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NELSON, JAMES,EDWYN,LE,MESSURIER

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**AN UNWELCOME EMPIRE: JAPANESE IMPERIALISM AS
THE YELLOW PERIL IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES IN AND AROUND THE SINO-JAPANESE AND
RUSSO-JAPANESE WARS.**

An original thesis following minor corrections presented to

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at

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of the requirements for the Postgraduate Research Degree**

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in

HISTORY

By

MR. JAMES EDWYN LE MESSURIER NELSON

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An Unwelcome Empire: Japanese Imperialism as the Yellow Peril in Britain and the United States In and Around the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars

This thesis is about Western perceptions of Japan's early imperialist years and aims to address how Britain and America perceived the expansion of Meiji Japan. In doing so the period spanning from the Sino-Japanese to the Russo-Japanese War is taken as the core area of study, with the victory of Japan in both of these conflicts marking the point in time where it emerged as an imperial power. As such anti-Japanese prejudices will be examined to show how some in the West regarded this ascendancy with contempt as the virtue of being an imperial state with the privileges of empire which came something which should be reserved for the white, Christian nations who possessed a history of such endeavours.

In order to establish a competent assessment of this I have structured this work in such a way which sees two intense chapters being presented focusing on the years surrounding these conflicts. In these chapters Japan's relations with the West, primarily Britain and the United States, will be looked at focusing on the differing political and societal opinions as to whether or not Japan's emergence as a global power constituted a legitimate threat. The former of these conflicts saw Japan's emergence as an imperial power whilst the latter saw it burst onto the world stage. For this period of study I have used materials from the popular media as well as governmental publications so to provide an encompassing image.

Following the defeat of Russia in 1905 the idea of Japan as the epitome of the yellow peril was more engrained in western circles. In America especially this is most vociferous with ideas of exclusion and anti-Japanese prejudices not being difficult to find. Across this period however, Britain was more reserved in their attitudes towards Japan and although similar examples can be found they were always the more accepting of Japan which the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is testament to. By bringing together a number of different strands surrounding this topic a range of material is used collating a range of ideas and arguments, something where a study with greater parameters than those permitted here would be of greater use, providing a more thorough and encompassing investigation.

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An Introduction to Japanese Imperialism, the Yellow Peril and Western Views of East Asia

‘For long I looked in vain for Fujisan, and failed to see it, though I heard ecstasies all over the deck, till, accidentally looking heavenwards instead of earthwards, I saw far above any possibility of height, as one would have thought, a huge, truncated cone of snow, 13,080 feet above the sea, from which it sweeps upwards in a glorious curve, very wan, against a very pale blue sky, with its base and the intervening country veiled in a pale grey mist. It was a wonderful vision, and shortly, as a vision, vanished’.¹

- Isabella Bird, *Unbeaten Tracks In Japan*, 1880

‘Many a young man starts life with a natural gift of exaggeration which, if nurtured in a congenial and sympathetic surrounds, or by the imitation of the best models, might grow into something really great and wonderful. But, as a rule, he comes to nothing. He either falls into careless habits of accuracy, or takes to frequenting the society of the aged and well-informed.

Both things are equally fatal to his imagination....’²

- Oscar Wilde, ‘The Decay of Lying’, 1889

‘The world is getting so small that the thought and life of one portion can no longer be a matter of indifference to the other, even the most remote’.³

- *Science*, December 1892

In 1882 Britain invaded and subsequently occupied Egypt, two years later France went to war with China leading to the establishment of Indochina, and soon after that in 1885 the

¹ Isabella Bird, *Unbeaten Tracks In Japan. An Account of Travels in the Interior Including Visits to the Aborigines of Yezo and the Shrine of Nikkô* (London, 1905 [1880]), 1-2.

² Oscar Wilde, ‘The Decay of Lying: A Dialogue’, *The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review*, 25:143 (1889), 37-38.

³ Quoted in Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement. Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911* (Cambridge, MA.,1972), 27.

conclusion of the Berlin Conference sparked the “scramble for Africa,” a colonial occupation which witnessed the beginning of a new age of imperialism, the period of colonisation.⁴ These events as well as others demonstrate a change in the attitude and approach towards imperialism with imperialists both old and new acquiring protectorate states across the globe in Africa, Asia and South America. Britain, France, Germany and the United States were amongst the most prominent of these nations. With the exception of America this had long been regarded as the norm, the natural progression of affairs. This was a unique club which was fastidious about its members. By the end of the century the United States had no trouble in gaining admittance as the United States expanded across Central America and into the Pacific – a white, Western, Christian nation who had proven its superiority over those it had conquered, emerging out of the New World with a devout expression of imperial gleam. But what if such an act was to happen under the guidance of a non-white, non-Western nation who held a seemingly inferior status? What if an East Asian nation was to acclaim such a standing in the global hierarchy? In the period stemming from the Sino-Japanese to the Russo-Japanese War, Japan celebrated such an achievement, acquiring overseas territory and establishing external dominance. How then did the West view these imperialist ventures following Japan’s quick and successive victories over China and Russia? And how was this development perceived in societal and political circles?

This was a period of change influencing regional and global affairs with Japan’s expansion catching many off guard. Victory over China marked the initial success of the Meiji government who since the Restoration of 1868 had embarked on policies of expansion with aspirations to develop, extend and assert a deepened and profound Japanese presence. Thenceforth Japan sought to emulate the strength of Western imperialism, having realised from the Opium Wars of 1839-1842 and 1856-1860, and the Perry Expedition of 1852-1854 that their own tactics, strategies, military and arsenal were outdated, meaning it could not compete with those displays of strength. Some form of change was needed in order to cope with the demands of a burgeoning new era.⁵ It was with this new mind-set that Japan emulated Western imperialism which developed quicker than any overseer would have been willing to guess. Inazo Nitobé stated in 1918 that it was at the commencement of the Meiji era where Japan placed themselves ‘under the tutelage of European and American leaders, gradually assimilating their thought – so, in the future, when the period of fruition shall have come, we should show forth what may be expected of the intellectual wedding of the two hemispheres, of the spiritual wedding of the East and the West’.⁶ In this sense Japanese emulation was for the greater good of their advancement toward becoming a modern power, as they engaged in an overseas conflict with China where there was a clear and underlined

⁴ See Stig Förster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and Ronald E. Robinson, *Bismarck, Europe and Africa: the Berlin Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition* (Oxford, 1988); R. J. Gavin and J. A. Betley (eds.), *The Scramble for Africa: Documents on the Berlin and West Africa Conference and Related Subjects, 1884/1885* (Ibadan, 1973).

⁵ William McOmie, *The Opening of Japan, 1853-1855. A Comparative Study of the American, British, Dutch, and Russian Naval Expeditions to Compel the Tokugawa Shogunate to Conclude Treaties and Open Ports to Their Ships* (Folkestone, 2006), 55.

⁶ Inazo Nitobé, *The Japanese Nation. Its Land, Its People and Its Life. With Special Considerations to Its Relations with the United States* (New York and London, 1918), 202-203.

intent of altering the status-quo. On 11 July 1894 one Japanese newspaper article claimed that war was anticipated by its warriors as a means of liberation from the feudal and backward policies of seclusion, stating that their displeasure would be inconsolable if events in Korea were to end without the sounds of cannon fire and of blood spilling. Anything less would have been regarded as an utter failure.⁷ So profound and influential was this victory that Premier Itō Hirobumi spoke of it as ‘the greatest event in our history’.⁸ This approach transcended Japanese attitudes towards furthering its influence in East Asia up to the war with Russia where victory catapulted Japan onto the global arena of contenders for empire, creating a shockwave of far greater magnitude than its victory a decade earlier. For it was this ‘small island nation of East Asia’ as Ikuhiko Hata writes, who ‘had emerged as an imperialistic nation in her own right, on its way towards hegemony in East Asia and the Western Pacific’.⁹ Victory over Russia was in many ways the parting of the waves. Traditionally a lesser Asiatic power whom Russia had managed to dominate since the times of Peter the Great, its defeat showed how times had changed with Japan emerging as a competitor in Great Power politics.¹⁰ Whereas the year 1895 marked the point where Japan’s imperialism began to take shape, it was its victory a decade later which cemented its power as being equal to Western imperialists with these victories making up the period of Japan’s early imperialism, a time so significant that this decade of the Meiji era warrants special acknowledgement.

But how was Japanese early imperialism and these golden age perceived by these Western states? In addressing these questions this thesis will look at the Western perceptions of early Japanese imperialism and the influence which this phenomenon as well as the events around it had on relations and attitudes between these two worlds. At this point I feel it is important that the reader is made clear about what is meant by two things which have thus far been mentioned: firstly what is meant by being an imperial power, and secondly what is meant by use of the term “West” and who it refers to. Regarding the former empire by colonisation had taken shape to become the norm, some labelling it as a characteristic of a modern state such as Akira Iriye who believed that imperialism and modernity were linked: ‘imperialism characterised part of the external behaviour of modern states of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It expressed the energies, orientations, and interests of a modern state of that particular period’.¹¹ By the turn of the century it had come to be regarded as a key feature of a modern state and a part of global affairs and therefore cannot be overlooked as it impacted upon the status-quo in the East and West. Thus the emergence of an imperial power in East Asia constituted a significant regional and global event, chastising

⁷ Stuart Lone, *Japan’s First Modern War. Army and Society in the Conflict with China, 1894-95* (Basingstoke, 1994), 27.

⁸ Quoted in Marius B. Jansen, Samuel C. Chu, Shumpei Okamoto and Bonnie B. Oh, ‘The Historiography of the Sino-Japanese War’, *The International History Review*, 1:2 (1979), 191.

⁹ Ikuhiko Hata, ‘Continental Expansion, 1905-1941’, in Peter Duus (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 6: The Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 1988), 271.

¹⁰ John W. Steinberg, *All the Tsar’s Men. Russia’s General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898-1914* (Washington, 2010), 147.

¹¹ Akira Iriye, ‘Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status’, in Marius B. Jansen (ed.), *The Emergence of Meiji Japan* (Cambridge, 1995), 312-313.

the existing state of affairs and challenging the idea of their inferiority. On the second of these points when looking at the topic of Western imperialists it is obvious that this study does not permit for a detailed study of all of them to take place. Thus I am primarily referring to Britain and the United States, the former being the world's most influential and widespread power with an empire that in one way or another touched every corner of the globe, and the latter being the new power in the Pacific with ventures that stretched into the Philippines and East Asia.¹² It is important to underline the fact that these nations had their own individual and specific interests and attitudes towards Japan. But both played key roles in Japan's opening and the formulating of its development thereafter and it is for these reasons that British and American perceptions of Japan will be addressed first and foremostly, although other Western states will at time merit attention.

Elaborating on this I will highlight the individual and varying attitudes of Britain and the United States towards Japan. By possessing a global empire it makes almost a historical sense to start with Britain. In 1907 Lord Thomas Sanderson likened the British empire to 'some huge giant sprawling all over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream'.¹³ This mind-set mirrored attitudes common to Victorians who believed that empire brought with it an aura of superiority.¹⁴ But the development of Japan added a new dimension to East Asian affairs which ultimately affected its position. Thus analysing the British perceptions of this new and rising power in an area of the world which had not experienced such displays of dominance since the times of Genghis Kahn and the Mongols, in a country which had abandoned any vested interest in engaging with overseas states during the Tokugawa era, will show how Britain's presence in East Asia came to be superseded. Britain could not grasp the rapidity of change as it became less tenable to continue defending their own interests there, the cost and practicalities of which had become burdensome. It was this which partly led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 after Japan convinced Britain of its worthiness as an ally who possessed the capacity to defend any and all British interests. What can be seen as a negotiation of an alliance to preserve Britain's interests in the East can also be seen as the thing which sparked the catalyst for the declination of its influence in that corner of the globe. There is definite truth in this which the subsequent renewals of the alliance in 1905 and 1911 are testament to, each becoming more favourable towards Japan. Up to the termination of the

¹² For a look at Britain's imperialism I would refer the reader to the following works as excellent points of reference: John Darwin, *Unfinished Empire. The Global Expansion of Britain* (London, 2013) and Niall Ferguson, *Empire. The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (London, 2002).

¹³ Quoted in Anne Orde, *The Eclipse of Great Britain. The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895-1956* (Basingstoke and London, 1996), 2. See also Keith Neilson and T. G. Otte, *The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1946* (Abingdon, 2009), 106.

¹⁴ In no sense is this truer than in Victorian attitudes towards India, Britain's prized possession and the crown jewel of its empire. Although this does not merit any length or in-depth analysis, I would recommend the following publications as excellent sources of information: Michael S. Dodson, *Orientalism, Empire and National Culture: India, 1770-1880* (Basingstoke, 2007); Nicholas B. Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain* (Cambridge, MA., and London, 2006); Douglas M. Peers and Nandini Gooptu (eds.), *India and the British Empire* (Oxford, 2012). See also J. Lawson Watson, 'Imperialism', *The Contemporary Review*, 75 (1899), 305-310.

alliance in 1921 with the Washington Conference the two were on friendly terms having collaborated during the First World War, the Siege of Tsingtao against Germany in 1914 a high point of their alliance. Having said this, relations became strained as Japan asserted itself as the foremost power in the East.¹⁵ Suffice to say however, that in this period of study relations were on mutually agreeable terms as they possessed similar if not alike interests, expressing cordial relations. Some would even go as far to label Japan as the “Britain of the East”.¹⁶

In a similar vein to Japan the United States was in the early stages of its imperialism, the two emerging almost simultaneously, the former following victory in 1895 and the latter out of victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898. This was quickly followed with the annexation of Hawaii and the expansion of interests into East Asia where so to ensure the security of China with the Open Door Policy as a means of securing a trading partner and of keeping Japan in check. Indeed their frequent denial of this policy and desire for expansion exists as reasons for American suspicion over Japan’s intentions in Asia-Pacific. Additionally the United States was the biggest recipient of Japanese immigration with high levels of people migrating to islands in the Pacific such as Hawaii, or to America itself with California exhibiting the highest influx of immigrants. It was this which put a great emphasis on the yellow peril sentiment as many quickly believed, especially following its swift victories in 1895 and 1905, that Japan posed a threat to American existence. There was always an underlying tension between the two even though it is more apparent at certain times more than others; a cautiousness unique in their relationship and something which Britain never possessed, or at the very least rarely displayed. The natural proximity between these two empires stand as testament to this, as both Japan and the United States became increasingly more disillusioned with each other and relations far less affable. All this contributed to an antagonistic relationship which would continue to worsen ultimately resulting in the eruption of hostilities in the form of Pearl Harbour in December 1941.¹⁷

In spite of the significance of both Britain and the United States it is important to emphasise that they were not the only two nations who contributed to Japan’s development or who had interests to defend in East Asia. Germany for one with the role of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his coining of the term “yellow peril”, a concept which epitomises the fear of oriental expansion westwards of which Japan came to epitomise, and Germany’s part in the Triple Intervention alongside France and Russia, cannot be overlooked. Furthermore when the time comes to address the Russo-Japanese War it will be sheer naiveté to avoid addressing the influence of Russia power and ambitions in East Asia with regards to China, Manchuria and Korea. With this it is clear that Britain and America are not the only players to hold an opinion on Japan’s empire making, but their roles and historical links with Japan in the years

¹⁵ For a look at the declination of relations between Britain and Japan there are no better materials than those by Ian Nish: *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23* (London, 1972), and *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952: Papers on the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the Second World War* (Cambridge, 1982). See also Antony Best, ‘The ‘Ghost’ of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: An Examination into Historical Myth-Making’, *The Historical Journal*, 49:3 (2006), 811-831.

¹⁶ Henry Dyer, *Dai Nippon: The Britain of the East. A Study in National Evolution* (London, 1904).

¹⁷ Michael H. Hunt and Steven Levine, *Arc of Empire. America’s Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam* (North Carolina, 2012), 1.

which led to the collapse of the Tokugawa hegemony make them unique. Although the presence of others are at times unavoidable and will merit attention, Britain and America will remain the primary focus in addressing the questions posed in this work.

One of the key challenges which this thesis will encounter is providing a thorough and in-depth breakdown of the events which encompass these significant years. Owing to the closeness of events which can be found to be intertwined with one another resulting in their fast occurring nature, it would not make any academic or scholastic sense to address a period of time smaller than what is presented here. The works of others are testament to this statement with those of Ian Nish, William Beasley, Anthony Best, and Richard Storry, being forced to write in the context of a larger timeframe for this same reason.¹⁸ By addressing the question of how early Japanese imperialism was viewed in Western social and political circles, and by doing so in a concise, thorough and detailed manner, this work seeks to provide a springboard for study into the events of this period. In doing so events surrounding the decade of study will be addressed. This in turn will provide an account of the significance of these years for Japan as well as their relations with the West, and affairs in East Asia. With this themes will emerge in this study which transcended earlier and later years. Immigration is one such example with many Japanese wanting the prosperity which Western states enjoyed. Their migration stemmed from the years before 1894 and was a part of Japan's Westernisation.¹⁹ In the United States this led to crisis with many Japanese occupying areas in and around California and the West Coast. Leading to increasing prejudices and heightened tensions this issue came to be the leading antagonist in Japanese-American relations. Although Britain also experienced Japanese immigration its presence was not as profound and prejudices far less intense. Whilst the United States had to cope with higher levels of immigration Anglo-Japanese relations strengthened with renewals of the alliance in 1905 and 1911, and the Japan-British Exhibition of 1910 expressing their friendliness. Suffice to say however, that the decade spanning from the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War to that of the Russo-Japanese War, the early years of Japanese imperialism and a time of change in the Meiji era, will form the essence of this study and the focus point of emerging themes.

Prior to establishing what the crux of this study will entail I first wish to provide some background information on British and American perceptions of Japan prior to the Sino-Japanese War so as to provide some background knowledge with which to take into this study. Typically this was a time where very little was known about Japan. Even Britain's vast empire was unsuccessful in breaking the boundaries of seclusion which the Japanese prided themselves on, that honour falling to the United States with the success of the Perry Expedition. It was this seemingly natural sense of wellbeing that characterised Japan and

¹⁸ See for example Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907* (London, 1966); William G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945* (Oxford, 1987); Anthony Best, 'Race, Monarchy and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922', *Social Science Japan Journal*, 9:2 (2006), 171-186; Richard Storry, *Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943* (Basingstoke, 1973).

¹⁹ Two excellent studies on Japanese westernisation which merit mention are William G. Beasley, *Japan Encounters the Barbarian. Japanese Travellers in America and Europe* (New Haven, CT., and London, 1995), and Donald Keene, *The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830* (Stanford, 1969).

even East Asia more generally, as a place embedded in traditional manners.²⁰ Travel and globetrotting accounts affirm this, identifying Japan as an exotic place with unique customs. The opening epigraph to this chapter, the travelling account of Isabella Bird, stands as an example of this and shows how she was in awe of Japan when viewing Mount Fuji. Furthermore she writes of her first glimpses on land as follows: ‘the coast of Japan is much more prepossessing than most coasts’, and that fishing villages are ‘bright with the greenness of English lawns’.²¹ Lafcadio Hearn voices similar experiences writing in 1894 how he regretted the fact that he was leaving behind Japan and its unique charm and personality. He saw it as being beyond belief, describing it as a place where ‘reality may not be distinguished from what is illusion – that all seems a mirage, about to vanish’.²² Other accounts echo similar sentiments regarding land, people and customs and it was these views which witnessed a change and increasing awareness throughout social circles. As Toshio Yokoyama has asserted, British views of Japan has begun to change towards the end of the nineteenth century: ‘From about 1880, the image of an unreal Japan became firmly established in Britain and began to exert a broader influence. For example, the image of “a civilisation without any originality”, which was as romantic an idea as the tourists’ idea of Japan as an elf-land, became an element in the way British intellectuals thought about Far Eastern questions in general’.²³ Britons were now more able to acquire a knowledge of Japan hitherto inaccessible to them. They were provided with an acute level of information and awareness hitherto unbeknownst to them.

These materials as well as others could be found across the Atlantic. Generally however, the American attitudes towards Japan differed from those of Britain with the notion of the yellow peril bearing more validity in social and political circles. Providing a look into the origins and significance of such a theme will establish a springboard of information with

²⁰ The opening of Tokugawa Japan brought about its first trade agreements with Western states following the conclusion of the Treaty of Kanagawa and the Harris Treaty. Other parts of East Asia, significantly China, were not as successful in rebuffing Western encroachment which the Opium Wars are testament to this as they forced China to succumb to their power. The influence of Japan’s opening however meant that all of East Asia had in one form or another been subjected to Western influences, serving as a catalyst for the Westernisation of these states. For the impact of these events see Irokawa Daikichi, *The Culture of the Meiji Period* (Princeton, 1988); Mitani Hiroshi, *Escape From Impasse. The Decision to Open Japan* (Tokyo, 2006); McOmie, *The Opening*.

²¹ Bird, *Unbeaten Tracks*, 1-2. See also C. F. F. Woods, ‘An Excursion in Japan’, *Belgravia: A London Magazine*, September 1870; H. F. Abell, ‘Travelling in Japan’, *Belgravia: A London Magazine*, March 1878; L. A. L., ‘Reminiscences of a Visit to Japan’, *London Society: A Monthly Magazine of Light and Amusing Literature for the Hours of Relaxation*, November 1895.

²² Lafcadio Hearn, *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan. Volume Two* (Boston and New York, 1894), 691-692. One of the best examples where Japan’s uniqueness is emphasised can be found in another of Hearn’s accounts where he speaks of the art of *jujitsu*. Translated to mean “conquer by yielding” he goes into detail of the discipline required to master it, and of the untold knowledge which that person would have over their opponent. But more to this is the fact that this discipline teaches victory by using the strength of the enemy, meaning that a mind-set is established where no matter how great an enemy, they can be defeated. This attitude can be found in the Sino-Japanese War and perhaps more significantly in the Russo-Japanese War where as we shall see, many were shocked at the collapse of an established Western imperial power. Lafcadio Hearn, *Out of the East. Reveries and Studies in New Japan* (Boston and New York, 1895), 186-187.

²³ Toshio Yokoyama, *Japan in the Victorian Mind. A Study of Stereotyped Images of a Nation 1850-80* (Basingstoke, 1987), 175.

which to take into the core analysis of the study, as well as allow parallels of how perceptions of Japan changed in a relatively short space of time to be drawn together. With their rapid development leading to the recycling of sentiments which had initially been applied to the Chinese, Japan quickly became the epitome of the peril. In the United States the term “Jap” as an ethnic slur began to appear more consistently throughout the 1890s as a derogatory term in publications such as the *Coast Seamen’s Journal*.²⁴ The Japanese came to be viewed as detrimental to society, something which transcended all mediums. Fiction is one such area and held great sway in manipulating public opinion and playing an intrinsic part in political debates. In both areas fiction provided stock for ideas and assumptions which nourished policy.²⁵ In 1880 for example, Arthur de Gobineau warned of a ‘new fifth century’ should an ‘Oriental movement into Europe’ occur. In his last work published posthumously in 1887, he went into greater detail on this viewpoint writing of an epic encounter between ‘whites’ and ‘yellows’.²⁶ Many stories followed a similar narrative which shows that a credible fear of the Japanese as well as the Chinese was expressed prevalently through popular social mediums leading to a mind-set which would not be easily undone. As some have stated: ‘Before the first Japanese immigrant appeared in America, the psychological foundation of the Japanese stereotype had been laid: it was that of the “heathen Chinese”. The legacy of prejudice inherited from the Chinese profoundly influenced the subsequent history of Japanese history and was never effectively erased’.²⁷

Sentiments echoed here were generally attributable more towards the United States than that of Britain whose people typically remained unknowledgeable of Japan. Valentine Chirol, an ardent imperialist and renowned correspondent for *The Times* who wrote extensively on affairs in East Asia, attested that Japan’s true state had been misinterpreted: ‘On the whole there was little knowledge of the real facts concerning Japan, and where there was knowledge there was little sympathy. In England especially the doctrine that the Japanese were superficial, aggressive, and generally objectionable was as fairly vested in many quarters as the belief in the “latent power of China, our natural ally”’.²⁸ But British

²⁴ Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution. Causes and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II* (London, 1974), 23.

Magazines such as these had a profound level of development in the United States and emerged from the 1880s onwards having a great impact on social circles. Indeed the question which virtually all editors were asking revolved around the idea of what they would do with the national audience they had generated which would only continue to expand. See David Reed, *The Popular Magazine in Britain and the United States 1880-1960* (London, 1997), 76.

²⁵ Philip Darby, *The Fiction of Imperialism. Reading Between International Relations and Postcolonialism* (London, 1998), 26.

²⁶ Quoted in Michael Keevak, *Becoming Yellow. A Short History of Racial Thinking* (Oxford, 2011), 125.

²⁷ tenBroek et. al., *Prejudice*, 23.

²⁸ Valentine Chirol, *The Far Eastern Question* (London, 1896), 139-140. It is worth mentioning here that British society during this period was always undergoing change and that a consensus was not always met. As Jose Harris has mentioned, ‘Great Britain between 1870 and 1914 was in many respects... a ramshackle and amorphous society, characterised by a myriad contradictory trends and opinions, and capable of evolving contingently in many different ways. It was not (despite the fashionable jargon of the Edwardian era) a coherent “organism”, still less a “corporation”, a “system” or a “machine”’. Jose Harris, *Private Lives, Public Spirits. A Social History of Britain, 1870-1914* (Oxford, 1993), 3. Further to this an article in the *Morning Post* stressed how a mutual knowledge and appreciation was needed across society for international amity to be achieved:

influences on Japan in the period of their development cannot go amiss with foreign residences alone totalling 1,200 out of 2,500 making up forty-eight percent of those in Yokohama and Nagasaki in 1885. A decade later this had increased to 1,750 out of 4,700 constituting thirty-seven percent. In this period British residents in Japan made up the majority and would not be surpassed until the 1920s when Americans began to outnumber the British.²⁹ Another such example can be found in the Japanese press with many newspapers and periodicals being printed in English.³⁰ Back home there was in some circles a fascination of things Japanese, the possession of a vested interest in its culture through an aesthetic movement identified as “Japonisme”, a fad which Olive Checkland labels as being ‘a mild obsession’.³¹ But it transcended artistic boundaries to become more popular as it found its way into popular media. *Punch* cartoonists first became aware of this movement in the 1860s and in the 1870s began to criticise it in “intellectual pictures”. By 1888 *Punch* claimed that it penetrated every corner of everyday life leading to the publication of a series of cartoons from 26 May to 10 November.³² At this point I will mention the influence which the popular press had in Britain. What separated this form of media from others such as books was the simple fact that whereas a bestseller could reach sales of a few thousand, newspapers and periodicals had a wider printing base and could reach sales amounting into the several hundred thousands of copies. Furthermore the readers of the popular presses were far greater than book readers.³³ On newspapers alone there were there were seventy-four morning dailies and eighty-five evening dailies in circulation by 1892. ‘If someone was unable to read a newspaper’ writes Lucy Brown, ‘the chances were that they would have the opportunity

‘... nothing can better further the cause of friendship than an opportunity for the individual citizens who go to make up the vague entity of modern democracy to definite and vivid ideas of the life of other nations. The ordinary man reads little, and even when he reads has too small a background of experience in conditions other than his own to be able to form any clear conception of distant and far different scenes’. *Morning Post*, 12 August 1909.

²⁹ James Hoare, ‘The Era of the Unequal Treaties, 1858-99’, in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations. Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930* (Basingstoke, 2000), 114.

³⁰ James Hoare, ‘British Journalists in Meiji Japan’, in Ian Nish (ed.), *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits. Volume 1* (Folkestone, 1994), 20-21. For further assessments of the Meiji Press see Albert A. Altman, ‘The Press’, in Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman (eds.), *Japan in Transition. From Tokugawa to Meiji* (Oxford, 1986), 231-247; Albert A. Altman, ‘The Press and Social Cohesion During a Period of Change: the Case of Early Meiji Japan’, *Modern Asian Studies*, 15 (1981), 865-876; J. L. Huffman, ‘Freedom and the Press in Meiji-Taishō Japan’, in Peter Kornicki (ed.), *Meiji Japan: Political, Economic and Social History. Volume 3: The Mature Meiji State* (London, 1998), 284-307. For Western printed views of Japan prior to the Meiji Restoration see Olavi K. Fält, ‘Image of Japan in Foreign Newspapers Published in Japan Before the Meiji Restoration’, in Ian Nish (ed.), *Contemporary European Writing on Japan. Scholarly Views from Eastern and Western Europe* (Kent, 1988), 55-61.

³¹ Olive Checkland, *Japan and Britain After 1859. Creating Cultural Bridges* (London, 2003), 111.

³² Ayako Ono, *On Japonisme in Britain. Whistler, Menpes, Henry, Hornel and Nineteenth-Century Japan* (London, 2003), 16. See also *Punch*, 27 February 1869; *Punch*, 5 February 1876; *Punch*, 26 May 1888; *Punch*, 11 August 1888; *Punch*, 25 August 1888; *Punch*, 10 November 1888.

³³ Alvar Ellegard, ‘Public Opinion and the Press: Reactions to Darwinism’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 19:3 (1958), 383. See also Walter E. Houghton, ‘Periodical Literature and the Articulate Classes’, in Joanne Shattock and Michael Wolff (eds.), *The Victorian Periodical Press: Samplings and Surroundings* (Leicester, Toronto and Buffalo, NY., 1982), 3-27.

speak to someone who had read that day's news'.³⁴ As Japan became more prominent on the international scene its existence became more open in British circles which in turn led to greater interests in things Japanese.

American attitudes towards Japan were somewhat different in nature. As aforementioned the United States was influential in Japan's opening in the 1850s but their interests in this nation revolved primarily around treaties of friendship, trade, amity and commerce between the two. Suffice to say levels of fascination did not take-off with the levels of fascination as it did with Britain. Indeed the influence of Chinese immigrants and later that of the Japanese preoccupied American thought. Furthermore the United States was concentrating on its own imperial development with the Civil War of 1861-1865 and other various wars against the indigenous populations in the years up to the 1880s. It was only from the 1890s where expressions of a vested interest in Pacific affairs took shape through occupation of the Philippines. Irrespectively Britain, Japan and the United States share a historical link – Britain and America were the first to sign treaties with the somewhat distant and unbeknownst land which was now linked with the most powerful nation in the world and the world's most rapidly developing nation in what can be identified as a triangular of international diplomacy.³⁵

These themes take on new meaning in the late 1890s up to the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 as attitudes towards Japan simultaneously strengthened in some circles and became more obsolete in others. Both Britain and America remained neutral in the Sino-Japanese War and as aforesaid avoided participation in the intervention. Britain for one started to view Japan as a potential new ally but the idea of Anglo-Saxonism was burgeoning with an aura of superiority from Britain and the United States reigning over their presence in East Asia. But the potential for Asian expansion still caused anxiety and was to some extent feared, underlining the power behind the ideas of the yellow peril. In addition to this Japan continued to progress and develop with military advancements, the Boxer Rebellion strengthening their status on a global level following its collaboration with Western nations. Equally by the turn of the century Japan had begun to view the interfering nature of these powers in East Asian affairs, specifically the United States following the establishment of its empire in the Pacific, with distain as the idea of a white peril flourished in nationalist and extremist circles. It is this period from 1895 up to the Boxer Rebellion which the first chapter will address as Japan strengthened its hold on East Asian affairs and began to challenge the role of the West.

Of greater influence than these events was the Russo-Japanese War, an event where Peter Duus has argued for the Japanese victory marking the take-off point of their imperialism.³⁶ This section will seek to address the rapid strides Japan made in their relations

³⁴ Lucy Brown, 'The Growth of a National Press', in Laurel Blake, Aled Jones and Lionel Madden (eds.), *Investigating Victorian Journalism* (London, 1990), 133. See also Aled Jones, *Powers of the Press. Newspapers, Power and the Public in Nineteenth-Century England* (Aldershot, 1996).

