ASSESSING THE TURKISH MODEL: THE MODERNISATION TRAJECTORY OF TURKEY THROUGH THE LENS OF THE MULTIPLE MODERNITIES PARADIGM

GOKSEL, OGUZHAN

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ASSESSING THE TURKISH MODEL: THE MODERNISATION TRAJECTORY OF TURKEY THROUGH THE LENS OF THE MULTIPLE MODERNITIES PARADIGM

OĞUZHAN GÖKSEL

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

School of Government and International Affairs
University of Durham
2015
Abstract. With the Arab uprisings of 2011, the so-called ‘Turkish model’ emerged as central to a number of debates within academia about the significance of the modernisation experience of Turkey and its alleged applicability for developing countries of the Middle East and North Africa region. This thesis explores the concept of the Turkish model through the lens of modernisation studies.

There are two mainstream conceptualisations of the Turkish model within the scholarly literature, namely what this thesis terms the ‘structural model’ and the ‘societal model’. While the structural model emphasises the value of the Kemalist secularisation program and the pre-1980 period of state-led development for the alleged success of Turkey in modernisation, the societal model highlights the role of social forces, particularly focusing on the post-1980 period of economic liberalisation and the rise of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) after 2002.

The methodology of the structural model is based on hypotheses of ‘classical modernisation theory’, whereas the societal model is inspired by ‘neo-modernisation theory’. Nevertheless, there is a gap in the existing literature on the Turkish model in terms of holistically examining this country case with a rising approach within modernisation studies in recent years – the ‘multiple modernities paradigm’.

This thesis offers an alternative approach to the study of the Turkish model by applying the multiple modernities paradigm. This theorem challenges Eurocentric and deterministic conceptualisations of modernity by arguing that the processes of secularisation and economic development do not necessarily result in the consolidation of liberal democratic regimes. The thesis argues that the conceptual frameworks used by the structural and societal models within Turkish studies are based on the historical Western European experience of development, which prevents the two schools from fully accounting for the nuances of the unique process of transformation in Turkey. While expecting Turkey to replicate the Western experience, both approaches neglect the
significance of *historical contingency, path dependency and international context* for the socio-economic and political history of this country. By contrast, the multiple modernities paradigm acknowledges the profound impact these factors had on Turkey’s modernisation experience. Based on this framework, the thesis analyses the economic, social and political development trajectories of Turkey, showing that modernisation in this non-Western society has been a complex phenomenon that produced a divergent 'modernity' rather than converging towards Western values such as liberal democracy.
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Declaration

I hereby declare that no portion of this thesis has been previously submitted for a degree at this or any other university.

The work is solely that of the author, Oğuzhan Göksel, under the supervision of Prof. Emma C. Murphy and Dr. Colin P. Turner.

Material from the published or unpublished work of others, which is used in the thesis, is credited to the author in question in the text.

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Acknowledgments

In developing societies such as Turkey that experience rapid processes of transformation, the history of every family is a story of modernisation. One can even trace the development trajectory of a country through looking at social mobility experienced by three successive generations: My paternal grandparents were born in small villages in central Anatolia, at the heart of Turkey. My grandfather was a farmer before migrating to the nearest city in the area to become a factory worker. My father was brought up in that small Anatolian city before moving to Istanbul to study public administration. I was raised in Istanbul, the fully industrialised economic capital of Turkey, before having the opportunity to study my postgraduate degrees in Durham, the UK. Perhaps due to the particular background of my family which fully reflects the dramatic socio-economic and political changes experienced in developing countries over the last century, studying modernisation has long been a dream of mine and I am very pleased to have had the chance to conduct this research project.

Studying a PhD is never easy, but countless people made it an enjoyable experience for me. Before moving on to thank some of these friends and colleagues, first I would like to state my appreciation of the hospitality shown to me by Britain and its people. The city of Durham, in particular, will always have a special place in my heart as I now see it as a second hometown. It provided one of the best possible environments in the world to write a PhD thesis. I truly feel privileged to have conducted my research under the shadow of its beautiful 11th century Norman cathedral while living alongside its kind and ever-smiling inhabitants.

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I owe an immense debt of gratitude to two brilliant examiners, Prof. Mehmet Asutay and Dr. Ayla Göl, who turned the viva voce into a highly enjoyable and memorable experience for me. I will be forever grateful for their time, insights and helpful suggestions that greatly contributed to my understanding of the subject of modernity and the case of Turkey.

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During my PhD, I have also had the chance to exchange ideas with a number of esteemed academics who were kind enough to spare their time for me. I am very grateful to Prof. James Piscatori, Prof. Ziya Öniş, Assoc. Prof. Hüseyin İşiksal, Prof. Şevket Pamuk, Prof. Sabri Sayar, Prof. Gencer Özcan, Prof. Hakan Yılmaz, Prof. İlter Turan and Dr. Reem Abou-el-Fadl in this regard. I would also like to acknowledge my intellectual debt to Prof. Cemil Okşay and Prof. Mehmet Ö. Alkan for inspiring me study the modernisation experience of Turkey with their thought-provoking lectures during my undergraduate years at Istanbul University SBF. It was a privilege to learn from such brilliant academics and I can only hope to pass on their knowledge to younger generations of social scientists someday.
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Finally yet importantly, I thank all the administrative staff of the School of Government, particularly Barbara Farnworth and Wendy Redhead, who kindly helped me whenever I required assistance during my postgraduate studies in Durham.
To my beloved parents

to whom I owe everything.

Her şeyi borçlu olduğum
sevgili annem ve babama.
**List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Association of Ataturkist [Kemalist] Thought (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMT</td>
<td>Classical Modernisation Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEV-GENÇ</td>
<td>Federation of Revolutionary Youth Associations of Turkey (Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DİSK</td>
<td>Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPT</td>
<td>State Planning Organisation (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOI</td>
<td>Export-Oriented Industrialisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEP</td>
<td>People’s Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFBs</td>
<td>Islamic Finance Banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import-Substitution Industrialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBTT</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Transsexual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGK</td>
<td>National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMP</td>
<td>Multiple Modernities Paradigm</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNP</td>
<td>National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MÜSİAD</td>
<td>Independent Industrialists' and Businessmens' Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMT</td>
<td>Neo-Modernisation Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTÜK</td>
<td>The Supreme Board of Radio and Television (Radyo ve Televizyon Yüksek Kurulu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHP</td>
<td>Social Democratic People's Party (Sosyal-demokrat Halk Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOEs</td>
<td>State-Owned Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>THKO</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TİP</td>
<td>Workers Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOBB</td>
<td>Union of Chambers and Stocks of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOKİ</td>
<td>Housing Development Administration of Turkey (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜSİAD</td>
<td>Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (Türk Sanayiciler ve İş Adamları Derneği)</td>
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<tr>
<td>YÖK</td>
<td>Higher Education Council (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu)</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: ASSESSING THE TURKISH MODEL OF MODERNITY

This first chapter provides the context of the research undertaken in the thesis. The chapter extensively focuses on the scholarly literature on the ‘Turkish model’, shedding light on different understandings of the concept. The shortcomings of existing approaches are discussed and an alternative conceptual framework for the study of the subject matter is presented, which constitutes the main research objective of the thesis. This chapter also explains the main arguments of the work as well as clarifying the research methods and methodology that are used throughout the thesis.

The chapter consists of six sections. Part one presents a review of the existing literature on the Turkish model. That section comparatively analyses the shared and divergent features of the two most commonly used approaches to the study of the subject matter. It shows that there is a consensus regarding the conceptualisation of Turkish model of modernity as comprised of the processes of economic development, democratisation and ideological transformation of Islamism. Building upon this, part two critically examines the competing understandings of the three fundamental elements of the Turkish modernity and highlights major gaps in the existing literature. Part three further discusses the neglected elements within the literature and explains how the ‘multiple modernities paradigm’ (MMP) will be used to offer an alternative and more effective understanding of Turkish modernity and historical modernisation experience. Part four contains essential information about the research methodology and methods used throughout the thesis. Part five contains the

---

1 It could be helpful for the reader to note the verbal context in which this thesis utilises two essential terms throughout this work – modernity and modernisation. These words are often used interchangeably, yet there is a noteworthy distinction between their meanings. Modernity ‘is the condition of being modern’ (Cambridge 2014). The term refers to a state of existence that is different from past forms of human experience in fields such as economic conditions, political organisation and social life. By contrast modernisation ‘is the transitional transformation period by which the state of modernity manifests’ (Cambridge 2014). Hence, modernity is a state of existence that is an outcome of a process of modernisation.
1.1 COMPETING PERCEPTIONS OF THE TURKISH MODEL

With the Arab uprisings of 2011, the so-called ‘Turkish model’ emerged as central to a number of debates about the significance of the modernisation experience of Turkey and its alleged applicability for developing countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (See, for instance, Nafaa 2011; Atasoy 2011; Kirişçi 2011; Taşpınar 2011; Al-Azm 2011; Akyol 2012; Torelli 2012; Andrikopoulos 2012; Rane 2012; Bengio 2012; Kubicek 2013b; Tziarras 2013). The popularity of the concept has extended beyond academic circles as numerous newspapers and non-academic journals have published views on the Turkish model and the politics of the post-2011 MENA region, resulting in an array of highly subjective articles (Kalın 2009; Aktaş 2011; Akyol 2012). The Turkish model has been utilised in various ways by scholars, leading to the emergence of numerous understandings in fields of foreign policy analysis, political economy, political Islam, democratisation and, more broadly, modernisation. This thesis explores the concept of the Turkish model through the lens of modernisation studies.

The current discourse on the Turkish model is not entirely a new subject as it had its precedents in the 20th century and the early 2000s. In the 1930s, the Kemalist modernisation project of Turkey attracted the interest of Western observers and reform-minded monarchs of predominantly Muslim non-Western countries such as Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq (Atabaki and Zürcher 2004; Omrani 2007:155; Altunışık 2008:42). In recent decades, the country was offered as a model twice more (Kirişçi 2011:34-35): first, in the early 1990s, as a potential inspiration for the nation-state formation processes of newly independent Turkic countries in Caucasia and Central Asia – which were founded after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 – and second, in the early 2000s, when the US President George W. Bush and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publically announced their joint vision for the future of the
MENA societies – the so-called ‘Broader MENA Initiative’ that presented Turkey as an appropriate democratisation model for the region.

In its earlier manifestations, the notion of a Turkish model inspired some social and political reforms in several countries, most notably in Pahlavi Iran and the Kingdom of Afghanistan in the 1930s and the Republic of Azerbaijan after 1991 (Atabaki and Zürcher 2004; Altunışık 2008; Kirişçi 2011). Nevertheless, the difference between the earlier manifestations of the Turkish model and the ongoing post-2011 discourse is that this time the debate has not remained limited to scholarly and policy-making circles but caught the attention of the general public, particularly the so-called ‘Arab street’ (Kirişçi 2011:43). In this regard, a survey made shortly after the 2011 Arab uprisings in several countries of the MENA region found that 61 percent of the respondents perceived Turkey as a model for the modernisation of their own societies (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012:5). Moreover, the leader of the Ennahda Party that won the first free and fair elections in post-2011 Tunisia, Rachid Ghannouchi explicitly told the press that his party would follow the footsteps of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) and adopt Turkey as their model (Jung 2011:2, Hurriyet Daily News 2011). A crucial research question that emerged out of these discussions is could the historical experiences of one society be possibly applicable to other countries?

Over the years, a large body of literature has suggested that the Turkish model could supposedly be helpful for the modernisation of MENA societies in terms of economic development, democratisation and building a pluralistic socio-political context in which Islamic values could co-exist with ‘modernity’ (Fuller 2004; Çavdar 2006; Altunışık 2008; Nasr 2009; Kaddorah 2010; Dede 2011; Kayadibi and Birekul 2011; Kirişçi 2011; Atasoy 2011; Kalın 2009; Aktaş 2011; Ülgen 2011; Taşpinar 2011; Akyol 2012; Bozkurt 2012; Ramadan 2012). Modernity, in this regard, has been portrayed in the literature on Turkish model as a universally desirable objective and the notion was understood by these scholars as referring to the values that characterise the contemporary Western civilisation – a liberal democratic political system, an industrialised, literate and largely urban society and a secular view of state and religion affairs. In this
context, two mainstream conceptualisations of the Turkish model of modernity emerged within the scholarly literature, namely the ‘structural model’ and the ‘societal model’ (Duran and Yılmaz 2011; Laçiner 2014:22-23).

It has been argued by both schools that Turkey has been very successful in establishing a ‘consolidated liberal democratic regime’, achieving a ‘high economic development level’ and ensuring ‘the ideological moderation of the Islamic political movement’, yet the approaches differ in terms of analysing how the supposed success in these three fields has been achieved (Fuller 2004; Dede 2011; Al-Azm 2011; İşeri and Dilek 2012; Kaddorah 2010; Jung 2011; Kirişçi 2011; Andrikopoulos 2012).

Scholars adhering to the understanding of the structural model interpret the Turkish model as ‘a state-led modernisation process directed by a secularised bureaucratic elite’ (See Altunışık 2008:45; Kubicek 2013b; Ülgen 2011; Ünver 2013; Karakaş 2007). The proponents of the societal model, however, perceive the Turkish model to be an example of the ‘compatibility of Islam with modernity’, arguing that the Turkish case proves that an Islamic political party such as the AKP can co-exist with non-Islamic parties within a secular and democratic state structure (See Ghanim 2009; Torelli 2012; Jung 2011; Akyol 2012; Khattab 2013; Verhagen 2012; Younis 2012; Nafaa 2011; Taşpınar 2011; Kayadibi and Birekul 2011; Nasr 2009).

The structural model highlights the secularisation experience of Turkey as the key characteristic that differentiates its modernity from that of other developing and predominantly Muslim societies, attributing the alleged success of Turkey in development, democratisation and secularisation to the legacy of the Kemalist Westernisation program in the pre-1980 period (Duran and Yılmaz 2011; Öniş 1999; Tütengil 1970; Ünver 2013; Berkes 1964; Lewis 1961; Kongar

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2 Please note that this method of categorising the literature on the Turkish model of modernity into two main approaches was used by the author in two journal articles that focused on different dimensions of the concept: See Göksel (2012, 2014). Nevertheless, the text of this thesis itself is original.
An example of this narrative can be found in Erdener Kaynak and Metin Gürol (1987:61):

The Turkish War for Independence, establishment of the Turkish Republic and the reforms that created modern Turkey have been admired and taken as a model by many Middle Eastern countries. Many Arab nationalists look to Ataturk, the creator of the Turkish Republic, as an idol.

By contrast, the societal model heavily focuses on the post-1980 socio-economic and political history of Turkey, arguing that the origins of Turkey’s contemporary achievements in economic development, democratisation and the emergence of a so-called ‘moderate Islamic paradigm’ with the AKP from 2002 onwards, lay in the dramatic transformation process that begun in the 1980s during Turgut Özal’s tenure as prime minister (1983-1989) and later, as president (1989-1993) (Taşpınar 2011; Akyol 2012). While the alleged success of Özal’s economic liberalisation program – that shifted the development policy of Turkey from the state-led import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) to the free market-driven export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) – is highly praised by the societal model, the late 1990s is portrayed conversely as an era of political instability and economic failure caused by the inefficiency of various coalition governments (Taşpınar 2011). Akin to the positive portrayal of the Özal era, the post-2002 rule of the incumbent AKP administration is also presented by the societal model as a period that has greatly contributed to the modernisation of Turkey. The AKP is given credit for the emergence of Turkey as a ‘success story’ in the MENA region with its pro-active foreign policy, rapid economic development and achievements in democratic consolidation (See Çavdar 2006; Nafaa 2011; Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011).

The societal model highlights the significance of the role of the AKP within Turkish modernisation to such an extent that the concept of the ‘Turkish modernity model’ becomes synonymous with the ‘AKP model’, namely the particular trajectory of ideological transformation the Turkish Islamic political movement had experienced over the years (Jung 2011:3). Alper Y. Dede’s article (2011:25) provides an archetype of such a narrative, suggesting that the
The Turkish model is deeply connected to Turkey's democratisation process, which is said to have started with the victory of the AKP in the 2002 parliamentary elections despite the fact that Turkey actually made the transition to free and fair multi-party elections in 1950. In this context, the AKP is claimed to be a 'role model' of ideological moderation and democratisation for Islamic or social conservative political movements of the MENA region such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Ennahda Party of Tunisia (Dede 2011:25; Torelli 2012; Taşpınar 2011; Shafiq 2009).

Following the post-2011 interest to the Turkish model, the aforementioned division of opinion between the two schools manifested as a result of the search by scholars to accurately analyse the historical modernisation process of Turkey and draw supposedly helpful insights for the MENA societies. However, the origins of the current understandings of Turkish modernity lay in an already established and extensive literature within modernisation studies. Conventional theories of modernity strongly shaped the literature on Turkey as the methodology of the structural model is based on hypotheses developed earlier by 'classical modernisation theory' (CMT), whereas the societal model is inspired by 'neo-modernisation theory' (NMT).

The depiction of Islam as a hindrance to modernity and the alleged necessity of the adoption of secularism to achieve modernisation in the Muslim world supported by scholars of CMT, such as David Apter (1965), Daniel Lerner (1958) and Sylvie Kedourie (1992), moulded the framework of the structural model (Çağlar 2013; Laçiner 2014). Influential scholars of Turkish modernisation such as Tarık Zafer Tunaya (1960), Bernard Lewis (1961), Niyazi Berkes (1964), Binnaz Toprak (1981) and Emre Kongar (1985) adhered to the understanding of CMT, perceiving secularisation as an integral element of modernity, praising the Kemalist Westernisation program of the 1930s and attributing the alleged success of Turkish modernisation process to its assertive secularist character.
According to Lewis (1961), the most positive character of Turkish modernisation has been the willingness of Turkish policy-makers to join Western civilisation through social reforms. The structural model contends that in order for any modernisation program to achieve success in predominantly Muslim societies, the socio-political influence of Islam has to be minimised as this belief system is represented as one that controls all aspects of life in a country due to the absence of divine and worldly spheres in its framework:

Islam is both a historical and an organic religion. On the level of ideas, it views history in sacred terms. This means that religion assumes an important role in establishing a socio-political order which conforms to divine design. On the structural level, its ecclesiastical organization is comparatively weak. In the absence of an autonomous church, the distinction between the religious system and the rest of society becomes obscure (Toprak 1981:21).

In this context, Berkes (1964) applies one of the most assertive variants of CMT to the Turkish case by arguing that secularisation and modernisation are synonymous and that it is unimaginable to envisage a modern society without a complete transformation of its lifestyles and worldview. The popularity of CMT among Turkish social scientists should not be surprising in light of the ideological compatibility between Kemalist ideology and the hypotheses of US-based scholars who developed CMT. After all, both Kemalism and CMT depict contemporary Turkey as the product of a ‘successful Westernisation program’ launched by a highly educated altruistic bureaucratic elite and a visionary leader of extra-ordinary capabilities, Kemal Ataturk (Kansu 1995:12).

NMT also influenced the study of modernisation in Turkey as scholars of the societal model built their narrative around the hypothesis that the reformist interpretation of Islam – not unlike Protestantism – would positively impact on the modernisation of a predominantly Muslim society by combining Islamic ethics with capitalism and commercialism (See Zürcher 2004; Yavuz 2013; Güngör 1991; Nasr 2009; Atasoy 2005; White 2002). Thus, NMT resulted in the emergence of a new concept within the literature, the so-called Islamic Calvinism, which has been utilised by the societal model to the case of modernisation in Turkey. In this regard, the societal model has re-casted Islam
as a modernising force and criticised the secularisation thesis of the structural model by portraying the state-imposed Kemalist modernisation project of the early Republican years as a failure that could neither thoroughly secularise the society nor prevent the rise of Islamism in the country (See, for instance, Yavuz 2005, 2013; Nasr 2009; Atasoy 2005, 2009).

The conceptualisations of the Turkish model offered by both schools are based on a different set of hypotheses derived from two distinct theoretical frameworks of modernity – CMT and NMT. Nevertheless, there is also common ground that can be found in the narratives they offer. Both the structural model and the societal model share the premise that contemporary Turkey constitutes a successful modernisation experience in the Muslim world. Furthermore, the concept of modernity is understood by both approaches in terms of success in three fields: economic development, democratisation and socio-political change in the form of the ideological change of Islamism.

In this context, the thesis will argue that there is a major gap in the literature on the Turkish model in terms of holistically studying this country case with an unconventional approach to modernity, namely the ‘multiple modernities paradigm’ (MMP). In contrast to large numbers of works that have used CMT and NMT frameworks, there are few noteworthy studies which analyse the Turkish modernity through the lens of MMP. In this regard, Nilüfer Göle (2000; 2002), Alev Çınar (2005), Esra Özyürek (2006), İbrahim Kaya (2004) and Masoud Kamali (2005) offer highly successful applications of MMP framework to the Turkish case. However, all of these scholars examine the scholarly discourse regarding the link between Islam and modernity on the Turkish example, heavily focusing their research on social change within Islamic groups. In contrast to these earlier works that mainly focus on the social development process of Turkey in terms of religious interpretation and the so-called concept of Islamic modernity, this thesis studies the origins of the Turkish modernity as a whole by tracing the trajectory of economic, socio-political and institutional development processes in light of MMP.
This theorem challenges Eurocentric and deterministic conceptualisations of modernity put forward by CMT and NMT as it argues that the processes of secularisation and economic development do not necessarily result in the consolidation of liberal democratic regimes (For the framework of multiple modernities paradigm, see Eisenstadt 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003; Wagner 2000, 2008, 2012; Arnason 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003; Wittrock 2002). The thesis argues that the conceptual frameworks used by the structural and societal models within Turkish studies are based on the historical Western European experience of development, which prevents the two schools from fully accounting for the nuances of the unique process of transformation in Turkey.

While expecting Turkey to replicate the Western experience, both approaches neglect the significance of historical contingency, path dependency and international context for the socio-economic and political history of this country. By contrast, the multiple modernities paradigm acknowledges the profound impact these factors had on Turkey's modernisation experience, which is highly useful in terms of comprehending the particular historical background that produced the contemporary Turkish version of modernity (Wagner 2012:VII-XIII; Eisenstadt 2000:2; Arnason 2003:XII). Based on this framework, the thesis analyses the economic, social and political development trajectories of Turkey, showing that modernisation in this non-Western society has been a complex phenomenon that produced a ‘divergent modernity’ rather than converging towards Western values such as liberal democracy.

In the following section, the chapter will focus on how the mainstream conceptualisations developed by the structural and societal models affect the way these schools study the economic, political and social development processes in Turkey – which collectively constitute the Turkish modernity. In all three dimensions of modernisation, the chapter will highlight the weaknesses of understandings offered by the existing approaches, which will pave the way for a re-conceptualisation of the Turkish modernisation experience through the lens of MMP in this thesis.
1.2 THE ‘TRINITY OF MODERNITY’ AND THE TURKISH MODEL

The previous section showed that the utilisation of opposing theories of modernity by scholars results in the emergence of two contrasting formulations that provide entirely different answers to the question of how Turkey has achieved modernity. This section will offer a critique of the mainstream studies of the Turkish model and argue that a more nuanced understanding would be possible through the application of MMP on all three aspects of the modernisation experience, namely economic, social and political development.

1.2.1 Studying the Economic Development of Turkey

1.2.1.1 The structural model vs. the societal model

The political economy of development in Turkey possesses a vast scholarly literature, yet several issues remain unresolved and continue to be a source for divided opinion: when did economic modernisation begin and which period and policies are most responsible for Turkey’s achievements in economic development? What has propelled the country into being the 16th largest economy in the world and a widely referred supposedly ‘successful economic development model’? (World Bank 2013; Dede 2011; Kirişçi 2009, 2011; Andrikopoulos 2012; Duran and Yılmaz 2011).

Scholars who subscribe to the structural model perceive the economic policies of the pre-1980 period as having been the source of Turkey's modern economic success and argue that this the era that should be taken as an example by other developing societies (See Pamuk 2006:824; Togan 1996; Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006; Keyder 1987; Ülgen 2011). The economic strategy referred to positively in this context is the statist development period (1930-1950) under the one-

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3 Economic modernisation refers to a number of inter-related processes such as industrialisation, urbanisation, mechanisation, infrastructure development, increases in literacy rate of the population and the improvement of average living standards that result in profound changes in the socio-economic life of a society.

4 Also known as the etatist strategy based on the French word, yet as this thesis is written for an English-speaking readership, I found it more appropriate to use its equivalent in English language throughout this study.
party authoritarian rule of the Kemalist CHP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*). Sumru Altuğ and Alpay Filiztekin (2006:17), for instance, highlight this early Republican era as the most significant years for the achievement of development, because the most dramatic progress in labour productivity, mechanisation of agriculture and accumulation of capital is claimed to have occurred in this period of planned development. The ISI period of 1960-1980 is also emphasised by the structural model as it is argued that the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation witnessed in this era constituted the preconditions for Turkey's later economic success (Öniş 2006:241). The structural model claims that the success of pre-1980 state-led development far outweighs the achievements of the post-1980 period that followed and the re-organisation of Turkish economy along the lines of *laissez-faire* in the early 1980s (Öniş 2003; Ünver 2013; Andrikopoulos 2012). Rather than market forces such as entrepreneurs, the main agent that is identified is the 'state' and the policies developed by its bureaucratic institutions such as the State Planning Organisation (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilati*, DPT).

In contrast, the societal model focuses on the post-1980 phase of Turkish economic development experience and emphasises the significance of transition from ISI to an EOI strategy through the economic liberalisation program of Özal in the 1980s (See Morrissey 1996; Öniş 1999; Cecen, Dogruel and Dogruel 1994:46; Özcan and Turunç 2011; Waterbury 1992b). Scholars such as John Waterbury (1992b:127) and Ziya Öniş (1992:74), for instance, argue that akin to other economic 'success stories' such as the newly-industrialised East Asian countries South Korea and Taiwan, Turkey is a model of neoliberal economic success.

The pre-1980 economic policies are depicted by the societal model as responsible for the supposed failure of the economic modernisation program of Turkey. The Turkish economy of that era is argued to have had problems that are common in less-developed economies such as a large budget deficit, an

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5 The term *laissez-faire* refers to an economic environment in which transactions between governments and private individuals are free from state intervention mechanisms such as restrictions, tariffs and subsidies. The phrase is of French origin, literally meaning ‘let them do’ or ‘let it be’. 

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unstable exchange rate, high inflation, over-reliance on public enterprises and excessive state intervention into economic affairs (Morrissey 1996:89). Within this narrative, the pre-1980 period is defined as resting ‘on a top-down state tradition governed by a state recruited elite in the civil service, the army, and in politics’ which is contrasted with the positively portrayed post-1980 period when ‘a new generation of indigenous entrepreneurs and conservative Anatolian urbanites began to undermine the state elite and their middle class allies’ (Özcan and Turunç 2011:64–68). The main agents in the framework of the societal model are social forces such as the entrepreneurs and their activities – e.g. exports to the markets of countries in the surrounding regions of Turkey such as Europe, the Central Asia and the Middle East.

1.2.1.2 The critique of the literature and the multiple modernities paradigm

Within the existing literature on the economic dimension of Turkish modernity, the significance of path-dependency – continuity between subsequent periods of history – is severely neglected. Both the structural and societal models artificially divide the economic development trajectory of Turkey through portraying the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods as contrasting experiences rather than perceiving the EOI strategy as a continuation of the national development objective of the ISI policy within a different international economic setting.

In this context, the role of two key factors on the economic development of Turkey are overlooked by both mainstream approaches: external factors (i.e. the impact of changes within the global political economic system and the interaction between Turkey and foreign actors such as the US and the EU on Turkish political economy) and the ‘sequencing of economic development’ (i.e. a number of non-Western countries such as Japan, South Korea and Brazil achieved rapid economic growth rates throughout the latter half of the 20th century, because they successfully sequenced their development strategies as a response to the changes in the international system and the changes in the

The idea of sequencing economic development suggests that the EOI strategy is most effective when it is based on the groundwork of a successful ISI policy as seen in the experiences of rising East Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China. Once a society experiences industrialisation within a protectionist national economic system based on the ISI and establishes strong indigenous industries that could compete with the enterprises of other countries within the global economy, then that economy could increase the likelihood of a successful transition to the EOI strategy through economic liberalisation. In such a setting, the protectionism of the ISI would no longer protect the national industries from foreign competition but only restrict their production capacity to the size of the national market due to the absence of external markets to export goods. Therefore, the EOI can in fact be seen as a continuation of the state-led national modernisation strategy of developing economies in a different form, rather than being portrayed as a fully contrasting paradigm of development under free-market rules. As such, the pre-1980 and post-1980 development policies in Turkey could be seen as complementary in terms of ensuring the economic modernisation of Turkey in the long term.

In addition to overlooking the role of path-contingency and international context, the methodologies of the structural and societal models limit themselves to analysing either the role of the state or the market forces rather than comparatively studying both essential elements of capitalist development. Thus, there is a strong need to scrutinise the economic development process in

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6 It is important to note that the concept of 'sequencing economic development', in this context, does not mean that societies which adopted a variety of different development strategies over the years such as the ISI and the EOI, decided on shifting from one policy to another in advance. Instead, it denotes the idea that even though policy-makers cannot effectively predict and design a 'reform path' in advance, there is still an element of continuity between successive economic policies and that shifting from one development strategy to another does not necessarily mean that one paradigm of development has collapsed. Sequencing economic development refers to an ‘eclectic and adaptive process which succeeds through continual monitoring, review, and revision of policies’ in light of the changing circumstances of the time (McPherson 1995:1).
Turkey through a new approach that does not rely on the limiting lenses of CMT and NMT.

Contesting the arguments of the structural and societal models, MMP offers a more suitable approach to the study of economic modernity as it emphasises the significance of path-dependency within the modernisation experiences of developing non-Western cases, which is compatible with the idea of sequencing economic development (Wagner 2012:VII-XIII; Eisenstadt 2000:2; Arnason 2003:XI). Economic modernity is a direct product of the particular development policies a non-Western society follows in its historical trajectory of change:

The new powers in the world - such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa - emerge from different historical trajectories, such as experiences of a regional version of communism, colonial domination, extreme inequality in an entrenched oligarchic setting or apartheid, and their ‘modernities’ are bound to be shaped by those experiences, and sometimes now their choices are seen as models to be emulated elsewhere (Wagner 2012:VIII-IX).

Thus, the nature of economic modernity cannot be analysed in isolation from the historical development trajectory of a society. Moreover, that trajectory can only be understood if the links – especially the continuities – between different historical periods are understood.

MMP also acknowledges the significance of a ‘globalised international setting’ for the modernisation of non-Western economies as these societies have devised their economic development programs within an international economic system that radically differs from the circumstances of the historical trajectory in the West (Wagner 2012:168-169; Arnason 2003:287-295; Eisenstadt 2000:14). The Industrial Revolution and the subsequent waves of rapid material changes occurred spontaneously in Britain as a result of the specific historical economic trajectory of the country. This can be called the ‘original’ economic modernity as it was one of a kind (Eisenstadt 1999:284). The economic modernisation process of the non-Western societies, however, emerged only after they encountered Western modernity via the economic and military imperialism of Western nations (Eisenstadt 2000:14). From that critical
moment onwards, the historical trajectory of non-Western societies was altered forever.

The original modernity of the West could not possibly be replicated elsewhere, because unlike its spontaneous manifestation in Britain, non-Western nations such as Turkey have had to design economic development programs in order to free themselves from Western hegemony. This premeditated economic development process not only occurred as a reaction to Western modernity, but it was also shaped by it through increased interaction between societies. As technological advances in communications and transportation technology that began in the West gradually spread all around the world throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, an inter-connected international economic system emerged. This meant that the economic modernisation of non-Western societies would occur while interacting with elements of Western modernity as well as other non-Western nations. The result of this interaction can be most effectively comprehended by a non-deterministic theory such as the MMP, because this approach takes into account the historical contingency of economic modernisation in non-Western country cases such as Turkey whose route would be shaped by unexpected factors that did not exist in the case of the ‘original economic modernity’ in Britain. Hence, as it will be studied in more detail in Chapter 2, the MMP offers a more inclusive conceptual framework than the deterministic approaches of CMT and NMT, which expect human societies across the world to eventually converge towards Western modernity defined in terms of free-market capitalism and liberal democracy.

In sum, the alternative conceptualisation of the economic modernisation of Turkey through MMP in this thesis will provide an effective understanding of the particular development trajectory experienced in the country by acknowledging historically contingent factors, the impact of interaction with Western modernity (international context) and the path-dependency between the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods. In the following section, the chapter will compare and critically review the understandings of the political development experience of Turkey developed by scholars of structural and societal models.
1.2.2 Studying the Political Development of Turkey

1.2.2.1 The structural model vs. the societal model

CMT and NMT both define political modernisation as ‘a general process of change in the political sphere through differentiation and specialisation of political functions and structures’ alongside ‘an increased popular participation in politics’ and ‘an increased popular identification with the political system’ (Dodd 1988:12; Rostow 1960; Huntington 1968:33-34; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). This definition reveals that popular participation into policy-making and legitimacy of the system are two essential elements of political development as understood by CMT and NMT. CMT and NMT perceive the concept of political development as synonymous with democratisation, which has also reflected in the arguments of the structural and societal models on the case of Turkish modernisation.

In recent years, particularly since the Arab uprisings of 2011, Turkey has been presented in the narratives of both the structural and societal models as a ‘successful model of democracy’ for developing countries such as Tunisia and Egypt (see, for instance, Yavuz 2013; Aktaş 2011; Akyol 2012; Al-Azm 2011; Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011; Kubicek 2013b). In this regard, the approaches converge on presenting Turkey as a ‘consolidated liberal democracy’ and interpreting democratisation as the most significant element of the political development process experienced in modernising societies.

Nonetheless, the structural and societal models differ in terms of their analysis of how Turkey supposedly democratised. The structural model suggests that Turkish democratisation has been a successful experiment due to the assertive secularism of the Kemalist rule in the formative years of the Republic (1923-1950) which is said to have triggered a complete ‘cultural revolution’ in Turkey by instilling the society with Western values (see Ünver 2013; Fuller 2004; Altunışık 2008; El-Labbad 2009; Everts 2004; Kubicek 2013b; Heper 1997). Challenging this assumption, the societal model argues that Turkish democratisation has been successful not because of Kemalist Westernisation.
program which had failed to spread democratic values, but rather due to the democratic transformation of the Islamic political movement (see Yavuz 2009, 2013; Atasoy 2009; Akyol 2012; Kaddorah 2010; Kalın 2009; Jung 2011; Nafaa 2011; Taşpınar 2011). Thus, it has been argued that democratisation has manifested ‘not from top’ via the imposition of Kemalism but ‘from below’ due to the rise of a social force, the Islamic movement, which has allegedly transformed over the years by adopting democratic principles and ceasing or downplaying its criticism towards the principle of secularism (Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011).

The main hypothesis of the structural model, derived from CMT, is that democracy can only develop in a thoroughly secularised society, and therefore the assertive secularism of the Kemalist regime was beneficial for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. An example for this school of thought can be found in Metin Heper (1991:1):

Atatürk attempted to plant the seeds in Turkey for both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of liberal democracy... It is true that during his lifetime, except for a brief experiment in 1930, a multi-party system was not installed. Atatürk, however, had an emphatic belief in the innate capacity of the people to develop and, in due course, impinge upon government. This particular approach has borne fruit in later years. A multi-party system was finally established in 1945.

By contrast, the societal model – which is inspired by the Islamic Calvinism hypothesis developed by NMT – conceptualises modern Turkey as an exemplar of the compatibility between Islam and modernity. For instance, a notable scholar who adheres to the approach of the societal model, Vali Nasr (2009:232-251), defines the Turkish modernity as the ‘harbinger’ of an emerging modernisation paradigm in the wider Muslim world, namely a ‘Muslim capitalist democracy’.

The societal model particularly depicts the AKP rule since 2002 as an era of democratic consolidation in the country:
Turkey has changed in remarkable ways [under the AKP]. A torrent of sweeping democratic, legal and economic reforms has been rushed through the political system. The power of the military has been curtailed; individual freedoms have been extended; Kurds have begun to receive rights long denied; and a start has been made to repair the damage caused by years of economic mismanagement and corruption. Turkey has made a great leap forward (Morris 2005:2).

1.2.2.2 The critique of the literature and the multiple modernities paradigm

While both the structural and societal models present contemporary Turkey as a liberal democracy, neither attempts to show to what extent Turkey fulfils the criteria required to be considered as a liberal democracy through referring to the characteristics of such regimes as defined by influential scholars of democratisation such as Robert A. Dahl (1971), Larry Diamond (2008), Alfred C. Stepan (2000), Arend Lijphart (1999) and David Held (2006). Also, in support of their argument for the evaluation of Turkey as a liberal democracy, neither the structural model nor the societal model refer to any notable international indexes that measure levels of democratisation across the world such as the annual reports published by the Freedom House (2008, 2013) or the Economist Intelligence Unit (2008).

In the absence of an assessment of Turkish democratisation based on any reliable conceptualisation of liberal democratic regimes, the description of Turkey as a consolidated liberal democracy reflects the subjective views of observers. In reality, since Turkey made the initial transition from authoritarian one-party rule to multi-party parliamentary system through free and fair elections in 1950, a number of shortcomings within the political and legal framework of the state have prevented the consolidation of liberal democracy in the country (Freedom House 2008:11; Vardan 2009; Kubicek 2013a:46; Dodd 1988:21; Hürsoy 2012:116; Öniş 2006). The Freedom House Index, for example, classifies Turkey as ‘partly free’ as of 2013, based on a set of indicators which together constitute one of the most commonly used criteria for identifying liberal democratic regimes, namely ‘electoral process’, ‘political pluralism and participation’, ‘functioning of government’, ‘freedom of expression and belief’,
‘associational and organisational rights’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘personal autonomy and individual rights’ (Freedom House 2013).

Today, the democratic shortcomings of Turkey include the absence of strong checks and balances to contain the executive power of governments, ongoing problems in granting minority rights to communities such as Kurds and Alevis, the excessive politicisation of judicial processes, the authoritarian nature of the 1982 Constitution and regular human rights abuses (Aknur 2012a; Yıldız 2011:130; Karabelias 2009:57). Until recent years, the extraordinary influence of the Turkish armed forces on policy-making – commonly referred to as the military tutelage – was another defect of the democratisation process in the country, one that had characterised it since 1960 (Polat 2011; Cizre 1999; Jenkins 2010). These limitations to the practice of liberal democracy in Turkey highlight the shortcomings of the narratives offered by the structural and societal models. In this context, there is a strong need for a new approach to study the political development of Turkey.

MMP is helpful in terms of re-conceptualising the political aspect of Turkish modernisation as it radically differs from CMT and NMT in terms of its formulation of political development. While the two established theories assert that liberal democracies are the only modern regimes that can ensure the ‘fair distribution of justice and services to the citizenry’, the definition of political development adopted by MMP does not necessitate the existence of a liberal democratic regime as the ones formed in Western European and Northern American countries (Wittrock 2002; Eisenstadt 2000, 2002; Wagner 2012).

MMP simply defines political development as the formation of complex state structures that can effectively direct policy-making (Eisenstadt 2002:1-2; Wittrock 2002:47-50). According to MMP, authoritarian regimes such as the former Soviet Union, its successor the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China are complex state structures that effectively monopolise power within a highly centralised framework and that they are just as ‘modern’ as the democracies of the Western world in terms of their function (Arnason
If MMP is applied to the case of political development in Turkey, it can be argued that the state structure in the country is modern, yet it is a different type of modernity than the liberal democratic variant based on the Western experience of transformation. Therefore, rather than the Eurocentric formulations of modernity developed by CMT and NMT and applied on the Turkish case of political development by the structural and societal models, a more realistic account of the Turkish modernity can be acquired through the lens of MMP.

The key difficulty the CMT and NMT encounter when applied to the context of Turkish modernity is that their deterministic frameworks do not acknowledge the particularities of this country case that caused it to diverge from the historical Western experience of political development seen in cases such as Britain and France. The application of MMP – with its emphasis on historical contingency, path-dependency and international context – to Turkey in this thesis will shed light on the case-specific factors that subverted the expectations of mainstream theories of modernity, which envisaged the consolidation of liberal democracy in secularising or economically developing societies.

In the following part of the chapter, the contrasting approaches of the structural and societal models to the social development experience of Turkey will be critically examined and compared with the framework of MMP.

**1.2.3 Studying the Social Development of Turkey**

1.2.3.1 *The structural model vs. the societal model*

Within the scholarly literature on the Turkish case, the social development aspect of modernity has been defined in terms of the ‘ideological transformation’ that has been experienced by the Islamic political movement in the country (See, for instance, Yavuz 2009, 2013; Akyol 2012; Kaddorah 2010; Taşpinar 2011; Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011; Nasr 2009). In this context, ideological transformation or moderation refers to the shift from *anti-systemic movements aiming to build a totalitarian Islamic state via revolution towards political parties*
and civil society organisations aiming to increase religiosity in public space through participation into free and fair elections. The so-called ‘radical change of the discourse and methods’ of the Islamic political movement in Turkey over the years has been a much cited aspect of Turkish modernisation, one that also remains one of its most controversial and least understood aspects due to the ongoing division of opinion over how this process has occurred (Yavuz 2004; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1996).

As with their opposing views on the economic and political development processes of Turkey, which were analysed in the two preceding sections of this chapter, the structural and societal models also differ in terms of examining the social development experience in the country. The structural model focuses on how the secularist elite of the Republican regime shaped the transformation of Turkish political Islamism through a calculated strategy of ‘carrot and stick’, namely by suppressing manifestations of radical Islamism through measures such as party closures and/or imprisonment while, simultaneously providing enough space for the socio-economic and political activities of its more moderate variants, thus ensuring the integration of the mainstream Islamic movement into the political economic system in Turkey (See Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1996; Ünver 2013; Özbudun and Hale 2010; Heper 1997). Conversely, the societal model emphasises the role played by social and external forces on the moderation of political Islam such as Turkey’s EU membership process, integration into global economy through economic liberalisation and the changing discourses of Islamic thinkers such as Ali Bulaç and religious orders such as the Gülen movement (See Tuğal 2009; Aydın 2005; Çevik and Thomas 2012; Atasoy 2005; Turam 2006).

Fully reflecting the methodology of CMT, the structural model praises the success of the so-called ‘Kemalist cultural revolution’ that took place within an authoritarian state formation in the early Republican years (1923-1950) with a heavy emphasis on secularisation (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1996). An archetype of the narrative can be seen in Ergun Özbudun and William Hale (2010:22):
If not for the considerable success of Ataturk's modernisation program; it can be said with confidence that Turkey could not even come close to achieving the political, economic and cultural development levels it has reached today.

It has been argued that the pressure imposed on the Islamic movement by the Kemalist elite of the military has forced the movement to tone down its religion-inspired discourse, cease its critic of secularism and adopt democratic principles (Aydın 2005:196; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1996; Heper 1997:34). The framework of the structural model indicates that the main agency that has shaped the parameters of Islam's role in Turkish politics has been the state actors, not Islamic groups themselves:

The consolidation of democracy in Turkey and the gradual reincorporation of Islam into politics were facilitated by the increasing secularization of Turks, after the establishment of the Republic in 1923, which made general support for a radical religious revival less likely. Even more critically, the increasing moderation of the worldviews of significant religious groups rendered those groups less of a threat to the secular democratic state (Heper 1997:34).

The structural model recently came under criticism by scholars of the societal model such as Cihan Tuğal (2006, 2009) and Zülküf Aydı̇n (2005) who assert that the emergence of a supposedly moderate Islamic paradigm in Turkey occurred due to rising pressure of social forces on the regime and this should be seen as a 'conservative or silent revolution' (See also Tuğal 2009; Atasoy 2005; Yavuz 2004, 2013). This narrative developed within the societal model has been influential in shaping the political discourse in Turkey to such extent that even the AKP administration used the label of ‘silent revolution’ to name one of its major official publications, which praises the party’s efforts for the supposed creation of a socially modern, moderate and liberal democratic ‘new Turkey’ since 2002 (see The Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry 2013).

In this narrative, rather than the pressure of state institutions on Islamic political movement, change is argued to have manifested ‘from below’ as a result of social factors such as moderate Islamic networks. A common element found in studies belonging to the societal model school is the emphasis put on
the liberalisation process initiated by the then-prime minister Turgut Özal in the 1980s (Yavuz 2009; Aydın 2005). In this regard, Kamil Yılmaz (2009:120-121) provides a typical narrative:

Özal’s tenure as prime minister (1983-89) and president (1989-93) is... a breakthrough in Turkish history... his neoliberal economic policies along with his efforts in expanding individual rights and freedoms benefited... people with religious backgrounds. The small companies of these religious businessmen in Anatolia started to export their goods abroad, especially textiles, through which some of them became multi-billion dollar business enterprises... It is possible to say that the Özal era marked the transformation of these religious people from the lower class to the 'middle class' stratum in Turkish society.

1.2.3.2 The critique of the literature and the multiple modernities paradigm

Studies of Turkey’s experience in state-religion relations conducted by the aforementioned structural and societal models are helpful to understand the process of ideological transformation experienced by the Islamic political movement as each school of thought shed light on different elements of this complex phenomenon. Nevertheless, neither of the structural and societal models can fully account for the ideological moderation of the movement as each overlooks critical factors that shaped this trajectory.

The structural model is state-centric as it overlooks critical effects of economic development and social networks on transformation of the Islamic movement. The argument of the structural model is solely based on the hypothesis that Islamic groups moderated due to gradual liberalisation of political sphere in the country as the Republican regime gradually softened its ideology, eventually allowing conservative citizens more freedom to express themselves. This argument is derived from a long established understanding in the theoretical literature on democratisation known as the ‘democratic moderation thesis’ (See Somer 2007).

The democratic moderation thesis claims that if an anti-systemic political movement is persecuted by the state, it will be radicalised whereas opening up
the system to participation will inevitably result in its moderation (Somer 2007). A case that challenges this hypothesis, however, is that of the split within the Turkish Islamic political movement itself. After the closure of the Islamic FP (Fazilet Partisi) in 2001 by the Constitutional Court, the competing factions within the FP formed two different parties, namely the reformist AKP and the traditionalist SP (Saadet Partisi). While the former adopted a moderate platform and refused the concept of shari’a, the latter continues to overtly challenge the secular state structure today. Both movements had been the subject of the same policy of ‘carrot and stick’ by the secularist regime of Turkey, but the strategy clearly resulted in two different political discourses (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009:961).

So, why the reformist faction of the FP founded the AKP and changed their political discourse, whereas the revolutionary Islamic ideology of the SP remained intact? The difference between the AKP and the SP lay in the social and economic ties both movements formed over the years, a nuance that can only be highlighted if social forces are taken into account (Çavdar 2006:480). Thus, the methodology of the societal model centred on the analysis of social factors have to be acknowledged as the ties between the AKP and the conservative capitalist class in Turkey resulted in the moderation of the movement, a factor that differentiates the AKP from the SP (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009).

As highlighted by the critique above, the structural model neglects a key component, namely the impact of social forces on ideological moderation such as the nature of economy. A similar problem exists within the narrative provided by the societal school as this approach also overlooks a key aspect, the gradual opening of a limited political space to Islamism by the Kemalist regime through a supervised democratisation process.

The societal model takes the rise of a conservative capitalist class aligned with the Islamic political movement in the 1980s and 1990s as the main determinant of ideological moderation. However, through overlooking the importance of the
pre-1980 limited democratisation process that allowed Islamic groups to form political parties such as the MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi) which had even entered coalition governments throughout the 1970s, the societal model fails to provide an answer to this question: why the Islamic political movement in Turkey had not been transformed into a revolutionary force due to its supposed repression by the assertive secularist regime in the pre-1980 period? The answer is provided by the structural model, which suggests that the gradual opening of the political system with the transition to multi-party political life in 1950 provided an opportunity space for social and political activities of Islamists, preventing the radicalisation of the movement. In fact, in the pre-1980 period, the Islamic political movement known as the National View (Millî Görüş Hareketi) had already adopted democratic competition as a method. Without the crucial historical background of the pre-1980 period and the gradual integration of Islamism into Turkish political life, the moderation of Islamic discourse witnessed with the rise of the AKP in the 2000s could not have possibly occurred.

The aforementioned shortcomings of both of the established approaches to the social development experience of Turkey are caused by the dedication of these schools to present Turkey as an exemplar of hypotheses developed by the mainstream theories of modernisation. While applying the framework of CMT on the Turkish case, the structural model over-emphasises the role of secularisation in modernity and develops a Eurocentric argument that portrays all understandings of Islam as potentially destabilising forces that should always be contained by the state. This framework overlooks the complexity of the Islamic movement and the ties it has built with different social forces such as business unions (e.g. MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD), Islamic orders (e.g. Naqshbandi orders and the Gülen movement) and intellectuals which have also shaped the direction of the movement while producing different variants of political

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7 Since 1969, the National View movement formed all the mainstream Islamic political parties in Turkey: the MNP (1970-71); the MSP (1972-81); the RP (1983-1998); the FP (1997-2001) and the SP (2001-Present). The reformist wing of the National View seceded from the FP and formed the AKP (2001-Present).
Islamism adopted by competing parties such as the AKP and the SP in modern Turkey.

Akin to the structural model, the societal model also puts forward a unidimensional understanding in its application of the framework developed by NMT to the case of Turkish socio-political development. Through focusing solely on the post-1980 economic development process of the country, which is said to have produced a so-called Muslim capitalist modernity, the impact of the pre-1980 democratisation process and the interaction between the secularist state and the Islamic movement on the ideological transformation of Turkish Islamism is neglected.

As will be analysed in detail in Chapter 2, MMP suggests that there are many different variants of Islamism within predominantly Muslim societies stemming from the various readings of Islamic scripture as well as the particular cultural, economic and political contexts of countries that condition the ideologies and methods of Islamic movements. As there are multiple ways to achieve modernity in non-Western societies that diverge from the Western experience, it is only natural that there would also be many different ‘Islamisms’ (Kaya 2004). Unlike CMT that presents secularisation as the only way for the modernisation of the Muslim world and NMT that portrays Islam as fully compatible with capitalism and democracy, MMP does not presuppose any knowledge about the nature of Islamism and its connection with modernity. This allows MMP to avoid ideological bias in its approach to the subject matter. Its framework is highly inclusive which allows scholars to effectively understand the unique historical characteristics of social development in non-Western countries.

Based on the setting of a society, Islamic political movements may manifest in various forms and the nature of Islamism may change due to the alteration of the initial socio-political and economic conditions. The change of the discourse of Islamism occurred in parallel to the transformation experienced by the Turkish state and its official ideology over the years, a key aspect of socio-
political development that has been overlooked within the literature developed by the structural and societal models (Turam 2012a:5). In the context of the evolution of Islamism in Turkey, the utilisation of MMP by this thesis will also demonstrate how the state has changed through its engagement with the Islamic movement.

MMP offers a multi-dimensional framework to study the evolution of the Islamic political movement of Turkey as it highlights the significance of path-dependency within the modernisation trajectory of a given society. The application of MMP to the case of development in Turkey in Chapter 5 of the thesis will reveal that a broader set of institutional and social factors than those envisaged by the structural and societal models affected the Turkish Islamic movement, producing the AKP in the 2000s.

1.3 RE-CONCEPTUALISING THE TURKISH MODEL THROUGH THE LENS OF THE MULTIPLE MODERNITIES PARADIGM

The aforementioned critique of the structural and societal models and the frameworks of CMT and NMT that inform their methodology on each of the three key aspects of modernisation – economic, political and social development processes – highlighted some of the shortcomings of the existing literature on the modernisation of Turkey. In every step of that analysis, the alternative framework offered by MMP was discussed in comparison to show that it could remedy these shortcomings and account for the unique nuances of Turkish modernity more effectively than the established theories.

The literature review in the preceding part showed that the most noteworthy gap in the literature of Turkish model is the absence of a study that highlights the significance of *path-dependency, historical contingency* and *international context* within the whole process of transformation. In the following empirical chapters on Turkish modernisation, the thesis will adopt MMP that highlights the influence of historical conditions and show in detail how the post-1980 period of economic development, democratisation and ideological
transformation processes in the country were built upon the consequences of the pre-1980 era setting, being entirely shaped by earlier events. MMP will also enable this thesis to study the effects of a wide range of factors on the modernisation of Turkey, rather than restricting the work to the analysis of only the role of the state or the social forces such as capitalists and Islamic orders.

Another key advantage in applying MMP to the study of modernisation in non-Western countries such as Turkey is that it saves the researcher from making Eurocentric presuppositions about linkages between economic development, democratisation and secularisation processes. As it will be shown in Chapter 2 and as discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter, both CMT and NMT claim that economic development and democratisation are positively correlated which means that an improvement in one process would always positively impact on the other. This assumption of a positive feedback loop is derived from the historical Western experience of modernisation that resulted in the formation of liberal democratic regimes and capitalist economies in Western European and Northern American societies in addition to some non-Western cases such as Japan and South Korea.

As a result of the adoption of the positive feedback loop concept, CMT and NMT as well as their reflections within the literature on Turkish study all three processes of modernisation collectively, which leave them highly susceptible to ideological bias. The feedback loop hypothesis is the main cause of reductionist arguments such as the view developed by CMT that incompatibility between modernity and religious and/or cultural values of the non-Western world should be attributed for the absence of democracy in non-Western societies (Kedourie 1992). The logic of this argument implies that the West modernised and democratised because its cultural and/or religious belief system is superior to other societies.

The teleology inherent in this retrospective account of modernisation prevents researchers of modernisation from studying ‘what is out there’ as they rather study ‘what is not out there’ by expecting democratisation to manifest whenever
secularisation process is initiated and/or the economic development levels reach the average standards of Western economies. Consequently, the realities and experiences of our time are neglected, while the future of the non-Western world is conceptualised as a mere replica of the contemporary Western countries. The epistemology of MMP successfully remedies this problem as it does not claim a priori knowledge about the subject matter, instead studying economic development, democratisation and ideological change processes in non-Western cases separately from one another to realistically uncover the connections or lack thereof between these phenomena. As a result, MMP provides a more objective method to analyse diverse trajectories of modernisation across the non-Western world, rather than expecting all societies to eventually converge towards Western values.

In recent years, a growing number of critical works have challenged established accounts of Turkish modernisation put forward mainstream theories of modernity. The most significant of these critical studies on various aspects of Turkish modernity are the works of Aykut Kansu (1995), Reşat Kasaba (1997), Nilüfer Göle (2000; 2002; 2009), Bedri Gencer (2000; 2008), Alev Çınar (2005), Chris Hann (1995), Selçuk Esenbel (2000) and Esra Özyürek (2006) – all of which have greatly benefited this thesis.

Göle (2000; 2009), Özyürek (2006) and Çınar (2005), in particular, contributed to the conceptual framework of the thesis as all three scholars use approaches inspired by or analogous to MMP. Göle's theory, referred to as 'local modernities', is fully compatible with MMP, which is hardly surprising considering that she has previously used MMP itself in her works. Local modernities are defined as the 'peculiar form modernity takes in non-Western societies' (Göle 2009:95). A very similar concept is referred to as 'alternative modernities' by Özyürek (2006:18-19). Accordingly, modernity does not lie beyond the 'imagination' and 'social practice' of non-Western societies and their own characteristics give a particular shape to it, which emerges out of the interaction between Western modernity and non-Western contexts.
Akin to Göle, Çınar (2005) and Özyürek (2006) aim to illustrate the synthetic ways in which Turkey's historically and contextually specific features have combined with Western influence to create contemporary Turkish modernity. The heavy emphasis placed on the role of international context – in terms of Turkey's interaction with external actors such as NATO, the EU and the IMF – for the manifestation of Turkish model in this thesis is partly inspired by Göle's arguments. The insights offered by Çınar were also helpful as her framework implicitly makes use of path dependency in addition to international context.

Another valuable insight for this thesis was derived from Kansu (1995) who strongly believes that political change in Turkey should not be studied with the taken-for-granted assumption that the year the republic was founded – 1923 – constituted a break in the historical narrative; and historians should instead focus on highlighting the linkages between the late Ottoman years and the Republican period. In my study of the genesis of the Turkish model, I follow a very similar line of argument, emphasising path dependency and continuity within Turkey's modernisation experience over accounts centred on presuppositions of break. Another noteworthy work that stresses the driving role of path dependency is Gencer (2000) and akin to his framework, the premise of this thesis is that historical experience of a country should be examined as a whole rather than focusing on subjectively selected segments.

The CMT-oriented understanding of modernity and modernisation has been the main target of deconstruction by critical Turkish studies. In light of this, the critique this thesis launches against CMT through the lens of MMP may seem as 'beating the air' – in other words, a futile attempt to highlight the shortcomings of a perspective that has already been widely denounced. Since the 1970s, many critics of CMT such as dependency and world-system theorists have proclaimed the 'downfall' of this mainstream school of thought, a belief shared by Kansu (1995:13-14):

There is no need to have a discussion here about the limits, ideological choices and shortcomings of [Classical] Modernization Theory. This discussion has already been successfully made by academics based in the
United States of America and Modernization Theory has been left to the dusty shelves of libraries, where it belongs (Kansu 1995:13-14).

This argument, which presents CMT as an obsolete paradigm that has long lost its appeal for public imagination and for academics working on related fields, was premature. In fact, much of the discursive hegemony of CMT and that of its more recent variant – NMT – is intact even today. In this regard, the sense of euphoria that initially characterised the writings of political scientists and columnists after the 2011 Arab uprisings can be evaluated as evidence, because many observers perceived the street protests as a vindication of the hypothesis that all societies would build liberal democratic societies and converge towards Western modernity (Cook 2011; Landler 2011; Sullivan 2011; Massad 2012). As shown in the preceding sections of this chapter, the mainstream portrayals of Turkish model have been archetypes of such a discourse, clearly illustrating the way in which those adhering to the tenets of structural and societal models continuously apply the ideas of CMT and NMT. Hence, the need to deconstruct the Eurocentric frameworks of CMT and NMT in the context of the Turkish model debate has so far remained as a major gap, constituting the primary purpose of this thesis.

To fully reflect unique characteristics of the Turkish experience, this thesis adopts the conceptual framework of MMP as it will study each pillar of Turkish modernisation separately: **Chapter 3** will focus on the economic development process, **Chapter 4** will examine the democratisation experience and **Chapter 5** will trace the ideological transformation of the Islamic political movement. In **Chapter 6**, the linkages or lack thereof between these three processes will be highlighted to present the characteristics of Turkish modernity and to re-examine the arguments put forward by theories of modernisation in light of findings drawn from the Turkish case. Before proceeding towards a new analysis of the modernisation experience of Turkey through the lens of MMP, the following parts of the chapter will explain the research methodology and methods used throughout this thesis.
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

In this part of the chapter, the type of research and the nature of sources used in the thesis will be discussed. In this regard, the three essential questions below will be answered:

i) Why the Turkish case has been selected in particular for this study of modernisation?

ii) What type of research methodology and methods are used in this thesis to verify hypotheses based on the framework of MMP?

iii) How the research was conducted (i.e. the examination of the data collection and selection process)?

1.4.1 Why the Turkish Case?

Turkey is often portrayed in the scholarly literature on modernisation as the ‘first modern Muslim country’ and/or ‘a bridge between the West and the East’, constituting an allegedly successful model of Westernisation for other predominantly Muslim societies to follow (See Ahmad 1993; Kaya 2004:11, Göl 2008:18; Laçiner 2014:20; Nasr 2009:232-237; Çavdar 2006; Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011; Akyol 2012; Tziarras 2013; Kaddorah 2010). Turkey has long held a ‘special place’ within the literature as the experience of the modern Republic and that of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, together constitute one of the longest processes of Westernisation ever witnessed in a non-Western society (Lewis 1961; Göl 2008, 2009; Laçiner 2014).

When the Industrial Revolution began in the latter half of the 18th century in Britain and spread to Western Europe and the US within a few decades, the Ottoman Empire was in control of a considerable portion of Eastern Europe as well as most of the territories that today constitute the region known as the MENA. As the contemporary successor to one of the largest non-Western empires and an early example of independent nation-states in the non-Western
world, the Republic of Turkey and its modernisation experience caught the attention of scholars as well as policy-makers from other countries since the 1930s (Rustow and Ward 1964; Rostow 1960; Apter 1965; Lerner 1958).

As mentioned before at the beginning of this chapter, the history of the concept of Turkish model can be traced to the 1930s when the Westernisation program of the Kemalists based on secularism and state-led economic development inspired the implementation of similar, albeit smaller-scale, reforms in Iran under Reza Shah Pahlavi and Afghanistan under King Amanullah Khan (Atabaki and Zürcher 2004; Omrani 2007:155). In fact, whenever new states or political regime changes manifested\(^8\) in predominantly Muslim non-Western societies, Turkey has been shown as a potential guide that can be used as a model in the formulation of economic, political and social development programs (See, for instance, Bal 1998; Altunışık 2005).

The special role long attributed to Turkey by scholars of modernisation as well as policy-makers of other countries such as Reza Shah Pahlavi resulted in the country to exert a noteworthy influence over historical and contemporary studies of modernisation. Due to its close interaction with the Western world, Turkey also possesses a long and complex history of Westernisation, which enables researchers to study the reactions of the society to this external stimulus and its subsequent consequences on the political, economic and social development trajectory in the country. To sum up, the high attention given to the country in the scholarly literature and its particularly long historical experience mean that Turkey is an appropriate non-Western country case to test the validity of hypotheses offered by MMP as well as to critically re-examine the earlier understandings of modernity developed by CMT and NMT in light of the data provided by the Turkish modernisation experience.

