
Iordanis Psimmenos,

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Employee Participation in a New Social Context: The case of the Greek Energy Corporation

Psimmenos Iordanis

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Durham

Department of Sociology and Social Policy
University of Durham, January 1991
Abstract
The thesis examines the theme of employee participation in large industrial undertakings, its political and ideological content, through a critical and detailed study of the effects that Capital's global industrial restructuring has produced on the role and discourse of employees in the democratisation of industrial relations. Following a comparative review of the main global trends and characteristics of industrial development, the thesis emphasises the political role of two major processes, those of integration and deregulation/reregulation of industrial organisation, in the shaping of a relatively new framework of power relationships (between Capital and Labour). The thesis proceeds by examining the effects of Capital's global industrial restructuring upon employees' ability to shape and change their industrial environments and hence their structural and ideological activity to produce democratic corporate functioning, through an in depth study of the new facets of industrial organisation, at a national and local/corporate level. It demonstrates those effects, by examining the role and political discourse of Greek employees in the issue of participation, through the analysis of the industrial conditions and how they affect employees, in the Greek Public Power Corporation. For an in depth examination of the factors that influence and determine the content and framework of employee participation in the Greek Public Power Corporation, the thesis focusses upon two main aspects: the new principles and aims for the industrial development of the Electricity Corporation and the new principles and aims of the Greek Public Power Corporation insofar as the issue of personnel regulations is concerned. In relation to the first, the thesis presents a detailed critique of how the E.E.C. and the International Energy Association and their aims to harmonise and liberalise the structure of Energy Corporations are affecting the existing nature and organisation of the P.P.C. and hence of employees participating in industrial decision-making and the general industrial functioning of the Corporation. In relation to the second issue, the thesis presents a methodological critique of how the new principles and aims on personnel regulation are affecting employees ability to participate through their existing bodies of collective representation. The presentation of a survey on employee opinions and of three case studies from different power stations, consolidate an overall critique of the spatial and social impacts of industrial restructuring on employee participation at the Public Power Corporation.
To my mother and my grandmother, for their life commitment towards my thesis and to the memory of my grandfather and of Mrs Rita Hart, my typist.

"If only even one hour could hold fast this early bounty! But the warm west wind already shakes down a full rain of blooms/ shall I take delight in the green which has just given me shade? When it has fluttered discoloured in the autumn some storm will soon disperse that too"

(Goethe, Permanence in Change, p.223)
I declare that the contents of the thesis, the sole analysis and statistical findings, have been the theoretical work of the author. Wherever the theoretical work of another author has been involved, for review purposes, his/her name is clearly stated.

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Introduction

The present political milieu and its ideological vibrations, transcends both the modes of industrial organisation and of political discourse to a new plateau. A new plateau of new social and economic configurations whose immensity for the political 'cosmos' of industrial environments is revealed through the re-evaluation of the power-relationships between Capital and Labour, as these are reflected in the ephemeral nexus between Global and local industrial activity.

The new socio-political milieu, as Bachelard (1969) has rightly observed, is capable of transporting man and his relationship to a world that 'bears the mark of infinity', far from geographical, cultural or socio-historical constraints. It is a transformation that subsumes existing perceptions and post-war rules of industrial activity; that subjects beliefs and systems of organisation to a radical questioning; and at the same time inaugurates new forms and ideas of industrial activity. The present transformation is an apocalyptic synthesis of a common experience - an experience of space and time as Berman (1989) has asserted, such an experience 'cuts across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology'. An experience whose realities are manifested in the presence and the decisions of the I.M.F.-World Bank, the E.E.C. directives, and the new neo-monetarist policies of different governments; and in the implementation of systems that harmonise and liberalise further the principles and functions of industrial undertakings. The political viability of the ongoing transformation does exist; in the transcendence of forms and of structures, of socio-economic activity and hence of the political discourse insofar as the issue of industrial organisation and control is concerned; and it does exist in the formulation of a new historico-political epoch that brings closer the boundaries of global and local activity.

The aim of the thesis, therefore, is to elucidate further the position of current discourse, insofar as industrial democratisation is concerned, from within the new upturn that formulates the parameters of power relationships (ie. between Capital-Labour), that is the global context. This context, its nature and characteristics, will determine the perspective and the issues under discussion and it will dictate many of the theoretical propositions in relation to the analysis of employee participation in
industrial undertakings. If the whole issue of employee participation is determined by the parameters that determine capital labour power relationships in general, how could one then isolate the analysis of the mode and forms of capital's activity from the analysis of the democratisation and control by employees of such an activity. The articulation of both is an essential conjectural part of the political cultural 'cosmos' that determines employees political movement for the democratic organisation of labour and for their construction of an alternative to the present system of industrial organisation. Such an articulation thus cannot be omitted because it entails the total and the part of the processes and characteristics of capital-labour power relationships, as these are being restructured at local and international levels. The articulation of the two issues cannot be omitted because it is the representation of capital-labour power relationships and the political 'logo's' of the democratic control of industrial functioning by employees, as those are being constructed in time and space.

If space and time constitute Capital's framework of social power; and if the production and accumulation of capital is perpetually changing this social power, through the manipulation of the two; it then follows that the point of departure for the analysis of Capital-Labour power relationships cannot be other than the socio-economic manifestations of such a restructuring. It is only logical to hold that if the above is true, then the point of departure for the analysis of employee participation and their political discourse for the control of industrial functioning cannot be other than Capital's systems and forms of social power, as those are being manifested through the reorganisation of production and accumulation processes at a global and local level.

Throughout the thesis the articulation of Capital's restructuring at global and local level produces the very concentration of the present development of employees' activity and political thought, insofar as the issue of participation and industrial control are concerned. In order to indicate and analyse the characteristics and parameters that influence the course of industrial democratisation, one has to unravel the essential processes and movements of Capital's labour regulation as those are being manifested.

The thesis examines why and how the issue of employee participation has been influenced and how it has been altogether re-modified due to the
emergence of new sets of structural and ideological factors of organisation? Why and how employees' ability to shape and change industrial activity has been changed by Capital's external and internal re-organisation? Why and how the post-war context of industrial participation as this has been shaped by various labour movements, is now at political crossroads, that demands both the reviewing of past approaches and conceptions, and the establishment of new political thought on employee interventions in the democratisation of their industrial environment?

By examining the cases of multi-national economic and political organisations, and in particular of the Greek Public Power Corporation, the thesis aims to explain the social conditions that bring about a new milieu insofar as the democratisation of industrial life is concerned and hence of employee participation in industrial decision-making processes and at the general functioning of large industrial units. The reason for using the energy sector as an example, in order to show the parameters for industrial organisation and how they do affect employee participation, is that the energy sector occupies the fundamental role in industrial restructuring, that Capital's activity is based upon, in order to establish new rules and forms of industrial development.

The first chapter establishes, through the examination of international comparative information, the major processes and characteristics of Capital industrial restructuring. Through the systematic elaboration of the facets of global reorganisation, the first chapter presents a meticulous but not exhaustive analysis into the 'political cosmos' of industrial relations as those are being constructed through the main generalised process, those of integration and of deregulation/re-regulation. Two points of clarification are necessary here before one proceeds.

First, the identification and definition of those two main processes, represent a general and fairly abstract overview of the dynamic of Capital's socio-economic restructuring and of the politics of industrial organisation. They depict here part of the temporal structural development, in the sphere of industrial functioning and in ideological discourse that characterises the directions of such functioning. As such, both processes constitute fundamental ingredients for the theoretical approach to the issue of industrial democratisation. They are fundamental ingredients for the analysis because they reflect and emphasise the
dialectical linkages between internal and external conditions of industrial organisation, that in turn weaves together into a unified process, the transformation of corporate regulation with global market regulations and vice versa. It is this compatibility and state of unification between the two, that altogether adds a new dimension to the theoretical understanding of the power relationship between Capital and labour insofar as the participation and control of the latter in decision-making and in general industrial activity are concerned.

Secondly, by the identification of those above processes, the chapter makes no claim to offer a universal model of spatial organisation. Instead, the analysis of industrial globalisation and of the ways that it affects the context of industrial organisation, allows the debate on industrial organisation to develop, by reminding the reader that the present political environment and its processes exists in a state of constant transformation and perpetual change. In turn this transformation is reflected through the construction of flexible forms of labour regulation and of networks of production activity.

The first chapter thus outlines the main characteristics of industrial globalisation and how they affect the political environment of industrial undertakings. By clarifying the role which Capital restructuring is playing upon corporate activity, the chapter presents an account of the recent changes and how these have transformed the power relationships between Capital and labour, especially in the area of decision-making procedures and in the area of principles and forms of industrial activity. These two areas of analysis constitute the basis of the debate on the issue of employee participation and of its determinant factors.

Chapter two presents a review of the main post-war ideological trends on employee participation and offers an analysis of some of the main problems that the issue is exposed to. It constitutes a theoretical critique of the diverse political debates on the democratisation of industrial relations ascending from the philosophical questions that have surrounded the issue, and from the political contributions of different political movements.

The chapter is a general review of literature, that aims to show the theoretical background of the subject and the contemporary dilemmas that employees face in order to shape and change their industrial environments.
The remaining chapters present the Greek case on the theme of employee participation, why and how industrial globalisation has changed the post-war activity and thoughts on the democratisation of industrial environments, and how the further centralisation of decision-making procedures and fragmentation of employees economic and political composition is minimising their power to intervene in industrial organisation matters.

Chapter three examines the historico-political background of the Greek employees movement toward the democratisation of industrial environments and it emphasises the links between the economic conditions and political discourse, whilst at the same time it exalts the determinant influence that exogenous political developments have played upon the theoretical development of employee participation. Its last section presents a chronological review of the main problems that the political and ideological experimentation of the Greek labour movement has encountered due to the emergence of new forms and principles of industrial organisation.

Chapter four examines the role which integration and deregulation/re-regulation is playing in the structures of organisation and discourse of the Greek Public Power Corporation. The chapter demonstrates the role that globalisation is playing in employees' ability to shape and change their industrial organisation by concentrating upon the new functional role of P.P.C. within the E.E.C. and within the international energy community; and by focussing upon the new structural and ideological dilemmas that the labour organisations are encountering in relation to employee participation and control of the P.P.C.'s functions.

The last chapter is the presentation and the critical evaluation of P.P.C.'s employees' conditions and opinions insofar as the issue of participation and control of industrial functioning is concerned. The first few sections of the chapter examine how the new structural and ideological re-adjustment of forms of industrial organisation have affected employees' political and economic ability to participate in and determine the outcome of P.P.C.'s functioning.

It starts with the analysis of employee participation by examining the effects upon it of the new employment and welfare policies and the new
working conditions. It proceeds, by examining how the new structural and ideational conditions in the organisation have affected employees' ability to be represented by industrial bodies (e.g., Trade Unions, participative organisations). The last three sections of the chapter examine the conditions that prevail in three different power and electricity transmission stations, and how they affect employee participation in decision-making procedures and in the general activity of the Corporation.

The conclusion provides a final assessment of the economic and ideational new context of industrial relations, and how employee participation has been affected in the course of Capital's global reorganisation.
1 GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND FORMS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION

1.1 Introduction

To understand the nature and characteristics of industrial reorganisation, and how it affects the ideological and political content of employees' participation, one has to embark on an analytical 'journey' exploring the dynamics and contours of emerging new global socio-economic arrangements. Indeed, as Harvey (1989) has asserted in 'The Conditions of Postmodernity', in order to decipher the political meanings that the present transitory framework of industrial activity has created for the role of employees in the process of industrial democratisation, it is necessary to search from within the present maelstrom of global political change. A maelstrom of change that breaks from major traditions of the past social organisation of industrial undertakings, and makes the present as poignant and transitory as if the 'cosmos' of industrial relations has suddenly became 'borderless', 'opaque' and temporary, which transmits new experiences which 'cut across the boundaries of geography, nationality and ideology. (Berman 1989) This chapter, therefore, will explicate the socio-economic conditions and processes that bring such a maelstrom of change in industrial relations and hence in employees' role and ability to shape and control industrial activity at their place of work.

The first section, entitled, 'Facets of the Global Village', in selecting certain major theoretical contributions towards the political debate on the internationalisation of capital, will examine the post-war reverberations of capital drive to expand spatially and to change its form of industrial organisation on a world scale.

The end of World War II has marked the beginning of a new era in world economic and political order. This order constitutes, in a sense, the political and economic 'institutionalisation' of international trade; of the rise of new hegemonic regimes of world economic regulation through the expansion and the domination of multinational corporations over financial and political activity; and of the growing changes in matters
relating to the division of labour on a world scale. In essence, the period of global orientated networks of economic and political regulation of labour by capital, had already begun.

New experiences, contradictions and antagonisms between capital and labour and amongst nations, were already a part of the cultural and social milieu of labour movements throughout the world, where, during the 1970s, a number of financial and political events have forced the transformation of capital's forms of social and industrial world organisation towards a new plane. The analysis makes no claim to exhaust the economic and political events which have pushed capital towards a new transformation, and its aim is not to pursue vigorously the political economy of capital's internationalisation. Instead, it focuses upon the main trends of capital's new transformation, and its main political components that exist in the ability to construct global integrated and flexible forms of industrial regulation. The first section, in its own way, focuses upon the endemic features of capitalism for worldwide expansion and for the establishment of global modes of industrial regulation. In short, it exposes in a systematic way, the essence of political and economic norms for global regulation that are being reflected in the presence of a new ideological/cultural framework for industrial organisation. The issue that industrial environments are being confronted with a new ideological/cultural framework becomes more evident through the existence and through the interpenetration of processes that on the one hand fuse together aspects and policies on economic capitalist activity, by integrating local and global industrial environments, and by centralising further decision-making procedures through the establishment of global networks that determine all major aspects of industrial activity. On the other hand, the new framework for industrial regulation demands almost total deregulation, total defusion of existing national and local industrial practices and aims for industrial planning, through the establishment of diverse structures which are autonomous from the nation-state and from other bodies of post-war political organisation (eg unions) and through the adoption of flexible forms of industrial regulation.
The second section on the nation-state's industrial organisation, is a theoretical examination of the effects of capital's globalisation upon existing domestic industrial structures and norms, that have marked with their presence much of the post-war political and economic debates on the role of labour movements in controlling and transforming the paths of national industrial development. There is a special importance attached to this section since it relates to the whole analysis of the Greek Public Power Corporation and how its industrial relations' framework is being affected and hence how the participation of employees is being transcended towards a new plane of political and ideological manifestations.

The ideological point of departure here, is the new content for capital-labour relationships that emerge out of the interpenetration or articulation of global economic and social activity with local/national industrial activity. Through the vigorous, but not exhaustive, critical review of major contemporary theories on the nation-state, this section emphasizes the theoretical 'need' for a new approach to the nation state's relationship with industrial activity. What is probably needed is a new theoretical outlook that is able to extrapolate from capital's globalisation, the major processes and effects which determine and shape the political and ideological 'cosmos' of industrial relations and hence of employee participation at a national level.

At the same time, this approach should be able to offer a coherent outlook of the increased centralization and global harmonisation of industrial principles and aims, in combination with the increased deregulation of state economic powers and structures which regulate the national economy, and in which ways both affect the ideological and political climate within industrial undertakings.

The analysis in this section is particularly concerned with two major aspects of the current global industrial transformation. The first relates to the general ideological and cultural integration of the nation state's economic and political institutions through the use of new images and symbols for the legitimisation of the present global industrial transformation, and for the establishment of a new 'ethos' concerning the
issues of sovereignty, frameworks of political representation and procedures of decision-making, and concerning the main principles and aims of industrial activity within a national context. The second aspect of analysis relates to the adoption, by different nation-states, of a number of industrial measures and structures for industrial regulation that demonstrate in full, the magnitude and nature of the present global change in industrial policy matters.

All three aspects of this section's analysis (eg the critical review of theoretical outlooks in relation to the role of the nation-state in a globalised economic and political framework, the introduction of new ideological and cultural reasoning by the state and the introduction of new industrial measures for labour organisation), demonstrate the extent and the characteristics of the present worldwide policies by governments, which define altogether a new political and social content for the debate on the role of employees in industrial undertakings. The same theme is also present in the last section on the new forms of industrial organisation of individual corporations throughout the globe, and how they effect in particular, employees' ability to retain collective organisational power, socio-economic homogeneity and welfare standards.

The section, following the theoretical importance attached to the main processes (identified in the thesis as being determinant parameters for the present socio-political content of industrial relations and hence for employees' ability to shape and change, to democratise industrial environments), ie those of integration and deregulation, attempts to clarify further the extent to which the frameworks and patterns of the division of labour have changed. In particular, the analysis focuses upon major issues such as the introduction of personalised systems of labour regulation, the growing importance of a temporary workforce in the field of industrial relations, and the further introduction of a number of pay measures that individualise the whole arena of pay negotiations between employees and management.
1.2 Facets of the 'Global Village': Ideological Frameworks of Industrial Organisation

The post-war era of economic development was marked by a rapid expansion and internationalisation of capitalist activity beyond any pre-1945 structural arrangements of production and trade, and by a parallel internationalisation of political regulation of the labour process; imposing thus a new 'social dawn' on the modes of industrial organisation and on the modes of thought on the relationship between capital and labour. (Spero E Joan 1989)

The 'shattered' towns and villages and the destruction of people's social relationships, in the aftermath of World War Two, could only be sketched as Doris Lessing (1988) in the 'Shikasta' has described, as a 'bitter, impoverished, grey, colourless' world, where hope and ideas for the future had to be rebuilt and reviewed in view of what the past 'produced' and stood for. This world had to face and assess the past and produce systems and ideas of organisation which surpassed the social 'impossibilities' of the past ie trade and military inter-imperialist wars, but also had to come to terms with the new 'impossibilities' which capitalist activity reproduced amongst the colonies and the colonial powers of the West, eg dependency, economic stagnation. This was a vital experience which cannot be summarised or 'parcelled', but which unleashed a new political and economic motion and dynamism in the social organisation of people and their political discourses. This is reflected in the growing internationalisation of the community and its political context; in the 'description' of people's lives in the colonies and in the 'polyglot cities' of the West, by Albert Camus (1962) in his 'Exile and the Kingdom'; or in Rybacov's (1988) narrative understanding of social relationships in a post-war socialist environment; and in the poetic reflection of popular support for the independence of peripheral nations from the US military and economic dominance, which Nikos Eggonopoulos (1977) in his 'Bolivar' expressed during the meta-dictatorial years of Greece. As Berman M (1989) has emphasized, the world which people inherited since the end of World War Two has produced new 'modes of vital experience, an experience of space and time,' of the self and others, of
new possibilities and life's perils, which is shared by the creation of a communal world in which we live. These modes of vital experience will be outlined here, through the presentation of some of the major facets which have comprised the edifice of a new socio-economic context of relationships between capital and labour; and through the presentation of a new ideological and cultural edifice for the political regulation of these relationships on a global scale. In a sense, this mode of vital experience is comprised by capital's internationalised activity and its radical movement forward for the complete integration and renewal of its relationship with the 'cosmos' of labour, and by the reformulation of industrial environments on an international basis.

Traditional modes of economic industrial organisation for the firm and the different nations, which were followed in the aftermath of World War Two, were replaced by a mode of organisation which encompassed production relations and political systems for labour regulation on a global level, which surpassed the hegemonic regimes of production-accumulation whose context was determined by the interaction between national economies and individual trade corporations, and established a world of socio-economic integration. [1] The new context of economic and thus political relations on a global level had to overcome the separation of the world into individual regional blocks of power (Franko Lawrence, 1983) through the economic and political transformation of the frameworks of industrial organisation and their replacement by new frameworks of industrial and political order. (Modelski G 1978)

The social factors which have dictated the transformation of the labour process and which are imposing a new economic and an ideological/cultural edifice on the relationship between capital and labour, are not determined by one set of political realities alone. The articulation of different sets of post-war realities have created domestic and global economic challenges, (ie in the mode of industrial development). The impossibilities which Zygmunt Bauman (1990) refers to in his article 'From Pillars to Post', are the impossibilities of reconciling the continuing 'dependent development' of peripheral capitalist nations on multinational corporations and the major post-war core capitalist nations. This
condition resulted in the expropriation-appropriation of the political and economic 'assets' which eg Third World countries had for their national development, and which has rendered them incapable of sustaining a policy of national reconstruction and industrialisation so as to become what Wallerstein (1974) has so often referred to as 'competitors' in the world market. (Goldfrank L Walter 1979; San Ranjit 1978; Clive Y Thomas 1976)

Then again, those countries of the so-called Third World, that were able to construct some form of industrialised sector, at large, remained the 'lands' of financial and economic foreign speculation. (Giannitsis T 1982, 1985; Jalee Pierre 1968; Babanasis Stergios 1980)

The impossibilities which international trade between individual nations and multinational corporations created, resulted in the stagnation and crisis, in terms of open trade conflict, amongst producer and consumer nations and amongst rival distribution corporations and organisations, (eg oil-multinational corporations and OPEC). (Nore Petter, Terisa Turner 1980) These impossibilities resulted not only in the financial crisis of the 1973-1980s, but also in the political and military polarisation of international relations and in the conglomereration of regional economic and political interests under the aegis of international institutions for the cooperation and regulation of domestic and international trade and of prices. (Keohane R, Nye J 1977; Keohane R 1984)

Zygmunt Bauman's reference to post-war impossibilities, has additionally a further 'meaning' in the sense that the present is the crisis of post-war suppositions on the cultural and ideological edifices of social organisation. The intervention of multinational corporations and the US or of other developed capitalist nations in the internal affairs of developing nations; the sustaining of repressive regimes for the operation of domestic and foreign 'ruling elites'; the scarcity of natural resources and the complete destruction of natural and social environments and the rise of popular nationalist orientated movements; have all synthesized a climate of ideological and cultural crisis. This crisis is related to issues of democratic economic and political activity, in the relationship between geographical regions, nation-states and the world market. From within this perspective, the analysis which follows will
focus upon the processes and factors which have contributed to the rise of a global frame of economic activity, and upon the main processes which determine the new context of ideological/cultural regulation of industrial activity at international, national and corporate level. These are: the increase in international capitalist trade and the rise of new forms of hegemonic regimes of economic regulation of trade and investment; the globalisation of the labour process and of its products; and the globalisation of markets.

The political difference between the era of capitalist activity that was analysed and referred to by classical theorists on the political economy of capitalism and the era during and after World War Two, was based on the characteristics and form of international industrial trade amongst nations, and in the rapid rise of multinational corporations on the political scene which became the most important feature of capitalism's internationalised operation. (Werner Olle, Wolfgang Schoelle 1982) [3] This feature of capitalist activity and of organisation (ie in the form of multinational corporations) became more apparent through the growing direct foreign investments by developed nations and multinational corporations and through the establishment of international political structures on a regional basis which perpetuated and expanded capital's economic and social dominance over foreign markets. [4]

The development of telecommunications, transport and energy systems on a world scale, (ie the establishment of national and international networks of services), has made possible the further utilisation of global trade by developed capitalist nations and their corporations, which has resulted in the increase of foreign investments of capital from the developed towards the developing countries. (Slenwagen Leo 1988; Groce R E 1982) The forms and reasons for the transfer of investments by capital vary, but at least in the early 1950s there was a need to expand, reconstruct and develop national economies so as to allow international trade to continue and also create 'safe networks' from which multinational corporations would operate. (Nayyar Deepak 1988; Seitz L John 1988; Ruggie J G 1982) This 'need' for the construction of networks for international trade by the US
for example, is summarised by Stephen R Gill and David Law (1989) as follows:

"...The first was the construction of a US-centred economic security, and political structure for the non-communist world, ensuring peaceful conditions at the capitalist core (in sharp contrast to the 1914-1945 years). The second element, closely related to the first, was the ability for the US to maintain the growth of global aggregate demand through its balance of payments deficits, partly generated by heavy overseas military expenditures. The third element was the substantial congruence of ideas, institutions and policies among the leading capitalist nations, in a system of 'embedded liberalism'. This involved the emergence and consolidation of ideology of the 'mixed economy', which along with the rise of the cold war, was important in the reconstitution (or creation) of the liberal-democratic form of rule in the West and in Japan. A fourth element was the cheap and plentiful supply of raw materials, especially oil..." [5]

The increased interest of Western super-powers in the reconstruction of foreign economies through direct foreign investments, had, as well, according to Sylvia Maxfield and J H Nolt (1990) a value in itself, as the coordinator of world trade, (e.g. price fixing, accumulation of goods). This coordination was essential if pre-war inter-imperialist rivalries were to be avoided and if coordination and cooperation amongst developed capitalist nations was to be established. (Jenkins R 1984) The essence of coordination and cooperation was especially important for the reconstruction of Third World economies, if international trade was to become more flexible and less dependent upon the market fluctuations of e.g. the US economy, and on the continuous supply of materials and means for production of goods from developed nations. In a sense the international trade demanded a new organisation of industrial activity and an 'injection' of new funds in the national economies of developing nations, if the latter were to be able and continue trade and boost the economies of developed nations. This was a situation, as Mandel E (1975) has described, where the capitalist world recognised the need to utilize the consumer tastes of peripheral economies and to create the condition where
there would be a market, far greater than the domestic ones. The recognition of the economic potential for developed countries which the revitalisation of trade with peripheral economies had, was also related to the US political motivation to develop a sustainable global order on trade for its interests.

"...In the immediate aftermath of the war, attention focused first on European reconstruction. By the late 1940s however, Third World development issues returned to the forefront as it became clear that chronic dollar shortages and consequent foreign exchange crises were plaguing many poorer countries: 'in the absence of capital exports or continuing gifts from the United States, such a contraction (in world trade) would appear inevitable, because US imports are unlikely to increase sufficiently to maintain present export levels' (ECEEP D-21/49:2)...Consequently several Truman administration officials pushed to implement wartime plans to promote Third World development. They determined that it was necessary to supplement multilateral organisations like the IBRD with direct US aid..." [6]

The above type and form of direct investments into peripheral economies was coupled with the rise of multinational corporation activities on the stage of a global market. This activity in the late 1950s was dominated by the US and Great Britain, whilst former economic powers (eg France, Italy) had reduced their range of direct foreign investment in other national economies. (See Table 1.2.1) The increasing trend in foreign direct investment (ie inward and outward) from and towards developed and developing national economies, reached its peak during the late 1960s and 1970s, where over ninety per cent of the multinational corporations' activities and of transnational financial corporations' (TFCs) was accomplished through such forms of investment (Andreff Wladimir 1984; Bruce Peter 1988). [See Tables 1.2.2; 1.2.3] Equally noticeable is the rapid increase of Japanese direct foreign investments during the late 1970s and 1980s, and an increase in foreign investment towards the US economy. (Guy de Jonquieres 1988; Thrift Nigel 1989; Reid Neil 1990) [See Table 1.2.4] Table 1.2.5 depicts the 1980-1985 trade patterns between developed industrialised and developing countries in terms of outward and inward
foreign investments. Both USA and the United Kingdom have been, according to the table, the major source countries for capital inflow and major countries for capital export to other host regions. (Hugh O'Neil 1990)

The flow of capital investments, became, together with the spread of multinational corporations and TFCs, the most characteristic form of capitalist activity and thus of the global organisation of production and accumulation processes. The spread of capitalist production and accumulation activity globally, meant a new edifice for the industrial organisation of large corporations. This new edifice was reflected in the creation of an international division of labour [7] and through the further integration and fragmentation of industrial functions and of competition around the globe, and through the spatial reorganisation of the labour process. (Scott Alen 1986; Veneris G 1988) The magnitude of a new international division of labour and its impact upon employment of personnel from developed and developing nations is exemplified by Thrift Nigel (1989) in his essay on the 'Geography of international Economic Disorder', by stating that:

"...By the mid-1980s, 65 million workers were directly employed in jobs provided by multinational corporations. Probably the same number were employed indirectly (United Nations, 1988). Most of this employment was provided by multinationals from only twelve countries, of which the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Japan and the Netherlands provided the bulk of employment abroad. A relatively new aspect of this pattern of employment has been that so much of it is in developing countries. Multinationals now employ about 5 million workers, or 8 per cent of their world labour force, in the developing countries....One reason why this new international division of labour took root was the breakdown of traditional economic and social structures in many developing countries, leading to an inexhaustible supply of cheap labour. Another reason was that the production process had become more fragmented and more homogenised, making it possible for many sub-processes to be spatially separated and carried out by unskilled workers...A third reason was that as transport and communications..."
### Table 1.2.1 Estimation of the total direct foreign investments according to the country of origin for the period 1914-1978 (% and M$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries of origin</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>M$</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>M$</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>M$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2,652</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>32,8</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>168,1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>10,8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>45,9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>31,8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>14,9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3,9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>26,8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dunning Jon, 'Un siecle d'histoire des multinationales p 21, in Cotta Alain, Michel Ghertman (eds) Les Multinationales en Mutation, IRM, Paris

### Table 1.2.2 Outward direct foreign investment from USA, Japan, UK and FRG to host geographical regions (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>30.96</td>
<td>25.02</td>
<td>25.12</td>
<td>24.57</td>
<td>21.83</td>
<td>21.77</td>
<td>16.23</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC (9 members)</td>
<td>23.56</td>
<td>31.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.93</td>
<td>21.87</td>
<td>34.45</td>
<td>34.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>28.92</td>
<td>18.08</td>
<td>8.52</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>17.36</td>
<td>13.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>-3.26</td>
<td>20.48</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>20.83</td>
<td>26.46</td>
<td>14.02</td>
<td>8.32</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed total</td>
<td>65.32</td>
<td>73.11</td>
<td>28.57</td>
<td>46.20</td>
<td>67.11</td>
<td>70.31</td>
<td>73.36</td>
<td>73.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing total</td>
<td>30.67</td>
<td>21.19</td>
<td>71.43</td>
<td>53.80</td>
<td>32.60</td>
<td>20.50</td>
<td>24.19</td>
<td>20.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) = the table is estimated

Table 1.2.3  Inward direct foreign investment from geographical source region towards USA, Japan, UK & FRG %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Europe</td>
<td>23.49</td>
<td>13.49</td>
<td>72.71</td>
<td>71.78</td>
<td>77.34</td>
<td>61.97</td>
<td>39.94</td>
<td>44.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC(3)</td>
<td>57.89*</td>
<td>58.31</td>
<td>11.07</td>
<td>15.18</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>16.87</td>
<td>40.25</td>
<td>34.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1.87**</td>
<td>11.29</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed total</td>
<td>97.21**</td>
<td>87.12</td>
<td>92.36</td>
<td>95.95</td>
<td>98.23</td>
<td>95.25</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Ireland & Denmark are included in the EEC
** = Other western region is included


Table 1.2.4  Japan's foreign direct investment in manufacturing industry according to geographical regions - Year 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Value in $million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>3316</td>
<td>14753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>9/1</td>
<td>4994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>3310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>1496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13375</td>
<td>36038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wary approach to the single market  Financial Times, Tuesday, 15 November
Table 1.2.5  Average foreign direct investment by selected countries  
1981-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Country</th>
<th>Outflows 1981-85</th>
<th>Inflows 1981-85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$million</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed market economies</td>
<td>44454</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1146</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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* includes Oceania  
** includes the Caribbean  
" totals do not sum owing to the number of countries which have been omitted

technology has developed, so it had become possible to carry out complete or partial production processes at many new sites around the world without prohibitive technical, organisational or cost production..." [8]

In relation to the social and technical structures of developed and developing nations, Frobel F, Heinrichs J and Kreye 0 (1980), in the 'Internationalisation of Labour', have proposed that the economic stagnation of late industrial economies, their relatively higher labour costs (ie in comparison to peripheral economies), and the rise in trade union militancy have all been contributory factors towards the rigidness of capital's profit accumulation and in turn of its competitiveness in the world market. Production therefore, moves 'offshore' in search of new cheap labour markets, rendering multinational corporations able to exploit the loose industrial and political structures of the Third World, where it developed into a 'concentration ground' for less capital intensive industrial undertakings whilst the western developed economies withhold those industrial phases which required the design and the engineering of consumer goods or of the production of the means of production.

The internationalisation of production-accumulation processes, has enabled capital to extend its use of a spatial division of the labour force, creating thus an 'alternative' to the existing labour markets consisting of 'cheap' and often unskilled employees. However, by enforcing Taylorist principles of industrial organisation upon developing economies, capital has resorted to what has been called as a 'peripheral Fordism' (Lipietz A 1984), where multinational corporations are able to dominate and exploit labour reserves and markets of less developed industrial economies. This was a process which was initiated by the internationalisation of trade before and after World War Two, and then developed into a process where only phases, rather than the whole production chain, was located in the country of investment, thus for the first time capital has created an industrial environment where both production and accumulation could be spatially divided according to the global and domestic socio-economic conditions that prevail at the time. (William M Allan 1987)
Further technological and social changes in developed capitalist economies, especially since the broad use of micro-electronics and fibre-optics have led to a more flexible use of production processes, making easier the global and regional division between places where much of engineering and technological conception is based, and those where the 'execution of production orders' is taking place. This creates a new industrial edifice for the economic and social organisation of production that is based upon flexibility and the further concentration and centralisation of capital investments and of decision-making at a global level. (Gordon David 1983) The increased use of technological achievements has rendered production processes flexible, and able to adapt and to be transferred throughout the globe at lower costs than in previous eras; and thus surpassing most of the technical and material problems of the past which were associated with regional economic peculiarities and domestic political problems (Umberto Colombo 1986; Lipietz A 1982).

This remodification of production techniques and the spatial reorganisation of the labour process at a global level, through integration of industrial activities throughout the world and through the fragmentation of the phases of production and of accumulation is further reflected in Canziannis A (1989) graphic representation of General Motors, the VW Group and of Toyota's global production. (See Figures 1.2.1 and 1.2.2) As it is shown in both figures, General Motors, the VW Group and Toyota's trend of development (1972-1977) follows a path which favours the decentralisation of manufacturing activity away from developed and towards developing nations. In the case of General Motors the manufacturing plants in Switzerland for example, is abandoned for new assembly plants in Zaire, Chile, Kenya, Iran and Singapore. The VW Group has also abandoned its manufacturing plants in Australia and it has increased its operations in Latin America, where in fact the Brazilian component assembly plant is further connected with Mexico, South Africa and Nigeria.

Toyota has also, during 1972-1977, further decentralised its activities by adding in countries such as Thailand, Philippines, South Africa and Australia. All three cases reveal a movement towards the further international division of their industrial activity and at the same time,
a movement in favour of internal restructuring, (eg from independent CKD assemblers to CKD assembly plant) that reorders relationships with HQ and develops new connections between assembly plants and manufacturing plants in other peripheral economies.

This spatial reorganisation of industrial activity is further illustrated by Lipietz A (1989) when he states that:

"...Washington places orders for sophisticated weaponry with west coast firms. These firms purchase West German machine tools, their engineers buy Japanese cars and Korean microcomputers and tip their 'collective servants' who in turn buy Brazilian shoes..." [10]

Lipietz's statement however, on the global industrial integration not only proclaims the integration of production and thus of trade, but also the beginning of a globalised network of the national markets. This globalisation of national markets is qualitatively different from the formations which were established during the post-war era. (See Figure 1.2.3) International interaction amongst national markets has given way to a stage of global integration of different regional and local markets into a great totality, from which control, accessibility and price-formulations are all shaped according to global market fluctuations and functions, and responds to multinational corporate and institutional activity (eg the EEC)

"...In this sense 'globalisation' can be understood as the process of linking different national financial markets together, including functions, market information, pricing and trading activities. At an aggregate level such linkages tend to be dependent upon the following factors: (i) development of national economy and international trade; (ii) development of communication and information technology; (iii) liberalized legal environment; (iv) adequate and stable foreign exchange reserves; (v) and political and cultural acceptance..." [11]
Figure 1.2.1 World Organisation of Three Major Corporations (1972)

Source: Canziani Arnaldo (1989) The Integration of World Economies and the New Challenge for Multinational Corporations, p 68, Economia Aziendale, Vol III, No 1, April - 18 -
Figure 1.2.2  World Organisation of Three Major Corporations (1977)

Source: Canziani A (1989), p 69
The reflection of such a globalisation of market activity, is most evident in the recent experimentation of EEC monetary integration, and in the establishment of a global organisation for the regulation of tariffs and of trade of goods which is far more international than the present GATT institution. In the first example, the European Common Market, as also the examples of the Central American Common Market, or of the Arab Economic Union, has moved closer towards a stage of complete economic and monetary union of the twelve European member nations, with a unitary framework of economic development on the issues of industrial organisation at a domestic level and on the issues of capital activity at the international level. (See Chapter Four; Buchan D 1990)

The second example, involves a new set of rules for the globalisation of the regulation of tariffs and trade which has come as a response to a growing integration and interdependence of national economies and as a response to what the GATT stood for since the end of World War Two, namely the financial organisation of developed capitalist nations for the regulation of their domestic economies and the control of world trade in accordance with their specific interests. The emergence however of new financial powers, eg Japan, the spread of regional economic unions, ie EEC, and the increased interlocking of developed with developing economies, has meant the arrival of a new point of departure from which world trade would have to be organised; one that in nature is including and is representative of global trade interests and that its policies should abandon individual national interests and concentrate more on how to regulate trade activity as a supranational organisation and not as an articulation of different national governments. (Riddell P; Peter Norman 1990) Such a capital movement on trade and tariff agreements is further reflected in the end of post-war agreements and arrangements between the developed and developing nations on the production of a number of goods, ie fibres, [12] and is also reflected in the movement towards the further restriction of a number of cartels, eg telecommunications, which continue to form their own tariffs in isolation from GATT's and other organisations' decisions, and hence retain a monopoly of tariffs globally. [13]
Figure 1.2.3  Schematic Representation of Market Development

Such forms of capital concentration and centralisation, on a global level, where in fact industrial activity and forms of organisations are spatially structured under the aegis of global networks of trade and of institutions (Marcussen S I; Jens E T 1982) have opened a 'new chapter' for the ideological and cultural framework for the regulation of the labour process and hence for the political relationships between employees and employers. Capital's vertical and horizontal mobility throughout the globe, which is reflected in the globalisation of industrial and financial capital, has resulted in what Harvey D (1989) defines as a state where there is a further compression of time and space. Such a compression has resulted in the structural reorganisation of corporate activity at the local level and in the reorganisation of international economic and political aims and of principles on industrial production-accumulation, (Jessop B 1988; Allen J Scott and Michael Storper 1986); and as (Cox R W 1987) [14] has stated, it has created an industrial environment where production and accumulation coexist in a fluid formation within national and global arenas, which in turn are determined by the world market and global institutions. (Wallace Iain 1989; Milner V Helen & Yoffe D B 1979)

The process of economic globalisation, as Jian Hai et al (1989) have shown in their article on the integration of national economies and markets, apart from the facets which were examined earlier, also presupposes the political and ideological reorganisation of the labour process through the establishment of a new ideological/cultural framework for industrial organisation. (See Figure 1.2.4) The epithet 'new' here denotes the crisis or the challenge to existing systems of organisation. It does denote the emergence of specific socio-technical systems which on the one hand re-adjust to globalisation through the integration of national or local industrial activity. On the other these deregulate and further fragment existing structures of organisation and of systems and beliefs which were centred around the local and national environment, and which were part of traditional paths of development and of national organisation.

The emergence of a new ideological/cultural framework far from solid or complete, reflects new demands for the renewal of man's relationship with the nation-state, his industrial undertaking and how his perceptions and
images are transfigured in the new dawn of global social policy. (Psimmenos I 1990) As Berman M (1989) has stated, the present industrial environment offers a multitude of new experiences, new arenas of 'dreams' and of new problems, so that for any one to adapt socially and participate in the present social environment, a complete new ideological and cultural transformation must first occur.

"...Modern men and women must learn to yearn for change: not merely to be open to changes in their personal and social lives, but positively to demand them, actively to seek them out and carry them through. They must learn not to long nostalgically for the 'fixed, fast-frozen relationships' of the real or fantasized past, but to delight in mobility, to thrive on renewal, to look forward to future developments in their conditions of life and their relations with their fellow men..." [15]

The new 'management' of the 'Global village', as Rousseau in his novel the 'New Eloise' has argued, makes people 'dizzy' with the magnitude of change on all social fronts, which disturb the visions for the future and dictates the pace for the re-evaluation of man's socio-economic identity and functional role in the economic development of a society. Such a condition has emerged through the further fragmentation of space and time, where as Giddens A (1989) has stated, [16] the globalisation of modern political and economic edifices of a society, has transformed the 'locale' into a transparent 'phantasmagoric' postulation, that exists within the new socio-economic edifice which the world as one single whole determines. (See Figure 1.2.5) This transformation is shown in a number of instances of capital activity, but whereas most analyses stop at the economic linkages which are formed today by adopting a line of thought which exalts the role which capital as a financial and economic entity plays on the relationships between capital and labour [17], the ideological dimension of this transformation often occupies no or little room in the understanding of the 'new', and how it creates a new dimension for employees in individual undertakings, in terms of political discourse and power relationships.
Figure 1.2.4 Representation of Factors that Determine Market Globalisation

Source: Jian Hai Liu et al (1989), p 381
The theoretical difficulties present in the study of the new ideological/cultural edifice of industrial organisation and hence of employees' political discourse and role, are immense. However, trying to approach the issue of globalisation and how it affects the political and cultural environment of industrial undertakings and hence of employees' ideological and political role in them, one can neither exalt the role of the 'world system' of capitalist relations and industrial activity in abstraction from the reality at the local and national level; nor can one present an analysis that separates the local (ie corporate activity and organisation) from the issue of the role of the state and the latter from the reality of global interdependence and economic integration. There is nothing more pivotal for the understanding and exegesis of the present edifices of industrial organisation, than an analysis that preserves a dialectical approach between the internal and external conditions which shape this organisation and weaves the 'local' with the 'global' market conditions and industrial mechanisms. It is the understanding that both planes of social activity exist in a state of compatibility and of harmony, which adds a new dimension to the theoretical detail of the social context of capital-labour relationships. This theoretical postulation becomes a necessary function for the understanding of the present industrial environment because as Lefebvre H (1979) in his essay 'Space: social product and use value' has stated, the global space is the edifice upon which the present epoch is created, and therefore the political and economic edifices of the local or national activity can only be construed within the context of global space. (Amin A, Robins K 1990) Similarly, in connection with the issues of power relationships and the political discourse of employees, (ie in relation to their social and political entity within an industrial undertaking), the ideological/cultural edifice for the regulation of the labour process cannot be separated from the conditions which the 'global space' is creating. (Baumgartner T, Burns R T, DeVille P 19/9) Any separation would be artificial and exogenous to the realities of the industrial activity, especially if power relationships as Foucault (1984) and Jameson F (1988) have depicted, are derivative from the way spatial organisation of the community's activity has been constructed. (Slater David 1989)
Figure 1.2.5 The Globalisation of Modern Political and Economic Structures

Secondly there is nothing more 'tragic' in the study of the present forms of industrial organisation, than a presentation of the modern polity of industrial organisation, as an extension and articulation of ideas and of political mechanism which have already been formed into a 'solid mass' and a concrete whole of rigid rules. The global experience shows that transformation is an ongoing process and that its difference with transformations of the past is that they rely on flexibility and coordination, which in turn 'shape' and 'shake' everything. The difference between previous and present industrial edifices exists indeed in the ability of the present industrial undertaking to sustain a state of perpetual flexibility and innovation and to profit from it; to exist in a 'contingent' flow of temporality at the expense of atemporal, rigid and static systems of labour process. (Connor Steven 1985)

This reality of 'temporality' and of perpetual flexibility, is reflected through the relationships between nations and international common markets, through the way in which trade and industrial organisations are regulated between common markets and global trade institutions, and through the way that economic activity is regulated at a national and corporate level. The transformation of Western Europe or of the Caribbean Islands into the EEC or into the Carricom respectively at the expense of decades and centuries of nationalism, expansionism and of colonial rule, is a part of this reality. Yet again the transfer of a number of important decisions, eg on energy, textiles or import/export quotas from the supranational executive bodies of different regional on continental common markets towards the executive bodies of larger global institutions, eg GATT, IMF-World Bank, at the cost of regional economic protectionism, is also a part of this reality. (Dullforce William 1990; Montagnon Peter 1990; Barber Lionel 1990)

Then again the fragmentation of the most important structures and mechanisms associated with the post-war development of national economies, and the further deregulation of existing working practices at local level, by different corporations, and the establishment of flexible social and economic mechanisms for the production of goods and the social welfare of employés, constitute essential parts of this reality.
All the different parts of this reality synthesize a new context for the organisation of industrial undertakings, which is placid and prone to a state of perpetual change, that surpasses even the most radical and visionary conceptions and theories for the present. An attempt will be made here to unravel some of the most important processes which affect industrial organisation and hence the employees' role in capitalist undertakings, despite the risk of empiricism or of sweeping generalisations, which might distort or partially reflect the present reality. (Hadjimichalis C; Vaiou D 1990) In trying however, to capture the theoretical conundrum of this new context, one has further to exemplify the 'need' for the establishment of a new ideological/cultural edifice of industrial organisation and to identify the main principles and the main processes which 'shake' and 'shape' the functions and characteristics of this new edifice.

In the transitory course which the present global industrial environment has taken, there is nothing more essential than the development of a new political system of symbols and metaphors, through which transformation in the social and economic domains of public life can become the 'core' of the political discourses of those who are part of it and render them free to identify with and participate in the ongoing transition.

"...It is not enough that the social order is 'legal'; it must also appear symbolically legitimate...It is all necessary that, as a 'free individual', not as a forceful subject but as a convinced citizen, one perceives the social norms as one's own. One must internalise them and fuse external compulsion and internal impulse into a new unit until the former is not longer distinguishable from the latter..." [19]

The need for a new ideological/cultural edifice for industrial organisation, comes as an answer to the global fusion of economic activity, by unleashing a process where political fusion as well, can take place. The gist of this lies along with the members of this new world context where it is recognised that a unitary new global 'intervention' into the socio-political 'cosmos' of people is necessary, if citizens are to become the subjects of transformation and the active
functionaries of the renewed environments. What is in need therefore, is the political instrumentalisation and channelling of this transformation which has to accommodate within its scope renewed or new 'signs' and 'avenues' or codes for political contact and regulation, by replacing or renewing existing perceptions and modes of political thought/discourse to match the replacement or renewal of existing methods and modes of industrial relationships. The arrival of a new ideological/cultural edifice which establishes itself at a global and local level, indicates what Gramsci (1971) has described in a different context as the 'state of catharsis', which here merely denotes the political passage from the economic stage of globalisation to the 'ethico-political' moment of globalisation; where new technical structures and economic mechanisms acquire new ideological values that seek to assimilate people to the organisational aims and principles of industrial activity. In this way:

"...Structure ceases to be an external force which crushes man, assimilates him to itself and makes him passive; and is transformed into a means of freedom, an instrument to create a new ethico-political form and a source of new initiatives..." [20]

This new edifice functions, as Cornelius Castoriadis (1987) has stated in his thesis on 'Imaginary Institution of Society', as the 'magma of meanings' from the 'volcano' of historical time and into the institutions of society.

"...Without a 'productive, creative, or radical imaginary dimension, as revealed in the invisible unity of social action and the simultaneous elaboration of a universe of meaning, history is neither possible nor conceivable'. The imaginary dimension determines the lifestyle, the volkgeist, of a society or an epoch..." [21]

The 'magma' of new meanings and 'imaginary dimension' with an emphasis on the principles of harmonisation of policies and of approaches and of the liberalisation of the economic and political organisation of industrial activity, introduces a new epoch for the regulation of capital-labour relations on a global level. The new ideological and cultural edifice
intervenes at the local, the national and the global plane of activity and is establishing itself through the emphasis of the necessity for a harmonious political and economic world, where decisions, functions and methods of industrial production-accumulation are all determined collectively, despite uneven and diverse conditions which exist amongst individual nations; and through the further liberalisation of economic-social activity against domestic or international structures, which might impede the full implementation on a political and economic level of the globalisation of social activity, in accordance with market forces and with global institutions of decision-making.

The establishment thus of a new ideological/cultural edifice for the regulation of labour process, becomes not the 'epiphenomenon' or the 'derivative social product' of what has already happened or is about to happen at the level of industrial or financial activity, but it is an essential social project, through which according to its levels of intervention and 'success' on the transformation of the present modes of thought and of political regulation, much of the economic transformation will be determined. The main processes which determine this ideological/cultural edifice are those of integration and of functional deregulation, which through their interwebness they conceal the whole dimension and characteristics of the present social context of industrial organisation. [See Figure 1.2.6] (Hancher L, Moran M 1989) [22] These two processes, however antithetical they may appear, through their inversion intervene at the local and global level by fusing together and defusing aspects and social patterns of economic and of political activity that were separated in the international arena of economic relations and united in the domestic arena of socio-economic activity.

The first responds and recognises the socio-political necessity for the creation of a state of common approach, a state of uniformity, across the globe on aims and principles, structure and measures and decisions in relation to the function of industrial undertakings, at a domestic and international level, and hence of the labour process. The second, recognises the necessity for the existence of diversity at a local or global level amongst producers and consumers, which presupposes the
Figure 1.2.6  Schematic Representation of the New Global Ideological Edifice of Industrial Organisation
'watering' of existing rigid and static, homogeneous forms of industrial organisation. Their interaction on an ideological/cultural 'level', on the one hand subsumes existing perceptions and modes of organisation, whilst on the other hand it replaces them with something entirely new. In this sense, integration could never become a reality, if the present structures and systems of beliefs were left untouched, and in turn the present structure and system of beliefs could never be applicable in an environment which defies the 'gravity of the nation-state' or portrays perceptions and cultural images which have little in common with the aspirational sentiments which were part of the labour movement's strategies during the era of welfare or national independence. (See Chapter Three)

The transitory and revolutionary context, of the present industrial environment, [23] through the establishment of a dual ideological/cultural edifice, which on the one hand redefines relationships and images in connection with the global market and supranational and institutional operations [24], whilst on the other it seeks to 'water down' and create 'flexible' images or adaptable conceptions of man's relationship with his/her work at national and corporate level, has synthesized a dynamism which dictates a new reality for employees at the place of work. Thus everything which was 'holy' and was considered as 'sacred' must be profaned and everything which was 'solid' must melt into air, and in turn everything that was left unexplored, and was considered as 'heretical' and 'anathema' to the employees' and employers' ethical codes on industrial organisation, now have become an essential of the social experimentation, for the construction of a new social environment at the place of work. [25] Keynesianism and 'welfarism' as part of the cultural and ideological edifice of organisation of industrial activity within a particular national context, the national sovereignty of economic organisation in relation to multinational corporations and the EEC, or the homogenisation of employees according to the employment status, skills, and functions at the production level, are all under an ideological challenge. [26] This challenge will be examined here under the analysis of two important areas where the new ideological/cultural edifice functions as a 'catalyst' for the old industrial modes and as a 'projector' of the new; namely the
nation-state and the latter's industrial response, and the corporate reorganisation of the labour process.

1.2.1 The 'Global Village' and the Nation-State's Industrial Organisation

On the issue of the nation-state's role in relation to industrial reorganisation, the process of globalisation has produced a rather complex and variegated reality for the ideological/cultural regulation of industrial environments. This complex and variegated reality is represented in a form of ideological crisis or challenge of the suppositions, ie philosophical and economic, which the nation-state has rested upon since the end of World War II. This crisis derives from the economic and political linkages at a global level (Cerny G P, 1990) or as Umberto Eco (1987) in his discussion with Stuart Hall [27] on the issue has asserted, from the derivation of open and integrated socio-cultural environments, which have produced a new flow of information and ideas which challenge domestic conceptions on the values and modes of socio-economic organisation of industrial undertakings. It has to do with the arrival of the 'new' in terms of the possibilities and ways for economic development, phases of global capitalist activity, and the arrival of new 'choices' which make necessary the transformation of existing modes of ideological/cultural edifices on the economic regulation of industrial environments and the establishment of new formed ones.

The presence of new principles and working practices adopted by the nation-state, should in no way be equated with a complete dismantling of existing political structures which have shaped the nation-state's post-war path of development insofar as industrial issues are concerned. Old regimes of industrial organisation might still remain, if not intact, but at the core of national policy commitments. However, what the analysis here will examine is first the inter-relationship between global and national edifices of industrial organisation, and second, the new emerging characteristics and how they affect the social policies of different governments insofar as the principles of the economic development of public corporations and of the measures (ie employment, welfare provisions,
industrial codes on labour) that are taken by different governments. The analysis here emphasizes how existing ideological and cultural edifices are challenged by the emergence of those new principles and policies which different nation-states adopt, and how this challenge affects the political and economic framework of industrial undertakings, and hence of the relationship of employees with the state and corporate activity.

"...That was the real change, it seems to me now. Not only that because we were making new metals and all kinds of machines we knew life on our planet would change, but because for the first time we thought in this way at all - and then began to think about how many different ways of living there could be - and then, of course, it followed that we wondered if we could choose how we would develop, choose the direction we would go in....It seems now as if what really happened for the first time was the idea of choice...." [28]

The arrival of the new possibilities for economic development and the parallel questions which are raised on the issue of whose choice it is to determine this economic development, through the interpenetration or articulation of global and local environments, has transcended the role and functions of the nation-state towards a new edifice. This new edifice on the one hand represents the crisis between the moral suppositions of a modern society for (ie sovereignty, welfarism) democracy and equality, and of its structure and dominant relationships; and on the other hand it represents the crisis between the processes towards the expansion and integration of capitalism as a social and economic system throughout the globe and the post-war rise of regional multinational blocks of unharmonised and of 'individualised' competition. (Modelski G, 1978; Skoopol T, 1974) It necessitates a new mode of regulation and of thought for industrial activity, within the perimeters of the nation-state. The uniqueness however, of a renewed attempt by capitalism to create a new context of industrial activity at the level of the nation-state, surpasses even the most radical exponents of capitalism's global dimension [29] through its emphasis on harmonisation of industrial activity throughout the world and through its emphasis on liberalisation of domestic structures by integrating further all its function and principles with the world market.
and global institutions, and by the deregulation of all the previous modes of industrial organisation. As Featherstone (1990) in his essay on 'global culture' [30] has pointed out where this 'uniqueness' lies, in terms of the existence of those processes, (he refers to them as being those of integration and disintegration), which in turn entrench a new political context for the nation-state that is bound or being determined by exogenous global realities. In this sense, the exponents of the world-system theory, eg Wallerstein, however their contribution is important, fall short of offering a dynamic and an integrated view of the relationship between the nation-state and the global environment or context of socio-economic operations. The 'global environment' is seen as the articulation of individual nation-states which are striving to achieve a political and economic harmony and become competitors in the world market, and within this logic or line of thought the nation-state appears as an institution and a political reality that is interacting with the global environment but is not integrated.

"...The existence of multiple centres of political power - independent territorial states - is one of the main characteristics which distinguishes the capitalist world economy from other economic system...Wallerstein's thesis that the state system is the political organisation of the capitalist world economy assumes that global economic relations determine the issues at stake in relations between states. Throughout his analysis, Wallerstein focuses on the state's role in creating the context in which domestic producers can maximise profit from the sale of their commodities in the world market..." [31]

The theoretical departure of Wallerstein's thesis (1974) or Skocpol's (1974) critique of Wallerstein's propositions, seems to progress from the nation-state towards the world-market, where it is almost assumed that the properties and context of the first are acquired prior to its 'interaction' with the world market (Robertson 1990).

"...To paraphrase Marx's famous statement, it is not buying and selling which makes a person a capitalist, but capitalism which makes a person buy and sell. It is the external class relations of capitalism that
makes men sell their labour, it was never a free choice....It is not the nation-state in trade, diplomacy or war that makes a state trade, act diplomatically and go to war..." [32]

Bergesen (1990) in the above statement exalts the role of the capitalist nation-state within a context of interpenetration or articulation of the local environment with the global economic and political edifices and goes even further so as to suggest that this role has a function and social significance for the capitalist system of economic and political relationships as a global and universal institution. His inversion, that it is the world market which has shaped the role and functions of the nation-state, is of immense theoretical significance since it injects into the existing theory on the nation-state a new dynamism, according to which the nation-state's role and functions are not either in total tied to the domestic conditions that prevail nor are determined exclusively by exogenous factors and conditions which subjugate individual nations to the interest of eg a group of core nations, as Wallerstein's theoretical categorisation has implied. Following this path of propositions, the present transformation of the nation-state's role in relation to industrial activity becomes an interlinked and dynamic process through which the global environment is tied by the 'interests' of the nation-state and the nation-state's 'interests' are tied with the global market and global institutions. This is what probably globalisation is offering as new, in the 'cosmos' of political and social organisation. This is a condition which dictates a radical approach of the present transformation of the nation-state in relation to industrial organisation, which emphasizes its unity with the global economic activity.

"...Regional and local economies have to be understood in the context of this global field. World Corporations have been the major force through which our epoch has been created..." [33]

The creation of a 'global field' of socio-economic activity or as Robertson (1990) has implied, is the creation of an economic and economic movement towards a 'single place', which in turn has produced a new dimension and a new 'break' or rather a 'historical break' from the post-war modes of
organisation. [34] But could this 'break' be analysed in isolation from historical and global social parameters, and could the characteristics and directions of the present ongoing transformation be solely examined as a response towards the inner-contradictions and antagonisms of a society? In fact, could the transformation of the role and functions of the nation-state be seen as an inert movement of domestic affairs, and if so then what is the role of such a transformation in the global stage of capitalist activity? If the response to these questions is affirmative, then probably the concepts and values that were attached to the ideological configuration of the nation-state, during the post-war period and much earlier, cannot be classified as belonging to a system whose nature is connected as one side of a coin is with the other, with global operations and global and universal ideological modes of regulation. (Palloix 1978)

"Capitalism's distinctiveness (ie from other systems) 'is based on the fact that the economic factors operate within an area larger than that which any political activity can totally control. This gives capitalists a freedom of manoeuvre that is structurally based.' (Wallerstein, 1976) The strategies and operations of modern transnational corporations demonstrate the reality of this freedom, which accounts for the tension frequently experienced in relations between them and territorially bounded national governments..." [35]

The new historico-political arrangements on an international level, as was shown at the beginning of this section, directly connect the socio-political modes of organisation of the 'locale' with the international edifices of economic activity. However, having outlined some of the major characteristics of the globalisation process or the movement towards an age where ideas and structures are tied by the global social edifices, the new rising ideological/cultural edifices in relation to the role of the nation-state have so far been seen at large as being determined in the last instance by the global, and thus by external social parameters.

Even though Wallerstein (1974) in his treatise 'The Modern World System' exalts the interconnection between external and internal factors which affect- the role and characteristics of the nation-state, and thus
determines the shape which the industrial organisation and regulation acquires at a national level, nevertheless he sees the interplay between internal and external conditions, especially in relation to developed capitalist economies in a restricted way.

"...there is a kind of asymmetry to Wallerstein's argument about the rise and fall of core nations. When the rise of a core nation is discussed, the explanation for the rise often draws heavily on the intentionality of class actors, whereas when a nation's decline is being accounted for, the explanations tend to be structural. For example, nations decline because there is an inflationary process that develops that makes the economy uncompetitive or because there is an over investment in the political cost of empire that happens inadvertently. In short, nations rise as a result of class intentionality and decline because of factors that emerge behind the back of social actors..." [36]

The combination of micro and macro analysis and the articulation of Marxist perspectives on the role of the state with perspectives which emphasize the effects of world trade and global market competition upon the state, have always presented methodological difficulties, especially if these approaches are based on a class-reductionist notion of the evolution of the state and of its characteristics. (Levine, Sober, Wright 1987) Those methodological difficulties which in turn reflect particular problems in the theorisation of the modern capitalist state and its role, are connected with two sets of issues: first, with the relationships between classes and the state apparatus and how the latter responds to the existing conflict and contradictions, and secondly, the state as an apparatus of (Dunford) intermediary social-economic regulation between exogenous, international factors and domestic conditions. The difficulty in the combination of both, (ie internal class orientated analyses and external international factors), is reflected in a number of contemporary analyses on the newly acquired social context of industrial organisation.

Though Mandel (1987) in 'Late Capitalism' directly asserts that the process of centralisation and integration of capital has profound effects on the political and economic organisation of the state, on the
ideological/cultural function of the state he nevertheless asserts indirectly that the state is a mechanism and responds, or rather functions, in accordance with domestic and internal political affairs.

"...The international centralisation of capital may also be accompanied by a gradual dismantling of the power of the various bourgeois national states and the rise of a new, federal, supranational bourgeois state power... The international fusion of capital without the predominance of any particular group of national capitalists. Just as no kind of hegemony is tolerated in these really multinational companies, the state form corresponding to this form of capital cannot in the long-run involve the supremacy of a single bourgeois nation-state over others, nor a loose confederation of sovereign nation-states. It must rather take the form of a supranational federal state characterized by the transfer of crucial sovereign rights..." [37]

However, Mandel's approach towards the socio-cultural nature and characteristics of the nation-state and its transformation, remains introvert in the sense that his conception of the state's role is seen as a response only to domestic-national and regional interests. The main functions of the state according to Mandel are:

"i) Provision of these general conditions of production which cannot be assured by the private activities of the members of the dominant class; ii) Repression of any threat to the prevailing mode of production from the dominant classes; iii) Integration of the dominated classes, to ensure that the ruling ideology of the society remains that of the ruling class..." [38]

His dichotomy between the economic and political processes of global capitalist activity and the ideological/cultural edifices of the nation-state as a mechanism of domestic rule and organisation, leads him to conceptualize the rise in power of dictatorial regimes and the establishment of monolithic edifices of cultural and political organisation, as a response only to internal affairs. The example therefore of the Chilean dictatorship (1974) is seen as an internal
response against class struggle and Allende's popular socialist regime; the role thus of the financial community beyond Chile or the imposition on Chile of a neo-monetarist programme of economic development by the US are 'subordinate incidents' to the financial and military rule of the Chilean 'bourgeois'. All these theoretical extrapolations are projected as if the Pinochet regime was not a product of post-war dependency upon the US, or as if the introduction by the Chilean state of a new ideological/cultural model of organisation based upon the further liberalisation of the national economic activities from local or regional social-political mechanisms that impeded profit maximization and the free mobility of capital, was a product of a handful of 'Chilean aristocrats' and not of the world market on copper trade and of the multinational corporations that have dominated the country. The state and its role for Mandel remains the 'faithful partner' from the era of merchant capital to the era of monopoly capital of the ruling domestic 'bourgeoisie', undisturbed by the rise of common markets, military alliances and the centralisation of decision-making above national economic councils, and through global organizations. (Borjas 1989; Goldfrank 1978)

At this point it is important to recall Sweezy's (1967) essay on 'Marx and the Proletariat', where he turns on its head the theoretical or rather political approach of the way capitalism and hence of the way a society is organised, that treats capitalism as either an issue of regional dimension or as only a system of regulation that is defined at the level of the production process. If capitalism is recognised as a system that is not defined and is not being confined by a particular country nor a system that is confined at the level of the forces of work, then it is important for someone to take the 'full account of the modus operandi of the system as a whole'. (Dowd 1978)

The 'modus operandi' of the capitalist system as a whole, in Mandel's analysis on the new configuration of the nation-state's role, is that it has been extremely confined in the traditional theoretical overview of the mode of production as the determinant characteristic between the forces of production and relations of production, thus exempting other social parameters which at present play a significant role in the 'shaping' and
'shaking' of the state's role at domestic and international forms of industrial organisation. These exempt parameters are the existing global monetary organisations, the various common markets and the growing tendency by nation-states to converge with the rest of the capitalist community on the principles and aims insofar as industrial matters are concern, (ie employment, welfare provisions). It should, however also be noted here that the present transformation is still an ongoing process, and that in no way has it already formed into a rigid new framework for domestic industrial operations, which either perpetuate existing post-war paths and choices of development or which have signified the end of existing modes of industrial organisation based for example on Keynesian principles and strategies. The 'modus operandi of the industrial system as a whole' therefore proclaims the need for an approach that synthesizes domestic with international processes and trends and emphasizes the new characteristics and trends which configurate a new picture of industrial activity at the level of the 'locale'.

The presence of a new mode of industrial organisation by the state, based on the replacement of old Keynesian politics and modes of economic thought with monetarist orientated polices for Mandel (1978) or Sutcliffe (1972) [39], is the result of the rise of class struggle by the working class on a domestic level, (ie by both authors, was incorporated in the establishment of the welfare state) which squeezed further capital's profit maximization. A more contemporary approach, and more internationalist in its suppositions, is that of the 'French Regulation School', where the present ideological and political transformation of the nation-state's role is seen as an articulation of external and internal factors and as a direct response by capital to the changing activity at the world market. Aglietta (1979) in his book 'A Theory of Capitalist Regulation', [40] proposes that a change in the forms of industrial regulation is the result of a change in the forms of capital accumulation. In brief, the socio-economic transitions in the form of regulation of economic activity, in the pre-war years, was marked by a shift in a mode or a regime of extensive capital accumulation and into a mode or a regime of intensive capital accumulation. The post-war regime of intensive accumulation, according to Aglietta, had to face two important problems: on the one hand that of the harmonious
relationship between branches of industry which produce the means of production, (ie Department I) and branches of the industry responsible for the production of the means of consumption (ie Department II), whilst on the other hand it had to resolve the dual nature of consumption, as a reflection of rising wages and thus of rising costs to capital as well as a reflection of a rise in the consumption power. The disharmony between Department I and Department II and between rising wages and rising costs, had resulted in the fiscal crisis of the 1980s, where unemployment and inflation caused many governments to resort to the imposition of 'monetary constraint' policies. Their relation towards domestic industrial activity had to change through cuts in public expenditure, wages and the general social welfare sector, and through the imposition of measures which assisted industry to mobilise its material and human resources towards those branches of industry which were more competitive in the world market, and at the same time be less restrained in the utilization of personnel from domestic labour laws and from traditional agreements and practices insofar as employment, and the social welfare or benefits of employees are concerned.

The problems associated with Aglietta's work in relation to the transformation of the nation-state's role in industrial organisation vary from the way he approaches the whole issue, to the exaltation of the social dimension of the market and its importance on the regulation of industrial activity, failing thus to combine such an analysis with an analysis of the role which contradictions and antitheses, due to capitalist relations of production, play in the occurring transformation. (Clarke 1987, 1988) The state appears in the last instance or in the background, as an 'instructor' of the mechanisms and functions which the market has already laid, and in fact the role of the state in the formation of a renewed mode of ideological/cultural edifice for domestic and international industrial organisation, according to Aglietta's analysis, remains at the level of fiscal policies. The rise of monetarism in place of old Keynesian politics, has no more significance than the regulation of money circulation at a national and global level, thus it reduces the state's role to an economic role alone, leaving aside its political and ideological roles. Another theoretical problem arises
from his emphasis on the techniques or forms of production-accumulation, which has led him to generalise and over-emphasize the change from Taylorized principles of industrial organisation to Fordism, (eg during the post-war era), and to the neo-Fordist principles of industrial production and accumulation.

However, the present ideological/cultural edifice of the nation-state, in relation to issues of economic activity and political regulation, might be a response to the occurring transformation of the schemes, techniques and principles of industrial organisation, but such a response in itself entails already a motive for a change in industrial organisations by the state. In other words, as will be seen later in this section, the nation-state not only responds by producing a new ideological framework on work values and images towards work, but also produces measures and strategies through which industrial undertakings can implement industrial schemes which are more flexible, and in addition as the case study of the Greek Public Power Corporations shows, the nation-state imposes a number of new policies that restructure the principles, aims and working patterns of the public sector and of its public corporations. Furthermore, the ongoing transformation of the principles and rules of industrial organisation, within a nation, cannot be seen as a transformation from Fordism to neo-Fordist type of arrangements alone, especially if these nations could not be characterised as having predominant Fordist types of organisations, in any branch of their economy.

If this is true, especially about Greece or other peripheral economies, then how would a transformation of the role of the nation-state in relation to industrial organisation be explained? Would it be seen as a response towards internal structural problems alone and how they interact with global market reorganisation movements or would it be seen as as only a response towards external conditions (ie dependency, EEC integration)? The issue of the internal structural problems, ie a rigid and overstretched public sector, or failure to re-invest in the areas which are more competitive in the world market, is an issue that especially for peripheral economies due to their dependent development cannot be analysed in isolation from the relationship of the nation-state with eg global
institutions and political unions. Whereas the issue of dependency cannot be analysed in isolation from the issue of how the economy was run by different governments in relation to the necessities for an overall structural re-adjustment in the way public corporations and the private sector are responding both towards the national economy and its relationship with the world market and towards other parameters of international trade, eg labour market competition and the application of new technology in industrial processes. (Giannitsis 1985)

The theoretical exaltation of the concept of 'regulation' however, has played the major role in the determination of the national economy by global factors, as being a mechanism which appears in the last instance. In other words, Aglietta's central theoretical contribution represents an inverse stand on where regulation occurs and how it is determined. For world-system theorists, this regulation occurs at a global level and in accordance with Frobel et al's (1980) thesis on the new 'international division of labour'. The role of the nation-state is being facilitated within the context of capital's global mobility and that regulation appears and occurs in accordance with this context, where indeed the state might impede or reinforce this global capital mobility (Friedman 1990). If this general supposition is a true representation of Frobel et al's theoretical stand on the role of the nation-state within a global framework of capital regulation, then for Aglietta's theory, the opposite determines capital regulation in a world economic activity. The concept of regulation does not appear to be 'synchronised' and determined by capital global mobility but it is rather 'confined' within the 'perimeter economic fences' of the nation-state. It is the nation-state that determines the regulation of capital's accumulation and for Aglietta, it is the nation-state that determines the volume and magnitude of capitalist activity at the global level.

In this sense, the global networks for economic and political regulation appear to respond directly to the nation-state's role and policies on economic-political regulation of capitalist accumulation. However, Aglietta's methodological and theoretical framework of analysis remains exclusively tied with the US economic-political experience during the
1970s, where both the US economy and the role of the US administration was increasingly dominant at global level; and probably his theoretical suppositions for this period reflected a part of the then economic realities. But the problems appear, as was shown earlier, when these suppositions are 'mechanically' attached to the present global context of economic activity and when they are taken away from the particular context from which they have been derived, at the first instance. Within those theoretical queries it is doubtful whether the role of the nation-state (as also will be shown later) insofar as the regulation of industrial domestic activity is concerned, remains above or beyond the structures and policies which for example the IMF-World Bank or the EEC organisations are imposing throughout the world, and it is doubtful whether one can continue to treat those supranational organisation as complementary to the already existing modes of power shared by the state and sectors of an industrial economy. These doubts derive both from empirical observation (ie especially in relation to peripheral or semi-peripheral economies and their part in the global restructuring) of the relationships between supranational organisations and the role (ie on a domestic level) of the nation-state, and from the theoretical analysis of the role of those supranational organisations which although they consist of different governments and state bodies, nevertheless act above specific national interests.

Similar propositions to those of Aglietta's theory on capitalist regulation are also present in Scott's (1988) essay on 'flexible production systems and regional development', dominate the exegesis of the present industrial restructuring as if the role of the nation-state is not determined as well by the role of market forces at the global level. (Lovering 1990) For Scott (1988) the external socio-political context plays little role in the actual determination of the nature and characteristics of what he defines as 'flexible regimes of accumulation'. Thus, the ideological and political intervention of supranational organisations like the EEC or the IMF in national economies, is almost left 'untouched' as if it is the public corporations of a particular society which determine on 'esoteric' criteria their paths of development. As if it is only a historical chance that almost all of developed and developing countries and their governments
are abandoning post-war national or regional orientated policies of development, in favour of a global harmonised industrial activity which establish market criteria for the operation of public sectors and rely on the further liberalisation of internal economic mechanisms from state control.

The role of supranational organisation on the establishment of a more harmonious and further open and transparent markets and industrial processes, in conjunction with the competitive and profit orientated spirit of capitalism, through the further integration of national edifices for industrial organisation at a global level, and through the further deregulation of existing patterns and principles of industrial organisation at regional or local level, are treated as exogenous factors to the national regimes of accumulation (Van der Pijil 1984). The conjunction point, where the supranational organisations and the nation-state meet and define the new ideological/cultural edifice for the domestic industrial adjustment of local public and private industrial undertakings, has so often been seen as either a mechanistic relationship, where the supranational networks impose upon the nation-state their market principles and rule on economic activity; or where the nation-state (ie as Wallerstein world-system theory) of developed economies 'shape and shake' the economic activity of other industrialised nations, in accordance with its interests, via the 'hegemonic' regulation which these supranational organisations exert.

The ideological context, within which such a relationship is constructed, and the new edifices which are built for the re-adjustment of domestic activity, (ie in relation to the global financial and industrial processes and how they shape the role of the nation-state), are issues which it is probably doubtful whether they could be explained using only the experiences and theoretical suppositions of the past by extending the political raison d'etre of the post-war nation-state's role to the present (Bourdieu 1989). What is needed, therefore, is probably a new theoretical 'ceteris paribus', which articulates the present transition of the nation-state's role with the global political and economic transformation on issues of industrial organisation, and emphasizes the
main processes which determine the direction that the present transition is
taking, and the main ideological/cultural edifices which determine the
political context of the nation-state in relation to domestic forms of
industrial organisation. Although these processes could not be seen as a
replacement of existing processes, that were structured around the
ideological, economic and political edifices of production/accumulation
process, it is important however for analytical and theoretical purposes
to investigate the role of the nation-state, (eg in relation to
industrial organisation) in conjunction with the global context within
which it has to operate. (Jessop 1989)

A more recent version of the theoretical approach which stresses the
importance of capital accumulation in the formation of particular modes of
industrial organisation, is that which stems out of the work of Piore &
Sabel (1984) in the 'Second Industrial Divide'. The role of the
nation-state has to be transformed by accommodating macro and micro-
economic politics which restore the imbalances (ie under-consumption), on
trade and consumption which the post-war regime or mode of capital
accumulation has created. Piore and Sabel suggest that nation-states have
either to adopt a programme of 'international Keynesianism' or a programme
of 'flexible specialisation'. Following their assumption that the crisis
of the 1970s was a crisis of under-consumption, both suggest that an
alternative is a new macro-economic strategy by different governments on an
international level, which will seek to regulate via international
measures on trade, the balance between supply and demand. The first
prerequisite mechanism for such a regulation, according to Piore and
Sabel, is an arrangement on a global level, which ensures post-war
imbbalances between consumption and production will be avoided, though the
integration of a national market with regional or global market unions; an
amalgamation of markets which since the 1970s has been the most noticeable
feature of present economic activity, through the expansion of the
European Common Market and the spread of common regional or continental
markets across the globe (ie Central-American common Market, West-Coast
African Common Market, Middle East and ASEAN countries Common Markets).
The second mechanism would ensure an exchange control on an international
or regional level, which would stabilize investments and secure the
environment for capital expansion. A similar action has been recently taken by the EC for the introduction of a single currency, the ECU, and a number of supporting directives on integration of banking, insurance and transport services. The third institutional mechanism, is that of measures which 'distribute' the 'expansion of productive capacity' amongst developed nations and between them and developing nations.

"...An international Keynesian order built with these three institutional mechanisms could be realized by expanding and reorienting international economic institutions that already exist. Such institutions include principally the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Detailed bargaining would be necessary to determine the role of other international institutions within such a system and how authority would be distributed between the IMF (which is experienced in negotiating settlements country by country) and the GATT (which makes and oversees the application of broad rules)...

" [42]

The second alternative which Piore and Sabel have envisaged for the regulation of domestic economic activity, is that of 'flexible specialisation'. The term implies flexible arrangements on the use and regulation of labour and at the same time a new approach on the re-utilization of regional capacities to produce and consume, with an emphasis on specialized regimes of production. The domestic economies in relation to the world market are seen as a potential, through the combination of flexibility with specialisation on both techniques and products, which expands the competitiveness of a nation's economy and limits the social and economic costs of production.

The 'problematic' of Piore and Sabel's analysis first of all lies, as with the Wallerstein thesis, with the supposition that the transformation of the economic organisation is a necessity that derives from the internal-domestic 'incapacities' to balance trade and regulate demand and supply at a local level, so that competitors would be able to compete at the world market. The state's role therefore is seen as the co-ordinator of the mechanisms which would strengthen one's position nationally and internationally before one has encountered the international market place.
These suppositions are made more clear in the author's 'alternative' proposition, where each individual nation-state moves forward to a stage of regional or global unification with other nation-states, for the macro-regulation of trade activity. This is envisaged as an 'alternative' movement towards a new industrial order and not as a process which has already taken place, due to the increased centralisation and concentration of capital activity, (ie on a global scale), which in turn has created integrated networks of production (eg multinational corporations - international division of labour) and of accumulation (eg globalised centres for market activity).

This conception allows the two authors to envisage a global network for national regulation, first as something which the nation-state can determine within the national context, and second as something which does not alter the post-war logic on industrial organisation and development, but it is a mere functionalist transfer of this logic (ie Keynesianism) from a national to a supranational level; the integration factor therefore, seems not to disturb or shake the old modes of thought, it seems to dominate the world stage from above. (Caporaso 1989) Third, these authors conceptualise the new mode of industrial organisation as either developing into integration or into flexible local industrial arrangements. Either the first or the second, but this 'either/or' concept, first of all fails to conceptualise the possibility that national economies and their states might move towards a direction which engulfs both and is determined by the symbiosis of international integration and industrial local flexibility and specialisation. (Groom and Heraclides 1985) Then again, integration is not seen also as flexibility on the part of capital from domestic political and economic constraints, and the stage of flexibility within local industrial undertakings is not seen as something which could lead or led to integration, (eg with the world market). [Katzenstein 1985; Frankel 1987] This 'either/or' concept implies a freedom of choice on the part of the nation-state and its regulation of industrial activity, which is acceptable if the issue at question is the implementation of specific policies, but if it is on the processes which might determine those choices, then the question cannot imply a freedom of alternative choices in isolation from the social context.
in which the nation-state exists and operates, which in the present era of economic activity is structured on a global level. (Altvater Elmar 1984) These processes, (ie integration-functional deregulation/reregulation) seem to dominate much of the nation-state's ideological/cultural edifice on industrial organisation. They seem to re-shape the principles and aims of the nation-state in relation to international and domestic economic activity and they seem to prefigure a new role for the state in terms of actual economic operations through its public sector.

