Fearsome truths : the challenge of animal liberation.

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FEARSOME TRUTHS
The Challenge of Animal Liberation

Barry Kew

PhD Thesis
University of Durham
Department of Sociology & Social Policy
Year of Submission: 1999

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In Memoriam

Grace K.
Introduction

In the broadest terms this thesis examines how animal liberation seeks, through revelatory means, to overthrow, rather than find space within, dominant and unifying speciesist ideology, its exploitations and self-blinding. It analyses how, in so doing, liberationist thought and activity give rise to elite representations which illustrate how speciesism is reproduced and otherness confronted, and which are driven by fear of the liberation of nonhuman Others, in whom and in whose domination, exploitation and subjugation humans seem to have so much invested. We trace how a dialectical process operates throughout history to reach a nineteenth century synthesis after which a consolidated welfarist paradigm is faced with increasingly powerful challenges, and how ideological strategies are deployed in the recoil from them. Before we look at this in more detail it is necessary to establish what this thesis is not about and to declare its presuppositions primarily in relation to animal liberation as a social movement.

Although this thesis recognizes animal liberation as a contemporary social movement it does not concentrate on this status. We are more concerned with animal liberation and dominant, animal-using culture as opposing or contradictory forces, and there is as much attention given to speciesism and speciesist discourse as there is to liberation and its own counter discourse(s). However, we can acknowledge or, rather, assume certain things about animal liberation as a movement, for it has been a commonplace of sociological literature that references to social movements exclude mention of animal liberation, and there is no book-length sociological work on the UK animal liberation movement as a social movement which may guide us in the way that, say, sociologists Jasper & Nelkin (1992) and, to a lesser extent, philosopher-activists Finsen & Finsen (1994) could in relation to the movement in the USA, although there are UK-focused historical overviews (e.g. Ryder 1989 and Kean 1998), works of political science (e.g. Garner 1993) and works concerned with
the movement’s strategic or tactical dilemmas (e.g. Garner 1996). Most of these works come from within or are sympathetic to the cause. Others we shall refer to later, within different contexts.

Here we shall be working on the premise that animal liberation as presently constituted aims at cultural, cognitive, affective and behavioural transformation (total in that all people are targeted) rather than political revolution. Despite claims from some within the direct action wing of the movement, for instance, that animal liberation is impossible within capitalist structures, the movement operates in the main as if its ends can be achieved within them. Indeed, this is the explicit stance of animal rights philosopher Tom Regan (1984: 341), and ‘animal liberationist’ Peter Singer’s utilitarianism has more than a hint of the pragmatism which has been maligned as the philosophy of capitalism. If we take too this statement from Animal Liberation Front founder Ronnie Lee we can see the emphasis on changing people:

I don’t like capitalism and I’m very sympathetic to at least certain aspects of what I’d call green anarchism. But I don’t think that the end of capitalism would necessarily mean the end of animal persecution. People in an anarchist society, if they didn’t fundamentally understand the reasons why animals shouldn’t be abused, would carry on abusing animals ... A society that’s good for people doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s also a society that’s good for other animals. The way that people view animals has got to be changed for that to happen. (Lee 1995).

A change in man, not management. Although the movement also targets government and companies in order to secure measurable gains, its overall liberal strategy ‘takes the individual as a sovereign actor, and sees changing individual values and perceptions as the primary means toward social transformation ... [It relies on] persuading enough people to change their beliefs and values and hence public policy’ (Birkeland 1993: 15). Such a strategy may be naive in that it seems to ignore the possibilities of consciousness being determined by structure and under what structure the desired changes may best be effected. But this is not our business here.

Borrowing David E. Apter’s classifications of emancipatory social movements (Apter 1992: 140-141, although he doesn’t consider animal liberation), we shall take the movement here then as an extra-institutional protest movement, confrontational
without challenging the political system as such. It is *not* one of *revolutionary insurrection* for it does not seek to overthrow the state (due to its lack of will or numbers), but it does contain an element of Apter’s third kind — pejoratively known as ‘*terrorism*’, utilizing ‘violent’ symbolic acts, although the majority within the movement and its major organizations appear to be appalled by this.

Next, although we are not about to examine the movement *qua* movement we shall consider animal liberation as perhaps the highest expression of what Klaus Eder (1996) calls *bloodless* or *vegetarian culture* which stands in opposition to, is the contradiction and negation of, dominant *bloody* or *carnivorous culture*; now having become an organized movement, forging an ‘unfamiliar modernity’. However, this is not to say, as Eder does (1996: 142), that such an oppositional movement is concerned more with ‘irrational’ issues such as the integrity of the body rather than traditional ‘rational’ movements’ concern, like animal liberation’s, with freedom, equality or liberation.

And we should note here animal liberation’s somewhat anomalous status and historical position. Apter describes his three movements in the following terms: ‘Theirs is the politics of the moral moment, disjunctive, redemptive or transformational’, their discourse is ‘negating and transcending’. ‘To the extent that they downgrade conventional knowledge while claiming superior moral insight, they challenge order ... Their inversionary discourse claims emancipation as a moral project rather than a form of alternative organization or structure’. They aim at ‘the capture of the moral initiative and net gains in imagination’ and they have the ‘disturbing quality of making visible a group that tends to be politically invisible’ (quotations from Apter 1992: 140-143). This, we can suggest, applies no less to animal liberation itself, except that its discourse is probably more subversionary than inversionary.

But Apter also tells us that critical theory is the privileging weapon of the emancipatory movements he classifies, and that their intellectual pedigree includes such figures as Marx, Foucault, Bataille and Lacan (Apter 1992: 142), which brings us
closer to Eder's oppositional movements. However, animal liberation, as constituted since the 1970s, has not been notably characterized by such thought. In part at least, animal liberation is concerned with developing the unfinished project of the Enlightenment in an evolutionary teleology. This is not to suggest however, that animal liberation itself, or indeed all its philosophers, can be viewed narrowly as only appearing along the Enlightenment continuum, but that some of the main roots of its contemporary movement lie there. However, at least a newer part of the movement appears now to be congruent with Apter's notion here; it is then, in this sense, possibly modern into postmodern. This amplifies the complex social movement status of animal liberation if recognized in its different forms — it is primarily about other animals (though this is heavily contested by some of its critics); it is not economistically determined nor does it have conventional goals; it is both an 'old' and a 'new' social movement; it is concerned with both equality and the negativized Other, and with both the 'rational' and the 'irrational'. The point to note is that although we shall take animal liberation in its most conspicuous modern rather than postmodern emancipatory condition, we shall also find it legitimate to refer to or describe it in terms and concepts more readily associated with postmodern critiques.

Notable amongst these have been those from the more inversionary animal defence current within contemporary feminism, e.g. Donovan (1990), Gruen (1993), Kheel (1993), Luke (1995), Birke (1995) which, although respecting the groundbreaking contributions of animal liberation philosophers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan, subject them to a critique which highlights the abstract, humanocentric, hierarchical, malestream, objectivist rationalism of such works which, in setting out to overcome commonplace accusations against liberationists of 'womanish' sentimentality and emotionalism, also inadvertently preclude the opportunity for these to become legitimate responses to animal use, and tend to disallow an urgently required conceptual break from the structures that maintain interlocking oppressions. More overtly respectful of human/nonhuman difference, such feminists have not been alone in this 'internal' critique. Other works of a related reflexive nature include Benton (1993) for whose eco-socialist view a liberal-individualist

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animal 'rights' cannot impact on industries of vast job and sector demarcations (rights, for instance, as merely a checks and balance device, being easily subsumed under existing power relations); Baker (1993) who seeks to loosen fixed meanings of animal representation for liberation purposes in proposing a strategic dedoxafication process; and Eder (1996) who, at a greater remove (to environmentalism), is also concerned with the impotence of bloodless culture rationalism (especially in the shape of utilitarianism). In sum, that animal liberation requires to be informed by more than rational ethics1.

This thesis does not directly address the above shifts and turns², though draws from some of them (e.g. in recognizing liberationists' identification with animals, reinventing themselves as Other, though this is not especially new in general analytical terms), but it is against such background that it is written and it does situate it within an interesting period of possible transition in the animal liberation career. And, this thesis may or may not support their general claims, for it examines animal liberation and animal use and their representations at a time when animal liberation is still founded upon and guided by ethics and self-presented as primarily a rationalist project (although the work of animal liberation philosopher Stephen Clark (e.g. 1984) provides an often neglected counterpoint to this; see Chapter 3 here).

This thesis appears at a point which may in the future be looked upon as the time when animal liberation as a whole was entering a post-philosophy, not to say a postmodernist-poststructuralist phase. To some extent then, the thesis will serve as a report on progress made by an emancipation movement in philosophy-ethics and late modernist mode, 'progress' being gauged in terms of its representation by others. This is not to say that the thesis sets out to critique animal liberation on this basis or to promote the claims of others, nor are there recommendations in the 'report'. In general though, the modern/postmodern divide, if that's what it is, may not be crucial. As Pieterse (1991: 32) suggests ... 'emancipation refers to collective actions which seek to level and disperse power, or seek to install more inclusive values than the prevailing ones. This means that emancipation, postmodern turn or not, involves
a moral horizon. It is the ethic (or ethics) of animal liberation, installing more inclusive values, that informs the view of it taken here. However, we should recognize that the movement, in its beliefs and practices, goes beyond what is formulated in the works of its foremost philosophers; just one reason for the insistence on the term animal liberation here and for not limiting our view of the struggle to one of, say, animal ‘rights’.

There is a further point which is partially related to the above. Although this thesis is concerned, as it cannot fail to be concerned, with power — the power that humans exert over other animals and the power exerted by the media, for instance — we shall not be analysing these two areas specifically in terms of power. But we should note three aspects. First, contrary to the Foucauldian concept of power, there is a binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relationships in the human/nonhuman context. Foucault tells us that by power he does not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body (Foucault 1981: 92): but this is power in the human/nonhuman context, and this thesis does go some way to show how the entire social body is thus pervaded. Second, another aspect of the animal liberation social movement complexity is that it is about liberation but not empowerment. We can say that animal liberation seeks, if not to do the impossible and eradicate power relations (we are in a position of power over other animals whether we like it or not), then to minimize them and use that power in a benign and just fashion which dissolves the notion of animals being means to human ends. Again, we can view animal liberation as more subversive than inversive. Third, although it makes little sense to talk of empowering animals and, because of that, of promises of power and the shuffling of elites within the human/nonhuman context, we should recognize the possibility of the animal-using orthodox perceiving an order-negating animal liberation as an attempt by certain humans to gain a form of power for themselves, especially if ulterior motives can be ‘successfully’ ascribed to animal liberationists. At the very least, we can see how animal liberation can be viewed as transforming human power over other animals into power over other people, in the shape of moral claim
enforcement. Already we can suspect and anticipate a fear of this kind of real or imagined threat.

Moving on, a large part of this thesis is concerned with media representations of animal liberation — how the challenge is met — but we find that, as with animal liberation as a social movement, there is no book-length sociological work on, for instance, *animal liberation and the media*, although there are references to media coverage and representation in several other works such as those mentioned above (e.g. Garner, Ryder, Baker), in articles in the campaigning magazines (e.g. Anon 1986/87, Melvor 1988, Anon 1989) and academic material relating to the American experience (e.g. Jones 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, Kruse 1998, Gerbner 1995). This again is symptomatic of the neglect animal liberation has experienced in the UK and elsewhere (but see, e.g. Birke & Michael 1998 on xenotransplants and the media), whilst there has been much work on, for instance, media and: gender (e.g. Dines & Humez 1995); race (e.g. Campbell 1995, van Dijk 1993, Hall 1995, Riggins 1997); class (e.g. Hall 1986a, Philo 1990, Glasgow University Media Group _passim_); the environment (e.g. Hansen 1991, Gamson & Modigliani 1989) and, of course, there is a large body of more general media theory from various positions (see McQuail 1994).

This manifold paucity of directly relevant literature has to a large extent determined the methodology and structure of the present thesis. One could perhaps embark on a full-scale analysis of representations of animal liberation (and animal use) but something would be missing; the nature of animal liberation itself. _What we have to do first is some, a lot of, history, exposition and interpretation, or our own representation_. We cannot really examine representations of animal liberation (and animal use) without exploring what animal liberation is or may be, and what animal use and speciesism are, and upon what they are founded. Before us stand their yesterdays.

We do not want to approach animal use and liberation in a vacuum which _would_ be the case if (a) we ignored animal liberation’s own (internal) context, and if (b) we ignored the history which allows us to analyse the arguments and the changes of
attitude towards other animals. What have been and/or are the characteristics of the exploitative mentality? What social, historical, cultural, political factors have played or play what part in its origins, development and continuation, even though, simply put, it could be expressed as plus ça change ... ? What has been and is the nature of its opposition and what factors have played their roles here? We do not want to take an assumed view of animal liberation as if it were this or that without exploring the obvious prevalent confusions over ‘welfare’, ‘liberation’, ‘rights’, ‘protection’, and so on. What sense are we to make, for instance, of: works promoting animal liberation or rights which also promote the use of animal products?; an ‘animal rights’ organization that does the same?; research papers which list the animal experiments animal rightists were in favour of?; an ‘animal rights’ organization whose campaign to stop the use of horses was conducted from the back of a horse?; academic works on ‘animal rights’ which systematically ignore or sideline what is possibly definitive of animal liberation? Certainly animal liberation does not appear to be, though from the point of view of its detractors often does appear to be, and from the point of view of its practitioners perhaps should be, a monolithic whole.

The ‘problem’ immediately confronts us. How can we represent, and analyze representations of something so seemingly amorphous or inchoate? All we can do at this stage at least, it seems reasonable to suggest, is to ensure that animal liberation and representations thereof are analysed in terms which acknowledge and investigate the above confusions. We need to try to get at just what animal liberation is or means and, especially for our later chapters, in relation to normative welfarism, today’s bloody-carnivorous culture. This is not to claim that at some point we shall arrive at the ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ of animal liberation but to acknowledge that a particular understanding has been reached and that it will provide a reference point for examining, for instance, what the media mean when they use, say, the terms ‘animals’!, ‘animal rights’, ‘animal rights extremists’ and ‘animal welfare’ and what it is they are doing with them.

It is how we perceive the history that to a large extent determines how we perceive
the theories and practices of animal use, animal liberation and liberationists today, for modern day representations are undoubtedly linked with historical and institutional assumptions and practices. But what kind of history are we to do here? As alluded to above, the contemporary animal liberation movement tends largely to see itself within a time continuum, a metanarrative drawing inspiration not just from its foremost philosophers but from pro-animal thought down the ages. It is this version of history, largely processual but emphasizing the continual rather than continuous, that we shall follow, for it can lay claim to some kind of credibility. Moreover, the transhistorical perspective adopted here also reflects the transhistorical orthodox perception and treatment of other animals as resources.

Chapter 1, then, surveys the history and tradition of and traces the discourse of animal use up to and including the nineteenth century in order to explore the reasons for using animals as material and symbolic resources; the various attitudes and beliefs developed and strategies deployed to rationalize human behaviour; the voices which have been raised against this orthodoxy at different times in history in a broken competing discourse; and the cultural and societal factors which have undermined and forced reassessments of the human/nonhuman relationship. The organizing structure of the narrative is one that depicts a dialectical process involving tension between two seemingly incompatible forces. These are characterized within a concept partially borrowed from Eder (1996): of dominant bloody-carnivorous culture and repressed bloodless-vegetarian culture. Although his symbolic organization of society thesis is not followed, its influence is undeniable. This struggle of opposites, which are both riddled with inconsistencies, escalates until strands from within each appear to merge in a ‘synthesis’ and a new dialectic proceeds on a higher level. But the same contradiction continues, with both cultures becoming more formidable adversaries though in different ways through, on the one hand, the consolidation of a welfarist paradigm and, on the other, in the further development of liberationist ethics and a liberation movement; a new thesis and antithesis which have yet to reach a further synthesis. The chapter also serves as a reservoir of themes to be drawn upon throughout and in so doing opens up the topos which feeds into contemporary rhetoric.
Chapters 2 to 4 concentrate on the antithesis; the challenge presented by animal liberation. Continuing the chronology, and exploring the revelatory character of animal liberation, Chapter 2 covers the approximate period 1880s-1970s, from and including the work of Henry Salt (who, according to Keith Tester [1991], ‘invented’ animal rights) to the eve of publication of Peter Singer’s seminal Animal Liberation and begins to look at the movement’s cohesive and deliberate oppositional strategies. The chapter is divided into three sections: the first examines Salt’s work and its late nineteenth century context; the second covers the period from there to the 1960s’ signs of emergence of a contemporary movement; the third builds from the 1960s to reach an assessment of how, in their identification with nonhumans, animal liberation’s latter-day representatives attempted to expose (again) what they now saw as the facts and fictions of prevailing ideology. Questions of relative and universal/alternative value in relation to the movement’s ethic are addressed as are the related concerns of historical context, conducive conditions, discourse and rebellion. What factors account for the appearance of Salt’s Animals’ Rights in 1892? Why did a ‘manifesto’ of animal liberation appear in 1971? From the movement’s writings certain themes are identified as fundamental to the case being made — evolutionary kinship as opposed to speciesism; the need for a comprehensive principle to bind disparate animal concerns; explosive combinations of empirical evidence and animal liberation theory; the balancing of intellective and intuitive faculties and the recognition of a co-operative rather than competitive ‘nature’; the struggle between symbolism and the literal, between logic and illogic; the challenging of orthodox sentimentalist fantasy, self-interest and conformity; and the overcoming of ‘blindness’ though revelation.

In an attempt to understand how contemporary animal liberation was galvanized by and remains underwritten by moral philosophy proceeding from the revelatory platform, Chapter 3 introduces three of its foremost philosophers and their strategic works, examining the similarities and differences of these developed expressions of pro-nonhuman (and pro-human) thought. Consideration is also given to the movement’s successes and failures.
Chapter 4 is pivotal, offering a critical assessment of animal liberation's contemporary identities and self-presentations. The analogy of slavery drawn by the movement generally, and the neglected model of veganism, are used to examine the proscriptions, prescriptions and putative comprehensive principle status of the philosophies and lead to a questioning not only of animal liberation's bloodless culture status but also of the entire two-culture scheme traced thus far. This also takes us to an examination of the movement's related welfare/liberation, means/ends tactical dilemmas.

We should then be in a position to analyse, in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, how the challenge of animal liberation is confronted in contemporary articulate thought as it appears in representations of animal use and liberation. In Chapter 5, which will act as a path between the previous and following chapters, we turn to a contrasting narrative, understanding and analysis of animal liberation. In a largely empirical-and textual-based engagement with Keith Tester's (1991) academic view of animals as blank pages in an epistemic-constructivist scheme, we shall be able to draw upon the material of Chapters 1 to 4 and also to identify representational themes of reduction, redefinition, entrapment and incomprehension which will have relevance for the analysis of media representation.

Drawing upon these themes, Chapters 6 and 7 concentrate on how the media function to maintain a system of control, regulate normality and reproduce the dominant ideology through speciesist-humanocentric forms of understanding. The chapters offer an analysis of media representation of animal use and liberation as an element of the wider speciesist discourse, postulating the theory that media performance is a function of ideological domination acting as to obstruct revelation, inhibit animal liberation's development and to eternalize animal use. What we see from an analysis of media discourse is the performance of a system under attack. An introduction sets out the theoretical perspectives relating to ideology, hegemony and myth, preparing the ground for an investigation into how, through signifying practices and the general command of reality, accounts and definitions of exploitation, liberation and related concepts are constructed and how and to what advantage they operate. Analysis and further theoretical discussion are then
threaded through the media examples which are considered as, and classified into groups of, ideological strategies. A final component summarizes the analysis and concludes by questioning whether notions of hegemony, and the media as sites of hegemonic struggle, are entirely applicable (in this context) to a society in which a fundamental speciesist ideology is still very much apparent as a unifying, stabilizing and comforting force. Largely, the analysis is guided by the notion of confronting the challenge of otherness and that the engine which drives the ideology-mythology is the fear of the liberation of the Other, a threat to cognitive and cultural order. Normative welfarism recoils, and in every sense.

Notes
1. Another kind of internal critique and attack on animal exploitation from a Christian perspective which has run alongside Singer and Regan since around 1975, sharing with the above critiques both similarities (moralism is not enough) and differences (itself subjected to feminist critique), has come from Andrew Linzey, for whom theology provides a way in which 'animal rights' theory can be 'released from its current philosophical straightjacket' (see, e.g. Linzey 1994: ix).

2. There are three further areas which we should be clear to identify as not being the concern here. We shall not be interested in resource mobilization (being concerned more here with identity-orientation), and there is no analysis of media effects-audience reception, e.g. of data on what impressions, beliefs, attitudes, knowledge and responses are publicly derived from media representations of animal liberation and use. Nor is this a 'responsibility of the media' thesis, although it may have implications for such an approach.
Introduction

In this chapter we shall trace humans' changing attitudes towards other animals. It is through this mainly chronological narrative that we may be able to examine how orthodox rationale and discourse arose, developed and continue to inform the reaction to animal liberation, and because it is within history that we may be able to overview the background to contemporary animal liberation ethics which oppose the speciesist ideology developed since the earliest use of other animals. In this sense the tendency is towards the processual in terms of both animal use and animal liberation but it is not a privileging of the processual in the style of, say, Keith Thomas (1983) or Norbert Elias (1994) although it owes much to processual and/or chronological accounts such as these, Peter Singer’s (1977) and Richard D Ryder’s (1989). Here we shall not attempt to assign any ‘inevitable progress’ status to animal liberation (although some liberationists have claimed inevitabilities and this notorious concept has informed an ‘inevitable’ animal use) but, whether the process is continual, continuous, discontinuous or purely erratic, the chronology also enables us to identify a dialectic, of sorts, which reaches a kind of synthesis in the nineteenth century. In structuring this we shall be borrowing Klaus Eder’s (1996) concept of two cultures — one dominant, bloody-carnivorous, the other suppressed and oppositional, bloodless-vegetarian — which, although we may see each culture find expression in different ways in different eras, can be used, initially, to locate the conflicting attitudes and values.

Because of this format, a consequent transhistoricism may be detected, and this relates to a fundamental point. Although we may perceive that at some earlier periods of human history there were no absolute category distinctions between humans and other animals, and that later development of such an idea says much...
about the changing forms of human consciousness and norms about what it is to be human, other animals have been considered and used as material, symbolic and economic resources at all stages (except for some indeterminate time in prehistory perhaps). This means too, that no particular era is identified as ‘better’ or ‘worse’ for animals. The animal-using rationalizations change according to the era — and these are related to what the eras determine animals as — but not by much in a practical, end-result sense. They are traced here, within significant periods of history (this is not a comprehensive history of nonhuman/human relations), not only in order that we have some understanding of the traditions which inform contemporary discourses, but that the chapter may also serve as a reservoir from which the following ones may draw.

The early part of the chapter identifies the pre-ethical origins of human unease at animal use, the ambivalence and inconsistencies which accompany it and the strategies deployed to overcome it. The middle part examines the roles of religion, ethics and humanism in the formulation of bloody culture rationalism and its opposition. The final part explores the ‘synthesis’ of the two cultures which establishes a new conflict or rather the same conflict but on a new level.

Natural Considerations

Our present instrumentalist relationship with other species is to some extent justified on the grounds of it being natural in terms of the so-called food chain, or even still the Great Chain of Being, hierarchical concepts wherein the one-sided notion of competitive nature, red in tooth and claw, has played no little part, in preference to and obliteration of an idea or ideal of co-operative nature.

Yet it may be argued that our ‘original’ relationship with other species, the non-exploitative — where biblical-Edenic and secular-pre-hunting narratives may coincide in space if not in time — is the natural, and the one which has informed orthodoxy — the exploitative — is the parvenu (although this is to downplay the very real and violent humans-as-hunted era, which has also served to motivate and justify the war on nature). The favouritism displayed for the latter illustrates how
our relationship with other species depends upon a sophisticated, preferential interpretation of the past. If something can be explained in terms of its origin then the choice of origin is crucial, for it functions as a charter (see, e.g. Peters 1971: 220-221).

In historical terms, humans possibly became killers out of accident and/or necessity, a circumstance which no longer obtains. Ever since, it has been thought natural and essential to escalate animal use in the process of survival, improvement, development, progress, a constant re-naturalizing of what becomes the political. It seems not so much that reality is bloody — although in part it is — but that the bloodshot visions speak for all reality, and become reality itself. They presuppose, are conservatively lenient towards, and reinforce established notions of what we are like, what nature is like and how the world is.

But there would seem to be two ways (at least) of appraising our hunter days. One way, following the 'natural' line above, says that it was the early part of the continuum which has brought us, cognitively, to our present relationship with other species; that early necessary exploitation has led on naturally and rightly to late exploitation. And this can serve to justify today's hunting as natural, but even more as tradition. The established Western dichotomies, forged by anthropology, between animals and society, and the metaphysics of the alienation of humans from nature can nowadays be called upon in order to view even such old days as the forerunners of another need, to establish order upon the chaos of nature. But even when the killing was necessary it was going beyond necessity. Some hunting cultures routinely slaughtered, to extinction in some cases, species of animals that posed no threat to human life. Some hunting cultures were also brutal towards the prey species. We can suggest that this was and is the raw bloody culture.

Tim Ingold (1994) tells us about another side to hunting culture, suggesting that the hunter's concept of his relationship with animals, as indeed with other humans, was as a single field, that little or no difference was perceived between humanity and nature. The hunter-gatherer relationship with animals was one of respect and
familiarity — a combination of autonomy and dependency. A similar line is illustrated by Serpell (1986) who explores the relationship as one of equality. But here the first problems arise. The hunter has to ‘know’ animals, has to put himself in their place, in order to be successful in the hunt. Not only are other animals part of the same field but even of the same ‘family’, and the empathy necessary for successful hunting inevitably leads to sympathy, and the sympathy to guilt. Killing nonhuman animals is uncomfortably close to homicide.

Two things are apparent. One, that even before the appropriation of nature became the later separation between culture and nature which allowed all manner of systematized atrocities to nonhuman species, some hunters were already engaged in this project. Two, that even when killing animals seemed to be essential for human survival it nevertheless gave rise to a sense of guilt and unease. Measures would be taken to evade it, to manage it. The hunter-gatherer era was one notably characterized already by an ambivalent system of food taboos and purification rituals (virtually all of which relate to animal ‘products’) within a prohibition on sullying the purity of the natural order. Although favoured aspects of hunter-gatherer romanticism may now be appealed to by deep ecologists and others in order to justify certain animal uses, ultimately the question must arise: What kind of society would emerge from a fusion of (a) the hunter’s human/nonhuman ‘equality’ mind-set and (b) the disappearance of his need to treat animals as resources? Somewhere between (a) and (b) a mentality and a reality are constructed which obstruct the emergence of the obvious society, where ‘meat’ would be murder. Indeed, the constructions begin to take place within (a). The tradition of rationalization and occlusion, of the naturalizing and eternalizing ‘statement of fact’ — that’s the way it is — begins here.

It would seem that the hunting economy represented the first appearance of moral conflict between emotional and materialistic considerations. To overcome it and evade guilt, hunting was formalized by: totemism; ritualized belief systems; self-deception; atonement; and absolution. These have taken various forms — entering into a pact with the animal spirit who allows killing only on certain conditions, e.g.
no cruelty, no waste, no ridicule; ceremonial acts, e.g. burying the bones of the victim in their original formation; assisting the animal to return to the spiritual home; begging forgiveness; or restitutitional cave painting, rendering the creature's image at a sacred spot (Serpell 1986: 144-146). Many of these specific forms are alien to late modern society but what remains, e.g. forms of ritual, no 'unnecessary' cruelty and, perhaps above all, the seeking of refuge in the symbolic, have been absorbed into the contemporary welfarist norm of animal use.

What hunting tribes also introduce are the inconsistencies or the particularisms which have continued to be characteristic of ambivalent human/nonhuman relationships. Despite the rhetoric of 'respect', for hunters there were (leaving aside the taboos on different wild animal species) three kinds of animal — the hunted, the hunting companion, and the pet — and at least three different attitudes towards them. The hunted and the pet may often have been the same species, as might the pet and the hunting companion. The hunted animal, positioned at some distance, encouraged a sense of awe, though his or her function was materialistic, providing the tribe with food and clothing. The hunting companion, most often a dog, was treated with indifference and even brutality, a working animal to be cast off when no longer up to the job, much like animals used for hunting and racing today. The pet was loved, suckled and treated as part of the community, an agent of emotional fulfilment. Leap to the twentieth century and picture Queen Elizabeth II, patron of the RSPCA, dressed in a fur coat, pet corgis in tow, visiting her racehorses' training ground or welcoming deer shooters to Balmoral. Today's welfarist ideology — the refined bloody culture — is not only informed by the 'natural' but is still the sum of the contradictions, of the ambivalence deriving from artificially-drawn boundaries, made commonsensical by the internal rationale of instrumentalist taxonomy.

The conflicts and inconsistencies inherent in the perception of other animals as symbolic, emotional and material resources did not go away as hunter-gatherer culture largely disappeared. The advent of domestication intensified them.
Transition

Hunter-gatherer culture persisted for more than ninety per cent of humans’ time on earth, until the end of the global ice age some ten to thirteen thousand years ago. It constitutes heavy baggage not thrown off in the socioeconomic revolution heralded by the domestication of plants and animals. Domestication could well have been domestication of plants only but, by that time, nonhuman animals also had already been brought within the range of human utilization and symbolic value; their domestication too seemed to be natural, economically and psychically. For the first of many times perhaps, chronology counted against them; the naturalness of eating animals and the myth of animal protein had taken hold.

The pastoralism-herding relationship, based far more on superior force, became one of mastery and control; at best, the transition was ‘from trust to domination’ (Ingold 1994:18). But although animals had become slaves, the human/nonhuman proximity of pastoralism could only intensify feelings of guilt and remorse, as what trust initially remained between husbandmen and animals was betrayed by maltreatment and slaughter. Distancing devices were, and continue to be, deployed to evade this uneasy conflict between sympathy and exploitation: detachment, often involving gratuitous violence; concealment, the individual animal 'lost' among increasing numbers farmed; misrepresentation, within a negative anthropomorphism, a projection of the animal within; and shifting the blame, it is the gods or spirits who demand the sacrifice (latterly shifted to the consumer or some other aspect of the specialized industry) (see Serpell 1986: 151). These, we can suggest, constitute a self-blinding.

The emphasis has been on animals used for food but

By far the greatest consequence of domestication of cattle was the contribution of yoked domestic bulls to the emergence of major old world civilizations. (Schwabe 1994: 40).

Not only did the bovine source of power create surplus plant food production but allowed many people their freedom from the labour of food production thus promoting the emergence of social division of labour, land ownership and the growth
of various cultural institutions. Cultivation and culture are one and the same. And this is a long process — civilization, as Keith Thomas has pointed out, rather statement of factly,

was virtually synonymous with the conquest of nature ... The civilization of medieval Europe would have been inconceivable without the ox and the horse. (Thomas 1983:25).

There could have been a symmetry about it. Nonhumans exploited for labour started and developed civilization. Their 'redundancy', initiated by the Industrial Revolution, could have marked the beginning of the end of animal exploitation (and possibly it did). However, the animal use-civilization relationship perhaps accounts in some measure, along with the grip of the symbolic, for today's extreme reluctance to cease exploiting animals lest civilization crumble.

Pastoralism, part of the neolithic revolution, has been hailed as the single most important development in human history and, like hunting, regarded also as necessary, a survival strategy, to feed a growing population but by ensuring a lower-risk continuity of the food supply than was provided by an uncertain hunting economy. Both humans and animals live with the consequences to this day in the development of a form of farming which is unavoidably expansionist, territorial and hierarchical and, unavoidable or not, carries with it the practical and psychological need to achieve mastery over every useful nonhuman entity and to control-eradicate every animal or plant which poses a threat to the imposition of human culture and control. This war against 'nature' was escalated to moral and other imperatives by religious, philosophical, scientific and cultural dogma.

Ancient World

Many of our attitudes towards other species have been shaped by the Judeo-Greco-Christian tradition(s), but we need also consider the influence of the Old World civilizations mentioned above. Calvin W Schwabe (1994: 36) explores this distinctive and less familiar aspect of human/nonhuman relations in antiquity, and perhaps the additional myths and fables of an interesting transitional period even now assist in the maintenance of today's animal use.
The most striking factor of ancient world relations with animals was not animal utility, for this had already been well established, but the persisting sense of awe, intensified by the proximity of domestication. The most profound ancient world fusion of metaphor, symbol, simile and analogue still underpin or rather gloss over contemporary animal-eating and its promotion long after practical necessity ceased.

In the ancient world, bovine species, especially bulls, became pre-eminent models for kings and chiefs, particularly in their association of power, fertility and dominion with heavenly bodies and the mysteries of life. The bull myths, bull jumping, baiting and dancing prevalent in ancient Crete and Egypt, like so much of bull-baiting in England up until the nineteenth century and continued in bull cruelty in Spain and the Middle East, relates strongly to the cult of manliness. Ritual forms of bravery-testing against the epitome of strength and dominance, an animal (notably a herbivore) who had been conquered and enslaved, is hardly at a great remove from the meatismo of flesh-eating. And the domination, institutionalized, takes other forms.

It was in the ancient world also that cattle domestication was accompanied by surgical techniques developed to control bulls. Many hunters had revered the animal spirit and, subject to contract, slaughtered the individual but now, whilst the species was still looked upon with awe, the individual was castrated, nose-ringed and horn-clipped in his pre-slaughter years. Primary wealth too was measured in terms of cattle though its relevance pertains also to the property rights of domestication, the lynchpin of later welfarist legislation. This points towards the concealment of the individual and the elevation of species; the primacy of the idea rather than the animal self; the flight from specificity.

Aside from considerations of animal use for food and labour, Schwabe additionally provides a reading of the possible origins of humans' unique habit — again, even now, claimed to be natural — of drinking the milk of other species. The early Egyptian Pyramid Texts refer to the king as the sun bull, identified with the sun god
Re, and the depiction of the pharaoh suckling from a cow was associated with the cow mother of humankind, a creation myth shared throughout the old world. The cow was seen as a symbolic foster mother after the human baby had been weaned from the breast.

Only the profoundest cultural needs, therefore, initially caused adult man to continue to drink cow milk through life. (Schwabe 1994: 54).

We may infer from this that milk drinking was always only cultural whilst ‘meat’ only became only cultural, preserving a habit by symbolic means as necessity slipped away. Of course, the cultural essentialism of eating animals is very hard to get at through overlaying cultural distinctions between beneficial and polluting foods, and rules about what can be raw and what must be cooked, and so on. Possibly, all we can talk about are changing forms of local conventions and suggest reasons for them. But, although of interest in, and as studies of, cultural distinctions, their value seems to be lessened when the eating of animals is an orthodox and universal constant which — and above all this is our topic — is under serious challenge as it is especially so today. Moreover, such distinctions derive from the approval of instrumentalism. What we need to recognize here is that the application of symbolic processes which still underlies today’s animal-eating was also established early, and certainly in ancient Greece (where the ‘unnecessary’ status of ‘meat’ was well-known) where Dionysians would tear at raw bull flesh in the belief that by so doing they would receive some of the god’s power. It’s what Peters (1971: 225) termed contagious magic (and see, e.g. Frazer 1978: 34-46 on sympathetic magic).

Two Cultures

Hunting-gathering, the transition to pastoralism, and the ancient world have enabled us to overview the function of animals as symbolic and other resources within what may be called a pre-ethical period, as totemic norms. As we now move towards more cognitive institutional forms of morality it is possible to introduce the useful concept of two cultures which relies to some extent on Eder (1996) who understands the ambivalence of modernity and the relationship to nature as resulting from the perpetuation of a precarious equilibrium between the ‘bloodless’
tradition from within Judaism and the ‘bloody’ tradition of ancient Greece (we have traced the bloody culture further back). In Genesis, killing entered the world after man’s fall from grace and initiated a complex and hierarchically-patterned system of food taboos regulating distance between nature and culture. But, for Eder, it is in Israel that the reverse process also begins, in the taboo on killing. This ‘civilizing’ process (which, we can suggest, contrasts with Norbert Elias’s, see pp31-32 here) replaces the prevalent ancient world practice of human sacrifice by animal sacrifice, this by sacrifices of the field, and these by money paid to the sacrificial priests (Eder 1996: 125).

For Eder, modern society retains only a very broken connection to the Jewish tradition of the bloodless sacrifice. It continues instead a different traditional evolutionary line of the sacrificial feast which emerges from the Greek polis. This ritual ‘civilized’ the earlier blood sacrifices in a different way to the Jewish tradition. It did not abolish blood sacrifices but retained them instead as a sacrificial feast in Delphi against the resistance of Pythagorean and other groups who attempted to call this central symbol of the polis into question (Eder 1996: 126). The dominant modern cultural code continues this older tradition, the bloody culture of Hellenistic antiquity, and symbolizes the fundamental distance from the state of nature (Eder 1996: 129-130): this is the culture that Elias describes. It is the co-existence of these, developing into carnivorous and vegetarian cultures, that opens two fundamentally different evolutionary options to modern culture (Eder 1996: 132).

Although in Chapter 4 we shall have reason to question the status of bloodless culture as we find it in the human/nonhuman context, for the rest of this chapter and through Chapters 2 and 3, we shall use a notion of two cultures, bloody and bloodless. The latter should be understood as if shown in inverted commas, as it will often be, until we reach Chapter 4’s reassessment. The rest of this chapter examines how the bloody culture consolidates its ground and how the bloodless culture attempts to compete and overcome both its suppression and, in our more animal-specific thesis, animals’ subjugation. We need first to appreciate the Judeo, Greek and Roman contributions to the struggle.
Myth Creation

Adam and Eve were created, and commanded to be, vegetarians in a non-violent, nil-maintenance world (Genesis 1: 28-30), although by the use of the word 'dominion' (1: 26), for instance, to describe humans' estate the Bible has allowed conflicting interpretations of the 'proper' human/nonhuman relationship. We shall look at biblical creation myth, not in order to develop a lengthy exegesis, but to illustrate how the well-established use of animals is reflected upon in competing readings of Genesis, and to see what kind of morality emerges.

Dominant theology and culture have had it, with various softenings and variations, that God makes man in his own image; a woman and a nonhuman animal are responsible for the Fall. There is some dispute over whether the early biblical figures remained herbivorous after this (Thomas 1983: 289), but after the Flood humans became fully-fledged animal users by special dispensation due to the scarcity of other food (Genesis, 9: 1-4). Nature had become wild and the necessity and right to subdue and kill had entered the world. Man is at the pinnacle of creation with all other species there for the taking.

Oppositional reading includes such observations as 'Herb-eating dominion is hardly a licence for tyranny', it was harmony that was envisaged; and that the 'dominion promised us ... is a limited one: we are not made gods in creation but God's deputies ... Service not mastery is a better reading of the Jewish creation stories' (Linzey & Cohn-Sherbok 1997: 20, 123). Genesis 9 permits animal-eating only as a special concession to human sinfulness, but the condition — take the flesh but not the life, symbolized by the blood — is at best ambivalent (see, e.g. Linzey 1994: 18, 125), thus leading to the complex food taboos. Moreover, the dispensation can be explained instead as a punishment which kosher laws make palatable (see, e.g. Barkas 1975: 60). Either way, and in relation to later biblical narrative, humans' animal-eating condition can be seen as a temporary arrangement, or even aberration.

The points of note are not only the existence of such and other, older oppositional readings — supported by, for instance, the human-nonhuman commonality of the
covenant emphasized in Genesis 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17 (Linzey 1994: 34) — which reach to a far greater depth of hermeneutics than we have even hinted at here, but that such readings are invited by the Genesis writers' troubled minds. They seem either to have wished to cover man's state of sin and corruption with rationalization, a 'realism' ideology after the fact, the bloody option; or to bring attention back to what was meant to be and, as later Old Testament writers (e.g. Isaiah) prophesied and wished, was to be: the peaceable kingdom ideal (the end of animal sacrifice, for instance, is decreed in Isaiah 1: 11f and Psalms 50: 7f), the bloodless option. What is relevant is how the latter has been downgraded and the use which has been made, up until this day, of the dominant political reading of Genesis in the justification of animal use. By this, a divine origin has been attributed to an established human/nonhuman morality, thus rendering it virtually 'value-free'. Human society thus shuffles off responsibility (other animals, and not just snakes, taking the worst of the punishment)3, animal use is further naturalized and eternalized, and vegetarianism remains mythical, unfit for the 'real world'; or child-like, inadequate for the adult world; or perhaps is the Imaginary, out of place in the Symbolic world.

Greek & Roman Gifts

The downgrading, dismissal or denial is reflected in what emerges from Greece. Vegetarianism was given voice by Pythagoras who, in a kind of mythological approach to ethical reason, taught respect for other animals, that they had souls, that the souls of dead humans migrated to other animals, that it was wickedness to swallow flesh into our own. Plutarch, arguing for the rationality of other animals and vegetarianism, taught that other animals should be treated with justice, suggesting that it was animal-eaters and not vegetarians who should be asked to explain their habits. And Porphyry, who regarded other animals as kin, was concerned that consistency required that we apply justice to both humans and other animals, recognizing that the killing of the latter was unnecessary and that the practice had blunted the most important part of the civilized soul; what we may call the bloodless culture option within it.
Yet as we know, it was not this school of thought that was to underpin later Western tradition but the bloody, that of Aristotle. Unlike dominant interpretations of Genesis, there seems to be no great gulf between humans and animals in Aristotelian thinking. There was something beautiful in every creature and animals, like man, had (sensitive) souls. And there is nothing in Aristotle of the later denial of man's animality, but the political animal shared with no other species its intellectual and rational soul — the Platonic distinction which the Stoics similarly recognized, viewing animals as devoid of reason and therefore without rights. By this principle of nature and expedience

... the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. (Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, Ch. 5, quoted in Regan & Singer 1989: 5).

And this ministering was quite natural within the Great Chain. What Aristotle shares with the dominant interpretation of the oldest Hebrew texts is the appeal to design, although here it is the design of nature and not God:

... we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all, at least for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man. (Aristotle, Politics, 1: 8, quoted in Regan & Singer 1989: 5).

Animals were at the bottom of the hierarchical pyramid of dominance, treated as property rather than as sentient individuals with their own interests. Instrumentalism has its secular authority.

Turning to the Romans, the martial virtues of the empire — itself expanded by pressing horses into greater service — did not encourage sympathy for the weak, and the routine slaughter of humans and other animals sat comfortably within the Roman concept of civilization where the entertainment of ever jading appetites consisted of increasingly nauseating atrocities (see e.g. Serpell 1986: 176, Johnson 1990). The exhibitions celebrated humans' superiority and the domination of nature. Roman culture shows what can be done to those excluded from a morality based nevertheless on justice, public duty and even kindness. Those beyond the pale, the
unseen, some humans and all other animals, could be treated with an entertaining, socially sanctioned brutality.

The Romans were not far removed from the raw bloody culture of our exterminating hunters and the pastoralists' distancing device of gratuitous violence used to cover the complicating emotions of guilt and shame. But once the barbarity becomes recognized as barbarity, disapproved of and tempered by benevolence, the complicating emotions come once again to the fore and, like the continued violence itself, are in need of different covering or distancing devices more suitable to or determined by the particular later, and bloody ages, as we shall see.

By now though, totemism had almost completely given way; nonhumans no longer defined the world, men defined animals. And, crucially, other animals were, irrevocably it seems, lumped in with and as objectified nature, alongside plague, tornado, flood, drought (as well as plants). Binary distinctions disallow placings between culture and nature, except as symbols of breakdown.

**Church Influence**

By insisting on man's immortal soul the new religion further enhanced the uniqueness of humans in their unanimality and widened the gulf between them and all other, soulless species. Christian influence on Roman culture, especially in the shape of the sanctity of all human life, saw the end of gladiatorial combat, but not the end of combat with animals. Dominant ancient Greek tradition found a place in Christianity and the combined attitudes to animals prevailed in Europe at least until the eighteenth century. Lacking the Old Testament's intermittent injunctions against wanton cruelty to animals, its non-speciesist vision of what was and what will be again — the vegetarian ideal, the New Testament's impression of indifference towards other species cemented the path for some sixteen hundred years of virtually uninhibited anthropocentrism in the Western world, a burden of legacy animals carry today albeit in modified form.
Middle Ages

The Middle Ages provide us with a colourful picture of human/nonhuman relationships and attitudes. It is from here that much of our animal vocabulary arose, at a time when language and behaviour in literature, pageants, public rituals and criminal trials were dressed in animal symbolism. There is the sense that the era's human-nonhuman familiarity may have contained the seeds of development of a more equal and benign relationship but we find, especially in the latter part of the 'second' middle ages, between the dark ages and the Renaissance that, once again, a different road is taken.

Aristotelian and Christian beliefs of the period took on a more functional, hierarchical view of other species reinforced by a strong taxonomical trend based upon the assumption of impassable theological, ethical and physical barriers between humans and other animals. Pre-thirteenth century ecclesiastical lenience towards pagan and animal cults was obliterated; animal-human familiarity outlawed. To blur the boundaries was impure, a heresy against orthodox belief. As the harmony of medieval Europe began to break apart due to plague, crop failure and pestilence, the creation of a new order entailed the scapegoating of the symbols of disorder, symptomatic of the by now well-established orthodox inability to distinguish between the symbolic and the material. It was during the Middle Ages, when the universe was one of 'hallucination', the world 'a symbolic forest peopled with mysterious presences' that

Europe was trying to create for itself a culture that would reflect a political and economic plurality, dominated, true, by the paternal control of the church, which nobody called into question, but also open to a new sense of nature, of concrete reality, of human individuality. Organizational and productive processes were being rationalized: It was necessary to find the techniques of reason. (Eco 1987: 260).

To this end, the achievement of St Thomas Aquinas was to synthesize Aristotelianism and Christianity and, in allowing the reason of the former to enter harmoniously into the latter's culture, created a structure which, as Umberto Eco points out, no revolutionary force has been able to shake from within. One could only speak of it 'from outside' (Eco 1987: 258). The fearsome Thomist dogma, which has
changed more in degree than kind, provided the basis upon which the Inquisition conducted its work in rooting out and destroying any heresy against this classic humanocentrism. Even prior to the modern era we find here the institutionalization of a 'universalist' morality, an enforcement of conformity, which persecutes not only the different but also the different-thinking and different-living. The intolerance shown toward those who would undermine falsehoods illustrates the pre-eminence of belief over truth.

Rational humans existed for the sake of individual well-being, but nonhuman animals existed for the sake of their species, intended by divine providence for man’s use, any use, in the natural order. Animal ‘intelligence’ was explained away as merely God-given instinct and any proscription against cruelty to animals was intended merely to minimize cruelty to humans, a strong echo of which we find in Kant much later. In Christianizing what already had become the convenient Aristotelian norm of exploiting ‘irrational’ creatures, Genesis 1: 29-30 and 9: 3 are reduced by Aquinas to ‘the imperfect are there to serve the perfect’. Despite being explicit that animals are sensitive to pain, there were no sins against them (Summa Contra Gentiles, iii, 113 and Summa Theologica I, II, Q72, art. 4; see, e.g. Regan & Singer 1989: 8, Clarke & Linzey 1990: 102-103, and Singer 1977: 202).

The road not taken this time is the one to which St Francis of Assisi had pointed. In this we can also note the pre-Thomist introduction by Francis of the inconsistencies and ambivalence of those who can be identified within a ‘bloodless’ tradition. His almost pantheist line within Catholicism seems not to have enabled him, despite his much celebrated concern for animals, to consider it immoral to kill them for food. His beliefs were tied to orthodox cosmology — all had been made for humans. At least, this is the interpretation that Peter Singer gives us, not surprisingly perhaps, seeing what little time he has for organized religion (see Singer 1977: 193 and 197-205). But Janet Barkas (1975: 65) tells us that although St Francis relied on the words of Christ (in Luke) for guidance in making non-vegetarian rules for his Order: ‘Eat whatever is put before you’, for the man himself animal-eating was an exception. Fish was a commonplace in the diet, however.
Francis is perhaps a classic example not so much of bloodless culture but of its potential and of the conflicting forces. His inconsistency and ambivalence, we can suggest, are due not least to being caught within a two-culture tension. Francis's compassion for other, brother and sister species from the same origin is pulled against by dominant theology (in later cases the authority may change), the sheer strength of this discourse, increasing greatly with Aquinas. (Many others of the time held, for various reasons, that it was indeed ‘sinful for a man to kill dumb animals’ and it was this very bloodless culture ‘error’ of theirs which Aquinas was at pains to refute). We shall see that history is littered with such representatives, but what we can also note here is how hagiography generally and indeed apochrypha show us again the pattern we noticed earlier with the first two elements of the Judeo-Greco-Christian tradition — the downgrading of alternative potential. Or, as Linzey & Cohn-Sherbok put it in their identification of the ‘positive resources’ of the Jewish and Christian traditions for establishing animal welfare and rights, how the alternative but no less authentic voices which indicate a ‘reversal of the relationship of fear and enmity between humans and animals that appertains after the Fall and the Flood’ have been sidelined or silenced by instrumentalist readings of the Scriptures (see Linzey & Cohn-Sherbok 1997: 13, 100)

If our earlier transition had led to Aquinas, the next transitory period, leading into the modern era, was to both consolidate the human supremacy myth he had mixed from biblical and classical sources and to work variations on the theme; but also to give light to bloodless culture in the minds, if not the deeds, of an increasing number.

**Renaissance & Reformation**

These twin initiatives furthered the process of transition from the medieval to the modern and the shift in focus from God back to man; the rise of humanism. They released intellectual forces, rediscovered classical Greek and Roman learning and broke down Church dominance thus creating space for theological and secular reflections, political theory, natural science and moral philosophy. It is during this period also that a greater freedom of thought encourages the dissenting pro-animal
voice. However, despite the Greek recognition of humans' 'descent' from animals and indeed the ability to live without killing, the search for an ideal system of culture-civilization now meant man's absolute separation from the 'brutes' in order to enhance the dignity, value and potential of humans who were not animal at all, such were their powers of reason. This also entailed further neglect and subjugation of the emotions which have never since been able to command the kind of respect that may be necessary for animals' liberation to be achieved.

From the Middle Ages through the Renaissance, a period of great agricultural and colonial expansion, Britain gained a reputation for gratuitous cruelty. Bull baiting, bear baiting, dog fighting and cockfighting were commonplace. Royalty set the tone with the slaughter of often specially herded or carted animals, and all this took place within the embracing ideology of taming nature through cultivation, land drainage and forest clearing. Nature, the wild, the wilderness was a sign of the Devil (depicted as half animal, utilizing the horror of binary breakdown), a chaos to be ordered.

The increased zeal to cultivate, domesticate and civilize was applied not solely to 'nature'. Within the same process, human society, despite its new creed of humanism, reinforced its hierarchical structure, and the poor, the unfortunate, the insane, and many women and children were also excluded. As for animals on farms, they (as even now) '... were a sort of inferior class, reassuring the humblest rural worker that he was not at the absolute bottom of the social scale ...' (Thomas 1983: 50).

Indeed, it may be said that by now, animals were not in the social scale at all, having become objects as men became subjects. If it hadn't already been achieved, the ambivalence of the Judeo-Christian inheritance — domination versus stewardship — was now fully overcome, by dismissing the stewardship possibility. It wasn't until the eighteenth century at least that it was fully restored in the shape of welfarism. Animal liberation was later to try to take the human/nonhuman issue to the other side of ambivalence.
Unsurprisingly, there was an excessive reliance upon animal products during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. Supported by medical advice, roast 'beef' becomes a national symbol (Thomas 1983: 25). The conquest of nature and the cultivated, civilized, social loftiness was, and still is to a large extent, celebrated and symbolized in that dish; the cooked separating humans from the raw- 'meat'-eating animal. Through ritual, bloody culture seeks to have it both ways, to be both animal and non-animal, natural and cultural. Ritual both bridges and covers the divide as the very act of cooking cancels the 'natural' claim, though this is best left unsaid.

But, at the same time, there is also a greater shift in sensibility, in the self-consciousness of bloody culture. As referred to earlier [p22], this is territory covered by Elias (1994) whose civilizing process, described in terms of the classical rather than the romantic perspective, appears to relate only to the bloody-carnivorous culture of early modernity. Elias deals with the post-medieval shift from 'natural' social hierarchy, matter of factness and non-embarrassment to the semi-urban courts where 'from the elements of the old nobility and partly from new rising elements, a new aristocracy forms within a new social space, new functions and accordingly a different emotional structure' (Elias 1994: 177). Within this context, of increasing social division of labour, competing civilities and state monopolization of violence, conflict becomes codified at the same time as other means than violence have now to be utilized in procuring status. What emerges in this unplanned dynamic are corresponding changes in manners. People depend on each other more. There is an external and internal regulation of behaviour (see Elias 1994: 445).

Elias traces this repression and control of the affect structures of humans and society. The process consists of bourgeois disgust, shame, fear and anxiety not just at animality but of what others may think of one's display of what they may construe to be animal-like behaviour. There's an increasing concealment of personal practice and there is nothing 'rational' about it; certain things are just 'not done', in public.

... people, in the course of the civilizing process, seek to suppress in themselves every characteristic that they feel to be “animal”. They likewise suppress such characteristics in their food. (Elias 1994: 98).
It seems that it is from after the Middle Ages that sentimentalism and a fantasy of control through ritual set in to the civilizing process of bloody culture through this steady move away from nature. The hunters’ and pastoralists’ unease has come to the fore again and new strategies are deployed to evade it.

Modern oppositions to the collective delusions were about to be felt. Reformation independence, a new era of ethical thought, permitted development of both anti- and pro-animal sentiment — the former aided by Luther’s advocacy of sanctified human tyranny, the latter aided materially by the introduction of new vegetables and herbs from the New World, giving impetus to the greater possibility of dietary change — a dialectical legacy notable ever since in the clash of escalating animal use and increasing animal concern. In the sixteenth century, the oppositional culture and animals found a new major champion, in the shape of Montaigne, who railed against the ‘absurd arrogance’ humans showed towards animals and nature in general. Although recognizing that cruelty to animals can indeed lead to cruelty to humans, this was not quite the point, for there was:

... a certain respect, a general duty to humanity, not only to beasts that have life and sense, but even to trees and plants. We owe justice to men, and graciousness and benignity to other creatures ... there is a certain commerce and mutual obligation betwixt them and us. (Montaigne, The Essays, quoted in Wynne-Tyson 1990: 316).

Helping to usher into the growing debate the heresy that humans were not at all superior, Montaigne sailed close to the sin of theriophily:

Let him (who holds all other life to be brought into being for man’s sole use and pleasure) show me, by the most skilful argument, upon what foundation he has built these excessive prerogatives which he supposes himself to have over other existences ... Is it possible to imagine anything so ridiculous as that this pitiful miserable creature, who is not even master of himself, exposed to injuries of every kind, should call himself master and lord of the universe, of which, so far from being lord of it, he knows but the smallest part? ... Who has given him this sealed charter? Let him show us the ‘letters patent’ of this grand commission. Have they been issued in favour of the wise only? They affect but the few in that case. The fools and the wicked – are they worthy of so extraordinary a favour, and being the worst part of the world, do they deserve to be preferred to all the rest? (Montaigne, The Essays, quoted in Wynne-Tyson 1990: 317).

It is this second quotation which throws the difficulties of the first into relief. The first hinted at orthodox culture/nature (including animals) distinction, the second
revealing more clearly his radical intent, exposing the hollowness of the much vaunted rationalism and the 'natural' order. But just as the potential which St Francis and others represented was overtaken by Aquinas, Montaigne and similar thinkers such as the vegetarian Leonardo da Vinci and the Utopians of Thomas More, may have secured some kind of foothold had it not been for René Descartes (and Thomas Hobbes) who, though rejecting the appeal to final causes and even perhaps scriptural sanction for human ascendancy, legitimized for most people both new and old forms of animal use. Not only this; they did it while giving birth to modern philosophy and when the rationales for human domination of other animals were shifting from the mythic, religious and metaphysical to the rational, technical and scientific.

Within the context of rising capitalism and its need for new technologies, science had become less contemplative and more applied, mathematical and instrumental. The aim was to discover nature's usable laws, its order. Science breaks down organic nature into constitutive, observable, measurable, experimentable parts; it becomes scientistic, the known becomes dominated by the knower, nature is devalued and animals become utterly objectified (and see, e.g. Noske 1989: 53-54). Fusing the science of mechanics with Christian doctrine, Descartes' rationalist philosophy could only see animals — having no language, souls or consciousness — as mere *automata*. This denial of suffering not only provided an answer to the ancient theological question of why, since they did not descend from Adam, God allowed animals to suffer, but also absolved people from the suspicion of guilt when they ate or killed them (Singer 1977: 208-209). This rationalized what had been done for centuries but was also of more immediate utility in justifying the increasingly widespread fashion for vivisection. The genius of the doctrine was that all objectors looked suspect, questioning by implication if man himself had an immortal soul. No less than Aristotle and Aquinas, Descartes gives us a clear indication of the knowledge-belief-power nexus which determines what animals are or are not. As Aquinas Christianized Aristotle, Descartes scientized Christianity.
Secularly, more concerned with social order, and yet with the same results, it was, for Thomas Hobbes, when all said and done, by the right of nature that man was entitled to take those steps which he thought necessary for his preservation and subsistence. Rejecting any notion of objective right and wrong, human rule reflected merely the naked self-interest of the human species which exercised dominion as hostility. The rule over other species rested solely on superior power. Or, as Spinoza believed, civilization would be impossible if humanity acted justly towards nature. And, still defending his stance by appeal to God's ordinance, Samuel von Pufendorf thought humans were in a permanent state of war with other animals and that martial law was in force allowing humans to hurt or kill this enemy; God had allowed this state of affairs to exist. The sense was still, genuinely or disingenuously, that humans could not survive without being predators (Thomas 1983: 171, 299).

Changing conditions, such as the progress of natural science, the revolt against authority, including the Church's, and the shift 'from status to contract', opened up the field, as we have seen from Montaigne but, as far as the human/nonhuman relationship was concerned, these others closed it down again. Although the Hobbesian 'enlightenment' brought ethics into the modern era by anthropologizing religious accounts, once again animals were excluded from the embrace. There was to be no Leviathan to protect animal interests, and the Hobbesian-Spinozan and even Pufendorf philosophies are utilized in today's arguments where animal use is tied to a sense of order, and security. Cartesianism itself has enjoyed a fine heyday, its dead hand still noticeable in the exclusive dualism which still determines the epistemology underlying animal use and, more specifically, in behavioural experiments on animals. Vivisection laboratory vernacular (see, e.g. Birke & Smith 1995) betrays a modern day allegiance to the doctrine as well as serving to distance scientists from the facts which disprove it, its deafening and blinding effects contributing to animal 'invisibility'. These philosophies, redolent of anxiety and the need for control, combine to yield the paradox; the necessary nothingness of animals.
Although moral scruples had hitherto failed to gain much ground due to their incompatibility with the direction in which society continued to move, they were beginning to find allies in unexpected quarters. As Keith Thomas tells us, the brutal realism of the nature-as-slaughterhouse view was to conflict with the principles of benevolence and good nature to which it later became customary to pay lip service. Building on the Renaissance and Reformation, the combination of factors in the succeeding years gave rise to the beginnings of a cultural shift and an increasing concern over how other animals were treated by the human.

Into Light

Although still strongly defended, allied to the scientific revolution's further taming of nature, from the seventeenth century onwards the wanton killing of and cruelty to animals came under increasing attack. Oppositional voices were informed by the combined or discrete concerns of anti-mechanism, justice, suffering, similitude, natural history, theology, duty and the reappraisal of nature and society.

Cartesianism had itself been in part a reaction to what other forms of science were finding out. New knowledge of the wider context, whereby humans began to look less significant, served to puncture speciesist vanity within a steady decentring process. Astronomers had revealed that the earth was not the centre of the universe and it became more apparent that there was a lot more out there than humans knew about. Millions of bacteria had been identified, all indifferent to human existence. Explorers found uninhabited parts of the world where forms of life had no known human use, species had come and gone long before humans had appeared, and biblical chronology had been found to be wildly inaccurate — the earth was much older than scripture had allowed.

The destruction of the old anthropocentric illusion was thus begun by astronomers, botanists and zoologists. It was completed by the students of geology. (Thomas 1983: 168).

