The Call To Happiness: An Investigation of Happiness, Virtues, Commands and the Common Good in the Doctrine of Calling, through the work of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century English Puritans.

WARNE, NATHANIEL, ADAM

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The Call To Happiness:
An Investigation of Happiness, Virtues, Commands and the Common Good in the Doctrine of Calling, through the work of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century English Puritans.

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2015
Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis is about eudaimonism in Puritan thought. I am concerned with the living strand of Christian eudaemonism within the writings of 16th and 17th century English Puritans, which has long tendrils back into the tradition, and which is, more or less, neglected by commentators. I will be concerned to show that the notion of divine callings as a kind of command from God can sit comfortably alongside this eudaemonism, without rendering the Puritans ‘divine command theorists.’ As a sub-category of eudaemonism, I will address the Puritan notion of divine callings, showing how this can be understood as an aspect of human flourishing. And, further, as a sub-category of calling, I will look at how the category of ‘work’ can also be understood as an aspect of human flourishing, illuminated from within this tradition of Christian eudaimonism.

I show within the Christian eudaemonistic tradition a distinction between natural and supernatural ends, the latter being only achieved in the vision of God in the next life. With this distinction made, I show that earthly happiness is constituted by the right use of reason in theoria and praxis, being related to our work places as well as a lifelong engagement in theology and philosophy. I then show the relationship between divine command theories and naturalism by looking at the emphasis on the development of virtue to character states appropriate to humankind as rational animals as a command of God. I then move to an examination of more particular commands in the doctrine of calling, arguing that for the Puritans the means of achieving earthly happiness vary from person to person and extend into our talents and workplaces. Finally, I show that personal earthly happiness cannot be achieved without the assistance of friendship in ecclesial and political communities.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Folks are usually about as happy as they make their minds up to be. Abraham Lincoln

Each person has a literature inside them. Anna Deavere Smith

When work is soulless, life stifles and dies. Albert Camus

Introduction

This thesis is about eudaimonism in Puritan thought. I am concerned with the living strand of Christian eudaemonism within the writings of 16th and 17th century English Puritans, which has long tendrils back into the Christian tradition, and which is, more or less, neglected by commentators. I will be concerned to show that the notion of divine calling as a kind of command from God can sit comfortably alongside this eudaemonism, without rendering the Puritans ‘divine command theorists.’ Eudaemonism is the central category that I will discuss. As a sub-category of eudaemonism, I will address the Puritan notion of divine callings, showing how this can be understood as an aspect of human flourishing. And, further, as a sub-category of calling, I will look at how the category of ‘work’ can also be understood as an aspect of human flourishing, illuminated from within this tradition of Christian eudaimonism. I do not deny that other aspects of eudaemonism could also be addressed – but these are some central ones for the Puritan writers who I discuss. If the thesis were strictly about ‘Puritan thought’, or even if I were writing an introduction to the Puritans, at least half of my material would need to be about Scripture and Augustine. We begin this chapter by describing some of the key concepts that will be utilized in this thesis.

Eudaemonism and Ethical Naturalism

In this section we will look at two of the key concepts that will be engaged throughout the thesis: ethical naturalism and classical eudaemonism. The ethical naturalism that will be investigated in this thesis is the Aristotelian naturalism that Terence Irwin describes as “the fulfillment of human nature, expressed in the various
human virtues.”¹ I will follow Irwin and define Aristotelian naturalism, or traditional naturalism, as a “holist doctrine, treating human nature as a whole and a system”² that is related to human function. This will be explained in more detail in chapter 2, but for our purposes here, we can say that Aristotle “argues for this account of the human good from premises about the nature of human beings as rational animals”³ with certain kinds of tendencies, but that not all natural tendencies are to be acted upon. We also emphasize that Aristotelian naturalism is teleological in that agents act for specific ends, where these ends are ordered to happiness. Accordingly, the particular kind of naturalism that will be looked at here is called classical eudaemonism, as it takes happiness to be the organizing principle of ethics without equating happiness with something only observable or sensed in nature. The Puritans, following in a tradition that includes Aquinas, believed God himself to be ‘the good,’ and that happiness consists in dispositions and relations to God that encompass the whole of a person. Though pleasure may be an aspect of eudaemonia, it is in itself not identical with it.⁴ The nuances of happiness and its relationship to virtue, contemplation, law and friendship, will be explored throughout the rest of this thesis. When necessary throughout the thesis I will complicate this account, but first we will look at the methodology that will be utilized for this thesis.

**Methodology**

Karl Barth comments in his commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism that we do not do theology “in a vacuum,” but within a tradition.⁵ This is not only the case of theology in general but also of theological ethics. Christian theologians must investigate moral theories within the tradition. Hans Georg Gadamer notes that the tradition is

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³ Ibid., 1:140–1.

⁴ There is a possibility of a misunderstanding in my thesis by those in the social sciences that should be briefly addressed. That is, what I mean by happiness and of work related flourishing is not the same meaning that is found in studies on Generation Y (emerging adults, born after 1980), a classification of which I am a part. I do not want to be misread as arguing for a Generation Y interpretation of happiness as it relates to work. This will become clearer thought the thesis. For more contemporary conceptions of happiness see, Christian Smith et al., *Lost in Transition: The Dark Side of Emerging Adulthood* (New York: OUP, 2011), 72–3; 75; 95–6; 100; 217; Daniele Hervieu-Leger, *Religion as a Chain of Memory* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), 103.

always a part of us, “a model and exemplar.” With a “critical attitude” we address the truth of tradition but seek to “renew it.” Oliver O’Donovan similarly writes that for ethics, history is important because ethics looks backwards in moral reflection on history so that we can deliberate about how we can do better in the future. Knowing our history and tradition allows for moral deliberation to take place. Stanley Hauerwas, in the context of a narrative or story, argues that common sets of interpretation about history provide the “basis for common actions.” Similarly, Alistair MacIntyre argues that the problem with modern philosophy is that there is a separation from “the story” and that there can be no stepping outside of this narrative. For these reasons, the method of this thesis is to be, to use O’Donovan’s term, ‘traditionalist’ where tradition creates social continuity making new beginnings out of old models. With this in mind, O’Donovan also notes, [t]he history of the modern ethical disciplines is still elusive, and we lack a comprehensive account. The development of Protestant Ethics, in particular, is hardly studied and little understood. This project is an attempt to understand the development of a strand of Protestant ethics through the work of the Puritans, while also giving the beginnings of an historical account and so address the underpinning moral assumptions of these Puritan thinkers.

Text, Tradition and Their Uses

This thesis engages with historical figures and in this way it takes a historical shape. I have taken every care to be responsible with the historical texts. In this way I hope that there is something of benefit for the historian of the reformation engaging with the moral thought of these thinkers. However, in order to draw out implications for our own theological reflection from eudaemonism in the Puritans, I will need, at times, to go

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7 For more from Gadamer on tradition and rationality see, ibid., 280–5; 291.
9 Hauerwas, *Community*, 60 Also see, 44; 49-50.
10 MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 126 Also see, 121; 125.
13 Baxter may be the exception to the above claim, one recent example being, James Calvin Davis, “Pardoning Puritanism: Community, Character, and Forgiveness in the Work of Richard Baxter,” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 29, no. 2 (2001): 283–906.
past the primary source literature, interrogating their outcomes and methods and drawing upon present-day theological and philosophical work in biblical studies, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. This is in light of the traditionalism as laid out by Gadamer and others above. The Puritan authors are a neglected resource whose insights can illuminate present-day issues in theological ethics, and by extension dilemmas in political discourse. With this in mind, I will be showing that these thinkers are dedicated to an Aristotelian-Thomist way of conceiving of the moral life. The question must then be answered as to how these Puritans can be considered Aristotelian-Thomists and thus eudaemonists. To say that 16th and 17th century Puritans are eudaemonists, is not to say that they follow Aristotle and Aquinas in every respect, and discrepancies will be pointed out when relevant. What I am claiming is that analyses of Puritan ethics show similarities with significant facets of Aristotelian-Thomist thought, eudaemonism being an example. We will see later that ancient Greek and Roman thought (namely Aristotle, Cicero and Homer) influenced the Puritans. Their eudaemonism is a synthesis of a Christian worldview and the adoption of certain elements of ancient and medieval philosophy. As mentioned above, this thesis is about ‘eudaimonism in Puritan thought.’ If the thesis were about ‘Puritan thought’ or if I were writing an introduction to the Puritans, at least half of my material would need to be about Scripture and Augustine.

Next, I will now address why certain primary texts were chosen for this thesis. We will begin by looking at what is meant by Puritan in this research, and why certain Puritans were utilized. I will then show why it is that Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas were the best choice for representing classical eudaemonism in relation to these reformation thinkers.

**Puritans**

Puritanism developed in the second half of the sixteenth century in an attempt to ‘purify’ the Church of England. ‘Puritan,’ was a term of abuse which first emerged during the Vestiarian Controversy in the mid 1560s. This group of feisty English Protestants resisted conforming to the rubrics laid down by the 1559 Prayer Book. Ultimately Puritan protests to the ecclesial and political concerns above lead them to emphasize pietism.

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14 This is similar to the methodology used by Insole on Edmund Burke in, Christopher Insole, “Two Conceptions of Liberalism: Theology, Creation, and Politics in the Thought of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Burke,” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 36, no. 3 (2008): 447–89.
This makes defining ‘Puritan’ a challenging task as this designation representing a breadth and plurality of beliefs. This thesis will take care in making statements about ‘Puritans’ generally by noting historical development and differences of opinion within the chosen literature.\textsuperscript{15} It is difficult to define Puritanism according to ecclesiology, or theological and political positions. John Coffey writes, “what made [Puritans] stand out was their zeal and fervour,” citing Patrick Collinson’s popularizing of the phrase, “the hotter sort of Protestant.”\textsuperscript{16} Coffey and Lim note some of the more objective features of what it is to be a Puritan. They note:

Puritan is the name we give to a distinctive and particularly intense variety of early modern Reformed Protestantism which originated within the unique context of the Church of England but spilled out beyond it, branching off into divergent dissenting streams, and overflowing into other lands and foreign churches.\textsuperscript{17}

Another distinguishing feature, as mentioned above, is that Puritans had their origins in the Church of England.\textsuperscript{18} The Puritans separated from, or were thrown out of, the English church because they wanted the Church to look less like Catholicism, and were of a Calvinist consensus rather than of a Lutheran persuasion, as there were almost no Lutherans in England at the time.\textsuperscript{19} With this said, this thesis, whenever possible will stand clear of discussions of predestination and covenant theology. Puritans also took scripture as normative in developing forms of devotion and religious customs developing distinctive literature laying out the stages of Christian life, illustrating these stages in a number of written means such as biographies and journals as well as treatises.\textsuperscript{20}

The Puritans also form an interesting bridge, not only between medieval and early modern thought, but also between early modern, modern and enlightenment thought. In


\textsuperscript{20} Campbell, \textit{Religion of the Heart}, 45.
many recent historical meta-narratives, whether positively or negatively, Puritans are painted as the impetus behind modern and enlightenment individualism. We can see in Weber a sense that calling and ‘inner worldly asceticism’ lead to the individualism found later in Western society. Charles Taylor agrees with Weber: that breaking down the idea that there are higher vocations makes everyday activities hallowed.\textsuperscript{21} Taylor constantly comes back to a Protestant, and at times Puritan, explanation of individual spiritual and vocational growth.\textsuperscript{22} He ties calling to the rise of deism, and later makes the connection from deism to humanism and eventually to secularism. Reformation, and specifically Puritan, calling in effect broke down structures and conflated earthly and heavenly flourishing.\textsuperscript{23} Under the Protestant conception, since we have our own “particular providences,” there is individualism within the broader society.\textsuperscript{24}

In one sense, this thesis confirms these historical narratives given by Weber and Taylor in that there is within the Puritan doctrine of calling a strong sense of individualism. There seems to be at least a strong precedent for tracing the changes in broader historical and theoretical origins of modernity to these thinkers. However, Weber’s reading of Richard Baxter exposes a flaw that I hope to exploit. Weber shows Baxter to resemble utilitarianism and less the classical eudaemonism that this thesis argues the Puritans more closely resemble. As Hannah Arendt has traced, utilitarianism descends into scientific naturalism and finally into nihilism.\textsuperscript{25} But I argue that it is not fair to associate this brand of teleological ethics with Puritan thought. This is not the place to address this in detail and will be taken up at some length through out this research.\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} See, ibid., 80; 129; 165; 230; 266.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 49; 104; 106.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 81–4; 119; 223.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Hannah Arendt, \textit{The Human Condition} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 154–9.
\item \textsuperscript{26} The closest form of utilitarianism to eudaemonism is David Brink’s ‘objective utilitarianism.’ Brink’s objective utilitarianism resembles eudaemonism, firstly, in that it strongly emphasizes a moral realism that is teleological and encompasses objective values. This variety of utilitarianism involves more of a standard of rightness than the utilitarianism of Bentham and J.S. Mill, which is more of a decision-making procedure. However, Brink’s utilitarianism does not require essential aspects of eudaemonism such as the development of prudence and the importance of good character in the moral agent. With that stated, the utilitarianism that will be specifically contrasted with eudaemonism here will be of the Benthamite variety that takes happiness to be synonymous with pleasure. David Owen Brink, \textit{Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
\end{itemize}
In another sense, in opposition to the narrative given by Taylor, this thesis shows an overwhelming emphasis on a communitarianism that does not get reduced to majoritarianism. The Puritans are communitarian in that they emphasize that individual citizens become better human beings, and develop in a community better than they would as individuals away from a community, a position for which Taylor himself argues. This will be addressed in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. These thinkers thus fulfill some of the concerns of modern Christian ethicists, for example Stanley Hauerwas, who want to move away from individualism in ethics to a more communitarian and ecclesiastical emphasis.

_Puritan Authors_

The Puritan texts that were chosen for this research were selected because of their influence in the time period. Most of the authors chosen for this research had books and tracts that were best sellers in their time going through multiple editions. One of the Puritans that will be investigated at length in this thesis is William Perkins (1558-1602). Perkins was a successful writer and teacher, both during his life and after. His theological treatises draw not only upon the Calvinism that was emblematic of Puritanism but also had deep scholastic roots. Along with Perkins, this thesis will look at the works of Richard Baxter (1615-1691) who also had success with his writing during his life and after, as well as being very familiar with medieval scholasticism. Baxter is still considered to be a figurehead for the Puritans, as evidenced by Weber’s use of him in _The Protestant Work Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism_. The use of Baxter as ‘Puritan’ was controversial in his time because of his retreat from certain views on predestination. I draw upon him first, because, despite his other theological views his thought on calling remains consistent with other Puritan perspectives; and secondly because he was the focus of Weber’s famous study on calling. Another author looked at here will be John Owen (1616-1683) who was a major figure and contributor to Protestant and Puritan theology. He too was very familiar with medieval scholasticism, and played an influential role at Oxford where he was the dean of Christ Church, as well as having close political ties and writing substantially in his lifetime. Other Puritans that will be looked at in this thesis are Richard Rogers (1551-1618), Thomas Playfere (1561-1609), Robert Bolton (1572-1631), Joseph Hall (1574-1656), Edward Reynolds (1599-1676), Thomas Goodwin (1600-1680) and
William Fenner (1600-1640). Each of these Puritans doctrines of calling are the result of their exegesis of sacred scripture along with the appropriation of a theological and philosophical tradition. I must emphasize again: scripture is no doubt vital to these thinkers, but this thesis is about eudaemonism in the Puritans and not an outline of Puritan thought.

The use of English, as opposed to American Puritans, in this thesis represents the number of treatises on this topic by English thinkers. The authors of these texts were also writing to a national church, a settled society and an established community, whereas in the American context, they were speaking to their own community and culture that was being built from the ground up. Also, the main cut off of the authors chosen does not allow for there to be much historical overlap with the American authors discussing this topic.

Along with these numerous Puritan authors, conformists such as Richard Hooker (1554-1600) and Joseph Butler (1692–1752) will also be explored throughout the thesis. Looking at some of these influential ‘conformist’ thinkers alongside of the Puritans will bring out some of the distinctive features that the Puritans bring to our discussion of ethics. Along with conformist authors we will also engage with Catholics such as Thomas Wright (1592-1676) and St. Alphonsus De’ Liguori (1696-1787) to give more historical context to the Puritans’ distinctive thought. Drawing upon these thinkers is helpful because they utilize many of the same sources and traditions as the Puritans and at times coming to different conclusions.

The texts of Aristotle that will be most often looked at are his *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*. But, given that the Puritans were so well versed in the Aristotelian corpus and drew upon his other works, these will also be looked at when necessary. The *Summa Theologica* will be the central text used for Aquinas, but at times his *Summa Contra Gentiles* and commentaries will also be drawn upon.

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27 This thesis will not make any comment as to whether the Eudemian Ethics or Nichomachean Ethics are Aristotle’s mature work. Since the Puritans focused on the EN, this will be the primary text for this research. For more on this see, Anthony Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relationship between the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas

Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas function in this thesis as clear proponents of eudaemonism in history. Aristotle will be used as the ancient representative of eudaemonism, instead of Plato or Epictetus, because of his massive influence in late medieval theology and philosophy as well as his essential role in the educational system in reformation England. Along these same lines, Aquinas will be drawn upon because of his systematizing of Aristotle and Augustine into Christian theology, and especially ethics. Fergus Kerr has noted that there is not an historical account of the use of Aquinas. In a roundabout way this thesis will attempt to show the use of Aquinas, or at least Aristotelian-Thomism, in and after the reformation.

As mentioned above, an important reason that Aristotle and Aquinas are used in this thesis is because of the prominence that they played in the education of the Puritans. Aristotle, along with Aristotelian scholastic philosophers, was read at universities in reformation England. It was not at all unusual for university educated Puritans to be engaging with Aristotle and thus, eudaemonism. Also, Aristotelian medieval scholastic philosophy and theology would have been taught and thus percolated into the doctrines and beliefs disseminated by Puritans preachers and writers. Many of these Puritans were classically educated, drawing both from Greek and Roman influence.

Scholasticism in sixteenth and seventeenth century England was inherited from Reformers such as Beza and Zanchi. It was important in academic culture and allowed for “doctrine to be explicated with greater precision and orderliness,” while also providing vocabulary, sharp distinctions that helped to prevent confusion and enabled systematization. A scholastic education involved the logic of Aristotle as well as his metaphysics and natural philosophy, which were also still prominent. Reformed theologians relied on Aristotle until he was gradually unseated by the Cartesian

29 Stephen William Peter Hampton, Anti-Arminians the Anglican Reformed Tradition from Charles II to George I (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 221.
philosophy. In a sense, Aristotle defines Protestant scholasticism. Medieval scholastics were also drawn upon in Puritan education. Perkins and Ames were happy with utilizing scholastic theology. Baxter remarked “that he loved to read Aquinas and Scotus and could not endure ‘confusion’; rather, he craved ‘distinction and method.’”

Aristotle loomed large in the background of the protestant reformation, especially with regard to ethics and discussions of the good life. Because of the prominent place Aristotle played in the academy in England at the time, nearly all university educated Puritans, as well as philosophers and theologians of different denominational leanings, used the ancients and mediaevals to hone and shape their own thought. Puritans were also indebted to Augustine, but this is outside of the boundaries of this thesis; Aquinas is Augustinian enough that the Augustinian moments are well represented in Aquinas himself. There will be some discussion of Augustine as he relates to Aquinas in the following and in chapter 7.

As we have seen above, the significance of the Aristotelian logic, and Aristotelian and Thomist traditions for Puritan metaphysics is well known, but research into whether Puritan ethics followed suit has not been extensively researched. This thesis will also contribute to our understanding of the development of ethics within the Puritan period.

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32 There was one challenger to the use of Aristotle in education, Petrus Ramus (1515-1572). Ramus attempted to bring about educational reform in England. From an early age he was fiercely anti-Aristotelian and argued against the use of scholasticism for his masters examination theme at the University of Paris. At the beginning of Ramus’ career he was intensely hostile to Aristotelianism and engaged in a number of different polemics to try and supplant Aristotle from University curricula arguing that Aristotle was obscure and incomprehensible to students. Despite his many attempts, Ramus could never find a way within the University setting to dethrone Aristotle from the universities. However, later in Ramus’ career he changes his position admitting that Aristotle, among other things, had variety and a style.

Ramus is still found amongst many of the Puritans. Williams Fenner’s “Sacra Theologia was thoroughly Ramist in method.” This method was further “summarised in his 1584 treatise on The Artes of Logiche and Rhetorike.” William Ames was also opposed to Aristotelianism and advocated the Ramist method. Though, more typically, reformed theologians were not keen on letting Aristotle out of the curriculum. Paul R. Scafer notes, at least for Perkins, it would be a mistake to see too much Ramism in his thought. Paul R. Schaefer, “Protestant ‘Scholasticism’ at Elizabethan Cambridge: William Perkins and a Reformed Theology of the Heart,” in Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment, ed. Carl R Trueman and R. Scott Clark (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), 150–2; Also see, Richard A Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 16–20; Howard Hotson, Commonplace Learning: Ramism and Its German Ramifications, 1543-1630 (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 3; 43; Bowen, History, 3:3:31; Wallace Jr., “Puritan Polemical Divinity and Doctrinal Controversy,” 211; Carl R. Trueman, “A Small Step Towards Rationalism: The Impact of the Metaphysics of Tommaso Campanella on the Theology of Richard Baxter,” in Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment, ed. R. Scott Clark and Carl R. Trueman (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), 186.

33 Campbell, Religion of the Heart, 48.

There has been very little attention given to Aristotelianism and eudaemonism in Puritan ethics in the secondary literature.35

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This thesis, with regard to scope, moves in the shape of an hourglass beginning, at its widest point, in chapters 2, 3 and 4 with a discussion of eudaemonism in the Puritans by looking at human nature broadly and what constitutes happiness from the most general perspective. That is, what does it mean, universally, for humankind to flourish. Chapter 2 will begin to disentangle concepts within eudaemonism with particular attention given to ends and nature. I will show that within western Christianity, God is recognized as the ultimate telos of human nature and it is here only that humankind finds true and eternal happiness. There are, however, conceptions of significantly lesser ends and thus ‘happinesses’ that are able to be experienced in this life. This chapter will show that according to the understanding of ends in the Puritans, natural ends allow for there to be a universal human ethic based on natures that extends beyond the realm of faith; or as ecclesial ethics relates with the secular political sphere. However, natural happiness is severely diminutive in comparison to the supernatural end that humans are intended for.

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35 There is some recognition that the EN was an important resource for moral education for those who were university educated. With regard to reformation education in ethics in the secondary literature, there is often at least a mention of the EN and Aristotle’s influence, but this usually is a passing reference. For example Euan Cameron notes, right after acknowledging Aristotle’s influence in metaphysics and politics, that the EN “was a common requirement for degrees in faculties of liberal arts. Rediscovery of classical texts generated interest in other moral philosophers.” Cameron, however, immediately moves on to go into more detail about the discovery of Platonism and the adoption of Stoics like Cicero. See Euan Cameron, The Sixteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 126; 132; Similarly MacCulloch discusses the importance of Aristotelian metaphysics with regard to the scholastic use of it in describing transubstantiation and the reformations, especially Luther’s, detesting of the doctrine and “The Philosopher.” There are also at points discussions of receptions of Aristotelian biology and views of women and reproduction, but there is no mention of Aristotle’s prominence, as we have seen above, in education as it relates to physics, metaphysics and ethics. See Diarmaid MacCulloch, Reformation: Europe’s House Divided 1490-1700 (London: Penguin Books, 2003); Also see Owen Chadwick, The Reformation (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964), 219. Books that do not mention either the Metaphysics or Ethics see Patrick Collinson, The Religion of Protestants: The Church in English Society 1559-1623 (Oxford: OUP, 1984); Robert Scribner, Roy Porter, and Mikulas Teich, eds., The Reformation in National Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Also, in the first preface to MacCulloch’s book The Later Reformation in England, 1547-1603, he writes that this book is to “give a picture of how recent research has opened up our understanding of the later tutor church;” yet there is no mention of Aristotle’s influence in reformation England. See Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Later Reformation in England, 1547-1603, Second Edition (British History in Perspective, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). One of the better accounts of Aristotelianism in Puritan ethics can be found in Keith Thomas, The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England (Oxford: OUP, 2009).
in the next life. By using the work of Henri de Lubac as an organizing principle, I will attempt to explain subtleties in the relationship between natural and supernatural ends. Once these distinctions have been made, I will turn to sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritan authors to show how they relate to the previous ancient, patristic and medieval tradition on ends, nature and happiness.

Chapter 3 begins to make the more explicit connection between eudaemonism and work in the Puritans showing why work has a particularly important role in human fulfillment. Building on the previous chapter, I will first show that the relationship between happiness and rational capacities found in previous eudaemonists is also present in the Puritans, through their tripartite view of the soul. Building from an understanding of the soul and reason, this chapter will demonstrate that the Puritans, like their predecessors, emphasized reason over other human faculties. From here we will continue to look at how reason might be conceived to relate to the supernatural end. We will do this first by looking at Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ views on contemplation, pointing out some of Aquinas’ modifications on the subject. Our intention here is to trace these Thomist modifications into Puritan thought by looking at the conceptual similarities between sacra doctrina and the category of meditation in the Puritan writers. What we will see is that the Puritans have strong views about the use of reason in this life. The chapter concludes by looking at the Puritan attempt to ease the said tension between theoria and praxis.

The next three chapters of this thesis will look at three interrelated components to a Puritan doctrine of calling, and thus a naturalist divine command theory. Chapters 4, 5 and 6, will in turn analyze the three parts of Williams Perkins’ definition of calling: “...a certain kinde of life, ordained and imposed on man by God for the common good.”

I will demonstrate in chapter 4 that the language of divine command language does not need to be in conflict with the desire of ethical naturalism’s desire to speak to the development of character. Engagement with eudaemonism in the Puritans shows us that we can conceive of a command to all humankind to flourish by developing in character a ‘kind of life’ towards a telos that has its natural terminus in the vision of God.

In chapter 5, the hourglass is at its most narrow point, with the focus on the happiness of individual persons as part of the whole of human nature. It is here that we

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36 Perkins, ATP, 2.
will look at the relationship between particular divine commands and callings and eudaemonism. Chapter 5 focuses on the second part of Perkins’ definition, “imposed on man.” This chapter will show that the Puritans, because of an emphasis on a metaphysically rich ethic, were able to incorporate in an interesting way the language of divine commands within a eudaemonist framework. Here we will look at the dialectical relationship between individual and universal flourishing and show that these do not create conflict but rather work in tandem.

Chapters 6 and 7 take a step back from looking at the happiness commanded to particular persons and broadens to investigate how the Puritans conceive calling’s relationship to the ‘common good’ and wider socio-political institutions. These chapters complete our image of the hourglass, as I will show how for the Puritans calling relates to the divinely ordained social positioning of individuals within the whole of a flourishing society. This will be done by looking at some of the nuanced specifics of the Puritan doctrine of calling, in terms of how people, both Christian and non-Christian, use callings to benefit society. This will direct our gaze away from a discussion of the particular happiness of the individual back to the universal development of virtue and the community’s role in this development. We will do this by looking at two aspects of social life that were important for the Puritans, and are still for contemporary theological ethics. The first is the importance of friendship. The second is a discussion of the state’s role in moral development. Finally in chapter 8, although we have looked at some of the contemporary implications of this eudaemonistic doctrine of calling for moral and political theology today, here we will look at how the eudaemonism found in the Puritans relates three specific moral and political issues.

The contention of this thesis is that eudaemonism in the Puritans makes a distinctive contribution from the history of ideas, bringing a typically naturalist emphasis on flourishing and universality, with more Protestant and ecclesial concerns with individual calling and community.
Chapter 2

Nature, Ends and Happiness

To me, happiness is Fred’s Horn. James Brown

Happiness is an accident of nature, a beautiful and flawless aberration. Pat Conroy

None of us really changes over time. We only become more fully what we are. Anne Rice

Introduction

In the previous chapter we began to look at some of the features of ethical naturalism with specific emphasis on classical eudaemonism. I stated that Aristotle proposes a holist doctrine that treats the entirety of human nature as related to its proper function and that classical eudaemonism is teleological, in that agents act for the specific end of happiness. In this chapter, we will begin to extricate some of these concepts and make clearer what is meant by happiness and how it relates to natures.

I will do this first by looking at what Aristotle means by happiness and the ultimate end, as described in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Metaphysics*, in order to gain a better understanding of classical eudaemonism. We will need to answer the question of whether or not, for the Puritans, there are multiple ends and thus multiple ‘happinesses.’ We will do this by focusing on a current debate concerning the supernatural in Aquinas. By looking at the work of Henri de Lubac, alongside Augustine and Aquinas, we hope to become clearer about what the tradition has said about the relationship between natural and supernatural ends. Once these distinctions have been made, we will turn our attention to sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritan authors to see how they relate to the previous ancient, patristic and medieval traditions on ends and happiness.

In doing this, three things will come to light. The first is that the Western tradition of thought on ends and happiness allows for a conception of natural ends that contribute to earthly happiness. The second is that, according to the Puritans investigated here, natural ends allow for a universal human ethic based on natures, which is not relegated to religious belief but extends to broader socio-political ethics. However, natural happiness is diminutive in comparison to the supernatural end that humans are intended for in the
next life. Third, this chapter will show that supernatural happiness is only attainable by the grace that is provided through Christ. As indicated above, we begin our discussion of ends and happiness with Aristotle.

**Aristotle and Happiness**

The objective of this section is to set out Aristotle’s development and exposition of *eudaemonia* in framing and defining the happiness-based ethic that is prevalent in the Christian tradition and among the English Puritans. This section will focus on the *EN* to extrapolate what Aristotle means by the happy life.

The beginning of the *EN* is concerned with the relationship between means and ends. For example, if a person is pressed on why they do anything, say, for example recreational swimming they might respond that they do that action ‘to be healthy.’ If pressed why they want to be healthy, the answer might be, ‘to live longer.’ If this person were asked over and over again the question ‘why,’ they would eventually demonstrate that every action they do is for some end. However, most people are not reflective enough to realize that their actions are motivated by this train of reasoning. Aristotle’s belief is that the result of following this train of reasoning is that there is some ultimate end that mankind pursues for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else: it is here that Aristotle is concerned. He is interested in the distinction between instrumental ends that are pursued for the sake of something else and superior ends that are desired in themselves. The superior end stops this practical reasoning from becoming an infinite regress of choosing one thing for the sake of another and so on. The end is ‘the good’ it is “what everyone seeks.” When someone makes a decision, they are inadvertently expressing a desire for an end or object as promoting the final good. To make a decision is to show and act on a rational desire to a rational end. We do everything else for the sake of that rational ultimate end. “Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue” we choose for the sake of happiness, “supposing that through them we shall be happy.” Happiness being the “end of the things achievable by action.”

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1 Annas, *Morality*, 27.
3 Aristotle, *EN*, 1094a1–4. All citations of Aristotle are from the Barnes edition unless otherwise noted.
4 Ibid., 1097b1–5; 21–22.
This highest and most perfect good, “as far as its name goes, most people virtually agree; for both the many and the cultivated call it happiness, and they suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy.” The kind of happiness that Aristotle is referring to here does not mean what we mean in modern English as some state of mental euphoria, but rather has the fuller understanding of ‘flourishing’ or ‘well-being.’ Happiness meets the criterion stated above for the ultimate end because happiness, more than anything else, is always chosen for its own sake and never for anything else. We sometimes choose things like honor and intelligence but, because we choose them on occasion as constitutive of happiness, they are not the ultimate end. Happiness is self-sufficient, requiring nothing. It is not one choice worthy good among others, but it meets all other conditions of being an ultimate end.

We have yet to paint a clear, classical eudaemonist picture of happiness. In order for us to fully understand what is meant by happiness we must refer back to Aristotle’s metaphysics to “grasp the function of a human being.” The good is not something that is external to the moral agent, but is the perfection of its nature. The acorn grows towards an end that is in accordance to its function and the laws of its nature, and it becomes a perfect tree, realizing the end of its existence by attaining ‘its own good.’ Because happiness is active rather than passive and includes the activity of the agent, this rules out wealth, for example, from being happiness. At the very least, happiness cannot just be wealth but must involve what you do with wealth. Aristotle concludes, “the human function is activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason.” Just as it is the function of a good harpist to play the harp well, the human function is a “certain kind of life” that is “activity and actions of the soul that involve reason.” The “function of the

5 Ibid., 1095a15–20; Also see, Josef Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation, 2nd ed. (South Bend: St. Augustines Press, 1979), 15–17.
6 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy.” As will be made clearer throughout this chapter, ‘happiness’ as used in English is not an acceptable translation of eudaemon. The English word ‘happiness’ is derived from Middle English and carries with it connotations of chance occurrence, good fortune or luck. Happ is found in contemporary usage in words like happenstance or happens.
10 Annas, Morality, 45.
11 Aristotle, EN, 1098a7–9.
excellent man is to do this well and finely.”

Functions are completed well by being completed in harmony with the virtue proper to that kind of thing, which is activity of the soul in accordance with the most complete virtue.

In conclusion, for Aristotle, happiness is the end that all mankind seeks. A happy and flourishing life is always chosen for its own sake and includes instrumental goods and ends in trying to achieve it. We have also looked at Aristotle’s dependence on metaphysics in his ethics. The question remains as to how Aristotle’s ethics relates to those found in the Christian tradition leading to the Puritans. As seen in the previous chapter, Aristotle, Cicero and other prominent medievalists were drawn upon in reformation theology and philosophy. The question that we will need to address in the following section is the amount of Aristotle utilized over other Christian thinkers like Augustine when thinking about penultimate and ultimate ends. At this point, it is necessary to become aware of a recent debate concerning natural and supernatural ends.

The Debate Over the Supernatural

We need to momentarily put aside the discussion of happiness and focus on the topic of ends. Later in this chapter, we will begin to see a distinction arise in the Puritans between natural and supernatural ends. In order to make clear what is being addressed in these terms, we here turn our attention to a contemporary debate over Thomas Aquinas’ view of nature. By looking at the work of Henri de Lubac on the supernatural, we will be able to make the necessary sorts of distinctions within Puritan thought. This section is not an attempt to add anything to this debate over the natural and supernatural, but rather to give our current discussion shape and to see where it is that Puritans land on the issue and how, or if, they make the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. Also, by using this debate as the organizing principle for the rest of this chapter, we will already be illuminating an aspect of the discussion of the vision of God in the next chapter.

De Lubac argues that the medievals, specifically Aquinas, thought that humans had been given the promise that they would see God. The desire to see God is in us, but

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12 Ibid., 1098a10–15.

13 When I have presented this portion of my research, the relationship between the natural and supernatural in the Puritans, as it relates to this debate, is the most frequently asked question. I add this debate not only because it is a helpful organizing principle for talking about nature and ends in Puritan thought but also because of the frequency of questions I have received about it.
we are creatures and it requires the free gift of grace in order to do this.\textsuperscript{14} The problem arises when one asks how it is that the human natural end is to see God, but that it requires something outside of our natures—grace—in order to achieve it. It is a mystery how something can be our natural and good end and not be achievable without assistance. Because of this discord, the supernatural has been blurred and neglected. De Lubac insists that this seeming contradiction is a mystery, and it is not something that is intellectually graspable in this life. Once one has accepted the idea of a transcendent, personal God, this form of rationality and mystery is perfectly acceptable. This is because the truth we receive from God is beyond our grasp and should be beyond our grasp.\textsuperscript{15} Unhappy with this tension, and longing to create a solution, theologians and philosophers have either stressed that seeing God is “fundamental” or “that it is a totally free gift,” thus sacrificing one of the positions.

One of the theologians, according to de Lubac and Milbank, unwilling to hold to ‘mystery’ was Thomas Cajetan (1468-1534). He made a distinction between what is due to humanity by nature and what is a free supernatural addition. In order to make Aquinas consistent, Cajetan had to elaborate a “doctrine of ‘pure nature’ which would alone do justice to the latter’s doctrine of the gratuity of grace and his repeated distinction between what is due to humanity by nature and what accrues to him by free supernatural addition.”\textsuperscript{16} Unlike Aquinas, Cajetan “explicitly says that human nature in actuality is fully definable in merely natural terms.” The implication of this is that there is an entirely “natural and adequate ethics, politics, and philosophy and so forth. Man might even offend the moral law and yet not be guilty of sin.”\textsuperscript{17} The result would be,

...the speculation about ‘pure nature’—in a quite different sense from that given it by the scholastics of old, as we have seen—a speculation ever more pervasive and widespread. And, where there has not been great care, this has even led to a certain compromising of the gratuitousness.\textsuperscript{18}

Aquinas, as de Lubac reads him, believes that the moment we say “I,” we have existence and supernatural finality, meaning it is impossible to disassociate personhood

\textsuperscript{14} Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural (New York: Crossroad, 1998), 167; 175.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 171.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} de Lubac, Supernatural, 176.
from teleology.\textsuperscript{19} Everything seeks beatitude, and humanity is no exception. The desire for the end is part of the human being.\textsuperscript{20} God made us “open and questioning” so that God, by speaking to his creatures, could bring them to him. It is necessary that “a call comes from God’s initiative, and it sounds from within the creature as a first natural response.” Creation has a unique final end in which it is “creation as effected by God precisely with the object of giving himself to it; that creation as finally illuminated for us by the good news announced to mankind one night at Bethlehem.” Man was not created to exist in the realm of nature. Ancient philosophers could sense that there was something beyond this ‘nature’ but could not interpret it, because they did not have “the means to interpret what they felt,” namely the longing to see God.\textsuperscript{21}

What do we do with the accusation that if our nature is to see God, then God is obligated to see us through to that perfection, that beatific vision? De Lubac answers that there is a difference between the gift of creation and the gift of deification. There can be no free gift if the giver cannot withhold it.\textsuperscript{22} Within our created natures there is a desire to see God, but the attainment of that is dependent upon the grace of God. There can be no movement of the will towards beatitude unless a supernatural agent moves it.\textsuperscript{23} We see here, as John Milbank summarizes, “deification is not there because of creation; rather creation is there because of deification, as the apex and microcosmic summation of created glory.”\textsuperscript{24}

Thus for de Lubac, justification is not properly a miracle.\textsuperscript{25} This is because it is not done “above the natural potency.” The soul is naturally capable of grace.\textsuperscript{26} For Thomas it is a miracle for a man to be given a vision of God in this world, but it is not a miracle to see him in the next. Late medieval interpreters of Aquinas, like Cajetan, think that salvation is a miracle, because we do not have a natural capacity for supernatural ends. For Aquinas the soul has a natural capacity for grace, because God created us to be

\begin{footnotes}
19 Ibid., 79.
20 Ibid., 53–6.
21 Ibid., 130–1; 137–8.
22 Ibid., 73–6.
23 Aquinas, \textit{ST}, I 12.5; 62.2; I–II 114.2.
26 de Lubac, \textit{Supernatural}, 142.
\end{footnotes}
with him.\textsuperscript{27} The supernatural end is natural: we are disposed to it, but we still need infused grace, as grace perfects nature.\textsuperscript{28} Just because humankind was created for the supernatural end does not mean that God has to give us that beatitude.\textsuperscript{29}

What begins to come out in de Lubac’s analysis of the supernatural in Aquinas is that the distinct Aristotelian movement in Aquinas is subordinate to Augustine.\textsuperscript{30} Even with the reemphasis favoring Augustine over Aristotle, de Lubac recognizes that Aquinas held both the secular and the Christian concept of nature. The question we must here answer is: if this is the case, then how is it that Aquinas uses Aristotle, a philosopher who is constrained to reason alone without revelation? We must here understand how Aristotelian Aquinas is according to de Lubac.

\textit{De Lubac, Aristotle and Aquinas}

As we will see later in this chapter, the Puritans are committed to a strand of the Christian moral tradition through Luther and Calvin that takes Augustine seriously in theological discourse. We will also see that they hold to Aristotle when thinking through happiness and ultimate ends. Thus a worry emerges as to the compatibility of Augustine with Aristotle, firstly within Aquinas and secondly in the Puritans. By continuing to use de Lubac as a resource, we will begin to investigate how it is that Aquinas was able to draw upon both Augustine and Aristotle, which will help us to shape our understanding of the Puritans later in this chapter.

Aristotle was helpful for Aquinas because he gave Aquinas a deeper reckoning of this worldly nature; this is “indisputable.”\textsuperscript{31} For Aquinas, only mankind is directly subordinate to the infinite, a framework laid down by Aristotle and also present in Augustine,\textsuperscript{32} but, it is true, as de Lubac insists, that Thomist nature is not Aristotelian nature. Both philosophy and theology talk of natures, but differently.\textsuperscript{33} Medieval, theological nature is destined for the highest nature, the final end of seeing God himself.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 98; 145; Aquinas, \textit{ST}, I–II 3.8.1.
\textsuperscript{28} de Lubac, \textit{Supernatural}, 33; 84–6.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 80; Aquinas, \textit{ST}, I–II 3.6q5a3.
\textsuperscript{30} Milbank, \textit{Suspended}, 19.
\textsuperscript{31} de Lubac, \textit{Supernatural}, 154; Milbank, \textit{Suspended}, 23; 24. Though Aquinas is Aristotelian in his discussion of natures, as de Lubac notes with regard to the soul, there are some differences between the two. The soul, for Aquinas, cannot exist without the body. In this, he is much more in the tradition of Augustine.
\textsuperscript{33} de Lubac, \textit{Supernatural}, 22–3.
Whereas with Aristotelian nature, it is possible for one to find the ultimate end in this world, hence Aristotle’s ‘magnanimous man,’ who will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. The study of creatures is for philosophy and theology, but in different ways. The philosopher considers their own nature, while the theologian considers it according to first principles ordered to their last end, God.\(^3\) When it comes to spiritual nature,

> …and especially to man who is neither merely a living being, nor a pure spirit, this word ‘nature’ will have two partially different meanings, according to whether it is to be applied to this particular species which we form, among the other species in the universe, or to the nature of spirit in so far as this is something which goes beyond any particular species because it is innately opened to the universal and directly related God.\(^5\)

However, Aristotelian principles are still in play here. The discussion of the “natural desire for the supernatural could not, in divine justice, be disappointed, without violating the Aristotelian principle that a natural impulse to an end cannot… be frustrated.”\(^3\) Aristotle’s discussion of ends is still relevant because our natures are the kinds of natures that seek natural ends. Human natures seek supernatural ends and thus God.\(^7\) Humans are created to see the vision of God; this is in our natures, with which advocates of a pure nature would agree too. If this is the case, then the interpretation of Thomas that states that we have purely natural ends is guilty of taking Augustine out of Aquinas, in that if all other natures in the world are able to pursue their natural ends, humans are only able to attain a condition that is not their true and final end.\(^8\)

What we have shown above is that the Thomist model that de Lubac sets forth prioritizes Augustine in that the ‘natural’ end of man is to see God, but this teleological move is made in an Aristotelian framework. Thus to read Aquinas without one or the other of these influences is to misread what he is trying to accomplish, theologically as well as philosophically.

**Augustine and Happiness**

If Aquinas is more Augustinian than Aristotelian, it will now be prudent to investigate what Augustine writes concerning happiness and ends, in the hope of looking

\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ibid., 105–6.
\(^7\) Milbank, *Suspended*, 29.
\(^8\) de Lubac, *Supernatural*, 111.
at points of continuity with Augustine and Aristotle. In this section, we will look at Augustine’s thought on natural and supernatural ends. What we will find by looking at Augustine’s ideas of self-love and the *ordo amoris* is not only that Augustine is a eudaemonist but also that there is room in his thought for both natural and supernatural ends. By looking at book XIX of *City of God* (COG), we will see that Augustine does have the same varieties of ethical concerns in mind as did the culture that was pervasive at the time, and in which he grew up. Though his formulation of happiness (i.e. peace in eternal life) differs from Aristotle and Aquinas, it does so only slightly, and it still has the same concerns and emphasis. All three of these thinkers emphasize a kind of self-love that leads to ends and flourishing that are appropriate to the nature of the thing striving for the end. The end of self-love for a human is happiness and the divine. This triangulation between Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas will put us in a better position to understand the Puritan position on nature and ends.

Augustine writes in COG that if a person knows how to love him or herself, then an end has been established for them. The final good of the ancient philosophers is “our Good,” and cleaving to him whose “spiritual embrace” fills “the intellectual soul and makes it fertile with true virtues.” Book XIX is an attempt to bring Christianity and

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39 In the reading of much secondary literature on Augustine and his mature ethics, it seems like a general consensus that what is being represented in his other works is consistent with what is written in COG. Also see Augustine, *Expositions of the Psalms* I-32, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Maria Boulding, vol. 1 (Brooklyn: New City Press, 2000), Ps 4.1; 5.9–10; 7.11; 8.3; 9.16; 32.12 ex 3.; Augustine, *Christian Teaching*, I.7–8; Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: OUP, 2008), i.1.

40 There are some who would not call Augustine a eudaemonist. Nicholas Wolterstorff has argued that Augustine breaks away from eudaemonism in his later writings; see, Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Justice: Rights and Wrongs* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 189; This is in direct opposition to Oliver O’Donovan who notes that Augustine was eudaemonist from his early writings till his latest and that this is the tradition he was brought up. Oliver O’Donovan, *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); There are a few reasons why Wolterstorff misreads a move away from eudaemonism on Augustine, one of which being that Wolterstorff reads Augustine as a Stoic rather than of another classical eudaemononistic school such as a Platonist or Peripatetic. Dodaro notes that Augustine’s “admiration for and debt to certain Platonic schools of philosophy is well known even if the nature and extent of his involvement with them are still widely debated among scholars.” Augustine’s attraction to Platonism is that he “admits that the Platonists possess a correct concept of the one, true God.” See Robert Dodaro, *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine* (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 63; Bonnie Kent, “Augustine’s Ethics,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), 209–11; Marcia L Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983), 143; There is simply not enough materialism in Augustine’s thought to put him in the same camp as the Stoics; further, any aspect of Stoicism found in Augustine can be better explained, or fit just as well, with a conception of Platonism. In the *City of God*, Augustine at times is quite anti-Stoic. One occasion is in XIX.4 when he argues that the virtues themselves cannot be the supreme Good, “but can only exist in those in whom true godliness is present.” Virtues are not such “liars as to advance such claims.” Augustine, *City of God*, ed. John O’Meara, trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), XIX.4.
classicism together.\footnote{O’Donovan, Self-Love, 154; Dodaro, Just Society, 35; Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 53.} Though Augustine does not mention Aristotle directly, the presence of self-love that is expressed by Augustine is represented in the \textit{EN}. Aristotle writes that a person is her own best friend and should love herself most. However, people define self-love in different ways. Negatively, people define self-love as having wealth, honors and bodily pleasures, and these are considered objects of competition and are related to the lower parts of the soul. Positively, self-love is in accordance with right reason and desiring what is “noble rather than what is advantageous.” The good person should be a lover of self, for she will benefit herself and her fellows,\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{EN}, 1169a13; a17.} and sacrificing for a friend is good. These same themes seen above in Aristotle’s description of self-love are what Augustine is attempting to synthesize with Christianity.

For Augustine, in directing our course towards God with love, we find our rest “and attain our happiness because we have achieved our fulfillment in him.”\footnote{Augustine, \textit{COG}, X.3. Augustine uses a different term (\textit{felicitas}) for ‘happiness’ than ‘\textit{eudaemonia}’.} He says elsewhere, “no man lives as he wishes, unless he is happy; and no man is happy, unless he is righteous.”\footnote{Ibid., XIV.25.} Life will only be truly happy, Augustine believes, when everything is loved for the happy life and must wish the happy life to be eternal.\footnote{Ibid.} We see here, rather paradoxically, that there is no way that God can be loved without the lover loving herself. There must be love for both the self and God, not just love for God.

For in order that a man may know how to love himself an end has been established for him to which he is to refer all his action, so that he may attain a bliss. For if a man loves himself, his one wish is to achieve blessedness. Now this end is ‘to cling to God.’

The ‘end’ of humankind is to be happy, because anyone who loves herself wants nothing more than to be happy. In Augustine’s view, self-love is the quest for happiness without which no ethics can be envisioned. Persons that are “granted eternal life with God live in complete happiness.”\footnote{Dodaro, Just Society, 208.} If loving ourselves is the highest end, then how is it that man is to achieve that end? For Augustine, loving God is the way to achieve that end; this is the only locus by which man can attain true rest and happiness. Man is “slave to that by
which he wishes to find happiness,” and it is the seeking of authentic happiness that drives a person to God.\textsuperscript{47}

Thus in order to be happy, we must love God and learn to love ourselves. Since we have a natural tendency to seek our own happiness and love ourselves anyway, we need to learn to do it well.\textsuperscript{48} True self-love is nothing other than loving God, which needs to be educated. “Thus the desire for happiness, like self-love, is equivalent to the love of God when it is taught, but has a natural non-moral area of reference in which it is common to all men.”\textsuperscript{49} We do not need a command to do something naturally, but we need one to know how to do it properly.

Along with Christ’s summary of the law, in which he gives the command to love God and to love one’s neighbor, comes the presence of a third love, self-love. Here we see the indication that love of God and love of one’s neighbor are to be conceived eudaemonistically. “In saying that self-love finds its expression in love of God, Augustine is formulating in one of the possible ways a principle fundamental to his metaphysical and ethical outlook, namely that all moral obligation derives from an obligation to God which is at the same time a call to self-fulfillment.”\textsuperscript{50} This is accomplished by having the right ordine amoris, or order of love.

Augustine writes that every “immortal power, however great its importance, will have no other wish, if it loves us as itself, than that we, for our happiness, should subject to God, seeing that it is such subjection that gives that Power its blessedness.”\textsuperscript{51} It is important not to place things that are of lesser importance above those that should take precedence; man must have the proper order of loves. The paradox of this line of thinking is that the one who loves herself and does not love God does not love herself, but the one who loves herself will love God and not herself. C.S. Lewis summarizes this when he writes, “you can’t get second things by putting them first. You get second things only by putting first things first.”\textsuperscript{52}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{47} Henry Chadwick, \textit{Augustine} (Oxford: OUP, 1986), 55. Chadwick is citing \textit{De vera religione}.
\bibitem{48} O’Donovan, \textit{Self-Love}, 42.
\bibitem{49} Ibid., 57.
\bibitem{50} Ibid., 138.
\bibitem{52} C.S. Lewis, “First and Second Things,” in \textit{God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics} (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), 280.
\end{thebibliography}
We have seen thus far that there are a number of substantial aspects of Augustine's ethics, as found in the COG, that support a eudaemonistic tradition. One more aspect is Augustine’s view of justice, which follows the classical philosophy that justice is a virtue, or a 'habit of the soul,' whereby each individual is given her due. One must love one’s neighbors in order to live justly and enable them to love themselves. Justice is understood as the ‘ordo amoris’ and expresses a series of right relationships which escalate in value in proportion to the order willed by God. In this context, Augustine defines justice as “love serving God alone and thus ruling well those things subject to human beings.” In the Christian sense, justice means to “stand in right relationship to God and, therefore, to obey God and his commandments,” and justice is transposable with love (caritas). “When Augustine says that true self-love is love of God, he is saying something not unlike what he means by the claim that God is man’s happiness. Both express the principle that duty and self-interest ultimately coincide.” The Romans’ weakness (infirmitas) to reason effectively only allows them to recognize that the happiness they seek depends upon the divine, but they do not know the name of the God of happiness, so they “turn Happiness into a god.” This flips the right order upside down.

For Augustine, self-love can also have its sinful and negative effects. It is evil when the self is understood imperfectly and envisaged as independent apart from the universe. What this means is that “true self-love, a self-love based on the true self-knowledge, must coincide with love-of-God because it involves a love of the whole of which self is understood to be part, the love of Being itself instead of love restricted to the self’s artificially individuated being.” Love follows knowledge, and right knowledge of the world brings right love: “A true knowledge of the universe brings with it love that is perfect in every respect.” Love must not lose its proper grasp of the order of things: first

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53 Dodaro, *Just Society*, 4. “[T]he second comes to Augustine from the New Testament and Latin patristic writers and equates the virtue with the love which is due to God and to one’s neighbour; the third sense follows logically from the second and is sometimes translated ‘righteousness’. It describes the Pauline notion of dikaiosune, the condition of the soul whereby it stands in a ‘right’, because properly ordered, relationship with God, its Creator.”

54 Augustine, COG, XIX.3.


57 Dodaro, *Just Society*, 49.

58 This will be discussed in Chapter 4 with regard to different kinds of friendships and loves.


60 O’Donovan, *Self-Love*, 60; Self-love is not original sin, ibid., 105.
comes love of God, and then love of self. Disordered love puts second things first and first things second. “The obedient believer, by contrast, has a love that is perfectly ordered to the proportions of reality. He has the ‘perfect justice,’ which is ‘to love the greater objects more and the lesser less.’”