³⁵ H. C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States. A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (London, 1954), 553.

³⁶ Peter Duus, 'The Take-off Point of Japanese Imperialism', in Harry Wary and Hilary Conroy (eds.), *Japan Examined. Perspectives on Modern Japanese History* (Honolulu, 1983), 153-157. See also Rotem Kowner, 'The War as a Turning Point in Modern Japanese History', in Rotem Kowner (ed.), *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War* (Abingdon, 2007), 29-46.

with the West following the Boxer Rebellion. Whereas the initial chapter will have looked at their growing presence relative to East Asia, this chapter will do the same but in a greater international context as it was these years where Japan had a far greater engagement with global affairs. One of the most prominent alliances of the time will be looked at here with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance existing as the first written agreement between a Western and an Eastern nation where the latter was regarded as an equal. As a general rule of thumb however, many Britons remained ignorant of Japan irrespective of its rapid progress and development. How they perceived the alliance will take shape here leading into how these perceptions and relations generally between the nations changed. For Britain this was a time of alliance building as their grasp of world affairs began to diminish meaning that the influence of the United States on the alliance and the idea of Anglo-Saxonism will also be addressed. This meant greater rapprochement with America as cordial Anglo-American relations and Anglo-Saxonism became increasingly more appealing in policies and became widely accepted. It has been noted by some scholars and academics however, that Britain favoured pursuing an alliance with the new imperial power of the Pacific. As American imperialism continued to take shape with victory in the war against the Filipinos in 1902 their relations with Japan began to become somewhat strenuous with the notion of conflict beckoning. Like Britain the United States remained neutral in the Russo-Japanese War with many sympathising with Japan's quest with the belief that they would not be able to overcome the might of a power such as Russia. As this conflict became increasing more one-sided this sentiment changed as feelings of estrangement heightened. Furthermore the yellow peril idea blossomed contributing to the increasing levels of suspicion and even more Japanese emigration westwards. The Boxer Rebellion serves as a prime example of where a strong Japan collaborated with Western powers, and it is from here to the Russo-Japanese War where Japan experienced a period of profound development. Consequently its presence took on new meaning signalling how times were changing, experiencing new relations with the West whose perceptions of Japan continued to undergo changes either in favour or disillusionment as Anglo-American attitudes differed.

Events following the Russo-Japanese War will be acknowledged in my final chapter so to provide some idea of how influential this victory was and how it affected relations between Japan and the West. Anglo-Japanese relations remained better than those between Japan and the United States. In an attempt to assert American naval dominance in the Pacific 1907 heralded the launch of Theodore Roosevelt's Great White Fleet leading to arguments that estrangement with Japan deepened after the Russo-Japanese War. This combined with the immigration crisis witnessed the emergence of the Asiatic Exclusion League led to heightened perceptions of Anglo-Saxonism and a more conscious awareness of the yellow peril. Japan's relations with Britain however, were typically stronger owing to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a success of diplomacy from both sides which would be renewed twice within the next decade. But this is not to say that such sentiments were universal as some in Britain opposed any renewal of the alliance in favour of distancing themselves from the growing threat of Japan and establishing more structured and fail-safe alliances with others. Disparities within these relations exist and will be of great interest to explore, with this triangular relationship between Britain, Japan and the United States experiencing varying degrees of conflict and cooperation with one another. Perhaps it would be more accurate to

provide an image where Britain is in the middle of America and Japan, mediating between the two to ascertain friendly relations with both powers.

Throughout the course of this study a range of themes will emerge which transcend the decade in question here as well as those surrounding it, some of which have been mentioned. From the expansion, development and assertion of Japanese and American imperialism and their ensuing estrangement in the Pacific to Japanese emigration and increasing fears of the yellow peril in British and American circles, this study will serve as a springboard for further research and examination into these country's perceptions of early Japanese imperialism. Furthermore it will bring to the foreground the existence of the white peril arising out of the growing presence and involvement of Western states in and around East Asia. There existed then a contrast in perils with a fear in the West of Asian expansion and vice-versa. The yellow peril however, remains a concept more closely linked to the United States as they had closer encounters with Japan through immigration and neighbouring empires. Britain on the other hand was more open to relations with Japan as Japonisme took shape with items of a somewhat alien yet equally exotic nature from a distant land became increasingly popular in social circles. Simultaneously Japan's increasing strength showed how it had the potential to be an ally, and a means for Britain to defend its interests in the East. Thus there existed a discrepancy in Japan's relations with Britain and America and those country's perceptions of it. Emerging from this is also the growing nature of relations between Britain and America. Many Britons applauded their acquisition of imperial status and believed that some form of alliance or agreement best suited British interests. All things considered it appears that Britain maintained and reciprocated friendly relations with Japan and America, but on the flip side of the coin Japanese-American relations were turbulent at best, strengthening the idea that Britain had to mediate between the two so as to guarantee their own interests. These themes as well as others dominated Western relations and perceptions of Japan, transcending the breadth of this study.

Scholarly works surrounding this period are specific to either events or themes. There is in existence a wide range of written material focusing on Japanese and American imperialism, Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-American relations, the yellow peril in the United States, and the immigration crisis. William F. Nimmo, Richard Welch Jr., and Walter La Faber have made major contributions to studies on American imperialism serving as excellent facilitators of information. Nimmo's work has focused on the simultaneous growth of Japan and the United States in the Pacific, detailing how their expansions collided with each other, in an epoch which demanded imperialistic and expansionist endeavours. His work *Stars and Stripes* focuses on how the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War saw both Japan and the United States emerge as the powers of the Pacific. His arguments primarily focus on American diplomatic, economic and military relations with nations within the Pacific basin including China, Japan and Korea, as well as Hawaii, Samoa and the Philippines. This study examines how Japan could be viewed as a threat to American interests in the Pacific as well as the general status-quo. Nimmo explains how this explained the growth of the yellow peril ideology in the United States.³⁷ Comparatively, Welch's work is more pinpointed by focusing

³⁷ William F. Nimmo, *Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific. The United States, Japan and the Asia/Pacific Region, 1895-1945* (Westport, CT., 2001).

on American political relations in and around the years of the American-Filipino War. Being politically based, his argument is that actions taken by American diplomats was a response to the views expressed in that era by the American population. In doing so he looks at the reasons which President McKinley put forward for engaging in this conflict and acquiring the Philippine Islands. With America now identified as an imperial power Welch successfully provides an analysis of how this newly attained status was greeted with a mix of welcome and distain. Here the importance of American popular opinion is made apparent with opinions of Japan, East Asia, and the Pacific more generally being assimilated into this work as a point of reference to how Americans viewed their country's position in East Asia and the impact this had on their foreign policy.³⁸ Whereas Nimmo and Welch provide accounts of a more diplomatic and political nature, LaFeber looks more at the social impact of imperialism in the United States. He argues that the period spanning from the American Civil War to the years leading up to the First World War was the founding period of American imperialism, and a time where the United States was a power player in the Pacific. In a similar approach to Welch, LaFeber focuses primarily on attitudes within the United States but additionally focuses on the societal changes which this development brought about in other countries. He writes how such developments fuelled the Chinese and Russian revolutions as well as impacting on other states. It is with this that LaFeber's work provides an encompassing view of the impact which American imperialism had at home and abroad, providing a more social approach which the works of Nimmo and Welch lack.³⁹ With these works as well as others the impact of American imperialism developing alongside that of Japan's is addressed, as are the political, diplomatic and societal attitudes which contributed to the developments of Japanese-American relations in the period addressed in this study.

Japanese responses to American imperialism lack depth, with Akira Iriye's *Pacific Estrangement* being perhaps the most prominent publication on this topic in the West. It is the knowledge and use of the English and Japanese languages that make this work an important port of call for information on the increasing tensions between the simultaneous rise of Japanese and American imperialism. It addressing this topic it pinpoints the threat of the Japanese empire in American foreign policy on both a political and diplomatic level. In return it also provides a comprehensive look into the responses of Japanese diplomats, statesmen and policy makers, and how they perceived American imperialism which some of them regarded as the white peril. Throughout this work the roles and positions of Japan and the United States, and relations between the two changed as a result of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, and the years surrounding these conflicts.⁴⁰

A source of tension and a key facilitator for the yellow peril ideology and Western perceptions of race, was the issue of immigration. Here the works of Erika Lee, Michael Diamond, and Anthony Best are used which provide a detailed and in-depth knowledge on American and British views on this topic. Lee's work focuses primarily on Chinese emigration to the United States and their cross-border movements with Canada and Mexico. But this is not to say that Japanese immigration goes overlooked. Views towards the Chinese

³⁸ Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Imperialism. The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1889-1902* (North Carolina, 2001).

³⁹ Walter LaFeber, *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* (Cambridge, 1993).

⁴⁰ Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement*.

were very often recycled to incorporate the Japanese as well as well as other Asian minorities, with attitudes towards Oriental hordes bearing similar sentiments. This is something which Lee emphasises and the views expressed in her works can thus be applied to Japanese migratory movements westwards.⁴¹ Both Diamond and Best focus more on British perceptions of race, thereby providing different analytical viewpoints. Diamond uses British popular material to address the yellow peril both towards Japan and China, highlighting how race was a key issue in the period studied here, and how other nations had trouble gaining acceptance as a racial equal. His work provides an excellent source of information of how racial attitudes were manifested in British popular cultures and how in many areas it became a norm of society.⁴² Best adapts a different approach, focusing on the importance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in overcoming racial, religious and cultural divides. In the formulation of this agreement he highlights how there existed in some political circles a mutual respect of each other's strength and position, and how both nations used diplomacy to forge an alliance made on equal terms. In doing this Best discusses the varying attempts of both nations to quell racial stereotypes with occasions such as royal visits undertaken to achieve this. In spite of these attempts he is forced to conclude how prejudices and apprehensions still existed and were expressed through the yellow peril as well as pan-Asianist ideologies which continued in the years beyond this period.⁴³

Topics such as American imperialism, race and the immigration crisis in the United States have received more attention than others in this period of study. Those such as the decline of Great Britain as a global power and the yellow peril in Britain have received far less attention from scholars, and a pool of sources have been used to try and counter this problem. On Britain's decline as a global power Anne Orde's work exists as one of the few detailed scholarly materials with many works on this topic choosing to focus on Britain's decline in the years following the Second World War thereby overlooking the influence which period on examination here had on Britain's position. One of Orde's works for example, *The Eclipse of Great Britain*, addresses how the expansion and rise of American power ultimately supplanted Britain as the dominant global power. She argues how this took two world wars to achieve, and regarding the period in question writes how the United States was hesitant of holding too much power and did not actively seek to overturn Britain as the dominant Western power.⁴⁴

What all of these topics have in common throughout this work is the use of secondary sources which predate the 1990s. Those of Nish, Iriye, and Bradford Perkins are examples of this. It is their substantial depth in research which they provide which means their

⁴¹ See by Erika Lee, 'Enforcing the Borders: Chinese Exclusion Along the U.S. Borders with Canada and Mexico, 1888-1914', *The Journal of American History*, 89:1 (2002), 54-86, and 'The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race, Immigration, and American Gatekeeping, 1882-1924', *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 21:3 (2002), 36-62.

⁴² Michael Diamond, *'Lesser Breeds': Racial Attitudes in British Popular Culture, 1890-1940* (London, 2006)

⁴³ Best, 'Race, Monarchy', and 'The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race, Immigration, and American Gatekeeping, 1882-1924', *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 21:3 (2002), 36-62.

⁴⁴ Orde, *The Eclipse*. See also Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (Amherst, MA., 2004).

significance cannot be overlooked.⁴⁵ But this is not to say that this study is dependent on predated sources which have been widely used and referenced to the point of submission. Indeed a number of sources have been used which are more recent than these mentioned, and even focus on topics which were overlooked by these authors as well as developing upon what has been written. As well as the works of Best and Lee which have been referenced above, there is the work of those such as Cemil Aydin who looks at anti-Westernism in Asia. Here he argues that anti-Western ideals from the nineteenth century to the outbreak of the First World War and beyond, contributed to the collapse of Eurocentrism and Western colonialism in East Asia. These factors served as facilitators in influencing other parts of the world who had been exposed to ideals of the West.⁴⁶ Other more recent works focus more on societal views of Japan such as Ayako Ono who has looked extensively on the British fascination for things Japanese, and how things of a Japanese nature influenced the works of prominent artists working in Britain. He argues that whereas Western influences led to the opening of Japan, Japanese influences in certain instances influenced Western societal circles; an argument strengthened through events such as the Japan-British Exhibition in 1910.⁴⁷ In spite of the wide use of recent sources, what can be seen to be lacking is the lack of Japanese orientated material. All of the works addressed in this thesis are all published in English, meaning that this study can be seen to lack Japanese works which would undoubtedly provide inestimable material with which to further assert any claims relating to Japan and the West. Furthermore these would have supplied an in-depth contrast which would have added breadth of this study and added a new dimension to it. In spite of this some Japanese publications have been published in English and serve as useful port of calls such as those of Okakura Kakuzo, Shigenobu Ōkuma and Inazo Nitobé.⁴⁸ Alongside these monographs a range of primary material is used stretching from American and British newspapers, monographs, travel and globetrotter accounts, journal articles, periodicals, letters, British Cabinet and Foreign Office papers, as well as novels and short stories. In spite of the lack of Japanese sources used enough primary and secondary material is available which permit the questions posed in this thesis to be sufficiently examined and addressed.

By examining the events which sparked great change in Meiji Japan during this period of examination, this essay will shed light on the topic of Western perceptions of early Japanese imperialism, and emphasise the fear of this expansion as expressed through the yellow peril. The decade constituting the period from the defeat of China to that of Russia was the main source for this anxiety. In some circles Japan thenceforth came to be viewed as a nation intent on expansion into the Western hemisphere with motives which transcended

⁴⁵ For the works of Nish see *Alliance in Decline* and *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*. For those of Akira Iriye see *Pacific Estrangement* and *From Nationalism to Internationalism. US Foreign Policy to 1914* (London, 1977). The works of Bradford Perkins are used less than others but his research on Anglo-American relations is extremely beneficial. An example of this is his publication *The Great Rapprochement. England and the United States, 1894-1914* (London, 1968).

⁴⁶ Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia. Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (Chichester, 2007).

⁴⁷ Ono, *On Japonisme in Britain*.

⁴⁸ Okakura Kakuzo, *The Ideals of the East with Special Reference to the Art of Japan* (London, 1903); Shigenobu Ōkuma, *Fifty Years of New Japan* (London, 1909); Inazo Nitobé, *Bushidō. The Soul of Japan* (Tokyo, 1908).

social and diplomatic boundaries. Indeed it is generally accepted by historians and scholars alike that the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars were significant events in the shaping of Meiji history as well as that of East Asia. But how Western imperialists perceived the rapidly changing developments is not widely addressed in scholarly material and generally goes amiss. By addressing the themes highlighted here alongside others this essay will bring to the foreground what other scholarly material is lacking. Consensus towards Japan in the Western world was not universal as the British and Americans differed in their views on how valuable an ally or how great a threat Japan was. Following their period of Westernisation since the Meiji Restoration, Japan's development attracted the attention of some, yet very rarely if ever at all made headline or front-page news. The same is true of their involvement in conflict against China and Russia. Many have come to the conclusion that the British and Americans were ignorant of Japan and things Japanese, a statement which is truer more so of the former than the latter owing to the development of American imperialism and them being subjected to influxes of Japanese immigration. Having said this, American viewpoints tended to be biased and at times were overly shaped by prejudices which the British were not. It is with these attitudes that the yellow peril was treated differently on both sides of the Atlantic, but it is not to say that it was non-existent in Britain. Even with events such as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance there were still groups who treated Japan with suspicion, and viewed them as the epitome of the yellow peril. In both circumstances this perception arose from Japan's victories over China and Russia, and it these events which make up the focus of this study, and the emergence of Japan as the yellow peril. Great events throughout history have always been known to erupt onto the scene and over the course of a decade which spanned from victory over China to the defeat of an imperial power; Japan stunned the world and emerged as a global power, experiencing a change unbeknownst in their history. A lack of knowledge of things Japanese, or close encounters with Japan, meant that Western circles viewed this development with a mix of admiration, anxiety and at times a mix of the two.

China's Defeat and the Boxer Rebellion: the Emergence of Japanese Imperialism as the Yellow Peril

‘Come, let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that, when there befalleth us any war, they also join themselves unto our enemies, and fight against us, and so get them up out of the land’.⁴⁹

- Exodus 1:10

‘The main incidents of the conflict which has just been brought to a close in China are so well remembered that only a brief recapitulation of the more striking features, in their relation to the ultimate success of Japan as a nation, may suffice to indicate the substantial character of her progress in the art of warfare. As already shown, this was the first opportunity afforded to Japan of proving that she had really strengthened her position in the East by adopting Western methods and appliances’.⁵⁰

- John Morris, *Advance Japan*, 1895

‘Compared with the dark, icon-like figure of the Korean, or with the rich and varied types of Chinese beauty, the Japanese is a poor remnant, a degenerate among his brothers. Moreover, there is something cold, if not malevolent, in his unlovely face, something mysterious and even frightening. You can believe it when they say: “Fear the Japanese, do not trust the deep bow, the smile, the lisping and sucking in of breath, the rubbing together of his hands. He would smile as he stuck a dagger into you, and go on lisping and smiling just the same’.⁵¹

- Nikolai Garin-Mikhailovskii, *Around Korea, Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula*, 1898

⁴⁹ Quoted in tenBroek et. al., *Prejudice, War*, ii.

⁵⁰ J. Morris, *Advance Japan: A Nation Thoroughly in Earnest* (London and Philadelphia, 1895), 336.

⁵¹ Nikolai Garin-Mikhailovskii, *Around Korea, Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula* (Nagasaki, Yokohama, 1898) [excerpts], in David N. Wells (ed.), *Russian Views of Japan, 1792-1913. An Anthology of Travel Writing* (Abingdon, 2004), 183.



IMAGE ONE: Kobayashi Kiyochika, *Our Forces' Great Victory in the Battle of the Yellow Sea – Third Illustration: The Desperate Fight of the Two Warships Akagi and Hiei* (October 1894).

Source: Available online at *MIT Visualizing Cultures*.

URL: < http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia_02/toa_essay02.html > (accessed 6 January 2015).



IMAGE TWO: Kobayashi Kiyochika, *Picture of our Armed Forces Winning a Great Victory After a Fierce Battle at Pyongyang* (October, 1895).

Source: Available online at *MIT Visualizing Cultures*.

URL: < http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia_02/toa_essay02.html > (accessed 6 January 2015).

A watershed moment the year 1895 marks the onset of Japan's early imperialism. This victory was to be a catalyst for change, influencing three key areas: the status of Japan who saw the role of their military redefined and their ambitions for greater expansion heightened; the hierarchy of power in East Asia as China who historically had been the dominant power and the key player in the region was surpassed by Japan; and the relationship between the East and West.⁵² These features are inherently linked and when these changes took place the West began to take note of Japan's position in the Pacific, their presence provoking reactions of either fear or esteem approbation. The former of these reached a crescendo at the end of the decade as this mix of attitudes would become a cocktail containing a heavy emphasis on one ingredient. Following the Treaty of Shimonoseki by only a matter of days was the Triple Intervention which stands as testament to this where the influence of other nations demonstrates both the worry within some Western states over Japan's acquisitions and intent, and yet the effect which they still had over it.⁵³ Peter Duus has written just this: 'despite their military victory over China, the Japanese still had to bend to the wishes of the Western powers'.⁵⁴ Owing to Japanese interests in Manchuria, Russia had the most to fear and equally the most to gain with France's participation in the intervention more an act of diplomacy than of defending their interests.⁵⁵ Whereas it kept Japan's expansion into mainland Asia in check it equally shows how some Western imperialists were fearful or at the very least anxious of its rapid emergence. Although it retroceded the expansionist ambitions of the Meiji government it can also be seen as complimenting them as they attracted the attention of three of Europe's major powers. At this point it is worth mentioning that although Japan was forced to concede the Liaodong Peninsula, it still walked away from the negotiation table with overseas territory by maintaining jurisdiction over Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands – symbols of how it had begun its stride towards empire, emulating those Western imperialist nations from whom they had learnt of the benefits brought about by empire building.

Throughout the Sino-Japanese War the strength shown by Japan is evident. Although pieces of propaganda the woodcuttings of Kobayashi Kiyochika, examples of which can be found in images one and two, depict the successes of its army and navy both on land and at sea and the strength on show. Although the intervention can be seen to have hampered Japanese efforts to establish a continental empire it failed to reign in and contain its ambitions

⁵² Sino-Japanese tensions had been present since the onset of the Meiji era and had increased thenceforth. For a detailed study which addresses Sino-Japanese relations in the decades prior to the outbreak of war in 1894 I would refer the reader to Putnam Weale, *The Truth About China and Japan* (London, 1921), especially pages 9-46.

⁵³ For a full text of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 17 April 1895, see Michael Hurst (ed.), *Key Treaties for the Great Powers 1814-1914. Volume 2: 1871-1914* (London, 1972), 670-677. For a full text of the Triple Intervention of 8 November 1895, see *ibid*, 678-680.

⁵⁴ Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword. The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910* (London, 1995), 96-97.

⁵⁵ Having said this France did possess interests in Indochina following the Sino-French War (1884-1886). But there exists no evidence to suggest that any engrained fear existed amongst the French that Japanese influence would spread so far as to manipulate affairs in Indochina. Her primary reason for partaking in the intervention was purely to preserve friendly relations and to uphold her treaty obligations with Russia. See Frank W. Ilké, 'The Triple Intervention. Japan's Lesson in the Diplomacy of Imperialism', *Monumenta Nipponica*, 22:1/2 (1967), 122-130.

and determination. Indeed what followed this saga of imperial acquisition and abatement was military rearmament and a revolutionary transformation of the army and navy, as the Meiji government sought greater investment in both military personnel and equipment in turn bringing about an influx of funds. With this the Japanese military would become a symbol of patriotism and national pride. Both the development and proficiency of the military were recognised in Western circles with the popular media emphasising the impressive nature of Japan's development. *The Illustrated London News* for example, reported the following on its army:

‘Few instances of rapid change in the adoption of new methods and practices and fashions in all history, ancient and modern, have been more remarkable than the transformation of Japan, with less than thirty years, from a singularly sequestered state, under the rule of barbarian feudal chiefs with the Shiogoon or Tycoon at their head, to a compact and vigorous national monarchy, with a Parliament of democratic complexion, and with an administrative system which bears comparison with those of European states.

It may safely be averred that the great change now going on is not confined to the art of war, but extends to all the elements of civilisation. Yet our illustrations of the strikingly different fashions of uniform and equipment of Japanese troops, at successive periods of the last quarter of a century, show what a strange alteration has taken place in the aspect of the army, the most conspicuous and still the most necessary department of national State service. This army is well trained, well officered, and we now see how well it can fight’.⁵⁶

In an edition prior to this, readers were made aware of the strength of the Japanese navy and were provided with images of the ships which they used in comparison to those used by the Chinese. In both cases these ships were British built with the warship mentioned here, the *Naniwa Kan*, being built at Elswick upon Tyne by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Mitchell and Co. Ltd, emphasising the influence of Britain, the world's global naval power, in the development of the Japanese navy by providing them with one of the most powerful cruisers afloat.⁵⁷ This trend continued throughout the rest of the decade. In 1899 *The Illustrated London News* reported on Japan's launching of a ship, the *Asahi* which weighed 5,500 tonnes, held an armament of four 12-inch and fourteen 6-inch guns, twenty 12-pounders and four submerged torpedo tubes, which was built in Britain by the Clydebank engineering and Shipbuilding Company Limited, was labelled as a signal of intent for military expansion. The article concluded: ‘Not even Japan, it seems, will listen to the voice that pleads for a stay in the increase of the world's armaments; certainly not England, and certainly not France’.⁵⁸ With the world entering a new era of imperialism a strong navy was deemed essential for any

⁵⁶ *The Illustrated London News*, 20 October 1894. In an earlier edition the Japanese army were glorified in their image being described as a ‘spectacle’ with ‘a verve and intelligence worthy of a first-class European war’. *The Illustrated London News*, 6 October 1895.

⁵⁷ *The Illustrated London News*, 4 August 1894.

⁵⁸ *The Illustrated London News*, 25 March 1899.

TABLE ONE: *Japanese Army, Navy and National Expenditures and Military Personnel, 1896-1903.*

Year	Army expenditures (¥)	Navy expenditures (¥)	National expenditures (¥)	Army personnel	Navy personnel
1896	53,243,000	20,006,000	168,857,000	123,913	18,233
1897	60,148,000	50,395,000	223,679,000	144,179	22,176
1898	53,898,000	58,529,000	219,758,000	132,666	23,430
1899	52,551,000	61,662,000	254,166,000	140,000	27,347
1900	74,838,000	58,275,000	292,750,000	150,000	31,114
1901	58,302,000	43,979,000	266,857,000	150,000	34,242
1902	49,442,000	36,327,000	289,227,000	150,000	36,674
1903	46,884,000	36,118,000	249,256,000	150,000	37,434

Source: J. Charles Schencking, *Making Waves. Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868-1922* (Stanford, 2005), 104.

power to succeed in the modern world. At the turn of the century Paul Reinsch, an American political scientist and diplomat, wrote on the importance of a strong navy as it would undoubtedly;

‘become a condition of existence, since they alone can protect transoceanic possessions and ward off invasion. Among imperial powers holding transoceanic possessions, naval warfare rather than land warfare will, in many cases, be decisive in the future, and an empire that does not maintain a navy will be shorn of its dependencies, as was Spain by the United States’.⁵⁹

Establishing a strong navy was one of the principle aims of the Meiji government. Following the events of 1895 a plan put forward by Rear Admiral Yamamoto Gonnohyōe was aimed at revolutionising the navy into a world class fleet which possessed the ability to challenge the world’s finest fleets. If followed it would bring about the purchasing and construction of brand new fleet, improvements to shore facilities, and the establishment of a Naval Construction Bureau to regulate all shore-based development. Additionally suggestions were made that sixteen capital warships, twenty-three destroyers, and sixty-three torpedo boats be added to the initial plan. With this the total displacement of warships totalled over 234,000

⁵⁹ Paul S. Reinsch, *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century as Influenced by the Oriental Situation* (London, 1900), 27. The growing importance of the navy continues in this publication up to page 32.

tonnes witnessing a seventy per-cent increase on the size of the navy as it stood in 1895. This plan brought with it a budgeted cost of ¥215,000,000 which was double the amount spent on the navy in the period 1868 to 1893.⁶⁰ Military progress is evident from the levels of investment they received from the government, points which are stressed in table one which shows increases in army and navy expenditure as well as personnel in the years leading up to the Russo-Japanese War. With this the military was more than simply a symbol of national pride and patriotism but also a statement of intent.

Military developments such as these led to a new and confident Japan whose superiority in East Asia was second to none, a transformation which was met with both admiration and apprehension. San Francisco newspaper *The Morning Call* for example, expressed the former of these sentiments, publishing how Japan sought reforms with China and Korea on peaceful terms and was forced to go to war solely for the defence of their own subjects in residence there.⁶¹ Newspapers in Britain were a bit more reverent and highlighted the emergence of a new era. *The Times* for example, wrote of the importance of trade with China and how this new Japan was something with which it had to adapt. Such was its effect that the status-quo had been changed and could no longer be restored meaning it became necessary to accept the new situation and come to terms with it:

‘If China could have been guaranteed to remain in a torpid condition, if Japan had not suddenly awakened to a consciousness of her naval and military strength and begun to use it, we should, perhaps, have been better pleased to go on as we have done for two or three generations. But that is past praying for. A new world has been called into existence in the Far East. We must live with it and make the best of it’.⁶²

In demonstrating Japan’s strength *Punch* published a range of cartoons showing how Japan had exchanged roles with China as the leading power of East Asia.⁶³ This was part of the characteristic change of Japan who took on the role as the saviour of the East, undertaking a civilising mission where it would lead other backward nations to the levels of Westernisation and progress which it had attained. In practise however, this can be seen as more of a cover-up for expansion southwards, the significance of the islands in the South Seas prominent in expansionist policy. ‘There were still South Sea islands’ writes Akira Iriye in highlighting the importance of this region, ‘which were like empty houses, to which Japan would be most welcome. Westerners were fast spreading their influence and control over this region, and the Japanese could not be left behind’.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ J. Charles Schencking, *Making Waves. Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial Navy, 1868-1912* (Stanford, 2005), 84-85. For another study which looks at the role of the Japanese navy in the Sino-Japanese War as well as its development thereafter I would refer the reader to chapters two and three of David C. Evans’ and Mark R. Peattie’s publication *Kaigan: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941* (Annapolis, MD., 1997), 32-93.

⁶¹ *The Morning Call*, 15 January 1895.

⁶² *The Times*, 23 April 1895.

⁶³ See ‘The Triumph of Civilisation’, *Punch*, 11 August 1894; ‘Jap the Giant Killer’, *Punch*, 29 September 1894; ‘The Jap in the China Shop’, *Punch*, 27 April 1895.

⁶⁴ Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement*, 38.

Tokutomi Sohō wrote of such a mission, stating that Japan should now look to extend their influence southwards so that it may be able to save those Eastern nations who may either be susceptible to or be unable to counter Western influences. On 8 February 1896 he wrote:

‘The countries of the Far East falling prey to the great powers of Europe is something that our nation will not stand for. East Asia becoming a mire of disorder is something that our nation will not tolerate. We have the duty to radiate the light of civilisation beyond our shores and bring the benefits of civilisation to our neighbours. We have the duty to guide backward countries to the point of being able to govern themselves. We have the duty to maintain peace in East Asia for this purpose. As a man has his calling, so too does a nation have its mission’.

Tokutomi also wrote of how a strong and expansive “Greater Japan” would be able to contribute to ‘spreading righteousness throughout the world’ and that in accomplishing their mission in Asia Japan would;

‘break the world-wide monopoly and destroy the special rights of the white races, eliminate the special sphere of influence and the worldwide tyranny of the white races, [and thereby] create true universal equality and progress in humanity, brotherhood, and civilisation for the world’.⁶⁵

Similar attitudes can be found elsewhere. Following the acquisition of Taiwan the importance of the Philippines increased for Japan. In a pamphlet entitled *Firipin guntō* the Minyūsha, a publishing company established by Tokutomi, sought to stimulate interest amongst the public for expansion into the south. Although it mentioned nothing of the United States it stated that neither Britain nor Germany held any interest in the Philippines and that Japan should cultivate a colonisation plan and assert Japanese interest in the region.⁶⁶ These ambitions also included acquiring influence in the Chinese mainland with Manchuria and Korea taking a primary role in Japanese plans, their imperial course evident.⁶⁷ After 1895 Japan sought expansion into Asia on a more pronounced level than before, and it was with its pristine new

⁶⁵ Quoted in John D. Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō 1863-1957. A Journalist for Modern Japan* (Guildford, 1980), 241.

⁶⁶ Translated as *The Philippine Islands*. Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement*, 48-49. Other publications on the Philippine question included Fukomoto Nichinan’s *Firipin guntō ni okeruni nihonjin* (translated as *The Philippine Archipelago with Regards to the Japanese*, 1889) which provided an account of the Philippines as a Spanish colony and perspective for Japanese expansion into and colonisation of the Philippines, and Hattori Tōru’s *Yō saku* (Translated as *South Seas Policy*, 1891) which detailed Hattori’s excursions to the South Seas and the potential which he saw for expansion into Filipino industries such as hemp, sugar and textiles. See Sven Matthiessen, ‘The Perception of the Philippines in Japanese Pan-Asianism from the Meiji-Era until the Wake of the Pacific War’, *GEMC Journal*, 4:3 (2011), 129-131.