And if science showed that humans were not at the centre, humans could only give meaning to everything if they, through objective knowledge, controlled it and gave it a meaning and purpose. In this shift from the geocentric to the egocentric is the
transition from an understanding of nature legitimized by a traditional faith to one based on scientific research (see Elias 1994: 209). But Descartes' and others' attempts at this form of control and the maintenance of human status was not without an opposition which did not attempt to restore mastery.

Some thirty years after Descartes' death, the vegetarian Thomas Tryon was probably the first to introduce the word 'rights' ('natural' rather than acquired) in the nonhuman context. His 'fowls of heaven' complained:

But tell us, O Men! We pray you to tell us what injuries have we committed to forfeit? What laws have we broken, or what cause given you, whereby you can pretend a right to invade and violate our part, and natural rights, and to assault and destroy us, as if we were the aggressors, and no better than thieves, robbers and murderers, fit to be extirpated out of creation? (Tryon, The Countryman's Companion, quoted in Magel 1989: 73).

And, ironically, it was the findings of vivisection that helped the animal case. Voltaire was appalled not only at the cruelty but at the rationalistic poverty of mind:

There are some barbarians who will take this dog, that so greatly excels man in capacity for friendship, who will nail him to a table and dissect him alive, in order to show you his veins and nerves. And what you then discover in him are all the same organs of sensation that you have in yourself. Answer me, mechanist, has Nature arranged all the springs of feeling in this animal to the end that he might not feel? Has he nerves that he may be incapable of suffering? (Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, quoted in Wynne-Tyson, 1990: 557).

Montaigne would have approved of both thinkers. Weight was added by Rousseau's rediscovery of nature and, like Porphyry, his promotion of human-nonhuman similitude and kinship rather than the presupposed moral significance of difference. Our duty to animals derived from the shared sentiency. His idealised concept of the noble savage at one with nature has more than an echo of St Francis, and served as a counterpoint to Hobbes's 'war'. Rousseau had also recognized that although civilization had been founded upon domesticated animal labour it was the coincidental possession of cultivated land which demanded laws and which together led to civilization's corrupting influences. He also shows us the two culture divide in the way he works against the sociogenic repression of drives and impulses traced by Elias and, like Francis and many other oppositional voices, shows too the
internal and external two culture tensions. Rousseau was no vegetarian whilst his utopia was and would be.

The late seventeenth century and the century that followed were increasing the site of conflict between sympathy and exploitation. Although Britain was still considered by many foreigners to be a cruel nation, the roll call of emerging (albeit mostly part-time) humanitarians was impressive: Johnson, Pope, Woolman, Paley, James Thomson, Burns, Blake, Cowper, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Southey, Addison, Steele and, perhaps above all, Shelley, as vegetarian as his utopia. This uprising of ‘unacknowledged legislators’ (and other notables, vegetarians such as John Oswald and the ‘eccentric’ Joseph Ritson) was a marked reaction against the dark side of enlightenment. That laws against animal cruelty began to be debated and implemented later is perhaps echoed in Freud’s ‘Wherever I’ve been I have found a poet has been there before me’. Theologians speaking out against orthodox teaching included James Granger, John Wesley, and Humphrey Primatt who, in contradistinction to Aquinas, argued in his A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and the Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals (1776) that cruelty was atheism (see, e.g. Linzey & Regan 1989: 127-130 and Linzey & Cohn-Sherbok 1997: 9).

Such figures and many others can be listed as part of the growing chorus of opposition to the rigid ontological separation of humans and other animals. But, in shifting the ground from metaethics to normative ethics, in a time of natural rights doctrine and within the swelling reaction against Cartesianism, it is perhaps Jeremy Bentham’s individual influence which has been most enduring. Utilitarianism — with an inclusion of nonhuman pleasure and pain — was to lay behind much of later animal liberation philosophy and campaigning. Like Primatt, Bentham compared the status of animals in Britain with that of human slaves in other countries, arguing that supposed or real difference was not sufficient cause to deny them certain rights:

The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withheld from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the
number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the *os sacrum* are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they *reason*? nor Can they *talk*? but, Can they *suffer*? (Bentham 1960: 142).

Albeit not alone, Bentham had put sentience firmly into the liberation debate. As others have commented, the philosophical underpinning made non-instrumental interaction with ‘nature’ more socially acceptable, and began the reversion of animals back from objects to subjects. The old criterion had been rationality, the ‘new’ competing one was the capacity to suffer pain, an issue more important to Bentham than killing. Indeed, what we get alongside utilitarianism’s ‘strength’ is the paradox of valuing animal suffering but not animal life itself — utilitarianism has difficulty in opposing ‘painless’ killing (a difficulty shared by the non-vegetarian Primatt) — and the emphasis on legal rather than natural rights.

Nevertheless, whilst Renaissance men, the majority non-Leonardo types, saw their increased civility in their distance from and their indifference to animals, by Bentham’s time the difference between refinement and vulgarity was based to a large extent on one’s attitude and behaviour towards animals themselves. This too seems to mark a significant shift away from, although significantly not entirely outside of, the Eliasian process of bloody culture in which we find Kant reinforcing the instrumentalist line — animals are ‘things’ to be used as mere means to man’s end. Actions only possessed moral worth when duty was done for its own sake, but the duty was to man. Animals have no moral status, except that kind treatment of them was necessary lest cruelty to beasts lead to cruelty to humans, a theory still to underpin much of the ensuing legislation in the nineteenth century.

The debate over rights and human duties — either as a direct duty to God and humans and thereby indirectly to animals, or direct, that as animals were sentient like humans they had a right to be treated with consideration — was eventually narrowed down to virtually the same thing, a kinder exploitation to suit the greater refinement and civility of the age; an enlightened speciesism.
Consolidations, Codifications & ‘Synthesis’

Up until now what we have been able to trace is a kind of heavily weighted dialectical process: domination/stewardship; sacrificial feasts/end of bloody sacrifice; Aristotle/Pythagoras-Plutarch-Porphyry; Aquinas/Saint Francis; Descartes-Hobbes-Pufendorf/Tryon-Montaigne-Voltaire; Kant/Bentham, and so on. In the nineteenth century both sides gained ground and strength and we can see how four major developments — of legislation, the (R)SPCA, the Vegetarian Society and anti-vivisection — suggest both a coming together and a new or continued separation.

In an increasingly secular and theological-reformist world a combination of factors had constituted considerable weight against animal exploitation. The ‘war’ was over. Humans no longer needed to subjugate nature and fend off the wild. Additionally, there was a certain stability and sense of security about England represented not least by its Empire, industrial wealth and Victoria’s reign. Typically British ‘animal loving’ royalty and aristocracy were emulated in an increasingly class-conscious society. And Thomas (1983: 301) suggests that urbanization and industrialization saw animals becoming less of a production process feature and, through the consequent physical remoteness of the individual from (farmed) animals, and from reliance on their economic value, town folk were familiar with them more as pets. The close relationships formed with companion animals who became part of the family fostered not only a greater though vague and still confused affection for other species, but a deeper appreciation of their character, abilities, emotions, individuality (Serpell 1986 and Jasper & Nelkin 1992, for instance, place great store by the compassion- and justice-inducing function of pets in the past and in the future, though a great many in the UK movement today demur). On top of this, Darwin problematized humans’ relationship with other animals.

However, what we must not overlook, and in contrast to (or in extension of) Thomas’s account, is that many of the worst cruelties were inflicted within an urban environment, in vivisection, fashion and on draught horses, as Richard D Ryder
(1989: 151) tells us. The point for us is what Hilda Kean (1998: 30-34) notes, the abundance of animals living in, worked in and herded through cities in the early nineteenth century, and the important role of sight in developing the relationship between a new sensibility seeing ill-treatment and creating change. After all, the success of early anti-cruelty legislation was to rely not just on framing it in terms of private property but also on the protection of those very animals who were being cruelly treated *publicly*. And opposition to vivisection came also from those who had by now come to 'know' and appreciate the very kinds of animal, e.g. dogs as pets, who were being used in laboratories, many of them being stolen for the purpose (see Kean 1998: 98).

**Legislation**

Legislative attempts in the early nineteenth century to ban bull baiting and similar activities — though leaving ruling class legislators' bloodsports intact — appeared to be more concerned with stopping poor, disorderly folk being distracted from their work. This has been made much of (by, for instance, Tester 1991; see Chapter 5 here) as an anti-working class, anti-revolution, pro-stability measure, thus sitting well with a view of the town as a symbol of moral decline. But this is rather simplistic; genuine animal concern and the pull of bloodless culture cannot be so easily written off. There is the dual nineteenth century concern with both control *and* progress to consider, and there *is*, after all, a nice distinction between the 'ruling class' pursuits of hunting-shooting-fishing of 'free' animals (sporting chance) and the 'rabble' setting captive animals upon one another (though irrelevant to liberationists today). The anti-working class theme is also weakened when we are reminded of Richard Martin's (see below) claim that this charge was an insult to the working classes who were thus assumed to be inherently cruel or had nothing better to do, and when we recognize aristocratic involvement in 'working class' sports such as cockfighting and dogfighting. Bull baiting was also defended on the grounds that it inspired courage, nobleness of sentiment and elevation of mind, according to George Canning. On 25 April 1800, and working further against the notion that such measures were a ruling class conspiracy, *The Times* denounced Pulteney's ultimately unsuccessful Bill against bull baiting as an undue interference with private life,
claiming that ‘whatever meddles with the private personal disposition of a man’s
time or property is tyranny direct’. This is not so much two class cultures but two
class-transcendent cultures pulling against each other,.

Other pieces of legislation were proposed, some, like the Bill to prevent any
‘wanton cruelty’ to animals in 1809 were framed and supported by those also opposed
to slavery; Thomas Erskine and William Wilberforce, for instance. In 1822, Erskine
and Richard Martin managed to pass the Act to Prevent the Cruel and Improper
Treatment of Cattle by framing it as if it were a measure to protect private property,
property rights being paramount (as they remain), and further laws were enacted
throughout the nineteenth century, bull baiting and cock fighting eventually being
banned in 1835. Both indirect and direct obligations were reflected in these
developments, and their supporters were also involved in a range of liberal causes,
e.g. emancipation of Catholics, abolition of the death penalty, the establishment of
legal aid. A major force in the anti-cruelty stance was also, according to Ryder (1989:
154-155), the Victorian era’s acceptance of death and tolerance of killing (done with
due care) yet allied to an even greater abhorrence at cruelty and suffering due to the
greater acknowledgement of pain itself in the light of painkiller and anaesthesia
development, creating a climate of greater sensitivity to suffering, a factor also in
the reform of prisons, child and female labour and slavery. Reformers were from all
religious sects and from none and the NSPCC grew out of the RSPCA.

(Royal) Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
Founded as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in 1824, the SPCA’s
first chairman was active anti-slavery campaigner Fowell Buxton MP, its first
Secretary was Reverend Arthur Broome and its second was Lewis Gompertz. Other
founders and early supporters included Martin, Wilberforce and Shaftesbury; the
mix again being typical of the age. The Society set out to educate through tracts,
pamphlets and instructive animal fiction for the young (part of the era’s
proliferation of anti-cruelty literature), and also to police the new anti-cruelty laws
which recognized and enshrined certain animals’ rights. The SPCA was granted the
Royal prefix by Victoria in 1840 and animal welfare had come of age, its patronage
ensuring respectability (in contrast to Tudor and Stuart monarchy) which was first to be a boon and later, as now perhaps, a handicap; certainly a mixed blessing.

That protagonists and supporters of early legislation and the formation of the SPCA were a mixed bunch is not surprising at an early stage of organized reform, when so much cruelty was visible to more people passing from ignorance to seeing to commitment, and when the SPCA was displaying a zeal which it tended to lose during the rest of the century and into the next. Other organizations, e.g. the League Against Cruel Sports and anti-vivisection groups, sprang up later to fill the void left by the Society's failures and loss of radicalism which are, in effect, measures of bloody culture's success. Bloody culture became dominant within the RSPCA (perhaps inevitable since it was founded upon dominant Christian principles) and, until the mid to late twentieth century, successfully governed the human/nonhuman territory in its own way and as a representation of the bloodless. The RSPCA's routine expulsion of radicals such as Animal Liberation Front spokesman Robin Webb in the early 1990s, fellow vegan Lewis Gompertz before him and Reform Group members at various times from the 1970s, illustrates the two-culture divide. (That Gompertz's expulsion has been suspected of anti-Semitism may be seen to reinforce at least Eder's theme).

Bloodless culture itself can be seen more clearly perhaps in the founding of the Vegetarian Society and, to a lesser extent, in the anti-vivisection campaign: the first, a codified negation of hierarchical food taboo structures, the second opposing bloody culture's scientism. Both sought a renaturalization of society, contradicting industrial culture.

Vegetarianism

The Vegetarian Society was founded in 1847. Unlike legislation and the (R)SPCA which were originally partly but later wholly versions of bloody culture and now something of an unequal mixture of bloody and bloodless, there was nothing new about vegetarianism which had been practised and advocated (or advocated and not practised) for millennia, before and after the rise of the hunting economy, and
attacked as crankish for almost as long. It wasn’t until 1842 that the word appeared, however, hatched from the Latin *vegetus* (whole, sound, fresh, lively), and became widespread after the foundation of the Society by secular followers of William Metcalfe, himself a follower of the Rev’d William Cowherd who had made vegetarianism obligatory in his Bible Christian Church in Salford in 1809 (Ryder 1989: 97).

Vegetarianism had since at least the seventeenth century also been seen by some as a method of lessening aggressive behaviour or of returning humans to a less aggressive state. Anatomical study had shown humans not to be natural carnivores, they had the wrong kind of teeth, gastric juices and intestines. ‘Meat’ was unhealthy, it caused untold suffering, it brutalized human nature. By the beginning of the eighteenth century all the arguments which were to sustain modern vegetarianism were in circulation and by the end of the century the land use efficiency argument had been added (Thomas 1983: 295 — it had also been recognized by Plato in *The Republic*). In the last third of the eighteenth century and the first third of the nineteenth — the Romantic heyday — vegetarianism’s radical, revolutionary stance, negating social values, opposing war, slavery and in many cases male dominance, had become more apparent, evolving into a reasoned system. As Keith Thomas points out, once it had been accepted that animals should be treated with kindness, it inevitably seemed increasingly repugnant to kill them for ‘meat’. ‘Meat’-eating symbolised too man’s fallen condition, the earlier thinkers’ view that it was a concession to human weakness had not been forgotten (Thomas 1983: 288-290).

During the nineteenth century, slaughterhouses began to be obscured from public view, and animal carcasses were seen less often in public places and at table. Slaughtermen (and others whose trade was animal-related) were virtually a despised class, resented even by ‘meat’ eaters. Although it had begun to disappear long before, carving at table had remained a position of honour even until the eighteenth century when its status was reduced as households shrunk and specialists, instead, slaughtered and butchered animals. Households became more
locations of consumption only; the link with killing became something to be increasingly avoided (see Elias 1994: 98).

However, we must be careful to identify the two cultures and their approaches to animal-eating represented by the last two paragraphs. The difference lies between, on the one hand, bloody culture’s civilizing process of concealment where Elias suggests that vegetarianism might increase due to escalating repugnance at the animal within, at the ‘animal-like’ practice of eating animals (Elias 1978: 120) and the concern with who we are and, on the other hand, bloodless culture’s ethical (and more practical) focus instead on human treatment of animals without and the concern with who they are, rather than what they are not. The former would be becoming vegetarian ‘for the wrong reason’ and does not appear to have materialized, in contrast to what at least seems to be the increasingly animal defence motivation of the majority of vegetarians. We can suggest these are repugnances and decencies of totally different orders. One culture conceals the link with killing, the other exposes and opposes the needless slaughter.

**Anti-Vivisection**

If 1824 and 1847 were major dates a third was 1876. The issue of vivisection dominated the animal concern world during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Seemingly founded on a policy of punishing one form of nature for the ills that other forms inflict on humans, its scientists and others had been performing experiments on live animals for centuries, but Descartes and his followers had given vivisection the ethical all clear, and in the nineteenth century laboratories of Frenchmen Francois Megendie, Claude Bernard and Louis Pasteur it was turned into an everyday practice. Now, in the new climate of rather confused animal concern, their work began to be viewed by many as a scandal of moral decline which eventually gave rise in Britain to the ironically titled Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 which, unlike many other legislative measures, did not abolish a cruel practice but legalized one. Though regarded as wholly unsatisfactory by anti-vivisectionists, it was not replaced until 1986 by the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act which itself did animals few favours and, after one hundred years, marked no conceptual shift.
Notably, the major anti-vivisection organizations were founded after the passing of the 1876 Act, not so much to police it but to organize opposition to the now legally-sanctioned cruelty.

Animal experimentation’s opposition included people from all classes — many of whom, again, had also been active in other social causes — but who on this occasion were outplayed by the rising religion of science, government-scientist collusion and the calculated and enduring promotion of the scientist as saviour. As vivisection, for the aristocracy, epitomised the soullessness of modern culture (Ritvo 1994: 109), as well as the rise of a competing class, the equating of vivisection with scientific progress also enabled its protagonists to depict opponents as anti-progress and indeed anti-science. The elevated status of the scientist who knows best, the triumph of scientism, the ‘objectivity’, and subjectivity-masking ritual of science, also served to obscure animal suffering which upsets or offends only the squeamish, though not obscured to many women and many of the working class who saw in vivisection a reflection of their own oppressions (see, e.g. Turner 1980, Kean 1998). However, that many of the leading anti-vivisectionists were women, for instance Francis Power Cobbe, who opposed vivisection not least because of its heartless rational materialism, its rape of nature (much like Margaret Cavendish and Anne Finch had railed against Cartesianism two hundred years earlier, see Donovan 1990: 366), made it all the easier not only to dismiss opponents as irrational and sentimental but also to preclude debate about the scientific (in)validity of the practice.

Against the anti-pain trend of the period, science itself maintained the manly stoicism of bloody culture. As Harriet Ritvo suggests, in the nineteenth century animals were still very badly treated by those taking pride in the doughty national character revealed by its infliction (Ritvo 1994: 106) to which Canning’s sentiments, cited earlier, testify. It took a real and rational man to give and take pain; violence continues to be a virtue; and this served not only the individual psychology arising out of Bacon’s masculine scientism but also reinforced the natural law mythology of a cruel static nature; Darwin could be seen to have vindicated them. If animal-eating
was always the means by which all other animal use was made acceptable (as noted by Henry Salt 1980: 55), vivisection compounded it, building upon notions of necessity and crisis, ends justifies the means and a biased utilitarianist balance of interests. Moreover, growing middle class respectability, which had lain behind much of the emerging animal concern, was compromised by vivisection being conducted by men of that very class, if not their ilk.

From the four developments resulting from the gathering challenge to orthodox theological and secular authority as from the sixteenth century we can note the following. A form of synthesis is identifiable which in turn gives rise to a renewed thesis and antithesis. It is impossible to declare that the beginnings of legislation and the foundation of the SPCA were deliberate bloody culture ploys to appropriate, appease or represent bloodless culture even if the outcome was to be just that. What we know is that such nineteenth century developments came about through the forces of both cultures (or elements within both). Whilst the founding of the Vegetarian Society can be seen as an attempt at consolidation and codification of bloodless culture, the legislation (including the vivisection Act) and the SPCA were of mixed origin.

As parts of both cultures are drawn simultaneously towards each other and apart, there is created between them an area of compromise and confusion where anti-cruelty foxhunters meet animal-eating anti-vivisectionists (typically Victorian anti-cruelty-suffering but killing-tolerant), where progress and control meet progress and liberation. It is in this area of ambiguity and redefinition, in which bloody culture is well schooled, that it cements its ground with legalistic welfarism, enshrines animals as human property and codifies, thereby legitimates, the contradictions of animal use. The synthesis becomes a form of bloody culture consolidation and control, accompanied by the crucial impression of concern.

Many had greatly aided bloodless culture progress up until now, such as Paley, Chesterfield, Franklin, Arnold, Michelet, Schopenhauer, Bentham, TH Huxley and Darwin himself but these, like many others before (and after) them, became and
remained vegetarians only intellectually and/or equivocated about vivisection, classic illustrations of two culture ambivalence and tension, as are the ambiguities of Darwinism itself. Again, the pull of authority, tradition, habit, status, the known, plus the new power of science causes enough tension for those stirred by bloodless culture, the bloodless potential within them roused, ultimately to recoil.

But it is not just the pull of bloody culture itself — its tradition, power, 'naturalness' — that's of great effect. There's also the seductive strategy. As Thomas points out, the contradiction between growing human comfort, well-being and the new sensibilities on the one hand, and the miserable lives of most animals on the other, was glossed over by compromise and concealment, the age-old practice developing greatly in the twentieth century (see also Benton 1996). Eder tells us that modern carnivorous culture justifies killing and that killing is assigned to agencies that are no longer responsible. All this carnivorous culture asks is not to have to worry about anything, not to overburden the system. Ultimately all it demands is that one should be thankful for being able to go through the world wearing blinkers (Eder 1996: 134). All has been taken care of. Concealment and institutionalization take away responsibility from the individual, and guilt is evaded. Managerial capability is added to the control of nature.

Although a shift had been taking place, from the insignificance of animal suffering to the appearance of the vivisectionist defence of regrettable necessity, for instance, by the end of the nineteenth century there had been little change in the dominant, fundamental attitude to animals. Indeed:

During the 1890s, Lloyd Morgan's famous canon for assessing animal behaviour ... worked as rampant propaganda for human dignity and uniqueness ... Notions about the species barrier slipped back from Darwin's emphasis on continuity towards something very close to Descartes' position regarding non-human animals as simple, unconscious machines. (Midgley 1994: 189).

Moreover, hunting experienced a boom throughout the century (c1820-1890) and vivisection increased after the 1876 Act, scientism gaining sway as the triumphant form of progress. After all, absorbed into the status quo, the theory of evolution merely remodelled the older idea of a hierarchy of nature but with man at the apex,
not God. This is not a far cry from Aristotle and besides, man had been playing God for centuries in creating different versions of animals most easy to exploit. In its all-purpose malleability, Darwinism failed to exacerbate the cognitive dissonance which advocates of animal exploitation seek to avoid.

We should note, however, that the animal issue was developing at an embryonic common cause stage in the nineteenth century (see, e.g. Kean 1998, Adams 1990). And the idea of inclusive progress had seen the beginnings of a coming together of vegetarianism, anti-vivisection, anti-bloodsports, feminism and socialism. (Although many leading anti-vivisectionists were animal-eaters, many others were vegetarians, such as Anna Kingsford, Louise Lind af Hageby and Frances Hoggan). The synthesis militated against this formulation of a coherent oppositional 'ideology' which may have had a greater pull on the likes of those listed above in breaking out of bloody culture's cosmology and its comforting compromise and concealment.

Moreover, animal concern is now formally broken up into discrete areas of use and control which tends towards division rather than unification of opposition to animal use. In similar fashion to the century's rise of the sense of civic duty which stifled revolutionary thought and possibility, codified bloody culture, in the shape of welfarism, had warded off and would continue to ward off revolution in human/nonhuman affairs.

'Bloodless culture' faced not only the problem of how to get around thinking differently to the orthodox but one of solid grounds, appearance and representation. If we see the synthesis in terms of a normative institutional form of morality, bloody culture makes laws and enforces them to some extent but these merely regulate an unchanged situation of dominance. They show that bloody culture (now continually washing the blood off its hands) is, after all, benign, anti-barbarian, willing to compromise. Indeed, by its very hegemonic nature it has to compromise. It looks reasonable in that, capitalizing on the developing separation and hierarchical ordering of the public and private spheres, its repressive tolerance 'permits' private
people to be, for instance, vegetarians, antivivisectionists, anti-hunt and so on ('it takes all sorts'), moral choices being open to all, but only after the instrumental die is cast. On the other hand, bloodless culture which is more concerned with the cognitive institutional form — ethics — finds it difficult to do likewise; ultimately it cannot find many or any points of compromise (although it may do so tactically along the road) and so can appear and is easily made to appear totalitarian and overtly ideological, in orthodox terms.

A system has now been created which, ostensibly, offers room for debate, negotiation and amelioration and, to some, appears to afford the opportunity of continual improvement until the abolitionist aims are achieved. On the other hand, bloody culture has either responded to demands in what its opposition sees (immediately or later) as an unsatisfactory manner and/or it has managed to maintain or gain greater control not only of animal use but also of how it is perceived, that is, as a well- 'balanced' system, and also control of the identity of those who disagree and whose disagreement, now that everything is under control, can be taken as a sign of excess and trouble, not to say heresy. Consolidation has been of bloody culture in codifying speciesist ideology and in reducing revolution and transformation to reform.

All debate here is to be framed even more within this welfarist ideology which is not concerned with whether the now regulated and regulating system of animal use is unjust but with which of its excesses or irregularities may require attention periodically. It is more concerned not with what is cruel (and cruelty is to remain the crude perspective) but with determining what is not. This system of excess control would be found to be seriously delinquent.

Summary & Conclusions

In tracing the changing discourses within a two culture framework we have been able to identify a growing strength within each culture, but the bloody always, by means of a greater store of more readily digested rationalization after the fact, remains in the ascendancy. From pre-ethical unease and its evading strategies, through religious, ethical and humanist dogmas that keep humans at the top of the pile,
synthesis and codification, bloody culture has managed to dissipate growing opposition, to consolidate a convenient ideology which, drawing upon sources of past fictions, informs today’s defences and promotions of animal use. Each era lives with the accumulation of these deceits and conceits, and of the texts which have run counter to them.

In the relationship with nature and other animals, humans have progressed from non-exploitation through necessary exploitation to unnecessary exploitation. During all exploitative times humans seem to have been subject to a sense of guilt about the use of other species. Animal-exploiting humans’ ambivalence towards other animals, like and unlike us, has always been central — reverence and admiration clashing with callousness and brutality; lack of necessity clashing with habit. Bloody culture’s choice of the options-potentials wins out each time and the anxieties arising have been tackled through the use of self-flattering myth, distancing, rationalizing and the more social and legal stratagems.

Binary distinctions and therefore hierarchically structured approaches to animals and society arose even in hunter-gatherer days when nonhumans and humans were of ‘one field’ and have been refined in modern versions of culture/nature. Within the always dominant bloody culture, where human identity is understood in relation to nonhumans, there is the belief that nature and human nature are static (and by including animals in nature they are already set apart and disadvantaged). There is revulsion, not so much at humanity, for humanity is the superior, but at the animal within, which is cast out, and that part of our subject becomes the object which can be controlled. Complex distinctions which serve as a form of control and self understanding and to explain-justify-rationalize what we do or don’t do, eat or don’t eat, cook or don’t cook are notably features of bloody culture and they determine and reproduce reality. They legitimize the ‘edible’ status of those foods taken and the practices practised. The structures themselves, elaborate systems of guilt assuagement, are prejudicial and yet, though they serve to consolidate domination and naturalize the political they also thereby imprison. Bloodless culture not only contradicts this but suggests a way out, yet it cannot satisfactorily guarantee safety;
indeed to negate the 'inevitable' and 'natural' is to threaten collapse of the civilization-animal use equation and the human/nonhuman distinction nexus. Suppressed culture's trappings and edifice are, necessarily, so much the lesser, and lagging far behind in the construction (and deconstruction) business.

The cultural is fused with the ethical. Bloody culture turns paradox and ambivalence into article of (bad) faith. We are civilized because we are not animals: whatever distinguishes humans from other beings (a constantly redefined lack in animals) is, *ipso facto*, the capacity which determines culture, superiority and acquires moral significance — humans are political, laughing, tool-making, cooking, property-owning, speaking, reasoning and religious (see Thomas 1983: 30-32) — whilst human-nonhuman similarities are not endowed with moral strength. Simultaneously, the instrumentalist attitude towards the rest of creation is justified not only by appeal to a dominant reading of God's design but also by moral appeal to amoral nature, red in tooth and claw: we eat animals because we *are* animals. Such appeals are perhaps what Sartre (e.g. 1957: 44) called 'bad faith' by which, here, the age-old anguish over animal exploitation is escaped. Aided by concealment, institutionalization and legislation, the pretence is perpetuated that we are not free to act differently, *and nor need we*.

With St Francis brushed aside (and, before him, the vegetarian ideal), Aquinas had combined the appeals to God and nature to build a formidable edifice. But as freer thought is made possible and Montaigne for instance appears to take advantage of it, Descartes consolidates the old human/nonhuman position. As his excesses invite heightened criticism Hobbes steps in to set things aright. Each time the oppositional culture advances it is depressed by further development of the bloody culture and not least in its escalation of animal use. When opposition reaches its most influential position from the accumulation of decentring, independence of thought, radical theology, urbanization, common cause and humanitarianism which begin to allow more people to see more than previous cosmology allowed (cognitively or socially), bloody culture appropriates it into a new order, aided by middle class compromise and inconsistency. Bloody culture, now in the shape of
legalistic welfarism, wants rid of the cruelties that outrage its sensibilities, its own circumscribed forms of decency and respectability: it outlaws those it can do without and hides what it doesn’t want to do without. How can a bloody culture do without blood? What is left intact though shaken and refined, is the view that, after all, nonhumans are lesser than humans and that they are humans’ resources. Radicalism has been overcome by ‘class’ consciousness. The Eliasian process, wherein the emerging class wants it both ways, triumphs over the Shelleyan, the one Eder identifies as beginning in Israel. Or, rather, it has recoiled from it in much the same way as many of our ‘bloodless’ representatives have themselves done.

Conflict continues but now on a different footing; aspects of both animal use and liberation are retained, reinterpreted and elevated in the new situation. The genius of bloody culture is that in appeasing, in ‘yielding’ to oppositional demands, it gains greater hegemonic strength. The nineteenth century’s dual concerns of progress and order have built-in factors of control. On the one hand, in relation to types of cruelty (limitations of definition and control of the concept) and, on the other, in relation to the extent and kind of progress (limitations of definition and control of that concept). The result is the the pre-eminence and pincer-like grip of welfarism and science.

In trying to consolidate and codify its own position, bloodless culture’s own major deficiency is its inconsistency, the very characteristic of bloody culture from which many of bloodless culture’s promoters sprang and then to which returned, unable to make the crossing, to escape the pull back to bloody culture ‘safety’. The emergence of a more strategic rights discourse, and of new organizations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is bloodless culture’s direct response to bloody culture’s gaining of such control and definition.

Notes
1. We shall not follow Eder’s thesis closely for he aims off in a different direction, concentrating on the development of environmentalism and a new ecological rationalism, suggesting that ecological reason is impotent to radically alter dominant culture through utilitarianism. Eder also tends to run animals and nature together, and views animal liberation almost wholly in utilitarianist terms, concentrating on Peter Singer (1977) to the total or virtual exclusion of other animal liberation philosophers who may either tend to contradict the thesis (e.g. Tom Regan

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or, ironically, aid it (e.g. Stephen Clark 1984). Further, although Eder pictures carnivorous culture as a development of bloody culture, and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless, we shall use carnivorous and bloody interchangeably and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless. However, we shall draw upon Eder at later stages when, as with the theme of two cultures, his thesis is of interest and use. This is just to acknowledge the partial origin of the two culture structuring device used here and to make clear that neither an appraisal nor a critique of Eder is offered, nor is the application of his thesis made more specific here to animal liberation.

2. This statement ignores a number of things; that, for instance, many people in ‘undeveloped’ countries may still ‘need’ to depend on the use of other animals. However, this thesis recognizes the plausibility of the animal liberation claim that development in the Western world has provided the conditions and opportunity for people to live here at least without resorting to animal use, notwithstanding the questionable claims of vivisectionists. Moreover, the undeveloped world’s needs in this respect are themselves not unchangeable; indeed, claims within the wider context of animal liberation, e.g. for the human and ecological benefits of non-animal agriculture, address this very point. It is also, of course, questionable whether systematic animal use has ever really been without alternative.

3. We can also hardly fail to remark here upon how, in coming to love and defend the punishment it has received and also in meting it out to other species, humankind’s bloody culture potential exhibits a fulfilled sado-masochist aspect.

4. Carol J. Adams (1990: 218): ‘It could be argued that Shelley’s [banned] Queen Mab is the first feminist, vegetarian, pacifist utopia’. Adams (1990: 109-118) also recovers the Romantic vegetarian meaning of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein: ‘It is remarkable that the Creature’s vegetarianism has remained outside the sphere of commentary’.

5. Peter Singer (1977: 215-220) identifies such characters and notes how ‘... with very, very rare exceptions, these writers ... stop short of the point at which their arguments would lead them to face the choice between breaking the deeply ingrained habit of eating the flesh of other animals or admitting that they do not live up to the conclusions of their own moral arguments’. For a distillation of Darwinism’s ambiguities see Noske (1989: 63-70).
Chapter 2

Animal Revelation

Introduction

Because the apparent softening of bloody culture — appearing in reasonable legislation measures and the policing of those selected cruelties which had been outlawed — had left it still (or even more) dominant, there is an increased tension in the twentieth century between its instrumentalism and the oppositional humanitarianism. Indeed, because of the synthesis which more fully established the welfarist paradigm, bloody culture begins to look, to its opponents, even more insidious because less blatant. It has assumed a caring face but the mask was torn off in the 1960s.

However, we cannot suggest that Henry Salt saw the situation in the same way at the end of the nineteenth century. Writing Animals’ Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress (1892), Salt believed instead that from the Reformation and especially since the 1789 Revolution, the ‘world-wide spirit of humanitarianism began to disclose itself as an essential feature of democracy’; the publication of Paine’s Rights of Man and Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Women had made a still further extension of the theory of rights to animals inevitable (Salt 1980: 4). He was part of the Bentham-Mill influenced, social reformist current of the late Victorian period which, as David Coates (1990: 266-277) tells us: had a commitment to social and moral progress; faith in the human capacity for improvement, in the twin imperatives of inevitability and justice, in programmes of reform, and in state action; believed in the malleability of human nature and in the interplay of action-individuals and structure-society; wanted to identify and solve social problems; thought that education and rational argument and not class conflict held the key to social progress; was keen to carry the egalitarian logic of liberalism.
to its conclusion; and some, including Salt we can say, condemned competition and
promoted co-operation.

What we can refer to as the quasi-synthesis was to Salt a promising development
but one which had to be shown to be just that. Where things went from here was
what mattered now. Much of early and subsequent animal legislation appeared to be
liberationist in that certain practices had been abolished, set a precedent of albeit
legal ‘rights’, and hinted at the recognition of natural rights. However, Animals’
Rights seems also to have been written when his optimism was tempered by an
impatience and a suspicion that bloodless culture was failing to gain ground, that
without structured, cohesive development, progress was going to be of the wrong
kind. Indeed, he wanted society to move along in a certain manner but it went
somewhere else and the bloodless culture, despite its continued protestations and a
possible golden age of vegetarianism between the wars, was eventually left
standing.

Salt has been perhaps the culture’s greatest strategist, standing both in and above
the fray. When we see him analysing society vis-a-vis animals in the late
nineteenth century then, he is offering a critique of both cultures and of those, by now
increasing in numbers, who were not sure where they stood though most, by voting
with their feet, and by their recoil from what Salt believed would be logical
progress, enhanced the respectable power of bloody culture.

We shall refer to this critique and indeed to the whole animal liberation project as
a revelation which is basically twofold in that it exposes the bases and works of
instrumental bloody culture and exposes to light and gives light to, among other
things, an alternative value which, appearing to go back as far as man (Salt only
refers back to Plutarch and Porphyry), has always been subjugated, repressed or
overtaken by another. Animal liberation is appealing to or fostering what it
considers to be a better or higher ethic in the human-nonhuman relationship than
the dominant (human/nonhuman) which is ultimately one of human self-interest. It
is ‘better’ in that it relates more closely to those values already universally
adopted — justice, equality, compassion (whether or not these are products of knowledge) — in relation to humans and denied as yet in full measure to other animals. (It is universalist in that it sees humans and other animals as fundamentally alike in their sentiency). These contingents are, or approximate to, universals (is there a fixed, immutable boundary?) in that once they have been achieved they are unlikely to be rejected; in this sense they represent substantive progress\(^1\). It is in this sense too that Salt saw animal rights, in terms of social progress, in the face of the progress of instrumental reason that relegated values to an unimportant role in knowledge and life, and passed itself off as value-free.

Animal liberation would seem not merely to be the latest offspring of Salt or his predecessors but, in a bigger sense, is also at least the partial embodiment of Victor Hugo's great ethic:

It was first of all necessary to civilize man in relation to his fellow men. That task is already well advanced and makes progress daily. But it is also necessary to civilize man in relation to nature. There, everything remains to be done ... In the relations of man with the animals, with the flowers, with all the objects of creation, there is a whole great ethic [toute une grande morale] scarcely seen as yet, but which will eventually break through into the light and be the corollary and the complement to human ethics. (Alpes et Pyrénées, quoted in Wynne-Tyson 1990: 190-191).

As others before him (and we can see St Francis in Hugo's thoughts here), Salt was a representative of the grande morale in terms of his rather different times. From Salt onwards the revelation becomes more powerful and continues to take various forms, reveals various things. It is made up of myriad related revelations which attempt to effect a change of consciousness or a recognition of a potential in the consciousness, and to influence human conduct here and now. 'Consciousness is the first step towards emancipation' (Fairclough 1989:1) but uniquely here it is the consciousness of one party (humans) which is the first step towards the emancipation of another (nonhumans) and possibly, liberationists would claim, of humans too.

It is worth compiling these revelations here and although Salt did not refer to all we shall see them at play as we go along through this and later chapters. The revelation is of: an alternative value (and that humans' relation with other animals is not value-free); animals as sentient individuals; the connectedness of life
(creed of kinship); the myths and fantasy that sustained animal use; what humans are doing in relation to animals, that is, speciesism as ideologically analogous to racism and sexism; the master/slave relationship; empirical fact of animal usage; how animal use is linked to a range of other human problems; how animal liberation is linked to a range of human benefits; animal liberation being unantagonistic to social progress; animal-using culture and its policy of violence not being inevitable, natural or immutable; human potential and capabilities; the ethically correct being nutritionally and scientifically sound. And, like the Revelation of St John the Divine, it has been ‘written’ primarily on behalf of, though not by, the persecuted.

We should make clear that neither Salt nor his successors make overt claims of revelation in this sense but from Salt onwards animal liberation, as an alternative form of reason, was greater able to reveal these things, with an emphasis on the literal, which had been obscured by instrumental reason’s rationalizations, concealments and constructions that had not only buried guilt and ambivalence but animals themselves, literally and metaphorically. Social practice is the very obstacle to seeing through the social practice. When we refer to animal ‘revelation’ here and in the following chapters it must be borne in mind that this does not necessarily imply that the revelation is of an ultimate or universal good, value or truth being revealed; it is, rather, of the order of solution, disclosure, discovery and even prophecy.

Salt was barely successful in his day and it was not until some twenty-five years after his death in 1939 that the torch he had carried was taken up to greater effect when, due to several factors which had encouraged or allowed development of both bloodless and bloody cultures, the latter’s led to an assumption of expertise, to a complex system of control wherein those who have such authority have the right to manipulate others and do their work secretly. This manifested itself in an explosion of animal use, exposed from the 1960s. During this period the process was underpinned by strong distinctions still being drawn between sentient beings, rendering the nonhuman (and types of humans) beyond the pale. Much of this will be examined in terms of Theodore Roszak’s ‘technocracy’ (Roszak 1970) which relates
closely to Eder’s bloody-carnivorous culture³.

In the 1960s and early 1970s (and indeed into the 1990s), liberationists appear to continue the use of revelation as a perspective and to provide a platform from which they can evaluate animal use. Following Salt’s prototype efforts, they seek also to establish a philosophical alternative to instrumentalism and defend animals against exploitative practices. We trace the continuum, the strengthening foundation of the counter discourse from Salt, through an animal liberation manifesto and an antivivisection classic, to the eve of publication of Peter Singer’s seminal Animal Liberation. Due to a full-blown animal rights case not being made out until 1983/4 (see Chapter 3), discussion of rights here will be somewhat loose and general, as it was with Salt himself. (References to Animals’ Rights [Salt 1980] in the main bodies of text will be shown as page numbers only).

Salt as Strategist

Fabians & Humanitarians

Rationalist, socialist, pacifist, Henry Salt considered animals’ rights as part of humanitarian progress, itself part of the process of increasing equality, a common denominator of the century’s liberal and radical perspectives (see, e.g. Pieterse 1992: 7). His Humanitarian League, founded with others in 1891, was concerned with war, poverty, women’s rights, prison reform, theory of punishment, flogging, animals’ rights and other causes (see Magel 1989: 92), reflecting, though taking further, the notion of connectedness which had been apparent to previous campaigners, as we saw in Chapter 1, though fragmented formally by the synthesis. For Salt, animals’ rights was no single issue although it remained so, outside the range, even for many other ‘humanitarians’. This element of his work seems to have been largely ignored during his lifetime, a neglect which is all the more instructive here, for during the years 1887 to 1910 pit ponies, captive animals, horses and stray dogs received legal protection and the pole trap was banned. That is, although Animals’ Rights ‘led to a great deal of discussion, and passed through numerous editions, besides being translated into French, German, Dutch and Swedish, and other languages’ (Salt 1921: 125), in such a climate, Salt may have expected it to help effect greater
change. However, the reverse seems to have been the case. Welfarist legislation and the existence of the RSPCA easily gave the impression that all was being taken care of; Salt was superfluous. The strategist faced stiff opposition even in (perhaps especially in) a world of codified welfarism.

No firm advocate of Fabianism's non-revolutionary pragmatism yet acknowledging the usual characteristics of slow reform, Salt shared much of its ethic which developed out of Victorian moralism with a strong sense of public duty. Man was accountable now not so much to God as to Humanity, and life was not to be lived for its own sake but by following a selfless ideal toward a socialist revolution. Salt and Bernard Shaw had much in common, their cause one of social reconstruction from which animals' interests were not this time to be excluded (despite humaneness finding little place in the Fabian philosophy [Salt 1921: 82]). Not only did animals deserve justice, but institutionalized cruelty to animals was a social problem, and welfarist paternalism wasn't the solution. Robert Skidelsky furnishes some of the general background:

In the last decades of the nineteenth century the feeling was growing that society was in a state of crisis; that big changes in social organization were needed if external decline and domestic convulsions were to be avoided ... Before [then] people had thought that laissez-faire, plus a modicum of private philanthropy, was making things steadily better and would go on doing so. Then came a cluster of unpleasant, inter-related events; the collapse of the mid-nineteenth century boom, followed by twenty years of violent economic oscillations; the emergence of new great industrial powers which threatened Britain's economic supremacy and the security of its empire; and the parallel rise of democracy and industrial militancy, through the two suffragette acts and the start of the 'new unionism'... [The massive scale of] destitution emphasized the irrelevance of private philanthropy, the waste of human resources, the potential threat to the stability of the state. (Skidelsky 1979: 119).

What Salt recognized was that the respectable face of animal concern was made up in large part of the now discredited philanthropy. It was taking too much for granted, assuming that it could continue as an adjunct to the unchanged framework of the day's orthodoxy. What Wilde wrote at the time about attempts to alleviate poverty seems to mirror Salt's views:

The emotions of man are stirred more quickly than man's intelligence; and ... it is much more easy to have sympathy with suffering than it is to have sympathy with thought. Accordingly, with admirable, though misdirected intentions, they very seriously and very sentimentally set themselves to the task of remedying the evils that they see. But their remedies do not cure the
Progress & its Obstacles

At a time when the notion of scientific, rationalistic and material progress was perhaps at its height, Salt was concerned with a form of progress with which all forms of cruelty were incompatible. Indeed, the purpose of his movement was to put science and humanitarianism in place of tradition and savagery (Salt 1921: 134). But, aside from the obstacles posed by the orthodox, the problem facing humanitarianism was that

There is a vast amount of compassionate sentiment that is at present scattered and isolated, and therefore to a great extent ineffective; it is the business of humanitarianism to collect and focus this feeling into an energetic whole ... for ... humanitarianism is nothing more than conscious and organized humaneness. (Salt 1913: 836).

Similarly, for animals' rights within this project, it was

... unscientific to assert that any particular form of cruelty to animals is worse than another form; the truth is, that each of these hydra-heads [is] the offspring of one parent stem. (Salt 1980: 88-89).

And what was necessary was 'some comprehensive and intelligible principle which shall indicate, in a more consistent manner, the true lines of man's moral relation towards the lower animals' (p8) which would halt the helpless drift between the extremes of total indifference on the one hand and spasmodic, partially-applied compassion on the other (pp105-106). If 'there are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the root' (Thoreau), we could see Salt as the one, preaching and practising in his own way what Thoreau preached, and practised now and then.

We should note too that it was only after early legislation, the foundation and early works of the RSPCA and the first anti-vivisection societies, at a time of assessment, that he wrote Animals' Rights. His strategic genius lay in his perception of the inconsistencies of both cultures and of the kinships between not
only humans and other animals, but between all cruelties and oppressions and therefore between the movements and groups fighting against them. Thus organized and underpinned, bloodless culture needed to tackle — in animals’ rights terms — the basic problem:

The root of the evil lies ... in that detestable assumption (detestable equally whether it be based on pseudo-religious [animals have no souls] or pseudo-scientific [animals have no consciousness] grounds) that there is a gulf, an impassable barrier, between man and the animals, and that the moral instincts of compassion, justice, and love, are to be as sedulously repressed and thwarted in the one direction as they are to be fostered and extended in the other. (Salt 1980: 102).

Humans stood in a false relationship towards other animals. The human/nonhuman divide, the sentimental discrimination characterized by inconsistency, existed only in the imagination and was merely a construct maintained not least by (false) consciousness-determining nomenclature: not only were humans barely regarded or best not thought of as animals at all, but nonhumans had been given the names of the Other — ‘brute beast’, ‘livestock’, ‘dumb’ and ‘vermin’ — in the reification and distantiation project.

**Nature**

Salt’s work is grounded in the appeal to nature, a creed of kinship. Bloodless culture continues to make no less appeal here than the bloody. Both are informed by evolutionary theory and turned to their own purposes. And for Salt there was a further kinship, between ‘nature’ and ‘human nature’. Not denying the existence of evil in nature (p118) — and Salt was not averse to the killing of proliferating species that threatened human safety or ‘supremacy’ — or the deep lying evil of the selfish, aggressive tendencies inherent in the human (p130), he also knew that competition was not by any means the sole governing law among the human race (p26). The dominant view of nature, as red in tooth and claw, competitive, was a literal dead loss, linked inextricably to cruelty, oppression and warring. Only the co-operative view, hitherto suppressed, held out any kind of social progress hope^4. Similarly, human nature had its better side:
... when a man turns aside to avoid crushing an insect, why does he do so? Certainly not because of any reasoned conviction as to the sufferings of 'the poor beetle that we tread upon', but for the simple fact that, consciously or unconsciously, he is humane: the sight of suffering, however slight, is distasteful to him as being human. Of all mistaken notions concerning humanitarianism, the most mistaken is that which regards it as some extraneous cult, forced on human nature from without; whereas in truth it is founded on an instinctive conviction from within, a very part of human development. When we talk of a man 'becoming a humanitarian', what we really mean is that he has recognized a fact that was already within his consciousness, — the kinship of all sentient life — of which humanitarianism is the avowed and definite proclamation. (Salt 1913: 836).

Bloodless culture resides within us no less than the bloody. But the dominant latter had divorced humans from nonhumans and the human from the humane. Bloody culture (not that Salt uses the term) had repressed man's better instincts and warped our sense of place in and understanding of the world, of our relationship to other animals and to each other. Without a consistent sense of universal justice society was suffering from an insanity of temperament. However, the general

... isolation of man from nature, by our persistent culture of the rationative faculty, and our persistent neglect of the instinctive, has hitherto been the penalty we have had to pay for our incomplete and partial 'civilization': there are many signs that the tendency will now be towards that 'Return to Nature' of which Rousseau was the prophet. (Salt 1980: 114).

This would achieve a balance of intellect and instinct, by a return to the common fount of feeling though without sacrificing what humans had gained in knowledge. It would provide a path towards yet greater achievement.

Rights

Consequent upon the denial of kinship was the denial of animals' rights. But our best and surest instincts (pp19-20) could only result in a realization that if humans had rights then so did other animals (p1):

If 'rights' exist at all – and both feeling and usage indubitably prove that they do exist – they cannot be consistently awarded to men and denied to animals, since the same sense of justice and compassion apply in both cases. (Salt 1980: 24).

Animals had individuality, character, reason and to have those qualities was to have the right to exercise them, in so far as surrounding circumstances permit (p16), to live a natural life which permits of natural development (p28). Although Salt
had no interest in discussing the 'abstract theory of natural rights' he recognized a 'solid truth underlying it — a truth which has always been clearly apprehended by the moral faculty' (pp1-2). Without the recognition of *jus animalium* there would be no progress worth the name. Animals have rights and, just as humanitarianism was not an extraneous cult, there was nothing quixotic or visionary in the assertion. It was perfectly compatible with 'a readiness to look the sternest laws of existence fully and honestly in the face' (p28). But this was not what society wanted to do.

**Revelation**

Salt makes the point in relation to fur:

A fur garment or trimming ... appearing to the eye as if it were one uniform piece, is generally made up of many curiously shaped fragments. It is significant that a society which is enamoured of so many shams and fictions, and which detests nothing so strongly as the need of looking facts in the face, should pre-eminently esteem those articles of apparel which are constructed on the most deceptive and illusory principle. (Salt 1980: 84).

One could speak similarly about a diet made up of different bits of different animals, and Salt himself had experienced this revelation:

... and I then found myself realizing, with an amazement which time has not diminished ... that the "meat" which formed the staple of our diet, and which I was accustomed to regard ... as a mere commodity of the table, was in truth dead flesh — the actual flesh and blood — of oxen, sheep, swine, and other animals that were slaughtered in vast numbers under conditions so horrible that even to mention the subject at our dinner-tables would have been an unpardonable offence. (Salt 1921: 9).

and he alludes to it when suggesting that most were wilfully blind:

The terrible sufferings that are quite needlessly inflicted on the lower animals under the plea of domestic usage, food-demands, sport, fashion and science, are patent to all who have the seeing eye and the feeling heart to apprehend them ... (Salt 1980: 106).

The ultimate concession of 'rights' was simply a matter of time (p21), but getting people, society, to recognize these 'facts', to awaken human-nonhuman affinity, to 'see', was the task. This practical problem, which consisted not least in a 'clearance of comfortable fallacies' (pxi), was to be tackled through education — the chief instrument of reform — which, in its widest sense, would no longer shirk the most important issues, addressing the ambiguous and untenable position of the 'sickliest
sentimentalists of all’ (p124); and the second, auxiliary and supplementary, instrument of legislation — the record and register of the moral sense of the community — which Salt felt was already lagging behind.

Society, Kinship & Reform

We must return Salt to his context of progress which was to be seen in human and humane terms rather than the material and the ‘value-free’ scientistic. Salt’s plea was not just for the victims but for the sake of humankind; the infliction of unnecessary pain was incompatible with progress. The hideous injustice of vivisection, for instance, confining itself to the material aspects of the problem, was abhorrent, revolting and intolerable to the the higher instincts of humankind. Vivisection was not a science at all but merely a one-sided assertion which found favour with a particular class of men, and it confused right and wrong (p87). But although vivisection was the fine flower of barbarity and injustice:

The cause of each and all of the evils that afflict the world is the same — the general lack of humanity, the lack of the knowledge that all sentient life is akin, and that he who injures a fellow-being is in fact doing injury to himself. The prospects of a happier society are wrapped up in this despised and neglected truth, the very statement of which, at the present time, must (I well know) appear ridiculous to the accepted instructors of the people. (Salt 1921: 243-244).

The most far-reaching consequence of Darwin’s common origin of all species was ethical. Universal kinship, interconnectedness, continuities; there is no sense at all in Salt of animals’ rights (or of anything) as a single issue. Therefore this is not purely an altruistic project and animals’ rights and human rights are not antagonistic but mutually beneficial and reinforcing. Contrary to all previous and subsequent orthodoxy, most pertinently perhaps in relation to his own socialism, animals’ rights were not something that should or need be sidelined in favour of the ‘priority’ of eradicating human problems, for it was only by a wide and disinterested study of both subjects that a solution of either was possible (p28). Salt appears to have seen the process in Marxian terms though including animals as a class (as well as recognizing individuality); inevitable development from now on towards a classless society, an end to class antagonisms. The free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. There is also the sense that for the first
time this possibility was there, both conceptually and practically.

Throughout Animals' Rights there is an optimism. What we see is a transition from the previous centuries of questioning and outrage to the sureness that comes not just from knowing how things are but also from the faith in inevitable progress. But there is the pessimistic undercurrent (which comes out more in the autobiographical Seventy Years Among Savages [1921] although here its more obvious cause was the first world war; nevertheless, here too is still evident the faith in the civilizing of humanity). The welfarist 'synthesis' was seeking to stifle the further dialectical process at a convenient point in the ascent from the ‘kingdom of necessity’ to the ‘kingdom of freedom’. What Salt hoped for and half-expected at the time, we know now not to have come through. The synthesis had brought strands of both cultures together and the road that Salt thought society would and should follow from then on was the bloodless culture's. But this is the road not taken.

The major route that emerges from the synthesis is again one of bloody culture's choosing. The concession of (certain limited acquired) rights within a controlled system of domination — far less than and far different to Salt's ground-breaking 'ultimate' concession — is as far as bloody culture goes. We have already identified nineteenth century legislation's role in the synthesis but what sealed it, it appears, and effectively froze the world of human/nonhuman relations, was the principal piece of welfarist legislation, the Protection of Animals Act 1911, a classic of utilitarianist, duplicitous Enlightenment whereby the meaning of suffering is redefined and controlled. Formally introducing the concept of 'unnecessary suffering' and therefore that of 'necessary' suffering, it interpreted the latter as 'the balancing of the interests of man in the benefits of a particular course of action against the interests of the animal in freedom from suffering'. This was already tipped in humans' favour by the Act exempting: anything made legal by animal experiment legislation; the slaughter of animals for food; and hunting and coursing. This is welfarism's greatest failure or masterstroke depending upon one's bloodless or bloody culture perspective.
Had it not been for the bloody cultural First World War, Salt may have seen his holistic case taken up to greater effect and we would be now perhaps looking back on a more even passage of revelation. According to Ryder (1989), progress was also blacked out by war aftermath wherein animal campaigners took a cautious line lest they appeared ridiculous to those with memories of the Somme. And Salt himself tells us about the cruelty-butchery-war-militarism-imperialism nexus in an autobiographical chapter entitled 'The Cave-Man Re-Emerges' — the war had retarded the growth of humaner sentiment (Salt 1921). But it did not kill off animal concern. Indeed, the terrible suffering and slaughter of the war altered some people's perceptions of animals and brought many closer to the recognition of human-nonhuman continuities: suffering was suffering; corpses were corpses; war did not discriminate. 'Meat' eating mentality was warring mentality. A greater empathy was fostered (see, e.g. Kean 1998: 166-179). But this isn’t translated into the kind of wholesale response Salt wished for: that all bloodshed cease. It seems to have been, instead, more of the vague spasmodic sympathy he lamented. In fact, the war ultimately compounded the public/private spheres division. Moreover, from after the war especially, vivisection epitomized the new modernity with anti-vivisection still cast as backward-looking. When Salt's Humanitarian League collapsed in 1919 (Salt saw its failure due to its being ‘a century or two too early'; see Gold 1995: 137), what might have developed into a holistic movement suffered from fragmentation of issues once again. Alone or with others, notably Shaw, Salt did in fact keep alive certain issues — anti-hunting, anti-vivisection, vegetarianism — but what he could not be aware of was that, as from the second war, instrumental reason, coupled with technological capability, would further separate fact from value and usher in a new era of animal use. Although Salt would have been horrified at this realization of the kind of social progress he feared, it was this, amongst other factors, that gave rise to a new surge of protest, again as part of a larger wave.

What further concerns us here is how Salt records the opposition, the bloody culture, not only in its ‘basic evil' but also in its response to humanitarian-based animals' rights. Remember Salt writing in his autobiography, twenty-nine years after *Animals' Rights*, that the barest mention at table of the subject of slaughter, and the
The reification of animals into 'meat' commodities, was an 'unpardonable offence'. And how what he promoted was a 'despised and neglected truth' which appeared 'ridiculous to the accepted instructors of the people'. In a society which takes animal use as the norm, the revelation is perhaps of that which should not dare to speak its name. We shall have cause to recall such things in Chapters 6 and 7 when we look at media representations some seventy-five years later and draw again on the notion of offence taken by the civilized, and see what vestiges of ridicule remain.

From Salt to the Seventies

In his Preface to the 1980 edition of *Animals’ Rights*, Peter Singer suggested that Salt had left little for his heirs to add but his influence was not to take greater effect for some sixty years or so when the still dominant force emerging out of the synthesis grew to enormous proportions. Within these 'worsening' conditions a contemporary movement was established. It was what the heirs were to do with Salt’s (and earlier and later) material and spirit that’s of importance. From here to the end of Chapter 3 then what we shall to do is identify the line of that development, tracing the continuum and its linkages to reach an understanding of how today's animal liberation movement itself emerged into light in the 1960s and 1970s.

Technocracy & Counter Culture

As we have seen from the above, Salt was looking for and pleading for a new climate to be created by ceasing the repression of humane emotions and co-operative nature. What he was hinting at throughout was not just a societal change in terms of humans’ relation to other animals but, and without this there was no hope, a spiritual as well as a cultural transformation. We have already seen the prevailing ethos to which the overlapping Fabian and Humanitarian League ethics ran counter — *laissez faire* and philanthropy, which were thought to be and would continue to be thought satisfactory in shaping society and solving its problems.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s a similar situation obtained, only this time,
according to Theodore Roszak, orthodox credibility rested on three interlocking premises. One, that the vital needs of man were (contrary to everything the great souls of history had told us) purely technical in character. If a problem did not have such a technical solution, it could not be a real problem. Two, that this formal (and highly esoteric) analysis of our needs had achieved ninety-nine per cent completion. Snags and hitches were caused only by some irrational elements, a ‘breakdown of communication’, and all could be ironed out by sitting down and reasoning together. And three, that the experts who had fathomed our heart’s desires and who alone could continue providing for our needs, the experts who really knew what they were talking about, all happened to be on the payroll of the state and/or corporate structure (Roszak 1970: 10-11).

It wasn’t difficult to see how the three premises related to animal liberation concerns. The first denied the spiritual and reinforced the old repression of humane instinct so lamented by Salt. Further, it merely compounded the Industrial Revolution creed that all human problems could be resolved given an unlimited amount of material commodities. The second accounted for the exposed animal abuses by excusing them merely as excesses of well regulated ‘humane’ systems. The third, that the desires and aims of those who had succeeded in passing off, for instance, vivisection and factory farming as triumphs of progress, had become inseparable from the policies of the state. The battle against this firmly entrenched ideology, this ‘reality’, was to range wider, be continuous and rather more complex. As for the ethos as a whole:

The paramount struggle of [the] day [was] against a far more formidable, because far less vicious, opponent, to which I will give the name “the technocracy”. (Roszak 1970: 4).

This seems to be Eder’s ‘carnivorous culture’ in its widest sense, and it was now more formidable precisely because it was more difficult to identify than say poverty, racial injustice or the Vietnam war. Opposition to it was initially of a similarly unclear and certainly less well organized kind in terms of specific counter ideology, ranging as it did from New Leftists to psychedelics. Rebelling against what Lewis Mumford called a ‘mad rationality’, a younger generation gave much attention to
figures such as 'merry prankster' novelist Ken Kesey (for his 'Combine' read the technocracy) and (anti-) psychiatrist R D Laing whose works had suggested that it was not the 'insane' who were crazy but the very nature of a society founded on a supra-rationality which had given rise to the Inquisition, the Final Solution, the world-wide balance of terror and (as exposed by Carson 1962) environmental pollution, and which was now reaching its ultimate expression. This was:

... surely because they [the young] have seen too many men of indisputable intelligence and enlightened intention become the apologists of a dehumanized social order ... [whose] ... technocratic assumptions about the nature of man, society, and nature have warped their experience at the source, and so have become the buried premises from which intellect and ethical judgment proceed. (Roszak 1970: 50).

Roszak was attacking instrumental reason and the myth of objective consciousness which had devalued and rendered defunct the mystical, the poetic, the natural, the psychic and the beautiful forces of life. Essentially soulless, and leading nowhere but to the waiting place of Beckett's two sad tramps, the technocracy had, through reductive humanism, appropriated to itself the whole meaning of reason, reality, progress and knowledge.