Aquinas demonstrates elements of Augustine’s self-love, even as he is commenting on Aristotle’s self-love. As we saw above, Aristotle makes a distinction between negative and positive self-love. Aquinas comments that the good self-love is different from the bad in two ways. First, on the part of activity, the good person loves herself in accordance with reason, while the person who loves herself in the negative way loves according to her passions. The second difference is in regard to motive, the good person who loves herself seeks the absolute good, not what is useful. But after commenting on Aristotle, Aquinas makes a connection with Augustine. As seen above, Augustine identifies good self-love with the love of God, thus declaring that no one can hate him or herself, and Aquinas believes that all operations of the will express the quest for beatitude. For both Augustine and Aquinas, all love is an operation of the will, and “can be explained in terms of the quest for beatitude—in that St. Thomas and St. Augustine are at one.”

Augustine’s theology played a significant part in the doctrinal development of the reformation. What we have established above is the relationship of ends and happiness in his thought, specifically in COG. What looking at Augustine along with Aquinas (which will be done in more detail throughout this research) allows for is a brief historical tracing of eudaemonism into the thought of sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans. We will continue to address, via de Lubac, this discussion of ends to see the overtones of Puritan

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61 O’Donovan, Self-Love, 64.
63 O’Donovan, Self-Love, 146–8. O’Donovan notes that there are some differences between Augustine and Aquinas. He writes, “the whole Thomist construct of a natural tendency which, as much in its inchoate as in its achieved form, is at the same time love-of-God and love-of-self is left without an essential supporting pillar.” He also notes that “nowhere in Augustine’s pages do we see a classic ‘psychological egoist’ argument” that is found in Aristotle and Aquinas. With that said, “Augustine and Thomas are both ‘eudaemonists,’ but there is a wide difference in the way that their eudaemonism is worked out.” Aquinas is concerned more with an analogy of being, while Augustine is concerned with the datum of revelation.
64 For more on the importance of Augustine to the Reformation, see MacCulloch, Reformation, 106–23.
eudaemonism. We thus begin to look at how the Puritans answer this question of nature and supernature.

**Natural Ends and Earthly Happiness**

The first question that we will attempt to address here is whether, for the Puritans, happiness is attainable in this life or if it is only in the afterlife that our telos is realized. We will begin this investigation by again looking to Augustine. We will see that, even with his high view of supernatural ends and ultimate blessedness, there is still a place in his ethics for an earthly, but lesser happiness. We will then begin investigating a number of sixteenth and seventeenth century English Puritans on the topic of the telos of human life and action. There will be some engagement with the Puritans and Aquinas, but a fuller description of Aquinas’ thinking on ends and happiness will be explored later, in the ‘supernatural ends’ section of this chapter, as the supernatural is Aquinas’ primary focus.

_Augustine and Natural Ends._

Augustine writes in COG book XIX, “when anyone reaches the Ultimate Good it immediately brings him happiness.” In Chapter 4, he continues to state that the Christian answer to the Ultimate Good and the Ultimate Evil is that “eternal life is the Supreme Good, and eternal death the Supreme Evil.” The peace that is an ‘ordered obedience in faith’ and happiness, are found only in God. We are saved in a hope through which “we have been made happy.” We do not enjoy a present happiness, but look forward to happiness in the future, looking forward ‘with steadfast endurance’ to the Ultimate Good. Justice, which is caritas (love) and being in right relationship with God, “is only acquired gradually in this life, never completely, and the lack of its perfection in an individual must not be taken to indicate its absence altogether.” The Christian’s possession of peace is through faith, is theirs in this life and will be theirs forever through open vision. Many times in Chapter XIX Chapter 4, Augustine argues that “those who have supposed that the Ultimate Good and the Ultimate Evil are to be found in this life, placing the Supreme Good in the body, or in the soul, or in both…all these philosophers have wished, with amazing folly, to be happy here on earth and to

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65 Augustine, COG, XIX.2; Ayres, *Trinity*, 278.
66 Augustine, COG, XIX.4.
67 Ibid. Also see XIX.13.
68 Dodaro, *Just Society*, 76.
achieve bliss by their own efforts.” Peace here and now, “whether the peace shared by all
men or our own special possession, is such that it affords a solace for our wretchedness
rather than the joy of blessedness.”69 Even our genuine righteousness through virtue
towards the ultimate good only consists in the forgiveness of sins rather than in the
perfection of virtues.

It sounds as if Augustine is here stating that there is no happiness outside of the
obtaining of God himself. However, Augustine maintains that justice in this life exists
when God rules and man obeys, or “when the mind rules and the body and reason
governs the vices.”70 What Augustine is saying here is that if someone lives and sets their
hearts on the next life, then they “may without absurdity be called happy even now,
though rather by future hope than in present reality. Present reality without that hope is,
to be sure, a false happiness.” This is the case because the present does “not bring into
play the true food of the mind; since no wisdom is true wisdom if is not directed towards
the ultimate state, which is God.”71

On de Lubac’s reading of Augustine and Aquinas, what has been formulated
above concerning an incomplete but natural happiness is an acceptable reading. There is
a natural happiness, or first perfection, which is an order of natural morality. However,
earthly happiness should not be considered the same thing as the happiness only attained
in the next life, but they should also not be too separate.72 We get a clear statement of this
in Aquinas when he writes, “a certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life:
but perfect and true happiness cannot be had in this life.”73 De Lubac suggests a “link
between the paradoxically necessary (for human nature) vertical supplement of grace and
the paradoxically necessary (for human nature) horizontal supplement of culture (event
and design).”74 Augustine and Aquinas allow for a natural morality. In this way, it is not
impossible to conceive of a two-fold end. “It is not the ancient concept of natura pura, but
the system which has grown up around it in modern theology and profoundly changed its

69 Augustine, COG, XIX.4.
70 Ibid., XIX.27.
71 Ibid., XIX.20.
72 de Lubac, Supernatural, 34–6.
73 Aquinas, ST, I–II 5.3.
74 Milbank, Suspended, 54.
meaning, which it seems to me could be set aside without any loss.”75 De Lubac cites Bonaventure in favor of this reading, stating that creation is two-fold: one aspect of which is in the being of nature, while the other is in the being of grace: “The first creation gives being to nature; the second gives being to grace.” God first created humanity on the earth so that he might be the second creation, which is the being of grace which also makes us good.76 It is of the utmost importance, however, that these two ends are not made so distinct that they become somehow separate. De Lubac writes, “if we begin by dissociating the two orders completely, in order to establish the existence of a natural order that could be fully and finally self-sufficient, we are all too likely to end up by seeing not so much a distinction as a complete divorce.” Thus the supernatural order “loses its unique splendor” and becomes a “shadow of that supposed natural order.”77 “Nobody can attain happiness in the present life,” but, if “anyone accepts the present life with firm hope of the afterlife,” they may be called happy even now.78 Jean Porter notes that there must be something to natural ends and not only to supernatural ends, or else we would not be a part of nature.79

We have seen in Augustine that there is some semblance of earthly happiness that can be achieved as long as the attempt to achieve earthly happiness does not replace the seeking of true and fulfilling happiness found in God. The above discussion opens up conceptual textures on the topic of ends by bringing out the sorts of distinctions that we will see in the Puritans, which are investigated below. We can now turn our attention to our target literature and see how it is that the tradition after Augustine drew upon this aspect of his ethics.

**Two-Fold End**

Aristotle’s investigation of the perfect life leads him to the conclusion that the final end of man is a life of contemplation. Anthony Kenny notes that under this “dominant, intellectualist interpretation” of Aristotle, “theoretic contemplation possesses all the qualities which, according to book I, were properties of happiness.”80 Given that there is

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75 de Lubac, *Supernatural*, 32.
76 Ibid., 92.
77 Ibid., 35.
78 Kent, “Augustine’s Ethics,” 211.
79 Porter, *Nature*, 380; also see, Taylor, *Secular Age*, 44.
quite a lot of debate as to whether Aristotle intended to have a ‘dominant’ conception of happiness (as Kenny has laid out), or an ‘inclusive’ one, meaning that happiness is made up of a number of separate ends, Aquinas and the Puritans seem to be interpreting Aristotle as describing a dominant position. There is only one ‘final end’ that is perfection and true happiness, and it is in the vision of God.\footnote{An interesting difference between medievals, early moderns and Aristotle is that they are historical in a way that Aristotle is not. For these Christians, movement towards the good is a movement in time. For Aristotle, the telos is in the polis and is a certain kind of life. MacIntyre, \textit{After Virtue}, 175.}

Aquinas, true to his Augustinian tradition, takes Aristotle a step further, arguing that the contemplative life is the beatific vision and that this life of pure contemplation can only be achieved in the afterlife. Aquinas calls the above distinction natural ends and supernatural ends.\footnote{This concept is not absent in Aristotle, but is rather explored in more detail theologically by Aquinas. Aristotle, \textit{EN}, 1101a19.} Natural ends, as we saw above, are a certain participation in happiness that can be had in this life, but not the perfect and true happiness that is brought about by the achievement of supernatural ends.\footnote{Aquinas, \textit{ST}, I–II 5.3.} Aquinas writes that “happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God.” For natural ends [happiness], “the body is necessary.” He continues, stating that the “happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ.”\footnote{Ibid., I–II 4.5.} This kind of happiness is connatural with the human person and is achievable without the help of divine grace, though it is an imperfect penultimate happiness.\footnote{Ibid., I–II 5.5, 7; 62.1; 63.3. Aquinas notes, “All virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.” See Ibid., I–II 63.1. More on the theological virtues and there relationship to ultimate happiness will be discussed in chapter 4.} Aquinas states, “\textit{imperfect} happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists…but man’s \textit{perfect} happiness,...consists in the vision of the Divine Essence.”\footnote{Ibid., I–II 5.5, emphasis mine; also see \textit{SCG}: III.48.9. “\textit{F}elicity in its perfect character cannot be present in men, but they may participate somewhat in it, even in this life.”} So we can see that for Aquinas, \textit{imperfect} happiness does not require grace as it does for Augustine. Supernatural happiness, or perfect happiness, is not attainable in this life.\footnote{Aquinas, \textit{ST}, I–II 5.3.} We are capable of it in the sense that we can “grasp with the mind...
the universal and perfect good and will it,” but we are “incapable of achieving it.”88 The “glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God.”89 It is only through God alone that man is “made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness.”90 This kind of end, found in the beatific vision, “is not connatural to us, because it presupposes grace.” It is still imperfect because it is not the “perfect happiness of the beatific vision.” Even so, there is happiness apart from the beatific vision.91 These two ends should not be thought of as two separate ends; rather, one end is natural and the other supernatural. Aquinas writes of “a single end which is two-fold, which is realized at both a natural and a supernatural level.”92

What we have seen in the tradition is that there is a place for natural ends, and these ends contribute to earthly happiness. But this is not the full picture. Christian eudaemonism affirms that natural ends are not the final ends of mankind, but rather the ultimate end is the supernatural end. Finally, the possibility for supernatural happiness is only attainable by the grace that is provided through Christ. We can now turn to the Puritans to see if these same themes and distinctions are made in their own thought.

**Puritans and Two-Fold Ends**

One of the essential aspects of Puritan ethics, like the tradition before them, is that all motivation for actions is directed towards an end. This will be addressed in more detail later in the chapter, but it has been generally agreed that the end that all humankind seeks is something akin to the concept of happiness used by ancients and medievals. That is to say, in Aristotelian terms, the Puritans were eudaemonistic. However, where Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas used the word ‘happiness’ (εὐδαιμονία, beatitudo) to represent the end (τέλος, finis) of action and human life, Puritans used a variety of terms including ‘happiness,’ ‘peaceable disposition’ or ‘rest.’93 Nevertheless, the teleological and

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90 Ibid., I–II 5.6, 7; 62.1; 63.3.
93 The semantic range of the εὐδαιμονία and beatitudo is much larger than the English word ‘happiness,’ in which the root is drawn from the Middle English *hap*, which means something more along the lines of ‘luck’ or ‘fortune.’ Sixteenth and seventeenth century references to the *EN* translate *eudaemonia* as ‘happiness’ but, as will be shown in this chapter, what is meant by this word in this context is something much more substantial and stable. With that said, the term ‘happiness’ will be used throughout this chapter.
eudaemonistic underpinning remain consistent. Though different terms are being used to signify the telos, the same conceptual eudaemonistic framework is being utilized.\textsuperscript{94} Happiness is akin to the perfection of our being, a perfection that represents an ontologically rich concept that involves the whole of a person, both body and soul. In happiness, we act and feel like humans are supposed to act and feel. It is important to emphasize that this happiness is a disposition that involves the possession of virtues. We will discuss the relationship between the virtues, happiness and the emotions later in Chapter 4.

Drawing upon Milton’s \textit{Paradise Lost}, Weber notes that there is an acceptance of a person’s task in this world as it relates to happiness that could not have “come from the pen of a medieval writer.”\textsuperscript{95} We have seen above that this is not necessarily the case. In Augustine and Aquinas, there is a potential for an imperfect earthly happiness. Weber is right, however, in noticing the above feature in the Puritans, and we will investigate this further here. This section will begin by showing that Puritans in sixteenth and seventeenth century England still had a strong teleological emphasis in the way they conceived natural life and right action. We will then begin to see that there was a strong account of natural ends that, if attained, would lead to some amount of happiness. We first start with identifying a teleological structure of action in sixteenth and seventeenth century England.

\textit{Earthly Happiness}

Puritans were not only teleological in their view of ethics; many also agreed that there is a practical result from reaching a natural happiness. Aristotle and Aquinas thought that we could be deceived as to the goodness of a particular end,\textsuperscript{96} but that we as

\textsuperscript{94} Carl Trueman points out that many scholars make claims of Aristotelianism in Puritan thought by committing a ‘root fallacy’ that does not account for the change of words over time. I hope to show below that classical eudaemonist principles are in place in these Puritans regardless of the term they associate with the end; see Carl R. Trueman, “A Small Step Towards Rationalism: The Impact of The Metaphysics of Tommaso Campanella on the Theology of Richard Baxter,” in \textit{Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment}, ed. Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark (Cumbria: Paternoster Press, 1999), 181–95.

\textsuperscript{95} Weber, \textit{Protestant Ethic}, 88.

moral agents are incapable of not willing happiness. When we do any action, even a wrong action, we see it as a perceived good that will lead us down the path to flourishing. As we will see, this is something that the Puritans, and especially Richard Baxter, will also emphasize.

For Aquinas, the desire for happiness is for the will to be satisfied in the end it has willed. We saw above that there is a certain participation in happiness that can be had in this life, but it is not the perfect and true happiness that we will speak of later in this chapter. Imperfect happiness can be acquired by man by his natural powers, but it can also be lost, unlike the happiness that consists in the vision of the divine essence.

Like Aquinas, some sixteenth century Puritans think that there is some amount of happiness that is achievable in this life. Richard Rogers notes that some people have happiness for only “an instant.” He also notes that there are times when God’s providence has people fall from happiness, but they can be lifted up to a happy and joyful state. This comment may refer to happiness in this life because we can fall from it and then get it back again. The final happiness in God cannot be taken away. Joy and happiness in this life are also signs of salvation. Robert Bolton’s *Discourse about the State of True Happinesse* begins like *EN*, with ends and explicitly uses the term ‘happiness’ as the end, as the medievalists do. We will see later that Bolton has a high place for the vision of God as the ultimate end, but he also wants to emphasize that the “godly man, may even flourish in this life.” Williams Perkins also sees that happiness can be achieved at some level here in this life. He writes in *A Godly and Learned Exposition of Christs Sermon in the Mount*, “that true happinesse before God, is ever injoyed, yea concerned many times, with

99 Ibid., I–II 5.4; 5.
100 Ibid., I–II 3.8; 5.5. Whether or not someone can attain happiness without the indwelling Holy Spirit will be addressed further in the next chapter.
101 This is not ‘like Aquinas’ in the sense that all Puritans are directly drawing upon Thomas. Rather, this ‘like’ represents the fact that the classical education described in the previous chapter, along with a deep biblical literacy, leads these thinkers to similar conclusions. There is, however, in the seventeenth century, much more of a ‘like Aquinas’ that is a result of direct engagement with Thomas, as seen in thinkers like Richard Baxter and John Owen. This will be described in more detail below.
102 Rogers, *PC*, 35.
103 Ibid., 39.
104 Ibid., 55.
Commenting on Matthew 5:3, where Jesus is discussing the poor in spirit inheriting the kingdom of heaven, Perkins describes the kingdom as an “estate of man” because God is the king who rules in this kingdom, and man obeys God as his subject. “This happie estate consists in Gods gracious ruling of man, and mans holy subjection unto God.” Few see this felicity, “but the truth is, mans whole felicity stands herein.”

Perkins believes that St. Paul teaches, in Romans 14.17, first that when God's spirit rules in a person, there is righteousness; second, that there is peace with God; and third, “the ioy of the holy Ghost, which [is all] unspeakable comforts, passing all worldly ioy whatsoever.” These three set out the state of a “happie man.”

Interestingly, the emphasis on the two-fold end is more explicit and optimistic in the Puritan writings in the sixteenth century than in the seventeenth century. Richard Baxter does discuss a kind of ‘rest’ that is in this world, but he has a very low opinion of it, comparing it to the soldiers that rest in the midst of a battle and mariners that choose to make the sea their home. We get the sense from Baxter, in the precarious situations described, that the little bit of rest that is gotten in these cases is not rest at all. We will explore this aspect of Baxter in more detail later in this chapter. We will also see in more detail later in this chapter that John Owen too makes a distinction between natural and supernatural ends, but, like Baxter, he takes a more pessimistic perspective on this than the sixteenth century authors mentioned above do. What we have seen here are the beginnings of a discussion of the possibility of earthly happiness. More will be said on earthly happiness as it relates to the Christian as well as to those without grace in the chapters to come, as these themes relate to political flourishing and people’s vocations. It is here that we run into a problem. If one holds to a robust view of total depravity, how is it that one can reason good ends? We will look at the Puritan answer to this query next.

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106 Perkins, GLE, 7.
107 Ibid., 10.
108 Ibid.; For a much more Stoic discussion of earthly happiness in eighteenth century Catholic thought see, Alphonsus de Liguori, Uniformity with God's Will, trans. Thomas W. Tobin (Lamp Post One., 2008); We need to pause for a moment to make a helpful distinction between happiness and joy. For Aquinas happiness is not the same as joy but that the two are inextricably tied. There is no happiness without joy. Possessing of happiness is primary, joy is secondary; it is an “essential accident.” Aquinas, ST, I–II 2.6; 7; 4.1; 4.5; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics,” 1, 13; no. 161; Pieper, Happiness, 43–49. Most of the Puritans in this chapter seem to agree with the order of this distinction. The one exception is Perkins, who seems to reverse the order by saying that joy leads towards happiness.
109 Baxter, SER, 554.
Reason and Total Depravity

How is it the case that mankind, with reasoning faculties that do not function properly, fully comes to recognize good ends? With a strong sense of original sin, it would seem that our reason would fail us, and we would always direct our actions and affections to penultimate goods.¹¹⁰

Within the western tradition, the concept of original sin is quite strong. Original sin, or more specifically total depravity, could cause problems for the concept of happiness laid out above, because it assumes that we are able to use our reason enough to decipher good ends and obtain earthly happiness. One of the strongest proponents of this position in history, John Calvin, defines original sin as “a hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature, diffused into all parts of the soul, which first makes us liable to God's wrath, then also brings forth in us those works which Scripture calls “works of the flesh” (Gal 5:19).”¹¹¹ If sin has touched every part of our natural faculties, shouldn’t it have affected our reason as well? How can we say that the unregenerate person can use their natural reason to recognize and seek good ends?

The answer to this conundrum is found by looking at the degree by which sin has affected each aspect of the human. The Christian concept of total depravity is not to be taken to mean that the sin of Adam has now made human nature as evil as possible. Rather, each of mankind’s natural faculties is touched by original guilt and thus do not function to their full capacity as they would with original righteousness. Despite our fallen state, which is corrupted by habits of vice,¹¹² for Aquinas, our reason is able to have a “natural grasp of certain common principles which should direct our acts”¹¹³ and help us to discern good and evil.¹¹⁴ We are able to partake of eternal law, which is imprinted on us by way of knowledge and the inward principles that move us towards actions, however knowledge of the good is imperfect.¹¹⁵ The divine mind is not only able to be made

¹¹⁰ Not directly related to happiness but worth noting is the eudaemonistic ethos in Joseph Hall’s statements in Meditations and Vows on the life lived well. He writes, “Hee that lives well, cannot choose but die well; for if hee does suddenly, yet hee dies not unpreparedly; if by leisure, the conscience of his well-led life, make his death more confortable.” Also, “whereas therefore, there are usually two maine cares of good men, to live well, & die well, I will have but this one, To live well.” Hall, MV, 63; 64.
¹¹² Aquinas, ST, I–II 93.6.
¹¹³ McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action, 110.
¹¹⁴ Aquinas, ST, 92.2.
¹¹⁵ Ibid., I–II 91.2; 93.6.
known to us by revelation, but also though reason. Calvin himself agrees with this understanding of total depravity with regard to reason.

Since reason, therefore, by which man distinguishes between good and evil, and by which he understands and judges, is a natural gift, it could not be completely wiped out; but it was partly weakened and partly corrupted, so that its misshapen ruins appear. Calvin is here stating that reason is only partly weakened by inherited guilt.

Puritans similarly thought that the understanding is corrupted by original sin, which is embedded in our natures. Williams Perkins wrote that original sin is “corruption ingendered in our first conception, whereby every facultie of soule and bodie is prone and disposed to evill.” Perkins shows his similarities with Calvin (and Melanchthon) in that original sin has touched every aspect of the human person, but it only makes the person ‘prone’ to sin and not totally evil. “We see that sinne is not a corruption of mans substance, but onely of faculties: otherwise neither could mens soules be immortall, nor Christ take upon him mans nature.” The remnant of the image of God is still in the mind:

…certaine notions concerning good and evill: as, that there is a God, and the same God punisheth transgressions: that there is an everlasting life: that we must reverence our superiours; and not harme our neighbors. But even these notions, they are both generall and corrupt, and have none upther use, but to bereave man of all excuse before Gods judgement.

Humankind received from Adam first, “ignorance, namely, a want, or rather a deprivation of knowledge in the things of God, whether they concerne his sincere worship, or essential happiness” (1 Cor. 2.14); second, “impotencie, where by the minde of it selfe is unable to understand spirituall things, though they be taught” (Luke 24.45); third, “[v]anitie, in that the minde thinketh falsehood truth, and truth falshood” (Eph 4.7, Prov. 14.12); and finally, “the natural inclination onely to conceive and devise the thing which is evil (Gen 6.5).” We can see here that Perkins is not taking original sin and its

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117 Calvin, *Institutes*, II.II.12. From the Lutheran tradition this is also the position of Melanchthon. (as found in the foot notes of The Institutes, II.I.8)
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 38.
122 Ibid., 23; 40.
effects lightly; there are severe consequences. However, Perkins, along with Aquinas and Calvin, is stating that the reason is not so far gone that it cannot reason about natural ends and goods. Perkins here seems to be well within his tradition with regard to the extent of Adam’s sin.\footnote{Owen is citing Thomas to say that sin is a defect of nature and not of the individual. Carl R Trueman, \textit{John Owen: Reformed Catholic, Renaissance Man} (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 23; Aquinas, \textit{ST}, I–II 81.1.}

Baxter believed that “every good agrees with every nature.” He continues, stating “rest is suitable to the Saints Necessities also, as well as to their Natures and Desires.” Rest contains whatever the moral agent truly wanted: “not supplying them with gross created comforts, which now they are forced to make use of.”\footnote{Baxter, \textit{SER}, 85–87.} What Baxter is stating here is that though we “have now a mixed nature,”\footnote{Ibid., 86.} one being sinful, the other not, we still seek out the natural desires towards fulfilling our nature’s end. Rest, however, is only suited to one of these natures. We are drawn to the vision of God just like every other creature seeks unity with God. As all things are made for God, humans are no exception; we were made to enjoy God. We will see later in the chapter that Owen does think that reason helps people to identify happiness in this life, but that this only comes if one possesses grace.

For our purposes in this thesis, with regard to the Puritans, De Lubac notes that even in the sixteenth century there was no modern concept of “pure nature.”\footnote{de Lubac, \textit{Supernatural}, 116.} Perhaps the main concern of original sin is that man cannot achieve perfect righteousness without grace. Whether or not this is the case will be addressed further in the next section as well as in Chapter 4.

What we have seen above is that there is within the Western Christian tradition that extends into the sixteenth century the possibility for a penultimate earthly happiness. But this is, in fact, an incomplete happiness and a penultimate end. True happiness, flourishing, rest and peace are found in the next life. We now take up this focus.

\textit{Supernatural Ends}

The Puritans conceive of ends in quite the same two-fold manner as Aquinas. As seen above, there is an end and thus a happiness, that is achievable in this life, but the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[\footnote{123}] Owen is citing Thomas to say that sin is a defect of nature and not of the individual. Carl R Trueman, \textit{John Owen: Reformed Catholic, Renaissance Man} (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 23; Aquinas, \textit{ST}, I–II 81.1.
\item[\footnote{124}] Baxter, \textit{SER}, 85–87.
\item[\footnote{125}] Ibid., 86.
\item[\footnote{126}] de Lubac, \textit{Supernatural}, 116.
\end{footnotes}
ultimate end or good is found in the next life. As mentioned above, the term used by the Puritans to identify the end may vary from ‘happiness’ to ‘peace’ or ‘rest,’ but the same eudaemonistic structure is consistent in their thought.

The influential Anglican priest and theologian Richard Hooker had a strong conception of ends in his *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, and he identifies these ends as happiness. For Hooker, God needs to be the final end that we seek, and pursuing any other end besides Him is evil. God is the only infinite end. Concerning happiness and perfection, Hooker writes,

> Happiness therefore is that estate whereby we attain, so far as possibly may be attained, the full possession of that which simply may be attained, the full possession of that which simply for itself is to be desired, and containeth in it after an eminent sort of contention of our desires, that highest degree of perfection.

For Hooker, we may acquire perfection but are not capable of this perfection in this life. As A. J. Joyce notes, Hooker’s thought here is eudaemonistic and is consistent with Aristotelian and Thomist conceptions of happiness, ends, virtues and the good life.

Church of England Clergyman Thomas Playfere sees a teleological structure to delight and contentment and draws upon a conception of nature. Everything in life has a proper good that concerns its end. Playfere writes, “what a sweet friend is God our good friend which onely feedeth and filleth the heart? He only feedeth it in earth, & filleth it in heauen: feedeth it with grace, and filleth it with glorie.” By using the example of food, Playfere shows that the end of a thing is natural to it and that nothing can be satisfied with anything that is contrary to its created nature. “For everything have a kind of foode proper to it. Offer a lyon grasse, he will neuer eate it. Offer him flesh, he will eate it. Why so? Because that is unnaturall, this naturall to him….”

As we have seen above, Robert Bolton’s teleological structure of action and comfort ends in “matchlesse happinesse” and even in this life the godly man may “flourish” to a certain degree. Bolton is drawing upon the eudaemonistic tradition

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128 Ibid., 1:XI.3.
130 Playfere, *HD*, 44.
when he speaks of natural, but penultimate ends. However, true happiness is for those whose sins have been forgiven.

Full sweet is the comfort, and great the happinesse of that Christian, who hath his corruption so farre mortified, and the remission of his sinnes so surely sealed vnto him; that the thoughts of his former pleasing sinnes can neither tickle him with delight and new desire, nor affright him with horro.  

The end of the children of God, he writes, is something different; it is peace and endless happiness, “…God with whom alone is he highest perfection of bliffe, and riuers of infinite pleasures…” Discussing the earthly struggle of the Christian, he writes, “this is the way, the race, and the euening in the world; but ioy comes in the morning, their end is peace, their reward is a bright morning starre, their haven is endlessse happinesse and life eternal.” As we have seen in Aquinas and Augustine, the happiness that Bolton is concerned with is different from the joys of profane men and ancient philosophers; it is not something that is fleeting, but is something that is being perfected. True happiness comes from the grace of God. It is the one who fears God and keeps his commandments who is truly happy.

Concerning material possessions, Bolton argues that even if every possible gift were given to a person, they would still not be satisfied. Material possessions cannot get us into eternity. There are no material contentments in this life. Drawing on the young rich man in scripture, Bolton argues that riches do not make you happy. They die at our deaths. It is impossible that any absolute joy may be found in possessions.

In Richard Baxter’s popular devotional classic The Saints Everlasting Rest, the main concept of rest is unapologetically Aristotelian and eudaemonistic. Baxter states, “happiness consists in obtaining [the End] where I mean the ultimate and principle end, not any end secundum quid so called, subordinate, or less principle.” This is not an end regarded in time, “but the end of Intention, which sets the Soul a-work, and is its prime Motive in all its Actions. That the chief enjoyment is this End.” This is what Baxter

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132 Ibid., 148. This quote is in the context of discussing Augustine’s Confessions.
133 Ibid., 1.
134 Ibid., 52.
135 Ibid., 21.
137 Baxter, SER, 6.
claims the book is about. Happiness must consist in the obtaining of an end, not just the promise of it. Mankind is geared towards achieving an ultimate end; we are always in motion towards that end, and persons in motion seek rest. It is only in God that one finds true rest. It is “gross idolatry to make means our ends.”

Baxter uses Aristotle—the Philosopher—as a conversation partner to talk about the nature of happiness. Aristotle affirms these principles, and so does the Christian. Baxter believes that Aristotle fits, and is consistent with, Christian doctrine. These are principles that can be proved by reason. “That which is desired and sought for itself, is better than that which is desired for something else: or the End, as such, is better than all the means.” Baxter continues, stating that the “salvation of our souls, is the end of our Faith, our Hope, our Diligence, and all Mercies, of all Obediences, as before is proved: it is not for themselves, but for the Rest, that all these are desired and used.” All good moves towards perfection, and Christ is the means and end to that perfection and rest.

Baxter, who is well read in medieval scholastic theology and philosophy, resembles Aquinas in that he makes a distinction between natural ends and supernatural ends. We saw this above in the discussion of the precariousness of earthly rest for Baxter. But the real force of Baxter is that happiness is not in this life: it “is only in the full obtaining of our ultimate end: But that is not to be expected in this life; therefore, neither is Rest to be here expected.” Rest contains “a sweet and constant Action of all the Powers of the Soul and Body in the fruition of God.” Baxter calls rest...

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138 Ibid., 9.
139 Rest contains the “chiefest Good,” God is our “chief good,” 10; God as Chief end, 407; God is our ultimate end, 598; “That God is our chief good and the fruition of him our chief happiness,” 550; God is ultimate end and happiness, 420; Christ makes us happy and presents us perfect, 132; Against those who say that rest is not our ultimate end but God's glory is, distinctions need to be made, 8-9; “The first true saving Act, is, To chuse God only for our End.” 10.
140 Baxter, SER, 550; Baxter, like Augustine, also attributes happiness with self-love, see Baxter, CD, 4.
141 Baxter, SER, 56; 57; Aristotle, EN, 1094a15; Aquinas, ST, I–II 1.4; 5.
142 Baxter, SER, 553. Baxter describes Aristotle and other Greek philosophers as figuring out the afterlife by reason, 144.
143 Ibid., 5.
Baxter continues,

Rest is [the end and perfection of motion.] The saint’s rest here in question is [The most happy estate of a Christian, having obtained the end of his course.] Or, It is the perfected endless fruition of God by the perfected Saints according to the measure of their Capacity, to which their souls arrive at Death: and both soul and body most fully after the Resurrection and final judgement.\footnote{Ibid. emphasis mine. "The Rest containeth the highest Degree of Saints personal perfection, both Soul and Body" 18. It seems though, from this quotation, that Baxter would disagree that this perfected state of the saint is something that is natural to, or at least a capacity of, the creature.}

As shown above in our discussion of Aquinas, there are perceived ends and goods that do not satisfy. Baxter agrees: “[a]n End toward which he moveth for Rest: Which End must be sufficient for his Rest; elses when ‘tis ordained, it deceiveth him.” There is a distance for this end, “else there can be no motion toward it.” This distance is because of the fall. We saw above that sin did not take away our full being (or ‘natures’ as Baxter put it earlier), or our motion, but our well-being and our rectitude of motion.\footnote{Ibid., 10.} The rational moral agent is constantly in motion towards a perceived end. Baxter writes:

Here is presupposed the Knowledge of the true ultimate End, and its excellency; and a serious intending it. For the Motion of the rational creature proceedeth: An unknown End, is no End, it is a Contradiction. We cannot make that our End, which we know not: not that our chief End which we know not, or judge not to be the chief good.\footnote{Ibid., 10–11.}

What Baxter is communicating here is that it is impossible for one to have motion if the intended end is not decided on. It is a contradiction to say that one seeks an end without knowing what end it is that is being sought. It is at this point, for Baxter, that we discover the distance to our true end.\footnote{Ibid., 11.}

God is the superior moving cause towards the chief end. Like previous eudaemonists, Baxter conceives of God as the “first mover.”\footnote{Ibid. 143 Aristotle, Phy., 258b26–259a9; 260b26–29; Meta., Book 12, 1072a.} God first moves in a person by giving her life thus qualifying her to move herself in subordination to the first mover.\footnote{Ibid., 12.} The rational creature freely moves towards its desired end, and if one is not in motion towards his or her rest, they “loose… heaven.”\footnote{Ibid., 13–14.} He writes, “[l]ook to your
hearts and duties (in which God is already with assisting grace), and he will see that you lose not the reward.”

As we can see, rest in heaven is related to conceptions of becoming perfect agents based on natural capacities. Baxter writes elsewhere, “the ungodly in their loss of Heaven, do lose all that glorious personal perfection, which People of God there do enjoy,” and talks of the blessed partake of “Moral Perfection.” Not only is imperfection removed, but we also receive our purified natures. Our spiritual bodies undergo an ontological change that does not resemble that of the previous body. We do not have the same dependencies that we used to. Our natural capacities grow (e.g. passions), and so does our enjoyment of happiness. “Therefore will God, as a special part of his saints Happiness, perfect themselves as well as their conditions.”

Our happiness and perfection are first by faith in Christ, and then by our actions. The “ultimate end” after all the “means” is rest. “Much less shall there be any need of labouring for the inferior ends, as here we do; seeing they will all devolve themselves into the Ocean of the Ultimate End, and the lesser good be wholly swallowed up in greatness.” “The excellencies of this rest is this; as it will be reasonable, so a suitable rest: suited, 1. To the Natures, 2. To the desires. 3. To the necessities of the Saints.” Our rest will be “absolutely Perfect and Compleat; and this both in the Sincerity and Universality of it.”

With regard to Christ and the ultimate end, Baxter writes:

...the ultimate end is necessarily the first intended; and the Divine Essence is principally the ultimate end; yet not excluding the humane Nature in the Second Person; But Christ as Mediator in the way to that end; and throughout the Gospel is offered to us in such terms, as import his being the means of making us happy in God.

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151 Ibid., 16.
152 Ibid., 271–2; 58; Rest unlike wealth and other conceived good cannot be taken away. Bolton, DSTH, 71; Aristotle, EN, 1100a10–1100b20; Stewart, Notes Vol. 1, 138.
154 Ibid., 19.
155 Ibid., 9.
156 Ibid., 2.
157 Ibid., 18.
158 Ibid., 88.
159 Ibid., 131.
In *SER*, the beginning of Part III is about happiness, and how those without Christ do not have it and will not have it. Christ is mediator; he is not the end but the means to an end, which is God. Christ is not the Ultimate end, “[for] the end is still supposed and implied, when we determine of the Means; and the Means confirm, not deny the excellency and necessity of the end.”160 “Every Soul that hath Title to this Rest, doth place his chiefest happiness in it, and make it the chief and ultimate End of his Soul.”161 As the unsaved lose God, “so they lose all those spiritual delightful Affections and Actions, by which the Blessed do feed on God.”162 We have alluded to the nature of this ultimate end. More will be said as to the specifics of the Thomistic and Puritan supernatural happiness in the section on meditation on contemplation in the next chapter.163

John Owen also conceived of human nature and ethics as teleological.164 The desire for the final good is part of being human.165 In Owen’s *Of Communion with God*, he writes that “the souls of men do naturally seek something to rest and repose themselves upon, something to satiate and delight themselves with all, with which they hold communion,”166 communion being, among other things, dispositions and actions towards a good (God) or evil, sinful, object.167 In opposition to the end of sin, which is the dishonor of God, “in The Lord Jesus there is the manifestation of another, and more Glorious end,” the praise of God's glorious Grace in the pardon, forgiveness and acceptance of it.168 It is reasonable to think that when he states that learning and prudence without Christ are ”insufficient for compassing and obtaining of those particular ends whereunto they are designed,” he has the ancients in mind. Learning and Prudence, Owen argues, do not get people to the wisdom that is their true end.169 Owen also states

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160 Ibid., 421.
161 Ibid., 406, 407.
162 Ibid., 274.
163 For More on Happiness as supernatural end see, Baxter, *CD*, 10; 17; 18; 54; 81.
164 For Owen God himself has an end, the “advancement of his own Glory.” Owen, *Comm.*, 147.
166 Owen, *Comm.*. 67. When Owen says “natural,” he does not mean, “the light of which he speaks was a necessary, structural part of being human, but he argues that it can be called natural because it relates to the original righteousness which Adam possessed and the end for which he was designed.” Trueman, *John Owen*, 2007, 69.
168 Ibid., 67; 133; 201.
169 Ibid., 148.
that the end in respect to our lives “is three-fold, honour, peace, usefulness,” which Aristotle associates with the goods of politics.\(^{170}\)

Obedience, for Owen, is a relationship between means and ends. He notes that the incarnation was a means to an end: God’s glory and our salvation. If you take away the end, Christ’s death and obedience, then you destroy the means, or in other words, the incarnation. The end of our obedience in respect to God “is his glory and honour.”\(^{171}\) Furthermore, the “two ends that Christ sends his spirit to us” are, “Sanctification” and “Consolation.”\(^{172}\) Owen argues that Psalm 116.7 is David’s statement that God is the ultimate end and our delight. “[David] makes God his rest; that is, he in whom his soul doth rest, without seeking further, for a more suitable and desirable Object.”\(^{173}\)

We have seen above that Owen is also very teleological with regard to the moral life. Owen also continues within the mediaeval tradition of making a distinction between natural and supernatural ends.\(^{174}\) For Owen, union with God is two-fold in that God receives from us and we receive from him a two-fold union. (1) Of supernatural ends we receive from him “perfect and complete, the full fruition of his Glory, and total giving up of our selves to him, resting in him, as our utmost end, which we shall enjoy when we see him as he is.” And, of natural ends, he writes (2) they are “[i]nitial and incompleat, in the first fruits and drawing of that Perfection, which we have here in Grace, which only shall handle.”\(^{175}\) Owen also writes that we are:

...creatures, made for supernatural and Eternal ends, and bound to answer the whole mind and will of God in Obedience required at their hands Now it bring before discovered to them, that both these are beyond the compas of their own endeavors, and the assistance which they have formerly rested on, if their eternal condition be of an concernment to them, their wisdom is to find out a righteousness that may answer both these to the utmost.\(^{176}\)

Here Owen is saying, as mentioned earlier, and in disagreement with some Christian theologians and philosophers, that both natural and supernatural ends need the assistance of grace in order to come to fruition. “Thus the knowledge of our selves in reference to

\(^{170}\) Ibid., 251; Aristotle, *EN*, honor is the end of the political life, 1095a23, 1095b33; peace, 1177b5; useful, 1155b33, 1143b28.

\(^{171}\) Owen, *Comm.*, 221; 250.

\(^{172}\) Ibid., 201.

\(^{173}\) Ibid., 30.


\(^{175}\) Owen, *Comm.*, 6.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., 137.
Wisdom is required in order for one to be righteous and to satisfy both ends, and true wisdom leads to supernatural ends. Knowledge of ourselves with reference to our “supernatural end” is to use wisdom to attain the five requirements so that we can walk together with God: “1. Agreements, 2. Acquaintance, 3. Strength, 4. Boldness, 5. An aiming at the End. And all these with the Wisdom of them, are hid in The Lord Jesus.”

God “from Eternity” lay “in his own bosom a design for our happiness.” Being in communion with him brings about this happiness that God has laid out. “Communion is, the mutual communication of such good things as wherein the Persons holding that Communion are delighted, bottomed upon some Union between them.” The complete communion “with [God] herein, holds some Analogie with his Love in this; for it is a Love also of rest and Delight.” Owen believes that “Adam’s righteousness in creation is natural, not supernatural,” yet righteousness is “more than an essential property of human nature.” Adam’s “natural endowments were not adequate” to achieve supernatural ends.

Reason and prudence outside of Christ is “darkness and folly.” Owen believes that Paul, in his letter to the Romans, says, “all of these became fools.” These philosophers who were deemed to be happy were fools because they were not with Christ. Here we see Owen in agreement with the ancients with regard to the idea that wisdom and prudence are necessary for happiness. Owen simply takes it a step further, stating that the wisdom required for happiness is only found in Christ.

Conclusion
Though there are many different ways in which these thinkers analyze and put into practice eudaemonistic concepts and principles, there are still two massive continuities, natural and supernatural ends. Whether a thinker conceives of happiness as part of our terrestrial natures, which can be known and perused by reason without grace, or,
according to the other extreme view represented by Owen that happiness is not achievable in this life and is a product of God’s working, the distinction still stands. There is a two-fold end, and these two ends equate to something like the ancient model of happiness.

So, what does Puritan eudaemonism look like? Firstly, there is a place for natural ends, and these ends contribute to earthly happiness. These natural ends allow for there to be a universal human ethic based on natures that extend beyond the realm of faith. I have not gone so far at this point to say whether or not grace is needed to enjoy some modicum of happiness in this life, but I will affirm that grace is certainly a significant contributor to achieving this end. I will say more about this in Chapters 4 and 5, but it is awkward to suppose that those without grace who find enjoyment and fulfillment in their work and family, for example, are not experiencing something of a natural happiness. However, the eudaemonist can affirm, along with Baxter, that natural rest is a significantly diminished rest from the attaining of the final and supernatural rest that is conducive to our created natures. This leads to my next point of observation.

Secondly, what we can affirm about eudaemonism in the Puritans thus far is that natural ends are not the final ends of mankind. The ultimate end is the supernatural. The happiness that is found in our work and our station in life is not the ultimate happiness. It is not the happiness that directly corresponds to our created nature. That is only found in the next life in the vision of God.

Thirdly, the possibility for supernatural happiness is only attainable by the grace that is provided through Christ. There is a natural, ontologically rich good in which we can base our lives and actions here in this world, but this is not the whole story. In order for one to reach their full human potential, one must be seeking God. When we make something besides the Son of God our end, we will inevitably become unhappy. In the next chapter, we will further investigate the relationship of earthly and eternal happiness in the terms of theoria and praxis.

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185 Helpful discussion of this is provided by Timothy Keller, King’s Cross: The Story of the World in the Life of Jesus (New York: Dutton Adult, 2011), 30.
Chapter 3

Theoria vs. Praxis

Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge; it is thinking that makes what we read our. John Locke

Introduction

In the previous chapter, we began to grasp the shape of the Puritan notion of the perfection and happiness of humanity. We also began to get a glimpse of what happiness looks like in particular: the supernatural end as the vision of the divine essence. This chapter picks up from the discussion of supernatural ends and the form this takes for the Puritans. It also begins our investigation into the relationship between eudaemonism in the Puritans and the doctrine of calling with special emphasis on a theology of work.¹

¹ There have been a number of interesting studies on theology and work. For examples see, Miroslav Volf, Work In the Spirit: Toward a Theology of Work (New York: OUP, 1991); Darrell Cosden, A Theology of Work: Work and the New Creation (Waynesboro: Paternoster, 2004); John Hughes, The End of Work: Theological Critiques of Capitalism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2007); Armand E. Larive, After Sunday: A Theology of Work (New York: Continuum International Publishing, 2004). Generally though, theology of work is an overlooked topic within theology. Most of these studies do not give this topic scholarly attention and keep the discussion at a popular level making sweeping claims about the history of work, see for example, Hugh Whelchel, How Then Should We Work? Rediscovering the Biblical Doctrine of Work (Bloomington: WestBowPress, 2012); Lee Hardy, The Fabric of This World: Inquiries Into Calling, Career Choice, and the Design of Human Work (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990); Douglas James Schuurman, Vocation: Discerning Our Callings in Life (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2004); R. Paul Stevens and Alvin Ung, Taking Your Soul to Work: Overcoming the Nine Deadly Sins of the Workplace (Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2010). There are, however, a few bright spots in the literature that looks at work. From the perspective of the social sciences, Robert Jackall's fascinating book Moral Mazes looks at the ethics and decision making of managers in corporate bureaucracies, which is related to Hannah Arendt's banality of evil, and people's “proper” roles within a system, while remaining blind to moral consequences, see Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers (New York: OUP, 1988); Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 1994). These texts however are more descriptive of moral problems in the workplace and in social groups than prescriptive or constructive, and are not chiefly theological.

Theological texts on work that discuss happiness are typically concerned with a more emotive or utilitarian interpretation of the term rather than the full-bodied metaphysically rich flourishing proposed by ancient, medieval and early modern eudaemonists. The use of language like well-being, flourishing and happiness, in the words of Patrick Riordan, “is capable of serving the distinctive methodological purposes of the relevant disciplines, from economics to theology, while at the same time being open to the considerations raised from other perspectives,” see Patrick Riordan, “Human Happiness as a Common Good,” in The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing, ed. Ian Steedman, John R Atherton, and Elaine Graham (Taylor & Francis, 2010), 2008; Also see Richard Layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).

There has also been a growing interest in theology of work in the wake of liberation theology that leans on the discussion of Marxism in anthropology, meaning that work is internally related to the worker. The result of the work affects the worker, thus the work that one produces defines the one doing the work. Work for the liberation theologian is an impersonal commodity like tools, see José Miguéz Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975); But, just like Volf, these theologians
Our first task is to answer the question, what is the relationship between earthly and supernatural happiness and being rational animals? In order to answer this question, we will look at what it meant for the Puritans to be rational animals, by showing that the Puritans adopt an Aristotelian conception of a tripartite soul. Showing the relationship between reason and work brings to light another potent historical and theological tension. If we are rational animals and find our happiness in being rational in contemplation, as Aristotle and Aquinas agree, what then is the relationship between study (doing theology and philosophy) and our daily work? To go even further, what is the relationship between contemplation and work as it relates to supernatural ends in the next life? Should a person in this life spend their time in study, meditating on scripture and nature as a means of character development, or serving one’s neighbor through one’s vocation? In order to answer these queries, a number of topics will need to be addressed. As we will see here, the Christian tradition before the reformation, drawing upon Greek thought, answers this question by subordinating the *vita activa* to the *vita contemplativa*. After the reformation, through to post-enlightenment thought, the opposite was emphasized.\(^2\)

In this chapter, we will also investigate how the Puritans attempt to hold together these two forms of life: the life of *theoria* and the life of *praxis*. Like Aristotle and Aquinas before them, the Puritans put high value on meditation and the contemplation of divine things. However, they also place high, if not higher, value on a political life of serving one’s neighbor through work. This chapter will look at some of the continuities and discontinuities between earlier eudaemonists and the Puritans with regard to a life of contemplation and the active life.

This chapter presents an argument, through the Puritans, that there needs to be an appropriate moderation of *theoria* and *praxis*. I will show that the ultimate end,
supernatural happiness, is, at the fundamental level, related to reason in that to see God is to contemplate him. This should be emphasized in Christian belief and practice. Also, being rational animals requires something of us in this life: a moral development that comes with theology and with doing intense thinking on philosophy or on the nature of God’s creation. Finally, being rational animals and being in this world do not conflict with our daily work and activity. Here we begin a discussion that will be taken up further in Chapter 5: there is a certain amount of earthly happiness that is obtained through our vocations.

In the first section of this chapter, I will show that the Puritans adopt a view of the tripartite soul from the Greek and medieval tradition. The Puritans, like their predecessors, emphasized reason as mankind’s highest distinctive feature and valued it higher than the senses. From here, we will continue to look at how reason relates to the supernatural end. We will do this first by looking at Aristotle and Aquinas’ views on contemplation, pointing out some of Aquinas’ modifications on the subject. We will then trace these Thomist modifications into Puritan thought by looking at the conceptual similarities between *sacra doctrina* and meditation.

I will then look at the Puritan conceptions of contemplation in previous Christian thought. What we will see is that the Puritans have strong views about the use of reason in this life. This of course brings out the tension that I drew attention to above. In order to answer this query, we will look at how the Puritans attempt to ease said tension between two ideal lives based on *theoria* and *praxis*.

**Reason and the Soul**

This section will begin an ongoing discussion of human beings as rational animals, a theme that will be picked up again in the following chapter. We will see here that an important component of Aristotle’s eudaemonism is the attention he gives to humanity’s rational faculties, more specifically the intellectual virtues alongside the moral virtues that are related to the right ordering of the passions by the reason. This also will be addressed at length in the chapter to come. For our purposes here, to show how reason affects the whole of the person in this life and in the next, we must look at how the Puritans adopt the tripartite soul from earlier eudaemonists.
For Aristotle, a soul is made up of, first, “nutrition and reproduction.” The “nutritive soul,” as Aristotle calls it, is in all living things and is the “most primitive and widely distributed power of soul.” Self-nutrition is the “only psychic power that plants possess.” The acts in which the nutritive soul manifests itself are “reproduction and the use of food.” Aristotle takes a very theological perspective regarding this part of the soul, stating that this is the way in which the natural agent may “partake of the eternal and divine,” which is the goal towards which all things strive.3

Sixteenth century English Catholic theologian Thomas Wright adopts the Aristotelian structure of the soul when he states that there is a “triple appetite, natural, sensitive, rational.” He continues, noting that the natural appetite is “found in plants and elements,” and the natural is also “in beasts and men.”4 Popular preacher and bishop of Norwich Edward Reynolds similarly states in TPFS that the “externall” or nutritive vegetable soul is “common to Beasts, Men, and Plants,”5 and is the “peremptorie and uniforme order” in the agent’s natural course, “governed by an immutable, most wise, and most constant Law, proceeding form the Will” in which there is no change.6

Sensitive Soul

Before discussing the second part of the soul, it is important that a definition of passions is given. Once a proper characterization is specified, it will be easier to discuss how it is that rational animals properly use the passions. This will be important for our discussion of meditation here as well as in the following chapter on the virtues.

The sensitive passions, as Reynolds portrays them, are thoroughly Aristotelian. For Aristotle, it is sensual desire, not sensual as in sexual but as in appetites (ἐπιθυμία) to which Aristotle attributes anger, fear and confidence and that which moves an animal.7 It is the sensitive part, which is in all animals, that gives movement. Local movement “is always for an end” and, because of this, cannot be in the nutritive part. Plants are deficient in this kind of movement because they lack “imagination” and do not have the

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3 Aristotle, DA, 415a23–30, 413a32–35.
4 Wright, PM, 12.
5 Reynolds, TPFS, 61–2.
6 Ibid., 33.
“organs necessary for carrying this out.”\(^8\) Local movement must issue in both the practical thought and the appetite. However, “thought is never found producing movement without appetite” and “appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is a form of appetite.” As will be seen later in this chapter in the discussion of meditation, the thing that is the object of the ‘appetite’ for the rational animal is the “stimulant of practical thought,” which may be a real or apparent good.\(^9\)

Reynolds defines Passion as follows:

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\text{…those naturall perfective, and unstrained motions of the Creatures unto that advancement of their Natures, which they are by the Wisdome, Power, and Providence of their Creator, in their own several spheres, and according to the proportion of their Capacities, ordained to receive, by a regular inclination to those objects, whose goodness beareth a naturall convenience to Vertue of satisfaction unto them, or by an antipathie to the good they desire, must needs be noxious and destructive, and by consequent, odious to their natures.}\(^{10}\)
\]

The passions are perfective motions of an agent towards natural ends that were put in the agent by the providence of God according to the capacities of the agent’s natural desires. Desire or distaste for a thing either encourages us towards or moves us away from certain ends. Reynolds notes, “the root and ground of all passions is principally the good; and secondly, or by consequent, the evill things.”\(^{11}\) Robert C. Roberts writes that, “while emotions can be morally evaluative in themselves, many can also be evaluative as producers of actions.” An emotion such as compassion “has moral significance in virtue of motivating compassionate actions.”\(^{12}\) The idea of having a specific ‘object’ that moves a moral agent is quite prominent among sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans. Passions having an object can have a number of senses. Martha Nussbaum gives a number of helpful examples of how passions can have an object. First, for emotions to be “about something, they [need to] have an object.” Having fear must come from something of which someone is scared. Second, “the object is an intentional object” because the emotion is “seen or interpreted by the person whose emotion it is.” Emotions are not merely about their objects, but the aboutness is a way of seeing. Third, beyond being a way

\(^9\) Ibid., 433a16–26. Rational animals share with non-rational animals both imagination and appetite. However for the rational animal, when calculating the means to a particular end not only uses ‘appetite,’ but also ‘thought.’
\(^{10}\) Reynolds, \textit{TPFS}, 31–2, Italics mine.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., 32.
\(^{12}\) Roberts, “Emotions Among the Virtues,” 38.
of seeing the object, emotions also entail beliefs about the object. One must believe that “bad events are impending.” Finally, there must be a particular sort of value given to the object.\textsuperscript{13}

Reynolds describes the passions as “those motions of Perfections or flight, which are grounded on the Fancie, Memory, and Apprehensions of the common sense: which we see in brute beasts; as, in the feare of Hares and Sheepe, the fiercenesse of Wolves, and anger or flatterie of Dogs, and the like,” which are the “impulsions of Nature.”\textsuperscript{14} It is also important to note that Reynolds’ definition of passion is similar to Aristotle, in that we see the same passions that motivate: “feare” and “anger.”