⁶⁷ Such notions were evident long before the 1890s however, with scholars and intellectuals from the Tokugawa era such as Yoshida Shōin stating that for the defence of Japan it was necessary to expand into these areas. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, 29. See also, David Magarey Earl, *Emperor and Nation in Japan: Political Thinkers of the Tokugawa Period* (Seattle, 1964), 173-175.

military and confidence that they would do it. This all falls under the umbrella of pan-Asianism, a concept which will be addressed later in this chapter. But suffice to say that it was with this where Japan would be able to challenge Western infringement in the East, an important point to keep in mind when discussing the yellow peril.

Regardless of what interests they had in East Asia along with the Japanese developments mentioned above, many in the West remained aloof from Asian affairs. Some writers looked to change this idleness and took to the role of comparing Eastern and Western existence so as to establish some understanding and knowledge of Eastern customs and lifestyle. In almost every case these writers conclude that they remained ignorant of modern methods and welfare. Japan was included in this list. Benjamin Wheeler is worth quoting at length:

‘The contrast between those two things, Occidentalism and Orientalism, you cannot mistake. You feel it in the air, and yet it may be easy to define; it may not apply in every case nor fit every man, but in the main it is this: you have passed out of the time-land into the time-less. The Occident lives in time; life is its clock; heart-beats are its ticks.... The East, on the other hand, is timeless. There one day is a thousand years. The great East has time to spare. In the West, men have so much to do, and so little time in which to do it, that they crown time by deviceful effort to the full.

‘In the West, life is a boat, with a rudder and a keel, that can cross the stream. In the East, life, personality, is a chip swept on in the great current. The West is given pre-eminently to activity in creating and shaping. It deals, therefore, largely with the shaping of the material universe which is the environment of the individual, and in subduing it to his control. The East is given to introspection. The West tends more to materialism, the East to communication with the things of the spirit. The West is full of creation, progress, restlessness, achievement, failure, disappointment, exultation; the East abounds in quietism, resignation, and blissful stagnation’.⁶⁸

Here the West was a place of rapid progress and the East one of contentment and traditional manners. Similarly Reinsch writes how the East and West, Orientalism and Occidentalism, maintain individual and unique characteristics where both remain ignorant of and fail to appreciate the other:

‘Western civilisation, now fully developed, and rich in the accumulated wealth and wisdom of centuries, stands panoplied in all the glories of histories. The Orient, which believes that it has learned ages ago the sum of knowledge and the essence of truth, is still animated with the same spirit, and still has in great measure the same social and political institutions that existed at the beginning of the Christian era. Though these two civilisations have in some degree reacted upon each other, they still maintain a distinct character, with little real mutual understanding’.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Benjamin Ide Wheeler, ‘Greece and the Eastern Question’, in *Atlantic Monthly: A Magazine of Literature, Science, Art and Politics*, 79:476 (1897), 723.

⁶⁹ Reinsch, *World Politics*, 236-237.

It could be said that this ignorance and aloofness overlooked what was an obvious time of progress for Japan, perhaps the true characteristics being reserved for globetrotting and travel accounts similar to those previously addressed. But this is not to say that affairs in the East were not being reported on. Although news of Japan's victory may not have made the front page headlines it was with relative ease that one would be able to find examples in European presses which voiced the significance of this victory and were favourable towards Japan. Irrespective of the intervention a majority of European newspapers and journals 'began to depict Japan as the singular successful case of Westernisation and reform on the larger Asian continent, which overall was failing to reform itself. Even some European authors felt they had to examine Japan to rethink whether its achievements could teach European states anything'.⁷⁰ Equal attitudes were expressed in the United States where public opinion had been aroused by the outbreak and outcomes of this conflict, leading to untold levels of praise for the progress of Japanese Westernisation. 'Japanese victory over China' writes Iriye, 'was widely interpreted in the United States as a victory of civilisation and enlightenment over backwardness and seclusionist foreign policy, and it was expected that post-war China would prove to be more receptive to foreign influences and intercourses.... Asia and the Pacific began to be looked upon as one of the keys to the future of the United States'.⁷¹ China's defeat succeeded in raising some heads as some believed that it brought with it a change which inherently signalled the beginning of a new era in East Asia.

Although positive as well as antagonistic attitudes towards Japan began to be expressed at this point, opinions generally remained mixed concerning their endeavours and were far from being universally or mutually aligned towards a common goal of acceptance. In Britain anti-Japanese sentiments can be found as people were disconcerted and at times appalled by the distinct lack of gentlemanly behaviour from the Japanese after 1895 when they resolved upon further challenging the integrity of China as well as that of Korea. Arthur Diósy writes of how a tidal wave of indignation swept over Britain:

“What!” cried the average Briton, represented by his principal newspapers and magazines, with few exceptions, “What! Those impertinent little ‘Japs’ going wantonly to attack our neutral ally, China, to disturb the balance of power, to jeopardise trade! They will have to pay dearly for their presumption. They may score a success or two just at first, but when China brings into play her enormous latent strength, when her huge population, her unlimited resources, her boundless staying power, begin to tell, Japan must needs be crushed in the unequal conflict”.⁷²

⁷⁰ Aydin, *The Politics*, 72.

⁷¹ Iriye, *From Nationalism*, 125. For a greater in-depth look at the American involvement in the Sino-Japanese War see Charles Holcombe, *The Real Chinese Question* (New York, 1909 [1900]), 115, 147; Jeffrey M. Dorwart, *The Pigtail War: American Involvement in the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895* (Amherst, MA., 1975).

⁷² Arthur Diósy, *The New Far East* (London, 1904), 6-7.

In addition to this an account of Japanese meeting with one another in the street can be found in an article entitled “‘How Do You Do!’ In Japan’ which ridicules and mocks Japanese customs:

‘As two Japanese come in sight of each other they slacken their pace and approach with downcast eyes, and averted faces, as if neither was worthy of beholding the other. Then they bow low, so as to bring the face on a level with the knees, on which the palms of the hands are pressed.

A succession of hissing sounds is next made by drawing in the breath between the closed teeth, interspersed with a series of complimentary phrases uttered with great volubility in a sort of understood falsetto, each trying to outdo his friend in rapidity and extravagance of language, while the palms are diligently rubbed against each other.

At last the climax is reached, and each endeavours to give precedence to the other. For some moments — perhaps for a full minute — the polite contest continues. Then the ceremony abruptly ends, as if the difficulty were capable of none but a brusque solution, and the two pass on hurriedly with a look of extreme relief’.⁷³

Regardless of these examples it must not be assumed that Britons holstered a wholly anti-Japanese approach. Britain’s position as *the* global power in the world with a range of interests in Asia meant that it possessed a different perception to others. Owing to their interests in China it may appear apparent enough for one to infer that Britain was pro-Chinese but this has been described as nothing more than an illusion.⁷⁴

During the Sino-Japanese War both Britain and the United States remained neutral with their involvement primarily revolving around a humanitarian basis which included the protection of properties in war zones, as well as the lives of Chinese citizens resident in Japan and vice versa.⁷⁵ In the immediate aftermath of the war Britain was more anti-Europe than anti-Japanese. As aforementioned it did not participate in the intervention and took the line of supporting Japan with the belief that it did more harm than good to British interests in Asia. Significantly this included trade with China which exceeded more than £32,000,000 a year and accounted for seventy per-cent of China’s total foreign trade.⁷⁶ But there is more to it than this as both Britain and Japan appeared to share common goals. Valentine Chirol made

⁷³ *The London Journal and Weekly Record of Literature, Science and Art*, 19 May 1900.

⁷⁴ Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 25.

⁷⁵ The American contribution is most apparent here. There were a large number of Japanese subjects who resided in port cities such as Tientsin and Shanghai whilst Chinese citizens resided in a number of Japanese cities which included the port towns of Yokohama and Kobe. Both China and Japan accepted the American offer of protection of their citizens leading to Walter Q. Gresham, the United States Secretary of State, forwarding dispatches to Edwin Dun, the American envoy to Japan, and Charles H. Denby, the American ambassador to China. These issued them with directions to act as agents for Japanese and Chinese residents in their respective areas for the duration of the conflict. When the hostilities spread to Manchuria the United States became more involved and concerned with protecting the lives of Americans situated there of which there were some 1,000 families of which many were missionaries. In 1894 Naval Secretary Hilary A. Herbert ordered a portion of the fleet to Asian waters. Nimmo, *Stars and Stripes*, 20.

⁷⁶ Allen, *Great Britain*, 584.

this point quite clear. In one of his publications he wrote of how they could work together for mutual benefaction:

‘No nation can be expected absolutely to renounce all dreams of future aggrandisement, and the day may come when the ways of England and Japan in the Far East will have to part. But the dread of remote contingencies must not be allowed to overshadow the possibilities of present usefulness. For some time to come it looks at least probable that England and Japan may have to travel along parallel paths. The experience of the last year has taught us the value of Japan, and it has taught Japan the value of moderation and prudence, without which she cannot hope to retain the permanent goodwill of England’.

He went on to write that;

‘... the interests of England and Japan should be arrayed on the same side, and it is upon such an association of interests rather than upon written engagements that must be founded in the pacific and, in the true sense of the word, conservative alliances which can alone find favour with British public opinion’.⁷⁷

Similar sentiments are reciprocated in Tokutomi’s writings following his trip to the West in 1896 where he visited England, Germany, France, Russia, Constantinople, the Balkans, Italy, Switzerland and France before returning to England and moving on to the United States. He was attracted more to the British than either any other European or the Americans, labelling them as ‘self-centred, but law-abiding, self-possessed, easy-going and very likable’, stating that they would be a worthwhile ally should the need arise.⁷⁸ Both Britain and Japan were

⁷⁷ Valentine Chirol, *The Far Eastern Question* (London, 1896), 151, 153. *The Times* was unwavering in this point of view with articles detailing before the Boer War that the protection of British interests in East Asia made it necessary to secure an ally who could counter the threat of Russia. Whilst they viewed any alliance with Germany with caution with the belief that it would not look to alienate Russia they had to look elsewhere, and the prospect of Japan became unwavering. See *The History of The Times. Volume 3: The Twentieth Century Test, 1884-1912* (London, 1947), 373. Similar attitudes can be found in the American presses. Californian newspaper *The Herald* for example, wrote of how the intervention was ‘an outlook for trouble’ and that the influence of foreign states possessed the objective solely to start a new war in East Asia. The same article also expressed a fear that there was the potential for China to re-enter into hostilities and prolong the war. *The Herald*, 27 April 1895.

⁷⁸ Tokutomi also went on to say that in spite of the disparities and discrepancies in the wealth and class of society how he was impressed that the London Metropolitan Police could seemingly maintain peace and order with little more than a truncheon, and that whereas other European nations were prejudiced towards Japanese travellers he experienced no ill-will when in England believing that the yellow peril was not a threat taken seriously. Alongside this he got the impression that other European nations were somewhat in awe with “Greater Britain” and that the British sympathised with Japan’s aspirations in Korea and Manchuria. Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō*, 254-258. As well as the links with England, Japan also held links with the prestigious University of Glasgow which stemmed from the 1870s. It was with these links that Japan sought entry into the Glasgow International Exhibition to be held in 1901. The most prominent individual in cementing these links was Thomas Blake Glover who assisted in the development of Japan’s industrialisation throughout Meiji Japan’s Westernisation. In 1908 he was awarded the Order of the Rising Sun, second class, and there is still erected a



IMAGE THREE: Kaiser Wilhelm II's painting, *The Yellow Peril* (1895).

This painting and the coining of the phrase "yellow peril" was inspired by Kaiser Wilhelm II following a dream he had. The German inscription of the painting reads "Völker Europas, wahrt eure heiligsten Güter" translated to mean "Peoples of Europe, guard your dearest goods".

Source: G. G. Rupert, *The Yellow Peril or The Orient vs. The Occident as Viewed by Modern Statesmen and Ancient Prophets* (Choctaw, Okla. 1911), 143.

aware of Russia as a threat, and the growing presence of Japan as a counterweight to this made Britain look towards viewing Japan as a potential ally. In the spring of 1899 British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain raised the possibility of an Anglo-Japanese alliance of some form with Kato Takaai, the Japanese Minister in London. Soon after the conclusion of Boxer Rebellion anti-Russian sentiments accentuated following the occupation of most of the Peking-Mukden railway line, adamantly refusing to discuss the withdrawal of their troops from Manchuria. These acts demonstrated the increasing threat of Russian expansion to both British and Japanese interests and their joint aim to prevent such acts of aggression.⁷⁹ As well

statue of him in Glover Garden, Nagasaki. See Alexander McKay, *Scottish Samurai. Thomas Blake Glover, 1838-1911* (Edinburgh, 1993).

⁷⁹ Inouye Yuichi, 'From Unequal Treaty to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1867-1902', in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations. Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-*

as this Britain and Japan became close trading partners. By the turn of the century Britain provided for a quarter of Japanese imports with their ships being frequently spotted in Japanese ports. British nationals also made up nearly half of the roughly 3,000 foreigners recruited by the Meiji government to assist with developments as British models served as inspiration for the Westernisation of Japan through the construction of railways, telegraph systems, and naval developments to name but a few areas.⁸⁰ It was these feelings and collaboration that fostered friendly relations and would serve as fundamentally laying the groundwork for a burgeoning alliance.

Japanese relations with other Western nations were not as equally fortuitous. The most prevalent example of this can be found through Kaiser Wilhelm II's painting entitled "The Yellow Peril". As image three shows the changing of affairs in East Asia stood as a threat to the wellbeing of Europe, the purpose of this painting a warning. He depicts the Archangel Michael as a symbol for Germany leading the European powers which included amongst others Britannia, Marianne, and Germania against the Golden Buddha of Japan which personified the yellow peril. With this racial thoughts and ideologies began to sprout which as Maik Sprotte has made clear, expressed feelings of superiority exaggerated by notions such as Herbert Spencer's phrase the "survival of the fittest" and Darwinian Theory. But what is more Wilhelm used the term as a political tool so as to influence the balance of power in Europe as well as keep Russia busy in the East as defender of the Christian world, on a line similar to that echoed in the first epigraph to this chapter. Furthermore it gave reason for Russia to act aggressively in Manchuria.⁸¹ Thenceforth this term was to be found in a wide range of scholarly and popular writings as it rapidly crossed all linguistic boundaries.⁸² The fact that it was used as a political tool is significant and cannot afford to be overlooked as some in Germany believed that the use of this term threatened friend and foe. Bernhard von Bülow was one of them, writing how this painting saw Germany preaching to Europe and the West a Holy War against Japan who greeted the term with nothing but antipathy and abhorrence.⁸³ This view has been taken on board by historians who have labelled Wilhelm's attitudes and speeches on the matter as being not only problematic but

1930 (Basingstoke, 2000), 153. See also Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 36-37. Irrespective of these common aims in counter-weighting Russian aggression and the good-will feelings between both Britain and Japan it has to be brought to light that both sides had dignitaries who opposed this point of view. They opposed this united front with advocates of this in Britain believing that Japan would try to dominate relations, whilst those in Japan were reserved as to whether Britain would pay her fair share. These views were expressed privately between diplomats and came to hamper negotiations for a formal alliance. See Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 161-162.

⁸⁰ Kenneth D. Brown, *Britain and Japan. A Comparative Economic and Social History Since 1900* (Manchester, 1998), 4.

⁸¹ Maik Hendrik Sprotte, 'Between Admiration and Fear – the Construction of Japanese Otherness in the German Empire (1871-1918)', in Koyoko Koma (ed.), *Image of Japan in Europe. Material of International Conference "Image of Japan in Europe" held on 13-14 October 2007 at Vytautas Magnus University Japanese Studies Centre* (Kanaus, 2008), 36-37.

⁸² Keevak, *Becoming Yellow*, 125-126. See also Aydin, *The Politics*, 54.

⁸³ Sprotte, 'Between Administration', 37.

‘ghastly’ and ‘pompous’ which did nothing to benefit Germany’s foreign relations.⁸⁴ An example of this term being used in such a way to manipulate the political atmosphere was the Kaiser’s attempt to create a wedge of tension between Japan and the United States, the idea being that Germany would benefit by being able to concentrate more on obtaining possessions in the Pacific. American general, politician and diplomat Charles Sherrill wrote just that:

‘The term “Yellow Peril” was one of the most ingenious of Kaiser Wilhelm’s lines of propaganda [which had a purpose] to arouse such suspicions between Japan and America as would leave him free uninterruptedly to develop his policy of island grabbing in the Pacific’.⁸⁵

When one looks at the relations between Japan and the United States in the 1890s and their estrangement which sprouted towards the end of the decade one may claim that Wilhelm was successful in this political gamble. Unquestionably he certainly picked two nations who could easily be at loggerheads with each other. In 1890 Americans was fearful that Asiatics may overtake the white minority of the population on the island of Hawaii which included 12,000 Japanese, 15,000 Chinese, 34,000 indigenous natives, and only 2,000 Americans. Although the Chinese and Japanese subjects paid twenty-nine percent of all taxes, the white minority held political influence as well as economic power and sought the backing of the United States. It was here that the topic of annexation was breached with one Hawaiian commissioner saying:

‘There is such a large number of Chinese and other cheap labourers on the islands who cannot be trusted to vote intelligently that if universal suffrage was declared the whites, who represent almost the entire business interests of the country, would be outvoted and powerless’.⁸⁶

Following the end of the Sino-Japanese War these views were more greatly exaggerated with the view that if China were to become civilised there was a fear that it would unite with Japan. Stafford Ransome wrote that;

‘... it is not probable that either Japan or any other nation will have a great deal of influence with her; but it is reasonable to suppose that as soon as that process has been accomplished China and Japan will be found on the same side when it is a question of facing a common Western enemy’.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Wolfgang J. Mommsen, ‘Kaiser Wilhelm II and German Politics’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 25:2/3 (1990), 303.

⁸⁵ Charles H. Sherrill, *Have We a Far Eastern Policy?* (New York, 1920), 193.

⁸⁶ Quoted in Iriye, *From Nationalism*, 121. See also William A. Russ, *The Hawaiian Revolution* (Selinsgrove, PA., 1959).

⁸⁷ Stafford Ransome, *Japan in Transition. A Comparative Study of Their Progress, Policy, and Methods of the Japanese Since Their War With China* (New York and London, 1899), 182-183.

In addition to this there existed a belief that the comfort and security of the West was under threat from the combination of these two nations. As Henry Hyndman wrote retrospectively in 1919 when reminiscing on the affairs of the mid-1890s:

‘The Japanese claim a controlling voice in the future of China, with her enormous population and her vast potential for wealth. They are on the high road to secure it, regardless of Great Britain or any other nation. What this may mean to the world at large can be judged by those who read the recent history of Japan. All other details of world-policy seem trifling in comparison with this. The suicide of the white race may leave the planet open to the supremacy of the yellow’.⁸⁸

A fear of Japanese expansion following their acquisition of influence over China sought about an increase in tension in the West as the idea that a threat of this magnitude would be unconquerable began to emerge. As Stafford Lyman has stated on the matter it was this combination which was feared purely because the dominant groups of the West, namely its spokesperson, leaders, officials, intellectuals, opinion makers, as well as others, believed that the particular element of the peril under discussion was not keeping to its place and threatened to claim any and all of the opportunities and privileges which it had been excluded from. Furthermore there was the fear and belief that it stood as a threat to the status, security, welfare and well-being of the dominant ethnic group.⁸⁹ Although this consensus was not all encompassing it ultimately came to be the threat of the yellow peril, the movement of Asiatics on a small or large scale a reason to ere on the side of cautiousness which at times, in some circles, became extreme.⁹⁰ This was then a racial problematic with the late nineteenth century seeing a mix of Chinese and Japanese constitute the makeup of the peril although it was the latter which was the most influential.

Western fears of the yellow peril were blossoming as the Japanese became the embodiment and face of this threat. At the turn of the century *The Spectator* put forward to the British public the possibility of ‘a Japanese military caste controlling China and organising a native army and military’.⁹¹ Elsewhere Matthew Shiel’s book *The Yellow Danger* told the story of Chinamen as well as Japanese disguised accordingly acting as spies in Western Europe for a future invasion which he believed would be equally as tragic as the Black Death which plagued the Middle Ages. Any total victory for the Asiatics where Westerners were forced to be submissive would bring about ‘the reign of hell’, a fear which intensified as many Europeans fled further westwards to flee any encounter. A counter attack

⁸⁸ H. M. Hyndman, *The Awakening of Asia* (London, 1919), 161.

⁸⁹ Stanford M. Lyman, ‘The “Yellow Peril” Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist Discourse’, *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 13:4 (2000), 687.

⁹⁰ The *New York Tribune* of 22 September 1895 for example, published an article with the title “Japan is Reaching Out” which opened as follows: Japan is the cynosure of neighbouring eyes, not only in the Orient but in the Occident as well. As the new Japanese Consul to this port, Kiujiro Miyagawa puts it, speaking of the United States: “You are Our Friend and our neighbour.” So that the broad bosom of the Pacific between Yokohama and San Francisco, the coasts of these two friendly nations become next-door neighbours through the comity of mutual trade interests and the international ties of good will towards all mankind’.

⁹¹ Quoted in Diamond, ‘*Lesser Breeds*’, 12.

led by the English put a stop to this as their superior naval power combined with that of others successfully conquered the yellow threat, the Japanese outdone by European pre-eminence.⁹² Although published earlier in the decade William Crane's short story *The Year 1899* told the story of an Oriental invasion, a Chinese led cohort which incorporated the Japanese, African Americans, Puerto Ricans, various Caribbean peoples, and those nonconforming American Indian tribes. In this story Europe and the United States were invaded by these peoples. Initially overrun they managed to regroup, counter and invade China. The Japanese were humiliated and disgraced, and the Chinese were forced to withdraw.⁹³ What novels and stories such as these have in common is their depiction of Oriental races with racial stereotypes emerging as a means to further assert Western dominance. As aforementioned Japan was the personification of this threat: 'As an Oriental power' writes Gina Owens, 'Japan focused the "Yellow Peril" fears of the West: Japanese national characteristics became central to the image of the Oriental hordes. Racial stereotypes cast as "national characteristics" were promoted by the Western powers as justification for their dominant position, forming part of the armoury of racial theories that originated in the late nineteenth century. Japan became both a victim and proponent of such ideas'. But there was more to it than just this as these stereotypes took on a more extreme racial view where Japanese traits could not escape examination: 'Physical racial characteristics were also identified in spurious "scientific" theories and research, which were used to justify an ordering of humanity with the whites firmly ensconced at the top of the hierarchy. From "yellow-monkeys" to "dwarf slaves" and "venomous lice", the Japanese were subjected to a barrage of racial insults from the 1850s reaching a crescendo in Second World War propaganda'.⁹⁴ With the establishment of these stereotypes it does not become difficult to envisage a divergent margin between East and West where different customs, beliefs and attitudes permeated. When one addresses each region individually two ideologies emerge from these racial tendencies: in the West there is the concept of Anglo-Saxonism amongst the British and Americans which has already been acknowledged, and in the East there was the pan-Asianist concept, again something which has already warranted some attention, which was vociferous in its view that Asiatic nations should dissolve all things related to the West.

Although Anglo-Saxonism has its roots in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it took on new meaning in the nineteenth. Generally referred to as a union primarily between Britain and the United States, it represented the distinct and superior racial elements of these nations. Its rise to prominence was identified as only one stage in a relentless Western

⁹² M. P. Shiel, *The Yellow Danger* (London, 1898).

⁹³ William W. Crane, 'The Year 1899', *Overland Monthly*, 21:126 (1893), 579-589. See also Lyman, 'The "Yellow Peril" Mystique', 694. For fictional works on the threat of China I would refer the reader to the following: Pierton W. Dooner, *Last Days of the Republic* (San Francisco, 1880); H. J. West, *The Chinese Invasion* (San Francisco, 1875); Atwell Whitney, *Almond-Eyed* (San Francisco, 1878); Robert Wolter, *A Short and Truthful History of the Taking of California and Oregon by the Chinese in the Year A.D. 1899* (San Francisco, 1882).

⁹⁴ Gina Owens, 'The Making of the Yellow Peril: Pre-War Western Views of Japan', in Phil Hammond (ed.), *Cultural Differences, Media Memories. Anglo-American Images of Japan* (London, 1997), 27. An excellent source which provides a unique point of view of Japan by looking at elements of the Japanese character through pilgrimages and religion is Percival Lowell's *Occult Japan or The Way Of The Gods. A Esoteric Study of Japanese Personality and Possession* (Boston and New York, 1894).

movement which begun in India, had stretched into the German forests, and was playing itself out in the United States and in the British Empire's settlement colonies.⁹⁵ Reginald Horsman has written on the changes Anglo-Saxonism undertook throughout these centuries, concluding that by the end of the nineteenth century it had undergone a profound change when 'an interest in national origins, in the intimate relationship of race, language and nation was of course not peculiar to Great Britain, but the Anglo-Saxons combined a long idealisation of their institutions with overt signs of nineteenth century success; of the apparently inevitable drive of Great Britain and the United States to world domination.... By the middle of the nineteenth century the idea of a superior Anglo-Saxon race regenerating a world of lesser races was firmly engrained in English thinking'.⁹⁶ The development of a key relationship between Britain and the United States can be seen to originate here as both held vested interests in East Asia, the encroachment of Russia into northern China, as well as Japan's greater presence which Britain and America perceived as a threat to their commercial interests and the integrity of China with the Open Door Policy.⁹⁷ American imperialism was significant in defining Anglo-Saxonism in the nineteenth century. With their belief that Britain was far better qualified to direct colonies, the strength of this ideal is apparent. 'Powered from a common mould, cherishing similar values' writes Bradford Perkins, 'the two peoples were assumed to have the same noble conception of the duties of empire'.⁹⁸ This was a time where Britain in particular was seeking to forge friendly relations and alliances so it could rely on others to help protect and defend their interests in the world's distant corners, like those in East Asia. Both America and Japan appealed to them but in the 1890s the notion of Anglo-Saxonism was stronger than an Anglo-Japanese union.

Britain was certainly keen to secure a formal alliance with the United States. Following American successes in the Spanish-American War the two certainly expressed cordial relations. Reinsch expressed how the two shared commonalities:

'The friendship between Great Britain and the American Republic is usually accepted as firmly established, and it may be looked upon as one of the most fortunate results of the late [Spanish-American] war that the unreasoning bitterness and misunderstanding between these two great nations have given way, even for a time, to a feeling of common interests and mutual good will. The best minds of both nations have long realised that, with all the commercial and industrial rivalry between them, they are at one on the essentials of civilisation and government'.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Paul A. Kramer, 'Empires, Exceptions and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule Between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910', *The Journal of American History*, 88:4 (2002), 1322.

⁹⁶ Reginald Horsman, 'Origins of Racial Anglo-Saxonism in Great Britain Before 1850', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 37:3 (1976), 410. This is not to say however, that Anglo-Saxonism was solely shaped in its entirety by Britain and the United States. If we take Kramer's view that it travelled across Europe it therefore could not avoid contact from the rivals of Britain and America such as those who forged the Triple Intervention. See for example Alan Pitt, 'A Changing Anglo-Saxon Myth: Its Development and Function in French Political Thought, 1860-1914', *French History*, 14:2 (2000), 150-173.

⁹⁷ Kramer, 'Empires', 1344.

⁹⁸ Perkins, *The Great*, 87.

⁹⁹ Reinsch, *World Politics*, 357-358.

In a speech at Birmingham on 13 May 1898 in the midst of this conflict, Chamberlain made his views on the importance of an alliance with Britain's Anglo-Saxon counterpart known, accentuating the importance of this concept with the primary duty of statesmen being;

‘to establish and maintain bonds of amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic.... I do not know what the future has in store for us, I do not know what arrangements may be possible with the United States, but this I know and feel — that the closer, more cordial, the fuller and the more definite, these arrangements are with the consent of both people, the better it will be for the world. And I even go so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance’.

In the House of Commons a month later, he qualified the idea of an Anglo-American alliance by further emphasising the importance of Anglo-Saxonism and the superiority which came with it:

‘Nothing in the nature of a cut-and-dried alliance is at this moment proposed. The Americans do not want our alliance at this moment. They do not ask for our assistance, and we do not want theirs, at this moment. But will anyone say that the occasion may not arise, foreseen as it has been by some American statesmen, who have said that there is a possibility in the future that Anglo-Saxon liberty and Anglo-Saxon interests may hereafter be menaced by a great combination of other Powers.... I think that such a thing is possible, and in that case, whether it be America or whether

There was then a deep underlying sentiment that drew Britain closer to America and a desire for a formal alliance. For this reason many historians such as Alan Dobson and Anne Orde have regarded the year 1898 as a turning point in Anglo-American relations as America emerged as an imperial power.¹⁰⁰ This is something which Britain welcomed. In his autobiography American historian Henry Adams described the joy he witnessed in London following the victory of the United States being something ‘as melodramatic as any plot of Napoleon the Great’ and a ‘diplomatic triumph’ which brought about a great ‘sense of satisfaction’.¹⁰¹ Britain formed a close relationship with the United States and was always cautious when negotiating friendships and alliances with others so not make any

¹⁰⁰ Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century. Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London and New York, 1995), 18; Orde, *The Eclipse*, 26. It is also worth mentioning at this point that although victory over Spain in 1898 was perhaps the most significant victory in American imperialism, this year also saw their annexation of Hawaii which added to territory they had acquired earlier in the century such as the Caribbean and Latin America following the Mexican-American War, the isthmus of Panama, and the purchasing of Alaska from Russia in 1867. See Perkins, *The Great*, 156-208; Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire. An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (New York, 1998).

¹⁰¹ *The Education of Henry Adams. An Autobiography* (London, 1918), 362-363.

commitments which may force them to fight against their Anglo-Saxon counterpart.¹⁰² Indeed where the powers of Europe were at time openly hostile towards American imperialism, Britain expressed a desire for friendly relations by remaining aloof from European alliances and extending its sympathy to the colonial adventures of their kindred.¹⁰³ American scholar Harry Thurston Peck wrote in the same vein as Adams when word of successes in 1898 spread across London:

‘Within six hours after the cable had told the story, London burst out into the rainbow hues of the American national colours. Thousands of American flags... [and] streamers of red, white and blue effected a brilliant contrast with the smoky walls of the metropolis. A great multitude of people assembled before the American Embassy, cheering heartily for the United States’.¹⁰⁴

Britain had effectively become pro-American, a supporter and advocate of American interests. In strengthening this assertion one can look at the reform clergyman Washington Gladden and his travels. In the summer of 1898 he toured England giving a lecture entitled *Causes of the War, and the Reasons for Friendship Between England and America* to which his listeners willingly engaged. Upon its conclusion they even sang with great enthusiasm ‘The Star Spangled Banner’ and applauded his speech with vigour.¹⁰⁵ It can also be said that British imperialism influenced the emergence of American attitudes towards imperialism. In discussing this, an article entitled ‘America on England’ found in *Chums* magazine told a story of how an English subject was confined by the King of Abyssinia. In his refusal to surrender the captive he found himself the recipient of a rescue mission which cost \$25,000,000 and saw the advance of ten thousand English soldiers who were willing to march seven hundred miles and were prepared to fight for the freedom of one man. The article concluded that it was the broadness of the British Empire which permitted this to take place and to be a success.¹⁰⁶ Friendly relations however, were not universal between Britain and United States with there being instances of British disapproving of American imperialism and vice-versa.

Regarding British sentiments towards the United States Paul Kramer states how some disapproved because of their promise of eventual self-governance and rapid and extensive employment of Filipinos in the colonial bureaucracy. Some even criticised them for their insufficiently harsh, hierarchical attitudes and public racism against the Filipinos. Carl Crow,

¹⁰² In the British draft for the defensive alliance Germany for example, one of the clauses proposed the following: ‘It is agreed that his Convention shall not apply to questions on the American Continent, nor bind either High Contracting Party to join in hostilities against the United States of America’. Quoted in Allen, *Great Britain*, 559.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 556.