What Salt had been advocating for animal liberation — a comprehensive principle to tackle disparate though related issues — was exactly what the counter culture was trying to forge in opposition to the technocracy. Just as Salt and his works were part of something bigger, within which there were many who disagreed with him or ignored him, his attempt at comprehensive principle not being taken up, animal liberationists from the 1960s were part of a loosely formed, inchoate counter culture of various strands which, though they had their opposition to the technocracy in common — albeit to different degrees and on different grounds — were to separate out rather than merge into agreement as a single movement after the radical protest apogee of 1968. This separation seems to have contributed to the animal liberation movement (and others) ever since being described or even denigrated in the media as 'single issue'.

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In both cases, Salt's and the 1960s-70s' galvanization of an animal liberation movement, the alternative value's renewed promotion was provoked by the failures and/or threats and dangers of orthodoxy to humans, animals and society. It had been coming for a long time, since Descartes especially, who himself occasioned a more immediate humane backlash. The myth of scientific objectivity, or of the objective consciousness, had been growing in influence and power, and Shaw, who had detailed an anti-vivisection case in his Preface to *The Doctor's Dilemma* in 1905, had been aware of it, recognizing that:

Public support of vivisection is founded almost wholly on the assurances of the vivisectors that great public benefits may be expected from the practice. Not for a moment do I suggest that such a defence would be valid even if proved. But when the witnesses begin by alleging that in the cause of science all the customary ethical obligations (which include the obligation to tell the truth) are suspended, what weight can any reasonable person give to their testimony? (*Preface to The Doctor's Dilemma*, quoted in Wynne-Tyson 1990: 474).

The pseudo-objectivity of scientism had placed science and technology beyond the parameters of morality; by the 1960s anything went as long as it could be seen to lead to practical results and/or a furtherance of knowledge:

So the sweaty quest for quick, stunning success goes off in all directions. If only one can find a way to graft the head of a baboon on to a blue jay (after all, why not?) ... if only one can synthesise a virus lethal enough to wipe out a whole nation (after all, why not?). (Roszak 1970: 271).

By the 1960s and 1970s the animal using element of the technocracy, most notable within the increasing industrializations of vivisection and factory farming, was evident to those such as Harrison (1964) and Vyvyan (1969 and 1971) who cared to look behind the closed doors. Closed doors are somewhat metaphorical of the technocratic ethos for not only had abuses and excesses been concealed — and animals increasingly reified, their products packaged, obscuring their origins, such commodification enabling the maintenance of consumers' clear conscience — but the technocratic state had arisen by stealth. Old political dichotomies of left and right were becoming less rigid and although the old style daily political argument was still framed in terms of the teams, it was the umpire (technocracy and its experts) who set the limits and goals and judged the contenders (Roszak 1970: 8).

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It was the young, arriving perhaps for the first time as a generation with eyes that could see the world anew, who were rising up against the expansion of the technocracy (most of the contemporary animal liberation movement’s major philosophers and early activists were aged between eighteen and thirty-two in 1970), a technocracy which had been aided by the blank stare, the near pathological passivity on the part of the older generation that had surrendered their responsibility for making morally demanding decisions. Roszak suggests that the reasons for the older generation’s loss of control of the institutions included: the remembered background of economic collapse in the 1930s; the distraction and fatigue of war; the search for security and relaxation afterwards; the bedazzlement of new prosperity; thermonuclear terror and international emergency of the 1940s and 1950s; the rapidity and momentum of technocratic totalitarianism after the war, drawing on heavy wartime industrial investments, the emergency centralization of decision-making, and the awe-stricken public reverence for science (Roszak 1970: 23).

Transformations

Rising to a position of primacy, scientism posed as the carrier of truth and from which all meaningfulness and value had been derived. Lewis Mumford reminded readers of Captain Ahab’s chilling confession: ‘All my means are sane; my motives and object mad’ (Roszak 1970: 78), but in animal exploitation terms the technocracy’s means too were mad, and not just mad, but evil. And now they were made to stand naked, the horrors, imbalances, deficiencies, criminalities and delinquencies of the technocracy revealed. If their effects were difficult to pinpoint within human society the effect on other animals was glaring, once exposed. In order to root out the distortive technocratic assumptions, which had established as real the false oppositions of reason/passion, intellect/feeling, head/heart:

... nothing less is required than the subversion of the scientific world view, with its entrenched commitment to an egocentric and cerebral mode of consciousness. In its place there must be a new culture in which the non-intellective capacities of the personality ... become arbiters of the good, the true, and the beautiful. (Roszak 1970: 50).

Salt could have written that, and we shall see that as well as proposing a new
intellective approach through, for instance, the work of two of its major philosophers (though not without their later animal liberationist critics), the animal liberation movement (or many within it) in the 1970 to 2000 period would attempt to subvert the world view and not least by renewing Salt's call for a balancing up of intellective and non-intellective capacities. More than that too:

What makes the youthful disaffiliation of our time a cultural phenomenon, rather than merely a political movement, is the fact that it strikes beyond ideology to the level of consciousness, seeking to transform our deepest sense of the self; the other, the environment. (Roszak 1970: 49).

Roszak suggested that what the counter culture lacked was 'a deep and pervasive critique of the mythos of the technocracy. Lacking that, I doubt that [its] strategy of ad hoc agitation in the streets can lead to more than temporarily therapeutic outbursts of frustration' (Roszak 1970: 293). If we understand the animal liberation movement to have been one among several strands to emerge from the counter culture, these sentiments, taken together, can be suitably applied to it. The change in man proposed by Roszak relates to a sense of spiritual transformation, inseparable from the concept of revelation and which would be later apparent in animal liberationists — from philosophers to activists — to varying degrees. The 'deep and pervasive critique' is begun by animal liberation philosophers and others, Stephen Clark (1984) — see Chapter 3 here — coming closest perhaps to an onslaught on the whole mythos rather than a narrower critique of animal abuse rationalizations; and the 'agitation in the streets' can serve as a description of the works of organizations and groups as varied as Animal Aid, the Animal Liberation Front and the liberation leagues.

Having seen what caused a younger generation's uprising, we can also ask just what conditions were conducive to it? By 1964, Britain was experiencing 'the affluent society'. After the depredations of war and reconstruction, the economic situation began to pick up, mass unemployment seemed a thing of the past and, along with the welfare state, people began to realise the fruits of victory at last. Luxuries became commonplace, foreign food and restaurants and holidays abroad were part of the widening of horizons and expectations while the popular mind was freed of the
worry of basic need fulfilment. The greater affluence was previously only available
to the aristocracy and middle classes, for instance the enormous wealth of Victorian
and Edwardian times during which animal welfare had been legitimized.
Replacing Alec Douglas Home in office in 1964, Harold Wilson, a complex anti-hunt
and Fabian-technocrat figure, spoke of sweeping away the 'grouse moor' concept of
government, and radical policies followed. Laws concerning abortion, homosexuality
and divorce were reformed and capital punishment abolished, in much the same
way that pro-animal thought had developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries amongst rafts of other social reforms.

Into this milieu were being added the sheer numbers of younger people, the great rise
in the number of under twenty-fives. They had more money and autonomy now and
felt their potential power in a market place, albeit one which was already
manipulating their dissent and selling it back to them. The search for new spiritual
values was symbolized by the Beatles in India, by the upshot of communes and a
general New Age endeavour. Higher education had expanded, especially in the
humanities, and graduates — from a wider range of backgrounds and indeed from
many new universities — were now identifying more with undergraduates than with
the adult world; part of the unique generational disaffiliation of the time. Indeed,
it was largely out of the informal 'Oxford Group' that the intellectual element of
the animal liberation movement and some of its milestone publications emerged as
the latest vigorous pro-animal period got into its stride in the late 1960s and
through the 1970s during the growth of interest among philosophers in practical or
applied ethics, after some sixty years neglect. During this time it became widely
recognized that moral philosophers could make an effective contribution to
discussions of difficult ethical questions. They were drawn into discussions of moral
values of equality, justice, war and civil disobedience by US civil rights, the
Vietnam War and the rise of student activism. Applied ethics became part of the
teaching in most university philosophy departments (see, e.g. Singer 1974: 647E). In
what other sphere could animal liberation have found such voice at that time? And
what better discipline to counteract a science which had attempted to suppress it
and replace it with its own claim to universality?

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A Series of Links

However, before we look at the works of the major animal liberation philosophers in the next chapter, we really need to go back to the early 1960s, for not only is it reasonable to suggest that today's movement began around that time — as the RSPCA failed to oppose bloodsports robustly, the Hunt Saboteurs Association was formed in 1963 and thus re-established organized direct action — it is also possible that in 1964 was established a basic principle or factor; the link between empirical and cognitive revelation; the sweeping away of concealments. The year saw the publication of Ruth Harrison's *Animal Machines* and its serialization in *The Observer* which led to such outcry that the government set up a committee of enquiry into the welfare of intensively farmed animals, although most of its many recommendations, set out in the Brambell Report (1965), never progressed beyond the debating stage. Harrison had produced the first detailed investigation, description, analysis and coining of 'factory farming' and the later emerging movement was to re-learn from it a major lesson: '... so long as there is a certain deadpan quality to the common-sense world, an imperviousness to injustices that go deeper than ameliorative reform can rectify ... ' (Apter 1992: 169), its theory and action would be required to shock, to get people to pay attention. Without the unearthing and presentation of new facts and new knowledge, without the spotlight of exposure, there would be no enlightenment, as early twentieth century anti-vivisectionists had also shown in their own shocking exposés (e.g. Lind-af-Hageby & Schartau 1903).

The inexorable rise and subsequent exposé of factory farming has to be seen in context. Opposition to vivisection's materialistic outlook especially had always been strong. In 1962 it had forced the Home Secretary to set up a departmental committee under Sidney Littlewood to inquire into the workings of the 1876 Act, its report being published in 1965, again with its many recommendations being scarcely debated in parliament. Earlier, Shaw had kept the issue alive in his own works and in the press, in the 1940s and 50s CS Lewis wrote pamphlets for anti-vivisection societies, and a wide range of other luminaries from literature, science and other fields (including Battle of Britain hero Lord Dowding in the Lords) had condemned the
practice as immoral and/or unscientific. But the numbers of animals used escalated in their millions and the additional rise of technology in the shape of factory farming seems to have thrown animal use into sharper focus.

Against this backdrop, animal liberation was an outraged double take. It was to say, 'Hey, wait a minute' twice. Once against the excesses and then, on further inspection, said it again in relation to the whole history and epistemology behind them; a new generation’s revelation. This was a radical departure from welfarism's acquiescence, for it exposed welfarism’s failure — inevitable without a comprehensive principle — to even hold in check systems which were recognized as inherently iniquitous, expansionist and wherein science and technology’s 'advances' were dictating tomorrow’s moral norms. Even the basic niceties of welfarism were being flouted and it was to be hoped instead that the pro-animal movement’s own 'excess' (of liberation) would aspire to the same status; an emerging norm. Moreover, there was no return to welfarism as the regulator of human/nonhuman relations, for vivisection’s deliberate and legalized infliction of suffering had made such considerations redundant, and factory farming had arisen due to the fundamental inefficiency of traditional systems. Rather than take what animal liberationists saw as the logical step of utilizing the power of science and technology in progressing beyond animal-based agriculture and research, orthodoxy called upon it instead to sustain them artificially.

This is the classic example of what one might call a tendency towards overkill in all obsolete systems. This is the process whereby a particular historical mode of production (such as the domestication of animals), or a scientific or industrial technique, reaches its furthest stage of application (its reductio ad absurdum) after it has been rendered obsolete by the development of the forces of production and the means of production by scientific and technological research. (Peters 1971: 225).

This was a fertile moment, and perhaps a moment only in which animal liberation could secure a significant foothold. For it was not long before the older generation’s now challenged speciesism and unquestioning respect for science was replaced by the more formidable technocratic wave that was to sweep up later generations, leaving them with little choice but to forge careers within it. Animal liberation in its present form turned up in the hiatus between the old fashioned respect and the new.
compulsion which was to twin animal liberation’s later ethical flourish with animal exploitation’s technological advance.

However, empirical exposés are not in themselves enough to cause, maintain or explain the upshot and growth of a social movement. On the heels of Harrison, it was the socialist Brigid Brophy who, in 1965, was to provide a link, via Shaw, between Salt and the further road to animal liberation. Born ten years before Salt’s death and publishing her first novel, Hackenfeller’s Ape — about a distinguished academic risking his career to save an ape from a rocket experiment — just three years after Shaw’s demise in 1950, she titled her startling Sunday Times article, ‘The Rights of Animals’ (Brophy 1965), picked by deliberate analogy with and extrapolation from Thomas Paine’s The Rights of Man which associated:

... the case for nonhuman animals with that clutch of egalitarian ideas which have sporadically, though quite often with impressive actual political results, come to the rescue of other oppressed classes, such as slaves or homosexuals or women ... I invoked The Rights of Man because it is classically associated with two Revolutions, the French and the American, which were the occasions of quite convulsive adjustment to our vision to correct for the distortions introduced by the class barriers of feudalism and empire. (Brophy 1979a: 63–65).

In setting out what was also an animal liberationist’s mini self-defence manual — anticipating the accusation of theriophily and the labels of sentimentalist, killjoy, economic naïf, anthropomorphizer and crank — Brophy invoked the concept of rights because they are, she said, a matter of respect and justice and not of love, which is capricious and involuntary. And, once embarked upon a course of social justice, it eventually carries one through the class barriers, including speciesism, the movement against which was to ask, in the light of evolutionary theory, that the present high barrier between humans and all other animals be displaced and re-erected (based on nervous system and therefore sentience criteria), if re-erected anywhere, between the animal kingdom (including humans) and the vegetable kingdom, thus radically redefining ‘nature’?. And, we might suggest, in the process causing the orthodox to recoil in horror at the breakdown of the binary oppositions that have constituted the basis of bloody culture.
For Brophy, humanity had seemed to switch off its morals and aesthetics where animals were concerned, just as the Greeks, for all their philosophical investigation, never noticed the immorality of slavery. Following the orthodox emphasis, Brophy agreed that it was indeed rationality that mattered, but the whole case for behaving decently toward other species rested on the fact of our very superiority. It was precisely because of our unique capabilities of imagination, rationality and moral choice that we were under the obligation to recognize and respect the rights of other animals. A sign that our conscience was about to be switched on was the emergence of a new family of largely anthropomorphic rationalizations offered by factory farmers themselves (e.g. that farmed animals preferred confinements with guaranteed security, shelter and food to the rigours of freedom), probably prompted by Harrison's exposé of intensive conditions.

**Fantasia**

What should concern us here mainly however is Brophy's focus on fantasy, for it is fantasy in its various manifestations and as a function of age-old ambivalence identified by animal liberationist writers which, perhaps above all and in contradistinction to the much trumpeted human rationality, is thought to be generally descriptive of orthodoxy's attitude and relation to other species, acting as a smokescreen to the revelation, underpinning all anti-liberationist stances. Our whole relation to animals was, for Brophy, tinted by it. We were lost in a fantasy about our toughness, for instance, where even our humane impulses were disguised under 'realistic' arguments — foxhunting is snobbish, factory farmed food doesn't taste so nice — for superstition and dread of sentimentality weighted all our questions against animals. The silliest superstition was that to which we sacrificed animals in our belief that by killing them we ourselves somehow live more fully. It was fantasy too, shaped by the either-or scenario, which fabricated a dilemma as an excuse for inertia. And recognizing that, among institutionalized animal abuses, only vivisection carried with it any semblance of a direct clash of human and animal interests, Brophy re-introduced into the vivisection debate the concept of 'marginal' cases, one to be emphasised by the major philosophers later. She could:
If we look back then at the Harrison book of 1964 and the Brophy piece of the following year we can suggest that in combination with the period’s spirit of rebellion and questioning they triggered the new era. A decade later, Andrew Linzey would begin to incorporate animal liberation into the Christian framework, Richard D Ryder would publish a breakthrough work on vivisection, and Peter Singer would be the first to combine empirical evidence and academic philosophy in one, single-author volume, the seminal *Animal Liberation*. But before then, Roslind and Stanley Godlovitch and John Harris edited a collection of essays by various contributors, including Brophy and Harrison, which also recognized the value of this powerful double act in forcing the revelation. Singer referred to the work as an animal liberation manifesto (*Singer 1973*), and a brief look at both *Animals, Men and Morals* and Ryder’s *Victims of Science* is necessary at this point.

**A Green Light**

**A Manifesto**

In his ‘Postscript’ to Godlovitch, Godlovitch & Harris (1971), Patrick Corbett wrote:

> ... we make no bones about our object in contributing to this book: we want to change the world. (Corbett 1971: 232).

This bold declaration of revolutionary intent, echoing Marx, illustrating the return to applied ethics and, to use Adams’ (1990) term, ‘rebuking’ bloody culture, encapsulates the immense significance of animal liberation which gradually took on an individual identity out of the mass of radical ferment. Although Corbett framed his Postscript in anti-technocracy terms, what is hinted at here is that either as a part of a larger revolutionary movement or on its own, animal liberation is world-changing in its intended application, forcing a thorough re-assessment and re-definition of the human/nonhuman relationship. If the seeds of that revolution had been already been sown, the first green shoots already having broken into the light, here were the first buds of its new season. If Roszak painted a picture of the
technocracy and the counter culture, here was a more focused portrait of one aspect of it and much of it relates directly to Roszak's concerns. Corbett's Postscript contains much that could have been written by Roszak himself, further confirming the contextual relationships:

The revolt of poetry and art against the formalisations of our culture, the revolt of the young against the roles which technological society requires them to fill, the concern with music, drugs and oriental techniques of meditation, the sudden anxiety to conserve as much as possible of the natural environment - these and innumerable other tendencies show that we are having drastic second thoughts about the idealisation of man the theorist and man the technologist which has dominated Europe for the last three hundred years. (Corbett 1971: 236-237).

The book exposed in much detail some of the most severe forms of animal servitude; analysed the reasons for the continuation of such practices (a clearance of comfortable functionalist fallacies and classificatory dogmatism); and outlined the reasons why they should cease. The varied work consolidated the ground and primed most of what was to follow in fully-fledged animal liberation philosophy. Although all the essays are worthy of note, indeed classics of their kind, three are especially pertinent here — Maureen Duffy's, David Wood's and Brigid Brophy's. Maureen Duffy had recognized that within the technological and scientific revolution

The undeniable improvement in human conditions however has not been paralleled by an improvement in animal conditions and in fact has been rather at their expense ... The animals have sunk from being members of the family or at least dependent servants to being automata... If the circus has lost its popularity with adults it is not, I suspect, because of suspicions of the cruelty necessary to make an animal perform faultlessly to schedule but because the other beasts have sunk so far below us in our estimation since the beginning of the technological age, in which they have no shaping part except as victims, that we no longer need to emphasize the distance between us and them. (Duffy 1971: 112, 122).

Despite the increase in popular knowledge of animals gained from television wildlife programmes and from ethological studies, any erstwhile familiarity had not been recaptured and, contrary to what the nineteenth century synthesis may have promised, things were in fact becoming 'worse' for animals, for any sense of sympathy, empathy, had been outlawed. Humans refused to recognize the sentience of other species in order that they might go on treating them as objects, projections and symbols. Society had made no significant advance in this respect and, in the
spirit of Henry Salt’s nomenclature concerns, David Wood identified increased linguistic and cognitive distortion in the use of such words as ‘system’ (e.g. ‘Three Systems for Beef’), ‘raw material’, ‘process’, ‘product’, ‘efficiency’ (of an animal), ‘fodder’, ‘feed’ (rather than food), ‘converters’, all of which were part of the huge pattern of jargon that degraded animals to the status of equipment (Wood 1971: 199).

Although from our vantage point we can now look at the work and find much of its content bouncing back and forth towards both Salt (especially in his political concerns) and animal rights theorist Tom Regan (1983) (in his narrower focus), developing the one and paving the way for the other, what emerges most is not just the combination of fact, analysis and theory, but also the identification of the techno-scientific ethos as merely an inhuman, inhumane and soulless virtual reality, indeed as an evil fantasy. Instead of exploding the myth of human supremacy, the series of body blows inflicted on it had encouraged its enhancement and extension. In an even greater denial of the intuitive and sympathetic, the ultra-rational techno ethos had, perhaps ironically, set itself on a path towards the repair and perfection of illusion.

What was the pro-animal cause to do in the face of it? In her own contribution to the work, Brophy supported Salt’s claim that animals’ rights were an integral part of the great ‘social question’, nonantagonistic to human rights, and suggested that the main problem was to get others to recognize the morality and logic and act upon them:

Persuasion, however, is a psychological act, and although man’s moral position vis-à-vis the other animals is straightforward (being a tyrant is straightforward), his psychological position is complex. One has only to read anthropological data or the case-histories of infantile neuroses or the many mythologies that include animal gods or animal-human mixtures or the doctrine of metempsychosis to recognise a propensity in human psychology for forming unrealistic fantasy relationships to the other animals.

If you suppose that such fantasies have no influence on the real lives of “normal”, civilised and modern persons, you will be at a loss to explain why most of those persons eat meat. I am not this time pointing to the contradiction between being civilised and disregarding the rights of other beings ... If there were no rights of the other animals to consider, the rights of humans would still demand vegetarianism as the only system likely to prevent a large part of the human population from being starved off the planet. (Brophy 1971: 132).
The repressed facets of human nature and indeed human thinking would have to be given greater freedom in order to give rise to the ability to see through the myths, to accept the revelation, and this was not just spiritual but practical. And in its exposure of orthodox logic’s discrepancies, the movement was declaring that it was not one to be legitimately accused of a lack of rationality. On the contrary. As Shaw had earlier pointed out that, in vivisectionist logic, the first duty of the vivisector was to experiment on humans, and that in the pursuit of efficiency animal-based agriculture should be phased out, Brophy exposed the inadequacy of the humanocentric twist on evolutionary theory. If indeed life was really a matter of survival of the fittest (with all that philosophy entailed for human treatment of ‘lower’ animals); if man was simply behaving as evolution ordained:

... he would not be seeking to cure sick humans. He would just out-compete them and let them perish as unfit. (Brophy 1971: 142).

In this concentration on what it saw as orthodox double-think, animal liberation was shifting humans’ relationship with other animals from the symbolic to the literal. It was ‘facing the facts’ as Salt urged, merging them with the metaphysical leap from the ‘false’ to the ‘real’ in order to reach an intellectual and imaginative sympathy. The manifesto was saying that the real ought to be rational, a theme to be taken up by some of the major philosophers later.

**Speciesism & Conformity**

Doing for anti-vivisection what Harrison (1964) did for anti-factory farming, Richard D Ryder’s *Victims of Science* (1975) was published as the *Sunday People* continued its own revelations about beagles forced to smoke tobacco substitutes by ICI. By the end of February 1975, the newspaper had collected petitions signed by over 300,000 people. A third factor in this mix was the appearance in court in March, of Ronnie Lee and Cliff Goodman (founders of the Band of Mercy, shortly to be superseded by the Animal Liberation Front) charged with causing extensive damage to equipment at various laboratories and animal breeding establishments during the previous two years. A fourth factor was the ‘theft’ or ‘liberation’ of dogs from the ICI laboratories by Mike Huskisson while Lee and Goodman were serving their
three-year sentences. These actions had not only shocked but had also, for many, lent a certain legitimacy to the physical expression of outrage at animal use and suffering; something could actually be done (beyond private lifestyle), and something not necessarily linked with class, as was easily made the case in relation to hunt saboteurs (as Lee and Goodman had also been).

Arriving at such a time (Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* was not published in Britain until the following year), and again combining shocking (laboratory) evidence with what have become basic planks of animal liberation — sentientism and anti-speciesism — the book gained far more popularity and attention than, say, John Vyvyan's largely overlooked history-based works of 1969 and 1971.

Here we shall look briefly at an aspect of Ryder's considerable contribution for, as a psychologist, one who had himself experimented on animals, it is in this aspect of animal exploitation — individual and collective psychology — that he offered more than just an exposé of vivisection. It is not necessary to dwell upon the work, for Ryder adds little to what has already been considered above although his encapsulation of it at the time was important, unique and not without huge influence. However, noting this, and that for Ryder, the 'capacity to suffer is the crucial similarity between men and animals that binds us all together and places us all in a similar moral category' (Ryder 1983: 4), and that the concept of 'species' had a nebulous quality about it, we must quote him in relation to that term of his, 'speciesism' (coined in 1970), an irrational prejudice which had no proper basis in evolutionary theory (Ryder 1983: 5-10):

I use the word 'speciesism' to describe the widespread discrimination that is practised by man against the other species, and to draw a parallel with racism. Speciesism and racism are both forms of prejudice that are based upon appearances - if the other individual looks different then he is rated as beyond the moral pale. Racism today is condemned by most intelligent and compassionate people and it seems only logical that such people should extend their concern for other races to other species also. Speciesism and racism (and indeed sexism) overlook or underestimate the similarities between the discriminator and those discriminated against and both forms of prejudice show a selfish disregard for the interests of others, and for their sufferings. (Ryder 1983: 5).
The racism analogy appears throughout the literature as does the demand of logic. But here it is the selfishness which seems to underlie the problem. Unlike, or to a far greater extent than racism and sexism with which analogies are drawn, animal liberation writing identifies speciesism as being grounded in human selfishness. Animal exploitation, prejudice against other species, is more fundamental to most individuals' everyday lives: it has not been common practice to eat blacks and women for instance. Most people actively participate in it, collude in it, and most lives are founded upon it. At almost every moment most humans have been or are touching, using or consuming something which is or contains an animal product, has been tested on animals, or both.

As well as being a societal norm, reflecting the convention of species selfishness, the collusion is intensely personal and the two are mutually reinforcing. This self interest is a significant factor in the separation of animal liberation from, say, humanocentric environmentalism-conservation, and makes the former unique among the movements which emerged from the counter culture. No other asks so much of the individual in terms of altruism and practical, personal, everyday commitment.

The collusion and its resulting universalist conformity also define orthodox decency and this surely is just as great a problem for animal liberation. If people do not like to be thought selfish most do like to consider themselves decent and respectable (witness the Eliasian process). To question that decency, to suggest that part of it is something quite different, something evil perhaps, is to incur wrath and incomprehension at those who do not participate in the rituals. Decency conventions are at ontological loggerheads.

Ryder suggests that conformism applied no less to those who exploited animals directly. The vivisector was not a sadist (in the main), but one merely conditioned and desensitized by education and training, by the promise of security and success. Vivisectors know that in order to achieve these ends they have to toe the line; they gain the privilege of conformity. Conformity means collusion in fantasy, illusion and secret guilt but also acceptance and security. On the other hand, we could suggest
that nonconformism means stripping abuse of its camouflage but also standing naked oneself; vulnerable, outside. One almost attains to the position of the Other, and through such shared alienation one may develop an even more acute empathy with those enduring their chronic otherness. Individuals and society as a whole shared the same dilemma. The problem was that animal liberation made the choice starker, 'stricter', whilst the erstwhile decency, respectability and leniency of animal welfare — perhaps the ultimate concealment — was eating your 'meat' and having your animal.

The old human/nonhuman divide was a long time in dying but, for the orthodox, which seemed to include those clinging to welfarism as the ultimate expression in human largesse, animal liberation — a baffling combination of decency and deviance, purity and pollution, culture and chaos, reason and the irrational — threatened to be the ‘rough beast, its hour come round at last, slouching towards Bethlehem to be born’ (Yeats 1970: 100).

Green Flash
Distilling the rationalizations and pretexts down to mere fantasy and its relatives is not, of course, what the above writers attempted, but they all tended towards and hint at it if not, as Brophy and Duffy did, focus upon it. We have seen also the repeated call for the more human (or the other and suppressed side of the human) that might facilitate the more humane, to ease the readjustment of our vision and our reason/emotion balance, rather than increase the conflict. Where the one had been denied, the other had grown out of proportion and given rise to analytical thinking — no bad thing in itself — but which, grown to grotesque proportions, legitimized the horrors it had visited upon humans and other animals alike. Prevailing logic was seen to be either illogic or a cop-out logic, failing to carry through its own reasoning; priding itself on objectivity it was essentially self-serving and sentimentalist. What animal liberation was battling against, it said, was far more complex than cruelty, only the random form of which had, with the rise of welfarism, tended to lessen (but with shocking increases in the 1980s and 1990s). Not only had orthodox thinking been conditioned by the orthodox diet —
‘meat’ on the menu limited the imagination and precluded objectivity — but everything which sustained that thinking was faulty. The vaunted reason was not rational at all.

Unconformist in their attitude toward other species, liberationists are unavoidably outsiders, self-exiled from prevailing thought patterns, and part of a different culture, pacing impatiently beyond the limits of cultural ‘reality’. This distance, it would seem, aids other kinds of objectivity and logic which discriminate differently, take different things for granted. Orthodoxy operated what Robert M. Pirsig called the static filter that filters out facts, opinions and beliefs that don’t fit the pattern, and this operated too at the individual level, unconsciously, unthinkingly and often against instinct. Two examples from his *Lila: An Inquiry into Morals* follow.

His character Phaedrus was sailing a yacht to a safe harbour he thought was some twenty miles south of Cleveland. Using his harbour chart to navigate the concrete dividing walls, harbour buoys and other markers until he found the yacht basin, he then tied up at berth and went to sleep. When he woke up he asked someone how far it was to Cleveland, only to be told that he was *in* Cleveland:

He couldn’t believe it. The chart said he was in a harbor miles from Cleveland.

Then he remembered the little ‘discrepancies’ he had seen on the chart when he came in. When a buoy had a ‘wrong’ number on it he presumed it had been changed since the chart was made. When a certain wall appeared that was not shown, he assumed it had been built recently or maybe he hadn’t come to it yet and he wasn’t quite where he thought he was. It never occurred to him to think he was in a whole different harbor!

It was a parable for students of scientific objectivity. Wherever the chart disagreed with his observations he rejected the observation and followed the chart. Because of what his mind thought it knew, it had built up a static filter, an immune system, that was shutting out all information that did not fit. Seeing is not believing. Believing is seeing. (Pirsig 1991: 343).

When Phaedrus started to read yachting literature he ran across a description of the ‘green flash’ of the sun. What was *that* all about? he wondered. Why hadn’t he seen it? He was sure he had never seen the green flash of the sun. Yet he *must* have seen it. But if he saw it, why didn’t he see it? The static filter was the explanation. He didn’t see the green flash because he’d never been told to see it. But then one day he read a book on yachting which said, in effect, to go see it. So he did. And he saw it. There was the sun, green as green can be, like a ‘GO’ light on a downtown traffic semaphore. Yet all his life he had never seen it. The culture hadn’t told him to so he hadn’t seen it. If he hadn’t read that book on yachting he was quite certain he would never have seen it. (Pirsig 1991: 342-343).
Down the years, pro-animal individuals and small groups had been trying to reveal the green light, to intrude dynamically upon a static situation, for 'When there is a letting go of static patterns the light occurs' (Pirsig 1991: 346). Salt, Harrison, Brophy, Ryder and the Godlovitch & Harris writers had, in different ways, contributed to their own yachting book and revealed to a larger and more receptive range of people that there was, even if they could not see it yet, a green flash of the animal liberation sun; a new or revised enlightenment. The value, in Pirsig's terms the Dharmakaya light, was still being rejected by the culture's immune system but the solution was to look for those factors — the keys — that would make the new information acceptable. Providing different kinds of philosophical keys in more auspicious times than Salt enjoyed, animal liberation philosophers Peter Singer, Stephen Clark and Tom Regan were to make the green light a beacon, and the hope must have been that it wouldn't be the same green light that Gatsby had picked out at the end of Daisy's dock:

... the green light ... that year by year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that's no matter — to-morrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms further ... And one fine morning —

So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past. (Fitzgerald 1983: 188).

There was, of course, nowhere to return to despite the orthodox claim that liberationists are seeking transport back to some golden age. In an article in The Independent (11.9.95), Felipe Fernandez-Armesto wrote:

Until about 300 years ago in Western Europe, it was still common for animals to have legal rights practically on a par with humans. Rats that despoiled barns, grasshoppers that ravaged crops, swallows that defecated over shrines and dogs that bit people were tried in courts for their "crimes", represented by counsel and, sometimes, acquitted.

In Wales and France, pilgrims visited the shrines of canonized dogs: there could be no more powerful demonstration of the moral equivalence of man and beast. Today's animal rights activists are ultra-conservative revolutionaries who want to put the clock back hundreds of years.

This view has failed to take account of the fact that before, after and while the trials were in session and dogs were being canonized, other animals were being slaughtered, eaten, used as 'beasts of burden', experimented upon, pitted against one
another, hunted and sacrificed in festivals. Animals which offended against
humans were tried and either punished if found guilty, or acquitted and, if deemed
edible, slaughtered later (for food) and without trial. Animals who did not offend
against humans were not afforded a trial, just killed (for food, sport, etc.). These
were, and are, always guilty until proven innocent. How such activities, again
illustrating the inconsistencies and particularisms of instrumentalist taxonomy, and
indeed of animal trials, square with Salt's ideas or with others expressed by the
animal liberation movement is hard to fathom, even if the law and trial courts
themselves had a greater respect for animals' interests than they have today.
Moreover, contemporary animal 'rights' regards animals not as moral agents but as
moral patients; they can do no 'wrong' and humans have no claim upon them.

A certain light, and a greater promise perhaps than that of dominant or familiar
modernity, was shining through the early, pre-scientistic-mathematical-model
Middle Ages, admittedly, but it was narrow-beamed. Fernandez-Armesto would
have been on safer ground if he'd suggested that certain elements of certain periods
of the past held some appeal perhaps (just as some aspects of otherwise unpalatable
thought does for a few animal liberationists even now), but there is no age to which
the animal liberation movement seems to want to return wholesale, only perhaps to
an Eden of the soul, to a recognition of human, nonhuman and earth potential. And
here we can take up a point made by Klaus Eder. Fernandez-Armesto paints animal
liberation as a traditionalistic reaction against modernity (or as suffering from a
modernist nostalgia), wanting a return to a less problematic past. But we should
rather see contemporary animal liberation as a repressed type of modernity,
attempting to create an alternative or 'unfamiliar' modernity (see Eder 1996: 141)
and, we might add, an unfamiliar civility.

**Summary & Conclusions**

In tracing how animal liberation responds to the nineteenth century synthesis, it has
been considered as representing an alternative value which, throughout time has
been served by a succession of agents at pains to reveal its light. Recognizing the
value, which as we saw from Salt is one lying within the human, is indeed a new
enlightenment, marked by spiritual and cognitive transformation. Emerging out of conditions conducive to social change and appealing to the evolutionary kinship of species, Henry Salt's significance lay primarily in his assessment of both orthodox and heterodox attitudes toward animals. Both were characterized by inconsistency, an immutable feature of institutionalized animal use and yet treatable within the scope of the humanitarian ethic. Salt was seen to have been a successor in a long line of descent, of those who had already been calling for moral extensionism. Uniquely, as a perceptive strategist who conjoined the spirit of Darwin with that of the French Revolution, he identified the need for a comprehensive principle to bind hitherto separately treated animal concerns, for all abuses too were kin and flowed from one source. Moral opposition to them should be centralized, replacing the hitherto ad hoc moral localization.

Being carried and promoted by what we can now recognize as an animal liberation movement, the progress of the ethic can be traced along a continuum, breakthroughs being continual if not continuous and not necessarily to any practical effect. Salt's impact was muted, holism fragmented, especially by the the welfare soporific, fears of instability and later world wars. If we look at it in Eliasian terms, Salt had come on the cusp of nineteenth century faith and the twentieth century disillusionment with the notion of social progress, a notion which had replaced the conservation of aristocratic value, only to be replaced itself by the conservation of the new existing order where, with the onset of wars, national ideals became paramount (and see Elias 1994: 194-198). Britain as a nation of animal lovers, with the best legislation in the world, becomes entwined in the process whereby progress gives way to fixity, and to Pirsig's static filter. In both conservative and utilitarian functionalist modes, society's aim is to restore and maintain established order and meaning, of which an ostensible animal welfarism is now firmly part.

But through Shaw and others and later via Brophy, the torch was carried to those within the 1960s-70s counter culture who had, like Salt before them, identified animal exploitation as a social problem, but now part of a soulless technocratic ethos against which many more, especially younger, people were protesting from different
platforms. Animal use came under the microscope; its excesses exposed, its pretexts and *raisons d'être* analyzed to a point of scrutiny unknown in the past. The contemporary animal liberation movement was now being launched, and in much the same spirit and climate as Salt’s.

A significant social movement becomes possible when there is a revision in the manner in which a substantial group of people look at some misfortune, seeing it no longer as a misfortune warranting charitable consideration but as an injustice which is intolerable in society. (Turner 1969).

It was to continue promoting a ‘superior’ value in the face of what had already assumed and retained the ascendant position despite a series of blows to its vanity; the most relevant having been delivered by Darwin. Salient in the range of themes identified by the 1960s-70s intellectuals as underlying man’s predation were the conscious and unconscious use of fantasy and conformity. In linking what he regarded as one paradigm of bigotry to another, Richard D Ryder had coined the word *speciesism*, by analogy with racism, to describe the prevailing human attitude toward other animals which stressed difference, the determining logic of which, like its systems, was declared an illogic, arbitrary and incoherent.

In general terms, animal liberation had the audacity to suggest that ‘Power without conscience is the greatest danger that confronts the modern world; and the progress of ethics is therefore far more important than that of science’ (Vyvyan 1971: 46-47). The representatives had been attempting a transformation or even a transcendence of oppositions: human/nonhuman; culture/nature; mind/body; intellect/intuition but, in contrast to a selective welfarism’s meeker and more acquiescent aim, there was no seeking or acceptance of ideological synthesis or absorption. It had become obvious, as Salt had suspected, that without a radical revision of the human/nonhuman relationship things would only get worse. Rather, there was the attempted overcoming of one ‘reality’, one culture, by another. All the time there has been this tension reflected not least in the battle over meanings — sentimentalism, war, tyranny, progress, nature-natural, civilization, rationality, what it is to be human, respectable, decent, civilized. Liberationists faced a task not unnoticed by Shaw: ‘Nothing is more difficult than to realise a superiority which the world has always
treated as an inferiority' (quoted by Skidelsky 1979: 122), and this related to virtually everything in the revelatory animal liberation canon — scientific method, land use, food, manners and morals; perhaps above all in its distinctly human capacity to imagine an alternative future, pitting what is easily portrayed as mere utopianism, and even nostalgia, against speciesist ideology and its hegemonic norms and values.

However, by the mid to late 1970s the counterculture had split apart as had, earlier, the scheme Salt initiated. The sense of kinship, not just in human-nonhuman but in cause-cause terms, was being lost. Hot dog and beefburger vans welcomed at festivals of 'peace and love' were perhaps the spectre. Nevertheless, in trying to force the revelation, to make society, its individuals and groups see things differently or indeed to see (for the first time or again), to see through the speciesist ideology, to overcome the culture's immune system, animal liberation would escalate its direct action (mass occupation, economic sabotage and animal rescue) and the various organizations which made up the social movement would reorganize, radicalize and become far more dynamic and mobilizing. But what underpinned these efforts and the movement's re-birth were the new philosophical works, key weapons in the attritional conflict.

Notes

1. We could perhaps quote Gramsci (1971: 348) in support of this idea: philosophical activity, i.e. the work of 'organic' intellectuals, must be seen 'as above all a cultural battle to transform the popular "mentality" and to diffuse the philosophical innovations which will prove themselves to be "historically true" to the extent that they become concretely — i.e. historically and socially — universal'.

2. Carol J Adams (1990: 175-179) also refers to the notion of revelation, as the first step of 'the vegetarian quest' — 'experiencing the revelation of the nothingness of meat as an item of food ... which arises because one sees that it comes from ... someone, and it has been made into ... nobody. The revelation involves recognizing the structure of the absent referent'. Animals in name and body are made absent as animals for meat to exist (p40). The second step is naming the relationships, e.g. the connection between meat on the table and a living animal; between a sense that animals have rights and that killing them for meat violates those rights; the recognition of the violence of meat eating; and possibly of the continuity between war and meat eating. This stage also enables the reclaiming of appropriate words for meat, from euphemisms, distortions and mis-naming. The third step is rebuking the meat-eating world by proving that an alternative to meat-eating exists and that it works; 'vegetarians ... seek to change the meat eating world'. (Within Adams' feminist-vegetarian critical theory the final phase of the quest is extended to the rebuking of patriarchal society.) She uses the quest as a context from which to make sense of individual vegetarian women's lives and novels thus offering 'opportunities for interpretation rather than
distortion'. We shall expand on this — though not adhering to Adams' 'steps' sequence — to cover the wider range of revelations inherent in the animal liberation project and also to apply it specifically to the experience and/or works of bloodless culture notables, including Salt and the later writers of an animal liberation manifesto (this chapter), and the major animal liberation philosophers (the following chapter). Adams (1990) is a 'new generation' revelatory text in its own right.

3. Indeed, we cannot continue with Eder's bloody-carnivorous and bloodless-vegetarian cultures throughout this chapter or the rest of the thesis, for Eder depicts ecological reason as vegetarian culture when the ecology movement is not necessarily vegetarian at all (in practice) whilst animal liberation has become so (in theory and in practice). However, the two-culture framework will continue in the way it has already been used in relation to animal liberation and speciesist orthodoxy.

4. In this view of nature, influenced by Kropotkin, Salt seems to have been taking a line now becoming more fashionable within evolutionary psychology — see, e.g. Axelrod (1990) — though not necessarily following it to Salt's conclusion.

5. The muting of Salt's case may also have been due to the 1890s generation's interest in the role of irrational forces in human personality and social history and in the ability of capitalism and democracy to guarantee prosperity and peace. Socialism threatened loss of property. In effect, what Salt saw as necessary and inevitable reforms were viewed by others as a revolution too far.

6. The oppressive force in One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest (1962).

7. Tactically, attempts have later been made to shift the barrier to various locations within the nonhuman world, e.g. Singer (1977) and Cavalieri & Singer (1993) and also by group campaigns seeking liberation for some species from vivisection, e.g. Animal Aid regarding cats and dogs, in 1998, a move which resurrects the original 1876 Bill's later modified exemptions (see French 1975: 126).

8. In its focus on what it apparently considered and considers as the bogus logic of animal use, animal liberation seems to come close to recognizing Pareto's fundamental distinction (in Mind and Society) between 'logical' and 'non-logical' action. Speciesist behaviour (for animal liberationists; for Pareto all human behaviour) would be non-logical in that it is the result of impulses and sentiments which Pareto calls 'residues'. These are camouflaged in doctrines and theoretical systems which Pareto terms 'derivations' and Marxists would call 'ideologies' (see Bottomore 1962: 217).
Chapter 3

A Bible, A Vision & A Case

Introduction

This and the next chapter concentrate on the vegetarian or bloodless culture as we see it in the shape of major animal liberation philosophers, Peter Singer, Stephen Clark and Tom Regan. Their works have (a) given the movement its intellectual credibility; (b) underpinned its various concerns and given it or reinforced its name(s); (c) formulated animal liberation's oppositional ideology and discourse, performing demythologizing and mobilizing functions, and providing moral capital in the war of values; and (d) acknowledged or embraced other and more practical aspects of the movement's claims.

Animal liberation seeks to transform consciousness, values, beliefs and habits, and these works reach out to people directly or through the efforts of organizations and other individuals. We shall look at the philosophies in order to establish the premises upon which the cases are based and by what means their proscriptions and prescriptions are reached. We shall also be concerned with how Singer, Clark and Regan relate to the revelatory tradition we have traced, and with the successes and failures of the project. It will not be necessary here to give comprehensive analysis of the three philosophies. It will be enough to understand their basic and general points, individually and collectively, as a preliminary to both what follows in Chapter 4 where we shall draw upon them, and others, in a specific critique of such works, and to the analysis of representations in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

New Life in the Old Value

Animal liberation has called for the circle of moral concern to be expanded to accommodate other animals whose exclusion, and the consequent treatment they
suffer even, or especially, within welfarist ideology, has been termed speciesism. Since Henry Salt, further major attempts have been made to underpin this project, and Singer, Clark and Regan have adopted different bases or premises upon which to found Salt's comprehensive principle, to effect revelation. They make it clear that they have not addressed all the implications and that their philosophies are not the end-all of aspirations but that they are (or were when written) enough in the current circumstances. There is no blueprint; they are, as it were, unfinished.

The initial and main practical targets of animal use in all three cases are animal experimentation and animal-based farming, the most conspicuous elements, in animal liberation terms, of the scientistic rise in institutionalized violence against other species (although individually they also preclude other aspects, for instance, hunting and trapping in Regan's case). Animal liberation philosophy, through these three and others, has attempted and perhaps heralded a kind of Copernican revolution but in the moral sphere, a furtherance of the decentring process.

The main focus of the philosophers' attention is on bloody culture rationalist instrumentalism, all three attacking the assumptions of human superiority and animal use. Singer and Regan are keen not just to do this but, in highlighting the irrationality or inadequacy of orthodox rationality and in refuting charges against liberationists of sentimentalism and emotionalism, present 'superior' rationalist theories for, as they emphasize, it is reason that compels the application to other animals of the basic moral principles we all accept already in relation to humans. They adopt the 'language' of the orthodox — the language which established a major theoretical justification for animal use — in order to establish a major theoretical objection and a new construction of the human/nonhuman relationship. Clark agrees with the latter point but is different in that he has little faith in rationalism. He does not present us with a system as such but savages and lampoons the rationalist arguments which have sustained animal subjugation. The rationalism is a sham, a cover for sentimentalism and fantasy. In engaging with the terms of the system, Singer, Clark and Regan attempt to subvert the established order which, for them, is based upon a justice-violating prejudice and arbitrary, self-
serving philosophical positions. They attempt to dismantle the static filter, to strip away layers from the obscuring cataract of this orthodoxy.

Between them, Singer, Clark and Regan consolidate most of the ground others have covered before them, Clark perhaps most comprehensively. The three, and other pro-animal thinkers, have also conducted their own internal debate, each challenging the others' premises. This will concern us to a certain degree but only enough to show that differences do exist and that they are rather more than noteworthy. Before proceeding, we can group the three together on their common ground.

All animal liberation philosophy recognizes implicitly or explicitly nonhuman sentience. Attacking what it considers to be the bigotry of speciesism, it is not concerned with dubious notions of and arbitrary distinctions between species but rather with the sanctity of the individual animal, though Regan and Singer take different versions of this and Clark transcends it. All recognize that, post-Darwin kinship especially, the burden of proof has been thrown back on those who (ab)use animals and suggest they haven’t met it. All three attack animal experimentation (although this is qualified in some cases) and animal farming (although just what is meant by this, and by the use of the word vegetarianism, is in some doubt). All see animal liberation as beneficial to and not antagonistic to humans and/or human ‘rights’, Regan most overtly.

We can note how Salt’s sense of inevitability is lost by now, as even he realized before his death. No historical laws are at work. Now it is a case only of what should be rather than what should and, within socialist reforming faith, will be.

A Bible, A Vision & A Case

The three represent, or are in line of, three different philosophical traditions: Singer from Utilitarianism; Clark from Christianity and Neo-Platonism amongst others and loosely; whilst Regan makes out a (deontological) rights case. In moral extentionist mode, they take established theories across the species barrier, the
Point at which orthodoxy denies and discards its own principles. Suffice to say here too that all three attack and demolish to their own satisfaction the orthodox rationalizations, or the epistemology which has sustained the ontology of animal use: Singer in a general historical survey; Clark in countering 'eight sophisms' of Thomism-Romanism and transcendental humanism (both Singer and Clark attacking the use of customs as a disguise for the interests of the strongest); and Regan through a rebuttal of contractarianism, consequentialism, perfectionism and indirect duty views (though there is more than a hint of them in certain passages of casuistry).

A Bible

Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* (originally published in the USA in 1975 and in the following year in Britain) has for many years been regarded as the 'bible' of the animal liberation, or even the animal rights, movement even though Singer is not a 'rightist'. There is no mystery about the choice of title, however. The cause is openly linked with black and other liberation movements demanding an end to discrimination based on an arbitrary, morally irrelevant criterion like race or sex (Singer 1977: xii).

His opposition to speciesism, like the above, an irrational prejudice, and to the infliction of pain and suffering, is worked out within preference or act utilitarianism, a consequentialist theory based on the moral principle of equal consideration of interests — for other animals too have interests and preferences — rather than equality of treatment:

The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all ... and the limit of sentience, not arbitrary qualities like colour, race, intelligence, rationality, is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. (Singer 1977: 8-9).

Singer's utilitarianism is, in effect if not in intention, a reinterpretation of the 1911 Act's biased version of 'balancing of interests' (see p65 above) to make it more consistent with sound moral principles. Further, it is the application of an existing ethical system to contemporary issues which has become more pertinent in what is increasingly recognized as a godless world. This is an important theme for Singer's
work in general. For him, thought independent of the Church has become or has been allowed to become increasingly beneficial to animals; the Judeo-Christian tradition has been liberationists' great enemy. (In this he is at one with Salt: 'Religion has never befriended the cause of humaneness'; the Humanitarian League had got nothing from religion [Salt 1921: 213, 216]). Animal Liberation is in this doubly ironical sense then a new 'bible'.

Singer does not imply that all lives are of equal worth. The idea of human equality, for instance, is based not on intelligence or self awareness but on a principle of equal consideration of interests. There is no good reason, Singer says, and only speciesist reasons, for not extending this principle to other animals, for not including them in the utilitarian calculus. Their suffering, physical and psychological, ought to have equal moral weight as similar suffering in humans whose interests are already considered equally, regardless of other factors, for example intelligence, which tend to make them unequal.

With the focus on pain and suffering, Singer does not make it entirely clear why, if it can be done painlessly, killing animals is wrong. In fact, as with Bentham, it isn't necessarily wrong, for Singer is content to let the matter rest on this:

In general, though, the question of when it is wrong to kill (painlessly) an animal is one to which we need give no precise answer. As long as we remember that we should give the same respect to the lives of animals as we give to the lives of those humans at a similar mental level, we shall not go far wrong. In any case, the conclusions that are argued for in this book flow from the principle of minimizing suffering alone. (Singer 1977: 22).

And Singer's qualified opposition to animal-eating rests on his recognition that cruelty and suffering are inherent in today's large-scale 'meat' production, regardless of any claims of painless killing.

The same approach is relevant to vivisection, a prime example of the unquestioned acceptance of speciesism. Having said that an experiment cannot be justified unless it is so important that the use of a retarded human being would also be justifiable\(^2\), Singer goes so far as to suggest, and in opposition to rights theory, that in an extreme

\(^2\)
case that very experiment may indeed be acceptable, for example if many lives would be saved, or significant suffering minimized, by its direct consequence (an area developed more in Singer 1979). In this somewhat controversial manner, Singer is proposing what he sees as a more genuine objectivity, stripped of human sentimentalism and arbitrariness. Consequently his system would also allow an animal experiment in the same circumstances.

*Animal Liberation's* frontal attack was designed to shatter the complacency with which humans' deeply ingrained attitude towards other animals is held as an unquestioned truth. It attempted also to undermine the plausibility of that attitude and its ideological camouflages by revealing its historical shortcomings (Singer 1977: 192-193). The attitude, for Singer, is easily sustained from generation to generation because as children we eat animal flesh long before we are old enough to understand that what we are eating is the dead body of a slaughtered animal. Chronology again (in this case socialization) militates against animals' interests, major interests which humans violate in order to further their own minor and trivial interests. The consequences of such violation are unjustifiable and unfair; animals winning on aggregate but losing the tie, so to speak.

This has significant implications, for Singer has been criticized (e.g. by Regan) for talking of 'meat'-eating, for example, as a trivial interest, and in relation to vivisection Singer suggests that as most experiments are indeed trivial, or serving no direct purpose, they should be stopped immediately, but that the rest should be replaced as soon as possible by alternative methods not involving animals (Singer 1977: 33). This particular 'non-absolutism' is characteristic of Singer's approach not only to reason, which is the basis on which we must view the subject rather than kind feelings and sentiments (Singer 1977: 255), but to appearing reasonable, practical, down to earth.

*Animal Liberation* is a triumph of marketing the idea that factory farming and vivisection are the predictable outcomes of keeping animals outside our sphere of equal consideration of interests. Such industries are nothing more than the
application of technology and science to the idea that animals are means to human ends. The astute amalgam of philosophy, gruesome evidence and practical advice — theory, exposé, recipes — along with ecological and health arguments against factory farming, bridges the gap between philosophy department and the general public, as intended. Far more than with Clark and Regan, an address to the individual, it made philosophy accessible at a time of ethical questioning, expressing for the first time, since Salt, in single-author book-length and systematised form perhaps strongly felt but hitherto unorganized thought on the most glaring examples of animal use. In Singer's use of well established philosophical tradition, which had brought about many of the most important political, legal and economic changes towards a more egalitarian society, and couched in pragmatic terms, it was a fine work of tactics. It has a certain flexibility about it and he may well be right in feeling it to be more in line with normal intuition than the rights case is, for instance. Its focus on suffering seems hardly a step away from the already established unacceptability of selected cruelties. Singer pulls off the trick of not appearing to be talking discomfiting revolution. If the appeal is to a mystified mass to which intervention must 'make sense' then, in not sounding overly ‘ideological’, Singer’s work has obvious strength.

A Vision

Stephen Clark approaches it from a different angle:

The open iniquity of factory farming has this merit, that it makes self-deception about the horrors caused to animals more difficult. It has this demerit, that by contrast the old ways seem courteous and kind. So the existence of concentration camps acclimatises us to slums. (Clark 1984: 183).

In contrast to Singer's emphasis on suffering, he is looking more at the whole business of using animals in the first place, and it is the human delusion and arrogance behind this use which Clark targets. If God is dead for Singer, he is very much alive for Clark who is no pure rationalist, not having rejected faith or religion. Whilst Singer draws upon and is located within the utilitarian tradition, Clark's The Moral Status of Animals (first published in the UK in 1977) is eclectic, influenced by Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Neo-Platonism, Episcopalianism and Mahayana Buddhism,
amongst others, taking them to form a holistic vision of how we should, or rather should not, treat animals. By far the most wide ranging of the three philosophers, providing a review of much that's gone before in theological, philosophical, anthropological and sociological terms, undermining falsehoods, and condemning all casting of animals in the role of culture's whipping boys, Clark also provides animal liberation with its greatest link to a sense of biosphere and environmental ethics. His is a plea for tenderness and community; we are, all species, a family in the earth household.

His other influence, Aristotle (whose declaration on plants being for animals and animals for man is for Clark a 'loose comment' [Clark 1984: 15]), provides a root for his epistemology — doing what is right to do based on what someone of sound moral character would do, delighting in the beauty and goodness of the world and its members. The Aristotelian ideal is to be extended to all animals. As with Andrew Linzey perhaps (see, e.g. Linzey 1976, 1987 and 1994), this philosopher of religion is a kind of Aquinas in reverse. Whereas, as far as animals were concerned, Aquinas synthesized the 'worst' of both Aristotle and the Church to tell us they cannot be wronged, Clark's philosophy admits both and yet tries to synthesize what's 'best' in them for animals' benefit; for animals can be wronged.

It is a mystery how the orthodox know what they claim to know or how they mean what they say about animals. Concerned with the presuppositions which make it difficult even for decent and intelligent men to grasp the real nature of what we regularly and unblushingly perform, the problem is the world-view with which decent men have convinced themselves that they obey 'the decencies' (Clark 1984: 3). Let us recognize that we do evil things and let us stop doing them, Clark pleas, for the basic moral principle, following Salt's Humanitarian League's⁵, is that

... this at least cannot be true, that it is proper to be the cause of avoidable ill. There may be other moral principles than this, but this at least is dogma. And if this minimal principle be accepted, there is no other honest course than the immediate rejection of all flesh-foods and most biomedical research.

The point, whatever its later complications, is a simple one, and the attempts of our hypocrisy to evade the issue provide a fascinating case-history of the corruption of our moral and philosophical sense. (Clark 1984: xiii).
His main enemy, aside from the all-pervasive sentimentality — only the cannibal is without it — is the (failed) rationalistic attempt to produce an absolute dichotomy between man and other animals which Clark sees as a largely unintelligible reconstruction of the Stoic ethic, the triumph of culture over nature, the use of animals to satisfy symbolic needs.

... in this case to prove that we are the masters. That absurdity we can perhaps forget. But even those who have forgotten it sometimes commit a like absurdity — that of defending their actions, or even beginning their actions on the basis of what ‘nature’ does. (Clark 1984: 179).

Clark is not saying that all ritual is wrong, only the type: ‘let us keep ritual ... But let us at least abandon war ... In short, let us stop day-dreaming and face our friends’ (Clark 1984: 129, 131). We may be rationalizing animals but we are not rational. We have a not wholly controllable psyche and yet pretend that we are masters of that nature. It is this imposition of rational system, this fantasy of control which Clark mocks.

The work has been criticized, perhaps unfairly, for lacking a ‘system’ although it could be said that this is his very point. For him, systems are ‘lethal’. He does not have the same faith in reason as do Singer and Regan, for the pretexts — the ‘devices of the heathen’ — used to excuse systematic animal exploitation in an age-old cover-up, amount to little more than the ‘dream of reason’ that brings forth monsters, an intellectual and psychotic fantasy within which the only meanings and values are humans:

A man, whether he is Thomist or Darwinian, who thinks of non-human animals as stones, devoid of any value till men give it to them, is, quite technically, an idiot: he lives in a world of private fantasy. He is also a dangerous idiot. (Clark 1984: 134).

Moreover, with the hint that we do have some notion of an ultimate good, Clark’s

... supposed lack of a system was a consequence ... of my conviction that it is a vision, not a rule, that stands at the heart of any way of life. To change the way that people live it is necessary to change the way they see things, to bring a new vision to light in them. If I am right to think that the ‘orthodox’ view of nature and humanity is deranged, people will not be cured of it by scholastic argument (however important it may be to set out the implications of the new covenant). The deranged are cured when they can remember how to see: argument is not enough. (Clark 1984: ix).
For Clark, who is keener to talk not of liberationists nor rightists but of zoophiles, it is not so much a matter of suffering and pain, justice or rights, but that, simply, we have no claim on animals. He asks what right we have to treat animals in the way we do and can find no plausible answers:

In general, we have no rights against animals: no right of punishment, no expectation of ‘good’ behaviour, no right of command. Man’s dominion, if he has such, is not of that sort. As with babies in our care, so with animals: we may not consent to operations that will benefit only us, but only operations that will benefit the child, or the animal. (Clark 1984: 73).

In short, their moral status is as ours: ‘If we are sacred then all are. If nothing is, then we are not’ (Clark 1984: 157). We should concentrate on how individual creatures within the whole have a worth and that the whole which is to be sustained is the one that allows them liberty. A Vedic influence is noticeable too in Clark’s sense of praiseworthiness consisting of acting in harmony with the universe, that those who do wrong are acting self-destructively. Unsurprisingly then, Clark takes more interest too in species, as well as the individual. And this has a material base in addition to a spiritual one:

Our long term interests, as a species, will be best served by a present tenderness to other life — a tenderness that we do in fact feel, though it is overlaid and ridiculed by our philosophies. In acknowledging this tenderness, this fellow feeling, we may come to see our earth as a cooperative endeavour of many million creatures, each with some contribution to the commonwealth ... What will such tenderness cost us in terms of comfort, or of civilization? The first steps will cost us nothing at all, for it is manifestly cheaper to eat plants rather than animals ... Will our restraint — and it must be our restraint, not that of some careful scapegoat — destroy our chances of a human life? Will it cause hunger for example? The question is ironical. (Clark 1984: 162).

Clark’s eloquently expressed anger, his use of literary and other allusions, dry humour and his more holistic vision — in the Old Testament tradition of peaceable kingdom — relates animal liberation more closely to spiritual and environmental matters, having one foot firmly in the wider counter culture ethos, binding or re-binding animal liberation with other concerns. It is in Clark too that we find perhaps a voice closer to a greater balance of emotion and intellect.
Towards the end of *The Case for Animal Rights* (first published in the USA in 1983; 1984 in UK), Tom Regan suggests in an aside that environmental ethics would be best served by rights theory. It is a small point of connection in this area for Clark and Regan though Clark would no doubt argue that at such a point rights theory would work out as complex as utilitarianism, which both of them reject. Otherwise there are few similarities between Regan and Clark, except in their general recommendations or demands (and in their revelatory status; see later). Regan's similarity with Singer rests on their shared aim to base the animal case on reason and to deflect charges of sentimentality and emotionalism.