We can also see similar aspects of the Aristotelian definition in Thomas Wright. In his \textit{PM}, he writes that passions “are internal acts or operations” of the “sensitive power, or facultie of our soul,” through the “imagination of some good or ill thing.” They are called affections because “they affect some good or bad.” Passions must follow either the sense or the reason.

Church of England clergyman and writer William Fenner is generally happy using the ancient schema for the passions, but is notably more Platonic than Aristotelian.\textsuperscript{15} In agreement with ancients generally, Fenner gives a eudaemonistic conception of the emotions, stating that every creature seeks out its own good, and our affections give us signs into our true happiness.\textsuperscript{16} The affections are the forcible and sensible motions of the heart, or the will, to an end, according to whether it is apprehended “to bee good or to bee evill.”\textsuperscript{17} The affections are the “feet,” the “wings,” the “inclinations,” the “passions” and the “perturbations” of the soul.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{14} Reynolds, \textit{TPFS}, 37–8.


\textsuperscript{16} Fenner, \textit{TA}, 1.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 29.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 3, 9, 66.
Just as the affections are in the forcible motions of the will, they are also in the sensitive appetite. Where Aristotle and scholastics would situate the affections only in the sensitive appetite, Fenner places them in both the sensitive and rational. He writes:

As the affections are motions, so they are the motions of the will. I know Aristotle and most Divines too, doe place the affections in the sensitive part of the soule, and not in the will, because they are to be seene in the beasts. But this cannot be so, for a mans affections doe most stirre at a shame or disgrace; which could not bee, if the affections were in the unreasonable sensitive part: the unreasonable sensitive part of a man is not sensible of credit or offense...the affections must needs be in the heart: the scripture places that affections in the heart or the will.19

For Aristotle, Fenner notes, the “virtues are nothing more than the right ruling of the affections,” but Fenner writes, “with little alteration,” the “ruling of the affections” is the main “worke of grace.” Thus grace rules the affections.20 This slight change in Fenner towards a necessity of grace, though a move away from the ancients themselves, puts him closer to Aquinas. We will see the details of this more clearly in the following chapter.

What we have seen above is that Reynolds’, Wright’s and Fenner’s definitions of the passions have all of these aspects that are also found in the ancient’s as to why local movement is in, or at least starts with, the sensitive appetite.

**Rational Soul**

Aristotle writes that it is in the possession of sensation that we call living things animals.21 Reynolds, agreeing with Aristotle, states that the sensitive appetite is “common to Men and Beasts.”22 However, in humans it is ordained to proceed naturally from the government of Reason; and therefore may properly be called an “Humane Appetite, as being determined, restrained, and made conformable unto Mans Nature.”23

Rational Passions are not simply “acts of reason” or “immaterial motions of the soul” but are a “participation and dependence by reason of their immediate subordination in man unto the government of the Will and Understanding, and not

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19 Ibid., 5.
20 Ibid., 53–4.
22 Reynolds, TPFs, 62.
23 Ibid.; Aristotle, DA, 415a7–12.
barely of the Fancie, as in other creatures.”

As for calling these governed passions reasonable, he writes that he has Aristotle on his side:

…who, though the sensitive Appetite in man be of it selfe unreasonable, (and therefore by him contradivided to the Rationall powers of the Soule) yet by reason of that obedience which it oweth to the Dictates of the understanding, whereunto Nature hath ordain’d it to be subject and conformable (thought Corruption have much slackened and unknit that Bond) hee justly affirmeth it to be in some sort a Reasonable Facultie, not in trinisically in it selfe, but by way of participation and influence from Reason.

The sensitive soul in a person is in a sense reasonable, but it is still obedient to the dictates of the understanding. The principal acts of the human soul are either reason or discourse, which proceed from his understanding, of which imagination is an assistant: or “of Action and Morality, from his Will.” These capacities proceed from the physical organs and “faculties of the body.” It is in the soul that God “fastened a perfect knowledg of his Law and Will.”

Though “most kindes of Plants or Trees exceed us in vegetation and fertility” and many animals “have greater activity and exquisitenesse in their senses than wee,” the “reason therefore is, because Nature ayming at a superior and more excellent end, is in those lower faculties lesse intent and elaborate.” Reynolds takes David in Psalm 139 to be saying that these lower faculties are the groundwork “for the better notice of mans greater perfections, which have ever some connexion and dependance on them” and are instrumental to humankind’s happiness. Baxter, as well, writes that humans are animated with an “invisible rational soul,” and that reason is what sets us apart from other animals. All spiritual knowledge passes into the affections. Now that we have shown that the Puritans, with few exceptions, adopt an Aristotelian tripartite soul, we can continue on to show how reason relates to the entirety of a person. We will do this first by

25 Ibid., 38–9.
28 Baxter, *SER*, 115; 421.
29 Ibid., 121; The three parts of the soul was even an aspect of philosophy that Calvin found commendable. See, Calvin, *Institutes*, I.IX.9; For a more comprehensive and complete discussion of the Puritans, incontinence and the parts of the soul see Nathaniel A. Warne, “Metaphysics, Emotions and the Flourishing Life,” in *Emotions and Religious Dynamics*, ed. Douglas James Davies and Nathaniel A. Warne (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013); For further reading on distinction between a variety of rational animals see, Alasdair MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals* (Chicago: Open Court, 1999).
relating reason to the supernatural end, that is, happiness found only in the vision of God in the next life.

**Theoria**

To this end we will look at four elements of contemplation and show the similarities from Aristotle through to Christian theology and into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These criteria are drawn from Thomas Bénatouil and Maura Bonazzi.

The first criterion is “an ethical justification of the superiority of knowledge over other human activities.” The thinkers investigated here follow a long tradition of advocating a life in search of understanding. The second criterion is a “psychological and epistemological elucidation of contemplation, assigning it to a separable and immortal faculty, νοῦς.” This distinguishes understanding as the highest faculty from other, lower faculties like “sensation, opinion, experience, practical reason, etc.” In the third criterion the entities contemplated must be ontologically and cosmologically superior divine beings, “which are both objects of knowledge and models to be imitated.” The fourth criterion is that there must be an analogy between the intellectual activity “defined by the first three aspects and the witnessing of a religious and cultural spectacle or festival.” This fourth criterion will not be discussed at length here, but will be investigated further in Chapters 5 and 6. We begin our investigation of the first three criteria with Aristotle.

**Aristotle on Contemplation**

The number of words dedicated to debating the relationship between eudaemonia and the contemplative life in Aristotle’s thought is nothing short of astounding, generally putting scholars in two categories: inclusive or dominant. The ‘inclusive’ view holds that happiness includes a number of goods, whereas the ‘dominant’ view argues that happiness consists of only one thing. It is not my intention to add to this ongoing discussion. However, it is the case that the Christian tradition has been adequately clear in its interpretation of this controversial aspect of ‘the Philosopher’s’ thought, reading

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30 Thomas Benatouil and Mauro Bonazzi, eds., *Theoria, Praxis, and the Contemplative Life After Plato and Aristotle* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 4; Also see, Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 329–32. This last criterion will be addressed more completely in the next chapter on friendship, community and the church.
Aristotle as holding the ‘dominant’ view. For our historical purposes here, we will assume this position for the rest of this research.31

Aristotle famously begins *The Metaphysics* with the statement that “all men desire to know.”32 It is a natural part of humanity to develop our rational faculties, “and if we do not, then we might be living men, but we are not living as men; we might enjoy ourselves while living, without enjoying living.”33 The best possible life for a human is to do specifically human kinds of things. Based on Aristotle’s tripartite soul, as described earlier, the use of reason is what makes humans distinct from other things in nature. Happiness for a human is contemplation (θεωρία) because happiness “must be a life of reason concerned with action: the activity of the soul in accordance with reason.”34 A life of studying universal truths best fits the criteria laid out in book one of *EN* because it is the “highest excellence” in us; it is our “natural ruler and guide.”35 Those who ‘know’ and do philosophy enjoy pleasures more than even those who inquire do. Contemplation fits the criteria for happiness because it is loved for its own sake.36 It also fulfills the two conditions of eudaemonia; it is perfect and it is self-sufficient. *Theoria* is perfect, because nothing else needs to be added to it, and self-sufficient, because the happy man can theorize alone even if a person can do it better with colleagues and the necessities of life.37

The use of the intellect (νοῦς) is the best activity, first because “the objects of intellect are the best of knowing objects” and second because it is the most continuous activity. We can contemplate more than we can do anything else. The happy life must be pleasurable, but with the kind of pleasure that comes from wisdom. Contemplation and

31 Debates between dominant and inclusivist interpretations of Aristotle will have to be addressed later in this chapter when we discuss the relationship between work and contemplation. There we will show that Christian ethics does not need to favor one interpretation over another. However, the dominant view seems to be the interpretation of both Aquinas and Aristotle’s early modern interpreters. We will also make use of a third interpretation of Aristotle put forth by Howard Curzer to help describe the Puritan position.

It should also be noted that the dominant view is distinct from a monist view. Where the dominant view holds that contemplation consists in one activity, namely contemplation, while the monist view is that contemplation is focused on one thing, for example God.

36 Ibid., 1177a26–1178a8.
the use of the intellect are distinguished from other faculties like sensation, opinion, experience and prudence.\textsuperscript{38}

The practice of philosophy is a theological matter for Aristotle, because the best and most divine thing for humankind is understanding;\textsuperscript{39} it is the divine element in us. The most important contribution we can make to life is the study of philosophy;\textsuperscript{40} and first philosophy is theology, “as it has to do with the highest cause of being.”\textsuperscript{41} Contemplation is the “highest fulfillment of our nature as rational beings; it is the sort of rational activity that we share with the gods, who are rational beings with no need to apply reason to practice.”\textsuperscript{42} Aristotle admits that this kind of life is too high for humankind, “for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him.” It is not the place of man to think of mortal “human things,” because we share reason with the divine. We must make ourselves immortal, in the sense that we should “strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us.”\textsuperscript{43}

Contemplation, as the most complete happiness, becomes most clear when we consider that the gods, who are the most blessed and happy, do not do acts of justice, are not brave or liberal or temperate, but only contemplate. “That which is most akin to this must be the nature of happiness.”\textsuperscript{44} The gods, who are higher and supreme beings, are objects of knowledge and models for imitation. The gods contemplate but have no need for external goods as we do.\textsuperscript{45} A life of contemplation is higher than human. “It is achievable not in virtue simply of being a man, but in virtue of being something divine in which men partake.” We have a divine element to us that gives us the ability to think about things higher than ourselves. This “is the highest aspect of our souls,” and should not be neglected or overlooked for “lower matters” unless it threatens to make

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 1177a13–18.
\textsuperscript{41} Burkert, \textit{Greek Religion}, 329.
\textsuperscript{42} Irwin, \textit{Development}, 2007, 1:149.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 1178b23.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 1178b9–34.
“contemplation impossible.”46 It is by virtue of our capacity to become like God that we find eudaemonia. This is why we can call Aristotle a “spiritualist.”47

We can see that Aristotle ticks all of the boxes that Benatouil and Bonazzi lay out for us concerning the prioritizing of contemplation. We will now see if Aquinas does the same.

Aquinas on Contemplation

As we have seen, for Aristotle, contemplation of universals is the highest and most god-like activity and is worthy of imitation. We now begin to sketch Aquinas’ view of contemplation. But a more thorough and detailed picture will be continued when discussing the similarities between Aquinas and the Puritans later in this chapter.

Happiness for Aristotle is in this life, but according to Aquinas, if happiness is in this life, it must be imperfect because it is in this life.48 “‘We call men happy but only as men.’ But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be ‘as the angels…in heaven.’”49 Aquinas, drawing upon Aristotle and passages of scripture like Matthew 5.8 (Blessed are the pure of heart: for they shall see God), 1 John 3.2 (We shall see him as he is) and 1 Corinthians 13.12 (For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face), comes to the conclusion that contemplation, and more specifically the vision of God (visio Dei), or beatific vision, is the end goal of human striving.50 We will focus our attention on Benatouil and Bonazzi’s second and third criteria in respect to Aquinas here. But there is a little more nuance to Aquinas’ position that should be drawn out.

Aquinas writes, “the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect.”51 Humankind’s basic craving is to see and to attain insight, to set our eyes upon our ultimate good by means of our intellectual capacities. It is through these intellectual pursuits in contemplation and through the infusion of grace the possibility of achieving

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48 There is a debate as to whether Aquinas takes Aristotle’s happiness as maximal, in that nothing can be added to something that is complete, or the moderate interpretation, in which nothing can be added, but it is capable of improvement. I will not be looking any further into this debate, though it seems that Aquinas prefers the moderate reading. For more on this see, Irwin, Development, 2007, 1:507–8.
51 Aquinas, ST, I–II 3.4–5.
the vision of God. Contemplation, however, is not merely an investigation of truth “but a
consideration and delight of a truth already grasped.”\(^{52}\) It is not directed to the practical
life but to the delight of gazing at truth. From this, Aquinas distinguishes between two
kinds of contemplation: contemplation ‘principally’ (principaliter) and ‘dispositively’
(dispositive).\(^{53}\) Contemplation principally takes place in the next life and is the
contemplation of truth in the vision of God. The emphasis here is on seeing that does not
take place while we have other “bodily senses.”\(^{54}\) Interestingly, given our discussion on
Richard Baxter in the previous chapter, Aquinas defines “rest” as having no inward or
outward disturbance.\(^{55}\) The vision of God is the creator’s intended perfection of human
existence in an act of the perfected human intellect that is beyond humankind’s terrestrial
dependence on the senses.\(^{56}\) The speculative intellect, rather than the practical intellect, is
where humankind’s perfect happiness resides. This is the contemplation of truth.\(^{57}\)

On the other hand, contemplation ‘dispositively’ is in this life and is the
contemplation of first principles. This contemplation is the activity of gazing at the truth,
and all other activities, such as “reception of principles” or “deducing principles,”
culminate here.\(^{58}\) Aquinas writes, “the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally
completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity.”\(^{59}\)
Just as in contemplation principally, this kind of contemplation is concerned with the first
principle, which is God. However it is imperfect and a “stepping stone to things
imperishable.”\(^{60}\) Aquinas’ view is that neither the life of contemplation as Aristotle
conceives it nor the life of moral virtue will end in ultimate happiness if confined to this
life, since “happiness can consist only in the vision of the divine essence.”\(^{61}\)

\(^{52}\) Jordan Aumann, “Appendices,” in Summa Theologiae: Action And Contemplation., vol. 46
(Cambridge: CUP, 2006), 103.
\(^{53}\) Aquinas, ST, II–II 180.4.
\(^{54}\) Ibid., II–II 180.5.
\(^{55}\) Ibid., II–II 181.2.
\(^{56}\) Ibid., I 12; I–II 3.8; Hardy, Fabric, 17.
\(^{57}\) Aquinas, ST, I–II 3; 5; 57.1; Aumann, “Appendices,” 110.
\(^{58}\) Aquinas, ST, II–II 179.2; 180.1.
\(^{59}\) Ibid., I–II 180.3; There are several ways that one can “gaze” and thus contemplate the truth:
See Aumann, “Appendices,” 103.
\(^{60}\) Aquinas, ST, II–II 180.4; 7.
\(^{61}\) Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 20; Aquinas, ST, I–II
3.8.
contemplation in the next life is about ‘seeing,’ this earthly contemplation is about ‘hearing.’ This will be further addressed later in this section and the next.

What we have seen thus far is that, for Aquinas, the use of the intellect is an essential aspect of his thought. He makes a distinction, however, between contemplation in this life (natural), and contemplation in the next (supernatural). Both of these contemplations express delight because the rational being is using reason and because this being contemplates what it loves. Contemplation is continuous, starting in this life and continuing in the next, and supernatural contemplation is a development of grace that ends in perfection. We will see this more in the following chapter on infused virtues. We have highlighted this departure from Aristotle in Thomist thought, but there are further discrepancies and continuities that should be looked at regarding the reason, contemplation and happiness.

When Aquinas first discusses happiness in the ST, he identifies it with “the ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature,” a “collection of all goods.” But this perfection is not attainable by those who keep philosophy apart from faith and divine revelation. For Aquinas, philosophy apart from theology can only go so far. Through sensory cognition, one can prove that there is a first universal cause and confirm that this first cause is the origin of existence, but one cannot reason about what God is. There is a cap as to how high into the realm of God philosophy can reason on its own. Theology, on the other hand, does not have this specific limitation.

Just as Aristotle believes that it is in all humankind to desire to know, for Aquinas, when we see an effect, we must inquire into its cause. This begins the process that ultimately must lead to the divine essence. There “resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men.” Philosophers see and ‘wonder,’ but they are incapable of truly knowing that first cause.

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62 Aquinas, ST, II–II 180.3; 181.1. There is the possibility for some to see the vision of God in this life, which Aquinas calls ‘rapture.’ However, even this is a lower divine image. Ibid., II–II 180.5.
63 Ibid., II–II 180.7; 8.
64 Ibid., I 62.1; 26.1.
65 Because of the emphasis on preaching as well as an “orientation towards the Word as logos,” there is an emphasis on hearing within the Puritan literature. In some cases, this is emphasized more than sight. See, U. Milo Kaufmann, The Pilgrim’s Progress and Traditions in Puritan Meditation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 236–8.
66 Aquinas, ST, I 12.1; “Traditionally, contemplation has been characterized as a knowing accomplished by amazement.” Pieper, Happiness, 75.
the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than “that he is,” then the perfection of the intellect does not yet reach the first cause. Nevertheless, it retains the natural desire to seek the cause. The knowledge of the philosopher can never rest or achieve completion. The Christian who contemplates and does theology does not have the same kind of ‘reason cap’ as the philosopher. This will be discussed in more detail below. The teaching of Christian faith is concerned with the vision of God and is directly related to the human’s natural desire to know. Faith is the perfection of our intellectual nature. As we will see in Chapter 4, the attainment of the supernatural end of happiness is through grace and God’s gifting. It is only by faith, which is infused by grace, that our natural light of reason is able to break through the reason cap that inhibits philosophy.

Divine revelation attributes to God “that which natural reason cannot attain.” Complete happiness cannot be made up of theoretical, philosophical knowledge. As pointed out above, however, the person with faith has a reason cap between contemplation in this life (hearing) as opposed to the next (seeing). Knowledge that is attained through faith cannot be genuine knowledge, in as much as the “intellect is determined by faith to some object.” Such knowledge causes the mind to assent \( \text{via} \) what is seen by means of an understanding of first principles. What we are beginning to see is that even the theologian has a reason cap of sorts. As mentioned above, theology is a discursive theological reasoning or investigation of truths revealed by God and made known to humankind through scripture and tradition. Therefore, the theologian uses the same discursive reason that the philosopher does, but by faith, which is a kind of hearing rather than seeing and is attributed to contemplation. The Christian theologian moves past the limit that the natural philosopher possesses, but hits another limit by virtue of still using discursive knowledge in this life and drawing upon certain principles by revealed faith.

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67 Aquinas, \( ST \), I–II 3.8.
69 Aquinas, \( ST \), I 12.13.
We are beginning to see that, for Aquinas, as far as earthly reasoning capacities go, there is a distinction between the use of philosophical reason and theology (sacra doctrina). Theology is the highest of all the sciences and involves specifically dealing with divine things. Theology takes a special place above strict philosophical reasoning and can assist the “philosophical sciences” but is not in need of them. Philosophy makes the teaching of scripture clearer; theology “accepts its principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God by revelation.”

Theology is above human wisdom.

For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principle in that order in sacred science, all things are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science.

Sacred doctrine, and thus theology, is chiefly concerned with God, whose handiwork is especially humankind. Theology makes use of the authority of philosophy with regard to matters where truth can be known by natural reason. “Those who use the works of the philosophers in sacred doctrine, by bringing them into service of faith, do not mix water with wine, but rather turn water into wine.”

So how is it that natural reason, such as that of Aristotle, and the divine reason that the Christian possesses through grace are related? Jan Aertsen helpfully sets out the relationship between the natural reason of philosophy and its relation to the revealed reason of theology. There is harmony between philosophy and that which is revealed by God. Theology and philosophy cannot contradict each other. In addition, “[f]aith presupposes natural knowledge, as grace presupposes nature.”

Natural knowledge is fundamental although theology should not be reduced to this. And finally, “grace does

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70 Ibid., I 1.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. “Therefore it is not a practical but a speculative science.” Theology, because it is speculative rather than practical, is more “concerned with divine things than with human acts” though it does treat practical matters “inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss.”
74 Aquinas, ST, I 2.2; from Aertsen, “Historical Setting,” 35; It is also the case for Augustine that the study of philosophy is the study of God and the human soul; see, Chadwick, Augustine, 30.
That is to say that faith is the perfection of philosophy.

As with Aristotle, Aquinas distinguishes the intellect over and above sensation, opinion, experience and practical reason. As seen in the previous chapter, for Aquinas complete happiness is the supernatural end of the vision of God, which can only be achieved in the afterlife. We will see, in further chapters, that happiness in this life includes the moral virtues, but is ultimately incomplete. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the greatest virtues that accord with human nature are without difficulty because they are conducive to our nature. Thus contemplation is effortless and not burdensome.76

Our happiness is essentially in the uniting of ourselves to “the Uncreated Good,” with which we cannot be united by the senses and goods of the body.77 The lower parts of man (senses) are perfected by the overflow of the higher part, namely the rational part. “The operation whereby man’s mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.”78

But what is the relationship between knowing, or the contemplative actions, and seeing (vision)? Knowing is a kind of loving, and “seeing itself is only stirred to full realization by love. Seeing is an act of the intellect. Both seeing and knowing are a kind of togetherness and intimate presence. “Only the presence of what is loved makes us happy, and that presence is actualized by the power of cognition.” It is not mere seeing; it is having, possessing and partaking of. 79

We have very briefly laid out the conceptual ground for theoria in Aristotle and Aquinas. In both of these cases we have begun to see an ethical justification for the superiority of the intellect over the senses, but in Aquinas there is still an emphasis on faith, a theme that will be picked up in more detail later in this chapter and in Chapters 4

75 Aquinas, ST, I 1.8; from Aertsen, “Historical Setting,” 35.
77 Aquinas, ST, I–II 3.1;4; Pieper, Happiness, 58.
78 Aquinas, ST, I–II 3.4.
79 I am indebted here to Pieper, Happiness, 70–2. There are some debates amongst the medievals as to whether one can have perfect knowledge of God in the beatific vision. “What is perfectly seen is perfectly understood, but what is imperfectly understood is still totaliter, albeit imperfectly.” God can be seen as he is but is not known as he is because our knowing is finite. Smith, Trinitarian Theology, 50; For a helpful discussion of Pieper see, John Hughes, The End of Work: Theological Critiques of Capitalism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2007), 162–70.
and 6. The thinkers investigated here follow in a long tradition of advocating for a life in search for understanding. We have also seen that there is an emphasis on the elucidation of contemplation, assigning it to a separable and immortal faculty of νοῦς, the intellect. This distinguishes understanding from other, lower faculties. We have also seen, in both cases, that the entities contemplated must be ontologically and cosmologically superior. The major difference in these cases is that Aquinas is quite sensitive to the particular role that philosophy plays in human flourishing. Without theology, which is beyond philosophy, the supernatural end of rational animals cannot be achieved.

We now turn our attention from the discussion of ancients and medievals to the Puritans, where the medieval conception will be made clearer and the Puritan position explicated.

Sacra Doctrina and Meditation as Theology

Contemplation and meditation are prominent fixtures in Protestant spirituality, and this is due in no small part to the influence of Puritan writers on the development of Protestant thought. As sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans draw upon Aristotle and Aquinas to make theological distinctions while also drawing upon other scholastics for exhortations and methods. It is prudent for our discussion to look at these two theological influences together. In this section, we shall assess the conceptual relationship between Aquinas’ understanding of sacra doctrina, meditation and contemplation and the Puritan practice of contemplation and meditation. By looking back at Aquinas, we hope to enhance our understanding of the Puritan concept of reason in meditation and ultimately to show the relationship between the moral development that comes with meditation and leads to the beatific vision; which is reasoning in the next life. What we will see is that the Puritans are very traditional in this regard.

Most Puritans make a distinction between meditation and contemplation. John Downname writes, “in nature there is a small difference between Meditation and Contemplation, yet as the Schooles define it, there is some in degree; Meditation being an exercise of a lower and meaner nature, within the reach of all Christians which will put out their hand unto it.” Contemplation, however, is “more highly and heavenly, fit only

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for such as by long exercise have attained to much perfection.” Thomas White notes that Contemplation is like “the beatificall Vision which they have of God in Heaven, like the Angels beholding of the face of God; Meditation is like the kindling of fire, and Contemplation more like the flaming of it when fully kindled: The one is like the Spouses seeking of Christ, and the other like the Spouses enjoying of Christ.” Thus contemplation is the end of meditation.

Meditation or meditation, can either mean “thinking over or contemplating something, or a practice or exercise.” The medieval technical application of meditation is distinguished from contemplation. The Puritans maintain this distinction, following the medieval concept of contemplation put forth by Aquinas, Richard of St Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux and others. We will see that the Puritans generally hold that contemplation is “more highly and heavenly than meditation, fit only for such as by long exercise have attained to much perfection,” a distinction that Aquinas also represents. Aquinas identifies the second activity (‘understanding of principles from which one proceeds to contemplation of truth’) with meditation, which we will return to later. For now, this analysis has given us a sense of meditation’s technical application. Meditation is discursive reasoning that proceeds from principles. It is a process that leads to the contemplation of truth through investigation. In order for the soul to rest in contemplation, the theological discursus must be ceased. We will now proceed to look more closely at the Puritan understanding of meditation by comparing it to Aquinas’ thought on sacra doctrina and meditation.

81 Downame, AGG, 534; Martz, Poetry of Meditation, 16.
83 Richard Baxter notes that meditation guides us to “ultimate ends” that are loved for themselves. Baxter, SER, 25; White, Method, 5; This distinction is generally but not always the case. For more on this distinction between meditation and contemplation see Tom Schwanda, “Soul Recreation: Spiritual Marriage and Ravishment in the Contemplative-Mystical Piety of Isaac Ambrose” (Durham University, 2009), 165–184.
85 Aquinas, ST, II–II 82.3; 180.3. Aquinas is here citing Richard of St. Victor, De gratia contemplationis, 1, 3, 4.
86 Ryrie, Being Protestant, 166.
87 Downame, AGG, 534; Martz, Poetry of Meditation, 16.
88 White, Method, 5; This distinction is generally but not always the case. For more on this distinction between meditation and contemplation see, Schwanda, “Soul Recreation,” 165–184; Aquinas, Summa, II–II 180.3.
We should acknowledge that while Aquinas does not devote much space in the ST to meditation explicitly, he does, as we have noted above, affirm the same conceptual understanding of meditation that we have laid out. Aquinas, quoting Richard of St. Victor, writes, “meditation is the investigation of a mind occupied in the search for truth,” that is, reasoning from certain principles to some truth. This is in conjunction with Prima Pars, where Aquinas notes that *sacra doctrina* “does not pronounce on God and creatures as though they were counterbalancing, but on God as principal and on creatures in relation to him, who is their origin and end.” Thus the focus of *sacra doctrina* is on God, but it does not seem that meditation needs to be focused on God in order to be meditation. Meditation is a process that leads to “contemplation of some truth,” but contemplation is gazing at the truth.

Later in the Prima Pars, Aquinas establishes that the search for knowledge of God in *sacra doctrina* must move through sensible things to arrive at knowledge of the unknown God because we are corporeal beings. This movement of *sacra doctrina* through the sensible world explains, according to Aquinas, why God reveals himself through Scripture. As he says, “Holy Scripture fittingly delivers divine and spiritual realities under bodily guises. For God provides for all things according to the kind of things they are. We are ‘of the kind’ to reach the world of intelligence through the world of sense, since all our knowledge takes its rise from sensation. Congenially, then, holy Scripture delivers spiritual things to us beneath metaphors taken from bodily things.” To this affirmation of Scripture’s fittingness, Aquinas adds that God “has taught that the knowledge making us blessed consists of two objects, namely, the divinity of the Trinity and the humanity of Christ.”

In his elaboration on the Trinity and the humanity of Christ in ST, we learn, as we do also in the Puritans (specifically in John Owen), that it is through the humanity of Christ that we are led to a knowledge of the Trinity. This movement of what is known (Christ) to what is unknown (the Trinity) is the movement of *sacra doctrina*, and it demonstrates that *sacra doctrina* is, as Torrell notes, theology as “an expression of a God-

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89 Aquinas, *ST*, II–II 180.3 ad.1.
90 Ibid., I 1.3 ad.1.
91 Ibid., I 12.11; 2.prol.
92 Ibid., I 1, a.9.
informed life, an activity in which the virtues of faith, hope, and charity are given full scope. Thus even though Aquinas concludes in the first question of the *Summa* that theology is more theoretical than practical, he is insistent that *sacra doctrina* shapes the life of the theologian through her search for truth. Aquinas writes,

> Whereas some among the philosophical sciences are theoretical and others are practical, sacred doctrine takes over both functions, in this being like the single knowledge whereby God knows himself and the things he makes. All the same it is more theoretical than practical, since it is mainly concerned with the divine things which are, rather than with things men do; it deals with human acts only in so far as they prepare men for that achieved knowledge of God on which their eternal bliss reposes.

What we have seen above is that it is common for Puritans to separate meditation and contemplation. Contemplation of God is in the next life and is the life found in the beatific vision, or vision of God. What is beginning to come to light here is that, like Aquinas, there are some Puritans that place the *telos* of reason not just in the doing of philosophy and theology here in this life, but also in the next. We will further investigate this later in this chapter. Also like Aquinas, the Puritans looked at thus far have a priority of reason that is in this life and that Christian conceptions of meditation resemble. We will now continue to address in more detail the Puritans’ conception of meditation and contemplation.

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95 Aquinas, *ST*, I 1, a.4 (17).
Puritan Contemplation and Meditation

Alec Ryrie notes that with regard to prayer and, by extension for our purposes, meditation and contemplation, there is considerable variation with regard to how Reformed Protestants discuss these topics.\(^96\) There are also variations and discrepancies among the sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans themselves. At times painting with broad strokes, we will attempt in this section to draw out these similarities and differences within themselves as well as with Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ conceptions of *sacra doctrina* while attempting to be sensitive to changes over time. We will start in the sixteenth century and look at Richard Rogers and William Perkins.

Rogers, in his *Seven Treatises*, dedicates the entirety of the seventh treatise to arguing that we need to be daily thinking on and reading scripture while also being in prayer. His definition of meditation is the separation of “our selves from all other things, where we consider as we are able, and thinke of some poynts of instruction necessarie to leade us forward to the kingdome of heaven, and the better strengthening of us against the divel and this present evill world, and to the wel ordering of our lives.” In meditation "we must set our minds on worke, about the cogitation of things heavenly, by calling to rememberance some one or other of them which we knowe."\(^97\) One of the best ways to know that you are saved “is the desire to study. The desire to study the word is a sign of ones assurance.”\(^98\) Christians “should give all diligence to muse and conferre on the things which [they] have heard, examining them by the scriptures.” This is how to warrant true blessing.\(^99\)

Perkins, a contemporary of Rogers, sees the importance of wisdom in ordering the affections through the act of meditating on God. He argues that newness of life is three things: (1) true wisdom, (2) good affections and (3) good works. True wisdom is to advise and to use good means. This arises from “faith in the Word of God.” Citing Psalm 98, Perkins notes that it is from the meditation on God’s testimonies that good affections come. From meditation comes the right ordering of the soul.\(^100\) The relationship between meditation and the ordering of the soul is to bring together the senses, the emotions and

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\(^96\) Ryrie, *Being Protestant*, 221.
\(^97\) Rogers, *PC*, 235.
\(^98\) Ibid., 51.
\(^99\) Ibid., 163.
the intellect.\textsuperscript{101} Perkins sees meditation on the example of Christ as crucial for preparing for the next life.\textsuperscript{102} What we see in both of these sixteenth century thinkers is that meditation either is a means or directs people to the means of ordering their lives and souls to the telos, this being “heaven.” There is still a eudaemonistic structure here, and it mirrors what we have seen in Aquinas in the relationship of discursive reasoning in meditation towards an end of contemplation in the next life. In our discussion of the virtues in the next chapter, we will see that the means that bring about the ordering of the soul are taken very seriously in considering the good spiritual and moral life.

In the seventeenth century, there is still a very eudaemonistic emphasis concerning meditation. Like Perkins nearly a century before, White notes that meditation is not just studying. Studying may make one a smart individual, but meditation makes one holy.\textsuperscript{103} We will now move from looking at authors in the sixteenth century to looking at those in the seventeenth.

Reynolds makes an interesting distinction between thought and meditation. The distinction is based upon the object of thought, as seen above. Reynolds, drawing from Aristotle, notes that the object of the appetite is the “stimulant of practical thought,” which may be a real or apparent good.\textsuperscript{104} Reynolds writes,

\begin{quote}
By reason of all their quickness and volubility, and withal, their continuall interchanges and successions, are the most numberlesse operations of the Soule of man: where, by thoughts, I understand those springings and glances of the heart, grounded on the sudden representation of sundry different objects; for when the Minde begins once to be fixed and standing, I call that rather Meditation than Thought.\textsuperscript{105}
\end{quote}

This multiplicity of thought is grounded “first upon the abundance of their objects and quicknesse and activity of Apprehension.” Abundance of thought “includes all the variety of species belonging to other faculties,” which is called \textit{prima philosophia}, drawing in and sorting objects, or, as Aristotle would put it, discerning and studying particulars.\textsuperscript{106}

With regard to contemplation, Reynolds makes a very Aristotelian move, dividing the rational part of the soul into two further parts. In Aristotle these parts are the scientific

\textsuperscript{101} Martz, \textit{Poetry of Meditation}, 2.
\textsuperscript{102} Perkins, \textit{CC}, 37.
\textsuperscript{103} White, \textit{Method}, 4.
\textsuperscript{104} Aristotle, \textit{DA}, 433a16–26.
\textsuperscript{105} Reynolds, \textit{TPFS}, 22.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid. More on Reynolds saying meditation is a highest good, 202-204.
(ἐπιστημονικόν), “whose principles cannot be otherwise,” and calculative (λογιστικός), which contemplates about “variable things.”

This first part of the rational soul Reynolds calls the “mental” part, which is the “high, pure, and abstracted delights, or the like agitations of the supreme part of the Understanding.” Reynolds writes that “Aristotle calleth nous, the Latins, Mens, or Apex amini; which are the most simple actions of the Mind, where in is the least intermixion or commerce with inferior and earthly faculties.” These motions are “grounded first on an extrodinarie knowledge, either of Vision and Revelation, or of an exquisite naturall apprehension,” which are beyond “usuall industrie.”

Vision however, Reynolds calls with the “schoole-men extasie and rapture,” which is what the authors of scripture had when they were inspired with heavenly revelation. The joy of this vision is “unspeakable” and gives “peace past understanding.” The mind, the purest and most abstract part of the soul, is where men can get a glimpse of the “future Glory.” This is where “Aristotle hath placed his greatest fellicite in the contemplation of the highest and divinest Truths; which he makes to be the object of that supreame part of the Soule.”

He further states,

[All bodily cognoscitive Faculties doe suffer offence and dammage from the too great excellency of their object... But understanding on the contrary side is perfected by worthiest contemplations, and the better inabled for lower enquiries. And therefore Aristotle in his Ethicks, placeth the most compleat happinesse of man in those heavenly intuitions of the mind, which are fastened on the divinest and most remote objects; which in Religion is nothing else, but a fruition of that beatificall vision (which, as farre as Nature goes, is call’d the contemplation of the first cause) and an eternall satiating the soule with reholding the Nature, Essence, and glory of God.

The category of ‘mental’ is more like the understanding, in that the understanding is no longer in process, as reason is still moving towards something, namely knowledge and understanding. Subjects that are wider than those concerning the body are moral and contemplative actions of the mind, are able to be relieved from sense and are therefore capable of the purest delights. As with Aquinas, Reynolds believes that this

107 Aristotle, EN, 1139a1–17.
108 Reynolds, TPFS, 36.
109 Ibid. It is interesting here that Reynolds writes that Aristotle calls this distinction nous, but this is not the term that Aristotle uses as shown above. However, conceptually Reynolds is making the same point here as nous...
110 Reynolds, TPFS, 36-7.
112 Reynolds, TPFS, 202.
contemplation is “always endued with the greatest wisdome.” As we have seen in Aquinas, wisdom is a central concept in the doing of theology, a theme we saw in the sixteenth century and will continue to see in the seventeenth century. Reynolds, in agreement with another seventeenth century voice, Joseph Hall, states, “He is the best scholler that reasons least, and assents most.” A contemporary of Reynolds, William Fenner, thought that one becomes zealous—has all one’s passions to the furthest extreme—through frequent meditation, thus showing a relationship between contemplation and the lower parts of the soul.

Moving slightly later in the seventeenth century, Richard Baxter too sees the object of thought as an important aspect of meditation and further relates it to the lower sensitive part of the soul, as does Fenner above. In meditation, there are distinctions between the act and the object. The meditation that Baxter is encouraging his readers towards “is discerned from all other sorts of Meditation…and the difference is taken from the Act, and from the Object.” Through sanctified dispositions, habits and powers, by the “supernatural renewing Grace of the Spirit,” a person is “enabled to action.” This meditation is “the acting of the powers of the Soul.” As with Reynolds and Fenner, Baxter is integrating meditation and the parts of the soul. The soul is rational and differs “from the cogitations of the Soul as sensative; the sensative soul hath a kind of meditation by the Common sense,” but all powers of the soul must be engaged. This is not the meditation of students, “which usually the meer imploymet of the brain.” It is not just thinking, inventing and memory. It is the “business of a higher and more excellent nature.” The understanding is not the whole soul, and can therefore not do all the work. “As God hath made several parts in man, to perform their several offices for his nourishing and Life; so hath he ordained the Faculties of the Soul to perform their several Offices for his spiritual life.” The understanding must take the truth, “prepare [it] for the

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113 Ibid., 37.
114 Hall, MV, 140.
115 Fenner, TA, 190. It should be noted that there is a certain wisdom that a person without grace can have, but this not the wisdom that is given at baptism (conversion). See, Aquinas, ST, I 45; I–II 111 1 and 5; II–II 45.5; Aumann, “Appendices,” 112–3.
116 Baxter, SER, 655.
117 Ibid. Dispositions do not please God, actions do. We can see that (1) acting implies a disposition and (2) this is only for those who have received grace.
will, and it must receive them, and commend them to the Affections.” But, as we saw earlier, much like Reynolds, such meditations could not be without their object of contemplation, which is heavenly rest, “the most blessed estate of man in his everlasting enjoyment of God in heaven.” In fact, help for meditation is to “be convinced once that thou hast no other happiness [than heaven], and then be convinced that happiness is there.” We must believe that heaven is the “chiefest good” and this must “sink into our affections.”

Baxter’s position seems very similar to Augustine’s, as found in Contra Faustum Manichaeum, where he defines sin as a transgression of the eternal law, which is the divine reason or will of God. In order for man’s soul to stay superior to the body, Augustine describes the traditional three-part soul. Contemplation is through faith, in this world, but through sight in the afterlife. To keep the natural order (the eternal law) is to restrain the moral affections and keep them within the limits of reason. We should also draw attention to the similarity between Baxter and Aquinas in terms of faith and sight, as looked at above.

Also like Aquinas, for Richard Baxter and Joseph Hall meditation is spiritual, not philosophical. The soul “must bee purged in order to meditate.” Everyone meditates; we can either do it well or not. Some people meditate on the sea or on things that grow

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118 Ibid., 656. “This is it that hath deceived Christians in this business; They have thought that Meditation is nothing but the bare thinking on Truths, and the rolling of them in the understanding and memory, when every School-boy can do this, or Person that hate the things which they think on.” Drawing on Bernard (in cant. ser.46), contemplation has two “Accesses”; the first is of “Intellection [and] the other of the affections.” p. 657; 654.

119 Ibid., 658–9. For Baxter, there do seem to be penultimate objects in the affections. He writes, “when thy meditation hath thus proceeded about the Truth of thy happiness, the next part of the work is to meditate of the goodness; That when the Judgment hath determined, and Faith hath apprehended, it may then pass on to raise the Affections.” The “first affection to be acted is Love,” which has goodness as its object. The next Grace or Affection to be excited is Desire. “The object of it is Goodness considered as absent, or not yet attained.” This is related to love. The next affection is hope. After hope, the next affection is courage, “[w]hich leadeth to resolution, and concludes in Action.” And finally, the last affection is joy, which “is the end of all the Rest, love, Desire, Hope, and Courage, do all end to the resting of our joy. This is so desirable to every man by Nature, and it so essentially necessary to the constitution of happiness.” 644; 687-98.

120 Ibid., 638; 639.


122 Hall, ADM, 24–5; 65. Hall, at least twice in this treatise notes that what he is writing is drawing upon the tradition. He cites an unknown monk “112” years earlier as well as Origin, Augustine, Bernard, Hugo, Bonaventure and Gerson. Baxter, SER, 26.
out of the earth, some others meditate on politics, but “[w]hile they would bee acquainted with the whole world, they are strangers at home; and while they seeke to know all other things, they remaine unknowne of themselves,” and the God that made them.\footnote{Hall, \textit{ADM}, 65–67.}

However, like Aquinas, Baxter is happy to say that meditation and study need not to be confined strictly to theological topics, as long as those topics bring the one meditating back to theology. Just as there is a difference between rational animals and sensitive animals, there is a difference between a “noble” and a “base” man. The noble Christian man differs from the world because of his consistent meditation on higher things, “this lies especially in a higher and more heavenly frame of Spirit.” He continues:

[S]o is he the most choice and goodly Christian, whose head and heart are thus the highest. Men of noble birth and spirits, do mind high and great affairs, and not smaller things of low poverty: Their discourse is of counsels and matters of state, of the government of the common-wealth and publick things: and not of the Country-mans petty imployments.\footnote{Baxter, \textit{SER}, 586.}

The above statements by Baxter resemble Aristotle. First, because it is the place of nobility and those of higher social position to meditate and be contemplative; second, because of the kinds of things that are contemplated by these kinds of nobility, namely God and politics. Baxter does say a few pages later that it is a dishonor to God when we \textit{only} meditate on the things of this world or with the reason of this world. It is a dishonor to him when we feed only on this world.\footnote{Ibid., 607.} This statement sounds like what we have already seen in Aquinas, that reason can only get humankind so far. “There is nothing worth our minding, but Heaven, and the way to Heaven.”\footnote{On this same page, in a footnote, Baxter tilts his Aristotelian-Thomist hand by making reference to the fact that those “divers religions, and manners of serving God, which are or may be in the World, they seem to be the most noble, and to have the greatest appearance of truth, which without great external and corporal service (such as Popish superstitions and formalities are) draw the soul into self, and raise it by pure Contemplation to admire and adore the Greatness and infinite Majesty of the first cause of all things, and the essence of essences, with any great declaration of determination thereof, acknowledging it to be Goodness, Perfection, and infiniteness, wholly incomprehensible.”} Baxter anticipates the question of meditating on church and state and replies that “they are considered, as the providences of God, and as they tend to the settling of the Gospel, and the Government of Christ, and so to the saving of our own, and our posterities Souls, they are well worth our diligent observation? But these are only their relations to eternity.”\footnote{Baxter, \textit{SER}, 616.}
Hall does not quite seem to be in agreement with Baxter here. Philosophy, even political philosophy, it seems, cannot be the primary means of meditation because of how closely Hall relates meditation to prayer. The disagreement between Baxter and Hall is that, where Baxter leaves some room for meditating on creation and politics to be a good subordinate to heavenly meditation, Hall sees only heavenly meditation as the only proper means of meditation. For Hall, the most direct and best-fitting way of exercising meditation is to think upon “those matters in Diviniitie, which can most of all worke compunction in the hart, & most stirre us up to devotion.” Hall gives an extensive, two and a half-page list of things appropriate to meditate on, all of which are theological concerns. His list encompasses everything from Christology and soteriology to ecclesiology and angelology. Richard Rogers, nearly a century earlier, also gives a list of appropriate things to meditate on, which includes “any part of Gods word: on God himselfe, his wisdome, power; his mercie, or of the infinite varietie of good things which we recieve of his free bountie; also of his workes and judgements; or on our estate, as our sinnes, and the vilenes of our corruption, that wee yet Carrie about us, our mortalitie, of changes in this world, or of our deliverance from sinne, and death.” In both these sixteenth and seventeenth century thinkers, there is an emphasis on wisdom.

When meditation is done correctly, it is the means by which one obtains wisdom and is a step towards contemplation in which we shall see God. Hall continues stating,

Yet neither could this glory make us happy, if being thus absolute, it were not perpetual. To bee happie, is not so sweet a state, as it is miserable to have been happie. Lest ought therefore should bee wanting beholde, this felicitie knoweth no end, feareth no intermission, and is as eternall for the continuance, as hee that had not beginning.

As in the previous chapter and above, Hall is stating here that happiness is the vision of God and that happiness would be miserable if we thought that it could be taken away. But we are assured that it will last for eternity, as God himself is eternal. The fruits, or

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128 Hall, ADM, 78.
129 Hall, ADM, 70–3.
130 Rogers, PC, 236. Rogers also gives rules for meditation; See p. 240
131 Hall, ADM, 56; 62.
132 Ibid., 26.
133 Ibid., 117–8.
end, of meditation are joy and happiness.\footnote{Ibid., 106–10.}

John Owen seems to agree with Hall when he challenges his readers not to contemplate on things that are perishing but rather on the “astonishing dispensation” of Christ in the incarnation: “its Excellency, Glory, Beauty, Depths, deserve the flower of our enquireies, the vigor of our spirits, the substance of our time; but when withal, our Life, our Peace, our Joy, our inheritance, our Eternity, our ALL lies herein, shall not the thoughts of it always dwell in our hearts, always refresh and delight our souls?”\footnote{Owen, \textit{Comm.}, 90.}

As seen above in other seventeenth century Puritans, meditation begins in the understanding, but for Hall it “endeth in the affection; It begins in the braine, decends to the heart; begins on earth, ascends to Heaven; Not suddenly, but by certaine staires, till we come to the highest.”\footnote{Hall, \textit{ADM}, 85; Hall in this treatise (p. 87-8) draws a very detailed diagram depicting the relationship between the understanding and the emotions in meditation; see also, Martz, \textit{Poetry of Meditation}, 62; 334.} Though meditation is more about affections than understanding, both are necessary.\footnote{Hall, \textit{ADM}, 9.} The use of reason in meditation makes its way to our sensitive soul and emotions. “A man is a man by his understanding part: but hee is a Christian by his will and affections.” Here we see Hall drawing upon a three-part soul to make sense of how meditation begins with our minds and makes its way to our passions. He continues stating,

\begin{quote}
[A]ll our former labour of the braine, is only to affect the heart, after that the minde hath thus traversed that point proposed throught all the heads of reason, it shall indeavour to find in the first place feeling touch, and sweete rellish in what which it hath thus chewed; which fruite, through the blessing of God will voluntarily follow upon a serious Meditation.\footnote{Ibid., 150–1.}
\end{quote}

Meditation is never done without the passions; by them we get more light to our knowledge and more heat to our affections, more life to our devotion.\footnote{Hall, \textit{ADM}, 3.} Hall even notes that meditation is a matter of continence, that is, the reasons right ruling over the passions. Our reason needs to stay focused and cannot be distracted.\footnote{Ibid., chap. 8; 37.}
It is clear that meditation and contemplation, with God’s help, contribute to happiness. For Richard Baxter a joyful mind is a heavenly mind. If people neither sincerely meditate nor live a life of heavenly contemplation, then he thinks that it is right to wonder whether they walk uncomfortably, live in sorrows and “know not what the Joy of the Saints means.” A person cannot have comforts from God and never think of him. Close meditation on the matter and cause of our joy is God’s way for us to procure our solid rational joy. “Learn the art of heavenly mindedness, and thou shalt find increase an hundred fold, and the benefit abundantly exceed thy labor.” Meditation is not only a means to an end; it motivates us towards that end. “The diligent keeping of your Hearts on Heaven, will preserve the vigor of all your Graces, and put life onto all your Duties. It is the heavenly Christian, that is the lively Christian; It is our strangeness to Heaven that makes us so dull: it is the end that quickens all the means: And the more frequently and clearly this end sincerely beheld, the more vigorous will all our motion be.”

In conclusion, with regard to the development of meditation in Puritan thought, we can see that Puritans in both centuries emphasize contemplation on the vision of God, which is the object or telos of meditation. We have also seen that in both centuries, Puritans accentuate meditation as a means to the end of contemplation. In addition, meditation that takes place in the rational soul makes its way down to the sensitive soul to effect and affect the passions. Baxter emphasizes that our natures want worship and knowledge of God. As Perkins puts it, the glory of heaven consists, in part, in that we shall “behold the face of god, which is his glorie and maiestie.” In some cases, like Rogers and Hall, the same methodological principles are encouraged.

There are some differences within Puritan thought. Baxter believes that reflection on nature along with scripture is an acceptable help while others, like Hall and Owen, disagree. We can also see that the seventeenth century thinkers become much more

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141 God must help the means that move towards heaven; see Baxter, SER, 589; Hall, MV, 81.
142 Baxter, SER, 588.
143 Ibid., 590.
145 Baxter, SER, 86.
146 Perkins, GC, 336.
systematic in their discussion of how the parts of the soul interact in meditation and of the specific effects that this interaction has on the movement towards the end.

We have seen that there are many important similarities between Aristotle, Aquinas and the sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans in their thought on contemplation in the good life. First, there is the drawing upon the parts of the soul to make distinctions regarding how meditation affects the whole of a person. Second, contemplation in heaven is the telos of reason, and is thus a significant part of the telos of humankind, because we are rational animals and need to do things that are fit for our natures and contemplation is central to good reasoning. Third, we have also seen that for both Aquinas and the Puritans, meditation is theological formation. Rather than being divorced from theological reflection, the life of meditation is the life of theology. Puritans certainly place high value on the importance of meditation and contemplation in the Christian life. The blessed life, notes Perkins, consists in the knowledge of God through God himself and his works. What should be noted is that Weber’s broad-stroke assessment of the Puritans as not valuing inactive contemplation in light of daily work is false, an issue that will be brought up in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.

While all these authors focus on the importance of meditation and contemplation, they are also mindful of the potential interpretations and outcomes of their teaching. These protestant writers do not want to be understood as saying that people should leave their vocations to live a contemplative life. SER, as we have seen, has a strong emphasis on meditation and the mystical life, but when Giles Fermin accused Baxter of encouraging people to leave their work for the contemplative life, Baxter had to make a few clarifications to his work and thought.

Controversially, Baxter writes that meditation “is not for any man in an Active life, because not everyone has time for it.” An appeal to moderation, which will be addressed further in the next chapter, is made when Baxter argues that extremes are to be avoided. One should not leave labors and responsibilities in order to meditate. No such duty is a duty at all times. One should only do as much meditation as one’s labors and

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147 Ibid., 1.
148 Weber, Protestant Ethic, 158.
149 Ladell, Baxter, 135.
150 Baxter, DHM, 4. This is like Aquinas at the beginning of SCG. 4
callings allow. Meditation is not necessary for salvation. The amount of meditation is related to the availability of the person to do it, but there is still a duty in certain aspects of the practice. It is important to spend enough time in meditation so that one can reach one’s telos. “Heavenly mindedness is essential to holiness,” and meditations and self-reflection are “much the exercise of heavenly mindedness.” Though people should not leave their jobs to become monks, it is every person’s duty to exercise meditation. Hearts and souls need time to habituate meditation.

We are beginning to feel a tension in Puritan thought of which Weber is at some level aware. It should seem strange that these theologians, who emphasize so fervently the importance of the active life, insist so much on a life of meditation and contemplation. This leads us to question whether the Puritans can hold the tension between the theoria described above in their thought and the praxis for which they are so well known. Does contemplation take precedence, like theological and philosophical thought prior to the Reformation, or does the Puritan emphasis on the place of work and practical action thus become the impetus for much Modern thought on the topic? This question will motivate the next portion of this chapter. Do the Puritans emphasize the theoretical life over the practical or vice versa? Or do they attempt to sustain a balance?

Praxis

We have seen throughout this chapter that reason and contemplation are an important aspect of the moral life for the Puritans. M. M. Knappen notes in the introduction to Two Elizabethan Puritan Diaries that the first Puritan duty was “spiritual meditation” which seemed “to have been stressed more than any other.” However, all duties “were considered important.” We will see that these include duties within one’s calling and vocation. This presents our investigation with a problem. What is the relationship between the active and the contemplative life in Puritan theology?