Those two processes seem to intervene at both the political and the economic domains of industrial organisation, by producing new images and ethics on work and by re-directing the role of the nation-state in the social regulation of economic activity on a global level. These new images and ethics are challenging existing political sentiments of the role of the state in relation to: nationalism and 'national sovereignty' in connection with the industrial organisation of a nation, the principles and aims of the nation-state's economic reorganisation, and the new 'modus operandi' of social welfare introduced by the nation-state. It should however be noted here that the new emerging principles, aims and patterns of domestic industrial organisation do not altogether signify the end of existing post-war paths of national development; they are taken as indicative conditions of an emerging new trend in the nation-state's 'philosophy' and political response towards matters of industrial organisation which do synthesize a new environment for employees at the place of work.

The establishment of a new ideological/cultural edifice, for the role of the nation-state, in matters relating to individual national industrial organisation, presupposes first and foremost the replacement and the establishment of new images and symbols concerning the entity (ie in both political and economic terms) of the nation-state inside the present context of global networks for trade and political activity. Without these images and symbols, the function of the nation-state as part of an economic and political union, (eg the EEC), would result in a historic disjuncture between the development of an integrated world and the 'development' of a nation in isolation and in antithesis to this world.
These images and symbols, therefore, play a crucial role in the determination of a nation-state's adaptability and response towards the global networks of the capitalist community, and as well in the determination of the nation-state's attitudes and response towards the principles and aims for industrial activity taken by this global network of the capitalist community.

The images and symbols which were associated with the nation-state as an entity, of national development and of its citizens' homogenisation, if they are not to be ossified, need to be replaced by a new economic universality whose main core lies in its transnationality, which in turn surpasses both the ethics and codes of identity and loyalty towards an individual nation and at the same time creates or reinforces those ethics and codes of identity and loyalty towards global institutions, economic supranational unions and the measures and policies which they decide. Such a transition creates a political gap between:

"...the idea of membership of a national political community, ie citizenship which bestows upon individuals both rights and duties, and the development of international law which subjects individuals, governments and non-governmental organisations to new systems of regulation. Rights and duties are recognised in international law which transcend the claims of nation states and which, while they may not be backed by institutions with coercive powers of enforcement, have far-reaching consequences. For example, the international tribunal at Nuremberg laid down, for the first time in history, that when international rules that protect basic humanitarian values are in conflict with state laws, every individual must transgress the state laws..." [43]

The example of the first post-war global legal frameworks, which were based on a universal declaration of human rights and of the obligations of governments towards their subjects, although it does reflect the movement towards the internationalisation of economic and political activities, nevertheless partially reflects the present social-economic context within which the nation-state and its subjects are 'expected' to operate. David
Held (1989) in his 'Decline of the Nation-State' uses the term 'sovereignty' as a theoretical departure to demonstrate the ideological and political transition which the nation-state as an entity has made in a complex and globalised economic and social environment, but he fails to emphasize the new images and symbols which determine a nation's role and relationship with its subjects, insofar as the industrial organisation and political regulation of the labour process is concerned. He ends his analysis at the point where national autonomy and domestic public accountability are infringed by the political and economic interdependence amongst states and global institutions, leaving unexplored what he defines as the 'new forms of political participation and intervention' which are essential parts of this globalisation process, in relation to the organisation of domestic industrial undertakings.

"...While such organisations frequently create new restraints upon national states, they also create new forms of political participation and intervention...it is misleading simply to conclude, then, that sovereignty is wholly undermined in contemporary circumstances. On the other hand, this discussion of the four disjunctures (ie world economy, power blocks, international organisations, international law) between the sovereign state and the late twentieth century economic and political world does reveal a set of forces which combine to restrict the freedom of action of governments and states by blurring the boundaries of domestic politics, transforming the conditions of political decision-making; changing the institutional and organisational context of national politics, altering the legal framework and administrative practices of governments: and obscuring the lines of responsibility and accountability of nation states themselves...Any conception of sovereignty which interprets it as an illimitable and indivisible form of public power is undermined. Sovereignty itself has to be conceived today as already divided among a number of agencies - national, international and transnational - and limited by the very nature of this plurality..." [44]

A similar path of analysis is followed by Marguand (1989) in the 'Irresistible Tide of Europeanisation', where he summarizes the
contributory factors affecting the issue of sovereignty and the role of the nation-state.

"...The fact is that the 1992 project is a response to a complex set of pressures which had called the traditional concept of national sovereignty into question. The first is the growth of international economic interdependence, ... Associated with the growth of international trade, moreover has been a marked growth in the role of multinational companies, owing allegiance to no national state and, in many cases, disposing of resources so great that they are almost immune to the sticks and carrots of national policy. The third development is the growth of an increasingly globalised capital market and the deregulation of many national capital markets. Last, but not least, come the effects of accelerating technological change, and the growing case of technology transfer..." [45]

But whereas Marguand (1989), like Held (1989) rightly emphasizes the changing context of the relationship between the nation-state and the globalisation of economic and political forces and directly implies that the state cannot anymore exercise the political and economic power which it used to exercise, nevertheless fails to address as well the new context for the operation of the nation-state in a globalised environment and the new images and symbols which enhance its entity with this environment. In other words, the ideological and political consequences - which the rise of supranational organisations have created for the socio-political entity of the nation-state at the macro and micro level (ie international relations and domestic forms of organisation) have only been related to the issue of the decline of sovereignty in terms of autonomous state systems and in terms of the ideological challenge which supranational networks of decision making pose. What is missing from the theoretical extrapolations of those theorists which tend to emphasize the decline of the nation-state's sovereignty, (ie in terms of autonomous decisions on development), is that sovereignty in relation to the socio-economic organisation of domestic industrial undertakings and of their policies towards the regulation of the labour process, today more than ever has acquired a new political framework. This new meaning and edifice derives

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from what Rosenau (1989) in his article 'The State in an Era of Cascading Politics' has referred to as the new emerging 'transnational patterns that seem to be shrinking the world', and create an economic environment where domestic and global systems and principles of industrial organisation have become increasingly 'obscure'. This economic environment produces new ideological perspectives for the role of the nation-state in relation to industrial organisation, which instead of an image of 'decline' (ie in relation to sovereignty) re-adjusts sovereignty to the new conditions applied, and transcends the role of the state from the level of 'domesticity' to an internationally-oriented level of operation, or as Katzenstein (1985) would have argued, creates a 'climate of symbiosis' between the nation-state and the supranational institutions and policies on industrial development. (Krasner 1989)

First of all, the nation-state is compelled to adopt roles which construct a new stage in relation to its position towards supranational organisations, which on the one hand harmonises its position, in politics and in economic principles and aims with other nation-states, whilst on the other it further liberalises its internal structures and activities from domestic orientated political programmes and strategies for national development. The issue of sovereignty, through harmonisation and liberalisation, thus becomes interwoven within a global mechanism and strategy for the regulation of trade and politics via the implementation of policies which are collectively decided by supranational institutions and parliaments, and which are aiming for the cooperation and adaptability of nation-states towards globalisation. This interwovenness is reflected in the recent experimentation of the EEC member states, or of other economic unions and their members, in a direction that harmonises economic and political decision making and liberalises further from national constraints the functions and principles of the national economy (See Table 1.2.1.a), and it has recently been expressed by the President of the United States Council for International Business (1989), at a speech given to the International Institute for Labour Studies (23 February, 1989), where he stated that: "... the accelerating movement towards a global economy makes it all the more necessary for the consideration of global responses to microeconomic issues that are based on the interest of the world wide
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selective representation of integration-functional deregulation of domestic policies on trade and development, according to common markets and individual nations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selective</strong>&lt;br&gt;Common Markets:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARRICOM (Caribbean)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACC (Arab Cooperation Council)</td>
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<td>MAU (Maghreb Arab Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central American Isthmus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selective Individual States:</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 EEC Members</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria/Morocco</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harmonisation of socio-economic decision-making/liberalisation of domestic structures &amp; policies</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Selective Individual States:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>Puerto-Rico</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon/Nigeria</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* (Those countries are seeking to re-adjust their social-economic programmes in co-operation with traditionally perceived rival common markets)

**Source:** Financial Times Surveys: 1988, 1989, 1990
International Herald Tribune: Wednesday, 29 June 1988
economy, rather than on narrow national or even regional interests. 'We cannot, (the President has said) limit the range of domestic policies that are the legitimate field for international co-operation.'..." [46]

This legitimation in relation to the nation-state's role towards supranational organisations is expressed through different forms, although in relation to the organisation of industrial trade and of the regulation of the labour process, these forms can be instrumentalized through the operation of a state of economic interdependence and the functional operation of a new framework of social and cultural identity. In brief, the first consists of all those images and symbols which 'allow' the unification of different governments and of different sectors of the economy under the social-political aegis of a single global institution, and presents the IMF's or GATT's decisions as legitimate decisions by which one nation-state is bound, and with which it has to comply accordingly. A stabilisation programme by the IMF-World Bank is seen no more as an intervention in the internal affairs of a country, but as a part of the global reality of economic-political integration, which in turn necessitates the deregulation of the previous acquired roles and functions by the nation-state which responded to a different set of norms and rules of trade and of economic activity.

As William E Connolly (1989) has asserted in his critique on the post-war political theory of the state, the current transformation of a state's political functions is characterised by new imperatives which in turn are legitimized as 'necessities' or as 'requirements of progress'. In the post-1980s era, though this legitimation of transformation in the form of 'necessity' is reflecting if not a totally new (in relation to post-war dominant economic and political suppositions) perspective of managing the domestic industrial development, it certainly reflects a global perspective of the growing interdependence between the nation-state and international institutions.

This necessity presupposes that the nation-state will challenge all those 'ethics' which will not legitimise the intervention of the IMF of of the World Bank; and that it will reinforce the economic and political cooperation of those active forces (at a domestic level), with the
decisions taken by a global organisation, through the domestic reorganisation of its public sector activity. However, this bipolar relationship between the nation-state and supranational organisations, should be treated with more caution insofar as the issue of the latter's 'hegemonic' rule over the nation-state and in turn its adoption of specific measures on industrial development. There is more than one example where nation-states have created political and economic obstacles to the measures and decisions which the IMF-World Bank have taken, (eg Peru, Bolivia), and which were reflected in the Third World initiatives led by Central American nations (1988), [eg Fidel Castro's proposals] to override the monopoly rule of the IMF, concerning the national financial liabilities of developing countries. Having said this, the necessity to regulate domestic trade and industrial production does not fall outside the political will for a supranational solution of Third World economic problems. Developing and developed nations see their own internal interests to be interwoven with the establishment of supranational institutions that unite rather than separate different national interests, and represent the collective wishes of all participants. (ILO 1987; Montagnon P 1990) Furthermore, their role in global trade and political decision-making, is seen in a state of transcendentality, where the nation-state seeks to re-adjust its industrial and social organisation according to the dominant forms and regulations, through its own participation in the 'global community' of industrial decision-making.

There is therefore a necessity for the nation-state to ideologically/culturally instrumentalise the functions of global institutions as being the 'embryo of a supranational state' (Amin Samir 1985), and the principles which those global institutions perpetuate, as being essential parts of the national development of a country. The recent controversy, which surrounds the functions of global institutions like GATT, shows that the new image for global and integrationist approaches to global issues is far more important than the individual attitudes and separatist or domestic orientated roles of the nation-state. (Riddel & Norman 1990)
"...The rewards for success are considerable. First, a guarantee that world trade will continue to grow so that economies can expand, creating new businesses and new opportunities. By throwing away the weapons of protectionism—import controls, restrictive deals, laws against the free flow of goods and services—a new trade deal will cut European unemployment and help Easter Europe revive. Above all, it will start to arrest the decline of the poverty-stricken countries of Africa and Latin America..." [47]

It is this image of unification and of international collective decision-making on matters concerning industrial organisation, which allows the governments of for example Kenya or France to identify their own national economic development with the increased globalisation of economic and political activity through the common regulation of trade and production. (Davidson 1990; Hawkins 1988)

This image of unification, despite the polarisation that exists between developed and developing nations on a number of highly important issues, eg debt, international regulation of tariff systems, nevertheless transcends the role of the nations towards supranational decisions and 'solutions'. The example above, of GATT's imminent transformation towards a global institution (which includes and represents Third World countries' interests), highlights the significance which the globalisation of economic activity has upon the globalisation of political regulation insofar as industrial organisation is concerned. This political regulation, it seems, can no longer be structured according to the political raison d'être of only the individual interests of developed capitalist nations and western supranational organisations. A new formula of international economic activity is at the forefront of the industrial trade debate. (Hufbauer 1989; Ostry 1989) Whether or not, therefore, GATT is dismantled and is replaced by a Multilateral Trade Organisation (MTO) — [ie EEC's current proposal] — or by a body like the OECD (ie a more favoured body by the Third World Textiles and Clothing Bureau), will have a tremendous significance for the way the global regulation of economic activity is going to be structured. But what at this point is more significant, is the fact that there is an ideological challenge to
post-war paths of development and there is an emerging new ideological/cultural edifice which seeks to re-adjust the role of the nation-state in accordance with the present global social context for economic activity and industrial organisation, which levels national with international market and political interests.

This unification rests upon the creation of a new ideological/cultural edifice that surpasses or is trying to surpass nationalism or separatism, through the portrayal of for example Pan-European or Arab or Carribean identity on matters relating to industrial principles/aims and organisation. This identity, or the state of belonging to a common geographical environment, has less probably to do with geography and the natural barriers of a geographical area, than with the revival and renewal of common shared cultural and economic experiences. The idea of a 'Common European home' or a of a 'Common Central-Americas' is a visualizing project of this sharing of common experiences in the cultural and economic domains (Kudryatsev & Shchenin 1989), which in turn subject the citizens of those environments to a common social background (Kean 1989; Mulgan 1989). But the present identity drive in the context of industrial organisation has less to do with what a 'continent' has shared during the past than with what it needs to dissociate from, in order to respond to the present. (Mardu 1990) As Fuentes (1989) has stated this dissociation would participate and reinforce Europe's integration against nationalism, and ideological monolithism of the past, which was captivated in the literary critiques of Europe's intellectual community.

"...Camus, Sartre, Jean Genet, Marleau-Ponty, Rosselini, Visconti, Vittorini, Gunter Grass ...Akhmatova, Andreyevsky...Samuel Beckett are great figures of that sacrifice that Europe imposed upon herself so that she might live again..." [48]

This renewal of images and symbols is expressed through what Delors (1989), in an opening speech at Bruges, has defined as the necessity to establish a single economic voice and a common political will, amongst European states, and as the renewal of the ideas for economic organisation and social welfare.
"...Behind triumphant nationalism and excessive individualism, ethics are making a come-back in the wake of scientific progress. How far, for example, are we prepared to allow genetic manipulation to go? We need a code of ethics for man, we need to promote our concept of the individual and his integrity...so we also need a code of ethics governing the relationship between man and nature...The time has come to return to ideals, let them penetrate our lives..." [49]

These ethics consist of a universalist approach towards the sovereignty of the supranational body of decision making and towards the democratic organisation of representation and accountability over and beyond what Delors calls the images of the 'bogeyman-nation', which has no place in the present context of socio-economic activity; and towards the new political dimension of social welfare. The first creates all necessary conditions for the political legitimation of the procedures and regulations of the European parliament, through the transfer of accountability and representation and the enforcement of law, to a higher supranational level.

"...Almost two years ago...I said the 'the spirit and the motive force of this parliament spring from the sturdy rock of democratic legitimacy'. I also at that time emphasized that this parliament has a perfect right - indeed it has a responsibility and a duty - to point the way forward for the European Community as a whole...The European Parliament has been remarkably innovative in making use of the powers it has and in achieving new responsibilities and stronger influence. This increase in political and institutional power...it's not the stuff of plot or conspiracy; it is rather the most natural development that could be envisaged for any democratic assembly. Of course this is a parliament with a difference. It is a multi-national parliament: it is the world's first experiment in trans-national democracy and it works. It works just as a parliament should, albeit in nine languages with eight different political groups, with twelve nationalities and with three different meeting places..." [50]
Such a political transformation has become more evident since the 'Single European Act' (1987) on integration came into force, where in fact the European Supranational Assembly enlarged its powers to legislate and enforce its decisions upon individual nation-states in all major fields, eg financial and industrial. At the moment, however, and in accordance with the Trans-European Policy Studies Association's (TEPSA's) report (1989), the European Parliament is acting as a 'co-legislative' body of decision-making in areas like the European monetary system (EMS) or the European Development Fund, but according to the report, a number of major political developments have increased the significance which the EP can play in European affairs. First of all, there have been further constitutional limitations on the centralisation of powers by national assemblies which were introduced by different European governments in order to encourage further, the horizontal (ie between national and regional assemblies) and vertical (ie between legislative, executive and judicial bodies) separation of powers; and second, the emergence of a global political 'dimension' has limited further the 'capacity' to perform functions and of traditional values, associated with existing roles which national parliaments have so far acquired.

The report lists a number of possible political scenarios according to which an integrated political system in Europe would develop, ie federal, intergovernmental systems, but its contribution towards the analysis of the relationship between nation-states and the EP derives from the recognition that despite existing controversies and differences in political opinions, a new ideological cultural edifice emerges amongst, political parties, Euro-MPs and individual citizens in Europe, which emphasizes the inter-locking of interests between national and supranational assemblies, and creates a new 'dawn' for political representation and accountability.

Such an interlocking of interests has already become apparent in the adoption of concrete measures of economic, political, and ideological nature by all twelve member states, in order to reinforce a new 'ethos' amongst their citizens, a new social order, that 'legitimates' the present transformation and allows integration to develop at the cost of
existing forms of decision-making and of modes of thought which have remained domestically orientated. (Lee 1990) These measures and values are further analysed below in the discussion of the new economic and welfare values and patterns, (in terms of industrial organisation), which almost all twelve member states are adopting, despite differences on how to enforce these new principles and aims on public or private industrial undertakings. The economic and political obstacles to integration therefore, amongst the twelve member states have not disappeared and in fact peripheral southern European states, ie Portugal, Greece, have so far been cautious on the steps towards integration (as in fact has been Great Britain), trying to enter the new competitive Europe without at the same time 'ignoring' domestic issues concerning industrial and political infrastructures, (ie uneven and peripheral development, differences in political attitudes amongst people concerning the EP). But these obstacles or 'differences' are not even seen by the 'rival' states of the EC as contradictory to the main principles and aims towards a European integrated market. (Blun 1990)

The second responds towards what can be called Pan-European ethics on welfare and social organisation, where it is expected that both the individual citizens and the nation-state will transcend their perception of welfare towards a higher place, that is both supranational, flexible, from domestic economic barriers and from cultural inhibitions, and co-operative on a trans-national level. The mobility of goods and of human labour across the European frontiers has necessitated the creation of ethics that both enable the citizens of Europe to share common codes and rights on social organisation and the distribution of material benefits to be freed from the ethnic barriers or from the political diversities existing amongst different nation-states and to indulge their activities in a less 'state-restrained' environment and in a more integrated way, (ie in relation to the EEC's political organisation and in relation to the global market forces) with the rest of the world. (Smith 1990; Turner 1990). The 'Delors Project' is one such case of a new image and of new symbols, where indeed it is expected that the employees in Europe would identify their material and social interest with the operation of the EEC as a supranational state and the application of new principles (ie
political harmonisation-economic liberalisation) insofar as welfare is concerned. (Mosley 1990)

"...The introduction of a supranational charter of social rights, first of all confirms the end of an era and the beginning of a new era...It expresses the necessity for the establishment of a supranational dialogue amongst different and diverse economic forces and it expresses a new ethic at the point where the present conditions of industrial organisation are unable to enforce..." [51]

The emergence of a supranational social charter on employee rights first of all signifies a need for the harmonisation, at least in terms of legislation, of international conventions on human rights and on industrial standards concerning the particular and collective interests of employees at the place of work. The major articles of the EC social charter thus 'forces' governments to sign and enforce industrial conventions which for different reasons were never part of the national labour codes (eg UNO 'International Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', 3 January 1976, or EC Council 'European Social Charter', 26 February 1965). Second, the emergence of a supranational charter signifies what earlier was defined as the global dimension on political ethos and forms of organisation, where indeed national codes and patterns of industrial relations are increasingly becoming the subject issues of supranational legislative bodies, (eg EC Court of Justice) that surpasses any individual or solitary approaches on issues of industrial welfare and political rights. The transfer however of decision-making on issues of this nature, from national to supranational institutions, does not remain confined to the adoption of specific functions which EC states have to adopt, but more than ever imposes new rules, principles and aims to which national labour codes have to re-adjust.

Although these principles and aims are analysed below in the discussion on the governments' economic and social strategies in relation to the regulation of the labour process, they nevertheless consist mainly, (in the case of the EC Social Charter) of market criteria and of criteria which will eliminate labour codes and practices from being tied by domestic
political traditions and patterns, eg on employment, labour costs. The first emphasizes competition, transparency (eg in relation to public enterprises and their operational costs) and flexibility (eg in terms of employment patterns, transfer of labour power, collective agreements); whilst the second emphasizes the importance of nation-states' roles being transformed, so that existing areas of control by the state, as a projection of traditional Keynesian politics, are slowly removed. In this sense the 'Delors image' establishes a bipolar cultural and ideological edifice for industrial activity, which on the one hand legitimises, at the domestic level, the rule and decisions taken by international labour organisation, ie the ILO or the ETUC, and seeks further to integrate national policies on rights and welfare, whilst on the other it legitimises the existing deregulation of national codes and patterns in order again to harmonise (not homogenise) national and global market conditions on labour practices and welfare provisions. (Hinterscheid Mathias 1990; Papandreou Vasso 1990)

As an addition to the new universalism of industrial ethics, the role of the nation-state is to introduce new measures and adopt new industrial principles and methods for the regulation of the labour process. This is the second biggest challenge and renewal of domestic social context by the nation-state and, as will be seen, furthers its economic integration with other nation-states and the global market forces, whilst on the other hand it furthers the liberalisation of its economic structures and principles of economic activity from the ideology of the past (ie Keynesianism) and from the political local forces which used to exert pressure and determine at one level or another the extent to which individual public sectors and their corporations responded to international market influences. (Christensen 1989)

In relation to the new state principles and aims for the economic activity of public corporations, these can be summarised through two parallel ideas, that of international harmonisation of economic activity and through the liberalisation of internal economic activity, from state national orientated controls and interests. The first is reflected in a number of instances, eg in the proposals put forward by the IMF-World
Bank, GATT, the IEA or the EEC, or is reflected in the policies which individual governments are adopting in relation to the economic framework for the future operation of their public enterprises. All important matters, (ie for international trade and political stability), are seen as integrated into a global whole from which economic activity should be regulated in accordance with what global market forces necessitate and in accordance with the principle of international cooperation and mutual social and industrial interdependence. The cases of the energy production-accumulation, (See Chapter Four), or of the telecommunications industry, show the emergence of new principles and aims which guide a new 'ideological deal' insofar as the issue of the nation-state's role in industrial organisation is concerned. In both cases, the determination of individual governments and of global supranational organisations like the EEC, is to 'wipe out' the distinct economic regional inefficiencies that are the result of the running of twelve different energy and telecommunications national networks and to make, for example 'Europe more competitive against the US and Japanese markets' (Kellaway 1990; Plaskett 1990); to increase national adaptability towards global networks of trade and of pricing systems and to increase international cooperation amongst regions and amongst sectors of different national economies. The second is reflected through the functional deregulation of a number of key aspects of the nation-state's role in the regulation of domestic economy. From the production of goods to the tariff-systems and trade with other nations, the principles and aims, which were 'praised' by the nation-state since World War II (eg subsidization, control from above of the production-accumulation resources and patterns according to national planning and agreements between the multi-national corporations and the state), are reviewed. Market criteria and a positive response for more integration in the european economy and political fields towards for example the European Community or GATT by the nation-state, are two major themes which individual governments have to adopt instead. According, therefore, to the latest OECD report (1989) [52], individual nation-states are urged to proceed with their economic re-adjustment in connection with the globalisation of economic and political networks, by overcoming their
domestic rigidities (ie political and economic) insofar as the labour market and their financial/industrial systems are concerned.

The report on the economic operations of almost eighty different countries draws the conclusion that a new face has re-emerged in the nation-state's role within its domestic economy; one that seeks on the one hand to 'liberate' existing economic activity from the 'hands' of the state's long standing monopoly control; whilst on the other it integrates further the framework (in both technical and social terms), of public corporations' operations with the operations and decision-making of larger supranational industrial and political organisations.

The measures which have already been taken by individual governments, towards the above direction, vary and range from the privatisation and semi-privatisation of existing public corporations, the concise adoption of financial and industrial rules in the spirit of an international integration under the aegis of eg the European Economic Community of GATT, to the actual agreement to construct supranational networks of trade and rules of market competition beyond and above national frontiers. In the first instance, therefore, a new ideological/cultural edifice is emerging for the role of the state in connection with the production process and ownership of public assets and of corporations or of whole sectors of the economic national activity, leaving behind the Keynesian and in more general terms the raison d'être that accompanied statism and the monopolisation of the economy by the public sector. (Barratt 1985) The new raison d'être for public corporations and individual nation-states, as was summarised by the recent industrial decisions which the European Centre of Public Enterprises (CEEP) took (1989), is reflected in the adoption of competitive measures by the individual nation-states so as to allow public enterprises to develop in relative autonomy from the state and in accordance with the 'dictates' of the global market forces (Jessop 1984).

"...the CEEP stressed its members' unreserved support for building a united Europe. Public enterprises feel that they have an important role to play in constructing dynamic and competitive infrastructures and public services to support all economic and social activities."
Moreover, it is important for the special features of public enterprises and their relations with states and community bodies to be clearly set out on the basis of full managerial independence. Whenever possible and economically useful, public enterprises should be placed in a competitive situation. The CEEP has also requested the community to create an environment that is favourable to enterprises, particularly through a more homogeneous tax system, a simplification of the procedures planned for the opening of public sector markets, effective recognition of standards and qualifications and a simplification of European Economic Community internal controls..." [53]

This new emphasis on the operation of public enterprises according to market criteria is an additional dimension in the attempt to reconstruct the industrial organisation of a domestic economy.

"...Twenty years ago it was agreed that the economic characteristics of many industries justified a high level of government control or involvement in their operation. According to the political philosophy of the times, many of the industries were considered strategic for national development or defence. Public utilities such as gas, water and electricity were seen as essential services which only the state could supply on a proper basis. Competition it was argued would be less efficient than monopoly by the state..." [54]

Yet today, there is a noticeable privatisation or indirect privatisation of those essential services and enterprises which the post-war state had under its sole control. From the European European Economic Community member states to the Latin American states to India or even to the 'socialist' orientated state of Algeria, the loosening of state control over public enterprises and over their principles and aims of functioning is a part of the present reality. [55] In fact, as Table 1.2.1.b shows, both developed and developing economies are involved in a massive reorganisation of their public corporation functions and in a massive reconstitution of the public sector's role in domestic industrial organisation.
## TABLE 1.2.1.b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selective countries/Geographical zones</th>
<th>Type of industry</th>
<th>Government policy goals</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WESTERN EUROPE:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>electricity</td>
<td>privatisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>electricity</td>
<td>deregulation of National Grid</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>telecommunications</td>
<td>deregulation of production-service areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>automobile</td>
<td>restructuring of production methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>telecommunications</td>
<td>de-linking of production/service industries</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>privatisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>telecommunications</td>
<td>semi-privatisation (Italtel, ENI)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hydrocarbons</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>telecommunications</td>
<td>deregulation of state-owned (OIE, PTC) utilities, restructuring of banking regulations (National Bank of Greece, Stock Exchange)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>power, banking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>electricity</td>
<td>deregulation/semi-privatisation of Endesa, ENSIDEA, Iberia/Casa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>steel, transport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>power</td>
<td>deregulation of energy consumption patterns</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>power, transport</td>
<td>privatisation of nationalised utilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>telecommunications</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>water</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>defence, banking</td>
<td>semi-privatisation of FFV, deregulation of banking mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>banking, transport</td>
<td>deregulation of stock-exchange mechanisms, privatisation of transport enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective countries/Geographical zones</td>
<td>Type of industry</td>
<td>Government policy goals</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>banking</td>
<td>deregulation of stock-exchange mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASIA:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>power plants, iron &amp; steel enterprises, cement</td>
<td>privatisation through the use of built-operate-transfer method (Iron Steel State Board)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>oil refineries, tourism, transport</td>
<td>semi-privatisation (eg EL-Al) commercialisation of tourist infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>steel, petrochemicals, fertilisers, refineries, agriculture, textiles</td>
<td>semi-privatisation/merger with private sector; commercialisation of agricult-ural enterprises, textiles, agro-based industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>banking, tourism, oil, petrol stations and gas supply centres,</td>
<td>50% of state bank shares sold, privatisation of state tourism authority, petrol stations &amp; gas centres been leased; agricultural leasing of land to civil servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICA:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>agriculture</td>
<td>commercialisation of state-led enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>banking</td>
<td>deregulation of state-led operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>oil, gas, agriculture</td>
<td>semi-privatisation of National Petroleum Corporation, commercialisation of gas production-distribution and of agricultural price fixing mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>agriculture</td>
<td>commercialisation, privatisation of parastatals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>forestry, iron &amp; steel, petrochemicals, public works, bauxite mines, pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>commercialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective countries/Geographical zones</td>
<td>Type of industry</td>
<td>Government policy goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMERICAS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>telecommunications transport, local services</td>
<td>privatisation of networks, services (eg refuse collection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>banking</td>
<td>deregulation, privatisation of National Telephone Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>power, mining, transport, shipping</td>
<td>privatisation of electricity utility (Endesa), airline company (Lan-Chile), Santiago Metro Co, Santiago port management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>power, construction, telecommunications, banking</td>
<td>privatisation of almost all state-owned public utilities, deregulation of National Bank of Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>power, banking</td>
<td>semi-privatisation of hydro-electric plants, deregulation of banking rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>banking</td>
<td>semi-privatisation of Banco de Credito</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Financial Times (1990) *Unbundling the State-*, Series

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The most striking examples are those of the different national telecommunications and energy industries, where in fact the 1980s have shown an international commitment by different governments towards the further liberalisation of corporations away from public control. In the case of telecommunications, the initial break (1977) of the US Telecommunications Corporation into two main corporations (AT&T and ITT), where AT&T is supposedly responsible for domestic communications and ITT for overseas investment, and where the former has broken further into regional semi-autonomous corporations (eg Bell Corporation), is a striking example of how far and deep the present structural transformation of the nation-state has gone. Canada's National Telecom is facing an imminent transformation as well from a state corporation to a semi-private corporation, where Bell and Roger's Corporation would be able to compete with the Canadian Telecom on equal terms. Similar examples are found in Great Britain between BT and Mercy Co; in Mexico, with the government's objective to privatise the National Telecom, ie Telmex; in Nigeria with the current reorganisation of Nitel (National Telecom) towards a new framework of development which accommodates market criteria and responds towards global market fluctuations and decisions on tariffs; in Japan, where the government has already initiated procedures to split NTT following the example of the US ATT and where Cable & Wireless will set its own telecommunication networks for the first time: and Latin American countries (eg Argentina) or the FRG National Telecom, where governments are committed to an open market for their telecommunications industries. Even the French government, which has currently (1987) opposed the European Economic Community's proposals for the further integration and liberalisation of its telecommunication industry (ie Compagnie Generale des Construction Telephoniques), has initiated a programme of restructuring what will resemble the actions taken by other governments and will accommodate market criteria for the future operation of the French Telecom.

In the case of energy, although different governments and their state energy industries are still retaining control, most of the International Energy Association member states have been recommended by the Association to liberalise further through their encouragement towards autoproducers in
the networks of energy production and to promote market criteria for the regulation of production-consumption patterns of electricity; to establish new tariff policies that are based on international price fixing bodies and to abolish fiscal barriers on energy trade. The case of the twelve member states of the European Community, according to the IEA's 1988 report, shows that there is a bipolar political commitment by different governments in favour of further integration of their corporations' policies with the IEA's global policy frameworks and a commitment in favour of a more deregulated (ie from state control) framework of energy production-accumulation. However, privatisation, especially of public electricity utilities has not been so apparent, as is the case with the Australian government and within western Europe, only the British and Austrian governments have so far been committed to a privatisation plan. But most of the other IEA member-states have adopted, since the beginning of the 1980s, policies which either emphasize and encourage private production-distribution of electricity (ie autoproducers), or have devised plans for a more competitive market orientated industrial development that emphasizes cuts in public spending, tariff increases and efficiency, ie in the use of indigenous energy resources.

In relation to the adoption of measures by the nation-state which both integrate and functionally deregulate its public corporations' activities, the European Economic Community's 'White Book' framework for economic activity provides a good example of the new role which the nation-state is expected to adopt. (See Chapter Four) On the one hand there is a movement towards the technical and social integration of public corporation infrastructures within the European Economic Community, whilst on the other, the European Community imposes a framework for national industrial activity that is freed from fiscal and technical barriers of trade, which impede transnational capital mobility and distort prices in home and foreign markets. For that reason individual nation-states and different economic unions (ie common markets) like those of the European Economic Community, MAU or of the Central American Isthmus, are adopting structures for industrial organisation which are both more 'integrationist' and at the same time more deregulatory towards the role of the nation-state on issues concerning the production structures and patterns of goods and

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the accumulation of those goods. (See Figure 1.2.1.a) On the level of production the nation-state's role is expected by supranational organisations to ensure two main tasks: that the public corporations or semi-private enterprises function within an integrated framework, where the main principles and patterns of their activity are guided and controlled by a supranational body of decision-making; which in turn proposes and legislates policies on behalf of the specific economic community and its member states. Second, that the nation-state's role ensures the possible minimum intervention by the latter in terms of financial or industrial support so as to allow a further domestic liberalisation that will increase competition and thus enforce a market or rather profit-oriented development of those sectors of the economy that used to be run according to national plans for development. The British Commissioner in Europe, Sir Leon Brittan (1990) has also claimed that these two principles run in parallel and in the case of Energy, Telecommunications and Transport industries [56] formulate the new 'philosophy' behind the ideas for a new global structural adjustment of the nation-state's role. The same principles apply for the accumulation patterns of goods, where in fact nation-states are 'obliged' to establish rules on tariff systems that are both decided by the collective executive bodies of the European Economic Community and yet respond to market fluctuations and the private bids by market forces.

The radical transformation especially of national energy and telecommunications industries, has not been imposed by the European Economic Community without protests by different governments and in fact the adoption of the European Community's proposal for a common carriage on energy transmission, although it is part of the general guidelines of the International Energy Association of which all European Community members are active participants, it is nevertheless still pending. In the case of telecommunications, the European Community proposals were met by an opposition from member states, (ie France, Greece, Belgium, Italy), especially against the plan for the further liberalisation of the manufacturing section of national telecoms; while West Germany, Holland and the United Kingdom were in favour of the plan and show it as an
Figure 1.2.1.a  Reorganisation of Industrial Activity

Production–Consumption of Public Enterprises

Harmonisation

Global Organisations Principles/Aims on Trade

Liberalisation

Integrated Supranational Networks

De-Monopolisation of Public Corporations

Common Carriage Systems

Multi-Level/Supranational Ownership–Competition

Diversity

Flexibility

Co-operation

Supranational Organisations

Price Formations

Individual/Private Market Forces

Internal/Local Competitors

MNC'S

Other (e.g., State Foreign Public Corporation)

State Enterprises

Multinational Organisations

MNC'S
extension of their non-domestic liberalisation of the telecommunication industry. However, a compromise was reached (December 1989) between member states that allowed the current European Community plan to be adopted. In contrast the European Community's plan to liberalise national telecommunication service sections was met almost by all member states with fierce opposition and an agreement was reached only when the Commission of the European Community 'threatened' its members that it would 'force' an agreement under Article 90 of the European Community/Treaty of Rome (ie which prevents national monopolies from acting against the Community interests). [Kellaway 1990] Although such voices of dissent create doubts over the willingness of individual member states to adopt all measures necessary for the further harmonisation and liberalisation of the most important sectors of their domestic economies, nevertheless they do not obscure the fact that there is a common consent amongst member states about both principles of industrial organisation; in contrast to a number of practical difficulties, the European Community Commission on both energy and telecommunications was able, by the end of 1989, to reach a common agreement on almost all its proposals. In fact a closer examination of the prevailing political and economic policies which different EEC governments have introduced, raise doubts as to whether their periodical disagreements with the different European Community Commissions are reflecting political queries on the principles of the European Community's integration, rather than on the consensus over issues of practicability. [57] (Resolution of European Community Ministers, June 30; EC COM [1989] 8 December)

In relation to issues connected with the role of the nation-state in relation to employment and the general social organisation of industrial activity at a domestic level, the 1980s has been an era where the political transition of the latter has become more apparent. This political transition first and foremost entails an ideological crisis and a social challenge on the suppositions which the post-war state was built upon.

"Over the past decade Keynesian full employment policies have been abandoned in one country after another, to be replaced by monetarist
policies that place a premium on price stability. The monetarist counter-revolution has no only abandoned the Keynesian commitment to full employment, but more fundamentally has challenged the Keynesian conception of the role of the state in the regulation of capitalism, returning to pre-Keynesian emphasis on the primary role of the money and the market..." [58]

This return to pre-Keynesian emphasis on the primacy of the market and of market forces over domestic social and political conditions and institutions, however, in the present globalisation of trade and of political activity, has not resulted in the return to the principles and aims of the pre-war era or to the forms of the social regulation of the labour process that were praised by individual capital holders and the state, during the early years of this century. (Miller 1986; Dearlove 1987) Quite the contrary, the present ideological/cultural edifices of the state's role towards employment and the general social organisation of domestic industrial activity are parts of the general process of global integration and of functional deregulation of domestic political structures, which depart from previously existing ideological-political assumptions. These new assumptions contain the idea of global harmonisation of decision-making and of industrial principles and aims, in relation to economic and political regulation of the labour process. As was the case with the economic regulation of production and trade of goods, so it is the case with issues in connection to personnel policies and the social welfare of the employees. The state sees its role as a force, that has on the one hand the task of integrating domestic policies with the rest of the world's industrial economies (eg IMF-World Bank), which balance domestic activity with global market activity and which create flexible social structures for the regulation of the labour process and which in turn are more prone to adaptability and change according to world monetary fluctuations, and are less restrictive on the role of the state by the domestic political forces, (eg trade unions, pressure groups). For this reason, the new ideological/cultural edifice demands the liberalisation from 'domestic social barriers', of capital's movement through the adoption of a number of measures that restrict the existing powers of employees (as a unified political entity) and at the same time
establish new patterns (ie in ideological and economic terms) of employment and social welfare which subordinate the political raison d'etre of post-war national or regional development to the political raison d'etre of a global integrated economic development. This global integrated economic development is not expressed in the subordination of the nation-state and its policies on social welfare to the powers of individual bankers or the multinational corporations alone, but more than ever to the articles of the IMF and the restrictions imposed by the IEA or GATT on how to regulate labour processes. (Clarke 1988) This political 'subordination' of the nation-state to those organisations, and their continuous interlinkage with the decisions taken at a global level, has created a new social 'dawn' for the social environments of public and private industrial undertakings at a national level.

This new social 'dawn', especially for the employees, became more apparent when indeed throughout most parts of the world, different governments imposed a number of neo-monetarist policies and austerity measures (1985-1986) that curtailed existing freedoms and rights of employees; and supervised or initiated a re-adjustment of national programmes that regulated all existing frameworks of social policy, to fit to the global and regional market criteria through the adoption of the IMF's-World Bank measures. (Walton 1987) According to Table 1.2.1.c most of the developed and developing capitalist countries have adopted (during the period 1986-1987) measures of austerity, ranging from general cuts in public spending to wage restrictions and the introduction of state policies that liberalised wage schemes and agreements between employees and employers in both public and private sectors. According as well to the ILO's World Labour Report (1989) on the social welfare of employees in the public sector, there has been a noticeable reduction in wages and parallel increase in low-paid and flexible employment patterns, that has in turn resulted in a 'universal' deterioration of social welfare standards. Such a deterioration of social welfare standards during 1986 has been more apparent in countries of the African continent, Asia and Latin-America, where wages (in real terms) amongst public employees were reduced to half or less the purchasing value of the 1975 levels, or they were reduced by twenty or thirty per cent during the 1980-1987 period. A closer review of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample of countries</th>
<th>Measures (1986-1988)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPE:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>wage freeze - introduciton of pay schemes; RRP - cut in public spending - freeze of wage indexation system - devaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>spread of individual pay schemes - cuts in public spending - limits in the powers of wage councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>individual pay schemes - cuts in public spending - measures to abandon wage indexation system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>cuts in public spending - introduction of a temporary incomes policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>measures to end long term tripartite agreements - spread of individualised pay agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>cuts in public spending - restrictions on income increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>wage freeze imposed on public employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICA:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>wage freeze - cuts in public spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>state loosens controls on pay settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>stringent incomes policy enforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>austerity plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>liberalisation of labour regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>devaluation - end to government subsidies (food/petroleum) wage restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>devaluation - import reduction - cuts in public spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample of countries</td>
<td>Measures (1986-1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LATIN AMERICA:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>devaluation - cuts in public spending - wage freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>devaluation - subsidy cuts - wage freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>'Primavera' austerity plan - devaluation of the austral.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>cuts in public spending - devaluation - wage controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>devaluation - end to state subsidies - wage restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>devaluation - austerity measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>devaluation - moderate wage increases and price freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>end of centralised wage system - liberalisation of pay control - introduction of temporal wage agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>spread of individual pay contracts - cuts in public spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>wage freeze in the public sector - cuts in public spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>wage policies to be based on productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>austerity measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>austerity measures - wage freeze - spread of individual contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>austerity measures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ILO Social and Labour Bulletins 1986-1989
the individual measures that were adopted by European Community member states, reflects as well, a more restrictive approach by different governments, towards wages and employment policies. (See Table 1.2.1.d)

It would be quite important here to note that such a 'convergence' over the policies on industrial and general welfare of the public is not automatically translated into an ideological convergence of different governments, following for example the examples of few neo-monetarist orientated governments, eg Britain and the USA. There are clear differences between eg the socialist government of Greece and the government led by Margaret Thatcher. An inverse understanding, not only would run the danger of suggesting an unhistorical examination of the present socio-political transformation of the role of the nation-state in relation to industrial welfare issues, but also would indirectly imply as Gunn (1989) does in his 'Revolution of the right' that the role of the nation-state in relation to wages and employment, is determined not by an articulation of internal-external conditions, ie globalisation of trade, concentration of capital and by centralisation of decision-making, but by a universal ideological revolution of monetary forces that shares common theoretical departures and has common proposals. Not only would such a view overshadow important differences that exist, for example amongst the so called 'neo-monetarist camp', but also it would undermine any historical perspective of the major processes that determine present shifts in policies concerning welfare issues.

The above two tables are only indications of this shift, and only imply that there is an articulation of domestic and international policies and principles on welfare, which reflect this 'global' effort to further harmonise and liberalise industrial structures from post-war economic and political domestic orientated paths of development. Different governments have adopted measures that on the one hand restrict the increase of wages or of full-time recruitment in the public sector, (Tables 1.3.1.d & e) whilst on the other they seem to 'decentralize' decisions on collective agreements from the existing bodies or councils for wages and employment matters. Despite differences in policies amongst for example the twelve EC member governments, in relation to wages it seems that the current
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EC Countries</th>
<th>Adopted Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium:</td>
<td>austerity plan - 'Val Duchesse agreement'; multi-sector agreement (1987/88) on wage-employment patterns; emphasis on competition and flexibility; Royal Decree No 424 on employment flexibility and on collective dismissals (EEC Directive); increase of retirement age - flexibility of working hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark:</td>
<td>reductions in working hours per week; amendment of the law on equal pay, following the decision of EC Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany:</td>
<td>amendment of Article 116 of the Employment Promotion Law; the government questions existing labour law on strikes; provision for co-determination in the local and steel industries which are due to lapse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France:</td>
<td>adoption of flexible law on dismissals; introduction of tight wage policy/no general increases in public and nationalised sectors of the economy; adoption of measures to increase flexible work patterns and working hours agreements; Law No 86797 (3 July 1996) eliminates the need to obtain administrative authorisation for collective dismissals - Law No 86/290 (28 February 1996) reorganisation of work hours and restrictions on overtime pay provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece:</td>
<td>austerity measures - increase in clandestine work in the public sector - part-time work was authorised in the private sector; constitutional changes in relation to workers' councils - disentanglement of the 1985 General Confederation of Greek Workers Executive Council members; introduction of the 'fourth shift' (twelve hours of work on Saturdays, twelve hours of work on Sunday); freeze on wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland:</td>
<td>no subsequent increases above the annual rate of inflation/pay panel wherever an agreement is imminent - wage freeze in the public sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy:</td>
<td>extension of indexation pay system to the private sector - wage restrictions in the public sector; reorganisation of labour codes concerning employment and the use of foreign labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg:</td>
<td>harmonisation (with EC) of promotion opportunities; flexibility of employment contracts, pensions and early retirement - income increase (2.5%, 1986; 1.5%, 1987) in the civil service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands:</td>
<td>Flexibility of labour market (on-call work, temporary work, homeworking - pay schemes - early retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal:</td>
<td>wage freeze in the public sector - flexible working patterns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**TABLE 1.2.1.d**  
Major socio-political measures adopted by EC states, affecting wage-employment patterns (1986-1987)
### TABLE 1.2.1.d (Contd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EC Countries</th>
<th>Adopted Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain:</td>
<td>wage restraint guidelines - intensification of measures to increase productivity, flexible working time, early retirement schemes; Royal Decree/Law 1/1986 on employers' flexibility to hire employees without recourse to the employment office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom:</td>
<td>government efforts to dismantle wage councils; ban on trade union activity in sensitive areas (GCHD); emphasis on competition and the 'enterprise culture'; increase of new flexible low-paid and insecure employment in the service sector - individualised pay schemes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

**EC Countries**  Government initiatives – state of relations

**Belgium:** the government has moved closer to a freer format of negotiations (i.e., from the state); during the last few months of 1988 there was a state of extreme discontent amongst public service employees and the government on issues concerning wage, employment and social benefits reforms.

**Denmark:** the government has moved towards the adoption of a number of measures which will lead to a further decentralisation of pension schemes away from the state.

**Federal Republic of Germany:** unemployment and flexibility of working time have been the main causes of discontent; questions as well (on the future of social welfare and the state of code termination) have been asked by employees, especially in connection with the Single European Market and the integration of decision making procedures with a supranational parliament.

**France:** the government has adopted a line which favours sectoral agreements on wages and employment which in turn are based on market criteria for development; although the number of strike days were reduced by almost 40,000 days (1987-88), there was an increased militancy amongst public service employees who are low-paid, have flexible contracts and are not unionised.

**Greece:** a new collective agreement was signed by the confederation of Greek workers and the government, following the end of the 1986 austerity programme (31 December 1987); the government, however, has introduced a pay-productivity scheme in the public sector; it has allowed atypical employment to rise amongst public service employees and it has attempted to abolish the pay indexation system; furthermore it has adopted a line that reduces the state's role in the signing of collective agreements and in industrial disputes (i.e., limit the use of Law 3239/55 on compulsory arbitration).

**Ireland:** the government of the Republic of Ireland has introduced measures which limit its role in wage negotiations, reduces the number of public employees and of public spending; and it has adopted measures which will reform the existing procedures of dispute-settling institutions and it will establish a new Labour Relations Commission.

**Italy:** multi-sectoral agreements were the main trend of 1988 where the government has stepped up its efforts to re-direct its wages and employment policies, so as to emphasize and improve the competitiveness of public corporations and the social-political integration of employees with the decisions and the new re-adjustment policies of the management.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EC Countries</th>
<th>Government initiatives - state of relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg:</td>
<td>discussions between the government and trade unions were held on existing policies in relation to wage restraints, minimum wages, tax systems and insurance policies; a wage restraint was not imposed after trade unions and government representatives failed to reach a collective agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands:</td>
<td>the Dutch government has committed itself to a reorganisation of the state's role in wage, employment agreements; the line of thought which was adopted was that there should be a decentralisation of the procedures and bodies that determine the outcome, from central national bodies to regional and local employment offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal:</td>
<td>an agreement was reached on measures of wage restraint; there were disputes between the government and employees on issues connected with collective dismissals and the revision of the existing law governing the procedures prior to dismissals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain:</td>
<td>industrial relations between the government and employees have become strained due to the government's commitment to introduce again a wage restraint policy, cuts in public expenditure, and liberalise further employment procedures and policies; there were also problems concerning the participation (in legislative terms) of employees within large industrial undertakings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom:</td>
<td>the Thatcher government has continued to deregulate traditional practices and schemes of representation of employees in regional and national bodies of economic decision-making; there has been a noticeable move towards the self-financing of regional public authorities and of public services, while at the same time the government has encouraged the signing of local agreements rather than antilocal agreements; the number of job-sharing schemes, individual pay schemes and of atypical employment contracts has risen in the last few months of 1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

trend is in favour of sectoral and localised agreements (i.e., between an industrial branch and a team of employees that allow further flexibility in terms of actual wage increases and in terms of duration, something that traditional national collective agreements were unable to pursue. In relation to employment issues, different member states have opened further their political horizons so as to allow greater flexibility and diversification of the labour market in accordance with regional and global competitive criteria. The extension of part-time or 'atypical' work contracts in the public sector, the introduction of subcontracting in areas of traditional predominantly secure full-time employment, or the adoption of policies which encourage public employees to take an early retirement scheme or to enable management to enforce collective dismissals without using or having to follow existing procedures which were laid down during the 1970s (i.e., in order to safeguard employee rights), are all indications of a grown trend to liberalise industrial organisation by the state.

The most usual political framework followed by governments in relation to the social organisation of the labour process is determined by a dual process: that of integration and of functional deregulation. The first is reflected through the nation-state's adoption of measures or decisions that were adopted by a supranational organisation and have resulted in the levelling or harmonisation of social welfare policies, or rather the principles which determine the nature of those policies, across developing and developed capitalist nations, and the further liberalisation of state procedures and criteria applied to employment and welfare distribution matters. The second is reflected through an unparalleled fragmentation (in relation to the pre-1980s period) of existing patterns and policies, followed by different nation-states, that minimises the role and the political pressure exerted by domestic political institutions and sectional interests, upon national incomes and employment policies and their determinant procedures. Despite this, the fact that during 1988 there was a slight improvement in wages and employment practices in contrast to the austerity measures which EC governments took during 1985-1986, governments have continued to pursue a programme of socio-political integration with the EC directives and with the functions and criteria of
the global market, and they have continued their programmes of liberalisation in the areas of wage agreements and wage schemes, employment and labour law. Despite a relative improvement in the relations between the government and trade unions during 1987-1988, most EC member states had witnessed a continuous determination by different governments to encourage moves away from the traditional national agreements on wages, employment and the social welfare of employees (See Table 1.2.1.e) through the revision of existing labour laws, placing rather the emphasis upon regional or local, multi-sectoral or multi-level industrial wage agreements, and through the introduction of flexible structures for pay and recruitment by public or private corporations.

The brief examination of comparative information concerning the role of different governments in connection with the social regulation of the labour process, shows that a new ideological/cultural edifice and a new political pattern is emerging. This edifice and pattern consist of the adoption of new criteria for industrial development and the social welfare of employees which reinforce market competition on a regional and supranational level, and eliminate the Keynesian orientated political macro-economic regulation of labour by the state. They also consist of the state-motivation to replace existing structural procedures by more flexible structures (to political and economic conditions), that are able to adopt the above criteria, (eg EC directives, market, self-financing, open and transparent competition), and adapt to the fiscal and general political decisions taken by governments at a supranational level.

The new ideological/cultural edifice of the state's role within the present environment of globalised economic and political activity, seems to reflect a new raison d'etre on the part of individual governments which first broadens the political scope of the latter so as to include general guides on trade and production organisation, which derive from their relationship with external markets (Jorgen Gronnegard Christensen); and second, reorganises the political relationship of the state with employees. A new dynamism is at the forefront that is reflected through the emergence of new universalism of ethics (eg insofar as the issue of sovereignty and the welfare of citizens), and through the emergence of
new practices and patterns of social organisation in relation to public corporations and the state's role in employment/wage policies formulation. This new dynamism, a theoretical departure from Keynesian political suppositions on the role of the state, is centred around two broad issues: flexibility and market oriented criteria. Both overlap to create an environment for employees relatively different from what post-war developments and values have so far been dictating, that poses a challenge to their economic and political collective entity at the place of work. (Rosenbery 1987; Kuttner 1990)

1.2.2 The New Context of Industrial Regulation at the Corporate Level

Since the 1980s in both developed and developing capitalist economies, there has been a rapid increase in the structural transformation of systems of industrial organisation in relation to both the actual phases or levels of production and the social and ideological regulation of employees, by management. The new applied principles and methods of industrial organisation, which are products of the further fragmentation of spatial barriers and of traditional modes of thought in relation to the social and economic entity of employees at the work-place, have created a new flexible industrial environment that requires the reorganisation of political and social structures and manifestations concerning the edifices of activity at an industrial undertaking. (Scott & Storper 1986) As Lessing (1985) had asserted in her science fiction novel, the world and the 'social-cosmos' which surrounds man and his activities can only exist in a state of transitoriness and 'permanent' change; and in this way the 'world of labour' and the 'social cosmos' of industrial employees become part of this transitoriness and of 'permanent change', from which only a few characteristics are identifiable here.

"...For nothing can be static, and steady and permanent, it could not possibly be that our world would spin there in space, unaltering, a planet of snow and ice: no, it would go on, gathering more to itself as a snowball does when travelling, or change into something else entirely, become a world we could not begin to imagine..." [59]
It would, however, be too premature to present the recent industrial transformation as the imminent demise of existing forms of industrial organisation altogether, partly because the present transformation is still an ongoing process (Hudson 1989), and partly because old systems of organisation in many sectors seem to co-exist with new principles and forms of industrial regulation. (Wood 1989). Furthermore the recent changes in employment patterns, welfare provisions and the social regulations governing the socio-political role of employees within an industrial undertaking, though they challenge existing working forms, it would nevertheless be quite important for the study not to treat these changes as part of a solid and static path of industrial development. As Zygmunt Bauman (1990) [60] has asserted in his critique of Jones' (1989) 'Metropolis', and Harvey's (1989) 'The Conditions of Post-modernity', the present economic and political transformations cannot be treated as fixed images of 'tough and solid' structures, because if these changes differ from existing dominant systems of industrial organisation, then their difference lies in their ability to exist in a 'contingent flow of temporality', at the expense of atemporal and rigid systems of labour regulation (Steven 1989).

Furthermore, these changes are integral parts of wider and far-reaching changes occurring on all fronts, ie technological, economic and political, and their magnitude, as Sabel (1987) has asserted in his 'Work and Politics', affect the global mode of industrial and political organisation (eg Fordism). They (ie these changes) respond to what Aglietta (1987) [61] has analysed as the internal limits to capital valorisation, or as Palloix (1976) [62] has stressed, as the social estrangement factor for employees (ie which lead to industrial fatigue or absenteeism) and later as Harvey (1989) has asserted in his 'Condition of Postmodernity', when he relates the transition of the way industrial production is organised, to the post-war crisis of aesthetics or to the mode of thought that was dominant in the post-war 'boom' of industrial international expansion [63]. In relation, therefore, to the issues connected with the division of labour or the actual technological and social new phase for the production of goods, the present transformation is seen—as a response by capital, to the growing globalisation of trade
and investment and hence to the growing internationalisation of political and economic structures. This, as was seen earlier, (ie section 1.2), demanded the reorganisation of market trading and of capitalist activity by multi-national corporations since the 1970s. This reorganisation on the one hand has led to global integration of industrial structures and economic decision-making, whilst on the other hand it has demanded the further liberalisation of capital's geographical mobility (in terms of investments), and of capital's aims and principles of development, from political constraints and national rigid industrial frameworks, which impeded or limited in different ways this mobility and search for greater profits and for unrestrained competition (Hamilton & Linge 1981; Dunning 1983; Thrift 1989).

In relation to the issue of the estrangement of employees and the growing polarisation through national or sectional industrial movements against the continuation of capitalist activity and modes of organisation which as Braverman (1974) in 'Labour and Monopoly Capital' described as contributing to the routinization and dehumanization of work environments [64]; the present reorganisation are major attempts by capital to integrate employees with corporate principles and goals through the introduction of personalised (from existing) measures and schemes that break the long standing political solidarity and socio-political cohesiveness of employees. (Sabel 1987) [65] Both aspects of the present transformation and of the main processes (ie integration-deregulation) have created a new ideological and political context for the industrial organisation of production and the regulation of employees at the place of work.

According to Esser and Hirsch (1989) the main characteristics of this new context of industrial organisation are reflected in what they have defined as a new mode of accumulation and a new method of regulation. [66] The new mode of accumulation and its new characteristics consist mainly of a transition to forms of industrial organisation based on the introduction of new technologies and the further diversification of political attitudes and lifestyles, based on the further 'fragmentation of the relationships
between wages and work'. The characteristics of the new method(s) of capitalist regulation are:

"...i) New relationships integrating branch structure and industry on the basis of advanced production technology, associated with strong international processes of concentration and a reorganisation of the relationship between industrial and finance capital...ii) A quantitative reduction and institutional fragmentation of the system of social security, resulting in a further division into different categories of waged workers...iii) The weakening of trade unions through mass unemployment, processes of tertiarization, the heterogenization of working relationships and processes of social division within waged workers...iv) The formation of new corporate forms, which are characterized by a close interweaving between the state and industry in the technology sector, a selective inclusion of privileged sectors of the workers in corporate arrangements, ('selective-decentralized corporatism')." [67]

The characteristics of the new socio-political context of the mode of industrial accumulation and of the regulation of personnel at an industrial undertaking, are further reflected in Scoyngedouw's (1986) paper on the 'socio-spatial implication of innovations in industrial organisation' [68] where diversity, flexibility and the fragmentation of uniformed and standardized procedures seem, according to the author, to replace the Fordist mode of production, by a new mode that is based on economies of scope and a new ideological edifice which places an emphasis upon the individual employee's socio-economic entity within the process of production and seeks his integration (in economic and political terms) with the corporation's aims and principles. (See Table 1.2.2.a)

In the case of the actual production methods and systems of organisation, there is a noticeable trend by major corporations towards the introduction of measures which organize labour in a diversified and flexible way, which is able to adapt to global market fluctuations and competition by harmonizing local with international patterns and strategies for development, whilst at the same time allowing further flexibility on the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Fordist production</strong></th>
<th><strong>New production schemes</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>vertical and (in some cases) horizontal integration</td>
<td>(quasi-)vertical integration subcontracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loss of production time because of long set-up times, defective parts, inventory bottle-necks, etc</td>
<td>reduction of lost time, diminishing 'the porosity of the working day'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cost reduction through wage control</td>
<td>learning-by-doing integrated in long-term planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>single task performance by worker</td>
<td>multiple tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>payment by rate (based on job design criteria)</td>
<td>personal payment (detailed bonus system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high degree of job specialisation</td>
<td>elimination of job demarcation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no or only little on the job training</td>
<td>long on the job training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vertical labour organisation</td>
<td>more horizontal labour organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no learning experience</td>
<td>on the job learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emphasis on diminishing worker's responsibility (disciplining of labour force)</td>
<td>emphasis on worker's coreponsibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2.2.b  Flexible organisation of production systems/personnel policies, due to globalisation of trade and introduction of new technology- country/industry, period 1986-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Organisation/ Industry</th>
<th>Production Systems</th>
<th>Personnel Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>G Electric</td>
<td>elimination of job classification down to three - skills orientated to meet specific plant requirements</td>
<td>intensification of work (12 hour shifts); introduction of atypical employment, flexible pay schemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G Motors</td>
<td>elimination of number of job classifications</td>
<td>flexibility in deployment of work force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT &amp; T</td>
<td></td>
<td>break up into three companies: local, regional, international; network integrated systems (NIS); elimination of job demarcation lines</td>
<td>elimination of operator/clerical jobs; flexibility of job evaluation scheme - shifting requirements; wage flexibility according to task, individual behaviour and productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>work teams; group leaders (in replacement of foreman's tasks); elimination of demarcation line on tasks</td>
<td>no information available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National * Research Council</td>
<td>Manufacturing industry introduction of AL programme: team work, multi-skilling, fewer job classifications, upskilling according to plant requirements; experience less important than ability to learn</td>
<td>worker participation (team) in problem solving; employment security only for those agreeing to the changes; consultative forms of decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>Renault</td>
<td>no information available</td>
<td>cuts in work force: introduction of flexible pay schemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peugeot</td>
<td>elimination of job demarcation lines; upgrading of skills - three levels of personnel: 'lifter repairman' (maintenance service), 'site foreman' (technician) who is responsible for team work, 'section head' responsible for a production unit</td>
<td>no information available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Organisation/Industry</td>
<td>Production Systems</td>
<td>Personal Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG</td>
<td>Bestag (newspaper)</td>
<td>multi-skilling; sectoral organisation systems which fragments further existing methods of production</td>
<td>displacement of workers; selective 'collective' agreements between compositors and management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AGV</td>
<td>reduction of job demarcation lines; separation of inspection people from production lines; team work</td>
<td>time rate and performance related pay schemes; employment secured by management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IG-Metal</td>
<td>combined skilled-unskilled work tasks, time measurements for productivity</td>
<td>reduction of work-force; pay schemes according to unit/productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bayer AG</td>
<td>jobs versatile and varied; retaining of work force</td>
<td>wages, bonus schemes, skill requirements of a job should remain unchanged for those employees employed at the time of the introduction of new measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dept of * Automation &amp; Technology-IG Metal</td>
<td>automobile industries in RG have: reduced manual activities in welding - painting, assembling; introduced two systems for job requirement (one for a core group and one for peripheral workers); further fragmentation of job-content (reducing this on-the-job skill retraining)</td>
<td>flexible wage systems; team negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPN</td>
<td>Fujitsu</td>
<td>no information available</td>
<td>pay increasingly being based on individual behaviour (i.e. personal characteristics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry * of Labour</td>
<td>reduction of manual labour - creation of new jobs/skills; division of labour after introduction of NC machine tools is at large confined between different phases of production</td>
<td>pay related to job assignments - elimination of job security; subcontracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Austin Rover (RD)</td>
<td>cell manufacturing (RD) - multi-skilling; reduction of manual labour</td>
<td>flexible pay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1.2.2b (Contd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Organisation/Industry</th>
<th>Production Systems</th>
<th>Personnel Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Printing Industry (Ritim Shah)</td>
<td>composition of editing printing layout – elimination of compositors’ tasks</td>
<td>no information available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nissan</td>
<td>application of RS system; elimination of job demacration lines; group work</td>
<td>two tier system of social security (ie newly employed personnel – others) – flexible pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reason Study*</td>
<td>multi-level skill requirements by employers in electronics, information technology, and computing industries</td>
<td>no information available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note*: Studies by national governmental agencies or private information institutes. All of these studies are based on cross-sectoral examples of industrial restructuring.

**SOURCES:**

- Financial Times (1990) *International Telecommunications FT, Wednesday, 19 July*
- Financial Times (1990) *International Telecommunications FT, Thursday, 19 April*
part of an industrial enterprise, to 'autonomously' respond towards internal (ie its work force) and local (ie national) conditions. (Mandel 1975; Canziani 1989) Table 1.2.2.b depicts this transformation which major global corporations are undergoing, aiming at further market integration at a global level, through the introduction of new technology and social systems of organisation that are both more flexible and adaptable or responsive towards global market fluctuations and consumer 'tastes'. (Rosenfield et al 1989) Some of the major characteristics, deriving from the introduction of new technology, that are reflected in the new production patterns within these type of industries, have to do with the total replacement of semi-automatic with automatic production processes, where production rhythm is determined by the pace each robotic operation dictates and manpower needs vary, using an unskilled labour force at mass production level and some skilled personnel at supervisory levels. Certain skills or roles performed by employees are becoming obsolete, (Rosenfield et al 1985), also the traditional role of foremen and supervisors as the model organisation of teamwork or of cell manufacturing, ie in Ford, Austin Rover companies, lead to the introduction of group leaders and to a further replacement of the workforce's assembly-line division by a unit type of work arrangement. (Griffith 1988) Supervisors often perform tasks between different levels of production, increasing the significance which job relation plays in the flexible organisation of industrial undertakings, and deregulating or eliminating further skill demarcations, extending thus the utilization of human labour and fragmenting further the relation of employees with any specific phase of production. As Holloway (1987) has explained in the case of Nissan car manufacturers in Sunderland (UK), the new production model attempts to fragment employee cohesiveness (in both economic and political terms) by enforcing new flexible systems for the operation of production that aim at higher productivity rates and an end of union militancy.

"...The question of union organisation is in any case peripheral if one follows the image projected by the company...Management and production workers wear the same clothes and eat in the same canteen....all are part
of a team, aiming to produce cars of high quality....Job demarcation has no place here, of course: the emphasis is on flexibility, of crafts, skill and jobs..." [69]

The flexible system of production organisation varies in its characteristics across different industries, but the new patterns of work which are reflected through the case studies of for example, metal, motor and energy industries, show a dual managerial response, which on the one hand retains a high degree of job status for one group of employees, usually working at the control, quality supervision, manufacturing phases of industrial activity, whilst those working in other areas of the production phase are usually unskilled workers often performing low status tasks. But both sets of workers are continually under managerial pressure to work in an environment where there is an increasing trend in favour of job-rotation schemes, which eliminates job-demarcation lines and increases the inter-connections between tasks that require skilled and unskilled personnel. (Dankbaar 1988) Similar patterns of work arrangement as the production are also evident in Sandberg's (1982) study of the Norwegian, Swedish and British motor industries, where in fact since the end of the 1970s there is an increasing trend in favour of the further fragmentation of existing patterns of the division of labour, by the introduction of flexible group orientated production units and by an elimination of existing job-demarcation lines (Blyton 1982) as a step to combat absenteeism, low morale, low productivity and turnover. Multi-skilling, flexible work arrangements between different phases of the production process, an end of job-demarcation lines, are all 'catch phrases' that express, especially in connection with the motor industry, a new pattern in work regulation that shows or serves as an indication to show that there is a change from the post-war path of development. International comparative studies show that automobile industries in Japan, Italy, USA, Britain and West Germany, or even in countries such as Brazil or Mexico, have introduced new flexible working arrangements that on the one hand integrated further their production systems with global market conditions, (eg through just-in-time production systems) and on the other hand liberalised, deregulated/reregulated systems of personnel regulation that
fragment existing uniformed structures (ie skill-task relation, pay schemes) and further disharmonize work procedures. (Tolliday & Zeitlin 1985; Sayer 1986)

In other types of industry (eg power plants), where there has been almost a total replacement of human manual labour through the introduction of electronic equipment, there is an emphasis more on reliability rather than ability. In these type of industries, operators at control rooms are set to perform often monotonous tasks, that degrade further their skills but at the same time upgrade their role in the whole production process, (eg the case study of the Magalopoli power plant). On the other hand, in areas of general maintenance, the use of electronics has made electromechanical equipment obsolete and as a result manpower needs for specific skills are diminishing. [70] Certain international observations for example, in machine tool industries and metal or motor industries, have shown, however, that automation through the application of computer numerical control systems (CNC) has not altogether degraded employees' skills and that there are departments where automation has improved working conditions and where there is a further need for 'hyper-specialisation'. (Lane 1988; Brodner 1985; Topfer-Becker 1987; Ullmark 1987) On the other hand, there is also international and cross-sectoral evidence to support the view that through the introduction of new technology and the reregulation organisation systems, there has been a relative deskilling and a further deterioration of employees' social and economic position in industrial undertakings. (Stuart 1988; Vasquez 1986; Volst & Wagner 1988) All these studies however, are based on particular types of industry and their research findings are in no way conclusive because mainly there is not any substantial evidence so far to support the claim that upskilling and deskilling exists as a homogenous process, within even one specific type of industry, and because evidence from one type of industry cannot be over-generalised. An emphasis by different theorists on whether or not a major deskilling or upskilling process has occurred or is continuing to occur, as part of the 'Fordist experience', and whether or not the presently occurring transformation challenges, through the application of new working patterns, the division
between mental and manual labour, is significant for the study of the politics and new economic context of the labour process in a capitalist enterprise.

However, it is not clear that there is a connection, which for example Kern & Shuman (1984) or Piore & Sabel (1984) [13] make, not between automation and for example flexible specialisation, but between the so-called 'reprofessionalization' of the labour force through automation and the 'humanisation' of working life for employees. To assert that 'reprofessionalisation' de facto leads to the humanisation of the capitalist enterprise and inbuilt relations of production, is an 'ideological invention' as Gorz (1989) in his 'Critique of Economic Reason' has argued, that first of all 'turns on its head' the whole edifice (in both ideological and economic terms) upon which wage labour as a manifestation of a specific historical system is based, and secondly isolates one factor amongst all other experiences which show a different case.

"...The image of enterprise as a place where employees can achieve personal fulfilment is therefore an essentially ideological invention. It conceals the real transformations that have taken place, namely that enterprises are replacing labour by machines, producing more and better with a decreasing percentage of the workforce previously employed and offering privileges to a chosen elite of workers, which are accompanied by unemployment, precarious employment, de-skilling and lack of job security for the majority. The advance of technology has thus resulted in the segmentation or disintegration of the working class. An elite has been won over to collaboration with capital in the name of the work ethic; the great mass of workers have become marginalised or lost their job security and serve as a reserve army for industry which wishes to be able to adjust its workforce rapidly according to fluctuations in demand..." [71]
Andre Gorz (1989), in his analysis of the main characteristics and tendencies which are rising from the introduction of new organisational schemes, emphasizes that the present internal structure of an industrial undertaking is based upon three major categories of the division of labour. The first includes skilled personnel (the 'stable core') who 'must accept occupational mobility' (e.g. multi-skilling, inter-phase work tasks) in 'exchange' for some long term job security; the second includes the so-called peripheral workforce that according to Gorz is divided into two groups, those retaining 'typical' (full-time) employment contracts and those employed for a short-term, or being hired (subcontracting) via another firm, or being employed as part-timers, who work in often degrading and self-unfulfilling job positions and their skills (although most are unskilled) can be 'renewed' or be replaced in accordance with the financial conditions which prevail at any time in the market. The third, includes a small number of highly specialised workforce that again might be subcontracted and their employment status might vary according to market fluctuations.

Furthermore, even for those working in positions which require the upgrading of their skills and who as those employed in design industries, or those specified in the third group of Gorz's analysis of the present structure of flexible organisational methods, their 'reprofessionalisation' cannot be directly equated with a further humanization of their labour conditions at the place of work. This is due to the fact that their labour is still turned into a commodity by capital, and any task, even if it involves the mixed use of mental and manual work, or of only the intellectual abilities of employees, can still turn into a routinized, exploitative, degrading task and cultural experience. (Morris-Suzuki 1984;1986)

The new ideological/economic edifice of industrial organisation, although being in an early stage, from the various examples of telecommunication, design, computer and motor or metal industries, does not seem to solely rest upon one uniform system of industrial principles and aims, as
probably was more the case during the post-war period of Fordism. New developments at the work place, seem, as Sayer (1986) has implied in his article on the introduction of Japanese industrial measures into Great Britain [72], to be more flexible; to allow more 'discretion' and to be more adaptable or integrationist with the local and international economic and cultural plains of activity than simple theoretical categorisations may permit. In accordance with this line, technological advancement and industrial measures (i.e., those identified by Swyngedou 1986 or by Gorz 1989) permit the flexible use of skilled and unskilled personnel, in an integrated linear flow of production, that seems both to enable capital to utilise further human capabilities, divest further labour's control over its labour power, and integrate further personnel with corporate goals, whilst at the same time attempting to integrate further its activity and functions at the production phase, with the occurring fluctuations and competitive demands at the global market. If one attempts (in spite of the theoretical risks involved) to define the main characteristic(s) of the present industrial restructuring, it would probably be true that today's large industrial undertakings do not follow one pattern for the division of labour, one pattern for the production-accumulation processes, but there is rather a multiple and interlinked existence of different forms of processes, that as Hudson (1989) has observed in his study of the British coal mines that:

"...Although in some economic activities there may be a general tendency to switch from a Fordist to a more flexible regime of accumulation, it is also important to acknowledge that in industries such as deep coal mining there are strong pressures currently to attempt to 'Fordize' production as a way of competing with open cast output and with coal imports... In other cases, the introduction of new conditions of work is associated less with the introduction of new technology than with the intensification of work with existing technology..." [73]

The common denominator of transformation, however, does not appear to be a definite category, e.g., Fordism or post-Fordism, of industrial thought
and regulation, but rather it appears to be the processes that dictate the pace, magnitude and direction of industrial activity. On the one hand they further integrate industrial activity at a corporate level with international trade activity whilst, as Table 1.2.2.b suggests, on the other they also deregulate and reregulate further existing internal industrial structures for production and personnel regulation so that industrial undertakings become capable of responding to the global context of competition. On the one hand they centralize further decision-making processes and harmonise principles and goals of industrial activity, whilst on the other the existing underlying processes they seem to decentralise, render 'autonomous' and seek to 'individualise' employment/job tasks, pay schemes, and power (ie participative) structures. The effects from the application of different measures that depend upon these bipolar processes, vary from one industry to another and from one set of employees to another, but they seem to affect the socio-economic uniformed (ie in relative terms) entity of the labour force at any industrial undertaking, which in turn affects the political discourse and organisational activity of personnel. (Andersen, Eason & Robey 1986) [74]

The new introduction of industrial measures and their effects that reorganise the economic and political edifice at the place of work for Palloix (1976) are summarised as:

"...a purely formal attempt to abolish the collective worker, taking into consideration the social tensions which necessitate the setting-up of an absolute despotism in the coordination of the labour processes based on automation, of several groups of workers, autonomous in appearance, but which are in reality forced to submit to the logic of the collective worker..." [75]
Table 1.2.2.c  Levels of part-time/temporary work amongst EEC member states and Latin American countries (1979-1986) % of total employed population

(1) PART-TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EEC Countries</th>
<th>total employment</th>
<th>part-time male employment</th>
<th>part-time female employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece*</td>
<td>(6.5)</td>
<td>(3.7)</td>
<td>(12.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note*: for Greece the % are for 1983

### (ii) TEMPORARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EEC Countries</th>
<th>All sectors**</th>
<th>Energy &amp; Water</th>
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(** including agriculture, forestry)

Alongside the above mentioned changes regarding the organisation of work at production level (ie job rotation, deskilling-upskilling, elimination of job demarcation lines) capital's attempt to 'abolish' the 'collective worker' or rather to further diversify, destandardize employees' socio-economic entity and roles within the industrial undertaking, two additional factors affect labour's composition and as will be further analysed in Chapter Two, their political discourse insofar as participation is concerned. The first factor is that of working patterns in relation to employment contracts. Atypical forms of employment (eg informal employment contracts, self-employment and clandestine work), which can be further subdivided depending upon work relationship (eg on-the-job training, casual and seasonal), working time (eg part-time or alternating work in the form of shifts), the workplace (eg homework or distance working/teleworking), and upon what many refer to as sub-contracting or triangular work arrangements, seem to have increased since the end of the 1970s. Cross-national data, especially with reference to temporary and part-time work, supports the view that atypical pattern of work are 'occupying' a large or a significant part of the labour market in industrial sectors. (See Table 1.2.2.c) According to this table, part-time employment (as a proportion of total employment) has risen in almost all EEC countries since 1979, with the exception of Italy, and temporary work has also risen between 1983-1985. In relation to other countries Cordova Efren (1986) in his article on 'Atypical Employment Patterns', claims that in Norway almost twenty eight per cent of the labour force are working in part-time jobs (1986), twenty five per cent for USA and Sweden, which correspond almost to one in every four workers. [76] An increasing trend in favour of part-time and temporary work has also been observed amongst different Latin American countries, where in fact part-time work for example in Montevideo (Uruguay) and Sao Paulo (Brazil), amounts to twenty and forty-one per cent respectively (1986 figures). [77]

These increasing trends towards labour market flexibility according to Rosenberg's (1987) paper on the labour market segmentation and flexibility, [78] are reflections of an international drive towards the further
decrease of labour costs and the further increase of individual undertakings' competitive performance and towards the further erosion of existing union powers and of employees' collective representation at the place of work.