\(^8\) For example, the full independence of various MENA countries such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria after the decolonisation process in the late 1940s; the foundation of new nation-states such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in Caucasia and Central Asia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991; the 2011 uprisings in a number of MENA countries such as Tunisia and Egypt.
1.4.2 Research Methodology

The use of theories in social research has always been necessary and inevitable as empirical data analysis and generalisable theoretical frameworks are intrinsically linked (Neuman 2014:88; Ritchie and Lewis 2003:25). Empirical data collection and case analysis is a meaningful method for enhancing our knowledge as long as it can yield generalisable hypotheses. The opposite is also true, however, as hypothetical principles that supposedly govern social reality should be tested on cases to verify their validity:

Most qualitative researchers when writing about their craft emphasize a preference for treating theory as something that emerges out of the collection and analysis of data... [P]ractitioners of grounded theory... especially stress the importance of allowing theoretical ideas to emerge out of one’s data. But some qualitative researchers argue that qualitative data can and should have an important relation to the testing of theories as well (Bryman 2012:387).

This thesis adheres to the latter approach as it consistently refers to a number of theories of modernity and aims to compare and contrast them on the Turkish case in order to assess their explanatory capabilities.

As will be examined in more detail in Chapter 2, the theories of modernity within the literature – including the framework of MMP adopted in this thesis – define the concept of modernisation as ‘a broad process of transformation that consists of systemic changes in the fields of economic, political and social development’ (Wagner 2012:X). The highly discursive and interpretative⁹ nature of a thesis that studies this multi-dimensional process of change pertaining to economic and socio-political structures necessitates the use of qualitative methodology (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:3). After all, qualitative methodology is most suited to understand the ‘complexities of social and

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⁹ In social research, interpretivism is an epistemological stance which argues that social scientific knowledge cannot be isolated from the way the social world impacts on the worldview of researchers (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:17). Even though it may not be possible to produce entirely objective knowledge, the researcher can minimise the risk of personal bias as much as possible through clarifying the rationale behind the choice of certain methodological and theoretical frameworks used in producing knowledge. Interpretivism is one of the key characteristics of qualitative research that clearly distinguishes it from quantitative methodology, which is based on natural scientific model (Bryman 2012:380). For a more detailed examination of research subjects of interpretative nature, see Berg (2001:239).
political life’, which, in the context of this thesis, refers to the re-examination of the literature on democratisation and ideological transformation processes in Turkey through MMP (Pierce 2008:45).

The nature of qualitative methodology has been the source of contentious debates among scholars and one particularly controversial issue is about the reliability of this type of research (Trenta 2014:110). Quantitative researchers, in particular, have raised doubts about whether truly objective knowledge can be obtained through what is often described as qualitative researchers’ ‘unsystematic views about what is significant’ and supposedly ‘unstructured’ ways of collecting data (Bryman 2012:405). In this context, various methods have been suggested for correctly assessing the reliability and validity of qualitative research, ranging from external reliability to internal validity and the criteria for trustworthiness. One of the most commonly used methods in recent years is the so-called subtle realist account – developed by Martyn Hammersley (1990) – which acknowledges the difficulty of being certain about the reliability of qualitative research as the world of social reality consists of mostly subjective interpretations. Hence, subtle realism suggests that the most effective way to assess the merit of qualitative research is to see if the hypotheses can be internally verified in light of the data presented within a given work (Bryman 2012:396).

In the conduct of social research, understanding the characteristics of qualitative methodology is only the first step towards thinking about the nature of a research project. Eventually, every researcher who engages in qualitative study is faced with an ontological decision about how to understand social reality and our knowledge of it:

In broad terms, there are three distinct positions, realism, materialism and idealism. Realism claims that there is an external reality which exists independently of people’s beliefs or understanding about it… Materialism also claims that there is a real world but that only material features, such as economic relations, or physical features of that world hold reality…

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10 For a detailed explanation of these different approaches of research assessment, see Bryman (2012:390-414).
Idealism, on the other hand, asserts that reality is only knowable through the human mind and socially constructed meanings (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:11).

Though realism, materialism and idealism constitute three broad and opposing categories, it has been noted that there are ‘less extreme’ stances such as subtle realism that can be positioned in a middle ground in the imaginary spectrum of varying ontological positions (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:13). This thesis adheres to subtle realist account, forthrightly acknowledging that the analysis it provides on the Turkish model of modernity through the lens of MMP is only one possible understanding of social reality. Yet, it is my sincerest belief and hope that the data and analysis presented in this work can shed light on a broader portion of reality than the existing approaches on the subject matter put forward by structural and societal models.

The main argument – and the target contribution to scholarly literature – of the thesis is based on the premise that the data available for the study of the Turkish model of modernity and its historical background can be interpreted more successfully with a framework provided by MMP. In an attempt to prove the validity of this argument, the thesis uses critical research approach – which is a type of qualitative methodology – to highlight the shortcomings of existing narratives on Turkish modernity offered by structural and societal models. Historically, critical research has its roots in Marxist theory and post-structuralism, but it is no longer exclusively used by such researchers. Broadly understood, critical research is used to re-evaluate/deconstruct existing approaches to the study of a subject matter in addition to offer alternative ways for studying the same subject more effectively. For instance, a crucial part of such research could be to draw attention to under-studied dimensions of a subject to show that a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon is possible. As this thesis argues that the readings of Turkish modernity by structural and societal models suffer from Eurocentrism and that a more

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11 Note that ‘deconstruction’, in the context of this thesis, refers to the research method based on criticising existing approaches to a subject. It is not used in the context of a broad theoretical perspective as in post-structuralist research (for more details on this issue, see Comstock 1982; Bryman 2012:380-384).
effective comprehension of it can be obtained through the lens of MMP, a methodology based on critical research is appropriate. The use of qualitative methodology based on the critical research approach has shaped the data collection and analysis methods of this thesis, which will be clarified in the next section.

1.4.3 Research Methods: Analysing and ‘Re-reading’ the Data

1.4.3.1 Data Analysis

Qualitative researchers have often been criticised for not providing clear explanations of their data collection process and/or being much less explicit about their methods of data analysis compared to quantitative researchers (Neuman 2014:477). In recent years, however, this trend has been changing as many qualitative researchers are now expected to clearly justify their choices of research methods.

As explained in the previous section, this thesis uses a critical approach based qualitative methodology. Various research methods are used for examination of qualitative data and the most appropriate one for this study is narrative analysis method, which is ‘a type of qualitative data analysis that presents a chronologically linked chain of events in which individual or collective social actors have an important role’ (Neuman 2014:496). The critical methodology of this thesis aims to deconstruct established narratives about the historical origins of Turkish modernity and replace them with an alternative explanation. Narrative analysis method is best suited for this type of work because it is specifically designed for examining connections between crucial historical events (e.g. a social uprising or a sudden regime change) and macro-level historical processes (e.g. economic development, democratisation or social change), aiming to understand the ‘sequence of events’ and explain ‘why events and phenomena occur as they do?’ (Neuman 2014:496).
Narrative analysis method has three main tools that will be consistently used throughout this thesis: 1. **path dependency**, 2. **periodization** and 3. **historical contingency**.

Path dependency is ‘the way that a unique beginning can trigger a sequence of events’, the historical starting point continuously shaping the outcome of the following trajectory (Neuman 2014:497). The impact of initial conditions on the subsequent development of events may take different forms – positive and/or negative – such as constraining, limiting or even accelerating a given phenomenon. If the strength of the initial event far outweighs the influence of subsequent events and fully determines the characteristics of the entire path, then this case is called as a **self-reinforcing path dependency**.

A classic example... is the QWERTY pattern of letters on a keyboard. The pattern is inefficient. It takes longer for the fingers to hit keys than alternative patterns do, and it is difficult to learn. Engineers created QWERTY more than a century ago to work with early crude, slow, mechanical typewriters. They designed a keyboard pattern that would slow human typists to prevent the primitive machines from jamming. Later, mechanical typewriters improved and were replaced by electric typewriters and then by electronic keyboards. The old keyboard pattern was unnecessary and obsolete, but it continues to this day. The inertia to use an obsolete, inefficient system is strong. It overwhelms efforts to change existing machinery and people to a more rational, faster keyboard. Social institutions are similar. Once social relations and institutions are created in specific form... it is difficult to change them even if they are no longer efficient under current conditions (Neuman 2014:497).

Another probable variant of path dependency is the so-called **reactive sequence**, which radically differs from **self-reinforcing path dependency**. In the case of reactive sequence, each new historical juncture or turning point builds upon the previous one, but initial starting conditions do not necessarily exert an overwhelming force that could determine the entire trajectory of a given phenomenon (Neuman 2014.497). Hence, each new factor that enters the chain of events has the potential to subvert the entire trajectory, ultimately changing the outcome.
In the empirical analysis of Turkey's modernisation experience in this thesis – studied respectively in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 on the economic, political and social aspects of the phenomenon – I will heavily utilise both types of path dependency based analytical methods. Particularly in Chapter 6, in which the theoretical implications of the Turkish case will be discussed, a number of flowcharts based on path-dependency explanations will be presented to highlight the sequence of key factors and turning points that shaped Turkey's *sui generis* modernisation trajectory.

*Periodization* is another commonly used tool of narrative analysis method as qualitative researchers working on long historical processes often break the 'flow of time' into artificial segments to help us understand the underlying characteristics of certain eras that distinguishes them from preceding or following eras (Neuman 2014:498). This thesis too follows a certain periodization method in its analysis of the Turkish case, but the characteristics of this particular periodization were not my own design. In fact, I argue that the contrasting periodization methods used in mainstream studied of Turkish model by the structural and societal models – namely the pre-1980/post-1980 divide – disrupt the narrative of Turkey's modernisation experience as a continuous trajectory. Through studying path dependent elements in pre-1980 and post-1980 periods, my aim is to show the linkages in between, expose the explanatory weaknesses of existing approaches, and ultimately re-conceptualise the Turkish modernity.

The last tool of narrative analysis research method, *historical contingency*, is 'a unique combination of particular factors or specific circumstances that may not be repeated' and this 'combination is idiosyncratic and unexpected from the flow of prior conditions' (Neuman 2014:498). Historical contingency can be seen as the main threat to deterministic social theories as such case-specific factors may potential defy supposedly generalisable hypotheses. I combine historical contingency and path dependency methods to explain why – despite repeated attempts to conform to values of Western modernity such as secularism, liberal democracy and free-market capitalism – the Turkish
experience produced divergent features that defy deterministic expectations of CMT and NMT derived from their study of historical European and Northern American experiences. The next section will discuss the data collection methods followed in this thesis.

1.4.3.2 Data Collection

The staggering and ever-increasing amount of data available for the study of a subject matter such as modernisation means that one of the key difficulties faced by the researcher is how to specify the issues to be studied and how to select the sources on that basis. The way I have managed this issue is that as broad a concept as modernisation is commonly understood, the conceptual framework provided by theories of modernity allows it to be constructed as consisting of three specific development processes in economic, political and social life. As the preceding parts of this chapter defined these processes themselves through the frameworks of the structural and societal models as 'economic development', 'democratisation' and 'ideological transformation of Islamism' in the case of the Turkish modernity, the thesis develops its historical analytical narrative based on this narrowly defined conceptualisation. These three processes can be seen as essential 'case studies' to understand the modernisation experience in Turkey as they constitute the mostly commonly referred aspects of Turkish modernity today.

It is important to note that to further specify the research inquiry, the thesis solely focuses on the modernisation experience of the Republic of Turkey from its foundation in 1923 until 2013 and the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire is not studied in detail – though it is acknowledged when necessary at certain instances as the modernisation of the country certainly began in the late Ottoman era (Göl 2009:799). As the three cases of modernisation refers to the study of macro processes such as industrialisation, mechanisation, secularisation and democratisation, the focus of the thesis is on showing which policies and factors have impacted on them and how these phenomena have evolved over the years. As such, even though micro elements of modernisation
such as the evolution of party politics, voting preferences of the citizenry and changes in the practice of social customs and traditions are referred to in relevant instances of the thesis, they do not constitute the focal points of the work.

Most of the data used throughout the thesis come from critical examination and interpretation of a variety of sources, namely the secondary literature such as peer-reviewed journal articles, academic books and monographs and the primary literature such as political party programs, official party manifestos, constitutions, a number of legal articles and reports of international organisations such as the EU, the IMF and the World Bank as well as those of non-governmental organisations such as the Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders. As the originality of the work is based on conceptual interpretation, it makes no pretence to offering new and original data on the subject of Turkey’s modernisation such as unused archives or interviews. The difficulty of preserving scholarly objectivity is a known problem of research projects that are mainly reliant on secondary literature (Trenta 2014:110). To minimise this risk whenever possible, I have crosschecked the validity of the data provided by secondary sources with data obtained from primary sources and with statistical data.

The use of statistical data to assess the economic development process in Turkey posed two other potential problems for the project: various sources have used different mathematically-based methods to analyse the same data set which have produced different results and different sources have offered contradicting data on the same periods of time (e.g. the differences between the official data released by governments and the data presented by international financial institutions). In order to ensure the reliability of the data as much as possible and at the expense of appearing one-sided, the thesis prioritised the data used by international financial institutions such as the World Bank over that of the Turkish governments. The rationale behind this is that compared to international organisations, governments are generally relatively less transparent structures consisting of a strict hierarchy of bureaucratic
institutions that are potentially more capable to manipulate data such as economic growth rates. Also, they are more likely to resort to such an action due to their vested interest in appearing successful in the eyes of the citizenry. In the event of a clash between two methods of research over the same data, the thesis also prioritised the data offered by international organisations over that of scholars on the basis of preserving consistency.

1.4.3.3 Notes on Transliteration

The method used in the transliteration of Turkish names is to keep their original forms in Turkish language as much as possible. For that purpose, letters that do not exist in English such as ‘ö’, ‘ğ’, ‘ü’ have been introduced, e.g. Turgut Özal, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. However, usages of Turkish names such as ‘Kemal Ataturk’ that have been strongly established in English sources with the absence of Turkish letters are kept in their familiar form in order to avoid confusing the reader.

To preserve consistency, the thesis uses the abbreviation of institutions, parties and organisations as established in Turkish language rather than the abbreviation of their English translation. E.g. the AKP is the abbreviation of the original name of the party in Turkish, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, rather than that of its translation, ‘Justice and Development Party’. The same principle can be seen in the cases of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican People’s Party), the MGK (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu – National Security Council) and the DPT (Devlet Planlama Teşkilati – State Planning Organisation). (See Pages 17-18 for the full list of abbreviations).

1.4.4 Elaboration of Some Concepts

In addition to the questions answered above, a number of caveats associated with the study of modernisation, its constituent elements and the case of Turkey need to be elaborated upon in this section.
1.4.4.1 Measuring economic development

Measuring economic development levels in societies has long been a controversial issue within the fields of modernisation and political economy. In particular, the reliance of researchers on quantifiable indicators of development such as literacy rates, average per capita income, urbanisation ratio and industrialisation ratio have been accused of Eurocentrism as many of those who study these issues attribute a particular positive value to development and use the Western model of capitalist socio-economic organisation as a basis (Escobar 1995). This is a valid critique as scholars of CMT have used indicators based on the ideological values of the West to measure how ‘developed’ other societies are. Nevertheless, in the absence of quantifiable indicators, there is no alternative method to study economic development. Some scholars have developed indexes to measure human happiness levels instead of economic development, but it is important to note that these studies are much more fallible than the positivist economic indicators, as only a very small sample of the total population can be included in these surveys which cannot provide any data for the analysis of economic change processes experienced by a society as whole (See, for instance, Selim 2008).

1.4.4.2 Defining political Islamism and the Turkish Islamic movement

A contentious issue that will be studied in the context of the Turkish modernisation experience is the definition of ‘political Islamism’. There exists a confusion about this concept as particularly after the September 11 attacks in the US in 2001 and the 7 July 2005 London bombings, Islam as a belief system has often been equated with its most radical interpretation adopted by terrorist groups such as the al-Qaeda (Göl 2011:432; Yıldırım 2012:36). It is important to note that there is a clear difference between Islam and Islamism as the former refers to the religion while the latter is used to denote the political ideology that is derived from a particular interpretation of religious values and worldview. Thus, it can be said that there is one Islam, yet there are many Islamisms. As such, political Islam should be analysed by ‘looking at the societal patterns,
political relations and modes of production in which it operates, as opposed to norms, ideals and values’ (Yıldırım 2012:39).

An Islamic political movement can be defined as one whose ideology is derived from or inspired by religious values and that the mobilisation of its constituency is achieved through references to a shared religious identity (Yavuz 2009; Rashwan 2007:15). According to Banu Eligür (2010:4), political Islamism has many variants that use different methods to reach their objectives, yet a key denominator for all Islamic movements is that they take Islamic values of the era of the Prophet as a reference for morality and utilise it to produce solutions for the problems of the modern world. However, not all Islamisms are the same.

The interpretation of Islamism adopted by many revolutionary Islamic movements is that of a closed society, one that envisages the imposition of shari‘a from above and a very restricted democratic life compared to the Western liberal democratic model, if at all. Nevertheless, there are many political Islamic movements across the Muslim world that do not defend a totalitarian state structure and reject the forceful imposition of shari‘a. The modern Turkish Islamic movement is multi-faceted as it consists of political parties such as the AKP and the SP, orders such as the Gülen movement and Naqshbandis, intellectuals such as Ali Bulaç, Sezai Karakoç and İsmet Özel, non-governmental organisations such as MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği) and various foundations and journals. The key characteristic of the mainstream Islamic movement in Turkey is its self-proclaimed moderateness, as it no longer appears to voice objectives such as building an Islamic theocracy, but seems rather concerned about expanding the expression and influence of religiosity within a public sphere and state designed by secularists:

Islamism in Turkey is basically an urban movement empowered by a strong middle class and its identity politics (Çınar and Duran 2008:25).

Apart from the mainstream Islamic movement, there remains a number of armed fringe groups such as the IBDA-C, the Hizbu‘t Tahrir and the Hizbullah of Turkey that continue to overtly aim to build an Islamic state in Turkey through a
revolution, yet they are divided into small groups and lack any visible support from the population at large (Heper 1997:43; Aydin 2005:191). Despite their negligible influence over the social and political life of the country, however, it is important to note that these organisations have been involved in the murders of a number of secular and left-wing intellectuals in Turkey over the years (Eligür 2010:4).

There is a consensus within the scholarly literature that most Islamic groups in Turkey adopted a moderate and reformist stance that is flexible in its approach towards secularism and cultural Westernisation, yet it is important to note that not all groups have experienced the same level of transformation (Aydın 2005; Yavuz 2013; Atasoy 2005; Eligür 2010). The SP, for instance, remains an anti-systemic party that is far more critical of secularism and issues such as alcohol consumption than the AKP. The underlying causes of the varying degrees of ideological transformation experienced by the Islamic political movement in Turkey will be discussed extensively in Chapter 5.

1.4.4.3 Defining the ‘elite’

The concept of ‘elite’ is commonly defined as those who hold a particular influence over policy-making through their control of commodities such as power (through positions in bureaucracy and government), wealth and knowledge production (Yılmaz 2009:114). In the context of Turkey, the term has long been utilised to refer to the Kemalists who had possessed influential positions within the administrative and judicial bureaucracy in addition to forming the officer class of the military (Burak 2012:66). The Republican or the Kemalist elite was characterised primarily by its traditional monopoly over cultural and political capital in the country rather than economic, therefore, it denotes a cultural group sharing a common lifestyle and worldview. It can be said that the group consisted of not only bureaucrats and politicians but also of intellectuals such as academicians (Göle 1997:50).
Throughout the thesis, I will utilise the terms ‘Republican elite’, ‘Kemalist elite’ and the ‘state establishment’ interchangeably to refer to the secularist elite that used to be influential over the policy-making in the country. Yet, it is important to note that the conventional balance of powers within Turkey rapidly changed over the course of the AKP rule since 2002 as a conservative ‘counter-elite’ manifested in the political, economic and social spheres of the country, an issue that will be analysed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

1.5 CONCLUSION

Part one of this chapter showed that CMT and NMT strongly impacted on the existing literature on the modernisation of Turkey, shaping respectively the approaches of the structural and societal models. Deriving their conceptualisation from the theories of modernity, the two models have defined the Turkish model as composed of three processes: economic development, democratisation and the ideological transformation of Islamism which, in the context of this thesis, form the three main case studies to understand the modernisation trajectory of Turkey. In this regard, a gap in the literature is that these elements of modernity in Turkey have not been studied holistically through the lens of MMP that offers an alternative perception of modernisation by contesting the views of CMT and NMT.

Part two built on the findings of the literature review of the preceding section and examined the way aforementioned three processes of modernisation have been studied by the structural and societal models on the case of Turkey. It became clear that the significance of historical contingency, international context and path-dependency within the socio-economic and political development trajectory of the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods of the Republic has been the main neglected element in the narratives developed by the structural and societal models.

In an attempt to prove the hypothesis developed by CMT that secularisation was a necessity of modernity, the structural model selected the pre-1980 period of
Republican modernisation experience and overlooked the changes experienced by the country since then. On the other hand, the societal model solely focused on the post-1980 period and presented the economic and political changes witnessed in the country from 1980 to 2013 as an illustration of the compatibility between religion and modernity, the so-called Islamic Calvinism. The assumption was that if Protestant ethics could positively impact on capitalist development in the Western world and that Christianity, democracy and capitalism could co-exist, the rise of moderate political Islamism would surely result in the formation of a capitalist and democratic modernity in predominantly Muslim societies such as Turkey.

As explained in part three, throughout the analysis of the literature review and the comparison of existing approaches with the hypotheses of MMP, this chapter argued that there is a strong need to re-conceptualise the Turkish modernity. The variant of modernity in Turkey today is the path-dependent outcome of the modernisation trajectory in the country. Without understanding the developments of the pre-1980 period, the post-1980 era cannot be understood. As noted by a distinguished scholar of MMP, ‘a new understanding of modernity needs to build on the insight in the contingency of historical developments’ (Wagner 2012:XII).

In accordance with the research methodology and methods presented in part four, the thesis will now proceed to study the three essential cases of the Turkish model of modernity in light of MMP. The following section will explain in detail the plan of the thesis, summarising the purpose of each chapter within the work.

1.6 PLAN OF THE THESIS

The following Chapter 2 contains the theoretical background of the thesis. It traces the emergence and evolution of modernisation studies from the post-World War II period onwards, focusing particularly on how the terms modernity and modernisation have been conceptualised by different schools of thought.
over the years. After comparatively examining the distinct understandings provided by schools of modernity, the chapter notes that all theories – including the multiple modernities paradigm – converge on understanding modernisation as the economic, political and social development experience of a society while modernity is the outcome of this process of change.

The main objective of Chapter 3 is to re-conceptualise the economic modernisation trajectory of Turkey in light of a conceptual framework drawn from the multiple modernities paradigm. In this regard, the chapter focuses on how Turkey achieved economic modernity as defined by this theorem. Particular focus is given to the divergence of the Turkish case of economic development from the historical path of capitalist development in the Western world – as seen by classical and neo-modernisation theories. Throughout the chapter, the narratives of the structural and societal models are deconstructed through the lens of the multiple modernities paradigm, which emphasises the significance of path-dependency within different periods of economic modernisation in Turkey.

Chapter 4 studies the political modernisation trajectory of Turkey in light of the framework of the multiple modernities paradigm. The democratisation process forms the most important element within the broader political modernisation trajectory. This is to critically review the narratives developed by classical and neo-modernisation theories, which long claimed that an economically modern society would also manage to build a consolidated liberal democratic regime. In contrast to this view, this chapter shows that the economic modernisation process in Turkey did not lead to the consolidation of liberal democracy. In the concluding part, the chapter highlights the way the Turkish case of political modernisation diverged from the Western model, focusing on the reasons behind this phenomenon.

Chapter 5 provides the third and final component of the study of the Turkish modernity by examining the widely publicised ideological transformation of the Islamic political discourse in the country. As with Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, this
chapter provides a helpful case to test the validity of competing hypotheses put forward by theories of modernity as the so-called ‘social dimension of modernisation’ in the form of secularisation and/or ideological transformation has formed a crucial element of the frameworks of classical and neo-modernisation scholars. The chapter argues that the two main factors that led to a change in the mainstream Islamic political discourse in Turkey were the political and economic opportunities that Islamic groups gained over the years. In this regard, political opportunity space refers to the provision of a degree of freedom of association for the Islamic political movement, which founded a number of political parties that competed in free and fair elections since the 1970s. Economic opportunity space denotes the rise of a conservative capitalist class in the post-1980 period, which formed links with the Islamic political movement. The chapter explains how these two factors affected the ideological transformation of Islamic groups in Turkey. In this regard, the chapter will contest the hypothesis of classical modernisation theory, while the frameworks of neo-modernisation theory and multiple modernities paradigm will be validated. Nevertheless, potential problems within the understanding of social modernity by neo-modernisation theory will also be noted.

Chapter 6 collectively reflects on the performance of the research hypotheses used throughout this study of the Turkish case. It particularly discusses linkages or the lack thereof between the three main components of modernity – economic development, democratisation and ideological transformation. In this context, the theories of modernity are critically reviewed in light of the findings of the Turkish case. The chapter highlights the inability of the mainstream theories – classical and neo-modernisation – to account for all the particularities of the modernisation of Turkey. By contrast, it is argued that the conceptual framework of the multiple modernities paradigm can more successfully explain the divergent trajectory of modernisation in non-Western country cases such as Turkey due to its approach that challenges the exclusionary Eurocentrism of its rival theories.
Chapter 7 contains the summary and concluding remarks of the thesis. It reflects on the contributions of the work to the scholarly literature. In addition, the chapter discusses the potential objections and critique that may be raised as well as the potential avenues for future research.
CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING MODERNITY AND MODERNISATION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Before proceeding to study the Turkish case in detail, it is necessary to discuss how the concept of modernity and its interaction with religion, economic development and democratisation have been perceived within modernisation studies. The question of ‘modernisation’ initially emerged in international politics in the 18th century when the economic and military supremacy of industrialising Western European nations vis-à-vis the rest of the world was becoming apparent (Gencer 2008:45). From the late 18th century onwards, non-Western countries based near Europe such as the Ottoman Empire, Egypt and Iran initiated reformation programs to close the development gap with the West. Throughout the 19th century, other non-Western countries such as Japan and China also implemented modernisation programs in an attempt to defend their sovereignty from the threat of expanding Western colonial empires such as Britain, France and the Netherlands.

Following the decolonisation process of the post-World War II years in the 1950s and 1960s, numerous new independent states were founded across the non-Western world, attracting the interest of social scientists from various academic disciplines such as sociology, economics, political science and international relations (IR). A multi-disciplinary school of thought known as ‘classical modernisation theory’ (CMT) emerged in the 1950s and the issue of modernisation began to be studied extensively. Over time, other schools of thought challenged the understanding of modernity developed by classical modernisation theorists. These included ‘dependency theory’, ‘world-systems theory’, ‘neo-modernisation theory’ (NMT) and ‘the multiple modernities paradigm’ (MMP).

In order to show how the concept of modernity has been defined within the scholarly literature, this chapter will comparatively assess the arguments offered by competing theories within modernisation studies. The chapter consists of five sections. Following this introduction, part two provides an in-
depth analysis of how the concept of modernity has been defined by three main theories. **Part three** builds upon that comparative analysis and discusses the way modernisation studies have perceived the interaction between modernity and three crucial issues – religion, economic development and democratisation. **Part four** offers a critique of mainstream depictions of modernity and modernisation, arguing that MMP can more effectively grasp the essence of these complex phenomena. **Part five** briefly summarises the analysis conducted throughout the chapter.

**2.2 WHAT CONSTITUTES ‘MODERNITY’?**

**2.2.1 The Mainstream Approaches and Their Rivals: Classical Modernisation, Neo-Modernisation, Dependency and World-Systems**

CMT dominated academic discourses from the 1950s until the late 1970s. CMT is multi-disciplinary in nature and produced a number of variants within different disciplines such as economy, sociology, politics and international relations (IR). The theory inherited its strong belief in the idea of ‘human progress’ from 19th century European social thought (Turner 1984:1). Notable sociologists, such as Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim, utilised the concept of progress by portraying human history in terms of transformation from pre-modern to modern society. For Spencer, this was a shift from ‘militancy’ to ‘industrialism’, whereas Durkheim interpreted it in terms of a transition from ‘mechanical solidarity’ based on shared values towards ‘organic solidarity’ based on division of labour (Durkheim 1964; Peel 1971; Leftwich 1996:7). CMT portrays the process of change and the idea of human progress as inevitable and irreversible, standing in contrast to the view of NMT and MMP that human civilisations may possibly experience cycles of progress and decay rather than constant development (Rustow and Ward 1964:3) (See Table 2.1.).

Common to all variants of CMT regardless of their ideological roots and disciplines is the emphasis put on the dichotomy of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, namely the assumption that all traditional characteristics of a society would
gradually be replaced by modern ones (Erkilet 2007:108-138; Berberoglu 1992:8; So 1990:33-34; Apter 1965:7). The concepts of tradition and modernity are placed at extremes of an imaginary spectrum indicating different levels of progress of a society. In this model, the two concepts are binary opposites and cannot co-exist with each other once a society completes its modernisation process. Walt Whitman Rostow (1960), for instance, offers one of the most classical dichotomies of CMT by analysing the transition to modernity in several phases, the starting point being the ‘traditional society’ and the final stage being the ‘mass consumption society’. The three stages in between collectively constitute the transition phases, the so-called ‘take-off’ to modernity.

Apart from making a definite distinction between tradition and modernity, a common feature that characterises the works of classical modernisation theorists is their description of modernity as comprised of three inter-related processes of transformation: ‘economic development’, ‘social development’ and ‘political development’ (see Levy 1968; Lerner 1958; Apter 1965; Rustow 1970:337-338; Escobar 1995:4; Chuanqi 2004:300; Huntington 1968:33-34; Banuri 1987:12; Sigelman 1974:525; Zapf 2004:2; So 1990:33-34). Economic development refers to material changes in a society triggered by industrialisation, urbanisation and mechanisation. Social development denotes the gradual elimination of the influence of traditional and religious belief systems and their replacement – via secularisation process – by the rule of logic and science. Political development means the formation of centralised state structures with efficient decision-making mechanisms. In addition, it refers to the replacement of authoritarian states by governing bodies that would ensure the political representation of citizens via democratisation process. In other words, the conceptualisation of a 'modern society' by CMT is one that is industrialised, mostly urban, consumption-oriented, liberal democratic and secularised (Turner 1984:3).

Industrialisation, secularisation and democratisation constitute the 'holy trinity' of CMT. These processes are valued as the only means to ensure the achievement of modernity (So 1990:33-34; Chuanqi 2004:300; Wagner 2008). It
has been argued that there is a *positive feedback loop* between these three processes as each one supposedly reinforces and enables the other to reach success (Lerner 1958; Apter 1965; Sigelman 1974:525; Zapf 2004:2). Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori (1996:23) have encapsulated the nature of the theory and the feedback loop:

> Economic specialization, it was argued, leads to political institutionalization; and the displacement of traditional, usually landed, elites by urban middle classes leads to the emergence of centralized commercial, bureaucratic, and educational structures.

Understanding modernity in this manner shows that classical modernisation theorists have taken the historical transformation experience of Western European and Northern American societies as the basis for their conceptualisation. The model of a secularised, liberal democratic and capitalist country fully reflects the contemporary features of the Western world. Thus, the definition of modernity adopted by CMT clearly equates it with ‘Westernisation’. The more non-Western societies begin to resemble their Western counterparts, the more they would be evaluated as ‘modern’. Non-Western societies that have adopted Westernisation and undertaken reforms to emulate the Western development experience in political, economic and cultural spheres have been labelled as ‘transitional’ or ‘developing’ by CMT (Toprak 1981:6; Berberoglu 1992). It is assumed that the rise of Western modernity in Europe and North America was merely the first image of the future of human civilisation and that Western experience was not geography-specific but merely the beginning of a ‘universal’ transformation of humanity. The hypothesis of convergence into Western modernity is rooted at the heart of CMT:

> Modernization is the internal achievement of a society; the particular processes of modernization support each other in combination; the leading nations do not impede the followers; the process of modernization are converging in a common goal (Berger 1996:46 cited in Zapf 2004:2).

The understanding of modernisation as Westernisation was not only limited to academia but also shaped the mind-set of statesmen in the non-Western world, inspiring large-scale Westernising social engineering projects modelled after
European models such as the ones developed by Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran (Ayubi 1991:49; Escobar 1995:VII). CMT dominated many disciplines of social sciences in the post-World War II years and its conceptualisation of modernity – as a Westernisation process that consists of economic, political and social development – rapidly became an unquestionable approach in the 1950s and 1960s:

Development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary. Indeed, it seemed impossible to conceptualize social reality in other words. Wherever one looked, one found the repetitive and omnipresent reality of development: governments designing and implementing ambitious development plans, institutions carrying out development programs in city and countryside alike, experts of all kinds studying underdevelopment and producing theories ad nauseam (Escobar 1995:5).

Despite its early intellectual hegemony, however, a number of emerging schools of thought such as dependency theory, world-systems theory, NMT and most recently, MMP, questioned the established framework of CMT from the late 1960s onwards. When developing non-Western societies began to diverge from the Western modernity model in the decades following the decolonisation of the late 1950s and 1960s, classical modernisation theorists began to perceive culture and religion as the main factors that allegedly hindered modernisation efforts in the non-Western world (Volpi 2010:76). Neo-modernisation theorists, such as Samuel P. Huntington (1984), later resurrected this approach. In retrospect, the problem within the theoretical framework lay not in cultural differences between Western and non-Western societies but in the highly exclusionary conceptualisation of modernity by CMT as a ‘secular, liberal democratic and capitalist society’.

CMT came under criticism by social theorists such as Ernest Gellner (1981) for not being able to explain why secularising non-Western societies such as Turkey and Iran could not catch up with the West in terms of attaining high levels of economic development and consolidating liberal democracy. The hypotheses of CMT were also challenged by dependency theory, which argues that rather than culture, it is actually the imperialistic economic hegemony of the West that has
resulted in many of the so-called Third World countries remaining economically undeveloped (Turner 1984:3). Dependency theory emerged in the 1960s and became particularly popular among South American scholars (See Frank 1967, Cardoso and Faletto 1979).

Dependency theory focuses on external sources of un-development in the non-Western world through analysing the balance of powers and hegemonic relations in the international political economic system. CMT perceives un-development as the original (pre-modern) state of a society, whereas dependency theory claims that it is a modern phenomenon – the product of an unequal distribution of capital due to Western imperialism within the international economic system (Berberoglu 1992). Accordingly, the success of the material development process of the West was based on colonialism and the global slave trade, which led to the accumulation of capital used to trigger the Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries (Berberoglu 1992:10). Dependency theorists and world-systems scholars alike have claimed that their works ended the hegemony of CMT by exposing its weaknesses (Wallerstein 1974; 2004; Apter 1987:27).

The framework of dependency theory is based on the idea that once Western European and Northern American societies gained the upper hand in material development vis-à-vis non-Western countries, the former used their technological and economic superiority to exploit the resources of the latter in order to bolster their economies even further, which resulted in a ‘dependency relationship’ between the two – one that is constantly re-produced by the initial gap (Berberoglu 1992:26-27). Dependency theory replaces the ‘modern versus tradition dichotomy’ of CMT with a new dichotomy between the so-called ‘metropolitan centre’ based in the West and its ‘dependent periphery’ based in the non-Western world. For instance, the economic interaction between the US and South American countries during the 20th century has been given as a typical example for this type of dependency relationship (Bodenheimer 1971, Frank 1967).
Table 2.1. Comparative Analysis of Three Theories of Modernity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Classical Modernisation</th>
<th>Theories</th>
<th>Multiple Modernities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>'Holy Trinity': economic, social and political development</td>
<td>'Holy Trinity': economic, social and political development</td>
<td>'Flexible Trinity': economic, social and political development without a strong correlation in between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Features of a Modern Society</td>
<td>Capitalist, secular, liberal democracy (Modernity is equated with 'Westernisation': the convergence thesis)</td>
<td>Capitalist, liberal democracy (Modernity is equated with 'Westernisation': the convergence thesis)</td>
<td>Many possible modernities (e.g. socialist, authoritarian etc.) (Modernity is not Westernisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idea of Progress</td>
<td>Unidirectional progress (e.g. 'the irreversible secularisation thesis')</td>
<td>Development is not unidirectional, it could regress and collapse</td>
<td>Development is not unidirectional, it could regress and collapse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Processes</td>
<td>'Positive feedback loop' between democratisation and economic development</td>
<td>'Positive feedback loop' between democratisation and economic development</td>
<td>'Negative feedback loop' or no feedback between development processes are possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Complete secularisation of a society is necessary for modernity</td>
<td>A religious interpretation that positively portrays capitalism and democracy is sufficient (i.e. Protestant ethics, Islamic Calvinism)</td>
<td>Social development in terms of secularisation and/or ideological moderation of religious groups is not an absolute requisite for modernity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Incompatible with modernity</td>
<td>Is compatible with capitalism and democracy</td>
<td>As there are many 'modernities', there are also many 'Islamisms', some of them compatible with modernity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.
The value of dependency theory lies in its focus on the international system and uncovering the historical roots of Western success in economic development as it shows that it is rooted in colonialism and economic hegemony over non-Western countries rather than cultural or religious superiority as had been claimed by classical modernisation theorists (Apter 1987:28). Nevertheless, dependency theory takes the existing system of Western hegemony as a constant and rules out any possibility for non-Western nations to catch-up with the West in terms of economic development, overlooking successful examples such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. For instance, by the late 1970s, the size of the Japanese economy had surpassed all Western societies except the US in terms Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank 2014a). The People's Republic of China also managed to rapidly develop within the last three decades, becoming the second largest economy in the world in terms of its GDP in the late 2000s (The Economist 2011:132). Another weakness of dependency theory is that it assumes the concept of hegemonic interaction with the West is applicable to all non-Western societies (So 1990:104). If so, how could some non-Western nations manage to develop whereas others have failed in this endeavour?

With the rise of East Asian economies towards the end of the 20th century, dependency theory began to lose some of its explanatory capabilities of modernisation in the non-Western world. Hence, world-systems theory emerged within dependency theory itself in the 1970s. This approach more successfully accounted for the rise of some non-Western economies by arguing that the transition of some ‘peripheral countries’ to ‘semi-peripheral status’ was facilitated by Western countries as it was supposedly necessary for the international capitalist system to function effectively (See Wallerstein 1974; Amin 1974; Frank 1978). World-systems theory suggests that within the logic of the international political economic system and the ‘willingness’ of developed Western countries, some peripheral societies may have a relatively more equal economic relationship with the West (Berberoglu 1992:35-36). Though more successful than dependency theory, world-systems theory is also unable to provide a satisfactory answer as to how some non-Western countries such as
Japan reached even higher levels of technological development than many countries of the West. Both dependency theory and world-systems theory focus entirely on exogenous factors and do not attribute autonomy to any indigenous factors that may affect the modernisation of a society. Yet, the example of the rapidly developing East Asian countries showed that domestic policies such as state capitalism could influence the outcome of the transformation process in non-Western societies, causing them to achieve noteworthy successes in modernisation despite following different trajectories than the historical Western experience (Kaya 2004:8). This suggests that approaches that reduce the role of non-Western societies to passive agents controlled by Western economies and/or the capitalist world-system centred in the West cannot sufficiently account for the modernisation of the non-Western world.

Though the strength of the rival approaches put forward by dependency and world-systems theorists has also waned over time, a key element of their criticism towards CMT has remained influential. CMT has been accused of Eurocentrism and Orientalism (See Pieterse 1996:542; Bernstein 1971:147; So 1990:54). CMT has even been accused for justifying the global hegemony of the US via serving the interests of the US State Department in the so-called Third World countries, as it has been claimed that the Western modernity model based on promotion of democracy and free-market capitalism has been used by Washington to counter the socialist modernity project of its main competitor, the Soviet Union, during the Cold War years (Berberoglu 1992:7). The fact that the US State Department funded scholarly works of influential classical modernisation theorists such as Daniel Lerner (1958) in the late 1940s has supposedly justified these accusations in the eyes of some observers, resulting in a prestige loss for the school of thought (Shah 2011:1; Berberoglu 1992; So 1990).

Along with dependency theory and world-system theory, neo-modernisation theorists launched a new set of influential theoretical criticisms of CMT. Samuel P. Huntington’s work (1968) has dramatically impacted on modernisation studies as it challenged some of the key arguments of CMT and offered a revised
understanding, which laid the ground for the emergence of NMT in the 1980s. The key point contested by Huntington (1968) is that the modernisation process in the non-Western world was not as linear as suggested by classical modernisation theorists such as Rostow (1960), often collapsing before reaching maturity in fields such as economic development as the process is highly de-stabilising.

Proponents of NMT argue that the ‘clear-cut transition’ from tradition to modernity envisaged by CMT does not reflect reality, as elements of tradition and modernity co-exist in many modernised and modernising countries (See Higgott 1983; Binder 1986; Berstein 1971:146; Inglehart and Welzel 2009:33-35; Giddens 1990:36). It has been pointed out, for instance, that a Western society as economically and politically developed as the US also experiences a resurgence of religiosity witnessed since 1980s with the rise of numerous popular Evangelical churches and preachers across the country (Smith 1998).

Scholars of NMT argue that traditional values can not only co-exist with modernity but also enhance the transformatory pace of political and economic development (Huntington 1968; So 1990; Zapf 2004:4). In this regard, a commonly used example by NMT is the modernisation experience of East Asian societies such as Japan, South Korea and the People’s Republic of China. It has been argued that the traditional values of East Asian societies based on strict discipline and dedication in the workplace rapidly accelerated the pace of their economic development, enabling these countries to catch up with the West in that field (See Black et al. 1975; Gbosoe 2006; Toprak 1981:7).

Until the late 1980s, the idea of global convergence towards the Western model of modernity developed by CMT seemed to be defunct, unable to legitimise its arguments in the face of sustained criticism by dependency theorists and neo-Marxist scholars (Roxborough 1988:753; Inglehart and Welzel 2009:34). However, starting with the collapse of the Soviet Union, a re-awakening of the convergence thesis – arguing that Western modernity is a universal destination for humanity – began after its adoption by NMT. In the 1990s, NMT interpreted
the fall of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe as vindication of the convergence thesis (Dallmayr 1993:4).

Francis Fukuyama (1992), who had resurrected a culturalist form of CMT, believed that the collapse of the communist Soviet Union signalled the final victory of liberal democratic and capitalist modernity based in the Western world (Sadowski 1993:14). Furthermore, Fukuyama (1992) offered a particularly Eurocentric understanding of modernity unseen since the heyday of CMT in the 1950s by arguing that the liberal democratic capitalist route is not a model among many, but ‘the final stage’ of human progress. Hence, the idea that liberal democracy and capitalism is the ‘pinnacle of human civilisation’ has dominated CMT and its contemporary offshoot, NMT (See Leftwich 1996:4; Huntington 1984; Fukuyama 1992).

Despite its differences with CMT, therefore, NMT also defines modernisation as consisting of three inter-related elements that feed each other: social development (change in value system), economic development (improvements in education levels, technology and productivity) and political development (emergence of a stable, centralised state structure with democratic institutions) (see Huntington 1968:33-34; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) (See Table 2.1.). In a highly influential work that has shaped the academic discourse of the last decade, Inglehart and Welzel (2005:1) incorporate the ‘holy trinity’ of CMT into the framework of NMT by defining modernity as consisting of three pillars termed ‘human development’: socioeconomic development, cultural change and democratisation.

Accordingly, economic development, cultural change and political change processes occur simultaneously within an ever accelerating and interactive process of transformation (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). In this regard, it is argued that political and economic development requires a ‘supportive cultural system’ that would enable the society to embrace the idea of change (Inglehart 1997:10-11). This approach implies that some of the cultural systems in the non-Western world are not compatible with modernity.
Akin to CMT, therefore, NMT also appears to be susceptible to the influence of Eurocentrism as the idea of global convergence towards Western political and economic systems is ingrained in its framework of modernity.

2.2.2 An Alternative Paradigm: Multiple Modernities (MMP)

In the 1990s, MMP emerged within modernisation studies as a school of thought that overtly challenges the long established Eurocentric and deterministic conceptualisation of modernity in the form of the Western model based on the convergence thesis (Preyer 2007:10; Arnason 2003:324; Eisenstadt 2003:130; Matin 2013:2). MMP strongly asserts that Westernisation cannot be the only form of modernity for developing non-Western societies (See Eisenstadt 2000, 2002, 2003; Arnason 1997, 2003; Wagner 2000, 2008). In the last two decades, the rise of former socialist countries and authoritarian state capitalist economies of the non-Western world such as the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation have posed a major challenge to the idea of convergence towards a liberal democratic-capitalist modernity. Therefore, the main premise of MMP is ‘that forms of modernity are so varied and contingent on culture and historical circumstance that the term itself must be spoken of in the plural’ (Fourie 2012:52).

MMP acknowledges the possibility of different paths to modernity beyond the singular perception of human evolution modelled on the Western trajectory by CMT and NMT (See Eisenstadt 1996; Wagner 2000; Arnason 1997; Kaya 2004). Modernity is re-conceptualised as a broader process than Westernisation, with Western modernity reduced to ‘one model among many possible routes’:

The concept of later modernities [MMP] suggests that there have been multiple ways to modernity and that those multiple ways give rise to multiple consequences. These consequences do not converge anywhere, neither under the label of liberal democracy nor under that of communist society. The multiple consequences of multiple ways indicate that history is far from coming to an end (Kaya 2004:X).
The concept of modernisation is simply defined by MMP as ‘a process of systemic changes’ whose direction and results cannot be predicted (Eisenstadt 2000:3; Preyer 2007:6). In this regard, modernity is acknowledged to have first emerged in Europe from the 17th century onwards as ‘a mode of socio-political life and economic organisation’ (Wagner 2012; Giddens 1990:1; Giddens and Pierson 1998:94). The definition of modernity provided by MMP focuses on its distinct character from preceding periods, largely fitting to the conceptualisation of Anthony Giddens (1990:6):

How should we identify the discontinuities which separate modern social institutions from the traditional social orders? Several features are involved. One is the sheer pace of change which the era of modernity sets into motion. Traditional civilisations may have been considerably more dynamic than other pre-modern systems, but the rapidity of change in conditions of modernity is extreme. If this is perhaps most obvious in respect of technology, it also pervades all other spheres. A second discontinuity is the scope of change. As different areas of the globe are drawn into interconnection with one another, waves of social transformation crash across virtually the whole of the earth’s surface. A third feature concerns the intrinsic nature of modern institutions. Some modern social forms are simply not found in prior historical periods—such as the political system of the nation-state, the wholesale dependence of production upon inanimate power sources, or the thoroughgoing commodification of products and wage labour.

Features of modernity that first emerged in the West (e.g. centralised nation-state based political organisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, mechanisation and more effective decision-making mechanisms) spread to other societies, transforming them over time. Hence, some initially West-specific conditions can no longer be used to distinguish human societies today.

In this context, MMP argues that modernised societies may share some characteristics in the structural complexity of their state organisation and development levels in economy, however they do not need to have the same ideological worldview or governance type (Eisenstadt 2002:2). Accordingly, all non-Western country cases constitute ‘different modernities’ as the contingent circumstances of the historical trajectory of each society results in the emergence of a different configuration of economic, political and social
development. Thus, the characteristics of non-Western cases of modernisation such as those of Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, Turkey, Iran and Egypt may not only differ from the features of Western modernity based on liberal democracy, free-market capitalism and secularisation but may also radically differ from each other.

In addition, modernisation may trigger economic, political and social development in a country, yet these three processes are not necessarily positively correlated with each other (Wagner 2012:XIII). More often, material development, democratisation and secularisation do not occur simultaneously in non-Western countries and the modernisation process produces unique types of modernities that are shaped by the particularities of the historical conditions in a given society (Göle 2002). For instance, a society may have made great strides towards industrialisation, urbanisation and mechanisation while traditional and religious values may remain deeply entrenched and/or that society may be governed by various types of authoritarian regimes rather than possessing the liberal democratic institutions seen in the Western world. In this regard, for instance, it is noted that many of the secular regimes that have emerged in the non-Western world such as the former Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the Kemalist Turkey of the 1930s have been authoritarian structures, not liberal democracies (Burak 2012:67).

It is important to note that MMP puts forward an entirely different methodology than its rival theories – CMT and NMT – towards studying modernisation in non-Western contexts. While the two mainstream analyse modernisation with the assumption that economic, social and political development processes positively impact on each other and that they should be analysed in conjunction, MMP suggests that the more effective way is to scrutinise each process separately without presupposing their positive correlation.

Though the conceptualisation of modernity offered by MMP is much more complex, multi-dimensional and one that can be more easily applied to various country cases than the earlier theories, it is important to note that it has also
received criticism. The understanding of ‘modernity’ offered by influential thinkers of MMP such as Shmuel N. Eisenstadt is found by some scholars to be excessively subjective and socially constructivist to the point of losing the ability to define the term altogether (Matin 2013:3; Chakrabarty 2011; Schmidt 2006:78).

As such, it has been argued that MMP does not possess a clearly defined approach to explain what modernity is in the first place and to distinguish a modern society from a pre-modern one (Fourie 2012:62; Schmidt 2006). However, this critique overlook that MMP actually puts forward a distinct framework to define modernity: a modern society is one that has experienced a process transformation in the fields of political, economic and social development (See Wagner 2012:X; Eisenstadt 2000). Its difference from the ‘holy trinity’ developed by CMT and NMT is that MMP does not perceive secularism, free-market capitalism and representative liberal democratic institutions as the inevitable products of the process of change a society experiences. Therefore, its conceptualisation of the characteristics of modernity can be called the ‘flexible trinity’ (See Table 2.1.). In this regard, modernisation and its product – modernity – are evaluated as open-ended and continuous journeys that assume different forms in various societies depending on the particular historical trajectory and conditions of each country (Wagner 2012).

The distinct understandings of modernity and modernisation have been explained so far. The following section of the chapter will focus on the perceptions of the interaction between modernity, religion, economic development and democratisation.

2.3 COMPONENTS OF MODERNITY

2.3.1 Modernity and Social Development: Religion and Secularisation

The ideas of notable sociologist Max Weber (1930) expressed in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism have shaped, albeit in different ways, the understanding of religion by both CMT and NMT (Berger 2001:447).
Weber (1930) indicated that a key element of the dramatic change Western European societies had experienced during their transition to modernity was the rise of ‘rationality’ (Volpi 2010:76). The concept of rationality was particularly used to refer to secularisation, a process that entails the replacement of religious beliefs and mysticism with scientific explanations and the ‘rule of logic’ as a way of thinking for modern societies. The Western experience of secularisation was seen as the first example of a universal process of social change that would transform the whole humanity. Thus, the followers of Weber who formed CMT fully expected religious beliefs and traditional norms to be replaced by what they referred to as rationality in modernising non-Western societies such as Turkey (Volpi 2010:76).

Adherents of CMT define the concept of modernity in terms of the Enlightenment ideal of human progress that is achieved through scientific thinking. Modern society is conceptualised as one that has ensured the superiority of reason over religion, which is commonly portrayed as a residue of the dogmatic and irrational belief system of the pre-modern era (Yavuz 2013:5). Based on this understanding of modernisation, it has been argued that religion and modernity are incompatible (See, for instance, Cassirer 1951, Gay 1966; Israel 2009; Kedourie 1992). Hence, CMT suggests that a society where religious values and the clergy continue to play influential roles cannot possibly be identified as modern. However, it is important to note that Weber and classical modernisation theorists paradoxically perceived a particular form of Christianity, the Protestantism that emerged after the Reformation movement of the 16th century, as beneficial for the modernisation process.

While some forms of other religions such as Protestantism and Confucianism have been described by classical modernisation theorists as potentially beneficial for achieving modernity, Islam constantly appears in their narratives as a ‘barrier’ to development, incompatible with the idea of progress (Çınar and Duran 2008:17; Göl 2009:796; Kedourie 1992; Huntington 1984; Berkes 1964). Elie Kedourie (1992), for instance, claims that Islam and industrialisation are
not compatible as the Islamic belief-system is supposedly against the use of modern production techniques.

The alleged incompatibility between Islam and modernity is not only limited to the field of economic development. Islam has been perceived as a ‘religious doctrine’ as well as a ‘political philosophy’ (Toprak 1981:20). It has been argued that the absence of a definite boundary between the approach of Islam to worldly and divine spheres results in the monopolisation of all socio-political life by Islamic clergy, leading to stagnation of political and social development processes in predominantly Muslim societies (Saeed 1994:X). Huntington (1984), for instance, argues that authoritarianism is inherent in Islam and that a predominantly Muslim society could never become democratic without undertaking a complete secularisation program (See Stepan and Linz 2013:17). According to CMT, Islam is a ‘dying belief system’ that would eventually fail to resist the sweeping tide of modernisation (Volpi 2010:76). Material development understood in terms of industrialisation, urbanisation, administrative reform and educational transformation would necessarily result in a decrease in religiosity, producing a secular/non-religious society (Wallis and Bruce 1992). CMT adheres to the ‘irreversible secularisation thesis’ which assumes that once a secularising cultural reform project is launched, it will initiate a self-sustainable chain reaction that would eliminate religiosity in predominantly Muslim countries (See Table 2.1.).

The negative portrayal of the role of Islam in social change processes put forward by CMT has been challenged by scholars of NMT such as Niklas Luhmann (1984) as well as by sociologists of religion such as Bryan S. Turner (1984) who point out that characteristics of Islam – such as its emphasis on the contribution of merchants to society and praise of trade – are actually compatible with the concept of a modernity defined as an industrialised capitalist society. The idea of compatibility and a mutually supportive relationship between religious ethics and modernity have been strongly voiced by supporters of NMT (see, for instance, Mardin 1989; Atasoy 2005; Yavuz 2013; Güngör 1991; Luhmann 1984; Tripp 2006; Göle 1997). Akin to CMT, NMT
bases its argument on the seminal work of Max Weber (1930). The perception of some forms of religion is highly positive in the understanding of NMT as it is argued that religious ethics accelerate modernisation via positively impacting on highly transformative processes such as industrialisation and commercialisation (see Table 2.1).

Not unlike NMT, MMP strongly challenges the understanding of religion proposed by CMT, arguing that secularisation is not a prerequisite for modernity (Wagner 2012:VIII; White 2002). As MMP acknowledges the existence of many unique types of non-Western modernities across the world, it also argues that there are many possible readings of religious belief-systems such as Islam (Kaya 2004:11; Göle 2002; Kamali 2005). Islam as a whole cannot possibly be evaluated as incompatible with modernity since some of its interpretations may positively impact on economic, political and social development processes which may eventually produce a capitalist and democratic modernity or an entirely different type of modern society that do not conform with the values of the Western world (see Table 2.1). In contrast to CMT that perceives Islam to be preserving pre-modern socio-economic and political structures, MMP even envisages the manifestation of unique and hybrid non-Western modernities in the Muslim world that could potentially combine Islamic values with elements of the Western modernity model such as neoliberal economics (Eisenstadt 2003:96).

2.3.2 Modernity, Economic Development and Democratisation

CMT and NMT have long argued that economic development would lead to democratisation in modernising societies (Przeworski and Limongi 1995; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Vanhanen 2003; Yıldız 2011). This is derived from an established view in social theory proposed by thinkers such as Karl Marx and Barrington Moore (Arat 1988:21). The link between economic development and democratisation can be described as a positive feedback loop in which both processes ‘feed’ from one another and sustain the continuation of each other (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996:23;
The positive feedback loop thesis has two variants: the Marxist approach (see Leftwich 1996) bases its argument on the connection between working classes and democratisation while liberal theorists (see Moore 1966) see the bourgeoisie as the engine of the democratisation process. The Marxist approach perceives the formation of social movements by the working class as the basis for democratisation. Liberal modernisation theory, on the other hand, notes that economic development fosters a rational middle class which is aware of its rights, one that sees the establishment of political institutions based on democratic representation as a strategy for increasing its chances to protect its socioeconomic interests (Inglehart and Welzel 2009:37).

Most economically undeveloped countries are authoritarian and most developed countries are democracies in the world. On this basis, CMT and NMT derive their argument for the positive correlation between economic development and democratisation. However, it is not clear whether democracy is a product of economic development or that democracy is simply more able to survive in prosperous nations (Przeworski et al. 2000:78). Nevertheless, since Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) published his famous work, both mainstream theories have claimed that democracy is the 'latter stage' of the modernisation process. When authoritarian nations experience economic development processes (i.e. urbanisation, industrialisation and increase in literacy), they are said to gradually become more democratic as the technological and socioeconomic changes supposedly produce self-conscious citizens that would be willing to demand more political rights (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000:89).

The positive feedback loop is one of the most critical hypotheses of both mainstream theories that MMP strongly contests in its framework of modernity (see Table 2.1; also Arnason 2000; Preyer 2007; Wagner 2008, 2012). The concept is evaluated by MMP as a key indicator that reveals the Eurocentric bias of both CMT and NMT as the formulation of a positive correlation between economic development and democratisation is mostly based on the experience
of modernisation in the Western world (Kaya 2004). As such, the positive feedback loop can be evaluated as potentially not applicable to non-Western cases, because many of the most economically modernised countries of the non-Western world such as Russia, the People’s Republic of China and Singapore are authoritarian regimes which have not formed liberal democratic state structures despite their high levels of industrialisation, urbanisation and mechanisation. The modernisation experience of Japan from the mid-19th century until the 1950s implies that it is possible to achieve rapid economic development without democratisation (Morishima 1995). The century-long Japanese economic development did not result in the emergence of a liberal democratic regime as democratisation was imposed on Japan by a foreign power, the US that occupied the country from 1945 to 1952, following the defeat of Japan in World War II (Gbosoe 2006: 194; Morishima 1995).

In this context, MMP suggests that the interaction between development and democratisation may actually be characterised by the absence of any correlation or even a ‘negative feedback loop’. Democracy could possibly hamper economic growth in developing countries as an elected government would be likely to use the state budget for responding to public demand for the immediate supply of services in order to get re-elected, rather than ensuring stable long-term economic development of the country through investing in production sectors (Przeworski and Limongi 1995:6). Rather than putting forward a specific model to define the link between economic development and democratisation such as the positive feedback loop of CMT and NMT, ‘uncertainty’ is the principle adopted by MMP as it is possible to refer to country cases supporting or contesting the existence of a strong correlation between the two variables (Roemer 1995:52-53).

2.4 A CRITIQUE OF MAINSTREAM THEORIES: RE-CONCEPTUALISING MODERNITY AND MODERNISATION

Though the rivals of CMT and NMT such as dependency theory and world-system theory could not entirely weaken the hold of these mainstream theories
over modernisation studies, their established conceptualisations have been the subject of ever-intensifying sociological and philosophical scrutiny in recent years. In this regard, critics such as Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann, Jeffrey C. Alexander and Kamran Matin offer insightful analyses that are very helpful for a more realistic and objective comprehension of modernity and modernisation through the lens of MMP (Giddens 1990; Giddens and Pierson 1998; Mann 2005; Alexander 2013, Matin 2013).

2.4.1 ‘Side Effects’ of Modernisation

Theorists such as Talcott Parsons and Emile Durkheim, who strongly believed in the idea of evolutionary social change, provided the sociological basis for CMT and NMT (Giddens and Pierson 1998:52-56). According to Parsons, for instance, the ultimate destination of modernisation according is the formation of a society that resembles American modernity in every way as the USA is depicted as the most advanced country in the world (Erkilet 2007:113).

Modernity has been equated with concepts such as ‘progress’, ‘perfection’, ‘ideal’, namely words that have highly positive connotations in the deterministic and evolutionary model of conceptualisation put forward by CMT and NMT (Alexander 2005:5). The excessively optimistic perception of modernity is not exclusively adopted by CMT and NMT as Marxism also offers a ‘unidirectional meta-narrative of universal progress’ in which modernisation process is imagined to occur via predetermined stages and culminating towards a ‘golden age’ of prosperity, peace and superior organisation (Giddens 1990:5). According to Karl Marx, this golden age can be realised through transition from capitalism to socialism and finally to communism, whereas it is referred to as the ‘free-market, liberal democrat modernity’ by proponents of CMT and NMT such as Rostow, Lerner, Huntington and Fukuyama.

In reality, the history of modernisation and the characteristics of modernity are far more complex than commonly imagined. A more effective understanding can be obtained once we stop romanticising these notions. Throughout the history
of modernisation, noteworthy achievements were made such as the development of modern medicine which has offered invaluable cures to many terminal diseases, largely eliminated or minimised childbirth and infant mortality, ultimately contributing to average life standards of many countries across the world – including the less-developed ones to some extent. Much progress has been made in the field of human rights as well, many previously marginalised religious and racial groups gaining civil and political rights in addition to the improvement of gender equality indicators between men and women in many modern and modernising societies (Alexander 2005:9). Nevertheless, it is also clear that not all groups have equally benefited from modernisation as there remain many global problems such as the wide income gap between rich and poor. In fact, many problems of our globe have emerged as side effects of modernisation such as imperialism, global environmental pollution, extinction of various animal species, total industrialisation of war, nuclear weapons, totalitarian political systems and many others (Giddens 1990:7-9; Keskin 2009:1-2; Alexander 2005:8-13).

Modernisation, the path that presumably leads to modernity, can be confidently said to have been a highly complex process in Western and non-Western societies alike, filled with its own contradictions, crises at least as well as its achievements:

We tend to think of President Thomas Jefferson as embodying Enlightened reason. Indeed, it was in the name of the advance of civilization that he declared that the “barbarities” of the native American Indians “justified extermination.” A century later, President Theodore Roosevelt, a decent modern man, agreed, saying of the Indians, “extermination was as ultimately beneficial as it was inevitable.” Forty years on, a third leader said, “It is the curse of greatness that it must step over dead bodies to create new life.” This was SS Chief Heinrich Himmler, who is rightly considered as the personification of evil. Yet he and his colleague Adolf Hitler said they were only following in the Americans’ footsteps... [M]urderous ethnic cleansing has been a central problem of our civilization, our modernity, our conceptions of progress, and our attempts to introduce democracy. It is our dark side (Mann 2005:VII).

Hence, modernity itself should be subjected to critical reflection, a position that stands in contrast to the way modernity has been presented for long by its
proponents that developed the CMT and NMT. The concept of democracy, for instance, has been portrayed as ‘the best of all possible political systems’ humanity has developed, yet it has been pointed that many crimes against humanity were committed in the name of modernity and democracy from the 19th century onwards, ranging from ethnic cleansing to mass genocide (see Mann 2005).