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151 Ibid.
152 Ibid., 8–9. Baxter makes a special point to say that magistrates should not leave their post to only meditate.
153 Ibid., 16.
154 Ibid., 7.
155 Ibid., 19–20; 22; Baxter, SER, 611.
This section will first look at this relationship in Aristotle and Aquinas to see how these very influential voices in Puritan thought saw the relationship between these two forms of life. We will then look at the Puritans themselves to see what they have to say about the relationship between the active and contemplative life. Finally, this chapter will finish with a discussion of the circumstances under which, for the Puritans, people may stop the active life.

Work in Aristotle and Aquinas

In the thought of both Aristotle and Aquinas, there is an attenuating of the practical life. For Aristotle, and the Greeks in general, work is not of high value. As mentioned briefly in Chapter 2, a life of simply chasing pleasure only is not sufficiently human, and as mentioned above, the human person most fulfills their natural telos by a life of thought and speech, a life that is in its nature higher. A life dedicated to war and politics is a very high life, but it cannot be happiness because they require trouble and further ends which deprive us of leisure.157

As seen above, for Aquinas, the beatific vision, which can only be achieved in the next life, is the true telos of intellect: reason being the chief feature of humanness. True felicity is only in contemplation.158 Productive work in this life only meets the needs of this life and has no lasting spiritual value and hinders people’s relation to God. Meditation requires a quiet life apart from the active life related to neighbors and other virtuous activity.159 It is impossible for a person to be part of both the active and the contemplative life.160 Giving oneself to the contemplative life and not to the service of neighbors is proof of one’s love for God.161 The supererogatory life of contemplation is not required unless a person binds it upon him or herself, and the persons who do not bind themselves to this life are not in danger of forfeiting their perfection. One can reach an end by many means. Christians can lawfully engage in secular business, choose a life of manual labor or not.162

An active life can have a number of dimensions, for Aquinas. There is a certain active aspect to the contemplative life that is the activity of “quieting and directing the

158 Aquinas, SCG: Providence Part I, III.37.9.
160 Aquinas, ST, II. I 182.3.
161 Ibid., II. I 182.1–2.
162 Ibid., II. I 186.2; 187.2; 3.
internal passions of the soul.” This is, however, not the kind of active life associated with secular business and vocation, but an active life oriented by the theoretical life. There is also the active life that comes along with the giving of oneself to certain religious orders. The activities of these religious orders are to serve one’s neighbor. In Aquinas, we can see that the active life is not altogether a negative life: there is in fact some optimism related to labor and the service of one’s neighbor. However, priority is definitely given to a purely contemplative life, as all human functions subserve contemplation. Though it was acceptable to be part of a ‘secular priesthood’—those monks who dealt with ordinary people and their lives—a life of contemplation, free from material concerns, was considered the best kind of life because it prepared them for their encounter with God.

**Puritans**

The Puritans strive as much as possible to achieve moderation between the contemplative and active life. It is in the relationship between these lives that we begin to see a slip happen between the Puritans and their predecessors. The Puritans, with their emphasis on the development of virtue through reason, meditation culminating in contemplation in the beatific vision, are also striving to reach a balance with an emphasis on the active life. In this section, we will seek to investigate the Puritan perspective between these two kinds of lives.

The contemplation that will be discussed here in the Puritan context is that of meditation as discussed above, not in the sense of the beatific vision that is found in the afterlife. For the Puritans, work and earthly labor cannot be contrasted with the work of the heavenly vision of God, which they hold to be vastly superior. The comparison in the discussion to come is between the people's daily work and vocation and the meditation and study that the doing of theology requires.

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164 Max Stackhouse, “Vocation,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics*, ed. Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 194–6; Lawrence, *Medieval Monasticism*, 3; Os Guinness, *The Call: Finding and Fulfilling the Central Purpose of Your Life* (Nashville: Word, 1998), 33. It would be too broad a generalization to say that this was the case for all orders of monasticism during this time. As alluded to above, there were secular orders that dealt with lay persons' concerns, other orders, like the Benedictine Order, were dedicated to missionary work and teaching, which are not technically 'secular.'
Howard Curzer’s reading of the debate between dominant and inclusive ends is helpful for giving texture to the Puritans’ position between *theoria* and *praxis*. For Curzer, the “secondary happy life” of courage, temperance and liberal acts, together with appropriate passions, desires and beliefs, is an ethical life. What is contested between intellectualists who hold the dominant view (Kenny) and those who hold an inclusive view (Ackrill, Irwin) is the *supreme* happy life. Curzer thinks that the “contemplator feels and does just what the ethical person feels and does, but also strives to understand things just for its own sake.” The person who contemplates does not have a life that is less morally virtuous; rather, it is a life in which the virtuous person is more mindful of universals as well as being an ethical person. Both the ethical person and the contemplative person are the doers of morally virtuous activities.

For example, take P₁, who does a number of virtuous activities and has habituated certain dispositions of their intellect and passions by the use of reason. However, this person likes to spend ‘all’ (the use of ‘all’ here will be important later in this discussion) their leisure time playing video games and watching films. Take that P₂ does all the same virtuous activities and has habituated all the necessary dispositions just like P₁. However, the difference between these two people is that P₂ contemplates while doing the virtuous activity and also in their spare time “because trying to understand things is what makes them happy.” P₁ is more concerned with knowledge as far as it is useful; P₂ cares about useful knowledge, but also cares about ‘theory,’ even if it is not practically useful.

There is a sense of recognition in P₂ that is not present in P₁, which Josef Pieper illuminates. Pieper emphasizes that all practical activity serves something other than itself. This is not to say that the active life has not felicity of its own which is the practice of prudence, but this practice is not the end. The whole of political life is to attain contemplation. P₁, according to Pieper, inverts the right order of things, making *praxis* the end.

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165 My use of Curzer here is not to promote his interpretation of the debate as it relates to Aristotle, but rather to give some clarity to the Puritans’ position.
167 Ibid., 394.
169 Ibid., 95.
170 Ibid., 94; MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 158.
The views of Curzer and Pieper above help to give some structure to the Puritan position that we will see below. What both of the above authors are trying to emphasize is that there is a reading of Aristotle and Aquinas that allows for one to be Aristotelian, or Thomist, and have a working relationship between *theoria* and *praxis*. We will also see below that the Puritan position resembles what Curzer is arguing for above.

To begin our discussion on the relationship between the active and the contemplative life for the Puritans, we will look at Richard Baxter’s response to criticisms raised against *Saints Everlasting Rest* by Giles Firmin. Baxter’s short work *Duty of Heavenly Meditation* is a reply to Firmin.

Baxter argues the priority of work over meditation and that people should do as much meditation as their labors and callings allow.\textsuperscript{171} Baxter even goes so far as to say that a life of meditation is not for everyone, because not everyone has time for it.\textsuperscript{172} This resembles a very similar comment made by Aquinas in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*: some people are unable to pursue truth because of “the necessities imposed upon them by their daily lives.”\textsuperscript{173} A person should not leave their labors and responsibilities to meditate. “No such duty is a duty at all times,”\textsuperscript{174} writes Baxter.

In order to clarify his position, Baxter describes the relationship between meditation and the active life. Firstly, “[h]eavenly mindedness is essential to holiness” and it is meditation that exercises the heavenly mind. The order of meditation is understanding, then application. Prayer is a duty, but there are limits to the frequency with which one should do it, based upon other responsibilities, for example family.\textsuperscript{175} A life devoted to meditation is not for everyone, it is every person’s duty to exercise meditation, but, as mentioned above, Baxter does not think that meditation is necessary for salvation. The amount of meditation one should do is related to one’s availability to do it, even though there is still a duty in certain aspects of the practice.\textsuperscript{176} This is a matter of degrees: everyone should meditate, but some should do it more, depending on their availability.

\textsuperscript{171} Baxter, *DHM*, 4.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} Aquinas, *SCG: God*, 1.IV.3.
\textsuperscript{174} Baxter, *DHM*, 4.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 7–8. (Gives more detail on p. 7)
The duty of meditation is to spend enough time in meditation to habituate ourselves to reach the 'telos.' This closely follows the discussion in the following chapter on using reason to habituate dispositions and states towards our final end, and, as we have seen above, the object and profitableness of meditation is that it guides to “ultimate ends” that are loved for themselves; meditation is our ‘light.’ By extension, part of meditation is self-examination, to ‘know thy self’ (in the more Greek vernacular). In this way, it is even profitable for the unbeliever to practice meditation. Also, as we will see in Chapters 4 and 5, meditation needs to be moderated. Even though it is a duty, too little or too much of it is a sin. Wolterstorff comments that the distinguishing feature of the Christian life is the “rhythmic alternation” between worship and work. This view is most representative of Baxter, and broadly of the Puritans.

Baxter’s response to Fermin here frames well the rest of Puritan thought on the relationship between contemplation and meditation, with very few exceptions. We will now begin to broaden our discussion to look at other authors, while also looking at how meditation and vocation interact in daily life.

For Perkins, prayer is important for sanctifying our calling. We should not only pray for the pardon of sin but also for the blessing of God on our work. Treatise 7, in Chapter 4 of Richard Rogers’ Seven Treatises, is dedicated to the relationship between meditation and work. For Rogers, meditation and work are inextricably tied. One goes with the other. Concerning daily meditation getting in the way of our daily work and callings, thus leading to less work and greater poverty, Rogers writes,

Godly thirst, and Christian gaining, and lawfull prospering in the world, doe arise from hence: when a man doth so goe to worke in the world, and follow his dealings, that he be sure, that he goeth about them with a minde which is at peace with God, and well ordered, this is, guided by him; and when he doth faithfully and devoutly commend himself and his affaires everyday to Gods providence, and rest therein quietly; & when he doth as it were arme himself with circumspect heed-taking and wise regard, that he behave not himselfe prophanely in the world, nor after the manner of men, but according to that which is written.

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177 Ibid., 16; 19.
178 Ibid., 25; 31.
179 Ibid., 29; Self-examination is also a strongly emphasized feature of Calvin’s theology in The Institutes that is picked up in Perkins. See, Perkins, GC; Calvin, Institutes.
181 Perkins, ATV, 107.
182 Rogers, PC, 579.
Rogers is implying here, and goes on to say, that if one begins one’s day with godly duties, one’s work and callings will prosper. There is an order of priority. Prosperous work follows from daily devotions and meditation. He whose “mind may stil attend upon God by faith, goeth about it prosperously, & shal find his successes answerable.” Callings and work do not keep people from godliness.

Reynolds is concerned about individuals taking on too many activities in their lives and emphasizes the importance of fellowship and society in the Christian life. He writes that though contemplation is an excellent thing, we should not “divide ourselves into parts.” Everyone should execute their proper function: “so to attend upon mear mentall notions, as to neglect the practicall part of our Life, and withdrew our selves from the fellowship and regard of humane society, is as wicked in Religion, as it would be in Nature monstrous to see a fire burne without light.” Performing our particular callings is a duty that is proof of grace on us, this grace being “patience, righteousness, hope, faith, love,” which are helps to becoming “well ordered” to do other holy duties in life. It is because of our particular callings “that wee may shew forth the vertues,” that God has given, which would remain hidden if not for particular callings. Those who desire to separate themselves from secular communities and from “earthly callings and dealings” for the sake of devotion have been deceived by the devil. Contempt for the world does not mean leaving earthly callings. Telling others of the happiness you have is part of the proof of conversion.

In summary, circling back to Baxter, our callings and our providentially appointed places within the polis are essential for a life dedicated to Christ. Baxter, while discussing the importance of prayer and meditation as callings that should be done, writes, “the labours of your calling must be painfully followed,” but servants and the poor who have a harder time providing for their families “may not lawfully take so much time for prayer, as some others may.” In addition, those who are in public service must not neglect their

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183 Ibid., 577.
184 Ibid., 581.
185 Reynolds, TPFS, 207.
186 Rogers, PC, 61.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid., 63.
political callings for the sake of devotion, meditation and prayer. We see here that the activities of the meditative life are of the utmost importance, but not to the expense of caring for oneself, others and the community. Baxter elsewhere encourages his readers to be laborious and diligent in their callings: “Both precepts and necessity call you unto this: And if you cheerfully serve him in the labour of your hands, with heavenly and obedient mind, it will be as acceptable to him, as if you had spent all that time in more spiritual exercises: For he would rather have obedience than sacrifice.”

Lee Hardy comments that contemplation will always be a Christian vocation. As we have seen from the first portion of this chapter, the Puritans would whole-heartedly agree with this statement. Reason, meditation and contemplation are essential aspects of the Christian experience as long as those politics and ecclesial responsibilities that are appointed by God on the individual, either ontologically or by one’s stations in life, are not neglected. Like Aquinas above, the Puritans order the love of God above the love of one’s neighbor, but the way that they conceive of this order taking place is by the love of the neighbor having equal value and effect in loving God as has meditation and earthly contemplation, rather than by either of these taking priority.

In this section, we have first looked at Howard Curzer’s interpretation of the ‘inclusive’ versus ‘dominant’ debate, in order to give some modern shape to the Puritans’ thought. Curzer emphasizes that the best life requires both forms of life. For the Puritan, the priority of these two forms of life rests with contemplation. This takes precedence, as it is more conducive to our created natures to be rational beings and to meditate on the things of God. However, this does not get Christians off the hook of having to be involved in the community through their particular callings. There is a sliding scale of the amount of responsibility one carries and time one is obligated to spend in regular meditation. Certain callings leave more time for meditation, while other callings consist almost entirely of contemplation. But in both cases, like Curzer has suggested, both are necessary, especially in those cases where a person thinks, meditates, prays and worships along with their vocations, continually contemplating the reasons why they act in the world. The best life is a life of action by a moral agent who continually practices theoria.

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189 Baxter, CD, 565.
190 Ibid., 619.
Conclusion

In the previous chapter, we began to shape the Puritan notions of the perfection and happiness of humanity that is found in God himself. With slight disagreement as to the amount of happiness that is attainable in this life, the Puritans agreed with Aquinas that perfect happiness is found only in the knowledge of God in the next life.\textsuperscript{192} We also began to get glimpses into what this looks like in particular: the supernatural end as the vision of the divine essence.\textsuperscript{193} This chapter picked up where the previous left off on the discussion of supernatural ends and the form this takes for the Puritans, given their Aristotelian and Thomist leanings. It also began our investigation into the relationship between eudaemonism and theology of work.

We have seen above in the Puritans that the tripartite soul was adopted from the earlier tradition, and this plays a significant role in how human identity was conceived, that is as rational animals. We will pick up this theme even further in the following chapter. We have also seen in the Puritans, however, that there were some disagreements about the particulars of meditation—some resembling Thomism more than others. They all placed high value on the use of the intellect both in this life, through the discursive reasoning of meditation and earthly contemplation of truth, and in the next life, in contemplation in the beatific vision. We also saw that the Puritans attempted to hold together these two forms of life: the life of \textit{teoria} and the life of \textit{praxis}. There was high value put on a political life of serving one’s neighbor through one’s callings.

For Aquinas, the best life was the life of the bishop, who was able to engage in the contemplative life as well as in some amount of ministry.\textsuperscript{194} But there was still a distinction between the mixed life of the bishop and the life of the secular world. It was simply the case that laypersons were not expected to engage with discursive meditation or contemplation. For the Puritans, however, everybody was to meditate and to contemplate; it was part of what it meant to be a Christian. On a Sunday, Christians were to gather together in congregations and with family, to meditate and to contemplate divine truth. This was also to be done in daily prayers and devotions. It was not just the task of those who had elected these obligations for themselves. For the Puritans, when the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{192} Aquinas, \textit{ST}, I–II 3.2; 4.  \\
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., I–II 3.8.  \\
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 188.6. 
\end{flushleft}
workday came, the farmer or the cobbler did not necessarily need to meditate on divine things in their labors, but they were expected to have a rich devotional life. The pastor or academic took on study as their vocation, but this vocation in and of itself was no higher than any other vocation in society. These aspects of the Puritan doctrine of calling, the relationship between meditation and daily labor, will be investigated at length in Chapter 6.

What is emphasized here is that for the Puritans we are rational animals and, in order to flourish in a way that is appropriate to our beings, we need to engage our reason. What we can draw from this chapter is that reason functions in two ways. The first is that there is an important place in the Christian life for the study of theology and that this can take place in a number of different ways, from intense academic engagement to the practice of short daily bible reading. It is part of our earthly flourishing to use our minds to engage with the world that God has created. Also, our being rational animals does not conflict with our daily work and activity. Here we have begun a discussion that will be taken up further in Chapter 5; there is a certain amount of earthly happiness that is obtained through our vocations, but these vocations do not conflict with the contentment that comes with meditating and contemplating God. Finally, since we are rational animals, the supernatural end that is achieved only in the next life is a kind of existence that engages our intellectual capacities through seeing and knowing. The ultimate end, supernatural happiness, is fundamentally related to reason in that to see God is to contemplate him.

In the next chapter, we will extend the discussion of reason and natural and supernatural ends to consider the moral development of persons. This will begin our discussion of the habituation of virtue and how the virtues relate to the political life.
Chapter 4

A ‘Kind of Life’: Rationality, Virtue and Moral Development

Pleasure to me is wonder—the unexplored, the unexpected, the thing that is hidden and the changeless thing that lurks behind superficial mutability. H.P. Lovecraft

Be steady and well-ordered in your life so that you can be fierce and original in your work. Gustave Flaubert

Introduction

In Chapter 2, we began to shape the Puritan notion of the perfection and happiness of humanity that is found in God himself. We found that there is happiness that is attainable in this life, but that the Puritans, agreeing with their scholastic precursors, thought that perfect happiness was found only in the knowledge of God in the next life. In the previous chapter, we extended the discussion of supernatural happiness. Both the Puritans and earlier eudaemonists emphasized the importance of reason, not only in this life but also in the next. We are rational animals and in order to flourish in a way that is appropriate to our being we need to engage our reason. This chapter follows the previous chapters by giving more clarity on the relationship between moral development and the supernatural, and the place of reason.

In this chapter, we will take the first steps to explore a Puritan doctrine of calling by looking at the doctrine generally. This will prepare us to delve deeper into the particulars of Puritan thought both here and in the chapters to come. The movement from the more general aspects of the doctrine of calling to the intricacies of this doctrine will be investigated through the three-part definition given by William Perkins, of which we will explore the first part here: calling as a ‘kind of life’ and character development.

In current virtue ethics, there has been interest in whether the pagan cardinal virtues are incompatible with Christian virtues. We will see where the Puritans adopt or reject Aristotelian pagan virtues. In this chapter, I will first show how a life defined by a character must include the proper development of both the cardinal (pagan) and the theological virtues. Also, like their eudaemonist predecessors, the Puritans conceived of
the virtues in a two-fold manner, drawing a distinction between moral and intellectual virtues. As in previous chapters, we will see that the Puritans, in Thomist fashion, go beyond Aristotle to affirm that the ability for the development and habituation of virtue is tightly connected with the infusion of the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. This occurs alongside the near complete adoption of a conception of the passions as a focal contributor to moral development, in that the sensual part of the soul relates to the reason part.

What we will also see here is that, for the Puritans, divine commands do not necessarily need to be in conflict with ethical naturalism’s desire to speak to the development of character that is based on natural phenomena. We will look here at the first layer of the problem that must be addressed further in this thesis. This chapter’s focus is more universal in nature; that is, it is concerned with the command to all humankind to flourish by developing in character towards a telos that terminates in the vision of God.

**Calling: Particulars and Universals**

Here we are going to begin specifically to look at what is meant in this thesis by ‘calling.’ We will do this by looking at the particular and universal aspects of calling within the Puritan literature.

*Calling and Particulars*

The Puritans investigated here generally take calling, minimally, to be the particularization of the virtues in a moral agent. Additionally, they take the character of calling to be relative to significant accidental intrinsic properties and significant relations to other people, places, and the times of each person in which it is instantiated. These terms, and their specific relation to the Puritans, will be explained in more detail below.

The fact that calling is a particularization of general dispositions, in conjunction with particular properties and relations, allows its character not to be the same in all cases. While the Puritans take calling to be a universal moral good, that is, a good that all people ought unconditionally to pursue, they also take the character of calling to be indexical, meaning that its intension (in particular instances) is contextually sensitive and is determined by the character of the person in whom it is instantiated in a particular context. Calling is a particularization of virtue, so its character is dictated by what it is to be a particular, properly functioning human, and that is not going to be the same across
the board. This will be addressed in much more detail in the following chapter, but before we can continue a discussion on the particularizing of calling, we need to draw our gaze back to the first of two aspects of universal calling.\footnote{Ben Witherington III makes a distinction between calling and vocation, asserting that calling is specifically to become a Christian and does not specify a vocation as work—other than the great commission. Calling is to conversion; vocation is related to work. For the Puritans, this distinction is not made. Rather, as we will see, calling relates to both the call to salvation and one’s calling to a particular work, but vocation typically does not refer to any soteriological action. The term calling is applied to both salvation and vocation within the Puritan literature; see Ben Witherington III, Work: A Kingdom Perspective on Labor (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2011), 32; Hardy, Fabric, 80. In e-mail correspondence with Stanley Hauerwas, he recommended staying away from the language of ‘vocation’ as it has a ‘Lutheran ring.’ I have attempted to take this advice whenever possible in this thesis. Stanley Hauerwas, “Possible Research,” November 24, 2010.}

**Calling and Universals**

Above, I noted that the means by which calling is instantiated will be different from person to person. This is because, whereas the character of the virtues in a person are grounded in that person being of a certain kind, i.e. what she is essentially, calling is grounded in the conjunction of those virtues with the accidental intrinsic properties and relations of a person, i.e. what she is accidentally. Here we move from a description of the particular calling of the individual to a description of one of the two aspects of universal calling: moral development. The virtues that will be addressed throughout this chapter are always the same in character, because their character is dictated by what it is to be a properly functioning human, something that is true generally, for all humans.

We see the above most explicitly in Williams Perkins’ definition of calling. He defines calling as, “a certain kinde of life, ordained and imposed on man by God for the common good.”\footnote{Perkins, *ATV*, 2.} For the rest of the thesis, this definition will function as the organizing principle and I will take each part of the definition in turn. Here, in this chapter, we will discuss what Perkins means by a ‘kind of life.’ What this chapter is specifically concerned with are the modes of being related to the moral development of persons towards the universal *telos* of humankind that was discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3.

With regard to the first phrase of the definition, “kind of life,” Perkins means an “order of leading our lives in this world,” like the monarch governing their country or a man governing his home.\footnote{Ibid.} A ‘kind of life’ is a kind of character of life or being a certain kind of person. In this chapter, we will see that the development and habituation of
character is important for the Puritans. For this reason, being a Christian is important to
doing work well. Robert Bolton states that sometimes “formall hypocriates” have good
vocations, but that this is like a “stage-plaier; who sometimes putteth on roabes and
maiestie of a prince, himself being a base and neglected state.”⁴ Perkins also writes that it
is the heart of the person doing the work that makes that work good, just as when the
publican and the Pharisee went to the temple to pray and the publican left justified while
the Pharisee did not.⁵ We will see this principle (in order for one to do virtuous actions,
one must be virtuous) in more detail later in this chapter. To put it in the Puritan
vernacular, in order for one to be virtuous, one must first be made righteous through
Christ. In the doctrine of calling, there is again an emphasis on this.

In order to look at the particulars of the Puritan conception of virtue, as it relates
to contemporary thought in virtue ethics, we need to briefly widen our scope. In the next
section, we will look at the differences between classical eudaemonism and contemporary
virtue ethics.

*Virtue Ethics and Eudaemonism*

There has been a growing interest in virtue ethics because of the work of
Elizabeth Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre.⁶ Virtue ethics has now received “full
status” as a legitimate ethical theory along with emotivism, utilitarianism and
deontology.⁷ The use of virtues can now be found outside of ethics in other areas of
theology and philosophy, for example biblical studies,⁸ virtue epistemology,⁹ and in social
sciences,¹⁰ for example in psychology. Talbot Brewer, I think humorously, writes, “the
history of ethics looks like a story of progress only if its main texts are read in reverse
chronological order.”¹¹ In one sense I agree with Brewer’s analysis, on the other hand, his

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⁵ Perkins, *ATV*, 78. Also see, 39.
19; Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: UNDP, 1984); Talbot Brewer, *The
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of
¹¹ Brewer, *Retrieval*, 1.
‘reverse chronology’ in not totally accurate as the Puritans can function as a resource for discussions of virtue.

But here we reach an issue. Virtues, and virtue ethics, are not yet very descriptive. These terms could take on a number of different meanings. We are seeing that classical eudaemonism requires much more with regard to ontology and personhood whereas some virtue ethics can be grounded in constructivist historical and social conventions. MacIntyre’s *After Virtue* argues that metaphysics does not need to be an important aspect of virtue ethics. He has since changed his position on this, but many have not moved from his original position. The differences between virtue ethics generally and specifically classical eudaemonism is that the latter requires an in-depth discussion of ontology and personhood.\(^\text{12}\) For example, Michael Slote claims to have created a virtue ethic that is, as he maintains, not dependent upon Aristotle. Christine Swanson’s brand of virtue ethic looks far more like Nietzsche than the Ancients and Medievals. Then there is Jennifer Herdt’s attempt to leave behind a Thomist virtue ethics in favor of Erasmus.\(^\text{13}\) Within the designation of ‘Puritan’ itself, there are distinctions. Jean Porter reads American Puritan Jonathan Edwards as concerned with virtue, but with a strongly Humeian moral-sense approach, placing moral judgments in the realm of sentiment rather than of reason.\(^\text{14}\) Late twentieth century virtue ethics and eudaemonism have several overlapping qualities that at times make them indistinguishable. But there are some slight differences that need to be addressed briefly here before moving on.

Overlapping concerns of both virtue ethics and eudaemonism include character habituation and dispositions to act, feel and respond rightly in a variety of situations. The object is to be able to respond to a situation as a kind of second nature. However, virtue ethics does not necessarily mean that a person is being habituated towards any one particular end or good. It is about good character, not necessarily about teleology. A virtue ethicist can ignore metaphysical concerns and base their virtue and character on cultural

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\(^{12}\) MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 163; 196.


or historical concerns. The virtue ethicist’s grounding for character could be quite relative.

Eudaemonism, on the other hand, as we have already observed, is metaphysically rich and is concerned with the right kind of happiness associated with the kind of thing in question. Virtue, for the eudaemonist, is for the sake of, and thus a constituent of, the happy life. The central question of the virtue ethicist is, “who should I be?” while the central moral question for a eudaemonist is, “what good can I bring into effect, express, attain or realize?” The happiness-based ethic argued for in this thesis places God as the good, the telos and the ultimate happiness. The virtue ethicist’s argument that the goal of their system is to make actions become ‘second nature’ is a bit of a misnomer, as the basis for their character and inclinations does not necessarily have anything to do with ‘nature’ at all. It is essential, at least according to Aquinas, that morality has considerations of human nature and that the virtues fit the appropriate nature of “creatures whose destiny was nothing less than to be friends with God.” Virtue perfects us so that we can follow our natural inclination in the right way.

How does this relate to the Puritans? The Puritan emphasis on happiness and virtues aligns with a tradition that emphasizes that the right kinds of virtues need to fit specific natures, that is, humankind expresses certain virtues in terms of a distinctively human form of goodness based on natural faculties as opposed to strictly cultural or traditional contexts. We will now look more specifically at the Puritans’ adoption of classical eudaemonism in more detail.

**Moral Virtue**

We will here begin to look at how the Puritans conceived of moral development and virtue. We will first describe the finer points of virtue and eudaemonism by looking at Aristotle. We will then extend our horizon to look at Aquinas and the Puritans. We start here by looking at the moral virtue.

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At the very basic level, for the Ancients generally, a virtue is a disposition to do the right thing and to have the right feelings and emotions in various areas of life.\(^{18}\) Aristotle separates virtue, and by extension excellence, into two kinds: intellectual and moral.\(^{19}\) Intellectual excellence requires time, education and experience, while moral excellence requires habit (\(\varepsilon\xi\varsigma\)), which is defined in the *Metaphysics* as “a kind of activity of the haver and the had—something like action or movement.” Having \(\varepsilon\xi\varsigma\) is a “disposition according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, either in itself or with reference to something else.”\(^{20}\) Moral virtues are “dispositions of our emotions which help us respond correctly to practical situations.”\(^{21}\)

None of the moral excellences arise in us by nature “for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature,” that is, if the nature of \(\pi\) is to do \(\gamma\) kinds of things, \(\pi\) cannot be trained to behave like \(\neg\gamma\.\)^{22}\) We are adapted by nature to receive excellences, which we reflect by habit. Things that come to mankind by nature acquire potentiality and later exhibit actuality. “Men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.”\(^{23}\)

For Aquinas, moral virtue is not to deprive the function of the sensitive appetite, but rather to “make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts.”\(^{24}\) Virtue directs the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements. Like Aristotle, Aquinas sees the animal “passions [as] a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil.”\(^{25}\) Also, building on the previous chapter, there must be moral virtues in order for contemplation to take place. This was an emphasis of both Aquinas and the Puritans. The passions must be settled by the reason.\(^{26}\) We will discuss

\(^{19}\) Aristotle, *EN*, 1103a14.
\(^{21}\) Hutchinson, “Ethics,” 206. The moral virtues and the emotions will be addressed at length towards the end of this chapter.
\(^{22}\) Aristotle, *EN*, 1103a20.
\(^{24}\) Aquinas, *ST*, I–II 59.4.
\(^{25}\) Ibid., q.22,a3.
\(^{26}\) Ibid., II–II 180.2.
how the development of virtues relates to the passions in more detail later in this chapter. We now turn to the Puritans on moral virtues.

*Puritans and the Moral Virtues*

The Puritan conception of virtue is very close to the model given above in Aristotle and Aquinas. Perkins, in *The True Manner of Knowing Christ Crucified*, writes that Christ’s benefits to his followers are three-fold: (1) his merit, (2) his virtue and (3) his example. Christ’s virtue, according to Perkins, has a double benefit. The first benefit of Christ’s virtue is that through the “power of his death” God “creates new hearts in all them that beleeve in him, and make them new creations” and begins the process of mortifying and crucifying “the corruptions of our minds, wills, affections.” This first aspect of Perkins’ view of virtue, much like that of Aristotle and Aquinas, has a sense of purifying movement towards some good or end. The second aspect of Christ’s virtue, for Perkins, is the “virtue of Christs resurrection.” Perkins makes clear that this double virtue must be more than speculative; it must be experiential. It is by this experiential sense of Christ’s resurrection that Christians “labour” to kill and mortify sins and “put spiritual life into us.” We must have “spiritual resurrection.” As Christ rose from the grave so are we to do the work of coming out of our graves. “This worke cannot be done at once but by degrees, as God shall give grace.” If resurrection is perfection for Perkins, this statement seems to imply that he sees a progression towards a supernatural end.

It is also interesting that Perkins says that Christ’s example is one of his benefits, as having good examples and moral exemplars are the key ways in which eudaemonists claim moral education occurs. “Emulation” for Aristotle is the “pain” of

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27 Perkins, CC, 11. There are many moral implications to the merit that Christians receive from Christ with regard to political peace and property, to name a few. However, these benefits are outside of the scope of this thesis.

28 Ibid., 23 Emphasis Mine; Campbell, Religion of the Heart, 48.

29 Perkins, CC, 23.

30 Ibid., 24.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 29.

33 Also see R.T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 72; Hall, MV, 164.

The definition might lead one to believe that emulation is a negative thing, resembling something like envy, especially as emulation has an aspect of pain involved with it. Emulation, however, is “a good feeling felt by good people,” while envy is “a bad feeling felt by bad people.” Emulation gives us the desire to secure good things, while envy gives us the desire to stop our neighbor from possessing good things. The person who wants to emulate someone is motivated to improve “so that they may in the end deserve the goods they desire.” The good student of ethics, for Aristotle, is not one who learns only by moral rules or precepts but one who learns “the that” and “the because” of moral action and lives well by observing the prudent and wise person and emulating them. The person of practical wisdom (φρόνιμος) is the rule by which to measure what is fine and pleasant. For Aristotle, practical wisdom, or prudence, is the intellectual virtue that serves the moral virtues by helping the moral virtues to find right and suitable means to their ends.

Aristotle’s ideas about moral education are that “prudence is concerned with particulars as well as universals, and particulars become known from experience, but a young person lacks experience.” That is, someone who reasons excellently on moral matters and is in possession of “the that” and “the because,” both the particular and the universal moral principles, is the picture of virtue at its finest in both the intellect and affect. This person has acquired a disposition to do and to love good by habituating good actions. By engaging her intellect in exploring the reasons behind what makes good actions good, she has further cemented her disposition to do the good by gaining the wisdom to discern the right thing, “for the right end, in the right way, at the right time” in any situation.

Perkins’ use of Christ as a moral exemplar functions in much the same way as Aristotle’s prudent person. Mark McIntosh, in Divine Teaching, gives an example of how the activity of reasoning, studying and observing God begins to actually create habits within the observer. In order for a person to truly study and observe their subject, they

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35 Ibid., 1388a34.
36 Kristjánsson, Emotions, and Education, 105.
37 Ibid., 99–113; Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics.
38 Aristotle, EV, 1142a13–16.
39 Ibid., 1115b17–18.
would have to begin to take on the characteristics of the object of study.\textsuperscript{40} In the same way as McIntosh describes, Christ, for Perkins, is not just a redeemer; upon our reflection on him, he is to show us the “patern of all good duties, to which wee ought to conforme ourselves.”\textsuperscript{41} Citing 2 Corinthians 11:1, Perkins writes, “Christ must be followed in the \textit{practise} of every good duty that may concerne us without exception simply and absolutely.”\textsuperscript{42}

The emphasis on moral exemplars is also found in Baxter. “Reason” he writes, “concludes that for the Best, which is so in the judgment of the best and wisest men.” Baxter believed that God “hides not from his people the end they should aim at and attain” and that one learns to be good by the examples of good and wise people.\textsuperscript{43} God has provided through scripture wise persons, such as Abraham, Moses, the prophets and Christ himself, for us to look. Baxter writes, “If the holiest men are the best and wisest, then their Lives tell you their judgements; and their unwearied labour and sufferings for this Rest, shews you they take it for the perfection of their happiness.” We should not look to “dying men” who are not yet in “their right minds.” Christians appeal to the unerring judgment of Wisdom itself.\textsuperscript{44}

In Perkins and Baxter, we have seen a description of how one becomes virtuous and develops one’s character. These thinkers have emphasized Christ as an exemplar, and in this way, they resemble Aquinas more than they resemble Aristotle. But, as we will see in Chapter 7, in the section on friendship, they also emphasize the importance of community. We will now turn to other characteristics of the moral virtues in Puritan thought.

Continuing our discussion of moral virtues more generally, Robert Bolton writes, “an absolute integritie of all concurrents is required to make a good worke acceptable to God.” He goes on to say that the end intended must be good and for the glory of God.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[41] Perkins, \textit{CC}, 25.
\item[42] Ibid., 26. Christ as an example is also seen in Perkins, \textit{GLE}, 6; Hall also writes, “I will honour good examples, but I will live by good precepts.” Hall, \textit{MV}, 185; For More on Christ as example in Baxter see, Baxter, \textit{CD}, 91.
\item[43] Baxter, \textit{SER}, 60.
\item[44] Ibid., 60–1. It may seem in this passage that Baxter does not recommend the use of philosophy for wisdom. However, he notes later that he is happy using philosophers to do his theology as long as one does not view “Cicero and Aristotle above Christ.” 518.
\end{footnotes}
“The action itself in its own nature must be just and warrantable; the circumstances honest and seasonable; the means direct and lawfull; the fountain, the heart, sincere and sanctified.”

“The moralists,” Bolton writes, “through nature saw a true proportion able to this, even in the actions of virtue. For them it was not just the outward action, but the inward and free and independent uprightness of the mind.” For the ‘moralists,’ an action is truly virtuous if it requires a resolved knowledge, freedom of spirit, habit of the mind and an entire love to the fairness of virtue. Therefore, accidental moral good actions do not have the full weight of a good moral action.

Bolton’s concerns here sound very close to Aristotle’s necessary conditions for good actions. Aristotle shows that an agent must be in a certain condition when he does actions. He must have knowledge; he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sake; and these actions need to come from a firm character. These are the conditions of fully virtuous actions.

Bolton continues, stating that God cares about the heart not just the action and that Pharisees may have deceived themselves into thinking that they were in a state of true happiness. Actions without sincerity of heart are nothing, because they do not come from the inward affection of the worker. Moral virtues and outward performances of religion are good. Bolton does not deny that moral virtuousness is good, and is excellent in itself: “the outward performance of religious duties, and the exercise of the means of our conversion, are necessary.” But these outward “performances” should not be used in order to get applause:

If moral vertuousnesse were able to put on the greatest magnificence, and applause, that ever it anciently enioyed amongst the precisest Romans; whereby it might worthily draw into admiration and iust challenge euene these times of Christianity: yet in respect of acceptance with God, and

45 Bolton, DSTH, 64.
46 Ibid. For Augustine, faith in the incarnation requires that believers reject the concept of an autonomous moral reason in the soul. The source of virtue is Christ, and to accept perfect human virtue can be found only in Christ. Robert Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 72; “For what kind of mistress over the body and the vices can a mind be that is ignorant of the true God and is not subjected to his rule, but instead is prostituted to the corrupting influence of vicious demons?” The virtues must be in relation to God. Augustine, City of God, ed. John O’ Meara, trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), XIX.25.
47 Bolton, DSTH, 64.
48 Ibid., 65.
49 Ibid., 60.
50 Ibid., 14.
However, man is sinful. The best man should not be deceived into thinking that with the “choicest and profoundest learning” or the expression “in action and ciuill honestie,” the “absolute portraiture of Aristotle moral virtues,” he can profess true happiness without “supernaturall illumination, and the divine graces, of faith, love, zeale sinceritie spiritual wisdome, a sanctified contention of spirit.”

I believe that Aristotle would take issue with Bolton’s accusation. For Aristotle, virtue alone does not make one happy; this is, however, the case for the Stoics. In Aristotelian eudaemonism, for true eudaemonia, more than just virtue is required, like external goods of fortune. That happiness requires some wealth is something that the Puritans would generally deny, but then again, so would Aquinas. Drawing upon Aristotle’s distinction between natural and artificial wealth, and disagreeing with his conclusion about wealth, Aquinas shows that external goods are not sufficient for happiness. The Puritans are closer to Aquinas with regard to external wealth and attaining happiness. It still stands that Bolton’s criticism of the person with “Aristotles moral virtues” is not necessarily fair.

For Church of England clergyman John Preston (1587–1628), prayer, which is usually associated with the building of virtue and character, must be done regardless of the way the prayer feels about the authenticity of the prayer itself. Preston argues that “a man by setting himselfe upon the worke,” of actively praying “shall gather a fitnesse, though he were unfit at the first.” The very practice and use of the heart “makes it fit for the duty.”

51 Ibid.; Joseph Hall similarly notes that “a mans best monument is his vertuous actions.” Hall, MV, 82.
52 Bolton, DSTH, 20.
54 Aquinas, ST, 1–II 2.1.
55 Hall makes an interesting comment about wealth and virtue. He states that he “will account vertue the best riches, knowledge the next, riches the worst; and there fore will labour to bee vertuous and learned without condition; as for riches, if they fall in my way, I refuse them not; but if not I desire them not.” Hall, MV, 165.
56 John Preston, The Saints Daily Exercise A Treatise Vnfolding the Whole Dutie of Prayer. Delivered in Fie Sermons Vpon I Thess. 5. 17. By the Late Faithfull and Worthy Minister of Jesus Christ, John Preston, Dr. in Divinity, Chaplaine in Ordinary to His Maiesty, Master of Emmanuel Colledge in Cambridge, and Sometimes Preacher of Lincolnes Inne., ed. John Davenport, Early English Books, 1475-1640 / 1555:01 (London: Printed by W[illiam]
body. “As we see in external riches of the body, none desire them more egerly then those that possesse them; and the more vertuous the Soule of man is, the more is the heart enlarged in the apperition of a greater measure.”

Focusing on the relationship of the passions to the virtues, Reynolds cites Tully, who is in turn quoting the Peripatetics, that the passions are the “sharpeners and…the Whetstones of Virtue, which make it more operative and fruitful: for the Passions stirring up the saints, and quickening the Fancie, hath thereby a direct influence upon habits and manners of the Minde.”

Thomas Goodwin writes in *The Returne of Prayers* that prayer is said to help to keep duties. Prayer keeps man upon the path, keeps him diligent in his duty. If ordnance is just a duty, then just doing the action itself is good enough, but we should be continually looking for the outcomes of these duties. The law of God consists of commands and duties, not to be followed in themselves, but a means to blessing and flourishing. These statements by Goodwin seem to address the issue raised by modern ethicist William Schaller’s ‘standard view,’ which states that the end of virtue is to obey moral rules. This will be discussed in more detail later, in Chapter 7. We have seen above that the Puritans adopted the previous eudaemonist tradition of moral virtues. We will now look at how they discussed the intellectual virtues.

**Intellectual Virtues**

In this section, we will begin by explicating Aristotle’s own thought on intellectual virtues. We will continue by looking at Robert Bolton’s almost wholehearted endorsement of Aristotle on this topic. Though we only focus on Bolton here, other Puritans’ embracing of the intellectual virtues will be discussed at greater length throughout the rest of this chapter. The intellectual virtues are important for the Puritans because of the close relationship that exists between the intellect, or understanding, and the will. Especially,
how the intellect and the will relate to the use of passions in doing right actions.\textsuperscript{62} We shall investigate this in more detail later in this chapter.

Right action, for Aristotle, is an important balance between the passions, with which moral virtues are concerned, and with reason, which is related to the intellectual virtues. Moral excellence is concerned with choice that is “deliberate desire, therefore true reasoning” and true and right desire. The intellectual virtues are important for Aristotle because, as we have seen, humans are rational animals, and humans are at their best when they are doing things that are good for humans to do; namely reasoning. It is good for humans to know the truth about things, and the intellectual virtues help us in the process of learning truth. The only overlapping virtue between the moral and the intellectual virtues is prudence, “whose function is to enable us to know the correct way to behave.”\textsuperscript{63} The intellectual virtues give us the reason necessary in order to achieve a mean state,\textsuperscript{64} which I address in further detail below.

The rational soul has two aspects: (1) scientific, when it contemplates things that cannot be otherwise; and (2) calculative, when it thinks of things that can be otherwise.\textsuperscript{65} Aristotle is interested in finding the function of the scientific and the calculative parts of the reason. Scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), as defined in the Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics, is concerned with deductions concerning nature.\textsuperscript{66} The second intellectual virtue that helps with scientific knowledge is comprehension or understanding (νοῦς), which we have addressed in the previous chapter. Philosophical wisdom (σοφία) is a combination of the two intellectual virtues above and is the “most finished of the form of knowledge.”\textsuperscript{67} Contemplation is the combination of these three virtues.

Aristotle makes a distinction between philosophical wisdom and prudence. Prudence is the ability to “deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself.”\textsuperscript{68} A person who exemplifies prudence knows what is good for her and for people

\textsuperscript{62} For discussion of the relationship between intellect, will, passions and moral and theological virtues see Baxter, \textit{SER}, 437–443.

\textsuperscript{63} Hutchinson, “Ethics,” 206.

\textsuperscript{64} Aristotle, \textit{EN}, 1138b18–25.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 1139a5–17.


\textsuperscript{67} Aristotle, \textit{EN}, 1141a17; 1141b1–3.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 1140a25–27.
in general. Prudence, then, is “concerned with things human and things about which it is possible to deliberate” and things that are “brought about by action.” Aristotle describes the prudent man as one who:

[I]s without qualification good at deliberating [and] is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action.\(^{69}\)

Prudence is not concerned with universals only, but must also consider particulars because particulars are concerned with practice. Just as medicine does not control health, so practical wisdom does not control theoretical reason.\(^{70}\) Thus prudence is of the utmost importance because it is concerned with both universals and particulars, whereas wisdom is only concerned with universals. The fifth intellectual virtue is art or technical skill (\(\tau\′\epsilon\chi\nu\eta\)). This is concerned with bringing something into being, which can be equated with the craft of the shoemaker or medical doctor (who brings health into being). The first three virtues mentioned above (knowledge, understanding, wisdom) are scientific and are about facts in the universe that cannot be altered. The last two virtues (prudence, art) are calculative and are virtues of the mind that can bring about change. Now that a very basic understanding of Aristotle has been given, we can move on to the Puritans to see their particular agreements and disagreements.

**Puritans and the Intellectual Virtues**

In *Discourse of True Happinesse*, Bolton is interested in probing the distinctions between the “formall hypocrite,” who is without saving grace, and the person in the “state of grace.” He is particularly interested to see if the “kinds of perfection, and degrees of goodness; whereof a man as yet unregenerate is capable, and may bee partaker.” He ultimately finds a few differences, one being that “the word and faith in the formall hypocrite have no root,” that is, they are not “rooted and planted in his understanding, conscience, thoughts, affections, and actions.”\(^{71}\) The formall hypocrite does not have the habits which St. Paul calls “\(\sigma\omega\phi\alpha\) and \(\sigma\omega\nu\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\pi\nu\varepsilon\mu\alpha\tau\eta\kappa\)”,\(^{72}\) “heavenly knowledge, or speculative wisdome in the mysteries of salvation: And spiritual prudence, or a sanctified

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\(^{69}\) Ibid., 1141b8–14.


\(^{71}\) Bolton, *DSTH*, 88. Emphasis mine.

\(^{72}\) Bolton is citing Colossians 1:9. In Bolton’s original version the Greek does not have breathing marks.
understanding in the practical affairs of the soul.” Bolton understands these two virtues as proportional to Aristotle’s two intellectual habits of sapientia (wisdom) and prudentia (prudence), as cited from book six of EN.73

Bolton continues with his Aristotelian distinction to clarify that sapientia is in the schools and that it is a habit compounded of the intelligencia (understanding). “Intelligencia is a naturall light and ability of apprehending and acknowledging speculative principles, the foundations and fountains of all humane knowledge.”74

Scientia (knowledge) is the habitual and exact understanding of all necessary “conclusions and deductions by force of reason.” Just as we have seen above, scientific knowledge, for Aristotle, is knowledge that is teachable and can be learned. It is taught through induction and deduction. Scientific knowledge is “known by its necessity,” is “eternal” and is “ungenerated and imperishable.”75 Both Aristotle and Bolton see scientia as the habit and proper use of reason, though Bolton does not explicitly mention the use of induction in the Discourse, while Aristotle sees both as necessary.

Bolton writes of prudentia that it is rooted in the understanding but is also used practically “in respect of the Object and the end and is the sovereign and guide of all other vertues.” This definition is nearly identical with that of Aristotle, as both ground prudence in “human concerns.” Prudence concerns “things open to deliberation.” The prudent person is one who deliberates well.76 The good deliberator is one “whose aim accords with rational calculation in pursuit of the best good for a human being that is achievable in action.”77 Aristotle also sees prudence as the chief virtue. In both cases, Aristotle and Bolton, Prudentia is about practical action; it is also the most important of all the virtues.

Of the five virtues that Aristotle discusses in book six of EN, Bolton does not mention the virtue of art or craft. However, Bolton does go on in the same section to talk about calling and vocation, which is how Aquinas talks about the intellectual virtue of an

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73 Bolton, DSTH, 88; For Augustine, ratio sapientiae consists in the faith, hope, and love through which the mind reflects on God and on those eternal things (res aeternae) that pertain to God, such as true virtue and happiness, as well as eternal rest. Augustine calls ratio sapientiae “contemplation” Dodaro, Just Society, 165.
74 Bolton, DSTH, 89.
76 Ibid., 1140a25–30, 1141b10–14.
77 Ibid., 1141b10–14.
Art as a virtue is present in Bolton, but perhaps in a more Thomist sense. With that said, Bolton, with almost no variation, derives his thought on intellectual virtues from Aristotelian thought. Now that a brief overview of the virtues has been laid out, we must look at how it is that these virtues develop our character.

**Habituation and the Theological Virtues**

Aristotle’s moral education strongly emphasizes habituation. The activities of virtue must be practiced and habituated so that one can acquire a right state of character (ἓξις). Actions should accord with right reason, but both rational and non-rational desires must be trained. Each person in every case must consider the right actions so that these actions become second nature. Actions that come from a state of character are “effortless but careful and attentive.” An agent must “be in a certain condition” when they act, that is, they must first “have knowledge”; second, must “choose [the acts] for their own sake”; and third, as we have seen, “actions must precede form a firm unchanging character.”

This presents a potential ‘problem’ for Aristotle, who says that we acquire virtue by being virtuous, but also that we must be virtuous in order to do virtuous actions. Unfortunately, Aristotle’s solution to this potential problem leaves him with other dilemmas. Aquinas’ discussion of infused and acquired virtues adds an interesting component to Aristotle. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle’s account of the virtues but adds a direct divine element. He writes, “some habits are infused by God into man,” that is, God

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79 A slight difference between Aristotle and Bolton is, as seen above, that Aristotle writes that wisdom is made up of science and understanding. Bolton only explicitly attributes understanding to wisdom and not science.


81 Aristotle, *EV*, 1152a32–33.

82 Hardie, *Ethical Theory*, 104.


84 Aristotle solves the initial ‘problem’ by making a distinction between the kinds of actions that produce virtue from those that manifest virtue; Ibid., 1105a17–21. The virtues that first bring about the virtuous character are false virtues, or accidentally acted virtue; it is “going through the motions.” See also Hardie, *Ethical Theory*, 104-6.
is the “efficient cause of infused virtues” which he works in us, but not without our consent. Thus “infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part,” but not without our consent.\(^8\) This is a departure from classical virtues, as Aristotle, as we have seen, thought that a habit (disposition) “informs a reason-governed power in such a way as to perfect the activity of that power.”\(^8\) However, Aquinas takes a much more Augustinian position, noting that virtue is living righteously and is something which “God works in us without us.”\(^8\) How this plays out will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter and in the next, in a discussion on concurrence. All virtues, with the exception of the theological virtues, are both infused and acquired. However, the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity are only infused and not acquired, “first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.”\(^8\) We should hear echoes of the discussion of *sacra doctrina* from the previous chapter concerning the importance of God and revelation in breaking through philosophy’s reason cap.

Acquired virtues, for Aquinas, are the traditional, cardinal virtues: temperance, fortitude, justice and prudence.\(^9\) These four cardinal, or acquired, virtues are infused along with the theological virtue of charity.\(^9\) Jean Porter helpfully writes, “the transforming effects of grace go all the way down, so to speak, transforming each of the operative capacities and power of the human person through infused analogues of the acquired cardinal virtues.”\(^9\) The infused virtues direct us to something that is higher than

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\(^8\) Aquinas, *ST*, I–II 51.4; 55.4.

\(^9\) Aquinas, *ST*, I–II 55.4.


\(^9\) Ibid., I–II 61.1.


our own natures, in a way a “higher nature.”\textsuperscript{92} Those who have the infused virtues also have the beginnings of acquired virtues. Aquinas even goes so far as to say that “grace perfects nature.”\textsuperscript{93}

Aquinas gives two reasons why God infuses habits. The first reason is “because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man.”\textsuperscript{94} Aquinas continues, “habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore it is necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature.” The sorts of habits that Aquinas is discussing here “can never be in man except by divine infusion.”\textsuperscript{95} Aquinas’ second reason for why habits are infused is because God “can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes.” What Aquinas means by this is that God, on occasions, can show His power. “He [God] causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power.”\textsuperscript{96} This brings us back to the discussion addressed in Chapter 2 concerning natural and supernatural ends. It is through the acquired virtues that one can attain a connatural form of natural happiness. The theological virtues, which are infused by grace, allow mankind to move towards supernatural ends.

For Aquinas, moral principles can be known without divine assistance. By reason, someone without the indwelling Holy Spirit can know good and true ends because sin has not touched the reason. Only by grace and the theological virtues can one achieve beatitude. In addition, Eleonore Stump notes that it is at this point that Thomist virtues cease to be Aristotelian virtues, in that, with the infusion of love, the acquired virtues become the gifts of the Holy Spirit. For example, “temperance becomes the fear of the Lord and justice becomes pietas.”\textsuperscript{97} There is still a place for the reason without the spirit in the ethical life, but God infuses ‘true’ virtues. Classical courage is a virtue, but it is not in its full form without the Holy Spirit. Therefore, we can see that Aquinas adopts the

\textsuperscript{92} Aquinas, \textit{ST}, I–I 110.3; cf. I–II 62.1; 63.3; 68. More will be said about the infusion of charity and friendship in Chapter 7.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., I 60.5.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., I–II 51.4; 5.5.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., I–II 51.4.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., I–II.51.4; I 105.6.

\textsuperscript{97} Stump, “Non-Aristotelian Character,” 96–7; Aquinas, \textit{ST}, II–II 19; 131.1.
Aristotelian moral virtues but reshapes them, showing an immediate divine aspect of them that not only helps with the cyclical dilemma in Aristotle’s conception of virtue but also makes his own ethics distinctly Christian.

We can now turn our attention to the Puritans on the habituation of virtue and the role of God in this development. What we will see below in the Puritan discussion of virtue is a very close connection between the habituation of virtue and the infusion of theological virtues as described above in Aquinas; like Aquinas, the Puritans go beyond Aristotle.

