-30 dependants in the house of an MP in Khartoum: refugees who have nowhere to go in the North.'\(^{213}\) Government officials were apparently 'hard pressed economically because their homes are overflowing with relatives who have come from the South.'\(^{214}\) Gordon Muortat Mayen, one of the founders of the Southern Front, petitioned for church financial support in 1967, as the Southern Front offices became overwhelmed with requests for help from southerners seeking 'temporary safety' in Khartoum.\(^{215}\) The SANU youth newspaper reported later that year,

> many Southern young men and girls are today thrown to extreme poverty, especially those deprived of parents... more than 200 of these children have approached SANU Office for recommendation, help, and many of them are still roaming about in the Northern towns without jobs.\(^ {216}\)

Personalised politics and the increasing possibility of travel northwards through rail and steamer boat meant that these connections were reinforced, such as the Dinka men of Aweil district who lost 1500 cattle to a government army raid in September 1969 and travelled to

---

\(^{211}\) Ibid., p. 71.
\(^{212}\) Ibid., p. 96; Howell, ‘Political leaders in the Southern Sudan’, pp. 14, 226.
\(^{213}\) Resume of a talk by Dr Toby Maduot, MP for Thiet [sic] North, 1968, Comboniani A/90/13/21.
\(^{214}\) Gordon Muortat, Vice President of the Southern Front, to the All Africa Conference of Churches Commission, 18 February 1967, TNA FCO 39.181.
\(^{215}\) Ibid.
\(^{216}\) L. D. Logoye, SANU Youth Organ Monthly Bulletin Issue 2, Khartoum, November 1967, p.5-7, Comboniani A/86/28. There are numerous files in the SSNA from new migrants, long-term Khartoum residents and all ages of students, all with enquiries about jobs or support.
Khartoum to report it to Joseph Garang, then Minister for Southern Affairs in Nimeiri’s new government.\textsuperscript{217}

It is questionable whether these workers in Khartoum even followed, rather than just respected, this “southern leadership.” Connections between “political elites” and “ordinary people” were also not necessarily hierarchical. Howell was unable to explain the violence of the mid to late 1960s in Khartoum from the supposedly politically “unconscious” masses. The violence of the Black Sunday protests on 6 December 1964, set off by rumours of the Southern Front leader Clement Mboro’s detention or murder, were not “led” by elites. Mboro was due to return from a fact-finding tour in the south on 6 December 1964 when the Southern Front organised a parade and demonstration in his support.

Several thousand southerners, mainly labourers, paraded to the airport... according to an eye-witness, the bar filled up with southerners demanding liquor which they declared would be paid for by the Minister. ... [By the time they heard of Mboro’s delayed arrival,] many of the crowd were fighting drunk and insults were exchanged with the airport staff. ... Somebody started a rumour that the Minister had been delayed by foul play; ... the crowd set off in a mood of irrational bellicosity [through the city] ... overturning parked cars, throwing stones through windscreens, molesting northerners and foreigners, and breaking into houses.\textsuperscript{218}

The protesters were attacked by crowds from the Coliseum cinema and football stadium, and ‘a general man-hunt ensued,’ with southern or black people attacked through the night and on Monday morning, and bodies thrown into the Nile.\textsuperscript{219} By Monday afternoon, southern residents were camping at the Omdurman football stadium and at a camp on the Blue Nile railway for safety, with many Dinka people leaving, although it was also reported that most of the Nuer workers and students returned to work by Christmas.\textsuperscript{220} In riots the following year, Howell noted that ‘it was clear that anger and resentment among southern labourers, army and police ranks, and townspeople generally, was not instigated by the political leadership.’\textsuperscript{221}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Voice of the Nile Republic}, No. 10, 15 October 1969, Comboniani A/86/21/3.
\textsuperscript{218} Henderson, \textit{Sudan Republic}, p. 211.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid., p. 211.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., pp. 212–3.
\textsuperscript{221} Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 79.
\end{flushleft}
Deng Nhial on 12 May 1968 were similarly uncoordinated: a large group gathered at the SANU club throwing stones at police, who used tear gas. Twenty people were injured and six killed, including one policeman, and over a hundred were arrested.\textsuperscript{222} Much like Howell, southern politicians appeared to be at a loss to explain the violence, even those who claim to have helped organise similar protests before, such as the journalist Bona Malwal; ‘the ‘Sunday incident’ 'was not a plan by anyone at least not by a Southerner … no sane Southerner could have planned it.'\textsuperscript{223} There were broader high-stakes debates and decisions being undertaken among the southern communities in Khartoum, beyond the reach of these elite politicians.

**An alternative political sphere**

This period has been commonly characterised as the collapse of formal Sudanese party politics: Lesch stated that this then led to ‘violence, non-participation, and alienation.’\textsuperscript{224} The rest of this thesis questions these dualisms – between violent conflict and formal politics, and between these intellectual elites and their impoverished and apparently inarticulate constituencies – and asks what “southern” politics was in practice.

The Khartoum context provided a hothouse for alternative political action. Khartoum political debate had never really centred on elected elites, but with open party politics shut down by 1972, a variety of older options - such as associations and social unions - and new organisations, such as student groups, began to boom. This growth was encouraged by increasingly large numbers of migrant labourers travelling northwards in the 1970s and early 80s, particularly as southern secondary schools and universities operated increasingly from Khartoum. The African National Front was founded sometime in the early 1970s, along with social organisations of the Nuba Mountains and Darfur, and other more short-lived groups including the Pan-African Socialist Society, Democratic Front, and the African Thought and

\textsuperscript{222} ‘100 arrested in Sudan demonstrations,’ *The Times* 13 May 1968, TNA FCO 39.181.  
\textsuperscript{223} Bona Malwal, ‘Report of the secretariat to the general meeting of the Southern Front on 6 February 1965,’ Comboniani A/90/8/10.  
\textsuperscript{224} Lesch, *The Sudan*, p. 66.
These groups were a mix of politics and mutual support, much like previous political parties, but with an emphasis on social and cultural activities. Philip Abbas Ghaboush called this ‘a legal front’ for ‘underground... black organisations’, where ‘instead of encouraging open resistance’ they ‘paid the poll tax of an impoverished member, helped at times of bereavement, arranged funerals and mourning parties and so on,’ as well as financing secret meetings. The term “southerner” (janubi) began to be used more widely, as part of the terminology of the growing idea of a “war of visions”. It was encouraged by international appeals to solve “the southern problem”, the regional terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the creation of the Ministry of Southern Affairs, which was inundated by petitions for assistance from individuals presenting themselves as “fellow southerners.” But “southerner” continued as only one term of reference in an arsenal of personal definitions and collective affiliations in this political sphere.

This “underground politics” – whether practical or conceptual – had long been the normal form of political expression for southern and other marginalised groups in Sudan, rather than political parties. The complex racial, political, historical and regional foundations of these familiar forms of organisation prioritised inward-looking work: their non-statist and often introspective focus was on community preservation (with the creative aspects this entails), political education, and moral integrity. The following chapters look at the alternative spaces opened up by this closing down of formal public politics and the growth of a self-consciously “black, southern and marginalised” population in the three towns of Khartoum.
Chapter two

From the 1980s, Khartoum expanded massively, growing from the 1973 census figure of 800,000 residents to around 1.8 million in 1983, and to an estimated 4 million people by 1990.228 This chapter focuses on this huge in-migration from the mid 1980s, mainly comprised of Nuba, Darfur and southern populations.

This is also when historical literature on the roots of southern political organisation and on southern communities in Khartoum fades.229 The boom in Khartoum’s marginal and mostly black migrants from around 1978 until 2005 is relatively undocumented. By 1989, after massive displacement northwards due to repeated famines particularly in Darfur and Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Ryle and Yai Kuol wrote:

The largest number of displaced southerners, and possibly the most needy, is in Khartoum itself. The size of the problem is daunting… basic information about the social composition of the shantytowns is lacking. Generally they are described as being composed of ‘Southerners,” “Dinka,” “Westerners,” or “Mixed.” … Aweil Dinka form a majority in at least three Khartoum shantytowns (Col Macar in Omdurman, Kalakala and the Bentiu section of Bagiar).230

---

230 John Ryle and Kwaja Yai Kuol, *Displaced southern Sudanese in northern Sudan with special reference to southern Darfur and Kordofan* (February 1989), p. 39. The first two place names in Khartoum noted here are transliterated in this thesis as, respectively, Machar Col and Kalakla, based on the pronunciation and written versions provided by informants in Aweil and Juba during research.
This lack of information was compounded by a particularly flattening terminology, as Ryle and Yai Kuol also noted:

Migrants of very diverse origins and backgrounds, speaking different languages, practising different religions and having different modes of livelihood become, collectively, “the Displaced.” They are thus characterised only by their present condition, homeless, without identity, in limbo. This terminology tends to homogenise and dehumanise the inhabitants of the south. It conspires inadvertently with a strain in northern discourse about non-Muslim and non-Arab inhabitants of the Sudan which lumps all southerners together and defines them thus with negatives, as non-believers, without real religion, not fully deserving of moral respect.²³¹

This chapter details the history of this intensive and highly political settlement from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, as violence, armed raiding and famines served to depopulate large areas of southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Greater Upper Nile. This period saw an intensification of the long struggle for control over Khartoum's geography and public character which had been underway since the 1910s. New residents made fundamental changes to Khartoum's social and political geography between 1988 and 1992, marking out and protecting new political space in a period many people called the “establishment” of Khartoum.

This chapter introduces several ideas that run through the rest of this thesis. The pressures of Khartoum’s complex political geography by the late 1980s, as well as the escalation of the war and the organisation of the SPLA into a significant force in the south, encouraged intense political and racial self-consciousness and social stress on Khartoum’s new, southern, poor residents. As force of circumstance, Khartoum attitudes and stereotypes, international observers and aid programmes lumped these new arrivals together into a collectively racial-regional category, so too did the self-organisation of settlement, social support and security among previously geographically and socially disparate new neighbours. Creating living space and negotiating the city as self-consciously black januubiin demanded significant mutual support; this chapter lays out these communities’ work to construct safe space.

²³¹ Ryle and Yai Kuol, Displaced southern Sudanese in northern Sudan, p. 34; for an example of this attitude, see Sharaf Eldin Ibrahim Bannaga, Peace and the displaced in Sudan: the Khartoum experience (Zurich, 2002), p. 37.
Khartoum’s geography, 1960s-1980s

Greater Khartoum has been heavily planned since 1899. The systems of first to third-class land designations, which were ordered on racial and class lines, were maintained throughout colonial and post-colonial periods. Particular groups – slaves, soldiers, specific trades, and ethnicities – have long been associated with particular areas of Khartoum’s Three Towns, such as Hay al-Dubbat, “the officers’ quarter”, in Omdurman in the early 1900s, and in regional Sudanese settlements in Omdurman, Bahri, and the *deims*, “native lodging areas”, of Khartoum from 1912 onwards. By 1956, Khartoum was ‘perhaps the most over-planned city in the world’, with several “master plans” and endless re-planning schemes. These plans have been consistently challenged, primarily by repeated famines, conflicts and economic displacement, as well as state bureaucratic failures. With the rapid growth of new unauthorised *deims* in the 1960s, copying the layout of their more central counterparts, the over-ambitious and often contradictory “master plans” were constantly outpaced.

This rapidly-evolving geography of Khartoum left many other residents feeling under attack. Visibly black, poor and rural residents were a challenge to the apparent pre-existing ‘Arab-Islamic’ integrity of three core identities: of Khartoum city, of the Sudanese state centre, and of local elites who felt they had ownership of both. A form of moral panic grew among local elites, state bureaucrats and suburban residents from the early 1960s, with calls for surveys of the new urban populations, and a growing field of urban studies at universities in Khartoum focusing on health problems and overcrowding. Residents were worried about the “ruralisation” of their neighbourhoods, with the cardboard villages ‘a mere

---


233 Pantuliano et al., *City Limits*, p. 3.


236 Aqra’, *Housing rentals in the Sudanese capital*, pp. 90–1; Pantuliano et al., *City Limits*, p. 7.

237 For an example of this, see Abdelrahman, ‘Internal migration in the Sudan’, p. 37.

238 ‘Social survey of citizens from Southern Provinces resident in the Three Towns,’ c. 1971, SSNA Equatoria Province 1.A.6/2; For example, see Aqra’, *Housing rentals in the Sudanese capital*, p. 96.
transplantation of poverty from the rural areas into the door-steps of our modern centres.\(^{239}\) The visible poverty of the new residents served, as Woldemikael put it, ‘almost to legitimize a feeling of superiority’ among other non-southern residents.\(^{240}\) These locals feared social and political conflicts due to the ‘cultural alienation’ of the displaced – even if this was not backed by real evidence.\(^{241}\) As well as noise from new evening churches in houses and public spaces in the suburbs,\(^{242}\) the new settlements were ‘generally conceived as a threat to health, security, and social order’ and responsible for the shortages and pressure on social services.\(^{243}\)

Politically, urban refugees from remote areas had long been seen by local and elite Khartoum residents as “suspect” “alien elements.” The fear was that these migrants from the peripheries – particularly from the south – ‘could be turned into political recidivists any time by any dissatisfied person or persons.”\(^{244}\) This was fuelled by the rise of the SPLA and rebel alliances: by 1988 and 1989, the southern war was spreading towards northern territories, with the SPLA operational in some areas of Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, finding broader appeal outside of southern Sudan in part thanks to John Garang’s explicit declarations of a pan-Sudanese uprising for a “New Sudan.” Both the NIF regime established in 1989 and the non-“displaced” populace of Khartoum felt increasingly threatened by the southern and Darfur influx, particularly within their own suburbs.\(^{245}\) These attitudes were encouraged by the Sudanese press and northern political parties, as a distraction or scapegoating for economic problems or to promote mistrust – ‘with headlines such as “Squatters intrude into capital and cause danger” and “Increase of displaced people

\(^{242}\) Mohammed Ahmed, *Christian missionary activity.*
\(^{243}\) Ibrahim, ‘The Southern Sudanese migration to Khartoum’, p. 60; Eltigani and Mahran (eds.), *The Displacement Problem in the Sudan*.
\(^{244}\) ‘Social survey of citizens from Southern Provinces’.
is part of a whole plan to bring about insecurity”. Oxfam noted that the Khartoum press frequently referred to the displaced as “infidels.” This was not necessarily media hyperbole; in this period, academics and politicians both wrote of the fear of the ‘politically dangerous’ ‘destructive physical force’ of the displaced communities, specifically on two bases: ‘the threat of superior power’ through their numbers, and ‘a possible fifth column in the capital.’

These attitudes were well understood by the new communities. Southern and black residents had contended with hostility and racialised prejudices in Khartoum for decades, and often tried to limit contact ‘to fellow tribesmen or fellow southerners’ before the 1970s. In 1980, Kameir explained that ‘in the streets of the cities of the North, the Southerners are easily distinguished by their physical features, their clothing, and their pidgin Arabic,’ what James called ‘ethnic visibility.’ These stereotypes and supposed characteristics of what constituted acting as “southern” or “black” were regularly imposed on new residents, as Jok observed: ‘the Black student at Khartoum University who is taken for a servant looking for domestic work, a non-Arab businessman who gets harassed by the police on the assumption that he may be a thief, the common slurs hurled at non-Arabs as being lazy, uncivilised, unintelligent, prone to crime, [and] the caricature of southerners or Nuba in everyday northern humor.’

---

246 ‘Sudan’s secret slaughter,’ SAD.985/6/48; Wijnroks, The displaced people of Khartoum, pp. 48–9, 35.
248 Jane Perlez, ‘Sudanese Troops Burn Refugee Camp, Forcing Residents to a Desert Site’, The New York Times, 4 November 1990; Salah El-Din El-Shazali Ibrahim, ‘War Displacement: the socio-cultural dimension’, in Eltigani and Mahran (eds.), The Displacement Problem in the Sudan, SAD.940/5/2/65–66; John Rogge, Relocation and Repatriation of Displaced Persons in Sudan: A Report to the Minister of Relief and Displaced Persons Affairs (University of Manitoba, 1990), p. 27. The anonymous report ‘Sudan’s secret slaughter’ records: ‘a group of the most educated people in Khartoum, such as the doctors, lawyers and others living in Riyad, have even set up the “Riyad Residents Self Defence Group” to stockpile food, fuel and weapons in anticipation of violence and insecurity involving southerners. They are believed to have requested the Commissioner for Khartoum Province and the police to remove the displaced.’ SAD.985/6/48.
251 James, ‘War and “ethnic visibility”’.
252 Jok, Sudan, p. 11.
'[Local residents] try to say that - why [arrange that] petrol is to be taken to [the] south? Is it [that] they’re going to give it to the cows?’

Khartoum authorities, already struggling to design the ideal capital city, dealt with this apparent social and spatial threat through forcible removal – ideally to areas of origin, but when this failed, to “new” (and often remote and un-serviced) suburbs. As one Aweil resident explained,

'They don’t want to southerners to [be] inside the city, they want them to go outside... because if the number of southerners increased [too much, then] they are going to change society.'

This was not a programme invented by or particular to one government: although demolitions and forcible relocations gained international attention in the 1990s, they were a popular method of re-planning in Khartoum since the 1930s, particularly of areas of brothels and beer houses. Demolitions were usually conducted at times of heightened stress on Khartoum’s urban and state image; there were evictions in July 1978 as a form of landscaping in preparation for a prestigious meeting of the Organisation of African Unity in the city. These interventions, though, were sporadic. By the 1970s, some technically illegal settlements were already decades old, such as Kalakla, opposite Soba, and the “Fellata village,” named after the collective name for Hausa, Fulɓe, Borno and other migrant communities from western Africa, a term with a derogatory association with menial and low-status labour and questionable citizenship. Umbadda (sometimes called ‘New Omdurman’) grew from a small village into clusters of illegal settlements during the 1950s and 1960s; attempts at re-planning and legalising parts of it in the late 1960s only

---

253 WDAA, 18 July 2013.
255 DKLK, 4 July 2013.
257 Bascom, Losing place, p. 39.
259 Sikainga, ‘Slavery, labour, and ethnicity in Khartoum’.
encouraged further squatting.\textsuperscript{260} This overcrowding was compounded by the massive dislocation of people from northern Sudan by the Aswan dam, creating new ethnic enclaves.\textsuperscript{261} Governments and local authorities were deeply inconsistent in their negotiations with these settlements and associations – for instance, under Nimeiri’s government there were increasing collaborations between locally organised neighbourhood authorities and city officials, but the central state used false promises of assistance to coerce relocations, and blocked UNHCR water holes.\textsuperscript{262}

Erratic and conflicting government interventions, electoral vote-seeking and local organisation gave room for local residents to expand and restructure Khartoum’s outskirts. Already in the early 1960s, for example, cardboard settlements had developed in the Safia area of Bahri, ‘encouraged and condoned by vote-seeking politicians.’\textsuperscript{263} Many people moved to Haj Yousif village, which doubled in population between 1969 and 1976, becoming a huge self-contained suburb and a political heartland for black and regional organisations, particularly with the growth of its Darfuri population in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{264} In Haj Yousif,

the community itself has shown a great sense of organisation, and a more than average participation in large community and political issues. They were very politically aware of their position and their potential, and through the political institutions they have erected, they aimed to manipulate the larger community institutions to improve their conditions. They also came to realise how important were their votes in the competition [in the 1968 election].\textsuperscript{265}

Place names are a useful way of exploring this contest over the practical and political geography of Khartoum.\textsuperscript{266} Popular place names, used instead of “official” ones, have been a means of political and class commentary in Sudan for decades. Wealthy areas of Khartoum

\textsuperscript{260} Aqra’, \textit{Housing rentals in the Sudanese capital}, pp. 177, 13.
\textsuperscript{261} Hale, \textit{Nubians}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{262} Greenfield, ‘Two months that shook Sudan’, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{263} Aqra’, \textit{Housing rentals in the Sudanese capital}, p. 111.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid., p. 111; Abdelrahman, ‘Internal migration in the Sudan’, p. 118.
have borne sarcastic names since the 1960s, like Hai Al-Mazahir ("Appearances" or "Exteriors” Quarter), a comment on the pretentiousness and exhibitionism of its resident elites. Ar-Riyad, At-Ta’iff, or Al-Mamoura are all satirically-named after richer middle eastern city regions, as inferior versions. Takamul ("Integration“) was allegedly named in the late 1970s, ‘meant to symbolise, by analogy and with irony, the integration of all Sudanese people.’ In Atbara, Ishash was named after the straw huts ‘associated with former slaves, West African immigrants, and marginal groups, and [which] were considered dens of social deviance. This Khartoum practice of multiple alternative and sarcastic place names took on new political weight during the massive expansion of the city in the 1980s, most obviously for the neighbourhoods taking on violent epitaphs, including Jabarona ("we were forced"), Zagalona ("we were thrown/forced out"), and Taradona ("they expelled us").

However, these names have long histories and can be found all over Sudan since at least the 1910s. A Zagalona was established before 1920 to the north-west of El Obeid, the capital of Northern Kordofan and a major post on the route to Khartoum, and remained on maps in 1933 and 1964. Another Zagalona was recorded west of Aba Island and north of Kosti, among the sugar plantations on the White Nile in 1927; a further Zagalona was recorded between 1929 and 1937 nearby at Abu Rukka, and another east of the railway line near Atbara town, north-east of Khartoum, in the 1930s; another Zagalona appears west of Al Fashir in North Darfur in 1961. Competing place names demonstrate similarly competing powers and agency in Khartoum: the urban poor are displaced, but also move themselves; new suburbs gain official names, but unofficial ones often prove more powerful. By 1984, when people from western, southern and eastern Sudan began to move to Khartoum in far greater numbers and with significant emotional, economic and political baggage, due to failed harvests in 1983 and 1984 across Darfur and the increasingly violent

Ahmad, ‘The neighbourhoods of Khartoum’, p. 44; in Juba, the new capital of South Sudan, the area where the South Sudanese President, Vice President and many ministers live was also named Riyadh sarcastically by locals in the early 2000s.

Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 27.

Sikainga, ’City of steel and fire’, p. 68.

Ahmad, ‘The neighbourhoods of Khartoum’, p. 44.


Map of Aba Island 55.1, Survey Office Khartoum, 1927, RGS Sudan Gen 46.

southern civil wars, these ideas of Khartoum’s geography, its in-migrants, and the methods of the often-violent battle for residency were firmly established.

**Famine, murder, and flight, 1985-1989**

‘You know, we were like people who ran to the enemy’s house. You were fighting with me, and then I run to you. I’m accused [there] – because they think that I’m still having a link with my people who are fighting. [We had to] stay with them, to become like – like somebody who is a slave.’

*Member of cultural group and local business owner, Aweil, explaining his feelings about arriving and living in Khartoum after fleeing from a Sudan government-sponsored militia attack on his home in what is now Aweil North county, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, in around 1988.*

For most people arriving to Khartoum from the south, the war ‘[of] murahaleen and the hunger’ began around 1985 to 1989. This period saw the escalation of localised, sporadic and complex conflicts across greater Bahr el Ghazal, southern Darfur, southern Kordofan and Upper Nile, and an intense and horrific famine that struck northern Bahr el Ghazal and southern Darfur from 1986 onwards. The heterogeneity of experiences of this conflict and famine means a concise narrative summary of this period is both impossible and redundant, although many new arrivals came with devastating experiences of violence, fear and loss.

Just as there was no discrete Khartoum ‘southern population’, or clear distinctions between motives for moving north, people’s routes away from their home areas were similarly diverse. Most of the people interviewed during my research had lived and worked in Darfur, Kordofan or Gedaref for long periods since 1987, and many had travelled between these places, a few into Egypt and the Middle East. Many people described being forced by

---

274 Miller, *Language change and national integration*, p. 18.
275 DCS, 11 August 2013.
276 DCS, 11 August 2013, also M, 13 April 2013.
277 M, 13 April 2013, among many other interviews.
violence or necessity into bonded labour or slavery – in their words – in households, on farms and with cattle herds in Kordofan and Darfur, and many had to leave their children as unpaid labourers and slaves with farmers and herders in the region. Violence and famine did not entirely override personal choice and experience. Some people chose to move on to Khartoum because of their previous work there, or because of relatives’ Khartoum experience or residence there. Other people claim to have been ‘heading the people’ in group movements north in 1987 and 1988.

Khartoum’s authorities and elite residents were unwilling to host these wartime migrants, and the city’s few aid organisations were unprepared and overwhelmed. The first attempts to survey and assist the displaced populations had begun in 1986. This was led by various Christian church bodies in Sudan, organised under the aegis of the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), led by the Catholic Cardinal Gabriel Zubeir Wako and acting partly through the Catholic body SudanAid (now Caritas) and various other international Christian partners. Only a few other international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had started small projects by 1988. Initial SudanAid surveys, conducted in July and August 1986 in Khartoum and extended to other northern towns by September, noted the near-collapse of existing networks of mutual support among the ‘already marginal’ southerners in the north as a result of these new arrivals. SudanAid successfully petitioned the World Food

278 M, 13 April 2013.
279 APA, 21 July 2013.
280 MKW, 11 August 2013.
281 JW, JUA, AT and MAA, 11 August 2013; MTL, 10 July 2013; WDAA, 18 July 2013.
282 For example, JG’s grandparents in the 1950s and 60s, 30 June 2013, and MI’s father and mother in the late 1960s, 23 January 2013.
283 For example, J’s stepmother, 26 June 2013, and YM, 10 September 2013.
284 For instance the executive chief AAY, 11 July 2013.
Programme (WFP) for an initial feeding programme of two months’ food rations for those who needed it on arrival, organised by local area committees who knew the applicants.\textsuperscript{287} The first government-sanctioned report on displaced people in Khartoum was the maternal and child health survey in February 1987.\textsuperscript{288} This survey noted specific locations with ‘high concentrations’ of displaced people, including entire suburbs - recorded as informal “camps”; ‘to the surprise of the surveyers [sic], the women respondents reported that 70 per cent of their husbands are also in Khartoum, 85 per cent of whom have found some form of employment.’ Two thirds of the people surveyed were from the south, with another third from the west of Sudan.\textsuperscript{289} By September 1987, SudanAid’s immediate food aid was extended to over 30,000 families, which coincided with a significant increase in the number of people travelling to Khartoum from Darfur, Kordofan and the south before the 1988 rainy season, mostly as a result of famine and insecurity particularly in Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile.\textsuperscript{290} According to a CONCERN note in early 1988, ‘their condition... gave rise to extreme anxiety amongst governments officials, International Donors and NGOs alike.’\textsuperscript{291} But despite some work in 1987, most of these initial “emergency humanitarian” interventions date from the catastrophic August 1988 floods. August storms devastated the clay and cardboard houses of Khartoum’s poorest populations, leaving hundreds of thousands of people homeless and attracting international media attention.\textsuperscript{292} While the floods receded, the destruction highlighted the huge “hidden displacement” of the newly-categorized “Internally Displaced Persons” of Sudan for international humanitarian agencies.\textsuperscript{293}

estimated, should be treated with caution! In June 1986, the Archdiocese of Khartoum recorded official government figures of at least 250,000 people displaced to Khartoum, though they believed it was much higher. By the end of the year, the Sudanese government were using the figure of 65,000, which SudanAid used for their feeding programme; however, their records showed food aid registration for 48,474 people from October 1986 to February 1987, which ‘indicates a startling influx of more than 12,000 people per month or 3,000 per week’:

...if an influx of 12,000 displaced persons per month is assumed during the period from Nov 85 to April 87, this would result in 216,000 displaced people. However, this may exaggerate the numbers, especially as the influx appears to vary over time, depending on specific events related to the civic unrest or to the schedule of trains and barges.

SudanAid settled on a working figure of 150,000 people. But by January 1988, SudanAid were estimating 1.5 to 1.8 million southern and Nuba Mountains migrants in Khartoum, amounting to over half of the total urban population. The city government’s Commission for the Displaced was using a figure of 1,621,200 people by 1989. At the same time, its government partner the Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation was using a figure of 1.8 million displaced people in Khartoum; the UN were using a figure of 1.25 million; the National Dialogue Conference held in the same year put the Khartoum displaced population at 3 million; MSF Holland were using a working estimate of 1 to 2 million people; and the massive UN and NGO consortium aid project Operation Lifeline Sudan II estimated 1.8 million people. Another government office estimated 600,000 displaced people in Khartoum in February 1989, and a small government census the same year counted only

294 Wijnroks, The displaced people of Khartoum, p. 3.
296 Elizabeth A. Bassan, Background information and program recommendation on displaced people in Khartoum (April 1987), MEDU 17/4/AID/125.
297 Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 18.
175,000 "displaced." By 1990, estimates of the number of displaced people in Khartoum spanned from 600,000 to 3 million. The wave of displacement that year overwhelmed these surveys: throughout the 1990s and 2000s, displacement totals were recorded as rounded millions.

Counting the Khartoum displaced was problematic primarily because categorisation of these migrants was so political in all senses. National and Khartoum state governments had long been factionalised, ineffectual and internally contradictory, particularly in the later years of Nimeiri's regime and under fragile post-1985 parliamentary democracy. By 1990, aid assistance to Khartoum was overseen by a combination of the Commission for the Displaced, the Commission of Relief and Rehabilitation (RRC), the Ministry of Social Welfare, Zakat and the Displaced (MSWZD), regional governments, local popular committees, and the Khartoum Commission. The Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), established in 1995, was the tenth institution created by the government for "the displaced" since 1984. This obfuscation was arguably intentional: in 1986, the Archdiocese of Khartoum noted that "officially, the Commissioner for Relief declares that Khartoum is not a relief area." The fragile parliamentary regime of the later 1980s was anxious to minimise both the war and the scale of poverty and suffering on the edges of Khartoum, which would demonstrate visible failures of governance at the heart of Sudan state, and admit to the scale and devastation of war and famine in the south and Darfur. Throughout the mid-1980s, the Khartoum state and national government termed new arrivals 'seasonal migrant labour.' Work in Khartoum with the "displaced" was only legalised in May 1987 under the RRC – but the government refused to define Khartoum's new urban poor as "displaced", with Dr Rahman of the RRC emphasising that 'we cannot just treat it as an emergency situation...
otherwise more and more people will come to the capital for handouts. Rehabilitation includes self-sufficiency.\textsuperscript{308} The Khartoum authorities also stressed that action was being justified primarily on the grounds of health hazards.\textsuperscript{309}

The 1989 coup and National Islamic Front regime hardened rather than changed this general establishment approach to both Khartoum urban control and the state narrative of the war. The regime avoided defining a “southern” population in Khartoum, increasingly using the homogenising, a-politicising and generalising term “displaced”, whose plight was explicitly due to “natural causes”, officially designating those arriving in the city after 1984 as squatters and thus also justifying their forcible relocation.\textsuperscript{310} The humanitarian problem with these new residents was re-emphasised as one of “culture”, poverty and integration, not of the outcomes of political violence. The Former Minister of Construction, Housing and Public Utilities for Khartoum State (and according to Human Rights Watch in 1996 the ‘government czar of slum clearance’)\textsuperscript{311} Dr Sharif Bannaga explained: ‘it is a fact that the displaced are from the poor layers of the community, unable to administer life affairs... the most immediate impact of the misconduct, malpractice and ill behaviour of the displaced was on public health.’\textsuperscript{312}

The NIF regime also took a harder-line approach to international presence in Sudan. By 1990, NGOs were fighting a monthly battle to stay in Khartoum.\textsuperscript{313} The constantly changing government agencies responsible for registration of aid work controlled permits and visas, and were increasingly difficult to contact over 1989 to 1991.\textsuperscript{314} By the early 1990s, NGOs had to re-register every year, with visas and permits expiring annually around January, forcing international staff to leave for around three months each year, while also being

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{308} Anonymous, Meeting about medical assistance to displaced people in Khartoum region, (Khartoum?, 1987), MEDU 17/4/AID/126.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{309} Bassan, Background information.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{310} Burr, Sudan 1990-1992, p. 24; Malik, 'Displacement as Discourse'; for example, see Bannaga, Peace and the displaced in Sudan.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{311} Jemera Rone, Behind the red line: political repression in Sudan (New York, 1996), p. 254.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{312} Bannaga, Peace and the displaced in Sudan, pp. 36–7, 41.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{313} AM, 6 February 2012.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{314} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
expelled seemingly at random.\(^{315}\) The high staff turnover, of around six months’ experience, meant that ‘planning for displacees is currently taking place without any adequate foundation of objectively derived data.’\(^{316}\) The UN Secretary-General’s urgent humanitarian appeal in October 1988, which emphasised ‘a programme of assistance for the Khartoum displaced,’ faced what were euphemistically called logistical and political ‘constraints’ and ‘delays’ well into 1990.\(^{317}\)

Despite this antagonism, international humanitarian organisations’ approach to displaced people was very similar to the Khartoum regimes’. International aid organisations were also focused on defining both “the IDPs” and their location. Operational decisions stuck – as they often do today – on ‘how displacees are defined and how long a person is considered to remain a displacee.’\(^{318}\) The NGO and multilateral community, like the regime, based their approach on a specific (homogenising and flattening) understanding of the IDPs in Khartoum. This was specifically a “traditional rural” homogeneity, and this kind of representation presented these new populations of urban Khartoum as vulnerable, emphasising their fracture and disintegration.\(^{319}\) Aid reports focus on the ‘profound adaptations’ facing the ‘non-literate’ and ‘nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral’ displaced people.\(^{320}\) Most NGOs worked from lists of chiefs, focusing on populations’ ‘clan’ structures.\(^{321}\) There was apparently little effort to approach other southern representatives, and the closure of southern provincial “co-ordination offices” in late 1987 further reduced any “non-rural” representation in the city.\(^{322}\) Most NGOs in Khartoum either did not work with Catholic agencies like the Sudan Council of Churches, and those that did – such as the international staff at SudanAid – were either expelled in the early 1990s or had little

\(^{315}\) Ibid.
\(^{316}\) Rogge, Relocation and Repatriation, p. iv.
\(^{317}\) Operation Lifeline Sudan (ed.), Operation Lifeline Sudan situation report No. 6 (September 1989), MEDU 17/4/AID/37, p. 2.
\(^{318}\) Rogge’s emphasis; Rogge, Relocation and Repatriation, p. 20.
\(^{319}\) For this argument, see Malik, ‘Displacement as Discourse.’
\(^{320}\) Feiden et al., Khartoum displaced assessment and recommendations, p. 6.
\(^{321}\) Concern, Emergency programme, p. 4; Feiden et al., Khartoum displaced assessment and recommendations, p. 6.
\(^{322}\) ‘Sudan’s secret slaughter,’ SAD.985/6/45.
operational contact beyond their offices and “the chiefs.”323 This reinforced the operational understanding of “southern IDPs” in Khartoum as parochial victims.324

Humanitarian aid’s dependency theory approach in this period aligned with Khartoum government discourse and planning. Many aid agencies considered their energies better spent in the southern or “transition” region, where people were “worse off” and also where populations could be controlled and aid distributed in an apparently more systematic manner. CONCERN re-focused on South Kordofan and Blue Nile partly because those places offered less stringent government restrictions and had settled camps to manage.325 NGOs struggled to partition Khartoum into operational zones as they had done in the south, unfamiliar and unhappy with programming within ‘urban sprawl communities’ that ‘look like’ other areas, and the ‘refugee camp-like’ but “not-camp” nature of urban living.326 Emergency programming in the late 1980s and early 1990s focused on food hand-outs to an apolitical “civilian” population, and many Khartoum programmes closed in the early 1990s because (specifically “emergency”) feeding programmes were not considered necessary in the urban context.327 This preference for formal “IDP” sites unfortunately reinforced the government’s strategic creation of formalised and securitised Dar es Salaam (“peace”) camps on the outskirts of Khartoum, partly to maintain a dependent and impoverished labour pool for the city whilst removing unsightly and politically difficult populations from the city’s suburbs: for UNICEF and Operation Lifeline Sudan,

the reinstallation of some of the displaced persons in environments where they can recover self-sufficiency in basic food production and can have access to essential social services, the improvement of logistical facilities, should be among the top priorities of any rehabilitation and recovery programme.328

323 AM, 6 February 2012; Tearfund worker, 15 February 2012.
324 Duffield, ‘Aid and Complicity’, p. 95.
325 AM, 6 February 2012.
Dependency theory thus chimed with Sudanese governments’ longstanding strategies of creating and maintaining a cheap labour class sourced from its peripheries, and acted as a form of re-packaging of colonial and post-colonial labour exploitation: for example, food for work programmes lasted into the late 1990s providing monthly food assistance to impoverished camp residents ‘as they do work useful to their communities.’\textsuperscript{329} The aid community was also worried that their efforts would undercut local enterprises like the donkey-drawn water carts.\textsuperscript{330} ‘Relocation to the Transition Zone or to other areas where income-generation opportunities exist is to be encouraged and facilitated providing that it is completely voluntary.’\textsuperscript{331}

By 1993, the hard-line Bashir regime and the escalation of the war in the south conspired to eliminate many distinctions between international aid provision and state intervention in “displaced” areas of Khartoum. Multilateral aid programmes were stopped or wound up in Khartoum by 1992, with the Ministry of Health frustrating project proposals, and the Commission for the Displaced actively disrupted food deliveries and tried to blackmail aid agencies for vehicles in exchange for access to forcibly-relocated camps.\textsuperscript{332} Most remaining aid funds and programming were left to the Sudan Council of Churches or funnelled through local Islamic agencies. This did not mean that the Khartoum state or national governments had designs on directly controlling these peripheral populations: instead, the NIF/NCP regime ‘treated the outskirts of Khartoum as if they represent a national border’, reflecting ‘the limited ambitions of the state and the prejudices of its agents.’\textsuperscript{333}

\textsuperscript{329} ‘Sudan’s secret slaughter,’ SAD.985/6/45; Beraki, \textit{PCHP for displaced population}. For this argument, see Mark R. Duffield, \textit{Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security} (London, 2001).


\textsuperscript{331} Rogge, \textit{Relocation and Repatriation}, p. iii.


Dar es Salaam: the fight for space in Khartoum, 1988-1992

There was ‘a state of shock’ among southern communities moving north in 1988. The situation was bleak for most new residents of Khartoum, as an anonymous (likely church aid) report noted at the time:

> new arrivals usually try to find relatives, friends or those from the same tribal group to stay with until they can get established. ... In “unplanned areas”, the displaced build huts from cardboard, twigs, scrap cloth, metal and plastic on any waste ground, unused land or rubbish dump, and will be constantly at risk of eviction or harassment.

In the years of famine and mass movement between 1986 and 1992, there were almost no social or basic services; newcomers were unaware of official processes, and held no documentation; overcrowded housing put family life under huge strain; labour markets were over-saturated, while labourers attempted to support usually dozens of relatives and friends, often while coming to terms with the loss of their old homes, possessions, farms and cattle: ‘some people can even feel shock, and die of feeling shock.’ In a 1990 research project about survival in the new shantytowns, ‘two of the 60 interviewed women reported that their husbands [had] become insane in Khartoum.’

The Catholic Church’s Khartoum Archdiocese office is the main source of the very little information on this period written from the perspective of southern and Nuba aid workers in the city, although these records echo the problematic NGO and state discourse about the culture shock, poverty, social collapse and disintegration of southern communities in Khartoum. The Khartoum Archdiocese education programme, starting in 1986, was titled “To Save the Saveable,” and stated: ‘there is simply no base from which to start... the Southern children... today can be called a threatened species, physically, morally and intellectually.’

---

334 lit. “Peace village”.
335 ‘Sudan’s secret slaughter,’ SAD.985/6/40.
336 Ibid., SAD.985/6/46.
337 APA, 22 July 2013.
339 Because aid programmes worked through local proxies, particularly after 1989-1990.
Parents ‘watch[ed] the family unit disintegrate.’\(^{341}\) The communities themselves were ‘well aware’ of their own challenges, compounded by the ‘atmosphere of helplessness and despair about the war’: ‘if the war continues there will be nothing Southern to speak about.’\(^{342}\)

These assertions are hyperbolic and political, but also emblematic of contemporary fear and stress. “Disintegration” was not necessarily an accurate description of the immediate community response to the Khartoum context. While people were deeply afraid of ‘alienation... extraction and abstraction from all... cultural roots,’ this period was neither one of total societal collapse or of community “preservation.”\(^{343}\) This period of massive dislocation and re-organisation was remembered very differently by these “rural unskilled IDPs”, as a time of vital community self-preservation that was only partly about food aid. What occurred in this period was less disintegration and dependency than an intense battle for space and control.

Between 1988 and 1992, this was a physical battle. Old colonial and post-colonial practices of violent urban planning were intensified under the al-Mahdi government until 1989, and then the NIF regime. Forced relocations were relatively uncoordinated and determined by combinations of local gentrification and political pressure from residents, demands for the land, and social cleansing. Machar Col (sometimes known as Zagalona) and Mawela, both in relatively central Omdurman, were demolished in 1988, and their populations created Jabarona, Mandela and further parts of Haj Yousif.\(^{344}\) Demolitions stepped up in 1990.\(^{345}\)


\(^{344}\) WDAA, 18 July 2013; this escalated under the government of Sadiq al Mahdi from 1986-89, justified by elite residents’ concerns about the rising crime rate and economic conditions; Rone, *Behind the red line*, p. 254.