Democracy, as a political system, emerged within the framework of nation-states in the Western world from the late 18th century onwards, and the Western model of political organisation have been taken as models by non-Western societies as well, resulting in democratic regimes and nation-state structures to spread to hitherto tribal, sectarian or multi-cultural imperial societies. During the formation of modern nation-states, violence has become the norm, both in Western and non-Western worlds as the democratic principle of the rule of the people have often been understood as the ‘unopposed hegemony’ or ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Mann 2005:3). In fact, a key argument of Mann’s work (2005) is that modernisation, democratisation and ethnic cleansing accompanied each other in the history of the so-called ‘developed West’, a phenomenon that have been repeating itself in so-called ‘developing societies’ such as the former Ottoman countries in the early 20th century and former Yugoslavian countries in the late 20th century.

The unwavering and unquestioning belief of CMT and NMT in the virtues of modernity and their depiction of it as the ‘pinnacle of human civilisation’ are very problematic. A more objective way to reflect upon modernity is provided by MMP as this school of thought aims to study the process of modernisation and all its contingent consequences without presenting the path and its results as virtuous or even ideal. Instead, the lens provided by MMP is to comprehend it impartially as part of the human experience, with its usual risks and troubles (see Wagner 2012). MMP strictly refrain from charging modernity, or more accurately ‘modernities’, with a positive value judgement. Modernity is conceptualised by MMP in terms of institutional centralisation and economic development, lacking the liberal democratic element found in CMT and NMT.
Arguably, this approach could also be problematic as it could potentially serve to justify violations of human rights by so-called ‘modern’ regimes across the world. Nevertheless, MMP is superior to mainstream theories of modernity as its framework acknowledges the possibility of ‘the dark sides’ of modernity which has been badly neglected by CMT and NMT.

2.4.2 Determinism and Eurocentrism in CMT and NMT

Apart from overlooking negative elements of modernity, another problematic issue within the frameworks of CMT and NMT is determinism and Eurocentrism. CMT and NMT can be thought as the voice of Western cultural hegemony, reproducing a universalist discourse to legitimise the existing world order that is based on an unequal balance of power between Western and non-Western societies (Gencer 2008:51). Deconstructing this discourse enables us to see the purpose of these theories: the Western supremacy over the world would become a permanent feature of global social life only if all other societies accept the Western modernity model based on cultural codes (Gencer 2008:51). In this regard, a strong critique can be found in Giddens who states that globalisation should be conceptualised as a ‘process of uneven development’ that does not necessarily result in convergence but also divergence from the characteristics of Western modernity:

Is modernity peculiarly Western from the standpoint of its globalising tendencies? No. It cannot be, since we are speaking here of emergent forms of world interdependence and planetary consciousness. The ways in which these issues are approached and coped with, however, will inevitably involve conceptions and strategies derived from non-Western settings. For neither the radicalising of modernity nor the globalising of social life are processes which are in any sense complete. Many kinds of cultural response to such institutions are possible, given world cultural diversity as a whole (Giddens 1990:175).

Giddens’ critique of deterministic/evolutionary theories of modernity – CMT and NMT – provides the philosophical justification for MMP as it highlights their ontological weaknesses, creating a lacuna in terms of re-conceptualising the essence of modernity. As Western modernity interacted with non-Western societies, the initial conditions and divergent characteristics of the latter
produced disparate outcomes, i.e. ‘multiple modernities’. The replacement of the deterministic convergence thesis of CMT and NMT with *historical contingency* and *path dependency* in the MMP framework enables it to offer a more nuanced framework of modernity than can be used to understand non-Western cases such as Turkey.

### 2.4.3 International Context

A third crucial element of the non-determinist MMP framework is the acknowledgement of the impact of Western modernity on the modernisation trajectory of non-Western societies. As examined in detail in *Chapter 1*, *international context* is presented by MMP as a key factor that causes the modernisation experience of non-Western cases to be unpredictable (see Wagner 2012:168-169; Arnason 2003:287-295; Eisenstadt 2000:14). In this regard, MMP’s understanding is compatible with the ‘uneven and combined development theory’ (U&CD), which offers insights into the crucial role of the ‘international’ in modernisation and social change processes of non-Western countries (see Matin 2013). In the case of international context, this thesis will combine the frameworks of MMP and U&CD and this approach will be applied to the case of Turkish modernity in the following empirical chapters.

U&CD theory introduces three generalizable principles related to the impact of international context or external actors on the modernisation experience of non-Western societies: *the whip of external necessity, substitution* and *historical reshuffling*. The whip of external necessity suggests that modernisation programs in less-developed countries are initiated as the result of a survival instinct (Matin 2013:18). Historically, as less-developed non-Western societies such as Japan, Iran and the Ottoman Empire engaged technologically advanced expansionist Western powers such as Britain, France and the USA, they developed modernisation programs for preventing themselves from becoming dependent colonies and preserving their independence. Hence, the phenomenon of socio-political and economic transformation did not emerge in
less-developed countries as a natural result of their own domestic conditions, but because of the impact of external actors.

Both of the other two principles – substitution and historical reshuffling – can be said to be the consequences of the whip of external necessity as they only manifest after modernisation process is launched, following interaction with more advanced countries. The concept of substitution refers to the unpredictable impact of foreign ideas and products on a modernising society. Once modernisation process begins, the more advanced external force becomes a guide or ‘model’ for the less-advanced country.

Through imitating, the less-advanced country introduces foreign institutions, technology and lifestyle that were not organically produced by that society. As a result of the mix of domestic and foreign elements, the initial modernisation trajectory is subverted; producing an unforeseen experience whose direction and outcome cannot be predicted by any determinist theory such as CMT and NMT. Simply, this country could no longer possibly replicate the path of original modernity, i.e. the case of Western modernity developed in countries such as Britain, France and the USA:

A key aspect of uneven and combined development is... the fact that a society can, and almost always does, adopt and adapt other societies’ products without undergoing the developmental processes from which these products had originated in their host societies. Uneven and combined development therefore not only pre-empts historical and developmental repetition but also enables a variety of apparently paradoxical patterns of development and political strategies (Matin 2013:17).

Stimulated by the entry of foreign elements to its domestic social, political and economic life, the society reacts and historical reshuffling manifests as a result. Historical reshuffling refers to situations, particularly seen in the case of non-Western countries, where the sequence of development in the less-developed country that adopted the more-developed country as its model occurs in radically different ways that diverge from the historical experience of the model country (Matin 2013:19). Hence, the experience of the model country would not
necessarily be replicated by the less-developed country as the interaction between foreign elements and domestic elements could produce a divergent modernity.

Precisely because CMT and NMT do not consider the contingency of the role of international context for modernisation, both theories presuppose that all of humanity would eventually converge towards Western modernity, gradually building liberal democratic, free-market capitalist and secular or ideologically moderate societies. As such, the MMP framework – reinforced by the aforementioned insights of U&CD – can more effectively comprehend the transformation experience of a non-Western case such as Turkey, whose modernity has been dramatically shaped by the interaction between its domestic conditions and the international context in the form of Western models it had followed.

2.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter presented the various understandings of modernity within modernisation studies and identified a common characteristic possessed by three schools of thought – CMT, NMT and MMP – namely that modernisation is defined as the economic, political and social development experience of a society. Nevertheless, it has also been shown that the methodology offered by MMP to the study of modernisation radically differs from that of the two mainstream theories. While CMT and NMT utilise the concept of positive feedback loop between economic, political and social development processes and argue that all three should be studied together in examination of modernisation experiences, MMP refuses to presuppose such a correlation and assesses each processes separately in non-Western country cases (i.e. the ‘flexible trinity’ of MMP vs. the ‘holy trinity’ of CMT and NMT; see Table 2.1.).

As discussed in part three, the theories differ in understanding the interaction between modernity, religion, economic development and democratisation. Deriving its framework from the historical Western development experience, CMT offers the most exclusionary formulation of modernity by perceiving Islam
as incompatible with modernisation and secularisation as an inevitable product of material development. NMT also partially bases its methodology on the Western experience by correlating democratisation and economic development, but it re-conceptualises Islamic ethics as a factor that strongly contributes to modernisation process of predominantly Muslim societies by encouraging capitalist development. MMP refuses to base its framework on the Western experience via acknowledging the existence of many different trajectories to the achievement of modernity in the non-Western world, indicating that a secular and liberal democratic society is not necessarily the outcome of a given modernisation process.

**Part four** offered a critique of the various dimensions of the CMT and NMT frameworks, arguing that MMP – with its focus on historical contingency, path dependency and international context – offers a far more nuanced approach for understanding the complexities of modernisation and modernity.

The following three empirical chapters of the thesis will build upon the literature review and theoretical context provided so far, deconstructing the narratives of structural and societal models through the lens and methods of MMP. **Chapter 3** will focus on Turkey's economic modernisation experience; **Chapter 4** will examine its political modernisation and **Chapter 5** will cover social modernisation.
CHAPTER 3: THE ECONOMIC TRAJECTORY OF TURKISH MODERNITY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

A world-renowned academic and advisor to various European and Middle Eastern governments, Azeem Ibrahim (2013:32) recently wrote:

   Turkey’s economy is the envy of most Middle Eastern countries. The World Bank’s Country Brief 2010 classifies Turkey as an upper-middle income country in terms of its per capita GDP in 2007. Mean graduate pay was $10.02 per man hour in 2010.

Since the 1970s, the Middle East average has lagged behind other less-developed and so-called peripheral regions of the global economy such as South America and South-East Asia in terms of development indicators such as per capita income, urbanisation, literacy rate, industrialisation and average life expectancy (Pamuk 2006:826; Karshenas 2001:59). By the beginning of the 21st century\(^\text{12}\), the average per capita income difference between the MENA region and Western European economies such as Britain, France and Germany remained roughly the same as it was in 1913, constituting a failure for many Middle Eastern societies in terms of shortening the modernisation gap with the West (Pamuk 2006:810; Page and Van Gelder 2001:15).

Turkey, on the other hand, has been an exception to the relatively slow pace of development common to the region: its GDP rose from about $17 billion in 1970 to approximately $800 billion in 2012, while within the same period the average life expectancy rose from 58 years to 75 years, the adult literacy rate from 52 percent to 95 percent, the urban population from 39 percent to 72 percent, the per capita income (in terms of GDP) from $539 to $10,810, the share of industry in the economy from 17 percent to 27 percent and the share of services sector from 47 percent to 64 percent (World Bank 2013, 2014b). Particularly as a result of the rapid economic development\(^\text{13}\) of the country since the early 2000s, the so-called Turkish economic model has caught the attention of scholars,

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\(^{12}\) The year the data refers in particular is 2005.

\(^{13}\) Within a decade from 2002 to 2012, the size of the Turkish economy in terms of GDP almost quadrupled with an average of 5.1 percent growth rate per annum (World Bank 2013).
journalists and policy-makers with observers such as Ibrahim (2013) arguing that the Turkish experience carries significant lessons that could be of assistance to other developing countries in the MENA region and beyond (See, for instance, Kirişçi 2009, 2011; Tziarras 2013:6; Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011). As the acclaimed economic success of Turkey constitutes one of the most crucial elements of the Turkish model, this chapter will examine the economic modernisation trajectory in the country to shed light on the historical conditions and factors that produced it.

The objective of this chapter is to re-conceptualise the economic modernisation experience in Turkey in light of a methodology drawn from MMP. According to MMP, economic modernisation is ‘a gradual process of shift from pre-industrial and less complex economic systems towards structural differentiation developed across a wide range of institutions in the organisation of economic policy-making units, urbanisation, modern education and mass communication’ (Eisenstadt 2002:1). An economically modern society, therefore, is one that is industrialised, urban and literate with effective economic policy-making mechanisms and an advanced infrastructure in transportation and communication.

It is important to note that the conceptualisation of economic modernity by MMP does not include the principle of ‘liberal, free-market, capitalist economy’ that has formed an essential element of modern life as seen by CMT and NMT. Any society that is complex enough to fulfil the aforementioned criteria of ‘structural differentiation’ can be considered as modern in this approach. For instance, the communist economy of the former Soviet Union, and the state capitalist economies of contemporary People’s Republic of China and Russia are considered economically modern societies (Arnason 2000, 2002). The chapter will utilise this understanding of economic modernity to assess whether contemporary Turkey can be considered a modern economy.

Other crucial elements of the framework of MMP are the roles of path dependency, historical contingency and international context on a modernisation
process that produces economic modernity. The chapter will highlight the significance of the three factors in the economic trajectory of Turkey and contest the analyses offered by the structural and societal models. In contrast to the earlier approaches that emphasise the impact of only a particular era of economic history, it will be shown that the performance of the post-1980 period of export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) strategy is rooted in the achievements and failures of the pre-1980 state-led import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) policy. In this regard, the impact of state policies as well as the activities of social forces such as the capitalists on the economic trajectory of Turkish modernity will be highlighted. The *sui generis* elements of the Turkish case that may not be found in other non-Western societies such as its close economic relations with the EU will also be acknowledged.

The main variable analysed in this chapter is the economic growth rate as progress in all major elements of economic modernisation according to MMP such as industrialisation, urbanisation, income per capita growth and rise in education levels are tied to the state of this indicator (Staehr 2005:1). Nevertheless, the impact of the economic growth rate on other indicators of economic modernisation will be consistently examined throughout the chapter.

The analysis of the economic trajectory of Turkish modernity will show that Turkey can be classified as a modern economy in accordance with the definition of the concept by MMP. However, it will be argued that the nature of the Turkish economy modernity differs from the Western model\(^\text{14}\) which is characterised by a less interventionist state and a more independent and assertive private sector. The difference will be attributed to the *contingent* historical starting conditions of Turkey and the nature of the global international system based on Western economic hegemony, which shaped the trajectory of modernisation in Turkey. The state played a leading role in the economic modernisation process while the capitalist class remained largely dependent on the state and it was not as influential as its counterparts in the West in terms of shaping the political economy of the country. The divergence of the Turkish economic modernity

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\(^{14}\) The definition of Western economic modernity is based on Lipset (1959) and Rostow (1960).
from the Western path has significant implications for the democratisation process in the country; therefore, the conclusion of this chapter will pave the way for an in-depth analysis of the issue in Chapter 4 on the political modernisation trajectory of Turkey.

The chapter consists of five sections. After this introduction, part two explores the origins of Turkey's economic modernisation process in the pre-1980 period. The initial starting conditions inherited by the Ottoman Empire and the impact of the statist economic policies followed for most of the pre-1980 Republican period are analysed to show how this period of economic modernisation laid the groundwork for the post-1980 development efforts in the country. Part three examines the profound economic change experienced in the post-1980 period with the transition from ISI to EOI and the implementation of a liberalisation program. The effects of the transition on various indicators of economic development in Turkey are studied while the role of the continuing legacy of pre-1980 era on economic modernisation is highlighted. Part four discusses the insights provided by the study of the Turkish case in juxtaposition with the conceptualisation of modernisation offered by MMP in order to show that this theory offers a more efficient understanding of the phenomenon than the structural and societal models that use frameworks based on CMT and NMT. Part five contains the brief summary of the chapter and the concluding remarks.

3.2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF TURKEY’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE PRE-1980 ERA

Time and again, statism has been adopted by policy-makers of developing non-Western countries to ensure their economic independency from developed Western economies. Particularly in the post-World War II period after the decolonisation process of the 1950s, many newly-independent non-Western countries were sceptical of the benefits of free-trade policy and the statist model was implemented instead to initiate economic modernisation processes (Cohn 2008:307). This strategy is based on triggering rapid industrialisation and
mechanisation through a state-led development process where the state imposes protectionist measures (e.g. tariffs on imported goods, restrictive quotas and other regulations) in order to shield state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and indigenous capitalists from competition with foreign enterprises within the national market. A key objective of ISI is to mobilise domestic savings for investment into production sectors rather than consumption. In this model of development, the state is envisaged to have the leading role in ensuring the economic modernisation of the country through building new industries, initiating the mechanisation of agriculture via the introduction of more effective production methods, building an integrated national market via the construction of an infrastructure network across the country (e.g. railroads, highways, ports, airports, other methods for the transportation of goods and services), encouraging the rise of education levels via building public schools and research-oriented higher education institutions and enabling the emergence of indigenous entrepreneurs via providing subsidies and credits (Aydin 2005:25).

In the years following the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the statist model quickly became the main strategy of the economic development program in Turkey. Yet, it is important to note that before statism, Turkey had a brief trial with free-market policy in the 1920s. In this regard, the post-1980 economic liberalisation period of Turkey is oft compared with the free-market economics of the early 1920s (See Nas 1992:13). Akin to the post-1980 period, the economy was based on export-oriented production in the 1920s as trade barriers were absent and the interest and exchange rates were free of state interventionism, yet the Turkish economy was actually very different from that of the 1980s.

In the early years of the Republic, Turkey's exports consisted entirely of agricultural products and raw materials as the country lacked the advanced industrial base of the developed nations of the time, which were exporting manufactured goods (Nas 1992:13). Moreover, the role of the industrial private sector during the 1920s was negligible due to various reasons such as the lack
of accumulated capital for investment, the lack of an ability to compete with the
manufactured goods of large-scale foreign producers due to the absence of
protective tariffs and the relatively low risks involved in the banking sector
which encouraged the emerging business class to engage with finance and
commerce rather than industry (Nas 1992:13). Following the brief period of
liberalism in the 1920s, the regime adopted statist policies in the 1930s,
initiating the modern debate within the literature on Turkish development. To
understand the rationale behind the adoption of statism, one has to start in the
early years of the Republic.

3.2.1 The Economic Legacy of the Empire and the Forced Free-Trade
Period (1923-1929)

When the Republic was founded in 1923, Turkey was a typical undeveloped
economy with low average living standards even compared with MENA
countries under direct colonial rule such as Egypt at the time (Hansen 1991).
Even though there were piecemeal efforts to initiate an economic
modernisation program in the 19th century as part of the ongoing
Westernisation process of the Ottoman Empire, the attempts for
industrialisation through establishing SOEs by the bureaucracy did not achieve
considerable success due to the pressure of military expenses and external debt
on the state budget.

By 1913, more than a century after the Westernisation program of the Ottoman
Empire had begun, industrial production accounted for a mere 10 percent of the
total GDP and most of the relatively industrialised provinces were concentrated
in the European territories which had been lost to expanding Serbia, Greece and
Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 (Hale 1981:36). Subsequently, the
economically significant Ottoman provinces in the Balkans such as Selanik
(Thessaloniki in Greek) did not form the national territories of the Republic of
Turkey.
The educated population was disproportionately concentrated in bureaucracy and military employment while the largely illiterate masses formed the peasantry. The industrial sector was dominated by foreign capital and non-Muslim minority ownership (Sönmez 2001:141; Hale 1981:36). The development of railway infrastructure from the imperial capital Istanbul to the major urban centres in Asia Minor (known as Anatolia in Turkey) was sporadic and largely built by foreign governments in piecemeal efforts, in particular by the rising European power of the late 19th century, Germany. From the early years of the 20th century until the end of World War I, the most noteworthy railway construction plan of the Ottoman Empire – the Berlin-Baghdad project – was designed, financed and built by Germany, which aimed to survey and extract the natural resources of the oil-rich Middle Eastern territories of the Ottomans (Pamuk 1987:80-81; Ortaylı 1981:76). In addition, the railway was envisaged to carry the German armed forces to the Middle East in a bid by Kaiser Wilhelm II to weaken the global hegemony of the British Empire via directly threatening the Suez Canal that connected Britain with its most economically significant colony, India (Jastrow 1917; McMeekin 2010). The beginning of World War I in 1914 prevented the completion of this project.

In sum, the territories that constituted the Republic of Turkey inherited a poor state of material development level from the Ottoman Empire (See Table 3.1; Yenal 2001:7; Sönmez 2001:141; Kepenek and Yentürk 1983:9; Aydın 2005:26; Keyder 1989:39-70; Hansen 1991). By the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had been reduced to a semi-colony of industrialised European powers such as France, Britain and Germany, serving these economies as a source to extract natural resources and a market to import manufactured goods (Aydın 2005:26; Keyder 1989:60; Berberoglu 1992:93). As can be seen Table 3.1, the early Republic lacked most of the essential characteristics of economic modernity as seen by MMP.

15 As a result of the inability of the Empire to pay its debts, an organisation called the Düyun-u Umumiye İdaresi (The Ottoman Public Debt Administration) was established in 1881 by European public and private creditors to supervise and collect a portion of the tax income of the state until the debt was paid. The organisation quickly took control of more than one-third of all the income of the Empire, emerging as an international technocratic agent to jointly manage the economic affairs of the state (Keyder 1989:60). The institution symbolised the incompetence of the declining Ottoman state and became a main source of anti-Westernism in the country (Keyder 1989:61).
Table 3.1. The Political Economy of the Early Republic (1920s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Material Development&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mechanised agriculture</td>
<td>Negligible (traditional production methods)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrated national market</td>
<td>Limited infrastructure (railroads existed only between major cities of western and central Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industrialisation</td>
<td>Very limited and mostly controlled by foreign enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>role of bureaucracy</td>
<td>Highly centralised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>role of landowners</td>
<td>Political alliance with the CHP in return for preserving regional hegemony over predominantly Kurdish south-eastern Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>role of capitalists</td>
<td>Negligible presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban middle class</td>
<td>Negligible presence (rural peasantry make up for most of the population)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

Most of the Turkish territory lacked modern infrastructure and other means of transportation, which prevented the formation of an integrated national market economy, negatively affecting early economic prospects of the Republic. The frequent internal and external military conflicts that engulfed the Ottoman Empire throughout the 19th and 20th centuries had devastated the economic and human resources of the country in addition to adding a massive burden of debt to its successor state.

Despite its lack of material development, however, Turkey’s economic foundations were based on the bureaucratic tradition inherited from the Empire, such that the roots of its modern economic development emerged in the

<sup>16</sup> Based on Berberoglu (1977); Rostow (1960).
early Republican years of the 1920s. The Ottoman Empire contributed to the process of modernisation in Turkey by providing an educated military officer class, bureaucracy, intellectuals and reformed Western-style institutions (Weiker 1981:1; Keyder 1995:195). Berch Berberoglu (1977:28) notes that:

The social and class structure of Ottoman Turkey in the early decades of this century [20th century] was essentially a product of the interaction of the traditional (pre-capitalist) mode of production of the Empire with European commercial capital, especially since the seventeenth century.

Thus, the society that the Republic inherited from the Empire was a direct product of the modernisation process that first began spontaneously when the pre-industrial Ottoman economy encountered industrialising Western European economies, a process that rapidly accelerated with the advent of the Industrial Revolution in the first half of the 19th century. The late Ottoman era witnessed the emergence of state-directed modernisation in Turkey as the ruling elites of the time, the Western-educated imperial bureaucracy, initiated a series of reform programs such as the Tanzimat (1838) and Islahat (1856).

Even though the state collapsed after the Allied invasion at the end of World War I, the bureaucratic and military classes of the Empire led the nationalist movement during Turkey’s Independence War (1919-1922) and later formed the ruling elite of the Republic via the formation of a one-party, authoritarian regime under the leadership of the founder and first president, Kemal Ataturk (Keyder 1989; Berberoglu 1977:25). The main governance agent of the new regime was the Kemalist CHP that gradually assumed full control of Turkish politics, economy and social life.

At the inception of the republic in 1923, industry played little role in the national economy (12 percent share in total GDP) and the sector was almost entirely controlled by capitalists among non-Muslim minorities and foreign-owned enterprises, Muslim capitalists possessing approximately 15 percent of all the manufacturing industries (Hale 1981:36; Berberoglu 1977:62). Moreover, industry was concentrated in two major cities, Istanbul (55 percent) and Izmir (22 percent) (Berberoglu 1977:63). The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 that
recognised the formal independence of Turkey also imposed a set of economic concessions provided earlier by the Ottoman Empire to Western economies, forcing the Republican government to not increase the tariffs for the duration of five years until 1928 (Hale 1981:39). This condition prevented the Republican regime from protecting indigenous industrial enterprises from competition with large-scale enterprises of developed Western European economies, negatively affecting the industrialisation process throughout the 1920s.

The legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the agricultural sector was also very problematic as the peasantry was poor and entirely dependent on landowners within a feudal structure. Mechanisation and the use of modern tools were virtually non-existent, agricultural production was labour-intensive, the heavy income taxes imposed on small-sized landowning peasants had prevented the accumulation of capital in their hands and most landlords had tax collection agreements with the central government that gave control of tax-collecting to the landlords for a fixed-amount of fee, sustaining and further intensifying the dependence of peasants on landlords (Berberoglu 1977:55).

Due to the poorly developed state of the economy, the Republican administration felt the need to focus most of its energy and resources on economic affairs from 1925 onwards and a series of initiatives to reform and develop the agricultural sector began that year. The 'tithe tax' that forced the land-owning farmers to pay a significant portion of their profits to the government was abolished in 1925 to enable farmers to sell their surplus products on the market and ensure capital accumulation in their hands in the long term (Keyder 1981:32). The advent of an integrated national market economy in this era was as a key turning point for the modernisation of the Turkish economy as the new regime helped connect provinces through railways, enabling cheaper and faster transportation of products across the connected major cities of the country17. From 1923 to 1934, a large portion of state-owned land was distributed to the peasantry by the state, but a

17 Early examples of infrastructure development in the 1920s include the construction of Ankara-Kayseri, Kayseri-Ulukışla and Ankara-Sivas railways (Yenal 2001:71).
comprehensive land reform that would ensure the redistribution of land from large landowners to peasants never occurred in Turkey (Berberoglu 1977:79-80).

Even though there were discussions of a land reform in the parliament since the early years of the Republic, this action was not undertaken by the government. This can be attributed to the close ties the ruling bureaucratic elite had built with the landowners (eşraf) during the Turkish Independence War (Keyder 1989). The eşraf was essential in mobilising the masses for the military and this class also made up a large portion of elected representatives of the new parliament in Ankara, filling the ranks of the CHP and playing a role in sustaining the mass support for the Kemalist regime through their patronage over the peasantry (Aydın 2005:26). This link to the new regime had paid off for the eşraf as this class benefited most from the removal of the tithe tax and the newly-established subsidies and credits the state provided to develop agriculture throughout the 1920s (Keyder 1989; Asutay 2010:109). These policies that served the interests of the eşraf resulted in widening the income distribution gap at the expense of the peasantry via rapid expansion of agricultural exports which yielded high profits for landowners (Berberoglu 1977:81-82). In terms of the absence of land reform, Turkey's experience of development is noteworthy as it clearly differs from many other developing countries across the non-Western world. Rather than the support of the peasantry, the CHP relied on the landowners to sustain and consolidate its rule over the country.

By the end of the 1920s, the Turkish economy had made a sharp recovery from the devastation of a decade of continuous wars (1912-1922) that ravaged its human and economic resources. A centralised state structure that could effectively shape policy-making was established, the first significant step towards economic modernisation according to MMP. Agricultural output increased by 115 percent between 1923 and 1929 (Keyder 1981:37). Due mostly to increasing production levels in agriculture, the annual economic growth rate reached approximately 9 percent in 1929 (Yenal 2001:71).
In addition to developing the agricultural sector, industrialisation was another key objective of the new regime in Ankara. Due to the imposed conditions of the Lausanne Treaty, the government could not increase tariff rates and throughout the 1920s, direct state intervention into the economy remained limited. Yet, considerable influence was exercised to gain the support of indigenous capitalists by encouraging capital accumulation in their hands in order to foster a strong economic base for the new regime (Keyder 1989:132-133). The state’s role was mainly complementary to the private sector in the 1920s as it was concentrated on developing the physical and financial infrastructure in order to support entrepreneurs, though the state also began to invest in manufacturing industries and establish public enterprises in sugar, glass, textiles and cement sectors. A key development of this early era was the foundation of Türkiye İş Bankası – the first national bank of the Republic – in 1924 to provide funding for the private sector.

Despite the aforementioned efforts of the state, the economic policies of the 1920s failed to achieve the stated objective of industrialising the country. By the end of the 1920s, the share of industry in the national economy remained at its 1923 level, around 12 percent (Hale 1980:103). This can be attributed to a number of factors, namely the unfavourable economic conditions imposed on the government through the Lausanne Treaty, the success of the lobbying of the eşraf to prioritise the state support for agricultural sector over industry and the inability of small-sized local enterprises to accumulate capital and expand activities despite substantial state support (Berberoglu 1977: 83).

The failure of industrialisation through the free-market model coincided with the Great Depression in 1929, which deeply affected the Turkish economy as its main trade partners such as France and Germany were directly hit by the global economic crisis. The demand for Turkish exports dropped dramatically in the years following 1929. This factor, coupled with a dramatic decline in the supply of manufactured goods to the country, caused a drastic fall (23 percent in 1929) in the volume of Turkey’s total trade (Nas 1992:13, Hansen 1991:266). A third and key factor that led the government to a radical policy change was the
success of the planned economic model of the Soviet Union, as the protectionist Soviet economy was less affected from the Great Depression than the free-market economies of the West, the Stalinist administration initiating a series of Five-Year Industrialisation Plans throughout the 1930s (Cohn 2008:307; Berberoglu 1977:89). The Soviet model based on planning and inward-looking production became a major inspiration for the Turkish development policy thereafter.

3.2.2 Assessing the Impact of the Statist Era (1930-1950)

The statist experience of Turkey throughout the 1930s and 1940s – along with that of Argentina and Brazil within roughly the same period – can be seen as one of the early precursors of national development strategies followed by many non-Western countries in the 1960s and 1970s based on the objective of freeing themselves from the economic hegemony of the Western world (Keyder 1989:150-151). The rationale behind the implementation of statism in Turkey can be attributed to the desire of the Kemalist policy-makers to ensure the economic independence of the country through building an industrialised and mechanised economy that would be as self-sufficient as possible (Kepenek and Yentürk 1983:32). During the Izmir Congress of Economics in 1923, long before statism was implemented in the 1930s, Kemal Atatürk stated his belief that no country would ever acquire full political independence without economic independence (Sönmez 2001:159). However, the economic impositions of the Lausanne Treaty were in effect until 1929, which prevented the Republican regime from developing a comprehensive industrialisation policy until the 1930s.

It can be argued that the Kemalist policy-makers followed statism as part of a broader nationalist agenda as they were against foreign influence of all kinds. Even the promise of aid and direct investment by developed Western economies such as Britain and France could not convince the Kemalist leadership to open-up the economy in the 1930s (Togan 1996; Grigoriadis and Kamaras 2008:55). This attitude can be attributed to the lessons the Kemalists drew from the late
Ottoman economic history, as the Empire was largely unable to control its finances in its last years due to excessive foreign influence over the economy. The Kemalist regime initiated a full-scale nationalisation program, ‘autarky’ becoming simultaneously an objective and a key element of Turkey’s national development strategy. It is important to note that statism was so influential in this era that it was included among the main principles of the party program of the CHP in 1937, constituting one of the so-called ‘six-arrows’ of the Kemalist ideology.

Hence, two inter-related factors strongly determined the Republican Turkey’s early economic modernisation trajectory: firstly, the path dependent legacy of the late Ottoman period – as seen in Table 3.1. – left materially strained conditions the new regime desperately and rapidly sought to overcome and; secondly, the international economic system limited the options of the policy-makers since the less-developed Turkish economy could not possibly hope to have a fair competition with industrialised Western economies under free-market conditions. In this regard, the Soviet model of protectionist state-led modernisation offered a potentially successful route that could rapidly mobilise resources around an industrialisation drive as well as enabling Turkey to avoid becoming an economic dependency of the developed West as the Ottomans experienced while trying to modernise via free-market policy.

The development program of the 1930-1950 era was strongly shaped by the belief of the CHP leadership that the Ottoman Empire collapsed because it did not possess an ‘indigenous capitalist class’ that could lead the economic modernisation effort in the country (Grigoriadis and Kamaras 2008:56). In this context, it is easy to understand the dedication of the new regime in Ankara to fostering Turkish capitalists, an objective that would remain a key concern for policy-makers of Turkey well into the 1980s (Öniş and Türem 2002). As will be shown below, the objective of fostering a national capitalist class constitutes a crucial path dependent element within the modernisation experience of Turkey.

18 The other five arrows being republicanism, populism, nationalism, secularism and reformism.
remaining a key element of economic development programs in the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods.

In the 1930s, the adoption of statism resulted in the emergence of an intensifying ideological rift within the ranks of the CHP. While a radical group of intellectuals and politicians perceived statism as a permanent ‘third way’ to capitalist and socialist development trajectories, a second liberal group led by the minister of economy (later president from 1950 to 1960), Celal Bayar, perceived the program to be merely ‘a pragmatic step’ on the road to the formation of a capitalist free-market economy in Turkey (Hale 1981:56). The ideological struggle between the two groups would surface after the transition to multi-party elections in 1950. This difference in economic visions was most pronounced in opposing party programs adopted by the CHP and DP (Demokrat Parti) after 1950, the former adhering to a Soviet-style planning strategy while the later adopted laissez-faire liberalism. Until the mid-1940s, however, the internal difference within the party remained dormant.

Regardless of whether the adoption of statism was a result of ideology or pragmatism, the government genuinely attempted to encourage the private sector to take a role in economic development in the 1920s, but the inability of the private sector to fulfil this envisaged proactive position led policy-makers to adopt the statist model in the 1930s. The two decades were very different from each other as the nature of the state’s approach to the economy in the 1920s was limited to preparing programs and reinforcing the private sector rather than directing all economic activities as seen in the 1930s and 1940s (Ülgener 1972:3).

In the early 1930s, as part of the new economic direction, quotas were introduced, tariffs were raised dramatically and the state took control of foreign exchange entirely. The statist development policy was implemented through several complementary initiatives, namely the nationalisation of foreign enterprises, the implementation of Five-Year Development Plans, the establishment of new public banks to fund development projects (e.g. Halk
Bankası and İlker Bankası) and attempts to generate foreign aid in order to provide capital and technical expertise for an extensive industrialisation campaign (See Table 3.2). As part of the nationalisation policy, the state took over large numbers of foreign enterprises during the 1930s and early 1940s, particularly in fields with strategic importance such as railways, utilities, transportation and ports. The nationalisation efforts of the Republican regime are credited with having strengthened the structure of the economy and preparing the pre-conditions for a full-fledged planning program that was going to be implemented through the Five-Year Development Plans (Berberoglu 1977:100).

Table 3.2. Elements of the State-led Development Program of the 1930s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisation of agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increases in total cultivated land in agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of consumer goods industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial production for domestic consumption (Import-substitution industrialisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of infrastructure (new railways across the country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging state-dependent capitalist class (crony capitalism)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

The first Five-Year Industrialisation Plan that came into effect in 1933 was based on a report prepared by a commission of Soviet experts as part of the friendship agreement between Turkey and Soviet Union (Hale 1980:105). Nevertheless, the Turkish policy-makers were reluctant to publically acknowledge the Soviet Union as the inspiration for the program:

[O]fficially, etatism [statism] was usually defined as a home-grown plant, specifically evolved for Turkish conditions. In Atatürk’s words, ‘Turkish etatism is not a system translated from the socialist theories developed since the nineteenth century... instead, it is a system that emerges from the specific needs of Turkey, a system peculiar to her’ (Hale 1980:105).
The objectives of the first Five-Year Industrialisation Plan were for Turkey to acquire the ability to produce consumer goods in the short-term and capital goods in the long-term (Nas 1992).

Industrial centres would be dispersed across the country to provide employment and create urban centres in what had been hitherto agrarian areas of the countryside, rapidly accelerating the pace of urbanisation akin to the Soviet development experience during the Stalinist era of 1924-1953. Twenty factories for producing textiles, paper, ceramics, glass, cement, chemicals, iron and steel were built in a number of provinces as part of the plan and all were operational by 1938. In total, 79 various industrial SOEs in industry and agriculture were established between 1932 to 1938 (Yenal 2001:89). Building upon the considerable success of the first plan in terms of industrialisation, a second program was prepared by the Ministry of Economy and approved by the government in 1938. The Second Five-Year Plan envisaged the construction of a hundred new factories concentrated in minerals, coal, electricity plants, marine transport, chemicals, engineering and home fuels.

The focus of the first plan was consumer goods whereas the second plan emphasised the production of capital goods. Unlike the first plan, the source of funds and technical assistance was designated as Western European economies, primarily Britain and Germany as the Turkish government signed numerous loan and construction agreements with firms from these countries (Berberoglu 1977:111). However, World War II broke out in 1939 and prevented the implementation of the plan. Turkey and its partners in the program had to channel their resources towards military expenditures even though Turkey itself remained neutral throughout the war. From 1939 to 1945, the Turkish economy was fully geared for war due to fears of invasion by the Axis powers – Italy and Germany. The military expenditures of Ankara amounted to more than half of the total state budget during the 1940-1945 period (Berberoglu 1977:179). The 1940s were consequently a lost opportunity for Turkish industrialisation.
In contrast to the agriculture-oriented development of the 1920s, the focus of the state policies throughout the statist period of 1930-1950 was industry. Even though the mechanisation effort in agriculture resulted in increased production levels, progress in this sector was clearly over-shadowed by the success of industrial development:

The agricultural sector, given the resistance throughout Anatolia of powerful landlords and the eşraf, never became successfully incorporated into the Five-Year Plans and remained in the periphery of the industrialization process (Berberoglu 1977:121).

Yet, a noteworthy effort to develop agriculture emerged in the late 1930s and 1940s as a Four-Year Plan came into effect in 1937, launching a series of intensive state initiatives such as the centralisation of production through uniting villages into agricultural production units in order to maximise the usage of modern tractors and other effective equipment. In addition, the regime established the so-called Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) in which the graduates of agricultural engineering programs taught modern production techniques to peasants.

The effects of the statist policies on development in Turkey can be assessed using available data that shows the economic performance for this period. During the 1930-1939 period, GNP (Gross National Product) grew at an average of 6 percent per annum (5 percent growth rate in agriculture, 11 percent growth rate in industry) (Hale 1981:75). Between 1933 and 1939, real GDP grew at an average of approximately 8 percent per annum which can be considered a major success if compared with the average of 3,2 percent for the 1927-1932 period and the average of 5,8 percent for the 1960-1978 period, the share of industry reaching 18 percent in national economy by 1938 (Hale 1980; Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006:18). It has been shown that labour productivity increased roughly six-fold from 1923 to 2003, the most significant increase occurring in the statist period of 1929-1939 (Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006:17).

In addition to success in industrialisation, the significance of the modernisation of agriculture for the achievement of high economic growth rates of the era
should also be noted (See Pamuk 2000; Owen and Pamuk 1998:21-23). The abolition of the agricultural tithe tax, the construction of railroads and the demographic recovery following a decade of ‘total war’ in the late Ottoman period all contributed to the rapid growth of the economy in the 1930s.

The data regarding the performance of the statist period presented here strongly contests the arguments of the societal model in terms of the economic trajectory of Turkey. It shows that long before the 1980s, Turkey already made great strides towards laying the groundwork for the industrialisation, urbanisation and self-sustaining economic growth of the economy (see Table 3.3). As such, the assessment of the early Republican economic development experience remains essential to understanding the origins of the economic aspect of Turkish modernity today.

The state-led industrialisation, the absence of a noteworthy amount of foreign direct investment (FDI), the emphasis on infrastructure (particularly railroads) development and a disciplined budget were key characteristics of Turkish political economy in the statist period. Despite its positive effects in terms of kick-starting the economic modernisation in the country through progress in infrastructure, education levels, establishment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and banks, however, it has been noted that that ‘there was little increase in per capita income and in standards of living’ (Weiker 1981:183).

The dominant state mentality of the time was ‘long term development at the expense of today’, which might explain the accumulated grievances against the CHP rule that would lead to the victory of the DP in the 1950 parliamentary elections after the transition to multi-party elections. Also, it is essential to note that the development of a national economic market lagged behind industrialisation as a majority of the population – particularly in rural areas – were not connected with each other due to ongoing deficiencies in the transportation infrastructure. Moreover, the successful economic performance of the 1930s could not be sustained in the 1940s as World War II proved disastrous for Turkish economy. During the war years of 1939-1945, the
national income is reported to have fallen an average of 5 percent per annum, forming one of the major preconditions for widespread public disillusionment with the CHP rule (Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006:19).

### Table 3.3. Growth Rates by Production Sector, 1923-1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1923 to 1938 Growth Rate</th>
<th>1938 to 1953 Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
<td>6,8</td>
<td>3,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>7,4</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>0,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>8,7</td>
<td>2,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>14,5</td>
<td>7,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>7,1</td>
<td>3,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>10,7</td>
<td>2,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank (1988).*

It has been argued that the 1930s also ‘sharpened the contradictions inherent in the system’ of Turkey (Berberoglu 1977:134). The problems of the statist era can be said to have prepared the stage for the collapse of the Kemalist political economic structure in the late 1940s. Even though the landlords initially supported the regime, a clash of interests between this class and the Kemalist bureaucracy emerged in the 1930s and 1940s as the massive state-led industrialisation, the agricultural mechanisation program and the Village Institutes increasingly posed a threat to the traditional hegemony of landlords over the peasantry.

The question of land reform was the main problem between the bureaucracy and the landlords as the latter effectively blocked all attempts for the pursuit of this policy until 1945 via utilising its significant influence within the CHP and
the parliament (Berberoglu 1977:140). The resistance to this policy by landlords within the CHP such as the influential member of parliament, Adnan Menderes (later the leader of the DP and the prime minister from 1950 to 1960) would eventually constitute the genesis of the DP and its emergence as the main opposition party to the CHP. Tensions peaked when the government introduced the land reform bill to the parliament in 1945. In retrospect, the unprecedented inter-party opposition that emerged as a result was the beginning of the end for the one-party regime of the CHP.

The land reform bill was finally approved by the parliament, but only after five months of deliberations, deadlock and heated debates that resulted in the original plan being modified to better fit the interests of landlords. Yet, it must be noted that even in its amended version, the bill would dramatically damage the interests of landlords as all private lands in excess of 123.5 acres were to be nationalised and distributed to landless peasantry. The maximum limit of allowed private land was later raised tenfold after severe pressures exercised on the government through the utilisation of the media by landowners (Berberoglu 1977:148).

Shortly after the contentious land reform issue, the CHP was split into two in 1946 as the inter-party opposition formed the DP. Most of the first members of the DP originated from landowner, clerical and capitalist social classes (Berberoglu 1977:149). The coalition that the CHP bureaucratic elite had formed with eşraf finally collapsed, leading to the end of authoritarian one-party rule in Turkey. From the beginning, the DP exhibited the character of a ‘coalition’ rather than a party with a fixed ideology, consisting of different groups united only in their opposition to the increasingly left-wing economic and social policies of the CHP. In addition to the landowners, the local clergy and the rural masses, a key pillar of the DP was the growing capitalist class that had close ties with the former prime minister, founder and first chairman of the party, Celal Bayar, who had been a colleague of Kemal Ataturk from the early days of the Republic.
Akin to the landowners, the capitalists had been allies of the Kemalist regime throughout the 1920s, but their subsequent relations followed the downhill trend as the regime's relations with landowners: when the central regime began to pursue statism and prioritised public enterprises over the private sector, the profit margins of the capitalists dropped while their main source of revenues – imported goods – were being blocked through protectionist tariff measures, causing the capitalists to be increasingly disillusioned with the regime (Keyder 1989). From 1946 onwards, they shifted their support from the CHP to the DP.

3.2.3 An Intermission for Planned Development: The DP Decade (1950-1960)

The DP came to power after their electoral victory against the CHP in 1950, initiating the era of a competitive multi-party political life in Turkey. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the DP era was the exact opposite of the preceding CHP rule in terms of all aspects of economic policy. Main components of statist development such as its protectionism and the public sector-led industrialisation were replaced with a free-market strategy. The first phase of the liberal transformation was the privatisation of a number of lucrative SOEs (Berberoglu 1977:190-191). This was followed by the law of ‘Encouragement of Foreign Capital’ implemented in 1954, establishing the preconditions for the entry of foreign capital into the Turkish economy by creating favourable incentives for foreign investors.

As the DP had to compete in free and fair elections (unlike the CHP in the preceding era), the DP’s economic policies were naturally poised towards gaining votes in the short-term rather than long-term development planning for the future. Yet, rather than possessing a pragmatic approach to economy, the leading cadre of the DP exhibited a strong ideological stance in their commitment to economic liberalism. Hale (1981:88) reports some speeches and public statements given by the DP leaders to explain the economic mentality of the party:
The DP leaders seem to have had an almost pathological opposition to the principle of overall economic planning. Adnan Menderes...maintained that ‘the [State] Budget is a plan’... When Fahri Belen, the Minister of Works in Menderes’ first cabinet, prepared a five-year plan for the construction of railways, roads, dams and waterways, he was told by the Prime Minister that planning was based on a ‘Communist principle’.

A key pillar of the economic policy of the DP was to strengthen the private sector at the expense of the public sector and privatisation was initiated with the aim of realising this policy. Despite the government’s continuous campaigns, however, the Turkish capitalists remained reluctant to purchase most of the public enterprises. Taking over the large industrial plants that were not constructed by the state in accordance with the ‘profit maximisation principle’¹⁹ must have seemed unprofitable for the capitalists.

Contrary to the CHP era, the DP prioritised the development of agriculture over industry and the only noteworthy direct state intervention to economy during the DP rule occurred in this sector. The main promise stated repeatedly by the DP during its electoral campaign in 1950 was to support agricultural sector (Sönmez 2001:90; Yenal 2001:98). As the peasantry formed most of Turkey’s population, this politically successful strategy contributed to the electoral victory of the party in 1950 and subsequent elections (Yenal 2001:98-99). As promised, several initiatives were implemented with the rationale of developing agricultural production, namely the subsidy of the sector through ‘high minimum price regulation’, supplying credits via state-owned banks to farmers and the mechanisation of production by importing large amounts of tractors and other modern equipment.

Coupled with a dramatic increase in the amount of cultivated land through distribution of public lands to farmers, these initiatives managed to achieve and sustain a substantial increase in agricultural production levels, leading some observers to refer to the development of the decade as an ‘agricultural revolution’ in Turkey (See Table 3.4.; Hale 1981:95-97; Yenal 2001:98). During

¹⁹ The capitalist pursuit of gaining highest possible profits with the smallest amount of capital.
the decade, the average annual GNP growth rate was 6.3 percent, which was partially due to a boom in agricultural exports in the early 1950s caused by the extraordinary high global demand for agricultural goods during the Korean War (Hale 1981:108). However, after that extraordinary war period, Turkey's exports began to rapidly fall from 1953 onwards.

A key development of the DP years was the shift to an oil-based economy. The preceding Kemalist governments concentrated their efforts on building railways instead of highways for automobiles. Therefore, by 1950 – after 27 years of the CHP rule – only 1,600 kilometres of highways had been constructed (Hale 1981:89). Within a decade from 1950 to 1960, the DP governments constructed 7,000 kilometres of hard-surfaced highways and approximately 35,000 kilometres of loose-surfaced roads for automobiles, which resulted in the creation of an integrated national economy as many towns and villages were connected together via a modern transportation network for the first time in the history of the country (Hale 1981:90). The formation of a fully integrated national market economy was arguably the main achievement of the DP era and its primary contribution to Turkey's economic modernisation in the long-term.

Throughout the 1950s, the DP administration attempted to stimulate economic growth via expansionist financing (Weiker 1981:183). A key part of this policy was to attract foreign capital. Economic growth dramatically increased in the early 1950s, accompanied by a rising private sector, emergence of a national market, accelerated urbanisation and agricultural mechanisation. However, there were also side effects to the DP's policy as this era was characterised by uncoordinated development, leading to high inflation, a budget deficit and the accumulation of a massive foreign debt (Weiker 1981:183; Yenal 2001:107). The negative consequences of the liberal economic policy included a severe balance of payments crisis in 1958, driving the government to seek aid from the IMF.
Table 3.4. Agricultural Production Growth (1950-1960)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural labour force (millions)</td>
<td>9,0</td>
<td>9,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated area (millions of hectares)</td>
<td>8,2</td>
<td>12,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors (thousands)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual average growth rate of agriculture (1950-1960)</td>
<td>2.7 percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The DP era of 1950-1960 constitutes one of the most badly neglected periods of the Turkish economic modernisation experience. As analysed in Chapter 1, while the narrative of Turkish modernity developed by the structural model solely focuses on the statist policies of the 1930-1950 and 1960-1980 periods, the competing paradigm put forward by the societal model searches the origins of modern Turkish economy in the post-1980 years. Contesting both of these approaches, this part of the chapter showed that, despite its aforementioned shortcomings, the 1950-1960 period had a major impact on the economic modernisation of the country by creating an integrated national market and strongly accelerating the mechanisation of agriculture. The emergence of these two crucial developments in this era should be acknowledged to understand the origins of Turkey’s economic modernity.
3.2.4 A Return to Planned Economy: The Rule of ISI (1960-1980)

The first Republican experiment with liberalisation in the 1920s was by imposition of the Lausanne Treaty, not by design. In contrast, the DP consciously undertook the second liberalisation experience in the 1950s. Despite its successes mentioned previously, various problems caused by the DP policies led to the failure of the liberal economic strategy in 1958. Following a military coup in 1960 that ended DP rule, the Kemalist bureaucracy once again took control of the economic modernisation process. One of the reasons behind the 1960 coup was that the purchasing power of the salary of military officers steadily decreased during the 1950s, the military blaming the economic policies of the DP government for their loss of ‘socio-economic status’ (Jacoby 2003:673).

A key factor that shaped the development policy of the 1960-1980 period was a strong critique of the DP’s policies as the absence of development plans or any kind of concerted strategy to accelerate the industrialisation process were considered to have caused the economic crisis of 1958 (Hale 1981:117). ISI, referred to as ‘mixed economic strategy’ by Turkish policy-makers of the 1960-1980 years, was not based on an a priori economic thought or ideology, but it was a result of the particular economic conditions and trajectory of the country from the 1920s onwards. The primary objective of ISI, in the Turkish context, was to create large-scale state-owned manufacturing industries in the absence of a noteworthy number of capitalists that possessed an interest\(^{20}\) for investment in that sector (Kılıçbay 1972:84).

The military junta that came to power in 1960 set about creating a framework for a sustained development policy largely autonomous from the control of elected governments. Economic development was seen by the Kemalist military and bureaucracy as ‘too important’ to be left in the hands of populist politicians (Hale 1981). With this rationale, the Devlet Planlama Teşkilati (DPT) was

\(^{20}\) The entrepreneurs of Turkey in this era preferred to concentrate on short-term investments in trade and the financial sector (Kılıçbay 1972:84). This was the case since the 1920s.
established. The ISI policy was designed and directed by the DPT, which had a special mandate over economic affairs, based on the model of economic policy-making institutions in the Soviet Union and other socialist economies in Eastern Europe at the time. The DPT directed investments into manufacturing industries of the public sector in addition to providing financial support to the private sector.

The main rationale behind the development strategy of the 1960-1980 period was the principle of the 'social state'. The emphasis given to the concept can be seen in Article 2 of the 1961 Constitution that defined the Turkish state as such:

The Republic of Turkey is a national, democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law based on human rights and the basic principles stated in the preface (T.C. Resmi Gazete 1961).

Social state in this context was roughly the equivalent of the 'welfare state', namely a society where the state is designed as primarily responsible for the well-being of its citizens measured in terms of two key indicators, income per capita and equitable wealth distribution. The Turkish state was expected to interfere in economic affairs regularly to achieve these two objectives. This definition of the state's responsibilities and prerogatives were significantly different from those of the new state that would later emerge after another military coup in 1980, this time designed in accordance with a neo-liberal view of political economy. It is also important to note that the policies of the 1960-1980 period indicate that socio-economic problems posed by rapid population growth in the country were noticed for the first time by Turkish policy-makers and an initiative to publicise the use of birth control methods were launched in the 1960s and 1970s (Hic 1972:15).

ISI was implemented by the DPT through five-year plans akin to the pre-1950 statist strategy (1963-67, 1968-72, 1973-1977). Yet, there was a fundamental difference between the post-1960 ISI model and the statist model of 1930-1950. The early statist planning was almost exclusively concentrated on industrialisation, whereas the ISI strategy of post-1960 was more balanced in
its contents, taking into account the importance of both the agricultural and industrial sectors and emphasising the balance between public and private sectors (Ülgener 1972:5-6).

The overall performance of the first three plans (1963-1977) was largely impressive as GNP and the industrial and agricultural growth rates continued to increase (See Table 3.5.; Weiker 1981:184). However, the envisaged targets indicated in the plans for the share of industry in total production lagged behind the services sector and two side effects emerged over time, namely an unexpected and unprecedented increase in consumer demand and an uncontrollable increase of imports. The most problematic issue was the structure of Turkish foreign trade as Turkey's exports became heavily dependent on imported materials, laying the groundwork for a chronic trade deficit that, even today, remains as the principal problem and risk for the Turkish economy. After its initial success in the 1960s and early 1970s, the ISI strategy failed to achieve sustainable economic growth as the low level of exports and dependence on imports of industrial production goods by local industries led to a severe foreign exchange problem in the late 1970s (Şenses 1988:9).

Over the years, Turkey rapidly diversified its import-substitution industries, constantly re-investing savings in industrialisation programs (Nas 1992:14). Between 1963 and 1977, labour productivity steadily increased, ensuring the achievement of very high economic growth rates amounting to roughly 9 percent per annum between 1970-1976, making Turkey one of the fastest developing economies of the era (Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006: 19). Despite the fact that the Turkish economy had deeply troubled years and poor performance in the late 1970s, it can be argued that by the end of the decade, Turkey had clearly achieved the ‘take-off’ to self-sustaining economic growth as described in Walt Whitman Rostow’s material development model (See Rostow 1960):

"GNP has grown at an average of 6.6 percent between 1950 and 1976, one of the highest among the OECD countries, though real per capita income
had grown more slowly due to inflation and rapid population growth (Weiker 1981:182).

The success of Turkey in economic growth was due to a dramatic increase in the production of goods and services, the shift from agrarian to industrial-oriented production, the rapid development of infrastructure by governments and rising standards of living for most of the population despite ongoing problems in equitable wealth distribution (Weiker 1981:182).

Between 1963 and 1975, the technological change rate was 2.23 percent per annum, leading to the emergence of a highly capital-intensive manufacturing sector that could potentially compete with its European counterparts (Cecen et al. 1994:40). Turkey successfully built a ‘large and diversified base’, which would serve as the basis for the achievements of the export-led era after 1980 (Celasun 1994:50; Cecen et al. 1994; Ahmad 1993). The strength of the manufacturing industry was demonstrated after the adoption of EOI in 1980, when the indigenous industries managed to challenge the primacy of European manufacturing firms across the continent in sectors such as automotive and white goods.

The data presented here indicates that the success of ISI between 1960 and 1980 greatly contributed to Turkey’s modernisation, forming a suitable groundwork to launch an export drive in the 1980s. As with the impact of the statist era (1930-1950) and the DP era (1950-1960) analysed above, the ISI period (1960-1980) contests the claims of the societal model regarding the origins of the economic modernity of Turkey. Without the essential background of the pre-1980 period, the subsequent trajectory of economic development cannot possibly be understood. Hence, the post-1980 trajectory was a path dependent outcome of the pre-1980 years.
Table 3.5. The Economic Development Performance of the 1963-1980 Period

(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP (Gross National Income)</td>
<td>% 6</td>
<td>% 1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income (In terms of GNP)</td>
<td>% 3,5</td>
<td>% -1,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Production</td>
<td>% 9,1</td>
<td>% -0,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Production</td>
<td>% 3,4</td>
<td>% 2,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nevertheless, the success of ISI came at a price for the Turkish economy. After 1968, Turkey entered the second and more advanced stage of the strategy as the aim became the substitution of imported ‘intermediate and capital goods, consumer durables, and the domestic production of related technologies’ (Cecen et al. 1994:39). The first stage of ISI, namely the achievement of local production of consumer durables and low-skilled production of intermediate goods was complete by the late 1960s. However, the increasing dependence on short-term loans to build second-tier industries led to a vicious cycle of import bills, debt-servicing payments and declining exchange reserves in the absence of available accumulated domestic capital and savings (Nas 1992:14; Cecen et al. 1994:44). Due to this factor, the balance of payments continued to deteriorate in the late 1970s, resulting in a severe debt crisis in 1977.
Another key problem of the 1960-1980 period was the inconsistency of economic policies as bureaucrats and politicians often had different visions. The inconsistency within the policy-making mechanism prevented the formation of a stable relationship between private businesses and policy-makers in the era. This was only exacerbated with the unstable nature of Turkey's democratisation experiment, occasionally manifesting itself as parliamentary gridlocks, political crises interrupted with military interventions (1971, 1980) and short-term technocratic governments that lacked political legitimacy. The private sector began to emerge as an influential actor in the 1960s and 1970s, benefiting from state subsidies and incentives. However, this resulted in the consolidation of the state-dependent private business structure in the country, an outcome that was largely engineered by elected populist governments through awarding state contracts to capitalists that supported their electoral campaigns (See Öniş 1992:87-88; Asutay 2010:108; Özel 2014). Thus, the deficient nature of the democratisation process had negatively impacted on economic modernisation in the country (See Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 for a more detailed analyses of the interplay between economic development and democratisation processes in Turkey).

The political life of Turkey was highly unstable in the 1970s due to the inability of a series of coalition and minority governments to fully control the parliament and effectively direct policy-making. Even though Turkey achieved high economic growth rates in the relatively stable 1960s and early 1970s, a severe economic crisis emerged from 1977 onwards, resulting in hyper-inflation and very high unemployment rates (reaching more than 20 percent by 1979) while the account deficit reached approximately 78 percent of the value of total exports in 1979 (Hale 1981:128). The economic crisis of the late 1970s was accompanied by a low-intensity civil war between socialist and ultranationalist militias across the country, the political conflict resulting in the lives of more than 5,000 citizens by 1980 (Hale 1981:128). The political and economic crises eventually triggered another military coup in 1980.
3.3 A NEW PATH OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD (1980-2013)

Even though the economy started to show signs of collapse in the late 1970s, the insistence on ISI by successive governments and the inability of policy-makers to respond to the Oil Crisis of 1973 exacerbated the severe problems characterising the 1977-80 period as the inward-looking production proved detrimental in the face of falling domestic demand (Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006:20; Shambayati 1994:312). It has been argued that in the late 1970s, Turkey was in a severe economic crisis and the country had to choose one of two available options to get out of the crisis, either shift the orientation of the economy towards an export-oriented strategy or proceed with an advanced stage of ISI which meant the replacement of the imports of durable consumer goods with domestic production (Togan 1996).

Turkish policy-makers within the government and the DPT chose the second option and strove to build new capital-intensive industries through using short-term foreign loans. In retrospect, the more effective option would have been the first strategy as financing ISI with short-term loans imposed a massive debt burden on the fragile budget, constituting one of the factors that led to the collapse of the economy in 1979. As a result, an IMF structural adjustment program was adopted to stabilise and reform the economy in 1980. The option that the policy-makers did not choose in the late 1970s was subsequently implemented by the military government after the coup in 1980. Throughout the 1980s, the liberalisation program achieved its main objective of reducing the account balance deficit as the budget had a 1.5 billion USD surplus by 1988 while the exports rapidly rose from $2.9 billion in 1980 to approximately $13 billion in 1990 (Nas 1992:15).

As the statist program of the 1930s was inspired by the Soviet model of planned development, the EOI strategy adopted in the post-1980 period was also based on the experiences of other countries. This time, the Turkish policy-makers studied the East Asian model of development based on the successful EOI
strategies of Japan and South Korea (Kaynak and Gürol 1987:61; Öniş 1992:75).

The importance of EOI for the economic modernisation of developing countries is succinctly explained by Erdener Kaynak and Metin Gürol (1987:54):

Less-developed countries (LDCs) rely heavily on export marketing to obtain much needed foreign currencies necessary for their socio-economic and technological development. Marketing domestic products in foreign countries provides LDCs with a reliable source of income to purchase capital goods they need for their development from the industrialized countries of the West.

In initial stages of economic modernisation, due to the tendency of less-developed countries to possess comparative production advantages in agricultural products and raw materials, these primary goods automatically form the majority of their total export goods. However, exporting primary goods have disadvantages for the achievement of economic modernisation in the long-term, namely the low-profit margins of these goods vis-à-vis manufactured products and the over-reliance on weather conditions for agricultural production. The main principle of EOI is to rapidly change the nature of a country’s exports from primary goods to manufactured industrial goods that would yield high profit margins.

Primary commodities constituted the bulk of Turkey’s exports in decades prior to the 1960s, but the share of manufactured products within Turkey’s total exports dramatically rose from 13.5 percent in 1968 to 18.4 percent in 1980 (Kaynak and Gürol 1987:55). A key objective of EOI of the 1980s was for Turkey to sustain the growing share of industrial goods exports and further increase it through transforming its economy.

In the following sections, the key characteristics of the post-1980 trajectory of economic modernisation in Turkey will be analysed.
3.3.1 The Rise of Turgut Özal and the Role of the Military Rule

The 1980 military coup that preceded and prepared the conditions for the economic liberalisation program of the 1980s was radically different from the previous military interventions in 1960 and 1971 (Sayarı 1992). The political crisis of the late 1970s was accompanied by economic and financial crises of unprecedented scale in Turkey. Because of the deep crises, the scope of the socio-economic and political engineering project undertaken by the military government was considerably wider than previous military interventions (Sayarı 1992:28). In contrast to the earlier short-term military interventions, the junta led by the Chief of Staff (later president) General Kenan Evren remained in power for almost three years before elections for a new parliament were allowed to take place. This relatively long period of unrestricted rule allowed the junta to have a direct impact on the reformation of the Turkish political economy after 1980.