¹⁰⁴ Harry Thurston Peck, *Twenty Years of the Republic, 1885-1905* (New York, 1906), 557-558.

¹⁰⁵ Washington Gladden, *Recollections* (New York, 1909), 357-358. Park Benjamin also highlighted the significance of 1898 in Anglo-American relations stating how the American victory ‘found the United States and Great Britain more closely drawn in bonds of friendship and goodwill than ever before’. Park Benjamin, ‘The Sting of the “Wasp”’, *The English Illustrated Magazine*, November 1899.

¹⁰⁶ *Chums*, 3 March 1897.

an American newspaperman, businessman and author, wrote of this perception how the British Colonial Service was amused and entertained at the mistakes and failures of the United States and were more than happy to offer patronising advice, taking the role of master teaching the student.¹⁰⁷ Equally so however, Americans were found to be sceptical of an alliance with Britain. From early as February 1898 Irishmen in New York had begun to organise an Anti-British Alliance Society with anti-imperialists such as Carl Schultz declaring that overseas expansion was the result of and would lead to entangling commitments which would be hard to get out of.¹⁰⁸ This Anglophobia can be found elsewhere. American historian George Burton Adams wrote how the English were a ‘thoroughly selfish’ nation and goes on to say;

‘There is on the part of many a positive dislike of England, a readiness to accept the worse interpretation of any act of hers, a belief that she is particularly our enemy and would do anything that she can to embarrass or injure us... On the part of many more, probably a much larger number, who do not feel the positive dislike or actual hostility, there is a feeling of suspicion, a conviction that England is capable of much evil, that she is not kindly disposed towards us, and that she must be carefully watched’.¹⁰⁹

In spite of this it is evident that Britain was most expressive in its keenness for an alliance with America as Britons welcomed the emergence of a second Anglo-Saxon imperialist, willing to overlook or ignore any antipathies which emerged, even if this feeling was not reciprocated.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Kramer, ‘Empires’, 1347-1348.

¹⁰⁸ Perkins, *The Great*, 52-53. The disparity in Anglo-American relations shown here was witnessed elsewhere by other imperialist nations. German statesman von Bülow wrote in his memoirs how Britain approved of American expansion and welcomed them as a noteworthy ally, but that this sentiment was not reciprocated: ‘The Americans have shown their dislike of England too clearly and though the English will not admit this fact to themselves or anyone else, they know it perfectly well’. He further noted that European governments could derive no advantage: ‘England will stand far more from America than from any other Power, and even in purely diplomatic issues it is more difficult to make England take sides against America than to make any other Power do so’. Quoted in Lionel M. Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship. A Study in World Politics 1898-1906* (London, 1938), 55. American diplomatic platforms affirm these claims. See the Democratic Party Platform, 4 July 1900. Available online at *American Presidency Project*.

URL: < <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29587> > (accessed 12 September 2014) and the Republican Party Platform, 19 June 1900. Available online at *American Presidency Project*.

URL: < <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29630> > (accessed 12 September 2014).

¹⁰⁹ George Burton Adams, *Why Americans Dislike England* (Philadelphia, 1896), 17-20. Similar sentiments can be found in the writings of Franklin Eastman where he voiced the view that Britain looked down on the United States and refused to treat them as an equal imperial power. *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1894. The editor of *The Nation* and the *New York Post* wrote in a letter to a British politician on the views of Anglophobia in the United States saying how the American populous would be more than prepared to go to war with Britain to show how it was a big imperial player. Orde, *The Eclipse*, 14.

¹¹⁰ See for example Goldwin Smith, ‘Imperialism in the United States’, *The Contemporary Review*, 75 (1899), 620-628.

At this juncture I will take some time to examine American imperialism and the Japanese responses to it as it is this confliction of empires which stands as a principle reason for estrangement. Having defeated Spain the United States had propelled itself to the apron of the world stage having earned the right to walk through the proscenium of empire. As *The Times* put it victory would thenceforth lead to;

‘a profound change in the whole attitude of the policy of the United States. In future America will play a part in the general affairs of the world such as she has never played before. When the American people realise this, and they realise novel situations with remarkable promptitude, they will not do things by halves’.¹¹¹

With this came the end of the Monroe Doctrine and isolationism, the policy which had characterised American feelings towards foreign involvement which nations such as Britain in the past had been typically pleased about.¹¹² Victory had ‘created a significant U.S. stake in Eastern Asia, inspired expansive visions of influence in the region, and thus set the stage for a string of conflicts that Americans in 1899 could not have anticipated in their wildest imaginings’.¹¹³ The mind-sets of those in the United States had now changed as a prosperous era for development was to commence as attitudes towards government, politics, the economy and social well-being underwent change.¹¹⁴ For these reasons Anglo-Saxonism strengthened as Britain and the United States shared a mutual and common ground on attitudes to imperialism. As Morton Keller has asserted, it was the American policy of actively embarking on territorial acquisition and engaging in guerrilla warfare with the Filipino nationalists which made them a colonial imperialist like their Anglo-Saxon ally.¹¹⁵ In

¹¹¹ *The Times*, 12 May 1898.

¹¹² Allen, *Great Britain*, 581.

¹¹³ Hunt and Levine, *Arc of Empire*, 56-57.

¹¹⁴ Arthur S. Link and William B. Catton, *American Epoch. A History of the United States Since 1900. Volume I: The Progressive Era and the First World War, 1900-1920* (New York, 1973), 3. Regarding imperialism the United States had for the first time in its history acquired overseas territory without the intention of granting inhabitants with either citizenship or statehood. See LaFeber, *The American Search*, 153. In terms of political changes imperialism was seen as a means of defending American interests with President William McKinley being praised for this initiative, being labelled as the defender of American interests. See Republican Party Platform, 19 June 1900. Available online at *American Presidency Project*.

URL: < <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29630> > (accessed 12 September 2014). On a social level the American people rejoiced with a mood combining national pride, duty, responsibility, and international greatness. It had suddenly become fashionable to seek the expansion of American frontiers. One of the primary frontiers which received most attention was the salvation of China. The popular media voiced these feelings with newspapers and magazines, as well as periodicals such as *The Advocate of Peace*, heralding the beginning of a new era in American policy and the fulfilment of her destiny. See Iriye, *From Nationalism*, 142, 164; Hunt and Levine, *Arc of Empire*, 66; the article entitled ‘Becoming a Great Power’, *The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920)*, 60:7 (1898), 149. But not all Americans favoured imperialism. For a look at the contrast between imperialists and anti-imperialists I would refer the reader to Michael Patrick Cullinane’s publication *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism 1898-1909* (New York, 2012) with a specific focus on chapter one which looks at the origins of anti-imperialism and chapter two which addresses opposition to the Treaty of Paris.

¹¹⁵ Morton Keller, ‘Anglo-American Politics, 1900-1930, in *Anglo-American Perspective: A Case Study in Comparative History*,’ *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 22:3 (1980), 461.



IMAGE FOUR: 'Uncle Sam's Picnic', *Puck*, 28 September 1898.

This print shows Uncle Sam assisting four little girls with the tags of "Hawaii", "Ladrones", "Puerto Rico", and "Cuba" onto a wagon which is filled with other young children such as "Hawaii" who are sat alongside American, waving their flags patriotically. The two horses are labelled "Liberty" and "Union" and the old man perched on a log with a hat labelled "Monroe Doctrine" and is identified as the Old Party, a symbol of the past. The caption here reads the Old Party asking "Ain't ye takin' too many in, Sam?" to which Uncle Sam responds with "No, Gran'pa; I reckon this team will be strong enough for them all!"

Source: Available online at the *Library of Congress*.

URL: < <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2012647475/> > (accessed 6 January 2015).

spite of some contemptuous feelings between the two, Anglo-American relations certainly prospered from 1898 as mutual ideologies would see them cooperate on a hitherto unparalleled level. Thereafter there existed between the British and American people a sense that insecurities amidst world affairs would be tackled leading to the strengthening of Anglo-American cooperation.¹¹⁶ A worthy example of this can be found in the collaboration between the two in the Boxer Rebellion. Although not solely an Anglo-American affair the Battle Yancun, one of the most significant battles of the rebellion, was led by British and American troops showing their cooperation for the first time in in a major engagement

¹¹⁶ Allen, *The Great*, 549.

signalling how times were changing.¹¹⁷ There emerged the notion that events which were deemed to threaten the global status-quo would be rectified as Britain and the United States would be swift and efficient in countering any such problems or misdemeanours, fulfilling their roles as frontrunners of Anglo-Saxonism.

Part of the responsibility which this tag brought with which in some ways can be seen as protecting and securing the Western world, was the concept of the “White Man’s Burden” following the publication of Rudyard Kipling’s poem of the same title in November 1898. Its aim was to encourage American imperialism and their take-over of the Philippine islands so that it may join with the likes of Britain in the possession of a global empire. In this work he pleaded with the United States to:

‘Take up the White Man’s burden —
Send forth the best ye breed —
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives’ need;
To wait, in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild —
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child’.¹¹⁸

Kipling was of the belief that these American ventures possessed the same virtues as Britain’s endeavours. In September he had written to Theodore Roosevelt of what America’s intent should be:

‘Now go in and put all the weight of your influence into hanging on permanently to the whole Philippines. America has gone and stuck a pickaxe into the foundations of a rotten house and she is morally bound to build the house over again from the foundations or have it fall about her ears’.¹¹⁹

This can be seen through the picture taken from the American periodical *Puck* in image four which shows the rapid rate of its progress and influence, its imperialism spreading across their territory as they asserted their presence. The idea of the White Man’s Burden can be seen here as Uncle Sam takes on a large number of countries and civilisations portrayed here as children showing how the Monroe Doctrine had been left for dust. These “children” needed to be educated on the principles of the modern world, the way which Westerners lived being a symbol of the natural path of development. This was the general principle of

¹¹⁷ Duncan Andrew Campbell, *Unlikely Allies. Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special Relationship* (London, 2007), 194-195.

¹¹⁸ Quoted in Perkins, *The Great*, 85. This sentiment was not unilateral in Britain and is a good example of opinions in society being divided. Varying opinions began to emerge on how to rate other racial groups, how much responsibility came with Britain’s place in the sun, how to react to British people who fell short of the standards expected of them, and to foreigners who exceeded expectations. Diamond, ‘*Lesser Breeds*’, 6.

¹¹⁹ Quoted in Patrick Brantlinger, ‘Kipling’s “The White Man’s Burden” and Its Afterlives’, *English Literature in Transition, 1880-1920*, 50:2 (2007), 172.

Kipling's work which was used to epitomise the duty of the white race to extend their civilisation to overseas territories which belonged to any and all other races which included the yellow races of the East.¹²⁰ What Kipling's poem does is intrinsically like imperialism and race, two concepts which as we have thus far seen held great levels of importance in the late nineteenth century. Relating it to Japan it is similar to their cries of pan-Asianism and the idea of "Asia for the Asiatics", the two notions coming head-to-head expressing the sentiments on both sides of the globe with the yellow and white perils respectively. Whereas some may have viewed the United States as the ideal "Western" nation in the East, perhaps the most enlightened "child" to have learnt the ways of the West albeit through a more indirect education, and the curators of an idea where their influence over Asia was paramount in creating unity, others may have seen their growth with apprehension, the burden of the white man thenceforth being to deal with the growing threats which emerged from these territories which experienced such tutelage.

With the increasing strength of Japan the focus shifted onto them as being the yellow peril which saw Britain and America come closer together. Both however, were enthusiastic about maintaining their interests in East Asia, as aforesaid, regarding China and commercial interests, as well as keeping both China and Japan in check and ensuring that they did not get too big for their boots and too much to handle.¹²¹ Western fiction warned of such an eventuality creating an image of 'Oriental hordes' that possessed the intent of 'descending on Europe [and] bringing about despotism where there exists enlightened rule'.¹²² As one American magazine mentioned:

'The peoples of the Occident are face to face with a powerful Oriental competitor in the arts of war, diplomacy, industry and commerce'.¹²³

Other periodicals and publications such as fiction and short stories expressed a fear of Asian expansion westwards on a line similar to that echoed by Wilhelm II and the publications of Sheil and Crane cited above. Oto Mundo's publication *The Recovered Continent* tells of how Chinese armies overcame forces in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean and how headlines screamed: 'FOUR HUNDRED MILLION CHINESE ARE POURING LIKE A FLOOD OVER EUROPE'.¹²⁴ One thing which is certain amongst Westerners is their confidence in

¹²⁰ Charles H. Sherril, 'The White Man's Burden', *The North American Review*, 223:830 (1926), 65.

¹²¹ At this point it is worth stating how Japan viewed the United States in particular as being hypocritical. On 16 August Japanese liberal Kōtoku Shūsui denounced America as being equally as aggressive and selfish as those others who had intervened in East Asian affairs. The United States was no longer viewed by Japan as the symbol of man's struggle for freedom. Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement*, 26, 60. See also Hunt and Levine, *Arc of Empire*, 59-61.

¹²² Owens, 'The Making', 32.

¹²³ *Arena*, November 1898.

¹²⁴ Oto E. Mundo, *The Recovered Continent: A Tale of the Chinese Invasion* (Columbus, OH., 1898). See also William F. Wu, *The Yellow Peril: Chinese Americans in American Fiction, 1850-1940* (Hamden, CT., 1982), 38; Owens, 'The Making', 692. For other novels looking at the threat of a Chinese invasion see the following: H. J. West, *The Chinese Invasion* (San Francisco, 1873); Atwell Whitney, *Almond-Eyed* (San Francisco, 1878); Pierton W. Dooner, *Last Days of the Republic* (San Francisco, 1880); Wolter, *A Short and Truthful History*.

being superior over Eastern nations, and in every case where a novel or short story is written on either the Chinese or Japanese invasion, or an invasion by both, it ends with the success of the West and the success of Anglo-Saxonism. French political economist Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu perhaps puts it best in his publication *The Awakening of the East* where he writes how Europe's strength would be able to counter any degree of threat expressed through the yellow peril ideal. He writes:

‘If this war [the Sino-Japanese War] had taken place fifty, or even twenty-five, years ago, when Europe paid less attention to foreign affairs, it is probable that the Manchu Dynasty would have been replaced by that of Japan. Possibly then the “Yellow Peril” — the military “Yellow Peril” — which to-day is but a mere chimera, might have become a very evident reality. The Japanese, after having thoroughly reorganised and disciplined the Chinese army, might at a given moment have let loose its innumerable hordes upon the Western world’.¹²⁵

In spite of this belief that Europe stood as an effective barrier against any encroaching Asian hordes there still existed a fear which pieces of fiction and scholarly studies such as those mentioned here expressed.

Displays of Chinese revolutionaries alongside extreme nationalists acting out against foreign imperialists during the Boxer Rebellion stood as an example of the threat which the yellow peril posed, and of what potentially lay in wait for the West. This was an occasion where Japan was extremely enthusiastic to get involved, something which cannot be overlooked as it made up the highest representation of forces in the Eight Nation Alliance. Whereas Russia committed to sending 4,800 troops, Britain 3,000, and the United States 2,800, Japan sent over 8,000.¹²⁶ Prime Minister Yamagata Arimoto stressed the excitement amongst the Japanese for involvement in this alliance, albeit a short lived one, by stating how he was excited by the prospect being alongside the likes of Britain and America. Furthermore Arimoto hoped that this would allow them to challenge Russian ambitions in the East.¹²⁷ Japan's involvement and enthusiasm however, made some more weary of their intent, taking the view that Japan used this rebellion as a way to acquire a stronger foothold in Asia where it could seek to gain a greater influence over China. This allowed Japan to test the waters further whilst aiming of overseas expansion. What Japan came to realise however, is that it needed the support of a major power. In theory this meant choosing between either Britain or

Although these works pre-date the 1890s and the subject of this chapter there are worth noting as they exist as excellent example of materials which were recycled to incorporate the Japanese.

¹²⁵ Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Awakening of the East. Siberia—Japan—China* (New York, 1900), 246. A chimera is a fabled fire-breathing dragon monster which can be found in Greek mythology as depicted by Homer with a lion's head, a goat's body, and a serpent's tail. It was killed by the Bellerophon, perhaps the most infamous slayer of monster before the time of Hercules. In this metaphor the Chinese and Japanese hordes are the fire-breathing monster and the forces of the West the hero, restoring the status-quo.

¹²⁶ Of the other nations in this alliance France sent over 800 troops, Austria 58, and Italy 53. The number of German troops that were sent over is disputed and thus unclarified. Nimmo, *Stars and Stripes*, 47; See also Ian Nish, ‘Japan's Indecision During the Boxer Disturbances’, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 20:4 (1961), 450.

¹²⁷ Sydney Giffard, *Japan Among the Powers 1890-1990* (London, 1994), 19.

TABLE TWO: *Japanese Subjects Resident Abroad, 1889-1900*

Year	Males	Females	Total
1889	13,815	4,878	18,688
1890	17,919	6,031	23,950
1895	34,332	11,945	46,277
1896	40,348	13,994	54,342
1897	43,707	15,078	58,785
1898	58,114	17,687	70,801
1899	76,633	22,406	99,039
1900	98,985	24,986	123,971

Source: W. Crewdson, 'Japanese Emigrants', *The Nineteenth Century and After: A Monthly Review*, 56:333 (1904), 815.

Russia, the two powers that resided on either side of the Great Wall.¹²⁸ Japan favoured an alliance with the former of these which in some cases was reciprocated by Britain who preferred a formal agreement with Japan over the likes of Germany but not the United States. Anglo-German relations were hampered when British diplomat Francis Bertie found out that Russian troops had been deployed to occupy Manchuria, taking over part of the British railway there. He directed his anger at Russia for embarking on what he viewed as a heinous act, and towards Germany for their lack of support. Soon after he concluded along with Lord Salisbury and Sir Thomas Sanderson that Germany had demonstrated how they were an ill-suited ally, and that Britain should consider Japan as the ally who could slow the Russian advance and hamper their ambitions in Asia.¹²⁹ Although Japan sought further friendly relations with the West their ambitions and intent in Asia were still not overlooked. Historian Paul Cohen reaffirms this point where he mentions how the Boxers and the events which made up the rebellion and the role of Japan therein were the 'yellow peril personified'.¹³⁰

But there was more than just the unravelling of events in the East which sparked concern. Throughout the 1890s there was an increased Japanese presence in the United States, especially on the West Coast. *The San Francisco Call* for example, published an article which bore the title 'Japanese Goods Flooding San Francisco'.¹³¹ Immigration itself however, also increased. As previously mentioned the Philippine Islands and Hawaii were the initial recipients of this but the numbers of those immigrating to the United States also saw an

¹²⁸ Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, 76.

¹²⁹ Zara Steiner, 'The Last Years of the Foreign Office, 1898-1905', *The Historical Journal*, 6:1 (1963), 69-70. See also Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London, 1980).

¹³⁰ Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience and Myth* (New York, 1997), xii; Lyman, 'The "Yellow Peril" Mystique', 719.

¹³¹ Here the cheap nature of Japanese labour is also expressed which held the potential to cause troubles in the United States. *The San Francisco Call*, 25 November 1895.

TABLE THREE: *The Destinations and Classifications of Japanese Emigrants in 1900*

Destination	On Official Duty	Students	Merchants	Labourers and Others
United States and Colonies	46	554	3,361	86,689
Great Britain and Colonies	133	40	512	7,530
Russia and Colonies	15	65	286	3,587
Holland	4	2	—	—
France and Colonies	44	36	18	799
Portugal and Colonies	—	1	—	9
Germany	33	162	5	14
Belgium	10	5	5	1
Italy	7	—	—	6
Spain	2	—	—	—
Austria	8	13	10	5
Peru	1	—	—	693
Brazil	7	—	—	2
Mexico	6	3	4	32
Siam	7	3	29	39
Korea	538	16	9,669	5,606
China	202	40	1,391	1,630
Total:	1,063	940	15,320	106,642

Source: W. Crewdson, 'Japanese Emigrants', *The Nineteenth Century and After: A Monthly Review*, 56:333 (1904), 816.

increase. As we can see from table two the number of Japanese citizens' resident abroad increased throughout the 1890s peaking at the end of the decade, with table three providing a more detailed image of where they found themselves. As can be seen the United States and its colonies experienced the greatest influx of migrants attracting diplomats, academics, importers, exporters and labourers as well as many others. Owing to these high numbers Americans felt a threat to their way of life, the Japanese becoming the new immigration threat which brought about emerging desires to restrict any further developments.¹³²

¹³² It is worth mentioning here that some in Japan viewed emigration as a principle issue in strengthening and developing the Japanese way of life. In an article entitled *The New Homeland of the Japanese Race* Tokutomi Sohō reflects on the ideas of Charles Dilke by stating that a nation should expand for reasons of race and national civilisation. He suggests that 'today is not a time when the world is conquered by military might; it is a time when the world is subjected by race'. On 30 June 1890 Sohō went further, asking the question: 'what territorial base is our race building overseas?' He admitted with great shame that 'the extent of Japan's expansion consists of only a few thousand students in San Francisco, ten thousand workers in Hawaii, and... a few prostitutes in Hong Kong and Singapore'. He insisted that Japan must imminently seek to 'develop a policy

Hyndman wrote of how their emigration to the United States was the new focus point following Japan's rise in East Asia. In contrast to China who was subjected to emigration laws, Japanese emigration showed how times were changing, with the American Exclusion Act of 1897 ineffectual as they were allowed to take the place of the excluded Chinese in the Pacific Islands and California. He goes on to mention that this did not mean that they were welcomed with open arms, highlighting how there were reports of Japanese being brutally attacked in California where their shops and businesses were ransacked, and their residences placed in great jeopardy. Americans now looked to intimidate the Japanese and coerce the US government into excluding them in the same way they did with the Chinese in the previous decade with the belief that they 'were equally members of an alien race: in fact, a Chinaman and a Japanese, both now without pigtailed, when dressed in European garb, can scarcely be distinguished by white men's eyes from one another'.¹³³ As one can see from the third epigraph to this chapter Japanese characteristics were not viewed favourably and should be viewed with caution. The San Francisco journal *Organized Labour*, published in an editorial on 17 March 1900 how neither the Chinese nor the Japanese were in any way beneficial or desirable contributions to American society:

'Chinatown with its reeking filth and dirt, its gambling dens and obscene slave pens, its coolie labour and bloodthirsty tongs, is a menace to the community: but the snivelling Japanese, who swarms along the streets and cringingly offers his paltry services for a suit of clothes and a front seat in our public schools, is a far greater danger to the labouring portion of society than all the opium-soaked pigtailed who have ever blotted the fair name of this beautiful city'.¹³⁴

In the following year the United States Industrial Commission wrote how the Japanese were more submissive than the Chinese but were at the same time far less obedient and less desirable, possessing most of the vices of the Chinese but having none of the virtues. They labelled the Japanese as a tricky, unreliable and dishonest class.¹³⁵ In America they had become victim to ill-sentiment which has previously been directed against the Chinese. Robert Heizer and Alan Almquist have been vociferous on this point, stating that 'prejudice against the Japanese sprouted in the rich soil that had nourished anti-Chinese studies shortly before'.¹³⁶ If anything the exclusion of the Chinese led to a fear of the Japanese as Californians portrayed this new immigration wave as yet another "Oriental invasion" with newspapers in San Francisco urging their readers to 'step to the front once more and battle to

to motivate our people to embark upon great adventures abroad... to stimulate their enterprising spirit and to encourage their spirit of boldness to seek residence outside the homeland'. Only in doing so could Japan hold any influence in the modern age, voicing this as 'a matter of the greatest urgency today'. Quoted in Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō*, 226. See also Charles Dilke, *The Problems of Greater Britain* (London, 1890).

¹³³ Hyndman, *The Awakening*, 186-188.

¹³⁴ Quoted in tenBroek et. al., *Prejudice, War*, 24.

¹³⁵ Ibid, 23-24.

¹³⁶ Robert F. Heizer and Alan F. Almquist, *The Other Californians: Prejudice and Discrimination Under Spain, Mexico, and the United States to 1920* (Berkeley, 1971), 178. See also Hyman, 'The "Yellow Peril" Mystique', 692, 698.

hold the Pacific Coast for the white race'. The Japanese were greatly feared because of their labour and work ethic as well as their race. As Erika Lee states, 'the Japanese were especially feared, because of their great success in agriculture and their tendency to settle and start families in the United States (as compared to the Chinese who were mostly sojourners). The political and cultural ideology that came to be used in the anti-Japanese movement immediately connected the new Japanese threat with the old Chinese one'.¹³⁷ Lyman provides us with a deeper insight into the mind-set of Californians by detailing how there was 'a belief that, whether as warriors or immigrants, or, as some would have it, warriors-as-immigrants, Asiatics from the "Middle Kingdom" were "invading" America with an eye to "conquest"'.¹³⁸

Similar attitudes can be found when looking at this issue with the British dominions. Canada for one was cautious of increasing Japanese immigration and shared attitudes similar to those described here. In British Columbia for example, the growth of the Anglo-Saxon population was slow whilst Asian immigration more generally was experiencing hitherto untold levels. In 1891 the numbers of Japanese there were nothing more than trifling, by 1896 there were around 1,000, and by 1901 there was a recorded number of 4,544 in the province. This combined with the Chinese numbers sparked images of Oriental hordes marching westward.¹³⁹ Elsewhere it was a fear of the yellow peril which brought the community together. In Australia for example, Major-General Kenneth Mackay published a novel entitled *The Yellow Wave. A Romance of the Asiatic Invasion of Australia* where he wrote of a scenario of Asiatics primarily made up of Chinamen owing to their vast population looking for expansion into Australasia. Here the Australian community 'became galvanised into warlike life, and cried out for arms with which to drive back the Mongols into the sea'.¹⁴⁰ In spite of their confidence Mackay's story concludes with the Asiatic defeat, their backwardness being no match for the discipline, training and prowess of Western nations who were always superior, their ability able to counter the endless waves of Mongols. Although the Japanese may have been viewed by some in a slightly more favourable light than the Chinese their presence was not openly welcomed as people remained cautious of their intent with the idea of an Oriental invasion, those mass hordes using the Pacific islands as stepping stones, to descend onto America's West Coast as well as in other states a genuine fear.

Having previously mentioned the presence of two distinct ideologies in the East and West, namely Anglo-Saxonism and pan-Asianism, I shall briefly address the latter of these

¹³⁷ Lee, 'The Chinese Exclusion', 44. There was however, a noted disparity between Chinese and Japanese immigrants in the United States with the significant difference being that whereas Japan had a right to settle in America, the Chinese did not. In contrast to the Chinese the Japanese were 'clean, quiet, capable Asiatics' who 'were formidable in the labour market, [and] were even in some respects perhaps more objectionable than the Chinese'. Hyndman, *The Awakening*, 188. For a more detailed view of the Japanese in America in contrast to the Chinese see page 194.

¹³⁸ Lyman, 'The "Yellow Peril" Mystique', 689-690.

¹³⁹ Patricia E. Roy, *White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914* (British Columbia, 1990), 91-92. I would also refer the reader to the entirety of this chapter in this work entitled 'The Politics of Restricting Immigration, 1896-1902', 91-119.

¹⁴⁰ Kenneth Mackay, *The Yellow Wave. A Romance of the Asiatic Invasion of Australia* (London, 1895), 352.

which emerged out of the hostilities of the other. Western discrimination towards Japan prompted a turn to pan-Asianism which exacerbated Western fears, accentuating ideas of Japan as the epitome of the yellow peril. This in turn posed a threat to Japan. Politician and scholar Kenchō Suematsu said of the matter how it was for Japan's own good that it seek to counter this problem. In one of his articles he wrote:

‘The so called doctrine of the yellow peril readily moves the hearts of Western peoples and is nowadays popular on the continent. If we do not combat this doctrine with all our power, there is a danger that European countries will actually join together against us. By attacking the yellow peril doctrine in all quarters, we shall prevent the combined interference of various European powers’.¹⁴¹

Tokutomi echoed similar attitudes having written in an article published on 23 June 1893 where he described how the white races were a constant presence in Japan:

‘The present position of our country in the world is no different from that of forty years ago.... The most progressive, developed, civilised and powerful nation in the Orient still cannot escape the scorn of the white people’.¹⁴²

If Japan was to develop along the lines it wanted then this was something that needed to be addressed. Although it expressed cordial relations with Britain and to a lesser extent the United States, Japan remained apprehensive as to whom it could trust.¹⁴³ With reserved attitudes towards these nations combined with an anxiousness regarding the Kaiser and his desire to open the umbrella of his new favourite term over any state where a fear of the East rained down, Suematsu directed his articles such as the one above at a number of European newspapers and periodicals.¹⁴⁴ It suffices to say that Japan was becoming increasingly more conscious of race as being a key political issue, a point which Yumiko Iida has been keen to stress.¹⁴⁵ Extreme sentiments began to be voiced by some Japanese on the issue of tackling what they saw as this white peril. Konoe Atsumaro wrote in *Do jinshu domei* how the presence of Western imperialists in China would inevitably lead to a conflict between East and West, the kind which fiction warned about:

‘Asia will not be able to escape becoming a stage for racial war.... The final destiny of the world will be a war between the white and yellow races, in which both Chinese and Japanese will stand on the same side as the enemy of the white race.... Western

¹⁴¹ Quoted in Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 285.

¹⁴² Quoted in Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō*, 229.

¹⁴³ With regards to the United States many Japanese, particularly nationalists, pictured America's imperial emergence in the Pacific as being part of the same phenomenon which witnessed European powers scramble for bases and concessions in China. See Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement*, 61

¹⁴⁴ Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 285-286.

¹⁴⁵ Yumiko Iida, ‘Fleeing the West, Making Asia Home: Transpositions of Otherness in Japanese Pan-Asianism, 1905-1930’, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 22:3 (1997), 415.

imperial powers compete in Asia for their own interests. Asia is Asia's Asia... It should only be Asians who make decisions on Asian issues'.¹⁴⁶

It was this kind of story which bred fear in Western circles, adding hype to the yellow peril emotions. These sentiments show how there was a desire to tackle this infringement into Asian affairs. Stories emerged and became prevalent in nationalist circles emphasising the need for the establishment of some kind of pan-Asianist policy. Yano Ryūkei's novel *Ukishiro monogatari* took into account the strength of Japan and how they could overcome the West. Here he tells the story of a group of Japanese South Seas adventurers taking over the possession of a British warship and then setting sail to explore Africa.¹⁴⁷

At this point it is worth bringing to the foreground the fact that some in the West opposed any European or American influence which manipulated events or affairs in East Asia with the belief that things should unfold in their own natural way for fear of creating an area even more openly hostile towards the West. Leroy-Beaulieu wrote of how Japan was fearful of losing their independence, re-emphasising the threat of Russia:

'The Ministers of the Mikado are very naturally somewhat alarmed at the thought that their country may soon be the only one in the whole world inhabited by a non-European race that maintains its independence, and they cannot forbear asking themselves how long this independence may be allowed to last, all the more so since Japan is in immediate contact with, numerically speaking, the most powerful state in the world, the Russian Empire, which borders upon China'.¹⁴⁸

Hyndman too wrote on reflection the existence of a white peril in the East which was of a greater hazard to the world than the yellow peril:

'We are inclined nowadays to take more account of the European invasion of Asia than of the Asian invasion of Europe. Yet the influence of the East upon the West and the far less powerful influence of the West upon the East have been going on for many, many centuries'.