The idea of habits and dispositions being essential parts of the development of virtue is common amongst the Puritans. In respect to the habituation of rational virtues, Bolton believes that one cannot cultivate these without the Spirit. This is one of the most significant differences between the ‘formal hypocrite’ and ‘saving grace’ found in scripture. Imagine that one man has many perfections of virtues, “and yet it remaine starke blind in the mysteries of salvation.” Without grace and faith, all these virtues are like “rich attire upon a leprous bodie.” The person without grace and faith may express the Greek virtues, but without the divine grace that brings a person to God “in all kinds of duties” and puts them “into possession of happinesse.” This person cannot “perceive the things of the spirit of God.” What Bolton is communicating here is that the formal hypocrite can be prudent and can be excellent at his work, but the regenerated person can be excellent and something more.

We can see that Aquinas and Bolton would agree in this regard. When discussing sacra doctrina in the first part of the Summa, Aquinas argues that wisdom is an infused virtue. In the order of human life, the prudent man is called wise, in as much as he directs his acts to a fitting end.” The one who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely God, is most of all called wise. Sapientia is said to be the knowledge of

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99 Bolton, DSTH, 20.

100 Ibid., 106.
divine things. Thus higher habits can only come through the gifts of the Spirit and through knowledge of scripture. It is by scripture, not through philosophy alone, that we are able to know our end.\footnote{Aquinas, \textit{ST}, I 1; 6; Also see, Mark Johnson, “The Sapiential Character of the First Article of the Summa Theologiae,” in \textit{Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl}, ed. R. James Long (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991); Two very helpful texts for this section were Richard A. Muller, \textit{Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms} (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1985); and Urmson, \textit{Philosophical Vocabulary}.

\footnote{Aquinas, \textit{ST}, II–II 45.1; 2.}
\footnote{Ibid., II–II 45.1.}
\footnote{Ibid., II–II 45.4.}
\footnote{Ibid., II–II 45.3. For a very short and helpful discussion of the analogical use of “habit” and “virtue” in Aquinas, see Sherl Overmyer, “Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Pagan Virtues?: Putting the Question to Jennifer Herdt’s Putting On Virtue,” \textit{Journal of Religious Ethics} 41, no. 4 (2013): 680.}
\footnote{Bolton, \textit{DSTH}, 91–93.}
\footnote{Bolton, \textit{DSTH}, 91–93.}}

Wisdom is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and “denotes a certain rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law.”\footnote{Bolton, \textit{DSTH}, 91–93.} We can also see continuity between Aquinas and Bolton in that there is some wisdom that someone without divine grace can have, but there is a higher wisdom that is from the Spirit. Aquinas notes,

the wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost, differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is ‘descending from above’ (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because ‘a man judges well what he knows’ (Ethic. i, 3).\footnote{Aquinas, \textit{ST}, II–II 45.1; 2.}

For Aquinas “Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins.”\footnote{Ibid., II–II 45.1.} And this wisdom presupposes charity, which is “incompatible with mortal sin.”\footnote{Ibid., II–II 45.4.}

Further, Bolton continues, these virtues spring out of the mystery of regeneration and the ‘formal hypocrite’ is ignorant of Satan’s schemes. Satan tricks the hypocrite to think that they are flourishing and tries to mix work in with our salvation.\footnote{Ibid., II–II 45.3. For a very short and helpful discussion of the analogical use of “habit” and “virtue” in Aquinas, see Sherl Overmyer, “Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Pagan Virtues?: Putting the Question to Jennifer Herdt’s Putting On Virtue,” \textit{Journal of Religious Ethics} 41, no. 4 (2013): 680.}

We saw in Chapter 2 that Bolton thinks that there is some semblance of happiness in this life, but he also admits that one weapon of Satan is earthly happiness and honor.\footnote{Bolton, \textit{DSTH}, 91–93.}

Bolton was not the only Puritan who envisioned virtues in this way. “Saving Grace,” for Richard Baxter, is the “special effects of this Work of the Spirit on the Soul, commonly called \textit{Habitual Grace}, or the Spirit in us,” our “seed of God abiding,” “real
holiness” and “new natures.” It is from saving grace that all other graces proceed. Baxter makes the distinction that ‘common grace’ allows for good dispositions, but only special grace contains habituation within it. He goes on to note that habituation and dispositions come in degrees. The “carnal man by the help of common grace” may be able to have a “weak inclination” to the superior good and a strong inclination to the “fleshly, Earthly, Inferior good.”

‘Habitual Grace’ and the habituation of virtue seem to be very close conceptually. In the same passage looked at above, Baxter goes on to note that good acts are an important signifier of habituation. He cites sixteenth century jurist and moral theologian Francisco Suarez to articulate “habits are not to be felt in themselves, but only by their acts.” Baxter explains that acts discern the habit. “We cannot know that we are disposed to Love God, but by feeling the stirrings of Love to him. So that it is the Act that we must directly look for, and thence discern the Habit.” Baxter describes good actions as being a mean state between two extremes, an ethical concept that will be discussed at length below. Citing Aquinas, Baxter shows that discovering “marks” of true belief, “there is a threefold truth to be enquired after in examination: 1. The truth of the Act or Habit. 2. The Moral truth of it as a Grace or Duty. 3. The Moral truth of it as a Saving or Justifying Grace or Duty.” We can see that Bolton and Baxter are very much like Aquinas in that the ‘formal hypocrite’ and unregenerate person has the capability to habituate virtue to a certain extent.

Baxter also places significant weight on God as the first mover pertaining to habituation and good actions. If God does not move us, we do not move. This seems to resemble the idea of concurrence that is found in scholastic philosophers and theologians including Aquinas and Suarez, in which God is the first mover of every action of every creature. This will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter. For Baxter, this is the necessary part of Christian wisdom, to keep our subordination to God and dependence on him. When “you once begin to trust to your own habitual Grace, and to

108 Baxter, SER, 434–5; 120; 373.
109 Ibid., 435.
110 Ibid., 435; 119.
111 Ibid., 415; Baxter, “Christian Politicks,” in CD, 46; In SER, Baxter does concede that there are times where an unregenerate person can act as if they have the virtues, even the virtues of faith, hope and love. This happens often amongst people in the church who “do perish”; Baxter, SER, 419.
depend on your own understanding or resolution, for duty and holy walking, You are then in a dangerous declining state. In every duty remember Christ's words, 'without me ye can do nothing.'”

Church of Ireland bishop George Webbe, in *Practice of Quietnes*, writes that quietness is a habitual disposition of the whole man (external and internal). What is also fascinating is Webbe’s description of the “quiet man.” Webbe begins his treatise by giving physical and characteristic descriptions of the man who possesses the “character of a quiet man.” This list includes descriptions as varied as “made of milde nature, and true Christian temper,” “not overladen with cares,” having large shoulders, having fortitude and not being a coward, and moderating himself. The quiet man also “has a charitable eye” and a peaceable hand. Interestingly, Aristotle has a similar description of the magnanimous man, or the man that has greatness of soul. There are certainly discrepancies between the description of the “quiet man” and the “magnanimous man,” but it is not their dissimilarities, but their equivalences, that are fascinating. Aristotle’s magnanimous man shares many of the same attributes mentioned above in the quiet man. He is moderate, charitable (liberal), slow to speak, possesses virtue and is brave. The strongest points of disparity are that the magnanimous man is concerned with great honors, and is boastful and full of pride (as in, an excellent man deserves excellent honors, not in the traditional Christian understanding which would attribute this mentality as sinful), whereas Webbe wants to emphasize meekness and humility.

Hursthouse helpfully shows that there is flexibility in the interpretation of Aristotle and his account of the virtues and other relevant issues. For example, the elitism that is found in Aristotle is not something that must be essentially held in order to be an Aristotelian. Elitism, like sexism, is present in Aristotle, but we do not need to think it is built into the very structure of his thought. Given Hursthouse’s comments here, it is not

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114 Ibid., 9–11. The virtue of fortitude belonged to men. War was a way of showing masculinity. Thomas, *Ends of Life*, 44–5.

115 Aristotle, *EN*, Bk IV.

inconceivable that Webbe could replace the magnanimous man with the quiet man and still be thoroughly within the eudaemonistic tradition. Webbe holds on to the most essential and fundamental attributes of the virtuous person of character.

Habits are an important aspect of justice for Edward Reynolds. It is by the habits of the soul that “we bear the image and signature of God.” Concerning the continual, cyclical movement of the development of a state of virtue Reynolds writes, “[a]s we see in external riches of the body, none desire them more eagerly then those that possesse them; and the more vertuous the Soule of man is, the more is the heart enlarged in the apperition of a greater measure.” Interestingly, Reynolds holds that the “Soul is *Rasa Tabla*, without any acauired or introduced habits.”

“Of the things that come with Grace,” John Owen thinks, “the first is the removal of our defilement.” This is “the habitual cleansing of our nature.” We are naturally unclean and also have a habituation to pollution. The grace of Christ removes our defilement.

Christ himself, according to Owen, thought that the sending of the Holy Spirit, “gives us habitual Grace: a principle of Grace opposed to the principle of Lust that is in us by nature.” Owen reads Joseph’s resisting temptation in Genesis as evidence that he had “a strong and habitual bent, against that sin” and where he was not fortified by “habitual grace,” Christ gave suitable help. But even Christ himself was in need of infused habitual grace in order to accomplish his task and calling on earth. The conformity of the "Soul of Christ, to the Will, Mind or Law of god, or his perfect habitually inherent Righteousness" necessarily came from being in “union” with grace. Owen also thinks that Christ in the incarnation was “furnished with habitual grace” and “could never have actually fulfilled the righteousness which was required at his hands.”

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117 Reynolds, *TPFS*, 442.
118 Ibid., 167.
119 Ibid., 5. For further discussion of Habits in Reynolds, see 4; 456.
120 Owen, *Comm.*, 232. For a more in-depth look at Owen and Thomist infused virtues, see Christopher Cleveland, *Thomism in John Owen* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).
121 Owen, *Comm.*, 234.
122 Ibid., 190.
123 Ibid., 212–15. Another important aspect of Aristotle’s idea of actions is that in order for them to have any kind of moral weight they need to be voluntary. Involuntary actions come from ignorance and from outside (violence). An example of this is if someone takes a family hostage, or throws goods over a ship’s side because of a storm. It is difficult to decide what one should suffer and at what cost (1110a30). If a person does something by ignorance but does not feel bad for her actions, then the action was voluntary.
We have established above some of the major features of Aristotelian virtues and states of character, but there are other essential characteristics that the Puritans pick up on and use to their advantage. We also saw, in our discussion of the theological virtues, that there are significant Thomist similarities in the Puritans investigated here. The Puritans see a close connection between the development of virtue and the role of God in the development of certain virtues. We must once again investigate the nature of virtue and excellence. Of the three conditions in the soul—passions, faculties (capacities) and states—states best fit the criterion for excellence.\textsuperscript{124} The “excellence of man… will be the state which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well.”\textsuperscript{125}

**Moral Development and the Passions**

Above we have begun to describe what the virtues are from the perspective of the Puritans in order to become clear as to what is being required of humankind in God’s command to a ‘certain kind of life.’ We have looked at the difference between the moral and intellectual virtues and seen that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is a near complete adoption of Aristotle. We have also seen, above, a Thomist move in the Puritans to go beyond Aristotle, putting the emphasis of moral development in the realm of the supernatural, through the theological virtues. Through possession of the infused virtues of faith, hope and charity, the other cardinal virtues can be developed.

In this upcoming section, we will first look at aspects of the passions and actions that the ancient and medieval eudaemonists and the Puritan thinkers have in common. Alec Ryrie notes, “most of the emotional territory… had already been well-trodden by...

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\textsuperscript{124} Aristotle, *EN*, 1105b19–1106a13. The possession of passions and faculties, in themselves, is not worthy of being praised. This is why they are not the best things in the soul that relate to excellence.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 1106a21–23.
pious Catholic Christians for centuries.” Reformers had a lot of material to use for their own thought on the topic of moral development and the passions.

For both the early eudaemonists and the Puritans, the passions need to be ordered by the reason. The Puritans disciplined their emotions because they knew how important they were. Of any other group of this time, these thinkers were the least suspicious of the use of passions, believing that they should be nurtured and directed, not suppressed. Our natural affections are not sinful. Ancient and medieval eudaemonists, as well as these later theologians, saw the importance that emotions played in the spiritual life. The affections give mankind insight into true happiness.

We will look at the relationship between passions and reason from two perspectives. The first is that of the relationship between the above two parts of the soul and what happens when there is discord, namely, the differences between virtue, continence and incontinence. Here we will mostly be looking at Edward Reynolds. The second perspective that we will look at is the relationship between reason and the passions in the doctrine of the mean.

Virtue, Continence and Incontinence

Here we will begin to discuss the right relationship between the passions and reason by describing what Aristotle writes on the issue. As we saw in Chapter 3, Aristotle thinks that the soul is made up of three parts: nutritive, sensitive and rational. Aristotle, based on this view of the soul and its place within the “rational animal,” emphasizes reason taking precedence over the passions. This is most clearly found in the four-fold distinction between virtuous, continent, incontinent and vicious persons. With the virtuous person, there is no discrepancy between the passions and the reason as to the right and good action. With the continent person, the rational part of the soul, which is pursuing right and good ends, and the non-rational part of the soul, which desires wrong ends, disagree with each other as to the right action. In the case of the continent person, the rational part of the soul overcomes the non-rational part. Functionally speaking, there

128 Fenner, TA, 1.
is no visible difference between the virtuous person and the continent person. The incontinent person judges accurately the best thing to do, but fails to control her desire to do otherwise and, as a result, acts on her desire and not her reason or better judgment. Thus her non-rational soul overcomes the rational part. The incontinent person has the ability to reason well and knows the right action, but acts on appetite. A “good state is truth in agreement with right desire.”

The idea of continence and habit was adopted early in western Christian ethics, as seen in Augustine’s Confessions. “Lady Continence” plays a significant role in Augustine’s conversion experience. As the voices of “habit” are weakening, Lady Continence encourages Augustine to come to her and encourages him by “good examples” for him to follow. Reynolds adopts this aspect of the tradition. In man, there is a natural struggle between appetite and reason, which comes from the fall but not from nature itself. “For from the Law of creation, there was not formall Opposition, but a Subordination between Spirit and Sence; Man having it in his own power, to excite, continue, remit, lay down his Passions, as Reason should dictate unto him.” Placing a person’s inability to properly submit the passions to reason within a post-fall reality is an addendum that Reynolds adds to Aristotle, but the belief that it is natural for a rational animal to control the irrational passions by use of the rational is an Aristotelian idea.

Reynolds uses Aristotle in his description of the incontinent person first in his definition of incontinence as “the weakness and disabilitie of Reason, to keepe close to her own Principles and Resolutions.” He continues by stating that, “this is the case of reluctancie betwenee the Knowledge and Desires of Incontinent Men, and others of the like Nature: For, as Aristotle observes of them, they are but..., half evil, as not sinning

130 Aristotle, EN, VII 1–10, 1102b14–18. Aquinas too discusses this in IaIIae.q24.a1. The vicious person is the person whose rational and non-rational parts agree and do the wrong actions, while in the virtuous person there is the same sort of agreement between the two parts, but both parts are pursuing right ends. Also see Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics. From Socrates to the Reformation, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 154.
131 Aristotle, EN, 1139a30–1.
132 Augustine, Confessions, VIII.xi.26–7.
133 Reynolds, TPFS, 6–7; 63. Aristotle, EN, 1149b15-1150a2.
134 Ibid., 61; Also see, Ole Riis and Linda Woodhead, A Sociology of Religious Emotion (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 113.
135 Aristotle, EN, 1102b29–1103a4; Also see, Aristotle, EE, 1219b28–31, 1220a1–2.
136 Reynolds, TPFS, 71. EN Bk.7 ch.7.
with that full and plenary Consent of will, but *Praeter Electionem.*"¹³⁷ Rather, they have a kind of “half-knowledge,” much like the sleep-talker who is neither fully awake nor asleep.¹³⁸ These ideas are nearly direct quotes from *EN.* The “half-wicked” man, for Aristotle, is one who is “like the man who is asleep or drunk,” who acts voluntarily “in a sense with knowledge both of what he does and of that for the sake of which he does it,” but is not fully wicked.¹³⁹

The sin of imposture, according to Reynolds, is when a person allows their lower parts to reign, “and being impatient altogether of resistance or controul, laboureth and to muffle reason.” This is where understanding is overrun by passions. It is the judging of things, “not according to their naked and naturall truth, but according as it finds them beare in the Fancie those impressions of Pleasure, which are most agreeable to corrupted Nature.”¹⁴⁰

Another manner of corruption, for Reynolds, is the withdrawing of the reason from the examination of pleasures, a voluntary ignorance. “Since as Aristotle hath observed, directly agreeable to the phrase of St. Peter, there is…an elected or *Voluntaire Ignorance,* which for their securities sake, men nourish themselves in.”¹⁴¹ He takes Romans 1, 2 Peter 3.5 and *EN* Book 3 Chapter 1 to be saying the same things concerning voluntary ignorance, or the voluntary suppressing of knowledge for a perceived good. However, what Aristotle is talking about in the section cited and what the Biblical authors are discussing do not seem to be the same. Aristotle is discussing the difference between voluntary, involuntary and nonvoluntary actions, but Aristotle never mentions that these forms of involuntary and nonvoluntary actions are related to people who are suppressing knowledge with malicious intent. The only mention of the passions in this chapter is to make the point that the irrational passions are no less a part of human nature than the reason is.¹⁴² In both the Biblical passages, there seems to be a voluntary ignorance of something natural, in the case of Romans 1, or something revealed, in the case of 2 Peter. St. Peter strongly emphasizes the conscious effort of ignorance when he writes, “for they

¹³⁷ Ibid., 70. *EN* Bk.7 Ch.10
¹³⁸ Ibid., 70–1.
¹³⁹ Aristotle, *EN,* 1147b7–9, Bk 7 Ch.10.
¹⁴¹ Reynolds, *TPFS,* 69.
deliberately overlook this fact…” (2 Peter 3.5). However, the point that Reynolds is trying to make, perhaps inaccurately, is that there is a place within the biblical narrative for a doctrine of continence and incontinence.\textsuperscript{143}

\textit{Doctrine of the Mean}

The next aspect of the reason and the passions that we will be looking at in terms of habituating virtue is the well-known, but controversial, doctrine of the mean. This ‘doctrine’ is controversial because of its many misuses in history. Ethan Shagan has shown that the idea of moderation was certainly pervasive in Reformation England; however, it was at times misapplied from the sense that Aristotle used the concept.\textsuperscript{144} Shagan opens his study of the doctrine of the mean by telling a story of Henry VIII’s “simultaneous execution of three Catholics and three Protestants” as a statement of moderation.\textsuperscript{145} This, however, is not an acceptable Aristotelian employment of the concept of moderation. Here we will see that the Puritans do, in fact, think and apply a doctrine of the mean that is acceptable within eudaemonistic ethics.

Aristotle writes, “every ethical virtue is a condition intermediate between two other states, one involving excess, and the other deficiency.”\textsuperscript{146} Courage, for instance, is the mean between rashness and cowardice. This state has become known as the doctrine of the mean. The virtuousness of an emotion or action is dependent on there being neither excess nor a deficiency. He writes that actions and passions,

\begin{quote}

may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim [motive], and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence [virtue].\textsuperscript{147}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{143} There are other interesting adoptions of continence and incontinence in early modern England. Thomas Wright describes incontinence “as a change or alternation of that purpose or resolution, which a man had prudently determined before.” He also describes incontinence as growing upon the excess of wicked considerations, as precipitation and a defect of “circumspection.” The passion start affecting the mind causing the judgement to divise means of “enjoying the Passions of delight,” but not a good kind of delight; see Thomas Wright, \textit{PM}, 56. Like Aristotle, Wright attributes incontinence to the young person with arrogance and bad habits; see ibid., 38–9. Webbe seems to have an interesting barrowing of the incontinence concept as it relates to quietness but outside of the will and desire where Aristotle uses the four-fold descriptors; see Webbe, \textit{PQ}, 34–5.


\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 7.

\textsuperscript{146} Aristotle, \textit{EN}, 1106a26–b28.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 1106b19–24. For an interesting Puritan perspective on courage and a soldier’s preparation for death, see Baxter, “Politicks,” 46–8.
Virtue exists between two vices that are on either of the opposite extremes. An individual person’s natural tendencies lean towards one vice or the other. If someone were naturally disposed to find him or herself on the side of cowardice, then they would need to move more towards rashness in order to achieve a good balance. Aristotle does not claim that negative passions and actions need to be eliminated and suppressed; he is in fact saying quite the opposite. It is not the case then that there can be negative passions and actions that one needs to be rid of. Rather, ‘negative’ passions and actions are used to counter natural dispositions towards one vice or another. However, not every action and passion has a mean; some are just wrong. This will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter and in Chapter 7.\footnote{\textit{Aristotle, EN}, 1102b2; 1106a36–b7.}\footnote{\textit{Robert C. Roberts, “Aristotle on Virtues and Emotions,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition} 56, no. 3 (July 1, 1989): 295; Also see, J.O. Urmson, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean,” in \textit{Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 163.} \footnote{\textit{Ethan Shagan notes a distinction between moderation in sixteenth and seventeenth century ethics. There was reference to Aristotle’s virtuous mean as described above, but there was also σωφροσύνη, which was a Greek virtue that will be explored below. Σωφροσύνη was related to self-knowledge and sometimes associated to prudence. For the early moderns it was the virtue of self-restraint and is “intense passions under perfect control.” See Helen F. North, \textit{Sophrosyne; Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature.} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), preface, xi–x; Shagan, \textit{Rule}, 13. There was also the juridical practice of ἑπιείκεια that can mean forbearance or restraint. This term was “used by the fathers with reference to virtuous men, specifically, with reference to Christ and his teaching of virtue in the face of evil and persecution,” Richard A. Muller, \textit{Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms} (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1985), 105. ἑπιείκεια was Aristotelian in inspiration, but used by St. Paul (ἐπιείκης, Phil 4:5; 1 Tim 3:3; Titus 3:2. ἑπιείκεια, 2 Cor 10:1). Shagan notes, “…Perkins, following Aquinas, had provided the theological rationale \textit{epiēkeia} in his posthumously published \textit{Epiēkeia: or, a Treatise of Christian Equitie and Moderation} (1604). There he made the key distinction that moderation is a virtue of men towards men, not of men towards God, hence zeal cannot be too great when directed towards God but nonetheless must be moderated with respect to human ‘society and fellowship.’” Shagan, \textit{Rule}, 42. Helen North notes that the confusion between these terms as related to moderation was generated because, as Cicero pointed out, \textit{temperantia} and \textit{moderatio}, along with \textit{modestia} and even \textit{frugalitas}, were appropriate Latin translations of the Greek word \textit{sophrosyne}. North, \textit{Sophrosyne}, 268.} \footnote{\textit{Riis and Woodhead, Religious Emotion,} 112–3, 125–6. The idea of moderation was not only attributed to the emotions for the Puritans. Richard Rogers in his \textit{Seven Treatises} writes that moderation is needed for all lawful things such as eating, drinking and recreation. Rogers, \textit{PC}, 228.} \footnote{\textit{Bolton, DSTH}, 74.}
his affection of anger, and bridle in himself impatience, hatred, and desire of revenge.”

Meekness is the "vertue" of moderating passions with two outcomes: (1) it gives man a “quiet and patient heart, to beare Gods iudgements” and (2) the meek person bears injuries that are done to him by others, to “forgive and forget.” In order to be happy, the virtue of meekness needs to be in our hearts.153 Joseph Hall wrote, “as hypocrisie is a common counterset of all vertues, so there is no speciall vertue, which is not to the very life of it seemingly resembled by some speciall vice.” Devotion is antithetical to superstition, good thrift to “niggardlinesse,” and “charity with vaine-glorious pride.”154 Webbe writes that “all immoderations are enemies unto the quietness of the Minde” and that moderation is an antidote to a disquieted mind.155 Baxter writes that the use of reason and the rule of law decide the mean, and he also notes that anger needs to be moderated.156 We currently have contrary desires, but we are able to cultivate our desires and “raise them up.” This is the life of satisfaction and enjoyment.157

Edward Reynolds also uses the Aristotelian model of moderation in regard to the passions.158 Like a ship sailing between storm and calm, the passions must also be between two extremes for virtue.159 Just as in Aristotle, passions are specific “to such and such a person,”160 and “is done either by opposing contrary passions to contrary, which is Aristotles rule, who adviseth, in the bringing of passions from an extream to a mediocritie” and to “incline and bend them towards the other extreme” by the power of reason.161 In the mind, “passions, as they mutually generate, so they mutually weaken each other.”162 Anticipating an objection in the case of Jesus casting out the moneychangers in anger, Reynolds acknowledges that Jesus had intense emotions, but he successfully moderated and directed them according to the rule of judgement. “In which

153 Perkins, GLE, 15–16.
154 Hall, MV, 96.
155 Webbe, PQ, 28–9.
156 Baxter, SER, 436; 401.
157 Ibid., 86–7.
158 Reynolds, TPFS, 131–6, 190–95, 319b.
159 Ibid., 60.
160 Ibid., 51.
161 Ibid., 52; Aristotle, EV, Bk 2 Ch 9.
162 Reynolds, TPFS, 53.
respect, the Passions of Christ are by Divines called Propassions” or the beginnings of passions, but not passions themselves.\textsuperscript{163}

Thomas Wright, when discussing the passions in his book \textit{The Passions of the Minde}, agrees with the above model for moderation. He writes the “men commonly by nature are more inclined” towards one sinful extreme or another and need to practice moderation in their spiritual development.\textsuperscript{164} One passion is the cure for another, and fear of being punished by a superior often tempers the passions of anger or lust or any other disorder of the commonwealth.\textsuperscript{165} He writes, “every moderat passion bordureth betwixt two extremes, as liberalitie betwixt avarice; fortitude betwixt desperate boldnesse and superfluous feare, called timiditie.”\textsuperscript{166}

Once a person has figured out to which vice they lean, then they should investigate how heavily they lean that way.\textsuperscript{167} The first remedy to “mortifie passions” is moderation. Among many other tools that Wright gives, the Aristotelian idea of habituation as one of the most important ways to appropriately control the desires. He writes,

\begin{quote}
This meane, to mortifie passions, I take to be one of the most forcible and important remedies that men can use, especially for two causes: the first, for that by these contraries acts are bred in the soules, certaine habites, helps, stays, or inclinations most opposite unto our passions; and therefore the passions being strong, they cannot be overcommed, by the might of excellent vertue.\textsuperscript{168}
\end{quote}

The deeper the roots of a tree, the more force is needed to pull it up. The deeper the vice, the more habituating of virtue a person needs to moderate it.\textsuperscript{169}

Church of England clergyman and writer William Fenner is interesting for our purposes here because of the components of the doctrine of the mean that he wants to adopt and those that he wishes to disregard. In his \textit{Treatise of the Affections}, Fenner makes frequent use of Aristotle to discuss the moderating of the emotions. He, like Aristotle, believes that the affections need to be ordered. When discussing taking control of the

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 49.
\textsuperscript{164} Wright, \textit{PM}, 78.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 154–5, 122–3, 147. Also see, Shagan, \textit{Rule}, 48.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 19–82. For Wright, we can become aware of our natural leanings, first, through a growing self-knowledge that lets us know which vice we tend towards. The second help is that good friends make us aware of inordinate passions, because people outside of ourselves can better judge our actions.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 84–5.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 85.
emotions, Fenner writes that in the “Greek tongue the spirit of God calls it σοφροσύνη,” which has a semantic range of reasonableness, self-control and temperance. Σοφροσύνη is used a number of times by St. Paul and St. Peter in discussing temperance as well as in the EN as Aristotle’s preferred word for the virtue of temperance.

According to Fenner, one cannot raise up one’s affections, or order them, unless one is risen with Christ. Fenner cites Aristotle’s questioning of whether Brutus was a block or brute for having no affections for his own children, who were murdered in front of him. He further cites “The Philosopher” stating that

[T]he affections are like wheeles, and like chariots unto reason. If a mans reason be never so good, he knowes hee is bound to repent, and be godly, and obey; yet if he have no affections thereto, he goes like a chariot without wheeles; he goes without force, he cannot go at all; but if he have affections thereto, the affections are like wheeles; and like horses to carry him amaine.

The emotions were an “elemental spiritual force, as irresistible as hunger or gravity. As such, it was folly to ignore them and prudence to harness them. ‘When a childe of God prays with affection, he prayeth with force.’” This is a eudaemonist and the Puritan polemic against the Stoic view of the passions.

Fenner also uses Aristotle to talk about sickness in the soul, stating that “Aristotle calls the affections Ægritudines animi…if the soul be affected indeed, she is sicke if she speed not.” What Fenner is using Aristotle to express here is that if the affections are sick, then the whole person is affected. They are also what make a man mutable. Without the passions, a person cannot be persuaded. Fenner cites Aristotle in saying that “virtues are nothing more than the right ruling of the affections.” He says that “with little alteration” to Aristotle, the “ruling of the affections is the main worke of grace.” Grace does not take away affections but rules over them. If a man were angry before conversion,

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170 Fenner, TA, 94; Hall, MV, 98.
172 Aristotle, EN, ed. G.P Gould, trans. H Rackham (London: W. Heinemann; G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1926), 3.10–11; Shagan notes, “More often, following Thomas Aquinas interpreting Aristotle, temperance was understood as a subset of moderation dealing particularly with the restraint of bodily appetites, whereas moderation might deal with any form of restraint.” Shagan, Rule, 32n.
173 Fenner, TA, 2–3.
174 Ibid., 67.
175 Ryrie, Being Protestant, 27. Fenner, TA, 4–5, 7.
176 Fenner, TA, 44.
177 Ibid., 48.
grace would not take the anger away.\textsuperscript{178} We can see above that Fenner is in fairly strong agreement with how Aristotle conceives of the soul and the emotions.

This seems to be the case generally; however, Fenner has interesting differences with Aquinas himself. We have seen above that the Puritans generally agree with Aristotle, and thus with Aquinas. Fenner, however, has some doubts about adopting the above description of the passions wholeheartedly. He asks, if the affections are only in the sensitive and material part of the soul, then what about the angels? But Aquinas has a response to this in \textit{ST}. When God and angels have joy and love, “they specify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion.”\textsuperscript{179} Shagan’s account of Puritan moderation describes it as a universal aspect of a disciplined life across the board; however, as we can see with Fenner, this is not quite the case.\textsuperscript{180}

\textbf{Conclusion}

In this chapter, we have had our first glimpse into the moral ramifications of the Puritan doctrine of calling. For the Puritans, to develop a ‘kind of life,’ or a life that is defined by a character that exhibits the cardinal and theological virtues, is central to a conception of ethics that is based on divine calling. Like their eudaemonist predecessors, the Puritans conceive of the virtues in a two-fold manner, making a distinction between moral and intellectual virtues. This is alongside the near complete adoption of a conception of the passions as focal contributors to moral development, as the sensual part of the soul relates to the rational part. We have also seen that the Puritans, in a very Thomist fashion, go beyond Aristotle to affirm that the ability for the development and habituation of virtue is tightly connected with the infusion of the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity.

What we have also seen here is that for the Puritans, divine commands do not necessarily need to be in conflict with ethical naturalism’s desire to speak to the development of character that is based on natural phenomena. However, this is just the first layer of the problem that must be addressed further in this thesis. This chapter’s focus

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 53–4.
\textsuperscript{180} Shagan, \textit{The Rule of Moderation}, 149–186.
has been more universal in nature; that is, it has been concerned with the command to all
humankind to flourish in a way across the board. In the following chapter, we will look
further at the universal call for everyone to be in right relationship with God through
Christ and to develop into perfected and happy human beings. We will also look at what
it means to have particular callings ‘imposed’ on the individual amidst the universal
calling to develop virtues, which end in the happiness addressed above.
Chapter 5

‘Imposed on Man:’ Personhood, Command and Calling

*Abe said where do you want this killing done, God said highway 61. Bob Dylan*

*Play is more proper to man than work, and it is only when work is play that it is really good and right. Eric Gill*

**Introduction**

In prior chapters, we looked at the moral ramifications of the Puritan doctrine of calling as it relates to metaphysics and rationality in a flourishing life, as well as the importance of developing a ‘kind of life,’ or a life defined by virtue. Rowan Williams emphasizes this aspect of calling, noting that the call is the process of living life well and vocation is the moment of “crisis within the unbroken process.” Crisis is the moment of recognizing that creature comforts distract us from “answering the call to be.”¹ What Williams is addressing here is the calling that we have been discussing in previous chapters. Here we must go a step further. In this chapter, we move from a conception of the divine command to universal humankind in moral development to the more particular commands in the doctrine of calling. Calling is ontologically grounded and thus related to flourishing generally as well as particularly. By ontologically grounded I mean that callings are to some degree possessed at the level of being as well as circumstantial based on one’s surrounding situation and context. This will be explained and examined in more detail within this chapter in a discussion of what I am calling a ‘deep’ calling alongside a discussion of calling being related to one’s ‘station’ in life.

The second part of Perkins’ definition is of interest to ethics, as this ‘kind of life’ (development of character) is *imposed* on, or commanded for, the human agent. The Puritans, because of their emphasis on a metaphysically rich ethic, are able to navigate in an interesting way the problem of divine commands. We can take call and command to be nearly synonymous, as both can be construed as moral impositions given by a superior

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agent to an inferior agent to act in one way rather than another. Weber notes that calling is the will of God and has the “same worth in the sight of God.” Calling is a command to fulfill duties, which the divine will imposes.\(^2\) John Hare makes a helpful distinction between the strict senses of a command and a calling. He notes that the word command stresses the “power relation” between God and humanity, whereas call emphasizes a “love relation which governs not just the destination but the selection of the route” towards particular ends.\(^3\) In this chapter, we will further investigate the command as a calling and how it relates to the eudaemonism that has been constructed in previous chapters.

**A Brief Reformation History of Calling**

As we will see in more detail in the next chapter, the Reformation way of addressing the doctrine of calling was a complete reversal of thought from previous generations. With this in mind, many of the reformers thought of calling in their own distinctive ways, giving the doctrine a feeling of development over the two centuries that we are looking at here. This section will look at two different Reformation doctrines of calling as expounded by Martin Luther and John Calvin. By doing this, we set the historical context for the Puritans and allow the distinctiveness of their thought to appear. We begin with Luther.

According to Luther, every person has a double vocation, spiritual (\textit{vocatio spiritualis}) and external (\textit{vocatio externa}). The ‘spiritual vocation’ emphasizes that everybody has a calling into the kingdom of God, that is, everyone is called to be in right relationship with God through Christ. On the other hand, the ‘external vocation’ is to serve other people in the community. Because justification is by faith alone, God does not need our works: our neighbor does. Justification by faith—fulfilling the spiritual vocation—frees humans to live out their external vocation.

External vocations are for the good of the community and are also related to one’s ‘station’ in life, a station being an external vocation that is by nature helpful, as it is related to one’s role in a surrounding context and place. In this way, people can have multiple vocations. A person can have the external vocation of three separate estates:


\[^3\] J. E. Hare, \textit{God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands, and Human Autonomy} (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 2001), 52.
priestly office, the family and the civil government. A particular person can be simultaneously a store clerk and have the vocations of a son, a father and a husband. The external vocation has a horizontal application in how God providentially relates to those who share in community life. Through earthly and spiritual government, God drives people to good works and to faith. Thus a paradox: “[a] Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, and subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all.”

The earthly life drives one to love one’s neighbor. For Luther, there is nothing more delightful and lovable on earth than helping one’s neighbor. “Love does not think about doing good works, it finds joy in people; and when something good is done for others, that does not appear to love as works but simply as gifts which flow naturally from love.”

When one loves one’s neighbor through one’s vocation, love for God is active. “It is the neighbor that stands at the center of Luther’s ethics, not God’s Kingdom or God’s law or ‘character.’ Vocation and law benefit the neighbor, as does love born of faith.” This is how our external vocation relates to God; it shows how our works fit within the scheme of salvation. God provides his people with ‘daily bread’ through the vocations of those around them in different vocations. The economic system of a working community contributes to meeting the needs of others within the community. This is how God provides for his people. Luther thus emphasizes that, for example, God is milking the cows through the vocation of the milkmaid. Vocation is the “mask of God,” because he is hidden in everyday work. This is how God works through his creation.

Calvin takes a quite different perspective on calling, relating calling to his doctrine of predestination. Where Luther would say that the ‘general calling’ is the internal call of God to draw all humanity towards himself in the preaching of the word, Calvin agrees but amends Luther, making the ‘special calling’ an illumination of the general ‘universal calling,’ through the Holy Spirit.

Within the context of expositing Matthew 22:14, “many are called, but few are chosen,” Calvin writes that the universal calling is the word preached to all, while special

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6 Wingren, *The Christian’s Calling*, 43.
7 Ibid., 46.
calling is that worked out in the heart of the elect. These “two species of calling” are both attributed to salvation. On occasion, special callings can be “justly forsaken,” meaning that God blinds a person because of their ungratefulness. Callings, for Calvin, are a kind of protection that God gives mankind against being rash and transgressing limits. “Therefore each individual has his own kind of living assigned to him by the Lord as a sort of sentry post so that he may not heedlessly wander about throughout life.” These are different “modes of life” to which God has given the name calling are assigned duties so that “all things may not be thrown into confusion by our folly and rashness.” Calling is at the foundation of well-doing. Holding to the straight path and doing one’s duties require that we direct ourselves to our callings. So in a sense, calling, for Calvin, becomes a form of law, whereas for Luther, (external) vocation is the form of life one lives after being freed from the law through justification.

We will see below that the Puritan approach to a Reformation doctrine of calling is an unabashed appropriation of Aristotelian metaphysics. This places them in stark contrast to Luther, who famously spurns Aristotelian philosophy in theological discourse. As we have also seen, Luther’s doctrine of external vocation is based on one’s standing, or station in life and not concerned with ontology. For Luther, one has a calling because there is a certain need in the community, or because one is a father. Also, as we will see in more detail later, for Luther there is no social mobility within a calling. If a person is a cobbler, they must stay a cobbler with little expectations of leaving that role in society. The Puritans are much happier to say that people can leave one calling for another, as long as there is a good motive for the change.

The Puritans differ from Calvin in much the same way as they differ from Luther. As seen above, Calvin places the contemplative life below the active life. By contrast, the Puritans hold, or at least attempt to hold, a balance between the active and the

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10 Ibid., III.10.6.
11 In Calvin’s interpretation of Luke 10:38-42 on Mary and Martha, he concludes that there is a time to work and a time to listen. This is not a comment on a way of life, as this passage had been interpreted within the earlier Christian tradition, but on Martha’s working at the wrong time. Calvin takes the emphasis away from the end being contemplation and puts it on the general advantage of work and calling; because God is continually acting, we must be continually acting in the world. See John Calvin, *Commentary on the Harmony of the Evangelists*, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1949), 142–4; Calvin, *Institutes*, Lxvi.3.
contemplative life. Another difference between Calvin and the Puritans, which we will see in more detail later in this chapter, is that Calvin attributes special callings only to those who possess the Holy Spirit, making it strictly soteriological, while the Puritans, like Luther, think that all people inside and outside the church contribute to society through their callings.

We can see that the Protestant expression of vocation and calling was new and central to the Reformation. Thus, this novel and nuanced concept of calling brings about something that is unique to the Reformation not found in the medieval times, though there are a plethora of continuities. Max Weber notes that for Protestants, “the only way of living acceptable to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by his position in the world.”\(^\text{12}\) The Puritans are a rich resource because their thought on calling was highly systematized and influential. Their thought on divine calling represents some of the most helpful and clear thinking on this doctrine in Christendom. In treating Protestant asceticism as a single whole, Weber notes that the Puritans give the most consistent religious foundation for the idea of the calling,\(^\text{13}\) but I would add, while holding on to a medieval tradition. They are aware of Scotus and voluntarism as well as Aristotelian-Thomist naturalism, but they do not simply draw upon these categories. They are continually shaping and molding their beliefs while engaging with the tradition.\(^\text{14}\) For this reason the Puritans are an exceptional conversation partner with ethical naturalism, specifically eudaemonism, because of their metaphysical considerations, as well as their emphasis on obedience to the will of God in the ‘call’ of God. This aspect of my thesis is to show that the Puritans were eudaemonistic in their view of calling.

Now that a brief Reformation context on calling has been given, we will look further at the relationship between ethical naturalism in the Puritans and calling as command of God.

\(^\text{12}\) Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (BN Publishing, 1905), 80. This thesis is not about Weber, but because of the closeness of this thesis with one of Weber’s most well known and influential works, he will continue to be a helpful conversation partner at time framing our discussion.

\(^\text{13}\) Ibid., 155.

Calling as Command of God

In this section, we will begin to further unfold an aspect of divine commands in the Puritans in light of the previous chapter’s argument that they fit exceptionally well within a long ethical naturalist tradition that goes back to Aristotle. Before we get to the specifics of how the Puritans conceive of divine commands and the ways in which they relate to naturalism, we will need to look broadly at some of the distinctions and where the Puritans fit in Christian history. We will do this by looking at other naturalists and divine command theorists in and around their time.

Naturalism and Divine Commands

We will hear look at the relationship between eudaemonism in the Puritans and divine commands, specifically the idea of calling. Below are three forms of divine commands:

A. All precepts that make up morality have their origin in God’s unconditioned will. As God’s will is unconditioned no moral reason can be assigned as to why these precepts are as they are. God could have willed otherwise. Thus, x is wrong because God wills it so.

B. God is above all moral norms. Natural reasons may be given as to why these moral precepts are binding to mankind. However, God on particular occasions can suspend these precepts and command actions that are in no way conditioned by natural moral norms, but are simply the expression of His supreme power.

C. God’s will is conditioned by reasons including moral reasons that are inscrutable to humans from the point of view of mankind. God’s will may appear to be arbitrary and even unjust; but this is only an appearance due to the feebleness of human understanding.\(^{15}\)

Puritans generally follow B and C and deny A. Not all of God’s moral precepts are based on his unconditioned will. A is opposed to, and incompatible with, the Puritan naturalism described in previous chapters. I take that the Puritans, however, are committed to those kinds of commands represented in B and C. God’s suspended commands are sometimes positive in calling one to go above and beyond the moral norm. But the way that the Puritans argue for these aspects of commands of God have distinctive features, in that there is a denial that God’s commands are the expression of his supreme power. God is not simply showing off his authority. His reasons for commanding are not contrary to the natural order and are always related to his goodness and wisdom. Point C differs from A and B as it is a quite weak account of the commandments of God and mostly concerned

\(^{15}\) These definitions are adapted from, John Colman, *John Locke’s Moral Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983).
with epistemology. The fact that some moral reasons are hidden is not in every case because of some lack in humanity or as a result of sin. There may be cases where God does not reveal the purpose of his commands to those whom he is commanding.

One of the potential problems with naturalism that the Puritans do not run into is that the created order demonstrates right and wrong distinct from divine will. Fourteenth century philosopher Gregory of Rimini (1300-1358) argues “that even if God did not exist…those dictates would still have the same legal character which they actually posses because they would constitute a law pointing out that evil exists intrinsically in the object.”16 In this view, natural law is separate from God and the divine law, because the law resides in human natures or in the structure of things. This is to say that, for this brand of naturalism, if God did not exist, the law would be the same because of human nature. What this sort of naturalism allows is the implication that God does not essentially command the natural law17 and that some principles or goods are independent of, and co-eternal with, God.

The above form of naturalism is problematic for the ethicist who wants to keep God central to morality and is unhappy with the naturalist account. Natural rightness and wrongness apart from God’s will restrict God’s freedom, a freedom that the Puritans are interesting in keeping, at least to some extent. Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694) argues that the naturalist is theologically unsound. According to Pufendorf, God created mankind by the exercise of his free will, and he was free to do otherwise than to create us with this exact nature. “The independence of natural law from God, as explained by objective naturalism, has the unwelcome result that natural law is not divine law and is not from God.”18

The Puritans also are dedicated to keeping God central to morality and political societies. One of the major benefits of divine command theories is that God has no moral restrictions and is free to will what is good rather than to will it because it is good. For the theist, allowing God to will the good is a very tempting and plausible option, because it emphasizes his sovereignty and allows the good to be below or subservient to God rather

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17 This is the objection of Francisco Suarez to this form of naturalism; see Terence Irwin, *The Development of Ethics. From Suarez to Rousseau*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34.
18 Ibid.
than being something to which God must submit. If God wills the good because it is good, then God seems to be subordinate to the good. Strict divine command theories seemingly allow God to be above the good and to command his creation to be involved in it by obeying what he wills. We will see below that this way of construing divine commands is not something that the Puritans are dedicated to entirely; however, they are dedicated to the benefit of having God at the center of ethics. We will see below that the way they conceive of divine commands restricts God’s freedom in some respects. The way that divine commands work for the Puritans looked at in this thesis is naturalistically grounded, as God’s created order plays a significant role in God’s willing the good.

It is not possible, for the Puritans, for one to simply deny the existence of God and, in the words of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, “make all things permissible.” This is where Puritans’ naturalism has strength. Simply denying the existence of God, and hence throwing out his precepts, does not get one off the moral hook. Oliver O’Donovan’s objects that “in this modern ‘faith-ethic’ Christian moral obligation becomes a function of the believer’s decision, something that he has opted into. It is esoteric, meaningful only to those who, by a process in which moral awareness has apparently played no part… have placed themselves within a closed circle.” Moral duties are relegated to “ecclesiastical house-rules” and have no authority for those outside the church community. O’Donovan argues that both theists and atheists, for the most part, use and agree on the meanings of words such as right, wrong, ought and duty. Two people with very different worldviews can talk about ‘wrong’ without knowing each other’s full definition. When either party utters the sentence, “x is wrong and it should not be done,” there is typically agreement on the types of things that are wrong. Let us say we take x to be, “one should not torture babies for entertainment.” Both parties would agree that the emotional and volitional attitude toward the word ‘wrong’ here is the same. ‘Wrong’ is a word of opposition. When we say something is wrong, we are saying we are against it.

Why is it the case that theists and atheists have so many similarities in their conceptions of these words? Why is it that we can use the same language, without knowing each other’s worldview, and have roughly the same definition? Naturalists, and thus the Puritans, could argue that human nature tells us something about what it is to be

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a good or bad human. They could say that there is something that grounds the universal definition of a human being: our natures. Why do we come to the same conclusions when one of us is grounded in God’s commands and another of us is grounded in something else?

Also, because of their metaphysically aware naturalist ethic, the Puritans do not fall victim to some of the problems that come with strict divine command theories, such as a particular construal of the general universalizable thesis. The problem of the general universalizable thesis is the idea that

\[(a) \text{ if } x \text{ is right at } t^1, \text{ then } x \text{ must be right for every person at } t^2 \text{ or } t^3.\]

There seem to be occasions where a person (p\textsuperscript{1}) believes that it is obligatory for one to do x at t\textsuperscript{1} and that the same action, x, is not obligatory for p\textsuperscript{2} at t\textsuperscript{2} or t\textsuperscript{3}. This ‘generalizing’ universalizable thesis is problematic and, as we will see, the Puritans do not fall victim to this problem.

A reflexive universalizable thesis could also be phrased as:

\[(b) \text{ if } x \text{ is right at } t^1 \text{ because } a, b, \text{ and } c, \text{ wherever } a, b, \text{ and } c, x \text{ is right. At } t^2 \text{ we have } a \text{ and } b, \text{ but } q \text{ (not } c).\]

So x could be wrong without violating universalizability. This way of working the universalizability thesis resembles more closely how Luther would see calling (vocation), as it depends more on the circumstances or ‘station’ of c being different from that of q. The Puritan emphasis is on a distinctive person’s internal dispositions towards actions at t\textsuperscript{1} or t\textsuperscript{2} and not so much on external circumstances. Both a and b, in a sense, have put the cart before the horse, because the command is particularized from person to person in creation itself. The Puritans evade these problems by advocating a double imposition, or command, that takes place in their doctrine of calling, calling being ‘imposed’ in creation. The Puritans can say that right relationship with God, in Christ and through the Holy Spirit, contributes to the flourishing of all mankind because this is the telos of humanity, by virtue of being human, and is universalizable, while also asserting that the universalizability thesis does not apply to the particular individuals who have particular telè in themselves.\(^{20}\)

\(^{20}\) Hardy, Fabric, 81–2. Elsewhere, Hardy writes that Calvinist thought on vocation does not impose a certain kind of life upon one from the outside. Based on Perkins’ clear Calvinist sympathies in his
The implications of this are that the eudaemonistic doctrine of calling found in the Puritans allows for a kind of situationism in ethics. This is not a situationism based on minor situational differences and moral psychology, but rather situationism that has the explanatory power to explain moral norms alongside individual supererogatory acts. There have been other attempts in Christian ethics to develop a situationist ethic, one example being Joseph Fletcher. Fletcher, however, does not have the important metaphysical concerns that we can see in the Puritans. His theory is concerned with the loving of persons and moves away from principles, the Puritans looked at in this thesis would agree, but Fletcher swings the pendulum too far in the other direction. He thus makes his construal a Christian brand of utilitarianism. The situationism that is an consequence of eudaemonsim in the Puritans is grounded not in love, though we have seen love (charity) is important, rather the vision of situationism here is grounded on cross, community and new creation, as Richard Hays suggests is the perspective of the New Testament authors. The particulars of this brand of situationism will be spelled out in further detail throughout this thesis. We will now begin to start analyzing some of these concepts within the Puritans.

What this section has aimed to accomplish is to give a clearer picture of the relationship between naturalism, calling and divine commands as it relates to Puritan thought. Secondly, the section has given a very brief context to some of the moral debates taking place between naturalists and divine command theorists surrounding the Puritans in and around their time. We will now begin to look not only at how the Puritans navigate these concerns in ethics but also at how they relate to politics through general and particular commands.

**General Calling**

We will now begin to look at the specifics of the two kinds of callings promulgated in reformation theology. We will first build upon our discussion of moral development in other works and the above emphasis on imposition language, it is clear that Hardy has not taken these English Puritan Calvinists into account when making this statement; see Hardy, *Fabric*, 67.


23 Ibid., 332.

the previous chapter and discuss the universal call to, or imposition on, all mankind to have a right relationship with God through faith in the death and resurrection of Christ.25 We will then move on to discuss the second aspect of calling, which is related to particular individuals.

As mentioned above, the first call is ‘general’ and is thus universal, as it is related to the essence of what it is to be a human agent and thus to experience the flourishing and happiness that is specific to humans. This is also related to the ‘kind of life’ discussed in the previous chapter, because the moral development that comes with habituating the virtues, cardinal and theological, relates to the good of all humanity and directs humanity to eudaemonia in the vision of God in the next life.

**Salvation and Virtue**

In *True Manner of knowing Christ Crucified*, Perkins shows the distinction between general and particular callings.

For as Christ in the garden, & upon the crosse, by prayer made with strong cries and teares, presented and resigned himselfe to be a sacrifice of propitiation to the justice of his Father for mans sinne: so must we also in prayer present & resigne ourselves, our soules, our bodies, our understanding, will, memorie, affections, and al we have to the service of God, in the generall calling of a Christian, and in the particular callings in which hee hath placed us.26

Here, like Luther and above, we see Perkins’ distinction between two kinds of callings, the first of which is related to the giving of our ‘ourselves’ to the service of God in our ‘generall’ callings, while our particular calling is related to his placement of a person in a particular place. “The General calling is the calling of Christianitie, which is common to all that love in the Church of God.” It is a calling “out of the world” and into the “kingdome of heaven.”27 The practices of the general calling are prayer, thanksgiving, meditation on Jesus and the furthering of the good estate of the Church.28 Like Luther, all Christians are called to play the roles of popes, bishops, priests and monks through our earthly vocations by loving our neighbors.29 It is the duty of the general calling that “every man ... become a servant of his brother in all the duties of love.” It is important

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26Perkins, *CC*, 27.
27Perkins, *ATV*, 13; Rogers, *PC*, 39; 50; 201.
that Christians learn this duty because the “practice of it is the special ornament of
Christ's holy Gospel.” The last general duty is to “walk worthy that calling whereto God hath called you.” This calling of Christianity “is the most excellent calling in the world.”
It is to keep a good conscience before God and be blameless among men. This duty is commanded “to the meditation and practice of all men.”