The architect of the IMF economic stabilisation program initiated by the last government before the coup, Turgut Özal, was allowed by the junta to keep his influential position as the chief economic advisor to the government. Shortly after the coup, Özal was appointed as deputy prime minister for economic affairs in the military government, eventually emerging as the most influential policy-maker of the 1980s after the electoral victory of his newly founded ANAP (Anavatan Partisi) in 1983. Özal’s influence over political economy in Turkey throughout the 1980s cannot be overlooked in any analysis of the period:

First, as the ‘economic czar’ of the military regime, and later as prime minister... Özal became the leading proponent of economic liberalisation and market-oriented policies. For a country that had a long tradition of state-controlled and inward-oriented economic strategies, Özal’s neoliberal strategy of economic growth, with its emphasis on an outward-looking economy, represented a significant new phase in its post-war development (Sayarı 1992:29).

Özal perceived ISI as detrimental to economic development in Turkey due to its alleged protection of ‘weak’ domestic industries that would not be able to compete internationally and for its creation of a state subsidy-reliant public
sector (Sayarı 1992:30). It has been argued that prior to the implementation of the liberalisation program of 1980s, Turkey was an undeveloped country, having problems common to these economies such as high budget deficit, unstable exchange rate, inflation, over-reliance on public enterprises and excessive state intervention which supposedly resulted in the emergence of an inefficient public sector that covered most of the economic activities in the country (Morrissey 1996:89). In light of these critiques of the pre-1980 period, a radical economic reform program was implemented in 1980 to severely reduce domestic demand in order to re-orient the production towards exports.

Turkey's economic liberalisation process began in 1980 with the so-called 'January 24 decree' and later gained momentum with the foundation of Istanbul Stock Exchange and the implementation of Law No. 2983 in 1984, ultimately leading to the removal of all legal barriers for foreign investments (Simga-Mugan and Yüce 2003:84). A privatisation program was also initiated based on the neoliberal assumption that SOEs are a financial burden on state budgets and that the private sector would more effectively manage these enterprises. The alleged inefficiency of the public sector vis-à-vis the private sector was repeatedly voiced in public by Özal during the 1980s (Simga-Mugan and Yüce 2003:85).

The economic development strategy adopted under the leadership of Özal was linked to the presence of the military as radical austerity measures imposed during the period of military rule (1980-1983) paved the way for the achievement of the main objectives of the plan, namely to transform the Turkish economy from ISI model to export-led model through cutting down state subsidies for all SOEs, privatising most of the SOEs and increasing the share of FDI (foreign direct investment) in the economy. Austerity measures included the elimination of state subsidies for the consumer goods produced by the public sector and the severe reduction of the wages of public sector employees (Sayari 1992:31). The political context of the early 1980s should be emphasised, as it would have been extremely difficult to implement any of these policies during Turkey's highly bipolarized and unstable democratic environment in the
late 1970s when labour unions and socialist student organisations were influential in organising mass demonstrations across the country.

A ‘military-industrial complex’ had emerged in the country from the 1960 coup onwards as the military officer class began to foster closer ties with capitalists, an attitude that became more apparent after the 1980 coup. The junta arrested 122,609 citizens on charges of terrorism and 54 percent of these were classified as ‘left-wing terrorists’ whereas 7 percent were referred to as ‘Kurdish separatists’, 25 percent as ‘unknown’ and 14 percent as ‘right-wing terrorists’ (Jacoby 2003:678). It was clear that a disproportionate amount of people imprisoned by the military had a left-leaning ideology compared to the ones leaning towards the right of the political spectrum. The government closed down labour unions, the post-1980 legal framework making it de facto possible for the government to postpone and outright ban strikes (Jacoby 2003:678). The new repressive framework of Turkish political economy was highly beneficial for the interests of the capitalist class.

The centralised control and heavy-handed approach of the military prevented the manifestation of any noteworthy public opposition to the aforementioned structural adjustment policies. Most of the leadership and cadres of political parties, labour unions, student organisations and other non-governmental organisations were imprisoned by the junta (Ahmad 1993). The military rule and the harsh measures it adopted in dealing with political opposition have been argued to be noteworthy elements of the Turkish development experience, enabling the effective implementation of a very radical liberalisation program relatively easy compared to the governments of other developing countries such as Argentina and Chile that had to face organised public opposition within the same period (Şenses 1988).

The military rule in Turkey officially ended in 1983, but even though the political system began to democratise to some extent after the parliamentary elections held the same year, the ANAP administration led by Özal was able to govern without strong opposition due the ongoing ban on the participation of all
the major political parties and party leaders of the pre-1980 era. Another element that made the post-1980 liberalisation program of Turkey different than its counterparts across the non-Western world was the determination of the administration to sticking with the original plan and to execute all of its measures consistently, which enabled the liberalisation program to fully transform the economy in all sectors (Şenses 1988:11).

3.3.2 The Urbanisation Process and the Emergence of the Middle Class

By the 1980s, it was clear that Turkey had made considerable progress in urbanisation, a key indicator of economic modernisation. Yet, rapid population growth and the uncoordinated urbanisation process impacted negatively on the economic performance of the country. Turkey's population rose from about 14 million in 1900 to approximately 45 million in 1980 (Hale 1981:17). As with many other developing nations, rapid population growth, mass internal immigration to urban areas and increasing percentage of youth within the population began to be major sources of economic problems from the late 1960s onwards.

The governments had to cope with a massive pressure to provide employment, primary and higher education and infrastructure to urban areas in order to sustain the needs of a dramatically larger population. This was a massive drain on the limited resources of Turkey. In 1935, the urban population amounted to 16.6 percent, rising to 18.7 percent in 1950, 29.8 percent in 1965 and to 41.4 percent in 1975 (Hale 1981:26). By 1980, the urban population overtook the rural population for the first time (Özcan and Turunç 2011:66). The trend accelerated over the years, the urban population reaching 74 percent of the total population by 2012 (World Bank 2014b). The acceleration of urbanisation in this era was accompanied by two essential elements of economic modernity according to MMP – the expansion of the manufacturing sector and the manifestation of sizable middle class.
After the adoption of EOI in the 1980s, the role of the manufacturing sector dramatically increased over the years, accounting for approximately 80 percent of total exports by 1990 and over 90 percent by 2000 (See Table 3.7.). Since 1980s, a culture of entrepreneurialism has been promoted by virtually all elements of life in Turkey, namely policy-makers, media, civil society and religious orders (Özcan and Turunç 2011). The culture of entrepreneurialism was supported by state banks with long-term credits and it was accompanied by internal migration and capital flight to urban centres. This resulted in the emergence of what came to be called the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, namely a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in second wave industrial cities of Anatolia such as Denizli, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Konya and Kayseri, many of which had witnessed a massive surge in their population in the post-1980 period, some even exceeding the one million threshold (Özcan and Turunç 2011:68).

There exists a strong link between the liberalisation program of the 1980s and the rise of the SMEs as these enterprises utilised the free market economics and the export drive for their benefit (Kirişçi 2009:43). The influence of EOI policy on the social and economic life of newly-industrialised areas such as Gaziantep, Denizli and Kayseri cannot possibly be overstated as in addition to the SMEs, an urban middle class began to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s in these hitherto rural and poor provinces (Tok 2008:83).

The liberalisation of finance in the 1980s allowed foreign capital – particularly from the Gulf countries in the Middle East – to pour into the Turkish economy. In this context, the inception of the Islamic finance banks21 (IFBs) with a special legislation by the government in 1983 was a turning point for attracting Middle Eastern investors to Turkey (Hosgör 2011:345). Initially, a number of IFBs were founded as joint ventures between Turkish enterprises and their partners from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE (e.g. Albaraka Türk, Family Finans, Faisal Finans and Kuveyt Türk). Since then, the Turkish entrepreneurs have also

21 Please note that due to the negative perception of the label ‘Islamic’ by the secular regime in Turkey, these banks have been referred initially as ‘Special Finance Houses’ and after 2005, as ‘Participation Banks’. 
established their own IFBs, namely Anadolu Finans, İhlas Finans and Asya Finans. Even though the economic influence of the IFBs in Turkey remained limited\(^\text{22}\) compared to the economies of other pre-dominantly Muslim societies, these institutions contributed to economic development by channelling significant amounts of capital into investments and gradually acquiring noteworthy shares in the national banking sector (See Table 3.6.; Asutay 2013; Hosgör 2011:346).

The link between the emergence of an Islamic finance sector, the rise of the SMEs and the Islamic political movement in the post-1980 period led to public debates and proliferation of works on the concept of Islamic Calvinism. As examined in Chapter 1, the scholars of the societal model within Turkish studies were inspired by the Islamic Calvinism concept of NMT and applied the hypothesis of compatibility between Islamism and capitalist modernity on the Turkish case (See Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 for a detailed analysis on this issue).

It is important to note that the origins of the SMEs and the Anatolian industrialisation – which constitutes one of the most significant elements of the trajectory of economic modernity in Turkey – can be traced back to the 1960s. In the pre-1980 period, governments attempted to reduce the regional disparities in the country through an effort to industrialise the inner Anatolian provinces, initially by channelling the Turkish workers’ remittances from Europe to village cooperatives in the 1960s, then through providing credits from state banks for the establishment of the SMEs in the 1970s. (Hosgör 2011:344). The DPT, a key institution of the ISI, had a major role in directing this process. In the post-1980 period, a second wave of industrialisation in these relatively developed areas began, the export-drive and the inflow of FDI further contributing to the rise of the SMEs.

\(^{22}\) Mehmet Asutay (2013:218) shows that Turkey was ranked eighth among predominantly Islamic countries in terms of shari’a compliant assets of Islamic finance banks in 2010, behind Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar.
The roots of the SMEs in the pre-1980 period strongly challenges the narrative of Turkish economic trajectory offered by the societal model, which puts heavy emphasis on the post-1980 era as Chapter 1 showed. The experience of the industrialisation of Anatolia and the emergence of the SMEs provide one of the most noteworthy examples of the high level of continuity between the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods as the latter developments built upon the groundwork provided earlier, once again highlighting the crucial role of path dependency.

**Table 3.6. The Asset and Share Growth of the Islamic Finance Banks in Turkey**

(percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Asset Growth</th>
<th>Shares in the National Banking Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>% 1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>% 29</td>
<td>% 2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>% 42.7</td>
<td>% 2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>% 36.2</td>
<td>% 2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>% 38</td>
<td>% 2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>% 41.5</td>
<td>% 3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>% 32.5</td>
<td>% 3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>% 30.4</td>
<td>% 4.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>% 28.8</td>
<td>% 4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>% 23.6</td>
<td>% 4.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Asutay (2013:218).*

It has been suggested that the main beneficiaries of the export drive and the liberalisation program of the 1980s were the large conglomerates concentrated in western regions of Turkey, yet a large number of SMEs were also able to utilise the opportunities to rapidly re-orient their marketing towards exports, particularly in the textiles, construction and service sectors (Hosgör 2011:344). Akin to the pre-1980 years, the state was influential in directing the economic development process via providing subsidies and loans to exporters in addition
to building organised industrial centres. The liberalisation process dramatically altered the nature of Turkish economy as ‘more than 500,000 firms were established between 1983 and 2000; and in 1990 the SMEs accounted for almost 90 percent of all manufacturing firms in Turkey and employed more than one-third of the workers in the manufacturing sector’ (Hosgör 2011:345).

3.3.3 The Export Boom and the Role of Economic Relations with Europe

After the adoption of EOI and the liberalisation of the financial structure by allowing the fluctuation of interest rates in 1980, the overall trade volume of Turkey quadrupled within only a decade (Nas 1992:11). During the 1983-1987 period, the scope and size of Turkey’s exports to Western Europe and Middle East rapidly expanded, which enabled the economy to sustain high economic growth rates (Sayarı 1992:36). The share of exports within the GNP was an average 3.9 percent during the 1975-1979 period, but it rapidly rose in the 1980s, reaching 16.4 percent in 1988 (Öniş 1992:73).

The export boom that characterised the 1980s had a substantial effect on the Turkish economy as the whole structure of export goods radically changed. The share of industrial goods within total exports rose from 18.4 percent in 1980 to 79.9 percent in 1990 and to 91.9 percent in 2000, demonstrating the positive impact of Turkey’s considerable success with EOI on economic modernisation (See Table 3.7.). The success of Turkey’s export drive constitutes an acclaimed aspect of Turkish economic modernity:

No other developing country that has changed development strategy in the period 1965-85, achieved such a rapid transformation of export structure (Taskin and Yeldan 1996:159).

Rather than heavy investment into export-oriented sectors, the Turkish export model was based on three factors: a real decline in wage share in the production process, export subsidies provided by the state and the devaluation of currency (Onaran and Stockhammer 2005:74). By keeping the wage levels low throughout the 1980s, Turkey gained a comparative international advantage as the wages rose considerably in the newly industrialised countries of East Asia.
during the same period (Leander 1996:140). Political governance was another significant factor that resulted in the success of Turkey's export-drive as the state managed to positively impact on the process through currency devaluations (13.5 percent fall vis-à-vis US dollars between 1979-1991) (Leander 1996:140-141).

**Table 3.7. Total Export Development, 1950-2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total export (Million $)</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,910</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>12,959</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>27,775</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>91.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Turkish Treasury (2006); Tanrıvermiş and Bülbül (2007).*

A third factor that positively affected the export drive was the trade agreement between Turkey and the EC (European Community, later the EU). The exemption of Turkey from trade quotas exercised to the exports of other non-European countries within European markets provided Turkish exporters with a significant comparative advantage against both the producers with lower wage levels (e.g. India and Pakistan) and those with a more technologically advanced manufacturing industry (e.g. Hong Kong and South Korea) (Leander 1996:140-141).

At first, the ‘Customs Union Agreement’ signed with the EC resulted in a disproportionate increase in Turkey's imports compared to its exports, but an export boom towards Europe occurred from the late 1990s, as Turkish enterprises gained considerable market shares in sectors such as textiles,
electrical machinery, iron, steel, chemicals, automotive and white goods (Lohrmann 2002:47). Turkey’s geographical proximity to European markets was utilised to attract foreign investors, particularly in the automotive industry as major international companies such as Renault, FIAT, Honda and Toyota built factories across the country. As a result of all these factors, Turkish exports rose from $2.9 billion in 1980 to $27.7 billion in 2000 (See Table 3.7.).

In the late 2000s, the Turkish white goods sector became the largest in Europe, a Turkish enterprise, BEKO, acquiring leadership in the UK market by 2012 as well as large market shares in countries such as Germany and Belgium (Bombey 2012). Another enterprise, Vestel, gained a significant presence in European markets of electronics and home appliances (particularly television sets) as with its 18 percent share in the Eurozone in 2013, it was the second largest TV producer in the continent after the South Korean company, Samsung (Bombey 2013). The automotive industry of Turkey also contributed heavily to the industrialisation of the country. In 2010, Turkey was the 7th largest automotive producer in Europe and the 16th in the world (The Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Investment Support and Promotion Agency 2013). Especially in the last few years, the sector expanded rapidly and Turkey is expected to become the 3rd largest producer in Europe by the end of 2014 (The Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Investment Support and Promotion Agency 2014b).

The pre-1980 period enabled Turkey to build a diversified industrial economy, which was capable of competing with European economies in the post-1980 period under free-market conditions. Hence, the largely beneficial role ties with Europe played on Turkey’s subsequent economic development trajectory were a direct path dependent outcome of earlier years.

3.3.4 A ‘Coming of Age’: The Private Sector as the New Engine of the Turkish Political Economy

The 1980s were characterised by high productivity growth in the economy (Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006:20). Even though radical changes within the
economic structure resulted in negative short-term consequences such as declining average living standards, the privatisation of the SOEs actually led to an increased efficiency in the production sector, particularly in manufacturing, as Turkish enterprises had to compete with the goods of other producers from all around the world. Increased political and economic stability enabled the government to attract unprecedentedly higher levels of FDI, which had a positive impact on the performance of local producers by driving the public and private enterprises to be more competitive in order to not lose their shares to foreign enterprises in the Turkish market (Sayarı 1992:37). 'Survival of the fittest' was the new governing principle of economic activity in the country and all producers had to adapt to the new economic conditions.

Even though the share of the public sector in the Turkish economy had been sustained throughout the 1980s, levels of public employment declined (Waterbury 1992a:55). Thus, it can be argued that the long habit of Turkish governments of using SOEs to provide employment for their supporters had been curbed to some extent. Moreover, the SOEs had to be managed more effectively than before under free-market conditions. In 1987, public sector employees amounted to 2.3 million people, constituting 14 percent of the entire workforce (Waterbury 1992a:57). However, apart from the continuing existence of a large number of SOEs, there existed other options such as credits from state-owned banks and provision of state contracts for governments to sustain a patronage relationship with the private sector (Asutay 2010:113-117). Thus, even after the liberalisation program, the clientelism that characterises the link between the state and the capitalist class in Turkey remained. As a result, despite the rise of a number of influential business associations throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the capitalist class in Turkey did not emerge as an independent actor, unlike their counterparts in the Western world (Özel 2014).

A middle class that was autonomous from the public sector and any affiliations to the state did begin to emerge in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Waterbury

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23 Turkey received $26.1 billion worth of FDI in the 1980-2000 period which was larger than the amount received for the whole of the pre-1980 Republican history (Loewendahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl 2000:4).
1992b:129; Özcan and Turunç 2011:83). As shown in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, CMT and NMT long argued that the strength and independence of the middle class determines the quality of democratic system and that economic development would eventually produce a liberal democratic system (Lipset 1959; Apter 1965; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). It is important to note that the emergence of a capitalist class and an urban middle class in Turkey in the post-1980 period constitutes a significant case to test the validity of these arguments. The political implications of the economic development process will be analysed in detail in the following Chapter 4 on the democratisation process of Turkey.

One of the key products of the post-1980 liberalisation program was the rise of big businesses as key actors of Turkish political economy. Business groups have oft been associated with authoritarian regimes in the literature of democratisation as their primary concern is supposedly not democratisation but to ensure political stability – under any circumstances – which is paramount to consolidate their economic interests (Sorensen 2008:10; Grugel 2002:21; Vanhanen 2003:87). However, this view has changed in recent years, business groups being depicted as a driving force of democracy building by NMT and the societal model that applied this hypothesis to the Turkish case of modernisation (Öniş and Türem 2002). The link between the business class and democracy is explained as such:

Elite groups will support democracy only in so far as they feel certain that their interests will be backed under more democratic conditions. The logical corollary of this proposition is that business wants more democracy because it feels more secure in terms of property rights, legitimacy of its dominant status in society, and the weakness of demands for radical redistribution from below in the current international order (Öniş and Türem 2002:442).

Until the 1970s, the business class of Turkey was represented by an official organisation that was closely supervised by the state, TOBB (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği). The first independent business association of the country, TÜSİAD (Türk Sanayiciler ve İş Adamları Derneği), was founded in 1971 when a number of big businesses seceded from TOBB. The influence of the independent private sector on policy-making in Turkey started to be visible from the 1970s
onwards. In the late 1970s, TÜSİAD emerged as a vocal opponent of ISI and applied pressure on coalition governments with a widely advertised criticism of their economic policies published in the most popular newspapers of the time (Öniş and Türem 2002:443). The Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit of the CHP repeatedly blamed TÜSİAD for supposedly orchestrating the collapse of his government in 1979, leading some observers to label TÜSİAD as ‘the organization that topples governments’ (Shambayati 1994:315).

It has been noted that TÜSİAD, the ardent supporter of democratisation in the post-1980 period, initially was not concerned with democratisation in the 1970s to the extent of not questioning the legitimacy of the 1980 military coup and the subsequent junta rule with the hope that the military would bring political stability (Öniş and Türem 2002:439). Nevertheless, the post-1980 period further consolidated the emerging influence of the private sector on Turkish political economy, as through joining their forces in organisations such as TÜSİAD, the business groups emerged as a class that gained considerable bargaining power against labour unions, the military and the bureaucracy. Still, it is not possible to argue that the state-dependent nature of the private sector completely changed as the generation of profits through the patronage of governments continued (See Yenal 2001:153; Ayata 1996; Asutay 2010; Heper and Keyman 1998; Özel 2014).

The radical change in the approach of TÜSİAD towards democratisation in the 1990s became evident in its publications and public speeches of its key figures. This can be attributed to the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was interpreted as the proof of the ‘inevitable victory’ of the liberal-capitalist democratic model of the West, a belief that shaped the worldview of TÜSİAD (Öniş and Türem 2002). Since the 1990s, the organisation has also been a key supporter of Turkey’s EU membership, perceiving democratisation as a key prerequisite for the political and economic modernisation of Turkey. Ties between Turkey and Europe have been a noteworthy element that shaped the economic development trajectory of Turkish modernity in this regard.
Despite the ongoing liberalisation process, the Turkish economy was still heavily protected before the EU-Turkey Customs Union became operational in 1995 as the average economy-wide nominal protection rate was 10.22 percent for the EU and it was 22.14 percent for third-party countries before the implementation of the agreement (Togan 2000:5). By 1999, protection rates for all industrial products between Turkey and the EU were removed. The process of ‘Europeanisation’ emerged as part of Turkey’s EU accession process and many Turkish cities built partnerships with the EU economic agencies and institutions. The European financial support enabled many SMEs to gain funds required to kick-start their operations and development projects (Tok 2008:86). A noteworthy example in this regard was the construction of an organised industrial zone in the Turkish province of Şanlıurfa with an EU grant (Tok 2008:86).

### 3.3.5 The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Aid on Development

Turkey initiated a key reform in the 1980s by beginning to provide foreign investors with open access to official data and statistics. Evaluations about the national economy and credit ratings could now be made publicly as the banking sector also distributed information, reducing the perceived risks attributed to investing in Turkey (Tırtıroğlu and Tırtıroğlu 1992:185). Compared to other developing middle-income economies, Turkey had received low levels of FDI since the 1920s (Balasubramanyam 1996:112). It is important to note that this had been the case even though Turkish governments were not particularly unwelcoming to FDI and in fact, during the 1950s and the 1970s, the policymakers overtly emphasized the role of FDI. Especially after the 1980s, the Özal administration publically endorsed FDI at every opportunity and the response of foreign investors to the liberalisation program in the country has been noted as largely positive, FDI levels increasing visibly in this decade albeit Turkey still lagging behind many other developing countries. Even though FDI levels increased over the years, Turkey’s share in the total FDI received by all
developing countries has never exceeded an average of 1 percent per annum between 1971-1991 (Balasubramanyam 1996:114).

Among the developing countries, Turkey has had a highly developed infrastructure in terms of transportation and finance, rapid economic growth (particularly in the 1960s and 1980s) in addition to a potentially profitable geographical location placed between large regional markets in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, yet its FDI levels remained low. Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures may be offered as a reason, but that argument would fail to explain why countries with even more inefficient bureaucracies such as Nigeria and Indonesia received more FDI than Turkey (Balasubramanyam 1996:117). If one considers how Turkey received more FDI in the 2003-2012 period than all the history of the Republic combined, the key reason for the low level of FDI in previous years appears to be the long absence of macroeconomic and political stability due to high-level inflation, exchange rate instability and political crises (See Table 3.8). Conversely, the post-2002 era has been characterised by the stable macroeconomic rule of a one-party government.

Unlike FDI, foreign aid had long been an important source of capital for Turkish economy. In the 1950s, Turkey received aid from the US, which was largely channelled into the most important production sector of Turkish economy at the time, the agriculture (Morrissey 1996). Throughout the 1960s, foreign aid continued to play a significant role as it amounted to an average of roughly 3 percent of GNP per annum during the decade (Morrissey 1996:88). Throughout the 1980s, Turkey received considerable amounts of foreign aid, ranking 14th in the world in 1989-90 (Morrissey 1996:90).

It is important to note that even though the main rationale behind the receipt of foreign aid is to sustain economic growth, the nature of aid matters greatly in terms of the effect it has on economy. As foreign aid is often tied to some conditions, it may actually be detrimental to sustain long-term economic development. In this context, the case of the US aid to Turkey highlights the potential risks of receiving large amounts of foreign aid. The post-World War II
US aid via the Marshall Fund was concentrated on agriculture and infrastructure, boosting economic growth in the short-term but proving very problematic in the long-term. The US aid was tied to the condition of the import of capital goods from the US, gradually causing a large trade deficit in Turkish economy (Krueger 1974, Morrissey 1996:92). Turkey was forced into importing goods for much higher prices than normal and the type of foreign aid resulted in the manifestation of a dependency relationship between Turkey and the US, the former becoming highly dependent on the technology of the latter (Morrissey 1996:93). One of the key reasons behind the failure of the free trade experience of the ‘DP decade’ in the 1950s was the growing trade deficit that originated in the negative impact relations with the US, an external factor, has on Turkish economy.

**Table 3.8. Foreign Direct Investment to Turkey under the AKP Rule (2003-2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FDI Inflows (USD billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Investment Support and Promotion Agency (2014a).*

Yet, the foreign support that Turkey received since 1980s impacted positively on its economic development. A key lesson that Turkey’s experience provides
for development is that the continued support of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank is essential to sustain liberalisation programs in developing countries. A deficit in balance of payments often emerges because of the transition process from ISI to market-driven economy and this can only be mitigated with the support of these organisations during the process (Şenses 1988:23). This issue is highly related with the foreign policy of governments and the orientation of the state within the existing international system. Among developing countries, Turkey had the advantage of possessing close affiliations to the developed economies of the Western world from which it was able to garner support for its economic program. Compared to the pre-1980 period, external factors have had a more benign role on Turkey's economic modernisation in the post-1980 years.

3.3.6 The Privatisation Process and the Legacy of the Pre-1980 Institutional Framework

Starting from the liberalisation program of the 1980s that reduced the salaries of public officials, the strength of the Turkish bureaucracy rapidly decreased as the appeal of civil service dropped considerably (Öniş 1992:88). A privatisation program was initiated in 1985 as part of the broader liberalisation process. The objectives of the program were to reduce state interventionism, increase competitiveness and efficiency of SOEs, reduce the share of subsidies on the budget and gain revenues with the sale of SOEs.

In Turkey, the main reason behind the privatisation policy was to prevent the usage of the SOEs by populist governments to provide employment to their voters, which had been the case in the 1970s (Asutay 2010; Ökten 2006:232). However, the pace of Turkish privatisation program was slow as the generated revenues from the program reached only $9.4 billion in 2005 after two decades (Nas 1992:16; Ökten 2006:227). It is important to note that even though the privatisation effort began in 1985, most of the sales of SOEs actually took place after the 1999 Stand By Agreement was signed with the IMF, which greatly emphasized the role of privatisation to reform the Turkish economy.
The slow pace of privatisation can be attributed to the strong opposition the governments had faced from different segments of the society, particularly the senior officials within the SOEs, labour unions, left-wing political parties, non-governmental organisations and major newspapers such as the Kemalist Cumhuriyet (Asutay 2010:108; Ökten 2006:233). A key factor that curtailed the whole endeavour was the influence of statist bureaucrats who successfully resisted repeated attempts of the government through erecting legal barriers to stop the privatisation drive (Leander 1996:137). For instance, the Constitutional Court repeatedly blocked the privatisation of Türk Telekom, the large state-owned telecommunications company, in the 1990s. As a result of the clash between the free-market ideology of governments and the state institutions that continued to remain loyal to the tenets of the ISI policy, only 8.3 percent of all the SOEs were privatised between 1985 and 1998 and the generated revenues remained low (Simga-Mugan and Yüce 2003:83). Nevertheless, even though the pace was slow, the opposition failed to stop the rise of the private sector in the long term as the share of the public sector in the national economy dropped from 40 percent in 1986 to 18.5 percent in 2000 (Ökten 2006:241).

In their comparative study of EOI experiences in Turkey and South Korea, Özlem Onaran and Engelbert Stockhammer (2005) argue that the different economic growth rates (South Korea’s growth rate had been higher than Turkey’s until the 2000s) were due to institutions, power structures and state policies. While Turkey had decreasing shares of wages in production, relatively low growth, low investment and low employment levels, South Korea displayed the opposite characteristics due to efficient state intervention that exercised export-led strategy through a regulated financial system and foreign trade regime rather than leaving these to control of market forces (Onaran and Stockhammer 2005:67). Following the footsteps of the South Korea, Turkey reformed its system towards a more regulatory structure after the 2001 Crisis, hence achieving rapid economic growth in the 2002-2012 period.
The Turkish economic liberalisation experience can be seen as part of a global phenomenon that spread to developed and developing economies throughout the 1980s, namely the drive towards neo-liberal policies. Yet, it is important to note that even though similar liberalisation programs with the same objectives were implemented in a number of developing countries, the results were quite dissimilar. Akin to other economies that went through this process, the liberalisation program in Turkey resulted in the deregulation of product prices, exchange rates and interest rates. The role of the state as a direct producer in manufacturing sector decreased dramatically because of privatisation. These consequences were in line with the initial aims of the program and with experiences of other developing economies, particularly South American countries such as Argentina and Chile. However, Turkey's liberalisation cannot be evaluated as a conventional example of such programs as the process actually contained elements that were contrary to the tenets of neo-liberal economics (Öniş 1999:186). A most notable factor that stood in stark contrast to the neo-liberal understanding of political economy was the increase of the economic and political influence of the Turkish state. In fact, this contingent factor constitutes the main reason behind the increasing divergence of contemporary Turkish economic modernity from the Western model.

The export drive strengthened the power of the large-scale Turkish conglomerates at the expense of smaller-sized private enterprises during the 1980s as these companies with large amounts of accumulated capital were in a comparatively more favourable position to benefit from the state-provided incentives (Ödekon 1992:168; Leander 1996:134). Another paradox of Turkish liberalisation was the continued influence of the public sector in the 1980s. In terms of capital formation and their share in gross national income, there was not a visible decline in the role of the SOEs. Moreover, the prerogatives of the policy-makers, particularly that of the prime minister, over economic affairs had been continuously increased after 1983. Particularly in regards to the control of the financial system, the power of the government reached unprecedented levels by the end of the 1980s (Öniş 1999:187-188).
There exists a strong connection between the outcome of liberalisation programs and the historical and institutional conditions of a country. The political economy of Turkey has long been characterised by 'the tradition of a highly centralized, patrimonial state with the concomitant weakness of “civil society”’ (Öniş 1999:242-243). The pre-1980 era of economic modernisation in Turkey was completely directed by a bureaucratic elite based in statist institutions such as the DPT within a highly centralised institutional framework. The pre-1980 legacy of state-led development in Turkey strongly impacted on the post-1980 trajectory of economic modernisation in the country.

While the entrenched statist ideology of bureaucratic institutions such as the Constitutional Court slowed down the privatisation program, the export drive initially consolidated the monopoly of large conglomerates over the Turkish market as business groups such as Koç and Sabancı accumulated a considerable amount of capital in the pre-1980 era through the incentives provided by the state to create an indigenous capitalist class. Moreover, although the liberalisation program decreased the share of public sector in the Turkish economy, the state had increased its influence over economic policy-making through new regulations. Therefore, the post-1980 experience of liberalisation in Turkey strongly challenges the arguments put forward by the societal model in terms of the role of the pre-1980 era on economic development. It is clear that without the continuing legacy of the statist background of the Turkish economy, the post-1980 experience cannot be fully understood.

3.3.7 The Turkish Export-Oriented Industrialisation Model in Comparative Perspective

In the 1980s, the Japanese and South Korean EOI experiences were perceived by Turkish policy-makers such as Özal as successful development models and a key element of their policies was the utilisation of intermediaries – the so-called foreign trading companies (FTCs) – to market the products of indigenous manufacturers to the global market, a practice that contradicts the conventional neoliberal ideology of ‘every enterprise for itself’ (Kaynak and Gürol 1987:61;
The rationale behind the use of the FTCs was to bring together the buyers and sellers of products in the global market, thus remarkably easing the export-import process and accelerating the pace of the EOI in Turkey.

In 1980, the Turkish government announced the formal criteria required for consideration of the FTCs and the privileges provided by this status. The criteria for the FTCs required a fixed amount of annual earnings, initial capital and a certain annual growth rate for exported goods. If these conditions were met, FTCs could benefit from a set of state subsidies such as the special credits provided by the Central Bank and the joint monopoly rights in selected sectors with SOEs (Öniş 1992:76-77). It is clear that an extremely high level of state support that even bestows monopoly rights is contradictory to free-market principles, yet the FTCs proved essential to the success of the export-led strategy in the 1980s as the share of foreign trade companies in Turkey’s total exports rose from 5.8 percent in 1980 to 49.4 percent in 1986 (Öniş 1992:77).

A crucial element of EOI in Turkey had been the strong links between the FTCs and domestic manufacturing conglomerates. Particularly in the early years of the export drive in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, the relationship between conglomerates such as Koç and Sabancı and FTCs such as Ram and Exsa had a positive impact on the rapid expansion of Turkish exports (Öniş 1992:78-79). Akin to the Sogo Shosha general trading companies in Japan, the Turkish FTCs that had close links with large-scale local manufacturers led the export drive of Turkey as their size enabled these enterprises to penetrate the markets of even more developed economies in Western Europe such as Britain, France and Germany (Öniş 1992:81).

The Turkish and Japanese exporting strategies had another key similarity. Japan’s export destinations changed over the years, beginning with exporting to less-developed countries in the 1950s, then after the 1960s re-orienting heavily towards the developed economies. In this regard, Japan’s experience is summarised as such:
First, Japanese manufacturers satisfied internal demand for products that were produced overseas [ISI strategy of development]. They had to purchase technology, usually from the U.S., to accomplish this. Then they started exporting to LDCs in Asia where there was a growing demand for the product and no domestic competition. Frequently Asian LDCs served as a testing ground for Japanese manufacturers in the world market... After a firm gained worldwide competitive strength, the Japanese manufacturers started exporting to industrial nations (Kaynak and Gürol 1987:61).

Turkey's geographical situation is similar to that of Japan, being placed between more developed European markets and less-developed MENA and newly independent former Soviet republics. If Japan's experience is an indicator for the stages of economic modernisation through transition from ISI towards EOI, Turkey has been undergoing the same process. As such, Turkey's exports to less-developed countries in MENA and former Soviet republics steadily increased along with its exports to developed countries in Europe (See Kaminski and Ng 2006).

It has been argued that the successes of EOI in both South Korea and Japan were due to the flexibility of the economic modernisation process in these countries as the development policies were changed over time in accordance with the needs of their economy and the global conditions (Sönmez 2001:21). The developing non-Western economies that were able to use their comparative advantages within the global international economy proved successful with EOI and shortened the material modernisation gap with Western countries (Page and Van Gelder 2001:15). In this regard, the experiences of Japan and Turkey imply that EOI is more successful if it is based on the groundwork of a developed industrial capacity and infrastructure established prior to transition. Nevertheless, it has been noted by Emma C. Murphy (2001:135) that there is no universally applicable model of transition from ISI towards relatively more market-driven policies such as EOI and the particular political institutional framework and economic conditions of every country case would shape their trajectory of development.
The sequencing of development in the Turkish case occurred through initially creating a number of large-scale industries and fostering the growth of an indigenous capitalist class through ISI in the pre-1980 period. After the transition to EOI with the liberalisation program in the post-1980 period, Turkey was able to take advantage of its earlier successes in industrialisation and the aforementioned comparative advantages in global market (e.g. geographical location, low share of wages and the tariff and quota exemptions provided by the Customs Union Agreement with the EU) to achieve a successful export-drive. The trajectory of Turkish economic development, therefore, contests the arguments of both the structural and societal models regarding the origins of the Turkish economic modernity model. Without the pre-1980 background of industrialisation, the EOI strategy would not have achieved success in Turkey. ISI contributed to industrialisation, but it had reached its limits by the late 1970s. This was due to the absence of new markets as the limited size of the Turkish market constrained the production capacity of the manufacturing sector. From the 1980s onward, the EOI enabled Turkey to find markets for the large manufacturing sector it created by protecting them from foreign competition in the pre-1980 period. Thus, the economic origins of contemporary Turkish modernity should be attributed to the way in which ISI and EOI had complemented each other in contributing to the industrialisation process.

So far, this chapter has covered the major characteristics and results of the post-1980 liberalisation program and the EOI strategy, discussing mostly its positive impact on economic modernisation in Turkey. In the following two sections, the chapter will analyse the negative effects of the transition process on the Turkish economy.


Despite all the successes of the liberalisation program presented in the preceding sections of the chapter, the radical transition process also had
negative consequences for the socio-economic life in Turkey. The main side effect of the program was a rapidly widening income gap as the share of wage earners and agricultural producers in national income fell by approximately 50 percent between 1980 and 1988 (Nas 1992:12; Cecen et al. 1994:51). The economic growth of the 1980s, in this context, can be argued to have been achieved at the expense of welfare in the short term. Until the late 1980s, the ever-intensifying liberalisation process led by Özal's ANAP continued without any visible opposition, but the tenets of the program started to be questioned from 1987 onward with the emergence of a number of popular opposition parties in the parliament.

The political developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s can be understood within the context of public frustration at the social consequences of the neoliberal economic policies. After a closely contested referendum, the banned party leaders of the 1970s were allowed to return to politics and the primacy of the ANAP in Turkish political economy began to wane after its second parliamentary victory in 1987. The rising popularity of the major party chairmen of the pre-1980 period such as Bülent Ecevit (CHP), Süleyman Demirel (AP), Necmettin Erbakan (MSP) and Alparslan Türkeş (MHP) and their new parties can be possibly read as an expression of a growing disillusionment with the ANAP in this era (Sayarı 1992:39; Öniş and Türem 2002:441).

It has been argued that the private sector, especially the big businesses that had close links with the Özal administration, had disproportionately benefited from the export-drive as exporting companies received strong support and subsidies from the government while the bargaining rights of organised labour movements were steadily curbed over the decade, giving rise to the popular idea that the economic development of Turkey and the rise of capitalists in the 1980s came at the expense of the working class (Waterbury 1992a:49; Miller 2006:450; Odekon 1988:33). The consolidation of the hegemony of conglomerates over the SMEs in the 1980s was also one of the most criticised side effects of the liberalisation program and the export drive (Odekon 1992:168; Leander 1996:134). This consequence of the liberalisation program
emerged due to the nature of EOI that requires highly skilled human resources and large amounts of capital.

In the case of Turkey, the tendency of EOI to favour big businesses was aggravated by the policies of the government, which provided subsidies for exports that exceeded certain amounts, disproportionately benefiting large companies (Leander 1996:134). The resentment of the SMEs towards these policies was often expressed in the media, paving the way for the establishment of the second major independent business organisation of the country, MÜSİAD in 1990 (Leander 1996:136). The SMEs that founded MÜSİAD aimed to challenge the dominance of the business association of big businesses, TÜSİAD, by uniting their resources. In the 1990s and 2000s, MÜSİAD emerged as a key actor of Turkish political due to ties they built with the Islamic political movement. The rise of the Islamic political movement and MÜSİAD occurred simultaneously in Turkey, challenging the long established primacy of centre-right parties and their conventional business partners, TÜSİAD. Chapter 5 will provide for a detailed examination of the TÜSİAD-MÜSİAD divide and the links between the SMEs and the Islamic political movement.

The focus of another criticism of the liberalisation process in Turkey was the over-reliance on foreign sources of capital as the national debt of Turkey quickly rose from approximately 40 percent of GNP in 1989 to over 55 percent of GNP in 1992 (Waterbury 1992a:45). During the 1990s and early 2000s, the economic development process of Turkey stagnated as a series of economic crises severely hit the Turkish economy, most notably in 1994 and 2001. It can be argued that the accumulated negative consequences of the radical liberalisation program of the 1980s resulted in the poor economic performance of the 1990s, the period commonly referred as a ‘lost decade’ for Turkish economic development (See Table 3.9; OECD Report 2004; Özel 2014:169).

The crises of 1994 and 2001 resulted from the inability of Turkey to sustain its loan interest payments to foreign creditors. This can be attributed to three major problems in the implementation of EOI in Turkey: firstly, the over-
reliance on foreign aid, FDI and short-term loans rather than domestic savings meant that the export-drive of the 1980s could not be sustained without a massive accumulation of debt. Secondly, the populist coalition governments of the 1990s that were most concerned about winning the next elections utilised the borrowed funds for social welfare programs rather than investment in export sectors of the economy (Öniş and Aysan 2000:128-135; Öniş 2003:6). Thirdly, when the Özal administration deregulated the financial system in the 1980s, a potentially detrimental effect entered the Turkish economy, namely the highly unstable capital flows. Most of the foreign capital inflow to the Turkish economy in the 1990s was short-term, not long-term stable FDI (Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006:21). The effects of these short-term inflows, known colloquially as 'hot money', were particularly devastating during the 2001 crisis as a severe economic contraction (-7,5 percent loss of the total GDP) that followed the balance of payments bottleneck was caused by the sudden withdrawal of capital by foreign investors at the first sign of political and economic instability (Tunç 2003).

The liberalisation program had negative effects for the industrialisation process as the state subsidies provided for the private sector led to rent-seeking behaviour. Rather than ‘real’ investment in major export sectors of the industry, many private enterprises established the so-called ‘paper businesses’ in order to claim bonuses from the state, resulting in a patronage relationship between the ANAP-led government and the private sector (Asutay 2010:110). It is important to note that this did not emerge in the 1980s for the first time, as it was a long established characteristic of the link between the state and the private sector since the early years of the Republic (Berberoglu 1977:84; Asutay 2010). Nevertheless, the rent-seeking behaviour was particular disruptive for industrialisation in the post-1980 period due to the unprecedentedly large amounts of subsidies provided to encourage the EOI drive in the economy. Ultimately, Turkey seemed to be incapable of achieving stable economic growth in the long-term as periods of ‘boom and bust’ followed each other in close succession between the late 1980s and the early 2000s.
A number of factors prevented Turkey from achieving stable economic growth until the structural adjustment of the early 2000s, namely the ‘inability to generate sustained increases in savings and investment rates’ and ‘excessive reliance on exchange-rate adjustments’ (devaluation of currency) (Nas 1992:12; Taskin and Yeldan 1996:174). The export drive was mainly achieved through suppressing the domestic demand via wage reduction and currency devaluation. The severe suppression of the demand in Turkish national market in order to re-orient the economy towards production for foreign markets was a risky method of EOI, resulting in an over-reliance on demand in foreign markets (Taskin and Yeldan 1996:174).

It has been argued that the export drive had failed to achieve one of its main objectives in the 1980s, namely the diversification of manufactured exports as only five sectors covered 92.4 percent of total industrial exports by 1990, after a decade of EOI: textiles (31.3 percent), iron and steel (15.7 percent), hides and skin products (7.3 percent), chemicals (6 percent) and electrical machinery (4.3 percent) (Taskin and Yeldan 1996:165). It is also important to note that these are all labour intensive sectors, not capital intensive industries that indicate a more advanced stage of industrialisation. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey’s GDP growth fluctuated dramatically, scoring huge losses in 1994 (minus 6 percent), 1999 (minus 5 percent) and in 2001 (minus 7.5 percent) due to a series of economic crises (See Table 3.9.). This trend shifted after the radical reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, the size of the economy and trade volume rapidly increasing from 2002 to 2012 (See Table 3.10.; Altuğ and Filiztekin 2006:22).
Table 3.9. The Economic Performance in the 1990s and the 2001 Crisis (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Economic Growth Rate (GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>% 9,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>% 0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>% 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>% 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>% -6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>% 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>% 6,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>% 7,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>% 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>% -5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>% 6,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>% -7,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank (2014b); Yendi, Çetin and Gallo (2012:47).*
Table 3.10. The Economic Growth Performance of Turkey between 2002-2012 (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Economic Growth Rate (GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>% 6,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>% 5,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>% 9,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>% 8,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>% 6,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>% 4,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>% 0,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>% -4,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>% 9,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>% 8,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>% 2,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank (2014b).*
3.3.9 The Aftermath of the 2001 Crisis: The Post-Washington Consensus in Turkey and the 'AKP Decade' (2002-2013)

The 2001 crisis was one of the most devastating setbacks experienced during the economic modernisation process of Turkey (Cizre and Yeldan 2005). However, its impact on the development trajectory of Turkey would prove to be highly positive in the following years. The dramatic collapse of the economy under the pressure of a severe balance of payments bottleneck triggered a genuine systemic effort by policy-makers and bureaucrats to reform the system through a new structural adjustment program developed jointly with the IMF.

The coalition of the DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti) chairman and prime minister Bülent Ecevit invited Kemal Derviş, an acclaimed economist in the World Bank, to take up the position of the Minister of State for Economic Affairs. Derviş was given full control over the structural adjustment program and as a practitioner, he had advantages not possessed by politicians such as not being concerned about the next elections and being independent from ties with domestic political and economic actors. This allowed Derviş and his technocratic team of experts to develop a radical stabilisation program and enact a number of highly transformative reforms in the economy within only a few months, particularly focusing on the fragile financial system of Turkey (Öniş 2010:49). The reforms re-oriented the neoliberal nature of the Turkish economy towards a more regulatory governance system based on the principles of the so-called Post-Washington Consensus24, culminating in the formation of the economic-financial model that was inherited by the AKP in 2002. The AKP rule of the last decade did not alter the principles of the model and it is still operational in Turkey today.

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24 Criticism of many elements of the neoliberal Washington Consensus agenda promoted by international financial institutions such as the IMF resulted in the emergence of a revised program called the Post-Washington Consensus. The new understanding of economic development puts more emphasis on regulation of economy and finance by the state while it also includes policy objectives such as poverty alleviation and equitable income distribution in contrast to the original Washington Consensus that focused heavily on economic growth.
A key element of the reform program concerned the banking sector. The regulatory powers of the BRSA (Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency) over the public and private sectors were increased in order to improve capital adequacy levels. The transparency of the BRSA and the activities of banks were enhanced and reforms to ensure financial stability were undertaken. In this regard, the debt burden of the public sector was reduced and ‘the Maastricht criteria concerning the ratio of public sector budget deficit to GDP was met in 2004 by the success of financial reforms’ (BDDK 2010:35).

In addition to the new financial structure adopted after the 2001 crisis, another key factor that positively impacted on economic development in the last decade is the dispersion of wealth across the country, giving rise to a large number of SMEs and a new middle class across Anatolian urban centres (See Table 3.10.; Table 3.11.; Tok 2008; Dede 2011; Hoşgör 2011). Despite the fact that inequality continues to be a major problem – especially in the predominantly Kurdish eastern and south-eastern regions which remain less developed compared to the rest of the country – it can be argued that the rapid economic development of the 2000s produced a vibrant economic life beyond industrialised major cities such as Istanbul, İzmir, Ankara and Bursa as globalisation penetrated the continental Anatolian heartland (Tok 2008:81). Unlike the business elites centred on Istanbul, which have close economic ties to Europe, the rising enterprises, the so-called Anatolian Tigers, possess strong trade ties to the MENA region, contributing to Turkey’s exports by diversifying its markets.

The 2001 crisis and the structural adjustment program were shortly followed by the victory of the AKP in 2002 elections. At first, the AKP was rather critical of the IMF and the economic transformation program, but it changed its stance during the election campaign in 2002 in order to reassure the capitalist class in the country that macroeconomic stability would continue (Miller 2006:459). During the 2002 election campaign, the chairman of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, publicly stated that the party would abide by the terms of the IMF program that had been signed by the coalition government of Ecevit. However,
Erdoğan also emphasised the need to revise the agreement towards a more social welfare orientation, although the content of this 'revision' was not articulated clearly and the party strictly abstained from altering the agreement after coming to power (Patton 2006:515-516). In the early years of the AKP rule, the party's willingness to stick with the IMF program contributed to its carefully constructed image as a supporter of political and economic stability (Öniş and Aysan 2000). During the 2000s, the party consistently emphasised stability in the public speeches of its leaders and international platforms in order to attract FDI to Turkey (Patton 2006:515-516).

Sadık Ünay (2006:167) encapsulates the character of the economic policy of the AKP:

In retrospect, the particular importance attached by the AKP leadership to administrative competence, fair and responsive governance, and democratic consolidation...enabled the party to forge intimate links with a range of socio-political groups associated with diverse political movements and institute a broad-based electoral coalition. The political rhetoric that held this coalition together was based upon a communitarian liberal synthesis which asserted a juxtaposition of free market liberalism with communal values, societal norms and local traditions. In this context, values such as freedom of enterprise, innovation and investment generally associated with conservative political parties in Europe and the US were merged with the ideals of social and distributive justice characteristics of European social democracy, the end result being a peculiarly Turkish style ‘third way’ formula based on trust and politico-economic stability complete with a degree of personal charisma and popular appeal [referring to the influence of Erdoğan].

A key reason behind the rapid economic growth of the Turkish economy in the last decade was the receipt of high levels of FDI. Under the AKP rule in the 2002-2013 period, Turkey received more FDI than the preceding 20 years combined (See Table 3.8.; Grigoriadis and Kamaras 2008:53).

The AKP administration emphasised the objective of integration into global markets and attracting FDI, but it is important to note that the approach of the party was rooted in the mind-set of Özal and the ANAP in the 1980s (Griogoriadis and Kamaras 2008). The difference in the generated amounts of FDI between the ANAP rule of 1983-1991 and the AKP rule of the 2002-2012
can be attributed to the success of the public relations campaigns\(^{25}\) of the AKP (Grigoriadis and Kamaras 2008:59).

Following several years of rapid economic growth from 2003 onwards, the Turkish economy faced the 2008 Financial Crisis under the AKP government and the economy shrank by 4.8 percent in 2009 (See Table 3.10.). The nature of the 2008 Financial Crisis was different to previous domestic economic crises which the country faced such as the 2001 crisis. The 2008 Crisis was based in the so-called ‘global North’, namely the most industrialised countries in the world, resulting in a reduction of capital inflows and export revenues for Turkey as these economies constitute Turkey’s most noteworthy economic partners. Unlike the previous domestic-based crises, however, Turkey did not experience a balance of payments problem as the structural reforms undertaken as a response to the 2001 crisis greatly improved the resilience of the banking and financial sectors (Öniş 2010:58). After 2009, the Turkish economy rapidly recovered, the GDP growing by 9.2 percent in 2010 and 8.8 percent in 2011.

A key factor that minimised the potentially negative effects of the 2008 Crisis was the stance of the AKP government. The policy-makers portrayed a highly confident posture in their public speeches which proved sufficient to relay a positive image to foreign investors, resulting in Turkey to be perceived as a ‘safe heaven’ amidst the ongoing crisis in the US and the Eurozone (Öniş 2010:60). In addition, three other factors have been argued to have contributed to the amelioration of the 2008 Crisis in the Turkish context: ‘a robust banking sector that was formed after the 2001 crisis’, ‘strong budget figures and fiscal discipline’ and ‘a low-averaged yet growth-oriented market’ (Akkurt 2010:40).

The strength of the banking sector during the 2008 Crisis was based on its increased capital adequacy ratio (19 percent) which constituted a strong capital base to absorb sudden shocks (Akkurt 2010:42-43).

\(^{25}\) It is important to note that the political and economic stability provided by the AKP began to deteriorate since the last electoral victory of the party in 2011, the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the ensuing violent clashes reflecting the image of increasingly unstable country (See Edgerly 2013). Nevertheless, as this thesis does not cover the period after 2013 and the latest political tensions occurred very recently, the economic implications of the aforementioned phenomenon has not been studied (See Chapter 4 for the analysis of the impact of the Gezi protests on the democratisation process of Turkey).
In the 2002-2013 period, the AKP’s relations with business groups differed as the party developed close ties with MÜSİAD which represents mostly the SMEs of the country (mainly concentrated in the new industrial centres of Central Anatolia) while the party was not close with the big businesses centred around TÜSİAD (mainly concentrated in the old industrial centres of Western Turkey). In this regard, it is important to note that TÜSİAD traditionally possessed stronger links with centre-right parties such as the ANAP and identifies with liberal European values, pro-EU foreign policy for Turkey and secularism, whereas MÜSİAD espouses a nationalist and social conservative stance, leaning towards Euro-scepticism and endorsing closer ties with the MENA societies and the broader Muslim world (Öniş and Türem 2002). In regards to its relations with the private sector – not unlike the governments that preceded it – the AKP has been accused of utilising the state resources and the vast prerogatives of the government to build and sustain patronage ties with enterprises that share an ideological affinity with it (See Özel 2014:173; Bank and Karadag 2012; Ilhan 2013).

The clientelism that characterised the Turkish political economy under the AKP rule functioned through public-private partnerships in several areas of the economy, most notably the construction sector which experienced a rapid expansion since the party came to power in 2002 (See Karatepe 2013; Ilhan 2013). The AKP administration developed a major initiative in the construction sector and utilised a state agency, the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ), to construct ‘more than 500,000 residential units, costing more than $35 billion’ (Karatepe 2013:3). It has been noted that enterprises owned by the political allies of the AKP – such as the İhlas, Çalık and Kombasan groups – disproportionately benefited from the ‘construction boom’ as they were given most contracts by the TOKİ (Karatepe 2013:7-8). Contracts provided by the AKP-controlled municipalities across the country – particularly in populous metropolitan areas such as Istanbul, Kocaeli, Ankara and Kayseri – had been another major source to establish a patronage relationship with the capitalist class as the local governments channelled public funds to businesses that
financially support the electoral campaigns of the party (Bank and Karadag 2012:11; Ilhan 2013:194).

Table 3.11. Trends in the National Poverty Rate26 2002-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poverty headcount ratio (% of total population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>30,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>23,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>20,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>16,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>13,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite its proven ability to withstand the negative consequences of a shock as large as the 2008 Crisis, the Turkish economy is not without structural weaknesses today. Turkey’s continuing over-reliance on external financial sources for sustaining its economic growth, its chronic inability to increase domestic savings and the dependency of the industrial sector on foreign technology in the absence of a domestic research drive may negatively affect the

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26 National poverty rate is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line.
economic growth of the country in the forthcoming years (Öniş 2010:60). Also, it is important to note that even though it has become commonplace in the scholarly literature developed by both the structural and societal models to see Turkey as a successful model, the economic modernisation of the country is still far from being a completed project:

No matter how dynamic the economy, it has the appearance of a house of cards. Widespread default on debt held by banking system could end the miracle. The loss of a few foreign markets could lead to such a default. If external creditors find their confidence in the export drive flagging, the flow of external credits that have sustained Turkey's high rate of imports, themselves crucial to sustain the export drive, could come to an end (Waterbury 1992b:127-128).

An established political economist wrote the words above more than two decades ago and they remain relevant today. In retrospect, the analysis of John Waterbury who highlights the deficiencies of the economic development process of Turkey proved to be an accurate portrayal of the Turkish economy as the 1994 and the 2001 crises hit the country.

Today, the financial system is more regulated than those years and the banking system is closely monitored and robust. The loss of significant European markets due to the ongoing financial crisis in the Eurozone and the loss of major MENA markets such as Syria and Libya due to the instability of the region since the 2011 Arab uprisings have not led to a collapse in Turkish exports. Nevertheless, contemporary Turkey remains to be heavily dependent on short-term inflows and possesses a large trade balance deficit that amounted to $99.78 billion in 2013, which constitutes roughly 15 percent of its GDP (Hurriyet Daily News 2014; Finkel and Ant 2014). In addition, a future problem could be in the field of the export structure of the country. Turkey's trade is mostly concentrated with European economies (46 percent in 2010) and MENA (26 percent in 2010) while Turkey's exports to East Asia, South Asia, South America – the fastest growing regions of the global economy – remain strikingly low (Goldman 2012:27).
Despite the ongoing deficiencies and risks in the Turkish economy, it can be argued that Turkey made great strides towards economic modernity in the post-1980 period. Particularly in the last decade, the rapid economic development of the country positively impacted on the daily lives of a large number of citizens as the percentage of people living under the national poverty line dropped from over 30 percent in 2002 to 2.3 percent in 2012, indicating a major success in terms of poverty alleviation (See Table 3.11.). In addition, the 2000s witnessed a noteworthy improvement in the equitable income distribution in the country, though this trend seemed to be on the reversal in 2010 (See Table 3.12.). A crucial factor that contributed to the considerable increase in the living standards of many citizens since the late 1990s was the declining population growth rate in the country as the demographic pressure on the provision of services by the state has been reduced (Yenal 2001:224).

**Table 3.12. Trends in the Income Distribution Level in Turkey - GINI Index**\(^{27}\) (2002-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GINI Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank (2014b).*

\(^{27}\) Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income of consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of ‘0’ represents perfect equality while an index of ‘100’ implies perfect inequality.
A qualification on the context of poverty alleviation is necessary for truly comprehending the nuances of Turkey’s contemporary economic model and its radical divergence from the Western economic modernity type envisaged by CMT and NMT. The state-defined minimum wage is considerably low in Turkey, being just below net 1,000 Turkish liras while the officially recognised poverty line for a family of four persons is around 4,500 liras (Kaya 2015). Even though Turkey spends more than other developing countries such as Mexico and South Korea on its public social program, Turkey’s institutional social security system does not cover a large portion of its citizenry as the records show that approximately 40 percent of the population does not have healthcare, because about half of the workforce are employed without any insurance in the informal sector (Buğra and Adar 2008; Eder 2010:156). Nevertheless, the percentage of population living below the poverty line has actually decreased during the AKP years, a phenomenon that clearly illustrates the peculiarity of the Turkish case of economic transformation. In this regard, a key question is that how the AKP administration did manage to reduce the number of people living below poverty line without dramatically raising the level of minimum wage and/or building a structured welfare state?

After the AKP came to power following the 2001 economic crisis, the Turkish state has begun to privatise the provision of welfare as charities and municipalities have filled the vacuum left by the absence of an extensive and institutionalised welfare state (Eder 2010). At first sight, Turkey’s social system might have looked as if it was converging towards the predominant global neoliberal paradigm which envisages the civil society to play a leading role in social welfare provision (Kaya 2005:49). However, the same period has also witnessed to a surge of state power in economic activities, municipalities becoming the main conduit for providing social welfare through cooperating with private actors. The AKP’s social policy vision, as formulated in the party program of 2012, has heavily stressed the role of the family and Islamic charities for welfare provision and poverty alleviation, while keeping direct references to the responsibilities of the state in this regard to a minimum (AK Parti 2012). As the central state organisation partially withdrew from the field
of social policy and steadily adopted a non-interventionist stance, municipalities have more than made up for the role of the state (Eder 2010:156).

Turkish political economy witnessed a profound transformation as successive AKP administrations have followed a hybrid social policy based on mixing neoliberal free-market capitalism with communitarian Islamic ethics centred on solidarity (Tuğal 2002:107). Marcie Patton (2009) refers to this model as ‘neoliberal communitarianism’ or the ‘AKP's third way’, namely a discourse in which values such as ‘responsible individualism’, ‘self-help’, ‘market-based inclusion’ and ‘Islamic communitarian ethics’ are synthesised. Accordingly, the state must be free of the ‘burden’ imposed on it by a welfare system which supposedly promotes rent-seeking and state-dependent culture; the energy of the state instead being concentrated on empowering capitalists enterprises, charities and creating more employment opportunities for the citizenry (Patton 2009:443-447). Hence, Turkey’s social security system displays *sui generis* characteristics that contain elements from both the established neoliberal models of Europe and the clientelist pattern of Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt (Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010). This Turkey-specific social policy model largely delegates the provision of social welfare to ‘moral capitalists’ rather than a state-designed ‘mature welfare system’, the likes of which can be found in Western countries such as Germany, France and Sweden (Tuğal 2002:99).

The AKP rule resulted in the rising influence of non-governmental organisations in socio-economic life as new legal regulations considerably decreased state control over their activities and also enabled them to collect vast sums of donations for ‘causes of their own choice’ (Eder 2010:156). Charities such as those affiliated with the Islamic Gülen movement and *Deniz Feneri* have emerged as key players in the newly privatised framework of social welfare, cooperating with municipalities and generating hundreds of millions of dollars (Eder 2010:179). In this regard, Metropolitan Municipality Law (No. 5216), Provincial Special Administrations Law (No. 5302), Local Administration Unions Law (No. 5355), Municipalities Law (No. 5393) dramatically increased the responsibilities and capabilities of municipalities in social welfare provision,
easing the legal procedures for cooperation with private actors (Eder 2010:177-178). Since the AKP came to power, the central government budget allocated for poverty alleviation has considerably declined (Kaya 2015:61).

The hybrid welfare governance has had three major consequences: firstly, decreasing the fiscal burden of the government; secondly, proving to be more much more successful than past policies in terms of poverty alleviation; and thirdly, consolidating patronage politics through the utilisation of municipal and private funds (Kaya 2015:59; Tuğal 2012; Buğra and Candas 2011).

Limited supervisory state control and the discretionary nature of funds used in social welfare caused the system to be politicised, political parties utilising welfare provision as part of their election strategies. By creating ‘social dependencies’ out of those citizens in desperate need of aid, political parties have aimed to consolidate their electorate in municipal districts under their control. As shown in several studies, the amount of funds transferred to citizens via the social programs of municipalities increase before parliamentary and municipal elections while it decreases considerably after elections (Eder 2010:175; Kaya 2015). The AKP, as the ruling party since 2002, has been the primary beneficiary of the politicisation of social welfare, but the major opposition parties such as the CHP and MHP, have also used similar strategies in municipalities they dominate (Eder 2010; Kaya 2015; Patton 2009):

[T]he enhanced power of the municipalities created ample room for patronage politics, as they were allowed to use private sector and/or wealthy organizations for various services and funding. Municipalities have thus become very visible by way of organizing soup kitchens for the poor, building giant food tents for iftar meals during the month of Ramadan, and, most importantly, in-kind assistance to the poor. Very little of the funding for these services, however, actually comes directly from the municipalities, but rather from those who contribute to the municipalities’ charity funds (Eder 2010:178).

As the structured welfare system is very weak and the number of citizens that benefit from public social policy are very low compared to various developed and developing countries, unstructured provision of welfare through patronage politics has been sustained and even deepened over the years (Buğra and Adar
The weakness of the centrally controlled systemic welfare system causes the problematic elements of Turkey’s hybrid social policy model, such as limited transparency and politicisation, to be not questioned by a considerable portion of the public and by mainstream media. A better alternative does not seem to exist and the model has been largely successful in terms of poverty alleviation albeit falling short of ensuring an equitable income distribution (Eder 2010:182).