He went on to state that;

¹⁴⁶ Translated as *The Alliance of the Common Race*, 1898. Quoted in *Ibid*, 416. Similarly American politician Roland Usher, wrote how pan-Asianist ideology constituted their policies and decision making: 'The basic postulate of Japanese policy is the domination of Asia by Asiatics. The mere fact that the Japanese identify themselves with those Asiatics for whom dominion is intended must not conceal from us the true breadth and significance of Japanese policies. They see populous countries, for the most part untrained in European methods of organised warfare and therefore incapable of resisting even moderate measures of coercion from Europe, upon whose rich resources and underdeveloped markets the European has fixed his covetous eyes'. Roland G. Usher, *The Challenge of the Future. A Study in American Foreign Policy* (Boston and New York, 1916), 255. See also Kakuzo, *The Ideals*, 1-3.

¹⁴⁷ Translated as *The Tale of the Floating Fortress*. See Thomas Schnellbacher, 'Has the Empire Sunk Yet? The Pacific in Japanese Science Fiction', *Science Fiction Studies*, 29:3 (2002), 382.

¹⁴⁸ Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Awakening*, 168.

‘One of the shrewdest English observers who ever passed many years in the Far East gave it as his sober judgement that white men were fatal to Asiatics; that the good they could do was practically nothing; that the evil they wrought was incalculable; and that no Eastern State, if it considered the well-being of its people, would allow of the settlement of white men in its midst. Once there, it was impossible to deal with them effectively otherwise than by complete destruction. And to this rule there could be no exception. Sooner or later the white man must be crushed, if wholesale calamities were to be averted’.¹⁴⁹

Sentiments in Japan echo these points. This combined with Anglo-Saxonism and their views that it personified the peril alongside the feelings of Americans towards Japanese and Oriental emigration generally, contributing to this Asia for Asia attitude.

East Asia had entered a new era which would see it play a more integral role in global events. Japan was developing as a force to be reckoned with and as historians have recognised this brought about the origins of Japanese-American estrangement. Iriye identified 1898 as a sign of unavoidable conflict. ‘History’ he wrote, ‘was at last becoming global, the Eastern and Western hemispheres were joined together, and mankind was being moulded into one unit. The United States was a symbol of the new age. Having departed from its Monroe Doctrine, it had expanded into the Eastern hemisphere under the name Anglo-Saxonism. The taking of the Philippines just because a ship was sunk in Cuba was essentially no different, no less criminal, than Germany’s plundering of Kiaochow, or Russia’s and Britain’s taking of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei. All these seizures indicated the coming conflict of races’.¹⁵⁰ Roger Daniels asserts similar claims writing how the successes of 1898 resulted in the United States becoming ‘a player in Asian politics, which placed it on a collision course with Japan, and, later in the later twentieth century, led to three separate American wars in Asia’.¹⁵¹ With these changes and the feeling that the East was getting closer to the West it is not a misinterpretation of the evidence to state that a new era had begun in East Asia. British newspapers related this to Japan’s victory over China, the *Daily News* for example wring:

‘All who have turned their thoughts to the question are agreed that the peace will have far-reaching, and, to some extent, incalculable consequences. For weal or woe, a new era has dawned in the East. The East... has been awakened to new life by the rude touch of Japan... It is evident that Japan will necessarily be the dominant power in China’.¹⁵²

If Japan personified the yellow peril it must also exist as the personification of the new era with their military successes ranking alongside its social transformations and political victories. Sidney Gulick, a scholar and missionary who spent his time working to foster greater relations and knowledge of customs between Japan and America, wrote how the

¹⁴⁹ Hyndman, *The Awakening*, 2-3, 61.

¹⁵⁰ Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement*, 61.

¹⁵¹ Roger Daniels, *Not Like Us. Immigrants and Minorities in America, 1890-1924* (Chicago, 1997), 29.

¹⁵² *Daily News*, 18 April 1895.

Boxer Rebellion demonstrated these skills, with the alliance contributing to their changing attitudes towards the West.¹⁵³ In addition to this an increasing interest in the East had seen it thrust into a world of commercial competition which brought about trade and economic benefits. But for Britain it signalled the beginning of their decline as its influence there began to diminish, unable to compete in an environment where two other nations were becoming increasingly more powerful. Thus Britain began to look for allies. Chamberlain was aware of the situation in the East with the Franco-Russian alliance meaning that any sort of action in the North China Seas was unthinkable owing to a French squadron stationed in Indochina. Furthermore as the partition of China began with Britain demanding the lease of Weihaiwei he was more aware than ever in the need for an ally in the East. He had only a few prospects: there was America, who did nothing but occupy the Philippines; the Japanese, who had favoured the partition of China from as early as 1895 with their own interests in mind; Russia, whose interests in East Asia were well known; and Germany, who in spite of the difficulties mentioned above and the fact that they possessed very minimal interests in China and focused solely on affairs in Europe, were near the top his list and were bombarded with proposals for an alliance. It was this conclusion that he came to which would bring about the origins of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.¹⁵⁴ Where there was a newfound competition amongst nations for dominance and influence, for Britain there was competition and decision making to be done regarding whom to approach as their ally.

China's defeat, the Triple Intervention, the rise of American imperialism and with it the increasing presence of Anglo-Saxonism, and the Boxer Rebellion all contributed to the tumultuous affairs of events in the East with the beginnings of Japanese pre-eminence in the region which would continue to develop throughout the 1900s as we shall see in the following chapter. Following the intervention Japan embarked on a military revolution which lasted up to the Russo-Japanese War and would revolutionise their army and navy to make them the most significant indigenous nation in the East. This transformation made people in the West sit up and take note of East Asia as people began to compare the worlds of Orientalism and Occidentalism. Although the European presses were generally favourable towards Japan after 1895 with the view that victory did not make it a strong enough nation to compete with those of the West, anti-Japanese antagonisms developed. The most significant of these was Kaiser Wilhelm II's coining of the term "yellow peril" which came to be used to epitomise the fear of an Asian expansion westwards of which Japan was to become the face as their growing presence as the West promoted racial stereotypes which appeared in fiction and monographs. This was in part a result of the rise in Anglo-Saxonism following the rise of the United States as an imperial power which served to heighten Anglo-American relations. Part of the reason for this was so that the United States had an effective means with which to defend their own interests as there was an increasing fear of Japanese immigration to the West Coast which saw attitudes towards the Chinese recycled as they were seen by Americans as the new threat to the American way of life. As it happened the legal exclusion of the Chinese subsequently saw an increased fear of the Japanese. Contrastingly there

¹⁵³ Sidney Lewis Gulick, *The White Peril in the Far East. An Interpretation of the Significance of the Russo-Japanese War* (London and New York, 1905), 64.

¹⁵⁴ A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford, 1992), 376-377.

existed in the East, as well as amongst few writers in the West, a white peril and the apprehensive fear of Western involvement there. American imperialism constituted part of this, resulting in estrangement between these two states competing for empire in the Pacific. All this combined to signal the changing of the guard in the East between China and Japan. Western views of this included either an admiration of Japan's victory in 1895 or of fear and trepidation to which the intervention and expressions of the yellow peril corroborate. These are attitudes which only blossomed in this era and as we will come to see, the years following the Boxer Rebellion would bring about a more engrained mind-set amidst the West towards the early imperialist years of Meiji Japan.

Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: the Collapse of Russia and the Personification of Japan as the Yellow Peril

‘... the significant thing is that, whatever this new empire arising out of the old has done, she has done well... [T]he Japanese are a people quick to learn, and no national or local vanity has prevented them from recognising and correcting their own blunders. On the other hand, their successes have been too marked and noteworthy to be belittled or ignored’.¹⁵⁵

- Henry Codman Potter, *The East of To-Day*, 1902

‘England and Japan have realised the dream of Alexander — the marriage of the East and the West. No event recorded in English history is fraught with graver consequences to the Anglo-Saxon race and to humanity at large than the alliance of England and Japan. Europe, at the insistence of Germany, has begun to look on England, the former champion of freedom, as a bad European; and, indeed, the definite contract entered into between King Edward VII and the Mikado to call on each other’s fleets and troops to come to the assistance of either in case of attack by a third Power is partial justification for the charge’.¹⁵⁶

- Coloniensis, ‘The Seamy Side of the Alliance’, 1905

‘... one may hesitate to express confident opinions about “the Japanese”, for the people are no longer seen *en masse*, and among individuals there are differences as among ourselves. We are often asked, “Do you like the Japanese?” and the answer can be only, “Yes and no”. Who can answer such questions in truthful generalisations? How we differ in our judgements of Western nations, and how insufficient on all cases are our data as we attempt on the basis of our narrow experience to describe the characteristics of a people!’¹⁵⁷

- George William Knox, *Imperial Japan*, 1905

¹⁵⁵ Henry Codman Potter, *The East of To-Day and To-Morrow* (New York, 1902), 84.

¹⁵⁶ Coloniensis, ‘The Seamy Side of the Alliance’, *The Monthly Review*, 21:62 (1905), 1.

¹⁵⁷ George William Knox, *Imperial Japan. The Country and Its People* (London, 1905), 6.

If victory over China in 1895 marked the beginning of Meiji Japan's early imperialism, then their success over Russia in 1905 must be regarded as a far greater, significant, and definitive watershed moment. A catalyst for future expansion, this moment can be seen as one of the biggest success of the Meiji government as Japan's future would thenceforth be changed forever. Indisputably the collapse of Russia left Japan as the leading indigenous power in East Asia with only the United States and their territories in the Pacific being the primary obstruction to any future plans for development. But it was not merely the conquering of an imperial power which strengthened Japan's status. In the years following the Boxer Rebellion Japan became increasingly closer to Britain through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its subsequent renewal, and succeeded in maintaining cordial relations with the United States up to the end of the Russo-Japanese War.¹⁵⁸ It is this period which formulates this chapter with the themes previously presented being further examined as Japan's influence took on new strides. Whereas the Treaty of Shimonoseki was swiftly followed by the Triple Intervention and the retrocession of territorial gains, the Treaty of Portsmouth was followed by no such qualms.¹⁵⁹ Although these negotiations can be seen as being overtly favourable to Russia, the fact remains that Japan had shown that they could rebuff any challenge posed to them in the East, their army and navy continuing to grow from strength to strength, their might becoming increasingly more apparent throughout the 1900s.

In this period Japan was more alike Western nations than ever before, developing in terms of commerce, trade and military as it sought further parity. Image five provides an interesting comparison of Japanese and Russian soldiers, showing that there is very little to distinguish between them and that they could easily be mistaken as a Western nation having successfully developed to the point of assimilation following their emulation and Westernisation. As Henry Potter in the opening epigraph to this chapter states they could no longer be ignored. Indeed people now began to identify Japan as a global power:

‘The Japanese are a first-class Power; there is nothing funny about their army, or their navy, or their politics. Their great national institutions are desperately in earnest, because from the moment they were conscious that they were a first-class Power they have been conscious that they may be called upon to make a life-and-death struggle for their existence’.¹⁶⁰

Others have written in a similar ilk:

‘Quaint and playful Japan has developed into a giant able to handle the hugest implements of modern warfare with unsurpassed skill. She is there, as the coming

¹⁵⁸ For a full text of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 30 January 1902, see Hurst (ed.), *Key Treaties*, 726-727. For a full text of the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 12 August 1905, see *ibid*, 770-772.

¹⁵⁹ For a full text of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905, see Thomas F Millard, *The New Far East. An Examination into the New Position of Japan and Her Influence Upon the Solution of the Far Eastern Question, with Special Reference to the Interests of America and the Future of the Chinese Empire* (New York, 1906), 312-317.

¹⁶⁰ Douglas Sladen, *Queer Things About Japan* (London, 1904), xiv.



IMAGE FIVE: Watanabe Nobukazu, *Illustration of Russian and Japanese Army and Navy Officers* (February 1904).

Source: Available online at *MIT Visualizing Cultures*.

URL: < http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia_03/toa_essay02.html > (accessed 6 January 2015).

world-power, claiming her right as the cannon's mouth to a predominant voice in the settlement of China'.¹⁶¹

Japan had gone a step further than in the previous decade, its rise fuelling China's decline and their own ascendancy. With this came the notion that Japan must be treated with seriousness, a point which Donald Lammers has made clear by arguing that the Japan of the 1900s was Asia's symbol of progress: 'unlike so any of the putatively passive societies of Hither Asia, whose golden age of achievement lay buried in the past, Japan was unmistakably growing in power; it was already the "Britain (or Prussia) of the Pacific"; even, in some formulations, the

¹⁶¹ Michael J. F. McCarthy, *The Coming Power. A Contemporary History of the Far East, 1898-1905* (London, 1905), xiv.

TABLE FOUR: *A Comparative Growth of Japan's Development in the Years 1894 and 1904*

	1894	1904
Population	41,000,000	46,000,000
Business companies	4,595	8,612
Business capital	\$ 309,000,000	\$ 613,000,000
Capital of banks	\$ 56,000,000	\$ 270,000,000
Foreign trade	\$ 115,000,000	\$ 393,000,000
Government income	\$ 49,000,000	\$ 125,000,000
Money in circulation	\$ 138,000,000	\$ 296,000,000
Deposits in saving banks	\$ 146,000,000	\$ 1,494,000,000
Clearing house accounts of the four main cities	\$ 126,000,000	\$ 1,793,000,000
Oil business	\$ 5,000,000	\$ 16,000,000
Tonnage of Steamships	120,000	715,000
“ “ Sailing ships	45,000	340,000
“ “ Navy	65,000	275,000
Miles of railway	1,500	5,600

Source: Sydney Lewis Gulick, *The White Peril in the Far East. An Interpretation of the Significance of the Russo-Japanese War* (London and New York, 1905), 125.

nation of the future”¹⁶² Arthur Diósy wrote on this topic in 1904 stating how its amelioration was reaching its climax:

‘For a quarter of a century the sun of New Japan had been steadily rising over the horizon, while China continued to sink deeper and deeper into the slough or corruption, losing one tributary state after another through the incompetence and venality of her officials, the inefficiency of her diplomatists, and the contemptible weakness of her forces’.¹⁶³

Some went further than this and stated how Japan’s successes saw them become more appealing as an ally who possessed the capacity to rebuff any displays of aggression.¹⁶⁴ Japan’s progress had undoubtedly reached new heights. Even before their victory over Russia

¹⁶² D. N. Lammers, ‘Taking Japan Seriously. Some Western Literary Portrayals of the Japanese During the Climax of their National Self-Assertion c.1905-1945’, in Robin W. Winks and James R. Rush (eds.), *Asia in Western Fiction* (Manchester, 1990), 200.

¹⁶³ Diósy, *The New*, 11.

¹⁶⁴ See for example Dyer, *Dai Nippon*, 388.



IMAGE SIX: Nitei, *Harbour Entrance of Port Arthur: Russian Flagship Sinking at Port Arthur* (1904).

Source: Available online at *MIT Visualizing Cultures*.

URL: < http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia_03/toa_essay02.html > (accessed 6 January 2015).



IMAGE SEVEN: Shinohara Kiyooki, *A Righteous War to Chastise the Russians: The Night Attack of the Destroyer Force* (December, 1904).

Source: Available online at *MIT Visualizing Cultures*.

URL: < http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia_03/toa_essay02.html > (accessed 6 January 2015).

Japan could be regarded as the leading nation in the East but to any who raised objections or showed reluctance towards this statement the Russo-Japanese War had a great effect in manipulating public opinion.

A great deal of truth resides in the statement that Japan's progress in the decade since their victory over China saw them reach new heights with table four demonstrating the developments Japan made in terms of commerce, economy and military which experienced dramatic levels of progress and development. Within a decade business capital increased by more than forty-nine percent, government income by sixty percent, foreign trade by seventy percent, and the capital of banks by seventy-nine percent. Additionally the tonnage of the navy increased by more than seventy-six percent, and the miles of railway laid down in Japan by more than seventy-three percent, further highlighting the development of the military and the efficiency in the transportation of troops and equipment. Regarding military development the Meiji government continued to place a strong emphasis on the navy. An editorial in the *Kokumin shimbun* of 25 October 1905 compared Japan to Britain and stressed the importance of maintaining a strong navy. It stated how 'seawater is in the lifeblood of the nation' and expressed the view that 'nothing can be obtained without paying a price, and the importance of this truth is nowhere greater than the navy on which pivots our nation's rise or fall'.¹⁶⁵ Japanese propaganda during the Russo-Japanese War emphasised the strength of their navy, as shown in the woodblock print by Nitei in image six and by Shinohara Kiyooki in image seven which show the demise of Russian ships. Regarding military progress more generally, one may look at the work of the British Japanologist and scholar who came to be professor of Japanese at Tokyo University, Basil Hall Chamberlain. His publication *Things Japanese* was released in the closing months of the war and details the significance of patriotism and its role in gaining dominance over Russia:

'In less than two months from its inception, the Japanese established their superiority in the handling of modern vessels, in gunnery, in tactics, in everything that makes for efficiency. Now, after six months, little remains of their opponents' fleet but disabled hulks, while the exploits of Admiral Tōgō and his brave subordinates will live on in the memory of future generations'.¹⁶⁶

This is further stressed by Patrick Porter who writes how the British military observing Japan throughout the war regarded it 'as an audit of two warring cultures, an arbitrator of their contrasting values and viability as civilisations', placing a spotlight on military dominance which came subsequent to their rendering of social and political cohesion.¹⁶⁷ Alfred Stead emphasises the combination of these forces in the Russo-Japanese War and the significance of their victory:

¹⁶⁵ Quoted in Schencking, *Making Waves*, 115.

¹⁶⁶ Basil Hall Chamberlain, *Things Japanese. Being Notes on Various Subjects Connected With Japan for the Use of Travellers and Others* (London, 1905), 351.

¹⁶⁷ Patrick Porter, 'Military Orientalism? British Observers of the Japanese Way of War, 1904-1910', *War and Society*, 26:1 (2007), 2-3.

‘When the flag of the Rising Sun rose upon the forts of Port Arthur, the sun of Russia’s Asiatic empire sank in blood-red glory, and the Far Eastern peoples had demonstrated their right to decide the fate of Far Eastern lands. And far more than that, a new world Power had thrust itself upon the world in a manner not to be ignored.... The Cinderella of ten years ago had become the proud princess of to-day.... No longer can the white races of Europe sit above the salt while the nations of Asia sit below. Japan, a brown race, a nation of Asia, has demonstrated her right to sit above, and, as she has done so by the force of arms’.¹⁶⁸

It is from views such as this where the idea that the Japanese possessed the right character which set them apart from other Asiatics began to emanate, allowing for progress to take shape. Henry Dyer writes about this point and is worth quoting at length:

‘If I were attempting to sum up briefly the qualities of the Japanese which has enabled them to make such wonderful developments in such a short time, I would mention as the most important factor the intense loyalty of the people, which compels them to make any sacrifice – even life itself – when they consider it necessary for the honour of their country. This, combined with their great intellectual ability, enables them to take full advantage of the modern science and organisation necessary for the attainment of the objects of their ambition. Their great power of foresight prepares them for all their enterprises, both of peace and war, with an exact and scientific prevision not excelled by any other nation. While they are permeated by Eastern ideas they have been able to appropriate much that is best in Western thought, and thus they unite many of the best qualities of the East and the West’.¹⁶⁹

Further asserting this point of view was the notion that Japanese patriotism fuelled their desire for change, continued Westernisation, and expansion setting them further apart from other nations.¹⁷⁰ Japan could thenceforth be seen with complete legitimacy as being the Western state in the East, their position in world affairs parallel to that of Britain or America’s, but their neighbours being the likes of China and Korea whose positions were paltry in comparison.

Questions on Japan’s status as an Asian nation now emerged with some viewing them as more of a state who was leaving Asia as opposed to guiding it forward. George Knox for example, wrote how times had changed to the extent that the Japan could be incorporated into the clique of the white nations:

¹⁶⁸ Alfred Stead, *Great Japan. A Study of National Efficiency with a Foreword by the Rt. Hon. The Earl of Rosebery* (London, 1906), 16.

¹⁶⁹ Dyer, *Dai Nippon*, 49-50.

¹⁷⁰ Japanese politician and scholar Shigénobu Ōkuma makes this point quite clear. His publication *Fifty Years of New Japan* received widespread attention in the West, so much so that its publication was dedicated to King Edward VII. In it he writes how the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War brought about excitement amongst the people, the idea of patriotism intensifying and blossoming as people clamoured for war. Ōkuma, *Fifty Years*, 118.




IMAGE EIGHT: Kindness to a Fallen Foe: A Japanese Soldier Giving a Wounded Russian Refreshment and Cigarettes.

Source: *The Illustrated London News*, 27 August 1904.

‘... the Japanese think earnestly... of their position among the nations; and they render us a service as they prove that the earth is not the exclusive possession of the white man, and show themselves worthy to be classed with the most advanced nations in science, in art, in enlightenment, and in war. They are not curiosities, to be prized for their novelties, nor are they inferiors to be patronised and governed; but they are men of like passions with ourselves, to be feared as foes, loved as friends, and to bear their part in the great task which was given to men in the beginning – “To subdue the earth” and make it the fit abode for enlightenment, truth, justice, beauty, and peace’.¹⁷¹

Japan had traditionally been viewed as a barbaric nation possessing customs frequently scorned upon by Westerners who believed that there was no reason for them to be present in a changing world. By 1905 however, some began to look through this facemask where a compassionate side hitherto unknown can be seen to have materialized. Sydney Gulick talks of the humane treatment of the Japanese on Russian prisoners, underlining how they were treated in a contrasting manner to the stereotypical barbarism held in the West towards those in the East. To provide a specific example Gulick writes how a group of fifteen Russian prisoners appreciated the good will of the Japanese to the extent that they wrote an appeal to the emperor pleading with him that come the end of the war and their release from incarceration, that they be permitted to remain in Japan and become Japanese subjects. This letter was translated and published in the local presses, and was greeted with esteemed satisfaction.¹⁷² This can also be viewed in image eight which shows an injured Russian soldier being cared for by their conquerors.¹⁷³ It is not surprising that the idea of Japan becoming increasingly more Western began to emerge. As we have already seen Dyer identified Japan as the “Britain of the East”, and other writers can be seen to take a similar approach. Diósy writes of how Japan’s destiny revolved around the possession of a strong and powerful navy, something which for centuries had transcended Britain’s position in the world. Japan was to become the next domineering sea power, alongside which it would possess a military with high levels of efficiency and patriotic spirit – a combination which would allow them to crush any opponent. Furthermore their active and thriving industry mixed with a strong commerce and economy would bring in a massive influx of capital from abroad, and fuel developments in natural resources and advances in the sciences, strengthening its ship-building industry and the carrying of trade – ‘in short, Japan powerful, prosperous, progressive, and rich – the Great Britain of the East!’¹⁷⁴ Dyer however, provides

¹⁷¹ Knox, *Imperial Japan*, 288.

¹⁷² Gulick, *The White*, 103. See also pages 92-108.

¹⁷³ It was with this that an attitude amongst some Asiatics emerged which labelled Japan as a traitor to the East and a nation opposing tradition and custom. As Diósy writes the Chinese who had long regarded Japan as the “Upstart Nation of Dwarfs” now delighted in the disastrous fate in store for “the Dwarfs” who had in their opinion turned traitors to the Yellow Race. They had become “Monkeys” who strutted about fashioning Western dress seeking to flourish and burgeon in their imitation of the hated “Western Foreign Devils”. Diósy, *The New*, 32.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 24.

a more personal recollection of the Japanese and their desire to achieve such lofty heights which I shall provide here:

‘When I arrived in Japan (in 1873) the highest ambition of all the officials with whom I came into contact, and also of my own students, was that their country might become the Britain of the East, and they not infrequently got laughed at by foreigners for what considered their conceit. During the thirty years which have elapsed since that time they have kept their ideal steadily in view, and few will deny that they have gone a long way towards its realisation’.

He goes on further to write:

‘So far as I have been able to judge from the utterances of her statesmen, from the opinions expressed by the press and the general ideas of the people, the Japanese have no higher ambition than that their country should become the Britain of the East, resting secure in her own strength, but with no wish for territorial expansion in other parts of the world’.¹⁷⁵

Japanese Westernisation can thus be seen to have separated them from the rest of Asia. As it continued to develop the rest of Asia stood idly by as Japan’s relations with the West blossomed into something ground-breaking as they were treated with a greater degree of parity.

As the previous chapter highlighted there was no other nation Japan sought to establish friendly relations with than the world’s leading naval power, their mutual interests becoming more closely aligned in the immediate years after 1900. In Britain there was a view that Japan was different to other Asiatics. Their victory over China stood as an indication of this and people began to write of the distinguishing characteristics of the Japanese with anthropological disciplines increasing in popularity. One renowned craniologist said how he had never found traces of a more extensive miscegenation than with the Japanese:

‘There is scarcely a race which has not contributed to make the Japanese nation, the Caucasian, the Mongolian, the Malay, and even, in the south, a slight tinge of Negrito from the islands of the Pacific’.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Dyer, *Dai Nippon*, 342-343. A more practical example of Japan being more like Western nations can be found in a British periodical. In an article entitled ‘A Lady Who Wanted A Husband’ an advert is taken from the Japanese publication *Anazawa Shembum Journal* published in Tokyo which stands as an example of young women in Japan advertising for a husband in a way which they adopted from Europeans. The article concluded that this was becoming increasingly more common in Japan and has brought about several desirable marriages as they appealed to the hearts of young Japanese men. *The London Journal and Weekly Record of Literature, Science and Art*, 23 August 1902. See also an article in the *Morning Advertiser* entitled ‘Women in Japan’, 12 November 1909.

¹⁷⁶ Quoted in Nitobe, *The Japanese Nation*, 90.

Similar phrenological approaches can be found elsewhere. As one British periodical wrote when looking at the East and West:

‘Ethnologists tell us that the Jap, this remarkable islander, possesses a cranial feature, the *os japonicum*, which differentiates him not only from the European, but also from the remainder of the Oriental races, and certainly he has lately shown a wonderful facility for the adoption of new ideas, whenever such seem good to him, without the hesitancy and delay which often precede their adoption in the West’.¹⁷⁷

Comparable attitudes can also be found on the other side of the Atlantic through Japan’s participation in the Louisiana Purchase Exposition of 1904 which witnessed a display of ethnological exhibits. One of which displayed Ainu, the indigenous people of Japan who had been labelled as a dying race following the Meiji Restoration as their numbers decreased, who provided many points of discussion for anthropologists with regards to their place in the world’s racial hierarchy.¹⁷⁸ The rapid transformation of affairs in East Asia and with it the changing perceptions of Japan, brought about these tendencies as views moved towards the affirmative. As Catharina Blomberg has written it was these military successes in the 1890s and 1900s brought about this change as ‘the Western view of Japan as a land of simpering, pigeon-toed geisha twirling their parasols under blossoming cherry trees changed dramatically, and those powers which viewed the expansionist tendencies of Russia with unease expressed admiration of “brave little Japan”, so unlike chaotic China’.¹⁷⁹ Britain was no exception to this with Gordon Daniels writing on the changing perceptions taking shape in

¹⁷⁷ F. Carrell, ‘East and West’, *The Monthly Review*, 60 (1905), 103-104. As well as existing as a means of distinguishing the Japanese from other Asiatics these anthropological views stood as a method of characterising the superior from the inferior. In one of his publications on Japan, infamous Japanese scholar Lafcadio Hearn emphasises how the world is no place for inferiority: ‘Needless to say that the aggressions of race upon race are fully in accord with the universal law of struggle — that perpetual struggle in which only the more capable survive. Inferior races must become subservient to higher races, or disappear before them; and ancient types of civilisation, too rigid for progress, must yield to the pressure of more efficient and more complex civilisations. The law is pitiless and plain: its operations may be mercifully modified, but never prevented, by humane consideration’. Lafcadio Hearn, *An Attempt at Interpretation* (London, 1907 [1904]), 520-521.

¹⁷⁸ It is worth highlighting how the organisers of the fair linked the exposition to the 1904 Olympics which were also to be held at St. Louis by holding anthropology days where natives of countries were sent to compete in a select few events. They performed much worse than the Anglo-Saxon competitors who had vastly better training and familiarity with the events, and it was taken as a sign of the racial superiority of the white race. Robert W. Rydell, John E. Findling, and Kimberly D. Pelle, *Fair America. World’s Fairs in the United States* (Washington, 2000), 55-57. For more on the Louisiana Purchase Exposition see Robert W. Rydell, *All the World’s Fair. Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916* (Chicago, 1984), 154-183. For a look specifically at the Ainu in Meiji Japan see David L. Howell, ‘Ainu Ethnicity and the Boundaries of the Early Modern Japanese State’, *Past and Present*, 142 (1994), 69-93; David L. Howell, ‘The Meiji State and Logic of Ainu “Protection”’, in Helen Hardacre and Adam L. Kern (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan* (Leiden, 1997), 612-634; Yamada Takako, ‘Anthropological Studies of the Ainu in Japan: Past and Present’, *Japanese Review of Cultural Anthropology*, 4 (2003), 75-106.

¹⁷⁹ Catharina Blomberg, ‘Isles of Gold or Police State – the Western View of Japan from Marco Polo to the Present’, in Koyoko Koma (ed.), *Image of Japan in Europe. Material of International Conference “Image of Japan in Europe” Held On 13-14 October 2007 at Vytautas Magnus University Japanese Studies Centre* (Kanaus, 2008), 63.

there, attesting how they ‘have been moulded and remoulded by complex and rapidly changing circumstances. The transformation of Japan and the transformation of Britain have shaped both realities and perceptions, while government cultural policies, developments in communications, and the spread of popular education have all been potent influences on Britain’s ideas’.¹⁸⁰ British approaches towards Japan in the 1900s had distanced themselves from the changing attitudes which had taken place in the decade previous as Anglo-Japanese relations continued to blossom.

The pinnacle of these relations at the beginning of the twentieth century was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Prior to engaging in an examination of this agreement I will firstly mention relations on a more general scale which were typically of a cordial nature as the two grew closer together. Japanese historian and author Kanichi Azakawa wrote just this:

‘If there ever was a need of an agreement with the rising Power of the Orient, it had probably been never more keenly felt by the British government than in the last part of the year 1901. Side by side with these favourable circumstances for an understanding, the student should not for a moment lose from sight two fundamental conditions which drew together, not only the governments, but also the people, of Great Britain and Japan with mutual attraction’.¹⁸¹

A new era of friendly relations between the two had begun following the Boxer Rebellion as ideas of a formal alliance with the United States began to fade from the political agenda in Britain. It was because of this that they got closer to Japan as the appeal of joining forces with East Asia’s most powerful nation was near impossible to refuse. Japan had now become of ‘marriageable age’.¹⁸² Through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain became the first Western power to formally approach Japan with both nations sharing common aims regarding peace in East Asia. As W. T. A. Barber wrote on these commonalities:

‘At present England’s interests are clearly the same as hers, and we may rejoice, if our ally of to-day come through this baptism of fire without hurt to us, that she may be our ally for many years to ensure the peaceful freedom of the commerce and development of the distant East’.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ Gordon Daniels, ‘Elites, Governments and Citizens: Some British Perceptions of Japan, 1850-2000’, in Gordon Daniels and Chushichi Tsuzuki (eds.), *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600-2000. Volume 5: Social and Cultural Perspectives* (Basingstoke, 2002), 3. For a more detailed outlook of Anglo-Japanese relations in the Victorian era see William G. Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858* (London, 1951).

¹⁸¹ K. Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict. Its Causes and Issues* (Boston and New York, 1904), 201. Paul Reinsch also speaks of the friendly nature between Britain and Japan at this time writing how they were ‘on the whole friendly and favourable to active cooperation in the affairs of the far Orient’. A new era of friendly relations between Britain and Japan had begun following the Boxer Rebellion where Britain has failed in securing a formal alliance with the United States. This stood as a reason why Britain got closer to Japan with any hesitation on engaging in a formal alliance quickly deteriorating as the appeal of joining forces with East Asia’s most powerful nation was near impossible to refuse. See Reinsch, *World Politics*, 180-181.

¹⁸² Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 95.