Under Bashir, camps were formally created for those “arrested” during mass police and army actions in poor urban areas scheduled for re-development, for having anything other than full identification papers permitting residence in Khartoum.\textsuperscript{346} Ibrahim Abu Ouf, Deputy Minister for Relief and Displaced Persons, told aid agencies in 1990 that all of the displaced in Khartoum would be ‘out of the city within a year.’\textsuperscript{347} Other people arrived in Jabarona from Souk Manthaga and Izzba, which was created after the destruction of Kilo, and some 30,000 residents of Hillat Shook were forcibly relocated to Jebel Aulia, 25 miles south of Khartoum centre, in October 1990.\textsuperscript{348}

\textsuperscript{346} Anon., “To Save the Saveable”, Comboniani 6734.21.1/8152-8156/47.
\textsuperscript{347} Perlez, ‘Sudanese Troops Burn Refugee Camp.’
\textsuperscript{348} JG, 30 June 2013; Rogge, \textit{Relocation and Repatriation}, p. 28.
Figure 3: Bassan’s hand-drawn map of Khartoum southern populations, April 1987. Bassan, *Background information.*
James Wala Kot [sic], a township resident, described the start of the operation: "The army said they would come on Saturday, but they came at 6 A.M. on Sunday. They turned off the water outlets. They told people they had to pack up their things or they would be burned. We escaped going to Jebel Aulia because we know there is no water there." The 28-year-old Mr. Kot and the 16 members of his extended family dismantled their canvas home and lugged it, two beds and cooking pots to a dusty back alley in the city.349

By 1992, there were five "official" camps, made partly from the demolition of relatively settled areas, such as Kermuta around the Islamic University in December 1991, which had a considerable Ethiopian refugee community.350 Alongside demolitions, there were a few manipulative "returns" programmes: in early 1990, the government began a "return program" aimed at moving 50,000 displaced people to the south,351 aided by military intimidation and promises of assistance from some aid agencies.352

These demolitions were, for their victims, an explicit part of the long Sudanese state history of black slavery and racism. In Khartoum Arabic, police sweeps were called kasha, colloquially meaning "search," and this term was also increasingly used for large-scale relocations.353 But this term was often reinterpreted in a variety of languages and linguistic fashions, linked fundamentally to Sudanese racial discourses. In 1985, Matthew Obur, a prominent southern politician, explained the term kasha as coming ‘from an Amharic "Kushasha" which means dirt or filth or garbage.’354 The term was also translated to me in Aweil as a corruption from English:

349 Perlez, 'Sudanese Troops Burn Refugee Camp.'
351 Bannaga, Peace and the displaced in Sudan, pp. 50–1; for statistics on repatriation convoys from 1992 to 1996, see pp. 91-2 and appendices.
353 The term kasha is used for sweeps and raids more widely; for example, Haumann describes how the SPLA 'had a kasha to get new recruits' by rounding up older boys in local schools in Nimule in the early 1990s. Haumann, Travelling with soldiers and bishops, pp. 70–1. Human Rights Watch also documented street kasha by the public order police: Rone, Behind the red line, p. 130.
In 1983 there is what is called *kasha*, for the blacks. ... Nimeiri, he said - why are gathering all these people [sic], they will make you problems, they will give you a lot of problems! Why don’t you *catch* them, and take them back to their homes. So ... that [was] called *kasha* in Arabic, *catching* black people! And taking them to their areas... Nimeiri is telling people that you go to the bush! Don’t stay here! It’s just where this [idea of] separation happened. It’s Nimeiri who introduced it! Who [introduced it] to the southerners, to the blacks!\textsuperscript{355}

As these angry re-translations imply, relocations were not un-resisted, particularly if they were violent or done without prior warning.\textsuperscript{356} Most stories of raids and demolitions included points of negotiation or resistance.\textsuperscript{357} Shelters were built with flexibility and ease of transportation in mind, and people hedged their bets by building cheap *rakubas* (wooden shacks, often open-sided) and spreading family members between sites. In 1990, Rogge recorded, ‘the fear of relocation to Jebel Awlia or elsewhere is currently causing considerable movements within Khartoum as people seek out locations where they perceive themselves not at risk from relocation programmes.’\textsuperscript{358} As in previous forced relocations in the 1970s and 80s, the evicted transported old beams and building materials to new sites.\textsuperscript{359} People also physically resisted unannounced demolitions, generally aiming for either a delay or a warning period before eviction. For example, in 1988, police and members of Khartoum District Council were stoned and threatened with knives for attempting to burn down squatters’ houses in central Khartoum.\textsuperscript{360} A news report recorded the relocation of Zagalona in 1988: ‘“We are prepared to die here,” said John Jok, who serves as chief of the camp, advised by traditional tribal elders.’\textsuperscript{361} In Machar Col, a major settlement particularly for Dinka Malwal from Aweil, residents also initially resisted demolitions: ‘they brought a bulldozer here... the following day the bulldozer came. We all, men and women, gathered before the bulldozer and said “you first crush us before you destroy our houses.” Thus twice

\textsuperscript{355} DCS, 11 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{356} See Rone, *Behind the red line*, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{357} For example, see Rone, *Behind the red line*, pp. 188–92, 254–64, for an account of the violent demolition of Khoder on 15 October 1994.
\textsuperscript{358} Rogge, *Relocation and Repatriation*, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{359} Fawzi, ‘Old and New Deims’, p. 519; PAD, 21 June 2013.
\textsuperscript{360} Anonymous, ‘Sudan’s secret slaughter,’ SAD.985/6/48; also see Tom Masland, ‘Khartoum Bursting With Refugee Slums’, *Chicago Tribune*, 30 September 1988, for other examples.
\textsuperscript{361} Masland, ‘Khartoum Bursting With Refugee Slums.’
we frightened them.' After later clashes with police resulted in deaths, locals then successfully negotiated, partly through the advocacy of George Kongor Arop (a career police officer, Dinka ex-Governor of Bahr el Ghazal State, and at the time Vice President of Sudan), for the installation of water points at the new site in Jabarona, and for a guarantee that their relocation to a new site would be permanent and they would be undisturbed there.

The rapid growth of suburbs to accommodate these huge new communities between 1986 and 1990 created community heartlands around Khartoum, particularly in older-established migrant neighbourhoods of Haj Yousif, Eshash, Arkawit, Mayo, Umbadda and Thawra. As W. J. Berridge noted, Umbadda had only a very small and practically defunct police station by the mid-1980s, and the entirety of Haj Yousif had only two police officers in one police post; the central and city governments encouraged self-policing via vigilantism. Khartoum became more strongly segregated.

‘Even in Khartoum there are some places where there are no Dinka totally. [Like] Amarat... it’s totally Arab. [But] Haj Yousif; Jabarona; and Wad el Bashir; and Mayo; Jebel Aulia and Soba, and Jur as-Shaab [and] Izba. These are all places [for black people]. ...Those Arabs, that were not cowards, can stay near these people. But the coward Arabs cannot come near them. ... [The] poor Arabs, and some drunkard Arabs, they do stay with the Dinka there, because they don’t have much concern with what is going on! [Laughs]

The ‘ethnic map’ of Khartoum that was ‘imprinted’ by 1990 in the minds of the new residents was not purely ‘a small-scale copy of the South,’ as Ibrahim puts it in the same year, but a complex geography of plural, politicised affiliations and sites of aggregate strength and experience.

This can be seen through the common names of the expanding circle of settlements around the city. Sites such as Jabarona, Zagalona, and Mawela - meaning ‘things have been

---

363 MDWR, 21 August 2013.
365 Berridge, “’Nests of criminals’”, p. 244.
366 AT, 8 August 2013.
scattered’ in Arabic - were mixes of residents, from Blue Nile and Darfur as well as Nuba and southerners. Local, darkly humorous names developed fast from 1988 to 1990: Hillat Kusha, “the settlement of garbage,” Hillat Alkawaja Dagas in Mayo (“the foreigner who was fooled”), Karor (“rubbish”), and Ras Satan (“head of Satan”) in western Jabarona were all names that amused informants in Aweil. Hillat Shook in Mayo meant “the village of barricades,” but was also called Bentiu (a border area of southern Sudan) and, in the 2000s, “Abu Ghraeb” by some of its inhabitants. Similarly, Khartoum North had a settlement called Jonglei, a reference to the southern Jonglei region, by 1986.

Despite on-going government attempts to rename these sites after their own nationalist symbols, such as Hai Mayo (in memory of the May revolution) and Hai el Baraka (Blessings Quarter, known to most people instead as Karton Kassala), these names are popular, more specific, and used with a full awareness of their emotional baggage. The multiplicity of names, one man explained,

‘came as a result of sadness... each one [would] call [it] according to his own atmosphere [sic] ...that could satisfy [his] sadness. [laughs].

Names and self-descriptions were, simultaneously, expressions of situational anger and sadness, snide political jokes, and self-aware references to common slurs against the “IDPs”. The words nazihiin – internally displaced, or internal refugees – and al-ashwai – informal – were self-employed pejoratives. The central Comboni school and grounds were commonly called Comboni Majaneen, meaning ‘just people who are staying without work... the

---

368 DKLK, 21 August 2013.
369 DCS, 11 August 2013; women in Apada, 21 July 2013.
370 Rogge, Relocation and Repatriation, p. 28; DCS, 11 August 2013 - a direct reference to the Iraqi prison used by US military forces in the 2003 war, and of the systematic abuse and torture of its inmates.
372 APA, 22 July 2013.
373 APA, 22 July 2013.
374 These terms were used across interviews in Aweil and Juba; Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 18.
drunkard people stay there, and people who are just conversing and what, they just overcrowd [sic]... It was named by Dinka.\textsuperscript{375}

‘And they have [the suburb of] Mandela. This Mandela means they are suffering, they are in prison like Mandela, who had been imprisoned by the British government in South Africa so that he can give up the country, the rebel leader. So all these names... they name the place according to their grief for the situation that they were [in].\textsuperscript{376}

Names were often communally used, but some places like Abu Adm and Zagalona also developed vernacular names, such as Kowic, meaning “thorns” in Dinka.\textsuperscript{377} Zagalona was called Machar Col by many Dinka, although the origin of the name is disputed – some women believed it to stem from a founder’s cattle, and others believed it to refer literally to “Black People.”\textsuperscript{378} Either way, these names were assertions of spatial control.\textsuperscript{379} When Machar Col was forcibly removed to a barren area outside of Khartoum, to create the government-named “Dar es Salaam” (“Peace Village”), it became known as Jabarona, specifically named in colloquial Arabic ‘so that the government can hear.’\textsuperscript{380} This “vernacularisation” of disputed land, as with much of the settlement work in this period, was not new: the Jabarona down at Yei was translated phonetically as “Jah ba rau”, ‘they come alone’ in Juba Arabic, in 1969.\textsuperscript{381}

The most essential claiming of the city through suburban names was the common assertion of historical ownership of Khartoum itself, now a popular refrain among returned residents in the South. For many people, Khar Tuom meant, in Dinka, the meeting of two rivers; Omdurman was similarly re-interpreted as meaning “boy calling for his mother.” Tuti Island was named after the Nuer name Tut, and the name of Bahri came from the Dinka bahr, “come here.” Shendi developed from the Dinka name Chendit, and Burri from Burrij, a

\textsuperscript{375} DAA, 13 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{376} DKLK, 21 August 2013; also explained by APA, 22 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{377} DKLK, 21 August 2013; women in Apada, 21 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{378} Women in Apada, 21 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{379} For similar discussions of names and ownership, see Tuttle, ‘Life is Prickly’, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{380} APA, 22 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{381} Voice of the Nile Republic, No. 11, 15 November 1969, Comboniani A/86/21/3/3.
These communities thus had a very different conception of dynamics of power and authority in Khartoum, demonstrated by the common explanation of *kasha* – ‘the blasting out of the southerners’ from central Khartoum – as the expropriation of the residents’ hard work and co-ordination in ‘cleaning’ the original area: a defiant inversion of government rhetoric. The residents had done what the government was apparently structurally incapable of doing, in physically and communally urbanising barren or polluted tracts of the city. ‘When [the government] saw that you have created the land well, and the land is well organised, then they can allocate you forcefully to another dirty place for you to go and clean it’, then

‘after we clean it... the Arabs come and demolish that area. They don’t like the Dinka, [the] blacks, to stay in a clean place. ... If you have been there in Khartoum, the camps you have been passing – there’s Mandela, Jebel Aulia, Jabarona, Machar Col, Haj Yousif, Gereif Akaba; all these were established by Dinka, and they were just pushed away by Arabs.’

**Organisation, solidarity, and mutual space**

1988 to 1992 was a time of massive organisation within these new Khartoum neighbourhoods that is barely recorded in any literature, but which provided the backbone for community order, secure social and political space, and neighbourhood integrity. These new residents were organised, resilient and resourceful under pressure, part of a long

---

382 DCS, 11 August 2013; AAY, 11 July 2013; APA, 22 July 2013; and many others.
383 DCS, 11 August 2013.
384 DKLK, 21 August 2013.
385 PDA, 29 June 2013; also noted by chiefs, 29 June 2013, and MDWR, 21 August 2013.
386 WDAA, 18 July 2013.
tradition of black Sudanese urban migrants, and more broadly, exemplary of subaltern populations and refugee communities worldwide.\textsuperscript{387}

In marginalia and footnotes, the few aid reports now available note these self-arranged systems of chiefs and elders that organised the local logistics of relief projects and aid distributions.\textsuperscript{388} The few articles written on this period in Khartoum focus on the re-establishment of this “traditional authority”, but this was not a sudden or simple “re-structuring” post-transit: this organisation was partly based on the long history of neighbourhood and community associations detailed in chapter one, given renewed energy and wider focus. This local organisation was part of Khartoum life for all of its residents by the 1980s, as city government also collapsed for permanent residents due to economic constraints and political stagnation, and organisation at the neighbourhood level became crucial.\textsuperscript{389} ‘The associations were actually [there] in the beginning,’ organising settlements around road patterns and managing the influx.\textsuperscript{390} Southern “traditional authorities”, also, were often not newcomers to Khartoum: many men who gained importance in Khartoum in 1989 (the common date given for the coordinated “organisation” of chiefs in Khartoum)\textsuperscript{391} had arrived in the city from 1981 to 1985.\textsuperscript{392} Many people noted the establishment in around 1989 of common courts and pan-ethnic groups of chiefs, who would (in theory) work together to solve inter-ethnic and local issues in their suburbs. Many of these local leaders, including men who also held low-level civil service, police or army positions, formalised their position in local and neighbourhood government in the mid-1980s, when ‘the gate [was] open to everybody [to] be given your permission to go and work [as a chief].’\textsuperscript{393}


\textsuperscript{388} Wijnroks, \textit{The displaced people of Khartoum}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{389} Ahmad, ‘The neighbourhoods of Khartoum’, pp. 41–2.

\textsuperscript{390} JUA, 29 October 2013; Miller, \textit{Language change and national integration}, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{391} Anon., 22 June 2013; JUA, 29 October 2013; AT, 14 April 2013.

\textsuperscript{392} As explained by AAY, 11 July 2013; AT, 15 August 2013; NJ, 8 June 2013.

\textsuperscript{393} AT, 15 August 2013; AAY, 11 July 2013.
These “traditional authorities” were not just relocated rural elders, but a heterogeneous mix of organisers and arbitrators. The “lists” of chiefs held by aid agencies by 1990 disguised a local confusion of “chiefly authority.”  

The social and political knowledge required to negotiate food and relief distribution encouraged the rise of younger men and broadened the idea of “chief”; similarly, the dislocation of the local – the creation of multiple communities of the same clan, village or local area across Sudan – created options and tensions within these new communities.

'I met the local people and let them organise themselves according to [their] tribes. So that whenever food is [found], or whatever is given to them, then their own people will be responsible for distribution, instead of bringing these items and putting it down and people have not organised themselves. So that was the beginning of making [the] so called now “chiefs”. They were called chiefs, but – the problem was that, customarily, the chief is somebody who selected by the tribe, to head in the area, but how do you have a chief, in Juba or in Wau – and another chief in Khartoum? Or El Obeid? So this was the question. But we said – you, these chiefs who are selected in these displaced areas, as soon as we get peace, the moment you return to the south, you don’t go as a chief, because it will bring problems with your original chief.'

As well as the newly displaced chiefs and gol (Dinka clan) leaders, there were new claimants:

'They were so many [chiefs], because every time, when there is food distribution, and a group feels that they were not properly provided, then they can break away and form another, their own chief. It was something for them to get food.'

These new chiefs were not only opportunists, but also often brought skills, contacts and particular social profiles necessary to negotiate the new urban geography, for example the knowledge of how to bribe, and being a “known” and socially accepted Muslim.

---

394 AT, 15 August 2013. Many men interviewed for this study were part of this confusion, made “sub-chiefs” in various places in Khartoum, or becoming executive chiefs for parallel displaced communities in Khartoum.

395 JUA, 29 October 2013.

396 Ibid.

This history of organisation laid foundations for mass management in late 1980s. Way-stations, reception teams at bus and train stations, and mutual funds for transport had been organised since the 1960s by southerners in Khartoum, particularly since the early 1980s.\footnote{Bona Malwal, ‘Report of the Secretariat,’ Comboniani A/90/8/10/5; Mohammed Ahmed, Christian missionary activity, p. 12.} New arrivals were ‘directed towards “their people”’\footnote{Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, p. 251.} by organisations such as the Aweil Youth Union (AYU), which was established in 1983 and grew in 1986 with the primary agenda of assisting people ‘pouring in’ to Khartoum, using branches in the northern cities of Nyala, Wad Medani, Kosti, Babanusa, where some members were working with Oxfam in El Obeid.\footnote{According to AMA, 9 August 2013; DCD, 12 August 2013; AB 12 August 2013.} ‘They heard [about family coming to Khartoum], even sometimes they came to meet people at the border and they take them... they just meet in Daein or Babanusa [and Nyala].’\footnote{MTL, 10 July 2013.} As well as information, these organisations collected clothes, food and money in Khartoum for new arrivals, funded partly by tithing from members; for AYU, this was made easier once the association gained a rare government permit to operate, organised by civil servants from Aweil still working in the government in the mid-1980s.\footnote{DCD, 12 August 2013, PKKM, 9 August 2013, AMA, 9 August 2013; Bassan, Background information.} This transit network included Cairo, where AYU worked with CONCERN, giving details of new people, their health conditions, and their time of arrival to help them get NGO assistance.\footnote{AB, 12 August 2013.} At Shajjara, the railway station area, AYU members would divide new arrivals by the names of their local executive chiefs in their villages and areas in the south, which they would record - ‘wherever we get Dinka – even from Bor, from wherever – we take them all, we take them, we record them.’\footnote{AMA, 9 August 2013.} AYU members would then call contacts and other associations in areas they knew had people from the same communities, asking for help in receiving them;\footnote{Ibid.} food aid from OLS and UNICEF was organised through the chiefs’ and AYU’s registers.\footnote{Concern, Emergency programme, p. 2.} Other organisations were also working at the bus and train stations to assist arrivals, including...
Nuer and Shilluk associations among others;\textsuperscript{407} NGOs provided some support, such as CONCERN’s emergency shelters along the bus and train routes to Khartoum in 1988.\textsuperscript{408}

The many different connections and affiliations prioritised among these organisations and families – from the clan to sub-tribe, regional linguistic or pan-ethnic categories such as among the Bari, to provincial ties and the complex ideas of the southern, black or “marginalised” Sudanese – were reflected in the growing geography of “displaced” Khartoum. Linguistic, familial, ethnic and regional origins, as well as a person’s time of arrival in Khartoum and ties among transiting communities created in Darfur, grew into clustered settlements. ‘You found people of Aweil they are living in one place, people of Wau they’re living in one place, people of Rumbek are living in one place.’\textsuperscript{409} CONCERN’s negotiations for siting a clinic in Khartoum North took weeks, as there was no appropriate median point between the Nuer or the Shilluk populations in the area.\textsuperscript{410} By 1990, there was already localised conflict, for example clashes in Hillat Shook in 1989, a fight of ‘Nuer against Dinka’ in Arkawit in 1997, and between Dinka Parou, Lau Nuer and Murle in one woman’s neighbourhood, for example.\textsuperscript{411} But ethnic “enclaves” were only one visible aspect of a massively dispersed new population which was often faced with little to no immediate choice in accommodation, and for the most part was mixed together. For people with prior connections or experience of Khartoum - which was common – it was possible to live in compounds, for example, with Equatorian, Dinka and northern Sudanese residents.\textsuperscript{412} Initial or attempted ethnic and regional enclaves were generally confounded by the realities of

\textsuperscript{407} AMA, 9 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{408} Concern, \textit{Emergency programme}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{409} RRL, 3 September 2013; Miller, \textit{Language change and national integration}, pp. 48–50; Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, p. 249.
\textsuperscript{410} AM, 6 February 2012.
\textsuperscript{412} MI, 23 October 2013; lots of people, including women, noted the same.
Khartoum life: ‘people were categorised in different places, [but] every tribe was to live together, especially the southern tribes, including the Darfurians.’

If locals lumped together the new arrivals into a racial-southern bracket, this only encouraged the already-growing supra-identifications developed through this self-organisation of in-migration, settlement and safe neighbourhoods in Khartoum. For the new arrivals,

‘these small, small organisations became quite big, involving many, many people – and for the first time, you would not only get like tribal [associations], but [the] whole region or the whole south, in some cases. [We were] talking about the same language – that we are all suffering in the south, you know, and hunger, and they just want to drive us out of our land.’

Despite the ethno-regional names of these organisations, assistance was part of a scale of commonality, under which ‘they helped whoever came from the South to the North.’

‘We talk to our people... so when we see people from [the] south coming, we don’t care whether he’s Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, whatever; he’s [a] southerner... we have to take care of him; we cannot leave him to die and take our own people.’

Discussions of mutual support involved layers of obligation, group responsibility and social image: 'even if you find a Dinka that you never see in your life, you have to contact him and greet him to come and drink water, in the north.' For one AYU member, his fellow Dinka clans of Northern Bahr el Ghazal were the priority, followed by all Dinka, then all southerners, then all black people – ‘that’s the order we do.’ This extended mutual obligation was partly in reaction to homogenising and uncivilised stereotypes of black (and) southern people in Khartoum. A member of AYU explained:

---

413 MDWR, 21 August 2013.
414 AT, 16 October 2013.
415 SAK, 3 July 2013.
416 AMA, 9 August 2013.
417 AT, 8 June 2013.
418 AMA, 9 August 2013.
'We don’t need our own people... to come across the city walking naked, and we are wearing so smart, because they would laugh at us, say look – these are their families walking naked and they’re wearing smart!'\textsuperscript{419}

Many were aware of the deep differences of class, wealth, experience and opportunity among the various residents or migrant workers in Khartoum.

'The life of southern Sudanese in Khartoum, is divided into three sections. A first section is the life of those who are living [outside] the state of Khartoum, in rural areas, in Jabarona, Mayo, Haj Yousif, [and] Jebel Aulia...; and we have a life of those who are government officials and some other traders: they are living inside with Arabs, they are living in very good buildings or even they used to rent some houses with Arabs inside. And we have [the] life of those who are called Jongo, or the agriculturalists, the farmer workers: they used to migrate.'\textsuperscript{420}

This community work was built on fears of “disintegration”, but actively demonstrated the opposite. The reinvigorated associational life of various southern families, clans, local communities, linguistic groups, regions and ethnicities focused on re-connecting, re-organising and re-socialising systems of gendered responsibility, family and moral practices, for mutual support and “the future.”\textsuperscript{421} [Haj Yousif] really changed because those who were staying as bachelors were reintegrated into their communities.\textsuperscript{422}

This social activity was focused on the re-creation of the ordinary, organising a sense of regularity and safe space for an insecure, criminalised and unstable population – what Sikainga terms '[taming] the city.'\textsuperscript{423} The huge numbers of new residents by 1992 ‘occupied’ Khartoum, creating an alternative urban geography.\textsuperscript{424} Entire areas of the city – for example, Haj Yousif and Umbadda – were self-contained black urban spaces, with their own markets, industries and centres: 'the black only, without Arabs. ... You can find Darfurians, you can find southerners like Nuba, and the other tribes of southern Sudan.'\textsuperscript{425} These places were

\textsuperscript{419} PKKM, 9 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{420} DKLK, 4 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{421} As explained by AD and AD, two women in Maper II, 13 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{422} MTL, 10 July 2013; WDD, 18 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{423} Sikainga, \textit{Organized labor and social change}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{424} APA, 22 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{425} PDA, 29 June 2013.
often termed “villages” in vernacular and English-language interviews, as opposed to ideas of the government-owned “town.”

‘There are some places that you will not visit if you don’t have reason of going [there] [sic]...even if it is near, like this mango tree, you cannot reach [it]. ... We used to move from the place where Dinka are, to another place where there are Dinka, like Comboni ground.’

By 1990, the huge immigration to Khartoum had created the idea of a critical mass among its new residents. “During those times (in the past), we were few. They call you abd [slave], there was nothing you can do. But now when they say it, you beat them.”

‘We used to go, but [now] we collect ourselves and then we occupy one of the places for ourselves. [...] and this is how we protect ourselves, because sometimes [if] Arabs feel like taking one of our brothers in presence of us, they feared, but if they find you alone they will just kill you.”

The common aim of mutual organisation and self-governance in Khartoum was not necessarily to fight the state and re-create ethnicised “southern” order on the edge of the city. While these associations and traditional authorities were instrumental in re-creating normality in Khartoum, they were not new. “Ethnic associations” are common to histories of urbanisation across colonial and post-colonial Africa; in Sudan, these associations’ practical and personal support networks date back to at least the 1930s, as detailed in chapter one.

These associations, built out of ethno-linguistic and regional ties, both sharpened ethnic identifications and operationalised them beyond exclusionary tribal lines: regional, ethnic, village and clan identifications were used as much for broad practical organisation and routes for mutual social support as they were held up as clear moral and political collectivities. These identifications were both asserted and blurred by the realities of Khartoum life and the proximities of racial and social experience.

---

427 MTL, 11 July 2013.
428 Woldemikael, ‘Southern migrants in a Northern Sudanese City’, p. 27.
429 KDK, 3 June 2013.
Nor was their practical organisation the main focus of people's social work in the city; they provided a framework and the intellectual space to discuss broader psychological, moral and practical problems, particularly those facing their children. Many people noted the forced self-awareness of re-establishing lives in Khartoum under economic pressures and racialised prejudices. ‘I think it has given me how bad is the war. Because a person respected in your area, accompanying your people, [is] found... doing jobs which are not – .... then you realize [that] within the community, these are the disadvantages, you lose people, you lose home, nobody knows who [you] are.’ A woman who was born in the north said she started to ‘understand’ her personal political context when Aweil ‘was burnt’ in 1985, and she heard details from people moving to her neighbourhood - and her brother-in-law began to organise house meetings to discuss the war. But this self-consciousness did not clearly, directly or passively create a straightforwardly “Southern” consciousness, a 'supra-southern Sudanese identity replacing the former ethnic and local loyalties' of the kind Ibrahim argued in 1991. The economic pressures, racial geography, violence and pluralism of Khartoum created a range of complex responses within family and community life. Non-southern local residents were not all considered to be “Arabs”, but often ‘their own co-citizens who suffer with them from the complete negligence and hostile attitude of the “hakuma”.

**Conclusion**

This practical organisation and critical reflection is the focus of the rest of this study. The space gained by both “traditional” mediation with the urban government and the violent creation of a less-policed Khartoum periphery allowed for internal community action. This fight for space, and the internal community action it was intent upon, was the work of teachers, students, ex-administrators, lay clergy and waged workers: the people written off

---

430 This is the focus of chapter three.
431 RRL, 3 September 2013.
432 AAD, 14 August 2013.
by Howell in his 1978 doctoral thesis on southern politics in Khartoum as unrepresentative, apathetic and apolitical, specifically because they worked outside of the two understood spheres of "traditional chiefly authority" and formal state politics.\footnote{Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 55; Vezzadini notes this organisational work in 1920s Sudan: ‘The 1924 Revolution’, p. 166.}

Educational life in these new Khartoum suburbs was the primary critical arena for political organisation, nationalist self-articulation, and debates over post-war Sudanese futures among these southern residents. This work had long roots by 1992: many people in Khartoum brought experience of teaching, organising local schools, of being students and of self-education.\footnote{For example: JUA (29 October 2013) was a mid-level politician and primary school teacher; WMT (17 August 2013) went to Khartoum in 1982 as a worker and student, then became a teacher.} Khartoum was a chosen destination for many specifically because of its possibilities for their own or their children's access to informal or formal education. The disruption of state schools in the 1970s under the imposition of Arabic language rules, combined with escalating conflict in the 1980s, meant that by the time people arrived in Khartoum, education was an urgent priority: 'we sat down and decided to open our own schools in our own mother tongue.'\footnote{DAA, 13 July 2013.} These people – including many women – worked to establish formal social organisations such as the St Paul’s Community association, church benevolent societies and other relief associations that aimed at social and adult education. Many of these collapsed by 1990 or were re-founded repeatedly, but survived on congregation and personal donations, and operated under the wing (if not necessarily the leadership) of Catholic and other churches in Khartoum.\footnote{APA, 21 July 2013, MTL, 10 July 2013; Stockwell (ed.), Displaced persons in the Khartoum Archdiocese, p. 4.} The three regionally-organised secondary schools opened by the state government in 1986 – including Maridi Secondary and Immatong – were massively outnumbered by community-run “private” and “informal” schools.\footnote{DCD, 15 July 2013; see Wijnroks, The displaced people of Khartoum, p. 8.} Former teachers, ex-politicians, and ex-government officials ‘joined together and established the schools’: at one point in 1986 school registration was doubling by the week.\footnote{JUA, 29 October 2013; DAA, 13 July 2013; DCS, 11 August 2013; Gabriel Zubeir Wako, “Meeting of the Archbishop and the Director of the Coordination Office of Bahr El Ghazal Administrative Area, July 24 1986, in the Archbishop's Office,” 24 July 1986, Comboniani 6734.21.1/8157-8158.}
This educational work, particularly in vernaculars, has been broadly overlooked by various external agents, and often by the Khartoum government itself: but by 1990, USAID commented that ‘education is surprisingly widespread and well-organised in the Khartoum displaced communities.’ Education provided defensive physical and intellectual space in Khartoum: secure spaces developed from the mid-1980s came into their own as southern and Nuba Mountains “educational” domains by the early 1990s, such as the Cinema Coliseum near the central bus park, Comboni College and Comboni Ground, and, in suburbs, particular meeting houses with radios. What aid agencies called “MPCs”, multi-purpose centres, operated as churches, schools, courts and social clubs depending on their users, and functioned in the evenings as informal schools, debate chambers, and centres for informal discussion. This was focused on teenagers and adults' political and philosophical education as much as on children and basic literacy.

Southern communities in Khartoum looked (as Rogge put it) ‘politically passive’ by 1992 because their political action was not focused on formally challenging or accessing “the state”, but focused instead on creating secure space for explicitly critical educative and discursive internal markets. This community work – in the broadest sense – and its description and debates over common black Sudanese histories is the focus of the rest of this thesis.

‘You know, in 1976, my opinion was not clear, but my opinion became clearer in 1985... Because I was born in war – and I’ve grown up in war – and I thought it is [an] unsolvable war. Which means that people have to think [of] something alternative. Change minds; find a way out; for making [something] new.'

---

441 Feiden et al., Khartoum displaced assessment and recommendations, p. 18.
442 AT, 8 June 2013; MI, 23 October 2013.
443 AM, 6 February 2012; Stockwell (ed.), Displaced persons in the Khartoum Archdiocese, p. 23.
444 Rogge, Relocation and Repatriation, p. 31.
445 PKKM, 9 August 2013, his emphasis.
Chapter three

Academic studies of the Khartoum urban poor and displaced from 1986 to 2003 are rare, and have generally focused on stories of social survival under a violent and assimilatory “Arab Islamic” state. This understanding is predicated on two dominant ideas: firstly, that a “southern” solidarity '[replaced] former ethnic and local identities,’ ‘despite ethnic, religious, occupational, educational and other differences,’ growing through ‘daily contact... [with] about thirty various languages’ and the ‘one enemy, that is the “hakuma”... represented by the so-called “Wlad Arab” [sic] (Sons of the Arabs).’ Secondly, for these studies, the enemy Sudanese state has consistently targeted these black peripheral migrant populations through “policies” of Arabization (t’arīb) and Islamization. In this analysis, Sudanese post-independence governments generally pursued homogenising projects based on broad ideas of a dominant Arab-Islamic “Sudanese culture.” “Arabization and Islamization” became, by the 1980s, a common political and academic shorthand for a mix of policies, attitudes and violence.

This idea – of a clear government assimilative strategy of Arabization and Islamization, and a growing “southern” collective resistance to this – is central to these explanations of life in Khartoum during the second civil wars. This approach simplifies, reifies, and homogenises experiences of broad and disparate processes of direct violence, political and economic impositions, alienation and segregation, social creolisation and internal community stresses. Drawing on wider debates on the nature of domination, power, and resistance founded on...
James C. Scott’s work, this chapter argues against the reduction of this heterogeneous landscape to a "African Christian southern community” reacting against “state Arab Islamic assimilation.” Instead this chapter firstly asserts that, rather than being an incorporative or assimilatory project, “Arabization and Islamization” was in effect a set of practices and assumptions that enforced and legitimated difference rather than seeking to erase it, marking and policing a marginal space for a subordinate population. Secondly, it deconstructs and pluralises the “southern community” that is most often explained as a direct antithetical response to violent hegemony. These are Scott’s two false polarities, the apparent choice between resistance or acquiescence to assimilation.

Instead, this chapter aims to return attention to internal community issues beyond “southern resistance” to state assimilatory repression: focusing on “southern-ness in reaction” tends to reduce or minimise intellectual independence and alternative stressors. While many people’s initial and shorthand summaries of life in Khartoum were structured around collective opposition – ‘like one community against the north’ – Arabization and Islamization were more commonly discussed throughout research as being felt primarily as an exclusionary force, silencing, minimising and superficially pacifying. Rather than acculturation, the primary fear in Khartoum in the late 1980s and early 1990s across accounts was a fear of loss, of deculturation. Individuals’ accounts of life in Khartoum focused not on state violence and ethno-regional resistance, but on the effects of urban creolisation, global acculturation, international racism and ideas of black African inferiority, commoditisation and the destructive individualism of global capitalism. Loss and deculturation were the risks from Khartoum’s challenges to social order, morality and safety; from displacement and urbanisation’s new demands for self-specificity, through food aid registers, the need for identity cards and residence permits, and broader demands for personal origin and otherwise ascribed affiliations (like southern, or Christian, or non-Muslim); and from the

---

451 Scott, Weapons of the weak.
452 ADA, 13 August 2013.
453 For a global discussion of these themes, see Dimitrios Theodossopoulos and Elisabeth Kirtsoglou, United in Discontent: Local Responses to Cosmopolitanism and Globalization, (London, 2010); this argument is made by Mark Duffield, ‘Aid and Complicity’.
opening up of new options and freedoms, both within Khartoum and from increasing access to global cultures through cinema, TV, and phones and internet, over the course of the 1970s to 2000s.

All of this demanded management: of cultural creolisation and acts of preservation, over new forms of information and knowledge both challenging and necessary, on gender dynamics and roles, and on the extent of trust and mutual reliance in heterogeneous new suburbs. These displaced populations’ apparent “resistance” to cultural and social changes was much more ambiguous, uncomfortable, internal and domestic. As within other populations under intense pressures of dislocation and violent authority, these new Khartoum residents were arguing about wider issues of responsibility, social values and trust, in complex moral projects. This chapter therefore looks instead at people’s own accounts of these challenges faced in this period in Khartoum; how new stresses and opportunities were debated; and the practical management and moral guidance taken up by men and women of all socio-economic backgrounds in order to cope, protect, educate and organise.

The effects of these mutual urban pressures were often remembered as very positive. People in Aweil recalled meeting other linguistic and ethnic communities for the first time, in schools, societies and neighbourhoods, and learning bits of Luo, Nuer and Shilluk languages. Weddings, funerals and dances provided opportunities to ‘[learn] a lot’ and observe other regional and ethnic dances and try them out; one Dinka Malual woman remembered trying Shilluk, Zande, Nuer, Dinka Bor, Nuba, Fur and Maasalit dances, as well as ‘Bob Marley and disco’, primarily with her black neighbours. This is not an entirely retrospectively imagined commonality; many people emphasised their frustration that they had lost phone numbers of friends from other Sudanese regions while returning to the south.

---

454 As noted by Wendy James, *The listening ebony: moral knowledge, religion, and power among the Uduk of Sudan* (Oxford, 1999), p. 2.
455 Much like the Mau Mau detainees discussed in Peterson, ‘The intellectual lives of Mau Mau detainees.’
456 MTL, 11 July 2013; AB, 12 August 2013; AAD, 14 August 2013.
457 APA, 22 July 2013.
or with the change in national dialling codes in 2011, and several women’s photo albums from Khartoum demonstrated their friendship groups of Zande, Dinka Bor, Dinka Malwal and Darfur neighbours, particularly with shared childcare arrangements.

As common as intra-ethnic or regional explanations of affiliation and friendship in accounts of Khartoum life is the assertion of a sense of racial collectivity. Pan-ethnic commonalities expressed through race – or blackness, a term more reflective of the language used by people in Aweil and Juba – were constants in explanations of Khartoum community thought and everyday life, and an essential means of self-interpretation. The multi-linguality of communication even within a single neighbourhood in Khartoum provided plenty of space for ambiguity and overlaps in translation and terminology. “Black people”, “southerners”, and pan-ethnic or regional terms including Equatorian and Dinka run through accounts, but were used and translated between languages and dialects self-consciously, if flexibly; the most common term used across accounts in a variety of languages, though, was “black people.”

Many men and women emphasised the historical nature of this black solidarity, often with Saint Bakhita as a common example of mutual slaving histories. In coping with life in Khartoum, ‘all [the] hard work [belonged] to every black tribe in Sudan,’ which for many people included the Ingessana, Nuba Mountains and Darfur residents – ‘they were our people.’ One chief emphasised that the Khartoum government saw southern Darfuri people as non-Arab “southerners.”

Some men dismissed “southern” as an accurate marker – ‘when I say I’m a southerner, it is a geographical direction’ – but others emphasised a collective understanding: ‘when we say southern Sudan, we became one tribe, [the] whole southern people. … But [the] Nuba and Fur... we [see as] our brothers, they were colonised

458 At the independence of South Sudan in 2011, a national country dialling code was created (+211); this apparently resulted in many people’s phone SIM cards failing, forcing people to change their numbers and lose contacts.

459 A note on terminology: in Aweil, most informants spoke in a mix of Dinka and Arabic, using the terms ran col (black person), monjiang/jieng (Dinka person/the Dinka, or sometimes translated by the person as “people” in general), and januubiin (Sudanese Arabic for Southerners); many Dinka people also used Dor as a collective term for Equatorians. In Juba and Aweil, those speaking Bari, Arabic and English used the terms (in English or equivalent) “black people” and “southerners” more frequently than ethnic categories.


461 AAY, 11 July 2013.
by Arabs, that is why they [got] lost."  

Women also emphasised a more personal black solidarity, meeting with Tishaat, Fur and other Dinka women to discuss their situation, watch TV, share childcare, and drink coffee. Schools – particularly smaller community-run ones – were often mixed-ethnicity.

As ever, different people placed different personal emphases on affiliations and markers. These multiple affiliations – to neighbourhoods, rural villages, clans, ethnic sub-groups, geographical regions, and to pan-ethnic, pan-regional, black, and “marginalised” identifications – do not necessarily resemble a clearly emerging “southern nationalism”, but have substantially more emotional and critical content than an explanation of such nationalism based on “resistance to the North.”

This communal discussion over multiple self-definitions and self-control was most commonly articulated through gender roles and expectations, and – particularly for men – through policing women’s sexuality, choices, and behaviour. This chapter brings together the literature on gender roles in Sudan with recent work in eastern Africa, focusing on negotiations of intergenerational and gendered social relationships, roles and the city’s challenges to masculinity, and debates over what in Khartoum constituted responsibility and respectability – against a background of broader Sudanese popular and political struggles to regulate women’s roles, bodies, and sexual relations in this period. These points of tension were as much about the extent and limits of cultural and social change as they were about young women’s sexuality. The closer to ones’ own ethnicity, clan, regional or other personal markers, the more intense was the internal policing, the more clearly articulated and defined the need for solidarity, and the specificities of its performance. This debate over moral discipline, markers of community respectability and belonging, and how these ideals were practically translated to action and organisation in this heterogeneous landscape, are at the core of this chapter, a process not of “othering” but of “ourselves-ing”, as Lonsdale puts it.

---

462 DCS, 11 August 2013; AAY, 11 July 2013.
463 AMJ, 16 July 2013; AD, over multiple interviews.
This was an intellectual project as much as one of regulation and social control. The second half of this thesis builds on a new literature on the intellectual projects of postcolonial Africa, particularly the work of Derek Peterson, Emma Hunter and James Brennan. Khartoum’s new residents were engaged in extensive historical, social, and ethnographic research and writing, poetry and arts, political and social commentary, archiving, and educational projects. Education was used throughout discussions of Khartoum life as a metaphor for these efforts to debate and inculcate ideas of personal moral integrity and political futures. Creating commonalities – among them the idea of being “southern” – took discussion, effort and mutual education.466 “Pan-Southern” ideas were not merely the organic product of proximity in Khartoum, but part of an active debate over forms of Sudanese and “southern” moral rules and behaviour.467 In exploring some of the debates among these southern residents in Khartoum over the intellectual and ethical basis for cultural rules and common moral ground, this study is an example of Wendy James’ ideas of moral knowledge.468 This chapter concludes with this discussion of the various aims, debates and administration of this internal educational work; chapter four takes up the content of these projects.

Arabization and Islamization

A summary of the closing down of Sudan’s national image among its ruling elites is not possible in the space here; other summaries do these themes of governance better.469 By the early 1970s, President Nimeiri’s ideas of a ‘melting pot’ of Sudanese culture really assumed assimilation rather than a two-way process: this was a ‘lopsided... Sudanese

466 For a discussion of Freirean and Gramscian ideas of critical consciousness, on which this chapter draws, see Diana Coben, Radical Heroes: Gramsci, Freire and the Politics of Adult Education (London, 2013).
468 James, The listening ebony, pp. 145–149.
469 Harir, ‘Recycling the past in the Sudan’, p. 20; Harir, Racism in Islamic Disguise?: Retreating Nationalism and Upsurging Ethnicity in Dar Fur, Sudan (Bergen, 1997), pp. 293, 295; de Geoffroy, ‘Fleeing war and relocating to the urban fringe’, p. 518.
nationalism, what the Darfur intellectual and politician Sharif Harir later described as the ‘centrifugal tendencies’ of central Sudanese socio-political elites – with Sudanese and Islamic character ‘redefined’ on the grounds of comparative ‘worth’ against apparently ‘embarrassingly primitive and outdated’ local customs, through successive government projects of the extension of this Sudanese character to its peripheries.

These ideas were consolidated as part of the NIF/NCP regime from 1989. After the coup in 1989, NIF government rhetoric was articulated most definitively in the Islamist state vision of a “civilisation project” (al-mashru al-hadari). Arabization and Islamization was, for the NIF/NCP regime, an explicitly proactive agenda for ‘defence and cultural salvation’ against international and internal threats to the integrity of this vision for Sudan. Abdelaziz Shiddo, then Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, responded to criticism in 1994 by complaining of the ‘alarming numbers of conversions to Christianity... [and] the vices wildly [sic] spread among children including addiction, pornography, prostitution and sale of organs.

In literature on Sudan, “Arabization policy” has become a shorthand referent among both Sudanese intellectuals and external commentators for this developing suite of assumptions and practices. The coherence of this “policy” has been assumed, even as its vision of “Arab” identity has been unpacked: many authors have pointed out the complexity of the Arabic and Islamic in Sudanese history, and the insecure foundation of an “Arab” identity in Sudan. Discussions of Sudan’s ‘crisis of national identity’ have focused on northern fears, partly around their racial and socio-cultural position in the wider world, but particularly in

470 Malik, ‘Displacement as Discourse.’
472 Malik, ‘Displacement as Discourse’; see Rone, *Behind the red line*, p. 2.
terms of national character: as Francis Deng has often asked, ‘are we a hybrid? Are we Afro-Arab? What are we?’