Path dependency has played a key role in the manifestation of Turkey’s current social policy model, because the failure of the more systemic ‘social state’ of the pre-2002 years to alleviate poverty led to a search for a different approach – which has been designed by the AKP throughout the 2000s. The AKP’s socioeconomic approach truly fit the MMP framework, as Turkey’s economic modernity is entirely different from the Western modernity based on either an entirely neoliberal system as in the USA or a structured welfare system as in Germany. Family ties, municipalities and private actors have covered social welfare provision more so than the central state, distinguishing Turkey from the experience of the West as well as from that of the developing countries in South America and Southern and Eastern Europe (Eder 2010:173).

In the following section, the trajectory and current outcome of Turkey’s economic development experience will be assessed through the perspective of MMP. It will be shown that the analysis presented in this chapter based on the framework of MMP is a more effective understanding of the origins of Turkish economic modernity than the narratives offered by the structural model and the societal model.

3.4. READING THE ECONOMIC TRAJECTORY OF TURKEY THROUGH THE MULTIPLE MODERITIES PARADIGM

So far, the chapter analysed the economic modernisation trajectory of Turkey through a methodology based on MMP. As stated in the introduction of the
chapter, the main objective was to uncover the roots of Turkey’s widely cited success in economic modernity. So, in light of the historical analysis presented above, can Turkey be evaluated as an economically modern society today?

**Part one** of this chapter provided the understanding adopted by MMP to define economic modernity. The key indicators in this approach are industrialisation, urbanisation, a centralised economic management structure, literacy and advanced infrastructure in transportation and communication (See Eisenstadt 2002; Wagner 2012; Arnason 2000). The features of the contemporary socio-economic life of Turkey are shown in Table 3.13.

Today, Turkey possesses a high industrialisation level, a large services sector, a large number of urbanites, a high literacy rate and a developed infrastructure. Moreover, as can be seen in the level of indicators such as access to clean water, average income per capita, national poverty line and the percentage of internet users, a considerable portion of the population was profoundly affected by the economic modernisation process in the country. Thus, Turkey of the 21st century can be considered an economically modern society based on the definition of MMP. Although Turkey continues to have deficiencies such as the considerably low level of labour force participation of the female population vis-à-vis the male population, this is not one of the preconditions for economic modernity according to MMP.
Table 3.13. Economic Development Indicators of Turkey, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Year 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product (million $)</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (% of GDP)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (% of GDP)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services (% of GDP)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Per Capita(^28) ($)</td>
<td>18,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Poverty Line(^29) (% of total population)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population (% of total population)</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at Birth (year)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Literacy Rate (% of total population)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Clean Water (% of total population)</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paved Roads (% of total roads)</td>
<td>89.9 (in 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Users (per 100 people)</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Force Participation(^30) (% of total male population)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Force Participation (% of total female population)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank (2014b)*

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\(^28\) Gross national income (GNI) per capita, PPP (current international $).

\(^29\) Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line. This indicates the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighed subgroup estimates from household surveys.

\(^30\) Above the age of 15.
In this context, it is important to note that the state of Turkish economy today also fulfils the criteria of economic modernity put forward by the rival theories of MMP, namely CMT and NMT which use the same conceptualisation. For instance, if the ‘take-off model’ of classical modernisation theorist Walt Whitman Rostow (1960) is applied to the case of Turkey, the so-called ‘take-off to modernity’ stage could be seen as the 1960-1980 period in which the groundwork of the Turkish industrialisation success was built – which itself was based on the development policies of the post-1930 period. After the transition to EOI through liberalisation in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, Turkey built upon the earlier efforts, reaching the final stage of economic modernisation, the so-called ‘age of mass consumption’, as it fully displays the characteristics of such a society described by Rostow (1960:10):

As societies achieved maturity in the twentieth century two things happened: real income per head rose to a point where a large number of persons gained a command over consumption which transcended basic food, shelter, and clothing; and the structure of the working force changed in ways which increased not only the proportion of urban to total population, but also the proportion of the population working in offices or in skilled factor jobs – aware of and anxious to acquire the consumption fruits of a mature economy.

Despite fulfilling their basic criteria for economic modernity, however, contemporary Turkey contests the expectations of CMT and NMT in regards to the impact of economic modernisation on the state and society as a whole. Both the classical modernisation theorists (e.g. Rostow 1960; Lipset 1959) and the neo-modernisation theorists (e.g. Huntington 1968; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) envisage that a modern society would possess a liberal free-market economy, a largely non-interventionist state, a highly influential capitalist class and a politically active middle class. Economic modernity is expected to have a significant impact on political modernisation, which is defined as democratisation. All these features of a modern society are expected to constitute the founding principles and/or protectors of a liberal democratic regime.
The economic modernisation experience of Turkey challenges this vision as this chapter showed that a noteworthy capitalist class in the country emerged only after the state deliberately set out to create one from the 1920s onwards. From the 1930s onwards, the economic modernisation process was entirely led by a highly centralised state in a top-down fashion, the economic policies designed and executed by a bureaucratic class along the tenets of statism. This statism was interrupted in the 1950s with the implementation of free-market economics under the DP rule, but the emergent capitalists remained highly dependent on their ties with the state; the contracts, incentives and subsidies provided by governments serving to consolidate a patronage relationship (See Sönmez 2001; Asutay 2010; Keyder 1989; Özel 2014).

As shown in part three, even after the transition to EOI through liberalisation in the post-1980 era, the pre-1980 institutional framework of the state persevered, highly constraining the autonomy of the capitalist class. Though the various business groups of the country founded independent business associations (e.g. TÜSIAD and MÜSİAD), the state-led nature of the economic modernisation continued due to patronage ties. As a result, unlike their counterparts in the Western world, the capitalist class of Turkey never asserted itself as a force that could overtly challenge the primacy of the state within the modernisation process. As such, a bourgeois-led social movement did not emerge to build a new political economic system throughout the history of the country.

In light of the Turkish case, it can be argued that CMT and NMT as well as the literature of Turkish studies based on their theoretical frameworks – the structural and societal models – cannot account for the nuances of the modernisation experience in this non-Western society. This is due to two factors: Firstly, the understandings of CMT and NMT are overly dependent on

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31 As mentioned earlier, the only notable exception to this was the extraordinary influence possessed by TÜSIAD in the late 1970s. Using the power vacuum that emerged because of the political and economic stability in the country, the capitalist class centred around the organisation overtly challenged the authority of governments for a short period. Nevertheless, this did not materialise as a political change in the form of a drive toward democratisation as TÜSIAD ultimately did not challenge the military rule of the early 1980s.
the historical modernisation experiences of Western European and Northern American societies in which political revolutions led by middle classes proved successful in setting up liberal democratic regimes (e.g. Britain, the US, France). Secondly, the application of the frameworks of CMT and NMT by the structural and societal model narratives to the case of Turkey overlooks the role of path dependency within the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods of economic history in the country, which prevent them from fully explaining the origins of Turkish modernity.

In the studies of non-Western country cases by CMT and NMT, the trajectory of change is conceptualised as one that would inevitably produce the same characteristics seen in the Western modernity today. This chapter showed that this approach cannot grasp the unique features of the non-Western modernity of Turkey because it does not take into account the differences in the circumstances of non-Western countries.

One of the most crucial elements that differentiated the Turkish case from the historical Western modernisation experience was the interaction between Turkey and its more economically counterparts in the Western world. When the Western experience of industrialisation occurred in the 18th and 19th centuries, the high level of communication and inter-dependency between economies across the world were far less influential than it was throughout the 20th century. The trajectory of Turkey evolved through interaction with Western modernity as well as the modernities of other non-Western societies. The legacy of the Western economic hegemony over the Ottoman Empire shaped Turkey from the start as the country inherited a materially less-developed economic structure and a desire to gain independency from the West through autarky. In the 1920s and 1930s, the ruling Kemalist elite were inspired by the success of a non-Western planned development model, the Soviet Union (Yenal 2001:85). In this regard, it should also be noted that the country did not possess an indigenous capitalist class that would launch an industrialisation drive by itself. Akin to many non-Western countries that faced the hegemony of the West over the global economy (e.g. South American and East Asian country
cases), there was a strong need in the early Republican period to accelerate the process of economic modernisation through extraordinary measures such as heavy state intervention into economy (Berberoglu 1992:49-66; Page and Van Gelder 2001:15). All these factors led to the adoption of statism in the country in 1930.

The state-led economic modernisation of the early Republican years strongly affected the subsequent trajectory of the country. The state set out to create a large public sector in addition to fostering an indigenous capitalist class through the provision of contracts, subsidies, credits and various other incentives. The post-1980 period should be evaluated as a continuation of the-pre-1980 era in this regard, as the legacy of the earlier policies could be seen in many aspects of the political economy of Turkey. The considerable success of the export drive in terms of industrialising the economy was based on the formation of large-scale public and private enterprises in the statist era, many of which proved successful in competing with the firms of developed Western economies as seen in the example of BEKO in the post-1980 era (founded by the Koç conglomerate in 1967). In this context, the role of Turkey’s strong economic relations with the EU should be acknowledged which contributed to its EOI through the providing it a comparative advantage in global economy, namely the removal of tariff and quotas for Turkish industrial goods in European markets. Akin to the role played by the Soviet modernity model in the statist era, the Turkish policymakers were inspired by the non-Western modernity models of Japan and South Korea and formulated their EOI policy based on these examples in the post-1980 period.

The rise of the SMEs and the industrialisation of Anatolia in the post-1980 years were rooted in the establishment of village cooperatives by the state and the provision of credits from public banks to the SMEs in the pre-1980 period. Apart from its contributions, the elements of continuity within the economic trajectory also had negative effects on the post-1980. The old legacy of Turkish political economy continued after the liberalisation process in the form of patronage between the governments and the private sector. In addition, the
statist ideology of the state institutions slowed the privatisation efforts of governments in the post-1980 period.

Even though the liberalisation process forms one of the key tenets of the liberal economic tradition that seeks to reduce the role of the state, the state bureaucracy and the governments actually increased their prerogatives over the economic and financial policy-making in Turkey in the post-1980 period (Öniş 1999:187-188). This trend intensified after the transition to the Post-Washington Consensus through a banking and financial reform in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis which further increased the control of the government over all dimensions of economic activity, consolidating the ‘illiberal regulatory role’ of the Turkish state (Özel 2014:170). The AKP rule of the last decade continued to increase the powers of the government and sustain the patronage relationship with the private sector through the ‘selective distribution of state resources’ (Özel 2014:173). In sum, the outcome of the particular historical conditions and continuities of the economic modernisation process in Turkey is a modernity that does not conform to the values of the Western model.

The framework of economic modernity developed by MMP is more suited than its rivals to explain modernisation processes in non-Western cases. Unlike CMT and NMT, MMP acknowledges the uniqueness of the experiences of the non-Western world. In this regard, the impact of path dependency, globalisation and Western hegemony on the divergence of trajectories in the non-Western world have been highlighted by the scholars of MMP (See Wagner 2012:168-169; Eisenstadt 1999; Kaya 2004). As a result of the economic hegemony of the West, many non-Western countries such as Turkey needed to develop rapidly through economic modernisation processes fully led by the state. Moreover, trajectories of non-Western countries such as Turkey were influenced by the success of other non-Western modernity models that were different from the Western case (e.g. the Soviet socialist modernity and East Asian modernities such as Japan and South Korea). The result of these factors was an economic trajectory that was distinct from the liberal capitalist path envisaged by CMT and NMT. In this regard, non-Western cases such as Turkey demonstrate that there are
various ways to achieve economic modernity, strongly validating the understanding put forward by MMP while contesting the Eurocentric frameworks of CMT and NMT (Becker 2014:1-26).

3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter had three objectives: first, to assess whether Turkey can be considered an economically modern society according to MMP. Second – in accordance with the framework of MMP – to re-conceptualise the economic trajectory of Turkey through highlighting the continuities between the pre-1980 and post-1980 modernisation process in the country. Third, to interpret the economic trajectory of Turkey and its contemporary product – economic modernity – in light of MMP.

In part four, it was shown that contemporary Turkey can indeed be classified as an economically modern society. To achieve the second aim, the effects of the pre-1980 and post-1980 eras on economic modernisation in the country were studied throughout the chapter. Part two focused on the pre-1980 era, showing how the state was able to establish a solid base of centralised policy-making structure, industrialisation, urbanisation and infrastructure. Part three examined the characteristics of the transition to EOI from ISI through a liberalisation program and the effects of the new development strategy on economic modernisation in Turkey. It was shown in this section that the legacy of the pre-1980 strongly affected the subsequent economic trajectory of the country, having both positive and negative consequences on the economic modernisation process. This section argued that the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods should be seen as inseparable parts of a non-Western path to economic modernity. This argument offered by the thesis strongly challenges the conceptualisation of the Turkish economic modernisation by the structural and societal models within the literature.

Part four focused on the final objective of the chapter by assessing the Turkish experience in light of MMP. It was shown that the trajectory and outcome of the
economic modernisation process in the country diverged from the historical Western experience in a number of ways, most notably the role of the state versus the capitalist class. Today, the Turkish case represents an illiberal capitalist economic modernity where the state continues to have a leading role in directing the modernisation process while the capitalist class remains weaker in comparison, being dependent on the state through a patronage relationship. The case of Turkey can be successfully comprehended by MMP as this theory acknowledges the possibility of unique paths of modernisation in non-Western countries, which would not necessarily conform to the features of the Western model. This implies that the socio-political implications of this type of non-Western economic development may be different from the historical trajectory of the West. In this regard, the following Chapter 4 will assess the democratisation process in Turkey to observe if the political trajectory of the country also diverges from the Western modernity.
CHAPTER 4: THE POLITICAL TRAJECTORY OF TURKISH MODERNITY: A PROTRACTED DEMOCRATIC (UN)CONSOLIDATION EXPERIENCE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapters 1 and 2 showed that political modernity is conceptualised by CMT and NMT as the establishment of a liberal democratic regime. Moreover, both theories envisage economic modernisation as impacting positively on the process of democratisation in non-Western societies. MMP, however, does not perceive political modernity as an inevitable outcome of economic modernisation nor does it see political modernisation as synonymous with democratic consolidation process (Arnason 2003). Any country that possesses centralised and effective decision-making mechanisms could be considered politically modern in this approach. Democratisation may manifest as part of the political modernisation experience of a society or it may not (Wagner 2012).

The preceding Chapter 3 concluded that contemporary Turkey is an economically modern society based on the definitions of the concept by all the aforementioned theories of modernity. In this regard, the analysis of the political modernisation experience of an economically modern non-Western country case such as Turkey is helpful to test the validity of hypotheses offered by these theories on the issue of political modernity.

The main objective of the thesis is to show that the framework of MMP can reflect the modernisation process in Turkey more efficiently than the two mainstream approaches. The aim of this chapter is to present an analysis of the political modernisation trajectory of Turkey to conduct this assessment. The chapter will study the Turkish case to highlight the shortcomings of the understandings of political modernity by both CMT and NMT. In this regard, the chapter will argue that the political trajectory of Turkey diverged from the Western path to modernity due to the role played by path dependency, historical contingency and international context. In addition, the chapter will deconstruct the narratives of both the structural and societal models by arguing that neither the secularisation program of Kemalism nor the economic
liberalisation and the rise of the Islamic political movement in the post-1980 period resulted in the consolidation of a liberal democratic regime in Turkey. The definition of the liberal democratic regime that will be utilised in this context is the one developed within the scholarly literature of democratisation and commonly used by international indexes that measure levels of democratisation across the world (See, for instance, Freedom House 2014b; Dahl 1971, 2000; Munck 2009; Stepan 2000; Grugel 2002; Diamond and Plattner 2001; Lijphart 1999; Held 2006; Sorensen 2008).

The chapter consists of five sections. Following this introduction, part two will examine the commonly used theoretical conceptualisation of liberal democracy by scholars of democratisation and international indexes. This section will allow the chapter to clearly define the criteria that will be utilised throughout the chapter to assess the democratisation experience of Turkey. Part three will study the political trajectory of Turkey based on the framework of MMP, but it will particularly focus on the democratisation process to show that the mainstream understandings of political modernisation offered by CMT and NMT – the one applied by the structural and societal models to the case of Turkey – neglect the divergent path that Turkey followed over the years. It will be shown that political modernisation process does not necessarily result in convergence towards the Western model of modernity via the consolidation of liberal democratic regimes. Part four will assess to what extent the contemporary state of political life in Turkey could be considered ‘modern’ according to three schools of modernity. In addition, that part will utilise the perspective of MMP in order to highlight the key divergences of the political trajectory of Turkey from the historical Western path to modernity. Part five contains the brief summary and concluding remarks of the chapter.

4.2 DEFINING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

In order to assess to what extent contemporary Turkey can be classified as a liberal democracy as suggested by the societal and structural models, an operational definition of this regime type is required. As noted in Chapter 1,
one of the main shortcomings of existing studies on political modernisation in Turkey is that the concept of liberal democracy has not been clearly defined based on its most common understanding by scholars of democratisation and international indexes. As a result, narratives propagated about the 'Turkish model of democracy' remains subjective. The chapter will remedy this by examining the characteristics of liberal democratic regimes before assessing the Turkish case of democratisation. In this regard, it is important to note that the research objective of this chapter is not to comparatively examine all the various variants of democracy, but solely focus on the concept of liberal democracy.

The literature on democratic theory and practise is vast. According to one scholar, 'more than 550 sub-types of democracy' have been identified in the academic literature (Vanhanen 2003:48). A noteworthy difficulty involved in the assessment of democratic regimes is the practice of democratic governance, a controversial issue as all kinds of regimes have defined themselves as 'democratic'. This can be attributed to the belief that this vague concept provides legitimacy to governments, which makes it difficult to define what a democracy is, a conundrum highlighted by David Held (2006:1):

[P]olitical leaders of extraordinarily diverse views profess to be democrats. Political regimes of all kinds describe themselves as democracies. Yet what these regimes say and do is often substantially different from one to another throughout the world.

Regardless of the official statements of policy-makers, however, observers are entitled to offer their own judgement on whether a country is democratic or not, based on a clear and objective set of criteria (Dahl 2000:100). Although there are different understandings that produce a wide range of democratic models, it is important to note that democracy, as a governance system, is not entirely subjective. In terms of basic electoral procedures, political rights and civil liberties, it is possible to identify an established understanding (Munck 2009:129).
A commonly used definition can be found in Georg Sorensen (2008:3): ‘Democracy is a form of government in which the people rule’. This simple definition consisting of a few words has been the source of scholarly debates as differences of opinion arise from various ways the terms of ‘people’ and ‘rule’ are interpreted. The term of democracy existed for a long time before the emergence of liberal democratic regimes in Western Europe and Northern America, yet it is important to note that the contemporary form that constitutes a key pillar of the understanding of modernity by CMT and NMT is a new phenomenon that emerged during the 20th century (Dahl 2000:3).

In contrast to the ancient Greek version that entailed different types of rights depending on the social class of a person, the most common characteristic of the post-20th century democracy of the Western world is its inclusivity as it grants voting rights to all adult citizens regardless of their ethnicity, religious belief, and gender or income level. In this conceptualisation of democracy, ‘the rule of the people’ refers to the influence of a large number of citizens on the governance of a country through regular elections. However, the principle of the rule of the people contains within itself a fundamental conundrum, namely ‘who will do the governing and to whose interests should the government be responsive when the people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences?’ (Lijphart 1999:1). Different understandings of democracy emerge out of the various answers given to this question.

The spectrum of conceptualisations are wide, ranging from Joseph Schumpeter’s minimalist understanding of solely having regular elections to a social democracy-oriented broad formulation offered by David Held that takes into account not only the criteria of liberal democracy but also the role of the state as a fair distributor of resources (Schumpeter 1947; Held 2006; Sorensen 2008:11). Based on the possible answers to questions about the rule of the people, Arend Lijphart (1999) defines two main variants of contemporary democratic system: the ‘majoritarian model’ and the ‘consensus model’. While the former refers to a governance type that is responsive to the demands of the majority at the expense of minorities, the latter describes a system in which the
state aims to serve the interests of maximum number of citizens through incorporating minorities into the system. This dichotomy allows us to differentiate between different types of democracies across the world.

The contemporary conceptualisation of the ‘majoritarian model’ is commonly traced to Joseph A. Schumpeter (1947) who defined it as ‘competition for power through free elections’, producing the minimalist understanding of democracy commonly referred to as majoritarianism. Robert A. Dahl (1971) added a number of other principles such as the freedom of expression, equality before law and universal suffrage to this model. The rule of law is another recent addition to the expanding list and, though it is also contested, it can be defined as the equal application of laws regardless of one’s ethnic, religious or political identity and socioeconomic status (Moller and Skaaning 2013:143). Thus, emerged the concept known as ‘liberal democracy’ or ‘the consensus model’ that covers the aforementioned criteria of majoritarianism and extends the meaning of democracy to include a number of civil liberties and the rule of law (Moller and Skaaning 2013:144; Diamond 2008).

The liberal democratic regime rests on several foundations, namely effective and equal participation for all citizens, voting equality and provision of equal opportunities for citizens to make an informed judgement (Dahl 2000:37-38; Doran 2008:32-33). The reason behind the use of this specific criteria is that all these factors are required to ensure political equality, as even if one of them is violated, some members of the society would be more privileged than others to shape the policy-making process (Dahl 2000:38). A key scholar of democratisation, Dahl (1971; 2000:85) offers eight basic requisites for a regime to be defined as a liberal democracy:

1. freedom of association,
2. freedom of expression,
3. the right to vote,
4. eligibility for public office,
5. the right of political leaders to compete for votes,
6. alternative sources for information,
7. free and fair elections,
8. institutions for making government policies depend on votes.

Free and fair elections refer to the absence of coercion that would violate the freedom of choice and unequal treatment that would violate the impartiality of the process (Elklit and Svensson 2001:203; Diamond and Plattner 2001:X). The rule of law prevents the abuse of power by the executive via placing the values of freedom and equality beyond the domain of politics in order to guarantee their protection (Munck 2009:124). These are the key requisites for a liberal democracy to be established, yet a few more principles should be added for a regime to be classified as such, namely ‘the protection of minority rights’, ‘the existence of a free media’ and ‘a robust civil society that can check the executive power of the government’ (Stepan 2000:39; Plattner 2012:65; Grugel 2002:94; Dodd 1988:17-18). In the modern age of mass communication, the political role of media and civil society in terms of constraining the power of the executive has dramatically increased and the lack of such powerful checks or their manipulation by a government would fully jeopardise the liberal democratic nature of a regime. Without the existence of free media and civil society that would enable access to reliable information, citizens cannot possibly be expected to make informed judgment in elections (Munck 2009:125).

Using the conceptualisation of consolidated liberal democracy explained above, the Freedom House Index categorises regimes according to two sets of criteria, the political rights (participation, competition and functioning of government) and the civil liberties (freedom of association and expression, rule of law). Based on this, countries are evaluated to be free, partly free or not free. A consolidated liberal democracy is a free society that fulfils a large degree of the aforementioned set of qualifications (Linz and Stepan 2001:93-94). In the following section, the chapter will use these criteria to analyse the democratisation experience of Turkey, assessing whether the historical and

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32 Democratisation can be defined as ‘the process by which societies develop towards democracy’ (Ishiyama 2012:30).
the contemporary political regime in Turkey can be considered a liberal democracy. The chapter will examine the democratisation process as part of a broader phenomenon of political modernisation based on the framework of MMP.

4.3 THE DIVERGENT POLITICAL TRAJECTORY OF TURKEY

4.3.1 An Ottoman Paradox: Political Modernisation without Economic Modernisation (1838-1922)

Political modernisation is understood by all the theories of modernity – CMT, NMT and MMP – as the establishment of centralised and effective decision-making processes in a society (See Rustow 1960; Huntington 1968; Arnason 2003; Wagner 2012). Unlike CMT and NMT, however, MMP does not equate the consolidation of a liberal democratic regime with political modernity – the inevitable outcome of a political modernisation process. Although the democratisation process began with the transition to free and fair multi-party elections in 1950 – political modernisation can be argued to be a relatively old phenomenon Turkey, initially manifesting in the late 18th century and early 19th century with the implementation of a number of administrative reforms by reform-minded sultans and the bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman Empire.

The rule of Sultan Mahmud II was particularly influential for the acceleration of political modernisation as the Empire was rapidly re-organised from a decentralised structure consisting of diverse communities, autonomous rulers and provinces with differing legal statuses into a centralised organisation that would be governed strictly by the bureaucrats of the imperial capital (Shaw 1976; Göl 2003; Berkes 1964). The reforms launched by Sultan Mahmut II continued after his successor Sultan Abdülmecit I came to power, the proclamation of the Imperial Edict of Gülhane in 1839 marking the beginning of the Westernisation period known as Tanzimat (1839-1876). By the end of the

33 Within this period, the rulers who oversaw profound administrative reforms in particular were Sultan Selim III (1789-1807), Mahmud II (1808-1839) and Abdülmecit I (1839-1861).
34 Known in Turkey as the Gülhane Fermanı, the document was publically proclaimed in the imperial garden of Gülhane in 1839. It introduced many new institutions and laws modelled after the Western state and legal structures, particularly France where many Ottoman bureaucrats were educated.
Tanzimat period in 1876, the Ottoman state possessed a considerable degree of centralised control over its territories, indicating a high level of political modernity in terms of decision-making mechanisms (Shaw 1976; Ahmad 1993).

Starting with the reforms of Sultan Selim III, the phenomenon of political modernisation in the Ottoman Empire manifested via interaction with Western modernity. This external factor, that dramatically shaped the entire subsequent political transformation trajectory, arose from continuous military defeats, which had traumatised the Ottoman policy-makers (Kara 1994). Attributeing the weakening of the Empire vis-à-vis Western states such as France, Britain and the Habsburgs to alleged weaknesses of its institutional framework, the Ottoman bureaucracy launched the political modernisation process as part of an attempt to re-organise the Empire on the model of the West (Kansu 1995).

A crucial event within the political modernisation trajectory was the proclamation of a constitutional monarchy in 1876 by a group of officers, intellectuals and bureaucrats known as the Young Ottomans. This political movement mostly consisted of people educated in European countries and they believed that forming a political structure based on the Western model was the means to shortening the development gap with the West and stopping the decline of the state (Cleveland 2000). Based on this rationale, a constitution (Kanun-u Esasi) was prepared and a bicameral parliament was established. The bicameral parliament consisted of a Sultan-elected Senate and a generally elected35 Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan). During this first experimentation with constitutionalism, there were no official political parties within the parliament and the cabinet was solely responsible to the Sultan – its ministers appointed by him. The parliament and the constitution remained operational for less than two years as Sultan Abdülhamit II suspended both in 1878. Despite the return to absolute monarchy from 1878 onwards, however, the brief 1876-1878 period left an enduring legacy of constitutionalism in the country.

35 There was a two-tier election method: the eligible populace elected delegates who then chose the deputies.
A secret society known as the *Young Turks* emerged in the early 20th century, taking their inspiration from the experience of the Young Ottomans (Ahmad 1993). In 1908, a number of Ottoman army units in the Balkans that were allied with the Young Turks rebelled against the rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II, resulting in an uprising that restored the 1876 Constitution and the parliament. 1908 was a turning point for the history of political modernisation in Turkey as for the first time, a constitutional monarchy with a government accountable to a democratically elected parliament was established. In contrast, the 1876 was only a movement to reform the structure of absolute monarchy, providing with a constitution that limited the executive power of the sultan. In this regard, Aykut Kansu (1995:3) argues that the 1908 uprising was a genuine ‘social revolution’ supported by large segments of people organised into various revolutionary cells and underground opposition movements. Hence, the influence of ‘the 1908 Revolution’ should not be under-estimated by labels such as the ‘Second Constitutional Era’:

To refer to the 1908 Revolution as the ‘Second Constitution’... does not indicate a scientific but an ideological position. In terms of constitutional law, absolute monarchy – *ancien régime* – became ‘history’ in the July of 1908 (Kansu 1995:4).

This time, there were a number of political parties – the most influential ones being the Turkish nationalist CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) and the liberal, multi-national FAP (Freedom and Accord Party) – which competed with each other in elections held across the country. The Constitution and the parliament remained in effect from 1908 until 1920. The 1908-1913 years witnessed, for the first time, to a competitive multi-party political life in the country, which ended with the coup of the CUP that established an authoritarian one-party rule until the end of World War I in 1918. The Ottoman parliamentary life and the constitutional tradition strongly influenced the emergence and subsequent political trajectory of the Republic of Turkey.

Firstly, the parliament that was established in Ankara by the Turkish nationalist movement during the Turkish Independence War (1919-1922) was a direct
product of the Ottoman constitutional monarchy. The last Ottoman parliament convened in Istanbul in 1920 and it was forcefully disbanded by the invading Allied authorities due to the refusal of nationalist deputies to recognise the territorial gains of Greece, Britain, France and Armenia in Asia Minor at the expense of the Empire. The unlawful closure of the Ottoman parliament allowed the nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later Ataturk) to call for the establishment of a new parliament in Ankara to lead the Turkish independence movement legally. Therefore, the legitimacy of the new regime in Ankara was at least partially derived from the constitutional experience of the late Ottoman years (Ahmad 1993). Based on this claim to represent the people of the country, the parliament in Ankara would later abolish the sultanate and proclaim a republic in 1923.

Secondly, the Ottoman constitutional tradition impacted on Turkey as the 1876 Constitution was a precursor to the 1921 and the 1924 constitutions of the Republic. Thirdly, the ruling elite of the Republic such as Kemal Ataturk (first president), Ismet Inönü (second president), Celal Bayar (third president) and Fevzi Çakmak (first chief of staff of the armed forces) were trained in Westernised education institutions of the Empire, their mind-set shaped by ideas of modernisation based on the model of Western societies such as France and Germany (Hanioğlu 2011). In sum, the key components of the institutional structure of the Republic were directly inherited from the political trajectory of the Empire.

The declaration of republic in 1923 is commonly portrayed as a breaking point in Turkey's modernisation, the implication being that the Republican regime was a historic 'anomaly' that only manifested due to the vision of Kemal Ataturk rather than being understood as a product of the path dependent political development trajectory of the country (Kansu 1995:6). This account neglects the origins of Republican Turkey's political modernisation process in the late Ottoman era because attempts to model Turkey on the basis of the Western political modernity framework had long become an established feature of
Ottoman political life from 1839 onwards. In this regard, the 1876 Constitution and the 1908 uprising were notable examples of such efforts.

Long before the Republican regime was founded in 1923, the political trajectory of Turkey had diverged from the Western path of modernisation. If reviewed in light of the understandings of CMT and NMT, the Ottoman experience appears paradoxical as the state achieved a noteworthy progress with political modernity via establishing centralised institutions, a Westernised bureaucracy, a constitution and a functioning parliament, however as shown in Chapter 3, the economic modernisation in terms of industrialisation, urbanisation, mechanisation and high education levels lagged behind the political modernisation process. As such, the Ottoman case stands in contrast with the hypotheses of the scholars of CMT and NMT such as Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) who assumed that economic modernisation would precede political modernisation such that material developments in a society would lead to the emergence of political modernity over time. Conversely, the Ottoman state had modernised politically without a noteworthy progress in economic modernisation. In this regard, CMT and NMT cannot account for the transformation process of the Ottoman state because they overlook the role played by the interaction of non-Western societies such as the Ottomans with the Western world.

As mentioned above, the Ottoman Empire designed its political modernisation program based on the Western state organisations in order to stop its decline vis-à-vis the expanding Western colonial empires. Even though the country lacked most elements of Western economic modernity by remaining a largely agrarian and less-developed economy until its dissolution, it possessed many political institutions of the West by the early 20th century as the imperial elite implemented reforms from above. In this regard, the Ottoman case shows that the encounter between Western modernity and a non-Western society resulted in the emergence of a hybrid modernity that the mainstream theories of modernity do not envisage, but one that the inclusive approach of MMP can explain. MMP recognises the global significance of the Western model of
Modernity as it affected all societies across the world, yet the theory envisages a plethora of different patterns to emerge from this influence rather than a replication of the Western path to modernity:

Modernity has indeed spread to most of the world, but did not give rise to a single civilization, or to one institutional pattern, but to the development of several modern civilizations, or at least civilizational patterns, i.e. of civilizations which share common characteristics, but which yet tend to develop different even if cognate ideological and institutional dynamics (Eisenstadt 1999:285-286).

The divergence of the political trajectory of Turkey from the Western model continued during the Republican period as well, which will be shown in the following sections.

4.3.2 The Kemalist Republic and the Rule of the CHP (1923-1950)

A crucial junction within the political trajectory of Turkey was the approval of the 1921 Constitution by the Ankara parliament. The 1921 Constitution stated that ‘sovereignty belongs to the nation without any condition or restriction and as the director of the Turkish state, the Grand National Assembly [Turkish parliament] is entitled to use all powers in the name of the people’ (Karpat 2010:125). This was a radical departure from the monarchist idea that the Ottoman sultan was the director of the Turkish state and that he was entitled to rule in the name of the people. Before the transition to a competitive multi-party parliamentary system in 1950 and the imminent abolition of the sultanate in 1922, the theoretical framework for the ideas of ‘republic’ and ‘democracy’ was embedded in the legal structure of the country. With the 1921 Constitution, the political legitimacy of the state in Turkey was officially based on the concept of the ‘national will’ for the first time (Mandacı 2012:63).

Nevertheless, the 1921 Constitution did not produce a democratic regime in the country, as the principle of the rule of the people was solely understood at the time as the end of monarchy, not the holding of competitive, free and fair elections. The early years of the Republic in the 1920s and 1930s were shaped
by the rise and consolidation of a one-party authoritarian regime ruled by the Kemalist CHP. After the formation of the second Republican parliament consisting mostly of loyal Kemalists and the implementation of a new and highly restrictive constitution in 1924, the CHP completely dominated Turkish politics, eliminating political opposition through banning parties such as the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) and the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Partisi*) (Tunçay 1981; Koçak 1989; Mandacı 2012:64). Civil liberties were guaranteed in the 1924 Constitution, yet the document also gathered all powers – executive, legislative and judicial – in the hands of the parliament which then delegated them to the government, essentially rejecting the principle of the ‘separation of powers’ that is a prerequisite for liberal democracy (Koçak 1989; Karpat 2010:225). Under such a regime, the full practice of civil liberties could not be possible as the government had dictatorial powers at its disposal to restrict personal and political freedom.

The republicanism of the CHP can be seen as a product of the interaction between Turkey and the political ideas developed in Western societies, however, the Kemalists derived their ideology not from the republican liberal democratic tradition of the USA but the authoritarian state structure of the First French Republic that emerged after the 1789 Revolution (Hanioğlu 2011; Tunçay 2005; Koçak 1989). The influence of the Jacobin republican tradition that gathers all executive, legislative and judicial responsibilities in the hands of a single authority can be seen in many of Kemal Ataturk’s public speeches as he often quoted the writings of thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau to legitimise the concept of *fusion of powers* which stands in contrast with separation of powers (Tunçay 2005:135). In this regard, it should be noted that the ‘six arrows’ of the party program of the CHP which listed the main tenets of the regime contained the principle of republicanism, but it did not include any references to democracy or liberalism. Despite its influences from the French republican tradition, it should be noted that the Turkish bureaucrats and the military founded the Republic of Turkey rather than the urban middle classes of the First French Republic. This crucial difference between the historical
trajectories of the two countries shaped the subsequent evolution of their political regimes, resulting in Turkey to diverge from the 20th century liberal democratic model of Western societies such as France.

Once the rule of the CHP was secure after the elimination of political opposition in the 1930s, the regime implemented its ambitious ‘cultural revolution’ program based on a thorough secularisation of state and society. It has been argued that popular opposition to the social reforms and the large scale of the economic modernisation programs that could only be financed by the state necessitated authoritarianism in this era (Aydin 2005:96). The state structure of Turkey in this period resembled the totalitarian countries of the 1930s and 1940s such as the Soviet Union, Fascist Italy and Germany. Akin to these regimes, the relationship between the ruling party and the state in Turkey was ‘symbiotic’, unlike in liberal democracies such as the US and Britain where there are strict boundaries between bureaucracy, government, parliament and political parties based on the principle of separation of powers (Altunışık and Tür 2005:25; Koçak 1989:154; Tunçay 1981). Another similarity with totalitarian regimes was that the official ideology of the Turkish Republic – not unlike Stalinism – was based on a ‘cult of charismatic personality’ centred on Kemal Atatürk himself:

Shortly after the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, the new ruling cadre mobilized the limited resources of the new state to create and disseminate the Atatürk cult as the new symbol to unify the nation. As early as 1927, Atatürk himself defined his role as a charismatic and authoritarian leader of the new regime and nation in his famous marathon speech... Early representations of the leader depict him as the sole victor of the Greco-Turkish war and the creator of the new nation. Such portrayals aimed to legitimate the new leader by locating him at a higher position than the sultans of the Ottoman Empire he had replaced (Özyürek 2006:95-96).

The roots of the democratisation process that first emerged in the late 1940s in Turkey can be tracked to two sources – internal and external factors. There has been a long and ongoing debate within the discourse on Turkish democratisation about which have been more influential. The first view attributes the transition to a multi-party system in the late 1940s and the
subsequent democratisation attempts to the pressure of external actors such as the US and/or the EU (Yılmaz 1997; Aydın 2005:96). The second view developed by scholars such as Çağlar Keyder (1987) and Korkut Boratav (1994), on the other hand, focuses on domestic factors, particularly the social contract the CHP formed with influential classes of society such as capitalists and landowners. Arguably, the external and domestic factors complemented each other, though the impact of external forces far outweighed that of domestic ones, which will be shown below.

The main domestic factor was the rise of opposition to the policies of the CHP. However, this opposition was not in the form of a popular social movement, but rather as inter-elite competition. The CHP leadership mainly consisted of the Kemalist elite with a background in either the bureaucracy or the military, yet the source of its support within the society at large was derived from two social groups, namely the emerging capitalist class of urban centres and the landowners of rural areas (Keyder 1989; Berberoglu 1977; Boratav 1989). The economic policies of the CHP in the 1940s alienated both of these classes from the party (Altunışık and Tür 2005:26). As shown in Chapter 3, while the wealth tax and the protectionist trade policy weakened the support of capitalists, the proposed land reform that envisaged the distribution of lands to landless peasants resulted in the party to lose the crucial support of landowners, triggering a power struggle within the party.

The land reform proposal crystallised the intra-party opposition as four members36 of the CHP signed a petition calling for democratising reforms including more individual liberties and room for legal opposition to the policies of the government (Altunışık and Tür 2005:26; Aydın 2005:99; Koçak 1989:177). When the CHP leadership rejected the petition, a group of deputies supportive of the proposal resigned from the party, setting the stage for the formation of an opposition party, the DP in 1946. At this critical juncture, the decision of President İsmet İnönü determined the subsequent political

36 The group is known as ‘Dörtlü Takrir’ in Turkey. It consisted of influential CHP members Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koralan who later founded the DP.
trajectory of the Turkey. İnönü encouraged the intra-party opposition to form another party rather than tightening the grip of the regime over the political system (Koçak 1989:177).

The transition from an authoritarian one-party rule towards a multi-party, competitive system in the country was achieved via the unilateral decision of President İnönü in a top-down fashion, rather than because of significant social pressures, though the growing dispute and emerging factions within the CHP deserve to the acknowledged. As the former Prime Minister, İnönü had been highly influential in the previous decisions of the regime to ban opposition parties – the Progressive Republican Party and the Free Republican Party – throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Karpat 2010:225-255). There was intra-party opposition to some policies of the regime in the 1920s and 1930s as well, yet the CHP did not hesitate to eliminate opposition in the previous instances. Why did İnönü change his stance this time and allow the formation of opposition parties and the holding of competitive, free and fair parliamentary elections? The reason can be found in the international political system of the post-World War II years, as external factors entirely shaped the political trajectory of Turkey in this period.

In the years following the end of World War II in 1945, the national security of Turkey was being threatened by the Soviet Union that demanded eastern provinces of the country such as Artvin and Kars as well as military bases in the straits of Istanbul and Çanakkale which served as a gateway between the Mediterranean Sea and the Soviet shores in the Black Sea. In this political conjuncture of the late 1940s, the Turkish policy-makers began to align towards the emerging NATO and the anti-Soviet bloc led by the US in order to ensure the national security of Turkey. In an attempt to gain the support of Western European countries and the US for the full membership of Turkey to NATO, President İnönü initiated a transition process in the late 1940s, believing that Western democracies would be more likely to protect a fellow democratic regime against the expansionism of the Soviet Union (Keyder 1989; Koçak 1989:174-179).
The expectation of the Turkish government of economic aid (i.e. the Marshall Fund) from the US also affected the decision for democratisation (Aydın 2005:96). As shown in Chapter 3, at the end of World War II, the Turkish economy was suffering under the effects of the wartime mobilisation that resulted in severely deteriorating living conditions; therefore, the country was in dire need of foreign aid (Koçak 1989:170-171; Boratav 1989). In an international political economic system dominated by the US and its predominantly liberal democratic allies in Western Europe such as Britain, France and West Germany, democratisation seemed the only means to enhance the prestige of Turkey (Mandaçı 2012:66; Karpat 2010:229; Koçak 1989:1979).

In this context, it is important to note that Turkey was able to qualify for the post-war economic aid program of the USA – the Marshall Plan – only after it initiated a democratisation process. This was followed by full membership of Turkey into NATO in 1952 under the first democratically elected government of the country. In sum, the first step in a democratisation process in 1950 occurred mainly because of the pragmatic national security and economic development strategy of the ruling elite.

Multi-party political life in Turkey was not born as an outcome of socio-economic triggers in the domestic realm such as a class struggle. This stands in contrast with modernisation experiences of consolidated liberal democracies such as Britain, France and the US in which democratic regimes were manifested as a result of internal struggles for political and economic power between social classes such as the landed aristocracy, capitalist bourgeoisie, peasantry and urban workers (Moore 1966). In the 1950s, the socio-economic roots of liberal democracy were weak in Turkey as no noteworthy social movements consisting of urban classes and/or peasantry demanded a regime change. As such, the particular transition of Turkey from one-party authoritarianism to multi-party life in 1950 constitutes a major divergence from the Western path to political modernity. As the preceding section of the chapter showed in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the political modernisation of Turkey continued to evolve through an intense interaction with the Western world rather than because of its own process of socio-economic change. Not
unlike the Ottoman era, the ruling bureaucratic elite took the key decisions regarding the modernisation of Turkey.

4.3.3 The Advent of the Democratisation Process in the Multi-Party Era (1950-1980)

In 1946, the first multi-party elections of the Republican era were held, yet this cannot be seen as the beginning of democratisation because it is noted that the elections were manipulated\(^\text{37}\) by the ruling CHP (Akşin 1996:216; Koçak 1989:182). After the elections, the DP demanded an official parliamentary inquiry to investigate the claims for fraud but this was rejected by the incumbent CHP administration. On the eve of the 1950 elections, however, the request of the DP to adopt a secret ballot system was adopted. In contrast to the 1946 elections, the 1950 multi-party elections were free and fair and resulted in the DP to win an electoral victory, ending the 27-year one-party rule of the CHP.

In the 1950-1960 period, the political life of Turkey was characterised by a \textit{de facto} two-party system in which the CHP and the DP competed for power albeit there were smaller and less influential parties such as the MP (Nation Party). The parliamentary and municipal elections held during the 1950s were free and fair, yet the transition to a genuine liberal democracy in this decade proved highly problematic as the authoritarian essence of the political system remained intact (Rustow 1970:362; Karpat 2010:63). When the DP was in opposition during the 1946-1950 period, its party program emphasised the need to democratise the institutional structure of the country, even promising to legalise the workers’ right to strike, yet the DP did not implement any of its promises after it came to power (Akşin 1989:215).

The restrictive 1924 Constitution which constrained civil liberties and the authoritarian state framework based on a centralised decision-making process directed by the bureaucracy were neither modified by the CHP before the 1950

\(^{37}\) The secret ballot system was not used. Instead, the votes were cast openly and counted secretly by the bureaucrats. As such, the ballot box officials could clearly see the choices of every citizen while there was no judicial supervision over the whole election process.
parliamentary elections nor in its aftermath during the rule of the DP throughout the 1950s. Because the transition from an authoritarian regime to multi-party elections occurred as the result an external factor and by fiat of the existing political elite, the policy-makers did not feel pressure from social forces for a change in the institutional structure. In the absence of an effective separation of powers and influential social forces that could check the government, the democratically elected DP administration gained near-absolute authority over the political system not unlike the CHP of the preceding decades (Rustow 1988:243; Özdemir 1989:227). Again, there was no legal boundary separating the government, the bureaucracy and the ruling party from one another (Ahmad 1977:1). The only noteworthy difference between the political system of the early years of the Republic and that of the 1950s was the holding of regular, free and fair elections in the latter. The freedom of the media and the autonomy of civil society from state control were just as constrained in the 1950s as it had been the case under the rule of the CHP (Akşin 1989).

Most of the leadership and cadres of the DP consisted of former members of the CHP, therefore the party can be considered a product of the mentality of the one-party regime of the pre-1950 period, underlining the negative impact of path dependency on Turkey’s democratisation process. As the practise of democracy in Turkey remained limited to the holding of regular elections during the 1950s, the concept of the ‘national will’ – an abstract notion without any substance – was utilised by the incumbent DP government, the leaders of the party perceiving themselves as the sole representative of the ‘nation’ due to their parliamentary majority (Ahmad 1977:44-45). Thus, the government did not see the monopolisation and the subjugation of state institutions, judiciary, media and academia as a violation of democracy, rather as a prerogative of a government that had the support of the majority of voters (Akşin 1989; Ahmad 1993:102-120). This was best demonstrated during an interview between the journalist Ahmed Emin Yalman and the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in the aftermath of the second electoral victory of the DP in the 1954 elections:
The elections have revealed just how much the citizens like the road I have taken. Thus far I used to think it worthwhile to consult you journalists. But the people's lively confidence suggests that there is no further need for such consultations (Ahmad 1993:112).

Once in power, rather than reforming the system towards a liberal democratic institutional structure, the party leadership utilised it for its own advantage, particularly from the second half of the 1950s onwards when popular support for the party began to decline because of an intensifying economic crisis (Karpat 2010:55; Ahmad 1993; Akşin 1989). After the 1954 parliamentary elections, the DP assumed an increasingly majoritarian understanding and gradually shifted further towards authoritarianism, perceiving criticism of the opposition in the parliament and media as illegitimate attacks on the 'national will' which they allegedly represented (Mandacı 2012:68-69).

In the 1957 elections, the share of votes for the DP dropped to 48.6 percent, barely ahead of the CHP’s 41.4 percent, resulting in a crackdown on the opposition within the media, academia and non-governmental organisations (Mandacı 2012:70). Between 1955 and 1960, the DP administration arrested many critical journalists, sentencing them to prison without even providing them the opportunity to defend themselves in court (Akşin 1989:216). Hundreds of academics, prosecutors, mayors and judges suspected of sympathising with the opposition were also removed from their positions (Akşin 1989:216-217).

By 1960, an economic crisis considerably worsened the living conditions of a sizable portion of the citizenry and the DP expected the CHP to defeat them in the upcoming parliamentary elections of 1961 (Akşin 1989:218). The same year, the DP formed a series of parliamentary commissions (solely consisting of the DP deputies) in an attempt to ban the CHP and a number of smaller opposition parties. If the DP attempts to ban the opposition parties had been successful, a second period of one-party authoritarian rule in the Republic would have started. However, hundreds of cadets of the military academy in Ankara organised a demonstration against the DP on 21 May 1960, leading the
Prime Minister Menderes to issue an order to close the academy temporarily (Akşin 1989:223). The crisis between the government and the officers was shortly followed by a military coup in 27 May 1960. The coup did not lead to the formation of a military dictatorship as the junta managed a transition process and allowed the multi-party life to resume by holding a free and fair parliamentary election on 15 October 1961.

In light of the failed decade-long democratisation experience of Turkey in the 1950s, it can be argued that the absence of social forces that could support the democratisation drive was the primary source of problems. The 1960 military coup was a direct consequence of the lingering authoritarianism within the institutional framework of the state (Yalçın 1967:709). Paradoxically, the 1960 coup that overthrew a democratically elected government – albeit one that was on the verge of building a fully authoritarian one-party regime – also marked a key turning point for the advancement of the democratisation process (Aydın 2003:318; Özdemir 1989; Ahmad 1993; Altunışık and Tür 2005). The 1961 Constitution was the most democratic constitution in the history of the country to date, one that granted extensive political and civil liberties to citizens in addition to building a number of strong checks and balances to constrain the excessive executive powers of the government (Özdemir 1989:228; Ahmad 1993:129).

The country had made the first stage of a transition to liberal democracy in 1950 by beginning to hold regular, free and fair elections, yet its institutions had remained organised according to the mechanisms of a one-party authoritarian regime during the 1950s. The 1961 Constitution was a major attempt to remedy this by setting up institutional checks on the power of the executive branch via an independent constitutional court (Anayasa Mahkemesi), an upper house of parliament called the Senato (Senate), a proportional election system and an increased autonomy for media and universities from the control of the government. Moreover, the autonomy of local governments was increased while the freedom of association was enhanced, enabling the civil society to flourish in the post-1960 period (Yalçın 1967:710). The new ‘Political Parties Law’ reduced
the influence of party chairpersons on the intra-party decision-making process. Despite its positive effects on the democratisation drive, however, the 1961 Constitution also legalised the influence of the military over Turkish politics by establishing an institution called the MGK (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu). Officially, the duty of the MGK was to advise the government, yet its influence and jurisdiction increased over time, particularly after the 1980 coup. The military tutelage over elected governments rapidly became a key deficiency of the democratisation process in the post-1960 period.

A noteworthy civil society emerged for the first time in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s due to the relatively liberal constitution of 1961, yet the country was beset by ideological polarisation in these years. A key consequence of the 1961 Constitution was the rise of Marxist political movements such as the TİP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) and numerous non-governmental organisations such as labour unions and university students’ movements as these groups benefited from the liberties provided by the document (Altunışık and Tür 2005:35). The proportional election system and the increased freedom of association enabled diverse political views to be represented in the parliament, transforming the political life from a de facto two-party system towards a highly competitive and multi-party system. In addition to the two mainstream parties – the secularist/social democrat CHP and the social conservative AP (Adalet Partisi) – the socialist TİP, the Turkish nationalist MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), the Islamic MNP (Millî Nizam Partisi) and its successor, the MSP, were able to assert themselves via gaining notable influence in the parliament. For instance, the MSP and the MHP were junior partners of a number of coalition governments during the 1970s.

It can be argued that the accelerated economic modernisation process of Turkey impacted for the first time on the political life of the country in the 1960-1980 period. As explained in the preceding parts of this chapter, there was no visible interaction between the economic and political modernisation processes until these years. However, the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of Turkey began to affect political life in the 1960s and 1970s by triggering the rise of
influential social forces. Benefiting from the increased freedom of association, both the capitalists and the workers became ‘class-conscious’ by forming class-based organisations to defend their interests more effectively against other social groups and the state (Özdemir 1989:259; Ahmad 1993:134).

A large group of factory workers in major urban areas of the country formed the DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) in 1967 to collectively bargain with their employers and governments for the improvement of safety regulations in workplaces, higher wages, provision of better health care and retirement pensions and various other social and economic rights. The politicisation of university students also intensified in this era, resulting in the formation of numerous organisations based on diverse ideologies and links with the political parties of the country. One of the largest and most influential student movements of the 1960s and 1970s was the DEV-GENÇ (Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu) founded in 1969. The mass 1970 demonstrations jointly launched by the DİSK and DEV-GENÇ members in the most industrialised two cities of the country at the time – Istanbul and Kocaeli – demonstrated the extent of the noteworthy influence gained by Marxist social movements in Turkey (Özdemir 1989:260). Partly as a reaction to the rise of socialist activism among the labour force, the capitalist class formed its own union in 1971 – the TÜSİAD – to avoid losing the upper hand against the workers in the social and economic decision-making processes in the country (Ahmad 1993:134).

Basic liberties and political rights were granted to citizens by the 1924 Constitution, yet the same document also indicated under what conditions these liberties could be restricted, in effect, empowering the state disproportionately over the citizenry (Cook 2007:100). The 1961 Constitution was much more liberal than its predecessor was, but its liberal nature was limited after the 1971 military intervention. Through threatening to use force on the government, the military demanded the constitution be amended due to the perception of the political liberties it provided as being ‘excessive’ to the extent of posing ‘a threat to the unity of the country’ via empowering Marxist groups that were allegedly aligned with the Soviet Union (Özdemir 1989:261). Before the military
intervention of 1971, the country experienced a brief decade of unprecedented political freedom, enhanced civil liberties and rising social movements, the 1960s constituting a noteworthy progress for democratisation in the country (Ahmad 1993:121-147; Akşin 2000:266-267). However, the state establishment (i.e. the military officers) overpowered the social forces and gained control of the political modernisation trajectory once again. From 1960 onwards, the overwhelming power of the military and its incessant political interventionism became the main contingent force that subverted the experience of Turkey from that of the Western model.

The 1971 intervention resulted in the repression of left-wing social movements, thousands of academics, lawyers, high school teachers, artists, labour union leaders and university students being arrested while many were reported to be tortured by members of the security forces (Selçuk 1987; Özdemir 1989:261). In this political conjuncture, the technocratic government and the parliament that were put in place by the military approved the death sentences for the three leaders – Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan and Yusuf Aslan – of an armed communist organisation, the THKO (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu). This was followed by the closure of the socialist TİP and various labour unions and students’ organisations by the Constitutional Court.

It can be argued that the execution of the three communist leaders, the complete elimination of democratic space and the draconian measures adopted by the military against the socialist movements resulted in the emergence of numerous highly militant and armed organisations in the 1971-1980 period (Çem 1980; Ahmad 1993:148-180). As a result of the 1971 amendment to the constitution, the rise of the political violence between ultranationalist and left-wing militias and a series of short-lived and unstable coalition governments, the democratisation drive of the 1960s could not be sustained in the 1970s. As noted in Chapter 3, the intensifying political chaos of the late 1970s was worsened by an economic crisis from 1977 onwards, culminating in another military coup in 1980.
The 1961 Constitution had a largely positive influence on the democratisation process in Turkey, but it has been argued that the relative weakness of elected governments due to the restriction of their powers by various institutions such as the Constitutional Court, the Senate and the MGK negatively affected political stability (Mandacı 2012:75-76). This perceived weakness and failure to ensure political stability caused initially the 1971 military intervention in which the military forced the elected government to resign. When the political violence reached unprecedented levels in the late 1970s – to the extent of a low-intensity civil war – accompanied by a severe economic crisis, the military once again launched a coup in 1980, this time changing the overall institutional structure rather than merely changing the government (Cem 1980; Özdemir 1989:275; Donat 1987). In 1971, the constitution was amended and some liberties were curtailed, while in the post-1980 years, the constitution was replaced by a highly restrictive one that sought to eliminate political dissent and freedom of association altogether.

A product of the 1980 coup, the 1982 Constitution was more similar to the 1924 Constitution than the 1961 Constitution. The 1982 Constitution – which is still in effect in Turkey today – protected the state against the political actions of the citizens, the opposite of what a liberal democratic constitution is supposed to do (Özbudun 2012b:149; Coşkun 2013:95). Even though the 1982 Constitution provided basic liberties, it also restricted them heavily. For instance, Article 68 granted the right to establish political parties, but it also indicated that parties cannot challenge or violate ‘the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, human rights, national sovereignty, and the principles of democratic and secular principles’ (T.C. Resmi Gazete 1982). Since 1982, the governments and the state bureaucracy utilised such restrictive clauses against pro-Kurdish and Islamic political parties, effectively constraining the freedom of association and the freedom of expression (Cizre 1999; Cook 2007).

The 1982 Constitution also increased the role of the MGK in Turkish politics, prioritising the ‘suggestions’ of this institution in the policy-making process. Thus, the institution evolved from being an advisory council in the 1960-1980
period towards sharing executive responsibility with the government in the post-1980 years, gaining the ability to directly impose its will onto elected governments which further consolidated the military tutelage. In the post-1980 period, the strength of the state vis-à-vis the society increased to such extent that Turkey has been defined as a ‘transcendental state’ in which the citizenry ‘do not have rights, but duties, service and obligations towards the state’ (Kılıç 1998:92). The post-1980 institutional framework of the state became rather effective at providing immunity to public officials for violations of the rights of citizens, resulting in the state to be not accountable (Turam 2012b:110). The 1982 Constitution also dismantled the Senate and strengthened the executive vis-à-vis the legislative branch while increasing the prerogatives of the presidency and the Constitutional Court to act as checks on the power of the government (Balkır 2007:415).

Between 1982 and 2013, the constitution was amended many times, however, it is important to note that the strongly established tradition of ‘reform from above’ via the will of the state in contrast to the demands of social forces continued (Aydın 2005:101). In the following part of the chapter, it will be shown that the political trajectory of Turkey before and after 1980 demonstrated continuity in terms of not being able to consolidate liberal democracy. In light of the criteria of liberal democracy, so far, the chapter focused on the pre-1980 period and highlighted the reasons behind the absence of a liberal democratic regime in these years. As such, the chapter contested the narrative offered by the structural model, which is based on the hypothesis that the secularisation program of the 1930s and the state-led modernisation effort of Turkey laid the groundwork for a liberal democratic regime to manifest.

4.3.4 The Travails of Democratisation in Contemporary Turkey (1980-2013)

This part of the chapter focuses on the post-1980 political trajectory of Turkey and contests the narrative of the societal model, which claims that contemporary Turkey is a consolidated liberal democracy that emerged as the
result of a ‘democratisation from below’, namely the rise of social forces. In order to determine whether a liberal democratic regime emerged in this period, the characteristics of the political regime in the 1980-2013 period will be analysed thematically in light of the criteria established to identify such regimes in part two. This section will conclude with an examination of the political life of contemporary Turkey ruled by the AKP since 2002. It will be shown that a number of path dependent deficiencies that were inherited by the pre-1980 period (e.g. the military tutelage) and the contingent new products of the post-1980 years (e.g. the lack of intra-party democracy) characterised the protracted unconsolidation process of liberal democracy in contemporary Turkey.

4.3.4.1 The lack of intra-party democracy (1983-2013)

In the wake of the 1980 military coup, a new phenomenon that manifested in Turkish politics was the elimination of intra-party democracy. Compared to the preceding military interventions in 1960 and 1971, the junta of 1980 was exceptional in regards to the long duration of its rule – almost three years until 1983 – and the extent of its political engineering program that sought to design a completely new political system based on what the junta called ‘a disciplined democracy’ (Akşin 2000:286; Ahmad 1993:181-212). An essential element of this vision of was the introduction of the new ‘Political Parties Law’ in 1983.

With the law, party chairpersons became the sole authority regarding the preparation of candidate lists for the parliament. This was in contrast to the norm of the preceding 1960-1980 period when the party organisation was selecting the members of parliament (Tanör 1995:55-59). With the new system, the responsiveness of members of parliament towards voters in their constituent areas decreased considerably, while their need to gain the approval of party leaders increased. The result was an extremely strong party discipline that resembled the strict chain of command and the culture of unquestioned obedience to superiors seen in military units rather than democratic deliberations that characterise decision-making mechanisms of political parties
within liberal democratic regimes (Freedom House 2008; Toker 2008; Tanör 1995).

The Political Parties Law allows the party leader to cancel any intra-party elections at the local level, completely subjugating the provincial and district organisations to the control of the chairperson (Toker 2008:31). Party members cannot act independently from party chairpersons unless they are willing to risk not being nominated in the next elections or direct expulsion from the party. Even when a party is in power, party members and the members of parliament experience difficulty in shaping the decision-making process as party leader and a select clique of advisors hold monopoly over decisions of parties, and by extension, the government (Aydın 2005:103).

In addition, the law forces all political parties to adhere to a single model of organisational framework, preventing them from forming different organisations for specific districts, opening branches abroad and forming official ties with civil society organisations (Cizre 1999:23). Party chairpersons and members of the executive committees are elected by delegates of parties who have no accountability to the citizenry, rather owing their positions and loyalty to party leadership. Moreover, party leaders often abuse the law to ‘cherry-pick’ their supporters and place them in strategically vital positions of the party hierarchy while eliminating their political opponents within the party:

It is apparent that political parties compete in national elections which provide legitimacy to the governing power, yet competitive and fair elections within the party are seen as threatening to their monopoly of power (Cizre 1999:23-24).

The existing ‘Electoral Law’ constitutes another serious defect that hampered democratic consolidation process in Turkey. Unless a party obtains the 10 percent of all votes in the entire country, the national election threshold imposed by the law prevents that party from gaining seats in the parliament, even if it wins all the votes in specific provincial districts. This leads to the monopoly of a few major political parties of the entire political system, excluding the smaller parties while discrediting the votes of many citizens.
Moreover, only the parties that gain more than 7 percent votes in parliamentary elections are entitled to financial assistance from the state treasury, further consolidating the hegemony of major parties (Toker 2008:28).

In the post-1980 period, the Political Parties Law produced ‘a cult of charismatic leadership’ as the party leaders are allowed to be re-elected without any term limits which means that the same chairpersons manage to remain in power indefinitely even if they consistently fail to achieve any success in parliamentary elections (Jenkins 2010:240; Aslan-Akman 2012:158; Taşkı̈n 2013:300). As shown in Canan Aslan-Akman’s study (2012:168), interviews conducted with many current and ex-members of the ruling AKP and other major political parties of the country such as the CHP and MHP highlight the importance attached to personal loyalty rather than merit in the eyes of party leaders for promotion – resulting in intra-party democracy to remain weak due to the absence of criticism and competition.

Political parties are the main agents of liberal democratic regimes across the world and the absence of democracy within the organisational structures of parties in Turkey constitute one of the key deficiencies of the democratisation process (Freedom House 2008:11; Toker 2008; Vardan 2009:50; Aydın 2005:103; Aslan-Akman 2012:174). It is important to note that today, the authoritarian framework of the Political Parties Law is still in effect in Turkey.