In Baxter’s Treatise on Conversion, he takes conversion, repentance, regeneration, sanctification and vocation to be the same work upon the soul, with very distinctive minor differences. The vocation that Baxter is discussing here is the more general vocation of becoming a Christian. We can see this in that he makes very little distinction between sanctification and vocation, though the latter is involved in the former. As it relates to salvation, vocation is “God’s act of calling,” which is called “uneffectual” when it is not answered and “our calling” when it is successful. We see here that Baxter makes a distinction between callings that are obeyed and callings that are “unanswered.” As we will see in more detail further in this chapter and in the next, our calling in the general and salvific sense, when successful, is when we are “brought but to outward profession and common gifts.” The second sense, which Baxter calls “special,” is when people are “savingly converted to Christ.” The successful universal calling of mankind to God Baxter calls “special effectual calling,” which is the same as conversion and repentance. The successful vocational calling he calls “common effectual calling,” which is “outward profession and common gifts.” Both of these are related to salvation and are part of the sanctification process. In Saints Everlasting Rest, Baxter writes that all effectual callings must be external callings “because the Scriptures hath yet shewed us no other way to the Internal Call, but by the External.” Based on our discussion of general calling, here in

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30 Baxter, ATC, 9.
31 Ibid., 6.
32 Ibid., 7.
33 Baxter, SER, 119. Though vocation and repentance are the same thing for Baxter, there is a slight difference in that repentance is terminus pro quo, while vocation is only the state to which one is called. Also see ATC, 7.
34 Baxter, ATC, 7. Special effectual calling is the same as conversion and repentance. It is for this reason that vocation is different from sanctification. Vocation is the “spirits causing the first act of faith in the Soul, and by that Act a habit is effected, and wherewith the seed of all Graces, which they call the work of Sanctification.” Vocation is a “special respect” of the Gospel’s call to the “act of believing in Christ.”
35 Perkins also uses the term ‘effectual’ to talk about the general calling and acceptance into God’s family; see Perkins, GC, 265.
36 Baxter, SER, 117.
this section and in previous chapters, we are now in a position to look at the relationship between the general and the particular calling.

**Particular Calling**

We have established in earlier chapters and above that there is a universal flourishing of humans by nature of being human. We will here begin to investigate the specifics of flourishing that are situational, depending on the individual person through their calling. This section will continue with the Puritans’ discussion of calling from the more general salvific calling to the particular calling that is imposed or commanded upon the individual. This is where the Puritans become distinctive in their position.

The particular calling, “is that special calling which belongs to some particular men: as the calling of a magistrate, the calling of a Minister, the calling of a master, of a father, of a child, of a servant, of a subject, or any other calling that is common to all.”37 Perkins writes, “every man must judge that particular calling, in which God hath placed him, to be best of all calling for him: I say not simply best, but best for him.”38

In the context of living this life well, we can see that, for Rogers, particular callings are “commanded to abide.”39

"[I]f the scriptures commend unto as a certayne course to walke in with God, and a particular directing of our lives (of what calling or estate soever wee be, according to his word) and further requireth the same to be daily kept and followed of us (as hath been shewed) then Christians must bee guided by some daily direction in the leading of their lives.40"

We can see from the above that there is a moral weight and obligation that comes along with a particular station and place in life. This is a requirement of our daily lives and activities. Calling is the service of God “in the observation of his commandments.”41 Rogers also writes,

"[W]hat ordinary actions in any lawfull calling are to be done of a Christian through the day, but God hath in his word guided him how to doe them, such wise, as hee by the helpe thereof, may with peace and comfort being it to an end...he the knoweth his will therein, and walketh not after the same, shall neither finde peace in his life, nor happines after."42

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42 Rogers, *PC*, 303; 318.
Here, in Rogers, calling, as the will of God, brings about our end, that end being happiness.

The St. Matthew account of the Sermon of the Mount, according to Perkins, is concerned with calling and the will of God. What Jesus is teaching here is the will of the father. The beatitudes, though speaking of blessedness and happiness, are also speaking of the will of the father.43 Perkins, in his exposition of the Sermon on the Mount, writes that it is a sermon to his disciples so that they would know his will and the “particularity in their office and calling.”44

We can also see an account of the virtues as they relate to calling. “The vertues which the word of God requireth of us in the practice of our callings are many, but two especially: Faith, & Love.”45 The faith being referred to here is not a saving faith, but a faith arising from the knowledge that doing our particular calling is pleasing to God. “Without this particular faith, no man can please God in any calling.”46 Thus when people live by faith and regard God’s commandments, “it causeth them to do their actions in obedience.”47 Further equating calling with command, Perkins defines commandment as “that word of God, whereby the actions of every man’s calling, are either expressly commanded, or at least approoved.”48 For example, God must authorize a magistrate to use the sword.49

The other virtue related to work is love. Perkins writes, “we must referre all the works of our calling, to the honour, praise, and glory of God: and here is the principle thing wherein love consisteth.” Love in our work and callings is first and formost, “for the honour and praise of [Christ’s] name.” The second sense and work of love, as with Luther, is “to apply the works, and duties, and labour of our callings, to the good of the Church, and common-wealth, and the place whereof we are members.” This is how love is put into practice.50 But unlike Luther, Perkins takes calling further than one’s station in

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43 Perkins, GLE, 3.
44 Ibid., 2.
45 Perkins, ATV, 102.
46 Ibid., 102–3. This statement may be an attempt to understand St. Paul’s statement in Romans 14:22-23 that anything not done in faith is sin.
47 Ibid., 104.
48 Ibid., 5; 103.
49 Ibid., 103.
50 Ibid., 105–6.
life. Perkins writes, “God ordaineth a calling when he *prescribeth* and *commandeth* the same in and by his word and those calling and state of life which have no warrant from Gods word are unlawfull.”51 Robert Adams shines some light on another aspect of the love of serving others. Having a calling is like having a personal project (which includes everything from parenting to hobbies or work) in which one nurtures and loves or cares for “something in particular, as one does in loving, and not just as a way of doing the most good.”52 We love the things that are put before us or “put in front of us to love” and, in this way, these things become more than just projects.53 The happiest people find these sorts of projects important. To combine the second Puritan sense of love with what Adams is stating above is to say that to love and nurture the community is a project of love. Serving the commonwealth, church and family is love in practice.

It is here that we shall make a further distinction within the category of particular calling. What we will call ‘deep’ callings are a priori broad character traits or innate dispositions that relate to one’s natural abilities, and they are metaphysically grounded. Some of examples of what I call deep callings are predispositions towards detail-oriented activities or towards being a natural conversationalist. Deep callings can also be inclinations towards arts over maths, or towards athletics over intentional discursive reasoning. Lawrence Blum articulates this aspect of calling (vocation), noting that callings are nonimpersonal goods in which the “moral pull. . . is experienced as implicated in the individual’s own sense of personal values,” as opposed to universal demands that weigh equally on all moral agents regardless of their character or desires.54 Vocation, is ‘about’ the individual agent, whose character is determined by certain intrinsic features, and its demands are meant to maximize flourishing and effectiveness in doing good. Vocation is also nonpersonal in that it is not solely about, or concerned with, one’s own good, but should generally be about service as much as it is about personal fulfillment. Deep callings are in relation to other a posteriori particular callings that are related more to time and space, such as living in this or that place or being the wife or husband of such and such a

51 Ibid., 4. Emphasis mine. Some things are not callings, e.g. gambling.
53 Ibid., 302.
person. These distinctions will be drawn out in more detail later in this chapter and in the next.

To conclude this section, we look to Rogers, who shows that the Christian’s growth must be seen in their duties to men and to “particular callings.” Before moving on to further investigate the distinctive features of Puritan particular callings, we need to connect the above description with a view of providence. We will here show the relationship between Aristotelian metaphysics and medieval elucidations of concurrence, and the correlation between divine freedom and the particular call.

**Providence**

Drawing upon Aristotle’s metaphysics, Perkins, in his doctrine of calling draws upon two causes of Aristotle’s four causes: the first and final. We will discuss the first cause here, as it relates to providence, and the final cause in more detail later in Chapter 6, on calling in the political sphere. Perkins writes that the first cause is God, “the author” of every calling. “Every man is to live as he is called of God.” Aristotle, in the *Metaphysics*, writes that a first cause has four senses. The first is concerned with “essences” or “substance,” which we have seen above and will see in more detail later in this chapter. God is, for the Puritans through substances and essences, the first cause, like a military general who appoints every person to their particular calling. God being the first cause in the above sense is his “special providence” over mankind. God watches over this great world, “allotting to every man his motion and calling, and in that calling his particular office and function.” This is how God is the author and beginner of our calling.

From these statements, we are able to see a concept of concurrence in Perkins’ conceptions of God as the first cause of our callings. This is that divine action is “concurring’ with human action in a single cause.” The concept of concurrence was

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55 Rogers, *PC*, 206.
57 Aristotle, *Meta*, 983a24–983b5. The other three aspects of the first cause for Aristotle could also be easily related with calling in the way that Perkins has conceived it. The second sense is a matter of “substratum,” the third is the “source of change” and the fourth is the cause “opposed to” the first cause.
59 Christopher J Insole, *Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 24. The concept of concurrence can still be found in eighteenth century Catholic moral thought: see Alphonsus de Liguori, *Uniformity with God’s Will*, trans. Thomas W. Tobin (Lamp Post Onc., 2008), 13. Concurrence can also be found in the works of Luther; see Martin Luther, “Exposition of
prominent in the theology of Aquinas as well as in that of other Catholic thinkers like Francisco Suarez. Concurrence is seen as an aspect of God’s providence in which created moral agents and God cooperate in every action, directing their distinctive properties to act. Brian Brock notes that for the reformers, “the glory of human work is not that humans become co-creators, but that God involves himself with it in order to use it for his purposes.”60 This is an asset that a concept of concurrence has for a theology of work, which we will see in the Puritans.

Divine action as the first cause becomes a way in which the Puritans can associate callings and vocations with a telos (or final cause, the second cause that Perkins associates with a kind of life) as well as with providence. In the previous chapter, I noted that both Bolton and Baxter use the language of concurrence in discussing the development and habituation of Aristotelian virtues that direct us towards ultimate ends.61 This is lucid in the discussion of infused virtues. Concurrence is a necessary part of Christian wisdom in order to keep our subordination to God and our dependence on him. Baxter further associates calling with ends and with providence when he writes, “make an advantage of every Object thou seest, and of every passage of Divine Providence, and of every thing that befals in thy Labour and Calling, to mind thy soul of its approaching Rest. As all Providences and Creatures are means to our Rest, so do they point us to that as their end.”62

Perkins, Bolton and Baxter agree that specific callings have ends and endeavors.63 Ben Witherington III highlights this from a New Testament perspective. “Certainly one of the most miserable things a human can experience is the feeling of not knowing what she ought to be doing with her life.” This is why it is important to have a telos. We must grasp that our lives have God-given purpose and a goal that is not just a “terminus.” This

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60 Brian Brock, *Christian Ethics in a Technological Age* (William B Eerdmans Publishing, 2010), 297. Brock continues on to note that that God’s working in our action is not about “achieving a goal.” This may seem contradictory in a section discussing the use of final causation. However, Brock is emphasizing the completion of a certain task or, in Aristotelian-Thomist terms, the end for which one acts. However, the Puritan discussion above, which will be addressed in the next chapter, is not about the completion of tasks, but final in the achieving of the “common good.”


“most certainly involves us working, indeed working hard, for the kingdom.” Work must be “both eschatological and ethical, both theological and teleological.”64 As mentioned above, this discussion of providence and ends will be again addressed in the following chapters on the political sphere as the end of particular callings and providence. Here we have seen providential efficient and final causation in particular callings, whereas in the next chapters we will see these concepts extended to God’s sustaining of the political order.

This, however, raises a potential problem with regard to providence and the relation of particular to general callings and obligation. O’Donovan notes that divine providence is ‘arbitrary’ in that God is not bound to act a certain way when there is no reason for him to do one thing rather than another. This divine freedom is related to the giving, or commanding, of callings.65 O’Donovan brings to the surface a problem with the relationship between general and particular callings. Does calling come into conflict with the ethical, as Kierkegaard argues in Fear and Trembling?66 Does there, in some particular instances, need to be a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’ where our particular calling conflicts with general moral principles?67 The protection of divine freedom is one of the benefits of holding a DCT, as mentioned above. O’Donovan argues that we should not confuse vocation with moral duty, meaning “the vocational demand, which is not generic, is sanctioned by the generic principle that one should heed one’s vocation.”68 There is the general moral principle that everyone should obey his or her calling, but the individual circumstances of this are left to the particular person to work out and obey. The Puritans would disagree with O’Donovan’s claim that “it would be wrong to say of any action which I might find myself ‘called’ to do that such an action

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64 Witherington III, Work, 9; 14. Witherington also notes that our work is distinguished from God’s but, because we have koinonia with him, we are able to participate with his actions. This seems to resemble concurrence language with a New Testament grounding; see pages 28-9.

65 O’Donovan, Resurrection, 42.

66 I do not take the moral views espoused in Fear and Trembling to be the actual views of Kierkegaard himself; I rather take them to be those of the pseudonymous author Johannes De Silencio. Even so, the moral discussion found in Fear and Trembling has a long history of representing the problem that O’Donovan is concerned with here.


68 O’Donovan, Resurrection, 44.
was ‘morally obligatory.’”69 As we will see, Puritan authors’ general ethic of ‘love thy neighbor’ is as morally obligatory as, to use O’Donovan’s example, the command to obey the call to live in Toronto. The call to live in a certain place and to do a certain work in a certain family and community is a duty. As we will see in more detail in the following chapters, one’s calling includes one’s particular station in life. The Puritans often use the term ‘duty’ as a way of describing the motivation for obeying a particular calling to do a certain action or work in a certain place and at a certain time. However, I imagine that they would also be uncomfortable agreeing with the author of Fear and Trembling that individual callings can contradict natural and general moral principles. More will be said on this in chapter 7, in the discussion on law. With this addressed, we now move on to discuss the Puritan doctrine of particular calling in further detail. This discussion will mostly focus on William Perkins, but will broaden to other Puritan authors as it continues.

In summary, what we have seen above are the beginnings of a discussion on how particular callings fit within a broader understanding of universal ethics. This, however, brings out certain problems that need to be addressed. I will attempt to answer two of these concerns in the remaining sections of this chapter. The first concern is with metaphysics: is there a discrepancy between persons and moral development, between universal personhood and particular persons, and does this lead to a conflicting dual flourishing? The second concern is addressed below and is epistemic. How can we know what our callings actually are?

**Dual Flourishing**

Here we must address the problem of dual commands or flourishing. What we see in the Puritan doctrine of calling is a sense that a ‘deep’ calling of broad character traits is individually substantiated at an ontological level within each person. How is it that there can be commands that all must obey, but at the same time commands that only some are obligated to obey? Further, how is it that individual commands could contribute to individual happiness and flourishing, given the Puritans’ strong metaphysical assumptions?

The tension lies in that the kind of situationism I am arguing for in this thesis makes a distinction between universal and individual happiness that may make it seem as

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69 Ibid., 43.
if there is a conflict between universals and particulars. To be more specific, there is a universal happiness that is objective and fitting for every person by virtue of their being human, but there are multitudes of particular ‘happinesses’ that are not the same ends. The question that needs to be addressed here is this: how can a multitude of seemingly conflicting parts contribute to a unified whole? As we have seen earlier, it is right for one person to do one set of actions, while it is wrong for another person to do that same set of actions. How does this diversity represent any cohesive conception of universal human flourishing and not fall into flagrant relativism?

In this section we will briefly see that there is a shared universal, which is human nature and which needs, for example, faith in Christ. This universal is expressed in unique and particular ways, and calling relates both to the universal and to the particular. The Puritans seem to be silent on how the relationship between universal personhood and flourishing relate to particular persons metaphysically, though, as shown in previous chapters, ontology is important to their ethics. It is not clear if they even see this as a problem.

The tension set out above relates to our current discussion of calling in that a person, by virtue of being a member of the species ‘human’ experiences human-specific flourishing as described in Chapter 2. One does this by being in right relationship with God through Christ. For all humanity, faith in the atoning work of Christ on the cross is fundamental to experiencing flourishing in the next life. Development towards this end is through the development and habituation of virtues as described in Chapter 4. But there is also a flourishing that comes along with being a particular human. For example, p¹, as a numerical particular of a broader universal of being human, expresses the property of flourishing through activity a¹ and not a², where p², while being a human being also expresses the property of flourishing by doing a² and not a¹. So within the broader and general flourishing, there are instances of particular flourishing. The above description of particular callings and particular flourishing is an a priori metaphysically rich account that gets to the level of our natural gifting and talents and includes the ‘deep’ calling described above. But there is another aspect of individual calling as well. Drawing upon the Lutheran emphasis in a doctrine of vocation, there are a posteriori conditions such as families, upbringings and other relationships within the community that contribute to the
particular calling. This aspect of particular calling is related to our being-in-the-world and who we are, subject to space and time.

Twentieth-century philosopher Edith Stein helpfully notes that with regard to individuation (the manner in which particular things are identified as distinct from other things) and natural talent, it is in these talents that we find ourselves. And the danger is that if we do not find ourselves as individuals, we “do not find God either and do not attain eternal life.” However, she also emphasizes that individuation is not simply reducible to talents. What matters is that “each of these persons feels himself in his innermost essence as an ‘authentic individual’ and is so regarded by those who have truly ‘grasped’ or ‘apprehended’ the nature of his personality.” Furthermore, as was saw in the previous chapter with the primacy of charity in the virtues, this is also the case for individual callings. O’Donovan is again helpful when he states, drawing upon 1 Corinthians 13, that individual callings are ‘clanging cymbals’ without love. Love intermixed with our callings becomes the fulfillment of the moral law. Callings are

[True interpretations, each within a unique vocational matrix, of the one moral life, the life which is given to all men to live. Just as love is the one demand which is differentiated generically in the varieties of commands in the moral law, so it is the one life-task which is differentiated particularly in the uniqueness of individual vocations.]

It is the virtue of charity that takes the mundane, everyday gifts of the secular person, done without this pivotal virtue and thus considered in Paul’s words as a ‘sounding gong’ or ‘clanging cymbal,’ and turns them into the cohesive fulfillment of the moral law. “We respond to the objectivity of that gift [calling] and live the life that God has summoned us to live in all its distinctiveness.” Circling this same theme, but with regard to freedom, O’Donovan notes that part of freedom is “the individual’s discovery and pursuit of his or

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73 Ibid., 220.
her vocation from God.”

Talents are signifiers of a metaphysical reality, but are not the extent of this reality. We will explore this further later in this chapter. A strength of addressing the problem of universal and particular calling in the above manner is that it allows for a strong sense of divine interaction and dependence between individual and universal personhood.

We have discussed above that human flourishing and happiness are the end and result of obedience to commands given either explicitly or at the level of our natures. The problem of dual commands, or dual flourishing, can be addressed in the above discussion of particulars by identifying the universal happiness that comes with the end, or telos, of being human, and also the telos of right use of the gifts and talents that are our natural abilities. The most happy person, for the Puritans, is the one who pursues both universal and particular ‘happinesses.’ Peter Sedgwick notes,

> The importance of a theology of vocation is that it finds a purpose in the valuing of work, as an offering by the created order to their Creator in love and adoration, with the sacrifice of self to serve others (altruism in happiness and social capital literatures). This goes beyond, although it includes, the idea of work as self-actualization.

This resembles the Puritan position on calling, work and happiness. We will now look at the specifics of the above discussion of universals and particulars in Puritan texts.

**Puritans, Calling and the Individual**

We can see this concept of individuation subtly in comments like Baxter’s statement that meditation is not a duty for certain people, depending on their natural disposition, or his statement that “any weak person [should not] stretch their braines beyond their ability.” Reynolds shows attention to a distinction between general and particular calling, while also emphasizing the demands upon private persons. He states,

> But must here withal, take notice of the generall care of the Creator; whereby he hath fastened on all creatures, not only this private desire to satisfie the demands of their own nature, but hath also stamp’t upon them generally charitie and feeling of Communion, as they are sociable parts of the Universe or common body. Wherein cannot possible be admitted (by reason of that necessary

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76 Baxter, *DHM*, 5–6. He has in mind here people who have a natural disposition towards melancholy.

77 Ibid., 6–7.
mutual connexion betwene the parts thereof) any confusion or divulsion, without immediate
danger to all the members.”

Here, we can get the sense in Reynolds’ thought that individual demands (or particulars)
make up the parts of the universal common body. If a particular person is in confusion
about the demand, there is an immediate danger of breaking a necessary, mutual
connection. Rogers writes that a calling grows and develops with the Christian towards
an end of comfort and enjoyment. “When yet, they having once received it of the Lord at
their first effectual calling and conversion, it ought to grow up with them and
accompany them throughout their life, and make every part of it more sweet and
comfortable.” Owen emphasizes that Christ, as our exemplar and as perfected
humanity, has a particular call and command from the father: “that he should lay down
his life, and take it again.” The law of mediation, which is a law for the work of a single
individual, Christ, was for no one else. Christ, Owen thinks, had a unique calling.

In this section we have seen that, according to the account of calling, how talents
and by extension one’s daily work, can contribute to earthly flourishing. However, this
can only be understood in light of universal human flourishing that resembles the
traditional Aristotelian-Thomist concept of happiness. We will now focus our attention on
the particularly spiritual aspect of Puritan calling and personal uniqueness and how it
shapes the way that they conceive of prayer and calling.

Calling and Prayer

In the Puritans, addressed above, we see a particularization of calling to the
individual. There is another way to see this played out in Puritan theology that will be
looked at here. What we will briefly look at here is the fact that different people in
different callings will have their own kinds of temptations and concerns.

Thomas Becon (1512/13–1567) in *Flour of Godly Praiers* writes prayers for different
callings. We can begin to see some of the varieties of concerns that come with being in a
certain calling. For example, a magistrate has the responsibility to promote virtue and
godliness in their people through the upholding of true religion. Becon writes,

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79 Rogers, *PC*, 432. Rogers seems to resemble Calvin himself, as he thinks that only Christians
have callings. If we recall, for Calvin the general calling is to all in the form of proclamation, but the special
calling is only for those who have the Spirit.
We beseech the, unot all civile Magistrates, head rulers and common officers thy holy spirit, which may so rule them in al their doings, that every one of them according to their vocation: may trulye and faithfullye do that whyche appertayneth unto their office.81

The king’s councilors, similarly, are to remember that they should care about the good of the people and direct them towards virtue and away from vice.82

In the realms of the court, Judges need prayers that they will judge matters according to “equity and justice, deliver the oppressed from the power of the violent.”83 Becon’s discussion continues on to sound like passages from Isaiah about caring for the fatherless and the widow. The lawyer, through the law, restores virtue and punishes vice. The prayer for lawyers is for “wisdome, prudence, and knowledge, so to rule thorow the goveraunce of thy holy spirit the harts of al lawyers.”84 The lawyer needs prayer that he will walk uprightly.

Bishops and Ministers should pray for hospitality, to lead a godly life, and to bring up the youth virtuously. They should also be aware of, and pray against, the inclination to be men pleasers which “by their fair speche and flatterynge wordes, decayue the heretes of the simple.”85

Schoolmaster John Clarke (d. 1658) in Holy Incense has a special prayer for the scholar. The scholar needs help in reading and meditating on things taught as well as the bestowed of understanding and wisdom.86 Clarke’s prayers for the scholar resemble the discussion of theoria in Chapter 3. In a very Aristotelian and Thomist fashion, scholars are to search out wisdom and the “reason of things,” or first principles.87 They should learn not only “heathen, and prophane Authors, but that wisdome also which is from above,

81 Thomas Becon, The Flour of Godly Praiers [most Worthy to Be Vsed in These Our Daies for the Sauegard, Health, and Conforte of All Degrees, and Estates / Neulie Made by Thomas Becon]., Early English Books, 1475-1640 / 1784:06 (Imprinted at London: By Ihon Day, dwelving ouer Aldersgate, a lytle beneth S. Martins, these bokes are to be solde at hys shop by the lytle cunduite in Chepesyde, [ca. 1550], 1550), xviii–xix.
82 Ibid., xvii.
83 Ibid., xviii.
84 Ibid., xxxi.
85 Ibid., xx–xxiii. There are also some interesting similarities between the prayers of the minister and the prayers of the king and councilors to care for the souls of the people. We will cover this in more detail in the next chapter when we will look at the place of politics in moral development.
87 Ibid., 194; 197.
and heavenly, which may give me an inheritance among all them that are sanctified."  

There is also a place in Clarke’s treatise to pray to possess the intellectual virtues. Clarke has a specific prayer for merchants and tradesmen. They need prayer against the desire to lie and use false weights and “deceitfull balances, or unjust measures,” as well as prayer not to take advantage of the poor. There are also prayers for laborers not to be idle, but to labor in the callings God has given. This theme of idleness is also found in the vocational prayers of Church of England clergyman Thomas Tuke (1580/81–1657).

Alongside prayers for callings, Becon writes prayers for people in specific stations in life, like the ‘richman,’ the ‘poor,’ and the ‘commons.’ Clarke has a specific prayer to “blesse my estate, that my riches doe encrease,” but to not let the workers “heart be set upon them.”

What we have seen in this section is the recognition in Puritan thought that different callings have different kinds of temptations and roles within a society and thus need certain kinds of prayers that address them. The temptations of the bishop are not the same as those of judge, and the temptations of the magistrate are not the same as those of a merchant. We have also seen that these prayers are not just related to the jobs themselves but to stations in life.

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88 Ibid., 194. This resembles the relationship described between philosophy and theology in Chapter 3. To do theology well is to be able to engage with secular thought. These two disciplines complement each other.

89 Ibid., 196–7.

90 Becon, Godly Praiers, xxx.

91 Clarke, Holy Incense, 198.


93 Becon, Godly Praiers, xxxiii–xxv. Tuke also comments on the responsibilities of those who are progressing in their wealth; see Tuke, Practise, 157. And there is a recognition that it is God in his providence who puts people in stations of wealth, ibid., 154.

With all the above in mind, John Hare helpfully emphasizes that the particular adds perfection beyond that of the universal. “Since our happiness is being co-lovers, particular happiness should be a way of being a co-lover that is unique to each of us.”\textsuperscript{95} Because there are individual essences and common natures that can be “perfection,” the difference in our treatment of different neighbors has to respect the common nature (humanity) that they all share.”\textsuperscript{96}

There is little to no room in the Puritans’ thinking on calling for the problem addressed by the author of \textit{Fear and Trembling} via O’Donovan, that is, our callings morally conflict with the generic good. Special callings coexist with and enliven general callings; they should not fight against each other.\textsuperscript{97} What we see implicitly in these Puritan writers, in the relationship between the good of the individual and the community, seems to be discussed explicitly by eighteenth century English bishop and philosopher Joseph Butler. Butler makes a distinction between the self-love (in the sense described in Chapter 2) that is related to the individual and benevolence that pertains to the universal or social.\textsuperscript{98} He writes that these ends, individual and communal, “do indeed perfectly coincide; and to aim at public and private good are so far from being inconsistent, that they mutually promote each other,” but remain distinct.\textsuperscript{99} The beginning of benevolence, which begins with self-love, contributes to happiness, both individual and communal.\textsuperscript{100} Against what would become the perspective of the author of \textit{Fear and Trembling}, social goods and individual goods do not come into conflict.

What we have seen above in our discussion is that the problem of dual flourishing does not need to be a problem. The command to flourish as humanity, described in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, need not be in conflict with the particular calling of the individual. In fact, they mutually inform each other. What we have also seen in the Puritan doctrine of calling is a sense that a call is individually substantiated at an ontological level, within

\textsuperscript{95} J. E Hare, \textit{God and Morality: A Philosophical History} (Malden: Blackwell Pub., 2007), 113.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 114. Hare also points out that if this reading of Scotus’ metaphysics is adopted by ethics, it also implies that ethical duties to one another do not end with our duties to the humanity found in each person; rather, they “include our duties towards the unique difference that constitutes each individual person as that person”; see page ibid., 115.
\textsuperscript{97} Perkins, \textit{ATT}, 32; 36.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 109; 20; 25–6; 103. Also see Perkins, \textit{ATT}, 34; 75.
humanity generally and in each person specifically, while also maintaining an emphasis on one’s ‘station’ in the world. I need to reiterate at this point that, in light of the above discussion on earthly ‘happinesses’ and Chapter 2 on the supernatural end, there is still technically only one ultimate end for humanity, and that is in the next life in the vision of God. We will now look at how a theology of work relates to creation or nature, and some of the problems that arise if these are separated. We will focus on the work of Miroslav Volf.

**Volf, Calling and Work**

For the Puritans, it is most certainly the case that personal callings are based in creation and ontology; they are a part of us. Miroslav Volf, in *Work in the Spirit*, disagrees with the Puritans brand of ontologically based, or at least creation based, view of calling and work. Looking at Volf here helps to bring out something distinct in the Puritans.

Volf's pneumatological view of work is similar to that of the Puritans, as it is teleological. All human work is moving towards the *eschaton*, and even though most human work will not be in the new creation, work makes the building blocks of the community that allow it to move towards the end. “Human work is ultimately significant not only because it contributes to the future environment of human beings, but also because it leaves an indelible imprint on their personalities.”101 Volf recognizes ends in much the same way as the Puritan eudaemonists do, in that the goal of human history is to have *shalom* with God, such that our end affects our means to our end.102 A Christian definition of work must account for where history is moving in the hands of God. “A theological interpretation of work is only valid if it facilitates transformation of work towards ever-greater correspondence with the coming new creation.”103

We also see that, like the Puritans, Volf's emphasis is on man’s cooperation with God in creation through the Spirit.104 In some ways, the Puritans and Volf have a similar concern, that is, how creation and work relates to ends. For both parties, there is an integral connection between the “first creation” of the world and the new creation, but for the reformers, as seen above, God involves himself with human work in order to use it

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102 Ibid., 85.
103 Ibid., 83. Normative principles are implied in the structure of human work; see p. 81.
104 Ibid., 98; 114.
for his purposes. Creation is set, and God providentially places us in the world in a certain place and time, whereas for Volf, humans are co-creators. Volf thus deemphasizes the ‘first creation’ aspect and focuses on the role of the spirit in a process towards the eschaton. Accordingly, for Volf, Christianity should not emphasize work based entirely on a doctrine of creation; in fact, doing so is “impossible.”

The potential problem that one could run into if one takes creation out of a theology of work, while still emphasizing an eschatological teleology, is a separation between the ‘first creation’ and the ‘new creation,’ to put it in Volf’s terms. This could lead to an unhelpful distinction between the natural and the supernatural, as we have seen in Chapter 2. Effectively, the theologian that has this tendency would be making a distinction between creation, taken as the natural end, and new creation, taken as the supernatural end, and claiming that they are no longer related. Making work a strictly pneumatological concept effectively elevates it to the supernatural, so much so that that it leaves creation behind. The potential problem with this is that work becomes unnatural, as it is only related to the new creation and is above the current creation.

Volf himself seems to flirt with this tendency without explicitly falling into it. Aspects of work become ends in themselves, such as leisure or nature itself. This comes dangerously close to implying that there are multiple ends that are not directly related to, or inclusive of, the new creation. Volf ultimately does not fall into this trap because he wants to emphasize that this world is transformed and not annihilated. The tendency towards annihilationism is not uncommon in Christian theology. Though Volf does not fall into this particular problem, he does seem to esteem work as having equal importance with worship in bringing in the new creation, giving the sense of the divide that concerned us above.

There is also the possibility with a theology of work divorced from creation that there is not a lot of ground for human nature as it relates to work. By affirming that the Spirit is a key aspect of human identity and that non-Christian work contributes to the bringing in of the new kingdom, we have a potential contradiction. Either non-Christians

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105 Ibid., 101.
106 Ibid., 133–4.
107 Ibid., 144.
108 One example of this can be found in Edward Adams, The Stars Will Fall from Heaven: Cosmic Catastrophe in the New Testament and Its World (London: T & T Clark, 2007).
who lack the Holy Spirit also lack an essential and necessary attribute of humanness or all humans are somehow in the Spirit in the same way. Based on a later statement concerning the Spirit’s relationship to the natural order, it would seem that Volf agrees with the latter. The Spirit relates to creation the same way in the non-Christian’s work as it relates in that of the regenerated person.

The Puritan doctrine of calling does not fall into these potential pitfalls for two reasons. First of all, the dichotomy and distinction between creation and the *telos* does not exist. The creation that we are currently working in has its *telos* in the new creation. Thus the work that we do here is integrally related to the bringing about of the new creation or, as we put it in Chapter 2, its perfection, not because we are co-creators with God, but because we are involved in God’s continual sustaining of the socio-political order. The eschatological transformation of the world is not its annihilation, but rather its fulfillment. Creation is not in the process of being completed or ‘open,’ but is to a vast extent set awaiting its perfection.\(^\text{109}\) There is not a distinction between pure and supernatural nature as it relates to the created order. Second, the Puritans do not have the potential problem of having the Spirit overly present in the world. In relating work to creation and the Spirit, rather than just to the Spirit, the Puritans are able to navigate these potential issues. The next question that will need to be addressed is an epistemic problem. How is it that we come to know what our callings and positions in society should be?

**Self-Examination, Community and Mistaken Callings**

Here we begin to look into a potential problem with regard to epistemology and discerning what our callings actually are. Finding a calling is, in a sense, discovering one’s God-given talents (what one can do) and one’s God-given personality (what fits the person), for the building up of community.\(^\text{110}\) At face value, this is easy enough. The problem is that we can only see the effects of our essential being, but never the essence itself. Because of this, it is possible for us to be deceived as to what truly makes us the individual that we are.\(^\text{111}\) Since the ability to recognize our particular essences are an important part of human flourishing, we need to address here if any certainty can be had

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\(^{111}\) The sense of essential being used here is same as that in Aristotle, that is, that essence constitutes the fundamental features of a substance; see Aristotle, “*Metaphysics*,” 1031a15–18; 1028a31–33.
in discerning our callings. Because the call of God encompasses every part of life, from eternal salvation to the places in which we live, there is a lot at stake, namely flourishing or frustration, in misinterpreting or not understanding one’s call. Here we will address this issue.

Perkins writes that every calling must be fitting to the person. The way people know their calling is by examining themselves and deciding to which calling they are most fitted and to what things they are not. One does this by examining one’s affections and examining one’s gifts. “For his gifts, he must examine, for and to what calling they are fittest. Having thus tried both his affections and gifts, finding also the calling to which they tend with one consent, he may say, that is his calling, because he liketh it best, and is every way the fittest for it.”112 This appeal to reflection on the inner self and experience was distinctively Puritan. Though they believed they were in the wake of Calvin himself, this move from an emphasis on looking to Christ, in Calvin, towards looking inwardly, as in the case of the Puritans, is notably more individualistic.113

The Puritans give a number of ways that one can know one’s calling. For example, one should ask oneself if the sense of vocation strengthens or weakens with prayer. Or does it survive tribulation? Sometimes callings are difficult; at other times, they come with ease. Actual results are a test in some contexts, but not in all.114 Baxter acknowledges that callings can be dangerous.115 For children, it is the parent’s choice to ‘fit’ the calling for them until they can judge for themselves.116 Parents looking for callings in their children should look for gifts of the body so that they can practice the mechanical arts or gifts of the mind.117 If a parent makes a mistake and puts their children in wrong vocations, then they ruin society by disturbing the web of interlocking economic structures.118 We can see that it is important for the flourishing of the individual and the community that people know their callings and are able to achieve them. The problem here is an epistemic problem of how people can have confidence that what they are doing

112 Perkins, ATV, 41; Perkins, HL, 41.
113 Placher, Callings, 210. Placher notes that this was because of the tensions between Catholic and Protestant theologies and, in light of empiricist philosophy, the best way to prove that one was right and the other wrong was to appeal to experience.
114 Adams, Infinite Goods, 315.
116 Perkins, ATV, 42.
117 Ibid., 43.
118 Ibid., 44.
is actually their calling. We have seen plenty of talent television programs in which people
genuinely think that they are gifted at singing, cooking or some other activity, but they
are clearly deceiving themselves.

There are a few directions in which one can be deceived of one’s calling, but I will
argue that one can be minimally justified in believing that something is one’s calling and
avoid falling into error, by self-reflection that is necessarily grounded in a community. We
will draw upon the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor to help navigate this
issue.

In order to know that one has a certain gifting or calling, one must be justified in
believing that one’s belief in possessing a calling is formed in a manner that is at least
minimally reliable, that it has at least a minimally reliable source. We saw above that the
Puritans’ “minimally reliable source” for knowing one’s calling is based on self-reflection.
This could be the reflection on the joy one receives from the activity, and on the progress
of ‘getting better’ over time. By self-reflection, as well as by the increasing growth of joy
and progress in doing a calling, people are at least minimally justified in believing that
they are gifted in a certain activity. Surely, if someone were engaged in self-reflection,
then they would recognize that they are naturally gifted at some activities and not at
others. There is also the possibility that a person genuinely believes that their calling is a
particular activity but chooses not to recognize, either voluntarily or involuntarily, that
they are not gifted in this way.

We have seen throughout this thesis that character development and uniquely
human rational capacities like reflection are an essential and emphasized aspect of
Puritan thought. Charles Taylor shows the relationship between a person’s character and
their ability for self-interpretation. For Taylor, our self-interpretations are based on, or
are ‘constitutive’ of, our previous experience. Taylor puts it this way:

…because our insights into our own motivations and into what is important and of value are often
limited by the shape of our experience, failure to understand a certain insight, or see the point of
the moral advice proffered, is often taken as a judgment on the character of the person
concerned.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{119} Taylor, \textit{Human Agency}, 38. The fuller context of this discussion is in first and second order
evaluations against utilitarian decision-making procedures, but this small bit of his larger argument shines
some light on our current discussion.
Our own insights into our motivations and into what we believe to be important are limited to our previous experiences. If someone fails to understand their experiences, it is taken as a ‘judgment’ upon their character. As we have seen several times throughout this research, the Puritans emphasize the character development of the moral agent and, as we saw in Chapters 3 and 4 and will see again in Chapter 7, the ability of rational animals to be self-reflecting and to meditate on truths about self and God. Thus, rational and self-interpreting humans must continually reconsider their most basic evaluations and rethink what is essential to their identities. This, for Taylor as well as the Puritans, is at the very foundation of personhood and moral deliberation. If someone is obviously not reevaluating their own identity enough to realize what they are truly called to, it says something about their character.

It seems, however, that these queries can also be addressed by putting the self-reflective person in the context of the broader community. MacIntyre notes that the virtues that are indispensably required for acquiring degrees of self-knowledge and preventing self-deception are “honesty, primary truthfulness about ourselves, both to ourselves and to others.” These virtues are exercised not only in self-examination but also in accountability to those with whom we participate in community, “those who have reason to look to us to help in meeting needs, by acknowledging to them our inadequacies and failures, wherever it is relevant to do so.” In order to be independent practical reasoners, we must concede to those who are expert co-workers and moral exemplars. As we will see more clearly in the next chapter, we have to rely on such people, from our close communities, friends and family members, for these necessary corrections.\(^\text{120}\) As dependent rational animals, we are dependent on the voluntary and involuntary communities in which we find ourselves.

What we have looked at above is the potential epistemic problem of how we can know what our callings are, and whether we can be deceived. Simply put, the answer is yes; there is the possibility of being deceived. By looking at MacIntyre and Taylor, however, we were able to see that the method that the Puritans give for learning one’s callings is at least minimally reliable. God created us with the capabilities to discern his call, and to discern the appropriate and specific means of achieving eudaemon. God created

\(^{120}\text{MacIntyre, Dependent, 95; 97.}\)
us in such a way that we can, upon reflection sense the call of God.\textsuperscript{121} Further, the Aristotelian practical reasoning that is being argued for in this thesis is, by its very nature, communal and takes place in social relationships within families, schools, apprenticeships and the church.\textsuperscript{122} Rational reflection is an important aspect of the doctrine of calling. Now we turn our attention to a historical epistemic problem in the Puritans that has relevance for constructive argument.

\textit{Certainty, Prosperity and Hardship}

There is a further epistemological issue that comes along with the doctrine of calling: the relationship between certainty and prosperity. The above description of the Puritans doctrine of calling could sound to contemporary ears like a prosperity gospel. The problem that this section will briefly try to address is how we can know that we are called to something while struggling to do it. Or, to put it another way, do we know that we have found our calling simply because we are prospering and are successful? We will look at two different strands of reformation epistemologies to help us think through this problem: a theology of glory and a theology of the cross.

How do people know God in the world? A theology of glory would answer this by appealing to reason and personal perceptions. Through these one can increase one’s knowledge about God and the world. If an action appears to be good, then it must be good. There certainly seems to be a strand of this within the Puritan thought investigated thus far. However, Reformation England also saw strands of a ‘theology of the Cross,’ which would answer the above queries by Christ on the cross. The self-revelation of God through Christ is the only means by which one can learn about God and one’s relation to him; all good actions pale in comparison with this. Because Christ suffered on the cross, and he is the only way that we can know good, we know our good, or know if we are following the will of God, by our suffering. Thus “the paradoxical insistence that the route to Christian glory is through suffering, and that persecution and worldly misfortune

\textsuperscript{121} Hare, \textit{God’s Call}, 48. Hare attributes this ‘sense’ to expressivism in ethics, which is a moral position outside of the scope of this research, but it is no way incompatible with what I am expressing.

\textsuperscript{122} MacIntyre, \textit{Dependent}, 107.
are signs of God’s favor.”

Robert Bolton argues that prosperity can actually be a sign of the “cunning and work” of Satan. The wicked experience prosperity because of their “large and unlimited consciences,” and because they are “men of this world,” placing their full “felicity in this world.” The Christian, however, must suffer in this life. He writes,

Let every godly man then with comfort and benefit undergoe those crosses which the Lord layeth upon him: for they are unto him as looking glasses, wherein God sees his faith and dependance upon his providence … So that by them God is pleased and glorified, the others edified and instructed himselfe humbled, recovered by repentance, and more sanctified.

The hypocrite’s prosperity even makes them more inexcusable.

On the other hand, we see in Ezekial Culverwell the exact opposite inclination. In his bestselling work from 1623, the *Treatise of Faith*, Culverwell writes, “what need there is to live by faith for these earthly blessings, which if we did, we should not onely be free from many fore vexations, which torment many ungodly in their distresses.” He continues, stating, “this if it were considered, would move many to labour more for this precious gift of faith, which will so abundantly supply all our earthly wants, whereof wee bee so sensible, and thereby so distracted.” Again, Culverwell writes, “there remain sundry other earthly blessings, which as they be much desired, so are they abundantly provided, promised, and bestowed as need requires upon the faithful.” What Culverwell is expressing in this passage is that those who live by faith will be free of

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124 Bolton, *DSTH*, 54; 50.

125 Ibid., 56.

126 Ibid., 57.


129 Ibid.

130 Ibid., 475.
distress, while the ‘ungodly’ will experience ‘vexation.’ There is health and prosperity for those who “perform [their] “places and callings.”

There are two possible ways of working out these discrepancies for our purposes here. The first, from a historical perspective, is that the Puritans can come to an issue from a number of different perspectives, emphasize different aspects and ultimately come out with very different conclusions. We have seen this throughout this research. This aspect of the Puritan doctrine of calling is generally wildly inconsistent, as different persons at different times want to emphasize one aspect over another.

The second way of working out these discrepancies, in a more constructive context is for a brand of moral situationism described above. With this in mind, we could respond to the above problem by asserting that each event and situation has its own particulars and its own surrounding context. Each of these particulars needs to be taken into account, and it takes the independent practical and reflective reasoning that comes along with the development of virtue grounded in a community to discern if prosperity or hardship is symptomatic of obedience to God.

Conclusion

We have seen in previous chapters that the Puritans eudaemonistic doctrine of calling set forth in this thesis has a universal component. We have seen that by virtue of being human, there are certain virtues that should be habituated, even by regenerate and unregenerate persons, in order for them to experience earthly happiness. This also involves the use of natural rational faculties in the workplace and in discursive and contemplative reasoning.

In this chapter, we have moved from a conception of the divine command to universal humankind in moral development and then to more particular commands in the doctrine of calling. A Puritan eudaemonistic doctrine of calling is ontologically grounded and thus related to flourishing generally as well as particularly. The

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131 Ibid., 163–4.
132 With regard to the prosperity account given above, there is an interesting issue that draws upon the economic principle called the law of diminishing return. This refers to the tendency of effort asserted in a certain craft or activity to decline in productivity or effectiveness after a certain level of results has been achieved. What this means is that a calling can bring in a large amount of prosperity, but at a certain point more effort will have to be asserted in order to achieve a lesser result, thus resulting in less obvious affluence.
particularization comes because the means of achieving earthly happiness vary from person to person. The means to the general calling or *telos*—the infusion of virtues through faith and charity in Christ—are universal in that every person has access to them. Specific callings, or earthly *te télé*, are the same, but the means are particular.

In this chapter, through the Puritan eudaemonistic doctrine of calling, we have seen that universals and particulars in flourishing can be simultaneously held together. We have also shown some potential problems that arise if creation and nature are taken out of a doctrine of calling and a theology of work, and that the Puritans do not fall victim to these issues. Finally, we have focused on the Puritan emphasis on self-reflection as a means of knowing one’s calling, showing the importance of the community in determining one’s calling.

From here, we will look at the final portion of Perkins’ definition of calling and move our gaze from the individual to the political. We will show that the community is exceptionally important for ethics as well as for a robust doctrine of calling.
Chapter 6

‘Common Good:’ Community and the Political

There is no duty we so much underrate as the duty of being happy. By being happy we sow anonymous benefits upon the world.

Robert Louis Stevenson

Introduction

Christopher Hill argues that the Puritan emphasis on private readings of scripture derives from Luther’s stress on the priesthood of all believers and the personal conversion of the individual’s heart. He claims that they create an ‘individualist’s anarchy.’1 We will see in this chapter that this narrative is misleading. In the previous chapter, we saw that the call of God is a loving, divine command that carries with it strong naturalist leanings. Along with the universal call to humankind to the happiness described in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, there are also particular ‘happinesses’ that are tied to individuals, not only in their historical and geographical position, but also at the level of ontology.

This chapter begins where the previous one ends, by looking at the social and political aspects of the Puritan definition of calling and at how the divinely ordained social position of individuals contributes to the whole of a flourishing society. This will be done by looking at some of the nuanced specifics of their doctrine of calling, regarding how both Christians and non-Christians use their callings to benefit society.

We will then direct our gaze away from a discussion of the particular happiness of the individual back to the universal development of virtue and the community’s role in this development. We will do this by looking at two aspects of social life. The first is the importance of friendship; the second is a discussion of the state’s role in moral development.

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For the Good of the Political Community

Here we reach the third portion of Perkins’ definition of calling. Perkins writes that the “good estate of the common wealth is when every person keepes himselfe to his owne calling. And this wil undoubtedly come to passe, if we consider what bee our callings & that we are placed in them of god, and therefore judge them to be the best callings of all for us.”\(^2\) Rogers writes that all Christians “must live in some lawfull vocation” in addition to practicing other godly duties while they “faithfully and diligently walke in the same.” Those who do this are the children of God, and “passe the day well and christianly.”\(^3\)

Here I will show how God in his providence directs certain persons to certain callings for the good of the whole society. Each person doing his or her calling creates a complex economic web, building upon others and depending on others, to make society function.

Callings do not reside exclusively in the realm of ethics, but widen to encompass the good of the whole society and thus become a topic of political theology. It is here in Perkins’ statement, “for the common good,” that the definition moves from aspects of the individual person to the good of the community. Calling is to be “for the benefit and good estate of mankinde.”\(^4\) Personal callings must have a community aspect to them. “There can be no working out of a personal destiny that is in abstraction from the community.”\(^5\)

In this section, we will begin to widen the scope of the Puritan doctrine of calling to see how it relates to the political realm, while continuing the discussion begun in the previous chapter on the relationship between calling and God’s providence. We will then look at the three primary communities to which callings relate, those being the commonwealth, the church and the family. After we look at the relationship of callings and work to these societies, it will then be important to address how one uses one’s calling well, having entered into a particular calling, and finally whether it is ever appropriate to leave one calling for another.

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\(^3\) Rogers, *PC*, 353.
Aristotle, Providence and the Political

Like Aristotle, Perkins notes that we are socio-political animals, and, like Luther, Perkins subdivides three natural sorts of communities: commonwealth, church and family.\(^6\) “God in his worde hath ordained the societie of man with man, partly in the common-wealth, partly in the Church, and partly in the familie: and it is not the will of God that man should live and converse alone by himself.” Even though mankind is a socio-political animal, “there should stil remaine a distinction betweene man and man, not only in regard of person, but also in other respects.”\(^7\) Our callings are necessarily related to another. The practice of an individual’s virtue and calling was seen as something that not only benefitted the individual but the community and the flourishing of the whole. However, the individualist mindset that is typically identified with the enlightenment was certainly becoming predominant in the sixteenth and seventeenth century.\(^8\) Perkins feels it necessary to attack a common saying, “everyman for himselfe and God for us all.” Perkins writes that this individualism is “wicked, and is directed against the end of every calling or honest kind of life.”\(^9\)

Veith comments that the “doctrine of vocation undermines conformity, recognizes the unique value of every person, and celebrates human differences; but it sets these individuals into a community with other individuals, avoiding the privatizing self-centered narcissism of secular individualism.”\(^10\) The Puritan doctrine of calling resembles something of what MacIntyre is looking to recover in contemporary ethics, and the mindset that he is attributing to the enlightenment seems to have been prevalent in England in this time. The Puritans’ denial of this view of God’s relationship to society and the individual may spring from their close readings and use of Aristotle.

As mentioned in Chapter 5, Perkins draws upon Aristotle’s first and final causations. The first cause is related to God’s continual work in sustaining providence; the final cause is the political aspect of calling. The final cause is the “proper end” and is “for the benefit and good estate of mankinde.”\(^11\) Within the Puritans, we have seen the final

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\(^7\) Perkins, *ATV*, 23.
cause being used in a double manner. As we saw in Chapter 2, the final cause is related to eudaemia as the end of the individual, culminating in the vision of God. In the present chapter, we see it as it relates to the end of a calling to the body politic. According to the Puritans, God designs us with callings that will accompany our flourishing and the flourishing of society. “The common good of men standes in this, not onely that they live, but that they live well in righteousness and holines, & consequently in true happiness. And for the attainment hereunto God hath ordained and disposed all callings and in his providence designed the persons to beare them.”12 Baxter writes, “[e]very one that is able, must be statedly, and ordinarily employed in such work, as is serviceable to God, and the common Good,” even if one is wealthy. Every person that is part of the commonwealth or church must employ their parts to the utmost for the good of the people. “Publick service is God’s greatest service.” For Baxter, a life of prayer and meditation is to refuse the “greatest work, and tie yourself to some lesser or easie part.” “God hath commanded you some way or other to labour for your daily bread and not to live as drones on the sweat of others only.”13

**Callings and Their Political Place**

We will now look in more detail at how callings relate to the political life. It is the very nature of callings to be social. Callings not only affect the individual but also benefit those within a community. Perkins and Rogers note that relationships help with our work.14 Calling, however, is wider than just work, though it includes it. A calling also involves service to others, “whereas meaningful work need not involve this element of service.”15 Within the three-fold subdivision given above—commonwealth, church and family—the Puritans generally give three ways of appropriately dealing with callings. The first we will look at is the right use of callings, how people should conduct themselves within their callings. Second, we will look at how the Puritans think that one should enter

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into a calling. In this section, we will be looking at callings that are within the family structure. We will look at this firstly because their thought on family vocations resembles Luther’s thought, in that one enters family callings through one’s station in life, and secondly because it is through the family that children begin their callings through education and parental discernment. Finally, having established how one is to enter a calling, we will see how one stays in that calling, and when it is appropriate, if ever, to change from one calling to another.

Perkins makes a further distinction between the priorities and types of personal callings. The first type of calling is one that is at the essence of a society. As we have seen above, this includes callings within the family, the church and the magistrate. The second sort of personal calling is “such as serve onely for the good happie, and quiet estate of societie.” This kind represents workers like the husbandman and merchant, the physician, the lawyer and the soldier.\textsuperscript{16} It is important to note, however, that there is a distinction between essential social callings and those of the ‘quiet estate;” “the goodness of the calling does not abase the goodness of the work, for god looketh not at the excellencie of the worke, but at the heart of the worker.”\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{I. The Right use of Callings}

In addressing the right use of callings, it is important, as far as it is possible, that one makes good choices in choosing a calling. Callings must be “honest and lawful callings” that “uphold the state, family and church.”\textsuperscript{18} The first ‘rule’ of calling is, “what so ever any man enterpriseth or doth either in word or deed, he must doe it by virtue of his calling, and he must keepe himselfe within the compasse, limites, or precinctes thereof.”\textsuperscript{19} God must assure him of his calling. The second rule is that “everyman must doe the duties of his calling with diligence: & therefore Salomon saith, whatsoever is in thy hand to doe, doe with all thy power.”\textsuperscript{20} In other words, people should execute their

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 40; Perkins, \textit{HL}, 40; Lee Hardy, \textit{The Fabric of This World: Inquiries Into Calling, Career Choice, and the Design of Human Work} (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 81–2.
\textsuperscript{19} Perkins, \textit{ATV}, 7.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 11.
callings to the best of their ability and with diligence. Webbe encourages his readers to preserve a quiet conscience and work hard in their callings.\textsuperscript{21}

By working hard in one’s calling, one fulfills to some degree the second table of the Decalogue: love thy neighbor. In our callings, we are able to love our enemies more than we love ourselves. “The like love ought wee to shew, by doing service to all men in the compasse of our callings, & by being al things to al men (as Paul was) that we might doe them all the good we can, both for body and soule.”\textsuperscript{22} Just as St. Paul is cited here as an example of loving our neighbors and enemies through our callings, Christ is also put forward as an example of this. In the context of Christ being our moral example, Baxter argues that Jesus “condescended to labour at a Trade and mean imployment in the world” in order to first teach that both body and mind express obedience and to teach men “to labour and live in a calling; and to comfort poor labourers with assurance that God accepteth them in the meanest work, and that Christ himself lived so before them, and chose their kind of life.”\textsuperscript{23} Therefore, like Christ, we need to be “lights and good examples in all good works,”\textsuperscript{24} particular callings “[w]herein every man, according to the gift which God hath given him, must bestowe himself honestly, to his owne, and neighbors good.”\textsuperscript{25}

The right use of calling is not for wealth and comfort. One’s calling should be “serviceable to God,” in that one should not choose a vocation that will bring the most money or honor, “but that in which you may do most good, and best escape sinning.”\textsuperscript{26} If a calling is “not to be sanctified by serving God in it, and regulating it by his Law, it is then neither honourable nor desirable.”\textsuperscript{27} Reynolds writes that there are “no more pestilent and pernicious disturbers of the publike Good, than those who are best qualified for service and imployment; if once they grow turbulent and mutinous, neglecting the common end, for their own private respects, and desirous to raise themselves upon “publique Ruines.”\textsuperscript{28} Rogers also writes in his diary that he could have gone into some

\begin{itemize}
\item Webbe, \textit{PQ}, 43.
\item Perkins, \textit{GC}, 33–4.
\item Baxter, \textit{CD}, 91.
\item Rogers, \textit{PC}, 209.
\item Perkins, \textit{GC}, 212.
\item Baxter, \textit{CD}, 133.
\item Baxter, \textit{CP}, 39.
\item Reynolds, \textit{TPFS}, 46.
\end{itemize}
other calling or line of work and “increased [his] commodities not a little,” but saw that his time and mind were better put to use by being a pastor and meditating.\footnote{Rogers and Ward, \textit{Diaries}, 66.}

We see in Rogers, Perkins and Baxter another means by which calling relates to Christian ethics. Doing our callings is not just obeying the command of God to perform our God-given callings at the individual level, but also performing these callings fulfills the greater command to love our neighbors and those within our communities. Money and survival are secondary motivations for someone to work hard in their vocations. We will be discussing money as it relates to work in more detail later in this chapter.