"...A combination of conventional and non-conventional types of jobs constitutes what is often called the 'flexible enterprise' - ie one that combines a permanent, regular skilled workforce with an insecure stratum of secondary workers, taken on and let go according to short-term production needs. This sort of flexibility depends on the ability of enterprises to impose such a job structure - which may be facilitated by a lack of solidarity between the regular and fringe workers. Accordingly its application is rather restricted in manufacturing and the like, but more widespread in such activities as construction and retail fast foods..." [79]

Another increasingly dominant characteristic of the present industrial reorganisation towards the establishment of a more flexible system of production/personnel system of regulation, that of the pay schemes. The introduction of flexible pay schemes at the place of work dates back to the end of the 1960s, where in fact in the USA (1970) there were almost three hundred thousand different pay schemes that were either related to performance or to annual corporate turnover; whilst in France (1977) almost twenty three per cent of the total labour force were employed according to flexible pay schemes and in the Netherlands (1976) more than seventeen per cent of small manufacturing enterprises had introduced pay schemes which in one way or another emphasized individual employee capacity and behaviour. (Evans 1983) However, since 1985 there has been a rapid increase of flexible pay schemes at large industrial undertakings (ie EEC member states) which during the period from 1985-1986 has covered almost one third of the total working population in EEC countries. [80] Kanawaty et al (1989) has claimed that at present there is a transformation of pay structures throughout Europe (following the examples of USA) that
transform schemes on pay away from traditional orientated bonus or payment by results methods of financial distribution.

"...There has also been increased interest in differentiating basic pay according to the performance of individual workers. In France...significant efforts have been made by employers to overcome the excessive uniformity of wages through the 'individualisation' of pay increases according to performance. This system is increasingly applied to supervisors and technicians and also, though to a lesser degree, to semi-skilled and unskilled workers. In the Federal Republic of Germany performance related pay increases have frequently been used to reward flexible and dynamic behaviour of workers. In the interest of greater work assignment flexibility, there is also an increasing emphasis on pay practices that reward individuals for assuming a variety of duties and responsibilities..." [81]

The increased tendency in favour of more individualized pay systems, does have significant effects on collective bargaining and on national labour codes on industrial practices, but the effects upon the political discourse of employees vary according to union density, size and type of industry. However, as also will be examined in Chapter Two, the growing measures taken by capital towards the 'individualisation' of pay, employment, production methods and working arrangements, seem to fragment further the socio-political composition of the labour force and establish a new social context for employees' material and ideological activity at the work place. The two major processes which determine the new social context of industrial environments, may be summarised as being mainly of deregulation (at company and state level) and of integration of major policies on industrial development agreed on a supranational level. [82]

The first decentralises and further diversifies an industrial undertaking's modes of organisation and working practices from the existing post-war forms and strategies between the state and trade unions, whilst the second
centralizes further and articulates national with global market strategies, thus creating an inextricably bound internationalised plane for deciding on all aspects relating to industrial activity.

1.3 Conclusion

This chapter has been a theoretical detour into the political 'cosmos' of industrial undertakings as they transcend towards a new plane of economic and political organisation. This theoretical detour has comprised of a basic review of how power relationships between capital and labour have been affected by the establishment of global economic and ideological networks for the regulation of labour's activity.

As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, the theoretical point of departure for the analysis of the present content of industrial relations relating to the ability of employees to shape and change industrial functioning, has been mainly the ideological and political realities that capital's globalised activity is creating. Through the careful consideration of the main factors and trends of capital's global networks for activity, the analysis has focussed on the combined effects that two general processes create, through their interplay, upon the modes of industrial regulation at an enterprise and at a national level. These processes for a matter of simplification, have been defined here as being those of integration and deregulation/reregulation. Both appear here, as being the major constitutive elements that drive and shape the overall framework of industrial organisation, and hence of the power relationship between capital and labour. Their political significance lies in their interconnection and upon their ability to harmonise industrial principles and aims worldwide, in order to fuse together the structures and procedures for industrial decision-making, as well as to diffuse and render 'autonomous' and to fragment, existing rigid and new ideological/cultural frameworks which, on the one hand, subsume existing
modes of industrial organisation, whilst on the other replace them with new ones to suit the globalised nature of capital's activity. In actual fact, integration presupposes deregulation and vice-versa, otherwise the global transformation of capital's industrial organisation would result in a project of 'grandeur' which would end at its initial steps of development. Instead, their dynamic interplay constitute the present fabric of industrial organisation by recognising and by establishing common principles and aims on industrial activity at a global level, and by establishing networks of global interaction beyond and above existing multilateral agreement. At the same time they recognise and establish forms of organisation that desynthesize the common threads of existing social and political 'fabric', by enforcing the adoption of a number of measures that allow further autonomy of action from the state and from local or national codes of industrial practice. In essence they allow the complete flexible use of labour, beyond and above any rigid, static and atemporal methods or perceptions of industrial organisation, that does not match the expectations of capital's interests for global competition, increased levels of productivity and of free geographical movement.

The presence and effects of those above processes, upon the economic and political organisation of industrial undertakings, is the main subject matter of the last two sections of this chapter. The analysis of the section on the transformation of the nation-state's role insofar as the regulation of industrial relations and of the nature of the public sector's development is concerned, has indeed demonstrated that amidst the variation in central politics that different governments follow, there is a noticeable trend towards the global integration of industrial structures, principles and aims, and towards the deregulation of existing, traditional labour codes and practices. In relation to the first issue, the role of the nation-state in the present environment of global political and economic regulation, has been transformed to such an extent that local industrial politics are essential parts of global politics and vice-versa.

There is a new ideological and cultural framework for industrial development at the forefront, that necessitates the articulation at an international level, of all major spheres of political activity, i.e
representation, organisation of production-accumulation, and of codes of industrial ethics and of welfare standards. This articulation is reflected on two major fronts: the harmonisation of neo-monetarist principles on industrial development, across the globe, through the political and ideological legitimation of an inter-state mechanism for labour regulation; and it is reflected in the harmonious approach by different governments towards specific measures which establish common and flexible industrial networks, that reinforce global integration and global competition about the post-war national or even multilateral sets of regulations.

In relation to the political and ideological legitimation of an inter-state mechanism for labour regulation, there is the political and cultural necessity for the nation-state to instrumentalise the functions of global institutions (eg IMF, EEC, GATT) as being the embryo of a supranational state, and their principles and industrial aims as being the essential parts for the national development of a country. Such an interlocking of interests and of new images, brings to the forefront a new type of universalist approach towards the issue of sovereignty of political representation and of regulation and a new type of ethics on social welfare. It is this new type of approach and of ethics, that makes necessary the adoption of a theoretical critique for the role of the nation-state in industrial organisation, that is able to synthesize into a whole, the global with the local or the external with the internal political manifestations, and extrapolate from such a synthesis the new dimension of industrial relations between capital and labour. Such a theoretical critique surpasses the logic of existing state monopoly theories; of theories that have been identified by their focus upon the 'world system' or even on the international regulation of capitalist accumulation as being presented by the 'Parisian' (ie Aglietta), 'North American' (ie Piore & Sabel) schools of thought.

Such a theoretical critique exists on the understanding that power relationships between capital-labour are recharged or are being reformulated in the context of global capital activity. The latter brings us to the issue of how and why capital-labour relationships have changed by
the change in the role of nation-states in industrial organisation. What are the major changes which affect further the ability of employees to determine locally/nationally, the shape and characteristics of industrial functioning? What are the reasons that have contributed to the creation of a new political environment within industrial undertakings, and why the post-war 'political milieu on the issue of industrial democratisation, and hence on employees' participation, is at the crossroads?

The section does not claim to involve an exhaustive analysis of the above issues, but it does nevertheless explicate the social conditions which bring about new parameters in the discussion of capital-labour relationships, which determine the latter's power insofar as the democratic organisation of corporations is concerned. Through a careful and cautious argument, the analysis has shown that the new principles and aims for industrial development, further allow the commercialisation and 'market orientation' of a national public sector and of its enterprises, and furthermore they allow the reorientation of codes and structures of political representation and control, at a national level, leaving behind modes of thought and labour strategies on democratisation which have played a crucial role in the power relationships between employees and management.

The post-war means and sentiments for the collective control of industrial activity, are no longer viable mechanism for a societal, democratic transformation, especially in an environment of growing privatisations, global centralization of decision making procedures, and further welfare restrictions upon labour movements.

In particular the section has demonstrated the growing political and economic global integration and deregulation amongst public sectors of different countries and continents through their adoption of new principles and aims for industrial development that correspond with capital's interests for a technical and social harmonisation of rules of trade; for an increased adaptability of services and of industrial production to market forces; and for a greater adaptability of national/local industrial organisation to the fluctuation of the global market. The tables in this section show that the issue of liberalisation of public enterprises from political and economic endogenous constraints,
has occupied a major place in the occurring transformation. Furthermore, the growing adoption of austerity measures by different governments and their implementation of new forms of organisation has minimised the role (in both political and social terms) of national labour movements, in influencing the politics of industrial organisation and development.

Following from the above, the last chapter is a theoretical attempt to demonstrate on a micro level, the new trends and directions of industrial organisation at a corporate level. Having outlined in brief some of those major changes in relation to the issue of the division of labour, employment patterns and systems of welfare distribution, the last section shows that fragmentation of labour's social and economic homogeneity further affects the latter's ability to preserve its cohesiveness and ability to participate and control the activity of industrial undertakings.

There is a new 'raison d'être' in industrial organisation that is reflected through the emergence of a new ideological/cultural framework and a new set of industrial practices and labour codes. Both seem to challenge the existing post-war paths of representation and control and they seem to dictate dimensions for the political discourse on the issue of industrial democratisation, that by far constitute the beginning of a new era and of power relationships between capital and labour, that in turn is tied to the dynamic relationship between global and local environments and principles on development.

NOTES & REFERENCES

1 The concept hegemonic regimes of accumulation is used here to denote the international dimension which the labour process and its political organisation has taken, which is imposed from an international alliance of ruling capitalist forces upon individual communities without coercion. See: Jessop B (1988) 'Regulation Theory, Post Fordism and the State', Capital and Class No 34. The Marshall Plan and the institutionalisation of its ideological and political context by the Western European governments is a good example of the interlocking of international control
upon the internal affairs of a country and of the comradeship or alliance which developed between US administrations and the state apparatus of dependent communities.

2 The distinction between the use of the terms concentration and centralisation is summarised in Aglietta M (1987): A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, the US Experience, pp 218-219, Verso London-New York. Accordingly the concentration of individual capital is reflected at the social level as the combination of the means for valorization on an increasing scale, whilst preserving the autonomy of separate capitals. On the other hand under the quest of capital centralisation 'a whole host of individual capitals disappear, absorbed by others, while yet others fuse together by merger or consolidation'.....The distinction between the two faces of imperialism (ie classical imperialism - new form of imperialism) insofar as the centralization of capital is reflected in the 'central command over capital with originally the different national origins and controls'...See Mandel Ernesto (1975): Late Capitalism, pp 322-323, Verso London-New York. According to Mandel's thesis the internationalisation of capital in the post-war era has created an upsurge in the international realization of surplus-value in different geographical areas (ie the c/v relationship is spatially organized amongst different regions of the globe), labour-power has also become an international commodity, ie either in the purchase of labour in the Third World, or the creation of immigration movements of employees from peripheral to core countries, and ownership of the means of production has shifted from 'one country to another or from one national group of capital owners to several', pp 325. A similar approach is taken by Brewer A (1980), Marxist Theories of Imperialism, Routledge, London.

3 In conjunction with Bukharins N (1972) thesis on Imperialism and World Economy and Lewins V I (1977) treatise Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Werner Oller and Wolfgang Schoeller (1982) in Direct Investment and Monopoly Theories, Capital and Clan No 16, refer to a new stage in capitalist development which is reflected in the process of the internationalisation of manufacturing and financial activities,
independently from the existing spatial context in which industrial undertakings have been established.

4 The analysis of the issue of the international centralisation of capital has been producing various and diverse definitions of what the internationalisation of capital actually means. For example, in the thesis of Emmanuel A (1972) Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade, Monthly Review Press, the focus is placed upon the relationship of \( c-m-c \) (\( c = \) surplus value in commodity form, \( m = \) surplus value in money form) and the circulation of surplus-value, thus he emphasizes the international relationship between poor and rich countries. In contrast, Palloix Chris (1978) The Internationalisation of Capital (in Grk), Nea Synora, Athens, develops further the issues, as the dual social relationship of \( M-L/M-MP \) (\( M = \) money-capital, \( L = \) labour power, \( MP = \) means of production), which at an international level is reflected as the relationship of \( c-m-c/C-M-C \) (\( C = \) commodity, \( M = \) money-capital). The importance for the issue of industrial organisation and political discourse at work is that Palloix C and Aglietta M emphasize the internationalisation of the relationship 'labour-money-labour' as being one of the major features of post war development. In this sense the internationalisation of capital means the generalisation of capitalist relations of production, at a supranational level.

national economies against the perceived threat from the Left and in particular from the then Communist parties of Europe.


7 Dunning J (1982) Un siecle d'histoire des multinationales in Cotta Alain, Ghertman Michel (1982), Les Multinationales en Mutation, IRM, Paris. Dunning J has proposed that the political rigidities, eg trade unions, and financial restrictions on the accumulation of profit, have been largely 'responsible' for capital's utilisation of foreign labour markets.


12 The Third World countries have agreed to do away with the post-war multi-fibre arrangement (MFA) which has had political 'set-backs' for an all round agreement at the Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC) of GATT, between the EEC and the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau (ITCB). See: Dullforce W (1990) 'Uruguay Round Classrooms on Textile Trade,' Financial Times, Tuesday, 17 July; Spero E J (1979) The Politics of International Economic Relations Unwin Hyman, London.
Financial Times, Thursday, 19 April; Dixon H (1990) *phone Cartel Faces up to Inevitable Change.*


15 Berman M (1989) pp 95-96


17 Most of the current literature focuses on the functions of the labour process in terms of technical and economic structures, emphasizing the transformation of work and its culture as being a transformation of techniques or systems of production/accumulation, eg Fordism/post-Fordism dialogue. Exceptional to this trend is the study of Harvey D (1989) on the conditions of post-modernity, where Fordism or post-Fordism is seen as also a mode of thought and a specific sketch or path of development, which denotes the domination of a particular set of beliefs.


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The term 'functional deregulation' here denotes the replacement of old methods and forms of industrial organisation with new ones, which are flexible towards internal and external markets and social conditions.


For the case of ie France see: Davidson I (1990) 'Murmurs Ruffle a Charmed Economy', Financial Times, Tuesday, 26 June; and for ie Kenya see: Hawkins T (1988) 'Role Model for Africa' Financial Times, Monday, 12 December. A list of governments which assimilate, in their programme for development, integration and function deregulation of their national structures is presented in the next sub-section.


ibid, pp 312-313


Lessing D (1985) The Making of the Representative for Planet 8, p 42, Grafton Books


34 Robertson R (1990) *Mapping the Global Condition: Globalisation as the Central Concept*, in Featherstone M [ed] (1990) *Global Culture-Nationalism, Globalisation & Modernity*, Sage Publications, London; Althusser L & Balibar E (1970) *Reading Capital*, Appendix part III, NLB London. The term 'single place' denotes here the existence of a social and political uniqueness which at large depends upon the production and domination of ideas that stem from the global context of economic activity. The use of the term 'break' here denotes a social rupture with previous forms of industrial regulation. The term 'historical break' puts into perspective this rupture as a 'discontinuation' of the existing industrial formations within the continuity of capitalism, as a historical mode of production and accumulation process.


38 Ibid p 475


42 Ibid p 254


44 Ibid pp 201-202


47 Chapman C (1990) 'Arthur Dunkel: Breakthrough in Texas or a Ticket to a Green Room', p 19, *The European*, Weekend July 6-8


49 Commission of EC (1989) *Delors Jacques - Bruges Speech*, p 6, COM EC, Opening Session of the 40th Academic Year of the College of Europe, Brussels

Directorate General for Research - "National Parliaments" Series No 5, Luxembourg, March

51 Psimmenos I (1989) 'Social Rights in Europe: A Continuation of the Past or a New Chapter?' (in Grk) pp 47-48, Syndikalisteiki Epitheorisi, No 59/60, November - December, Athens


56 In the case of Telecommunications the new technological advances are promising an integrated global future for the industries, through the use of digital networks on a global scale (ISDN); but the most promising future for this global integration derives from the EC's creation of a Pan-European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which will monitor and control the activity of all telecommunication corporations in Europe. The latest EC position on the issue is that an economic and political harmonisation of different national industries throughout Europe is necessary if the basic objectives of European economic integration are to be fulfilled. Such harmonisation can only be achieved if telecommunications throughout Europe adopt common principles and aims for the operation, that promote co-operation, are technologically flexible, and diversify their objectives from a nationally orientated framework, to a supranational framework. In addition, the EC has also proposed to individual ministers responsible for the regulation of the industry, to limit further the nation-state's monopoly over telecommunications and to adopt market criteria for the running of the industry. The EC has in fact introduced a new proposal under which different national PTTs will be divided into two broad sections (ie manufacture of equipment and provision of services), and the private sector together with the public corporations will run both sections. See: Dawkins W (1990) 'Moves to Break Monopolies' Strangleholds', Financial Times, Wednesday, 19 July. In the case of the transport industry the present unification of transport systems across Europe and the further deregulation of national regulations on exports and imports (eg excise duties), illustrate the transformation of the nation-state's role in industrial organisation.

57 France and Italy have agreed to the plans for an integrated energy and telecommunication system across Europe; the same is true for Greece. All three have signed specific agreements with the private sector that eliminate both the state's control over energy corporations and at the same time allow public corporations to accommodate market criteria for their self-development. See as an addition: Europe Information Document (1989) No 5149, Saturday, 9 December; EC directive on the liberalisation of terminals market, see: Europe Information Document (1988), No 4775.
Monday/Tuesday; European Report (1988), No 1418, Saturday, 2 July.


60 Zygmunt Bauman (1990) "Living with Indeterminacy" Times Literary Supplement No 4, 545, May 11 - 17

61 Aglietta M (1987) in his Theory of Capitalist Regulation: the US Experience, Verso, London-New York, tends to focus more upon the internal structural problems which the increasing fragmentation of labour tasks and the integration of those tasks with the rhythm that machines dictate, have created for capital in terms of rising production costs which in turn limit further capital valorisation.

62 Palloix C (1976) in the Labour Process: from Fordism to Neo-Fordism in the Conference of Socialist Economists (1976) The Labour Process and Class Struggle, CSE pamphlet No 1 London, concentrates his analysis of the reasons which have led to the present transformation of industrial process organisation, mainly in two factors: economic restrictions on capital's tendency to increase its profits and in the socio-psychological problems which were created out of Fordist types of organisation. The latter for Palloix Ch., is seen through a decrease of employees' motivation to raise their productivity and through an upward slope of tendencies such as industrial fatigue, absenteeism, which have had negative effects upon productivity levels and upon industrial relations, between employees and management.

being also a significant parameter of Fordist mode of organisation. Following the analyses offered by theorists like Piore & Sabel (1984) or of Scott Lash & John Urry (1987), he sees the present industrial transition as the emergence of a new regime of accumulation that is a response to the post-war aesthetics of modernism which had prevailed over the ways the state was organised and its relationship with the 'civil society', and the ways global financial and industrial activity was conducted. These aesthetics perpetuated images of mass consumption, standardization, centralization of power and of vertical economic integration and according to Harvey they were parts of a complete mode of thought and of a particular mode of industrial organisation, ie Fordism.

64 Braverman H (1974) Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century p 193, Monthly Review Press, New York. Braverman's theoretical propositions in relation to the Taylorian and Fordist principles of industrial organisation, follow a bipolar level of analysis. The first level, constitutes a general appraisal of man's relationship with society. Braverman by adopting Marcuse's psychological critique of modern capitalist society (ie the dichotomy of mental/physical activity), is in essence raising the philosophical questions over the articulation of man's being and his political discourse or the articulation of internal/external - mental/material conditions that shape a man's mode of thought and political role (ie an articulation presented in what is defined as a Philosophy of Praxis). The second level consists of philosophical questions which are directly related to the economic and political processes which lead to the domination of the machine over the thoughts and material lives of human beings.


management technology. It includes the type and method of organizing production and labour and the national economic reproduction of labour power and capital... and as a method of regulation the 'way in which the elements of this complex relationship between production and reproduction are related to each other socially, ie based on the behaviour of the social participants... It includes a multifaceted configuration of economic and socio-political institutions and norms, which gives a certain equilibrium and stability to the reproduction of the system as a whole...'

67 Ibid, p 422

68 Harvey D (1989) p 176


70 ETUI (1982) Negotiating Technological Change, European Trade Union Institute Report, August, Brussels


74 Andersen-Bjorn N, Eason K & Robey D (1986) Managing Computer Impact. An International Study of Management Organisation Ablex, New Jersey. The study examines the computer impact upon power structure, ie decision-making procedures, task allocation, leadership patterns in the UK, Denmark, Austria, FRG and the USA. One of the findings was that computers have increased the transparency of the patterns and aims of industrial organisation rendering decision-making procedures more flexible
but at the cost of an increase of power centralisation at a superior level of managers.

75 Palloix C (1976) p 65

76 Cordova E (1986) 'Atypical Employment Patterns: Significance & Repercussions', Social & Labour, bulletin no 1, March, Geneva


80 Psimmenos I (1988) 'The Effects and Role of Productivity Related Pay: A Study of Pay Systems in Western Europe' (in Grk), Syndikalistiki Epitheonsi, no 41, May, Athens


2.1 Introduction

The theoretical evaluation of employees' participation, concentrates in this chapter upon the review of the main philosophical and economic trends of the post-war period and upon some of the major issues that expose further the politics of industrial relations to a new reality.

In the first section there is a theoretical attempt to approach the terrain of employees' participation, ascending from the political relationship which the issue of participation in the democratic organisation of a society has, with the issue of employee participation within industrial undertakings. Avoiding any stereotypical definition of participation, the analysis links the ideological contexts of employees' participation with the theoretical works of major political strands and various political movements, and it focuses upon the ensemble of nodal points on employee participation which the liberal-socialist/social-democratic, the radical-socialist, marxist and existentialist-marxist thought have contributed to the subject since the end of World War II.

Participation in the organisation and control of industrial environments is understood here, as an epicentre of general political critique of the way society is regulating economic and political activity. In contrast to the view that focus only on employee participation as being a practical schematic formula for joint consultation, or for representation at shop-floor and board levels, the emphasis here is placed on the relationship between political discourse and socio-economic conditions which prevail and characterise a society's social structure. The theoretical detour, therefore, begins from the conceptualisation that the context of employees' participation is determined by those conditions and processes which in turn determine the nature of industrial relations within any given social system. It is also determined by the specific traditions (of a given society) to which labour movements have ascribed, insofar as the role of employees within capitalism and their place in its political
transformation is concerned. On a philosophical plane, the analysis has included the theoretical contributions of theorists like Tocqueville, Paterman and Argyris, but in essence it has concentrated more on the above mentioned radical, political strands. On the political plane, the first section concentrates upon the characteristics and ideological manifestations to which various movements for the transformation of industrial and general societal institutions have been committed, by referring to the specific strategies which could change and reorganise power-relationships. Employees' participation, therefore, is placed under review through the brief examination of political tendencies which emphasize an evolutionary approach to the theme of democratisation of work and of society in general. Such an approach is more evident in the strategies and political theses of Labour/Social Democratic parties of western advanced capitalist countries such as Great Britain and West Germany.

Another dominant approach during the 1950s-1970s emphasizes the revolutionary rupture of capitalism's modes of organisation through the establishment of popular committees of social control. The last approach to be examined stems from the growing disillusionment of socialist and radical theorists with the existing models of socialist participation and with the social-democratic reformist policies on joint consultation. This last theoretical approach exalts the role which self-management units of production play for the self-actualisation of individual employees and for the development of democratic structures of organization. The last section of this chapter is a brief encounter with some of the issues which dominate the whole of the thesis, that serve as ideological and political landmarks for the future continuation of the post-war reasoning on employee participation. This section is more or less an ideological 'bridge' between Chapter One and Chapter Two, by focussing upon the theme of globalisation and how the process of integration and deregulation interacts, thus creating a comparatively new climate for industrial politics and the role of employees in undertakings.
2.2 Theoretical Debates on the Quest for Democracy

The theoretical departure, for the analysis of issues relating to aspects of employee participation and control of the economic and social functions of industrial undertakings, lies in the theoretical supposition that those issues are reflections of the modes of economic and political organisation of capitalist societies in totality. [1] This totality engulfs all those contradictions and antagonisms that capitalism is producing at every level of social activity, cultural or economic, local or international; [2] and is reflected in the ideological manifestations concerning man's critical assessment of his relationship with society, of what is democratic, and what is attainable. [3] These critical assessment or 'visions' of the socio-political organisation of society, have determined the meaning (in both ideological and political terms) of the concept of participation. This, in very broad terms, does not only symbolize what Prole (1975) has asserted in his 'Workers Participation In Industry', [4] as being the 'solution' to problems of alienation and of decision-making, but also it symbolises a general critique of the way society as a whole is structured, and the way power relationships are determined and economic activity regulated. To a certain extent it also symbolizes the need for a social transformation, partial or total, by projecting new visions of socio-economic organisation, either at local/industrial or at national/global level.

As Albert Camus (1975) in an allegorical way has described the philosophical critique of man's relationship with society, the question of democracy and freedom is a question of imprisonment of thought and action.

"...Knowing whether or not man is free involves knowing whether he can have a master. The absurdity, peculiar to this problem, comes from the fact that the very notion that makes the problem of freedom possible, also takes away all its meaning. For, in the presence of God there is less a problem of freedom than a problem of evil. You know the alternative: either we are not free and God the all-powerful is responsible for evil. Or we are free and responsible, but God is not
all powerful. All the scholastic subtleties have neither added anything to, nor subtracted anything from the acuteness of this paradox..." [4]

Within the above context, knowing that any universal definition of employee participation outside the specific environment or the specific areas of ideological intervention that different political trends focus upon, would probably only produce a historical understanding of the concept, there will be an attempt to analyse existing distinct ideological manifestations on the subject. These manifestations are classified according to the line of approach that is adopted in relation to the concept of democracy and the relationships of an individual to society. The categorisation of different philosophical schools according to their perception of democracy as a concept, and their understanding of participation may be controversial, it is nevertheless a useful 'tool' for the identification of some of the main ideological suppositions that each school of thought or each political strand holds. In the case of the liberal-theoretical tradition, participation is seen more or less in a Hobbesian manner, where the emphasis is placed upon individual or corporate decision-making ability for the purpose of integrating people into society, and the attainment of social order that in turn is 'able' to guarantee social coherence and economic development. [6] In contrast to the classification of the ideological manifestations of employee participation by Ulrich Von Alemann (1977) [7], this liberal philosophical tradition on the concepts of democracy and participation, is not limited to what Alemann has called a pluralistic-integrative model of participation (ie as was mentioned above) but includes all kinds of theoretical trends that see participation as a counter-mechanism of alienation, or as Argyris C (1970) has defined it, as an outward manifestation of people's attitudes and behaviour towards each other.

The second categorisation of participatory mechanisms in society stems, in brief, from the Utopian tradition on the understanding of the meaning of democracy and participation by philosophers like De Tocqueville. The rise of capitalism in place of feudalism and the creation of new social and political modes of thought and of organisation that, as De Tocqueville has asserted in his treatise on the 'Democracy of America', bind men together
on the basis of interests, speculation and antagonism rather than 'ideas', have synthesised anew the question of man's relationship with the society on a democratic basis. On the one hand secularization, the omnipotence of the mass society over the individual ability to control the political destiny of a nation, to indulge in the decisions taken on behalf of the majority, the subjugation of workers to the necessities and conditions determined by the manufacturing element in society and finally the separation of man from the community and his cultural roots, have all contributed to man's alienation from the democratic traditions and thoughts that are vital for the development of 'spiritual' life in a society. In relation to the modern division of labour in capitalist enterprises, De Tocqueville wrote:

"...When a workman is unceasingly and exclusively engaged in the fabrication of one thing, he ultimately does his work with singular dexterity; but at the same time he loses the general faculty of applying his mind to the direction of the work. He every day becomes more adroit...what can be expected of a man who has spent twenty years of his life in making heads for pins? And to what can that mighty human intelligence which has so often stirred the world be applied in him except it be to investigate the best method of making pins?...In proportion as the principles of the division of labour is more extensively applied, the workman becomes more weak, more narrow-minded and more dependent. The art advances, the artisan recedes..." [8]

The modern division of labour for Tocqueville's philosophical critique on Democracy, presents a dilemma of whether or not 'technicism' and 'commercialism' (ie Nisbet's emphasis on the theoretical understanding of Tocqueville's treatise on Democracy and Alienation) 'allow letters and the spiritual life of citizens to succumb to the ethos of capitalism, of trading everything in order to satisfy profit interests. On the other hand, he saw the emergence of new modes of organisation and of political thought, as being the epitome of a particular trend of individualism, that having first stripped the individual of his 'spiritual' properties, then allows the rise of greed, of adventurism and of selfishness.
"...Individualism at first only saps the virtue of public life; but in the long run it attacks and destroys all others and is at length absorbed in downright selfishness. Selfishness is a vice as old as the world..." [9]

In a different line of thought and within the liberal ideological plateau on the issues of democracy and participation, the mode of political organisation of modern capitalist society is seen as the functional ceteris paribus for the attainment of collective and representative decisions. Democracy is viewed as:

"...a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political-legislative and administrative decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given historical conditions..." [10]

In a similar manner, but from a different perspective, democracy, instead of the classical Greek definition given by Herodotus as being the people's (ie demos) rule (ie kratei) is understood by another school of liberal thought as the willingness of the people to 'influence' the common state of political or industrial affairs. The emphasis is placed upon the individual's frame of thought to conduct his/her relationships with others in a manner that is self-fulfilling for the individual and promotes mutual understanding and mutual interaction on all levels between different people. In this sense participation is viewed by Argyris (1970) as an:

"...outward manifestation of a philosophy about how people ought to behave towards each other in an ideal state. an expression of freedom, equality and adult relationships. In the western post-industrial world we live in, we believe the demand for these kinds of human relationships is growing. But it is an imperfect world we live in. Fixed attitudes exist, human variations, economic, social psychological pressures exist and all combine to produce a very uneven and imperfect environment...So that in striving towards an ideal philosophy in an imperfect world the most we can hope for is a shift in attitudes, a movement in thinking and some change in behaviour..." [11]
Participation is envisaged as a frame of thought that is acquired through work or non-work activities and determines an individual's passive or active political behaviour in society. (Kornhauser 1972) As an addition to the above psychology orientated analysis of political democracy and of participation Carole Pateman (1970) has argued that:

"...If in most social situations the individual finds himself subservient to some authority figure, it is likely that he will expect such an authority relationship in the political sphere. On the other hand, if outside the political sphere he has opportunities to participate in the wide range of social decisions, he will probably expect to be able to participate in political decisions as well. Furthermore, participation in non-political decision making may give one the skills needed to engage in political participation..." [12]

The above theoretical understanding of the concept of participation has largely been based upon the political treatises of John Stuart Mill or of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the issue of democratic organisation, and it conceives participation as both a mechanism that promotes public interests and at the same time as an ethical principle of society's political organisation, through which public interests are at the core of any government's attention. (Bachrach 1969) The immediate relationship with employee participation in industrial undertakings and issues of economic democracy, derive from the conceptualisation by the above school of thought (ie that stems from a general critique against the philosophical suppositions of the liberal tradition of democratic elitism or 'democratic politics', in the sense that they entail decentralised decision-making processes throughout different planes of socio-economic activity. According to Carole Pateman, Peter Bachrach or Lars Erik Karlsson (1969), participative industrial management not only influences employees' personal attitudes towards the management, but also 'reformulates' the whole social context upon which societal organisation is based.

In the first instance as Lars Erik Karlsson asserts:
"...If and when a general reform towards industrial democracy is put into effect, a multitude of social, cultural, and economic conditions outside of the enterprises will change. Status differences, now related to differences in occupation and income, will be reduced...The change in the pattern of values will open up possibilities for extending social services, cultural activities, the protection of the environment from pollution, health services and democratic organs for the scrutinization and control of consumer articles..." [13]

In the second instance participative democratic models of organisation may contribute towards the rebirth of people's lost community identity and of the power to govern their own affairs within the spatial parameters of this community. (Dearlove 1973, Dennis 1972) The connection between participative management and the raising of people's community identity, appears further below in the analysis of participation systems, however the political significance of the above issues raised by theorists like Karlsson or Pateman, lies in their emphasis on the role participation plays in transforming both personal values retained by individuals on the issue of work and of community, and also political structures within a given society. In this sense, if individuals are able to control their lives and the activities of their community, then they will also be able to understand the meaning of concepts like participation, and, in turn, if a democratic polity exists in a given society then according to Carole Pateman this polity cannot surely remain on certain levels and not on all others. Thus for the construction of democratic societies two main functions must be in existence: on the one hand the societal function that educates people and promotes democratic principles and procedures for social activity, and, on the other, the function that decentralizes decision-making structures and disperses power to the public.

As has been seen above, the liberal theoretical tradition on issues of democracy and political participation at large, as Mortensen (1982) [14] has asserted, stresses individuals' needs for their personal self-actualisation and their social interaction with the rest of the community or their political integration with the dominant socio-economic system; and emphasizes consensual politics rather than conflict orientated
political organisation. Although there are great variations amongst different strands of liberalism, it nevertheless conceptualises democracy as being a state of affairs and a model of organisation that reflects or represents functional-integrative sets of beliefs of how a society should be regulated so as to enhance individual and collective interests together and promote at the same time mechanisms which safeguard access to equal representation, and the accountability of the government to the people. Participation in this line of thought is at large conceptualised as an essential mechanism, a means–ends function and procedure, that does ensure the 'workability' of individual–man representation and the accountability of public authorities towards its public. According to Mortensen (1982) property rights and the main principles of economic and political capitalist organisation at large are left untouched.

In contrast, socialist or radical theories of democratic organisation are based on the philosophical supposition that modern capitalist society and its systems of political and economic regulation are based more or less upon the domination of one group or category of people over another. It stresses collective organisation and representation of people in accordance with their position in economic and political spheres of activity. Democracy is conceptualised as either means for collective emancipation from the political and economic domination by those in control of industrial activity and of political regulation, or as being a concept that is defined according to the historical and economic modes of relationship that prevail, so that there are different types of democracy (ie bourgeois democracy - socialist democracy). In this line of argument participation is either a social movement which is based on a conflict of interests and strives to counter existing power formations at industrial and other levels, and/or is viewed as a movement of anti-capitalist essence altogether that strives to create those conditions necessary for the political change of society's mode of organisation. (Schreggle 1976)

The above classification of the major philosophical typologies in relation to the ideological conceptualisation of democracy and of political participation, despite the controversial theoretical nature which surrounds any categorisation of diverse philosophical traditions, has
nevertheless added a dimension to the study of employee participation in industrial activity. This dimension, the philosophical context within which the definition of employee participation is determined, is of immense theoretical and practical importance for the further classification and political orientation of different movements of participation in industrial environments. This context in essence is the theoretical base for the whole subject of industrial relations. Without it, without any level of theoretical abstraction on the economic nature and processes which determine the role of employees in capitalist industrial undertakings and hence of the political context of employees' participation as a concept and strategy on the part of labour, the study of industrial relations would probably be an impossible task or would only be linked to particular conditions and situations of industrial activity at any given enterprise. This essence is further 'exploited' in the classification of participative forms of contemporary industrial democratic theory which different schools of industrial sociology have produced and which different intellectuals have adopted for their study of employee participation in industrial capitalist undertakings.

In accordance with Michael Poole's (1986) conceptualisation of participation and of industrial democracy at the place of work, there are three main philosophical approaches to the subject; the first approach emphasises employee participation in industrial decision-making processes, as an extension of a wider culture for political participation in society, focussing more upon the modern organisational structures which advanced capitalist societies have built, (especially since the end of World War II). The second is more or less based upon the theoretical works of Utopian proto-socialist thinkers like Owen (1825), Charles Fourier (1808) or Saint-Simon (1825) and emphasizes the development of participative movements in industry as part of a wider political movement for the social-cultural emancipation of workers through a transformation of the basic relations of industrial production-accumulation.

The third theoretical approach, which Poole asserts as being more evident in self-management forms of industrial participation, emphasises the existential relationship between modes of thought and material external
conditions, and focuses upon methods and types of industrial activity that promote the collective and individual emancipatory development of people in a capitalist society. Although there are many more categorisations of the theoretical approaches to employee participation, which different social scientists have adopted in their studies, Poole's categorisation, although it is controversial (i.e., in terms of his theoretical classification of different participatory typologies), does nevertheless reflect in a more articulate and contemporary form, both the different philosophical discourses on employee participation and the different systems of participation followed by different labour movements, which subscribe to radical and/or socialist thought. Following Poole's classification, the different typologies on employee participation within the radical/socialist frame of thought, can be further broadened so as to include recent tendencies in the study of the subject. However, the analysis in this chapter, on the different forms and political contexts of employee participation has been further narrowed so as to include theoretical approaches that view the concept as a response to, and product of, the total framework within which capitalist relations take place. In addition, they depart from the understanding, that democracy and political participation are not linked or defined by whether or not an increase of employees' involvement in the decision making processes of industrial undertakings is profitable or not, or whether or not an 'x' or 'z' system of industrial organisation is increasing employees' efficiency at work, and hence of capital's productivity ratios and its world competitiveness. Furthermore, the whole theoretical scope of the thesis on employee participation and how new conditions (i.e., both local and international) are affecting both the political context and employees' ability (i.e., as a collective social force) to shape and control industrial functioning, is outside the framework of analysis and theoretical suppositions, which the proponents of the 'Human Relations' school of thought adopt. In this sense participation in industrial organisations, as Blumberg (1968) has asserted in his study of industrial participation, is not examined as:

"...a device to lower costs, to improve quality, to increase productivity, to undercut trade union or workers' demands or to give
workers the illusion of power without its actuality, the more easily to guarantee jealously guarded managerial prerogatives within the framework of private enterprises..." [19]

The context of employee participation in industrial undertakings is examined instead as ascending from the structural and cultural conditions and relationships that prevail, and from the interpenetration or actuation of processes and tendencies that stem from both the internal mode of industrial organisation and from the external global organisation of industrial activity. This context, however, as was mentioned at the beginning of this section, reflects those contradictions and antagonisms between capital and labour at every level, social-economic or ideological. It is an articulation of philosophical and political discourses that transcend, or attempt to transcend, man's relationship with industrial activity beyond the already set frameworks of societal organisation. (Campbell Balfour 1973) Critical theoretical reviews and systems of 'participation' or rather of employee involvement, seek to modify Taylorian principles of management and of labour regulation, because as Westley et al (1971) put it, [20] dissatisfaction amongst workers 'increasingly challenges the competence of foremen and the rights of managers' and thus of participatory forms of organisation.

In this sense such reviews and systems are not treated by the present thesis as being part of the above conceptualisation of employee participation in capitalist industrial undertakings. Even the use of the term 'participation' has been under consideration by the theoretical proponents of the Human Relations school, arguing that:

"...Participation (as a concept) is thought to be closely linked to joint-decision making and some sharing of control which need not imply unity of purpose (between labour and management)..." [21]

Instead, the use of the term 'employee involvement', as a concept that implies employee commitment to corporate goals and the labour force's incorporation in the ethos of existing forms of authority and ownership arrangements, is seen as more preferable and as more accurate for
describing the theoretical plateau from which Human Relation theorists depart for their analyses. [22]

Within this frame of political thought an emphasis is placed upon the mechanisms through which the management of industrial environments is made possible by the diffusion of collective power from employee organisations, and by the reinforcement of consensual orientated or integrationist policies. These policies on the one hand fragment further forms and concepts of employee collective identification, whilst on the other they promote individual employees' co-operation with management, without questioning or changing existing power relationships and social control structures. The whole theoretical background of the 'Human Relations' school of thought has come to emphasize the above mechanisms as a result of both internal (at the production level) contradictions and antagonisms, that were increasing because of the introduction of Taylorian principles of management, and external (international political and economic conditions) societal conflicts that, as the cases of May 1968 and the rise of Third World movements have shown, posed questions about the existing modes of political and cultural organisation of capitalist societies.

"...Starting from the viewpoint that man is an infinitely adaptable animal, they (American Managers) concluded that those who did not get used to production line work were 'unadaptable'; they must, it was felt, suffer from 'psychological problems'. Industrial psychologists were hired to help the workers gently to 'overcome their personal problems'. This opened the era of 'human relations in industry', a gigantic brain washing enterprise. After the Second World War...managers started to combine 'human relations' with material incentives in various ways...The thirst for consumer goods which lasted throughout the 1950s seemed to confirm management's basic belief, that you can get anything out of a worker provided you pay him for his trouble...You can buy his labour-power, his health, his youth, his sanity, his sleep, his very reason. All good things come to an end...A few years ahead (ie mid-1960s) of their European colleagues, American workers were beginning to rebel against production-line
speeds...tyrannical supervisors, the nervous exhaustion resulting from monotonous tasks..." [23]

As a response to inert political problems that the managers of large industrial undertakings were facing, especially with increased trade union militancy during the 1960s and mid-1970s, and to the increasing globalisation of production activities of financial services, new theoretical frameworks were devised by industrial socio-psychologists so as to cope with and facilitate industrial change in an era of rapid political and economic global transformation. The political line of the 'Human Relations' school on this issue is probably best reflected in the US Director of Employee Relations in the Office of Defence Production (1986) stating that:

"...Then there is the most critical factor: the capacity of senior managers to manage the changed social, industrial, political and economic factors that confront their work places... change never occurs without turbulence. It is probably fair, in fact, to say that some senior public administrators create turbulence in order to set off a process of change. On the negative side, turbulence can be threatening, but on the positive side it can create energy in people and therefore within the organisation. Where there are people who feel threatened and angry about what is happening in their workplace, there is a lot of energy available if it can be turned around..." [24]

The 'Human Relations' political line of thought, on the issue of managing 'change' in capitalist enterprises, has modified its approach over the years to industrial relations. From the period where paternalistic supervision of workers by management was approved or where absenteeism and industrial grievances were viewed as reflections of psychological neuroses (Clegg & Dunkeley 1984) to the era of 'employee involvement' and of 'job-enrichment', the position of the Human Relations school on the issue of democratisation, has become more 'refined'. The context of such a 'refinement' lies in the emphasis on 'self-managing' work teams, [25] the increase of an individual's responsibility in the actual running of industrial undertakings (eg the implementation of schemes such as ESOPs,
PRP), the relative increase of an individual's control of operations in accordance with his/her position and skill, the psychological improvement of inter-personal relations between workers-managers, through team-briefings and quality circles. (Rashford & Coglan 1987) Such a political diversion, however, is still connected with what was mentioned earlier, that the whole theoretical conceptualisation of participatory schemes at production or board level is related to issues of workers' efficiency at work, productivity levels and a neo-corporatist ideology (ie in the sense of workers' accommodation of corporate goals and of co-operation with the management). [Fiorelli & Joseph 1988]

In essence, workers and their motives for the socio-political democratisation of the work place are only associated with socio-psychological factors and levels of analysis which retain a commitment towards capital's interests to regulate and control labour, rather than reformulate some of the basic factors that contribute to workers' social and political alienation and to their powerlessness to shape and control industrial activity at both the production level and at the boardroom decision-making level. Participation is at large viewed as a functional mechanism by which workers are more able to increase their potential in material benefits and integrate their social entity with the goals and principles of industrial organisations. As Frederick Herzberg (1968) has asserted in his study on how to motivate employees, the whole issue of the democratisation of power relationships at work reflects a biblical analogy.

"...The factors associated with job-satisfaction are those stemming from man's need to realize his human potential for perfection. In biblical terms this is the 'Abraham' conception of the nature of man. Abraham was created in the image of God...He has a need to understand, to achieve, and through achievement to experience psychological growth and these needs are very powerful motivating drives. Both the Adam and Abraham natures of man look for satisfaction in his work...The Adam nature requires effective company policies, working conditions, security, pay, etc., and is affected by inadequacies in these...Satisfaction in work is provided through the Abraham nature of man which is concerned with the job content of the work itself, with
achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement, etc. These are the motivator or growth factors and their presence will cause satisfaction..." [26]

The above mentioned factors may contribute towards a greater 'job-satisfaction', however the distinction between 'Human Relations' and democratic/socialist theories on employees is not based on whether recognition and personal achievement advances employee satisfaction at work, but rather on the latter theories' emphasis upon the interconnection between material conditions, general political societal issues and man's ideological and cultural condition. Herzberg's theoretical understanding of employee satisfaction at work can only be classified as a probably profound statement that is impossible to understand without being a 'profound metaphysician'. Whether or not man's nature can be understood in biblical terms, and in turn whether worker's behaviour and aspirations are parts of this 'nature', certainly deserves a more thorough philosophical and theological examination, but as Rousseau once stated, one cannot explain inequality amongst men and all issues connected with it, by simply ignoring or not having a knowledge of men themselves.

"...And how can man come to know himself as nature made him once he has undergone all the changes which the succession of time and things must have produced in his original constitution, and so distinguish that which belongs to his own essence from that which circumstances and progress have added to or altered in his primitive state..." [27]

It is this unity of internal (ie spiritual) and external (ie material/societal) conditions, that determines the political context of employees' relationship with management and of the meaning of concepts, that in turn reflect the process of industrial democratisation. This unity in the theoretical socialist/radical tradition, that surrounds the whole theme of industrial democratisation and hence of employee participation, is represented by three main typologies. (See Table 2.2.1) These typologies, however, only represent the major political and social tendencies both in terms of theoretical lines of thought and of actual experimentation (ie in relation to participative schemes), that
| Ideological Traditions: | | | |
|------------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Guild socialism in Great Britain - social democratic devisionism in Germany - statist | Revolutionary class politics (Marxist - Leninist/Trotskyite traditions); radical socialism (Third Road) | Existentialist German and French political thought; Marxist-existentialism; Utopian socialism in France (reformed catholicism - anti-statist self-managed regulation) |

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<th>Schemes of Employee Participation</th>
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<td>Joint-consultation committees; co-determination</td>
<td>Workers councils; anti-imperisalist/assemblies of economic control</td>
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different labour movements have followed or subscribed to since the end of World War II.

The first theoretical typology stems from a variety of philosophical schools and is probably most associated with what can be called as being the non-Marxist evolutionary/constitutionalist type of approach towards the democratic organisation of industrial undertakings. The philosophical 'roots' of this typology lie in the articulation of theoretical works that emphasize the non-revolutionary path towards societal transformation, through the development of administrative mechanisms for the democratic organisation of industrial environments. These roots are 'anchored' in the Utopian industrial society of Robert Owen [28] and in the more contemporary Anglo-Saxon movement of Fabian Socialism. [29] It would be almost impossible to summarise in few sentences the theoretical tradition of Fabian Socialism, but in very general terms its theoretical framework is probably best reflected in its distinctive approach to societal transformation from the then Labour movements in Europe. The state is seen as a mechanism which can transform society in terms of both values and structures, and as Tawney (1981) has asserted in his political essay on 'Freedom', delivered to the Fabian Society in 1944, parliamentary struggle can determine both the democratic characteristics of a society and the future social development of the dominant social system.

"...The state is an important instrument; hence the struggle to control it. But is is an instrument and nothing more. Fools will use it when they can, for foolish ends, and criminals for criminal ends. Sensible and decent men will use it for ends which are decent and sensible, and will know how to keep fools and criminals in their place..." [30]

Following the conceptualisation that decision-making bodies express the mechanisms through which democratic representation and power distribution can be achieved, Fabian Socialists and theoretical exponents of social-democracy have focused upon the functions which employee participation (as an element of economic democratisation) in individual undertakings can play. In relation to the state and industrial enterprises, employee participation is conceived as the end-goal, by which both the essential
features of industrial organisation in a capitalist society are transformed, and at the same time capitalism as a social system and its tendencies to monopolise economic and political power into few hands is further controlled. In relation to the first, the post-war theoretical tendencies of Fabian Socialism and of what has been called Guild Socialism, [31] developed as a critique against the Taylorian principles of industrial organisation and against the spreading of Fordism as a form of labour regulation and of production-consumption patterns. (Szell Gyorgy 1988)

"...But even this great army (ie labour) will achieve no final victory in the war that really matters unless it has behind it the driving force of a great constructive idea. This ideal Guild Socialism fully supplies. The workers cannot be free unless industry is managed and organized by the workers themselves in the interests of the whole community. The trade union, which has been till now a bargaining force, must become a controlling force....We can only destroy the tyranny of the machinery - which is not the same as destroying machinery itself - by giving into the hands of the workers the control of their life and work..." [32]

In contrast to Communist and anarcho-syndicalist movements on the continent, exponents of Guild Socialism and later of social democracy in both Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, [33] have argued for the integration of mental and manual activity (ie in contrast to Taylorist separation of the two) and for the workers' control of industrial activity at local-municipal level. G D H Cole (1930), in summarising the ideas of Guild Socialism has rejected the Utopias of both the collectivist theoretical tradition which leads to the centralization and domination of decision making by the party of one class, and the Utopias which the then theoretical proponents of anarchism have put forward, which 'show' no realism for the obstacles that any social transformation has to confront.

"...What is sound and live in the Guild idea is, above all, its insistence that the worker, as a worker must be treated as a human being and not as a mere factory hand. What is sound, too, is the insistence
that the conditions under which a man works go far towards determining what sort of man he becomes, and how he behaves politically and as an individual in his hours of leisure. What is sound finally is the view that to lead men is better than to drive them." [34]

The idea of self-government, of the development of the individual interest in conjunction with communal interests has been one of the major themes with which Guild Socialism has been associated. In contrast to the idea of communes and of the collectivisation of property, Guild Socialism and the later theoretical trends of 'democratic' socialism have pursued self-government as the end-goal for the socialist reorganisation of capitalist society and have emphasized workers' control as a mechanism that promotes justice and equality, but not at the expense of democratic pluralism, individualism and efficiency to produce and consume industrial goods. The role played by different market forces, in relation to the organisation of production and consumption patterns, is believed to be strengthened and better regulated if there is a democratic structure that is able to represent and influence industrial decision-making on behalf of individuals as well as the community as a whole. The role of workers' control, as well, is perceived as a lever through which first of all an individual learns to participate in the regulation of the society; he/she learns to be responsible and represent the community's interests; and second, to identify socialism and its ideals as not impractical and unrealistic. In this sense, the structural mechanisms for workers' control (e.g. workers' councils, collective bargaining, joint consultation committees) act as catalysts for the decentralisation of power and for the creation of a political and economic representative system that is accountable to its citizens and whose policies stem from participative democratic procedures. In accordance with Cole & Mellors (1970) the Fabian model for workers' representation consists of workers' nominees alone, who are responsible for the general representation of workers' grievances against the management's abuse of working conditions and political statutory rights (i.e. in connection with the issue of unionisation) and for issues such as cuts in the labour force, the transfer of labour and the manning of machines. [35]
In relation to the second issue (i.e., the monopolisation of economic and political power by representatives of capital and multinational or large industrial undertakings), the exponents of Guild/'democratic' socialism have pursued the idea that private interests should be subordinated to the political control of national industrial authorities and local representative committees.

"... (Nationalisation) means that the state shall be equipped with machinery needed to enable it to regulate, stimulate and direct the flow of capital into different undertakings; that the foundation services, such as banks, transport, coal and power, steel.....shall be vested in public ownership; that monopolies shall either be treated in the same way or be strictly controlled; and that the mass of industries which continue to be carried on outside the nationalised sector shall be required to work within a framework of policy laid down by a national authority... The essential thing is that private interests should be subordinated to those of the majority of the nation and that the state should be equipped with such powers and organs as may be needed to guide economic development on lines conducive to the general well-being..." [36]

At this point, it should be noted that the theoretical meaning of nationalisation for most exponents of Guild/democratic socialism, does not follow the political emphasis on the state and its class control which for example Marxist orientated labour movements on the continent have adopted. The idea behind the use of the term has more to do with the state-ownership of specific sectors of national economy and less with the device of a social system that emphasizes central planning and the appropriation of private capital from individual producers. 'Nationalisation' is used not in the same sense in which the collectivist theorists [37] have used it, and it does not represent a political stage where working class rule, through the establishment of a socialist state, is able to dictate political transformation from above. Rather it signifies a political strategy that responds towards the expansion of multinational capital; it recognises the economic and political necessity to expand existing social
welfare services and to broaden the scope and intervention of constitutional principles of democracy at all levels of social interaction.

In contrast to Communist led labour strategies, nationalisation has more or less been perceived as a necessity which at the same time can lead to great problems (eg bureaucracy, centralization of decision-making) and which can lead to limitations on the autonomy of industry from the state and the decrease in the power of workers' councils to decide independently from state authorities on their working arrangements. For this reason the adoption of a political programme for the nationalisation of the most important/key areas of industrial activity has always been accompanied (by the proponents of Guild socialism) by theoretical scepticism and a political will towards the strengthening of trade unions and the bargaining power of workers' councils. In fact, in Britain during the first Labour Party nationalisation programme (1940s) there were many 'voices' of dissent, who offered a theoretical argument for the parallel establishment of workers' councils within nationalised industries and for the creation of an 'independent' system for trade union bargaining from the state, and for the industrial management of local undertakings. (Dahl 1970; Haynes 1970)

The system of industrial democracy, that was envisaged by the progressive theoretical strands of this particular type of British democratic socialism, was reflected in the political strategies for the expansion of the welfare state, the retaining of a relative autonomy between the state apparatus and trade unions and most of all in the establishment of a pluralist democratic consensus which heavily emphasized the right to collective bargaining, consultation and focussed upon the ideal of co-managing the British society without breaking with liberal ideals (ie in relation to individual and his/her relationship with market forces) and without ignoring the necessity to reform capitalism. [38] The latter is a matter of immense theoretical controversy, since there has been no single ideological position that the British Labour Movement has adopted since the end of World War II. In the case of employee participation, the issue of reform has taken different meanings from that which theorists like Cole have adopted, to the pursuit of conservative lines of thought
which theorists like Clegg or Crosland have followed, especially since the end of 1960s. [39]

The evaluation of the different theoretical lines of thought on the issue of employee participation cannot adequately be represented here, for an attempt at such a 'project' necessitates a complete historical and social examination of the Labour Party's post-war development, the political tendencies which existed and the new ones which emerged during the first British Labour government. However, in relation to the concept of employee participation one could possibly identify three main political traditions that still represent a large section of the British labour movement. The first is rooted more in the ideas of Fabianism/Guild Socialism where workers' participation and hence workers' councils are viewed as social levers for the establishment of a new community orientated work ethic amongst employees, and for the development of a society that safeguards individual interests and yet accommodates policies that are also representative of 'collective' bodies of representation. Participation is seen as the vehicle for a socialist transformation that respects and flourishes through municipal/local industrial autonomy or independence from the state and it is in a sense an articulation of the 'parts' (different associations, bodies) into a whole, rather than the opposite (the Soviet example of centralization and central planning).

For Guild Socialists, like Cole's theoretical formulation of a socialist society, (in his book 'Self-Government in Industry'), the political departure for the transformation of capitalism lay in the recognition that it is a particular set of power relationships that contribute to the social slavery of man by man. In contrast to socialist collectivism and the communist emphasis on class rule, his critique focussed upon those structures (ie between employees and the state, or between employees and managers) of power control which revolutionary socialists have seemed to ignore. Participation in industry and in the decision-making processes was viewed as a political contribution beyond the Utopias of the collectivists, that could restore the imbalances of power in modern industrial societies and addresses once more the question as to whether or not the abolition of the bourgeois class structure de facto leads to the
abolition of human slavery and of the subordination of workers to the interests of an economic and political elite. (Wright 1979)

The second is more linked with the ideological and political rift in the Labour Party between traditional socialists and followers of a pluralist philosophical strand. Participation in industrial undertakings takes on a new meaning, in the sense that the objective or theoretical aim no longer lies with the ideal of social transformation, (in the sense of creating a new socialist consensus that is tied to the principles of Guild or Marxist philosophy) but rather it lies in the social management of the industrial and political environment. In contrast to the concept that defines a strategy for workers' control and collective representation, participation is seen as a function through which organisations are run democratically, in an effective productive way, by improving working conditions and equalising benefits and rights amongst workers of the same trade throughout society. (Sturmthal 1983) [40]

The third general line of thought on employee participation exalts the political thesis that focuses upon the gradual transformation of capitalism as a socio-economic system through the transcendence of industrial structures and of principles of economic organisation. Employee participation is seen as a political vehicle which can essentially create an alternative system for industrial production, based on the ideas of co-operation, community development and democratic decentralisation. (Hyman 1974; Coates 1970) Whereas this last political line of thought has a lot in common with Fabianism and Cole's theory on Guild Socialism, it nevertheless represents a contemporary political validation of modern industrial societies that has sprung out of the experiences of self-management on the continent (eg the Basque region, socialist/catholic co-operatives in Italy) and shares with other labour movements a political will against corporatism and state domination. (Watson 1980)

These above theoretical lines of approach to the issue of employee participation have never existed in pure form either amongst British Trade Union officials or in other labour movements on the continent who in general advocated social-democratic or socialist democratic principles of
societal transformation; in contrast they have existed in a perpetual state of articulation. However, the most dominant post-war schemes of employee participation, that have been at the fore-front of political debate amongst Labour Party/socialist thinkers, were schemes which either emphasized the right of consultation and the right for shop-floor association of workers or the right of board-level co-partnership and joint-consultation between management and employees. (Odaka Onio 1977)

The first is mostly related to the British experience of Trade Unionism and the development of, or attempts to develop, a contemporary legal and political framework for industrial relations at local level. The distinctiveness of the British Trade Union structure has, in contrast to other continental labour movements, led the political emphasis to be centred around issues of wages, health and safety and the general appraisal of working conditions at an industrial site, and around the reinforcement of locally based trade union structures, in contrast to the national, tripartite and board-level representation upon which continental movements have focussed. It should be noted here, that the above statement refers to the actual practice of participation in Great Britain. In contrast, the proposals of, for example, the TUC's conference on industrial democracy that were set out during the 1966 recommendations to the Donovan Commission, included and emphasized board-level representation and joint consultation between managers and employees at all important areas of decision-making (eg investment, takeovers, productivity rates and personnel internal regulations). In fact, according to the Report of the Committee of Inquiry on the Industrial Democracy (ie Bullock Report), the TUC, during its conference (1974), has asked for the right to redress the balance of power between capital and labour, through the establishment of worker representative committees at board level. [41]

The second, is in fairly general terms related to the political objectives that schemes like the German co-determination or the French political framework (ie Auroux Laws) have focussed upon. Participation by co-determination is a system where employee representatives confer with management and jointly make decisions about internal personnel organisation or regulation and about the general appraisal of industrial undertakings'
economic strategies in relation to productivity, trade relationships, pricing schemes for the product and general welfare benefits. The philosophy of participation by co-determination is summarised by Johannes Schregle (1976), stating that:

"...Workers are entitled to have a say in the management of their enterprise irrespective of ownership and simply because they work there. This is the philosophy of the DGB (ie the German Confederation of Trade Unions) which insists that co-determination does not affect, and is independent of, the question of ownership. It is being argued in a growing number of countries in both the highly industrialised and the developing parts of the world that, as was pointed out by the participant from the Government of Jamaica at the Oslo symposium, 'employees who invest their lives in a company, (like) shareholders who invest their capital, have a right to influence decisions.' The Norwegian Minister of Labour said that 'workers' participation is based on fundamental concepts of justice' and that 'the ordinary worker invests his labour and ties his fate to his place of work. For this reason he has a legitimate claim to have a share in influencing aspects of company policy'...

In contrast, the second theoretical typology on participation (See Table 2.2.1) starts from the ideological conceptualisation of participation as a state of industrial organisation that is inextricably bound with employees' collective ownership of the means of production. The management of industrial organisations and the control of decision-making procedures become an essential vehicle for the socio-economic transformation of a capitalist society in conjunction with the socialisation of the means of production. Thus, the democratisation of industrial relations at a local base is seen as an inseparable process from the appropriation of private capital ownership, and from the termination of profit-linked vested interests in the regulation of industrial undertakings. The philosophical roots of this second typology on employee participation, spread across the theoretical works of early 'socialist' thinkers (eg Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier); [43] of the anarchist movement which was led by Pierre J Proudhon, Kropotkin and Mikhail Bakunin; [44] and of the various strands
of Marxist or radical socialist thinking, which developed more or less out of the revolutionary movements in France, Germany, Russia and in the pre-war years in the then Fascist Italy. [45]

There are two broad theoretical traditions on the issue of democratisation of industrial activity and on the establishment of employees' participation and control in organisations, which have developed during the post-war period (ie 1950s-1970s) in capitalist developed or developing countries. The first is exalting the political nullity in strategies which seek to establish democratic structures within industrial undertakings, without aiming at the same time or without seeing employees' participation as an essential part of socialist society and a workers' state. In contrast to liberal and social-democratic traditions, where ownership of the means of production is separated from the issues of working conditions and employees' interest representation in decision-making procedures, Trotskyist and orthodox communist party policies on employee participation do not view the ability to participate in board or shop floor level per se, as a radical alternative to and as a breaking of the exploitative nature of capitalist social relations. The regulation of industrial activity through workers' committees and trade unions is not seen as a political function independent from the theme of a socialist oriented transformation of society; and in turn a political strategy for the socialist reorganisation of a society is not seen as inseparable from the rule by working class organisation of all the economic and social activities of the state. Ownership, control of industrial decisions and the creation of a socialist state, are all necessary elements for the future democratisation of industrial relations and the ending of capitalism's dehumanizing division of labour.

The above two political and ideological strands of Marxism, however, do not share the same ideas and objectives regarding the achievement of a socialist state, the meaning and significance of the term 'participation' and of the central role which employees' committees at work play in the transformation of society. The Trotskyist parties (especially in Latin-American countries) have, for example, rejected altogether the Soviet, Yugoslav models of workers' control, because the first has led to the loss
of workers' control by the continuous transfer of power to an intellectual elite, a self-interested group of bureaucrats, [46] whereas the second facilitates workers' control at plant level but does not present adequate evidence of national and regional regulation of the economy in a manner that is not determined by sectoral and ethnic factors.

Workers' state control, and their domination of cultural, political and economic activities, have always been in the forefront of Trotskyist movements, whilst armed struggle and the support for collectivisations (ie amongst peasants or industrial workers) has remained up to the 1980s the theoretical view on how to transform capitalism (eg the rise of revolutionary communist parties in Chile, El-Salvador, Nicaragua). In turn, the use of terms such as participation, self-management, joint consultation, have been dismissed or denounced by different theorists as 'ideological diversions' for the preservation of capitalism's industrial order, especially if the use of such concepts is linked to the idea that a change of structures, of legislative measures as part of the state, of workers' councils and participatory schemes are sufficient ingredients for a social transformation of a society. Participatory schemes and workers' councils are seen by Trotskyist movements and by orthodox or Euro-communist parties as Bodies, that through conflict with management and with their contradictory function and role within industrial undertakings, raise collective industrial action and employees' working class consciousness as well as preparing workers to manage the future socialist enterprises.

For the Trotskyist movement, however, workers' councils reflect (in contrast to orthodox communist parties) the revolutionary spontaneity of the working class to self organise and 'appropriate' from employers the right to manage. They represent the first outbreaks of workers' mobilisation towards the setting of a new form of social order that, if it is generalised beyond sectoral and particular interests of the society, can become the first 'linking cells' for a socialist and anti-bureaucratic orientated force. In a theoretical critique of Rudolf Bahro's (1978) theoretical work on 'The Alternative in Eastern Europe', Ernest Mandel (1979) distances his conceptualisation of workers' councils from the orthodox communist tradition as being essential but only complementary.
bodies for the socialist transformation of the capitalist society. [47]
He argued in response to Bahro's work that:

"...The specific articulation between mass power, mass activity and the mighty leaps in individual consciousness made possible by workers' councils, a revolutionary party and multi-party system, all this gives way to vague hopes in the progress of 'general consciousness'. In the meantime, since it is open who will take decisions expressing 'general' as opposed to 'particular' interests, it is at least possible, if not inevitable, that the power will remain in the hands of a bureaucratized state... Bahro has not understood the alternative between a state apparatus independent of the mass of citizens, and those councils which represent the mass of citizens, and those councils which represent the only historically produced form of self-government and control by the masses themselves. A minority league of communists is certainly no substitute for mass control, even if it embodies the highest level of general 'consciousness'..." [48]

The second political strand, which many orthodox communist parties have followed, has also placed its emphasis upon the establishment of industrial committees for the educational preparation of workers towards the management of a socialist state and for the industrial transformation of the ways production-accumulation processes have been structured by capitalism. Its ideological tradition is in line with the Soviet model of socialist administration which was firmly tied to a centralised body of decision-making and to an apparatus of workers' participation that was (at least in theory) based upon the functions of trade unions, workers' councils, committees of popular rule and the functions of governmental organs of decision making. The institution of workers' control has been seen by classical Marxist theorists and European communist parties, as the first revolutionary step without which it is impossible to establish a socialist society.

"...(this first step) is an essential contribution for the masses, so that in turn they understand that without the need for a general control
of production and of the distribution of goods, workers' rule will not be established..." [49]

The political 'didactic' function, which Lenin has so vigorously linked with the creation of a revolutionary socialist state, has followed in one way or another the political approaches towards participation which contemporary communist parties have adopted especially since the end of World War II. Especially in the cases of the Portugese, the Greek, and elements of the Spanish and French communist parties, the establishment of workers' councils has usually been linked to a dual political function: one that educates workers to manage on a collective basis and one that raises political consciousness beyond the particular trade union affairs of a local industrial environment. However, the establishment of workers' councils and of participatory schemes which manifest some form of control over industrial decision-making has always been viewed as a transitory phase towards the creation of a society where the means of production and their products are socially owned and are socially administered (ie socialisation). [50] For the orthodox communist parties the end-goal is the establishment of a social system that is based on economic socialisation, meaning in essence the abolition of classes and turning the means of production from state control to social control. It is important here to note that workers' councils are associated rather with the establishment of a social system which is state controlled and because in general such an association is viewed as a first or as an initial phase of social transformation. [51] For example, the Greek and the French communist parties have always advocated strategies which link participation to nationalisation. [52] Workers' control and different participatory schemes are considered as essential in the process of social transformation as long as they are in co-ordination with a wider administrative process of national affairs that is regulated by trade union representatives, party officials, local/regional committees and industrial councils. In the post-1952s period the French, Greek and Portuguese communist parties have advocated a strategy for employee participation that was a part of a wider policy towards the peaceful transformation of their societies.
As an example, the French communist party (the orthodox wing, before the 1968 split), saw the participation first (1950s) as a mechanism for the labour movement's control of the nationalised (state-owned) industries, and since the 1970s as a democratic mechanism for the regulation of national economy against the increased domination of multinational corporations. Since the 1980s, however, the French communist party and CGT have both used the term 'employee participation' and the concept 'autogestion' in order to describe their alternative proposal, which basically was anti-capitalist and at the same time recognised the need for the immediate democratisation of industrial modes of organisation. The meaning of participation is closely linked to the French party's view on the nationalisation issue.

"... Nationalisation for the CGT, most of all is a battle against the domination of multinational corporations with regard to their economic strategies and their industrial organisation. Nationalisation means the control (of national affairs) by the nation and its workers and their ability to shape and choose their (nation's) future.....Administrative autonomy, administrative councils within which trade unions will have a large representation, increased rights for the intervention of industrial councils (in the management of national affairs), immediate rights for employees at enterprise level...all these (rights) constitute the fundamental views of the CGT insofar as the democratic administration of nationalised industries is concerned....The industrial council will become a good example of democratic organisation at enterprise level. The CGT sees industrial councils as a progressive model...The industrial council will contribute to the transformation of the relations of hierarchy, and it will establish new social relations of co-operation and of co-responsibility..." [53]

In similar 'fashion' the Greek communist party has viewed participation as a political and economic institution which needs to be established for the social transformation of Greek society. It was seen as a part of a a wider strategy towards achieving a government with an anti-monopoly (ie anti-multinational corporations) and anti-imperialist orientation. Workers' control of industrial functions and on decisions taken by
individual enterprises was viewed as an imperative element in what the Greek communist party has called the phase of 'real change'. Within this phase, state-owned enterprises together with trade union representatives, regional/local administrations and technocratic institutions were supposed to establish the first co-ordinated, grass roots attempt towards the disengagement of Greece's ties with NATO, the EEC, and other bodies of imperialist control and in turn to set the principles and aims for the country's future social-economic development. (See Chapter Three) This socio-economic development for the Greek communist party and the trade unions which were affiliated to the communist party, was tied to the ideas and experiences which stemmed from the Soviet model of development, and in principle concepts like 'autogestion' or 'self-management', were always denounced, as belonging ideologically either to the Euro-communist fraction or to the Yugoslav model of administration, which in turn were viewed as a semi-socialist, anti-Soviet and as a diversion from the 'principles of socialism' example of development.

During the late 1960s there has been a growing socialist movement in the developing capitalist orientated nations that more or less developed into a critique of the global social order and in particular of the increased dependency of peripheral economies on the multinational corporations and the military-political alliances which were controlled by imperialist forces. This political movement, which has incorporated diverse and even conflicting ideological tendencies, was a broad socialist radical alternative, a replacement of the theoretical Eurocentrist approaches [54] of social-democratic, and orthodox communist parties on the theme of democratisation and social transformation of a particular society. Radical socialist thought, which has focussed upon the relations between metropolitan capitalist centres and peripheral capitalist nations, had attempted to redefine the existing Marxist critique on the transformation of capitalist societies. It would be impossible to categorise the ideological contributions which different socialist parties in developing countries have made since the 1960s, but in general these contributions emphasize the role of the global capitalist market and the trade relations between the metropolis and periphery, as opposed to the traditional Marxist outlook and critique of production relations. In addition,
imperialism is further defined as a feature of capitalism that is more equated with the dominant role of multinational corporations on a global level, whereas class struggle is further determined (apart from the contradictions on the level of the relation of production) by the sphere of exchange relations which in turn engulfs the issues of dependency and of national economic political control.

The state and its mechanisms are seen by socialist parties in the Third World, as being the determinant lever for the transformation of society and as being the major body which determines society's economic-political characteristics (i.e. in contrast to the orthodox Marxist critique which argues that society and its relations determine the nature and characteristics of the state). [55] For the above reason, the transformation of capitalist peripheral societies has always been closely linked to the development of an independent (from multinational corporations' economic pressures and control) anti-monopoly/anti-imperialist government, that would be able to pursue a programme of national industrialisation, to surpass the political difficulties which agrarian economies and the persistence of non-capitalist modes of production or of backward sectors of the economy had created in the political democratisation of Third World countries. A programme of nationalisation and of participative schemes which established workers' control in the major industries, which are vital for a national economic reconstruction against the neo-colonialist interests of multinational corporations, was seen, especially by certain South American, Mediterranean and Arab radical socialist parties, as an imperative for the redistribution of power away from monopolistic capitalist centres and for the beginning of a policy of socialisation (i.e. of both the means of production and of the goods which are produced). [56]

The theme of workers' control and of the nationalisation of industry, as a part of an independent national development and as a first stage of socialist orientated transformation, has been dominant amongst communist and socialist parties in the peripheries and even amongst communist parties like the French or the Spanish communist parties. However, one should not here, assert that radical socialism in the peripheries has always more or
less equated political control of the national economy and the creation of an independent state with the establishment of a socialist orientated social system, leaving almost 'untouched' or uncriticized the issues relating to the relations of production. [57] However, it is also important to note that most of peripheral nations have witnessed different political and economic experiences from those of other advanced capitalist nations; and that especially since the end of the 1960s those experiences have created a new non-Eurocentrist intellectual tradition on the theme of social transformation that conceptualized the need for class and popular alliances, the control of the state's power by progressive and united forces and the collective ownership of industrial undertakings by employees and popular movement representatives, as being the Achilles heel of 'imperialism's' colonial domination and the means for a new democratic development. [58] Workers' councils became the first political 'layers' upon which a new social bargaining could be initiated between multinational corporations and indigenous national forces, whereas the nationalisation of important sectors of the peripheral economy was viewed by radical/socialist parties as being the 'backbone' for the establishment of a society that would respond freely to its internal dynamics and necessities. In accordance with the nature and characteristics of radical Third World regimes, participation has been viewed as a mechanism for the decentralisation of industrial decisions and functions away from capitalist multinational corporations and as a step towards the setting of a national network for the control of national economic policies (eg Chilean, Greek cases); or as in the case of former colonies, it was seen as a mechanism of the national ruling regime, for the de-colonization of their economies from the colonial rule of the West (eg Iran, Libya, Egypt). [59]

The last major type of employee participation, which engulfs the concept of self-management, is mainly a product of the development of social movements during the 1960s, which were critical towards the structural organisation of modern urban societies, [60] the technocratic and politically alienating social environments, [61] and towards the authoritarian, state-controlled version of socialism which the Soviet Union and dogmatic communist parties have adopted. [62]
Self-management as a concept for the democratisation of industrial undertakings has, by different schools of thought and by different post-war political tendencies, been mainly linked with the re-evaluation of three major philosophical themes: the relationship between being and the environment and the conditions that determine man's socio-political transcendence, the relationship between internal (i.e., mental) and external (i.e., economic) conditions, and finally the relationship between discourse and political praxis on the part of workers. The theoretical background of self-management and of human self-realisation has stemmed from the alienation or self-estrangement which modern social environments have produced, by the universalisation of capitalist work ethics and of political relationships, and by producing a dichotomy between man's activity and the community (i.e., in both geographical and social terms) of his origin. In response, man's understanding of the world becomes inseparable from his understanding of his being, of his 'Dasein'; [63] and inversely his understanding of his 'Dasein' is inseparable from his understanding of the social world and how it expands. [64] From the organisation of the family to the organisation of labour, the individual and his political being transcends into a universal image of capitalist relations, which in turn reconstructs and transforms everything in its passage. It creates social relations that go beyond any given space and moral barriers and above all it presupposes the establishment of new ethics that exist in a domain of total 'openness', in which the individual and the world of politics and of economics are merged into a unity of purpose, of cash payment, mobility and profit gains. [65] This unity of purpose or rather of social necessity and the emergence of new ethics in man's social activity has consistently became a starting point for those advocating in their theoretical theses a reappraisal of the role of workers in a capitalist society. Questions on the relationship between mental and material or subjective and objective processes, that determine workers' political discourse, have been in the forefront of theoretical works which denounced economic determinism as this has been envisaged by Engels and by orthodox communist parties. The common theoretical derivation of the above issue was the reappraisal of what earlier has been defined as the relationship between the internal and external in political thought and in revolutionary activity, [66] that was based on the reappraisal of Hegel's
dialectic between reason and the philosophy of Praxis. The essence of Praxis for contemporary thought that emphasizes self-management as a Utopian mode of organisation that promotes individual self-realisation through the collective reorganisation of modern societies, symbolises, as did also for Hegels, the conjunction point in history of political organisation between consciousness or understanding of what is democratic, what is unjust and what changes could take place, and of the need for societal transformation.

"...Castoriadis goes beyond the Aristotelian concept (ie of Praxis) by radicalising the specification that praxis is always directed towards others as towards autonomous beings, through adding the proviso that no one can seriously will autonomy without willing if for all...By taking initiative, the agent transcends all given determinations and makes a new beginning. Praxis is essentially creative and generates the 'radically other'. Above all emancipatory, Praxis is creative par excellence...Such Praxis is aimed at the transformation 'of present society into another one established organizationally for the autonomy of everyone. And carrying out this change has to come from people's autonomous action.'...The revolutionary project surely directs the analysis of historical processes. But we can always only know history within and from history..." [68]

On the same issue from a different theoretical line, Henri Lefebvre (1968) has viewed Praxis as being the dialectical relationship between man and nature, and instead of using a Utopian term like Castoriadis' 'autonomy' concept, his understanding of Praxis, is a more 'Marcussian fashion', involves the re-articulation of man's thoughts and actions into a single whole or totality of unified experience.

"...The total man is both the subject and the object of becoming. He is the living subject who is opposed to the object and surmounts this opposition. He is the subject who is broken up into partial activities and scattered determinations and who surmounts this dispersion. He is the subject of action as well as its final object, it product even if it does seem to produce external objects. The total man is the living
subject-object, who is first of all torn asunder...Through this tearing apart, he moves towards freedom; he becomes Nature. But free. He becomes a totality, like Nature, but by bringing it under control. The total man is 'de-alienated man'..." [69]

The philosophical terrain of neo-Marxist and existentialist works on the theory of the articulation between internal and external conditions that determine one's discourse and actions, and on the theory of the political and social emancipation of human beings in the contemporary environments of mass culture, authoritarianism and further alienation of man's social activity from his mental inner needs, cannot all be 'exhausted' here. However, as was seen above, if the philosophical questions that were raised by the humanist centred project of the 1960s Marxism and by the radical thinking of intellectuals with a socialist orientation, against both the modern industrial capitalist society and the Soviet-style Stalinist totalitarianism, have a significance for the theoretical reappraisal of industrial organisation; then that significance lies in the establishment of a new alternative system of work organisation, (ie to the Soviet or social-democratic model). Social-democratic or conservative principles of organisation had faced their world-wide crisis with the 1968 May events, where indeed despite the political and ideological divergence of the French student movement and of the American protest against racism and modernism, and the 'mass-culture', there was a popular will for the reorganisation of democratic mechanisms, and an anti-capitalist feeling, the first glimpses of which were already so strong that they sent shock-waves of panic to any administration manager or university lecturer. From Marcuse's 'Eros and Civilization', to Reigh's analysis of the psychology of totalitarianism; and from the experiences of the Cuban revolution to the Yugoslav model of self-management; different popular movements were able to stage a total denunciation of Stalinism, and of capitalist ethics by proclaiming or adopting a strategy of individual and collective liberation of man from the socio-political constraints of contemporary societies.