4.3.4.2 The rise and decline of military tutelage (1980-2013)

As explained in the preceding section, the military played a major role within the policy-making process in Turkey, directly interfering in politics in 1960, 1971 and 1980 while indirectly exerting influence over the elected governments through the utilisation of the MGK. The military tutelage constitutes one of the key ‘anomalies’ of the political trajectory of Turkey, one that fully differentiates its experience from that of the Western path of modernity envisaged by the mainstream theories, CMT and NMT. Such an influential position for a military is unseen in the political life of consolidated liberal democracies of the West.

After the 1980 coup, the military tutelage continued in the 1980s and 1990s, leading some scholars to brand Turkey as ‘the country with two governments’ (Cizre 1999:58; Jenkins 2010; Cook 2007). The role of the MGK had been paramount for the consolidation of military tutelage as this institution extended its mandate from the narrowly-defined field of national security to developing policies for unrelated issues to military matters such as determining the contents of textbooks in primary schools, the content of news in television channels, the closure of newspapers and television channels and even advising a government about the election coalitions between political parties on the eve of the 1994 municipal elections (Cizre 1999:70; Rouleau 2000:105).

For most of the post-1980 period, the military preferred to impose its will indirectly ‘from the shadows’, acting as the ‘supervisor’ of the political system based on the Kemalist ideology. In addition to the utilisation of the MGK, the ties that the military formed with other elements of the state establishment with a similar dedication to Kemalist ideology such as the Constitutional Court also proved influential in ensuring the continuation of the Kemalist rule over the state (Cook 2007; Cizre 1999). The multi-party political life of the 1980-2002 period did not prove sufficient to constrain the military tutelage as arguably, it was even reinforced during the 1990s due to the inability of coalition governments to direct policy-making effectively. Throughout the 1990s, the military managed to steer the course of political life via encouraging parties (e.g. the DYP-RP and later the ANAP-DSP-MHP) to form coalition governments and establishing a de facto political rule of consulting prime ministers on the selection of ministers and policy-making (Jacoby 2005:654).

In 1997, the military was involved in another direct intervention to political life – the so-called 28th February Process – when it formed a coalition with the Constitutional Court, sympathetic elements of the media and the secularist political parties to pressure the Islamic RP-led coalition government to resign.
(Cizre 1999; Jenkins 2010; Cook 2007). In retrospect, the turning point for the role of the military in the country was the 2002 parliamentary elections that brought the AKP to power.

The AKP rule of the 2002-2013 period resulted in a dramatic decline in the role of the military in politics. The increasing power and legitimacy of the AKP derived from three successive electoral victories – in 2002, 2007 and 2011 – and the heavily publicised investigations of alleged coup attempts against the government constituted the main factors that weakened the military tutelage (Aknur 2013:132). The decline of the military tutelage initially began during Turkey’s EU accession process in the early 2000s. After the EU confirmed the official candidacy of Turkey for full membership into the organisation in 1999, it presented a list of reforms called the ‘accession partnership document’ to the Turkish parliament. The implementation of these political reforms was the precondition for the EU membership.

The most critical reform expected from Turkey was in regards to the role of the military as the EU demanded the institutional source of the military tutelage to be removed from the political system (EU Commission 2007). This was mainly a reference to Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, which had established the MGK as a highly influential institution in policy-making. Before the EU accession process, the MGK was comprised of six top-ranking officers from the military and five ministers from the elected government, therefore enabling the former to have the majority vote in the meetings.

In 2001, the membership structure of the MGK was reformed to include more civilians than military representatives in order to ensure the civilian control over the institution (Kaloudis 2007:57). The AKP administration further amended the status of the MGK in January 2004, entirely limiting the use of this institution by the military to impose its will: the secretary-general of the MGK would no longer be appointed by the military but selected by the government. Thus, the government took control of the agenda and policy recommendations of the institution.
The EU harmonisation packages that were implemented by the AKP had major implications on the overall influence of military as the ‘State Security Courts’ that consisted of a mix of civilian and military judges were abolished and the military representatives appointed by the chief of staff of armed forces were removed from the YÖK (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu) and the RTÜK (Radyo ve Televizyon Yüksek Kurulu) which used to be utilised by the military to effectively censure the press and academia, eliminating expressions of alternative ideologies and criticism of Kemalism (Cook 2007:128). The military did not overtly object to any of these changes due to concerns regarding Turkey’s EU membership process. If the military were to be seen as directly affecting the policy-making process, the EU accession process could have been negatively affected.

It is believed by many secularists in Turkey that the AKP – which originated from the Islamic political movement of Turkey known as the ‘National View’ – pragmatically implemented the reforms required for Turkey’s EU accession for the purpose of eliminating the influence of military rather than genuinely aiming to consolidate liberal democracy (Usul 2008:179; Duran 2010:333; Jenkins 2010:236). As such, secularist political organisations such as the CHP and the ADD (Atatürkçü Düştünce Derneği) repeatedly accused the AKP administration of abusing the EU accession process to purge the country of Kemalist secularism (Çınar 2008:122; Göl 2009:796). Since the latter half of the 1990s, the intellectuals and reformists politicians of the Turkish Islamic political movement had begun to believe that the religious freedom of Sunni Muslims and their right to express themselves in public space could be effectively protected against the assertive secularist regime via the democratisation program required for Turkey’s accession into the EU (Duran 2010:336).

The EU accession process resulted in a dilemma for the military as the membership was seen as necessary to become part of the European civilisation, a long objective of Kemalism, yet it was also known that the reforms would

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38 Ataturkism is the Turkish equivalent of Kemalism. This study prefers to use ‘Kemalism’ as this is the term used in the scholarly literature in English language, whereas the same concept is commonly known as ‘Ataturkism’ (Atatürkçülük) in Turkey.
result in the military losing its influential role in Turkish politics (Bilgiç 2009:817). The military remained sceptical about the willingness of the EU to grant full membership to Turkey, yet the accession was seen as the final stage of Kemal Ataturk’s Westernisation program, preventing most elements of the armed forces from overtly questioning the reforms implemented as part of Turkey’s harmonisation with the legal and political system of the EU (Jenkins 2010:235). Paradoxically, the key goal of its own Kemalist ideology – being part of the Western civilisation – ‘entrapped’ the military into abiding by the reforms that were the prerequisites for the EU accession process to continue (Jacoby 2003:674; Sarıgıl 2007:39; Burak 2011:145).

Despite the elimination of its official authority over the government through amendments to the status of the MGK, however, the military was still able to exercise indirect influence in the early years of the AKP rule. Until 2007, the military effectively constrained the ability of the AKP administration to act independently through making constant references to the threat against secularism in regular public statements which were complemented with the highly critical stances adopted towards the government by the secularist President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Constitutional Court (Çınar 2008:113). In this context, it is important to note that the position of the chief of staff of the Turkish military remained under the supervision of the Prime Ministry, not the Ministry of Defence as is the case in liberal democratic regimes of the West. Thus, in terms of the official hierarchy and actual influence on the decision-making process pertaining national security matters, the chief of staff still possessed more power than the minister of defence had (Cizre 1999:72).

Despite the chronic mistrust of the military for the AKP, however, the presence of a moderate general known as a ‘dove’ as the chief of staff – Hilmi Özkök – ameliorated the tensions between the military and the government in the early years of the AKP rule (Jenkins 2010:244). Nevertheless, General Özkök was under heavy pressure from radical Kemalist officers, resulting in the military clashing with the AKP as key leaders of the party such as Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç were personally visited by Özkök and other high-ranking generals
in the parliament and were warned about their various statements seen by the military as violating secularism (Jenkins 2010:244-247). One particularly heated clash between the military and the AKP occurred in May 2004 when the government announced a reform package to ease the entry of religious school graduates into universities, leading the military to issue a statement that overtly criticised the package. Shortly after, the government abandoned its reform package and shelved the proposal. This incident clearly demonstrated the continuing ability of the military to pressure the government even in issues that were not related to national security in the early years of the AKP rule. After the successive victories of the AKP in the parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011, however, the military had diminished its early zeal for confrontation and adopted a compromising stance, particularly since the non-interventionist chief of staff, General Necdet Özel, was assigned to this once-influential position by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in August 2011 (Aknur 2013:139).

The influence of the military in Turkish politics decreased in parallel with the increasing legitimacy of the AKP administration, derived from its electoral victories. A key factor that facilitated the elimination of military tutelage since 2007 was the so-called Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, the two major investigations into allegations of conspiracy against the government by some elements of the military and security services. A faction within the armed forces – often referred to as the ‘Euroasianists’ (Avrasyacılar) – opposed EU membership due to the reduction of the influence of military and the intensifying reforms that would allegedly result in the collapse of the nation-state via the secession of Kurds from the Republic with European aid (Cizre 2008:141). According to this faction, Turkey's fate lay elsewhere, in forming alliances with non-Western countries such as Russia, Iran and China, in addition to joining the Shanghai Pact rather than the EU (Cizre 2008:141). The Eurasianist group was accused of planning a coup to overthrow the AKP government. Allegedly, the culprits had planned a series of assassinations and bombings in order to create a security crisis in the country and trigger a military coup against the AKP government.
The *Ergenekon* and *Balyoz* cases resulted in a strong division of opinion in the country. While many liberal columnists and scholars perceived the trials as a major step in entirely eliminating the military tutelage and advancing liberal democracy in Turkey, the critics of the government pointed to the high number of imprisoned journalists who were critical of the AKP, claiming that the trials were utilised by the government to eliminate its critics within the media, academia and military (Polat 2011:213). It is important to note that regardless of whose claims are accurate, the trials revealed the weakness within the judicial process in the country as they were characterised by excessive pre-trial detention periods extending up to a few years, questionable connections between suspects and cases as well as the lack of strong evidence (Polat 2011:214). Nevertheless, the alleged coup cases that resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of officers severely tarnished the reputation of the Turkish military as the popularity and credibility once possessed by the armed forces declined considerably (Cizre 2008:162; Aydınlı 2012:104; Aknur 2012b:238). Until the last few years, the military was consistently ranked as the most trustworthy institution in all the public opinions polls made in Turkey, possessing a high degree of public support (Aydınlı 2012:101). In the aftermath of the publicised cases, even the secularist civil society organisations and protestors began to display scepticism of the role of military in politics as witnessed during the 2013 *Gezi* Park protests, one of the highly popular slogans of the demonstrators being ‘we want neither *shari’a* nor coup’ which was also used during the 2007 ‘Republican demonstrations’ (Göle 2013; Göl 2009:801; Aydınlı 2009:587).

Today, it is clear that the once-mighty military tutelage over Turkish politics has disappeared. The decline of the military as a determinant factor of Turkish politics signifies one of the most profound changes in the political trajectory of the country. Since the late Ottoman era, the Westernising forces of the central state – the military and the bureaucracy – were the main agents that shaped the modernisation process. The removal of military tutelage by an elected civilian government was expected to impact positively on the consolidation of liberal democracy as a key difference between the political system of Turkey and that
of the Western countries was finally eliminated (Cook 2007:X). However, a variety of factors has prevented this outcome.

In the wake of the removal of the military tutelage, a type of system referred to as majoritarianism began to characterise the political life of Turkey since 2011 (Özbudun 2014; Göle 2013). As explained in part two of this chapter, majoritarianism is a regime type that downgrades the practice of democracy to its most rudimentary version – the holding of regular, free and fair elections – in the absence of other prerequisites of liberal democracy such as checks and balances, intra-party democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and protection of minority rights (Lijphart 1999). With the gradual rise of a majoritarian one-party regime ruled by the AKP, Turkey shifted towards another form of divergence from the Western liberal democratic modernity rather than converging towards its values.

4.3.4.3 Civil liberties in the post-1980 period

Civil liberties refer to personal freedoms that are subject only to laws established for the good of the community, therefore they cannot be restricted arbitrarily by the government through laws or judicial interpretation. As noted in part two of this chapter, the legal protection of civil liberties such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of religion are among the essential criteria required for a liberal democratic regime to function (Dahl 1971; 2000). In this regard, neither the pre-1980 era nor the post-1980 years of the political regime in Turkey can be effectively identified as a liberal democracy as the violation of civil liberties by the state was commonplace in both periods (Alpay 2010:370; Aydın 2005:104; Hürsoy 2012:116; Vardan 2009:50; Dodd 1988:21; Rustow 1988:242; Usul 2011:143; Aknur 2012a:1; Kılıç 1998:104; European Commission 2012).

The low intensity civil conflict of the late 1970s shaped the characteristics of the post-1980 political and legal system (Jacoby 2005:645). The military elite identified two mutually inclusive groups as the main potential enemies of the
state, namely the leftists of various strands and the suspected sympathisers of 'Kurdish separatism' (Jacoby 2005:646). The new institutional system was designed mainly against the two groups, the 1982 Constitution and many complementing articles of criminal law aiming specifically to curb and eliminate all possible expressions of these groups' view in public space, effectively making it a crime for a citizen to voice any ideas perceived as a danger to 'national integrity', a concept interpreted highly subjectively by judges and prosecutors (Jacoby 2005:645-647).

In the post-1980 period, the 1982 Constitution, the Penal Code, the Press Law and the Anti-Terror law have been the legal sources that regulated freedom of expression and freedom of association in Turkey. The constitution severely restricted freedom of association and freedom of expression in the country. Article 28 that focuses on the practice of civil liberties indicates that 'publications which would endanger the national security are prohibited' (T.C. Resmi Gazete 1982). In this regard, the restriction of civil liberties by the constitution was complemented by Article 301 of the Penal Code that envisages severe penalties for 'the crime of insulting Turkishness'. The inclusion of vaguely defined concepts such as 'the endangerment of national security' and 'insulting Turkishness' into the main legal documents of Turkey allowed governments and judicial authorities to prosecute political opposition and critics of the illiberal practices of the state, effectively constraining freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Usul 2011:156; Freedom House 2008:16; Hayes 2007:12).

Public intellectuals such as minority rights activist and journalist Hrant Dink, columnist and academic Murat Belge, novelists Orhan Pamuk and Elif Safak were among those who were prosecuted under Article 301 of the Penal Code. Hrant Dink was convicted and given a suspended six-month prison sentence for 'insulting Turkishness' in an article published in the newspaper Agos that discussed the killing of Armenians in 1915. The publication of Agos was suspended briefly in 2001. Murat Belge, Orhan Pamuk and Elif Safak also faced charges for publicly discussing the killing of Armenians and Kurds by the
Ottoman and Republican states respectively. In one of his articles written shortly before he was shot and killed by an ultranationalist Turk in 2007, Dink (2007:25) argued that the judiciary in Turkey is not an independent institution that protects the liberties of citizens, but it is actually a device of the state establishment designed to constrain freedom of speech and prosecute all those who criticise the policies of governments, the official ideology of the state and the deficiencies within the democratisation process.

In this context, one particular trial case reveals the way Article 301 has been used to constrain freedom of expression:

For example, one interesting case concerns two professors, Baskın Oran and İbrahim Kaboğlu, who are now awaiting trial. They were asked to work for the Committee of Human Rights established by the office of the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The government asked them for a report on identity questions in Turkey. Their argument was that ‘Turk’ is an identity of one ethnic group (albeit much the largest) and that the country also includes other ethnic groups such as ‘Kurd’ or ‘Arab’. Therefore Türkiyeli (Türkiye being the name of the country) should be the ‘higher’ identity. In this way they sought to create a nuance between ‘Turkish’ and ‘of Turkey’. The idea was to find the equivalent of a neutral term, like ‘British’ or ‘the United Kingdom’, one that can accommodate the identities of ‘English’, ‘Scottish’, and ‘Welsh’ people... But then a prosecutor decided to open a case charging two professors with dividing the Turkish nation (Belge 2007:45).

The 1982 Constitution and the ‘Law of Association’ both regulate freedom of association in Turkey, imposing numerous requirements for establishing an association. The difficulty involved in fulfilling an extensive list of requirements results in complete state control over the activities of non-governmental organisations as one scholar notes: ‘[O]ne might think that law-makers had deliberately aimed to restrict them [associations]’ (Usul 2011:161). The Law of Association was amended in 2004 as part of Turkey’s EU accession process. The original law had banned all ties between political parties and civil society, whereas the amended version allows associations to form official ties with political parties, therefore potentially enabling the civil society to take a more influential role in politics of Turkey (Usul 2011:161).
Arguably a result of the amended liberal version of the Law of Association, more than 100,000 civil associations exist in Turkey as of 2013, some of them capable of mobilising masses on major political issues as witnessed in the 2007 public protests against the murder of journalist Dink and the Gezi Park protests of 2013 (Kubicek 2011b:920). If it is well organised and pro-democratic, civil society may play a key role in checking the power of the executive branch and contributing to the consolidation of liberal democracy through expressing public demands for reforms in the political and legal system. Civil society is required to sustain a consolidated liberal democracy, yet it is no guarantee of the system by itself as authoritarian forces may also manipulate this sphere (Keyman and İçduygu 2003:232). Moreover, the number of civil society organisations does not necessarily mean that liberal democracy is emerging. In 2007, there were over 19,000 registered civil society organisations in Egypt and this number had already reached 65,000 in Turkey in the mid-1990s – both of them can hardly be described as liberal democracies – while in Argentina which had been thoroughly democratised since the 1980s, this number remained around only 1,000 in the 2000s (Cook 2007:7). In the case of Turkey, the primacy of the state within the direction of the political life continued in the 2000s despite the increasing number of non-governmental organisations.

In the early decades of the Republic, the authoritarian state did not allow any room for the existence and growth of an independent civil society, rather seeking to eliminate all manifestations of a potential challenge to its total control (Erdoğan-Tosun 2012:179). Civil society strongly emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, bolstered by the liberal 1961 Constitution, yet it was repressed once again with the 1980 coup. The second rise of civil society began in the late 1980s and 1990s as a result of the economic liberalisation process, rapidly expanding in size, scope and variety across the country (Erdoğan-Tosun 2012). Nevertheless, the presence of a highly centralised bureaucracy and the state-led decision-making process limited the impact of civil society on the political trajectory of Turkey (Heper 1992; Altan-Olcay and İçduygu 2012).
As with the aforementioned elements of civil liberties, ensuring freedom of the press remained a problematic issue in the post-1980 democratisation experience of Turkey. The media had been susceptible to the disruptive influence of governments and business groups in Turkey, resulting in its limited potential to provide reliable information for citizens. The economic liberalisation program of the 1980s, in particular, impacted negatively on the objectivity and impartiality of the press. In this regard, the rapid commercialisation of newspapers and television channels resulted in the media being transformed into a tool of business corporations to pursue their interests via negotiating state contracts with governments in return for providing supportive broadcasting (Alpay 2010:376; Freedom House 2008:18). Patronage politics considerably weakens the principle of the freedom of the press. This was particularly the case in the 1990s as highlighted by a political scandal in 1998:

The nature of the relationship in the late 1990s between media control on the one hand and commercial and political power on the other is perhaps best demonstrated by the case of a businessman named Korkmaz Yiğit. Mr Yiğit, after winning the public tender for the privatisation of the state owned Turkish Trade Bank (Türk Ticaret Bankası) in 1998, moved to purchase two national dailies (one from each of the two big media groups, Milliyet and Yeni Yüzyıl) and two television stations. Soon after being arrested on charges of having links to organised crime, he stated that he had been encouraged to buy the media outlets by Motherland Party ministers [ANAP], anxious to have a media group that would loyally support them. The scandal led to the resignation of the government led by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz in 1998 (Alpay 2010:378).

The restriction of this crucial element of liberal democracy in the country continued in the 2000s and early 2010s as Turkey is ranked 154th out of 179 countries assessed in a 2013 report by Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index (Reporters Without Borders 2013; Kubicek 2013a).

4.3.4.4 Citizenship and identity in the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods

Even though the society in Turkey is highly pluralistic in terms of containing a number of different ethnic and religious communities, the official ideology of
the state did not reflect this variety of identities due to the particular nation-state formation of the country in the 1920s and 1930s (Özkırımlı and Sofos 2008; Navara-Yashin 2002). The Kemalist Westernisation program of the 1930s attempted to form a secular and Turkish identity in Turkey, resulting in the marginalisation of ethnic Kurds and conservative Muslims who did not adopt this homogenous vision of a nation (Cook 2007:99; Ergil 2000:123; Navara-Yashin 2002). The conceptualisation of citizenship in this manner overlooked the rights and liberties of the individual, instead opting to define a communitarian identity based on exclusionary Turkish nationalism (Hann 1997:32-33; Cizre 1999:9; Özbudun 2012a:61). The opposition of conservative Muslims and Kurds resulted in various uprisings against the regime in the formative years of the Republic (e.g. the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925). The clash between the ‘Turkishness’ of the state and the resistance of the Kurdish minority to it lied at the heart of the violent conflict between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) which resulted in the deaths of over 30,000 citizens in the 1984-2013 period (Rouleau 1996; Ergil 2000:122).

The PKK grew within the ideologically-charged political context of the 1970s, initially emerging as a radical Marxist movement supported by Kurdish students, later evolving into a militant organisation that utilised terrorist methods, targeting mostly Turkish military personnel as well as civilians in its struggle for Kurdish political rights (Güneş 2012). In the mobilisation of Kurdish citizens of Turkey around the PKK, the repressive measures of the 1980 coup was influential as the junta banned the use of Kurdish names and resorted to the torture of prisoners within the predominantly Kurdish region of south-eastern Turkey (Ergil 2000:127). After the 1980 coup, approximately 81,000 Kurds were arrested, many being subjected to various forms of inhumane treatment while imprisoned (Jacoby 2005:648-649).

The Kurdish language is estimated to be the mother tongue of about 20 percent of the citizens in Turkey, yet the state long prohibited its teaching in schools and its use in broadcasting and printing (Ergil 2000:122). For long, the issue of Kurdish rights in Turkey was portrayed by the governments, the mainstream
media and the military as either a socio-economic problem that supposedly emerged due to the poverty of the predominantly Kurdish region or a problem facilitated by the ‘conspiracies of foreign powers’ (Göçek 2008:91).

The first steps towards reconciliation with the Kurds emerged in the late 1980s under the rule of Prime Minister (later president) Turgut Özal. A number of political and economic reforms such as the removal of the ban on the usage of Kurdish language and the recognition of the European Commission of Human Rights jurisdiction in human rights abuses in the country were implemented in the Özal period, attributed at least partially to Özal’s desire for Turkey to join the EU (Vardan 2009:51). In 1991, for the first time in Republican history, 22 Kurdish deputies representing a pro-Kurdish party – the HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi) – were elected to the parliament as a result of the electoral coalition between the social-democrat SHP (Sosyal-demokrat Halk Partisi) and the HEP. When a member of parliament from the HEP used the Kurdish language in the parliament, the Constitutional Court banned the party and many of its members were arrested. The reconciliation did not continue during the coalition governments of the 1990s. Concrete initiatives re-emerged only in the political reformation period following Turkey’s official candidacy to the EU in 1999.

One of the most critical reforms implemented as part of the EU accession process was the lifting of the ban on the usage of non-Turkish languages such as Kurdish and Armenian in teaching and broadcasting (Vardan 2009:51-52). When the AKP came to power in 2002, emergency laws and special courts existed in nine provinces of southeastern Turkey, populated mostly by Kurds (Rouleau 2000:112). Abolition of special courts and lifting of the emergency laws were the first initiatives of the new government. Unlike most Turkish political parties and the state establishment, the AKP’s understanding of the Kurdish issue was reformist as it did not see it as a national security problem but ‘within the parameters of political freedoms and rights’ (Duran 2008:96). The legitimacy and the representation capability of the parliament increased since 2002 as the long repressed Kurdish movement entered the parliament via

The issue of Kurdish rights and identity was a 'taboo subject' until the 2000s as even mentioning words such as Kurdish rights or ‘Kurdistan’ could lead to prosecution and subsequent imprisonment (Göle 2000:55). In this regard, considerable progress has been made in the 2000s under the AKP rule and today; the government, wide sections of media and civil society as well as most major political parties – with the exception of the Turkish nationalist MHP – acknowledges the Kurdish rights issue in Turkey. The rise of the pro-Kurdish BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) with more than 30 members of parliament in 2011 and the increasing number of peaceful negotiations between the government and representatives of Kurdish political movement signifies a profound change of perspective in Turkey (Updegraff 2012:119). In recent years, representatives of the Kurdish movement such as the BDP publicly demanded more political and cultural rights for the Kurdish minority as well as regional autonomy from the central state based in Ankara (Updegraff 2012:120).

Despite the improvements of Kurdish rights in recent years, major problems remain today, barring a final peaceful resolution of the issue: the absence of a reference to the Kurdish identity in the constitution and the continuing utilisation of the Anti-Terror Law and the Penal Code by judicial authorities to prosecute the expression of Kurdish identity (Usul 2011). A number of initiatives, dubbed the 'Kurdish Openings' by the media in Turkey, were launched by the AKP administration to implement reforms to resolve the conflict, yet the first round of negotiations failed in 2009. The second initiative was launched in 2013 and it continues at the time of the writing of this thesis. It is important to note that despite the recognition of the Kurdish language, the EU reports and those of notable international non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch continue to be critical of deficits regarding minority rights in Turkey, arguing that more cultural and political rights should be granted to those communities who demand them such

In an attempt to respond to demands for more rights by Alevi and Kurds, the AKP launched an initiative to draft a new constitution after the 2007 parliamentary elections. However, the government unilaterally organised a committee to draft the constitution and refused the presence of representatives from a wide range of civil society organisations and opposition parties in the parliament (Gümüşçü and Sert 2010:63). This attitude reflected the authoritarian decision-making process that has characterised constitution making in Turkey for so long, as none of the constitutions of the country emerged as products of a social contract with wide participation into discussions. A new initiative was launched by the AKP after the 2011 elections - this time with the participation of the three opposition parties in parliament as well as representatives from some civil society organisations – yet this attempt also failed to produce a draft constitution as of 2015 due to disagreements between parties.

The similarity between the AKP and the Kemalist establishment in terms of their conceptualisation of politics as the monopoly of a ruling class and top-down approach to decision-making process has been noted (Özbudun 2014). Under the AKP rule of the last decade, the Press Law, the Anti-Terrorism Law and the Penal Code were consistently used by courts to constrain freedom of expression – particularly in terms of the repression of dissenting voices on the Kurdish issue – imprisoning many scholars, journalists, activists and politicians with charges of ‘treason’ and ‘terrorism’ on the basis of their public speeches and/or writings (Göçek 2008:90; Gunter 2012:120-121). During the AKP rule since 2002, none of the legal foundations for the repression of minority rights were eliminated from the legal system, continuing to constitute a deficit for the consolidation of liberal democracy. For instance, a key principle of liberal democracy is the creation of an environment suitable for the expression of all identities, yet the contemporary Turkish political system continues to restrict the political participation of pro-Kurdish parties through the national election
threshold of 10 percent, which limits the influence of a particular community on the policy-making process.

In addition to Kurds, Turkey contains a number of other minorities such as Alevis. The Alevis long demanded to be officially regarded as a community by the Turkish state via the recognition of their worship places – the Cemevleri – as an equivalent to mosques that possess privileges such as the provision of a large budget from the state to cover the cost for praying services. The AKP leadership made a number of public statements about this matter, revealing the view of the party that perceives Alevism as differing merely in interpretation of Islam not as a community in its own right, continuing to see mosques as the sole worship places for all Muslims (Usul 2008:188). It is important to note that the Alevis are not represented in the official institution, the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs). While the AKP argues that the Diyanet is not a Sunni institution, the EU perceives it as a device of the state designed to spread a Sunni understanding of Islam (European Commission 2006; Usul 2008:188). Another contentious issue, in this context, is the compulsory religious classes in schools where it is claimed by the EU report that Alevis are instructed only in Sunni interpretations (EU Commission 2006:16).

The AKP initiated the so-called ‘Alevi Opening’ and organised meetings with several Alevi organisations; however, the government did not accept any of the demands of Alevi groups with the exception of the introduction of a section on Alevism in the textbooks of religion courses. Other demands were the abolition of the compulsory religious courses, abolition of the Diyanet or equal recognition of Alevis and Sunnis within the institution and the official recognition of the Cem Evleri as places of worship (Gümüşçü and Sert 2010:66). It can be argued that the Alevis do not enjoy the same rights granted to Sunni citizens as the costs for the worship places of Sunnis and the salaries of clergymen are covered by the Diyanet whereas the Alevis lack any state support. It is important to note that the prioritisation of the rights one religious group over others by the state in a pluralistic society violates the principle of secularism and the criteria of liberal democracy.
As analysed above, neither the Kurds nor the Alevi have been incorporated into the political system of Turkey yet, therefore, both communities remain marginalised:

While being a Sunni-Hanefi-Turkish-male would increase your chances to climb up in the social ladder, being an Alevi-Kurdish-female would similarly push you to the bottom (Taşkı̇n 2013:299).

In addition to Kurds and Alevi – the two largest minority groups of the country – sexual minorities constitute another discriminated-against community in contemporary Turkey. In recent years, the country witnessed a number of street protests launched by activists affiliated with LGBTT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transsexual) associations aiming to draw attention to the struggle of this community for legal recognition of their rights such as gay marriage (Amnesty International 2014). So far, it is not possible to state that these activities produced a visible change in the policy-making of the government, which overlooks the existence of these communities.

The issue of identity is directly linked with the democratisation process in the country as liberal democratic model dictates that all citizens must have political and civil equality in terms of their representation in the public sphere (Dahl 2000). The official ideology and the political system of the state continue to exclude or restrict alternative expressions of identities by non-Muslims, Alevi and Kurds in addition to those of various smaller minorities (Taşkı̇n 2013:299; Çınar 2008; Kılıç 1998). In sum, as the establishment of liberal democracy requires the recognition of cultural, religious and sexual differences and the equal treatment of all communities in the legal and political system, contemporary Turkey could not be argued to fulfil these criteria (Özbudun 2012a:87).
4.3.4.5 A report card on the AKP rule: the democratisation drive (2002-2007) and the shift towards majoritarianism (2007-2013)

The rule of the AKP can be roughly divided into two periods based on the contrasting policies the government adopted: the early years of progress towards democratisation through the EU accession process (2002-2007) and the later years characterised by an increasing shift towards majoritarianism that began to curtail civil liberties in fields such as freedom of expression and freedom of the press (2007 - 2013).

Right at the beginning of the new millennium, Göle (2000:60) wrote that ‘Turkey is in search of a new political movement that could synthesise tradition and modernity, unite Turks and Kurds, shorten the gap between the social centre and periphery, offering solutions derived from political liberalism rather than authoritarianism’. The AKP, during its first years in power, seemed to be that long expected progressive/liberal democrat political movement to many observers in Turkey and abroad (see Çınar 2005:175; Dağı 2004; Morris 2005; Dede 2011). Shortly after it came to power in 2002, the AKP built on the democratisation packages initiated by the preceding coalition government of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to harmonise Turkey’s legal and political system with the EU standards. The party rapidly accelerated the pace of the democratisation drive in order to gain the support of Western European countries, legitimising the Turkish regime in their eyes for the aim of joining the EU (Aydın 2005; Freedom House 2008:6; Yıldız 2012:281; Örmeci 2012:208; Duran 2010:348). Therefore, not unlike the late 1940s, the democratisation program emerged in the country due to Turkey’s interaction with Western modernity, rather than the pressure of domestic social forces.

Enhancement of human rights formed a key element of the reform packages initiated by the AKP, the government appearing supportive of cultural pluralism and the provision of more political rights to the Kurdish minority. The program included the abolition of capital punishment, lifting of the ban on broadcasting and publishing in minority languages and the improvement of women’s rights
through an amendment to the 1982 Constitution. In this context, the Ministry of Education developed a program popularly called ‘Let All Girls to School’ aimed to increase literacy levels of female children in Turkey. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these reforms were implemented with the initiative of the government based on an external incentive, the EU accession process, continuing the state-centric decision-making mechanism of the country. The willingness of the AKP to undertake all the required reforms for the EU accession and the vocal support of party leadership to the process led observers to associate the party with ‘Europhilia’ (Dağı 2004:143). The AKP’s initial enthusiasm for democratisation should be sought in the party’s expected outcomes of the process, namely the elimination of the military influence over civilian policy-making (Özel and Özcan 2011:127; Aydın 2005:243; Gümüşçu and Sert 2010:59).

Since the electoral victories of the party in 2007 and 2011, the AKP leadership appears to have lost its initial enthusiasm for the democratisation process as the party consistently reacted harshly to any criticism of its policies in the media resulting in the claim that ‘criticism may cost one’s column in a newspaper’ which is rapidly becoming a well-known norm in the media (Taşkın 2013:299). Why did the AKP change its approach over the years, moving from a progressive stance towards an increasingly unilateral and top-down decision-making mechanism? The answer lies in the combination of several reasons: the deterioration of Turkey-EU relations, the elimination of the restraining influence of the Kemalist military, the increasing hegemony of the AKP in Turkish politics derived from its electoral successes and the chronic weakness of the institutional checks and balances in containing the power of the executive branch in the country.

The EU's influential role in shaping the political trajectory of Turkey began to decline after 2005 as the government and the public opinion started to show signs of fatigue with the accession process. This can be attributed to the widespread belief in the Turkish public that the organisation would never admit Turkey as a full member as Western European countries appeared to
consistently favour Turkey’s regional rivals, Greece and Cyprus, in political conflicts such as the Cyprus dispute, resulting in the Turkish government and media accusing the EU of ‘double standards’ (Duran 2008:101). The feeling of unfair treatment of the AKP administration was further enhanced by reports of the organisation that overlooked the problems experienced by conservative Sunni citizens due to the assertive secularism that banned all expressions of religiosity in public space, whereas the same EU reports consistently highlighted the ongoing problems about the expression of identity and civil liberties of Alevi and Christian minorities (ECHR 2005; Çınar 2008:123). Particularly, the European Court of Human Rights’ approval of the ban on headscarves in Turkish universities imposed by the Turkish Constitutional Court on 11 November 2005 led to the alienation of the AKP from the EU and its affiliated institutions.

In the aftermath of the five democratisation packages implemented by the AKP, the EU began to voice its warnings by 2005, indicating that the reform process in Turkey had slowed down and the regime could still not be evaluated as a consolidated liberal democracy (EU Commission 2005, 2007, 2012). In order to enhance the quality of democracy in Turkey, the EU suggested a number of reforms: the reduction of the 10 percent threshold required for parliamentary representation of parties, the introduction of legal rights for sexual minorities, the provision of equal rights and religious freedom for the Alevi, the resolution of the Kurdish rights issue through negotiation with representatives from Kurdish political organisations and ending the repression of non-Muslim minorities through measures such as the seizure of their assets and bans on religious teaching in schools belonging to these communities (EU Commission 2012, 2013).

In response to the EU’s demands for more reforms, the AKP adopted a defensive stance as public statements of the AKP leaders accused the EU of ‘double standards’, ‘supporting Kurdish terrorism’ and ‘attempting to divide Turkey’ through demanding more political rights (amounting to autonomy) for Kurds (Usul 2008:187). Also, the reforms that were implemented as part of the EU accession process in the early 2000s did not reflect in the practices of the state, especially in terms of local governance as the highly bureaucratic decision-making process of the centre continued to overlook the demands of citizens across the country (Çelenk 2009). For instance, the 2004 reform package that legally provided the same power to the local governments with their EU counterparts had not been put into practice as the democratically-elected mayors continued to share their responsibilities with bureaucratic governors appointed by the central government in Ankara as well as remaining heavily dependent on Ankara for funds (Thumann 2010:33).

Since the 2008 Financial Crisis, Turkish leaders such as the Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasised the strength and resilience of Turkish economy vis-à-vis the fragility of EU economies such as Greece, Spain and Ireland, which also weakened the initial public zeal for the EU membership in Turkey (Kubicek 2011b:921-23; Vardan 2009:52; Lagendijk 2012:169). Public opinion polls show that support for the EU membership dramatically decreased in Turkey over the years, from 73 percent in 2004 to 33 percent in 2013 (Eurobarometer 2006; Usul 2008:189; Kubicek 2011b:922; The Economist 2013).

The AKP’s political reforms since 2002 largely focused on empowering the elected government and weakening the influence of the Kemalist elite in the military and bureaucracy, whereas enhancing the practice of basic rights and liberties of the citizens lagged behind (European Commission 2012; Öniş 2013; Taşkın 2013; Turam 2012b; Lagendijk 2012; Kubicek 2011a). The sporadic negotiations with the Kurdish and Alevi citizens did not produce visible results in terms of fully integrating these marginalised communities into the political system yet. A key issue that characterised the later years of the AKP rule had been the increasing utilisation of the Anti-Terror law by the judiciary to target
political opposition to the government, resulting in the imprisonment of many journalists, academics and activists. There were 273 people convicted of the charge of terrorism in 2005, rising to 6,345 in 2009 and approximately 12,000 by the end of 2012, making Turkey the first country in the world in terms of the number of convicted peoples with charges of terrorism, ahead of authoritarian states such as China (Cop 2013:66; Kubicek 2013a:43).

The AKP continued Turkey's authoritarian tradition of using tax investigators of the Ministry of Finance to punish opposition media corporations such as the Doğan group that owns a number of influential opposition newspapers such as Hürriyat and Radikal (Thumann 2010:33; Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012:302). Since the party came to power, a dramatic change in the ownership of media assets was witnessed as numerous popular newspapers and television channels of conglomerates such as Doğan, Ciner and Uzan groups were taken over by the AKP administration based on allegations of tax fraud and transferred to ‘more government friendly owners’ (Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012:307).

By 2014, a significant section of the media outlets in Turkey such as Sabah, HaberTürk, Star, Yeni Şafak, Takvim, Show TV, SKY Türk TV, NTV and ATV is allegedly under the control of the AKP and its supporters within the business world, resulting in an excessively positive portrayal of the policies and leadership of the party (Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012; Çınar 2008:122; Baydemir 2011:44; Lagendijk 2012:173; Tibi 2009). Since 2007, the AKP leadership continuously referred to elections as the sole source of legitimacy for their rule, overlooking other key characteristics of liberal democratic regimes such as the rule of law, civil liberties, protection of the identities of minorities and freedom of the press, thereby displaying a majoritarian understanding of a democracy limited only to the holding of regular elections (Çınar 2008:123; Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012; Özbudun 2014; Öniş 2013). Not unlike the DP in the 1950s, the AKP leadership portrayed the party as the sole representative of the ‘national will’ in reference to its three parliamentary election victories, overlooking the fact that opposition parties collectively gained an equivalent
amount or more votes than the AKP in these elections (Taşkın 2013:294; Öniş 2013).

One of the most noteworthy factors that produce majoritarianism in contemporary Turkey is the absence of checks and balances, a crucial prerequisite for liberal democracy. By 2007, three forces that were capable of checking and balancing the executive power of the AKP administration existed: the presidency, the military and the judiciary. Until that year, all three were controlled by the political rivals of the AKP as a well-known Kemalist ex-judge, Ahmet Necdet Sezer was the president, the military was able to impact on policy-making and the judiciary also acted in unison with the military via utilising the authority of the Constitutional Court. As analysed in the preceding sections, the military tutelage came to an end in 2007. The same year, the term of President Sezer ended, leaving the election of the next president in the hands of a parliament dominated by the AKP. The AKP successfully elected a key leader of the party, the foreign minister Abdullah Gül to the presidency in the second round of votes in the parliament.

After the elimination of the extra-judicial check the military imposed on the AKP government and the election of Abdullah Gül to the presidency, the Constitutional Court assumed the role of balancing the AKP government. In liberal democratic regimes, the main purpose for the existence of Constitutional Courts is to protect the citizens against the actions of the executive branch and the supervision of the actions of the government in terms of their compatibility with the constitution. In the Turkish case, the Constitutional Court played a different role. The Kemalist military’s closest ally within the state had long been the Constitutional Court that dedicated itself to protecting the official Kemalist ideology via containing the two alleged threats against the regime, the Kurdish nationalists and Islamists (Özbudun 2012b:156; Cizre 2012:122). In 2008, the Constitutional Court accused the AKP administration of ‘being a centre of anti-secular activities’, the party barely managing to escape closure due to the absence of majority vote in the court (Göl 2009:795).
The failed attempt of the Constitutional Court was followed by the AKP preparing a constitutional amendment to change the status of the institution. The voters approved the constitutional referendum on 12 September 2010. The number of judges in the Constitutional Court rose from eleven to seventeen while the influence of the parliament and presidency (both controlled by the AKP) over the selection of these judges increased. In effect, the amendment increased the power of the government over this institution, weakening the checks and balances via jeopardising the autonomy of the judiciary from the other two branches of the state (Freedom House 2008:20; Turam 2012b:111; Kubicek 2011a:444; Aknur 2012c:440). As the systemic opposition to the AKP government from the Kemalist state establishment had been eliminated and the political opposition within the parliament remained weak due to the relatively small numbers of seats obtained by the three opposition parties CHP, MHP and BDP vis-à-vis the AKP, the party strongly consolidated its rule over the political trajectory of Turkey.

In this context, an opposition to the AKP administration recently manifested via street protests. The Gezi Park protests of the summer of 2013 quickly expanded its original aim of protecting a park at the heart of Istanbul and transformed into a movement that targeted the ruling AKP, in particular the Prime Minister Erdoğan (Göle 2013:8; Yayla 2013:13). It has been argued that the increasing interference of the prime minister in the lifestyles of non-conservative citizens of the country via public statements and policies (e.g. attempting to limit the alcohol consumption and restricting abortion and Caesarean section) resulted in the marginalisation of secularist sections of the public and its subsequent mobilisation as an opposition movement in the streets (Ete 2013:16; Atay 2013:39; Yayla 2013:11; Abbas 2013:24).

A key factor that caused the rapid expansion of uprisings across the country was the heavy-handed approach of the security forces against the protestors as Web-based social networks such as Facebook and Twitter were filled with images of police brutality, resulting in the victimisation of the protestors in the eyes of some segments of the public (Abbas 2013:21). The Gezi Park protestors
were comprised of many diverse groups such as LGBT associations, Kurdish rights activists, social-democrats, liberals and environmentalists, though the majority appeared to be of secularist and/or left-wing ideological stance (Eşkinat 2013:45; Ete 2013:20; Yayla 2013:9-10). The protestors lacked a clear ideology – similar to the Arab uprisings of 2011 – and the factor that united activists from a wide spectrum of political identities was their common opposition to the government, many participants referring to the alleged shift towards authoritarianism as the main reason for their protests (Abbas 2013:26). Ultimately, the protest movement failed in its objective of forcing the government to resign, yet it was reflective of the disillusionment of various groups from the government. The increasing marginalisation of these groups in contemporary Turkey is reminiscent of the disenfranchisement of the Islamic political movement in the era preceding the AKP rule. It appears that the country achieved little success in consolidating liberal democracy over the last decade as the roles of the social conservatives and their non-conservative opponents had simply been reversed. A majoritarian understanding that excluded and repressed political opposition continued its hold over Turkish politics. The failure of the Gezi social movement to reach its objective also signified the continuing primacy of the central forces (the state and/or the government) over the social forces in shaping the political trajectory of Turkey.

4.4 READING THE POLITICAL TRAJECTORY OF TURKEY THROUGH THE MULTIPLE MODERNITIES PARADIGM

As stated in the introduction of the chapter, the three theories of modernity have different understandings regarding political modernity. While CMT and NMT equate it to the gradual formation of liberal democracy, MMP conceptualises it as a broader process that solely refers to the emergence of centralised and effective decision-making mechanisms. In the model of MMP, democratisation may or may not be part of the political modernisation process of non-Western societies. The two mainstream approaches to the study of modernisation in Turkey – the structural and societal models – applied the hypotheses of CMT and NMT respectively, claiming that contemporary Turkey
constitutes a successful model of liberal democracy. Nevertheless, the structural and societal models did not base their claims on a fully explained definition of liberal democracy.

The study of the Turkish case conducted in the preceding part three showed that rather than converging towards the Western liberal democratic modernity, the democratisation process in Turkey suffered from numerous deficiencies which prevented the formation of a liberal democracy, based on the commonly used understanding of this regime type within the scholarly literature of democratisation analysed in part two. In this context, can we evaluate contemporary Turkey as a politically modern society? Contrary to the claims of the structural and societal models, Turkey is characterised by majoritarianism rather than liberal democracy. As such, Turkey cannot possibly be identified as a modern society through the utilisation of CMT and NMT frameworks, which are based on the Western model of modernity that excludes any society that does not conform to its values. However, Turkey could be considered modern according to MMP because it possesses a central state structure that possesses effective control over all spheres of life in the country.

As noted in Chapter 3, Turkey could be defined as an economically modern society by CMT and NMT. As both of these theories presuppose that economic modernisation would result in the consolidation of liberal democracy, they fail to provide an answer to this question: how an economically modern country such as Turkey cannot possess liberal democracy? In contrast to CMT and NMT, MMP argues that modernisation is a transformation process that ultimately produces different outcomes (modernities) which do not necessarily reflect the features of the Western model. Therefore, MMP provides more appropriate conceptual framework to study modernisation, because it can successfully explain the differences between the ‘political modernities’ of non-Western cases such as Turkey and that of the West. Accordingly, the origins of the various forms of modernities are rooted in the divergences within the historical trajectories of societies from one another (Wagner 2012; Eisenstadt 2000;
Arnason 2002). The validity of this idea can be seen in the case of political modernisation in Turkey.

The late Ottoman era was marked by major progresses in political modernisation, yet there was not a noteworthy development in the field of economic modernisation. This phenomenon continued during the early years of the Republic as well. The country had made the transition from a monarchy to a republic that was *de jure* based on ‘the rule of the people’ as written in the 1921 and 1924 constitutions, yet the state was an authoritarian construct ruled by a one-party regime. The rapid economic modernisation of the 1920s and 1930s as shown in Chapter 3 did not impact on the political trajectory as the transition from authoritarianism towards a multi-party life with free and fair elections was made as a consequence of national security concerns rather than a considerable amount of pressure from the citizenry.

Reading from the perspective of MMP, a key divergence of the political modernisation trajectory of Turkey from the Western experience was the extraordinary impact of the military on the whole process. The military played a paradoxical role: on one hand it contributed to the democratisation process by designing a liberal democratic constitution in 1961, but on the other hand it wished to control ‘the ebb and flow’ of the political life in the country through building a tradition of interference in policy-making. The MGK was the main agent to legitimise this culture of military interventionism.

When the 1961 Constitution succeeded in liberalising the political life and led to the rise of left-wing social movements, the very force that created it in the first place restricted the institutional structure. Through the 1971 intervention, the military eliminated the influence of social forces that had begun to affect political life of the country for the first time, namely the labour unions of urban workers and the students’ movements (Boratav 1989:371). As such, the state elite re-gained the control of the modernisation process from the social forces, resulting in a significant deviation in Turkey from the Western trajectory of political modernity, which was historically based on the emergence of social
forces such as the urban middle class and the capitalist class that posed a challenge to the authority of the state and its elites (Moore 1966; Boratav 1989:377-378). In sum, regardless of whether one perceives the overall influence of the military on the political trajectory of the country as positive or negative, it is clear that the role of the military constitutes one of the most crucial differences between the path of modernity between Turkey and the West.

The legacy of a state-centric modernisation process continued to shape the political life of Turkey as even after the military tutelage had been weakened by the AKP during the EU accession process in the 2000s, this phenomenon did not result in a dramatic change in the direction of Turkey’s political trajectory (Göl 2008:19). The legal system of the country was still based on the authoritarian 1982 Constitution and a number of its products such as the Political Parties Law and the Anti-Terror Law that continued to restrict civil liberties in the country. The contemporary political system of Turkey ruled by the AKP proved that an elected government could be as successful as the military in terms of containing the rise of social forces and severely limiting their influence on politics, which was demonstrated in the aftermath of the Gezi Park protests.

The result of the particular trajectory of Turkey – which was directed by the state forces in contrast to the influential role played by social forces in the Western trajectory – is a majoritarian regime whose legitimacy is solely based on the holding of regular, free and fair elections as other prerequisites of liberal democratic life are absent. The effects of external forces (the USA in the 1950s and the EU in the 2000s) on the democratisation process remained limited as domestic social forces that could sustain the drive towards the formation of a liberal democratic regime were initially lacking due to the absence of economic modernisation. When they began to emerge from the 1960s onwards, the state forces continuously repressed them and preserved their primacy over the direction of the political trajectory of Turkey. Therefore, it can be concluded that domestic social and economic conditions of a society play a larger role than
external forces in terms of shaping the outcome of a political modernisation trajectory.

4.5 CONCLUSION

In an attempt to show that MMP is more efficient than its rival theories in explaining the phenomenon of political transformation in non-Western cases, this chapter studied the case of Turkey. Two bodies of literature were contested throughout the chapter: first, it was argued that the portrayal of Turkey as a liberal democratic model by the structural and societal models of Turkish studies was not based on solid evidence and that Turkey could be more realistically identified as a majoritarian regime. Second, it was maintained that the political trajectory of Turkey diverged from the Western historical experience, resulting in a different type of modernity that cannot be understood through the ‘convergence towards the West’ hypothesis of CMT and NMT. The main reason behind that divergence was that the political modernisation process of Turkey evolved in a completely different period of time than the Western historical experience and that the interaction between the Western modernity and the society in Turkey led to the emergence of a hybrid form of political system.

The following Chapter 5 will focus on the social dimension of modernity in Turkey. Once again, the Turkish case will be evaluated to determine which theory of modernity is most successful in terms of grasping the nature of modernisation processes in non-Western contexts.
CHAPTER 5: THE SOCIAL TRAJECTORY OF TURKISH MODERNITY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Social development constitutes one of the most contentious issues within modernisation studies that clearly differentiate the frameworks of the theories of modernity from each other. As explained in Chapter 2, CMT perceives social development as the gradual replacement of traditional/religious values with a secular worldview based on the Enlightenment tradition of Western Europe. In the case of predominantly Muslim societies such as Turkey, CMT claims that the implementation of secularisation programs is the only means to achieve social modernity as Islamic values are supposedly incompatible with the vision of a liberal democratic and capitalist society. Conversely, NMT rejects the incompatibility hypothesis by contending that religious values such as Islamic ethics could be harnessed to accelerate the modernisation process in the Muslim world. A third conceptualisation is put forward by MMP that does not presuppose a link between modernity and religion, suggesting that religious values may positively or negatively impact on modernisation depending on the particular economic and political context of a society (Wagner 2012; Kaya 2004). As such, MMP suggests that the role played by religious interpretation within the social transformation process is fully shaped by the economic and political changes in a country rather than the intrinsic nature of the religious texts.

As noted in Chapter 1, social modernisation in the Turkish case has been identified within the literature on the Turkish model as the ideological transformation of political Islamism in Turkey, shifting from a revolutionary movement aiming to build an Islamic state through violence (early 20th century) towards one that adopted a non-violent method of competition into multi-party elections to legally expand the influence of religiosity in public space (late 20th and early 21st century). Ideological change, in this context, refers to the particular trajectory the mainstream Islamic movement experienced in Turkey. Within the existing literature, the structural model
adopts the view of CMT and claims that the state-led secularisation process of the pre-1980 era and the continuing role of the Kemalist military in Turkish politics forced the Islamic movement to moderate its discourse and methods. However, the societal model focuses on the post-1980 period of economic modernisation and contends that the link between the Islamic movement and the rising conservative capitalist class of Turkey led to the ideological change.

This chapter has two objectives: first, contemporary Turkey will be assessed to determine whether it could be considered a ‘socially modern society’ according to the theories of modernity. Second, the trajectory of ideological transformation of the Islamic political movement will be interpreted via the conceptual framework of MMP. This will provide the chapter with a multi-dimensional understanding of social modernisation through highlighting the influence of both the state and the social forces in addition to the significance of path dependency between different eras of history (the pre-1980 and the post-1980 periods), international context and historical contingency.

The chapter will challenge the approaches offered by both the structural model and the societal model through arguing that the ideological change of the Islamic movement should be attributed to the impact of two path dependent factors which complemented each other: the provision of ‘political opportunity space’ in the pre-1980 years to the movement by the state and the emergence of ‘economic opportunity space’ with the rise of a conservative capitalist class in the post-1980 period. The political opportunity space manifested because from the 1960s onwards, the secularist state establishment allowed Islamic parties to compete in multi-party elections and reformed the official ideology of the state over the years to incorporate them into the political system of Turkey. The economic opportunity space occurred because – as explained in Chapter 3 – the economic liberalisation program of the 1980s led to the establishment of numerous SMEs that formed a strong link with the Islamic political movement, shaping its ideology and objectives. As such, the Turkish case will show that Islamism is a changeable phenomenon that is shaped by the economic and political conditions of a predominantly Muslim society, taking various forms.
under different circumstances. This validates the hypothesis of social modernity developed by MMP.

The chapter consist of four sections. **Part two** will analyse the changes in the nature of state-religion relations in Turkey with a particular emphasis on the interaction between the Kemalist secularisation project and the Islamic social and political movements over the years. The impact of the transition to a competitive multi-party system, the softening of the state’s approach on Islamic groups and the economic development process on the ideological discourse and methods of the mainstream Islamic movement (the *National View*) will be studied. **Part three** will assess if contemporary Turkey can be evaluated as a socially modern society according to three main theories of modernity. In addition, the socio-political development experience of Turkey will be interpreted through MMP in that section, highlighting the differences between the Turkish case and the historical trajectory and current state of Western modernity. **Part four** contains the summary and concluding remarks of the chapter.

**5.2 THE STAGES OF AN IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION TRAJECTORY**

The interaction between the Islamic movement and the state in Turkey evolved over time (see Table 5.1.). As such, the framework of MMP that emphasises path dependency within modernisation efforts is particularly helpful in comprehending the continuities and discontinuities within the social trajectory of Turkish modernity (Wagner 2012). Initially, Islamic groups and secularists were engaged in a violent conflict to control the fate of the post-Ottoman society as the socio-political visions of the ruling Kemalists and the Islamic movement clashed with each other (1923-1950). Islamic revolutionaries reacted to the Kemalist secularisation program through launching a number of armed uprisings in this era. The state-Islam relations have become more complex over time, characterized by periods of conflict and rapprochement from the 1950s onwards (Hann 1997:42).
After the transition to multi-party life (1950-1960), religious orders such as the Naqshbandis and the Nurcus utilised the limited political opening and gathered around the socially conservative DP, providing it with support in order to expand their activities and gradually increase religiosity in public space (Toprak 1981). This was a key turning point for the socio-political trajectory of Turkey as Islamic groups – for the first time in the Republican era – began to place their struggle within legally defined boundaries. In the second multi-party period of the 1960-1980 years, Islamic groups benefited from the increased freedom of association provided by the liberal 1961 Constitution by forming their own political movement, the National View and its affiliated political parties (Kanra 2013). The trajectory of the Islamic movement in the post-1980 period was shaped by the contrasting waves of political opening (1980-1997) and restriction of political space (1997-2001) imposed by the secularist military. The intensifying economic modernisation process of the era also impacted on the trajectory, forming one of the key drivers of ideological transformation within the movement, eventually culminating to the emergence of a new Islamic paradigm in Turkey with the formation AKP in 2001.

The following sections of the chapter will analyse the trajectory of the Islamic movement and its interaction with the Turkish state in detail. In contrast to the narratives of the structural and societal models analysed in Chapter 1, the chapter will highlight the how the state itself was gradually shaped by its engagement with the Islamic movement. Thus, it will be argued that the transformation of political Islam in Turkey manifested through a process of ‘reciprocal compromises’ in which both the regime and Islamic groups negotiated with each other and changed their ideologies over the years. While the mainstream Islamic movement officially renounced its commitment to shari’a and the concept of the Islamic state, the Turkish state also moderated its position, shifting from a more ‘assertive understanding of secularism’ towards ‘passive secularism’ (Turam 2006; Kuru 2009).

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39 Assertive secularism refers to the French model Kemalists adopted in late 1920s, a model that envisages the regular intervention of state into religious realm to contain and control it, while passive secularism refers to the American model in which the state does not interfere in religious sphere at all.
Before delving into the analysis of the Islamic political movement in the Republican era, a brief overview of the late Ottoman period is required, because the origins of the violent confrontation that characterised the interaction between the state and Islamic groups in the formative years of the Republic (1923-1950) lie in the legacy of the imperial modernisation program.

5.2.1 The Legacy of Ottoman Westernisation on the Trajectory of Social Change in Turkey: An Emerging Power Struggle (1839-1923)

The Ottoman Westernisation program left its mark on the Republic as the Westernised education system of the Empire fostered the emergence of secular bureaucratic and military elites. The secularisation in Turkey began before the establishment of the Republic, in the Tanzimat era (1839-1876). The understanding of social modernisation put forward by CMT emphasises the 'need for changing religious values' in predominantly Muslim societies (Apter 1965; Lerner 1958; Berkes 1964). An example of this narrative is as follows:

We may say that the value system of such a society [traditional, pre-modern] must change from a prescriptive type to a ‘principal’ type, to borrow again from Becker. Traditional societies... tend to have a normative system, in which a comprehensive, but uncodified, set of relatively specific norms governs concrete behaviour. But in a modern society an area of flexibility must be gained in economic, political, and social life in which specific norms may be determined in considerable part by short-term exigencies in the situation of action, or by functional requisites of the relevant social subsystems (Bellah 1958:1-2).

Based on this definition, the Ottoman Empire of the pre-Tanzimat era was a traditional society with a prescriptive value system as the religious law - shari’a - was in practise. In the Ottoman Empire, the Sunni ulema (clergy) not only monopolised theological interpretation but also controlled law-making, judicial processes and the education system via madrasas (Kara 1994:46). The chief of the ulema was the Sheik-ul Islam who was a permanent member of the Ottoman cabinet and a chief advisor to the sultans.
The Ottoman monarchs and bureaucrats initiated an ever-intensifying process of Westernisation from the late 18th century onwards. However, the sphere of religion could not be touched by the reformers due to strong opposition from the *ulema* which had strongly established itself within the imperial political economic system (Kara 1994; Ahmad 1993; Berkes 1964). The pro-Western bureaucracy avoided direct confrontation with the *ulema* by circumventing their sphere of influence and building a separate secular institutional structure without eliminating the traditional-religious one (Toprak 1981:32). As a result, the Ottoman state structure, bureaucracy, and secular education system was thoroughly Westernised by the end of the 19th century. In the late Ottoman years, there existed not one but ‘two Ottoman Empires’, one that was providing secular education with curriculums imported from Western European countries such as France, while the other continued to train pupils in Islamic schools - the *madrasas* - with Islamic teachings and instil in them traditional values.

The state-engineered social change process of the late Ottoman era inevitably brought the clergy and pro-Westernising bureaucracy against each other (Kara 1994:47). Throughout the 19th and early 20th century, the social Westernisation program of the reformers – particularly the debate on the necessity of secularism among Ottoman intellectual circles – attracted the hostility of the clergy and other conservative groups as any attempt to distinguish between religious and political realms was considered as ‘heresy’ (Toprak 1981:32). The first popular Islamist discourse in Turkey emerged within the *Young Ottomans* in the late 19th century, an intellectual movement that contained diverse ideologies (Göl 2003:15). Islamist thinkers of the era attributed the decline of the Empire to the alleged decay of moral values that was said to have occurred because of the Westernisation program (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1996:223; Göl 2003:15).

The marginalisation of Islamic groups in Turkey did not emerge with the Republic, rather it had already begun during the late Ottoman period (Ahmad 1988). As the socio-political influence of the clergy vis-à-vis the bureaucracy over education and policy-making faded during the 19th century, political Islam
began its shift from the centre of power towards the periphery of the society, expressing itself as an opposition movement through religious orders beyond the control of the centralised polity.

Calls for a return to traditions and Islamic values intensified in the conservative segments of the Ottoman media in early 20th century (Ahmad 1988; Yıldız 2006; Kara 2003; Gencer 2008). One particularly influential newspaper, *Volkan* and its continuous critique of Westernisation was partially responsible for triggering the armed Islamic uprising on 13 April 1909\(^40\) (Yıldız 2006). In this first revolutionary Islamic uprising of Turkey, a large group of soldiers led by Muslim clerics revolted in Istanbul against the restoration of the constitutional system that had taken place the previous year, demanding a return to absolute monarchy and the country to be ruled strictly according to *shari'a* (Islamic law). The soldiers and masses mobilised by revolutionary clerics lynched many deputies, officers and journalists during the 11-day rebellion which was eventually suppressed by secularist elements of the Ottoman armed forces (Yıldız 2006). The rebellion was a clear sign that a clash between secularist and Islamic forces in Turkey was surfacing.

The Ottoman Empire collapsed after the end of World War I as the Allies captured virtually all of its state functions after the occupation of Istanbul in 1919. The armed forces of the nationalist movement led by the new parliament in Ankara proved successful against the invading Allied forces such as Greece and France, resulting in the fate of Turkey to be decided by Kemal Ataturk and his followers. After the military victory, the Ankara parliament dominated by the Kemalists abolished the sultanate, ending the rule of Istanbul. Ataturk and most of the cadres that would rise to higher echelons of power in the Kemalist Republic were officers educated in the Ottoman Royal Military Academy in which they were introduced to a number of materialist publications (Hanioğlu 2012:40).

\(^{40}\) This incident is known as ‘31 Mart Vakası’ (The 31st March Rebellion) in Turkey, in reference to the date the uprising occurred, 31st of March in the Rumi calendar used by the Ottoman Empire at the time.
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<td>Clashes between the regime and revolutionary Islamists</td>
<td>1961 Constitution: increased freedom of speech and association</td>
<td>The 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis': Islamism as part of the official state ideology</td>
<td>The Kemalist crackdown on Islamists in 1997</td>
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<td>Radical secularisation from above</td>
<td>Softening of assertive secularism</td>
<td>Emergence of the National View</td>
<td>Economic Opportunity Space: rise of the conservative capitalist class through their association – MÜSİAD</td>
<td>An alliance between the MÜSİAD and the reformist faction of the National View is formed</td>
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<td>Repression of Islamic groups</td>
<td>Emergence of Islamic networks as lobby groups</td>
<td>The National View as coalition partners in the 1970s (MSP)</td>
<td>The Islamic RP wins a major electoral victory in 1995</td>
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Source: Author.
It can be argued that the secularisation program of the early years of the Republic was a by-product of the Ottoman Westernisation reforms that founded a secular education system:

The famous Westernization plan published in two instalments in the scientist journal İctihad in 1913 looks like a blueprint of both the early Republican reforms and the later Kemalist version of modernity. This plan, presented as a report of a dream revealed to the author to avoid legal charges by public prosecutors, proposed a thorough Westernization through changes such as the abolition of the fez [the traditional Ottoman hat], the emancipation of women, the closure of dervish lodges [religious orders], and a reformation of Islam (Hanioğlu 2012:45-46).