¹⁸³ W. T. A. Barber, ‘The Coming of Age of Japan’, *London Quarterly Review*, October 1904.

For Britain this represented the ‘strategic umbrella’ of their foreign policy in its quest to defend their own interests in the Middle Kingdom, but for Japan some have regarded the alliance as a stepping stone in manoeuvring of their own imperialism.¹⁸⁴

Being the first union between an Eastern and Western nation where the two were on an equal footing stands as the most significant outcome of this agreement. Some scholars have regarded it as a somewhat inevitable result of their growing closeness.¹⁸⁵ These sentiments are also evident in primary material. On this significance John Solano writes how the communication between Britain and Japan was amongst the most effective acts of diplomacy to greet the status-quo of East Asia:

‘The pen, through the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, has forged the mightiest weapon of war which the world has ever known. It has ranged together, in concert of action, irresistible powers of sea and land. The greatest and most powerful navy, with an attendant host of transports, brings the whole earth within the reach of the strongest and most efficient army. Two little islands, set half the world apart to East and West against the coasts of the largest continent, have stretched a link of steel across it, which not only secures their common interests against the menace of a common danger, but, at the same time, safeguards the peace of nations for the benefit of all humanity’.¹⁸⁶

Azakawa identified how the alliance was a rare and unique product of history, owing to its bringing together of East and West, strengthening the relationship between these two worlds:

‘seldom seen in history, especially when it is considered that it united reciprocally two nations widely apart in race, religion, and history, one of which had rarely entered into a regular alliance with even a European power’.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ T. G. Otte, ‘The Fragmenting of the Old World Order. Britain, the Great Powers, and the War’, in Rotem Kowner (ed.), *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War* (Abingdon, 1997), 93. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, 77.

¹⁸⁵ Dyer is perhaps the most vociferous of those around at the time of the alliance highlighting this inevitability: ‘As Great Britain was the first Foreign Power to recognise the freedom of Japan from foreign jurisdiction, she was also the first to follow up that by a treaty of alliance which bound the Britain of the East to that of the West with more than the ties of diplomatic friendship. The advisability of such an alliance had been gradually impressing itself on the minds both of British and Japanese statesmen as a very natural result of the political developments which had taken place in the Far East’. Dyer, *Dai Nippon*, 329.

¹⁸⁶ E. John Solano, ‘The World Influence of Britain and Japan’, *The Monthly Review*, 21:32 (1905), 11. I would also refer the reader to the article written by American Senator Johnathan Dolliver where he states that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance brought ‘the whole world to its senses’ in a way hitherto unmatched. Johnathan P. Dolliver, ‘Significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, *The North American Review*, 174:546 (1902), 603.

¹⁸⁷ Azakawa, *The Russo-Japanese*, 202. At this point I will bring to the reader’s attention the influence of a prominent Japanese, the Foreign Minister of the Meiji government and former ambassador to Great Britain Aoki Shūzō. Ian Nish has brought to light his significance by detailing his ability to influence the foreign presses and public opinion as well as his ability to build and formulate friendly relationships. This along with his experience of European courts and skill at diplomacy permitted him to influence sentiment of the British towards Japan. ‘Aoki’s place in Anglo-Japanese relations’ concludes Nish, ‘was historically significant. At many crucial

On this note it is perhaps worth underlining the fact that this agreement was of greater significance to Japan than it was to Britain.¹⁸⁸ Irrespectively however, it brought together the East and West in a way which had hitherto never before been worthy of consideration, and was only worth mentioning when Japan began to show itself in an imperial gaze. With this they began to be seen as a nation with a 'large share of Anglo-Saxon virility' whilst equally 'imbued in Eastern thought' with philosophies powerful enough to 'profoundly affect social and political conditions'. Dyer concluded the following:

'It will be interesting to watch how far the Britain of the East is in alliance with the Britain of the West, not only for political purposes, but also how far the two Powers are able to co-operate in the solution of the most important problems which lie in the future, and thus promote the highest welfare of the human race'.¹⁸⁹

Should the two be able to cooperate then the potential which the alliance brought with it was unwavering, perhaps a stepping stone towards the two gaining near total control of the seas. With Japan's mix of 'pluck, determination, and endurance, and with a rapidly growing knowledge of modern warfare and its methods', Stafford Ransome has stated how Britain could not want anything more than an ally who held equally ambitious naval plans:

'Together, as far as naval warfare is concerned, England and Japan could at the present day hold the position against all corners; and the interests and authority of these two countries could be maintained entirely by means of naval warfare. Neither wishes to acquire territory in Russia or in Central China, and, in the event of war, their energies could consequently be entirely devoted to dealing with the ships and holding the coast-line of the enemy. In fact, as matters now stand, Japan and England could, by playing a somewhat waiting game after hostilities had begun, bring about a

junctions, he seems to be pointing the way to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Although his residence in London was comparatively short, he did affect relations beneficially in 1894. For twenty-five years the in the Meiji period, Britain had not appeared to be an obstacle among the powers. Yet Britain was the big fish who had to be caught if Japan was to win back her international self-respect. And Aoki was the lucky fisherman'. Ian Nish, 'Aoki Shūzō (1844-1914)', in J. E. Hoare (ed.), *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits. Volume 3* (Richmond, 1999), 137, 143.

¹⁸⁸ Part of the reason for this is that Japan believed that this alliance countered the threat of Russia whose ambitions for expansion into Asia were made aware in the previous chapter. Shigénobu Ōkuma wrote how this agreement was made with the primary purpose of defending British and Japanese interests by providing them with written testament to 'preserve permanently the integrity of China and Korea against the Muscovite Empire'. Ōkuma, *Fifty Years*, 116. Documents in the British Foreign Office papers echo these viewpoints: 'Their [Japan's] main object in entering into such a contract is to make it plain to Russian that she must keep her hands off that country. Japan will, in my belief, never accept a stipulation that she is not to be allowed to take, without our permission, measures which we might regard as provocative, but which she would defend upon the ground that they were forced upon her by the conduct of Russia'. FO 46/560. Anglo-Japanese Agreement by Lord Lansdowne, 1 January 1902.

¹⁸⁹ Dyer, *Dai Nippon*, 402-403.

TABLE FIVE: *Estimates of Battleship Tonnage of the Major Powers as of 1902*

Britain	561,900	Italy	124,153
France	246,096	United States	119,120
Russia	193,311	Germany	115,968
Japan	129,715		

Source: Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement. Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911* (Cambridge, MA., 1972), 83.

coal famine which would cripple the whole of their opponents, including Russia, if the season of the year were well chosen'.¹⁹⁰

This is further emphasised by table five which shows how Britain held an overwhelming influence whilst Japan possessed the fourth most powerful navy. Should the two be combined then it would take an alliance of a far greater magnitude than France, Russia and Germany to challenge this naval supremacy. To even pose a challenge it would require the incorporation of either Italy or the United States into the coalition seen in 1895, a union which would not have been forth coming. A perfect example of the pen being mightier than the sword, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is symbolic of the East and West forging a closer relationship. Although the endeavours of American imperialism can be seen to have brought these two worlds closer together as each stood on the others doorstep, the 1902 agreement showed that two such distinct worlds could operate both amicably and diplomatically.

One can imagine the delight which spread throughout Japan where people believed that joining with the world's indisputable leading power affirmed their global status. Tokutomi Sohō expressed how a formal pact with 'the greatest naval power in the world' was a consequence of Japan's newfound standing in East Asia: 'it is precisely because we are strong that England sought an alliance with us'. He used this as reason why Japan should continue with its policy of imperial expansion.¹⁹¹ For Japan it held a profound diplomatic significance in their foreign relations. Kenneth Brown writes how it stood as the formal recognition of Japan's progress and of their ambitions to achieving great power status which thenceforth could only continue to develop.¹⁹² Murashima Shigeru has stated how this 'was an epoch-making period for the Japanese. They had achieved their diplomatic and defence aims, albeit insufficiently, since the Meiji Restoration as a result of treaty revision in 1894 and victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, and had established a modern state. They now stood on an equal footing with the Western powers, and their external activities were of great

¹⁹⁰ Ransome, *Japan in Transition*, 248-249.

¹⁹¹ Quoted in Pierson, *Tokutomi*, 275.

¹⁹² Brown, *Britain and Japan*, 1-2. See also Colin Holmes and A. H. Ion, 'Bushidō and the Samurai: Images in British Public Opinion, 1894-1914', *Modern Asian Studies*, 14:2 (1980), 315.

importance in the international arena'.¹⁹³ It had brought about the idea of a Eurocentric civilisation coming to an end.¹⁹⁴

Many Britons also approved of this relationship and commended the government for approving the agreement. Members of the Shirley Ward Conservative Association for example, wrote to Lord Lansdowne how they;

‘desire[d] to forward to you an expression of our high appreciation of the Statesmanship you have shown in the recent treaty with Japan, which ensures the consolidation to maintenance of a general peace in Eastern Asia, particularly safeguarding our Indian Empire, thereby enabling the Government of that Country to devote all their energy to fostering, and developing, internal industrial and agricultural matters, for the benefit of millions of our fellow subjects.

We also hope that this clear understanding with regard to Asia, will greatly tend towards the maintenance of peace in Europe, and help to build up by international community of industrial interests, a better understanding, based upon mutual respect, for the rights of each other’.¹⁹⁵

For Britain the alliance had profound diplomatic importance, marking the culminating point where relations between Britain and Japan split from other European powers such as Germany, France and Russia who held a vested interest in the East.¹⁹⁶ With this agreement Britain could now able to delegate the defence of their dominions and interests to Japan. At the turn of the century Britain had thirty-eight battleships and cruisers stationed in the East, and by the end of the decade this number had been halved and was continuing to fall.¹⁹⁷ That they did not have to invest as much money into maintaining a fleet in East Asia stood as a reason why the alliance met approval, *The Times* stressing the need for an ally there: ‘It was only half recognised before the Boer War that the protection of British interests in the Far East made it necessary to secure an Eastern ally. The need became increasingly insistent as

¹⁹³ Murashima Shigeru, ‘The Opening of the Twentieth Century and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1895-1923’, in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations. Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930* (Basingstoke, 2000), 159.

¹⁹⁴ Giffard, *Japan*, 25-26.

¹⁹⁵ FO 46/603. Letters from Members of the Shirley Ward Conservative Association to Lord Lansdowne, 13 October 1905.

¹⁹⁶ This echoes similarity to the Triple Intervention where the development of two groups in East Asia emerged, one consisting of France and Russia and the other Britain and Japan, with Germany mediating between the two groups siding with France and Russia on all political issues, and with Britain on things financial. See Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 36-37. In a similar vein Kaiser Wilhelm II persisted in voicing concern over the yellow peril and the threat which Japan brought. In a letter to Tsar Nicholas II he wrote of how a Japanese legation has been sent to reorganise the Chinese army and how they would seize this opportunity to us the Chinese army now at their disposal to expel all other foreigners. Letter XXVI (from the Kaiser to the Tsar), 2 September 1902, in Isaac Don Levine, *Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar, Copied From the Government Archives in Petrograd Unpublished Before 1920; Private Letters From the Kaiser to the Czar Found in a Chest After the Czar’s Execution and now in the Hands of the Soviet Government* (New York, 1920), 84-87.

¹⁹⁷ Peter Lowe, *Great Britain and Japan 1911-15. A Study of British Far Eastern Policy* (London, 1969), 17-18. For a more general look at the diplomatic significance of the alliance for Britain I would refer the reader to section 5 of Anthony Best’s article ‘Race, Monarchy’, 177-179.

the war lasted. Salisbury had tried and had failed to come to terms with Russia. For three years Chirol had watched the British government consistently weakening in the face of Russian pressure. No attempt to bring in Germany as a counter-weight could, as he understood, succeed, for she would never alienate Russia by opposing her in China. The Yangtze Treaty of 1900 was a warning'.¹⁹⁸ Joseph Chamberlain spoke of this point stating how Japan were the best means of defending British interests in the East:

‘[The Japanese] are rapidly increasing their means of offence and defence, and in many contingencies they would be valuable Allies. They are at this moment much inclined to us and, being very sensitive, would appreciate any advance made to them. If we decide to take anything and were to inform them beforehand, I imagine that we should be sure of their support. I do not suppose that a Treaty of Alliance would be desirable, but I should hope that an understanding might be arrived at which would be very useful. In any case they are worth looking after as it is clear that they do not mean to be a *quantité négligeable* in the East’.¹⁹⁹

Hostilities between Britain and Japan were virtually non-existent as many were content to see the alliance unfold. Following the Russo-Japanese War and its renewal in September 1905, there was equal enthusiasm amongst Britons to continue friendly relations. *The Times* published a speech by Sir Edward Grey which said that no one doubted the obligation of maintaining the ties created with Japan, a view which gained support amongst conservatives and liberals.²⁰⁰ This political approach can also be found on a social level as many believed

¹⁹⁸ *The History of The Times*, 373. At this point I would stress the influence of Valentine Chirol who was regarded as an expert on foreign relations, possessing access to the foreign secretary as well as other senior officials in the Foreign Office. American President Theodore Roosevelt invited him to Washington in 1905 and spoke of him as the godfather of the alliance and the primary catalyst for its inception. Roosevelt saluted him on this issue and stressed his importance. See the following publications of Valentine Chirol: *Far Eastern and Fifty Years in a Changing World* (London, 1929), 208-209. See also Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 12, 368. It is worth bringing to light however the fact that Chirol was not the only person to have a high level of influence in orchestrating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Renowned diplomat and military officer Colonel Sir Claude MacDonald, known best for his service in China and Japan cannot go amiss. His services have been widely acknowledged as pioneering. For his role in Anglo-Japanese relations and the 1902 alliance there is no better work than that of Ian Nish and his article, ‘Sir Claude and Lady Ethel MacDonald’, in Ian Nish (ed.), *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits. Volume One* (Folkestone, 1994), 133-145. See also Sir Hugh Cortazzi, ‘Royal Visits to Japan in the Meiji Period, 1868-1912’, in Ian Nish (ed.), *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits. Volume 2* (Folkestone, 1994), 79-93.

¹⁹⁹ Quoted in Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 64.

²⁰⁰ *The Times*, 1 June 1905. Other conservative newspapers such as the *Glasgow Herald* and *Birmingham Post* as well as periodicals such as the *Spectator* and the *National Review* welcomed it by stressing the maintenance of cordial and friendly relations. See Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 343-344. *The Monthly Review* published two parallel articles on the alliance’s renewal. One entitled ‘The Seamy Side of the Alliance’ looked at the agreement being an example of Britain’s decadence whereas the other entitled held a contrasting view. See Coloniensis, ‘The Seamy Side’, 1-10 and Solano, ‘The World Influence’, 11-37. I would also refer the reader to Pro Patria, ‘England’s Decadence, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty’, *Contemporary Review*, 88 (1905), 703-707. Attitudes in Japan were generally enthusiastic after 1905 as leaders felt that Britain was a reliable ally who could be called upon if and when she was needed. Russia was regarded with great contempt whilst relations with the United States were strained because of their intervention in Manchuria and anti-Japanese sentiment on

that that its renewal ensured the maintenance of a force in East Asia which was vastly superior to that of any European power.²⁰¹ To provide a specific example, imperialist politician Richard Haldane on one occasion urged an undergraduate audience to pay less attention to sport and to take encouragement and motivation from the fierceness and devotedness to the principles and practices of discipline which had led to Japanese victory at the battles of Liaoyang and Mukden.²⁰² In spite of these feelings however, there remained scepticism towards the alliance.

Although the benefits which it brought with it were widely known some in Britain remained cautious, a sense of untrustworthiness present towards its initial inception and of its renewal. In 1902 some believed that Japan was a nation too different and accordingly unreliable with whom to forge a stable and enduring agreement: 'To some British observers, the differences between their country and Japan were so profound that they could not contemplate any understanding [of an alliance] being reached'.²⁰³ But more to this there was the idea that it brought with it a false sense of security. As one article in *The Monthly Review* published:

'Our treaty with Japan is dangerous, because it is an opiate that lulls to sleep a people that should be up and doing

The Japanese Treaty, moreover, enables the Mikado to call upon the British fleet for use in the Far East — a departure from established practice without a parallel in history. The Japanese Treaty, while barring the way to an understanding with regenerated Russia, not only prevents the federation of the British Empire, but hastens the establishment of the Australian republic under the suzerainty of the United States, which is the ideal of many Australian working men. For these reasons I hold that the Japanese Treaty of Alliance is an instrument showing, not wisdom but cunning; not strength but decadence; and the appearance of Japanese troops in the Hooghly is more likely to break that consolidate the British Empire'.²⁰⁴

As can be seen here there was a fear that Japan would use the alliance as a stepping stone in their imperialist ventures. Indeed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Lansdowne, warned how Britain had to keep a watchful eye:

'Unless we do so, Japan will be free to embark upon hostilities in which we may become involved over some comparatively insignificant local question'.²⁰⁵

America's West Coast. Britain was seen as the power that would be invaluable in smoothing out differences. Lowe, *Great Britain*, 30.

²⁰¹ Bruce M. Russett, *Community and Contention. Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA., 1963), 6.

²⁰² See G. R. Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency. A Study in Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914* (London, 1990), 59.

²⁰³ Best, 'Race, Monarchy', 172.

²⁰⁴ Coloniensis, 'The Seamy Side', 10.

²⁰⁵ CAB 37/59, no. 132, 1901. Government Document from Lord Lansdowne, 16 December 1901.

This defeated the purpose of the alliance for Britain who looked to limit their involvement in Eastern affairs. Irrespectively however, its significance cannot be overlooked with some such as Cemil Aydin stating that Japan had now entered the club of ‘white-Christian great powers’, although some Britons and Americans believed that Japan still belonged to the yellow race and was nowhere near equal to the superiority of the West and all white-Christian nations. Along the lines outlined in the second epigraph above Britain could now be seen as a bad European having provided Japan with the capacity to become a more poignant threat. Tension between the legal status of Japan in international law and popular perceptions of Japanese racial inferiority thus began to emerge.²⁰⁶ With the coming together of two parallel races it was almost inevitable that scepticism would play its part. But never before had Japan been accepted as an equal power by a Western state than in 1902 where the notions of extraterritoriality and unfair treaty provisions had become a thing of the past, the alliance standing as a defining moment, a watershed moment, in Japan’s foreign relations.²⁰⁷

But what of the presence of the United States in East Asia in the early years of the 1900s? As mentioned in the previous chapter, it was their Anglo-Saxon kin across the Atlantic who was Britain’s primary focus in gaining an ally. America’s need to have public support for negotiating foreign alliances or for the use of any and all expressions of force however, made Britain look elsewhere for support in East Asia and their union with Japan.²⁰⁸ Indeed America had somewhat alienated itself from the two since the consummation of their partnership. In 1901 when Japan sought clarification regarding the American position towards the Russian displays of aggression in Manchuria and how they intended to keep it in check, the United States responded by saying that would not undertake any positive action. With specific regards to Britain, the Boer War did not meet with approval from the United States who opposed colonial wars thereby placing strain on Anglo-American relations. It subsequently became clear that Britain could not rely on their Anglo-Saxon ally for any form

²⁰⁶ Aydin, *The Politics*, 40.

²⁰⁷ Peter Lowe writes how that by 1905 and their success over Russia, many Japanese believed that the alliance had served its purpose with public opinion moving away from the idea of this agreement as being an invaluable agreement between the two powers. Many believed that Japan now had less to gain and that Japanese statesmen and diplomats acquiesced far too readily and willingly to British demands and pressure. Party politicians such as Inukai Tsuyoshi, a member of the Rikken Seiyūkai a conservative party which supported bureaucratic control and militarism, and Ozaki Yukio, member of the Kenseitō party which was under the leadership of the liberal politician Shigénobu Ōkuma, viewed the alliance as a hindrance to Japanese dominance in East Asia. Along similar lines, the thinking of pan-Asianist ideologies through groups such as *Genyōsha* (the Black Ocean Society) and *Kokuryukai* (the Black Dragon Society) the alliance stood in the fundamental thinking of Asia for Asians. Regarding the Japanese government itself it was not disconcerted by public opinion with the point of view that the alliance was a necessity for both Britain and Japan and Anglo-Japanese relations, even if for different reasons. Lowe, *Great Britain*, 31. Pan-Asianist organisations such as the *Genyōsha* were founded in the 1880s and developed in power and influence. None held more prominence than the *Kokuryukai* who emerged in 1901 and sought Japanese domination over all Asia. David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, *Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld* (London, 2003), 24. For a list of prominent radical organisations in the Meiji era and their ideologies see Sven Saaler, ‘Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, Creating a Region, Forging an Empire’, in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (eds.), *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History. Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders* (Abingdon, 2007), 4.

²⁰⁸ Allen, *Great Britain*, 585. See also 607.

of concrete support yet alone an alliance.²⁰⁹ Relations however, generally remained on good terms albeit with a mix of hostility and at times mistrust. Lionel Gelber has stressed how an Anglo-American understanding was ‘among the most decisive events of modern history’ with the rapprochement between the two at the turn of the century assuming ‘so deep and historical a significance’.²¹⁰ English journalist Sydney Brooks explained British public life to an American audience in 1903 by saying how both spoke for nationalism, imperialism and the ascendance of social and economic groups of its nation.²¹¹ It was with these thoughts which saw Henry Allen conclude that at the turn of the century ‘the foundations of Anglo-American friendship... were now firmly laid, the British people and their governments were too determined to acquire American goodwill, and the tide of the next years was running too strongly towards this amity for incidental rivalries to disrupt these developments’.²¹² With this Anglo-Saxonism seemed to be developing and a bond forging. Nevertheless the United States was reluctant to engage in military alliances.²¹³ It was this which led to disputes between the two nations with the First Venezuelan Crisis of 1895, the Second Boer War of 1899-1902, and the Second Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903 being examples of friendship turning into hostility.²¹⁴ Typically on this topic the Americans ‘disliked Britain’s tacit endorsement of Japan’s policy in China’ which the 1902 agreement did little to help, whereas ‘British officials were often exasperated by what they took to be the naiveté of Americans in the East’ which led to a scenario where Anglo-Saxon cooperation would only serve to weaken the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, something which Britain was not prepared to accept.²¹⁵ They can thus be seen to have moved towards Japan in a more favourable light than the United States, an idea which was not met with widespread acceptance. Rudyard Kipling was one of them with his feelings expressed in an illustration taken from the front cover of *Puck* early in 1902, shown here in image nine where he is trying to get the British lion to move in a certain direction. Where there existed tensions and mistrust between Britain and the United States in the forging of friendly relations following the Sino-Japanese War, similar sentiments transcended the opening years of the twentieth century though Britain moved towards allying with Japan.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 589.

²¹⁰ Gelber, *The Rise*, 1.

²¹¹ Sydney Brook, ‘Politics in England’, *The North American Review*, 176 (1903), 901-902. See Keller, ‘Anglo-American Politics’, 460.

²¹² Allen, *Great Britain*, 552.

²¹³ There is one underlying areas which stands as reason for this which fuelled the hostility and mistrust mentioned above – their differences in government. This is perhaps the most significant difference in the foreign policy makings of British and American governments with the cabinet system applied to the former and the presidential system to the latter. D. Cameron Watt, *Succeeding John Bull. America in Britain’s Place 1900-1975: A Study of the Anglo-American Relationship and World Politics in the Context of British and American Foreign-Policy-Making in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 1984), 6. For an elaboration on this theme see chapter 9, ‘Presidential Power and European Cabinets in the Conduct of International Relations and Diplomacy: A Contrast’, 167-193.

²¹⁴ Dobson, *Anglo-Japanese Relations*, 22. See also R. A. Humphreys, ‘Presidential Address: Anglo-American Rivalries and the Venezuela Crisis of 1895’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 17 (1967), 131-164.

²¹⁵ Iriye, *From Nationalism*, 212.

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Puck

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"ET TU, BRUTE!"

THE BRITISH LION.—I did n't mind the others, Rudyard; but I never thought you 'd be prodding me!"

IMAGE NINE: 'Et Tu Brute!' *Puck*, 29 January 1902.

In this illustration Rudyard Kipling is holding a pen labelled "criticism" which he is using to prod the British lion into a certain direction and course of action. The caption describes the expression of the lion, reading "I didn't mind the others, Rudyard; but I never thought you'd be prodding me!"

Source: Available online at the *Library of Congress*.

URL: < <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2010651558/> > (accessed 6 January 2015).

At this point it is worth mentioning the significance of American imperialism which continued to go from strength-to-strength. Samuel Moffat, chief editorial writer of the *New York Journal*, put the attitudes of a vast majority of the populace towards imperialism best when he wrote in 1901:

‘It is based upon the fact that the United States is, and intends to remain, the paramount Power of the Western Hemisphere.... For other Powers the only question is whether they will accept it or collide with it. If this fundamental principle be once accepted, no country will have any trouble in maintaining harmonious relations with the United States’.²¹⁶

America possessed an intention to expand, something which Britain was more than aware of with the knowledge that the American navy was undergoing a programme of expansion so that its overseas interests could be administered without the need of an ally. Although the United States may have been the sixth highest nation in terms of battleship tonnage as shown in table five, their potential for development exceeded this. In a cabinet memorandum the First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Selborne, echoed the opinion shared by the Committee of Imperial Defence who identified the American navy as one of the ones to be wary of:

‘It is certain that it would be a hopeless task to attempt to achieve an equality with the three largest navies; but I go further and say that, if the United States continue their present naval policy and develop their navy as they are easily capable of developing it if they choose, it will be scarcely possible for us to raise our navy equal to that both of France and the United States combined. I propose therefore to consider our position almost exclusively from its relative strength to that of France and Russia combined’.²¹⁷

Selborne later wrote to George Curzon, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, emphasising the potential threat of America should its navy expand:

‘I would never quarrel with the U.S. if I could possibly avoid it. It has not dawned on our countrymen yet... that, if the Americans choose to pay for what they can easily afford, they can gradually build up a navy, fully as large and then larger than ours and I am not sure they will not do it’.²¹⁸

On its own expansion, America claimed that their focus on becoming an imperial power was not to seek engagement in overseas conflicts but to aid in the maintenance and lasting of peace. During his second inaugural address as president, William McKinley said how he looked to preserve the status-quo and that any quarrels which may arise be settled by

²¹⁶ Quoted in Orde, *The Eclipse*, 21.

²¹⁷ Quoted in *Ibid*, 25.

²¹⁸ Quoted in *Ibid*, 25-26.

‘peaceful arbitration’ so to ‘avoid the horrors of war’.²¹⁹ Similar attitudes were expressed in the inaugural address of Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 where he placed a heavy attention on the notion that ‘toward all other nations, small and large, our attitude must be one of cordial and sincere friendship’.²²⁰ It was with this approach that Roosevelt sort to mediate the peace talks following the Russo-Japanese War, a feat which saw him presented with the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906.

Like Britain the United States remained neutral during the Russo-Japanese War with public opinion being favourable towards those ‘gallant little Japs’.²²¹ As news of Russia’s struggles circulated with the idea of a Western nation losing somewhat badly to one in the East, this attitude began to change as an ‘undercurrent of apprehension’ began to emerge in American mind-sets. The place where this was most profound was the West Coast owing to high numbers of Japanese resident there. Following the American annexation of Hawaii in 1898 some 60,000 Japanese who inhabited the islands were now permitted to enter the United States without the need of a passport. By 1899 the number of those resident on the West Coast was five times higher than it had been four years earlier. They were grouped with Chinese immigrants and experienced the same racial prejudices.²²² Following the Portsmouth Treaty Japanese-American relations distanced as Japan begrudged the terms imposed to them as being more unfair on their status than the intervention of 1895. Whereas Roosevelt looked for the United States to be a silent partner in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan believed themselves worthy of greater recognition and that Russia be subjected to harsher terms.²²³ Ralph Minger echoes this point stating how American public opinion towards their competitor in the Pacific had changed and vice versa. Whilst the Japanese experienced uproar, Americans began to regard their immigration as a serious problem.²²⁴ Estrangement intensified more now than in the 1890s as increasing tensions led to mounting talks of war between these two nations in the Pacific arena which would see the confrontation of two major powers representing different races, cultures and traditions.²²⁵ In the United States immigration took on a new emphasis as the yellow peril ideology becoming more vociferous.

²¹⁹ Second Inaugural Address of William McKinley, 4 March 1901. Available online at *The Avlon Project*. URL: < http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/mckin2.asp > (accessed 12 September 2014).

²²⁰ Inaugural Address of Theodore Roosevelt, 4 March 1905. Available online at *The Avlon Project*. URL: < http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/troos.asp > (accessed 12 September 2014).

²²¹ This description comes from Theodore Roosevelt describing a Japanese surprise torpedo attack on Russian ships at Port Arthur. He labelled this move as a “bold initiative” before referring to their gallantry. Storry, *Japan and the Decline*, 63.

²²² Ibid, 89-90. In certain circles still existed however, a fear of Chinese immigration as being the primary fuel to the yellow peril in the United States was used to emphasise this fear. A cartoon published in *The Commoner* expressed this and how exclusionary acts needed to be undertaken with the Japanese as well as those with China greatly enforced. *The Commoner*, 6 December 1901.

²²³ Paolo E. Coletta, ‘The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft’, in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker (eds.), *American Foreign Relations. A Historiographical Review* (London, 1981), 97. American newspapers expressed appreciation of the alliance and what it brought to the East with the belief that it preserved the Open Door Policy in China and was a means to further assure peace. See *The Indianapolis Journal*, 13 February 1902; *The Washington Times*, 20 March 1902; *The Independent*, 7 September 1902.

²²⁴ Ralph Eldin Minger, ‘Taft’s Missions to Japan: A Study in Personal Diplomacy’, *Pacific Historical Review*, 30:3 (1961), 284.

²²⁵ Iriye, *From Nationalism*, 200.

As we discovered in the previous chapter a fear of this peril and immigration were intrinsically linked and if there was an event which acted as a springboard for an intensifying of this attitude then it was Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War. Many historians have identified the influence which this victory had on British and American attitudes towards this plucky nation in the East. Gina Owens marks this point as a time where Western fears were stimulated: 'The Russo-Japanese War profoundly altered both Japan's status in the world and the opinions of Japan held by Western powers. In the space of a decade (1895-1905) Japan became the primary focus for Western fears. Racial ideology was the means through which the West justified to itself and to others its domination of millions. Japan's precipitous rise threatened the very core of the West's self-perception and its precarious position of rule'.²²⁶ Similarly Jean-Pierre Lehmann identified that 1905 marked the take-off point for the yellow peril for the simple reason that has already been identified – the collapse of a Western imperial power to an Eastern nation who was regarded as only just beginning to get to grips with modern warfare. Lehmann concluded 'that a yellow people could defeat a white people in a major war was contrary to all accepted laws of nature and history'.²²⁷ These views are in keeping with the general sentiment of Westerners towards the Japanese. Gulick for one wrote how the defeat of Russia marked a greater emergence of the yellow peril in the West:

'It is sometimes said that Japan's victory spells the immediate rise of the yellow peril. She will reorganise China's military power; and raising her to the standard of her own efficient financial, educational and governmental attainments, will make those four hundred million people invincible. And then combined, China and Japan will exploit the world. Victorious Japan, they say, means bumptious Japan, swaggering Japan, Japan with a "big head." All of which would signify discomfort and immediate danger to America and Europe. This in truth is the yellow peril feared by some'.²²⁸

Similar writings can be found elsewhere:

'The bogey of the "Yellow Peril" has been raised as a reason why Eastern nations should not be encouraged to strengthen themselves with all the appliances of Western arts, both of peace and war, and the rapid development of Japan has led to the fear that she may place herself at the head of an Asiatic combination which might overwhelm the civilisation of Europe'.²²⁹

Some have gone further and stressed that a victorious Japan would have been presented with the opportunity to establish a unified Asia which could pose a threat to the West. This is an attitude which was brought to light in the previous chapter but took on a new meaning in the years surrounding the Russo-Japanese War. One article is worth quoting at length:

²²⁶ Owens, 'The Making', 36.