This alternative strategy had to do with the establishment of units of industrial undertakings where a human being will be able to identify with
his/her product and organisation; that in turn he/she will be able to determine and shape the internal or external (national) democratic process; and at the same time one will be able to understand that, as Castoriadis has put it, individual liberation or 'individual autonomy' ascends from collective liberation. [70] In turn this collective liberation could not any longer succumb to the platitude of models of organisation and ideas that seemed to replace capitalist 'sweatshops' with dissidents' camps, forcing upon the individual and the 'masses' the will of socialist authoritarianism. [71] In this sense, the project of self-management, despite the divergent practical implications which had for Yugoslavia or the Basque country, was, during the 1960-1970 period, a project of humanism whose influences derived from the enlightenment period, the classical Greek philosophy (of 4th - 5th BC) and from the classical contemporary Marxist intellectuals.

During the May 1968 events, self-management in the French industrial environment was defined as being the moment where power-relationships, administrative structures and work ethics became transformed and are being replaced by direct democratic, accountable administrations and by a new set of ethics based on equality and on the re-articulation of mental and manual labour.

"...In place of the industrial and administrative monarchy there must be substituted democratic structures on the basis of self-management. The question of power is not just a problem of persons, so it is not sufficient to replace the capitalist management; rather the structure of power has to be radically changed. Work organisation, hierarchy and technology have to be fundamentally democratized. The problem is alienation and social differences within the society. Demands are therefore orientated towards the right of expression in the enterprises, direct democracy, equalization of income, the development of the 'fundamental' competence of each worker to question and determine the objective of his work..." [72]

Following the line of socialist orientated labour movements, Kostopoulos (1984) in his book entitled 'Self-Management' has also argued for the
collective decentralisation of industrial administration at a local level and the seizure of government by popular forces so that self-management is not limited within enterprises. He envisages a three level strategy for the implementation of self-management on a national level. On the first level lies the establishment through peaceful means of a government willing to change the existing bureaucratic regimes of regulation and replace them by popular and accountable representatives from all sections of the population. On the second level, there is the need to replace authoritative and centralized principles and structures of public administration by democratic-pluralistic and decentralized aims and structures and by allowing local administration and industrial enterprises to determine their own future socio-economic development within the national framework of policy making, which workers' representatives and technical or specialised officials have agreed upon, in consultation with the work councils. Lastly, new modes of organisation should allow workers' councils at an enterprise level to decide the economic and social organisation of work and also be responsible for the development of the local community's industrial planning. [73]

This collectivist 'Fichtian' line of social transformation and of decentralisation has been further reflected in Castoriadis' (1974) illustration of self-managed industrial societies. At the top level of administration, there is the so called 'central meeting of the delegates' and the 'board of the central meeting of the delegates' legislating and proposing general policies on the socio-economic development of a society. At the intermediary level of decision making there are the factory board and the factory plenary meeting which consists of representatives of the production, engineering and management sections of industrial undertakings. In addition there are the 'farmers' board and the farmers plenary meeting which also consists of representatives of the farmers' association and the 'country commune'; and lastly there are the 'board of gainfully employed people' and the 'plenary meeting of gainfully employed people' whose members consist of representatives of small industrial and tradecraft associations. At the third level of decision making there are the workers' councils, framing or country associations and small trade associations. [74] With his theoretical work on self-management and
democracy Castoriadis surpasses the radical socialist typology that emphasize collective decentralisation as the means to an end by actually focussing more upon the relationship between the revolutionary subject and the institute of self-management. Workers' councils, or industrial committees in a self-managed orientated society, play a role of 'catharsis', of indoctrination, from the alienated experiences of the past, where indeed workers learn the first lessons of individual emancipation and of determining their activities in accordance with their spiritual necessities. This pedagogic role can only be in existence in periods of a revolutionary break from the past, where the collective will of the people transforms society and at the same time society transforms the will of the individual by establishing systems of democratic organisation that are inextricably bound up with the immediate will of the individual. [75] The individual and the psychological conditions under a self-management system of industrial regulation, has also been the theme in the works of Pierre Roanvallon, and of Willhelm Reigh. The first sees in his work 'The Age of Self-Management' that even if the social system changes, those remaining traditional psychological experiences will in a sense hinder a consistent programme of transformation, unless at the centre of social transformation is the role of the individual and the relationship between his/her mental and economic activity. [76] The second intellectual stresses the importance of self managed organisations, as being pedagogic institutions that not only respond to the political and social desires of the masses but at the same time are able to 'detach workers' from the 'traditional psychic bondage to capitalism'. [77]

2.3 Employee Participation in the Networks of Global Industrial Organisation

The new processes of global economic and political organisation of industrial environments have inaugurated a vital new experience for employees and their political role in the transformation of capitalism's modes of industrial organisation. These processes, as has been demonstrated in chapter one, are subjecting existing forms of political organisation and political reason to a radical questioning by establishing
new forms of organisation in industrial undertakings and by creating a new ideological 'plateau' whose epicentre exists in the relationship between global, national and local industrial environments. (Bourdieu 1989)

It would not be a political exaggeration to describe the present historical period as being a radical break from the milieu of post-war political organisation and of thought, in the sense that the present formulates the conclusion of an era of labour movement and the beginning of a new one. [78] The global framework of capital's activity, its networks of organisation and the new ideological plane for the organisation and regulation of labour in a globalised interdependent and integrated environments, sweep away notion, ideas and systems of organisation that since the end of World War Two, have been the political profile of many of labour strategies and thoughts within developed and developing capitalist countries.

"...All fixed, fast-frozen relations with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind..." [79]

Within the political environment of globalised networks of industrial activity and of integrated supranational political organisations, the theoretical analysis of the role of employees insofar as the issue of participation and control is concerned, cannot but depart from the interpenetration of local with global industrial environments. It is within this interpenetration that the major processes, that were analysed in chapter one, make the analysis of employee participation in the present context, the focal point without which any contemporary critique of employees' political role in capitalist enterprises would rend the role of employees subject to the 'dictates of the raison d'etat', (ie to the
dictates of traditionalism and paternalism). On the contrary, if there is a dialectical relationship between one's thoughts and the surrounding socio-economic and cultural environment, then the theorisation of employees' role and ideas cannot but be part above of all the 'genesis' of new forms of thought and relations, that stem from the 'thrust' that the coming together of the ideological and material 'worlds' produces. This thrust at the present world of global industrial organisation creates new dilemmas and new experiences, that force upon employees and their collective organisations a political reasoning quite different from what the strategies and thoughts of the previous section have suggested.

In the first instance, the global networks of industrial activity are directly affecting (as was shown in chapter one) the economic and political organisation of industrial undertakings, and hence the political 'climate' of industrial relations, between capital and labour. On the one hand, employees and their labour organisations are faced with new monetary and labour principles and aims for local or national economic development, whilst on the other hand they have to politically adjust to the introduction (on national or enterprise level) of flexible methods of production and industrial-managerial regulation of the personnel.

"...Since the mid-1970s there has been a continuation of the gradual removal of barriers to competition between countries, a process which should be intensified by the planned removal of all internal tariff barriers within the European Community by 1992. The growth of international trade is further helped by the number of companies which now plan their production and sales operation on a world scale, as has occurred dramatically in the automobile industry. The moves to open up stock markets and to create greater international competition in financial markets world-wide are likely to prove important in the future. For industrial relations, the most important implications are likely to be the increased frequency of management changes even in large companies, and hence in management policies towards such questions as union recognition..." [80]
Market integration, however, as it was shown in chapter one has profound effects upon the whole framework of national policies on industrial development. Different governments throughout the world are adopting new principles and aims especially for enterprises which are nationalised. Market criteria and profit oriented methods of industrial production-accumulation are replacing the main criteria and policies of nationalised enterprises, allowing thus the 'last corners' of 'national protectionism' and of state regulation to be further drawn into the competitive world of global financial and production exchange. With a radical change of political attitude towards the issue of national development, a number of measures have been introduced that range from the way public corporations organise their production to the way good and services are priced. The effects upon employees and their collective bodies of representation vary from one country to another, however, as chapter one has illustrated, the new measures on national industrial development do on the one hand put a question mark against national agreements between governments and labour and of the latter's protection of wage, employment and general social welfare standards; whereas on the other these measures transfer power over economic and political decision-making further away from local/national committees on labour matters to the decision-making boards of supranational institutions like the EEC or the IMF.

The change of industrial principles and aims at a national level, through the further integration of labour codes and patterns of industrial functioning with standards, principles and frameworks of trade that the international capital market dictates and through the further deregulation/reregulation of existing paths and policies of national industrial development, hit at the centre of existing political and economic frameworks of employee participation and control of local industrial undertakings. As Mauricio Fernando, the Teacher's representative at Indersyndical (1989) has explained, the new measures constitute a milestone against the policies and strategies of European Labour movements for participation and control of multinational capital in any country, and against existing rights that during the 1970s workers, especially in peripheral economies, were able to enjoy.
"...Nationalised industries become semi-privatised or have to adopt market criteria for their industrial development. Workers are laid off or have to increase their productivity through measures that especially in Portugal create a large workforce that is peripheral (eg part-time, temporary, non-unionised) and a skilled workforce that on an individual basis may enjoy more material benefits but their political rights are not protected, or their ability to collectively negotiate their work standards is constantly under threat...As a Federation at the moment, we can only defend certain rights, ie against mass unemployment or the right to belong to a union, but insofar as the issue of participation is concerned we can only hope that international labour actions would enforce some form of national formula for joint consultation committees, that at least are informed of industrial intentions by the management, prior to their introduction..." [81]

A similar theoretical evaluation of the effects of new economic measures upon participative arrangements and labour patterns and codes of industrial organisation, has also been adopted by Professor Treii (1988) in an international symposium on the relations between the state and different national Labour movements. [82] In accordance with Professor Treii, the radical break by different European governments with post-war models of macro-economic and social-democratic schemes of labour regulation (eg collective agreements, tripartite committees, the implementation of a number of austerity measures), has marked the beginning of a new era in industrial relations, that surpasses the post-1960s political reasoning for the democratisation of labour relations via the establishment of 'autonomous' (ie from the state or the management) industrial committees of collective control and joint-consultation. The 'new era' has instead to do with the emergence of new realities that have been created by the implementation of flexible frameworks of production and personnel regulation, by national governments and managerial teams at the enterprise level. As Kasalow (1987) states in his survey of the effects upon industrial relations and trade union movements, [83] there are clear signs on a global scale that employees' traditional post-war bargaining
structures are being abandoned even by the Swedish Labour organisation, in favour of more localised and individual orientated approach to economic regulation and industrial participation. Summarising the new political context of industrial relations he states that in particular, unions and labour movements in industrialised countries are faced with a period of transformation that renders obsolete existing ideas and strategies for labour's control of industrial environments.

"...All of these industrialised countries (eg Great Britain, Sweden, USA) are in the throes of great scientific, technological and economic changes which are radically transforming their social and economic structures. One large labour confederation compares the present transformation to the industrial revolution of the nineteen century. (AFL-CIO, 1985,6)...These changes are rendering obsolete policies and structures which served labour movements so well in the post-war decades..." [84]

In a recent comparative study on the future of labour representation and control of industrial functioning, the director of the International Institute for Labour Studies (1988) has also concluded that the economic and political changes and the adoption of new principles and aims for industrial development have had a profound impact upon post-war structures and ideological frameworks for employee participation.

"Economic and political changes over the last ten years have placed a great strain upon established forms of worker representation and in particular upon trade unions. Although the picture was far from uniform across industrialised countries, the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s had seen a big and apparently irreversible expansion of the scope and influence of worker representation everywhere except perhaps in the United States, so that by the latter part of the 1970s unions were not just the major advocates of workers' interests in the place of work, but increasingly they were also major actors in the political arena. However, since the
late 1970s, in many industrialised countries, unions have been in retreat, faced with declining bargaining power in the industrial sphere, declining political influence and failing membership. Trade Unions' fortunes have varied throughout their history and their power commonly fluctuates with business conditions, but the economic crises of the early 1980s has brought a number of qualitative changes in industrialised economies which pose new kinds of problems for the methods of representation used by unions throughout much of the post-war era..

These new 'kinds of problems' as will be illustrated in chapters four and five, question the functions of existing participative committees (ie in relation to the management's principles and aims for industrial production) and furthermore lead to a reorganisation of the existing power relations between capital and labour to the point where the latter is compelled to re-evaluate its political role (ie as a determinant force) within a particular enterprise. The stark examples of such a re-shift of power, away from employees' collective bodies of representation, is manifested in the new composition of the labour force and in the direct implementation of austerity measures or of new flexible systems of production and personnel regulation by governments and management, in line with the political dictates of global capital organisations such as the IMF, Gatt or the EEC. In relation to the first, as Maryse Gaudier (1988) has stated, the growing numbers in a peripheral labour force and the introduction of individualized structures for material and social welfare, has questioned the traditional role of unions and of participative committees as collective bodies in bargaining and for representation. [86] In relation to the second issue, it is more than evident that global industrial integration and the adoption of neo-monetarist policies by national governments insofar as the issue of labour regulation is concerned, has indeed questioned the ability of unions and national confederations to challenge and to co-decide on labour issues at a national or even local level, without taking into consideration the enforcing powers for regulation of international economic and political organisations.
"...The globalisation of industrial and financial capital will reorganise the decision making procedures on labour issues which in turn will, as a result, decrease unions' power to intervene on a local and national basis and modify the politics at the enterprise level..." [87]

The interpretation of the present industrial context for industrial relations is closely connected with the articulation of local, domestic industrial environments with global industrial political and economic networks for a new kind of industrial development. The manifestations of such a relationship are here, identified as being represented by two major processes, that of integration and that of economic deregulation/reregulation. Within and due to the present restructuring there are new dilemmas and questions for employees' future political role insofar as their determination and ability to control and shape the industrial functioning of industrial enterprise. The following chapters are devoted to the presentation of these dilemmas and contradictions, and of the new ideological climate insofar as employees' participation in the post 1980s era is concerned.

2.4 Concluding Remarks

The brief review during the post war period, of the most influential strands on the theme of employees' participation, has illustrated the central position that the democratisation of industrial environments occupy in the process of democratic reorganisation of any society. From the philosophical plane to the political and economic, the ideological meaning and political context of employees' participation have always remained complex and variegated in accordance with the various strategies that different political movements have pursued, but have always expressed in an indirect way, fundamental questions on: 'what the world is', on 'what is just or unjust', or on 'what are man's hopes', 'what is possible and impossible' for the future organisation of society. (Therborn Goran 1988)
In essence the political contour of the theme of employees' participation as was illustrated, has always remained closely related to a general critique on the relationship between man and society and his ability to change and shape the nature and characteristics of the ruling social environment.

This general critique has taken various forms within the political dialogue for the democratisation and control of all aspects of social-economic activity. In the first section there was a brief analysis of the main points on employee participation which social-democratic revolutionary socialist and neo-Marxist/existentialist political thought have contributed during the post-war period. In the case of the first, as was illustrated earlier, the emphasis has been placed by labour movements on the evolutionary transformation of capitalism's modes of industrial and political organisation through the establishment of networks for the direct representation of employees and for their participation in decision-making procedures at a local and national level. The democratic reorganisation of industrial undertakings is best achieved through mechanisms which redistribute power into the hands of employees and trade union representatives via various schemes, i.e. nationalisation, co-operatives, and community associations.

In this sense the ideological context of employees participation is distanced from models of socialist organisation which Communist and Trotskyist political movements have adopted during the post-war period. The emphasis for those two particular strands of thought and strategy for the replacement of capitalism, was placed upon the class relationships as being expressed in the production and accumulation processes. Employee participation (with the exception of the Italian Communist Party and the new-Marxist movement within the French CP) was almost never separated from the issue of ownership and from the nature of economic relations as being the essence for a socialist transformation of society. In contrast to the Labour Party's ideas on employee participation and the social-democratic tradition of Germany's trade union movement, the democratic reorganisation of industrial undertakings has been always equated with total subordination.
and change in economic activity to the political and economic control of the working classes.

As Cornelius Castoriadis (1990) had once argued, democracy at work and democratic organisation was always seen by post-war communists and Trotskyists as a 'right which blows out of the crater like a thunder' (la raison tonnne dans son crater) and seeks the establishment of a new order of social activity. From this tradition, and after the 1968 events, a new movement of political thought has taken place amongst intellectual circles being related to the issue of participation and industrial democratisation. It is probably impossible to summarise here the main contributions of this political movement but one could argue that its ideological roots stem partly from the growing dissatisfaction of intellectual activists with the monolithical and totalitarian socialist experiments in Eastern Europe, the economic deterministic approach of most of Europe's Communist parties and partly from the cultural and ideological renaissance of ideas during the 1960s against modern political order - (be it socialist or capitalist). During the 1960s especially, there was a growing movement that sought at least in theory to re-unify existentialism and Marxism by placing equal importance upon one's ability to determine and shape his/her cultural and political 'being' and upon the need to transform capitalism by changing the nature of economic and political relationships. In actual fact, industrial democratisation, through collective ownership and through direct participation in the actual decision making procedures, was equated by different theorists with the establishment of a new social order that promotes and depends upon the 'autonomous will' of beings, which in turn depends upon the promotion of the autonomous will of all, and on the revolutionary project which a society as a whole undertakes.

The ideological context of employees' participation as expressed in this chapter, and as it has developed during the post-war period, seems today to be in front of a new phase of renewal and criticism. As chapter one has illustrated, not only because there is a change in national politics by different governments or due to the fact that the state is playing a different role, but also because today's industrial environments have become the central connections for a global reorganisation of political
change. Local industrial undertakings are becoming increasingly integrated with global principles and methods of production and personnel administration and national governments are enforcing a different set of social organisation, and both, as a result, change the socio-economic contour of industrial environments. The ability to control and participate in the local industrial planning has been further undermined by the disintegration of labour's economic homogeneity in enterprises, and by the removal of decision-making on important issues from local industrial environments towards global centres of economic organisation, such as the EEC, IMF and the World Bank.

**NOTES AND REFERENCES**


13 Abrahamsson B (1977) pp 203-204


15 Poole M (1986) Industrial Relations: Origins & Patterns of National Diversity, Routledge & Kegan Paul London. Poole in his third theoretical typology of workers' participation approaches, he includes further from the self-managed types of industrial participation associated with the Yugoslavian experiments, the theoretical tradition which stems from the works of Argyris C or of social psychologists like Maslow, Likert and McGregor and has been associated with the so-called Human Relations trend of the Chicago School of Ergonomics, the Tavistock Institute, and with the theories of 'organisation' orientated intellectuals like Peter M Blau, D S Pugh, Don Zimmerman or Alan Fox. See Poole M (1975) Workers' Participation in Industry, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Garson G D (1977) classifies employee participation according to societal systems of political participation. He thus recognizes four different models and theoretical approaches to the whole subject: the model that is based upon an individual's ability to manipulate decisions through the purchase of goods (ie consumer), and/or through his/her share in capital stock; the model that is based on the political structures linked with the framework of the welfare state; the model of collective association, representation and bargaining; and the model of political participation based upon the pluralist/integrative functions of participatory schemes for the 'equal' and 'just' representation of different interest groups. King Charles D and Van de Vall Mark (1978), in a similar way to Poole's classification, have categorized the different theoretical and political traditions as being that of: Utopian Socialism, proletarian socialism, Fabian Socialism, workers' participation in management, (ie joint consultation, co-determination) collective bargaining, and human relations. See Szell G (1988) 'Participation, Workers' Control & Self-Management,' Current Psychology, Vol 36, No 3, Winter.

The concept of self-management, for example, is not only associated with the thoughts and actions of intellectuals concerned with the development of individuals in industrial organisation (eg Pugh D S, Fox A) but also with the theoretical traditions of existential Marxism (eg Galvano Della Volpe, Marcusse H)

18 The origins of the Human Relations School are linked with the American 'Scientific Management Theories' as they have been taught at Virginia School of Economics and Chicago University, the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations and the Institute of Economic Affairs in London. The main concern of the 'Human Relations' line of thought is how to improve organisational structures so as to retain within managerial control conflict and to diffuse political power away from trade unions or other labour organisations at production level. See Roberts B (1987) Mr Hammond's Cherry Tree: The Morphology of Union Survival, Occasional Paper 76, IEA, London; Shenfield A (1986) What Right to Strike, Hobart Paper 106, IEA, London; and, Hanson G C & Mather G (1988) Striking &
Strikes, Hobart Paper 19, IEA, London. The main 'participatory' schemes which Human Relations theorists have envisaged are the T-groups, the 'Y' schemes of hierarchical leadership arrangements etc. More current versions are the schemes which have been outlined in Chapter One.

19 Abrahamsson B (1977) pp 187-188


24 Richardson T (1986) 'Managing People is Managing Change,' p 19, Work & People, Vol 12, No 2


28 Owen R (1825) created an industrial colony based on the Utopian vision of a just and democratic society through the establishment of a system of industrial organisation that emphasized direct representation and social solidarity (i.e., the ideal of the Brotherhood of Man). Although he was not a Socialist thinker, in the sense of subscribing to a class conceptualization of society, he could nevertheless be categorized as a proto-socialist thinker (in the sense of his focus upon social inequality and the need for a collective social transformation) and as a founder thinker of what became known as Guild Socialism. See Webb C (1917) Industrial Co-operation, Ch 1, Manchester Co-operative Union.


31 Wright W A (1979) G D H Cole & Socialist Democracy, part one, II, Clarendon Press, Oxford. The principles of Guild Socialism are reflected in the ideas put forward by G D H Cole, where on the one hand industrial democracy is conceived as a reorganization of power structures which lead to the integration of spiritual (mental) and manual labour (i.e., in contrast to Taylorism), and to the national control of economic activity by the representative forces of the society. In both cases the individual is free to regulate political and economic life and learns how to manage industrial development in a communal way and the trade unions are further equipped to regulate and control the spread of monopoly capitalism.


33 Cole G D H as Tawney R H, although their theoretical works could not be characterized as anti-Bolshevik or anti-Communist in general, nevertheless had retained a distance from labour movements on the Continent which viewed workers' control as a class-power struggle for the social.
revolution, a la Russe as Cole has asserted. See Coates K & Topham T (1970)

34 Szell Gyorgy (1988) p 42


36 Tawney H R (1981) p 92


38 On the issue of nationalisation, the followers of Guild Socialism have emphasized that, between capitalist bureaucratic authoritarianism stemming for the state and syndicalism, (which was rooted in the theoretical tradition of anarchist and communist labour movements), the establishment of National Guild committees would be better able to construct a free, representative and just society. See: Clegg H (1955) Industrial Democracy & Nationalisation, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

39 It should be noted here that the theoretical propositions adopted by Clegg H A (1970) in the A New Approach to Industrial Democracy, Blackwell, Oxford, and of Crosland C A R (1970) in the essay, We Must Align with the Technological Necessities, in Coates K & Topham T [eds] (1970) Workers' Control, Panther, Great Britain, signify a diversion from the political 'assumptions' of early Trade Union and Socialist thinkers that the control and elimination of capitalism's laissez-faire abuses, the domination of state policies by workers' committees and the ability to control decision-making procedures, necessarily lead to a more democratic society. Clegg in fact introduces a theoretical inversion, by emphasizing that the strengthening of those structures which reflect different and often contradictory interests and opinions, prevents more adequately the abuse of power by different sections of the society. His position on employee participation, together with eg Crosland C A R, has been influenced by
the 1960s relative affluence of a section of British working class, the change in the political strategy of the Labour leadership (1964-1967), and the theoretical works of intellectuals like Alan Fox and Allan Flanders. The emphasis is placed upon the development of a theory of democratic industrial organisation which is further distanced from the political visions of early Marxist and democratic socialist thinkers, and focuses upon the idea of how best to represent different and conflicting interests, to manage the development of 'late' capitalist societies and to create all those democratic procedures for individual/collective accountability, in contrast to the Soviet, Yugoslavian or Algerian models of industrial socialist development. See: Watson J T (1980) Sociology, Work & Industry, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

40 As an addition see: Poole M (1984) Theories of Trade Unionism: A Sociology of Industrial Relations, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. The second political tradition on the theme of employee participation is associated more with theorists like Flanders A (1975) and his work on Management & Unions: The Theory & Reforms of Industrial Relations, Faber & Faber, London and the Oxford School of Industrial Relations (eg Clegg, Fox). Flanders A has in a way introduced a new theoretical approach to the whole issue of trade unionism in Britain by adopting a new strategy for labour away from the traditional sectional and revolutionary ideas and policies of the 1930s. He basically viewed participation and trade union activity as a mechanism for the support of modern industrial societies where workers' associations embrace consensual policies in relation to national economy and broaden the scope of their activity in fields like culture, national economy and the community. As a member of the Oxford pluralist tradition and a member of the then Commission on Industrial Relations (1969), Flanders' position was disputing the traditional (ie Webb's) line of thought that saw collective bargaining as a response to and a product of economic conditions. His main assumption was that trade unions are political organisations and as such need to re-adjust their strategies, in the face of a labour government what was committed to full employment and welfare benefits for all, and play a positive role in the re-organisation of industrial environments (eg Donovan Commission, de-bureaucratisation of trade union structure). His ideas on union
reorganisation are a 'contemporary' Weberian look at organisations that have set the way for what today could be named as 'tripartite agreements', most successful in Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Norway. Unions from opposing forces are transcended into functional parts of societal management, that go beyond sectional interests.


45 The reference relates to the theoretical works of the Austro-Marxist school of thought (eg Kautsky, Hilferding, Max Adler); the German ideological legacy which Luxemburg and Liebknecht started inside the SPD; the Marxist strands of the post-1930s era in Italy (eg Togliatti), and of course the original works of classical Marxist thinkers (such as Trotsky, Lenin, Phekhanov, Lukacs)
Mandel E (1985) *Marx and Engels on Commodity Production and Bureaucracy & Essays for Harry Magoff & Paul Sweezy*, in Stephen Resnick, Richard Wolf [eds] (1985) *Rethinking Marxism*, Autonomedia, New York, USA. Mandel's famous passage, ie p 245, summarises his denunciation of the Soviet model of workers' control by arguing that the Soviet working class has no control over state organs, over political and economic matters. The only control which Mandel sees in the Soviet Union: "exists at the level of regulating the subway traffic or soup temperature in the plant cafeteria (even that is questionable)..."

Bahro R (1978) *The Alternative in Eastern Europe*, NLB, London. Bahro's thesis reflects a theoretical position in workers' councils, that emphasizes the role which a revolutionary party plays in transcending what is viewed as 'particularistic' actions by the working class, (ie based on sectional and localised interests) into universal/general strategies and political theses, that in turn are capable of administering and changing both the economic and political facets of capitalism. See: Mandel E (1979) *Trotsky: A Study in the Dynamic of his Thought*, NLB, London

Mandel E (1979) p 64


The term socialisation was first coined by Duhring (1875) in his work *Kursus der Philosophie*, see: Psimmenos I (1985) *The Greek Workers' Movement. Themes & Issues*, Dissertation, University of Newcastle upon Tyne

The first phase is the initial period of a society that has succeeded capitalist organisation. The establishment of a socialist order in industrial undertakings under the dominance of proletarian organisations and the regulation of economic affairs from above becomes an imperative. See: Lenin V I (1972) *The Revolutionary Phase*, p 143, Progress Publishers, Moscow. In it Lenin denounces those who were critical of the state regulation and of the dictatorship of the proletariat. See also:
Chkhikvadze V (1972) The State, Democracy and Legality in the USSR: Lenin's Ideas Today, Progress Publishers, Moscow. In it the author explains the use of democratic centralism in the management of industrial organisations. The state and its apparatuses are presented as safeguard mechanisms against the remaining ideological manifestations of the bourgeoisie and for the expansion of state socialist democracy at the place of work. Socialist management, indeed, is viewed as being bound with the principles of democratic centralism.

52 The term nationalisation here, is qualitatively different from the concept of nationalisation which is equated with the ownership of services and of industrial production by the state. It actually refers to the first phase of socialism, where the means of production and the regulation of economic affairs is owned and distributed 'equally' by a given nation, and the mode of production is in a phase of political transformation. The Labour movement becomes a central mechanism for the process of nationalisation and workers' control of industrial decisions is viewed as being an essential ingredient for the phase of transformation towards a socialist society. See: Rousis G (1984) Employee Participation: Class Struggle of Class Co-operation? (in Grk), Synchroni Epochi, Athens.


54 The persistence of underdevelopment and the post-war political manipulation of Third World Affairs through violent and reactionary regimes, has led many theorists to disengage from what so often is referred to as the 'Eurocentrist' approach as the theory of imperialism. In contrast to orthodox Marxist critique which has focussed more upon the relations of production and the development of the productive forces and to the social-democratic revisionist critique (ie Bernstein) which focussed upon the political organisation of workers in the era of monopoly capitalism: there is a theoretical attempt to develop the theory of imperialism as an economic and political relationship between advanced and peripheral or developing capitalist countries. See: Bottomore T (1985)
Theories of Modern Capitalism, George Allen & Unwin, London. See also: Kozo U (1983) The Pure Theory & the Stages of Capitalism, in Bottomore T and Goode P [eds] (1983) Readings in Marxist Sociology. Some of the most well known schools of thought which have attempted to redefine politico-economic relations between advanced capitalist countries and developing economies are reflected by the theoretical neo-Marxist agendas, eg Paul Baran (1973) and Latin-American centred theorists (Gunder F, Do Santos, Cardoso F H), which mainly conceptualise underdevelopment as a product of Third World dependency upon capitalist metropolitan centres. Another tradition on the theoretical evaluation of capitalism in the peripheral countries, stems from the structuralist school of thought (ie Rey P P, Meilasoux C, Samir Amin) and from the theorists whose works have focussed upon the new international division of labour and the internationalisation of capital (ie Palloix Christian, Warren, Frobel et al). See: Long N (1980) And Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development, Ch 4, Tavistock Publications, London; and Goodman D, Redclift M (1981) From Peasant to Proletarian Capitalist Development & Agrarian Transitions, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.


56 The term of socialisation here denotes the collective/national ownership of capital assets and the control of industrial activity by the nation as a whole.


61 The reference refers to philosophical critiques of Modernism and on the contemporary school of German and French existentialism (ie Heidegger, Nietzsche and the Frankfurt school/existential Marxism developed in France and in post-war Italy).

62 Self-management here denotes a radical theoretical break with etatism, the dictatorship of the proletariat and economic determinism (ie the determination of culture and politics by material forces, base/superstructure relationship).

63 'Dasein' is a concept coined by Heidegger, in order to denote the relationship between being and the socio-political environment and the social conditions of human transcendence in space and time. 'Dasein'
symbolizes the transfiguration of contingency into necessity and in this sense as Eagleton T (1990) *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, p 299, argues, the term symbolizes the 'mouthpiece of being in the world' (ie in both ontological and political sense). See also Heidegger H (1988) *Being & Time*, part one, Basil Blackwell, Oxford


65 Berman M (1989) p 106


67 The philosophy of Praxis which has been revived and re-evaluated, due to the rise of Stalinism and Modernism in Europe, has been involved in a general critique of the relationship between object (ie class factors), and subject (ie consciousness), and it can here be defined as the study of the general activity of free human beings. Through the theoretical works of intellectuals being associated with what is known as the Frankfurt School (eg Marcusse, Reigh, Habermas, Adorno) and the existentialists of the post-war period (eg Sartre, Marleau-Ponty, Castoriadis) the concept of praxis has in general been linked with a moment in history or an instance in the social activity of human beings which is determined by a break from the past and exists in the transcendence of human relations. Praxis represents a turning point in both ethics and modes of organisation and at the same time, as it is understood from the philosophical works of Sartre and Cornelius Castoriadis, it represents a philosophical Utopia (an idea for the emancipation of man) through man's involvement in the political revolutionary transformation of his society. The reference on 'Praxis' here has a significance for the analysis of self-management since both are concepts which are centred around the issue of self-realisation though the advocacy of a social system that is based upon 'autonomous' democratic societies and not 'heteronymous' types of societal organisation.

68 Habermas J (1985) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, p 328, Polity Press, Cambridge. See also Castoriadis Cornelius (1989) 'The Revolutionary Problem Today', (in Grk), *The Platform of Social Sciences*, University of Crete, November, No 1. In his paper presented at the University of Crete, Castoriadis exemplified further his philosophical understanding of Praxis by referring to the lyrics of the 'international' here he compared the famous phrase from the song, ie 'la raison tonne dans son crater'e with the revolutionary moment of transformation, in order to create a just society, a new order of relations.


70 Habermas J (1985) p 328

71 Markovic M (1975) *Self-Management*, (in Grk), Epikouros, Athens

72 Szell G (1988) p 102


general assembly of representatives exerts; the control over issues of
distribution and capital ownership; and the existence of a 'political
support system' that provides the statutory and political framework.

75 Castoriadis C (1990) *Speeches in Greece*, (in Grk), Chapter Three,
'Authority, Politics, Autonomy', Ipsilon, Athens

Andromeda, Athens

Books, Montreal, Quebec

78 Hobsbawm E (1990) 'Goodbye to all that: 1989 marked the end of the
era ushered by 1917', *Marxism Today*, October

79 Marx K, Engels F (1977) *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, p 38,
Selected Works, Lawrence & Wishart, London

80 Kane E & Marsden D (1988) 'The future of trade unionism in
industrialised market economies', *Labour & Society*, p 114, Vol 13, No
2, International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva

81 Interview with Mauricio Fernando, member of the Central Committee of
Intersyndical (Portugal), conducted during a conference (1989) on the 'New
measures of flexible production', organised by the Greek, Portuguese,
French and Irish Textile, Leather & Shoe-making Trade Union Associations,
in Athens.

82 Professor Treii's paper on the 'New State Intervention' was presented
at an international conference that was organised in support of the
dismantled GSEE general committee (1986). The GSEE general committee was
dismantled by the 91986) PASOK government for refusing to adopt the 1985-
1986 austerity plan, which was enforced by the IMF-World Bank.
83 Kassalow E (1987) 'Trade Unions & Industrial Relations, Towards the Twenty-First Century', Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, Institute for Labour Relations, No 6, Catholic University of Leuven, USA

84 Ibid, p 1


3 EMPLOYEES' PARTICIPATION IN GREECE: A PROLOGUE

3.1 Introduction

The analysis of the Greek labour movement's socio-political development, comes at a time of domestic, economic and social transition, where existing political conceptions and strategies are under constant critical review. The examination, therefore, of the Greek labour movement's history fulfils a major political need for the identification of the nature and characteristics which define today's new social environment, in which a new political discourse for labour and its role in society is emerging.

The objective of this chapter is to identify the main social and economic parameters which have shaped the employees' discourse on work, through time; to show the ideological 'fluidity' of labour concepts on industrial organisation and their dependence upon exogenous and indigenous social movements; and to elaborate on some of the distinctive (ie in comparison to other European labour movements) features of the Greek social environment which played a significant part in the formation of a different political approach by employees on the theme of participation and economic democracy.

The analysis evolves around the nature of economic activity at workshops and industrial undertakings and how it has influenced employees' political thought; the wider political and economic movements and how they have influenced politics at the work place; and the major problems which employees had to surpass in order to expand their political activity and thought, so as to develop a critique of the role of employees inside the areas of industrial organisation and industrial decision-making.

The first section is a condensed theoretical attempt to identify the main historical phases which the Greek labour movement has passed through and how they have influenced employees' socio-economic formations at work. The emphasis is given to two important epochs: the years of the first labour associations and the years where the labour movement has struggled
for the establishment of democratic procedures in the country. The first epoch illustrates the role which economic activity and the then relations of production had upon employees' conceptualisation of their social entity in society and their role in workshops. The issue of economic democracy and participation at work planning, takes forms which are limited to either the trade or the particular workshop. It is a struggle (in both ideological and economic terms) for the social and political unification of employees under common objectives. Throughout the duration of 1840-1920s period, the Greek labour associations were entangled in a continuous search for a common identity. Having to deal with different ethnic and diverse ideological backgrounds and distinct values on property and the social organisation of the community, it was not earlier than the beginning of the twentieth century, that the first National Trade Union Congress was established and a coherent political movement for the transformation of Greek society appeared. International political developments and the spatial reorganisation of capital's role inside workshops and within whole regions, have proven to be the main catalysts which drove labour's homogenisation. The second epoch illustrates the role which the then new path of Greece's development had upon labour thought and industrial activity. The years from the 1930s to 1974 were marked by two major issues: by the ideological and political suppression which the Greek government applied to employees for the continuation of a system (which catered for indigenous or foreign capital interests) and the political stability of dominant values; and by the beginning of a new economic and political path for Greece's administration, which would ensure the expansion of capital interests in the county and which would envelop structures and mechanisms appropriate to contemporary developments.

The inter-war years (1940-1946) produced new dilemmas for Greek labour, where in fact the issue of economic democracy and socialist transition becomes interrelated with Greece's national economic and political dependency on the US and other foreign powers. Participation and the democratisation of industrial undertakings, is seen inseparable from a social change in the country's relationship with MNCs and of the country's dominant social system.
The second section offers an analysis of the post-dictatorship era, where indeed labour organisations and trade associations are for the first time free from foreign and domestic agencies to 'accumulate' on Greece's post-war development and critically assess their role insofar as national and sectional interests are concerned. There is a noticeable upsurge in political thought and the issue of economic democracy becomes the centre of employees discourse for a socialist transition.

The essence of this section lies on two fronts: on the political factors which determined the implementation of the first participative schemes in the public sector and on the new economic realities which by then (1985-1986) the Greek public sector and the economy as a whole had to confront. Labour discourse on the issue of participation had once more to be re-evaluated and industrial schemes for the democratic reorganisation of the telecommunications, power and railway industries were undermined by the government's new monetary policies. The introduction of flexible working patterns, and of policies for a further economic integration with the capital community became the two main catalysts against the newly established political and social role of the existing participative bodies.

3.2 The labour movement's periods of transition: from representation to legitimisation

There is a scarcity of systematic studies that have dealt with the distinctive (not peculiar, there is nothing peculiar about Greece's development) socio-political development of Greece and the production and reproduction of political ideas. Ethnocentric and socio-cultural studies on the ways in which the Greek community related to either the economic activity or the political structure of the country, are almost absent. This is particularly true for areas of study which relate to the agrarian or industrial movement and to the development of people's political discourse, either at the place of work or at the place of residence.

This scarcity is a product of the troublesome years which academic institutions and scientists had gone through; of the political 'inability'
of intellectuals to engage in research and in the free development of political thought; of the predominant middle-class values on culture and letters, which had often been characterised by a drive towards light entertainment and the 'survival' of a consumption-culture; and of the mere state of Greece's political affairs which often drove people towards the struggle for economic survival and left little or no room for other important activities. The few academics and social scientists who were able to avoid state suppression and a culture which often did not promote the systematic and objective study of people's relationships with their work, had either to emigrate abroad in search of financial support, or rely on the data which the state archives of the main western powers had collected for their national interests.

Amidst those diverse and past-accumulated theoretical problems on the study of the Greek labour movement, the point of departure for this analysis cannot rely on any one single element (eg economic data, historical analysis of military and political defeats or conflicts) and on the recollection of the main events, which have characterised Greece's process of development. This analysis has to rely on the interrelated use of economic, political and ideological parameters which became the prime determinants of labour's industrial activity and political discourse. If economic democracy and indeed employees' participation, as a concept, is seen as a social product of economic and social relationships; if in turn both types of relationship, are the reflections or the by-products of subjective/objective conditions that cannot be determined independently from the social environment where they take place [1]; if indeed employees relations and contradictions with capital and the history of those is above all the history of the genesis of new forms of thought and of socio-political organisation [2]; then it would be difficult to conceive an analysis of labour movement and of the political discourse at work, that does not show the passage from one form of thought and social organisation to another and does not identify the main levers for this transition.

The conflicts and contradictions between capital and labour, which have powered this transition, are reflected in almost everything, from the way the state machinery has been organised to simple daily events.
'"Every afternoon there is a broadcast on Greek radio on behalf of the missing persons bureau of the Greek Red Cross. Inquirers seek news of relatives who disappeared without trace... in the troubled aftermath of the Russian Revolution, after the chaotic defeat of the Greek Army in Asia Minor in 1922, during the hard years of the German Occupation, and during the bitterly fought civil war that racked Greece between 1946-1949." [3]

Such events serve as bitter remnants of the many disasters which the Greek people had to come to terms with, before a secure political environment could be established. The background, however, of the Greek labour movement, suggests an even more complicated, troublesome and controversial path of Greece's development. In short, the history of employees is the product of what the Greek middle-class and its government failed to identify with, such as democratic pluralism, economic development according to national interests, welfare provisions, etc., and is the product of what the foreign occasional interests on the region dictated.

The social environment soon after the liberation of large parts of Greece from the Ottoman Empire (1921), became again dependent on the administrations of the then western foreign powers. The genesis therefore, of the first labour associations has to confront the British, French, Turkish and Bavarian rulers, which regulate and impose their own terms for the economic and political activity in the regions which were under their control.

Between the rural north (ie that was occupied by the Turks and where economic relations were predominantly feudalist) and the financial centres of the south (which were under the other three western powers), which have had developed all aspects of commercial activity and of shipping, the first 'glimpses' of labour associations started to emerge (1870 -). The island of Syros, for example, where trade between East and West flourished and the British administrators needed an economic infrastructure (ie Banks, Stock Exchange Markets, etc) and an industrial infrastructure for the transfer of goods, (ie tobacco, cotton from Egypt, etc) allowed
the rapid concentration of the labour force and introduced into the country the first almost industrial workshops.

Similar outbreaks of industrial and financial development happened almost at every major port, (ie Patras and Serifos), and areas where rich mineral reserves were easily exploited by the different superpower administrations, (ie Lavrion). From 1879 to 1910, the Greek labour force established trade associations in printing (1882), shipyards (1872), tailoring, shoe-making, mining (1887) and other areas.

The main characteristic of the then trade associations, was that they were local based, limiting employees' political objectives within a particular trade and a particular workshop. One of the main associations of the time, the association of Syros carpenters (1879) had as an objective to secure employment for fellow carpenters and regulate the hours of work for its members. [4] The Lavrion miners association (1887) was more militant by demanding a more humane treatment of miners by the then management, but then again the objectives of the association remained within the trade conditions which miners experienced. The majority of then then associations were unable to relate to wider domestic political issues and to establish trade unions on a national level. [5] Those associations did not challenge either the way industries and workshops were organised or the dominant values at work which allowed the use of labour force by managers as being servants. They sprang out of the then financial crisis (1870s) and employees formed separate or common associations with employers in order to safeguard existing material benefits.

The factors which determined the context of the then associations were related to the political relationship which domestic and foreign ruling regimes developed; the nature and characteristics of the then socio-economic activity; and the creation of distinctive social-political networks by the ruling or supervisory regime in the country, for the perpetuation of economic and social processes which allowed the continuation of Greece's friendly relationship with the west.
In the first instance, the country's dependence upon several foreign powers; its partitioning according to financial and military interests and the extent and nature of foreign intervention into the domestic political affairs of the country; allowed the perpetuation of non-capitalist relationships, regulated industrial development and contributed to the development of a parasitic economy - a development which was mainly based upon a comradeship relationship between foreign and domestic speculators. The local regimes were responsible for labour hiring and the general provisions of services in the banking sector, whilst the state was responsible for the provision of military and legislative services to the then financial circles. The foreign agents were responsible for Greece's economic planning and the general supervision of its domestic and international political relationships. [6]

"(Greece) soon became a branch of European capitalism and imperialism, by playing a supplementary role in the trade relationships between east and west...the development of commercial capital was followed (by foreign powers) in parallel with shipping and financial services, developing Greece into an international commercial-broker agent." [7]

This type of development had serious implications for the labour market and the political manifestations of employees in relation to industrial and more general socio-political matters. First, due to the development of commercial services at the expense of industrial production, there was never a 'steady' labour market which comprised of unskilled or semi-skilled craftsmen and whose work would not be temporary. In contrast to other European nations, Greece's cities attract a mass of rural landless agrarian workers from the nearby village communities, whose employment would last only a few months, (ie during the winter), and then they would either return back or would remain unemployed. These workers would go to towns (1860s-) in order to escape from the harsh rural agrarian life and from the rule of the then land and livestock owners (ie chiftlikades).

"...the man who will constitute the majority of the working population in towns is an unemployed who for many weeks during the winter has to live from the bread his relatives will send him from the village..." [8]
Their work often involved the transfer of goods the provision of general services, (eg domestic household services, transfer of money to the banks, or assistant services to the workshops' employers). This 'boom' on employment in the commercial sector, increased the concentration in towns of people with different cultural backgrounds, who established community ghettos who out of a need were ready to accept any job and work under any kind of conditions; and who identified with neither the work place nor their place of residence. The latter is of immense importance, because in contrast for example to the Lavrion miners, the worker in small workshops, shipping, or in other commercial areas, either were there for a short-term period and developed a 'speculative' perception of their labour services to employers (meaning that the worker was interested in how he could achieve more in financial terms and in a short-time, so that he can send part of his wages back to the village, or leave the town altogether), or he was perceiving his relationship with his employer as he perceived his relationship with his landowners, back at the village. It is important to note that the agrarian worker in the town, carried with himself all existing traditional values of the village community and neither the nature of work nor the place of residence allowed the development of a new attitude on economic and socio-political relationships. The employer in the workshops was often perceived as the master (ie Afentis), someone to be respected at all times and never to be challenged. He acted not only as an employer but also as a figure that would mediate on behalf of his employees, for matters external to work (eg marriage, the law and the judicial system, etc). The work on the other hand often involved the employment of few employees who would undertake different tasks and they would be under the total protection of their workers.

Second, this type of development had seriously determined employees composition in the towns. Industrial workers constituted the minority amongst the then employed population (1850-1870s), whilst the majority were landless peasants, breeders of small live herds, servants, temporary workers and administrative employees. (See Table 3.2.1) The same table also shows an increase of small workshop owners, of merchants
and sailors, which indicates that the main economic activity was focused upon trade and shipping, rather than the manufacture of goods.

The nature and composition of the Greek industrial activity and of the labour force, is also reflected in Table 3.2.2, where in fact the majority of industries were either for the production of food, or were workshops that either repaired or produced accessories for the shipyards and the brown-coal mines. (See Table 3.2.2) The dominant form of industrial activity was therefore a commercial service sector that catered for and responded to the financial and industrial plans of a few shipyards and ports (which were under the regulatory control of foreign and expatriate Greek barons); that used casual labour and employed people for general services. Whenever though, there was a need to expand Greece's industrial or commercial infrastructure, (eg the Corinth Canal, the Copais irrigation land project), or whenever a new industrial undertaking was built, foreign labour was brought in, in order to cope with skill shortages, and foreign institutions supervised the design and the engineering works.

Third, the establishment of a ruling regime that was dependent upon the socio-economic decisions of the then powers, as well as the nature of economic activity that was linked with short-term investments and financial speculation, rather than on any long term investments in industrial production and on an economic regulation based not on a black economy, resulted in the perpetuation of a distinctive type of ruling regimes. These regimes often evolved around client type of relationships with their electorate, were suppressive insofar as any kind of reforms, (either industrial or politico-cultural), and used traditional rural values to rule and regulate public life in the towns.

The need to maintain Greece's external credit, meant the sustainment of political subordination to the creditors.

"Trikoupis (a reform-minded Westerniser) shied away, for instance, from introducing land reforms in the newly acquired (ie from the Turks) province of Thessaly, where agriculture was characterised by large
'chiftliks' or estates...to avoid offending the susceptibilities of foreign capital and of wealthy expatriate Greeks, who were increasingly inclined to invest in the mother country..." [9]

Economic development and industrial organisation were therefore directly linked to the values and financial interest of foreign creditors as in the Corinth canal project or the Syros shipping industrial zone. [10] Under such economic conditions, industrial development remained unplanned and was based on the short-term exploitation of human or natural resources and quick net-capital returns. All that foreign creditors were asking was the provision of a safe capital investment environment where neither domestic unions nor other political parties could impede the capital returns which those creditors expected. Insofar as the issue of industrial organisation was concerned, foreign companies at large were still able to exploit the existing social networks of the different communities which were patriarchal, hierarchical and did not challenge the rule of management. Wherever, though, the use of technology and the characteristics of work did not sustain local values, on exchange and organisation, employers as in the Lavrion mines or the tobacco industry were confronted with a more militant labour force. This holds for industries which had either traditional roots of existence or for industries where their trade with the west dictated the adoption or the facilitation of new methods of production, division of labour, and hence new industrial concepts on labour and its role in industry. But such examples were still rare and the common feature during 1870-1880s was the financial development of workshops and areas where natural reserves were in abundance, without involving a change in the way work was organized in the predominant agrarian areas and without 'disturbing' much of the political and cultural archetype relationships of the village community.

On the second instance, the ruling financial and political regimes of the same period relied too often upon the use of either force or the undermining of democratic procedures, in order to subordinate domestic industrial grievances and to allow the maintenance of values which in turn could financially regulate and politically control the majority of the working population. The military was turned by foreign and domestic
rulers into a contemporary militia, whose deployment would ensure that
different political movements of the time (anarchists, socialists,
nationalists, etc) were not in any position to disrupt the rule of the
authorities. With regard to the issue of undermining democratic
institutions and procedures, the ruling regimes were able to safeguard
their position through the use of a mixture of agrarian values and of a
large state bureaucracy. The combined use of state machinery for the
protection of individuals, the dissolution of parliament and the dismissal
of basic human rights, often led to oligarchism and the formation of
military national councils. For example, between 1870 and 1875, there
were four elections, nine governments (ie elected and non-elected), and
thousands of public employees, who were dismissed each time, only to be
replaced by the new 'favourites' of the new political regimes. [11]

This situation which produced whole generations of people, who were
ready to accept political clientism and the undemocratic measures of the
domestic regimes, whilst on the other hand people's basic political rights
and democratic cultural values were continuously under threat. The Greek
political system at the period flourished upon both the use of violence and
the exchange of political consensus for economic or other personal favours
(this is known as 'Rousfeti'). In this sense, the parliamentary process
and the state evolved around rival cliques of politicians who used their
position in order to secure employment for their voters, a loan from the
state banks, or even the introduction of a law for the exclusive benefits
of their party followers. In fact, the majority of the then national
deputies acted as Kounbaroi, (ie godparents) and/or as nonoi, (ie
godfathers) to the children of their voters, in order to secure their
votes and to establish good personal relations with the place of origin of
their electorate. Apart from bribery, the courts and the militias as
well as the then brigands were used to intimidate all non-conforming
citizens and suppress the functions of trade unions, so as to get them to
submit to the occasional political and financial interests of ruling
regimes.

The composition of the first industrial labour force, the nature and
characteristics of economic activity and the political regulation of the
country, impeded the coherent ideological and social representation of employees at work and the development of a labour movement insofar as the issue of economic democracy is concerned. On the issue of ideology, Greece at the time presented diverse theoretical lines of thought and political discourse was more or less dependent upon imported ideas and the spontaneous work of few intellectuals who were influenced by the then international movements in both east and west. There was a nationalist movement which followed the Mazzini line in Italian nationalism, an anarchist movement which was influenced by the teachings of Prince Kropotkin, a humanist movement which was in direct line with Tolstoy's teachings and the objectives of the London based Fabian Society. The trade associations were mostly influenced by the Paris Commune of 1871 or the objectives that were set in the Second International in London during 1889. Despite the fact that even under suppression there was an ideological debate on the issue of democracy, the role of the state and the nature of contemporary capitalist society, the 'labour movement' was unable to unify under common objectives and values. Workers were unable to represent their associations on a national level and there was incoherence on objectives even amongst employees of the same association.

It was not therefore, before the first decade of the twentieth century, that the workers were able to establish a common national trade union congress and set a coherent political agenda. The expansion of industrial production, the further economic interdependence amongst domestic industries and between national and international enterprises, and the emergence of a new labour movement in the east as well, then international preparations for a world war, played a catalytic role on labour thought and employees' consciousness.

The development of the manufacturing industrial sector and the expansion of construction works resulted in the rapid increase of the employed population and hence of the unionised workforce. [12] In the then liberated parts of Greece, (Macedonia and Thrace were still under the Ottoman rule and were liberated after 1918), the number of workers' associations had increased between 1860-1910 and all major economic activities witnessed industrial disputes. (See Table 3.2.3a) Strike
activity, in particular, increased in all major industrial towns and ports, against the then monetary austerity measures (1902). During 1910 the first independent (ie from employers) workers' associations were set up, only to add to the already increased fears of the then ruling regimes that the political system was no longer stable. From that date onwards there was a rapid polarization of workers' associations which resulted in the 1911 proclamation of a Pan-Hellenic Workers' Federation, and in the recognition that workers constituted a separate class in society with opposing interests to the ruling financial and political regimes. The unification of workers and their national representation through trade unions and federations, and their ideological homogenisation is reflected in two major political statements of the time: that of Athens Workers' Centre and that of the Confectionery and Catering industry employees. In the first statement it was written that:

"...United, aligned as one human, we will fight against our misery and our misfortune...we will defend with all our powers, everything that we do not rent at our employers for few (pence), ie the labour law that the parliament has just enacted..." [13]

Whereas in the second statement it was written that:

"Our enemies are all different exploiters. Their interests are opposite to ours; we formulate a specific class within society, the class of poor and exploited people...we the productive people, who we produce everything and feed everybody, we will ask for the 'bread' of our labour; we are the powerful because we are the masses, we only have to realise this; with our strength we will force our will and we have got a good example, the millions of fellow workers around the globe who have organised under such ideals..." [14]

Both proclamations offered a new dimension for the role occupied by workers within Greek society and at the place of work. Trade associations and other representative institutions are presented as inadequate forms of political representation and regulation since they do not safeguard workers' interests and can only reform society. Power struggle, for the
first time, is not confined as a concept within places of work and is not limited to the achievement of basic human and economic rights for workers. Instead the concept of power struggles acquires a new philosophical meaning, that encompasses the perception of workers as a separate class, which has to strive for a new type of society.

These trade union declarations were probably the first elaborate ideological attempts by workers to organize a labour movement which would be both critical of the way Greece had developed, and which would offer a new perception of how Greek society should be organised. While these new developments were happening in the then liberated parts of Greece, new political thought amongst workers in the regions of the country occupied by Turks was also emerging. This new thought flourished through the then rapid industrialization of the Ottoman Empire and the increased numbers in the unionised labour force. (See Table 3.2.3b)

"In the Ottoman Empire there are almost one million workers (1910);....Sixty thousand union members are in Macedonia, twenty thousand in Istanbul alone and eight thousand in Smyrna; (in the occupied Greek territories) there are forty thousand union members of Greek origin, thirty five thousand of Turkish origin, twenty thousand of Israeli origin and twenty thousand Armenian union members. A third of the unionised labour force belongs to the tobacco industry (almost fifty thousand), to the printing industry (eight thousand) and to the railway corporation (ten thousand); whilst more than one hundred thousand workers are of a socialist orientation..." [15]

The rapid industrialization of the north, the neo-Turkish economic reforms, the influx of revolutionary ideas from east and west and the then increasing imperialist intervention in Turkey's affairs, resulted in the first workers' federations, which united all communities and trade associations (1909). The neo-Turkish revolution of 1908, a product of western influence on the economic and political system of the agrarian Turkey as well as the 1905 Russian Revolt, and of the Persian middle-class revolution of 1906, played an inspiring role for workers (in the Greek territories) political discourse. [16]
For example in Salonika, the then centre of the north, new political movements sprang up which both demanded the economic transformation of the main activities of exchange, the re-organisation of working practices and rules, and the termination of imperialist military and financial interventions in the East. According to Moskof K (1988), each of the then ethnic communities was influenced by a distinctive international theorist. The Israeli community, by being employed in the banking sector and having had close relationships with the then large industrial undertakings, were the first to be interested in the works of Marx and translated Capital and the Communist Manifesto, as well as the ideological theses of Kautsky and Bernstein. The Slavs were influenced by the teachings of Plekhanov and other Eastern Marxist writers; the Turkish community by theorists whose work was perceived to be against western hegemony of the internal affairs of sovereign nations, and the majority of the then Greek intellectuals of Salonika, by the works of Jaures J, and by the theoretical line of the Marxist newspaper, "Humanite".

The Workers Federation of 1911 became the first political body of socialist orientation that debated the role of workers in industrial undertakings to that of the role of workers in the Balkan region. With the emergence of the 1917 socialist revolution, the imperialist embargo on the Soviet Union, and the liberation of the north, there was an alignment of the Workers' Federation in the north and Workers' Federations in the liberated areas, which resulted in the General Confederation of Greek Workers (1918). This political development signified a new beginning for both the politics at the place of work for employee national representation and the direction of the labour movement in Greek society. [17] The period which followed the establishment of GCGE showed an unparalleled industrial activity of workers in industrial undertakings, [18] and an increased political awareness by workers for the reorganisation of industrial norms and regulations. [19]

The issue of workers control at the place of work became a major issue for both the then Socialist Party (SEKE), the Greek Communist Union (UCG), and the then intellectual circles of the industrial centres of the country. The manifestos of the Left were asking for the immediate introduction of
workers' control schemes in industry and the establishment of workers' councils in shipping. [20]

The issue of workers' control and participation, in fact, was so popular a theme that the then largest and traditional trade unions (ie of the railway and tobacco industries) asked for the immediate representation of workers in the decision-making bodies. The tobacco workers were able to establish workers' committees on a shop-floor level, (1920), that acted as the contemporary health and safety councils. [21]

The idea for the establishment of workers' councils was mainly a product of the Russian Socialist Revolution, but unlike the 1917 Russian Workers' Councils, the Greek version of the concept was limited to collective agreements and the observation of workers' health conditions.

It is difficult to identify the main ideological trends within the movement for industrial control and participation, or what the concepts of control or participation exactly meant. The essence of workers new political discourse, though, lies with the articulation, for the first time, of an ideological and economic critique of labour relations, and with the political recognition that political changes in the nature of the relations of production are inseparable from workers' control of industrial functioning insofar as investments, planning and the internal work regulations are concerned.

From a landless peasant to the industrial centres of Greece, the Greek worker and his political discourse on socialism and the transformation of the working environment, was faced with a corrupt undemocratic political system, with a large service sector and a state bureaucracy that acted on behalf of each government's interests. It was faced with a financial system that was regulated from abroad and extended the intervention of foreign powers in home affairs, and had to reconcile itself with a general economic and socio-cultural environment that disrupted any attempts by workers to foster new attitudes and hence to 'adopt' new concepts which would develop the ideological formulation of a revolutionary theory, in the Greek context. The necessity was there, so was the movement, but
the economic and political structures and values which Greece presented, impeded any large scale involvement in the transformation of the society, by the then active working population.

In the years that followed, (ie from 1920s onwards), the international and domestic political events and the slow transformation of the Greek economy from a non-capitalist to a capitalist one, certainly provided a new arena for the development of an industrial movement. But the articulation of new economic and political developments was proven also to be a big barrier against workers' legitimate representation and the establishment of their trade union organisations. Ever since Greek workers were organized into a national trade union movement and established the first socialist and communist political parties, there had been a rapid increase in state interventionist policies in the organisational affairs of trade unions and a parallel disruption of democratic rights insofar as the freedom of speech, of association and of political participation/representation in the National Assembly were concerned. What the progressive and socialist forces of the country, since 1926 (ie the first dictatorship, by Premier Pangalos) have been confronted with, was the open military and political violence of the state, which inflicted heavy casualties on the ideological and political activity of the labour movement. The General Confederation of Greek Workers Executive Committee became an appointed body of the then ruling regimes, whereas at the same time, left wing trade unionists were either exiled, prosecuted or executed, and the creation of the so called 'rubber stamp' unions, (ie non-representative, undemocratic unions) flourished. During 1926, for example, the then dictatorial regime jailed most of the progressive representatives of the Trade Union Congress, whereas the Metaxas dictatorial regime (1936) nationalized the Union Congress and appointed the then Minister for Labour Affairs as the general secretary of the General Confederation of Greek Workers. [24]

Metaxas' admiration for Hitler's Third Reich, the German corporate loyalty and strict discipline, as well as Mussolini's Fascist state, led him to evolve the concept of the Third Hellenic civilisation, (ie the first was that of Ancient Greece, the second the civilization of Byzantium, and the
third the combination of both), and to establish a form of national syndicalism which was based upon the ideological conception of Fascist unions in Italy and Spain at the time. The new element in this period derived from the fact that the state from 1936 onwards, became the sole mediator between employees and employers, and the sole regulator of labour affairs. The Trade Union organisations lost all their autonomy from the Ministry of Labour and Employer Associations, while the General Confederation of Greek Workers was used as the organ for the ideological and social regulation of employees. [25]

Participation as an important industrial concept was not dismissed (as it was the case in previous periods), but instead the dictator, (ie Metaxas), restructured trade unions and redefined the meaning and objectives of them so as to fit his regime's manifesto on nationalism. The role and objectives of participative organs, therefore, were to reconcile differences amongst employees and establish a strong political and social corporation between management, employees and the state [26]; to observe the discipline and commitments of employees towards national and corporate goals and to safeguard national interests. The concept of participation was used as a political medium by the state, with some emphasis on the racial and cultural common attributes that both employees and industrialists shared.

The propagators of national syndicalism and of Fascist ideology amongst trade unions attempted to unite both peasants and employees through the notions of national supremacy and the exaltation of Greek capability to overcome economic dependency against the rich nations of the western world. Marxist or non-Marxist trade unionists who did not 'fit' into the framework of Metaxas Fascism, were branded as anti-Hellenics, traitors of the state, and conspirators, and the only choice that thousands of political activists had, (in order to escape imprisonment or execution), was to sign a humiliating declaration renouncing both their political involvement in the left, and their ideological inclinations towards class struggle and socialism. [27]
The suppression of democratic rights, the commitment of the labour force, under the then Workers' National Liberation Front (1941), for a national resistance and for the creation of a common front against conscription by the German industry, as well as the 1946-47 fully fledged civil war, (which claimed more than 80,000 lives, 20,000 prisoners, and over 700,00 political refugees, or almost 10% of the total population), 'ensured' indeed that for a long period the labour movement would be concentrating in the struggle for its members' economic and political survival as well as for the basic democratisation of the Greek political system and the establishment of an independent economic development for the country.

During the years of popular resistance (1941-1946), both the National Liberation Front (EAM) and the Workers' National Liberation Front (EEAM) had advocated in their manifestos the establishment of a popular democracy and of workers' control in the means of production and decision-making, as being the most important factors that would determine the nature and future of a socially just society. In addition, the then Socialist Trade Union Organisation (1946) in its programme was propagating workers' participation in the public sector so that an increase in productivity and tariff control could be achieved. [28]

From the years of open military conflict and foreign forces (e.g. the German Army 1941, British and domestic forces 1946), to the restoration of a semi-democratic political system (late 1950s and the 1960s), there was a further institutionalization of Greece's socio-economic dependence upon international financial centres to function autonomously from the state, to democratically elect its representatives, and pursue further its objectives at the work places. It was a period in which the labour movement was confronted with a rapid transformation of the economy, and a political change in the ways labour was to be regulated. A period in which the domestic financial and political ruling regimes, with their open consent to the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, the country's participation in the EEC (1962), inaugurated a new 'start' for Greece's social development. The political emphasis was to be given on the role of the state and to its relationship with financial and political
institutions and its ability to develop those mechanisms which would safeguard global capital interests in the region. [29]

This new 'political start' for Greece's development and the objectives behind it, were openly proclaimed by Truman, in his 1947 speech to the US Congress and the then British administration, in his concerns over the political future of Greece.

Iran, Turkey and Greece were viewed by both as the northern tier, where the economic interests of the then oil corporations were considered to run in parallel with the strategic interests of protecting the Near and Middle East. From the start (1946), the British and American global strategy rested on the principle of flexibility, but Greece was the unquestioned first priority to put in a political 'order'. [30]

The new 'social deal' between Greece and the then western superpowers affected the character of the country's economic development through a rapid influx of foreign capital investment [31]; the development of manufacturing and a tertiary sector [32]; the reorganisation of the trade union movement in accordance with the then political interests of European and US capital organisation; and the general reconstruction of Greece's judicial and parliamentary procedures.

Greece's dependent development has 'allowed' the evolution of an industrialization process which was technically and financially regulated from abroad and which was based upon the exploitation of natural resources, the use of a cheap labour force and a political system which would enhance in its objectives the political values shared by the United States and other leading capitalist nations. Contrary to the theoretical assumptions of some development school theorists, industrialisation was not impossible amongst the peripheral countries of the capitalist system. At least this was what the Greek example had suggested. Frank's A G (1969) hypothesis, for example, is that the only periods when peripheral countries had enjoyed some industrial growth happen to coincide with periods of weakened ties with their 'metropolitan' countries. This is not only a stagnationist point of view but also has not been the case for Southern Europe. [33]
The issue, however, is not whether industrialization 'per se' is feasible or not in a peripheral country, but rather the conditions that are imposed upon the country, the role of such an industrialization, and its effects upon the labour force and upon the socio-political state of affairs. It was the regulation of domestic economic and social decision-making processes from abroad, the use of the country's indigenous mineral resources and the use of nationalised organisations and industries for the exclusive benefit of a few multinational corporations, which reinforced a whole social network of non-democratic institutions. [34]

It was the development of a supplementary economy, geared towards financial speculation and short-term capital investment in industry which created further economic subordination of the country to the international capital community; it was also the maintenance of a large number of unskilled workers with the labour force, (See Table 3.2.4), who would work under any conditions without any sort of bargaining power and without any sort of legislative protection for their services. Such an economic process which allowed the maintenance of pre-capitalist modes of production alongside capitalist ones, the creation of a 'Kafkasian' type of state bureaucracy, the exodus of thousands of younger workers and intellectuals for a more prosperous life and for a more advantageous career, (it is estimated that between 1961-1970 almost 900,000 younger workers left the country) [35] and the maintenance of a large number of small scale industries that employed no more than nine employees on average, (during 1969-1978 almost 49% and 39% respectively of the total industrial labour force was employed in industries with less than nine employees). [36]

In relation to the political system and the state's social and ideological regulation process, the MNC's International Military and Financial organisations, (ie NATO, EEC, etc), have aided the enforcement of juntas upon the people and the creation of a state network of corruption, intrigues and embezzlement, for the direct suppression of any sort of opposition, which might threaten the continuation of foreign-domestic capital and military interests. [37]
Using, for example, a NATO contingency plan for internal disorders during 1967, a new dictatorial regime took over and abolished the constitutional rights of its citizens, rounded up thousands of left wing and progressive trade unionists and intellectuals, abolished the right to strike and of association, banned all political parties and sent thousands of people into exile. The colonel's 1967-1973 nationalist junta declared, as was the case with the 1936 Metaxas regime, the establishment of the third Greek civilisation, which now comprised of the virtues of Ancient Greece, the Byzantium period and of the Christian orthodoxy. The dictator himself proclaimed that he was a National Father, a representative of both the poor industrial workforce and of peasants, and set the objective to discipline the Greek Trade Union movement and establish a system where there was no room for 'rightist', 'centrist' or 'leftist' political views but only of a nationalist ideology that catered for Greek Christian Orthodox and propounded the development of Greece. [38] Once more, as with the Metaxa National Syndicalism, with the new international aid from the United States backed unions, (AFL-CIO), new trade union organisations were created which were 'non-communist' and the whole official trade union movement was regulated by the government. [39]

The ideas of industrial consensus, of labour cooperation with management, of the sharing of common interests, (ie between management and employees), were pushed into the forefront of industrial politics by both the then trade union 'representatives', (who were directly appointed by the junta committees for labour), and the then junta propagandists (ie G. Georgalas and his declarations in his book "Pax Nucleara").

On the other hand notions which questioned or were thought to question the junta's views on National Syndicalism, ie industrial participation or control, were equated by the Labour Ministry and the spokesmen of the GSEE as being anti-Hellenic and foreign to the cultural and political sentiments which were 'shared' by the public. Employees and their representatives were in fact urged to abandon the use of political discourse at the place of work which was in direct violation of national interests and did not promote - the collaboration of the labour force for the economic reconstruction of industrial undertakings. The junta went that far by
also outlawing basic freedoms and rights to which organisations such as the ILO or the European Trade Union Federation had basically subscribed. The suppression of political rights, the abolition of democratic representation with the trade union movement, the direct appointment of trade unionists favourable to the dictator's policies in the executive committee, created an era where in fact there was an absence of labour opposition against the dictatorship. The latter was the social result of, on the one hand, the financial support by the state of civil servants, of peasants, and of small industrial owners, and on the other hand, of the political and economic suppression of industrial workers and trade unions.

The deployment of the security and military police (ie Asphaleia and ESA) for the brutal breaking of any attempt to organize a grass-root opposition, as well as the spread of economic rewards, (ie income increases, job security, welfare advantages, etc), amongst various sections of the working population, and the political reinforcement of reactionary sentiments safeguarded the stability of the regime till 1973, (the time when due to serious economic problems and public unrest against economic austerity measures, a new coup d'etat evolved and remained in power till 1974). In addition, the dismissals of intellectuals from academic schools, the systematic prosecution of writers, journalists, lawyers, etc, the rewriting of school textbooks and the then educational reforms which comprised a variety of measures, (the entry of students in higher education was made dependent upon political tests of allegiance towards the junta), left little or no room for open theoretical and political thought and had serious implications for the development of political theory in the country. The places where an ideological and political opposition were developed were either located abroad or in secret circles amongst left wing trade unionists and intellectuals, but then again the political immediacy for the restoration of democracy, and the absence of the conditions for scientific work, had not allowed the theoretical development of issues relating to industrial law and organisation and had further postponed the introduction of industrial reforms which throughout Europe had long been implemented.
Even after the restoration of parliamentary democracy, the labour movement and its trade union representatives were mostly entangled in the struggle for the democratisation of the General Confederation of Greek Workers, against the implementation of the then austerity measures and of the Act 330/1976 which still limited the freedom of association, strike activity and trade union activity in the Public Corporations of the country. Despite the perpetuation of austerity labour and monetary measures and the continuous prosecution of trade union activists, during 1976-1980s a mass broad politically based opposition developed against political intrigues, state interventionism and anti-popular economic policies. With the return of exiled intellectuals and political activists, the reorganisation of educational establishments and the relative normalisation of democratic public life, a new era began for both the trade union movement and the political thought and activity in the country. The social achievements of labour around the globe, the ideological movements in both East and West in relation to the role of labour in society and its relationship with management, the new developments insofar as the economic dependence of peripheral economies and their political manipulation by multinational monetary and military institutions was concerned, have all paved the way for a new thinking in relation to the role labour in Greece could and had to fulfil. Public control of political and economic decision-making was seen by the left and the majority of labour representatives as the most important issue that a democratic government had to acknowledge and pursue vigorously, if the country and its people were to develop independently and be able to manipulate, express and represent their political feelings without foreign interventions. Such control should, however, not only lie with the parliament, but rather it should also involve the public in all major stages of economic and political decision making processes. The labour movement envisaged that such public control should involve the extension of the nationalisation programme, the decentralisation of executive powers and the increase of economic regulation and the social role of the local authorities and community agencies, for the democratic development of the country. The role and task of labour, through its participation in the decision-making bodies, was seen as a major step towards the establishment of a democratic and socially just society, that could form the first major organs in the public and private sectors of the
economy, for independent social development and for the extension of the internal democratisation process.

The public sector, with its economic activity in the areas of energy and telecommunications, as well as general administration of the country, was seen by both left wing parties and trade union forces, as the main 'locomotive' for the change in the country's economic and political development. The increase of trade union membership amongst public employees, (during the period 1974-1981), and the key role public corporations played in the internal economic development of Greece as well as their relationship with international monetary institutions and multinational corporations, presented a political 'opportunity' for the labour movement to intervene and assist in the creation of a new type of social development for the country and its labour force.

3.3 The Introduction of Participative Bodies in the Public Sector

The downfall of the 1967-1974 dictatorship, the return of thousands of political activists from exile and the re-establishment of democratic institutions, had inaugurated a new start for the country's labour movement. The years since the ending of the civil war and the aftermath of bitter experiences, the foreign capital and military intervention in the country's affairs and the rapid increase of a state sector and the progressive growth of an industrial infrastructure, had all played a role in an increasing labour movement which evolved around two major themes; the socio-economic reorganisation of industrial activity and the democratisation of public life. The first was directed against the increased influence which MNCs had on state affairs and against the path of development which Greece followed in its post war years, whilst the second theme was directed against the political system which had neither protected basic rights nor was able to safeguard the existence of institutions via which public scrutiny could be exercised.
### TABLE 3.2.1 The Development of Occupations 1853-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>1853</th>
<th>1856</th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1870</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sailors*</td>
<td>26302</td>
<td>20700</td>
<td>19303</td>
<td>25178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants</td>
<td>6260</td>
<td>6965</td>
<td>10245</td>
<td>18952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialists**</td>
<td>25546</td>
<td>22609</td>
<td>32801</td>
<td>48129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock breeders</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local employees</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public employees</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants****</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>229259</td>
<td>243807</td>
<td>147507</td>
<td>218027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sailors: Including fishermen, captains of vessels and ordinary sailors

** Industrialists: All those who owned craft workshops

*** Workers: It is not known whether they were industrial workers or not

**** Servants: assistant labour; from the 28490 young people, 5735 were women/girls (servants)

Source: Kordatos G (1977) "Introduction Into the History of Greek Capitalism" (in Greek) Epikairotita, p 47, Athens
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF INDUSTRY</th>
<th>1856-1879</th>
<th>Number of workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat-mills</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water-mills</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaghetti factories</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakeries</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanneries</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breweries factories</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wine factories</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipyards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinning mills (cotton)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaving mills (cotton)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk mills</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap factories</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer factories</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ice factories</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint factories</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Print workshops</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>600 - 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet workshops</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacksmiths</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine shops</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining industries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kordatos G (1977) "Introduction into the History of Greek Capitalism", Epikairotita, p 46, Athens
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>NO. OF EMPLOYEES</th>
<th>NO. OF STRIKES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>Syros</td>
<td>25000</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>Lavrion-Athens</td>
<td>32000</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Athens-Patros</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Athens-Volos-Lavrion</td>
<td>72000</td>
<td>13000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See: Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Nouvelle Serie Grece (Volume VI, p 39)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TRADE</th>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>No. OF EMPLOYEES</th>
<th>No. OF STRIKES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>Salonika-Karala</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>Istanbul-Salonika</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Carpenter-shops</td>
<td>Salonika</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Ceramics</td>
<td>Salonika</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Steelworks</td>
<td>Salonika</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Dockers</td>
<td>Istanbul-Salonika</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Railworkers</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Gasworkers</td>
<td>Salonika</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Tobacco-workers</td>
<td>Salonika</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>Salonika</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Ice-works</td>
<td>Salonika</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF INDUSTRY</th>
<th>PERSONNEL NUMBER</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE TO THE TOTAL LABOUR FORCE (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>12340</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity/Gas</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>4060</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>3160</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>10280</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks/Insurance</td>
<td>3760</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>15600</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>51610</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Babanasis Stergios (1980) "Greece in the Periphery of Developed Countries" Themelio, p.188, Athens
The political discourse at the time was centred around the democratisation process of all aspects of social life and the development of independence from either western military or financial blocks which were held responsible for Greece's troublesome history.

The return of political activists from abroad, of artists and scientists whose works had been banned from the country for so long, had inaugurated a new development for political science for ideas relating to social transformation and industrial organisation. For the first time there was an open re-alignment of industrial activity by employees and political thinking by students and the intelligentsia of the country. Since the 1973 Polytechnic uprising against the dictatorship a new climate appeared, for issues which concerned the development of Greece; a process which with the return of academics and artists became even more an integral part of the people's new movement for democratisation.

From the organisation of the military to the characteristics of Fascist ideology, and from the way local authorities used to be run to the way the state machinery was functioning, there was a continuous ideological critique and philosophical 'search' for new paths of social organisation. The emergence, however, of schools of thought (which were originally developed abroad) on the new problems which peripheral capitalist nations faced and on the new industrial global activity and industrial experiments on democratic models of organisation, in the country; and the domestic and international political events on the then 'new' movements for the transformation of social relationships; paved the way for the expansion of industrial thought and philosophical discourse.

The three main left wing parties at the time (ie The Greek Communist Party, the Communist Party of Interior, and the Socialist Party) together with leading trade union federations and trade union party political affiliates, (eg ASAKS, AEM, PASKE) for the first time produced coherent manifestos on the country's independence and its democratisation.
The then Communist Party (Interior), influenced by the cultural revolution of the 1968 student movement in France and the 1958-1968 political events in Eastern Europe, as well by the theoretical writings of leading Euro-Communists on the issues of the state and the structural functions of capitalism, proposed the introduction of Workers' Councils in industrial undertakings (1979). [41] In particular workers participation in the public and private sectors of the economy was emphasized as a means which could open the way out of the then undesirable effects of the 1973-1974 crisis, which could install power on decision-making in the 'hands' of the labour force and which could establish a mechanism for the further democratisation of the society. [42] The principal ideas which the context of employees' participation was based upon, more or less originated from the 1960-1970 Euro-Communist discourse on democratic socialism and the influence which the 'Prague Spring' had upon Europe's left-wing intelligentsia. Participation was conceived by the CP (Interior) as a model of socialist development and as a lever of political and economic transition. Democratic de-centralization of economic activities and of social decision-making processes were some of the major objectives which were reviewed by CP (Interior) as mechanisms which could strengthen public scrutiny, self-expression and self-emancipation against the role of global capital and of the state bureaucrats and which could yet avoid the repetition of mistakes which the then socialist countries were committing.