Regan's cool, clinical and logical progression towards the implications of full-blown rights theory takes Kant's direct duties across the species barrier within a generally negative concept of the unacquired rights of non rational but self conscious mammals as ends in themselves, not as a means to the ends of humans. Regan's work is virtually an extension of human rights applied in the nonhuman case. Indeed, more overtly than in Singer or Clark, it is a case too for human rights. His 'models' are mammals, aged one year or over and he places a greater emphasis, backed by empirical evidence, on mental ability in such animals than Singer and Clark allow or are interested in.

It is not just that these animals have the capacity for suffering or are part of the commonwealth but that they are: (self-) conscious; sentient; and autonomous in the preference sense, and that they have: desires and beliefs; memory and a sense of the future; an emotional life and intentionality; and that they experience fear and desire. That is, they share with us a set of biological, social and psychological interests (Regan 1988: 121-122), and as we are benefitted to the extent that we have increased opportunities to satisfy these interests harmoniously, so, too, are they (Regan 1988: 94). These factors make animals 'subjects-of-a-life' who are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles; their 'inherent value' is to be respected (Regan 1988: 243). So, for Regan, the criterion of life is not satisfactory; potatoes and cancer cells have life. It is not life which qualifies animals as having inherent
value, but their being, like humans, subjects of a life, possessing the above qualities. And it is sheer reason which compels us to recognize this. Animals who do not fall into this category, e.g. chickens, should be given the benefit of the doubt. Moreover, to treat these and other animals any differently — though they may have fewer rights — is to encourage the wrong attitude to, and thus violation of, those who do fall into the mammal category.

Like Salt, though in far more detail, Regan asserts that if humans have rights then so do these animals and that this is not antagonistic to human rights, though we be moral agents and they moral patients (they cannot do what is right or wrong) as are the paradigm cases of moral patients — human infants, the mentally deranged or enfeebled of all ages. We have a direct duty to both moral agents and patients, for

Both moral agents and moral patients have inherent value, they have it equally thus both are owed respectful treatment as a matter of justice ... The myth of the privileged moral status of moral agents has no clothes. (Regan 1988: 279).

In fact, Regan is more specific about kinds of rights than Salt in that, for the former, as moral rights are universal they do not arise from legislation, are independent of the law of any nation and can be used to argue for changes in the social order, including changes in the law itself (Regan 1988: 267-268).

Although Regan describes as a rational defect the orthodox view that suffering inflicted on humans is unacceptable whilst the same suffering inflicted on an animal is acceptable, he takes this further, to a matter of harm and ‘not all harms hurt’. We have a prima facie direct duty not to harm individuals and this cannot be overridden by appeals to consequence (although Regan accepts that the prima facie rights may be overridden in certain circumstances; casuistry which brings rights theory closer to utilitarianism and which has attracted criticism, see, e.g. Benton 1993: 86-87, 213). Death is the ultimate harm, the harm of deprivation, but it may not be the worst harm (Regan 1988: 100).

A “contented” housewife and a “happy” domestic slave may have been harmed without their knowing it. Indeed, sometimes the harm is all the greater precisely because those who have been harmed are unaware of the harm that has been done.
That individuals can be harmed without knowing it has important implications for the proper assessment of the treatment of animals. Modern farms (so-called factory farms), for example, raise animals in unnatural conditions ... The unspoken assumption is not that what you don't know can't hurt you; it is that what you don't know can't harm you. This assumption is false.

... Those animals who are being raised intensively, then, let us assume, do not know what they're missing. But that does not show that they are not being harmed by the conditions under which they live. Quite the contrary ... what we should say is that part of the harm done to these animals by factory farming is that they do not know this ... Even if these animals were not made to suffer, that would only show that they were not hurt, not that they were not harmed. (Regan 1988: 98-99).

Thus our institutions and practices do not give animals the justice they are due. The animal agriculture industry treats animals with inherent value as if they were renewable resources and it is this ‘impoverished view of the value of these animals, not only the pain or suffering that they are made to endure, that exposes the practice as fundamentally unjust ... Vegetarianism is not superogatory; it is obligatory’ (Regan 1988: 344-346). The ultimate objective of the rights view then is the ‘total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture as we know it, whether modern factory farms or otherwise’ (Regan 1988: 349-351).

This in turn is linked to the hunting of predatory animals. As the animal rearing industry is now made illegitimate, then so is the hunting of those animals which prey on the ‘property’ of farmers, a legal concept to which the rights view denies legitimacy and seeks to change. ‘With regard to wild animals, the general policy recommended by the rights view is: let them be!’ (Regan 1988: 361).

Regan is also totally opposed to animal experimentation because risks are not morally transferable to those who do not voluntarily choose to take them. Any benefits ('ill-gotten gains') which may happen to accrue from such a practice are morally irrelevant to assessing its tragic injustice. Regan offers this 'dissident reality': ‘Lab animals are not our tasters; we are not their kings’ (Regan 1988: 387). And, unlike Singer who talks about phasing out animal research as alternatives are found, and unlike Clark who talks of rejecting most biomedical research, Regan demands immediate abolition of the practice. Although similar to Clark’s consideration, like Roszak’s, that the substitution of expert technical debate for moral debate is one of the most vicious of rhetorical fallacies (Clark 1984: 7), Regan
makes a partial departure from his and indeed much previous opposition to
vivisection; here there is no specific reference to the idea that it corrupts humanity.
Instead it is purely a matter of prohibiting science which violates individual
rights:

If that means that there are some things we cannot learn, so be it. There are also some things we
cannot learn by using humans, if we respect their rights. The rights view merely requires moral
consistency in this regard ... Those who accept the rights view are committed to denying any and
all access to these "resources" on the part of those who do science. And we do this not because
we oppose cruelty (though we do), nor because we favour kindness (though we do), but because
justice requires nothing less. (Regan 1988: 388, 394).

Like Singer with 'liberation' before him, Regan had been able to lock in to the spirit
of the age in terms of 'rights', a word and concept that was gaining greater currency
as societal emphasis was shifting to the victim and away from the perpetrator, as
Ryder has commented. We should note too that, true to the liberal-individualist
spirit and to the capitalist origins of rights discourse, Regan is at pains to point out
that the revolution and revelation he advocates can be contained within society's
present structures of free enterprise and the market mechanism. However, for Regan,
no-one has the right to be protected against being harmed, for example losing one's
job or business, if the protection in question involves violating the rights of others.
'In this sense the rights view implies that justice must be done, though the
(economic) heavens fall' (Regan 1988: 347). Butchers for instance, like any business
people, can have no claim on the consumer. Indeed, those buying 'meat' exceed their
rights, for their purchase makes them a party to the perpetuation of unjust practice.

Now Singer, Clark and Regan have not been without their public differences which
we do not intend to air here except that some serve to illustrate their positions more
clearly. Utilitarianism is severely criticized by Regan and Clark (although both
agree that it has served animals well in alleviating suffering):

... utilitarianism is not the theory its initial reception by the animal rights movement may have
suggested. It provides no basis for the rights of animals and instead contains within itself the
grounds for perpetrating the very speciesist practices it was supposed to overthrow. To secure
the philosophical foundation for animal rights requires abandoning utilitarianism. (Regan 1988:
315).
The utilitarian calculus ... being strictly incalculable, [is] the dead end of argument' (Clark 1984: 75), its outcome being a function of one's moral character and purpose.

In return, Singer has argued that Regan has not shown that respect for inherent value of subjects of a life is a reason for embracing a rights view rather than a utilitarian view, and Clark has critiqued the abstract theory of rights: 'animals perhaps have no positive rights: it is difficult to see on what basis we have any either' (Clark 1984: 28).

Singer and Regan represent liberal animal liberationism, a rationalist project of emancipation originally espoused by the ideals of revolutionary enlightenment in America and France. It extends consideration of interests or of rights without causing large scale disruptions to the existing social institutions (aside from animal use or the animal using). In all senses though, and to borrow a phrase from Wilson (1973: 257), the three philosophies comprise a strategy to change the normative order and are grounded in the values of society, calling the system to account for practices believed to be unjust in society's own definition of justice.

Revelation

It is of revelatory character that all three claim that their particular traditions of philosophy have been delinquent, have not been fully developed (or not in the right directions) before developing them to embrace other animals. They take up themes already established and, in their alternative or extended use, these serve as revelatory tools. Clark is especially open about using philosophy and other means merely as methods of developing, re-creating or changing people's vision.

The philosophies represent intervention to establish a new social order based upon an alternative value. One might see the ethicists as surgeons operating on the blind, the myopic and the blinkered. Moreover, animal liberation ethics lay siege to the selectivity and inconsistency (marked by taboo and ritual) of normative human/nonhuman relations, the Western ontological separation of human and nonhuman natures. Indeed, part of their task seems to be to separate animals from
the 'nature' which the Enlightenment project sought to control, and to break down
the us/them, subject/object oppositions (though what hope of success there is by
their method[s] is open to debate⁴), whilst Clark breaks them down through a
greater holism, if not holyism. Certainly there is in Clark a sense of an invisible
power and a reality other than the one sold to us, and with him we feel most
strongly an animal liberation ideology performing a demythologizing function.
Reaching much further back than the other two, drawing upon pre-Enlightenment
tradition, Clark's work is far more related to a sense of universalism: can one be both
a Christian and a relativist? (see Rollin 1983: 7). Running through his work, the
most apocalyptic and eschatological of the three in both secular and theological
terms, is the virtual leitmotif of 'And God help us if we carry on like this'. That
Clark is also the one to draw heavily upon certain previous traditions for support
too brings to mind T S Eliot's sense of returning to our beginning to know it for the first
time or at least to start again. He hints in a Platonic way at something beyond us,
behind us, something blurred or hidden, trying to help people remember what they
once 'knew', to recover what is deep inside, to recollect what was once clear but now
forgotten under the distorting pressures of society, practicality, education and
training (see Rollin 1983: 18).

The revelatory nature of the philosophers' own personal experiences is also
significant. Singer's work is more closely allied to the disclosing of fact, opening
eyes to the type and scale of animal use. It was the gaining of knowledge of how
animals were treated that led Singer to write the book with photographic and
textual evidence with the aim of leading the reader to make a similar 'mental
switch in attitudes and practices' (Singer 1977: xiii) aided by the oppositional use of
philosophy.

Regan himself had grasped a 'moral truth' on reading Gandhi, and 'Reason
demanded that I become a vegetarian', but it was after the death of a companion dog
that he understood 'in a flash' that his powerful feelings for 'this particular dog ...
had to reach out to include other dogs. Indeed, every other dog. Any stopping point
short of every dog was, and had to be, rationally and emotionally arbitrary. And not
just dogs, of course' (Regan 1987: 27-28). After cutting his way through all previous obstacles, Regan ends his work with a quotation from Ansell Adams: 'We are on the threshold of a new revelation, a new awakening ...' (Regan 1988: 400). Regan believes that:

Perhaps, indeed, there is in everyone a natural longing to help free animals from the hands of their oppressors — a longing only waiting for the right opportunity to assert itself. I like to think in these terms when I meet people who are not yet a part of the Animal Rights Movement. Like Socrates I see my role in these encounters as being that of the midwife, there to help the birth of an idea already alive, just waiting to be delivered. (Regan 1987a: 42).

For Clark it was direct experience of calves separated from their dams, 'lowing miserably' through the night and 'prevented from living anything like a decent life according to their kind' that forced his decision to stop financing such practices (Clark 1984: v). Again we see how it is new knowledge — earthly revelation — that sets the ball rolling and how fresh personal experience can force the issue against an animal-violating system that depends to a large extent on maintaining public ignorance and dissuading people from seeing what is before their eyes. Clark goes on:

It is necessary to emphasize that the farmer responsible for our conversion was a kindly and honourable man who would certainly never willingly have 'mistreated' his beasts — never beaten or starved them. The tragedy of our times is that decent people, step by step, have come to treat non-human animals as mere material for their own purposes, but there are far worse symptoms of this perverse outlook than [he] ever provided. His animals, we believed, were not being allowed the sort of life that they ought to have had, even if it were right to breed them for eventual slaughter, even if they were not exactly 'in pain'. (Clark 1984: v).

There are similarities here with Regan's 'not all harms hurt' and of the treating of animals as resources. And there is something here too of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries' concern with the ultimately triumphant stifling of compassion in relation to animals as if the suffering was an inevitable, immutable or even necessary part of the 'real world'. Especially important is Clark's remark about decency, and animals as mere material. Common decency cannot be relied upon. Natural squeamishness can easily be overcome by not seeing the animal. We are superstitiously Platonic: it is the Idea (the Pig, the Cow) that is more real to us than the suffering individual (Clark 1984: 64). Clark also criticised animal-using scientists for their bogus objectivity, and Regan similarly:
Like Galileo's contemporaries, who would not look through the telescope because they had already convinced themselves of what they would see and thus saw no need to look, those scientists who have convinced themselves that there can't be viable scientific alternatives to the use of whole animals in research (or toxicity tests, etc.) are captives of mental habits that true science abhors. (Regan 1988: 388).

Animal liberation ethics present a moral case in opposition to the insidious accumulation of societal preferences or to an ethical relativism or even ethical egoism which amount to the ethics of violence. It tells us that moral questions are not answered by saying what we like or dislike, that ethical relativism cannot be a valid principle because it is inconsistent, and that it is consistency of approach which animal liberation seeks and which is required by a just society. The clash is not just between ontologies and their underlying epistemologies but more crudely is between morals and mores. We might also add 'between moralism and libertarianism' except that the only libertarianism against which animal liberation appears to offend is that involved in the 'freedom' to use animals for human purposes.

The revelation attempts to destroy the fantasy grown ever more sophisticated since early guilt gave rise to the animal as a social construct and historical object and to the myriad devices by which conduct toward other species may be justified. The orthodox, as Pirsig pointed out, saw what they believed: believing was seeing. Animal liberation was turning the phrase around.

Incomplete Success

Underpinned by such influential philosophical works, the animal liberation movement has achieved limited success(es). Although the movement tends towards a rhetoric which combines Singer, Clark and Regan indiscriminately, Singer's *Animal Liberation* especially and even now, seems to be the most popular publication of the three (*The Moral Status of Animals* and *The Case for Animal Rights* both being out of print) due perhaps to its greater accessibility and recruiting potential, its unique (of the three) shock quality and — a double-edged sword this — its closeness to utilitarian orthodoxy, as much as to its underlying radicalism.
We could paraphrase Oscar Wilde and say that animal liberation has been a success, most of the audience a failure. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that some audiences have been successes and others failures — noting that the philosophies make specific appeal to different constituencies, recognizing that society is heterogeneous superficially even if homogeneous in its fundamental speciesist ideology. Singer, Clark and Regan all lie within the revelatory tradition, bringing animal liberation to high expression in the 1970s and 1980s, showing the green light to enough receptive people — directly and through organizations — to encourage significant protest activity and change in the lifestyles of millions of people worldwide, indeed millions in Britain alone (certainly in terms of increasing vegetarianism, the rise of 'cruelty-free' cosmetics and the decline of the fur industry). Successes have come also in specific legislative and regulatory areas — new wildlife protection, many local councils banning hunting and circuses on their land and adopting 'animal charters', the abolition of cosmetics, alcohol and tobacco testing on animals and the banning of the use of great apes, and so on; in more general terms such as the Treaty of Rome recognizing, in 1997, animals' 'sentient beings' status; and in the creation of a recognized, academically respectable animal liberation discourse (though animal liberation has not yet become an accepted discipline in the way that, say, women's studies has [and see Stallwood 1994]).

However, from opinion polls we know that most people have for decades now opposed a number of practices which have still not been banned, the same cultural lag to which Salt referred. National governments have been slow to respond to animal liberation-influenced public opinion even in those areas where the animal use or cruelty is somewhat distant, 'frivolous', 'trivial' or not participated in by large numbers: fur, circuses and hunting, for instance. But the very use of animals, animals seen still as resources, is still very much intact, where it impacts on human lives daily: medical research, food and clothing. Perhaps the greatest area of noticeable influence has been in welfare awareness, concern and change: modifications of animal rearing systems, for instance, which indicate a reinterpretation of animal liberation or 'rights' by the orthodox.
And, all the while, animal use has escalated and become further entrenched in the shape of biotechnology and genetic engineering (additional hydra heads) where the instrumentalists appear to have won the argument before it has taken place — animal liberation always facing new faits accomplis — or is taking place somewhere else and where ‘ethical’ debate is restricted to considerations of exclusively human ‘yuk’ and safety factors (and see Birke & Michael 1998).

Summary & Conclusions

We have seen then how contemporary animal liberation is underwritten by the rival theories of three very different philosophers. We have looked at them primarily in order to gain an appreciation of just what it is that animal liberation says to us and why it says it, and under which influences liberationists are working. We need to know these things if we are to assess how the movement is represented by others.

To borrow David E. Apter’s terms relating to emancipatory movements, Singer, Clark and Regan have bound an indeterminate number of people together in a kind of discourse community or, as this movement confronts a fundamental aspect of orthodoxy, an anti- or counter-discourse community. The ‘... chief weapon is a discourse capable of threatening prevailing norms and principles of power particularly when combined with confrontational episodes’ (Apter 1992: 141-143). They have attempted to subvert bloody culture rationalism (two especially with rationalism) and to subvert the conditions of the positivized us and the negativized them, to make visible the invisible, include the excluded and correct the denial of animals’ subjectivity. Animal liberation ethics, the whole revelatory project, explodes the animal use topos in seeking a new human-nonhuman relationship. For the philosophers, other animals are our kin, as fellow sufferers, subjects of a life or members of the earth household. It is this epistemological basis that has continued to create the ontology of animal liberation.

Engaged in a rationalist project of enlightenment, there is enough in Singer’s
utilitarianism and Regan's rights theory especially to depict them as rooted in modernity's linear purposeful model of history, progressing steadily towards an idealized goal. This is a dangerous game. It 'makes sense' to try to complete the rationalist project but can raise the same obstacles; utilitarianism and rights are easily subsumed within the domination they have sustained. Moreover, Singer and Regan did not follow Roszak's advice; they did not try to found the new version of the culture on the non-intellectual capacities of the personality. Although primarily and ultimately recognizing the importance of the intuitive, because of their emphasis on reason and the rejection of emotion as the basis of their cases, Singer and Regan also appear to have become somewhat divorced not only from Salt's antipathy to liberal-individualist-capitalist competition but also, at least superficially, from his claim that

... reason itself can never be at its best, can never be truly rational, except when it is in perfect harmony with the deep-seated emotional instincts and sympathies which underlie all thought. (Salt 1980: 114).

Clark, however, stands closer to Roszak's camp in this and in his critique of the whole disenchanting ethos or mythos. It is in this very connection too that we have seen how Clark's vision relates most strongly to our notion of revelation which we have also identified in the others, albeit of a more prosaic nature there.

Despite its incomplete success and its having no power of office, animal liberation has gained the kind of ethical strength which presents a powerful challenge to speciesist orthodoxy, and much of this strength lies in its consistency and espousal of the notion of a comprehensive principle for which the movement can in large part thank Henry Salt.

Now just as we are not interested here in examining the philosophy department responses to animal liberation ethics (e.g. Frey 1980 and 1983, Leahy 1991 and Carruthers 1992), we are not about to go on to debate further the movement's practical successes and failures which indeed may owe more or less to the performance of animal liberation organizations and activists than to the
philosophers themselves. Nor are we to take up the internal, strategic turn, critiques which, as mentioned in the Introduction and alluded to above, are largely concerned with the philosophies effecting a rationalist, metanarrative, anthropocentric, Enlightenment, justice, malestream, abstraction paradigm within animal liberation although Clark is usually omitted from these, being perhaps free from praise or blame, or perhaps too religious or hinting too much at universal claims for the tastes of a postmodern turn, despite his lack of faith in the rational.

What we are interested in is part of the more external area; not so much in how these philosophies may have been obstructed and disadvantaged in the political field with the rise of Thatcherism or by the development of postmodern culture's politics of diversity but in how, underpinned by such philosophies, the movement, indeed animal liberation in general (and therefore animal use under its attack) have been represented in the mid 1990s, one hundred years after Salt's *Animals' Rights* and some twelve to twenty years post-Singer, Clark and Regan. We shall look at such representations ('interpreting the interpretations') in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. These, of course, constitute a measure of the 'successes' and 'failures' of both animal liberation and orthodoxy, in relation to the challenge the former poses.

However, something hitherto generally neglected is relevant to both the narrative we have traced and to any strategic turn in animal liberation. To appreciate it we need to go back to a point somewhere between Salt and Singer; in fact, to the seemingly unlikely and inauspicious time of the second world war. Richard D Ryder (1989) tells us that animal liberation's development has been interrupted by war at various times in history (e.g. c1798, 1854 and 1914). Our own turn now to 1944 breaks with that mould to some extent and should also enhance or alter the understanding of animal liberation so far achieved. Although their works were not and are not the end-all of aspirations, Singer, Clark and Regan have achieved a significant advance. They have pushed ambiguities to the periphery in contrast and opposition to bloody culture's central ambivalence. Nevertheless there is what appears to be a certain anomaly internal to animal liberation, and one of a different order to those social movement anomalies outlined in the Introduction to this thesis.
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Notes

1. These are not of course the only animal liberation philosophies but it is these which have spawned a huge body of work within (and without) ethics over the past twenty-five years or so, and it is these three, though Singer and Regan especially, who appear to be the most often quoted and referred to by the movement, its detractors and the commentators with whom we are concerned.

2. It is in this area, of speciesism, that Finsen & Finsen (1994:185-187) and others identify a significance in Singer’s case for animal liberation which ‘survives any attack on utilitarianism’.

3. ‘... it is iniquitous to inflict avoidable suffering on any sentient being’ (Salt 1921: 132).

4. Feminist critique, e.g. Gruen 1993, has it that such dualisms, and that between reason and emotion, cannot be overcome by rugged, individualist ‘rights’ theory which ultimately gives rise to a logic of domination. We shall not argue with that case but note that such critique tends to ignore much of both Salt’s and Clark’s contributions to animal defence theory.

5. This is not to overlook the considerable animal liberation activity conducted prior to Singer, Clark and Regan in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and alongside them from the 1970s, nor that many may continue to be drawn to animal liberation uninfluenced by them (directly) though just where their influence ends, if at all, is now impossible to determine.
Introduction

Representations are determined to a large extent not only by pre-existing attitudes but also by understandings-comprehensions or mixtures of the two. The mixture of negative (speciesist) attitudes and misunderstandings-incomprehensions can easily militate against animal liberation's interests. Because it seeks to change consciousness and attitudes in order to effect the 'proper', or a 'better' constructed, relationship with other animals, it is the further understanding-comprehension of animal liberation itself with which we are concerned here. In this chapter we shall explore further the kind of identity that, consciously or unconsciously, animal liberation gives itself, its self-representation. But this time there is a twist in the narrative's trail.

We need to ask, is there an unequivocal statement, or a clear picture given, of the movement's full intent? Singer, Clark and Regan take established theories across the species barrier, but how far do they go? It is necessary to assess the theories against their prescriptions and vice versa; to ask, what is demanded by the movement or rather, what, in reference to its philosophies, may we expect these demands to be? In this we shall examine animal liberation's use of analogy, for if it tends to picture animal use within the same frame as, say, Nazism or to see its cause in a similar light as, say, the emancipation of slaves, then we may expect to be able to identify direct comparisons rather than contrasts.

This investigation will also lead on to pit the philosophers against another expression of, and a model or criterion for, animal liberation which predated them by several decades. Challenging customs that other humanitarian organizations (including Salt's) did not question, the Vegan Society's promotion, from 1944, of total
non-exploitation of other species consolidated a standard, which had been established at least one hundred years earlier, against which all animal liberation prescription must surely be measured.

We shall then consider how all this relates to the movement's central welfare/liberation dilemma which has its roots in the nineteenth century synthesis, and how this and the foregoing relate to how ends determine means and vice versa. Only then shall we be in a position to examine other representations.

The Slavery Analogy

In an attempt to make animal liberation more credible and to awaken public consciousness to the scale, nature and values of animal use, the animal liberation movement uses several parallels, and slavery seems to be the most pertinent. Certainly 'speciesism' was coined and has been repeatedly used conceptually in relation to racism and sexism but, in more practical terms (though these are not without their own conceptual aspects), the movement has drawn analogies between animal use and both Nazism and slavery. The latter seems to be the stronger because blacks under slavery, like nonhumans now and in the past, were used as renewable (and expendable rather than exterminable) natural resources in a respectable economic system. Moreover, Aristotle used the analogy and both animal use and slavery have been considered at various times synonymous with the process of civilizing and the progress of civilization. The systematic atrocities of human slavery bear striking resemblance to the practices of institutionalized animal use and continuities are identifiable. Indeed:

The domestication of animals seems to have been a necessary social precondition for the institution of slavery as practised in the early civilizations; it provided the material foundations making the enslavement of humans a practical possibility, and it provided a model which could have made the latter psychologically conceivable. (Peters 1971: 228)1.

The main reason for looking at this best analogy is that it not only serves the animal liberation movement's aims, but also enables us to examine it in such a light. If the movement defines itself in such a manner this provides us with a key to its nature and self-image. It is also the longest-running and has personnel in common, for
example Wilberforce and Wesley, emancipationists of humans and other animals, and the analogy was drawn too by Bentham and Salt. The latter, in predictive mode and again like others, had also suggested that the emancipation of humans would bring with it the emancipation of other animals. The slavery analogy allows us to ‘test’ animal liberation against its own standards just as the philosophers ‘tested’ society’s against its own, and found it wanting.

We can turn to the comparison of human and nonhuman slaveries, first of all in the rationalizations analogy drawn by Richard D Ryder:

If we examine the arguments used by slave-owners in the past to counter those of the reformers, we can see a striking similarity with the view expressed today by those who defend the exploitation of animals in factory-farms, the fur trade, laboratories and elsewhere. The slave-owners discouraged travellers’ visits to the plantations because they considered that such visitors were not experts and therefore tended to react emotionally to what they saw, not understanding, so it was said, the high-mindedness of such ventures nor the technical problems involved. It might be conceded that there were ‘isolated’ whippings and the mortality rate was rather high, but the average slaver could assure his ‘ill-informed’ or ‘over-sensitive’ visitor that he felt a deep compassion for his slaves and they reciprocated this with loyalty and devotion. After all, their living conditions were much better than in the jungle and, besides, these creatures had never known sophisticated pleasures and so what they did not know about they could not miss. The visitor must not judge slaves by his own standards — to believe that they could feel and suffer in a way similar to himself was to be merely ‘sentimental’. Above all else, it would be stressed, slavery was necessary for economic survival. (Ryder 1989: 1-2).

In addition, Marjorie Spiegel (1988) furnishes us with a catalogue of practical similarities. In terms of physical comparison, of both human and nonhuman slaves as victims, we see that the former were and the latter still are routinely: chained, shackled or in some way restrained; transported over long distances in dire conditions, many dying in transit; separated from their kin; sold at market or auction; branded or tagged; hunted, their body parts sold or given away as trophies; experimented upon; raped; ‘broken’; driven to their productive limits and beyond; punished (often or always by death) for not measuring up; and generally defeated physically and psychically.

The analogy is not perfect. Singer’s parallel with black liberation, for instance, is somewhat inappropriate, for the latter in the 1960s was not so much a challenge to chattel slavery but to more covert, less organized but no less insidious forms of
racism. Animals are still at the stage of slavery. On a functional level, the uses to which animals are put far exceed those to which human slaves were (are) subject, and the range and level of the violating practices is far greater in animal usage. And if blacks had formed a central part of the white diet then perhaps the struggle for that abolition would still be in process.

Nevertheless, slavery perhaps is the most illustrative and instructive analogy across the range. As with blacks, especially slaves (but see Ellison 1953), animals are largely rendered invisible as is their oppression. For liberationists, if nonhumans have interests, feelings, the ability to suffer, inherent value, then the dominant class has to be apprised of them or reminded of them, for such considerations or constructions do not come naturally or rather, they may come naturally but such sympathetic imagination has been repressed and suppressed by bloody culture. These people, creatures, animals, are not like us, we have placed them beyond our ‘sight’, for to admit them would demand a disorienting ontological reappraisal and undermine our colonizations and their determining epistemology.

The slavery analogy is pertinent too in that the practice was also universal, socially sanctioned, but now virtually eradicated, the consensus of world opinion realising its stain, and where it still exists in various lesser-known forms, education and legislation will perhaps eventually rout it. Yet three thousand years ago, relatively few would have supported the call for its abolition; it would have seemed impossibly idealistic. As Brophy pointed out, the Greeks couldn’t see it (though their slavery was of a different kind). This perhaps is the condition of animal slavery now.

Let us assume the absolute case then, acknowledging that there will always be exceptional, extraordinary and nonrepresentative situations to which no philosophy can hope to extend with consistency (and this is not to assume, as the philosophies themselves do not assume, an absolute inviolability of animal life). Let us assume that an animal liberation case could be made out (and pursued tactically without dilution), declaring simply that, à la the abolitionist case,
humans should not deliberately use animals for any non-symbolic purpose (except perhaps in non-invasive ethological studies in the wild) or in any material way in order to utilize their symbolic power. The aim of the abolitionists was abolition, not kinder treatment, not better conditions, not longer chains, not fewer slaves, not gentle usage, not partial abolition, not a different kind of slavery (notwithstanding wage-slavery into which other animals could not enter into consciously), but abolition. Slavery was wrong, according to the campaigners, and the world came to agree or to see the wrong. What we need ask then is how do the philosophers' prescriptions stand in relation to this abolitionism? We saw in the previous chapter what Singer, Clark and Regan prescribe in general terms but we can reassess from this different perspective here.

Clark’s promotion of anti-vivisectionism, for instance, is qualified by talk of abolishing ‘most’ biomedical research on animals, without saying what should be left to continue and on what basis, and although Regan appears to be quite straightforward in his recommendations and demands — for vegetarianism, anti-vivisection and an end to hunting and trapping — his idea that it is ‘commercial’ animal agriculture which should be abolished leaves one considering what ‘non-commercial’ animal agriculture is envisaged as acceptable within his rights theory. It is hard to see what this is, for as even he implies, no animal-using system is viable in the long term without routine mutilation and slaughter, a similar point made in relation to suffering by Singer who calls for abolition of trivial experiments whilst the suffering in non-trivial research can go on until alternatives are found.

Although the three cases are indeed challenging on different grounds, none of them actually makes out a clear, unambiguous case for an end to all animal-using practices, and of an activity such as horse riding, for instance, a classic master/slave relationship, there is no mention. Understandably, Singer, Clark and Regan did not set out to establish in detail the ‘proper’, or ‘better’ constructed, behaviour in regard to all human/nonhuman practices and relations. Instead they establish principles from which we may be able to assume it in most if not all areas. But although we may simply extrapolate to give us an idea of how the philosophers would look upon,
say, animal circuses — obviously unacceptable to all three — what guidance is there for something as innocuous to the orthodox as horse riding? 4

It is here that we have perhaps the best insight into several of the themes which have concerned us. It is in this relationship that we can recognize: a human pastime — presented and widely perceived to be respectable and harmless; the combination of animals and war-victory — the hunting field as a preparation for the battlefield, the use of animals for human warring purposes, and the war against animals; its blinding nature — representing the cataract which obscures humans’ vision and hinders revelation; animals as resources; the hidden stories which in different ways lie behind the use of animals — horses are ‘broken’, kin-family groups separated, animals which are not up to it or beyond it cast off; the exercise of power and domination; and the animal use-civilization equation. Moreover, once broken and separated (and often confined to barren fields deprived of shelter, which even welfarism does not yet address) it is still looked upon as a kindness to find them ‘work’, to keep them active. This then becomes natural; a practical example of culture passing itself off as benign nature.

Now horse riding is possibly too complex for suffering- and interests-based utilitarianism to condemn easily (indeed, it is implicit in Singer’s work that animals can legitimately be viewed as resources or means to human ends, although horse riding is no less ‘trivial’ than flesh-eating) and it is not at all clear from Clark’s work just how we should regard this. From Regan’s Case we can get the idea that horse riding may be anathema to at least rights theory, which can easily accommodate the objection, though it is only an informed guess; Regan’s dissident reality of ‘animals are not our resources’ is always shown to us in the familiar contexts of more obvious harmful or hurtful use5.

As we have seen it then, animal liberation does not actually spell out what some of it implies and what it implies could be spelled out, and especially in a case such as horse riding. Indeed, precisely because of its ‘innocuity’, a condemnation of horse riding — or ‘riding’ as its practitioners prefer it to be known; again the invisible

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animal — may be a classic statement of animal liberation from which a stance on virtually every issue within the subject could be then confidently assumed. Perhaps this could take animal liberation away from any confusion or seemingly endless and generally welfarist-framed, cruelty-abuse-suffering-grounded debate within which even vivisection and factory farming can be and are defended. That is, it shifts the paradigm and does so emphatically and specifically. However, there may be tactical considerations. Would the condemnation of horse riding not appear to the orthodox, and especially to many self-professed horse-riding ‘horse lovers’, to be too harsh, even ‘loony’? But vegetarianism itself has always faced this (which may be tactical reason enough, of course, for omitting mention of horse riding).

What we can conclude is that, taking the foremost philosophers’ central works, we find discrepancies between the human and animal slavery abolitionisms. We have to look elsewhere for the kind of consistency we may expect to find:

We can see quite plainly that our present civilisation is built on the exploitation of animals, just as past civilisations were built on the exploitation of slaves, and we believe the spiritual destiny of man is such that in time he will view with abhorrence the idea that men once fed on the products of animals’ bodies. Even though the scientific evidence may be lacking, we shrewdly suspect that the great impediment to man’s moral development may be that he is a parasite of lower forms of life.

These words, which appeared in the first issue of The Vegan News in November 1944 in explanation of the founding of the Vegan Society, were written by co-founder Donald Watson, coiner of the word vegan (from vegetarian). Perhaps it is here that we can find or to get closer to a best existing model of and for animal liberation. In measuring the philosophies against it, more specifically than with the slavery analogy, we find also that it has implications for the two cultures scheme used hitherto.

**Veganism: A Neglected Model**

Shortly after the Vegan Society was formed it issued the following Manifesto, twenty-seven years before the Godlovitches and Harris issued theirs:

The Aims of the Vegan Society are:
To advocate that man's food should be derived from fruit, nuts, vegetables, grains and other wholesome non-animal products and that it should exclude flesh, fish, fowl, eggs, honey, and animals' milk, butter and cheese ...

The Vegan Society seeks to abolish man's dependence on animals, with its inevitable cruelty and slaughter, and to create instead a more reasonable and humane order of society. Whilst honouring the efforts of all who are striving to achieve the emancipation of man and of animals, the Vegan Society suggests that results must remain limited so long as the exploitation in food and clothing production is ignored.

The Vegan Society is eager that it should be realised how closely the meat and dairy produce industries are related. The atrocities of dairy farming are, in some ways, greater than those of the meat industry but they are more obscured by ignorance. Moreover, the Vegan Society asserts that the use of milk in any form after the period of weaning is biologically wrong and that, except when taken directly from the mother, it becomes polluted and unsafe. The Society, therefore, sees no honourable alternative but to challenge the traditions of orthodoxy by advocating a completely revised dietary based on reason and humane principles and guided by science to meet physiological requirements. (From the Vegan Society Manifesto November 1944).

What we need to ask is how much, in distilling an alternative value, Singer, Clark and Regan achieved in presenting a comprehensive principle as called for by Salt. Do their underpinnings embrace veganism? And if they do, do they spell it out as central to the cause, assuming that the philosophies are presented not primarily as tactical works, thinking that veganism would be considered too 'extreme' by the audience(s).

The most notable fact, indeed the great anomaly, is that Singer's Animal Liberation, a work fêted as the bible of the 'animal rights' movement — the one quoted and referred to most (albeit mixed with rights rhetoric) and the one, with its author, which tends even now to flag the movement — actually promotes the use of animals. This would not perhaps be so surprising had not a Vegan Society been established some thirty years before Singer wrote the work, a Society which had proclaimed, even as early as 1951 that:

The object of the Vegan Movement (“to end the exploitation of animals by man”) is clarified as to the meaning of exploitation by Rule 4(a), which pledges the Society to “seek to end the use of animals by man for food, commodities, work, hunting, vivisection, and by all other uses involving exploitation of animal life by man.” By the adoption of this rule, the Society has clearly come out on the side of the liberators; it is not so much welfare that we seek, as freedom. Our aim is not to make the present relationship between man and animal (which if honestly viewed is mostly one of master and slave) more tolerable, but to abolish it and replace it by something more worthy of man's high estate. In short, our aim is to set the creatures free — to return them to the balance and sanity of nature, which is their rightful place, and so end the historic wrong perpetrated when man first decided he had the right to exploit and enslave them.

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The second broad aspect of the vegan aim is its effect upon human evolution. Apart from the abolition of an enormous burden of cruelty which is bound constantly to return like a boomerang upon humanity's own head, it has to be remembered that in any relationship of master and slave, the greatest and deepest harm is suffered not by the slave, but by the master. Until the present relationship between man and his fellow creatures is replaced by one of companionship on a relatively equal footing, the pursuit of happiness by man is foredoomed to a painful and tragic frustration. (Cross 1951).

Thus speaking 'to the condition of our modern world' (Wynne-Tyson 1979: 107), Leslie Cross went on to claim that this new constitution marked the 'true birth' of the Vegan Society and, if we are to measure animal liberation against the slavery analogy, this surely is its classic statement, where the ambivalence, the inconsistencies, the ifs and buts, seem to be overcome. Can the master-slave relationship of riding horses be accommodated here? Only by more sophistry than usual.

The Society not only entwined the various strands of pro-animal thought but also, immediately or a little later, bound them with the related issues of natural foods (the bloodless culture's appeal to the natural), faith in the possibilities of science, human health, spirituality, land economy, environment, social progress and, as we shall see later, aesthetics, in a full and coherent statement of bloodless culture values. The benign fusing of Enlightenment and the Romantic. Indeed, the late counter culture fragmentation into discrete issues worked contrary to what the Vegan Society had already been advocating, having recognized the interrelatedness of human, animal and earth liberations, a theme which we can only begin to recognize later among the philosophers in Clark. Just as important perhaps is that the Society, and vegans in general, had already established a practical underpinning to animal liberation, living with moral consistency and proving the ethic's firm grounding. This itself is a revelation: veganism is not just an ideal type, veganism works (and see Chapter 2's note 2).

That Singer should then, in 1975, talk of veganism in the following terms is curious, unless he is focused, as he seems to be, on tactics or, more seriously, if utilitarianism cannot accommodate veganism. That is, in a chapter titled 'Becoming a Vegetarian' (rather than 'Becoming a Vegan'), Singer is at pains to encourage more to the fold.
and is conscious of those whom he believes may be alienated by too 'strict' a regime.
In trying to determine how far his philosophy extends, and considering that
'somewhere between a shrimp and an oyster' is as good a place as any to 'draw the
line', Singer says, in something of a dodge, that:

If my toleration of mollusc-eating will seem anomalous to some vegetarians, there is an aspect of
the normal vegetarian diet that has drawn the same charges from critics; the use of animal
products, especially eggs and milk. Some have tried to accuse vegetarians of inconsistency here ... those
who eat neither animal flesh nor eggs nor foods made from milk have begun to call
themselves "vegans" ... What we should ask is whether the use of these other animal products is
morally justifiable ... for the present it is enough that the reader know that we can do without
eggs and milk. But is there any reason why we should? (Singer 1977: 179).

The child was walking but Singer wants to teach him/her how to crawl. He goes on
to say that:

Assuming you can get free-range eggs, the ethical objections to eating them are relatively minor.
Hens provided with both shelter and an outdoor run to walk and scratch around in live
comfortably. They do not appear to mind the removal of their eggs. They will be killed when they
cease to lay productively, but they will have a pleasant existence until that time. (Singer 1977:
180).

This is animal welfare, not liberation, a result of the lack of prohibition on killing
if the life is virtually free from inflicted suffering (notwithstanding the
confinement) and the act of slaughter painless. Moreover, there is no mention of the
chickicide of day old males — around thirty million per annum in the UK — as
surplus to the requirements of the egg industry (relevant also if the whole flock were
free-range). The second edition of Animal Liberation (1990/1995) does consider this
as a main objection to eating eggs but Singer then asks '... whether the pleasant lives
of the hens (plus the benefits to us of the eggs) are sufficient to outweigh the killing
that is a part of the system. One's answer to that will depend on one's view about
killing, as distinct from the infliction of suffering'. Singer's answer is that he does
not, on balance, object to free-range egg production (Singer 1995: 175-176). Contrary
then to our two culture scheme, Singer does not actually shed the blood guilt of
bloody culture. Like many before him he is torn between two cultures.
After suggesting that part of the consistency provided by vegetarians was the non-wearing of leather and fur, he claims that:

We could do without wool, if we wanted to, though since the sheep is not killed for its fleece, and is allowed to roam freely, perhaps this is not a major issue. (Singer 1977: 244).

This is curious too seeing as Singer also acknowledges that shearing can be a terrifying ordeal for sheep and that sheep farmers kill a lot of wildlife. It is also very much like Salt’s naivety in this respect, ignoring all the hidden sufferings of the sheep which Singer has already pointed out as inherent to animal-based agriculture, not to mention the economic value of wool without which the sheep-flesh industry would hardly be viable.

By 1990, and after reading Townend’s (1985) exposé of the sheep industry, Singer had changed his mind, suggesting that there was a strong case for dispensing with wool. This reinforces the point about personal knowledge of course, and one can get the feeling that Animal Liberation was written before the author knew all he could have known (note even his phrase, in 1975, ‘some have begun to call themselves “vegans”’). The conclusion that the philosophy is only applicable to those with limited knowledge of animal exploitation would seem not to be acceptable however, given that Singer has been prolific and active since 1975, undoubtedly gaining in knowledge, witness the above, and yet remaining true to his original principles. Singer has moved towards a vegan position, though still far from it. Indeed, the quibble over sea creatures keeps Singer short of even vegetarianism.

Earlier, he had accepted that dairy farming causes ‘some’ suffering to the dairy cow and her calf, and that in an ‘ideal’ world, free of all speciesist practices, we would not use animal milks. It is at this point that we find the crux, where Singer struggles with a philosophy and its strategy. Retaining the use of inverted inverted commas for a word that had been in use for over thirty years, he declares that:

“Vegans”, then, are right to say that we ought not to use dairy products. They are living demonstrations of the practicality and nutritional soundness of a diet that is totally free from the exploitation of other animals. At the same time, it should be said that, in our present speciesist world, it is not easy to keep so strictly to what is morally right. Most people have difficulty

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enough in taking the step to vegetarianism; if asked to give up milk and cheese at the same time they could be so alarmed that they end up doing nothing at all. A reasonable and defensible plan of action is to tackle the worst abuses first and move on to lesser issues when substantial progress has been made. (Singer 1977: 181-182)7.

The above passage illustrates two contentious areas. First is the unfounded assumption that meat eating is 'worse' than drinking milk. Note that Singer’s ‘worst abuses first’ is in direct conflict with Watson’s claim that ‘the atrocities of dairy farming are ... greater than those of the meat industry’. Some seventy per cent of bovines reared for ‘beef’ are originated in the dairy herd where traumatic early separation of cow and calf is routine (as in Clark’s revelatory experience), cows are pushed beyond their yielding capacities, are simultaneously lactating and pregnant for eight months at a time and, plagued by laminitis and mastitis and worn out after four or five calvings, are then slaughtered some fifteen years before the end of their natural life span. The calves are sent for slaughter, or for ‘veal’ or ‘beef’ rearing or become successors to their dams. These practices ensure that unweaned humans can continue with the unnecessary and unique (and to use Singer’s term for meat eating and most animal experiments, ‘trivial’) habit of drinking another species’ milk. Singer deliberates about ‘drawing the line’ between killing shrimps and oysters at the same time as considering the fate of the long-suffering dairy cow and calf as a lesser issue8. More importantly perhaps, for our purposes at least, this approach, along with Singer’s use of the word ‘strict’ to describe veganism, thus conceding to orthodox rhetoric, can lead easily to others’ confused representation of the movement’s objectives.

The second problem, following on from the first, is that Singer is adopting here the same tactic commonly noted as being characteristic of the liberal (especially perhaps the political Left) and indeed those who have already rejected the arguments for sexism and racism but utilize them in defence of speciesism, the very thing Singer wants eradicated. An arbitrary selection of ‘worst abuses’ is made and tackled and then one must play a waiting game before tackling other abuses, in hierarchical fashion. What compounds the problem is that substantial progress had already been made, by the dairy-industry exposing Vegan Society as from 1944 (and by individuals before then). Donald Watson had dealt with the delaying tactic:
A common criticism is that the time is not yet ripe for our reform. Can time ever be ripe for reform unless it is ripened by human determination? Did Wilberforce wait for the 'ripening' of time before he commenced his fight against slavery? Did Edwin Chadwick, Lord Shaftesbury, and Charles Kingsley wait for such a non-existent moment before trying to convince the great dead weight of public opinion that clean water and bathrooms would be an improvement? If they had declared their intention to poison everybody the opposition they met could hardly have been greater. There is an obvious danger in leaving the fulfilment of our ideals to posterity, for posterity may not have our ideals. Evolution can be retrogressive as well as progressive, indeed there seems always to be a strong gravitation the wrong way unless existing standards are guarded against and new visions honoured. For this reason we have formed our Group, the first of its kind, we believe, in this or any other country. (Watson 1944).

Of course, Singer made a good point when he feared scaring people off by confronting them with too formidable a challenge, and Animal Liberation has been hugely successful in promoting the growth of an animal liberation movement and in raising awareness of the issue to new heights throughout the Western world. On the other hand, it is a backward step in terms of prescription or ends and not just regarding veganism. Before Singer, anti-vivisection organizations and the Vegetarian Society themselves were already advocating more than his major work prescribes, and no animal liberation group now subscribes to the versions of vegetarianism and anti-vivisection Singer's utilitarianism demands. It is only the rhetoric and criteria of suffering and interests which have powered and continue to power the movement. Staying firmly in touch with animal welfare and prevailing philosophy, and mixing philosophy with tactics, means with ends, the book seems to be a conundrum, its title possibly a misnomer.

So, how do Clark and Regan fare here? If it seems strange that Singer keeps veganism at arm's length, Stephen Clark, the closest of the three to a sense of 'nature', makes this claim:

What follows for our obligations? Simply, that if we are to mean what we say in outlawing the unnecessary suffering of animals, we must become, at the least, vegetarians. (Clark 1984: 45).

It is hard too to see how, with veganism established — and with the chickicide of day-old males, the suffering of the dairy cow and the immediate or delayed slaughter or crated future of her calf exposed by the Society which broke the silence on these issues — Clark did not feel the need to write instead, '...we must become, at
the least, vegans'. Although Clark refers to veganism several times, as a stage of progression, thus implying that veganism is a material development rather than a cognitive change ('... those vegetarians who have not (yet) progressed to veganism' he says, for instance, in his 'Notes for Proselytes' after the main body of the work [Clark 1984: 213]), it is vegetarianism for which he makes the case. However, at least he uses the word with confidence: 'There will be less suffering in a vegan world, even in a near-vegan world' (Clark 1984: 80). But, although declaring in a footnote that '... veganism is a better project than lacto-vegetarianism ...', he goes on to say: '... we may in the end be able to take some milk from our kin without injustice' (Clark 1984: 185). But why this concession to the purely cultural? And is this what Regan had in mind when he condemned only 'commercial' animal agriculture?

This is connected also to Regan's preference for the word vegetarian which he uses throughout The Case for Animal Rights, not using the word vegan. Now it had for long been the American practice, somewhat in contrast to English usage since the 1940s-50s, to use the word vegetarian as all-embracing (and technically correct it is or, more accurately, was), despite the existence of an American Vegan Society since 1960. So it is reasonable to assume that Regan, in talking of the total dissolution of commercial animal farming (and of animal use in science), was perhaps thinking veganically, reservations about 'commercial' notwithstanding. This is supported by Regan’s later adoption of the word vegan, for example in an article with Gary Francione (1993). But why not use it ten years earlier in the major work which, after all, came partly as a response to Singer who, as we saw, differentiates between vegetarians and vegans?

His (possibly tactical) use of the word vegetarian, again, leads to confusion and should not go without comment. In fact, it could be the case that Regan’s whole effect is warped by not using the word vegan. Not using it denies the crucial differences between vegetarianism and veganism and can lead not least to immense practical problems of understanding as any vegan, considered to be 'a vegetarian', has found in hotels, restaurants, on airlines or even as a guest in a private house (see The Vegan passim). It may seem a small thing but the implications are far-reaching, for by it,
both here and in Singer and Clark, vegetarianism is typically equated with rights theory and indeed with animal rights and animal liberation. When we can regularly read about celebrities and others being described as ‘vegetarians’ only to find that they eat fish, the word and concept of veganism, by contrast, constitutes a clear and unequivocal statement. In the light of the nomenclature concerns voiced earlier, this immobilizing power of inappropriate words cannot be unimportant in self-representation. Surely it is clarity and stability of identity that a movement, like the individual, requires. (Or perhaps, strategically, it isn’t).

The chronology is awry then; momentum appears to have been lost. The philosophers did not build on veganism, did not make it central to their works. This had happened before; it is a repeated anomaly. In 1892, Henry Salt, like Singer after him, an advocate of egg-eating and wool-wearing (e.g. Salt 1980: 43 and nd: 35-38), had written that:

I desire to keep clear also of the extreme contrary contention that man is not morally justified in imposing any sort of subjection on the lower animals. (Salt 1980: 33).

He was referring to the contention of Lewis Gompertz who, some seventy years earlier, had written:

... at least in the present state of society it is unjust, and considering the unnecessary abuse they suffer from being in the power of man, it is wrong to use them, and to encourage their being placed in his power. (cited in Salt 1980: 33).

Lewis Gompertz, second Secretary of the SPCA, champion of the ‘rights’ of women, blacks, the poor and nonhumans, published his Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes in 1824. We see from Gompertz that it was not the case, as some have claimed, that Salt left little for his heirs to add, but that he and they left out a lot of Gompertz who, although his work is not fully formulated, being more of an uncertain inclination, outlined much of what was to follow (utilitarianism, rights and visionary concerns) and more. Recognizing human-nonhuman similitude, animals’ personal identity, and promoting equal pleasure and happiness in the cause of what was moral and just, Gompertz claimed that:
... we should never admit of the propriety of the will or volition of one animal being the agent of another, unless we should perceive its own good to result from it, or that justice should require it. (Gompertz 1992: 68) ... I admit it as an axiom, that every animal has more right to the use of its own body than others have to use it. (Gompertz 1992: 110).

Being a vegan long before the word was coined, and later to be thrown out of the SPCA, Gompertz refused to use wool, leather, silk, to eat eggs or to ride in a horse-drawn carriage, and much of his neglected work is taken up in the form of 'arguments' (with Gompertz as Z):

Y: I understand that you object to the use of milk; what harm can there be in that?
Z: It was evidently provided for the calf, and not for man.
Y: When the calf is taken away from its mother, it is then a kindness to relieve her of her milk.
Z: But the calf should not be taken away. (Gompertz 1992: 97).

We have already alluded to Salt's own inconsistencies and it is difficult to square his milk and egg consumption with his own claim that assertions of one form of animal exploitation being more or less cruel than any other, were 'irrelevant' (Salt 1980: 106). What places Salt firmly within the irregular inconsistency-to-consistency continuum of animal liberation are comments which can be juxtaposed thus:

It is little use to claim 'rights' for animals in a vague general way, if with the same breath we explicitly show our determination to subordinate those rights to anything and everything that can be construed into a human 'want' ... (Salt 1980: 9).

What I say will of course have no reference to wool, or any other substance which is obtainable without injury to the animal from which it is taken. (Salt 1980: 79).

Indeed, in 1899 Salt referred to the charges against vegetarianism's inconsistencies as so much 'cock and bull' (Salt nd: 37), for which he was taken to task by the vegans of 1944, and it is impossible to determine in the above whether Salt was speaking from naivety or some other factor. For Salt, who considered the question of whether man is morally justified in utilizing animal labour at all as 'abstruse' (Salt 1980: 43), animals were still resources. The rhetorical question is, as with Singer, what kind of 'animal rights' or 'animal liberation' is it that advocates the use of animals?
Moreover, for both Salt and the philosophers to privilege a certain version of history in falling short of overt endorsement of Gompertz and veganism also means not capitalizing on the substantive shift of ground constituted by Gompertz’s revelatory contribution. Gompertz epitomizes the green light and, perhaps fittingly, shines it on horses. His concern with the way horses were treated appears foremost in his work but extends beyond questions of cruelty. Asked, ‘How can man do without the aid of horses?’ Gompertz’s reply is, ‘That is his business to find out’ (Gompertz 1992: 122), perhaps a typical response from one famed for inventions, the expanding chuck being one of many. He goes on:

It is true that we have adopted the method of employing horses to perform our labour, by which we have most probably only chosen one method out of a great many, and we have remained contented with it ... What causes you to think the services of horses so important to man is, that you take things as they are; horses being used... (Gompertz 1992: 123-125).

What is important here is that very ability to see, not only the suffering of horses when most others could not see it (which was Salt’s concern), but that animals, horses, were being used in the first place (which wasn’t Salt’s concern, until later¹⁰). Gompertz exposes the mythology of animal use naturalism and inevitability (and at a time when he believed, or was encouraged to believe, that his largely personal project would cost him his health. Moral Inquiries is a triumph of vision, compassion, humanitarianism and conviction over knowledge).

Promoting animal liberation or, in Salt’s case, animals’ rights without giving due emphasis to veganism when the model(s) already existed, not making it central to the project, could be a seriously flawed exercise, and the point to be noted is that, whether Regan and Clark are promoting veganism or not (Singer isn’t just as Salt wasn’t), it is lacto-ovo-vegetarianism which, one hundred and seventy years after Gompertz, is popularly taken as the obligatory stance of animal liberationists. Indeed, the caution, if that’s what it is, seems endemic. The vigorous correspondence during 1909-1912 in the Vegetarian Society’s journal The Vegetarian Messenger and Health Review had led to the conclusion that the defence of the use of eggs and milk by vegetarians was unsatisfactory and that the only ‘true way’ was to ‘live on cereals, pulse, fruit, nuts and vegetables’. Nevertheless, in what was becoming a

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¹⁰ Across the Divides 131
familiar pattern, this was reversed in the decades that followed (see Leneman 1997).

The denial of veganism’s importance or even existence has also been contagious, and in the academic literature too. Garner (1993a: 39 and 186) for instance, talks of the vegetarian and vegan societies in Britain and elsewhere all campaigning to end animal cruelty ‘which for them involves the end of the meat industry’ (no mention of dairy or eggs) and even manages to omit the Vegan Society from his listing of the other three organizations which formed the Great British MeatOut coalition in the late 1980s. The essays in the Garner-edited Animal Rights: The Changing Debate, as late as 1996, also ignore veganism, and the earlier ‘manifesto’ edited by Godlovitch, Godlovitch and Harris, and a great influence on Singer, also had only extremely limited references to it (e.g. Harrison 1971: 23). Ryder (1989) and Tester (1991) merely acknowledge veganism, give the briefest of descriptions and fail to record the foundation or existence of a Vegan Society, despite the latter offering a partial critique of Bryant (1982) who, almost uniquely, spells out that veganism is de rigueur within ‘animal rights’. Indeed, virtually all the popular and academic literature on or referring to animal liberation talks in terms of vegetarianism rather than veganism. Benton (1993: 25), even though he identifies the rights view with an opposition to ‘animal agriculture’, equates it with vegetarianism (thus following the Regan confusion) and not veganism which, again, is dismissed. And Finsen & Finsen (1994: 284, 155) still refer to Gompertz as a vegetarian and use inverted commas for their reference to vegans. Eder (1996) too, in his references to animal liberation never mentions veganism and, although his ‘vegetarian culture’ is seen in terms of negating social (hierarchical) order, lacto-ovo-vegetarianism reinforces food hierarchies in terms of the primacy of animal protein and sustains the negative magic of complex food taboos which normalize animal-dependent diets. Again, the debate seems to be going on somewhere else. Moreover, that Donald Watson and Leslie Cross are ignored by Magel (1989) and Wynne-Tyson (1990), the two works which represent the movement’s most comprehensive archaeologies of pro-animal thought, would seem to weaken these attempts to help legitimate the tradition and authority of animal liberation heritage through its hallowed value-leaders.
Welfare & Liberation

The outcome of an animal liberation which does not emulate and unequivocally advocate non-use and uphold veganism as its base line is, ironically, illustrated in a 'state of the cause' comment by Singer himself:

What disturbs me is the fact that the thrust for a really radical change in our attitude to animals — in other words, for equal consideration of the interests of animals — keeps getting sidetracked into small increments of progress in animal welfare. (Singer 1993).

What this links to is, again, strategy and tactics; how theory relates to practice. We have seen how a less than vegan stance could be seen as a tactical move, but the risk is of comprehensive principle being denied again, and a slipping back into, or a containment within, bloody culture welfarism, though this is not to say that animal liberation cannot achieve its ends by such means. But some do say this in the movement’s internal conversation.

Tom Regan & Gary Francione (1993), for instance, are adamant that welfare and rights ideologies are morally incompatible and that the enactment of animal welfare measures actually impedes the achievement of 'animal rights'. They claim that the movement is generally in danger of continuing to support reformist means to abolitionist ends, a policy which they consider to be mistaken for moral, practical and conceptual reasons. Animal rights cannot support reformist measures which depend upon implausible speculation about the future; making practices 'more humane' is no more likely to achieve abolition than was making slavery 'more humane'. Indeed, the opposite is more likely the case; making either 'more humane' carries with it the greater probability of the indefinite perpetuation of the practice. Rightists must reject such ends-justify-the-means policies for they authorize present exploitation and allow animal users to present their reformed practices as legitimized by the movement. Further, they tend to encourage an image of dishonesty; that in demanding reform advocates are hiding another, abolitionist, agenda.
Retarding the pace at which animal rights goals are achieved, the moral framework of welfarist reforms almost always guarantees that nonhuman animals will lose out when their interests are balanced against the claims of human rights. Welfarism, then, defeats the ends of justice.

Concerned with the congruence of ideology and strategy, what Regan & Francione propose instead of welfarist step by step reform is indeed a gradualist approach to end animal exploitation but that the steps must themselves be abolitionist in nature. For example, within the field of animal experimentation, an end to the Draize, LD50 and all other toxicity and irritancy tests; and an end to the use of animals in maternal deprivation, military and drug addiction experiments, and so on. Within agriculture and food, those who advocate animal rights must 'seize the vegan initiative'; a 'No veal at any meal' campaign, not 'Eat happy veal raised in larger social units', is the realistic abolitionist place to start. These are abolitionist means to abolitionist ends.

They are also critical of the backing off from animal rights by some organizations in their attempts to appeal to a wider base. This is counter-productive, they claim, because a wide range of pro-animal views is prohibitive of an agreement on the (presumably comprehensive) principles informing and directing the movement. The end result is the appeal to a welfarist common denominator which ensures animal rights will remain an unattainable ideal.

Regan & Francione also suggest that it is only through the rights path that the animals case can link with human rights and the freeing of people too from oppressions. Virtually ignoring this concept, Robert Garner (1993b) responded to the Regan-Francione article by suggesting that the animal rights movement must 'focus its attention on what is strategically possible and, at present, this must involve exploiting the very considerable mileage that still exists within the framework of animal welfare'. Garner wants rightists to work within welfarism, for to pursue a 'new fundamentalism' of rights is to stand by and let animals suffer. Garner seems to want to keep welfare and liberation merged into an animal protection movement as

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is implicit in his confusing reference to the welfarist Compassion in World Farming as an ‘animal rights’ group and as also demonstrated throughout his 1993a work. (If Garner is right to use this term for CIWF then it tends to confirm Regan & Francione’s fears of movement ‘dishonesty’).