²²⁷ Jean-Pierre Lehmann, *The Image of Japan: From Feudal Isolation to World Power, 1850-1905* (London, 1978), 149.

²²⁸ Gulick, *The White Peril*, 174.

²²⁹ Dyer, *Dai Nippon*, 392.

‘In these articles [which emerged upon the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War] it was said that, unless Japan were defeated by Russia, an immense Chinese army would arise under Japanese leadership, which would first wrest with her Asiatic possessions from Europe, and then wage war against the white races, Christianity, and European civilisation, as in the days of Genghis Kahn and Tamerlane.

If the yellow races should become united into one solid mass, or if China should follow in the footsteps of Japan, the danger of a conflict with that immense power would, indeed, be very great for the European powers, and especially for those European powers which have valuable and extensive possessions in Asia’.²³⁰

This was also expressed in Jack London’s short story ‘The Unparalleled Invasion’ which told the story of a victorious Japan colonising Korea and China thereby creating an insurmountable population level, and an Asiatic expansion westwards. It required the unification of the West to overhaul this threat.²³¹ Elsewhere in an essay entitled ‘The Yellow Peril’, London also emphasised the threat of Japan:

‘To-day, equipped with the finest machines and systems of destruction the Caucasian mind has devised, handling machines and systems with remarkable and deadly accuracy, this rejuvenescent Japanese race has embarked on a course of conquest, the goal of which no man knows. The head men of Japan are dreaming ambitiously, and the people are dreaming blindly, a Napoleonic dream. And to this dream the Japanese clings and will cling with bull-dog tenacity. The soldier shouting “Nippon, Banzai!” on the walls of Wiju, the widow at home in her paper house committing suicide so that her only son, her sole support, may go to the front, are both expressing the unanimity of the dream’.²³²

Even more than a decade earlier Japan had further displayed itself to the West as the yellow peril. Now more than ever before, Western nations were apprehensive of its intentions and desires to expand their empire, and in which direction they would go. Many believed that if this was to happen then immigration stood as the foundation of this expansion.

But this may not have been the intention of the Japanese who continued to pursue Westernisation. Sidney Osbourne highlights how the East lacked the prosperity of the West and that all Asiatics and Oriental subjects sought something better:

‘The attitude of the Asiatic toward this dog in the manger policy may be likened to that of the poor labouring man who sees himself and his large family forced to starve because his little patch of ground is not large enough to raise sufficient for their needs, whereas over the fence, in his rich neighbour’s yard, the provisions are not only over-

²³⁰ O. Eltzbacher, ‘The Yellow Peril’, *The Nineteenth Century and After: A Monthly Review*, 55:328 (1904), 910.

²³¹ Jack London, ‘The Unparalleled Invasion’, *McClure’s Magazine* (1910), 308-316.

²³² Jack London, *Revolution and Other Essays* (New York, 1910), 279-280. The full length of the essay runs through pages 267-289.

abundant but in danger of going to seed for the want of attention and the fruits rotting on the ground for the lack of someone to harvest them. And not even a watch-dog to guard such precious treasures! Under such circumstances would it be at all surprising if our poor labouring man climbed the fence some dark night and helped himself? That is the problem of the Pacific'.²³³

Movement westwards was appealing in nature but it was this migration which brought about problems. Significant numbers of Japanese were migrating abroad, primarily to America but also to the British Dominions, including Australia, Canada and New Zealand.²³⁴ When considering expansion the Japanese had in mind the wider Pacific base which saw them collide with the United States who still held influence in the Philippines. In 1902 there were around 1,500 Japanese labourers on the island signifying a threefold increase since 1898. But Hawaii was of greater interest with the number of passports issued to Japanese labourers moving there increasing from 5,913 in 1897 to 12,952 in 1898, and to 27,155 in 1899. When Hawaii came under American jurisdiction however, immigration laws were tightened leading to a drop in Japanese emigration there. If anything however, this simply led to an increase in emigration to the West Coast which brought about a near doubling of the Japanese population there between 1889 and 1900, their total number of residents in the United States totalling in the region of 24,000. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War there were more than 65,000 Japanese in Hawaii and in the region of 40,000 on the West Coast.²³⁵ As can be seen from these statistics the Japanese looked towards emigration to America as their movement into areas in the Pacific were restricted. As the United States did not impose such restrictions many found themselves there which exacerbated the already on edge levels of antagonism.

Prevalent on the West Coast more than anywhere else in the United States, the yellow peril by 1905 had emerged as a significant part of everyday life. American policy had moved on from an impulsive and somewhat rash mind-set which solely revolved around issues of immigration and policy towards China to incorporate Japan and the threat it posed.²³⁶ This can be seen when looking at the Japanese workforce there. Regarding the worker himself the following was noted:

‘The American foreman is confronted by the difficulty that nearly every Japanese labourer knows the word “yes” as is prepared to use it in reply to every question that he is asked’.²³⁷

²³³ Sidney Osbourne, *The Problem of Japan. A Political study of Japan and of Her Relations with Russia, Great Britain, China, Germany, the United States, the British Colonies and the Netherlands, and of the World Politics of the Far East and the Pacific* (Amsterdam, 1918), 164.

²³⁴ Ayako Hotta-Lister, *The Japan-British Exhibition of 1910. Gateway to the Island Empire of the East* (Richmond, 1999), 17-18.

²³⁵ Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement*, 84-85.

²³⁶ Owens, ‘The Making’, 33.

²³⁷ W. Crewdson, ‘Japanese Emigrants’, *The Nineteenth Century and After: A Monthly Review*, 56:333 (1904), 817.

TABLE SIX: *Average Wages of American and Japanese Workers Per Day*
(shown in US dollars)

	Americans	Japanese
Carpenters	3.59	1.54
Forman Carpenters	5.75	2.43
Engineers	4.72	1.66
Foreman Painters	4.00	2.50
Painters	3.25	1.50
Sheet Metal Workers	3.16	1.50
Tinsmiths	3.50	1.50

Source: A. E. Yoell, 'Oriental vs. American Labour', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 34:2 (1909), 28.

TABLE SEVEN: *Immigration to the United States, 1891-1924*

Decade	Number of immigrants
1891-1900	3,688,000
1901-1910	8,795,000
1911-1920	5,736,000
1921-1924	2,345,000
Total	20,564,000

Source: Roger Daniels, *Not Like Us. Immigrants and Minorities in America, 1890-1924* (Chicago, 1997), viii.

TABLE EIGHT: *Japanese Migration to the United States, 1861-1924*

1861-1890	3,000
1891-1900	27,000
1901-1908	127,000
1909-1924	118,000
Total:	275,000

Source: Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice. The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Berkeley, 1977), 1.

Indeed when one looks at the comparison of wages which were demanded by Japanese and American workers one can see that there existed a reason for tension. This is shown in table six which details the biggest difference as being the pay amongst Forman Carpenters where the Japanese demanded \$3.32 per day less. Other significant differences included the pay of engineers and painters which stand at a difference of \$3.06 and \$2.75 respectively. This happened at a time where America was experiencing peaks numbers of foreign arrivals. At the beginning of the 1890s the number of foreign born as a percentage of the American population stood just shy of fifteen percent, a number which was equalled at the end of the 1900s.²³⁸ Looking specifically at the American census on the West Coast Japanese immigrants and native born in California make up a majority of the population. In 1890 they made up over fifty-six percent of the total Japanese population in the United States which had decreased to just over forty-one percent by 1900, and had increased to over fifty-seven percent by the end of the decade.²³⁹ Tables seven and eight highlight this point, the former showing that the 1900s experienced the highest number of immigrants in the space of thirty-three years, whilst the latter details how the Japanese made up a majority. When one looks at table eight the years 1891 to 1900 can be described as unrestricted and growing, and the following period of 1901 to 1908 as being at its peak and still unrestricted. It was figures such as these which led to many identifying the influx of foreign individuals as a problem with immigration and the onset of a crisis.

When comparing the yellow peril sentiment in America to that of its existence in Britain one finds a stark contrast as there was a faction which emphasised the friendship between the two, and on occasion completely dispelling the notion of its existence. In the introduction to the book *The Japanese Spirit* a Victorian poet and novelist wrote how this notion was non-existent:

‘Concerning the foolish talk of the Yellow Peril, a studious perusal of this book will show it to be fatuous. It is at least unlikely in an extreme degree that such a people, reckless of life though they be in front of danger, but Epicurean in their wholesome love of pleasure and pursuit of beauty, will be inflated to insanity by the success of their arms. Those writers who have seen something malignant and inimical in their gracious politeness, have been mere visitors on the fringe of the land, alarmed by their skill in manufacturing weapons and explosives — for they are inventive as well as imitative, a people not to be trifled with; but this was because their instinct as well as their emissaries warned them of a pressing need for the means of war. Japan and China have had experience of Western nations, and that is at the conscience of suspicious minds’.²⁴⁰

²³⁸ Daniels, *Not Like Us*, 59.

²³⁹ Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice. The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Berkeley, 1977), 1.

²⁴⁰ Okakura Yoshisaburo, *The Japanese Spirit* (London, 1905).

Indeed some have written how British public opinion wavered from the lines of those in America and that Japan would start acting like Europeans.²⁴¹ Diósy for example wrote the following:

‘Britannia wavers; her lovely face — a reminiscence, may-be, of sweet English girls seen at Cowes — is pensive. She knows that peril well, you see; she has done a good deal of business with him in the past, and, naturally, feels reluctant to use her spear against an old and valued customer’.²⁴²

Here the importance of Anglo-Japanese relations is emphasised, the alliance helping to prevent anti-Japanese sentiment from sticking in the minds of the British public. On the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Australian adventurer and correspondent for *The Times* in Peking George Morrison, wrote to Valentine Chirol about the successes which Japan will bring, and how it will make its mark on the Western world:

‘I am unfeignedly glad that war has come. I have no fear of the result. Japan will astonish Europe. She will move forward, I believe, irresistibly. Already she has done well and the effect of her success has been remarkable. Should she drive the Russians from the Yalu as it is certain she will do, she will have the assistance of every *Hunghutzu* in Manchuria’.²⁴³

Interestingly the radicals of Britain’s left-wing politics did not use the idea of the yellow peril and the fact that Japan was an Asiatic race who was culturally alien to make the headlines. Indeed Japan was admired for the amazing progress which it achieved in such a short space of time.²⁴⁴ The idea of there being a peril was definitely not as profound in English society as it was with their Anglo-Saxon kin across the Atlantic. But this society was far from anti-Japanese, anti-Asian, or anti-Orient free as images of these places were used as entertainment, the recipient of gesticulation.

Perhaps the best example of this is the portrayal of the East in theatre. Although this might not be expressive of a peril per se to the extent it was in the United States it exists as a means of how society in the Orient was perceived. ‘In plays and musical comedies’ writes John MacKenzie, ‘the Orient provided an unrivalled opportunity to portray not only spectacle in setting and costumes, but also peculiar people with funny names, odd laws and customs, and characters who were slippery, grasping, and, even more interestingly, lascivious. The orient, after all, had become a source of anxiety and strain, a place of complex trading relations and periodic warfare’. A number of plays which had a theme focused on the Orient were amongst the most successful and long-running of the period. *The Geisha* (1896) ran for

²⁴¹ Best, ‘Race, Monarchy’, 179-180.

²⁴² Diósy, *The New*, 332-333.

²⁴³ *Hunghutzu* are armed Manchurian bandits. Taken literally the term is translated to mean “red beards”. Letter from George Ernest Morrison to Valentine Chirol, 9 March 1904 from Peking [excerpts], in Lo Hui-Min (ed.), *The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison. Volume 1: 1895-1912* (Cambridge, 1976), 256.

²⁴⁴ Howard S. Weinroth, ‘The British Radicals and the Balance of Power, 1902-1914’, *The Historical Journal*, 13:4 (1970), 655.

760 performances, *San Toy* (1899) for 768, *Chinese Honeymoon* (1901) for 1,075 which stood as a record for the time, *The Cingalee* (1904) for 365, a naval comedy entitled *The Flag Lieutenant* for 381, and an Anglo-Chinese play *Mr. Wu* for 403 performances.²⁴⁵ Specifically to Japan the most infamous play was Gilbert and Sullivan's *The Mikado or the Town of Titipu* which became the most frequently performed Savoy Opera. It stands as a prime example of Japan being used for satirical purposes and a means of creating comedy and entertainment, as well as being an expression of Japan's unique beauty.²⁴⁶ The streets of London treated Japan and the Orient as a means of amusement with their customs and traditions being the subject of appreciation but perhaps more frequently of ridicule. It must be remembered however, that Londoners were not in immediate contact with the Japanese and that owing to Britain's vast empire, and the nationalistic fervour and pride of Britons which came as a result of it, that the presence of Japanese elsewhere brought with it reason to be apprehensive. Australia, Canada and New Zealand who like those on the West Coast were sceptical of Japanese expansion after 1905. As the British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour was reported to have in government memoranda:

‘Sir George Clarke has pointed out to me that there are obvious difficulties — not to say absurdities — in showing Australia and other Colonies to treat our Japanese allies as belonging to an inferior race. At the same time, I am very doubtful whether this is a subject on which we either can, or ought, to coerce our self-governing Colonies, though it seems obvious to me that if we permit them differentiate against the Japanese immigrant we can raise no objection to the Japanese differentiating against the British trader, whether he come from Australia or from England. There is much to be said for trying to get this question put on a satisfactory basis before the Treaty is signed, though, on the other hand, it may be one of the difficulties which it is best to ignore, in the hope that, during the currency of the Treaty, it may not arise in an acute form’.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁵ John M. MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire. The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960* (Manchester, 1984), 53-54. Other plays which held a focus on the Orient focus on India and include *The Defence of the Consulate* (1883) which consists of scenes with British soldiers firing on the “fuzzy-wuzzies” against an oriental background. By the end of the century other recurring titles included *The Great Mogul*, *The Nabob's Fortune*, *The Nabob*, *The Nabob's Pickle*, *Lalla Rookh*, *The Saucy Nabob*, *The Begum's Diamonds*, *The Stars of India*, and *The Mahatma* which the British audience lapped up. In the latter part of the decade stage performances almost perfectly reflected the military apprehensions and obsessions of the time with global events such as those in East Asia adding fuel to the fire. In 1909 the propaganda of the National Service League and the Navy League was embodied in plays entitled *Wake up England*, *Nation in Arms*, and *A Plea for the Navy* where the purpose of the military and navy were encouraged amongst the general public. Ibid, 48-49. For a general look at British theatre and melodrama I would refer the reader to the following: Michael Booth, *English Melodrama* (London, 1965); Michael Booth, *Victorian Spectacular Theatre, 1850-1910* (London, 1981); J. S. Bratton, Richard Allen Cave, Breandan Gregory, Heidi J. Holder, and Michael Pickering, *Acts of Supremacy. The British Empire and the Stage, 1790-1930* (Manchester and New York, 1991), 129-149, and pages 150-178 for a look at the portrayal of India on the British stage.

²⁴⁶ Blomberg, ‘Isles of Gold’, 63; Daniels, ‘Elites, Governments and Citizens’, 6-7.

²⁴⁷ CAB 37/77, no. 98, 1905. Government Document from Arthur J. Balfour, 1 June 1905.

Table three shows how Britain and its colonies were the second highest recipient of Japanese immigrants looking to move to the West. It was with this mind-set that the word “Oriental” was used in a derogatory manner. Here more comparisons are made between the Occidentalism and Orientalism. Gulick states how the “Oriental” brought with it negative connotations and hampered the path of progress:

‘In my own use of the word, oriental signifies that type of civilisation which does not recognise the value or rights of the individual person as such. It represents autocratic absolutism in government; it emphasises the rights of the superior and the duties of the inferior; it ranks man as inherently superior to woman; it has no place for popular education or for representative government, and it esteems military virtue as the highest type known. In other words in oriental civilisation the community is supreme, the individual of no value whatever in himself.

By occidental I mean that type of civilisation which recognises and builds on the inherent value and inalienable rights of the individual person. The community exists for its individuals. The final motive of conduct is the highest welfare of the individuals in the community. The communal life is the means and not an end. It does not ignore the value or the necessity of communal life, but it finds the justification for, and the roots of communal life in the inherent nature and needs of individual persons. The typical representatives of occidental civilisation to-day are England and America. To occidental, therefore, I prefer the word Anglo-Saxon. In its logically developed forms, Anglo-Saxon civilisation emphasises constitutional and representative government, obedience to law, inherent equality and liberty of all men even though in social rank and person attainments there may be great inequalities; it emphasises popular education, the mutual duties and rights of older and younger, superior and inferior, the prime importance of personal character, the equal importance of the family with the military, the commercial, and the industrial virtues’.²⁴⁸

It was not merely the hampering of progress which Westerners attributed to those in the East, it was the fact they held on to their traditions and customs, things which the West perceived as traits of an underhand and deceitful civilisation:

‘It is certainly true that to a great many Europeans who have mixed with Orientals the Eastern character has seemed a hopeless melody of simplicity and cunning, fidelity and treachery, wisdom and folly, suspicion and trust, cruelty and superstition, which is always stultifying itself and always needing the presence of at its side of the more ponderated Western character, and although there is no doubt that the judgement of Europeans as to the majority of Orientals has been considerably justified by one set of facts, yet another set is not wanting which tends to support a less favourable view’.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁸ Gulick, *The White Peril*, 88-89.

²⁴⁹ Carrell, ‘East and West’, 101.

Alongside their concentration on the fact that the Occident inhabited the superior being and civilisation was the idea of Anglo-Saxonism, both experienced varying levels of the yellow peril with it being more a form of entertainment in Britain whilst Americans treated it with greater sincerity and apprehension.

Russian defeat stands as the pinnacle of this threat. Fears that Japan now possessed the ability to hamper American trade in southern Manchuria and the Open Door Policy in China emerged. Combined with their immigration crisis this led to an increase in anti-Japanese sentiment. As Henry Hyndman has stated, by the end of the war some Americans believed that Japan now had the opportunity to deal with the presence and perceived threat of the United States in the East with the same ‘relentless efficiency’ which they had displayed in the wars with China and Russia.²⁵⁰ Japan had now become a major power in the Asia-Pacific region which as historian Tadashi Aruga states, witnessed the end of ‘an era of amicable U.S.-Japanese relationship’. With this the idea of the peril had to be nipped in the bud. One American newspaper published an article asking ‘Is There Anything In the Yellow Peril?’ with the subtitle of ‘Uncle Sam Has Nought to Fear if He is Vigilant’. The article concluded that Japan was the main source of the peril, but provided the United States be anything but negligent and indifferent they could only benefit from affairs in the East and would have nothing to fear from it.²⁵¹ Thenceforth the United States sought only to restrain any Japanese attempts at expansion and challenge their burgeoning hegemony.²⁵² In addition to this the fact that many felt cheated at the Portsmouth peace talks was evident in America as one anonymous letter entitled “The Angry Japanese” published in *The New York Times* stresses:

‘With all our patriotism we could not but cry that such a great failure on the part of the Japanese diplomats is a permanent and irredeemable national disgrace to the history of the Rising Sun....

Just examine the peace terms now supposed to be agreed upon.... There is no diplomatic victory on the part of Mr. Witte, there is no diplomatic strategy whatsoever on the part of the Japanese....

I hereby declare to the world: Wage war with Japan upon the least pretence and you are sure to win a diplomatic victory, whether you shall win or not on the battlefield. I hereby thank Russia and Witte that they were so mild in their peace terms, while they could, if they had tried, have imposed and got a large indemnity from Japan.

²⁵⁰ Hyndman, *The Awakening*, 151. Osbourne also brings to light how troubles now began to appear in education, stating how they brewed in schools with owing to the segregation of Japanese school children. Osbourne, *The Problem*, 151.

²⁵¹ *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, 24 December 1905.

²⁵² In addressing this Tadashi Aruga brings to light how these American attempts were in many ways futile owing to Japan’s connection with the Entente powers, specifically Britain with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which was renewed twice prior to the outbreak of the First World War, and because of American involvement in European affairs during the war. Tadashi Aruga, ‘Reflections on the History of U.S.-Japanese Relations’, *American Studies International*, 32:1 (1994), 9-10.

‘Lastly, a few words to Komura and the Elder Statesmen of Japan: Those who know where to die, when to commit hara-kiri, are truly great; or at least they may be said to know how to apologise. True samurai prefer death to living a shameful life’.²⁵³

It was this animosity which led to the outbreak of the Hibiya Riots in Tokyo which expressed how the Japanese felt that their patriotic endeavours during the conflict were betrayed by their own statesmen who had previously been commended for their success.²⁵⁴ These riots have been seen as accentuating the notion of pan-Asianism with the idea of *unmei kyōdōtai* spreading across not only the Asian world but also the Arab.²⁵⁵ This unrest can be regarded as heightening the caution of Japan to the West, accentuating the yellow peril in the same way as the Boxer Rebellion. Rotem Kowner for one writes how these riots displayed the violence of what was perceived as an ‘infuriated mob’.²⁵⁶ It is from this that an image of a mass hoard can be inferred with Japan once again standing out as the epitome of the peril, sentiments which had deepened by the end of 1905 and now on a far grandeur scale as their pre-eminence in the East became second nature.

In the years after the Boxer Rebellion these feelings became far more profound, the Japanese victory over Russia serving as the crux of anti-Japanese feelings and an example to the West of what level of threat they posed to their way of life. But as we have previously discovered Japan was fearful of losing its independence, an attitude which prevails in the years examined here as the notion of a white peril continued to develop. Indeed many believed that their war with Russia was a result of the increasing Western infringement in Eastern circles. As one Japanese statesman and diplomat put it, the reality of the white peril was the real threat whilst the yellow peril was simply a myth.²⁵⁷ But beyond this was a

²⁵³ *The New York Times*, 4 September 1905.

²⁵⁴ Michael McCarthy talks of the importance which the Mikado in particular had during the Russo-Japanese War. That he and his statesmen had ‘shown themselves magnanimous as well as prudent’ witnessed the nation express their gratitude with a personal gift to him of ¥20,000,000 (£2,000,000) which was unanimously voted by the Diet ‘as a memento of the single successes achieved in the war’ which ‘were mainly due to imperial virtues’. Quoted in McCarthy, *The Coming Power*, 13-14.

²⁵⁵ *Unmei kyōdōtai* is translated to mean “common destiny”. Saaler, ‘Pan-Asianism’, 10. See also Iida, ‘Fleeing the West’, 410-421. At this point I will direct the reader to an interesting study looking at Japan’s claim to the Islamic world which overlaps a period of this study: Selçuk Esenbel, ‘Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945’, *The American Historical Review*, 109:4 (2004), 1140-1170.

²⁵⁶ Kowner, ‘The War’, 30.

²⁵⁷ Baron Kentaro Kanekō, ‘The Yellow Peril is the Golden Opportunity for Japan’, *The North American Review*, 179:576 (1904), 644. In addition to this Gulick writes how there was a view that the Russo-Japanese War was solely a result of the white peril in the East, and that the meaning behind this conflict was for the defence of her empire and the desire to establish a permanent and lasting peace. For a look at the former of these points I would refer the reader to pages 138-153 of Gulick’s *The White Peril* and to pages 154-163 for the latter of these points. Following on from this James Bashford writes of how a policy amongst white races had developed which had a purpose of excluding all yellow and Oriental races which spanned across five continents and a portion of the sixth. This he argues has been engrained in policy since the middle of the nineteenth century where since 1848 Portugal had annexed approximately 800,000 square miles of territory, Belgium, 900,000; Germany and Russia each 1,200,000; the United States, 1,800,000; France, 3,200,000; Great Britain, 3,600,000; and other white nations approximately 500,000. This totalled 3,200,000 square miles of territory annexed in the space of the last seventy years, constituting an area three and one half times the size of Europe. He goes on to

feeling amongst Japanese that they had become the civilised power during this conflict where they were the ones fighting for the principles of freedom and enlightenment which had been bestowed on them:

‘Brains plus education plus thorough-going enterprise of this kind must conquer all things — even the Muscovite, who, content to keep his own country enslaved in ignorance, would fain crush such an enlightened and progressive people as those of Japan’.²⁵⁸

Along with this idea there was a belief that people in the West maintained a profound distaste of Japan which developed more after the war with Russia. Revolutionist and scholar Taraknath Das, who was anti-British and openly opposed their rule in India and Bengal, wrote of these attitudes. In the introduction to his book *Is Japan a Menace to Asia?* which he dedicated to the cause for Asian independence, he wrote:

‘The awakening of Asia is the most outstanding feature of the present age. The future of Asia is bright and glorious if the new spirit of Asia be rightly directed in co-operation with all the Asian people. We hope, though we may not live to see it fully accomplished, that Japan and China and India will work unitedly, standing for Asian independence against all outside aggressions’.²⁵⁹

When addressing Japanese unpopularity Das further writes:

‘Some of the far-sighted Japanese statesmen fully realise that she will have to fall back to Asian aid in case a combination of powers arises against her. So to them the vital plank of Japan’s policy is to establish a community of interests between all the yellow races (if not Asiatic people) and to begin with the strongest of them all — China. Japan faces the strongest opposition of Great Britain and U. S. A., both haters of Asiatic people. The strongest of all oppositions come from Great Britain because her interest in Asia is immense’.²⁶⁰

Pan-Asianist sentiments can in many ways be seen to have contributed to the emergence of a new era in East Asia, the defeat of a Western imperialist bringing about a new level of consciousness amongst Asiatics.

mention: ‘The tendency at present is to exclude the Asiatic races from Europe, Africa, North America, South America, Australia, and from Russian holdings in Asia, and to confine them to the southern portion of this last continent. The exclusion policy extends not only to the Chinese and Japanese and Malays, but to the people of India, a portion of whom, are cousins to the higher branches of the white race’. James W. Bashford, *China: An Interpretation* (New York and Cincinnati, 1916), 446.

²⁵⁸ Edmund Mitchell, ‘Japan at St. Louis’, *Temple Bar: A Monthly Magazine for Town and Country Readers*, July 1905.

²⁵⁹ Taraknath Das, *Is Japan a Menace to Asia?* (Shanghai, 1917), v-vi.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 32-33.

With their newly established empire Japan was on the same footing as other imperialists, becoming the first Eastern state to do so thereby facilitating a new world order. Diósy details the significance of this emergence by stating how;

‘... it was the Empire of the Rising Sun that gave the Old Far East its death-blow. The New Far East is the Far East as Japan has made it by her adaptation of Occidental civilisation, and by the results of the policy towards her neighbours the new methods enabled her to pursue’.

Japan’s growth and expansion as an economic power also merited attention:

‘The enormous industrial development of New Japan, and the competition, in many cases successful, it has entered into with the Occident—not only in Japan itself, but in markets hitherto considered as virtually reserved for the products of Europe and America—supply an object-lesson that teaches us what the Far East can do when thoroughly aroused’.²⁶¹

East Asia could now be seen as a hub for global affairs as changes such as these saw Japan acquire its own momentum which was beyond the ability of Britain and America to either halt or control. Richard Langhorne also states how this was now a place thwart with difficulty owing to the fact that it contained an international system embryonic in nature as it incorporated the European powers of Britain, France, Germany and Russia as well as the United States, all of whom continued to possess influence and sway in this area of the world.²⁶² With this there was the idea that the East and West were getting closer together, that idea first expressed in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as imperialism emerged in both world arenas in a short and rapid space of time leading to competition and the potential estrangement. As Inazo Nitobé puts it:

‘When one calls at a neighbour’s front door, one is usually received with courtesy; on the other hand, one may possibly be considered an intruder in the backyard, no matter how innocent. Just as the marginal utility of commodities fixes their value, as economists teach us, so it is in the margins of civilisations that the powers of expansive nationalities seem to be tried and determined. America has extended her borders to the Philippines, and Japan the edge of her dominions to Formosa. Here they almost meet. American trade, increasing in China, is brought into competition with Japanese, and as in these outskirts of commercial territory, inhabited by alien races, each nation tries to demonstrate and assert its own superiority, the timid are afraid that we may come to know each other in ways not agreeable.

‘With the growth of imperialism the stronger nations look upon each other with suspicion and jealousy, and, unlike the more innocent intercourse of former days,

²⁶¹ Diósy, *The New*, 102, 338.

²⁶² Richard Langhorne, *The Collapse of the Concert of Europe. International Politics, 1890-1914* (London and Basingstoke, 1981), 8, 21-22.

when men delighted in the exchange of the ideas and arts of peace, modern imperialism, impelled by feverish megalomania and zest for commercial supremacy, has come to regard all competitors, not only as rivals, but as potential enemies, whose existence jeopardises their own and whose fate must therefore be decided at the point of the sword'.²⁶³

But not only the result of imperialism this coming together can be regarded as a symptom of progress and a result of technological innovations such as the electric telegraph and the steamship. A combination of these factors can be seen to have led to the collision of these distinct worlds. Langhorne concurs with this point: 'The result was a change in the nature of international power in which its expression became more and more technological, and caused an upset in traditional relationships both between powers and between different parts of the world. This change in the currency of international power coupled with the emergence beyond Europe of new powers, dealing also with in the new currency, faced the great powers with a world-wide sphere of international operation in which the old bases of the international system in Europe had become geographically and practically inappropriate'.²⁶⁴ Times were continuing to change in a similar ilk to the turn of the century, a statement which is true of Britain whose dominance in East Asia continued to diminish. At home there was the concern of a military threat with the belief that their traditional defences, significantly the Royal Navy which although it remained the best navy in the world found itself going head-to-head with other developing navies, would not be able to protect Britain in the future to the same degree it had done centuries past. Growing economic competition as developing countries in the East like that of Japan, opened up new markets leading to writers, journalists and pundits publishing works on this panic. The works of Ernest Williams and Fredrick Mackenzie which featured the penetration of British markets both at home and abroad by superior foreign goods are perfect examples of this, becoming bestsellers.²⁶⁵ In the space of five years since the Boxer Rebellion East Asia had become a prominent area for economic, commercial, and imperial development. Owing to the growing strength of Japan the Orient and Occident had become closer together as the former of these hemispheres became a global powerhouse with Japan the glowing symbol of progress in the East.

Whereas the years after the Sino-Japanese War witnessed the retrocession of Japanese imperialism the years following the Boxer Rebellion saw them acquire a more reputable accreditation as an imperial state and emerge as an indisputable global power. This began

²⁶³ Nitobé, *The Japanese Nation*, 2-3. On the coming together of East and West Nitobé cannot overlook the influence of imperialism: 'As facilities of intercommunication, and therefore points of contact, have of late rapidly increased, and as the East and West can now see and hear each other at close range on matters of business interests, instead of merely exchanging courtesies at a polite distance, occasions have likewise more frequently arisen from misunderstanding and for doubt. The reasons for this seem manifest, and among them is imperialism, the overpowering trend of the last century, which, causing the stronger nations to overleap their respective territorial bounds, has brought them face to face with one another in unexpected quarters distant from home'. Ibid, 1.

²⁶⁴ Langhorne, *The Collapse*, 21.