But while the binary concepts of identity behind Arabization and Islamization have been broadly challenged, the terms themselves survive as common descriptors for the content and impact of supposedly assimilatory projects, particularly in much of the human rights, migration and development studies literature and reporting. Under Bashir, in these reports, ‘African traditions clash with the strict application of Islamic law,’ and ‘processes of both Arabicization [sic] and Islamization [among] Southern Sudanese displaced in the North’ create ‘alienation, … extraction and abstractions from all … cultural roots.’ Much of the broader theoretical literature supports this approach, with displacement as basically negative and destructive, a form of ‘modern alienation, anomie, homelessness… dépayesment [and] individual powerlessness.’ On the receiving end of this, ‘southerners and westerners (especially the Nuba) are resisting the attempts at manipulating them into the fold of Islamic culture.’ This idea of the assimilatory application of Islamization and Arabization policies, and resistance by target communities, has continued in contemporary popular opinion in South Sudan, most generally articulated in daily newspaper opinion pieces about the new nation’s citizenry: either the southerners in Khartoum “kept the culture well,” or were co-opted, and therefore politically and morally suspect, pro-Islamic collaborators.

Was there – as Lesch put it – a ‘systematic [program] of Arabization and Islamization’?

Even in Khartoum, the Sudanese state has been vast, incoherent, chaotic and personalised

---


480 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested national identities, p. 213.
for decades, particularly under the Bashir regime from the early 1990s.\footnote{Abdel Ghaffar Muhammad Ahmad and Gunnar M. Sørbo, 'Introduction: Sudan’s Durable Disorder’, in Mohammed Ahmed and Sørbo (eds.), \textit{Sudan divided: continuing conflict in a contested state} (New York, 2013), pp. 1–24; Massoud, \textit{Law’s Fragile State}.} Abusharaf argues that ‘an ethnographic analysis of \textit{El-Mashru El-Hadari} is ultimately an account of domination.’\footnote{Abusharaf, \textit{Transforming displaced women in Sudan}, p. 66.} But the Arabization and Islamization of \textit{al-mashru al-hadari} were not a coherent project. If anything, the “civilising project” of Bashir’s Islamist regime has defined the limits to “acculturation” and emphasised alienation and social distinction: what is popularly summarised as “marginalisation” in Sudanese political thought. There are only a few studies of what was entailed in the political project of “Islamization and Arabization,”\footnote{As noted by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, ‘Islamization in Sudan: A critical assessment’, \textit{The Middle East Journal} (1990), p. 610. The best example is Abusharaf, \textit{Transforming displaced women in Sudan}.} and these do not ask what constituted the ‘attempts at cultural hegemony’ that supposedly made up Arabization and Islamization, and whether these impositions were intended to assimilate in the first place.\footnote{Hale, ‘Nationalism, “Race”, and Class’, p. 180.} In practice, the direct efforts most cited as government ‘civilising’ projects by the early 1990s were explicitly exclusionary and violent: they were not intended to build a homogenous nation.\footnote{This was articulated explicitly by several ex-residents of Khartoum: JGRN, 28 June 2013; RRL, 3 September 2013; ADA, 13 August 2013.} 

common throughout the late 1980s and 1990s because of paranoia over arms smuggling and urban unrest; southern and western people were the main targets.\textsuperscript{488} By 1992, neighbourhoods had become more insular, partly due to collapsing funding for state services, but also due to the outsourcing of local policing and security to pro-NIF/NCP area committees.\textsuperscript{489} The public order courts established in this period, according to popular southern opinion, ‘[had] no written law’ – ‘so southerners... suffered a lot [in those courts], they used to be judged. ... they are [basically trying] to correct people according to the Islamic sharia, ...especially the ladies.’\textsuperscript{490} Women knew in which public spaces they would have to conform to alternative clothing standards, and men knew which neighbourhoods they could not walk in.\textsuperscript{491} Local neighbourhood committees evicted southern residents with the justification that they should settle in ‘separate’ areas where they could drink or wear trousers.\textsuperscript{492} This “containerising” of unwanted populations, in Oxfam’s terms, was not just to help Islamic agencies in ‘Islamicizing the southerners’, but to remove them from sight.\textsuperscript{493}

This supposedly assimilatory project involved direct violence: street abductions and the containment of children in orphanages, forcible Popular Defence Forces (PDF) recruitment from the mid-1990s onwards, enforced military training in order to receive secondary school certificates, and the regular raids on alcohol brewers – overwhelmingly southern and western Sudanese women – and resultant imprisonment, fines and often sexual or physical violence from police.\textsuperscript{494} Night-time raids, supposedly to suppress alcohol-brewing, involved looting, beatings, the kidnap of children, rape and planting evidence.\textsuperscript{495} This gave rise to real

\textsuperscript{488} Woldemikael, ‘Southern migrants in a Northern Sudanese City’, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{490} DKLK, 4 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{491} AMJ, 16 July 2013; MTL, 11 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{492} DKLK, 4 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{493} Oxfam, ‘Confidential report’, SAD.93/2/3.
\textsuperscript{494} DKLK remembered hearing of women having miscarriages from overwork, or from illness and rape in prisons (4 July 2013); this was also reported by MTL, 11 July 2013. This violence is comparatively well-documented. Also see Michael Parker, \textit{Children of the sun: stories of the Christian journey in Sudan} (Nairobi, 2000); Amnesty International, \textit{Sudan: the tears of orphans: no future without human rights} (1995); African Rights, \textit{Food and power in Sudan: a critique of humanitarianism} (1997); Ann Mosely Lesch and Osman A. Fadl (eds.), \textit{Coping with torture: images from Sudan} (Trenton, N.J., 2004); Human Rights Watch Africa, \textit{Children in Sudan}; Jok, \textit{War and slavery in Sudan}.
\textsuperscript{495} LAM, 8 June 2013; DKLK, 21 August 2013.
fears when moving across or in the centre of Khartoum, for instance when on buses.⁴⁹⁶ Arguably, the Arabization and Islamization to state standards enforced by PDF recruitment and training was mostly targeted at northern populations, though PDFs did draw on financially or physically coerced recruits from elsewhere in Sudan, and many southerners experienced forced conscription or obligatory PDF training. From December 1990 onwards, all civil servants, teachers, professors and students had to do military training for six week periods, which was obligatory for enrolment in university. This was extended to all men under thirty by 1995, with youths seized on the streets at “checkpoints”.⁴⁹⁷ Bashir called the PDF a ‘school for national and spiritual education,’ through which the Sudanese citizen’s mind can be remoulded and his religious consciousness enhanced.⁴⁹⁸ In the words of one ex-trainee,

'Most of it is conduct training. They can train you by brainwashing you, by telling [you] that this is Islamic country, [and that] Islam is under threat, and you’re supposed to train yourselves to take up arms, and we are going to – even liberate Africa, ... Islamize Africa.'⁴⁹⁹

This was not acculturation, but ideological violence.

Similarly, the economic pressures for socio-cultural change in line with “Arabization and Islamization” hardly produced assimilation. It has been widely noted that food aid was used across Sudan to pressure local and displaced communities into conforming with subjugation.⁵⁰⁰ In light of people’s tenuous living situations, they had limited options: access to formal education in the peripheral official camps was through khalwa kindergartens, and most forms of paperwork could only be accessed through local government-affiliated committees.⁵⁰¹ As Bakhit’s study of a Khartoum shantytown in 2011 and 2012 noted,

---

⁴⁹⁶ See the account of a Darfuri man reported in Human Rights Watch Africa, Children in Sudan, p. 26.
⁴⁹⁸ Quoted in Lesch, The Sudan, p. 135.
⁴⁹⁹ DKLK, 4 July 2013.
'mobilizing political support for the government by means of the local committees, along with civil society organisations such as youth organisations, and some religious institutions, like the Zakat institute, ...[aimed] clearly to make political affiliation with the government the only way for shantytown people to participate in and influence the provision of government services. In the early to mid 1990s, many non-Arab government officials were dismissed from service for failing to “prove” their Muslim beliefs; applicants had to provide testimonials or confirm their religion in interviews. Work in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and PDFs was a financially attractive route for some men, as was working – despite the potential for abuse or the regular refusal of pay – on agricultural schemes elsewhere in Sudan, or (for children and women) as domestic labourers. Many accounts of life in Khartoum include periods of forced work or deception into trafficked labour outside of the city. Economic coercion, by force or circumstance, was generally unsubtle, explained by many people as “bribes”, at the very least aiming to encourage a particular type of performance: for example, in exchange for publicly acting as a Muslim, or to dress or act in ways socially acceptable to Arab riverain residents. The social isolation of individuals as cleaners or guards, for example, would ‘absorb’ people like this: ‘those who isolate themselves, are those to be lost [to] Arabs.’ This form of subsumption into politically Islamicized economic systems was heavy-handed, explicit and superficial; one Islamic relief group would only accept Islamic-named food aid applicants ‘on the understanding that this indicated conversion to Islam,’ and most people viewed their Muslim “nickname” as part of living in Khartoum.

For those on the receiving end in Khartoum, this was intellectual vandalism and psychological abuse, intended to subordinate through its unattainable promise of inclusion.

502 Mohamed A. G. Bakhit, 'Negotiations of power and responsibilities in Khartoum shantytowns', in Elke Grawert (ed.), Forging Two Nations: Insights on Sudan and South Sudan (Addis Ababa, 2014), p. 139. 503 Several people explained their attempts to get formal civil service or private sector jobs this way; Lesch, The Sudan, p. 139. 504 ADA, 13 August 2013; DTL, 10 July 2013. 505 LAM, 8 June 2013; APA, 22 July 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 13 April 2013; LAM, 3 June 2013; KDK, 3 June 2013. 506 DTL, 10 July 2013; APA 22 July 2013. 507 Rev. Dr R. Rodgers, Report for Light and Hope for Sudan concerning a visit to Khartoum, 22 June 1994, SAD.93/2/77; DCS, 12 August 2013.
The most obvious and insidious form of this was the broad use of a particular elite style of Khartoum Arabic in government schools, exams, and higher education. This was mostly imposed on secondary and university-level students, but also affected local self-run primary schools and evening classes through the systematic cancellation of scholarships, the posting of non-Muslim or non-Khartoum Arabic-speaking students to Omdurman Islamic University, the refusal to endorse school certificates or certify self- or church-run schools under the Sudan curriculum, and the unilateral closure of schools by security and police forces.508

'They said that – it is not good for us... we the northerners, to witness you, you are learning, while your brothers are [killing] some people.'509 This rhetoric was taken up in popular encounters in Khartoum, and was not the preserve of state officials.

'[When you] go to the restaurant to eat, you [are] asked – are you also [a] student? You say yes! What do you want to do when you finish and when you graduate? ...some say I will be a politician; some say I need to be an engineer, I need to be a doctor, I need to be an officer in the police... how they laughed [at] us! They said that – but what about your brothers in the bush now? They are killing people, and you are here eating our things. ... Why [do] you refuse to join your brothers in [the] bush, and you are now affecting us in the market, even [in] the schools? Please, you join the bush, and you come with your brother and take this country from [the] Arabs, if you are able to do that.'510

Many people remember being forcibly bussed to political rallies, where they were “discouraged” – ‘especially on politics, they can say you will not succeed [in] what you are doing, even the Darfurians [will not succeed]... you will be sorry if you refuse to become Muslims, because we are now going to Islamize this area; they even despair you [sic] by saying that the SPLM is not going to succeed.'511

Many ex-residents’ explanations of “assimilation” into northern society were often based on acquiescence because of insurmountable inequality:

508 The Information Committee of the South Sudan Students Alliance for Separation – Middle East, ‘Report on the compulsory transportation of students to Khartoum’, 8 September 1992, SAD.93/1/74-5.
509 DKLK, 4 July 2013; Maper chiefs, 13 April 2013.
510 JGRN, 28 June 2013.
511 DKLK, 4 July 2013; Malik, ‘Displacement as Discourse.’
‘when you request your rights in the court, ...you will not be given your right even if you are right. They considered Arabs to be the right person, who can say the right [sic]. It will not be possible for you to do a good thing: whatever good thing you do will not be considered by an Arab.’

Khartoum state programming – collectively summarised as a “project” of “Arabization and Islamization” – generally aimed to alienate rather than assimilate its incompatible residents, and set out geographical, social and behavioural dividing lines. Both locals and recent residents knew the limits of assimilation: this was not an ‘open door’, as Nyombe termed it, where one could convert, declare a new name and alter behaviour, and be seen by northern society as being ‘Arab’.

‘Even if you pray in [the] Muslim religion, they are still thinking of [you as] being unbelievers.’ The “upgrading” of squatter areas that had successfully petitioned for state recognition just maintained their position as the lowest stratum of Khartoum residents, rather than integrating a supposedly “Arabized” area.

Medics in remote or majority-displaced suburbs were allegedly poorly trained or careless, because ‘if ... somebody kills three people or four, there’s no problem, because they are not an Arab, it is not a loss to them.’ Dressing in jellabiya, a traditional long garment popular in the Nile Valley, the use of henna, co-opted marriage practices, attendance at the mosque, and alternative Arabic names did not – as the above demonstrates – equate to an Arabization or Islamization that would ever fully socialise a person into Khartoum elite society. While southern residents acknowledged some genuine southern Muslim converts, conversion, naming, and dress were ‘pretending’: the goal was jobs, as one group of chiefs said, although ‘some people [aspire] to be equal.’

‘They go to the mosque to pray, but after they come back, they build a relationship with their brother Dinka. ... They just advised their brothers that we are just taking care of our lives... it means they are pretending... For these people, they went there purposefully pretending to be Muslim, in order to defend themselves and their brothers.’

---

512 JG, 19 July 2013; also mentioned by DKLK, 4 July 2013, and LAM, 8 June 2013.
514 LAM, 8 June 2013.
516 DKLK, 4 July 2013.
517 Chiefs’ meeting, 29 June 2013; also DDD, 4 June 2013, and DTL, 10 July 2013, discussed ‘pretending’.
518 LAM, 8 June 2013; also AAD, 14 August 2013.
This was not just pretending for some men, though, who saw their rights to dress as they wanted, particularly in the very Sudanese *jellabiya*, as an assertions of their identification as Sudanese and a political statement of equality and citizenship: this southern claiming of Sudanese identity is arguably as neglected an issue as southern Sudanese nationalism.

‘They don’t need Dinka to enter into their customs like dancing, and dressing, and other things. [They say that] there are such things that are different from black people [sic] ... when you want to [be] involved,... they will tell you that this is not your custom.’

One man described this as a ‘cold war’: after an SPLA advance, public harassment would increase, and ‘sometimes if you talk to them in Arabic they can accuse you of being a soldier in the south... because [they say] why do you talk wisely in that language that [does] not belong to you, it means that you are a soldier.’

These practices were explicitly aimed at the invisibility and segregation of Khartoum’s black, poor, politically suspect and culturally “backward” populations, and – when these people were visibly in designated Khartoum public spaces – demanded a cultural and religious performance. The Khartoum state in its various forms was always, in practice, keen to make and demarcate space for this subordinate but economically and politically useful non-Islamic, non-Arab other.

This explains Ibrahim’s surprise, in 1991, that ‘the influence of the Arab-Islamic majority... has proved weaker than one had assumed... The southerners show little interest to integrate themselves into the Islamic society of Khartoum. There is hardly any reciprocal acceptance of coexistence on both sides.’ As Abusharaf says, ‘this program was designed not to assimilate non-Arab, non-Muslim groups but to dominate them’: but it was also to hold them

---

519 JG, 19 July 2013.
520 PDA, 29 June 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; LAM, 8 June 2013.
521 Duffield discusses the creation of this mobile and servile labour pool extensively: Duffield, ‘Aid and Complicity’; Duffield, *Global governance and the new wars*.
522 Ibrahim, ‘The Southern Sudanese migration to Khartoum and the resultant conflicts’, p. 16.
at arm’s length. Sommers has described people’s ‘precautions designed to minimise potential interactions with government authorities,’ including not looking at landmarks on a commute through Khartoum. Some men commented that it was better to ‘stay poor’ in order to avoid notice; ‘we don’t talk strongly… we don’t want to show what we have to Arabs.’ Hanaa Motasim terms this ‘camouflage’, ‘hoping at best to be overlooked and ignored.’ This self-minimisation created exhaustion – ‘if [they found] people like the way we are seated here, they will just …arrest all of us, because they don’t want people to gather and share their opinion. … [These people] lose the appetite of staying [in Khartoum, and in the community]… when they’re tired.’ State and non-state pressures in Khartoum, then, essentially encouraged southerners not to assimilate, but to conceal their difference in central public spaces, remain in peripheral areas of the city, and hide their intellectual, political, and cultural interests, to avoid the worst of public abuses.


This organised spatial, economic and social subjugation fuelled community organisation in Khartoum. The period from 1992 to 1994 is broadly explained by ex-residents as a period of “scaling up” in activity and activism in Khartoum, what Pero terms a “transition moment.”

523 Abusharaf, Transforming displaced women in Sudan, p. 33.
524 JGRN, 28 June 2013.
525 Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 211.
526 Maper group meeting, 13 April 2013.
527 LAM, 8 June 2013.
528 Taha, ‘Deeply Divided Societies’, p. 12.
529 Meaning that they were tired of dealing with these pressures. KDK, 3 June 2013.
530 LAM, 8 June 2013.
However, this community work was not framed as resistance specifically to Arabization or Islamization: popular discourse, in contemporary records and discussions in South Sudan, emphasises a fear of *loss*, a de-culturation rather than a cultural change. De-culturation is the (potentially academically counter-intuitive) term used by Duffield in 2002 for the ‘attempt to ignore, dilute and ultimately suppress Southern cultural histories [in favour of] a bounded homogeneity that reflects Northern interests and dominance’. But this fear of loss was less based on state policies or elite Khartoum-region Sudanese societal pressures than on broader fears of their own “de-culturation” due to forgetting, adapted habits, new options for socialisation, and local coping mechanisms. Residents from the southern regions were well-aware that ‘something that stays in a place will be resembled to the environment’. Many men and women mentioned their own moments of political self-consciousness at this time, ‘when... you realise, within the community, these are the disadvantages, you lose people, you lose home, nobody knows who [you] are.’ By 1991 and 1992, as the massive number of people who had arrived from 1986 to 1988 settled and established themselves in the city, managing and disciplining community “loss” and ‘controlling our language and our culture’ became a priority for many within Khartoum “displaced” communities.

‘I saw some things in Darfur, when I was in Darfur. After I saw all these things, then I became a grown up person, then I really became a sound minded person... – and I began to realise the bad and the good.’ The fear of loss structured interviews with men and women in Aweil. The adaptations necessary in Khartoum meant that ‘since we left this area [Aweil] we were different people.’ There were wider pressures post-flight: trauma, urbanisation, poverty, the

---

533 JG, 19 July 2013.
534 RRL, 3 September 2013.
535 APA, 22 July 2013.
536 APA, 22 July 2013.
537 These ‘moments’ of realisation form a trope across accounts of Khartoum; for a methodological discussion of this genre of storytelling, see Kindersley, ‘Southern Sudanese Narratives of Displacement’.
538 NAJ, 5 June 2013; also AD, 5 June 2013.
collapse of social ties and networks of mutual dependence, as well as socio-cultural mixing, particularly with the advent of international media in the 1990s. Forgetting words in your own language, picking up other tribal languages, as well as ‘when you learn the languages of the people who don’t respect you,’ would mean someone was “getting lost.” Children born or raised in Khartoum generally became practically monolingual in a creole of southern and Khartoum Arabic. Adults remember losing the ability to express complex ideas and emotions in their mother tongue. ‘Everything was mixed’: ‘what happened is even neighbours change our culture [sic]. The Dinka language [is] there, the Nuer language is there, all our cultures are there!’

The most obvious of these concerns (for the community and observers alike) was the rise in numbers of “street children” or “gangs”, a catch-all term for schoolchildren selling cigarettes to fund their education, pickpockets, homeless or destitute children, groups of youths in public spaces, and organised adult criminal activity. Some children became vagrant or self-sufficient on the streets due to the death, abandonment, destitution, or mental health and addiction problems of their parents or guardians. Poor, unmarried and un- or sporadically-employed young men increasingly looked to American black cultures to assert an internationalised sense of difference and feeling of power, particularly through the frequently-referenced “nigga gangs” of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Aside from these

539 AD, 5 June 2013.
540 Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 59.
541 AMJ, 16 July 2013.
543 DKLK, 21 August 2013; In court, DKLK said that these criminal groups were delineated as shamasha, small-scale pickpockets; blathajiiya or balathaga, big gangs of burglars, or assaba; and rabathiin, night gangs and drug smugglers.
545 DCS, 11 August 2013. Many people emphasised that the name “nigga” (or Nigger, or Niggaz) gangs developed in the early 2000s, including – in Khartoum – groups called ‘West Coast’, ‘The Blacks’, ‘Backstreet Boys’, ‘Cash/Catch Money’, and many others. This term, with various spellings, continues to be used to describe violent delinquency and immorality particularly among young men in South Sudan, but is often described as a post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) phenomenon. See Cherry Leonardi, Deborah Isser, Leben Moro, and Martina Santschi, ‘The politics of customary law ascertainment in South Sudan’, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 43:63 (2011), pp. 58–60; Mareike Schomerus and Tim Allen, ‘Southern Sudan at odds with itself: Dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace’ (London School of Economics, 2010), pp. 64–5; Katarzyna Grabska, ‘In-
‘youth,’ who apparently suffered ‘alienation… extraction and abstraction from all… cultural roots,’ many people emphasised the negative impact of emotional breakdowns, financial stress, and the monetisation of relationships on their communities, as people became ‘tired’ and ‘lost appetite.’

However, these changes were not all seen as bad; viewed retrospectively from Aweil and Juba they were generally prosaically described as the “advantages and disadvantages” of Khartoum. Many people were positive about inter-tribal relationships, access to international news, and in their relationships with non-southern work colleagues. Most people’s discussions of Khartoum – including across gender, age and economic status in Aweil and Juba – demonstrated a core tension over these positive and negative impacts of modernity: for instance, between significant new economic opportunities for many, versus economic disempowerment (particularly of men); and over the changing social significance and moral weights of particular behaviours and skills, such as the capital gains offered through low-status, menial and subordinate work like brick-laying.

While many of these discussions were about the practical challenges and social rebalancing required from these new circumstances, at their core they were fundamentally concerned with mitigating risks of individualisation from these new activities and options. Khartoum offered access to global cultures and – possibly – opportunities for onward movement and personal advancement that encouraged the pursuit of individual success and freedom at the potential expense of collective obligations and responsibilities to family and communities of various kinds. For most people who contributed to this study – including, for instance, ambitious young men who headed on to Cairo, and self-described gang members –

---

546 See Harragin and Chol, The Southern Sudan Vulnerability Study; also Luca Russo, ‘Crisis and food security profile: Sudan’, in Alinovi, Hemrich and Russo (eds.), Beyond relief, p. 20. Mental health problems were recorded in 1989 in El-Shazali Ibrahim, ‘War Displacement: the socio-cultural dimension’, p. 64; and also explained by LLAA, 3 June 2013.
547 Chiefs’ meeting, 13 April 2013; Chiefs’ court meeting, 14 June 2015.
548 RRL, 3 September 2013; anonymous woman, 3 September 2013; AAJD, 22 August 2013; DCD, 12 August 2013; for instance, PCP’s boss in Khartoum changed P’s shift work to accommodate his volunteer teaching schedule.
freedom, as Hunter also observes, is not necessarily via individual autonomy, but a search for reciprocity, responsibility and security.

This was a highly gendered conversation over choice, agency, and responsibility, and gender relations were under significant strain anyway from a fundamental shift in economic and social balance in migration and civil war. The economic power shift towards women in migrant communities has been well-documented: in Khartoum, men had absconded, gone to fight or work on agricultural schemes, or were unable to find regular employment, and so most families depended on women's incomes, and often on women as heads of the household. This presented a serious challenge to male authority: 'the women were free, because they were brewing the local brew, they're working in Arab houses, and they are to be paid – they don't even ask where the man is!'

This was 'difficult' for men, with women finding more opportunities in housework and small trading. Ibrahim noted that men were deeply ambivalent over their wives obtaining ID cards for work. Alternative modes of legitimate marriage became prevalent, such as elopement and inter-marriage between Darfuri, Nubian, Beja and other eastern and southern broadly "black" residents, and between people of different religious backgrounds. Both older men and women, and younger men, found bridewealth a point of stress, as elopements, intermarriages, and marriages through pregnancy undermined older systems and in many cases created significant social tensions. People remembered internal conflicts across southern, Nuba and western populations over dances, fashions, sex, religion, gender norms, beautification and intermarriage. The definition of intermarriage varied between families: one woman’s family emphasised to her that she was ‘supposed to marry Dinka Ngok or Zande or Shilluk and other tribes of southern Sudan,' but that ‘even if [the parents] are not happy, they

549 Or the more common southern Sudanese political aim of "self-determination".
550 Hunter, Political Thought and the Public Sphere, p. 13.
551 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; also AAD, 14 August 2013. See Ryle and Yai Kuol, Displaced southern Sudanese in northern Sudan, p. 40; for a more recent detailed discussion of changing gender roles, see Grabska, Gender, Home & Identity: The Nuer Repatriation to South Sudan (London, 2014).
552 AAD, 14 August 2013.
554 Miller, Language change and national integration, pp. 53–4.
555 MW, AD and AD, 13 July 2013; DKLK, 21 August 2013.
556 AMJ, 16 July 2013.
aren’t] able to stop’ a marriage in Khartoum. Some women remembered others killing themselves when families blocked marriages, including marriage to Darfuri and Nuba Mountains men.557

Younger women were also blamed more generally by older men and many women for making money through sex work, for drinking, and for smoking cigarettes, as well as being seen as morally ambivalent for attending picnics and parties.558 Abortion and miscarriages were a concern of many men and women of all ages throughout interviews, highlighting concerns over the dangers of women’s labour, choice, and familial and moral responsibility.559 The tight wrap skirts adapted from the Zande from south-western Sudan, a group of women agreed, were believed to cause abortion: ‘for such people who know they are pregnant, and they are still adapting that system, [they intend] to make an abortion.’560

Dress was more broadly a point of tension, primarily for older men and women: some new “customs” – including henna designs described as “Darfur style” – were very popular, as were tobs and other cheap and accessible fashion, such as kitenge fabrics from East Africa, and westernised suits and sportswear; morally and culturally dubious salons were increasingly established and run by young southern men and women. By the late 1990s, girls would wear trousers and “don’t-sit” skirts, and a few dressed in American-style basketball or rap culture clothing – ‘we were pretending like a man!’561

557 Ibid.
560 AMJ, 16 July 2013.
561 Ibid. “Don’t sit” skirts, in common South Sudanese English, are skirts that are too short or tight to sit without risking exposure.
Figure 4: Youth in Khartoum
Angelina (front left, crouching), with three male and one female friend (back left, standing), c. late 1990s. Photograph provided by Angelina and reproduced with permission.
Women’s memories of Khartoum are noticeably different to men’s. Social problems in Khartoum were, for many women, ‘administrative issues’: if women worked in brewing or domestic service, some women said, men complained that they were really engaging in sex work. Men in Khartoum, apparently, ‘cannot decide properly’ about women’s roles. Women, conversely, emphasised their freedoms in Khartoum to ‘go anywhere’, for instance to theatres and picnics, with many young married or single-parent women in rural areas of Aweil emphasising their desire to return. One woman, widowed early in the war, explained her ability to refuse re-marriage in Khartoum:

‘Khalas! [Laughs] Khalas intaat! [I was] really finished with marriage.’

**Assimilation, resistance and self-expression**

With a broader Sudanese panic over women’s roles and rights in Sudanese society, particularly since the economic crisis in the 1970s undermined the dominance of men in the economy, these attempts to shame and control women’s behaviour could be portrayed as the appropriation of both policing women’s bodies and morality, and the adoption of northern Sudanese cultural practices (such as henna and wearing the *tob*) as social assimilation to the hegemony of dominant northern cultures. This is likely partly true, and maybe demonstrated by a common claim to superior social morality and class among returned residents of Khartoum across South Sudan.

But this was not just a case of patriarchal and elderly forces clamping down on rebellious youth and cultural decay. Residents struggled to articulate the differences between necessity, obligation and personal choice in cultural adoptions of northern practices, as Abusharaf observed in her anthropological study of displaced southern women in Khartoum.

---

562 AAD, 14 August 2013; many conversations with women in Apada.
563 R, 3 September 2013; AND, and other women, 29 June 2013.
564 Lit. “Enough! (Completely) enough!”
565 AND, 29 June 2013.
in the 2000s. But these struggles were not necessarily a case of negotiating specifically northern assimilation versus southern ethno-cultural resistance. Things like the use of henna and wearing tobs were both partly dominant Sudanese cultural adoptions and also part of a wider cultural expansion and exploration – of north-east African, eastern African, pan-African and global black cultures, music, dress and other self-expressions.

A key demonstration of this agglomeration of global and local beauty standards was the controversial practice of skin whitening which became common in the early 2000s. Bleaching and lightening dark skin was both a localised part of the racial politics of Khartoum’s society, and a global racial-political issue. One young woman explained that its users ‘think that you will look good [and] become a light skinned person... it is really bad, even some people rejected it,’ including other young women. For many people of all ages, ‘those girls who have chemicalised themselves to be brown [sic]’ were ‘cases of despair’ – although several men and women of various ages said they had tried it, often with ambivalence:

‘When they see the ladies, the girls of Arabs, are moving, they are so red, and that is why maybe they thought that if you change your colour, you will be loved by your boyfriend; so this is how they adapt, they want to change the colour. So changing the colour is changing the culture! Because the colour is part of our culture. ... I think this is one of the cultures in East Africa. You know, even men are doing it.’

As Pierre notes, it is important to put skin bleaching into global as well as local histories of racialisation: this practice is not just an aspiration to a lighter-skinned, potentially non-southern, ideal Sudanese (and potentially more “Arab”) skin tone, but a response to a

---

566 Abusharaf, *Transforming displaced women in Sudan.*
567 While there is increasing international anthropological scholarship on the practice of skin bleaching, there is little written on Sudan or South Sudan. See Caroline Faria, ‘Styling the nation: fear and desire in the South Sudanese beauty trade’, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 39:2* (April 2014), pp. 318–330.
568 AMJ, 16 July 2013.
569 DAA, 13 July 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013.
570 DCS, 11 August 2013.
complex combination of local, Sudanese and international cultural hegemonies, and global white supremacy.

These “positives and negatives” were more a form of global and local creolisation than deculturation or appropriation, implying more entangled and on-going processes of personal agency and broader obligation rather than more static and direct loss or imposition, as James observes of “assimilation”: ‘the people themselves appropriate and modify, and they respond intellectually, emotionally and politically to some extent within the terms of reference offered them.’ 572 These terms of reference were broad, and the learned ability to navigate multiple international cultures of modernity, asserting Sudanese-ness and southern-ness while also demonstrating global multiculturalism, was a source of pride to many ex-Khartoum residents in Aweil and Juba. Asserting Sudanese-ness, through dress, social life and Khartoum’s own Arabic slang, was an explicit appropriation by many, from older men asserting elder status to younger and often single-parenting and working women. 573

---

572 James, *The listening ebony*, p. 3.
573 Conversations with women in Apada; AMJ, 16 July 2013; AND, 29 June 2013; JG, 30 June 2013.
Figure 5: “African women”
Angelina (left) and friend (from Darfur), dressed in trouser suits, c. late 1990s. Photograph provided by Angelina and reproduced with permission.
Much like Siri Lamoureaux’s surprise to find classical Arabic poetry exchanged by Nuba students in Khartoum – what she described as a Bourdieu-like reproduction of social inequality⁵⁷⁴ - “Arab-Islamic” elite tools and status markers (and what some non-southern residents argued was not theirs to wear or employ) were in use to challenge marginalisation and social inequality, assert a broader idea of inclusive “Sudanese” citizenship, and challenge the exclusion of “southern” residents from Sudanese political and social self-conceptions, as one young man observed:

’Whenever you put that jellabiya, ...then they will tell you no, this is not your dressing. Southerners dress in trousers. ... [But] we [want to] wear jellabiya as a Sudanese, as Sudanese dressing, but not to [be] Arabs.’⁵⁷⁵

This demonstration of plural cultural powers could arguably be seen as a direct rebuttal of the mono-cultural elitism of upper-class Khartoum, and potentially also of the patrimonial ethnic patriotism of some parents and community members.⁵⁷⁶ Many young women now resident in Aweil were continuing discussions and practices, started in Khartoum, about Afro hair care and styling, Darfur styles of henna painting, and Chinese-made tight western t-shirts from the town market, a conscious balance of practical and aesthetic choices, cultural and political assertions of knowledge, individualism and experience, and the negotiation of social judgement.⁵⁷⁷

In this context, then – against a background of systemic public abuses and risks, economic and intellectual subjugation, and opportunities for cultural innovation – many, particularly older residents, felt that ‘we were going to forget the Dinka dignity. We were about to forget it.’⁵⁷⁸ Life in Khartoum was not only punitive and often socially degrading, but fundamentally time-consuming, working in what Comaroff calls ‘the “shadow” of the global system’ just to

⁵⁷⁵ JG, 19 July 2013.
⁵⁷⁶ This is not specific to southern Sudanese communities in Khartoum, as Lamoureaux’s thesis demonstrates.
⁵⁷⁷ Having grappled with this challenging cosmopolitan array of socio-political statements is likely the source of some ex-Khartoum residents’ sense of exceptionalism, and sometimes also a sense of superior morality, skill and experience, back in South Sudan.
⁵⁷⁸ DAA, 13 July 2013; also AMJ, 16 July 2013.
make life possible.\textsuperscript{579} Commuting, home-building, negotiating rent, living space, land rights, marriages, deaths and burials, healthcare, communications, births and childcare were both exhausting and highly politicised in Khartoum.

Of primary concern was a loss of mutual respect, and a loss of social education, through the dissolving of family ties and new opportunities for creolisation, as one older man and part-time teacher explained:\textsuperscript{580}

‘When they come back to their grandmothers, who don’t know this foreign languages, and [call them] habooba [grandmother in Arabic].\textsuperscript{581} They will not understand, they will think [it’s an] insult! [They would say] why [don’t you] separate, if you are educated in English! When it is necessary, you want to speak in English – you speak English! Pure English, with those who want to understand. But when you come back to your family, don’t make it as a class for your mother, for your father, and then you start pouring some foreign languages to them, they will not understand. … That is why we are advising our young men, our young people, that [you] have [the] right to assess all the other languages. But when [it’s] time to come back to your house: you have to speak with your people in your language. Let the young ones learn from you! Don’t let them lose their ways, don’t let them lose their culture, through you. Like… these niggas, eh? That is why we were trying to control our – our tribe; our people; in order that to maintain our culture, that was the final thing.’\textsuperscript{582}

This concern over deculturation, acculturation and re-culturation was articulated through these discussions and clashes over individualism, masculinity, women’s sexual and social freedom, and the limits to broadening cultural repertoires, particularly from the early 1990s. The focus of this “advice”, as the teacher quoted above called it, was not ultimately on specific problematic actions, innovations or ideas; these were flashpoints and tools in a discussion essentially about what James calls ‘moral knowledge’: the ability to make good and informed choices, and thus what constituted the right information and moral basis for these choices.\textsuperscript{583}

\textsuperscript{580} The same concerns are noted in the colonial Zambian vernacular press by Englund, ‘Anti Anti-Colonialism’, p. 240; and in Tanzania, by Hunter, ‘Dutiful Subjects, Patriotic Citizens.’
\textsuperscript{581} Sudanese Arabic for grandmother.
\textsuperscript{582} DCS, 11 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{583} James, The listening ebony, p. 3.
**Social control**

This “good” knowledge was negotiated through community projects of discipline and cultural entrepreneurship, particularly from around 1991 onwards. Many people discussed the broad attempts to “control” friends, family and community in Khartoum from this period: ‘we discuss[ed] so many things... we keep on advising people [to be] careful when roaming around in the city,’ and many men emphasised the need for a ‘very strict living.’ This organisation was framed by locals as civic and moral education and (self) control, in the face of dislocation and urbanisation.

The most visible and discussed forms of this collective attempt to control, resist and advise in the peripheral areas of Khartoum were (and are) what are commonly called “traditional chiefs’ courts” and local groups of young men often termed “nigga gangs.” Maybe counter-intuitively, many among both groups were working to the same ends: they were engaged, and often allies, in explicit community policing on ethnic and gendered lines. As recent research has argued of traditional authority in South Sudan, chiefs in Khartoum were mediators between their communities and external powers, particularly through negotiating or making payments to release women arrested for brewing. In establishing government-recognised alternative court systems, leaders could organise the resolution of local small-scale legal cases outside of government courts (though robbery and murder ‘belong[ed] to the government’). Chiefs who knew Arabic could ‘rescue people’ more effectively, working with the local police partly in collaboration but also to stymie them. Similarly, Khartoum gang members’ primary interest was ‘to defend ourselves’ through complex affiliations:

---

585 Magnusson points out that urban control by gangs and militias is a kind of order in itself; this approach does not necessarily separate ‘anomic’ or ‘immoral’ policing activities from those more generally considered ‘cultural’ or ‘traditional’, such as chiefs’ courts. Magnusson, *Politics of Urbanism*, pp. 12–3.
587 MDM, 5 June 2013; NAJ, 8 June 2013; LAM, 8 June 2013.
588 LAM, 5 June 2013; for examples of this in Bor, see Tuttle, ‘Life is Prickly’, pp. 43, 49.
'Our group was powerful because it included those who served national service, the educated class of people, and [other] physically strong people... [and you know that] police cannot afford to come and arrest a person [who has served national service or is in the army], because they are soldiers, and that is police – so police cannot arrest [them]. ... after something is heard over the whole of Khartoum, it brings a lot of people from that group, different groups of gangs, to come and investigate why their colleague was arrested. ... the Dinka chiefs in Khartoum – you know, they were not happy [with] our group, [but] they like only that protection we made.\textsuperscript{589}

This self-policing was generally tolerated in remote areas by local state authorities because

'...they are taking care of their brothers. You see, if they do something wrong, they will not do it to an Arab. The government is not worried for them, because as long as they are working, they are working on their southerners. Even if they do it wrong, they do it to their people, because they have been isolated.'\textsuperscript{590}

These men were primarily concerned about internal community affairs and social responsibility. As with Pratten’s recent research on youth associations in Nigeria, both young and old men in southern communities in Khartoum were ‘resisting disorder’: ‘in this sense, they may come across as innovative and transforming yet conservative at the same time.’\textsuperscript{591}

Both courts and gangs reflected the complex racial and ethnic dynamics of their neighbourhoods, with individual ethnic courts collaborating formally and informally, for instance the Ashan Kom court, established in 1989 for Dinka Malwal, Nuer and Shilluk in one area, with local sub-committees formed including Nuba, Baggara and Darfuri members.\textsuperscript{592}

While many chiefs criticised “the niggas” in Khartoum, they distinguished criminal associations from youth gangs: one sub-chief said that ‘the youth... are responsible people, that we give orders [to], and they go and practice them. So they are right [haq].’\textsuperscript{593} For one ex-gang member, ‘the youth were aiming to guide themselves against problems that will aggress them. ... It was youth liberation.’\textsuperscript{594} One man noted that some chiefs ‘[selected]
some youth to protect - to monitor the situation at night,’ and local gangs were expanded or incorporated into neighbourhood militias when camp relocations were imminent.595

Primarily, though, these groups’ work centred on the control of women and marriage, or in one chief’s words, ‘wrong weddings and committing adultery.’ Gangs were formed partly ‘to monitor the situation of the girls... that is why we created this gang, in order to liberate our girls from Arabs, because they [the girls] reject us.’596 The majority of traditional court cases in Khartoum were about rape, adultery and problems with bridewealth.597 Some men specialised in negotiating bridewealth and marriages among their own sub-clans and village members in Khartoum.598 The ideal arrangement was part-payment:

‘it was acceptable to pay money, as a dowry in Khartoum, but not all of the money... you promise to pay cows when you come back to South. ... It was told that a person must have to pay an amount that is equivalent to thirteen cows, and the rest of the cows will be completed in the South as a promise. ...people come always from the South, and they are the ones to express the rate of change of cows in the auction here. Then people must have to see which price is good for them.’599

The cow-equivalent deposit varied, with most families unable to pay anything more than sacks of sorghum at the time: this was a source of frustration to many men and women, but also entrenched the expectation of return.600 Some customs were adapted from local migrant communities, such as western and eastern Sudanese-style wedding convoys and large gifts of sugar, oil and household goods, which fitted the urban context, but other ideas were far less welcome: many bemoaned the rates of divorce in the city.601 The Tueny Youth Society’s brief in 1992 focused on encouraging young women to go to school, stay at home or in Dinka spaces, and ‘get married from our people.’602 Girls who were ‘not steady at home’ were forced into marriages so that ‘the man will take the responsibility of the girl.’603

595 DKLK, 21 August 2013; AM, 6 February 2012.
596 JG, 13 August 2013.
597 ADA, 13 August 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013.
598 AAJD, 22 August 2013.
599 SAK, 3 July 2013.
600 Many conversations with women in Apada, June and August 2013; also MTL, 10 July 2013.
601 DCS, 11 August 2013.
602 DCD, 12 August 2013.
603 R, 3 September 2013.
Some women worked as matchmakers, with some positive results, but much of this 'relationship policing' was controlled by men. This was made difficult by women’s access to alternative sources of finance, widespread poverty, and the limitations of the “alternative” cash bridewealth system in Khartoum. Groups of young men, unable to financially compete for bridewealth in Khartoum, instead ‘used to separate the girls... whenever [we] see that the girl is walking with [an] Arab boyfriend’:

‘They rejected their black people, because they are poor, and they like the Arab north[erners] because they are rich. ... when we see that a girl [wanted] a good dress and a phone, and we have money, we have to buy something and give [it to] her, in order to [make her] stay at home. ... If you are Dinka, without knowledge of [the] Arabic language, you will not be considered as [an] important person. ... We know that they wanted to adapt the Arab customs, and we don’t like that, we need to attract them towards us – such that we stay together, conversing together, because we are one. ... After the Arabs saw that we have formed our group, the Arab youth also tried to form their group in order to control their girls.

These men sound like Peterson's patriarchal ethno-nationalists, but their work emphasises negotiation as much as ethno-traditionalist “resistance,” including, for example, approving elopements within families and communities: the locally-produced book by an early 2000s literacy group called *The Dinka Customology of Marriage* emphasised, ‘don’t force girls to be married to people they don’t want.’ This was not as straightforward as 'language and dress [being] used clearly as signs of resistance, insisting to talk one’s language and refusing to assimilate into the "Arab/Islamic" culture,’ as Taha puts it.