In contrast, the Communist Party of Greece by being influenced mainly from the industrial and political organisation models of Eastern Europe and the way social development was regulated, was 'slow' in developing a thesis on industrial and economic democracy. It did review its position on issues of industrial organisation, however, and from 1979 it campaigned vigorously for a system which could allow employees to participate in decision-making in all aspects of life. Participation as was the case with the CP (Interior), was conceived as a mechanism which could both safeguard employees' sectional interests and promote a new national development (ie in both economic and political terms) for the country. [43] The main difference with the CPO (Interior) was on the point of the characteristics of social transformation. The CP of Greece saw
participative bodies more or less as structural and political 'agents' of a centrally planned economy, as mediators between the National Council and the different public and private industrial undertakings, which would promote both the restoration of democracy in the country and limit the role MNCs had played in the economic life. The CP of Greece was at first not keen to use the term employees' participation, since participation in general could not be conceived as something separate from a socialist oriented system of relationships. At the beginning (1974-1980s) the CP was careful in the use of the term self-management and the theoretical works which were related to it. Instead there was more emphasis upon the aspects of class-struggle inside the boardrooms and shop-floor committees of industrial undertakings, and participation and the introduction of 'scrutiny' bodies, were seen as aspects or forms of class-struggle, which could influence decision-making and become areas of conflict, by revealing further the nature of capitalist activities to employees. [44]

In contrast to both parties, the socialist part of Greece (PASOK) conceived employees' participation as a measure of social transformation 'per se' to redistribute power from central bodies to local and industrial committees. PASOK being influenced by diverse ideological schools of thought which ranged from the works of the 1970s dependency theorists (eg Frank), the social democratic works on the South-North divide and the Yugoslavian or Algerian experiments in socialism, conceived the whole theme of industrial reorganisation in often extremely diverse and conflicting terms. Initially, employees' participation was seen as a mechanism which could disperse executive powers from the centre to regions, as a model for industrial transition which could protect Greece's interests against the unfair economic regulations imposed by leading capitalist nations and as a model of socialist organisation. There was an intermixtution of diverse ideological schools of thought, however, which often resulted in an unparalleled confusion of what participation meant for PASOK.

Participation was the basis upon which political transition could take place, whilst it was also seen as a reformist notion which mystified the nature of social relationships in capitalism. [45] PASOK's attitude
towards participation was never coherent and in actual fact the socialist party's ideology was also a mere conglomeration of different fashionable ideas, with little or no reference to the problems which Greece and its industrial structure confronted. From the years where PASOK was in opposition to the Conservative government, to the years which led to the first formation of a PASOK government (1981), the context of participation had changed drastically. In the first phase, the socialist party was projecting, through the use of the term a vague critique on capitalism and on the necessary steps which were needed in order to replace it. During the years of the PASOK government and especially since the 1985 first experiments on participation and the 1986 austerity measures, the use of the term no longer implied social transformation. Employees' participation was accepted as nothing more than an industrial reform within the political context of the 1970-1980s western European industrial restructuring, for better co-operation between the management and employees on key aspects of industrial activity.

During the post-dictatorial period, all three parties of the left, saw the public sector and its corporations as the major area for social experimentation and reorganisation. Public Corporations were viewed as the major couriers of political 'allaghi', (ie meaning change on past paths of development), where employees' participation could enforce progressive policies for the democratisation of domestic institutions and for an independent economic development of the country. In particular, the rapid increase during the 1970s of a public employee movement, the scale and importance which public corporations' activity in the economic sphere of life had at the time, and the decisive (ie for Greece's financial relationships with the rest of the capitalist community) role which those corporations played in all aspects of trade and political regulation of the economy, played a major role for the left's emphasis on the immediate restructuring of public corporation's organisational life. The three major public corporations which were seen by the left as the main 'targets' for change, were the Telecommunication Industry (GTO), the Public Power Corporation (PPC) and the Railway Corporation (OSE). Those three public corporations covered almost all major infrastructural networks of Greek economic activity, from the transportation of goods to the
provision of electricity and the regulation of energy resources throughout
the country.

By means of Act No 1365 of 1983 and the 1985 presidential decrees (ie No
57, 58, 59) the first participatory schemes were introduced by the end of
1985 in the above Corporations. The structure of participation (See
Figure 3.31) was comprised from three main areas of employee intervention
in decisions affecting the nature and character of national economic
activity. The first area concerned the involvement of employees in the
actual planning of industrial activity, the second area was more or less
regulatory, whilst the third level or area of employees' participation was
focused on aspects of local, regional and cultural interests. [46]

The main political frame for the introduction of those schemes, was
heavily dependent upon two aspects of social life: the democratisation and
decentralisation of domestic functions and the government's commitment to a
policy of 'allaghi'. In fact one was inseparable from the other and the
post-1985 'industrial climate' produced ideas on industrial and in general
economic democracy, which emphasized the need for the government's
cooperation with employee representatives and vice-versa, if any serious
political transition in the country was to be carried out. [47]

According to the above mentioned Presidential decree, first to be
established was the right of employee representation at the Board level.
The executive committee or council of each Public corporation was to be
comprised initially of three trade union representatives and six government
representatives. The function of this body was to decide upon any issue
relating to the economic and social development of a Public Corporation,
but only after having consulted employee representatives from the Employee
Representative Assembly for Social Control (ie ASKE), and after employees
had approved those decisions. The executive committee or council had the
obligation to consult ASKE members for any short or long term plan for
industrial development, ie investment plans, tariff policies, etc., and
on anything that was related to aspects of personnel management (ie
Presidential Decrees Articles No 7, Paragraph 2, Section 1). It should
approve the internal regulations (ie Paragraph 2, Section 4) and approve

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the annual economic and social balance reports, (ie Paragraph 2, Section 3). The executive committee had the right to appoint and recall the president of the committee and the director of the corporation.

The employees' representative assembly (ASKE) for social control of corporate activity was initially comprised of nine representatives from diverse institutions of the Greek community, (ie trade unions, the government, local authorities, the industrialist's federation and the representatives from the Greek chamber of commerce). ASKE was intended to function as a body of social control and was responsible for matters of investment, financial regulation and personnel management. Initially, it had the power to contravene the executive committee's policy guidelines and had the right to veto any decision which was not approved by its representatives. It had the mandate to decide on almost any aspect of industrial corporate activity, and could intervene in a public corporation's function through the disqualification of any member of the executive committee. [48]

At the shop-floor level, the presidential decrees introduced the so-called central workers' committees or councils (KES), which were mainly responsible for the administration of policies which were decided by ASKE and the executive committee and had the right to recommend to those bodies measures which would improve the corporation's productivity targets and its general functioning (ie Article 14, Section [a]). KES had the right to recommend methods for the improvement of health and safety and the obligation to mediate between management and employees on aspects which related to cultural and technical problems (ie Article 14, Section 3e, 3f).

Since the first introduction of participative bodies in Public Corporations, there have been a number of legislative alterations on the functions of each of the above committees. The number of employees' representatives on the executive committee was reduced to two members, whilst the number of government representatives increased, making even more difficult the task of employees to control the outcome of decisions. The general director of each Corporation also became the president of the
executive committee, undermining thus further ASKE's power to replace the
president of the committee. The role of the executive committee from a
body of central decision-making, more or less evolved into an
administrative organ of the National Cabinet and its policies were further
integrated and were made dependent upon the general policies which
different Ministries produced.

ASKE's functions on the other hand were totally reduced to administrative
and consultative tasks by removing Article 2 from the Presidential decrees,
limiting its role to that of mediation between employees and the
management. Similar legislative alterations influenced the organisational
political functions of the peripheral or regional participative bodies and
of the central workers' committee (KES).

Between the first participative schemes and the latter schemes (ie which
came into effect after 1987), there was a political marginalisation of
participative bodies by the government and a continuous conflict between
management and employees, as to how Corporations should function, and
what kind of policies they should follow in economic and social terms.
This political marginalisation, however, did not reinstate old managerial
concepts and organisational models, nor did the Corporation's policies on
the labour force and on financial principles for corporate development
return back to the pre-1983 years.

Prior to the legislative alterations to the presidential decrees, there
was a noticeable shift in the government's attitude towards trade unions,
the internal organisation of Public Corporations, and towards the
financial and political regulation of the country. [49]

The increased political and financial pressure by the World Bank and the
IMF on the government for the introduction of new monetary policies, which
would comply with global market fluctuations, has indeed had a tremendous
effect on internal social policies. Soon after the introduction of
participatory bodies into the public sector, the government froze wages,
dismantled the then inflation-proof scheme, (ie which compensated for
FIGURE 3.3.1  The Structure of Participation According to Presidential Decrees No 557-58-59

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inflation increases), and introduced measures which further liberalised working patterns, (ie flexible working contracts, relation of wages to productivity rates, etc). [50] When in fact, the general workers' confederation opposed the implementation of austerity measures, the government intervened in the democratic procedures of the labour movement and dismantled the then Executive Council (1986). The government moved further by stepping up its pressure on the labour movement by legislative or political means which undermined the role of regional or local employee representative bodies and transferred most executive powers to central bodies who in fact were in a position to implement these austerity measures despite industrial opposition.

The issue of participative bodies, and the new problems which they were facing, was in fact a part of a new shift in the government's internal policies, which on the one hand concerned the centralisation of further decision-making powers, whilst on the other the government further deregulated the statutory and political relationships which allowed the trade unions and the employees, especially in the public sector, to 'enjoy' a more stable (ie in financial terms, wages, welfare benefits, etc), and homogeneous (ie in terms of personnel policies, working practices) environment. [51]

3.4 Conclusion

The analysis of Greece's labour movement background has shown the interaction and reciprocal influence which relations of production and political organisation have upon labour thought insofar as participation and the wider issues of economic democracy are concerned.

The political context of employee participation and control of the economic function of industrial undertakings was shown to be dependent upon the nature of economic activity in the country, the latter's political dependency by international monetary and military institutions, and upon the dominant socio-cultural values which regulated the economy and the political system of Greece.
From the period when workers were unable to formulate coherent ideological and political relationships amongst themselves, to the period when workers established the first national union organisation, the Greek labour thought on the issues of industrial activity and industrial relations was a conglomeration of diverse, exogenous and of abnormal ideas on the role of labour in Greek society.

The nature of economic activity, the interventions of the then western powers and the volume and characteristics of the political activity prohibited until the 1920s any major ideological and social identification of workers at the place of work, or at a national level. It was after the 1930s, when the first major glimpses of a Greek labour movement, which emphasized the need for industrial reorganisation and for the political transformation of Greek society, started to appear. The foreign military intervention in the internal affairs of Greece during the years prior to and during the civil war, became the main ground for renewed political discourse insofar as the role of works in Greek society is concerned.

The trade union movement, for the first time almost, was viewed as a catalyst for the emancipation of workers at the place of work and the creation of a Greek society independent from foreign rule. The issues of participation, of democratic representation of workers in all major areas of public life were incorporated into the ideas for the transformation of Greece's capitalist-orientated economic and political activity.

From the years of open military and political conflict between the left and domestic and foreign conservative forces, to the years of covert political and economic subordination (ie by USA and multinational corporations) of Greece's internal affairs, the Greek labour movement was struggling for basic democratic rights.

The end of Greece's last dictatorship (1974) marked the beginning for a new type of relationship between the labour movement and the public authorities. This beginning opened a whole new era for the development of labour thought on industrial matters, for the expression of past political
and industrial grievances by workers and for the left's reconstitution of its strategies and ideological inclinations towards socialism and the independent development of the country.

The mass movements in Paris, Prague and in the countries of the periphery, for the social reorganisation of developed and developing capitalist nations and the new freedoms which Greece enjoyed, gave a new impetus to the ideological context of both industrial participation and of the economic transformation of societies who were dependent upon foreign powers.

Democracy at the place of work and the socialist-orientated transformation of Greece against the increased influence of multinational corporations and international military and political institutions, became 'synonyms', which led to the establishment of the first radical and participatory schemes in the Greek public sector.

Employees' participation was viewed as a measure that guaranteed the then rights of the labour movement and safeguarded the continuation of Greece's democratisation process. But furthermore, employees' participation was viewed by employees in the public sector as a safety valve against Greece's long established trend of foreign interventions. The Telecommunication, Railway and Power Corporations were seen as the basis for an alternative path of development, where indeed the control by employees of their industrial and social functioning could regulate the national development.

The first experiments on the democratic reorganisation of the public sector were short-lived, due to a renewed economic and political arrangement by the then government (1981-1988). The new international monetary pressures upon Greece, the implementation of new austerity measures in accordance with the IMF's proposals, which further centralized decision-making processes and deregulated further patterns and norms of the working environment, were shown to be a major new obstacle for the Greek labour movement, an obstacle that not only undermined existing practices and
participatory schemes, but which equally undermined the ideological configurations of the role of employees in industrial undertakings insofar as the issue of participation is concerned.

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4.1 Introduction

The transitoriness of industrial activity on a global scale, the radical nature of its principles and aims, and the new set of questions which they raise, make even more fragile the applicability of traditional paths of analysis and of ideological conceptions upon the industrial environment. On the industrial plane, the relationship between labour and management has required new dimensions insofar as both the role of labour in industry and society is concerned. The globalisation of industrial processes, the centralization of executive powers from the local industrial scene to supranational committees, the deregulation of existing norms and practices between industry, state and unions, and the imposition of new monetary and political principles of contact between them, have contributed to the questioning of existing notions and political praxis, on the part of labour, for the democratic organisation and role of labour in industrial development. If there is therefore any social meaning in the presentation and analysis of the new context of industrial discourse, then clearly that meaning has to be searched for within the present maelstrom of change, a change which, not only dictates the social parameters of the present analysis, but also defines the perspective from which matters are to be discussed.

Using the case of the Greek Public Power Corporation's new face of industrial functioning as an example, this Chapter will focus on two main subjects: the magnitude and nature of the economic and social changes in the field of industrial development, and their effects upon production and accumulation processes. The aims of this Chapter are to show how the globalisation of industrial activity restrains the possibilities of any employee participation in decision-making on crucial topics, and how the notion of participation at work is enriched in view of the new monetary and political global measures.
In the first section there is a reappraisal of the Public Power Corporation's general path of development in light of the new monetary and political measures which it is obliged to implement by the European Economic Community and other international organisations, (eg the International Energy Association). This is done by offering an analysis of why the new measures constitute a radical break with the Public Power Corporation's past economic development and how they formulate a new industrial environment for labour.

The second and third sections analyse the new policies on energy use and tariff systems, and how they affect both the national and corporate path of development and the organisational and political role of employees within the Public Power Corporation.

Both aspects of energy utilisation show a transition towards more centralized processes of decision-making and a more deregulated working environment. The new policies on energy use, energy systems and electricity price schemes, not only further subordinate the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic functioning to energy MNC's interests and further undermine existing democratic employees' participatory schemes, but they also create new modes of socio-economic functioning for the Public Power Corporation, and hence they produce a new or modified phase for the employees' relationships at a corporate level.

All three sections aim to identify the new characteristics of the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic activity and how they determine the context of employees' participation at work, emphasizing the need to re-evaluate both the economic relationship between employees and the Public Power Corporation, and the ideological and political discourse insofar as the issue of the democratisation of public undertakings is concerned.

4.2 The Manifestations of a New Policy on Energy Utilisation

The socio-economic development of the Public Power Corporation of Greece (PPC), ever since the construction of a national electricity grid (1950s),
has mainly been characterised by its dependency upon energy suppliers, (ie Oil-Multinational Corporations) and foreign national energy utility corporations, [1] (ie British and North American). From the British Power Corporation (1945), to the North American Ebasco Corporation, (eg a subsidiary of the Morgan Trust International), the issue of energy use consumption and distribution in the country was directly related to the then regional energy interests of US-British administrations and their post-war socio-economic policies for a 'safer' (ie in both military and political terms) and a stable economic environment. Greece, ever since the civil-war ended (1946), was used by the then western powers as a link between the US and British energy corporations and the oil-reserves in Iran and Turkey and as a base for political stability in the Near and Middle East. According to the revelations of Howard Jones (1989), the Greek National Utility was viewed by the US administration as the first major infrastructural project for capital's expansion in the southern mediterranean region, which could regulate and further expand the economic development of the country autonomously, thus preventing the interdependence of the latter on the issue of energy use, with other Balkan countries behind the Iron Curtain. Furthermore, the development of a national energy policy and a national electricity network in Iran, Turkey, and Greece, were viewed by the US administrations as the first concrete project which reflected both the strategic military interests and the global capital interests in the area. The creation of a public network, (in the absence of the private sector's interest and capability to invest in services) for the utilisation of energy resources in Greece, was a necessity for the reconstruction of the national economy and thus for the internal and external (ie Western Europe) political stability.

The objectives of the US Ebasco Energy Corporation (1950-1955), therefore, were to construct, organize and manage Greece's energy utilisation, to complete its national electrification project and to establish a national public power corporation which would be able to regulate energy use/distribution, according to their global strategic interests. [2] In accordance with the legislative regulations of 1951, (eg when in fact the Public Power Corporation was established), Ebasco US Corporation was made responsible for the planning of the then national energy programme;
for the production and transfer of electricity throughout Greece; for the administration of the Public Power Corporation's capital assets, the commissioning of new energy projects, the recruitment of foreign technical advisers and for the general managerial supervision of the Public Power Corporation's labour force. [3] The then criteria and principles, upon which the Public Power Corporation based its energy policies, defined the Public Power Corporation's post-war energy development and the political discourse of its labour force on the socio-economic functions of their corporation and on their political role within the Public Power Corporation. [4]

Insofar as the first issue is concerned, the Public Power Corporation's post-war development provided the framework for the exploitation of indigenous energy resources, and the expansion of trade between energy producers and consumers on a global level. It established further Greece's energy links with the rest of the western capitalist community, (on the co-ordination of energy use and on the issue of financial assistance to major energy construction projects), and the country's economic and political dependence upon the decisions of the then Western European energy agencies. This form of dependence according to Fountoulis Chris (1982) has enabled the energy multinational corporations to safeguard the then energy trade operation, (ie crude oil, hard coal) and has allowed the economic exploitation of Greece's oil and lignite national resources with the imposition by the Greek State of the most favourable terms for the multinational corporations. The multinational energy conglomerates, (ie Cruppe, Calvin and Oceanic Exploration Company), under the then joint ventures (ie during the 1960-1970s period) with the major multinational energy construction corporations (ie Knappen and Omnium Lyonais), were able to modify the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic structure and to determine Greece's energy programme in order to suit their particular interests.

The bilateral agreements between the Greek state, the Public Power Corporation and the various energy multinational corporations were based upon the short term speculative interests of the latter and more or less rested upon the political view that the Public Power Corporation and the
Greek public sector will create industrial zones free from domestic political and economic regulations, (eg labour laws, excise duties, etc), which were not considered favourable by the multinational corporations (eg the agreements between Kalvin, Oceanic International and the Greek government on industrial relations and the exploration of crude oil reserves).

It was this form of dependency which led the Public Power Corporation to develop as the main contributor for multinational corporations' interests in the region, to accommodate policies and plans on energy which reflected those speculative interests; to organise its socio-economic function and its technical infrastructure according to the then short-term profit oriented interests of crude-oil and hard coal producers and traders.

Against such a socio-economic background, the Greek Public Power Corporation has played a key part in Greece's labour movement demand for the reconstruction of the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic operations.

The end of the dictatorship (1974) and the restoration of democratic institutions allowed the Greek labour movement and the Corporation's labour force to expand and to further develop their political influence and discourse on the issue of a new alternative path of development for the country as a whole.

The international labour experience on the nationalisation programmes of the Algerian and Libyan energy sectors, as well as the then increased influence of various socialist and nationalist movements for the independence of peripheral states from the economic and political control of multinational corporations, led the Public Power Corporation's employees and the national Trade Union Congress to argue for the socialisation of the Public Power Corporation and of the rest of the energy public sector (1978-1981). [5]

The Greek Public Corporation was viewed by its trade unions and the political parties of the Left (ie the then Communist Party [Interior],
the Communist Party of Greece and the Socialist Party [PASOK]), as one of
the major organisations whose political reorientation could eliminate the
influence of multinational corporations upon Greece, which could restore
the economic independence of the country, and which could determine the
public sector's democratisation process. As being one of the main
organisations for Greece's capitalist oriented economy and the country's
main agent for global trade with the capitalist community, the labour
movement viewed as a necessary precondition for a socialist path of
development, the establishment of mechanisms and criteria of energy
accumulation, that were controlled by employee representatives and were in
line with the then (1981) anti-imperialist political sentiments of the
trade union movement. [6]

The introduction of the first participative bodies, therefore, into the
Public Power Corporation were seen as social control manifestations which
could dictate, to the economy and the political system of the country, a
new non-capitalist path of development. [7]

Since though the first workers' council and assemblies of social control
were established (1985), the labour movement and the employees, had to
face new problems and dilemmas as to what their role should be inside the
Corporation and on what should be the political strategy for Greece's
economic and political independence. Apart from the 1985-1986
government's general austerity measures, and the continuation of the
state's political intervention in the democratic procedures and internal
affairs of the trade union movement, the domestic, economic and political
processes were further tied to the interests and the decisions of the major
international energy and industrial capitalist institutions through the
introduction of market-orientated policies at all levels.

Once more as was the case during 1950, when the then US and British
interests dictated the Public Power Corporation's nature and
characteristics of development, global energy interests and European
industrial policies are dictating the Public Power Corporation's current
and future path of development. The essence, however, behind the new
initiatives for the Public Power Corporation's re-direction, lies in the
political and economic context and characteristics of the new measures on energy.

The Public Power Corporation is obliged to re-evaluate its socio-economic functions and adapt to the new pressures and interests of the capitalist energy and monetary community. Its technical infrastructures, political and social organisation, and its aims and principles on economic activity have to be re-drawn. The main emphasis now is on the political, technical and economic integration into the energy systems and policies of the capitalist community rather than just the speculative interaction between the Public Power Corporation, the Greek state and the various energy multinational corporations. The Public Power Corporation has to adopt a new path of development which will come to terms with economic and political impossibilities that were created out of the post-war development of the Corporation.

In a world where indeed the energy market, (ie on tariffs and natural resources) is no longer stable and fluctuations in prices, scarcity of energy resources and regional political or environmental problems can lead to major upturns or downturn in the use of particular energy resources, the Public Power Corporation is obliged to open further its technical infrastructures and diversify further its energy input. It is actually obliged to change its technological and organisational (ie in terms of electricity generation and distribution) structures from rigid to flexible models, which will be able to accommodate or integrate with other European systems, and adapt to global energy market fluctuations, thus contributing to the prevention of major crises and avoiding the influence which political domestic forces exert upon the public sector.

The same transition is also taking place insofar as the Public Power Corporation's social and political organisation is concerned. From the period where the Corporation's services and economic functions were tied to individual multinational corporations and state interests; where energy systems were monopolised by the Public Power Corporation on the stability of the same supply networks for their operations; where in fact those rigid modes created in turn, rigid political relationships between energy
producers and consumers; where the state, and hence the public energy corporations, developed into the principal agents of energy control on a regional and national level, irrespective of wider trends and shifts in patterns of energy use and distribution; the Public Power Corporation is moving towards a new period.

The characteristics of this new period insofar as energy utilisation is concerned, although they do not replace altogether the post-war modes of social and political organisation, nevertheless they do open further the field of energy production-accumulation to various global and domestic mechanisms and forces. Energy utilisation is now based more upon the international collective interests of the multinational corporations and supranational decision-making bodies. Energy system are redesigned so as to become less dependent on particular forms and modes of production-accumulation organisation and less dependent on the traditional monopoly of the Public Power Corporation on energy. The Public Power Corporation's relationship with the public authorities is further deregulated and reregulated so as to adapt to the new emphasis on flexible, competitive and transparent socio-economic networks.

The same transition also holds for the Public Power Corporation's main aims and principles on economic activity. The traditional socio-political context of a public corporation's nature of operations, although not abolished, has been increasingly placed under review. The Public Power Corporation now is obliged: to follow more rational economic policies; to develop by enhancing in its functions market profit-oriented criteria; to become a partner and a competitor of the private energy sector; and to follow rules and policies which expand both its competitiveness on the global energy market, and the competitiveness of other major energy producers/consumers, in an 'autonomous' (in relation to the state) and yet in a co-ordinated way with its global partners.

The transition towards new flexible arrangements for the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic function (See Table 4.2.1), are reflected in the EEC's and in the International Energy Association's new guidelines on energy production-accumulation policies, through which they further oblige
the Public Power Corporation to harmonise (not homogenise) its decisions and activities with other global and endo-European member states and energy corporations. In the light of EEC proposals and energy directives for a common European internal market, the policies for an integrated energy market constitute a continuation of the general objectives for energy use/distribution, that were laid by Euratom and the IEA during the 1970s. These promote co-operation amongst IEA member countries, (in order to reduce their dependency on oil-imports); the development of alternative energy resources; the exchange of information and of consultation, between member countries and oil companies; and the development of co-operation between oil-producing and oil-consuming nations, with a view to stabilizing the oil-markets, (in relation to the newly established OPEC organisation). [8] These objectives have not been either changed or modified, instead they still constitute the basic elements of the EEC's policy on the economic and political integration of Western European member states. The advancement of an internal common energy policy is seen by the European Community as the most important factor which will 'cement' the contemporary needs of the industry, for a more open and competitive world with no barriers (between states) or state interventions, through the creation of a flexible energy market, which will respond to those needs. [9]

The nature of this new energy policy 'touches' upon two important issues: the political role of public authorities and energy corporations, and their specific policies on tariffs, energy resources, investments, etc, which are seen as the means for the accomplishment of an internal common energy market. The EEC's policies on energy, contrary to what may appear, (as an articulation of various economic objectives), are the ensemble of both ideological and economic concepts, which question the political role of the Public Power Corporation, its traditionally accepted functions and responsibilities, the role of the trade union movement and other pressure groups in the economic development of a society, and challenge the political and social significance of political sentiments which are 'tied' with post-war economic development.
TABLE 4.2.1 The Social-political Transition of the Public Power Corporation's Socio-economic Orientation - Main Trends

A Technical Infrastructures

1 Single-purpose use
2 Emphasis on technological system interdependence
3 Emphasis on the autonomous use, distribution of energy (national level)
4 Dependency upon type of energy and bilateral trade
5 Multi-purpose use, diversification
6 Emphasis on technological system integration
7 Emphasis on interconnected grids for regional or global use, and distribution of energy
8 Emphasis on independency from type of energy and individual members bilateral trade

B Socio-political Organisation

1 Emphasis on single national-MNCs interests
2 Monopolisation of energy trade by PRC
3 PRC's organisation based upon rigid nationally regulated norms
4 Emphasis on global priorities, regional interests
5 Disintegration of PRC's exclusive rights on trade and energy use
6 Functional deregulation of PRC's relationships with public authorities, domestic forces of control, and international energy traders

C Aims and Principles of Socio-economic Activity

1 PRC's energy provision through subsidization policies
2 Non-profit oriented development
3 Emphasis on the accommodation of non-market criteria on economic activity
4 Emphasis on self-financing
5 Emphasis on profit-oriented development
6 Emphasis on the accommodation of market criteria
In the first instance, the Public Power Corporation as a public corporation is directly asked to change its role and social responsibilities towards Greek society, in a way that although it does not threaten the continuity of electricity generation/distribution, nevertheless changes the political perspective between the Public Power Corporation and private capital, in such a way as to replace domestic considerations and responsibility, by an emphasis upon the international capital community and its interests. [10]

"There will be still a role for the public authorities, but it is evident that the very spirit of the large market presupposes that the responsibilities in question will increasingly be exercised in a community perspective and less and less on the basis of domestic considerations." [11]

To what extent public corporations like the Public Power Corporation will continue to provide the existing services to the public, or whether they will continue as public or quasi-public corporations, it is too early to tell. The important question, however, lies with the issue of decision-making processes and the role of trade union representatives in them. It seems that with the new EEC energy policy that the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic function, and the decisions that are taken for its future development, will no longer be accountable and will no longer develop according to internal economic and political domestic factors. The whole process of decision-making will be further removed from the place of work, board or shop floor level, and from the ministry responsible for energy matters to the administrative offices of the EEC or the IEA. [12] The increased centralization of the decision-making process remains a major obstacle for the democratic industrial reorganisation of public corporations like the Public Power Corporation, but probably this is not the only obstacle in this democratization process. The changing economic function of the Public Power Corporation and its new perspectives insofar as the electricity generation/distribution policies are concerned, also undermine the Public Power Corporation's democratic functioning in relation to employees and the Greek community as a whole. The increased functional deregulation of energy operations, working
practices and of domestic legal frameworks, in order to attain a flexible energy sector (according to current European Community objectives), enlarges the gap between the socio-economic function of a public corporation and public control. It is the latter however, which, in the present Chapter, seems to be at a point where a whole new era probably opens in both ideological and political terms.

The magnitude and political nature of these new structural and social developments, insofar as energy is concerned, is shown in the concrete horizontal and sectoral objectives of the European Community. The horizontal objectives include policies on the supply-distribution patterns of power corporations, ie their external relations with multinational energy corporations and member states of the EEC, technological and regional co-operation amongst member states, energy pricing systems and electricity tariff policies; whereas the sectoral European Community energy objectives focus upon electricity generation and problems that are related to the energy infrastructure of each member state and of each power corporation.

In relation to the objective for the improvement of external relations between power corporations and oil-producing or oil-consuming nations, the EC is aiming to maintain an economic cohesion between member states and individual multinational corporations, through the IEA/OECD organisation. Such aims are considered as an important element for the further expansion of the world energy market and mutual interdependence which could maintain and develop satisfactory market conditions. [14] For this reason public power corporations and their governments are urged by the European Community Commission to abolish or eliminate trade barriers and follow sound pricing and taxation policies, in their contracts with multinational corporations. According to the IEA this objective 'has to be seen in the wider context of general economic efforts to reduce subsidies and barriers to all international trade'...and specifically to energy resources. The system or patterns of energy use/distribution 'should be structured so as to be transparent and to avoid as far as possible distorting energy prices and trade'....[15] The term "trade barriers" itself, however, is a general-and ambiguous one which can imply many things at the same time.
The European Community and the IEA though, have 'tied' the use of the term with general fiscal and political policies. These policies encourage the expansion of the private energy corporations, to operate in member states, without the domestic legislative and wider political restraints, which different governments and public power corporations might have been obliged to follow during the 1970s.

Interestingly enough, the policy on external relations aims at the deregulation of public authorities' approach on energy and at the creation of a flexible relationship between existing domestic bodies of energy decision-making, domestic energy users or suppliers and multinational energy corporations. This is also reflected in the second main European Community objective on internal energy markets, which pursue a policy of regional energy development, surpassing national economic or political energy aims and the existing centralized power control which public power corporations have exercised traditionally (with the exception of West Germany). The objective on regional energy development, apart from the European Community's aim to counter the negative effects which are products of the post-war 'Keynesian' macro-economic policies. It deregulates further the role of the latter in member states and leaves open the field of energy use/distribution to foreign or domestic private bulk energy suppliers and distributors. [16]

Another crucial objective for the socio-economic operation and nature of development, of public power corporations in the community, is that of the centralization of pricing and tariff systems. As was also the case with the previous objectives, the aim is to further minimise the role of national governmental and other pressure bodies in the formulation of tariff regulations; to open the field of energy price systems to market forces; and to remove domestic political or social restraints from the agenda of energy pricing. What the European Community's energy policy is trying to achieve in the field of tariff systems, is not some form of homogenisation on energy prices across Western Europe, or the watering-down of price diversification amongst state owned public power corporations (insofar as the import and use of primary energy resources is concerned), but rather the establishment of a unified pattern of conduct with suppliers
of energy resources, that will ensure effective competition between the different fuels and safeguard market interests against state monopolies. [17]

Public Power Corporations, in view of the globalisation of the energy market, the further centralization of policy decision-making processes and the European Community's internal common energy policy, are required by the latter to conform to a uniform energy use approach. In relation to primary energy resources, public corporations and the corresponding ministries of each member state, have already laid down a general formula on liquid and solid fuels use, have set pattern and energy quotas and have agreed to maintain and if possible increase, for example, the present market share of solid fuels and the use of nuclear power (ie by 40% for electricity generation). [18] The main change in the European Community's policy on energy resources, however, is not only on the new quotas for oil or natural gas use, but most of all on the political perspective upon which these energy resource formulas are based. Firstly, insofar as oil is concerned, net oil-imports are to be maintained at almost less than one-third of the total energy consumption (by 1995), by the substitution for this form of energy fuel of other resources, ie gas, nuclear, etc, and by the continuing oil exploration within the European Community. [19]

Underlying this objective rests the EEC's energy principle of removing existing exclusive monopoly rights for imports and the distribution of oil, by the public corporations of each member state, so that a free market price system for oil use can develop. [20] The relations of each member state with oil corporations external to the European Community are to be encouraged to continue insofar as those oil corporations are not 'satellites' of OPEC and are not endangering, with their operations, the European Community's principles for a common European energy policy. Almost the same guidelines are applied in the use of natural gas, with one exception, that the rules governing the use of natural gas not only presuppose the flexible and state deregulated approach in production/consumption patterns, but also oblige public power corporations to confine their use of gas within the European Community and not develop
external relations with non-EEC states. For that reason European Community member states and their public power corporations are obliged to 'encourage' the free transportation of natural gas within the Community, thus weakening further state exclusivity on transport and distribution of energy. The policy on natural gas goes even further by proposing a radical change of the whole public power corporations' infrastructure, by examining "under what possible conditions direct access to a resource might be extended to a large industrial consumer". [21] Thus the ideal of free movement of goods, which the European Community has incorporated in its plan for a common European economic integration, is expanded by the inclusion of energy resources, which are going to be transported through public or private networks across Western Europe, (ie the common carriage proposal).

In the case of solid fuels, the European Community's public power corporations and their public administrations are to share the IEA's commitment to promote free trade in hydrocarbons and uranium fuels and to remove away existing trade obstacles that relate to the use, transportation and pricing systems of solid fuels. For this purpose the European Community Commission undertook a series of measures which encourage the expansion of intra-community trade, of vertical and horizontal agreements between producers and consumers, and between coal producers and traders; encourage international trade in coal and remove any domestic political and technical barriers on solid fuel trade. According to the Commission's [22] intra-community trade needs to expand further, despite national or regional policies on coal, and a legal framework should be introduced which restricts competition on prices and imports, between national power corporations and external or internal coal producers. First of all in relation to prices, the existing national agreements should not fix prices at levels which do not correspond with international market prices on coal. Second, public power corporations should facilitate all necessary conditions, so as to increase the use and transportation of coal amongst member states, despite national quotas on coal use from indigenous reserves. Third, intra-community coal trade should not in any way impede the development of trade between member states and non-European Community states. [23] In addition, public power
corporations are asked by the European Community Commission to remove, as well, technical barriers and quotas for the use of 'national technologies', and open up the market on technological innovation and production which will increase the competition between private and public parties: which in turn could lower capital costs for the production and use of equipment. The role of public authorities and power corporations in relation to the use of solid fuels should not contravene the European Community's general energy guidelines and should not impede the competitiveness of the coal industry whilst they should promote the interdependence between public and private industrial undertakings. [24]

The new European Community's economic and political policies on energy, exert considerable influence amongst Western European public power corporations, on the level of the nature and characteristics of their operational infrastructure, its extent and its limits. There are three main objectives which will determine much of their socio-economic function and which will consolidate the relationship of those corporations with their labour force and the public as a whole: through the deregulation of the economic and political national framework on energy; the increased influence of private capital on use, prices, and distribution systems, (with the intention of developing market competition within the Community and within the IEA member states); and through the harmonisation of rules, norms and political decisions, governing the extraction, use and consumption of energy resources. To meet these objectives, power corporations are encouraged to extend their established national grids across European Community frontiers and develop the relationships with the existing intra-Community energy utilities, (ie UCPTE, UFPTES, Sudel and Nordel). The European Community is also carrying out a study (of which the results are not yet available) for a new statutory and legal framework for the operation of national electrical utilities, which would lead to the deregulation of existing public procurement policies and promote the cooperation between public electricity supply companies and private auto-producers of electricity. In relation to the first, the existing partitioning of public markets on energy procurement has been viewed by the European Community Commission on Energy as the result of the differences in standards of products, the lack of accurate information and
'due to procedures which were not designed with the possibility of tenders from other member states in mind'. [25]

The European Community Advisory Committee for Public Procurement (1987) seeks to open the markets by:

"Ensuring publicity for calls for tender, across the Community; providing for products to be specified in the way that makes them accessible to the largest number of firms; ensuring that procedures for awarding the contract are such as to make it possible to bid effectively from different member states; providing for the contract to be allowed on the basis of objective criteria determined in advance; guaranteeing transparency of the operation of the system which is a necessary condition if contracting authorities are to be convinced that opening of markets is mutual." [26]

What these objectives are trying to ensure is a common access to the European Community's electrical utility firms by public authorities.

"For this reason, the coverage of the directives is not necessarily the same, as that of national public procurement codes. The key in determining who should be covered by the Community legislation is to decide which contracting entities are potentially subject to political pressure to buy national to the detriment of their commercial interests... It is clear that any entity which is an organ of government, whether central, regional or local, is subject to the political pressures referred to above." [27]

It is evident therefore, from the above objectives on public procurement on energy, that the European Community Commission is encouraging not only the intra-community competition on energy trade, but also the competition amongst public and private energy bidders within a national framework. This is clearly reflected in the proposed cooperation between public electricity supply companies and private auto producers of electricity. The public power corporations of each member state and their governments are mainly asked to draw a common framework of measures which should govern
the relationship of private and public electricity companies, and establish common principles with private electricity producers, so that they respond to market fluctuations. [28] It should be noted that the EEC's proposal on the cooperation between public power corporations and auto-producers of electricity, mainly involves the generation of electricity through the use of renewable sources of energy (ie biomass, geothermal, hydro-power, etc), and the exploitation of waste energy (ie energy that is produced out of organic waste or the residual heat in large industrial undertakings, and through the application in large urban areas of combined heat and power installations). [29]

Such a recommendation however, does not only imply the freedom of operation by various electricity utilities within a member-state, but as is the case with public power corporations, which are dependent on the use of hydro-electric power (eg Greek Public Power Corporation), it also suggests the encouragement of the private sector to step up its operations through the use of indigenous primary energy resources, which otherwise would have been an energy asset in the development of national operations, and where the pricing distribution patterns would have been under the control of public authorities. [30]

Finally under critical review by the European Community Commission is the proposed compartmentalization of national and international links between existing production/distribution systems, which, if it is agreed by member states, would lead to the interconnection between national and international energy producers and between regional and international distribution or supply agents. If such a proposal is carried forward however, that would probably mean a total change in the existing functional socio-political role of public power corporations within a member state. The main aim of such a compartmentalization of national energy utilities, as was the case with the previous objectives, is the separation of public power corporations into three or more areas of operation and services provisions, ie production, consumption, distribution, where the private sector and the multinational energy corporations would have a more conclusive role to play in the formulation of domestic energy policies.
The European Community's set of new objectives depict the main shift in political and economic terms on energy use and electricity distribution policies. This shift involves and necessitates a radical change (in relation to post-war development) in perceptions and industrial approaches by power corporations, on the issue of energy utilisation and the organisation of economic activity. Although most of the objectives have been partially implemented by various power corporations across the European Community, the main directions and principles for the future socio-economic development of energy sectors have already been accepted by the European Community's member states and IEA's member electricity utilities. These directions and principles extricate further the energy sector from the residual post-war political and economic networks of domestic social control. They further mould together private and public capital interests and they palliate further the executive powers which national bodies of decision-making had, since the creation of public electricity networks on a domestic level. (See Table 4.2.2)

Although the practical effects of these shifts cannot yet be fully analysed, they articulate a new or a radically modified industrial environment for employees, insofar as the issue of the democratisation of industrial undertakings is concerned, in both ideological and political terms.

Traditional perceptions on the role of nationalised industries, their functions and their modes of political and industrial organisation, are under review with the 'arrival' of new flexible economic policies. Post-war tripartism and shop-floor or board level employee participation schemes are under pressure to end in an industrial environment which is further deregulated. Neither legislative nor political mechanisms and values on the issue of democratic representation of trade unions and other social agents of control are anymore guaranteed.

The policies of the European Community and the IEA on energy production and accumulation processes further reconstitute the role and principles of the activities of public power corporations and, through their deregulatory objectives and centralization of decision-making procedures, further allow private capital interests to intervene and dictate the pace and
character of energy use on a domestic and global level. In the case of the Public Power Corporation, however, that intervention and dependence upon private capital interests, and in particular upon energy multinational corporations, was always there. Although it must also be stated that the increased militancy of trade unions against the Public Power Corporation's dependency on multi-national corporations, the enlargement of executive powers by employees, and the increased governmental political rigidity to implement a number of measures that enhanced capital's new initiatives in the area, had all created a major functional obstacle.

The Public Power Corporation's post-war development has shown that the Corporation was unable to function on the basis of national interests and promote an energy programme which would be controlled by democratic representative institutions. The gist of the matter, however, lies today in the renewed attempts by international agents of the capitalist community to redesign the Public Power Corporation's infrastructure and activities, so as to integrate further the Public Power Corporation's role in the mechanisms and policies of capital for the restructuring of the economic activity.

This restructuring, as was shown in Table 4.1.1, necessitates the end of technical and political rigidities which the Public Power Corporation's post-war development reproduced and which redraws once more the basic aims of the Corporation.

Although the dependent nature of the Public Power Corporation upon foreign energy multinational corporations is not a thing of the past, a new form of dependency is on the horizon. The Public Power Corporation is obliged to remove all remaining structures and procedures which were products of the post-1970s era of social demarcation in Greece. The creation of flexible structures and policies is viewed by the EC and the Greek government as being the 'panacea' for the realisation of market principles and competitive regulations, and for the termination of mechanisms and of control procedures, which are obstacles to the further integration of public utilities with global energy market criteria.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Energy Activity</th>
<th>Domestic Energy Activity</th>
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<tr>
<td>i  Integration of policies on energy</td>
<td>i  Disintegration of public areas of control on energy, minimisation of monopoly rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii  Harmonisation of economic response on energy use and tariffs on a global level</td>
<td>ii  Harmonisation of public energy sectors with international activity (national level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii  Integration of energy systems and electricity grids</td>
<td>iii  Functional deregulation of existing energy systems and electricity grids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv  Centralization of executive powers on energy by supranational bodies</td>
<td>iv  Functional deregulation (re-regulation of existing norms and principles on national energy programmes)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the period where (1978-1981) the labour movement and employees in the energy sector were able to exert enough political pressure on the government and change the whole organisational mode of the Public Power Corporation (ie through the implementation of participative schemes); employees now have to come to terms with a new modified situation, that has no similar resemblance with any of the post-war phases of Greece's political and economic development.

The ideas and political strategies which trade unions within the Public Power Corporation have followed since the 1970s no longer reflect the political and the economic situation of the country. The new exacerbated interdependence between local, national and global decision-making and industrial activity allows little or no 'room' for control by domestic forces over local and national issues, without a further reference to international movements and policies on energy. On the other hand, the renewed reconstitution of the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic functions (according to which principles and aims are further tied to domestic or global market forces and criteria), and the further compartmentalization and limitation of the Public Power Corporation's activities, fragment further the Corporation's traditional role in the regulation of the economy and hence employees' strategies and objectives of a 'socialist' oriented transformation of the country, through the major public corporations, (ie Public Power Corporation, Telecommunications and Rail industries).

These obstacles towards the realisation of post-1980s aims for the democratisation of the country, and the new dilemmas on structures and ideas which the labour movement is confronting, are depicted in the following analysis of the issue of energy use and of the issue of electricity consumption and price costs regulations.
4.3 Employee Participation in the Light of New Electricity Generation-Distribution Patterns

The increased centralization, internationalisation and deregulation of traditional public energy use-electricity generation systems have marked a new era for industrial organisation and thought on the issue of democratic employee representation and control of the procedures and outcome of decision making. The emphasis of the analysis in this section, therefore, will be placed upon two major themes: the relationship between employees' effective participation and the new politics of energy use, and how they transform the nature of the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic function, which in turn affects the socio-economic position of employees. Second, the relationship between the nature of new energy systems and the participation of employees will be examined, focussing upon the social and political dimensions which the new global energy measures place upon the democratic control of energy systems and use patterns.

Against the background of a growing contemporary political movement for the re-appraisal of traditional patterns of economic development, and the demand for public control in all major aspects of social organisation and exchange, there is a further deregulation of decision-making procedures through the new economic measures for industrial restructuring proposed by the European Community and other major international political organisations. These measures, as analysed in the previous section, are centred around two main spheres of economic and social life. First, on the relationship between industrial undertakings and domestic forces of regulation, (ie public authorities, unions, etc), and second on the relationship between local industrial operations, principles and aims of activity, and the global market. These measures, in the light of energy use and electricity generation, present a major new obstacle for effective employee participation in the Public Power Corporation, since they further adapt the Corporation's principles of economic activity to capital interests, and remove all major domestic political mechanisms for employee control of decision-making processes.
On the issue of energy use—electricity generation, the relationship between the Public Power Corporation and European Community began with the establishment of the European Energy Council, during 1966. This relationship became more apparent on matters of electricity generation, during the 1973 oil crisis, when the then Vice President of the European Community Commission asked the western nations to formulate energy policies in accordance with global energy interests. The main aim at the time was the formulation of a common European policy on oil-reserves, distribution and consumption patterns, so as to intervene and control the European share of oil on the world market. [31] In addition, the European Community and IEA/OECD wanted to modify the trade relationships between oil-consuming and oil-producing nations, to establish better intra-Community links on energy amongst the member states, and to strengthen the political and economic powers of international energy agents over domestic political institutions. The pre-eminence of the new political attitude towards energy matters is reflected in the statement made by the European Community Vice President at the time (1970s), where it is stated that:

"...the problem of reliable supply and the diversification of energy resources had now unquestionably become a problem for the public authorities...the emergence of the oil problem into the political arena, involving a change desired by certain oil-producing countries, showed that responsibility was now in the hands of the public authorities..." [32]

In accordance with the European Community's then 'new' political stance on crude oil, the then ministers on energy matters had to reach a common agreement on the rational utilisation of energy; on the development of technology for alternative energy resources use; and on the steps which would be followed for the enforcement of IEA's 1973 targets on oil-consumption. Due to the then escalation of crude oil prices, the European Community Commission undertook further steps for the decrease of oil imports by member states, the increase in the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation, and the expansion of intra-community trade in hard coal and natural gas. [33]
These objectives still hold, although they have been modified so as to respond to contemporary world market developments. The framework however, of the European Community and IEA's policy on energy use—electricity generation, has been radically changed. The aims today are not to harmonise the response of member states towards specific energy resources alone, but rather to integrate member states' energy policies and industrial infrastructures into a unique economic and political force which is in line with market forces. In addition they transfer further powers away from public authorities towards the centres of international decision-making, so as to avoid domestic barriers for the utilisation of contemporary energy programmes and respond to market needs; and create the technical and political conditions which will enable the future flexible industrial use and of different energy resources according to market forces. The spectrum of international influence upon public energy corporation has been widened to include: the types of energy resource use for electricity generation (which are imported into the Community); the spheres of energy extraction and utilisation of indigenous materials; the trade between multinational energy corporations and public authorities; the trade of electricity throughout the Community; and finally the criteria upon which financial investment on energy resources is based.

In front of this radical shift in political thought for energy use, the PPC has to further integrate its energy operations with the functions and aims which the world energy market dictates. In this line, according to the new measures taken by the Corporation on behalf of the European Community, the Public Power Corporation is changing its characteristic pattern of economic development by emphasizing three main aims. There is the need, first, to diversify further the types of energy resources used for electricity generation by lifting further its quotas and restrictions on indigenous and exogenous energy resources; second, to open up its economic relationships with energy auto-producers and bulk energy suppliers, and to create all necessary conditions which will enhance and develop market criteria in its energy use policies; third, to reorganise its structural organisational basis, so as to create flexible structures which will enable the implementation of the above.
The first signs of this movement towards a new political framework for the Public Power Corporation's energy use—electricity generation policy, are reflected through its patterns of energy utilisation. According to the National Energy Council (1985-1987), therefore, during the period 1970-1984 the Public Power Corporation had increased its consumption of imported energy resources (ie. solid and liquid fuels) by more than 20%, whilst it had decreased its crude-oil use and increased its hard-coal use (ie. from European Community member states). [34]

Despite the Public Power Corporation's 1984-1989 development plan, where the need is recognised the need to step up the utilisation of indigenous resources and develop the use of renewable resources, [35] the Corporation, faces already (through the existing price competition at the world energy market), serious difficulties in developing the use of indigenous resources. In accordance with the President of the Public Power Corporation's Engineers (1986), the whole issue of energy choices, as to which and on what scale indigenous and imported energy resources are used, reflects a wider political problem, between the government, the multinational corporations and the European Community.

"...The use of imported crude-oil for electricity generation is the result of Greece's post-war development and the government's concession towards the bulk crude-oil suppliers, which has negatively affected both the Public Power Corporation and the national economy as a whole. Today there is a repeat of these concessions, but toward the European Community (by curbing crude-oil imports from non-community nation/suppliers and stepping up imports of oil and hard-coal from European Community member states). The situation has arisen out of the European Community's new directives on energy resources, which obliges indirectly the Corporation to use the types of energy resources which, for only marketable reasons, are more in favour. Secondly, despite the European Community's assurances and commitment for the development of indigenous resources, it does oblige Greece to open up its quotas and restrictions on intra-community trade and allow the importation of ie hard-coal against the further utilisation of brown-coal national reserves..." [36]
The nature of the Public Power Corporation's energy use policies, although it has always been dependent upon multinational corporations and the interests of exogenous international financial centres, it is not one dimensional as the statement above has implied, nor are the European Community's and IEA's policies so blunt. In the first case, the Public Power Corporation's development in the area of electricity generation has passed through the years where Ebasco Electric Company (which founded the Public Power Corporation) during the 1950-1960s emphasized the development of indigenous energy reserves, to the years where the Public Power Corporation policy focused upon both exogenous and indigenous energy resources. The qualitative difference with the past lies in the fact that the criteria for energy use have changed and no longer are based solely upon the bilateral agreements between Greece and multinational corporations or the distinctive domestic requirements of the national economy. These criteria demand the re-appraisal of the Public Power Corporation's statutory and social obligations and the redrawing of its functions in accordance with what the Community decides in the field, and the re-evaluation of its position in the European Community and the world energy market. There is therefore a qualitative movement from the period in which the Public Power Corporation acted as a regulator for national economy and private capital interests, to the period where the Public Power Corporation is asked to act both as a co-ordinator of local and global market interests, and as a competitor in the European Community and the world market, by placing its political image and functions of the past aside. The criteria of the Public Power Corporation's energy use policy, therefore, are not any longer defined by its exclusive obligation to serve the state and the public, but rather by the need to promote its liberalisation from any forms of domestic-social barriers which impede the Corporation developing through market-oriented strategies.

In the second case, the European Community's energy use policies cannot be treated as a homogeneous set of measures which are all designed for the same reasons, and all lead to the same effects. There are contradictions and antitheses in the European Community's package of proposals. For example, on the one had it liberalises further the Public Power Corporation's operations from domestic national considerations, and
prepares the public Corporation to function according to the market rules, whilst on the other hand the European Community is trying to safeguard the Public Power Corporation's development against all the adverse effects which market operations may create. There are therefore a number of proposals and European Community directives for the protection of for example indigenous forms of energy, [37] financial aids for regional and national development of its electricity generation activities, etc, [38] whilst at the same time the package it allows the private suppliers and electricity distributors to compete with the Public Power Corporation on an equal basis. According therefore to the European Community Commission, although the Public Power Corporation (in its plan for the years 1984-1990) has proposed to double the use of brown-coal for electricity generation, the world market intervention through its price for lignite as well as the operation of hard-coal suppliers, undermines the Public Power Corporation's plans for development. On this issue the European Community has stated:

"...The extraction of lignite from new reserves, may present more difficult geological conditions, and in this case the competitive price of the Greek lignite (ie brown coal) may suffer. On certain assumptions made by the Greek government about longer-term increases in crude oil and coal prices, it is apparent that the future production costs of lignite from new working reserves (it is estimated that the price of lignite will be almost 50% higher by the 1990s), maybe - if at all - only marginally competitive with imported hard coal, even if competitiveness with crude oil is ensured..." [39]

These economic dilemmas have already been reflected in the forthcoming energy programme of the Public Power Corporation (for the years 1987-1996), where it is stated that imported fuels will have a far greater participation in the energy balance of the country and where the use of hard-coal, in accordance with the European Community proposals, will replace any future reductions in the use of indigenous energy resources. [40] This particular shift in the Public Power Corporation's policy was seen by its labour force and employee representatives in the board of the Corporation, as the first step towards integration and harmonisation of
domestic policies with the operations of the international energy market. In line with the new objectives by the Public Power Corporation on the types of energy to be used for electricity, the Corporation's management commissioned, during 1985-1988, the US Bechtel Corporation to undertake a feasibility study on the future construction of power plants which would use diverse energy resources, and hard-coal in particular. Consolidation Coal US was to be responsible for the supply of hard-coal to the Public Power Corporation, whilst General Electric US was to be responsible for the construction and quasi-management of some of the first commissioned power plants, and Bechtel would be the general coordinator of the Public Power Corporation's supplies and electricity sales. It should be noted at this point, that the Public Power Corporation's initial favour for the use of hard coal in particular was due to its inability to finance the extraction of existing lignite reserves and its 'capability' to explore the new energy avenues which both the European Community and the IEA laid down insofar as the use of cheaper imported energy resources (other than crude oil) is concerned. The whole study was kept secret and local and regional employee representatives had no information of either the nature and scale of the project. [41] It should also be noted at this point that the study questioned not only the traditional use of lignite by the Public Power Corporation but also its own future as a monopoly in the areas of extraction, use and electricity distribution.

The bilateral agreement between the Public Power Corporation and the US administration was supervised by the 1987 President of the Public Power Corporation and the US Ambassador to Athens, and in the secret documents leaked to the press, it was outlined that the US was in favour of the Public Power Corporation's new liberalization programme for energy resources and in particular the use of hard coal. A part of these letters (from the US Ambassador to the Public Power Corporation's President) shows the terms and extent of US involvement and control of the project.

"...(The Companies to be involved) are: The Public Power Corporation, US Consolidation Coal, General Electric US, A Coupas Ltd and General Cement Company (Heracles)...Up to 50% of the cost of the feasibility study (undertaken by Bechtel Co) will be funded by the US Trade and
Development Programme (a body of the US Department of State)...before approving the funding, TDP will require the full concurrence of all major decision makers in the terms of reference...it is our understanding that the government of Greece is prepared to proceed, to implement the solution recommended by the feasibility study...TDP has approved a grant for US Consolidation Coal, acting for itself and for a consortium of American Companies, to partially finance phase one of the feasibility study for a power project in Greece...The approval is particularly gratifying because it is the first time US government funds have been allocated to carry out feasibility studies, leading to new American investment in Greece..." [42]

Although the project itself, has been halted since the publication of these letters, the Public Power Corporation's plan of development (for the period 1987-1992) shows that imported hard-coal will constitute a major part in Greece's energy balance, and that the Public Power Corporation and the Greek government are in favour of an energy liberalization programmed. The liberalization of energy use is further promoted by the European Community's decision to put its subsidies to the coal industry on the negotiating table in the Uranus Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before the end of 1990. Such a decision by the European Community member states breaks open the traditional post-war path of energy utilisation, where indeed indigenous resources were treated in an economically favourable way by domestic public power corporations against the influence which certain leading coal conglomerates exerted upon governments.

In line with foreign pressure to withdraw from the further exploitation of brown coal, the future use of hydro-power is also facing an uncertain future. The contribution of hydro-power for electricity, during the years 1980-1984 has dropped suddenly, [43] whilst the relative costs involved in the use of hydro-power for electricity generation were lower than the operational costs of thermal plants and the financial costs of imported hard-coal. [44] Despite the Public Power Corporation's assurances that it will step up its future use of hydro-energy, [45] the Corporation has
Figure 4.3  Total primary consumption of energy (%) in Greece Period 1920-1980

postponed indefinitely all major hydro-power projects that were supposed to be commissioned by 1990 at the latest. [46]

In relation to other forms of energy, like renewable resources for electricity generation, the public corporation has not developed its true potential future and the present low contribution to the energy balance of the country (Figure 4.3) suggests rather an unfavourable position for future exploitation.

An example which demonstrates the complexity of the Public Power Corporation's new energy policy and exogenous international influence on it is the case of the Soviet and Algerian natural gas importation. Despite the Greek government's intentions to import Soviet natural gas by 1992, thus lowering the contribution of, for example, crude-oil in the country energy balance whilst covering only 10-12% of national energy needs from use of gas, this project has also been halted indefinitely [47] and the international energy community has reacted with mixed feelings. The initial reaction was against the signing of the agreement between the Greek government, Algeria and USSR authorities, without the full consultation with, and agreement by, the European Community bodies, whilst the final reaction of European Community and IEA was in favour insofar as the Greek government acts within the new context of European Community integration. This response is shown in two continuing statements made by the IEA on the issue of the Public Power Corporation's use of natural gas and on the Greek government monopoly over indigenous resources.

"...To diversify further its energy supplies, Greece is now completing negotiations for importing natural gas from the USSR and Algeria. These two geographically diversified contract will avoid too large a dependence on one source in line with the recommendation of the IEA Governing Board meeting. Introduction of natural gas in the energy supply represents an important and valuable complement to overall Greek energy policy...Any delay in the realisation of gas imports which is currently planned to be completed in the early 1990s could force Greece to rely upon imported oil..." [49]
On the other hand and in relation to Greece's monopoly over the distribution and use of indigenous resources, and in the same document above, it is stated that:

"...the adoption of oil law 1571/85 has dismantled the national commercial oil monopoly to a certain extent. However, the position of the European Commission is that the progressive liberalisation of the oil-market undertaken by the Greek authorities does not comply with the principle of free movement of goods stipulated by the Treaty of Rome.."

The IEA's objective to remove all obstacles to trade in energy resources, between consumers and producers has also been reflected in the European Community's often contradictory approach towards state protectionism of indigenous resources. Although, therefore, both organisations are for the limitation of oil-imports, they pursue vigorously a policy for energy trade liberalisation, which is clearly reflected in the European Community's internal energy market on crude oil use (1989).

"In Greece, imports of oil products are limited owing to the continued existence of an obligation to purchase from state-owned refineries. For the first half of 1987 it was obligatory to buy 40% of quantities for consumption. The Commission has initiated infringement proceedings against this quantitative restriction on imports."

Both statements clearly reflect, the European Community's and the IEA's new position on energy use where a power corporation is allowed to sign bilateral agreements on energy resources, as long as the objectives are in line with the general aims of the IEA or European Community (ie if they do open their energy policies to other alternative forms of energy, which are cheaper and have more potential in energy use), and are in line with the new economic spirit for the liberalisation of energy trade.

Throughout the examination of the Public Power Corporation's new socio-economic function, as far as the issue of energy use is concerned, the new flexible policies introduced by the international energy institutions
and the European Community, and the further centralization and transfer of executive powers from the Public Power Corporation to global energy bodies, have articulated a new reality for the nature of the Public Power Corporation's economic operations and hence for its employees socio-economic position. It is not the threat of privatisation or the indirect economic problems (which might arrive as a result of the Public Power Corporation's liberalisation stance), which might impede any possibility for effective employee participation at work, but rather it is the political framework upon which decisions on energy use are based: a frame which necessitates the regulation of economic operations to be tied to the market forces; which removes the mechanisms and statutory principles upon which the Public Power Corporation's participatory bodies were built and challenges the political notions upon which the Public Power Corporation was proclaimed as a national enterprise and later on as a socialised corporation, (ie the notion meant the control of the industry by the public for the public).

The functions of both the Public Power Corporation's executive committee and of ASKE (Assembly for Social Control) have been further undermined through the Public Power Corporation's moves towards the liberalisation of its economic operations on energy use, trade and electricity generation. The nature of the whole presidential decree 57/1985 (under which the role and functions of ASKE and of the executive committee are defined) as a statutory document, which introduces public control and establishes the right of employees to decide on issues of energy planning (eg Article 2, Paragraph 1-2), is under question. The problem, apart from the immediate questions which arise out of the Public Power Corporation's structural reorganisation, so far as its dual relationship between the domestic and international new obligations demands are concerned, lies in the new perspective under which the Corporation operates, and whose right it is to determine the political context of that perspective. In this case, although still neither the Greek government nor the European Community have reached the final stage of economic integration, it is clear from what has been proposed or been implemented so far, that the role and obligations of participatory bodies move further from decision-
making and control, into regulation and administrative tasks, whilst at the same time crucial topics for the nature of future energy development are decided on the basis of capital interests in the energy market.

"...The government is moving towards the implementation of measures which will further enhance the Public Power Corporation's activities with the international energy market. In all this procedure, the Public Power Corporation's labour force, the executive committee and other bodies played no crucial part...The big 'loser' in this situation, I think, is the democratic organisation of this Corporation and the Greek economy since neither our opinions are considered nor the domestic economic situation...The criteria which the Public Power Corporation has 'accepted' are no longer based at least on what the Corporation itself can financially withstand. It is therefore, difficult to accept that the European Community's economic integration will mean much more than simply the 'surrender' of the Public Power Corporation's exclusive rights to existing energy conglomerates, and the exclusion of trade unions from the negotiating tables..." [51]

This is clearly seen in the examination of the European Community's direction, towards the creation of an intra-Community infrastructure on electricity generation and distribution, through the harmonisation and integration of European Community member states' energy systems, in both economic, technical and political aspects. In relation to the transmission-distribution of electricity throughout Europe, the European Community has proposed as an initial phase the creation of a common-carrier with the aim of removing further the existing monopoly powers of public power corporations and increasing the competitive trade in electricity. [52] Despite the not yet resolved problems on the European Community's common carrier objective, the Public Power Corporation has already opened the procedures for its infrastructural connection with other European member states (other than Yugoslavia and Albania). In a recent document published by the IEA, it stated that:

"...The authorities (meaning the Greek government) are very interested in a project of interconnecting the Public Power Corporation's network with
Italy's, through an underwater cable line. They have applied to the EEC for financing. This project is considered to be a way of strengthening the country's security of supply, to facilitate the more efficient operations of the Public Power Corporation's supply system and also to optimise the overall European electricity system..." [53]

The political outcome of such a project upon labour and the national economy cannot yet be outlined. However, the thought of a supranational body which would regulate and determine electricity generation, distribution and consumption patterns between member states, questions the whole notion of public accountability and of employees' democratic control of the criteria and aims of energy development. [54]

In relation to the issue of an integrated European energy system as a form of political and social regulation, the new flexible energy programme shows that the European Community's new objectives on a common-carrier do not answer important questions of environmental and of a political nature.

"...We, the engineers, have been used to consider an energy system as apolitical. The new phase of internationalisation, the economic interdependence and the worldwide threat to our survival on this planet, have related further the issue of energy use, of future investment in traditional means of power generation, of economic utilisation and political control..." [55]

It is the interrelation of economic plans for energy utilisation and of public control of the democratisation of energy systems, which is lacking from the European Community's and IEA's new perspectives on energy use. Instead they open further the field of energy exploitation and distribution for profit-oriented firms at a local and international level, with occasional contributions for the protection of natural and socio-cultural heritage of member-states. [56]

According to the European Community power employee federations, the European Community's stance on the integration of European energy systems addresses only the interests of multinational capital and 'leaves aside' as
a secondary matter, serious regional, national, economic and environmental problems, which are exacerbated by the further perpetuation of profit-oriented energy systems. [57] Similar views were also expressed at the conference of the international trade unions of workers in energy (ie TUIWE) where it was stated that the continuing trend of energy internationalisation, and the increased monopolisation of energy power by a few conglomerates and economic institutions, undermine further local employee democratic rights and leaves open the road towards profit-orientation. [58]

"There is a public awareness and motivation towards the democratic reorganisation and decentralisation of energy decision-making. The new economic possibilities and the increased influence of certain energy multinational corporations upon our way of living, raise many questions about the rightful continuation of existing energy paths..." [59]

Although the European Community has taken a few major steps for the protection of the regional environment [60] it has nevertheless failed in its reappraisal of energy systems in the contemporary world, to address the issues of democratic accountability; of participation in energy decision-making by employees and the public; and thus it has not accounted for the right which a society has to intervene directly in the criteria for and the procedures of its economic development. Instead the European Community energy commissioner sees energy systems as a challenge for "the provision of efficient services at a moderate cost," [61] through the removal of all domestic political barriers and the creation of flexible energy systems, which will respond to the price fluctuations of energy resources. [62]

4.4 Employee Participation and the New Regulations on Tariff Schemes

The change in the economic and political perspectives on energy use patterns has placed the issue of electricity tariff systems in the forefront of the economic and political transition of public power corporations. The framework and nature of energy tariffs are considered to
be at the top of the political agenda of the IEA and the European Community for the increase in market competition and the establishment of common approaches across Western Europe on electricity consumption. They are supposed to be the main determinants and deterrents for the expansion of the private sector and the state's policies of 'intervention' and bureaucratic control, respectively.

The European Community's new energy policy, insofar as the tariff systems of public power corporations throughout the European community are concerned, signifies for the Public Power Corporation, the beginning of a new era in its relationship with private capital, either domestic or multinational. Although the nature of this relationship although it remains unchanged, its characteristics regarding the sale and consumption of electricity have radically changed through the inclusion of a flexible policy on tariff formulae and through the Public Power Corporation's integration approach into the European energy price/cost system. This system is necessitating the establishment of transparent procedures and the accommodation of market criteria of financial regulation.

Before the analysis of the new EEC policy requirements begins, it is of social and political importance to define the nature and characteristics of the Public Power Corporation's existing tariff policy; and to describe its role in the economic development of private capital in the country. In addition, it is imperative to demonstrate why the issue of decision-making, insofar as tariff schemes are concerned, has been kept out of the hands of ASKE's representatives, and why the nature of the Public Power Corporation's tariff scheme has been an obstacle for the democratic reorganisation of the Corporation.

Firstly, according to the data gathered by the National Association of Public Power Corporation's Engineers during 1989, the cost of electricity use for residential users represents almost 11% of their net income for 450,000 employees with an average net income of not more than Drks 40,000, and 8%-9% of the net income for the rest of employees, (with an average income that varies between the scales of Drks 60,00-85,000). Whereas for almost four hundred thousand pensioners and four hundred thousand
unemployed, an electricity bill represents more than 9% of their income support benefit. [63] In relation to industrial users of electricity, the costs of an electricity bill represents no more than 4%-5% of their total production costs (for the period 1981-1984). The discriminatory tariff policy in favour of industrial consumers is also reflected in Figure 4.4.1, where in fact the average price per KWH of electricity for domestic consumers (in relation to the rate of inflation and consumption levels) is considered as one of the highest in the European Community. [64]

In relation to the nature of the Public Power Corporation's tariff policy and its discrimination in favour of private capital, the Corporation has stated in its 1985 Balance Sheet and Activities Report, that a tariff policy should promote energy efficiency and economic fairness towards its consumers. The first should discourage private consumers from the inefficient use of electricity, whereas the latter should ensure that consumers pay towards electricity no more than the actual real cost of electricity generation and the general services that are provided to the public through maintenance and administrative tasks. However, according to the assistant general manager of the Public Power Corporation (1987), the tariff policy of a natural public monopoly is subjected to a variety of economic and political pressures and in general reflects the overall political objective of the government. Efficiency and fairness, therefore, are relative terms and the discrimination in favour of certain sections of the population or industrial sectors is unavoidable. [65]

The above issue leads to the second major issue which is the characteristics of the relationships between the Public Power Corporation and the private industrial sector, and the major effects upon the first, due to such a relationship. The whole system of the framework of the Public Power Corporation's tariff policy towards industrial users plays a role insofar as the subsidization of industrial production encourages investment (through favourable indirect financial schemes, ie tariffs). This subsidization policy occurs in all major industrial or developing countries. However, although the Public Power Corporation charges for electricity at under the current rate of production costs, it also allows
Average Sale Prices per Type of Use

Centre of Programming, P.P.C., Athens
the use of electricity by bulk or other high voltage consumers at a price which is not negotiated and agreed upon by the Public Power Corporation. This sort of policy in favour of the private industrial sector has contributed to the rapid increase of the Public Power Corporation's financial debts, the increase in its borrowing from foreign banks, and its state of bankruptcy during 1989.

It is estimated that the private sector owes almost thirty to forty billion Drhs to the Public Power Corporation (due to the latter's controversial tariff schemes). It is also estimated that more than two thirds of the present (1986) price of electricity use (for domestic consumers) is for the repayment of part of the Public Power Corporation's financial obligations towards foreign banks. [66]

According, therefore, to the majority of employee representatives in ASKE, there is an immediate need for the government to review together with the Public Power Corporation's management, the latter's relationship with multinational corporations and to re-draft new energy sale tariffs.

"...If however, the government is still wishing the continuation of such special tariffs for multinational corporations....it should pay for all the losses that result out of the Public Power Corporation's relationship with private capital." [67]

If for example, the Public Power Corporation's management was not subsidizing the French multinational Pechiney's electricity costs, then according to the representative of the Greek Chamber of Technology and Commerce in ASKE (1987), the Corporation could substantially decrease its foreign borrowing by almost 40%. [68]

In an interview with a representative of employees in the executive committee of the Public Power Corporation (1987), it was clearly stated that:

"The present tariff policy, its political framework and economic characteristics, clearly favours the private sector, irrespective of
its investment policy....In relation to the French Pechiney, although it is not yet possible to calculate all of the company's net profits, (due to the secretiveness that surrounds the Public Power Corporation's economic contracts with industries), it is clear from what the management has provided, that Pechiney has profited alot at the expense of the Public Power Corporation's financial position. The issue however, is that in the case of the Public Power Corporation's relationship with the multinational corporations, the amount of value that is being generated (out of their conduct with the Public Power Corporation), unfortunately is being transferred out of the country. And in that case the present policy of positive discrimination does not serve any national economic purpose. It does not promote investment and productivity and more or less denies the country and the Public Power Corporation of valuable capital assets which otherwise could have been used by the latter for the development of energy use." [69]

The above issues are clear indications of the Public Power Corporation's economic dependence on the multinational corporations and domestic industrial undertakings of the private sector for the formulation of energy tariffs. There are also clear indications of the political perspective that has determined the relationship between public and private sector in Greece, which to a large extent was defined by an unparalleled (in comparison with other western European states) level of state intervention through protectionism, in the function of private capital in the country, and by an unparalleled creation of informal client relationship (between the Public Power Corporation and industrial consumers) which are not based upon any mutual economic interests (ie production costs, world market prices, etc), but rather upon the economic criteria, for financial profiteering set by the industrialists themselves. It is a system of economic and political relationships which, since the establishment of the Public Power Corporation has characterised its financial operations, but which today has reached its full circle. It has left the Corporation in massive debt, unable to utilise any programme for development, and in doubt over its ability to support its existing operations without resorting to heavy borrowing from financial transnational corporations and changing its policy towards industrial electricity consumers. [70]
Against such a background the European Community's common policy on energy pricing schemes comes to restructure the Public Power Corporation's economic functioning, through a political perspective for development, which although it might be critical of the Public Power Corporation's present protectionist financial arrangements with the private sector, nevertheless, as it will be seen in the analysis below, opens further the field of intervention by individual industrial consumers in the formulation of price schemes. Though the policy for tariffs this time will be based more upon exogenous international factors and rather less upon domestic ones.

The idea of a common policy on tariff systems throughout the EEC and the IEA countries began to materialize during the 1970s when member states of the two organizations pursued a common policy on the coal trade and established a common legal framework of financial assistance towards member states. The aims of this common policy was to control and establish common rules of competition between coal-producers and coal consumer countries and to secure the continuation of coal supplies at price levels which would not impede the economic development of those countries concerned. The idea of a western European common tariff approach was based upon the principle that consumer prices throughout the EEC should 'reflect' the price conditions on the world energy market, and upon a political vision of how to regulate international organizations like OPEC, and its oil price patterns, through common action by the EEC, Japan and the USA. [71]

For this reason, the EEC has proposed and then it was agreed by member states, that electricity costs and tariff fluctuations on an international level should correspond symmetrically with domestic consumer prices, that a 'fair' competition between member states would be ensured and a harmonious influence upon the world energy would be enforced. [72] In essence what the then ministers of the energy sectors agreed upon was to:

"Work progressively towards the elimination of differences in policies and practices which give rise to differences in energy prices within the Common Market. It is important to note that this does not mean that
consumer prices should be identical throughout the Community. On the contrary, the aim of Community policy is to ensure that differences in investment and productivity in energy transformation, (refining, electricity generation and distribution)....are reflected in energy prices so as to encourage rational decisions by both producers and consumers and to promote a political and economic climate favourable to prudent energy investment policies." [73]

The new common denominator of these perspectives on tariff policies is the political aim for a structural change in the present economic function of the EEC's public power corporations; a structural change, which will enable the private sector to overcome financial difficulties from electricity consumption and yet establish an economic atmosphere in the energy public sector, which will reflect market price fluctuations, be less rigid and more dependent upon the individual supplier-consumer relationships. [74] To meet this objective, the EEC Commission has looked at the Greek Public Power Corporation's economic function and has stated that in order to further pursue the common policy on tariff schemes, although electricity prices underwent a considerable increase (since 1975 and before Greece became a full member of the EEC in 1981), in the subsequent years prices for electricity (in relation to domestic consumers) have to rise. [75]

The European Community therefore has urged the Public Power Corporation to raise further the prices for residential use and in accordance with the Greek GBI's (SEV) recent request, industrial electricity consumption prices should be further lowered so that the private industrial sector would be able to compete on an equal basis with other European partners. [76] The nature of the Public Power Corporation's tariff system, however, is already based upon an open positive discrimination in favour of private capital. What the EEC is asking, is mainly a further deregulation of tariff schemes in accordance with the type of consumption levels of an industrial undertaking, and also the subsequent review of the existing processes for the formulation of a tariff scheme.
The Public Power Corporation has already complied with the EEC regulations on tariff schemes and has modified its industrial and domestic electricity tariffs in line with the objective for the harmonisation of schemes with the world energy market price fluctuations, and the subsequent competition between external and internal energy suppliers. To meet these objectives and reach a self-financing position, the Public Power Corporation has been committed to raise its tariff levels for low and medium type of voltage users, whilst for the period 1988-1996 it will keep the tariff for high voltage users at a parallel level with world market prices, and negotiate individually with each industry. Firstly, in connection with the existing tariff frameworks for domestic consumers, the European Community Commission on Energy, through its proposals, has requested that the state intervention on the Public Power Corporation's tariff domestic schemes be reviewed. In this way individual consumers will pay the full amount of production and electricity distribution services, in contrast to the current proposals by the majority of ASKE's representatives not to raise electricity prices, and further that the domestic consumer will have in addition to pay for any development projects undertaken by the Public Power Corporation. In a sense, the costs of technological innovation and development will be met by the public, without leaving the Corporation needing to resort to heavy public borrowing and private loans from abroad. Secondly, in relation to industrial users, the European Community has urged the Public Power Corporation and the Greek government to ensure that the private sector will be provided with all information on the different price levels for electricity use charged by the Public Power Corporation amongst various bulk and other high voltage users. In that direction the EEC Commission has asked the Greek government to:

"...avoid legislative, fiscal or other measures which would distort competition between their industries or which would inhibit the establishment of a price hierarchy consonant with common policy objectives." [77]

The new directives on tariff schemes, therefore, have put forward a new framework for pricing systems which on the one hand establishes flexible rules and norms for industrial consumers, whilst domestic users are
requested to pay according to production costs and in addition to finance the Public Power Corporation's restructuring programme. The most important matter, however, is that as far as the tariff policies of the Public Power Corporation are concerned, according to the new directions from the European Community, a dual political and economic process is going to take place. A further increase of the influence of the multinational corporations, and in general of the international market forces, in the formulation of prices, and at the same time a political intervention by the state, for the removal of major political and economic 'obstacles' for the realization of the European Community's objectives.