\textit{II. Good entrance into the calling}

We will here further address the question of how one enters into a particular calling. We have seen above and in the previous chapter that every person, regardless of education, comes to know his or her callings, according to the Puritans, by self-reflection, which gives insight into the work that every person should pursue.

In the relationship between general and particular callings, it is always the case that the general calling takes precedence over the particular. A Magistrate must be a “Christian Magistrate in executing the office of a Magistrate.” This is the same for the father, mother, schoolmaster and any other special calling. But the general calling without the particular calling is “but a forme of godlinesse without power thereof.” Both callings must work in tandem like the “bodie and soule.”\footnote{Perkins, \textit{ATT}, 32–3. More will be said in Chapter 7 about Christian magistrates and the way in which they relate to the justice of the community.}

Amongst the Puritans, there is general agreement with Luther; sometimes people may have more than one ‘particular’ calling.\footnote{Aristotle also has no problem with a person having more than one vocation; see Aristotle, \textit{Pol}, 1256b2–4.} We will now explore how this can be the case by explaining the three cases for there being dual callings. Here we will look at multiple callings as they pertain to work; we will later look at them as they relate to work and family. One can have two callings if God combines them, is not against scripture, and in their joining they do not hinder each other or the common good.\footnote{Perkins, \textit{ATT}, 60–1; 64.} Baxter notes that a person cannot have multiple trades if the motivation is to become rich and put their neighbor with the same calling out of business, thus negating this cut-throat and self-
serving aspect of modern capitalism. Also, in order to have two callings, one must be able to manage both well without one being sinfully neglected.\(^{33}\) “Thus god manifests his fatherly care over us by the imploiment of men in his service according to their several vocations for our good.”\(^{34}\)

We saw in the previous chapter that some callings have specific temptations. Baxter anticipates the following question: what if the highest calling brings about the most temptation? Baxter replies in various ways to the idea that certain callings have certain kinds of temptations and that a person of good character will be able to overcome these. If the temptation is particular, meaning that it is great on a certain occasion that is not usually the norm, one must “still obey God whatever the difficulties and temptations are.” When God calls someone to a vocation, he will preserve them, “for no temptation can necessitate you to sin.”\(^{35}\) Baxter later admonishes his readers to know the temptations of a calling and to be “suspicious of yourself.”\(^{36}\)

There are instances of what the Puritans call ‘extraordinary callings,’ where the spirit gives strength to someone for a time to accomplish the restoring of the Gospel. These cases are very rare; Luther’s reforming the church is held up as an example.\(^{37}\)

**Family**

As we have seen, there are many differences between Luther’s doctrine of vocation and the Puritan’s doctrine of calling. The Puritan doctrine of calling is more concerned with a person’s ontology. There is, however, some overlap on the place of the family as a calling or ‘station.’ This Lutheran emphasis, as seen in the previous chapter, still carries weight for the Puritans and is still to this day an important aspect of Christian moral and political theology.\(^{38}\) To have a certain station in a family is not ontological but contextual, meaning that the calling to be a father is not inherent in a person, but it comes about when one bears children.

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\(^{33}\) Baxter, *CP*, 142.

\(^{34}\) Perkins, *ATT*, 33.

\(^{35}\) Baxter, *CD*, 133.


\(^{37}\) Perkins, *ATT*, 52.

Webbe draws upon Aristotle to discuss roles in the family,\textsuperscript{39} showing how fathers should relate to servants, children, and their wives. Reynolds writes that the special calling of a minister is difficult in inward and outward duties, finding the same trouble in disciplining themselves to be in the word. In fact, they have a double duty—the spiritual lives of themselves and their people—but the spiritual calling of a minister is not any easier than the layperson’s.\textsuperscript{40} Baxter agrees, noting that being a minister is a high work, but being a father is higher.\textsuperscript{41} The good husband is aware of the workings of his labor as well as that of those he supervises. He must know the “particular tempers, and faults, and virtues of those whom he is to govern.”\textsuperscript{42} He must have “prudence” in the way he conducts himself, and “justice” in the way that he conducts his workers.

Part of the calling of parents is to wisely discern the calling of their children. It is the parent’s responsibility not only to cultivate moral sensibilities in their children but also to discern the crafts at which the child should develop. The parents become the first and primary educators of the child.\textsuperscript{43} Children at young ages are motivated to certain callings not by self-reflection but by the prompting of their parents or other authorities. A poignant sign of bad parenting is forcing children into wrongful callings, or preventing them from entering into their rightful calling.\textsuperscript{44} When discussing the duties of schoolmasters in the education of children’s souls, Baxter argues that one must first determine the end of labor and then continually keep “in your eye” the end and the means by which to accomplish and attain it. “If the end be chiefly your own commodity or reputation, the means will be distorted accordingly, and your labours perverted, and your calling corrupted, and embased (to your selves,) by your perverse intentions.”\textsuperscript{45} Parents must “choose such a calling and course of life for your children, as tendeth most to the saving of their souls, and to their publick usefulness for Church or State.”\textsuperscript{46}

Parents need to pick callings for their children that will allow them the leisure time to develop spiritually, make a decent amount of money and have “fit opportunities to get

\textsuperscript{39}Webbe, \textit{PQ}, 81; Aristotle, \textit{EN}, 1149b5–14.
\textsuperscript{40} Rogers, \textit{PC}, 590.
\textsuperscript{41} Baxter, \textit{CD}, 519.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 529; Also see Waters, \textit{Family}, 33–6.
\textsuperscript{43} MacIntyre, \textit{Dependent}, 89–90.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 104–5. MacIntyre gives the example of Aquinas, whose mother locked him up in order to keep him from the Dominican order.
\textsuperscript{45} Baxter, \textit{CP}, 44.
\textsuperscript{46} Baxter, \textit{CD}, 548.
good, and to do good.”

Parents need to bring up their children in their calling as a means to quietness. We have seen from previous chapters that Webbe’s quietness resembles closely the concept of eudaemonia. From another perspective, children need to seek the approval of their parents to pursue their chosen callings.

With regard to the relationship between the calling of one’s employment and the calling of a place in the family, sometimes a person with a work calling will need to be away from their family calling for months. Baxter thinks that this is fine as long as no significant hurt is to follow. There are times when it is necessary to prioritize a “lesser work” when the greater may be delayed. “The duties of the first table [love God] are to be preferred before those of the second [love neighbor], yet the greater duties of the second table must be preferred before the lesser duties of the first.” This means that there could be times when one should favor the needs of the family over other aspects of morality, for example, the command to rest on the Sabbath.

Men and children are not the only people within the household that have particular vocations and callings; women are also important parts of the family and community. Every person has a personal calling, regardless of class, sex, state or degree. Women, Baxter thinks, need to be taught callings at a young age, so that they will have some skill when they get older and will not become beggars if their husband dies, though there are certainly jobs that are only for men. In the same way that the wider political community had certain people doing certain jobs in order to fulfill the needs of the entire community, this was the same for the family. The mutual duties of marriage partners were given equal stress both in the case of the female and of the male. But even

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47 Ibid., 548; 550.
48 Webbe, PQ, The Table, C.
49 Baxter, CD, 551; 553.
50 Ibid., 535.
51 Ibid., 132–3.
53 Baxter, CD, 547. Chapters VIII and IX of Baxter’s treatise on Economics is dedicated to the special duties of wives and husbands to each other.
with this emphasis, it was of mutual importance for wives and husbands to keep up with their roles within the home, women’s vocations are often gruesome work.56

Women’s vocations were also not always restricted to the household, one example being brewing. There are vocations in which women may partake, but there were great discrepancies between the wages of women and men. Nevertheless, even with this wage discrepancy, women, depending on their trade, were paid quite well for their work.57 We can see here that women’s vocations were not restricted simply to the home; at times, they included running businesses or writing books, and some upper-class women managed their husbands’ estates and political roles.58 There was a recognition that their callings may be, to an extent, outside the home. In sum, women of this time were essential parts of this sixteenth and seventeenth century economy and not simply relegated to domestic labors.

There is certainly a cultural favoritism for males over females in this period. As was mentioned in Chapter 4 with regards to Aristotle, virtue ethics and putting aside the non-essential and dated aspects of his thought (elitism, sexism, racism), we can put aside the aspects of Puritan thought that are not built into the very structure of their ethics.59 The overarching principles of the Puritan doctrine of calling with respect to male and female also does need to be adopted. There is still plenty of room in this argument to say that women can be entitled to equal pay and high-ranking social positions.

III. The Good Continuance in a Calling

An important aspect of nearly all the Reformation doctrines of calling is that the work that people are called to is the work in which they need to stay. ‘Continuance,’ which is the “constant practice of the duties and workes of the same calling,”60 is certainly seen as an important point of the doctrine. Continuance in calling requires that people do the proper works of their callings and “must do them in a good and godly manner.” Two things are “principally required for a calling,” writes Perkins, “Holiness, and

57 Peters, Women in Early Modern Britain, 52; 66.
58 Thomas, Ends of Life, 23.
59 See Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, 9.
60 Perkins, AT, 64.
Moving away from one’s calling leads to frustration, because flourishing is found in performing our callings.

As we have seen above, the primary purpose of work for the Puritans is not to accumulate wealth or to move up in social class. Money is not a proper motivation for performing a calling; rather, the primary motivation should be to serve God and neighbor. It is not a duty, Baxter argues, to labor for the sake of riches and wealth; it is, however, good to work for the “honest increase and provision, which is the end of our labour.” With this in mind, there is nothing wrong with working hard in order to receive a pay increase. Thus it is acceptable “to choose a gainful calling rather than another,” so that “we may be able to do good, and relieve the poor.” For Baxter, the accumulation of money is fine as long as that money ends up in the hands of those who are in need. Christians should “forbear all needless expenses; but those also that are needful but to such conveniences and accommodations as may be spared without a greater hurt.” In summary, the accumulation of wealth is not necessarily an evil as long as those who are in need are not left in want. A successful worker should make caring for those in need a priority rather than prioritizing lush unnecessary comforts.

**Leaving a Calling**

If the Puritans claim that calling is related to the flourishing of an individual at an ontological level, then is there the potential objection that one can never leave one’s calling or vocation? The worry is that some people will be stuck in a less than ideal work environment for their entire lives. Luther’s doctrine of vocation emphasizes that all people should restrict themselves to one calling, thus not allowing there to be any sense of social mobility. One should not pass from one social class to another. God put people in a certain class and to leave that class would ruin the social order. The Puritan doctrine of calling, however, allows for people to change callings as long as it is for the right

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61 Ibid., 75; 65.
62 Ibid., 111. One should not covet other people’s callings. See ibid., 66
65 Placher, *Callings*, 207.
reason. The Puritans give much thought to this, asking, under what circumstances are
people able to leave their calling, and when do they need to stay where they have been
put? Generally, Puritans think that one should not change one’s calling out of envy,
ambition (in the negative sense), or impatience. Rather, one should strive to be content in
one’s calling. Rogers notes that after performing our callings for some amount of time,
they will become pleasurable. One should not leave a calling because it is difficult.

It may appear, that it is no wearisome thing to be settled in such a course (wherein we may please
God) as frailty will permit: but the sound and chiefest pleasure rather, yea and besides, it is that
onely, which so seasoneth our earthly and temporall liberties, that so they become lawfull and
pleasant to us also; and the duties and works of our callings, that they be not (as to others)
burthensome and tedious.

For Perkins, a change can only be made on two occasions. First, if it is of private
necessity, which is when a person “cannot maintain themselves and theirs, but the calling
in which they are.” For example, St. Paul upon “private necessitie, returned to the calling
of a Tent maker: yet so as he performed his ministerie, when occasion was offered.”
Secondly, we can change our callings for the “common good.” But in this second case,
people can only change their callings if their station in life is improved and it is thus better
for the community.

Perkins makes another distinction under the umbrella of callings: changeable and
perpetual. Changeable callings are callings done for a season, while perpetual callings can
only be left for a disability of mind or body or lawfully disposed of for a crime committed,
death or the last day of judgment. These are the only occasions when people may resign
from perpetual callings. Using the ‘army and general’ metaphor used earlier, Perkins
shows that people are able to leave a calling for another: God assigns “a particular office,
in performance whereof he is to live and die. And as in campe no soouldier can depart his
standing without the leave of the general.”

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68 Rogers, PC, 579.
69 Perkins, ATV, 120–1.
70 Ibid., 129–31.
71 Ibid., 3.
Baxter writes, “keep in the way of your Place and calling, and take not other mens works upon you, without a call, under any pretense of doing good.” Baxter is saying, just because you can do something better than the person who is called to it, this does not mean that you should hijack the other and do their job for them. This specifically applies if the work that one wants to do is higher than one’s particular calling. God will honor lower callings, though men do not honor them. The reason that Baxter gives for not doing the work of another person’s ‘higher’ calling is that God knows best what is pleasing to him and it is better that one is obedient than sacrificial. Baxter also argues that pastors cannot leave their callings simply because there is resistance from politicians and congregants. If someone is not succeeding or finding blessing in their labors, this does not mean that they should stop.

With the Puritans, however, there is the possibility of the “lawful going from one calling to another.” It is not the “[a]postles meaning to barre men to divert from this or that calling, but he gives them an item to keepe them from changing upon every light conceit, and ever suddaine occasion. And that changes may lawfully be made, it appeareth thus.” Many people in scripture changed their callings, including Christ (from carpenter to minister and mediator). Baxter also points out that the changing of callings is something that we see in the example of the Apostles in scripture and of pastors of the church in the history of the church. “God no where forbids men to change their employment for better, upon a sufficient cause or call.” But this does not mean that one can simply leave the callings of the family. “No man must take up or change any calling without sufficient cause to call him to it: But when he hath such cause, he sinneth if he change it not.”

At this point, I must address a potential problem. In the previous chapter, I noted that callings trickle down into the very specifics of our lives and that these even include such things as the places we live. If this is the case, how is it that one can change one’s calling? In the previous chapter, we looked at the concept of a ‘deep’ calling. I described

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72 Baxter, CD, 132.
73 Perkins, ATV, 34.
74 Baxter, CD, 703; 854.
75 Rogers, PC, 63.
76 Baxter, CD, 133.
77 Ibid.
deep callings as a distinctive combination of broad character traits, for example, being detail-oriented or highly curious and contemplative. The deep calling does not necessarily need to be to any one specific job. Earthly flourishing can be possessed by a person in a number of jobs that correlate to their broad character traits. If a car mechanic, who enjoys the visceral experience of working with her hands and is not particularly detail-oriented, is offered an office job to do the paperwork for the garage she works for, this would not necessarily be a good promotion, even if the pay is more. The promotion comes with responsibilities that do not comport with the natural ‘deep’ calling. Just because one is able to leave a calling, this does not mean that one should.

With regard to job mobility, Volf’s theology of work is, in part, to protect a diachronic plurality of employment in modern society. He claims that his pneumatological understanding of work does not necessitate a “single event.” This allows a person the opportunity to change vocations multiple times in their lives. This, however, is to baptize modern ideologies of mobility. Brock rightly criticizes the view of work apart from creation by noting that this view is “relentlessly and voluntaristically optimistic” and is “deaf to the limitations that materiality and finitude place on social change.” In juxtaposition, what we can draw from a Puritan theology of work for our constructive purposes is that career changes and work advancements are good and should be taken if it will benefit the community. It is fine if there are financial benefits, but this is secondary. We can also draw from the Puritans that there are some jobs that are simply not conducive to the natural dispositions of certain persons. Volf’s diachronic plurality does not account for the fact that certain jobs are naturally not conducive to certain persons for whom doing them would lead to frustration rather than flourishing. Ultimately, any opportunity for movement, as mentioned in the previous chapter, requires a person to seek God and heed the advice of those in their communities. These important decisions should be made through practical reasoning and the advice and counsel of friends.

The consideration of leaving a particular calling should not lead us to think that we should leave our general calling. There is no vacation or change from the general calling as

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79 Brock, *Technological Age*, 308.
there can be with our particular callings. With this in mind, we must now look at the occasions when people can leave callings. As we have seen above, there are acceptable times for people to leave one calling for another calling. What we will need to look at in the context of what we have looked at in light of our discussion of Aristotle and Aquinas in Chapter 3 is whether there are any occasions on which one can leave a calling in order not to work. This also leads us, again, to think about the relationships between work, meditation and rest and leisure.

**Sabbath, Recreation and Disability**

A major emphasis on work could be seen as an apologetic for a whole community to become workaholics. Bremer notes that this is the impetus to Max Weber’s claim that Puritanism is the foundation of Capitalism. However, writes Bremer, Weber does not account for the fact that the Puritans view rest with the same moral seriousness as work.

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80 Perkins, *ATV*, 128. We pause here to answer the question of whether one is able to leave a particular calling for another temporary vocation. Baxter notes that if the reason for leaving a calling for another temporary calling is lawful, and a wife cannot go with the husband, then it is “lawful” for a husband to leave the duties of a husband for a time; see Baxter, *CD*, 535.

The Protestant persecutions in the sixteenth century as well as during the English Civil Wars that were taking place in the seventeenth century bring into focus an interesting aspect of calling, that is, whether one can leave one’s everyday callings for the temporary calling of being a soldier. This is an interesting case because, as we have seen, callings are either ontologically dependent or grounded in one’s station in life and not easily shed. The soldier leaves their everyday callings in order to take part in a temporary calling as, it is hoped, the war will end and they will return to their previous callings. Because war was a constant reality along with the shifting position of Calvinism in sixteenth century resistance theory through François Hotman’s (1524-90) *Francogallia* (1573), Théodore Beza’s (1519-1605) *Du droit des magistrats* (1574), and the anonymous *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* (1579); see Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, *From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought, 100-1625* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999). These three writings epitomize the Calvinistic resistance after the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre in 1572, the potential necessity to fight was a real possibility.

Even with this in mind, to be a soldier is subservient to the primary types of callings within a community: family, church and magistrate; see Perkins, *ATV*, 37-8. However, upon the command of a prince, there are occasions on which people can become soldiers to do an “urgent work of publick consequence” and forbear regular aspects of their lives, such as weekly worship; see Baxter, *CD*, 871. The command of a magistrate to leave a calling to become a soldier should not be taken lightly and requires much wisdom. One needs to be sure that the war is just. It is better to be a “neuter” than to fight in an unjust war. However, if the war is just, then one should fight with humility. Baxter notes that it is a horrible thing to kill men who should be loved as neighbors; see Baxter, *CP*, 47. The calling to be a soldier is a heavy calling; nevertheless, it is “more desirable to serve God in a Prison than in an Army.” It is more desirable be a doctor or a carpenter where the “vertue” of that calling is to build and heal rather than to destroy; see ibid., 48. Murder is “heinous” and always referred to in a negative manner as unlawful and against nature; see ibid., 47; 151. But, even so, the vocation to be a soldier was still viable as a vocation.

It is also worth asking, with regard to the changing of callings and the family, whether getting married is a change of calling—a change from the call to be single to the call to be a spouse. This is an issue that cannot be addressed here at length, as it does not significantly alter the broader constructive argument of this thesis.

At this point in our study of the Puritan concept of calling, work and contemplation, we need to connect a few strands. We have also discussed in this chapter the relationship between leisure and work. This section will attempt to bring these two stands together and address issues related to rest, play and disability. This is important to our discussion because it rounds out and gives some clarity to the Puritan thought on rest and work in very practical ways. This section broadens to discuss not only the leisure that comes with contemplation but also that which comes with recreation and rest.82

This section will continue to use William Perkins’ thought as a model to build a more comprehensive Puritan view. Perkins’ discussion of constancy in a calling looks at the concept of vacation.83 Perkins seems to use the terms ‘vacation’ and ‘sabbath’ synonymously. Vacation is the “surcease from doing duties of a particular calling from some time or space.”84 It is a command of God and is allowed in three ways. The first is to keep the Sabbath day holy, second recreation, and third is disability. We will look at each of these in turn below.

The first is by the command of God in the Decalogue to keep the Sabbath day holy, “[h]ere every man is bound in conscience before God, to surcease from the duties of his calling.”85 Knowledge of the kingdom of heaven cannot be attained unless people take a break from their labors and hear and study the word of God. “Therefore it is for the good of the families, townes, countries, and kingdoms, that the Lords day be kept, and consequently it stands us in hand to take the benefit of this vacation, and to use it for the increase of faith, repentance and obedience, if we desire the salvation of our owne soules.”86 Christians must depend on God’s providence for the success of their labors. This is how Perkins suggests that one strike a moderate position between hard work and rest: by having faith that “God best knows our wants, and he will give unto us all things which hee in his wisdom knows to be necessary.”87

83 Perkins, *ATV*, 113.
84 Ibid., 114.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 115.
The Sabbath is the day that is dedicated for all people to meditate and rest. As seen earlier, knowledge of God and eternal salvation comes from people taking a Sabbath to study the word of God together. This is how the contemplative life and the active life come together. As we have seen earlier in Chapter 3, both are fervently argued for. Rest, and particularly the Sabbath rest, is how lay people can participate in both activities. Sabbath rest and the command for the layperson to temporarily cease labor and meditate is also a social endeavor. The Sabbath is also a time of coming together through church services and family gatherings. The communal and ecclesial structure of meditation is highlighted in a warning given by Bishop Joseph Hall, “that when left unbridled, meditations could easily wander from the Word and become superstitious.”

In definitive opposition to privatized understandings of meditation, Hall’s warning insists that meditation be an expression of the life of the community of faith in seeking God. This is not unlike the pedagogical character of Aquinas’s vision of *sacra doctrina* and the truly ecclesial and communal understanding of meditation that was discussed in Chapter 3 like the necessary relation between a teacher and a student.

The second of Perkins’ “vacations” is recreation. There is general recognition that work is hard and that, since Adam, callings have strife mixed with them. However, we can take heart because God is well pleased with us and all our efforts will be for the good in the end. In addition, even with the recognition that work is hard, there is still an encouragement to make labor a pleasure and a recreation. It is helpful, as seen above, that most of our callings, at least the ones that are ontologically associated with our persons, are tied to our happiness. Outside of finding pleasure in our work, recreation “is a necessarie meanes to refresh either bodie or minde, that we may the[n] better doe the duties which pertaine unto us.” Rest is not optional; it is compulsory, and indeed compulsory each and every day of our lives. We again see a theme of moderation, as recreation is not to cut into our work.

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89 Thomas Aquinas, *ST*, II–II.2.6 (85).
91 Baxter, *CP*, 44.
If we can recall the discussion of the two virtuous people given in Chapter 3 by Howard Curzer—p\(^1\) is only concerned with practical knowledge and spends all their free time in recreation, while p\(^2\) is concerned with practical knowledge as well as theoretical knowledge and spends some free time in contemplation—we can see that the Puritans encourage the lifestyle of p\(^2\). The Puritans reserve a high place for practical and moral knowledge in their work places as well as within their communities. However, the Puritans go to great pains to emphasize that in work we should not just be concerned with the practical but should also be thinking about divine things. Work is a duty, a spiritual discipline and a godly life that brings us closer to God. However, meditation also is a duty of every person.\(^94\) The Puritans also emphasize that there should be free time that is dedicated to the meditation of God and not spent in other non-meditative forms of leisure, but that recreation is something that everyone should engage in on a daily basis.

This recreation and festiveness is at the very heart of leisure. As was discussed in Chapter 4, virtue for Aristotle, Aquinas and the Puritans is not the mastering of our natural inclinations, but the perfection of our natures so that we can follow our natural inclinations in a way that is appropriate to the kinds of natures that they are. Thus the greatest virtue is not difficult, but it is like ‘second nature.’ Josef Pieper’s discussion of leisure helps us to see the naturalness of leisure to the nature of humans, as well as its importance. He remarks that leisure “is a form of that stillness that is the necessary preparation for accepting reality; only the person who is still can hear, and whoever is not still, cannot hear.”\(^95\) Leisure is not just the absence of striving and work, but is the state of taking things into consideration in a celebrating spirit.\(^96\) The center of leisure is festival, which is the opposite of toil and effort. For the Puritans, the Sabbath is a time of leisure, contemplation, meditation, hearing and festival. It is a necessary part of the Christian life, not only because it accords with our natures but also because it is commanded by God. “Leisure stands opposed to the exclusiveness of the paradigm of work as social function.”\(^97\) What this means is that we need to make sure our priorities are in the right place. Leisure should not be done for the sake of work. In fact, as Brian Brock notes,

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\(^94\) Rogers, PC, 323; Martz, *Poetry of Meditation*, 16.
\(^95\) Pieper, *Leisure*, 50. It should be noted that the term ‘leisure’ was not in regular usage in sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans. See McKay, “Refreshment,” 56.
\(^97\) Ibid., 53.
communal worship and, for our purposes, meditation are the “first and true work because it is the concrete forum in which our secular work finds its place.” Leisure allows us to come back to our labor, either contemplative or active, renewed and mentally refreshed. “The power to be at leisure is the power to step beyond the working world and win contact with those superhuman, life-giving forces that can send us, renewed and alive again, into the busy world of work.” For the Puritans, though, there is an emphasis on work and loving God and our neighbors through our work; we find the greatest fulfillment of our natures in the use of reason and in the worship of God. For the Christian, worship should be a priority, but rest and play are also of utmost importance to the Christian life. Just as the love of God takes priority over the love of our neighbors, so we do not leisure to work well, but rather work to leisure well. Man understands work and accepts it for what it really is, namely, the “tilling of the field,” which always includes happiness and toil, satisfaction as well as the sweat of the brow, joy as well as the consumption of vital energy. If one element in these pairs is suppressed, the reality of work is falsified and festivity is ruled out.

With the above in mind, the Puritans do not think that all of a person’s time should be spent in recreation. Under Curzer’s model of the dominant and inclusive ends, we see that the Puritans can emphasize the practical virtuous life of labor, and of loving one’s neighbor, while also giving credence to spending large amounts of time in undistracted concentration. This model, encouraged by the Puritans, allows for the relationship between theoria and praxis that Alasdair MacIntyre argues for, which is that the best city should direct people towards contemplation.

The third occasion Perkins gives for ‘vacation’ is disability, which consists of sickness, age, imprisonment, “or any other just impediment.” Baxter defines disability

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98 Brock, *Technological Age*, 298.
102 MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 158.
103 It may seem insensitive to our modern ears to say that disability is a vacation. It is hopefully clear from the above discussion that the early modern use of the term vacation has a wider semantic range than what we would use it for today.
104 Perkins, *ATV*, 117. Age is only a disability in so far as it “disableth you; but no further”: see Baxter, *CP*, 133.
as an “unresistable impediment”; other than this, no person is to be idle. 105 “Outside of this, idleness is negligence to one’s calling.” 106 People who are prevented from working because of some disability need to have their basic health and life needs attended to “by the labour of other men’s callings.” 107 Perkins argues that Christians need to take care of their disabled and elderly. He writes that the “goods we have are not our own, but the Lords: we are but keepers and stewards of them. And it is God’s will that the poor should have title to part of every man’s goods: and for this cause it is a shame if they not release without rousing, begging, or crying.” 108 Here again, against Weber’s thesis, we see a concept of work that is neither capitalist nor utilitarian. The concern of the church is not simply with productivity and business but also with the care of the handicapped, sick and aged.

**Limited Atonement and the Secular Calling**

At this point, we need to draw together a few strands of thought from this and previous chapters, to discuss the reprobate and calling. We will do this by referring to Augustine’s two cities from which reformation political theology borrows heavily. The two cities model is concerned with the state’s relation to the church. Previous reformers such as Luther and Calvin, in their own ways, adopted this model.

Augustine takes the city of God as an eschatological rather than visible reality and those in this city of God are those who have received the promise of redemption and the gift of the Spirit. 109 Those who are ‘in Christ’ find their identity in the city of God, which is not co-extensive with any particular institution. The church transcends space and time and is outside the confines of history. Those who are citizens of the city of man are the political secular polis. The city of God exists within this world, but it is not of the world. Ultimately the two cities signify two loves that are concerned with the destination of human souls. 110

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105 For a helpful discussion on the differences between idleness and leisure, see Pieper, *Leisure*, 47–50.
106 Baxter, *CD*, 133. As idleness relates to lust and marriage, see ibid. 484; 489; Baxter, *CP*, 146.
108 Ibid. Emphasis mine; Stanley Hauerwas, *A Better Hope: Resources for Church Confronting Capitalism, Democracy, and Postmodernity* (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2000), 185; Also see Brock, *Technological Age*, 314.
110 It should be acknowledged that there are many interpretations of Augustine’s two cities. For just a few varieties see, William Cavanaugh, “From One City to Two: Christian Reimagining of Political Space,” *Political Theology* 7, no. 3 (2006): 299–321; Christopher Insole, “Discerning of Political Space,”
Highlighting different aspects of Augustine’s two cities, Luther, Calvin and the Puritans make it a part of their political thought. The Puritans believe that reprobates, and thus the city of man, still play important and providential roles in the societies they make up. All callings, both secular and sanctified, are part of the political community. All vocations have social weight—they all contribute to a flourishing society—but only those that are done with right intentions are called ‘good,’ just as when the publican and the Pharisee went to the temple to pray and the publican left justified and the Pharisee did not.\textsuperscript{111} As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Bolton thinks that there are times when the “formall hypocriate” will have good vocations, but that this is like a “stage-plaier; who sometimes putteth on roabes and maiestie of a prince, himself being a base and neglected state.”\textsuperscript{112} Callings are a way to serve reprobates in that Christians can care of their basic and tangible needs. The fundamental difference, say, between the Christian shoemaker and the secular shoemaker is that the motivation behind human actions is different. As the poet George Herbert writes,

\begin{quote}
A servant with this clause  
Makes drudgery divine:  
Who sweeps a room as for Thy laws,  
Makes that and th’ action fine.
\end{quote}

From the point of view of the observer, there is no substantive difference between the work of the Christian and the secular shoemaker, the difference is an internal, ontological and spiritual reality. But, as we have seen above, the sentiment just expressed by Herbert might make some Puritans uneasy. For example, we saw above that Perkins emphasizes that before the particular calling to specific task; there must be a stress on the general calling. For example a magistrate must be a ‘Christian magistrate.’\textsuperscript{113} However, there is not a consensus within the Puritans themselves on this issue.

With this in mind, we have seen in Chapter 2 that within the western Christian tradition, as well as within most Puritan thought, there is the possibility of some amount

\textsuperscript{111} Perkins, \textit{ATV}, 78. Also see 39.  
\textsuperscript{112} Bolton, \textit{DSTH}, 30.  
\textsuperscript{113} Perkins, \textit{ATV}, 32–3. As we have seen this position is emphasized also in Rogers.
of penultimate happiness in this life, of which the unregenerate get a taste. They can get a
taste of this through exercising their calling and experiencing enjoyment from it.

**Conclusion**

Brian Brock helpfully notes that the most “fundamental theological criterion” of a
theological perspective of work is “that it coexist[s] in harmony with the satisfaction of
others’ needs.”\(^{114}\) In this chapter, we have seen this very emphasis. In looking at the final
portion of Perkins’ definition of calling and moving our gaze from the individual to the
political, we saw that the community is exceptionally important for ethics as well as for a
robust doctrine of calling as described in previous chapters.

We looked at some of the nuanced specifics of a Puritan doctrine of calling,
regarding how both Christians and non-Christians use their callings to benefit society.
Drawing from our discussion in previous chapter on providence, we looked at the
relationship between first and final causations, the first cause being related to God’s
continual work in sustaining providence; the final cause is the political aspect of calling.
We then focused on particular socio-political and economic issues like how one should
enter into a calling, the social positioning that calling takes within the family, the good
continuance in a calling and when it is appropriate to leave a calling. We finished by
looking again at the relationship between rest and work.

What this chapter has begun to show is that a Puritan eudaemonistic doctrine of
calling is not solely about individual happiness. At a fundamental level, the doctrine of
calling has far reaching political implications. These implications will be addressed further
in the upcoming chapter.

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\(^{114}\) Brock, *Technological Age*, 304.
Chapter 7

Community, Friendship and Law

_They say a person needs just three things to be truly happy in this world: someone to love, something to do, and something to hope for._ Tom Bodett

**Introduction**

In this Chapter we will bring together multiple themes from throughout this thesis and look at the community’s role in the development of virtue for these Puritans. We are making the turn from the political, “common good” of calling back to the ethical “kind of life,” to ask the following question: how is it that the political life relates to the development of virtue and character? We will do this in two ways. The first is a discussion of friendship. There are two aspects of friendship that will be addressed here: friendship with others in the community and friendship with God. The second discussion concerns the role that law plays in making persons better, and it will be addressed later in this chapter.

For the ancients, and all the way through western patristic and medieval Christianity, the topics of friendship and community were an essential moral conversation.¹ However, friendship has been put aside in philosophical moral discourse,² as has the “widely ignored” relationship between ethics and the church.³ One fault of the enlightenment, under Bentham, Mill and Kant, was that it created a purely rational moral method that was accessible to any component individual, whereas, in the tradition prior to this time, there was no purely rational morality. Moral reasoning had to take place within a tradition and a community.

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² Hursthouse, *Virtue Ethics*, 3.

Stanley Hauerwas has written that he is convinced that “happiness, virtue, and friendship are crucially interrelated in a manner necessary for any adequate account of character” and that there should not be separation between character, happiness, and friendship. This section will explore these claims by looking at how friendship and community assist moral development. We have seen in previous chapters that all people seek happiness and that happiness, for the Puritans, is found in its most complete and perfect form in the vision of God in the next life. We have also seen that, for the Puritans, moral development is a process of possessing virtue. It is virtue that helps direct our lives and actions towards God and godly living. This third aspect of moral development is grounded in the conviction that community is essential for this process to take place. We will here begin to look at how this is the case. In focusing in on the community’s role in the development of its members, we will be drawing our gaze back to the connection between happiness, virtue and the calling to a kind of life, as well as the importance of community. We will now show the importance of friendship in Puritan moral development by looking at the relationships between virtue and earthly friendship in the community; then we will move to show the importance of friendship with God.

Aristotle on Friendship

Aristotle makes a distinction between three forms of friendship that are concerned with love and goodwill but vary in goodness; friends can be of utility, of pleasure or of good character. Friendships of utility are the majority of friendships and are for the sake of self-interest. These friendships are ‘incidental.’ “Complaints and reproaches” arise out of relationships of utility. The second of Aristotle’s types of friendship is the relationship that is built on pleasure. These kinds of friendships “get at the same time what they desire,” because they want the same thing. Those who love and have friends for the sake of pleasure do so for what is “pleasant to themselves.” These types of friendships are typically found in young people.

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4 Hauerwas, The Hauerwas Reader, 83.
6 Aristotle, EE, 1236a15–b26; Aristotle, EV, 1156a6–57b5; 1158b1–11.
7 Aristotle, EV, 1056a11–12; 17.
8 Ibid., 1156a15.
Friendships of good character, for Aristotle, have the above two characteristics but differently. This friendship is not just concerned with pleasure and usefulness as it relates to self-interest but are, “anxious to do well by each other.” The best form of friendship has to do with mutual respect and virtue. It begins with goodwill and a friendly relationship, but goodwill itself is not actual friendship, because you can have goodwill for someone you have never met. For friendship, you must know the other person. The persons in a good friendship also need to be good men.

Friendship being divided into these kinds; bad men will be friends for the sake of pleasure and utility, being in this respect like each other, but good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e. in virtue of their goodness. These, then, are friends without qualification; the others are friends incidentally a resemblance to these.

The good friendship is not based on utility or pleasure, but on the good, and it requires good people who know how to love themselves well. Aristotle’s good friendship is beginning to resemble Augustine’s self-love, discussed in Chapter 2. Sarah Broadie explains, “I engage in the activity which is necessarily no one’s happiness but mine, but what I seek through so engaging is someone else’s.” The appropriate form of self-love is needed for the appropriate form of love for others. The best kind of friendship is when one person wishes for the other what they would wish for themselves, namely life, health, happiness and the fulfillment of desires. A person wishes for herself what seems good; she exerts herself for this end and does it for his own sake. With this in mind, John Cooper notes that φιλία, or friendship, for Aristotle, requires that a person desires the good for a friend for the friend’s own sake.

Aristotle makes a distinction between good and bad kinds of self-love. It is not a problem that people should view themselves as their own best friends and that they

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9 Ibid., 1162b5–16.
10 Ibid., IX.5.
11 Ibid., 1157b1–4.
12 Sarah Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 46. This concept is also found in Aquinas. “A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend’s sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from sin.” Aquinas, ST, II–II 26.4; J. J McEvoy, “The Other as Oneself: Friendship and Love in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas,” in Thomas Aquinas: Approaches to Truth: The Aquinas Lectures at Maynooth, 1996–2001, ed. J. J McEvoy and Michael Dunne (Portland: Four Courts Press, 2002), 16–37.
should love themselves best, but it becomes a problem when self-love manifests itself in the taking of wealth, honors and bodily pleasures. These are considered objects of competition and are related to the lower parts of the soul. Positive self-love, on the other hand, is according to right reason and desiring what is “noble rather than what is advantageous.” The good person should obey her intellect and be a lover of self, for in so doing she will benefit herself and her fellows.

A good person has specific characteristics; friendship is one of these characteristics because another person is another self. Incontinent and vicious people cannot love themselves well and thus do not love others. Perfect friends wish good for each other. All friendship is for good or pleasure. These friendships are rare because these men are rare. Admittedly, for Aristotle, love is an emotion, but friendship, which must involve love, is a state. Love is passion, but mutual love is a choice, and the choice comes from a state. In loving a friend, I love what is good for them. Friends become good to and for each other.

With friendships of utility and pleasure, a few are enough. But there is no fixed number of good friends, although it is hard to be intimate with a large number of people. Aristotle’s recommendation is to be a great friend to as many as it is possible to live with, which will also be a small number, but we must be content even if we find a few good friends. For friends, the most desirable thing is to live together. Friendship is a partnership. Friends share their interests and pursue them together and, because they are good, they make each other better. Now that Aristotle’s understanding of friendship has been set out, we turn to the Puritans.

Puritan Friendship

Friends are not just for security; they are also valued and enjoyed. As we saw in the previous chapter, Puritans enjoyed being in contact with fellow Christians and visiting with friends. Like Aristotle and Augustine before them, the Puritans think that spiritual

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16 Ibid., 1169a13; 17.
17 Ibid., 1166a1–1166b29; Aristotle, *EE*, 1240a8–b37. In order for a good friendship to exist, there must be two separate people.
18 Aristotle, *EN*, 1156b7–24. The love we have for others is different from the love we have for things. Wine, we do not wish well, and it does not love us in return. Friends do this. Ibid., VIII.2.
20 Ibid., 1171b29–1172a16.
assistance means aiding each other in attaining the ideal state. In some cases, this means persuading the unconverted towards a life with Christ and thus beginning them on their quest towards full human development. In other cases, spiritual assistance means helping those who are already members of the household of faith to overcome struggles and achieve happiness.21 Either way, Puritan authors are generally quite happy with addressing their readers as friends.22 One of the features of Protestantism is an emphasis on talking about theology amongst friends, a feature that had formed generations of ministers. The community of friends is also the way in which people find their identity,23 and thus the Puritans strive to see transformation in their families, churches and societies.24

Rogers, who spoke highly of community and friendship for the Christian life, became influential in encouraging others to organize covenanted groups.25 In his diary he often writes about how important friendship is to him, describing his friend Ezekiel Culverwell as a help to him and to his studies. He credits his friends with renewing his desire to study and with helping him to write his book Seven Treatises.26 Rogers writes, “great hope we have by our private company amounge our neighbors to woorck as well more conscience in their whole course as knowledge.” He adds how “sweet conference I have had this time, especially with Newman and mr. Culverwel,” whom he counted as wonderful mercies.27 Rogers valued his time with his congregation and friends both inside and outside the church.

One of the most helpful aspects of good friendship is that a friend can make one aware of one’s own sin—sin that one would not have been able to spot on one’s own. The 18 August 1587 entry in Rogers’ diary, for example, describes how friends have helped him realize his sin by helping him to see that he cared too much for possessions. These realizations did not come from his personal study. As well as pointing out his sin, friends

22 Among many others, Richard Baxter seems to address both his Christian and non-Christian readers as friends; see Baxter, SER; 772. It was common practice for two thinkers from different denominations and divergent traditions to address each other as friends. For example, Luther and Erasmus, in their letters to each other, would address each other as “friend.”
23 Ryrie, Being Protestant, 574.
24 Bremer, Puritanism, 61.
25 Ibid., 67.
26 Rogers and Ward, Diaries, 58–61; 99.
27 Ibid., 61; 63.
also helped him to prevent sin. Rogers notes in his diaries that the community of Christ is to delight with others in things that are good. Regular meetings are something that Rogers emphasizes.

The community was helpful for the development of virtue towards happiness, but the central role that friends and community play for the Puritans is that of moral exemplars, as discussed in more depth in Chapter 4 in our discussion of emulation and the person of practical wisdom (φρόνιμος). The theme of friends pointing each other towards the good, and thus towards God himself, continues in Roger’s published writing. “Friendly meetings,” he writes, “should be used for gaining one another towards God.”

In having “conversation in the world among men,” we “practice” virtues, like faithfulness and uprightness, and this practice helps us to perform “the duties which we know, [to] set our selves about them with more roundnes, and (as farre as they can be discerned) shall cause them to shew more beautie to others, and raise more admiration in them.”

Relationships in this life prepare us for the next by habituating virtues and making them practices that lead us to everlasting happiness with God in heaven.

Edward Reynolds and Richard Baxter, like Rogers, see friendship as a help to move us towards heaven and to God. In Baxter’s view, it is a pity that some Christians do not meet together to talk about heaven and future rest. Being in community helps people move towards heavy by talking and thinking about it together. If we love our friends, we will talk with them about heaven and will help them to pursue rest. Friends should weep for lost friends and care about their moral and spiritual development enough to tell them about Christ. Reynolds, commenting on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, adds to this that community points us towards heaven and holy living through shame and accountability. Reynolds calls shame the fear of just disgrace from parents, rulers, counselors and friends. “We are apt to be ashamed with our friends, because their opinion wee value, and with our Enemies, because theirs we feare; with our friends because they are grieved; with our Enemies because they are delighted with that which shames us.” We fear the opinions of

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28 Ibid., 56–7; 73; 90.
29 Collinson, Religion of Protestants, 271.
30 Rogers, PC, 132; 152.
31 Ibid., 153.
32 Baxter, SER, 643; 640.
33 Ibid., 491–3.
34 Ibid., 286; 395.
virtuous men because “their presence aweth us from liberty of sinning, and maketh us blush if they deprehend us in it, because Examples have proportionable Authority over the heart of man, as Lawes have, which wee doe not trespasse without feare.”\footnote{Reynolds, \textit{TPFS}, 301–2. Also see Aristotle, \textit{Rhet}, 1383b13–1385a15.}

Though there are the negative or shameful aspects of community that help towards habituation and happiness, addressed above, community also positively and pleasurably contributes to earthly happiness. People are most happy, for Baxter, if they have a heavenly father and “heavenly Associates.” These associates are the “companions who will watch over thy ways; who will strengthen thee when thou are weak who will cheer thee when though art drooping, and comfort thee with the same comforts, wherewith he hath been so often comforted himself, 2 Corinthians 1.4.” If you travel with this person on the way to heaven, they “will be directing and quickening thee.” Moreover, “if thou be angry, [a friend] is meek, considering the meekness of his heavenly Pattern; or if he fall out with thee, he is soon reconciled, when he remebereth that in Heaven you must be everlasting friends: This is the Christian of the right stamp.”\footnote{Baxter, \textit{SER}, 606–7; Ryrie, \textit{Being Protestant}, 575.} These friends are rare, but what great societies we would have if we had friends like this.”\footnote{Baxter, \textit{SER}, 643; 640.}

Baxter also notes that it is important to ask for help in uncertainties from friends who are more experienced. “Another help to this Heavenly Life, is, to be much in serious discourse of it, especially with those that can speak from their hearts, and are seasoned themselves with an heavenly Nature.”\footnote{Reynolds, \textit{TPFS}, 210.}

Good friends of this kind unite themselves to each other and to God and have the return of the greatest delight. Reynolds writes that there is nothing more delightful than the real union of two minds. “If we mark it in all matter of Pleasure and ioy, the more the union is, the more is the Delight.” The union of two friends is the highest degree of fruition and pleasure that can be.\footnote{Reynolds, \textit{TPFS}, 210.}

Reynolds discusses a “natural” or “habitual” love that is subordinate to the “greater, our love for God.” Habitual love first carries with it right respect, meaning, “we love a friend for himself, and not indirect ends, onely upon our own benefit.” True love is
a “benevolent affection […] willing good unto another for his own sake.”

This love must also be serene and not muddled with prejudice. The third aspect of habitual love is to love particular people in ways appropriate to their relationship with the lover. Though “we must love all men as ourselves,” this is not a love of “equality, but a fidelity and sincerity.” Reynolds, citing St. Paul, writes that the greatest degree of our love should be for those in the church and our families, “not excluding others, but preferring them.”

Aristotle’s view is that proximity is an essential aspect of friendship. If friends do not converse for long periods of time, then their friendship begins to diminish. Reynolds disagrees with this because he wants to make room for friendship in the universal church. In this view, the exercise of love can be seen in both its absence and its presence. Reynolds knitted people together within the “mystery of the communion of the Church of Earth, both with in it self, in all dispersed members of it, and with Christ the Head, and that other part of it which triumpheth in heaven.”

Using Aristotle’s three types of friendship, Joseph Hall writes that

Nothing in the world unites mens harts so firmly, as the bond of faith: for whereas there are three grounds of friendship, vertue, pleasure, profit, and by all confessions, that is the surest which is upon vertue, it must needs follow, that what is grounded on the best, & most heavenly vertue, must be the fastest; which as it unites man to God so inseparably.

In spite of all the agreements between Christian and Greek concepts of friendship, of which plenty have been seen above, there are some important discrepancies. Paul Ramsey notes three of them, the first being the sacrificing of one’s life for a friend, as exemplified in Johannine brotherly love. “There is no greater love than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John 15.13). Aristotle’s views on friendship for the sake of the good would agree with this biblical statement. However, Christian love differs in

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39 Ibid., 91; Reynolds cites Aristotle as a source for this point. Aristotle, *Rhet*, bk. 4, ch. 4. However, there is no book 4, chapter 4 of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, at least in modern editions. Reynolds may have been referring to bk 2 ch 12.
40 Reynolds, *TPFS*, 92.
42 Reynolds, *TPFS*, 96. All of these forms of love and friendship Reynolds calls “amor amicitiae.” He does end this section on love by discussing the negative form of self-love, “amor concupiscentie.” This kind of self-love is more like selfishness than is the self-love proposed by Aristotle and Augustine. Ibid., 93–4.
43 Joseph Hall, *MV*, 168–9; Hall prefers fewer, but good friends. Ibid., 24; 189.
that “while we were still sinners Christ died for us,” not as good people, but as sinners.\(^{45}\) Secondly, as we have seen above, for Aristotle, one can stop being a friend to somebody if one has changed. In a Christian perspective, friendship “endures all things.”\(^{46}\) Finally, Aristotle’s best form of friendship has self-interest at its heart, while in Christian friendship, there is very little difference between loving a friend and loving an enemy, as self-interest is not the primary motivation for enjoyment of another.\(^{47}\)

However, as we have seen, Augustine and the Puritans would disagree with Ramsey on this final point. We will look at one of the most significant adaptations of Greek friendship later in this chapter, how sin corrupts community and friendship with God, but with all this in mind, there is still a strong communal aspect to the Puritans’ religious life. Patrick Collinson shows, through William Perkin’s *Golden Chaine*, that ecclesiastical and social disciplines naturally associate with “intellectual and moral constraint.”\(^{48}\)

The question remains as to the effect that sin has on earthly friendships. It must be the case, given the above discussion of friendship, that the Puritans would have some reservations about putting so much importance on depending on other frail human persons. It is to this that we turn our attention.

_Suspicions of Earthly Friendship_

As mentioned above, because of a doctrine of sin, Christian conceptions of friendship will take shape in ways that differ from those of the Ancient Greeks. Christians may be encouraged to engage with friends in order to become better and more virtuous people, but at the same time, there is going to be a tension between two sinful people. This tension will lead to reservations and suspicions because of the human inclination towards inappropriate forms of self-love. In this section, we will explore some of these qualms and the ways in which Christians in the past have dealt with this problem.

Most of what we have seen thus far is a very positive reception of the idea of friendship in the western Christian tradition. There are, however, some concerns that we will need to address here. The problem of friendship, for Augustine, is how sin continually

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46 Ibid., 245.
47 Ibid., 95–6.
puts strain on friendships and leads to suffering. We will inevitably hurt each other. You can’t always trust someone, because you can’t “see his or her soul.”49 Even in the midst of this concern for the inevitable pain that friends will bring, there is still something positive about these close relationships. When Augustine’s friend dies, he writes in *The Confessions* that love for friends is good if they are loved in God, not for themselves alone.50

In a similar fashion, the Puritans have plenty of positive things to say about the nature of friendship in the Christian life, but they also have suspicions. Because of their strong emphasis on the sinfulness of man, friendship with other sinners is suspect and at times highly discouraged.51 Joseph Hall, though very much in favor of an Aristotelian form of friendship, has his misgivings.52 Hall writes that he will use his friends “as Moses did his rodd; While it was a rodd, he helde it familiarly in his hand; when once a Serpent, hee ranne away from it.”53 Later in *Meditation and Vowes* Hall writes,

That which is the miserie of Travailers, to finde many hostes, and few friends, is the estate of Christians in their pilgrimage to a better life: Good friends man not therefore bee easily forgone; neither must they be used as sutes of apparell, which when wee have worn thred-bare we cast off, and call for new; Nothing but death or villanie shall divorce me from an olde friend: But still I wil follow him so farre, as is either possible or honest: And then I will leave him with sorrow.54

Hall continues his cantankerous attitude towards friends when he writes, "great mens favours, friends promises, and dead mens shooes I will esteeme, but not trust to."55 “True Friendship necessarily requires Patience,” Hall states, because “there is no man in whom I shall not mislike somewhat; and who shall not as justly dislike somewhat in mee.”56

It seems as if Hall is always in a tension. He appears to know the importance of Christian brothers and sisters in spiritual and moral development, but he is very untrusting of their motives and intentions, and his own motives and intentions for that matter. Even in the context of the above quote, where he is complaining that friendship necessarily requires patience because everyone gets irritated with each other, Hall goes on

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49 Augustine, *COG*, XIX.8.
53 Ibid., 31.
54 Ibid., 179–80.
55 Ibid., 159.
56 Ibid., 180.
to state that “my friends faults therefore, if little, I will swallowe and digest; if great, I wil
smother them; how ever, I will winke at them to others, but lovingly notifie them to
himselfe.” For Hall, it seems that friendship is very difficult and sometimes requires harsh
but loving rebukes that move people towards holiness.

A sharpe reprofe I account better then a smooth deceit; therefore when my friend checks me, I
will respect it with thankfulnesse; when others flatter mee, I will suspect it, and rest in my owne
centure of my selfe, who should bee more privie, and lesse partiall to my owne deservings.57

Here we see Hall’s openness to friends’ helpfulness, but also his skepticism and, ultimately, his self-reliance. Hall later states that he will “honour good examples, but I will live by good precepts.”58 Though Hall may seem unhappy with moral examples and friends, he later writes that care for good company will either teach him or he can be the teacher. “Both these” he writes, “shall much pleasure me; one as an agent, the other as an subject to worke upon, neither knowe I whether more; for though it be an excellent thing to learn, yet I learn but to teach others.”59 We see here that community is still an essential tool for Hall.