Responses to policies of erasure and marginalisation, and the more extensive pressures of urban cultural change, were clearly wider than a choice between passivity or resistance. Explaining southern community activism in Khartoum as conservative "resistance" does not answer what this resistance was for. As Fletcher argues,

---

604 J, 26 June 2013.
605 AMJ, 16 July 2013.
606 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013.
607 JG, 30 June 2013.
'We know what freedom is *freedom from*: “inequality”, “exploitation” and “oppression,” variously defined. But what does freedom *realize*? How does one know when one has achieved it?\(^{610}\)

The same questions were posed by southern Sudanese writers in Khartoum themselves: ‘how shall we give... freedom?’\(^{611}\) This centred on a tension over ideas of the limits to the effects of personal change on moral integrity and community values. While some people, both men and women, said that new urban socialisations were fundamental and irreversible - ‘when something like rain falls down you cannot collect it again’\(^{612}\) - others argued that ‘this is a world that can be worn and taken off.’\(^{613}\) As both men and women emphasised, what mattered was proving continued moral integrity, mutual understanding, and most particularly a sense of self-awareness in political context. This maintenance of internal moral strength was, many argued, a way of avoiding compromising too much; the community discussions and activities of the early 1990s onwards were focused on what acts of defiance, self-preservation and endurance constituted and proved this.

**Social work**

This was the basis for the long list of organisational, educational and community-building projects that started in around 1991 to 1994. As both men and women became ‘sad... they discussed how to [deal with] it.’\(^{614}\) These were projects rooted in civic education and moral community-building, using a broader understanding of “literacy” in the Gramscian and Freirian emancipatory mould, of reading clubs, discussion groups, and mutual adult education.\(^{615}\) Associations were based on interlinked ideas of education, political thought, moral support, cultural entertainment, record-keeping and social space, with people holding multiple memberships. These projects were myriad – in meetings across Aweil Centre, North

\(^{610}\) Fletcher, *Beyond resistance*, p. xvii.


\(^{612}\) Chiefs’ meeting, 29 June 2013.

\(^{613}\) *Dinka Displacement*, Section 11.

\(^{614}\) AMJ, 16 July 2013; R, 3 September 2013.

\(^{615}\) Coben, *Radical Heroes*, pp. 29–32.
and West counties, and in Juba, people described too many different organisations to be
detailed here. Nikkel recognised this plethora of activities in 1994, when he noted that the
enthusiasm for ideas of “psycho-social activities” for ‘IDPs’ among NGOs was overshadowed
by ‘the most dynamic systems... which refugees themselves create and sustain.616 These
organisations appear to be ethnically based and Christian-oriented, but their affiliations and
intent are more complicated.

The vernacular language schools, curricula, adult education classes, cultural societies, clan,
ethnic, and ethno-regional associations, religious groups, theatre and dance companies,
writing groups, musical troupes and neighbourhood gangs were all on the spectrum of what
Peterson describes as pedagogical cultural work.617 This was rooted in established societal
practices for coping with urbanisation in Sudan, for instance the widespread take-up of
sanduk mutual savings schemes, particularly among groups of southern and eastern women,
and the continuation and proliferation of ethnic and local associations based on towns,
payams or villages of origin.618 However, beyond the practicalities of these organisations in
providing collective funding or basic social security for funeral costs, for instance, their aims
were remembered as a constant assertion of the temporary nature of people's situation: ‘we
are people who fled war, this is not our land, and we must keep [our] culture until we go
back.619

616 Dr Marc Nikkel, circular letter, Nairobi, 15 April 1994, SAD.105/91/3.
617 Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival, pp. 25–26; see also Peterson, Creative
writing.
618 I encountered three groups of women running mutual savings schemes in Aweil. See David Pratten,
Return to the roots?, p. 11; sanduk saving schemes are also mentioned by Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf,
Life in Khartoum: probing forced migration and cultural change among war-displaced southern
619 See accounts of AAD, 14 August 2013; MTL, 10 July 2013; MDWR, 21 August 2013; LCL, 13 July
2013; chiefs’ meeting, 29 June 2013.

This work ‘start[ed] at home,’ with both men and women widely involved in maintaining vernacular languages among their children, as well as being personally involved in dance groups, church associations, youth groups and adult literacy classes. Sommers wrote in 2005 that ‘the sacrifices that Southern Sudanese have routinely made to provide or attain education, often under conditions of considerable deprivation and duress, are so remarkable that they are difficult to adequately express.’ This was not unique to Khartoum: self-help schools *in extremis* are common in records of southern refugee populations from southern Sudan across east and central Africa and Egypt, for example an ex-Khartoum University

---

620 DCD, 15 July 2013; AMJ, 16 July 2013; AA, chiefs’ meeting, 13 April 2013; also see ‘Candle-Ends Sisterhood’ constitution, Khartoum, ND., SAD 89/5/18-20.

student running a self-help refugee school at Niangara in Congo-Kinshasa in the mid to late 1960s.622 As Taha has noted, this education was not primarily about finding jobs:

education amongst the displaced is perceived as an essential component to becoming “street wise”... people who understand the written word become more oriented and confident in their dealings with officialdom. Night schools, to which the older youth go, are a centre for the discussion of politics, the discussions act as eye-openers.623

Khartoum had long been a focus for various ideas of intellectualism and literacy in Sudan. Formal education in government-run schools had always been for a tiny minority, and this continued in the 1990s: by 1991, thirty five government “IDP” primary schools catered for just over 19,000 southern students.624 However, as formal education was degraded across Sudan under the Bashir regime from 1991, these government “southern schools” were closed down by 1994, with only three self-help secondary schools surviving by 2000.625 This closing of state space encouraged the growth of older institutions that became central to community organisation, such as the evolving collectives called the “Dinka Congregation” and “Nuer Congregation” in the Catholic church, with their roots in the 1970s.626 The alternative schools – self-help, private, Islamic, or Christian – were ‘parallel education systems existing for the same population and in the same location,’ and were ‘surprisingly widespread and well-organised,’ and part-recognised or broadly tolerated by local authorities.627 While church-sponsored schools were common, they were run primarily by southern and western local residents, ‘who speak the students’ own language’ and directly recruited their pupils, and the NGOs’ “multipurpose centres” – rakubas, basic shelters, used for schools, meetings, and leisure – were generally built by locals.628 Educational work was

622 Agolong Col Agolong to Rev. Father Sina, Kisangani, 9 October 1970, Comboniani A/104/7/6; the SSNA and Comboniani archives are excellent and untapped sources of evidence on this low-level and often unseen refugee education since the 1950s.
625 Sommers, Islands of Education, pp. 224–5, 228.
626 Nikkel, Dinka Christianity, p. 229.
627 Chiefs’ meeting, 13 April 2013; Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 222; Feiden et al., Khartoum displaced assessment and recommendations, p. 21.
628 Feiden et al., Khartoum displaced assessment and recommendations, pp. 22–3; Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 222.
organised partly by priests, such as Father Edward Brady, who founded the influential Christian Leadership course, but initiatives like the late-night one-to-one teaching at Comboni Playground were sanctioned rather than led or controlled by the churches.\textsuperscript{629} Sommers claimed that these systems were ‘atomised,’ segregating the population along lines of ethnic origin, language, religion and politics;\textsuperscript{630} however, many people remembered highly mixed classes of southern and Nuba populations, with some Darfuri classmates, with fluctuating or poor finances a primary determinant of parental or personal choices.\textsuperscript{631}

These associations and their educational projects were most commonly based in churches, schools and land owned by churches in Khartoum. This primacy of church space and assistance in southern accounts of Khartoum organisation has generally been seen as further evidence of a longstanding and essential religio-political feeling of “Southern Christian” difference. Since the 1940s, church representatives, observers and government officials have all noted, celebrated or condemned Christian “expansion,” as either organic conversion to faith, or as a political demonstration of opposition to northern regimes.\textsuperscript{632} This “resistance” narrative was reinforced by the Sudanese Catholic church in the 1980s and 1990s via educational programmes, orphanage projects and political pressure to recognise Sundays.\textsuperscript{633} However, people’s explanations of the role of the church in Khartoum focus more on space. Throughout the twentieth century, conversion to Christianity was a means of gaining access to alternative spaces and opportunities across the region. This use of Christian safe space and financing was fundamental to southern communities by the 1990s partly because of previous migrant generations’ reliance on Christian institutions in Khartoum for accommodation, local information in the vernacular, education, job opportunities and funding: catechists from all southern communities were crucial in

\textsuperscript{629} DCD, 12 August 2013; interview with anonymous Tearfund worker, London, February 2012.
\textsuperscript{630} Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 222.
\textsuperscript{631} SA, 8 August 2013; J, 26 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{632} Foreign Office note, 12 January 1963, TNA FO 371.173185 VS1015.3; Alex de Waal, ‘Draft strategy paper on providing aid for Sudan’, 13 April 1983, SAD.985/6/125; Nikkel, Dinka Christianity, p. 225; Mohammed Ahmed, Christian missionary activity in the three towns, p. 5. For similar changes in the Nuba Mountains, see Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 52.
organising arrivals in the late 1980s. The pressures of Khartoum’s political geography made these spaces more valuable. ‘International security’, as one man put it, was available in the Catholic Church-run Comboni Ground in the centre of Khartoum; various other denominations also provided space for cultural and teaching activities in the urban peripheries, and local communities established their own self-run church spaces in the suburbs.

A focus on “southern Christian conversion” also ignores the plurality of spiritual and social beliefs, and the frequent acceptance of Muslim converts in southern families and communities. Personal conversion to Islam was not necessarily contentious, even within families. Conversion ‘is like freedom to a person... for the people who convert themselves into Islam... they are not Arab.’ Most people divided Muslim converts in the community into those who ‘joined’ because of jobs, or because of belief. What are generally called “traditional beliefs” were apparently – in these retrospective accounts – less visible, and allegedly less popular, due to a combination of the urban context, formal education, and their anachronism to younger generations, and were generally talked about with a sense of embarrassment or comedy in interviews (if at all): yet many men and women reported the presence in Khartoum of, for instance, several Dinka spearmasters, a Shilluk royal healer in Fitihaab, a plethora of fortune tellers and witchdoctors, and the common experience of possession by spirits. Many of these people also attended church, as ‘we know that the spearmasters and the church leaders perform the same thing.’ Witchcraft and possession, as ever, reflected the stressors of society: witches created illnesses as a ‘matter of jealousy’,

---

635 AT, 8 August 2013; MAA, 11 August 2013; DCD, 15 July 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 13 April 2013; also see Taha, ‘Deeply Divided Societies: charting strategies of resistance’, p. 15.
636 Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 51.
637 JG, 19 July 2013.
638 AAD, 14 August 2013.
639 LLAA, 15 August 2013.
640 People were divided over whether jok (Dinka for spirits, roughly translated) travelled to Khartoum with the people, stayed in the south with the cattle, or were already in the north in translated forms. People were possessed in Khartoum by Garangdit, Makoldt, Machardit and Riny, which were either described as coming from the south or being the same jok as the northern jamaa. LCL, 13 July 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013.
641 AAY, 11 July 2013; MTL, 10 July 2013, chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; see also Parker, Children of the sun, p. 108.
particularly against other women’s children who were performing well at school.\textsuperscript{642} People often relied on traditional medicines and witchdoctors, including across ethnic lines, for medical care, particularly after attempting courses of antibiotics.\textsuperscript{643} One man explained that he was bewitched in 1985 while in Khartoum and fell ill with a mystery illness that could not be cured by modern or traditional medicine, probably because of his financial success as a bricklayer; he was cured eventually in 2000 by the Full Gospel Church, in which he became a pastor.\textsuperscript{644} As ever, though, this was not a society-wide phenomenon:

‘[Laughs] in Khartoum – [we] were internal [sic] displaced people by the war, and everybody was busy looking for where to get food, and you cannot stand and shiver yourself that you have a spirit! Then you will not get food! [Laughs]’\textsuperscript{645}

All this complicates the idea of a mass Christian conversion among southerners in Khartoum in this period. Church spaces were not straightforward sites for conversion and top down preaching, but were described as forums of debate, including inter-religious discussions.\textsuperscript{646} Aside from encouraging attendance and education, most men said that the international clergy ‘[didn’t] know’ about political activism in church spaces.\textsuperscript{647} Disputes with Catholic policies were frequent: the archbishop Gabriel Zubeir Wako walked a fine line, criticising the SPLA and attempting – controversially – to replace separate vernacular services with cross-community Arabic language programmes.\textsuperscript{648} Catholic church authorities were criticised by one literacy association for underrating and undermining community leadership skills.\textsuperscript{649} Similarly, nominally “tribal” organisations generally disguised a more complex system of local, regional and specific ethnic, clan and village affiliations: for example, for one man

---

\textsuperscript{642} AG, 13 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{643} AG, 13 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{644} MTL, 10 July 2013; see also a story recounted by Rodgers, ‘Report for Light and Hope for Sudan’, SAD.93/2/76; also the miraculous cure of PM, recounted in his own interview on 17 October 2013: ‘they said, “this man has demons in his life.”’
\textsuperscript{645} MDWR, 21 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{646} These religious debates had been notable at least since the 1950s; Rev. Parry, Annual letter, 1951, p.1, CMS; LLBK, 19 October 2013. See also Carla N. Daughtry, ‘Conflict and Community in Church-Based Refugee Havens in Cairo: The Quest for Space to Be Dinka’, The Arab Studies Journal, (2006), pp. 41–43.
\textsuperscript{647} SAK, 3 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{648} “How can Christian intellectuals contribute to the peace effort in the country?”, Comboniani 6734.21.1/8180-8186/674/27/4, p. 2-3; DCS, 11 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{649} DCS, 11 August 2013.
from Aweil, ‘we have unions; we have associations; we have societies… like myself, in Marial Bai [village area in Bahr el Ghazal], we have Ayat [Youth] Association,’ then the ‘Tueny Youth Charitable Society,’ then the Ayat Sons Areas Association’ as a subsection, with ‘most of Tueny area [living] in Arkawit, [in] Gereif West.’ Similar associations from across Sudan operated in the same space. Hai Baraka and Comboni Ground were apparently extremely busy on Sundays with a mix of people from ‘every south’, for dances, football and conversation. Continuing links to these ethnic associations’ regions created Khartoum echoes of ‘village’ events, such as counterpart funeral ceremonies for those dying in the south and vice versa.

Recalling Khartoum life in retrospect from Aweil, a few key groups came up repeatedly in conversation. Church groups were the most common for women and men: St Vincent de Paul, the Catholic social and benevolent organisation many people had connections to or relied on financially, was officially dissolved in 1994 but continued to operate informally, partly because there was nowhere else to rehouse the 150 homeless children it was looking after. Technically a prayer group and a cultural and mutual support church association, St Paul’s Community partly grew out of the decline of St Vincent de Paul, and was a church-based attempt to create a more pan-ethnic organisation, with sub-communities of Nuer, Shilluk and Dinka. There were many other versions of St Paul’s Community across Khartoum, and while there were tensions between churches - particularly with emerging new Pentecostals in the late 1990s. Most encouraged youth groups, drama associations, an “Olympics” for basketball and football between church clubs, and ceremonial parades at Christmas and Easter. More importantly for many, though, was the sprawling “ethnic association” of ‘Dinka Culture,’ Akut Jieng – a composite of various Catholic church-based aspects of what the church itself termed the Dinka Congregation, and which had Nuer and

---

651 ADA, 13 August 2013.
652 As noted by Miller, *Language change and national integration*, pp. 38–9.
654 SAK, 3 July 2013; APA, 21 July 2013.
Bari equivalents.\footnote{LLAA, 15 August 2013; JW, 18 October 2013.} The confusion of associations under this umbrella were summarised by one member:

‘The Dinka Congregation was divided into politicians, the Kuei Group [see Chapters 4 and 5], and Morwel Ater Morwel [see Chapter 4], and those of [the] Dinka language pattern, and there are also religious leaders, [all] within the Dinka Cultural Society.’\footnote{APA, 22 July 2013.}

Among this, an association called Dinka Leadership was established early in the 1980s, and became the “Dinka Cultural Society” around 1997.\footnote{APA, 21 July 2013; SAK, 3 July 2013.} The Dinka Cultural Society, another result of organisation and financial support through Catholic church space, was primarily focused on the development of the Dinka written language, encouraged by the introduction of a new orthography and Catholic funding of a re-translation of the bible into many southern languages from the early 1990s.\footnote{DKLK, 4 July 2013; DCS, 11 August 2013.} This educational focus was matched by non-church-based associations, such as the Equatoria Union and the Aweil Youth Union, the latter established during the period of Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government as an educational association; it was allowed to continue its activities legitimately under the Bashir regime due to support from government officials who were themselves from Aweil.\footnote{DCD, 12 August 2013 and 15 July 2013.} The Union included men, women and those not in education, as well as secondary school and university students, and it held parties as well as formal discussions.\footnote{AAD, 14 August 2013.}

All of these organisations placed specific emphasis on vernacular languages.\footnote{Feiden et al., Khartoum displaced assessment and recommendations, p. 23.} Language has always been a site of struggle in Sudan.\footnote{Sharkey, ‘Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan’, p. 36; Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 104; Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 243.} Supported by various Catholic foundations for education, such as SOLO and the Summer Institute for Linguistics, written literacy training was extended from 1994, growing from seven to over forty nine centres by 1997, with the top-performing candidate (and their county in the south) feted after competitive exams.\footnote{DCS, 11 August 2013.}
‘People... categorised themselves’ according to sources of funding, spaces, and connections, with the Shilluk teaching in Moguren in Khartoum, Nuer language schools being run by Catholic groups, and Zande often being taught via the Seventh Day Adventists.\textsuperscript{665} Even members of the Fur communities in Khartoum organised vernacular teaching, as well as smaller western and Nuba groups: ‘every different black tribe... including Funj themselves were there.’\textsuperscript{666} In 1992, Miller noted that the maintenance of vernacular languages and multilingualism, especially among young people born in urban areas, ‘cannot be explained by their rural origin’: ‘this relatively high percentage of Southerners learning and speaking other vernaculars seems to challenge the assumption of the recession of vernaculars.’\textsuperscript{667}

One teacher's explanation for the importance of vernacular education in this period demonstrates the complex ideas of the benefits of pan-southern, pan-black integration, while also maintaining self-knowledge of personal and political origins and emphasising a moral system that values blackness and racial integrity:

‘maybe the mother is not from Dinka; ...Shilluk learn Dinka and Dinka learn Shilluk and Shilluk learn Nuer, and Nuba even... – we want our children not to lose their culture; not to lose themselves; [otherwise later] they will forget, claiming that – I heard before that my grandfather is from Dinka but now I’m from [X]. There are those who are denying themselves! ...We don’t want a child to deny [their mother]! Because of economics, or because of poverty or because of being ashamed ...or [because] their colour is black.’\textsuperscript{668}

This work was not confined within “ethnic groups”, and was not the preserve of a few ‘educated’ or ‘traditional’ elites in the community. This final part of this chapter discusses those organising and participating in this community work, people who were explicitly “not lost” from their communities, and were engaged in articulating to others both the constitution of these communities, and how not to get lost from them. This focus on authorship and individual action in Khartoum is in line with the general search for agency in African history, which has lately focused on smaller and smaller “collectives” for study, down

\textsuperscript{665} APA, 21 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{666} Miller, \textit{Language change and national integration}, pp. 110–11; MMD, 17 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{667} Miller, \textit{Language change and national integration}, pp. 61, 69, 74.
\textsuperscript{668} DCS, 11 August 2013.
to the familial and individual.\textsuperscript{669} Primarily, this individualist focus has looked at the mostly male ‘professional ethnic spokespersons’ criticised roundly by Amit-Talai as ‘regular players in an on-going if somewhat inchoate circuit of public exercises in ethnic minority consultation and representation,’ where ‘reappearing faces, recurring names, [and] repeated motifs’ create a representational ‘circuit.’\textsuperscript{670} This is somewhat true of the heavily “representational” history of state-building in South Sudan: the decentralisation and extension of state authority since the 1920s has focused on the creation or assertion of representatives, particularly in an ethnic mould, and continues in the idea of chiefly (and, maybe only a little more broadly, “local civil society”) representation in national negotiations of the shape of the South Sudanese state today. Delineating “popular intellectuals” has been a long-running game in South Sudanese politics: the necessary qualifications, position, and values of this ‘educated Southerner’ have been locally debated throughout the last century.\textsuperscript{671} Recent scholarly attention on these “intermediaries” across eastern Africa has broadly looked at the brokerage powers of chiefs, clerks, police, interpreters, and guides, and one could add teachers, “students” of all stripes, and church workers – including altar boys, youth leaders and choir masters.\textsuperscript{672}

But in Khartoum, these local organisers were not generally focused on “representing” the south in the same way as the minority of southern political elites from the 1960s onwards. This is articulated most explicitly by a (potentially self-deluding, but still notable) comment by a student on a scholarship to Wisconsin:

‘...It is not my ambition to go as far the academic title of the doctor of Philosophy. This kind of degree tries to isolate you from the people where you can be effective. ...I must go back [to Sudan]. Everything is not in our own hands.’\textsuperscript{673}

\textsuperscript{669} For example, Brennan, \textit{Taifa}; James Leonard Giblin and Blandina Kaduma Giblin, \textit{A History of the Excluded: making family a refuge from state in twentieth-century Tanzania} (Ohio, 2005).


\textsuperscript{671} For example, Deng, ‘The dynamics of identification’, p. 18.


\textsuperscript{673} Zacharia Deng to Bishop Eduardo Mason, Stout State University, Wisconsin, 11 June 1971, Comboniani A/104/37/4/7.
These organisers were an alternative field of local intellectuals, those ‘who knew how to survive’ and who also prioritised internal community discussion on significantly less hierarchical and formal political grounds than the ostensible “southern leadership”, much like Brennan has recently argued of similar work in Dar es Salaam. These people were not necessarily delineated along professional, associational or educational lines, but had multiple connections. Civil servants, traders, daily labourers, tea ladies, and brick makers on the banks of the Nile were variously involved with political parties like USAP, church organisations, village courts and schools. As with earlier generations of migrants to Khartoum, people played a spectrum of roles, with the most active locals being concurrently students, teachers, political activists, court workers, gang members and poets. At least post-facto, there appeared to be little differentiation between “roles”: chiefs and bookwriters were ‘doing the same thing’. Some men held multiple roles as teachers, chief court attendants and church leaders; some teachers were ex-government officials, who privately wrote songs, books and poetry, often for church or ethnic association events.

There was, in effect, no real category of “students” in Khartoum, aside from those studying full-time at university level; many people were perpetual students, exploring self-taught study in parallel with daily labour and other roles.

This diversity of roles and activities emphasises the importance of Mbembé’s anti-generalisation of urban “proletarians”: Khartoum urban “IDPs” have been homogenised and gendered in academic and popular literature as predominantly-female abused slum labourers, sex workers or beer brewers, struggling with changing gender roles and Islamic

---

674 JW, 18 October 2013.
676 Examples include ADA, 13 August 2013; LLAA (15 August 2013) debated who “counted” as a “local leader”. For discussion of this migrant plurality, see Hamidou Dia, ‘From Field to Concept: The Example of Senegalese Multisited Villages’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 34:5 (2013), p. 580; for other examples, see Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 121.
677 For example, JG, DKLK, SAK, and LLBK.
678 DAA, 13 July 2013.
679 AAY, 11 July 2013; demonstrated by SAK’s authorial autobiography, printed in Magazine of Dinka Culture, p. 22.
680 DAA, 13 July 2013. ADA’s uncle, was in a political party, then became a teacher at a Comboni secondary school. One of the members of the highly political Dinka-language Akut Kuei song group worked as a language education coordinator - with Nuba and Nuer students - at a Comboni girl’s school from 1994: JAN, 8 September 2013.
681 For example, SA, 8 August 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 13 April 2013.
Many people, particularly women, had little time to engage with cultural and literary work, with some seeing writing groups as a male leisure activity. But many women emphasised the importance of learning vernacular languages and a critical political history of Sudan and their local areas, even if they did not involve themselves beyond teaching their children. By the late 1990s, community organisation was not only funded significantly from women’s earnings in Khartoum – particularly for child and adult education – but also included women as teachers. Sommers records that by 2005, 52 per cent of informal or self-run community school teachers were women, and this figure was roughly borne out through interviews with slightly more affluent women in Aweil and Juba who became teachers (as well as, in one case, a political candidate) in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many women were in retrospect extremely proud of their often dangerous work in Khartoum which put their children and relatives through school.

‘[Our] mothers... they struggle a lot. That’s where we get some intellectuals, graduates, students. ... I do appreciate the women, those who were in Khartoum. Because they achieve a goal – they have [taught] their children until some of them graduate... even my mother, she was working in that. I got my education through – because of that. ... my mother was arrested twice. [Once] she spent two months, the second [time] she spent six months in Omdurman Prison... That tested me, [so in 1998] I got a chance, that’s where I defected to SPLA.’

This was primarily a family project, with many women invested heavily in this political and cultural work, argued along and across gender lines. Women’s social (and sometimes formal) education was encouraged in songs and texts. One woman re-learnt how to articulate complex emotions in Dinka, and another woman remembers her mother singing Ngok Dinka songs from Abyei to her, and translating them into Arabic so she could

---

683 Sommers notes that seven per cent of formal schoolteachers employed by the state were women in 2005, but gives a far higher figure for women teachers in what he terms ‘informal’ education. Sommers, *Islands of Education*, pp. 71, 252. Many women teachers contributed to this study, including MI, SA, and AAD.
684 AND, 29 June 2013; also see ‘The situation of Sudanese women,’ SAD 306/7/105.
685 SA, 8 August 2013.
686 For example, the *Magazine of Dinka Culture*: Story Two, p. 4; Story 23, p. 12; Story 35, p. 19.
understand them fully. Another lady’s parents frequently made her ‘just pound’ the grain rather than taking it to the local mill, cook with wood ‘not charcoal,’ and told her how grain ‘should be hand cultivated, not by machine,’ all as efforts to teach her southern skills and preferences. Some men emphasised the “female intellectuals” in Khartoum society: ‘you know, this word of separation ... I [first] heard it from my mum: my mum, she is an intellectual, she is illiterate but she is intellectual.' This is a broader definition of intellectual than that employed by southern political elites and standard international understandings of literacy and education.

These highly active people did not necessarily intend to create an intellectual hierarchy in Khartoum. Their (avowed) egalitarian intentions are most obvious in the acknowledgements and introductions to textbooks and histories. Two books’ editors emphasised the accessibility of authorship: the conclusion to the book *The Dinka Customology of Marriage* states of its writers, ‘their highest level of study is this: twenty four people have read other languages plus Dinka, and ten people read only Dinka language... One person has reached high school level.’ The editor Achirin Nuoi Mou introduces the *Magazine of Dinka Culture* similarly:

> ‘The authors of this book do not know whether they are great writers, because many of them have just started writing and reading and like this, they have written many other books.’

The same book calls for new members to ‘join the group of your brothers, and we move forward, preaching the culture of reading and writing together.’ These cultural workers were not specifically aiming to become new authorities, but encouraged mutual participation in creative endeavours as “fellow readers.” There is evidence of Khartoum literary and cultural work beyond a tiny minority: Sommers (though broadly despondent about southern education in Khartoum as complicated, disorganised, and ‘infused with strains of political

687 AMJ, 16 July 2013; R, 3 September 2013.
688 AD, 5 June 2013.
689 SA, 8 August 2013.
691 *The Dinka Customology of Marriage*, p. 13.
692 *Magazine of Dinka Culture*, p. 3.
693 Ibid., p. 3.
and religious resistance’) notes an almost 1:3 ratio of teachers to students in “IDP informal schools” in 1993 reports, and reports an illiteracy rate of only around 60 per cent for southern displaced people in Khartoum in the early 2000s - roughly the same as northern Sudanese rates. Abu-Manga and Miller recorded twenty per cent of southerners speaking English in one shanty town in 1992. Many southerners spoke and understood a mix of vernaculars.

This hyper-activity was obviously not taken up by all residents of Khartoum’s peripheries, but specifically by those who had the energy, time, economic and intellectual resources to spend on making space and time for conversations, history-writing, arts, and cultural investment, Peterson’s cultural urban “work”. These ‘are the people who are the pioneer section,’ according to one man who was educated in Khartoum;

‘when you are exposed to education then you realise... your right. For [the] majority of people who were here [in Aweil], they were not knowing what is at home, and what is between north and south. But when they move [to Khartoum], that’s when you found key people, educated people, ... who are exposed.’

Like southern political elites, this was somewhat hereditary, circular, and inward-looking, with teachers training teachers, and some men holding multiple formally-titled positions on a multiplicity of ethnic and court committees. With this cultural work mainly produced in vernaculars, it would be easy to characterise these networks as closed and Khartoum-based ethnic circuits, a self-contained mutual audience of the wealthier and time-rich. For example, within the Dinka literature encountered in this study – which makes up the body of chapter four of this thesis – there is extensive cross-referencing: the writer and church worker Lino Alëu Angic Dut’s book *History* references a story on page thirty-seven of the civil servant and teacher Dut Anyak Dit’s *Book of Stories*, as well as directing the reader to a

---

695 Miller, *Language change and national integration*, p. 74.
697 RRL, 3 September 2013.
698 WMT, 17 August 2013.
699 Sommers reports that ‘most Southern Sudanese IDPs and IDP education officials had little or no knowledge of education taking place in southern Sudan or beyond.’ They had never heard of New Sudan Curriculum or SPLM Secretariat of Education. Sommers, *Islands of Education*, p. 241.
proverb taught in the community-produced Dinka-language Primary 4 textbook, citing a song by Akut Kuei ("The Eagle Group"), a popular Dinka-language song-writing duo. The *Magazine of Dinka Culture*, a church-produced photocopied pamphlet written by a group of self-taught residents of Mayo Mandela, contains Dinka proverbs also printed in the Dinka Primary 4 textbook. However, this is partly because of shared spaces for this work: Dinka Cultural Society members remember one compound holding five working translation groups, including the Luo, Dinka Rek, and Latuko teams. A member of the Dinka Cultural Society also noted that - from the mid-1990s into the 2000s – a prominent Dinka Rek poet and ex-civil servant chaired Rek dialect Bible translation work in the same office as the (Malwal-dialect-speaking) Cultural Society’s Dinka literacy textbook drafting programme, and that Joseph Modesto – a prominent Luo politician – ran a translation team in the same office space.

Major figures, such as the textbook and story writer and poet Dut Anyak Dit, the song group Akut Kuei, the pan-ethnic dance troupe Kuato, and the Bari singer General Paulino, were referenced by many people in Aweil and Juba, including illiterate men and women. Pan-ethnic dance groups boomed in the late 1990s, following in particular the example of Orupaap, a music group founded in 1987, and its offshoot Kuato, a prominent multi-ethnic dance, drama and song troupe founded by Stephen Ochalla and other musicians in around 1994. Kuato and Orupaap were some of the most cited organisations by both men and women of all ages and educational backgrounds throughout research. Kuato was explicitly “pan-Southern,” “African,” and “Sudanese,” including dances and songs from the Nuba Mountains, as per the broad debates over blackness, political southern-ness and inclusion in

---

701 *Magazine of Dinka Culture*, pp. 25, 22; Primary 4 Dinka Reader, p. 12.
702 DCS, 11 August 2013.
703 Ibid.
704 Kuato, as with many other music ‘groups’ in Khartoum, has a confused timeline; see Catherine Miller, ‘Juba Arabic as a way of expressing a Southern Identity in Khartoum’, *Contemporary Arabic Dialects* (2002), pp. 117–18; GP, 23 October 2013.
Khartoum at the time. Miller notes the language work within Kuato, where performers would translate and explain songs ‘from Nuer or from Anuak or from Zande,’ generally through southern regional Arabic.\textsuperscript{706} Ochalla explained that Kuato organised the “collection” of songs from older community members and family, and the boom in similar church-based dance and song groups in the mid-1990s meant he toured schools and churches as an advisor. Like local self-supporting schools, arts and literacy groups had a broad support base: one of the Akut Kuei artists cited the Abyei Youth Union and a group of university graduates and civil servants who provided financial backing, and referenced the singers Atak Deng Deng and Teresa Nyankol as supporters and artistic influences.\textsuperscript{707} The renowned Bari-origin singer General Paulino performed with other southern musicians at graduation ceremonies, ‘because it was the right place for them to pass the messages,’ and cited as influences Nuba, Nuer and Shilluk male and female performers, Akut Kuei, and the Wau-origin artist Emmanuel Kembe, who was forced to leave Khartoum in 1994 after performing his song “Shen-Shen” – about the day to day violence of life in Khartoum shanty towns – at a major Khartoum music festival.\textsuperscript{708}

This collaboration did not necessarily prioritise or strive for some kind of pan-southern integration. Many Dinka artists and writers use “Dinka” as a shorthand for “southern” as well as for the pan-southern Dinka collective, often emphasising pan-Dinka moral, linguistic and cultural strength while also referencing other southern groups and “black people” in general, sometimes all within the same paragraph or verse. The song group Akut Kuei are a good example of the complexity of this affiliation and focus: singing entirely in Dinka, their songs often focus on pan-Dinka unity and draw on community stories and sayings, but their content emphasises collaboration between “col Junub” (Dinka for southerners) and includes references to the Shilluk, Nuer, Nuba, and the Dor (Equatorians) as ‘Southerners with the same skin colour.’\textsuperscript{709} An Akut Kuei artist emphasised that ‘it was really very good’ when Nuer song groups began to translate and write in parallel with Akut Kuei songs in about 1998.\textsuperscript{710}

\textsuperscript{706} SO, 9 November 2013; Miller, ‘Juba Arabic’, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{707} JAN, 10 September 2013.
\textsuperscript{708} GP, 23 October 2013; ‘Emmanuel Kembe Profile’, The Sixty One (online publication, c. 2009).
\textsuperscript{709} Akut Kuei, Songbook; see chapter four for a full discussion of this work.
\textsuperscript{710} JAN, 10 September 2013.
There was a spectrum of collaboration which, to most participants, was not supposed to be ethnic and insular, but worked in (and emphasised the need for) federalism. As one Bari man commented:

'I attended several of the Dinka [events], whether they [were] Dinka Twic or Dinka Aweil, I attended! And I attended the people of Western Bahr el Ghazal having their cultural days, and they attended ours. ... We worked as a team... we had the same agenda which we were carrying out. ... The Dinka had better methods of passing information, [through] songs... the messages in the songs [-] the Dinkas [sic] are are very crafty when it comes to them. ... We need to create more activists within the ethnic groups, but they knew that they were all southerners, and that we were actually doing the same thing, except [in] different languages. But it was the same.'\(^{711}\)

These people, and their wider networks of supporters and financers, were attempting to formulate an audience both within and beyond their own personal sphere,\(^{712}\) potentially understandable as layers of audience, from the closest clan and regional-ethnic-linguistic market to more distant hoped-for forms of influence. This is thus both ethnic patriotism-configuring and asserting specifically pan- or clan Dinka ethnic codes and behaviour, particularly around women and family - and radical nationalism; the cultural and educational work itself involved a fundamental discussion over whether their messages could be broader than ethnic community, clan, and locality, and how broad they could and should be. All this work wove ethno-linguistic and regional specificities with broader ideas of overarching commonalities of politics and moral community. This complexity and confusion is partly because these projects were a working-out of these ideas, and partly because of a problem of vocabulary. These are Peterson and Macola’s “local historians”, who are speaking both to a specificity of knowledge, such as folk tales, local histories and dialect-specific shorthands, and trying to contextualise their ideas to a wider community. This content, and my discussions of this work during research, are the subject of chapter four.

\(^{711}\) JW, 18 October 2013.
\(^{712}\) See Peterson and Macola’s argument in *Recasting the past*, p. 8.
Conclusion

This community activism and creativity is a long way from the “reaction and resistance” narratives of South Sudanese nationalism. “Arabization and Islamization”, and its supposed output of a collective southern, African, Christian community formed in opposition, are probably too clumsy a shorthand to describe the experiences of violent impositions and alienation, the many kinds of loss, and the resulting ‘engineering of certainty’ – or options for certainty – among southern communities in Khartoum.\(^{713}\)

Resistance and resilience were more explained as a need to adapt and strengthen ways of living and thinking about life in Khartoum as they were about being “against” any oppositional force. The creative ‘bricolage’ of southern associational, organisational and managerial practices, as a response to the primarily internal stresses of Khartoum living, was run by people who drew on racial and political registers from, and beyond, the ethnic and national.\(^{714}\) This Khartoum context demonstrated that people could simultaneously be Peterson’s ethnic patriots and iconoclastic nationalists.\(^ {715}\)

While heterogeneous, fuzzy and often somewhat contradictory, the fundamental multiplicity of affiliations demonstrated in this community work emphasised the popular idea of a black political community structured on multiple layered familial, regional and (here Dinka-centric) ethnic lines – arguably, on forms of moral confederation. This work contained a confusion of arguments about the structure, content and relationships among Sudanese communities as a potential political unit, what this thesis terms a debate over the nature and intent of southern and/or Sudanese political community. These arguments are the focus of chapter four.

\(^{713}\) Mbembé and Nuttall, ‘Writing the world from an African metropolis’, p. 361.


\(^{715}\) Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival*. 
Chapter four

This chapter examines the content of the literary and cultural circuit invented and managed by the diverse southern communities in Khartoum. These men and women produced texts, songs, dances, histories and poetry, as part of their attempt to articulate ideas of community and commonality, the values, knowledge and actions needed to be part of these collectives, and challenged readers and listeners to define themselves. Many of the authors of these pamphlets, school readers, plays and songs did not demand that their readers subscribe to their particular worldview, but instead emphasised the importance of political self-consciousness and critical engagement. Those who failed to participate in this self-education project were told: ‘know that you’re colonised now.’

The surviving documents collected for this research evidence this plural debate, which gave moral content and force to multiple, and not necessarily incompatible, ideas of affiliation. The horizontality and mutuality among overlapping racial, regional and ethnic identifications demonstrated in this body of cultural work is what many people described as “brotherhood”, and what this study describes as moral federalism. This work is part of a broader pattern of extensive archiving, ethnographic and historical research, writing and commentary produced by and within African communities, particularly in the vernacular, in the twentieth century. This material was part of the construction of what James calls minimum common moral ground: the basis for codes of action and mutual reliance ‘from which a people, as individuals or a collectivity, judge their own predicament, their own condition, themselves as persons.

After laying out the material encountered, recorded and translated for this study, and their histories, interpretations and methodological challenges, this chapter looks at the ways in which the political and academic community have interpreted this work: these activities were themselves couched in “cultural” terms, as expressions of “cultural maintenance” - as

716 The Dinka Customology of Marriage, Section 6.
717 James, The listening ebony, p. 149.
discussed in chapter three - and their cultural, contextual, ruralised mode of explanation and terms of reference have encouraged their interpretation as apolitical, ethnic, parochial and anti-urban. This chapter instead argues that this “ethnic cultural” mode of expression was a convenient and practical idiom for implicitly political and intellectual projects.

This broader view is then demonstrated through an examination of these works’ content, their complex layers of identification and mutuality beyond their often specific ethnic and local references: although this chapter draws on a snapshot of mostly Dinka-authored work, it highlights competing political philosophies and ideas of the future. The political community these texts detail is not coherent, but evidences a discussion over the shape and extent of a plural horizontal South Sudanese community, beyond Lonsdale’s horizontal moral communities of tribes, towards a federation of “black brothers.” This emphasis on the common political, historical and cultural experience of peripheral Sudan was the explication, for some people, of Garang's nebulous idea of “New Sudan”.

**Personal archiving**

Men and women in South Sudan showed me hand-written, photographed, printed, taped, and re-typed personal archives, recorded and sometimes published products of social organisation from Khartoum which they had brought back to South Sudan. The proximity and intensity of urban life enabled this personal organisation, more than any other context, as frustrated informants emphasised in rural interviews: ‘we were really very organised people when we were there [in Khartoum].’ Many people, including illiterate women, were frustrated by how little they could now produce – photograph albums, diaries, books and tapes were lost in transit; TVs were redundant without electricity in the south, video tapes were unplayable or destroyed by heat. Interviews often involved references to photograph collections, history textbooks, remembered documents, songs, speeches and cassette tapes.

---

718 For a full discussion of the history of the idea of New Sudan within the SPLA/M, see Rolandsen, *Guerrilla government*, pp. 118–122.

719 Dia also observed this in Senegal: ‘From Field to Concept’, p. 574.

720 JG, 30 June 2013.
sometimes to the point of comedy: one man, in response to a question, went to look up his personal history in the “authors” section of a book he had edited in the early 2000s. Some of these references to a wider body of community-produced text appear aspirational rather than material, but there is evidence of this wider literary and cultural work, particularly from Nikkel, who recorded the growth of song and poem composition and book-writing, primarily about southern Sudan and not focused on Christian imagery, among “youths” as well as young clergy in the 1980s and 1990s, and the publishing and re-publishing of personal and edited collections of popular songs, as well as the songs’ oral circulation in southern bars. People’s personal archives in South Sudan remain substantial, as Stephen Ochalla said of his work with Kuato: ‘I’m doing [an] archive, everything we tape it [sic]. Videos, and photographs, and writing down – everything. Rehearsals, workshops, shows, invitations, meetings – I even have newspapers!’

This chapter focuses specifically on the snapshots of songs, essays, histories and poems encountered as texts in Aweil and Juba, supplemented by translations of songs recorded during research. Although I heard of many more books, songs and educational handbooks, and saw many Nuer, Dinka, Bari and Arabic hand-printed versions and cassette tapes on sale in markets in Aweil, Wau and Juba, I focused on finding work explicitly referenced or written by informants, only eight of which I have had translated in full for this study. These texts and songs use primarily written Dinka, as well as blended Khartoum and Juba Arabic, a mix still used by returned Khartoum residents in the south today. I focused on those most referenced during research, including by illiterate men and women, specifically the works of Dut Anyak Dit, Morwel Ater Morwel, Akut Kuei, Kuato, General Paulino Mesaka, and Lino Alëu Angic Dut’s book History, which is popularly referred to as “the debt book”, as

---

721 SAK, 3 July 2013; also see Coben’s discussion of Gramsci’s ideas of ‘cultural journalism’, Radical Heroes, p. 23.
722 Miller, Language change and national integration, pp. 74, 79; Nikkel, Dinka Christianity, pp. 271, 276–7; Nikkel transcribes a song in full, p. 277.
723 Nikkel, Dinka Christianity, pp. 297, 300. One popular 1970s song by a mechanic, Jacob Jot, is quoted by Nikkel, p. 302: ‘We were nearly lost in the wilderness / we had disappeared far away. / ... / We had vanished in a bad place. / No temptation will have victory over us.’
724 SO, 9 November 2013; renewed civil conflicts in December 2013 meant this study has not had access to the text of Al Hosh, which SO has at home in Pibor.
725 See the bibliography for a full list of texts, authors, publishing details and translators.
its focus is on ‘compensation’ for ‘our debts from Arabs.’