In the context of social change, the impact of the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II should be acknowledged as mass education campaigns beyond the imperial capital Istanbul first started under his rule and many private and public education institutions were founded (Gencer 2008:76). Though Sultan Abdülhamit II implemented an extensive national education program for the purpose of preserving and consolidating the rule of Ottoman dynasty via catching up with the West, his policies paradoxically established the social origins of the rise of Kemalists in the 1920s. After all, the genesis of Kemal Atatürk’s worldview was shaped in the secularised military schools of the Empire (Gencer 2008:784; Hanioğlu 2012). As such, the Kemalist Republic can be evaluated as a path dependent – albeit not designed – outcome of the Ottoman social change program of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

It would be ahistorical to assess the secularism of the new Republic as a ‘revolutionary break’ in Turkish history as it is often referred to by the Kemalist discourse (Kansu 1995; Kara 1994; Gencer 2008). In fact, the late Ottoman state was already on the fast track towards conforming to Western social modernity via secularisation and the reign of Abdülhamit II – which is often glorified by conservative accounts of history in contemporary Turkey – actually accelerated this trend (Kansu 1995). Various Islamic groups such as the Naqshbandis were so alienated from Sultan Abdülhamit II that they were initially supportive of the revolutionary CUP which eventually overthrew the sultan in 1909 (Kara 1994:74-75). Nevertheless, once the social policies of the CUP began to take
shape, Islamic intellectuals and orders became critical of the new administration as well, because the CUP soon proved that it did not intend to stop the state-led secularisation program, which seemed bent on minimising the socio-political influence of the Sunni clergy (Kara 1994:118-119).

In sum, the impact of Western modernity on the Ottoman state and society laid the groundwork for Turkey's subsequent trajectory of social change. In fact, İsmail Kara (2003:199) traces the origins of the so-called concept of 'Islamic modernity' to the late Ottoman era. As a result of increasing interaction with Western societies and a feeling of 'inferiority' due to the large technological gap between Ottomans and their Western counterparts, Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats felt forced to re-interpret their own traditions and religious values through the lens of 'modern life', a perspective entirely infused with Western social codes. The Kemalist interpretation of modernity was an archetype of this type of reaction among the late Ottoman intelligentsia, which desperately searched for a 'miracle cure' to save the country from falling under the control of industrialised Western states such as Britain, France and Germany.

5.2.2 The Era of Clash: An Assertive Secularist Regime versus Islamic Revolutionaries (1923-1950)

5.2.2.1 The Kemalist social modernisation program

A lesson the Kemalists drew from the collapse of the Empire was that the state was 'not socially modernised enough', particularly in reference to the ongoing influence of the clergy in the cultural sphere (Bellah 1958:2). The main difference between the Ottoman reformers and the Kemalist elite was that the Ottoman modernisation program attempted to manage a system where Westernised institutions co-existed with religiously-oriented ones while the Kemalists were dedicated towards building a thoroughly secularised state structure in terms of institutions and the legal system (Akyol 2008:79). The Kemalists perceived the ulema as responsible for the collapse of the Empire by preventing the implementation of a far-reaching social modernisation program,
which would have supposedly stopped the decline of the Ottoman state (Toprak 1981:38).

It is important to note that modernisation, in the eyes of the Kemalists, referred exclusively to Westernisation (Çınar 2005:5). The existence of a clergy with its control over the education and legal system was contradictory to the Kemalist vision of a ‘modern Turkey’ that would supposedly join the Western civilisation as a developed nation. It can be argued that for the Kemalists who were creating a secular Republic with nationalism as its legitimising ideology, the existence of an organised network with a proven ability to appeal to the masses (e.g. the 1909 Islamic rebellion) with its references to much more established values – traditions and religion – was a clear threat. The Westernisation program of the Republic aimed to constitute a break from the traditional/religious values of the Ottoman Empire through replacing them with a Turkish nationalist and secularist official ideology (Aydın 2005:185).

Nevertheless, Islam initially remained as the official state religion of the emerging Kemalist Republic that was still in the process of consolidating its authority over the country in the 1920s. The crucial issue that triggered violent clashes between the regime and Islamic groups was the abolition of the caliphate in 1924. Beginning from 1925, the Republican regime was challenged by a series of armed rebellions (e.g. the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925) led by Islamic groups that aimed to build a new caliphate which would be strictly ruled according to *shari’a* (Ahmad 1988:754). One such example occurred in a town called *Menemen* in western Turkey:

In December of that year [1930] there was a dramatic and violent reactionary incident in *Menemen, Izmir* that alarmed the government. A large crowd, led by Dervish Mehmed Efendi, a member of the *Naqshbandi* order, left the mosque after morning prayers vowing to restore the Caliphate. The commander of the gendarmerie saw this demonstration as a rebellion and sent a young officer to restore order. The officer was seized by the impassioned crowd and beheaded. His head was stuck on top of a pole bearing a green flag and paraded around the town (Ahmad 1988:754-755).
The Islamic challenge that manifested with uprisings such as the Sheikh Said rebellion (which had both Islamic and Kurdish separatist claims) in 1925 and the Menemen incident in 1930 led to the crystallisation of the secularist tendency of the emerging regime into a fully developed anti-clerical ideology. Religious orders – particularly the Naqshbandis – played major roles in inciting conservative masses for revolt across the country (Toprak 1981; Ahmad 1988; Geyikdağı 1984). In this regard, the Kemalists identified religious orders as the primary threat to the sustainability of the Republican regime, triggering a concerted effort to eradicate the orders (Ahmad 1988; Küçük 2007). As a result of the increasingly anti-clerical policies of the regime, the pact between the Kemalists and conservative intellectuals that was formed during the national struggle against the Allies started to deteriorate towards the latter half of the 1920s. Influential conservative figures who were supportive of the Ankara regime in the early 1920s such as the poet and member of parliament, Mehmed Akif Ersoy and the Islamic scholar and founder of the Nurcu religious order, Said Nursi were opposed to the Kemalist Westernisation program (Küçük 2007:128; Mardin 1989).

From 1925 onwards, the Kemalists initiated a series of programs that targeted all remnants of Ottoman social life (See Table 5.2.). The language reform changed the alphabet from Arabic to Latin script in 1928. It is common to find lamentations in the literature over this act as it has been claimed by conservative thinkers that the essential cultural link between contemporary Turkish society and the Ottoman Empire was supposedly eliminated (Lewis 1999; Azak 2010). All religious orders were banned based on the rationale that these had become the focus of revolutionary Islamic groups (Toprak 1981). The office of the Sheikh-ul Islam was abolished and its authority over religious affairs was delegated to a newly founded and state controlled institution, the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs). The shari'a was repealed and madrasas were closed. Islam as the state religion was removed from the constitution and the principle of secularism was added in its place, defined as the separation of state and religious affairs. A new legal system based on models imported from Western European countries was implemented as the Kemalist regime adopted
the Swiss civil code and the Italian criminal law. The continental European measurements system and the Gregorian calendar were also introduced as part of the social transformation program.

Despite all these reforms, however, the role of religion in the new state remained a highly problematic issue. On the one hand, the Kemalists perceived it as ‘a relic of the past’, one that had allegedly imprisoned the society to a state of perpetual backwardness, while on the other hand, Islam was the only source of identity that could unite the people around the new regime in the absence of an established national consciousness (Aydı'n 2005:185). In contrast to the Bolsheviks who entirely eliminated religion and clergy in the emerging Soviet Union at the time, the Kemalists’ contradictory policies in Turkey point to the difficulty the policy-makers experienced when dealing with the issue. Islamic orders were banned, religious education was restricted, while simultaneously, the state felt the need to establish the Diyanet and utilise a moralist discourse to reinforce Turkish nationalism.

The secularisation process intensified over the years and by the end of the 1930s, a proposal for ‘Islamic reform’ was developed by a commission of Kemalist bureaucrats. The commission suggested some radical changes to the practice of Islam such as the usage of Turkish language in all rituals of worship, redesigning the interior of mosques on the model of Christian churches with seats, allowing mixed gender praying and the introduction of musical instruments in mosques, all of which were rejected by scholars of the Diyanet to avoid a strong backlash from Islamic groups (Ulutas 2010:393; Azak 2010). Nevertheless, one key suggestion of the commission was adopted - the replacement of Arabic with the Turkish language in the ezan (adhan in Arabic), the Islamic call to worship recited five times a day from mosques.
Table 5.2. ‘The Kemalist Cultural Revolution’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Foundation of the Republic of Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Abolition of the Caliphate, <em>shari’a</em> courts and the office of <em>Sheikh-ul Islam</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of the <em>Diyanet</em> (Directorate of Religious Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elimination of the dual education system through the ‘Law of Unity of Education’ (<em>Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>The dress reform and the ‘Hat Law’, the prohibition of the wearing of religious and traditional clothes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Official closure of religious orders, <em>dervish</em> lodges and <em>madrasas</em> (religious schools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adoption of the Gregorian calendar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Adoption of the Swiss Civil Code instead of religious law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adoption of the Italian Penal Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adoption of a new commercial law imported from various European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Introduction of the Latin alphabet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Removal of Islam from the constitution as the official religion of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Adoption of continental European system of measures (the metric system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Introduction of the surname law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of full political rights for women, to vote and be elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Inclusion of the principle of secularism (<em>laïcité</em>) in the constitution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author.*
The secularisation program gradually became part of the Kemalist nation-building process. As with the case of Turkish ezan, the regime used religion and nationalism to design a ‘new citizen’, the so-called ‘Turkified Islam’ being a key element of this ambitious social transformation project. This ‘Islamic reform’ program was inspired by writings of Turkish nationalist and sociologist, Ziya Gökalp as Kemalists such as Ismail Hakkı Baltacoğlu (the first chancellor of Istanbul University in the Republican period and the translator of Quran to Turkish) and Reşit Galip (minister of education, 1932-1933) used his ideas (Azak 2012:61). Kemal Atatürk was personally involved in directing the so-called Islamic reformation process until his death in 1938. İsmet İnönü – the longest serving prime minister of Atatürk – was elected as the second president of Turkey. During İnönü’s presidency (1938-1950), the authoritarian one-party rule was further consolidated, yet the most radical phase of Kemalist secularisation was over as the new leader did not seem as willing as his predecessor to pursue further social reforms, shelving the idea for an Islamic reformation (Geyikdağlı 1984:65).

5.2.2.2 The Turkish secularisation experience vis-à-vis the Western model

Fatih Sultan Mehmet transformed the Hagia Sophia from a church into a mosque, and Muslims used the Hagia Sophia as a mosque for almost 500 years. However, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the new Turkey, the first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, transformed the building into a museum. In the modern world, what does this museum represent? Are museums related with an archaic and mystical past, or are they a product of modernity and an attempt by the modern world to capture and examine the past? What was the purpose of transforming the building into a museum, which has been a touristic attraction in modern societies for over 70 years? Does religion belong to a museum, and should it be expected to become obsolete one day? (Keskin 2009:2-3)

To many, the turning of Hagia Sophia from a mosque into a museum was symbolic of the way in which the Kemalists understood Islam and its function in a modernising society: that Islam was rapidly becoming obsolete and that it would not play a big part in the new world that was expected to come, the ‘age of modernity’. The Kemalist thinking of religion was fully in-line with CMT’s
perception of inevitable convergence towards a universalised Western modernity. Nevertheless, beyond their ideological vision based on the Enlightenment ideals of secularism, rationality and scientism; the Kemalist elite also was pragmatic enough to see in Islam a potential source that could be harnessed to legitimise the regime – at least ‘for the time being’ during the transition phase to modernity. Hence, the practical realities of the socio-political life of the emergent Republican Turkey caused the social modernisation trajectory to diverge from the idealised Western path to modernity, the process gaining its hybrid characteristics – most notably seen in the case of the Diyanet. Paradoxically, the same force that wished Turkey to fully conform to Western modernity in terms of secularisation also played a key role in its further divergence away from the idealised model of social modernisation.

Hence, though the French model inspired the secularisation program of Turkey, but it produced unique characteristics over time (Özyürek 2006:13; Göle 2009:111; Mardin 1990; Tunçay 2005). The principle of secularism was defined in the constitution as ‘the separation of state and religious affairs’, however, it was utilised by the regime to establish state control over the religious sphere in practice (Mardin 2006:235; Eligür 2010:37; Jacoby 2004:82). The Diyanet was paramount for the efforts of the Kemalist regime to ensure control over religion (Göl 2008:22; Turam 2006). It was assumed that if the Republic could eliminate all alternative interpretations and present a ‘state Islam’ to the masses, the regime could gain legitimacy while the Islamic opposition groups would weaken (Hanıoglu 2012:42-43). In this regard, the Kemalist regime eliminated the ulema as an influential actor in politics, imams (worship leaders in mosques) and Islamic scholars becoming public officials of the Diyanet, which had to adhere to the official interpretation of Islam in a nationalised and secularised form. Loyal to the regime, the Diyanet defined the contents of Friday hutbas, assigned imams and managed the mosques, which were all owned by the state.

The understanding of ‘national Islam’ as a legitimacy device of the regime extended beyond the practice of secularism seen in Western European countries such as France as religion was paradoxically placed at the centre of politics in
this approach. In an emergent nation-state that officially emphasised the ‘will of the people’ as the ultimate source of legitimacy for its government, the heavy emphasis on Islam as means to gain the support of the citizenry was contradictory. This can be attributed to the difficulty the regime experienced in consolidating its authority across the country. The secular nationalist ideology lacked legitimacy in the eyes of conservative citizens, as it appeared to threaten the established traditions and religious belief-systems of the society (Gürbey 2012; Küçük 2007; Azak 2010; Yavuz 2003; Tunçay 2005; Mardin 1989). In this context, there was a need to refer to established norms and values of the society to reinforce the new official ideology.

During the Turkish Independence War (1919-1922) and the formative years of the Republic in the 1920s and 1930s, Islamic concepts such as jihad (holy war or struggle), shuhada (matrydom) and ghazi (Islamic warrior) were heavily referred to by Kemalist leaders (Azak 2010:45-61). For instance, in honour of his leading role in the Turkish nationalist victory, it had become common practice in Turkey to use the honorific title ghazi (gazi in Turkish) prior to the name of Ataturk, usually in the form of ‘Gazi Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’ or simply ‘Gazi Pasha’. In this regard, the idiosyncratic character of Turkish secularism indicates that the interaction between the Western social modernity based on secularisation and the particular socio-political conditions of Turkey led to the emergence of a hybrid social modernisation trajectory in the country (Çınar 14-17). The Kemalists had based their understanding of secularism on the French model, but the regime utilised the concept in a completely different manner compared to France where the state did not refer to religious values in its official discourse (Tunçay 2005).

Turkey’s social change experience reflects what Bedri Gencer refers to as ‘mechanical secularisation’ in contrast to the ‘organic secularisation’ of the West (Gencer 2008:781). As such, Turkey’s domestic social conditions did not produce secularism, but it was imported from Western modernity because the ruling elites perceived it as a necessity of the modernisation path. Yet, the Republican secularism was only a more intense variant of a process that began
earlier in the 19th century when the Ottoman society, its intellectuals and statesmen faced the might of Western modernity, starting from the Tanzimat in 1839 (see Gencer 2008). The subsequent history of Turkey's social modernisation can be evaluated as natural consequence of a path dependent trajectory, the initial starting point being the encounter with a technologically superior external force in early 19th century.

5.2.2.3 The difficulty with the ‘periphery’: The Islamic resistance to secularisation

The aforementioned attempts of Ankara to monopolise Islamic interpretation through a ‘state Islam’ were not sufficient to prevent it from becoming an ideology of opposition to the regime. The explanation for the emergence of Islamic revolutionary movements in this era should be sought in the failure of the Kemalist state to penetrate the traditional value system of the periphery in Turkey, the rural areas (Geyikdağ 1984:61; Saeed 1994:165; Zürcher 2004).

The secularist ideology of the central state organisation could not be effectively extended to the peasantry, which formed most of the population, as the influence of Ankara remained very limited beyond the cosmopolitan urban centres such as Istanbul and Izmir (Jacoby 2004:83; Toprak 1981:1-2; Karasipahi 2009:93):

Behind the facade of secularism, strictly maintained in the national education system and in the state-controlled media, it is clear that Islam never lost its hold on the great majority of the population. Within or parallel to the Sunni orthodox tradition, tarikat brotherhoods attracted many adherents (Hann 1997:34).

Alternative sources of socio-political networks remained intact in rural areas, surviving even the most radical phase of the so-called ‘Kemalist Revolution’, namely the mass executions of members of opposition to the Republican regime by Istiklal Mahkemeleri\(^{41}\) in a manner reminiscent of the French Revolution of 1789.

\(^{41}\) Can be translated as the ‘Independence Tribunals’. These institutions were founded with a special mandate during the Turkish War of Independence to prosecute deserters, spies and those who were against the regime. After the end of the war, the court in Ankara continued to operate and judge the opponents of the Republic, executing rebels involved in uprisings.
The ‘forces of the periphery’ were mainly composed of landowners (often referred to as ağalar in Turkey) and the remnants of the Ottoman ulema, which were organised within religious orders such as the influential Naqshbandi groups across the country. The influence of these two social groups was particularly dominant in the least economically developed regions of the country, namely eastern and south-eastern Anatolia where the state authority remained considerably lower than the rest of Turkey. The Republican state was able to co-opt the landowners into the new regime and expand its sphere of influence through providing a de facto autonomy (Berberoglu 1977). However, the same conciliatory approach was not shown towards the ulema as the power of religious values in the hands of a class beyond the regime’s control was perceived as a potential threat (Jacoby 2004). Nevertheless, the official dismantling of the conservative ulema – replaced by a state-assigned new religious class – did not result in the complete elimination of Islamic groups as religious networks were pushed into re-organising themselves as clandestine organisations (Jacoby 2004:85).

The Islamic uprisings of the late 1920s prompted the Kemalist regime to accelerate its social Westernisation program through incorporating the ideological transformation of rural areas into the agenda (Yavuz 2003:54). Until the late 1930s, the CHP had focused on secular education in urban areas to foster the creation of a military-bureaucratic elite to be the flag-bearer of Kemalism rather than initiating a large-scale Soviet-style campaign to spread the new ideology of the regime to the masses (Arnason 2002). In the 1940s, however, a noteworthy program was initiated to spread the secularist ideology of the Republic to the periphery. Based on this rationale, official education institutions were founded in villages and towns across Turkey, the Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) in the former and the People’s Houses (Halkevleri) in the latter. Nevertheless, the number of these institutions remained very limited and the DP closed them down in 1950, only a few years after their inception. As a result, they did not leave a lasting impact on the social development trajectory of Turkey.
5.2.3 The Shift towards Reconciliation between the State and the Movement (1950-1960)

In 1950, a process defined as the ‘tempering of Kemalist Revolution’ began under the DP rule after the victory of the party in the free and fair parliamentary elections of this year, bringing an end to the 27-year one-party rule of the CHP (Yavuz 2003:59). Directed by the populist policy-makers of the DP for a decade between 1950-1960, the nature of the Kemalist state was transformed. The most noteworthy impact of this decade on the social trajectory of Turkey was that the wide gap between the official ideology of the state and the conservative masses was narrowed down after the DP adopted a reconciliatory approach towards the Islamic groups of the periphery (Turam 2006).

After the transition to competitive multi-party life in 1950, the mainstream political parties in Turkey adopted contrasting approaches to the role of religion in political life. While the Kemalist CHP maintained that references to religious values should not have any place in politics, as it would allegedly violate secularism, the social conservative parties such as the DP and the MP extensively utilised religion in their electoral campaigns, managing to garner the support of conservative citizens to varying degrees (Toprak 1981). The ability of the DP to appeal to the conservative peasantry was the main reason behind their decisive electoral victory in 1950 as this class formed the majority of the population at the time (Roos and Roos 1971:45).

The DP successfully utilised the widespread public discontent with some elements of Westernisation reforms of the CHP to its benefit, effectively carving itself the largest segment of the electorate (Toprak 1981:72). Throughout the 1950s, the DP consistently branded the CHP as an ‘elitist’ party with an ideology that was supposedly ‘alien’ to the traditional values of the society, using a religious discourse to reinforce this image (Yücekök 1971:153). For instance, the most popular slogan used in the propaganda posters of the DP during its 1950 electoral campaign was as follows: ‘Enough! It is time for the people to speak!’ (in Turkish: ‘Yeter! Söz Milletindir!’). This was a thinly veiled accusation
launched against the rule of the CHP, which was supposedly not representative of the ‘ordinary people’, therefore not receptive to the demands of the citizenry.

The departure of the DP from the Kemalist understanding of secularism resulted in the party coming under strong criticism from the CHP throughout the 1950s and by secularist thinkers of Turkey ever since. The political alliance between various Islamic orders and the DP – particularly in the first half of the 1950s – was interpreted as indicative of a ‘counter-revolution’, ‘vulgar populism’ or a ‘hidden Islamic agenda’ (Toprak 1981:72-73). One such critique traces the origins of all the subsequent ‘ills’ within the socio-political modernisation process in Turkey to the DP rule:

When Turkish political life is examined carefully, it is possible to determine that the institutionalization of Kemalism was cut in 1950 and a semi-counter-revolution process began then. Although the institutionalization process was re-started by the 1961 Constitution, the politics of the 1960s brought a semi-counter-revolution back to the political scene. The military intervention in 1971 could not prevent the anomaly in the political structure (Çakmak 2009:842).

In this narrative, the rise of Islamic values in Turkish politics is defined as an ‘anomaly’ with a critical overtone, the DP decade being blamed for ending Kemalism. In this regard, it is important to note that most of these accusations are unwarranted, as the DP did not jeopardise key Kemalist principles and the public image of Kemal Ataturk as the national hero. The DP indeed altered the practice of secularism through policies such as the introduction of optional religious courses into the curriculum of public education institutions and establishment of faculties of divinity in universities (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1996:237). However, these were hardly indicative of a radical counter-revolution aimed to build an Islamic state. Among the aforementioned accusations, the most accurate one could be ‘vulgar populist’ as the DP leaders utilised religious values to gain the votes of conservative citizens, even though they were known for their Westernised personal life-styles not unlike the Kemalists that they repeatedly criticised for being distant from the traditions of the society (Toprak 1981:73; Altunışık and Tür 2005:30).
A crucial factor that restricted the revisionist tendencies of conservative members of the DP was the experience of previous opposition parties that implicitly challenged the Kemalist principles, especially its secularism. The Progressive Republican Party (founded in 1924) and the Free Republican Party (founded in 1930) were both banned in less than six-months after their establishment due to allegations of threatening the existence of the Republican regime by serving as platforms for Islamic revolutionaries. Many leaders of the DP were former members of the CHP and they personally observed the closure of these parties. Thus, the DP did not attempt to present an overt criticism of Kemal Ataturk and the Kemalist principles albeit the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes made a number of public speeches that indicated his support for softening the assertive secularism. For instance, in 1950, Menderes made a controversial statement by declaring that the DP would preserve those Kemalist reforms that were adopted by the people, implying that the ones that were resisted by conservatives would have to modified or repealed (Toprak 1981:78-79). The DP's understanding of secularism was different from the conventional Kemalist vision as it defended ‘passive secularism’ against the CHP's ‘assertive secularism’ (Kuru 2009). Article 14 of the DP program criticised the Kemalist approach to secularism and called for a ‘true understanding of secularism’ based on an actual separation of state and religion to minimise state intervention into the practice of religious belief and practices (Geyikdağı 1984:69).

Among the major changes the DP made to the Kemalist secularist practise was the lifting of the ban on Arabic ezan, permitting of the broadcasting of Qur’an readings over the state-owned radio channel and the relaxation of the ban on the wearing of religious clothes in public space. The DP expanded the Imam-Hatip schools – which were initially founded by the CHP in the late 1940s in a late attempt to appeal to conservatives – and transformed these institutions into middle and high schools with religious curriculums. Rather than solely serving for the purpose of training a limited number of clerics for the Diyanet as the CHP envisaged them to be, Imam-Hatip schools began to gradually emerge as an alternative to the secular education system, resulting in a dualistic education to
be established in Turkey not unlike the 19th century Ottoman practice (See Table 5.3.).

Table 5.3. ‘The Tempering of Kemalist Revolution’ by the DP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1950-1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Introduction of more voluntary religious courses in the curriculum of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establishment of a faculty of divinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foundation and expansion of Imam-Hatip schools into middle and high schools with religious curriculum, triggering the emergence of a dualistic education system as these institutions gradually emerged as alternatives to the secular education system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lifting on the ban on Arabic ezan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Permitting of broadcasting of Qur’an readings over the state-owned radio channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relaxation of the ban on wearing of religious clothes in public space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relaxation of the ban on the social activities of religious orders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

The DP decade dramatically affected the interaction between the regime and the Islamic groups. In the 1950s, the Islamic social movements benefited from the softening of regime pressure, extending their influence through religious publications and forming civil society organisations (Toprak 1981:81). The Ticanis, Naqshbandis and Nurcus emerged as influential religious orders in this period (Toprak 1981:83). In the preceding section, it was noted that as a result of the elimination of the Ottoman clergy by the Kemalist regime, religious orders had emerged as the sole representative of conventional Islamist interpretation in the country-side. This led these orders to take an influential role in both the early resistance against the Republican regime and the subsequent trajectory of the Islamic movement in Turkey.
In the 1950s, the *Ticanis* appeared to be the most radical Islamic group in terms of its dedication towards overtly – and often violently – challenging the Republican regime. In the early 1950s, members of the *Ticani* order started a campaign to smash the statues of Ataturk and call for *jihad* in mosques (Mardin 2006:235). Before the lifting of the ban by the DP, the *Ticanis* were also known for repeatedly violating the law on the use of Turkish in rituals, preferring to use Arabic instead (Azak 2012:63). A far more influential group with a lasting impact on the socio-political transformation process in Turkey was the *Nurcus*, the disciples of Said Nursi, who offered a critique of Kemalist reforms (Mardin 2006:236).

In contrast to the *Ticanis*, the *Nurcus* focused on preserving cultural and religious values rather than overtly challenging the regime in the streets, remaining non-violent. Initially, the DP formed political alliances with many of the Islamic orders, responding to their demands regarding the practice of religious rituals and change in religious education policies in return for their support in elections (Heper 1997:38).

Whereas the religious orders had to operate secretly during the Kemalist one-party period of the pre-1950 years, the 1950s was characterised by the emergence of a tacit agreement between the DP administration and the religious orders – in particular the *Naqshbandis* and *Nurcus*. The DP was vocally supported by the *Nurcus*, which can be seen in the letters written by the sheikh of the order, Said Nursi to his pupils at the time: ‘We must help preserve the rule of the Democrats [the DP] for the sake of Quran and Islam’ (Yücekök 1971:154). However, from the mid-1950s onwards, the ties between the DP and religious orders began to weaken as the DP relied more on its stronger ties with the business class of western Turkey (Azak 2010:107-122).

After the DP consolidated its rule in the country in the latter half of the 1950s, it became less receptive to the demands of religious orders (Toprak 1981). Once its former allies became disillusioned from the DP and began to publicly oppose it, the DP administration did not hesitate to repress some of these orders. The
DP adopted a particularly strict policy against the revolutionary Ticanis as the so-called ‘Ataturk law’ resulted in the imprisonment of many members of the order under allegations of offending the memory of Ataturk. Nevertheless, the early alliance between the DP and Islamic groups had a profound impact on the nature of the regime. The Village Institutes that were founded by the CHP in the 1940s to train villagers as teachers and instil in them the values of the new Republican regime (e.g. secularism and Turkish nationalism) were closed by the DP. The religious orders had perceived the secular worldview of the institutes as a threat to their ideological hegemony over the peasantry, requesting the DP to abolish the program of secularising the masses (Ahmad 1988:756). As such, the religious orders became influential lobby groups that could shape the policies of the regime in the 1950s.

Even though the attitude of the DP towards Islamic groups did not follow a consistent trajectory and shifted from building partnerships to a policy of repression, this was the first time the policy-makers of the Republic interacted with Islamic networks. The responsiveness the DP initially displayed towards Islamic orders constituted the first break from the Kemalist policy of ostracising and marginalising these groups. The nature of interaction between the state and the Islamic movement was changed in the 1950s as it was gradually evolving towards a negotiation process in which both entities were shaping each other. The reason behind this noteworthy change in the trajectory of social modernisation in Turkey was Turkey's transition to multi-party life in 1950. Unlike the authoritarian one-party era of the preceding years, the political parties could not remain autonomous from the sentiments of different segments of the citizenry as they needed their votes to win elections. Therefore, political change in the form of a limited democratisation process influenced the trajectory of social development in the country.
5.2.4 The Provision of ‘Political Opportunity Space’: Integration through Electoral Participation (1960-1980)

The softening of the state’s attitude towards Islamic groups emerged during the DP decade and it remained an integral element of Turkish politics, one that was not even challenged by the junta of the 1960 coup that overthrew the DP administration based on its alleged treason to the values of the Kemalist Republic. The junta that styled itself into an executive institution – the National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi) – was characterised by its strict adherence to secularism and Turkish nationalism, therefore the moderate policy adopted towards Islamic groups can be evaluated as a pragmatic strategy that aimed to alleviate fears of conservatives for a new wave of repression after the coup (Geyikdağı 1984:90). The brief rule and the rapid withdrawal of the military from the political scene enabled the continuation of multi-party competition from 1961 onwards.

The 1960 coup constitutes a critical juncture for the evolving role of Islamic groups in Turkey. The liberal 1961 constitution allowed Islamic orders greater freedom of expression and freedom of association as religious organisations and Islamic publications flourished in the 1960-1980 period (Çınar and Duran 2008:29). Due to the liberalisation of assertive secularism, the Islamic groups were able to organise and spread their ideas, yet the policies of the state were not the only factor that led to the rise of political Islam in these years. Starting from the early 1950s, a wave of immigration from the countryside to urban areas began, re-shaping the socio-political and economic life of Turkey. The immigrants mostly settled in shantytowns of industrial metropolises such as Istanbul, Ankara, Bursa, Kocaeli and Izmir, bringing their traditional and religious values.

Due to the aforementioned failure of the Kemalist state to spread its secular ideology in rural areas through institutions such as the Village Institutes, these new urbanites did not encounter the Westernised worldview promoted by the regime. As their prospects for social mobility and achieving economic
prosperity remained rather limited in the peripheries of industrial cities, Islamic values gained a new dimension, that of providing relief for the economically and socially disenfranchised masses. Gradually, Islamic values were to be transformed into a mobilising ideology in the shantytowns in addition to its continuing influence in rural areas. The impact of uncontrollable mass emigration on the socio-political trajectory of Turkey cannot possibly be over-emphasised as the very foundations of the Republic, especially its assertive secularism and official ideology based on a culturally Westernised society, was shaken by the massive numbers of conservative peasants settling in cities (See Table 5.4). In this context, Feroz Ahmad (1988:758) notes the effects of this phenomenon on urban social life:

A city such as Ankara, built in the 1930s on the model of Balkan towns whence the Kemalist elite originated, was integrated into Anatolia, much to the bewilderment and annoyance of the elite. The same was true for other cities.

Thus, ‘demography’ and ‘competitive multi-party life’ became the two key forces that shaped the interaction between the state and the Islamic movement. In order to contain the rapidly mobilising and marginalising communities, the state had to moderate its strict Kemalist ideology over time. As such, it can be argued that from the 1960s onwards, economic and political modernisation of Turkey profoundly affected its social development trajectory defined in terms of the transformation of the Islamic movement.

After the closure of the DP by the junta, a tacit alliance was formed between the military and the CHP, the Kemalists returning to power through technocratic governments supported by this coalition, an era that frustrated the conservatives (Toprak 1981:92). In this conjuncture, the AP emerged as a successor to the DP. The AP adopted the DP’s image of being the ‘party of the masses’, representing the interests of the conservative citizenry against the Kemalist secularism of the CHP which was being associated with communism and atheism in the eyes of its critics (Geyikdağlı 1984).
Table 5.4. The Urbanisation Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share of Urban Population</th>
<th>Share of Rural Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>% 16.6</td>
<td>% 83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>% 18.7</td>
<td>% 81.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>% 29.8</td>
<td>% 70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>% 41.5</td>
<td>% 58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>% 52.5</td>
<td>% 47.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Building upon the policies of its predecessor, the AP further deepened the inclusiveness of the political system for Islamic groups, defined as a ‘ruralising process’ in the scholarly literature (Roos and Roos 1971:52). In contrast to the predominantly urban and business background of the DP members, the cadres of the AP consisted mostly of the lower ranking former members of the DP, whom came from a rural and lower-middle class background. The struggle between the CHP and the AP in the 1960s was a continuation of the ideological conflict between the former and the DP in the 1950s, the main field of debate being the issue of religiosity. The CHP consistently accused the AP of ‘obscurantism’ and alliance with ‘reactionary forces’ such as the Nurcus while the AP attempted to form an all-encompassing coalition of conservatives, Turkish nationalists and liberals against what they termed the ‘anti-religious socialism’ of the CHP (Toprak 1981:93; Mardin 1989:40).
In the late 1960s, the AP had an intra-party conflict, leading to the purge of the Islamic faction known as the National View by the party chairperson, Süleyman Demirel. The struggle for leadership within the AP had a dramatic impact on Turkish political life. After the Islamic faction was expelled from the AP, the National View formed a party of its own in 1970 under the leadership of conservative politician Necmettin Erbakan – the first overtly Islamic-oriented party in Turkey – the MNP. The Naqshbandis were influential in the initial formation of the party and the development of its discourse over the years (Mardin 2006:239). A notable Naqshbandi sheikh, Mehmed Zahid Kotku, had a close relationship with the leader of the movement, Erbakan who often visited him to exchange ideas in the 1970s and 1980s (Atasoy 2005:82).

With the formation of the MNP in 1970, the transition of Islamism from prosecuted social networks in the periphery (1923-1950) to lobby groups within centre-right political parties (1950-1970) and, finally, to a political party was complete. Prior to the emergence of their own party, the Islamic groups had located themselves as factions within the DP and the AP. After 1970, the Islamic movement acquired the ability to assert itself in Turkish politics as an independent and major political force, whereas in the preceding era of the 1950s and 1960s, it was able shape the social policy-making of centre-right parties to some extent. However, shortly after the formation of the MNP, the military intervention of 1971 occurred. Subsequently, the party was banned by the Constitutional Court on the basis that it constituted a threat to the regime and the principle of secularism.

This was a critical moment for the transformation trajectory of the Islamic movement as the leadership of the National View chose to form another party and remain within the boundaries of legal multi-party competition. Despite the closure of their first party, the Islamic movement was not repressed altogether by the regime and they were allowed to form another party called the MSP. After the 1971 intervention, the Kemalist military and the Constitutional Court focused primarily on eliminating Marxist political movements such as the TİP and the DİSK, which were perceived as more dangerous to the regime than the
Islamic movement within the bi-polarised international ideological conjuncture of the Cold War (Özdemir 1989:261). Some members of the technocratic government, which was placed by the military in the early 1970s, perceived the Islamic movement as a potential ally in the struggle to contain the rise of socialist movements, therefore the second party of the National View was not banned (Nebati 2014; Özdemir 1989:260-264). The MSP gained 11.8 per cent of total votes in the 1973 elections, becoming the third biggest party in the parliament after the AP and the CHP.

The rise of political Islam as an ideology of opposition to the established political and economic system of Turkey in the 1970s stemmed from two social groups: the disenfranchised owners of the small and mediums-sized enterprises (SMEs) who were negatively affected from the state-directed economic development policy and the conservatives who criticised cultural Westernisation (Geyikdağ 1984; Özdemir 1989; Atasoy 2005). The critique of the Republican bureaucratic elite, their big business allies and their Westernised lifestyles had been common themes within Islamic discourses since the 1930s. Ahmet Yücekök (1971:90) reports one such example from an Islamic journal:

> The people, in their worn out and traditional garbs, could only see this new elite class [Kemalists] from the wreckage near Ankara Palas⁴², all dressed in Western suits, smoking and dancing like Westerners.

Here, a single sentence reflects the two main elements of the Islamic critique of Kemalism, namely its promotion of Westernisation that was supposedly ‘alien’ to the values of the society and its alleged ignorance of the economic plight of lower classes. These two issues formed the main pillars of the party program of the National View in the 1970s. The solution offered by the Islamic political movement for the ongoing socio-economic problems was material modernisation and a revival of Islamic values (Toprak 1981:99).

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⁴² A hotel commonly used for receptions by members of parliament in the 1930s.
The statements of party chairperson, Erbakan and other members of the MSP displayed a mixed and confusing understanding of secularism as Erbakan often emphasised that state and religion affairs should be separated, implying a passive secularist approach, while the grassroots leaders of the MSP affirmed their commitment to *shari‘a*, indicating that the party would be the vanguard of an Islamic revolution in Turkey (Geyikdağ 1984:122). It can be argued that after the closure of their first party, the leadership was aware of the need to not overtly antagonise the Kemalist military and the judiciary on the basis of the issue of secularism, but many members of the Islamic movement did not exhibit the same awareness (Ahmad 1993:159).

The 1973-1980 period proved influential for the transformation of the Islamic movement as the National View cadres gained considerable political experience by entering into a number of coalition governments, both with the secularist/social-democrat CHP and parties of the right such as the AP and the Turkish nationalist MHP. Thus, the legitimacy of the Islamic movement increased in Turkish politics, but in the process, the state was also legitimised in the eyes of its critics within the Islamic movement (Kanra 2013:55). The decision of the MSP to form a coalition government with an ideological opponent – the secularist/social-democrat CHP – was indicative of the political pragmatism of the National View leadership. The MSP was becoming a dynamic actor of political life in Turkey, being incorporated into the mainstream political system rather than remaining a radical opposition movement on the fringes. The political mobility displayed by the MSP and the reconciliatory approach adopted by other political parties and the state establishment towards the Islamic movement provides a key insight for the broader literature as it demonstrates the significance of providing a political opportunity space for the moderation of anti-systemic political movements such as the National View. Before an economic opportunity space emerged in the 1980s – which would facilitate the rise of a conservative capitalist class – the Islamic political movement was already on the way to being transformed into a systemic actor through moderation of its Islamic revolutionary discourse.
5.2.5 The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and the Rise of ‘Economic Opportunity Space’ (1980-1997)

The military coup on 12 September 1980 was a turning point in the history of Turkish modernisation as it dramatically impacted on all pillars of life in Turkey – economy, political culture and institutions. Its effects on economic development and democratisation were examined in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The impact of the coup on the ideological transformation of the Islamic movement was also highly influential. The ideology that shaped the policies of the post-1980 junta was the so-called ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ which is defined as a ‘policy to guide the society with the understanding of national cultural values and principles’ and that ‘Islam would constitute the main point in this national culture’ (Altunışık and Tür 2005:42).

According to the doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the alleged degeneration of national and religious values among the youth was the main reason behind the political violence of the late 1970s and the rise of socialist movements (Koyuncu-Lorasdağı 2010:222; Göl 2008:24; Ahmad 1988:762; Rashwan 2007:197; Aydın 2005:193). The solution to this alleged problem would be to put a heavy emphasis on Islam, utilising it to eradicate the influence of anti-religious ideologies such as communism within the society. Islam strongly entered the state discourse in this period as President Kenan Evren and Prime Minister Turgut Özal repeatedly made references to Islamic and national values in their public speeches, often using them interchangeably (Altunışık and Tür 2005:43). In the post-1980 period, the junta purged socialist and secularist officials, teachers, academics and journalists, replacing them with people of right-leaning convictions such as Turkish nationalists and conservatives (Kanra 2013:56). Moreover, many figures of the leading cadre of the ANAP that won the parliamentary elections in 1983, including party chairperson and Prime Minister Turgut Özal, were former members of the MSP, increasing the influence of Islamic ideology in the new political conjuncture. For instance, it is noted that all Özal cabinets of the 1983-1989 period had at least three ministers who were Naqshbandis, the Islamic order that heavily supported the MSP in the 1970s.
The state elite cultivated Islamism to complement their right-wing/nationalist vision of an anti-Marxist coalition (Jacoby 2003:680).

A key factor that accompanied a softened approach to political Islam was the ongoing economic transformation process from statist policies to an export-oriented liberal economy. The rise of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Turkey was facilitated in this era by the entry of heavy capital investment from Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar (Başkan 2011; Hoşgör 2011). These foreign investors formed ties with an influential Islamic network known as the Gülen movement and the conservative entrepreneurs of Turkey known as the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, contributing to the increasing role of Islamic groups within Turkish political economy (Eligür 2010:85; Yavuz 2013; Atasoy 2009).

Since the initial manifestation of the National View in the early 1970s, the link between the Islamic political movement and the SMEs had been very strong (Tuğal 2002:100; Cop 2013:31-33; Shambayati 1994:316). This can be explained through the alienation of the SMEs from the import-substitution industrialisation policy of the 1960-1980 period as the statist development program benefited big businesses of western Turkey at the expense of the smaller-sized Anatolian enterprises (Aydın 2005:201; Yücekök 1971:100; Gülalp 2001). This was due to the high tariff policy, which protected the large-scale businesses from foreign competition while forcing the small sized Anatolian entrepreneurs to compete with these consolidated and large-scale enterprises within a closed national market.

In addition, the big businesses centred on the business union, TÜSİAD had built a clientelist relationship with policy-makers of the AP in the 1970s, as they were the ones that were awarded with most contracts by the AP-led coalition governments of the era (Kurt 2009:22; Ahmad 1988:759; Atasoy 2005:118; Asutay 2010). It has been noted that small firms (employing less than 100 employees) obtained ‘only 2.7 percent of total bank credits in 1974 although
they were responsible for 25 percent of total industrial production’ at the time (Atasoy 2005:117). Starting from the early 1970s, the *National View* affiliated parties acted as the political voice of the SMEs as the economic discrimination faced by these businesses was a key theme in their electoral campaigns (Buğra 2001:102; Yavuz 2009). As the SMEs were a disadvantaged group within Turkish political economy in the pre-1980 period, the link between the Islamic political movement and the SMEs fed the frustration of the movement from the Turkish state (Buğra 2001; Özcan and Turunç 2011:69). As such, the Islamic political movement and their allies in the business sector were willing to endorse a revisionist vision to re-orient the political and economic system of the country towards what they referred as a ‘Muslim Just Order’ in the 1970s (Tuğal 2009; Özdemir 1989:258-259). The concept of Muslim Just Order indirectly pointed to the direction of an Islamic political and economic system.

The perception of the political and economic system of Turkey by the Islamic movement and its capitalist allies changed in the post-1980 era. The influence of the SMEs over the Turkish economy rapidly increased in the 1980s and 1990s. The economic liberalisation program of the post-1980 weakened the monopolistic structure of the Turkish national market, contributing to the emergence of a competitive economy (Hosgör 2011; Yıldırım 2009; Buğra 2002; Kirişçi 2011). As the SMEs become the main beneficiaries of the post-1980 economic development strategy, they developed a stake in the continuation of the economic system and – by extension – the political system. These enterprises would no longer be willing to support political groups with revisionist aims such as a revolutionary Islamic movement that could have potentially brought instability to Turkey (Yıldırım 2009:69). The change in the approach of their allies in the business world reflected on the discourse of the *National View* affiliated party of the post-1980 era – the RP.

The Anatolian SMEs founded an influential business association in 1991 – *MÜSİAD* – which became a major supporter of the RP in the 1990s, financing all the electoral campaigns of the party until its closure in 1998 (Buğra 2002; Cop 2013:32-33; Shambayati 1994:316). Most members of *MÜSİAD* were family
companies originating from the rural areas and the newly industrialising, predominantly conservative cities of Anatolia such as Gaziantep, Kayseri, Konya and Denizli (Aydın 2005:213; Yavuz 2009; Atasoy 2005, 2009). The membership of the business association reached approximately 3,000 firms in 1997, majority of which were founded in the post-1980 period (Yankaya 2012). The relationship between the SMEs and the Islamic political movement can be defined as ‘symbiotic’ as the rise of the weight of MÜSİAD over Turkish economy occurred in parallel to the success of the RP in elections (Aydın 2005:213). While the RP-led coalition government came to power in 1996, the share of MÜSİAD affiliated companies within the GDP of Turkey reached approximately 10 percent by 1997 (Yankaya 2012:32; see Table 5.5).

*MÜSİAD* affected the ideological transformation of the Islamic political movement in a number of ways. Above all, the documents published by the business association were influential in shaping the mind-set of the leadership of the RP, convincing them of the compatibility between capitalist free-market economics and Islamic ethics (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009:964; Atasoy 2009). Particularly a report published by the organisation in 1994 titled ‘The Muslim Person in Working Life’ proved extremely significant as the concept of ‘homo Islamicus’ emerged out of this report (MÜSİAD 1994). The economic development strategy espoused by *MÜSİAD* – the self-styled representative of the ‘Anatolian Tigers’ – was the East Asian model, which was perceived by the Turkish Islamic movement as based on the principles of ‘high morality’ and ‘advanced technology’ (MÜSİAD 1994). The East Asian business culture that syntheses communitarian Confucianist ethics with innovation, discipline and hard work was applauded by *MÜSİAD* that aimed to build a similar understanding in Turkey with the utilisation of Islamic ethics (Hosgör 2011:351).
Table 5.5. The Electoral Performance of the RP

(percentage of total votes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987 Parliamentary Elections</td>
<td>% 7.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 Municipal Elections</td>
<td>% 9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 Parliamentary Elections</td>
<td>% 16.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 Municipal Elections</td>
<td>% 19.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 Parliamentary Elections</td>
<td>% 21.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: İhlas Haber Ajansı (2014).

If the party program and policies of the RP in the 1990s are compared with the doctrines promoted by MÜSİAD in the same period, a striking similarity becomes noticeable. The RP’s official booklet titled the ‘Just Economic Order’, for instance, emphasised the convergence between free-market principles and Islamic ethics as the Muslim society during the Prophet's era was described as a non-interventionist, free-market economy with a strong 'welfare' component, the concept of zekat, which ensured equal income distribution (Refah Partisi 1991; Hosgör 2011). Thus, following the vision of MÜSİAD, the Islamic political movement also stated its dedication towards free-market capitalism, yet one difference between the RP and MÜSİAD was regarding the notion of the welfare state as the former strongly emphasised its significance while the latter did not refer to it (Erbakan 1991). This difference would later be influential in triggering a schism within the Islamic movement in the early 2000s. Nevertheless, the similarities between the economic visions were more pronounced in the 1990s. For instance, MÜSİAD explicitly criticised Turkey’s membership application to the EU in the 1990s, instead opting for the establishment of an alternative Islamic common market, which was adopted by
the Eurosceptic RP as the Prime Minister Erbakan announced his D-8 project\(^4\) (Developing 8) once the party was in power in 1997.

On the level of society, the dramatic economic changes Turkey experienced in the post-1980 period had a profound impact as a conservative middle class emerged, providing the societal basis ideological change within the Islamic movement:

The sociological base of the reformist movement within the Welfare and Virtue parties are the urban, educated and professional middle classes. The conservative discourse of the 1970s could not fully appeal to this social group, but the collective power and passion required for the formation of a new political movement was also not found. We may think that this is due to the end of the social mission of political Islam. Hence, it can be argued that rather than the end of Islamism in general, Islam as a collective opposition movement has served its function. The Islamic movement has created its own middle class, intellectuals and professionals; and the intensifying individualisation of these groups and their participation into the free-market economy, media and the art world have begun to transform the evolution and dynamics of the Islamic movement (Göle 2000:14).

Socio-economic changes of the status of conservatives in the post-1980 Turkey gradually reflected on the intellectual realm as well, a radical transformation in the worldview of Islamic intellectuals becoming visible by the second half of the 1990s. Islamic intellectuals’ understanding of modernity has evolved over time, as many initially perceived it through the form it had taken in Turkey under the state-led modernisation project (i.e. the Kemalist/secularist social engineering program) (see Kasaba 1997; Kara 1994; Gencer 2008). It was not uncommon for Islamic intellectuals to stress the necessity of eliminating the allegedly contagious influence of Western values (Kasaba 1997; Bulaç 1990; Göle 2000). However, this attitude changed over time as modernity, starting from the late 1990s onwards, has been re-conceptualised and ‘localised’ as a phenomenon that could be suitable for Muslim societies – if infused with Islamic values and if modernisation can be taken in terms of technological and institutional change.

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\(^4\) The D-8 is an economic development alliance founded by Erbakan in 1997, a group of predominantly Muslim developing countries consisting of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey.
but not in the form of the transformation of lifestyles (Kasaba 1997:17). This process of ideological change regarding the relationship between Islam and modernity is most clear in the case of Ali Bulaç, a well-known Islamic intellectual.

Bulaç (1990) once believed that Islam and modernity were entirely incompatible, reflecting a ‘mirror image’ of CMT’s hypothesis albeit from a different point of view within Islamic circles (Göle 2000:13-15). Bulaç (1990:7) defined modernity as a destructive force that had emerged with the promise of universal salvation and building ‘a paradise on earth’, instead turning the entire planet into ‘hell on earth’. In fact, it was neither possible nor even desirable to try to improve human condition in our planet since the real and only paradise could only be seen in the afterlife, not in this world whose sole purpose was to test the resistance of virtuous individuals to temptation and sin (Bulaç 1990:62). Accordingly, true salvation could only come from Islam and that arguments based on the compatibility of Islam and modernity were wrong – these two were direct opposites having originated in entirely different philosophical readings of human nature. Then, it was only natural for Bulaç (1990:8-9) to equate modernisation – the gradual process of becoming ‘modern’ – with the ‘destruction of virtuous religious lifestyle and the subversion of Allah’s words by the Satan’.

From the late 1990s onwards, Bulaç altered his perception of modernity, becoming a determined proponent of the concept of ‘Islamic modernity’ and the synthesis of Islamic values with free-market liberalism, human rights and democracy (Çınar 2005:11; Göle 2000:15). Bulaç (1995) argues that a pluralistic Islamic political/legal system can be built based on a treaty – the Charter of Medina – drafted by the Prophet in the formative years of the Islamic State. Accordingly, all groups – Muslims, various non-Muslims and seculars – could have separate legal codes, the system envisaging peaceful co-existence within a multi-cultural society based on mutual tolerance and respect. It is argued that Islam and its teachings put forward a ‘progressive’ and ‘modern’ civilisation that is preferable and indeed superior to the democratic systems of the West, which
are claimed to frequently take the form of the ‘tyranny of majority’ rather than being genuine liberal systems (Bulaç 1995:11). The case of Ali Bulaç perfectly exemplifies ideological change among Islamic intellectuals in Turkey. It is clear that even when alternative ideas to Western modernity are offered, the attitude of Islamic intellectuals has shifted from the categorical rejection of Western values towards stating their ideas within the discursive context of *modernity*, often via the utilisation of terms originating in Western political thought such as ‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’.

In sum, as a result of the economic opportunity space that led to the rise of a conservative capitalist class organised into MÜSİAD, the increasing integration of conservative professionals into public and private sectors and a profound intellectual discursive change, Islamic groups in Turkey were transformed from an economically disenfranchised and politically marginalised movement towards a systemic actor that would favour stability over revolutionary ideals such as the Islamic state. However, the incorporation of Islamism into the official ideology of the state in the 1980s and the electoral successes of the RP in the 1990s caused discontent among some elements of the state establishment in Turkey – the radical Kemalist officers.

### 5.2.6 A Kemalist Counter-Revolution: The 28th February Process and the Turning Point for Ideological Transformation (1997-2001)

In contrast to the seeming partnership between the Kemalist military and the Islamic movement in the 1980s, the latter half of the 1990s witnessed an intense conflict between the two forces. The rise of a new Islamic party of the *National View* – the RP – in the 1990s intensified tensions. If the period between the transition to multi-party life in 1950 and the electoral victory of the RP in 1995 is evaluated as a détente in relations between the secular regime and the Islamic movement, the post-1995 period can be seen as a continuation of the early struggle in the formative years of the Republic.
The RP won the 1995 parliamentary elections and came to power by forming a coalition government, growing bolder as its mayors and low ranking members called for ‘an Islamic order’ frequently, prompting the Kemalist military to spearhead a secularist coalition (consisting of secularist political parties such as the CHP and segments of the media) and present the government an ultimatum on 28th February (Eligür 2010:214; Hosgör 2011:352; Yavuz 2009). The RP-led government was eventually forced to resign, which was shortly followed by the closure of the RP by the Constitutional Court in 1998.

In the 1997-2001 period, the secularists began to severely restrict the political opportunity space of the Islamic movement. However, the Islamic political movement was benefiting from the economic opportunity space initiated in the 1980s through building ties with the rising conservative capitalist class of Turkey. This dramatically affected the subsequent trajectory of the Islamic political movement and triggered a set of events that would produce a new Islamic political paradigm in Turkey: the AKP.

A particular combination of political and economic opportunity spaces can be identified as the reason behind the rise of the AKP. The restriction of the political opportunity space with the military intervention of 1997 that resulted in the fall of the RP-led coalition government and the persecution of Islamic socio-economic networks had a paradoxical impact on the evolution of the Islamic political movement (Dağı 2008:27). After the RP was banned, the same cadre formed the FP as its successor, yet this party could not function properly due to the growing intra-party division between a staunchly conservative faction loyal to the venerable leader of the movement, Necmettin Erbakan, and a reformist group led by two young politicians, Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The traditionalists desired the Islamic political movement to remain a revolutionary vanguard party whereas the reformists wanted to shift towards a moderate, ‘catchall’, centre-right party that could maximise votes via reaching non-Islamic sections of the society (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009:962).
The 1997 military invention known as ‘the February 28th process’ allowed the differences of opinion between the traditionalists and the reformists to come to surface, however, the schism can be traced back to the 1980s:

Nureddin Nebati, current vice-chair of AKP’s Istanbul branch, and a MUSIAD member, claims that the division between Yenilikciler [reformists] and Gelenekciler [traditionalists] existed from the 1980s, and he was one of the moderates known as the Yenilikci leader of a local RP branch in the early 1990s. As early as 1992, Nebati penned an article on RP’s future, arguing that the RP would either become a conservative democratic party or become increasingly marginalized and disappear. A core group within the MG [NOM] movement, including Erbakan himself, insisted that the RP should stay as an Islamist ideological party and resisted the centrist tendencies of the Yenilikciler (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009:962).

The reformists accused the ideologically charged discourse of traditionalists for the closure of the RP, therefore the 1997 intervention reinforced their sense of alienation from this group (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009). The main lesson the reformist faction drew from the 1997 intervention was that the power of the Kemalist establishment was overwhelming and that it would not hesitate to punish those who would overtly challenge the secularist regime, but as long as political movements remained within the established boundaries of official ideology, they would be allowed to participate in elections (Rashwan 2007:200; Göl 2009:802). Thus, the political opportunity space was not eliminated altogether, rather it was restricted to exclude revolutionary Islamic groups but remained inclusive enough to encourage the moderates into looking for possible solutions to come to power through elections.

The long schism finally crystallised in the party congress of the FP in 2000 as the reformist faction led by key Abdullah Gül, Abdüllatif Şener and Bülenty Arınç (all of whom later became the founders and top leaders of the AKP along with Erdoğan) nominated Gül for party leadership. The reformists lost the election, but they were able to gain almost half the votes in the party congress, demonstrating the appeal of the movement. Once the reformists realised that they would not be able to 'transform the movement from within', they decided to form a separate political party after the closure of the FP (Gümüşçü and Sert
2009:963). While the reformists formed the AKP, the traditionalists formed the SP. The AKP came to power in 2002 after a highly successful public relations campaign in which the party leadership was able to portray the AKP as ‘moderate’, ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ rather than ‘Islamic’ which had negative connotations in Turkish political system (Göl 2009:803; Aydin 2005:180). The AKP’s vocal support for Turkey’s EU membership process played a crucial role in re-invigorating the images of its ruling cadre as moderates. All of the predecessors of the AKP within the National View (including the RP) were known for their anti-Western stance, therefore this was a radical departure from the conventional Islamic ideology in the country (Yılmaz 2007:492-493; Göl 2009:799).

Following the 1997 crackdown on political Islam, many elements of the Turkish Islamic movement changed their attitudes towards the state establishment in Turkey. A notable Islamic intellectual, Ali Bulaç called for a new approach labelled as ‘civil Islam’, one that would avoid confrontation with the Kemalist regime, while the Islamic Gülen order organised a series of conferences designed to develop a moderate Islamic paradigm in-line with the passive secularism based on the American model (Kuru 2010:141-142). Founders and key leaders of the AKP such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Bülent Arınç and Abdullah Gül participated in these conferences (Kuru 2010:141-142). Nevertheless, not all parts of the Islamic political movement adopted the same approach after 1997. The traditionalist faction of the National View vehemently refused the emerging concept of ‘moderate political Islam’.

The main factor that differentiated the reformist faction from the traditionalists was the alliance the former built with the conservative capitalists who had a vested interest in sustaining the stability of the Turkish political and economic system. The ultimate ideological transformation of the Islamic political movement with the foundation of the AKP occurred only when the post-1950 political opportunity space facilitated by multi-party politics was complemented with that of post-1980 economic opportunity space, which emerged with the rise of the conservative SMEs. The moderation of the Islamic political movement
was led by the AKP in the political sphere with the support of their allies in the business world – MÜSİAD (Kuru 2009). The capitalist class centred on MÜSİAD was the essential driving force behind the rise of the reformists and the subsequent formation of the AKP. The alienation of Anatolian capitalists from the traditionalist discourse and their decision to support the reformists were due to their stakes in sustaining the economic liberalisation drive of Turkey:

The so-called ‘Just Order’ of the MG [National View] line that highlighted social justice, redistribution, and heavy state intervention through an economic programme alienated the emerging devout bourgeoisie. Erol Yarar, the founding president of MUSIAD, stated that the organization was highly sceptical of Erbakan’s Just Order Economic Program and rather preferred a political cadre that could deliver a well-functioning free market. Erbakan’s backing of greater state presence in the economy did not match well with what the expanding devout bourgeoisie asked for (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009:963).

In this context, the formation of an alliance between the reformist faction of the National View represented by the AKP and MÜSİAD can be attributed to a change in the perception of Europe by the latter. As explained in the preceding section, MÜSİAD had opposed the EU membership of Turkey until the late 1990s, which had also reflected on the Euro-scepticism of their political allies, the RP, in those years. However, the signing of the Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995 removed the protectionist barriers for Turkish exports and financial flows to the Eurozone. Benefiting from the state subsidies for the export drive and the removal of barriers after 1995, conservative entrepreneurs affiliated with MÜSİAD began to invest heavily in the Eurozone and establish close economic links with companies based in the EU countries from the late 1990s onwards (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009:963; Özcan and Turunç 2011:72). Therefore, MÜSİAD changed its initially critical attitude towards the EU and voiced its approval for Turkey’s accession process into the organisation in the 2000s (Özcan and Turunç 2011:72).

In this conjuncture, the enduring Euro-scepticism and protectionist economic program of the traditionalist National View faction that formed the SP antagonised MÜSİAD, resulting in their decision to side with the AKP that
appeared supportive of the EU accession process (Göl 2009:799). In contrast to the AKP, the SP adopted the mantle of anti-Westernism of the RP, continuously referring to objectives such as withdrawing from NATO, modifying the legal system with Islamic principles and referring to the EU as a ‘Christian Club’ (Tuğal 2009). The impact of this conservative capitalist class on the formation of the AKP cannot possibly be over-stated as during the intra-party schism of the National View, 28 out of 31 members of parliament from the business world chose to join the reformist AKP rather than the traditionalist SP (Gümüşçü and Sert 2009:964).

The split of the Islamic political movement with the formation of the AKP that was less confrontational towards the tenets of the Kemalist ideology than the conventional National View discourse was as a turning point in the socio-political development trajectory of Turkey. The AKP carried the mainstream Turkish Islamic movement towards ideological moderation as the more confrontational Islamic discourse of the SP was marginalised during the 2000s while the AKP managed to win three parliamentary elections in a row since 2002 (see Table 5.6).

**Table 5.6. The Votes of the AKP and the SP in Parliamentary Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>AKP (%)</th>
<th>SP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>34,28</td>
<td>2,49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>46,58</td>
<td>2,34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>49,83</td>
<td>1,27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: İhlas Haber Ajansı (2014).*
5.2.7 A New Path for the Islamic Political Movement: The AKP (2001-2013)

‘What is an Islamic party? How can we distinguish an Islamic party from a secular one? When does an Islamic movement ceases to be so and under what conditions?’ (Yavuz 2009:2). These questions had been a key part of the scholarly debate on the AKP and its political identity since the formation of the party in 2001. The AKP leadership and the official party program consistently used the term ‘conservative democrat’ to define the identity of the party (AK Parti 2011). For instance, Yalçın Akdoğan (2010:61), a key ideologue of the party and the chief political advisor to the Prime Minister Erdoğan, defined the AKP’s ideology as such:

The parameters of conservative democrat political identity can be summarised: According to this approach, the political sphere is defined through a culture of consensus, the differences within social sphere can only be expressed in the political sphere through such a culture. Social and cultural differences should be involved in shaping the political sphere on the basis of mutual tolerance produced by a democratic, pluralist environment.