Influenced by Singer, and assuming that it is Singer’s influence which has lain behind the movement’s successes, Garner believes (as Bryant 1990 appears to) that the most effective strategy is ‘an on-going attempt to re-define the public’s perception of what constitutes unnecessary suffering’. This has the advantage of working within ‘a moral framework — that humans can exploit animals but any suffering inflicted must be warranted by the benefits produced — which the vast majority can accept’. He cites the successes of the anti-fur campaign as an example of how ‘the perception of what constitutes unnecessary suffering has shifted’ rather than a widening acceptance that animals have a moral status akin to humans. Practices such as hunting, circuses, zoos, testing me-too drugs, and so on, are examples of those which can be demonstrated to be the causes of unnecessary suffering and can be attacked and abolished as such. This is the effective strategy road the movement should be taking rather than relying overly on the vision provided by animal rights philosophy. ‘We must live in the real world’, Garner suggests, and that what is required is that a direction be taken by a political elite (Garner 1993a: 188).

Seemingly in agreement with Garner, Ted Benton, again in the ‘real world’ where there is only the vaguest notion of veganism, suggests instead a broad strategy aimed at restructuring the economic and technical relations in the food producing, processing and distribution industries, and:

A coalition of forces committed to diverse but complementary aims — animal rights and welfare organizations, agricultural trade unions, organic farming interests, health and diet campaigners and others — would be likely to be more effective in realizing the kinds of protection sought by the rights view than would a campaign relying solely on the moral force of the argument for animal rights. (Benton (1993: 161).

Which — despite its similarity to Regan & Francione in the call for linking with other groups, almost totally lacks a ‘united against oppression’ stance — is an even
more severe pull back to what Regan & Francione lament, common denominator welfarism.

This mini overview is intended to show only the abiding strength of the welfarist paradigm, the pull of bloody culture and how it relates to veganism. In the early post-synthesis stage when things were not so clear, Henry Salt had tried to straddle the welfare/liberation dilemma, arguing for both reductionism and abolitionism: 'The acceptance or refusal of compromise ... is a matter of policy, not principle' (Salt 1987). Now, in a much later strategic mode, there is a split: on the one hand, Regan & Francione who, closer to Gompertz, dissatisfied with progress and suggesting a ground shift, consider it a matter of principle; on the other hand, and closer to though diluting Salt, Garner (satisfied with progress and suggesting a keep plugging away approach) and Benton (dissatisfied and suggesting a dilution of everything, which implies an end point of high welfare) consider it a matter of policy. Regan & Francione seem to be talking total liberation whilst Garner and Benton are vague and/or pessimistic about it. Whilst Garner wants to continue putting veganism as a base aside (until the time is ripe?), and Benton has no time for it, Regan & Francione are now talking it: the further one travels from veganism (as a starting point and an end point), it seems the longer one stays within and perpetuates slavery, welfarism and the speciesist paradigm.

If we switch our attention from academic theory to organizational campaigning, we find similar divergences. First off, we should note that despite the 'lost ground' spoken of earlier in the movement's lack of recognition of and adherence to veganism, there appears to have been a gradual development towards the vegan nexus by some other groups. In the campaigning magazines one notices in the 1990s, as with Regan & Francione, a growing emphasis (explicit or implicit) on veganism in, for instance, the promotion of vegan food items and the publication of vegan rather than vegetarian recipes. Animal Aid, the only major animal liberation organization dealing with all animal issues, on a comprehensive principle, to be founded immediately post-Singer (in 1977) has, in the mid to late 1990s, dropped its reliance on hidden agenda campaigning and is open about its vegan stance. However, it has
all taken a very long time to catch the shirt tails of Watson and Cross, indeed with those of Compertz who, with greater support, may have changed the nature of the nineteenth century synthesis and the course of the further dialectic.

The delay has served, in the 1970s to 1990s, to render animal liberation somewhat confusing and confused as to its aims (important for those outside the movement) and therefore its means (important to the cognoscente). Even now however, it is easy to find, say, the Vegetarian Society, which is in an anomalous position similar to Singer's, actively promoting animal products. And, possibly for tactical reasons, many of the organizations do still tend to promote by name the more 'user-friendly' option of vegetarianism, and anti-vivisection organizations promote 'cruelty-free' (non-animal tested) products many of which contain animal ingredients. These two factors again split up the vegan, animal-free, comprehensive principle. Moreover, throughout the 1990s, there seems to have been an increasing association of vegetarianism with 'animal rights' through female vegetarian-welfarist celebrities, which may make easier the dilution and redefinition of animal liberation, and reinforce the old derogatory association of animal concern with sentimentality. For the funeral of leading 'animal rights' campaigner Linda McCartney (vegetarian promoter of predominantly vegetarian, and therefore also animal, rather than vegan products), Paul McCartney is reported to have written in an eulogy that: 'All animals to her were like Disney characters' 15. There can still be detected an ambiguity and vagueness which only disappears with veganism and its lack of concession to orthodoxy's exploitations. For various reasons, not all of which are as ultimately liberation-minded as Garner's, many still wish to yield to, or cannot resist the pull, and therefore the determinants and deterrents, of bloody culture.

Rebuking Vegetarianism

Crucially perhaps, the abiding common association of vegetarianism with 'animal rights' associates animal liberation with animal use, and animal use is welfarist, bloody culture, territory. We can pursue this. The second step in Carol J Adams' (1990) 'vegetarian quest', as referred to in Chapter 2's note 2, was naming the
relationships which could also recognize the continuity between war and animal-eating. We saw this with Watson on the foundation of the Vegan Society in 1944. But Watson took further Adams' third step, of rebuking the meat-eating world. Although appreciating the efforts of vegetarians, he also rebuked the non-vegan vegetarian world. If the Great War gave rise to a revelation of continuities between warring and animal-eating (as it had for Salt, see Salt 1921: 219-230), it was the effect of the second war which took the process across to re-connect with Gompertz's vision. Remembering why the Society had been formed in 1944 while war was still raging, Donald Watson wrote the following:

Why did we do it then of all times? Perhaps it seemed to us a fitting antidote to the sickening experience of the War, and a reminder that we should be doing more about the other holocaust that goes on all the time. (Watson 1988).

Watson's own connection of animals, veganism and peace not only identifies bloody culture rationalism's nadir but also expands the war 'front' (another of Adams' notions, see Adams 1990: 120-141) to recognize not just all animals but all animal products and, for Leslie Cross and the Society as we saw earlier, all animal use. But Watson goes on (and in the process disrupts the foster mother symbolism of old world creation myth and reverses the values of sacred and profane):

Or perhaps it was that we were conscious of a remarkable omission in all previous vegetarian literature — namely, that though nature provides us with lots of examples of carnivores and vegetarians it provides us with no examples of lacto-carnivores or lacto-vegetarians. Such groups are freaks and only made possible by man's capacity to exploit the reproductive functions of other species. This, we thought, could not be right either dietetically or ethically. It was certainly wrong aesthetically, and we could conceive of no spectacle more bizarre than that of a grown man attached at his meal-time to the udder of a cow. (Watson 1988).

We can follow this revelation through. Humans seem to have gone from being vegan to being animal eaters and then, only with animal domestication, to full-blown lacto-ovo-carnivorism. In this sense, lacto-ovo-vegetarianism is a product of, is firmly rooted in, animal-based agriculture; it is animal-using culture's freakish form of veganism. (There should, perhaps, have been no need for Watson to coin a new word).
This means that, as we said in Chapter 1, we must re-assess the two cultures, as it appears that we now have two different versions. The one we have followed, calling upon Eder, would place veganism as the full development of bloodless culture. However, if we take our lead from Watson’s statements, we can suggest that veganism is no such thing but, rather, that it is veganism which is bloodless culture, wherever it originates: in an innate alternative potential; in ‘our’ earliest state; or in the ideal of creation myth. We cannot suggest that Watson himself is claiming any of this, but we can suggest that he is, in his turn, discovering and connecting with bloodless culture as a potential or option, one which had been rejected at the time of cultivation and domestication; efforts being made ever since to reconnect but obscured as such by established understandings. Eder’s bloodless culture’s starting point in Judaism can be seen as just one effort and the Genesis writers’ Eden may have been another (after all, Adam and Eve were vegans).

It may be a further step from vegetarianism to veganism but on a lateral, cross-culture route (cognitive), not on a vertical one (material). Not so much a development as an abandonment of one culture for another; a substantive shift which tends to make claims of ‘back to the future’ somewhat redundant. Many, if not most of our ‘bloodless culture’ representatives so far here — including the anti-cruelty foxhunters and animal-eating anti-vivisectionists — have been in some half-way house, trying to represent, to reach out to, express a bloodless culture or ideal but restricted or tongue-tied (mind-tied?) by dominant bloody culture. Yet even vegetarianism itself, being a product of bloody culture, is a cultural approximation of the real, natural thing and imbued with bloody culture’s attendant ambivalence.

Watson, like Gompertz though to a much lesser extent, still in some doubt due to the lack of scientific-nutritional knowledge, finally puts bloodless culture in perspective, fully identifying and articulating it, now being fully part of it, liberated from the concept of animals being here for human use, from the mythology of the animal product dietary and from the ambiguity of human/nonhuman relations, all of which are retained by vegetarianism. And this has great relevance for the orthodox’s perceptions and representations of animal liberation-
vegetarianism-veganism, many of which picture animal liberation as an extreme of
orthodoxy. The equating of animal liberation with vegetarianism affords the
extreme label a certain validity for, as we have seen, the latter can be viewed
legitimately as a product of bloody culture, on its edge. But it would be illegitimate
to view and represent veganism-animal liberation as an extreme rather than as an
alternative.

What the above relates to is not so much the effectiveness of animal liberation
strategy in terms of practical results for animals but how, in adopting certain
principles and strategies and thereby projecting identities, the movement and the
concept of animal liberation are perceived, represented and articulated by those
outside the movement. Although Garner, for instance, as we saw above, is keen to
maintain animal liberation within normative frameworks of political lobbying and
popular morality, what is omitted is how, drawing upon available material and
impressions such as the above, this morality is constantly reproduced.

Summary & Conclusions

We have seen how, measured against the slavery/abolition analogy and the model
of veganism, the philosophers fell short. This is not to say that this was either
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ of them but that it would appear to have particular consequences.
We have seen how this relates to a welfare/liberation dilemma and a debate over
tactical approaches, and how all of this may impact on the ability of the
movement’s oppositional discourse and image to effect a conceptual shift in
human/nonhuman relations, and possibly in how it may relate to others’
representations of it.

In his Preface to the 1980 edition of Salt’s Animals’ Rights, Peter Singer wrote that
after Salt:

... the issue faded away and was not heard of again until the early 1970s, when human rights for
blacks and women were a major political issue and the extension of the argument to nonhuman
animals again seemed a logical short step. (Singer 1980: viii).
Chapter 2 set this in context and showed that the issue was indeed heard of in the 1960s, if not before. In this chapter we have tried to show that the issue was brought to its fullest expression in the 1940s and 1950s by the Vegan Society but that, suffering from the inauspicious aftermath of war, its message was obscured by cultural lag. Moreover, during the 1970s and 1980s, the major philosophers added far less than we may have anticipated, given this earlier development, once the conditions had been created for a more sympathetic reception of animal liberation's ethic(s). Indeed, it appears as if a great opportunity was lost to state the case in more forceful terms (just as Salt had not consolidated Gompertz's ground). It certainly had the heritage and legacy to draw upon and yet in reaching back to Aristotle, Christianity, the Enlightenment, Bentham and Salt it did not also take its lead from the Vegan Society and, should it have needed earlier endorsement, from Gompertz himself. Strange too that Singer had read Gompertz in 1973 (Singer 1992: 11) and not thought fit to incorporate veganism into his own scheme where Gompertz is described not as a vegan or a total or true vegetarian but, unhelpfully, as a 'strict' vegetarian (Singer 1977: 244).\footnote{Salt's opposition to veganism was all the more curious when we consider that he also expressed his eager anticipation of its development (Salt 1980: 80-82) though not in so many words. And Singer's lack of enthusiasm for promoting full-blown animal liberation is all the more peculiar (and understandable only in terms of either a possibly flawed tactical awareness, a general lack of full knowledge of the issue or the incapability of utilitarianism) at a time when that development had taken place. We could suggest then that not only are the 'truths' of animal liberation fearsome for the orthodox, but that veganism is, or has been, a fearsome 'truth' for the philosophers (and the movement generally) who themselves have been fearsome, using fearsome now in its other sense, of apprehension, timidity.}

What we see then is the conservatism and selectivity of animal liberation philosophy, most noticeably post-Gompertz, until Regan seems to have decided that, like the Vegan Society but unlike Salt, it was no longer necessary or indeed proper to wait any longer for the ripe moment to promote a full case\footnote{Across the Divides 141} (the above and crucial reservations over 'vegetarianism' and 'commercial' notwithstanding). Salt's opposition to veganism was all the more curious when we consider that he also expressed his eager anticipation of its development (Salt 1980: 80-82) though not in so many words. And Singer's lack of enthusiasm for promoting full-blown animal liberation is all the more peculiar (and understandable only in terms of either a possibly flawed tactical awareness, a general lack of full knowledge of the issue or the incapability of utilitarianism) at a time when that development had taken place. We could suggest then that not only are the 'truths' of animal liberation fearsome for the orthodox, but that veganism is, or has been, a fearsome 'truth' for the philosophers (and the movement generally) who themselves have been fearsome, using fearsome now in its other sense, of apprehension, timidity.

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Taking advantage of the liberationist zeitgeist Singer, like Bentham before him, gave a burgeoning movement another kick start into a new era, but his philosophy was not firing on all the cylinders available to him (or perhaps utilitarianism is cylinder deficient), and the movement is still spluttering though perhaps now de-coking. It is worth asking a question, perhaps: what would have happened if, instead, Regan had written in 1975 in a similar format to Singer’s Animal Liberation, packaged with graphic illustration of animal use but using the word vegan? His 1985 essay, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’ — ‘intended for those who want to have a clear sense of the intellectual foundation of the Animal Rights Movement but who choose not to suffer through the book of the same title’ (Regan 1987: 45-46) — could have formed the basis of the text and, in its anti-slavery tone and its greater emphasis on the ground-shifting ‘animals are not our resources’ claim, a different base line for a contemporary abolitionist movement. For example:

What’s wrong — fundamentally wrong — with the way animals are treated isn’t the details that vary from case to case. It’s the whole system ... that allows us to view animals as our resources, here for us ... Once we accept this view of animals ... the rest is as predictable as it is regrettable. Why worry about their loneliness, their pain, their death? Since animals exist for us, to benefit us in one way or another, what harms them really doesn’t matter — or matters only if it starts to bother us, makes us feel a trifle uneasy when we eat our veal escallop, for example. So, yes, let us get veal calves out of solitary confinement, give them more space, a little straw, a few companions. But let us keep our veal escallop. But a little straw, more space and a few companions won’t eliminate — won’t even touch — the basic wrong that attaches to our viewing and treating these animals as our resources. (Regan 1987b: 47-48).

However, before that and even by the time his Case appeared in 1983-84, largely as a result of his dissatisfaction with Singer’s position, though acknowledging the movement’s debt to him, it would seem that the die was cast and no other single work was to have the same immediate impact or enduring influence, despite the burgeoning rights rhetoric. Chronology counted against, again, perhaps. We cannot answer our question.

For one reason or another then, and by one means or another, what the philosophers as a whole appear not to promote in their classic works is a clear philosophical statement that animal liberation’s base line or its centrality is veganism which, more than Salt, was hacking at the root rather than the branches of animal
exploitation as from at least 1944 (although people had been vegan before that, of course\textsuperscript{18}). Subsequently and consequently, the movement has not exploited fully a most powerful and comprehensive weapon or not built its discourse around veganism. We can see now that the narrative traced in Chapters 2 and 3 is rather superficial. To talk in terms of the green light shining as from the late 1960s-early 1970s is not so much inaccurate but rather myopic. A green light it was and the one which most saw for the first time, forgetting or not knowing or not wanting to know that it had also tried to shine in the darkness of war. Although the works of Singer, Clark and Regan have in the past twenty years spawned more philosophical work on the moral status of animals than had appeared in the previous two thousand (see Regan 1990: xi), it was the Vegan Society that had shown that there is nothing so practical as a good theory, and Gompertz who had flashed the full revelatory light briefly in 1824. These, in effect, were challenges for animal liberation to fully (re)connect with bloodless culture.

Moreover, perhaps it is through veganism that animal liberation could, should any of those involved think it necessary, recombine with the issues from which it was parted in the late 1960s and thereby establish the kind of challenge advocated by some in the 1990s. Uniquely, it is veganism which provides this route back in order to go forward (on whatever conceptual basis and cultural correlation). Both Salt and Watson spoke of both human and animal problems being solved through a recognition of their commonality. Moreover, veganism's range of concerns reinforces animal liberation against being viewed derisively as single issue, and its alternative, bloodless culture status stands against the 'extremist' label. Veganism restores the bigger story.

The movement seems to have recognized late in the day an advantage or the sense in a stronger and more open adherence to veganism and, although this is more noticeable within animal liberation organizations now (and always has been amongst many within the movement), it seems to have passed without much notice from many academics and others. This links with the debate on tactics and strategy where a central dilemma concerns adherence to or a break from welfarism where
again ends and means become entangled in a round of which determines the other. Animal liberation is caught in the dilemma of whether or not to let tactics determine ethics and the dominating bloody culture determine bloodless culture strategy; ultimately, to extend orthodoxy or up-end it.

All this relates to the distance that animal liberation has travelled and what it looks like on arrival in the mid to late 1990s. And we can take its measure in rough manner by referring to John Stuart Mills' comment, cited as a motto by Regan (1988) — 'Every great movement must experience three stages: ridicule, discussion, adoption'. It can be claimed with some justification that animal liberation has, to some extent, reached the second stage and we shall see in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 just what form this discussion takes. We may at the same time ask whether it has ever passed completely beyond the first stage; we know it has not reached the third. This chapter may have shown one of the reasons why. The following chapters may show other reasons — those of representation — which may relate to this one.

In our analysis of representations we shall continue to keep veganism in full view; not as if the movement were unequivocally embracing and espousing it, though this now looks to be increasingly the case, but in the same way that we have used it here as a model against which to analyse animal liberation.

Notes
1. 'Cattle', which has been used to refer more generally to farmed animals, even to bees (and variously to all 'vermin'), comes from the same root as 'chattel', moveable property. Thus, chattel slavery. Cattle is used in Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin (1850) to refer to human slaves. Oxford English Dictionary. (A point also noted by Finsen & Finsen 1994: 285).

2. Of more than passing interest is that most, if not all, of these practices continue whether or not the 'other' is afforded acquired rights, that is, rights afforded after the use of animals has been established.

3. This point also is recognized by Singer himself (1993). 'I think that Animal Liberation made a cogent case for the view that our treatment of nonhuman animals is an atrocity on the same scale as, say, the slave trade'.

4. This is not to enter into the crasser area of objection-query — e.g. what about locusts, mosquitoes and rabid dogs, and should amoebae get the vote? — by which animal liberation is commonly beset, even in academic debate.


7. The second edition of Animal Liberation modifies the final sentence to read: 'A reasonable and defensible plan of action is to change your diet at a measured pace with which you can feel comfortable' (Singer 1995a: 176).

8. It would seem that public ignorance of milk production is rife, e.g. the erroneous belief that cows produce milk by eating grass. Moreover, apparently only one per cent of the public consider it 'not all right to' milk cows, in contrast to seventy-eight per cent opposed to keeping calves in 'veal' crates — Gallup/Daily Telegraph, 21.8.95. Typically, the pollsters did not ask whether it was 'not all right to' separate cow and calf or even to breed the calf at all.

9. In analysing the philosophers, we could have drawn upon Jasper & Nelkin (1992: 178) who classify 'types of contemporary animal protectionists: welfarists; pragmatists (e.g. Singer); and fundamentalists (e.g. Regan). Clark is ignored. Certainly this classification has some relevance, and Singer's down-to-earth, consequentialist philosophy can be at least loosely described as pragmatist. The problem for us here though is that whilst welfarism and 'fundamentalism' (an unhelpful, pejorative term also associated by Jasper & Nelkin with 'absolutism' and the 'more extreme', p96) can be identified by their ends, pragmatism tends to be a mode, its ends being somewhat nebulous (indeed, the 'major goals' attributed respectively to welfarists and pragmatists by Jasper & Nelkin can all be identified with welfarists). In trying to overcome this last difficulty by clarifying the issue in regard to, say, free range eggs and sea creatures, Singer adopts a curious ends position (for a liberationist, though perhaps not for a utilitarianist) and it is this which has been of interest to us.

10. Salt came to see it more from Gompertz's angle: '... a civilized posterity will shudder at the sight of what we still regard as a legitimate agent of locomotion' (Salt 1921: 217).

11. This incompatibility identified by rights theorist Regan seems to contradict Keith Tester's (1991: 13) claim that 'animal rights' brings together vegetarianism, opposition to hunting, anti-vivisection and animals' welfare. This may relate to Singer but hardly to Regan. This again highlights the difficulties thrown up by casual use of the term 'animal rights' when rights theory is only one means by which the liberation of animals may or may not be achieved.


13. In 1997-98 Garner could have added the UK ban on cosmetics, alcohol and tobacco testing on animals, though whether this came about because of his preferred strategy or Regan & Francione's or a mixture of both is unclear. However, the 1997 ban on the use of great apes is surely due more to a combination of 'rights', human-ape commonality and conservation claims than to a heightened perception of unnecessary suffering.


15. 'Hogs of War', Alexander Chancellor's 'Pride and Prejudice' column in The Guardian, 13.6.98. What is of interest is how, in a 500-word statement, the Disney reference was seized upon. McCartney's full sentence in fact read: 'All animals to her were like Disney characters and worthy of love and respect', which puts a different complexion on it.

16. Clark's heavily referenced work only mentions Gompertz once and not in relation to veganism. Regan's Case is not characterized by a call upon previous pro-animal thinkers.
17. Watson seems also to have realized three of the things that Salt had suspected already at the turn of the century: that the virtually automatic progress inherent in nineteenth century evolutionary concepts shifted into an unspecific 'social change' in the twentieth (and see Elias 1994: 184); that the idea of progress where all changed together and for the better was replaced by an understanding of uneven and partial change, different aspects of society falling out of step with each other (notably the animals issue being left aside); and that change then had to be forced — one couldn't wait for inevitability or for the ripe time.

18. One of the earliest recorded vegans in Britain was Roger Crab who died at Bethnal Green in 1680 (see The Vegan, Summer 1997, p 25).
Chapter 5

Ends of a Different Story

Introduction

Now that we have established a particular understanding of animal liberation we are in a better position to approach an analysis of how it, liberationists and animal use are represented in media discourse. However, as a path to this latter part of the thesis we shall examine a representation contained within an academic work, one which shares some common ground with media discourse in relation to the response made to the liberationist challenge. In *Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights* (1991), Keith Tester makes out an intriguing sociological case but which, in attempting to explain animal ‘rights’ in terms of its functions for its practitioners, robs it of its sincerity, identity, ethics and politics: ‘Animal rights is not about animals’ (Tester 1991: 177). For Tester’s new historicist sociology on the rise of animal ‘rights’ discourse, animal liberation is, at best, of dubious epistemological provenance, and he seeks to expose it as a fraud.

We shall not be concerned with how or whether Tester’s constructionist account weakens the transhistorical one presented earlier. There is no reason, in principle, why the one cannot co-exist with the other, approaching the subject from different perspectives. That is, we shall not be concerned to contest Tester’s more structural claims, for this would involve us in a debate over social and sociological theory and methodological issues which would become a thesis in its own right.

However, although founded upon two legitimate sociological presuppositions, Tester’s thesis seems, firstly, to go awry at the outset, assuming (and ignoring the wider perspectives) that animal liberation concerns itself only, and then only marginally, with mammals. Secondly, by diverting attention from the politics to
the psychology, and privileging origin over ethics, he undermines the selected messengers rather than the message (recoiling from the challenge that animal liberation poses). Why we should address the work, concentrating mainly on the empirical, is because of its outcome, of the way the premises are used to produce or reproduce a negative representation of animal liberation (for it is not their inevitable consequence) and ultimately because of what it may hold for us in looking at wider and more populist representations. What we shall be interested in is how what can be identified as incomprehension, reduction and redefinition combine to entrap animal liberation and ultimately legitimize animal use. For the duration we shall use Tester’s term ‘animal rights’ and the preferred ‘animal liberation’ interchangeably. (References to Animals and Society in the main bodies of text will appear as page numbers only).

Animal Rights & Humanity

The combination of two main sociological presuppositions sustains Tester’s thesis. First, the structuralist-anthropologist claim, that animals are good to think and that, in classifying them we are defining ourselves in relation to them and vice versa. So, for Tester, animals are a ‘blank page’. Contrary to what liberationists believe, or try to make us think they believe, there is no ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ of animals to reveal; animals ‘are nothing other than what we make them’ (p42), and animal liberation is merely making them anew for its own purposes. Second, from Foucauldian ‘archaeology’ and discourse, that history is characterized by discontinuities — there is, as it were, no steady ‘civilizing’ process of ‘improvement’ — and that it is only possible to think certain things within specific epistemes; their relative classifications and structures of knowledge mean that the blank pages are written upon differently in different eras and this cannot be otherwise. Animal liberation only became ‘thinkable’ in the Modern episteme and it was invented by Henry Salt. Animals are socio-historical objects and ‘animal rights’ is a socio-historical construction. Far from being a liberationist movement, ‘animal rights’ consists of little more than new versions of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism; animal rightists want to show that they are not animals at all. In this relativist account animal liberation does not signal a better relationship with
other species, merely a different one, but one inescapably still motivated by self-ish concerns though passing themselves off as altruistic. Animal liberation is 'dishonest' in that it naturalizes its beliefs in order to make them self-evident.

Tester's claim, which he establishes through an analysis of Singer, Clark and Regan, that animal liberation only concerns itself with mammals — those animals which 'are most easy to anthropomorphize' (p16) — is significant because it is only mammals which present humans, with the uneasiness of ambivalent status, as human animals. We need to create distance especially from other mammals in order to establish our own sense of selfhood. This necessitates an avoidance policy, a 'slamming of the door' on animals (p88), for animals are a taboo, an impurity and a pollution (hence 'vegetarianism') on the part of animal liberation which is an extreme attempt at this project. Human response to animality is the key to animal 'rights'.

But animals are also historical objects. Norbert Elias and Keith Thomas want to see continuities but Tester argues that we have to take account of the different cultural meanings of animals relevant to particular eras. Previous 'cruelties', for instance, cannot be seen in 'our' terms because

... the taxonomic structures which shape and mould the relationships between animals and society, which define what a cat is, are different. This is what it means to say that animals are a historical object; they are used to understand the meaning and basis of humanity, but the structures which shape that use are themselves historical. They are discontinuous over time. (Tester 1991: 70) ... We can only think this and not that because our thoughts and perceptions are not free. They are determined by structural rules which have changed historically. (Tester 1991: 77).

Tester prefers this Foucauldian (The Order of Things) approach, and the claim is that animal rights — as a 'full-blown moral idea and not just idle speculation' — could only become possible within the context of one specific taxonomic system or problematic, the Modern.

In order to explain animal rights, Tester asks why humanitarianism arose during the eighteenth century, as it could not have done so earlier. Thomas suggests it was
due to urbanization removing the anthropocentric blinkers, distancing humans geographically and ideationally from regular encounters with animals, thus enabling people to view them more objectively. For Tester this is by no means the whole story. It is too simply cause and effect or even coincidence. Instead:

Humanitarianism and sympathy are products of human knowledge. They are solely events of the systems of classification which are the foundation of moral relationships, and which attempt to make the world intelligible as it is experienced from the city (Tester 1991: 76) ... The ambiguity of ‘Man’ provides a full explanation for the rise of compassion in the late eighteenth century. (Tester 1991: 87-88).

Leaving aside the dubiousness of the first sentence which may apply to societies or forces within them but not to all individuals within them at various times², we are more concerned here with how he arrives at this ‘full’ explanation — by tracing the different taxonomies of Renaissance, Classical and Modern epistemes. In the first of these, the human/nonhuman relation was relatively trouble-free for humans. It was an anthropocentric world, animals represented only themselves in their strangeness. Man was unique. But in the attempt to order both a rural and urban life, Classical taxonomy ‘tried to accommodate a double perception of animals as objects which were simultaneously seen to be separate from the properly human (which was increasingly equated with urban life), whilst retaining a wealth of symbolic meaning in the countryside. In other words, animals were at one and the same time the Same and yet the Other’ (p81). The classification of animals, based on visibility criteria, took the human as the yardstick, searching for the different within the same. The system was somewhat untenable, nay unintelligible, for much of the sameness was minimal, for example between a fish and a human.

The taxonomy of the Modern episteme (from c1800) escapes the problem by undermining the central category of the same in denying the importance of the visible world. Instead, it creates an order of things by concentrating upon the same behind the different. Animals’ bodies are far less important than the similarities of their organic structure. The standard of similitude is reinvented. ‘Animal species differ at their peripheries, and resemble each other at their centres; they are connected by the inaccessible, and separated by the apparent’ (Foucault, cited by

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Tester p85). In the shift from natural science to scientific enquiry, ‘Life’ becomes the classificatory principle, the keystone of knowledge. But, by this, humans become the same as animals, and therefore indistinct. However,

Humans are given a special position as the living object which is also the subject that knows life ... Humans are the animals who know they are different ... The ambiguous status of ‘Man’ is the historical basis for the moral principle of animal rights. It is certainly the classificatory principle implicit to the theories of Singer, Regan and Clark. The distinction between humans and animals is simultaneously clear and blurred; animal rights is one way in which the ambiguity can be confronted and reconciled. (Tester 1991: 87-88).

Now this reconciliation didn’t happen all at once: ‘Unity had to be created and it only gelled in the late nineteenth century. It drew on roots which reflected the curious status of ‘Man’ as the subject who is an object’ (p88). Tester suggests that historically it is possible to identify two of the major roots, contradictory demands for a moral treatment of animals that play on the paradox of the human as a different kind of animal. He labels these the Demand for Difference and the Demand for Similitude, both of which arose in the eighteenth century (p88) and continue to this day. They clash over what it is to be human.

For the Demand for Difference, Man was basically evil and had to be educated. Its more notable later representatives were Bentham, Kant, Erskine, Martin, the (R)SPCA and it was class-based, for only the rich and rational knew how to behave, and social reform had to come from above. They stressed the uniqueness of man, and organic structures as objects of knowledge. Cruelty was wrong because it undermined social order (p105). Cruelty to animals was an offence against social sensibilities. In the opposing, Demand for Similitude camp were Rousseau, Ritson, Shelley and Thoreau for whom Man was basically good. Cruelty to animals is a crime against nature and justice, and the urban working class was only prone to cruelty because it was trapped in a coercive and oppressive society. The Demand offered a thorough critique of the apparent world with an emphasis on the natural. Too much knowledge merely hid morality. The true basis of human being, and the right relationships between animals and society, can be discovered if individuals live naturally. Then, crucially, Henry Salt appears:
Animal rights is an alliance of themes from contradictory traditions. Its development was not implicit to either of the Demands: the morality had to be made (Tester 1991: 149). The Demand for Difference never doubted that the moral legislators were morally and socially correct, but Salt did. Moreover, where the Demand for Similitude condemned culture, Salt believed that it could educate and reveal the truth of being. Salt was not saying that only other people should change their relationships with animals; rather, he was proposing that as individuals everyone should change, and thereby begin to change society. He did not think he was intrinsically better than anyone else; it was just that he had come to realise the truth and was obliged to put it into action.

Salt reconciled ‘Man’ with animals, culture with nature, and the individual with society. None of these alliances had been formed in the prehistory of animal rights. The ambiguities of ‘Man’ had led to deep dualisms in the treatment of animals as well as radically different ideas about the best and right path of reform. Henry Salt had managed to accept both the privileged ‘Man’ who is a subject as well as the unprivileged one who was a natural object. This is the core of the epistemological break in Animals’ Rights. It explains why Salt was so certain about what the single, true relationship between animals and society should be. He knew who ‘Man’ was, and therefore knew how animals should be treated. (Tester (1991: 156).

In transcending and fusing the two, Salt ‘more or less invented’ animal rights (p194) and made the Demands part of its prehistory as if the narrative was naturally given. Although he was able to do this only in the modern era when animal rights became ‘thinkable’, Salt pretended it always had been. Likewise, Singer, Clark and Regan see their moral claims as an immutable truth, upheld today when it would have been mocked two centuries ago, simply because we have progressed to a higher level of moral goodness. But Tester thinks this is misplaced, for ‘animal rights is a social construction … a fiction’ (p194), a ‘fetish’ (p172). It’s a modern product, just another commodity on the market which we are being asked, even forced, to buy under false pretences.

Animal rights was invented by people who wanted to know who ‘Man’ was, not primarily because they were worried about animals. It can be understood as a rupture, an epistemological break, in modern knowledge. (Tester 1991: 149).

We shall not contest the second of Tester’s points in the above quotation nor the historical narrative that leads to it. It is how that understanding of animal liberation is used that will be of interest, and we shall join this with debating the first point’s reductionist intent and its more obvious implications and repercussions. However, we can first of all dismiss the polemic:

If this book has any polemical intent, it is to ask the militants and the philosophers to realise that they are fetishistically upholding obligations which are made and not found. (Tester 1991: 194-195).
This seems to be a straightforward misrepresentation, at least in Salt's case, for he was fully conscious of his position:

It must be noted ... that humanitarianism in this sense [conscious and organized humaneness] as a branch of ethical science, is a modern product, for it was not until the eighteenth century — the age of 'sensibility' that there began to be any wide-spread recognition of humaneness as a force in civilized society. (Salt 1913: 834).

Caging the Beast

Blank Pages

This section will address the representation of animal rights which derives from the blank pages presupposition, contesting the empirical assumption, the misrepresentation built into it.

Mammals & Veganism

Tester tends to play Singer, Clark and Regan at their game but on his ground. Where they are pictured as wanting to strip away rationalizations to expose orthodox naked self interest and prejudice, Tester strips away their rationalizations to reveal theirs. Where the philosophers are pictured as wanting to strip away symbols to reveal the 'real' animal, Tester tells them there is no such thing. What is crucial for this blank page presupposition to have force is the reading that animal liberationist protagonists are only concerned with mammals ('nice cuddly animals'), and then only marginally. What they are really concerned with is what it is to be 'properly human'. Unlike Eder (1996), for instance, who utilizes structural anthropology to discern societal organization, Tester uses it more in relation to individual psychology, to deny liberationists their ostensible motive and indeed animal liberation ethics.

But the mammals focus is a severely limited view, one perhaps which is understandable only within that restricted context which one can quite easily assume if one hardly looks further than the philosophers — and treats their seminal works as definitive rather than attempts at philosophical underwriting — and a few chosen extracts from the writings of certain direct activists. Against the wider context, taking in veganism as we have explored it above, animal liberation is

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bigger than its official philosophies, which themselves display ample evidence of wider concern. It is noticeable in this regard that Tester too fails to recognize the significance of veganism. This is (the first part of) his only reference:

Vegetarians only give up the flesh of animals, but vegans go a stage further and also try to do without eggs, animal milk, cheese, and butter ... Veganism believes that vegetarianism does not go far enough. If it is wrong to eat meat, if humans are frugivorous organic beings, then it must also be unnatural to eat any produce which comes from animals. (Tester 1991: 143).

Aside from the dismissiveness (similar to Benton 1993: 25), as if veganism were some obscure, hardly manageable enterprise on the periphery of animal liberation (some 250,000 vegans in Britain testify to the invalidity of such an assumption), Tester implies that it is based solely upon a view of animal-based diets being 'unnatural', thus bracketing off liberationist ethics, diverting attention to self-interest.

Moreover (and leaving aside the fact that vegetarians dispense with the products and by-products of slaughter), vegans go more than a stage further, in dispensing with all animal products, including honey, silk and more obscure or specialist products such as shellac (derived from the lac insect) thus contradicting the claim, as does dispensing with eggs, that animal liberation is only concerned with mammals. As Donald Watson (1990) put it when describing 1940s welfarism: 'There ... seemed to be an illogical preference to work for the furry and the cuddly, whilst ignoring the rights of the equally sentient scaly and slimy'. To suggest that animal rights is only about mammals when 'official' veganism has existed for at least fifty years, that both Salt and Bryant (1982), both considered by Tester as representatives of animal rights, are opposed to angling, as was Bentham (and note that Brophy opened her 1965 article with an attack on angling), that hunt saboteurs have taken action against anglers and that the ALF has taken action against shrimping vessels, is to ignore the evidence. Salt too showed concern over the killing of insects (Salt 1913: 836 and 1980: 48). Also, for Clark and Regan, vegetarianism at least (which itself dispenses with fish and fowl) and opposition to vivisection (regardless of species used) are obligatory (Chapter 4's critique is irrelevant here). One of Singer's (1977: 177-178) objections to eating fish rests on the suffering criterion, and Regan has this to say about shellfish:
It is true that some animals, like shrimp and clams, may be capable of experiencing pain yet lack most other psychological capabilities. If this is true, then they will lack some of the rights that other animals possess. However, there can be no moral justification for causing anyone pain, if it is unnecessary to do so. And since it is not necessary that humans eat shrimp, clams, and similar animals, or utilize them in other ways, there can be no moral justification for causing them the pain that invariably accompanies such use. (Regan nd. c1990: 20).

In terms of the philosophers, the only claim being made by them, even if we accept Tester's mammal insistence, seems to be that mammals are where we start in coherent moral underpinning; that at least mammals should benefit from a mutual sense of fair dealing. The seemingly logical extension of this is that other species too, about whom we know less, should be given the benefit of the doubt. This may not apply specifically in Singer's case for he is keen to draw a line of sorts. But even here what we need to compare is the line drawn by society — arbitrarily between humans and all other animals — with that drawn by Singer where certainty fades, 'somewhere between a shrimp and an oyster'. The problems are more to do with moral extensionism than with who 'Man' is. The claim that animal rights is only concerned with mammals (and shrimps are a long way from mammals) is untenable, in the sense that Tester wants to make of it. That is, Tester thinks it a 'paradox' of 'profound sociological and moral significance' that animal rights is not meant to apply to all animals. It seems to be nothing of the sort.

Avoidance

Following from the mammals focus, the charge against animal rights is that it is an avoidance strategy (pp44-45), animals are a pollution for liberationists. Now this could be a racist charge when the strategy is espoused by one human group against another. But animal liberation is about other species; avoiding animals in animal liberation terms means allowing them to live their lives. The avoidance Tester speaks of is surely, instead, avoidance of exploitative-instrumentalist relationships, a non-co-operation with injustice. It is the kind of relationship which is taboo, not animals. Other emancipatory movements can overcome this hurdle by negotiating alternative and mutually consenting relationships. In the case of animals this is not possible as far as we know, at least not in a systematic, industrial and perpetually 'productive' manner.
Other obstacles to Tester’s ‘slamming the door on animals’ thesis, are Leslie Cross’s talk of companionship, Peter Singer’s talk of free range eggs, and the commonwealth of Stephen Clark who also suggests, remember, that: ‘... we may in the end be able to take some milk from our kin without injustice’. Indeed, Tester’s thesis would have been stronger perhaps if he had equated animal rights with veganism rather than vegetarianism, for how does Salt’s milk- and wool-use square with avoidance? Moreover, in writing of activist John Bryant’s (1982) ‘peep of what could be’ in St James’s Park, Tester claims that Bryant had ‘... a brief, yet profound, contact with the greater truth and reality of nature, and conveniently forgets that St James’s Park is not wild nature at all’ (p175). But, surely, all Bryant ‘saw’ was a glimpse of an ideal. It was quite obvious to him, and significantly so, that the park was man-made. Tester suggests that this ‘vision’ and those of the Animal Liberation Front ‘are a nostalgia for Gemeinschaft’ (p189). Maybe, but Gemeinschaft implies close, emotional, face to face ties, a long way from the ‘avoidance policy’ which is ascribed to animal rights. Indeed, Bryant’s peep is not exactly of a world where he is ‘distancing’ himself from animals. It’s the possibility of non-exploitative co-habitation in which he is interested.

Further, it is difficult to associate an avoidance policy with those who (even if the long-term aim is hands-off) risk their own freedom during the struggle for animal liberation by breaking into establishments in order to rescue/steal animals; those who provide homes for these and other animals; and those who work in sanctuaries established for such animals. Credibility is further stretched when, in noting that an Animal Rights Militia communiqué referred to animal ‘abusers’ as ‘filth’, Tester asks us to

Notice the rather Mary Douglasian association of improper humanity and pollution taboos ... Compared to filthy scientists, the bombers of the Militia, who have nothing to do with animals, are quite pure. (Tester 1991: 186-187).

Now this may make sense in the closeted world of animal rights that Tester has fashioned out of cultural symbolism but surely, for the Militia, the scientists are ‘filth’ not in their touching of animals but in their use of them as means to human ends. As with Bryant, their purity is best read not as self-purity, not as ritual purity,
but as the purity of nature at peace. It is the orthodox 'blindness' (unconscious or wilful) to animal use which allows for animal liberation's objections to it to be seen as anti-pollution rather than as genuinely anti-use. The suggestion that what liberationists seek through their avoidance is moral self-perfection is also contradicted by Henry Salt who wrote:

To pretend that in our complex modern society, where responsibilities are so closely interwoven, it is possible for any individual to cultivate a perfect character — that is the false ideal which it is the first business of a genuine reformer to put aside ... they [vegetarians] do not aim at moral perfection, but at rational progress. (Salt nd: 35-36).

*Animals and Society* reduces everything in animal liberation to self-interest, denying any possibility of mutual or universal benefits. If animal liberation suggests that what it proposes would also benefit society (what social movement wouldn't?), this is redefined to mean that all animal liberation is a project of who 'Man' is or, more specifically, to an individualist self-identity-purity mission. As Tester takes animal liberation philosophy as animal rights, what else could be said? Normative ethics is about human moral development.

**Other Movements**

In connection with this, there is something of an inconsistency within Tester's reading of animal liberation in relation to other movements — e.g. blacks and women's liberations. Animal liberation is likened to them only in as much as they are all 'struggles preoccupied by selfhood' (p168) but is separated from them in terms of historical development and liberationist concerns where animal liberation is seen merely to have 'borrowed their radical clothing' (p167). The second point, separation, we shall look at later (under *An Illegitimate Concern*) and take the first, conjoining, here.

It is difficult to see how animal liberation even can be joined with these other movements within the scheme of selfhood preoccupation. From the point of view of women and blacks their liberations may well be so preoccupied. But animal liberation does not correlate in this sense. It correlates with men and whites campaigning for women's and black emancipations. Are these men and whites also
preoccupied with selfhood? If they are, it is difficult to know who isn't so preoccupied. If they are not, then why are animal liberationists? (Because their sympathies and empathies are unconventional?) The problem is that Tester is concentrating not on the cause in its relation to dominant culture and ideology but on denigrating animal liberationist individuals for their by-proxy preoccupation. The psychological profile breaks down. Tester suggests that the Demand for Similitude ‘... was the concern of consciously interstitial individuals with a firm awareness of self. Contemporary animal rights still is’ (p146). But does a firm awareness of self really go hand in hand with a preoccupation with selfhood?

Meaning & Knowledge

In addition to the more or less empirical matters whereby we can see, taking a wider perspective, that animal liberation does not at all limit its animal concern to mammals and their function for humans, there remains the basic structural presupposition; that animals are good to think. Now we shall make no attempt to argue with it but what we can argue with is the conclusion that animal rights hides ‘the utter meaninglessness of animals’, as if the morality was ‘just one more entrapment of them’ (p206). Certainly society projects meaning onto other animals and animal liberation can hardly fail to do likewise, but Stephen Clark makes the point which is absent from Tester’s account and from orthodox cognitions. Clark wants us to consider that:

An animal’s world is not meaningless to it merely because it does not see our meanings: it has its own ... It is a mere conceit of whoremaster man to be so convinced that it was only with men that meaning, time and death came into the world. (Clark 1984: 104).

And Clark isn’t suggesting he knows their meanings (or, as Tester might put it, their ‘reality’ or ‘truth’). As he says elsewhere, it is not that animals are dumb but that we are deaf (Clark 1984: 95). Even if Clark is ‘wrong’, Tester misrepresents him in the eagerness to set up a straw man of animal rights:

Despite the beliefs of the protagonists, animal rights is not a knowledge of the irreducible being of animals at all. (Tester 1991: 86).
But it's not apparent how animal rights was ever meant to be a superior form of knowledge of animals but, rather, of how we act on the common knowledge. In Clark especially, and this is not lacking from Salt, Regan and Singer, is the acknowledgement of ignorance, and what little we can know — starting with the more obvious mammalian commonality — is enough to proscribe their use, the infliction of suffering and the causing of harm. They would, it seems fair to say (even if it's only sayable in the modern episteme), prefer not to be mutilated, experimented upon, separated, hooked, chased, slaughtered, and so on, although for Tester this is impossible to say, for we cannot 'know' the 'real' animals. Clark is both questioning the knowledge that gives rise to the ontology of animal usage and renders it legitimate, and saying that there are other lessons of that knowledge.

What the concentration on 'Man' also serves to do — hinted at by the claustrophobic nature of Tester's account — is to deflect attention from just what it is that animal liberation opposes, and enables the reading of animal liberation as a fraud to proceed. When Peter Singer provided his readers with graphic detail of life and death in the laboratory and on the factory farm (and not exhaustively concerned with mammals) — that is, what society was doing or colluding in — Tester claims that Singer was merely playing 'the emotional card' (p8) as if this showing of evidence were somehow not only bad form but also irrelevant. Thus the legitimacy of outrage, supported by reason, is denied. Characteristic of a 'blank pages' approach for which sentiency is of little or no account ('outside of our investment of it, there is nothing about the lion for us to know' [p207], Tester's 'flight from specificity' or concealment by omission, an orthodox avoidance strategy, aids the attempt to reduce animal liberation to a concern about something else. Animal liberation is a front, liberationists dissemblers.

In Tester, the notion of emancipation (and consideration of power, subjugation, oppression, domination, politics), for instance, is irrelevant. Animal liberation cannot be about anything other than selfhood. By ignoring the evidence, this reductionist exercise traps animal liberation within a psychological and taxonomical prison.
Historical objects

This section relates to the ‘epistemological break’, the ‘invention’ of animal rights. As said earlier, it is not the view of historical discontinuities we are concerned with but with how that view is used to reproduce a certain representation of animal liberation.

Fear & Ideological Confusion

Something interesting happens with the notion of animal liberation as an invention. Picturing animal rights as such, Tester is able to describe it in commodity fetish terms (p172). One could perhaps cite Roland Barthes in support of this; that, for instance, ‘all one has to do is possess these new objects from which all soiling trace of origin or choice has been removed’ (Barthes 1993: 151). In short, that animal rights is mythology. But we have to remember that, in the conflict that Tester recognizes — ‘animal rights may be interpreted as the other side of the rationalized socialization of animals ... the two sides are in conflict’ (p46) — animal rights is not dominant ideology but, rather, oppositional and yet it is subjected to a critique as if it were the former. This exercise confuses meanings which are implicated in perpetual relations of power (those of animal-using society) with meanings that are implicated in relations of freedom (those of animal liberation), the latter’s language aiming at transformation. Animal rights is here being attacked as if it were a ‘false’ universalization when, not having become dominant by a long chalk, it has not been in a position to establish such a thing. Still in a revolutionary phase, its ‘true’ universalization is still in place (and see Eagleton 1991: 57).

Tester overcomes or obscures this difficulty by denying the vast gulf between animal rights and animal-using society, confusing the former with dominant ideology instead of maintaining the recognition of conflict. In Tester’s vacuum, where there is no sense of oppositional ideology being suppressed, animal rights and animal-using society are conflated, firstly in descriptions which are meant to apply to, and legitimate, an anti-barbarian orthodox society but instead describe animal rights:
... humans do, indeed, act morally when we perceive similitude. We know that the organic structure of mammalian animals is comparable to the structure of humans and so we modify our behaviour. (Tester 1991: 85).

A knowledge founded on life [as in modern epistemel cannot deliberately inflict pain or death. (Tester 1991: 92).

And then in the fearful imagining that animal rights has already become the norm:

... animal rights is not natural; it is a social and a historical invention. Society is worshipping a thing of its own creation when it falls down before this truth. (Tester 1991: 171).

An Illegitimate Concern
As referred to above (under Other Movements), Tester separates animal liberation from other movements at a crucial moment by suggesting that Peter Singer merely ‘borrowed their radical clothing’ and that Singer was not being entirely honest when he did it (p167). Tester wants to tell us how humanitarianism arose and although he accepts that the ‘claims of animals’ moral importance were one part of a widespread and new humanitarian sentiment, which would include anti-slavery, penal reform, and so forth’ (p75) he then tells us that ‘animal rights is one way in which the ambiguity can be confronted and reconciled ...’ (p88). But, we might ask, what are the other ways of confronting and reconciling this ambiguity if not the concealment and rationalization after the fact that we saw in Chapter 1? And how does all this relate to anti-slavery, penal reform, the campaign against child labour, and other nineteenth century liberal and radical progress perspectives? So, because it is not about animals animal liberation, like the other liberations, is ‘preoccupied by selfhood’ but, because it is about animals, it cannot genuinely be part of the same ethic as other (human) liberations10. On both counts, animal liberation is denied legitimacy.

Incomprehension & Representation
Animal liberation cannot be about animals for everything is about ‘Man’. It cannot be part of a long-term humanitarian narrative because it is a nineteenth century invention. It is doubly ‘unnatural’. The species barrier is the barrier to
comprehension. We must go to the cause and effect of Tester's thesis — to the incomprehension and the representation — the latter end being dictated by the former and by the means used to overcome it.

We can go along with Tester's historical discontinuities and yet not arrive at the same unsympathetic representation; the history could well encourage us to applaud Salt for a masterwork, even if it was only possible after around 1800. This would still leave the rest of society with the challenge that animal liberation poses today. To explain where animal liberation came from does not necessarily mean that it has been rendered suspect. But robbing it of its ethics, identity and politics offers the opportunity to reproduce the mythology of animal use, and to degrade animal liberation by exposing and representing it as a vehicle for ulterior motives. Because the cause is incomprehensible — surely people cannot be taking other animals that seriously, as their own ends — it must be about something else. This serves as a stick to beat the protagonists with while evading their basic challenge, and gives rise to a representation which renders animal liberation unrecognizable as, and denies it status as, a sincere liberationist movement.

Because it is has the wrong credentials, animal liberation cannot be comprehended unless netted within an interest system which does apply to humans vis a vis humans. It can then and only then be made sense of, but only as something which pretends not to be part of this system. What doesn't recognize the system isn't recognized by the system unless it can be derisively labelled, and whatever is said or done in its name translated into the language of the system, and what is lost in the translation is the spirit of the cause.

We can use 'comprehend' initially in the dual way Barthes uses it in his essay 'Wine and Milk' (Barthes 1993: 58-61). In describing the grip that wine has on the French psyche — 'the absence of wine gives a sense of shock' — Barthes suggests that its

... universality implies a kind of conformism: to believe in wine is a coercive collective act. A Frenchman who kept this myth at arm's length would expose himself to minor but definite problems of integration, the first of which, precisely, would be that of having to explain his attitude. The universality principle fully applies here, inasmuch as society calls anyone who

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does not believe in wine by names such as sick, disabled or depraved: it does not comprehend him (in both senses, intellectual and spatial, of the word). Conversely, an award of good integration is given to whoever is a practising wine-drinker: knowing how to drink is a national technique which serves to qualify the Frenchman, to demonstrate at once his performance, his control, his sociability. Wine gives thus a foundation for a collective morality, within which everything is redeemed: true, excesses, misfortunes and crimes are possible with wine, but never viciousness, treachery or baseness; the evil it can generate is in the nature of fate and therefore escapes penalization ... (Barthes 1993: 59).

For wine read animal exploitation and animal products; for the Frenchman who keeps the myth at arm's length read animal liberation, except that animal liberation is spatially comprehended (see Chapters 6 and 7); for society read Tester, especially as ‘... like all resilient totems, wine [animal use] supports a varied mythology which does not trouble about contradictions'. Moreover:

The mythology of wine can in fact help us to understand the usual ambiguity of our daily life. For it is true that wine is a good and fine substance, but it is no less true that its production is deeply involved in French capitalism, whether it is that of the private distillers or that of the big settlers in Algeria who impose on the Muslims, on the very land of which they have been dispossessed, a crop of which they have no need, while they lack even bread. There are thus very engaging myths which are however not innocent. And the characteristic of our current alienation is precisely that wine cannot be an unalloyedly blissful substance, except if we wrongfully forget that it is also the product of an expropriation. (Barthes 1993: 61).

The task of comprehending animal liberation is made all the more difficult, and the task of denigrating it made easier, if the colonization it is set against — by analogy with Barthes above, for instance, the growing of 'feed' rather than food or, in entirely animal terms, the horror stories that lie behind all animal products — is, as by Tester, 'wrongfully' forgotten.

He tends to ‘make sense’ of animal liberation in his system (pp67-68) in much the same way as he accuses Norbert Elias (see Elias 1994: 167) of understanding (or not understanding) the sixteenth century institution of cat burning within his own system, or Edward Evans (1906) of understanding (or not understanding) medieval and later animal trials in his own system (pp72-75). For Tester, the past is a foreign country where they not only do things differently but think them so differently that we cannot understand them, we cannot think that. Fair enough. But what we also find is that for Tester animal liberation is not a foreign country for there is no exteriority in this scheme; animal liberation is some kind of hoax, it must be an
extreme form of the bloody monoculture, the other extreme to the raw version. But if we see animal liberation as a foreign country, a culture foreign to the orthodox, then Tester's view is 'ethnocentric' in that animal liberation is viewed from the orthodox (humanocentric) perspective of the researcher. This charge is dodged by a swing from the ethnocentric to the relativistic, by the more defensible ethnographic claim that animal liberation does not represent a 'better' version of human/nonhuman relationships, only a different and extreme one. And if the possibility of this better, even if 'unnatural' version, and the sincerity of animal liberation, are denied, the significance of its simpler statements is missed:

Indeed, when something substantive is said about animals it tends to be fairly banal. Let us be honest; it is not actually too profound to say that certain things hurt other species. (Tester 1991: 196).

But it is profound if, as it does, society believes or prefers to believe that certain things don't hurt (not to say harm) animals or, if they do, that it is of little or no moral significance, or that nothing can be done about it. This goes to the heart of revelation.

One of the notable features of Tester's thesis is how easily confrontation with direct activists — the really suspicious characters — entails a lapsing into cliché and stereotype. Just as Tester describes Evans' (1906) lack of understanding of animal trials, Tester can be seen too to have 'covered his incomprehension with abuse' (p75, emphasis added). Animal liberation would be tolerable perhaps if it just submitted to the rules, taking its chances in the lifestyles market and letting those of us that know a fraud from the real thing get on with our far more honest, and private sphere, lifestyle choices. But the problem is that the protagonists won't be told. They will persist in their fraudulent activity and seem to be taking people in. A major difference between animal liberation and the Frenchman who keeps the wine myth at arm's length is that the latter doesn't necessarily demand that society does likewise; and animal liberation does not seek spatial comprehension in terms of integration or appropriation, but as wholesale adoption. As well as forcing a dodgy cult product on us it is the aggressive marketing, deceitful advertising and strongarm
salesmanship of animal liberation that's outrageous. The barbarians are not so much at the gate as within society but if they will not play society's game they must be exposed, labelled and associated with the other suspects.

Due to their self obsession, the ‘militants’ are, for instance, narcissistic. When an activist says ‘We strongly dislike the term “animal lover” ... It is a derogatory term like nigger lover', Tester reads this to be a statement showing that ‘animal rights is not about animals’ (p177). Other belief is filtered through the norms and meanings of the orthodox and if liberationists are not ‘animal lovers’ (that is, not like animal-using British society12), they cannot be genuine in their cause. They are more concerned with ‘constructing a selfhood which is divorced from animals' and in so doing think that they ‘will become better humans' (p177), and bodily too:

Animal rights rewrites the dietary statements of Rousseau, Ritson, and Shelley so that the natural diet is seen as a key to a healthy physique which is itself a symbolic testimony of moral goodness. I eat well, therefore I am well. In particular, the individual who only eats vegetarian food will lose weight and gain a socially prestigious body (Wynne-Tyson 1979: 103) which is slim and highly desirable to the opposite sex (for the prestige of slimness, see Featherstone 1982) ... the preoccupation with selfhood of modern animal rights might lead to the slim and moral watching over the flabby and violent. (Tester 1991: 177-178).

This is nothing more than a slur (again fearfully reducing an oppositional movement’s social aims and claims to dominant culture’s preoccupations), deforming the spirit and letter of Wynne-Tyson’s entire output. In utter contradiction of this fantasy, John and Jo Hicks, organizers of Animal Activists, write:

To us Veganism (sic) is solely about stopping suffering, and, to this aim, converting others to the diet. So where do health foods come in, how does the use of brown rather than white flour help the animals? ... Like most people we live on a trash diet, living a hectic life and eating almost entirely out of tins, the deep freeze and the local chippy as do most young Vegans we know. We have neither the time or the self interest to worry about health foods ... (Hicks 1979).

Amongst the millions of words said and written by activists it is easy to find material to suit almost any representation (see the forum of Arkangel magazine, for instance) and it is in reference to activists especially that Tester’s representation tends towards media sensationalism. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that much of his chapter on direct activism (especially pp182-192) relies heavily upon
Henshaw's (1989) journalistic work on the Animal Liberation Front and is prone to the same factual inaccuracies and distortion. The publication of Henshaw occasioned probably the only time that the ALF has seriously considered taking someone to court, for libel.

In contrast to Tester's narrow focus on mammals as the motivating concern of the philosophers and therefore the movement as a whole, he is keen to show us how 'the militants' go beyond or contradict the philosophers' stance on violence. That the ALF has concerned itself with defending shrimps is of no account (nor is their rescue-rehoming of animals) but their and/or others' 'violence' against buildings and people is seized upon (pp182-188). At the same time, orthodoxy's structural violence against animals is ignored. The relativism does not apply to violence. And nor to Nazism.

Aside from telling us that the militants are narcissistic, violent or 'noisy' (p190), Tester represents an ethical and political crusade as an exercise in totalitarianism. That 'the militants have curious alliances' is due to author Hans Ruesch's interview with a Nazi magazine (p192), for instance, but how Ruesch links with the ALF is not at all clear. (His Slaughter of the Innocent and Naked Empress are both, unlike the ALF, centrally concerned with the scientific invalidity of vivisection). We have to accept though that Ronnie Lee, co-founder of the Band of Mercy-Animal Liberation Front — described by Tester as an 'eco-fascist' (p190) — once suggested that Nazis who joined animal rights groups should not necessarily be expelled, for this would deprive 'the animals of some of their defenders' (Lee 1985: 10). But this is one, albeit prominent, activist offering one view which is obviously unrepresentative of militants' or others' views within the movement. Indeed, these examples are possibly the sum total of the movement's Nazi association. Tester does tell us that the Hunt Saboteurs Association and the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection have more honourable records than Lee's in dealing with Nazis, but the point here surely is that all the major animal liberation organizations and the vast majority of those in the movement have such an honourable record. The Nazi allusion is par for the journalistic course and fits well with Tester's notion of animal
rights as 'magical purity' rather than moral and political protest. The militants' concern with world populations is reduced to eugenicism (p189) whilst orthodox creation of animal population explosions is a taken for granted. Scant attention is also paid to what many liberationists see as the fascism of institutionalized animal use, the orthodox finding fascist references relevant only to intra- and not inter-species holocausts.

The odd impression given overall is that animals would be better off without animal liberationists, and animal liberation is explained away:

The activities of the militants are just one especially fundamentalist way of living the truth of the fetish of animal rights ... The animals only wander into the picture when they are dying or dead. The humans are too busy painting their own image throughout the world to take any notice of them. (Tester 1991: 193).

But surely it is Tester who doesn't take any notice of them. *Animals and Society's* exposé of animal rights could hardly be bettered as a parody of anti-animal liberationism. Salt would probably have regarded it as an effort to 'absurdly exaggerate the least vital points in [animal rights] reasoning while failing to note what is the very core of the controversy' (Salt nd: 2), and Edward W Said as perhaps a 'learned perspective [which] supports the caricatures propagated in the popular culture' (see Said 1995: 290).