I was given the 2005 edition, which was published as a pamphlet and whose credits note Dinka teachers as proof readers and financial supporters. Lino Alëu, Dut Anyak and Morwel Ater were named throughout research as influential Dinka writers, historians and teachers in Khartoum, and I thus tried to trace them; Dut Anyak provided me the hand-written versions of nineteen of his poems composed since the early 1990s in Khartoum, which he was transcribing and translating into English himself, from his own notes and from some photocopied pamphlets. One of the two singer-songwriters who made up the well-known song group Akut Kuei (“The Eagle Group”) provided me with a printed song book with twenty-four typed song lyrics spanning songs produced from 1992 to 1997. It was transcribed and written into Dinka by Lino Alëu in November 2003 as a “trial edition”, with support from the Khartoum Workshop Programme, and the pamphlet is copyrighted to the Dinka Cultural Society Committee.

Several teachers, members of the Dinka Cultural Society, catechists and part-time students provided me with various copies of books, or short bibliographies of texts they recommended that I trace. A resident of Mandela neighbourhood provided copies of three texts: The Dinka Customology of Marriage, printed by the Sudan Open Learning Organisation (SOLO), a Sudanese national NGO focusing on literacy – who printed many of these texts as basic photocopied pamphlets with a soft card cover – and which was written as a “trial edition” by the Mayo Mandela Dinka Rek Group, made up of teachers from a Mayo Mandela school, established in 2000. It was published in 2000, and reprinted again in 2001, both times for a local Khartoum audience. The same group then wrote the pamphlet Dinka Displacement to northern Sudan and other stories in October 2003, assisted by the International Extension College and SOLO. By 2004, the Dinka Mayo Mandela group had expanded and published the Magazine of Dinka Culture – in Dinka, titled “Reading” (Kuën) – with short passages from a variety of authors drawn from a wider consortium of reading and writing groups, based in markets and churches across Khartoum.
These pamphlets, song and poetry collections were longer and fuller examples of the broader collection of cultural and educational literature, including individual leaflets and reference materials, songs and poems, sourced during research. This wider collection includes the Dinka-language Primary 4 Reader, a vernacular school text produced on a photocopier and cut from various sources; a variety of Dinka and Equatorian-origin song lyrics written and sung in Khartoum, including song lyrics written by southern university students in support of the SPLA and other northern and Nuba rebellions; notes of plays, photograph collections, comedy group programmes and tape recordings of other songs.

These songs, short books and poems recorded and translated for this chapter were part of a miscellanea of photograph collections, documents, membership cards, work and training certificates that made up the material references of interviews in South Sudan. Comparisons between text and song cultures were constrained by the vagaries of research in South Sudan: the political environment and geography of “returnees” from Khartoum restricted research access to predominantly Dinka areas, the renewed conflict in December 2013 stopped travel to other regions, and this chapter’s work was dependent on the availability of surviving documents – often photocopied on cheap paper and bound in cardboard – in markets and personal collections.\footnote{Public recordings of some of the songs mentioned here be found on YouTube and on community websites, although it is hard to know their provenance and so they are not linked here. Some songs’ lyrics match exactly with the 1990s and 2000s transcribed versions used here, and others have been altered, or follow different patterns of chorus and verse.}

\textit{Latueng Cieeng Monyjang} (Dinka Cultural Development), Khartoum; JKA from the group of Choir, St Kizito; VWA from the group of Writers and Readers of Mandela; and AAR from the Group of Writers in Mayo Mandela.
Figure 6: Street sales of locally-produced Dinka and Arabic-language pamphlets Haj Yousif, c. early 2000s. Photographed by Angelina, and reproduced with permission.
This written and oral literature circuit expanded in the intense activity of the early 1990s, but continued to draw on older texts, not least the vernacular language textbooks of the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) and other churches since the 1970s. The texts produced in typed print by the mid- to late-1990s were cheaply photocopied and stapled with cardboard covers, and many show signs of being cut together from previous print-outs; the lists of versions in the frontispieces of some pamphlets reinforce this. This self-publishing apparently became very popular by the early 2000s, with the growing availability of computers and printers. Several introductions in the texts collected during research emphasise the importance of the illustrations drawn by contributors, which are often comedic or dramatic, and are photocopied into the text alongside photographs cut from human rights reports or news articles on the civil war. These were composite works, for a demi-literate but articulate audience.

These composite works are on-going; people emphasised they would re-edit, re-record and re-publish if they could find the funds in South Sudan. *The Dinka Customology of Marriage’s* introduction states: ‘[This] book is selected out of books which are written by the Rek Dinka who are living in Mayo Mandela; it is written so that other books will be written too.’ The songs and poems recorded here were written down as pamphlets, or copied out by their authors, as part of a process of clarification, editing and improvement that is still continuing today. This chapter finds no methodological resolution to this, but instead understands the translation and transcription process for this thesis as part of this on-going work: the translations of Dut Anyak Dit’s writings and Akut Kuei’s songs are currently being debated by the Dinka Cultural Society now re-formed in Aweil, with continuing disputes over translation of specific words.

This fluid editing is most obvious in songs, for many academics a still-dubious mutational source. Songs were the most common reference point in working people’s accounts of their political awakenings, as catchy and emotive shorthands; but their provenance is often

---

730 The Summer Institute of Linguistics is a Christian NGO focused on minority language support and documentation.
731 *The Dinka Customology of Marriage*, p. 2.
hard to mark out. For example, although I met one of the two singer-songwriters who together created Akut Kuei, a Dinka-language political song group, who provided me with a photocopied booklet of collected song lyrics he helped to edit in Khartoum in 2002, I heard many, very slightly differing, versions of the same songs – and of other Akut Kuei songs not recorded in the booklet – including versions sung by the Akut Kuei singers themselves. And although Akut Kuei was made up of two men working primarily between 1992 and 1997, it was more commonly and variously described by other informants as being a large group of artists, or a general phenomenon of political singer-songwriters, or a “political party”: some young men described their attempts to become the “next generation” of Akut Kuei in Khartoum, by performing versions of Akut Kuei songs as well as their own new compositions.

“Traditional ethnic culture” as political action

These physical texts that survived return to South Sudan were part of a wider pantheon of note-taking and record-keeping in pace with (and – for many – summarising) far wider discussions. “Cultural” work has long been a useful form of political activism, with literacy and its uses embedded in “freedom fighting” in, for example, East Timor, Nepal, and South Africa.733

‘it was mostly, cultural, but then of course always politics would come up. You know, when news came what was happening in the south here, you know, the fight, the war – ...the suffering, the hunger, and so on. It would always, almost always turn into something political.’734

734 AT, 16 October 2013.
This carried real risk. Sommers found when trying to give out previous reports on education in 2005. One court worker, and now teacher, remembered newspapers holding printouts of international news about Sudan as “carton news” at the Khartoum Monitor office, stored in a box to be read on the premises only and shared by word of mouth.

Work in vernacular languages thus used the relatively apolitical space of “ethnic culture” as well as funding available for linguistic and cultural “tradition”, such as from UNESCO or the Catholic Church. This de-politicisation was helped by common prejudices against this type of vernacular “ethnic” work as backwards, unintellectual and therefore unthreatening. Vernaculars provided privacy and a useful ambiguity which offered a degree of security for its speakers in Khartoum, such as the Equatorian singer General Paulino’s songs in a mix of Bari and highly allegorical and abbreviated Juba Arabic. Miller and Abu-Manga record a Nuba girl explaining that the vernacular offers ‘a secret language,’ even while under public organising laws it was only permitted to sing in Arabic. Unlike some forms of cultural work, these Khartoum projects were not attempts to claim public or state rights or recognition, but were for creating a field of action within which to argue about power, liberation and the future.

This publishing and archiving, even if – as one foreword noted – ‘they have written these books without hope that they would continue,’ was an attempt at laying out and giving substance and definition to histories, debates and community changes, much like Watson’s idea of ‘acts of persistence.’ Dinka Cultural Society members noted that before the mid-1990s,

---

736 Sommers, *Islands of Education*, p. 32; personal accounts were also given by JGRN, 28 June 2013; NB, 18 October 2013.
737 DKLK, 4 July 2013.
740 *Magazine of Dinka Culture*, p. 3; Watson, “‘Good Will Come of This Evil’”, p. 70.
'no one started to develop the history... about how people [came] to Khartoum. Because people were [afraid]... That is why we did not think deeply of writing the history of how people have been displaced. So these people were brave [enough] to write [books back then], [but] I think they did not produce it publicly. [Laughs]'

This literary work is often noted by Sudan researchers, if not well studied. For Vezzadini, ‘uneducated political activists’ acting in or commenting on Sudanese national politics and history have had ‘very few channels to express their own views of the past’; at least on English- and Arabic-language national platforms. Vernacular community work – particularly Dinka songs – has broadly been studied either as social ethnographic evidence, such as the work of Francis Deng, or as general local comment on war and state crisis. As such, these texts, associations and songs sometimes appear to present a relatively straightforward patriarchal ethnic nationalism, policing and judging women, and eulogising broad-brush ideas of lost community lands, Christian and ethnic pride. These standard lines of academic interest also generally misrepresent these artistic endeavours as either war- or state-focused broad political or social critiques: the majority of songs written and performed in Khartoum, for instance, were about love.

As such, more recent academic literature has increasingly understood this political literacy organisation along two main lines: firstly, particularly for displaced people and in urban areas, as a means of maintaining primarily ethnicised, ruralised ideas of “return home”, and secondly and more broadly, as an act of (proto-)nationalist “resistance,” with teaching as “fighting” against both urban cultures and state impositions. These analyses are broadly

---

741 DCS, 11 August 2013.
742 Miller et al., Arabic in the city, p. 23.
743 Vezzadini, ‘Spies, Secrets, and a Story Waiting to Be (Re)Told’, p. 65.
746 This idea fits with the standard analysis of Arabization and Islamization: see Chapter 3.
standard in Sudanese scholarship on urban migration,\textsuperscript{747} and fit in with humanitarian summaries of people’s work in Khartoum for ‘eventual reintegration,’ as one IDP assessment put it in 1990, as well as with later planning for return and resettlement post-CPA.\textsuperscript{748} Going back was a common idea in Khartoum: 'some people [at] that time [talked] of the special time, that maybe [the] time to come south will one day become good [sic].'\textsuperscript{749} However, with constant doubts over the future of the war and the possibilities of eventual return, particularly as families settled and grew in Khartoum, in practice this idea of preparing next generations for return focused more on providing regional, local, and ethnic “traditional” information, to make southern landscapes and livelihoods familiar to children. Sommers’ 2005 study noted the editing of standard textbooks to reflect regional grains and animals, substituting pictures of cows instead of camels.\textsuperscript{750} This is evidenced in the detailed illustrations and photographs printed in books, and in interviews with teachers about their classroom work: ‘I draw the cows, sometimes, with the bulls in [the] cattle camp, and how the cattle are arranged in the cattle camp, and the containers that people are using for milking, so I just draw everything.'\textsuperscript{751}

With “return” as a logic for these projects, this community work is then described as ‘education as resistance.'\textsuperscript{752} Sommers records an ‘IDP school administrator’ saying: “In Khartoum, people don’t fight with guns. People fight with minds.”\textsuperscript{753} But, as most donor-funded reports on Khartoum focus on structured primary and child education, these researchers predominantly look at local curriculums and formal Christian educational texts, such as the vernacular “Readers” sponsored by the Catholic church in Khartoum.\textsuperscript{754} This

---

\textsuperscript{747} For a summary of this literature, see Leonardi, \textit{Dealing with government in South Sudan}, pp. 5–7.
\textsuperscript{748} Feiden et al., \textit{Khartoum displaced assessment and recommendations}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{749} AT, 8 June 2013; also AAD, 14 August 2013, and many other accounts.
\textsuperscript{750} Sommers, \textit{Islands of Education}, p. 247; as explained by DKLK, 4 July 2013 and 21 August 2013; WMT, 18 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{751} MMD, 17 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{753} Sommers, \textit{Islands of Education}, p. 243.
\textsuperscript{754} Breidlid, ‘Sudanese Images of the Other’, p. 564; Sommers, \textit{Islands of Education}. 
focus on relatively formal educational programmes that were often inspected and interfered with by the Khartoum state tends to close down the space for ‘IDP’s expression of political and religious resistance’ to ‘limited revisions of the state curriculum, which they are forced to use,’ and to an idea of “southern resistance” specifically against the state and their ‘Islamic influences.’ Islamic passages were often replaced with Bible verses or sermons, such as in the Dinka Primary 4 Reader, which has a visibly inserted section comparing the Dinka and Christian genesis stories and an endorsement of further Bible study. But this focus on formal child education, as a reaction to displacement from a rural and ethnic “home” and against Arab-Islamic state impositions, is too narrow. While “future return and present-day resistance” is a convenient shorthand explanation for both Khartoum teachers and humanitarian reportage, it glosses a far broader understanding of these complex projects.

This does not necessarily make these texts works of pure ethnic nationalism. The dominant language of these texts is “ethnic” because of the use of vernaculars to describe common historical experience: their authors often use idioms as generalisable, often-ambiguous demonstrations of common knowledge, and as a means of euphemising, variously, political critique, direct threats to the regime or information about the war, for example: “the eagles have landed on the road,” or “the doctor is coming with his medicine.”

A more historical approach situates this work within longer-term southern understandings of urban contexts and the benefits of education. Leonardi’s recent work emphasises the perceived lack of knowledge, whether in terms of southerners needing more knowledge and education to catch up with their “elder brothers” in the north, or in terms of the enduring claim that politicians practised cunning and trickery. The belief that ordinary people could easily be “tricked” by the educated and town people was an expression of vulnerability in the politics of knowledge, as well as a moral criticism.

---

757 For example, see Miller et al., Arabic in the city, p. 21.
758 Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 135.
This is still a common idea, and many teachers were proud of their efforts in Khartoum to spread the ability to – as Leonardi says – ‘mediate the line between threat and guarantee’ of state power,\textsuperscript{759} and provide the basis for future southern-led governance.\textsuperscript{760} But also – maybe more emphatically – these writers and teachers intended to promote a very specific type of education against this trickery, rather than teach a westernised education or promote specifically “ethnic traditional” values. All the texts and songs encountered in research explicitly criticised those whom Leonardi calls ‘modern, urban intellectuals’: the men who presented themselves as superior to “tribal” things, who called Garang a “savage”, or who criticised the continuing war. These men were criticised in turn as being ultimately uneducated – despite their university degrees – and focused on “eating.”\textsuperscript{761} This vocabulary is directly referent to broader discourses of eating and the politics of the belly in African political discourse, with this language of eating resources, power, and social futures meshed here with the Dinka taboo against selling cows for food.\textsuperscript{762} “Eating” is a common metaphor across this Khartoum literature, for example in Akut Kuei’s songs \textit{Anyoot yic} (“It has not started yet”), and \textit{Abuk jal ting, ku abuk jal ting} (“We shall see – we’ll see”) – which includes the lines

\begin{quote}
Now that we are like the ticks on the cows  
The tick that sucks at the cow  
Now that we are like the fly on the meat  
...
It is food that is killing us,  
It is eating that we are fighting.  
We were made to fight  
And you agree to go and fight with your brother  
Just because of food  
...
Do not sell your right because of food –  
Don’t sell your land for food,  
Don’t waste your lives for food.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{759} Ibid., p. 207.  
\textsuperscript{760} Five teachers voiced their pride in having taught members of the SPLM elite, South Sudanese civil service, and SPLA officers.  
\textsuperscript{761} Leonardi, \textit{Dealing with government in South Sudan}, p. 148.  
\textsuperscript{762} Most notably, Bayart, \textit{The State in Africa}.  

177
These people were thus acting as Feierman’s “peasant” or Gramsci’s “organic” intellectuals, situating themselves in between these superior urban self-titled “intellectuals” and their parochial, hide-bound counterparts in the village: they aimed to foster a form of critical thought that both consciously resisted the standard intellectual hegemonies in Khartoum, and promoted the (clandestine) intra-communal discussion of alternatives. 763 Their texts argue for a critical self-awareness based on rewritten community histories, aiming to promote an understanding of the individual and communal place of southern people in Sudanese political and historical context. These cultural activists were thus indirectly disproving Scott’s claim ‘that subalterns always perceive clearly the reality of elite domination.’ 764 They argued instead that this understanding required work.

The content of this education, and the type of knowledge taught, would need to stop someone from being fooled – in the common language of these texts and songs, being “blind.” 765 This is demonstrated, interestingly, by Sommers’ observation that state textbooks at grade five and above were not altered, because by that stage of education – as a headmaster stated in Aweil – the students ‘know the situation,’ and should be able to criticised the textbook’s epistemology themselves. 766 This literary community were arguing for a ‘real education’ based on intra-community dialogue and a critical factual basis for self-knowledge in context: ‘when you see yourself, you can find that you are already marginalized.’ 767

Thus a theme of all of this work was the preservation of internal integrity, a personal inner “front”, and a core of social and moral responsibility and understanding, expressed through variously-translated ideas of “the right”, “knowledge”, “respect” and “heart.” This was not necessarily self-definition against a set “other”: this literature was concerned with critiquing

763 See Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals.
764 Summarised by Fletcher; see Fletcher’s problematisation of ‘resistance studies’, Beyond resistance, p. viii; Scott, Weapons of the weak.
765 For example, Dut Anyak’s poem Panda (“Our Country”):
The blind man can now see
Days are not the same, the blind man is throwing away his walking stick
And Akut Kuei’s song Jieng ameen wuot (“Everyone hates the Dinka”).
767 DAA, 13 July 2013; APA, 22 July 2013.
a growing individualism and the need for personal control in the pressures of the Khartoum economy and geography. This was based on the common fear of “getting lost”, including in the day to day demands and opportunities of individualising city life. These texts and stories are punctuated by demands for self-awareness and factual knowledge, and their direct questions to their audience – as actual quiz “tests” or as rhetoric – tried to set the terms and content of this self-awareness.

These moral messages were lodged in “factual” histories and emotive songs and poetry. These were not specifically “ethnic projects”, but were aimed at re-framing and challenging the standard hegemonic order of Sudanese “national history”, re-casting what was “national” and re-constituting the boundaries of “community history.” Their often contradictory or ambiguous language about the linguistic, local, regional, racial and political lines and layers of community inclusion were arguments about the parameters of alternative political collectives.

This literacy and educational work was not designed to be comfortable or positive. Watson, writing of African American slavery and post-redemption literacy work, emphasised the ‘ambivalence’ of literacy, as a means both of self-determination as well as ‘indoctrination [and] disillusionment’; she notes that literacy brought alienation, dissatisfaction and frustration. Watson, “Good Will Come of This Evil”, p. 68. One chapter of Lino Alëu’s History is titled “My heart burns with sadness throughout the day and night”, and Dut Anyak writes

We hear the old words
We know they repeat themselves
And they hurt in our hearts when we think on them.

Akut Kuei’s song Rinydan Junub (“This southern generation”) says ‘being always annoyed makes you a man,’ and their song Ke Col Ater Cie Ke Yeku Puol Yok Muonyjang (“The Dinka don’t give up the fight”) includes the lines

---

768 Watson, “Good Will Come of This Evil”, p. 68.
769 Dut Anyak Dit, Diet e muoc (“Bravery songs”), written c. August 2004, Khartoum; the song’s translator noted that this pain is meant to act as encouragement.
It is paining me, it is paining me if I think of all this destruction
I don’t sleep
I wish I could divide my heart
To divide it amongst all the people
It pains my heart,
I wish I could divide it among all the southerners.\textsuperscript{770}

General Paulino’s song \textit{Nan Be Kolo Jongo} ("I am crazy") contains a similar lament,

\begin{center}
\begin{verbatim}
I became crazy from being lonely
I am tired of staying alone,
No one to comfort me or even to heal my wounds,
The wounds inside me, do you remember me?\textsuperscript{771}
\end{verbatim}
\end{center}

Community-run literary and artistic education was difficult and emotionally draining work: the texts, poems and songs drawn on for this chapter all directly address the history of pain and loss of their audiences, and explicitly demand emotional and intellectual self-reflection and response. The rest of this chapter will focus on the content and aims of this work Freire calls ‘conscientization,’ as an attempt to create mutual and critical self-awareness.\textsuperscript{772}

Compared to formal child education and literacy programmes, these writers held a very different understanding of “basic skills.”

\textbf{Recruitment to political consciousness}

These texts primarily emphasise the importance not of a broad westernised liberal schooling but a comprehensive and critical worldview.\textsuperscript{773} This was explicitly anti-hegemonic historical work, challenging the narratives put forward by the state. History was already a contentious field in formal education in Sudan, with state textbooks ending in 1956 and focusing on the

\textsuperscript{770} Written c. 1994-5, Khartoum.
\textsuperscript{771} Written in the early 2000s, Khartoum. Translated by Melanie Itto.
\textsuperscript{772} Paulo Freire, \textit{Literacy: reading the word & the world} (London, 1987).
\textsuperscript{773} Primary 4 Reader; also SAK, “Equality”, in \textit{Magazine of Dinka Culture}, p. 10: ‘If one wants to be the only educated one, and others with whom they are sharing the country are not educated, then there will be no peace.’
Arabian Peninsula and Islamic history. People were well aware of the selective editing of these books:

'We were bringing [the Comboni priests] the textbooks and saying the explanation here is [doubtful]. ... we doubt the textbook, because some explanations were forgeried [sic] – the history is not telling the real thing. ... Like the coming of Arabs they write to be the coming of people. ... Some realities which have been forgeried from the Sudan history, we used to correct them.'\(^{774}\)

Teaching and writing history was, after 1992, a position apparently reserved in state schools for Muslims only, and so was considered a dangerous profession.\(^{775}\) One Dinka man remembered his Fajulu and Latuka history teachers, who taught ‘the book [but] added some things’ – about the Abboud regime closing off the south, the expulsion of missionaries in 1964, and the ‘assassination’ of the southern Sudanese Communist politician Joseph Garang in 1971. The Latuka-origin teacher was, apparently, arrested four times, ‘because he’s a politician.’\(^{776}\)

The majority of these texts and songs focus on old regional histories, writing southerners into a longer history of Sudan, or recording their own subaltern history of the civil wars. This history writing was so important that a research methodologies section is included in the Dinka Primary 4 Reader.\(^{777}\) The Reader details a history of the Nubian kingdom, Merowe, Greek migration and the gradual arrival of Christianity,\(^{778}\) but emphasises that:

The history of the people who have lived in your land where there are black people - we do not know it. There are no records in the books, but we have them on rocks and caves. ... The stories of our grandparents are of a few years past. Which means we have only discovered the history of the people who stayed at the riverside where Khartoum is now. ... There are no records, we do not have remains, the words they spoke orally are not from long ago and they are unclear.\(^{779}\)

\(^{774}\) DKLK, 21 August 2013.
\(^{776}\) DKLK, 4 July 2013 and 21 August 2013.
\(^{777}\) Primary 4 Reader, p. 7.
\(^{778}\) Ibid., p. 9
\(^{779}\) Ibid., pp. 8, 10.
The book *Dinka Displacement to the northern Sudan* begins with a history of the Northern Bahr el Ghazal famine, with the opening sentence, ‘what took them away from their country?’ It then details the start of the famine in 1985, what people were forced to eat, including plant names, and the route through Meiram, when events were so terrible that ‘a person who died on the road can be overlooked.’ This was so that children could know ‘how you came to northern Sudan,’ and so that others would ‘[not] forget all the past and present events.’

These history books had, therefore, very different foci and timelines - both to national history textbooks, and also in comparison to southern elite histories of the “1983-2005” war. Teachers emphasised this alternative history as a fundamental part of their curriculum: ‘these were the things we taught in the school, and these were also the things that made us sad.’ Lino Alëu’s book *History* listed the presidents and prime ministers of Sudan and then stated: ‘all these presidents had oppressed black people and sold them.’ His history of (specifically) South Sudan starts by writing ‘every black [sic]’ into the struggle for independence in 1956, and includes the Closed Districts order controlling southerners’ movements, a short mention of the 1947 Juba Conference, details of the southern regional administration in the 1970s, and a section on the Babanusa and Daein massacres. Texts and songs also referenced international texts, such as Lino Alëu’s reprinted first person accounts of atrocities collated by an international human rights organisation (probably Human Rights Watch), as well as popular sustained metaphors from SPLA propaganda - such as “needles” for AK47s in one Akut Kuei song - and traditional songs and stories, such as Dut Anyak’s shorthand reference to an Aweil-area Dinka war song.

---

780 *Dinka Displacement*, Section 1.
781 APA, 22 July 2013.
782 Lino Alëu, *History*, pp. 16-17, 23. Howell also noticed ‘text-books of unusual influence’ in secret circulation in Khartoum, such as TR Batten’s series Tropical Africa in World History, in 1978; ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 112.
Songs included references to a continuous history of slavery, and many of the books found in Aweil included photocopied images of atrocities, such as the Primary 4 Reader’s back page image of shackled men, and Lino Alëu’s *History* including a picture titled ‘abducted children’, and one of men with amputated hands.\textsuperscript{784} There was significant power in articulating experiences of forced labour, mass violence and abductions in villages in the south, and labour exploitation in Khartoum specifically as slavery. Lino Alëu’s *History* emphasises the continuities of slavery as a common experience for, broadly, Dinka people, southern people, and black people in the Sudan since the 1800s to the present day, and notes international authority on this:

> The Human Rights Watch has conveyed the message to Dinka youth, women and children that many people have been abducted by Baggara and categorized them into two:
> - groups of men and women to work on their farms as slaves
> - groups of other young men and children to take care of their cattle as slave shepherds.\textsuperscript{785}

Even if this was recent or lived history for its “students”, as some of the members of Dinka Cultural Society said, ‘you want somebody to remind you,’\textsuperscript{786} and to put individual or relatively distant experience into a broader historical narrative, as one young woman who was born in Khartoum said: ‘we realised it was colonial – because we were slaves to the Jur, to Arabs.’\textsuperscript{787}

\textsuperscript{784} Lino Alëu, *History*, pp. 32, 27; Dut Anyak Dit, *Wek caa bi ben ting* (“I will not see you again”):
> This slave peg that we’ve been tethered to,
> The black race wants to uproot it
> ...
> The people among us still hammer the peg further
> They will not manage it.
> The hammer they are using is being taken from their hands.

\textsuperscript{785} Lino Alëu, *History*, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{786} DCS, 11 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{787} AAD, 14 August 2013.
Figure 7: Photocopied image in Dinka Primary 4 Reader, captioned ‘Slavery in Wau, where people are chained’
Reader provided by Arou Piol Adam.
This work emphasised comparisons of life pre-1985 versus life in Khartoum, and the epic and heroic nature of southern history – 'we want to show... the change.' Comparative histories and sustained metaphors are common in the predominantly Dinka texts and songs examined here, but also in Equatorian versions seen and collected during research. The book *The Dinka Customology of Marriage* is a sustained comparison between Khartoum and pre-war southern “traditional” gender relations and marriage norms. Songs particularly – probably because they were more commonly written than books, and recited in conversations and gatherings, including among women – put personal histories of displacement in wider historical context and with a narrative arc.

This work aimed to produce an overarching historiography and core narrative, with major historical figures, periods and events, on which local histories and references could be hung, as an implicitly nationalist teleology. These songs and texts emphasised a broad heroic southern history, often beyond ethnic or clan boundaries: Dut Anyak Dit references the King of Zande – likely a reference to King Gbudwe, famously written of by E. E. Evans-Pritchard, and who died in 1905 of wounds received in a clash with Condominium forces in Western Equatoria – as one of many martyred ‘forefathers’ in his poem “I will not see you again.”

The book *Dinka Displacement* similarly includes a long story of how the late and famous Dinka Rek paramount chief Giir Thiik of Luonyaker, Warrap State, became a chief. The Primary 4 Reader references the historic northern Sudanese state of Alwa as a root of its national Sudanese history; Alwa was also used by Nuba Mountains politician Philip Abbas Ghaboush and his party, the United Sudan African Liberation Front (USALF), as their name for the imagined future state of a united black Sudan.

But by far the most heavily referenced and invoked hero in the (mostly Dinka Bahr el Ghazal) texts and songs is William Deng Nhial, a politician from Tonj, then part of Bahr el Ghazal state. As he caused a split in the SANU party in 1965 during the first civil war and

---

788 SAK, 3 July 2013.
789 See Malik, ‘Displacement as Discourse’; for example, General Paulino’s song “Problems have come”, a version of which was re-written and sung by the Gbaya singer Emmanuel Kembe.
791 *Dinka Displacement*, Section 6.
advocated federalism under a united Sudanese government before being murdered in Cueibet in 1968, William Deng seems an unlikely martyr figure. However, his name has been invoked in Dinka songs – particularly from Greater Bahr el Ghazal – since his death, and a song addressing William Deng is recorded by Francis Deng in his 1973 text *The Dinka and their Songs.* Akut Kuei’s songs reference William Deng frequently, particularly his death as sacrifice and his judgement on the current apathy or lack of valour of southern people. A court worker remembered and sang a similar song, written probably in the mid-1990s, with the lyrics “who is unlucky like a black man?” with the chorus:

Dinka! The majesty of Deng Nhial will be lost  
Shilluk! The majesty of Deng Nhial will be taken  
Nuer! The majesty of Deng Nhial will be gone  
Zande! The majesty of Deng Nhial will be lost  
...

William Deng Nhial is most heavily invoked as an owner of the land, for instance in Akut Kuei’s famous song *Duk ben la wel wel*:

Why did you come and step on the land of Deng Nhial?  
And the land of Ajang Duot?  
And the land of Ayel Baak?  
And the land of Tookmac?  
And the land of our maternal uncles?  
...  
People live on the land but they have to know the owner.

And in Akut Kuei’s song *Piny ci Deng nok,* “The land that killed Deng”:

---

793 "We are the Dinka," including the lines: ‘it is the land of Morwel Malou and William Deng Nhial. We shall avenge the evils of the past.’ Deng, *The Dinka and their songs*, pp. 216–7.

794 *Duk ben la wel wel* (“Don’t panic”), 1994; *Pienyda, pienyda, pienyda* (“Our land”), 1992; *Ku na kocka* (“What of these people?”), 1997; *Aya yii ye ping, ye ping* (“I’m hearing – I’m hearing”), c. mid-1990s; *Ke col ater ci ke yeku puol yok muonyjang* (“The Dinka don’t give up the fight”), c. mid-1990s; *Abi thok terrek* (“It will finish, one by one”), c. mid-1990s; *Piny ci Deng nok* (“The land that has killed Deng”), c. mid-1990s; and *Cien kedie ka alei* [sic] (“I have no problem with foreigners”), c. 1996.

795 This chorus can be repeated through a list of tribes; as sung by DKLK, 21 August 2013, as well as by Akut Kuei in Juba.

796 Likely, my translators noted, a code name for an Anyanya (c. 1964–1972) or SPLA (c.1983-2005) guerrilla leader local to the area.

797 *Duk ben la wel wel* (“Don’t panic”), 1994.
If it is not this land, the land that has killed Deng,
If it is not this land that will be compensation for Deng -
Then we shall avenge with one hundred people,
One hundred, tens of thousands, we shall not count.
Even if I’m given food, I will not accept -
The life of Deng Nhial is not food...
The life of Deng Nhial is not worth money...
The life of Deng Nhial is not thirty-one cows...

The word used for land is *baai*, or *baai panda* – a territorial expression of a permanent homeland that runs through these books and songs. As Zoe Cormack details, the term *baai* ‘has been infused with strong associations of liberation war, nationalism and independence’ and ‘provides a way of expressing the nation and political identification with the state,’ but – more importantly – this use of *baai* subsumes the central state of southern Sudan to a local, rural and ‘moral centre.’ This is true of the sustained moral analogies that run through the books of children’s stories, poems and songs, with wolves and hyenas attacking the *baai* and outsiders stealing from it. Intrinsic to the idea of *baai*, and as common in the Dinka songs and books, is the idea of ownership of land. Many people emphasised the true meaning of the name Sudan - ‘because of this colour of ours’ - as a mark of authentic ownership of *baai panda*; Nikkel records a female songwriter singing in 1991: ‘we are the real owners of the country... is there a soil which does not know its owner? The country resembles us.’ This is reinforced by the common representation of Arab-origin Sudanese as immigrants, as ‘the land they entered is an African land... I studied this history in the school.’

Sudan is the land of the black people
We shall struggle for it

---

798 *Piny ci Deng nok* ("The land that has killed Deng"); thirty-one cows is the sum paid by Dinka people as *dia*, compensation for murder, under the legal codes set out at Wanh Alel in 1984. See Cherry Leonardi, Leben Nelson Moro, Martina Santschi, and Deborah Isser, *Local justice in southern Sudan*, (Washington, DC, 2010), p. 27.


800 Akut Kuei, *Junub pandan* ("The South our country"), c. early 1990s.

801 DCS, 11 August 2013.

802 Nikkel, *Dinka Christianity*, p. 332; also see Akut Kuei’s use of the term ‘visitor’, in *Duk ben la wel wel* ("Don’t panic"), *Pienyda, pienyda, pienyda* ("Our land"), and *Thudan ee Panda* ("Sudan is our country"), c. mid-1990s.

803 JG, 19 July 2013.
... It is God who created us and placed us in Sudan and said this is your land. You are a visitor - you go

There are comparative ideas of land, homeland and ownership in the Equatorian and Arabic-language work from Khartoum, including the work of General Paulino Mesaka and Emmanuel Kembe, although this needs further exploration beyond the scope of this study.

These songs and books, however, do not focus on a clear future nation-state of South Sudan, but on political identification with a broader territorial moral collective. In establishing a historical homeland – even if the parameters were vague – this literary work was challenging readers to imagine an alternative political community.

The plural political community of “southern” Sudan

The political community evoked by these projects, though, was deeply complicated and potentially contradictory – for instance, Akut Kuei’s two songs “Sudan our country” and “the South our country.” These projects are ambiguous: many of these texts could be described as Dinka “ethnic nationalism”, but their ethnic specificity in language (and thus their apparent target audience) belies their broader pan-southern or pan-black language, and their generalisations of “southern”, “black” or “Dinka/etc.” Similarly, this ethnic specificity reflects the practicalities of language in arts – for instance, Akut Kuei were singing in Dinka for the Dinka primarily, but also because using the vernacular was safer, emotionally powerful, and drew on musical traditions. Non-Dinka speakers were familiar with (and sometimes could sing) Dinka songs, and vice versa. But while written in Dinka and often about “the Dinka”, these Dinka texts use the terms jieng/monyjiang, ran col, and janubi (Dinka, black person, and southerner), and the Equatorian texts and songs accessed in this study move between generic “people”, “black people” and “southerners”.

---

804 Akut Kuei, *Thudan ee Panda* (“Sudan is our country”).
This was not necessarily just a case of interchangeable terminologies. These texts, and their authors, aimed specifically at complexity and interpretation, creating ambiguous works of broad emotional strength that was often the opposite of more common dogmatic, unequivocal political propaganda. For instance, a Dinka friend (a keen cultural sponsor and ex-resident of Khartoum himself) took the lead in an interview with one of the Akut Kuei songwriters to discuss his own interpretations of their work:

LB: The information you have in your songs is more than what you saw in your eyes [sic], I believe. You might have seen ten things but what you have put down here is ninety. [laughter]

JA: So now, like what you said, the meaning of songs here, is really powerful, more than –

LB: What you saw.

JA: What I saw. These – deep things coming from my heart.  

The authors of these texts were well aware of the contradictions and problems of mutual affiliation as “southerners” or as “black people” in their work. The most obvious example of this is in the Akut Kuei song “Everyone hates the Dinka” (Jieng ameen wuot):

The Dinka are hated by everyone  
The Dinka are hated by everyone  
But they can’t defeat them  
Something’s gone wrong in this South Sudan of ours  
Look at Africa –  
They are different, but southerners have the same skin  
The Nuer of nyantoic speak and act differently  
But we, the people of the South, have the same skin  
The Dor  
and the Nuba are different  
But they are also Southerners, with the same skin  
The Shilluk are also Southerners with the same skin  
But the heart – the heart is not the same  
If it was one,  
We would not have problems between us,  
Scraping over the remains of the carcass  
We have chaos over the carcass  
And we leave a person eating the meat,  
Dipping their hands into the Dinka for their blood.

---

805 LB and JAN, 8 September 2013.
806 A Dinka term for Equatorians.
It is better to go hungry.\textsuperscript{807}

When translating this from the Dinka, many Dinka speakers – including the song’s author, who wrote the original version in 1992\textsuperscript{808} – disagreed over who was meant by “the Dinka,” with many saying (potentially retrospectively) that this meant “southerners,” or more broadly, the black people of the south. These songs’ focus on the lack of pan-southern solidarity is echoed across this genre of educational texts, emphasising the need for mutual respect, intermarriage in Khartoum, and mutual solidarity: ‘If he only loves to promote this own culture, and does not want other people’s culture to develop, then there’s no truth.’\textsuperscript{809}

This cultural work was part of a debate over the content and form of alternative Sudanese moral and political communities, even if this was not necessarily predicated on clear ideas of an eventual geographical or political unit: they demanded their listeners do the personal moral, intellectual, and communal “workings-out”.

This plurality of markers was an articulation of layers of affiliation, of social solidarity and mutual political understandings; these mutualities were explained by many people as “brotherhoods”, and maybe are best articulated in an academic context as a kind of moral federal community. In these texts, loosely-drawn ethnic, pan-ethnic and local communities were coordinate, mutually referent, while also independent and sometimes competitive, and operating under umbrella commonalities of political and historical experience and ideals. People’s local, regional, linguistic, clan, ethnic identifications were affiliated as a loose collective based on consciousness of a common political history of being black, peripheral and subordinate. This oral and written literature debates the lines of this layered black community. The area of “the south” – or of “black Sudan”, which is sometimes correspondent – was mutually defined, and is an historically and politically shifting concept across these texts: the Primary 4 Dinka Reader, for instance, includes a map of the ‘land of the areas of Dinka’ but juxtaposed this with the explanation that, just south of Jebelein, ‘the southern part of Sudan is for black people [\textit{koc col}],’ including the Nuer, Luo, Shilluk, Nuba,

\textsuperscript{807} Jieng ameen wuot (“Everyone hates the Dinka”), 1992.
\textsuperscript{808} JAN, 10 September 2013.
Topologies of violent confrontation characterise these mobile borders in these accounts, for instance in Akut Kuei’s song “Abyei, Abyei, the wut of Deng Kuol”:

We no longer want to be in the north...
Twelve years Abyei has fought with these sons of dogs
And we have allowed them to suffer
If we had realised this
We would have told the youth from Dor\textsuperscript{811} to run to the border...
And the youth of Dor would run in,
And the message would be taken to Nuer...
Then this war of ours would have finished at the border...
...
And one thing I want to tell you,
You southerners,
Let’s respect Aweil and Abyei,
They have managed to keep the nightmare at bay - ...
If it were not for them, then the Arabs would have gone deep into the south for the border.\textsuperscript{812}

This writing of alternative political histories encouraged the imagining of new world orders, and the exploration of the limits of what Anderson called the ‘deep horizontal comradeship’ of national community. Discussions of the constitution and defence of black or southern Sudan often echo or directly take up John Garang’s ideas of “New Sudan.” A core phrase in the SPLA’s ideological rhetoric from its first use in the SPLM/A manifesto of 1983, “New Sudan” was initially used to describe an imagined Sudan which would emerge after the overthrow of the regime, becoming unfashionable after the 1991 SPLA split but then re-emerging in 1994 at the first SPLA National Convention.\textsuperscript{813} By the end of the Convention, New Sudan had gained a more ambiguous definition, as – ‘for the time being’ – Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Upper Nile Regions.\textsuperscript{814}

\textsuperscript{810} Primary 4 Reader, p.6.
\textsuperscript{811} Dinka term for Equatorians.  
\textsuperscript{812} Abyei, Abyei wun e Deng Kuol (“Abyei, Abyei, the wut of Deng Kuol”), c. mid-1990s; Lino Alëu makes similar statements in History, p. 11. Wut means a section of the Dinka, more easily translated here as the “people” of Deng Kuol.
\textsuperscript{813} Rolandsen, Guerrilla government, pp. 118–9.
\textsuperscript{814} Ibid., pp. 121, 172.
Garang’s problematic pronouncement on the reach of the civil war - in the words of one Bari man, ‘those of you who want to fight for South Sudan, fight and then when you get to Kosti – you stop there, we will continue’ – resonated with many people engaged in this mutual and personal definition of the limits of *baai panda junub*:815 ‘whether I came from the north to join them in Kosti or not, or whether I perished there it didn’t matter – my people would stop at Kosti and come back to what is theirs.’816

‘We want to re-Africanise those people in the north parts [sic]. There are some people like - there is a tribe called Denagla. There is a tribe called Shaggiya. These people, they have their own language. Which means that they were African...817

Where the “south” ended in these texts is also complicated by the consistent claiming of northern Sudan in origin myths and genealogies, particularly by the Dinka.818 This claiming of “southern origins” in northern Sudan, as Beswick has recently detailed, is not only an expression of Dinka nationalism, but is linked to discussions of the heritage of pre-colonial non-Muslim regional states such as Nubia and Alwa, and to pro-southern and pro-black historical work in general.819 The Primary 4 Reader states ‘we assume our grandparents were also the ones near Khartoum’ - but the textbook goes on to briefly explain textual, oral and archaeological historical sources, the limited source material on southern and pre-colonial Sudan, and emphasises the importance of research and record-keeping.820

Membership of these collectives was often expressed in these texts along lines of “trust”, apparently in the broadest sense of the term as truth, responsibility, mutual safe-keeping and common hope. This is a long-used term among migrants in the north: Woldemikael’s

---

815 lit. our ‘homeland, the country of the south’; JW, 18 October 2013.
816 JW, 18 October 2013; another version of Garang’s statement is recorded by Jok, *Diversity, unity, and nation building*, p. 9: ‘anyone not convinced about the liberation of the whole Sudan can stop when we reach Kosti and leave me to march to Khartoum alone if I so choose.’
817 JGRN, 28 June 2013.
818 These origin myths are not limited to Dinka people; see Leonardi, *Dealing with government in South Sudan*, p. 22; Nikkel, *Dinka Christianity*, pp. 41–43. For example, see *The Dinka Customology of Marriage*, Introduction, p. 5; Lino Alëu, *History*, p. 9.
820 Primary 4 Reader, p. 10. It is possible that the author of this section of the textbook was drawing on Arkel’s 1940s writings that described excavations in northern Sudan apparently finding skeletons resembling Dinka and Nuer physiognomy; see Nikkel, *Dinka Christianity*, p. 41.
informants in Wad Medani in 1985 referred to “northerners” as *mundukuru*, now a common derogatory term in South Sudan for Arabs but in Woldemikael’s translation meaning “untrustworthy”; and Malik records a Kordofan woman resident of a slum area as being afraid that ‘one day they [southerners] will come to kill and eat me’ (although her friend corrected her that southerners could be trusted, unlike the Nuba).\(^{821}\) Similarly extreme accounts of a lack of trust – or the fundamental amorality or immorality of “Arabs” – punctuate explanations of relationships with Darfur and Arab northerners in these southern interviews and texts.\(^{822}\) As Ibrahim noted in 1990, ‘women’s perception of the “Arabs” is limited to whom they call “Arabs” in the shanty town’; he delineates this as everyone who was not southern or Nuba.\(^{823}\) Like “southerners,” “Arabs” are not a coherent grouping but a shorthand for those outside of the racial, ethno-linguistic and political lines of trust.