The role of ASKE representatives, (due to the government's policy and the new direction of the Public Power Corporation's economic development), in the decision-making processes for price formulae has become consultative and it does not any longer have any executive powers to decide about tariffs. As one ASKE representative has stated (1986) at an ASKE council for the increase of domestic and medium voltage industrial use tariffs:

"...With astonishment we have been informed (ASKE representatives), through the media, that the government has decided to raise the tariffs of electricity use by 15%, with an illegal procedure, which is also anti-popular...it is illegal, because it was decided without the approval of ASKE, of course we had a series of current measures by the government, which further degraded the role of ASKE, the decision by the Minister for Energy and Technology, in respect of tariffs and the Public Power Corporation's policy on auto-producers, etc...It is only obvious how the government understands workers' participation and socialization of public corporations, and how it sidesteps those elected bodies in order to pursue its anti-popular new economic objectives...only from the Public Power Corporation's policy (that undervalues electricity use costs for high voltage industrial consumers) it is estimated that during 1986 the Corporation lost Drks 42 bil....which resulted in excessive borrowing in foreign currency. (The Public Power Corporation has borrowed almost Drks 210 bil. instead of Drks 80 bil. that were needed for investment.) This creates an additional burden for the Public Power Corporation's foreign borrowing, which exceeds Drks 13 bil.
per year and increases the level of amortization payments...There are the effects of the Public Power Corporation's services towards capital and the EEC..." [78]

In another statement by an ASKE/PPC representative, referring to the government's aim to raise the price levels of electricity for domestic use, it was stated:

"Has the management used the Law 190/1975 (which states that the government has to participate (5%) in the investments of the Corporation)? Have the big industrialists paid their electricity bills?...Has a formula been found for the payment of their current obligations (almost Drks 45 bil.) towards the Public Power Corporation? Of course the 'financial order of our foreign loan lenders, and of international economic organizations, are asking for the collection of public deficit...for the culmination of workers' income, something which has already been in force since 1985...Today the government no longer believes in its aims and principles... The (public sector's) socialization is only in the Presidential Decrees...The role of workers' representatives on the executive committee has already been minimised...The Presidential Decrees (Nos 57-58-59) were products of the Greek Trade Union movement and of this Corporation's union struggles. They gave some responsibilities (by the government) because the government had some principles...However, now they see the new international obstacles. So they (the government) have introduced measures to undermine the then spirit of both the Presidential Decrees and of the union's role in decision-making...On the one side the Public Power Corporation raises its tariffs for low and medium voltage users, while on the other it 'gives a gift' of Drks 7 bil. per year to Pechiney and does not collect Drks 40 bil. from the other fifteen industries..." [79]

Both statements are only reflections of the new problems representative bodies, such as ASKE, are confronted with, in relation to the issue of price scheme formulation and in relation to the new political climate in the energy public sector which further undermines any sort of collective
decision-making. The influence of existing policy frameworks and legislative measures upon the ability of employees in the Public Power Corporation to participate and control decisions over the price of electricity distribution services, is immense. As it was clarified in the start of the analysis in this section, the EEC's objective to further centralize and harmonize on an international level decisions affecting the sales and tariffs of electricity, and remove all economic and political barriers, for a more flexible and competitive operation of the Public Power Corporation, clearly raises many questions over the future existence of bodies such as ASKE, as effective control organisations. Even if those bodies continue to function, whatever their functions may be, whose responsibility will be the laying down of criteria on domestic price schemes and what will those criteria be?

The further interdependence of the Public Power Corporation's financial activity upon international and domestic capital organisations, removes further the essential mechanisms for employees' control from one of the largest and most important Corporations which used to be, and still is, the main regulator the the national economy. As one executive council member has argued:

"The Public Power Corporation's liberalisation of domestic tariff systems, in accordance with the European Community's and GATT's proposals on energy-distribution, will not only increase the company's dependence but will further undermine any positive steps towards the democratisation of the national economy and of the Public Power Corporation's social organization...As employee representatives, we are now faced with two major obstacles; the government and its austerity measures, and the international monetary regulations...We must be honest when the European Community directives on prices and tariff systems overrule even moderate government initiatives, (ie for the protection of certain national interests), it is increasingly difficult to intervene (ie as employee representatives) and change the European Community's decisions, at a local level."
This new political development was emphasized during the Public Power Corporation's Employee Federation Industrial International Conference on the future role of employees in public energy utilities (1989). At this conference it was clearly stated that there is a need for the modification of both strategies on union activity and labour conception of the employee's role. The increased interdependence of tariff policies at an international level and the further deregulation and reregulation of price schemes at a domestic level, according the Public Power Corporation's union employees, has created a new reality for workers across the European Community.

4.5 Conclusion

The participation of employees at work has acquired new dimensions in the light of the internationalisation of economic activity, some aspects of which were examined in this chapter. The emphasis of the analysis has centred around two main parallel processes, that of decision-making centralization and of deregulation/reregulation of the principles and aim of industrial life.

The areas which could be identified as being affected by the new economic transition that is taking place, are: the statutory and political ensemble of rules and principles which have so far determined the nature of relationships between public corporations and public bodies of regulation, and have guided the industrial operations of the Public Power Corporation; and the area of economic criteria of the Public Power Corporation's social function, which determine both its labour force's socio-economic position and the country's energy development path.

In the first instance, all three sections have shown that the issue which is at stake is not the implementation of Y or Z measures which might compensate for contemporary energy utilisation problems per se, but rather the nature and characteristics of traditional economic political development which marked individual European Community member-states post-war approach on energy matters and financial regulation. There is an
attempt by the European Community and other international organisations to break with the past, to change the course of today's path of development through the implementation of measures which will all lead towards the economic integration of the Community, making the European Community a more competitive region in a world which is increasingly open to demanding competition. These measures are based on the international application of the European Community's 1985 'White Book', the application of Community law, environmental protection, and on the new principles and strategies for energy generation-consumption patterns, and are schematically summarised in Table 4.5.1. The aim of those measures is basically to allow European Community member states to respond harmoniously towards energy resources' use, consumption and distribution, and allow competition to determine much of their energy policies. These two major aims, according to the European Community and the IEA, can be best met through the further deregulation of existing principles which power operators, energy producers or consumers have to follow at national and international level, and through the further centralization of the criteria and decision-making procedures for the configuration of national energy policies.

The political principles upon which the new policies on energy rest, although they have not yet been defined in any detail and concrete form, basically emphasize and exalt the role which market relationships and criteria of competition play in national and international development.

They reiterate in a modified form traditional neo-liberal sentiments on the 'natural' capabilities which market forces have to solve and ensure, the 'smooth', 'transparent' and 'just' financial and political regulation of economic activity. As 'deus ex machina' the market and its determinant forces focus on the principle of equal exchange between producers, distributors and consumers, and they are accepted as the only possible forces which could restore post-war imbalances between economic and political activity, between necessity and political praxis, and match contemporary needs and interests with contemporary means of monetary regulation. International organisations, therefore, do arrive on the
political scene, as the political 'guarantors' who guide domestic and international social transition. Not as collective bodies who would function as the representatives of different member-states' interests, but rather as organs who would ensure that the above (ie Table 4.5.1) market criteria are met and that the political institutions do not impede either national or international market forces to compete on an 'equal' basis, by not allowing domestic considerations and sectional interests to determine the pace and character of social development. On the other side, the EC or the IEA have a crucial gap to fill in the existing international relationships between producers and consumers (which were mostly determined on an individual basis and accomplished the temporary interests of traders and consumers, irrespective of what the global, energy market, or the international political climate might have necessitated), and observe the harmonious (not homogeneous) global economic and political response towards possible future financial crises and the regulation of resources utilisation.

In the second instance, the analysis of the manifestations of new energy policies, and of the new energy use-distribution and electricity consumption measures, has shown that the new international objectives on, for example, public power corporations, demand a change of their industrial operations' mechanisms and aims, so as to become susceptible to the new global capital objectives. They demand the overall change of their organisational infrastructure so as to be able to diversify further their resources used for electricity production and to be flexible in their trade. They demand a change in their approach towards their financial obligations and strategies. The new economic perspective for the operation of public power corporations, as documented in the analysis of this chapter, incorporates the general principles of the free movement of goods, of human labour and of capital, as well as the general measures which contemporary market conditions dictate, (ie transparency, global production/distribution network connections, closer relationships between private-public corporations, self-financing, etc).
Table 4.5.1

The new EEC's objectives for industrial activity

1. Application of the 'White Book'
   - 1. Removal of Technical Barriers
     - Harmonisation of rules and technical norms
     - Open up of procurement
   - 2. Removal of Fiscal Barriers
     - Harmonisation of domestic energy use and excise duty taxation (VAT)

2. Application of Community Law
   - 1. Free Movement of Goods
   - 2. Public monopolies of a commercial character
     - All-monopolies
     - Rights for transportation and distribution
     - Rights for import - export
   - 3. Rules of Competition

3. Environment
   - 1. Harmonisation of safety standards and their application

4. Energy Policy Priorities
   - 1. Costs, prices and tariffs
   - 2. Infrastructure
The new objectives for the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic function create new realities for its employees' participation in decision-making processes, on at least two major planes of socio-political relationships between capital and labour, ie on the political and economic plane of industrial organisation and on the ideological conceptualisation of participation and its new manifestations.

The immediate political and economic impact which the new industrial restructuring has upon employees' decision-making capability, is defined by the centralization and deregulation/reregulation processes and their new characteristics. The centralization process on an international level has acted upon industrial relations' organisation as a catalyst, which dissolves or rather further undermines local, regional and national political mechanisms of social control. Through the concentration of legislative and executive powers in supranational bodies, existing domestic participatory schemes lose much of their powers to intervene, improve existing policies and decide on the basis of domestic considerations. The mechanisms which were built into the ASKE's assembly for the control of the Public Power Corporation's functions in accordance with general national, social and economic interests, although not yet removed by the government, are continuously undermined by the removal of the essential role which ASKE were designated to play. In relation to the Public Power Corporation's energy policy framework, both the executive committee and employee representatives functions are limited to those of supervision and consultation, within the general guidelines for energy which either the European Community or the IEA and the government have adopted.

It must be stressed that although employee participatory bodies were granted the legislative right by the government (1985) to decide on all the above topics, their functions were limited in practice by the government's austerity measures and its transfer of executive power from local regional committees to the central energy ministry. The introduction, therefore, of the European Community's new energy policies, and their further undermining of the participatory bodies statutory functions, has further minimised the functions which ASKE and other representative bodies were
supposed to play. The new dimension, however, which the European Community's or the IEA's policies have brought forward, is that the general energy policy framework is decided on an international basis, away from both national organs of decision-making and specific domestic considerations.

The second aspect of the new industrial restructuring, which has an effect on employee's participation, is that of the current functional deregulatory/reregulatory measures which the European community and the Greek government have adopted. The essential spirit in which the participatory bodies were established, and the Public Power Corporation was first proclaimed as a socialised corporation, was that of minimising the influence which multinational corporations exerted on the country and that of extending public scrutiny of the Public Power Corporation's operations, so as to safeguard the public nature of its services and democratise its organisation. Against the political spirit of the then initiatives for participation, the new policies on industrial operations, on energy use and consumption, undermine further the character of the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic functions by allowing or rather reinforcing the conditions which lead to the total liberalisation, from public constraints and agreeable formulas on social policy. The European Community's emphasis on competition and the use of market oriented criteria for the industrial activities of public power corporations, and its intentions to compartmentalize those activities so as to end the monopoly conditions which those corporations enjoyed, does certainly have a profound political effect on the Public Power Corporation's structural and political orientations. This is well illustrated in the case of the use of energy resources and in the case of price, tariff formulas. In the first case, the market-oriented criteria push further the Public Power Corporation to accommodate in its energy policy objectives which are neither based on national interests nor do they conform to the local or regional labour intentions which employee representatives have put forward. Instead, the use of indigenous or exogenous energy resources has been tied further to the global energy market trade relationships, and the Public Power Corporation is required to operate according to what is considered as a more profit gaining strategy, which would self-finance its operations.
and contribute positively to the regulation of the energy market. Its relationships with private producers-distributors becomes an exclusive affair which neither state nor other social agents are permitted to impede and dictate their own political criteria.

In the case of electricity consumption regulation patterns, the Public Power Corporation again is required to adopt measures and policies which reflect the global market situation, in opposition to any other social policy intentions which either the government or the labour representatives might have. Price controls are becoming the factors for promoting industrial competition on energy, and capital investment; for guaranteeing price transparency for bulk electricity consumers; for the regulation of electricity consumption at a domestic level, for both industrial and household consumers; and for the integration of the Public Power Corporation into the European Community's main monetary policies. It is important to note, that the new price-tariff policies on electricity consumption have been considered by the European Energy Commission (1988) as the 'backbone' of capital's restructuring objectives and as the driving force behind the European Community's economic and political unification.

Labour's intentions to restructure existing price formulas on electricity consumption, to designate a tariff policy which would lessen the PPC's current dependence on international financial institutions and energy multinational corporations, and democratize further the PPC's relationship with both industrial and household consumers, have been left out of the European Community's main objectives.

On the ideological plane, those new objectives on energy have in turn affected the theoretical perspective of employees' participation and the context of political discourse on economic democracy at the place of work. The centralization and deregulation/regulation processes have not acted only as catalysts for existing participatory schemes and labour's political role in the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic function. They have not only been the framework by which industrial restructuring is taking place in the legislative and economic co-political sense. They have also unleashed new sets of questions on the notion of participation per se and
on employees' ideological configuration of their role in industrial undertakings today.

The new structural and social changes with which the Public Power Corporation is confronted, leave little or no room for the ideological conceptualisation of participation as an introvert notion, which seeks to structurally adjust the internal organisation of an industry and addresses the problem of executive power control, as being a matter of indigenous industrial relationships built either into the nature of production-accumulation processes only, or in the ways in which the management has regulated the whole socio-economic function of the industry.

The continuous economic and political international centralization of decision-making has reached such proportions, that, as the case of the energy utilisation has demonstrated, decision-making on major topics is by definition out of reach of domestic or local industrial bodies. Furthermore, the new international interdependence has created an environment where the Public Power Corporation's employee representatives, in contrast to what they may believe, cannot decide on the basis of either domestic or sectional interests alone. The global integration of financial corporate activities and aims for economic regulation on, for example, energy taxation or the ecumenical problems which the traditional use of energy resources has created and the continuous monopolisation of energy systems by multinational corporations, are indeed some of the issues which necessitate, as the debate by international employee federations in the energy sectors illustrated, a new perspective by employees, beyond the limits of the traditional domestic activity. In addition, the decomposition of the Public Power corporation's existing political and economic uniformity, the further deregulation of its principles and aims for industrial operations, and their replacement by new flexible approaches (which further diversify its functions and liberalise its criteria for energy utilisation) do not only weaken the employees' role to intervene in the socio-economic development of the Corporation, but also diffuse further the political importance which was attached both to participatory bodies by employees and to the political notions for the structural reorganisation of the Public Power Corporation.
Issues of industrial organisation are further tied to the wider political organisation of Greek society and issues of energy control are interlinked with wider aspects of national and international paths of economic development.

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5 'EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION': NEW CHALLENGES AND A RE-APPRAISAL OF PERCEPTIONS

5.1 Introduction

Amidst the current transitoriness of work practices and relations on a global scale; in front of the radical changes that have already occurred and the new economic and political questions which those changes have imposed on the study of employees' participation in industrial undertakings, the focus of this chapter is on how and why the role of employees, their models of representation and their own perceptions on the subject of participation and control, has shifted to new political grounds, generating new dilemmas and enriching further the theoretical spectrum of industrial-labour organisation. In particular the analysis of the Public Power Corporation's employees' role, and of political obstacles to wider participation and control of the Corporation's decision making processes, offers a further understanding of the impact which the processes of centralization, of flexible accumulation and of functional deregulation have upon the labour force. How and why do the parameters of the discussion change, how and why are traditional structural and ideological formulations of the issue are made redundant, in the light of new work/organization relationships?

This study of the issue of employees' participation in decision-making processes rests upon three main theoretical propositions. Firstly the issue of workers' participation and its definition is not given, prescribed or outlined, beyond the wider social and economic context of which industrial relations and employees are part. In line with this general theoretical remark comes a second line of thought, which recognises the existence of certain economic and political parameters which formulate the frames and nature of industrial systems. These parameters range from the level of production, the ensemble of all those spatial realizations which have derived from the social processes of the reproduction of the means of production and of the objects of labour, to the bipolar role of political and ideological regulation, the
establishment of economic and social domination and the ideological 'management' of crises. Secondly, the emergence of a new political culture amongst employees, the economic and political need to restructure production and accumulation processes and the dilemmas which are created by capital's new restructuring policies, have undermined existing forms, structures and ideals upon which industrial organisation was based, and have created a period of transition and of the replacement of existing modes of economic and political regulation by new ones, whose form, structure and ideological 'threads' are not yet fixed, and which are in constant change.

Proceeding a step further, the last theoretical proposition, central to the analysis of employees' participation, is connected with the methodological norms which were followed in this study. As has already been mentioned, the application and use of the concepts of change and crisis are central for the theoretical perspective, context and direction of the study. Building on the concepts of change and crisis, it was imperative that the methodological norms of the study would not impede the examination of the new relationships and contradictions which are present in the Public Power Corporation's working environments and would not restrain the field of research within a discussion of the epi-phenomena, of the reflections of these relationships alone. For this purpose the study covers all major areas of industrial organisation and political interrelationships between employees and management; from the areas of employment industrial recruitment and training, to the relationship employees have with their bodies of collective representation. To simplify further the logic of the study, the analysis extends beyond formal networks of participation and schemes of collective decision-making and involves a critical overview of all those new relationships and results of this crisis-change process. These are thought to reflect both the new in political discourse on the theme of participation and the new directions in the economic and political organisation of industrial undertakings. For the implementation of these objectives the study used all available sources of information, from first-hand observations to the analysis of interviews/questionnaires and other primary sources. There is an intermixture of various methods of research, which have equal
validity, but which cannot be seen or judged separately and cannot be taken out of the context of the environment (Public Power Corporation) itself.

There is a special emphasis or rather importance attached to employees' and management's opinions, and there is a clear preference for the analysis of the changing trends of both political and social behaviour within the Public Power Corporation. But the pattern of methodological thought that was followed can be outlined or sketched from the main types of questions; what is changing, why and how, and what is the impact upon employees.

The first section examines the main problems which were faced prior to the study of employees' participation in the Greek Public Power Corporation. There is an extensive presentation of the dilemmas (both theoretical and practical) which the nature of the subject under study, and of the Greek political reality, imposed, and of the main parameters which comprised the design of sampling methods, of the questionnaire/interview structure and context, and of the form under which the three main case studies were conducted.

Sections two to five, present the main economic and political processes of restructuring, how and why they affect employees' participation in decision making and what are the new elements in employees' political roles within a large public industrial undertaking. There are clear signs in those sections, of the process of polarization, further centralization of executive powers and at the same time of an imposed functional deregulation; whilst there are also noticeable signs of a further universalization of matters related with work, to a point where every single issue that is presented in this study is further interconnected indirectly or directly with wider political issues and its impact no longer is confined within the industrial confines of the Public Power Corporation.

Section six offers a comparative view between three different electricity generation and power distribution centres, and throws further light on the imposition of new working practices and how they affect the political and
economic organisation of labour, and which new factors are added to the theoretical and practical understanding of employees' participation within their working environments.

5.1.1 The Design of the Study

The internal logic which has determined the design of the study rests upon the theoretical propositions which were outlined in the introductory section of this chapter and upon methodological norms which emphasise and evolve around the 'discovery' and indepth analysis of the main tendencies, trends and relationships which are formulated due to current changes and contradictions in large industrial undertakings. The whole traditional path of analysis, which sets up a theoretical hypothesis and then tests its feasibility through specific measurements, is not the pattern of this study. On the contrary, this particular study of employees' participation in the Greek Public Power Corporation should be seen as an additional theme in the thesis that contributes to the theoretical evaluation of the new processes which determine the nature and characteristics of labour's role in industrial undertakings. The study offers a reappraisal of those new processes and how they affect the political discourse on participation and what new factors have to be brought into the theoretical debate over employees' role in economic and political decision making.

Evolving around the issues of industrial change and reorganisation and focussing upon the aim to bring to the surface and identify the main political movements and industrial directions which the current political and economic restructuring has created, the design of the study had to consider three main parameters: the social environment where employees live and work; the socio-economic spatial characteristics of the working environment; and, the morphology of the labour force under study.

The social environment in which employees live and work was thought to play a crucial role in shaping employee attitudes to both industrial organisation and working conditions. The central question, however,
that determined the choice of studying a particular social environment, was whether or not spatial social networks were representative of the wider political and cultural life in the country. In addition, whether or not those networks were open to the new political and economic rearrangements and structural changes and allowed for cultural and political diversification amongst the working population. The magnitude of industrial development, of the influx of information, of avenues (formal or informal) that exist, for employees' representation and participation in political decision-making within the Public Power Corporation, were all considered as important elements in the design of the present study. Social environments where employees are kept apart from each other; or where they live and work in relatively marginalised areas (eg hydro-power stations, islands); or where due to close-knit communities and strict work regulations, employees are reluctant to express their opinions; these have all been intentionally excluded from the study.

Secondly, the places of work which were chosen for the study of employees' participation in the Public Power Corporation had to be typical and representative of the Public Power Corporation's social and industrial functioning. Work which was thought to be atypical of Public power corporation operations (ie experimental stations, power stations under construction which do not involve Public Power Corporation employees, etc), as well as work centres which either are semi-autonomous from the Public Power Corporation's operation and decisions, (eg mines, renewable electricity stations) or require only the occasional attendance and supervision of Public Power Corporation's employees (eg sub-stations) were not included in the study. They were neither typical cases of the Public Power Corporation's general electricity generation/distribution network nor did they present specific modes of industrial organisation where the impact of new forms of organisation upon the labour force could be studied. In addition, the issue of employees' availability had to be considered, since a number of the Public Power Corporation's work places do not present an opportunity for either the distribution of questionnaires and/or the personal interview of members of staff, simply because the labour force is dispersed, and is not located in a particular area (eg maintenance staff).
The last, but not least important factor to be considered prior to the design of the study was the Public Power Corporation's labour force morphology. The study needed industrial places which presented a diversity and multiplicity of different employee categories, of skills and of years of employment in the Public Power Corporation, so that there will be a representative study of employee attitudes across different sections of the Public Power Corporation's labour force. A cross-sectional study of employee attitudes was thought to be of particular importance for the objectivity of the study itself and for the presentation of possible differentiations of political behaviour amongst employees with different job orientations.

5.1.2 Sampling Methods

In accordance with the main parameters of the study's design, a decision was taken to draw the sample of employees from the inner-area of Athens, and to use, as an additional illustration of the changing nature of industrial organisation and its impact upon employees, case studies from three different electricity generation/distribution centres of the Public Power Corporation, focussing on the nature and patterns of new working conditions and relations between management and employees.

The inner-area of Athens and the Public Power Corporation's ten large departments, were thought to be more representative of the new conditions at work today, and to present all the different elements (which were outlined earlier) for the objective study of employees' participation. Athens as the capital of the country's social and political activity, with its scale of the industrial development, and the volume of political and trade union activity presented all necessary elements for an objective study of new conditions at work. Its cultural and social diversification amongst the working population was thought to be the main place where the crisis of existing modes of economic and political development and the need for restructuring and change are presented in an acute form. It is the central place for decision making, where the debate between capital and trade union representatives over the questions
of future paths of development has involved large sections of the population, and where there is a continuous influx of information concerning industrial relations and codes of labour law. But more than anything else, the decision in favour of Athens as the social environment from which the study's population sample would be taken, depended heavily upon the Public Power Corporation's network of operational network. Within the inner area of Athens, the Public Power Corporation's operational structure is a miniature reflection of its economic and social functioning throughout the country. In terms of its labour force morphology, the ten largest departments within the inner area of Athens have large concentrations of employees with diverse skills, years of employment in the Public Power Corporation and more importantly, the majority of employees have already spent more than five years as employees of the Public Power Corporation and have (during that length of time) acquired a good experience of the working conditions/relations at power stations and at various departments. In terms of organisational structure, the departments within the inner area of Athens are responsible for economic-administrative decisions for the implementation of the Public Power Corporation's personnel policies and for the technical development and maintenance of the corporation's power stations. With respect to relations with existing participative bodies of decision-making and trade union or management bodies of collective representation, the departments within the inner-area of Athens cover all existing participative and representative organs and have large concentrations of employees and management representatives.

The population size in the ten inner-Athens departments was estimated by the Centre of Programming and Development of the Public Power Corporation at around 1,500 in 1988 and the sample size of the study was targeted to be around three hundred and fifty (350) employees, in order to allow adequate coverage of various sub-groups within the sample. Having the knowledge of the difficulties that are presented in the determination of the sample size, as well as possible bias or errors that might have been unintentionally made in the decision process, one could only hope that the above estimate is as adequate as possible, for the representation of the population under study. However, one has further to note that the
existing personnel figures, which are annually published by the Public Power Corporation itself, are not accurate in the sense that they do not reflect the Corporation's recruitment figures for casual employment (part-time, temporary, trainees, etc) and are usually based on estimates and projections, as the 1988-89 branch manager of the Public Power Corporation's computer department has explained during a personal interview [1].

Having decided upon the target for the sample size, the second in line step was adequately to represent various employee categories proportionally out of the ten large inner Athens departments. In accordance with the 1986 balance sheet and activities report (which was officially published by the Public Power Corporation at the end of 1988) and the advice given by the Public Power Corporation's Centre for Research and Development, there were three main categories which the study had to include: engineers, technicians (mainly maintenance staff), and administrative staff (mainly economists, accountants, personnel officers). The quotas for the proportional representation of each category were: eighty for engineers, sixty for administrative staff and almost one hundred and eighty technicians, whilst the rest of the employees (which their employment status is termed as casual or not fixed) could not be adequately represented in the study since up to date they are not officially counted in the personnel figures of each department separately and of the whole Public Power Corporation itself.

In relation to the case studies, the study is offering the experience of employees in three main electricity generation/distribution centres. The case studies are supplementary to the exposition of employees attitudes in the ten departments of the inner-area of Athens, in the sense that they provide a critical view of industrial conditions and relations at the production level of the Public Power Corporation, and are complementary to the whole theme of new challenges on employee participation and control of decision-making processes. There is a presentation of three different power stations which had different modes of production forms but which face similar organisational problems and are major centres for the Public Power Corporation's restructuring programme. The Megalopoli combine-fired power
station was chosen due to its large concentration of employees, of diverse skills, and due to the magnitude and volume of new personnel policies in relation to the employment of casual labour.

Lavrion was chosen as a case of an oil-fired power station which operates within an industrialized area and its labour force does not live in the surrounding area, whilst the analysis of Roof Centre offers an indepth view of the working conditions/relations at a power distribution centre. Combined together, these three case studies show how the employees' role at their places of work has been affected by new personnel policies and why there is a new challenge to existing modes of organisation and the political perception of the employees' demand for participation in the running of their plant's economic and social operations.

5.1.3 The Structure of Questionnaires and Interviews

The techniques that were chosen for the measurement and analysis of employee attitudes towards condition/relations at the place of work were limited to the distribution of questionnaires amongst the Public Power Corporation's labour force and the recording of personal interviews with high-middle ranking officials as well as ordinary employees. By the combined use of those two techniques it was thought that it would be easier to probe employees experiences on working conditions and attitudes towards industrial organisation. Furthermore by using both techniques under strict control interchangeably, it was easier to transcend the time limitation (to which the study was exposed) by enquiring into the distant past as well as into the present levels of employees' experience and critique of the Public Power Corporation's economic and social functioning.

The design of the questionnaire and the interviews presented more difficulties than were originally anticipated. There were dilemmas on the issue of which questions it was necessary to ask, and how they should be phrased (so as not to determine or dictate the answer). The order of these questions, how detailed or general they should be, and which scales of measurement or of coding should be used, were additional issues for the
research. The content of the questions was decided after having adopted
the International Labour Office's definition and characterisation of the
employees' participation in industrial decision-making (according to which
the employee's role in participative bodies included the determination or
influence of employment, training, material benefit schemes and of
working conditions at the place of work), and is based upon the
theoretical view of the employees' role in industrial undertakings (which
was exposed in the previous chapters). The questionnaire was subdivided
into four main sections: a section which was concerned with a general
overview of the Public Power Corporation's recruitment and training
policies. A section which was concerned with employees' attitudes on
matters of health and safety at the place of work. A section on the
employees' role in relation to wage schemes and general welfare policies;
and a section which dealt with the employees' relationship with existing
bodies of collective representation (both participative bodies and trade
union associations). In short, the questionnaire offers a variety of
questions on topics which are thought to be highly important in the
theoretical evaluation of the employees' relationship with new modes of
economic and political organisation, which are also thought to affect the
political perceptions and behaviour of employees and are 'held' responsible
for the further erosion of existing participative schemes within the Public
Power Corporation.

Secondly, wording became an important factor in the design of the
questionnaire and of the interviews so as to avoid vague notions and
leading words. In general the questionnaire has omitted phrases or words
which are either considered as being too personal or embarrassing, or are
considered as hypothetical. There are though, certain questions which
contain vague expressions, eg do you think that working conditions should
be improved? On the whole, however, the questionnaire offers a number
of differently phrased questions on the same issue so as to counter the
inherent bias of question wording.

The content of interviews was directly based upon the content of the
questionnaire and the questions that were asked were the same questions
which the questionnaire asked. Most of the interviews have been recorded
and were standardized, although in some cases (eg high ranking officials) the context of the interview could not be recorded and questions had to be altered. In general though interviews were used as additional material which either registered employees' opinions on the issues which the questionnaire covered, or explored further certain issues relating to employees' attitudes towards the Public Power Corporation's economic and social organisation. The number of interviews was sixty and the interviewees were mainly from representatives of either the management or of the employees, (eg trade unionists, representatives from participative organisations).

5.1.4 The Sample and Overall Response

The sample was drawn from the ten large departments of the Public Power Corporation within the inner-area of Athens and its estimated size was not more than three hundred and fifty employees. However, the responses to the questionnaire did not exceed three hundred employees, due to loss of the questionnaires, unavailability of respondents at the time of the study, and the political reservations towards the study's questionnaire which some of the employees expressed [see Table 5.1.4(a)]. (The questionnaire and frequencies of response are in the appendix.) The majority of those who were not willing to answer the questionnaire were trade union representatives and middle-ranking administrators. It is believed that such unwillingness was the result of either heavy responsibilities on the part of respondents, or due to the political restrictions which are indirectly imposed upon trade union and management officials by their superiors or bodies of organisation.

The respondents to the questionnaire were 'selected' randomly (within the restrictions imposed from the quotas) and the questionnaires were distributed during employee working hours at the ten departments. At all times it was observed that the target number of employee categories would be reached or that it would not be exceeded. Prior therefore, to the distribution of the questionnaires, a list of each department's personnel was reviewed, so as to allow a further understanding of each department's
personnel morphology and to reveal the possible availability or non-availability of employees at the time of the study. A few departments had large concentrations of one particular category of employees, e.g. engineers, which meant an underrepresentation of other categories. In one department the management, for political reasons, did not allow the distribution of questionnaires. In the first case the problem was overcome by considering proportional quotas for each department in relation to the total size and category quotas. The loss of access to that department meant that a new department within the inner-area of Athens had to be added to the list of the study.

The measured overall response to the questionnaire was approximately at the level of 85% (excluding the missing not blank responses), and the target quotas for employee's categories were achieved [see Table 5.1.4(b)], this in spite of the management's decision to ban the study and to forbid the circulation of the questionnaires from the Public Power Corporation's work premises.

5.1.5 An Interview with the Assistant General Manager for Personnel

The circulation of the questionnaire was officially banned by the Assistant General Manager for the Public Power Corporation's Personnel, for the following reasons:

"...Your questionnaire is subjective. For example, in the question about employees' opinions on the productivity related pay schemes (PRP), I believe that the majority will answer in a negative way, whereas I believe that they should answer in a positive way - in favour of our scheme. This is an issue of objectivity for us (personnel officials)......

"...After all, what is your relationship with the Public Power Corporation? Why did you choose the Public Power Corporation as your example? .....Are you associated with any trade unions or the GENOF-PPC? (Public Power Corporation's Employee Federation)......We do not know whether you have been sent by the Unions or if you are a journalist, or
### TABLE 5.1.4(a)  \[\text{Survey Response}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial sample size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanswered questionnaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answered questionnaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of employees (at time of survey)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5.1.4(b)  \[\text{Response Amongst Employees}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qualified Engineers</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Personnel</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-administrative Personnel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Personnel</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"even if you intend to publish your results. It would be easier for us to accept the questionnaire if we select the sample of respondents, if we supervise the interviews and get hold of the results ..... Even if I accept that you are what you claim to be, how can I be assured that the results will not be known amongst trade union circles? You see they, those unproductive lazy people, need all the propaganda and support they can get ..... If you are willing to wait for a year or two, then we can discuss it again. The times then will be better for us, whereas now I am afraid the industrial climate is not ripe for such studies....."

From the time of that interview and onwards, the study was officially banned, although there was little that the management could do to prohibit the entry and circulation of the questionnaire in the departments of Athens. The official ban on the study, however, created a number of practical problems such as the distribution and collection of the questionnaires from employees on the same day, the restriction on time that was spent on each interviewee, and more importantly, the increased fear for prosecution if caught by officials who had already been informed by the Assistant General Manager for Personnel. The official ban, however, seemed to be imposed by each department almost after the collection of the questionnaires.

5.2 The Nature of Public Power Corporation’s Personnel Policies and Employees’ Role in Decision-Making

The analysis of the Public Power Corporation’s personnel policy is of crucial importance for the further understanding of the Corporation’s social organisation and hence the employees’ role in it. In particular, the social significance in the examination of employment and ‘promotion’ policies, not only will unravel the Corporation’s labour force composition and the nature of its division of labour, but it will also show some aspects of employee ‘non-participation’, and the reasons for being excluded from any decision-making in so far as employment training and upgrading is concerned. The analysis therefore, in this section, will focus upon the employees’ role, its determinant factors and its political
manifestations in conjunction with the Public Power Corporation's personnel policy.

The examination of the Public Power Corporation's employment training and promotion policies is related to two major issues; firstly, the social context within which such policies are formulated and implemented, and secondly, the immediate implications for employees and their role in decision-making processes. The analysis, therefore, will also include the critical evaluation of labour policies amongst public corporations in Greece, their nature and economic role for the economy as a whole, and their political significance for the control of labour and determination of party-political processes. In conjunction, the immediate effects upon the employed workforce will be evaluated, concentrating upon the perception and role reserved for individual employees and their collective representatives.

In relation to other industrialized, capitalist economies, the level of employment in the Greek public sector was one of the lowest for the 1980-82 period [2], in relation to the total employment percentage (excluding agricultural services). [See Table 5.2.1]

However, though the level of employment in the Greek public sector may be low, the individual analysis of public enterprises suggests that there is an over-labour surplus, and that employment patterns do not correspond either to any rational manpower demand and/or to a rational division of labour, that in turn relates to production-distribution processes. The Public Power Corporation for example, has increased its manpower since 1975-86 by more than five thousand employees, reaching a 'record' level of more than thirty thousand at the end of 1986. A Public Power Corporation employee elaborated further by saying that:

"Unfortunately the Public Power Corporation has become a corporation where employment is not at all related to any internal socio-economic planning. There is a further need (as far as I know) for permanent personnel at power plants and engineer repair sites, but instead the management like they've got no plan, without asking anyone, keep on
### TABLE 5.2.1 International Rates of Employment in Public Corporations (1980-1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>FDR</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-1982</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Public Corporations employment in relation to total employment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>FDR</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-1982</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Public Corporations employment in relation to total employment, excluding agricultural employment)


---

### TABLE 5.2.2 Annual Personnel Turnover in Energy, Mining and Water-Supply Public Corporations (1979-1982)

#### Annual Turnover

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Personnel:</td>
<td>30200</td>
<td>32200</td>
<td>46200</td>
<td>50200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Source: ΕΣΗΕ 1986; KEDE Athens]
employing personnel for departmental jobs, where there is already a problem of surplus labour.....it is hard to imagine how a corporation of that scale and importance can even function with such a division of labour." [3]

According to the Public Power Corporation's official estimates, there are 'roughly' almost ten-thousand employees working at power stations and in areas of maintenance, whilst the rest of the workforce is employed on departmental (administrative) tasks. Another employee added:

"It is not only how many employees the Public Power Corporation employs, but also for what purpose and with what qualifications.....it is not only the issue of surplus labour, but its composition as well, that is difficult to reconcile [4]

Although the management has not produced any detailed analysis of the corporation's manpower needs, so as to compare its employment patterns with its plan of economic development, the issue of employment levels acquires a somewhat different social meaning in a developing economy. The Greek public sector and hence the Public Power Corporation's role in the economy (as was seen in the previous chapter), not only is related to energy extraction/production and distribution, offering services to individual and bulk consumers, but in addition acts as the primary employer of the country's labour force, upon which much of the government's monetary and labour policies depend.

The Public Power Corporation's 'irrational' employment policy and labour division are related to its nature and process of development and the government's use or manipulation of employment for party-political reasons. The issue of surplus labour and of the non-rational division of labour, although they are the consequences of much of the country's uneven capitalist development and its development upon external financial and political centres, has become an important political 'tool' for the social regulation of labour within the public sector and for the stabilization and perpetuation of regimes and ruling policies.
The use of employment as a political tool in exchange for votes has 'opened the gates' to employment (during the 1984 Euro-elections) for almost sixty thousand people, or an increase of 46% in comparison to 1983 levels, whereas during the 1985 pre-election period an additional fourteen thousand people were employed in the public sector as a whole. [5] In addition, according to ESYE [6] (National Statistics Bureau), employment during the 1980-81 pre-election period in energy, mining and water-supply public corporations increased by 17.5% or five thousand employees, raising the total employed personnel (for those corporations alone) from thirty two thousand (1980), to forty eight thousand employees (1981). [See Table 5.2.2]

The total employment in public enterprises rose during the 1981 pre-election period by almost 100.4% more than personnel withdrawals. During the 1984 election campaign it rose by 74.1%, and during the 1985 election by almost 120% [7]. Such patterns of employment can also be seen in the Public Power Corporation's 1981-85 annual personnel turnover tables, where specific job categories have been favoured during pre-election periods [8] (See Table 5.2.3)This table shows an increase of employment during 1981 by 8.4% and during 1985 of 7.2%, and an increase of personnel withdrawals before and after election periods.

In addition, the public sector's enterprises have increased the recruitment of a temporary labour force which, according to representatives of the public sector's trade union movement, is seen as a method that enables enterprises to comply with party-political manipulation of employment (at times of elections) and yet allows the management to regulate and control their labour by further unharmonising the economic and social position of employees. Within a three month period (between 1/3 1985 and 5/6 1985) almost 73% of the public sector's employees were recruited as a temporary labour force and only 13.1% were employed, at the time, as permanent staff. (See Table 5.2.4)
### TABLE 5.2.3.a

**Public Power Corporation's Turnover Per Year, and Job Category**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Employment:</strong></td>
<td>26369</td>
<td>27566</td>
<td>27002</td>
<td>27463</td>
<td>29988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Employment:</strong></td>
<td>2281</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Withdrawals:</strong></td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1431</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5.2.3.b

**Employment per Job Category:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economists</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subengineers</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:**

- (+) relative increase to other categories
- (-) relative decrease in employment of people with those specific skills

TABLE 5.2.4  Employment in the Greek Public Sector (New Recruits)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>19.10.81 - 31.12.81</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>01.03.85-05.06.85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indefinite</td>
<td>1355</td>
<td>7491</td>
<td>10642</td>
<td>14430</td>
<td>1854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>16186</td>
<td>20722</td>
<td>30157</td>
<td>8774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcontract</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Employment in the Greek Public Sector (%) (New Recruits)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1988 - 1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indefinite</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcontract</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>(eg researchers, supervisors)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Source: Oikonomikos Taxidromos, p 83, 4 May 1989]

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Table 5.2.4a shows an increase of temporary personnel in the Public Power Corporation from almost two thousand employees (1981), to three thousand (1985), an average increase of 6.3%. During the same period there was an average decrease of permanent employees by almost 6% [9]. [See Table 5.2.4(a)]

As one trade union representative explained:

"...The political importance of the Public Power Corporation's employment pattern is that it has, over the years, been able to recruit people on a temporary basis, distorting further employment figures. By passing trade union activity (since temporary employees are not allowed to be and are not interested in or are afraid to belong to a Union), it has been able to use employees for a limited period of time, paying them less in both wages and security benefits. What we are witnessing at the moment is an upsurge of a relatively new industrial method, which seeks to lower the employment and hence work standards of employees, and at the same time be so flexible in terms of 'rousfeti' (exchange of employment for votes)." [10]

Another trade union representative added that:

"The government, the Ministry and the Public Power Corporation's management have never published a report on the full extent of a temporary labour force within the Public Power Corporation or other corporations. We have repeatedly asked for 'figures' and places of work, but we have had no response. I suppose it is better to employ people who can neither argue with the management nor can support their colleagues in times of industrial action..." [11]

The extent of flexible employment patterns is difficult to measure since the Public Power Corporation's management does not often release any data on the issue and its published figures are not always reliable, and are never detailed. Although, for example, during 1985 there were reported
### TABLE 5.2.4(a) Relationship Between Permanent/Temporary Personnel in the Public Power Corporation (Total Employment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>25836 (93.7%)</td>
<td>23946 (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>1730 (6.3%)</td>
<td>3056 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>27566</td>
<td>27463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to be almost nine thousand temporary personnel, there were many employees that are subcontracted and are not described as temporary, or there were times when temporary staff were reported as trainees. This was the case (during the survey period) with a number of employee categories, eg electricians and maintenance staff, cleaners and doorkeepers, who had even to share their temporary employment amongst each other. Temporary and job sharing schemes are widespread, according to ASKE representatives, more in rural areas (eg as discussed in the Megalopoli power plant case), wherever there are large trade union member concentrations, and whenever there are elections for local or national government. Since 1986 however, (ie when the PASOK government implemented the first major austerity programme that was decided by the IMF), there has been a further 'relaxation' of employment procedures in the public sector and a noticeable increase in part-time and atypical types of work.

Ever since 1985, the Public Power Corporation's introduction of participating schemes, and under trade union pressure (for a change of employment procedures), the government and the Corporation's management have made certain concessions, that allowed some employee participation at employment board meetings. There are, therefore, employee 'representatives', (one from each trade union political organisation), who are not elected by employees and are politically appointed by fellow trade unionists. These 'representatives' have no veto powers and are not allowed to review and critically assess the Public Power Corporation's structure and/or employment policy. Each 'representative' is allowed only to review employment applications for either engineers, technicians or surveyors, but within the criteria laid down by the Public Power Corporation's central managing board. These criteria consist of general employee requirements, ie one to be of Greek origin, to have a permit to work, to have completed his military requirements and to have no criminal record. The procedure of selection, however, depends upon written examinations or assessments, but which in turn are reviewed and can be altered by the general director of the Public Power Corporation without any previous consultation, and in contrast to employment board decisions. Even the minimum criteria are subjected to alterations and change by the general-director [12].

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According therefore to GENOP-PPC, "...employment boards are nothing more than policy endorsement bodies, where the employee 'representatives' role is only for approval of the management's decisions." [13] Even the participatory bodies, responsible for employment issues (ie TES Branch Employee Committee), are not consulted prior to any decision concerning employment. As one TES representative has explained:

"The branch employee committee should be consulted prior to any employment... (Since 1985) however, we have never been consulted by the management. Not even our departmental manager is able to decide on who is employed and why..... Decisions on employment are directly dealt with by the personnel central office of the Public Power Corporation.... I can only recall two cases where we have been asked about whether or not an individual should be employed [14]."

The nature of the Public Power Corporation's personnel policy is also reflected in labour division, job categorisation and skill, or further training provisions for the Corporation's workforce.

From Table 5.2.5 it can be seen that the majority of the Public Power Corporation's employees (survey sample) have either a secondary level of educational qualifications (56%) or degrees (29%), which correspond to administrative, engineering and technical staff, and constitute the largest majority amongst the Corporation's labour force. (See also Figure 5.2.1) The majority of those employees with secondary educational qualifications were technicians and administrators. (See Table 5.2.6)

The above is due to the fact that either they had not obtained a degree or diploma from a technical college, before entry to the Public Power Corporation, or because their existing qualifications were never officially recognised (eg as in the case of graphists). The usual procedure until 1987 was that technicians had to attend a six month course at the Public Power Corporation's Technical College before being employed by the Corporation. Today, however, most of these technical colleges have been either privatised or closed, thus affecting the standards and skills of employees. As one forty year old technician described:
### TABLE 5.2.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Background</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/Polytechnic</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate Degrees</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Colleges</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5.2.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Engineers</th>
<th>Administrators</th>
<th>Technicians</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/ Polytechnic</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"We are employed as technicians by the hundreds, but only a few of us have got a skill. The rest, as soon as they finish school and their military service, and because most are looking for a job to support their families, are usually employed by the Corporation as electricians. I have met kids that haven't completed even a three months course and the next thing were sent to repair cable lines or electricity generators. Others were good technicians but due to their lack of personal contacts were never employed." [15]

In response to the question of whether educational levels correspond to the Public Power Corporation's job allocation, 83.9% of employees (f=251/300) have answered that they do in contrast to 16.1% (f=48/300) of employees that felt their educational background has no relationship with the type of job they do. In response to (Q8) 35.3% expressed the view that either their decision to accept the Public Power Corporation's job position was due to health considerations and/or due to the general fall in manpower demand for certain skills. In addition, 11.8% of employees felt that their skills did not match job positions due to the lack of certain branches that specialise on research and development, 17.6% that their skills were not recognised by management, whereas 35.3% have said that they were misplaced due to political reasons. (See Figure 5.2.2)

To quote an engineer:

"The Public Power Corporation does not care really of what you are capable of doing, nor even if your educational background is so minimal that simple administrative tasks prove to be difficult. Not that altogether the management does not care for certain skills, as is the case with few departments, but the majority of office employees often do tasks where reliability rather than actual skill is emphasized (by the management)...The issue of job allocation depends more upon your party political affiliation, who do you know, rather than any actual knowledge of how to do this or the other." [16]
Figure 5.2.1  Annual Turnover of P.P.C. Personnel - per job category

FIGURE 5.2.2

WHY YOUR JOB POSITION IS NOT RELATED TO YOUR EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
(Q 8)

1. Personal/other reasons
2. Lack of departmental specialisation
3. Political discrimination
4. Skills not recognisable by PPC's management

x = 3.94; SD = 2.61
FIGURE 5.2.3

THE NATURE OF EMPLOYEES' TRAINING (Q 10)

1. Being an employee whilst not yet graduated (work experience)
2. Student at PPC's technical schools
3. Scholarship by PPC for further educational training
4. Foreign language, computer courses
5. Seminars
Although, as was shown above, the majority of employees expressed the view that their educational background corresponded to particular job positions, there were many employees that in addition argued that their job allocation and position were not determined by skills and experience. The very same procedure of labour division reflects both the nature of the Public Power Corporation's internal development and its purpose and socio-economic function within the society. It is not accidental that many of the Public Power Corporation's engineers and highly-specialised staff often do office work instead of being at a research centre. Their skills are often reduced to the level of job supervision and maintenance engineering.

Because, as was seen above from both the criteria for job allocation and employment selection, internal procedures are often open to political discrimination and control, as one of many employees has explained:

"I was employed by the Public Power Corporation during the last elections (1985), but I remember that I had not even submitted an application for the job....I had a personal contact at the time. I was happy to find a job and support my family. Now I feel terrible because my colleagues despise me and really, I've got no control over my job. I have to say one thing to one person, another to someone else, in fear of being rested somewhere else...." [17]

Another employee said:

"I was employed during 1985 as a secretary for a six months job. Due to my physical attractiveness and political contacts with PASKE's representatives (trade union organisation that supports the government's ideological and political programme), I have kept the job till 1988 (as a temporary secretary). They've (PASKE representatives) told me, recently, that in the next elections and after my contract has expired I am going to be replaced, so that a new PASOK supporter could be employed." [18]

The issue of employment and task allocation and the problems that are connected with lack of commitment and insecurity, are also reflected in the Public Power Corporation's appraisal training schemes. In particular, the relationship between educational background and training provisions,
has shown that 77.6% (f=223/300) of the respondents have received no additional training of any kind, whilst being employed. While 23.3% (f=67/300) claimed that the Public Power Corporation has provided them with some kind of further education.

An overwhelming majority of employees with secondary educational background (87.4%) or 57.7% of the sample population, and 58.4% of higher degree graduates, (or 19.7% of the sample) have had no training by the Public Power Corporation. (See Table 5.2.7)

From these employees, 60% (f=48/300) were engineers, 73.8% (f=31/300) administrators, and 88.1% (f=140/300) were technicians. There were however, 40% (f=32/300) engineers, 26.2% (f=11/300) administrators, and 11.9% (f=19/300) technicians, who had received further training. This training consisted of 52.6% (or f=30/300) of employees that were sent to attend general managerial courses, 26.3% (f=15/300) who attended seminars on foreign languages and computer programming, 12.3% of employees who were awarded scholarships for the completion of further studies, and 3.5% of employees who attended the Public Power Corporation's Technical College. (See Table 5.2.7 and Figure 5.2.3)

Such levels of further training provision, the Public Power Corporation's lack of provision of courses on software and the application of micro-electronic on the design and development of new electricity production methods, demystify further the Corporation's role in production/distribution processes and 'ipso facto' reflect its dependency upon foreign institutions for research and development. As one employee explained:

"...Not long ago the department of hydroelectric power plants consisted of highly specialised personnel. Today, due to the Public Power Corporation's budget cuts in research and development, the department, sooner or later, will have to concentrate on maintenance rather than research or development. At present, the hydro-powered stations use almost 70% of indigenous resources and technology. Due, however, to management's commitment on coal and oil imports, one of our most important efficient and indigenous sources of power production will have
to be on its 'destiny'..... The crux of the issue behind research, employee training, lies not only in terms of managerial attitudes but more or less in the Public Power Corporation's attitude or political choice for its development. They simply do not need any research that contradicts their political conception of development, and in turn they prefer to have employees that do very little than employing people who ask questions and interfere in the internal political process." [19]

According to the Public Power Corporation's Association of Engineers, the management has 'starved' of funds research projects and training courses which update and provide employees with the necessary incentives to commit themselves to any training and research. However, during 1988, there were scholarships for engineers interested in nuclear fusion and electricity production and on the other side, engineers interested in hydro or lignite power production found that their projects were being budget starved. [20]

At a visit (in the summer of 1988) to the Public Power Corporation's Department for Personnel Education, a new dimension was added to the issue of training and employee skill upgrading, when the local departmental manageress was excluding certain employees from a seminar list. These employees were referred to as 'problematics', and instead a new name list was prepared according to their political affiliations. This sign of political discrimination was further validated by a member of ASKE, when he argued that even before an employee is admitted to a seminar (of his manager's choice), he has to 'win' his manager's personal confidence.

Similar political and economic features are also apparent in the Public Power Corporation's structure and system of promotion or status upgrading, and the management's attitude towards employees. Responses to (Q12) have shown that 53.9% of employees felt that educational qualifications, skill or job experience, play no role in actual promotion, and 23.3% felt that political affiliations are of central importance for any kind of employee status upgrading. In addition Table 5.2.9 shows that, in response to Q12, 43.7% of employees with secondary education and 78.6% with higher education, have answered that education/skill qualifications play no role
in status promotions and wage increases. Instead, 31.3% of employees with secondary qualifications have argued that promotion criteria and procedures are largely party-politically determined, thus creating a working environment where 'meritocracy' is absent and instead party 'cliquism' flourishes. (See Table 5.2.8)

Promotion procedures have long been the subject of personal, party-political favours but since the 1987 introduction of new internal employee reports, social and political discrimination is more likely to be institutionalised and increase tensions and/or the use of 'rousleti' as an aspect of employee political control. This is so, because the new reports not only grade employees according to performance but also assess their 'social' behaviour, whether or not they are co-operative and do not disturb the industrial organisation of their department. All reports are kept out of employees' reach and are under the control of branch and departmental managers. As one manager argued:

"These 'employee reports', instead of being an additional method of employees' work appraisal and his/her upgrade, have developed into personal reports that classify individuals according to their political or social commitment towards corporate goals. As a manager, my position has changed dramatically; people, friends see me as a 'watchdog' of their affiliations. What's the point behind these reports, since they do not measure or assess one's work? There are people that have been turned into 'informers' so that they will be promoted. Personally, I distrust procedures that are not open to employee scrutiny and create an environment where one suspects the other. It's not nice, not democratic..." [21]

The analysis of the Public Power Corporation's employment, training and employee appraisal procedures, has so far revealed three aspects of the Public Power Corporation's personnel policy, and has shown some of the reasons why employee participation in and actual control of industrial organisation is far from possible within the given social and economic context in which the Public Power Corporation operates.
### TABLE 5.2.7 Relationship Between Educational Background and Further Training by the Public Power Corporation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Further training by PPC</th>
<th>No further training by PPC</th>
<th>Total response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f (0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Background:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>25 (12.6%)</td>
<td>173 (87.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/Polytechnic</td>
<td>42 (41.6%)</td>
<td>59 (58.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5.2.8 Relationship Between Educational Background and Reasons Given Which Explain Why Education/Training Play No Role in Promotions and Salary Increases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotions/Salary Levels</th>
<th>Problems of Not Dependent on Qualif'ns</th>
<th>Political Criteria</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f %</td>
<td>f %</td>
<td>f %</td>
<td>f %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>87 (43.7%)</td>
<td>29 (14.6%)</td>
<td>62 (31.3%)</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>79 (78.6%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The bipolar nature of the Public Power Corporation's employment, training and promotion policies, which on the one hand appear to be the social product of its economic role in relation to national development, and on the other show the exercise of political domination over its employees through the party-political manipulation of personnel policies, leave no room for any form of actual employee representation in the decision-making process.

As was also argued in the previous Chapter, the Public Power Corporation's dependence on exogenous energy resources and technological imports, as well as its dependence on external 'centres' for its general plan formation, has created a situation where much of the technological conception and decision-making is transferred to and determined by international financial institutions and energy associations. In relation to the nature of the Public Power Corporation's employment policy, the role this Corporation is playing within the international market of energy, has determined much of its labour composition and labour division. Its policy to recruit semi-skilled and skilled personnel for maintenance and construction jobs, shows one further aspect of the relationship with current trends for the introduction of flexible production-accumulation processes. In addition, the existing employment structure and its procedures reflect the government's interest in using jobs for political ends, that in turn institutionalize political discrimination and introduce further means for labour division and regulation. In so far as the Public Power Corporation's training and promotion procedures are concerned, once more there is a dual perspective in their nature and structure. Both are indirect reflections of the Corporation's general planning and both, as is the case with employment, are used as a means for labour's political regulation. In all three issues, employees are unable to control any decision making procedure and, as was shown in the case of employment boards, trade union representatives can only play a consultative role and cannot change either policies or procedures.

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5.3 Employees' Role in Relation to the Public Power Corporation's Payroll Systems

The management of the Public Power Corporation has proposed and treated the whole issue of wage and performance structure and processes without any detailed analysis of the Corporation's problems of productivity and without employees' consent, often drawing their conclusions from productivity systems that have been implemented in other western European countries and in relation to the financial proposals of international monetary centres. Especially since the first widespread implementation of flexible payment systems across western Europe, the management has also responded with proposals for the introduction of a productivity-related pay system, which will deregulate the employees' financial position and, according to its proponents, will increase individual commitment towards corporate goals.

On the other side, the Public Power Corporation's employee associations have long been committed to a specific form of financial activity with the management, ie collective agreements, so that their members' interests will be protected, often ignoring the general social and political implications of wage structures upon the Corporation's labour force. The trade unions have often isolated the member's financial position from any critical evaluation of the prolonged and deep structural changes that occur in production-distribution processes and wage structures.

The analysis in this section will focus upon the nature and structure of the proposed productivity related pay system, the employees' responses, and the social and economic relationship that employees have with the financial organisation of the Public Power Corporation. The first two issues will assist in the understanding of some of the reasons for the introduction of a productivity related pay system and will clarify further the employees' position. To elucidate, however, the importance of new, flexible payment schemes, for both management and labour, the analysis should also examine the present economic and social position of the employees within the Corporation.
In contrast to the beliefs [22] (ie Labrakopoulos V & Firbus G, 1987) that understand, the new proposals for the introduction of flexible payment systems, are measures to curb the public sector's functional rigidity and thus raise its productivity levels, the new labour policy reflects a general strategy that seeks to deregulate further industrial environments and integrate Greek labour policies with other EEC member nations' policies. This is so according to D Papoulias' [23] (General Director of Public Corporations 1988) official report, where it is argued that the introduction of a new flexible system of industrial organisation, and specifically the introduction of the productivity related pay system, is a policy which balances competition between private and public enterprises and restores management's labour regulation, thus introducing a new relationship between state and public corporations. In particular, according to this report, the proposals for a new flexible payment system are seen as a reflection of West European initiatives in this area, eg Great Britain and France, where new payment systems have assisted in the process of industrial reorganisation. According to the Greek Public Corporations' Secretariat (DEKO), therefore the government has to enforce a new financial policy, in so far as wages and the issue of productivity are concerned, that modifies the role and economic function of public corporations, so that the private sector's competitiveness is not in any way hindered. In the same way, the last (1988) Report of the Ministry for National Economy has also insisted that public corporations no longer should pursue and function according to any long-term developmental plans but rather public corporations should respond to national market forces and international conditions and rules of competition [24].

The strict observation, therefore, of monthly and annual objectives, that will correspond with the economic regulation of management by objectives (MBO), rather than management by consent, is seen as a necessary step towards the public sector's reorganisation in accordance with international capitalist, financial and political developments [25]. National and international competition is restricted within areas of industrial activity where 'production costs' are further reduced by deregulating labour's financial benefits [26]. The criteria, therefore, in accordance with the Public Power Corporation's financial policy "of a
the public corporation's labour policy must not be different from those according to which the private sector operates, and be able to replace labour-management antithesis with labour cooperation and commitment, so that both production costs will lower, and the public corporation's competitiveness on international markets will increase." [27]

The government, therefore, together with the assistance of DEKO's secretariat, proposed during 1988 the replacement of traditional payroll systems (that were mainly based upon national labour policies and collective agreements with trade unions) with the introduction of productivity related systems. The first corporation that was chosen to implement a productivity related pay system was the Public Power Corporation, due to its central role in the development of the national economy, (its development projects and commissions are over Drk. 70-80 billions per year), the composition of its labour force, its role in relation to other Western European production-distribution power enterprises and its economic role in relation to the private sector.

The management of the Public Power Corporation has based its arguments for the productivity related pay on the neo-classical theory of imperfect competition of Weitzman H. (1984) [28], and Meade J.E. (1986) [29], which prescribes the direct relationship between wages and overall productivity as a measure to eradicate inflation, unemployment and increase industrial material benefits and commitment [30]. (Politis D, 1988) This new system, that the management has proposed will further disengage wage rates from years of work, experience (skills), and from national economic indicators, ie inflation and trade union agreements. Instead, the monthly wage of employees will be based directly upon individual performance, which in turn will be assessed by the Public Power Corporation's central management, according to monthly performance reports. However, even if half of the Public Power Corporation's labour force is assessed as highly productive, only 10% of the Corporation's working population will receive an extra bonus. Those, whose work has been assessed as very good, satisfactory, or not satisfactory, will not be allowed to exceed 20%, 40% and 10% of the total employed population. This is one of the reasons why, during May 1988, 90% of the total Public
Power Corporation's workforce went on strike, demanding the abandonment of productivity related pay by the management.

According to the survey results, as Figure 5.3.1 shows 49.7% (f=140/300) of respondents were against the introduction of productivity related pay, and 50.3% (f=150/300) thought that it should be introduced. (See also Table 5.3.1) The result does not correspond to the rate of employee opposition to the introduction of productivity related pay, and at the same time it does not indicate either a clear preference for or against. It must be clear however, that during the survey there were many employees who, although in favour of the GENOP-PPC policy against management's proposals, believed they might be better off with a different system of pay (although not the package proposed by the management). The above table shows that the majority of employees wish to participate in the process of wage or material benefit distribution. Throughout the survey, the majority of employees have said that they wish to relate their wages with productivity, only if they know the criteria and measures applied and only if they are able to control these criteria [31].

Almost 65% (18.6% of the entire sample) of respondents (Q15) who were involved in a productivity related pay system, were engineers by trade, whereas 59% of respondents (33.7% of the sample), who were against the introduction of a productivity related pay system, were technicians. (See Table 5.3.2) It seems therefore that there is a relationship between the opinion of employees on a productivity related pay scheme and job categorisation, and that collective payment systems rate stronger amongst employees performing general maintenance and technical tasks than employees with tasks and skills that require individual effort, and where performance is directly related to individuals. (Figure 5.3.2) shows that 64.7% of employees (ie that were for a productivity related pay system) believed that material rewards should be allocated to entire work units and/or departments, rather than to individuals, whilst 35.3% were for the distribution of premiums to individual employees. 74.1% of respondents however, (ie that supported the distribution rewards to be done collectively), had only secondary level educational qualifications, and 52.3% of respondents had a higher degree from a University or Polytechnic.
FIGURE 5.3.1 Employees' opinions on the implementation of a productivity-related payroll system within the Public Power Corporation (Question 15)

1. PRP should be implemented
2. PRP should not be implemented
FIGURE 5.3.2  (Question 16)  Employees opinion on the distribution of productivity related pay premiums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>64.7%</th>
<th>35.3%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Individually, including present salary
2. To the whole unit of the workplace and in addition to present salary
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Levels of Qualifications</th>
<th>Positive Responses to P&amp;I</th>
<th>Negative Responses</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>85 (43.1%)</td>
<td>113 (56.9%)</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/Polytechnic</td>
<td>65 (64.4%)</td>
<td>36 (35.6%)</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 5.3.2  Relationships Between Job Categorisation and Employee's Opinions on the Distribution of PRP Premiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive Responses to PRP</th>
<th>Negative Responses</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Background</td>
<td>Distribution to Individuals</td>
<td>Distribution of Work Units</td>
<td>Total Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the other hand, only 25.9% of employees with secondary level of education and 47.7% with higher degrees, were for the introduction of a payroll system that will individually distribute any material rewards, out of performance. The conjuncture from the above figures, shows again a relationship between opinions on productivity related pay and job-skill categorisation. The importance of such results however, is in the relationship between benefit distribution methods and employee categories, firstly because they show that employees are not all against a greater relationship between their performance and wages, and secondly, that employees seek greater control of their payments through collective means. The latter is important since it shows that material incentives are not isolated from work environments and that there is social identification amongst employees with similar educational and work experiences. In addition (as will also be shown later) performance and productivity levels, despite the management arguments, have not been associated that much with individual performance rates and instead are seen by employees to be related to their job tasks, working conditions and their role in production and administrative processes of the Corporation's function. The system of payment, that the majority of employees who were for a productivity related pay system subscribed to, was that premiums or bonuses should be on top of wage benefits so that both trade union agreements will not be affected and the general economic position of employees will not fluctuate according to the Public Power Corporation's general rate of productivity. However, for one to fully understand the Public Power Corporation's employees' opinions towards the proposed introduction of 'flexible' payment systems, one needs to look at the employees' relation with the economic function of the Corporation and at the nature and structure of present payment systems. In a sense, in order to construe the employees' position (in relation to the Public Power Corporation's payment systems), the analysis has to go beyond the presentation of opinions and show the reasons for the formulation of such opinions, so as to discover the rational 'kernel' within the mystical shell of the Public Power Corporation's industrial personnel organisation.

The present structure of the Public Power Corporation's payroll system, as in other public corporations, is based on wage differentiations that
categorise employees according to years of work, rather than skill, experience and individual responsibility and performance at work. As one employee in the Public Power Corporation's administrative departments said:

"The present pay system rewards no one for either his expertise and/or efficiency at work. Employees can raise their material benefits only through union agreements....." (Interview at DAP)

Another employee stated:

"...The present management proposal for the productivity related pay and its relation to individual employee performance, bring to our (employees') agenda, two issues: firstly, how productivity is linked with employees, and secondly how can one determine the performance?....[32]

Both issues seem to relate to general issues, like the Public Power Corporation's division of labour and how the general organisation is structured. A common aspect, however, amongst employees from different departments, was the underlying issue of one's economic control over economic processes and one's relationship with his/her product. Many of the employees interviewed had expressed the view that employee performance is something that does not solely depend upon individual commitment and that much has to be blamed on the Public Power Corporation's centralized, extremely bureaucratic and irrational organization. A situation which allows little or no room for personal creativity and employees' control of job performance, and at the same time a situation which does not increase individual commitment towards efficiency. This problem was more evident amongst technical staff, who felt that although their jobs are highly responsible, they are not supervised appropriately, and employees are not provided with necessary equipment, so as to increase their efficiency at work. One of the technicians responsible for cable-line maintenance explained:

"We are a team of few employees, that are sent throughout Athens to repair cable lines. Most of our maintenance work should take no more
than 10-20 minutes, but instead, because we are ill-equipped and not all experienced, we usually take hours for the completion of simple maintenance tasks .... Even when we had completed a repair job, we know that probably we will be back next morning to repair again what we've repaired yesterday. Is that how I could improve my productivity?" [33]

Another technician added:

"There is probably going to be a major power failure, in the middle of Athens. As a repair engineer (electrician), I was sent into Patisia (area of inner Athens) to do some repairs ...... The Public Power Corporation provided me with no car, no specific instructions, and by myself. When I returned I did report to my supervisor that there is an immediate need for extensive repair work and that I am willing to work on Sunday (without being paid an overtime bonus). The supervisor's answer was that if and whenever a power failure occurs, then I'll be sent to deal with it. How can a technician be productive with such conditions and how can one assess my work?" [34]

An individual's job-performance is also related to the type of job and the employees' involvement in the production process. Many of the survey's employees who were designers, expressed in one form or another their sense of alienation from what they were doing and how they performed their job tasks. One such employee commented by saying that:

"...At the moment I am doing a design for a future medical centre at the Ptolemaida power plant. This design will probably 'enjoy' the same fate as all those designs behind us......Every two or three months there is a new plan, but few are actually being implemented. This design will for sure end at the back of the drawer. Why should I finish this design within a week, there is no point not for the fate of this future medical centre, not for the Public Power Corporation nor for me.....no one looks at them and to be hones no one cares." [35]
The issue of performance and individual productivity rates is also an important problem amongst engineers in the departments of Athens, which are responsible for electricity production throughout the country. The problem of job alienation and the issue of employee control of economic processes, is expressed throughout the survey in many forms. Many of the engineers, however, expressed the view that the present payment structure and the proposed productivity related pay system, do not raise employee motivations for efficiency. The exclusion of employees from actual decision-making processes and the intensification of work for some employee categories, according to the engineer's association, have resulted in the formulation of opinions against the deharmonisation and further regulation of wages by the management. According, for example, to the president of the Public Power Corporation's qualified engineer's association (1988), the Public Power Corporation's strategy for productivity is mainly a strategy that seeks to regulate further wage levels and intensify work, instead of improving a number of material factors (e.g., material benefits, economic planning, etc) and non-material factors (e.g., introduce and allow direct employee involvement and control of economic decisions). Whenever employees agreed to intensify their work, their material benefits decrease and their economic position was further regulated by management decisions.

"Lignite miners, for example, increased their production by almost 27% (since 1981), whilst at the same time their wages have gone down by 25% to 45%, and on top we have to 'accept' claims that wages are responsible for the Public Power Corporation's slow overall productivity rate." [36]

Table 5.3.4 shows that whilst there is a reduction of personnel at electricity plants, electricity output has increased, whilst technological and financial investments are kept constant, which in turn suggests that there has been a work intensification. This is also evident in Table 5.3.5 [37], and Figure 5.3.3 [38], where there is a comparative decrease of employees in relation to the Public Power Corporation's installed capacity (MW) and an overall increase of net electricity output. Although there are no available data on employee productivity rates in relation to work place and labour categorisation, the issue of work
Figure 5.3.3  Net output of Electricity per Employee per Year

### TABLE 5.3.4  Production Levels at Electricity Power Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output MW per Employee</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lignite Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Tonnes</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customers per Employee</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees per MW</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Employees/Installed MW</th>
<th>Sales/Employees (MWh)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.3.4

Productivity per employee and installed capacity

- Source: ESF-PC (1984) Symposium on Productivity (in Greek) 3-4 April, Athens
intensification is also shown in the example that is provided by the engineers of thermal power stations [39]. (See Figure 5.3.4) One engineer of the DMKTH department said that:

"Most of thermal power stations are under-staffed and most of the people have to work long hours under harsh environmental and industrial conditions. Workers have often produced more than they could have ever envisaged. And what do they get out of the Public Power Corporation? These workers are often under physical threat; they have to cope with pollution, danger and a general work environment that does not even protect them against fire or any industrial accident." [40]

The situation however, at the department's inner-Athens area is slightly different. Employee performance is an even more complicated issue, where surplus labour, bad organisation and bureaucratic structures often determine much of one's work and one's capacity to raise its productivity. As one employee explained:

"How could an engineer be efficient when he is not working with the latest electronic equipment or how could I respond efficiently when an inter-departmental letter takes over a month to reach its destination (across the street)?" [41]

Another employee, at the department for research and development of thermal power stations, added that the issue of employee performance and productivity depends more on the structure of the Public Power Corporation's organisation than on anything else.

"There are departmental branches where employees have nothing to do and branches where work is piling up..." (Ibid)

Such problems are reflected in Figure 5.3.5, where there is a presentation of gap between one's work and wages, and where the majority of the survey respondents (Q13), 76.7% (f=284/300), think that their present salary does not correspond with their work, because either they do too much or too little. This problem of uneven work distribution amongst department
employees in Athens was so evident even amongst employees of the same office. Many of the departmental employees were highly critical of themselves and their work performance. However, a common aspect had always appeared to be the issue of the nature of work and whether what they were supposed to do had any meaning for themselves or the Corporation. In addition, many of the survey's employees showed more interest in national wage agreements than in bonuses or premiums, which from all that has been described above indicates why employees validate more collective rather than individualised wage structures. The issue for example of indexed wages was more important than the issue of productivity related pay, where in response to (Q14) the majority of employees wanted their salaries to be related to inflation rates (95.3%, or 281/300).

Table 5.3.6 shows that a majority of 67.9%, that were for the indexation of their salaries, were also for the collective distribution of bonuses or premiums. In addition, 96% of respondents who wanted to participate in the decision-making process of the Public Power Corporation, also wanted their salaries to be indexed, while 80% of those employees who did not want to participate in the Public Power Corporation's organisation were also against the indexation of their wages. (See Table 5.3.7) There is a strong relationship between employees' views on material benefits and opinion on participation. Table 5.3.8 shows that a bare majority of employees (51.8%) who were for their participation in economic and social planning, were also against the proposed introduction of productivity related pay, whilst 81.3% of respondents who were against participation were for the introduction of a productivity related pay system.

The most important figures however, are given in Table 5.3.9, where, amongst those who were for a productivity related system, 69.1% wanted to participate (in decision-making processes) and premiums to be distributed collectively. On the other hand, 83.3% from those who did not want to participate in the Corporation's decision-making processes were for an individual premium distribution system. Also a similar pattern is seen in Tables 5.3.10 and 5.3.11, where the majority of employees (in favour of trade union participation at decision-making bodies) rejected the introduction of a productivity related pay system, and 81.8% (that were
FIGURE 5.3.5  (Q13) Do you think that your present salary corresponds to your work-load?

FREQUENCY

- 76.7%

- 23.3%
against union involvement) were for the introduction of a productivity related pay system. The second table shows that from all those employees who were in favour of trade union involvement, they also favoured a collective distribution of additional material benefits, whereas 72.2% (that were against union involvement) were also for an individual distribution of material benefits.

The data above suggests that economic and social participation by employees in decision-making processes is related to opinion about the nature of the Public Power Corporation's wage structure and wage systems. The social significance in the figures on wage indexation and union involvement lies in the fact that employees relate their financial and overall social position within the Public Power Corporation to both corporate and non-corporate issues. On the one hand, wages are directly linked with not only the Public Power Corporation but also with national developments, whereas on the other hand, the issue of wages is directly linked to employee representation and control of the Public Power Corporation's economic decisions. Thus the issue of employee performance, and of material benefits, is not independent of the employees' ability to shape and decide upon matters of finance and probably is central to their understanding and acceptance or not of a wage system. In contrast to views that reiterate schematic equations between material benefits and employee commitment, the example of the Public Power Corporation's employees suggests that material benefits, if not linked to internal democratic procedures, are unable to shape and divert employee commitment towards corporate goals. In the case of the Public Power Corporation, material benefits are more closely related to the nature of the Corporation's social-political function rather than solely on individual ability. An engineer described this by saying:

"How can there be any increase in individual work performance when the individual has no control over his work task. I was working for a project upon which the management would decide for a future thermal plant at Creta. We did choose, after research, fifteen possible sites where the plant could be built so as not to destroy the
### TABLE 5.3.6
**Relationship Between Employees Opinions on Index-Linked Salaries & Payroll Systems of Premium, Bonus Distribution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Premiums, Bonuses for Individuals</th>
<th>Premiums, Bonuses for Whole Units</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Salaries to be Indexed | 49 | 32.1% | 95 | 67.9% | 140 |
| Salaries not to be Indexed | 5 | 71.4% | 2 | 28.6% | 7 |

### TABLE 5.3.7
**Employees' Opinions on Participation & on Issue of Wage Indexation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Wage Indexation</th>
<th>Against Wage Indexation</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| For Participation | 267 | 96% | 11 | 4% | 278 |
| Against Participation | 12 | 80% | 3 | 20% | 15 |
### Table 5.3.8: Relationship Between Opinions on Participation & Introduction of a PRP System in Public Power Corporation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For PRP</th>
<th>Against PRP</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employees in Favour of Participation</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees Against Participation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>81.3%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.3.9: Employees' Opinions on Participation and Methods of Premiums/Bonuses Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Distribution at Individual Levels</th>
<th>Distribution at Collective Levels</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Decision-making</td>
<td>f %</td>
<td>f %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>42 30.0%</td>
<td>94 69.1%</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>10 83.3%</td>
<td>2 16.7%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
environment and not to destroy some of the island's villages. Instead, without any explanation on the part of the management, they decided on their own and will start building the station in the most unsuitable location. How can an engineer give the best of himself when decisions are continuously not based upon his work, and at the end his work is reduced to a symbolic act?" [42]

Another employee said:

"...Our research colleagues have produced many reports and have investigated a lot in both engineering and in the field of economics of operations, but their studies are kept in the library for future reference. They have even (some of them) developed a whole project of how to utilise further designs and how an engineer can make use of modern methods of investigation through micro-processors. Everything is kept like it has never existed. It seems that the Corporation bases its economic activity not on employees' reports and research findings but rather on external plans and guidelines set up by the government and the EEC." (Ibid)

The absence of an kind of management-labour consultation process, and in particular between employees and supervisors, is also validated by the survey's population, since a clear majority, 65.9% (f=195/300), argued that they have never been consulted by their supervisors on matters related to work (Q35). The results, however, of employee responses on issues relating to both present and future payroll systems, and on issues related to their economic role within the Corporation, not only contradict common assertions on employee motivation and its features, not only shows the importance of internal democratic procedures for employees' performance [43] but also add a new dimension in the analysis and appraisal of the employees' role in the financial and overall economic function of an enterprise. This new dimension is shown in the way employee opinion and actions are formulated, and how they respond to payroll systems and corporate economic goals. It is shown in the critical approach and actions of employees (intentionally or even unintentionally), which are
TABLE 5.3.10 Employees' Opinions on Trade Union Participation and the Proposed Introduction of a PRP System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade Union Participation</th>
<th>For PRP</th>
<th>Against PRP</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5.3.11 Relationship Between Employees' Opinions on Trade Union Participation and Systems of Premium/Bonus Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade Union Participation</th>
<th>Distribution at Individuals</th>
<th>Distribution at Units</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
expressed within their dual role in the economic formation of an organisation. On the one hand there is the employees' relationship with the process of work and product, and on the other hand their ideological and cultural conceptualization of the nature of work in the organisation and their relationship to broad economic processes (i.e., the Public Power Corporation's place and role within the national socio-economic development of the country). The conjuncture of both issues have (in the case of the Public Power Corporation) facilitated the understanding of the nature of the Public Power Corporation's payroll systems and of the employees' socio-economic role within the Corporation [44].

The issue of economic control and employee involvement in both the Public Power Corporation's production/distribution and financial regulation, has appeared throughout the survey in many areas and in different forms of expression. In this section, however, two major aspects have appeared that further demystify the employees' role within the Corporation (in so far as wage and other economic benefits are concerned), in relation to the issue of economic control and representation. The first revolves around the issue of the employee's relationship with job-tasks and performance levels [45], where the majority of respondents have proposed a system of material distribution and production organisation, that depends on the team or department's work, and where material benefits are controlled by collective means. [46] The second involves the Public Power Corporation's inter-relationship with wider socio-political decisions, (e.g., the government's monetary and labour policies, international monetary institutions, etc), where employees have shown that any effective control of economic resources within the Public Power Corporation can only be adequately achieved if and whenever employees are also represented and are able to control decision-making at a national level.
5.4 Working Environments: A Negative Experience

The analysis of the Public Power Corporation's working conditions (in addition to the aspects of its personnel policy already analysed), is crucial for both the determination of employee attitudes towards the Corporation, its social and economic functioning, and for the identification of some of the factors that 'render' their working environment an estranged spatial confine within which employees cannot shape or change conditions of work that affect their physical and social well-being.