Regardless of the definitions provided by the AKP leadership, however, the secularist critics of the party argued that the AKP was forced by the Kemalist elite to use the label of ‘conservative democracy’, which supposedly signified merely a ‘cosmetic change’ (Kurt 2009:35; Yavuz 2009; Tibi 2009). The AKP felt the necessity to curb its Islamic discourse in order to broaden its appeal in the 2000s, yet its ideological roots often came to surface during its rule as seen the failed attempt of the party to criminalise adultery in 2005. Even though the party avoided defining itself as an Islamic party, it is clear that at least some of its policies were inspired by an Islamic morality. Hence, the party appeared more religious than conventional centre-right parties of Turkey such as the DP, AP, and the ANAP, yet not as religious as the traditional National View-affiliated parties, the MNP, MSP, RP, FP and the SP. Therefore, despite the continuing scepticism of secularist observers, the AKP can be evaluated as the product of a genuine ideological transformation within the Islamic political movement (Köni and Açıkgöz 2013; Göl 2009:802-803; Kurt 2009:25; Kanra 2013:57; Dağı 2008; Özbudun and Hale 2010).
A common reading of the emergence of the AKP out of the *National View* is to perceive this phenomenon as the ‘victory of the secularising modernisation project’ of Turkey (Çınar 2005:177). According to this account, if there is ‘Islamic modernity’ in contemporary Turkey today, then it is the product of the secular state (Çınar 2005:178). This understanding overlooks the fact that the Kemalist social engineering project was not fully successful in establishing its particularly radical brand of secularism within large sections of the populace. In contrast to Kemalist secularism, capitalist values based on the pursuit of wealth, professionalism and neo-liberalism had been strongly established over time, shaping even the Islamic movement (Tuğal 2002; Keskin 2009). In due process of multi-party competition and economic development, loyalty to the Republic had been ingrained within the Islamic movement though its struggle to re-fashion the official ideology and institutional framework of the state towards a more Islamic-sensitive direction continued. Nevertheless, the current nature of the Islamic political movement in Turkey stands in stark contrast to the revolutionary Islamists of the 1920s and 1930s that aimed to implement *shari’a*, re-establish the caliphate and build an Islamic totalitarian state.

As a result of the 12-year rule of the AKP since 2002, the mainstream Turkish Islamic movement was fully integrated into the political and economic system of Turkey, yet as explained in *Chapter 4*, the secular groups increasingly appeared to be the marginalised opposition movement in the country as demonstrated during the *Gezi Park* protests of 2013. As ideological polarisation in Turkish politics intensified over the years, the secularists and the AKP administration began to perceive each other as ‘security threats’ by 2013 (Özbudun 2014; Atay 2013; Göle 2013). As *Chapter 4* had analysed, while the Islamic movement moderated its discourse due to a genuine ideological transformation within the *National View*, the democratisation process in the country was not positively affected from this phenomenon, the political regime in Turkey reflecting the characteristics of a majoritarian system rather than a consolidated liberal democracy.
5.3 READING THE SOCIAL TRAJECTORY OF TURKEY THROUGH THE MULTIPLE MODERNITIES PARADIGM

So far, the chapter emphasised the significance of path dependency within different periods of the social modernisation trajectory of Turkey. Part three showed that the legacy of the Ottoman Westernisation process constituted the genesis of Turkey’s social change experience, laying the groundwork of a power struggle between the pro-Western Kemalists and the revolutionary Islamic groups in the formative years of the Republic. The particular way the Kemalists interpreted the fall of the Ottoman Empire led them to the conclusion that the society was ‘not socially modernised enough’, which referred to the continuing influence of the Islamic clergy over social life. After the Kemalist Republican regime defeated the Islamic uprisings, it implemented its vision of social modernisation into practice. This resulted in the marginalisation of Islamic groups in the country, yet these networks managed to survive in rural areas where the control of the Republican regime was relatively weak.

The survival of these groups shaped the subsequent trajectory of state-religion relations as after the transition to multi-party politics, the state gradually expanded the political opportunity space of Islamic groups through reforming its official ideology. With the inclusion of an economic opportunity space to this equation in the post-1980 period, the political economic setting that led to the creation of the AKP out of the mainstream Islamic political movement was established. The AKP renounced the official discourse of the National View, presenting itself as a pro-democratic social conservative party that supposedly had no intentions for building an Islamic state and implementing the shari’a.

The conceptualisation of the socio-political modernisation trajectory of Turkey in this manner by the chapter contests the narratives of the structural and societal models within the literature on the Turkish modernity. As examined in Chapter 1, the former focuses on the role of the state and the secularisation process while the latter highlights the influence of the economic development process that created a conservative capitalist class. In contrast to both of these
approaches, this chapter argued that the transformation of Islamism in Turkey could only be understood through focusing on how the political opportunity space that started in the pre-1980 period complemented the post-1980 economic opportunity space. Another factor that was neglected by both of the mainstream approaches was the transformation of the state over the years, a phenomenon that this chapter emphasised as one of the key reasons behind the change experienced by the Islamic movement in Turkey. Through the engagement between the state and the Islamic movement, a ‘social contract’ was established as the assertive secularism of the regime shifted towards passive secularism, which ensured the incorporation of mainstream Islamic groups into the political and economic system of the country.

In addition to the role of path dependency, the framework of MMP utilised in the chapter acknowledged the contingent divergences of the Turkish case from the social modernisation experience of the Western model. The Kemalist paradigm of social modernisation adopted secularism as an inseparable part of the Republican ideology in the 1920s and 1930s and imposed it from above to the society, a phenomenon that preceded the advent of economic modernisation in the country. This meant that the social trajectory of Turkey strongly diverged from that of the historical Western modernisation experience in terms of the relationship between the secularisation process and the economic development (Göle 1997:48). While the secularisation process in the Western experience evolved in parallel to the economic modernisation, secularism in Turkey was implemented by the fiat of the state, emerging prior to the existence of a socio-economic environment that could potentially generate and sustain the secularisation of the society. The roots of this divergence lay in the Ottoman period of Westernisation – as akin to the political modernisation effort studied in Chapter 4 – social modernisation in Turkey also emerged before the economic modernisation accelerated. The result of the interaction between the Turkish society and Western modernity in the social realm of modernisation was a hybrid modernity that emerged as a result of the initial violent clashes between secularists and Islamic groups, later to be followed by a reciprocal negotiation process.
In light of the analysis presented throughout the chapter, could contemporary Turkey be evaluated as a ‘socially modern’ society according to the views of the three theories of modernity – CMT, NMT and MMP? As analysed in Chapter 2, social modernity is envisaged by CMT as referring to a thoroughly secularised and largely non-religious society. As Turkey is a country in which religious values continue to play a large role in shaping the social and political life, contemporary Turkey would not possibly be defined as modern by scholars of CMT such as Daniel Lerner (1958), David Apter (1965) and Elie Kedourie (1992). However, it is important to note that even contemporary Western societies such as the US and Germany that possess religiously motivated political parties with noteworthy public support – the Republican Party and the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) respectively – would fail to fulfil the exclusionary criteria of modernity put forward by CMT in this regard. In fact, this reveals a contradiction inherent in the framework of CMT: CMT that identified the features of Western civilisation as the ‘universal destination for modernisation’ cannot possibly account for the resurgence of religiosity and the popularity of religiously oriented political parties in some contemporary Western societies with very high economic development levels and consolidated liberal democratic regimes.

By contrast, Turkey could be defined as ‘socially modern’ in accordance with the understandings of NMT and MMP. NMT puts forward the hypothesis of ‘Islamic Calvinism’ that forms a positive link between economic development and Islamic values. This accurately reflects the modernisation trajectory of Turkey in the post-1980 era when the rise of a conservative capitalist class centred on the business association, MÜSİAD, accompanied the ideological moderation of the discourse of the Islamic political movement, culminating in the formation of the AKP. Nevertheless, this approach solely focuses on the link between the economic and social development processes, neglecting the role of the political development in the form of democratisation. MMP presents the notion of ‘multiple Islamisms’, arguing that different forms of Islamism are shaped by the interaction between Islamic groups and the political and economic conditions of a predominantly Muslim society (Kaya 2004; Göle 2002). This conceptualisation
is fully applicable to the case of Turkey as the ideology of Islamic groups in Turkey was shaped by their interaction with the state and the capitalist class. As such, MMP is a more effective framework than NMT, which overlooks the role of the state-religion interaction on social modernisation. Apart from their definitions of social modernity, the theories also offer highly different understandings regarding the trajectory that produces social modernity in non-Western contexts such as Turkey. The following sections will assess four different hypotheses offered by CMT, NMT and MMP in light of the Turkish case of social modernisation trajectory analysed throughout the chapter.

5.3.1 The ‘Irreversible Secularisation Hypothesis’ of CMT

The scholars adhering to CMT envisaged Islam as incompatible with modernity and they interpreted secularisation as an irreversible process in the 1950s and 1960s (Lerner 1958; Apter 1965; Berkes 1964). Once it was launched, it would automatically initiate a self-sustainable chain reaction that would supposedly produce an ‘irreligious modernity’ in modernising Muslim societies (Volpi 2010:81). This hypothesis of CMT was based on the idea of linear progress, a key pillar of the social theory of the immediate post-World War II years. Nevertheless, the Turkish case refutes this notion as the Kemalist secularisation program imposed in the 1920s and 1930s did not result in the elimination of the appeal of Islamic values for a considerable portion of the society in the country (Gülalp 1997; Keskin 2009:10). There were a number of Islamic oriented revolts to the secular regime, both in the predominantly Kurdish areas (e.g. 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion and the series of uprisings in the Ağrı province between 1926 and 1930) and the Turkish provinces (e.g. the Menemen incident of 1930) ( Çağaptay 2006). Moreover, Islamic networks such as Naqshbandis and Nurcu remained influential in rural areas despite the official closure of all religious orders (Jacoby 2004:83; Toprak 1981:71-72; Roos and Roos 1971:45). After 1950, the political opening of the DP legitimised the social and political influence of Islamic, enabling political Islam to manifest strongly over the years.
In this context, the Turkish experience of socio-political development shows that in the decades following the implementation of secularism, religiosity did not wane in modernising Turkey. In contrast to CMT, the paradox of modernisation is that conservatism or religiousity actually increases during processes of rapid social change, because people often feel the need to cling on to values they feel under threat (Gencer 2008:230). As such, the Turkish case strongly challenges the ‘irreversible secularisation thesis’ of CMT. However, some scholars of CMT offered another hypothesis to revise the shortcomings of the irreversible secularisation thesis, arguing that Islamism was a reactionary movement launched by the so-called ‘victims of modernisation’ such as low income earning and political disenfranchised classes in rapidly developing societies such as Turkey (Volpi 2010:81; Lerner 1958). This argument suggests if economic development could ensure the elimination of mass poverty in predominantly Muslim societies such as Turkey, the appeal of Islamism would also vanish. Hence, the notion of the ‘transience of Islamism’ emerged in the literature.

5.3.2 The ‘Transience of Islamism Hypothesis’ of CMT

The transience of Islamism hypothesis was applied to the case of Turkey which began to experience a resurgence of Islamism from the 1950s onwards, proponents of CMT such as Niyazi Berkes (1964) and Binnaz Toprak (1981) arguing that the rise of religious groups in the country was only a temporary phenomenon that manifested because of income inequality. Islamism was perceived as an expression of socio-economic grievances, mostly adopted as a political ideology of anti-systemic opposition in rural areas and shantytowns of industrialised urban areas of western Turkey (Kösebalaban 2007). The rapid rise of the RP in the 1980s and 1990s was interpreted in this manner, supposedly a temporary symptom of a society in transition to modernity (Kongar 1997, 1999). The rapid economic development of Turkey in the post-1980 period enabled the rise of an urban middle class and a conservative capitalist class, resulting in many conservative lower income-earning classes to be transformed into relatively high income-earners (European Stability
As such, the socioeconomic development of Turkey in this era provides a suitable case to test the validity of the so-called transience of Islam thesis.

The post-1980 liberalisation of trade and the export-oriented industrialisation strategy weakened the hegemony of Istanbul-centred conglomerates over Turkish economy as the SMEs across Turkey utilised the opportunities provided by the new economic program via building partnerships with foreign enterprises and exporting their products to the new markets in the Middle East and Central Asia (Başkan 2011). The rise of the new economic elite impacted on Turkish political life as many SMEs preferred to form ties with the National View affiliated parties such as the RP in the 1990s and the AKP in the 2000s rather than centre-right parties such as the ANAP. Ties with the influential business association of the SMEs, MÜSİAD, shaped the early social conservative ideology and the initial pro-EU program of the AKP in the early 2000s. The rise of the AKP indicates that political Islam – albeit in a relatively moderate form compared to the discourse of the National View in the pre-2000 period – has risen in parallel to the emergence of the middle class in Turkey, contesting the ‘transience of Islamism’ hypothesis of CMT. Islamism in Turkey did not disappear with rapid economic development but merely transformed itself over the years through adopting a new discourse. As such, the Turkish experience of modernisation highlights the weaknesses of both of the key arguments of classical modernisation theorists regarding the link between religion and modernity: the irreversible secularisation thesis and the transience of Islamism thesis.

### 5.3.3 The ‘Islamic Calvinism Hypothesis’ of NMT

Challenging the arguments of CMT, scholars of NMT contend that Islamic values are fully compatible with modernity defined as a capitalist and liberal democratic society (See, for instance, Ülgener 1984; Rodinson 1974; Güngör 1991; Yavuz 2013). The holy book, Qur’an, was re-conceptualised by NMT as a text that praises the spirit of merchants and the capitalist pursuit for wealth,
scholars noting that the Prophet himself was also a merchant (Yavuz 2005; Nasr 2009; Akyol 2012; Dede 2011). In this context, scholars such as Mustafa Akyol (2008:86) applied the hypothesis to economically developing predominantly Muslim country cases such as Turkey and Malaysia:

People understand religion according not only its textual teachings, but also their social environment. This environment has been feudal, imperial, or bureaucratic in most contexts. But now, in Turkey and in a few other Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Islam is being transformed into a religion of the middle class and its rational, independent individuals. No wonder this social change generates new interpretations of religion.

As analysed in part two of the chapter, it is clear that economic change in the form of the rise of a conservative capitalist class and the formation of an alliance between this class and the Islamic political movement had a profound impact on the social modernisation of Turkey, considerably moderating the discourse of the AKP. This validates the hypothesis of Islamic Calvinism in the case of Turkey. However, NMT over-emphasises the role of economic modernisation and neglects the interaction between social modernisation and political modernisation.

The particular conditions of Turkey enabled the rise of a conservative capitalist class after the liberalisation program was implemented, but the Islamic Calvinism hypothesis cannot be generalised to the whole Muslim world. Countries such as Egypt experienced a similar process of economic liberalisation, yet the degree of ideological moderation observed in the case of the Turkish Islamic political movement was not witnessed there (Sokhey and Yıldırım 2013). In societies with a historical legacy of colonialism and those that lacked a competitive multi-party life such as Egypt, the forms of Islamism differed from that of Turkey. As such, the political context of societies should be taken into account in addition to the economic factors. By presupposing a strong link between Islamic values and modernity, NMT fails to develop a generalisable theorem to account for the process of Islamic transformation. In this regard, the understanding offered by MMP is more successful.
5.3.4 The ‘Multiple Islamisms Hypothesis’ and a New Conceptualisation of the Link between Islam and Modernity by MMP

As discussed above, the exclusionary framework of social modernity used by CMT perceives Islam as a monolithic bloc, neglecting all the possible varieties of interpretations across the Muslim world (Saeed 1994:1). True to Eurocentric social thought tradition, Islamism has been conceptualised as if it is autonomous from the subjective interpretations of social and political actors who derive the rationale of their actions from Islamic texts and worldview (Göle 2000:21-25). In reality, the Muslim world long contained a large number of interpretations derived from different teachings developed by various Sunni schools, variants of the Shi’a belief, heterodox sects and the Sufi orders. None of these interpreted Islamic texts in the same manner. Therefore, Islam – not unlike Christianity or other belief systems – can be possibly interpreted in radically different ways by an observer. As the transformation of the ideological discourse of the Turkish Islamic movement shows, there are many possible readings of Islam which renders the arguments of CMT as reductionist (Çınar and Duran 2008; Ayubi 1991; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996:29; Volpi 2010; Saeed 1994).

In contrast to CMT, NMT formed a positive correlation between Islamic values and capitalism, assuming that manifestations of Islamism would be compatible with modernity wherever economic modernisation had emerged. Yet, this approach neglects the possibility of Islamisms in economically developed countries that would not necessarily perceive modernity as desirable. Instead, MMP does not presuppose any a priori connection between Islamic values and modernity, suggesting that religious norms may be interpreted in various ways based on economic and political conditions of a society. In fact, historical and contemporary Islamist thinkers across the Muslim world have been highly selective and innovative in the way they interpret Islamic scripture, resulting in the manifestations of not one but many Islamism(s) as shown in the Turkish case (Ayubi 1991:3).
Depending on its particular interpretation – which is shaped by the interaction between the interpreter and the political and economic system of a country – Islamism could have positive or negative effects on the modernisation of a predominantly Muslim society. A religion cannot be judged as a whole via analysis of solely some of its interpretations. Rather than the source, the actions of the ‘interpreter’ of religion are the most important agents in the assessment of a particular religious understanding within modernisation processes (Saeed 1994:26). The study of the social modernisation trajectory of Turkey shows that depending on a particular interpretation, religious norms can possibly co-exist with modernity. Yet, this compatibility in the Turkish context owed its existence to the political and economic opportunity spaces possessed by the Islamic groups in the country.

In this context, the failure of CMT to account for the rise of Islamic morality and the collapse of the ‘irreversible secularisation paradigm’ do not necessarily mean that the Kemalist project did not impact on the transformation trajectory of the Islamic movement in Turkey as suggested by scholars of NMT such as M. Hakan Yavuz (2013) and Javaid Saeed (1994). In addition to the impact of the economic development that produced the conservative capitalist class, another key factor that contributed to the moderation of the ideology of the National View with the rise of the AKP was the interaction between the Islamic movement and the secularist regime (Cizre-Sakallioglu 1996). The ever-present fear of party closure by the Kemalist judiciary and the stabilising influence of the strong link between the Islamic political movement and the conservative SMEs resulted in the emergence of the AKP. With its social conservative agenda, the party greatly differed from its predecessors within the National View by downplaying Islamic values and focusing on ties with the Western world, welfare and economic development in the early 2000s.

The Turkish case validates the ‘multiple Islamisms’ hypothesis of MMP by showing that the most important determinant for what role Islamism would play in a given society is the political and economic setting which conditions the nature of an Islamic group. In Middle Eastern and North African societies that
had a historical experience with Western colonialism, Islamism manifested in anti-Western and pro-militant forms as seen in the writings of Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, Sayyid Mohamud Taleqani of Iran and Abu-l-A’la Maududi of Pakistan (Çınar and Duran 2008:19). The analysis of Islamism, therefore, should be primarily centred on the political and economic conditions of a society. Islamic interpretation takes different forms in various Muslim societies, hence it should be expected that Turkish Islamism would be different from Egyptian, Saudi or Indonesian Islamisms.

In this context, the Turkish case suggests an alternative way for conceptualising ‘modern’ via not perceiving it as synonymous with ‘Western’ (White 2002). In a world of many different types of ‘modernities’, there would also be many ‘Islamisms’:

In analysing the relations between Islam and modernity it is essential that both are seen, not as clearly defined and fixed entities, but as open to interpretation. Not only there are different modernities, but there are different Islams (Kaya 2004:11).

5.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter had three objectives: Firstly, the narratives on the social development experience of Turkey put forward by the structural and societal models within the literature have been contested through an approach that focused on the complementary roles of the political and economic opportunity spaces on the transformation of the Islamic movement. The long engagement between the state and the Islamic movement in Turkey had been an arduous process of clash, negotiation and reciprocal compromises that resulted in the moderation of ideologies and approaches of both the Islamic political movement and the state. A key product of this process was the integration of the once-disenfranchised and marginalised Islamic groups into the political and economic system of the country.
Secondly, contemporary Turkey has been evaluated through the lens of the three theories of modernity to determine if it could be considered a socially modern society. It was shown that while CMT cannot define Turkey as modern (and even some contemporary Western societies) because of its exclusionary criteria, NMT and MMP would perceive the country as socially modern today. A key finding of the chapter in this context was that Turkey strongly diverged from the Western path of social development, because the secularisation process was imposed by the state rather than emerging as a social phenomenon as seen in the case of the Protestant reformation in Western Europe from the 16th century onwards. The outcome of this unique social modernisation trajectory also differed from the contemporary features of Western modernity, as the new Islamic paradigm that emerged with the AKP in Turkey is a hybrid of modern lifestyles and a capitalist/consumerist culture with moralism and religious values. This is a phenomenon that poses a serious challenge to CMT that long interpreted modernisation process through opposing dichotomies such as ‘traditional versus modern’ or ‘secular versus religious’ (Çevik and Thomas 2012:143).

Thirdly, the social modernisation trajectory of Turkey was interpreted to test the competing hypotheses offered by the three theories of modernity to comprehend the development experiences of non-Western societies. It was argued that MMP offers the most generalisable theorem that could fully explain the nature of the Turkish case. The method provided by MMP to study political Islam is inclusive and objective as it does not presupposes a static link between Islam and modernity, rather focusing its attention on the political and economic context of a society, which drives the Islamic groups towards different ideological stances.

A key insight of the Turkish trajectory of state-Islam engagement is that through providing a restricted democratisation process where the Islamic movement was able to express itself, the state impacted on the ideology of the movement albeit its official ideology was also shaped during this interaction. Political opportunity space affected the moderation of Islamism in Turkey, making it
different from cases such as Algeria and Egypt where the clash between Islamism and the secular state has been violent (Göle 2000:54). This remains the most difficult element involved in the process of ideological moderation of anti-systemic movements as the Turkish case also highlights that the engagement between state and Islamic movement has been far from being a straightforward model that can be directly applied to other country cases. In the process of interaction between the state and the movement, fluctuations of government policies from repression to opening was witnessed in Turkey as well as the emergence of different reactions within the Islamic political movement, ranging from those who radicalised their ideologies to reformists that aimed to remain within the boundaries of the democratic system. Thus, the outcome of the process of ideological transformation within the state and the Islamic movement also depends on power struggles within these blocs.

The most commonly referred unique element of Turkish modernisation vis-à-vis other developing predominantly Muslim societies has been that of its radical and determined secularisation process undertaken by the Kemalists, yet other societies such as Tunisia and Iran also experienced similar processes to a large extent. The key factor that truly differentiates Turkey from most predominantly Muslim countries is its democratisation experience (Mecham 2004:341). Despite its deficiencies that prevent the system from being classified as a liberal democracy, the relative inclusivity of the system compared to fully authoritarian regimes could be offered as the key factor that prevented the radicalisation of the Islamic movement and ensured its shift towards integration with the political system. In this context, it is important to note that the mainstream Islamic political movement in Turkey was not involved in political violence since the transition to multi-party politics in 1950, whereas Islamism prior to that period appeared to be revolutionary, inciting a series of rebellions against the Kemalist state in the 1920s and 1930s (Yıldız 2003:200).

With this chapter on social modernity, the study of the three major cases of the modernisation experience of Turkey is complete. The following Chapter 6 will present a discussion of the insights gathered from the economic, political and
social development processes of the country, each examined in a chapter. The thesis utilised the methodology of MMP to allocate one chapter to each of these processes in order to objectively analyse the connections in between without making *a priori* assumptions. This approach will be particularly helpful in the following chapter that will test the hypotheses of the theories of modernity – CMT, NMT and MMP – regarding the links between the three pillars of modernisation.
CHAPTER 6: RE-READING THE THEORIES IN LIGHT OF THE TURKISH MODERNITY

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this chapter is to comparatively scrutinise the hypotheses of theories of modernity in light of insights gathered from the empirical study of Turkey. Being a non-Western country case whose modernisation experience has been dramatically shaped by its interaction with Western modernity, and subverted from conforming to the Western model due to a path dependent and contingent historical trajectory, Turkey indeed sheds light on the explanatory power of theories. In this regard, this chapter will provide clear answers to two questions of utmost significance for our understanding of the subject matter; firstly, if modernisation does not transpire in similar ways across Turkey and Western societies, then how can we create an effective theoretical framework that helps us understand this phenomenon? Secondly, which specific factors have led to the divergence of Turkish model from Western modernity? This chapter will respectively focus on these questions in the following sections.

6.2 A NON-DETERMINISTIC FRAMEWORK

Chapter 2 had presented differing understandings within the existing literature: CMT and NMT adhere to the paradigm of ‘holy trinity’, both claiming that economic, political and social development processes are interrelated, therefore the interaction between them is characterised by the so-called ‘positive feedback loop’. Accordingly, progress achieved in one field of modernity would supposedly reflect on the others positively. A third way is presented by MMP – the hypothesis that was referred to as the ‘flexible trinity’ in Chapter 2. Akin to mainstream approaches, MMP also understands modernity as composed of three dimensions, yet their contents are perceived differently. Accordingly, economic, political and social modernisation phenomena do not necessarily produce a West-like modernity in non-Western country cases.
Modernity is not equated with the characteristics of contemporary Western world such as a representative liberal democratic political system, a free-market capitalist economy with a non-interventionist state and a secularised and/or largely irreligious society (Eisenstadt 2000; Wagner 2012). Moreover, this thesis refers to the ‘trinity’ framework of MMP as ‘flexible’ because the connections between the three components of modernity are not assumed to be equally applicable to all country cases across the world – unlike the positive feedback loop hypothesis. As such, transformation process in some non-Western societies may exhibit strong connections between two or all processes, whereas experiences of others may simply indicate total absence of links or even ‘negative correlation’ in which progress in one field may actually hamper the other (Wittrock 2002).

As shown in detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the Turkish model today is a hybrid modernity that emerged after a sui generis trajectory of transformation. Hence, its features and historical path stand to challenge many of the tenets of CMT and NMT: firstly, the idea of universal convergence towards Western modernity; and secondly, the ‘positive feedback loop’ between economic, social and political transformation processes (see Table 6.1.).

Both of these shortcomings of mainstream theories arise due to the inherent Eurocentrism and determinism of their conceptual frameworks. In other words, CMT and NMT cannot account for the contingent elements of Turkish case because they are fixated on expecting the historical Western experience to be replicated by the entire humanity. This understanding badly neglects the fact that the phenomenon of modernisation did not manifest in other societies as an ‘organic process’ – that is the product of their own domestic conditions (e.g social class struggles or new technological inventions) – as it did historically in Western societies such as Britain or France. Instead, modernisation was launched only after these societies encountered Western societies and attempted to ‘learn’ from their example by modelling themselves. From the 19th century onwards; the Ottoman Empire, Japan, China, Egypt, Iran and many others constituted primary examples of this mode of behaviour.
Table 6.1. A Report Card on Hypotheses of Modernity in Light of the Turkish Modernity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theories</th>
<th>Classical Modernisation</th>
<th>Neo-Modernisation</th>
<th>Multiple Modernities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is Turkey Fully Modern?</td>
<td>No. Turkey is an economically developed country that lacks a fully secularised society and a liberal democracy</td>
<td>No. Turkey is an economically and socially developed country that lacks liberal democracy</td>
<td>Yes. Democratisation and a complete secularisation is not a requisite for modernity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implications on:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>The Turkish case challenges the theory as religiosity did not wane despite the secularisation project of Kemalism</td>
<td>The Turkish case fully reflects the 'Islamic Calvinism thesis' as the Islamic political movement moderated</td>
<td>The Turkish case fully reflects the 'Multiple Islamisms thesis' as contemporary Islamic political movement portrays capitalism and modernity positively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idea of Progress</td>
<td>Turkey constitutes an alternative modernity model, challenging the 'convergence towards Western values' thesis</td>
<td>Turkey constitutes an alternative modernity model, challenging the 'convergence towards Western values' thesis</td>
<td>The Turkish case constitutes an alternative modernity model to the West, fully reflecting the view of multiple modernities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components of Modernity</td>
<td>The Turkish case challenges the 'positive feedback loop' between democratisation and economic development</td>
<td>The Turkish case challenges the 'positive feedback loop' between democratisation and economic development</td>
<td>The Turkish case supports the argument of multiple modernities in terms of negative feedback loop between economic development and democratisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author.*
During the phase of adopting the characteristics of the Western model (e.g. secularisation or democratisation); these societies introduced many ‘inorganic elements’, which were the products of a West-specific historical experience, to their own societies. The outcome of such a course in Turkey was that the domestic path dependent social, economic and political features reacted to the entry of these inorganic elements in a way that could not possibly be predicted by deterministic theories (Göle 2000:113). Today, the result of the mixing of domestic (Turkey-specific) and foreign (Western-specific) elements is a type of modernity that was not envisaged by CMT and NMT: firstly, a free-market capitalist society where the state is much more dominant than in the Western model via patronage politics which largely subjugates the middle and capitalist classes; secondly, a secular institutional framework with a largely conservative citizenry and an ideologically transformed Islamic political movement (i.e. a form of ‘Islamic modernity’); and thirdly, a majoritarian political system that holds regular free and fair elections while not possessing many other essential components of a liberal democratic regime (see Table 6.1).

So, if CMT and NMT cannot comprehend modernisation in Turkey; then, what is the more effective way? As I have consistently emphasised throughout this thesis, studies of modernisation and social change must be non-deterministic, acknowledging the unpredictability of outcomes that may manifest when country-specific (i.e. contingent) and path dependent characteristics interact with external influences (i.e. the social, political and economic products of other societies). Hence, a better understanding of the Turkish model can be obtained once the ways in which its origins were moulded by historical contingency, path dependency and international context are taken into account as seen in the conceptual framework of MMP.
6.3 SUBVERTING THE TURKISH TRAJECTORY

According to MMP, a number of reasons result in the emergence of unique non-Western modernities such as the Turkish case that do not adhere to the Western model (Eisenstadt 2003; Arnason 2002; Wagner 2012):

i) Firstly, the interaction between the Western modernity and non-Western societies disrupt the spontaneous transformation trajectory in these countries, elements of Western life influencing the mind-set of non-Western thinkers and decisions of policy-makers.

ii) Secondly, the political, economic and military hegemony of Western states force non-Western societies to initiate a premeditated process of modernisation fully designed and directed by a state that mobilises the resources of the society for the achievement of modernity. The rationale behind this accelerated process of transformation led by the state, rather than the social forces, is to save non-Western societies from dependence on Western states.

iii) Thirdly, the intensification of globalisation from the late 19th century onwards with increased levels of international trade and improvement of communications technology – which led to an unprecedentedly high level of interaction between various societies across the world – subjects the non-Western societies to external influences stemming not only from the Western world but also from other non-Western contexts.

iv) Fourthly, the legacy of the particular features of the historical economic, political and social life of non-Western countries continue to shape their subsequent trajectory of transformation in the aftermath of the initiation of modernisation programs.
These general outlines put forward by MMP can be effectively complemented with insights derived from Kamran Matin’s (2013) U&CD theory, which further specifies the influential impact of the ‘international context’ on the divergence of the modernisation trajectory of non-Western countries via the usage of three principles: the ‘whip of external necessity’, ‘substitution’ and ‘historical re-shuffling’. Once the experience of Turkey is interpreted through the lens of this framework, the factors that subverted the Turkish trajectory can be identified.

There is a repeating pattern in all three dimensions – economic, political and social – of the historical origins of Turkish model. The starting point of all was the ‘whip of external necessity’, namely the encounter between the Ottoman Empire and its more technologically advanced Western counterparts (see Table 6.2; Table 6.3; and Table 6.4). As demonstrated in numerous Ottoman military defeats throughout the 19th century, the balance of power was heavily tilted in favour of Western states. As a result, the interaction with the West triggered an increasingly desperate search for methods to reduce the wide gap in military and economic capabilities (Gencer 2000:159). For this purpose, the Ottoman policy-makers began to introduce elements of ‘modern life’ imported from the Western model such as more technological weaponry, secular education institutions, structural centralisation, constitution, parliament and industrial production facilities. After the transition from the Empire to the Republic, the process of change in economic, political and social life further intensified. The Kemalist elite largely consisted of military officers, bureaucrats and intellectuals that were traumatised by the decline and collapse of the Empire; and the salvation of the new Republic were sought in an even more extensive application of the Western model on Turkey, particularly in social life via state-imposed secularisation (Hanioğlu 2011).

The whip of external necessity sowed the seeds of Turkey's path dependent modernisation trajectory. The key to understanding subsequent events in

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44 U&CD framework and its combination with MMP was explained earlier in the fourth section of Chapter 2.
Turkey is to note that all the reforms that were implemented from above by the Ottoman and Kemalist elites were products of the organic trajectory of Western societies. Hence, the transformation processes did not originate in the domestic conditions of the country, instead showing the character of centrally directed programs containing elements ‘foreign’ to Turkey's own social, economic and political life. Over time, the reaction of the society to these external stimuli became the main driving engine of the divergence of the Turkish model, many elements of Western modernity ‘re-shaped’ and transformed in a different environment.

In the case of economic modernisation, Turkey attempted to conform to Western model through a state-led development process (see Table 6.2.). An influential indigenous capitalist class did not exist when the Republic was founded and the state created this class from the 1940s onwards – through privatisation of state-owned enterprises, provision of subsidies and state contracts and the protection of indigenous entrepreneurs via high tariffs on foreign companies. The artificial creation of a capitalist class in a society that did not organically possess it was a classical example of 'historical re-shuffling', namely the historical sequence of Western modernisation experience was entirely altered in Turkey. In contrast to the Turkish case, the capitalist class had emerged organically over time in Western societies such as Britain, France and the USA; becoming an independent political economic force that could check the executive powers of the state and gain a transformatory role in terms of political modernisation (see Moore 1966).

The leading role of the state in initiating economic modernisation in Turkey was a necessity born out of the weak material conditions of the late Ottoman and early Republican period. The private sector simply did not possess the capital required to invest in industrialisation, mechanisation and infrastructure development. However, the overwhelming power of the state over society in Turkish political economy transcended the limiting characteristics of subsequent periods as well, constituting a type of ‘self-reinforcing path dependency’ (see Table 6.2.). Despite the transition from statism and ISI to a
liberal economic policy and waves of privatisation in the post-1980 years, crony capitalism has endured in Turkey, as the power of the state over capitalists, middle class and the rest of the citizenry has been constantly re-produced via patronage politics.\footnote{For details of patronage politics in Turkey, see Asutay 2010; Öniş and Türem 2002; Grigoriadis and Kamaras 2008; Özel 2014; Laçiner 2014.}

**Table 6.2. The Divergence of the Economic Modernisation Trajectory**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th>The ‘whip of external necessity’ in the form of encounter with the West [international context]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conforming Method</td>
<td>The creation of a capitalist class by the state ['historical re-shuffling']</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Reinforcing Path Dependency</td>
<td>The initially over-whelming power of the state in political economy remained a continuous character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent Peculiarities</td>
<td>• Hybrid social security model&lt;br&gt;• State-dependent capitalists ['substitution']</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subverting Factor</td>
<td>A state-society relationship dominated by the former</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author.*

Historical re-shuffling and self-reinforcing path dependency in the Turkish economic modernisation trajectory led to the emergence of ‘substitution’, namely the attempts to conform to Western model produced contingent peculiarities that neither existed in the original model nor initially envisaged by the modernising policy-makers themselves. The hybrid social security model of Turkey has subjugated most of the citizenry to the will of the government and
political parties, whereas the state-dependency of capitalists has been ensured through patronage politics. The result of the trajectory is a type of economic modernity ‘forged’ and ‘re-made’ in a form compatible with the conditions and nature of the society in Turkey. The Turkish model does not conform to Western economic modernity and the primary subverting factor that caused this was a state-society relationship dominated by the former (see Table 6.2.). Surely, the subversion of Turkish economic modernisation experience has had dramatic consequences on political modernisation process as well.

Starting from the late Ottoman period; the bureaucracy, the pro-reform sultans and the mostly Western-educated intellectuals modelled the institutional and legal systems of the Empire based on Western modernity, an attitude inherited by the Kemalists that established a Republican regime from above (see Table 6.3.). The vastly de-centralised structure of the Empire was rapidly transformed into a centralised political machine and the Republic further intensified the centralisation process, the decision-making mechanisms gathered almost exclusively in the new capital Ankara. The familiarity of the Ottoman-early Republican elite with Western modernity occurred through their education in either Western countries or Western-style secular institutions of the Empire such as military academies and medical schools. The heavy influence of Western ideas on Turkey’s socio-political life caused a ‘historical re-shuffling’ as political modernisation (e.g. centralisation, constitutionalism, republic and the establishment of parliaments) actually preceded economic modernisation (see Table 6.3.). Conversely, during the historical experiences of Western societies, political modernisation in the form of shift towards democratisation manifested only after urban middle classes – the products of economic modernisation – launched social uprisings from below (see Moore 1966).

In the formative period of political modernisation, the Ottoman state collapsed a few years after World War I. The military and bureaucratic remnants of the Empire, the Kemalists, were able to mobilise the citizenry during the War of Turkish Independence and founded the Republic. Much like the role of the state in the economic realm, the initial leading role of the elites over political
modernisation can be seen as a historical necessity that was born out of the specific conditions of a period, namely the urgent need to save the country from invasion in the early 1920s. However, the 1920s was followed by the consolidation of an elite-led authoritarian state and even after transition to multi-party life occurred in 1950; the influence of the elite (i.e. the military) over political life did not diminish. In fact, military tutelage became a self-reinforcing path dependency after the 1960 coup, the officers almost regularly intervening in political decision-making. After every intervention, namely in 1960, 1971 and 1980, the military tutelage was further institutionalised and reproduced, gaining a *de jure* legitimacy via mechanisms such as the MGK. Military tutelage was finally limited in the 2000s, yet not because of social pressure but the essential role of an external factor in the form of the EU accession process.

Though Turkey consistently tried to conform to Western modernity via profound political changes imposed from above such as the transition to multi-party life in 1950, the state-led nature of political modernisation process produced its own contingent peculiarities (see Table 6.3). Because the regime changes (e.g. 1923, 1950) were implemented from above instead of by social forces, the prerequisites of liberal democracy such as a pro-active civil society could not mature and even when it did in periods such as the 1960s, 1970s, the military forces repressed them. Instead of social forces, the driving engine of political changes – witnessed in 1950 and in the early 2000s during the EU accession process – have been external factors as the desire to join NATO and the EU were influential in the implementation of democratic reforms. Yet, it was shown in Chapter 4 that external factors could not sustain a democratisation drive in the absence of strong domestic incentives, Turkey shifting towards a majoritarian political system from 2007 onwards. Hence, the Turkish model does not conform to Western political modernity and the primary subverting factor that caused this was a state-society relationship dominated by the former which is unfavourable for a liberal democracy to emerge and be consolidated (see Table 6.3).
Table 6.3. The Divergence of the Political Modernisation Trajectory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th>The ‘whip of external necessity’ in the form of encounter with the West [international context]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conforming Method</td>
<td>An <em>elite-led</em> political modernisation process (e.g. constitution, parliamentary life, republic, democratisation) ['historical re-shuffling’]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Reinforcing Path Dependency</td>
<td>The leading role of state forces such as the military elite remained a continuous character</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Contingent Peculiarities        | - Military tutelage  
- Weak or repressed civil society  
- Democratisation driven by external forces instead of social forces ['substitution’] |
| Subverting Factor               | A state-society relationship dominated by the former |

*Source: Author.*

In the case of social modernisation, attempts to conform to Western modernity began in the 19th century with the foundation of secular education institutions and the gradual elimination of the socio-political influence of the clergy by the secular bureaucracy and military. In the European experience of Protestant Reformation and subsequent waves of secularisation triggered by the Enlightenment ideals, social change came organically within the society. However, the Turkish case of social change was characterised by ‘historical re-shuffling’ (see Table 6.4.). As such, societal transformation did not arise from domestic social forces but from a state-imposed social engineering program, particularly after the Kemalists implemented an extensive secularisation campaign by force from the 1920s onwards (Gencer 2000:167).
Table 6.4. The Divergence of the Social Modernisation Trajectory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th>The ‘whip of external necessity’ in the form of encounter with the West [international context]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conforming Method</td>
<td>State-imposed secularisation program and the elimination of the influence of clergy on socio-political life ['historical re-shuffling’]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive Sequence Path Dependency</td>
<td>The state could not sustain its initial social transformation program, engaging instead into a negotiation process with Islamic actors who have also changed their discourse and methods [political and economic opportunity spaces]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Contingent Peculiarities | - The Diyanet
  - Lingering religiosity of society
  - Survival of banned Islamic groups in the periphery (e.g. Naqshbandis, Nurcus)
  - Rise of National Outlook, later the AKP
  - ‘Islamic Modernity’ ['substitution’] |
| Subverting Factor | A ‘weak state’: the state-society relationship dominated by the latter |

Source: Author.

Faced with repression by the Kemalist state, Islamic groups shifted their activities towards the private sphere and the periphery of the society. Yet, Islamic values were strongly established as organic features of social life in Turkey and Islamic groups such as religious fraternities successfully sustained their claim to represent indigenous characteristics of the society. The lingering influence of religiosity within the society necessitated a paradoxical move by the Kemalist regime; attempting to repress public manifestations of Islam on one hand while building the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) to keep Islamic interpretation under its monopoly on the other hand. During the process
of social change, other contingent peculiarities emerged – such as the rise of the popularity of Islamic political parties affiliated with the National Outlook (see Table 6.4).

From the beginning, the Turkish model has been subverted from the Western model of secularisation by an elite that attempted to design a fully secularised society by fiat, yet lacked the social power required to accomplish this. The Kemalist state is often described as a ‘strong state’, yet it was clearly not in full control of the socio-political life of Turkey, resorting to repressive measures to prevent ‘undesirable’ social agents from threatening the regime. In fact, the subsequent fate of the state-imposed secularisation program offers clues regarding the nature of the Turkish state. Behind a façade of strength existed a ‘weak state’ that was largely unable to control the social periphery and spread its ideological influence for legitimising the regime in the eyes of the citizenry (Hann 1995:135).

The weakness of the Kemalist state caused its radical secularisation program to be not sustainable and ‘a reactive sequence form of path dependency’ manifested, namely the state had to change its initial stance towards Islamism over the years and eventually negotiate with Islamic groups such as the National Outlook (see Table 6.4.). Both the state and the Islamic groups changed their ideologies and methods of struggle at every step, state-religion relations having been transformed via a process of reciprocal compromises. The reactive sequence path dependency seen in the context of social modernisation stands in contrast to the self-reinforcing path dependency discussed in the economic and political modernisation trajectories.

The key junctures of the reactive sequence path dependency was the provision of political opportunity space after the transition to multi-party system in 1950 and the manifestation of economic opportunity space after the rise of conservative SMEs and middle class in the post-1980 period. A discursive change initiated by Islamic intellectuals such as Ali Bulaç accompanied the

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46 See, for instance, Heper 1997.
opportunity spaces, Islamic groups being increasingly integrated into the political and economic system of Turkey as seen in the experience of the AKP and its supporters since 2002. The outcome of social change in Turkey has been an entirely *sui generis* 'Islamic modernity' that originated from a delicate and highly fluid reactive sequence path dependency.

To sum up, the contemporary features and origins of the Turkish model defies the deterministic expectations of mainstream theories of modernity because of the subversion of Turkey's modernisation trajectory by path dependent elements of its own historical economic, political and social characteristics. As shown in the analysis presented above, a combined framework of non-deterministic approaches, MMP and U&CD, could account for Turkey's divergence, clearly highlighting the sequence of events and factors that caused it.

### 6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has once again underlined the deficits of the portrayal of the Turkish experience by the structural and societal models. The defining impact of path dependency on the subversion of Turkish case from the Western modernity proved that the pre-1980/post-1980 periodisation method used by the two predominant approaches could only reflect a very limited portion of the reality.

This chapter has also aimed to test the hypotheses within modernisation studies. A key insight that can be drawn from the Turkish modernisation experience is that a capitalist class that emerge as a result of rapid economic development cannot always contain the excessive prerogatives possessed by forces of the state – the governments and the bureaucrats. This challenges the idea of a positive feedback loop between economic development and democratisation found in the works of classical and neo-modernisation scholars (see Table 6.1.). Compared to its economic development level, Turkey displays a very low quality of democracy as economically less-developed countries such
as Niger have similar democratic standards with Turkey (Goldsmith 2007:90-91; Park 1976; Freedom House 2014b; Azavedo and Atamanov 2014; World Bank 2000).

Despite the absence of a positive correlation between economic development and democratisation, however, the ideological transformation of the Islamic political movement in Turkey occurred due to the contributing impact of political development and economic development on social development. Therefore, The Turkish case stands as an example of a positive feedback loop between ideological moderation and economic development as well as between ideological moderation and democratisation. The outcome of the Turkish modernisation process, so far, appears to be a truly unique modernity. As such, it stands to challenge the mainstream theories on a number of issues (See Table 6.1).

In terms of the role of Islam within modernity, the Turkish case shows that religiosity did not disappear in spite of a radical social engineering project aimed to completely secularise the society. Instead, an influential Islamic political movement emerged over time. Moreover, the appeal of Islamism did not wane in parallel with the rise of an urban middle class and a capitalist class. Modernisation process often triggers discrepancies and uneven development in non-Western societies (Kaya 2004; Eisenstadt 2000; Matin 2013). The unique trajectory of Turkish modernisation resulted in a peculiar relationship between the three processes – economic, social and political development – that was envisaged neither by CMT nor by NMT. As contemporary Turkey does not fit in the prescribed model of modernisation described within the mainstream literature, it can be better understood through the lens of MMP – complemented with insights put forward by U&CD.

In conclusion, the theoretical implications of the study of modernisation in Turkey challenged various arguments offered by both mainstream schools of thought in the literature, while the conceptual framework of MMP appears to have been validated. The following last chapter of the thesis contains the
summary and concluding remarks, discussing the contributions of this study on bodies of scholarly literature, the potential objections that may be raised and the potential avenues for future research.
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The objective of this final chapter is to reflect on the trail of thought followed throughout the thesis. The chapter will explain the origins of the research project, summarise its findings and state its contributions to scholarly literature. In addition, a number of potential objections that may be raised in response to its arguments, theoretical framework and research methods will also be discussed, along with future avenues for research that could possibly further or complement the goals of this project.

The chapter consists of four sections. Part two reiterates the origins of the research project that was mentioned in Chapter 1, which will serve as a linkage between the initial objectives of the thesis and its findings. Part three discusses a number of objections, clarifying the rationale behind the hypotheses and methods adopted in the work in detail. Part four briefly suggests some potential avenues for future research and concludes the thesis.

7.2 ORIGINS OF THE THESIS, ITS MAIN OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS

As stated in Chapter 1, the main inspiration for the pursuit of this research project was the scholarly debates that were sparked by the Arab uprisings of 2011, which dramatically impacted on politics, economy and social life of various MENA countries since then. A crucial – albeit contentious – subject that emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings was regarding the Turkish modernisation experience, which was presented by a large body of literature as a model that supposedly offered insights that could be applicable for the developing and predominantly Muslim societies of the MENA region (See, for instance, Dede 2011; Atasoy 2011; Çavdar 2006; Kirişçi 2011). The notion of a Turkish model rapidly became a widely studied subject in the literature of modernisation and other disciplines closely connected to it such as democratisation, economic development and social change. However, as showed from Chapter 1 onwards, the concept itself was not entirely new, being highly connected to an already established discourse within modernisation
studies. After 2011, two main understandings of the Turkish model emerged and both of them – the structural model and the societal model – actually utilised conceptual frameworks developed earlier by classical modernisation theorists in the 1950s and 1960s and neo-modernisation theorists from the 1980s onwards. Therefore, the starting point of this thesis was to trace the evolution of these mainstream theories within modernisation studies and analyse their hypotheses in comparison with a relatively recent approach – multiple modernities paradigm.

The main premise that shaped this thesis is that the adoption of a conceptual framework based on MMP can comprehend the nature and historical origins of the contemporary Turkish model more effectively than the approaches offered by the structural and societal models, which were influenced by CMT and NMT. What were the shortcomings of existing approaches to the modernisation of Turkey and in what way this thesis sought to remedy them? As Chapter 1 covered extensively, a considerable portion of the scholarly literature developed on the Turkish modernity is characterised by two main shortcomings:

i) The periodization method used by the structural and societal models to study the Turkish case is problematic as they focused solely – and respectively – on the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods of the modernisation trajectory of Turkey to substantiate their claims.

ii) Secondly, the conceptual frameworks of CMT and NMT themselves are fraught with problems as both are Eurocentric theories that fully base their understandings on the expectation that there is only one modernity, the concept defined in an exclusionary manner as synonymous with Westernisation. For CMT, modernity is a secularised, liberal democratic and a capitalist free-market society. NMT only removes the element of secularisation from this conceptualisation and adds ideological transformation of religious discourse instead.
The examination of the divergent path of the Turkish case through the lens of MMP and insights from U&CD in Chapter 6 showed that focusing on a particular era within the modernisation trajectory of Turkey cannot explain the state of Turkish model today, because this method cannot trace the path dependency, contingent factors and international context that moulded the nature of economic, political and social life in the country. Moreover, as the structural model and the societal model base their frameworks on the positive feedback loop of CMT and NMT, they cannot possibly explain why the Turkish model has been subverted from the Western model it attempted to conform and why an economically modern country such as Turkey does not possess a consolidated liberal democratic regime.

The foremost aim of this research project was to remedy these shortcomings of the existing literature on the Turkish model with a new conceptualisation of the modernisation trajectory of Turkey. In this context, MMP was utilised as it avoids the two problems that were explained above. Scholars of MMP, such as Peter Wagner (2012), offer a conceptual framework that does not envisage non-Western societies to replicate the historical path of Western modernisation and its outcome in the form of values that characterise contemporary Western societies such as capitalism and liberal democracy. Accordingly, the trajectories of non-Western societies are shaped by contingencies that CMT and NMT cannot predict. These contingencies in the form of economic, political and social conditions that diverge from the Western experience produce unexpected and potentially unique results in non-Western societies, which experience transformation.

As discussed throughout Chapter 1 and 2 in detail, the non-Eurocentric and non-determinist nature of the methodology of MMP meant that this theorem could potentially comprehend the Turkish case more successfully than the earlier approaches that relied on CMT and NMT. This formed the rationale behind the study of the modernisation trajectory of Turkey through the perspective of MMP in this thesis.
To sum-up, this thesis mainly contributed to the literature on Turkish model. It re-conceptualised the trajectory of the Turkish modernity through MMP, emphasising the significance of path dependency to present a more comprehensive understanding of the political, social and economic forces that shaped contemporary Turkey than the earlier approaches developed by the structural and societal models. The thesis also drew noteworthy insights for the theories of modernity by highlighting the limits of the explanatory power of CMT and NMT on Turkey.

The thesis can now suggest a potential answer to a research question that led to contentious debates within the literature of Turkish model and inspired the pursuit of this thesis: can the modernisation experience of a society be applicable to another county that wish to achieve similar outcomes in terms of modernity? One of the key findings of this thesis is that non-Western country cases such as Turkey cannot be possibly expected to replicate the Western model as these countries have unique conditions and a historical trajectory that would produce unpredictable modernities.

In this context, it should be noted that the adoption of the modernity model of a non-Western country such as Turkey by other non-Western societies – for instance those located in the MENA region such as Egypt and Tunisia – would result in further divergences of these countries from the Western path of development. This was actually seen in the case of the study of Turkey in this thesis as Turkish policy-makers were inspired by various models of Western and non-Western countries such as France, the Soviet Union, Japan and South Korea over the course of Turkey’s modernisation history. The applications of the experiences of these countries on the Turkish setting contributed to the hybridity of the Turkish modernity as foreign models gained unique characteristics through practice in a different setting. For instance, the French secularism inspired the secularisation program of the Kemalist Republic, yet it produced its own characteristics that diverged from the French model such as the formation of the state-controlled Diyanet institution to manage the Sunni clergy. Therefore, if post-2011 MENA societies were to adopt some elements
from the Turkish modernity model, it should be expected that the results could be quite dissimilar to the Turkish case as gradually; these societies would produce their own modernity models with different characteristics – e.g. the Tunisian model, the Egyptian model or the Libyan model.

A second key finding of the research conducted in this thesis that there cannot be a singular universal modernity to which all societies across the world would eventually conform. As showed in Chapter 6, three conditions (i.e. ‘whip of external necessity’, ‘historical re-shuffling’ and ‘substitution’) that emerge out of the encounter between Western modernity and a non-Western country case such as Turkey gradually produce a path dependent trajectory filled with contingent elements. Over time, the trajectory results in types of modernities that are strongly distinct from the characteristics of contemporary Western societies as well as their historical origins.

The subversion of the Turkish case from the CMT/NMT type of modernity does not mean that Turkey is not ‘modernising’ anymore, modernisation as an idea has ‘collapsed’ and that a new ‘dark age’ has begun (Kasaba 1997:32-33). Simply, the reality of the Turkish model highlights a conceptual lacuna in the literature on modernity that which MMP can successfully fill. Çağlar Keyder (1997:37-88) highlights this gap that first became apparent in the 1990s with the rise of political Islam, also pointing to the possible direction the theories of modernity can take:

In a context where modernity was a conscious imposition by modernizers whose arsenal was the exercise of state power, the crisis of the state seemed to forebode the bankruptcy of the entire project… Turkish modernizers had readily identified modernization with Westernization— with taking a place in the civilization of Europe… It was this concept of modernity, with its strict identification of modernization with Westernization, that led to the pessimism I mentioned. There is, however, another conception in which modernization is taken to mean the process of actual transformations towards organizational efficiency and rationality, which implies no normative commitment to the Enlightenment project. This perspective of non-Western modernization has gained in popularity in the Turkish context. Its proponents, taking a stance similar to the postmodernist celebration of the hybrid, see in the
apparent crumbling of social cohesion and the rise of credos actively
calling the aspirations of modernity a welcome sign that some
negotiation might occur between the Westernizers and their erstwhile
objects.

As such, breaks from the Eurocentric convergence thesis should be perceived as
cases of non-Western societies ‘localising’ modernity. Today, all societies are
affected by the same global patterns and we are all part of an inter-dependent
international system (Esenbel 2000:19; Göle 2000:174). However, we are not all
living the same modernity type described by mainstream theories. Non-Western
modernities are different from the envisaged Western modernity in many ways
and they are also distinct from each other, being the products of path dependent
trajectories. However, what makes non-Western country cases similar to each
other as cases ‘multiple modernities’ is the eclecticism of their experiences since
they all diverge from Western modernity in varying levels.

In this context, the application of the conceptual framework of MMP on studies
of various non-Western countries in the future may help us to better
comprehend the underlying factors that lead to divergences from the Western
model. Before proceeding to discuss potential avenues for future research in
more detail, however, the following part of the chapter will examine some
potential objections that may be raised in response to this thesis.

7.3 QUALIFICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

As with every research project, it is possible for this thesis to receive objections.
They are categorised under five headings in this part of the chapter. This section
will clarify the rationale behind the selection of the research hypotheses and
methodology of the project.

7.3.1 The Theoretical Framework of MMP

Possibly, one of the main objections to this thesis would be concentrated on the
theoretical framework it derived from MMP. Though even its critics
acknowledge the superiority of its hypotheses vis-à-vis CMT and NMT in terms
of studying modernisation in the non-Western world, some scholars argue that MMP also has shortcomings (See, for instance, Matin 2013; Chakrabarty 2011; Schmidt 2006; Fourie 2012). Paradoxically, MMP is accused of building a new Eurocentric theorem while trying to deconstruct the Eurocentrism of CMT and NMT (Matin 2013; Chakrabarty 2011; Schmidt 2006). In addition, Elsje Fourie (2012:62) argues that the definitions of the components of modernity by MMP have been ‘vague’, its framework allegedly unable to distinguish modern from pre-modern societies. The second critique was already evaluated in Chapter 1 and it was argued that this approach misrepresents MMP as it neglects the fact that the theory actually offers a clearly defined conceptualisation to define what modernity is. It was referred to as the ‘flexible trinity’ throughout this thesis.

By contrast, the first critique highlights a particularly problematic issue within the conceptualisation of MMP offered by one of its main scholars, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt in his *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities* (2003). In this work, Eisenstadt utilises a concept he refers to as ‘axial civilisations’ to explain the divergence of non-Western societies from the Western modernity model. Axial civilisations puts forward the hypothesis that cultural differences between Western and non-Western civilisations constitute a key reason behind the manifestation ‘different modernities’ across the world. Not unlike the frameworks of CMT scholars such as Daniel Lerner (1958) and NMT scholars such as Francis Fukuyama (1992), this emphasis on ‘culture’ as a static factor can be evaluated as Eurocentric. Instead, culture should be evaluated as a dynamic factor that evolves over time as a result of its interaction with changes in the political and economic context of a society.

In this regard, it should be noted that this thesis did not refer to the hypothesis of axial civilisations at all in its analysis of the modernisation trajectory of Turkey. This was deliberate as I derived my framework to analyse the origins of Turkey’s divergence from other works of MMP scholars, in which the roots of different modernities are attributed to the interaction between Western ideas and non-Western societies in addition to the hegemony of state over society in non-Western modernisation programs and the global political economic
hegemony of the West (see Wagner 2012; Eisenstadt 2000, 2002, Arnason 2002). Therefore, this thesis avoided the Eurocentric bias of a particular variant of MMP through focusing on the political and economic context behind social change and studying the Turkish case via such as an understanding.

7.3.2 The Method of Analysing Modernity through ‘Three Pillars’

Even though the thesis studied the three components of modernisation separately in different chapters on economic development, political development and social development, several positive and negative linkages between the processes were found on the Turkish experience of modernisation. This should not be seen as a contradiction as the division of modernisation into three relatively narrow fields of change was used purely as an analytical tool to ensure in-depth analysis of each element and it help the thesis avoid the presupposition of linkages bias inherent in works of CMT and NMT.

7.3.3 The Concept of the Turkish Model as a ‘Social Construct’

It has been argued that the Turkish model is a ‘socially constructed’ notion that supposedly serves the interests of Turkey in the MENA as the Turkish policy-makers appeared increasingly willing to influence the politics of various countries in the region in recent years in order to carve a Turkish ‘sphere of influence’ (Andrikopoulos 2012). The Turkish policy-makers may in fact have foreign policy designs of their own in terms of utilising this concept, but the thesis showed that the Turkish model is actually an old and recurring discourse within modernisation studies since the 1950s. Therefore, it should be noted that rather than discussing the notion in conjunction with Turkish foreign policy, this thesis focused on its conceptualisations within the literature of modernisation.

7.3.4 The Discourse of the AKP and the ‘Genuineness Debate’

As Chapter 5 focused on the ideological transformation of Islamic groups in Turkey and portrayed the AKP as a turning point in the political discourse of
Islamism in Turkey, a potential criticism could focus on the genuineness of the claims for ideological change by the AKP leadership. It should be noted that this has been a contentious issue within Turkish politics since the party was founded in 2001 as many opponents of the AKP refuse the claim that the party represents a different type of political movement than its predecessors within the Islamic National View such as the RP and the FP (Dağı 2008). In this regard, it should be noted that ideological transformation in this thesis was used to refer to the integration of the mainstream Islamic movement of Turkey into the political and economic system of the country. Whether the party is truly social conservative or Islamic are ideologically-charged subjects that are very hard to study objectively. As such, the thesis did not focus on this debate, only noting that the AKP represents a different political paradigm from another successor of the National View, the overtly Islamic SP. The ideological transformation of the AKP does not necessarily mean by itself that the party is fully democratic or that it constitutes a Muslim equivalent of Christian Democratic political parties of Europe.

7.3.5 The Overlooked Elements of Democratisation

Another potential objection to the thesis could be that Chapter 4 does not mention or emphasise enough a variety of issues that constitute crucial elements of liberal democratic life in the Western model – e.g. women’s rights and the rights of disadvantaged minority groups that were not mentioned in the chapter such as non-Muslims, non-religious citizens and ethnic groups such as the Romani people and Circassians. The work could not mention a considerable portion of these issues related to democratisation, yet it should be noted that the macro scale and the world limit of the research project necessitated a selective analysis. In addition, the thesis was not on democratisation and it was analysed as part of a broader phenomenon – modernisation. In research projects of this nature, there are limitations such as the neglect of many microelements of democratisation. Nevertheless, the main finding of the chapter was that Turkey does not constitute a liberal democracy in the sense that this regime type is practiced in the Western model. Therefore, even if these other
elements of democratisation were included in the analysis, the conclusion would not change because contemporary Turkey cannot fulfil many other criteria of liberal democracy.

7.4 POTENTIAL AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The study of the modernisation trajectory of Turkey through MMP in this work supplied this rising social theory of modernity with a holistic analysis of a non-Western country case. The main research objective was to show that MMP is a more appropriate approach than CMT and NMT to explain the phenomenon of modernisation. There are several avenues for future research that may further the research goals of this thesis. One option is to multiply the case studies to comparatively assess the hypotheses of MMP on trajectories of different countries.

As the divergence of non-Western societies such as Turkey from the Western modernity model has been established in this work, an original approach would be to select non-Western country cases that seemingly fit the prescribed conceptualisations of CMT and NMT – e.g. contemporary Japan or South Korea that possess liberal democratic regimes, free-market capitalist economies and religious discourses that supposedly comply with modernity (See Gbosoe 2006). A comparison between non-Western countries that converged towards the Western modernity and their counterparts that diverged from it such as Turkey may help us understand the underlying factors in their respective historical trajectories that led to dissimilar outcomes. A research of this nature would indeed be a valuable contribution to the scholarly literature of modernity. Due to the large amount of variables studied in this research project and its word limit, an in-depth comparison between distinct non-Western country cases could not be included.

Another potentially rewarding option for future research would be to compare and/or combine the strength of the conceptual framework of MMP with other rising social theories of recent years such as post-colonialism, Neo-Gramscian
social theory and the U&CD\textsuperscript{47}. An example of how MMP and U&CD can be effectively combined has already been provided in this thesis as seen in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6.

In the future, a comparative study of MMP with these approaches can be conducted on several non-Western country cases. Such a comprehensive study or series of studies could conclusively determine the future of modernisation studies of the non-Western world in the forthcoming period. Debates between scholars of CMT, NMT, the dependency theory and the world-systems theory shaped the discourses of the 20th century and the early 21st century. The fate of modernisation studies from the early 21st century onwards will probably be settled by a new group of theories – each supposedly superior to earlier theories and each claiming to explain the phenomenon of modernity in non-Western cases better than its counterparts.

\textsuperscript{47} For instance, a brief analysis of these approaches can be found in Kamran Matin (2013) who applies the framework of uneven and combined development to the case of Iranian modernity.
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