As with Brennan’s work on Tanzanian nationalism, this work established ‘a politics of enmity concerned with defining enemies of the nation and creating corresponding purge categories,’ listing atrocities and acts of discrimination against Dinka people, including photographs of amputations and enslaved men.\(^{824}\) This was most emphatic in accounts of murdering patients to remove their blood, organs and bones, generally believed to be done by northern and/or Arab doctors, ‘in order to remove some good things for his medical activities’: ‘even they steal the babies sometimes,’ and ‘they sometimes remove the blood, or [it] can be sold.’\(^{825}\) Lino Alëu’s *History* is explicitly violent and retributive, calling not necessarily for financial restitution but direct violent repercussions against the Khartoum regime and its supporters by generations to come.

Ask the child like this:
- Do you know what Arabs did to us?
  Explain it properly to the child, if he understands, ask him or her:

---

\(^{821}\) Woldemikael, ‘Southern migrants in a Northern Sudanese City’, p. 30; Malik, ‘Displacement as Discourse.’

\(^{822}\) For example, PDA, 21 June 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; AT, 8 June 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 13 April 2013.


- What shall we do to Arabs?826

In this imaginary Venn diagram of political and social trust, then, the Nuba and Darfur communities were peripheral “brothers”: but, for many people, while ‘all the south Sudanese in Khartoum [were] brothers together,’ people from the Nuba Mountains and particularly from Darfur were “brothers” of a different kind.827 This reflected the contemporary attitude from the SPLA and other anti-regime political organisations in Sudan at the time: ‘Dr John realised that there is [unity] of the black people.’828 This was layered, as above: ‘when you talk about the rights, even if you are not from that [area], you get people supporting you... [the SPLA was] addressing every problem which is facing any Sudanese people in general. And south Sudanese in particular.’829 Perhaps startlingly, despite the apparent fading away of Garang’s inclusive rhetoric about democratic reform and national black African unity post-CPA, most of these texts and the discussions around them emphasised the historical and political inclusion of eastern and western Sudanese people.830 Without writing a history of Darfur, Nuba and Beja activism in Khartoum here, these communities were frequently seen by “southerners” as part of this geographic power struggle and ownership of Sudan – in theory, if not always in practice. This was partly because of the heterogeneity of populations, an awareness of mutual discrimination and violence from the Khartoum state because of their blackness, and the collective educational provision in impoverished areas of the city.831 Many Khartoum southern residents at least studied alongside these other “black marginalised” populations in Khartoum, particularly the Nuba residents.832 ‘The students we taught [were] not from Dinka alone, but from various states, including the far north, and western Sudan, Darfur. It’s a mixed school, but [we] used to tell [sic] in classes that – you

826 Lino Alëu, History, p. 11.
827 ADA, 13 August 2013.
828 SA, 8 August 2013.
829 RRL, 3 September 2013.
830 See Dut Anyak Dit, Yok ci yokoth tuoom (“We have gone opposite ways”):

What you are looking for is not what I’m looking for
We are going different directions
You have missed me...
Look your way – the road is there.
I have turned my back on you.
I am going to the border
I will sit at the border and demarcate it.

831 JGRN, 28 June 2013.
832 DKLK, 21 August 2013; also AAD, 14 August 2013.
are our people. Because you have been originated from the south... you have been originated [sic] from the south, southern Sudan! This was based on a subjective personal spectrum of inclusion, trust and collaboration with the collective Nuba, "easterners" and Darfuris (mostly in that order). Several people had attended the Nuba politician Philip Abbas Ghoboush’s rallies because 'we want to learn politics.' This pan-black Sudanese politics – particularly with the Nuba and Philip Abbas – is emphasised in many of these texts, for instance a chapter in Lino Alëu’s History, titled “William Deng Nhial and Philip Abbas Ghoboush”: ‘[they] were the first leaders who begin the struggle for the south against Arabs. They met and discussed to find a solution about Arab colonialism in Sudan.835

But there were limits to the solidarity that rested on this political nexus of culture, language, religion and moral affiliation. The Darfur populations of Khartoum are a good example of these limits for their southern neighbours, whose young men often joined the Sudan Armed Forces under Bashir’s “jihad” in the 1990s and early 2000s. The presence of Darfur locals blurred these lines of brotherhood and social inclusion as ‘co-citizens who suffer with them.’ People from Darfur were often described as “black but...”, being racially but not consciously politically, socially or intellectually part of a broader Sudanese black collective, unlike those who were “black and...”: ‘we are black and we are south Sudanese,’ in that order.838

'We were the same by the skin, but different in heart. They think that they are Arabs. ...So for Darfurians we don’t mix with them sometimes, because for them they used to steal our things and they don’t want to be our brothers. For some time they sat to be Arabs, and we as Dinka.'839

For many “southern” residents of Khartoum, Darfur people’s political and social loyalty was suspect, undermined by some Darfur groups’ claims to Arab genealogies, forms of Islam,

833 MAA, 11 August 2013.
834 DKLK, 21 August 2013.
835 Lino Alëu, History, p. 27; this section is probably referring to General Union of Nuba meetings with the SANU leadership, c. 1965-69.
836 APA, 21 August 2013.
839 LAM, 8 June 2013.
and political Islamic ideas. For many Dinka residents, their Darfur neighbours further challenged pan-Sudanese solidarity in the Khartoum suburbs because of personal memories and historical legacies of the suffering of particularly Dinka communities at the hands of southern Darfur and southern Kordofan armed raiding parties, known as murahaleen; Rizeigat and Misseriya massive armed raids, driven initially by famine in western Sudan in the mid-1980s and then fuelled by government assistance as proxy warfare against the SPLA in the late 1980s and early 1990s, killed tens of thousands of people and depopulated large parts of northern Bahr el Ghazal. Many of the poorer and newer residents from greater Bahr el Ghazal and Abyei had suffered significantly in Darfur and on the route to Khartoum; many people had experienced, and lost relatives and children to, violence against displaced communities on the roads and in the towns on the way to Khartoum, or been kidnapped or forced by violence or circumstance into enslavement or exploitative labour by local landowners or cattle and camel herders between 1986 and 2005. There are many examples of extreme vitriol against Darfur communities in this literature, not necessarily restricted to Muslim groups or those claiming Arab ancestry.

'They are the ones [who] damaged our people... they are black in colour but their heart [is] different. [They were] thinking that what we [were] doing [then] was bad. But now, they are suffering!... They were the ones who did bad to us [sic], at that time. They were very strong ones, they stand and confront our people in the field of war. They even sang songs of jihad... they had songs [singing] that they are not afraid, [as] Darfurians [sic].

This definitive delineation of the "Darfurian" community as stooges of the Khartoum regime was common in interviews and texts: 'they are black, but they are brainwashed by [the] Islamic system.' The most extreme example is Lino Alëu’s introductory comments about the nature of the civil war in his History.

We will punish Darfurians [sic], and they will know that Garang was [fighting for the] freedom of a black person... it is good for God to show Darfurians how the disaster occurred [in the south]. It is good for God to show them the disaster, to see it with

841 DCS, 15 July 2013; also ADA, 13 August 2013.
842 DCD, 15 July 2013.
their own eyes in Darfur... what let us be conquered by [the] Arabs was [Darfur], they are those who let us be conquered... I will thank God if He will show Darfurians disaster.\textsuperscript{843}

More common, though, is a more subtle explanation of why, for many, Darfur people could not be fully trusted: they were “duped”, not politically conscious, or not fully understanding of their deeper political and historical position in Sudan. As one man explained, ‘the situation to the south was not only for the south, but for the black [people]’ – but ‘[the Darfuris] don’t understand that they are also black.’\textsuperscript{844} Many people, as well as Lino Alëu’s History, emphasised that Darfur people were misled into thinking that they were fighting for the cause of Islam. This explanation emphasised that, by the 2000s, many people from Darfur realised that they had been “duped”, and ‘became aware’ of this alternative understanding of, and political vision for, Sudan.\textsuperscript{845} John Garang, in all cases, was ‘the one enlightening those of western Sudan... to know themselves also as a black people, and [that] Sudan [belongs] to them. So, black people united [in] the one vision - know [that] the Sudan [belongs] to them.’\textsuperscript{846}

This cultural work did not consistently or solely set out a “southern Sudanese” communal identity, or even argue that southern-ness should take a kind of precedence over ethnic, regional or racial affiliations. The historical and political content of this work was not (or not only) pushing a clear “South Sudan nation-state” based on an alternative selective political history created by these local educated elites. Instead, these texts and their authors encouraged a consciousness of broad affiliations of black political and historical consciousness, and emphasised the critical discussion of the nature of black, southern and Sudanese identification, and the importance of self-reflection in this context; as Dut Anyak’s poem \textit{Kongku rot deet} (“We must study our souls”) says,

\begin{quote}
We must study our souls, and come together  
We first study ourselves, then we will become one  
Let’s not be misled by blackness
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{843} Lino Alëu, History, p. 8.  
\textsuperscript{844} ABA, 16 August 2013.  
\textsuperscript{845} Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; ABA, 16 August 2013.  
\textsuperscript{846} SA, 8 August 2013; also ABA, 16 August 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; Lino Alëu, History.
But let’s be united by facts. Lino Alëu wrote that knowledge is to ‘understand our hearts’, to ‘cooperate’ and to ‘select out those with poor vision [sic] among us.’ The most obvious manifestation of this focus on practical education is the frequent tests, questions and mottos strung through the books. These are not straightforward questions but demands for critical thought:

Questions:
1. What is the lesson we learn from the above?
2. Is there anybody who has ever done this?

The book *Dinka Customology of Marriage* has a revision section with twenty-two questions on the content of the book, including ‘which things are not in order in Khartoum’ Dinka *Displacement* demanded that ‘a person... read [and] analyse,’ and ‘think about [the stories] carefully.’ This should be a collaborative education, according to the *Culture* magazine: ‘if you are just reading some books and articles outside without attending classes, you think yourself someone who is educated, but those things cannot take you anywhere.’

These exams could be seen as tests of character, not knowledge. Their central demand for personal and collective responsibility and self-regulation is common across histories of southern Sudanese political thought. This demand is commonly conceptualised in these texts and songs as *yic*, commonly translated or co-opted into English as “right” or “the right”; Leinhardt translates *yic* as ‘truth which is arrived at and stated by a communal intention.’ Leonardi’s discussion of “rights” focuses on its application for advocacy and ‘claiming one’s right’, an educated person’s ‘creolised and multivalent term, an interpretation...’

---

847 Dut Anyak Dit, *Kongku rot deet* (“We must study our souls”), 2003.
850 *The Dinka Customology of Marriage*, p. 12.
851 *Dinka Displacement*, Sections 4 and 10.
both of Western notions of legal rights and of vernacular concepts like *yic* in Dinka’; she defines *yic* as an objective truth ‘which transcends the subjective truths of disputants.’

Here, in Dinka and English (used by both Dinka and Equatorian people), these terms go beyond claim-making into explanations of political consciousness and self-management, a “right” and “rights” that are understood through this educational work: ‘when you are exposed to education then... you realize your right.’ All the texts, songs and their writers were explicitly anti-individualist, warning of the dangers of and against the isolation and commercialisation of relationships and daily living in Khartoum, getting “lost” in the day to day pressures of survival. This theme is not anti-change, but emphasises the importance of social systems: as the *Dinka Customology of Marriage* book states, ‘you consider being related as when you share ideas, and you share wealth,’ but in Khartoum, ‘marriage is not stable, it is flowing like money’: ‘don’t turn marriage into a business.’ These texts demanded nuance and a depth of emotional understanding in communication, particularly by younger people who did not understand some social demands of their communities or use the complex emotional linguistics and expressions of their vernaculars. ‘Old words have changed, because the young men... have stopped understanding words, and stopped asking.’ The texts are littered with Khartoum-specific proverbs and instructions about interpersonal relationships – not always simply criticising “the youth” necessarily, and often praising “good” young men and women who are aware of and use different registers and languages in the various social situations in Khartoum. This is a demonstration of the reaction against what Leonardi describes as ‘the widespread discourse of selfish “townese”’: ‘townspeople actually worked hard to maintain kinship and wider relations and to invest in social capital, respectable marriages and recognition of their social status in networks and communities beyond the towns.’

856 RRL, 3 September 2013.
857 *The Dinka Customology of Marriage*, pp. 5, 7-8.
858 For example, *The Dinka Customology of Marriage*, pp. 8-9.
859 *Dinka Displacement*, Section 11.
860 Both Akut Kuei’s *Song Book* and the Primary 4 Reader print proverbs at the end of each section or song; all the texts sourced for this thesis contain proverbs.
losing hope or becoming immersed in day to day economic and leisure activities, as one man explained:

‘[These songs were] enlightening the southerners to remember the situation they are [in]. Because... some of them have even given up. ... And because of this despair – this song was the one [to] restore the hope [sic]. ... The singer [wanted] to remind people that if you behave like this now, then what Deng Nhial died for is going to become zero [sic]. You’re supposed to be aware... you eat the food of important people here in Khartoum – and majesty of Deng Nhial is going to be taken. You walk in the street like free people – but the majesty of Deng Nhial... which means: he wants to tell them that even though you walk freely inside the streets of Khartoum, you are still enslaved, you are a stranger here.’

Those who did not know “their right” in Khartoum were members of the community who were intellectually lazy, living day to day, scared or dismissive of social involvement, and individualist, parochial or insular. In the Dinka texts, this is often expressed through the common idea of “weak” or “hard” hearts. This was often a topic of humour as well as serious debate. Comedy groups commonly acted ‘[as] the court... and also how are the leaders behaving in the community.’ The popular play *Al Hosh* (“The Compound”), written in the mid-90s by a founding member of Kuato and Orupaap, is a good example of this self-satire that was engaged in by comedy groups and youth theatres across Khartoum suburban communities, often around churches. *Al Hosh* focused on an “everyday” mixed-ethnicity southern Sudanese compound in Khartoum, whose residents fulfilled all the comedic tropes of the community, including a group of young women at Afhad University dedicating themselves to gossip, men, and the latest fashions; a lazy, drunken and abusive man and his beleaguered wife; and a lone man in good employment who was rich and generous but was exploited for his generosity by the rest of the compound. Nobody in the play avoids satirist criticism.

---

862 DKLK, 21 August 2013.
863 For example, Akut Kuei, Kongdien e cuec (“My right hand”), and Ka ye beny theeeth (“The spearmaster will regret his prophesy”); Dut Anyak Dit, Yomdit mei (“The dry season storm is rising”), c. 1992.
864 AMJ, 16 July 2013. Miller records text from several plays on this theme: ‘Juba Arabic’, Appendix 3.
865 SO, 9 November 2013; an improvised comedy group was repatriated to Apada and still practices today on Sundays.
866 SO, 9 November 2013.
This work therefore encouraged people to have internal critical lives, in the face of heavily policed public space and expression. One man remembered using headphones and a cassette player to listen to these subversive songs while on a long commute to work and school on public transport.\textsuperscript{867} This importance of having and controlling a positive and constructive internal life in spite of Khartoum economic and political pressures is expressed throughout these texts as speaking in the heart versus the mouth.

What is said in the heart is much more than what is said in the mouth. The heart thinks and says a lot... What you say in your heart is not the same as what you say with your mouth. The mouth is good because it will fear to speak.\textsuperscript{868}

Another book emphasises: ‘we would like you to keep those words in your hearts, and think of good words that you will use... there are many things to be said, but few speak the truth.’\textsuperscript{869} A 1998 song by an unknown author, recorded by Nikkel in 2001, summarises this emphasis on internal critical responsibility as a member of a broader moral and political community:

\begin{quote}
I must struggle to adjust my life  
For best advantage,  
Both in the way of our ideals  
And in actuality.  
If it does not proceed like this,  
Then my life and my existence  
Have no meaning  
In the flow of the stories of my people,  
In the history of the world.\textsuperscript{870}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{867} DKLK, 4 July 2013.  
\textsuperscript{868} Dinka Displacement, Section 10; also see Magazine of Dinka Culture, p. 16.  
\textsuperscript{869} The Dinka Customology of Marriage, p. 12.  
\textsuperscript{870} ‘Deng and Mohammed in the Land of Sudan’, Nikkel, Dinka Christianity, p. 281.
Conclusion

This cultural work complicates the more broad-brush or elite-focused explanations of contemporary post-secession South Sudanese nationalism from Frahm, Jok and others, as detailed in the Introduction.\textsuperscript{871} Nor does this local intellectual work match up with the broader characterisation of the state of South Sudanese nationalism today. This chapter challenges the assertion that “southerners” have “only a hazy notion of a collective national identity beyond [their] unified opposition to the north.”\textsuperscript{872} As argued in chapter one, using “southern” as a default or \textit{a priori} term when discussing political thought in the region constrains discussions of nationalism. Similarly, many of the discussions of South Sudanese nationalism focus on post-CPA or post-secession local debates, which are broadly characterised as a tension between “ethnic” and “national” identification.\textsuperscript{873} This assumes a lack of supra-local, supra-ethnic critical thought pre-2005, and imagines nationalism in terms of a “prioritising” of the national over the tribal, a nationalism predicated on a ranked hierarchy of clear affiliation.\textsuperscript{874} These analyses’ emphasis on the empty reactive nature of South Sudanese negative nationalism, needing ‘a clear-cut enemy’ to bring disparate and discrete specifically ethnic communities together, is the logical conclusion of a dualistic, state- and civil war-focused historical perspective.\textsuperscript{875} These chapters, though, have demonstrated Khartoum residents’ work to discuss and articulate a plural moral community beyond the specifically ethnic. People well knew that, as Jok said, ‘nations are made, not born... creating such a nation... requires a vision, a plan, and honest and participatory actions, not just the pronouncements of politicians’.\textsuperscript{876} These local intellectuals were doing this work in Khartoum already.

\textsuperscript{872} Jok, \textit{Diversity, unity, and nation building in South Sudan}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{873} Frahm, 'Defining the nation'; Jok, \textit{Diversity, unity, and nation building in South Sudan}; Copnall, \textit{A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts}.
\textsuperscript{874} See Jok, \textit{Diversity, unity, and nation building in South Sudan}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{875} Frahm, 'Defining the nation', p. 22.
\textsuperscript{876} Jok, \textit{Diversity, unity, and nation building in South Sudan}, p. 4.
This work was part of ‘the process of interpretation and reflection that takes places [sic] in all forms of protest and social mobilisation,’ framing and demarcating commonalities and potential communities - what is sometimes called “meaning work.”\footnote{877} This was aimed at producing a sense of moral responsibility and communal history, but on plural and fluid lines. It did not explicitly set out definitive “southern nationalist” or ethno-nationalist units, but demanded broader critical engagement, and provided the basis for creative imaginings of possible future political communities. This Khartoum cultural and literary world is a good example of Lonsdale’s deep political work, beginning to draw up the limits of southern, racial, and political inclusion, and challenging the civic virtue of the wealthy, apathetic, culturally promiscuous, and politically ignorant.\footnote{878} These texts and songs – and their authors and writing groups – were focused on a recruitment to consciousness.

As in Tuttle’s work, this confronting of the painful political context and wartime experience was a ‘[struggle] to gain control and to keep or regain the ability to make choices.’\footnote{879} These ideas of potential political community were dependent on concepts of “trust” and mutual understanding, concerned that ‘the heart is not the same,’ and intent on encouraging people to take up a particular perspective on the war and the world, as ‘black people united on the one vision – [who know that] the Sudan belong[s] to them.’\footnote{880}

\footnotetext[877]{See Baud and Rutten, \textit{Popular intellectuals and social movements}, p. 1.}
\footnotetext[879]{Tuttle, ‘Life is Prickly’, p. 322.}
\footnotetext[880]{Akut Kuei, \textit{Jieng ameen wuot} (“Everyone hates the Dinka”); SA, 8 August 2013.}
Chapter five

The part-time artists, authors and organisers of southern communities in Khartoum considered themselves to be ‘in the lion's den’. Many people claimed involvement in explicitly subversive political activity, beyond the internal intellectual projects of their cultural and social work. They aimed for this work to achieve more than community solidarity and intellectual resilience, and described themselves to me as active civil war agents, detailing stories of “resistance” in the mid-1990s to mid-2000s.

This resistance, in retrospect, was explicitly “for the SPLA”, part of a long-standing simplification of “the southern liberation movement” from all parties. One man, who worked as a volunteer for around twenty years while a labourer in a factory in the mornings, explained:

‘The most important issues were to support the SPLA outside here, like those whom we trained [in school], they came out and joined the SPLA; [this was why] we opened schools. ...so many people were trained in the north. We were intending to support the south.’

This simplification of wartime affiliation and action is entirely at odds with the messy pluralities, flexibilities of identification and broader understandings of black Sudanese political community detailed in previous chapters – as well as contradicting the large body of academic literature on resistance. Any variety of modes of resistance, and of grey areas between rebellion and collaboration, are broadly stripped away in these accounts of spying and subversion in Khartoum: traitors, collaborators and quislings are apparently clear-cut actors to those working undercover.

But these explanations of clear “good” and “bad” agents, of rebel nationalists versus weak and greedy collaborators, are also challenged by the actual details of the stories of spying

---

881 DCD, 15 July 2013.
882 Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 94.
883 WMT, 17 August 2013.
and subversion recounted in Aweil and Juba. There are no clear-cut “good” actions in these accounts; the terms “collaborator” and “sell-out” are accusatory rather than descriptive.\textsuperscript{884} If resistance is not fetishised in analysis, then, as Fletcher observes in his critique of “resistance studies”, ‘it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the good guys from the bad guys’.\textsuperscript{885} reducing civil wars to loyalists versus rebels, as Peterson observes of Mau Mau detainees in Kenya, makes it ‘hard to see the range of intellectual and moral projects in which [people] were involved.’\textsuperscript{886}

This chapter therefore takes a different approach to these binaries of pro/anti-SPLA, and subversive activists/collaborators. In exploring these multiple narratives of resistance, this chapter is not primarily debunking or questioning the truths of these accounts. It does not focus on the argument that this (macho) talk was retrospective self-justification by people who actually did very little, or that this was just self-aggrandising make-believe “spy stories” by people who wanted to tell me of their exploits, and who were otherwise aware of their own powerlessness or apparent passivity. There are elements of all of this demonstrated in this chapter. Instead, it primarily argues that these accounts of “good and bad” political action are part of the struggles of Khartoum residents to fit their ideas of black federalist moral communities into the practicalities of realistic political futures and structures, within the socio-economic and political limitations of life in Khartoum.

The messy reality was that there was no single SPLA – or southern “movement” in general – in the political context of the mid-1990s civil wars, and the various militarised factions did not necessarily fit into categories of “pro-south/north”, or even “pro-unity/secession.” The broad mutual aim of self-determination was a political catch-all,\textsuperscript{887} exemplified by the SPLA slogan “awich ku angich ku,” literally translating to “we know what we want.”\textsuperscript{888} This chapter therefore looks at these explanations of actions, motives and compromises in the Khartoum

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{884} That these terms were commonly used in the English and in translations in research.
\item \textsuperscript{885} Fletcher, \textit{Beyond resistance}, p. viii.
\item \textsuperscript{886} Peterson, ‘The intellectual lives of Mau Mau detainees’, p. 75.
\item \textsuperscript{887} For a discussion of the changing aims of the core Garangist SPLA, see Claire Metelits, ‘Reformed rebels? Democratization, global norms, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army’, \textit{Africa Today}, 51:1 (2004), p. 70.
\item \textsuperscript{888} Peter Adwok Nyaba, \textit{South Sudan: The state we aspire to} (Nairobi, 2011), p. 155.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
context, demonstrating Kalyvas’ point that ambiguity is ‘endemic’ to the ‘convergence of local motives and supra-local imperatives’ in civil wars, despite a continual empirical quest for “the root causes.”

This reading also avoids the historiographical and methodological issues of a retrospective history of “spying”, and any over-emphasis on “action.” Talking about “resistance” presumes a distinction between “the state” and “the rebels” – a distinction that exists rhetorically, but not in practice. As Archbishop Gabriel Zubeir Wako asked of Khartoum university students in 1986: ‘All black people are considered rebels. But rebels against whom? And why?’

It would be easy to write off these reported rebellious actions as glorified “mass political subversion”, made to write the tellers into a national history of the war as proud secessionists - particularly because of the moments of bathos and realism in many accounts: ‘we thought they were going to arrest us and then they didn’t.’

‘I found that there were some military intelligence of the SPLA that could help me, but it was very difficult for me to get any contacts of these people... We didn’t have [a] connection, to tell you the truth, with anyone in the SPLM/SPLA.'

This would be to underestimate the paranoiac belief in this southern “fifth column,” and the danger of its mobilisation, by the brutal, repressive and increasingly extensive security branches of the Sudanese state. Regardless of the substantive extent of their subversive work, many people showed me serious scarring and gave me accounts of torture and imprisonment. Detention, surveillance, torture and public state violence in the 1990s and 2000s have been relatively well-documented, particularly of Nuba, National Democratic

---

889 Stathis N. Kalyvas, ‘The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars’, Perspectives on Politics, 1:03 (September 2003), pp. 475–6; these ideas have recently been taken up by Anderson and Rolandsen, ‘Violence as politics’.
891 JW, 18 October 2013.
892 YM, 10 September 2013.
893 The growth of formal and irregular state security forces is documented by Human Rights Watch; Rone, Behind the red line, pp. 129–130.
Alliance (NDA) and human rights activists. Organising musical performances and evening classes invited the attention of formal and informal security forces and armed members of the local neighbourhood committee and People's Police Force. Jebel Aulia and Mayo had notoriously abusive Comprehensive Security police stations by the mid-1990s. Several people showed me large scars and burns.

’[They] just … wrapped me with, uh – what do you call it in English, I don’t know – the metal wire, they wrapped me, and they put me [tied] to the car – and they dragged [me]’

Another man was in prison for a year, and suffered from being exposed on the roof of the prison in blistering heat, a common form of torture in Khartoum, some people related stories of electrocution, and colleagues dying in custody. Even if the political outcomes or actions of these “civil society” or party organisations were negligible or symbolic in practice, the dangers of engagement were real. People in Khartoum really did run severe risks to act in what they thought were subversive ways.

Brennan described nationalist development in Tanzania as focusing on ‘the process of defining who was a good citizen... and who the enemy was. In the same way, animosity and frustration in accounts of political activism in Khartoum in this period was predominantly directed not at the “grand other” of “the Arab North,” but at people within the southern communities. Accounts focus on the complexities of determining trustworthy collaborators, versus southern “sell-outs,” and those who got “fat” off the post-colonial

---

894 Lesch and Fadl (eds.), *Coping with torture*, pp. 3–4; Rone, *Behind the red line*, pp. 55–78, 127–8. The Amnesty International back catalogue of Urgent Actions, held in the Amnesty International Secretariat archives in the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, and church reports such as Rev. Canon P. P. Augustine to John Boulden, ‘Horror in the Sudan,’ 14 April 2001, SAD.891/1/1-2, also detail this history.
895 Rone, *Behind the red line*, p. 138.
896 Ibid., pp. 138–9.
897 JA, 10 September 2013.
898 YM, 10 September 2013. For corroboration of this technique, see Rone, *Behind the red line*, p. 3; Lesch and Fadl (eds.), *Coping with torture*.
899 PKKM, 9 August 2013.
901 For a broader discussion on this common internal focus of subversive political movements, see Nachman Ben-Yehuda, ‘Gathering dark secrets, hidden and dirty information: Some methodological notes on studying political assassinations’, *Qualitative Sociology*, 13:4 (1990), p. 367.
These ‘rhetorical personages’, like Brennan says, ‘opened discursive space’ for questioning the limits of morality and citizenship in the political community of the speaker, and most importantly, drawing clear lines of good and bad political action. The figure of “the sell-out” was a powerful force, affecting behaviour and appearing as a common selfish and morally weak agent of destruction in people’s accounts of wartime in Khartoum; but on the other hand, people were (and are) unwilling or unable to name anyone specifically and simply as “a sellout.”

---

903 Ibid., pp. 410, 413.
Figure 8: ‘Sell-outs at the table with the Arabs’

Detke ke apath koc rec yiecda aa kak.    Watch them closely, these are the ones who are spoiling our right.

This chapter will first detail some of these explicit accounts of work “for the SPLA”, and the convenience of stripping away wartime ambiguities; it will then focus on the substance of what was explained as “spying”, looking at forums of underground political groups and examining how discussion of political futures, in itself, constituted political subversion. This discussion relied heavily on the safe political space and governance of the huge peri-urban black settlements of Khartoum by the early 2000s, which was based on the work of the “collaborators”, men who claimed traditional authority, military support and/or political power from dubiously pragmatic alliances with the Bashir regime. Those working as or with these brokers, within a less binary logic than self-described “SPLA spies”, had similar imaginings of alternative governance and future polities, but which were often more explicitly ethno-nationalist than pan-Sudanese. Those who were apparently politically beyond the pale for many people – such as the regime-funded rebel militias of Paulino Matip and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, among others – were practical necessities in Khartoum and part of this “struggle” for the south, justifying their own work as pro-southern and emancipatory based on quite different (and possibly more pragmatic) understandings of governance and political futures. Actors like Paulino Matip were arguably also revolutionary subversives, albeit militaristic and ethnicised revolutionaries.

This is therefore a study of explanations of applied morality in Khartoum, and the compromises and justifications necessary during the civil wars to attempt to square possible actions with political ideals. This is Lonsdale’s deep politics, “[where] people sustained in their narrative imagination what they struggled to achieve in practice.”\(^904\) This chapter also integrates violence – as a part of the ideas and practice of governance in Sudan, and a delimiting factor on action – into this history of discussions over possible forms of a future Sudanese political community.\(^905\) As Wendy James observes,

\[
\text{from the periphery, the market-place of “certainties” on offer is less open than might be represented at “the centre”. For most people, there are very few real options, once the merchant banks and the arms-dealers have made their choices. In the daily lives of ordinary people there may be very little choice as to whether one wears Bata}
\]

\(^905\) Anderson and Rolandsen, ‘Violence as politics’, p. 545.
shoes, joins a fundamentalist church, or joins an ethnically based militia and dies for it. The only certainty is a pragmatic one, that you may have to do it.  

This chapter demonstrates these tensions, between imagined radical new worlds, the pragmatism of a violent labour economy, the determinism of wartime practicalities, constraints on immediate personal futures and actions, and the quotidian efforts of “getting by.”

Spy stories

Accounts of subversive political action post-1983 broadly involve either returning to the south or recruiting guerrilla fighters, propaganda production, political parties, and seditious “New Sudan”-based youth groups. This style of “sedition” by southerners in Khartoum – like the binary of “spy” versus “collaborator” – has a long and dubious history, particularly in accounts of politics from a minority of male political elites. There are few (and differing) opinions on the character and legitimacy of this explicit “political activity” until the 1970s, and very little information on, or analysis of, Khartoum-based political subversion since then. It would be relatively easy to build an image of a vibrant and coordinated subversive political movement in Khartoum, thanks to the availability and intense revolutionary intent of “opposition” documents, such as the NDA and Communist Party archives in Amsterdam, the occasional bombastic political party or student manifesto in national archives, and the emphatic descriptions of organised spy cells in many politicians’ accounts of Khartoum in the 1980s and 1990s, homogenised as covert SPLM activity under other names. Post-facto oral histories similarly contain spy stories that demonstrate the impact of dominant national narratives about the war and political independence, and situate the teller as part of a

---


907 These accounts are always by men: R, a young woman, pointed this out, 2 September 2013.

908 For one of the more ambitious accounts of this subversive history, see Abbas, ‘Growth of Black Political Consciousness in Northern Sudan.’ There is substantial material available in the Communist Party, National Democratic Alliance and Amnesty International archives, all held in the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.

909 For some examples of these, see chapter one.

910 EBK, 12 September 2013; JUA, 1 November 2013; NB, 18 October 2013.
specific and implicitly united fight against discrimination and marginalisation – in their words – that was aimed explicitly at the now-achieved independence.

Throughout research, I heard stories of spying and subversion explicitly for the war effort that chime with Howell’s description of late 1970s work more closely.\footnote{Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan.’} These stories, primarily of transferring information to “the opposition”, involved figures from major SPLA and SAF commanders and civil servants down to market traders and chiefs. Although mostly about men, I heard several stories of women employed to pass maps and stolen information to contacts in Darfur and Kordofan through travelling on buses with notes hidden in their vaginas.\footnote{JW 18 October 2013; AMA, 9 August 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; AT 14 April 2013; a woman also noted this: AMA, 9 August 2013.} As in Howell’s notes, code names were used to arrange for people, such as medical doctors, to travel to join rebel movements, particularly through NGO workers in the “transition area.”\footnote{AB, 12 August 2013.} This work was made particularly “subversive” – for my benefit, at least – by giving code names for spy work. The most dramatic was “Black Fox” - named in English and translating as \textit{awan col} in Dinka – which allegedly consisted of seven southern Sudanese government staff, broadly working in “security”, buying information and transferring it abroad; ‘this money [was] coming from a secret place, so no need to mention it.’\footnote{PKKM, 9 August 2013.} The two members I spoke to said that they passed information on armaments and troop movements for SPLA ambushes from the 1980s (which seems improbable) to 1995.\footnote{PKKM, 9 August 2013; also MMD, 17 August 2013.} One member explained that the name of operation changed to \textit{Diin Ajer} (“The [concrete] stone religion”) in 1996, as a new reincarnation.\footnote{MMD, 17 August 2013. The SPLA apparently called it \textit{Katip Ajer}, “the Stone Battalion”.} This organisation also had internal spy names. One “alternative name”, \textit{Mony Boc Kaliec Wel},\footnote{These spellings are from interviewees.} meant in its owner’s words

‘... that the night is pregnant for something that is invisible. ... I write the letter and put that name, and when they find that letter they cannot get such a man! [sic]’\footnote{MMD, 17 August 2013.}
Diin Ajer returned in another interview with an Equatorian ex-Khartoum resident, with the narrative starting in 1995, involving high-ranking South Sudanese officials working within the Khartoum regime sending information\(^{919}\) to the SPLA. ‘They will say [that] this news, we [got] it from Diin Ajer! [Laughs]’\(^{920}\) Another man, in explaining the name Diin Ajer, summarised the neat binary duplicity of the double agent:

NK Why was it called Diin Ajer?
PK You know because, what we say – is not what we do. Like we told the northerners – we belong to [the] government of Omer Bashir, we are squatters, we are against [the] SPLA, and we are ready to fight [the] SPLA. But what we say is not what we are doing. We told them something, we do something different.
NK So why “concrete”?
PK [Because] that stone [is so hard that] you cannot break in to know what is inside.’\(^{921}\)

**Jongo**

The most common claim to political activism in the civil war in Khartoum, throughout interviews in Aweil and Juba, was participation in jongo. Jongo is a colloquial Sudanese Arabic term for casual or seasonally employed agricultural workers, employed generally in weeding, and living as squatters in settlements along the Sudanese agricultural belt of Gedarif and Kordofan.\(^{922}\) While there are many English and Arabic-language analyses of the social politics and migrant networks of the Sudanese workers on agricultural schemes in this region, the term was used in two ways by people in Aweil and Juba:

‘Is it jongo for work or the jongo that goes to Ethiopia? ... So the jongo were the workers who go into agricultural scheme for the work, and that is also where they get that SPLA jongo. So when you go to [the] agriculture scheme, you leave the field

---

\(^{919}\) JA, 8 September 2013.
\(^{920}\) Ibid.
\(^{921}\) PKKM, 9 August 2013.
\(^{922}\) See Magdi El Gizouli, ‘South Sudanese labour: refill the “kambo”’, *Sudan Tribune*, 8 October 2012.
and then you go to Ethiopia to join the army. And that is why they were called *jongo*. This *jongo* work in the Gezira was part of explanations of black movement and survival in wartime northern Sudan. By the early 1990s, the areas up to the Ethiopian border, via agricultural schemes and trade routes, was a well-known path to potentially get investment capital for businesses in Khartoum. This movement for trade and labour was the basis for the more political outcomes of *jongo*. Most people associated *jongo* with the political movement of information and, increasingly, people. Because roads back to many areas of the south were blocked or too dangerous to pass, people – mostly men, but some women – would ‘go underground’ to Gezira, Gedarif, south to Kordofan, or into Ethiopia, and information would travel through these networks.

This apparent *jongo* project – with no real leadership or common system emerging over the course of research, despite several claims to management – was explicitly articulated as semi-organised recruitment and travel to “the SPLA.” Two men explained:

‘whoever became set [on going] – goes to mobilise the rest of his colleagues in order to find a way to Gedarif. … Setness [sic] comes as a result of the war, when your brother has been killed in the south, and the rest of your relatives, then you become set and you intend to go. Sometimes your father will be killed; when you heard about that, also you involve into the group. … we are not the ones to select them but they came alone, yeah, when they feel set is when they come and report themselves that they wanted to go this way. And for them they keep on counting the number until they reach 100, and then they give money and send them to Gedarif. … when they reached, because there was a certain market where they meet, so these people when they went there they met some other Dinka and they know where these people stay and they go to them. … it is the market, at the border, and sometimes we visit

923 WDAA, 17 August 2013; also explained by DCD, 15 July 2013. PDA (21 August 2013) was a *jongo* worker in Gezira for 24 years.
924 GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; PKKM 9 August 2013. This is borne out by statistics on cane-cutter in Gezira from a sample survey conducted by Hassaballa Omer Hassaballa in 1991: people from Darfur made up 52.4 per cent, Upper Nile 8.9 per cent, Equatoria 3.6 per cent, Bahr el Ghazal 10.1 per cent, and White Nile 10.3 per cent of labourers. ‘Displacement and migration as a consequence of development policies in Sudan,’ SAD 940/5/2/34-50, 45.
925 LLAA, 3 June 2013.
926 DCD, 15 July 2013; also GDA, 22 June 2013. News was also transferred via southern workers in the civil service: GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013.
927 It is unclear to which factions or divisions.
to go as *jongo* also, as workers, we visit that place as workers and we come back. So the time we went to north, we walk around at the whole country, we know all the corners and the borders of the Sudan with Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{928}

This “setness”, for many, was a generic point across accounts, a moment of personal contextualisation rooted in a personal loss in the war during their time in Khartoum, such as hearing of a raid on a local village or a significant loss of cattle. One man said that – having seen familial marked cattle for sale in Omdurman – many men, including himself, wanted to go to Ethiopia to join the fighting.\textsuperscript{929} Most of the people I met who stated that they went to join the SPLA through travelling via Ethiopia, or whose family members went, travelled in 1995 or 1996.\textsuperscript{930} This apparently included men and women, from better-off as well as poor families.\textsuperscript{931} One man laughingly admitted that he reached the (dangerous) border area but was too frightened to cross, so came back to Khartoum.\textsuperscript{932}

As a broad process of information-passing, conscientisation, radicalisation, spying and recruitment, *jongo* had a plethora of affiliate organisations and claims to responsibility; individual or familial decisions about return and volunteering for guerrilla combat were framed within a wider, formalised recruitment to an imagined umbrella SPLA. Despite the apparent informality of this movement, many members of organisations cited in the previous chapters – including the Dinka Cultural Society, St Pauls Community, and Akut Jieng – claimed *jongo* as a core aim of their work:\textsuperscript{933} “we have so many officers now, they are still calling us teachers [laughs].”\textsuperscript{934} Most were keen to define three periods of “Jongo battalions” recruitment. Jongol 1, the oldest and least organised, was dated by several people to the time of Sadiq al Mahdi in roughly 1989,\textsuperscript{935} with Jongol 2 in 1992 to 93,\textsuperscript{936} and Jongol 3, the

---

\textsuperscript{928} GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; LLAA gave a similar account, 3 August 2013.

\textsuperscript{929} AT, 8 June 2013; also SAK, 3 July 2013.

\textsuperscript{930} For example, APA’s cousin went to join Jongol 2 in 1996 after spreading Akut Kuei songs and becoming frightened for his life; APA, 21 July 2013. Other accounts from MDWR, 21 August 2013; SA went to join Jongol 1 in 1998 after he graduated, but returned directly to Aweil and tried to support the SPLA regionally (8 August 2013).

\textsuperscript{931} SAK, 3 July 2013.

\textsuperscript{932} WDAA, 17 August 2013.

\textsuperscript{933} SAK, 3 July 2013; DCS, 11 August 2013.

\textsuperscript{934} DCS, 11 August 2013.

\textsuperscript{935} WDAA, 17 August 2013; GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; AT, 6 August 2013.

\textsuperscript{936} SAK, 3 July 2013; PDA, 21 June 2013.
largest movement, in 1995 to 96. Bashir has two jongos, Sadiq al Mahdi has one jongo. Those who did not travel were part of jongo through recruitment, working alongside more mysterious SPLA organisers in Gedarif, Kassala and Ethiopia, 'sensitising the public, especially the youth... and the sound minded people, who know what is going on.' The National Democratic Alliance, its constituent political parties and its civil servant membership in Khartoum allegedly assisted with routes and funding. Some claimed jongo was mostly made up of Dinka men (and some women), but many others claimed Nuba, Darfur, Blue Nile and Dongola recruitment, which was corroborated by a retired senior SPLA officer in Juba:

'The SPLA also codenamed them as jongo, because they were coming from farms around Gedarif, around Doka, and the eastern Sudan. But the name given to them by the SPLA/SPLM was New Sudan Brigade... because the SPLA wanted to incorporate, the elements of uh – NDA, National Democratic Alliance, and it was to be [the] formation of a national army.'