Although the issue of conditions at work is usually seen as an exclusive aspect of work, (that has little relevance to the issue of participation), the experience that stems out of these conditions, the problems and antitheses between one's cultural and physical being at the work place and one's socio-political position within the industry cannot be treated as topics of no relation. It has been, however, an overwhelming practice, amongst industrial sociologists and trade unionists, to treat participatory issues and decision procedures in isolation and theoretical exclusion from working conditions and the problems employees encounter. Indeed, the working environment and its effects upon employees has for long been portrayed as an issue with little political meaning, where the well being of employees is seen as a peripheral matter to the issue of power and socio-political control. There are analyses of how a working environment should be, and to what kind of benefits an employee should be entitled. There are even some timid approaches to the role and effects that working conditions and welfare provision within an industry have upon society and the state and upon its economic and social development. How often however, is the analysis of employees' conditions at work reflected in the analyses of democratic representation and control within an industrial undertaking? How often are working conditions seen as political manifestations of industrial organisation, and how often are welfare industrial issues analysed in the light of employees' experiences and their social role in large undertakings?
Although the theoretical implications of traditional aspects of industrial sociology analyses cannot be detailed and explored in this chapter, the analysis of working conditions, their relevance for participation in relation to the Public Power Company has to express an interwoven relationship between the ensemble of social effects of spatial conditions and the whole industrial structure as a whole, into a unified process. In the first instance the case study of the Public Power Company reveals that working conditions are not only determined by the specific nature of work but also by work relations and the regulations that prevail. Decisions on issues relating to welfare or other employee provisions are not taken either in consideration of employee objectives and/or in relation to specific problems, that are determined by specific spatial conditions. Instead, the Public Power Company's general welfare policies (as is also the case with other public corporations) are based and determined by the Corporation's socio-economic function and the government's monetary and overall labour policies. The state of employees' physical and social conditions is therefore largely determined by the Corporation's policies on development and its political approach to the labour force. In the second instance, however, decision-making centralisation and the political nature of working conditions and in turn the new welfare provisions have 'opened-up' the role spatial networks play for both the physical and political conditions of employees. The study, therefore, of the working environment cannot merely be reduced to a study of 'social policy recommendations' and provisions or to a study of how and why employee physical conditions are affected by work. It has also to account for the employees' powerlessness to intervene and change their working conditions.

Amidst all the theoretical and practical difficulties that the survey has encountered, the management's non-cooperation attitude on issues of employee conditions at work, their secretiveness on the release of information relating to job-related health problems, and their quick response to ban the distribution of questionnaires in the departments of the Public Power Corporation, has reflected its political attitude towards the labour force. However, it must be noted here that the management asked that if the survey was to be allowed in the Public Power Corporation, then the research would have to be restricted to specific departments (of
the management's choice) where interviews and questionnaires would be limited to specific employees (of the management's choice).

Similar problems were also encountered with trade union officials from GENOP-PPC, whose reaction to the survey could be described as that of apathy towards research, and ignorance of the validity and political meaning, knowledge and analysis of working conditions for employees and the labour force as a whole. The Federation had no records of any detailed analysis of its members working conditions, whereas the general attitude (in relation to the issue) could be described as being class-reductionist but with no reference to either the political economy of working conditions or the socio-political nature of employee relationships within a working environment. It must also be noted that most of the trade union representatives (from departments and the Federation) had some abstract knowledge of some of the problems that employees face at work, but were in difficulty when answering specific questions and detailing their policy recommendations. In contrast, employee representatives at branch level and non-representative employees were more conscious of both the implications their work has for their socio-physical condition and their role in the Public Power Corporation. The majority of employees from the sample population thought that working conditions and welfare provisions in particular put their physical state at risk and are inadequate to cope with the complexity and diversity of work-related problems. Participatory schemes were also seen as inadequate forms of 'representation', where the majority of respondents could not intervene in the general decision-making processes, and where welfare provisions were not be seen as being determined in any way by employees.

The majority of respondents (Q20) have expressed that they are moderately satisfied with their present job, whilst those who were very satisfied or not satisfied accounted for only 6.4% and 17% of the sample respectively. Variations however, in job satisfaction are related to and fluctuate according to specific job categories, so that, for example, 91% of engineers were moderately satisfied, as were 76.2% of administrators and 70.7% of technicians, whereas 22.3% of technicians were not satisfied with their jobs, as were 14.3% of the administrators and 6.4% of the engineers.
(See Table 5.4.1) The majority of those employees who were moderately satisfied (i.e. engineers), thought that their nature of work is not self-fulfilling in mental and financial terms and that they have to work in extremely hazardous conditions and under time pressure which puts at risk theirs and other employees' health. As one engineer at the department for hydro-powered stations said:

"...a few minutes ago I received a call from the dump in Megdova region. The supervisor there informed me that there is another 'crack' in the dump....Every time that I'm sent there I am ordered to do 'patch-work' and repairs, as best I can (at the dump) irrespective of my opinion which asks for a total repair.....Sometimes I feel like the phone is going to ring and I am going to be informed of a disaster..."

[47]

Another engineer said:

"Working conditions for us engineers always involve a high amount of health risk and personal responsibility for others. We have often to do repairs and advise others on equipment that is totally unsafe....How can I perform my jobs when I am only restricted within administrative-financial limits. At the moment there are sites where employees are working under the worst possible conditions and yet the only thing that an engineer can do is to make sure that no major accident will happen within a week or two."  [48]

The majority of respondents however expressed the view that working conditions (including welfare provision) constitute at large a prerequisite factor, that determines both employees' levels of job-satisfaction and their general response and attitude, towards the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic function. An overall majority, for example, (97.3%) of respondents argued that working conditions should be improved (Q21), whilst only 2.7% of employees thought that working conditions should not be improved, either because they were not dissatisfied with their environment of work, and/or because the nature of their work was not affecting their socio-physical conditions. Both
### Table 5.4.1 Relationship Between Job Categories and Levels of Job Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Category</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Moderately Satisfied</th>
<th>Not Satisfied</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td>71 (91%)</td>
<td>5 (6.4%)</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32 (76.2%)</td>
<td>6 (11.3%)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>110 (70.1%)</td>
<td>35 (22.3%)</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.4.2 Relationship Between Job Categories and Attitudes on Working Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Category</th>
<th>Working Conditions to be Improved</th>
<th>Working Conditions Not to be Improved</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>79 (98.8%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>38 (92.7%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>154 (97.5%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 5.4.1  (Question 22)

Which areas should be improved?

1. In all areas
2. Organisation-distribution of work
3. Pay-democratic procedures for promotion
4. Health & Safety at work
5. Alternative relations with management
engineers (98.8%, \( f = 79/300 \)), and technicians (97.5%, \( f = 154/300 \)) constituted the two main groups which were asking for job-improvements (See Table 5.4.2). The empirical and theoretical crux of the issue however, was presented when employees were asked (Q22) to point the areas or topic which should be considered as the major factors that contribute and affect working conditions. The importance of this question is that it shows in a very clear manner that respondents related environmental matters with organisational aspects of work, and that employees show an understanding that their socio-physical conditions depend on a number of factors that are all interrelated and are determined by the Public Power Corporation's general monetary and labour policies. In relation therefore to (Q22), 6.1% of respondents suggested that there should be improvements in all areas of the Public Power Corporation's work organisation (eg employment, promotion-pay, health and safety, etc), 28.4% asked for better organisation and equal distribution of work, 4.8% for better pay and democratic promotion procedures, 52% for health and safety regulations at work places that will increase health provision for employees, and lastly, 8.7% of employees asked for an alternative industrial relations organisation. [See Figure 5.4.1] Those that have asked for better work organisation, complained that at present (as was also shown in the previous section) work inside different departments and branches is not distributed in accordance with the number of employees and their qualifications, thus creating sections where employees have to work more and to be responsible for tasks for which they are not skilled. Many of the Public Power Company's engineers and technical staff complained that often they have to perform different tasks which both complicate and increase their amount of work and put at risk their physical and mental condition. Some of the technicians said that they have to do tasks for which they have no qualifications and which can be proved to be extremely hazardous, while others stated that in performing tasks, for which they have no training, this devalues their labour power and the quality of their work.

"We are often ordered to do repairs on substations or whole stations without being consulted whether our technical training and experience allows us to carry out such repairs. Most of the time we try to delay
our repairs or even ask someone else to do the job because we are afraid that there might be an accident."  [49]

An engineer from the department of hydro-power, research and development unit (DAYE) added:

"Although I've specialised and I belong to this department, I was sent yesterday to inspect and carry out repairs at Megalopoli Thermo-Power Station. It seems that the Public Power Company is relying a lot on the good will of its employees, but at the same time it does not care for either their safety or their work quality. It all comes down to costs and the Public Power Company is trying not only to limit its repair costs, but also to use its labour force for all job-tasks, irrespective of qualifications."

A third of those employees with a higher degree level of education (33% of respondents) as compared with 25.5% of those with only secondary education, have asked for better work organisation. This directly or obliquely asserts that this group of personnel, due to its specialization, is more career-orientated than others, and their skill-power is an important element of their economic and social identification within the Public Power Company. (See Table 5.4.3)

In particular, the engineer's association is the most powerful trade union organisation within the Public Power Company, which is able to unify its members on issues of job-upgrading and pay rises, as well as mobilize them during industrial disputes. The management of the Public Power Company however, by following a policy of job deregulation, has put under threat both this group's skill power and work-regulation, by distorting the value of their work and by creating technical divisions amongst employees of the same skill and job category. For instance, there are engineers who have their skills and position upgraded whilst others are having their skills further demarcated (job-rotation), losing contact with their original skills and hence the value of their work (in comparison to other engineers who have some qualifications and some skills). Others have been situated amongst the inner-Athens departments (where often work is not related to...
TABLE 5.4.3  Relationship Between Employee Educational Background and Employee Responses on Which Areas Working Conditions Should Be Improved (Q 22)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In All Areas</th>
<th>Work Organisation</th>
<th>Pay/Promotion</th>
<th>Health &amp; Safety</th>
<th>Alternative Industrial Relations</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECONDARY EDUCATION</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHER DEGREE EDUCATION</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5.4.4  Relationship Between Job-Categories and Employee Responses on Which Areas Working Conditions Should be Improved (Q 22)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In All Areas</th>
<th>Work Organisation</th>
<th>Pay/Promotion</th>
<th>Health &amp; Safety</th>
<th>Alternative Industrial Relations</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGINEERS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMINISTRATORS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHNICAL STAFF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
either skill-specialisation or educational qualifications), and those are at the moment placed according to their area of specialization, often doing a mixture of administrative and other tasks. Similar problems were also witnessed during a visit at the department (DAP) where most of the economists are situated. Only few of the economists were actually performing tasks similar or identical to their educational specialization, whereas the majority were either involved in accountancy or were doing simple administrative jobs or were even allocated to secretarial jobs. (This was most evident amongst female economists.)

4.8% of employees have asked for better pay and democratic promotion and job transfer procedures. Although the number of employees was small, there were many employees who have complained about the present wage system, due to the fact that it does not adequately compensate employees for dangerous-type jobs and because it discriminates against those who are employed doing maintenance. One employee explained further by stating that:

"The maintenance staff receive no extra pay because of the nature of work in which they are involved. On the other hand the Public Power Company's doorkeepers not only enjoy favourable conditions of work, (they never do anything), but they also receive an extra bonus because of the 'dangerous' nature of their work." [50]

Another employee added:

"...not only we (as technical staff) are paid no extra money to compensate for our highly dangerous job-tasks, but we have to put up with an undemocratic job transfer system. Most of us have no control over where we are sent or what we are doing." (Ibid.)

Both issues bring us to the third problem which employees encounter at work, that of health and safety. As was seen before, the overall majority of employees (52%) have asked for considerable improvements in the health and safety regulations and provisions at work by the Public Power Company. Table 5.4.3 shows that the majority of respondents (Q22) with
secondary level educational qualifications (55.3%) asked for improvements in health and safety at their place of work whereas 46.6% (or 17.9% of sample) of those with a higher university or polytechnic degree did so. A similar pattern of relationship between employee qualifications and response on issues of safety regulations and health provisions is also evident in Table 5.4.4, where 60.2% of technicians wanted improvements in health and safety (33.6% of survey sample), as compared with 27.6% of administrators and 45.6% of engineers (3.6% of sample respectively).

The extent of health hazards and their effects upon employees, is shown in Figure 5.4.2, where since 1979, fatal accidents have increased by 8%, and the number of reported casualties have almost doubled by 103 cases between 1979 and 1986. In specific terms, the degree of casualty seriousness (in relation to days when employees are absent from work as a result of an accident) has risen by almost 4% (those that were over fifty days out of work), whereas the number of employees who had to be out of work for seven days almost, has risen from 252 to 299 people (or an increase of almost 15%). In addition there was a rapid variation increase by 22.6% (1979-1986), in people who, due their accidents, had to spend between seven and fifty days in hospital or at home. [51]

The severity and extent of health hazards at work, is also reflected in the relationship between accidents and the age of employees. In the same figure, the age group 25-35 years is the most vulnerable to accidents and reported cases since 1979 have risen to 256, an increase of almost 117 or 45%. In addition, there has been a rapid increase (by 63%) in accidents to employees who are under twenty-five years of age. The majority of the Public Power Corporation's young trainees and young unemployed (working under a youth scheme) for example, are obliged to work in dangerous job-tasks, without any adequate training or clothing, for a wage that is less than what is paid to an unskilled employee. Most of the Public Power Corporation's young employees, therefore, have often to work by day for the Public Power Corporation and by night for someone else, which constitutes an additional factor that contributes to their health and life being so often at risk. According to the technicians' association, these youths because of long hours of work, poor nutrition (a young trainee
Figure 5.4.2 Levels of occupational accidents, according to Employee, years of age and days out of work

receives only £1.00 for drinks and meals during his day's work at the Public Power Corporation), are not fit for most of the jobs that they are assigned to do. [52]

The conditions young employees experience are not only confined to the Public Power Corporation's working practices. According to official statistics provided by the department for health and welfare (IKA 1986), three age groups appear to be most affected by working environments. [53] Those that belong to the 20-24 year age group have their accident incidents being increased from 10% during 1975 to 11% during 1984, whilst for those between 25-29 years, accidents have increased from 14.3% to 15.3% by 1984. There has also been a rapid increase in accidents of employees between 30-34 years from 10.4% of all accidents during 1975 to 13.8% by 1984.

Both sets of accident patterns (in relationship to days lost and age groups) suggest that the degree of accident severity has increased rapidly and that younger employees are most likely to be affected by their work environment. Since the corporation has not accounted for and measured both the different types of accidents that can usually occur, and/or the relationship between accident rates and job categories, it is rather difficult to draw further any important relationship between work environment and employee physical condition. According to the interviews, however, it seems that all those employees (engineers and technicians), who are responsible for the repair of production units or substations and the maintenance of transmission lines, are, as was shown above, often working in a hazardous environment in which their or other employees' conditions of health are under threat. On the one hand there was a clear understanding by employees that the nature of their jobs involves an amount of risk that no organization could ever adequately compensate for or remove, whilst there were many employees that blamed the Public Power Corporation and the nature of its social organisation for many of the accidents which occurred at work. Technicians were first amongst those that complained, during the survey, that they both have to work with inadequate training and without the adequate tools and protective clothing. As one technician said:
"...We have to do repairs on cable lines....the Public Power Corporation is insisting that we wear our helmets during our job, yet they insist on sending us to do any repair without turning off the power from those cables. Is it more likely that an employee hits his head or rather that he is burned by the current? .... Our lives cost less than her (the Public Power Corporation) economic policy for a productivity increase....." [54]

A KES (Central Workers' Committee) representative from the department responsible for hydro-power electricity maintenance and production stations, explained further by arguing that:

".... Although I am the secretary and president responsible for KES function amongst the inner-Athens departments, and a member of the executive for PASKE (trade union organisation that is closely linked with PASOK and the government), I must admit that the Public Power Corporation has had so far no good record insofar as health and safety at work is concerned. First of all, although KES should be provided with all necessary legislation (since one of its many functions is to 'control' matters relating to health and safety), we have been reduced to a committee that receives only employee complaints, but can take little or no action at all. The Public Power Corporation is using a number of chemicals, a number of tools in the process of electricity production and transmission that are unknown to us. It is unknown whether this or the other has side-effects against employees .... We have got no charter (as other European Public Corporations have) of how employees should handle certain materials .... There are no seminars (as a result of the Public Power Corporation's secrecy on issues of health hazards) for employees, and in turn we have been reduced to a bureaucratic committee that does not act, not say anything, just exists. There is no education for employee health inspectors and not even one leaflet to inform them on health issues .... The only health and safety material (information package) that was ever produced by the Public Power Corporation was during the 70s, one in case of fire, one in case of electrocution, and one in case of an accidental fall. Nothing about employee rights and obligations at work."
### TABLE 5.4.5  
Relationship Between Degrees of Supervisor Consultation and Employee Responses on Which Areas Working Conditions Should be Improved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEGREE OF CONSULTATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never:</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The lack of any sort of employee representation and consultation in matters of health and safety at the place of work was also shown to be a feature of the existing relationship between employees and supervisors at the workplace. Table 5.4.5 shows that (56.9%) of respondents, whose supervisors have never consulted them on issues related to either job conditions and/or the nature of the job, also want improvements in health and safety at the work place. Many of the employees interviewed have repeatedly stressed that the role of supervisors and of middle managers is reduced only to supervision, whereas the employee's role is reduced to mere passive acceptance and subordination or submission to whatever is asked. When employees were informed that a number of international labour codes enable them to resist work if their life or general health condition are believed to be under threat, they responded by saying that for an employee to object to work on the grounds of safety would be rash. The performance of an employee under any work conditions becomes an ineluctable necessity since according to employee representatives, employees' opinions don't matter, they are not consulted at any stage and their job prospects are always under threat since the corporation is using its labour policy (like promotion, the employment by the Public Power Corporation as full-time employees, transfers etc) as a tool for labour discipline. One employee representative from the Public Power Corporation Federation (GENOP-PPC) said:

"The Public Power Corporation has not only never allowed the disclosure of any sort of information (relating to health and safety standards) that might result in any collective action against the present state of affairs, but it has also created a state of fear amongst employees, by repeatedly 'punishing' those that are characterised as 'problematics' whilst promoting or favouring those that keep their mouths shut."

This sort of labour policy was more evident amongst engineers and in many instances has been openly expressed by employees, who out of fear for their careers declined to give a full interview on issues relating to health and safety at work. Others, although reluctant about the interview, have expressed some horrific stories concerning how and why accidents occur, and how the management has dealt with both the media and
Do you regard provisions in relation to sick-pay as adequate?
particular departments (in which the accidents have happened). As one department manager has said:

"Two years ago I did give an interview to a journalist about a nineteen year old technician who was involved in a fatal accident .... I thought that the corporation was responsible for his death, and that compensation should be paid to his family .... The result was that although my promotion was due last year (1987), it has not yet come and it will never probably occur since my pension is due at any moment now ...." [55]

The issue of health and safety at work (apart from the already discussed problems of employee relationships and their role within the Public Power Corporation) has also been related by employees to the state of the Public Power Corporation's present health provisions. The two aspects of working conditions (employees' relationships and roles in the face of job-tasks, and the Public Power Corporation's welfare policies) come together only to show how inadequate present participatory structures are to determine the physical and mental well being of employees. The pertinence, however, on the Public Power Corporation's health provisions and its employees' role, adds to the theoretical 'exegesis' why working conditions are determined by the nature of the Public Power Corporation's social organisation and in turn why the employees condition at work is related to the employees socio-political role within the Public Power Corporation.

First, as is shown in Figure 5.4.3, the majority of respondents (82.4%) have expressed the view that sick-pay provision is not adequate to cover present demands and to deal adequately with job-related health problems. One ASKE representative explained:

"Under the present health arrangements in order to be granted sick leave from his/her job, an employee has to be examined by the Public Power Corporation's general practitioner, who is not specialized in job-related problems and who is more likely to act as the Public Power Corporation's 'medical agent' rather than a conscientious medical
adviser. Sick-leave, for example, is usually avoided and whenever it is granted, the number of days out of work are usually kept to a minimum and are determined also by the departmental or branch manager's decision. There have been cases where GPs had their contracts (with the Public Power Corporation) terminated because their medical advice on sick-leave and long-term therapy prescriptions did not correspond with the Public Power Corporation's general welfare policies."

In the inner-area of Athens, according to employees, not only is there a scarcity of the Public Power Corporation's GPs but even when individual employees visit a general practitioner of their choice, sick pay provisions are not even adequate to cover visiting expenses. According to 1568/85 law, work places are obliged to employ one general practitioner (that is specialized in job-related health problems), run annual checks on the health condition of employees and observe all safety regulations. Instead the Public Power Corporation has only employed three GPs, one of whom is placed in the northern region of Greece (ie Ptolemaida Station), while the other two are placed in the DAP department as part-time health inspectors. The problem however, of the GPs scarcity is also due to the fact that at the moment (1988), there are no GPs, who have specialized in work-related problems, available in the whole country, since the Medical Schools of Greece offer no specialization on such issues. The problem of the Public Power Corporation is that it does not even allow ordinary GPs to use the facilities offered and run annual health examinations and/or inspect work premises according to the above law. [56]

Another employee representative said that:

"Our sick-pay provision by the Public Power Corporation amounts to no more than Drk. 400-500 per visit, at a time when a GP is charging not less than Drk. 5000-10000 per visit. This is the Public Power Corporation's great welfare provision." (Interview at DMMI)

According to GENOP-PPC, the problem of medical allowances (although it is similar throughout the public sector) does not correspond to an employee's health contributions which only for the period 1981-1984 amount to almost
Drk. 15780.6 million. [57] According to the same information pamphlet, employee welfare contributions are channelled by the Public Power Corporation to fund its investments (build power stations, etc) and to repay some of its annual debt abroad. This single issue probably shows the extent of the Public Power Corporation's irrational and anti-labour (in relation to its employees' welfare condition) social function. The Public Power Corporation's welfare attitude reflects much of its economic relationship with its employees, that treats an individual worker as a 'tool', a means to greater profits through work-intensification, cheap labour and work environments that can be maintained as places for work without extra manpower and/or direct financial investment.

One such example is the Public Power Corporation's policy on working methods/patterns deregulation, across the Corporation's places of work, where labour intensity, amount or volume of output, and the numbers of employees assigned to a particular job, all vary according to different social and economic demands, irrespective of the risk individual employees may encounter. At the moment, therefore, there are places of work in which employees are only working for seven hours per day, whilst where are places (eg Samos Station) where employees are obliged to work for sixteen hours per day. Intensity of work, according to the Technicians' Association, is the single most frequent factor to be blamed for major accidents at the work-place, and despite the opposition from trade union representatives and despite the poor safety records of the Public Power Corporation, the management is still pursuing a policy of work intensification in order to meet consumption demands and avoid the employment of extra labour. [58]

The corporation has also enforced measures that curtail both access to information, regarding the nature of accidents and long-term illnesses, as a result of current working practices, and has barred employee representatives and participative committees from being able to control and change current working conditions. As the president of the employee branch committee responsible for health and safety issues explained:

-381-
"First of all it must be said that we have not got higher rates of accidents because people are 'lucky'. Luck is the reason and nothing else.... There are many serious problems like that of the present state of the Public Power Corporation's automobiles. We are still using trucks that were made during 1962 and since then five different drivers per year are driving these trucks. Second, we have not been provided with GPs (according to the law there should be one GP per 50 employees), and there are within those two departments over 500 employees and not even a nurse is present. Third, the management does not inform our committee, TES; it does not even recognise our existence and the branch responsible for accidents in the Public Power Corporation has not functioned for a long time. There was a meeting (organised by the management) during 1987 to inform us on major health and safety issues, but it was postponed .... There isn't even a list of chemical or other substances harmful to man. What do you expect? We have been left (employees on our own), so whenever someone reads something in the newspaper or in a journal he passes it over to the others ...."

According to Table 5.4.6, the majority of employees who have not found sick pay allocated by the Public Power Corporation as adequate, have also asked for improvements on health and safety at the work place (55.4% or 46.2% of sample), which suggests that job-related health issues are (according to the table) the most important factors that determine one's physical condition and that employees establish, in their minds, a direct relationship between welfare conditions/provisions and job conditions.

This interwoven relationship between one's working environment, the conditions of work that affect the socio-physical well-being of employees and the socio-economic relations between employees and the Public Power Corporation, is also reflected amongst those employees (Q22) who have asked for the introduction of alternative industrial relations at the place of work (8.7%). In accordance as well with the interviews that were obtained in relation to the questionnaire, the reference to alternative industrial relations expresses a dual objective: first, that the Public Power Corporation's management and the existing internal regulations of the
### Relationship Between Employee Response on Sick-Pay Provisions and Responses on the Areas Working Conditions Should be Improved (Q 22)

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sick Pay Provisions Adequate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick Pay Provisions Not Adequate</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
corporation will not impede the employees' role in determining their work organisation, and second, that the existing socio-economic policies of the Public Power Corporation will be decided with the employees' consent.

So far, the analysis of the causes and effects of existing labour policies upon employees has shown an inter-relationship between democratic representative conditions that prevail at the Public Power Corporation and employee conditions at work. If, however, one wants to extrapolate certain theoretical conclusions from what has already been stated, then significant issues for participation appear throughout the analysis. On the surface, the political characteristics of the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic function have further emphasised the social importance which the Public Power Corporation plays within the Greek economy and society as a whole.

Many of the problems that employees face at work (the major ones have been listed above) are not the by-products only of some mismanagement or management's crude apathy towards their health and safety conditions, but rather the reflection, the after-effects, of both the way the Public Power Corporation is manned and the nature of its organisation. It is not only bad management, whatever some might understand by the use of this ambiguous term, that leads to the present treatment (by the Public Power Corporation) of young trainees, that young people are treated as cheap labour and that socio-physical conditions are seen only as another burden. Is it an issue of 'bad management' alone, or is it related to the state and conditions that full-time employees have to face, where they choose between their own safety and/or their colleagues' health, and their employment and 'job-status'?

The Corporation, as a miniature reflection of the country's economic and social organisation, and in accordance with the Government's (1988) neo-monetary policies, has on the one hand created a working environment whose methods of work, conditions and regulations are flexible to economic situations, and at the same time, through political coercion, has achieved the social regulation of its labour force. It seems from what has already been discussed, that the Public Power Corporation's management
(far from being categorised as 'bad' or whatever) have managed both to
deregulate working conditions and further to centralize decision-making
away from the place of work - an aspect that complicates further the
analysis of the working environment and adds a new dimension on the issue
of employee participation insofar as working conditions are concerned.

This new dimension casts doubts on orthodox industrial assertions, that
many of the employees' problems could be resolved alone by the
establishment of representative committees for the conditions at work.
The Public Power Corporation example shows that although the central
workers' committee (KES) exists, it cannot function or initiate its
programmes nor can it resist or alter the present situation at places of
work. Is this so due to the unavailability of material resources for
purposes of health and safety? Is it due to the management's labour
policy towards representative bodies and towards issues of employee
welfare; or is it due to lack of awareness on the part of employees, that
makes the function of such bodies being reduced to mere 'complaint
bureaus'? Both employee responses and other information have demonstrated
that all the above issues contribute to the present situation that
employees have to face, within a working environment, but they are not,
probably, the main causes.

When these representative bodies were first introduced, the main idea that
was laid upon them was that both governmental and managerial socio-economic
policies will be formulated after employees have been consulted, and only
when workers have decided; this was a major idea behind the introduction
of participative bodies in the public sector. The short history of these
bodies, however, shows that consultation and decision-making by employees
was never a favourite 'subject' amongst the Public Power Company's
officials and that safety committees were only allowed to function
according to the general policies that were laid by the administration,
and only as mediatory organs between the management and the employees.

Such an explanation, however, still remains short of any full
understanding of the limited role of employees within a working environment
(through consultative committees), and why they are unable to decide,
shape and change working conditions. What is often ignored is that due to an increased centralization of decision-making processes on welfare issues, the increased inter-dependence of welfare matters upon general economic and social policy making are due to the increased deregulation of working practices, between one aspect of work and another, so that the role of employees cannot any longer be limited within a spatial confine. When the working environment becomes the 'meeting point' for policies of different institutions, when indeed working conditions no longer depend upon a committee (being either of the management or employees), when even legislation on health and safety is no longer a national issue (i.e. EEC Social Charter), it is hard to envisage how the employee's role can be confined within a single industrial structure.

The analysis so far has shown that the working environment has become more flexible on health and safety procedures and policies and that aspects of the employees' welfare are further integrated with wider trends of the general national path of development. Within this context one employee representative (from the department of economic administration) clarified the present role of employees within the working environment by stating that:

"Employees are faced with two problems: one, that their bodies of consultation are not allowed to function, because they present a 'threat' against the Public Power Company's general policies and, two, that the problems employees encounter to a large extent, are problems of the Public Power Company's general plan for development .... and the government's overall attitude towards employees. For example, inside Athens, employees are facing an acute problem of air pollution which is the cause of lung/heart disease. No employee committee can change this situation alone .... then again, the dangers that our colleagues face at work are not only caused because of irresponsible branch managers or careless employees nor because our job tasks cannot avoid them, but most of all because the government does not introduce strict safety measures and the Public Power Company does not invest in safety devices, etc."
5.5 **Employees' Relationship with Collective Bodies of Representation**

There has been, so far, a detailed analysis of some of the reasons why employees' participation in the decision-making processes of the Public Power Company have not been effective. In this section, the relationship between employees and their bodies of representation will be analysed. Two forms of participation will be examined: that of the institutionalized participative bodies (i.e., the role and function of the executive and ASKE), and that of trade unions, in relation to two major issues: employee attitudes towards both representative bodies in relation to working conditions that employees face, and actual levels of involvement in the policies and strategies of those bodies. The reason for analysing these two issues is twofold: firstly, the analysis of employees' views on both representative bodies will further clarify some previous theoretical assertions as to why employees have been excluded from the Public Power Corporation's decision-making processes and why the issue of employee participation is not a matter only of structural procedures. Secondly, employee responses will further enlighten the issues as to how the new reorganisation of industrial relations has both affected their socio-political conceptions within the Public Power Corporation and why traditional forms of industrial activity are increasingly under review.

Embarking on the analysis of the relationship between employees and their representative bodies, in relation to their ability to resolve many of the problems they face at work, first it must be mentioned that an overwhelming majority of employees (71.4%, \( f = 212/300 \)) have job-related problems. (Q23) Table 5.5.1 however, shows that the largest population of employees with job-related problems is among technical staff (79% or 44.6% of sample), whilst the largest percentage of employees who have said they have no job-related problems is among engineers (41.8% or 11.9% of sample). The results above (as was the case with the previous section) show that job-tasks and working environment conditions are both important factors in the determination of employee conditions at work. The problems that employees face at work vary (Q24): 59.6% (\( f = 127/300 \)) of respondents have said that their problems are due to the place of work (job-task and work environment), 24.9% (\( f = 53/300 \)) that their problems are mainly due
to their relations with supervisors; 11.4% (f = 24/300) due to personal or other reasons, and 4.2% (f = 9/300) due to their relations with other colleagues. According however, to Table 5.5.2, however, a considerable majority of engineers (60.9%) and technicians (68%) had a specific problem with their place of work, whereas the larger population of administrators were facing problems with their supervisors (See Table 5.5.2). One administrator said:

"I have not only to be vigilant in my job (accountant), but also to fulfil my supervisor's wishes. Whenever there is a financial crisis in our department, the economists and accountants have to transfer money from here to there, present the accounts to the management, but the worst is that our professions have developed into some sort of secretarial work.... We are responsible (at least in theory) for financial affairs but we are never being consulted and we cannot even determine the nature of our monthly reports. We are just reduced to personal secretaries. We do as we are told and we present what is expected, irrespective of the state and the problems the department and Public Power Corporation is facing." [59]

The problem of consultation, professional integrity and of the loss of any sort of autonomy (from the management) is further exposed in Table 5.5.3, in which the majority of employees who have never been consulted (79.8%) by supervisors or the middle-management, have job-related problems, whereas of those (a very small number) who have always been consulted 80% face no job-related problems. (See Table 5.5.3) The significance for employees per se and for the theoretical evaluation of the political relationship between the former and their work, lies not so much in the absence of consultation or in the demand for democratic procedures, but rather in the correlation between work relations, job organisation and individual perceptions. Consultation and democratic control are not seen by employees in some abstract way, nor is the pursuance of these objectives reflected in some general theoretical notion of how and why work should be organised in this or the other way. The importance of employee statements (like the one above) lies in the fact that individuals consolidate personal experiences in a way that interweaves particular problems they face at work.
### TABLE 5.5.1 Relationship Amongst Employees with Different Job Descriptions and Responses on Whether or not the Former Have Job Related Problems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Job-Related Problems</th>
<th>No Job-Related Problems</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5.5.2 Relationship Between Job Categories and Major Problems that Employees Face at the Public Power Corporation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Relations with Coworkers</th>
<th>2 Relations with Supervisor</th>
<th>3 Place of Work</th>
<th>4 Personal/Other</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with general socio-political issues that question both the present employee-Public Power Corporation relationship and nature of the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic function. This sort of correlation (between one's socio-economic situation and general social relations that prevail) is also reflected in Tables 5.5.4 and 5.5.5 in which employees have related their individual participation in decision-making processes with the issue of whether or not they face job-related problems and with what those are related to. In the first table (5.5.4), the majority of these employees that have asked for more participation in decision-making at the Public Power Corporation (72.5%) have also job-related problems, whilst of the very small number who have answered negatively to question 30, 50% have responded that they have no job-related problems.

In Table 5.5.5, the majority of those who want to participate at a decision-making level and of those who have job-related problems, the work place constitutes a major problem area, whilst 70 (or 25%) of respondents who want no further participation at the level of decision-making, have particular problems with their supervisors.

The relationship between the ability to participate at decision-making and determine working conditions-relations within the Public Power Corporation, is central for both employee categories (those that are asking for further employee involvement and for those that are not), however this may be express. As one employee stated however:

"If you mean by participation of what has already happened, where there are some consultative committees which play no role in decision-making, which are just there with no objective or which have to act on behalf of the management then I just don't want such 'participation'." (Interview at GENOP-PPC)

Then another representative interrupted the interview by saying that:

"The present government (1988) has ridiculed the role employees could play within Public Corporations. On the one side, there is an administrative mechanism that limits the social role consultative
TABLE 5.5.3 Employee Responses on Consultation Levels by Supervisors and Job-Related Problems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job-Related Problems</th>
<th>No Job-Related Problems</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5.5.4 Employee Responses on Participation and Whether or not They do Face Job-Related Problems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job-Related Problems</th>
<th>No Job-Related Problems</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I want to participate in decision making</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't want to participate in decision making</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
committees could play in the Public Power Corporation, whereas on the other, the function of these committees is debatable, since not even ASKE can meet more than once a year.....Even when representatives meet they cannot decide since government representatives are boycotting the normal function of ASKE, by abstaining." (Interview at GENOP-PPC)

Both interviewees above, although in they clearly express dissatisfaction with the present consultative structure and the limitations of participation within the Public Power Corporation, do not doubt the necessity of the participation of employees at a decision-making level. If one wishes to construe the meaning of these interviews above, then one has to understand that trade union representatives and GENOP-PPC in particular, were never (since the 1985 introduction of participation schemes) at ease with institutionalized employee participation and that the absence of any sort of democratic reorganisation, consultation and employee intervention at the Public Power Corporation's general policy making, has fuelled a negative reaction towards present schemes. The central point here, however, is not so much that there is a dissatisfaction with or mistrust of participatory bodies, but rather that if employees are to be allowed to decide the socio-economic function of their corporation, then what changes are needed and how are these changes going to be implemented? It is this issue that brings trade unions and consultative committees into the forefront of this section, not only as bodies of collective representation (through which employee objectives are represented) but also as socio-political manifestations of the employees' role within the Public Power Corporation.

Answers to Q 25 (Do you think any of these problems can be resolved?) show that 61.3% (f = 184/300) of employees believe that the problems they face (in relation to Q 24) can be resolved, whilst only 9.3% (f = 28/300) feel that they cannot be resolved. If to this is added that the nature of the majority of problems is determined by the socio-political organisation and overall policy of the Corporation, then it is clear that the majority of respondents in the sample are indirectly implying that their problems are related to the social relations that prevail, but not only this, they see that there is a need to change existing politco-economic relations.
### TABLE 5.5.5 Employees Responses on Participation and Major Problems Employees Face at the Public Power Corporation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Relations With Workmates</th>
<th>2 Relations With Supervisor</th>
<th>3 Work Place</th>
<th>4 Personal/ Other</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To participate in decision-making</td>
<td>13 4.4%</td>
<td>70 25%</td>
<td>169 59.8%</td>
<td>30 10.8%</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not to participate in decision-making</td>
<td>2 12.5%</td>
<td>1 6.3%</td>
<td>10 62.5%</td>
<td>3 18.7%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Q 26, however, a corresponding employee majority has also argued (51.3% or f = 154/300) that the trade unions are important in resolving these above problems. In relation to these responses, Figure 5.5.1 shows that ASKE (Joint Consultative Committee) has not been considered as an adequate mechanism or institution for both promoting employee objectives and improving working and material conditions. In the first figure, 88.7% (f = 266/300) of employees have answered (Q33) that ASKE has not improved their material conditions, whereas in the second, that ASKE has not helped in improving conditions at work (Q34) 87.7% (f = 263/300).

Certain government analyses however emphasize bureaucracy in general and sectional interests, as being the major causes for ASKE's inadequacy to represent employee's objectives. In contrast, according to trade unions, the Public Power Corporation's loss of autonomy from the government and its present socio-political policy towards its labour force, are considered to be the two most important factors that influence the joint consultative committee's function. At a time of general employee discontent towards existing participatory bodies, government representatives within ASKE are blaming what has been called the "visible and invisible centres of central bureaucratic power" for the inability of various participatory bodies to function in the interests of employees and of the Corporation. [60]

Throughout the survey's duration however, there were instances when one could observe that the ideas on participation and even of the principles and aims of decision-making bodies were not compatible with the way the Public Power Corporation was managed.

"The problem with the Public Power Corporation is that we waste time in dialogues and not in any coherent activity. Why should a Corporation be run by politically motivated employees?....What the Public Power Corporation is most in need of is a strong leadership that will allow educated and committed individuals (to the Corporation's goals), to pursue the Corporation's goals. As a manager, I have to put up with both my superiors and subordinates, yet because the Unions have managed to regulate our department, it is difficult to do what is necessary, take the right decisions, and increase employees' performances.....how
FIGURE 5.5.1  Question No 33 & 34

Question 33: Do you think that ASKE helped in improving your salary?

Question 34: Do you think that ASKE has improved your conditions of work?

Yes  No  Yes  No

Question 33  Question 34
could a manager function in an environment where there are various trade unions with different objectives and where even the most practical tasks have political meanings for some." [61]

The above, however, represents an attitude not towards participation per se but rather towards the mechanisms, the whole process in which participation (if any) takes place. Although throughout the survey such attitudes were rare, nonetheless they show and reflect some employees dissatisfaction with existing industrial organisation, the way their work is affected, and their role in the Public Power Corporation.

The argument (that the 1985 experiment in the Public Power Corporation and other public corporations has so far been shown to be an ineffective and inadequate mechanism to alter present social arrangements), that sees as a major problem the functions of some "invisible and visible bureaucracy", not only distorts the analysis of what has occurred (during 1985-1988 period) but also conceals the issue of working relations and conditions, while leaving undisturbed all those conditions and factors that determine their continuation. Who are those invisible and visible bureaucratic centres of central power? Why and how have they managed to end the development of participation within the Public Power Corporation? In contrast, however, to PASKE representatives and the government (who have identified the root of the Public Power Corporation's participation problem within individual political perceptions) the majority of employee respondents have clearly shown that the development and present characteristics of participatory bodies have been determined by the government's monetary and new labour policy; its conservative approach towards institutions and employee collective bodies; and its attitude and policy towards the socio-political organisations of the country (eg local government associations, etc) and the nature of Greece's energy patterns. As one ASKE representative has explained:

"There are problems (that the Public Power Corporation's participatory bodies are facing) which are connected with attitudes and individual approaches towards every one of the major newly established bodies of
consultation. There are, for example, colleagues, members of the executive committee or the ASKE, who have shown a somewhat relaxed attitude towards serious social and economic issues. But these are minimal, the major problem that the whole participatory scheme is facing has nothing to do with personal attitudes. Rather, the continuous loss of autonomy (in relation to the government), the increased centralization of decision-making powers in few hands, like the Ministry for Energy and few officials from the management side, the persistent strategy of bypassing major decisions, eg on the Public Power Corporation's tariff policy, that ASKE has taken recently and the introduction of new monetary and labour policies by the management and the government, have all created a new climate within these bodies.

The government's political intervention into the Public Power Corporation's participatory bodies, since 1985 (when the first schemes were established), is evident in both legislative and economic terms. The function, for example, of the executive committee has been almost limited to that of an approval committee, in which the Ministry for Energy and the government's socio-economic programme determine the Public Power Corporation's financial and social development. The government, in the case of the executive committee's internal regulation, has directly intervened by appointing directly the general director or the President of the Public Power Corporation, by changing recent legislation so that the former has absolute executive power over the committee and by leaving unchanged Act No 100/1967, which makes impossible the removal of the Public Power Corporation's President or Director from office. [62]

Another example of legislative intervention in the internal regulation of the executive committee is the reallocation of executive members' seats (both of the government and employee representatives), so that the number of employee members is reduced by two seats and the government appointed representatives increase from four seats to six, making it impossible for elected employee representatives to determine the decision-making process. The legislative restrictions over the members of the executive committee range from the internal regulation for its formation, to individual obligations that impede members from disclosing corporate information to
the public or trade unions. The present conditions of the executive committee inner working regulations, however, to a large extent characterise both the socio-political perception of participation, amongst government and management officials, and the predominant monetary and labour policies that the former has pursued and continues to pursue. It is the combination of both that has both reduced the executive role of the committee to that of an approval mechanism, and limited the role of individual members within a political frame of consultation but not of decision-making, and of mere subordination to policies that have been decided by institutions external to the Public Power Corporation.

The nature of the socio-economic function of the Public Power Corporation, however, and its determination by general policies on energy production/distribution and the labour force, has not only limited the decision-making process of the executive committee, but most of all has affected employees' working conditions and relations within the Public Power Corporation. For example, employees' conditions at work places, the way power stations are run, the way employees are used and their social problems at large (as a result of working methods), depend upon the executive committee decisions. Since, however, (as was also shown earlier), the Public Power Corporation as a whole is obliged by the government and international institutions (eg International Energy Association, EEC, etc) to follow a specified economic outline of development, little can be done by members of the committee to change existing conditions at work. Then again, the committee is also limited in its role in the Public Power Corporation's social organisation, by its internal regulations, which in fact act as a reassurance for the continuation and the development of the Public Power Corporation. One employee representative, on the executive committee, has sought to explain why the role of the executive committee has been limited and why its policies are in fact policies that are decided by others, not for the benefit of the Public Power Corporation and its labour force, but rather for the interest of MNCs and political arrangements within the country, by stating that:
"So that the executive committee can function and play its role within the Public Power Corporation, it must employ a new economic and social programme. It should stop disregarding the potential of indigenous resources like water, and it should start to develop and modernise its hydro-powered stations.... There is a persistent policy for promoting private subcontractors, of privatising sections of the Public Power Corporation's production/distribution process. This is called 'functional privatisation', where parts of the Corporation's activity are literally transferred from public ownership to private hands.... But in order to pursue a new policy, there should first of all be a democratic reorganisation of the Public Power Corporation, ASKE, the executive committee and the rest of participatory bodies should be allowed to function. There should be a democratic regulation of employment promotion...." [63]

What the above interview shows, is that the functions (in terms of policy making), of the executive committee of the largest Corporation (in terms of production activity, financial resources) and one of the most sensitive industries for the social and economic development of the country, are subordinated to a strategy of political accommodation that serves the economic interests of external and internal financial centres and of the government's direct party-political interests. The consolidation of all the above issues crystallises further the inter-relationship between the Public Power Corporation, private capital, the government and internal social organisation. In accordance with the analysis in the previous Chapter (the socio-economic function of the Public Power Corporation) and what has been described above, the executive committee and its functions do not suffer from a lack of some imaginative political will or from some vague and abstract bureaucratic form of organisation, but rather from the policies it implements on behalf of external power centres. The nature of these policies, the factors that influence the executive committee's decision-making process, impede any sort of democratic reorganisation for the Corporation and its labour force. In this sense, active consultation, employee intervention, not only in the process but also in the actual policy formulation, not only contravene the Public Power Corporation's present development policy but are also in contradiction...
with the present political decisions that rule the economic and social development of the country. The "social anatomy" (if one may refer to it as this) of the executive committee's organisation and policy implementation, reflects two interrelated processes and state of affairs. The first expressed, in general form, within the Public Power Corporation's economic relationship with private capital and political institutions. The distinctive dependent character of the Public Power Corporation's energy policy upon financial centres and multi-national energy corporations (which had been analysed in some detail in the previous Chapter) has traditionally surrounded and economically sacrificed to foreign interests much of the country's indigenous economic and social development. The adverse effects of this have been noticed by the labour force (employees of Public Power Corporation) and the community at large. The new element however, between the Public Power Corporation and multi-national corporations lies in the present process towards policy harmonisation and energy integration across western Europe. This motion both develops the role an energy corporation plays for private capital, and redefines the relationship the public corporation has with the state and the community. The traditional framework of the Public Power Corporation's subordination and dependence changes, and new socio-economic requirements are added, that affect both energy production/distribution policies and the corporation's social organisation directly (ie wage structures, employment, and general personnel policies). In this sense, centralization of decision-making processes and deregulation of working methods and personnel policies are continuously developing into a mechanism by which the managing and operation of a large and so important corporation respond to both short and long-term market and political interests.

The second element is reflected in what some might describe as the articulation of political sentiments, of social and economic expressions of public life, that do not usually correspond to 'open' and democratic types of social economic development. In this sense, the recent billion drachma fraud in which the President General Director was personally implicated, and in which money was transferred from the Public Power Corporation's assets to a Bank (ie the Bank of Crete) [64], for the
economic benefits of a new elite amongst the business circles, (in which Cabinet and other officials were implicated), does not correspond easily with what one might expect, of a Director and a Cabinet or of a whole government.

Similar problems, are to be found in the function and role of other participative bodies, such as ASKE (Representative Assembly) or KES (Central Industrial Committee), and TES (local or branch industrial committees). In particular, ASKE's role, since 1985, has changed from a joint consultative one, that can decide on the Public Power Corporation's economic development and industrial organisation [65], to an approval committee that implements decisions. This sort of political approach by the Public Power Corporation's management is also reflected in the present government's response towards ASKE. In an interview with the Junior Minister for National Economic Affairs (1986), it was clearly stated that ASKE's role is only to implement the policies and plans of the Public Power Corporation and not to decide on any of the issues that relate either to financial or administrative matters. [66] The government, together with PASKE's representatives in ASKE, have always held the view that a participatory body like ASKE can decide upon issues that are in line with the government's general economic policy, that it can decide on how best a plan might be implemented but it cannot and it should not have the right to challenge in any way the management's government policy making. [67] Such an approach (by the government) has certainly limited the political role of ASKE, its functions and its social significance, in relation to employee objectives, and current legislation.

It should be noted however, that since 1985 and since the implementation of the Presidential Decree No. 57/1985, ASKE has changed its function and its role within the Public Power Corporation twice. In the beginning, there used to be a common agreement between employees and government-management representatives that decision making would be based upon joint consultation and even when ASKE's decision was contravening the government's or the Ministry of Energy's general plans, there would still be consultation, between the Public Power Corporation's participatory bodies and government representatives, before a final decision is taken.
Since, however, the introduction of the 1985-1986 austerity economic plan, the government and pro-government representatives within ASKE insisted that the role and function of this body cannot in any way contradict both the principles of the government's policies nor the actual policies. A government representative has explained this, by arguing that ASKE can only and should only decide how best the government's and the public corporations' policies can be implemented. "It (ie ASKE) should not determine the formulation of general policy making, which other bodies or institutions are responsible for, ie the parliament." [68] Such an approach, however, by the majority of PASKE's representatives and government officials, has created a situation in which the aims and decision-making of employees and the representatives of social institutions has been removed. As an employee representative explained:

"...Most of employees were enthusiastic even with the idea that for the first time their representatives would be in a position to decide on economic and industrial relation issues. I do remember that when I was elected as a representative in ASKE, I had plans for how best to represent employee interests.....However, soon it was understood that our role in ASKE was not more than that of endorsing the government's austerity 'package'......The turning point was when the majority of employee representatives rejected the management's plans for electricity distribution and their general economic plan (ie the increase in tariffs). From then onwards, the government and PASKE's representatives (not all) either abstained from voting procedures or delayed any decision making process, or even ignored that they had a responsibility to inform the organ, for whatever information was relating to the issues in discussion, so that the organ could not a reach a decision." [69]

Another ASKE representative has said:

"Theoretically the legislation, as it was first introduced during 1985, gave essential powers for the amendment of policies, relating to the Public Power Corporation's five year plan. Today (1988) we are faced with a situation where ASKE decides on issues and policies that have
already been implemented by the Corporation. For example, in our last meeting (1987) the agenda was the 1985 balance sheet and activities report....I refused to take part in such a discussion and voting procedure. To decide on what? The 1985 plan for the Public Power Corporation's socio-economic development should have been discussed during 1986, not during 1988. In this sense ASKE's function has no purpose at all...Another example (of the condition ASKE has to function in) is the present situation. The last meeting rejected the Public Power Corporation's five year plan, the controversy was such that the government and the management withdrew their proposals. Instead of opening the dialogue (over the controversial issues) and instead of re-drafting a new five year plan, the government and the management has 'condemned' the Public Power Corporation to function without any sort or long-term programme. Can you imagine what this means? It actually means that whatever the Public Power Corporation does or is planning to do, we as representatives, the public and its social representatives, will have no knowledge.....Whenever we are going to discuss what has happened during 1985 or 1986, the 1986 activities report has not been yet (1988) officially published. The management is insisting on asking our opinion, but on the other side, whenever the issue is more controversial, either they withdraw their original drafts, so that everyone will forget about the issue, or they simply abstain so that no decision could ever be reached."  

The consequences of ASKE's role within the Public Power Corporation, in accordance also with the two interviews above, are threefold. First, the continuous policy by the government and the Ministry for Energy matters, for a further centralization and political regulation of decision-making processes, has in fact rendered participatory bodies, ie ASKE, as bodies for implementing the plan according to general policies. Any previous notion about the role of participatory bodies, as the 'pillars' of employees' corporate control and of the distribution-dispersion of executive powers to the Public Power Corporation's labour force, has indeed become increasingly questionable. Second, however, it is not only centralization per se that is to be blamed, but rather the nature of policies which not only question present participatory schemes
but also question the government's intentions insofar as labour objectives are concerned. In the previous chapter it was clearly shown how the Public Power Corporation's economic function determines both the country's and its labour force's social development and the latter's ability to participate effectively in the Corporation's decision making. Both economic dependence on multinational corporations and the country's integration with the socio-political programme laid down by the EEC, the International Energy Association, and other organisations, has indeed opened a new era for both the Public Power Corporation policy making and implementation process. Personnel policies (eg employment, material-welfare benefits, etc), as was shown in the first three sections of this chapter, not only require an industrial organisation that is as 'flexible' as can be (so that employees' organisations do not present a 'force' that impedes the Public Power Corporation's response to industrial restructuring) but have also created an industrial environment within which administrative issues and executive powers are further related to wider socio-political factors and decision-making is no longer under the Public Power Corporation's operational control. Third, as has also been reflected in recent legislative changes, insofar as the role and the function of ASKE is concerned; accordingly, ASKE is no longer responsible for long term planning, and it no longer decides on issues that relate either to the Public Power Corporation's economic function (ie investment, tariff policies, etc) and/or insofar as matters of industrial relations are concerned. [71]

In this sense, and in accordance with the replaced paragraphs in the Presidential Decree N57/1985 - Article 2, the role and function of ASKE is further clarified as that of an approval committee that can only offer its opinion on various matters, whereas the word 'decide or determine' has altogether been removed from the Article No.2 (P. Decree 57/1985). [72]

The subordination of ASKE's decision-making powers on general social and economic policies, the nature of these policies and the present change of ASKE's internal regulation and consequently its social and political role within the Corporation, have all produced a negative environment for employees' participation. The majority of employees, however, see their
participation in decision-making as the most important factor that can determine both their economic and social conditions at work. According to Table 5.5.6, 88.7% of those employees who want participation believe that their problems at the place of work can be resolved somehow, whilst only eight employees (or 50% of those against participation) were not in favour of the idea that participation can produce effective results in relation to their problems of a socio-economic nature. (See Table 5.5.6) Though it must be said, that the majority of responses from employees show that ASKE has not been an adequate mechanism for socio-economic representation. According to employee representatives from the executive committee, ASKE and KES (Central Employee Committee), of employees in the Public Power Corporation, although they feel that their participation in policy making bodies is an essential factor that can determine their conditions at work, the majority do not recognise and identify with present participatory bodies, for three reasons. Firstly, because as shown in the previous sections, and the interviews above, employees are unable even to decide and be involved in areas and policies, which the participatory bodies should monitor.

Secondly, due to the continuous governmental intervention over labour matters, and the latter's use of the Public Power Corporation's industrial organisation as a pretext for its austerity, monetary and labour measures, (ie Article No 4, Wage Restraints, etc), a large majority of employees have identified present participatory bodies as part of the government's anti-trade union campaign. Participatory schemes were seen, and still are, as devices that obscure the real nature of the Public Power Corporation's management policies, and as organs that seek to institutionalize and diffuse the power struggle of employees, from objectives and strategies that demand a change in the political nature of the Corporation's socio-economic function. [73]

Thirdly, because of the Public Power Corporation's new industrial restructuring, the diversification of interests and the new division of labour at work, employees seek individual solutions for specific problems they face. An ASKE representative said:
TABLE 5.5.6  Relationship Between Opinions on Participation at Decision-making Level and of Whether or Not Employees' Soci-economic Problems at Work Can be Resolved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems Can Be Resolved</th>
<th>Problems Cannot Be Resolved</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARTICIPATION:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
<td>250</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88.7%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"...Employees are in general dissatisfied with what has so far been offered by ASKE. When for example, they see that for their promotion or transfer, complaints and internal regulations, elected officials play no role in the outcome. They either seek the union's advice and/or personal contacts... There are many colleagues, this is more evident inside Athens, who will not even consider the use of ASKE or KES or TES committees, but they would rather use their political affiliations or personal relationships to solve their problems. This is not the employees' fault, since such a situation is encouraged by both the government and the management..."

The general social impression, which was formulated out of employee interviews and responses, was that employees were not rejecting ASKE altogether as a body for industrial participation, in favour of some form of 'traditional' collective bargaining between unions and management. The inadequacy however of ASKE to ameliorate employees' financial and social conditions at work, and the nature of the Public Power Corporation's personnel policies, has shifted attention from particular industrial structures and internal mechanisms of representation, (in relation to the Public Power Corporation's internal organisation structure), to a more general political plateau in which the predominant social feature is the exaltation of political representation in the government's policy making. For this reason, but not the only one, the Public Power Corporation's employees see their Federation's and Association's involvement in decision-making, as an integral part of the Public Power Corporation's democratic reorganisation, and labour participation in wider socio-economic decision making. The first is depicted in Q29, in which 91% (f = 273/300) of respondents have said that the Public Power Corporation's trade unions should participate in policy-making and the second aspect, in Q36, where almost the entire sample population, 94% (f = 282/300) of employees believe that regulations on industrial disputes, should be decided after trade unions have been consulted. It should be noted however, that the trade union role is seen by many employees as that of a guarantor for democratic processes.
An important issue, which has been usually ignored (by industrial relations theorists), is how such a situation within the Public Power Corporation has affected employee involvement with both institutionalized bodies of participation and trade unions, and how it has shaped industrial activity by employees within the Corporation.

In relation to the institutionalized bodies and in particular that of ASKE, it must be stated that employees showed (during the survey) that they had little to identify with, or be involved in, and most were in absolute darkness of even whether or not ASKE functions at all. First of all, an overwhelming majority of employees, 68% (or, f = 204/300), do not even receive any information about ASKE (See Figure 5.5.2). One employee said:

"What information?....We know nothing, not even when they meet, what they discuss and what they decide. It just proves how important the committee is....There should be regular information distributed about ASKE's decisions. However, the management and the representatives have not bothered to report anything that is happening." [74]

In addition, Figure 5.5.2 also shows that more than two-thirds of the entire sample population, 87%, (f = 261/300), have never been consulted by employee representatives in ASKE, prior to a meeting. (See Figure 5.5.2) When asked, an ASKE representative said:

"Listen, we haven't had a meeting for a year.....I don't often know what is on the agenda. Even when I know (two or three days beforehand), I have to prepare for the meeting. But the issue is that ASKE had, as far as I can recall, only one meeting where a decision was taken since 1985. This is not normal. I could go further and say that ASKE has already stopped functioning.....so what is there to report back.....You have asked me whether or not, and how often, I consult 'my' employees. It is difficult to consult someone or something when you have no information on what is going to be discussed, when there is no general information available." [75]
The issue of employee involvement in the actual functions of ASKE and consequently the problem that exists in communication between employees and representatives, does not, as it might seem, depend entirely upon personal commitments, as many have suggested, (ie Mpourtisas G, 1987, Koutroukis Th, 1987). There is for example, the problem of information availability from ASKE to employees that is the cause of many strains in the relationship between the two. The root of this problem however, lies more than ever with both the government and the management's attitude towards participatory bodies and employees in general. The former has not yet facilitated any programme under which the collection, regulation and disclosure of information (that relates to labour interests) involves employee representatives and is under public scrutiny. This fact alone raises a myriad of new issues, from that of accountability, (of government institutions), to whether or not decisions taken by representatives are based on accurate information. Many of the employee representatives have said that the organ (ie ASKE) is usually restrained in its use of information and the discussions involve a lot of general remarks, (based on general proposals as to how the Public Power Corporation should develop), assumptions and often long repetitious political monologues on, for example, the effects of the government's austerity measures upon the Public Power Corporation's labour force. In this sense ASKE's main role which is to act as a body of economic and social control, and to review and formulate jointly with the management, the Public Power Corporation's plan of development, is not concretely defined. The relationship between representatives and employees loses any appropriate relevance, inasmuch as it was originally expected, and enthusiasm (to be involved and to be informed) gives way to employee lassitude. As one employee representative has explained:

"...Originally, we were talking for hours on specific issues, (before any ASKE meeting). We were nominating our representatives with concrete policies and objectives, that we wished them to explain in ASKE. I've got in my house (because I was the secretary of the employees meetings), boxes full of notes, important contributions as to how we saw these schemes and how we wanted to be represented by ASKE...The room (in which the meeting was taking place) was filled with people arguing ..... a
Question 31: Do you get information about ASKE’s meetings? [a]

Question 32: Does your ASKE representative consult you before the meeting takes place? [b]
truly democratic procedure....Today, under a situation which impedes these organs from any decision-making, and which 'obliges' members of ASKE to become 'couriers' of unimportant (for employees) policy making, has resulted in members of ASKE and employees not being interested any more. They are not apathetic towards participation, but how can someone be involved when nothing happens and when the management is not interested in revitalising these bodies....Remember the point behind ASKE was that for the first time employees would be able to do something. This opportunity has finished; it no longer exists." [76]

The relationship of employees and their involvement at any level with ASKE and institutionalized organs of representation, has also been shown to be problematic during the 1988 elections for employee representatives. There are two points here, which actually show and reflect a part of employees attitude towards ASKE; firstly, there was a high percentage of employees who did not vote in the election (20%), secondly, there was a massive increase (24%) of support for those representatives who were asking for an alternative energy policy, to be followed by the Public Power Corporation, and for a reorganisation of the Public Power Corporation's industrial structure within which employees would be able to exercise control over any decision making. [77]

In relation to trade unions, employee attitudes about involvement are somewhat different from that above. For example, Figure 5.5.3 shows that 79% (f = 237/300) of employees always vote for union representatives, whilst 16.7% (f = 50/300) said that they often vote and 2.7% (f = 8/300) of employees stated that they never vote for trade union representatives. (See Figure 5.5.3) In addition, in Figure 5.5.4, it is shown that 40.3% (f = 121/300) of employees always attend union meetings, 43.3% (f = 130/300) often attend, and 14.7% (f = 44/300) never attend trade union meetings. Table 5.5.7 however, shows that the majority of employees who never attend a trade union meeting are either engineers and/or administrators, whilst the majority of those attending union meetings are technicians.
Despite the fact that employees are more likely to attend and be involved with the trade unions of the Public Power Corporation, and despite the fact that the Public Power Corporation as a public corporation is one of the largest undertakings with the highest union membership density (especially amongst technical staff), that it has a long trade union history, the involvement of employees in the Public Power Corporation's associations faces new problems and new dilemmas. There are new 'signs' (according to trade union representatives), which show that there is a downward slope in employees' attendance at meetings, that people become more reluctant in their active support of trade union objectives and there is a fall in or stagnation of union membership numbers. Apart from issues which relate to the character and structure of trade unions, according to a latest independent national survey and a survey by the Public Power Corporation's trade unionists, the introduction of new industrial relations, insofar as employment, the distribution of material benefits and the introduction of new technology are concerned, have all created new problems in employees trade union representation and expression of political activity within the industry. In the Public Power Corporation for example, the government's attitude towards unions and its anti-union policies of 1985, have caused tremendous divisions amongst employees on the future role of the union and its relationship with employees. As one executive trade union member said:

"We were used to defending our objectives by collective agreements or when those failed by strike actions. Since 1985, the government, in order to pursue its austerity plan, has not accepted any demand that was put forward...We continued to press for a change of these policies, but nothing has happened...Then many of our members started to be not indifferent but not so interested in what we had to say, others thought that the best would be to conform with the government's policies whilst others started to believe that the union cannot any longer press for a change in industrial policies; a fatalistic attitude."

There were many employees that, during the survey here, have said that trade unions, although still important for uniting employees under common objectives against the management and the government's new labour policies,
FIGURE 5.5.3  (Question 27)

How often do you vote for union representatives?

Always  Often  Never

79%  16.7%  2.7%
are no longer capable of convincing the latter to change its policies. Such attitudes were particularly reinforced during 1988, when even collective agreements between GENOP-PPC and the management, over wages, have been violated by the latter. One trade union representative in these agreements said:

"We struck for over a month against the introduction of a PRP system and for a further rise (in line with inflation). After a month the management and government officials started negotiations. They signed a very detailed agreement and they promised that our demands would be fulfilled. When we did return to our jobs, the management said that our agreement was general and new negotiations would have to start. People were really disappointed and everybody was saying that we were 'cheated'. We lost wages, many had to borrow money because of financial difficulties, others were beaten by the police (during the strike). The country was on the very of a new 'black-out' and at the end not even an agreement is valid any more. This has changed our relationship with the management. They had never before violated an agreement; now everything can be violated."

The government/management's arbitrary attitude towards employees and their associations, by which negotiations and agreements are under constant review, has indeed inaugurated a whole new perspective on the management of industrial disputes, on how to undermine union power by removing the credibility of collective tripartite agreements. Indeed, many of the employees who were interviewed expressed a feeling of powerlessness, of 'lost cause', that cuts across from trade unionists to non-representative employees. A representative of the Engineers Association said:

"We were used to rooms filled with people and people were standing in our associations meetings. I can remember that out of five hundred people, four hundred would be in the meeting...Now we have to make sure that twenty (the most) would appear."

Such a trend, a steady decrease of the involvement of employees in trade unions, is further reflected in a recent trade union survey (1989).
FIGURE 5.5.4 (Question 28)

How often do you attend union meetings?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Always Attending Union Meetings</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin'tors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5.5.7  Relationship Between Job Categories and Responses on Union Meetings
Though the reasons given vary, Table 5.5.8 shows that 22% of employees do not want to be involved in trade unions, whilst 15% state that they have no time to be involved and 4% of employees confirm that they do not participate because trade unions are considered to be ineffective bodies. These responses, however, inconclusive evidence on their own they may be, are indicative of the new times and issues that trade unions are faced with. In relation to the Public Power Corporation, however, the issue is not of whether or not employees wish to participate in trade union activity, the problem of the relationship of employees with their traditional political bodies of representation is not expressed in a linear way, (if one may so describe it). The increase of temporary employment contracts, flexible personnel policies and the continuous reinforcement of personal and party political favours, have all strengthened the alienation of employees at work, which is expressed in different forms, either by seeking individual solutions to 'individual problems' and/or transforming industrial actions into general political actions. The cases from the department of the inner-Athens area show that on the one hand there is a tendency amongst employees, not to be keen in seeking collective actions and forms of representation. This is especially true for issues that still can be manipulated by personal contacts, (ie issues relating to upgrading, transfer, etc). In contrast, for issues of wider importance, which need to be centrally determined, workers are more conscious of their impotency in establishing an effective industrial mechanism to achieve a balance in their demands. A member of the executive trade union committee of the Public Power Corporation's qualified engineers has said:

"It is even more difficult nowadays to motivate people....Many are trying to solve social problems by themselves. They see the Federation incapable of stopping many of the problems that employees face, ie economic problems. So employees instead of talking about the Union and how to organize, are constantly trying to leave work earlier only to start work somewhere else. A lot have double jobs....Many are using the only way that is left, political rousfeti, in order to preserve their interests....People are interested in the Unions but under present economic pressures, it is difficult to convince them that collective
action means a lot.... On the other hand there are signs of new trade union militancy, especially when more than two thirds of the labour force collectively support and are involved in a strike action for more than a month.... The 1988 strike action took even the most radical leaders by surprise.... All these probably mean that we have entered a new period, which demands that the role of trade unions is modified."

There are many characteristics and many factors that affect the relationship of employees with their associations, not all of which can be analysed here. However, throughout this survey, three main factors have appeared strongly to influence this relationship of representation, namely the continuous creation of a 'new' labour force within the Public Power Corporation, the further deregulation of the Public Power Corporation's industrial organization and the flexible use of its personnel policies for labour regulation, and the changing form of the Public Power Corporation's policies in relation to wider political decision-making.

First of all, the study of the Public Power Corporation's inner-Athens departments, has shown that the management is implementing a policy on employment where unskilled or semi-skilled personnel are employed, and that short-term employment contracts between 1979 and 1986 have increased rapidly. Without analysing the Public Power Corporation's employment policy once again, the increased employment of casual labour within the Public Power Corporation has negatively affected membership rates (of trade unions) and labour's collective bargaining power. What is most evident in these departments is the fact that many unskilled or semi-skilled employees are hired for a short term to do nothing. They are placed in positions where there is no trace of work, i.e. in offices, without almost any obligations or in positions that have been created for reasons that are related to the Public Power Corporation's employment policies. So, in fact, there is a large number of the Public Power Corporation's labour force who have no job task in reality and who are privileged in this sense. Equally important to note is the fact that the majority, if not all of these employees, have been employed in exchange for their political support towards the government of the day and towards the management.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is not a trade union at place of work</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not want to be involved</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have not got the time</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because TUs are run by parties</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They cannot change anything</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oikonomikos T; p 83, 4 May 1989
Secondly, the continuous deregulation and flexible socio-political arrangements which the Public Power Corporation has further introduced and by which the corporation manages to regulate its labour force, have created inconceivable problems for the social homogenisation of the employees within the Public Power Corporation. From employment to welfare benefits existing formal regulations (that have been the result of trade unions' collective bargaining) have been further eroded and instead the management has been able to regulate and enforce its personnel policies variably, without creating homogeneous sections of its labour force that can easily identify with particular issues. However, this so-called flexible arrangement has not only deregulated policies and aspects or patterns of work, nor has it only affected the ability of employees to bargain collectively on certain topics, but it has also further created an environment where its regulation is enforced by the further individualized integration of employees with corporate aims and hence by the further fragmentation of employee social units.

It would be a feeble assumption to assert that the majority of the Public Power Corporation's labour force has been in a position where such policies have favoured their political or social objectives. Quite the opposite, as was seen in the previous sections, the majority of employees have not identified their interests with the Public Power Corporation's personnel policies. To be more precise, the Public Power Corporation's employment, appraisal, welfare and material benefit distribution policies have endowed individual employees with further insecurity and further powerlessness to intervene in the social and political decision making machinery. In fact, those policies have stripped employees of major democratic rights, and have further 'individualized' industrial procedures, creating an environment where legislative rules do not apply, where managerial accountability is not enforced and where industrial problems are more or less dealt with on an individual level, in the absence of open and democratic relations. Indeed, the Public Power Corporation's industrial organization could be characterized as the model prototype of a large society that rules by discrimination and insider dealings, where everything can happen if one knows the right person in the appropriate position, at the right time.
It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why employees (although they might support a trade union), irrespective of their political emancipation and level of industrial trade union commitment, have not been able to change the present situation in the Public Power Corporation, and why trade unionists are confronted with empty rooms (at meetings). The majority of employees who were interviewed have all complained about such a situation, but yet even though they might seek advice from their trade union representatives, they would still use the only way open to them, personal favours. But whereas deregulation and political discrimination have created an industrial environment where employees do little to change things, and where there is a further abolition of democratic regulations, the very same process has also created a new or renewed phase of industrial politics; one in which employees have to rely further and further on wider political and economic decisions and policies, for the sustenance of their material and social benefits and for their political rights. The place of work and its organization, industrial problems and employee representation in decision making, as was shown in the previous sections, have been related to the government's social and political measures and to the role of labour in society in general.

The social significance of such a work organisation, of such industrial problems with which employees are confronted, is lying in a dual process. On the one hand this process creates a fragile working environment and further distorts employee homogeneity (in relation to regulations and procedures), and the employees' ability to change existing relations; on the other hand, it enforces the relation between industrial politics and social-political decisions, taken outside the Public Power Corporation. The issue of democracy at the place of work develops into an issue of political representation in society, and the issue of material distribution into an issue of monetary policies that the government has introduced.

The continuous use of such policies has created certain conditions by which employees are more likely, as has been shown, to search for 'alternative' proposals that will guarantee elementary democratic rights and obligations by the management. Proposals which are not, in any sense, limited to
the Public Power Corporation or certain sections of the labour population, and which question the present form of trade union strategy and tactics. The latter has also been shown to be a major issue in a National Survey (1989), on the relationship of employees with trade unions, where 20% of public employees have said that their industrial problems can be best dealt with by trade unions that have modified their forms and roles, in accordance with new needs, (ie Oikonomikos Takidromos, 1989).

Lastly, in accordance with what has already been mentioned, the further centralization of the Public Power Corporation's decision-making process, and the integration of its personnel policies with its socio-economic functioning and role in Greek society, has created an unparalleled objective situation where energy choices and industrial relations are 'roots' of the same issue, namely the Public Power Corporation's nature and the characteristics of its social development. In this sense, without reiterating some of the issues that have been already analysed, the role of trade unions and employees' representation in them cannot be limited within some 'technical' barriers. The issue of pay related productivity for example and its implications for employees is also an issue of the Public Power Corporation's developmental plans, its utilisation of energy resources, its investment in research and its extension of democratic rights and participative procedures. The further integration of the Public Power Corporation's energy policies with international energy markets and organisation has also brought into the forefront the issues of decision-making, who is deciding, for whom and what are the social implications of those decisions?

The relationship therefore, between employees and trade unions, is determined by all those issues raised above, which have transformed the work place in such a way as to create new perspectives for industrial democracy and the participation of employees at work. The situation which both employees and trade unions face is a complex one, and only 'wild' theoretical analyses could predict the outcome. It is not however, the intention of this thesis to express any predictions about the future of industrial relations, but rather to extrapolate from current industrial changes the socio-economic significance for the participation of employees,
to unravel the complexities which surround the issue and show the transparency and transformation which industrial politics undergo at the moment, and how this has affected the issue of democratic participation and employee control of decision making processes.

5.6.1. The Megalopolis Combined Fired Power Station

The Megalopolis power station is situated on the north-east side of the Peloponnese peninsula and rates as one of the largest power stations in the country. It is powered by using a combination of brown coal (lignite) and crude oil, so as to increase lignite's thermal power, and produces almost 11% of the Public Power Corporation's electricity production.

The power station consists of three major power units (that were built during 1970s) with a total capacity of 550 MW (or 12.5% of the total Public Power Corporation's capacity), and of a fourth unit, which after its operation (1990s) will be capable of producing additional 300 MWs. In addition, apart from the four power units, there are four large opencast mines (ie Thoknia, Horemion, Ciparisi, Marthonsa) from which, according to the Public Power Corporation's estimates, 500 million tonnes of brown coal would be extracted by the year 2028. [78]

In terms of production methods, Megalopolis combines both mining (extraction of fossils) and automated methods for electricity generation. As is shown in Figure 5.6.1, the extracted lignite is transferred by belts to large graders, then to silos, to oil-lignite mixers and then to the power plant. The electricity that is produced in the power plant is then transmitted via Corinth and Rio to the lines connected to the National Integrated Grid. (See Figure 5.6.1) It is however, the large labour force concentration (almost 4,000 people), their living and working conditions, as well as the concentration of different skills and origin, which is of social importance.

The Megalopoli power station employs almost four thousand people who are drawn from the region itself, and from regions all over Greece. The
Figure 5.6.1 Diagram of Megalopolis Production Line and of its Integrated National System for Transmission

Megalopoli Power Plant

-Rid

Corinthos

(Future Line) to Crete

National Grid
majority of employees live in the town of Megalopolis, but there are many employees who have to travel for three hours or more to work each day. However, the town of Megalopolis is described by locals as the 'electricity town' because almost two thirds of the population are employees at the power station. It must be noted here, that the majority of these employees are not originally from Megalopoli, but from surrounding areas and even Athens, which has created additional problems (apart from issues relating to the Public Power Corporation's power plant working conditions) for employees, eg housing problems, etc. The survey into the working conditions of employees and their attitudes towards participation was immediately banned by the manage of Megalopolis power station. The reasons were that:

"Power stations are camps as military ones. I do not know whether or not its results will be made known to employees, as journalists do. Personally I will never admit anyone within the plant's premises. Here I am the manager which also means that if I do give way to surveys, then who knows how my superiors will respond...I cannot allow the survey which will do a detailed observation of the opinions of employees about industrial relations/conditions, since these opinions are known to be damaging for the Public Power Corporation's relations with the public...However, because I am not a bureaucrat, and I am myself a liberal, you can either choose to wait outside, (till all four shifts have ended) and ask the workers to 'help' you. I doubt whether they will respond because, you see, they are illiterate. They cannot understand the importance of a social survey. Or you will give me your identification card and I will send a telex to the Personnel Director in Athens, and within three months at the most, you will have an answer .... You see this is a power station. Whatever happens inside here is treated as a national security issue. So how can I let you in? Would a general allow a foreigner to inspect his camp in this way? [79]

The personal ban of the survey by the manager did not, however, deter the continuation of the survey inside the power station. An employee from the power unit No 2, together with the gatekeeper, agreed not to inform the
manager about the survey in the Megalopoli station, so a 'permission' was
given insofar as no one (the administration) noticed anything.

The survey however, was restricted within the three power units, and the
time spent with each individual employee was limited. These restrictions
though, did not impede the scope and scale of the survey.

First of all, according to employees, at each power unit the number of
employees required has been recently cut to a minimum, enabling the use of
new technology and new production methods, that increase output at lower
costs to the Public Power Corporation. At any one production unit, there
are no more than fifteen employees working at different stages of the
production process for each shift. From those fifteen employees, four
employees (three operators and one sub-engineer) are responsible for the
operation of the unit, which is automatically controlled, whereas the
rest are maintenance staff and are situated throughout the unit, doing
repairs and observing the performance of different equipment.

Throughout the visit in the three power units, employees expressed their
dissatisfaction with the Public Power Corporation's personnel policies,
and they have said in a number of interviews that their ability to control
decisions over their social-economic condition at work is diminishing. In
relation for example, to training and upgrading policies, a majority of
the power plant's employees have said that the management has enforced a
policy of deregulation, under the new government's campaign for new
industrial relations, and a policy of political control which reinforces
divisions amongst employees. This, however, is a general delineation
of what Megalopolis employees have expressed, but there were some
specific problems in relation to the control room employees and general
maintenance staff, which as the interviews show, add a further dimension
to what has already been analysed in the previous sections.

In the case of control room employees, the Public Power Corporation's
policies on training or upgrading had an immediate effect on the 'power' to
bargain with the management on their material benefit distribution and to
use their skill and experience as a pressure mechanism against the latter's policies. As one employee said:

"Personally, I have had to lie that my father is in hospital, so that I would be able to retrain myself .... The management does not care about our training at all, irrespective of the fact that we are responsible for the whole plant .... There is no training at all; everything rests upon individual consciousness .... Each one of us in this power unit has different qualifications instead of being retrained so that our skills match the new requirements; the management prefers to have a system where employees work out of experience rather than anything else. There is, however, another side to this issue. Instead of having regular seminars which deal with computer planning or something else, the management is using certain individuals for some months, then transferring them somewhere else and so on."

Another employee said:

"The issue of training or post-training I think has got to be related to how the management wants to regulate us. You see, the management I think consciously, makes us dependent on the job. Let me give you an example. I am a sub-engineer and when I was trained in a private school, I learnt a number of important skills which give me the capability and authority to work anywhere I want .... I've been at this power plant for over five years, and in this time I have seem my skills (knowledge) fade away .... The management knows, I am sure of that, that we are capable of leaving the industry, but for us it is increasingly difficult to get a new job in an industry that uses a lot of electromechanical equipment, that demands new skills when our knowledge is limited."

The issue of retraining and homogenisation of skills within the Megalopolis control rooms has proven (according to employee interviews) to be of major social significance for employee wage determination. As many had said, whenever employees of the Megalopolis power station were in industrial dispute, the management either used personal favours to attract employees
to the management's side, or used the threat of transfer so as to create divisions between employees, from the control room and general maintenance staff and even amongst employees from control rooms.