**Summary & Conclusions**

In place of a dialectic evolution, Tester uses cultural and epistemological relativism. The problem does not lie in this, however, but in the reductionism, representing the ethics of liberationists as functionally dependent on their other beliefs and practices which, we are told, have nothing to do with, can have nothing to do with, genuine animal concern. We have seen that Tester's work runs counter to any notion of revelation — for there is nothing to reveal, except animal liberation as a fraud — and that the internal context of veganism and the external context of animal use are ignored. We have also been able to identify certain other themes — redefinition, entrapment, incomprehension and ideologies — within the representation of animal liberation given there.
Reduction, entrapment and redefinition tend to run together. Reducing animals to ciphers, animal liberation to a concern over what it is to be human, and locating them within a history of determining structures (restrictions) of knowledge, serves to take animal liberation out of its contexts and cage this exotic beast within a system of thought which denies it both sincerity and agency, effectively labelling it an illegitimate concern. It has been redefined within the very structures from which it seeks liberation, those which have determined and explained bloody culture's continued animal use. Contrary to 'animal rights' being an 'entrapment' of animals, Tester's thesis is an entrapment of animal liberation.

Picturing animal liberation in such a restricted way that other animals and their exploitation are left out of the frame hints at an incomprehension which stems from the incredibility of people taking other animals seriously, as discrete beings, ends in themselves, rather than trope material. The representation of it is the effect of this incomprehension and of the structures used to comprehend it. Tester's concealment of animal use allows its comformism and collective acts to remain untouched, its mythology to continue, the transhistorical speciesist ideology and its discourse to go unchallenged. Against this, any revelation the movement tries to achieve is viewed as dishonest or crass, its protagonists denigrated.

This critique of animal liberation concerns the claim that it naturalizes its beliefs in order to render them self-evident. Now this is generally identified as an ideological strategy employed by a dominant class or group in order to legitimate its power and position and to protect and further its interests. But animal liberation is not a dominant power and the interests it is protecting and furthering are not its own. Tester appears to disagree with both assertions. On the first count, the conflation of animal liberation and society gives the impression that, through subterfuge, animal liberation has become a dominant power or is threatening to attain such a position. Regarding interests, the extraordinary characteristic of animal liberation is that, unlike all other bodies and agencies and movements, it is entirely made up of humans who struggle for radical change in the interests of others. The major weakness of its ideological strategy then is that it is not about this or these at all. And it is not just
that animal liberation is, instead, about human worry over what it is to be human but, rather, that animal liberation is the ultimate expression of this anxiety which, for liberationists, is all consuming, approaching the pathological. But as we have seen, this is far-fetched, animal liberation cannot be reduced to a concern over polluting mammals, to an avoidance and self-perfecting strategy.

If Tester's straw man is doing what everyone else does in relation to the blank pages and is no better at the exercise, just different in his equal 'knowledge' or ignorance; if he cannot avoid being just another animal trapper, then what is omitted is serious consideration of what is in it for animals (such a question being redundant if an impoverished structuralist-reductionist view of animals is taken). Whilst it may be impossible to determine whether other animals are treated better or worse within the changing though consistently instrumentalist taxonomies of different eras, it is not impossible to determine whether individual animals are better off not being experimented upon, for instance, and at the present time. But, for Tester, animals are just as well off without liberationists.

Whether Salt invented animal rights, whether it was one of Gompertz's many inventions, or whether Salt was canny enough to organize humaneness and unify the various strands of animal concern doesn't matter at all in terms of the challenge that animal liberation poses now. But if animal liberation is pictured as just one way of reconciling the ambiguity of 'Man', no better than others, then this covertly legitimates animal use and overtly deligitimates animal liberation as a political and ethical protest, and renders innocuous the other, non-liberationist, versions of reconciliation. Wholly absorbed (comprehended) into the project, liberationists' only distinguishing characteristic is their extremeness which distances them from the animals whose interests they pretend to serve. The implication is not just that liberationists can 'know' nothing about animals, but that they know less than the orthodox.

Certainly, to say that full-blown animal rights philosophy is a product of modernity is a valid claim and, contrary to Tester, Salt would probably agree. But
this does not invalidate animal liberation as Tester seems to want to do. What is disturbing and despised is that if, within the modern episteme, Salt actually did invent a coherent animal rights, others did not. Why they did not, and why-how they did not-do not go along with it, and found-find ways of undermining it, keeping it unthinkable, or sidestepping the challenge, is the more instructive area of concern.

Whether intended at the outset or not, consciously or unconsciously, Tester’s account is ultimately symptomatic of the recoil from and the obscuring of revelation. Tester seems to have dimly perceived the revelatory moment but has tried to contain it within a symbolic-Foucauldian account. Yet the academic tone cannot be sustained: the work becomes sensationalist, and illustrates the fear of the liberation of the Other from functionalist structures. It mimics, and possibly even informs, much of what we shall find in the following chapters.

Notes


2. For instance, ‘Humanitarianism appears to be the main conscious motive for da Vinci’s meatless diet’ (see Barkas 1975: 70-72) and ‘The Utopians feel that slaughtering our fellow creatures gradually destroys the sense of compassion, which is the finest sentiment of which our human nature is capable’ (from More’s Utopia of 1516, quoted in Wynne-Tyson 1990: 327). Moreover, Tester does not acknowledge that humanitarianism and compassion may also be products of belief nor, even if they are solely products of knowledge, how those products are then shaped to the requirements of dominant ideology.

3. The second part of the reference reads: ‘Both diets are codifications of points raised by Pythagoras and Plutarch, but largely reinvented by Rousseau’ (Tester 1991: 143), with which we shall not argue here.


5. A Vegan Society membership survey (1990) recorded that 63 per cent of members became vegan for ‘animal rights’ reasons; 16 per cent for health reasons; 11 per cent ecology reasons: and 10 per cent spiritual reasons. (The Vegan, Summer, p 21).

6. It is worth quoting Salt here: ‘Perhaps the strangest of Mr Chesterton’s charges against humanitarians was one which he made in his book Orthodoxy, that their trend is “to touch fewer and fewer things,” i.e. to abstain from one action after another until they are left in a merely negative position. He failed to see that while we certainly desire to touch fewer and fewer things with whip, hob-nailed boot, hunting-knife, scalpel, or pole-axe, we equally desire to get into touch with more and more of our fellow-beings by means of that sympathetic intelligence which tells us that they are closely akin to ourselves ... ’ (Salt 1921: 128).

7. This general point is also made by Baker (1993: 214).
8. Despite downgrading processual accounts, in claiming that animal liberation is an avoidance strategy, Tester is not so far from Elias's (1994) idea that vegetarianism could grow out of the civilizing process as a repugnance at animal-like behaviour. In addition, there is a brief point of contact between Tester's account and ecofeminist animal defence theory in that both critique animal 'rights' on the basis of its anthropocentrism. For the latter the problem is that, in the rationalist philosophy, animals' rights and interests are recognized the nearer they approach the status of humans, sharing standard attributes with man as the benchmark. This runs against ecocentrism. Tester claims that animals will remain objects to the privileged subject and that the debate, framed in such terms, will go on until we can be certain about the final basis of what it is to be human, or until the day when 'Man' is finally buried (Tester 1991: 89). But, as we can see, the two soon separate out again; ecofeminism, like Eder (1996), seeing the anthropocentrism (or androcentrism) as ultimately impotent, a conceptual fault or liability; Tester seeing it as a suspicious purity obsession and therefore an imposture, for which he seems to rely heavily on an outmoded view of vegetarian abstinence. Although they can easily do so, strictly cultural-sociological accounts do not have to end up like Tester's whose 'avoidance strategy' of liberationists is contradicted by Carol J Adams' liberationist view (similar to both Andrew Linzey's and Stephen Clark's) of the present human/nonhuman relationship: 'We are estranged from animals through institutionalized violence ... we have also been estranged from ways to think about our estrangement ... Eating animals is an existential expression of our estrangement and alienation from the created order' (Adams 1994a: 174).

9. We could also add that the form of thought closest to 'truth' is that of the subjugated or of those 'thinking' on their behalf.

10. Incidentally, in this connection, a 1991 University of Utah survey of subscribers to The Animals' Agenda magazine showed 84 per cent also supportive of the civil rights movement, feminism, the struggle against apartheid, pacifism and gay rights. (Cited by Pluhar 1995: 127).

11. A Vegan Society leaflet, c 1986-90, read 'Behind Every Animal Product Lies a Horror Story'.

12. An illustration of orthodox animal love is how a loved pet is routinely translated into a surrogate child (e.g. BBC1 Six O'Clock News, 30.11.98). Depth of positive emotion can only be genuine, and comprehended, if humans, real or symbolic, are the recipients.

Chapter 6

Media Representation: Part One

Introduction

In this and the following chapter we shift our attention from the representation of animal ‘rights’ contained within an academic work to the more social and certainly more common and everyday although, as we have already suggested, there are overlaps or intertextualities. Here we shall be concerned with the representations of animal liberation and animal use as found in the media and considered here as an index of how the challenge of animal liberation is or is not confronted.

Society is steeped in speciesism but that unifying ideology is under sustained attack. Animal liberation is a severe challenge to a dominant liberal-pluralist rationalism which distances itself from non-institutional cruelties and institutional excesses but legitimizes all other institutionalized animal use. Bloodless culture presents itself as offering something better, and is founded on those very values on which the bloody culture has prided itself: rationality, equality, compassion, justice. There is much at stake — power, cognitive and affect structures, values, norms, beliefs, habit, economics, mores, language, meaning, knowledge of self and of the ultimate others against whom humans have defined themselves.

The fearsome attack threatens cultural revolution, negation of cultural order and liberation of the Other; the culture is exposed as ambivalent, hypocritical, inconsistent, its common decency like its common sense a superficiality. Under attack the refined bloody culture will defend itself and launch naked counter attacks and covert operations, its immune system working sleeplessly.
In order to prevent a legitimation crisis, it must maintain its health, status and the upper hand and it will do this via certain ideological strategies, and this reaction to the attack can be traced in the speciesist media discourse. Together, the strategies serve to obscure revelation, to prevent more people seeing the green light and defecting to the oppositional culture or, as the orthodox would see it, to the extreme.

Now all the above presupposes several things, most importantly that the media function in certain ways and that they function in certain ways in relation to animal use and animal liberation. We should attend to these things before proceeding. We shall not be working on the understanding that the media are open-minded or objective or balanced in their representations for by the very monitoring of media output — which may have begun upon such a basis — it became apparent that such pretences are untenable. The character of media discourse here directs us instead towards other premises.

First of all, and not forgetting that social attitudes create and sustain public discourse, we shall work from the premise that:

> Social texts do not merely reflect or mirror objects, events and categories pre-existing in the social and natural world. Rather, they actively construct a version of those things. They do not just describe things; they do things. And being active, they have social and political implications. (Potter & Wetherell 1987: 6).

And that, as these media texts help construct a reality and shape public consciousness and popular consent, the two main areas of investigation or analysis are how the accounts themselves are constructed and what functions or purposes they achieve or fail to serve.

More specifically, in relation to both animal use and liberation, we shall be working to the role of the mass media here as characterized by Larry Gross (1995: 62): that (a) representation in the mediated ‘reality’ of our mass culture is in itself power; non-representation maintains the powerless status of groups that do not possess significant material or political power bases. Those who are at the bottom of the various power hierarchies will be kept in their places in part through their relative
invisibility; and that (b) when groups or perspectives do attain visibility, the
manner of that representation will itself reflect the biases and interests of those
elites who define the public agenda. Hall (1982: 81) reinforces the points: the
struggle over meaning itself is not the only one; there is also the struggle over access
to the very means of signification. Accredited witnesses and spokespersons with
privileged access to the world of public discourse, carry authority and establish the
frameworks of debate. When those whose definitions are more partial, fragmentary
and delegitimated actually gain some form of access they have to perform within
the established terms of the problematic at play. This tends to give credibility to
the 'common sensical', the orthodox versions of 'logical' and 'rational'.

Now these things lead us to consider the ideology, hegemony and (Barthesian) myth
caracter of media representation and we can suggest that speciesist discourse, or the
media texts of speciesism, can be analyzed in ideological terms. We have already
alluded in this thesis to speciesism and animal liberation as ideologies but we can
expand upon it here. Because animal liberation is not economistically determined nor
has conventional political goals, this implies that we should largely dispense with
questions of reductive ideology (although animal exploitation is not merely
discrimination but profitable prejudice, like slavery). Yet we should not dispense
with a notion of ideology so readily. Admittedly, speciesism and animal liberation
do not fit easily into classic ideology-hegemony-myth frameworks if we take these
as they relate (in solely human/human terms) to one class or group maintaining
dominance over another or others through legitimation of that dominance. In
human/nonhuman terms we can see this at best in the rather unlikely sense of
animals being forced, persuaded, misled or mystified into believing that their
objectification — which they above all cannot see as such (?) — is in their interests.
That aside, speciesism is indeed an ideology, a death-dealing ideology,
totalitarian in its methods and effects, where animals are the subjugated 'class'.
Indeed, not to see speciesism as an ideology would itself be open to the charge of
speciesism. It follows then that we shall have no truck with any rationale which
considers animal liberation to be ideological whilst the orthodox are merely
animal-eaters. We are well beyond 'food first, morals later'.

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But can we use ideology, hegemony, myth here to relate to speciesism in human/human terms? Who is pulling the wool over whose eyes? Are some classes or groups of people suffering at the hands of this ideology and others benefitting instead? Superficially at least, the media are merely engaged in a reflection of a reality in which the majority appear happy to collude and enjoy its 'benefits'. And the dominating class in this sense is still the one which also partakes of the same 'fruits' of animal-based agriculture and health system as the masses. There is no clean break which separates 'classes' in relation to speciesism for all traditional human classes are speciesist. But what of veganism's claims that its superiority lies not just in animal liberation values and ethics, but in the inextricably related improvements, promised as a bonus, in human health, hunger and land use, indeed, in human rights? If speciesism contributes to human hunger and sickness then we can talk more straightforwardly in terms of ideology, an ideology which has as one of its strategies the exclusion not only of rival forms of thought and belief but of rival forms of practice, those rival forms which are promoted by individuals and groups from all classes who constitute, or who aim at, a non-speciesist culture.

But even then certain critiques of speciesism's status as an ideology may still be weakened: we cannot truly speak of it as an ideology, which naturalizes and universalizes its beliefs and practices so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable, without at least recognizing that this is not an ideology hatched in the sense of bourgeois ideology and its historical intention. Speciesism does have on its side in this the larger claim to naturalness, its traditions as illusions of permanence, its killing and animal-eating essentialisms which defy complete unravelling.

So, to some extent an analysis based entirely here on terms of, say, myth would be somewhat invalid. As Roland Barthes points out in Mythologies, myth can only have an historical foundation, for myth is a type of speech chosen by history; it cannot possibly evolve from the 'nature' of things (Barthes 1993: 110). However, we are long since past the genuine appeal to necessity, and continued animal use has
been characterized by secondary rationalization which, if it cannot be analyzed completely in terms of myth, is indeed defined by its present and continuing intention.

Notwithstanding the contention that society is now a society of fragmented ideologies we shall proceed on the basis that speciesism as a unifying ideology can indeed be analyzed in ideological terms. What we are to focus on is how it utters its message and on how ‘meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations of domination’ (Thompson 1984: 130-131); how speciesism is maintained in the face of attack, when it deploys classic ideological strategies (of legitimation) — promoting beliefs, values and practices congenial to itself; naturalizing and universalizing such beliefs; denigrating ideas (and their agents) which challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought; and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself (see Eagleton 1991: 5-6), although this last strategy is rather moot here, the obscuration is more of a self-deception. We shall substitute the confusing and redefining strategy.

Here, the notion of ideological ‘mystification’ relates not just to the masking or suppressing of social conflicts (ideology as an imaginary resolution of real contradictions) but also to the mystification which seeks to obstruct the kind of revelation we have been concerned with throughout; one which reveals in a different light not one’s own subjugation but that of the mass of the Other. What we shall do then is view the discourse from an ideological critique viewpoint, drawing on Barthesian myth.

But, because of the weakened notion of ideology, and because we are looking at this speciesist discourse as it appears in the media — taking the media as a site of struggle rather than, initially at least, an ideological state apparatus — we can consider ideology also, and more generally, in terms of Gramsci’s hegemony, which includes ideology. McQuail gives a summary:

Hegemony refers to a loosely interrelated set of ruling ideas permeating a society, but in such a way as to make the established order of power and values appear natural, taken-for-granted and commonsensical. A ruling ideology is not imposed but appears to exist by virtue of an
unquestioned consensus. Hegemony tends to define unacceptable opposition to the status quo as dissident and deviant. In effect, hegemony is a constantly reasserted definition of a social situation, by way of discourse rather than political or economic power, which becomes real in its consequences. (McQuail 1994: 99).

Not just the class outlook or world view but the manufacturing of consent, the maintenance of credibility and legitimacy; a manipulation which involves the production of ways of seeing and thinking and of excluding or downgrading alternative visions and discourses. And hegemony is of use here not only because it is 'a less economistic way of conceptualizing the relationship between ideological, social, political and economic processes and relations' (Bennett 1982a: 52-53) — ideological struggles being seen on their own terms rather than in relation to some other site — but because it enables us, again at least initially, to view animal liberation in a struggle to win the agreement of other groups in order to achieve the universal recognition, acceptance and adoption of bloodless culture values. This is a crucial point for, as we have earlier claimed, animal liberation does not merely seek some form of accommodation within a dominant speciesist ideology, a discrete area of discursive privacy within liberal-pluralism. It is not a plea for toleration of diversity of belief and value. In this the obvious charge against it, and the defence of the status quo and its 'repressive tolerance', is that it is animal liberation which is totalitarian. However, animal liberation does not seek power for itself as a group of individuals or for animals; it seeks to end it in human/nonhuman relations. Appearing to have great faith in human nature, animal liberation does not seek to shuffle elites, only that they and others come to 'see' and act upon the revelation. It negates the concepts of hegemony and power in human/nonhuman affairs. It is not so much hegemony itself that we are interested in but its modus operandi and the opportunities afforded, or not, for participation in the struggle.

Relating more specifically to media and media function in relation to animal liberation, and to draw upon concepts used in Christopher Campbell's (1995: 3-6) work on race and the media, we shall be examining how majority culture perceptions (preferred readings) reproduced in the media feed mythological notions about animal exploitation and liberation — notions that can contribute to contemporary speciesist attitudes, the animal-using consensus. Or in Barthes' terms how, through

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their rhetoric, 'bourgeois myths outline the general prospect of this pseudo-physis
which defines the dream of the contemporary bourgeois world' (Barthes 1993: 150).
Several of Barthes' 'rhetorical figures' will assist in the analysis.

We have referred to a work on race and media, but just as the speciesist discourse
cannot be analysed on the same terms as one may analyse sexist or racist discourse,
for instance (analysis of speciesist discourse having to find its own way in an
overwhelmingly speciesist world where media representation is saturated with
speciesism), the method(s) used in those analyses too, in this case, cannot readily be
applied here. Regarding the style of analysis it should be noted then that:

There is no analytic method as such, rather a broad theoretical framework which focuses
attention on the construction and functional dimensions of discourse. (Potter & Wetherell 1987:
169).

It is the speciesist discourse's freedom to be blatant which determines the analytical
basis and yet, because its messages are broadcast in and to a speciesist society where
dominant models about animal use (and possibly 'animal rights') are shared, even
the explicit can appear implicit or tacit or even subliminal. An example of the
difference between analysing racism and speciesism in elite discourse in this sense is
the case of what van Dijk (1993) calls the semantic move of denial: 'We are not
racist but ... '. Within speciesism the speciesism is not denied openly — it is the
social norm and the proud boast of many — so the denial relates instead to its own
criterion, of illegal cruelty: 'We don't want animals treated badly but ... '. Thus we
are operating from at least one remove and a crucial one, for it separates cultures.

The aim here is not only to relate media discourse to the foregoing narrative and
exposition but to cover the gamut of representational types more at the macro level,
rather than at the micro level of stylistics and semantic structures. (Depth may be
sacrificed to breadth in the process). So we cannot follow, either, an analysis (e.g.
Kress & Hodge 1979, Fairclough 1989, Potter 1996) which may linguistically analyse
in detail a small number of examples, looking perhaps at the use of passives and
intransitive structures which may attenuate participants' roles, for instance. Nor can
we follow one which concentrates on theory rather than its application to a large
number of specific examples (e.g. Foucault 1981 and 1991). Nor are these chapters able to use the kind of space necessary for a combination of these analyses (e.g. Said 1995). Moreover, we have already traced the changing dominant and subjugated discourses. What we are interested in, as referred to at the start, is just how society's speciesist condition is defended and how overwhelming speciesist ideology is reproduced in media discourse when under attack. Although it draws upon some of the above works, the analysis here falls between the kinds mentioned, being a combination of qualitative content analysis, ideological textual analysis and informal discourse analysis and, due to such matters, the style of these chapters differs somewhat from the foregoing. As in previous chapters, however, the following material keeps both animal use and liberation in view, considering together both the media's offensive rhetoric — 'constructed precisely to rework, damage or reframe an alternative description', and defensive rhetoric — 'its capacity to resist discounting or undermining' (Potter 1996: 107). In effect, these are two aspects of recoil.

The overriding claim is that the manner in which the media function serves to suppress the development and adoption of animal liberation. They act as a brake on emancipation, maintaining the species barrier: thus far (welfarism) and no further, a circumscribed liberalism reproducing the legitimation of speciesism. In this particular expression of dominant articulate thought we see the failure to confront responsibly the challenge of animal liberation, to confront otherness and difference; how it has, instead and through incomprehension and fear, controlled in various ways and within the parameters of the welfarist synthesis. The chapter will also serve as a report, not only on media-bloody culture performance but on animal liberation progress (in terms of ridicule and discussion); specifically on that of an animal liberation as we have understood it here.

Throughout, we should remember that animal liberation, to a large extent though not wholly, rests upon a rationalist philosophy, a major strategic tool in extending prevailing norms to other species; using bloody culture's norms for its own purposes. This identification with the bloody culture also tends to identify its decency with
common decency as if it were part of an Eliasian civilizing process and which can be viewed as taking things too far. So, instead of this being a clash of different decencies, animal liberation can be viewed as being within the same field, not recognized as of another order. This problem also operates, as we saw in Chapter 4, in relation to the philosophers and movement, for one reason or another, not emphatically espousing veganism but vegetarianism which has a foot, if not its roots, in bloody culture. We should carry with us here not only the 'model' of veganism but also what has become the norm of 'animal rights' equating with vegetarianism, whatever the movement's intentions. And we shall have to see how these factors may afford orthodoxy the opportunity to use animal liberation for its own purposes, not least in picturing animal liberation as an extreme of it, rather than an alternative to it, an oppositional and bloodless culture.

This relates to something we mentioned in the previous chapter; how animal liberation was uncomprehended, calling upon Barthes' dual sense of comprehend. We shall keep this in mind, remembering that the spatial and intellectual (in)comprehensions may work against animal liberation in different ways.

The media in question here are the quality press (where we may expect to find the highest or more considered popular articulate thought), the Radio Times, BBC1's, BBC2's, ITV's and Channel 4's fiction and non-fiction output where animal issues were flagged (and often where not), and the BBC1 Six o'Clock News. All television coverage was during the period 6pm until midnight which meant, for instance, the omission of daytime studio free-for-all formats which generated more heat than light, and there is little consideration given to newscasters' and anchor peoples' winks, smiles, frowns and raised eyebrows that cue viewers' appropriate responses to stories and comments. Soap operas were also excluded, and there are no case studies. During the period of this monitoring — specifically during 1994 to 1996 but calling upon earlier and later examples — obvious case study candidates may have included the 1995 live export demonstrations and the trial and imprisonment of ALF activist
Keith Mann during 1994-95. Interest has been more in what appear to be the routine representations, although elements of these two ‘events’ are incorporated into the analysis.

Another of Gross’s points is that we should not take too seriously the presumed differences between the various categories of media messages. News, drama, quiz shows, sports, etc. share underlying similarities of theme, emphasis and value. Elliott et al (1986: 272) also claim that narrative codes and ideological reference points cut across varied forms, e.g. news, comedy, fiction. The inclusion of news, current affairs, fiction, comedy, articles, columns and comment in this analysis affords too a greater comprehensiveness and shows how actuality and fictional forms accumulate meaning(s) in an overwhelming and relentless regime of representation.

The spectrum of media material and its organizational presentation needs comment before we proceed. Taking speciesism as an ideology, material from the media discourse was categorized within typical ideological strategy groupings and then broken down into more manageable and illustrative genres or ‘tactics’. (Admittedly, this is somewhat artificial for more often than not more than one strategy or tactic is at work at any given time). It should be stressed however, that material was not initially selected with this in mind; that is, in order to fit a theory. On the contrary, the gathered material (and what is used here forms merely part of a much larger archive), if not exactly dictating the scheme, was found to be most easily accommodated and, hopefully, accessible within it. Material has not been rejected if it contradicted the argument (and some material which tends to work against the theory is included as representative of rarity even though, in terms of strict representative ratio, it should not appear at all in this small sample. The archive shows the ‘negative’ representations utterly overwhelming the positive or semi-positive).

Another point could be held in mind while reading this material. There may be recognized in this analysis examples relating to different historical strands of
bloody culture — from Cartesianism, Thomism and Hobbesianism, for instance, but other examples show how they combine to give the same result. This point being that what is drawn upon are dominant models and the accumulation of bloody culture tradition, the *topos*, the 'reservoir of ideas or core images from which specific rhetoric statements can be generated' (see Karim 1997: 153) just as we have been able to draw upon the reservoir of Chapter 1 throughout this thesis. These areas are largely coterminous, of course.

As this part of the thesis is broken down into two chapters, this Introduction will serve for both, the Conclusion and References appearing at the end of Chapter 7.
Ideological Strategies

Promotion

There is perhaps no need to outline extensively the media’s blatant promotion of animal use and killing and thereby the overt reproduction of speciesism, the beliefs and values congenial to it and the practices ‘beneficial’ to it. In a speciesist society, the media will not only be saturated with it but specific enticements and instruction in the practices and recreations will predominate. So, the initiation of young children into bloody culture traditions extended also to the promotion of educating them in the ways of bloodsports, and all the quality newspapers ran full-page weekend features not only on how to cook animals but on the pleasures of bloodsports and animal farming. These included such items as teaching readers how to kill magpies and crows after luring such ‘vermin’ with a trapped live decoy. In fact, there seemed to be a desperation to extend the range of dominion. Much of the promotion was of activities one could travel abroad to participate in or watch, activities which were not allowed or available in the UK, such as ‘game’ shooting in Africa; turkey hunting in America; lassoing calves in Ireland; camel wrestling in Turkey, or the celebration of the annual elephant festival in Thailand where wild elephants were captured, separated, confined, ‘broken’, and forced (with kicks and prods) into logging, playing football, taking part in tugs of war and races. With no sense of irony on the part of programme makers or enthusiastic spectators (tourists), the latter wore ‘Save the Elephant’ t-shirts.

But this section is more concerned with the less obvious. First of all we should look at some of the defining examples of speciesist discourse which constitute the quality of a common morality where, if animals and concern for animals are recognized they are as something of a joke. Unsurprisingly, coverage was loaded in favour of humans—where the highest (or any) level of sympathy, concern and privilege was reserved only for one’s own kind; a display of species loyalty. The ethical and ontological framework was determined by what the media were prepared to take seriously, so here too was an area of trivialization. It also drew in the more common indulgence of sentimentality and ultimately defined the human in relation to ‘lesser’ animals.
Invisibility-Low Visibility

This tactic of ideology maintenance regarded animals as the insignificant Others, only incidental to the action, to life. Their suffering, their use, was inevitable, their subjugation the natural order of things; it went without saying and therefore passed without comment. Human interest came not just first but first and last, founded upon occlusion. As Steve Baker puts it, drawing on Barthes:

The unwritten priorities of the culture enable even that which is in full view to be rendered effectively invisible — or if still visible to be drained, by common consent, of any significance. The dominant culture view that the subject of animals is essentially trivial ... is a clear case in point'. (Baker 1993: 8).

And this applies to animals themselves as much as to their advocates and the issues. Footage would show freshly-netted fish trampled and gutted while still alive, as the narration talked of human livelihood (this applied also to footage of sheep-dipping and fears over farmers' health), or pictures showed as an ('unseen') visual, a calf, head clamped between a farmer's knees, having his/her ear mutilated for a news item on the Irish claim for exemption from the EU ban on cattle imports due to the BSE scare. (Virtually all BSE-related coverage failed to concern itself with bovine suffering). In coverage of horse racing, which treated it as if just another sport, horses and jockeys would be shown crashing to the ground with details given of the fate of the latter only. The Radio Times preview of The Great Australian Camel Race stated that: 'Few of the participants [the riders] could foresee the physical and psychological challenges they had set themselves'. The trailer for Channel 4's The Great Outdoors gave shots of people doing various things to the voiceover of 'Walk it' (showing a footpath); 'Sail it' (a yacht); 'Fly it' (a glider); 'Ride it' (not a bike, but a horse). And BBC1 Six o'Clock News would run items on winter's 'big freeze', focusing on the suffering of the old, the infirm, the homeless, wildlife and farmers, but was blind to the millions of farmed animals routinely fenced in and deprived of natural cover or artificial shelter.

Invisibility which, as we see, also served to disguise the master/slave relationship, could also be due to the shadow cast by a weaker form of animal protection; a
species-oriented conservationist flight from specificity, a hint of which was contained in the concern for wildlife in the elephant and 'big freeze' examples above. BBC1 Six o'Clock News ran an item on sharks endangered by overfishing. While viewers were being encouraged to worry about this situation the footage showed a shark with a hook in his/her mouth and another in his/her side being hoisted onto deck. Despite the suffering before our eyes, the shark was spoken of not as an individual but as a species, a vague notion of The Shark. And in a television investigation of the death of environmental campaigner Andrew Lees in Madagascar, the locals were shown paying homage to him by slaughtering a bull and hanging the bull's head on a fence, a ritual in which Lees's partner took part. Lees had been investigating the RTZ company's damaging impact on the local culture and environment, of great concern to the film makers for whom the crude slaughter, and the bull himself, were of only local symbolic interest.

When animals and their use gained low-grade visibility, when the culture's blindness was not entirely conspicuous, media representations stood as examples of pure humanocentrism, the trivialization (or exclusion) of animal concern and the reinforcement of dominion. The animals were recognized only in order to render them insignificant.

The Independent featured jockey Graham Bradley's 'nightmare' of oversleeping and missing a race, then being chosen later to ride a winner. Some 750 words were given over to this transformation of human fortunes, leaving the last 50 or so to tell readers that at the same meeting two horses 'had to be put down' due to race injuries, making it 'a bad afternoon for the owner and trainer' (emphasis added).

Instrumentalism was inherent and only sometimes appeared in such bold statement as Martin Whittaker's in The Independent, telling readers: 'OK, so they're cute. But llamas have their uses' and, after asking: 'So what exactly are llamas good for?', went on to list the ways by which they may be exploited for human ends. And in the Goldring Audit, the eponymous reporter looked at a calf and then asked the farmer, 'When will that be eatable?'
A gung-ho celebration of motor culture in the Australian outback (Jeremy Clarkson's *Motorworld*) saw the eponymous hero rounding up panicking cattle from a helicopter, shouting, 'You can run but you can't hide'. Clarkson then went on a two-hour camel hunt, jumping from a jeep in order to boondock the exhausted animal who was captured for racing in the Middle East. Clarkson's parting comment to the camel was, 'There's no veal protestors where you're going.' The 150-foot long animal-transporting trucks in the area 'don't need to be thoroughbreds; they need to be mules', and without them, 'northern Australia would starve', the reality-fixing statement of fact. At no point was there the slightest concern for the cattle, the environment or even wildlife, many of which were mown down by the huge lorries and 'make a mess of the truck'.

After winning the 1996 St Leger, jockey Frankie Dettori was given a four-day whip ban for using the whip on a horse called Shantou too forcibly and too often. Horse-whipping enthusiasts subsequently interviewed on *Right to Reply* included racing's TV commentators justifying whip-use by analogy with boxing — Shantou was known for 'needing bullying ... he got bullied and he won'. A celebratory interview of Dettori in *Radio Times* was headed by the jockey's quote: 'Colts are like men, you can bully them. Fillies are like women, you have to keep them sweet', sentiments typically unchallenged by interviewer Andrew Duncan.

And, in the face of this insidious onslaught, so relentless it became virtually invisible itself, editor Andrew Marr could claim in *The Independent* that 'the tyrannies that forced ordinary people to become heroic are dead or in retreat', ignoring or not seeing the human 'tyranny' over nonhumans, and the rising numbers of animal liberationists risking their security, health, freedom and lives by their actions which were almost entirely 'unseen' by the media, and certainly in this sense (see Exclusion section).

**Comedy & Humour**

Other animals are a vehicle for comedy, beasts of humorous burden. Within this category, especially within 'alternative' stand-up comedy, there was a shade of the
critic and satirist. One might look especially to alternative comedy — noting its avowed anti-sexism and anti-racism — to provide an alternative to conventional approaches to animals and their liberation. One could expect, perhaps, to find here attacks on speciesism, on animal exploitation and abuse or at least on individuals committing cruel acts. But, as early as 1983, and setting the tone for most if not all of what followed, it seems, London Weekend showcased alternative comedy with a series titled Stomping on the Cat. Anti-animal or anti-animal liberation jokes were the stock in trade of most television comedy of all kinds, betraying perhaps the age-old tension and contradiction inherent in the orthodox relationship with other (non-laughing) animals.

Lauded for its courage in pushing the boundaries, Channel 4 has been a provider of ‘alternative’ comedy since its inception in 1982 when it raised false hopes for animal liberationists by also showing the harrowing Animals Film. But its record was to be more characterised by the Just for Laughs series in which derisory references to animals were standard, e.g. ‘Ever taken your contact lenses out and put them in the cat’s eyes, and then put the cat out on the balcony?’ Further, its One Night Stand series featured Jake Johannsen’s routine about cow-tipping, and hunting cows with hammers, ducks with pliers, and tortoises with power drills. One of two bored characters in the channel’s Absolutely suggested that: ‘We could go out and shove a banger up a cat’s ass’ and its Drop the Dead Donkey offered this variation: ‘I was so incensed I head butted the cat’, along with running gags about ‘that incident with the cat’.

The Clive Anderson Show (passim) hardly let an opportunity pass for an anti-animal-liberationist joke. For instance, enthusiastic horse-whipper-bullier jockey Frankie Dettori appeared here as a bloody culture hero. Anderson turned the practice of whipping into a gag or two at the expense, not of the guest as was usual on this programme, but of horses used for racing who, being thoroughbreds, were ‘thick’. Animals’ ‘lack of intelligence’ anchored much of television comedy.

Other cases thought suitable for laughter, across all channels, included: a video clip
of a tethered bear in a TV studio attacking a woman and getting beaten for it27; jokes about eating calves, transporting live animals and vivisection, all at animals' and not humans' expense28; '... if there are vegans (mispronounced as 'vayguns') watching, this coat is not made of leather, it's made of Linda McCartney' 29; jokes by television cooks about eating animals, vegetarians (all of whom 'look ill'), and 'vayguns'30; and, without irony, and highlighting perhaps the distance a sexual politics of meat has yet to travel, a female protagonist of a television comedy series ramming stuffing into a dead turkey while chanting 'Begging for it'31.

It was not so much the 'bad taste' of some of this humour (although we can disagree with Gross [1995: 63] who suggests in unconsciously speciesist manner that it is only homosexuals, communists and, currently, Arab 'terrorists' whose enemies are generally uninhibited by the consensus of 'good taste') but, on the contrary, the received opinion, and the fundamental conservatism of television humour which was not used to undermine the sacredness of speciesism or even the excesses of the exploiting institutions unless the victims were humans, health-wise. The pull of such respectability also seemed irresistible for one-time 'vegetarian' Billy Connolly whose several TV series promoted angling, ostentatious leather-wearing and exotic animal-eating32.

That animals and their suffering were not serious topics but legitimate sources of humour leaked into other areas and included: a report on pig rustling, with newsreader Michael Buerk quipping: 'Police are obviously hoping someone will squeal'33; the claim that it was a 'Good Day' for Iranian donkeys when Iran's Ministry of Commerce decided to increase foreign currency by allowing the export of 30,000 of them34; a weather forecaster, for once recognizing that animals on farms were not merely rural decoration, perhaps, predicting with a smile, that 'The sheep are going to be a bit cold tonight'35; and a promotional item on ostrich farming with the reporter breaking into hysterics at the sight of frightened ostriches trying to escape their confinement36. The background to all these was the high number of programmes and sitcoms which continued to bring animals into studio or story for a
laugh. Over all, although we have to accept the possibility of extremely rare exceptions, the comedy, humour, frivolity and insensitivity were to nonhumans what Bernard Manning is to non-whites and non-English.

**Fantasy: Sentimentalism & Emotionalism**

To some extent this was the flipside to comedy. The fantasy consisted of the necessity of animal use and a dream-world of caring humanity which, in the shape of end-of-news animal stories, often went beyond the anodyne, to mawkishness.

Emotion and sentimentality were: perfectly acceptable, even *de rigueur*, and without limit, when the relationship was human-human; ambivalents when the relationship was human/nonhuman in welfarist terms (television was generally favourable, the press antipathetic although both favouring child-animal sentimentality); but certainly not acceptable when the relationship was human-nonhuman in an animal liberation context. Animals were denied the emotional space. The tactic in this struggle over meaning was to characterize even animal liberation — rationalist — as emotional and sentimental in order to denigrate it. And there was no aversion to the use of emotional blackmail:

Nearly 3 million animal experiments were performed in British laboratories last year ... Most of us can accept, albeit with discomfort, the necessity of such work. Few parents would put shampoo on their baby's hair without knowing that its low toxicity had already been proved.

First, the 'necessity' fantasy (a host of cruelty-free and animal-free shampoos have been on the market for decades), then the sentimental example, a formidable coupling. Note also the mythology of vivisection's authority and validity.

*Heart of the Matter* was concerned that 'the case for those who are suffering and might benefit from animal experiments is rarely heard', a fantasy in itself. The opening and closing sequences, sandwiching a host of interviews and a studio debate, focused on a wheelchair-bound vivisectionist displaying his stated love for animals by petting ponies and cuddling a new-born pup. And a photograph in *The Independent* showed (again without the slightest hint of intentional irony) a
Farmer, eating a beef pasty, while pleading sympathy in a town centre for a Union Jack-draped prize heifer ('Dolly') 'who would have to be killed if a (BSE-related) 36-month cull were enforced'.

Regular sights in the press, especially at weekends and holidays were pictures of children petting or feeding animals on farms. Scenes from the slaughterhouse would have been more 'real' perhaps. Indeed, the idea that there are no slaughterhouses or that they exist due to someone else was illustrated by the 'Malmesbury Two' episode. When this pair of pigs escaped from a Wiltshire slaughterhouse in January 1998, the media reacted as if the orthodox were not animal-eaters, as if the pigs were heroic, as if some other system were responsible for the animal rearing and killing industry. A practising slaughterman was even brought on to wish them the best of luck.

Fantasy also contributed towards the debilitating nature of speciesism, the inability to see beyond the norm, as if it marked the limits of reality and its possibilities. In an attempt to rear 'organic chicken' — giving them a 'brief but glorious life before eventually meeting the Paxo packet' — at an affordable price, Paul Heiney queried the practice of feeding 'fish meal' to chickens. Finding difficult the role of paragon, he agonized thus:

What's the point anyway? All you are doing is turning one form of protein into another. Why not eat the fish in the first place? The trouble is, if I do not have the fish meal in the chicks' rations they will grow so slowly that I shall end up with table birds more expensive than lobster. Then the world would demand more lobster instead and they, in turn, would be consigned to a hellish intensive farming system.

Of course, it is impossible to be entirely sound from an ecological point of view. If I were, my conscience would not let me eventually wrap the dressed chickens in plastic bags, or even paper ones. So, for the moment I am carrying on with the fishy feed ... trying hard to be good and finding it difficult.

One could unpack this statement indefinitely but suffice to say that Heiney seemed to be trapped within the fantasy where protein equates with animal products, where fish death is ignored (just as a euphemism is used for chicken slaughter) within constructed hierarchies of protein, suffering and value, and where animal use and his own involvement in it were inevitable. He was unaware that lobsters were
already intensively kept, and that — as vegans would have it — ecological soundness can be far more nearly approached via non-animal food production. It was the cognitive and cultural, and not the material, limitations that created the obstacles to being 'good'. And the fantasy was not without its own anthropomorphism:

Rani the elephant, turning 30 and in her statuesque prime, has finally packed her trunk, said goodbye to the circus and gone to Southend for a rest. Like any star, she would probably sit down and cry if she knew she would never again hear the roar of the crowd ... 41.

This fantastic notion of animals being thankful for their human-dictated role — just as cattle would willingly offer themselves up to the knife and cats help humans find cures42 (and see Birke & Michael 1998) — also characterized a Times leader. Implicitly accepting animal consciousness on this occasion, it claimed that animals enjoyed interaction with humans, citing sheepdogs, budgerigars and sea lions, who 'seem to enjoy having something to do'43.

But this dream-world of a caring humanity which had come into existence in order to worry about how it exploited animals or to save other species from ennui was too much for some, and yet their reaction to it seemed perverse. Jo-Ann Goodwin began in The Guardian with: 'Why are the British so pathetic about animals?' giving as her first, and hardly representative example, hunt saboteurs. A clutch of off-the-peg ascriptions — self-indulgent, inadequate, arrested development, self-loathing, emotional cripples (virtually the same labels Brophy had anticipated in 1965) — was then applied to anyone who could be identified with animals. So, Beatrix Potter, CS Lewis, Richard Adams, vegetarians, vegans, hunt saboteurs, donkey sanctuarists, pet owners and even pet breeders were all reduced to the same person — like animals, the Other. She ended with a plea for a 'reality':

We ought, as a nation, to grow up and stop trying to pretend that Peter Rabbit is still our best friend. In the greater scheme of things, the worst of humanity is worth considerably more than the best of bunnies44.

This is, of course, and yet invisible to Goodwin, the reality we already have, the
one that Montaigne railed against in the sixteenth century and Salt in the nineteenth. It exhibits the same fear as Tester in his conflation of animal liberation and society. Animal liberation (from the vegan model) could well respond by suggesting that the attempt to ‘grow up’ may be best assisted by weaning from milk. And notably it is only the orthodox who refer to rabbits as ‘bunnies’.

Beastly Animals!

We should also pay attention here to the media’s ubiquitous, derogatory use of the term(s) ‘animal(s)’ — used as if it were a legitimate metaphor or simile — where cultural approval is lent to negative feelings. And this is where we begin to see the spectre of animal liberation and its cronies.

At root was the horror of human animality. First the denial: ‘... we are not animals’45 or ‘about 120,000 years ago we ceased being animals and became civilized human beings’46. Interestingly, the two bogus claims come from different sources; the first Renaissance humanist, the second biological/evolutionary, both somewhat detached from Aristotle’s recognition of human animality, though retaining Aristotelian notions of hierarchy. As did a BBC TV advertisement for Ceefax subtitles but in a different way. It illustrated the range of programmes where the Ceefax facility was used, each example accompanied by the voice-over’s comment. When a wildlife programme was shown, the voiceover said ‘From wildlife ...’ and when a news programme was shown, the voiceover said ‘... to real life’47. The continually reinforced human/animal dualism gave rise to the convention of what Adams (1990) calls the absent referent: ‘He beat me like a dumb animal’48 and ‘You walk in here and kick her like a dog’49, which reduces nonhumans to insignificance, validates cruelty and ignores the connecting oppressions. The disturbing cultural norm of casual, ‘invisible’ cruelty to animals also emerged, unchallenged as was always the case, in news and documentary interviews: ‘Instead of coming home and kicking the cat, they kick the wife and kids’50.

When those disliked or disapproved of are labelled Animals!, the species is not specified, of course: as long as it is beyond the barrier, on the other side of the
culturally-drawn line where all other animals — lions, amoebae, rabbits, spiders, sharks, earwigs, chimpanzees, worms — become The Animal humans no longer are. And where animal individuality is again denied. People become 'animals' when they get behind the wheel of a car

Or when they regress collectively. The cover of The Sunday Times supplement, 'The Culture', illustrated its lead article, 'Return of the Dark Ages: Norman Stone on the rise of barbarian culture' with a photograph of contemporary pinstriped man overdraped in a raw animal fur, brandishing an animal bone as a weapon. Civilized is using technological weapons and wearing processed skins and furs.

The situation became even more complex and, in another conflation of bloody and bloodless cultures, the orthodox fixation was projected onto liberationists as if they too thought along these lines. In a baroque twist on the use of the term beastly, Robin Page wrote a pro-hunting piece in The Telegraph titled 'Winter's tales about friendly Mr Fox and his beastly pursuers'. Reducing others to orthodoxy's standard again, 'beastly' is how he thought hunt saboteurs saw hunters. And, in a case of further misreading, of a fantasy within fantasy, Philip Howard in The Times thought that 'animal' had ceased to be a 'politically acceptable' insult, when 'animals are perceived as victims not vicious'. But by whom?

All that was wrong with humans could be offloaded onto a failure to rise sufficiently above the animal, the Eliasian and Tester's Demand for Difference territory. What we think is animals' reality becomes our metaphor (see Adams 1994b: 184). And, as Baker (1993: 202) points out, even animal liberationists themselves have been denounced as animals, and significantly by a pet dog, in a 1990 Gaskill cartoon (on the occasion of an alleged 'ALF bomb' injuring a child). Liberationists were trebly beyond the pale: being associated with animals they were as insignificant as animals; injuring humans they were 'animals'; being denounced by a dog they were worse than animals, who themselves were better off without liberationists.
Exclusion

We have already encountered some representation of liberationists, and this leads
us into the territory(ies) of Exclusion and Denigration, strategies reserved for those
not participating in the instrumentalist-sentimentalist world of civilized, caring
humanity. We shall look at the Exclusion strategy first before proceeding to the
Denigrations at the beginning of the next chapter, although the former itself affords
the opportunity to conjure up lurid images of those denied access and real presence.
They remain spectres here, for the main exclusion is of liberation which, when not
entirely excluded, was allowed entry only for the purpose of ejecting or defeating,
setting up for a fall.

In debate and discussion on any animal issue, the host-chair was always of the
orthodox, for instance the notoriously partial Mary Warnock\textsuperscript{55}, and often a
journalist, for instance the anti-liberationist John Diamond, even when the
programme was not a regular one hosted necessarily by an anti-liberationist, such as
Jeremy Paxman. Another standard was to place pro-vivisection scientists on the
authoritative, trustworthy and value-influencing platform or panel and have
liberationists struggle to contribute from the mixed-opinion audience. Further,
whether by intent or because bloody culture thought-pattern precluded certain ways
of thinking, animal liberation was a non-starter as a problem solver.

This was another form of Invisibility but of animal liberation and liberationists
rather than animals. Generally, exclusion was evident in a lack of programmes and
articles dealing with the subject of animal liberation in its own right, although
animal welfare was conspicuous as a subject as well as an organizing principle.
Despite the presence of four million vegetarians in the UK, vegetarian cookery
programmes were not featured, vegetarian dishes only appearing sparingly within
the plethora of ‘omnivore’ cookery programmes shown during the chronic BSE crisis,
reflecting a designated status of bloodless culture food as merely a temporary change
of meal — try Chinese, Italian, French, Indian, vegetarian, vegan cuisine; ethnic
rather than ethical. And no other kind of programmes for vegetarians who
outnumber many other groups who do have their own programmes, again reflecting a
bias against a group that seeks to effect fundamental change. (One may not expect to find vegan cookery programmes due to vegans' lower population numbers perhaps, although vegans too outnumber other groups enjoying dedicated programmes, but the media and others do tend to equate animal liberation with vegetarianism).

Similarly, many animal liberation events such as street demonstrations, mass rallies and economic sabotage were just not covered at all, but more interesting perhaps and related to this, was the practice of selectivity of exclusion, excluding from news reports actions in which many rather than a few liberationists were engaged. For instance, The Telegraph used a large photograph and a small report to cover one anti-fur demonstrator dumping a dead raccoon on the Vogue editor's plate in a New York restaurant.\(^56\) The Guardian ran a similar piece of coverage of a small number of protestors at the Damien Hirst restaurant where skinned cows' heads create the ambience.\(^57\) But there was no national media coverage of the many actions taken, by hundreds of people, in the UK and abroad, in support of imprisoned ALF activist Barry Horne's hunger strike during the same period (although there was coverage of the 'terrorist' as he neared death in a subsequent hunger strike in late 1998). What was included were items which involved controversial public individuals and personal objection. What was excluded was that which struck at the heart of institutionalized animal use, unless the striking — like 'violence' — could be easily condemned and attention diverted from the system that provoked it. So, the rescue/theft of animals from establishments is no longer covered, lest it afford animal liberation sympathy, perhaps, but their wildlife- and pet-endangering release from fur farm cages is covered, and extensively,\(^58\) thus linking the demonized ALF with the demonized mink, both vermin when active outside of the normative frameworks.

**Exclusion**

Exclusion here refers to the more specific exclusion of animal liberation voices and the denial of animal liberation when the subject matter was human use of other animals. The media also generally excluded animal liberation voices from reports on animal-based scientific and agricultural 'progress' as if there were no controversy
and no animal liberationist claims. Events, issues, situations were presented as if there were no animal liberation 'experts’. This was not so much a case of extra ideological weight being given to primary definers, so establishing and maintaining a high degree of cultural closure (see, e.g. Stevenson 1995: 36), as weight given to them only.

So, during the 1995 Science Week, BBC2’s Newsnight held a studio debate on science, contributors to which included David Hunt MP and spokespersons from Friends of the Earth, Body Shop, Green Alliance, ICI, Merck and the almost inevitable journalist (Richard D North), but no anti-vivisectionist (abolitionist). Indeed, the mythical status of science as a carrier of miracles, and the potency of 'scientific research', were still very evident in the countless media items which referred to the latest 'breakthrough'. If it could be related to children's health or cancer or both, so much the better; animal liberation was especially insignificant here, in much the same way as one never or rarely hears voices objecting to space research or indeed to capitalism. To a large extent animal issue discussion constituted a 'science' discourse drawing on scientists (or their media representatives) as the primary arbiters of right and wrong, true and false, real and imagined (see, e.g. Hansen 1991: 452). But not animal liberation scientists, an exclusion essential to the maintenance of the myth of 'animal lovers' being anti-science. Most one of these dubious breakthroughs had vivisection at its source and yet hardly ever was an anti-vivisectionist invited to comment on the ethics and/or scientific (in)validity of the practice. So, even the ethics of cloning and xenotransplantation were pronounced upon by animal-using scientists (although The Guardian published a 250-word article by animal defence philosopher Mary Midgley condemning the practice of cloning). Science was pushing the boundaries of the morally acceptable (the horrors of the developmental stages of cloning, for instance, being scrupulously censored by the media) and the public would catch up with this progress once realizing the balance of benefits. Other forms of thought, knowledge and progress were devalued in the process.

The faith in the animal use-science combination was so great that, even in an age
when efficiency is the watchword, the fundamental inefficiency of animal-based agriculture went without mention, the praise going not to non-animal systems but to genetic engineering development (albeit with qualms about the consequences for humans). That is, to the extension of the existing system which followed only its own cultural logic and taken-for-grantedness. Lack of necessity becomes dire need. Equating animal use with essential progress served to delegitimize protest.

As a rider to the concept of faith in science as a definer of reality, BBC1 Six o’Clock News reported on experiments at Pennsylvania State University which were leading to the conclusion that pigs ‘are intelligent’. The reporter told viewers that ‘It may be difficult to believe, but it seems there may be brains behind the bacon’61. Pigs are not intelligent until science determines it (and then goes on using them). This also highlights the scientistic exclusion of the intuitive and instinctive which, despite critiques of animal liberation rationalism, are inherent in the ‘benefit of the doubt’ stances of the philosophers. The results of the experiments may amaze the orthodox — who will want more of such and conflicting evidence, ad infinitum, before acting upon it — but liberationists would be amazed that the experiments were required at all. That pigs are intelligent is either ‘obvious’ or irrelevant or both. Exclusion of liberationist voices from such reports was possibly due not just to their being lost for words but also to the ruling out of consideration the ‘logical’ (non-tool, non-‘bacon’) direction the human-porcine relationship should now take.

Generally when the science tended to favour the liberationist case, liberationists were excluded all the more, serving to prevent consolidation. Independent research condemning deer hunting was reported with comments from the hunt but none from the anti-hunt, and the COMA and World Cancer Research recommendations to cut down on meat consumption on the basis of a meat-cancer link were reported with comments from the Meat & Livestock Commission and butchers but no vegetarians, let alone vegans62.

In a more regular exclusive pattern, whilst BBC1’s Question Time panellists included politicians, company bosses, charity bosses, ecologists, conservationists,
journalists, academics, blacks, women, chefs and comedians — that is, as representatives of a particular standpoint — no animal liberationists appeared on the panel of authority (and rarely appeared even in the non-authoritative audience). Aside from such denial of liberationist legitimacy, expertise and possibly articulacy, and the exclusion of any viewpoint that may contest the framing of debate, never mind offering opposing views within it, other forms of exclusion took advantage of the absentees who could thereby be referred to in shadowy terms and spoken for. A few examples:

A Guardian report on the RSPCA defending the safety of Aintree’s Grand National course extensively quoted the welfarist charity’s equine consultant, the clerk of the course, a Jockey Club spokesman, and the trainer of the 1997 winner, but no animal liberationist, just a reference to the ‘animal rights faction’ not being appeased63.

BBC1 Six o’Clock News heralded the start of the hunting season with an interview from a Master of Foxhounds who spoke of the violence against hunters from saboteurs, though no saboteur was interviewed64. And on the opening of the London Aquarium, BBC1 Six o’Clock News mentioned briefly that some people opposed the use of animals in such a facility and then countered it with a conservationist saying how such considerations were outweighed by conservation needs. The rest of the item consisted of a series of people connected to the Aquarium, extolling its virtues65.

An alternative version of exclusion was for the orthodox representative to play the friendly Devil’s Advocate. In The Goldring Audit, the superficial critiques of various animal using practices came only from Mary Goldring herself and not from source. The routine destruction or abandonment of foals and horses who did not live up to expectations (as racing industry money-earners) was, therefore, afforded unchallenged defence66.

**Partial Exclusion: Imbalance**

This was where a liberationist or, more likely, a welfarist voice was present but given far less time or weight than those representing the orthodox, yet within an
ostensible framework of balance. An extension of this exercise was to tip the balance
in favour of the orthodox — and at the last minute or shortly after the event. At the
end of Heart of the Matter which asked the question, ‘Is vegetarianism morally superi-
or to meat-eating?’, host Joan Bakewell tucked in to a steak67. BBC’s Six o’Clock News
carried an item on xenotransplants in which the ‘debate’ involved first a pro speaker,
then an anti. These were then followed by an interview with a patient who was wait-
ing for a transplant operation68. The Independent gave 200 words to a British Field
Sports Society spokesperson to speak up in defence of hare coursing (the Waterloo
Cup) which had been covered in a reasonably balanced piece the day before. No such
follow-up space was given to the antis69. On Newsnight, Jeremy Paxman pl-
antage sided with Telegraph columnist RWF Poole in order to ridicule Britain’s
leading fox expert Professor Stephen Harris’s statistical research results which
undermined fox demonology70. A few weeks later, Poole used his column to
review the discussion and criticise the ‘well-meaning’ Harris still further. The
argument had taken place ‘under the kindly eye of Jeremy Paxman’ and ‘Both
Paxman and I choked a bit at that’ (one of Harris’s statistics)71.

When allowed space or time, condemnations of animal use were paired with a
defence from the industry in question, usually along welfarist and cruelty lines thus
precluding liberationist debate; but celebrations of animal use were rarely paired
with dissent from animal liberationists or even welfarists. So, when a television
programme held the promise of free liberationist speech this was not in fact the
case. There was always something to undermine it, whether strong or weak. For
instance, Counterblast: It Shouldn’t Happen to a Pet launched an attack on pet
keeping and the pet business. But, perhaps in the interests of ‘balance’ (by which
routine anti-animal liberation programmes were not encumbered), it also included
(was forced to include?) counter views from pet owners, who ‘couldn’t do’ without
their pets72.

War Cries: Angels of Mercy? (note the question mark) gave animal liberationists the
rare opportunity to explain why they were active against animal use. But this was
undercut by intermittent on-screen statements announcing that the scientists who
were invited to appear had declined due to ‘fear for their lives’. And, in case it was becoming obvious that animal use was not a simple matter, that opposition constituted serious argument, or that the issue was spiralling out of the control of normative thought, the programme was immediately followed by a reductive, sentimental, binary-reinforcing trailer for the following week’s programme which would ... tell the story from the other side. A heart surgeon says why he thinks humans are more important than animals73. The liberationists had not claimed the reverse.

Inbuilt imbalance was also regularly scheduled. In a weekly set-piece of ‘balanced’ commentary, the Radio Times featured articles by the anti-animal liberation journalist Polly Toynbee, and others by the tame, token vegetarian DJ John Peel. Strident views were balanced against balanced views. Presented with the golden opportunity of commenting on anti-liberationist Jonathan Meades’s cliché-ridden television programme J’Accuse: The Vegetarians74, Peel’s defence of vegetarianism was about as weak as it could be — ‘Perhaps I am not a very good vegetarian anyway’75. The end point of these is that order is restored, and fairly; the opposition has been ‘given a chance’, and seen off.

Moving the Goalposts

Liberationists’ main arguments and values were often excluded or sidelined in favour of some easier ground on which to preserve the status quo, or reduced to something (anything) which the culture considered to be more important than other animals and the liberationist ethic. National Vegetarian Week gained a small, frivolous feature on The Good Food Show, which reduced animal eating to a matter of taste or fashionable lifestyle choice76, and The Sunday Times promoted cormorant fishing in Japan as a holiday feature, which included a ‘taste is everything’ finale:

All the same, some people will consider the fishing cruel, and will think of the riversmelt, highly regarded in Japan, as a delicacy, with tainted antecedents. I did hesitate myself for a moment, before I bit into my helping of barbecued fish. For a different reason, though. Was I sure I fancied eating fish which had been regurgitated by a cormorant? A queasy thought. But it tasted so good that soon I did not care77.
BBC2's four-part series, *Meat*, looked at our 'changing' attitudes toward the cooked flesh of other animals. Carnivores' Club members — many of them quality press journalists — were quoted extensively, and all the 'experts' were animal-eaters. Against all this, a vegetarian failed, predictably, to convince a bunch of rugby players that the vegetarian food he had prepared for them tasted better than 'meat'. Seen off again.

Emphasis could also be shifted to another context. In the revealingly titled *The Trouble with Animals* (and see *Denigration: Problem*), Sarah Dunant presented a superficially balanced in-depth programme on animal liberation. Peter Singer and Stephen Clark made rare appearances in order to articulate part of the case and were countered by another philosopher and, perhaps inevitably, a couple of journalists. But attention was suddenly switched to the Cree Indians — hunters whose culture and livelihood were presented as being threatened by animal liberation. That is, instead of concentrating on the same main ground focused upon by the liberationists — animal-based agriculture and experimentation (and notably, the American Tom Regan, who overtly condemns hunting in *The Case*, was absent) — the ground was shifted to a different context, and ethics were displaced by the practicalities of a native culture for which there was a growing liberal ethnographic affection. (The context could have been, say, the north east of Scotland where culture and livelihood presently 'depend' on farming animals for 'beef' although, in a climate of BSE and Scottish 'meat'-related E-coli scandals, they could not be guaranteed the same sympathy). The implication was that if animal liberation appeared disadvantageous to Cree Indians then British animal-using practices were justified. Further, once the scene had been shifted to a native culture, concern was not extended to, say, Amazonian peoples whose livelihood and culture had been destroyed by cattle ranching. Moving the Goalposts is a close relative of redefinition of which we shall see more later under *Confusing & Redefining*. 

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False Dichotomy & Polarization

The more formal framing of discussion and debate took the style of a false dichotomy where an exclusive choice was constructed within which the 'commonsense' option was made inevitable, its case overwhelming the weakly portrayed claims of a selected alternative. Additional options, notably those of liberationists, for instance non-animal agriculture and medical research, were excluded from the reductionist exercise as forbidden options, roads not shown on bloody culture's map.