The description of this jongo movement is a demonstration of the agglomeration of political mobilisation, communication and associational efforts in fighting for “the cause.” This raises several questions: over the practical limits of pan-black activism, the actual aims beyond “fighting for the SPLA” – whatever “the SPLA” politically constituted – and over the extent and shape of political activity. It would be relatively easy to try to classify political activity in this period as a spectrum of action to inaction, and of iconoclastic nationalists to anti-secessionist collaborators. But working “for the SPLA” encompassed a range of motivations and ideologies behind often politically ambiguous actions. This fighting for the

---

937 PKKM, 9 August 2013.
938 WDAA, 17 August 2013.
939 AT, 8 June 2013.
940 SAK, 3 July 2013.
941 DKLK, 21 August 2013; SA, 8 August 2013.
942 PKKM, 9 August 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013.
943 EBK, 12 September 2013; EBK, a high-ranking military officer, reported that Darfur people made up most of the jongo recruitment, which began in 1994. The cohorts he led were then graduated in 1995, and became the New Sudan Brigade in 1997.
945 This was noted in Khartoum by similar-minded revolutionaries: Gizouli, ‘South Sudanese labour.’
SPLA and/or “the south” is a point of confusion in these interviews; a lot of what people explained as pro-SPLA work – such as holding political discussions in beer houses – apparently had very little to do with actually directly helping the SPLA, or even participating in any material way in the civil war effort. Most stories of spying were not grand dramas, but were small acts of rebellion, insubordination, or open discussion of the war - all dangerous in the Khartoum context.

**Fighting for the South**

The actions described under the *jango* banner in the mid-1990s chime with what Howell records as underground southern political activity in 1978, ‘mainly concerned with passing messages about what was happening in the South, and also in Khartoum, to the movement outside [Sudan]’:

‘Several informants have claimed that a fairly well-disciplined cell system was in operation inside the Sudan in which only three or four people were known to each other with one person “linking” with another cell. Certainly, small groups operated, but there appears to have been quite widespread knowledge about who were the most important links and which senior southern administrators were sympathetic and which were not... [these men] helped people to escape the country when it was felt necessary to do so, and when there was a request from outside that a particular person was needed...’

Interviews about the 1980s to 2000s gave similar descriptions of political cell networks, through chains of individual links and concealed identities, and clandestine meetings in cars and churches, coming out one by one for security. Overall, though, meetings appeared to be primarily about passing information:

‘if the movement got any information, then the leaders can call us, [saying] “you take this information into the grassroots so that they can know information”... when the people are fighting in [certain] areas, then they say – last night there was fighting

---

[that] took place in this area against [X], ...like [what] took place in Torit, the last [time], they said “Torit is captured by our people, then now we returned it back.”

Many people produced minutes, records and descriptions of seminar circuits and political meetings held in the schools and church centres detailed in chapters two and three, initially under the aegis of parties such as the United Sudan African Party (USAP), until they were banned. USAP itself was a collective of politicians and parties - whether nominal or well-subscribed - including other “non-southern” parties such as the Communists and Democratic Unionists, and later with rebel Darfur movements such as the United Popular Front, as well as other parties or associations that are untraceable in wider literature and archives. The state crackdown on USAP and other political parties in 1989, although officially driving them “underground”, apparently did not change much in practice, as many less prominent organisers were also employed at Catholic school and church networks, cultural and community organisations, and in local civil service positions. Politicians - many of whom made their living by teaching or working in churches - including James Surur, Joseph Okel, Philip Abbas Ghaboush, Hilary Paul Logali and Toby Maduot visited schools and churches to take part in discussions. As today, in the mid- to late 1990s students in both state and private schools formed their own versions of political parties, including the Sudan African National Union, the DUP, NCP, African National Front, the Communist party and Democratic Salvation Front, where they debated national politics relatively freely. Attendees and participants were not just the educated, male or young, but included illiterate market workers and women. Most “meeting places” were in people’s homes.

Many people who attended these meetings through the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s summarised their organisers as the National Democratic Alliance, which apparently started being a force locally in the Khartoum suburbs in 1992, supposedly taking over from these

948 DCD, 12 August 2013.
949 The Democratic Unionist Party had southern members; DKLK, 21 August 2013.
950 ADA, 13 August 2013.
951 SA, 8 August 2013; DKLK, 21 August 2013.
952 DCD, 12 August 2013.
953 DCD, 15 July 2013.
954 DKLK, 21 August 2013.
955 DKLK, 21 August 2013; AAD, 14 August 2013.
956 JW, 18 October 2013, among many other accounts.
“banned” parties. Established as an exile opposition coalition by twelve political parties – including many of the above – and fifty-one unions in October 1989 following the coup, the NDA is broadly characterised as a failure, although its army, under SPLA-affiliated control, was active on the Ethiopian border in 1996. NDA’s elite political coalition fragmented from 1999, but the organisation continued in theory and name. From a local perspective within Khartoum, the NDA was at least nominally a forum for these politicians, parties, discussants and informants to transmit and debate politically sensitive information.

Other organisations similarly claimed revolutionary positions, even if their actions were broadly informative and internal. The most explicitly revolutionary and “pro-SPLA” in accounts of Khartoum was the African National Front (ANF), which was incorporated into the SPLM as part of the Youth League after 2005. Its leadership was mostly drawn from university students and graduates, as well as those who could be classified as “middle-class” in Khartoum, such as teachers, legal clerks and clergy, many of whom now live and work in regional towns in South Sudan. Two now-prominent ex-students of a Khartoum-based university said that they (re?) established the ANF with a group of students in the late 1990s, using university records to find notes on the founding of the “original” Southern Students Welfare Front in 1958 as a means of establishing themselves as part of this student heritage. Its political debates were intense, with screenings of propaganda videos and performances of rebel songs. Membership included northern, Nuba and Darfur students, as well as students from the Communist party, although there were tensions and splits, for instance between the Nuer/Shilluk and Dinka sections in 1991. Much like the NDA, the ANF was explicitly a conglomeration of political ideas and aims. It is a shelter

---

957 DCD, 12 August 2013.
958 Lesch and Fadl (eds.), Coping with torture, p. 2; Johnson, The root causes of Sudan’s civil wars, pp. 122, 138.
959 ‘Sudan: National Democratic Alliance (NDA)’, Refworld.
960 ADA, 13 August 2013.
961 Ibid.
962 JGRN, 28 June 2013; YM, 10 September 2013.
963 ADA, 13 August 2013; ADA provided me with a battered copy of SPLA songs, written in Sudanese Arabic and containing a lot written by Nuba and Darfur authors, specifically in support of the SPLA’s pan-Sudanese revolution.
964 YM, 10 September 2013; JGRN, 28 June 2013.
965 JGRN, 28 June 2013.
that student southerners are hiding themselves [under] to fight the system... the ANF is the umbrella.\footnote{JGRN, 28 June 2013.} The Nilein University ANF group organised one of the only explicitly documented “SPLA” actions in Khartoum in 2002, detailed by two ex-members – both detained afterwards – in South Sudan, and protested in Amnesty International Urgent Actions at the time. One man, now a farmer and teacher, explained:

‘We raised the SPLM flag in Nilein University, [me] and some other groups. We made a celebration, [an] anniversary of the SPLA. ...We raised it up [on the] university campus, and we were arrested, we were twenty-five in number. [We] spent twenty two days in jail in security cells. ...We denied all the accusations that we belonged to the SPLA.'\footnote{DKLK, 21 August 2013; YM, 10 September 2013. These events are corroborated by Amnesty International reports ‘AFR 540092002 SUDAN UA 15402 Fear for safety: incommunicado detention: possible Prisoners of Conscience (POCs): 25 students - members of the African National Front (ANF)’, May 2002, and ‘SOUDAN: 25 étudiants membres du Front national africain (FNA): Further information on UA 154/02’, July 2002, AI Secretariat archives, Amsterdam.}

Presenting all this activity as ‘recruiting the battalions’ disguised the fact that most of this political activism was focused on talking.\footnote{PKKM, 9 August 2013.} As Howell observed in the early 1970s, ‘above all, [this] was a means of bringing southerners into contact with each other... [this] reinforced loyalties and provided an important boost to morale.'\footnote{Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, pp. 196–198.} These various political parties, debating societies and house meetings took on this subversive ‘underground cells work,’ after the shutting down of open political discussion in the early 1990s.\footnote{YM, 10 September 2013.} These groups discussed various potentially realistic political futures, making people turn their “hardened hearts” into action of some form, even if in the form of talking.

‘When we talked to non-northerners, we talked about what is our right and what is not our right, and [this was] also struggling – it means you are fighting. Because the person is supposed to find the right [sic]. When he find the right from us, then he has to join us. That is how we normally work. ... So you talk to one person, and that one will go to talk with another person, and on and on. Until the information has intensified the whole of the community [sic].'\footnote{LLAA, 15 August 2013.}
Access to information, and the ability to discuss and debate this information, was a deeply subversive act in its own right, especially in Khartoum by the mid-1990s. Security forces conducted raids on private homes and offices, confiscated books, and detained at least one person for the unauthorised possession of a fax machine. Academics and political observers have long criticised Sudanese domestic opposition politics as a “talking shop”, but the activities of these political associations were all “just talk” because that was considered to be fighting, in an active political debate over how to mobilise political community, and on what lines.

The mobilisation of rebel consciousness, ambiguity and “tricking” the opponent constituted subversive action – even if the actions were themselves not visibly subversive. Political action could involve playing to parochial stereotypes to avoid violence: ‘that is why we pretend to be cooperative with them, in order [that they do] not aggress [sic] our people. … For us we went to [the centre of Khartoum like] those who went to the forest [like rural villagers], [not] like those who are going to the town.’ Conversion and collaboration could be justified this way: ‘[they] can bribe me, to give me food, and I can give [it to] my brother – and [then] I did nothing.’

A demonstration of this alternative conception of political activism is the most cited “successful” example of this “fighting the system” in the mid-1990s. This was not a self-designated political party or “spy cell”, but the song group Akut Kuei, whose published work formed part of the canon of the last chapter. Akut Kuei – literally meaning “Eagle Group” in Dinka, as a coded reference to SPLA battalion names – is a good example of the ambiguities of membership, structure and intent within this “political work” in Khartoum in this period. Many people gave a variety of histories for the group, many of which do not accord with the more individualistic account of one of the songwriters and singers of the two-man group, as the name Akut Kuei and many of their songs have been appropriated and reinvented by various young Dinka men and some women, and translated into Nuer and Shilluk versions,

---

972 Rone, *Behind the red line*, pp. 161–162.
973 LAM, 8 June 2013; similar stories were told by LLBK about returning to the south in the late 1990s through Abdel Baggi Ayii Akol’s territories in Southern Kordofan, 19 October 2013.
974 APA, 21 July 2013.
across East Africa and further afield. Various other prominent Dinka writers, as well as some Nuer activists and singers, were included by Akut Kuei fans in their lists of members of its core ‘committee.’ All – including the founding member – agreed that Akut Kuei was formed for the purposes of jongo, ‘to teach people.’

‘They used to hold occasions, celebrations, in places in Jabarona and even in Comboni ground... they used to sing these songs so that the youth can hear them, [so] they will rebel. These songs, they are the ones that led to the rebellion of battalion called jongo in the SPLA.’

Akut Kuei was then “betrayed” by “Dinka politicians,” who translated two particular songs that insulted southern politicians “collaborating” with the government. One of its founders has a prominent scar on his shoulder from a period in detention in Khartoum, before he moved to Egypt.

Akut Kuei were ‘like a party’ in Khartoum because their focus was on political motivation and communication; they arguably were one of the most successful political groups, as their songs are well-known in Kampala, Nairobi, Sydney and London. Their songs (and other songs ascribed to them) project plural, concentric ideas of inclusion and mutual support under umbrella concepts of marginalisation, historic powers and traditions – often under pan-ethnic or regional labels such as Dinka or Equatoria – and blackness, attempting to delineate the constitution of potential political communities. For instance, the song “Our leader Garang Mabior has liberated our country, so let’s turn our eyes to it, all of us,” written by an immediate forerunner to the artists of Akut Kuei, explains

975 A few people said that the member I spoke to had died in Australia. This translation work was noted by several people, and English translations of Akut Kuei’s song lyrics are often used online, and cited as key source material, for instance a commenter on the online article by Hamid Eltgani Ali, ‘Darfur war crimes, changes in demographic composition, and ethnic displacement,’ Sudan Tribune, 1 October 2012: ‘if you know someone that can translate the songs in Akut-Kuei’s Cassette for you from Thuongjang/Dinka to Arabic or English, please look for this cassette.’

976 DKLK, 4 July 2013; APA, 21 July 2013.

977 APA, 21 July 2013.

978 DKLK, 21 August 2013; also DCS, 11 August 2013.

979 Named by APA, 21 July 2013; DCD, 12 August 2013.

980 APA, 21 July 2013; Kuei songs generally agreed to be some of the best; ‘they had very good songs – even now they are present here in the cassettes, we have them.’ DKLK, 21 August 2013.

981 lit. “Banyda Garang Mabior acii panda, bei bei ok acok onyin thin eben.”
Banyda Garang Mabior aci panda bei bei
Our leader Garang Mabior has liberated our country
Banyda Kiir Mayar acii panda bei bei
Our leader Kiir Mayar has liberated our country
Banyda Abuk Abuk acil panda bei bei
Our leader Abuk Abuk has liberated our country
Panda Rumbek;
Our country Rumbek;
Panda Mading Aweil;
Our country Mading Aweil;
Panda Wau;
Our country Wau;
Acii tek thok
They are not different
E pandan tonken
It is the same country.982

Labelling people, or their parties, as either for “secession or unity” was always too reductionist a paradigm for explaining political ideas, “southern” or otherwise. These political discussion forums were more heterogeneous:

‘We [had] a lot of freedom to research for ourselves. We were not confined to certain things... because we were given these freedoms of research, not like normal political limits.’983

 Debates over definitions of a political constituency for a future polity were long-standing in Khartoum, for instance the torturous definition of the predominantly Fur, Nuba and Beja USALF constitution in the mid-1970s, which included ‘all pure black Sudanese in and outside the Sudan’, and also ‘any federal minded Arab Sudanese.’984 Documents from the 1980s and 1990s emphasise this growing negotiation of political affiliations among the dissident organisations in Khartoum;985 ‘we were just [discussing]: how can black people unite?’986 People counted friends in political discussions from Darfur, greater Equatoria and eastern regions of Sudan,987 but these friendships were part of a brokering of the limits of practical political affiliation – broadly between ideas of specific regional national self-rule, with the ethnic and territorial border disputes that this entailed; broader ideas of black Sudanese nationalism, which necessitated a delineation of “Arab” Sudanese; and the more inclusive

---

982 Atak Deng Deng, 2003, recorded 17 August 2013, translated with the artist.
983 YM, 10 September 2013.
984 ‘Constitution of USALF,’ Comboniani, A/90.
985 For example, see Africa Confidential, 15 October 1971, TNA FCO 39.901.
986 SA, 8 August 2013; also AMA, 9 August 2013; PKKM, 9 August 2013.
987 DKLK, 21 August 2013.
ideas of pan-Africanism, which were generally with university students’ associations. At a 1999 workshop in Oxford titled “The SPLM’s New Sudan vision and Southern Sudanese nationalism: are they compatible?” Lazarus Leek Mawut noted fears ‘that southern Sudan is being made to sacrifice too much for something very illusive [sic] or too ambitious,’ and that the presence of “Northerners” – including Nuba and Ngok Dinka – ‘is resented by a few southern Sudanese “ultra nationalists”.’ But in Khartoum, he noted, ‘public rallies, literature and discussions’ invoked a spectrum of local and historic ethnic figures in their descriptions of a broader and wider regional nationalism, including ‘Mayen Mathiang, Sultan Yambio, Prophet Ngundeng, Prophet Awuo Kon, Biar Abit, Kon Anok, Sultan Akuei, Chief Lohide, Prophet Arianhbit, Tafeng, and Ali Gwatala [sic],’ and Leek Mawut asked:

‘If the people of Abyei, [the Nuba Mountains] and [southern Blue Nile]... are clear of what the are fighting for, how come that the teacher does not know what he has been teaching his students?’ Similar criticisms of both the SPLA and their own leadership in the late 1990s and early 2000s can be found in the Nuba political record. This Nuba southern affiliation centred on the figure of Philip Abbas Ghaboush, who had a long history of connections among southern and Nuba populations in Khartoum since 1970s as a priest and 1980s as a politician, and who attended various southern community graduation ceremonies. By contrast, most informants in Aweil and Juba dated affiliations with Darfur groups to later in the early 2000s, coinciding with the publication of the “Black Book,” before which point many people excluded Darfuris from their understandings of “black Sudan”.

---

988 YM, 10 September 2013.
991 CMS Newsletter No. 352, September 1971, SCF A173 Sudan.
992 SA, 8 August 2013; also noted by DCD, 15 July 2013.
994 APA, 21 July 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013.
This discussion over the limits to, variously, alliance, collaboration, affiliation or federation within the common aim of substantive political change fitted within John Garang’s very broad genius, and many people in Aweil and Juba were happy to explain their continued belief in the idea of “New Sudan” and their disappointment with secession. But the problems of creating the political community necessary for a New Sudan were evident, for instance in the common statement that Nuba and Darfur activists needed to join ‘as southerners,’ or the popular description of Nuba and Darfur (and other regions’) political activists as ‘black brothers.’ This struggle over the descriptor for this alternative political community, and the hierarchy implicit in “fitting” black Sudanese communities into a “southern” bloc, was indicative of these tensions over the practical shape of “self-determination.” These discussions involved grey-scales of demands for independence and self-rule, and so struggled with what form these demands would take, and whether this would be together with, in some kind of “affiliation” with, or separate to their “brothers.” Ideas of federalism – as Abel Alier argued in 1999 in a Khartoum student union debate – were unspecific enough to accommodate this pluralism, and were not based on political experience or specificities. The layered affiliations articulated in these communities’ own political literature were similarly difficult to map into a territory, particularly as there was no one conception of “the south” as a region, and the “south” was long defined as a political affiliation as much as a regional line. Those engaged in these debates were aware of these problems, with some activists emphasising the need to incorporate this complexity in any political outcome: ‘there is no short cut in the future.’

995 SA, 8 August 2013; YM, 10 September 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013.
996 APA, 21 July 2013; MDWR, 21 August 2013; DKLK said that Philip Abbas Ghaboush is a ‘southern leader’, 4 July 2013.
997 ABA, 16 August 2013; DCD, 15 July 2013; also noted by DCS, 11 August 2013; SA, 8 August 2013.
999 For example, the African Liberation Front manifesto, written by George Akumbek Kwanai, c. 18 August 1965: ‘all the Southern Sudanese residing outside the southern Sudan shall only enter the Free Republic of Azania after their acceptance has been a successful parliamentary bill’ ... ‘those southerners who reside outside the Free Republic of Azania but contributing directly to the overthrow of the hostile regime shall be given free admission to the Free Republic of Azania as soon as the borders are free’. TNA FO 371.190417 VS1015.47.
1000 Kwawang to Moi, SAD.89/10/110.
Space, compromise, and “selling-out”

These were attempts to discuss the form and shape of a potential future national community, which were frustrated by the limits to pan-Sudanese affiliation and imagination, and by the economic and political practicalities of survival in civil war. But these activists and spies specifically considered themselves to be fighting for self-determination, despite the heterogeneity and confusion of their practical aims for the future. In their explanations of their “pro-SPLA, pro-south” work, they described themselves in antithesis to other southerners’ actions, rather than to the northern regime or northerners in general. In this analysis, these southerners were either blind men or stooges: the mazariin, the betrayers. These “sell-outs,” “stooges,” and “traitors” were historic villains in southern political culture, and figures common to civil wars. An Akut Kuei song from the early 1990s begins:

I have no problem with foreigners
I have no issue with foreigners
This is between me and the black man -
The black man who is making himself the Arab of the South.

These sell-outs were described several times in terms of a common child’s tale of the lueth fish in the River Lol in northern Bahr el Ghazal; the lueth looks terrifying, but has no teeth, and (stupidly and gullibly) told this to the crocodile. The song that apparently led to the

---

1001 Quoting LLBK, 19 October 2013. Metaphors about sight and blindness run throughout the vernacular literature cited here, for example Dut Anyak Dit’s 1993 poem Macar Anyaar (“The black buffalo”):

Coor kuc kapuoth to tueng, The blind that doesn’t know the times ahead,
Coor dot aduok yic, The blind that sees what is on his plate,
Coor ci puoth thou, coor ngueen alei. The blind whose heart cannot think - a stranger is better than him.
Coor pir rim, rim kacken. A blind man surviving on blood, the blood of his people.

1002 Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 7.
1003 Vivienne Barton, interview with Joseph Oduho, recorded in ‘Half a million dead so far in forgotten war,’ Sunday Nation, 4 May 1969 TNA FCO 39.480.
1005 Kalyvas, ‘The Ontology of “Political Violence”’, p. 467; see Edward Thomas on the wording of the SPLM constitution in 1983, which focused most of its vitriol onto such sell-outs: South Sudan, p. 111.
1006 Akut Kuei, Cien kedie ka alei (Lit. ‘I have no problem with foreigners’; the Dinka is mis-spelt in the original).
1007 Primary 4 Reader, p. 3; and Dut Anyak Dit, Adhuom Akan! (“There is a hole!”).
detention and flight of the Akut Kuei songwriters in 1996 specifically targeted these collaborators:

What will happen to them?
Will their testicles not be cut off, when we start stabbing at the Arabs?\footnote{1008}

But in discussion, asking about these “blind” collaborators provoked embarrassment, silence, evasion, frustration, equivocation and amusement.\footnote{1009} Many were sympathetic.\footnote{1010} These collaborators were – according to two “political activists” as above – ‘the people who’ve mixed everything,’ and were ‘just in between.’\footnote{1011} Again, this “internal political divide” was far less zero-sum than it was presented.

The second part of this chapter examines these described “sell-outs,” who did not justify their political actions in the same terms as the “spies” of the first half, or who held a different understanding of what “working for the war” meant. This is an exploration of the concern among southerners in Khartoum in the 1970s, noted by Howell, over the dangers of “false autonomy”:\footnote{1012} what was acting and thinking truly independently in the politically ambiguous, dangerous, and deeply confusing political context of the factional 1990s and 2000s? And was it possible to find the space for an independent discussion of alternative future polities?

The room for discussion among the radical National Democratic Alliance and African National Front umbrella in this period was dependent on safe space and distance from the Khartoum state. Most people were highly supportive of southerners or “brothers” working in the Sudanese state system in some form: ‘a person who is working in the government, and who

\footnote{1008} This is a reference to a western Dinka story about a hunting party in time immemorial: the hunting party killed an elephant, and while the group were butchering it slowly from the outside, one impatient and greedy member of the party climbed into the belly of the elephant to steal the best organs. However, one of the other men’s knives cut into the elephant and cut off the thief’s testicles – which, as the story emphasises, was his own fault. Akut Kuei, ‘Ku Na Kocka?’ (‘What of these people?’).

\footnote{1009} Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; AMA, 9 August 2013; AAD, 14 August 2013; RRL, 3 September 2013; and many other discussions over 2013.

\footnote{1010} For example, DCD explained that people were “exhausted” in Khartoum; 15 July 2013.

\footnote{1011} AAD, 14 August 2013; AMA, 9 August 2013.

\footnote{1012} Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 7.
is taking care of the people, is known [as a good person] through what he is doing.\textsuperscript{1013} Many of the “spies” at work in the first half of this chapter were employed by the state at some point, including in the militia barracks of southern politicians, as administrators, or as clerks in the judiciary.\textsuperscript{1014} The most obvious form of this interstitial authority were those formally employed as chiefs or in chiefs’ courts.\textsuperscript{1015} These people, according to one court worker, “became respected by police because they know there is a law.”\textsuperscript{1016}

These chiefs were often less ‘sacrificial’ than pragmatic.\textsuperscript{1017} Duffield described Dinka traditional authorities’ roles in southern Darfur in 2002 as ‘brokers on behalf of the displaced,’ gaining authority through allocating ‘labour, credit and aid’ but also by having the ear of local state security to denounce alleged “SPLA sympathisers.”\textsuperscript{1018} These alternative courts and government liaisons were necessary: many people described complex disputes and violent crimes that were variously ignored, misunderstood, or dealt with punitively, violently or wrongly in the formal government system.\textsuperscript{1019} These people often played valuable roles, such as passing information on private judicial decisions or criminal investigations, and arranging the return of abducted adults and children in southern Darfur and in agricultural schemes.\textsuperscript{1020} As in the 1960s, these people in positions of authority – not just chiefs, but in my research all men – were political middlemen, simultaneously both and neither NCP and/or SPLA.\textsuperscript{1021}

Several people discussed the proliferation of chiefs in Khartoum:

\textsuperscript{1013} MDWR, 21 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{1014} RRL, 3 September 2013; AMA, 9 August 2013; DCD, 12 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{1015} These southern intermediaries have been discussed briefly in chapter three, but here I am focusing on their political positionality; for a discussion of the ambiguous position of chiefs specifically, see Leonardi, \textit{Dealing with government in South Sudan}, p. 140.
\textsuperscript{1016} LAM, 5 June 2013.
\textsuperscript{1017} Tuttle, ‘Life is Prickly’, p. 49. Explained by SAK, 3 July 2013, and ABA, 16 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{1018} Duffield, ‘Aid and Complicity’, p. 96; a similar form of brokerage is described in Khartoum by Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, p. 251.
\textsuperscript{1019} DKLK, 4 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{1021} Leonardi, \textit{Dealing with government in South Sudan}, p. 141; DKLK, 21 August 2013.
‘A person – just [could say] alone that “I’m a chief” to Bashir, and he accepts [sic]. And [at] the refugee conference, ...they just express that “I’m a chief,” and people [would then try] to pay at least some little money [to them], and then you will be accepted as a chief.’

De Geoffroy noted this, describing three forms of sultans: those who came as chiefs with displaced populations, those appointed in Khartoum and those paid by the government and accepted because of their connections. For Aweil residents, these categories were too prescriptive, and these apparently separate or potentially antagonistic “types” would often mutually organise; for instance, Ibrahim recorded in 1990 that

‘The squatters of Abu Siid have elected Ali Faragalla, a Mondari Muslim to be their Sheikh and speaker before the town council... Ali is being supported by a committee of 16 Sheikhs representing the main ethnic groups of the shanty town.’

This mutual organisation was formalised in the government-recognised Ashara Wilayat (Arabic for “Ten States”) court system, a persistent reference throughout work in rural and urban Aweil, and part of the various “traditional courts” invested in by the Bashir regime. Many people gave different dates for the formal establishment of Ashara Wilayat, from 1988 to 2000, with various branches including a major one at Lafa’a, and various leaders’ names. But while this court was part of the longer tradition of collaborative inter-tribal justice systems running in Khartoum, all associated Ashara Wilayat specifically with Khartoum government recognition of court judgements, and therefore the coercive authority to resolve cases. For many people, there was ‘no alternative’ to this court mostly because of language barriers and finance.

---

1022 MDWR, 21 August 2013.
1023 de Geoffroy, ‘Fleeing war and relocating to the urban fringe’, p. 525.
1025 For discussion of the role of chiefs and sultans in general, see chapter three, pp. 112-115.
1026 PDA, 21 June 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; NAJ, 8 June 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; AAY, 11 July 2013.
1027 According to the “formal codes”, as one man called it, of Nuer “Fangak punishment,” or Dinka “Wanh Alel punishment”: NAJ, 8 June 2013.
1028 DKLK, 4 July 2013.
These heterogeneous authorities blurred distinctions between traditional, military and formal government, both ‘being and opposing the state.’ The logical extreme of this necessity for local governance and the securing of political space were the Southern Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), including Riek Machar, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, Paulino Matip and others, active at various times and with various resources. These various militarised authorities were not only regime-funded military “warlords,” but active organisers of their own parallel systems of governance in Khartoum, including their own prisons, barracks and offices, and were formalised into the SSDF with the 1997 Khartoum Agreement. As with their individualised support from the regime and the SAF, these groups were a loose coalition at best. Two court members in Aweil explained that these militia leaders ‘sat alone between the northern army and the southern army.’

In early interviews, everyone I spoke with described these men and their followers as ‘bad people,’ ‘dead-hearted people... who do not know about what will happen in the future.’ ‘Most southerners, they don’t like them, because they [destroyed] the south.’ For the Dinka Malwal residents of northern Aweil, explanations of the SSDF commanders’ work in Khartoum centred on their local representative, Sultan Abdel Baggi Ayii Akol, who comes from Malual Bai in Aweil East, and who – with his sons – commanded a militia along the railroad from Aweil into Darfur, with a main base in Meiram. Young observed ‘local SSDF’s commanders’ tendency to carve out their own semi-independent domains’ in the border regions of the south, and this extended to Khartoum. As a less-powerful affiliate of the now-deceased Nuer commander Paulino Matip in Khartoum’s Lafa’a Gufa’a area, Ayii based himself in Jabarona, before the formal recognition of his militia, which gained strength

---

1031 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; MDWR, 21 August 2013.
1033 GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013.
1035 DKLK, 21 August 2013.
1036 Ibid. Very little is known about Abdel Baggi’s militia and organisation: Young, The South Sudan defence forces, pp. 22, 36.
1037 Young, The South Sudan defence forces, p. 17.
by the early 2000s.  

Ayii had established himself earlier, first in northern Bahr el Ghazal and then Abyei, then as an authority in Jabarona as 'a half way between Dinka and the Arabs', according to chiefs in a returnee settlement outside Aweil. As one young teacher also said: 'if people were in the north, you better attach yourself to Ayii, because he has power from Arabs.' Some referred to Ayii as 'our militia.' For a local Aweil administrator, 'this was the positive side.' Along with Paulino Matip, another man said,

'we explained what is happening in our community. They said, leave the case, come to us - show us the problem and we will settle it. And we went to them, we were given some police from these two militiamen, and we reported crimes to them.'

Ayii had military police and vehicles, his own official court stamp recognised by government courts, and jails, in Wad Isein in Mayo and elsewhere – which courts like Ashara Wilayat drew on to implement their decisions. Ayii remained separate from Ashara Wilayat, attending infrequently and resolving larger issues at his own offices; 'even if the security elements want to be asked to come to the villages [sic], [Ayii] is the one to direct them.' These courts were 'separate' from government courts, dealing with 'family matters' and local conflicts. Those who could not pay the court fines, for instance for elopement, would pay Ayii’s court through labour. One man said Ayii had a hibiscus tea farm in Meiram, but many young men would be employed in Ayii’s militia forces, providing paid policing of routes back to the south in the early 2000s. These militarised intermediaries were explained as "necessary evils": 'if you refuse, then you will be killed. ... Some people tried to avoid [them] – but there’s no alternative.' At the same time, Abusharaf noted that Paulino Matip’s

1038 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; APA, 22 July 2013; SA, 8 August 2013.
1039 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013.
1040 D, 22 July 2013.
1041 NAJ, 5 June 2013.
1042 RRL, 3 September 2013.
1043 NAJ, 5 June 2013.
1044 APA, 21 July 2013; GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013.
1045 GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013.
1046 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013.
1047 DCD, 12 August 2013.
1048 LLBK, 19 October 2013.
1049 Chiefs’s meeting, 20 August 2013.
court system was approached with caution by Khartoum locals;\textsuperscript{1050} Ayii’s prisons could also hold “Arabs” who had been found guilty of minor infractions.

The few studies of the SSDF generally characterise the groups as simply local-level organisations tied to the government of Sudan and primarily concerned with the defence of their immediate communities; “[to] the extent that they entertained political objectives it was for the separation of the South and rejection of “New Sudan”.\textsuperscript{1051}

However, in the context of Khartoum discussions, these political objectives were arguably more developed than this lens of “separation/unity” allows. The militarised authorities organised in Khartoum in the late 1990s and 2000s were a form of separatist federal southern ethnic nationalism in practice. Young notes that these factions saw their political administration of controlled areas in the south on regional and ethnic lines as ‘important steps towards the realisation of their goal of southern self-determination.’\textsuperscript{1052} Many leaders worked to find scholarships and employment in Khartoum and abroad for young men from their administered regions.\textsuperscript{1053} Similarly, their courts and administrations in Khartoum were separate but associated, with chiefs from Luo, Dinka, Balanda, Nuba, Nuer and Shilluk groups and clans acting as ethnic representatives.\textsuperscript{1054} These organisations claimed the right to make political and military agreements between ‘their territories’ in the south, and by extension between communities in Khartoum.\textsuperscript{1055}

In this sense, then, actors like Ayii Akol were less co-opted “sell-outs” than their alliance with the Khartoum regime implied. One man remembers Ayii’s openness in ‘criticising the system’, ‘because he was not afraid, because he was in the system already.’\textsuperscript{1056} As Arnold said,

\textsuperscript{1050} Abusharaf, \textit{Transforming displaced women in Sudan}, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{1051} Young, \textit{The South Sudan defence forces}, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{1052} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{1053} JGRN, 28 June 2013.
\textsuperscript{1054} SA, 8 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{1056} ABA, 16 August 2013.
'The SSDF members saw themselves as “true southerners”, as they were seeking full independence for the south, while conversely arguing that the SPLA was the actual “sell-out” to southerners because it had long fought for a unified Sudan.'

More broadly, southern chiefs and state administrators argued for their political integrity on different lines: their “collaboration” with the regime was, for them, an alternative form of this important southern duplicity in Khartoum, a bargain to protect their community or create alternative political spaces of control in the city and the south – such as the government-recognised chiefs’ courts, and the militia leaders based in Khartoum. These “defence forces” and their mixed military-“traditional” administrative structures were a pragmatic and delineated mobilisation of the social and political solidarities implied by the community organisation and education discussed in chapters three and four. Like the spies and rebels of the first part of this chapter, these men were similarly creating safe spaces and alternative ideas of governance and future polities. These ideas found expression from the early 2000s in ideas of ethnic nationalism organised into a South Sudanese “nation of nationalities”, as vague as the black Sudanese federalism of “New Sudan.”

This ethnic nationalism was ideally organised on regional zones of militarised authority and within a federal independent south, an imaginary which persists as a “working model” in southern politics today.

These ideas do not match up to the looser and more collaborative models of mutual identification, as black Sudanese southerners, in the political education of previous chapters, or to the more emancipatory and democratic ideals espoused by the jongo recruiters. But just getting by in Khartoum, and the safe political space necessary to discuss these more inclusive and less violent versions of a potential post-war Sudanese culture, were both dependent on this more ethnicised, exclusive and coercive system of authority. The pan-Sudanese political creativity of the ANF, NDA, USAP and others was reliant on, and ultimately buried by, the practical needs of militarised authority along ethnic and local lines. As one chiefs’ court worker said, ‘these were those who were taking care of the Dinka and

---

southerners in general. If they were not there, people would have lost [everything].”

This authority provided a measured safety, but also, as Duffield observed in southern Darfur in 2001, ‘a guarded atmosphere of dependence and intimidation,’ setting limits to what could be spoken about, organised and imagined within Khartoum.

The awkwardness with which people spoke about Ayii Akol and the vitriol against “sell-outs” did not only conceal the political necessity of “collaboration” on all sides; it also obscured – through its binary view of united pro-SPLA fighters working against the regime and its stooges - deeper histories of the ambiguous, violent and confusing civil wars. “Civil war” was not the descriptor used for a conflict that was, as one teacher put it, ‘not clear to the people,’ but ‘a dark channel.’ Particularly from 1991, at the same time as southern communities were establishing themselves around Khartoum, the conflict was increasingly made up of an impenetrable and baffling array of affiliations, authorities and organisations. In this sense, the National Democratic Alliance, as an apparently coherent entity disguising an incoherent and divided plurality of actors and aims, was much like the Southern Sudan Defence Forces.

Similarly, as Anderson and Rolandsen have pointed out in eastern Africa more widely, conflict was not confined to a structured civil war arena, but was an integral structural force, a banal reality, and a common source of employment. The part-time teachers, writers, students and artists, as well as the politicians of the ANF, NDA and USAP, were as integrated as the rest of the black communities in Khartoum in an impoverished economy with few

---

1059 MDWR, 21 August 2013.
1060 Duffield, ‘Aid and Complicity’, p. 96.
1061 DKLK, 21 August 2013. As veteran politician Peter Adwok Nyaba wrote, ‘during those hard days, it was impossible to tell the truth from mere propaganda.’ Nyaba, Politics of liberation in South Sudan, p. 3.
1062 As exemplified by the Southern Sudan Forum’s confusing coalition in 1999: Samuel Odat, SPLM-United, Programme of Southern Sudan Forum, 29 January 1999, SAD 89/6/15: the Southern Sudan Forum ‘is a new umbrella organisation composed of the SPLM-United, Bahr al-Gazal Group, Bor Group, Southern Sudan United Movement (SSUM), Southern Sudanese internal politicians, community leaders, and a number of SSIM/A commanders: John Kong Chol, Simmon Gatdkowth and others [sic].’
1063 Anderson and Rolandsen, ‘Violence as politics’, p. 546.
routes to financial security, livelihoods or self-improvement. Away from discussions about “sell-outs”, many people acknowledged what they called a ‘coping strategy’.

‘It’s for their sake – they want to live! They have children! People are suffering! No food to eat! If you are given [a] position, ohh, you can go and work, get your money, eat!’

In the context of what seemed an unending and endlessly complex conflict, many people were sympathetic to those who thought ‘that there is not going to be a peace again... they need a good life [so their] children [can study].’ Many vulnerable young men (and some women) – who, in the words of one clerk, ‘[didn’t] have [an] objective’ – were forced or decided to join the SAF, PDFs or local militias, out of financial necessity and a lack of options for personal advancement. For those in secondary education in the 1990s and 2000s, military training and for men a period of national service were compulsory in order to receive a secondary school certificate, and forty-five days' PDF training was mandatory for civil servants, university students, and government-recognised tribal authorities. One man noted that militia membership was financially rewarding, with members taking up to 15 per cent of any revenue. There was not necessarily a clear distinction between military employment, with many men having worked variously in the SAF, SSDF, SPLA (of some form) and the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, often moving with weapons or because of funds and travel needs. Work was migratory and transient; SPLA recruits would leave for Khartoum due to a lack of pay or food, or out of frustration, and then rejoin militias such as Ayii Akol’s, which gave young

1064 RRL, 3 September 2013; APA, 21 July 2013; ADA, 13 August 2013; DKLK, 21 August 2013; DTL, 10 July 2013; GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013.
1065 ABA, 16 August 2013.
1066 DCD, 15 July 2013.
1067 APA, 21 July 2013.
1068 ABA, 16 August 2013.
1069 There are many examples from interviews and sources, for example, MDWR, 21 August 2013; APA, 21 July 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; also see Human Rights Watch Africa, *Children in Sudan*; this was also observed by Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, p. 252.
1070 Rone, *Behind the red line*, pp. 11, 13, 268–292.
1071 APA, 21 July 2013.
1072 For example, JMA, a Luo man now living in Aweil, worked in the SAF for 20 years to support his family, and denied any political opinions on this (12 July 2013).
men access to home areas, weapons, funding, cattle and options for marriage: ‘when they joined that militia they come and take the lady [for] free!’\footnote{DKLK, 21 August 2013.} Similarly, many militia soldiers became SAF, JIU and ultimately SPLA employees under the CPA in 2005 and the Juba Declaration in 2006, when Paulino Matip’s SSDF transferred to the SPLA.\footnote{GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; Arnold, ‘The South Sudan Defence Force’, p. 492.}

This military employment was not necessarily due to personal choice, political machinations or cunning, or possible economic gain; much of this was coercive, contingent and traumatic. Many of the men who had engaged in or submitted to military employment struggled to frame their experiences and choices within their own wider moral frameworks and ideals of political change and community.\footnote{For example, MDWR, 21 August 2013.} For instance, later recruitment to PDF units in 2003 onwards involved horrific calculations of action and responsibility. A man who had been a long-term student, member of the ANF and DUP, and writer in Khartoum, returned to Aweil to become a teacher, and who translated several of the songs in the previous chapter, explained accordingly: ‘if you are lucky to go to Darfur, it’s better [than the South],’\footnote{DKLK, 21 August 2013.} because of the emotional and moral burden of committing violence against fellow southerners; but in Darfur, ‘we have make genocides! We have killed those people very much! ... I witnessed all this, we killed there.’\footnote{DKLK, 4 July 2013.} He later elaborated:

‘I was taken to Darfur section... we were going to liberate Jebel Marra from Abdel Wahid.\footnote{Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur is the original chairman of the Sudan Liberation Army, a Fur and Zaghawa guerrilla movement fighting in part against the Sudan government from 2001; the movement fractured in 2006.} ... Because it was imposed on us that if you don’t go and fight, you will not have your [Sudan] school certificate. ... So we went there and we fight! Because we have no alternative. You will not learn all these years, then you sit [with] zero at the end. You must achieve what you have been struggling for. So...we were not happy! [sic] Even the war in Darfur, we have committed genocide exactly. Because [in] that fighting, ...you don’t love anyone - the children and the women, ...if you put them in a room, you burn it. We [did] this. ... You are recommended to burn everything. ... And if you say I will not fight, they will say you belong to Abdul Wahid! ... [If] you don’t want to fight, then you belong to the security – you will get a firing squad,
according to military orders, they will say – this man is [the] enemy. ... So we are dealing with orders.  

Conclusion

'We attained this freedom as a united people, from the western end of Bahr el Ghazal to the eastern borders of Eastern Equatoria; from Abyei in the North to Nimule in the South.'

The presentation of the Sudanese civil war as unilinear and binary – not just between north and south, but between forces of revolution and justice versus dictatorship, and between an emancipatory secession of “the South” versus an unequal unity of Sudan – has been a useful reconceptualization for the new South Sudanese state. This standard format disguises the many negotiations, both practical and intellectual, over the pragmatic realities of potential political futures. Among southern communities in Khartoum, turning the grey-scales of “moral federalism” into political structures foundered on the limits of political imagination and collaborative space: political relationships were structured and restricted by the economics of civil war. These scales of compromised action and intent, though, meant that – despite being a powerful idea – nobody was a “sell-out.” The “Sudanese civil war” was incorporative and pervasive, challenging definitions of “civilian,” “militia member,” or “SPLM activist”; as an Akut Kuei song said, the civil war context was ‘a disaster that will spare no one.’

Stories of political action in Khartoum illustrate competing ideas of “good work” in the war, in a morally ambiguous field of play: but everyone was ‘still southerners.’

As Kalyvas said, after civil wars, ‘the master narrative of cleavage provides a handy way to ex post facto simplify, streamline, and cover up the war’s ambiguities and contradictions.’