"During our last dispute the management has used personal means, ie phoning individuals at night and promising them that if they broke the strike, then they would be promoted or granted 'leaves' for training in Athens; that they would be transferred to a department in Athens and so on. I had to cope with such a situation, however, when I refused to break the strike on principle, and cross the picket line. The manager immediately said that I would be transferred to another power plant in the north of Greece, (where condition would be far worse for me and my family). [80]

According to what the majority of control room employees have said, it is clear that the management, according to the Public Power Corporation's general personnel policies, is using training and/or promotion as direct means of pressure; a pressure that is based upon an employee's vulnerability and inability to control major decisions and to bargain collectively. The new element, if one may call it as such, of the situation of employees at control rooms, is the fact that there is an increased element of insecurity about what they are going to do, where they are going to be transferred, and of how long their contracts with the Public Power Corporation were to last (many of those employees had temporary employment contracts). This sort of situation, under which skilled individuals lose much of their skill-orientation, that slowly becomes increasingly dependent on the management's socio-political decisions, has resulted in a situation described by a sub-engineer as follows:

"Without doubt, we can afflict a lot upon the management, after all we control the operations of this station. However, we are increasingly under pressure, because we can be replaced without any notice. I remember that, during the last strike, we had to make sure that no one will 'give' anything to the management. We had to assure ourselves that no one will end the strike, because even if he was on strike and I
was back in my job, then all of us would have to go back .... It was not like that a few years ago. Now a job-transfer, to lose your job, or a promotion, means a lot, especially nowadays."

In addition, there were many employees who have said that the management continuously has resorted to 'rousfeti' in order to break the solidarity of employees. As they explained, the management usually promotes young sub-engineers or engineers, who have just been employed, as indirect 'mediators' between the management's policies and employees whenever there is an industrial dispute. During the survey, because of the presence of these employees, most of the interviews were conducted in a very 'secretive' way. However, there was one incident when an employee (in one of the power units) was ready to report that a survey was in progress, and if it was not for the rest of the employees, the survey would have ended here. In another power unit, the interviews had to be conducted in a very personal way, where different issues were mentioned, as if the interviewed and the interviewer were relatives.

The management's use of flexible personnel policies have also created new problems for many of the general maintenance staff's conditions and industrial relations at work. In relation to employment, many technicians expressed a fear that, due to a recent upsurge in short-term or sub-contracted employment, the management is in the position to further manipulate and control the social and political cohesiveness of individual employees. As an employee said:

"The management is employing many farmers and in fact many of my colleagues have been transferred somewhere else .... It is even more difficult for us to press for anything as a team, since many are not in any way committed to this job .... We have specific problems that have to do with our pay, our health and safety, and as you can see, we work in terrible conditions. Yet for someone that has another job in addition to this one, it is not easy to understand why we should strike or take any action."
Insofar as training is concerned, much of the high-technology equipment that is used, and much of the management's new policy on employment, have created conditions where old skills can easily become replaceable and where the use of semi-skilled or even unskilled personnel is increasing. The management provided no retraining courses and even most of the personnel in three power units were either unskilled, casual labour, or semi-skilled (usually young employees that were employed for a short term period). The problem which maintenance technicians face is twofold: firstly that their bargaining position and skill identification is changing continually, and secondly, that the increased use of political 'rousfeti', by the management, deters many employees from a collective approach to particular issues. There were, however, some employees who although employed on a short-term basis, because of their political or individual contracts with the management, have criticised the present personnel policy for not providing them with a secure job and adequate training. A young employee said:

"I've got two jobs. At the moment I'm employed here but after six months I'll be out of the station. There should be jobs, proper jobs, because the way it is here (Megalopoli) I have to work for twenty four hours almost, for what? Do you know that if I remain unskilled I will always have to rely on such jobs, which give you no allowances, no pension, etc. At the moment I'm trying to earn as much as possible so I can sell my farm and go to Athens. There is no hope here."

The majority of those employees who were interviewed have said, in relation to productivity and material benefits, that although the plant has increased its total output and the productivity of their work has increased, material benefits have not followed this upward trend. The production of electricity for example, from 2.9bn kWh during 1976, has increased to 3.35bn kWh during 1986, and during 1987 the level of electricity output increased by an additional 2.9m kWh (or 14.1%). Such levels of output increase, according to employees, have been reached mainly due to management's policy for labour intensification, the use of casual labour and the government's 1985 dismantling of ATA provision, whereby wage levels were linked to inflation. [81] For all these
reasons, many of the employees who were interviewed have demanded that their wages were related to both the plant's electricity productivity levels and to inflation levels. In contrast however, to the Public Power Corporation's proposals for the introduction of a productivity related pay system, the employees demanded that they be involved in decision-making and that any 'bonuses' are distributed collectively. The central problem, which was also a major objective during the 1988 strike (95% of Megalopoli power plant employees participated), was that whatever measure is introduced, employee representatives (from the plant) and national trade union organisation, will be involved in the procedures that lay down the criteria and decide which team is going to be awarded a productivity benefit. However, as many control room employees have argued:

"Any system that relates productivity with wages cannot be seen as the panacea for productivity, because the operation of this plant faces serious structural problems. Why should we be responsible when the unit shuts down because of explosions, etc. On more than one occasion we did warn the manager that adequate repairs had to be carried out and nothing happened. The other day we warned the manager that spare parts had to be in the plant. We were ignored and when finally there was a breakdown of the control system, we, the employees, had to wait for six months till we got what we needed. All this time the plant had to operate at half its capacity. Another example is when the manager announced that he will sign a deal with a multinational, so that extensive repairs will be carried through. The Public Power Corporation did not care that the whole cost of the deal amounted to Drk billions .... We had to insist that we will carry out all repairs for not even 1/3rd of that figure, yet the management and the Public Power Corporation's central office insists in signing this deal with the multinational." (Interview with a maintenance technician)

Apart from the issue of economic control and democratic regulation of the power plant's operations, employees were also 'suspicious' of the Public Power Corporation's plan for a productivity related pay wage system, because as they have said, it will further reinforce personal favours and an anti-union feeling amongst employees.
"The management through a productivity pay related system that we have no control of and where individuals and not teams are rewarded, will create a situation where people are further dependent upon the manager's goodwill, which in turn will create further problems for employee solidarity and loyalty to each other, especially at times of dispute."

Such 'suspicions', however, were further elaborated during a personal interview with the plant's general manager, where the issue of further work intensification, the loss of employees' democratic control of material distribution, and the ways in which productivity related pay (as was intended by the Public Power Corporation's management) will further curtail trade union representation and employee political solidarity, were indirectly reflected upon.

"Employees should not be allowed to endanger the nation's economic and political development. The manager is the general, and his orders should be executed by his 'soldiers' (employees) without question. There should not be any doubt about this .... Those people (employees) do not need any improvement in working conditions, because they are unproductive and they like coffee breaks too often. So, why as a manager shouldn't I be able to do whatever I want with their wages, promote and reward whoever works hard? Do you know that during the last strike my employees were not allowed to cross picket lines? So I had to bring the police to protect the plant's operation. You see they are not interested in anything apart from their 'secret' political interests."

The issue of health and safety at work, apart from issues that relate to either employment and/or wage policies, was probably the most important theme that, when interviewed, employees complained about first. First of all there is noticeable environmental pollution from sulphur and carbon-dioxide plant emissions within the town and surrounding areas as well as inside the plant itself. The result of such emissions can be easily seen in the nearby forests, agricultural plantations (the local farmers have officially complained against the destruction of their crops), and
according to what trade union and council representatives have said, it is also reflected in the state of health of employees and local commuters. (There is an acute increase since 1975 of lung-heart illnesses.) The problems of emissions is so acute that even roads, houses and cars are covered with thick coal dust, and every morning Megalopoli's inhabitants are preoccupied with thorough cleaning exercises. At the time of the survey, employees and other inhabitants of Megalopoli were demonstrating against the Public Power Corporation's plant emissions and the Public Power Corporation's management reluctance to install special dust filters and introduce the desulphurisation of lignite, before it is used. According to council representatives and trade union officials, instead of responding to these demands the management will further commission a new power unit.

"They don't care if we are poisoned. At the beginning there were some councillors who were against the fourth unit (because of the existing pollution levels). Others were for it because it meant more employees, more investment and business in the town .... Today, most of the councillors and employee representatives are asking that the fourth unit should be commissioned only if the Public Power Corporation will guarantee that they will use filters." [83]

Apart from the issue of environmental pollution, the whole plant and the mines operate without the 'presence' of a medical practitioner or even a nurse. According to employee accounts, there was a general practitioner (who was a specialist in work-related health problems), but after a year he was dismissed, because his activities (he carried out a medical survey on the health conditions of employees) were described by the management as 'unnecessary' and 'incompatible' with the Public Power Corporation's general policy on health and safety at the place of work.

"Since we have been employed, we have never been examined on our heart or lung conditions. In fact when we asked for a medical examination (because of sulphur emissions), we were told (by the manager) that the levels of pollution are within agreed limits." [84]
The levels of pollution (which are not monitored by anyone) seemed excessive, since thick coal dust layers covered everything, and even the management's building had to be cleaned every day by employees. In fact, the only place that seemed coal-dust free were the control rooms and the inside of the management's building.

Other serious problems that employees complained about were related to present working conditions, the level of employee training and the management's use of the labour force, irrespective of whether or not certain equipment might endanger their lives. According to employees, the level of training and health and safety issues are two highly interrelated aspects which the management has so far ignored.

"Last year a young kid was crushed by a grader. He was unskilled and yet he was ordered to perform tasks that none of us would have agreed to perform. Because he was not experienced, he stepped where he was not supposed to, (there were not notices). We never found him .... Others have had serious cuts, etc. But as you see, a life of a 'casual' worker means nothing; they pay no compensation and there is no tribunal to determine the cause of an accident."

The employee allegations against the management's improper use of its labour force varied and extended further, but most employee complaints were categorically against the present unsafe operation of the power plant and the absence of any democratic procedures that deter and prevent serious accidents (Health checks, safety committee inspections or work premises, etc).

"We have been ordered to pump coal via a pipe into the main tower. This is a clear violation of all safety rules. We did complain about it, but nothing happened .... One night the top of the tower exploded and a big fire ball covered the whole unit. It was only luck that no one was nearby." [85]
Another added that:

"When I was working at the unit, suddenly there was a big fire, just behind the control room .... Everything was off in seconds, however, without any indications from the board. I was ordered, by the management, not to turn off the unit. It could have resulted in our death." [86]

The employee complaints were endless, however, one thing that was repeated was that the issue of health and safety at work is inseparable from the issue of the control and participation of employees in Megalopoli's socio-economic function and decision-making processes.

Having outlined in some detail some of the serious social and political problems employees face at Megalopoli, the majority of interviewed employees expressed a serious scepticism as to whether or not participative bodies (ie ASKE, the peripheral consultative committee, TES) were in a position to change their working conditions.

"The manager of the plant is an ASKE representative. This means a lot .... We know nothing; whenever we have an objection it is only the Unions that can represent us, whereas all other bodies do not even function .... These bodies, even if the 'existed' (they do not function), would not be able to change anything because the government and the management are not open to dialogue ..."

Another employee said:

"Everybody has forgotten us; only our union representatives are available. The joint consultative committee, the local workers council have even been unable to inform us of what is discussed .... I don't understand. I've given all my life to this Corporation. My ear-drums have almost been destroyed, my lungs are suffering.... and yet I have been treated worse than an animal. No wonder I call this place (Megalopoli power plant) the Great Auschwitz!"
The case study into the Megalopoli power station has illustrated the importance of employees participating and controlling important decision-making processes.

There were aspects of work conditions which could have been improved and where the management could have initiated a programme in which the safety at work and physical condition of employees would be improved, or where employee representatives and their serious allegations would have been taken seriously. However, the absence of democratic organisation and the new industrial measures have both created an industrial environment where even institutionalized bodies of representation are further by-passed (by the management), and the only means of employee pressure, which still exist, are the trade unions. According to local trade union representatives, however, even trade unions and employee collective industrial representation are under 'threat' because the management has further deregulated working patterns and industrial procedures, and because most of the problems employees face are issues which have to do with both the general plan of the Public Power Corporation's development and the government's monetary and labour policies. This new political development was further reflected in a current (1988) drop in union membership, and through absenteeism from trade union elections. In the last union elections (1988), for the national and local bodies of participation, there was a rapid increase in the number of employees who were absent from voting procedures (ie more than 19%); and according to internal trade union polls on employees' attitudes towards trade unions, there was a noticeable shift in opinions in favour of non 'traditional' (independent) representatives and in favour of issues that safeguarded individual rights, eg promotion, pay. These, however, are only indicative signs of probably a new trend which partly derives from the further deregulation of existing working practices and from the further fragmentation of existing economic and political 'bonds' amongst employees.
5.6.2 The Lavrion Oil-Fired Power Station

The study of the Lavrion oil-fired power station, which is situated on the south-east side of Attica and employs three hundred people, did not present the same complications (with the manager) as the Megalopoli case. Instead of asking for permission to conduct a survey on employees' opinions on industrial issues, which the manager would not have permitted, he was only told that a tour of the power station was the focus of interest. He was, however, reluctant because, as he said:

"Normally I would have to 'phone the personnel director...However, if as you have said, you are an engineering student and you are not going to talk with workers, then I suppose I could let you in."

The structure and operation of the plant was based upon almost identical principles to the Megalopoli power station, and the only differences were that the environment inside the plant was cleaner and that the plant is directly linked to the National Grid system.

One of the major issues that employees complained about was that of training and retraining of the labour force that work in control rooms and the general maintenance areas. Many have said that since they were employed by the Public Power Corporation, they have never been asked to attend any technical course on how to improve their skills in relation to the introduction of new technology.

"We are expected to do almost everything there is. However, there are no industrial seminars and even the manuals for the operation of the plant are outdated. The Public Power Corporation 'counts' on our 'patriotism' and yet the management says that we are unproductive..."

The majority of employees were complaining that the lack of retraining has seriously affected not so much their performance per se, because, as they have argued, the most experienced employees teach the less experienced ones how to utilise best the new machinery, but rather their whole attitude towards work. As some have indicated, the absence of training,
provisions and work specialisation has further reinforced the management's flexible work arrangements, where especially maintenance employees are transferred from one job to another (job-rotation), and where employees are responsible for many tasks at the same time.

"The management was asking people (that were responsible for the maintenance areas) to do repairs in the transmission area (ie cable lines). There were employees who had never been trained to do repairs on cable lines...After few accidents we managed to stop this. However, there are still many employees who today are cleaning these turbines, but tomorrow they might do something else..." [87]

The issue of labour division and new work distribution was also one of the major topics which the employees felt was responsible for present attitudes towards work. Many complained of the lack of rational task distribution and the absence of job specialisation, which is followed by financial schemes which are linked to either the level of work done and/or responsibility. In relation to the former, many of the employees who were interviewed have said that the present wage system in the Public Power Corporation discriminates against those who are skilled, and who work in sensitive positions (eg control room, boiler rooms etc) where their labour power is not valued according to certain criteria, but rather in accordance with general wage agreements:

"The problems that the present wage system has created, apart from the level of living standards, are also reflected in collective industrial actions. We might be 'faced' with two technicians but one is skilled and the other semi or even unskilled (casual labour) or with two people who, one is placed in a very sensitive area within the plant whereas the other (because he is being favoured by the management), is placed in an area (where his life is not under any danger), apart from years of work (the difference amounts to less that 1%), they will be paid the same amount...So how would those two people understand and respond to a demand for wage increases? If an engineer happens to work at a control room, he would be personally responsible for everything that happens
there...Yet his pay is not different from a person who works in an office." [88]

When employees were asked to unveil their thoughts on the Public Power Corporation's proposals for the introduction of a productivity related pay system, many said that the main problem of the present wage system is that of meritocracy; the objective evaluation of one's amount of work and whatever the proposed system might be, if it does not establish democratic procedures (for wage determination-distribution), then employees' attitudes to work are going to be unchanged.

The proposed introduction of a productivity related pay system was clearly not accepted by employees, because, as employee representatives have said, it would not be based upon defined criteria and, in an organisation where political and personal favours still exist, and in a corporation where work is not regulated by democratic rational procedures, a productivity related pay system would rather intensify work and it would probably create individual and political antagonisms amongst employees.

"I am against the relation of our wages with only productivity rates. First of all as a worker in this room (control room), how can my work be measured? I am sitting here in a chair, and just observe the operation of the plant...Is my work the same as that of the person next door (main electricity generation area)? [89]

These attitudes towards the management's proposals on productivity related pay, however, should not be 'translated' as being against the relation of wages with productivity. Although the majority of Lavrion employees said that productivity levels should not be the sole determinant of a wage level and that other factors as well should be included, they have argued that employees' participation in the general function of the plant is an essential prerequisite for the democratic reorganisation of Lavrion's labour relations. The issue of employees' participation and control of decision-making procedures was also linked by employees with the present work conditions and health and safety issues.
"The plant is probably one of the 'cleanest' (in terms of environmental pollution) in comparison with other power stations, due to its nature (oil-fired plant) and due to the high technological standards...We have no coal dust or noticeable traces of pollution....However, we are still suffering from emissions in the atmosphere, but it takes longer, compared to illnesses linked with coal, to notice any serious health disorders." [90]

The environment in which employees work (ie the Lavrion area) has recently been characterized as an area heavily polluted with lead [91], by the institute of epidemiological studies at the University of Athens. Despite however, the large concentration of chemical industries in the area and the presence of the power plant, the Public Power Corporation's management has not yet carried out a health survey on its employees' physical conditions. Indeed, as was also shown in the Megalopoli case study, the Lavrion plant's employees have had no medical examination (by the Public Power Corporation) on their health (in relation to their working environment), since they have been employed. Although, as trade union representatives have said, employees have repeatedly asked to be informed on the permitted levels of lead emissions and for a medical survey on employees' health status, the management has not yet responded (1988).

"We do not know either how much our health is affected by lead or what could be done. All these years we have been kept uninformed." [92]

The same attitude (by the management) has also been 'present' in relation to health and safety at work.

"The plant is in operation for more than sixteen years...All this time the trade union was asking for proper medical facilities...Yet, after a lot of industrial pressure, it was after fourteen years that the Public Power Corporation and the manager of this plant, that they brought an ambulance...One ambulance for all these workers, without any equipment (not even oxygen), without a nurse and even without any first aid emergency kit...There are people that during the summer months faint (because of the intense heat inside and around the plant); others that
break or cut their legs or heads (from industrial accidents)... There was a case when one employee was seriously hit on the head. The ambulance was here, but first no employee was willing to help his colleague to be transferred to the nearest medical centre (almost two hours)... Because of the management's policy, the person who accompanies an employee to the hospital is also responsible for his death. Secondly, there was no qualified nurse to give medical first aid. The result was that this colleague died as soon as we reached hospital." [93]

Another trade union representative said:

"We asked for an ambulance fully equipped, for a nurse, for a doctor (who is specialised in industrial injuries), for a medical centre that can cope with the area's employees.... There is a medical centre in Lavrion, where there is only one doctor and one nurse, ill-equipped, and which caters for almost five thousand employees, apart from local inhabitants... The government and the Public Power Corporation's management does not care whether we die or not."

According to recent legislation (1985), and since a team of occupational safety and health experts from the ILO has visited the country (1972), the government passed a bill on safety at work, under which an enterprise (private or public) has to have "regular medical examinations of workers and establishes their right to information about occupational hazards, provision in emergencies, fire exits, ventilation, lighting, fire extinguishers, passageways, etc. [94]

The case however, of the Lavrion plant has shown that none of these provisions are met by the management, whereas the employment of occupational physicians (as it is in the regulation of Act 1568/1985) and safety engineers has not yet been introduced (except in the Ptolemoida plant) in any other power plant throughout Greece. Even the function of employees' committees has been so far impeded by the Lavrion management's policy on health and safety. It is not as Valavanidis A, and Sarafopoulos N (1989) have claimed, that employees and trade unions have so far been 'unwilling' or 'reluctant' to collaborate on such issues with
the management, but rather the opposite. From these employees, who were interviewed in Lavrion, the majority have clearly stated that employee committees on all issues, but in particular on health and safety cannot function, not only because the management is unwilling to collaborate with employees, but also because the Public Power Corporation's policies have been formulated in such a way that they contravene employees' participation in major decision-making.

"We are not allowed by the manager to decide on issues insofar as working conditions are concerned. In the beginning the TES were unable to decide even on issues which are clearly defined; we were running the plant's refectory, a very simple thing, but the management has even taken the keys from the committee...We no longer control even the refectory, let alone other places. The issue of workers' participation and the so-called participatory bodies, is a 'fiasco' (not reality). Workers cannot have the control of a plant if they are not allowed to decide on general policies...these bodies did not promise more than just a collaboration with the management...How can we be allowed to have any control since the government has imposed these economic austerity measures which hit the living standards of workers and allow anti-worker policies to be implemented." [95]

Throughout the plant (from those employees who were asked), none knew anything about ASKE's or other participatory bodies' (ie TES) function in Lavrion, since, as they have said, TES in particular has not been able to function for a year. There was a general 'apathy', not towards participation, but towards the effectiveness of those bodies. In contrast, the trade union was still considered as an important representative body, that unites employees and represents their interests. However, according to trade union representatives, the current anti-union governmental measures and the Public Power Corporation's personnel policies (employment, working conditions, etc), have reinforced the militancy of employees against both management and government, but they have also created new problems for the normal functioning of a trade union.
"During the 1988 strike, we witnessed a new type of militancy amongst employees...Everyone was 'locked' inside the plant; we were successful. However, on the other hand, we are unable to mobilise people for meetings or other activities because first of all Lavrion's employees are living far away. There is a difficulty in holding meetings when some are on shift-working, some have just finished their shifts and others want to rest. There is no time...Then there are problems of convincing employees that a union, together with the Federation, are able to change things, and then, most of the issues are no longer within our reach. One simple example is the case of welfare provision for this plant's employees. We were asking for kindergartens for our kids. The Public Power Corporation's management bought three, for its labour force (inside Athens), yet after few months they were sold for Drks 5,000 each, to the Welfare Ministry...Then again, with regard to health issues, it is not only what goes on inside this plant, but also what happens in the area." [96]

Another employee representative said:

"To give you another example, of how issues are not limited within this plant, when we had a strike during 1988, the inspector from the Ministry of Labour was sent to review our objectives...She was refused admission to the plant (where employees were locked) but after we found that the manager complained to the Public Power Corporation's General Director for Personnel, who in turn made a formal complaint against her to the Ministry, she was never sent back to the plant. Indeed, during the strike we were left all alone with the riot police...Many things have to change before even established democratic regulations are observed."

The flexible and relaxed attitude of the government, and the Public Power Corporation's management's attitude towards regulations, have (as was observed in Lavrion) created a new 'scepticism' amongst employees about the struggle to change existing statutes and procedures. Many employees, although they were not against industrial action and were supporting their trade union representatives, have also said that something 'new' is in demand. As the president of the Lavrion trade union has said, 'old
enemies' and 'tools of action' were no longer appealing and new relationships between employees and the union have to be developed, upon all those new issues with which employees are confronted.

5.6.3 National Centre for Power Transmission/Distribution: Roof

The Roof National Centre for Electricity Transmission and Power Distribution is situated on the outskirts of Athens and it employs almost four hundred people. It is one of the least technologically advanced centres of the Greek public sector, and is one of the most politically sensitive areas due to its industrial capabilities. During the 1967-1974 junta, the centre developed into one of the main 'national security' industrial places, from within which the then generals were able to sustain their control over Greece's National Grid. The extent of Roof's automated control over the country's power transmission-distribution processes, as well as its comparatively independent telecommunications branch (in relation to the Public Telecommunications Corporation), has 'attracted' the attention of various governments and it has so far been developed into an industrial place that serves both the immediate economic interests of the Public Power Corporation and is directly accountable to the government. In particular, the Telecommunications, the Electronic Control Branch and the National Centre for Power Distribution are under the immediate control of the Energy Ministry and the Ministry of Defence. (See figure 5.6.3)

The majority of employees in both the transmission centre and transmission systems sector have said that the new personnel policies, insofar as employment, training and promotion procedures are concerned, have seriously affected both working conditions and employees' relations within Roof. In particular, the Public Power Corporation's current policy on employment and employee training, has created an industrial environment where on the one hand there is a lesser emphasis on skill, whereas on the other work standards and the deregulation of employment procedures (in comparison to 'traditional' employment standards) has seriously affected both productivity and the bargaining power of employees.
"The Public Power Corporation is relying on unskilled young people, that
are either employed under the current Youth Employment Scheme or they
have been employed as technicians, (although they have only attended the
Technical High School and are not qualified). This has affected
everything from health and safety at work, to productivity, to
industrial representation... These young lads are employed for eighteen
months and then they are fired. (We are better off in Roof, in other
places, the Public Power Corporation employs people who are unskilled,
for only five months)...These young people get only Drks 25,000 after
eighteen months of work, so they cost nothing although they are working
hard...I cannot understand why the Public Power Corporation employs
people and then 'fires' them. Then it employs new recruits. It is
stupid. Why should we have to deal with new unskilled recruits all the
time (who are not unionised and are not committed to the Public Power
Corporation)?"

Another technician who works in the area of repairs, said:

"I am a foreman, but I do not think that what happens today is right,
because there used to be a school (for Public Power Corporation
employees) where 95% to 98% of young recruits used (after the graduation)
to be skilled technicians...This school was shut during 1976 because, as
they have said, it was a 'breeding ground' for Communists, simply
because the majority of those students voted for left-wing trade union
associations...Since then we operate with unskilled personnel and we have
never been asked what we think of the situation...The closure of this
school was a 'murder' for young people."

The problem of training and post-training is not limited and it does not
only affect young recruits, but rather the same managerial attitude
underlines much of the Public Power Corporation's policy in relation to the
skill capabilities of its labour force.

"The management provides us with no seminars on health and safety, or on
our work tasks...I have to find out from others of how I should do this
or the other. Everything depends on the willingness of myself and other
colleagues to cooperate in these matters...There is no continuity in the Public Power Corporation's policy on education...Every time there is a new government, a new educational programme is introduced for young recruits...That's why I believe that the whole issue is a political one."

The issue, however, of personnel training and/or post-training (as it has been discovered in Roof and as has been implied by many employees) is not a case where the management is not providing seminars for employees. The Roof case shows the complexity of the Public Power Corporation's policy, which on the one side provides seminars on topics which the management considers essential for its administration and regulation of its labour force, and which are designed for specific sections of the working population, but, on the other, there is a conscious political decision to exclude (from these courses) employees who are considered to be politically 'undesirable'. Furthermore, the participation of employees in these educational seminars is determined by political and personal contacts, but also by the position an employee occupies in the administrative structure of the corporation. The case study of Roof, however, further exemplifies what has earlier been assumed, that the management of the Public Power Corporation is using a number of issues, eg training, in such a way that certain employees are favoured (usually middle ranking officials), whereas the majority of technicians and engineers, who are directly involved with the Corporation's production process and technological development, are kept out of the corporation's educational activities. In that sense, training or post training is used as an incentive, not in a way to increase individual productivity or to increase the skill capability of employees, but rather to increase individual commitment and identification with corporate socio-political goals. In accordance with what employees in Roof have said, there is an annual educational programme for employees. This programme is partly funded by the EEC (through the Integrated Mediterranean programmes), and partly by the Public Power Corporation, and it offers courses on a variety of topics which are related to the new technological applications, the new industrial management and the role of a public corporation inside the EEC.
"The main focus of these educational programmes is the Public Power Corporation's new 'flexible' working relations, e.g., they have seminars on productivity related pay or psychological methods for labour management etc., or on issues that relate to employment and how to integrate employees into the Public Power Corporation's organisational goals etc. However, in general, they (the management) offer no opportunity for workers to educate themselves further in relation to their job-tasks. For example, in our sector only 1% of employees have gone through such programmes since the 1980s." [99]

Even, however, when there is a topic that directly relates to employees' specific skills and job tasks, the management indirectly favours those employees who are not immediately involved with the area covered in the course.

"There are computer seminars about which the management inform us and ask us whether we would like to participate. On the other hand however, we are not exempt from our duties and the result is that we are not going. Instead then, the manager sends a particular employee (who is not involved with our job), and exempts him from his duties for as long as the seminar is on. What then happens is that there is an employee who knows how to analyse computer data, or how to programme a computer, but cannot practise what he has learnt, and employees like us who use computers but our knowledge is acquired through personal commitment in our free time... This is a political choice which the management has taken. They seem to favour a situation where even employees who are working in very sensitive areas like ours, are not informed and retrained, but on the other hand employees who have nothing to do with computers are trained on computers... It is irrational, but it seems that the Public Power Corporation prefers to use and pay private consultants whenever there is a major problem, rather than relying on its scientists and technical labour force." [100]

It was soon discovered, however, in an interview with two employees from the above centre, that the Public Power Corporation's policy on training has created a situation where the already highly skilled personnel lose
much of their job-task 'autonomy' and where their skills do not match their job requirements.

"We are heavily relying on what other employees are willing to do for us. For example, they, the employees (out of different manuals), give us a programme and teach us how to run. They do not know the necessities of this job and so we are left with programmes that are not for this sort of job. We have just become typists...Instead of the Public Power Corporation investing in our skills and knowledge, we have been left alone to cope with any problem. But I suppose this reflects the Public Power Corporation's political choice on energy development and the government's attitude towards research and development." [101]

Experience and reliability, rather than actual skill capabilities, seem to be the main emphasis given by the management on job tasks in sensitive areas such as the above. Such an example, however, should not be immediately translated as a case of a deskilling process, because many of the employees have gone through a process where their skills are becoming obsolete. The case, however, of employees in Roof's automated control operations shows that job requirements and work relations (insofar as the specific case is concerned) are both rather in transition; a transition where no one could predict the future outcome for these employees, but in which, due to the introduction of new technology, the significance of its applications, and the work environment that has further been rearranged, new requirements and new objectives are demanded. The Public Power Corporation's response, however, on these new demands, seems to be 'continuations' of what has always been the case, that research and development is left with large private firms. This is probably the essence behind the issue of training, but the form of its expression has changed insofar as labour is concerned. Instead of providing educational training programmes for particular sections of the working population and not for others, or instead of relating the existing programmes with job requirements, the management of Roof has applied a totally flexible policy that enables both the variable use of the labour force in these programmes, according to different requirements (without changing the essence of their
energy policy), and at the same time the use of training as a political regulation mechanism.

In the case however of maintenance technicians, the management's policy on training has altogether created a new industrial environment, where almost the majority in the machine shops are unskilled employees, low paid casual labour, and where the skilled personnel are placed in charge of young recruits.

"Each one of us (skilled employees) is as a personal 'foreman' to those young workers. They do a lot of work but they have almost no rights, not even to enter the workshop without our permission..." [102]

The majority of skilled personnel in Roof's workshops have said that the management's attitude towards training, its lack of interest in specialisation and the improvement of its employees' skills, have clearly affected much of the working conditions, the union power of employees and their future employment security in this place. The entailed budgetary cuts in training have left employees ill-equipped to cope with work adequately, which in turn directly affects the performance of employees and the Public Power Corporation's productivity level. The management's improvised attitude towards employee skill capabilities has, according to employees, determined much of the Public Power Corporation-employee working relations and the latter's ability to improve their work place.

"Even five years ago, the majority of workers were informed and educated by the management in the use of new equipment. Now we get nothing, which I believe has contributed to the deterioration of our working relations and working conditions. The only thing that the management does is to administer our work, but otherwise even our foreman is not called into seminars. So the situation is that we are relying on what he (out of goodwill) will tell us, if he knows. Otherwise, we are not involved in anything, even when we ask for training, so that the Corporation will increase its productivity." [103]
In relation to material benefits, the employees from Roof were in favour of a wage system that will be related to employee productivity, although they were totally against the management's proposals for the introduction of a productivity related pay system. In particular, the majority of employees asked for 'open' criteria according to which wages will be determined, and have said that employees have to be allowed to participate in major decision-making, otherwise any new wage system will increase further their economic exploitation and will result in the intensification of work.

During the visit, in the maintenance shops of Roof, the employees there expressed the views that productivity is not determined by employees alone and that any serious dialogue (from the management's side) on wage systems and productivity related pay in particular, must also include discussions on present personnel policies. They identified four main areas which they see as main contributors to productivity levels; firstly, that the present employment/training policies need to adapt to employee necessities and objective job requirements, so that there is an increase in skill investment, in further training, increase of personnel (skilled) in workshops, investment in high-technological equipment, and a rational division of labour:

"We are in favour of a programme that will relate our productivity with part of our wages, but how can an individual raise his productivity when he has first to learn a number of skills by himself or when he has to work without the adequate equipment. This is an East German transformer. The Germans take two to three weeks to repair it, whereas we here cannot deliver earlier than four months...They have skilled people, real 'craftsmen', whereas we have first to learn, then figure out, how we are going to repair it, and so on. Secondly, these transformers were built during 1973 in Western Europe and even in East Germany, they have stopped using and/or producing them, because they are too noisy and their standards on noise pollution are lower than those set by many European countries. However, we still use them, which (because they were built so long ago), means that every six months, even less than that, they are repaired." [104]
Secondly, that administrative incentives related to material incentives:

"There are many friends who although qualified to be supervisors (foremen) reject such a promotion. At present the difference between two employees who have been employed for the same years by the Public Power Corporation, and one is a technician, whereas the other is a foreman, amounts no more than 2% in real wages. So why should someone be interested in promotion or work in sensitive areas that require responsibilities." [105]

Thirdly, the majority of maintenance technicians have asked that their wages should be indexed against present inflation levels and they should correspond to national economic policies and developments. The most important factor however, according to employees, was that of their ability to participate and jointly decide on the economic functioning of Roof, together with the management. First of all they said that any benefit out of productivity should be distributed amongst employees collectively and not individually, and secondly that there should be defined democratic criteria and that their union representatives should participate in the wage negotiations.

In relation to those employees who were working in the Roof's transmission system sector, again the emphasis behind material distribution, and in particular the proposed introduction of pay related productivity was on the democratic participation of employees in decision making processes, the democratic reorganisation of the Public Power Corporation's industrial structure, and on employees' control of the Public Power Corporation's energy policy.

"Our job is to control the power transmission and distribution in the country. However, the present system of control is totally inadequate. First of all we rely heavily on communications (with other power stations) via the telephone. So many times I give an order, the person in charge of the power station hears at the end of the line something else, eg I said once turn off main R220 and the other person heard R420, so there was large damage. You say something, they hear another
thing and in turn you get something else. How can I be reliable in my job under such extremely bad conditions. The management has not, or pretends not to understand that we need new equipment. Imagine that even these computers were bought because the employees in this room, together with GENOP-PPC demanded it, after years of negotiations....Now when there was a black-out, we were interviewed for twenty four hours continuously. They (the management) were trying to discover who was responsible for the black-out. Do you know that we can be imprisoned and be dismissed from our posts at anytime, yet we are working sixteen hours per day under general alert and if there is a distress signal we jump and run, our heart beat reaches the top, etc. The management does not recognise that we work under extremely harsh conditions."

Another employee from the same section said:

"We are not paid for what we are doing...We haven't got specifically defined obligations because the management is afraid that we might ask for an increase in our pay. But what do you expect from a Corporation where twenty out of thirty thousand employees are allocated in departments? How can we increase our performance when for example we have warned the management that the Kardia Power Station is near a break and yet they don't consider our view...they prefer to use power stations till they 'break' rather than invest in new systems...Then what control have we over our jobs when for example we are also responsible for the repair work of Auriannis radio antenna? The Telecommunications General Director 'phoned us and ordered us to dispatch a team of technicians for the repairing of Auriannis (newspaper) radio communications. The issue of energy control is a political matter; from the issue of energy utilisation to energy distribution, the government and its policies determine everything."

The identification of employees' problems in relation to their work performance and in relation to material distribution has so far shown that employees' control and participation in Roof's economic function is inter-related with their work performance and attitude towards the management.
The lack of democratic procedures and the absence of any form of employee consultation by the management, as well as the nature of the Public Power Corporation's energy policy, has further though, interlinked conditions and relations at work places with exogenous factors to the Public Power Corporation's industrial structure, that characterise the Corporation's nature of development, the government's monetary and labour policies and Greece's distinctive facets of social-economic development.

In relation to the issue of working conditions such as the aspects of health and safety at work, the majority of employees who were responsible for maintenance, have complained that the health and condition of workers has so far been treated as a non-important aspect of work by the management.

"The rate of accidents has increased lately, especially amongst workers who are responsible for line maintenance (due to inadequate training and equipment). The present increased use of casual labour and unskilled workers has exacerbated the frequency of serious accidents. Then another employee category (that accidents occur) is maintenance staff that work in workshops, where in fact there are major work hazards...The buildings are not equipped with health and safety devices, eg power switches, cranes, etc, and where the demands of employees have been ignored by the management...There are bodies for health and safety, ie the local GENOP-PPC committee or the Branch Workers Committee who face serious functional problems and/or they are not in such a position as to enforce new safety regulations in Roof." [107]

In contrast to Megalopoli and Lavrion power stations, Roof has a physician and a nurse but after a preliminary observation inside the local medical centre, it was revealed that in the case of an accident, the medical personnel would not be able to transfer the person who is injured or assist him at any great length.

"We have a GP and a nurse but no ambulance, not even an oxygen bottle...We don't pass through medical examinations and when once I was ill, the management sent their GP to check whether or not I was ill...We
take care ourselves... Last summer people were fainting, so employees had to transfer them home. Nobody cares. I mean, even the Union cannot do anything." [108]

The conditions inside the transformer repair section for example, were not good. There was no ventilation, no heat appliances and the equipment that was used in repairs was not safe (according to employees). Most of the employees, however, said that the issues and problems that relate to health and safety at work are problems that have to do with the present lack of information disclosure (on chemical substances), and of employees' relations and ability to change existing industrial decisions. The local committees on health and safety are unable to intervene in management's policy on working conditions, either because the management is not informing employee representatives on safety issues or because those issues and their solution is not determined by the manager of Roof.

In relation to participatory bodies (from those employees who were interviewed) all have said that the problem in relation to participation and the function of these bodies is a political problem:

"Why should we be concerned about those participatory bodies...I do not know anything about the function of those bodies. They do not function; how can they function under such a political regime as in Greece? Don't you understand that participation clashes with specific political interests which prevail?" [109]

Not even one employee could mention the name of his ASKE representative and no one could outline some of the issues that were on the agenda of the forthcoming ASKE meeting. All these, however, serve as an indication that employees in Roof have had serious problems insofar as their representation in ASKE is concerned. The majority of these employees however, have said that they are not against participation and democratic representation of their demands at shop-floor and boardroom level, but rather against the continuation of a system that (as they have characteristically defined it) "talks about democracy but reaffirms the management's original decisions."
There were, however, problems with trade union representation as well. Many employees from both the transmission sector and the transmission systems sector, said that due to new employment policies, wage restraints and further centralization of decision making processes, unions have lost their 'original' power to bargain collectively and solve many of the Roof's industrial problems.

"They are people that will work overtime, in bad working conditions with less pay...In front of this state of affairs the Union can do little...There is a break in homogeneity insofar as industrial disputes are concerned, new obstacles from the management's side that need new approaches. Then how could a trade union respond adequately in relation to our problems when for even a single issue, a whole policy will have to change...But also, we are confronted with a trade union movement that under the present economic situation has not renewed its structure and strategies and still allows union 'godfathers' to run the executive...Also there is a pressure to conform with the management's decisions, so that people will not be fired, etc." [110]

There were many employees who, although they supported and belonged to an association, due to the Public Power Corporation's energy and personnel policies and their employee representatives inadequacy to solve their objectives, have expressed opinions that show or reflect an individualistic approach towards social industrial problems.

"What I want is to get my pay, have a strike once a year and be left in peace."

Although most, if not all, of the employees who were interviewed were against the Public Power Corporation's personnel policies and have said that Roof's working conditions/relations are politically determined, and although most were able politically to define the reasons behind such policies, there was, however, a clear reluctance to press for changes. Many were still blaming the union for the present situation, while others were unable to tell how industrial relations could change for the better,
and how there could be a collective response from the employees of Roof against the management's policies.

In comparison with Megalopoli or Lavrion, Roof's case (insofar as employees' loyalty and motivation to be involved in the Union) presents similarities with many of the issues that were raised in the analysis of the questionnaire. Apart from the facts of increased numbers of casual workers and the continuous deregulation of employment and working conditions standards, there were sections of Roof's labour force who, although they were not in favour of the present industrial arrangements, were reluctant to express their opinion openly, out of job insecurity or even because some of the polices have favoured them personally.

Those employees, for example, who were in semi-administration positions, had difficulty in openly responding in the interviews, and although they did complain about many issues, their primary interest was whether or not and how they will be able to sustain not only their jobs, but also their positions within the Public Power Corporation. They recognised that for example the Public Power Corporation's employment or training policies had lowered Roof's working standards, but because they were also a 'product' of those policies, of political rousfeti, and of personal rather than of open democratic procedures and decisions, they were not 'keen' on sacrificing their short-term plans (ie promotion) for anything else.

"We have a major problem and that is employees that work in offices are caught in a strange situation. On the one hand they are indirectly favoured because work standards are low and personal contact allows someone to 'climb' sooner than others; on the other they are discriminated against because there aren't any democratic procedures...So they need first to be convinced that such a system has to be changed, but I admit, it is difficult." [111]
5.7 Concluding Remarks

This study of employees' participation in the Greek Public Power Corporation has, in the course of its analysis, raised more questions on the nature and political dimension of participative discourse at the place of work than was originally anticipated. It has offered a new polydimensional approach and perspective on the subject and has brought to the surface new problems and dilemmas with which employees are confronted.

The methodological format, which the study followed, has enabled the presentation of an in-depth analysis of both economic and political parameters which determine the nature of capital-labour relationships and of the employees' political role at the place of work, showing the dynamic and dialectical relationship between the two and the parallel necessity to appraise economic and political relationships at work as a flow of interconnected and contradictory processes, which stretch beyond the gates of an industrial undertaking.

Firstly, the study has offered an interwoven perspective of how and why the superstructural and infrastructural social and economic relationships intervene and determine the context of employees' participation at work. By combining the political, economic and ideological functions at work, upon employees, and by interrelating an analysis of the macro social network of employees' relationships, at corporate level, the study identified the main factors and processes which characterise industrial politics at the Public Power Corporation.

Secondly, the study, through its methodological norms, has broken off with traditional inward looking and one-dimensional perspectives on the subject, which limit the scope of research within one area, that of decision-making at shop-floor or board level; and thus often miss the political meaning which the study of the production process or personnel management has for the analysis of the subject. It has thus analysed labour relations in recruitment/training, welfare, health and safety areas and employees' political discourse in so far as collective representation is concerned.
Thirdly, the combination of questionnaires, interviews and the presentation of other secondary data, has enabled the illustration of both personal experiential and non-personal accounts of the conditions and social relationship present within the Public Power Corporation. The multiple examination of the Public Power Corporation's economic role in relation to the Greek political system, the international centres of decision-making and of employees' opinions and roles within the Corporation, has added a new 'colour' in the theme of employees' participation at work. In addition, in contrast to infertile, traditional economist-centred approaches, the study, through its presentation and analysis of economic, political and ideological processes at work, has attempted to interlink the issues on what and how the Public Power Corporation is functioning, why there is a change in the modes of labour regulation, and how they affect the economic and ideological representation of employees; how and why employees' participation at work is determined by both the economic and political exchanges and the socio-cultural discourse at the work environment.

The methodological form which was followed in the analysis, is further summarised in Figure 5.7.1, where the levels of analysis are schematically presented. The first two levels of analysis draw a dialectical relationship between the Public Power Corporation and the dominant features and parameters of the social system in the Greek society. The examination therefore of employee attitudes and opinions (in relation to their participation in the decision making processes of the Corporation) is balanced against the existing socio-economic background and principles according to which the Public Power Corporation operates. The third level of analysis has focused upon the different areas of social and economic organisation which, as was mentioned in the first section, are thought to influence or determine the employees' role within the Corporation. In contrast, the fourth level of analysis has been focused upon the ensemble of the employees' political and economic realizations and the reasons which lead to the reformulation of the concept of participation and to the emergence of a new political behaviour and culture amongst the employees, which in itself presents new dilemmas for their role within the Public Power Corporation's mode of organisation.
Figure 5.7.1  Schematic Re-Presentation of the Study’s Levels of Analysis

1st level
- Greek Society
- Public Power Corporation

2nd level
- Ideological plane
- Political plane
- Economic plane

P.P.C.’s Employee attitudes and Opinions

3rd level

A
- Matters related with initial entry
  and training of skills

B
- Matters related with physical and social relationship of employees with their job environment

C
- Matters related with payroll structures and welfare provisions

D
- Employees relationship with bodies of collective representation

P.P.C.’s Employee Relationship to A, B, C, D

4th level
- Ideological formulation of participation as a concept
- Modes of Political behaviour towards P.P.C. and its socio-economic nature
- Configuration of employees role within P.P.C.
The theoretical contribution from the study of employees' participation in the Greek Public Power Corporation, in light of the new socio-economic changes, is also schematically summarized in Table 5.7.1. Looking at each area of industrial organisation (e.g., recruitment, welfare, etc.), one particular issue has come to the surface, that is, the application by the Public Power Corporation of new modes of economic and social organisation which come as a replacement or modification of the existing norms and rules: modes of industrial organisation, which as was shown in the analysis of the Public Power Corporation's recruitment/training and welfare benefit distribution policies, have originated from the wider restructuring of industrial life on a national and international scale. The features of those modes of the Public Power Corporation's organisation, as in the case of the production process, are thought to be the products of the Public Power Corporation's economic restructuring, part of a wider international operation towards new energy generation/distribution programmes.

The new organisational features come as a response to the changes of world industrial production and accumulation by further allowing market forces to regulate the cost of labour and by creating forms of production organisation which are flexible, are in line with global and domestic monetarist principles and aims. These changes occurring in the fields of production organisation and in the systems for personnel regulation (e.g., Table 5.7.1) are creating a new maelstrom of ambiguities, capital-labour contradictions and of pulsating industrial political changes insofar as the role of employees in the process of participation and general control of the Public Power Corporation's infrastructural functioning is concerned.

First of all, the present survey has illustrated the transcendence of the political plateau of industrial relations towards a new kind of industrial order, that is determined by the existence of two parallel and complementary industrial processes: those of integration with global market principles and aims on industrial functioning, and of deregulation/reregulation from existing post-war strategies and frameworks of industrial organisation with their replacement by new forms of corporate activity. These two parallel processes are evident in each of the four
TABLE 5.7.1  Contrast Between Traditional and New Modes of PPC's Economic and Political Organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Forms</th>
<th>Transition</th>
<th>New Forms of Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A Production Process-Welfare</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical/quasi horizontal organisation of production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Single task performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial training by PPC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment of skilled/small number of unskilled personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct recruitment by PPC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment status procedures rigid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large proportion of permanent personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill demarcation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job upgrading-defined criteria/rigid procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization/uniformity of welfare policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Payment per rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniformity of welfare security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on general productivity levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-vertical/compartmentalization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiple task requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training on job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment of unskilled (production)/skilled (for maintenance-admin posts)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indirect recruitment/subcontracting</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Procedures flexible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Large proportion of permanent/temporary personnel - Increased use of casual labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Elimination of skill demarcations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Flexible procedures - personalised appraisal criteria loosely defined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Flexible welfare distribution/multiple welfare policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Payment by results - FRP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare security for core employees - No welfare security for temporary employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on unit/personal productivity levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Forms</td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>New Forms of Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniformity of rules and norms on working conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Flexible rules and norms, based on spatial conditions/relations at the place of work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization of working hours, payroll schemes</td>
<td></td>
<td>De-standardization of working hours - payment conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B Ideological Regulation of Labour**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Forms</th>
<th>Transition</th>
<th>New Forms of Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single identification of employees according to job category</td>
<td>Emphasis on individual qualities - a break from single identification, by management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on unified workers' responsibility</td>
<td>Emphasis on individualised responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on collective co-operation</td>
<td>Emphasis on unit/individual integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on employee participation through participative bodies</td>
<td>Emphasis on individual participation through personal achievement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective representation of personnel</td>
<td>Individual/departmental representation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee collective negotiation or bargaining with management</td>
<td>Unit/individualised bargaining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective control of wage levels/ working conditions</td>
<td>Personal control of wage benefits and conditions at work through individualized welfare schemes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on disciplining the labour force through dismissals or wage restrictions</td>
<td>Emphasis on co-partnership - discipline through segregation/promotion of those in line with management's policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on PFC's labour force distinctive welfare standards/ competition with other corporations</td>
<td>Emphasis on unit/personal welfare standards - competition between regions, departments, individuals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Forms</td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>New Forms of Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect mediation between management and employees</td>
<td>Direct relationship between employees and local managers</td>
<td>Emphasis on personal needs, specific requirements and individual qualities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on collective employee job requirements - skills</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
topics analysed in this chapter, including the three case studies from the Megalopoli, Lavrion and Roof power centres. On the one hand the Public Power Corporation's management is responding to the new global industrial rearrangements by adopting principles and measures for the Corporation's future economic development that are market orientated and further succumb to national criteria for the functioning of public corporations to the 'dictates' of international monetary organisations. Such a high integrationist approach is illustrated by the management's commitment to increase the 'participation' of a peripheral labour force in comparison with the already existing levels of skilled employees in the total composition of the Public Power Corporation's personnel; to pursue flexible systems of labour division (Table 5.7.1) which may increase the adaptability of employees to the new competitive-profit orientated criteria for industrial activity, and may increase the individual commitment of employees to the Public Power Corporation's corporate strategies and aims; and to intensify labour so as to increase the levels of productivity of the Public Power Corporation's power stations, while at the same time minimising technical and human costs.

In relation to the above, the Public Power Corporation's management has also adopted a number of measures for the regulation of its personnel which 'cut through' the established regimes of employee collective representation and of national practices and codes of industrial relations. This is done by establishing new individualized or team networks for the 'improvement' of employees' social and political welfare which are autonomous from the existing organisational procedures of trade unions and in opposition to the post-war frameworks of collective, and of the more recent joint-consultative practice of agreements, between management and employees. The emphasis is placed, as the summary Table 5.7.1 suggests, on the individual employee's ability to raise his/her standards of living through systems that establish some connections between one's productivity and level of commitment towards corporate aims. This new approach towards industrial relations is illustrated by the establishment of flexible and personalised procedures concerning recruitment, production techniques, material welfare and the degree and nature of personnel participation (through their already existing bodies of representation) into corporate
decision-making. It seems that the traditional view of employee representation through unions and their participative organisations is under constant 'attack' by the management, which undermines the collective networks and the recent nationally agreed policies on the representation and participation of employees through the emphasis on autonomous and individualized routes of negotiation between employees and management. The three case studies plus the analysis of the effects of new industrial systems upon representative and participative organisations, illustrate that there are potential tendencies towards de-unionisation, with employees losing confidence in ASKE or KES as they lose control at any level of the Public Power Corporation's internal functioning.

Secondly, the analysis of the survey so far has illustrated that in relation to recruitment, material welfare, and working conditions and production methods, there is a parallel centralization of executive power into the hands of the executive council, and away from the different administrative and participative organisations, while at the same time there is further deregulation and decentralization of decision-making powers from the union and participative organisations, towards the 'anonymous' production teams or corporate units of employees.

The 1983 experiment on socialisation (ie the social control of industrial enterprises by the public), especially since the first introduction of austerity measures by the government and the adoption of measures that integrate further the Public Power Corporation's internal form of organisation with the guidelines on national economic development suggested by the IMF-World Bank and the EEC, has now been placed in doubt. The political frameworks for the decentralization of decision-making powers away from the government and its state machinery and from the hands of the top level management, in the wake of the introduction of market orientated industrial principles and aims, are being constantly undermined. The government and the Public Power Corporation's management have as the survey showed, taken all major and secondary industrial relation matters under their control and have reformulated the codes of the Public Power Corporation's internal functioning, so as to further minimise the political role which collective employee organisations were designed to
play. They have encouraged political favouritism and individualism amongst employees, and in general they have adopted a line which undermines any political ethos of the sort which the 1983 socialisation experiment reflected. The above had led to the creation of a new industrial climate where basically the traditional broad homogeneity of employees in relation to recruitment, working conditions, welfare standards, is placed in doubt if it is not broken. The industrial environment of the Public Power Corporation has become more or less a conglomerate of interests and of various employee categories where one is at great difficulty in perceiving a collective strategy for the control of the Corporation's industrial planning. This in turn has had a negative effect on existing principles and forms of collective representation and upon the ideological evaluation of employees of their role in participative organisations and decision-making processes.

In view of the general industrial and political restructuring, some employees 'prefer' to remain outside the activity of trade unions or of participative organisations, whilst others, in search of a new collective strategy for employee control of the Public Power Corporation's activities, are in constant search of a totally new approach towards participation and trade unionism which, at least, in the context of the survey, remains as yet unshaped. Few examples of such an approach were the case of employee opinions towards productivity related pay, where one could say that employees and unions are in some form of compromise to partially accept the introduction of wage-productivity linked systems on the basis that it is democratically organised and the merits of such a system benefit the whole team or unit of employees; the ideological linkage between working conditions and the general welfare or of the environmental conditions of the local population; and the political re-evaluation of union methods by prominent union executives which state that there is a need to re-appraise the particular needs of the individual and the construction of a strategy for the future which recaptures the political support of employees and their motivation for social change. But having outlined some of the examples which illustrate employees' formulation of a new political line in relation to participation and control, the survey as a whole has suggested that at present the Public Power Corporation's new internal restructuring
has contributed to an increased ideological confusion and political stalemate as to the future political role of employees inside the corporation, and how they are able to shape and change the industrial organisation of the corporation for the benefits of all.
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Laimos Stefanos (1989, A Gallup Different From Anything Else (in Grk) Rizospastis, 23 April, Athens
Laimos S & Smailis L show that the majority of Greek workers are in favour of a productivity related pay scheme and that there are significant differences from the past, in political activity and discourse amongst employees. This is most noticeable in employees opinions on trade unions and traditional objectives which the Left parties in the country used to pursue.

47 Interview with a supervisor engineer for hydro-powered stations, DAYE/PPC

48 Interview with an engineer for thermo-powered stations, DMKTh/PPC

49 Interview with a supervisor/technician, DAP/PPC

50 Interview with an employee, Department of Organisation, DAO/PPC

51 PPC (1987), Perspectives and PPC's Development (in Grk), PPC, Athens

52 Enotiko Bima (1988), In Struggling Movements (in Grk)
Enotiko Bima, no 64-66, September/November, Athens

Department of Health & Welfare, Athens

54 Interview with a technician, Dept of Sub-stations, DYS/PPC

55 Interview with an economist, DAP/PPC

56 GENOP-PPC (1986), The Federation Informs You (in Grk)
GENOP-PPC Bulletin, March, Athens

57 Enotiko Bima (1989), Work General Practitioners (in Grk)
Enotiko Bima, no 69, January, Athens

58 Enotiko Bima (1988), SOS for Samos (in Grk)
Enotiko Bima, no 64-66, September/November, Athens

59 Interview with an administrator, DAP/PPC

60 Spyropoulos R (1986), 'The Statute of Socialisation' (in Grk)
Dimosios Tomeas, no 5, February

61 Interview with the Manager, Dept of Power Transmission & Ecological Research, TMGM/PPC
62 Tsirkas P (1986), 'Socialisation' (in Grk)
Dimosios Tomeas, no 10-11, Athens

63 Interview with an executive committee representative

64 Proti (1989), Drk 1.5 bil Have Been Transferred to Koskotas (in Grk)
Proti, Saturday, 25 February, Athens

Foni Mihanikou (1989), PPC and the Bank of Crete (in Grk)
Foni Mihanikou/PPC, March-April, Athens

65 Presidential decree No 57/1985, Articles I & II of internal regulations

66 Papantoniou E (1986), 'The Interpretation of Acts' (in Grk)
Dimostos Tomeas, no 12, Athens

67 ASKE/PPC, Minutes, 23.9.1986

68 Mpouritsas G (1987), 'Indications for Socialisation' (in Grk)
Dimosios Tomeas, no 64, October, Athens

69 Interview with an ASKE/PPC representative 1987-1988 period

70 Interview with an ASKE/PPC representative 1985-1987 period

71 Dimosios Tomeas (1987), 'The New Role of ASKE' (in Grk)
Dimosios Tomeas, no 20, May 1987

72 There is qualitative change in the political context of Articles
No2/1985 and Article No2/1987 (of the presidential decrees No57/1985);
The Modification of Articles No2 for ASKE (in Grk), Ministry of
Presidency, Athens.

73 Koutroulis Th (1987), 'Socialisation Present and Future' (in Grk)
Dimosios Tomeas, no 22-23, July-August, Athens

74 Interview with an employee, hydro-power research unit, DAYE/PPC

75 Interview with an employee representative ASKE/PPC, period 1988-1990

76 Interview with a KES representative, DAYE/PPC

77 GENOP-PPC (1988), 1988 Results on Participative Bodies (in Grk)
GENOP-PPC, Athens
PASKE (1988), *Socialisation* (in Grk)
PASKE bulletin, September, Athens


79 Interview with the 1988 Megalopoli Plant General Manager

80 Interview with a sub-engineer, Megalopoli No2 Unit

81 PPC (1987), *Accounts*, PPC, Athens

82 Interview with a trade union representative

83 Interview with a Megalopoli local council representative

84 Interview with a TES/PPC representative

85 Interview with a technician No3 Unit

86 Interview with a sub-engineer No3 Unit

87 Interview with a technician Control Room No2

88 Interview with a branch trade union representative

89 Interview with a technician No1 control room

90 Interview with a trainee

91 Rizospastis (1989), *Children of Lead* (in Grk)
Rizospastis, 4 May, Athens

92 Interview with an office engineer, Administrative Department

93 Interview with a 1988 trade union executive member


95 Interview with a Conservative trade union executive member

96 Interview with a branch trade union member

97 Interview with a supervisor/technician, transmission systems department

-474-
98 Interview with an administrator, personnel department

99 Interview with a middle manager, general maintenance

100 Interview with an engineer, National Centre for Electricity Transmission & Power Distribution, transmission systems sector

101 Interview with an employee in the National Centre for Electricity Transmission

102 Interview with a technician, maintenance department, Roof

103 Interview with a maintenance technician, service department, transmission sector

104 Interview with a foreman, maintenance department, transmission sector

105 Interview with an engineer, main control room, Nation Centre for Power Distribution, Roof

106 Interview with a middle-manager, administrative dept, transmission sector

107 Interview with an employee, main maintenance workshop

108 Interview with an engineer, administrative offices

109 Interview with an engineer, branch for protection and electronic control, transmission systems sector

110 Interview with the branch trade union representative

111 Interview with representative from the GENOP-PPC Engineers' Association
CONCLUSION

By situating the theoretical debate on Employee Participation within the global dimension, that the industrial transformation of Capital is creating, the thesis has focused upon the Spatial Context of power relationships between Labour and Capital. In turn this global dimension, with its Spatial networks for industrial organisation, at both domestic and International levels, have structured a new political environment. An environment that challenges the existing dominant frameworks for cultural and ideological regulation of employees, their discourse on Participation and transforms the actual operational networks for any participative collective activity, at the place of work.

At the core of the political reformulation of Industrial undertakings, is the emergence of major socio-economic processes and in turn, of specific tendencies that are shaping and determining the context of employee's participative activity.

Those processes have here been indentified as those of integration and of deregulation/reregulation. The articulation of both brings about the further global harmonisation of industrial-corporate organisation; and the further global liberalisation of industrial structures of organisation from domestic-orientated, and one-dimensional frameworks of employee regulation. These processes fuse together on an International scale, industrial principles of development and personnel regulation, whilst at the same time they defuse existing domestic post-war networks of organisation and instead they introduce multi-dimensional and flexible structures of industrial development and personnel regulation.
Their interaction has, on the one hand, produced the further concentration and centralisation of industrial activity and decision-making in multinational corporations and transnational institutions and managerial boards, away from the reach of domestic labour and other agents of social control. On the other hand, their interaction has brought the further fragmentation of the employee's political and economic power networks and their ability to intervene and shape accordingly the directions of development of their industrial environment in a collective manner and in continuation from existing strategies and discourse on participation. In addition, there has been a parallel introduction of new codes for the ideological and cultural regulation of employees by the management that reformulates or re-parcelizes existing networks of political relationship (between management and employees) by shifting the emphasis from collective to individual-orientated forms of representation and involvement in the decision-making procedures of industrial undertakings.

The thesis has demonstrated through the synthesis of the above processes and tendencies of Capital's, the global industrial restructuring, of Capital that industrial environments, their mechanisms and forms of economic development and employee regulation are all in a state of constant transformation. Their forms of industrial organisation are affecting the role that National and Corporate labour organisations and participative institutions have been structured to play. This is especially true when issues like labour norms and codes of practice, at a local or national level, are considered. It is also true, for the determination of employees' role in the actual process of decision-making about the configuration of the general industrial function of undertakings.
The political reverberations of the above for employee participation are first shown in chapter one. Where in fact a cautious analysis has indicated that the global industrial restructuring of Capital is enforcing a new edifice for the ideological and cultural regulation of employees; that in turn produces new dilemmas and perspectives for participative activity.

The analysis of the nation-state and of the Corporate restructuring of labour forms, has revealed indeed that employees are facing an entirely new situation that questions their ideological and their political networks of collective and domestic orientated participative activity. In relation to the first, the analysis has indicated that the adoption by the Nation-state of new principles and aims on economic development and personnel regulation, has created a new edifice; one which makes necessary both the disassociation from existing post-war, statist-Keynesian, and domestic centred approaches to labour, and the adoption of anti-statist, market-oriented images and codes, as parts of the global industrial restructuring of Capital. Both integration and deregulation/reregulation have produced an era that emphasizes the further harmonisation and liberalisation of corporate industrial activity, in accordance with global market interests and at the expense of collective, tripartite and public oriented networks and codes of industrial organisation.

It is within the area of the latter, that the tendencies for the further concentration of industrial activity and the further centralisation of decision-making powers in the 'hands' of international organisations, are producing new dilemmas that employees and their bodies are facing. These dilemmas range from employees present ability to make certain choices on the nature and direction of the development of their undertakings; to the actual
operational function of existing participative bodies, at corporate and National level. In addition, questions have also risen over the ability of employees to sustain the political rights and material standards, that were introduced during the 1970s and were the products of national collective agreements. These dilemmas have also to do with the emergence of new ideological symbols and images for the regulation of labour, that in fact question employees' ability to 'keep open a series of real alternatives' (Laclau, E., Mouffe ch., 1989) to the centralized systems of industrial organisation and as a continuation from the political and ideological 'experiments' on participation during the 1970's. The introduction in the political scenery of industrial environments, of a number of ideas and policies that integrate National frameworks on industrial organisation with global institutions and seek to create new identities and ethics on participation and control, are all producing certain disjunctures.

These disjunctures are situated in the relationship between the reality of globalised frameworks for industrial organisation and the establishment of local/corporate networks of participation and control. Furthermore the adoption of a number of new principles and measures for the economic development and political regulation of industrial undertakings, have produced certain disjunctures in the existing post-war constitutional arrangements on the functions between participative bodies and the State. The introduction of market-criteria and of transnational codes for development in the public sector and its enterprises, seem to have questioned the era on the social experimentation for the further decentralisation and democratisation of decision making procedures, at the National level. Instead the present global dimension of industrial organisation, require, as it was demonstrated in the case of the
European Community, a new set of ideological and cultural codes. These allow the employee of today to identify with the operations of transnational structures of industrial organisation and with a flexible, multi-dimensional and temporal framework of labour practices and ethics. Since the reformulation of a number of important procedures on decision-making and since the projection of symbols and images that exalt the present transnationality of industrial activity and the necessity to operate in an open and competitive environment, the discrepancies between beliefs on post-war labour strategies on participation and the new reality has widened.

The general review of the actual policies on industrial development and personnel regulation, that a number of developed and developing countries have introduced, has indicated that there is a common approach, that on the one hand seeks to transfer executive powers from National to transnational decision-making bodies. At the same time it opens further the fields and criteria of operation of especially public corporations, to International trade. On the other, first through the adoption during 1985-1986 of a number of austerity measures; and second through the adoption (by different governments) during 1988-1989 of a number of measures, that rep parcelize labour codes and agreements on a more flexible and branch level; there has been an attempt by nation-states to fragment the actual powers that labour organisations have, and to create new type, less rigid and multi-dimensional forms of regulation, on a national level. These will seek to diversify further and multiply the connections between corporate functioning and the new requirements of International trade agencies, and at the same time legitimise on the political level the operations and the new
relationships between corporations, the nation-state and the global or regional executive decision-making bodies.

In relation to the second issue, that of the internal restructuring of industrial corporations, the analysis has indicated that there are trends towards the further harmonisation and liberalisation of structures on personnel regulation. The new corporate emphasis on a more flexible and quite personalised schemes in relation to labour division, welfare distribution and recruitment or employment composition, is questioning not only employees' ability to intervene operationally on a collective basis in the social affairs within an industrial undertaking; but furthermore is questioning employees' ability to maintain a collective identity and a common approach so as to intervene and have the capacity to produce a collective alternative to their participation and control of industrial functioning.

Both issues above are further employed in the analysis of the field of historical and political ideas that have, especially since the 1960's shaped and become dominant features of the strategies and discourse of the Labour movement on Participation and the democratisation of industrial environments.

The second and third chapters, through a careful but not exhaustive review of the available literature on the ideological manifestations of participation amongst western nations and in particular Greece, have illustrated some of the major factors and elements of social composition, that have determined the formulation of those manifestations and have shaped specific structures and mechanisms for participative activity amongst different labour organisations in different nations.
On a philosophical level, questions about the nature and characteristics of the industrial enterprise; about the role of labour and of its organisations in the Capitalist enterprise; and on what is to be done so that the nature and characteristics of this enterprise are changed, have dominated much of the ideological debate on the issue of participation and control in society and in places of work. On the political level, specific experiences like that of dependency; the rise in the influence of multinational corporations over national and in general public mechanisms of control; the disillusionment with prototype socialist alternatives based on the Soviet model of socialist regulation or with reform-oriented strategies that Unions and socialist parties in the West have formulated; have all played a major role in the formulation of distinctive approaches to the issue of participation.

Both chapters, in essence, develop further the relationships between National (internal) and International (external) conditions of economic and political development and how they in fact determine the content of employees' discourse about participation. At the same time they indicate that there are specific disjunctures between the dominant manifestations on employee participation and the actual transformation of the relationship between internal and external conditions of social development. These disjunctures are present in the new experiences of employees and their unions at the place of work that stem from the introduction of flexible personnel schemes and from the adoption of global, market-oriented approaches by different governments.

In the case of the Greek Labour Movement, these disjunctures between ideological manifestations on Participation and the present
structural re-adjustment of Greece in the framework set by European and the global economic organisations, are further exemplified in the 1985-1986 first concrete attempts by the government to increase the powers of employers on all issues and to change the constitutional and social role that participative bodies in the public sector were designed to play. (Petras James, 1987)

By establishing a new political and economic framework for industrial organisation, at both local and National levels, Capital seems to have forced a 'new beginning' for employees' role in decision-making and in the control of actual industrial operations. This 'new beginning' and its actual effects upon employees' participative discourse and activity, are further illustrated in the concrete analysis of the Greek Public Power Corporation's developmental and regulatory schemes, as those are presented in chapters four and five. These effects can be summarised here around four major issues.

Firstly, there has been a noticeable change in the political and economic codes, since the first introduction of participation in the public sector (1983), away from the anti-Monopolistic and anti-Imperialist strategies of the PASOK government. The use of participative bodies for the socialisation of the public sector and of its enterprises, towards a non-capitalist path of development with the extension of public control, was abandoned soon after the first IMF and EEC package of monetarist policies was adopted by the Greek Socialist government. In turn the introduction of the first major austerity measures and the further centralisation of decision-making away from those existing participative bodies, as well the further abolition and fragmentation of the powers that those bodies had, has actually signified the beginning of the end
of the social experimentation with Participation in Greece (at least in the form that was originally conceived). Secondly, a new reality for employees' participative activity in P.P.C. has been created by the adoption by the P.P.C. of market-orientated criteria on developmental (see chapter four) and regulatory matters (see chapter five); its integrationist approach towards the E.E.C. and its centralizing networks for decision-making as well as its adoption of flexible, multi-dimensional structures and schemes on both personnel and economic development.

The actual energy utilisation programme of the P.P.C., has been further diversified so as to accommodate the new political and economic frameworks on energy and electricity generation of both the European Common Market and of the International Energy Association.

From its technical to financial infrastructures, the P.P.C. is further harmonised and liberates its operations in accordance with the objectives of the above institutions and in a parallel with the movements of International energy producers or the demands of bulk consumers. The same holds true for issues like tariff policies and future energy consumption patterns at National and E.E.C. levels.

The same approach is also evident in P.P.C.'s introduction of a new personnel regulatory framework. In the case of employment/training schemes, the government and the management of the Corporation, on the top of existing policies that for long used employment as a means to regulate political behaviour and voting patterns in Greece, have further deregulated and integrated the labour composition of the P.P.C. with constant fluctuation of market interests. That in fact, reduces labour costs and further control
the political environment of the industry through the manipulation of the ratios between skilled/unskilled or semi-skilled employees; and through the further categorisation of personnel into multiple sections according to types of contract and the variation in the actual numbers of temporary, part-time and permanent employees working in one specific department or area of industrial operation. The same also holds for policies on material distribution, and policies that are more clearly related to the standards on health and safety or to hours of work. The general breakdown of all major wage schemes that were based on the collective and sectoral negotiations of unions, participative bodies and the management, has indicated the end of a philosophy and the adoption of a new philosophy that exemplifies individual associations and rewards personalised targets on productivity. The same approach and philosophy is also evident in P.P.C's managerial handling of representative and participative bodies. The emphasis here again is on the individual or team association of employees with the management, whilst the role and functions of participative bodies and collective activity by unions, are becoming increasingly displaced by the management's attitudes and the government's 'positive reluctance' to safeguard those remaining functions and networks of collective employee bodies.

Thirdly, this new reality as was demonstrated in chapters four and five, has increased the centralisation of decision-making powers away from all those social forces that are thought by Capital to impede its restructuring at a corporate or National level.

In both chapters, this centralisation is evident in the transfer of control away from the National arena and into the discretion of the Energy Commission of the E.C.; and/or in the further displacement
of control away from bodies like A.S.K.E. and into the 'hands' of a few managerial officials that in a way exercise control and are accountable only to the government, which in turn is orientated towards its objective of instrumental harmonisation with trans-national networks of industrial organisation.

Lastly, this new reality has also included what has been termed as the fragmentation of employees' collective networks of power sharing and the actual re-parcelization (or reformulation) of those networks that exalt and are structured around team or individualised associations of representation and involvement of employees in decision-making procedures. Both tendencies, create ideological and political ruptures in the continuation of a collective participative body as a functionable mechanism of industrial control and of change, at the same time they undermine the actual identification by employees of such collective participative bodies as bodies of control and change. The tendency to fragmentation and to a reformulation of the networks of power sharing and of control, are evident in the specific examples given in chapters four and five, and in particular in the observations of working conditions in the three case-studies. They have been reflected even in the actual functional problems that employee representatives have in order to co-decide with the management in secondary matters. The management has in fact minimised employees' ability to shape P.P.C.'s general industrial functioning, through the fragmentation of existing networks of co-decision making and through the further dispersion of powers from representative bodies to branch level officials and towards bodies that are not representative of employees, such as ministerial committees. However, though the above has almost put an end to the 1983 social experimentation for the democratisation of Greece's
public sector, the introduction of a number of policies and schemes on top of existing discriminatory policies, further promote or reinforce a political climate against the collective representation and the social homogenisation of employees at the place of work. Such an ideological and political re-parcelization or reformulation of networks of power-sharing and of control, has further 'pushed' employees to look for an industrial answer to their particular problems, outside the areas that existing collective participative bodies. The rise in individualised actions amongst P.P.C.'s labour force, insofar as issues of employment, welfare distribution and matters connected with health and safety are concerned, has been attributed partly to the further restructuring of P.P.C.'s personnel strategy and to the reformulation of a new set of objectives. Partly to the rise of a new set of questions by employees' about their political role in P.P.C. and their conceptualisation of a radical-democratic alternative to the existing economic and political organisation of P.P.C., which at the moment remains at the level of critique on existing labour strategies and ideological fixations, that were products of the 1970's post-dictatorial years and of the independent/non-capitalist political choices of the then labour movement.

In the wake of the present global dimension of the industrial restructuring of Capital, the thesis has offered a critical review of existing theoretical trends in the analysis of the present political reformulation of undertakings and how they affect employees' collective ability to shape and change their industrial environments. However the thesis has focused upon the way that contemporary processes and the rise of specific
tendencies has affected the structural context and the content of employee's discourse and of their functional activity towards participation.

In contrast to contemporary theoretical approaches, that as their unit of analysis have the inner relationships between management and employees within a given industrial undertaking; the thesis has placed an emphasis on the political climate created by the globalisation of industrial developmental and regulatory aspects of life. In addition, in contrast to existing theoretical approaches that focus, either on the integration of industrial life and its effects on an international level or on the effects of deregulation/reregulation of working patterns and codes of organisation on a local or corporate level, the thesis has attempted to combine both processes. Both appear today, as major dynamic factors that not only characterise the present course of restructuring, but as well, through the rise of specific tendencies, characterise the present course of power relationships that in turn affect the whole framework of participation at places of work.

Those processes and tendencies produce new forms of industrial organisation, that are characterised by their temporal, flexible and multi-dimensional orientation and that in turn create operational and ideological ruptures in the existing dominant frameworks of employees' participation, and force employees' to face a new set of dilemmas for the democratic organisation of industrial undertakings.
### Appendix

#### Questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Gender:</strong> Male 215 Female 85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Job Description:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer 80  Administrators 42  Non-administrative staff 2  Others 17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Place of Work:</strong> Inner-Athens departments 300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Years of Employment:</strong> 1 - 35 years 300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Educational Background:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education 18  Secondary 168  University/Polytechnics 87  Postgraduate Studies 14  Technical College 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. Is your level of education matched to your job-description/position:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes 251  No 48  Missing 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8. If no why?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal 12  Lack of specialisation in P.P.C. 4  Political 12  Diploma not recognised by P.P.C. 25  Unanswered questionnaires 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9. Has the corporation assisted in your further training?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes 67  No 232</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10. If yes, what was the nature of your training:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in seminars 30  Foreign language/ computer training 15  Sponsorship for postgraduate studies 7  P.P.C.'s technical college 2  Permission to pursue any studying 3  (on full pay) 23  Unanswered 11  Missing 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. Does your education/training play a major role in promotion and salary?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>122</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. If no, why?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flat rates on pay and regulations on promotion</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non recognition of diploma</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discrimination</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanswered</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Do you think that your present salary corresponds to the amount of your work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Do you think that your basic wage should include ATA?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>281</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Do you think that productivity related pay schemes should be implemented?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. If yes, how do you think productivity related pay should be distributed?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individually, including present salary level</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the whole branch or units of the workplace and as an addition to the present salary level</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanswered</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Do you think that your present salary level is better than you could obtain elsewhere?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>115</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Do you regard the salary as the most important incentive for keeping your job at P.P.C.?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>199</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19. How important at overtime and bonuses to your standard of living?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite important</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. To what extent are you satisfied with your present job?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately satisfied</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not satisfied</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Do you think that working conditions should be improved?

- Yes: 290
- No: 83
- Missing: 2

22. If yes, how? (which areas)

- On all issues: 14
- Division of labour: 50
- Pay/Promotion: 11
- Health/Safety: 119
- Industrial Relations/Supervision: 20
- Unanswered: 8
- Missing: 63

23. Do you have job-related problems?

- Yes: 212
- No: 83
- Missing: 3

24. If yes, are these problems related to any of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relations with colleagues</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with supervisor</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of work</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal/other reasons</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanswered</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Do you think any of these problems can be resolved?

- Yes: 184
- No: 28
- Unanswered: 83
- Missing: 3

26. If yes, do you think your trade union is an important body in resolving these problems?

- Yes: 154
- No: 33
- Unanswered: 103
- Missing: 10
27. How often do you vote for union representatives?
   a) Always 237
   b) Often 50
   c) Never 8
   d) Missing 5

28. How often do you attend union meetings?
   a) Always 121
   b) Often 130
   c) Never 44
   d) Missing 5

29. Do you think that the union should participate in the decision-making process in P.P.C.?
    Yes 273
    No 22
    Unanswered 4
    Missing

30. Do you think that you should participate more in the decision-making process?
    Yes 282
    No 16
    Missing 2

31. Do you get information about ASKE meetings?
    a) Always 21
    b) Often 70
    c) Never 204
    d) Missing 5

32. Does your representative consult you before the meeting?
    a) Always 6
    b) Often 261
    c) Never 26
    d) Missing 7

33. Do you think that ASKE helped in improving your salary?
    Yes 21
    No 266
    Missing 13
34. Do you think ASKE has improved your conditions of work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. Does your supervisor consult you before any decision is taken?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Always</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Often</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Never</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Missing</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. Do you think that regulations on industrial disputes should be structured by joint-consultation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37. Do you regard provisions in relation to sick-pay as adequate?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38. Do you regard provisions in relating to pregnancy leave as adequate?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39. Do you consider the corporation's holiday provisions as adequate?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40. Do you know of participation schemes anywhere else in W. Europe?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanswered</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41. If yes, where?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC Countries</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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