²⁶⁵ David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled. British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century* (Harlow, 2000), 66; Keller, 'Anglo-American Politics', 466. See also Ernest Edwin Williams, *Made in Germany* (London, 1896) and F. A. Mackenzie, *The American Invaders* (London, 1902).

with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as Britain moved away from the idea of a formulating a formal agreement with the United States, the idea of Anglo-Saxonism which had been prevalent towards the end of the nineteenth century being overshadowed by the devising of an alliance with a nation who was more than enthusiastic to share the burden of defending British interests. Regardless of this split both Anglo-Saxon nations supported Japan in the early 1900s. By the end of the Russo-Japanese conflict however, Americans had become far more cautious of Japan's and their rise to power, whilst the British maintained a generally friendly approach. It was this which led to the idea of Japan as being the epitome of the yellow peril being more widely accentuated, their seemingly comfortable victory combining with displays of discontent in its immediate aftermath showing how the Japanese and even Asiatics more generally had the potential to disrupt the Western way of life as the Boxer Rebellion did in 1900. But it was more than their newly established military prowess which made people in the West stand up and take note. In America there was a fear of Asian immigration surpassing the levels which Chinese emigration witnessed in the 1880s. It was now without doubt that Japan had become the most powerful nation in the East as its Westernisation had led to modernisation with the establishment of a continental empire which did not receive any respite as it had following the war with China. As Japan was the only Asiatic imperial power the notion of them leaving Asia and becoming increasingly more similar to Western states materialised. Beyond this however their development was also seen to bring about the awakening of Asia as this area of the world could no longer be overlooked in a way which it had been in centuries past. It was this which further fuelled yellow peril sentiment, with America and Europe no longer the cornerstone of global affairs. Whereas the 1890s saw a changing of the guard between China and Japan, the years up to the war with Russia saw them emerge on the world stage as an indisputable leading regional power leading to expressions of the yellow peril prevailing as a genuine fear and as a form of entertainment. By 1905 this fear had reached its peak and thenceforth Japan would find itself alienated and branded by Westerners who feared their next expansionist move. Having conquered an imperialist state in the form of Russia, Japan was on top of the world, standing on the shoulders of giants. The cost of success was them being labelled as a primary threat and the epitome of the yellow peril. Thenceforth however, Japan became increasingly more independent and less reliant on alliances with the West as it pursued policies of continental expansion as a means to counter the white peril and assert their pre-eminence in what was their own back garden.

Some Concluding Reflections on Japan and the Yellow Peril

‘Japan and the Japanese have not been so much in evidence before the world since the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed as they have been last month. For Japan is showing herself as expert in the great art of advertisement as she has already shown herself in the arts of war. Japan all this year has been in London, preening her feathers and warbling her sweetest music like a golden oriole of the tropical forest, murmuring softly to each passer-by, “Am I not fair to see? Come and look and gaze your fill. For that purpose have I come, and for that purpose I remain yet three months more — three months and no more”’.²⁶⁶

- *Review of Reviews*, 1910

‘The truth is that in spite of the countless visitors to Japan and the mass of literature about things Japanese, the European world is still curiously far from an adequate understanding of these “Yankees of the Pacific” – ignorant of the common facts of their life and country, still more ignorant of their real character and temperament’.²⁶⁷

- Sir Henry Norman, *The Real Japan*, 1909

‘That a yellow race could ever defeat a white race had never occurred to us, and we were correspondingly startled and alarmed. We abruptly ceased to think of the Japanese as a third-rate nation of polite, well-meaning, and harmless little men, drinkers of tea and wearers of kimonos. They became the Yellow Peril’.²⁶⁸

- E. Alexander Powell, *Asia at the Crossroads*, 1922

²⁶⁶ ‘Japan in London’, *Review of Reviews*, 15 August 1910.

²⁶⁷ Sir Henry Norman, *The Real Japan. Studies of Contemporary Japanese Manners, Morals, Administration, and Politics* (London, 1909), 338.

²⁶⁸ E. Alexander Powell, *Asia at the Crossroads. Japan : Korea : China: Philippine Islands* (New York, 1922), 13.

Dramatic changes were a significant feature in this decade of the Meiji era; changes which saw Japan acquire an empire, defeat a Western imperialist on the battlefield and become the predominant indigenous power in the East going head-to-head with the United States for hegemony in the Pacific. The fundamental change which took place however, occurred in the decade prior to the 1890s as colonialism took place where Africa and Asia were the primary targets for Western imperialists for the establishment of colonies. Although it was primarily these nations who sought to acquire protectorate states with a primary focus being more on China, Japan materialized in the 1890s following the Sino-Japanese War as Asia's answer to the changing state of global affairs as their embarkation to establish a programme of empire building catalysed a change hitherto unbeknownst in the East. It is for this reason that the ten year period stemming from the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, the early years of its imperialism, are significant in the development of Meiji Japan. Substantial differences separate the years after the war to the Boxer Rebellion and the subsequent five years up to the end of the Russo-Japanese War in terms of Japan's relations with the West, and how or if Westerners perceived them as a threat. The premise of this work has been to address in detail the significance of the events which formulate this period and how they were received, perceptions which have not been widely addressed in historiography. Following the Sino-Japanese War, Japan was regarded as a growing threat whereas by the end of the conflict with Russia in 1905 they had firmly established itself as the epitome of the yellow peril. They had moved away from the traditions of a now distant past as their Westernisation and modernisation had redefined its position. Japan's growing ascendancy was received with greater and unparalleled levels of attention as they became the key player in the East, the orchestrator of a new world emerging out of the old.

It was the Sino-Japanese War which led to the emergence of Japanese imperialism and the genesis of a new world in the East as well as a new hierarchy there as their victory brought about the occupation of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, the beginnings of continental expansion marking the inception of Meiji Japan's empire. Of such profound influence was this development that even the Triple Intervention, that act of mischief from a select few anxious Europeans in their attempts to retrocede and reverse its newfound status, could not hamper its occurrence. The key point here however, is not that Japan lost some of what they had won at the Treaty of Shimonoseki, it is that a select few European powers deemed it prudent enough to enforce their will upon affairs in the East highlighting how there was an awareness and a sense of anxiety towards Japan's newly acquired strength. Thenceforth the term "yellow peril" emerged, receiving widespread attention as images of Oriental hordes and the idea of an invasion spreading across the Middle East followed quickly across Europe with the potential to reach the United States, which some viewed the Boxer Rebellion as expressing, began to sprout amongst those who were cautious of a change in the status quo. But there was more reason for the emergence of this sentiment than merely Japan's rapid rise, and that is the simultaneous advent of American imperialism where through their occupation of the Philippines it had effectively set up camp in Japan's back garden. As Britain commended the ascendancy of the United States the notion of Anglo-Saxonism became prevalent in British and American societal and political circles as relations between the two entered into rapprochement and the beginning of prosperity. As the West entered the realms of the East however, those in the Asia-Pacific area started to move

westwards as the trend of emigration took shape. This is true of Japan as the Meiji government sent envoys to Western nations, and as Japanese subjects sought a more thriving standard of living. Japanese immigration to America's West Coast in the decade after the exclusion laws had been applied to the Chinese, saw Orientals enter Western territory.²⁶⁹ As some migrated westwards those nations to which they went began to express fear of what was a completely new culture from a part of the world with inherently different traditions and ethos. Thereafter Western attitudes came to view Japanese development and progress with a mix of admiration and fear; a respect for their swift victory over China and acquiescence, adoption and adaptation of Western cultures and attitudes, and trepidation because of this expression of strength, their ambitions for further gains, and the movement of Japanese. It is with the latter of these perceptions which saw a growing fear of Japan as the yellow peril materialise.

Following the Boxer Rebellion further changes took place to those experienced in the last days of the nineteenth century. With the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan had now joined with one of the leading Western nations, its significance being that an Eastern nation had agreed a formal agreement which treated them with equality, extinguishing notions of extraterritoriality. It was with this that Britain can be seen to have moved slightly away from the bonds of Anglo-Saxonism as it was only with Japan that they could engage in a union which protected their interests in the East, the United States persistent in their reluctance to partake in an coalition or union which held the potential to drag them into foreign entanglements which did not directly affect them. This is not to say however, that America did not play a part in East Asian affairs, nor that the idea of cordial Anglo-American relations and Anglo-Saxonism had disintegrated in any way. In the early 1900s the United States still focused on its position in the East with the Filipino-American War, and even sought to be a silent partner in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. With this the United States still held an interest in how Japan progressed, and like Britain expressed feelings of support which continued into the Russo-Japanese War. As this conflict ensued these feelings of support began to alter, a statement truer of America as its expressions of the yellow peril became far more vociferous. Japanese emigration to the West Coast fuelled these sentiments as estrangement between these two nations furthered. Although these expressions can also be found in British circles they were far from being expressed on an equal level and to the same standard. Indeed in London theatre the Orient and the traditions which had transcended Asiatic nations for many a century was treated with ridicule as theatre productions used them as a form of comic entertainment. But the changes taking place in Japan were not overlooked by either of these nations. With the occurrence of pan-Asiatic sentiment and the support which this ideology expressed growing, an idea of Asia awakening was voiced, strengthening the idea of the yellow peril. This was catalysed by the Russo-Japanese War which saw the collapse of a

²⁶⁹ An article published by Yosaburo Yoshida stressed how the reasons for Japanese emigration revolved around the American dream and the advertisements in newspapers of how Japanese who had ventured to the United States were able to save money, start a business and own land. His article also stresses how the increase in Japanese population, economic pressure because of limited land, and heightened levels of competition amongst the working classes made emigration appealing. The contrast between East and West are apparent here. Yoasburo Yoshida, 'Sources and Causes of Japanese Immigration', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 34:2 (1909), 157-167.

Western imperial power and a greater expression of what these Oriental hordes were capable of should they have an appropriate leader to guide them westwards. Whereas Japan's victory over China was followed by the retrocession of what acquisitions they had made no such occurrence followed the Russo-Japanese War. Although there was some qualms following the Treaty of Portsmouth with many in Japan believing that Russia was not treated with the level of discipline and punishment which was expected, holding the belief that they were still not viewed by all many in the West as a nation on equal standing. The Hibiya Riots stand as a prime example of Japan's nationalistic endeavours and expression, emphasise these feelings. By the end of Russian conflict Japan had affirmed itself as the staple power in East Asia and was now more independent than ever before, their confidence extremely high. It is with these factors that Japan had become the yellow peril personified in the West as their newfound strength and imperial gains saw the concretion of them as a growing threat. This sentiment was expressed through the popular media.²⁷⁰

By examining the ten year period from the Sino-Japanese War to the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, the period of indisputable progression for Meiji Japan, this work has sought to add to the historiography surrounding this period and this topic. By providing insight and a distinct level of acumen into the emergence of Japan as the epitome of the yellow peril and the fear amongst which came with it, this work acts as a point of information, a springboard relating to the events which sparked and fuelled this sentiment. In using these two conflicts as well as other events such as the Boxer Rebellion and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, this work as sought to contribute to existing scholarship. Through addressing the effects which these events had on Japan, the Japanese and its military, commercial, economic and societal development, and the perceptions of such changes in the West, the findings outlined in this thesis have developed upon and added to existing works from a range of academics. The works of those such as Erika Lee and Gordon Daniels who have focused on both Chinese and Japanese emigration westwards, as well as other scholars whose works focus on the same topic but are not as widespread such as Andrew Cobbing, have highlighted how these nations were the primary recipient of Japanese influences as they looked westwards, and that how perceptions changed.²⁷¹ Alongside more general works offered by the likes of Akira Iriye and Peter Duus who offer a more singular look of Japanese imperial development and how it came into closer contact with other nations, an all-round and encompassing picture is provided, allowing for the various aspects which contributed to Japanese growth alongside Western the observations of these changes which this study has addressed to take place. This piece of research is unique in that it has focused on the growth of the yellow peril and the growth of Japanese imperialism in the space of ten years spanning

²⁷⁰ *Harper's Weekly* in November 1906 reported the following: 'Japan is at this moment the strongest naval power in the Pacific.... In a word, rich as we are, and poor as she is, we could not afford to go to war with Japan, for the Philippines, in Hawaii, an on our Pacific Coast, we are vulnerable'. Quoted in Lyman, 'The "Yellow Peril" Mystique', 700. Homer Lea also wrote how Japan was the source of the yellow peril and that the United States was now the last line of defence for the West. Homer Lea, *The Valour of Ignorance* (New York, 1909).

²⁷¹ See Andrew Cobbing, 'Early Japanese Visitors to Victorian Britain', in Gordon Daniels and Chushichi (eds.), *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600-2000. Volume 5: Social and Cultural Perspectives* (Basingstoke, 2002), 43-59.

two conflicts which were to alter the status-quo in East Asia. In this period Japan emerged as the first non-Western and non-white imperial power, altering the status quo and planting the seeds of cautiousness and fretfulness amongst groups of Westerners where a belief that the vast number of Eastern hordes with the potential to upset their way of life had been awakened, possessing the intent to expand in an era where colonialism was all the rage, and overseas territory to establish an empire the trending fashion.

Owing to the constraints which inhibit this work it is worth bringing to the reader's attention a range of themes and topics which transcend the period of study presented here, as well as the years preceding and following it as they provide a more encapsulating view of Western perceptions of Japan. One such topic is the notion of bushidō which put simply is the way and life of the samurai comparable to the chivalry attributed of Medieval Europe, permeating all areas of society. When one looks at how Japanese scholars have defined it this is understandable. Inazo Nitobé for one describes it as 'the code of moral principles which the knights were required or instructed to observe. It is not a written code; at best it consists of a few maxims handed down from mouth to mouth or coming from the pen of some well-known warrior or savant. More frequently it is a code unuttered and unwritten, possessing all the more the powerful sanction of veritable deed, and of a law written on the fleshly tablets of the heart. It was founded not on the creating of one brain, however able, or on the life of a single personage, however renowned. It was a single organic growth of decades and centuries of military career'.²⁷² With this, observers in England began to urge the need of the British to adopt and emulate Japanese attitudes as a means to help maintain Britain's position in the world.²⁷³ The same attitude was shared amongst the British populous who by the turn of the century began to believe that this philosophy stood as a means of guaranteeing an efficient and sustainable empire, able to counter problems such as Britain's decline as the global economic power, which were blossoming from the heart of the empire.²⁷⁴ By the time of the Russo-Japanese War it becomes more obvious that the British military were looking to learn this ideal. Up to this point the British army had vast experience fighting only colonial wars, and its navy had not been tested in modern warfare for near a century meaning the Admiralty and War Office sought to learn what they could from this conflict as a means of keeping updated. Furthermore with regards to the navy, the British were facing increasingly greater threats from other growing navies which included the French, Russian, American, Italian, German, and Japanese fleets.²⁷⁵ Equally so there were views amongst some who opposed Japan's blatant non-gentlemanly methods following its attack on Port Arthur in 1905 with the use of stealth, deception and surprise. Many historians have drawn parallels with this attack and their attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, both of which demonstrated these characteristics. This initiative went against the gentlemanly and cordial manner and the rules of fair play,

²⁷² Nitobé, *The Soul*, 4-5.

²⁷³ Perry Anderson, 'The Prussia of the East?' in Masao Miyoshi and H. D. Harootunian (eds.), *Japan in the World* (London, 1996), 31.

²⁷⁴ Holmes and Ion, 'Bushidō', 309, 314. See also Stephen R. Turnbull, *The Samurai: A Military History* (London, 1977); Richard Storry, *The Way of the Samurai* (London, 1978); Searle, *The Quest*.

²⁷⁵ Philip Towle, 'British Naval and Military Observers of the Russo-Japanese War', in J. E. Hoare (ed.), *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits. Volume Three* (Richmond, 1999), 158. See also Porter, 'Military Orientalism?' 5-6, 24-25.

which the British had known and held in their modes of warfare.²⁷⁶ The bushidō philosophy did have an influence on British perceptions of Japan showing how certain elements of the Japanese mind-set alongside its patriotism appealed to the British military as well as society more generally. Although the works of Patrick Porter have been used which focus on military observations in the Russo-Japanese War, as well as Colin Holmes' and Amish Ion's article 'Bushidō and the Samurai', a detailed examination would permit for a different approach and angle on British perception of Japan in its early imperialist years to take shape.

Beyond the inherent features which made the Japanese military a distinct entity from the rest of society were its societal traditions and cultures which became a fad in Britain especially where this trend, generally referred to as Japonisme, became a growing trade from the late nineteenth century onwards.²⁷⁷ From 1875 to the turn of the century the British were keen and enthusiastic buyers of things Japanese from old and valuable pieces of art to the cheap factory-produced knick-knacks. The demand for cheaply produced Japanese fancy goods had risen steadily in this period. Whereas many of these novelty items were made in Japan, bulky pieces of bamboo furniture as well as cheap stamped-out metal ware including trays and tea caddies were made in Britain at places like Birmingham.²⁷⁸ Furnishings and arts became of great interest but its prevalence went further than this and can be seen in works of fiction. The most successful profiteer from publishing on Japonisme in Britain was Mortimer Menpes. His book, *Japan. A Record in Colour* published in December 1901, was lapped up by the eager public who were reeled in by the lure of one hundred coloured plates which were painted by Mortimer Menpes himself, all of which were covered with a tissue noting the title of the picture.²⁷⁹ Japanese culture was part of the fashionable trend in Britain, the aesthetic movement which contributed to the establishment of a unique culture and surroundings, playing a part in the middle-class and affluent homes of the Victorian era. This stemmed from the Great Exhibition at Crystal Palace in 1851 where Orientalism had been promoted as 'a fresh well of art' with the belief that it was from the East where the most impressive lessons could and would be learnt.²⁸⁰ Indeed Japanese art was met with great levels of enthusiasm with artists such as James McNeil Whistler, Menpes, George Henry, Edward Hornel, as well others being influenced by its style and composition, their works minting the term.²⁸¹ Of

²⁷⁶ Irrespective of this however, Britons were impressed by the effects which night attacks and feints brought about as it brought the attacker to the verge of victory in a blaze of power before a shot was fired. Alongside this Britons were impressed with the discipline of the Japanese who did not reveal any information when captured. Porter, 'Military Orientalism?' 10.

²⁷⁷ Blomberg, 'Isles of Gold', 63.

²⁷⁸ Checkland, *Japan and Britain*, 187-188.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 162.

²⁸⁰ Tomoko Sato and Toshio Watanabe, 'The Aesthetic Dialogue Examined. Japan and Britain 1850-1930', in Tomoko Sato and Toshio Watanabe (eds.), *Japan and Britain. An Aesthetic Dialogue 1850-1930*, (London, 1991), 27. See also, Rupert Richard Arrowsmith, 'The Transcultural Roots of Modernism: Imagist Poetry, Japanese Visual Culture, and the Western Museum System', *Modernism/Modernity*, 18:1 (2011), 27-42.

²⁸¹ Blomberg, 'Isles of Gold', 63. Although the works of these artists were somewhat experimental it provides a detailed impression of the breadth and depth of this phenomenon. Japanese art was regarded as a source of inspiration in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In 1862 Japanese art made quite an impact in London, as it did in Paris in 1867, Philadelphia in 1876, once again in Paris again in 1878 and 1889, and in Chicago in 1893. By that time it had a clear effect on all the arts and had become one of the most important sources for

these artists most historians have regarded Whistler as the most influential who has been regarded as the pioneer of introducing Japanese art into European circles and linking it to the current British movement. Specifically focusing on Whistler's work we can see the level of influence which Japanese art was beginning to acquire. We can see in Whistler's impressions of the River Thames of 1861 which show a clear response to Japanese art with the use of Japanese compositional devices, used as the basis of pictorial experiments.²⁸² The influence of other artists however, cannot be overlooked. Menpes for one travelled to Japan twice so to learn artistic methods from Japanese painters, and to place orders for interior decorations for his house in London. Furthermore he held exhibitions in London where his works were all very Japanese in subject and by the 1880s he began to create a novel form of realistic expression. Henry and Hornel also travelled to Japan and used mass-produced photographs known as *Yokohama Shashin* which provided foreign visitors ideal images of Japan. They did not use photographs to make an accurate, acute and detailed record of Japan, but simply selected figures and settings from photographs and ended up shaping their depictions from an amalgamation of first-hand experience and stock images. Although Henry showed some signs of understanding Japanese colour and its subtlety their primary target audience remained foreign tourists.²⁸³ Although this began in the mid nineteenth century it continued into the 1890s and beyond as kimonos, fans, screens, blue and white porcelain and furniture in line with the aesthetic dialogue described here decorated ordinary English households. Furthermore whilst Britain's view of Japan was supported by the art brought back by British painters, as well as furnishings brought to decorate houses, the real Japan was changing rapidly towards what it saw as a Western way of life.²⁸⁴ With the works of these artists as well as others the British public were provided with an opportunity to experience Japanese style and everyday living through visual images, something hitherto inaccessible to them.

One further topic worth bringing to light which has been touched on in this work but warrants greater attention than can be provided here is the role of Japan in international exhibitions and expositions. As industrialisation took shape in the Western world they became of far greater significance, a chance to showcase progress and innovation – a prime opportunity for Japan to display the depth and rapidity of its change brought about following the Meiji Restoration. They came to be regarded as a means by which people defined culture and in the way in which they identified culture with a society.²⁸⁵ 'International exhibitions', acknowledges Paul Greenhalgh, 'grew and matured in a way which in retrospect seems at once tentative but inevitable. The conditions allowing them to come into existence fell

proto-modernist development across the board. See Ono, *On Japonisme in Britain*, 142 and Paul Greenhalgh, *Ephemeral Vistas. The Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and World's Fairs, 1851-1939* (Manchester, 1988), 148. For the influence of art more generally see Yuko Kikuchi and Toshio Watanabe, 'The British Discovery of Japanese Art', in Gordon Daniels and Chushichi (eds.), *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600-2000. Volume 5: Social and Cultural Perspectives* (Basingstoke, 2002), 146-170.

²⁸² Sato and Watanabe, 'The Aesthetic Dialogue', 19. For a more detailed examination of Whistler and the Japonisme movement see Ono, *On Japonisme in Britain*, 41-86.

²⁸³ Ibid, 139-140. For a more detailed examination of Menpes as well as Henry and Hornel and the Japonisme movement see chapters three and four, 87-113 and 114-138.

²⁸⁴ Sato and Watanabe, 'The Aesthetic Dialogue', 40.

²⁸⁵ Paul A. Tenkotte, 'Kaleidoscopes of the World: International Exhibitions and the Concept of Culture-Place, 1851-1915', *American Studies*, 28:1 (1987), 5-29.

haphazardly into place, but once there they grew with startling rapidity. Between the two of them, the Great Exhibition of 1851 and the Exposition Universelle of 1855 established a form that was to go on unbelievable heights of embellishment. As cultural manifestations, they revealed an expansive West in its most flamboyant and bombastic state; baroque, overblown expressions of societies that felt they ruled the material world absolutely'.²⁸⁶ This was an opportunity which Japan would not pass up. In the period from the International Exhibition held in London in 1862 to the Japan-British Exhibition in 1910, irrespective of the enormous strain which they imposed on the nation, they participated in thirty-six of the eighty-eight events held worldwide. They provided Japan with a convenient means of acquiring the most diverse and up-to-date information needed to further their industrial, technological and military development, while at the same time affording them the opportunity to display their artistic and technical attainments and to foster their trade, heightening their sense of national identity garnering international prestige.²⁸⁷ In the 1900s there were no less than twelve international of these events hosted across the Western world where Japan spared no expense. Its expenditure in this decade on exhibitions alone totalled ¥4,316,626, the most significant of these being the Exposition Universelle held in Paris in 1900, the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition, and the Japan-British Exhibition of 1910, where expenditure for these three alone totalled ¥4,019,000.²⁸⁸ Specifically to Britain and the United States however, it was the Louisiana Purchase and the Japan-British Exhibitions which contributed to a greater change in the perceptions of Japan.

The former of these and its display of ethnological exhibits were addressed in the previous chapter, so I will briefly mention the former of these. The year 1910 saw the British fall in love with things Japanese all over again as they were educated about these things on a level similar if not greater than in the years of the Japonisme craze. Indeed the exhibition exists as the most significant event in relations between the two since the signing of the alliance in 1902 as it profoundly influenced British perceptions of Japan, the Japanese and almost all things Japanese related. The work of Ayako Hotta-Lister is amongst the most detailed of studies of any exhibition held in this period. In it she emphasises the anticipation amongst Britons, the Japanese aim of educating the British in things Japanese from their traditions to modern existence and the desire amongst them to be educated on such matters, as well as providing a detailed look the exhibits themselves. With this it would be somewhat futile to attempt at trumping such a study.²⁸⁹ It is well worthwhile noting how this event contributed to the 1902 agreement with some labelling it as establishing a willingness amongst private financiers to invest in Japan. Furthermore it was seen to have transformed the alliance from one of governments into a broad alliance of peoples, providing a cultural and racial justification for its inception by demonstrating the appropriateness of Japan's

²⁸⁶ Greenhalgh, *Ephemeral Vistas*, 24.

²⁸⁷ Ellen P. Conant, 'Refractions of the Rising Sun. Japan's Participation in International Exhibitions 1862-1910', in Tomoko Sato and Toshio Watanabe (eds.), *Japan and Britain. An Aesthetic Dialogue 1850-1930*, (London, 1991), 79.

²⁸⁸ Hotta-Lister, *The Japan-British Exhibition*, 222.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

appearance as a commercial, naval and imperial power.²⁹⁰ This significance is shown in a variety of sources. The *Daily Telegraph* has expressed how it helped cement cordial relations, as has the *Pall Mall Gazette* which described its inaugural banquet and how the Japanese ambassador commended the strength in depth of relations and the alliance, and the *Daily Mail*.²⁹¹ Some have even stressed that the Exhibition further strengthened their positive view of Japan which emerged out of the war with Russia, and believed that Britain could learn from Japan's attitude, approach and way of life.²⁹² With the Japanese now on Britain's doorsteps in what can be seen as an extension of the Japonisme movement, the Japan-British Exhibition stands as a cornerstone of their relations, a key facilitator in the changing face of British perceptions.

This is not to forget the presence of the United States however, who following the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War experienced increased political as well as social tensions. On the former of these points Theodore Roosevelt's launching of the Great White Fleet in 1908 expresses how there was resentment towards the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which encouraged Japan's naval building in the Pacific, as well as a means of asserting their power.²⁹³ Consisting of sixteen battleships and a number of escorting vessels it was welcomed in Japan to rapturous applause and cheerful hospitality. In spite of this the American naval administration henceforth began to regard the Imperial Japanese Navy as its principle enemy and vice versa.²⁹⁴ This was mixed with the ever increasing immigration crisis on the West Coast. As we have seen in the previous chapter this decade experienced peak numbers of emigrants from the East, the seriousness of the situation beginning to take its toll as the San Francisco Board of Education adopted an order which enforced a segregation of all Oriental school children in 1906.²⁹⁵ Roosevelt's negotiation with those in San Francisco as well as the Japanese who were appalled at such an act led to the formulation of the Gentleman's Agreement in 1907. With this the United States agreed not to pass discriminatory legislation against the Japanese as well as seek to prevent states from being prejudice. In return the issuing of passports for Japanese labourers bound for America would cease. Both parties mutually agreed that all Japanese workers who had already travelled to

²⁹⁰ Nish, *Alliance in Decline*, 12-13; Daniels, 'Elites, Governments and Citizens', 10; McKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*, 105.

²⁹¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 1 September 1910; *Daily Telegraph*, 15 September 1910; *Pall Mall Gazette*, 28 July 1909; *Daily Mail*, 28 October 1910.

²⁹² *Croydon Guardian*, 4 June 1910.

²⁹³ Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 363-364; Coletta, 'The Diplomacy', 98. Following this crusade of ships Lord Edward Grey stressed how he believed that the Roosevelt administration had misconstrued the Japanese and refused to endorse its deployment. Other European naval powers however, reacted differently and voiced their approval such as Kaiser Wilhelm who spoke of how it 'knocks all the calculations of the British and the Japanese on the head'. See Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement*, 233.

²⁹⁴ William Reynolds Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909* (New York, 1958), 230-231; Giffard, *Japan*, 36. In the United States War Office plans started to develop with the intent of being able to counter any Japanese hostility, the most prominent of these being War Plan Orange which underwent continued modifications up to the outbreak of the Second War. See Kathleen Dalton, *Theodore Roosevelt. A Strenuous Life* (New York, 2002), 333; J. A. S. Grenville, 'Diplomacy and War Plans in the United States, 1890-1917', in Kennedy, Paul M. (ed.), *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914* (London, 1979), 23-38; E. S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan 1879-1945* (Annapolis, MD., 1991).

²⁹⁵ Link and Catton, *American Epoch*, 141.

and settled in America with their wife and children would be permitted to stay and receive passports to the affirmative. In reality however, this agreement failed to protect or put an end to anti-Japanese prejudice as they remained under federal law “aliens ineligible to citizenship”.²⁹⁶ Following the defeat of Russia estrangement in the Pacific expressed itself on far greater magnitude whilst on the West Coast immigration simultaneously became a key political issue.²⁹⁷

In the space of a decade Meiji Japan experienced two defining moments which defined its progress, establishing an empire and a sphere of influence in East Asia with the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese standing as watershed moments, marking the culmination of its progress. Although both had a different effect they brought Japan on par with other powers who regarded empire building as the norm in an age when imperialism was being redefined. It had been a long time in the past where East Asia had been accustomed to displays of such expressive might as demonstrated by Japan here, and it is with this that Western states started to become more aware of their existence, and its presence in world affairs becoming the subject of discussion in social as well as political circles. As the development of Japan took place in such a short space of time there emerged concerns that this revelation had the potential to move westwards, conjuring images in some circles of Oriental hordes upsetting the status quo and the way of life to which they had become so accustomed. Although this did not happen in the ways which works of fiction portrayed, Japanese emigration can be regarded as a sort of invasion. The prejudices on the West Coast of America certainly emphasise this point with legislation and the establishment of groups with the intent to upset Japanese labourers there, showing how they were increasingly becoming more unwelcome. As the United States was the main recipient of Japanese emigrants, predispositions can be seen to be most vociferous there. As we have seen it is not a misinterpretation of the facts when one states how the British were far less cautious of Japanese immigrants. Owing to Britain’s position in the world however, it would be ignorant to not address the views of their dominions as Australia, Canada and New Zealand experienced higher levels of Japanese immigration. In both countries however, propaganda personified them as the yellow peril and was existent across magazines, periodicals, newspapers, fiction and monographs as well as other materials which were being distributed equally as much as the travel and globetrotting accounts which preceded them. Japan’s progression had gained them access to the forecourt of world affairs as the establishment of

²⁹⁶ Daniels, *Not Like Us*, 74-75. This act followed the establishment of the Asiatic Exclusion League in May 1905 which would last until the end of the Second World War and eventually draw support from all segments of the population. It opposed Japanese immigration on the grounds of economic and racial well-being. Its influence brought about the boycott of Japanese owned shops and sought to advance and promote any and all anti-Japanese propaganda. Daniels, *The Politics*, 27-29. Primary examples of Japanese victims are also provided here. Ibid, 34. For a look at Japan and the exclusion acts following the First World War where racial discrimination intensified, especially on the West Coast as well as Australia and Canada, see Sidney Osbourne, *The Isolation of Japan. An Exposé of Japan’s Political Position After the War* (Amsterdam, 1919), 145-150.

²⁹⁷ Following the conclusion of the First World War a lack of knowledge of Japan amongst Americans was found to be hindering. The *Evening Star* for example, published an article entitled ‘Americans Must Know More About Japan’ where a number of question relating to American immigration policy towards Japan and vice-versa, as well as on Japanese traditions, customs, military prowess and attitudes towards foreigners were asked to the reader. *Evening Star*, 6 January 1922.

its empire made them the leading power in East Asia and the catalyst for changing the existing state of affairs in international. Victory over China ignited the spark of imperialism which Japan had sought to adopt through its emulation of those states who had opened them to the outside world, whilst victory over Russia witnessed the combustion of imperialistic endeavours as Japan stood on the shoulders of a Western giant, a nation with a reputation long established as a prominent and powerful state seemingly made somewhat insignificant. A prime example of David striking down Goliath, it was this which characterised Japan's early imperialism and its emergence on the world stage in a blaze of fiery glory which would see them branded the epitome of the yellow peril. Changes had taken place where East Asia would thenceforth play a pivotal part in global affairs with Japan at its helm, driving forward change.

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