In an article titled 'Don't knock intensive farming — bar the slug pellets' the choice was between intensive and organic farming systems, both animal-based, and the Jeremy Paxman-fronted You Decide asked 'Should we end factory farming?' (and not 'Should we end animal-based agriculture?').

The third part of the television series, Meat, followed the same line, with the added bonus of holding the 'extremists' as a threat on the outer edge of the debate in order to encourage the only sane choice. But, despite the rare admission that the export of live calves was due to the milk industry discarding surplus offspring at a few days old, and the observation that if the country went organic the country couldn't be fed (two of veganism's concerns), the question of veganic (vegan-organic) agriculture was not considered. Bloody culture logic would not extend that far, and could not recognize it as fundamental to an alternative culture, or perhaps the very obstacle was that it could, fearfully.

When liberation concerns were brought into view, hoary reductionist frames of antagonism, conflict, competition, and sentimentalism were the common coin. On Newsnight, Jeremy Paxman asked, 'How many dogs are worth the life of a single child?' throughout Heart of the Matter, Joan Bakewell asked anti-vivisectionists if they believed human life to be more valuable than animal life; and twenty years after Animal Liberation, Peter Singer was still being asked which trapped animal he would save first, a deer or a human. These were the dead
weight of orthodox articulate thought, understanding stopped in its tracks by authoritative cliché. Clichés are usually born of 'truth' but this is 'truth' born of cliché, with reality emerging from the underlying fundamental dyads. If there is a human to be saved, the media will be trying to paint other animals into the picture in order to create a dilemma, a crisis — for which moral rules are not made — from which the everyday — for which moral rules are made — can be extrapolated and reinforced; generalizing from and institutionalizing the preferred exceptional. There is something here too of the journalistic, scientific, positivist need for the black and white, the hierarchic and a winners/losers framing, or frame-up.

Polarization was a close relative of False Dichotomy and applied more to the liberation movement itself, pitching welfarists against 'terrorists' thus excluding the bulk of liberationists who inhabit the middle ground or travel another road. An article in The Observer reported that a series of secret meetings between pro- and anti-vivisectionists had been taking place over the last couple of years, attended by 'every significant anti-vivisectionist ... bar the out and out terrorists' (emphasis added). In fact, no major anti-vivisection organization, nor the anti-vivisectionist Animal Aid, was involved at all.

This was apparent also in The Telegraph where the ethical debate concerned only animal welfare where, on the pro-animal side one found either the welfarist Compassion in World Farming or 'animal rights fanatics'- 'the balaclava brigade' but no-one in between. Non-animal agriculture and non-terroristic liberationists were unthinkable, non-existent or barred entry. The exclusive or heavily-weighted either-or scenarios betrayed a fear of: the other's liberation; the potential collapse of the known; and a different way of seeing.

Omission

By omission, information was omitted which may have carried the threat of gaining sympathy and respectability for animal liberation or raising uncomfortable thoughts to challenge the 'common sense' of animal use. Again, a sense of forbidden or impossible knowledge.
A full-page *Sunday Times* article on the antibiotic Septrin which 'has been linked to a hidden toll of deaths and injuries' had nothing to say about the questionable scientific validity of animal testing. Similarly, an article in the *Independent* explored how, for instance, and somewhat belatedly, science has become as much a problem as a solution, but within the 1400 words there was no mention of vivisection and its own catastrophes. And the *Equinox* series investigated how much valuable research had been 'suppressed' by 'irrational fears' of scientific progress. These fears, lamentably, had suppressed pioneering primate head transplantation work.

The other questions — how much valuable research had been prevented, and how many valuable drugs rejected, by the animal experiments paradigm — were not considered. As in the 'cure around the corner' mythology, animal-based research could never be shown to be failing humanity. It was an article of blind faith, as was animal eating, preserved in a report on 'Medical advances set to cut cancer deaths by a third':

Lung cancer, currently accounting for 38,500 deaths annually, could be cut by 30 per cent as smoking decreases. Bowel cancer kills 20,000 people, but this could be cut by 40 per cent with improved screening (emphases added).

Lung cancer was self-inflicted; bowel cancer was nature-inflicted. Smoking should decrease, animal-eating can continue with better science. (Interestingly, uncooked or undercooked meat carries risks of food poisoning: it is the cooking of meat — the sign of the social and civilized — that forms cancer-causing heterocyclic animes [see, e.g. Barnard 1997]).

Whilst the stories behind animal products and animal-using practices usually went unrecorded (unless they were 'excesses': see *Naturalizing & Universalizing: Excesses*), this was not the case if an animal-using industry was in real danger of demise. That is, if an animal exploiting practice was challenged, readers and viewers were informed about the hidden suffering and hardships that could ensue if it were halted (the 'prohibitive cost of change' syndrome). For instance, BBC1 Six o'Clock *News* carried a report on the last meet of the Quantock Stag Hunt, leaving...
viewers with a final shot of the hounds behind a fence, and the voiceover worrying about their fate. However, this again only went so far, typically omitting to mention that hunt hounds are routinely abandoned or shot when either not up to the job or too old, at around six years of age. (Also see Promotion: Fantasy).

Only Connect I: Problems & Solutions

Just as animal use was generally seen on a single issue basis, never considered as a whole, the target broken up, animal liberation was only ever seen in its single issues — anti-vivisection, vegetarianism, etc. — and yet a single issue status of animal liberation as a discrete whole was sustained, in its rejection, by media failure or unwillingness to connect it to other related issues. (Ironically, this negative “single issue' status assigned to it also, inadvertently, afforded animal liberation its comprehensive principle). Coverage of animal liberation routinely decontextualized it, or limited the context of incidents, events and situations. The tendency towards one dimensionality militated against what animal liberation would consider to be its problem-solving potential. But contemporary speciesism itself was not problematized: animal liberation was, then, offering solutions to problems which 'don’t exist’ or, as Roszak had pointed out, the tactic was to show that any problems arising were solvable, if at all, within the established ‘rules' of society and culture (and see e.g. McQuail 1994: 367). (The reader may be advised to study Appendix 1 before reading the following examples).

In an article for the Independent on world food resources, David Bellamy scared readers with statistics on the rising human population, dwindling fish stocks and grain harvests, but did not consider how the world’s exploding farmed animal populations use most of the world’s land and water resources, nor entertain the idea of non-animal agriculture. In its ‘Education’ section, a Guardian feature on water scarcity throughout the world did not consider the vast amounts of water used by animal-based agriculture, and ITV/Anglia’s Survival series looked at the problems of subsistence in the more hostile parts of the world, but its depictions did not lead on to a consideration of using land to feed people rather than using land to feed animals to feed people.
When some kind of acknowledgement of the animal-based farming problem was made, it was again not pursued. *The Natural World: Badlands* made the connection between the persecution of the prairie dog — because it ‘competes’ with human-produced and owned cattle for grazing land — and the decimation of wildlife, e.g. eagles, that depend on the prairie dog as a food source. But cattle ranching was still considered to be a fixed part of the equation. Likewise, fishing and fish farming were reported as being responsible for the killing of seals, cormorants and albatrosses, as if fishing and fish farming were as natural as the weather.

This is as far as it went: on the problem of famine, a rare piece in *The Independent* discussed vegetarianism and food distribution, and suggested that: ‘If everyone on Earth were vegetarian, there would be just enough food for us all’.

*Only Connect II: Oppression-Oppression*

This was a more straightforward failure, to connect one abuse or oppression (condemned) with another (condoned).

In *Clive James in Buenos Aires*, the eponymous hero was typically hard on the human rights abuses in Argentina whilst happily immersing himself in the ‘glory’ of the ‘natural’ animal-exploiting macho culture of polo players and gauchos, of rodeos and barbecues. This ‘celebrity abroad’ genre was not notable for its famous tourist criticizing even local cruelties.

The next two examples link us back to our earlier sections on *Invisibility* and *Animals!. The Independent* (‘Does machismo face death in the bullring?’) was moved to carry a piece in celebration of the bullfight by a woman achieving status as a matador in Spain: she ‘has cojones’ remarked journalist Elizabeth Nash. The bull, usually visible in condemnations of bullfighting, had suddenly become invisible (as a woman became visible, as a man; a triumph for liberal rather than cultural or eco feminism, perhaps).
The Promised Land series focused on the northward migration of blacks during the 1940s-1970s to escape the hostilities and penury of work on the plantations where they were 'Beaten like animals', 'Living like dogs', 'Shot down like a dog'. Many of those who travelled north took jobs in the feed lots and slaughterhouses of Chicago, but the oppression connections and awful, glaring irony were lost on the programme-makers who settled for the simile validation of animal cruelties. (Incidentally, and in contrast, Adams [1990: 51] reminds us of how Upton Sinclair's novel, The Jungle, used the operations of the Chicago slaughterhouse as a metaphor for the fate of the worker in capitalism. But the descriptions of slaughter made the 'absent referent' [animals] all too present and thus overwhelmed the metaphor).
Chapter 7

*Media Representation: Part Two*

**Ideological Strategies**

**Denigration**

Largely, this far more offensive strategy served to tell animal liberation, liberationists and the various publics just what animal liberation was; a media-determined identity, and usually within a unifying ‘we’ discourse. Again, animal liberation is being spoken for and about, depicted here in negative terms, as bad company. Media representation consisted of mug-shots of the undesirable liberationists, who could be depicted in any fashion (a point also made by Baker 1993) — the inadequates, the motley crew, the theriophiles, the ‘animal lovers’, the politically correct, the nutters, the extremists, the violent, the terrorists, the ‘animals’, who were also fighting amongst themselves. In contrast to Exclusion, there was always room for the troublemakers and freaks in this rhetoric of othering, where the norm was reinforced by pointing to concrete examples of what it is not (see, e.g. Murdock 1981: 207). There was an element of myth here too:

... myth prefers to work with poor, incomplete images, where the meaning is already relieved of its fat, and ready for signification, such as caricatures, pastiches, symbols, etc. (Barthes 1993: 127).

And, following on from Chapter 5 where we identified an incomprehension of animal liberation, we can note just how liberation and liberationists are labelled sick and depraved. Perhaps the ultimate sign of their sickness and the ultimate affront to speciesist decency was to value ‘animals above humans’ (and, by extension, nature above culture, body above mind, the very inverse of orthodoxy, or what can only be seen as an inverse within the limitations of orthodox binary cognitions). Depicting liberationists as extreme served to validate the centre (a tactic noted by other researchers of different issues), a centre where animal love is kept in proportion.
Most of this section consists of stereotypes, to accompany the rash of clichés, but the section breaks these down into several distinct types, the first being the more obvious range which tended to be the standard fare of television drama.

**Stereotyping**

Essentializing, reductionist and naturalizing, stereotyping symbolically fixes 'difference' and boundaries. It is part of the maintenance of social and symbolic order, bonding the normal together, maintaining purity; and it tends to occur where there are gross inequalities of power (see, e.g. Hall 1997c: 258-259).

Within this representational practice, liberationists were deviants and so was anyone else who could be linked or confused with the cause. Not only were they a deviation from the norm but, because of their identification with something which could not really be taken that seriously or comprehended — animals and their liberation — ulterior motives or other reasons were found for that identification. Any form of what was considered overidentification with animals was fair game, like animals themselves. Animal liberation was used as a trope not just for those things that the norm finds execrable but in a redirecting at animal liberation of society's negative cognitive models of animals.

It was animal defenders, of any hue, who were the (generally inconsistent) oddballs, often the *personae non grata* of ideological fictions. The stock of whipping boys that television drama could draw upon included animal liberationists who could also be drug addicts-dealers as well as terrorists who, for instance and perhaps ultimately, valued animal life more than the search for a cure for childhood cancer. Alternatively, by being often portrayed comfortably as wimps or eccentrics, they counterbalanced the more threatening challenge of the ALF.

In BBC1's *Ballykissangel* series a ram was hoisted in a crate above a crowded local fair. In response to a woman who objected to the wheeze, the village priest (the good guy) pronounced that the animal had no soul, it didn't think. The woman was the local eccentric and drunk. In *Only Fools and Horses*, it was a mad axeman escapee.
who hated both anglers and people who ate fish\textsuperscript{104}; in \textit{A Touch of Frost}, hunt saboteurs were portrayed as a riff-raff collection of anarchists and thieves\textsuperscript{105}; in \textit{Common as Muck}, it was the retarded character who said, about two dead rabbits poached by a workmate: 'They should be running about a field, they should\textsuperscript{106}; and in \textit{Cracker}, a man went crazy, shaved off all his hair, killed a Pakistani shopkeeper and a police psychologist, but was shown to love cats\textsuperscript{107}. \textit{Between the Lines} depicted an animal rights group as seedy 'veggie lunatics' and 'the fruit and nut gang' living in a squat and led by a crackpot. That the leader turned out not to be an animal liberationist at all, but an industrial spy, did nothing to undermine the depiction, for that was his 'authentic' cover\textsuperscript{108}.

Such images and identities were never undercut by irony or subverted by a developing narrative, and liberationists (and those who, in typical media confusion, were considered their ilk) fared hardly any better in non-fiction. The casual loaded reference — Peter Hughes in \textit{The Times} opened an article on travel with the words: 'It is a paradox of tourism that, like cat lovers, it is kinder to animals than it is to people'\textsuperscript{109}. And the full-blown assault — in television's \textit{Expert Witness}, a reconstruction of the case of ALF activist Keith Mann and the events leading up to his arrest and imprisonment, he was portrayed as a human hater, fanatic and terrorist, wearing leather boots, frightening little girls in supermarkets, conspiring in vans stiff with chainsmoking, balaclava'd characters or in dimly lit rooms draped with banners. Searching for Mann after his escape, police were shown talking to a Mann 'associate' — who just happened to be a street performance fire-eater. The programme also constructed incidents which did not happen in order to demonstrate what Mann could have done, for instance a car was shown exploding. Adding insult to injury, Celia Hammond, former fashion model turned cat sanctuarist, and unwitting one-time employer of Mann, was inaccurately depicted as seedy and obese\textsuperscript{110}.

One of the regular columnists promoting bloodsports was R W F Poole who wrote a 'Country Diary' in \textit{The Telegraph} and who represented 'animal rights campaigners' with this equally bizarre collection of clichés in just one splenetic article:
[those] that I have managed to talk to sound equally ignorant ... they patently understand little about animal welfare ... their "love of animals" is a furry cloak for hatred of people ... the sincerity of this hatred ... is based on ... good old class hatred; and now that God is dead, PC has replaced prayer ... and they are more concerned about their own mortality than immortality ... Anything involving death reminds them that one day they too must die, and this they cannot face ... what nicer thing to worship than something nice and furry with big brown eyes\textsuperscript{11}.

The major themes running through these representations are irrationality and, because animal liberation rationality is identified with the irrational and insignificant Other, an incomprehension which automatically ascribes ulterior motives in order to make (common) sense of it. The ulterior motives are rendered into the familiar and knowable, indeed to the very motives of the orthodox — hierarchically-determined class- (or species class-) based self-interest. And if the orthodox have little serious time for animals, animal liberation must then have little time for real humans, who know the facts of life. The binary distinction disallows concern for (and the imagination to comprehend concern for) both human and animal rights; it must be human rights and animal welfare. (And someone had to take the ‘animal rights bible’ tag literally).

In the \textit{Times Magazine}, John Diamond began with the common appeal to readers' solidarity, bonding us, the normal, the insiders, with hyperbole and sarcasm:

So how shall we, you and I, celebrate the World Day for Laboratory Animals today? Should we perhaps go out and shoot a few diabetics? Or maybe we could join in a jolly pill-crawl of our local hospitals, taking cancer patients off their chemotherapy treatments? Perhaps by way of showing how unspeciesist we are, we could release a few smallpox viruses into the water supply and set loose live rats in the nearest nursery school.\textsuperscript{12}

Diamond claimed also, quite inaccurately, that anti-vivisectionists found that their ethical argument wasn't working (because most animals vivisected are not 'cuddly') and had lately switched their argument to scientific invalidity. The piece also included the almost obligatory suggestion that anti-vivisectionists had a hidden agenda and stated too, again entirely inaccurately, that 'more energy is put into promoting the anti-vivisection case than the vegetarian one' (though this may be the situation in the USA, see Finsen & Finsen 1994: 268-269). A couple of months later, Diamond wrote about the response he expected to this and other similar
pieces: '... no less than a couple of bricks through the window' and, having not received them (yet), recycled the article for *The Observer* ("Of Mice and Men and Militants: John Diamond mauls animal lovers with no time for humans"). In a further diatribe, against vegetarians, Diamond, à la Tester as much of this territory is, spread the fallacy that contemporary vegetarianism was merely vanity (health and slimness') dressed up in a cloak of morality. In her own incomprehension, journalist Anne Robinson was also sure that liberationists had ulterior motives:

I am ... suspicious of individuals who want to ban something. Too often I find they prefer to police other people’s lives because their own are too messy to bear close attention. I wonder why the saboteurs with dreadlocks and rings through their noses do not usefully park their camper vans outside Battersea Dogs’ Home and volunteer to assist in relieving the suffering of domestic pets ... I wonder where it will all end. Perhaps eventually the protestors will dispense with excuses and simply pour paint over Volvo, BMW and Mercedes estates on the rather more straightforward basis of: ‘I don’t like you’.

When Robinson bowed out, her ‘Diary’ place was taken by Germaine Greer, another prominent opponent of animal liberation who, in the *Independent Magazine*, had already opted for the same ulterior motives strategy in order to explain the campaign against fur. It had ‘... little to do with animal liberation and a lot to do with class antagonism’. She went on, in quite typical ignorance (and elevating leather to crucial proportions), to claim that ‘no attempt has been made to discredit the wearing of leather’ for that ‘would bring home to most English people just how much they had to lose if they espoused animal rights’. (Both the Vegetarian and Vegan Societies and Animal Aid have been discrediting the wearing of leather since their inceptions). That there is more to be lost than gained in an intervention is, of course, classic revolution-negating stuff.

We have to accept however, that some of the incomprehension may be more related to genuine simple-mindedness or utter ‘blindness’ than to disingenuous ideological strategy, but the same incomprehension shone through. Lynne Truss ridiculed the Campaign for the Abolition of Angling because ‘I could never love a fish’ and because attacking anglers was ‘like attacking a person for quietly reading a magazine’. Despite the long history of vegetarianism, she was astonished that anyone could claim that ‘Fish have rights’. In not untypical ‘priorities’ mode she was amazed
that anyone could care for fish when there was a war going on in Bosnia, although it
was not made clear how a concern over Bosnia precluded dispensing with angling and
fish. We could suggest that projecting worry out towards a distant atrocity whilst
trivializing the here and now serves to excuse not taking responsibility for one's own
daily actions, and denies the possibility of recognizing the expanded war 'front'. On
the other hand, one can suspect a more serious intent. This kind of approach is what
Barthes (1993: 35) called Blind and Dumb Criticism where the critic, professing not
to understand (or even not understanding at all), is in fact saying 'I don't understand,
therefore you are idiots'. Blindness and dumbness are elevated to a universal rule of
perception and to reject from the world animal liberationist thought.

However, there were some rare positive representations. ITV's London's Burning
offered a sympathetic portrayal in television drama, of a vegetarian anti-
vivisectionist (a member of the fire brigade who said: 'Those who sent the bomb
disgust me as much as the people who do the experiments'), despite a generally pro-
vivisection storyline with animal activists (that is, people who act on their beliefs
outside the private sphere) as the villains. In the Frank Stubbs series, animal
liberation campaigners protested at a pharmaceutical company's AGM. Although
they looked rough they were well-organized and articulate, and the programme
appeared to have sympathy with their case.

Politically Correct
The contemptuous 'politically correct' (or 'ultra politically correct' as The
Telegraph had it in relation to anti-speciesists) was a catch-all term applied to
anything or anyone perceived as carrying an ethic beyond the bloody culture norm; an
over-development of competing civilities. It allowed something (or someone) to be
held in bemused contempt when to name it (or them) more specifically would have
been to open up the possibility of its (or their) seriousness and potential. One
example will suffice. The Telegraph referred to the non-animal Cirque du Soleil as
'one of the new breed of politically correct circuses'. The newspaper could have
used 'ethical' or 'humane' as the adjectives instead but this would have necessitated
a redefinition of either term outside of the speciesist framework.
Sackcloth & Ashes: Puritans, Extremists, Fascists & Terrorists

The depiction of animal liberation and non-animal diets as extreme functioned as warnings to stay away, not to be brainwashed into this dangerous cult of zealots who, as in Tester's depictions, sought purity from the pollutions of animals and animal products. So negative terminology and association were commonplace: 'The taste of extremism: how healthy are macrobiotic and vegan lifestyles?'123, and 'Strict' vegetarians, 'strict' vegans and even 'strict' semi-vegetarians124, 125.

The purity to puritan range also gave rise to 'statements of fact' and fixed the world: 'Contemporary philosophers such as Tom Regan and Peter Singer offer a new vision of "animal rights" too puritanical to be enacted'126. Again the derision, the perception of animal liberation as going to the extremes of orthodoxy. We could say that the tag here confuses (in Hurne's terms) doctrinal puritan rigidity with the political puritans who maintained the highest principles of civil liberty. Their 'crime' is to include animals within it. The puritan label also takes us back to the sense-making ulterior motives accusation levelled against those who opposed bearbaiting, 'not because it gave pain to the bear, but because it gave pleasure to the spectators' (Macaulay).

The association of animal liberation with violence too was endemic (one can trace a liberationists = animals = nature = violence continuum), serving perhaps to deprive animal liberation of political status (though variously associated with fascism), and relegated to the level of criminality-irrationality. To name is to judge:

... deciding whether an action is terrorist ... is more the result of a verdict than the establishment of a fact; the formulating of a social judgement rather than the description of a set of phenomena. (Elliot et al 1986: 256).

An Independent article repeatedly alluded to bomb outrages and threats to animal experimenters as if these were the stock in trade of the animal liberation movement127. 'Animal extremists are thought to have destroyed premises in North Yorkshire'128.'Anarchists and animal rights extremists are planning a spring

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offensive ...’ (‘Mink hunters fear season of violence by extremists’)129. ‘Try telling that to an animal rights campaigner, though, and he’ll probably hit you’130. Hugh Fernley-Whittingstall wondered in an Independent feature if, as a result of his ‘eat anything’ cookery series, ‘some real (sic) militants will fire-bomb my house’131.

It was not always quite so straightforward. Reducing an issue to an easily condemned tactic seemed also to be the delegitimizing function of the BBC on the abandonment of the 1997 Grand National, due to IRA bomb threats. At the time of the decision to abandon the meeting (and despite the police having announced that they had received at least one IRA coded message) the Grandstand team gave viewers the impression that the ‘bombs’ were the work of an ‘animal rights’ outfit. Distraught horse trainer Jenny Pitman spoke of ‘these people’ who ‘don’t love animals at all’. By 5.20pm it was commonly understood that the perpetrators were the IRA, and yet the BBC1 News at that time showed again the same Pitman interview — the connection between the two groups of ‘terrorists’ being successfully achieved. Animal liberation had been the cause of disruption in 1995 and it was now guilty by (false) association132.

And the Hitler-Nazi label endured, finding room in virtually all sustained attacks on animal liberation. Leaving aside considerations of Hitler quite possibly not being a genuine vegetarian at all, let alone vegan (see, e.g., Cox 1992: 205), that Himmler was a chicken farmer, Goering a keen hunter, and indeed that Stalin was an animal eater (which were not mentioned, nor other animal-using tyrants in this ‘debate’133), the Hitler-Nazi myth was deployed to associate animal liberationists with Hitler’s dietary preferences; with intolerance and coercion; and, as we have already seen as a piece of standard rhetoric, to associate animal ‘love’ with human hatred. The Nazi association alone was enough to delegitimate and dismiss (any of the media versions of) animal liberation.

Again, the casual, thought by-passing use: ‘Animal rights fascists will not stand a cat’s chance at Cruft’s.’134, and ‘It is true that the Führer loved animals’135. And then passed off as a serious contention: unopposed on BBC1’s Question Time, Oxford
historian and regular television and quality press contributor Niall Ferguson associated live export protestors with Hitler’s vegetarianism, suggesting authoritatively that the audience ‘think about it’\textsuperscript{136}. The cover of The Independent Weekend promoted its lead article, an interview with author William S Burroughs, featuring the headline, ‘William Burroughs shot his wife, but he’s very kind to cats’. The accompanying photograph showed Burroughs dressed in a full-length black leather coat — a Nazi favourite\textsuperscript{138}. And, unselfconsciously, presenter Pete McCarthy was himself wearing a black leather jacket when he associated vegetarians with Hitler in an otherwise frivolous and brief feature on National Vegetarian Week\textsuperscript{138}. The Nazi-human-hating representation also served to distance animal liberation from human liberations, and animal exploitation from human oppressions (and see Exclusion: Only Connect II).

However, on the very rare occasion there was an attempt to put things in perspective: ‘... it is a strange kind of terrorist campaign, to say the least, that is waged for 20 years without killing anybody’\textsuperscript{139}. However, the general representation of animal liberation as trouble, evil, deranged, sinister precluded any consideration of the thick case book of liberationists themselves (never mind nonhumans) suffering threat, terror and physical assault from animal users.

‘Fur Flies’

But there was always space for coverage of liberationist in-fighting. These people only want a scrap, the cause is immaterial; it's a pathological problem. An extremely rare (500-word) piece on the Vegan Society appeared only as a result of a heated AGM\textsuperscript{140}. The same newspaper (Observer) increased its space for a (700-word) report on internal strife at the Vegetarian Society\textsuperscript{141} and did the same for the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection\textsuperscript{142}. These amounted to more space than was ever given to such organizations on an animal use issue.

*Problem*

Cumulatively then, and further to animal liberation not being recognized for its potential as a problem-solver (see Exclusion: Only Connect I), it was ‘animal rights
groups' who, in one dissident mode or another, were the problem — the negative-destructive force, 'the extremists' who laid factory farms 'under siege', whilst it was scientists who solved the problems by, for instance, creating 'super chickens' who could withstand the rigours of the broiler house. Channel 4's sympathetic coverage of Suzanne Chipperfield entering the family circus business as a tiger 'tamer' told viewers that, 'The tigers are not all she has to contend with', referring to animal liberation protestors. And TV fiction took up the theme: Casualty depicted two 'animal rights activists whose terrorist activities ... cause problems for the hard-pressed hospital staff'.

Yet a Times leader on the funeral of campaigner Jill Phipps, who was crushed to death beneath the wheels of a lorry bearing live calves for export, not only confused things in trying to explain them but became confused over just who or what was the problem:

Britain has a long and honourable tradition of animal welfare. Yet the people of this country have always recognized, in regard to animals, the frontier between welfare and rights. In the wake of Ms Phipps's "martyrdom", there will arise a temptation to blur that important distinction. There is a danger which we should take guard against; older, kinder concerns must on no account be harnessed to a more destructive engine.

Leaving aside the dubious claim made earlier in this leader that middle class stirrings against the live export trade came only as the result of the work of undesirable 'agitators', it was difficult to know exactly what the leader writer thought s/he meant by this curious statement, not least because in this context surely the destructive engine was, literally, tragically and ironically, the cattle truck — a symbol of the animal welfare system — which killed the campaigner. Tradition is tradition, and yet it was the 'long and honourable tradition', the 'older, kinder concerns' defended by The Times, which were themselves responsible for the crude live export trade. The episode and its coverage also poignantly illustrated one of Roland Barthes' points regarding system validation. In his essay 'Operation Margarine', he wrote of how the 'sick' [liberationists here], those with the 'illness', those who rebel against the inhumanity of the Established Order, were expected not to collide head-on with it but rather exorcise it like a possession; should instead rid
themselves of a prejudice which costs them dearly, costs them too much in scruples, in revolt (see Barthes 1993: 42).

**Fear & Loathing**

Perhaps the most virulent, uncomprehending, fearful and affronted Cartesian contributions came in the same newspaper, from Bernard Levin, exemplar of culture above nature, man above animal, rationality above emotion, order above ‘chaos’. Consistently denying intellectualism to the cause, not bothering to confront the challenge, it was easier to fire-off at the bête noire. Animal liberationists were running wild in towns and countryside, plotting to overthrow civilized society:

The Single Issue Fanatics, notably the ‘Animal Liberation Front’, find smashing windows, wrecking lorries and burning buildings too tame for their hatred of mankind, and now yearn to find a suitable human being to kill.\(^{147}\)

Levin’s 2,000-word *Times* article of 10.1.95, which re-ran much of the same demonizing ground (‘Animal liberation affront: There is murder in the minds of those who claim to be protecting livestock’), was a classic of the genre, pitched hyperbolically somewhere between Keith Tester (e.g. 1991: 170-193) and Alf Garnett. At the time of the Shoreham protests against the live calf trade and just after the sentencing of ALF activist Keith Mann, Levin offered these considered and assured thoughts on the ‘animals’ who know nothing about animals. Levin has the knowledge that belongs to power and, like Tester, knows how to entrap the threat to the (re-)established order:

I don’t much like veal, except occasionally in a *Wiener schnitzel*, but I propose to eat it in huge quantities for weeks on end, starting now ... The “Animal Liberation Front” has no interest in the treatment of animals; it only wants to hurt human beings, starting with their windows ... [This is] a cause that would rejoice if lives were taken ... the violent ones do nothing at all in the way of actually getting face to face with any animal. (Cynic that I am, I would bet that some of the Fronters don’t know the difference between a cat and a dog) ... these fanatics ... howl for human blood and will not stop until they have slaked their thirst ... they will not rest until they have killed. ... Keith Mann ... could have been, with his strength and determination, very useful in a society like ours. But he rejected the real society for the false one.\(^{148}\)

Levin’s real society is where one doesn’t come face to face with, doesn’t see calves, who are not only invisible, hidden behind ‘veal’ but, for Levin, also behind the
further and ultra-cultural screen of Wienerschnitzel. That Mann is depicted not as he is (as a recognizer of calves), but as he should be, makes one of Barthes’ rhetorical figures — ‘Identification’ — relevant here:

... the Other is a scandal which threatens his (the petit-bourgeois man’s) essence ... There are, in any petit-bourgeois consciousness, small simulacra of the hooligan, the parricide, the homosexual, etc., which periodically the judiciary extracts from its brain, puts in the dock, admonishes and condemns: one never tries anybody but analogues who have gone astray: it is a question of direction, not of nature, for that’s how men are. (Barthes 1993: 152).

Levin too seemed to be ignorant of the far more significant ground that lies between animal liberation ‘violence’ and animal welfare — or perhaps this was merely another case of deliberate polarization and false dichotomy; the ALF again used as a political synecdoche. In contrast to the ALF, he wrote:

There are, of course, many organisations which are truly dedicated to the welfare of animals; two very familiar ones are the RSPCA and the Blue Cross.

As with Tester, and now that the values and beliefs congenial to the bloody culture have been restored, animals would be better off without liberationists. Levin also wrote of the ALF in these terms ‘... oh how those spotty creatures love to give themselves big boys’ names ...’. At the same time as representing them as thugs and terrorists Levin infantilized (or adolescentized) them, the contradiction typical of stereotyping. Again, the subject of animal liberation wasn’t serious enough to warrant what Levin thought liberationists were doing so they must be mad or immature, the culturally fixed sites of ‘extreme’ animal concern-identification. In his own way he both entrapped activists between the force of opposites from which there was no escape and excluded them from serious debate.

Like RWF Poole earlier (Stereotyping), Levin shows us how the orthodox cannot intellectually comprehend the Other, in this case the liberationist, who will instead be ignored, denied or transformed into the image and terms of the orthodox. If the Other is thought to be irreducible he or she becomes the exotic — a pure object, a spectacle, a clown. Relegated to the confines of humanity, he or she no longer threatens the security of the home (see Barthes 1993: 151-152).
In one of Woody Allen’s films he delivers the line: ‘I know some people. Well, they’re not exactly people’, and to a large extent this was how the media ‘knew’ liberationists. They were typically presented not so much as people but one-dimensionally, extremely rarely as ‘ordinary’ people who happened to be vegan or vegetarian or liberationist but rather as vegetarians or animal rights terrorists or as nutters who were nutters because of their relationship to animals. They weren’t, couldn’t be, quite people. This was the other side of denying liberationists presence in matters of fact (in Exclusion). Both strategies, overflowing with negative attributes, contributed towards shadowiness and incompleteness; there was ‘something wrong’ with them; they were irrational and incomprehensible. Genuine concern and political protest are denied or erased in this exercise of discursive power.

When libbers show up we know there’s trouble. To represent them otherwise would be not only to render them sympathetic but would also confuse, contradict or highlight the ambiguity of the natural order where they are merely phantoms, tropes and signs. (Perhaps this is why the iconography in fiction more often than not included leather, as though liberationists too had to be shown to be inconsistent and hypocritical, or was this just to associate them with Nazism, or was it just more ignorance and confusion or, à la Greer, to be convinced that life without leather is impossible?). How could these be decent folk, like us?

This ascription and denigration was an exiling, a marginalization, a keeping in place, an imprisonment which allowed the further promotion of a world-view untainted or barely tainted by any recognition of or concern for animals in a liberationist sense. As Edward W Said pointed out in reference to Arabs, if they occupy space enough for attention, it is as a negative value, as disrupters (see Said 1995: 286-287). But, lurking behind the above images is the menace not of jihad but of liberation. Consequence: a fear that the liberationists will take over the world.
Confusing & Redefining

The intellectual incomprehension takes on a more prosaic nature when we notice how confused the media appear to be regarding animal liberation. However, there would seem to be more at work than a genuine bafflement. The confusion strategy, an obscuration in itself, seemed to be related to or part of a larger project to redefine animal liberation for orthodox purposes. Just as earlier strategies allowed the glimpse of a shadowy liberation and its proponents, Confusing & Redefining went towards appropriation in the struggle to maintain legitimacy and to control meaning. The bloody culture then, through this combined strategy, reasserts its own authority, enabling its representatives and representers to assume the role of experts and moral guides in the absence of the excluded. This relates more to spatial comprehension; a nullifying co-optation.

Confusion

By this we can refer to the seemingly erratic media use of descriptive terminology and the general ambivalence which inform dominant human attitudes to other species. Media approach to animal liberation seemed to be grounded in the confusion philosophy, exploiting the ‘bias against understanding’ which was guaranteed to baffle the layperson and obscure a movement and its message; to make the whole cause complex, too much to think about, and that much easier to present in orthodox, authoritative terms.

*The Times* described Animal Aid, Britain’s leading animal rights organization (as it calls itself), as ‘an animal welfare pressure group’ but recorded that ‘animal rights activists’ jeered at live export lorries149. However, in *The Times*, Danny Penman referred to the welfarist Compassion in World Farming as an ‘animal rights group’150 as did the BBC1 Six o’Clock News 151.

*The Times* ran two animal-oriented reports wherein ‘animal rights’ campaigners (in fact it was the welfarist Compassion in World Farming) challenged minister William Waldegrave over live exports, but it was ‘animal lovers’ and ‘animal welfare charities’ who were outraged at the killing of an elephant at a wildlife...
(CIWF was by far the most quoted pro-animal organization, its welfarist stance perhaps being intellectually comprehended most easily and representing no ostensible threat to the institution of animal use). The Sunday Times offered this slick interchange:

Wildlife groups are demanding a change in legislation to help prevent what they claim is indiscriminate killing of seals by fishermen. Animal rights supporters met in Edinburgh last week following reports ... (emphases added).

No animal rights group was represented at this meeting which approved of fishing and of 'killing rogue seals' although, to be charitable, this 'confusion' may be an ill-informed attempt to see animal 'rights' as something more than single issue. However, in an Observer report on a heated Vegan Society AGM, Ben Macintyre confused readers by writing that: 'Some members believe that the rowdier element within the vegan cause ... is the result of infiltration by anti-vivisectionists ...' (The Vegan Society, as we know, has always been anti-vivisectionist). And John Diamond suggested that 'Vegetarianism as a moral stance only makes sense if it excludes eating any living thing' as if vegetarianism didn't do this by definition.

One of the greater confusions could be found in features on and interviews with 'vegetarian' celebrities who ate fish, and a more peculiar form of confusion, though perhaps not without its ideological reductionist motivation, was the habit of describing celebrity vegans as vegetarians. The Radio Times referred to the Madhur Jaffrey's Flavours of India focus on the 'strict vegetarianism' of Gujarati cuisine only for the programme itself to serve up meals containing milk and yogurt. The confusion was compounded by Lynne Truss's peculiar comment in her TV review of the programme: 'The Gujarati cuisine is so strictly vegetarian that it eschews all root vegetables' (perhaps meaning macrobiotic). By this process — vegans-to-vegetarians-to-fish eating — bloodless culture is broken up and swallowed by the bloody. Adams (1990: 79) offers a perceptive analysis of this 'weakening of the concept of vegetarianism', how it dismembers word from meaning, eviscerates radical protest and weakens the effort at new naming (and, we might add, strengthens the orthodox efforts at renaming). What also concerns us here is how...
bloodless culture is, again, comprehended only by bringing it into known territory where other animals and their products are consumed. The problem, and this is not brought out by Adams, is that vegetarianism, rather than veganism, opens the door to this confusion and dismembering, by its own animal product consumption.

There is the distinct possibility of course that those responsible for such coverage (and again the representation is stiff with such confusions) are themselves confused and/or just plain sloppy, the ‘faddy’ issue not worth the time or trouble to get it right. But the other side of this is that generally, the steadfast denial of the word liberation — unless conveniently associated with the ‘terrorists’ of the Animal Liberation Front — and the use instead of ‘rights’ or ‘welfare’ served to minimize any sense of animals being in need of liberation. The media’s interchanging of ‘rights’ and ‘welfare’ was indicative of something more profound than a concession to popular rhetoric. This leads us to consider redefinition which extends analysis of the points made earlier regarding the drawing of animal liberation towards welfarism and its animal-use legitimations.

**Redefinition**

Animal liberation philosophy was bypassed except in name(s), and the animal use defences of yesterday were dressed up in today’s language. This was the media moving with the times all the better to keep them in their place. So, welfare issues were, more often than not, termed rights issues; the same story, different title. Not merely a tinkering with the rhetoric but an appropriation. Welfarism was the representation of liberation.

Warmly reviewing the first in a Brass Eye series which satirized current affairs programmes — the current affair here being ‘animal rights’ — Germaine Greer described animal rights as ‘incoherent’, giving as an example the fictional dinner-party liberals lampooned on Brass Eye who did not object to lobsters kept in boxes but who did object to veal calves kept in crates. This example, of classic inconsistency, comes from welfarism and it was the ambivalent welfarist orthodoxy Greer was criticizing when she (like Brass Eye itself) thought she was ridiculing ‘incoherent’
animal rights. A common delusion or a piece of disingenuousness? (and, again, very much like Tester's confusion of animal rights and society). Both Brass Eye and Greer were ignorant of animal liberation theory and, in the latter's case, we have a further reason to suspect it. On a BBC2 Arena debate in 1990 in which Greer (and Mary Warnock and Stephen Rose) spoke against a 'That the Animal Kingdom Needs a Bill of Rights' motion, Tom Regan (in an extremely rare appearance in UK media) expressed his exasperation at having to debate with those who had apparently not troubled to familiarize themselves with the theories. Perhaps Greer Warnock and Rose typically prejudged any such theory to be absurd, akin to Barthes' Blind and Dumb Criticism, which we met earlier (under Denigration: Stereotyping). More interesting, perhaps, is that the motion was carried in Regan, Richard D Ryder and Andrew Linzey's favour and yet this success seems to have been suppressed in the media. Subsequent debates have resorted back into the more easily controlled welfare or single issue territory and the hoax of open debate.

Less formal discussion followed the same pattern. Coverage of fur traps on Newsnight, for example, was illustrated with powerful video footage from the anti-fur, Lynx-David Bailey ouevre and of animals writhing in traps. But host Kirsty Wark talked of campaigners as 'animal lovers' and the studio debate was framed in welfare terms — the 'what kind of traps?' question.

Failure of effort or cognition was central to the displacement of liberation. In offering a sigh of relief in The Times that the perilousness of buying products in ignorance of their country of origin and its bad human rights records was now virtually over, Alan Coren now felt pressured to recognize the ethics of food production at home. Are these eggs 'barn fresh', for instance. But, again, the shift made was from human rights to animal welfare (not to animal rights or liberation).

Defining or redefining the debate was also apparent in The Telegraph, which told readers how a new hardy race of 'super chickens' had been developed at a secret location:
The new breed of birds should silence critics of the huge broiler houses who have complained that the animals have weak bones and lose their feathers. The 'super chickens' grow faster, produce more lean breast meat and have stronger bones and thicker feathers to keep warm.

All was now acceptable. The system was not wrong, only the birds. We can see from such coverage how the 'meaning' of the issue was generally relocated back into the welfare category, into the 'sphere of legitimate controversy' and safe territory, where objectivity and balance are sought (see e.g. Shoemaker & Reese 1991: 188; Hallin 1986: 116-117). This appeared to be a form of co-optation whereby animal liberation was disarmed of its potential or even its raison d'être. In a leader supporting the relaunch of London Zoo in 1993, The Times had this to say:

The world is far less sanguine about the confinement of animals than it was when London Zoo was founded in 1828. The pre-Enlightenment belief that man has careless dominion over the beasts dies hard, but the writings of Bentham and Schopenhauer against animal exploitation are gaining intellectual currency. Contemporary philosophers such as Tom Regan and Peter Singer offer a new vision of "animal rights" too puritanical to be enacted. But the appearance of Bentham's slogans against animal suffering in shop windows is not simply faddish.

In a cultural lag (one to be preserved at all costs, it seemed) it was, for The Times, Bentham and Schopenhauer and not Singer and Regan (never mind Clark) who represented the new intellectual paradigm. Animal liberation was seen not in terms of its contemporary representatives (extreme versions of enlightenment; an excessive rationalism perhaps) but in terms of their — safely pre-1911 Act — predecessors, though even Bentham and Schopenhauer are hardly adopted here as moral guides. Liberation had been acknowledged in order only that speciesism itself could acquire a new gloss.

The other side of redefining was not to admit liberation in the first place, continuing along the old welfarist line. Illustrating the politically determined distinction between illegal and legal cruelties to animals as society's moral reference point, The Telegraph ran a full-page feature headed 'Everyone is against cruelty to animals. But opinion differs sharply over what is cruel — and about the best ways to combat it'. Aside from concerning ourselves with the obvious fact that not everyone is against cruelty (or that cruelty is arbitrarily defined), it is apparent that the debate was still being framed in terms of (illegal) cruelty, the base line of welfarism.

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(à la RSPCA) rather than in terms of, say, 'not all harms hurt' or 'animals are not our resources'. One of the articles on the page concerned Paul & Linda McCartney's purchase of land to protect deer from hunting, but it was written by a Devon farmer who was 'bitter about the damage done by the rock star's love of deer. The farmer attacked the McCartneys because deer got in the way of his animal farming which, itself and its own inherent cruelties, were beyond question. Nothing appeared by the McCartneys themselves or by anyone on their behalf. A second article ('Vets split in the debate on ethics') was about the ambiguous position of vets in the pay of 'questionable' farming systems such as battery egg production. Notably, it was the 'originators of the contemporary debate on ethics' who were here excluded from it. A third article ('Killing them kindly: the skills of the stalker') presented the deer/human relationship as one of necessary culling, in cruelty/kindness terms. But, most revealingly, the final article was the regular angling column, typographically marked off from the rest of the page. Angling remained aloof even from the cruelty debate, for angling cannot be safely discussed within even welfarist ideology. The only way for the angler to combat cruelty is to cease angling. When the solution is simple, it is ignored. When it can be constructed as complex, the orthodox can guide us through, and relocate the (mock) debate. Result: the practices continue.

**Guilt, Decency & Gentle Usage**

Promotion (especially its fantasy world of caring humanity), Exclusion, Denigration and Confusion & Redefinition combined to contribute to a reclaiming of the moral high ground, a classic example of which could be seen during the 1996 BSE 'crisis'. This also functioned for the media as the representative 'farm animal' issue for a very long time; an opportune moment — mini legitimation crisis in the monolith of animal agriculture — to silence and then taunt the liberation movement, to obstruct revelation and revolution. Media practice was to deny space and time to animal liberation groups, who were clamouring for attention, whilst simultaneously condemning them for not being outspoken on the issue.

The practice was widespread and illustrated, for instance, by a rash of articles in the press and a diatribe on Question Time, all without equal or any response. 

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Orthodox outrage was often expressed that the slaughter policy was killing ‘healthy’ animals, as if ‘healthy’ animals were not slaughtered as the norm (and see Promotion: Fantasy). Having cleared the ground of what it may have seen as competitors, it was the media who spoke for seriousness and decency. This also fed into the mythology of animal liberationists (‘phoneys’) not really caring for animals at all which appeared strongly, for instance, in Tester.

The extension of this was to establish the boundary and also to put one of the media’s own out there as a rogue marker; one who didn’t quite go along with the inevitability of cruelty but, nevertheless, with the inevitability of animal use. Journalist-cum-organic farmer Paul Heiney, whom we met earlier, made a pitch for ‘meat we can honestly enjoy’ and claimed the following:

The rearing and killing of animals happens behind closed doors. It is only since we have been given a glimpse of the appalling transport trade — which is but one of the injustices heaped upon farm animals that we have made any kind of fuss (emphasis added).

Conveniently excluded from this ‘we’ discourse are the campaigners against live export who had been active for decades and with far more than a glimpse available for those willing to look beyond the media’s version of the world. A few weeks earlier, kind master Heiney had informed readers, with the inaccuracy and half-truth that passed for reality within the animal harvest mind-set, that:

Being organic, it is as environmentally friendly as you can get; it treats farm animals with respect and demands of them what they are naturally capable of giving.

The three points here only make sense if it is presupposed for each that nonhuman animals are humans’ resources and that agriculture has to involve them. The presuppositions are apparent not least in the use of ‘farm’ rather than ‘farmed’. That the media were claiming decency as their own, or claiming their own decency to be the only standard, was also demonstrated in features which seemed to have been influenced to some extent by unacknowledged liberationist thought and language. Selected animal-using practices were identified as being ‘kind to animals’ or as something which could be done ‘with a clear conscience’ or
which were 'guilt-free'. In a typically confused manner, the writers seemed to connect with the age-old problem of guilt which may attend their usual support of animal exploitation. In an article improbably titled 'Feasting with a guilt-free complex: Max Davidson feels no qualms about tucking into rabbit sausage', the writer went on to describe the other foods he ate — cod, crab and venison — presumably with a guilty conscience, and was inexplicably proud that a rabbit had taken the place of a pig on that particular occasion. 'Morally', he wrote, 'the [rabbit] dish was a masterstroke'. Entrenched in arbitrary welfarist distinctions, Davidson's article is perhaps a classic example of the (updated though plus ça change) complexities of hierarchically-ordered taxonomies — the negative magic — from which animal liberation seeks to break free. It is not a vegan, or even vegetarian, diet (presumably 'rabbit food') which is the moral masterstroke, but rabbit eating. Part of Davidson's fantasy here is perhaps the notion of being innocent if the animal was killed in the wild, that he or she had a life according to his or her kind before the early death. But this hunter romanticism ignores the unsustainability of such 'food' production, an unsustainability which has led to intensive rabbit, crab and deer farming. This vision of the future is nostalgic, bloodshot and hopelessly utopian.

It was noticeable from such examples that exclusion of the bearers of liberation served to clear the ground for consolidation of and by the authorized version, a reworked welfarism offering retreat from the ghosts of guilt stirred up by the evicted. The ambivalences, hierarchies and 'common decency' of welfarism were faced with no opposition, for what serious opposition could there be? The effect is a displacement of animal liberation by a refined speciesism which robs the former of its meaning and purpose and uses its language for orthodoxy's own ends. Animal liberation is not comprehended intellectually but spatially, and to bloody culture's advantage.
Naturalizing & Universalizing

Because this is perhaps the transcendent strategy, we have seen it in operation throughout the earlier examples. Here we can look at some of the tactical moves within the strategy more specifically. This is where we find an area similar to our initial defining examples of Promotion in that they serve to endorse, except that here, in this rather more mythological territory of cultural closure, we sense the work of a system knowing itself to be under attack and fearing the consequences, as it perceives them. It defends not only through denigrating strategies but, following on from a reassertion of its place, through the reiteration of statements of fact, naturalizing and universalizing animal use, and reinforcing — and returning us safely to — cultural norms and thought patterns of the taken for granted. Inherent in this was the unquestionableness of animal-using industries and practices, which were featured superficially. The cultural, as well as the political, became naturalized; legitimation reproduced. Much of news coverage, for instance, would be characterized by the casual statement which required no explanation. In a BBC1 Six o’Clock News item on the leaked EU report recommending a postponement of the cosmetics animal-testing ban, the visual showed mice in a laboratory while the voiceover announced, quite gratuitously and dubiously, that ‘Many animals like these are used in life-saving research’172. Reality is thus defined.

When endorsement of animal exploitation did carry with it an internal critique of the practices in question they were located within a tight normative framework where the statement itself was not even necessary. So, for example, The Goldring Audit examined the fishing, horse racing and animal-based agriculture industries, but their fundamental legitimacy was never questioned. The rape of a tethered mare by successive stallions was just a natural part of the natural business of horse breeding173. Culture as physis.

It was not only the legitimacy that was unquestionable but also the limited range of knowledge which kept things in their place. The reinforcement of hierarchical and exclusive dietary structure was evident in a report on hunger in the former Soviet Union where the focus was on iron deficiency, the only cure for which was ‘iron-rich
meat'\textsuperscript{174}. And demonstrations by British farmers protesting recent BSE export bans showed them claiming that 'If we carry on like this there'll be no livestock industry in this country'\textsuperscript{175}, an invitation, perhaps, for comment and even programmes on the possibility and the alternative. But, again, this was the road not taken, it doesn't feature on bloody culture's map. 'No livestock industry' is code for the unknown, which is chaos.

**Excesses**

The fundamental institutions were beyond the frontiers of censure, alternatives to animal-based agriculture especially were beyond comprehension. It was not animal-based institutions which the media criticized but their excesses or, as Roszak would put it, merely their 'snags and hitches'. Condemnation of the excesses served to legitimize the system, giving the impression of objectivity and deterring from the oppositional critical dimension (see, e.g. Molotch 1979: 91, Riggins 1997: 11), and to show that all was well-monitored and under control. The audience was steered towards the idea that excesses were one-offs, unrelated to each other, somehow aberrant and not inherent to the system itself. Drugs that caused side effects, other harm and death, for instance, were not results of an invalid system but of inadequate testing by that unquestionable system.

During the BSE 'crisis', media focus was almost entirely on its impact on the farming community, on politicians, on the economy, and on the human health victims, to the exclusion not only of the cows but of the milk issue. This far outstripped coverage of the campaigns and statements made by animal liberation groups and the damaging effects of animal products in general on human health. Continuous epidemics of salmonella, listeria, E coli, Newcastle disease, swine fever, for instance, continued to be treated as the excesses and exceptions rather than giving rise to a questioning of animal-based agriculture and diets. The imperfections and vexations would be aired but they were then undermined in order to reinforce the culture's immune system. Here we can refer to one of Barthes' principle figures of rhetoric, 'The Inoculation':

\[ \ldots \text{admitting the accidental evil of a class-bound institution the better to conceal its principal evil} \]
\[ \ldots \text{one thus protects against the risk of a generalized subversion. (Barthes 1993: 150).} \]
A news item informs viewers that poorly pasteurized milk may cause bowel disease. But the bulk of the report goes on to feature a stream of experts extolling the virtues of milk and emphasizing that there is ‘no need to change your diet’. The health risks of properly pasteurized milk are ignored as are its alternatives and its inessential dietary status.

Animal use itself was framed in the same way. Powerful and disturbing as they were, Channel 4’s Countryside Undercover: Bringing Home the Bacon and its sister programme Countryside Undercover: It’s a Dog’s Life (about the use of dogs in vivisection) were both reported from a welfare and not a liberation perspective, focusing again on excesses and illegalities. The investigator in Bringing Home the Bacon was an animal eater, and the harrowing scenes (‘of illegal treatment of livestock’) were contrasted with the acceptable and only alternative: organic pig farming. The investigator in It’s a Dog’s Life was not opposed to animal experiments in medical research. Moreover, even these kinds of exposé remained one-offs with the meagre follow-ups telling us how the offenders had been mildly, or not, brought to book. What viewers had seen in these two programmes was undoubtedly serious, and they would seem to have been exposing only the tips of icebergs, and yet the issues and the material just passed away. Trust was placed in ‘stricter control’; liberationists were superfluous now that unnecessary suffering had been exposed. The ills and contingent evils of the system-institution have been expressed but the animal-using system itself has been redeemed and on the way to cure; after all, it alone can feed us and keep us ‘healthy’.

The strategy seemed to be so effective that even recurrent excesses could do little to alter perception; the mythology feeds on them. We saw in Exclusion: Exclusion how in 1997 the RSPCA and the Jockey Club defended the safety of the Grand National course. In the following year’s race three horses ‘had to be put down’. Both RSPCA and Jockey Club order further enquiries into how to make the course safer. There’s no talk of banning the race or indeed horse racing in general where some 250 horses die each year; the welfarists have it under control.
Rome Has Spoken

Taken from Saint ‘to refrain from the killing of animals is the height of superstition’ Augustine, the tactic title here refers to a dogmatic version of cultural closure, to ontology hiding epistemology, construction passed off as nature. And here we meet, more specifically, Barthes’ rhetorical figure of the naturalizing ‘Statement of fact’:

Bourgeois ideology invests in this figure interests which are bound to its very essence: universalism, the refusal of any explanation, an unalterable hierarchy of the world. ... Bourgeois aphorisms ... belong to metalanguage; they are a second-order language which bears on objects already prepared. Their classical form is the maxim. Here the statement is no longer directed to a world to be made; it must overlay one which is already made, bury the traces of this production under a self-evident appearance of eternity ... The foundation of the bourgeois statement of fact is common sense, that is, truth when it stops on the arbitrary order of him who speaks it. (Barthes 1993: 154-155).

The connection between animal experiments and medical advance, for instance, was cemented and all sense of other probability and possibility closed off. And it wasn’t just the media operating as primary definers; others were elected to the privileged position to make unchallenged ‘statements of fact’.

If it wasn’t for advances in medical science, I wouldn’t be here. I was a rhesus baby. If it wasn’t for the experiments on those monkeys, I and a lot of other people simply wouldn’t be alive.

But often it was the media who assumed the positive or positivist language of science. At the end of a BBC1 Six o’Clock News item on USA animal liberationists demanding the release of chimpanzees from a research institute, it was the reporter who concluded with the statement that chimps were ‘irreplaceable’ in research and — with the ultimate legitimation and unconditional allegiance of ‘my species wrong or right’ — that ‘we may not have the right [to use them] but we have the need’.

Channel 4’s Poor Man’s Pig, a typical piece of unfettered vivisection propaganda, told viewers, oddly, that ‘Without this animal [the armadillo] humans would be no nearer a cure for leprosy than we are now’, thus presenting failure as triumph.

When Prince William shot a stag for the first time, in November 1996, the otherwise even-handed report in The Telegraph, which quoted both supporters and
opponents, rounded off with this statement of fact: '... it is necessary to cull 100,000 [red deer in Scotland] each year to keep the herds at a stable number'. The final sentence was the giveaway: 'Those managing the estates rely on stalking for economic survival', another etched-in-stone understanding of the countryside — the one that even 'townies' can't fail to appreciate — which disallowed any other reading of deer or countryside possibilities. The Independent told readers authoritatively, under a title of the same name, 'Why we have too many seals'.

Untypical and positive coverage of non-animal research appeared in The Times ('Researchers are opening the cages of the animal labs') but the journalist still found room to inform readers of the 'fact' that, 'Another example is transplant surgery, which could not have been developed without animal experiments'. And in the Goldring Audit, animal use and its culture of violence were further reinforced by Goldring thus: 'artificial insemination has done so much for livestock'; 'beef is grazed on land that is not suitable for anything else'; horse 'breaking' depends 'on the love and patience of the trainers and grooms'; and the thoroughbred was 'a pea-brained racing machine'.

The statement of fact was most obvious within the 'nature red in tooth and claw' myth, naturalization par excellence, reinforced by countless wildlife programmes devoted to predation and horror. The 'real world' myth also functioned to perpetuate country/town opposition and promote killing: 'The country law of tooth and claw, too easily forgotten by urban dwellers, is part and parcel of a proper butcher's trade'. The philosophy was further promoted by Desmond Morris in his television series The Human Animal, an historical overview of humans' completed progress to the pinnacle of social, sociable and superior animal-eaters and, presumably, animal skin wearers. In Realms of the Russian Bear, presenter Nikolai Drozdov told viewers that humans are marmosets' greatest enemy. Marmosets, he said laughingly, made 'good fur hats', one of which he wore.

'Of course, there's no feast without cruelty', Thomas Sutcliffe informed readers in the Independent thus reinforcing an equally inaccurate Times leader: 'It is...
impossible for Homo Sapiens, which is a carnivorous species, to live without cruelty to animals\(^{189}\). These two, though related in their reproduction of predation and ‘bad faith’, come from different areas. Whilst both have significantly omitted the word ‘deliberate’ before ‘cruelty’, Sutcliffe is working on the basis that any accidental harm (to worms and insects, perhaps) is probably unavoidable in growing and harvesting arable crops, which therefore justifies the avoidable; once the killing starts we may as well escalate it. And *The Times* is doubly misleading. We do not share carnivore physiology and it is only by cooking meat that we are able to eat it, thus *making* humans, if anything, limited omnivores. The moral choice is made under the cloak of inevitability.

Such programmes, articles and statements tended to perpetuate the notion of an immutable human nature and its relationship to immutable ‘wild’ nature. Humans could not exist without being predators, the old Pufendorf line. Putative carnivores, we rise above other animals through superior ruthlessness and power, even cruelty itself being inevitable. Responsibility was shuffled off onto natural law: ‘It’s a cruel world’. This is where two of Barthes’ rhetorical figures — the maxims, proverbs and common sense of ‘Statement of fact’ and ‘the Privation of history’ (the irresponsibility of man) — coincide to universalize an unalterable hierarchy of the world, refusing any explanation (Barthes 1993: 151, 154).

**Inaccuracy, Ignorance & Scaremongering**

Statements of fact also served to curtail apostasy, in maintaining the primacy of animal products — animal liberationist diets were continually misrepresented, often outrageously. Typically, no balancing or correcting articles or programmes would follow; non-animal diet and agriculture just *had* to be inadequate and detrimental. In an article in *The Times*, a GP author offered this canard: ‘Deficiency of vitamin B12 follows inevitably from a strict vegan diet’ which was described as ‘highly restrictive’ and ‘faddy’. The article also stated, equally erroneously, that ‘Iron deficiency is commoner in vegetarians’ than in omnivores\(^{190}\). ITV’s *The Big Story* claimed that ‘propaganda’ in schools was resulting in young girls becoming vegetarian and, consequently, anorexic (is this what ‘bloodless’ culture means to the
orthodox?). It also featured, and endorsed, a doctor at one clinic forcing vegetarian girls to eat meat ‘as it was the only way to get them the protein they needed’\textsuperscript{191}. Notably, the media were interested in seizing upon this rather than in engaging with just what it is about animal use and animal products that gives rise to health problems and also makes girls turn to vegetarianism in the first place. The latter is written off as a fad of the individual, the former an excess of the system. (The scaremongering is ironic at a time when orthodox diets are straining to approximate to vegan nutrition status).

Breathtaking ignorance and inaccuracy tended often to merge not only with the inevitability of killing but with the limited imagination of the dominant, as in these two examples:

Cattle are a vital link in our food chain ... No cattle means no prime grassland and a landscape turned over to the cultivation of oil, seed, rape (sic) and genetically engineered soya beans. Give up on beef and veal, and it’s the thin end of the wedge whereby our whole larder is diminished and impoverished. Besides, if we give up on veal, what are we going to do when it’s time to kill the fatted calf?\textsuperscript{192}.

If the world turned vegan the cow and the chicken would become extinct\textsuperscript{193}.

As with foxhunting, killing animals now becomes a benevolent act of conservation, but of their Forms or Ideas. And as with Greer and the leather fetish earlier, here is the revolution-negating warning of what there is to lose (never what there is to gain, nor what crop and animal species/breeds have already been lost to animal-based monoculturalism).