These were not just ambiguities over affiliation, but over the ideological specifics and

1079 DKLK, 21 August 2013.
1080 The Office of the Chairman of the Committee For National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation for South Sudan, working paper, ‘Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation for all South Sudanese,’ July 2013, Juba.
1081 Akut Kuei, Ka Ye Beny Theeth (‘The spearmaster will regret his prophesy’).
1082 APA, 22 July 2013.
1083 Kalyvas, ‘The Ontology of “Political Violence”’, p. 487.
possible outcomes of the conflict, the logical extremes and pragmatic realities of the
previous chapters. The progression towards demands for secession was not clear in practice.
Secession was not a panacea option for most people, and was one aspect of complex
discussions over was what was “achievable”, personally and generally. Many had different
conceptions of “the south”, and how to fight “for” it; ultimately, action was key, and
variously justifiable. Inaction was not:

You are told but you don’t listen
You are shown, but you don’t want to see
This is something even the Dinka deaf have heard,
And the Dinka blind have seen.
So you Dinka, what are you waiting for?
Are you waiting for your paycheck?
Are you waiting for your paycheck?
If it’s your payment
If you’re waiting for your pension
We’ll be like donkeys, just waiting for our paycheck.1084

This wartime action was ambiguous and broadly defined. ‘If you pretended to be a beggar in
Khartoum – you are even affecting their economic situation.’1085 Cheats, thieves and cultural
performers all contributed to the struggle; joining the security services or converting to
Islam could be justified as finding routes to educate your children independently, “for the
south.”1086 These “positive” actions were not always obvious - ‘some people are angry,
unless [they] are educated to understand it.’1087 You ‘cannot act like you are in Bilpam!’1088
This complex self-positioning was explained to me in an example of one man’s uncle, a
mine-layer working for the SAF around Juba.

‘This man used to talk with us... he used to tell us that... in the military – [even] if
you are not happy, you have to pay your loyalty to the orders. This devil, which is
called orders...! ...he was even loyal to the SPLM. If he gets somebody coming from
the south, he used to [tell] him all about the situation, if he [had] money he can give,
[he gave it]. One of his children now is in the SPLA. He’s the one that told [me] that,

1084 Akut Kuei, Jieng ameen wuot (‘Everyone hates the Dinka’).
1085 ABA, 16 August 2013.
1086 Ibid. ABA had worked for Sudan’s National Intelligence Services for a few years.
1087 Ibid.
1088 Bilpam village in Ethiopia was the original SPLA training camp in 1984. ABA, 16 August 2013.
please, I will die in the Arabic army, then you go to Gedarif [with the] Jongō battalion, so that if we die here, you can live there, if you die there, then we can live here. ... He said that we are going to be divided, to divide ourselves. ... So he was a very intelligent old man.¹⁰⁸⁹

Unlike the grand narrative of the civil war, wartime living involved what Ndebele called ‘the sobering power of contemplation, of close analysis, and the mature acceptance of failure, weakness, and limitations.’¹⁰⁹⁰

¹⁰⁸⁹ DKLK, 21 August 2013.
Conclusion

Black Monday

2005 was a fracture in many people's personal histories. This fault line came not with the signing of the CPA, but with the SPLM/A leader John Garang’s death on 30 July 2005 in a helicopter crash. His death came soon after his joyfully emotional visit to Khartoum on 8 July, where he was greeted by hundreds of thousands of people, including many wearing and holding SPLM colours, before his inauguration as Vice-President of Sudan the next day. The options for a “New Sudan” laid out in the CPA seemed at the time increasingly achievable, as a northern Sudanese academic told the press,

‘There was such a huge amount of enmity and bad feelings, you would expect Garang to be killed. But to come to Khartoum, that we never expected.’

Twenty days later, Garang’s death was confirmed by radio early on Monday 1 August.

‘[It] started in the morning, when people hear the news on the radio that Dr John was crashed. ... All the black people, the southerners, they went to the tarmac...’

People took to the streets in what has since been called Black Monday, initially in middle-class suburbs in central Khartoum including Soba, Haj Yousif, al Mamoura and others, with unrest later spreading to the peripheries.

‘As I keep on watching [the silent street]... I heard the sound of people behind the building. SPLM Oyeee! For the first time in Khartoum shouting like this. SPLM Oyeeeee! ... they told me – didn’t you know that Garang is killed?! So they say, he’s killed, so [when] they said that - you get angry very fast. He’s killed?! Who killed him?! So... I joined the fight.’

1091 AT, 8 June 2013; also GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013.
1093 Ibid.
1094 APA, 22 July 2013.
1095 ‘Khartoum following the death of Dr. John Garang’, FIDH, 4 August 2005.
1096 LLBK, 19 October 2013.
'It's the whole of the southern tribe who were fighting. ... It is all even the older people fought also. Only that they don't have guns. ... even [women were] involved in fighting!... After the news that president has crashed – it was announced directly within Dinka community that this, the crash of the president, is in Arabic [sic] hands. ... They went straight to fight... They were really very sad [, so] they moved violently, they need[ed] to kill people even if they are killed, it's okay, it's what they need, they were just striking violently.'

By midday, some of the army and police moved in to contain violence away from factories and major institutions, generally ignoring the poorest suburbs and thus allowing the violence to escalate there; other residents responded by forming vigilante groups.1098 By the Wednesday, soldiers and armed civilians were involved in retributive killings in many of these Western- and Southern-dominated neighbourhoods.1099 Eighty four people were recorded killed by Thursday by the International Committee of the Red Cross, although many people put the count far higher;1100 rumours that a southern militia leader had been killed briefly heightened the violence.1101 By the following week, the death toll was at over 130 people.1102

The fight emphasised the ambiguous lines of the "southern community" in Khartoum. Southerners were not the only people involved in the riots, as Assal observed, with others also targeting 'those identified as members of the riverain elite on an ethnic basis.'1103 One contemporary observer noted:

'Despite reports to the contrary, the residents of Angola and Mandela are not exclusively southern Sudanese – and the rioters were not exclusively southern either.'

---

1097 MTL, 11 July 2013; the gendered point is supported by Khalid Mustafa Medani, 'Black Monday: the political and economic dimensions of Sudan’s urban riot,' *Middle East Research and Information Project*, 9 August 2005.
1100 ‘With 84 dead, Sudan leaders seek calm.’
1101 Ibid.
1103 Quoted in Berridge, “Nests of criminals”, p. 239.
Their ranks included a large contingent from the war-torn western province of Darfur as well as the Nuba Mountains region in the east.\textsuperscript{1104}

This was racial profiling on both sides; while people emphasised that ‘the [Nuba and Darfur residents] were not attacked’ by southern rioters, the Arabs were ‘going to be recognised’,\textsuperscript{1105} and vice versa:

‘[Wednesday] was the day when these Arab people have mobilised themselves, against any black [sic]. Because when they [the Arabs, sic] came... they realised that it wasn’t only South Sudanese, it was [anyone] black against them. It’s true! It was not South Sudanese, it was Nuba, it was Darfur, it was everybody brown, black, against them. ...Now at [that] point, we [were] not talking about South Sudanese anymore, we just talk of black. [Laughs]\textsuperscript{1106}

At the same time, the practical powers of Khartoum’s “southern ethnic militias” came to the fore. Many people noted the importance of Paulino Matip, Abdel Baggi Ayii Akol and other SSDF figures in controlling the suburbs and stopping the fighting:

‘they all came with their artilleries and patrol[ed] around where the Dinka are, and the situation was cured by them. ... When people were striking and Ayii Akol and Paulino Matip were helping people, even the Arabs knew that all the black tribes are together that day.’\textsuperscript{1107}

Black Monday was therefore a horrific exemplification of the pan-Sudanese black community constructed in Khartoum, and of the practical power of federalised, ethnicised and militarised southern authority in the city. The government described Black Monday as an expression of “grief and hysteria” but also as the work of an organised fifth column,\textsuperscript{1108} both of which at least reflected the outcomes of the violence. But events in 2005 also fundamentally changed the character of, and relationships within, Khartoum suburbs. Immediate social tensions combined with discussions over boundary commissions and repatriation to begin to explicitly delineate the “southern community”: as a non-southern

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1104} Medani, Black Monday.
\textsuperscript{1105} MTL, 11 July 2013; Medani, Black Monday.
\textsuperscript{1106} LLBK, 19 October 2013.
\textsuperscript{1107} Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{1108} Medani, Black Monday.
\end{flushleft}
resident of Kalakla told the *Financial Times* after the riots: ‘Southerners should stay in the south and northerners should stay here.’\(^{1109}\) Rumours and conspiracy theories abounded, practical relationships between local authorities, police and chiefs became strained, and the *Financial Times* records:

‘numerous northerners and southerners, old and young, in different neighbourhoods, repeat the same message: whatever trust did exist between the two communities is evaporating.’\(^{1110}\)

**2005-2011**

The body of this thesis ends here, in 2005, with this shift towards the political and practical definition of a distinct South Sudan, and the funnelling of collective southern efforts into what self-determination and political change could be achieved under the CPA. Disputes over the exact line of a potential north-south border threw being “southern” into explicitly geographical relief. The new regional administration of the Government of Southern Sudan, the opening of SPLM party offices in Khartoum, and the convenient journalistic and political simplifications of North and South encouraged this distancing.

Despite longstanding calls for substantive representation, rights and political revolution by both those in power and their new nascent national public, the energies of the SPLA, SPLM and fast-growing bureaucratic and administrative apparatus of Southern Sudan were focused primarily on achieving the creation of a now-possible nation of South Sudan, rather than broader change. Politics was arguably intellectually on hold until 2011, to the point where, by the national elections in 2010, discussion of any of the details of citizenship, political rights and forms of governance was deferred until after the referendum over secession in 2011.\(^{1111}\)

\(^{1109}\) England, ‘Tensions run high in slums of Sudan.’

\(^{1110}\) Ibid.

This period also saw the massive re-migration of the vast majority of Khartoum’s southern Sudanese residents back to southern Sudan. Garang’s death, the creation of the southern administration, and a huge aid initiative to return the IDPs to their “place of origin”, encouraged a broad turn to repatriation:

‘If that first president of ours would have been still alive, we would have given him enough time to prepare our south Sudan, as a good home land for his own people, and then he has to be the one taking decisions also to move us back, once the south Sudan has established, but when we have seen that he’s no longer alive, then we start preparing coming back. ... That’s how we lost the opinion of staying there, and then we start mobilising ourselves, and start coming back to our motherland.’

This process was initially confused, badly coordinated and supported, and often significantly coercive on the part of both the Sudanese authorities and Southern Sudanese regional powers; early mass movements in 2005 and 2006 were sometimes abortive. By 2006, though, huge numbers of families and individuals had begun the strenuous, financially taxing, carefully-staged and managed process of moving back “home”, including many people who had never been to southern Sudan before. This was actively encouraged by many among the Khartoum communities: a group of men explained that they

‘[kept] encouraging ourselves, [we kept] encouraging [the] children’ to go to the south, until the 2010 election was scheduled; ‘[we] say [we] shall be registered in South, and told people should go to [their] land and be registered there. ... This is how we influenced people so [that] they hated Khartoum and wanted to be repatriated back to the South.’

About 1.5 million people travelled south from northern Sudan in 2006 and 2007 alone, and these numbers increased in 2010 in the run-up to the referendum. What figures there are of people originating from southern Sudan remaining in Khartoum are calculated from a subtraction of these counted “returnees” from an original estimate of about 1.7 million southern Khartoum residents. As with the period of massive movement and resettlement

1112 AA, 13 April 2013.
1113 NAJ, 5 June 2013.
1114 Personal communication from anonymous Embassy staff, Juba, South Sudan, 2 October 2013.
from 1986 to 1992, this was a period of intense disruption and rupture for those relocating part or all of their lives and families to often unfamiliar or strikingly changed areas. The stress and complexity of this resettlement and re-establishment of social order has been documented in detail by a new wave of social anthropology, and articulated most obviously in South Sudanese contemporary discourse through discussions of social morality, stereotypes of the various “returnee” communities from different parts of eastern Africa, and rights to land. Previously called jellaba, now people who once lived in Khartoum are called “Khartoumers” in common South Sudanese parlance, often accused of being uneducated, over-serious, and snobbish by people who lived in eastern Africa during the wars.  

2005 to 2011 was also, for many, a tense period of redrawing lines and power bases: most people believed that the war could or would restart. Southern Sudanese forces pushed ahead with significant military and militia recruitment, despite widespread international assumptions that the CPA heralded a move towards disarmament and demobilisation. Stories of the aftermath of Black Monday from Khartoum residents emphasise renewed militarisation: ‘after the signing of the CPA, Ayii opened a military training centre in Khartoum, where he trained soldiers and transported them to the south.’ Many people, particularly unemployed or casually employed men, were recruited to the SAF, SPLA, and SSDF under the 2005 Joint Integrated Units agreement that fused SAF and SPLA units in a demonstration of Sudanese unity. Militia leaders such as Paulino Matip, with the SSDF, also recruited, particularly from people from Unity and Upper Nile. This recruitment to the SSDF was not necessarily a political act against the SPLA, but for many was exactly the opposite, as one man explained:

---


1116 JG, 11 June 2015; J, 8 August 2013.

1117 GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; also APA, 22 July 2013.

1118 Small Arms Survey, Pendulum swings: the rise and fall of insurgent militias in South Sudan (November 2013).
These people were separate, Abdel Baggi and Paulino Matip were special. ...they don’t come to SPLM and SPLA directly. Paulino Matip was already with the Arabs, and Abdel Baggi was already with Arabs; ... and Abdel Baggi Akol is intending to join the SPLA after the peace was signed [the Juba Agreement, reintegrating SSDF forces with the SPLM, signed January 2006]. Paulino also needed to join the SPLA. And these people [the recruits], they need to join the SPLA, but there is no nearer road than to join Paulino Matip and Ayii Akol - which will be the road to bring them to the SPLA. ... They [Matip and Ayii Akol] were to come and report themselves [to the SPLA under the Juba Agreement], that I come with a certain number of troops, and this one comes with a certain number of troops, that was their plan. And these militia leaders, they already have their guns which they took from Arabs.¹¹¹⁹

These complex logics and logistics of military repatriation and gambles on switching loyalties exemplify the ambiguous practicalities of fighting for, and returning to, a potential new South Sudan.

This is a study of a history of home-grown local political theory and practice, and an attempt to integrate the study of what Hunter calls ‘intellectual history from below’ with high political histories of civil war, and broader concerns about the creation of popular nationalism.¹¹²⁰ It demonstrates the co-existence, or nesting, of multiple parochial and iconoclastic identifications and personal projects within a southern Sudanese wartime urban community, an example of the creative confusion and political compromises inherent in histories of the intellectual worlds of eastern Africa. It also illustrates the possibilities of emotional and philosophical histories of civil war.

This thesis has a depressing trajectory: it was researched and written during a time of a loss of optimism and political freedom, and is in some ways a history of possibilities lost. I started working on this thesis at South Sudan’s independence in 2011, an event of spectacular emotion, and a time of extensive local reflection on and reconsideration of these personal activist histories and political philosophies. Over 2012 and 2013, as I was working in South Sudan, these messy but potentially intra-ethnic and cross-border ideas of community pluralism and solidarities were being closed down: by the pressures and prejudices of establishing financial and personal security in one’s “home area” (or, often, the

¹¹¹⁹ APA, 22 July 2013.
¹¹²⁰ Hunter, Political Thought and the Public Sphere, p. 7.
high-stress fast-growing suburbs of urban areas), continued violence and insurgencies in part resulting from the entrenchment of neopatrimonial militarised order under the political domination and attempted ideological hegemony of the SPLM/A, and violent economic collapse encouraged by the government’s shut-down of oil production in January 2012.\textsuperscript{1121} I finished research a few weeks before the internecine struggle over control of the SPLM/A culminated in massive intra-SPLA violence in Juba, and horrific massacres. The resulting civil war has dashed the hopes of many in the South Sudanese and international community. Now South Sudan’s government is essentially understood in standard contemporary political analysis as a less artful and more explicit version of the militarised neopatrimonial extractive and violent state of old Sudan, now commonly summarised using Alex de Waal’s descriptor of kleptocracy.\textsuperscript{1122} it is now becoming hard to find any explanations of South Sudan’s current crisis that do not implicitly or explicitly describe the state’s collapse and renewed war as an inevitability.

However, this thesis demonstrates a longer popular history of often-radical political creativity for alternative national futures, well beyond a basic mass demand for independence, localist and ethnically-focused understandings of self-rule, or ideas of liberation primarily based on resisting Sudan; it also evidences the intensive efforts of the southern Sudanese “masses” to intellectually and emotionally fill out these ideas, and demonstrate the practicability of Sudanese horizontal moral community. This did not, for many people, equal secession:

’We southerners, we believe that Sudan - it belongs to the Sudanese people, and the people of [Sudan] are southerners, Darfurians, Blue Nile, and the South Kordofan [sic]. … [The referendum] is a second step, after the unity of the Sudan: …when [the] central government is mixed, [with] southerners, western Darfur, where all Sudanese are seeing their colour there... that’s what we mean, that’s the attractive unity we mean - not south Sudan alone. When there is no consideration of [us], or there’s no reflection of our needs, all of us – the Sudan can be divided into so many countries. And that is what we believe [is happening] now.’\textsuperscript{1123}

\textsuperscript{1122} de Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent.’
\textsuperscript{1123} JGRN, 28 June 2013.
'We don’t think of separation. You see, most of the northern people, they don’t want separation of the south. They say, instead of [the] southern[ers] to separate from the country, it is better for the government of Bashir to go. ... So, at that moment [in Khartoum], we were thinking [of the] total liberation of the country, [from the] Islamists, so that the Islamists will be smashed out of the country and the country will remain unite[d] – and people practice democracy. ... [Even those who were pro-SPLM] would say they don’t want the separation of the south, but they were just looking for what - the total liberation of the country, and the practicing of democracy. [In 1999], because that principle of self-determination was granted in peace negotiations which were held in capital city of Nairobi ... they said that it is better for southerners to get away from the country, because the country is not going to be liberated [in its entirety], and the ideology of the Arabs will not finish in the country [sic], unless we go so that we can make our own state. ... And people began to discuss this. And we felt shy on such a thing [sic], because we were not interested in the ability of the SPLM to divert the country - because we think that if the SPLA was able to liberate the [whole] country, this will [be a] success. But if not, then this idea will fail. ... The change which is going [on] now in our [new] government, it is what? It is a [false] change. It is not an environmental change. ... Even – I am telling you this – if the southerners [knew] that the South is like this, like we are living now, they would never vote for separation.‘

Ideas of this New Sudan, while apparently "failed" in political and military terms, still have significant popular purchase, not least as a way to discuss the construction of an inclusive national community and responsible self-governance. Demands for responsible political change and representation have long coalesced around the term “federalism”, which is in effect somewhat a catch-all term for anything from territorialised tribalist entrenchment to radical, pluralised, decentralised and inter-ethnic governance. This competition over the definitions of federalism, and more essentially over the nature of South Sudan’s national community, continues today; federalism has, since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and particularly since the 2013 political crisis, been both an essentially banned political topic and a political tool via the supposedly “federal” division of South Sudan’s ten states into twenty-eight by President Kiir’s decree on 2 October 2015. This study has documented some of this history of competing imaginations of federal community, from horizontal brotherhoods of pan-southern and pan-Sudanese activists to the ethnicised, territorialised

1124 DKLK, 21 August 2013.
1125 Johnson, 'Federalism.'
and militarised practicalities of the SSDF and Ashara Wilayat; and South Sudan’s new citizens continue to try to make room for political dissent and discussion.

The political events of 2011 to 2015 have structured this thesis’ subject, content and perspective. Over the course of research, there was a moving field of possible topics and approaches to studying the intellectual history of Khartoum, constrained also by my naiveté, and people’s confidence in expressing themselves in my company. For instance, the focus on resettlement and social reconstruction in 2011 to 2012 among the recently-returned communities of Northern Bahr el Ghazal essentially structured the topics of the first three chapters of this thesis. Local recruitment to Paul Malong’s para-SPLA militias in this period, and concomitant popular topics of debate, were focused primarily on the disputed border with Darfur (what is known as “Mile 14”), and thus conversations centred on past lives within, and understandings of, a Sudanese black community. By early 2013, however, as recruitment increased for Mathiang Anyoor, and particularly with Malong’s rally in Aweil in July 2013 in support of President Kiir’s firing of his Vice-President Riek Machar and dissolving the national cabinet, research on political pluralism, federalism and alternative political futures became highly charged. But it was also increasingly possible to discuss the significance of the SSDF in Khartoum, often as an oblique way of talking about the resurgence of the old Khartoum patterns of SSDF elites and paramilitary ethnic fiefdoms which were entrenching themselves across South Sudan by 2013 and 2014.

People’s reflections on the meaning and significance of their Khartoum intellectual projects – and their own translations of past texts and songs – evolved in line with the deteriorating political climate. Many people’s initial defensive emphasis on pan-ethnic solidarities became tensely nuanced in the course of repeated discussions over 2013, and other songs and poems, particularly on inter-ethnic rivalry, brainwashing and manipulation by elites, and the militarization of ethnicity, were increasingly referenced and translated to me. As space for political discussion was closed down by violence and intimidation over 2014 and 2015, the possibilities for reconstructing these Khartoum projects diminished. In turn, these projects’ activists and authors emphasized the importance of recording their past work, as a means of demonstrating (and championing) a broader political pluralism, activism and subaltern
intellectual culture that many saw as being forcibly extinguished in favour of a PDF-style mobilization of violent ethnicised ignorance. But they were also increasingly pessimistic over the rapidly-diminishing space to exercise their histories of alternative ideas.

“*We are hoping it will become good*”: a note on the current situation

‘War is said not to be in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, but war does not start on the day you take up arms, but it starts when people eat, talk, sleep, move [apart] – this is when the war starts. Because if you don't eat together, talk or move freely together, sleep in the same house – there is war already, you are in war.’

I visited Aweil in mid-2015, to present some of my writing and arguments to friends and advisors and to hear their retrospective feelings on this research, and ideas of South Sudanese nationalism since the civil war restarted. Several people described the aftermath of the crisis as going “back to normal”: although, as they also emphasised, there was more space in Khartoum to discuss problems and voice complaints. One teacher argued that, although the policies appeared the same as those of the Bashir regime, Bashir was only using people as ‘human machinery’, ‘but you [did not] bring your thoughts to what your hands are doing’: instead, he said, the SPLM demanded full loyalty in thought as well as deed. Many men and women described the sharp narrowing, since about mid-2013, of being “South Sudanese”: ‘to be in [the] SPLM means you are really supporting the new nation, ... and to be considered in the community as a person who can tell the truth.’

‘Politics is something burnt down. They have taken our voices by force.’

Although during research in 2012 to 2013, it was common knowledge that most people accessed state and NGO jobs through “uncle certificates” (rather than any educational

---

1128 Ibid.
1129 Anon., 16 June 2015; many people reported a comprehensive programme of SPLM party registration across South Sudan during 2014, in preparation for then-slated 2015 national elections.
1130 Anon., 16 June 2015.
ones), access to work, food aid, land rights and other opportunities have since become almost entirely dependent on patronage, and with the current economic crisis and militarised political order – particularly in Northern Bahr el Ghazal – ‘you [have to] jump according to the beat of the drum’; ‘so here it is difficult to do the right thing and still maintain your position.’\footnote{Anon., 16 June 2015; this is noted by Thomas, \textit{South Sudan}, pp. 23, 94–5.} Several men and women commented on how South Sudan is quickly becoming an ‘inherited country’; according to one teacher and writer whose past work is documented in this thesis, many of the military elites are consciously perpetuating an educational divide, ‘for poor people not to reach them, like the sky and the ground’; they themselves ‘have exported their children’ for education. The remaining 99 per cent, he explained, are seen as ‘thorns for their fence.’\footnote{Anon., 12 June 2015.}

The ethnicised, militarised authorities of 1980s to 2000s Khartoum are resurgent across Northern Bahr el Ghazal and in Juba: by late 2015, Abdel Baggi Ayii Akol re-emerged as a “traditional authority” in Abiem East in Aweil East, and one of his sons rebelled from the SPLA with a small group of soldiers to join the SPLM-In Opposition armed forces in 2016; and courts called \textit{Ashara Wilayat} have been established across Juba, again under the guidance of Deng Macham and with many of the same agents, in an explicit revival of the Khartoum inter-ethnic courts system. Militia recruitment has also continued, particularly in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, although it is difficult to differentiate between militias, SPLA reserves, and the personal forces of ex-Governor (and now Chief of General Staff of the SPLA to President Kiir) Paul Malong Awan. The largest of the recruitment drives in Northern Bahr el Ghazal has been to what is popularly called Mathiang Anyoor (“brown caterpillar”), a force organised since around 2008 as a more formal organisation of wider youth-based western Dinka militias from Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states, operational during the 1980s onwards.\footnote{Naomi Pendle, “‘They Are Now Community Police’: Negotiating the Boundaries and Nature of the Government in South Sudan through the Identity of Militarised Cattle-keepers’, \textit{International Journal on Minority and Group Rights}, 22:3 (July 2015), p. 414.} Many of the young recruits to Mathiang Anyoor were moved to Juba in support of President Kiir during the SPLM crises in late 2013, as part of the \textit{Dut ke Beny} force (roughly translated as “protect the boss”), and allegedly participated in the massacres...
and intense violence in Juba in December 2013.¹¹³⁴ In Aweil, Mathiang Anyoor is specifically understood as a "tribal battalion", 'oriented to answer the tribal question'; people compared them to Sudan's Popular Defense Forces.¹¹³⁵

This recruitment has been fuelled by shock and anger at the mass murder of Dinka people across Greater Upper Nile during the civil war,¹¹³⁶ with many people invoking the violent split in the SPLA in 1991 and the resulting ethnic divides as a direct comparator: 'they think that the old history has come back.'¹¹³⁷ Many men and women in Aweil expressed embarrassment, anger and deep sadness at these narratives of Dinka "domination", arguments for ethnic federal enclaves, and events in Juba that were 'really genocide'; one man, a teacher, recounted the proverb, 'if you want to dig a hole to bury your brother, make it large, because you will be in it tomorrow.'¹¹³⁸ He went on:

'It is not a matter of Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, Bari, Zande. It is a matter of a bad man on a throne. We are not all children of Salva Kiir Mayardit. You tell them [in Juba] that there are still some Dinka brothers.'¹¹³⁹

But even as many people emphasised that the civil war is a 'political issue which has been preached in a tribal manner',¹¹⁴⁰ a variety of mobilising ideas were circulating in Aweil in mid-2015: that the Dinka would be killed if the Nuer rebel Riek Machar took power, that the integrity of South Sudan demanded the eradication of rebel challengers to President Kiir, and most arrogantly, the idea that as the Dinka are the national majority in South Sudan, they should not accept minority rule. The dominant, zero-sum tribalist narrative of the civil war, in the words of one teacher, is 'creating a gravitational force that will pull you down.'¹¹⁴¹

¹¹³⁵ Anon., 12 June 2015; although one former member, speaking to Radio Tamazuj, reportedly said 'they even aspired to march north to "annex Kosti"', much like Garang’s speech: ‘Generals say Juba massacres done by private militia, not SPLA’, Radio Tamazuj, 9 March 2015.
¹¹³⁶ Court meeting, 14 June 2015.
¹¹³⁹ Anon. 2, 12 June 2015.
¹¹⁴⁰ Anon. 3, 12 June 2015.
Recruitment to this patrimonial, tribalised military order also was and is often the only option for many young men, with one elderly sub-chief describing Northern Bahr el Ghazal as a ‘dry wood forest’ for collecting President Kiir’s soldiers. During my visit to Aweil, there was very little food in the market, partly because of a serious failure of the first rains; women in a rural village market were selling edible tree leaves, much like during the previous civil wars. Across Aweil North, grain was being bought by the sack at the Darfur border for around 800 South Sudanese pounds (SSP), and re-sold in Aweil town for up to 1400 SSP, while cash incomes from government jobs and manual labour remained static at around 300 to 700 SSP per month, for a primary school teacher to ranked police officer respectively. Many teachers suspended work in favour of fishing, or working as handymen and cleaners in the United Nations base in Aweil. Several people compared the situation in Northern Bahr el Ghazal by 2015 as akin to the famine of 1988, and there is a growing out-migration: people have ‘lost hope’, and many men and women have moved across the border to southern Darfur, or back to Khartoum.

There is very little room or purchase now for hopes of an inclusive, inter-tribal South Sudanese nationalism, and very little public space for political discussion, in Aweil or Juba: ‘everybody, we don’t trust ourselves.’ The cultural and intellectual forums re-established in Aweil and Juba from around 2008 to 2011 are now ‘just talking down’, under the political radar, for fear of the consequences of discussing alternative political futures and possible change. Teachers and students are the first to be mobilised into the military and militias - much as in the previous civil wars. The currently expanding civil war does not provide the practical or intellectual space for these projects: as one market worker said in Aweil, ‘we want a quick peace to come - so that people can know their mind.’

---

1142 Anon., 16 June 2015. A sack of sorghum, for instance, would sustain a family of six people for about three weeks on one meal a day.
1143 Ibid.
1144 Ibid.
1145 Anon., Aweil suburb, 15 June 2015.
1147 Anon., 15 June 2015.
Bibliography

Interviews cited in text, by location

Aweil

AA, Aweil suburb, 13 April 2013.
AAD, Aweil town, 14 August 2013.
AAJD, Aweil North village, 22 August 2013.
AAY, Aweil town, 11 July 2013.
AB, Aweil town, 12 August 2013.
ABA, Aweil town, 16 August 2013.
AD, Aweil suburb, 13 July 2013.
AD, Aweil town, 5 June 2013.
ADA, Aweil town, 13 August 2013.
AG, Aweil North village, 13 July 2013.
AMA, Aweil town, 9 August 2013.
AMJ, Aweil North village, 16 July 2013.
AMM, Aweil East village, 21 June 2013.
AND, Aweil East village, 29 June 2013.
Apada women, 21 July 2013.
AT, 14 April, 8 June, 6 August and 15 August 2013.
Chief's court meeting, Aweil suburb, 14 June 2015.
Chief's meeting, Aweil East village, 20 August 2013.
Chief's meeting, Aweil North village, 13 April 2013.
Chief's meeting, Aweil suburb, 7 June and 29 June 2013.
D, Aweil suburb, 22 July 2013.
DAA, Aweil North village, 13 July 2013.
DCD, Aweil town, 15 July and 12 August 2013.
DCS, Aweil town, 11 August 2013.
DDD, Aweil suburb, 4 June 2013.
DKLK, Aweil North village, 4 July and 21 August 2013.
DTL, Aweil town, 10 July 2013.
GDA, Aweil suburb, 22 June 2013.
GDA and MWD, Aweil suburb, 22 June 2013.
GMM, Aweil town, 11 August 2013.
J, Aweil suburb, 26 June and 8 August 2013.
JG, Aweil suburb, 30 June and 19 July 2013, and 11 June 2015.
JGRN, Aweil town, 28 June 2013.
JMA, Aweil East village, 12 June 2013.
JMA, Aweil suburb, 12 July 2013.
JW, JUA, AT and MAA, Aweil North village, 11 August 2013.
KDK, Aweil town, 3 June 2013.
LAM, Aweil suburb, 3 June, 5 June and 8 June 2013.
LCL, Aweil suburb, 13 July 2013.
LLAA, Aweil suburb, 3 June and 15 August 2013.
M, Aweil suburb, 13 April 2013.
MAA, Aweil North village, 11 August 2013.
MDM, Aweil suburb, 5 June 2013.
MDWR, Aweil East village court, 21 August 2013.
MKW, Aweil North village, 11 August 2013.
MMD, Aweil suburb, 14 April, 3 August, 15 August and 17 August 2013.
MTL, Aweil town, 10 July and 11 July 2013.
MW, AD and AD, Aweil suburb, 13 July 2013.
NAJ, Aweil suburb, 5 June and 8 June 2013.
NJ, Aweil suburb, 8 June 2013.
PAD, Aweil suburb, 21 June 2013.
PDA, Aweil suburb, 21 June and 29 June 2013.
PKKM, Aweil town, 9 August 2013.
R, Aweil suburb, 3 September 2013.
RRL, Aweil town, 3 September 2013.
SA, Aweil town, 8 August 2013.
SAK, Aweil North village, 3 July 2013.
WDAA, Aweil suburb, 18 July and 17 August 2013.
WMT, Aweil suburb, 17 August 2013.

**Juba**

EBK, 12 September 2013.
GP, 23 October 2013.
JAN, 8 September and 10 September 2013.
JUA, 29 October and 1 November 2013.
JW, 18 October 2013.
LLBK, 19 October 2013.
MDWR, 4 August 2013.
MI, 23 October 2013.
NB, 18 October 2013.
PM, 17 October 2013.
SO, 9 November 2013.
YM, 10 September 2013.

**Other interviews**

AM, by Skype, 6 February 2012.
Tearfund worker, 15 February 2012.
**Songs and poems**


Akut Kuei, “Waide Ke Jong” (“The spear is on target”)
--------
“Duk Ben la Wel Wel” (“Don’t panic”)
--------
“Wa Ye Ke Nyiei Wen” (“What took the cow”)
--------
“Kongdien e Cuec” (“My right hand”)
--------
“Jieng amen wuot” (“Everyone hates the Dinka”)
--------
“Piényda, piényda, piényda” (“Our land”)
--------
“Ci Thok Luith” (“It has finished, bit by bit”)
--------
“Junub Pandan” (“The South, our country”)
--------
“Ku Na Kocka” (“What of these people?”)
--------
“Yen Adhiau, Yen Adhiau, Yen Adhiau” (“I’m crying”)
--------
“Yen Kueng Mel Ee, Yen Kueng Mel” (“I want to take an oath”)
--------
“Abyei, Abyei, Wun e Deng Kuol” (“Abyei, Abyei, the wun of Deng Kuol”)
--------
“Pandan Pan Theer Wadit ke Madit” (“Our grandmothers’ and our grandfathers’ home”)
--------
“Thudan ee Panda” (“Sudan is our country”)
--------
“Ka Ye Beny Theeth” (“The spearmaster will regret his prophesy”)
--------
“Rinydan Junub” (“This southern generation”)
--------
“(Aya) Yii Ye Ping, Ye Ping” (“I’m hearing”)
--------
“Ke col ater ci ke yeku puol yok muonyjang” (“The Dinka don’t give up the fight”)
--------
“Abi Thok Terrek” (“It will finish one by one”)
--------
“Anyoot yic” (“It has not yet begun”)
--------
“Week aaya thieec caik jal ngic nen?” (“I’m asking you, when did you realise?”)
--------
“Ping ci Deng nok” (“The land that has killed Deng”)
--------
“Cien kedie ka alei” [sic] (“I have no problem with foreigners”)
--------
“Abuk jal ting, kua buk jal ting” (“We shall see – we’ll see”)

All translated from Lino Alëu Angic Dut, Akut Kuei Song Book (Khartoum, 2003), by Parek Madut Jok, Ngor Santino Akech Chol, and Wol Aluk Chol, 2014.

--------
“Yomdit Mei” (“The dry season thunderstorm is rising”), Khartoum, April 1992.
--------
--------
“Ker lioi aaci yom buok” (“The weak branches of the tree are broken”), Khartoum, October 1992.
--------

“Rok Ril” (“The strong fence”), Khartoum, April 1993.

“Ater thee anyoot” (“The old wrong done to my family is unfinished”), Khartoum, April 1994.


“Ala kak yo tek yiic” (“There are things that separate us”), Khartoum, 2002.

“Wek caa bi ben ting” (“I will not see you again”), Khartoum, n.d. c. 2002.

“Yok ci yokoth tuoom” (“We have separated”), Khartoum, August 2002.


“Kongku rot deet” (“We must study our souls”), Khartoum, December 2003.

“Yic acie kuot ngin bi leu” (“You can’t bury the truth”), Khartoum, April 2004.


“Cieengda amar” (“Our culture is disappearing”), Khartoum, February 2005.

“Garang”, Nairobi, August 2005.

All poems transcribed by their author in 2013, and translated by Parek Madut Jok, Ngor Santino Akech Chol, and Wol Aluk Chol, 2014.

General Paulino, “Jurlikam” (“Our homeland”)

“Lo Ngun Lio” (“Oh my God”)

“Kulya Kwe – Kulya Kwe” (“A problem has come”)

“Nan Be kolo Jongo” (“I am crazy”)

All songs transcribed and translated by Melanie Itto, 2013.
Personal archive documents

Dinka Course, Morwel Ater Morwel (Khartoum, 1994); translated by Joseph Tong Ngor, 2013.

Dinka Displacement to the northern Sudan and other stories, Mayo Mandela Circle (Khartoum, 2003); translated by Parek Madut Jok, Ngor Santino Akech Chol, and Wol Aluk Chol, 2014.

History, Lino Alèu Angic Dut (Khartoum, 2005); translated by Joseph Tong Ngor, 2013.


Primary 4 Dinka Reader, anon. (Khartoum, c. early 2000s); translated by Parek Madut Jok, Ngor Santino Akech Chol, and Wol Aluk Chol, 2014.

Archival sources

Amnesty International Secretariat Archives, Amsterdam


Comboni Archives, Rome (Comboniani)


*Voice of the Nile Republic* No. 11. A/86/21/3/3.

*Voice of the Nile Republic* No. 10. A/86/21/3.

**Church Missionary Society Archives, Birmingham (CMS)**

Annual letter 1952, Eric Parry. ACC/693 F2/1.
Bishop Allison to Africa Secretary, London, June 1949. CMS/G/Y/S.
Church Missionary Society North Sudan Standing Committee minutes, April 1958. ACC505 Z3.
Diary, Rachel Hassan, ACC641 vol. 1967-69.
Diary, Rev. Canon Bewes, 1954. AF59 AFE AD3.
Dr Mary Bertram to H. D. Hooper, 20 April 1938. AF59 AFE AD1 729.
Dr Roland Stevenson to Nuba Mountains Fellowship, January 1959. AF35/59 G3 SN 1 Subfile 5.
Jesse Hillman to Rev. Canon Bewes, 29 October 1958. AF35/59 G3 SN 1 Subfile 1.

**Kenya National Archives, Nairobi (KNA)**


**Middle East Documentation Unit, Durham University (MEDU)**


---

**Royal Geographical Society, London (RGS)**

Khartoum G.23. Sudan Survey Department, 1940. 551847.

**Save the Children Fund UK Archives, Birmingham (SCF)**


**South Sudan National Archives, Juba (SSNA)**


Sudan Archives, Durham (SAD)


El Obeid 55.1. Survey Office Khartoum, 1933. SAD.PF 4/2


‘From political awakening to present Southern political leadership,’ Bona Malwal. Draft paper, October 1965. SAD 985/5/1-27.


‘Report for Light and Hope for Sudan concerning a visit to Khartoum’, Rev. Dr R. Rodgers. 22 June 1994. SAD.93/2/65-86.


‘Report on the compulsory transportation of students to Khartoum’, The Information Committee of the South Sudan Students Alliance for Separation – Middle East. 8 September 1992. SAD.93/1/74-6.

The National Archives, Kew (TNA)

Foreign Office internal correspondence, 26 September 1966. FO 371.190418 VS1015.56.
Foreign Office internal correspondence, 26 November 1966. FO 371.190418 VS1015.65.
Foreign Office internal correspondence, 13 October 1966. FO 371.190465 VS1821.6.
Foreign Office note, 15 February 1948. FO 371.69209.
‘Note on Dr Mohammed Adam Adham and the Black Bloc.’ 15 February 1948. FO 371.69209.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office internal correspondence, 30 August 1977. FCO 93.1184.
Gordon Muortat, Vice President of the Southern Front, to the All Africa Conference of Churches Commission, 18 February 1967. FCO 39.181.
‘100 arrested in Sudan demonstrations.’ Times, 13 May 1968. FCO 39.181.
’Arabization and Islamization,’ Philip Abbas Ghaboush to Prime Minister Heath, 27 December 1971. FCO 39.901.
Foreign Office note, 12 January 1963. FO 371.173185 VS1015.3
Africa Confidential, 15 October 1971. FCO 39.901.
’Half a million dead so far in forgotten war,’ Vivienne Barton. Sunday Nation, 4 May 1969. TNA FCO 39.480.

Newspapers and online sources

’Black Monday: the political and economic dimensions of Sudan’s urban riot,’ Khalid Mustafa Medani, Middle East Research and Information Project, 9 August 2005.
Comment, Daniel Malual Nhial, Sudan Tribune Facebook page, 18 June 2013.
’Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation for all South Sudanese,’ The Office of the Chairman of the Committee For National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation for South Sudan, working paper, July 2013.
’Deadly violence grips Sudan’, News24, 3 August 2005.
’Emmanuel Kembe Profile’, The Sixty One, c. 2009.
’Generals say Juba massacres done by private militia, not SPLA’, Radio Tamazuj, 9 March 2015.
’Khartoum following the death of Dr. John Garang’, FIDH, 4 August 2005.
’Kiir and Makuei want 28 states in S Sudan’, Radio Tamazuj, 2 October 2015.
’President Kiir’s Independence Speech In Full’, Gurtong, 14 July 2011.
’South Sudanese labour: refill the “kambo’’, Magdi El Gizouli, Sudan Tribune, 8 October 2012.
’Sudan: National Democratic Alliance (NDA),’ Refworld.


‘South Sudan president creates 28 new states’, *Al Jazeera*, 25 December 2015.

Published sources


Abdelrahman, Babiker Abdalla. 'Internal Migration in the Sudan: A Study of the Socio-Economic Characteristics of Migrants in Khartoum.' PhD, University of Glasgow, 1979.


Ahmad, Adil Mustafa. 'The Neighbourhoods of Khartoum: Reflections on Their Functions, Forms and Future.' *Habitat International* 16:4 (1992), pp. 27–45.


——. ‘Federalism in the History of South Sudanese Political Thought.’ Presented at the Rift Valley Institute seminar, Centre for Peace and Development Studies, University of Juba, 2014.


Lamoureux, Siri. ‘Message in a Mobile [Risālah Fi Jawāl]: Mixed-Messages, Tales of Missing and Mobile Communities at the University of Khartoum.’ PhD, African Studies Centre, Leiden University, 2011.


Malik, Saadia Izzeldin. 'Displacement as Discourse.' Africa Migration, 2005.


Meier, Larissa Carol. ‘Returning to Northern Bahr El Ghazal, South Sudan,’ Master’s Thesis, Lund University, 2013.
Newhouse, Léonie S. ‘South Sudan Oyee! A Political Economy of Refugee Return Migration to Chukudum, South Sudan,’ PhD, Washington University, 2013.
———. South Sudan: The State We Aspire to. Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS), 2011.


Rift Valley Institute. ‘My Mother Will Not Come to Juba: South Sudanese Debate the Constitution.’ Juba, South Sudan: Rift Valley Institute, 2013.


Watson, Shevaun E. “‘Good Will Come of This Evil”: Enslaved Teachers and the Transatlantic Politics of Early Black Literacy.’ College Composition and Communication 61:1 (2009), pp. 66–89.


Woodward, Peter. 'South Sudan: Exception or Precedent?’ Royal African Society, 2011.