The Puritan authors who seem to be less conflicted over the place of friendship in the Christian life still have some concerns. Rogers is concerned that some men will trade a friendship with God for earthly friendships by not giving their whole heart to God.60 Baxter, in good Thomist fashion, argues that people will do evil because they think that it is a good. No one wills “evil as evil.” On the back of this comes a warning not to let good things become evils, and thus friends become a distraction from seeking the good.61 “Rest” can only be found in the “full obtaining of our Ultimate end.”62 Wealth, and even friendship, is too low an end for happiness; what our souls find as true rest must not waver in satisfaction.63 Friendship is a good, as long as it has its proper place. This is also the case for Reynolds, who argues that there is a strong dependence upon the assistant means to the end that is hoped for. These means, which we rely upon to achieve the final end, “have more or lesse power or certainty in them.”

57 Ibid., 141–2.
58 Ibid., 185. Also see 187-8.
59 Ibid., 27.
60 Rogers, PC, 95.
61 Baxter, SER, 428.
62 Ibid., 153.
63 Ibid., 555.
policy, power, or the like,” are the foundations of corrupt hopes. They can be the causes of “hope of probability,” but not of “certainty,” because they are subject to miscarriage and the providence of God who is the true arbiter of certainty of hope. These probable means are just tools to ultimate ends. Other aids have either wings that easily forsake us or thorns that will poke us if we lean too hard on them.64

We see that friendship, for the Puritans, is a good thing, a good means and a help in pursuing God and eternal happiness. There are, however, strong concerns that these means might become ends in themselves, but as we have seen, it is not really the idea or concept of relationships between one or a few people that is the worry, but the making more of these ‘means’ than is appropriate. On the contrary, friendship, even according to the most skeptical thinkers, is a necessary and important aspect of moral and spiritual growth.65

Friendship with God

Friendship with God is an exceptionally important means of moral development, arguably the most important. We will begin by looking at Aquinas and his agreements and disagreements with Aristotle’s thought, in order to shape our discussion on the importance of friendship with God for the Puritans.

From the Thomist position, which the Puritans generally adopt, true virtue only comes when one has friendship with God. Here we see some overlap with our discussion in Chapter 4 concerning the infusion of theological virtues. Aquinas saw being in right relationship with God through Christ as necessary in order to break beyond natural, rational and moral constraints and to truly flourish and be all that we as humans are meant and created to be. It is God’s very being to be happy and he shares this with us through friendship.66 This relationship of God and humankind is necessary for happiness because friendship and well-wishing require communication. Since there is a communication between God and humankind, in which God communicates his happiness to us, “some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same

64 Reynolds, *TPFS*, 248.
65 It should be mentioned at this point that it was common at this time to assume that the congregation and the audience of books were Christians. This “charitable assumption” that one is in the community of Christ could contribute to some speculation of “friends” in the church. But, even with this charitable assumption, there was still pressure by some to separate themselves from sinners; see Collinson, *Religion of Protestants*, 252–6; 269.
communication.” Along with a new ability to cultivate virtues, charity brings with it ‘communication’ with the divine, “wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man and God.” God’s Trinitarian nature is the foundation of this friendship. A point that Aquinas makes is that God is love and that he also has a loving relationship that takes place within his everlasting Trinitarian self. However, there is still a problem as to the differences and similarities between earthly friendship and friendship with the Divine, and here Aquinas parts ways with Aristotle in order to make genuine friendship between God and humankind possible.

Aristotle’s theory of friendship has very strict parameters for what kinds of relationships can be considered true friendship, which seemingly prevent a human being from having a friendship with God. In particular, Aristotle asserts the impossibility of true friendship between two unequal persons. Aquinas broadly agrees concerning human friendships between unequals, but he also makes a fascinating departure from Aristotle in his discussion of caritas and friendship with God.

It is charity that makes friendships between such supreme unequals possible; caritas extends to all regardless of status. It is in this love that we are able to be friends with God, who is clearly not equal with his creation. The friendship of charity, grounded on a “fellowship of happiness,” is essentially in God as the First Principle, “whence it flows to all who are capable of happiness.” According to Aristotle’s view, friendship between unequal parties is impossible because he has in mind friendly relations between two persons where ‘the good’ and the object of friendship reside in some restricted way, rather than “friendly relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality”. This unequal friendship works because we become friends with ‘the good’ itself.

For Aquinas, “charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual love, together with

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The invitation to partake in God’s loving activity “provides the dynamic sharing in virtue, so necessary to friendship.” Equality with God comes by his invitation; it is a gift, indeed a grace, which makes friendship possible without the distance from God ever being reduced.

As important as charity is, the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace. As for Augustine, he believes that grace enables and then love achieves friendship with God that is by the mediation of the Holy Spirit. For Aquinas, there are two kinds of grace. The first kind of grace, among other things, heals corrupted human nature and is related to infused virtues. Believers do not need further help from this kind of grace. The initial infusion is sufficient. The second kind of grace helps us towards righteous acts. This grace enables us to abide in good to the end of life. “Caritas and amicitia [friendship] are both oriented outward, to the other.” The logic here is that God loves all people, the Christian loves God, and thus the Christian will love all people for the sake of God.

Now that we have a broad picture of friendship with God, we can look more specifically at the Puritans. Baxter and Owen’s understanding of friendship with God is remarkably like that of Aquinas. Baxter, for example, makes an analogy between the pain we feel when a friend is absent and our relationship with God. A close relationship with God is a necessary aspect of genuine faith. We see here in Baxter’s writing a high view of earthly friendship as well as the importance of being in the presence of God as friend. Baxter also remarks that contemplation is like talking to an old friend or countryman. Enjoyment of parents and of friends is a “sweet” pleasure; how much sweeter will it be to be in a perpetual love with God? It is also important for Baxter that we, as friends on

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73 Ibid., I–II 65.5; Aristotle, EN, viii.2.
76 Summers, Friendship, 89; Porter, Nature, 379.
77 It is by the infused virtue of charity that the other theological (faith, hope) and cardinal virtues (temperance, justice, courage, prudence) can be cultivated.
78 Aquinas, ST, I–II 109.9; 10.
79 Summers, Friendship, 90.
80 Aquinas, ST, II–II 23.1; Young, Politics of Praise, 110–11.
81 Baxter, SER, 562–3.
82 Ibid., 605; 750.
this earth, communicate with and worship our divine friend in heaven, and in the midst of this, that we make new friends through conversion.\textsuperscript{83} Conversion is a person not only joining a new community of earthly friends but also beginning a friendship with God.

Owen’s writing on friendship also mirrors that of Aquinas quite closely. Owen distinguishes between two kinds of love: \textit{beneplacito} (“good pleasure and destination”) and \textit{amicitia} (“friendship and approbation”). Both of these loves are particularly assigned to the person of the Father, “in an eminent manner.” It is through the person of the Son that the Father shows these two loves, and it is through these loves that we are able to ‘dwell’ with the father through the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{84}

With regards to friendship, it is also through friendship with Jesus, who calls us friend, that we have the ability to be obedient,\textsuperscript{85} but when we are not obedient and do sin, we are grieving the Holy Spirit and thus grieving “a tender and loving friend.”\textsuperscript{86} We can see above that in both Aquinas and Owen there is an emphasis on the Trinity in friendship with God.

There are other Puritans who have a place for a deep and intimate friendship with God, though it works itself out in different ways. For Richard Rogers it is through meditation that one finds that one is friends with God, and thus happy.\textsuperscript{87} Even Joseph Hall, with his generally negative view of earthly friendship, emphasizes that God is our friend, even when we do not deserve that friendship, and that God will treat his friends better than his enemies.\textsuperscript{88}

Friendship with God is an important aspect of Puritan moral and emotional development. In order for true virtue to be achieved, communion with God in friendship must be established. We can see a kind of chain of events. In order for one to gain control over the emotions by the use of reason and thus possess virtue, one must first have communion with God, which only comes through having this friendship. This is, however, not the end of the story with regard to moral development and friendship in Puritan thought. Our earthly friends and communities play important roles as well. In

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[83]{Ibid., 752. For more on being friends with God, see 273; 405, and on God calling us friends, see 586.}
\footnotetext[84]{Owen, \textit{Comm}, 23–4. For more on friendship with God, see 25; 239.}
\footnotetext[85]{Ibid., 159.}
\footnotetext[86]{Ibid., 202.}
\footnotetext[87]{Rogers, \textit{PC}, 36; 67.}
\footnotetext[88]{Hall, \textit{MV}, 23; 28–9.}
\end{footnotes}
this section we have looked at the role of friendship in moral development; we will now show the part that laws and rules play in developing us as persons.

**Rules and Law**

John Rawls takes it as the case that the Reformation was the cause of liberalism: further, P.T. Forsyth writes that Puritan individualism led to political liberalism. Forsyth’s comment may be slightly misguided. There is without question a new sense of individual spirituality in the Puritans, but community was also an essential aspect of their moral development. The Reformation doctrine of calling recognizes that there is a generous area of “relativity” in ethics. Not only, as we have seen in this thesis, are there particulars in virtue ethics generally, as each person has dispositions to one vice or another that need to be moderated, but there is also particularity with regard to gifting and obligation. This section, with regard to law and politics, will seek to answer the question of moral norms; that is, what are the particular normative moral obligations for certain individuals in particular situations? This is a continuation of our discussion in Chapter 4 on the development of virtue. The purpose of this section is to investigate how the Puritans see the relationship between the development of virtue and the State. This section continues to address issues that were addressed in the previous chapter.

What we will see is that the place of divine commands in Puritan thought generally is not of the first type mentioned in chapter 5—all precepts that make up morality have their origin in God’s unconditioned will—because there is recognition of God’s created order. There is an elevation of divine commands for morality, but within these commands, there is not an absence of reason. The ordered world still has a grip on general moral commands. We can see statements from the Puritans, such as Owen’s statement, to the effect that our universal obedience to the will of God is our duty, but what we will find is that this seems to be secondary. It is the case that humanity has a duty to obey God’s commands, but this is a means to the end of habituating character-states that usher in earthly and heavenly happiness. In this way, the Puritans reflect their ancient and medieval counterparts’ political perfectionism more than other political

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91 Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics*, 188.
theorists do in England at the time, such as Thomas Hobbes or John Locke, in that the
state can legitimately promote a certain conception of the good, even if this good is
subject to disagreement by those who live and work within the community. However,
the view of law and political order that will be given below does have its liberal moments.
It does not resemble a standard construal of liberalism in that it is not voluntarist,
constructivist or progressivist. The depiction of law and politics below does have a
‘family resemblance’ to liberalism, in that law is concerned with the protection of
human frailty and there is an emphasis on the responsibility of rulers and the rule of law.
This is a strand of liberalism that admits, “the human person is a creature incapable of its
own perfection, although nonetheless called to and made for this perfection.” Also, as
will be seen, an attribute of liberalism that is typically dominant but is not represented
here is a conception of toleration or cultural relativism; there is a conception of the
common good that is more than the sum of individual preferences. With this in mind,
this section will look at the political implications of the Puritans’ eudaemonism in their
Aristotelian-Thomist political perfectionism. We will begin with a brief analysis of
Aristotelian-Thomist perfectionism and move on to show how the Puritans accept and
implement it.

**Political Perfectionism**

This section will broadly describe Aristotelian-Thomist perfectionism and the
ways in which it relates to the development of virtue. For Aristotle, political science has
law (legislative wisdom) as its primary concern. He makes a distinction between kinds of
laws, the first of which is ‘particular,’ related to a given place and community and able to
change depending on place and circumstances. A second kind of law, ‘Universal law,’ is
the law of nature and is not particular, but is “common to all” and is related to justice.

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98 Aristotle, *EN*, 1141b25; 1154b13–6; 1134b18–1135a15.
Universal laws are to be made in accordance with virtue. Just acts produce happiness for society and the law binds us to do just acts.\(^{100}\) As we have seen, happiness requires virtue, virtue requires education, and, going a step further, education is managed by legislation. Thus Aristotle can say that it is hard for a person to be virtuous if they have not been brought up under the right kinds of laws.\(^{101}\) Moral training and education is the proper concern of the legislator,\(^{102}\) who must possess practical wisdom\(^{103}\) so that the people’s errors can be corrected, thus leading the individual, and by extension the community, to a state of happiness.\(^{104}\) The law helps people to form habits, as it allows for the employment of our capacity for deliberation and prudence, which would not be exercised if not in a community.

Aquinas’ conception of the law is quite similar to Aristotle’s, with a distinctive theological emphasis that takes into account tradition, scripture and contemporary practice.\(^{105}\) The definition of law is an ordinance of reason for the common good, made and promulgated by those who have been given the responsibility of caring for the community.\(^{106}\) Reason is not just a general rational character; rather, it is a process that is concerned with ends. Law that is obeyed contributes to a life that is both ordered and well lived, which is by reason governing every level of human functioning towards an end.\(^{107}\) Legislators are to make laws that are ordered to the common good and that promote virtue.

Aquinas has a clear hierarchy of law that begins with the eternal and divine law. God is the ruler of the universe, and the world, being ruled by divine providence, is governed by divine reason. The end of the “divine government is God himself, and His law must needs be ordained.”\(^{108}\) The natural law directly relates to the divine and eternal

\(^{101}\) Ibid., 1179b34. Virtue is related to laws, but it is more than mere conformity to law, ibid., 1144a13.
\(^{102}\) Ibid., 1102a7; 1103b3; 1129b19; 1180a24; Aristotle, \textit{Pol}, 1289a11; 1310a12; 1337a11.
\(^{103}\) Aristotle, \textit{EN}, 1141b23–9.
\(^{104}\) Aristotle, \textit{Pol}, 1310a28; 1280b.
\(^{106}\) Aquinas, \textit{ST}, I–II 90.4.
\(^{107}\) For a short survey of the interrelatedness of end, virtues and law in Aquinas’ ethics, see the introduction chapter in Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Disputed Questions on the Virtues}, ed. E. Margaret Atkins and Thomas Williams (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), ix–xxx.
\(^{108}\) Aquinas, \textit{ST}, 91.1.
law. We share in the eternal reason, which gives humankind a teleological inclination and is the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law. Natural law relates to civil (positive) law, which conforms to the natural law. These different forms of law are all interrelated. The relationship of law, ethics and nature is that the moral life begins with rules or laws that are intended to help people towards the good by providing a standard of right direction. The laws are not ends in themselves and should not be valued in themselves, but they lead to the perfected will and perfected desires required for happiness. It is the intention of the law “to make good citizens.” Aquinas further writes,

Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue is “that which makes its subject good,” it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good, which is the common good regulated according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simply.

Law is to be given for the purpose of directing human action. Lawgivers make men good by habituating them to good works. For this reason, heresy is not only the concern of the church but of the state.

For both Aristotle and Aquinas there is a necessary and integral relationship between nature and law. The law serves as an educator for perfecting persons. We will see below that the Puritans also are strongly perfectionist in their thought on rules and laws.

**Puritan Perfectionism**

The Puritan conception of the purpose of law is a near adoption of both Aquinas’ and Aristotle’s conceptions, given above. Laws are not given for the sake of obedience; rather, obedience to laws is a means to the end of achieving happiness. Laws are a pedagogical tool to mold persons into the kind of people that they are created to be. What we will find in the Puritans is that they follow in a perfectionist tradition more than other English theologians and philosophers. They believe that the state should take on a much more active role in the moral development of citizens. Religion and politics are

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109 Ibid., I–II 95.1.
110 Ibid., I–II 92.1.
111 Ibid., II–II 11.3.
112 It seems to be the case that the Puritan use terms like law, rule and commandment synonymously.
intrinsically tied. Puritans thought that moral commandments should be upheld by “laws of the realm,” arguing for public humiliation, fines and excommunication for sins. The doctrines of vocation of some smaller protestant movements were collectivist and given to a new social solidarity that tried to actualize God’s law and purposes on earth to the salvation of society.

In the following sections, we will start by looking at the relationship between law and nature in Puritan ethics. We will then look at the role of law as teacher and finish with special focus on civil government.

Law and Nature

I argued earlier for the explanatory power of an ethic that is based on created nature. If this is the case, then what is the relationship between a natural flourishing and the following of rules and laws? We will also see the answer the Puritans give for this connection. I will start by looking at two biblical scholars, Tom Wright and John Barton, in order to draw out distinctions in Puritan thought.

Alongside looking at the relationship between nature and law, another question that we will be asking of the Puritans is this: do they fall into the problem that Walter Schaller calls the ‘standard view,’ in other words, are virtues simply dispositions to follow moral rules? This is a question about the order and priority of virtues over rules, or rules over virtues. What we will see below is that the Puritans place a high value on the commands promulgated by God, but that these are means to other means, which are virtues. This question will first of all be addressed in this section and will continue to be addressed in the following section on the pedagogical components of the law.

For Tom Wright there is an intrinsic connection between the created order and the commanding of a law by God. He describes how, just as a highway builder “builds a central barrier so that any car drifting towards the oncoming traffic will be stopped in its

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115 For more on the relationship between covenant theology, virtue, nature and law, see Gardner, *Justice and Christian Ethics*, 66–8. For the most part, I agree with Gardner’s account, the exception being that I see more similarities between Aquinas and Augustine on the virtues, and thus think that the Puritans’ Augustinianism is closer to that of Aquinas.
tracks,” so the purpose of laws and rules is to keep those who are growing in virtue going in the right direction when they are distracted or an unexpected emergency happens. “Those building roads are not saying ‘there you are; there’s a nice crash-barrier. Bounce off that you’ll be all right.’” The point is that people are heading in the direction of their intended goal, and the barriers keep them on the road when something unexpected takes place. The best way to keep the rules is to build habits.

As we have seen in previous chapters, virtues are natural dispositions that are habituated and help to move us towards natural ends. What Wright is getting at here is that rules keep us moving in the direction of our created nature. The commands of God are not arbitrary but, as John Barton notes, “the biblical writers often argue not from what God has declared or revealed, but from what is apparent on the basis of the nature of human life and society.” Thus “‘wisdom’ is essentially the ability to live one’s life in accordance with such order, at both the physical and the moral level: to be skilful in one’s occupation, sensible and sagacious in one’s decisions, and moral in one’s whole way of life.” Obedience to divine commands and laws is only a small aspect of the whole system of ethics and politics, and where divine commands do emerge, they are specifications of how the cosmic order should be maintained in a particular sphere of activity, rather than overarching principles. Wright and Barton represent the view of the Puritans with regard to law and human flourishing.

Rogers writes that unbelievers have knowledge of God through reason, but those who delight in the scriptures receive from them the wisdom that informs them “what [is] the happiest estate of life that here can be enjoied, and even, which hath the promise of this life and of the which is to come.” The reading of the word of God in scripture instills a daily resolve against evil and sin. Rogers also notes that we know such duties in our conscience.

For Reynolds, there is an intimate relationship between nature and law. God is the end of natural agents. When someone is in discord with the law, and thus with their

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117 Wright, *Reborn*, 172.
118 Ibid., 171.
120 Ibid., 66.
122 Ibid., 596; Also see Bolton, *DSTH*, 58.
proper end, there is “decay” and “dissolution.” It is in the soul that God “fastened a perfect knowledg of his Law and Will…” There are natural rules to which human nature needs to be habituated to follow, especially those rules that relate to the right use of the passions. Reynolds, many times in his treatise, refers to the “rules” that help moderate the passions, two examples being the ‘rule of God,’ loving God and his glory and commands, and the ‘rule of self,’ which resembles the self-love discussed in Chapter 2 and friendship described earlier in this chapter. Also, as in our discussion of moral exemplars in previous chapters, instead of focusing only on rules, Reynolds shows that it is the opinions of others, especially those who are our examples, that shape us. These people function as a kind of rule.

Thomas Goodwin writes in *The Returne of Prayers* that prayer is said to help us to keep our duties. Prayer keeps humankind upon the path, keeps her diligent in her duty. This could sound like an endorsement of the ‘standard view’ mentioned above, but Goodwin continues on to say that prayer is not just a duty and a looking forward to the things that will be obtained. It is like a doctor who prescribes a patient medicine and a sick person who only takes it because the doctor said to do so, rather than to get better; patients should be concerned with good ends. If ordnance is just a duty, he notes, then just doing the action itself is good enough, but we should be continually looking for the outcomes of these duties. The law God gives consists of commands and duties not to be followed in themselves, but as a means to blessing and flourishing. Goodwin later states that in prayer there are two aspects that need to be considered. There is first the duty, or the command from God, and second, the need to see that duty as a means to bring about blessing.

There are two parts of moral epistemology for Baxter. The first part is “the natural part; being from the beginning, and written in the Nature of every reasonable creature, and by an Eminency and Excellency it is of Natural Morality above all other

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124 Ibid., 401.
125 Ibid., 82–94. Also see 10-1; 33; 52-3; 113; 127-8; 192.
126 Ibid., 301.
127 Goodwin, *Returne of Prayers*, 120.
128 Ibid., 236–237.
129 Ibid., 238–9.
Laws whatsoever.” Jean Porter’s discussion of Aquinas helps draw out what Baxter seems to be getting at here. The cardinal virtues are universally recognized and admired in some form. “Almost everyone can see that restraint, courage, fairness, and good judgement have some point, given the exigencies and common aspirations which structure human life.” Thus natural cardinal virtues provide the “closest thing we have to universal moral language.”

The second part, Baxter calls the ‘supernatural parts of the conditions’: that which is “not known to any man by the meer light of nature: but is supernaturally revealed to the world by the Gospel,” much as we saw in Chapter 3 with sacra doctrina. For Baxter there can be good acts of virtue done by a heathen; this is related to the ‘natural part’ mentioned above and is purely natural. But it is only by the “precepts of Christ” that action or duty be truly virtuous. “By the Precept I mean any Divine determination concerning our duty, what we ought to do or avoid.” Precept is the same as “God’s Testament, his Covenant, and the New Law.” This law is broken into two parts: the ‘precept’ and the ‘sanction.’ “The precept may be considered, either as by it self [do this or that] and so it maketh Duty: This constitutes the vertue of Action; [Regulating them].” So we see here that virtuous actions come from divine precepts. “So the second kind of sincerity [whether an Action be good or bad] must be tried by the Precept as Precepts. What God requireth is a vertue: what he forbiddeth is a Vice: what he neither requireth nor forbiddeth, is indifferent, as being not of Moral Consideration.” Sanction is an addition and stands in conjunction with the precept, “[Do this or that, and be saved, or else perish.]”

What we have seen above in Baxter is that there is a natural ability to possess virtue, but that the supernatural is only related to the precepts of Christ. It is natural, but something more, much in the sense looked at in Chapter 2 on natural and supernatural ends. Duty to law is not our ultimate end, but has its place in the spiritual life. We need to be careful to note that the command, though it comes from the precept of Christ,

130 Baxter, SER, 422.
132 Baxter, SER, 422.
133 Ibid., 419.
134 Ibid. For more on the relationship between duties and practice, see 331; 334; 336. For more on the use of sanctions with regards to Aquinas, see Hibbs, Virtue’s Splendor, 72.
135 Baxter, SER, 6–7.
is still based in nature. Happiness is the “natural part concerned with the pure
Godhead.”

For John Owen, God is by nature loving, and commands not from an arbitrary
will but from his nature. “Those who lay the necessity of satisfaction meerly upon the
account of a free act and determined of the Will of God, leave to my apprehension to just and
indispensable Foundation for the Death of Christ, but lay it upon a supposition of that
which might have been otherwise.” This makes God’s “justice not a Property of his Nature,
but a free act of his will: And a will to punish, where one may do otherwise injustice, is
rather ill-will than justice.”

Carl Trueman, regarding Owen, notes that “rational
creatures must necessarily exist in a state of moral obligation to God as Creator, a moral
obligation which will have a certain legal content which cannot be a matter of simple
divine whim; it has to embody those elements such as obedience which reflect the
ontological Creator—creature distinction and relationship which must necessarily exist
once God has acted to create.”

Law as Teacher

Above, we have seen that for the Puritans there is a direct connection between the
commands of God and the created order. What we will look at here in this section is how
the law and rules function as a pedagogical tool for the learning and practicing of virtues.

Rogers argues against the accusation that the practice of daily direction leads to
toil and inconvenience. Rather, he thinks that the daily practice of observing rules leads
to “well ordering” and that there is “no pleasure nor comfort in the world like it.” The
well ordering and framing that come from the daily practices of obeying God’s
commands constitute the “greatest wisdome” and so lead to the greatest pleasure. We
should note that the connection between wisdom and the practice of the law is a feature
highlighted by John Barton above. Obeying God’s commands is a way of ordering our
lives in such a way that we experience the most pleasure. The Ten Commandments
are to be “formed” in us to help with our daily worship and to live with others; laws are

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136 Ibid., 420. For the natural aspects of prayer and meditation, see Baxter, DHM, 12.
137 Owen, Comm, 21.
138 Ibid., 110–1. Emphasis mine.
140 Rogers, PC, 577–8; 313.
The law is to be preached to show people their sin, and to be corrective.\textsuperscript{141} We should not only look to laws for moral development, but should also consult the wisdom of those who have “experience in them,” that is, the laws. We can see that there is a community aspect to following the law, in that we are dependent upon others for understanding what it requires of us.\textsuperscript{143} “The proper frame of mind was one which kept a man constantly fit and willing to fulfill his Christian obligations, whatever they might be.”\textsuperscript{144}

Perkins, as we have seen, has a very robust conception of happiness that is taken from his reading of the Sermon on the Mount. He states that this particular sermon is the key to the whole of the Bible and is given so that the disciples would know the will of the father.\textsuperscript{145} The first part of the sermon, verses two through thirteen, are concerned with the rules that bring about true blessedness and happiness.\textsuperscript{146} Obeying the commandments of God lead to Sabbath and “perpetuall happiness.”\textsuperscript{147} What we see in Perkins’ discussion of rules is that they are not the end in themselves. Rather, they are the means, leading a person towards the end: happiness. Unlike Perkins, Tom Wright thinks that the Beatitudes are not rules, but he would agree with Perkins that they are virtues concerned with ends. Wright argues that Jesus’ discussion of the kingdom in the Sermon on the Mount is not referring to some future kingdom, but rather the state of affairs in which God’s kingdom has come.\textsuperscript{148} “God’s future is arriving in the present, in the person and work of Jesus, and you can practice right now” the habits and character of a life which finds its goal in that coming future.\textsuperscript{149} The Beatitudes are not rules but virtues, habits of the heart that anticipate the new world now. “That’s how they work: grasp the end, the goal, the \textit{telos}, the future, and go to work on anticipating it here and now.”\textsuperscript{150} The true human end is already given in Jesus. “Become what you will be” is to become what you

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{141} Ibid., 311; 577.
\bibitem{142} Ibid., 48–50.
\bibitem{143} Ibid., 577.
\bibitem{144} Ibid., 577.
\bibitem{145} Rogers and Ward, \textit{Diaries}, 3.
\bibitem{146} Perkins, \textit{GLE}, 1–2; This also seems to be the opinion of Yoder. See John Howard Yoder, \textit{Discipleship as Political Responsibility}, trans. Timothy Geddert (Scottsdale: Herald Press, 2003), 12.
\bibitem{147} Perkins, \textit{GLE}, 6.
\bibitem{148} Perkins, \textit{GC}, 29.
\bibitem{150} Wright, \textit{Reborn}, 90; 6.
\end{thebibliography}
actually are in Christ. “Be perfect as I am perfect” means to be a complete, genuine human. From a less obvious theological perspective, William Frankena agrees with Wright and the Puritans above. Morality cannot provide principles (laws and rules) of prima facie duty and cannot be content with the letter of the law, but it must foster in us the disposition that will sustain us in the hour of decision. Principles without the development of dispositions “to act in accordance with its principles” seem ad hoc. Morality cannot be content with simply obeying principles.

In Baxter, we can see the same emphasis that is given by Rogers and Perkins: “[t]hat while we are guided by the fear of Castigation, we may be converted to the perfection which is through Christ.” What begins as the fear of punishment turns into the development of character to perform duties. We can also see in John Owen that the law is insufficient for the end and purpose of righteousness.

What we have seen above is that, for the Puritans, the magistrates are to care for the souls of their citizens. Civil law is a corrective behavior and, “spiritual recovery and the rescue of the civil order go together.” The laws of God should be the laws of the state. However, the degree, means and execution of this relationship between ‘spiritual recovery’ and ‘civil order’ vary depending on the thinker. John Witgift thinks that human authority can decide a subject’s ‘adiaphora,’ because God does not ordain them, whereas Thomas Cartwright seeks to ground such matters only in scripture. What seems to be most consistent is the idea that the law is normative for all people because it accords with nature. But laws pertain to norms in the sense of the general calling. The law convicts people of sin and moves them towards repentance and eternal happiness. To again cite Baxter, “the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom; but the Law bringeth fear: Therefore the knowledge of the Law is the beginning of wisdom; and no man is wise without the Law. They therefore that refuse the Law, are Fools…”

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151 Ibid., 102; Also see Goodwin, Returne of Prayers, 239.
153 Baxter, SER, n. 364.
154 Owen, Comm, 136.
155 Perkins, ATV, 69.
156 Taylor, Secular Age, 107; 119.
157 Doran, Elizabeth and Religion, 26.
158 Baxter, SER, n. 364.
between individuals. Obedience to laws and rules is part of, but not exhaustive of, what is required for a life characterized by the virtues.

**Conclusion**

This chapter along with the previous turned our gaze away from the discussion of particular ‘happinesses,’ back to the universal development of virtue and the community’s role in this process. We have done this first by looking at the importance of friendship in the Puritans. It could be thought that this emphasis on friendship would not have been sustained in Reformation England because of the emphasis on sin and a general distrust for humanity. Though there is a place for this worry, it does not dissuade English reformers from encouraging friendships as an essential part of moral and spiritual growth. Communities and friendship were important, especially for persecuted communities.\(^{159}\)

We have then finished our discussion of community involvement in moral development by looking at the role of the state. Here we saw that Puritan ethics does not necessitate an assent to political liberalism.

What I hope to have shown here is that the community is an essential part of an individual’s moral development. Even with a strong emphasis on personal flourishing and happiness, the achievement of this is never beyond the reach of another who assists in this journey. Whether this ‘other’ is a community of believers, the secular state or God himself, it most certainly takes the help of others for one to achieve both natural and supernatural happiness.

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\(^{159}\) Bremer, *Puritanism*, 68.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

*Money can’t buy happiness, but it can make you awfully comfortable while you’re being miserable.*
Clare Boothe Luce

*An unfulfilled vocation drains the color from a man’s entire existence.* Honoré de Balzac

Introduction

Steve Jobs at a graduation address for Stanford in 2005 said, “you’ve got to find what you love. And that is as true for your work as it is for your lovers. Your work is going to fill a large part of your life, and the only way to be truly satisfied is to do what you believe is great work. And the only way to do great work is to love what you do.” A recent article takes issue with Jobs’ statement, saying, “The 21st-century Jobsian view asks us to turn inward. It absolves us of any obligation to, or acknowledgment of, the wider world.”

The eudaemonism and doctrine of calling in the Puritans presented this thesis disagrees with this complaint, in that a person should turn inward to find their natural, innate talents and capabilities and that these very capabilities contribute to the ‘wider world.’ The account of the good argued for in this thesis does not subordinate the good of the individual to the good of the community or vice versa. The individual pursues and defines their good within the concrete context of the whole.

This chapter will briefly summarize the argument of this thesis and give some practical applications for contemporary theological ethics, politics and economics.

Thesis Summary

This thesis was fundamentally a discussion of eudaemonism in Puritan thought with a view to its wider implications for Christian ethics. We saw in Chapter 2 that there is a diversity of ways in which the Christian thinkers analyzed in this thesis, from Augustine through to Owen, conceive and put into practice eudaemonistic concepts and

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principles. With that said, there are still two substantial continuities, which are the two-fold natural and supernatural ends. We have seen that, for these Puritans, there are natural ends, and these ends contribute to earthly happiness. These natural ends allow for there to be a universal human ethic based on nature. However, the eudaemonism represented in Puritan thought can affirm that earthly happiness is a significantly diminished happiness in comparison to the final, and perfect, supernatural happiness that is conducive to our created natures. The Puritans emphasizes that earthly ends are not the final ends of mankind; the ultimate end is the supernatural. The possibility for supernatural happiness is only attainable by the grace that is provided through Christ. What does this mean for Christian ethics? There are natural ontologically and environmentally rich goods in which we can base our lives and actions here in this world, but these are only penultimate ends. In order for one to reach one’s full human potential, one must be seeking God.

Chapter 3 extended the above discussion of supernatural happiness to look at the relationship between theoria and praxis in the Puritans. Based on a shared picture of humankind being rational animals set in a conception of the tripartite soul, we saw that post-Reformation thinkers attempted to hold together the tension of these two forms of life: the life of theoria and the life of praxis. What was emphasized was that we are rational animals and that, in order to flourish in a way that is appropriate to our beings, we need to engage our reason, which functions in two ways.

The first way our reason functions as Christians is the study of theology, which can take place in a number of different ways, from intense academic engagement to prayer or short daily bible readings. It is part of our earthly flourishing to use our minds to engage with the world that God has created. Being rational animals does not conflict with our daily work and activity. The second way that we use our reason appropriately as rational animals is in the supernatural end. This ultimate end is achieved only in the next life and is a kind of existence that engages our intellectual capacities through seeing and knowing. The ultimate end, supernatural happiness, is related to reason in that to see God is to contemplate him.

In Chapter 4, we began an analysis of William Perkins’ definition of calling and the moral ramifications of the Puritan doctrine of calling. For the Puritans, the
development a ‘kind of life,’ or a life that is defined by a character that exhibits the cardinal and theological virtues, is central to a conception of ethics that is based on divine calling. The main push of Chapter 4 was that divine commands do not necessarily need to be in conflict with the Puritan desire to speak to the development of character that is based on virtue and natural phenomena.

Like their eudaemonist predecessors, the Puritans conceive of the virtues in a two-fold manner, making a distinction between moral and intellectual virtues. This is alongside the near complete adoption of a conception of the passions as a focal contributor to moral development, since the sensual part of the soul relates to the rational part. We have also seen that the Puritans, in a very Thomist fashion, go beyond Aristotle to affirm that the ability for the development and habituation of virtue is tightly connected with the infusion of the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity.

Chapter 5 moved from a conception of the divine command in universal humankind through moral development to an examination of more particular commands in the doctrine of calling. This was done by expounding the second part of Perkins’ definition of calling concerning the personal and private imposition of callings on humankind. We saw that calling for the Puritans is ontologically, environmentally and situationally grounded and thus related to flourishing generally as well as particularly. This is where we were able to see specifically and most clearly the situationist account of ethics that had been developed in previous chapters. The particularization and situationally oriented duties come about because the means of achieving earthly happiness vary from person to person. The means to the general calling or telos—the infusion of virtues through charity and faith in Christ—are universal in that every person has access to them. In this way, this thesis attempted to integrate divine commands, specifically the idea of vocation or calling, into a naturalist eudaemonist framework.

What this thesis has shown is that the Puritans arrive at an insight paralleled in Dorothy Sayers’ work. Sayers' short essay on work argues that there is a connection between work and the pleasure that is had in hobbies, such that people need to see these as more closely related. Work is a way of service, and certain kinds of work are “fitted by nature.” Work should be enjoyed and we do not fight for simple employment but for a
quality of work. However, Sayers’ argument resembles more Weber’s utilitarian reading of Baxter in that “work is not, primarily, a thing one does to live, but the thing one lives to do.” To be clear, Sayers argues along with the Puritans looked at here that work is to be enjoyed and is fitting to our natures, but I also have shown, against Sayers, that for the Puritans we do not live to work. We live for something much more, that is, God himself not only in this life, but also in the next. There is room in the Puritan’s conception of work for rest, leisure and meditation; in fact it is a duty. This is something that Weber’s account of the Puritans does not take seriously.

With the above in mind, Chapter 6 showed that the community is an essential part of an individual’s moral development. Even with a strong emphasis on personal flourishing and happiness, which can never be achieved without the assistance of others. Whether this ‘other’ is a community of believers, friends, the secular state or God himself, it certainly takes others to achieve natural and supernatural happiness. We further saw the social and political aspects of the Puritan definition of calling and work. Drawing on Aristotelian final causation these thinkers were able to navigate the individual’s divinely ordained social positioning and the value that this positioning contributes to the whole.

We then looked at some of the nuanced specifics of their doctrine of calling in respect to how both Christians and non-Christians should use, enter and progress in their calling. We also saw that ‘sabbath’ played as significant a part in their theology of work as did labor itself. And in Chapter 7 we looked at the importance of friendship for moral, spiritual and political development. Communities and friendship were important for the Puritans, especially for persecuted communities. We finished our discussion of community involvement in moral development by looking at the role of the state.

In the sections to come, I will give a brief account of how eudaemonism in the Puritans along with the doctrine of calling has practical import for ecclesial and political life today especially with regard to work. I will do this by looking first at the continuities between what has been argued in this thesis and in Catholic Social Teaching, second the role of education on social flourishing, third the dangers of value judgments and market values, and finally at a further analysis of globalization and supererogation.

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3 Ibid., 55.
Happiness, Vocation and Contemporary Issues

Bellah and associates in *Habits of the Heart* argue that work “is one of the central requirements for a revitalized social ecology.”4 Richard Layard has noted that happiness can be a social good, the “one ultimate goal that enables us to judge other goals by how they contribute to it.”5 The explanatory power of this thesis confirms both Bellah and Layard’s statements. Work is an important political discourse and happiness can be the organizing principle to determine overall social flourishing. Layard, however, advocates a utilitarian conception of happiness. Utilitarian definitions of happiness should not be the basis of social goods. If pleasure is tied to buying and consumption, work can appear only as an endeavor necessary for securing pleasure and satisfying our greed and envy. The happiness looked at through this thesis offers a more full-bodied moral and political happiness. It is my intention at this point in the thesis to show some of the moral and political alternative to Layard’s description of happiness with the eudaemonism and doctrine of calling represented here.

I suggest that there is a cyclical relationship between universal and particular happiness, whereby if citizens are happy and are experiencing well-being, the society as a whole will experience well-being. Just as Aristotle writes that the “true student of politics must study the soul,”6 so I suggest, that particular and universal happiness can be accomplished by placing value on those innate callings that are expressed in individual persons. I will first show that there is much continuity between the specifically protestant eudaemonist doctrine of calling expounded in this thesis and contemporary Catholic Social Doctrine. Leading on from this, we will look at what this unified perspective on work can say to broader social issues, market values and education. And finally, we will look at the positive global implications of the situationism described throughout this thesis and above.

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Catholic Social Teaching

What we should first draw attention to is the close relationship that the themes of this thesis have with Catholic social teaching. There are a number of strong continuities between the Puritan authors on human flourishing, work and economics and modern Catholic social teaching. I will be specifically comparing the concepts from this thesis with those in the *Compendium of The Social Doctrine of the Church* (CSD).  

Firstly, both traditions focus more on the priority of “conversion and transformation of the conscience of believers than on the need to change the social and political structures of the day.” As we have seen in Chapter 2, the primary focus of ethics for the Christian authors investigated here is the supernatural happiness and the virtues and character traits that flow from this reality to make personal and social advancements in this life. This takes priority over penultimate ‘happinesses.’

Secondly, with regard to gifts and talents, our gifts from God are for personal and social flourishing. This has the same emphasis as the CSD, which states, “economic activity is to be considered and undertaken as a grateful response to the *vocation* which God holds out for each person.” This section of the CSD continues, stating that good administration of the gifts received, and of the material goods, is a work of justice towards oneself and towards others. Furthermore, “everyone should make legitimate use of his talents to contribute to the abundance that will benefit all, and to harvest the just fruits of his labour,” and “talents should be considered in the redistribution of resources.”

What we saw in Chapter 6 is explicitly stated by the CSD, “the dignity and complete vocation of the human person,” which is the creative dimension and is essential to human activity and “the welfare of society as a whole.” These are “to be respected and promoted.”

The model presented in this thesis by the Puritans, and by Catholic social teaching, can be extended beyond the local community to the global economy. As I have shown earlier, the good society is one in which particulars (individual callings) contribute

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7 It could have been just as easy to draw upon John Paul II’s encyclical *Laborem Exercens*. CSD was chosen because it closely draws upon this encyclical as well as other earlier Catholic documents. See, John Paul II, “*Laborem Exercens.*”


9 Ibid., 7.II.326; 328. *Emphasis mine.*

10 Ibid., 7.III.336; IV.355.

11 Ibid., 7.II.331; III.337.
to the good of the whole (socio-political order). The section of the CSD on globalization describes this well, when it states,

[T]here is an ever wider awareness of the need for models of development that seek to take on the task not only of raising all peoples to the level currently enjoyed by the richest countries, but rather of the building up a more decent life through united labour, of concretely enhancing every individual's dignity and creativity, as well as his capacity to respond to his personal vocation, and thus God's call.12

What this is communicating, in agreement with the argument of this thesis, is that callings at a global level contribute to the worldwide, interrelated network of economic participation that attends to the dependence of people on each other’s skills and giftings. I propose that those Protestants who consider themselves part of the Puritan tradition have more in common with Catholic social teaching than is perhaps thought. With this in mind, social and economic action can be agreed upon and promoted from both Catholic and Protestant perspectives on global and economic goals, some of which I will discuss briefly below.

**Callings and Markets**

Another fundamental agreement between the CSD and the argument of this thesis is that there is a “necessary relationship between economics and morality.”13 In this section, I will show the issues that arise when a doctrine of calling is directly related to free-market values. A report written for the *Institute for Faith, Work, & Economics* uses the concept of uniqueness and calling similar to that argued for in this thesis and the CSD as an attempt to biblically justify income inequality.14 Ann Bradley, the author of this report, associates uniqueness with the image of God, making it an ontological reality. She states,

All of this comes down to the fact that each individual is born with unique skills and abilities. Our work on earth, pursued with a true understanding of how God has called us to use those gifts—our purpose—can further His Kingdom. And that can occur through owning a dry-cleaning business, playing professional football, being a professional evangelist and countless other vocations, even though those gifts can and do bring different earthly rewards. Tim Tebow has a net worth of $3 million and Billy Graham’s is recorded at $25 million. Those dollars reflect the market return to their comparative advantage. The market rewards and punishes in dollars.

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12 Ibid., 7.V.373.
13 Ibid., 7.II.331. Also see 7.III.349; 360; 338; 339.
The above means of thinking about natural uniqueness and economics leads to a number of issues. First, the problem with the way in which it is construed is as follows: if uniqueness is ontological and the market dictates values then, by necessity, there arises the issue of one person being ‘valued’ over another because of supply and demand of innate abilities. The dry-cleaner becomes less valuable than the professional athlete. John Rawls is right to be concerned with a conception of justice that is based on ‘natural talents.’ Rawls’ concern is a legitimate one because of his awareness of the possibility that a lottery of natural talents may favor some people over others, simply based upon contingent cultural values. This seems to be the case with Bradley, who reads a conception of free-market capitalism back into scripture. The Church relates to the state, at least for St. Luke, a profoundly theological (and not simply pragmatic) question, requiring a hermeneutical frame of reference for right apprehension. Only from the position of the risen (and coming) Christ will one arrive at the epistemic commitments necessary to understand the concomitant overturning of, and situatedness within, the lex—and with it pax – Romana. Oikovonia is a term employed by Luke, in the Gospel as well as Acts, to depict the third way by which the Church may live. It is not a via media, it is important to note, charged with the task of forming a material negotiation between right and left. Its life of oikovonia—and thereby its handling of goods is the alia via (or alia omnino aliam viam)—an entirely different ‘way’ of life; and this is reason enough for Luke to call it, without any qualification, ‘the Way’ (Acts 9.2). In light of the above, it is hard to see how Bradley can separate functionality from ontology, and she seems to read contemporary economic systems back into scripture.

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15 See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999), 62–4; 87; 91–2; 137; 142; 265; 271–4; 354; 365; 271; 274; 354; 364; 376–7; 387.

16 Hauerwas, in his own way, has made a similar point: ‘[t]here is, however, one characteristic of Christian convictions that, while not unique to Christians, is nonetheless a stumbling block to many who would assess whether Christian convictions are true…For I have argued that the very content of Christian convictions requires that the self be transformed if we are adequately to see the truth of the convictions – for example, that I am a creature of a good creator yet in rebellion against my status as such. Talk of our sin, therefore, is a claim about the way we are, but our very ability to know we are that way requires that we have already begun a new way of life. That is why the Christian doctrine of sanctification is central for assessing the epistemological status of Christian convictions”: Stanley Hauerwas, “Why the “Sectarian Temptation” Is a Misrepresentation: A Response to James Gustafson,” in *Hauerwas Reader*, ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 99–100.

17 Also see C. Kavin Rowe, *World Upside Down: Reading Acts in the Graeco-Roman Age* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
Secondly, the above report also does not take into account other canonical texts that discuss justice as taking care of the poor through some, at least minimal, form of wealth redistribution. Other Old and New Testament passages with regard to social behavior and the accumulation of wealth would most likely lead to one of two conclusions: (i) either individual callings are equal and should receive near-equale pay or (ii) the discrepancies between callings should be of no consequence because those who make more should care for those who make less, so much so that there can be no visible difference between the lifestyles of people with different callings. This form of capitalism “provides systematic incentives” for vices and for people to “develop a kind of character that has a propensity for injustice.”

Thirdly, the economic basis given by Bradley is driven only by rationalizing, capital and cooperative bargaining with no regard to sympathy and empathy for others. The inconsistency in this form of economics becomes apparent, as there is a dichotomizing of social relationships. “All social relationships are to be either relationships governed by bargaining undertaken for mutual advantage (market relationships provide the paradigm) or affective and sympathetic relationships.” There should be a general encouragement for persons to move away from pure self-interest and towards developing affections and sympathy for others. This requires that we invest ourselves in non-market relationships of “uncalculated giving and receiving.” Michael Sandel has recently pointed out the dangers of allowing markets to dictate morals. The value of natural talents should not be socially contingent, but talents should contribute to the good and flourishing of an entire society. With this said, the above should not be taken as a full-frontal attack on markets. We will now look at one specific instance in which an inappropriate relationship between callings and market values has taken effect in Western culture.

Also, if value is put on people based upon what they can produce, then there could be a problem with how a culture with the about economic presuppositions should treat the disabled and the elderly. As was made clear in chapter 6, under the doctrine of calling described in this thesis, care for those who are unable to care for themselves is a

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19 MacIntyre, *Dependent*, 115.
crucial part of vocation and community. This is not because of what these people are able to do, but because of what they are. These people have value not because of what they can produce, but because they have relationships with family and friends.

**Education**

A saddening effect of the above extreme free-market mentality has made its way into education. In the last few decades, at least in the United States, there has been a constant struggle to keep art, music, humanities and ROTC courses in public schools. Based on the conception of work, and the broader economic effects that work has on happiness given in this thesis, taking these subjects out of schools injures social well-being because students with the above natural giftings are not given ample opportunity to develop these skills and apply them in adult life in their work. Wendell Berry notes, “[a] loser, by definition, is somebody whom nobody knows what to do with.”21 Those whose callings have no social political capital become losers simply because their natural interests are outside of what the market deems as valuable. Artists, writers and musicians, whose vocation is related to beauty rather than capital and value, become ‘losers.’ The above subjects in education are seen as extra-curricular, non-essential, and deemed not worthy of funding, while mathematics and sciences take center stage because of their quantitative and empirical impact. If a job does not meet a utilitarian purpose then it does not have societal legitimacy.22 Thus whole communities of people are left to employment that is not conducive to their innate character traits and experience frustration in their daily lives.

Having training as an artist does not necessarily mean that one must end up as a successful painter, sculptor or curator. There are plenty of vocations that allow people to draw upon a natural creativity and tend towards the visceral experience of ‘working with one’s hands. Matthew Crawford shows that the “potential for human flourishing” in the manual trades (e.g. mechanic, plumber, craftsman) is greater than in more computer, or machine-based trades (e.g. assembly lines and call centers) because of the “rich cognitive

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challenges and psychic nourishment” that comes with them. These manual trades cannot be outsourced to other countries due to the necessity of their close proximity, and they also offer chances to problem-solve in unique ways in the physical world. Such vocations usually require apprenticeships that look very much like an Aristotelian type of mentoring. Under his mentor, Chas, Crawford became a more “virtuous” mechanic. Being able to be mistaken and corrected by a mentor “is an ethical virtue.”

From the above, we can see that the educational processes for some giftings do not require a university education, and thus not everyone should go to university, but rather, vocational schools encouraged. As a result of people being forced into universities, the economic web or balance has been thrown off, and there are fewer people to do the ‘dirty jobs’ that are necessary for socio-political flourishing.

This relates to the argument of the thesis in that if there is not adequate training for the variety of talents and character traits that are represented in humanity and within a society, then there is the potential that a large group of citizens may not be sufficiently educated to flourish; these people may then be pushed into careers that do not accord with their giftings. If such a significant portion of a polis is unable to flourish as individuals, it seems unlikely that the polis as a whole will be able to flourish.

Globalization, Mission and Situationism

The eudaemonist doctrine of calling as represented in this thesis by the Puritans also has another added benefit for practical Christian ethics, which has been explored at various points through this thesis, which is situationism. This benefit allows for an explanation to the problem of supererogation. Julia Annas defines supererogation as “acts which the agent does which go beyond what he is obligated to do, which are admirable but in some way go beyond moral requirements.” In practical terms, this could look like God calling a person to leave the comfort of Western civilization to lead a life dedicated

24 Ibid., 99.
25 I also, however, want to affirm that education, such as, the reading of texts like Shakespeare or Walt Whitman, shapes peoples’ characters. If I am advocating that some people should not go to university, won’t they miss out on this important part of character development? My response to this is to say that the reading of these texts should not be delayed until university but should be engaged with at younger ages and made a central part of school curriculums.
to the poor in India, while another person may be called to work hard at their job and to care for their family in an exceptionally less harsh environment. Is there a significant moral difference between the two people described above? Susan Wolf puts the problem this way, “[I]f the moral saint is devoting all his time to feeding the hungry or healing the sick or raising money for Oxfam, then necessarily he is not reading Victorian novels, playing the oboe, or improving his backhand.”27 Within this eudaemonist doctrine of calling one action is no less morally praiseworthy than another, but if the person who God has called to care for their family abandons this call in order to go to India, then they are acting wrongly. Moral principles generally still apply by virtue of us discussing right actions for human nature, but individual situations allow for a variety of right actions that are not universalizable. A eudaemonist conception of calling allows for these kinds of particularities in ethics. Being virtuous is the ideal for every person. Because of the emphasis in Puritans, and in a reformation ethic of calling, there is a large emphasis on responding to a particular situation with prudence and not holding fast to rigid philosophies.28

Not every life is required by God to be extraordinary in the way that popular media would define extraordinary; some are called to the ordinary, and this can be extraordinary in the context of the city of God. In the example given above, the person who is called to care for the poor in India should be recognized for their deeds, but the person who cares for their family should not be thought less of. The doctrine of calling, as it relates to ethics, helps us to navigate some of these questions. But it is predicated on those who are called to do the seemingly dirtier jobs or missions in the world stepping out and doing them. The social breakdowns caused by some persons not being obedient to their callings are sometimes the reasons why others are called to do ‘dirtier’ or ‘riskier’ vocations, for example, the person who feels called to care for orphans is sometimes necessary because parents have not taken their callings and responsibilities as parents seriously. Or the call to serve in impoverished countries arises because of the corruption

27 Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” The Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 8 (1982): 421. How I am using Wolf here is not the main argument in her paper. However, the passage quoted above does contain the thrust of the inquiry I am making into deontological ethics.

of political leaders who do not practice the virtues required to do their particular callings well.

What should be stated at this point is that everybody, by virtue of being human, has a calling. Every person regardless of age, gender or health, has a divinely oriented responsibility to fulfill this personally and socially whether that is as a mother, teacher, electrician or entertainer. What this does not mean is that every person has a ‘right’ to wealth, fame and riches. Not every calling leads to celebrity. Some callings require a faithful, humble and quiet commitment to family and community. These more humble callings can be, in the words of Friedrich Nietzsche, “a long obedience in the same direction; there thereby results, and has always resulted in the long run, something which has made life worth living.”

Conclusion

What I have drawn out in this chapter is how a Puritan eudaemonist doctrine of calling helps shed light on some modern-day socio-political issues. Firstly, though there may be deep differences in theology between Catholics and Protestants, there is much that can be agreed upon with regard to moral and political theology if this conception of a eudaemonist doctrine of calling is taken up. Secondly, the emphasis on natural, innate uniqueness is important, but it is severely damaged if an unfettered free-market capitalist perspective of values is prioritized. Thirdly, with regard to education, separating work from our natural loves and giftings ultimately leads to a dichotomy of work and happiness. ‘Non-work’ time becomes escapist. A solution to this would be to give more attention at the educational level to those who are gifted in the arts and humanities and to how they can implement these talents fruitfully in society. And finally, the situationism described in this thesis has wide implications for meeting global needs in relation to God’s providence.

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