\textit{Fabric Repair}

Fabric Repair refers here to the continuous makeshifts, to the media practice of rushing to patch up rents in the fabric of orthodoxy in order to re-establish or re-affirm the dominant discourse. It is a routine rearguard action, a propaganda exercise not without its own statements of fact. Speciesism is a strong myth and the attack upon it by animal liberation is making it a weaker one by exposing its political trace, but the fabric repair (including loads of ‘artificial nature’) serves to
restore its strength. And strength is perhaps the operative word, much of this territory being marked by 'tough' values.

The most obvious examples — ones which were not constrained by any requirement of immediate or later 'balance' — could be found in The Telegraph which specialised in such a role, as was apparent in its support and sympathy for: the animal circus, when in seemingly terminal decline¹⁹⁴; for hunting, when threatened by a prospective Labour government¹⁹⁵; for McDonalds, when the company was losing face in the longest High Court libel case in history¹⁹⁶; for the fur industry, in the face of growing disapproval¹⁹⁷; and for shooting, in the wake of Dunblane¹⁹⁸. Again, the defence did not necessarily rest on the same evidence as the prosecution. Tactics changed to suit the new necessities — McDonalds was celebrated as a good training employer, for instance, and not as a fast 'meat' outlet.

The Sunday Telegraph magazine made out a six-page martyr-victim defence of besieged cat-vivisector Colin Blakemore, telling readers 'what the animal rights campaigners don't want you to know'. A photograph showing Blakemore cuddling his daughter cuddling a pet cat was juxtaposed by one of a campaigner wearing a 'Vivisectors are Scum' t-shirt¹⁹⁹.

BBC1's The Gamekeeper series, which encouraged our sympathy for the breed, was screened during a period when traditional country sports were coming under increasing attack, and Firing Range virtually gave viewers a re-run but extended the range of gamekeepers' problems — 'vermin' — to include rabbits and 'ruthless killers' such as crows, foxes, stoats and weasels, but not gamekeepers²⁰⁰.

The Times attempted the task of defending the force feeding of geese by tube, funnel and pump which enlarges the liver to produce foie gras. The growing number of objectors to this practice were merely 'morally squeamish'²⁰¹. And at the height of the protests over the live export of calves, restaurant critic Jonathan Meades, in Levin mode, made a point of recommending establishments which served veal tartare and calf's head as well as foie gras. One of the restaurants was especially
recommended because it did not serve 'arts lab vegan muck'.

Perhaps the most notable example of fabric repair, however, came at the tail end of the major live animal export protests in the shape of BBC2's *Public Eye* ('Animal Wars'). The 'wars' did not refer to any human war against animals (a concept alien to media discourse), but to actions taken against the trade by animal campaigners. The focus of sympathy were those who, going about their lawful export business, were suffering, with special emphasis on their children. Protesters were seen attacking lorries and wrestling with the police whilst an exporter, who spoke in interview about the campaigners' 'anarchy', chatted amiably with police officers (pictures speaking louder than words). Campaigners had 'no understanding of the animals' who were 'treated well because it is in the farmers' interests' but no contradictory or exporter-incriminating footage was shown of the animals themselves (words where pictures would speak louder); and no airing of the fundamental issues or any consideration of the roots of the protest.
A Composite

In these two chapters, much of the material has been broken up in order that different aspects of the ideological representation could be illustrated. Different parts of the same media text, for instance, appeared in different sections. However, and finally, we can break with that pattern here and, remembering different strategies and tactics, present briefly some speciesist discourse in a more ‘holistic’ fashion. What it shows is how, drawing on previous tradition and rationalization, many or all the above strategies are, more often than not, deployed simultaneously or on a regular beat lest the reader or viewer be left in any doubt about the danger of irrational animal liberation. Rationalism is prized above all in this discourse of superiority, of triumphant though anxious culture, for nature is the lurking enemy. The attempt, as before, is not to comprehend intellectually (for any such endeavour has been abandoned, even if begun) but to dismiss and/or pick at.

Polly Toynbee, a BBC and Independent regular and, as we have seen, an inhabitant of the animality denial world, told Radio Times readers that:

I am unlikely to become a vegetarian, not being over-burdened with a sense of guilt about animals. I wish them to be treated well and killed painlessly, but see no reason why we should not eat them. Animals eat each other. If they really had the same right as us not to be killed, then we might also have a duty to police the animal kingdom and ensure they didn’t kill one another.204

Animals eat each other (except that only some animals eat some other animals), therefore we can eat them (though only some of them); but they can’t eat us, because we are not animals. Again too the confident ignorance of or deliberate distortion of, animal liberation theory. But two areas are concealed in this: that the orthodox already legally police the ‘natural’ world in the shape of killing those species, for example, seals, foxes and crows, that predate on species ‘owned’, used or favoured by humans; and that wishing animals ‘to be treated well’ is to hide the inherent cruelties of their use. Moreover, the deliberate cruelties of vivisection cannot be accommodated within this sentiment. These points raise the larger one which relates to the very nature of media: that the endless stream of authoritative though piecemeal reasonings obscures the lack of and requirement for overall coherence. In
this way, sentimentalism, myth and fantasy can all too easily be passed off as rationality in a world where all nature is bad and all science good:

Nature is the enemy, red in tooth and claw. It killed most babies, gave us smallpox, famine, plague and a life of unremitting toil followed by early death. Science is our triumph over nature. Truth — demonstrable, provable — matters. Toleration for this brain-rotting stuff ['New Agery'] is fashionable, but we should be harsher rationalists. Humanity is humiliated when people are drunk on delusions. What hope for progress if we abandon reason in droves to seek out sentimental escapism? It is distressing to watch grown-up people foolishly seduced by fairy tales.

A denigrating, statement of fact, and reductionist pro-vivisection article by Toynbee in the Radio Times referred to: 'fanatics'; 'violent animal lovers'; 'terrorist tactics'; experiments which 'have to be done on animals'; drugs 'that would never have existed or gained licences if they had not been shown to be effective in animals first'; and to Professor John Martin who 'effectively demolishes the specious and tendentious reasoning of the animal activists' (on Frontline, Channel 4, 6.9.95, and he didn't); following it with:

But an emotional spasm over pictures of bunnies in labs is no substitute for calm and rational choices. In the end, human lives are worth more than those of animals.

Thinking that there was an organization called the 'British Union of Anti-Vivisectionists', Toynbee suggested that 'the answer' may lie with 'moderate animal rights supporters (sic) ... approving the value of the research and the conditions in which the animals are kept'. But this is animal welfare, in the confusing and redefining strategy; the 'answer' is to let them have her way. In The Independent ('Animal rights can damage your health') Toynbee wrote of how 'vital medical research — and the safety of scientists — is threatened by the rise of the anti-vivisectionists'.

In another Independent piece, Toynbee sought reform of charity laws to exclude 'animals or the other bizarre causes that have slipped in ... Religion and animals would be fallers under any new law that made any sense ... if old ladies want to leave money to cats, I do not want to be party to that lunatic transaction'. And yet,
under her new rules, 'There would be new winners, they are the weak, the small and	hose without clout' — a good description of nonhuman animals. Then, in a
libertarian defence of cruelty, this time hunting — 'the rights of a small, if eccentric
bunch of people' (it's acceptably eccentric to kill foxes but 'lunatic' to care for cats) —
Toynbee reached the main, paradoxical point:

Personally, I don't much like the killing of foxes, but since I think we are less cruel to foxes over
their lifetime than we are to chickens, or most farm animals that end up in abattoirs, only vegans
have a coherent position on hunting. On a points system of cruelty, taken over a whole lifetime,
we are probably far crueler to farm animals than foxes, despite their bloody end. The fact that
foxes are inedible makes no difference, since we only eat meat for pleasure — lentils and pulses
(sic) will do just as well or better.

Despite the culturally determined logic — cruelty to animals on farms justifies
hunting, both justified by pleasure — Toynbee brings us back to the consistency
problem where it is 'only vegans' who present and constitute coherence. It is
inconsistency and lack of necessity which actually justify animal use. Animal
liberation has coherence, so we will reject it; we don't need to hunt foxes or kill
animals for food, so we will. Nonhuman animals just aren't that important. This is
what remains when the camouflage is stripped away; not the 'real' animals but the
real reasons.

One is reminded of another of Barthes' rhetorical figures — Tautology — which
verbally makes the gesture of rationality only to abandon it. Refuge is taken in this,
as one does in fear or anger when at a loss for an explanation, as if to children: 'just
because, that's all!' And, as they are like children, irrational, too much associated
with animals and a threat to order, animal liberationists and those who can be
associated with them are told over and again in different ways the same thing: 'We
are more important than animals, because that's how it is, because I say so'.
Tautology creates a dead, motionless world (see Barthes 1993: 152-153). Moreover, it
is not so much the power of the argument, but the opportunity for its constant
repetition that precludes any contradiction.
However, Toynbee’s finest moment gave readers this gem. On contemporary television, she wrote:

... there is now little of the casually sexist, racist, homophobic beastliness of yesteryear ... 210.

Causally, deliberately, consciously or unconsciously speciesist? And what sense of the logic of related dominations? At the time of writing, Toynbee was the media’s ‘Writer of the Year’.
Summary & Conclusions

From media deployment of the ideological strategies of Promotion, Exclusion, Denigration, Confusing & Redefining and Naturalizing & Universalizing, we can note what, in relation to media coverage of Islam, Said (1985) called the *covering* (with far from objective material, stiff with clichés) and the *covering up* (what doesn’t fit media perception or construction does not get covered). These worked simultaneously for the besieged bloody culture, defensive rhetoric inherent to all, offensive rhetoric notable most in the openly aggressive, relentless diatribes of the rational culturalists, purveyors of perennial dualisms and superiorities. In this articulate thought especially was perhaps the highest expression of symbolic elite discourse where the fear, fantasy, selfishness, hatred, incomprehension and sheer ignorance of common decency and common sense oozed off page and screen in response to the animal liberation attack. Relying on unifying ideology, much of it constituted phatic communication as in the nonsense lyrics of folk song chorus encouraging others to join in.

The mantle of the animal Other was forced upon liberationists. Age old perceptions were brought to bear, the *topos* drawn upon, in fending off animals’ liberation. We saw how the same but different was dealt with linguistically in, for instance, binary forms of representation; socially, in the struggle over meaning, for instance over ‘rights’ and welfare; and culturally, in terms of classification — like animals, liberationists do not fit easily, they are like us and not like us; pollutions (see Hall 1997c: 234-236), and so were rendered invisible or denigrated, operations facilitated by polarization and stereotyping processes. This was how the accounts and meanings were constructed, the functions or purposes they achieved being the command of reality, a reality in which, by their absence in any substantive form, liberationists themselves and indeed liberation were ‘symbolically annihilated’ (see Gerbner & Gross 1976 and Tuchman et al 1978) by the animal use-eternalizing dominant ideology. Alternative constructions were marginalized, downgraded or delegitimated, made unthinkable or unspeakable (see, e.g. Hall 1982: 67). Revelation is obscured. The manner in which the media functioned served to suppress the development and adoption of animal liberation. In recoil mode(s), they
acted as a brake on emancipation, maintaining the us/them barrier: thus far (welfarism) and no further, a circumscribed liberalism reproducing the legitimation of speciesism. We saw the failure to confront responsibly the challenge of animal liberation, to confront otherness, difference and indeed similitude; how, instead and through incomprehension and fear, media texts served to control in various ways and within the parameters and determinants of the welfarist synthesis.

The media approached the subject from a position of imperium, producing strategic knowledge — functional and instrumental — in the service of power and the valuational base of science rather than, as liberationists would demand, moral sense and imperative. If the media’s impact had much earlier been accused (by the Frankfurt School) of ‘impeding the formation of a socialist political consciousness amongst members of the working class’ (Bennett 1982a: 42), we could follow by saying that there had been also an impediment to the formation of animal liberation consciousness amongst the various publics.

Intellectual incomprehension was primary and lay behind all the strategies where animal use was the basis for collective morality. It led to fear and thus directly to denigration-ridicule where animal liberation could not be a serious alternative. But it was in the strategies of Promotion, Exclusion, and Naturalizing & Universalizing that the secondary spatial incomprehension was at work, where animal liberation was never allowed to offer or comprise a solution. In the strategy of Confusing & Redefining, spatial comprehension became the alter ego of intellectual incomprehension — absorbing, manipulating, muting, emptying animal liberation of its radical meaning, even to the point of reducing its values to a matter of taste; public to private domain. As with Tester, the revelatory moment, when dimly perceived, is recoiled from and concealed, its creators sniped at.

Yet there was little evidence that the media in general had even seen Pirsig’s green flash. Perhaps they saw animal liberation but did not or could not believe it. It didn’t square with the contours on the bloody culture’s chart, so was filtered out or diluted. The conventional meaning-categories embodied in society’s codes were not
flexible enough to represent animal liberation without distortion and prejudice. 'Not all harms hurt' and 'the cow does not exist for us, the cow exists for the cow' were incomprehensible notions so set aside in favour of kindness/cruelty considerations in the known territory of brutalism/sentimentalism, the more comforting paradigm and its (balance of) 'benefits', reinforced by ideologically-reductive dichotomies. Myopias and species loyalties of this kind diverted attention from the routine of animal use, its wider context, other meaning and implications.

But the British public were also perceived as having a tendency towards sentimentalism over certain animals, yet rather than being regarded as a reaction against this, animal liberation was seen as an extension of it or mistaken for it. Orthodox sentimentalism, incoherence, fantasy were all projected onto liberationists in the same way that 'animal' qualities in humans are projected onto other animals. In the process, liberationists’ and liberation's discrete identity was obscured. Compressed into fragmentary images, animal liberation’s 'extreme' was made its norm; species taken as genus; generalizations of all animal liberation being taken from the particular (the demonized ALF), leaving the bulk of animal liberation — including its philosophy and possibilities — barely considered or explored, and therefore also marginalized. It just could not be a responsible, respectable, sensible or sincere concept or movement, so it was almost literally meaningless and therefore opened up for any media-controlled interpretation. Discussion and meaning of the human/nonhuman relationship, of animals and of animal liberation were taken hold of by the media, becoming as institutionalized as animal use itself.

Just as animal liberation had attempted to speak in the terms of the orthodox, the orthodox robbed animal liberation of its own meaning(s) and, instead of allowing liberationists the time and space for understanding, they were most often spoken for or represented at best as (always opposed) opiners rather than fact-givers, in great contrast to scientists and even journalists who, in familiar grammar (and usually unopposed), told readers and viewers how it really should be, and was. As the rationalism of animal liberation philosophy tends to render it placeable within the same field as rationalistic speciesism, and the firm association of animal liberation
with vegetarianism possibly sets it within the same field as bloody culture, whatever else it promotes is seen also as within the same field of competition. So animal liberation rationalism, seen as part of the same order as the orthodox, results in the reiteration-promotion of speciesist rationality and the labelling of animal liberation as irrational. Animal liberation decency and compassion, seen in the same field as the speciesist versions, results in ever increasing ostensible animal concern, the reiteration-promotion of speciesist decency (the welfare and wildlife paradigm). In both areas animal liberation is lesser, worse, a shadow.

And just as human superiority is defined against what other animals lack, animal liberation was used as another way of defining civilized society; by what animal liberation is not. Television offered twee animal stories (always about pets or wildlife) at the end of the News, and a plethora of wildlife and pets programmes, all echoing, presumably, what the media considered to be the acceptable attitudes towards animals or those which made 'good television'. But there was no series on fundamental institutional usage (and the very 'nature' of this media ensured that the issues were dealt with on an ontological level thus preserving the invisible epistemology that creates animals as objects), only odd programmes on institutional excesses, and very little on the source of the mess which Animal Hospital and Pet Rescue helped to clear up, and perpetually (whilst Pet City opens yet another retail warehouse). This, for the media, did not appear to be a serious subject; we should care, but not too deeply. Or perhaps it was too serious: compassion ends where structure begins, so structure might end where compassion extends.

To watch the above series (and others which also validated the keeping of many pets in confinement and killing the abandoned), along with the erratic Absolutely Animals for instance (e.g. Channel 4, 20.9.95) — though undoubtedly genuine in its animal concern, especially later (1997) — was to forget, or not realise, that such a thing as animal liberation existed, or even needed to. The texts of speciesism in this, as in the scientistic discourse of progress, delegitimized protest. That the BBC, for instance, ran twin series called Animal Hospital and Children's Hospital seemed to be symptomatic of a perception which paralleled society’s treatment of animals and
children, as though such treatments were of the same order, children and animals already sharing the same protection and care in society. Behind media representation as a whole there was the (mis)perception of a society which is fully enlightened, which took the form of concern about its 'slaves'; a new self-flattering myth, of haute welfare and its hauteur. 'We' care for animals; we who emit the message are the civilized; we of the superior rationalism are in charge and have it all under control. And we have no need of help from the animal 'rights' freak show. Television series celebrating the work of police dog handlers (coinciding with court proceedings against police dog trainer cruelty), vets and zookeepers were the icing on the cake. The common decency was a gloss on the structural violence, leaving the actions of the ALF and other riff-raff now gratuitous, without context.

In defending the attitudes and values which underpin the status quo of animal use, the media reproduced commonsense ideology or were working to what Inglis (1990: 79-80) calls 'strain theory'. Like a nanny or 'auntie', they reassured viewers and readers that everything was alright really, as long as things were maintained as they were, under welfarist control, although a few things needed tidying up occasionally. All we had to do was go blithely on as if all made sense. We would just have to settle for the 'fact' that, like the poor, the problems, the excesses and indeed the cruelties would always be with us. And their causes would, anyway, have to take their turn which, perhaps, would come when every human problem (never solvable by animal liberation) had been solved by (animal-manipulating) science. Or, reminding ourselves of Eder: all that this discourse demands is that 'one should be thankful for being able to go through the world wearing blinkers' and not see the green light off to the side. Media representation of animal liberation appeared to be a tribute to a speciesist fantasy which animal liberation hoped to subvert, to expose the myth of a caring humanity that was doing all it possibly could. The irrationality of animal liberation lay in its inability to accept the sentimental illusion.

Underlying many of the strategies was anger at the affront to speciesist decency and the conventions of the tribe; to culture, where humans are in control. In just being
there, in daring to speak its name and to speak of what the gloss concealed, animal liberation committed the 'unpardonable offence' to which Salt had referred. These were not merely fearsome truths but 'despised and neglected' ones which, in Mills' terms of a great movement's career, may have reached the second stage, of discussion, but which were never discussed without a sense of orthodox outrage (liberationist outrage being bad form) and/or ridicule, without being re-shaped to fit, and not entertained in any context or frame where the outcome could be adoption.

With the ideology's discourse apparently speaking through journalists, the affront and the fear of the 'irrational', the negative imagination running riot was partnered by a lack of positive and sympathetic imagination. The deficiencies and delinquencies permitted perpetuation of both speciesist sentimentalism and the claim of animal liberation ulterior motive and dubious knowledge. Noticeable was the partial transition from Topsell's stereotype (1607): 'They which love beasts in a high measure have so much less charity to men' to the characterization of liberationists as not exactly people (animals?) who cared for neither 'beasts' nor men and knew nothing about the former to boot. Not for one moment was time or space allowed to consider that animal liberation could be unantagonistic to human rights, a stance maintained by ignoring or not comprehending the human benefits promised by veganism, not least in feeding the starving. Indeed, close links between species and race loyalties were suggested — the statement of fact was not 'if we all turned vegan the world could be fed and the single largest cause of avoidable sufferings routed' but, implausibly: '... there would be no cows'. (They cannot exist outside of their human-resource roles).

There was a sense that future development and improvement had been cut off; that the limits of the status quo were the limits of the world:

... this limitation of vision and perceptions is an inevitable consequence of the dictatorship of definition, interpretation and consciousness ... (Stokeley Carmichael, quoted in Altschull 1984: 200).
How any of this would be different had animal liberation, when it turned up the wick, made a vegan stance unequivocal as from the mid 1970s is uncertain; it may or may not have contributed to the negative and confused representation of an alternative holistic vision and project of substantive difference. Nevertheless, we saw how, alone, it was veganism ('... only vegans ...') that was beginning to receive true acknowledgement and force a break in both ‘incoherence’ and incomprehension barriers.

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At the outset it was suggested that we could consider viewing media representations under the concept of hegemony and its allowance for the struggle over meaning, but we could be tempted instead to conclude that we should not lose sight of the links between economic, social and cultural domination approached through the early Marxist concept of ideology:

... those groups who own the means of production thereby control the means of producing and circulating a society's ideas. Through their ownership of publishing houses, newspapers and latterly the electronic media, the dominant classes subject the masses to ideologies which make the social relations of domination and oppression appear natural and so mystifying the ‘real’ conditions of existence. (Gledhill 1997: 347-348).

The media are major instruments of ideological domination, and this ...

... makes it difficult to conceptualize a position from which to resist or challenge it, except through the values of the dominant elite ... (Gledhill 1997: 348).

Gramsci’s hegemony may, as Gledhill suggests, have provided a way round this impasse, explaining not so much the fixed grip of domination but consent won in the to-and-fro between forces. And representation may be a key site in this struggle since the power of definition is a major source of hegemony. But is there a site of struggle of definition in the media with the small amount of animal liberation input we have witnessed? What sense of competition against the ideological unity of speciesism, its unifying ‘we’ discourse and its relentless media reproduction, underwriting existing power relations?
The concept of flexible hegemony does not seem to be entirely applicable or, if it
does, it is in its infancy in relation to animal liberation or, rather, it may have been
in its infancy between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s but then denied further
development. As Gledhill (1997: 348) points out, within the hegemony framework
... ideologies are not simply imposed by governments, business interests or the media as their
agents — although this possibility always remains an institutional option through mechanisms
of direct control such as censorship.

To say that there was no extensive direct control such as censorship would be a
dubious claim indeed, and what we have seen takes us past a notion of tendentious
media. At one with the state on institutionalized animal use, the media (at least
the media seen here) would seem to have been operating in relation to this as
something close to an Ideological State Apparatus, functioning by unified ideology
but also, secondarily, by repression (see Althusser 1971b: 138-139), doing little more
than bathing society in a speciesist discourse. We could further suggest that, as the
media (along with other ISAs, especially education) have replaced the Church as
the erstwhile dominant ISA, they have, in relation to animals and animal
liberation, not only taken up its preferred dominion-domination doctrine and
reproductive capabilities but also the role of opiate provider, not this time to the
exploited but to the exploiters, which includes themselves. If the dominant
ideology has its principle cultural and consciousness effects on the human
superordinates (as suggested by Abercrombie et al [1980]) and its material and
psychic effects on nonhuman subordinates, against the broadest claims of animal
liberation-veganism, the ruling class would thereby be hiding things not only to the
detriment of the animal 'class' (kept as a class by denying individuality, as opposed
to animal liberation's identity and animal class politics) but to the detriment of its
own self. And, as narcotics-use also has negative material and organic effects, this is
not confined to the cultural and cognitive.

Notes
1. What seems to emerge ultimately from the wildlife genre is not so much how marvellous other
species are but how marvellous the programme-makers are.
2. The slim amount of animal liberation literature devoted to media representation — aside from the uncritical 'Our campaign was covered by ... ' — tends to agree that not only did media coverage change for the worse but it changed during the mid 1980s. Richard D Ryder tells us that through most of the 1970s the media gave considerable (and quite often sympathetic) coverage to the movement but by 1978 the novelty seemed to have worn off. However, there was a resurgence of interest as the movement took more direct action [as from around 1980 with the advent of the short-lived Animal Liberation Leagues' mass break-ins and occupations], though this interest too dried up around 1984-85, about the time of the Mars Bars contamination episode, from which time the media increasingly ignored the militants or castigated them as terrorists (Ryder 1989: 287-288). Also, 'press sympathy was suddenly lost: it had become the trend for the media to attack 'animal lib fanatics' (Anon 1989); '... the often favourable coverage which accompanied animal rights campaigners in the early 1980s has been almost entirely replaced by antagonism ... television documentary makers, investigative reporters and Fleet Street (or Wapping) hacks alike are sticking to safer ground. It seems that many have realised that they had bitten off rather more than they could chew ... Serious questions about the effects of abolishing our institutionalised subjugation of animals reared their heads' (McIvor 1988). And see, for instance, Anon (1986/87) and Harris (1987).
Chapters 6 and 7 References

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2. Duff Hart-Davis, 'A live decoy is by far the most effective', The Independent, 20.4.96.
3. e.g. 'We shoot bison. Should we?', The Times, 21.1.95.
5. Holiday, BBC1, 8.8.95.
7. BBC1, 21.2.93.
8. The Goldring Audit, Channel 4, 8.3.97.
10. The Independent, 29.3.96. The Independent paradoxically captured invisibility with a colour photograph showing horse and jockey crashing headfirst to the ground with the caption: 'Jamie Osborne tumbles from Black Humour in the Martell Cup Chase at Aintree yesterday, breaking his collarbone ...'. No mention of the horse's fate.
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13. Six o’Clock News, BBC1, 3.1.97.
15. War Cries: Natural Causes, Channel 4, 10.9.96.
16. 'Bradley turns a nightmare into a dream', The Independent, 13.3.96.
17. The Independent Weekend, 18.11.95.
22. 'Letter from the Editor', The Independent, 13.7.96.
23. Just for Laughs, Harlan Williams, Channel 4, 9.9.94.
25. Drop the Dead Donkey, Channel 4, 11.3.93 and 13.10.94.
27. Sunday Night Clive, BBC1, 13.3.94.
28. Saturday Night Armistice, BBC2, 1.7.95.
29. Tony Slattery on the Bore of the Year Awards, BBC2, 20.3.93.
30. The 'Two Fat Cooks' on the End of the Year Show, BBC1, 31.12.96.
32. e.g. World Tour of Scotland, BBC1, November-December 96.
33. Six o’Clock News, BBC1, 14.2.96.
34. 'Yesterday was a ... ', The Independent, 13.6.96.
35. BBC1, 28.9.95.
36. Tomorrow’s World, BBC1, 12.11.94.
37. The Independent, 21.11.95.
38. Testing Times, Heart of the Matter, BBC1, 9.7.95.
39. The Independent, 18.4.96.
40. 'Making a hash of rearing chicks', The Times, 10.6.95.
41. 'Cottle’s ringing farewell', The Times, 12.4.93.
42. 'Cottle’s ringing farewell', The Times, 9.6.95.
43. 'Cottle’s ringing farewell', The Times, 12.4.93.
44. 'Cottle’s ringing farewell', The Times, 9.6.95.
45. 'Cottle’s ringing farewell', The Times, 12.4.93.
46. 'Cottle’s ringing farewell', The Times, 9.6.95.
47. Polly Toynbee, Radio Times, 12-18.4.97.
48. Steve Jones, In the Blood, BBC2, 10.6.96.
49. BBC television advertisement for Ceefax subtitles, 5.12.96.
50. Sports psychologist referring to disgruntled football fans, Six o'Clock News, BBC1, date unknown.
51. The Times, 12.3.93.
52. The Sunday Times supplement, 'The Culture', 17.4.94.
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54. The Times, 17.2.95.
55. The Great Ape Trial attempted to investigate beliefs and opinions (including Peter Singer's) about humans' nearest relatives, Channel 4, 27.12.95.
56. 'Waiter, waiter, there's a dead raccoon in my soup', The Telegraph, 21.12.96.
57. 'Hirst's cow heads on protest menu at Soho restaurant', The Guardian, 25.1.97.
58. e. g. Six o'Clock News, BBC, 9.8.98.
59. Newsnight, BBC2, 17.3.95.
60. The Guardian, 25.2.97.
61. Six o'Clock News, BBC1, 3.6.97.
63. The Guardian, 9.4.97.
64. Six o'Clock News, BBC1, 24.10.95.
65. Six o'Clock News, BBC1, 27.3.97.
66. The Goldring Audit, Channel 4, March 97.
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68. Six o'Clock News, BBC1, 16.12.96.
69. 'Hunting Is Good News for Hares', The Independent, 28.2.96.
70. Newsnight, BBC2, 11.11.96.
71. The Telegraph, 7.12.96.
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76. The Good Food Show, BBC1, 23.5.95.
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78. Meat, BBC2 as from 2.5.95.
79. The Trouble with Animals, BBC2, 19.9.95.
81. You Decide, BBC1, 19.9.96.
82. Meat, BBC2, 16.5.95.
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106. Common as Muck, BBC1, 5.10.94.
107. Cracker, ITV, 10.10.94.
108. Between the Lines, 'Blooded', 23.11.94.
111. RWF Poole, The Telegraph, date unknown.
112. 'Something for the Weekend', Times Magazine, 24.4.93.
113. Times Magazine, 3.7.93.
114. 'Of Mice and Men and Militants: John Diamond mauls animal lovers with no time for humans', The Observer, 19.12.93.
115. 'News From the Front', The Times, 20.2.93.
116. The Times Magazine 'Diary', 11.3.95.
118. The Times, 23.2.93.
119. London's Burning, ITV, 5.11.95.
120. Frank Stubbs, ITV, 8.8.94.
121. 'Sambo is Innocent', The Telegraph, 4.9.96.
122. 'Roll up for a job with the circus', The Telegraph, 29.10.96.
123. The Independent, 27.10.95.
124. e.g. Trisha Greenhalgh, 'When a child gives up meat', The Times, date unknown but c1995.
125. Radio Times, 11-17.3.95 on Madhur Jaffrey's Flavours of India, BBC2, 14.3.95.
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153. 'Wildlife groups seek new laws to protect seals', Sunday Times, 17.10.93.
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165. 'Everyone is against cruelty to animals. But opinion differs sharply over what is cruel — and about the best ways to combat it', The Telegraph, 28.9.96.
166. Peregrine Worsthorne in the Sunday Telegraph, 7.4.96; Linda Grant in The Guardian, 28.3.96; (the tabloids joined in: Paul Johnson in the Daily Mail, 30.4.96); and Charles Hendry MP on Question Time, 25.10.96.
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175. Six o'Clock News, BBC1, 5.12.97.
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205. 'New Age may be mainstream, but it's a mistake', *The Independent*, 27.5.96.
207. 'Animal rights can damage your health', *The Independent*, 22.4.96.
208. 'A farewell to alms — of the dottier sort', *The Independent*, 8.7.96.
209. 'Sorry Reynard, it's a human right to hunt', *The Independent*, 1.11.95.
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This thesis has examined how, through revelatory means, animal liberation seeks to overthrow, rather than find space within, dominant, unifying and self-blinding speciesist ideology; how, in so doing, it gives rise to representations which illustrate how speciesism is reproduced and otherness confronted, and which are driven by fear of the liberation of the Other, in whom and in whose subjugation humans and human society seem to have so much invested.

In Chapters 1 to 4 we attempted to establish an understanding of both animal use and animal liberation so as not to approach representations of both in a vacuum, and this meant doing a lot of history which was followed in largely linear fashion, recognizing and reflecting the transhistorical nature of animal use.

Chapter 1 traced the history, tradition and discourse(s) of human/nonhuman relationship(s) up to and including the nineteenth century in order to explore the reasons for uneasy use of animals; the various attitudes and beliefs developed and deployed to rationalize human behaviour; the voices raised against this orthodoxy at different times; and the societal factors which undermined and forced reassessments of the subjugation. The organizing structure of the narrative was a dialectic involving tension between two incompatible forces, characterized within a concept partially borrowed from Eder (1996): of dominant bloody-carnivorous culture and repressed bloodless-vegetarian culture. This struggle of opposites, both of them riddled with inconsistencies, was seen to grow until, forced by reformation and humanitarian accumulations, strands within each appeared to collide to form a ‘synthesis’ and a new dialectic proceeded on a higher level but with the same contradiction continuing, one yet to reach a new synthesis. Both cultures would become more formidable adversaries, though in different ways — through the consolidation of a comforting welfarist paradigm and its control of meaning and
value in human/nonhuman affairs, and in the later development of a challenging liberation movement.

Chapters 2 to 4 focused on animal liberation itself and its efforts to break down the edifice of animal exploitation. Continuing the chronology, Chapter 2 covered the approximate period 1890s-1970s, from and including Henry Salt's *Animals' Rights* to the eve of publication of Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation*, and began to look at the movement's attempts at more cohesive strategies. The chapter examined: Salt's work and his period; from Salt to the 1960s' signs of emergence of a contemporary movement; and reached an assessment of how, in their identification with other animals, animal liberation's latter-day representatives attempted to expose the facts and fictions of prevailing ideology. Salt, in the line of 'bloodless culture' expression, was the first real strategist, his *Animals' Rights* growing out of a canny perception that the welfarist paradigm was inconsistent and untenable and presented liberationists with problems. His major, humanitarian-based contributions were to build on evolutionary kinship, to make the plea for co-operative 'nature', identify the need for a comprehensive principle to bind disparate animal concerns and to include animal liberation within the programme of social progress, of increasing equality.

Due largely to welfarism, the continuing inconsistency of bloodless culture, increasing scientism, wars and their aftermaths, it wasn't until the 1960s that the torch was taken up and a 'manifesto' of animal liberation appeared in 1971 which drew attention to how human/nonhuman relations had been skilfully mismanaged. Roszak's work on technocracy and counterculture provided the context which also showed how, if bloodless culture common cause had fallen away in the early twentieth century, a similar fragmentation occurred in the late 1960s-early 1970s separating animal liberation out from related issues. From the movement's writings certain themes were identified as fundamental to the case being made — the failure of welfarism; revolutionary intent; explosive combinations of empirical evidence and emerging animal liberation theory; the balancing of intellective and intuitive faculties; the struggle between symbol and the literal, and the rational and the
irrational; the challenging of orthodox sentimentalist fantasy, self-interest and conformity; and the overcoming of ‘blindness’ through revelation.

In an attempt to understand how contemporary animal liberation was galvanized and remains underpinned by moral philosophy and how this proceeds from the revelatory platform, Chapter 3 introduced three of its foremost philosophers and their further strategic works — Singer’s utilitarianism, Clark’s eclectically derived vision and Regan’s rights theory — which attempted to take previous tradition through the species barrier. We noted how this was fraught with the danger of counter discourse speaking the rationalist language of orthodoxy, that which had served in bloody culture’s consolidation of animal use. But Clark’s ‘systemless’ work was seen to provide something of a counterpoint which opens animal liberation up from purely rationalist concerns. Consideration was also given to the incomplete success of a movement grounded in normative ethics.

This lead us to offer a critical assessment, in Chapter 4, of animal liberation’s contemporary agenda and self-presentation. The human and nonhuman slaveries analogy drawn by the movement generally, and the neglected model of veganism, were used to examine the proscriptions, prescriptions and putative comprehensive principle status of the philosophies. We found that animal liberation’s most comprehensive principle was to be found within veganism (a challenge to or within animal liberation) but that, despite Lewis Gompertz and the Vegan Society, the philosophers (tactically, fearfully?) had not espoused it emphatically, leaving animal liberation associated with vegetarianism and, as with the use of ‘rights’ theory rationalism, with a foot in bloody culture. Veganism then looks like an extension of animal liberation. But it was suggested, instead, that it is at the point of veganism that not only is consistency truly established but that here is the substantive ground shift. Here is the full revelation. It is at this point that bloodless culture refuses compromise and lessens the opportunity for bloody culture to redefine and usurp. Here lies the bloodless culture common-cause nexus; this is bloodless culture and where it finds its true voice, not least in ‘rebuking’ the non-vegan world. Our previous two-culture scheme was questioned; the ‘bloodless’ traced thus far appearing as reaching out to the real thing. Nevertheless, we saw how the denial of

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veganism remains endemic. Although acknowledging the movement's late shifts towards a vegan foundation, the combination of these factors raised questions about tactics determining philosophy and about which means create which ends: the welfare/liberation dilemma. Animal liberation's self-presentation becomes confused and was to prove problematic in representations of it as an extreme of bloody culture rather than a discrete alternative-oppositional culture.

Establishing such understandings enabled use of them as relief against which to examine, in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, representations of animal use, liberation and liberationists more than one hundred years into the post-synthesis phase, as an element of the wider speciesist discourse. These representations served as an index of how the animal liberation challenge is met.

In Chapter 5 we turned to a contrasting narrative, understanding and academic representation of animal liberation. Empirical-based analysis of Keith Tester's view of animals as blank pages and of animal liberation as a fraud in an epistemic-constructivist-new historicist scheme served as a pathway to Chapters 6 and 7, enabling us to draw out themes of reduction, redefinition, entrapment and 'incomprehension' which had relevance for the analysis of media representation.

Chapters 6 and 7 concentrated on how, with bloody culture under attack, the media function to maintain a system of control, regulate normality and reproduce the dominant speciesist ideology through humanocentric forms of understanding and the management of symbols. The chapters offered an analysis of media representation of animal use and liberation, postulating the theory that media performance obscures revelation, inhibits animal liberation's development and eternalizes animal use. The theoretical perspectives relating to ideology, hegemony and myth were set out, preparing the ground for an investigation into how, through signifying practices and the general command of reality, liberation and related concepts and issues are constructed, and how and to what advantage they operate. Analysis and further theoretical discussion, informed by Barthesian mythology, were then threaded through the media examples which were considered as, and classified into groups of, offensive and defensive ideological strategies which drew upon the topos, the
comforting pool of rationalizations and rhetoric accumulated since hunter-gatherer
days. A final component summarized the analysis and concluded by questioning
whether notions of hegemony, in relation to the media as sites of signification
struggle, were entirely applicable (in this context) to a society in which a
fundamental speciesist ideology is still very much apparent as a unifying force and
where animal liberation could find no unmediated (and little mediated) access to
the sites. Largely, the analysis was guided by the notion of 'confronting' the
challenging otherness of both animals and animal liberation and that the engine
which drives the ideology-mythology is the fear of the liberation of the Other, an
intellectually uncomprehended but spatially comprehended threat to cognitive and
cultural order.

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Much of what we have seen reflects how the conversion of Enlightenment into
positivism has cut across animal liberation's path. Popular in the nineteenth
century, its evolutionary approach — society passing from theological to
metaphysical to positive (scientific) stages of development — was compatible with
evolutionary theory and its extension to human society in the shape of social
Darwinism. Gathering strength in the 1920s, it aided the obscuration of Salt's
evolutionary kinship (much like Pythagoras was overtaken by Aristotle, St Francis
by Aquinas, and Montaigne by Descartes earlier), informed the later technocracy,
and contemporary animal liberation was to find its own moral progress more than
matched by the advent of genetic engineering which, in its ultra commodification of
animal patenting, is the utter antithesis of veganism; the dialectical link between
domination and liberation. Positivism's scientific glorification of the human, its
reductionism, its love of system, its separation of fact and value and its certainness
have all been recognizable here as characteristic of the bloody culture. Perhaps
above all, in relation to what we have found in our analysis of representations, has
been positivism's fear of what it sees as mental anarchy, and its propensity towards
controlling and taming, in the same way that natural-scientific knowledge has been
and is used to tame 'nature'. It was suggested in Chapter 3 that animal liberation
ethics challenged ethical relativism or egoism and we can add here the ethical positivism which maintains that what is, is good.

This formidable ‘science’ underpins and sustains speciesist mythology. Whereas ‘revolution announces itself openly as revolution and thereby abolishes myth’ (Barthes 1993: 146), the representations of animal liberation we have seen tend to produce or reproduce myth. That which seeks to preserve or eternalize ‘reality’ is faced by that which seeks to transform it, to demystify or demythify it, to call its bluff. Animal liberation has been seen in its process of breaking down the ‘good’, the falsely obvious, from the platform of revelation, but all the time, bloody culture continues to promote, naturalize, universalize its own beliefs and meanings, doing so through the media which reject the basic planks of animal liberation — the material and the moral. Materially, animal liberation cannot be beneficial. It cannot be progress. Indeed, perceived as more nature than culture it is a threat to progress — served by views of animal liberation as nostalgic — for progress is measured in (animal-use and nature-conquering paradigmatic) science terms, and animal liberation is maintained as ‘anti-science’ or non-science. The very notions of animal liberation co-operative problem-solving potential residing in non-animal agriculture and science are not worth trying to think about, can barely be thought. Going to extremes with impossible schemes.

Nor can animal liberation signal an advance in morals; bloody culture maintains dominance by its resistance in the name of moral economy, silencing or downgrading other moral concern. Animal liberation has the audacity to suggest that the world is not at all perfect, that the triumph of culture over ‘nature’, and the bloody welfarist culture itself are, after all the highminded work, not only questionable but ethically corrupt. That culture should be regarded as not really civilized, and that the accusation is thrown by those who, again, not being the culture must be nature, is perhaps the biggest affront to human confidence and self-esteem. The affront turns to outrage, for whereas pluralism looks for compromise there is perceived to be little or no compromise in undefined animal liberation which itself is denied legitimate outrage. What can it be angry about? Liberationists must be misguided, dubious,
irrational, heretical, sinister, dishonest, totalitarian, murderous and treacherous.

The media could only 'recognize' animal liberation's claims by reducing them to tactics, or to taste, but most especially to a version of competing civilities, all of which can only be seen in terms of normative welfare. The challenge of animal liberation induces shame, fear, anxiety and affront, major factors of the bloody culture of Eliasian civilizing process. Bloody culture recoils, deploying strategies which denigrate the attackers, reinforce its own self esteem and rightness, and appropriates animal liberation meanings in order to maintain its own. Revelation is obscured. The ideological strategies take the politics out of animal liberation, trying to contain it as personal acts which have no place in the public sphere (where they become acts of ulterior motive). Animal liberation's anomalous status tends to open it up for representations of it not so much as a serious social movement but merely as a form of collective behaviour, a fad, a craze, a cult, a delusion; or as an ideology, lest the status quo itself be recognized as one. The massive structural violence against animals is disregarded (except as its excesses) and the emphasis placed instead on individual or small group 'violence' (and see, e.g. Karim 1997: 176), often used synecdochically, reinforcing the extreme status of animal liberation. The orthodox are thus allowed to regain the moral high ground where guilt and responsibility are evaded by ever increasing glosses of decency and concern laid over the stench of 'inevitable and natural' animal use, like applying deodorant on sweat. This civilizing process seems to be the triumph of form over content; a covering, mirroring the invisibility of animals and the concealment of animal-using establishments.

In the confusing and redefining, animal liberation was raided in an effort at co-option by which its counterhegemonic potential was lost through its translation into the dominant cultural context. It was the media who were 'borrowing the clothes' of the impostor, re-tailoring them to fit the body politic. What utility can be found in animal liberation is easily assimilated into speciesist discourse, appropriated, thereby neutralizing the beast, bringing it under control. Being thus displaced, it becomes something else, anything else, and the 'debate' about it takes place somewhere else, on the bloody culture's grounds and terms. Animal liberation
disappears when the media get hold of it just as animal suffering is ameliorated by studio discussion. Animal liberation is rendered superfluous to our already decent society where animals are treated better than anywhere else in the world. As both threat and suggested improvement it is outrageous. And, as Keith Tester claims (1991: 192), animal ‘rights’ exists in a fundamentalist ghetto but, as he does not go on to say, this is where it is trapped, where it is forced to live, as animals themselves are, though as a symbolic rather than a symbolic and material resource.

Labelled extreme thus validating the centre, animal liberation is held, at best, in the ‘going too far-whatever next’ frame. The commonsense of ‘everything in moderation’ applies no less to compassion but not, even now, to science. Fact (and its valutonal base) is unfettered, value has to catch up. Animal liberation is going too far in both directions, backwards in ‘anti-science’ and repression mode and forwards in value-oriented, Other-liberation mode. It is by turns or at once both irrational and over-rational. Other Others (or at least some of them) have finally been recognized as human and this begins the rehabilitation. We have more invested in the human/nonhuman binary and its perceived, imagined or constructed differences which animal liberation, in its favouring of similitude, seeks to do away with. As old certainties break down, perhaps it is a comfort that we, all classes, all races and both genders, have a unifying ideology and a closed universal sign system in speciesism, despite its local accents. The end of ideology and post-ideology theses serve not just to hide the existence of this unifying ideology but to erase the notion of welfarism-speciesism as an imaginary resolution of real contradictions, and to render absurd the attack upon it. The species barrier — and the tautological cultural imperative of ‘we are more important than animals’ — remains the ultimate and universal article of faith; all roads go off the map at this point.

But that another life form is both operating on the map and hinting at something off it is disorientating. Animal use has determined not only how we perceive civilization and progress, but also what constitutes the civilized and the known. Bloody culture perceives in animal liberation a threat to its own understandings and cognitive and cultural order, to a civilization founded upon the backs of animals (and
to an animal-loving society which, it seems, will do anything for animals except get off their backs).

We can expand a little on what fears this liberation threat may induce. We referred earlier to Elias's civilizing process relating to bloody culture (and no less than to the more conservative, functionalist theories he critiques), and we can apply one of his central notions here — the question of sociogenic fears (see Elias 1994: xiii) — in relation to what the challenge of animal liberation means to it. We have to enlarge upon this for our analysis of the interplay of bloody and bloodless cultures, and we shall leave aside fears which are more specific to individuals' personal relations.

We cannot determine exactly and completely what fears are constitutive and which relate to the social function of animal use, but we can suggest they include those associated with: (a) functionalist collective conscience, order and social solidarity breaking down, a more generalized subversion; (b) the more Freudian aspect, wherein if the culture of violence towards other animals constitutes a scapegoating sublimation of aggressive instinct, perhaps animal liberation is a 'repression' too far. With the 'acceptable' outlet for societal aggression closed off, human society may become more violent (just look at the ALF) or become more miserable (symbolized in diet-impoverishment); and (c) the forced recognition and confession of guilt, if speciesism is self-hatred, and welfarism (as Watson 1944 suggested) the bad conscience of the parasite. It may also upset property owners, power seekers, Panglossians, libertarians, wealth and status seekers (where success is still measured in terms of animal product use), and conservatism (with its fear of the 'tyranny of the enlightened') and liberalism (with its fear of 'absolutism'), both shuddering at animal liberation's 'excesses' of freedom and rationality. And what of the work ethic if animals are not to be commissioned into service? Social negation becomes cultural negative.

Unavoidably assisting in their own dehumanization by their association with animals, their 'over-identification', animal liberationists threaten regression to the animal from which the civilized have striven to be free. If the liberation is to become a reality, what then of bloody culture's bearings? The entire combination

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spells chaos, the media's version of anarchy. We could suggest, then (and taking a liberty with W B Yeats), that at worst, animal liberation threatens to make

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world
... Surely some revelation is at hand. (Yeats 1970).

The revelation is dimly perceived and recoiled from, for it

Troubles my sight: somewhere in the sands of the desert
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
Is moving its slow thighs ... (Yeats 1970).

The representations we have seen here seem to suggest that the orthodox are more appalled and horrified by the challenge of therianthropic animal liberation than by the horrors of animal use (which themselves now involve the breakdown of human/nonhuman barriers in the shape of ultra-utilitarian xenografts and their inevitable chimerism). It's not just the animal liberation creature that's fearsome, but also the orderless, structureless, cultureless desert on the edge of bloody culture whence it seems to come rather than the ordered, structured, cultured laboratory. The real or fabricated fears have their consequences for animal liberation which, not regarding itself as a threat to society at all, quite the reverse, is — if we can join with the orthodox and view it in symbolic terms — more of a secular Hound of Heaven (Thompson 1972): the (Divine) Love, the beneficence, the revelation, that pursues us even when we seek to flee from it and to which we ultimately submit having seen through our misplaced fear. Except that, instead of fleeing from it, the orthodox seem to capture and exclude it as if it were the rough beast; that is, imprison it, denigrate it, define it in their own way according to their — the only — epistemology, milk it, reproduce it, 'kill' it and then, in contrast to Tester's fetish, sell off the product to the many who, guided by media strategies, are willing to 'buy' it. In relation to animal liberation the media acted like both hunters and pastoralists (again, having it both ways). Not to be these would be symbolic death. Instead, animal liberation's values become bloody culture's resources; life at Others' expense.

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Whereas animal liberation is a leap of faith, speciesist discourse, as we have seen it in the media, constitutes and encourages not just bad faith but purblind faith and purblind fear. This was the partially-sighted leading the myopic in a circle of security, exclusion and entrapment. If welfarist bloody culture looks like it's moving on it is instead going around in the untenable space between the 'callous indifference' of the past (not yet lost) and the 'logical' path of humane progress, whether that path be linear or lateral.

As we noted in the Introduction, animal liberation is all about transforming people's consciousness, habits and spirit; effecting change in allegiance from bloody to bloodless culture. Both cultures exist as options within society as they do as potentials within the human individual. We are born into the ways of dominant bloody culture which expects us to subscribe to its teachings and hides those things which may make us doubt it and search for the alternative. Attempts against bloody culture can be seen as attempts at reconnecting with, or a rediscovery of, the bloodless. But, largely obscured by the blinding light of the known, safe culture, the bloodless is not at all clear, which accounts in part for inconsistencies, and it is not until Gompertz that we get close to a clearer vision though even he was not entirely sure that his project was viable. Salt recoiled from the fullness, then Watson and Cross, albeit still with some practical doubts but notably with faith in both nature and science, bring the culture into full view. The philosophers draw back, and then we see a more general move again towards that light. All the time there is this attempt at revelation.

And in our revelatory context we noted how, for the bloody culture orthodox in relation to other animals, believing is seeing; sight is determined by humanocentric belief (immune) system. Animal liberation is filtered out by it. But it is a belief system which is not complete without being bolstered by the idea that, even then, seeing is deceiving, it's eating that's believing. Simone Weil suggested that, 'The trouble in human life is that eating and looking are two different operations ... it may be that vice, depravity, and crime are nearly always, or perhaps always.'
attempts to eat what we should only look at' (quoted in Berry 1979: 81). Bloody
culture confuses the acts of eating and looking; it can’t see animals unless it is eating
them, or vivisecting them, caging them, etc., acts which are never quite enough to
overcome the uncertainty of the symbol which, nevertheless, is just enough to
guarantee animals’ invisibility as entities in their own right, as their own ends. So
it goes, round and round; the perpetual holocaust to which Watson referred. And one
sustained by the perhaps wishful delusion that the Lambs in the field are always
the same lambs.

The use of trope to represent animal liberation is akin to how society favours
symbolic thinking to the literal in talk and thought about animals (and see, e.g.
Adams 1990: 74). If, psychoanalytically, symbols are an act or object representing a
repressed unconscious desire, in relation to nonhumans the desire is not repressed.
Moreover, the use of symbol covers not just other animals but the gaps in orthodox
knowledge of what or who they are. Whereas animal liberation has a negative
capability2 — admitting at various points, and happy to live with the fact, that it
is not exactly sure about who or what all animals are; it knows ‘enough’ — orthodox
positivism must maintain the illusion that all is known or can and should be known,
for certain. Bloody culture’s seeing capability is based on eating (etc.) those whom,
according to animal liberation, we should only look at. The whole revelatory
scheme of animal liberation seems to be dedicated to this, seeing is both means and
end. Comprehension and transformation are one and the same.

Animal liberation claims to have a clearer sight, a better vision, not so much
entirely of the ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ of other animals from a position of situated
knowledge (more an uncovering of the morally significant aspects of animal
commonality), but of a superior relationship with other animals based on common
knowledge and that the present relationship is not fixed, or is fixed only arbitrarily
and temporarily. Yet there is a problem here which links incomprehension,
revelation and alternative value. Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation has been hailed
as the bible of the animal rights movement. But, if we take the works of Gompertz,
Salt, Watson, Cross, Singer, Clark and Regan together as the (no less polysemic)
bible, we can draw comparison with Althusser’s comments on Marx’s *Capital*, the ‘Bible’ of the International Workers Movement. Althusser’s point here was that whereas the workers ‘understood’ *Capital* so easily because it spoke of the everyday reality of the exploitation they suffered under the capitalist system, the intellectual specialists had trouble ‘understanding’ it:

... they do not suspect, they cannot suspect the extraordinary power and variety of the ideological grip ... They are not in a position to criticize for themselves the illusions in which they live and to whose maintenance they contribute, because they are literally blinded by them. (Althusser 1971c: 72-73).

Perhaps the most influential works — the green flash yachting books? — are those which speak to our condition, telling us what we already ‘know’ or feel or see but which we have, or have had, suppressed; those which defamiliarize, make the taken for granted appear new, seen again or for the first time, enabling the reappraisal and transformation, strengthening self-confidence in the ‘unfamiliar’.

The proto-liberationist’s ready identification with other animals and their condition enables easy understanding and agreement with Gompertz, Salt, Watson, Cross, Singer, Clark and Regan; for others an incomprehension which, though the ‘war’ is long finished, leads to the vicious circle of continued animal use (animals as POW slaves), the fantasy and the incapacity for innovative thought. Suffused in perceptions of animal liberation’s material and moral ‘impossibilities’ is the lack of, or suppression of, sympathetic imagination of other animals’ experience, and of the practical, justice-driven Gompertzian imagination of what society and civilization are capable of without resorting to blinding animal use. This relates to social and cultural vision, and Shaw’s comments on his own ‘sight’ are instructive:

... I got a clue to my real condition from a friend of mine, a physician who had devoted himself to ophthalmic surgery. He tested my eyesight one evening, and informed me that it was quite uninteresting to him because it was normal. I naturally took this to mean that it was like everybody else’s; but he rejected this construction as paradoxical, and hastened to explain to me that I was an exceptional and highly fortunate person optically, normal sight conferring the power of seeing things accurately, and being enjoyed by only about ten per cent of the population, the remaining ninety per cent being abnormal. I immediately perceived the explanation of my want of success [as a playwright] ... My mind’s eye, like my body’s, was “normal”: it saw things differently from other people’s eyes, and saw them better. (Shaw 1946: vi).
A major concern for animal liberation lies in that want of success, in the possibility of only a limited number of people ever being predisposed to see the green light, unless there is a universal ‘normal’ sight of the mind’s eye which either exists, can be restored or, more sociologically, in an alternative scheme, created. And that restoration, correction or creation would seem to depend greatly on the representations animal liberation enjoys or, as we have seen here, suffers and where the orthodox belief system determines that the normal or normative imperfect sight not only sees other animals as little more than symbolic and material resources, but mistakes the Hound for the rough beast.

Although this thesis has not been written with the aim of providing a report but with analysing representations against our understanding of animal liberation, and especially in relation to the vegan liberation model in both liberation and use cases, it is worth making a few observations in this connection. The ironic, or perhaps inevitable, aspect of animal liberation is that even though, in order to free animals, it has attempted to use the language which has subjugated them, then judging from the representations it is still intellectually uncomprehended, although it is impossible to tell where disingenuousness ends and incomprehension begins. Whatever it is, those with the most of it have retained the most discursive power and the greatest capacity for projecting animal liberation as complex and fearsome.

We have seen how an animal liberation grounded in ethics and within Enlightenment rationalism has been met with negative representation, with the recoiling, big gun offensive rhetoricians whose own base has been overwhelmingly rationalist and with a greater stockpile to draw upon. Indeed, an endless supply and the same arguments and inaccuracies continuously recycled. And we have seen how many of these seem also to have drawn eagerly upon Tester as if Animals and Society were yet another chapter in the bible of anti-animal ‘rights’ (a bible which can be comprehended) and how Tester has drawn upon media representation; many of the tirades were interchangeable. Certainly in its aim of eliminating accusations of sentimentality and emotionalism, animal liberation has not succeeded, such notions
still being rife in the media, for this excessive concern for the mere (cuddly) animal must still be childish. But if liberationists do not ‘love’ animals in the orthodox manner, they must be more concerned with themselves, as in Tester. And, despite what has always seemed to be animal liberation’s strong belief in human potential, its ‘idealism’ and ‘utopianism’, in both the media and Tester liberationists don’t seem to care much about other humans either, notions fostered by wrenching animal liberation, and indeed animal use, out of both their moral and material contexts.

However, none of the foregoing has meant to suggest that animal liberation is following, or has been following, a ‘wrong’ or ‘right’ strategy. There is as much reason to believe that it will achieve, or fail to achieve its ends whether it overtly takes the full revelatory stance of veganism, or imagines that its success lies through vegetarianism, or through welfarism, or through rights, or by going it alone, or by forging or re-forging the late nineteenth century-early twentieth century common cause with other groups. (Or ironically, that its ends are achieved as a result of entirely empirical matters; through fact rather than value, though in the wider liberationist case the two are not separated). We have not been interested in deciding upon the movement’s best options (or indeed what the media should be doing), only to analyse what appears to have happened and in terms of representations. Certainly, if we have not seen anything of media effects on the public here then we have seen how, in passing off construction as fact and in renaturalizing the political, the media may affect the movement, not least in intensifying its revelatory dilemmas.

Notes

1. Compromise links with (in)comprehension. There is always room on letters pages for correspondents who complain that whilst they are willing to cater for their vegetarian guests, their (intolerant and impolite) vegetarian hosts are not prepared to serve them ‘meat’.

2. A term coined by poet John Keats, who defined it as: ‘... when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts without any irritable reaching after fact and reason’ (quoted in Barry 1995: 25). Peter Barry refers to it as a privileging of the unconscious, the silent working of the mind erupting into the spirit or the consciousness. In our scheme we could say it was the return of the repressed bloodless culture.
Appendix 1

Data on nonhuman animal use and land use

In cycling grain through farmed animals 90% of its protein is lost, and 96% of its calories.

An acre of cereal can produce five times more protein than an acre devoted to meat production; and legumes (beans, lentils, peas) can produce ten times as much. Thus the greater the human consumption of animal products, the fewer people can be fed.

While it takes, on average, 25 gallons (113 litres) of water to produce a pound of wheat in modern Western farming systems, it requires 2,500 gallons (11,250 litres) of water to produce a pound of meat.

85% of topsoil loss in the USA is directly attributable to animal-based farming.

All above from Seager (1995).

Calculations on water requirements by David Pimental, water resource specialist at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York (reported in the New Scientist 1.2.97), show the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Litres of water required to produce 1kg of food</th>
<th>Potatoes</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Alfalfa</th>
<th>Sorghum</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Soya beans</th>
<th>Chicken</th>
<th>Beef</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some 75% of all UK agricultural land (60% of all UK land) is used to feed/rear farmed animals. (Vegan Society).

Cattle alone ‘take up 24% of the land mass of the planet’ (National Geographic magazine, July 1992).

Nearly half of the European Union’s methane emissions comes from ruminant digestion and manure (New Scientist, 7.12.96).

Numbers of animals slaughtered for food in the UK per annum: 675 million chickens; 38 million turkeys; 15 million pigs; 3 million cattle; 19 million sheep. Some 30 million male chicks are slaughtered on hatching per annum. (MAFF/HMSO/Animal Aid 1995).

Numbers of animals used per annum in the UK vivisection industry: approx 2.6 million (1995 figure; Home Office/HMSO). (Approx. 50-500 million worldwide).

Further such information may be found in, e.g. Clements (1995).
Appendix 2

Further Research

Possible further research which could lead from (or the need for which has been experienced while researching and writing) this thesis could include *(mostly qualitative)* research into:

- responsibility of the press and political economy viewed through the representation of animal liberation;
- public knowledges of and attitudes towards animal use and animal liberation in relation to their sources of information, which could be studied in tandem with or separate from media effects-reception work in this area;
- animal liberation in a more detailed and larger work concentrating solely on representation;
- a syntactically based form of discourse analysis in relation to media and animal liberation;
- deeper analysis of the individual ideological strategies and tactics addressed in this thesis;
- representations of animal liberation and animal use in the tabloid media. A casual monitoring of tabloids suggests (a) that more space is devoted to animal *cruelty* issues in the tabloids, and (b) that positive representation is higher there. In April 1999, the *Sunday People* launched a campaign to ban vivisection;
- representations of animal liberation and animal use in soap operas;
- animal liberation and gender; and race; and class;
- animal liberation and different ‘constituencies’, e.g. the religious, the atheist, the young, the middle aged, the old;
- animal liberation and different occupational groups;
- animal liberation as a UK social movement;
- the challenge to animal liberation in a postmodern world;
- the effect of speciesism on the cognitive and affective structures of liberationists;
- patterns of the liberationist ‘quest’, from revelatory moment;
- animal liberation and speciesism in relation to different political structures, e.g. in communism, capitalism, green anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, etc. and to theories of ‘human nature’;
- legitimate and illegitimate violence in relation to animal use and liberation;
- soya, seeds and the feminization of culture: promise or threat;
- case studies, e.g. media coverage of World Day for Laboratory Animals over the years, or of a liberationist’s hunger strike;
- a UK-focused work comparable to Gerbner (1995);
- engaging animal liberation with established (non-animal) sociological thought.

See also Cunningham (1995).
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[ ] indicates date of first publication where relevant.


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